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Phase II: Campaign Practices 


Book 10 

Printed for the use of the 
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 


Concord, New Hampshire 033 f; 

^ -'"^'T JVi ;-:4 1974 










Phase II: Campaign Practices 


Book 10 

Printed for the use of the 
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 

21-296 WASHINGTON : 1973 

For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office 
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $3.00 


(Established by S. Res. 60, 93d Congress, 1st Session) 

SAM J. BRVIN, Je., North Carolina, Cha:; ,nan 
HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee, Vice Chairman 




Samuel Dash, Chie] Counsel and Staff Director 

Fred D. Thompson, Minority Counsel 

RUFDS L. Edmistex, Deputy Chief Counsel 

Arthur. S. Miller, Chief Consultant 
David M. Dorsen, Assistant Chief Counsel 
Terry F. Lenzner, Assistant Chief Counsel 
James Hamilton, Assistant Chief Counsel 

Carmine S. Bellino, Chief Investigator 

Wayne H. Bishop, Chief Field Investigator 

Eugene Boyce, Hearings Record Counsel 

Marc Lackritz, Assistant Counsel 
William T. Matton, Assistant Counsel 
Ronald D. Rotunda, Assistant Counsel 

Barry Schochet, Assistant Counsel 

W. Dennis Sum.mers, Assistant Counsel 

James C. Moore, Assistant Counsel 

Donald G. Sanders, Deputy Minority Counsel 

Howard S. Liebengood, Assistant Minority Counsel 

H. William Shure, Assistant Minority Counsel 

Robert Stlverstein, Assistant Minority Counsel 

Carolyn M. Andrade, Administrative Assistant 

Carolyn E. Cohen, Office Manager 

Joan C. Cole, Secretary to the Minority 





Wednesday, September 26, 1973 3899 

Wednesday, October 3, 1973 3979 


Wednesday, September 26, 1973 

Buchanan, Patrick J., special consultant to the President 3899 

Wednesday, October 3, 1973 

Segretti, Donald H., former employee of the Committee To Re-Elect the 
President; engaged in "political tricks" ; accompanied by Victor Sherman, 
counsel 3980 


Ervin, Hon. Sam J., Jr Buchanan: 393^-3942. 

Segretti: 4010, 4023, 4025, 4026, 4029-4034, 4037-4042, 4045, 

4046, 4052. 
Baker, Hon. Howard H., Jr Buchanan: 3942-3947. 

Segretti : 4023, 4027-4029, 4038, 4039. 
Talmadge, Hon. Herman E Buchanan: 3947-3951. 

Segretti: 4022-4027. 
Inouve, Hon. Daniel K Buchanan: 3957-3960. 

Segretti: 4017-4019, 4044, 4045. 
Montoya, Hon. Joseph M Buchanan: 3965-3971. 

Segretti: 4012-4015. 
Gumey, Hon. Edward J Buchanan: 3951-3957. 

Segretti: 4019-4021. 
Weicker, Hon. Lowell P., Jr Buchanan: 3960-3965, 

3971-3975. Segretti: 4015-4017, 4034-4037, 4041-4044, 4051. 
Dash, Samuel, Chief Counsel and Staff Director Buchanan: 3899-3934, 

3976, 3977. Segretti: 3979, 3985-4005, 4046-4049, 4052. 
Thompson, Fred D., Minority Counsel _ Buchanan: 3907, 3908, 

3934-3938. Segretti 4005-4012, 4041, 4049-4051. 




No. 158— (3934) Pamphlet about Muskie entitled "Wake Up Liberals" Page 
published by "Citizens for a Liberal Alternative" 4055 

No. 159 — (3934) Various news articles, advertisements, and letters; docu- 
ment entitled "The McGovern Record — A Critical Appraisal"- 4059 

No. 160 — (3956) Quicksilver Times article entitled "The People Are Com- 
ing to San Diego" re: Plans for demonstrations at Republican 
Convention, etc 4107 

No. 161 — (3975) Handwritten notes entitled: "Status Report on P's 

Requests" 41 09 

No. 162 — (3975) Memorandum to Bob Haldeman from the President, 
dated October 28, 1969, re: PR aspects of John Lindsay's 
victory in New York 4111 

No. 163 — (3975) Memorandum to Jeb Magruder from H. R. Haldeman, 
dated February 4, 1970, in regard to getting good PR in the 
press for the administration 4112 

No. 164 — (3975) Memorandum to the President from Patrick J. Buchanan, 
dated March 3, 1970, re: Suggestions on how to combat the 
institutionalized power of the left concentrated in the founda- 
tions that succor the Democratic Party 4114 

No. 165 — (3975) Confidential memorandum from H. R. Haldeman to 
Colson/Buchanan/Cole/Magruder dated March 12, 1970, re: 
Generating support for the administration's position on 
Vietnam; with attachments 4120 

No. 166 — (3975) Memorandum to Mr. Magruder from L. Higby, dated 
July 16, 1970, re: Possible discrediting of Chet Huntley of 
NBC 4127 

No. 167 — (3975) H. R. Haldeman memorandum for Mr. Magruder, dated 
September 11, 1970, re: Advertisement suggestions hitting 
radical liberal theme, with focus on Cambodia 4128 

No. 168 — (3975) Memorandum from H. R. Haldeman to Buchanan/ 
Keogh/Klein/Nofziger, re: Using Victor Lasky instead of de- 
veloping an in-house columnist, as a basis for general mailings. 4129 

No. 169 — (3975) Memorandum for Mr. Haldeman from Jeb Magruder, 
dated December 11, 1970, re: PubHc relations after President 
Nixon's press conference; with attachments 4130 

No. 170 — (3975) Memorandum for the President from Patrick J. Buchanan, 

dated March 24, 1971, subject: "The Muskie Watch" 4146 

No. 171 — (3975) Buchanan memorandum for the President dated April 19, 

1971, subject: "The Resurrection of Hubert Humphrey" 4154 

No. 172 — (3975) Memorandum for Jeb Magruder from Gordon Strachan, 
dated May 4, 1971, re: Possible establishment of "Humphrey 
Watch" and "Kennedy Watch"; with attachment 4164 

No. 173^ — (3975) Memorandum for "the President from Patrick J. Buchanan, 

dated June 9, 1971, subject: EMK— Political Memorandum.- 4167 

No. 174 — (3975) Confidential memorandum from Pat Buchanan for De- 
Bolt/ Finch/ Harlow/ Moore/ Nofziger/ Price/ Timmons/ Walker, 
dated June 22, 1971, re: Suggested topics for discussion at 
meeting 4173 

No. 175 — (3975) Memorandum for the Attorney General from Jeb Ma- 
gruder, dated July 2, 1971. Subject: "Democratic and Re- 
publican Contenders"; with attachment 4174 

No. 176— (3975) Memorandum dated July 28, 1971, for the Attorney Gen- 
eral from Jeb Magruder. Subject: Tracking Presidential Con- 
tenders; with attachment 4185 

No. 177 — (3975) Buchanan memorandum to Jeb Magruder, dated Au- 
gust 7, 1971, concerning Horida primary; with attachments.. 4192 

No. 178— (3975) Memorandum for the Attorney General from Jeb Ma- 
gruder, dated August 13, 1971, re: Democratic '72 Sponsors 
Club 4196 

No. 179— (3975) White House memorandum of October 5, 1971, to the 
Attorney General and H. R. Haldeman, re: Exploitation of 
"fissures" within the Democratic Party; with attachment 4197 

No. 180 — (3975) Buchanan memorandum to the Attorney General and 
H. R. Haldeman, dated February 4, 1972, re: New York 
Times article about Jackson's strategists seeking earlier Ten- 
nessee primary; with attachments 4205 

Note.— Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the record. 













No. 181 — (3975) Memorandum for John Mitchell from PJB/Khachigian, 

dated March 14, 1972, entitled: "Attack Organization and Page 
Strategy" 4209 

No. 182 — (3975) Magruder memorandum for John Mitchell, dated April 12, 
1972, concerning plans for activities at the Democratic Na- 
tional Convention; with attachment 4221 

No. 183 — (3975) Memorandum for John Mitchell from Jeb Magruder, 
dated April 14, 1972, re: Attached memorandum concerning 

contender tracking and strategy 4225 

3975) Buchanan memorandum for John Mitchell/H. R. Halde- 

man, dated April 27, 1972, re: Strategy on McGovern 4235 

3975) Memorandum for H. R Haldeman and John Mitchell 
from Patrick J. Buchanan, dated June 2, 1972, re: Basic attack 

strategy 4236 

3975) Memorandum dated Junr- 6, 1972, to John Mitchell from 

Patrick J. Buchanan, re: McGovern strategy' 4237 

3975) Assault strategy by Buchanan and Khachigian, dated 

June 8, 1972, on how to undermine McGovern election bid.. 4240 
3975) Memorandum for John Dean from Chuck Colson, dated 

June 16, 1972, re: Checks on key McGovern staffers 4247 

3975) Buchanan memorandum to John Mitchell and II. R. 
Haldeman, dated June 25, 1972, re: Manner of McGovern 
response 4248 

No. 190 — (3975) July 14, 1972, memorandum to Clark MacGregor and 
H. R. Haldeman from Pat Buchanan discussing "points of 
weakness" in McGovern campaign 4250 

No. 191 — (3975) White House memorandum to H. R. Haldeman from 

Pat Buchanan, re: "McGovern Assault Book." 4252 

No. 192 — (3975) Memorandum from Pat Buchanan to Clark MacGregor, 
H. R. Haldeman, and Charles Colson, ro: Political suggestions 
of attacks on Mc Govern 4254 

No. 193— (3975) Memorandum dated September 11, 1072, for Betty Nolan 
from Pat Buchanan suggesting distributi )n and signature of 
"Letter to the Editor"; with attachments^ 4256 

No. 194 — (3975) Buchanan memorandum to Haldeman/Ehrlichman/ 
Colson, dated September 13, 1972, re: Strategy in last 7 weeks 
of campaign 4259 

No. 195 — (3975) Reproduction of "Canuck letter" to Manchester Union 
Leader, dated February 28. 1972, signed bv Harold W. 
Eldredge i _' 4264 

No. 196— (3975) February 17, 1972, letter from Paul Morrison to Mr. Loeb, 
Manchester Guardian (Union Leader) alleging Senator 
Muskie's "Canucks" remark 4265 

No. 197 — (397.5) Letter from Robin Ficker, chairman, United Democrats 

for Kennedy, to "New Hampshire Voter." 4266 

No. 198 — (3996) Poster: "Help Muskie Support Bussing More Children 

Now." 4267 

No. 199— (4026) Letter to Donald Segretti from Herbert Kalmbach 

concerning payment for services; dated Septemljer 27, 1971 __ 4268 

No. 200— (4026) Memorandum dated September 28, 1971, re: Muskie 

signs at demonstrations and rallies. . 4269 

No. 201 — (4026) "Can you answer . . ." questions for Senator Muskie 4270 

No. 202— (4026) Note addressed to Don Segretti entitled "PoHtics" 4271 

No. 203 — (4026) Post Office box application form for James R. Norton, 

Citizens Committee for Representative Government 4273 

No. 204 — (4026) Anti-Muskie-Mc Govern newspaper advertisements 4275 

No. 205 — (4026) Letter to Jackson campaign manager from "A Former 

Muskie Staff Worker," dated February 25, 1972 4279 

No. 206 — (4026) Senators Jackson and Humphrey are charged with sexual 

misconduct in bogus letter with Muskie letterhead 4280 

No. 207 — (4026) Spanish (Cuban) newspaper advertisement about Muskie- 4281 

No. 208 — (4026) "Newsmakers" column about Jane Muskie; alleges 

off-the-record remarks by Mrs. Muskie 4282 

No. 209— (4026) Display entitled: '"Disgusting— The Secret Money in 

Presidential Politics." 4284 

Note.— Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the record. 


No. 210 — (4026) Handwritten poster: "Free — All You Can Eat" invitation Page 

to bogus Humphrey rally 4285 

No. 211 — (4026) Bank forms and receipt for $30 to Don Simmons 4286 

No. 212 — (4026) Pennsylvania Voice article by Blair Stobaugh, dated April 

19, entitled: '^\.B.:\I. (anj'thing but Muskie)" 4289 

No. 213 — (4026) Handwritten cards to "Don" with suggestions for 

posters 4290 

No. 214 — (4026) More handwritten cards with poster suggestions 4292 

No. 215 — (4026) J & J Addressing and Mailing Service receipt for Dick 

Barton 4294 

No. 216— (4026) Poster entitled: "Humphrey— He Started the War, Don't 

Give Him Another Chance" 4295 

No. 217— (4026) Two letters: "Dear McCarthy Delegate" and "Dear 

Chisholm Supporter," both signed by Barbara Barron 4296 

No. 218 — (4026) Circular entitled: "George McGovem's Real Record on 

the War." 4298 

No. 219 — (4026) Anti-Humphrev pamphlet entitled: "A Fishy Smell for 

the White House?" 4299 

No. 220 — (4026) Publication excerpt Ayith three letters superimposed 

Yorty and McCarthy letterheads, with printed comment; 

receipt from J. L. Stewart Co. to Tom Wallace 4301 

No. 221 — (4026) Letter to Select Committee from Towne Motel enclosing 

six copies of records, registers, etc., dated September 19, J973_ 4303 
No. 222 — (4026) Western Union money order receipt of $207.90 to Doug 

KeUy 4310 

No. 223 — (4026) Bank deposit shp, telephone statement, cashiers check 

payable to Donald Segretti; with attachments 4311 

No. 224— (4026) Telephone log— Morris (Segretti) to Chapin 4314 

No. 22.5 — (4026) Various Segretti expense account forms 4315 

No. 226^(4026) Notes on "Personal Directory" handbook 43-50 

Letter and aflBdavit of Mitchell Rogovin 4369 

Note. — Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the record. 



U.S. Sexate. 
Select Committee ox 
Presidential Campaigx AcrrvrnES, 

Washington^ D.C. 

The Select. Committee met. pursuant to i-ecess. at 10 :10 a.m., in room 
318, Russell Senate Office Building. Senator Sam J. Erv-in, Jr. (chair- 
man), presiding. 

Present: Senators Erv'in. Talmadge. Inouye. Montova. Baker, Gur- 
ney, and Weicker. 

Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel and statf director; Fred 
D. Thompson, minority counsel: Rufus L. Edmisten. deputy chief 
counsel : Arthur S. ^liller. chief consultant : Jed Johnson, inyestigator: 
DaA-id ^I. Dorsen. James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant 
chief counsels: Marc Lackritz, Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Scho- 
chet, assistant majority counsels: H. "William Shure and Robert Sil- 
yerstein, assistant minority counsels: Pauline O. Dement, research 
assistant; Filer Ra^mholt, office of Senator Inouye: Ron McMahan. 
assistant to Senator Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator 
"Weicker: Michael Flanigan. assistant publications clerk. 

Senator Enyix. The committee will come to order. 

Coimsel will call the fii-st witness. 

Mr. Dash. Mr, Patrick J. Buchanan. 

Senator Enyix. Mr. Buchanan, will you stand up and raise your 
right hand ? 

Do you swear that the testimony which you shall giye to the Select 
Committee on Presidential Campaign Actiyities will be the truth, 
the whole truth, and nothing but the truili, so help you God ? 

Mr. BrcHAXAx. I do. Mr, Chairman, 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Buchanan, is it trae you are not appearing with 
counsel today? 


Mr. BucHAXAx, That is accurate. 

Mr. Dash. Do you haye a statement tlial you prepared that you 
wish to rea.d to the committee? 

Mr. BucHAXAX, I do. I haye a statement, abbreyiated statement of 
about, 1 would think, no more than 15 minutes at the most. 

Mr. Daspi, "Would you please read it? 

Senator Talmadge. Do we haye copies of it, ^Ir. Chairman? 

Mr. BucHAXAX. I haye giyen copies to the 



Mr. Dash. One copy has just been obtained. No copies under our 
rule were submitted to the committee, I think they were submitted 
to the press but not to the committee. 

Mr. BucHANAx. They were submitted to the committee about 20 
minutes ago for Xeroxing. A young Lady came to me and said they 
would be distributed to the Senatore and members of the staff. 

Senator Giirney. Are they being Xeroxed? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mv. BucHAXAN. Should I proceed with the statement or do you 
want to wait for the copies? 

Mr. Dash. Proceed with your statement then, Mr. Buchanan. 

Mr, Buchanan. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for 
a variety of reasons, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before 
your Select Committee but in candor, I cannot speak with the same 
enthusiasm for the manner in which the invitation was delivered. At 
the President's personal directive, his White House staff has been 
called upon and has cooperated, I believe fully, with the committee. 
Specifically, this witness has certainly done so. Nevertheless, the sur- 
prise announcement that I was to be called as a public witness before 
these hearings was made over national television before even the ele- 
mentary courtesy of a telephone call of notification had been extended. 

Of greater concern to me. however, has been an apparent campaign 
orchestrated from within the committee staff to malign my reputation 
in the public press prior to my appearance. In the hours inmiediately 
following my well-publicized invitation there appeared in the Wash- 
ington Post, the New York Times, the Baltimore Sun, the Chicago 
Tribune, and on the national networks, separate stories all attributed 
to committee sources alleging that I was the architect of a campaign 
of political espionage or dii'ty tricks. According to the Post, committee 
sources were in possession of my memorandums recommending infil- 
trating the opposition. 

In the Times the charge was that the committee had a series of 
Buchanan memorandums suggesting "political espionage and sabo- 
tage against Edwin S. Muskie of Maine and other candidates for the 
Presidential nomination.'' 

One wire service stated that Mr. Buchanan would be questioned 
about "blueprints and plans concerning the scandal." 

In the Chicago Tribune, the headline read : "Nixon Speech Writer 
Blamed for Muskie Plot." The story read, and I quote: "Senate 
investigators have evidence that Patrick J. Buchanan, one of Presi- 
dent Nixon's favorite speechwriters, was the secret author of a polit- 
ical sabotage scheme." 

In the Baltimore Sun under a major front page headline reading: 
"Buchanan Linked to 1972 Dirty Tricks," the story ran thus: 

Patrick J. Buchanan, a Presidential consultant, may emerge as yet another 
architect of the 1972 White House dirty tricks strategy, according to congres- 
sional sources. 

Mr. Chairman, this covert campaign of vilification carried on by staff 
members of your committee is in direct violation of rule 40 of the 
Rules of Procedure for the Select Connnittee. That rule strictly pro- 
hibits staff members from leaking substantive materials. Repeatedly, 
I have asked of Mr. Dash and Mr. Lenzner information that they 
might have to justify such allegations. Repeatedly, they have denied 


to me that they have such documents. A¥hen I asked Mr. Lenzner wlio 
on the committee staff was responsible he responded, "Mr. Buchanan.^ 
you ought to know that you cannot believe everything you read in the 
newspapers." It was his joke and my reputation. 

So it seems fair to me to ask how can this Select Committee set itself 
up as the ultimate arbiter of American political ethics if it cannot even 
control the character assassination in its OAvn ranks. 

For the record, Mr. Chairman, let me state the following: I did not 
recommend or authorize, nor was I aware of any ongoing campaign of 
political sabotage against Senator Muskie or any other Democratic 
candidate. I did not recommend either verbally or in memorandums 
that the reelection committee infiltrate the campaigns of our opposition. 
I have never met nor spoken with nor can I recall ever having heard 
the names of Messrs. Hunt, Liddy, McCord, Ulasewicz, Reagan, 
Barker, or Segretti, until those names appeared in the public press. 

Nor have I ever heard until the terms were made public the code 
names of Ruby 1, Ruby 2, Crystal, Sedan Chair, and Sedan Chair 2, or 
Fat Jack. Even today I could not testify with certitude as to whom 
these terms refer. 

Now, let me move quickly to the heart of the public allegations, 
against me — but more generally against our Presidential campaign. 

It is being argued that illicit Republican strategy and tactics were 
responsible for the defeat of the strongest Democratic candidate for 
President — and for the nomination of the weakest. 

It has been contended publicly that the Democrats were denied — 
by our campaign and strategy — a legitimate choice at their own 

It is being alleged that the campaign of 1972 was not only a rigged 
campaign but an utter fraud, "a political coup by the President of the 
United States." These contentions, Mr. Chairman, are altogether 

Republicans were not responsible for the downfall of Senator Mus 
kie. Republicans were not responsible for the nomination of Senator 

To suggest that, is first of all to do a grievous injustice both to Sen- 
ator McGovern and his campaign organization. 

Senator McGovern was nominated because his men wrote the rule- 
book, his men were in the field earlit st and worked hardest; his cam- 
paign was precisely targeted on the primaries they could win, and 
because he was possessed of the best political organization the Demo- 
cratic Party has seen in at least a dozen years. 

It was not Donald Segretti who put together the organization that 
carried, for Senator McGovern, the crucial Wisconsin primary. 

It was not any agent of the Committee To Re-Elect the President 
who was out winning McGovern delegates in States like Georgia, Vir- 
ginia, and Louisiana. 

Senator Gurney. Would you pull your mike a little bit closer? I 
am having great difficulty in hearing you, there is so much noise at 
the table. 

Mr. Buchanan. Thank you. 

It was not our personnel, but theirs, who worked out Senators Mc- 
Govern's victorious campaign and convention strategies. 

The McGovern people won their own nomination — and they lost 
their own election. 


As Theodore H. "\'\Tiite has written in his latest and best campaign 
history : All of the dirty tricks of 1972, added together in the ultimate 
balance, had "the weiglit of a feather." 

Now, one of the suggestions that I recommended, that Republicans, 
in the spring and summer of 1971, concentrate their political resources 
upon Senator Muskie — rather than dissipate them on the dozen other 
potential aspirants for the nomination. 

That statement is essentially true. 

Senator Muskie was targeting his political attacks upon the Presi- 
dent — as was every single one of the other potential nominees. 

No requirement exists in ethics — or logic — or law — that we provide 
equal time in political response to each of our potential opponents. 

The reasons for reconunending the focus upon Senator Muskie were 
basic : 

He was the frontrunner. Alone among the Democrats he led the 
President in the national polls. He appeared to me to be both the 
strongest candidate, and the candidate with the greatest opportunity 
of uniting the warring wangs of the Democratic Party. 

Candidly, it was my hope, if not my expectation, that our political 
counterattacks, concentrated primarily, but not exclusively, upon the 
Democratic frontrunner, might contribute to opening up the Demo- 
cratic primaries and preventing a closed convention. 

There was nothing — and is nothing — in my judgment, illicit or im- 
ethical or improper or unprecedented in recommending or adopting 
such a political strategy. 

The resources which we recommended for employment in that 
summer and fall, all of them legitimate, were basically these : 

National committee speakers and publications including INlbnday. 

Republican chairmen and organizations in States Senator Muskie 

The Committee To Re-Elect — its media resources, and its develop- 
ing State organizations. 

Surrogate speakers from the national administration including the 
Vice President and Cabinet. 

Congressmen and Senators from the Republican Party who would 
use the forum of the White House or Capitol Hill either to defend the 
President against Senator Muskie's allegations — or to put Senator 
Muskie himself on the defensive. 

Also, use of the media, through briefings and conversations and the 
like by political operatives, to carry the message. 

There is no Republican individual or organization, Mr. Chairman, 
to credit or blame for the decline in the candidacy of Senator Muskie. 

The narrowness of his victory in the New Hampshire primary was a 
reflection of his declining standing in the national polls. 

The enormous margin of his defeat in Florida was a consequence 
of the unanticipated appeal of the candidacy of George Wallace. 

His defeat in Wisconsin came at the hands of one man, Governor 
Wallace, who had been there but a single day and another man. Sena- 
tor McGovern, who had organized the State for 18 months. 

As for the general election, Mr. Chairman, the President of the 
United States did not achieve the greatest landslide of any minority 
party candidate in history because of Watergate and dirty tricks — 
but in spite of them. 


Watergate was the most deleterious issue in our national campaign. 
In our own estimation, and that of political analysts, the Watergate 
tragedy cost the Keioublican, Part}' millions of votes. 

The reasons for the landslide of J 972 are chronicled elsewhere ; they 
need not be repeated here at length. Basically they are these : 

The President read the mood of the Nation better than his opponent. 

The P'-esident had conducted an administration, for 4 years, that 
had won the confidence or support of millions of Democrats. 

The President's stand upon the issues of defense and welfare, upon 
taxes and government, upon coercive integration and busing, were 
closer to what tlie American people wanted than those of his opponent. 

But we won as well, Mr. Chainnan, because of the quality and char- 
acter of our candidate. 

If one looks back over the political history of this country, there 
is only one other man, other than Richard Nixon, w^ho has been his 
party's nominee for President or Vice President five times. That is 
Franklin Roosevelt. 

No other individual in our political history has served in both of 
the same high offices for so long a period of time as has the incumbent 

He is not the leader of a majority party. 

He had been — since 1946 — a member of the minority party in Amer- 
ican politics. 

And thus, his political career, I believe, is all the more impressive. 

That political record, Mr, Chairman, is no accident. It is no fluke, 
and that election of 1972 was not stolen. 

And the mandate that the American people gave to this President 
and his administration cannot and w^ill not be frustrated or repealed 
or overthrown as a consequence of the incumbent trag»'dy. 

Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the time. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to deplore, along with 
Mr. Buchanan, any newspaper stories derogatory of him that are in- 
dicated as having been leaked or come from sources in this committee 
I know o^ no sta ff member wdio has done it ; I have searched to find such 
staff members, if there were any. We have had a problem like this be- 
fore and I think we all know that the problem of leaks is one that can- 
not always be solved. Also, this has been a problem, I think, that has 
plagued the inquiry in this area not only with this committee, but with 
the Department of Justice and the White House itself. It is not even 
known whether or not these sources did come from the Senate com- 
mittee. But I would deplore, along with Mr. Buchanan, newsstories 
that reflect on his character, reflect on his activities, and I can assure 
the committee that they did not come from any source that I know 
of in the committee, and certainly not from any counsel that I know of. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could I say a word in that respect ? 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Senator Baker. I join with majority counsel in deploring the al- 
legations that Mr. Buchanan alludes to, and I commend him for tak- 
ing that position. I have talked to Mr. Dash on a number of occasions 
not related to this matter, but to other alleged leaks from the commit- 
tee, and I can verify from firsthand information that Mr. Dash on 
every occasion, has made a conscientious effort to locate such leaks and 
I entirely believe him when he says he deplores such leaks. 


Unfortunately, we live in a pretty leaky atmosphere. I am not de- 
fending against the allegations that you make Mr. Buchanan ; I am 
snnply saying in a sense of fairness to Mr. Dash that I am sure that he 
genuniely expresses that regret and that concern, as I do, too. It does 
not help the mandate of this committee to have the matter thrashed out 
in the press before a witness appears. It does not help to have specula- 
tive stories about it. It does not help to have a witness' summary pub- 
lished verbatim in the newspaper, wliich once happened. 

But let me quickly say as the senior Republican on this committee 
that for my part, I am convinced that Sam Dash means exactly what 
he said. 

Senator Ervin. I would like to say, Mr. Buchanan, that I share your 
consternation about leaks. One thing I have never understood, hav- 
ing been a lawyer and been accustomed to keeping the secrets of my 
clients, I have never understood why such a large part of earth's in- 
habitants have such little restraint, that just as soon as they get any- 
thing in their minds, it comes tumbling out their mouths. I have noticed 
leaks ever since I got to Washington 19 years ago. Somehow or other, 
it seems to me that they are increasing, that the number of people 
who cannot exercise self-restraint seems to be growing rather than 
diminishing. I deplore the leaks which so often reflect on a man's char- 
acter. I can guarantee that one man in this committee has never leaked 
anything. That is myself. I learned long ago that as Kipling said, 
"Man can kiss and tell. Wisely has the poet sung, Man can hold all 
kinds of posts, If he'll only hold his tongue." 

I notice in recent months leaks have come out of the White House, 
come tumbling out of the Department of Justice, have come tumbling 
out of every congressional committee of both Houses of Congress. It 
is a most deplorable state and very unjust to people who have become 
victims of these leaks. 

Mr. Buchanan. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the statement and I 
was unaware that you were into the British poets. 

Senator Ervin. Yes, sir. Not only the British but the Irish and the 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Buchanan, when did you fii-st begin Avorking for 
President Nixon in any political campaign ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I met President Nixon — frankly, I met him briefly 
when I was a caddy at Burning Tree Country Club in 1954. But for- 
mally, I met Mr. Nixon in 1965, In December, when he spoke at a polit- 
ical meeting filling in for Senator Dirksen in southern Illinois, when I 
was an editorial writer with the St. Louis Globe-Democrat. I went over 
and indicated to him that if he were going to run in 1968, I would like 
to get aboard early. He made some inquiries. We had some long ex- 
tended conversations and I joined his staff in January of 1966. 

I served with him in the 1966 political campaign. We traveled some 
35 States, on one or two occasions into Tennessee, I think. Senator 
Baker. That was my first association with him. I remained on his 
staff through 1967 and the 1968 cam])aign and joined the AAHiite House 
as a special assistant in January of 1969. 

]\rr. Dash. A^Hien you joined the White House as special assistant, 
what, specifically, were your responsibilities, 'Mr. Buchanan? 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, you have got essentially — my functions cor- 
respond to that of general assignment reporter for a news))aper. I only 
have three definite and ongoing assignments. They would be as speech- 


writer for the President on major speeches; oversight of the Presi- 
dent's daily news summar}', which is prepared by Mort Allen; and 
third, the preparation of the briefing books and briefing materials foi 
the President for all his press conferences, which has been a function of 
mine for almost 8 years. 

Mr. Dash. Xow, to wliom in the '\A'liit^ House did you report from 
the period of your appointment to the "White House position that you 
held through May of this year ^ 

Mr. Buchanan. May of this year? Well, through April of this year, 
the primary channel of communication with the President would be 
H. R. "Bob" Haldeman, President's Chief of Staff. He would not be 
the exclusive cliannel. Tlie President would contact me on occasion di- 
rectly. But that would be the primary channel. 

Mr. Dash. Now, in the course of your duties at the White House, did 
you have occasion to writ^ a series of memorandums to tlie President, 
or to Mr. Haldeman, or an^'body else ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, being a writer, yes ; I did. That is the format I 
generally used for communication in the lYliite House, was memoran- 
dums. I have v/ritten numerous, scores if not hundreds, of memoran- 
dums to both the President and, I am sure, to Mr. Haldeman. That is 

Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Buchanan, did you bring with you or produce 
in accordance with the subpena issued to you on Sept. 20, 1973, copies 
of your memorandums dealing svith political strategy for the Presi- 
dent or Presidential primaries of 1972 and the campaign? 

]Mr. Buchanan. No, sir ; I did i^ot. I first went to get the direction of 
the Director of the President's Counsel. I believe this matter is in 
court. I have read — because of the brevity of the time I was given tc 
prepare for this testimony, I have not had an opportunity to read all 
of tlie political strategy memos that 1 have sent between 1971 and 
1972, but I have read a number of them. Again, I did not bring them 
here; I first went for the direction of the Pi-esident's Counsel. 

Mr. Dash, Do you have those memorandums in your possession in 
your office at the White House ? 

Mr. Buchanan. No, thai would not be precise. I have some in my 
WHiite House files. Most of my memorandums from 1971 to 1972 are 
down in the basement of tlie Executive Office Building. I have had the 
opportunity to Xerox some of these, my secretary has. That is a limited 
number, just Ijecause of the sheer volume. 

While I am allowed to Xerox and read these memorandums, I could 
not without authorization from the President's Counsel remove them 
from the "Wliite House, nor would I. 

Mr. Dash. Would you tell us when did your file of memorandums 
become part of the Presidential Papers and not in your complete 

Mr. Buchanan. I think they have ahvays been part of the Presiden- 
tial Papers. 

Mr. Dash. When were they removed from j^our control ? 

Mr. Buchanan. They were removed at my direction and frankly, 
I thought it was only temporary. It was indicated, an individual who 
had worked for me in the campaign in 1972 came back from a com- 
mittee hearing and he said, "They are going to subpena all our files." 

So 1 said, "Well, let's go down to the counsel's office." 

So we 'went down to the counsel's office and the counsel indicated 
that it would be best if all our files were ])laced under, taken down- 


stairs, at least from 1971 and 107:2, and so they were. But I had that 
access and I did have the right to Xerox those particular memoran- 

Mr. Dash. "What counsel advised you ^ 

Mr. BrciiAXAN. I couldn't be certain which individual. It was cer- 
tainly Mr. Buzhardt and Mr. Garment and /or Mr. Parker, I would 

Mr. Dash. And is it the position of counsel at the White House that 
these memorandums dealing "with ])olitical campaign strategy are not 
available to us under the subjiena because of executive privilege? 

Mr. BucHAXAX. I think you will have to ask counsel what their posi- 
tion is, but I think that is not unreasonable in light of the fact that 
man}' of the memorandums are to the President of the United States. 
Many of the memorandums deal with reconnnendations for Presiden- 
tial action. Many of the memorandums were prepared at the direction 
of the President. 

I think you would have to talk to those individuals to ascertain 
what the legal grounds on which they withheld them are. 

Senator Ervix. If I ma.y interject myself at this point, the ^^Hiite 
House and myself have very fundamental disagreements about the 
nature and scope of executive privilege. The Constitution and laws of 
the United States place certain obligations upon the President. I 
accept executive privilege to a limited extent. I think the President is 
entitled to receive the uninhibited advice of his aides, which is being 
sought by him or given by them, to enable him to perform in a lawful 
manner the official duties of his office. 

For that reason, I accept the validity of executive privilege to this 
extent : In my judgment, the President is entitled to have kept secret 
confidential information, confidential communications made to him by 
an aide, or even confidential communications among his aides, which 
have for their purpose enabling him to perform in a lawful manner 
his constitutional and legal duties. 

Further than that, executive privilege does not go. Since it is not a 
part of the official duty of a President to run for reelection, and since 
it is not the official duty of a President to conceal evidence of wrong- 
doing, I do not think the President has the right to withhold any infor- 
mation in his possession that deals with political activities, or which 
deals with wrongdoing. And I am gi-atified to know that former 
Attorney General John X. IMitchell agreed with me on my view of 
executive privilege at the time he was before this committee. 

Mr. BuciiAXAX. Mr. Chainnan, first, I think it would be a mistake 
to make the assumption that anything in my memorandums indicates 
a recommendation for wrongdoing. 

Second, a number of these memorandums were prepared prior to the 
campaign of 1972, and they deal with my analysis of individuals which 
would also have an impact on Presidential strategy with regard to 
legislation and Presidential strategy, say, with regard to defense 
issues, because we were being criticized on those scores. 

Third, there is no question that the character of my rhetoric in 
some of these memorandums would be. in your term, uninhibited. I 
have been writing these confidential memorandums to the President 
for close to 8 yeare and — that will be my statement. 

Senator Ervix. I didn't intend to intimate that I had any opinion 
that there was anj'thing in your memorandums that indicated wrong- 


doing. I "was just laying down a proposition. But I do infer that there 
is much in your memorandums that dealt with political activities. 

Mr. BucHAXAN. That would be true. 

Senator Ervin. I do not think the Constitution and laws make it 
thu official duty of anybody to rur. for President of the United States 
and, therefore, executive privilege can't possibly cover that. That is 
my own opinion, and I am glad to say that John Mitchell agreed with 

Thank you. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Buchanan, just one last question on that. I think j^ou 
mentioned that action was taken concerning the control of these papers 
after a witness returned and said the papers might be subpenaed. 

Can you tell us what witness ? 

Mr. Buchaxax. It was not a formal witness before the committee. 
It was my aide, Khachigian. There was no subpena forthcoming. 

Mr. Dash. Xow, the committee has been able to acquire by subpena 
from the Committee To Re-Elect the President's records, a number 
of memorandums — not, certainly, all of your memorandums — and you 
will find on your table for later use during questioning, a file of those 
memorandums with tabs and a summary. 

Mr. Buchaxax. Mr. Dash, let me comment upon that. 

The other night, when I had my discussion with you and Mr. Lenz- 
ner, I asked you candidly, at that time, if there were any memorandums 
in your possession which I could look at and study in prej^aration for 
discussion before this committee. You and Mr. Lenzner sliowed me 
something like, somewhere between 4 and 6 memorandums. There are 
a good deal more than 4 or 6 memorandums here. There are dozens of 
them of tremendous length. If you had shown me these memorandums, 
I would be a good deal more prepared to testify fully about their 

Mr. Dash. ]Mr. Buchanan, you will recall when you did that, you 
also informed me that you had a complete file of your own memoran- 
dums. These are from that file ? 

Mr. Buchax^ax. No, sir; they are not. You have memorandums dat- 
ing back to 1969 — 2 in 1969 — and 1970. I have no memorandums in my 
operative file that I would even Xerox that deal with 1969 and 1970. 
I understood that was not within the purview of the committee. 

Mr. Dash. At the appropriate time a memorandum is referred to, 
you can raise whatever questions joii wish. Not all of those memo- may be referred to. The^^ are the memoraadums that the 
committee dici receive and we felt you should have them at your table. 

Mr. Buchaxax. Mr. Dash, I don't think I need a c )unsei; I need a 
librarian more. 

Mr. Thompsox". Mr. Chairman, excuse me. 

Is my understanding correct, Mr. Buchanan, that you thought yqji 
were informed that you would be able to see all the documents you 
were being queried on ? 

INlr. BucHAXTAK. I had a discussion with Mr. Dash and Mr, Lenzner. 
I asked repeatedlj^ 1 said, ''Listen, I did not. recommend any dirty 
tricks. If you have any strategy memo that could be misconstrued, I 
would like to see it. If you have any memo you want to take up with 
me in committee session, let me see it; I will be happy to discuss it.'^ 


Mr. Thompsox. You were askiiio- to see 3'onr own memorandums ? 

Mr. BrcHAXAx. My own memorandums, because in my files there 
are thousands of memorandums which I could not have possibly read 
in the 24 hours I was given to prepare for this testimony. I am pre- 
pared to discuss any of these memorandums if I am given an oppor- 
tunit}^ to look them over. 

Mr. Thompson'. Mr. Chairman, as a general proposition, I think that 
we should have done this with past witnesses and I think we ought to 
do it with future witnesses. If we have documents, especially docu- 
ments that the witnesses themselves prepared, essentially their own 
work product, I don't think it serves the committee's purposes to put 
the witness in the position of being able merely to surprise him with a 
document that maybe he hasn't seen for a few years. I don't think there 
is anything wrong; I think it is only proper and right that a witness, 
especially when he has requested it and it is promised him, be able to 
review his own memorandums, particularly when he is asked to come 
in here and testify in detail, especially about sentences in his own 
memorandums, in public. I think he ought to have a chance to sit and 
read the whole memorandum. 

Senator ER%aN". I agree with you, and I would suggest that we give 
Mr. Buchanan all of the memorandums that they are going to ask 
him about, and if he wants to adjourn the meeting so he can read them 
before we question him, I will be glad to take that up with the com- 
mittee; and, on the other hand, if he wants to proceed, I will assure 
him I will give him plenty of time to refresh his recollection about 
the memorandums. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, this again is in a context of a subpena 
that we served on Mr. Buchanan for his memorandums which he 
prepared, and which was not forthcoming under the directions of the 
Wliite House to give us those. There was no promise to supply him 
all of the memorandums that Ave had. It is not for the purpose of 
surprise, but direct questioning of this witness by the committee is 
not accomplished by providing all of the memorandums in advance, 
so that any testimony that can be given may be rehearsed testimony. 

Senator Gtjrxey. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that in 
this very thick folder there are something like 84 memorandums, and 
I was presented these memorandums last night about 6 o'clock, so 
I do not know about the witness being surprised but I certainly am, 
and I have had no opportunity to go over this at all. I have leafed 
through a few of these, did it last night. They have nothing to do 
with dirty tricks at all. But I think also, in the proper procedure 
of this committee, it would be an excellent idea if Senators had an 
opportunity of seeing voluminous memorandums that the committee 
apparentlv has had for many weeks. 
•Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a qnestion to put things 
in perspective for my own purpose ? Could I ask where we got these 
memorandums ? 

Mr. Dash. We got these memorandums bv subnena of the fiVs of 
the Committee for the T?e-Elof^tion of the President, that are either 
in the archives or from ]Mr. Mairuder's files which are presently in 
the possession of the Special Prosecutor. 

Senator "Raker. So all of these documents came either from the 
Committee To Re-Elect or from the archives ? 


Mr. Dash. Or from the Special Prosecutor who was holding Mr, 
Magruder's files. 

Senator Baker. So one way or the other they came from the Com- 
mittee To Re-Elect or the White House files? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Buchanan. If I can make a statement. 

Senator Baker. Before you make a statement was any protest made 
about the delivery of any of these documents? 

Mr. Dash. No protest. 

Senator Baker. You have no litigation? 

Mr. Dash. Given to us by subpena and by the Special Prosecutor as 
well as subpena on the archivist of the Committtee To Re-Elect. 

Senator Baker. The only question is whether the witness and the 
committee has had a chance to look at this inch-and-a-half folder. 

Mr. Dash. We have had this problem before. These foldere and 
exhibits come to us over a period of time. We also have had the problem 
that has been indicated earlier, and I only feel it is fair to make this 
record, since it has been referred to, as to when various membei^ 
of the committee get exhibits. We have had- the problem of when 
exhibits do appear in the press, and I have indicated, how I deplore 
the question that INIr. Buchanan raised concerning revelations in the 
press, since it is the effort of the committee to hold as tightly as possible 
all of its documents so that there are no leaks. 

The emphasis is to try to put together for the full committee all of 
the material that we have in advance of calling the witness as early 
as we can for the committee. Yesterday was the first time that we could 
actually index and put these things together for the committee, and 
prepare them oui^selves as the staff of this committee. 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman. I can verify the difficulties, and 
Mr. Dash and I have worked together on these matters trying to get 
these things out in sufficient time for members of the committee and 
for ourselves. 

The problem that I see, though, and one that I think needs verifica- 
tion — Mr. Dash in his statements and purposes of the committee is not 
served by not providing these documents to the committee in advance. 
A criminal defendant under rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Proce- 
dure has a right to copies of his own recorded statements well in ad- 
vance of trial, and I do not think it is right to bring a witness in here 
and surprise him with one of his own documents. I think he ought to 
have a chance to look at his own documents, especially if they have 
been promised to him. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, let me say that I think you accurately 
summarized the dilemma when you said that it really is up to the 
witness to decide whether he wants to proceed at this point or not and 
I would recommend, Mr. Chairman, that we leave that decision to 
Mr. Buchanan. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. May I ask Mr. Buchanan one question ? Mr. Buchanan, 
did you not tell us that, in fact, you were informed by the archivist as 
to the memos vre had Xeroxed ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Right, I w^as informed by the archivist as to memos 
you had Xeroxed. I was not sure these were in your possession. If 

21-296 O — 74- 


these memos were in the archives, we were not sure what you had, and 
we asked you what you liad, and I was not informed . 

Mr. Chairman and Mr, Cochairman, let me just mention, I am 
altogether unfamiliar at this point in time with the first 10 memo- 
randunis that deal with — going to 1970. I do not believe they have 
anything to do with the 1972 campaign. 

My first — I am aware of the firet memorandum, INIarch 24, 1971, 
which has to do with strategy for the 1972 campaign, and I do not 
know if I have read or looked over all of these memos ; I do recognize 
a number of them. I am fully prepared to go ahead and testify to 
these, and if there are some in here that I have not seen or looked over 
in the last couj^le of weeks, then we can take a few minutes and I can 
look them over. Would that be fair ? It is up to No. 10. The ones before 
that I would have to sit back and read because I have not seen those. 

Mr. Dash. We may have to because, on the question of whether they 
are relevant to this inquiry, I think I will be able to at least state an 
argument as to the relevance of those that I will refer to, and if Mr. 
Buchanan would like to read them first, before any questions, then I 
would desist, but 1 would like to proceed in a certain line of question- 
ing which may 

Mr. Buchanan. Sure. 

Mr. Dash [continuing]. Lead into some of those memorandums. 

Mr. Buchanan. OK. We will do the best we can. 

Senator Baker. Let us make sure we understand what we are doing. 

Senator Ervin. Let me see if I understand the witness. Do you 
want some time to read the memorandums ? 

Mr. Buchanan. No, Senator, I would j^refer to go ahead. As I say, 
these memorandums, the first 10, deal with prior to the 1970 congres- 
sional elections. I do not think, in glancing over it, they have anything 
to do with 1972 at all. They may have. I am prepared fully to testify' 
now and if we run into a memorandum that they quote from, and I 
have not read or seen in 4 years, maybe I can sit back and take a look 
at it. 

Senator Ervin. We can rule on that when it is presented but my im- 
pression is that people run for office about 6 and 7 years in advance 
now and 1 think 

Mr. Buchanan. We were more successful 

Senator Ervin. That was one reason why the Democratic Party suf- 
fered a defeat and that so many of its candidates got out and ran so 
long in advance. 

Senator Baker. 1 take it, Mr. Chairman, I fully agree with you, 
and I have been the victim of having to run 6 or 7 years in advance. 
I know the symptoms, but 6 or 7 years in advance, according to my 
mental arithmetic, would take us back to 1961 and I think we ought to 
take that into account as we proceed. 

Mr Dash. I do not think v.e will go back to 1961, Mr. Buchanan. 

Mr. Buchanan. Right. 

Mr. Dash. How were your memorandums routed ? 

Mr. B ghav.nn. The primary channel of communication for politi- 
cal meuiorandums, it was to the President. It would go through Mr. 
Haldeman. other than that the principal strategy memorandums would 
go to Ml. R"];:;.omii and a copy to the Attorney General. 


Mr. Dash. All ri^ht, now. Sometime during the summer of 1971 
were you asked to direct an investigation of Daniel Ellsberg? 

Mr. Buchanan. That is correct. 

On July 6 — if I recollect the date correctly, I was called to a meet- 
ing in Mr. Ehrlichman's office where Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Colson, and 
Mr. Haldeman were present at various times, and I was asked to not 
so much conduct the investigation, I believe, as to oversee the investi- 
gation and to serve as White House liaison, an assignment I rejected. 

Mr. Dash. In rejecting it — by the way — what reason did you give 
for rejecting it? 

Mr. Buchanan. I felt that for me an investigation of Daniel Ells- 
berg was a waste of my time and my abilities. 

Mr. Dash. Did you prepare any memorandums with regard to that 
assignment request? 

Mr. Buchanan. I did. I rejected the offer verbally, and subsequent 
to that I believe on July 8 I did prepare a memorandum foi" Mr. 
Ehrlichman indicating my reasons why I not only did not want to 
uniertake it myself, but did not see the value of doing so. I do not 
have a copy of that memorandum, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. We do not have either. 

Mr. Buchanan. I am going to talk to the grand jury tomorrow 
about the particular memorandum but I have to go back to the "Wliite 
House and sit down and study it before I could give you any details. 

Mr. Dash. I am not asking you for that at this moment and we do 
not have a copy of it either, Mr. Buchanan. But I would like to show 
you a memorandum dated August 26, 1971, from Mr. David Yomig to 
Mr. John Ehrlichman which is already in the record of this com- 
mittee as exhibit No. 91. Do you have it there? If it is not in the file, 
it should be loose. 

Mr. Buchanan. Exhibit No. 91 ?* 

Mr. Dash. It should be loose on the top of your pile. 

Mr. Buchanan. Are these in chronological order the way they are 
going to come, right ? 

Mr. Dash. If you will turn to page 4 of that memorandum, you will 
note that there is an item 9 that raises the question : "How quickly 
do we want to try to bring about a change in Ellsberg's image?" And 
you see an asterisk 

Mr. Buchanan. This thing, is this from David Young, the 28th, 
page 4 ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes, page 4. 

Mr. Buchanan. How far down here ? 

Mr. Dash. Down to the last line. 

Senator Baker. "VVliat date ? 

Mr. Dash. August 26, Senator Baker. I think everyone has it. 

Mr. Buchanan. I have got it, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Yes. If you have it, it is No. 9, the last line of the memo 
on page 4 and the question put there is: "How quickly do we want 
to try to bring about a change in Ellsberg's image?" You will note 
there is an asterisk, and if you turn the page 

Mr. Buchanan. Riffht. 

•See Book 6, p. 2646. 


Mr. Dash [continuing]. Tlie last half of the page has an asterisk 
and it is followed by the following language : 

In connection with issue 9, it is important to point ont that with the recent 
article on Ellsberg's lawyer Boudin we have already started on a negiative pres*. 
image for EUsberg. If the present Liddy-Hvint project No. 1 is successful, it is 
absolutely necessary to have an overall game plan develoiJed for its use in 
conjunction with the Congressional investigation. In this connection I believe 
that the point of Buchanan's memo attacking Ellsberg in the press should be 
borne in mind namely that the situation being attacked is too big to be under- 
mined by planted leaks among the friendly press. 

Is that a reference to Buchanan's memorandum — the memorandum 
you referred to wlien you refused to accept tlie assignment i 

Mr. Buchanan. I think it would have to be because I have gone 
through all of my chron file, have all of my memorandums thiough 
July, August, and September, and that is the only memorandum that 
m.akes a reference to Mr. Ellsberg. There are a couple of points 1 
would like to make in reference to this. 1 trust I did not have the im- 
pression that what the assignment I was being offered was something 
illicit or unethical or wrong, it was not, and I did not understand it 
that way from Mr. Haldeman, Colson, or Ehrlichman. 

Second, in the memorandum, I would not like to be held to the 
exact verbiage of my memorandum right now, not having looked at 
it, but I did suggest — frankly, my personal view was that a national 
address be made and that the subject of the national address would be 
the New York Times decision and Washington Post decision, and 1 
drafted a speech which was not delivered, but the speech had no men- 
tion of INIr. Ellsberg in it, and it was m.y feeling that not having done 
that, the situation with regard to the public opinion which had decided 
frankly in favor of the newspapers, a decision to publish those docu- 
rnents which we disagreed witli, the documents not being particularly 
disadvantageous to the Nixon administration since they were from 
the early Kennedy and Johnson years, I felt we should argue this 
thing out on principle on the front pages in a major address dealing 
with the New York, and the Washington Post, and not try to, 
in effect, speak to columnists who tended to agree ^^ith us and ask 
them to argue this issue on the back pages. That would be inefficacious. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Buchanan, in line with your statement that you did 
not understand there Avas any request for wrongdoing, I wish tc 
stress in questions I will be putting to you, I don't wish you to infer 
any inference from the question of any wrongdoing or impropriety on 
your part. 

As a matter of fact, I think that one of tlie values of your being 
here today and being able to testify is to aid the committee in deliber- 
ating what is proper, what is not proper. This is a problem that the 
committee will have to resolve ultimately under its mandate, and 1 
would like to ask you from time to time, your own opinion on that 
to aid the committee and that therefore, I would like to express the 
fact that my questions are seeking to suggest impropriety on your 

Mr. Buchanan. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Did you know though that a special unit under Mr. 
Ehrlichman was contemplated, and was, in fact, set up to investigate 
Mr. Ellsberg? 


Mr. Buchanan. No, sir ; I did not. The first I heard of the Plumb- 
ers unit was when I believe I read it in Newsweek, and my under- 
standing of my assignment was it would not be an investigation con- 
ducted inside the Wliite House at all, by White House personnel but 
it would be outside. 

Mr. Dash. Did you know Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young? 

Mr. Buchanan. Very well. Mr. Krogh is a good personal friend 
of mine. Mr. Young, I worked with on briefing books occasionally 
when he worked with Dr. Kissinger. I knew him less well than I 
knew Mr. Krogh. 

Mr. Dash. Did you have any working relationship at all with 
regard to this particular matter ? 

Mr. Buchanan. No, I had nothing to do with the thing once we 
signed off. 

Mr. Dash. After you turned down the offer to sort of coordinate 
this investigation of Mr. Ellsberg, did Mr. Colson talk to you about 
it and indicate that you had been given first opportunity and that he 
had gone ahead and picked somebody else ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Well this came very recently. Mr. Colson had called 
me, he said, simply to alert me as a courtesy that he had discussed the 
Ellsberg thing before some Senate Committee, and he said : 

I told the Senate Committee that you had been offered the assignment of 
investigating the Ellsberg thing first and that you turned it down and that I 
had, after you turned it down, I had spoken to you by telephone to offer it to you 
again and that you had turned it down again by telephone. 

And I have no recollection of that telephone call with Mr. Colson but 
I am sure it is accurate. 

Mr. Dash. By the way, when did you first learn of the break-in of 
Dr. Fielding's office? 

Mr. Buchanan. When Mr. Mort Allen who nms the President's 
news summary came walking into my office with the item off the 
A wire. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Buchanan, would you turn to your memorandum of 
June 8, 1972, which is tab 27 [exhibit No. 187] and turn to page 11 
in that? 

Mr. Buchanan. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. Is that a memorandum that yovi prepared? 

Mr. Buchanan. This is known euphemistically as the assault 
strategy. This is not — I did a memorandum like this but this does not 
look like my typewriter. This is not the format. This is not the — I did 
do a memorandum of considerable length on this subject, it looks like 
mine but it does not look like the top of it. Mine would be a memoran- 
dum from the President to Buchanan and Khachigian and giving the 
date, but it is nothing like the format, but I did prepare a fonnat at 
great length on the various 40 items on assault strategy ; that is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Is it true a number of your memorandums that you did 
prepare on a certain form were actually transmitted to Mr. Magruder 
of the committee, and sometime they retyped them in another form? 

Mr. Buchanan. I think from what you gentlemen showed me the 
other night it appears that is what was done to a number of them. 
This Avas conceivably done here. I am sure this was my memorandum, 
I am sure it was done here. I thought you gentlemen had retyped 


Mr. Dash. We have not retyped them. 
Mr. BuciiAXAx. OK. 

Mr. Dash. Let me point to paragraph 25 which has a heading 
"Ellsberg" and reads : 

McGovern's personal encouragement of Ellsberg to violate Federal law is a 
matter which \.e .should wait to exploit, say, two months after the DemcK-ratic 
Convention. It should serve as a centerpiece of a national s^ieech, ix?rhaps by the 
Vice President. 

Now, was that in your memorandum, do you recall making that 

Mr. Buchanan. I am sure it is because what you do not have is, 
coupled with this, if you will, the attack strategy was what was known 
as a quotations or attack book. In that book t^here is a public state- 
ment by Senator McGovern of our paragraphs from Parade magazine 
wherein he himself states publicly, I believe that he encouraged, he 
told Daniel Ellsberg, I believe, that : "I can't do this because I am a 
Senator, but why don't you go to the New York Times f 

In my judgment that was a political error on his part — the quota- 
tion was a public one — the quotation was in the medical quotations 
book and my recommendation was, having researched Senator McGov 
ern thoroughly, having gotten ahold of this quotation, we should hold 
back and use this as a centerpiece of a speech later in the campaign ; 
that is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Then it would be fair to say that one of your recom- 
mendations during the campaign was to attempt to make some tie-in 
between the Ellsberg matter and Senator McGovern's campaign. 

Mr. Buchanan. There was no need to make the tie-in. It was going 
to use Senator McGovern's own quotations. That was a matter of pub- 
lic record. 

Mr. Dash. In preparation for the campaign of 1972, Mr. Buchanan, 
were task forces created at the White House to deal with various as- 
pects of the campaign? 

Mr. Buchanan. I don't think they were at the AYhite House. I think 
the Committee To Ke-Elect had a number of some 15 task force-typt; 
groups which would study various aspects of the campaign, and I 
think they were inclusive, tliese groups, of A^^ntc House personnel. 

Mr. Dash. Were you given any particular assignment in the cam- 
paign of an opposition nature ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I think it was around mid-19Tl I was named chair- 
man of the opposition research, opposition tracking, opposition analy- 
sis group which would be one task force within the campaign. 

Mr. Dash. What was your responsibility in that particular position ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, I saw my responsibility as essentially analysis 
of the strength and weaknesses and potential strategies and scenarios 
of the potential Democratic candidates for the Presidency. 

Mr. Dash. Who worked with you in this task force ; who assisted 

Mr. Buchanan. Some of the memorandums I did, quite frankly, be- 
fore I was given the assignment. I think the one you mentioned — 
Muskie on March 24 — I think the assignment came in either May or 
June, I believe with — when Mr. Ken Khachigian was a political assist- 
ant of mine. 

Mr. Dash. Now, in the course of your duties during the Presiden- 
tial campaign of 1972 and also your duties at the White House, were 


you of the view that a number of tax exempt foundations were un- 
friendly to tlie President or to the Republican Party, and indeed help- 
ful to the Democratic Party ? 

Mr. BucHANAX. Well, that has — that might have been mentioned 
during 1971 or 1972, but there is an idea or thought that I have had 
back as far as 1969 and 1970 and it is my view that, for example, the 
tax exempt funds of the Ford Foundation, which is the largest of all 
foundations, which has something like 18 percent of all assets of 
foundations, that these, by and large, were being channeled, when they 
were, into public policy institutes, and others wdiich were in l>asic dis- 
agreement with our own political philosophy and that these tax ex- 
empt multimillions have the effect, in my personal judgment, of un- 
balancing the political process, so I have recommended and have 
drafted speeches actually to lay this out on the table, much as we laid 
out what I felt was the base of the networks on the table, at the same 
time to create some of our OAvn institutions which would be a counter- 
part of, say, the Brookings Institution which would be conservative in- 
stitutions that is true. But I do not think that was an issue or a matter 
that was — I may be wrong, I have not read all these memos but it was 
under active consideration in the campaign of 1971 or 1972. I know I 
Tccommended it to the President after the campaign of 1972 that we 
ought to establish our own institutions, our own public policy things 
on a competitive basis. 

Mr. Dash. Well, did you not believe that the leading contender in the 
beginning of the Democratic primaries for the Presidential candidacy, 
Senator Muskie, had a special relationship with the Ford Foundation? 

Mr. BuciiAXAX. Well, I think Senator Muskie when one — Senator 
Muskie went on two trips, I believe, again it was a matter of public rec- 
ord, two or three that were sponsored by the Ford Foundation, one of 
them was to Japan, I believe, and one of them was elsewhere. Again, 
my view is that we ought to make the whole question of tax exempt 
foundations and the use of their funds, especially a giant one like 
the Ford Foundation, to unbalance the political process, in my judg- 
ment, we ought to make it a public and political issue, and I have 
recommended speeches dealing with that subject. 

Now, on the JNIuskie recommendation, I think you Avould have to — 
before moving on that — you would have to make the case nationally 
against the Ford Foundation and McGeorge Bundy's oper-ation. 

Mr. Dash. Did you make the recommendation that an investigation 
should be made concerning the Ford Foundation's activities in politi- 
cal affairs with regard to Democrats ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I did an investigation myself in 1970, in the sum- 
mer of 1970, but again this did not have to do with 1971 or 1972. I read 
every article that was written, and the books that were written on the 
Ford Foundation in a 10-day vacation period, and you did not need 
other than the material that I had at hand in the public sector as to 
where these funds were being channeled. It is a matter of public record 
where the Ford Foundation puts its funds. 

Mr. Dash. All right, now, INIr. Buchanan, would you turn to your 
memorandum — 24: to the President, which is tab 10 [exhibit No. 170]. 
On that subject, "The Muskie Watch." If you will turn to page 7 of 
that memorandum. 


Mr. BuciiANAx. Your librarian has ma<le an error. My 24 here is a 
memorandum to John iMitchell and H. K. Ilaldeman. I do not have 
that here. 

Mr. Dash. Is that tab 10 ? 

Mr. BucHAXAx. Tab 10 ? 

Mr. Dash. It is your memorandum of March 24. 

Mr. BucHAXAx. I am sorry. "The Muskie Watch,'* yes, sir. 

What page is that ? 

Mr. Dash. Page 7. 

Senator Ervix. There is a vote on in the Senate, so we will have to 

Mr. Dash. This will give you an opportunity, ^Mr. Buchanan, to 
read it. 


Senator Ervix. The committee will resume. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Buchanan, we will resume the questioning. 

I directed your attention to the March 24, 1971, memorandum, which 
is a memorandum from you to the President on the subject, "The 
Muskie Watch." I have asked you to look at page 7 of that memoran- 
dum. I will read into the record the short paragraph on the top of 
page 7, headed "The Ford Foundation" : 

When Whitney Young passetl away, one saw a picture of Ed Muskie in the 
surf with Young and one learned that they were gathered in Nigeria on a Ford 
Foundation-financed trip. Now, in my research on Ford, this is the third such 
trip. Muskie was the only Democrat who made both junkets to Japan (some 
of our Republican friends went also on one) financed by Ford. Certainly some 
troublesome questions could be raised about Muskie's connection with McGeorge 
Bundy's giant institution — and are they beliind hU: candidacy. Investigation 
should be done on this score. This goes hand in "globe" — I guess the word is 
"glove", really — hand-in-glove with the Foundation si^eeches. 

Therefore, you were recommending at that time that investigation 
should be done? 

Mr. Buchax^ax'. Yes, but the investigation would be investigation 
of the public record. All the materials I had on the Ford Foundation 
came from huge volumed magazine articles; they came from reading 
the voluminous testimony before the Patman Committee, which un 
covered, I believe, or elevated the fact that the Ford Foundation had 
provided stipends for eight of Senator Kennedy's campaign assistants. 
An investigation would be a simple matter to go down the list of 
Muskie staffers, and ascertain if any of these were on the payroll of 
the Ford Foundation. But that is all I can say on that. 

Mr. Dash. Well, then, actually, and I think you have testified to this 
briefly, even prior to this particular memorandum, and actually, a 
year earlier, in March 1970, you indicated to the President, or the 
President indicated to you, the belief that investigation should be 
made of the large foundations to learn which foundations supported 
the Democratic Party and which were favorable to the administration. 
Do you recall that ? 

Mr. Buchaxax. Which investigation — what is the date of the 
memorandum ? 

Mr. Dash. Let me refer you to vour memorandum of March 3, 1970, 
tab 4. 

Mr. Buchaxax. I think I can explain that very simply for you. The 
investigation was made. It was made by me in June of 1970. I got 


Reader's Guide, every publication, books, everything I could read on 
the Ford Foundation, the Patman hearings. I took them to Florida 
and spent 10 days researching and writing. I wrote there. I had every 
connection of the Ford Foundation and the Brookings Institution, the 
Fund for the Republic, the Institute for Policy Studies, and other 
satellite institutions. I made my recommendations in the form of tw'o 
addresses. The speeches were written. As written here, they have never 
been delivered. But this seemed to me to be a purely legitimate activity 
and the fact that 

Mr. Dash. I am not questioning that, ]Mr. Buchanan. 

Mr. Buchanan. The fact that the Ford Foundation is using its tax- 
exempt funds to fund, by and large, liberal or left institutions pre- 
sents a distortion, in my judgment, of the American political proc- 
ess. There is no conservative foundation which even approaches 
the resources of Ford or which is as active in funding either liberal 
institutions or social action agencies. So my argiunent was that this 
w^as a matter that ought to be put in the public record. That is why I 
wrote the speeches and the investigation was not anything done cov- 
ertly in any manner. 

Mr. Dash. AVell, as a matter of fact, Mr. Buchanan, I would like 
you to turn to tab 4 [exhibit No. 16-1:], which is your memorandum of 
March 3, 1970, to the President, in wliich you clid put dow^n most of 
this on record, and I tliink from this memorandum, must have come 
your investigation and later understanding of the foundation. 

Mr. Buchanan. This is inaccurate. Let me tell you, Mr. Dash, sec- 
ond to the political realinement, the dream of the American consen^a- 
tive is to put together our own Brookings Institution. I believe — is 
this the idea for the Mac Arthur Institute ? 

Mr. Dash. No. Do you have tab 4 ? It is a memorandum on White 
House letterhead, March 3, 1970. 

Mr. Buchanan. I have not been shown this memorandum before. 

Oh, there it is, the MacArthur Institute. 

Mr. Dash. I am not talking about the MacArthur Institute at this 
point. The first page of the memorandum which has a date, March 3, 
1970, on it. 

Mr. Thompson. I believe that is the MacArthur Institute. 

Mr. Buchanan. I have not been shown this memorandum prior to 
todaj^ I have not seen this for close to 4 years. 

Mr. Dash. I am going to ask you some questions. You may have time 
to read it — take as much time as you want. There was 20 minutes dur- 
ing our brief recess in which I had asked you as one of the things to 
look at some of these memorandums. 

In any event, is it not true that the very opening paragraph of that 
memorandum states that the President directed several of us to give 
thought to how to combat the institutionalized power of the left con- 
centrated in the foundations that succor the Domocratic Party? 

Mr. Buchanan. That is an accurate reading of the firet sentence, 
yes, sir, 

Mr. Dash. Now, have you believed that it is appropriate for the 
administration, either the Wliite House or any of its representatives, 
to influence Federal Government grant programs in a way to deny 
grants to unfriendly foundations in favor of proadministration 
foundations ? 


Mr. Buchanan. That would depend. I am not that conversant Avith 
grants, but if the grants are based on lowest bidder, then it should 
be done honestly. If the grants are discretionary within the authority 
of the President to turn them o\er to one institution or another, I 
would recommend to the President that he turn any grants for studies 
or projects like that over to institutions which generally support tlie 
values and principles in which we believe, and not to other institutions 
such as the Brookings Institution, which in my judgment, amounts 
to, really, a government in exile for the Democratic Party. 

Mr. Dash. And in fact, if }ou look on page 4 of your memorandum, 
which follows your recommendation for the MacArthur Institute, 
which would be a Republican conservative foundation, there is a 
heading, "What About the Money'' that would fund such an institute? 
If you look at item 3 under that, the recommendation is that all 
Federal contracts now going to institutions which are essentially anti- 
administration would be shifted to this new baby — and to other pro- 
administration foundations. Antiadministration foundations should 
be cut off without a dime. One good talk to the Cabinet would be all 
that would bo required to get cooperation here and Budget could be 
on notice to notify the West Wing if Brookings gets any more money. 
IVIr. Buchanan. There is nothing in there. Of course, it is a lowest 
bidder thing. I do not have any recommendation in here for violating 
the law. But I Avould urge that the Nixon administration, if there 
are discretionary funds, if there are institutions wliich are su]:»portive 
of the values in which we believe, then our discretionary contracts 
for studies and the like should go to institutions which concur with 
our ideas. I repeat, but what does this have to do with the campaign 
of 1972? 

Mr. Dash. This is in the contention of the question I asked earlier 
about the Ford Foundation and tlie influence of foundations in the 
campaign. I think this is the background of that which led up to 
that. That is why it is relevant. 

Now, do 3^ou also believe, Mr. Buchanan, or did you advocate that 
it is an appropriate function of the White House or its representatives 
to use the Internal Eevenue Division as a weapon against foundations 
you believe are friendly to the Democratic Party and unfriendly to 
the administration ? 

Mr, Buchanan. I have recommended on several occasions, once 
when I received in the mail a political attack on the President and 
the Vice President and the Attorney General — it was a strictly political 
attack, in violation of the law, in my judgment, because at the end of 
the political attack, it said, please send in your tax-exempt dollars 
now. On each of these occasions — there Avere two or three when these 
things occurred — I recommended to Mr. Haldeman that this 
matter be looked into. It appeared to me to be a violation of the law. 
It was the use of tax-exem]it funds for political operations; it was 
disadvantageous to the administration and if these institutions were 
using their tax-exempt status to engage in politics, then Ave should 
move to remove their tax-exemption status. 

As you Avill recall, in 1969 — I am sorry, 1967 — President Johnson 
directed that the tax exemptions of the Sierra Club be removed for 
violation of its tax exemption by virtue of its lobbying. It had only 
sent out a single ad, I believe, on a conservation issue. 


Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, in a single memorandum on the next 
l^age, Mr. Buchanan, page 5 of your general memorandum on the so- 
called liberal foundations and a requirement for a Republican con- 
servative foundation, at the very top of the page, you state that: 

One of my primary concerns about this is that it requires a strong fellow run- 
ning the Internal Revenue Division 

Mr. Buchanan. Right. 

Mr. Dash [continues reading] : 

And an especially friendly fellow with a friendly staff in the Tax Exempt Office. 

Am not sure we have the right now. 

Second, we could use a greater willingness on the part of our Internal Revenue 
to engage in combat with some of these lesser anti-Administration institutions 
like the Stern Foundation. 

Mr. Buchanan. Right. Let me give you the reasoning on this thing. 

After the election of 1964, when Barry Goldwater was defeated, 
there was a conservative foundation that had some personnel that had 
worked in Senator Goldwatcr's campaign. They came within an ace 
of losing their tax-exempt foundation status even though they had 
not engaged in any political activities. There is an apprehension in 
my mind that the Democratic Party came into power and any tax- 
exempt institution created which was not really as clean as a hound's 
tooth, in which any sort of conservative political activity occurred 
would have that tax exemption withdrawn. 

Mr. Dash. Was there any request that you know of by the adminis- 
tration for either tax audits or tax reports from the group of founda- 
tions that 3^ou classified as liberal or 

Mr. Buchanan. No. I think that is — the expenditures of founda- 
tions, I believe, as a result of the 1969 tax act, I believe were a matter 
of public record. I have never seen a tax return of anybody, any in- 
stitution or any individual, that I can recall since I have been in the 
White House. I do not know why you would have to look at a tax re- 
turn. It is a public record what the Ford Foundation's income, its 
assets, its disbursements are. You can just read their annual report. I 
do not believe I recommended that, but again, I have not looked 

Mr. Dash. No, I just quoted your recommendation. I have not sug- 
gested that you have. 

I have asked you whether or not, based on that recommendation, 
you are aware of any implementation or followthrough of any request 
for tax reports ? 

Mr. Buchanan. No, because as I say, it is not a tax report you would 
look for if you are trying to remove the tax exemption of an adminis- 
tration. It is not a financial hanky-pank. It is whether they are en- 
gaged in the political process where they have no business. 

For example, I saw a report back in 1967 or 1968 of the National 
Student Association. It had decided to engage in lobbying and the like 
and it was engaged in wholly political activity. But the same report 
that you had which was a public report, incidentally, showed that they 
had set up some sort of dual fund which enables them to get tax- 
exempt funds in one pot and the other is nontax exempt. 

Mr. Dash. But your recommendation of what would be required as a 
friendly fellow or friendly staff in the Internal Revenue would mean 
some aggressive activity. 

Mr. Buchanan. It is well known that the Internal Revenue Service, 
in our view, was politically controlled by Democrats, or had been at 
that particular time. 


Mr. Dash. Do you know whether or not after this 

Mr. Buchanan. Did we clean it out ? 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Buchanan. We have only gotten something like 10 schedule C 
positions. At this particular time, we had only filled with one of our 
own. It has been the impression, I think perhaps justified, in the past 
that the tax-exempt division of the IRS had been biased agairist con- 
servative tax-exempt organizations and had been very lenient in re- 
gard to liberal tax-exempt organizations and their activities which 
crossed the bomidary into politics. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did you know or do you know, Mr. John Caulfield ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I know him very well. 

Mr. Dash. Did you know of his Avork at the White House, and what 
his work was at the "*A"hite House '( 

Mr. Buchanan. I knew he was doing routine investigations. I had 
no knowledge of some of the activities which have become public. 

Mr. Dash. And you had no relationship in any way with him? 

Mr Buchlvnan. I have a closer personal relationship. He is a very 
good friend of mine. 

Mr. Dash. Did you know about the political activities of a person 
known as Fat Jack ? I think in your statement you indicated you did 
not know the person. 

Mr. Buchanan. The fii-st I heard of Fat Jack is when it came out 
in Mr. Hunt's testimony. 

Mr. Dash. Were you aware that the Committee for the Ee-Election 
of the President had a spy in the Muskie campaign headquarters who 
was photographing Muskie material and turning them over to the 
Committee for the Re-Election of the President ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I was not aware that Ave had a spy. On two occasions 
we receiA'ed — I received, personally — documents from the Muskie 
campaign which were fairly low-grade political ore. They were sent 
over by the Committee To Re-Elect. They were unsolicited papers and 
they were in a photographed form, but whether the individual there 
was a leak or a spy or whether it was Fat Jack or one of these other 
code names or how it came to the Committee To Re-Elect, I could not 
tell you to this day. 

Mr. Dash. How did you — you say you received some material that 
came from the Muskie headquarters ? 

Mr. Buchanan. It came out of the Muskie campaign, that is correct. 
There Avere several batches of photographed documents and, as I 
stated, it was fairly loAv-grade political ore. Leaks are not uncommon 
in campaigns, and a recommendation made to the Committee To 
Re-Elect asked Avhat I should do Avith it, and I said most of it is 
insignificant, but there are two or three items in Avhich Evans and 
NoA^ak might be interested — the fact that Senator Muskie proposed 
using public funds in public hearings to advance his candidacy, which 
would seem to me to be a matter which the people had a right to know. 

Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, did Mr. Evans and Mr. Novak, 
did they publish the matter in their column ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Published, I could not say Avith certitude. What I 
recommended that Ave send to them Avas the material that was pub- 
lished. I Avould have to be shoAvn by the staff — the columur— and I 
would also have to be shoAvn, I think, again the material Ave had. But 


we did get material on two occasions, and I did recommend that it 
be sent to columnists Evans and Novak. Evans and Novak did print 
on two occasions, I believe, material from Muskie's campaign; I do 
not know whether this was the same thing. Mr. Hunt testified, maybe 
I am mistaken, there were maybe 10 batches of it. If that is true, we 
did not see it. 

Mr. Dash. Yes, you only saw two batches ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Just two occasions. 

Mr. Dash. Two occasions. 

Now, an important part of your assigmnent in the 1972 campaign 
was to recommend strategy, was it not ? 

Mr. Buchaxax. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. And what, in fact, was your major recommendation at 
the beginning of the campaign ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I would say that in 1971, as I stated at the outset, 
my principal recommendation was that given the fact that we had 
12 Democrats opposing us, all of them attacking the President, that 
we ought to concentrate and focus our political resources primarily, if 
not exclusively, on Senator Miiskie, who was then the frontrunner 
leading the President in the polls. 

Mr. Dash. Did you put these recommendations in the form of a 
memorandum ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I certainly did. 

Mr. Dash. It was your recommendation, was it not, and I think you 
have just indicated, that the Republican Party all through the cam- 
paign actually attempted to aft'ect the primaries so as to affect Mr. 
Muskie's chances in the primaries ? 

Mr. BucHAN^Ax^ Well, there is no doubt about it that in the summer 
of 1971, we were counterattacking against Senator Muskie. He had 
to run the gauntlet of the political primaries, and — right. If you are 
devising a political strategy, you would have to take these into consid- 
eration and providing scenarios for the primaries, the Democratic 
primaries was one of our functions. 

Mr. Dash. And this actually led to one of your — or at least the basic 
memorandum was the one I think we referred to already, the memo- 
randum of March 24, 1971, which is tab 10 [exhibit No. 170], which 
you called the Muskie watch. 

Mr. Buchanan. There v.ere four basic ones. One was an analysis of 
Senator Muskie. One was an analysis of Senator Humphrey, another 
an analysis of Senator Kennedy, and another an analysis of Senator 

Mr. Dash. Is it not true, Mr. Buchanan, that you personally be- 
lieved that the 1972 election was more than an ordinary Presidential 
election but had a direct relationship for the safety of the country? 

Mr. Buchanan. That is a line, I believe, out of a memorandum of 
mine, the Muskie watch — let me say I would not — I would have been 
less apprehensive liad Senator Jackson been the nominee than Senator 
Muskie or Senator McGrovern. Senator Muskie or Senator McGovern 
had won their election, given their views with regard to American 
policy in Southeast Asia, I think it would have been a little short of 
a catastrophe, that is correct. 

Mr. Dash. If Senator Muskie had won the election ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Given his views on Southeast Asia and later in the 
campaign of Senator Humphrey. The only Democrat I would have 


been mildly comfortable with would have been Senator Henry 


Mr. Dash. So actually, you expressed that view on page 7 of the 

memorandum ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Yes; this is the Muskie watch, 

Mr. Dash. Let me just read you the langua<re that you had : 

We ought to go down to the kennels and turn all the dogs loose on Ecology EJd. 
The President is the only one who should stand clear, while everybody else gets 
chewed up. The rest of us are expendable commodities : but if the President 
goes, we all go, and maybe the country with us. My view 

Mr. Buchanan. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. That was your 

Mr. Buchanan. Mr. Dash, if you read my articles in the New York 
Times, which are a fourth or fiftli draft, you will loiow my rhetoric 
is somewhat hot and you can imagine what the first draft is like and 
that is one of them. 

Mr. Dash. In your 

Mr. Buchanan. Incidentally, let me make a point here. The exag- 
gerated metaphor is really the staple of American political language. 
In the campaign of 1972, 1 recall Mr. Gary Hart said publicly : "If the 
Nixon people do to us wdiat the Humphrey people did to us, which is 
underestimate us, we will kill them." 

I am. sure Mr. Hart did not mean physical violence on us, and when 
I said we are going down to the kennels, the reference w-as not to King 
Timahoe. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Dash. ^Yliat actually did you have in mind when you were talk- 
ing about being chewed up and doing everything that you could in 
order to go down the line to see that Muskie would not succeed? 

Mr. Buchanan. As I say, others disagreed with this — the Buchanan 
memos are not the campaign. I made strategy, others disagreed 
with me. Others felt Senator Kennedy perchance would be a stronger 
candidate than Senator Muskie and if we focused our political resources 
which were formidable, on Senator Muskie and he would decline in the 
polls the result might be the nomination of Senator Kennedy would 
be stronger. My personal view was otherwise. I always felt Senator 
Muskie would be the strongest candidate, that analysis indicates that, 
and we do not ha^■e political resources we coidd not focus on all 12 of 
the Democrats and I asked the President, or recommended to the Presi- 
dent, that the limited resources we were building then, these be focused 
on Senator Muskie. 

Mr. Dash. Let me put this in somewhat focus to see what your un- 
derstanding was as to how far you would want to go because of how 
you saw the fate of the countrv at that time. We have had testimonv 
before us from Mr. Mitchell, the former Attorney General, who, I 
think, in response to Senator Talmadge's question, stated that in order 
to reelect the President he would practically do anything, and in that 
case he was being questioned involving subornation of perjury and 
coverup. Of course, there is no question with you, Mr. Buchanan, with 
regard to that. 

But would you have gone as far. though, did you feel as strongly as 
Mr. Mitchell, do you endorse Mr. Mitchell ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Charles Col son was quoted once as saying, "I would 
do anything the President of the United States would ask me to do. 


period." I would subscribe to that statement for this reason : The 
President of the United States would not ask me to do anything un- 
ethical, improper, or wrong or illegal. 

Mr. Dash. I think your statement really is that I would not go 
as far as Mr. MitchelFs statement. 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, I do not know that Mr. Mitchell has been 
demonstrated to be guilty of anything. I do not know the fact of 
these cases involving the Watergate and I think we ought to leave 
that up to the courts. I am loyal to the President of the United 
States, that is correct. I have been loyal to him for 8 years. 

Mr. Dash. I am not questioning that, Mr. Buchanan. 

Mr. Buchanan. What is it that you are questioning, Mr. Dash? 

Mr. Dash. I am just asking you, in the memorandum, where you 
have indicated the nature of the danger that you saw to the country, 
and the impoi-tance that the forces of the Republican Party including 
the Wliite House be aimed at knocking out the frontrunner, Mr. 
Muskie, liow far would you go to do that ? What tactics would you 
be willing to use? 

Mr. Buchanan. What tactics would I be willing to use ? Anything 
that was not immoral, unethical, illegal, or unprecedented in previous 
Democratic campaigns. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Dash. We will leave that general definition and see whether 
or not some of this we might be able to define a little more clearly. 
Did you have any discussion with anyone at the AAHiite House about 
the possibility of hiring someone like a Donald Segretti ? 

Mr. Buchanan. We certainly did. As you know Mr. Richard "Dick" 
Tuck is the well-lviiown Democratic prankster, we enjoyed some of 
his tricks against us as well as, I am sure, he did. I recall in just 
three, briefly three of his favorites, one of them Avas in 1962 when 
Mr. Nixon began to deliver a major address from the back of a rail- 
road train he put on an engineer's cap and signaled the engineer to 
drive off leaving Mr. Nixon standing there. 

Another of his favorites w^as during a major political speech just 
as the speaker reaches the denouement he drops the fire escape 
on him. 

The third was, we were at the Hotel Hilton down there in Miami 
Beach, and out front demonstrating — I thought it was welfare mothers 
or we heard it was welfare mothers at the time, they were all black, 
they were all pregnant, and they were all carrying placards that said 
"Nixon's the one." [Laughter.] 

Some of the things done to us were hilarious. Mr. Haldeman as he 
has testified, indicated that maybe it is about time we had ourselves 
a political Dick Tuck. I was called into a meeting with Mr. Chapin 
and several othei-s and asked how the Dick Tuck should be struc- 
tured. My recollection of the meeting is that it should be a small 
operation, and that because of 1971 Ave were depoliticizing publicly 
the Wliite House, it ought to be under the Committee To Re-Elect 
the President. That was the last I have heard. I do not know if that 
was the — if Donald Segretti turned out to be the Dick-Tuck-gone- 
awry or not. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Chapin was at that meeting with you ? 

Mr. Buchanan. He was in ]Mr. Chapin's office. 

Mr. Dash. Did you learn Mr. Chapin in fact hired Mr. Segretti ? 


Mr. Buchanan. No, I never heard the name Mr. Segretti until it 
came out in the banner headlines of the Washington Post. 

Let me just state, make a point here also. When these things were 
done by JNIr. Richard Tuck, tliey were considered humorous, pranks, 
stunts, and we thought of them as such. But when some of the things 
done by our people which were similar to those that were done, it re- 
sulted in screaming banner headlines in the Washington Post about 
political sabotage. Now there is a line across which political tricks 
should not go, quite clearly. One of them obviously was in Florida. The 
salacious attack on Senator Jackson, and Senator Humphrey, and 
another I think was against us. against the President when phone 
banks of McGovern's campaign, I believe, were used in California tc 
get near violent demonstrations denying the President of the United 
States a right to speak. These things clearly got out of hand I think 
in both campaigns. 

Let me move to Donald Segretti. The first I heard of that, as I said, 
was the Washington Post and I think you have testified that I was 
called in to a meeting at the White House in October of 1969 when 
this came out, to discuss the handling of the Segretti matter and that 
was the first of any idea we had about the thing or I had about his 

Mr. Dash. What was your relationship with the Committee To Re- 
Elect the President and Mr. INIagruder during the campaign? 

Mr. Buchanan. My personal relations with the Committee To Re- 
Elect was minimal. I had a political aide who had liaison with them on 
some matters but my strategy memorandums and my analysis and 
things like this, these would go directly up to the President, or to Mr. 
Haldeman, or to Mr. Ehrlichman sometimes, so my relationships with 
Jeb Magruder were very few. I was on a committee which they ran on 
Monday nights, but which was not a significant one, but they were 
fairly minimal. I know Jeb Magruder fairly well. 

Mr. Dash. I think having said you "did not become aware of Mr. 
Segretti," you are not able to really tell us Avhat kind of acts Mr. Se- 
gretti may have done ? 

Mr. Buchanan. No, I don't ; that is true. I think he has pleaded 
guilty, hasn't he, to some things, maybe I am wrong. 

Mr. Dash. There is one count. 

Now, were you aware that Mr. Magruder actually had working for 
the Committee To Re-Elect the President political espionage opera- 
tives who, like Segretti, were working in the field ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I don't know that Segretti was — you see there is a 
differentiation between pranksters and infiltration. 

Mr. Dash. I am talking about infiltrators. 

Mr. Buchanan. As I mentioned, I received those Muskie docu- 
ments. I didn't know if that was a spy or if that was a leak. I don't 
know today the source of them. I could not testify to that. I do not 
believe I knew of any spie^ in the other campaigns, because I do not 
believe I received any other documents other than these two, and the 
very fact that I received just these two, would lead me to believe that 
we did not have widespread espionage operation going, 

Mr, Dash. Were you aware 

Mr. Buchanan. Or spies. 


Mr. Dash. Were you aware that any activities were going on, as a 
political espionage matter under Mr. Magruder through Mr. Segretti 
which were also aimed at the candidacy of Mr. Muskie? 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, if you set a grand strategy, if the strategy 
I recommended and, incidentally, I did not set the strategy. I was not 
on the senior strategy board during the campaign, and I did not set 
the strateg}^ for the primary thing but I recommended it. If my 
recommended strategy were adopted, and if there were pranksters 
out there, I am sure they would fit in underneath that but I do not 
laiow that. I don't know that for sure. 

Mr. Dash. Now, it is true, is it not, that you recommended as a 
goal of the Republican campaign effort during the Democratic pri- 
maries that the securing of Senator McGovern would be the best can- 
didate for Mr. Nixon to run against 'i 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, that would not be accurate— I thnik you have 
a memo. I have a line in there that says : "We have not been so good in 
our lives that providence is going to reward us Avith the nomination of 
Senator McGovern." That was a statement in 1971. I did not even do 
an analysis on Senator McGovern in 1971 because we did not consider 
him a serious candidate. We began to consider Senator McGovern 
a serious candidate just prior to the Wisconsin primary when we got 
report of the strengths of his organization, and after the Wisconsin 
primary we did do an analysis, a strategy analysis of the coming 
Democratic primaries which led us to believe that McGovern could 
win the nomination. In my judgment, McGovern was the candidate 
we wanted most at that point in time, and I believe, I did make a 
reconnnendation that all political resources of the Nixon campaign 
and of the Nixon public campaigns that they leave Senator McGovern 
alone and let him proceed unimpeded on the nomination because there 
was a strong chance he would win it. 

Mr. Dash. Let me refer you, Mr. Buchanan, to a memorandum of 
April 12, 1972, to Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman from you and Mr. 
Khachigian which is tab 23 [exhibit No. 183], April 2. Do you. have 
that memorandum ? April 12, excuse me. 

Mr. Buchanan. Let me see if I am right. The cover memorandum? 

Mr. Dash. It is a cover memorandum. 

Mr. Buchanan. Right. 

Mr. Dash. And then the one that is from you. 

Mr. Buchanan. This is right. This is our scenario, I think, of how 
we felt projections and predictions of all 

jNIr. Dash. Yes; let me read at least the first paragraph which I 
think sets forth the position that you have been testifying to : 

Our primary objective, to prevent Senator Muskie from sweeping the early 
primaries, loclving up the convention in April, and uniting the Democratic Party 
behind him for the fall, has been achieved. The 1 livelihood — great three months 
ago — that the Democratic Convention could become a dignified coronation cere- 
money for a centrist candidate who could lead a united party into the election — 
is now remote. 

Now, if we look to page 8 of that same memorandum. 
Senator Baker. What are you looking at, Sam? 
Mr. Dash. Tab 23, April 12, 1972, memorandum. 
Senator Baker. Tab 23 ? 

21-296 O — 74- 


Mr. Dash. Tab 23, and I am now referring to pao:e 8 of that memo- 
randum, Senator Baker. And on the very top of that page : 

Our next goal. What we need now is a decision on wliom we want to run 
against. We believe that McGovern is our candidate for dozens of reasons. He 
could be painted as a left radical candidate, the Goldwater of the Democratic 
Party, and at this point in time we would inundate him. The Wallace Democrats, 
south and north, as well as the Daley and Aleany Democrats would have to take 
hemlock to support a fellow whose major plank is to chop $32 billion out of 
defense. Also he is weak n'ith the blacks and would have to cater to that vote. 
To his great disadvantage Humphrey can take the blacks for granted in a contest 
with the President. 

So in that memorandum tlie deal was, as stated, to have Mr. McGov- 
ern as the candidate for the Democratic Party. 

Mr. BucHAXAN. It asks for a decision, I believe, from the campaign 
hierarchy in the first sentence. 

Mr. Dash. That was your recommendation? 

Mr. Buchanan. My recommendation was repeatedly that we ought 
not to do anything to Senator McGovern in any way to impede his run 
for the nomination and, frankly, Mr. Dash, if anything was done 
against — even in the way of pranks or something like tliat — against 
Senator McGovern in that period of time, then it Avould certainly have 
been contrary to any recommendation that I had made. 

Mr. Dash. Well, actually, on page 24 you make — ^on tab 24 [exhibit 
No. 184], your next memorandum, dated April 27, 1972, from you to 
Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman — that is exactly your recommenda- 

Mr. Buchanan. Right. 

Mr. Dash [reading] : 

With the great success of McGovern and subsequent pull out of Muskie the 
chances of McGovern's nomination are immensely improved. Thus we must do as 
little as possible at this time to impede McGovern's race. 

Mr. Buchanan. I think the reason for that was there were some 
self-starters on our side. We had frankly had one candidate, Senator 
Muskie, on whom we have done enormous research who had dropped 
out of the race. We had done enormous research on Senator INIcGovern 
and there Avere some individuals within the campaign organization of 
the Republican Party who were recommending we move now to be 
critical and lay on the record Senator McGovern's positions in order to 
get him on the record before the convention, postconvention criticisms 
being given little credence and my recommendation was that we not do 
that, that we not be critical of Senator McGovern, that we stay out of 
his effort, and I don't mean that in any pejorative sense but that we 
don't criticize him. 

Mr. Dash. Yes, you notice a handwritten statement which I think 
is legible even in the Xerox at the bottom which says, "T agree with 
this. Pass along to our staff. RNC," et cetera, that looks like John 

Mr. Buchanan. That is the very fii'st I have seen of that notation 
but that indicates Mr. Mitchell concurred with the strategy. 

Mr. Dash. Concurred with your recommendation. 

Did you believe during the campaign, or advocate that the admin- 
istration should use its power to make judicial appointments, including 
the President's power to nominate ]>ersons for Supreme Court vacan- 
cies either for political i:)urposes or to deride the Democratic Party ? 


Mr. Buchanan. I recommended since back in 1968 or 1969 that the 
President of the United States appoint, first, a southern judicial con- 
servative to tlie Supreme Court and. secondly, an Ajnerican of ethnic 
descent, preferably an Italian to the Supreme Court, a distinguished 
jurist, because I feel that Avould be good for the country and I think 
it would have been good for us and it is consistent with our philosophy, 
that is right. 

Mr. Dash. Would you turn to , I think it is, a memorandum on tab 
19 of October 6, 1971, and it is a cover memorandum which attaches 
to your memorandum. 

Mr. BucHAXAN. This is the memorandum on dividing the Demo- 
crats' research. 

Mr. Dash. Yes, dividing the Democrats. 

Mr. Buchanan. They — let me place this in context. 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Buchanan. This says from research as requested. My under- 
standing of this — I had been asked to do a long-range analysis of any 
issues, of any recommendations, of any move that we could take which 
would result in divisions in the Democratic Party, the fact being that 
we can't win unless the Democratic — if the Democratic Party is 
united, which is about twice the size of ours, there is no way we can 
win a national election and we had recommended for a long period of 
time that we move to win to our side certain specific segments of the 
Democratic Party and my recommendations are the southern Protes- 
tants, if you will, and the northern Catholics, both of those strategies, 
and I think this is my long-range analysis of all the possible fissures 
and faults running through the old Roosevelt coalitions. 

Mr. Dash. Right. 

Now, on page 3 of that memorandum under regional fissures, num- 
ber one. 

Mr. Buchanan. Right. 

Mr. Dash [reading] : 

The Supreme Court nomination of a southern district constructionist will 
force Democratic northern liberals and major candidates to anger either the 
south or the veto vote or the blacks and the labor movement and the northern 
liberals, a highly qualified southern conservative nominee to the Supreme 
Court is de facto a divisive issue in the Democratic Party. 

Mr. Buchanan. That is one of those occasions where good policy 
is also good politics, I think, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. But w^hat is^ — your recommendation here was that even 
the President's filling a Supreme Court vacancy 

Mr. Buchanan. Mr. Dash, there is no secret to any individual of 
the national press corps or any individual Avho knows me that I would 
recommend strong conservative judiciary officials be put on the U.S. 
Supreme Court. I have been recommending that since 1966 to the 
President. I would recommend it today, and the side effect of that 
is to be divisive within the National Democrats; that is an ancillary 
benefit with which I am delighted. 

Mr. Dash. Did you say it was an auxiliary ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Ancillary. 

Mr. Dash. Ancillary. 

Now, did you in a memorandum spell out what breadth there might 
be to a Senator Edward Kennedy Presidential candidacy ? 


Mr. Buchanan. Eig'ht, but it was an analysis — I think this was on 
a request. After I did the Muskie analysis, I was asked to do an analysis 
on other Presidential candidates. I did one on Senator Kennedy, I 

Mr. Dash. That would be your June 9, 1971, memorandum, which 
is tab 13 [exhibit No. 173]. 

Were you aware, by the way — I am not making any special refer- 
ences to that, but that does take in the possibility of, the strong 
possibility of a Kennedy candidacy ? 

Mr. Buchanan. That is right. We were low in the polls, or rela- 
tively low in the polls in 1971. I think this reflected that it was our 
feeling that we were low, that if the President looked extremely vul- 
nerable that Senator Kennedy would move, but that if we were strong 
and looked fairly invincible, that Senator Kennedy would lay back. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Buchanan, my next question would not directly 
relate to anything of your knowledge, but the date of this memorandum 
is related to testimony we have already received in this committee. It 
is June 9, 1971, which recognizes Kennedy as perhaps a strong 

Mr. Buchanan. Right. 

Mr. Dash. But we received testimony from Mr. Hunt yesterday that 
he had received instructions from Mr. Colson to fabricate some State 
Department cables that linked the Kennedy administration to the 
assassination of Diem. 

Mr. Buchanan. Mr. Dash, as I have stated, I never heard of E. 
Howard Hunt until June 1972. 

Mr. Dash. I am not connecting that with this. I say the date of the 
memorandum certainly shows that the administration 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, it does not show that. It is a memorandum to 
the Preisdent doing an analysis of Edward M. Kennedy, and my 
analysis indicated that I thought we should focus on Senator Muskie. 
I do not believe there is anything in here which suggests that we 
ought to do anything unethical. 

Mr. Dash. I think you misunderstood my question, ]Mr. Buchanan. 
I am not suggesting that you or your memorandmn suggested any- 
thing other than it brought out the fact that Mr. Kennedy was not to 
be forgotten as a possible Presidential candidate. 

Mr. Buchanan. There was a division of opinion within the "V^^iite 
House and even within the opposition reseai'ch room as to who would 
be the strongest candidate. I think the feeling of some individuals was 
that Senator Kennedy would be a good deal stronger candidate than 
Senator Muskie, but I did not share that view. 

Mr. Dash. Were you ever asked to help develop a newspaper ad 
campaign following up on Vice President Agnew's attacks on radical 

That is 1969. 

Mr. Buchanan. Vice President Agnew's attacks ; you mean, in the 
Des Moines speech and other speeches ? This was in 1969. 

Mr. Dash. Right. During the 1972 campaign, did you pai-ticipate in 
getting attack ads placed in newspapers against Democratic candi- 
dates ? 

Mr. Buchanan. There was only one candidate, McGovern — right. 
We recommended — as a matter of fact, a large portion of what we were 


doing — we recommended a significant budget for the political offen- 
sive as an approach to the pro-Xixon commercials, and so on. We 
recommended placement of those critical materials, but even more im- 
portant, to emulate the Johnson commercials against Goldwater and 
the Humphrey against Agnew, use of television spots against Senator 
iNIcGovern, and we did some which I thought were very successful. 

We reviewed those materials and while I do not know if we prepared 
them, I certainly reviewed some ads. They brought them over to me 
to look at. 

Mr. Dash. I would like to just bring your attention to a memoran- 
dum from you to Messi-s. Clark MacGregor, Haldeman, and Colson, 
August 1, 1972, which is tab 32 [exhibit No. 192]. 

Do you have that memorandum before you ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Right. 

Mr. Dash. Now, do you see political suggestions? [Reading:] 

1. In the Assault Book, we have the quote from McGovern about not "inanu- 
facturiug foolish projects" like the space shuttle. Would it not be wise to have this 
put into ads and pamphlets right now in the area of California which just bene- 
fited Humphrey from the space shuttle. 

No. 2, along the same lines, the old anti-Tydings ad which was so effective, 
in my view, in Maryland. "If .Toe wins you lose," would seem to me an ideal 
all-purpose ad for GOP'ers in areas affected by McGovem space and defense 
cuts. "If McGovern wins, we lose.'' Again, the negative ads, I would think, will do 
more to make the President a big winner than a positive "re-elect the President." 

Mr. Buchanan. RigJit. Can I explain why I believed that? 

Mr. Dash. Of course. 

Mr. Buchanan. My feeling was that when the President was in the 
polls at 65 percent, every vote — or almost every vote — from 55 per- 
cent to 65 was less a pro-Nixon vote or an enthusiastic pro-Nixon, vote 
than it was a vote against the candidate of the Democratic Party and 
our most effective political strategy, since these were Democrats, rather 
than have us say, you know, what a great job we have done, was you 
should focus on the reason why they are voting for Richard Nixon. 
They were voting for Richard Nixon, quite frankly, and we recog- 
nized that, not because they were the most strong supporters of ours — 
in fact, they were the most lukewarm — but because they were in strong 
opposition to Senator McGovern. That is why we recommended that 
we get the strongest slice of the anti-McGovern voters with these com- 
mercials rather than with the pro-Nixon commercials. 

Mr. Dash. Were these also supposed to be signed by the Committee 
To Re-Elect the President or the Republican Party or citizens groups? 

jNIr. Buchanan. No, I would think Democrats for Nixon would have 
been an effective one at the time. But it did not make much difference. 

Mr. Dash. In other words, you would use some sort of group that 
would look like a group of citizens ? 

Mr. Buchanan. No, there is nothing in there about doing that. Po- 
litical advertisements in newspapers are a common staple. We ran ads 
in newspapers and I do not know that they were done unethically. 
All the attack ads which were run, I think, were run after the Re- 
publican Convention. I think most of the attack ads — or the offensive 
ads, I should say — these had on them the identification of Democrats 
for Nixon, which we felt would be a more effective appeal to Demo- 
crats than a Republican group. 

Mr. Dash. Did you ever recommend or approve the use of Republi- 
can campaign funds to go into an ad of this kind, which would be 


placed in the papers, which would have as its support a citizens group ? 

Mr. BucHAXAX. A citizens group? Well, in the campaign, there 
are hundreds of citizens groups that go up, that are set up. You know, 
citizens for honest government, citizens for this, citizens for that. 

But here is the thing. 

Mr. Dash. You would prepare the ad ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I just do the copy. I do the copy or I clear the copy. 
I do not go out and find out what the political connnittee is going to 
be. I would basically probably not do the copy. The advertising folks 
would bring the copy in, I would clear it, say sharpen this, and I would 
say, it should be placed in Illinois or this should be placed in Cali- 
fornia, The details of these things and whether it was a Kepublican 
gr-^ ip or whether it was Democrats for Nixon, these would more than 
liiveLy be decisions of other individuals, I think. 

Mr. Dash. Well, Avhether anybody did it, whether Republicans or 
Democrats, would not such an ad be, in effect, a manufactured ad 
because it would give to readers the impression that a group of citi- 
zens felt so strongly about a particular issue that they would be put- 
ting their own money into purchasing that space and giving the mes- 
sage, which in fact 

Mr. Buchanan. No, Mr. Dash, I have ghosted speeches for Presi- 
dents, Vice Presidents, Senators, Republican chairmen ; I have gliosted 
letters to editors. "VYliat is illicit about ghosting an ad in which indi- 
viduals are going to put their names on them ? 

Mr. Dash. I am asking your advice, not raising any question of 
what is illicit. What I am saying is, in effect: although you say you 
have ghosted speeches; to ghost or manufacture an ad or a letter to 
the editor that purports to be a letter from a citizen and is read by 
fellow citizens as an irate citizen's response, which, in fact, is actually 
written by a mythical campaign worker and sent to a citizen to sign — ■ 
really, is that a true waj^ to mold citizen opinion ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, as long as there is an individual who is will- 
ing to sign a letter and asks you to draft it, or you draft it and an indi- 
vidual, if it does not conflict with his views, I don't think there is any- 
thing, as I say, that would seem to me to be in the same category with 
a speechwriter who is told by a candidate or a President or a Vice 
President, draft me a speech and make these points on it. It becomes 
the property and the views become the vieAvs of the signers. There is 
nothing compulsory. It is strictly voluntary. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Buchanan, did you ever recommend any covert or 
clandestine activities to be taken on during the campaign? 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, it would depend. My own view is that there 
are such things as covert and clandestine intelligence activities that are 
not wrong, that are not unethical and things like that. It is conceivable, 
yes. But what did you have in mind ? 

Mr. Dash. Turn to tab 16 [exhibit No. 176] of your July 28, 1971, 

Mr. Buchanan. Did you say 15, sir? 

Mr. Dash. 16. 

Mr. Buchanan. Here it is. 

Mr. Dash. Do you have it ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Turn to page 5. 


Mr. BucHAXAX. Right. Incidentally, this memorandum is not in my 
memorandum form. The approved-disapproved comment is 

Mr. Dash. I know. I think you told us that in executive session, but 
that probably is another memorandum which you had prepared, but 
was rewritten by the committee with their approved and disapproved 

Mr. BucHAX'Ax. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Page five, you see Special Projects. [Heading :] 

We would like to utilize Ron Walker's resources where possible to handle some 
close-in operations, pickets and the like, and candidates visit various cities. 

What did you have in mind in that kind of recommendation? 

Mr, BucHANAX'. Well, when you have Senator Muskie traveling to 
a city, he will bring with him a traveling national press corps which 
will be interested in the size of his crowds at airports, will be inter- 
ested in the circumstances surrounding his appearance. If you have at 
the airport a group of individuals with a sign that they throw up at 
the right moment, "This is Nixon country," for example, you are liable 
to get an Associated Press photograph with Senator Muskie with the 
sign, which is, we feel, advantageous. 

Mr. Dash. Who was Ron Walker ? 

Mr. BucHAXAN. Incidentally, this, I believe, was rejected. Ron 
Walker was in charge of the President's advance men and so he would 
have — there are advance men we have in various cities around the 
country who, when you go in there, they handle crowds and scheduling 
and they could organize these demonstrations. It would be a less expen- 
sive operation than having men travel around in advance and do it. 

So, he would have an advance in place. I am not certain of it, but my 
recollection is that this idea was rejected and we were not allowed to 
use White House advance men for these types of things, and we did 
use State chairmen. State committees, and the like. 

AVe would phone to them and they would set up the demonstrations 
or they would issue the statements there. 

Mr. Dash. This would be to give the appearance of a demonstration 
against the candidate ? 

Mr. BucHAXAX. That would be one example, yes, sir. Or you could 
have your literature of the Committee To Re-Elect. Or you could write 
up, say, if Senator Muskie were having difficulty with some particu- 
lar question, a list of questions, something like that, you could draft 
the questions and get the local Republicans there to put them on the 
press bus, or to hand out their flyers at the Muskie rally, put them on 
the seats of chairs, things like that. 

Mr. Dash. Would you turn to your memorandum of August 13, 1971, 
which is tab 18 [exhibit No. 178 IJ 

Mr. BucHANAx. Right, the '72 sponsors club. 

Mr. Dash. There it says : 

Attached is a copy of an Evans and Novak column from the July 25 Washing- 
ton Post which indicates that the Democrats are setting up a '72 sponsors club 
similar to the President's club of the LBJ era. For $72 a month, there are a num- 
ber of privileges accorded to those who contribute. 

Pat Buchanan has suggested that we have someone we know, preferably a 
Democrat not connected with us, join this club. This could be arranged by having 
the individual write in explaining that he had read about the club in the news- 
paper and is fed up with the Administration's policies and wants to contribute 
his share and become a member of the club. This would give us many advantages 
in keeping track of Democratic contenders and their strategy. 


Mr. BucHANAX. Yes, sir, that idea is taken out of Larry O'Brien's 
campaign book. He has recommended in his campaign book that it is a 
good thing for Democrats to get on the mailing list for all Republican 
materials they could find. Our recommendation was that someone get 
on the mailing list for all these Democratic materials so that we get an 
ongoing flow of their political literature. 

Mr. Dash. Again, Mr. Buchaium, the point is not whether it is done 
by Democrats or Republicans, because our mandate is to look into the 
entire activity. Is this a form of infiltration ? 

Mr. Buchanan. It is. Yes, you get on the mailing list. Our news 
summary is on the mailing list of Connnon Cause. tVe get all their 
publications. Our reason is we have to put them in the President's news 
summary. It is not because we agree with their goals. I don't think it is 
any more infiltration than that. 

I\Ir. Dash. Were you aware of the covert activities sponsored by the 
Republican Party for the Democratic National Committee during the 
time of the convention ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Was I aware of any? Xo, I was not aware of any. 
I would trust we had some intelligence people down at Miami Beach 
to see how they handled their convention — that is a gigantic affair — 
how they handled their press, how they handled their demonstrations. 
Frankly, their scheduling was a little weak in terms of the hour of the 
morning at which Senator McGovern spoke. I would hope we would 
have people down there looking at this, but this was not my function. 

Mr. Dash. "Would you look at vour memorandum of April 10, 1972, 
on tab 22 [exhibit No. 182], to' Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman? 
Page 2 of that memorandum. 

Mr. Buchanan. Yes, sir 

Mr. Dash. Just at the bottom, "the dangers" are : 

If all hell breaks loose down there, they could conceivably point up to the 
Republicans at the Fontainebleu to distract attention from themselves. 

Thirdly, they could get some demonstrators to indicate tliat the Republicans 
up there told us to come down here and "raise hell." Anyone at the observation 
post should be clean as a hound's tooth — and the observation post should have no 
hand in any "covert operations" on-going in Miami. 

Mr. Buchanan. That is right. 

If you look at the top of that page, it says "The Republican forward 
observation post should be made public." 

That was my recommendation. I was at the 1968 Democratic Conven- 
tion in an observation post, which was made public. I had recom- 
mended that we set up a similar observation post at INIiami Beach 
with the Democrats and that I go down there from the White House, 
with someone else at the White House. I believe we did have one. But 
the reason I did not go and this recommendation was withdraAvn was 
because, frankly, of the Watergate incident and apprehension on my 
part that if, from the podium, they said they have some Republican 
spies up there in the Fontainebleu and they are there from the ^AHiite 
House, we would never have caught up with the story. 

I did recommend a forward observation post down there. We had it 
in 1968 at the Chicago convention of the Democrats. Governor Love of 
Illinois was in both the observation post and 

Mr. Dash. But you recommended that it be kept clear or clean, 
away from any covert operations ? 


Mr. Buchanan. Rig^ht. There were 2,000 press in Miami Beach. 
I certainly hope we had people down there demonstrating for Richard 
Xixon. But anything like that should be kept away from the observa- 
tion post, we should be clean as a hound's tooth out of apprehension 
at the allegations made against us so we could say flatly, no, we had 
nothing to do with X, Y, or Z. 

Mr, Dash. Mr. Chairman, I have just one more question. I would 
like to show you a pamphlet which purports to be issued by Citizens 
for a Liberal Alternative. 

By the way, do you know of the group, Citizens for a Liberal 

Mr. Buchanan. Xo; Len Garment called me one night after some- 
one had come back from the committee, and he asked me, Mr. 
Buchanan, or Pat, are you familiar with Citizens for a Liberal Alter- 
native 'I I said, it sounds like a fine organization. 

Senator, this pamphlet has only been shown to me. I have seen a 
Xerox of this. This pamphlet has been shown to me by the staff, I 
believe ]Monday night. Prior to that, Mr. Lenzner showed me a copy 
of it which was not identifiable. 

My recollection of this is largely based on my political assistant, 
Ken Khachigian, who tells me that I edited it. To my recollection, 
this pamphlet was not my idea, I did not draft it, I did not order it 
produced, I did not order it distributed. I do not know to whom it 
went, but if he says I edited it, I edited it, rather, the text of it. He 
is an honest individual and I assume he did it. 

Mr. Dash. Did he tell you that he prepared it? 

Mr. Buchanan, No, he said he told you that he prepared it. 

Mr. Dash. All right. Do you know that the fact is that there is 
no such organization as Citizens for a Liberal Alternative ? 

jMr. Buchanan. Right. The error in this — from my understand- 
ing — is that it failed to have on it the proper identifying name of an 
individual avIio belonged to the organization, which is not an unroutine 
shortcoming in a Presidential campaign. As a matter of fact, I have 
brought with me, ]Mr. Dash, as I said I would the other night, a 47- 
page diatribe against Senator McGovern which was released all over 
the Democratic Convention and which similarly lacks identification. 
From Time magazine ; I understand the author of this is Mr. George 
]Meany and sponsorship is Mr. Barkin. I trust that if we could intro- 
duce that one into your evidence, they will go through the same 3 
hours of discussion of that as we are going through material like this. 

Mr. Dash. And what in effect this was aimed to do was to show 
liberal Democrats, purportedly from an organization of liberal Demo- 
crats, that Senator Muskie was, as it says in the first page, Ed Mnskie 
will be no different from the Nixons, Agnews, Mitx:hells that we liaA'e 
now, and make him a candidate of the Democratic right. 

Mr. Buchanan. The rhetoric is not leftwing rhetoric, but the state- 
ments on Senator Muskie's position on gun control is accurate, on 
the statement with regard to the black Americans — there is not an in- 
accuracy in terms of the writing 

Mr. Dash. What I suggest is that the j)urpose of the pamphlet as 
you see it is to represent to liberal Democrats that a liberal Democrat 
organization is urging them to not vote 'for Senator Muskie. 


Mr. Buchanan. Right. Mr. Dash, the thing looks to me, it is a fairly! 
unsophisticated document. A fairly unconvincing document. It looksj 
to me like more of a joke. It does not look like it is going to convince 
an intelligent liberal Democrat to do anything. 

Mr. Dash. The record will show that this particular pamphlet was 
distributed quite widely throughout the country by different opera- 

Mr. Chairman, I have referred to a number of memorandums and 
specifically read from these memorandums during the coui'se of my 
questioning of Mr. Buchanan, and also this particular pamphlet. 1 
would like to have those particular memorandums, and especially those ; 
portions that I have read from, identified for the record and admitted 
in evidence. 

Mr. Buchanan. Can we introduce the Meany pamphlet, sir? I 
brought it with me. 

Mr. Dash. Do you have the Meany pamphlet? 

Mr. Buchanan. Yes ; this is the document here, the McGovern rec- 
ord, a critical appraisal. Attached is the Time article. 

Senator P^rvix. Without objection we will receive both documents 
for the record at this time. 

[The documents were marked exhibits Nos. 158 and 159*,] 

Mr. Dash. By the way, is that one of the files we subpenaed !? 

Mr. Buchanan. No, it is not ; I do not believe so. I just had this in 
hand fairly recently. 

Mr. Dash. How did you obtain that ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I do not know. I think it was sent to us. 

Mr. Dash. Did you request it ? 

Mr. Buchanan. No, we have done, in our own spare time, a little 
political research into the background of other political activities. 
Just as the committee suggested that things went wrong in the Repub- 
lican campaign, we felt there were some errors in the Democi-atic cam- 
paign and we brought it to your attention. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Buchanan, I am sure we have. If you have any ad- 
ditional things, we will be glad to see them. 

Mr. Buchanan. No, I only have this one. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Dash, I might say there are others and you 
will indeed receive copies and you will not be disappointed. 

Mr. Dash. I take it they are not presently in the committee files. 

Mr. Buchanan. No; I do not know what the committee file has got 
other than my memos. 

Senator Baker. I do not believe I will tell you. 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Buchanan. I think you have given us some in- 
struction into the practicalities of American politics that are unfor- 
tunate policies of unorthodox matters of both political parties. 

The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock. 

[Whereupon, at 12 : 30 p.m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at 2 
p.m., this same day.] 

Afternoon Session, Wednesday, September 26, 1973 

Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. Mr. Thompson. 
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Buchanan, several documents were referred to 

*See pp. 4055 and 4059. 


this morning and I would like to go over a few of them with you. You 
were asked to respond to particular passages from particular docu- 
ments that were read along and I think it is important that we get 
the full and complete flavor of the documents in case there is any mis- 
understanding. I would refer to page 7, of tab number 10 [exhibit 
No. 170], which is a memorandum for the President from you; sub- 
ject: the Muskie watch; and I would like to discuss your paper on 
Senator Muskie, Senator Kennedy, and Senator Humphrey. 

I think in fairness to your position, we might point out, at least 
one other than the ones read to you. On page <, the final paragraph, 
it says, "The attacks should not be name calling, they should be well 
thought out." 

Mr. Buchanan. Right. 

Mr. Thompson. In the first place, when you say attacks, what are 
you talking about ? 

Mr. Buchanan. That would be, the reference would be to the politi- 
cal offensive, political speeches, political statements, political adver- 
tising, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Thompson. Political speeches by whom ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I think I indicated what I felt to be the political 
resources which we could utilize. As well as I can recall, in 1971, the 
President vetoed our authorization, if you will, to bring in the Cabinet 
and to utilize the Vice President. This is not to suggest that we gave 
any directives of any kind to the Vice President, but in mid-1971, I 
think there was sort of a general rule that the Cabinet and the Vice 
President Avould not engage in political colloquy, and the other re- 
sources I think I have named were the national committee, of course, 
the burgeoning resources of the Committee To Re-Elect. You have 
State parties, and you were beginning to get State committees. You 
have Republican Congressmen and Senators who were willing to take 
a hand in it. Senator Dole, who Avas an extraordinarily effective 
spokesman, I felt in our behalf. You have the Republican publication 
Monday which had high credibility with the national media and 
which was readily picked up on wires. These would be a few of the 

Mr. Thompson. So when a public figure, in effect, made a speech 
promoting the candidacy of the President and taking a position 
against the leading Democratic opponents, that would be an attack ; is 
that right ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Right, that would be a political attack, right. 

Mr. Thompson. "\Miat was the political climate with regard to name 
[^ailing? Was there name-calling throughout the campaign? 

Mr. Buchanan. I think if you go through some of these, the 
March 14, 1972, memorandum, I think you will find a recognition 
and awareness on our part that when the campaign gets heated 
things are going to get out of hand. They invariably do. You have 
statements made that are too much, that are excessive, so we recom- 
mended that one individual, and I named in that memorandum, the 
Attornev General, or that he designate a deputy who would be 
assigned to clear all political copy coming — 'all attack, offensive copy 
?oming out of the campaign in order that we not run into the same 
problem we ran into in 1970 when some of the ads were excessive and 
counterproductive. But there is an awareness, I think, through a 


number of these momorandums that things, when you get into the heat! 
of a campaign, individuals do go too far. Some of the — I recall in 
Senator McGovern's campaign — I am sure Senator McGovern now, , 
would not like to refer to the fact that he compared American policy 
in Indochina with the nationalist extermination of the Jews or that 
he compared the President of the United States with Adolf Hitler. 
These things were excesses, I think, in the campaign that occurred 
and we were cognizant that they would occur. Some things would 
occur on our part as they occurred on tiie other side. 

Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you to turn over to page 8 of that same 
memorandum. In the final paragraph you say : 

My recommendation then is for creation of the Muslcie watch, an operation 
worlving perliaps within the Republican National Committee, which may even 
he a publicized operation, doing constant research on Ed. 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, frankly, I had even considered myself — I 
was, in my own mind fairly certain, not that Senator Muskie would 
get the nomination, so I had thought myself of sort of resigning from 
the White House Staff, making a fairly high le\el operation in the 
Republican National Committee which would have all the research 
and data on Muskie to which the political reporters could come and 
which would be a publicized operation and which could issue state- 
ments vis-a-\ds Senator Muskie, but even though in some of these 
memorandums it said that the Muskie watch was created, in reality 
it was not created. The Muskie watch amounted to actually little more 
than the research files of Buchanan and Khachigian. 

Mr. Thompson. In any of your recommendations regarding the 
possible candidacies of the leading Democrats, did you in any way 
advocate the defaming of anyone ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, no. In a public statement that sort of thing 
is not only mistaken, it is counterproductive. 

Mr. Thompson. I refer you to tab 1?> (exhibit No. 173), if I may, 
on page 5. That memorandum is dated June 9, 1971. Confidential. 

Mr. Buchanan. This is the Kennedy memorandum. 

Mr. Thompson. For the President from you. EMK, political memo- 
randum. You discuss pros and cons, his assets, deficiencies, and on page 
5 under the heading of Chappaquiddick, yon state : "This, of course, 
will be kept in the public mind by the press — speculating on whether 
it is helping or hurting EMK." 

Mr. Buchanan. Right. 

Mr. Thompson [continues reading] : "We ought to stay miles away 
from it — indicating even in private, it is hard to say the affect; we 
don't know." 

Mr. Buchanan. Right. 

Mr. Thompson. Was this policy followed ? 

Mr. Buchanan. It was. Let me add another case similar to the thing 
when Senator Eagleton's problems came over the national wire the 
President directed — I was in the room when he did it^ — directed all 
Republican spokesmen out on the campaign trail to make no comment 
whatsoever about it. This, the Chappaquiddick thing, I think, the 
same policy was in effect. This would be my recommendation, that our 
speakers make no reference whatsoever to it in public statements, and 
this was made in the coui^se of a confidential memorandum. I l>elieve 
it was a course that was followed. 


Mr. Thompson. In these evaluations, did you set up the strong 
points of the candidates as well as their deficiencies ? 

Mr. Buchanan. We certainly did. As a matter of fact, the memo on 
Hubert Humphrey is very laudatory, as I recall. 

Mr. Thompson. That is tab 11 [exhibit No. 171] and thar was next 
on my list. 

Mr. Buchanan. Right. 

As a matter of fact, you lead off — the sources of these were basically 
three: One was the files, the excellent files maintained at the Repub- 
lican National Committee on tracking of candidates. The second was 
our own research operation under Mort Allen, the news summary, we 
would get about 30 newspapere and magazines; everything on those 
candidates would go in those files. You read that. The third would be 
conversations I had on a regular basis with political reporters. 

Mr. Thompson. Would you read the first paragraph of that memo- 
randum dated April 19, 1971, for the President ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Entitled '"Resurrection of Hubert Humphrey." It 
reads : 

One emerges from a perusal of our "Humphrey file" with a grudging regard 
for old Hubert. Since November, with but a few notable exc-^ptions. the ex- Veep 
has conducted himself remarkably well. He receives an excellent price. He has 
maximized his assets, and minimized his deficiencies. The result is that today, 
unlike six months ago, the man is a serious contender for the Democratic 

And it moves on from there to analyze, how we analyzed, how Sena- 
tor Humphrey made a rather, what we felt was a remarkable come- 
back and had made himself a credible candidate for the Democratic 
nomination in a period of time wherein no one felt that he would have 
had another opportunity. 

Mr. Thompson. You were asked to address yourself to broader is- 
sues respecting the propriety of certain things and I believe multi- 
plicity, this in historical context, and to 'preface my next question, I 
would like to read certain passages from "Lyndon B. Johnson: The 
Exercise of Power,"' written by Evans and Novak, and ask you to 
evaluate this in terms of 3^our own political experience. It says: 

Behind the slapdash, jerry-built campaign structure, one element of strategy 
was devised in comparatively orderly — and extremely secretive — fashion. It was 
what was known as the anti-campaign. 

Not often did all these members of the anti-campaign meet at the same time. 

About the Johnson campaign — 

They came and went, and Feldman and Sharon were first among equals. The 
job was easily defined : embarrass the Republicans, get under Barry Goldwater's 
skin, thereby achieving Johnson's overall goal of winning by the biggest possible 

For example, it was learned early in the campaign that half a dozen small 
liberal church journals, one of them published by the Protestant theologian, 
Reinhold Niebuhr. had scathingly editorialized against Barry Goldwater as a 
man not to be entrusted with the Presidency. 

Just a coui:)le of more paragraphs. 

Normally these editorials would not have found their way to congregations 
across the country until months after publication. The anti-campaign opera- 
tion, duplicated them by the hundreds and saw that they got appropriate church 
groups throughout the nation in a matter of days. 

Another project was more typically in the realm of black politics. If Gold- 
water were to speak somewhere at six o'clock, one local anti-Goldwater .speaker — 
usually a Democrat but sometimes a Republican — would be scheduled at four 


o'clock and then another man at eight o'clock. Thus Goldwater wonld l>e brack- 
eted by the opposition. An impression of feverish anti-Goldwater activity would 
be given on the very day of his appearance. 

Now, the point here : 

Another anticampaign ploy was to make generous use of the letters columns 
of local newspapers. The anti-campaign group would ask a Republican business- 
man known to be backing Johnson to write an anti-Goldwater letter to the 
editor of his local newspaper on a day calculated to get the letter published just 
as the Groldwater caravan swept into town. Or. just before Gold water's arrival, 
a local democratic official would be told to plant a letter in the newspaper pub- 
licizing Goldwater's position on a major issue if, as .so often was the case, the 
Goldwater position was anathema to the majority of voters in that city. 

This clandestine operation was Johnson's campaign pet and he was kept 
closely informed of everything the group did. 

First of all, is this what we are talking about in regard to the 
letter-writing system? How do you evaluate its propriety in Ameri- 
can politics? 

Mr. BucHAXAN. Well, we had established within the — we did struc- 
ture the thing within the Republican National Committee a letter-writ- 
ing campaign in 1969. The purpose of it was to make efficacious use 
of political volunteers with computers and the like, licking envelopes 
and things like that. There are not much more of those assignments. 
]More worthwhile would be a letter to the editor operation and what 
you do is draft sample letters and you send out letters that are pub- 
lished to show your volunteers in various States how to write a short 
sharp letter. You recommend they write to their local newspaper and 
then you begin to send them fact sheets and other information on 
issues that you want — if in favor of welfare reform or in favor of 
revenue sharing, something like that — send them short fact sheets and 
you have to rely on the individual in the State to do his own job and 
then they would send back to you Xeroxes, say, of letters that had 
been published. I think it is an effective use of volunteers and we had 
a structure like this set up at the Eepublican National Committee 
which, I believe, was transferred to the Committee To Re-Elect the 
President in 1972. 

I think the group that you are referring to could have been ]\Ieyer 
Feldman's five o'clock club in Johnson's administration, the counter- 
part of which would have been our "9 :15 group'' in the White House 
which was known as the — enshrined by John Osborne and Jules Witt 
cover as the attack group, which is the phrase of Chairman Ervin, 
was not a minor organization. We had similar organizations like that. 

Mr. Thompson. It is your opinion, then, that as long as the peo- 
ple who sent these letters out ascribed to the viewpoint espoused, those 
were proper campaign practices ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I believe so, right. If the signatures are not forged, 
if the people agree with the point of view, the drafting of a letter for 
them is no more unethical, I think, than the ghosting of a speech. 

Mr. Thompson. Thank you, sir. 

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. You say that they contemplated using the Attor- 
ney General or somebody in the Depart mejit of Justice to scrutinize 
the press releases ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Yes, sir. Well, to be candid, it was this memoran- 
dum I believe I sent on March 14, recommending that the Attorney 
General clear all campaign copy. At that point in time, it was my un- 


derstanding or our expectation that the Attorney General would be, 
by the time these campaign materials were prepared, the campaign 

Senator Ervin. So the Attorney General, while drawing a salary 
from the Federal Government and ostensibly discharging the duties 
of Attorney General, was censoring and passing on campaign releases? 

Mr. Buchanan. No, sir; that would not be accurate. The attack or- 
ganization strategy, the memorandum that I drafted was for the fall 
campaign, which would begin after the Republican Convention in 
August. By that time, it would be our expectation that the Attorney 
General would no longer be Attorney General, but would be our cam- 
paign chairman. 

Senator Ervin. But you did not hold back the press releases until 
he actually retired and became campaign manager did you ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I do not believe we ran any national media ads, 
which I was referring to, during the time that Mr. Mitchell was At- 
torney General. The national media campaign, all of which was to be 
cleared, was post-August, I think. 

Senator Ervin. I thought you were talking about press releases. I 
make a distinction between a national advertisement and a press re- 

Mr. Buchanan. I would make the same distinction, Mr. Chairman. 
If you have a review function by the Attorney General, I would — al- 
though I do not know that I stated it — generally restrict it to major 
stuff. If you have a small, minor, fairly insignificant release, I think 
that can be done down the line. But anything like those ads in 1970, 
for example, which were controversial and counterproductive, was de- 
signed to make sure the campaign chairman or someone in author- 
ity — one person cleared all the materials before the public. 

Senator Ervin. It does strike me, as a strict constnictionist, that it 
is rather peculiar to have an Attorney General pass upon the wisdom 
of issuing press releases while he is still in that office. 

Mr. Buchanan. Senator, I am not a lawyer, but there is a precedent 
for that in Attorney General Robert Kennedy. 

Senator Ervin. Yes, that is one reason I have been advocating di- 
vorcing the entire Department of Justice and the Attorney General 
from political matters. I would think that — incidentally, I might state 
that when the committee passed on the nomination of Mr. Mitchell, 
Mr. Mitchell said he agreed with me on that point. That is twice he has 
agreed with me, once on my executive privilege and once on stopping 
the Attorney General from being a political adviser to the President. 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, far be it from me to disagree with both you 
and Mr. Mitchell, Senator, but in his book on the Presidency, Clinton 
Rossiter indicates that the President of the United States himself, one 
of his duties and roles is that of political leader of his party. It seems 
to me that political duties are really inseparable from the f miction of 
the Office of the Presidency. 

On legislation and the like, where I would make recommendation to 
the President or he would ask me my view on that, invariablj^ the 
political impact of the decision would go in there. There is sort of a — 
between issues and politics — there is a sort of symbiosis, and I do not 
know that you can really draw a hard and fast line as to what is and 
what is not political. It is a difficult thing to do. 


Senator Ekvin. Yes, it is. We have tried to draw it in the case of the 
FBI and the CIA. 

Mr. BucHAXAN. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. It has always seemed to me somewhat incongruous 
to unite the functions of being a campaign manager and censor of 
campaign materials with the Office of Attorney General. I think the 
Attorney General ought to — but that is sometliing you and I are not 
responsible for. I would just make this observation, as I frequently 
have. The fact that Bobby Kennedy may have done this did not justify 
Attorney General John Mitchell doing it. 

Mr. Buchanan. No, sir; tu quo que is the weakest of all arguments. 
Senator Ervin. Now, you say that the President issued instructions 
not to talk about the problems of Senator Eaglet on ? 

Mr. Buchanan, Yes, sir. I was in his office the day the report came 
in and I recall the President said, "Send out orders I want everybody 
who is out on the road, surrogates, everyone, informed that they are 
not to discuss this matter in public.'" 

Senator Ervin. Now, you made the memorandums to the President 
in your function as director of stra/tegy about what should be done in 
the campaign ; did you ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I have been doing political memorandums of this 
kind for the President for almost 8 years. Senator, and some of these 
memorandums were done before I had the function and some of them 
were done subsequent to the function. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. Well, the President was not altogether above 
the battle during the campaign of 1972, was he? 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, my memorandum would go in. The disposi- 
tion or the decision as to what the final strategy would be, as I have 
indicated, would be made very often without my knowledge as to 
whether m_y strategy or my recommendations were accepted. 

Senator ER^^N, Did you make recommendations to Mr, Haldeman ? 
Mr. Buchanan. Yes, sir ; I think most of the strategy memorandums 
after mid- 1971 were addressed to the Attorney General and to Mr. 
Haldeman. I would be fairly confident that the President would have 
seen some of them, but that would be something that Mr. Haldeman 
would have to testify to. 

Senator Ervin. I have been a little troubled by the proposition that 
the President stood above the battle in 1972 because I think, having 
been a candidate for a number of offices, I have never seen a candidate 
who was not interested in what was going on in his campaign. 

Mr. Buchanan. There is no doubt about it. The President was inter- 
ested in wdiat happened in his campaign, but you can campaign fairly 
effectively by being President of the T'^nited States, as the returns of 
the Presidential campaign of 1972 would indicate. 

Senator Ervin. But he was interested and did issue directives from 
time to time, did he not ? 

Mr. Buchanan. From my conversations with him, I would say he 
indicated a mild interest in the outcome of the 1972 campaign ; yes, sir. 
Senator Ervin. I was very much intrigued by your testimony, and I 
want to commend you for the frankness of your testimony that you 
advised the President that they should see that grants were channeled 
to organizations that supported the President's philosophy. 
Mr. Buchanan. Can I clarify that, sir ? 


Senator Ervin. Yes, sir, I would be glad for you to. 

Mr. Buchanan. If you are talking about the grants and contracts 
and things like that, that are up for bids, if there are discretionary 
funds at the disposal of the White House — in other words, the White 
House says the State Department is doing a study of a foreign policy 
problem, and it is within our discretion as to whom that contract 
should go — my recommendations would invariably be that we give the 
contract to those particular public policy institutes which were suppor- 
tive of our point of view and philosophy. 

Senator Ervin. And you favor that, even in cases that the other party 
or applicant was better qualified, as long as the matter was discre- 
tionary Avith the President ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, I certainly would not recommend that he 
grant to totally unqualified and incompetent individuals; but if it is 
six of one and half a dozen of the other, I would favor our side. 

Senator Ervin. Suppose it was seven of one and five of the other ? 

Mr. Buchanan. We are getting close, Senator. I think if it were 
eight to four, we might go the other way. 

Senator Ervin. I would judge from your testimony that if some- 
thing had to be submitted to the lowest bidder, the lowest bidder should 
get it, but if it is anything that is discretionary, the ones favored 
should be the ones whose political philosophy and activities harmo- 
nized with those of the President; otherwise, they would be disqual- 
ified or should be ? 

Mr. Buchanan. No, here is the thing : Let me give you an example 
in the Brookings Institution. I am sure if you asked them to do a 
study^ — this is purely hypothetical — on some disarmament problem 
and they had the capability to do it, and some other public policy in- 
stitute also had the capability to make the study effectively, I am sure 
both of them would do the best they could. They both would do ob- 
jective research. But in my view, if we have discretionary funds and 
it is within our decision, we ought to support our own decisions which 
support our philosophy and our point of view and our values, that is 

Senator Ervin. Well, I suppose that is a practical application of the 
"if you scratch my back, I will scratch yours" philosophy. 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, it is not uncommon in American politics. 
It is not unethical or wrong, I believe, either. Senator. 

Senator Ervin. One reason I am a Democrat is because Andrew 
Jackson said the Government should emulate the example of heaven's 
rain and shed its benefits equally on all people. 

Mr. Buchanan. Senator, I believe President Jackson was the father 
of the spoils system. 

Senator Ervin. Yes, but he ran things pretty well under the spoils 
system. [Laughter.] 

Well, I realize that in all probability, politicians of both parties 
have yielded to that principle. But it is rather disconcerting to have 
it asserted here as official policy for the campaign to take the taxpayers' 
money and turn it over in the form of grants or compensation to people 
on the basis of the fact that they share the President's philosophy 
rather than let it go on the basis of merit. 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, Senator, as I have stated, my recommenda- 
tions would be as they were. But the recommendations of Buchanan 

21-296 O — 74- 


are not necessarily coterminus with administration policy. I do not 
know that this has been followed at all. 

Senator Ervix. Well, I will have to say 1 admire the Buchanan 
recommendations. They are very forthright. 

Mr. Buchanan. Thank you," Senator. 

Senator Ervin. I do not fully approve of all of them, however. 

I think you have a sense of humor and I am glad I have one, be- 
cause I do not know how you would get over the rough spots of life 
without one. I am like you; I do not object to some humorous things 
being done in a political campaign. But I infer from the testimony 
that you gave this morning that if it is true, as has been charged, that 
some persons in Florida forged, made a forgery on what purport exi 
to be the letterhead of Senator Muskie and disseminated it. broadcast 
it, making salacious attacks upon Senators Jackson and Hun:iphrey 
for the purpose of discrediting them, that is beyond the pale. 

Mr. Buchanan. That crosses the line. Senator. My own view is that 
there are four gradations. There are things that are cei'tainly utterly 
outrageous and I would i^ut that in with the kind of demonstrations 
against Vice President Humphrey in 1968 which denied him an op- 
portunity to speak for almost a month. Then, there is dirty tricks, then 
there is political hardball, then there is pranks. I think you will al- 
most have to leave it to the individual and his own sense of ethics 
as to what is permissible. There is no question but what the line was 
probably breached in both campaigns in 1972 and perhaps previous 

Senator Ervin. Sometimes, that is left to people's determination 
that have no ethics and we have very unethical things happen. 

Mr. Buchanan. Yes, sir; that is very true. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Baker. 

Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

This is really a fascinating line of inquiry, Mr. Buchanan, and you 
are a fascinating witness in that you not only have clear perception 
of your role in the political realm of the United States, but the verbal 
agility to express them most clearly and forthrightly. It is an oppor- 
tunity for us to examine some areas of this inquiry that we really have 
not had a chance to touch before. I do greatly admire your description 
of the gradations of political activity. I think I want to pursue that 
just for a moment a little later. Let me make one or two inquiries of 
you first. 

The question of whether or not the President was above the cam- 
paign in 1972 or was engaged to a significant degree in the campaign 
in 1972 and what the quality of the Presidential role is in a campaign, 
is one that concerns me greatly. For instance, I am concerned as much 
for how active a President is, as how disengaged he may be from a 
campaign. I happen to think that the President is necessarily a poli- 
tician, and I think the tighter his control of the political process is, 
the better off we all may be. So I have no quarrel and I hope and trust 
you have no quarrel with the President conceptualized as a politician. I 
think it is inevitable and essential. Would you agree with that? 

Mr. BuciiANAiSr. I would agree ; yes, sir. 


Senator Baker. The second point I think you have touched, that has 
major significance for us, is not completely spelled out in the man- 
date of S. Res. 60 which created this committee, but I think it is 
clearly implied in the scope and jurisdiction of our inquiry. That is, 
what is the role of the favored, tax-free foundation in public life? I 
am not going to prolong ajid extend the conversation and colloquy 
that you and the chairman had about the awarding of discretionai-y 
grants of contracts. I think I understand what you mean and I think 
it means, all other things being equal, we are going to give it to our- 
selves instead of theirs. 

Mr. Buchanan. Precisely. 

Senator Baker. If all other things aren't equal, we may think about 
it a little more. 

Mr. Buchanan. That is right. 

Senator Baker. But there is another question in that, and I am 
deeply disturbed about the role of foundations in any event, because 
of their tax-free situation, they are able to amass huge sums of money 
and control huge blocks, huge amounts of capital in this country and 
I think this committee ought to look into what is the apj^ropriate 
role, if any, in the formulations by foundations of public policy, pub- 
lic attitudes, and political undertakings. That is just as fuzzy and in- 
distinct as your gradations of political activity. But I suggest that 
that may be an inquiry that we need to approach, and I hope that we 

Would you agree that that is a significant part of the political pic- 
ture of this country ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I do. My conception that there seems to be an im- 
balance in the political process when I don't believe there are any 
major foundations that have more than $1 billion in assets, or at one 
point they didn't, with the sole exception of the Ford Foundation, 
which has $43 billion in assets, generating an income of probably $180 
to $200 million. And these funds, of course, have been used for quasi- 
political operations. They have been used for public policy institutes 
like the Brookings Institution, various funds on the west coast, the 
Institution for Policy Studies, and by and large, the institutions they 
fund. The quasi-social action movements they fund are on one side of 
the political spectrum, which I think, given the enormous power and 
wealth of the Ford Foundation, they can tend to tilt the balance in 
the other direction. 

Frankly, if we, the conservatives, had a foundation such as the 
Ford Foundation with similarly funded public policy and study in- 
stitutes and the like, I would not complain. The situation is analogous 
to that, in my view, of the networks, where a particular p^iii^sophy 
and point of view of a small group of men has tended to dominate these 
media conglomerates and, really, to control the flow of news and in- 
formation to the American people. To me, that is not a satisfactory 
situation and it is a matter that ought to be raised in the political 
forum. I have recommended since 1970 that we do so. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Buchanan, I have neither the time nor the in- 
clination at this point to try to fill in the blanks in tliose three broad 
categories that I have ti-ied to describe, that is, the role of nonprofit 
foundations in the formulation of public policy or public attitudes, 


keeping in mind that foundations, by reason of their tax-exempt 
status, are, in effect, subsidized by the Federal Government. They are 
subsidized to the extent that they ai-e free of taxation which must be 
borne by other individuals and not borne by that foundation. 

Mr. Buchanan. Precisely. 

Senator Baker. And second, tlie question of where do you draw the 
line on political activity; and third, to what extent should the Pres- 
ident be involved. 

Let me focus in on just one of those three, though, for the remain- 
ing minutes I have in this series of the inquiry. That is, what is ap- 
propriate and what is not appropriate as political activity? I suppose 
that is such a subject — I have inquii-y that Ave Avill ever establish it 
satisfactorily, but we have to try. We liave to establish some sort of 
guidelines if we fulfill the charge of our jurisdiction as a committee. 

But precedent is good. Precedent gives us at least some insight into 
what has gone on before. I have a copy of the Democratic Cami:)aign 
Manual that was delivered to me this morning, which I have had a 
chance to peruse briefly. Are you familiar with that manual? 

Mr. Buchanan. If it is Mr. O'Brien's manual, I have read seg- 
ments of it. I am not totally familiar with it ; yes, sir. 

Senator Baker. Neither am I. I have onlv had a chance to scan it 
briefly. It was given to me, I believe, by Mr. Khachigian, who works in 
your office. 

Mr. Buchanan. He is our researcher. 

Senator Baker. I would like to call your attention to tAvo or three 
sections of it and see if you have some personal knowledge of it. Some 
mention was made of letter-rewriting camj^aigns in your campaign 
and things of that sort. I notice in the section entitled "Women," 
which I didn't think Avas permissible anymore, but in the section en- 
titled "Women," it reads on page 4, it says : 

Stay at home volunteors can use their brains and typewriters to promote the 
candidate through public letter columns in the local papers. These are read from 
cover to cover in many liomes. Letters should be brief and concentrate on one 
point. Such letters can serve to set the record straight when mistakes have been 
made ; to call attention to the candidates' programs. 

And so forth. 

There is another section under the section, "Newspapers," on page 11 
of that subsection, which says : 

The letters to the editor pages haA'e a liigh readership. Most newspapers which 
oppose you editorially will print your side of the story in the form of a letter. 
Make such letter short and to the y'oint. Don't sjiend your time abusing the paper 
or the editor. Use the space you will get to state your argument and be positive 
Avhenever possible. 

It seems to me in this Democratic manual, they are suggesting, in 
effect, a program for Avriting letters to the editor and mass letters to 

Is this, in your experience, a form of political activity that has been 
practiced ? 

Mr. Buchanan. It certainlv is. Senator. My familiarity Avith that 
is partly due to the fact that I used to be an editorial writer and we 
ourselves would edit letters to the editor. Our surveys indicated in 
a number of cases that the letters-to-the-editor column had a higher 
readership than our own editorials. It is a useful device for the Avriter 


to present his views in a political campaign. It is a fairl}^ useful activ- 

Senator Baker. There is another reference also under the Women's 
section that says, '"Talkers.'' I am sure Larry O'Brien did not pick 

Mr. Buchanan. They used the term "Women" before their 1972 
convention, I imagine. That would be copersons in there now^, Senator. 

Senator Baker. Copersons would be better. 

However, it is not my function to advise on the editorial comment. 

It says : 

"Call in" and "open mike" radio and TV shows offer a good opportunity for 
putting across the candidate's views and records — at no cost. Organize teams 
to call in to these shows to speak up on the issues of the campaign. They must be 
well informed, persuasive, polite, and natural. 

That, I take it, is a standard, more or less accepted campaign prac- 
tice in the United States. 

Mr. Buchanan. Yes. 

Senator Baker. We get to a few others, however, that come to my 
particular attention. On page 8 of "Research," it says: "Arrange 
for some of your staff members to have their names placed on the 
opponent's mailing list" et cetera. 

Mr. Buchanan. Eight. 

That is w^hat Mr. Dash was referring to. That is what we were doing 
when we said the Democrats had set up some group called 72 which 
cost $72 to join. Some of our people would send in $72 in order to get 
some of the literatui-e sent out by those organizations. 

Senator Baker. "Candidate exj^enses'' under "Budgeting." 

The candidate's first consideration must be paying for permanent expenses : 
meals, hotel rooms, telephone calls, et cetera. He pays for them out of his own 
pocket, have the treasurer arrange to pay out of a special fund or the general 
fund, or allow for a contributor to pick up certain bills. Most of the candidate's 
personal exi>enses will be incurred in traveling, but there are many shortcuts to 
limiting on-the-road spending. Contributors can be persuaded to lend the candi- 
date their telephone, hotel, or gasoline credit cards. 

Mr. Buchanan. I don't have any knowledge, or much knowledge 
of the financial end of it, but I guess that would come under the terms 
of a campaign contribution. I don't know how something like that 
would be handled. 

Senator Baker. Or how it would l3e reported. 

Mr. Buchanan. How it would be rej^orted, right. 

Senator Baker. It might be reported under the "in kind" section of 
the Federal Reporting Act. There is a section that deals with that, 
but if it is in fact a service or a facility and of the amounts to a 
certain amount under the Federal statute, it has to be reported. 

Another section of budgeting, on page 4, it states : 

Some of the finest campaign stationery, for example, is designed and supplied 
by the printer or shop favoring the candidate. Buying at wholesale, sympathetic 
merchants are often happy to provide supplies as their contribution to the 

Which I take it as well would be something that should be con- 

Mr. Buchanan. It would have to be reported. 

Senator Baker [continuing]. Should be considered in terms of the 


general campaign fund. Here is one that particularly caught my 
attention also under fund raising on page 8. It says : 

If the hotel is running the bar at the social hour, see if you can get i. 
percentage of the gross. Normally, 10 to 20 i^ercent. 

Mr. Buchanan. Mr. O'Brien goes into some detail. 

Senator Ervin. I was just going to inquire whether under the regu- 
lations, the gross was the beverage or the receipts for the beverage. 

Senator Baker. I was going to inquire whether it was in kind or in 

I think that covers it. But the point I am reaching for, Mr. Bu- 
chanan is, that this committee's function is to try to undertake to 
identify those things that are illegal, unethical, immoral, or imdesir- 
able. To do that, we have to establish some understanding of the 
range of political activities of the United States. 

Now, I am not alleging by reference to the Democratic campaign 
manual that these things are illegal. I am not alleging that they are 
necessarily improper. But I do ask you whether or not, in your knowl- 
edge as a practicing politician and a Federal official, they fall gen 
erally in the purview and scope of what is done in campaigns by both 
parties — that is, letter writing, such as letters to the editor, such as 
getting your name on the other fellow's mailing list, such as trying 
to get stationerv supplies and equipment donated to you and thing's 
of that sort? 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, in terms of — first, my knowledge would only 
deal with getting on the mailing list and getting information in a 
legitimate fashion. I think everything you stated up there seems to 
me to be routine, although I have no specific knowledge, for example, 
when we travel with the candidate or with the President in areas — to 
me, I don't know how advance men work to set up rooms, who pays 
for what, things like that. We just go in and out. 

I tell you, that might be an education if you get a couple of first-rate 
advance men up here to tell you how they put these things together. 

Senator Baker. We may have to do that. 

Mr. Buchanan. I am very, very limited in that area. I have no 
knowledge of how they do it. 

Senator Baker. Let me ask you one final, concluding line of ques- 
tions in the few minutes I have remaining. You were questioned rather 
extensively on the political activity in your office and by you in moni- 
toring the campaign of Senator Muskie or Senator McGovern or Sena- 
tor Humphrey and the like. 

Do you know of your own knowledge, or can you tell us whether or 
not such political monitoring activity — that is, keeping account of the 
political health and x^rospects of potential adversaries, in a Presiden- 
tial campaign is the general practice and is always done, or has been as 
far as you know ? 

Mr. Buchanan. As far as I know, it has, and the Republican Na- 
tional Committee, of course, mider Senator Dole was a very effective 
organization and their research there was some of the best I have ever 
seen. But to my knowledge, there has always been a sort of tracking of 
the opposition. 

I have read books where it was said that President Kennedy had his 
eye on Senator Goldwater and was watching the progress of liis can- 
didacy. I am sure Larry O'Brien, Mr. O'Brien when he was in the 


White House, might liave liad something to do witli political activity 
there. So, I think these sort of things are really, in my judgment, rou- 
tine. As I suggested to tlie chairman 

Senator Baker. Mt-. Buchanan, do you think they are desirable? I 
happen to tliink they are. 

Mr. Buchanan. I believe they are. I believe they are. 

Certainly, if a President; let us say a President has a program and 
policy he wants to have carried out in foreign policy that is going to 
take over 8 years, he has to be reelected to do that and he should hav(» 
someone on his staff who understands these matters and can research 
these matters and can comisel and advise him on how best to be re- 
elected without which reelection there cannot be any continuation of 

Senator Baker. I will conclude this time segment by relating quickly 
a stoiy they tell on former Speaker Sam Rayburn who was hearing 
a glowing account of a distinguished Vice President of philosophei-s, 
theorists, doctors of this, that or the other, professiomil men who had 
gathered around a duly-elected President. After this long account had 
l)een given by tlie newly elected Vice President, he asked, '"What do 
you think, Mr. Sam?"' He said, "I think I would feel better if one of 
them would run for sheriff."' 

I frankly and honestly confess that I think politics is essential to 
the functioning of a self-governing system and I do not think you can 
separate the President from politics and I do not think you should 
and I Iiope you would agree with that. 

Mr. Buchanan. I concur with you. Senator. 

Senator Ervin, Senator Talmaclge. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Buchanan, I believe you testified this morn- 
ing that part of your duties and responsibilities at the White House 
was to provide a news analysis to the President and brief him prior 
to press conferences ; is that accurate ? 

Mr. Buchanan. That would — the President's daily news summary 
is something which I do not prepare but which is in my jurisdiction. 
It is prepared for tlie President and placed upon his desk every morn- 
ing and prepared by a staff' headed by Mort Allen. It is in my juris- 
diction and I am genei-ally responsible for it, but I do not make a 
significant contribution to its preparation. I did during the campaign 
of 1972, which I will mention in a minute. 

With regard to press conferences, I am the desk man, if you will, 
for all the research and material from the National Security Council, 
from the Domestic Council, from the various shops in the White House 
and the agencies, the briefing materials which come to me which are 
cut, digested, and then presented to the President in his briefing books 
for his press conferences. I have been doing that for 6 or 7 years. 

Now, with regard to the campaign of 1972, Senator, there was an 
aspect of that, a news summary where I did make a contribution. I 
would come in in the morning at 6 :30 or so and we would go through 
the seven or eight Eastei'n papers and the Chicago Tribune, if it were 
available, and through the news summary would do a complete politi- 
cal analysis to i:)ut on top of tlie news summary which would go on the 
President's desk and we did it from September through the election. 

Senator Talmadge. Immediately after the break-in of the AVater- 
gate you were aware many of the newspapers had speculative stories 
and articles about various people in the White House and in the Com- 


mittee To Re-Elcct the President beino; involved in the coverup. Werej 
any of those newsstories withheld from the President \ 

Mr. BuciiAXAx. No, sir, they were not. As a matter of fact, f^iven the 
fact that we would not include in the President's news summaries news J 
items like, say, a natural disaster abroad and news items that are not I 
of specific interest to the President, it would probably be a hi^rher 
percentage of copy within the President's news summary devoted to 
an issue like Watergate than there would in your average newspaper. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Buchanan, 1 send by a member of the staff 
a memorandum prepared by you, Patrick Buchanan, dated Maich ;>, 
1070, on White House stationery — Xerox (•o])y including your signa- 
ture, and I will ask you to please identify it. 

Mr. Buchaxan. Is this one I have seen t 

Senator Talmadge. One you testified about this morning. 1 want 
your identification for the purpose of inserting it in the record. 

Mr. Lenzxer. It is tab 4 [exhibit No. 164] . 

Mr. Buciiaxax. This is one that I have not — as I said, this is one of 
the ones I was not shown the other night. 

Senator Talmadge. It is tlie one you testified about this morning. 

Mr. Buchaxan. Right. They asked various facets of me and I testi- 

Senator Talmadge. Will you take your time and testify about it and 
see if it is a true, accurate Xerox copy with your signature affixed 
thereon ? 

Mr. Buchax'ax. It appears to be, yes, sir. This is the March 3, 1970. 
memorandum, and it appears to be my memorandum, yes, sir. 

Senator Talmad<;e. I thank the Chair, and I believe the chief coun- 
sel says all these memorandums will be inserted in the record. 

Mr. Buchanan, I ask you please to tui-n to page 5 of that document 
and follow with me the following language beginning with para- 
graph 1 : 

One of my primary concerns about this — 

And we are referring to foundations and your recommendations to 
the President — 

is that it required a strong fellow ninuing the Internal Revenue Division and 
an especially friendly fellow with a friendly staff in the tax-exempt office. I am 
not sure we have this right now. 

You may or may not recall that Randolph Thrower, a constituent of 

Mr. BucHAX'AX. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. A fine lawyer, fine gentleman, outstanding Re- 
publican, was then collector of intei-nal revenue. 

Mr. BuciLvxAX. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. He held that office from April 1969 to June 
1971. Did Mr. Thrower leave his office under ])ressure I 

Mr. Buciiaxax. Not to my knowledge. Senator Tahnadge. 1 just 
could not answer that. It is true that Mr. Thrower was in the Internal 
Revenue but I believe, as I have stated, my understanding of the 
situation was that we had done an unsuccessful, and quite candidly 
a very bad job, of taking effective control of the agency as was within 
our rights by appointing our own schedule (^'s to those available posi- 
tions which we had open to us. 


Second, it was our belief, justified or not, that within tlie Tax- 
Exempt Division there was basically a hostility to our point of view, 
and for us to set up, say, a ]\IacArthur Foundation or a John Adams 
Foundation as we talked about it, and to have that set up and say we 
left office in 1072 and have politically inspired individual removed, its 
tax exemption would be a problem. 

Senator Tai.madge. I thought jNIr. Tln-ower was supposed to be a 
friendly man. He was appointed by the President. 

Mr. BucHAXAX. Sir, this is not just the head of the Internal Revenue 
Division. There is an office within it, I believe. 

Senator Talmadge. Did he not ran it, did he not head it? 

Mr. BuciiAXAX. He headed the entire ao-ency but as I say. Senator, 
our view Avas that we did not, we were not statl'ed in depth at the 
Internal Revenue, IRS. 

Senator Talmadge. Please follow with me further on the same 
page. Paragraph 5 : 

Some of the essential objectives of the institution — 

And this is the proposed foundation that you propose to establish, 

\ would have to be blurred, even buried in all sorts of other activities that would 
1 be the bulk of its work, that would employ many people, and that would provide 
t the cover for the more important efforts. 

Are you not recommending the same thing to be set up that you are 
( complaining about in other sections of your memorandum ? 

Mr. Buchanax, Well, Senator, there is indeed a gray area in the 
( thing in terms of political activity. One of my reconnnendations, quite 
( candidly, was that within this foundation we would set up a group ; 
! a lawyer about 35 years old and with some young law clerks who would 
; gage the qualifications of Federal judges across the country in terms 
I of both their qualifications and philosophy, and these type of things. 
I Quite candidly, if another administration came in they would say 
that is political activity and we will take away its tax exeuiption and 
' so my recommendation was, basically would be, that this would not be 
a highly publicized thing within this institution; that is correct. 

Senator Talmadge. Let us read further now. The next paragraph : 

Every menial task of Government possible would be sent over to the founda- 
tion to carry out at cost-plus-10. 

Mr. Buchanax. That is right. 

Senator Talmadge. A^^lat do you mean by that? 

Mr. BuciiAXAx. Well, that would be instead of sending these as- 
signments over to the Brookings Institution and have them do it at 
cost-plus-10, we would send them to our new institution. This is only 
a discretionary contract. Senator. This would not be 

Senator TALMADfiE. Go ahead, are you finished ? 

Mr. BucHAXAN. No. This would be — we have not an available in- 
stitution, conservatives do not today, to do the kind of work that 
that the Brookings Institution does. I am sure the Brookings Insti- 
tution, cost-plus-10 simply means that the Brookings Institution — 
or, I am not sure a slight margin on what they do in terms of assign- 
ments, and we would simply — what this says is we would shift these 
assignments over to the new institution if we set it up. 

Senator Talmadge. I want to make myself perfectly clear. As a 
member of the Finance Committee and as a member of the Joint Com- 
mittee on Internal Revenue Taxation, I have worked as hard as I 


know how to keep that service out of politics, out of anyone's politics, 
Democratic politics and Republican politics alike. I am thorough! 
aware, as you are, that some of these foundations have intruded int 
the political arena when they should not have. "We have tried to cor- 
rect it in legislation. I have even tried to go further, I have inserted 
in tax bills provisions to get them out of the arena of voter registra 
tion. But I lost that battle on the Senate floor. It seems to me that 
what you are proposing here is to try to get unfriendly foundations out ^ 
of the political arena and get f riencUy foundations in. j 

Mr. Buchanan. No. 

Senator Talmadge. Is that what you are seeking to do ? 

Mr. Buchanan. No, what I am seeking to do is — would be to estab- 
lish — first off, it is my belief, as expressed in this memorandum, there 
is a bias that had already existed witliin the Internal Revenue Serv- 
ice. In my judgment, I do not recommend, incidentally, that you take | 
away the tax exemption of the Brookings Institution. I do not believe 
in politics. 

Senator Talmadge. If they get involved in politics, I think their tax I 
exemption should be denied because they violate the law. 

Mr. Buchanan. I agree 100 percent but I do not think the Brook- 
ings Institution engages in politics. It engages in studies which are 
used. I think that law should be very tight. But, we should have in- 
stitutions similar to that in my judgment, and secondarily, what you 
see here is a reflection of my view that there was a political bias that 
existed against conservative institutions, whereby the IRS would 
look at them a good deal harder than they look at others. 

Senator Talmadge. How were you going to determine what is 
political and what is not if you get into the area of thought control ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, if you are referring to 

Senator Talmadge. I do not see how you can outlaw liberal foun- 

Mr. Buchanan. You cannot. Senator. 

Senator Talmadge. And say they must be conservative to get the 
tax exemption. The only yardstick you can have, as I see it, is whether 
or not they engage in politics and if they are engaged in politics. 
Democratic, Republican, Liberal, Conservative, or Reactionary they 
ought to be put out of business. 

Mr. BuciLVNAX. Not put out of business, have their tax exemption 
taken away. 

Senator Talmadge. Exactly, that is what I mean. 

]Mr. Buchanan. I would concur with that but even though I am 
critical of the Brookings Institution as biased in the other direction, 
I agree with the use of tax exemption for institutions Avhich study 
public issues even if they are liberal or conservative as long as they 
are studying public issues. But if they are engaged in voter registra- 
tion, if they are demonstrating up on the Hill for legislation, if they 
are lobbying, if they are taking out ads to influence the votes of Con- 
gressmen one way or the other, I would concur. But as long as it is 
educational. Senator, even if it is liberal, I have got no objections to 
its tax exemption. 

Senator Talmaikie. You and I are in thorough accord on that. The 
only difference I can see is the one distinction. You are opposed to 


unfriendly foundations and favor friendly foundations. Is that an 
accurate statement I 

Mr. BucHAXAx. I think that would be a fair statement ; that I am 
opposed to unfriendly, in favor of friendly, but I would not recom- 
mend. I do not believe, removing; the tax exemption from a foundation 
which was strictly engaged in studying issues even if it were a liberal 

Senator Talmadge. All right, let us go one step further in your 
memorandum. On page 4, paragraph ;>. Page 4 of your memorandum, 
paragraph 3, the second sentence : 

Anti- Administration foundations should be cut off without a dime. 

Mr. BucHAXAN. Senator, there is a differentiation between giving 
antiadministration foundations our money and leaving them with 
their tax exemption. I believe that we ought not to fund liberal tax- 
exempt foundations. There is no inconsistency in that position, with 
the statement that they also ought to be allowed to keep their tax 
exemption. I do not think we ought to fund them, simply. 

Senator Talmadgk. Are you not talking about tax money belonging 
to over 200 million American people ? 

Mr. Buc'iiANAX. Well, here is the thing. You are talking about it 
two ways. You are talking- about it as if we in the White House are 
giving tax exempt — I am sorry, I mean tax funds to a foundation. 
They get a death tax exemption and they get a tax exemption as well. 
My only recommendation would be to cut off the first. 

Senator Talmadge. You use the phrase "our money." You really 
are talking about the taxpayers' money. 

Mr. BuciiAXAx. Taxpayers' money. 

Senator Talmadge. Let me make this suggestion to you. 

Mr. BuciiAXAx. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. If you have some recommendations for improve- 
ment of foundations to g-et them out of the political arena, you get the 
President to send up an appropriate messag:e and you will have my 

Mr. BucHAXAx. Thank you very much. Senator. It will be appre- 
ciated, I can tell you. 

Senator Talmadge. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervix. Senator Gurney. 

Senator Gurxey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

I think this matter of foundations has intrigued the Congress for 
a long time and I would like to pursue that a little further. As I recall 
the testimony this morning, Mr. Buchanan, you did make, I think, a 
general statement that the big foundations support liberal Democrat 
views. Is that a fair statement to make 'I 

Mr. BrcHAXAx. The biggest one, the Ford Foundation does. No. 2, 
I believe is the Rockefeller Foundation. But when you get down 
below that to Lilly and Duke and some of the others in the top 10 they 
are, some of them, Mellon, for example, are supportive of conservative 
things but conservative foundations, to be quite candid, are less ag- 
gressive than the Ford Foundation. 

Senator Gurxey. Could you give us examples of how the Ford 
Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, give their support '( 

Mr. BucHAXAx. Well, exclusive of the Rockefeller Foundation 
which I had not studied, the Ford Foundation, for example, provides 


funds for the Institute for Policy Studies. The Institute for Policy 
Studies liolds, has held, it is my recollection, it is Baskin's and Bar 
nett's outfit, they hold seminai-s witli Congressmen, for staffer's and the' 
like and they deal in tryino; to influence Congressmen and the like to 
vote in one direction. They get very close to the line but they, in turn, 
if I am not mistaken, the Institute of Policy Studies has in turn funded 
the Quicksilver Times which was a radical — it is one of the radical, 
what they call underground newspapers which has a political point 
of view which is sold for profit. 

Senator Gurxey. Do you have any copies of that ? 

Mr. Buchanan. This is, as I say, the studies that I did, Senator, 
Avere done in 1970, and I could get the background. All that material 
was in the speeches we had drafted and had set for delivery. There is, 
of course, the highly celebrated also, the fund that the Ford Founda- 
tion provided to ex-Kennedy staft'ei-s in 1968. 

Senator Gurnet. Well, would you f ui-nish a copy of the draft of the 
speech for the record ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I will take a look at the speech and I would have to 
take a look at that speech first. 

Senator Gurney. Go on. 

Mr. Buchanan. In 1968, the Ford Foundation under Mr. Bundy 
provided sort, of severance pay foi- the Democratic staffers of Senator 
Edward Kennedy. In the mayor's race in Cleveland, in 1968, I be- 
lieve, they funded a voter- — Ford Foundation funded a voter regis- 
tration drive in the black area which was partially responsible for 
the defeat of Seth Taft and a victory for Mr. Stokes in that area. 
I believe the legislation now is that you can fund voter registration 
drives, but you have to do it over an area of something like five 
States. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference under Mr. 
Abernathy is the one that caught my attention. What was done there — 
they, of course, are funded by the Ford Foundation, or have been. 
They sent to me what was a strictly political literature document 
which was called in effect, "We did a-, y, and z to Mr. Nixon and 
Mr. Agnew,-' and at the bottom of that it said, "Send in your tax- 
exempt contributions." Now, this is what we raised Cain about, Mr. 
Haldeman and I. It was checked out and some of thcvse groups like 
that group in the NSA, I believe, set up dual funds. In other words, 
if you send in your check and declare it tax exempt, they say it 
goes into educational fmids. I don't know what efforts there has 
been made to sec if there is a commingling of funds or not of those 
things. These would be a few of the things that I can recollect from 
those particular speeches. 

Senator Gurney. These are examples of direct political activity. 

Mr. Buchanan. These were examples of direct political activity. 
But one of the questions I was making earlier was — it is just my 
judgment — that if you have a number of public policy institutions that 
are of the liberal persuasion, I agree with the tax exemption for 
these kinds of institutions even if you disagree with them. But if 
you have got a giant like the Ford Foundation which is pouring 
tens of millions of dollars into the creation of studies which, in effect, 
argue for a particular point of view, persuasively, like you take a 
Brookings study, as soon as a study — Brookings study — is done, you 
w^ll see it on the front page of the New York Times and the Wash- 


ington Post precisely what they recommended, and these things are 
moved into the political bloodstream, and one of my basic conten- 
tions is that there is an imbalance in resources with regard to these 

Senator Gurney. Mr. Buchanan, it seems as if a copy of the Quick- 
silver Times has turned up here, so if I can have a staff member 
take it over to ]\Ir. Buchanan — would he identify this as what he is 
talking about. Is that the publication? 

Mr. Buchanan. It appears to be. This is a — came across March 23 
to April 6, 1972, edition. Eight. The information I have came out 
of an article, I believe, in the Washingtonian magazine, or I would 
have to check the source but it indicated that IPS. 

Senator Gurnet. Mr. Chairman, may we have that marked as 
an exhibit and included as an exhibit ? 

Mr. BucpiANAN. It indicated that the Institute of Policy Studies 
which was the beneficiary of Ford money 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, an exhibit has just been given the witness 
which we haven't seen. Frequently, when I have presented exhibits and 
minorit}^ counsel has not seen it, questions have been raised about it. 
I don't even know what that paper is. 

Senator Gurney. I wonder if a staff member would give it to 
Mr. Dash so he can look at it. It is a very interesting publication. 

Mr. Thompson. I believe Mr, Lenzner has seen that publication. 

Mr. Buchanan. Senator Gurney, I do not speak with the authority 
of the administration on this issue. This is a matter of personal interest 
to me but I have always felt that legislation perhaps which would — 
the Ford Foundation is divided into four separate very powerful 
divisions, one of them is foreign, I think one of them is national affairs, 
which budget has been increased, one of them education,, and the other 
is something else. If legislation were passed, say to restrict the founda- 
tion to a particular percentage of the gross national products in its 
assets, that legislation could result in the dismantling of the Ford 
Foundation's essential power structure while leaving all the benefits 
there. In other words, you could — national affairs would be one founda- 
tion, education would be another separate foundation, this would be 
another separate foundation, and if one of those foundations deter- 
mined to move into the political arena, then perhaps that could, the 
tax exemption on that particular foundation might be, if they wanted 
to, the tax exemption could be withdrawn but it seems to me this is 
the problem. It is the concentration of political power in all those 
resources and frankly something analogous to an antitrust situation 
with regard to the Ford Foundation, I think, would be advantageous 
to the political process. 

Senator Gurney. On page 5 of tab 4 [exhibit No. 164], in the para- 
graph marked four — it is about the middle of the page. 

Mr. Buchanan. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. You mentioned, you say this: "We would be 
striking at the heart of the establishment." What do you mean by the 
word "establishment" there. 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, that would be, and it might not be, in agree- 
ment with this, but in my own view there is existent in the country in 
essence an intellectual and political establishment to which the major 
networks, the Ford Foundation, some of youi" major public policy 


institutes, the dominant media on the eastern seaboard, the liberal 
wing of the Democratic Party in the Senate and others can be saicj 
to belong. I think, this is my view, I think there is a prevailing Unci 
set by these groups and they are in control of significant political! 
assets and there is nothing conspiratorial or anything of that nature 
about it, but I thiiik it is essentially the political establishment of the 
country, the dominant political establishment of the country against 
which you might set to be simplistic, Mr. Nixon and his middle Ameri- 
can constituency. 

Senator Gtjrney. Are you saying that in these large foundations 
you are talking about there really is an establishment that directs its 
views oriented in the liberal direction ? 

Mr. Buchanan. There is tremendous interlocking directorates. If 
you take a look at INIr. Kaysen's institute at Princeton, the Brookings 
Institution, the Ford Foundation, Harvard Center for the study of, 
Kennedy Center for the study of politics and things like that, I think, 
you will find the same individuals who move on these various board 
of directors and, I think, it is not unfair to characterize that as — and 
the term is not necessarily pejorative — as a national establishment. 

Senator Gurney. In tab 10 [exhibit No. 170] on page 7, if you would 
turn to that, there is also a meaning of the Ford Foundation. Tab 10, 
I think is the Muskie watch, isn't it ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. And there is an allegation in there that the Ford 
Foundation is behind Muskie's candidacy. Could you elaborate on 

Mr. Buchanan. Which page is it ? 

Senator Gurney. Page 7 of tab 10. 

Mr. Buchanan. I think it is; certainly some troublesome questions 
could be raised ; yes. I think it is in a question form, Senator, are they 
behind his candidacy? Investigation should be done on this score. I 
don't liave any knowledge, the evidence would be clearly circumstan- 
tial. I think Senator Muskie on several junkets that had been — or trips 
abroad that had been sponsored and funded by the Ford Foundation — 
I think Senator Muskie had been prominent on each of these or all of 
these, and I think this was available, I think, in Congressman Pat- 
man's hearings which I read in the Congressional Record. I think this 
is where that came from. 

Senator Gurney. You never found any direct evidence that that 
was so ? 

Mr. Buchanan. No, sir; no, sir. These are just ideas. 

Senator Gurney. You gave us some examples of some of Mr. Tuck's 
pranks and tricks this morning. Do you have any others; did he do 
anything in the 1972 campaign ? 

Mr. Buchanan. No. I think he was at our convention, I believe. 
They were putting out a newspaper down there. Most of his pranks 
in 1972, I think, were directed at Senator jMuskie. He did something 
at a tea in New Hampshire. I believe, but it was — I can't recall ex- 
actly. I think after the Watergate thing frankly, anybody- who was 
involved in these kinds of pranks and things was probably drawn in. 

Senator Gurney. Do you recall any further the prank in New 
Hampshire ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Of his prank ? 


' Senator Gurney. Yes. 

Mr. Buchanan. I do not. Senator. 

Senator Gurnfa*. I wonder if we have settled the issue of the Quick- 
silver Times yet, Mr. Dash. Have you had an opportunity to read it? 

Mr. Dash. Yes, but was there a question, Senator Gurney, that the 
Quicksilver Times was funded by the IPS, the Institute of Policy 
Studies, which is part of the Ford Foundation ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I think, if I am not mistaken, that is in a public 
record in an article that was written on the Institute for Policy 
Studies, and I believe it was one of these small Washington magazines 
and in all this research going on, since I was familiar with the Quick- 
silver Times, I believe as a commercial venture it would seem to me 
this would be an illicit use of tax-exempt funds, and the IPS, of course, 
is Ford funded. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Rogovin, who is general counsel for the Institute of 
Policy Studies, has just contacted the committee and says it has never 
funded the Quicksilver Times, and the only money it ever received 
from — that IPS received from Ford was $6,000 in 1964. 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, as I say, this is my understanding of an 
article which I have read. It is a question of fact, and I would be happy 
to go back and find the research I did on this. 

Senator Gurney. Would you do that? 

Mr. Buchanan. I would, Senator. 

Senator Gurney. And submit that for the record. I take it the 
Quicksilver Times is in jeopardy at the moment; is that, Mr. 

Senator Ervin. No, Senator, I looked at the thing. It seems to be 
what you call the sort of undergi'ound hippie paper, and I am- — I 
would be glad to put it in the record if you want it there, but so that 
I may not remain in a state of ignorance, I would like to know what it 
has to do with what Ave are investigating. 

Mr. Buchanan. Senator, that is correct. 

Senator Gurney. I think it has. Although today I just glanced at 
it quickly, but it talks about people coming to San Diego. This has 
something to do with the Republican National Convention when we 
were going there before we went to Miami Beach and it also says some 
unflattering things about the Republicans, so I would say this was 
one of the dirty tricks department, I don't know who is responsible 
for it. 

Senator Ervin. Whose dirty trick ? 

Senator Gurney. That is'^what I just said. I don't Imow Avho is 
responsible for it. Perhaps we had better make this part of our hear- 
ings and find out Avho is responsible for it. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I really suggest that we not get into 
a quarrel over this. I have sat here day after day and had stuff put 
in the record, much of it I not only did not know about or didn't see, 
but much of it I could find only the most tenuous connection with what 
we are investigating. I think we are pretty far down the road to start 
showing a causal connection between the allegation and source. I know 
here, for instance, that the Quicksilver Times suggests that demon- 
strations are a crucial part of the range of activities, what the political 
goals confronting the GOP are and there should be one massive legal 
demonstration past the sports arena and it gives a whole bunch of stuff. 


I don't, know who that is, but it is in fact in the mainstream of, 
political activity and I su<i<rest rather than ar^rue about it we put it in; 
the record for whate\er it is worth. 

Senator Ervin. I will put it in the record accompanied by my state- 
ment that I can't see what it has got to do with what we are investi-| 

Senator Gurxey. I agree with the chairman. 

I don't Avant to upset the Democratic counsel so I will withdraw that 
and perhaps we can identify it further on in the dirty tricks depart- 

Senator Baker. If the Senator will yield ; since it is here, let's put it 
in the record and we will check it later. 

Senator Gurney. I don't want to embarrass the Democrats. 

Senator Ervix. AVait a minute. 

It doesn't embarrass me. I am a Democrat and I didn't have anything 
to do with the Quicksilver Times or the demonstrations. [Applause.] 

Senator Gurney. I didn't either, Mr. Chairman. He happened to 
mention it and there happened to be a copy back here. So, I intro- 
duced it. 

Senator Ervin. In fact, I am a good friend 

Senator Gurxey. I think we had better turn to gold instead of silver. 

Senator Ervix'. Wait a minute. Let's get it in the record if you want 
to. Put it in the record and also my statement of ignorance that I am 
ignorant about why it is in the I'ecord, but let it go in there. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, put it in the record and I don't 
know why it happened but it happens against the Republicans and 
not against the Democrats. 

Senator Ervix. Let the reporter mark it Avitli the appropriate 

[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 160.* j 

Senator Gurxey. I wonder if you could give us any advice, Mr. 
Buchanan, you certainly have been the most knowledgeable witness, 
I believe, we ha\'e ever had before the committee on the whole area of 
issues in the campaign, what the candidates stood for. the various 
candidates, attack plans and all that sort of thing, and you are also 
acquainted certainly with some of the other political campaigns in 
recent years, either actively participating on behalf of Mr. Nixon or I 
guess doing research. 

Could you give us any idea how tliis campaign of 1972 stacked up 
against other campaigns in the sort of strategv^ and tactics done by all 
of the candidates ^ 

Was it a fairly clean campaign? Wns it a very dirty campaign? 
What about it, keeping out the Watergate thing now because we are 
talking about supposedly dirty tricks department ;' 

]Mr. BucnAXAx. I just could not testify with accuracy about what 
dirty tricks were played, what allegations are true, but I do have to 
concur with Theodore White's statement that these were — these really 
had the Meight of a feather in the campaign of 1972. 

I think what was unprecedented for us. Senator, was the fact that 
we were — that Ave controlled the Office of the Presidency, and this 
was the, frankly, some of the, innovations in terms of the offensive 

♦Seo p. 4107. 


f strategy in media ads, the attack group which has gotten, the 9:15 
group which has gotten a bad name, the use of surrogates, and the or- 
chestration of our political oliensive, these had nothing to do with 
dirty tricks. It was one of the most effective operations and one of 
the most enjoyable operations I have been involved in. 

When we first started out with Mr. Nixon back in 19(;() and traveled 


Senator Gurney. May I interrupt, we are on a strict time limit here 
and I have used up my time. 

I would like to come back to that because I think it is very important 
but I will come to it again. 

Mr. BuciiAXAX. May 1 make one point, Senator, in order to com- 
pare campaigns, Senator, I think what you really have to do in terms 
of strategies you would have to go back to President Johnson who 
had the power of incumbency in 1964, and compare his strategy 
and strategems and institutions with ours because the others — -the 
Democrats this time were going the primary route — in 1964 it was 
Senator Goldwater and Governor Rockefeller and the Republicans. 
So it would be a better comparison there that you would get between 
us and the Democrats. 

Senator Gurxey. Thank you. 

Senator Ervix. Senator Inouye. 

Senator Ixouye. Thank you, sir. 

Mr. Buchanan, by your testimony and by your documents you have 
proven yourself to be a very effective and very scholarly political 
strategist, and some of the tactics you have recommended are time- 
honored practices in the American politics. 

Now, whether they should be continued will be addressed in our 
final report. 

I would appreciate your assistance in outlining appropriate limits 
of where ethics end and impropriety begins. 

Now, lirst, do you feel that it is ethical or proper for campaign funds 
contributed to the candidate of one party to be funnelled into the cam- 
paign of a candidate running in a primary of the opposition party? 

Mr. Bi ciiAXAX. I think a direct transfer of campaign funds from 
one party to the candidate of another is currently illegal, Senator. I 
may not be sure of that; that is in the funding legislation. I do not 
think it is illegitimate, for example, if we went to, say, one of our 
large contributors, given the fact that we had considerable financial 
resources — if we went to one of our large contril)utors and said : ''The 
best thing you could do for the President would be to contribute to his 
campaign in the Democratic primary because that is a close race and 
he doesn't have any money." 

That, it would seem to me, is — I don't know that it has been done in 
the past, with the idea of assisting candidates in the other party's 
primary, is not unprecedented at all. 

Senator Ixouye. Do you think it was ethical or proper to covertly 
transmit $400,000 to the primary of fonner Governor Brewer? 

Mr. BucHANAx. I do not know the law on the $400,000 contribu- 
tion, whether that was legitimate or not. I think if we had told our 
financial contributors, if you will, that Governor Brewer can win that 
election down there, it is a very close one, he is lagging for funds and 
the best thing you could do for the President of the United States 

21-296 0—74- 


in 1972 is to make a contribution of that amount to Governor Brewer's 
campaign ; that to me would be i)roper and legitimate. I do not know 
the handling of the transfer of those funds whether that Avas it but I 
would think so. 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Buchanan, do you feel it would be ethical or 
proper to place camf)aign spies in the camp of the opposition and 

Mr. BucHAXAx. No, as John Osborne wrote, this is a connnon thing 
done in American politics. Xow, is it ethical? I would Jiot sit in judg- 
ment of the ethics of an individual who took that assignment. I do not 
think myself if I were asked to do it I would want to insinuate myself 
into the confidence of an individual and tlien betray that confidence 
for cash. It would not be something I would do but I don't — I would 
not want to sit in the judgment of the ethics of others who volunteered 
or did those things, and I think you made yourself, Senator — go ahead, 

Senator Inouye. Do you feel it would be ethical or proper to origi- 
nate or distribute campaign literature which does not identify the 
source and which is designed to embarrass the opposition candidate? 

Mr. Buchanan. I think the failure to identify, the failure to have a 
source named on the literature or sponsor is a violation of the law, I 
believe. It is a misdemanor, I believe. This is somewhat— we referred 
to in the documents released by Mr. ]\Ieany and Mr. Barkin and the 
other one that w^as referred to this morning. 

If you ask is it legitimate, to — let me give you an example, I would 
say yes on these grounds: Let's say Senator McGovern was running 
against the President of the United States. He is running from a 
position on the left of the spectrum. President Nixon, in our campaign 
of 1972, we had weaknesses on the right side of the spectrum. 

Now, if Senator McGoveni got, say, some conservative Democrats 
on the Hill and some conservative money raisers and they formed a 
committee which, say, was a committee for a balanced budget or some- 
thing like that, and then they criticized the President of the Ignited 
States for having spent, say, having run deficits in excess of x^ ?/, and 2, 
that would be a political criticism of the President of the United States 
from a separate vantage point of Senator McGovern's done by Demo- 
crats and that would be entirely legitimate even if Senator McGovern 
had laiowledge of that. It doesn't seem to me there is any requirement 
there that this has to be a consistency in every argument you make 
against a candidate. 

Senator Inouye. Do you think it would be ethical or im])roper or 
proper for campaign aides of one candidate to involve themselves 
in sabotage of the campaign ai)i)earances of the opposition candidate? 

^Iv. Buchanan. That would depend — let me see, the Washington 
Post uses the terminology "sabotage" for what Ave do and '"pranks" 
for w^hat they do. 

It would depend precisely on what is done. The examples I gave you 
on what Dick Tuck did and there is room in American politics for 
])ranksters and hecklei-s and the like, there is room on both side^. 
These things are part of the fun of politics but they can get to the 
point wdiere they cross the line. I think they would cross the line in 
terms of r.umbers. In other woixls. you have one Dick Tuck or two 
Dick Tucks, or three Dick Tucks, OK. But suppose you feel, you know, 
you have in every field about a hundred of them out there, the cumula- 


tive impact of these kinds of disruptions could have such an effect as to 
deny a candidate, not merely the right to communicate with the 
American people and so foul up his operations, as really to deny him 
his legitimate right. 

So, I think 3'ou could probably cross the line in excess numbers, 
1 think you could probably cross the line in the other direction in 
terms of the character of the prank and the stunt. 

Senator Inouye. Well, when jNIr. Tuck put on an engineer's cap 
and got the train to move, was that not a crime ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Impersonating an engineer? Senator, I just do not 
know. What would it be, disorderly — ^there are 

Senator Inouye. This was interfering with the orderly schedule of 
a train in interstate commerce. 

]Mr. Buchanan. In interstate commerce? It was a California train, 
I understand. It was just going up and down the California line. 

I do not think he should be prosecuted — let me say this. If every 
time the President began a speech, that train pulled oat of the station 
and it was his responsibility, I think somebody ought to put a stoj) 
to it. [Laughter.] But I do not think that that singular act was — we 
would all be in trouble if something like that — every time something 
like that happened, an individual was prosecuted. 

Senator Inouye. Do you think it is ethical ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Doing that? 

Senator Inouye. Yes. 

My. Buchanan. I do not think it is unethical. I cannot speak to 
the ethics of ]Mr. Tuck doing that. That is his own judgment. I do not 
believe it is unethical. It does not strike me as unethical. 

Senator Inouye. Do you think it would be ethical to encourage the 
voters of one party to participate in the political caucus of the opposi- 
tion party? 

Mr. Buchanan. The political caucus? I think that is next to im- 
possible. I think you have to be a registered — I know in the Demo- 
cratic Party, which has caucuses, I believe you have to be a registered 
Democrat to get into a caucus. But j^ou raise a broader question. 

Senator Inouye. Or a primary. 

Mr. Buchanan. How about the primary, right. Now, there is a place 
where, on the State level, there could conceivably be reform, and that 
is crossover voting. I think the Republicans in 1968 in Wisconsin, when 
we were there — because they crossed over in droves for Senator 
McCarthy and the purpose was to inflict a defeat on President 
Johnson. President Johnson had withdrawn '2 days before. That is 
something that could conceivably be recommended. But 3'ou ought to 
know what you are doing. The crossover voters in my estimate, the 
percentage of Republicans moving into a Democratic primary or the 
percentage of Democrats moving into Republican primaries. These 
tend to have more of an effect to increase the chances, I think, of 
centrist candidates. You remove crossover voting and I think 
your candidates will tend to be more ideological in the sense that they 
will go to true believers of their own party who are on the left in the 
Democratic Party and the conservatives in the Republican Party, and 
you allow them to have sharper differentiations in the candidates. So 
I think before States do that — I think, my own personal feeling is that 
that would be a good thing, to rule out crossover voting, because I think 


that each party should have the right, you know, to nominate its own 
candidates, and Republicans should have no business voting in Demo- 
cratic primaries and vice versa. 

Senator Ixouye. Do you believe it is ethical or proper foi- a candidate 
to provide information to friendly press or media whicli would prove 
damaging to the opposition candidates without the source of that in- 
formation being identified publicly ^ 

Mr. BuciiAXAX. AVell, most of the individuals in the national press 
that I know would not print a story which did not have some substan- 
tive documentation. You mean to go to — make a false allegation 
against an individual '( That is not ethical. That is a detraction, I mean 
against an individual. But none of your national press people are going 
to run with a story that is just based on the word, I think, of another 
individual, about a serious personal charge against someone else. 

Senator Inouyk. What about a reliable source ^ 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, when they have a reliable source, they gener- 
ally have a reliable source. Ver}^ few repoi-ters — you are getting into 
the ethics of journalism now. I think generally when a reporter says 
he has a reliable source, he has got a reliable source. 

Senator Inouye. So there are some good leaks and bad leaks ^ 

Mr. Buchanan. And there are some good reporters and some bad 
reporters ; yes, sir. 

Senator Inouye. I thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. Buchanan. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Erv^n. Senator Weicker. 

Senator Weicker. I have read your opening statement rather care- 
fully, jMr. Buchanan, and I would say that in many areas, I agree with 
you. I think some of the mattere that you have raised needed telling; 
specifically starting on page 9 of your statement, where you say that 
it is being alleged that the campaign of 1972 was not only a rigged 
campaign but an utter fraud, a political coup by the President of 
the United States. These contentions, Mr. Chairman, are altogether 

And I must confess to you that I think any political scientist look- 
ing at that election would at least give equal attention to the mattei- 
of the Democrats in their primaries being so split, or at least splitting 
up the center, that the outcome was fairly much assured. I cannot 
disagree, either, where you quote '"Theodore White, that the diity 
tricks of 1972, added togethei-, the ultimate balance — at least as far 
as I know dirty tricks — had the weight of a feather." 

And I would not disagree with those valid activities which you 
have set forth before the committee with letterwi'iting campaigns or 
issue-oriented speeches by Republicans, either the Senate or the surro- 
gates around the countiTside. And again, I cannot argue with you on 
a spoils system. Ortainly it still has a certain hold on the AmeT-ican 
political scene. So I want to make it clear that in those i-espects, what 
I think all of us would agree is legislation, there is little argiunent. 

But the pi'oblem is, of course, that the matters that you wei-e en- 
gaged on, or rather, matters that you and othei- members of the admin- 
istration were engaged on, go way beyond the admittedly legislation, 
hardnosed aspects of politics. And unfortunately, and I came here 
really expecting to do most of the listening this moniing, I cannot 
let this stand insofar as your testimonv is concerned. I would like to 


get into certain of these activities and see just how we categorize them 
and how you would explain them. 

Now, I would like to refer, if I might, to the memorandum which 
you wrote of September 13, 1972, to Messrs. Haldeman, Ehrlichman, 
and Colson. More specifically, it is at the end of the memorandum, the 
bottom of page 4. 

Mr. Buchanan. Could I have the exhibit number of that? 

Senator Weicker. Yes, indeed ; that is exhibit No. 194, 1 believe, the 
last exhibit. 

Mr. Buchanan. The bottom of which page, sir ? 

Senator Weicker. Let me read, if I might, the memorandum : 

Again, tlie critical point is that just as McGovern ouglit to malve "Nixon" tlie 
issue — so tlie issue this fall is McGoveni. Will he and the hard core left winger 
radicals who took over the party take over America? That is the hottom line. 
If the country goes to the polls in November, scared to death of McGovern, think- 
ing him vagiiely anti-Amei-ica and radical and proceed the left wingers and 
militants, then they will vote against him — ^which means for us. What we have 
done thus far, and fairly well, is not put the President 34 points ahead — but 
McGovern 34 points l)ehind. 

Mr. Buchanan. Yes, sir. 

Senator "Wfjecker. I find that a rather interesting statement coming 
from a man who is one of the spokesmen, certainly, for this adminis- 
tration and for the President. Did you feel at the time that you wrote 
the memorandum that there was not enough, sufficient, in the way of 
accomplishment by this administration that we could not put Presi- 
dent Nixon 34 points ahead, that we had to take the other candidate 
and put him 34 poinds behind? Was there a lack of positive material? 

Mr. Buchanan. No, there was not a lack of positive material. As a 
matter of fact, the budget for the positive or pro side of the media 
campaign was far in excess of the anti side. But I am not presumptuous. 
Senator, and I am not foolish. We were not 34 points ahead of Sen- 
ator McGovern simply on the basis of our record. I think we could 
have won on the basis of our record. As I stated earlier, once we moved 
up above 60 percent in the polls, toward 70 percent in the national poll, 
peoj^le who are voting there or voting for us are almost entirely Dem- 
ocrats. If you polled them, most of them would say they were dissatis- 
fied with certain aspects of the President's economic program, certain 
aspects of his other programs, his personality. In a normal election, 
they would go for a Plubert Humphrey, they would go for a Senator 
Muskie, they would go for a Senator Kennedy. They were standing 
with us. Senator, for the reason that they were strongly opposed to 

Now, this goes to a point that you raised earlier in otliei- testimony. 
You wanted to know, did we abandon other Bepublicans? The answer 
to that question is : No, we did not. In 1966, the President went out and 
worked 'for Republicans; in 1970, we worked. We were totally unsuc- 
cessful. We felt that the best Avay we could bring in a Republican Con- 
gress, that the best way we could bring in Republicans in the Senate 
and the House was to identify as President, to run as President, and 
win by a landslide and liopefully, they would then come in on the 
Presidential coattails, as they did in 1936 and as they did in 1964. 
That was unsuccessful for tlie reason that this new ticket-splitter 
phenomenon has taken over and candidates at the top of the ticket 
less and less can deliver for candidates down the line. 


Senator Wkicker. Well, you have raised another issue ^Yhich I Avilll 
certainly be irlad to get to, hut let us just stick to the memorandum, if I 
wc can, "for a minute. What is it in the course of a campaign that makes i 
an incumbent President try to paint his opponent as anti-American ? 
I do not quite understand that one. 

Mr. BuciiANAX. Wait a minute. 

Senator Wkickkr. ''If the country goes to the polls scared to death 
of McGovern, thinking uiany vaguely anti-American and radical" — 
What does that mean ? 

Mr. BuciiAXAN. There were polls taken — Mike Wallace on election 
night said there were polls taken indicating that the people went to 
the polls and voted for the President as opposed to McGovern on two 
issues, as he said: "Patriotism and morality." Walter Cronkite got 
ap -y and said: "AAHiat do you mean, George McGovern is not anti- 
American and he is not immoral.'" 

Then Mike Wallace said : "Wait a minute, what we are talking about 
is the American voter's perception of the candidates." When Mc- 
Govern said he would go to Hanoi, he would crawl, if necessary, and 
\)&g for the release of American prisoners, for example, in the minds 
of the people, this is anti-American. I do not say Senator McGovern 
is anti-American, but the perception in the voter's mind was that Sen- 
ator McGovern was not a figure whom they wanted to put in the Presi- 
dency of the United States because he did not share their views with 
regard to patriotism and things of that character. 

Now, I do not say that Senator McGovern is tliat, but it would be 
false for me to stand up here and deny that that was the perception of 
millions of Americans. 

Senator Weicker. Why do you think this perception came about on 
their f)art? 

Mv. Buchanan. I think Senator McGoveni contributed to it more 
than anybody else in the comitry. 

Senator Weicker. Do you think maybe now that you have heard 
the evidence of what happened during the campaign of 1972 that has 
come before this committee, with various members of the administra- 
tion testifying, do you think that maybe you took that lawlessness, 
that restlessness, that violence wdiich the American people were leeiy 
of, that you maybe took it out of blue jeans and put it into blue suits? 

Mr. Buchanan. Are you referring to me, sir? 

Senator Weicker. No ; I am asking on the basis of the testimony 
which you have heard, as has everybody else, before this committee, 
do you believe that the lawlessness, which, obviously, the American 
people were concerned w^ith, was in fact taken out of blue jeans and put 
into blue suits? 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, with regard to that, the individuals against 
whom allegations have been made have not yet been tried. There were 
errors, mistakes, misjudgment, and wrongdoing on the part of indi- 
\-iduals with whom I have been associated, I believe, and perhaps some 
of them were within the White House. That is tnie. But I do not think 
that to take — I do not think that cei-tainly, what we did — if these 
things were done, they were not justified and they cei-tainly do not 
justify the things that were done in 1970 by the demonstrators. Both 
were wronff. 


But I do not see the connection between this and the President of the 
United States and I do not see the connection between that and me. 

Senator Weioker. Well, let me ask you a question. On page 10 of 
your statement before the committee, you made the statement that 
Republicans were not responsible for the downfall of Senator Muskie. 
And you made the statement that the Republicans were not responsible 
for the nomination of Senator McGovern. 

And I agree with you. I agree with you. Now, let me ask you this 
question: Were Republicans — do you feel that Republicans in the 
sense of the party were responsible for Watergate ? 

Mr. Buchanan. No; I think individuals have to be held accountable 
for what they did. Inclividuals who conceived and carried out the 
Watergate break-in, which, in and of itself, I considered wrong but not 
just grievously w^'ong 

Senator AVeicker. Right. 

Mr. Buchanan. Those individuals are accountable. No; the polit- 
ical party is not responsible. The Republican Party is not respon- 
sible ; no. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, it was just four Cubans sitting in 
a bar and doing a gratuitous act for the Republicans ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Whom do you want me to pass judgment on. 

Senator Weicker. 1 would like you to tell this committee as to whom 
you feel was responsible for the matter called Watergate and its 
attendant circumstances. 

Mr. Buchanan. You mean Mr. Magruder has, I believe, testified 
before this committee that he was cognizant of it. There are seven 
individuals, I think, who have been convicted of it. There are other 
individuals who I do not believe have yet been indicted and I am in no 
position to sit up here and to say that these individuals were guilty. 
I just do not know. I am not in control of the evidence. I am not a 
judge. That is for a court to decide. 

Senator Weicker. I am not trying to judge individual guilt or 
innocence. I would like to know who was responsible for these acts, 
these things that were precipitated. 

Mr. Buchanan. Men are responsible for what they do themselves. 

Senator Weicker. Let us keep on going relative to the matter of 
what was done, what has been testified to before this conmiittee. I 
laughed along with the others as to the matters of Dick Tuck and 
trains pulling out of the station. But let us try and fit into one of your 
categories the following occurrences which happened in the campaign 
of 1972. Now, you have four categories: Utterly outrageous, dirty 
tricks, political hardball, and pranks. 

The use of the Justice Department, the CIA, the FBI, the State 
Department, for political purposes by an incumbent administra- 
tion : Which category would that fall into ? 

Mr. Buchanan. That reference to those categories is in refer- 
ence to the so-called dirty tricks and not in reference to crimes, 

Senator Weicker. I am not saying they are. I am just asking you, 
the use of the Justice Department', the CIA, the FBI, the State Depart- 
ment, in behalf of an incumbent administration in a political way — 
what would that fall into ? Is that pranks ? 


Mr BuciiAXAX. Senator, it is customary in national politics that the 
Secretary of Defense, I believe, and the Secretary of State generally 
stay out of national politics, although that was not the case m 1964. i 
And Secretary Laird, of course, made political speeches. I do not see 
anything wrong with that. 

The use of the FBI in a political campaign to me would be an un- 
justified use of that agency, which should not be done. The Depart- 
ment of Justice, Senator Ervin and I would — it has been precedented 
tliat both in our administration and President Kennedy's, the Attor- 
ney General was a political figure. 

Senator Wkickeh. Let me say one thing right now, because I thinl< 
I would like to believe that maybe the people elected Richard Nixou 
President in 1068 because they did not want any more of these things 
to «-o on. Maybe 1 am wrong, but I would like to go on that assumiv 
tion. This is what I believed. 

As far as I am concerned, Mr. Buchanan, let us restrict ourselves 
to matters of this election. 

Mr. BuciTAXAX. People have no reason to regret the election of 1968, 
in my judgment. 

vSenator Wkickeu. I am saying to you let's restrict ourselves to mat- 
ters of the campaign of 1972. In other words, the "everybody did it" 
theory which has been floated has no bearing in this hearing. 

Mr. Buchanan. No one has suggested that the fact tliat things were 
done wrong before justifies doing them again. 

Senator Weicker. Why cite the examples ? 

Mr. Buchanan. You are the one citing the examples of Justice De- 
partment, State, and Defense and I am responding to them. 

Senator Weicker. In the 1972 campaign and yon are responding to 
what went on in 1960 and everything else. 

Mr. Buchanan. I would beg to disagree with you. If the Secretary 
of Defense and Secretary of State — I would think the Secretarv^ of 
State should stay out of politics. But the Secretary of Defense — the 
defense budget is a national issue, as it was in 1964, when Secretary 
McISTamara spoke out, as it was in 1972 with Secretary Laird. They 
are perfectly within their rights to speak out and defend the policies 
of the incumbent administration. That has a partisan connotation, I 
know, but I see nothing wrong with that. 

Senator Weicker. I was not referring to the Secretai-y of Defense, 
never made any mention. I said the Justice Department, use of Justice 
Department agencies in behalf of political campaigns, what category 
does that fall into ? 

Mr. Buchanan. They should not be used. 

Senator Weicker. CIA ? 

Mr. Buchanan. The CIA, I think, by law is forbidden and it should 
obev the law. 

Senator Weicker. FBI ? 

Mr. Buchanan. The FBI should have no role in any national poli- 
tical campaign. 

Senator Weicker. No. 2, the Ellsberir break-in coverup. A^^lat does 
(hat fall into? Is that pranks, iwiitical hardball, dirty tricks, or ut- 
terly outrageous? 

Ail-. liucHANAN. The coverup? 

Senator Weicker. Yes, the Ellsberg break-in covenip. 


Mr. Buchanan. You are asking me to talk about a matter for which 
ndividuals conceivably could be indicted in the next week. I don't 
vuow. I am not a lawyer. I don't know the responsibilities upon law- 
yers to — some of the individuals who are said to have known about 
his are lawyei-s, to report this to tlie trial judge at which point — these 
ire matters with which I am not conversant. 

Senator Weicker. Well, of course, it was testified to before this com- 
mittee by the former Attorney General that this was the most serious 
matter of all. 
Mr. Buchanan. The Ellsberg break-in ? 

Senator Weicker. The Ellsberg matter and its coverup was abso- 
lutely essential to the campaign of 1972. 

Mr. Buchanan. The Ellsberg break-in took place m July ot ID — 
I am sorry, September, I believe, of 1971. 

Senator Ekvin. September of 1971. 

Mr Buchanan. I would disagree with the Attorney (Tcneral, 
franklv, to this extent. If after that thing had occurred, we luid come 
forward and said so and explaiiu'd it, 1 don't think it would have 
been a favoraljle element. 

Senator Weicker. In other words, you feel that was wrong J 

Mr Buchanan. Not doing it t I tliink that would be 

Senator Weicker. Revealing all the facts as to the break-in. 

Mr Buchanan. If you look l)ack in ivtrospect, I think certainly the 
tliimr to have done would be not to have waited until the 1972 cam- 
paign, but to have dealt with that problem at that particular time. 
T think that is right. 

These have nothing to do. Senator Weicker. with the matter under 
discussion, which is things done during the campaign by political 
organizations. That had nothing to do with the political campaign, 
as I recollect. 

Senator Weicker. What \ 

Mr. Buchanan. The Ellsberg break-in. 

Senatoi- Weicker. Well, it had a great deal to do— maybe not the 
break-ill, but the fact that it would be revealed, this was of deep con- 
cern, deep concern, to manv individuals. 

My time is up right noW. I will get back to the list after I return. 

Senator Ervin. Senator ]Moiitoya. 

SenatorMoNTOYA. Thank vou,:Mr. Chairman. 

At the end of your testimony this morning with Mr. Dash, you 
stated that the b'rochure, although rhetorical, correctly stated Mr. 
Muskie's position about blacks. 

Mr. Buchanan. Did I? 

SenatorMoNTOYA. That is the brochure -,,-,. t ■^ 

Mr. Buchanan. If I did sav that, that is in error. I believe I said 
it stated correctly his position with regard to gun control. 

Senator ]Montoya. I will read you from the transcript, page 8Ubi. 
These are your words : 

The rhetoric is not left wing rhetoric, but the statements on Senator M"sji^« 
position on gun control is accurate, on the statement with regaul to black 
Americans— there is not an inaccuracy in terms of the writing . . . 

Isn't that the same thing? . . , ^ ^^i • • • . 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, if I did say that this is a— what this is is a 
combination, I believe, where the record is stated— I have only had an 
oi)portunity to read this once. 


Senator Montoya. This is your testimony. 

Mr. Buchanan. Right. Well, let me just state, where the record 
is stated witli regard to his view on i^ini control, it is accurate. As I 
stated, the rhetoric is something else again. This is not stating fact, 
this states basically opinion with i-egai'd to blacks. This is not — well, 
go ahead. Senator, 

Senator jMoxtoya. "Well, do you say that the statement contained in 
the brochure is not accurate ? 

Mr. BuciiAXAN. It is exaggerated ])olitical rhetoric; that is correct. 

Senator IVIJoxtoya. Isn't that inaccuracy, then ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, it is — yes, right. Because an awful lot of politi-^ 
cal speeches, it is exaggerated political rhetoric. 

Senator Montoya. Isn't exaggerated political I'hetoric inaccuracy? 

Mr. Buchanan. It can be inaccuracy ; yes, sir. 

Senator Montoya. All right. Now, let us examine that a little more 
carefully. You stated in this brochure 

Mr. Buchanan. I did not write the brochure. Senator. It is my recol- 
lection that I may have edited it because that is the testimony of some- 
body else. 

Senator Montoya. Didn't you state this morning on the record that 
Mr. Khachigian had told you that you had prepared it and that you 
were not about to doubt his word. 

Mr. Buchanan. No. Mr. Khachigian, when he came back from the 
committee liearing, he said that he had prepared it and that he had 
run it by me for editing. That was his recollection. And he is a truthful 
individual, so I stand on that recollection. 

Senator Montoya. Right. Now, here's what the pamphlet reads, for 
the record : 

Muskie has told black Americans that there is no room for them in his politics. 
Blacks are the backbone of the Democratic Party, and Mr. Muskie told them to 
go to hell. 

Now, let us examine that against the context of what ]\Ir. Muskie ' 
said in the press conference. I read from the excerj^t from his press i 
conference of September 8, 1971 : 

Repokter. What was the purpose of your meeting witli black leaders in Watts 

>rr. Muskie. The question was particularly of liow we could move effectively to 
deal with the problems that concern bhick people, iiu-ludinjr the elections. So I was 
asked in that context whether a Itlack candidate for Vice President could be con- 
sidered for the 1072 election if I were a candidate for the Pi-esidency. I said^ 
that in my judgment, such a ticket was not electable now. I .said I regretted that : 
it .should not be so. But my judgment was that such a ticket would be defeated and 
that if it were, it would be a setback to our efforts to im])lement our commitment 
to equality for blacks in this country. I think we must work to eliminate this 
wrong. I consider it a wrong, but I don't think we have done so yet. So this is the 
choice that faces blacks and those of us who are committed to the ideals of 
equality in America, how best we move effectively in the direction of equality, 
including political equality, which will make it realistically possible for blacks, 
Mexican-Americans, and representatives of any other minority to aspire to the 
Vice Presidency or the Presidency of the United States. That ought to be our goal. 

Then the reporter asked a further question : 

Reporter. Senator, are you saying that it's the wrong time for a black man to 
run for Vice President, or are you .saying that there isn't a black man qualified to 

Senator Muskie. Oh, no, there are blacks who are qualified to run, (pialified 
to a.spire to the Vice Presidency. T know some of them and they ought to be 
eligible for consideration. 


Now, do you think that the jDamphlet lias put the whole thing out 
of context^ 

Mr. Buchanan. Senator, I think, if you ask me is this pamphlet, 
from what I have read of it, a fair or accurate i-eflection of Senator 
Muskie's civil rights position, I would say no. This is exaggerated, 
hyperbolic political rhetoric. If you ask me if it should have been 
published, 1 would tell you no to that. It is wrong to do this. The vot- 
ing record is right on gun control, as I have said. Some of the rhetoric 
in here is wrong. It is unjustified about Senator Muskie. This thing 
should not have been published. It is lying oversight. If this thing 
went tln"ough, and in addition to that it failed to have on it the proper 
identification, then I am to blame and I should take the responsibility. 

There were things done wrong. But this is not as bad as comparing 
the President of the United States to Adolf Hitler. It is not as bad 
as comparing American policy in Indochina to that of the Nazis in 
Germany. Now, both are mistaken. 

Senator ]Montoya. One wrong does not justify another, is that 
right ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Precisely, Senator. 

Senator Montoya. Let us go to the letter that was sent from Miami 
to Mr. Loeb of the ^Manchester Guardian under date of February 17, 

Mr. Buchanan. The Union Leader. 

Senator ]Montoya. You know about that letter, do you not? 

Mr. Buchanan. The ITnion Leader. Yes, the so-called Canuck letter. 

Senator Montoya. Do you think that was a fair thing to do? 

Mr. Buchanan. It was a political dirty trick. 

Senator Montoya. Do you think it was unethical ? 

Mr. Buchanan. It was unethical. 

Senator Montoya. There was another letter dated February 28 
sent to the same editor in the same vein 

]\Ir. Buchanan. I w^as unaware of it. Which was the so-called 
Canuck letter? 

Senator Montoya. Referring to the so-called, supposed Canuck 
statement made by Senator Muskie. 

Mr. Buchanan. I did not know there were two letters. 

Senatoi- Montoya. Do you think that was unethical? 

Mr. Buchanan. The Canuck letter is the only one I have seen re- 
ferred to. Yes, sir, I do. 

Senator Montoya. Do you think that is a dirty trick? 

^Ir. Buchanan. Yes, sir; it should be counted a dirty trick. But 
there is a myth 

Senator Montoya. Do you know who inspired this letter? 

Mr. Buchanan. No, sir. But there is a myth building up that this 
so-called Canuck letter was responsible for Senator Muskie's emo- 
tional moment outside the I^nion Leader Building and that is not true. 
As Senator jNIuskie himself has stated, the reason for tliat emotional 
moment, the primary reason, was a slur against his wife which was 
not made in any Canuck letter, it was made in Women's Wear Daily, 
was transmitted by Newsweek magazine, which happens to be a sub- 
sidiary of the Washington Post Co. So I think it is unfair to say that 
this emotional moment of Senator Muskie was a result of that Canuck 
letter. That is not to justify the so-called Canuck letter. 


Senator Montoya. They were interconnected in a way, were tliey i 
not? ' I 

Mr. Buchanan. Senator Muskie liimself says it was a slur on liisl 
wife, or what he conceived to be a shir on his wife. i 

Senator INIontoya. Now, there was another letter that appeared in j 
the New Hampshire primary campaign, on stationery of the TTnitedj 
Democrats for Kennedy and signed by Eobin Ficker. | 

Yon are acquainted with that letter, are you not? 

Mr. Buchanan. No ; I am not. But I am acquainted that Ficker was j 
running a write-in for Kennedy in New Hampshire. i 

Senator Montoya. In our investigation, it has been ascertained that i 
some people contacted Mr. Ficker for a signature to this letter and the 
letter was designed to create a write-in atmosphere for Ted Kennedy in 
New Hampshire. This was not sponsored actually by United Democrats 
for Kennedy, although it appears under the signature Robin Ficker, i 
Montgomery County, in Chevy Chase — in Silver Spring, Md. ! 

Now, do you think that such a tactic, assuming that Mr. Ficker has ' 
disavowed the contents of the letter, do you think that was a proper \ 
campaign tactic in New Hampshire ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Is Ficker pro-Kennedy, do you know ? 

Senator Montoya. Yes. 

Mr. Buchanan. And somebody funded him to do this ? 

Senator Montoya. Somebody got him to sign the letter under false 
pretenses. That Kennedy people were urging him to sign the letter. He 
later ascertained that it was not so. 

Mr. Buchanan. You mean to file it on an individual ? 

Well, that is a borderline case. 

Let me just give you one example. Senator Montoya. In 1940 — — 

Senator Montoya. If that is a factual situation on the assumptions 
I have made, would you say that that was unethical or improper? 

Mr. Buchanan. Let me give you an exami^le. When Harry Truman j 
ran in 1940 in the State of Missouri against Governor Stark, he was in 
some difficulty, as I remember the story, because Governor Stark said 
he was the one who had put Tom Pendergast away and Harry Tru- 
man's friends got some individual named Morris Milligan, who ap- 
parently was the prosecutor in the case, and they ran him as the third 
guy in the race, the result of which was to \)vt Harry Truman in the 
Senate. That is the same type of oi^eration. 

AVlioever did this probably did this to draw votes off from Senator 
Muskie, I would guess, in New Hami)shire or to lower his margin. It 
is something in the same vein as that, I would think. 
Senator Montoya. Well, do you think it was ]n-oper ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I would—! would have difficulty making a judg- 
ment on filing your opponent, your iwtential opponent, so you can beat 
him in the State or getting him. That is a tough call as far as I would 
be concerned, ethically. 

Senator Montoya. Now, on tab 27 [exhibit No. 187], page 13, under 

item 40, is the following : 

If Daley is booted out of the Democratic Convention, on his arrival at his 
Mayor's office in Chicago, some bearded types can be out front with signs, 
"Daley's through in 1972 ; vote McGovern." 

Mr. Buchanan. Right. 


Senator Moxtoya. Were these to have been paid demonstrators? 

Mr. BuciiAXAN. No, you would just call the Republican committee 
up there and do it. 

Senator INIgxtoya. That was supposed to be volunteers, then ? 

i\Ir. BucHAXAX. Oh, sure, you would not pay somebody to picket. 
Our funds were not limitless. 

Senator Moxtoya. Now, do you think th.d that was proper and 
ethical ? 

Mr. BucHAXAX. Well, this again. Senator, if I knew I were going 
to be up here explaining all my memorandums, this little item woukl 
not have been included. Whether it is proper — again, this is a case 
of identifying your opponent with an unpopular individual or figure. 

Senator Moxtoya. I know what you are doing, but do you think it 
is ethical or proper ? 

Mr. BuciiAXAX'. Again, I would have to say I don't think this is 
unethical, to tell a giiy to go out and get a sign. Mayor Daley comes 
back from that convention, angry as he can be, and there is a picket 
out there with a sign 

Senator Moxtoya. Do you think it is proper? 

Mr. BucHAXAX. It is not improper. 

Senator Moxtoya. Then it is proper? 

Mr. BucHAXAX. No, the two are not the same. 

Senator INIoxtoya. Give me tlie differentiation. 

Mr. BucHAXAX. Well, by something that is not improper, you mean 
that it might be — well, let's classify Avhen you get into the area of 
pranks. I think that is in the area of pranks. It is like carrying the 
sign, the "Nixon's the one" sign. 

Senator Moxtoya. Would you say it is neutral ? 

Mr. Buchaxax. I would say it is in the same range with the "Nixon's 
the one" sign. 

Senator Moxtoya. Now, on tab 21 [exhibit No. 181], page 9, item 
4, you suggested "On all the black radio stations in the swing States, 
we should run ads on ]\Iuskie's statement about no blacks for Vice 

Mr. Buchaxax. Excuse me. Senator, this is the March 

Senator Moxtoya. Tab 21, page 9, item 4. 

Mr. Buchaxax. Tab 21, page 9, item 4. 

Senator Moxtoya. And you follow that suggestion as follows — tliis 
is part of the radio plug : 

If lie does not think the time lias come for one of ns to be even considered for 
Vice President, then the time has come for black America to tell Ed Muskie we 
don't think it's time for him to be considered for President. Write in Shirley 

Mr. BucHAx^Ax. Right. 

Senator ]Moxtoya. Now, do you think that was ethical? 

Mr. Buchaxax. Yes, I do. in this sense. Senator. There was a point 
in time in 1971 when Congressman John Conyers and Senator Eugene 
McCarthy each was considering a fourtli party candidacy. In my judg- 
ment, that would have been, that would have helped us along to what 
I considered a goal for a long time, which is a realinement of political 
parties. In my judgment, it would not have been unethical or illicit to 
have made an alliance of convenience with a Democrat to the left of 
the National Democratic Party, because it would have been advan- 


tageous to them, it would liave been advantageous to us. Our objectives 
would have been served, their objectives would have been served. It 
was the same thing as I would think in the Senate, if you had a Sena- 
tor on the — say on the left side of the spectrum get together with a 
Senator on the right side of the spectrum to support a bill that he 
wanted in exchange for support there. I think it would be in that 

Senator Montoya. Now, you are implying that this was politics as 
usual and, therefore, it was proper, that is what in effect you are 

Mr. BucHAXAx. No, I don't say everything that has been done, 
everything that is done regularly, is proper and ethical. You have to 
judge the individuals — I do think — this is, this would come in the area 
of Avhat Senator Baker was reading, I believe he was reading. 

Senator ISIontoya. Let me go to another page. 

Now, you, of course, know that Senator Jackson's headquarters in 
Florida were broken into. 

Mr. BucHANAX. No, sir; I did not know that. 

Senator INIoxtoya. Well, and Senator INIcGovern's headquarters in 
Ohio were broken into. Senator Muskie's in Washington. D.C., were 
broken into. 

Mr. BucHAx-^AX". Senator Muskie's were broken into ? 

Senator Moxtoya. Yes, or I should say there was an infiltrator in 
there and files were stolen on two occasions from Senator INIuskie's 

Mr. BucHAXAX. That was Fat Jack. 

Senator Moxtoya. Yes. And one of his agents. I think it was a young- 
man by the name of Gregory. 

Now, also there were paid infiltrators in Senator Jackson's cam- 
paign in Florida. 

Mr. BucHAXx\x. That would be unwise as well as — — 

Senator Moxtoya. All right. Senator ISIuskie's in Washington, Fat 
Jack or John Buckley, and Senator McGovern's, that is Chotiner's 
friend, to cite some examples of the infiltration. 

Mr. BuciiAXAx. Chotiner's friend, it is my understanding, was a 
political or was rather a reporter who traveled aboard the various 
campaign planes and was two separate individuals; this is the Avay the | 
re])orts have come out. 

Senator jMoxtoya. Well, do you think that these were — that these 
things were ethical I 

Mr. BucirAXAX^. Well, Senator, I would ask, do you think it was 
ethical for Joe McGinnis to pose as a reporter and come into our cam- 
paign in 1968, find himself an office and aide, and steal my memo- 
randums and publish a best-selling book and have it applauded in the 
Washington Post? 

Senator Moxtoya. No. sir ; it was not. 

Do you agree with me 

Mr. BuciiAXAX. This sort of thing has been praised and applauded 
and cheered until it was done by Kepublicans against Democrats. 

Senator Moxtoya. Well, just because there was something wrong 
in the Democratic camp, 1 am not going to condone it. 

I am asking you if these things were wrong. You ask me if other 
things that happened similarly in the Democratic campaign were 
wrong, then I will agree with you. 


Mr. Buchanan. Which particular is it now, which particular infil- 
tration; I have talked about political spies. It is not something I would 
do to insinuate myself into an individual's confidence and then betray 
that confidence. Now, other people have other stajiclarcls on the ques- 
tion of being political spies. It is just not something I would do. I don't 
think I should sit in judgment on their ethics. I don't know that I could 
really — I Avould want to draw a line that this is thoroughly unethical 
to do this. I don't know that I would want to draw it. 

Senator Montoya. Thank you very much, sir. 

Mr. Buchanan. Thank you, Senator. 

Senator Ervin. I have nothing further. 

Senator Baker says he has nothing further. 

Senator Talmadge is not here. 

Senator Inouye is not here. 

Senator Gurney is not here. 

Senator Weicker. 

Senator Weicker. All right, Mr. Buchanan, if you will try to con- 
tinue down the list — I w^ill try to shorten it — of various activities and 
your evaluation of them. 

Perjury, subornation of perjury, obstruction of justice, is this some- 
thing that should form part of a campaign ? 

Mr. Bi'Chanan. Senator, this is the famous Weicker litany of 
wrongdoings in the campaign. I know you have got the definition 
down of every illegal act and things like that but what — to me 
what they amount to and what I have seen is that people in our cam- 
paign made a grievous error and then they went and compounded the 
error and made mistakes. In the process of this thing, they even com- 
mitted — I don't know, I don't want to state that they did, but con- 
ceivably they committed wrongdoing amounting to crimes and ille- 
galities, but I think that, by and large, the sins were of the head and 
not of the lieart. They thought that they wanted to make sure the 
President of the United States was reelected, and a lot of mistakes 
and bad things, and erroneous things were done ; there is no question 
about that. 

But these people, I think they have got a right to a fair trial and 
I don't think I am in a position to sit up and moralize or pontificate 
upon their ethics or their morality. 

Senator Weicker. Mr. Buchanan, it isn't a question of a litany of 
wrongdoing. The problem is that when these matters are equated 
with just another Dick Tuck type of operation. 

Mr. Buchanan. They have never been so by me. 

Senator Weicker. This is exactly the type 

Mr. Buchanan. I do not consider Watergate a prank; it is a crime. 

Senator Weicker. I see. Tliis is all I am trying to find out from you 
since you have thrown Dick Tuck out as sort of the example to be fol- 
lowed by the Republicans in the campaign of 1972. I am trying to 
differentiate between those activities and these activities, which 
clearly you are as dead set against as I am. 

What I can't have, I believe — I would hope, anyway, you would 
think the same way — I can't have these floated as legitimate campaign 

Mr. Buchanan. Nobody has floated Watergate as a legitimate cam- 
paign activitv for the last 15 months. 


Senator Weicker. Well, then, certainly you would agree that really 
we are not talking in any manner, shape or form about the equivalent 
of a Dick Tuck operation so far as Watergate is concerned. 

Mr. Buchanan. I did not know I was up here to discuss the Water- 
gate break-in. 

Senator Weicker. You are here to discuss the matter called Water- 
gate which encompasses a great deal of activity and again I have tried 
to be very specific with you as to what those activities are. Are they 
the same as Dick Tuck-type activities? Do you want me to continue 
down the list? 

Mr. Buchanan. No, I don't know that Dick Tuck did any break-in 
and burglaries; no, sir. 

Senator Weicker. Electronic surveillance ? 

Mr. Buchanan. No. Electronic surveillance was done on xVdlai 
Stevenson at the Democratic Convention in lOGO. They had electronic 
surveillance done, I believe, on the Vice President of the United States 
13ost-1968 before he was inaugurated. I believe that; I am not sure 
of that. Electronic surveillance for political purposes is wrong and 
should be outlawed. 

Senator Weicker. I think the last pait of your answer is very sig- 
nificant. I would agree with you, that is exactly what the work product 
of this committee is all about. 

How about putting out the story tying the Democratic Party to 
Coimnunists and foreign money ? Is this a legitimate tvpe of activity of 
the Wliite House? 

Mr. Buchanan. I don't know any j)olitical reporter who is going 
to pick up a phony story like that and run it if you don't have any 
substantiation, and if you tell an individual to go do that, any indi- 
vidual who has contacts in the national corps or the political press 
corps will tell you to go fly a kite. 

I don't know a single political reporter to whom I will say. "Well, 
Senator McGovern is getting Comn-iunist money," and he will say, 
"Is that right. "Wliere is your evidence ?'■ 

Every single one — I don't know a single one who would go with a 
stoi-y like that based on hearsay. 

Senator Weicker. Well, of couree, this wjis the subject of a memoran- 
dum within the AVliite House, wasn't it ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I have not been watching all the testimony on tele- 
vision but I believe it was, I believe, Mr. John Dean, though. But John 
Dean is not an individual who dealt with the press. My guess is 

Senator Weicker. No, this memorandum was attested to by Mr. 

Mr. Buchanan. Mr. Haldeman sent a memorandum to ]\Ir. Dean, 
but that sounded a bit fishy to me because John Dean was not an indi- 
vidual who dealt at all with the press, I don't know who he was going 
to call. 

Senator Weicker. I think what bothers me is in tliis discussion that 
you and I are having. I think both of us are fully aware that the Presi- 
dent would have won this election. I, like you, voted for our President. 
Not only that, I thought I delivered some effective speeches against 
Mr. McGovern, but I get bothered with this continued reference to 
Communist and anti-American and radical and we go right down the 
list, what kind of politics is this ? 


Mr. BucHAXAX. Senator, I will tell you this. What do we have here, 
you have confidential memorandums of mine to the President of the 
United States and to Mr. Haldeman and to Mr. Mitchell. 

Now, they are, quite obviously, if I knew my confidential papers, 
dozens of them were going to be called up for inspection anct I was 
going to be held to account for phrases and paragraphs that I used in a 
confidential connnunication with the Presiclent, I certainly would have 
written it differently, there is no question about that. But I am sure 
that if we went through your own files and got every political mem- 
orandum you were sent by staff aides there would be things that would 
horrify both you and your own staff aides, not in terms of wrongdoing, 
but simply because you would phrase things differently. 

When I write a first draft of a column or a speech, some of the copy 
is extraordinarily hard and I would not want to make public. I would 
like to be held responsible for what I write as a final speech and for 
what I say publicly. But with my private communications, in effect, 
which are almost your private letters, to be called to account on na- 
tional television for your phrases is not a very pleasant, altogether 
pleasant, experience and I don't think. Senator, you would find it any 
more pleasant than I find it, to have to go through there to see things 
I haven't seen in 4 years and find things that maybe were my own per- 
sonal rhetoric in the memorandum was excessive. It is not an alto- 
gether pleasant experience. 

Senator Weicker. Well, number one, let me assure you that these 
files are totally available to you or anybody else and always have been 
and, to be honest, I am not going to have you sit here and tell me that 
the type of language that is used in these memorandums, the refer- 
ences and the rather consistency of the reference, to the far left, and 
the Communists and the foreign money and radicals and all the rest 
of it. 

Mr. BucHAXAx. The far left, is suggested by a term and there is no 
term that I have seen in my memorandum that connects Senator 
McGovem or suggests he is connected with the Communist Party. 

Senator McGovern was the candidate of the far left in the last elec- 
tion. He was the candidate of the left. He was the candidate of the 
Democratic Party. Mr. Schmitz was the candidate I would say, of 
the far right. We had the right and the center. These have been cus- 
tomary terms over since the French General Assembly in 1789, that 

Senator Weicker. How about anti-American ? How about that 
phrase ? 

Mr. BuciiAXAX. Well, there is a phrase in here that Senator 
McGovem was perceived by a number of people because of statements 
ho made especially Avith regard to foreign policy, especially in regard 
to Vietnam in that vein. I don't say he was anti-American. 

Senator Weicker. Of course, that was your phrase, it is your memo- 

Mr. BuciiAXAx. What does the phrase say, he is perceived that way ? 

Senator Weicker. Well, let's go ahead and see it. 

Mr. BuciiAXAX. What you are doing is you are precisely taking par- 
ticular minor phrases out of memos written in the heat of a campaign 
and that statement, Senator, is far less offensive to me, even now in 
public, than is Senator McGovern's statement comparing the Presi- 
dent of the United States to Adolf Hitler, and he is a senatorial can- 

21_9QR n 7^_ 


didate and he made that publicly, not in some confidential memo- 
randums in the heat of a campaign. 

Senatc>r "Weicker. Well, of couree, I think many people, myself in- 
cluded, held those comments against Senator McGorem. 

Mr. Buchanan. Right. 

Senator Wek;ker. I think they are desj^icable. 

Mr. Buchanan. I think you should be held accountable for what 
you say publicly but I think a man is entitled to the privacy of his 
own views that he expressed in his own way in his private papers and, 
as I say, it is not an altogether usual experience to have your confi- 
dential papers, have to explain them on national television. 

Senator Weickek. In the matter of Mr. Ulasewicz, is that — and 
the subject matter of those investigations — is that proper politics? 

Mr. Buchanan. I never heard Mr. Ulasewicz' name until he ap- 
peared on national television. 

Senator Weicker. I see. Now, that you know about Mr. 

Mr. Buchanan. What did he investigate? 

Senator Weicker. Incidentally, Mr. Caulfield was a very close 
friend of yours. 

Mr. Buchanan. Yes, he is. 

Senator Weicker. Did he ever mention to you any of his activities ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, Mr. Caulfield's activities, in the 1068 cam- 
paign certainly, he was campaign security. He had conducted an 
investigation of the things that have come out subsequently, I have 
no knowledge of. 

Senator Weicker. You had no knowledge of the relationshij) between 
Mr. Caulfield and INIr. Ulasewicz ? 

Mr. Buchanan. I never heard of Mr. Ulasewicz' name until it was 
on national television but I know Jack Caulfield very well. He is very 
decent, in my judgment, even though mistakes were made, he is a 
very decent individual. 

Senator Weicker. The mattei's which Mr. T'lasewicz investigated, 
you feel now that you have heard about it 

Mr. Buchanan. Which ones are you referring to, Senator? 

Senator AVeicker. Well, I can go right down the whole list, but 
basically I would say personal matters related to the various candi- 
dates, do you tliink that is a proper thing? 

Mr. Buchanan. Senator, are you asking do I think that 

Senator Weicker. I asked that ([uestion. 

Mr. Buchanan. It is not my end of the cam})aign business, as inves- 
tigations ai'e done. There was a story in the Atlanta pajier where 
Senator McGoveni sent out 100 people to investigate the President 
and asked, "Fellows, have we dug up any dirt ?"' And he said, "Well, we 
will let that out, too." There aie these aspects to campaigns. I do not 
think I have Ix^en in a political campaign where I have not heard 
stories about the pi-ivate liv(>s and the persomil habits of individuals, 
but that is not my stock in trade. 

Senator Weicker. So, in othei- words, you would say that should not 
be part of a campaign ? 

Mr. Buchanan. There is no way you can halt investigations. I think 
investigations of the backgi'ound of candidates, going out, say, to his 
hometown newspaper and finding statements say, like Senator Mc- 
Govern made in 1948 


Senator Weicker. Fair enough. 

Mr. Buchanan. In the coui-se of that thing, what do yon do when 
you come across, if you come across something that is personally dam- 
aging to the individual ? INIaybe it depends on how rough a campaign 
is being fought. 

Senator Weicker. Is basically your answer — and I am trying to be as 
fair as possible in this matter — that matters of public record are cer- 
tainly eligible to be pushed out there during the campaign? 

Mr. Buchanan. Right. 

Senator Weicker. That is a matter of the record ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Right. 

Senator Weicker. But this was specifically asked of Mr. Ulasewicz 
and, of course, his investigations went way beyond what was a matter 
of public record. It went way beyond. 

Mr. Buchanan. It went into personal — my own view is that the 
personal, private lives of candidates should not be part of the cam- 
paign; they should not be discussed by a candidate. But there are 
political muckrakers just like journalistic — and you can have this 
until — as long as you have got politics, people are going to go out and 
do these things. I am not involved in it and I would not do it myself, 
but I do not want to sit up here and assume that I am a judge of other 
people who do these kinds of investigations. 

Senator Weicker. But at least I want to thank you for saying that 
because you are a part of the administration. 

Mr. Buchanan. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. And you have made a statement that was not 
made before. In other words, we have heard that: "Yesj these are 
23roper matters of political campaigns," and it has not been said by 
any person but rather representatives of an administration, and to 
have the American people believe that pei^onal dirt, for example, is a 
valid part of the political process, that type of investigation, not in- 
vestigations that are matters of record, but that go into the types of 
thing that you and I both decry, it just is something that should not 
be allowed to fly in this country, you and I both agree on that point. 

Mr. Buchanan. Well, I do not think they have — I do not think they 
are a proper subject matter for campaigns ; that is right. 

Senator Weicker. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. As I understand it, this morning, the exhibits that 
were obtained — the memorandums prepared by Mr. Buchanan that 
were obtained from the Committee To Re-Elect the President and 
from the Archives department were not admitted in evidence. 

They will be appropriately marked as exhibits and i-eceived as such. 

[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Nos. ^ '" thru 

Senator Montoya. I would like to present for the record, Mr. Chair- 
man, and foi- identification and for filing for the record, the three let- 
ters to which I referred in my examination of the witness. 

Senator Ervin. Without objection, it is so ordered. They will be ap- 
propriately marked as exhibits and received as such. 

[The letters were marked exhibits Nos. 195, 196, and 197.*] 

Senator Ervin. Do counsels have any further questions ? 

*See contents pp. iv and v for pages of individual exhibits. 


Mr. Dash. I just liavo one that I want to clear up, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Buchanan, I know that Senator Baker, in referrino- to ]\Ir. 
O'Brien's manual, referred to the letterwriting campaign. I think the 
letterwriting campaigns are well known, not only in politics but in 
civic associations and social organizations generally. What I would 
like to really get from you as we close this afternoon is: Is there a dif- 
ference between what, in fact, is a genuine letterwriting campaign 
and — as I ^^nderstood the reference in the manual — that certain wom- 
en who would be volunteers would be asked to use their brains and 
their writing to write short letters and that they themselves would 
write the messages that they wanted to write to the editors? Is there 
a difference, Mr. Buchanan, between that and where the message, the 
irate feeling, is actually manufactured by the political campaign itself 
and that a signature is obtained so that the person who reads the let- 
ters-to-the-editor column believes that a citizen really wrote that when 
he did not ? 

Mr. Buchanan. Do you have in mind that letter to the editor in 
Michigan ? 

Mr. Dash. Let me just turn to tab 3;> [exhibit No. 193]. 

Mr. Buchanan. In Michigan? 

Mr. Dash. Yes ; the Michigan letter. 

Mr. Buchanan. Let me tell you about that, I am a strong — I pei-- 
sonally feel very strongly about the issue of abortion, and I am opposed 
to it, and I drafted that letter. We did get another person's signature 
on the letter, and the individual we went to, frankly, was in the Right 
to Life movement who believed in that, and in effect, I ghosted that 
letter for the individual who signed it and sent it to the papers, I 
believe, in Michigan. 

Now to me that is on a par, I think, with, you know, my sort of pas- 
sionate rhetoric in a political speech which is delivered by a candidate 
who believes as well as I do and I write the rhetoric and he delivers it. 
I think those things are analogous. 

Mr. Dash. Would you say the same thing if you turned to tab 
[exhibit No. 169], to the telegrams that are indicated as having been 
prepared by you? There is a memorandum which indicates that If* 
telegrams have been drafted by Mr. Buchanan and sent to Time and 
Newsweek and — let me just read one of them, there are a number: 

To the editor : The best proof yet of the allegations of Vice President Agnew 
about the Nation's news media was their incredibly arrogant performance be- 
fore the entire Nation last Thursday night. Who in the hell elected those people 
to stand up and read oft their insults to the President of the United States and 
then ask that he comment. 

Do you have tab 9? 

Mr. Buchanan. Do I have tab 9 ? 

Mr. Dash. It is an attachment to tab 9. There are a number of 
Buchanan telegrams that were drafted and then sent. 

Mr. Buchanan. I don't know that they were sent. Here is — I don't 
know — I have not read these memorandums and I don't know who 
signed them. I don't know who signed them. 

Mr. Dash. What I am saying and what I am asking is for informa- 
tion. Isn't there again a difference — and I am talking about the tab — 
that a telegram of that nature which is prepai'ed, and assume you do 
get someone to sign it, and it apjiears in the letters to the editor col- 
umn of Newsweek, and is read as though a citizen thought of the idea 


to send a telegram when, as a matter of fact, all of these had been 
actually manufactured in a political office, actually in the White 
House, and are sent out to news media 

Mr. Buchanan. Well 

Mr. Dash. Is there a difference ? 

Mr. BucHAXAX. There is a difference. But inspiring; an individual 
to write a telegram and drafting a telegram for his signature, these 
are different things. I mean this seems to me to be a foolish exercise, 
I will be quite honest. 

Mr. Dash. I am just asking, wasn't this signature requiring a pro 
forma kind of thing, you had pro forma volunteers? 

Mr. BucHAXAX. No ; I don't see a difference. They asked Buchanan, 
"Can you draft something like that?" Once it leaves my desk, I don't 
know what they do with my copy. I am not the one who is going to 

Mr. Dash. You were drafting it not as Buchanan's statement but 
as a citizen's kind of statement? 

Mr. I^uchaxax. But citizens signed them. I drafted them. I ghosted 

Mr. Dash. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Thompsox. No questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervix. Thank you, ]Mr. Buchanan. 

Mr. BuciiAXAX. Thank you. 

Senator Ervix. The committee will stand in recess until Tuesday 
morning at 10 o'clock. 

[Whereupon, at 4 :30 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 
10 a.m., Wednesday, October 3, 1973.] 

[Subsequent to the hearing, a letter and affidavit of Mitchell Rogo- 
vin was received by the committee rebutting certain parts of Mr. 
Buchanan's testimony and appears on page 4369.] 


U.S. Senate, 
Select Committee ox 
Presidential Campaign Activities, 

Washington, B.C. 

The Select Committoe met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room 
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair- 
man) , presiding. 

Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker, 
Gurney, and Weicker. 

Also present : Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director ; Fred 
D. Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief 
counsel ; Jed Johnson, investigator ; David M. Dorsen, James Hamil- 
ton and Terry F. I^enzner, assistant chief counsels; Marc Lackritz, 
Ronald D. Rotunda, James C. Moore, and Barry Schochet, assistant 
majority counsels ; Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel ; Howard S. 
Liebengood and Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels; 
Pauline O. Dement, research assistant; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Sen- 
ator Inouye; Robert Baca, office of Senator Montoya; A. Searle Field, 
assistant to Senator Weicker; Michael Flanigan, assistant publica- 
tions clerk. 

Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. 

Counsel will call the first witness. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Donald H. Segretti. 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Will you stand up, Mr. Segretti, and hold up your 
right hand? Do you swear that the evidence which you shall give 
to the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities 
shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help 
you God? 

Mr. Segretti. I do. 

Senator Ervin. Let the record show that Mr. Segretti is testifying 
involuntarily pursuant to an order of Judge Sirica extending to him 
imnninity as provided in sections 6002 and 6005 of title 18 of the 
TTnited States Code. I make that statement in order to protect any 
future right you have arising out of that grant of immunity. 

Mr. Segretti. Thank you, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Counsel will proceed. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Segretti, do you have counsel with you ? 

Mr. Segretit. I do. 

Mr. Dash. Will counsel identify himself for the record ? 

Mr. Sherman. Victor Sherman. My address is 8383 Wilshire Boule- 
vard, Beverly Hills, Calif. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Segretti, do you have a statement you wish to read 
to the committee ? 





Mr. Segretti. I do. I do have an opening statement. 

Mr. Dash. Would you proceed to read it ? 

Mr. Segretti. In 1963 I graduated from the University of Southern 
California. I majored in business administration. I then attended the 
University of California at Berkeley and graduated from its law 
school in 196(). My first job was as an employee of the Offic(> of the 
Comptroller of the Currency in Washington, D.C. 

After a few months, I was inducted into the U.S. Army. That was 
in May 1967. Once in the Army, I applied for a commission in the 
Judge Advocate General Corps and Avas accepted. I was released from 
Army active duty in September of 1971, after serving 4 years and 1 
months, a year of which was in Vietnam. 

After my graduation from USC, I maintained infrequent social 
contact with two college friends, Dwight Chapin and Gordon 
Strachan; so, it did not seem unusual when I was contacted in early 
1971 by these two friends about the possibility of doing some work for 
them after my release from active duty. I indicated interest although I 
had no concept of what they had in mind. 

In the summer of 1971 I flew to Washington, D.(^., and met with Mr. 
Chapin and Mr. Strachan. It was explained to me that I would bo 
employed to perform certain political functions for the reelection of 
Pi-esident Nixon. At tliat time I was aware that both men were em- 
ployed at the AVliite House. I considered the political functions we 
discussed to be similar to college j^ranks which had occurred at USC. 
The impression was given to me that these so-called pranks were per- 
formed by both parties in Presidential campaigns and that there was 
nothing improper or illegal in such traditional activities. 

Subsequently, I was told to contact Mr. Herbert Kalmbach in New- 
port Beach, Calif., for the purpose of finalizing my employment. I met 
with Mr. Kalmbach in August 1971, and was otfered a salary of $16,000 
per annum plus expenses for my activities. ^Nlr. Kalmbach and I did 
not discuss the specifics of my employment, and I myself had no con- 
crete ideas as to what work I was to perform. It was not even clear to 
me whether or not I would be working foi' Mr. Kalmbach, Mr. Chapin, 
or others. However, I was happy to accept employment from ])eople 
who held prominent positions in and out of the Government. 

After meeting with Mr. Kalmbach, I met Mith ^Iv. Chai)in. not far 
from the Western White House in San Clemente, Calif. Dui-ing this 
meeting, Mr. Chapin gave me a list of cities in which I was to acquire 
acquaintances to assist me in my future endeavors. Mr. Chapin stressed 
the secrecy of my duties and stated that he would be my contact at the 
White House. He further explained that my duties Avoidd consist of 
A'arious activities tending to foster a split between the various Demo- 
cratic hopefuls and to prevent the Democratic Party from uniting be- 
hind one candidate. I was told that this was a common campaign 
strategy. Even though I had at one time been a registered Democrat 
and was ai)oliti('al during my Armv tcuui'e. I uas in agreement with 
President Nixon's announced i)olicies of ending the Vietnam war and 
the draft. Thus, it was on pi-inciple that I favored his reelection. It 
was this combination of factors, my lack of any concrete career ])lans, 
my friendship and respect for tlie individuals involved, my belief in 


the reelection of President Nixon, the opportunity of working for the 
"VVliite House, and the cliang-e of ])ace from my Army duties wliich led 
me to accept the employment. 

From Septem.ber 1971 to the end of the year, I traveled to various 
parts of the United States attempting to line up political associates. 
Mr. Chapin had instructed me not to use the names of any pereons 
at the White House or the name of any person associated with the 
Eepublican Party when making my contacts. I was also told not to 
use my real name so that I would never pro\e an embarrassment to 
the President or his campaign supporters. It was, therefore, difficult 
for me to explain to people exactly what I was doing, who I was work- 
ing for, or what wc would be doing together. During the initial period 
of my employment, I myself- had no specific idea as to what I was doing 
or how I was to do it. t did indicate to people I "recniited"' that their 
tasks would be to picket various Democratic candidates under the 
guise of working for a rival Democratic candidate, to ask difficult 
questions at news conferences, and, if possible, get someone to work 
in a candidate's headquarters. The purpose of planting so-called 
spies was primarily to obtain candidates* traveling schedules to assist 
in the planning of picketing activities. During this period I received 
$5,000 traveling expenses from INIr. Kalmbach and the sutu of $667 
every 2 weeks as salary. 

Apart from the above, T did the following during 1971 : 

No. 1, I prepared a list of questions to ask Senator Muskie when 
he appeared at '\Aniittiei- College in southern California. Tlie questions 
were passed out among the audience, and I believe one of tlie questions 
was asked. 

No. 2, I contacted an individual in California who provided three 
or four persons in San Francisco, who picketed a meeting of various 
Democrats, with signs sayinir, "Kennedy foi- President" or words to 
that effect. 

No. 3, I had Senator ]Muskie followed for 2 days while he was in 
Los Angeles, Calif. This was the one and only time that I ever had 
any candidate followed, and it was done pursuant to an earlier sug- 
gestion from Mi: Chapin that I have a familiarity with how Presi- 
dential candidates traveled. To the best of my recollection, those are 
the only activities I performed in 1971. 

In January of 1972, I received a second sum of $5,000 from Mr. 
Kalmbach. This sum was paid following my request for additional 
moneys to cover my travel expenses. On or about January 15, 1972, I 
received my last biweekly check in the sum of $667 from a trust ac- 
count apparently maintained by Mr. Kalmbach. At about this time, 
Mr. Kalmbach explained to me that rather than receiving further 
moneys by check he preferred that we "switch to green.'' On or about 
March 1,^1972, I received the sum of $5,000 in cash from Mr. Kalm- 
bach's secretary, and on or about March 28, 1972, I received the sum 
of $25,000 in cash from Mr. Kalmbach. This latter payment was made 
upon my request for the sum of $5,000 whicli I anticij^ated was needed 
to cover my traveling and salary expenses. It was my impression at the 
time that the extra $20,000 was given to me so that I would not have 
to contact Mr. Kalmbach on a frequent basis. I now believe that the 
new campaign law regarding the reporting of income and disburse- 
ments, had something to do with this payment. The funds referred to 


herein are the only moneys that I have received. I did not at any tiinej 
discuss with Mr. Kahnbach any of tlie specifics of my political activity J 
and I have no personal knowledge as to whether or not he spoke withj 
others about what I was doing. I should add to my statement that I; 
did receive also the sum of $400 in casli that sunnner to cover my ex- ! 
penses for travel to Washington, D.C., to meet with Mr. Kalmbach — ; 
meet with, pardon me, Mr. Chapin and Mr. Strachan. 

All of the moneys received were spent for traveling and living ex- 
j)enses. A complete accounting, to the best of my ability, has been pro- ; 
vided to this committee and to the Special Prosecutor's Office. 

In December of 1971, I traveled to the State of Florida for the pur- 
pose of seeking additional contacts. During uiy visit I met with a Mr. 
Kobert Benz in Tampa, Fla., and a Mr. Douglas Kelly in Miami, Fla.j 

Mr. Benz and Mr. Kelly seemed knowledgeable as to the inner- 
workings of a political campaign and expressed a willingness to assist 
me in my endeavors. In fact, both young men seemed to know much , 
more about liow political campaigns operated than I did. Therefore, 
I gave to each a modest sum and asked that they make contact with ' 
other persons who would be of future assistance. The intention was, i 
as previously indicated, to line up pickets, recruit persons to ask hard 
questions at news conferences, and to obtain the travel schedules of 
the various Democratic candidates. 

In early January 1972, 1 returned to Florida. At this time Mr. Benz 
had obtained two students to picket the opening of Senator Jackson's 
headquarters in Tampa, Fla., carrying "Muskie for President" signs 
or words to that effect. He also recruited approximately 10 persons to 
picket a Muskie rally with signs relating to Muskie's reluctance to 
consider a black American as a running mate. These activities of Mr. 
Benz wei"e done pursuant to my suggestions. I also understand that I 
Mr, Benz, on his own initiative, added a sentence to a Muskie press l 
release, which announced the sending of 10,000 invitations for a ISIuskie 
rally to be followed by a $l,000-a-plate dinner. This press release was 
sent to one or two newspapers. 

In addition to the above, Mr. Benz and I collaborated in one way 
or another on the following matters : 

No. 1, a letter on Senator Muskie *s stationery alleging unauthorized 
use of Government typewriters by his staff. This letter was sent to 
various persons whom I do not recall at this time. I 

No. 2, the placing of posters stating, "Help Muskie In Busing More 
Children Now." The poster bore the legend "Mothers Backing Muskie 
(^ommittee.-' Approximately 100 to 150 such posters were distributed 
or posted by me. 

No. 3, the placing of stink bombs at a Muskie picnic and at the 
Muskie headquarters. 

No. 4, the sending of a letter on Muskie stationery accusing Senators 
Jackson and Humphrey of sexual improprieties. I would like to make : 
clear that this letter was my idea and was not suggested by any other 
person. I assume full responsibility for its contents. Each and every 
allegation in the letter was untrue and without any basis in fact. It 
was not my desire to have anyone believe the letter, but instead it was 
intended to create confusion among the various candidates. It is my 
belief that from 20 to 40 such letters were sent out, mainly to Senator 
Jackson's supporters. I deeply regret that I initiated this incident and 


wish to apologize f)ublicly for this stupid act. I can only hope that this 
apology will in some way rectify the harm done to these Senators and 

j their families. 

I There were other activities performed by Mr. Benz and myself 

' which I cannot fully recall at this time but which generally consisted 
of picketing candidates and disti'ibuting reprints from various daily 

j newspapers and magazines. 

j Mr. Douglas Kelly assisted me in posting the aforementioned Muskie 
posters, and in placing an ad in a college iiewspaper stating : 

"Wanted. Sincere gentleman seeks running mate. AVliite preferred 
but natural sense of rhythm no obstacle. Contact E. Muskie.*' 

He also helped me place an ad in the classified section of the Miami 
Sunday Sun-Keporter stating : 

"Senator Muskie, would you accept a Jewish running mate?" and 
another ad in the same newspaper stating : 

"Senator Muskie. You wouldn't accept a black or an American 
Indian, would you accept a Jewisli running mate ?" 

There was also an ad that was placed in a local Cuban newspaper 
and on a local radio station which stated : 
"Muskie believes all people have a right to choose any type of govern- 

i ment that they want. Tiie Cuban people are no exception and the 

j United States should not interfere. If elected, Muskie will attempt to 
ease the tensions between the United States and Cuba. He was born 
in Maine and is a good American. Vote for Ed Muskie."' 

We also distributed some fliers inviting the public to a nonexistent 
open house at Muskie's headquarters in Miami. Mr. Kelly and I per- 
formed other activities of a minimal nature which I have disclosed to 
this committee by way of staff interviews, to the best of my recollec- 
tion. I also understand that Mr. Kelly did other things about ^vhich I 
am not totally clear, since ho also operated to a great extent on his 

At this time, it is my best recollection that I paid Mr. Kelly and Mr. 

i Benz a total of approximately $5,500. 

I In February of 1972, a man called me, identifying himself as Ed 

• Warren. From a jirior conversation with Mr. Chapin, I had been in- 
formed that a i)erson would call me who would give me assistance. In 

' Miami, Fla., I met with Mr. Warren and another individual who was 
introduced to me as George Leonard. I now recognize Ed Warren as 
being Mr. E. Howard Hunt. I have been unable to identify Mr. George 
Leonard; however, it is my understanding that iie was probably G. 
Gordon Liddy. Mr. Warren provided me with the name of a printer in 

' Miami whom I subsequently used for various purposes. I recall meeting 

' Mr. Warren a second time in June 1972 at the Sheraton Four Ambas- 
sadors Hotel in Miami, Fla. During this meeting Mr. Warren sug- 
gested that I put together a group of peaceful demonstrators to picket 
the Doral Hotel during the Democratic Convention, at which time 
another group of pickets was to join in the demonstration and act in 
an unruly manner. It was explained to me that the bad conduct of the 
crowd would be blamed on Senator McGovern. It was never my inten- 
tion to create, nor did I ever participate in, any kind of physical vio- 
lence, and Mr. Warren's ])lan was something in which I did not want 
to get involved. As fate would have it, the Watergate burglary pre- 
ceded these plans, and they were never carried out. 


At this point I would like to state to tlie committee that at no time 
did I ever have any knowledo:e of, nor did I participate in, the Water- 
gate burglary or any activity involving electronic surveillance. 

It is possible that 1 may have met JNIr. Warren on a third occasion, 
but I am unsure at this time. 

On April 1, 1972 (Ai)ril Fools' Day), in Milwaukee, Wis., Mr. Benz 
and I distributed a tlier advertising a free all-you-can-eat lunch with 
drinks at Hubert Humphrey's headquarters. I have given the com- 
mittee and the Special Prosecutor's Office a copy of the flier. There 
was. of course, no such party. 

Also in April of 1972, in response to a telephone call from Mr. War- 
ren, 1 flew to Washington, D.C. I had Mr. Kelly meet me there. Senator 
Muskie was to have a fundraising dinner at the Washington Hilton 
Hotel, and Mr. Kelly and I, ostensibly acting for Muskie organizers, 
ordered flowers, pizzas, and liquor foi' the campaign workers. In addi- 
tion, we invited certain foreign guests and provided for their delivery 
to the dinner by chauU'ered limousine. A magician was also hired to 
attend the dinner and to entertain. AVe also made inquires about renting 
an elephant, but were unable to make the necessary arrangements. The 
))urpose of all this was to cause confusion at the Muskie dinner. Mr. 
Kelly and I also distributed a flier stating, "Come. Protest the Fat 
Cats With Signs." This was in reference to the INIuskie dinner. Mr. 
Kelly and I constructed various protest signs, but no one showed up 
to protest. 

During 1972, I performed activities of a similar, but less extensive 
and significant nature, in other States. I have given a full statement 
to this committee's staff regarding these events. I believe my activities 
in these other States produced little, if any, commotion, and do not 
need to be elaborated on in this statement. I also feel that many 
innocent persons would be hurt if I were to disclose the names of all 
persons I contacted in my travels. Most of these persons are completely 
innocent of any wi'ongdoing. and to publicly disclose their names 
would be a great disservice to them. I have given the committee's staff 
a complete list of all persons whose names I can recall. I understand 
that both the committee's staff and the prosecutor's office have in- 
vestigated my activities in an intensive manner. I would, therefore, 
beg the indulgence of this committee that I not be forced to publicly 
disclose the names of innocent persons, which could only damage their 
reputations unduly without serving any legitimate legislative purpose. 

In July of 1972. Mr. Kelly and I made arrangements for a small 
plane to fly over the Democratic Conveiition center with a trailer 
reading: "Peace, Pot, Promiscuity. Vote McGovern." This was my last 
political activity of the 1972 campaign. 

After newsstoiies began mentioning my name, I sought legal counsel 
from Mr. John W. Dean. I met ]Mr. Dean through ]Mr. Chapin and 
Mr. Strachan. Over a period of months. INfr. Dean acted as my law3'er, 
and I confided in him in this capacity. At Mr. Dean's request, I made 
a tape I'ecording explaining my activities in 1971 and 1972, and gave it 
to him. I also prepared a wi'itten statement and gave it, along with 
many documents, to an attorney in Los Angeles, Calif., who was sug- 
gested as coimsel by Mr. Dean. It is my understanding that this attor- 
ney sent to Mr. Dean copies of the material left with him. and that 
Mr. Dean subsequently turned over said material, which were obviously 


intended to be confidential and part of the attorney-client privilege, 
to this committee. Although I feel that Mr. Dean betraj^ed my con- 
fidence, I do wish to state that at no time did he tell me to be anything 
but honest and truthful with the Federal Bureau of Investigation 
and the U.S. attorney's office. 

This general statement was prepared with the advice and assist- 
ance of my present counsel, Victor Sherman of Los Angeles, Calif., 
jand was not intended by us to be a complete statement of all my activ- 
jities during the months in question. I am sure that this committee is 
I now aware that my activities have been blown out of all proportion by 
the news media. I accept the fact that most of my present problems 
are the direct result of my own conduct. However, I cannot help but 
feel that I have been abused by rumor, character assassination, in- 
nuendo, and a complete disregard for the privacy of myself, my 
friends, and my family. I have literally had to avoid the onslaught 
of the media during the past year, and their attempts to get a story 
at all costs. I understand that under various guises, some of the news 
media illegally obtained my telephone, bank account, and credit card 
records, and generally conducted their investigations without any con- 
cern for my rights. Nevertheless, this in no way lessens my sincere 
belief that my activities were wrong and have no place in the Ameri- 
can political system. To the extent my activities have harmed other 
persons and the political process, I have the deepest regrets. I am now 
ready to answer the questions of this committee. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Segretti, your statement has been quite full. You 
have already indicated how you fii^st came to know Mr. Dwiglit Chapin 
and Mr. Gordon St radian. As you have indicated in j'our statement, 
you knew them as college classmates at the University of Southern 

. Mr. Segketti. That is correct, Mr. Dash. 

' Mr. Dash. Now, at the time INIr. Strachan and Mr. Ohapin were in 
touch with you while you Avere in the Army in 1971, and also during 
the period of July 1971 to June 1972, do you know what Mr. Chapin, 
Mr. Dwight Chapin's position was '? 

Mr. Segretti. He was employed at the White House and I believe 
his position at that time was Presidential appointments secretary. 

Mr. Dash. And do you know what Mr. Strachan's, Mr. Gordon 
Strachan's }x>sition was ? 

Mr. Segretti. All I knew at that time was that he was employed at 
the White House. 

Mr. Dash. Did you come to know that he was an assistant to Mr. 
Haldeman ? 

Mr. Segretti. I did, but that was much later into 1972. 

Mr. Dash. Now, after the series of contents you have included in 
your statement, you did in fact come to Washington on June 23, 1971, 
to meet with Mr. Strachan and Mr. Chapin ? 

Mr. Segretti. Mr. Dash, I am not quite certain of the exact date on 
that, but it is approximately that period of time. 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall where you met Mr. Chapin ? 

Mr. Segretti. I had dinner with Mr. Chapin and Mr. Strachan 
at Mr. Strachan's residence. 

Mr. Dash. And it was at that time that Mr. Chapin began to dis- 
cuss with you the job opportunities that he had been talking to you 
about on the telephone? 


Mr. Segretti. Yes; it -svas. 

Mr. Dash. Now, is it not true that Mr. Cliapin told you that what' 
they Avei-e looking for was someone to do some midei-covei- work fori 
the reelection of President Nixon and to engage in political tricks?! 

Mr. Skgreti'i. I don't recall if the term "undercover'' was used, but' 
secrecy was stressed. 

Mr. Dash. Well, is it a question of semantics? I say imdercover- 
Mr. Chapin did tell you at a later time that you were to use secrecy,! 
tliat you were not to reAcal your identity and mucli of your work was 
undercover, was it not? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. And although you use the term of what you had engaged 
in with them as college pranks, actually what they wanted you toj 
engage in was political tricks? 

Mr. Segretti. That is right. 

Mr. Dash. You were interested in this job, were you not? 

Mr. Segretti. I was. 

Mr. Dash. In your statement, you liave already given us for the} 
record the information received fi-om Mr. Chapin to contact Mr. 
Kalmbach and the meeting you had with Mr. Kalmbach in which 
your salary was arranged. 

Could you tell us, how much did you receive from Mr. Kalmbach 
totally for your work during 1971 and 1072 ? 

Mr. Segretti. I can give you an a})})roximate tigure on it, Mr. Dash. 
I have it in my financial records somewliere. I think it is in tlie neigh- 
borhood of around $45,000. That inc hided salary and moneys for ex- 
penses, total. 

Mr. Dash. Now, on the same day that you arranged this with Mr. 
Kalmbach, and I think the date is July 9, 1971 — do you recall that 
date ? 

Mr. Segretti. I place that date a little bit later, Mr. Dash, but it is 
in the summer of 1971. 

Mr. Dash. Did you on that day also have a meeting with Mr. 

Mr. SEGRE'nT. I did. 

Mr. Dash. And where did you uieet with Mi-. Chajun ? 

Mr. Segretti. I met Mr. Cluipin near the San Clemente White House 
and we went to a small restaurant in the local area. ! 

Mr. Dash. Now, what information and instructions did Mr. Chapin i 
give you at that meet ing ? ' 

Mr. Segretti. At that meeting, ^Nfr. (^hajiin, in addition to describ- 
ing the general backgi-ound of the political situation, gave me a list 
of States to concentrate on in making future political contacts. 

Mr. Dash. And were these States ])riniarily the primary States? 

Mr. Segretti. Primarily ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. And it was at this meeting that he indicated to you that 
you were to act in secrecy so that there would be no trace back to the 
White House? 

Mr. Segretti. I don't recall specifically if that was discussed at thar 
meeting. That was discussed sevei-al times. 

Mr. Dash. I^ut I take it, it was fairly eaily in your discussions with 
Mr. Chapin that he emphasized se<'i'e('y ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 


Mr. Dash. And that there should be no tracing back to the "White 
\ House ? 

! Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

i Mr. Dash. And that you were not to use your own name? 
i Mr. Segretti. That is correct, ISIr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. What, if anything-, did Mr. Chapin tell you about the 
importance of the use of news media and news media impact in your 
assignment ? 

Mr. Segretti. It was related to me in relationship to pickets that, 
for example, at a Muskie rally, if you were to have a Humphrey for 
President sign or two, it should be placed in proximity to where the 
media could take a photograph of it. 

Mr. Dash. Well, was he emphasizing to you that you should use, as 
best you could, news media impact ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. At that period of time and in relationship to 
that type of activity, yes. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did he also talk to you about the candidate you 
should spend most of your time on in terms of your political activities* 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir; he did. 

Mr. Dash. Who was that candidate ? 

Mr. Segrei^t. That ^^ as Senator JMuskie. 

Mr. Dash. Did he indicate why ? 

Mr. Segretti. It is difficult to recall any exact conversation at this 
time — that was some time ago. But Senator Muskie at that time was 
certainly the forerunner, shall we say, of likely prospects to run for 
the Democratic nomination. 

Mr. Dash. He was the front runner at that time, was he not ? 

^Ir. Segretti. Yes, I believe he was. 

Mr. Dash. Now, also at this meeting, and I think you have indicated 
some of this in your statement, Mr. Chapin gave you some of the strat- 
egy that you were to use in your activities. Let me state what I believe 
you have indicated to the staif, both here and in executive session. I 
think what you have indicated in your statement, and tell me if this is 
not true, as to what the strategy was — that you were to engage in activ- 
ities to weaken the leading candidate, Senator Muskie, and to carry out 
political tricks to set one Democratic candidate against the other so that 
after the convention the staffs of these candidates would still be bitter 
and would not be able to rally behind any chosen candidate. Would 
that be a fair statement of the strategy ? 

Mr. Segretti. That would be fair except the statement you made 
about weakening Senator Muskie. I think you attribute a little more 
emphasis than at least was conveyed to me at that point in time. 

Mr. Dash. But your emphasis was on Senator JMuskie and your 
political tricks and the use of your agents during that period of time 
was directed toward him and to confuse the candidates f.nd his cam- 
paign, was that not true ? 

Mr. Segretti. I think that could be stated, yes. 

Mr. Dash. And, therefore, it is not too strong a statement to say 
that it was an effort to weaken Senator Muskie's i^rimary campaign. 
It was not to strengthen it, was it? 

Mr. Segretti. No ; it was not. 

Mr. Dash. By the way, when you were first approached you were 
in the Army, were you not ? 


Mr. Segretti. I was. 

Mr. Dash. While you were still in the Army did you recruit somej 
persons to work for yon in this pol itical project ? ; 

Mr. Segretti. I contacted some indiyiduals. 1 

Mr. Dash. Mow, followino- youj- release from the Army, which I| 
understand was on Sept(Mnber 15. 1971 j 

Mr. Segretti. I bolieye that was September 1,3. 

Mr. Dash. What? 

Ml". Segretti. I belieye that was September !?>. 

Mr. Dash. September 13. Did you «2:o to Washington to meet with 
]Mr. Chapin some time toward the latter part of September? 

Mr. Segretti. I did. 

Mr. Dash. And did Mr. Chapin tell you at that time that "Sir. 
Strachan would no longer be inyolved in the project? 

Mr. Segre'fit. I tend to belieye that that statement, or a statement 
to that etl'ect, was made a little earlier than that, Mr. Dash. 

Ml-. Dash. Well, about when, would you say for the record? 

Mr. Segretti. Prior to my release from Army actiye duty. 

Mr, Dash. And thereafter you had no further contact with ]\Ir. 
Strachan in your actiyities ? 

INIr. Segretti. The only contact I can remember with INIr. Strachan, 
from my release from actiye duty until June 1972, was Mr. Strachan 
called me once on the telephone in late Sept(Miiber or Noyember 1971. 

Mr. Dash. Did it haye anythino- to do with these activities? 

Mr. Segretti. Pardon? 

Mr. Dash. Did it have anythinir to do with your assignment? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes ; it did. 

Mr. Dash. Would you tell what the discussion was about? 

Mr. Segretti. Senator ]\Iuskie was traveling in southern California 
and some individuals threw some eggs at his staff or at Senator ^luskie, 
and it was broadcast on the news media. ]Mr. Strachan called me up 
to ask me if I had anything to do with that. I told him I did not, which 
is the truth. 

Mr. Dash. Did he sound disappointed ? 

Mr. Segretti. I just do not recall. I do not believe so. 

Mr. Dash. What arrangements — at the meeting now that I think 
we have established that took place some time in late September after 
you left the Army when you met with Mr. Chapin in Washington — ' 
what arrangements did ]\Ir. Chapin make with you for the purpose of 
contacting each other during the course of the project? 

Mr. Segrei'it. Well, I was insti-ucted at some point in time that I 
Avould — T was given his home telephone number. Generally speaking, 
I was to call the AVfiite House switchboard and I was to use another 

Mr. Dash. All right. What name were you to use? 

Mr. Segreiit. I was to use and did use 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall thv name Don Morris? 

Mr. Segre'iti. That was the name that T did — M-o-r-r-i-s — that was 
the name that I used, although at the veiy first it may have been an- 
other name very similar to that, lk)b AForse, M-o-r-s-e, but I believe 
the first time 1 called up the operator said "is that spelled M-o-r-r-i-s", 
and I said yes. 

Mr. Dash. Was Mr. Chapin to have a code name ? 


Mr. Segretti. I was instructed to get an answering service on my 
home telephone number in California, which I did. Mr. Chapin, if he 
were to call, and I was not in, and if he left a message, he used the 
name Mr. Chapman, C-h-a-p-m-a-n. 

Mr. Dash. Have you heard the iiame Bob Duane? Have you ever 
heard that as a code name? 

Mr. Segretti. That, I believe was mentioned — at least was in one of 
the notebooks that had been — that I had given to the attorney in Los 
Angeles and eventually went to Mr. Dean. That name was never used 
to my recollection, and it was probably just part of the discussion at 
some point in time. 

Mr. Dash. Were you also to open up a post office box so that you 
could receive mail ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. And did you receive mail during that period of time 
from Mr. Chapin? 

Mr. Segretti. I did receive some mail from Mr. Chapin. 

Mr. Dash. And some instructions or recommendations? 

Mr. Segretti. At one time I did ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. In order to help you select agents or contacts? 

Mr. Segretti. Contacts, I would prefer, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Well, I know we may be dealing with semantics but they 
were in fact agents of your work, were they not ? They were follow- 
ing your directions and were acting under your supervision in some 
cases and sometimes on their own but they were carrying out the 
project and the assignments you had been given by Mr. Chapin. 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir ; they were carrying out the assignments, yes, 
si I'. 

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Chapin, in order to help you find such persons, 
give you a list of the 1968 advance men of President Xixon? 

Mr. Segretti. At one point in time he did. I don't know whether it 
was a 1968 advance man's list or not but it was a Wiite House list of 
advance men. 

Mr. Dash. Did you use this list to make contacts? 

Mr. Segretti. I did use that list to some extent. 

Ml-. Dash. I think you have mentioned that at one time Mr. Chapin 
did send you a memo containing suggestions. Would you turn to^ — 
3'Ou have before you some memorandums and other exhibits and they 
are tabbed and will you turn to tab 2 [exhibit Xo. 200]. Would you 
look at that? It is a memorandum, for the record, dated September 28, 
1971, 4 p.m. 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Yes. Is this a memorandum you received from Mr. 
Chapin at your post office box ? 

Mr. Segretfi. This is a memorandum I received. I do not believe I 
received it at my post office box but at my home address. 

Mr. Dash. At your home address. 

The memorandum for the record states : 

From now on, we want to have at least one Muskie sign in anions demonstra- 
tors who are demonstrating against tlie President. It should be MUSKIE FOR 
PRESIDENT in big letters and should be held in a location so that it is clearly 

At IMuskie events or events by other Democratic hopefuls, there should be a 
sign or two which goads them. For example at a Muskie rally there should be 


HUMPHREY or something else that would goad him along. 

At Humphrey rallies there should be Muskie signs and at Kennedy rallies, 
there should be Muskie or Humphrey signs and so on. These signs should be 
well placed in relationship to the press area so that a picture is easy to get. 

Did you follow that recommendation ? 

Mr. SEGRJi-n^i. To some extent I did, yes. 

Mr. Dash. That was the o;eneral, one of the general, strategies you 
used, did you not ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, that is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did Mr. Chapin, also in September 1971, ask you to 
fly to Portland, Oreg., and stay at the Benson Hotel where the Presi- 
dent and his party were staying ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. Tell the committee why he asked you to do that 

Mr. Segreitt. Well, some of it is conjecture or speculation and I 
hate to really engage in that but perhaps it is not too speculative. I 
think perhaps one reason was to get me enthused about the job, but 
I think more of a primary reason was to let me get familiar with 
the Presidential advance and how a Presidential party was put to- 
gether in traveling and in that type of thing. 

Mr. Dash. Did he give you at that time an advance man's manual ^ 

Mr. Segretti. I am not certain whether it was given to me in 
Washington, D.C., or Portland. 

Mr. Dash. But he did give you one ? 

Mr. Segretti. I did receive one. 

Mr. Dash. Did he at that time tell you to contact Mr. Kalmbach 
to get you the first check ? 

Mr. Segretti. My first recollection was that it was told to me by 
telephone a little bit prior to that. However, my notes regarding that 
meeting do mention, I think, the term operating capitafof $5,000 so 
apparently it was discussed at that point then. 

Mr. Dash. Well, shortly after that you did go back to Los Angeles 
and you did meet with Mr. Kalmbach and did receive a $5,000 check 
and expenses i 

Mr. Segretti. I don't l:>elieve I did. I received a check in the mail 
of that sum. 

Mr. Dash. Now, when you started out on your work, how did you 
make your political contacts; how many States did you actually visit, 
a p p rox i m ate ly ? 

^Ir. Segretti. That is really a guess, to some extent, and requires my 
going over my records thoroughly. Some were very sporadic. For ex- 
ample, T remember one trip I flew. I was flying down South and I hap- 
pened to know a friend that was living in Albuquerque, from my peri- 
od of time in the military. So, instead of flying direct to Florida or 
wherever I was flying, I stopped oft' in New Mexico and it was a com- 
l)i nation of both social visit and you might call it a political visit. 

Mr. Dash. About how many States did you actually 

Mr. Segretti. INIaybe 12. 

Mr. Dash [continuing]. Make contacts Avith, is what I am really 
getting at, Mr. Segretti. I know you traveled quite a bit throughout 
the country. 

Mr. Segretti. Riirht. 


Mr. Dash. In how many States did j^on actually place, either on the 
payroll or for serious business — people who were going to follow up 
and do work in the area of j^olitical tricks ? 

Mr. Segretti. I would sa}^ half a dozen. 

Mr. Dash. And were these primarily the States that Mr. Chapm 
had talked to you about — to emphasize your work in ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes ; they were. 

yh'. Dash. When you made these contacts with these various people 
throughout the country, what name or names did you use ^ 

Mr. Segretti. At first, I believe for a short period of time, I used the 
name Don Durham and the balance of the time I used Don Simmons. 

Mr. Dash. You have already in your statement indicated that you 
were asked or you did put under surveillance. Senator ISIuskie, when 
he was out in Los Angeles ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall that Mr. Chapin asked you to do this? 

Mr. Segretti. Specifically ? 

Mr. Dash. Or told you that Senator Muskie was going to be out in 
Los Angeles and that you should arrange pickets and things in that 
area ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes ; that is correct. 

]Mr. Dash. And that came from Mr. Chapin. 

Wlien you did have him placed under surveillance, and T am not 
asking you now for the name of the individual 

Mr. Segretti. I appreciate that, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash [continuing]. But was this just a friend or what was his 
occupation ? 

]Mr. Segretti. This was an individual whose name I had gotten on a 
list from a friend that I knew in the Army, that I had worked with to 
some extent in the military service, who was assigned to the CID and 
the military which is really — stands for Criminal Investigation Divi- 
sion, and this individual was a retired CID individual and at that time 
he was working for a detective agency. 

Mr. Dash. A private detective ? 

Mr. Segretti. I would classify him as that at that time ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Now, as your statement has indicated you went out to 
Whittier College, I think, in November of 1971 ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Chapin inform you that Senator Muskie was 
going to be appearing at Whittier College ? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe that is how the scenario went. It is possible 
that I called jNIr. Chapin to inform him of that fact, finding out from 
a local paper or a news release that I read in the paper, but my best 
recollection is that I received a phone call regarding that. 

Mr. Dash. All right, your activity at that time, I thinlv you have 
indicated in your statement, was that you distributed a list of some 
hard questions or questions to be asked Senator Muskie ? 

Mr, Segretti. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Will you turn to tab :^> [exhibit No. 201] of the exhibits 
that are before you, and would you identify that exhibit as the hand- 
out that was given at the appearance of Senator Muskie ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Some of the questions that you were asking to be put to 
him were : 


Do you refuse to even consider a black or Chicano as a running mate? 

Your public answer that they do not yet have political equality only fosters any 
bias that exists and avoids the question. ' 

Do you speak in terms of equality for minority yet send your children to all| 
white private schools? 

That was the tenor of your question, was it not ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is right. 

Mr. Dash. During your operation at Whittier, did you receive any 
communication from Mr. Chapin ? 

Mr. Segretti. I did. , 

Mr. Dash. TVliat was the form of that communication ? ! 

Mr. Segretti. I received a Xerox copy of what I now believe to be^ 
a page from the White House press summary. 

Mr. Dash. Will you look at tab 4 [exhibit No. 202] I think 

Mr. Segretti. We have it. 

Mr. Dash. On tab 4, if you have that before you, there appeal's on! 
page 10, of what appears to come from the White House press sum- 
mary that goes to the President, a reference to Mr. Muskie's appearance! 
at Whittier. I just want to read a couple of lines from there : 

Reynolds said that he had come prepared for conservative questions, but the 
Chicanos gave him no chance and Big Ed proved that he can keep his cool. 
Aluskie reported that he was pleased by the reception he received from those 
willing to listen. But more importantly, said Reynolds, he proved he can keep 
his temi)er under stress. 

Now, does there appear on that news summary some handwriting 
addressed to you ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. And is that handwriting Mr. Chapin's ? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe it to be Mr. Chapin's. 

Mr. Dash. Would you read what the handwriting says with refer- 
ence to the item I just referred to ? 

Mr. Segretti. It states: "Don — note we really missed the boat on 
this. Obviously, the press now wants to prove EM" — I believe that — 

Mr. Dash. Ed Muskie, I believe? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. [Continues reading:] "Can keep his temper. Let 
us prove he cannot." 

Then there is another little notation and there is one more little com- 
ment that says, "Your Q," which I take it to mean "My question." 

Mr. Dash. And does that refer to the fact that in the news siunmary | 
there is a statement that Muskie favored abortions for therapeutic rea- 1 
sons and one of the questions you had in your handout referred to 
abortions. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is true. 

Mr. Dash. And he was giving you credit for the fact that your ques- 
tion got into this news summary ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did you do any work in the New Hampshire pri- 
mary ? 

Mr. Segretti. I did not. 

Mr. Dash. What happened in New Hampshire? 

Mr. Segretti. I was instructed to go to New Hampshire. I did. I met 
with an individual whose name was given to me. I found him to be a 
very personable and likeable gentleman — very knowledgeable in poli- 


tics. He seemed very receptive to my ideas. I felt so much at ease with 
him that I gave him my true name. 

Mr. Dash. Then what happened afterwards? 

Mr. Segretti. I received a phone call and was told to leave New 

Mr. Dash. Who called you? 

Mr. Segretti. Mr. Chapin. 

Mr. Dash. And what was his problem? Wliat was your problem? 

Mr. Segretti. My problem was that I had used my real name, and 
apparently, this individual had called around Washington to find out 
who I was. 

Mr. Dash. I guess in that sense, you had blown your cover in New 
Hampshire ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Chapin then indicate that you should stay out 
I of the New Hampshire campaign and go to another State? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. he did. 

Mr. Dash. What State did you next go to and spend most of your 
I time at that point ? 

Mr. Segretti. Well, tlie next primaiy schedule was Florida and that 
is where I went. 

Mr. Dash. Now, I think you made, in your statement you have incli- 
cated that you recruited two agents in Florida, Mr. Benz and Mr. 
Kelly. How did you contact Mr. Benz ? 

Mr. Segretti. ^Ir. Benz was quite by accident, really. When I ar- 
rived in Tampa, I called a local Republican office and asked whoever 
answered the phone if he knew of any individual that might like to 
do some part-time work and I was given the name of INIr. Benz. 

Mr. Dash. And Mr. Kelly ? 

Mr. Segretti. Mr. Kelly's name I received from Mr. Benz and I re- 
ceived it from another individual when I went to Miami, whose name 
I got from the White House advance list. The name of Mr. Kelly came 
up both times, so I subsequently called jNIr. Kelly. 

Mr. Dash. Now. did you instruct Mr. Benz and ]VIr. Kelly to engage 
in various activities, to create great confusion among the Democratic 
candidates in such a way that they would blame one another? 

]Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Were they also to infiltrate the Muskie campaign? 

Mr. Segretti. They were not. People associated with them were to. 

Mr. Dash. I did not hear your answer. 

Mr. Segretti. I do not believe they personally were to. 

Mr. Dash. Were they given the independence to recruit other per- 
sons ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir, they Avere. 

INIr. Dash. And did they have other persons infiltrate the Muskie 
campaign ? 

iSIr. Segretti. I believe they did. 

Mr. Dash. What was the' purpose of infiltrating the Muskie cam- 
paign ? 

Mr. Segretti. Primarilv to obtain campaign schedules. 

Mr. Dash. But while they were there, were they to take anything 
else they could find ? 



Mr. Segretti. Anything else they could come across that would be 
information would classify as a bonus ; yes, sir. , 

Mr. Dash. You had contacts in Califoiiiia at that time as well, diet 
you not ? i 

iSIr. Segretti. Any contacts I had in California at that time reallj;', 
were rather minimal, but I believe I did. j 

Mr. Dash. But you did develop contacts in California ? i 

Mr. Segretti. To some extent, yes, sir. { 

Mr. Dash. And they also infiltrated, both in Los Angeles and San| 
Francisco, the Muskie campaign ? | 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. ' 

Mr. Dash. Now, during the time you were recmiting and traveling,; 
yov have indicated that you maintained contact with Mr. Chapin. Is it; 
tr.o. that Mr. Chapin actually received periodic reports from you, that 
you sent Mr. Chapin copies of material that you had distributed and 
a list of things that would reflect your conduct ? 

Mr. Segretti. As a general practice, I would. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did there come a time when you received, at your 
box in Los Angeles, copies of a Muskie pamphlet ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir, that is correct. 

Mr. Dash. "Would you turn to tab 6 [exhibit No. 158*]. This is a 
pamphlet that the committee has already received in evidence. 

Mr. Segretti. Yes; this is the pamphlet; yes, sir, a copy of it. 

Mr. Dash. Purported as being issued by a group called Citizens for 
a Liberal Alternative ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is right, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. "VVliich has a picture of Mr. Muskie with a large cigar 
out of his mouth, identifying him as a person who is no different from 
the Nixons, Agnews, Mitchells, Connallys, we have now. The com- 
mittee has already had this exhibit introduced during the time 
Mr. Buchanan was a witness. 

Were you aware, by the way, that that pamphlet was prepared by 
Mr. Khachigian, Mr. Buchanan's assistant, was edited by Mr. Bu- 
chanan, and Wcis printed by the Committee for the Re-Election of 
the President with the approval of Mr. jSIagruder, Mr. Mitchell, 
Mr. Haldeman ? 

Mr. Segretti. I have absolutely no idea. 

Mr. Dash. How many copies of the pamphlet did you receive? 

Mr. Segretti. I can take a guess ; 500 to 1,000. 

Mr. Dash. What did you do with the pamphlets ; these 500 to 1,000 
copies ? 

Mr. Segretti. I read it. Upon reading it, it a^ppeared to be somewhat 
out of date by the time I received it. It was after the Florida primary. 
I have no clear recollection of where it was distributed, but I believe 
some were sent on either to a friend of mine in Chicago or perhaps 
someone else. I have no real clear recollection, really, what was fully 
done with it. 

Mr. Dash. All right. I think you have covered fairly fully your 
relationship with Mr. Warren who — did you know, by the way, at 
that time that he was E. Howard Hunt ? 

Mr. Segretti. I had no idea. 

Mr. Dash. I think you now know tliat he was ? 

♦See p. 4055. 


Mr. Segretti. Yes, I do. 

Mr. Dash. I think you fairly fully related your relationships ^\ith 
Mr. Hunt at that time, but did he also suggest to you, at one point, 
that you could be of assistance to the President's policies in Vietnam 
by having certain telegrams sent ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. What did you do in that respect ? 

Mr. Segretti. I called my associates, I believe, making — just pri- 
marily repeating the suggestions or requests, and I believe some of 
those were followed up on. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know how many names you had put on the tele- 
grams ? 

Mr. Segretti. I personally sent two telegrams, a total, perhaps of 200 

Mr. Dash. About 200 names. 

Where did you get those names ? 

Mr. Segretti. A number of them I made up. Another group of names 
II took from a list that I had from the California Shirley for Presi- 
dent delegates — Shirley Chisholm for President. 

Mr. Dash. And on that list of names that you did not make up, that 
were real names, did the persons' names appear 

Senator GuRNEY. Mr. Chairman, apparently, we have a live quorum. 

Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in recess until 1 o'clock. 

[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at 
1 p.m., the same day.] 

Afterxoon Session, AVEcisrESDAY, Octpober 3, 1973 

Senator Ervix. The committee will come to order. 

Counsel will resume the interrogation of the witness. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Segretti, you have already given the committee infor- 
mation that Mr. Benz, through various peoj)le that he had employed, 
placed some infiltrators in Muskie's and also in Jackson's campaign ; 
is this not right ? 

Mr. Segre^iti. I believe that is correct, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Now, was there an occasion when one of these infiltra- 
tors in Senator Muskie's campaign in Tampa leaked to the press that 
there was to be a secret $1,000 plate fundraising dinner ^ 

Mr. Segretti. I believe that is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know what happened as a result of that leak? 

Mr. Segri:tti. I understand that the dinner which was to be attended 
by 17 individuals was subsequently canceled. 

Mr. Dash. Yes, and, therefore, the dinner was canceled as a result 
of that information becoming public. 

Mr. Segretti. I heard that, yes. sir. 

Mr. Dash. Xow, you have stated in your statement that you had 
various schoolbusing posters printed up involving Mr. Muskie. 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Would you look at tab 8 [exhibit No. 198] . You will find 
at tab 8 in your series of exhibits, because of the size of the poster, 
it is somewhat broken up, Init I think the poster read: "Support 
busing now, support more children now." I think I have a copy of this 
and you can see it. It says : "Help Muskie support busing more chil- 
dren now." Is this the poster you are referring to ? 

3996 i 


Mr. Segretti. That is correct, Mr. Dash. j 

Mr, Dash. And the reference in the bottom ''Mothers backing Muskio 
committee,'' was that a committee that you made up ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. There is no committee by that name, to my 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman 

Mr. Segretti, This, you could say was my committee. 

Mr. Dash. Your committee ? 

Mr. Segretti. One of them. 

Mr. Dash. You were one of tlie mothers backing Muskie ? 

Senator Ervin. Counsel, pardon me. That was a committee which i 
existed only in your contemplation ? 

Mr. Segretti, That is correct, Senator. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Chainnan, although I am going to be asking that 
the various exhibits be introduced, this particular exhibit is one that 
does not appear very clear in our collection of exhibits and I would 
like to have this reconstruction of the poster marked for identification ; 
and admitted in evidence as part of our record. 

Senator Ervin. That will be done. It will be marjved as an exhibit i 
and admitted as such. \ 

[The poster referred to was marked exhibit No. 198,*] ; 

Mr. Dash. Do you know how many posters of that kind that you \ 
had printed up ? I 

Mr. Segretii. I believe the total was 300. ] 

Mr, Dash, Where were they distributed ? 

Mr, Segretti. Primarily in Florida. ]My Ijest guess is 100 to 125 in 
Florida. Perhaps a dozen or so were posted in and around Chicago, i 
I believe some were sent to an individual I knew in Indiana. However, j 
they were never used, to my knowledge, and that is the total. ! 

Mr, Dash. Did you send copies or a copy of the poster to Mr. • 
Chapin ? i 

Mr. Segretti, To the best of my recollection, I did, 

Mr. Dash. And this was in keeping with your sending him, regu- 
larly, various copies of things that you were distribut ing ? i 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Mr, Dash, Now, did your Florida agent distribute anti-Wallace 
cards purporting to be backing Mr. Muskie ? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe INIr. Benz had some printed up and they were 
so distributed. 

Mr. Dash. Would you take a look at tab 18 [exhibit No. 214]. You 
will notice that part — I only direct your attention to the printed card : 
"A vote for Wallace is a wasted vote; on March l^th cast your ballot 
for Senator Edmund INIuskie." Is that one of the cards ? 

If you turn the page, again looking at the printed part, the printed 
card: "If you liked Hitler you'll just love Wallace.'' Under this was; 
"Vote for Muskie.'' Was that one of the cards ? I 

Mr. Segretti. No, sir. I imdei-stand that the one — this was the same ' 
card printed on two sides ? 

Mr. Dash. Printed on two sides ? 

Mr. Segretti. There was only one card, to my recollection. 

Mr. Dash. Then, what I just read was on two sides of one card? 

Mr, Segretti. That is right. 

♦See p. 4267. 


Mr. Dash. I think you have also testified that you were aware, in 
fact participated in, sending out false letters on Mr. Muskie's cam- 
paign stationery. 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. And you referred already to one of them. Now, there is 
one particular letter you referred to in your statement which was es- 
pecially scurrilous and accused Senator Jackson and Senator Hum- 
phrey of, serious accusations of, sexual and drinking misconduct. I 
think in due respect to Senator Jackson and Senator Muskie and 
Senator Humphrey, against whom this letter was used, that it would 
not be fair to read the actual language of the letter into the record. 

Mr, Segretti. I agree, Mr. Dash. That letter is untrue. I sincerely 
regret that any copies of that were sent out. 

Mr, Dash. Would you agree with me without my reading it into the 
record, to demonstrate this for the record, that it was an especially 
vicious and scurrilous letter ? 

Mr, Segretti. I will agree it was a scurrilous letter. 

Mr. Dash. How much did it cost you to print that letter and dis- 
tribute it? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe $20 was sent to Mr. Benz to do that. 

Mr, Dash. Did you send a copy of that letter to jNIr. Chapin ? 

Mr, Segretti. I believe I did, yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Did you get a response from him '? 

Mr. Segretti. No. 

Mr. Dash. Do you recall Mr. Chapin telling you that for your $20 
you received $10,000 to $20,000 worth of free publicity but to be care- 
ful next time ? 

Mr, Secjretti. Yes, or words to that etl'ect. 

Mr. Dash, Were stink bombs used against Mr. Muskie's campaign in 
Florida ? 

Mr. Segretti. There were three instances when a substance, which 
name I do not recall now, were either attempted or were placed in 
places involving Senator Muskie. 

Mr. Dash. Was one of them Senator IMuskie's headquarters in 
Tampa ? 

Mr, Segretti. I understand that did take place. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know who placed that particular bomb ? 

Mr. Segretti. No, sir, I do not. 

Mr. Sherman, Mr, Dash, excuse me, I think it should be made clear 
these were not bombs in the sense of exploding bombs or anything of 
that nature. It was more to create a smell rather than explode to dam- 
age other persons, that should be made clear. 

Mr. Dash. Its purpose was to create such an odor that people could 
not occupy the place when the bomb did whatever it was supposed to 
do, is that correct ? 

Mr. Segretti. Well, perhaps that states it a little strong but cer- 
tainly to make it unpleasant. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know what was — where the particular substance 
was placed in the Muskie headquarters in Tampa ? 

Mr. Segretti. No ; I do not. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know how they were able to place the substance 
in the headquarters ? 


Mr. Segretti. I have understood, after the fact,, that it was put in 
through a window or screen. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know, as a matter of fact, that they had to break 
into that wnndow to do it ? 

Mr. Segretti. No, I do not. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Benz did not report that to you ? 

Mr. Segretti. If — my recollection is that a screen was pried open 
and a window lifted, something to that effect. 

Mr. Dash. Well, would you then say that the prying open of the 
screen is breaking into the headquarters ? 

Mr. Segretti. It certainly was an unauthorized entry. 

Mr. Dash. I won't take you back to your laAv school burglary days 
but — not your act of burglary but your definition of burglary — as to 
what the breaking in would require but, in fact, it was a breaking in of 
that headquarters ; was it not ? 

Mr. Segretti. I don't know the complete facts of what occurred 
there. I was told after the fact that the substance was placed in 
Senator Muskie's headquarters in the Tampa area. Now my recollec- 
tion as to the details of how it was put in is somew^hat vague. I do, 
however, remember that it seems to me a screen was pried open and a 
window lifted. 

Mr. Dash. Was this on the primary day itself ? 

Mr. Segretti. I don't recall that, Mr. Dash. It could very well have 

Mr. Dash. And if it were on the primary day, w^ould you agree that 
would be quite disruptive of the activity of the headquartere that day, 
that important day ? 

Mr. Segretti. It could very well be, yes. 

Mr. Dash. Who did you hire to work for you in the Pennsylvania 
primaiT ? 

Mr. Sherman. Could we have a moment? [Conferring.] 

Mr. Segretti. I had a young man in the Philadelphia ai-ea who was 
given, I believe, the sum of $100. 

Mr. Dash. We have some exhibits which have his name on them and 
what was his name ? 

Mr. Segretti. His name is Mr. Zimmer. 

Mr. Dash. Did he pass out literature and organize anti-Muskie 
pickets at Muskie rallies ? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe he did some of that. 

Mr. Dash. All right. Now, will you turn to tabs 16, 17, and 18 
[exhibits Nos. 212, 213, and 214]. Start at 16. Do you recognize what 
appeal's to be a clipping from the Pennsylvania Voice, of Wednesday, 
April 19 — an article called Points of (Jrder by a journalist whose name 
is Blair Stobaugh ? 

Mr. Segretti. I do. 

INIr. Dash. Without reading the article — specifically that article 
refers to Senator Muskie's effort in Philadelphia to speak in the pres- 
ence of demonstrators and hecklers during the course of his speaking, 
is that not true ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is true. 

Mr. Dash. Now, all around — by the way, how did you receive this 

Mr. Segretti. By mail. 

: 3999 

i Mr. Dash. Is it true that you received this clipping from Mr. 

Mr. Segretti. To the best of my lielief , it came from Mr. Zimmer. 

Mr. Dash. Do you notice around the clipping some handwriting? 

Mr. S'EGRETTi, Yes. 

Mr. Dash. Which refers to the clipping itself, and could you read 
:hat for us ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, I will, Mr. Dash. 

Left-hand side toward the top it says, "This whole article is about, 
md by one of my people. Pennsylvania Voice, circulation'' — I believe 
hat says 10,000, I am not sure. This may be a student newspaper up 
:here, a student-oriented paper, I am not certain of that. It says, ''Don : 
Treat ! I didn't think that we could get this in print. Protesters, counter- 
protesters, us" 

Mr. Dash. There are three, "us, us, us'' underscored, quite bragging. 

Mr. Segretti. "Blair" — I can't read the last name, I can't pronounce 
it — "Stobaugh was one of my own henchmen." 

Mr. Dash. He is the writer of the article ? 

]Mr. Segretti. His name is on the article ; yes. 

Mr. Dash. Yes. 

Mr. Segretti [continues reading] : "I didn't think that this would 
make the paper so I forgot to tell you about it. I didn't see it until 
riiursday night right after I talked to you." 

The rest of it is a little difficult on this copy. 

Mr. Dash. Can you make it out on the bottom? "These are all my 
protesters' " and the word "great" underneath. 

Mr. Segretti. That seems to be what it states. 

Mr. Dash. Will you turn to tab 17. Actually as you have them, I 
hink, Mr. Segretti, they are put in the wrong order. If you will turn 
the next page, and do you see at the top where it says, "Skip — Philly 
April 23, 1972." 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. Who was Skip ? 

Mr. Segretti. That was Mr. Zimmer. 

Mr. Dash. Was that his nickname ? 

Mr. Segretti. I imagine. 

Mr. Dash. He was known as Skip Zimmer. Could you just read — can 
lyou read his note to you at that time ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes; it says: "Don, talked to Jack Cannon, Senator 
Humphrey's deputy press secretary, tonight about the paying of 
demonstrators by M's people" — I assume that means Senator Muskie's 

Mr. Dash. Muskie's people. 

Mr. Segretti [continues reading] : "Gave him names, places, et 
cetera, told him I was reporter Bob Schmidt of the Daily News, and 
chat our paper had received calls and letters about it. He said the Sen- 
itor had no comment for publication but they said 'off the record' 
were in fact 

Mr, Dash. If you turn over to the next page it follows "aware" 

Mr. Segretti. It looks like "Aware this had been going on and there 
were hecklers" 

Mr. Dash. "And they were checking further," I think it says, could 
yon read that ? 


Mr. Segretti. "Checking further into the matter and that the Fair 
Campaign Practices Committee had been contacted but that" — his 
writing is a little difficult— "but that further proof might be needed 
to make the charge stick for publication purposes," et cetera. He also 
said 'oti" the record' that the H people"— I assume Humphrey peo- 
ple — 'Svere very disturbed and planned to complain to John English 
aI)Out it personally on Monday." 

Mr. Dash. AVasn't that a case, Mr. Segretti, where Mr. Zimmer had 
employed hecklers against Muskie ^ 

Mr. Segreiti. I don't believe Mr. Zimmer ever employed any heck- 
lers, Mr. Dash, to my knowledge. 

Mr. Dash. Well, apparently posing as a reporter he contacted Sena- 
tor Humphrey's headquartei'S, and told them that Muskie's people had 
placed the hecklers. 

Mr. Segreii'i. That is right. 

Mr. Dash. And this was part again of the strategy of playing one 
candidate off against another ? 

Mr. SEGiiETTi. That is right. 

Mr. Dash. To create divisiveness ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is right. 

Mr. Dash. Do you know the signs that are drawn underneath the 
last statement in red which Mr. Zimmer gives you as illustrations of 
the signs they used during the Muskie rally ? 

Mr. Segretti. Right. 

Mr. Dash. And one says, "Muskie, Florida ; 9 percent, Wisconsin, 10 
percent; Pennsylvania, 11 percent (with luck)" in parentheses. 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. And then the next one says "M-u-s-k-i-e spells loser, 
H.H.H. is the man." 

Mr. Segretit. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Another one says "probusing Ed's kids go to private 

Mr. Segiuetti. That is correct. 

Mr Dash. I will read, down at the bottom there appears to be in 
handwriting — "Muskie looked right up at these two'' — meaning the 
first two — "right in front of him as he left, and scowled perceptibly," — 
so apparently, Mr. Segretti, what you were doing had some effect as 
Ix'ing icported back to you by your Philadelphia agent, that you were 
gottingMr. Humphrey and'Mr. Muskie pretty upset. 

Mr. Sk<;retti. Yes. However 

Mr. Dash. Is it true? 

Mr. Segret-h. I would like to state that Mr. Zinnner at times did 
hiive a tendency to perhaps embellish a little bit, so I think to some 
extent, such as the term "henchman" and so forth, was embellishment 
upon the language. 

Mr. Dash. Xow, Mr. Segretti, turning to the California campaign, 
did you have copies of the lieadqiuuters stationery, campaign sta- 
tioiu'iy, fiom Mr. McGovern, Mr. Yorty, Mr. McCarthy, Mr. Hum- 
phrey, printed up? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. Did you have them printed up by a printer? 

Mr. SEfjREiTi. Tln-ough a pi-inter given to me by Mr. Warren, now 
Mr. Hunt. 


Mr. Dash. Did you also have anti-Humphrey bumper stickers 
printed up ? 

Mr. Segretti. I did have some. 

Mr. Dash. Would you look at tab 20 [exhibit No. 216] ? I will just 
hold this up. 

Humphrey ; he started the war ; don't give him another chance ; Democrats 
for Peace Candidate. 

Is that one of the bumper stickers that you had printed up ^ 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. By the way, that Democrats for Peace Candidate, what 
organization was that? 

Mr. Segretti. That was me again, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. That was Donald Segretti. 

How many of those did you have printed up ? 

Mr. Segretti. I really do not recall, without looking into my rec- 
ords, the number. I would guess perhaps 1,000. 

Mr. Dash. Where were they distributed ? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe some were distributed in California. My 
guess is the number would be 100, 150. 

Mr. Dash. Apparently, now, this is an attack on Humphrey, where 
the emphasis had been :Muskie in the past. It shifted to Humphrey. Can 
you explain why now the emphasis has shifted to Humphrey? 

jNIr. Segretti. Well, I would not want to characterize the emphasis 
as switching to Humphrey at all. 

Mr. Dash. Well, maybe I can put the question another way. 

Did ^Ir. Chapin, after the Wisconsin primary, tell you to stop 
focusing upon Senator Muskie and to begin driving a wedge between 
the leadmg candidates? 

Mr. Segretti. He mentioned two candidates. 

Mr. Dash. Which candidates? 

Mr. Segretti. Senator Humphrey and Senator Muskie. 

Mr. Dash. And \\ as this an effort to do that ? 

]Mr. Segretti. Yes. These bumper stickers primarily, perhaps 75 of 
them, were mailed to Humphrey delegates. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did you also have a pamphlet printed up and dis- 
tributed in California with regard to Mr. Himiphrey ? If you look at 
page 2o, you can identify this pamphlet — tab 23 [exhibit No. 219]. 

Now, that pamphlet shows a photograph of Senator Humphrey 
holding a billfish, does it not? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

]Mr. Dash. And underneath the photograph is printed "A fishy smell 
for the White House"? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. And did you actually — this pamphlet looks very much 
like the earlier pamphlet that you identified, which was against Muskie, 
which had come out of the White House. You testified that you did not 
know it did, but it had been mailed to you and coj)ied in about 5,000 

]Mr. Segretti. That is right. 

Mr. Dash. Was this dummied up from that pamphlet? 

]\Ir. Segretti. I thought the pamphlet I received relating to Sena- 
tor ]\Iuskie was, seemed to be well done. I took that pamphlet and I 


patterned this pamphlet after it. The pictures I took from Time or 
Newsweek mao^azine. 

Mr. Dash. And you have a picture inside of a UMW president, 
Tony Boyle, and a picture of Senator Humphrey, "Memories of 1968 — 
stop the bomb — end U.S. aggression.'' 

Is that correct? If you wmII tuni the page, you Avill see those photo- 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. And this particular pamphlet again repeats pretty much 
the language that was in the Senator Muskie pamphlet. "Hubert H. 
Humphrey would be no different from the Nixons, Agnews, Mitchells, 
Reagans, we have now." 

"He is the 'boss-candidate'," et cetera, and it is pretty derogatory of 
Senator Humphrey, is it not ? 

Mr. Segretti. It is pretty much a copy of the same language that 
was in the pamphlet regarding Senator Muskie. 

Mr. Dash. Well, this one seems to make Humphrey kind of a war- 
monger, does it not ? 

Mr. Segretti. Well, I do not know if I Avould term it "warmonger." 

Mr. Dash. Well, also, it refers to him as a Democratic boss-candi- 
date, does it not ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, it does. 

Mr. Dash. Apparently, the sponsor on this particular one — differ- 
ent from what appeared on the INIuskie one, which said "Democrats for 
a Liberal Alternative," says "Democrats Against Bossism, T. Wilson, 
Chairman" — is that again you ? 

Mr. Segretti. That, again, is a committee of one — me. 

Mr. Dash. And who is T. Wilson — chairman? Is that a phony 

Mr. Segretti. I do not know. That is just a name. 

Mr. Dash. How many of these pamphlets did you have printed up ? 

Mr. Segretti. I had printed up, I believe, 3,000, something along 
that line. 

Mr. Dash. And where were they distributed ? 

Mr. Segretti. There Avere some distributed in northern California. 
I would say the number distributed up there were 100, 150. A few were 
mailed. I would say the total distributed perhaps, I would guess per- 
haps 300. Somewhere along that line. 

^Ir. Dash. "Wliat impression were you attempting to create with 
this kind of pamphlet with the Humphrey supporters ? 

Mr. Segretti. That another Democratic camp was distributing such 

Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, did you Imow that Senator Hum- 
phrey was quite stirred up and actually believed that Senator Mc- 
Govern or Senator Muskie had printed this pamphlet ? 

Mr. Segretti. I did not know tliat. 

Mr. Dash. Now, using the stationery of the various candidates that 
you had printed up — now laiown as bogus stationery — did you send 
out a false letter on INIcCarthy campaign stationery over the signa- 
ture of Barbara Barron ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes; I did. 

Mr. Dash, "\^^lo is Barbara Barron ? 


Mr. Segretti. I am not really sure who she is. I believe she was a 
campaign worker in McCarthy headqiiarters. 

Mr. Dash. Is that her signature that appeared on that letter? If 
you will look at the tab, tab 21 [exhibit No. 217] is it ^ 

Mr. Segretti. I believe a facsimile. 

Mr. Dash. This actually was a forgery of her signature, was it 
not? Or somebody signed her name ? 

Mr. Segreto. Somebody signed her name, yes. 

Mr. Dash. Now, the contents of the letter essentially is on McCarthy 
1972 headquarters stationei-y. 

Mr. Segretti. Right. 

Mr. Dash. It is addressed to McCarthy delegates, is it not ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is right. 

Mr. Dash. And does it not ask that McCarthy delegates switch 
their support to Senator Humphrey ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Also, if you just turn the page, was there not a similar 
letter on McCarthy stationei-y, also purportedly signed by Barbara 
Barron, sent to Shirley Chisholm supporters ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes; essentially it is the same letter. 

Mr. Dash. The same letter? 

Mr. Segretti. With a few minor changes. 

Mr. Dash. And the letter essentially says, if they were interested 
in Senator McCarthy, they should switch their support to Senator 
Humphrey, even though Senator McCarthy's ideology is more closely 
associated with Senator McGovern. Is that the gist of the letter? 

Mr. Segretti. I would say so, essentially. 

Mr. Dash. Who got these letters, the McCarthy delegates and 
Chisholm delegates, is that correct? 

Mr. Segretti. Some McCarthy delegates and some Chisholm dele- 
gates did receive these. At the same time the others were mailed, some 
were addressed, but intentionally, no stamp was put on so that they 
would go back to the McCartliy headquarters so thev would be aware 
of it. 

Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Segretti, did you compound this and send a 
form letter on Mayor Yorty's campaign stationery, purported to be 
written by a disgusted Yorty worker, blaming Yorty for these Mc- 
Carthy letters ? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe there were four or five such letters typed 
and sent. 

Mr. Dash. Look at tab 24 [exhibit No. 220]. 

This appears to be a full page display of May 26, 1972, of the 
Los Angeles Free Press. The headline is : 'Ts Mayor Yorty Involved 
in a Plot To Sabotage McGovern?" And there is — as you will see — 
a photograph of the bogus Yorty letter, which was youi' production, 
which purports to be written by a person wlio just says they thought 
that politics was dirty, but this is the last bit, that they were going, 
they were going to quit the Yorty campaign because of it, and it 
attaches copies of the two letters just referred to on the McCarthy 
stationery, one to a McCarthy delegate and one to a Chisholm delegate, 
is that not tiTie ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is true. 

Mr. Dash. And all of this was your handiwork ? 


Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. What was the purpose of all this ? 

Mr. Segretti. Just to confuse the candidates. 

Mr. Dash. I take it you were quite successful in this ? 

Mr. Segretti. It is hard for nie to categorize success or not. The Free 
Press is an underground newspaper out there. 

Mr. Dash. Now, did you have knowledge of false press releases sent 
out on Humphrey press release stationery ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes ; I did three of these. 

Mr. Dash. You drafted them yourself ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. Did one of them say that Lyndon Johnson favored 
Hubert Humphrey ? 

Mr. Segretti. Or words to that effect. 

Mr. Dash. And did one of them state that Shirley Chisholm was at 
one time confined to a mental institution in Virginia ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. And you made that all up ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. And in effect, you made a false charge ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is not correct. 

Mr. Dash. It is not correct 'I 

Mr. Segretti. I mean the charge is not correct. 

Mr. Dash. These all came out of your imagination ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Were these sent to the newspapers, false press releases on 
Hubert Humphrey stationery ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. And were they pi'inted ? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe they were mimeographed, Mr. Dash. 

Mr. Dash. Did the newspapers pick up the story ? 

Mr. Segretti. Not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Dash. Did you send copies of these false press releases to Mr. 
Chapin ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. And what was his reaction to that ? 

Mr. Segretti. There was a comment that he laughed for a period 
of time regarding the press releases. 

Mr, Dash. He thought it was funny that you sent a press release 
saying that Shirley Chisholm was at one time confined to a mental 
institution in Virginia ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. Did you have an anti-Muskie ad distributed outside Mus- 
kie's fundraising dinner in Los Angeles? Look at tab 1^^ [exhibit No. 

Mr. SiiERMAX. May we ]ia\e a moment, Mr. Dash. [Conferring.] 
Thank you. 

Mr. Dash. If you will look at tab 13, you will see an advertisement 
which is under the name of Stewart R. INIott, chairman of the Commit- 
tee for Honesty in Politics. And it is headed ''Disgusting, the Secret 
Money in Presidential Politics." Theie is a reference to Senator Mus- 
kie's failure, according to the ad, of making a full disclosure, financial 
disclosure. Now, did you take this ad out of a New York newspaper and 


reproduce it for this particular Muskie fundraising dinner in Los 
Angeles ? 

Mr. Segretti. I don't believe I took it out of a New York newspaper. 
I saw it in some newspaper. It was an ad. I clipped it out thought it 
Avas quite good, and 

Mr. Dash. Did you add the printed language at the bottom? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, I did add that. 

Mr. Dash. The language at the bottom says : "Now he says he will 

Mr. Segretti. That is where it starts. 

Mr. Dash. "Now he says he will disclose the fat cats behind him 
(after he lost badly in Florida and cried in New Hampshire). "Wliy is 
he waiting for full disclosure — is it to fix up his books?" 

Then you have at the bottom: "The committee will look for your 
names as part of INIuskie's fat cats. They better be there." 

You and your operatives were giving this ad to people who were 
attending that Muskie dinner at this time and they were being told 
that their names better be there. Is that not true ? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe some of those were passed out ; yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. And I take it the purpose of passing that out was to put 
them in fear that there was some 

Mr. Segretti. I don't think the purpose is to put them in any fear. 

Mr. Dash. You don't think the language carries a threat of some 

Mr. Shermax. Well, there is a great difference between fear and a 

Mr. Dash. Would you accept a change of the qusocion to saying you 
feel that that language poses some threat ? 

Mr. Segretti. The purpose of that language was to irritate people 
rather than to actually frighten or thi-eaten them. I take this language 
now and I took it then to be, to some degree, political rhetoric or 
puffing, in a sense. 

Mr. Dash. I think you have also given us one of your final acts. You 
have said that during the JNIiami Democratic Convention, your agent, 
Mr. Kelly, had a plane fly over carrying a sign against ]\IcGovern say- 
ing "Peace, Pot, Promiscuity — Vote McGovern." 

iNIr. Segretti. That was a trailer, I believe. 

Mr. Dash. A trailer. 

What caused your own activities to come to a halt ? 

Mr. Si:gretti. At one time, I had been visited by the FBI and I think 
that sobered me up a great deal. I started to think about these activi- 
ties. A little bit later, I was instructed to cease. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions. 

SenatoT- Ervix. Senator Montoya — excuse me. Mr. Thompson, par- 
don me. 

Mr. TiioMPSox. I will yield to the Senator if you prefer to go ahead. 

Senator Ervix. No, go ahead. 

Mr. TiiOMPsox. Thank you. 

Excuse me, Mr. Segretti, let me direct your attention to document 
No. 22 [exhibit No. 218]. I believe you liave it there. The sheet en- 
titled "George INIcGovern's Eeal Record on the War." It deals chrono- 
logically with how Senator McGovern voted on various issues pertain- 

21-296 o- 


ing to the %var. Down at the bottom, it says : "Don't believe it. Check the 
record. Prepared by Students for Honesty in Government." 

Was that another one of your committees ? 

Mr. SeCxRetti. AVell, it was and it wasn't, Mr. Thompson. I think 
this would be the correct way to g'ive you an answer. Perhaps I should 
explain that. 

This flier was obtained, I believe, by Mr. Kelly in the Miami area. 
I can't recall exactly, whether it was told to me it came from either 
Senator Muskie's or Senator Hump]irey''s campaign ; in other words, 
people workin<2: with him. It was picked up. I subsequently had some 
reproduced and distributed those or had those distributed myself. 

Mr. Thompson. This document was picked up at either Muskie's or 
Humphrey's headquarters ? 

Mr. Segretti. Well, I don't want to say that. It was picked up in 
the areas being- distributed by those individuals. W nether it was 
actually picked up at their headquarters, I have no knowledge. 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Kelly could testify to that, I assume. 

Mr. Segretti. I imagine he could. 

Mr. Thompson. You redistributed it. is that correct? 

Mr. Segretti. Pardon ? 

Mr. Thompson. You redistributed this document? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Thompson. I notice at the top there is a signature that appears 
to be that of Mr. ]\IcGovern ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. Do vou know liow that came about, who signed 

Mr, Segretti. It was related to me that Mr. Kelly attended a rally 
somewhere in the Miami area. Mr. Kelly folded this document up and 
as a souvenir — after the talk Senator INIcGovern was giving auto- 
graphs, and as a personal souvenir of his, he went up and Senator Mc- 
Govern signed this document. 

jNIr. Thompson. So Senator McGovern signed his autograph on this 
particular document I 

Mr. Segri:tti. Yes, sir. 

^Ir. Thompson. ]Mr. Segretti, you have related, I believe, just about 
all of your activities, some anuising and some not amusing at all. 

Mr. Segretti. I agree with you, Sir. Thompson. 

Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you this; generally speaking, how were 
these ideas thought up ? Were they planned out in advance ? Was there 
a game plan, so to speak, as to what you would do at one time? 

Mr. Segretti. Xo; to be very frank with you, a number of them 
were just thought u]) over a beer or two. 

]Mr. Thompson. Thought up over a beer or two ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. By whom, usually ? 

Mr. Segretti. Myself, perhaps one or two other individuals assist- 
ing me. 

Mr. Thompson. Such as who ? 

Mr. Segretti. Mr. Kelly or Mr. Benz. Sometimes I would think them 
up and suggest them to them. No set pattern. 

Mr. Thompson. How long were the sessions in which you would 
discuss these ? 

Mr. Segretti. Some were lonaei- tliau others, none verv long. 


Mr. Thompson, How many of the people you were operating with 
knew about AVhat you were going to do before it was done? 

Mr. Segretti. Specifically '\ 

Mr. Thompson. Yes. 

Mr. Segretti. Generally, I would have to say no one. 

Mr. Thompson. Generally you would have to say what ? 

Mr. Segretti. No one. 

Mr. Thompson. No one else? 

Mr. Segretti. There were a few examples, minor examples, earlier, 

Mr. Thompson. Well, who would know about it beforehand — any- 
one at the White House, for example ? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe i^ossibly Mr. Chapin. 

Mr. Thompson. In what sense ? 

Mr. Segretti. Some pickets at the Democratic dinner in San Fran- 
cisco that had "Kennedy for President'' pickets — I think there were 
three or four pickets. There may have been one or two other minor ex- 
amples such as that. 

Mr. Thompson. But that is the nature of the activity that was known 
beforehand at the White House by Mr. Chapin ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Mr. TiioMPSON. I believe you said you reported to Mr. Chapin on 
some regular basis what you were doing? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. Would that be all of your activities, or could you 
give us a certain percentage of your activities that were reported to 

Mr. Segretti. It is hard to recollect a percentage. I Avould say as a 
general matter, of course, I would send what was done to Mr. Chapin. 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Segretti, you, as I stated, listed several activities 
that you were involved in. Were there activities in the dirty tricks area 
or the prank area during the campaign that you were aware of that 
you have gotten credit for which you did not in fact do ? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe there are, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Thompson. Could you relate those to us ? 

Mr. Segretti. Well, the Canuck letter is one that stands out in my 
mind. I am sure there are others. 

Mr. Thompson. Are you saying that you did not write the Canuck 

Mr. Segretti. I did not write the Canuck letter. I have no idea who 
wrote the Canuck letter. What more can I say? 

Mr. Thompson. Did you in fact nm a spy school ? 

Mr. Segretti. No. 

Mr. Thompson. Was that not reported? 

Mr. Segretti. It was reported, I believe in the Washington Post 
and perhaps other newspapers, that I was running a spy school in 
the Midwest. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you know how that story came about? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes; I believe that came about from a story given to 
the Washington Post by Mr. Lawrence or I^arry Young in California. 

Mr. Thompson. Who was Mr. Young ? 

Mr. Segretti. Mr. Young was an individual that I knew at the 
University of Southern California. I believe he knew Mr. Chapin 
and Mr. Strachan also. The Washington Post or one of their reporters 


Avent to see Mr. Young and subsequently obtained a storj- in which 
it contained, amon^: other things, an allegation that I was running 
a spy school in the Midwest. 

Mr. Thompson. What about the allegation that you prefaced your 
grand jury perfonnance by having been shown FBI 302's. Is that 
part of the same story ? 

Mr. Seoreiti. I believe that was in the same story and I believe 
that came from Mr. Young, too, and that is false. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you know why Mr. Young avouIcI state these 
things that ha ve been related to you ? 

Mr. Segretti. It is very hard for me, sitting here — at other times, I 
have thought of it a great deal why Mr. Young, whom I had con- 
sidered to be a very close individual to me for a number of yeare, 
would do such a thmg. I think part of it was plain politics. He was 
a liljeral Democrat and I guess I didn't term my friendships in terms 
of Republican or Democrat. Perhaps that was sort of my problem witl 

Mr, Young. But after the November election, he did send to my 
parents, who he knew, and to myself a card stating to some degree, 
the election is over with, it is water under the bridge now, and let's 
got together again. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you know whetlier or not he submitted a letter 
to the Special Prosecutor, Mr, Cox, with regard to these allegations? 

Mr, SECJRETri. I have no ide^. 

Mr. Sherman. Mr. Thompson, we did have a copy of that letter and 
we did make it available to the Special Prosecutor's office, I believe i 
we showed a copy of the letter to Mr, Lenzner, too. 

Mr, Thompson, I am just reminded, I think you probablj^ did. I 
would like to knoA\' a little more about it if you remember the contents 
of the letter. 

Mr. Segretti. As far as I could remember or recall — off the top of 
my head now — that letter effectively said, essentially said, he was 
visited by individuals from the Washington Post, and that they told 
liim that they were going to print a story that tens of thousands of 
dollars of campaign funds were channeled through his law finn for 
various and sundiy activities. In response to that he felt, along with 
that and the fact that he was not 

Senator Ervin, There is a vote on in the Senate and I expect we 
may have a short roll call and maybe we had better go over there and 
vote immediately, 


Senator Ervin, The committee will come to order. 

Mr. Thompson, will you resume interrogation of the witness? 

Mr. Thompson, Mr, Chairman, I believe the witness was in the mid- 
dle of an answei-, and if he recalls the question and his initial response, 
I would just like for him to ])ick up where he left off. We were re- 
ferring to a letter Mr, Young had written explaining the reason why 
he had told newspaper reporters that you had rmi a spy school and 
had done various other things which you say you did not in fact do. 
Would you pick up on that and tell us what Young related as his rea- 
sons for his actions? 

Air. SEGRE-rri, Well, essentially, he related to me the fact that if he 
did not give the pi-ess a story they were going to print a stoi-y re- 
gai-ding him that was untrue. To a great degree it was a letter saying 
to let bygones be bygones and to be friends again. 


Mr. Thompson. Tlie newspaper reporters told liim they were going 
to print a story that was untrue unless he gave them that information ? 

Mr. Segretti. That was the thrust of tlie letter written to me. 

Mr. Thompson. Wliat information was untrue? 

Mr. Segretti. That large sums of money were channeled through 
him to be used in the reelection of President Nixon. 

Mr. Thompson. Do you know if there is any factual basis for that 
at all? 

Mr. Segretti. I do not believe there is any factual basis. 

Mr. Thompson. Young was not for Nixon, was he ? 

Mr. Segretti. So far as I know, he was not. 

Mr. Thompson. Did a story subsequently appear in the Washington 
Post setting forth these allegations ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes; that is correct, Mr. Thompson. I think that is 

Mr. Sherman. I think that article was dated October 10, 1972. 

Mr. Thompson. October 10. 

I think I will pick that up on another round. I will not take time 
to read the entire letter right now. You say you were shown FBI 
reports — FD-302 forms — before your grand jury appearance in 
August ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Thompson. I will ask you whether or not you have, at any time 
since the Watergate breakin, been shown by anyone other than the 
FBI any FBI FD-302's ? 

Mr. Sherman. At this point we would ask for a ruling from the 
Chair. We had discussed this previously, I think, with both you, Mr. 
Thompson, and Mr. Dash, that this does go into a matter — another 
matter, AS'e do not feel has any relevancy to these hearings at all, and 
has been disclosed to the special pix)secutor in this case and I would ask, 
unless the question is framed in terms of resolution 60, we would say 
it has no relevancy now. We would ask for Senator Ervin's under- 
standing on the issue. I explained it fully to Mr. Dash in private and 
also Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, if I understand it correctly, and I 
do not want to state counsel's case for him ; I really would prefer for 
him to state his own case. ISIy own feeling is that any time subsequent to 
the break-in — pursuant to the break-in, if he was shown an FBI report 
by anyone dealing with the Watergate investigation 

Mr. Sherman. We would object to tliat unless the question was 
framed within terms of the resolution having to do with the 1972 
campaign and it would be irrelevant, and I can state for the record, 
if any reports were shown it was certainly after the election was over 
and was not part of any coverup and does not involve any persons in 
any way that are under investigation by this committee, 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, I would simply state so far as rele- 
vance is concerned, we are talking about the investigation of the Water- 
gate matter. I will not belabor the point by referring to witness after 
witness after wdtness who have related similar matters concerning all 
aspects of the Watergate investigation. This pertained to the Water- 
gate investigation. Anybody in possession of an FBI report, especially 
if he shows it to a person wdio is a subject of the investigation, I think 
the facts should be brought out. I am not necessarily asking for a name 


of an individual. If that individual is the object of an investigation 
by Special Prosecutor Cox, while it is not a courtesy we have shown 
other people involved in this case, for my part, I do not necessarily 
care to have a name if the source can be identified. 

Senator Ervix. I think it would have to be somebody who would be 
competent. I cannot see, if some third party that is not involved in any 
of the transactions that are authorized to be investigated by the com- 
mittee, how it would be admissible. I do no know exactly what the evi- 
dence is but we are not investigating the FBI particularly. 

Mr. Sherman. The problem is, if I may be more specific and indi- 
cate the exact ground of the objection, that in effect we told you any- 
how. Hut as I say. we told Mr. Lenzner and Mr. Dash quite sometime 
ago and I think t indicated to you yesterday and it certainly is a third 
party to this investigation having absolutely nothing to do with it. 

If' the chairman feels we must answer the question, then, of course, 
]Mr. Segretti will answer it, but certainly I do not think it is within 
the Senate resolution. 

Mr. TiioMrsox. If the chairman please, I am not really sure that I 
understand the nature of the objection as it pertains to Mr. Segretti 
or what the objection is. 

Senator Ervix. Counsel says that it is not germane to what the 
connnittee is authorized to investigate. I cannot tell whether it is, not 
knowing what the ansAver would be. 

Mr. Shermax. Of course, if I tell you the answer then, in order for 
you to make an intelligent judgment, we have answered the question 
but I told Mr. Dash and maybe Mr. Dash can tell you. 

Mr. Thompson. I would suggest that Mr. Dash inform the chairman 
now in private and let the chairman make a ruling. 

Senator Ervix' [conferring]. I frankly cannot see where this throws 
any light on what we are investigating. 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, if you rule that it is not relevant, 
then, of course, I won't pursue it. 

Senator Erain. Well, on the information supplied to me by Mr. 
Dash, I will so rule. 

Mr. Shermax. Thank you. Just so it is clear, however, that Mr. 
Segretti is in no way protecting any person, is not being forthright 
with this committee, he has fully disclosed this information months 
ago to Mr. Lenzner and to the si)ecial prosecutoi- and is cooperating 
fully in their investigation into this matter. 

Ml-. Thompsox". Of course what we arc trying to do is lay out all the 
facts of this investigation, which have been repeated many times, be- 
fore the American people; to have all aspects of it made public, past 
Mr. Lenzner or the prosecutor or myself, so we have a ruling on it. 
You understand my concern ; I am not interested in dragging up any- 
one's name even though you seem to have firsthand facts regarding 
that situation, even if that person is imiocent, but I thought, based upon 
prior testimony we have heaid and matters which have been considered 
i-elevant by this connnittee, dating back sometime before the election, 
sometime after the election, that it Mas relevant; but the chaiinian 
has !-uled and I Avon't pursue it any further. 

Let me refer to document No. 25 [exhibit No. 221], if I might, Mr. 

Mr. SEORETn. All i-ight, Mr. Thompson. 


Mr. Thompson. It appears to be a copy of a daily register of the 
Towne Motel in Miami, I believe, dated June 10, 1972? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Thompson. I have noticed this since our interview, frankly, in 
reviewing the documents. There is listed a Mr. Simmons, No. 7, I 
assume that is you ; is that correct ? 

Mr. Segretti. That was me, Mr. Thompson. 

Mr. Thompson. What were you doing in Miami that particular 
time ? '\^^lat was your reason for being there ? 

Mr. Segretti. To talk to Mr. Kelly and to talk to another individual 
that I knew at that time under the name of Mr. Warren; in other 
words, Howard Hunt. 

Mr. Thompson. "W^iat were you discussing at that time ? 

Mr. Segretti. The conversation with Mr. Hunt related to a proposed 
activity at the Democratic convention. 

Mr. Thompson. What was the proposed activity ? 

Mr. Segretti. The proposed activity related to creating a peaceful 
group of demonstrators ostensibly for Senator McGovern. Mr. Hunt 
was going to have another group merge with the peaceful demon- 
strators and act in an unruly manner and the unruly demonstration 
would be blamed en Senator McGovern. 

Mr. Thompson. I direct your attention to this particular document 
because I see there listed No. 11 — Mr. Martinez. Have you ever met the 
Martinez who participated in the Watergate break-in ? 

Mr. Segretti. I have not ; not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Thompson. Have you seen him or were you aware he was there 
if, in fact, he was the same man ? 

Mr. Segretti. As a matter of fact, this was the first time I ever 
noticed this and I have no idea. It could be a coincidence — no idea. 

Mr. Thompson. Well, if it is, it occurs more than once with regard 
to another official, Mr. Gonzales. If you will check over the next 
coui)le of pages, on June 11 you have Mr. Simmons listed again under 
No. 7, and in No. 12 you have an entry of Mr. Gonzales. Do you know 
whether or not that was Mr, Gonzales who participated in the W^ater- 
gate break-in ? 

Mr. Segretti. I have no idea. 

Mr. Thompson. That is June 11, and again on June 

Mr. Sherman. ]Mr. Thompson, I might point out the spelling may 
be different but there also is another Gonzales staying there on the 
same day. No. 23, which indicates a fairly common name. 

Mr. Thompson. I was wondering about that or whether or not the 
same man checked back in. 

Mr. Sherman. It is a different spelling for the name Gonzales, how- 

Mr. Thompson. It apj^ears to be the same to me. 

Mr. Segretti. I might state, Mr. Thompson, perhaps this may or 
may not explain it, that this motel — it is in close proximity to where I 
was told to meet Mr. Warren. It is within a few blocks, perhaps that 
would account for it, but if those were the same individuals involved 
in the Watergate escapade it is pure coincidence. 

Mr. Thompson. On the next one, June 12, No. 23, Mr. Gonzales 
again. You have Martinez on the 10th, Gonzales on the 11th and 12th, 
and you were there from the 10th through the 12th. 


Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Ml-. Thompson. But you wore not aware that these people were then 
if these were tlie people'involved in the DNC break-in. 

Mr. Segretti. 1 am not. 

Mr. TiioMPSOX. Mr. Hunt did not discuss their presence with you 

Mr. Segretti. He did not. 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions at thi 

Senator Ervin. Senator Montoya. 

Senator Moxtoya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

]Mr. Segretti, prior to your indoctrination into these practices, whal 
did you conceive to be the preelectoral process under our constitu 
tional system in the United States ? 

Mr. Segretti. I conceived the electoral process of the United States 
to be, one, where hopefully the best candidate for the office woulc 
obtain that office. That is essentially through the political process 

Senator Montoya. Well, did you conceive as part, of that thinking 
that he should obtain the office honestly and by open, free, and undecep^ 
tive discussion on the campaign trail with the American ])eople? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, that is correct. 

Senator Montoya. And what led you to change? 

Mr. Segretti. That is a difficult answer for me to give. I hav^ 
tliought of that myself many times. Senator. 

Senator Montoya. Give me the genesis of it, or the transformation 
the gradual transfoniiation. if it was gradual. 

Mr. Segretti. I have never come up with an adequate answer tc 
myself for that. 

Senator Montoya. "What ingredients can you supply us with tliaf 
led you to transform yourself from that type of thinking into what you 
actually did ? 

Mr. Segretti. I think there Avere a combination of factors. Senator 
I think — Xo. 1, I think it was the individuals who contacted me; the^ 
fact that they were old friends; the fact that I had — still have — re- 
spect foi- them, even though a lot of water has gone under the bridge 
I think the fact of, in a sense, working for high officials, that is, the 
White House — I think that was a factor. I think the fact that it was 
at a particular stage in my life; the Army was not a career that 1 
wanted to pursue. I Avas in it for tlie period of time that I was obligatecil 
to do the best job I could in the military but after that I wanted to gci 
out and do something else. There was a change of pace from that andi 
it sounded like a great deal of travel, and I think those are all factors 
that must be listed. 

Senator Montoya. Did you understand your mission to be in the area; 
of prankstorism or dirty tricks ? " , 

Afr. SFXiRE'iiT. I heard ])erhaps a different— or an attempted de-j 
lineated difference by Mr. Buchanan. It is veiy hard for me to draw, 
the line between the two. I think you can draw the line Iwtween ex-; 
tremes. Wien it was first approached to me I certainly looked upor 
it as in the category of pranks. 

Senatoi- Montoya. You mentioned in your own statement on ]iage 3. 
that one of the reasons why you agreed to accept the position was tliej 
fact that vou w(M-e now being given tiie oppoi-tunity of working for the 
the White House? " ; 


Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Senator Montoya. Did you, during all this time, think that you were 
working under the umbrella of the White House, so to speak? 
[ Mr. Segretti. I believe in a sense that would be a correct statement; 
[yes, sir. 

} Senator Montoya. And I notice from the record of communication 
[with Mr. Chapin, who was an employee of the White House, that you 
were in quite frequent contact with him from the time that you began 
[your employment until after you ceased as a result of the investigation 
that began in 1972. 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Senator Montoya. Now, it stands to reason that during all this time, 
in addition to the initial contact that you had with Mr. Chapin and Mr. 
Strachan, that you were receiving quite a bit of instruction from these 
people as to how to conduct youi-self and what to do in the different 
State primaries in Florida, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, California, 
and the other States. Is that correct? 
■ Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Senator Montoya. Now, liow extensive was the instruction that you 
received from these two individuals which I have mentioned and other 
individuals ? And please name them if you can ? 

Mr. Segretti. I had very little contact Avith Mr. Strachan; I wish 
to make that clear. Since the time of my, shall we say, employment up 
until post- Watergate, and even then, my contact, I believe, was one 
meeting — one brief meeting. Other than that, my contact at the White 
House, excluding Mr. Dean, was Mr. Chapin. My instructions from 
him, if you can call them instructions, were to a very great extent very 
passive, rather than do this or do that or any specifics. 

Senator Montoya. You were reporting to him what you intended to 
ido, say a day or two from now^ and you were reporting, also to him, 
what you had done previous to the time that you were calling him. You 
were in constant communication with him, were you not, and relating 
all these things to him ? 

Mr. Segretti. Pretty much. Senator. There were periods of time 
later on when Mr. Chapin was out of the country. There was no regu- 
lar schedule of contacting him. One week it may be several times and 
then perhaps, there may be a 2-week period that there would be no 

Senator Montoya. Were you submitting written reports to him, too? 

Mr. Segretti. There may have been one or two very brief ; nothing 

Senator Montoya. Were you sending him copies of the different 
fliers and pamphlets that you were putting out? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, I was. 

Senator Montoya. And, of course, you were getting communications 
from him in return as to whether they were in proper taste or very 
proper within the orbit of the mission that you were performing? 

Mr. Segretit. At times; yes, sir. Many times, there was no response 
that I can really recall. 

Senator Montoya. Now that you look back on what you did and 
now that you have reflected quite a bit, would you say that what you 
actually did, and especially those things about which you have testi- 
fied this morning, fall into the category of being pranks rather than 
dirty tricks ? 

4014 [ 


yiv. Seorktti. I would say they cover the whole o^amut, Senator. 

Senator Moxtoya. Then, is it your testimony that they would W 
classified also as dirty tricks ? . 

Mr. Skgretti. Some were ; yes, sir. 1 

Senator Moxtoya. Well, would you not say most of them were ? 

Mr. SEOKfTTTi. I have never- really sat down and cate^rorized them. 
Hut 1 a<jree with you. i 

Senator Moxtoya. You do atrrep with me ( [ 

.^^r. SK(;RKi"ri. Yes. 

Senator Moxtoya. All right, fine. 

Now. in view of this, would you say that you were actually sub- 
verting the free electoral process as you envisioned it when you were 
a young lawyer fresh out of law school and fresh out of the Army, and 
before you were contacted by the White House ^ 

Mr. SEGRKTTr. I never really analyzed it in that term, but looking 
back at it, certainly during the time that I was doing it. I had nc, 
thought along that line. I tliink if I had the wisdom at that time tc 
look at it in that light and with some degree of perspective and 
objectivity, which I really did not have — hindsight is a very valuable 
thing at times — I think I would have been long gone from these 

Looking back on it, it is not a — none of these activities, I believe. 
are ones that should be included in the American political system. 

Senator Moxtoya. Xow, you mentioned on page 10 of your state- 
ment, and I quote you as follows : 

However, I cannot help but feel that I have been abused by rumor, character 
assassination, innuendo, and a complete disregard for the privacy of myself, my 
friends, and my family. 

Well, this observation leads me to extend my sympathy to you. Now,U 
do you not think that you were practicing that very same thing onj 
Presidential candidates and also practicing deception on the AmericanJ 
people when you were engaged in this mission^ 

Mr. SEcutEiTi. Yes, I agree. And I regret it very much. Senator. 
Senator Moxtoya. And you also submitted some deceptive state- 
ments to the press, ostensibly ascribing them to the dift'erent Presi-i 
dential candidates. Xow, do you think that this was proper and within 
the free press guarantees of the Constitution i 

Mr. SEGR?:'n-r. I think it is imi)r()per and T do not think incorrect 
distortions, untruths, or anything of that nature should be disseminat- 
ed by the press or by any individual. 

Senator Moxtoya. In other words. Mr. Segretti, do you not feel 
that by virtue of what you did, you have disappointed many people 
ill the United States, especially young i)eo])le in your age group? i 

Ml'. SEORE'rn. Yes, " i 

Senator Moxtoya. And do you not feel that if we are to have a 
free electoral process, there should be not only a rededication on the. 
pait of both political parties to insure to the American peoi)le the free 
electoral process and to exhort the press to disseminate as much in- ^ 
formation on each candidate on its pages untainted by things such as: 
you did in the last campaign ? ' \ 

Mr. Sfxjretti. I believe that both i)olitical parties and all candidates 
should run in the future— that may run in the future— should look at 
themselves m a very critical light and any activity such as what I was 


engaged in, or others may have been engaged in, should not take place. 

Senator Montoya. Now, you have testified that you feel that you 
were done a disservice by those vvhom you trusted, those friends with 
whom you attended college, in that they recruited you to perform this 
task and it degenerated into something that was very distasteful to you 
as you look back — in retrospect. Do you have the same feeling with 
respect to those young people that you recruited yourself to carry out 
some of these missions ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Senator Montoya. And is it now your feeling that there should be 
an alertness on the part of youths throught the United States that they 
should not lend themselves or permit themselves to be used for this 
kind of a mission ^ 

Mr. Segretti. I think I should answer it in these terms: I heard 
Mr. Strachan testify when he was asked whether young people should 
come into politics. Mr. Strachan's statement was: "Stay away." I 
can certainly understand that statement. There is many a morning 
that I have waked up and I have said to myself, I wish I had stayed 
away, or I wish I had had that advice myself somewhere along the 
line, or have somebody sit down with me and say, Don, do you really 
want to get involved in things like this, rather than just by law? 

Then, I heard another individual — I do not recall who it was — 
perhaps Mr. Haldeman, in a call for young people to come into 

My own feeling is that I think our country would be a lot better 
off if young people, particularly young people, were to get involved 
in the political system, but not blindly. I think when they come into it, 
Ithey should come in with a very critical eye. They should go into it 
very carefully. I think there are some good things that have come out 
of this entire — the entire events of the last year and a half. I do not 
think it is — it has been a tragedy for, certainly, the people involved and 
also for our system. But I think the good thing that could come out of 
it would be that young people or people that are presently involved, 
young or not, would really be very critical of their activities in regard 
to the political process. 

Senator 3,Iontoya. Thank you very much. INIy time has run out. 

Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervix. Senator Weicker. 

Senator Weicker. Thank you, INIr. Chairman. I just have a few 
very brief questions. 

On page 5 of your statement, Mr. Segretti, you say at the top : 

In December of 1971, I traveled to the State of Florida for the purpose of 
seeking additional contacts. During my visit, I met a Mr. Robert Benz in Tampa, 
Fla., and a Mr. Douglas Kelly in Miami, Fla. 

How did you come across these two individuals ? "Were these persons 
that had been referred to you? How did you find them? 

!Mr. Segretti. I came across Mr. Benz somewhat by chance aft-er I 
arrived in Tampa. I really had no one to call there. I did call a local 
Republican headquarters and asked the individual who answered the 
Dhone if he knew of a young man who might be interested in doing some 
political work of some type, part time. He gave me the name of Mr. 


Bonz. I talked to Mr. Benz. Mr. Benz seemed knowledgeable about 
politics and seemed to be interested in getting involved in the type of 
activities I had in mind. 

Subsequent to leaving Tampa, I was going to go down to Florida 
in conformity to the list that was given to me earlier of places to get 
ac<|uaintances to help me out with my endeavors. 

Senator AVeicker. What list, was that ? 

Mr. Segretti. That was a list of States that I was supplied earlier 
in my emiDloyment by Mr. Chapin. Mr. Benz mentioned the name of 
Mr. Kelly. 

Upon arriving in Miami, I happened to call an individual that 
was on the AVhite House advance list that had been supplied me and ! 
that individual gave me the name of Mr. Kelly. So I had Mr. Kelly-s ; 
name from two sources and I subsequently called him. 

Senator Weicker. Let me just be clear on this. You got Mr. Kelly's 
name from Mr. Chapin's original list? 

Mr. Segretti. No, no, sir. I got a name from the White House list 
supplied me by ]Mr. Chapin of an individual in Miami. I called that 

Senator Weicker. AVlio was that indi\'idual ? 

Mr. Segretti. Senator, he is an individual that, other than my con- 
tacting him that one time 

Senator Weiciler. All right, could you supply his name to the com- 
mittee, then ? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe I have, and I would be happy to supply it to 
you off the public light, shall I say, without any problem. 

Senator Weicker. Fine. 

]Mr. Segretti. He mentioned the name of Mr. Kelly. 

Senator Weicker. Then you also were in touch with the White 
House advance man ? 

Mr. Segretti. That was the 

Senator Weicker. That was the advance man ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. He was not currently working as an advance man. 
He had at one time, I believe, performed functions as an advance 

Senator Weicker. I see. 

When you called Mr. Chapin, were these calls to the Committee 
To Re-Elect the President, or were they calls directly to the White 
House ? 

Mr. Segretti. They were calls to the White House switchboard. 

Senator Weicker. I gather from the statement which you made 
earliei-, oi- your opening statement — I beg your pardon. Let me correct 
myself. I gather from tlie statement you made before the staff of the 
committee that there were occasions when apparently, your operation 
was conducted simultaneously, and I am now talking* about protesters, 
et cetera, with anothei- Republican operation. Were you aware of this? ! 

Mr. Segretti. No, sir, I was not. I had no idea that anvbody else 
was operating. 

Senator Weicker. Well, the reason why I am asking this is, and let 
me have you respond any wav you want to. It seems to me that there 
might have been soit of two dirty tricks operations going on in water- 
tight compartments. Am I correct in assuming that? 


Mr. Segretti. Well, it is difficult for me, because I have no personal 
knowledge of that from my position, but certainly watching the hear- 
ings and from what I have read in the press, it is very possible. 

Senator Weicker. But your operation, then, I gather, received its 
direction from the White House? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Senator Weicker. And the other operation seemed to have its direc- 
tion out of the Committee To Re-Elect the President. You have no 
personal knowledge of that ? 

Mr. Segretti. I do not. 

Senator Weicker. And there is no time that you came into conflict 
with each other ? 

Mr. Segretti. Not to my knowledge. The only cross there may be — 
well, I was thinking about that one pamphlet that was mailed to me 
and where that came from, I really don't know. But from testimony, 
that apparently originated in the White House also. 

Senator Weicker. Then lastly, in the course of your activities dur- 
ing that period of time that the Democratic primaries were going on, 
were you ever assisted in your task by Democrats, in other words, sup- 
porters of any one of the Democratic candidates who might have 
shared a similar goal, to put the other candidate under? Was that a 
field for recruitment as far as any of your activities were concerned ? 

Mr. Segretti. Not really. 

Senator Weicker. Or any information supplied to you by 

Mr. Segretti. By other Democrats ? 

Senator Weicker. Yes. 

Mr. Segretti. Not to my knowledge. I believe the one individual I 
knew in Philadelphia used one of the Democratic — some Democratic 
workers at a rally. He had printed up some fliers that the large print 
Avas "Trust jNIuskie'' or "Trust Senator Muskie."' He went to the rally 
and I believe he gave a few of those — I think we are talking in terms 
of 50, 60, TO — leaflets to some of the local staff workers who then took 
those and passed them out themselves. Beyond that, it would be that 
type of, it would be extremely minimal, if at all. 

Senator Weicker. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervix. Senator Inouye. 

Senator Ixouye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

During the latter part of September, Mr. Segretti, you visited Port- 
land, Oreg., and stayed at the Benson Hotel. 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir, I did. 

Senator Inouye. Of the many people you communicated with, there 
must have been some involved in your special activities. 

AYho were these people ? 

Mr. Segretti. I beg your pardon, sir ? 

Senator Inouye. Did you communicate with anyone in Portland re- 
lating to your sabotage activities ? 

Mr. Segretti. I called two individuals. They were essentially, to 
some extent, social calls. Nothing came of those contacts. They never 
did anything for me. That was the extent of it. 

Senator Inouye. What was your conversation with the district 
attorney ? 

Mr. Segretti. He was an individual whom I knew^ from the Army. 
He was a reservist and he was the only individual I knew in Portland. 


I called him up and I asked him if he knew of anybody that might 
want to get involved in political activitj^ He gave me the name of an 
individual, and I called him up and he said he was not interested. That 
was the extent of it. 

Senator Inouye. Did you describe to the district attorney the scope 
of your political activity ? 

Mr. Segretti. No ; I did not. 

Senator Inouye. Before the election day, besides Mr. Chapin, Mr. 
Strachan, and Mr. Porter, were there others in the White House who 
were aware of your sabotage activities ? 

Mr. Segretti. Senator, I did not know Mr. Porter. I have never met 
Mr. Porter. As a matter of fact, before all this publicity, I did not even 
know the name of Mr. Porter. 

Senator Inouye. Besides Mr. Chapin, Mr. Strachan, and Mr. Dean, 
were there others who were aware of them ? 

Mr. Segretti. If there were, I have no knowledge of that. 

Senator Ixouye. Besides Mr. Kalmbach, Mr. Hunt, and Mr. Liddy, 
were there others in the Committee To Re-Elect the President who 
were aware of j'our special activities? 

Mr. Segretti. I don't know whether Mr. Kalmbach was at any 
time. So far as Mr. Hunt, his knowledge of what I was doing was ex- 
tremely limited. Mr. Liddy's knowledge of what I was doing or Mr. 
Leonard, if that is Mr. Liddy — and I assume at this time that it was — 
was also extremely limited. 

Senator Ixouye. In mid-November of 1972, Mr. Dean is supposed to 
have offered you a job in Montego Bay for about $35,000. 

Mr. Segretti. What was that date again. Senator? 

Senator Ixouye. Mid-November 1972. 

Mr. Segretti. That is about the time frame ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ixouye. What was the purpose of this ? 

Mr. Segretti. The purpose of him offering me a job ? 

Senator Ixouye. Was this to get you out of town ? 

Mr. Segretti. It could have been. It was not communicated to me as 
such, but that could very well have been the reason. 

Senator Ixouye. Do you know a Mr. Alex Shipley? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, I do. 

Senator Ixouye. Mr. Shipley has indicated that you said the fol- 
lowing: "Nixon knows that something is being done. It is a typical 
deal. Don't tell me anHhing and I won't talk." 

What did you mean by this, sir ? 

Mr. Segretti. I am not really sure, Senator. For one thing, that state- 
ment is attributed to me and it occurred 2 years ago, practically. Mr, 
Shipley at that time when I — I knew him in the military service. At 
the time I contacted him, he apparently, as soon as I contacted him, 
contacted a friend of his who was on the Democratic staff committee or 
something, and subsequently contacted the Washington Post to tell 
them that somebody had contacted Mr. Shipley. So it is really hard for 
me to really say what I meant by that, for 'the reason that I don't 
really recall saying that. 

Senator Ixouti'e. Weren't you trying to recruit Mr. Shipley ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, I was, but I had no knowledge whether Mr. 
Nixon or President Nixon knew anything that I did. 


Senator Inouye. You have indicated that Mr. Hunt suggested that 
you disrupt Senator Muskie's April 17 fundraiser in Washington. 
Mr, Hunt has denied this. Which version is correct, sir ? 

Mr. Segretti. Well, all I can tell you is Mr. Hunt called me on the 
telephone and told me about a Muskie dinner in Washington, D.C., 
and asked me if I would be willing to come back to Washington, D.C., 
and do some activities in relation to that dinner. 

Senator Inouye. Mr. Hunt has also denied meeting you in New 
Fork City and giving you a copy of the Newsweek article on Mrs. 

Mr. Segretti. I never met, to my recollection, Mr. Hunt in New 
York City. 

Mr, Sherman. I don't believe that his part of any statement or part 
of any staff interview that was ever given, that Mr. Segretti met with 
Mr. Hunt in New York City. 

Senator Ixouye. These documents that you received from Washing- 
ton, were you made aware of the offer of these pamphlets ? 

Mr, Segretti. Are you talking about the pamphlets relating to Sen- 
ator Muskie ? 

Senator Inouye, Yes, sir. 

Mr. Segretti. No, I was not. And, Senator, I am not at this time 
clear that they were mailed from Washington to me. I don't know 
where they were mailed from. 

Senator Inouye. Did Mr. Chapin tell you where they were mailed 

Mr. Segretti. No, sir, he did not. 

Senator Inouye. And to the best of your recollection, you did not 
recruit anyone in Portland to work for you ? 

Mr. Segretti. No, I did not ; no, sir. 

Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, sir. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney. 
i Senator Gurney. Mr. Segretti, I think in your statement it says 
that you started your political activities in college, University of 
Southern California ; is that right ? 

Mr. Segretti. To some degree, I would say that is correct. 

Senator Gurney. Campus politics ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. "What did you do there in campus politics ? 

Mr. Segretti. Well, I ran for an office there but I think many people 
ran for offices there. It was not that unusual. 

Senator Gurney. Is this prank business the sort of thing that goes 
on in campus politics ? 

Mr. Segretti. Certainly not of this magnitude ; no. 

Senator Gurney. "Wliat do they do in campus politics that is any- 
thing like this ? 

Mr. Segretti. Well, it is really hard for me to recollect that. For 
one thing. I was not that involved in campus politics there. I was in- 
volved but I had other interests at the same time. I Avas not a political 
science major, I was a business major and I think much has been made 
of the fact that I was a great activist as far as politics at USC. I think 
many people were much more involved in politics at USC than I was. 
I think the type of thing that may have been going on there would be 


that you could plant a friendly individual in an opponent's camp to 
find out what was going on. 

Senator Gurney. At least some of your activities in the 1972 cam- 
paign was somewhat of an extension of campus politics ; was that it ? 

Mr. Segretti. To some extent, 1 would say that is correct. 

Senator Gurney. In your statement on page 3 — and I quote from it — 
you say : "During the initial period of my employment I myself had 
no specific idea as to what I was doing or how 1 was to do it." Is that 
not really pretty much the whole operation, really ? 

Mr. Segretti. Looking back on it I would say that is true, Senator. 

Senator Gurney. Because as I recall your testimony in answer to 
questions by Mr. Thomspson, you thought these things up on the spur 
of the moment ; is that right ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Senator Gurney. You had no real guidance out of Washington? 

Mr. Segretti. Just general — just a general theory to work from. 

Senator Gurney. I am curious about the Florida primary which, of 
course, was the first big political primary in the 1972 campaign. Any- 
body who knew anything about Florida politics, of course, knew what 
was going to happen and that was that Gov. George Wallace was going 
to take that race going away, as, indeed, he did.He got more votes than 
the next three people next to him in line, Humphrey, and Muskie, and 
Jackson. Why waste time on the Florida primary; everybody knew 
that Wallace was going to win. 

Mr. Segretti. Senator, I could not agree with you more. As a matter 
of fact, I would even like to extend that and why waste time with 
any of this ? 

Senator Gurney. I would agree with that, too. [Laughter.] But 
Florida especially, since that was so evident as to what was going to 

This McCarthy letter, I am also interested in that. 

Mr. Segretti. In what, sir ? 

Senator Gurney. The McCarthy letter. 

Mr. Segre'iti. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gurney. In California. So help me this would seem to 
boost the candidacy of Hubert Humphrey, was that what it was 
intended to do ? 

Mr. Segretti. It was not really intended for that purpose. 

Senator Gurney. If I got it I would as a McCarthy supporter, I 
think I would view it as that. My observation there is why promote 
Hubert Humphrey's candidacy in California when everybody on our 
side wanted George McGovem to win ? 

Mr. Segretti. Well, as originally 

Senator Gurney. It was a pretty hot, close race right down to the 
wire. Republicans were really trembling in their boots for fear 
Humphrey might win it. Why help out Hiunphrey ? 

Mr. Segretti. Well, I think there are two ways to think of that. I 
think the more realistic and politically astute thinking would be, that 
Senator McGovem would certainly be the best choice the Democrats 
could make for the Republicans in the 1972 race for tlie Republican 
campaign in this sense. 

Perhaps another line of thinking would be. that if the Democrats 
went into the campaign without any clear choice, that they would fight 


a little harder at the campaign and it would be more difficult for them 
to unite. But I think that is not really a very viable theory, certainly 
not in the context of 1972. 

Senator Gurney. Well, I must say it is too subtle for my political 
mind. It seems to me to be a pitch for Humphrey. 

Mr. Segretti. Certainly it is way over my head, too. 

Senator Gurney. As 1 underetand you — how many people did you 
have engaged in your operation ? 

Mr. Segretti. Senator, do you mean at any one time or how many 
people ? 

Senator Gurney. No, the whole bag. 

Mr. Segretti. You say, "engaged in your operation." Does that 
mean people who actually went out and did something affirmative, 
or just people that I talked to and nothing came of it? 

Senator Gurney. People who did something affirmative. 

Mr. Segretti. Well, primarily I would say there would be two 
others, perhaps three others. There were other individuals that did 
perhaps one or two activities, one or two small activities, and I would 
place their number at another six, seven, perhaps eight. 

Senator Gurney. Three principals and about eight others? 

Mr. Segretti. That is right. 

Senator Gurney. The reason why I am asking the question, if 
you read in the media about the Segretti operation, you would get 
some idea there were about 5.000 spies in America and some kind of 
a great big political operation was about to sink the country? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Senator Gutiney. I am glad to know you only had 11 in this 
"rinkydink" operation. 

Mr!^ Segretti. Well, even 11, I think, is perhaps overemphasizing. 

Senator Gurney. It is true, and this answers some of the colloquy 
you have had with others that there were thousands and thousands 
of young people on the Republican side working for Richard Nixon 
in a legitimate way, is that not a fact ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is right, and I cannot help but think at this 
point in time that there would be a heck of a lot more benefit to 
channel my energies and the energies of others on an aboveboard, 
legitimate way. 

Senator Gut?ney. Well, I am very glad you think that, and I believe 
your sincerity. But the point I wanted to make is, that this was a very 
tiny operation involving 11 people where thousands of other fine 
young people in this country were working hard for the reelection of 
Richard Nixon. 

Mr. Segretti. I agree. 

Senator Gurney. In retrospect, do you think this $45,000 spent on 
this operation really influenced any votes? It really mattered? 

Mr. Segretti. Well, I think Theodore White in his book, I think, 
assessed it correctly. 

Senator Gurney. What did he say ? 

Mr. Segretti. He said something to the effect that the Chapin- 
Segretti operation, if it could be determined that, had the weight of 
a feather. 

Senator Gurney. Well, I think I would agree with that, too. 

That is all, Mr. Chairman. 


Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge. 

Senator Talmadge. Mr. Se^-etti, will you tell us what your activ- 
ities were following the breaking and entering of the Watergate 
complex ? 

Mr. Segrettt [conferring with counsel]. Very briefly, Senator, I 
was in California Avhen that occurred. I heard it over the news. I 
really — I don't believe I did an\'thing about it. Subsequent to that, 
I was contacted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and I con- 
tacted Mr. Chapin and subsequently was put in touch with Mr. John 


Senator Talmadge. Will you pull the mike a little closer to you? 
I cannot hear your voice. 

Mr. Segretti [continuing]. And subsequently met Mr. John Dean 
in Washington, D.C. 

Senator Talmadge. Then what happened after that ? 
Mr. Segretti. I talked with — I met Mr. Dean — I talked with him 
very briefly the day I met him, and then I talked to him the next day 
at his oiRce, and then I flew back to Los Angeles, Calif., and met agents 
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 

Mr. Sherman. Senator, do you mean what were his activities over 

a long period of time or 

Senator Talmadge. I wanted to know whether or not your acti\nties 
of subversion and sabotage continued following the breaking and 
entering of Watergate. Just exactly what you did after that. 

Mr. Segretti. The only thing that I can recall after that was the 
plane that flew over the Democratic convention with the trailer relat- 
ing to Senator McGovem. 

Senator Talmadge. Was your advice subsequent to that to lay low, 
hide, go to a foreign country, or what ? 

Mr. Segretti. Xo, I was advised later on 

Mr. SrrERMAN. Senator, this raises a problem that I had also dis- 
cussed with Mr. Dash and Mr. Thompson. The question is broad 
enough that it might refer to conversations Mr. Segretti had with 
attorneys and an attorney-client relationship, and if the question is 
asked excluding conversations that may be within the attorney-client 
privilege, then, of course, he will answer it, but if it is intended to 
include conversations with an attorney employed in that capacity, 
then, of course, we would raise that as an objection. 

Senator Talmadge. If you want to assert that privilege, I will not 
pursue it; but I read a synopsis of the staff report, and it indicates 
exactly the same coverup operation was pursued with Mr. Segretti 
as was pureued with the Watergate, and I wanted to bring that out if 
Mr. Segretti wanted to go into that area. If he wants to plead attorney- 
client privilege in that area, I shall not go into it. If he wants to 
invoke the fifth amendment rights, I shall not go into it; but if he 
wants to voluntarily discuss it, I am prepared to ask him questions 
about it. 

Mr. Sherman. First, he has no fifth amendment rights, I assume, 
because he has been given immunity. Second, it was part of the synop- 
sis because, at all times. Mr. Segretti has cooperated fully with the 
staff of this committee, and has disclosed every single conversation 
he ever had with anybody in the world about his activities, because 
he wanted to cooperate fully. But it was cooperation with the under- 


standing that there were certain attorney-client privileges that ex- 
isted, and as an attorney himself, and we both feel as I explained to 
Mr. Dash and Mr. Thompson yesterday. 

Senator Talmadge. If yon or Mr. Segretti want to extend or in- 
voke the attorney-client privilege, I won't go into that area. 

Senator Baker. Will Senator Talmadge yield on my time, not on 

Senator Talmadge. Certainly I yield. 

Senator Baker. Do I understand you are discussing now the possi- 
bility of claiming attorney-client privilege with relation to conversa- 
tions between Mr. Segretti and John Dean ? 

Mr. Sherman. That is correct, and other lawyers. 

Senator Baker. And other lawyers. 

Mr. Sherman. That is correct. We have fully disclosed to the com- 
mittee staff and told tliem exactly the basis of the claim, who he talk- 
ed to and what was said, but with a clear understanding that was not 
to be a waiver of the attorney-client privilege, 

]Mr. Dash. Senator Baker, it is true we have had that discussion 
with regard to Mr. Dean and Mv. Segretti. It would be my position 
consistently with counsel that I do not see any attorney-client relation- 
ship existing. 

Senator Baker. Was there any fee paid for instance to John Dean 
for this service ? 

Mr. Segretti. No : there was not, Senator. 

Senator Baker. Thank you, Senator Talmadge. 

Mr. Sherman. Possibly to clear that up just a little bit, the commit- 
tee is in possession of a tape in which I believe the tape fully indi- 

Senator Ervin. I think if he claims Mr. John Dean was his attorney, 
frankly, the evidence in this case indicates to me Mr. John Dean was 
a messenger boy. But if he, if an attorney conspired with a client to 
obstruct the course of justice, I don't think it would be covered by the 
attornev-client privilege. 

Mr. Sherman. Well, I don't think Mr. Segretti did anything to ob- 
struct justice in any manner, shape, or form. I think the staff is aware 
of that. too. But he did seek Mr, Dean and Mr. Dean agreed to repre- 
sent him as an attorney at some period of time, and we feel it is cov- 
ered bv the attoiTiey-client privilege. I mean we are not trying to ob- 
struct the committee in any way at all. 

Senator Ervin. Maybe if Senator Talmadge would modify his ques- 
tion, if he wants to ask about any conversations INIr. Segretti had 
with anyone except his attorney, why he certainly is at liberty to do so. 

Senator Talmadge. I will pursue it in another way and if, at any 
time, you think you ought to assert the attorney-client privilege, or 
any other immunity that you may have, don't hesitate to do so. 

Mr. Segretti. Thank you. Senator. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you engage in any so-called dirty tricks 
or espionage following the Watergate break-in? 

Mr. Segretti. The only thing that I can recall is what I related to 
you regarding the plane with the trailer flying over the Democratic 

Senator Talmadge. Were you advised by anyone to maintain a low 
profile ? 


Mr. Segretti. Other than an attorney ? 

Senator Talmadoe. By anyone. 

Mr. Stiermax. WoU^ T tlion^ht wo just had a discussion that the 
question implies any person other than ^Ir. Segretti was communicat- 
ing with. 

Senator Taoiadoe. I didn't ask him if the lawyer advised that; I 
asked him if anyone advised him to maintain a low profile. 

Mr. Seor?:tti. Perhaps this will answer that question or a part of it. 
I did have lunch with Mr. Chapin in the summer of 1972, between my 
grand jury appearance, and. I believe, the period of time when news 
stories started coming out about me, which was in October, and at 
that time I was certainly told to cease all activities, although they 
had pretty much ceased prior to that. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you check out of a hotel under the name 
Segretti and register in another hotel under an assumed name? 

Mr. Segretti. A^Tien was this, Senator ? 

Senator Talmadge. Shortly after the Watergate break-in in Wash- 
ington, D.C. 

Mr. Segretti. "WTien I came to Washington, D.C, and met with Mr. 
Dean, I was stayinaf at the Mayflower Hotel ; staving there under my 
own name. After I talked with Mr. Dean, I checked out and flew 
back to Los Angeles and met with the agents. 

Senator Talmadge. Before you left Washington, though, didn't 
you register in another hotel under an assumed name? 

Mr. Segretti. I did not. 

Senator Talmadge. You did not ? 

Mr. Segretti. T did not. 

Senator Talmadge. Now, were you advised that the Grecian Islands 
were pretty that time of the year and you might want to take a trip 

Mr. Segretti. Senator. T think I now know what area you are talk- 
ing about. That period of time was after the news stories about me 
started to come out. At that time T was instructed to fly to Washing- 
ton, D.C. I did check into a motel under my own name. I was then 
instructed to check out of that motel because I was there under my 
own name. I had a meeting with !Mr. Dean and ^Vfr. Fielding and I 
was instructed to check into another motel under another name. 

Senator Talmadge. Were you advised that the Grecian Islands were 
beautiful at that time of the year and it might be nice to take a trip 

Mr. Segretti. There was a discussion of that but I took it more on 
the social level. [Laughter.] 

Senator Talmadge. Were you off'ered a job in Jamaica ? 

Mr. Segretti. I was — subsequent to. it was after the election — I was. 
It certainlv sounded nice. [Laughter.] 

Senator Tal:madge. Were you advised to ^et on a train and travel 
around the country ? Did you subsequently do so? 

Mr. Segretti. I was advised — [Conferring with counsel.] Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. And you did ? 

Mr. Segretti. I did. 

Senator Talmadge. "^Hiere all did vou travel ? 

Mr. Segretti. I took a train from Washington, D.C. up to. I believe, 
Philadelphia, I am not sure, and I was, to take a train — I had never 


taken a train before and I was going to head back home, out West, and 
from Washington, D.C., to go to the west coast you must take the 
train, I believe up to Philadelphia, transfer to Chicago and then take 
another train from Chicago to the west coast and that is what I did. 

Senator Talmadge. By way of Houston, Tex., also, did you not? 

Mr. Segretti. I don't know that that train goes through Houston 
or not. 

Senator Talmadge. Washington, D.C., to Philadelphia, and from 
Philadelphia to Chicago, and from Chicago to Houston. 

Mr. Segretti. I don't believe I went to Houston. 

Senator Talmadge. You did not go to Houston ? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe it was some other town. 

Senator Talmadge. Did you have a code name at the "\^Tiite House? 

Mr. Segretti. I don't know. My code name when I called Mr. 
Chapin, I would use the name Don Morris. 

Senator Talmadge. Do you loiow how many contacts that you had 
with Mr. Chapin from the time of October 5, 1971, to September 1, 

Mr. Segretti. I would have to guess on that. Senator. The records 
would reflect that better than my memory. 

Senator Talmadge. Would 47 calls from you to Mr. Chapin, not in- 
cluding the Chapin calls to you, seem about accurate? 

Mr. Segretti. That could very well be. Although many of those 
calls were to his office and he was not in, and I would leave a message, 
and sometimes I would get a return call, and sometimes I would not 
right away, and perhaps there w^ould be two or three phone calls along 
that line. 

Senator Talmadge. Do you have the folder in front of you that in- 
cludes tab 28 [exhibit No. 224] ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. I ask you to look at that and see if you think 
that is probably correct. 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Then, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent 
that that be appropriately numbered and marked as an exhibit in the 
record at this point. 

Senator Ervin. I believe that will be received in evidence as an ex- 
hibit appropriately marked. My understanding is that all of these 
exhibits were identified. 

Mr. Dash. Can we do that now, Mr. Chairman, since I have used 
the exhibits? In addition to tab 28 that Senator Talmadge has identi- 
fied I would like all of these exhibits entered into the record at this 

Senator Ervix. Am I correct in assuming that Mr. Segretti has 
identified all those exhibits ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, I will do that on the record. Senator. 

Senator Ervin. Let the record show that all of the exhibits identi- 
fied in the testimony of this witness will be received in evidence as ex- 
hibits and will be appropriately numbered by the reporter as such. 

Mr. Sherman. Mr. Chairman, I might say that Mr. Segretti has 
obviously not been asked about each of these exhibits, and I don't even 
know that we have looked at each and every one of these exhibits. I 
am sure if Mr. Dash says that at some point in our interviews, he has 


identified them, that is fine ; but I wouldn't want him to say that it is 
his exhibits. 

Senator Ervtn. I believe he just stated, though 

Mr. Dash. He has had an opportunity this morning. 

Senator Ervix. He identified them ? 

Mr. Segrktti. Yes. I went through those exhibits briefly this morn- 
ing and prior to appearing before this committee and I am familiar 
with most of those. There are one or two that I — that were done by 
people that I had contacted, but I am familiar with them now. 

Senator Ervin. You do identify them ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Nos. 199-226, 

^jenator Talmadge. Mr. Segretti, in your opening statement, you 
stated: "I was happy to accept employment from people who held 
prominent positions in and out of the Government." 

You also said a factor in accepting your duties was the opportunity 
in working for the T^Hiite House. Would you have accepted those 
duties if they had not been proposed to you by your friend in the 
White House; but a local campaign organizer ? 

Mr. Segretti. I do not believe I would. Senator. 

Senator Talmadge. Would you have accepted your duties if you 
had received much less compensation or had been asked to do those 
things without pay ? 

Mr. Segretti. Well. I certainly did not have funds of my own to 
travel around the country and expend large amounts of monev, and I 
certainly would not have done that for these type of activities. So 
certainly, that is a very important factor in this. 

Senator Talmadge. Am I correct, then, in sayiriff that the rea^n you 
acce]jted those duties that you have described in detail durina: the day, 
was because, first, of the glamor of working for the T^Hiite Hoiise, 
friends in the Wliite House, plus the fact that you needed a job and 
the iob was attractive ? 

Mr. Segretti. I think they were certainly some of the factors. 

Senator Talmadge. Several times, you have stated that your activ- 
ities were to cause confusion. Just exactly what did you mean by 
confusion ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is a little hard to define. T would say the best 
way I could describe that is the word confusion to some extent sneaks 
for itself. Perhaps to perplex the staff of the particular candidates 
where these were comin.qr from. 

Senator Talmadge. You concluded your opening statement by say- 
ing, "that vou have been abused by rumor, character assassination, and 
innuendo." Is it not rather ironic that the same effect that you com- 
plain about wfis vested, in abundance, I may say, on Senators Muskie, 
Jackson, and Humphrey, by vou ? 

Mr. Segretti. It certainlv is and T know how it feels. 

Senator Talmadge. You have had a career in college, graduated from 
one of the best colleges in the country. Then von served your country 
with responsibility during the Vietnnm war. Wliy would you, as a 
bright, young, attractive, articulate fellow, get involved in something 

♦See pp. 4268-4350. 


that you got into, where you were running around the country, falsi- 
fying documents, falsifying letters, falsifying press releases, and doing 
all the things that you did, Mr. Segretti ? You had a very bright future. 
Yet, you let these people persuade you into getting into something of 
this nature. 

Mr. ISe(;retti. Very honestly and candidly, Senator, I have net been 
able to give myself a satisfactory answer to your question. 

Senator Talmadge. You never had any previous criminal record of 
any kind before ? 

Mr. Segretti. Absolutely none. 

Senator Talmadge. Xo involvement with the police, no falsification 
no forgeries, anything of that kind ? 

Mr. Segretti. No, sir. 

Senator Talmadge. Thank you, Mr. Segretti. 

I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Baker. 

Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. 

Mr. Segretti, I do not have many questions. I think most of the 
principal areas of your testimony have been covered and covered 
rather exhaustively, but to continue the line of questioning that Sen- 
ator Tahnadge initiated — that is, why did you undertake this — I have 
pursued tliat line of questioning with other witnesses and I will not 
press you on it now. But let me suggest a hypothetical situation. 

If you were approached to do the same sort of job that you did in 
1971 and 1972 now, after these hearings and after a full and thorough 
public ventilation of the facts and circumstances, would these hearings, 
would this record, would this experience have any impact on your 
willingness or unwillingness to do that ? 

Mr. Segretti. I think the answer, certainly to me, is very obvious, 

Senator Baker. Well, what is the answer ? 

Mr. Segretti. I would not. 

Senator Baker. AYell, this has been a painful experience and, I am 
sure, an unpleasant experience for you — your interrogation, your in- 
dictment and arraignment, your testimony before this committee, I 
suppose. It has really been, I would expect, an unpleasant personal 
experience. But if you can, lay that aside and put yourself in the role 
of a young man who has served his country in the armed services, who 
is a graduate of a distinguished law school, someone who had not 
suffered the scars and the wounds of this hearing and these investiga- 
tions. Do you think that same thing would apply ? Do you think these 
hearings and this public ventilation of these circumstances may in fact 
have a deterrent effect on others undertaking what you did undertake? 

Mr. Segretti. I really believe that they would, and I hope that they 
will. I think that is one of the benefits that these hearings have 

Senator Baker. What do you think about the possibility that these 
hearings or this testimony of yours or other testimony may have an- 
other effect? It may have the effect of disillusioning young people, 
young men and women, will, instead of accepting this as a deterrent to 
such conduct in the future, just simply decide, well, that is politics and 
just drop out of the whole political system ? How do you evaluate that? 

Mr. Segretti. I think that is a very important factor to consider. 


and I think that is one of the dangers of this committee. Very hon- 
estly, I feel that to some extent, the committee has done its job in this 
regard, insofar as a deterrent, in cleansing the political system. I think 
if it were carried on for a great length of time, I think it would create 
a great deal of disillusionment in the country. And I think that is 

In other words, I think it is a balancing situation and it is very 
difficult to make that decision, and I do not think I am the one that 
should make that. I think it is up to you Senators to do that. 

Senator Baker. Well, I thank you for that information. Sometimes I 
hear men and women, particularly young men and women, say, well, 
after all, that is politics. And that is not politics. That is not politics as 
I know it, and I would even venture the estimates that that is not 
politics as you know it, except for the situation that you have testified 

What is your concept — is this your concept of what American pol- 
itics is all about, that is, a bag of dirty tricks over a period of time? 

Mr. Segretti. Not now. 

Senator Baker. Was it then ? 

Mr. Segretti. I think as it was explained to me, and I think you 
should realize that I had no great background in politics, practical 
politics, that some of these things were somewhat traditional in Amer- 
ican politics. 

Senator Baker. How widespread do you think that point of view is ? 

Mr. Segretti. I really do not know. Senator. 

Senator Baker. What about your experience in campus politics ? Did 
that have some impact on how you viewed the propriety of these 
activities ? 

Mr. Segretti. I am sure it was a factor, yes, sir. 

Senator Baker. One or two other questions, ISIr. Segretti. I know you 
have touched these matters in previous questions and answers, but tell 
me briefly, who gave you your instructions ? "V^Hio was your boss ? 

Mr. Segretti. I would, I guess you would say Mr. Chapin. 

Senator Baker. All right, who thought up your dirty tricks, if that 
is the right word for it ? 

Mr. Segretti. I think to a great extent, I did. 

Senator Baker. Pardon ? 

Mr. Segretti. I think to a major extent, I did. 

Senator Baker. In other w^ords, you initiated it, you carried forth 
your project on your own ? 

Mr. Segretti. Right. 

Senator Baker. Did you have any comment from Chapin or anyone 
else on the appropriateness or inappropriateness of wliat you were 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Senator Baker. By whom and on what occasions ? 

Mr. Segretti. By Mr. Chapin, I believe. It is liard to recall specific 
instances at this time. 

Senator Baker. What I am driving for is to what extent were you 
a free agent or what control did some responsible political official 
have on vour conduct and activity ? 

Mr. Segretti. Well, I believe at any time, I could have been told 
to cease and I would have ceased. 


Senator Baker. Mr. Segretti, we have a vote in progress and I 
understand we are on 10-minut« rollcalls, Mr. Chairman, so I would 
like to suspend. 

Senator Ervin. We will recess until we can return and resume the 


Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. 

You were a college mate at the University of Southern California 
with not only Dwight Chapin, but also Gordon Strachan and Ron 
Ziegler, weren't you ? 

Mr. Segretti. I understand that Mr, Ziegler was at USC at about 
the same time, although I do not recall Mr. Ziegler at USC. I believe 
he was there 3 years prior — in other words, I would have been a 
freshman and he would have been a senior. I don't recall ever meeting 
Mr. Ziegler. 

Senator Erviist. Now, Dwight Chapin and you were verj^ close 
friends, weren't you ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. As a matter of fact, you were his roommate and 
he was your campaign manager when you were elected to the student 
senate there. 

Mr. Segretti. I don't think that is exactly correct. Senator. Mr. 
Chapin was involved in politics there. One evening, a list was being 
made of people that were going to run for different offices. A very 
good friend of ours was going to be running for student body presi- 
dent. We were short several people that we were going to put on 
the slate for student senate, and just because we were short of names, 
my name was put on that list. I had no real campaign manager, shall 
we say, and there was no real campaign that I conducted. 

Senator Ervin. Well, Chapin was a leader of the group which 
placed you on the ticket and elected you to the student senate, was 
he not? 

Mr. Segretti. He was one of those that was involved; yes, sir. But 
I was involved, to some extent, in that also. 

Senator Ervix. Yes. So you and he had formed a close friendship 
before he became an employee of the '\"\niite House ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator Eratx. Do you know what his office was in the "White House? 

Mr. Segretti I believe is was Presidential appointments secretary. 

Senator Erven. He was the man who made the President's appoint- 
ments day by day? 

Mr. Segretti. I really don't know the duties of the job, but the 
title Avas Presidential appointments secretary. 

Senator Er\tn. Now, did you fly to Washington before you began 
this ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, I did. 

Senator Ervin. And had a conference with Chapin? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And in that conference, Chapin indicated to you 
that he wanted you to engage in what he called dirty tricks? 

Mr. Segretti. I don't think he used the term "dirty tricks" at that 
time. Senator. 


Senator Ervin. Well, he indicated to yoii that he wanted you to 
engage in a course of action which he did not want you to expose 
under the full glare of the noonday sun, didn't he ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Senator ER\qx. He told you to keep secret what you did ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Senator Ervin. ^\nd to act in such a way that your activities would 
never be traced to him, didn't he? Or the l^Hiite House? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct, Senator. 

Senator ER\^N. Now, was he the man who arranged for you to be 
paid by Mr. Kalmbach ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is a question that is difficult for me to answer. 
I believe Mr. Strachan called me and gave me Mr. Kalmbach's name 
to contact in Newport Beach, Calif. So who made the real arrange- 
ments there, I really don't know. 

Senator Er\t:n. Well, anyway, you were told by Mr. Strachan, who 
was also a Wiite House aide, to contact Mr. Kalmbach. 

Mr. Segretti. I believe it was Mr. Strachan ; yes. It could have been 
Mr. Chapin. 

Senator Ervin. Did he tell you why you should contact Mr. 
Kalmbach ? 

Mr. Segretti. To finalize my arrangements on my prospective 

Senator Er\t:n-. To make financial arrangements ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervix. And you did contact Mr. Kalmbach. and he made 
financial arrangements which continued for a period of about 12 or 
14 months ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. My last contact with Mr. Kalmbach relating to 
financial matters was the latter part of March 1972. 

Senator Ervin. Now, during this period of time, how often did you 
talk by telephone to Mr. Chapin ? 

Mr. Segretti. Well, we ran into the same problem, Senator. I think 
the records would reflect more accurately my recollection. To give you 
a total, I think it was mentioned, 40-some times during the entire pe- 
riod. That could very well be. 

Senator Er\t:n. During a period from about August 1971 and ex- 
tending at least ud to July 1972, you had at least 40 telephone conver- 
sations with Mr. Chapin ? 

Mr. Segretti. That could very well be ; yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And each time vou had a telephone conversation 
with him, when you called the switchboard and were asked for your 
name, you gave the name of Don Morris? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Senator Ervt^n. And you made rather complete reports to Mr. 
Chapin of what you had done, the things you have told us about here? 

Mr. Segrettt. Well, not necessarily. I certainly didn't tell him all ; 
the details. 

Senator Ervin. Well, you indicated to him, didn't you, what you had 

Mr. Segretti. Yes : but most of that was done bv mail. 

Senator Ervtn. Yes. You sent copies of various documents which | 
you concocted ? 


Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Senator Ervin. So Mr. Dwi^ht Chapin knew all the time what you 
were doing, what was going on ? 

Mr. Segretti. I imagine he must have. 

Senator Ervin. And he told yon on most of these 40 phone calls he 
was very much pleased with your good work, as he put it, didn't he ? 

Mr. Segretti. Well. I don't recall any intercorrespondence relating 
to that because I don't really recall the content of those phone calls. 

Senator ER\aN. Well, you called him to tell him what you had been 
doing. You didn't call to talk about the weather, did you? 

Mr. Segretti. I think many times— we did talk on a social level. We 
talked on a variety of matters, but many of the matters related to my 
political activities. 

Senator Ervix. Well, when you did talk about your political activi- 
ties, he knew what you were doing; at least you told him what you 
were doing ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Senator Ervix. And you sent him the posters. Did you send him 
a copy of the letter that you prepared to circulate about Jackson and 
Humphrey ? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe I did, and I believe I sent him the newsclip- 
pings on that. 

Senator Er\t[n. You sent him the newsclippings about that. And 
he sort of brightened on that, didn't he ? 

Mr. Segretti. I am sorry. Senator. 

Senator Ervix. When you sent him the newsclipping about the let- 
ter that was written on IMuskie's letterhead, he commended you on that 
and said you had gotten $10,000 worth of good work out of an expendi- 
ture of $20 ? 

Mr. Segretti. There was a comment to that effect. 

Senator Ervix. In your conversations with Chapin, didn't Chapin 

tell you that Muskie was the front runner among the Democrats and 

the polls showed that he would make the best race against President 

! Nixon and that he wanted to do as much as he could to discredit 

Muskie's campaign ? 

Mr. Segretti. I am trying to recall any specific conversation and 
I can't pin any date on such a conversation. However, that was the 
general background of many conversations. Unfortunately, they tend 
to merge, because it covered such a period of time. 

Senator Era^x. Well, what he said, regardless of what the specific 
words were, created in your mind the impression that Chapin wanted 
you to do all you could to discredit Muskie and to promote the candi- 
dacy of ]McGovern, didn't he ? 

Mr. Segretti. I don't believe McGovern was ever mentioned, but 
focus on Muskie. 

Senator Ervix. Wasn't it the strategy, as outlined by Chapin, that 
your efforts would be directed to discredit Muskie because he was at 
that time the front runner? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Senator Ervix. And didn't you know at the time that you were 
engaged in these activities that it was the strategy of Chapin or the 
Republican Party, as outlined to you by Chapin, to promote the nomi- 
nation by the Democrats of ]\IcGovern because they considered him 
; the weakest candidate? 



Mr. Segrettt. No, sir; that was never really conveyed to me. In 
fact, during the period of time that I was engaged in any activities, 
I don't think I, or others, such as Mr. Chapin, believed that Senator 
McGovern would ever win the nomination. 

Senator Er\t[x. But you did all you could to see that he did win it, 
didn't you? 

Can you tell me a single thing you ever did to place an obstacle in 
the path of ]McGovern obtaining the nomination? 

Mr. Segretti. Well, we had the plane fly over Democratic head- 

Senator Ervin. That was after he had the nomination, wasn't it? 

Mr. Segretti. No ; I think it was the day before. He had it locked up. 

Senator Ervin. Well, it was after he had gone to the Democratic 
National Convention in Miami with enough delegates to insure his 
nomination, wasn't it? 

Mr. Segretti. I am sorry. I was thinking of another example and 
I didn't hear the question, Senator. 

Senator Ervtcn. I was just asking you, now you have told us about 
things that you did to discredit^ — which were calculated to discredit 
Jackson, Humphrey, and Muskie and to create confusion among them. 
My question was, did you do anything to discredit the campaign efforts 
of Senator McGovem prior to the time that he was nominated ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. sir. I had the flier. "McGovern's real record on 
the war," that was obtained in the Miami area and that was reprinted 
and distributed. 

Senator Ervix. "\^nien was that ? 

Mr. Segretti. It was distributed in the California primary. Some 
of it was distributed in the Florida primary. That is the only instance 
I can remember. 

Senator Ervix. Well, in fact, you didn't do much to impede the 
nomination of Gov. George Wallace, did you, in your Florida ac- 
tivities ? 

Mr. Segretti. No, sir. 

Senator Ervix. The only thing you ever said about him was that 
he was sort of like Hitler? 

Mr. Segretti. That is right. 

Senator Er\t:x. Now, I want to invite vour attention to exhibit No. 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Senator ER\^x. You stated in your opening statement, that it was 
not vour desire to have anyone believe this letter. 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. Senator. 

Senator Er\t:x. Well, now. how can you reconcile that statement 
with the fact that vou sav in the sixth and seventh lines of that letter, 
"However, if you have not made your decision, you should be aware 
of several facts." 

Mr. Segretti. It is difficult for me to reconcile that at this time. All 
I can tell you is my intention at that time — and it is true that the way 
this was written — my intentions, I don't think, were as clear as they 
should have been. In fact, this letter should never have been written, 

Senator Ervix. It says, after you have set out statements which you ; 
admit constituted scurrilous attacks on two Democratic candidates for 


the nomination, you close the letter with this : "These are not pleasant 
facts, but they should be considered by you before you vote on 
March 14." 

Now, I don't understand how a person can assert twice in a letter 
that certain things are facts and then say he didn't intend anybody to 
believe what he said were facts to be true. 

Mr. Segretti. Senator, this letter was put on Citizens for Muskie 
stationery and it was really aimed toward Muskie, rather than the 
other two individuals involved ; although I agree that it was done very 
poorly and there was a great deal of misjudgment, it certainly didn't 
work out the way I intended. 

Senator Ervin. Well, it looks like to me you were trying to kill 
three Democratic birds with just one stone. You issued what was a 
scurrilous libel, manufactured out of the whole cloth you admit by 
yourself, against Senator Jackson; you circulate what was a libel 
against Senator Humphrey, and you say you did that also for the pur- 
pose of creating dissension and discord among the three candidates. 

Mr. Segretti, That is right. 

Senator Ervin. At least, those two candidates with McGovem — ^with 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervix. So you were really — your shaft, was directed at 
three different people, and calculated to hurt three different people and 
that is what it was intended for, was it not ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes ; I will say this. Perhaps you can better under- 
stand, that this letter was not done with a great deal of forethought in 

Senator Ervin. Well you admit there is not a word of truth in the 
whole letter, do you not ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is true. 

Senator Ervin. And you attempted to deceive people into thinking 
that it emanated from Muskie's headquarters or from his campaign 
organization ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is right. 

Senator Ervin. Now, you invented the names of these w^omen who 
are mentioned here, did you not ? 

Mr. Segretfi. Yes. 

Senator Ervin. You invented the names of the Mary Ann Cramer 
out of the whole cloth, did you not ? 

Mr. Segretti. Senator, the letter is made out of the whole cloth. The 
facts in the letter are made out of the w^hole cloth. I attempted to 
make this letter so outrageous that nobody would really believe it. 

Senator Er\tn. "^^Tiy, if you did not want 

Mr. Segretti. I did not know what to say. 

Senator Ervin [continuing]. If you did not want anybody to believe 
it, why did you not put at the head : "You must not believe anything 
that is said in this document." ? 

Mr. Segretti. I should have. 

Mr. Sherman. Senator, T think Mr. Sesfretti has made clear that it 
was to create dissension amonjr the candidates and not for the contents 
to be believed and, of course, if it would have said that they would 
have known it before. 


Senator Ervin. If I take the words that he set out — ^the only infer- 
ence I can draw from it is that he wanted the people who saw it, or 
heard about it, to believe the most reprehensible things about Senator 
Jackson and Senator Humphrey. 

Mr. Sherman. That may appear on the face of it. However, he 
told you what his intention was and that was the intention. 

Senator Ervin. I am constrained to say that I, as a lawyer, do not 
undertake to say what a man intended when he wrote a document ; 1 1 
determine that by the words of the document, rather than what he says i 
many months after that. I 

Mr. Segretti. Senator, all I can tell you is what my intention was. I 

Mr. Sherman. That is, of course, not to excuse the letter and he is i 
not attempting to do that at all. 

Senator Ervin. Well, he admits that he composed a libelous letter 
and mailed it out. Every word he said in the letter referring to repre- 
hensible conduct on the part of Senator Jackson and Senator Hum- 
phrey is untrue and without any foundation whatever. 

Mr. Sherman. That is correct. 

Senator Ervin. That he even invented some nonexistent women ? 

Mr. Sherman. That is correct. 

Senator Ervin. To be named, to make the letter specific. 

Mr. Sherman. That is correct. 

Senator Ervin. Well, so much for that. [Laughter.] 

My time is up, I will come back, I have more questions. I want 
to find out how John Dean got such a big law practice. [Laughter.] 

Mr. Sherman. I might just comment if he is relying upon fees made 
by Mr. Segretti, he must not have a very successful law practice. 

Senator Ervin. I was not asking about you, I was not asking about 
your law practice. 

Mr. Sherman. I was not commenting upon mine. 

Mr. Segretti. I am sure Mr. Sherman is quite successful. 

Senator Ervin. I was just wondering how Mr. Dean got spread out 
so fast. [Laughter] . 

Senator Weicker. 

Senator Weicker. During the course of your conversation with one 
of the Senators, I cannot remember which, Mr. Segretti, you men- 
tioned .your meeting with Fred Fielding. 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. that is correct. 

Senator Weicker. Is that correct ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Senator Weicker. What was the occasion of your meeting with Fred 

Mr. Sf^retti. OK. I talked to Mr. Dean by telephone. INIr. Dean, 
I believe, was in Miami or that area at that time, and he informed me 
of a forthcoming article concerning me in the Washington Post. He 
wanted to meet with me as soon as possible regarding the allegations 
in that article. This was around October 10, 1 believe, 1972. Mr. Dean 
told me to fly to Washington, D.C, and that he was going to fly from 
Florida up to Washington and meet me there. He said that in case I 
arrive prior to liim to call his assistant, Mr. Fielding, and he gave me 
Mr. Fielding's telephone number. T did so, I called Mr. Fielding, and 
I told him where I was staying. Mr. Dean, I believe, had not yet 
arrived. I was subsequently contacted by, I believe it was, Mr. Field- 


i ing, although it may have been Mr. Dean, and then told to check out 
of that hotel and come and meet with them. 

Senator Weicker. Where did you meet ? 

Mr. Segretti. We met in Mr. Dean's office in the Executive Office 

Senator Weicker. How was your entry into that building? Was 
it the normal routine of signing in? 

Mr, Segretti. No, it was around 8 or 9 in the evening. I took a cab, 
after I checked out from where I was staying, to within a block of 
the Executive Office Building. I called Mr. Dean's office. He told me 
to wait where I was and that an individual would come and meet me 
and that would be Mr. Fred Fielding. 

That was done. When we entered the Executive Office Building, 
as you know, there is a check point there, and you are to produce iden- 
tification and perhaps sign in. I am not sure of that. Mr. Fielding 
stated something to the effect, "This was the individual who lost his 
wallet," and I was just ushered in. This was around 9 or 9 :30 at night. 

Senator Weicker. How long did this meeting last? 

Mr. Segretti. It is hard to really guess now. An hour perhaps. I 
was pretty exhausted. I had been up really, that night on the airplane, 
and it was certainly a shock to me to see my name and picture on the 
front page of the newspaper, so I was exhausted. 

Senator Weicker. What was the purpose of this meeting? 

Mr. Segretti. To go over the Post article, to see what allegations 
were true and untrue. 

Senator Weicker. In the course of the meeting did you discuss in 
general the matters which you brought to the attention of this 
committee ? 

Mr. SherMx^n. The problem, Senator, with that question is that it 
does ask for privileged communications between an attorney and a 
client, and if he answers a question yes or no, then he has told you 
the contents, particularly if he answers yes. 

Senator Weicker. Would you care to characterize the meeting? 

Mr. Sherman. Well, that, of course, does the same thing. I mean, 
there is no Avay to talk about the meeting, the contents in the light 
of that question. Just 1 second. [Conferring with witness.] 

As we have indicated, however, previously, preserving the pri\alege, 
we have discussed these matters in detail with Mr. Dash, Mr. Lenzner, 
and Mr. Lackritz, and we would be perfectly willing to answer any 
questions, any general questions, in private about this but we feel an 
obligation to maintain the attorney-client privilege. 

Senator Weicker. All right. 

And I know you have. I think that point should be made clear, you 
have cooperated fully with the staff of the committee. 

Senator Ervin. Senator, on that point, I have difficulty accepting 
the view that there is any relationship of attorney and client between 
the witness and Mr. Dean. Mr. Dean was allegedly the White House 
lawyer at the time, and furthermore, when he had a conversation with 
Chapin and the witness, a third party was present and you cannot 
have a confidential communication between an attorney and his client 
when third parties are present. It is not confidential. And furthermore, 
Mr. Dean's testimony before this committee indicates that Mr. Dean 
was engaged in a conspiracy to obstruct justice, and communications. 


If anything transpired in that meeting that had anything to do with 
obstructing justice tlien it is not covered by the confidential lawyer's 
relation, if it existed, because it only can refer to past activities of a 
criminal nature or supposedly criminal nature. That is my under- 
standing of the law of attorney-client privilege. 

Mr. Sherman. That is also my understanding of the attorney-client 
privilege. The point about Mr. Chapin being present, 1 do not — 
questions have been asked about that particular conversation, and I 
think that w^as only an introduction and the questions about the in- 
troduction, Mr. Segretti might be willing to answer the question. 

Senator Weicker. May I ask a question as to who was present at | 
the meeting ? 

Mr. Segretti. Well, which meeting are you talking about ? 

Senator Weicker. I am talking about the meeting at the Executive 
Office Building at 9 o'clock on the evening of October 10. 

Mr. Segretii. That was Mr. Dean, Mr. Fielding, and I. 

Mr. Sherman. Well, of course, Mr. Fielding 

Senator Ervin. I don't believe a confidential communication can 
be had between — a communication can be had which is confidential 
in nature within the purview of the rule when it takes place in the 
presence of two outside parties. 

Mr. Sherman. Unless the third party also happens to be another 
lawyer who also in the conversations does maintain an attorney-client 
privilege, which was done during this conversation. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, I think this has been the claim counsel 
has made. It is my position as chief counsel, and I have stated this 
to counsel that this was a fictitious relationship of attorney-client 
privilege. Mr. Dean, who was counsel to the President, certainly could 
not in any way serve as counsel to Mr. Segretti. Certainly Mr. Fielding 
could not, and cannot create a fictitious attorney-client relationship 
in order to shield these conversations, and I think the position that 
the committee really should have is there was no attorney-client rela- 
tionship established. 

Mr. Sherman. However, whatever Mr. Dean's purposes were to 
shield anything I have no knowledge of. From Mr. Segretti's point of 
view, there was a good faith relationship of attorney and client, and 
he reasonably believed there was an attorney-client privilege and had 
specific conversations with Mr. Dean on that particular point, and 
only confided in Mr. Dean because Mr. Dean assured him that that, 
was the relationship and he was representing him in that capacity. 

Senator Ervin. Are you asking him about a conversation that he 
had with Mr. Dean at the time Mr. Fielding and Mr, Chapin were 
present ? 

Senator Weicker. That is correct. 

Senator Ervin. I will rule that is not covered by attorney-client 
privilege at all. 

Mr. Sherman. Mr. Chapin was not present, sir, during that meet- 
ing- and I think. Senator, if vou were to make a ruling 

Senator "Weicker. I specificallv asked Mr. Sesretti to sfive to this 
committee the contents of the ronvorf=ations heM with Mr. Dean and 
Mr. Fieldinjr. in Mr. Dean's office on the night of October 10 in the 
Exerutive Office Building;. 

Mr. Sherman. I think if the chairman is g-oin<i to make a ruling 
Jls to whether or not there was an attorney-client privilege, a founda- 


tioii ought to be laid as to whether there was or was not an attorney- 
client relationship and the only way to lay the foundation is to ask 
Mr. ;Segretti what was said. 

tienator Ekvin. 1 don't think we have a scintilla of evidence in this 
case that Mr. Dean was practicing law generally and was counsel for 
this man. 

Mr. t5HEii3iAN. You haven't asked the questions of Mr. Segretti as 
to what Mr. Dean told him so how can there be any evidence? If 
you want to ask those questions, you should do that hrst before 

tjenator Ervin. I was on the verge of asking him when my time 
expired a while ago. 

Mr. Shermax. Of course, we are always — and we have discussed 
all of these conversations in private, so we are certainly notwith- 
holding any information. 

Senator Ervin. You can proceed, Senator. 

Senator Weicker. I would like to have Mr. Segretti discuss con- 
versations held with Mr. Dean in the presence of Mr. Fielding in 
Mr. Dean's office and on the night of October 10. 

Mr. Sherman. Can I then request a foundation be first laid as to 
whether or not there was an attorney-client relationship in questions 
asked of Mr. Segretti in this regard, what was told to him and what 
did he reasonably believe ? 

Senator Ervin. Let me ask him a question or two on that point. 
Did you make any agreement with Mr. Dean to pay him a retainer 

Mr. Segretti. No, sir ; I did not. 

Senator Ervin. Did you expect to pay him a retainer fee? 

Mr. Segretti. If he had asked for one, 1 would have paid one. 

Senator Ervin. Well, he didn't ask you for one and you didn't 
offer to pay him one ? 

Mr. Segretti. No. 

Senator Ervin. And you didn't tell him that you had committed 
any violation of the law for which you were seeking legal counsel? 

Mr. Segretti. I asked Mr. Dean whether anything that we said 
would be privileged and under the attorney-client, otherwise I would 
not discuss any matters with him. 

Senator Ervin. What did you say about Mr. P^ielding being there? 

Mr. Segretti. I asked the same question about Mr. Fielding. 

Senator Ervin. You had two lawyers there ? 

Mr. Segretti. I asked Mr. Fielding whether he was a lawyer be- 
cause, otherwise, I was not going to talk or say anything to him. 

Senator Ervin. But Mr. Fielding, was he a lawyer? 

Mr. Segretti. He assured me he was. 

Senator Ervin. Do you know whether he was practicing law ? 

Mr. Segretti. I really don't know. 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Segretti, don't you know that neither one of these 
men were acting in the capacity of lawyer for you ? 

Mr. Segretti. I thought they were. 

Senator Ervin. Didn't you ask him to get you a lawyer, isn't that 
what happened ? 

Mr. Segretti. That was much later on, Senator, when I was going 
back to Los Angeles and I asked him if he could suggest a counsel 

21-2flRO — 74- 


in Los Angeles, in the area. Mr. Dean was back in Washin^on, D.C. 
Senator Ervin. You asked him to get a lawyer out in California for 


Mr. Segretti. If he could recommend a lawyer to me. 

Senator Ervix. Recommend one. You already had a lawyer in Wash- 
ington, why did you want one out of town ? 

Mr. Segretti. Because I was in Los Angeles, Senator. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a qualifying question 
in that respect ? 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Segretti, can you tell this committee under oath 
that at the time you talked to Mr. Dean that, and Mr. Fielding that, 
one, you knew they were attorneys ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Senator Baker. That they were qualified to practice law ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Senator Baker. That you expected to employ them as counsel to 
advise you on your rights and prepare you for whatever legal proceed- 
ings might be in prospect ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Senator Baker. That you intended to compensate them for those 
services ? 

Mr. Segretti. I don't believe that was — I really considered that at 
that time. Senator Baker. 

Senator Baker. That you asked for and received assurances of the 
privileged nature of the communication ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Senator Baker. Now, the final question I would put to vou in that 
respect is this : Did you ask for that assurance of privileged communi- 
cation for the purpose of assuring your legal defense, or for the purpose 
of concealing the substance of what you were about to communicate? 

Mr. Segretti. I will tell you why that is difficult for me to answer, 
Senator Baker, because I felt that the privileged nature of any com- 
munication would be necessarv in my defense. 

Senator Baker. The point I am trying to 

Mr, Segretti. So the answer would be, yes. 

Senator Baker [continuing]. The point I am trying to reach is 
whether or not you are trying to obtain an assurance of confidentiality 
for the sake of protecting the confidentiality of that information, or 
for the sake of assuring your representation by counsel in any pro- 
ceeding that might be brought against you. 

Mr. Segretti. I think the latter would be true. Senator. 

Mr. Sherman. Of course, Senator, obviously when you seek an at- 
torney you also expect it to be confidential so it is kind of a dual 

Senator Baker. Yes. but the law is well settled that you cannot 
cloak yonrself in a claim of confidentiality or attorney-client priv- 
ilege simply for the sake of concealing information. It must be a 
legitimate intentment of gmployment for the purpose of advancing 
the legal defenses that may be available to you under the Constitution 
and statute. 

Mr. Stierman. I think if the question was asked, did he intend to 
cloak it, not to disclose part of the coverup, then the answer would 
be no. 


Senator Ervin. My understanding is, and I am not able to say this 
as a fact, there is a regulation for anybody who is a lawyer for the 
Government to engage in private practice, and the inference is that 
Mr. Dean at least had the title of counsel to the President. That means 
a lawyer for the executive branch of the Government. 

Mr. Sherman. As Mr. Dash, of course, raised the same point yester- 
day, and my response was, even if that is true, which I asked for such 
regulation, he could not. So to me I don't think that would affect 
what Mr. Segretti's good faith belief was, and the example, of course, 
I gave him yesterday, if you went to somebody who told you he was 
a lawyer and he was not a lawyer and you communicated with him in 
the good faith belief he was a lawyer, he would be protected. 

Senator Ervin. Isn t it a fact that you went to see Mr. Dean at Mr. 
Dean's instance? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Senator Ervin. At his request? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. You didn't go to him to employ a lawyer? 
[Conferring.] What did Dean tell you? Mr. Dean wasn't soliciting 
employment as an attorney, was he, at the time he invited you to come 
and pay him a visit ? 

Mr. Segretti. I don't believe so, Senator. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Mr. Segretti. However, if Mr. Dean had informed me there was 
such a prohibition against him acting in that capacity and he could 
not so advise me in that capacity, that would have been the end of it 
right there. 

Senator Ervin. Did Mr. Dean ask you to claim the lawyer-client 
privilege ? 

Mr. Segretti. No ; he did not. 

Senator Ervin. I do not know what it is that you would testify to, 
but his testimony here indicated that after tliis time, you sort of 
vanished from sight. 

Mr. Segreiti. 1 did what ? 

Senator Ervin. Did Mr. Dean give you advice to trust your two 
good legs rather than a bum lawyer ? Is that what you claim to be 

Mr. Sherman. Senator, we are not trying to hide any of the facts, 
because ]Mr. Dash and Mr. Thompson are in possession of all of the 
facts. The whole point is we maintained from the outset that there is 
an attorney-client privilege and he is an attorney, and upon my ad- 
vice, if he has this privilege, and we feel very strongly about the 
attorney-client privilege, as all the lawyers on this committp'^ feel, he 
ought to claim it, not to hide anything. 

Senator Baker. You mean to claim it just for the sake of claiming 

Mr. Sherman. No ; because there is a legitimate attorney-client priv- 
ilege here that ought to be recognized. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe there is. 

Mr. Dash. Even if there were an attorney-client privilege, if Mr. 
Segretti were the client, he could waive it. If an attorney were sitting 
there, he would have no right to waive another's privilege. 

I do not see any principle involved if Mr. Segretti in fact wants to 
tell us the facts, because he is the client, if he is the client, and could 


waive it by telling lis the facts. He has already told us the facts. In 
my own view, there is no attorney-client privilege, but I do not see any 
principle, if there were, if Mr. Segretti wants to tell us something that 
he wants to tell us. 

Mr. SHERjtAX. We are claiming the privilege, and I think the facts 
make it clear that there is an attorney-client privilege, and if the 
chairman wants to rule there is not and instruct him to answer it, I 
will advise him to do so, of course. 

Senator Ervin. The evidence just does not satisfy me that there was 
any attorney-client privilege, and Mr. Segretti admits that he did not 
go there for the purpose of employing Mr. Dean, that he went there in 
response to a request from Mr. Dean, because Mr. Dean wanted to get 
some information from him. 

Mr. Sherman. I do not think that is the tenor of the testimony, 

Senator Ervin. Is that not true, Mr. Segretti ? 

Mr. Segretti. I do not think that is absolutely correct. Senator. I 
knew Mr. Dean was an attorney at that time, and from the brief dis- 
cussion I had on what was told to me regarding the Post article, I cer- 
tainly was desirous of receiving some legal advice at that time. 

Senator Ervin. Well, now, did Mr. Dean call you at the instance of 

Mr. Segretti. I believe I called Mr. Dean at that point, and he in- 
formed me about that article. 

Senator Ervin. Well, how did you know about the existence of Mr. 
Dean ? Who did you get information from that there was such a per- 
son as John W. Dean III ? 

Mr. Segretti. I was introduced to Mr. Dean in June 1972 at the May- 
flower Hotel by Mr. Strachan. 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Strachan? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. In 1972 ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Senator Ervin. When did this meeting occur that Senator Weicker 
was asking you about ? 

Mr. Segretti. That was in October, I believe, 1972. 

Senator Ervin. And Dean set up the meeting ? Is that not a fact ? Did 
you not tell me that ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. 

Mr. Sherman. Senator, I often call my clients and ask them to come 
into the office. That does not destroy the attorney-client ]>rivilege. 

Senator Ervin. You do not call your clients to come into your office 
before they become a client? He says he has no reason to believe Mr. 
Dean was soliciting lecal business. I just hold as a matter of fact that 
the attorney-client, the evidence is insufficient to show that the at- 
torney-client privilege existed between this Avitness and Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Sherman. Might I ask the Senator to look at, I think a tran- 
script of the tape, which makes it clear that that, in fact, was a discus- 
sion between the participants — that, in fact, there was an attorney- 
client privilege. 


Senator Weicker. If I am not mistaken, the tape which is being 
referred to, however, is a tape that was done on November 10, and I 
am referring to a meeting of October 10. 

Senator Ervin. And Mr. Dean has testified before this committee 
that at that time he was engaged in efforts to cover up the so-called 
Watergate affair, that he was engaged in an effort to obstruct justice. 

]Mr. TiioMPSOx. Mr. Chairman, if I might, in referring to this 
transcript that counsel referred to, part of it reads as follows : 

Mr. Dean. I consider anything said in this conversation is completely privileged 
by reason of the fact that I serve as general counsel over at the White House. 
I am looking at this as it relates to Dwight Chapin, a member of the White 
House staff. To our understanding, I will make no copies. 

et cetera. 

Mr. Steachan. OK, let me clear that such that I will feel confident in speaking 
truthfully and freely at this point. 

He says something to the effect that it will not be divulged unless I 
give my consent. 

I think it is clear from here that at least in Mr. Dean's mind, he was 
talking about executive privilege at that point and not attorney-client 

Mr. Segretti. My recollection is on that tape. I put a statement 
regarding attorney-client privilege. I have not seen a transcript of 
that interview and neither has my attorney, Mr. Sherman. 

Senator Ervix. Well, I hold it is a matter of fact that you do not 
produce enough evidence to sustain the privilege. The burden is on 
you to show that at the time of the conversation Senator Weicker 
asked you about, the attorney-client privilege existed between you 
and John W. Dean, and the evidence does not satisfy me and I do 
not believe it satisfies the other members of the committee to that 
effect. ^ 

Dean says here : 

I served as general counsel over at the White House and looking at this as in 
relation to Dwight Chapin, a member of the White House staff. To our under- 
standing, I will make no copies of the transcript of this other than one for 
myself and one I will send you for any use you may want to make of it 
personally or to turn over to your attorney so that he has got a record of 
exactly what we have talked about. 

In other words, there is Mr. Dean's testimony to the effect that he 
was not your attorney, that he would give you a copy of the transcript 
so that vou could turn it over to your attorney. 

Mr. Segretti. I never received a copy of that, and very honestly, I 
do not remember that being said on the tape. 

Mr. Shermax. Senator, in addition, Mr. Segretti did employ a Los 
Angeles counsel who I talked to just in the past few weeks. He told 
me that when he turned over certain documents to John Dean — which 
apparently, John Dean without authorization turned over to this com- 
mittee — he considered John Dean cocounsel for Mr. Strachan and Mr. 
Segretti. That was another attornev in Los Anq-eles who advanced this 
idea after I asked him why documents were turned over. 

Senator Ervix^. This is a transcript of the tape and here is Dean 
talking. He says : "He will give Mr. Segretti a transcript of the con- 
versation so Mr. Segretti can turn it over to Mr. Segretti's attorney." 


Now, if Mr. Dean had been Mr. Segretti's attorney, he would not have 
said he was going to give it to him, he would have just kept a copy. 

I am going to hold that thei'e is not sufficient evidence to justify 
the conclusion that any attorney-client relationship existed between 
Mr. Segretti and Mr. Dean. I am going to instruct you to answer the 

Mr. Sherman. Then just for the record, because we feel there are 
other reasons which I have explained to Mr. Dash why this point is 
extremely important, because we feel Mr. Dean, without authoriza- 
tion and in his relationship, obtained information from Mr. Segretti 
and Mr. Segretti's Los Angeles lawyer and turned it over to this com- 
mittee, and we feel there were violations on his part. If you are 
forcins: the witness to answer under penalty of contempt of Congress 
if he doesn't, I would like to make an objection. And, of course, if he 
doesn't want to answer, he has no choice. 

Senator Ervin. I hold that there's no privilege for several reasons. 
He certainly didn't ask Mr. Fielding and Mr. Dean both to be his 

Mr. Sherman. He is testifvinir that when he met with Mr. Dean and 
Mr. Fielding, he asked at that time if there was an attorney -client re- 
lationship because he wouldn't speak with Mr. Fielding present unless 
it was told to him that there was such a relationship. 

Certainly if there is a secretarv present in mv office, that is part of 
the privileged communications, because she is an agent of the attorney 
at that time, which Mr. Fielding was. 

Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, do I understand it to be the Chair's 
ruling that the witness and counsel have not made out a case to sup- 
port attorney-client privilege? 

Senator Ervin. Yes. I direct the witness to answer the question. 

Senator B.ucer. And that the witness is instructed to answer Sen- 
ator Weicker^ question. 

Is that the state of affairs ? 

Senator ER\^N. Yes. 

Mr. Segretti. I would be ver\^ happy to answer vour question. Sen- 
ator Weicker. However, I have really forgotten what it was. 

Senator Weicker. "\Yhv don't you just go ahead and describe to the 
committer discussions held in the office located in the Executive Office 
Buildiner on the night of October 10, at which place, Mr. Dean and 
Mr. Fielding and yourself were present? 

Mr. Segretti. To the best of mv recollection, the meeting lasted 
perhaps a half hour, perhaps an hour. He had a copy of the Post 
article that had just come out relating to allegations by Mr. Young. 
Mr. Dean read through that to me, line by line and paragraph by 
paragraph, and we discussed the truth or falsitv of that article. At 
the end of that period of time, there was a brief discuSvsion about me 
making a statement or writing up a statement to be considered the 
next dav for release. 

At about that point, to the best of mv recollection, the meeting 
ended and Mv. Dean drove mvself, and I believe Mr. Fieldinc was in 
the car. over to a hotel or motel in Crvstal City here in Washington, 
at which time, I went in and checked in under another name. They 
waited in the car while I did that. Then I went back, got my luggage, 
and went to sleep. 


The next morning — well, that is 

Senator Weicker. Just go ahead in narrative form as you are 
doing now. 

Mr. Segretti. The next morning, I prepared a brief statement — I 
believe the next morning. I was pretty tired that evening. Mr. Field- 
ing came by — it is hard for me to guess the time — 9 o'clock, 10 o'clock 
in the morning. He had another statement that had been prepared by 
someone else — I don't know whether it was Mr, Dean or Mr. Fielding 
or others — essentially, that was a denial of most of the allegations. 

Something was said to the effect that he wanted me to go over it and 
he had to take it back to a meeting at the White House. I don't be- 
lieve I was ever told what the meeting involved or who was involved 
in the meeting, that type of thing, and he said, read over the statement, 
there was time pressure. He read over my statement at the time and he 
thought that my statement I had prepared was better. 

I read over the statement, I made some corrections on it. There was 
some pressure of time, that is certainly clear in my mind, and he left. 

Later on, Mr. Dean, I believe, came by where I was staying and 
stated something to the effect that the media people decided that things 
will die of their own volition rather than making any statement 

Then there was a brief discussion at some point — I don't know 
whether it was then or later by phone — it is hard to recall fully; it 
was just a few weeks prior to the election — discussion about what I 
should do in the meantime, and there was a social discussion regarding 
how nice the Greek islands were at that time of the year. But I took 
it at that point to be more of a social discussion than anything else. 

Then there was a discussion at some period about going back out 
West. I told him I wanted to go back to the Los Angeles area and 
decided for me to travel by train, and I did. 

Senator Weicker. During the course of the meeting on October 10, 
did you give essentially the details of your activities to Mr. Dean as 
you have given them to this committee — in essence ? 

Mr. Segretti. Not in as much detail, but certainly the general out- 
lines, yes. 

Senator Weicker. The broad outlines. 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. Now, may I read to you testimony which was 
given before this committee by Mr. Richard Moore. He is now referring 
to a meeting that took place on October 15. 

I can perhaps summarize very quickly. We had that meeting on Friday. The 
story appeared Sunday and of course it was a major story. Monday morning, 
Mr. Ziegler would he sub.iect to press, a lot of queries at his press conference 
(a) ; (b) I rather think Mr. Ehrlichman was going on one of the Sunday inter- 
view shows and there was a meeting in the Roosevelt Room to discuss both 
those things, how do we respond to this and frankly. Senator Weicker, we did 
think. I did. and most of us. that the thrust of it as far as the White House was 
concerned, Chapin's role of hiring his old college chum is what he called it. was 
wrong, is wrong but we thought the meaning of it is apparent since to get it 
closer and closer on the Presidency required that there was a political thing in 
the story right in the political season and required, of course, as honest an answer 
as we could make but also one that takes into consideration the charge was rather 
political so we met and discussed how it could be properly handled. 

Now, the response, as I understand it, the brief denial by Mr. Ziegler 
that came forth on your story was as follows : 


I will not dignify with comment stories based on hearsay, characterization, 
innuendo, or guilt by association. That is the White House position. 

Do you feel that that was an honest response in light of the informa- 
tion which you had given to Mr. Dean and Mr. Fielding in the previous 
days ? 

Mr. Segretti. The trouble with giving an answer to that question is 
that the Post article did contain many allegations that were in fact 
not true. There were many truths in that article, however. That is the 
best I can do to answer that. 

Senator "Weicker. But at that time, John Dean, counsel to the Pres- 
ident, had essentially — essentially — the story that you have told to us 
here today? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe he did, yes. 

Senator Weicker. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman. 

Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye. 

Senator Inouye. Thank you ; sir. 

Mr. Segretti, the city of Washington is a city of rumors and there is 
a very persistent one floating around involving you. I would like to 
give you an opportunity to respond to this rumor. 

Do you know Mr. Arthur Bremer ? 

Mr. Segretti. I do not. 

Senator Inouye. What does the Greek symbol or letter, delta, mean 
to you? 

Mr. Segretti. Are you referring to my notes, Senator ? 

Senator Inouye. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Segretti. I believe that means Mr. Nixon, President Nixon. 

Senator Inouye. Who is delta 1 ? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe that was, in those notes, Mr. Chapin. Those 
were just my own shorthand way of making notes. 

Senator Inouye. And delta 2 ? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe in that context, it was Mr. Kalmbach. 

Senator Inouye. And delta 3 ? 

Mr. Segretfi. I don't know whether I had a delta 3 or not. It would 
be Mr. Strachan, I would imagine. 

Senator Inouye. At the time of your unusual activities, were you 
aware that you were breaking the law when you forceably opened a 
window and placed a stink bomb in headquarters ? 

Mr. Sbgretii. Senator, I was not aw^are of how that stink bomb was 
going to be put in that headquarters. I did not at any time envision 
that the — that it would be done in that manner. 

Senator Inouye. Were you aware that it was a violation of the law 
when a political radio commercial was placed under false sponsorship ? 

Mr. Segretti. I didn't believe I really thought of it at that time, but 
I certainly know it was wrong. 

Senator Inouye. Were you aware that it was a crime to falsely 
order flowers, limousines, pizzas, liquor, without anv intentions to 

Mr. Segretti. I didn't think of it in those terms at that particular 
time. I know it is wrong and I certainly regret it. 

Senator Inouye. Were you aware that it was unlawful to send sala- 
cious and libelous letters ? 

Mr. Segretti. I am certainly aware of it now. 

Senator Inouye. And the fraudulent use of U.S. mails? 



Mr. Segretti. Yes ; although very honestly, Senator, at that time, 
we just didn't think of those things. I think to a great extent, we got 
caught up in the zeal of the activity and the zeal of the campaign 
and these things were not done with any great forethought or 

Senator Inouye. Throughout all that time, none of you discussed 
the possible criminal involvement of these acts? 

Mr. Segretti. I don't recall doing that until, really, after the fact. 

Senator Ixouye. Now that you look back, wouldn't you say that just 
about everything you did was a crime of one sort or another ? 

Mr. Segretti. No ; I don't believe I can really characterize it in those 
terms. Certainly, many of the things were improper, but things such 
as putting a picket at a rally or something, I don't believe that is 

Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, sir. 

Senator Ervix. You don't call forgery or libel a mere prank, do you ? 

Mr. Segretti. Senator, I don't call any of the things I did at this 
point in time pranks. I have stated many times before this committee 
today that they have no place in the American political system. I 
don't believe there should be pranks as such or dirty tricks, or how- 
ever you want to term it, in the American political system. 

Senator Ervin. Well, it appears here from your testimony that you 
did in effect forge several letters, that you uttered libelous statements, 
and I am glad that you say you don't classify those things as pranks 
or mere dirty tricks. 

Mr. Segretti. Senator, you know, it is really hard to draw the line 
between a lot of these things. Many people have said that pranks in 
the American political system have been traditional and in some quar- 
ters, humorous and acceptable, and it is a good thing. Well, certainly, 
there should be some light and himior in life and I am the first one to 
say that there should be. But I don't believe many of these things so 
classified in other contexts as humorous and funny should be present. 

Senator Ervtcx. You testified under examination by Senator Tal- 
madge that you traveled from Washington to, I believe Philadel- 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Senator Er\t;n [continuing]. And then to Chicago and as you trav- 
eled — you went by train ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Senator Ervix. What were you trying to do, hide your whereabouts ? 

Mr. Segretti. Senator, at that time, I was subject to many news- 
paper stories regarding me. I remember getting off, changing trains 
in Philadelphia and seeing my picture on the front page and going 
up to Chicago and seeing my picture on the front page up there. 
And I certainly did not want to talk to any reporters at that period 
of time, that is correct. It would have been difficult for me to honestly 
deny all the questions put to me and I didn't want, really, to be put 
in that position. Plus the fact that it would have been extremely 
embarrassing to President Nixon, obviously. 

The election was upon us or upon the scene, and I thought it would 
just be best for all concerned to stay out of sight until after the 

Senator Ervin. Did you talk to anyone about staying out of sight 
before you did stay out of sight ? 


Mr. Segretti. Mr. Dean. 

Senator Ervin. Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Senator Ervin. And he was not your counsel at that time ? 

Mr. Segretti. Well, I disagree with that. I think he was, but in any 
case, he agreed. 

Senator Ervin. Well, one time down in North Carolina, there was an 
accused in a case that had no lawyer. He had no lawyer, so the judge 
asked him — asked this lawyer if he would represent the accused. He 
said, "Yes." 

The judge said, "Well, take the accused out to the side room and 
give him the very best advice you can." 

He went out to the side room with the accused. In a few minutes, 
the lawyer came back without the accused and the judge told the 
sheriff to look out in the side room and bring the accused in. The 
sheriff came back and reported that the accused was not there. 

The judge asked the lawyer, "What does this mean ?" 

The lawyer said, "You told me to give him the very best advice I 
could, and I did." 

So Mr. Dean — assuming that he was your lawyer — seemed to have 
given you what you considered good advice, because you followed it. 

Mr. Segretti. It certainly sounded like good advice at the time. 

Senator Ervin. And didn't you adopt similar tactics after the elec- 
tion was all over ? 

Mr. Segretti. No, I proceeded to my residence about 2 days after the 

Senator Ervin. Weren't you sort of out-of-pocket here about the 
time this committee was set up ? We had a little difficulty finding you, 
or so I am informed by the staff. 

Mr. Segretti. I don't believe so. I was always living at my places of 
residence imder my name and I don't believe — many newspapermen 
found me. They didn't seem to have much difficulty. 

Senator Ervin. Do you have any further questions, Mr. Dash? 

Mr. Dash. I just have a few questions. 

Senator Gumey asked you about the number of people that you 
actually had working for you and I think you said something about 11. 

Mr. Segretti. I just made a guess. 

Mr. Dash. Actually, your expense record that we have shows that 
you actually paid 22 people and that counting those who worked for 
some of the others, would bring it to 28. Following a request that you 
have made to us, I won't go down the list and name them. 

Mr. Segretti. Fine. 

Mr. Dash. Now, even if there were only 28, which I take it is not I 
necessarily a large number when one speaks of thousands working in 
the campaign. Nevertheless, isn't it true, Mr. Segretti, that only one 
agent acting in the kind of arena that you were acting in, doing the 
kind of work that, say, Mr. Benz was doing, or the work that was 
being done in California, could be quite destructive of a candidate's 
opportunities ? It doesn't take very many to do it J 

Mr. Segretti. It is possible ; yes, sir, assuming that that is correct. 

Mr. Dash. The particular letter that we have spoken about, the 
very scurrilous letter about Senator Humphrey and Senator Jackson 
under Senator Muskie's campaign stationery — Mr. Chapin thought 


i that for very little money, one person got quite a bit of return out of 
it. So you got quite a bit of pack for one person. 

Mr. Segretti. That is the danger for the type of activities that I en- 
gaged in. 

Mr. Dash. WelL I would like the record to show, so that we are not 
misled by numbers, that the fact that there were only 28, that that 
does not minimize the impact that 28 may have had on the election. 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. Now, when you were informed that you were going to be 
called before the grand jury, you did have a meeting with Mr. Dean 
in Miami, did you not ? 

Mr. SEGRET-ri. Yes, I did. 

Mr. Dash. Did the question come up concerning whether or not 
certain parties should be dealt with if it should come up to the grand 


Mr. Shermax. Senator, again we are going to raise — he went back 
specifically, I think, to discuss with Mr. Dean his legal rights. If the 
Senator makes the same ruling, we will answer the question. We think 
this conversation is particularly within the attorney-client privilege 
and I believe Mr. Segretti will testify that he was consulting with 
' Mr. Dean in that capacity. 

Senator Ervix. I think I would hold that the evidence totally fails 
to show any attorney-client relationship between Mr. Segretti and 
' Mr. Dean. 

Mr. Shermax. And that would include this latter meeting? 

Senator Ervix. Yes. I would think that is evident. 

Mr. Dash. Following that, did you testify before the Senate — did 
fyou talk to representatives of the Senate Committee on Administra- 
tive Practices in November of 1972 ? 

IVIr. Segretti. I never discussed any substance with them, no, sir. 

Mr. Dash. No, but did you tell representatives of that committee 
that because you had not consulted an attorney, you did not have an 
attorney ? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe my statement was to the effect that I did 
not have an attorney in Los Angeles at that time and I wished to con- 
sult with one. At that time. I was in the process, I believe, of obtain- 
ing counsel in Los Angeles, which I did, based on Mr. Dean's recom- 

Mr. Dash. Well, relying on the chairman's ruling, and I will again 
ask the question : In ]\Iiami when you went to see Mr. Dean prior to 
your being called before the grand jury, was there a discussion con- 
cerning certain names of persons you had dealt with during your op- 
erations coming up before the grand jury ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Mr. Dash. What names were there concern about? 

Mr. Segretti. Mr. Chapin, Mr. Strachan and Mr. Kalmbach. 

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Dean indicate that he might be able to do 
something about those names not being — coming up ? 

iSIr. Segretti. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. Could you elaborate a little more on that? 

Mr. Segretti. He said something to the effect that he might be able 
to put parameters on the inquiry. He seemed to be particularly con- 
cerned about Mr. Kalmbach's name coming up. 


Mr. Dash. All right. Then when you actually went to testify before 
the grand jury, did you have a meeting with Mr. Silbert? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, I did just prior. 

Mr. Dash. At that time he was acting as the principal Assistant 
U.S. Attorney and in charge of the Watergate investigation? 

Mr. Segretti. I don't know his exact role but I believe that is essen- 
tially correct. 

Mr. Dash. During his questioning of you, or preparation with you, 
before your testimony before the grand jury, did a discussion come up 
concerning Mr. Kalmbach ? 

Mr. Segretti. Brief reference was made; yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. How was that reference — how did Mr. Silbert in any way 
refer to Mr. Kalmbach ? 

Mr. Segretti. He said something to the effect, "Were you receiving 
funds from Mr. K?" 

Mr. Dash. He used the letter "K" ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. Did that seem strange to you at the time ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Mr. Dash. "What impression did j^ou get? 

Mr. Segretti. The impression I had was that there was something 
going on behind the scenes. 

Mr. Dash. Did you believe then that you were really not being asked 
full questions concerning 3'our knowledge of these facts? 

Mr. Segretti. Well, I have to look upon it, upon my perspective now. 
I believe the questions they asked relating to the Watergate burglary 
and wiretap were full and complete. I think they did an adequate job 
in that regard. 

Mr. Dash. There was no effort to ask you any questions concerning 
Mr. Kalmbach or how you were paid ? 

Mr. Segretti. Well, there was that very brief prior discussion with 
Mr. Silbert which did not go into any detail, and during my testimony 
before the grand jury nothing was asked by the U.S. attorneys re- 
garding that. 

Mr. Dash. The only references Mr. Silbert made were to a Mr. "K" 
and not to Mr. Kalmbach to you ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is right. That was not in front of the grand jury. : 

Mr. Dash. No. no. not in front of the grand jury, before you went 
before the grand jury? 

Mr. Segretti. That is right. 

Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Silbert ask vou any question concerning Mr. 
Chapin ? 

Mr. Segretti. In the prior meeting ? 

Mr. Dash. In the meeting prior to 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 

Mr. Dash. How full was his inquiry on that ? 

Mr. Segretti. T think I gave him the general outline that I was first 
contacted by Mr. Strachan and Mr. Chapin. 

Mr. Dash. "\Vlien you appeared before the grand jury, did he ask 
you any questions concerning Mr. Kalmbach and Mr. Chapin? 

Mr. Segretti. To the best of mv recollection he did not. 

Mr. Dash. But did you in fact mention Mr. Kalmbach and Mr. 
Chapin and, if so, under what circumstances ? 


Mr. Segretti. A g:rand juror asked me questions relating to those 
individuals, and I believe I answered all of them. 

Mr. Dash. Specifically to those individuals, did the grand juror 
know of those individuals ? 

Mr. Segretti. No, not to my knowledge. 

Mr. Dash. How did it come up ? 

Mr. Segretti. It is very hard to remember, Mr. Dash. That was a 
long time ago. 

Mr. Dash. Weren't you asked how you were paid and how you got 
involved ? 

Mr. Segretti. Let me give you my best recollection of that. I have 
not seen a grand jury transcript of that, of course, but there was a 
question by a grand juror regarding my financial arrangements, who 
they were with and when was the last money received, and I told 
them — I told them it was Mr. Kalmbach and the last sum I received, 
I gave them the date as best I could recall it, and I told them the sum. 

Mr. Dash. And actually at that time you were really following 
what Mr. Dean had suggested to you in Miami, not to answer questions 
or volunteer anything that was not asked but to try to keep Mr. Kalm- 
bach and Mr. Chapin's names out, but if the questions were put, to tell 
the whole ball of wax. 

Mr. Segretti. Certainly. 

Mr. Dash. All right. 

Mr. Segretti. I had no intention to perjure myself before the grand 

Mr. Dash. But if that juror had not asked that question, Mr. Cha- 
pin's and Mr. Kalmbach 's names w^ould not have gone before the grand 
jurv ? 

Mr. Segretti. I don't believe they would have. 

Mr. Dash. I have no further questions. 

Mr. Thompson. Mr. Segretti, when the question was asked as to 
who was paying you, was the question also asked what you were being 
paid for ? 

Mr. Segretti. I don't recall exactly, Mr, Thompson. There were 
some things said that I was engaged in getting pickets, rival pickets, 
in other words a Muskie picket in a Humphrey rally or what have 
you, that type of thing, but no details were ever gone into, just very 

Mr. Thompson. Did you discuss that in the grand jury ? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe so. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you discuss that with Mr. Silbert? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Mr. Tho:mpson. Beforehand. You have testified about what might 
be described as two different categories of activities, things that might 
be what have been referred to as Dick Tuck type of activities, per- 
haps — amusing things — and things that were possibly violations of 
criminal law and not in any wav amusing. 

'V^^at are we to understand about Mr. Silbert? Are we getting the 
correct impression now? Did he understand the full scope of your 
activities or, to the best of your knowledge, did he only think you were 
engaged in the prank-type things which we have heard testified about 
here for several weeks ? 


Mr. Segretti. I do not really know. It is hard to guess ; but to the 
best of my knowledge, Mr. Silbert had no knowledge of all the activi- 
ties that I engaged in, and probably thought, although this is pure 
speculation, that I was engaged in, shall we say, the prank-type 

Mr. Thompson. Did he ask you what you were being paid for ? 

Mr. Segretti. He may have. I really do not recall. 

Mr. Thompson. Did he ask you how much you had been paid ? 

Mr. Segretti. I do not believe he did. 

Mr. Thompson. Getting back briefly to who knew what and when, 
I understand in your meeting of October 10, Mr. Dean and ]\Ir. Field- 
ing were both present, and did you discuss the Humphrey-Jackson 
letter with them at that time ? 

Mr. Segretti. I believe that was mentioned. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you discuss Mr. Chapin's involvement with 
them at that time ? 

Mr. Segretti. I cannot say whether I did or not. I just do not recall. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you have a recollection as to the scope of their 
knowledge when you left that meeting with regard to what your acti^d- 
ties had been? 

Mr. Segretti. I certainly had the general outline of it. I was very 
tired that evening ; I had been up the night before traveling. 

Mr. Thompson. You talked about the Humphrey-Jackson letter 
and you talked about some of the hard stuff anyway ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. The question is whether or not you mentioned other 
individuals, Mr. Chapin and other people, who you had dealt with in 
setting this up ? 

Mr. Segretti. I do not know whether that was brought up at that 
time or not. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you have 

Mr. Segretti. Mr. Dean, so far as I know, knew about those indi- 
viduals at that time. I had been introduced to Mr. Dean by Mr. 
Strachan so he knew about Mr. Strachan, and he knew that Mr. 
Strachan knew me. 

Mr. Thompson. You assumed he knew what you were doing — what 
Mr. Strachan had done ? 

Mr. Segretti. I just — I do not believe I made any assumption at 
that point. 

Mr. Thompson. Did you have any subsequent meetings, say that 
month, the month of October, with anyone at the White House? 

Mr. Segretti. No, I did not; not to my recollection. 

Mr. Thompson. Fielding, Strachan, Dean, Chapin, anyone? 

Mr. Segretti. No ; none. 

Mr. Thompson. Was your next meeting with anyone at the White 
House — with Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. Segretti. It was Mr. Dean in Palm Springs, Calif. 

Mr. Thompson. Is that when he taped the conversation that we 
have alluded to? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. Going back to October 10, I believe he suggested 
that you keep a low profile. 

Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. 


Mr. Thompson. Is he the one who suggested the train trip ? 

Mr. Sec.retti. I believe he did. 

Mr. Thompsox. Senator Talmadge referred to someone asking you 
whether or not you thought the Greek Islands were pretty at this 
time of year, something to that effect ; was that Mr. Dean? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. I had the impression that he had taken such 
a trip at one time and he said they were. 

yiv. Thompson. Did he ask you if j'ou needed any money ? 

Mr. Segretti. There was a reference to that, I believe, that evening 
around October 10 or whatever, whether I had sufficient funds to 
sustain myself until the election, and I told him I did, and that was 
about the end of that. 

Mr. Thompson. Did he, at any time, offer to get you a job or indi- 
I cate that perhaps he had a job for you out of the country ? 

Mr. Segretti. That was after I returned to my residence after 
the election. 

Mr. Thompson. About mid-November ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Mr. Thompson. "When you met in Palm Springs with him again, 
did he indicate that he had discussed this matter with anyone else in 
the l\Tiite House ? 

Mr. Segretti. I do not recall that ; no, sir. 

Senator Weicker. Just to make sure the record is straight, I under- 
stood your previous answers, after the meeting of October 10, as I 
understand it, you went to a hotel over in Crystal City ; is that correct? 

Mr. Segretti. That is correct. 

Senator Weicker. And you did meet with Mr. Dean again on Octo- 
ber 11? 

Mr. Segretti. If those dates — I believe it was the next day he came 
by to the motel room ; yes. 

Senator Weicker. With a form of denial ? 

Mr. Segretti. No ; I believe that was Mr. Fielding who came by with 
that, and Mr. Dean came by later in the day, if my memory is correct 
on that. 

Senator Weicker. On October 11 ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Senator Weicker. Did you stay in the motel past the 11th ? When did 
you leave the motel ? 

Mr. Segretti. I do not know whether I left later that day or the next 
day ; it was rather soon then. 

Senator Weicker. So it was Mr. Fielding who came by first? 

Mr. Segretti. That is my best recollection, and then Mr. Dean. 

Senator Weicker. Right ; and then Mr. Dean ? 

Mr. Segretti. Yes. 

Senator Weicker, "V^Hiat was the nature of this denial? Was this 
something that you were supposed to sign ? 

Mr. Segretti. That was my impression ; yes. 

Senator Weicker. Was it in affidavit form ? 

Mr. Segretti. No ; just seemed to be a statement. 

Senator Weicker. A statement which they attempted to get your 
signature on? 

Mr. Segretti. I do not recall if there was a signature line on that or 
not, but certainly my approval. 


Senator Weicker. I see. I have no further questions. 

Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to extend the hearing but I 
think I want to make sure our record is clear. I think, as our record 
from a prior phase of this hearing already shows, that the only rea- 
son the FBI gave, and the U.S. attorney gave, for not pursuing this 
particular matter is there was a belief that dirty tricks did not involve 
criminal behavior. 

Mr. Segretti, you now have pleaded guilty, have you not ? 

Mr. Segretti. That is right. 

Mr. Dash. In the U.S. district court. To what have you pleaded 
guilty ? 

Mr. Segretii. To three counts of 18 U.S.C. 612, which is distributing! 
or causing to be published unauthorized campaign literature, in other 
words, not properly attributed to the source. 

Mr. Dash. And if, in fact, Mr. Silbert had pursued all of the ques- 
tions he could have pursued concerning your activities, your testimony 
before this committee is you would have told him everything that you 
have done. You would not have withheld anything from Mr. Silbert ? 

Mr. Segretti. Well, I do not know how I would have acted — reacted 
to that. I may have taken the fifth amendment at some point. I just do 
not know. 

Mr. Dash. But you did not have that opportunity because Mr. Sil- 
bert did not pursue all these questions with you; did he? 

Mr. Segretti. No, he did not. 

Mr. Dash. I have no further questions. 

Senator Ervin. I understood you to say you told Mr. Silbert you 
had engaged in certain activities for which you had been paid by 
Mr. Kalmbach, and you outlined in a general way what the nature of 
those activities were. 

Mr. Segretti. Very general. Senator. 

Senator Ervin. Yes. And there was nothing to prevent him from 
asking you any further questions if he had had any desire to learn any 

Mr. Segretti. No. I believe that is correct. The door may have opened 
at that point. 

Senator Ervin. Any further questions? 

Mr. Segretti, I want to thank you on behalf of the committee for 
the cooperation that you have given us — the full cooperation. You 
have answered all our questions freely, including those where you re- 
lied on the attorney-client privilege that existed between you and John 
Dean, and it has been very helpful to the committee. You apparently 
made a frank disclosure of things, and you have not tried, so far as I 
can tell, to evade answering any question you thought we were entitled 
to have answered. 

Mr. Segretti. Thank you. Senator. I would like to say it certainly 
has not been easy for me or anybody in my position to make some of 
these disclosures because, certainly, I regret sincerely many of the acts 
I was engaged in. However, I do feel it was necessary, and hopefully 
this will, to some extent, in the future prevent other individuals from 
getting in the posture that I am today. 

I do feel a benefit from these hearings, at least in this area, will more 
or less cleanse the system for some time to come. Thank you. 


Mr. Sherman. Senator, I think I would also like to thank both Mr. 
■ Lenzner, Mr. Lackritz, in particular and, of course, Mr. Dash and Mr. 
Thompson, because they have been very kind to us over the past few 
months. Thank you. 

Senator Ervin. Thank you. 

The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow. 

[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene 
at 10 a.m., Thursday, October 4, 1973.] 



Exhibit No. 158 




/.-fit -*«,• \ -'if=Vs«^ '' ' 




Ed Muskie would bq no different 

from the Nixons, Agnews, Mitchells, 

Connallys we have now. 

He is the candidate of the 
Democratic Right, His victory would 
be a victory for the old-line reaction- 
ary elements in the party. 

Will we sit on our hands again 
until Muskie locks up the nomination 
in the cigar-filled back rooms at 
Miami? Or will we work for a New 
Politics? He * s a sell-out, and we 
know it. 

Let's do something about it. 


Muskie has always voted against 
gun control, (He violated the law in 
1965 by hunting in a baited field in 
Maryland and was fined, ) He sits 
cheek-by-jowl in with the rancid 
National Rifle Association lobby. 

Muskie is the only of the so- 
called Liberal Democrats who crawled 
into bed with racist-supercop Frank 
Rizzo when Rizzo beat liberal Thatcher 
Longstreth for Mayor of Philadelphia 
and now plans a meeting with Rizzo in 
December to sell out Liberalism for 
"law »n order". 


Muskie added himself publicly to 
the list of political opportunitists in 
opposing abortion reform — denying the 
right of a woman to have control over 
her own body. He is a sexist, 

Muskie has told Black Americans 
that there is no room for them in his 
politics. Blacks are the backbone of 
the Democratic party, and Mr, Muskie 
told them to go to hell. This is 
Muskie 's way of playing on Southern 
Strategy, We don't want a racist to 
represent Democrats in 1972, 


He's a wheeling-dealing, ward- 
healing politician who will fit right 
in with the Daley, Meany, Johnson gang 
in the Democratic party. 

He's sold out. Let's not be 

We blew our chance in I968; let's 
not blow it again. 




Exhibit No. 159 


I The si/ence wos ominous. 

■ services Both Medny and Daley hjse 

I made il clear thai they have been mor- 
lally oftended, and neither is one to for- 

1 give or forget an insult, much less a pub- 

< lie humiliation 

"This mans ideas aren't liberal,' 
growled Meany last week "This man's 
ideas are crazy " Meany s anger has 
been building up It is not jusi that he ob- 
jects to McGovern's positions on such 
issues as pot, abortion and the Viet Nam 
War He has also developed a distrust 
of the candidate that aides feel can nev- 
er t>e dispelled The antagonism dates 
back to 1962, when McGovcrn ran for 
the Senate from South Dakota Hard- 
pressed for cash in a lough campaign 
he asked the AH -c lO for a $30.(MKJ loan 
The request came lo Meany. who or- 
dered 'Give him the money With 
that Meany concluded that he had an- 
other Senator who was safe for labor 

That turned out to be only partly 
true McGovern dutifully voted the la- 

1 bor line much of the lime, but he 

' flunked one crucial lest He voled 
against culling ofT a filibuster thai was 
preventing a vote on repeal of the righl- 
lo-work provision of the Taft-Hartley 
Acl— a sacred mailer with labor He 
subsequently cast many other votes thai 

' were considered anti-labor To Meany, 
he was an ingrate He made no notable 
effort to conciliate the labor chieftain 
Typically, he said thai since he had 
made a mistake on right-to-work 
Meany should confess that he had been 
wrong about the Viet Nam War By con- 
vention time. Meany was mad enough 

j to have the A( ! C If) distribute a 46-pagc 
attack on McGovern's legislative record 

I —as if McGovern were the Republican 
presidential candidate Most of the rest 
of big labor is following Meany's lead 
Unless he relents, ihey will not yield, ei- 
ther It could cost McGovcrn help ^ 

. the polls as well as S5,(KH),(KK) in labor 
campaign funds 

I initially. Daley was not as angry at 


The distrust wos deep. 

McGovcrn as Meany was McGovern 
did not encourage delegates to file in 
his behalf in Chicago, he wanted the 
mayor's support if il was at all possi- 
ble But he forfeited it w hen Daley s del- 
egates were replaced at the convention 
by the challengers, including some of 
the mayor's sworn enemies, among 
ihem Alderman William Singer Watch- 
ing the proceedings from a distance at 
his summer home in Ntichigan. Ihe may - 
or maintained an ominous silence while 
his supporters vowed that they would 
never back McGovcrn Said Chicago 
Alderman Viio Marzullo "Only the 
Lord or Mayor Daley could activate me 
for McGovern " 

At this point Ihe Lord would be the 
belter bet "To Daley.' says an aide. 
"McGovcrn is the classic Methodist 
— Ihe kind of guy who doesn't sweat 
No one is more difficult for an Irish 
Catholic to get along with than one of 
those non-sweating Methodists "' As de- 
vout a Democrat as he Is a Catholic, 
Daley would agonize over abandoning 
Ihe presidential nominee But short of 
that drastic step, there is plenty he can 
do lo express his displeasure with Mc- 
Govern He can cut off Cook County 
funds lo McGovern or hamper the dis- 
tribution of his literature or harass his 
workers On Election Day. Daley's pre- 
cinct workers will be strategically sta- 
tioned at polling places. Conceivably. 
Daley's services may not be as indis- 
pensable as Ihey once were — al least so 
the McGovern forces hope A group of 
reformers called the Independent Pre- 


cinct Organi/ation. led by Bill Singer, 
have developed a grassroots organiza- 
tion that has proved as effective as Da- 
ley's in some local races If it can be 
mobilized for McGovern. it might do 
Ihe work that Daley seems likely to 
shun Then, too. Daley might eventually 
be moved lo help McGovern — a 
If Meany and Daley remain hostile 
to McGovern in the campaign or are 
at least neutralized. President Nixon has 
an advantage he would not have 
dreamed possible before the conven- 
tion Spokesmen for the Old Politics 
though they may be, the two bosses have 
enormous appeal for a large part of Ihe 
electorate — the ethnics." the kind of 
voter that was underrepresentcd at the 
Democratic Convention and is likely to 
resent McGovern If these voters switch 
to the Republicans in large numbers, a 
sizable chunk of the Democratic coali- 
tion will disappear Would Meany and 
Daley, loyal Democrats all these years, 
welcome such a development'' In the 
past, they have taken exception to the 
President Yet they have also learned 
to live with him. though not very com- 
fortably They are not sure they would 
be as comfortable with McGovern. who 
so far has made life distinctly trouble- 
some for them They might be willing 
10 wail out another four years of Re- 
publican rule in order to get the kind 
of Democrat they want It is Candidate 
George McGovern's task to convince 
them that it is not worth the wait, that 
even if he is not their kind of Dem- 
ocrat, it is still in their interest to sup- 
port him in Ihe coming campaign 


Eve's Operatives 

Gazing around the convention 
through her blue-tinted glasses. Gloria 
Steinem pronounced with satisfaction 
"We've changed the population here It 
almost looks like the country " What 
she meant was that women are 52Vi of 
Ihe nation's population, and last week 
close to 40'f of the convention dele- 
gates were women — a dramatic jump 
over their I3'v representation al the 
1968 Democratic Convention Decora- 
tive as the women were in their bell-bot- 
tom trousers, miniskirts, jeans and hoi 
pants, they were not there to be on dis- 
play but 10 seek power Except for a 
couple of setbacks, they got enough to 
satisfy and even surprise them 

The National Women's Political 
Caucus had worked hard to get women 
elected as delegates under the liberal- 
ized McGovern-Fraser Commission 
rules At Ihe convention, they turned 
up everywhere in positions of power 
— on the Credentials Committee, the 
Rules Committee, the Platform Com- 
mittee. They came in all sizes, ages and 
accents They ranged from Katherine 
Harjo. 17. a Seminole Indian from 
Oklahoma to Jessie Sanders, 79, a po- 
litical pro from South Dakota. The con- 



[From the Chicago Dally News, July 11, 1972] 

IBKED BY Losses, Meant Shuns Convention Hall 

(By William J. Eaton) 

MLA.MI Beach.— The 77-year-old president of the AFL-CIO, George Meany, has 
stayed away from the convention hall. 

But Meany's top political adviser, Al Barkan, and about 50 officers of AFL-CIO 
unions, watched glumly Monday night as roll call votes registered major victories 
for Sen. George S. McGovern. 

Meany let loose an across-the-board blast Monday at the foreign and domestic 
record of the South Dakota senator, in a last-ditch effort to prevent McGovern's 

A 23-page "white paper" was released by a Meany aide during the McGovem 
camp's successful fight to seat all 271 of his California delegates. 

The paper is certain to make good ammunition for President Nixon if McGov- 
ern is nominated. 

"Senator McGovern has adopted the 'new populism' as a key campaign slogan," 
the AFL-CIO document says. "Yet the record shows that he has repeatedly voted 
wrong on legislation affecting working people and the trade union movement." 

The "white paper" attacks McGovern's votes dating back to 1957 and scores 
his views on civil rights, amnesty, marijuana, crime, violent protests, Vietnam, 
Israel and defense budget cuts. 

In general, McGovern is pictured as weak on such key labor issues as minimum 
wage increases and federal union shop legislation. The document implies that 
McGovern has been indifferent on civil rights and is pro-Arab in the Middle East 

Jerry Wurf. pro-McGovern leader of the AFI^CIO State, County and Municipal 
Employees Union, shook his head in dismay over the labor opposition to the 
apparent winner. 

"Labor cannot dictate to the Democratic Party and now Meany and the others 
are painting themselves into a corner," Wurf lamented. "It's sickening." 

Leonard Woodcock, president of the United Auto Workers, has been a behind- 
the-scenes McGovem supporter. His union is expected to endorse the South 
Dakotan against Mr. Nixon. 

A labor leader backing Sen. Edmund S. Muskie on the convention floor, Wil- 
liam Du Chessi, secretary-treasurer of the Textile Workers Union of America, 
said several AFL-CIO unions, including his own, probably would endorse 
McGovern before November. 

But the APLr-CIO attack raised new doubts about whether federation leaders 
would give their traditional allegiance to the Democratic presidential contender. 

The AFL-CIO Executive Council is scheduled to meet Aug. 30 to decide whether 
to make an endorsement in the presidential contest. No one expects an AFIy-CIO 
endorsement of Richard Nixon but federation neutrality would be a plus for the 

Meany at one point said he would favor any Democratic contender except 
Alabama Gov. George Wallace and New York Mayor John V. Lindsay. But as 
McGovern's chances improved on the primary trail, Meany's attitude apparently 

I. W. Abel, president of the Steelworkers, is reported to be behind Meany's 
action. Abel is a fervent Humphrey supporter. 




A Critical Appraisal 


* Labor 

* Civil Rights 

* Amnesty and the Draft 

* Marijuana 

* Crime 

* Violent Protests 


- 1 


Senator McCovern has adopted the "new populism" as a key campaign slogan. 
Yet the record shows that he has repeatedly voted wrong on legislation affecting 
working people and the trade union movement. 

In 1959. McGovern voted for the Landrum-Griff in bill , which was opposed 
by organized labor. The overwhelming majority of non-Southern Democrats voted 
"no" - among them such Democrats from neighboring states as Senators Anderson 
and .Metcalf of Montana and Senator Burdick of North Dakota, as well as four 
Democrats from Minnesota and five from Wisconsin. (26) 

In 1960, McGovern voted against raising the Minimum Wage to $1.15 and 
extending coverage to 1 . 4 million retail workers. He was one of only five non- 
Southern Democrats to vote "no." (27) 

In 1966, McGovern was one of only 5 Northern Democrats who voted to deny 
minimum wage coverage to some 1,000,000 workers in retail and service firms 
with gross sales of less than $500,000 annually. McGovern also voted against 
raising the minimum wage to $1.55. 

Also in 1966, McGovern voted against a Long (D-La.) amendment requiring 
states to provide eligible workers a minimum of 26 weeks of unemployment compen- 
sation coverage for 20 weeks of employment. Only five other Northern Democrats 
voted "no.'' 

In the same year, McGovern was one of 6 Northern Democrats to vote for 
a Divkscn amendment to cut the appropriations for the Departments of Labor and 



- 2 - 

In 1968, the man hailed as thf; Candida te of the young, voted, along 
with Republicans antiSou'thfrn Democrats, to table a Javits amendment which 
would have provided $52.1 million in appropriations to the Labor Department 
for summer jobs . 

WcGovern and 14(b) . . . or the Case of Great Plains Wheat. Inc. 

After the Democratic sweep in 1964, President Johnson and pro-labor 
Senators made an all-out effort to repeal section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley 
Act. Tlie conservative forces mounted a filibuster to , prevent the repeal 
bill (H.R. 77) from coming to a vote in the Senate. On October 11, 1965, 
Mansfield moved to invoke cloture. McGovern voted against cloture -- and the 
motion failed. 

Two more cloture motions were made -- on February 8 and 10, 1966. 
iMcGovern voted for cloture the first time, against it the second time — the 
lenly Senator to switch his vote. He explained ttiat the first vote was to 
indicate his opposition to filibuster in general, while the second vote 
indicated his opposition to the repeal bill . 

McGovern is quoted as saying: 

"It was a straight political decision. It was the at'ly time in 
the United States Sfnate I voted against my conscience." (28) 

Jlore recently, on May 13, 1972, McGovern told the New York Times that, just as 
fte had conceded he had made a mistake on the 14(b) vote, George Meany should 
acknowledge that he had made a mistake in supporting the Vietnam War. The 
■implication is that the AFL-CIO position on the war was, like McCovern's 
position on 14(b), a "straight political decision," a violation of "conscience. 


_ 3 - • 

What was the politics of HcGovern's decision to vote "against my 

In February, 1964, President Johnson had helped to end a maritime 
union boycott o^ wheat shipnents to the Soviet Union by pledging thit 
fifty percent of such shipments would be carried in U.S. -flag ships. This 
had- been the original understanding when President Kennedy had approved the 
wheat progran, but several giant wheat export companies sought to increase 
their profits by peeking a reduction in tlie 50% requiremsnt. 

The wheat companies continued to press for a reduction. On Miy 19, 
the companies' views were expressed in a msmorandum from Great Plains 
Wheat, Inc. to the Special U.S. Maritime Advisory Co.TOni ttee. Meanwhile, 
Paul Hall, president of the Seafarers Union, had sent Senator McGovern a 
statement of the Union's position. Mr. Hall received a reply from Senator 
McGovern dated May 2'1. It was word for word, page after pags, identical to 
the state:-nent of Great Plains Wheat, Inc. Senator McGovern was clearly 
serving as a moutlipiece for an organization founded to promote foreign and 
doxestic wheat sales. 

Three months later, on August 24, Senator McGovern was interviewed 

by Sander Vanocur on N!3C's Today show. Tlie following exchange took place: 

Vanocur: Senator, to be blunt about it, you have threatened on 
the Senate floor, have you not, that there's a possibility the 
D^'mocratic Senators fro.-n farm states may not support the union 
movement on 14(b), an attempt to wipe out the right-to-work laws. 
Are you going to follow through with that, if you don't get your 
way on til is? 

McGovern: KV.-ll, I can't speak for other Senators, but what I had 
said on the Senate floor is, I can't get up very much enthusiasm 
personally for a crusade to repeal section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley 
law, the so-called Righ t-to-Work law that exists' in some of our 
states, at a time -.vhen the same labor leaders wlio are urging this 
repeal of that restriction on labor have placed a restriction on 
my wheat farmers. . . . 


- 4 - 

At issue here was not the well-being of Senator McGovern's farmers 

their wheat had already been sold — but the profits of the wheat export 
companies as measured against the jobs of maritime workers. 

McGovern went with the companies — not only against the maritime 
workers but against all workers who do not enjoy the benefits of unionism 
because of Right-to-Work laws. 


The 1957 Civil Rights Act was the first civil rights law to be enacted 
by Congress since thedays of reconstruction. McGovern was absent on the votes 
leading to passage of this bill in the House. (29) 

In 1959, when the House passed the Rooney Amendment to the Justice 
Department Appropriations bill (H.R. 8385) to extend the life of the Civil 
Bights Commission for 2 years and appropriate $500,000 to it, McGovern was 
absent — and did not pair. (30) 

When the Civil Rights Act of i960 was up for final House approval, 
McGovern was absent -- and did not pair. (31) 

In 1960, McGovern voted against the McDonough Amendment (to the Housing 
bill) which would prohibit the Federal National Mortgage Association from 
purchasing 'housing where discrimination was involved. (32) 

One month later, McGovern voted against the Powell Amendment to the 
School Construc^tion bill requiring that facilities built. under the Act be 
open to all students without regard to race, color, creed, national origin 
or religion. 

On June 15, 1964, Senator McGovern joined 22 other Senators -- 18 of 
them from Southern and Border states, in supporting a last ditch effort to 


emasculate the voting riplus provisions of the la nd mark Civil Rights Act of 
1961. The McGovern supported a-nendment was defeated 62-23. 

On May 13, 1968, Senator McGovern joined in supporting punitive 
legislation that sought to disqualify anyone convicted of participating in a 
riot from Federal employment for a period of 6 years. This legislation was a 
thinly veiled effort to punish blacks who had participated in the disturbances 
that followed the King assassination. 

The Atlanta Constitution of June 7, 1972, reported that McGovern 
offered two major concessions to the South in meetings at the Democratic 
governors' conference in Houston. One was to discourage frivolous challenges 
to delegations to the na ti'ral convention. The other was a p.-i.mise "to push 
for a chancie in the 1965 V^o ting R ights Act which requires Southern states 
including Georgia to submit state reapportionment plans to the Justice 
Department." (Portions of Georgia's 1972 plan were turned down.) 

Wlien McGovern's stands on these issues are combined with his votec on 
minimum wage, youth employment and otiier economic issues of concern to working 
people, the result is a record that, with regard to the needs of minorities, 
can only be described as ambiguous at best. 


McGovorn has'promised that if elected he would grant amnesty to people vlio I; 
gone to jail or left the country to avoid serving in the army in Vietnam . (Tliis 
has since become one of the most frequently-repeated McGovern pledges.) He 


- 6 - 

"It may very well he that statemenls of this kind will lead 

people to hold nut ayainst the draft , but i: is a position on v;hich 
I feel very stronyly." (33) 

McGovern also said he would extend amnesty to those who are accused of leading 
Atnerica into the war by war crimes trials on college campuses: 

"I think no useful purpose can be served in tlie effort to pin on a 
few men the responsibility for the war in which millions of Americans 
have shared." (31) 

In a "Meet the Press" interview on February 21, 1971, David Broder 
referred to a McGovern statement that at his age and n'Mi i:is convictions 
he could not participate in the Vietnam War. Broder asked McGovern if that 
would be a conviction that he thought would serve as an example to the young 
people of the country if he were President. He replied: 

"I made very clear that I wouldn't offer advice to any young 
man faced ivith the draft or with a decision not to respond to the 
draft . I have an 18-year-old son who is in that situation and I 
wouldn't advise him. That is a matter of conscience. . .Wha t I said 
the other day that you are .-eferring to is that George McGovern, at 
the age of 49, feeling the way I do about this war, I could not con- 
scientiously support it. I am not rccotnmending that course for any- 
one else but I regard this war as the most barbaric and inhumane act 
that our country has ever committed . " 

In a speech at Ohio Stats University on May 2 McGovern suggested, to 
I the delight of his student audience, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff precede the 
i troops into any future war. McGovern added that if he were writing new draft 
taws, " nobody under 30 woul d be drafted ." (35) 


III a speech at a drug counseling center in Boston on February 16, 1972, 
McGovern said that 


_ 7 _ 

"experience, along v;ith limitations on enforcement personnel and the 
grave costs involved in inposing severe sentences and prison terms on 
usually law-abiding young people and young adults, suggests that a more 
promising route might be to regulate marijuana along the sqme lines as 
alcohol , while continuing and expanding educational programs aimed at 
discouraging its use." (36) 

On February 17, McGovern sent a qualifying statement to DPI: 

"I have not in the past, nor do I now advocate, the legalization of 
marijuana. Our knowledge of the possible harmful effects of 
marijuana is insufficient to allow us to conclude that it should be 
legalized. ' However, I believe that no person should be sent to jail 
for the mere possession or use of marijuana. This has been my posi- 
tion for some time." 


Senator McGovern has called for the "decriminalization" of marijuana. 
And he denounced J. Edgar Hoover as "a menace to personal citizens" (sic) and 
"a chief obstacle to law enforcement." But at a time when millions of Americans 
are deeply and rightly concerned about rising crime rates. Senator McGovern has 
largely ignored this issue in his campaign. 

In his mass mailing fund appeal of 1971 -- 8 pages of McGovern' s positions 
on the issues — the only specific item that deals with crime control is this: 

"We'musl upgrade the quality of our local police and improve the 
understanding and communication between the police and the community. 
My policemen's G.I. bill would enable policemen to get a college 
education for self-improvement. They v;ould not only gain in socio- 
logical understanding of community problems but would mingle with 
students as equals in a way that could bring better communication 
and mutual respect." 

To be sure, McGovern has spoken, in generalities, about the need to 
eliminate poverty, slums, and the other conditions that are conducive to crime. 


_ 8 - 

but in the absence of statements dealing with the need for immediate crime . 
control, the implication' is that the victims of crime can expect no relief 
until our larger socio-economic problems are solved. And it is doubtful that 
better communication between police and college students will significantly 
reduce t!ie C'-Lme rate. 


Senator McGovern's statements on violent demonstrations repeatedly 
convey the impression that it is not violent demonstrators who are to blame 
but government policies. 

Thus, on March 1, 1971, McGovern deplored the bombing of the Capitol 

as a "barbaric act" but related it to "our Vietnam madness." 

"The massive bombardment we are continuing year after year against the 
peoples of Indochina has its counterpart in the mounting destruction 
of human values in our land. It is not possible to teach an entire 
generation to bomb and destroy others in an undeclared, unjustified, 
unending war abroad without paying the price in the derangement of 
our own society . " (37) 

On March 30, 1971, McGovern extended his support to the upcoming 
April 24 "peaceful protest" against Vietnam in Washington and San Francisco. 
Then, on May 3, in a statement on the violence that followed the peaceful 
demonstrations, McGovern had this to say: 

"I regret deeply the events that are taking place in Washington today. 
I cannot condone illegal acts by those who seek an end to the Indochina 
war. These acts undermine the efforts in Congress to bring about a 
withdrawal of our forces by the end of this year.... As much as I 
reciret the confrontation between demonstrators and police, I believe 
it is the direct result of tlie failure of the Administration to listen 
to ttie American people. What we sec today is Just another sign of 
the frustration ff,-lt by so many people. I hope it will not bring furtlier 
confrontations this week. But even more, I hope tliat the Administration 
will finally listen to America and end the war." (30) 


_ 9 

That same day, McGovern told an Ohio State University audience: 

"It's a mistake in terms of one's effectiveness to engage in 
disorderly and violent tactics tliat interfere with the rights of 
others." (39) 

Thus, McGovern's criticism of violent demonstrations seems r-^inly 
tactical: they don't work--they drive people over to the other side. One 
cannot find a McGovern statement indicating' that violent protests are 
inherently wrong, no matter what the protestors feel about government policy, 
and tliat those who engage in them must bear full responsibility for the con- 

Indeed, in urging that the Administration respond to the violent 
demonstrations by ending the war. Senator McGovern in effect helps to 
legitimate such demonstrations as an effective pressure upon government 
po 1 i cy . 





* Basic Assumptions 

* View of the Cold War 

* The Soviet Union 

* Czechoslovakia 

* Otiina 

* Vietnam 

* Israel and the Middle East 

* Proposed Military Cuts 


- 10 


"It is not enough merely to favor withdrawal from Vietnam. If 
we are truly to reverse our national priorities and restore 
sanity to our national life, we must have a President whose 
thinking is completely free from the last vestiges of the cold 
war p a ranoia which led to our Vietnam involvement in the first 
place." (1) 

In the view of Senator George McGovern, our presence in Vietnam 
is the outgrowth of an overall foreign policy which has been fundamentally 
wrong because it has been based on a paranoid attitude toward Communism. 

"This is what I mean by cold war paranoia — the thinking which 
dictates that 25 years after World War II, ws must keep half a 
million American troops in Europe to defend the 250 million people 
of Western Europe from 200 million Russians, who meanwhile have to 
worry about 700 million Chinese at their back door!" 

"Keeping our NATO forces in Europe alone costs us $14 billion. Yet 
many Senators who voted for the McGovern-Hatf ield amendment calling 
for total withdrawal from Vietnam by the end of this year voted 
against the Mansfield proposal to cut our NATO forces in half." (2) 

Senator McGovern would replace our "paranoid" anti-Communism with a different 

"Speaking for myself, I think Cortmunism is anotlier economic system 
that doesn't happen to fit my view of how society ought to be 
organized, but I'm willing to live in a world of diversity and I 
think we can get along with the Communists. If people ivant to be 
flrqanized under a Communist system, we've got to accept the fact 
that this is their judgment to make." (3) 

And Time reports McGovern as saying: 

"I don't like Conmunism, but I don't think we have any great obligation 
to save the world from it. That's a ciioice other countries have to 
make." (4) 


11 - 

The Time article continues: 

"Going beyond the Nixon Doctrine, McGovern says that he would 
prefer that nations like Brazil and India not turn Communist, 
but that if they did, it would not fundamentally affect our 

Thus, Senator McGovern sees Conmunism as just "another economic system' 
which some people "want to be organized under"--a " choice " they have made. 
Presumably, the pftople who live under Communist regime have freely made that 

By contrast, Senator McGovern has a less benigr. view of what he calls 
"the so-called free world": 

"The establishment center has persisted in seeing the planet as 
^engaged in a gigantic struggle to the death between the free world 
and the Communist world. The facts are that much of the so-called 
free world is not free but a collection of self-seeking military 
dictators financed by hard-pressed American workers. And most of 
the Com-Tiunist nations are far more obsessed with their own internal 
divisions than they are with Washington, London, Bonn or Saigon." (5) 


In' 1948, McGovern was an avid supporter of Henry Wallace and went as a 
delegate from Illinois to the Progressive Party Convention which nominated 
Wallace for President. McGovern, according to a biography, was "bewildered 
at the 'fanaticism' of some of the people closest to Wallace, and dropped out 
of the campaign. Nonetheless, McGovern continues to defend Henry Wallace's 
basic foreign policy outlook. 

"I felt then, as I do now, that U.S. foreign policy was needlessly 
exacerbating tension with the Soviet Union and that we were wrong in 


- 2 - 

our support of Chiang, the French in Indochina, and Boa Dai. I 
wasn't happy with the direction the Democratic Party was taking 
in those times. I liked what Wallace ha(j to say about foreign 
policy . I still think he was essentially right ." (6) 

At issue is not whether McGovern supported Wallace in 1948 — so did 
many others: The issue is: how does he feel about it novy . Most others had 
second thoughts later on. McGovern did not. 

"I'm not at all ashamed that I campaigned for Henry Wallace in 
1948. He was a great Secretary of Agriculture and a great Vice 

President. I'm very proud of it. 

"If we had listened to some of the things that Henry Wallace said, 
we might have avoided the Korean War and the Vietnam War." (7) 

"I think my judgment was pretty good for a 25-year old." (8) 

"So what? I am rather proud of it." (9) 


There is an echo of the Henry Wallace attitude in some of Senator 
McGovern 's statements on the Soviet Union and the Cold War. 

"... we're going to have to abandon our paranoia about Russia's 
ambition to dominate the world . I think if the Russians had 
messianic views at one time, they've largely subsided . The Soviets 
are interested in a security zone to protect them from another 
invasion from the West , from revived German militarism, and they see 
American policy in Western Europe as reviving German power and build- 
ing a nuclear cordon around them. I've always felt that's the real 
reason they wanted a cushion of Communist states on their western 
border, from Poland to the L.lcdi terranean . " (10) 

"The enormous American buildup after World War II almost guaranteed 
that the Soviets v;ould attempt to offset it. If we tiad moved with 
less air±)ition in trying to encircle tliem with nuclear power, they 
might have been less fearful and therefore, less belligerent than 
they've become." (11) 


- 13 - 

But if Soviet imperialism has subsided -- if indeed, it ever existed -- how 
does Senator McGovern explain the Soviet role in the Middle East? It is, 
he says, an exception: 

"But the Middle East is different. There's an old czarist carry-over 
involved tliere, I think, of wanting to have access to the eastern 
Mediterranean. I suppose they're concerned about the oil in the 
Middle East, although perhaps not as much as we are. But they're 
going to be a force in the Mediterranean whether we like it or not; 
they're going to increase their sea power in that area ." (12) 

Apparently, the expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union are confined 
to the Middle East, and these are rooted not in Communism but in czarism. Even 
so, the Russians' interest in the region's oil supply is less than our own. 

Moreover, although McGovern sees an inevitable Soviet military build-up 
in the Middle East, his proposed defense budget would preclude an appropriate 
American response. (See pp. 12-14.) 


If any event of modern times has underscored the imperialist character 
of the Russian regime, it was the invasion of Czechoslovakia. But even on this 
occasion, McGovern found a way to blame American policy. 

In a speech at the City Club of Clevelandon August 23, 1968, McGovern 
said that, while the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia was in "blatant dis- 
regard of international order," the 

"Government of the United States, the foreign policy of this 
Administration, also bears a considerable part of the blame." (13) 



According to McGovern, we had so "squandered American military might in the 
futile war in Vietnam"^ that the Russians did not feel deterred. Moreover, the 
Johnson Administration "has helped to establish the claim of large nations to 
intervene in small nations." Finally. 

" bypassing the U.N. in our own unilateral intervention, we 
have weakened both international law and the influence of world 
opinion. The brave people of Czechoslovakia have paid the price ." (14) 

Thus, Senator McGovern adopted the line of the New Left that Vietnam is 
America's Czechoslovakia -- and that the Johnson Administration had to bear 
the responsibility for what the Russians did to the people of Czechoslovakia! 
So blind was McGovern to the meaning of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia 
that less than a year later, he -could say: 

"International conditions have changed so radically that I doubt 
whether the policy-makers of 25 years ago could find today the 
political landmarks most prominent in the world affairs of their 
day. . . MoscQ-.v does not and cannot control the action of such diverse 
Communist groups as those in China, or Vietnam, or Czechoslovakia. 
or Cuba, or Albania." 

In the same statement, McGovern also said: 

"It is unclear to me how we can expect the Soviets to loosen 
their grip over the eastern half ''f Eutop'e so long as the western 
fcalf remains militarily dominated by the United States." 

It is apparently Senator McGovern' s view that the American military presence 
in U'estern Europe is comparable to the Soviet role in Eastern Europe. 


"The primary re^xisibili ty for the people of Taiwan is in the 
hands of the Chinese government. You have to express the hope 
that it would deal with its people peacefully." (16) 

"China is incapable of any expansionist design." (17) 

I 4077 

f . " ^'5 - . • 


Senator McGovern has been critical of only one side in the Vietnam War — 
ours. V.'hile frequently condemning American policy and the Saigoii government, he 
hai looked upon the North Vietnamese as the bearers of authentic Asian nation- 
alism. He has denounced successive South Vietnamese regimes as corrupt dicta- 
torships while ignoring the totalitarian character of the Communist regime 
in Hanoi. 

In a '7tleet the Press" interview, Robert Novak reminded McGovern of an 
earlier statement he had made (Jan. 28, 1971) that we were "on the wrong side 
of national aspirations throughout Asia." Novak asked whether the North 

I Vietnamese troops invading Cambodia and lodged in Southern Laos without the 

I consent of the Laotian government represented the right side of national aspira- 

"tions in Asia. McGovern's response: 

"They are a lot closer to the natioielistic aspirations of their people 
than the American troops who are there." (18) 

This view was expanded in the interview with Playboy : 

McGovern : "I think that Ho Chi Minh has copied our Declaration of 
Independence . He was really trying to throw the French out, not 
invite the Chinese in. And, as Eisenhower said: 'If there had been 
an election after they threw the French out, he would have had 
80 percent of the vote, at least, in both North and South Vietnam.' 
Similarly, George Washington was ovenvhelmingly elected once he 
kicked the British out of the country." 

Playboy : "I suppose that Nixon would like to make the late Ho Chi 
Minh into the Vietnam Hitler. Are you suggesting he might be the 
North Vietnam George Washington ?" 

McGovern : " That' s right ." (19) 


-16 - 

In the same interview, McGovern was asked: "Do you sympathize with the 
aspirations of the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese allies?" [Ie replied: 

"In that they are striving for national independence, yes... 
(although) I can scarcely condone the terror the Vietcong and 
Hanoi have adopted as a military tactic." 

In Bedford, New Hampshire, on August 9, 1971, McGovern charged that 

"the real w-ar criminals are the people that deceived the Congress 
and the American people about this war . " 

When asked if he meant the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, he replied: 

"No question about it at all--I think they were very much in error." (20) 

In a ir.agazine interview, Mc(Jovern was asked if he agreed with Gloria 
Steinem's thesis that the causes of the Vietnam war can be tiaced to the 
" masculine mystique " which requires male leaders to pursue aggressive politics. 
He replied that the thesis " might be correct . " (21) 

McGovern' s proposals for ending the war rest on an indifference to the 
fate of South Vietnam and an enormous confidence in the good will of Hanoi. 

In an interview with the Washington Post on January 9, 1972, McGovern 
criticized President Nixon's November statement on Vietnam, and said that in 
November he would have announced a specific withdrawal date. But, he added, 
now that the Vietnam elections are over, tlie South Vietnamese are "now ready 
to chart their own future." Asked if he would have gone a step further and 
said that it no longer natters, how it comes out in Vietnam , McGovern replied: 


-17 _ 

"Well that's what I would have thought privately. I don't 

know whether I would have .-^aid that. I've said that as a candidate, 

if I were in Nixcn'.s place, I don't know what I would have done." 

In a nationally televised debate (June 4, 1972), he explicitly stated 
that he would withdraw all American aid from South Vietnam before securing 
agreement for the release of American POWs. He said he would depend on the 
power of world opinion to induce North Vietnam to release the prisoners. 

Then, on June 28, McGovern told a meeting of South Carolina delegates 
to the Denocratic Convention: 

" Begging is better than bombing . I would go to Hanoi and beg if 
I thought that would release the boys one day earlier, but begging 
won't help if we bomb and aid the Thieu Government." (22) 

The notion that an American President should go begging to Hanoi will make 
sense only to those who believe that in the Vietnam war all right is on one 
side — Hanoi's -- and all wrong on ttie other -- ours. It is doubtful that 
such people will constitute a majority of the electorate in November. 


In 1957, McGovern was one of a small minority' of Congressmen to vote 
against H.R. 117 authorizing President Eisenhower to undertake a program of 
military and economic cooperation with Middle Eastern states in order to 
counteract Conmunism. The Resolution passed overwlielmingly, .355-61. (23) 

In May of 1970, Senator McGovern signed two letters, one to President 
Nixon and another to Secretary Rogers, supporting the sale of aircraft to 
Israel. 'J'v;o ~onths later, in a position paper on tlie Middle East, McGovern 
qualified his stand. "The IJnited States," he said, "should clearly express 
its v.ill That the aircraft cold to Israel sliould not be used for irrcursions" 
aciDSs the Suez Canal. 


- 16- 

"Such a declaration would signal to the Arab leaders the American 
intention to seek directly some restraint on the part of Israel . 
This would help. restore credibility in American policy, 'lliough it 
would cost them nothing in strategic terms, the Arabs should 
reciprocate by ending the formal sLate of v.'ar between the two sides, 
which might have an important psychological effect." (24) 

Thus McGovern demanded concrete concessions from the Israelis in return for 
Arab expressions of good faith. He was either unaware of or indifferent to 
the fact that Israel's air raids over Egypt we're a direct and necessary 
response to the War of Attrition which Egypt declared in April, 1969, when 
slie announced her unilateral abrogation of the June, 1967 UN cease-fire. "* 
Israel's efforts to knock out the Soviet missiles and other sophisticated • 
military equipment were basic to her defense. If Israel stipulated that she 
would not use her aircraft over Arab territory, Egypt would be able to wage 
war against Israel at virtually no cost to herself. Egypt would have no 
incentive to maintain a cease-fire. 

Despite his protestations that his general "dove" position docs nut 
preventhiin from taking a strong position on maintaining Israel's military 
strength. Senator McGovern is obviously uncomfortable with the issue of 
providing U.S. arms to Israel. Thus, while he voted for the Jackson amendment 
authorizing $500 million for Israel, he voted against the final bill because 
it also contained military aid for Laos and Cambodia and what McGovern objected 
to as "a sustained high level of defense spending." 

In July, 1971, when the Administration was withholding a reply to a 
long-standing Israeli request to buy more aircraft, McGovern told the Jewish 
Telegraphic Agency that he was at that time "not active" in efforts to persuade 
Hie Administration to answer the request because he was"not aware of any Con- 
gressidnal initiatives." (25) 


- 19 - 

In the same interview, McGovern said explicitly that he did not believe 
freedom of Israel shipping through the Straits of Tiran meant continued Israeli 
control of Sharm el-Sheikh . 

On March 2, 1971, in a Washington speech. Senator McGovern registered 
his approval of the Rogers Plan . He said Israel's borders should be guaranteed 
by pledges from the Arab states and possibly also by the United States and the 
Soviet Union. McGovern' s statement was prominently featured in the press and 
drew an avalanche«of criticism from both Jews and non-Jews in the Democratic 
Party. ■'^' ■ 

McGovern issued a statement on March 5 "expanding on his views." He 
said that "I feel the basic thrust of t'le TJixon Administration policy in the 
Middle East is correct," that "no solution can or should be imposed on the 
Middle East by outside powers," that borders and other issues must be resolved 
by "negotiations between the Middle East governments," that "Israel will never 
accept a settlement that does not assure her of defensible borders," and that 
"our government should not seek to predetermine the outcome of negotiations." 
He did not acknowledge that the Nixon Administration was, in effect trying to 
impose its border plan on Israel through Jarring at that very time; he did not 
■qualify his previous endorsement of the-Rogers plan — in fact, he indicated 
his belief that the borders outlined in that Plan were consistent with "defens- 
ible borders." 

On May 8, 1972, in an interview' with the Christian Science Monitor , 
Senator McGovern said he thought Senator Frank Churcli "would make a great 
Secretary of State." Senator Church voted against legislation providing 
military credits for Israel in both 1970 and 1971. He was among only seven 
leaders who opposed the legislation in 1970 and among only fourteen who 
opposed it in 1971. 


- 20 - 

In the same interview, McGovern said that Richard Stearns -- who was 
in charge of the Senator's campaign in the non-primary states -- would have a 
key role in the inner core of a McGovern administration. Stearns, formerly 
International Affairs Vice President of the National Student Association, was 
one of the signers of a viciously anti-Israel ad published in the New York 
Times (November 22, 1967) under the sponsorship of the Cambridge Committee for 
Respect and Humanity. The ad bore the signatures of such anti-Semites and 
Arab propagandists as Arnold Toynbee and Mohammed Mehdi and solicited funds 
for Arab "relief" organizations such as American Middle East Rehabilitation, 
which sponsors anti-Israel rallies and disseminates anti-Israel propaganda. 

On June 19, 1972, McGovern received the endorsement of Mohammed Mehdi. 
Dr. Mehdi, an official of the Action Committee for Arab-American Relations, 
an Arab propaganda group, said in an interview on WNEW-TV: 

"There is of course, a matter of contradictory positions 
between the Senator's position on the Far East... but in our 
opinion this is just for political purposes. .. In our opinion, 
positions given tomorrow are more important tlian the talks 
today, and that is why we are supporting him because we 
believe essentially in his integrity and independence of 
mind, which is more important than any pressure group can 
hope to withstand the Zionist pressures." 


- 21 - 


On January 19, 1972, Senator McGovern released, under his own name, a 
paper entitled "Toward a More Secure America — An Alternative National Defense 
Posture." The paper contained proposals designed to reduce Defense Dep3rtmenl 
expenditures over the next three years, so as to result in a defense budget of 
$54.8 billion in fiscal year 1972. According to McGovern, the current defense 
budget -- given inflation -- would amount to $87.3 billion in fiscal 1975. 
Therefore, he projects a saving of $32.5 billion in fiscal 1975. This is the 
Origin of the phrase: "McGovern will cut the defense budget by $33 billion." 
These savings would be achieved by cutbacks in various areas: 

(1) Reducing the number of aircraft carriers from 15 to 6 . This would 
cripple the ability of the U.S. to react simultaneously to widely separated 
crises. A major crisis, say, in tlie Mediterranean, would require denuding 
vast areas of the oceans of American naval strength. At present, for example, 
there are five carriers off the coast of Vietnam alone and only two carriers 
on station in the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, the Soviets are increasing their 
naval strength in the Mediterranean, the Baltic and the Indian Ocean. 

(2) Cancelling the Navy's F-14 fighter and the Air Force's F-15 fighter . 
These two aircraft are so-called "air superiority" fighters, i.e., they are 
designed for air-to-tair combat rather than for support of ground operations. 
They are our answer to the MIG-23, currently the "hottest" fighter in the 
Soviet inventory. Cancellation of F-14 and F-15 will mean that we will have 
nothing to match the MIG-23. The F-14 is carrier-based. Its mission in a 
place like the Mediterranean, say, would be to guard the air over a carrier 
that might be attacked by land-based aircraft. There are already some MIG-23' s 


- 22 

with Russian pilots stationed in Egypt. Their role in some future crisis might 
well be to help neutralize the air cover for our carriers. The consequences of 
allowing this to happen are easy to imagine. 

(3) Reducing U.S. garrison in Western Europe from 300,000 to about 130.000 . 
This would tilt the balance of conventional military strength in favor of the 
Warsaw pact, as well as call into question the strength of American commitment. 
It would create all sorts of opportunities for the Soviets to apply pressure. It 
would deprive us of a "conventional option," in the event of war, leaving us a 
choice between using nuclear weapons and capitulating. 

(4) Withdraw remaining U.S. troops from South Korea . The U.S. presence in 
Korea is symbolic, but is is not merelj' symbolic. Such a U.S. withdrawal, at the 
time when discussions between North and South Korea have been initiated, would 
deprive the South Koreans of an important bargaining point. The Japanese would 

be forced to reconsider their own position, since they would no longer be sure 
of what the U.S. would do to keep the Korean peninsula out of hostile liands. 

(5) Reduce U.S. bomber force from about 600 to 200 . The efforts would be 
felt at both the tactical and strategic level. 

(6) Removing all U.S. ground and air forces from Southeast Asia including 
air bases in Thailand . Taken together with the suggestion of cutbacks in aircraft 
carrier strength, the results could be severe. The current situation in Vietnam 
indicates that, in the absence of all U.S. air power, the North Vietnamese army 
would overrun South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, plus, over tlie long-term, create 
serious security problems for Thailand. 

(7) Scrapping the Safeguard ABM system . Had this proposal been implemented 
before the recently concluded round of SALT talks, the Russians would liave had 


- 23 - 

little .incentive to limit their Own ABM as part of a strategic arms limitation 

(8) Reducing overall U.S. military manpower from 2.4 million men to abou t 
1.7 million . This would be- the lowest number of men under arms since 195G, i.e., 
since immediately before the Korean War. 

(9) Reduce funds for military research and development from $8 billion to 
about $5.5 billion . This, at a time when Soviet expenditures for military R&D 
are increasing. ],n the last 25 years, the breakthroughs in military technology 
have revolutionized warfare. There is obviously a neecj to see that we do not 

.'■fall behind in these areas. 

(10) Tlis McGovern budget also fails to provide for significant naval 
rnization in any area except submarines (increasing the number of nuclear 

atiack submarines by 15 - from 69 to 04.) The fact is that the U.S. Navy has 
a disproportionately large share of older vessels. Something close to two-thirds 
of the U.S. active fleet is more than 20 years old, whereas only about 10}^ of 
the Soviet active fleet is more than 20 years old. 


Senator McCiOvern has underlined his opposition to the space program by 
voting to cut back appropriations for NASA every year he has been in the Senate. 

21-296 0—74 13 



(1) From McGovern's mass-mailing fund appeal letter, 1971. No specific date. 

(2) Ibid. 

(3) f layboy interview, July, 1971. 

(4) Time , June 26, 1972. 

(5) Speech to Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner, Detroit, April 1972. 

(6) Quoted in MeGoVern , a biography by Robert S. Anson, 1972. 

(7) The Washington Daily Netvs , April 27, 1972 

(8) The Washington Post , May 1, 1972. f?'- 

(9) The Washington Evening Star , May 1, 1972. 

(10) Playboy interview, July 1971. 

(11) Ibid. 

(12) Ibid. 

(13) The New York Times , August 24, 1968. 

(14) Ibid. 

(15) Annals , American Academy of Political and Social Science, July 1969. 

(16) Playboy interview, July 1971. 

(17) Washington Post interview, January 9. 1972. , ■ • 

(JO) "Meet the Press". February 21, 1971 

(19) Fo'r some reason, this passage from the Playboy interview never appeared in 
the magazine, but it did appear in Robert Anson's biography, McGovern . 

(?.0") Mcinchester Union Leader , August 10, 1971. 

(^1) New Republic intereview with Paul Wiock, October 29, 1971. 

(22) Remarks to South Carolina delegates in Columbia, S.C. Reported in 
New York Times. July 1, 1972. 


(23) 1957 Congressional Quarterly Almanac , p. 3l8. 

(24) McGovern position paper on the Middle East, July 20, 1970. 

(25) Interview with Jewish Telegraphic Agency, July 8, 1971. 

(26) 1959 Congressional Quarterly Almanac , p. 382. 

(27) i960 Congressional Quarterly Almanac , p. 460. 

(28) McGovern , Apson. p. 143. 

(29) 1957 Congressional Quarterly Almanac , p. 306, 348. 

(30) 1959 Congressional Quarterly Almanac , p. 396. 

(31) i960 Congressional Quarterly Almanac , p. 434. 

(32) Ibid ., p. 436. 

(33) News Conference, Washington Press Club, September 23, 1971. 

(34) Ibid . 

(35) Columbus Dispatch , May 3, 1971. 

(36) Quoted by United Press International. 

(37) Quoted in the St. Louis Globe-Democrat by special writer, Maj. Gen. 
Thomas A. Lane. 

I (38) Statement issued by Senator McGovern' s office. May 3, 1971. 

I (39) Columbus Pi spatch, May 3, 1971. 


Memorandum fob the Special U.S. Maritime Advisory Committee 

Great Plains Wheat, Inc., 

Washington, D.C. 

Until November 1963, all commercial U.S. wheat exports (that is all wheat 
exports outside of Public Law 480) were exempt from the 50 percent provisions 
of the Cargo Preference Act. When the Soviet Union came to the U.S. to buy 
wheat in the fall of 1963, the Executive Branch of the government, in authorizing 
such exports, applied 50 percent U.S. flag shipping requirements in connection 
with the issuance of "validated" export licenses required under the Export Con- 
trol Act. This was done even though the business transactions were strictly 
commercial, and were in no way related to Public Law 480 or involved any 
credit or credit guarantees. Thus, for the first time, the provisions of Cargo 
Preference Act was applied to a U.S. commercial cash export transaction. 

During the confusion that followed the application of U.S. shipping preference 
to Russian wheat purchases, it was discovered that no branch of the government 
had authority to absorb U.S./foreign freight rate differentials on commercial 
exports. Therefore, the extra cost of the shipping requirements was to have been 
borne by the buyer — in this case the U.S.S.R. As might have been expected, the 
Russians refused to accept the additional cost. The issue was finally solved by 
the U.S. Department of Agriculture's acceptance of an extra high bid for export 
subsidy on durum wheat included in the total sales contract. Only half of the 
total sales volume to the U.S.S.R. that had been originally mentioned by the 
Russians was realized. The remaining two million tons of potential wheat sales 
went on the shoals of the 50 percent shipping requirement. 

The U.S. non-liner fleet presently derives 90 percent of its business from Public 
Law 480, with three-quarters of that business carrying U.S. wheat exports. While 
the U.S. merchant fleet is carrying only 8 or 9 percent of total U.S. exports it 
is carrying 38 percent of all U.S. wheat exports. The American wheat economy 
is already providing substantial business to U.S. flag shipping under Public Law 
480. Commercial wheat exports should not be impeded by non -competitive U.S. 
flag shipping requirements. 

Certainly the effect of the 50 i>ercent U.S. flag shipping requirement imple- 
mented in 1963 on validated licenses to export wheat to Russia and other Eastern 
European countries has turned out to be unfortunate this year. Since July 1, 
1964 Russia has purchased, for cash payment, 2.6 million metric tons of wheat 
in addition to what she imported the previous year. These purchases have been 
1.4 million tons from Australia, 125 thousand tons from Canada, 750 thousand 
tons from Argentina, and 325 thousand from France. No purchases have been 
made by the Russians from the United States. 

In addition, the other East European countries of Czechoslovakia, Hungary, 
Bulgaria and East Germany have purchased 1.740,000 tons of wheat since July 
1, 1964, from same countries as well as France and Mexico. The U.S. again 
has not shared at all in these sales. 

U.S. grain exporters and market development oflBcers have testified that U.S. 
wheat sales could have been made, and indeed may still be made, to Soviet bloc 
buyers if our delivered price can be competitive with other exi)orting countries. 

fCopy illegible.l 

Such a subsidy proposal might be patterned after the principles involved in 
the direct subsidy system in effect for the U.S. liner fleet. The proposal might 
include the provision that the 50 percent rule of the Cargo Preference Act could 
still continue on Public Law 480 shipments, but should not be applied to com- 
mercial transactions regardless of credit arrangements. A direct subsidy should 
enable the U.S. non-liner shipping companies to capture a fair share of U.S. com- 
mercial export transportation without preferential guarantees. 

Because the U.S. merchant fleet now carries only 8 or 9 percent of the total U.S. 
export business, as compared to over 30 percent 30 years ago, there will be a 
strong appeal to somehow increase the business volume on U.S. flag shipping in 
working out the new merchant marine policy mentioned by the President in his 
State of the T^nion message. 

The immediate elimination of 50 perr-ent TT.S. shipnine from oomTnerciai aeri- 
cultural exports would not in any way adversely affect our merchant marine 
because no such business can now be done where the requirement is in effect. 
In fact the following benefits would accrue to our over all economy : 


(1) Improvement in our balance of international payment from increased 
competitive commercial exports — particularly grain including primarily wheat. 
Any freight payment to foreign ships in connection with such possible exports 
would be vastly more than offset by dollar receipts in payment for the exported 

(2) Increased jobs for our longshoremen, and business for our docks, from in- 
creased exports ; as well as for interior transportation via railroads, trucks and 

(3) Reduced government costs for storage of grain surpluses and for farm 
production adjustment programs. 

We wish to heartily support a new policy and program for our bulk cargo 
merchant fleet. Government aid for construction of modern vessels, better able 
to directly compete with foreign shipping rates, would undoubtedly go a long 
ways to [copy illegible]. 

May 19, 1965. 



'^Cnilcb ^iciic^ S^cixcxic 

conHiT-rrr. ON- 


May 24, 19G5 

Dear Mr. Hall: 

Thank you for sending me your May 17 submission to the I'.ariti 
Advisory Comraittee. In order to further clarify rr.y position, 
which involves commercial sale of agricultural corrmodities 
only, permit me to review the matter and offer a suggestion. 

Until November 1953, all comixiercial U.S. wheat exports (that' 
is all wheat exports outside of Public Law 480) were exempt 
from the 50 percent provisions of the Cargo Preference Act. 
When the Soviet Union came to the U.S. to buy wheat in the. 
fall of 1963, the Executive Branch of the government, in 
authorizing such exports, applied 50 percent U.S. flag shippi 
requirements in connection with the issuance of "validated" 
export licenses required under the Export Control 7sct. This 
was done even though the business transactions were strictly 
commercial, and were in no. way related to Public Law 480 or 
involved any credit or credit guarantees. Thus, for the 
first time, the provisions of Cargo Preference Act was applie 
to a U.S. commercial cash export transaction. 

During the cpnfusion that followed the application of U.S. 
shipping preference to Russian wheat purchases, it was dis- 
covered that no branch of the government had authority to 
absorb U.S. /foreign freight rate differentials on corrimercial 
exports. Therefore, the extra cost of the shipping require- 
ments was to have been borne by the buyer — in this case, 
the U.S.S.R. As might have been expected, the Russians 
refused to accept the additional cost. The issue v;as finally 
solved by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's acceptance of 
an extra high bid for export subsidy on durum wheat included 
in the total sales contract. Only half of the total sales 
volume to the U.S.S.R. that had been originolly mentioned 
by the Russians v/as realized. The remaining two million 
tons of potential v/hoat sales v;ent on the shoals of the 50 
percent shipping requi rcm.ent . 


Peigc t\^"0 
May 24, 19G5 

Tlic U.S. non-liner fleet presently derives 90 percent of 
its business from Public Law 480, vith three-q-jsrters of 
that business carrying U.S. wheat exports. vrhile the U.S. 
merchant fleet is carrying only 8 or 9 percent cf total 
U.S. exports, it is carrying 38 percent of all U.S. v.'heat 
exports. The American wheat economy is already providing 
substantial business to U.S. flag shipping under Public 
Law 480. Comnercial wheat exports should not be inpeded 
by non-competitive U.S. flag shipping require— ents . 

: Certainly the effect of the 50 percent U.S. fl£c shipping 
; jtequirement implemented in 1953 on validated licenses to export 
■wheat to Russian and other Eastern European countries has turn; 
but to be unfortunate this year. Since July 1, 1964, Russ^ia , 
has purchased, for cash payment, 2.6 million rr.etric tons of 
wheat 'in additbn to what she imported the previous year. 
These purchases have been 1.4 million tons frorr Australia, 
125 thousand tons from Canada, 750 thousand tons from 
.Argentina, and 325 thousand from France. No purchases have 
been made by the Russians . from the United States. ■ 

In addition, the other East European countriss of Czechoslovakia 
Hungary, Bulgaria and East Germany have purchased 1,740,000 
tons of v.'heat since July 1, 1964, from these san-.e countries 
■ as well as France and Mexico. The U.S. again has not shared 
at all in these sales. 

U.S. grain exporters and market development officers have 
testified that U.S. v;heat sales could have been made, and 
indeed may still be made, to Soviet bloc* buyers if our 
delivered price can be competitive v/ith other exporting 
countries. This has not been possible because of the dra- 
matically higher ocean freight rates associated v/ith 50 percer.; 
use of U.S. flag "tramp" ' ships compared v/ith open market rates. 
As you knov/, our bulk cargo "tramp" rates range from 50 to 100 
{>ercent higher than com.parable foreign rates. 


Pago three 
Moy 24, 196 5 

The unfortunate effects of 50 percent nliipping in connection 
with the licensing requirement has been: 

1) Lost opportunities in mnkip.g wheat export sales for 
dollars, to tlieso destinations in relief of our im- 
balance of payments, 

2) increased pressure of unsold \s?heat stocks on our 
wheat producers and government agencies, and 

3) the result that the requirement has yielded our 
Merchant Marine 50 percent of no business. 

Expanded trade v;ith the Soviet bloc has been expressed as 
being in our national interest. Effective support for 
expanded agricultural exports to Eastern Europe should be 
directed toward general export licensing of commodities 
not on the "Positive List" of strategic materials required 
under the Export Control Act of 1949. 

It is essential that the U.S. develop means of supporting 
the U.S. non-liner merchant fleet v;ithout requiring U.S. 
flag' shipping to be an impediment to any agricultural exports 
financed under U.S. government credit guarantees. 

V7e v;ish to outline our general views on a new policy for 
U.S. shipping of all future commercial exports. One first 
part of this policy should be to immediately exempt by 
executive order all agricultrual ' exports outside of Public 
Lav; 480 from U.S. shipping requirements. _ This should also 
exempt such exports involving government-insured short-term 
commercial credits. 

An additional step in this nev/ policy should be to provide 
a direct subsidy to the U.S. non-liner fleet to enable them 
to match foreign freight rates in competing for expanded 
comm.ercial export business. Such a subsidy proposal might 
be patterned after the principles involved in the direct 
subsidy system in effect for the U.S. liner fleet. The 


iPagc four 
■May 24, 1965 

Hie proposal might include the provision that the 50 percent 
rule of the Cargo Preference Act could still continue on 
Public Law 480 sliipments, but should not be applied to 
coTJiiercial transactions regardless of credit arrange-ents . 
A direct subsidy saould enable the U.S. non-liner shipping 
companies to capture a fair share of U.S. corru-.iercial export 
transportation without preferential guarantees. 

Because the U.S. merchant fleet now carries only 8 or 9 
percent of the total U.S. export business as compared to 
over 30 percent 30 years ago, there will be a strong appeal- 
to somehow increase the business volume on U.S. flag shipping 
in v;orking out the nev/ Kercliant Karine policy mentioned by 
the President in his State of the Union message. 

The immediate elimination of 50 percent U.S. shipping from 
commercial agricultural exports wo-.ild not in any way ad- 
versely affect our Merchant Marine because no such business 
can now be done where the requirement is in effect. In fact 
the follov;ing benefits would accrue to our overall economy: 

1) Improvement in our balance of international payment 
from increased competitive commercial exports — 
particularly grain including primarily wheat. Any 
freight pa^Tnent to foreign ship in connection with 
such possible exports v.'ould be vastly more than 
offset by dollar receipts in payment for the exported 
commodities . 

2) Increased jobs for our longshoremen, and business for 
our docks, from increased exports; as v/ell as -for 
interior transportation via railroads , trucks and barges 

'3) Reduced government costs for storage of grain surpluses 
and for farm production adjustment programs. 


Pncjc five 
May 24, 1965 

Wc wish to l-.cnutily support n new policy and prcgrc:- fcr 
our bulk cra-gb r.-icrchnnt fleet. Government aid for con- 
struction of modern vessels, better able to directly ccrrpcte 
with foreign s'nipping rates, would undoubtedly go a long 
ways to strengthen the economic position of our shipping 
firms and seafarers unions. Perhaps more could be done 
as well. 

Unfortunately, the 50 percent requirement of U.S. flag 
shipping on wheat and other grain exports licensed to the 
Soviet bJ.oc is making no contribution toward this objective. 
In fact, it appears to be hindering us in arriving at a more 
rationalized and practical solution of the problems of our 
maritime industry. 


^-s-^^ W^P^^ 

George McGovern 

Mr. Paul Hall 


The Seafarers International Union 

of North America, AFL-CIO 
675 Fourth Avenue 
Brooklyn, New York 11232 


Radio-TV Monitoring Service, Inc., 

Washington, D.C. 
Program : The Today Show. 
Network : NBC Television. 


Frank Blair. The recent purchase by the Soviet Union of Canadian wheat has 
caused a stir among Democratic and Republican senators from wheat producing 
states. They're seeking to have the White House change the requirements set dur- 
ing President Kennedy's Administration that 50 per cent of such U.S. wheat 
exports be shipped in United States vessels. This requirement, the senators be- 
lieve, so raises the cost for the Soviets that they will no longer buy our wheat. 

One of the senators who is leading the fight against the requirement is George 
McGoveru, Democrat of South Dakota. He is in our Washington studios this 
morning with Today Show's Washington correspondent Sander Vanocur. Sander? 

Sanuek Vaaocuk. Senator McGovern, since the Soviet Union has recently pur- 
chased almost a half a billion dollars worth of wheat, mostly from Canada, and 
are likely to continue purchasing western wheat for the next few years, why 
can't the American wheat farmer get a share of this market, since the principle 
of selling wheat to the Soviet Union was seemingly approved in 1963? 

Senator George S. McGovern. Well, the American wheat farmer should have a 
share of this busines.--. We have about 8()0 to {XJO million bushels of wheat in sur- 
plus in this country, in our reserve stocks, a good part of which we ought to sell. 
We have another big crop coming on this year, and as you say, we made a policy 
decision two years ago that it was in our national interest to sell wheat to the 
Soviet Union, and to the countries of Eastern Europe, then, very mistakenly, in 
my view, we put on an administrative ruling that required that 50 per cent of 
any wheat that we sell to the Soviet Union, or to the countries of Eastern Europe, 
must move in American ships, and that simply raises the price, anywhere from 
eleven to fifteen cents a bushel, to the buyer, and as a consequence, the Soviet 
Union and the other countries in Eastern Europe are not buying any American 
wheat. They're going to Canada, Australia, France, or Argentina, and completely 
by-passing the American market, and as long as that shipping restriction exists, 
we're not going to sell any wheat, in my view, to the Soviet Union. 

Vanocur. Senator, was this an administrative decision by President Ken- 
nedy's Administration, in 1963, or did Congress have to do it ? 

McGovern. The Congress had nothing at all to do with it. It was a decision that 
was reached by the Kennedy Administration at the time of the Russian wheat 
proposal in 1963. My understanding is that that restriction v,-as placed on the 
deal as a means of winning support from some of the maritime unions. Actually, 
it hasn't helped them in any way at all, because the net result of that restriction 
placed by the Administration, it's been continued by the present administration, 
has been to deny us any opportunity to sell wheat in Eastern Europe, so when we 
talk about requiring 30 per cent of the wheat and other grains that might move 
into that part of the world going in American ships, we're actually talking about 
50 per cent of nothing. We're not helping the maritime unions ; we're not helping 
anyone, and we're depriving the wheat farmers of this country of an opportiinity 
to sell hundreds of millions of dollars of wheat and other grains to the Soviet 
Union, and to the countries in Eastern Europe. 

Vanocur. Senator, tell me first, what is the size of the potential market, given 
Soviet agricultural diflBculties? 

McGovern. Well, I would estimate that this year, the Soviets may be in the 
market for as much as 14 or 15 million tons of wheat. Now, they have recently 
completed arrangements with the Canadians, and a smaller deal with the Argen- 
tineans, and a somewhat smaller deal with the French, to purchase somewhere 
around seven million tons, but every indication is that before the end of this year, 
they're going to need another six or seven million tons. Now, the Canadians have 
just about exhausted their capacity to meet that need. Their port facilities are 
strained to the limit ; their shipping opportunities are almost fully utilized, and 
they're contra nted now for almost the maximum amount of wheat they can deliver. 

Vanocur. Put this in dollar figures on a yearly basis. 

McGovern. Well, I would say somewhere around a billion dollars this year. 
Now. last year, the Russians purchased something over a half a billion dollars 
in wheat from the western world, and they're going to be in the market this year 
for an even larger amount, from all indications. The evidence we have is that 
this year, their crop is no better than it was in 1963, which was a bad year. 


They had a somewhat better crop in 1964, although it was not particularly a good 
harvest. Now, from what we can learn, they're back to the level of about 1965, 
in terms of production, so that I would think there's still a half a billion dollars 
worth of potential business that has not yet been completed in this calendar 

Vanooue. And for the foreseeable future? 

McGovERN. Well, every indication is that for the next few years, they're going 
to be iu the market for several billion tons of wheat each year, in the western 
world. There's no reason that I can see why we wouldn't get at least half, and 
maybe more than half, of that business. 

In other words, we're talking about perhaps as much as 280 million dollars 
in wheat sales that the Unite<l States could make, were it not for this restriction 
on shipping, what I referred to as a self-defeating restriction ; it's a restriction 
that doesn't help anyone. 

The maddening thing about it is that it applies only to grain. This is not a 
restriction that is applied to machinery. We can sell automobiles, steel, tractors, 
industrial equipment to the Soviet Union, and move it in any ships that we 
want to. There's no restriction at all on the shipping, but when it comes to 
wheat, something that people can eat and that they can't shoot back at us in 
the form of ammunition, we apply this restriction that in effect just takes us 
out of the market. 

Vanocur. I want to get back to 1963. It is commonly assumed, rightly or 
wrongly, that the Administration did this at George Meany's behalf, the Presi- 
dent of the AFIy-CIO. Now. if that is so, who made Meany do it? 

McGovEBx. Well. I think probably the pressure came from the maritime 
leaders, the labor leaders of the various maritime unions, who thought that this 
would be helpful to their workers and to their members. They thought that if 
they could put a restriction on the arrangement that would require at least half 
of the wheat to move in American flag vessels, that this would provide greater 
employment for the American maritime industry, for the dock workers and 
the shippers aiid the various people who are involved in our ocean shipping 
industry. But as I have indicated, it didn't work that way. But I do think that's 
where the pressure came from. 

Vanocur. And persists from? 

McGovEBN. Yes, my understanding is that the labor leaders who originally 
applied the demand for the 50 per cent shipping requirement are still holding i 
out. I can't understand why, because it isn't providing one additional job 
for any member of the maritime unions. Quite the contrary, it's hurting them. 
It's preventing the movement of wheat through our ports, that would provide 
additional work for the dock workers, the shipping industry, the railroads, and 
the people who work around our ports. It's actually working against the interests 
of the maritime industry. It's certainly working against the interests of the 
United States as a whole. 

Yanocur. Senator, you're leading a group of Republican and Democratic 
senators in the senate on this question. Have you made your views known to the 
White House, and if you have, what has been the White House reaction? 

McGovERN. Yes. Last spring, a number of us sent a letter to the White House, 
in which we expressed our views on this subject, and that letter was signed by 
members of the senate, from both political parties, primarily senators who come 
from the states that grow a great deal of wheat. We tried to point out to the 
Asflministration that a policy decision had been reached two years ago, that it was 
in the interest of the United States to sell wheat to the Soviet Union, to take 
advantage of this opportunity to improve our balance of payments position, to 
receive gold in payment for something that we have in surpluf^, and that we're 
storing at great cost to the taxpayers ; we outlined all of those views in a letter 
to the White House, and we've been in further contact with the White House 
ofl^cials since that time. They expressed great interest in our views, and advised us 
that they are under active consideration. I still hope, and hoix* very strongly 
that the Administration is going to lift this restriction. We haven't yet had any 
such assurance. 

Vanocub. Senator, to be blunt about it, you have threatened on the senate 
floor, have you not. that there's a possibility the Democratic senators from farm 
states may not support the union movement on 14-h. an attempt to wipe out the 
right-to-work laws. Are you going to follow through with that, if you don't get 
your way on this? 

McGovERN. Well. I can't speak for other senators, but what I had said on the 
senate floor is, I can't get up very much enthusiasm personally for a crusade 


jto repeal Section 14-b of the Taft-Hartley law, the so-called Right-to- Work law 
that exists in some of our states, at a time when the same labor leaders who are 
urging the repeal of that restriction on labor have placed a restriction on my 
wheat farmers, that is doing a lot more damage to the American economy than any 
damage that results to us because of Section 14:-b. I think we have to look 
at our country as a whole. We can't think in terms of the labor interest or the agri- 
cultural interest or the business interest; we're all in those issues together, and 
the United States is faced with a very serious problem in its balance of pay- 
ments, in the outflow of dollars and gold. Here's an opportunity to correct that 
situation to the tune of several hundred million dollars a year. 

We're faced with a very serious agricultural problem — depressed income for 
farm producers all over this country, and surpluses that have accumulated in 
government stocks. Now, I think the same labor leaders that are concerned about 
a restriction on the economy as they see it, in the form of 14:-b, ought to be con- 
cerned about the restriction that they've placed on the economy, that's hurting 
all of us, in the form of restrictions on the sale of American wheat. 

Vanocub. Senator, let me put to you a not so hypothetical possibility. Sen- 
ator Dirksen has said he is going to try to revive the Dirksen amendment on re- 
apportionment and attach it to 14-b when it comes to the senate. If you don't 
get your way on this wheat shipping business, is there a possibility you might 
support Senator Dirksen when he tries to attach this to 14-b? 

McGovETRN. Well, I really haven't reached any judgment on that but I think 
it's quite clear that farm state senators have to be concerned first about those 
issues that directly affect their own people. I come from a state that's more 
dependent on agriculture than any other state in the union. There's no other state 
that derives such a large percentage of its income from agriculture. We're a great 
wlieat state. But it's very diflScult for us to oppose proposals such as the Dirksen 
amendment and to support proposals such as the repeal of the Right-to-Work law 
at the very time when the people that are urging us to take that position then 
turn around and insist on a foolish and self-defeating restriction that de- 
prives the agriculture of America of an opportunity to increase its income, of 
an opportunity that the highest officials in this government decided two years 
ago was not only in the interests of the wheat farmer, but in the interests of our 
country as a whole. 

Vanocur. Thank you very much. Senator George McGovern, Democrat of 
South Dakota, talking about the difficulty of selling wheat to the Soviet Union, 
with the present restriction of shipping half of it in Ameircan vessels. And now, 
back to Today in New York. 

Fbank Blaie. Thank you, gentlemen. That was live from Washington. . . . 


The AD: 

The MrGovern Positions on the Arab-Israel Conflict: 
Contrast between the infornvation given in McGovern's Jewish newspaper ad 
and the information f rem McGovern 's record 


■ Senator McGovern knows that ■ 
there can be no lasting peace in 
the Middle East until the democratic 
state of Israel is recognized by her 
Arab neighbors --neighbors that still 
deny her right to exist. 

"The feeling of the Palestinians that they have 
unjustly lost their homes and property is perhaps the 
most important source of tension and conflict in the 
Middle East. A unilateral act of Israel recognizing 
this to be the case could be the greatest single steo 
toward peace." (From McGovern 's major position paser 
on the Middle East, delivered on the Senate Floor on 
July 20, 1970, and hereafter referred to only by date, 

And McGovern is firm and clear on 
what the American posture must be: 

''America must do whatever is 
necessary to ensure the survival 
and independence of Israel, This 
- is in the American interest and 
is in the interest of justice, 
democracy and humanity." 

Senator McGovern has repeatedly 
pointed out the vast difference 
between the corrupt regime v/e have 
backed in Saigon and our need to 
assist the democratic State of 

"The United States is committed to aid in the preser- 
vation of the State of Israel. This has been American 
policy for more than two decades. At the same time 
the United States is committed to the preservation of 
all Arab states in the area." (July 20, 1970) 

On the one hand, McGovern stresses that the United 
States should have a commitment to Israel but not 
Vietnam because Israel is a democracy; on. the other 
hand, he says that the U.S. conmitraent to Israel is 
equally applicable to all Arab nations, none of which 
except Lebanon are democracies in any sense of the v.-ord 

It is difficult to understand v,hat McGovern means by 
a U.S. commitment to Israel and all the Arab states 
in any event because he also calls for reducing our 
commitments all over the v.-orld--cutting our IJATO 
strength in half, slashing our Mediterranean fleet 
v;hich President Johnson used successfully to deter 
Soviet intervention in the June I967 v/ar, and choppin, 
$30+ billion from our defense budget would make it 
impossible for the Unitqd States to fulfill any commi 
to any nation abroad, especially to Israel, v;hich is ni 
threatened directly by the massive Soviet buildup in 
the Mediterranean and in Egypt. 

"I 'am for negotiation betv;een 
Israel and the Arab states in 
direct face-to-face discussions. 

"Both sides should be v;illing to negotiate in any vay 
fcasible--directly, through intermediaries, in the openj 
or in secret. The unfortunate 'Goldmann affair' in 
which Israel missed the opportunity for informal direc! 
Contacts with the Arab leaders should not be repeated. 
If both the Arabs and Israelis make it clear that they 
are sincerely ready to talk about any problem, that woyj 
represent a powerful impetus toward negotiations. Shoal 
the Arab nations so desire, representatives of the 
Palestinian Arab organizations should be permitted to 
participate in the negotiations.... 

"[A]s a token of its v/illingness to negotiate an 
agreement with the Arab nations fir.raeTI could ellccat 


je.Jisli Nc^soaptT Ad vs. KCuovoni's Hccurd 

I'he AD 

Thr? R'vCORD: 

a specific sun of nonsy for co.-npcnsation and place it 
In an cscroj account for thc-_ Palestinicn Arabs.'' (July ; 

McCovern thus denies Israel not only the right, to 
insist on direct negotiations with Arab officials, but 
also the riglit to choose her orfn neijotiators . N'ahuzi 
Goldmann, to •.■.'ho.Ti McGovern refers, is not oven a full- 
tine resident of Israel, no less an official of the 
Israeli Government. Prenier Keir, responding to sons 
press reports that Goldmann had been invited to negotia: 
with Egyptian officials, nsrely stated that Goldrana 
^id not represent Israel; as it turned out, x.hs press 
reports v;ere Just rumors--there was never even an 
invitation from Egypt , 

McGovern also ignores the fact that Israel has been 
pleading with the AraU nations for ?.h years to negotiats 
on all issues, while the Arabs have refused to negotiate 
with Israel on any issue. It is not Israel that should 
be required to give a "token of its willingness to 
negotiate." Purthermore, McGovern never suggests that, 
the Arab states offer coapensation to the more than 
600,000 Jewish refugees from Arab lands who fled to 
Israel since 19'tS; Israel believes this would be a fair 
exchange for compensation of Arab refugees. 

"'There must be acceptance of 
the premise that no nation or 
group of nations can legitimately 
,inpose an outside settlement 
of the Arab-Israeli conflict." 

"Secure and defensible aad 
peaceful borders are essential 
ingredients of any settlement." 

"Israel must be prepared to yield much of the territor 
gained in that Q-96^ war.... 

" f ll n the spirit of mutual concessions to bring about 
a peaceiul settlement, Israel as well as tlie Arab states 
should be willing to accept the presence of the Uii 
forces on their territories. In the past, Israel has 
not welcomed UT! troops.... 

''The present proposals [Sogers Pla^ are limited to 
tactics for getting both sides to negotiate. They 
appear to be running into tough o'ostacles. I submit 
that if the United States made kno-<m t'ne kind of 
equitable solutions of the major issues in the Middle 
East it would be prepared to support, chances would be 
markedly improved for acceptance of our suggested steps 
for opening the talks." (July 20, I97O) 

McGovern was asked after a speech in '//ashington on 
March 2, I97I, if he supported the Rogers Plan calling 
on Israel to withdraw to the pre-1967 boundaries with 
only "insubstantial alterations" in territory. McGoverr 
'replied: "Yes. Generally, I do." {)n Tiines, March 3) 

In an Interview on July 7, 1971, Kcgovem proposed 
that rather than Israel remaining at Sharm cl-Sheikh 
in Sinai to guarantee her free access through the Suez 
Canal and the Straits of Tiran, the U.S. and other 
"interested nations" could saf guard access through the 
watcr-^ays, perhaps under u:i auspices. (Jewish Telegrapnl 
Agency, July 8) 

The AD: 


McGovern's Jewish Ncjopapcr Ad vs. McGovern's Record 


In Hay 1970, McGovem was one 
of only 7 Senators who first 
urged the lUxon Adninistration 
to stop del^iylng shipment of 
Phantom jets that the Israeli 
Government needed. 

The May 23rd letter to President Hixon, initiated | 
by Senator Alan Cranston ond signed by HcGovern and ' 
5 other Senators, '.vas far fron the first Senatorial 
appeal to the Administration on .lets. Throughout 
the first half of 1970 the Adninistration v/as bombard 
with such appeals from Senators of both political 
parties, including the Majority and Minority Leaders 
of the Senate. Seventy -three Senators, =any of whoa 
had been speaking out on this matter for months, 
signed a letter urging jets which v;as delivered to 
Secretary of State Rogers on June 1st. The most 
significant and successful effort to expedite the 
sale of jets to Israel was Senator Henry M. Jackson 'si 
anendmeht authorizing unlimited arcs credits for | 
Israel, which was in its final stages of completion i 
in May and which was reported out favorably by . 
the Senate Armed Services Committee in June. 

McGovern distinguished himself from other Senators 
who had participated in these efforts by qualifying 
his advocacy of jets for Israel with a proposal that 
the U.S. restrict Israel's use of the jets: 

"Such aircraft should not be made available for 
forays over Arab territory for the purpose of sus- 
taining the limited but real war which has persisted 
since the six -day conflict in I967.-.. 

''The United States should express clearly its 
wish that the aircraft sold to Israel should not be 
used for such incursions. Such a declaration v.-ould 
signal to the Arab leaders the American intention 
to seek, directly some restraint 0,1 the part of Israe! 
This would help restore credibility in American 
policy. Though it v.-ould cost them nothing in • 
strategic terms, the Arabs should reciprocate by ) 
ending the foraal state of v/ar between the two sidei 
v/hich might have an important psychological effect.! 
(July 20, 1970) 1 

The "incursions" to vihich McGovern refers — Israel; 
flights across the Sue: Canal — were the direct and 
necessary response to Egypt's unilateral abrogation- 
of the 1967 Ull cease-fire and declaration of the 
V/ar of Attrition against Israel in April 1569- 
Egyptian officials publicly declared that since Egyj: 
was unable to deal a knock-out blovf to Israel, Egypt 
was pursuing this V/ar of Attrition to deplete Israel 
manpower cUid weapons supplies. This would be a 
no-cost war for Egypt, which she could maintain 
indefinitely. But unlike Egypt, Israel does not hav 
an unlimited supply of manpower, nor does she regard 
her war casualties as mere statistics; and unlike 
Egypt, Israel must pay for all her weapons and oust : 
suffer delays in tlie approval of her weapons request: 
Go Israel refused to ficht the Eg^-ptian- imposed -ar < 


McGovern s je.vish r.'c./spapcr Ad vs. McGovern's Record 

he AD: 


Egyptian-imposed terms. Israel raised the cost for Eg%-t)t bv 
flying boaibing missions across the Canal. KcGovern asis 
Israel to give up this strategic necessity while he asks 
the Arabs to give up "nothing in strategic terns." 

Furthermore, America has not been pouring billions of 
dollars of arms into nations whose avowed purpose is to destrc 
another nation, a member state of the UI). Ansrica is 
not the nation with a Dassive troop deployment in the 
Middle East. And it was not America and Israel but the 
Soviet Union and Egj^pt which violated the new cease-fire 
standstill agreement less than a month after McGovern made 
his speech. McGovern's concern about credibility and 
restraint v;ould more properly be directed tov;ard the 
Soviet Union than the United States. 

Finally, the Phantom jet is by definition a bomber. 
Flying it up and over Tel Aviv would not ser/e Israel's 
defense needs. 

McGovern voted KO on 
iraiendments to the Foreign 
lllitary Sales Bill in 1970, 
hich would have placed severe 
imitations on anas to Israel. 

The votes to defeat these amendments were routine and 
virtually unanimous, with one of the amendments receiving or.J.y 
the vote of its sponsor. 

McGovern voted YES to amend 
he Military Procurement Act 
n I97& to provide open ended 
xtension of funds for Israel. 

McGovern '..'as one of only 5 Senators who -/oted '\0 on the 
Military Procurement Act which contained the unlimited 
authorization amendment --the Jackson amendment--ajnd thus 
made his vote on the amendment itself meaningless. Moreover, 
there was no occasion to vote TE3 on the Jackson ajnendmen':: ; 
the amendment had been approved by the Armed Ser/ices 
Committee and was therefore already in the Military Procuren= 
bill '.jhen it reached the floor of the Senate. McGovern 
■was merely among the 87 Senators v^ho voted to defeat an 
amendment by Senator J.ff. Fulbright v/hich -would have delayed 
action on the Jackson amendment. 

On July 7> 1971 ) McGovern said in an interview that althc^j 
he '^/ould not favor repealing the Jackson amendment, "-..'e dor. 't 
want to give anyone a blank check on the U.S. Treasury." 
McGovern also said that he was "not active" at present in 
efforts to persuade the llixon Administration to answer 
Israel's pending arms request because he 'was ''not av.'are 
of any Congressional initiatives." (Jewish Telegraphic 
Agency, July 8) 

; McGovern voted Y".S on a I97I 
le.'-.-lcent to ^utho^i^c additional 
■gait sales of arms and jets to 

■- ra'^l . 

In 1971j McGo'/crn introduced a 
!-'rf- foreign assisi-anco bill to 
j.arantee economic aid and 
Llitary sales to Israel. 

McGovern voted KO on the entire foreign aid bill in 1971, 
'//hich included $300 million in military credits and $50 mill: 
in grant supporting assistance for Israel. 

McGovern maie no effort whatsoever to bring his foreij,-r. 
aid proposal to the Floor for a -/ote or to enlist cospon^ors . 

21-296 0—74- 




HATIOttAl CO/.IMIJSIOM (5J5) 222-I106 • I N I E R » AT I O H A I COUMISSIOIJ (:i5) 2J2.J7JJ 

.July 30, 1965 

Rabbi and Mrs. Elmer Berger 

912 E. 5th Avenue 

New York, New York 10017 

Dear Rabbi and Mrs. Berger: 

I am wrilingon behalf of the participants in the United 
States National Stvidcnt Association's Arab Student 
Leadership Project to thank you for having us in your 
home during our stay in New York. Your speech, 
Rabbi Bergc-r, made the largest single impact of any 
we heard, particularly among our Arab guests. It 
affirmed very graphically in their minds the distinction 
Arabs, I believe, have attempted to maintain, betv/een 
Zionism on one hand and the Jewish people on the other. 
Agreement with your position on Palestine, I think 
is 100%. 

Our best v/ishes to you and your wife. 

Richard Stearns . ^" 
Seminar Director 






fTtJiwday, /un. :S, IJ47 , I 



?■ DcarMr. " President; ■ ^ . - ' ■'._ ,, - ' " . 

: -',; As ^Vmerlcans concerned with the grave consequences to our countr)'' -which Soviet ' -■" 
.- ascendancy in the Middle East would entail, we the undersigned voice our.alarm that '.-, 
V '.recent events have caused an unprecedented deterioration in America's relations with •■ ': 
: a vital area of the world where the United States hitherto enjoyed friendship and. '■'■ 
• prestige. There is a real and present danger of America's losing the- Arab world by ..: 
^ ^dcf auIr.^We have lost China. We cannot lose the Middle East. ' .■..■''■•"• * '•?.'. J,,''''; ' ' 

N-' In order to avoid this impending disaster, we respectfully urge, Mr. President; 
- .that in facing the realities of this crisis, the United States Government recognize' 
< that: ; /,-,>^;^;:;' :- ' ' ; .- ' ' ■.i';^r'\:''\''^'^:i'] 

..■il-' Peace talks between the antagonists will never occur until there is total mill- .' ". 
. tary.withdrav/al from area5 occupied by force of arms. Such withdra-wal need in- ; 

vite no repetition of the recent conflict if simultaneously accompanied by a strength- 
■ encd United -Nations presence, which we Join Britain in recommending. However, 

•contrar)' to the situation in 1957, this strengthened United Nations force must bcpres- . ' 

ent on both sides. ' . . '> ■ <<■•..- *'"--' ' *' '■'■ -' ' ' :• ..t ' 

_ -■■'.2. Tlicrc Can be' no Just and lasting solution of the refugee problem while the 
•''•world coiinicnanccs the creation of new refugees dally in" a territory held by a bcl- • 
.Ii''crent. . . i'' ' ' ' ' . ■ -' . - ' .' ■'• '•' • '-'■■.*''.' " ■ , '..'•. .' . * 

^■, -3. Arab provocation cannot be condoned, yet historical perspective, v/c belic-ve, 
will show v.ith fearful clarity that It is no favor to Israel to allow her \n the flush 
of short-term military victory to deepen the divisions and antagonisms which scpa- 

arateiier from those neighbors aoi-aits \VhorTi":<;l)f- iiiust c-t-cjL llibxs'riot t3i'e'ro3J tv 


■1'4. Our cdmnutmcnt to the political indcpcn<^cnc<; arr{ to'ruorlal^ritv of all 
nations in the area, recently reaffirmed by yourself and previously rnmciatrd by 
.President Truman, President Eisenhower and President Kennedy, v, ill lose its mean- 
ing unless ic is made unmistakably clear voiv to all the world and the nations of the 
\?»Iiddle East in particular that the United States will not tolerate territorial aggran-' 
' dizcment. Wc recall -President Eisenhower's warning of February 20, 1957: 

- : ,'; ." "Israel insists on firm guarantees as a condition to withdrawing its forces :" ' ■".' 
;■ ; of invasion ,.. . If we agree that armed attack can properly achieve the pur- , •- 
'•, .■ poses' of the assailant, then I fear \Ve will have turned back the clock of in- "' -' 
•-'■■', ternational order. We will have 'countenanced the use of force as a means of ' - "■ 
: .■" settling international differences and gaining national advantages .-. •. If :.^-. 
.'/- the United Nations once admits that international disputes can be settled by ' ' ,' 
•..^,\;' using" force, then wc will have destroyed the very foundation of the organi- 
t;;'- zation, and our best hope' for establishing a real world order." '■ '' r.- ;• . •",. "_ 

r.'; .5. There are, indeed, areas of dispute which can be resolved through negotiation 
>in a climate of clear impartiality. These include questions relating to- recognition, 

y'lriaritimc rights, borders, refugees and water distribution. But we reiterate, it is vain •. 

•/-to. hope for peace talks and settlements deriving from them as long as any aritago- 

.,riist enjoys the fruits of military conquest. ' - \- .. .. ;',," ... -^ X- -.".!• '/s'Ju - 

','. I *' -.:-,--■ 1- .'. - • -. ■' '•■ •■ • .".•>•■;. ■ Vy'-v"' :' i"v ,'- "*■.-■ 

;'.W , -4 1^ --••'-■• •:S-^,: .,\ ':-■.■. ■■'■".'/ t ■';•■• :^ ^;^.s:--i '.■■■;,?i^ 

'.'ij. The loss of the Middle East would be a disaster of" the first magnitude^ It would ". 

',..opcn a new path to ultimate confrontation of the super powers and a graver threat 

<^than ever of universal nuclear holocaust. Pressure groups, wherever they may be and 

-■rliowevcr-vocalrcannorbe perniitted'to obscure America's Iargc"r in teres ts'aliHYranw/^ 

C/cending issues of. world imperatives. ;•• -■ ..; ... ;'\; ■,.'? '\':1' J.'-v,"^- '.'" 

;-"";.-The United States.^ Mr. President, can assure this. does not happen.^,,*'.. 

Profeitor John Ruedf ■ 

■ Veptrtmtnt of Hlilonr 

.' Prcfei:er Chrlstini P. Hirrii 

i.- TmptnrytM rf Pollliul Scl«»c« 
'. tiaafgrd Univt/tiry 

1 Profsijor Alan R. Tiylor 
( SchitJ al lnl«i-««i:or»l lankt 
f' Ajiv*rlcan Unlvtriity 

' Profcisor V^lltird G. Ortaby 

' ■ Dertrimpnt o( Rctittov* &lud.t9 

• Profssjor Hirbtii B. Huffrntn 
Dep^rln.rvt tf M?4r Eatitrn sm*;*! 

' Proftssor Lucttia Mo»ry 

> Df^arr^n^I cf Hti^tU,* 

• Vrll ••-lir C.l.u« 

EI:h5rd H. Tetlt. ■ . 
(=cu:'Cir o) UIIS In \u—> 
Friia Ulley 

Ronald G. V/ol>> 

fr'c'nW. Soth.Tunn 

Rlchird C^ Stearnt 
t.itcmstl^af Attain Vic* Pm(cl4nt 
t'.iltcd sulci NahOAjl iluatnl 

Frank C Siltran 

LawY*r, Awlaor - 

Joiepli 0. Thompion . _. , 

Pflil Direcltj* • • 

Lv^^'"on Wodd padvrallon In tM 

lAliiH till 

Tnt Pev. ChariM R. Ilplie 

Prairlt Vlll»«, Kanut 

Pabbi Elmer Bersar 

Ka« York citr 

r-fofcnor Karl Stowamr 

-. Profetior Barbara Slowitttr 

Ojpartmsnl et Arabic 
I tA»r,Un4 Univenlly 

Gjorge M^rdikiart 

Aul»*r, Ltclunr, Huniannartu 

Fred Ellinghaui , . 

B«jl«e/. CotoaD* 

Pro'eiior Millar Burrow* 


otr, Ya 



Dc^iailin^nl of SIJI;, Rrllm 

Profcisor Ceorgu'Houranl - 

UnUirlily <r( Mkmvar. 

Profenor Hiiham B. SKarabi 

D«p*rln"»nl 0* HM'-rY 
Ce.>rHil«Mn Unr.trl'lr 

'Mr. HujSO. Auchinilou 
Pfofsisor Ri:h»rd P. Ste»eiM 

■ "■A. Wiliard'jon'ei "'' -'■ 
■ ' Pasi SKreltrr' American Prfii 
^•>'.iiiK>n, Samalla.-i. J^<Ca» 

. K. 8roo<co Anderfon » 
, . FcrmerlY Ktzr Em ChftHa'a 

. Council (cr Sd.saa Viarn 

"Thomaj J. ASxrcrombit 
.Wrnar, LtcTjrtt 

.' Professor Errert McCaruJ 

D<ol. <j* Star Eait Lan:uaM> 
. •* MKJi<',aa 

• Profctjor 01:9 Grabar . 
Det'l. bi Near Eaii.rn Ail ■. 


mphrer V/ttz 

Ic RIIat.o«i» _ 

el ANi/1 S 


Ai(i!Uuon» Irnrd for idenui/cicoo oalf- 
ed by Tbt Ad Hoc CommUi,. en tht MUJ!^ Etil 


■ Mtchtn 

> (are of Frjmk Suirs:i, St:rrUrj. 
tiitle, M^n^"^ 



rownt«im — fulkn SI. i DtKjil) .«vj. li:01 Consy hUrJ-Vftmild Av«, IW. WihSt 11224 

B«nIcn^«^l-£6l(l St. I l?iri Ave. 11214 Eietn icftj-Cr«tn Acres Sfto;;,ng "ctnfer 

IIiUb«Ii-A«. J island Ave. 11230 S'jnis! HiS-"3^ Vjiljy SIrtJn, N. t. 11532 

Mill coupon to any DIME oMn li'ttH ibov* 

As » starter. I enclose $ . 


Q/ 1 y«j' lat«st toljl ( 

(Mini(numdepositJ5.00. Maximum JS\ /q ind compouVsled 

deposit $25,OiOO en Individual Accounts; jjj qujrtetiy 

$50.0ClOinTrust or Joint Accounts). . >-»' 

Please open a savings account: 

□ In my name alone Q Jointly with Q In trust for 

O Mr. 

d Mrs. a Miss 




NOTE: C»sh should b» sent registered mail 

Member Federal Deposit In 





comp«)ifoa f»r 
'— « compiiiioit 

inrf t> 

Y. W« th« ■nrfcnf^nctf ipp««l f« «ll m* 

tJit A/«& refugcct in<rets«d In numktr by f 

wMch Inclutfct rnpc«t f»r lh« rtfttftci •• vrfl ai 

Mtlf4«fic« to h* ylvcn th«fn fr*«fr «nd ti«n>po1itic«ll 

W t(r«fi SI ijulckly m ponjbic* : .. ^ _ 

2. W« «ppf«l ff* lh« lir*«li C«v«(nm«tif U rripcct th 

•ntf ihrtnn ef liUm whfch «r« «t preMnt undfr lir«cli juthority 

■ftrf to iA«k« them freely trtAtM* f»r w«nhip «nd vtneration 


). Wc «ppeil t0 th* n 
h<cp th« vclFjr* of th< 
Ihclr de!ib«rAficni en f 
• ban^n thi? world fsrui 
4. Our appeal li 
especially »n4 U a 
Inrimatcly and ic 

mbcr itjtes of th* Unifed Halieni r*. 

propTci Involved foremojl in mind In 
Middle Eatf critrt and to rcfuM |a '' 

fe Cold War di9'«<ilont and Intrt^uea. 
9n behalf of the pcoplrt of the Third World^ ... 
'ratcrnal one made by Individwalt vho Identify' 
pectfudr with their (radttiani and crcaliv* 

• .- Th^ClmkriJa- ioiT 
CO. Bt 

niilf!e_CaUirj (srj 
I 128, Cambridge, Ma 

Respect anJ Human 



fictul lilt of SiiniloilM: ■ 

TK. UfV.n S./irli, 

Mirll.if j:,>. nj 

lurry Pvryi;. B.ojkl>n. ll'kamjra, ' 

Pr-f. Rasa?:, 

Re/ I ItomohreY W)*r, 

Jj-." C T-evor. 

ihj.rrru". %(-ul. 

Cj;rioi.c v.jrt.-r. iivc- 

H:-i;fM-lT,.in. c;tt 


■ Un.y. of Co.OradOk 

N Y C. 


fret. CeoT» W', 

Wo'iaTim?.* *i p. 

jn) M).n« ouice. 

Chlrhrc Ttub:r, 

Prnf. E.l»ra-d Busin, 

Day.d ir. S:ow-. 



Wfymium. /.\---T 

M""-!-' Fi'-,.-,'o, 


EjsIoo Un.yerily. 

Ili.'.cnil Ccjr^ilof 

prof. V.orr.s laiercyvill. 

pTpr. Hoam OvomilT, 

MT- E- 5?h.rr Wnci, 

Un y.rvlr Hbranr. 

F-li Troi-r.l.-IT. 

Assad E. SSonan, 


Smilri Coilege- 

! MIt. 

Boslon, f\Jii 


Pry Chj'IfJ l«a»:. 
Columo-a Un.y.-rsily, 


lan:y H.CL-S. 

AVs 4d-l( df C. H.ll, 

Fnl. Mo^^mm-(^, 

Prof. CSarlf, Ji-f-e 

V.-! inrt Tj,:|:'cr 

Pnf. ItcTlljAlownr, 

Bculder, Colorado. 

B.-sUn U.n.v. 

Eosfcfi Vnivfz:^, 5; br'.-^!. 

Sot«. ^.-w Vo'kC.l 

• Pf-I. T. Cuylcr Younn 

Wcllpsley. -^ E,„„i F-siT. 

Dr. Fr^nc.s H. Horn, 

P/or. W S:l>l»» Ir«n.r, 

Prof. CliuieCaitn. * 

Rtv G. B!i?'l..Sinl. 

Prnf Ray. L. Cleve'an^, 

CjfS'iII, 11 Y. 

lorrr.r President, 

D )!»lirr! OnKltr, 
n Ro»il Insl.f.'.e r;r 

Prof Ela.f>3, 

Simmons Coi'cl?. 
Prof. Mvr.« Hjll-. f<II. 

SI- 6:na/.nlurf 
Ur..e'Vlr, NY. 
Rfnp Ta.r.n cr. wrilcr; 

Rot^'t Buron. Io'me< 

Minuter of Frmr^ 

Cibinel a-5 Vi-.e 

Univ. cl S) 
P.Silj J. Canem, 
YiOl!ta-o. U H. 

E. A K„l„,jr., 

Rider C-.llese, N J. 
Prcf, V/.llian> r. 

Rn:d? ivand 
Pror Join E. Y/wrell, 
.Pn.lio, Uni, 

11 IfilfjrsficnsI ^l^alrj 

RfV CXarIti H 
Dc»t.. N H. 

P-cf. PrJcrl Wc<ibb-/i, 
SI Jv.eobs CoIlM!. 

Prei. of vrc'Id 
A«'x: l;> WjrM 

Prol. Francis E. Psle.l, 
N Y,U. 

S:.-e-,or,n,, Duke 

Pry J A-a'co'm 
WcCaluTi, Pb.lliet 

Prof Wirihall C. S. 

Dr. SjmuO J. Kerser. 

FfCeral on. 

Prof Herbert B. Huff. 

MicSael Horn. fJarvard. 

V'^ vers ty. 
Pro'. Pa.jt B. Invii, 

Hc^5Mn. Urtiv. cf 


Prof Rcharif Slime, 

tnzn, Jshns Hcokmi. 

R.cnard ^r Teti.e. 

, Chcno. 
t*Y VInwY p. Vn 
■ [l-Jirn. i>reiH.nt 
Erft'Hin. Union 
IhfOl Scm'njry. 

Dr. tir >1J^3I. 

Y?rp W'dcji Sdioal. 
Je»n ijr Bf-^r. ie«. 6en. 

P.L H. Ct'tl- 
L'tlcaire Intcrnv 

Jacoy^s fl»nfct, 
• •:->r, f-antj. 

Rrr 0;-j E rioHlt, 

Day 1 Pr,.tkar<. 

Prcf J. Rjlani Ramirrr 

DuQuasr.e Un,v?.-s ly^ 
M'!! Ruin 8. Ilandhn, 

Prol C. Filihtsb 
Sora^'ns. AfF.ansai 
FrelEllnjbjus. 111. 

Fcur-cr-r U S. InlorTna- 
lion Sery.cts Pn Israel. 
;As Wcgar,; j.'cKay. 
A^? B- Icb-Par- a'T>enl 

Pro' «!-.> H.Hall, 
Xin , oINt. 
/ Hj-:shire. 

1 PtrT-, Emma»>ycl, pset 

tional; S"C Cm. 


R)«l lie. 

B:jl.rf r, Co;. 

Ga^e Borden, Harvard, y 

'P.-r £rr,,l Br^m, 

Ami! rfe Te.ihard 


Joel ;n:n^,,. P-rc-lon. 

R'CVrdC. S'Mms. v/ 

Ct'd'l^n U., Cmaf.a. 

11 Rr<»n i.lvw, ■ 

lie CharcJ.n. f rarcf. 


«- an-l Mfs, Dana'd 

Brc»n.,.. Cla-rminf 

1»M.S/ lnt.-nal.:nn 

P-.'. G-nn Pe-rr. 

n f^,rx>„ f,.~.ii 

Prct Sluin C. C^i. 

P-V r.'urray Erfen, 

M-.lan, Siull Al.-,ta. 


md.)., S'ale U. 

H >»r«,v. CommKftf, 

U.iiv. 01 V asMf.g'^o. 


R»v K^^st.l J, 

Prof CI'O GraOar. 

us' I'll-S-J':"' 

P-o- Ja-^-s JA. Pet •> 

. C»mb,i^,f 
Pre*. K;cl3lat Hpcr, 

Arr Ab'jnjm, 

hT.t: Yvc-r> C-iauffin. 

Fore'.l Hilis, N Y. 


s-i. Cia'f— ,nl Cel --d' 

Oy.nrr, ».r«i. 

vi.-iltr, f rjntf. 

Mr and f.'.rs td^ard 

Frank Mirij. Bnsl-n. 

Dii--IG V-l'l-sb. 

P.-i;' E^IJ^•"l Hcck.-i, 

S'f.'.srl Sjntfcfi, 

M ^4 Yvonne Hcm'.y 

Jacn^ii-n, Laurence, 

AVs. Pal*ic-a kremefs, 

P4;.<? V.:e.Pr.s 

Sm In Cnilidi. 

Rotbunr, Oos'o^ 



D-nvrr, Col. 

fo- Inl-rna- «lla r). 

Pr.'f HanmvdeH Atdal 

ScMriTifl. Hitviri 
«».. Pcltr R.5., 

PrJ V,' llnni Korn..str, 

Un,». or ..nsvjchui'l^l. 
Mr-.>erl r.^*scn. Harvard. 

J. d -y Wc:«frrT, 

WiME.-'.n Wrntcnl, 

Adfibfl J.'assn, (r.cndi 
Srnool. Fa. 

Prcf Josn RuMt. 
Ctoffleio/rn Univcrs-lr 

J:'n V'.M, Vr , >A 

U 5 hal. S'Jdcfl 
fArs Jin.l 5 B elb/. 

A'., Co-lese, 
Pr-.f C-a-d E Casoarr 
S-'.ln Cdl.cse. 

P'or. lool) K^rrpf, fAJT 


Dcrc^-yt-r. r.ia«. 

P:ol r/.r!.-, tii;„ 


Pi.Te, H.Y. 

Rey. Ja-nei E. Pierce, 

Prof. Ojv.4 Da e^tl, 

Pfcf J;r.e'd Kjir. MIT. 

Ja-ri ijrjh.n,. 

lo.ilfi, V;ellesl«y. 

»u-:*i D Aucfilndoss, Jr. 

Prof Sl-nUy D.a-n-:n<, 

Br rul 


Oji'tr. f.'«l. 

Prcf. Kfnal H Karpat 

K V C. 

K-.Scl-Mlcf Social 

Frank S'.vran. 

Prcr P.1111,0 Morhlon, 

Hpre'erjon, Cam&<ida», 

R.C'i-4, P-;.tanJ 

/.'..•sr/i-y JoO'l 

R.-s-)th. H Y.C. 



Ul-f D ■■.<••„ 

Rev E- J la'irrnrlhy. 
Sober eclair. 

Vet'b 0, Ha-vard. 

Pr-f. J. Hrnr, Korson, 


P-»'. Rlth»r< fnt. 

Prrt V; J Cr.i- 


r 8-0-ke Ar.-."-s'n, 

Un.v cf A'.ais-cbiiells 

A'3''a7rrtd T. A'.ehdI. 


■ ».ii.|(. CtXo>a3i>«S'«lf 

IV-v AMI i-1-n.n.a, 

Pro,.-lrr:.. R 1. 

EfC SnrcTder, Cc.r c 

>«rt'ijfd r/cnrfi. Ballon. 

t-r.i.frr !liJOA, 

D-. Wild C.-hanl, ■ 

Prof Tlo-nas fijif, Uni 

ll■a-^ic Arl, Fm» 

R-crl A. r/rrdr, eredl- 

'^^ •"•! r.'f% H->r'y R 

Prof. H.iicn Smiii, Mir. 

J^enosba, Vr.'.cacs.n. 

vers ■< cl Ptmsyl/ana 

dini, Cr»d^a'--S'u- 

Alkift^w. Biootl.p?, 

V'l. rem fotoM, 

Wri, Oi ,ry IcV.r, RN 

W.llai H Or-ton. 

Mr, l.-.icnlm P-abody, F. Sml'h. HI 

f.r's lor Ptl,«-e 


Ont «a. I( Y 

Ca-nbr.du, Aran. 

l.tra-inn, EyjnsloB, Hi 

R(' .f, Havcnd'on. 

fAr.'lUatForu |lvi 

Th« Cariibrl.lE., CcmiTilHes may 
Tl.lf^ WotM.-Conlrlbutlonj for 

cir-d fr^r bll.lio 
elief be 

r,ii>liles Aiirl oilier scholarly 
ent lo the following oreaniz 

nine the .Mir1.U« L'rsat and tho 


U.S. Senate, 
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 

Washington, B.C., May 20, 1970. 
D. B., 
Yankton, S. Dak. 

Dear Mr. Gellhaus : T appreciate knowing of your opposition to Section 222 
of the President's Postal Reform Bill, H.R. 17070. 

It has been my feeling that public employees should have the right to join 
a union, but that membership should not be a mandatory incident of their 

I have other serious questions about this legislation and I am glad to have 
your views on it. 

With every good wish, I am 
Sincerely yours, 

(s) George McGovebn. 

U.S. Senate, 
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry, 

Washington, D.C., September 12, 1968. 
Reed Larson, 

Executive Vice President, National Right To Work Committee, 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Mr. Larson : Thank you for your letter of September ninth, and for 
enclosing the materials on the right-to-work issue. 

As you know from my vote in 1966, I favor retention of Section 14-B of the 
Taft-Hartley Act. While I have not made a final judgment on the Federal Em- 
ployees Freedom of Choice Act my inclination is to support it. 
With every good wish, I am 

(s) George McGovebn. 



Exhibit No. 160 

The people are 
coming to San Diego 

- The fottanng aormuniqut ia fpcm th« 
r rij^.qo Co nyant-l.rm CoaUtio n. a group of people • 
developing an election year strategy focusing I 
on the Republioan national Convention to he 
held in San Diego August 21-24. 

AUGUST 2l5t - 24th, 1972 . . . 

The nUbUshiiMnI of th* city of iSaa Diego (but not its people) wHl 
play boat to the Republican National Convention. This present . 
"executive committee of the rutin| cla>" will meet in the 6V2 million I 
dotUr Sports And*. "V 

At the same time, people of Sao Diego, through the San Diego 
Convention Coalltian (SDCC). will play boet to (he people of the 
United States. The p«ople wlli gather in the streets and parks of the' 
elty- " . _'. . 


How It Ended Up In San oSgal '' ' ' 

News that the Republican Conventian waa coining to S*D Dlage 
was met with objections tft>m moat of the people of the city and eves 
some oftlciais (the meet vocal of whom are out of ofOoa now). By Itr 
the strongest oblections were about the cost of hosting such an event 
The city had to come up with an initial bid of 1.5 miUiun doUan, and 
estimates for the total cost are running between 2.5 and 4 miilioa 
dollars. Despite assurances by pro-convention Republicans that a» 
city money would be spent, San Diegans realized that it would be the 
people wiio eveatutUy pay. 

The same modve, money, is what's bringing the convention to Sao 
Diego. Shoaton Inns, a subsidiary of LT. & T., came up with 
$400,000 to round out the initial bid. Sheraton owns two hotels lo 
San Diego and to bnlidlng a third. I.T. & T. has gained valuable 
Udelaods to build cable factories in San Di^o through the local Port 
ComnilaBon, which is supposedly controlled by C. Arnhoit Smith. 
Smith was Nixon's largest campaign contributor io 1968. The clindMr 
is Harold Geneen, I.T. & T.'s Preadent, who was cQ-fiind raising 
chairm^ with Smith in 1968. 

ThereTs more. Eight days after the aiuouncement that San Diego 
would Ik the sit» of the Convention, the Justice Department dropped 
an anti-trust suit against I.T. & T. The out-of-court settlement allowed 
I.T. & T. to acquire the 1 bUiion dollar Hartford Insurance Company. 
C. Amholt Smith got the prestige of hosting Nixon and his convention 
(as well as substantial income through his local busiocssea), the 
Rep;;aUcaos got 1.5 million dollara, and the people of San Dlago wff 
eventually pick up the bills. 

Because of thto then is a better chance than evn l>efore that mai^ 
of the local dtizeos wQl become involved in, or be sympathetic with, 

Jainonat CTtlona. 

What's At Stdwr 

The Coalition isn't planning d^Bonstrationa af tlia Republkatloii 
CoDventiou just so we can have a liberal Democrat for president (Wa 
know enough history to know that it was Ken^y who Siat seal 
large oumlMn of U.S. ground trt>ops to Indochina.) We're moving 
agaioat Nixon and the Republicans because they are the present 
guardlais of the intetasta of the American establishment They are the 
moat visOta, tandble proponents of U.S. imperialism, sexism and 
racism, and of the teprcasiop ' '•at underlies all that 

tatlona In S an Diego are a crucial part of the-r«n«« nt 


h _ 

^in San Diego we wiu give Nlxoo a bee t«lo b U^ Cffilation of the war 
and increasingly repressive domestic polidea. Iluough massive demoo- 
strations hoe we can shatter the IBusion of domestic pacification that 
to so essential to Nixon's program. 

Demonstrations in San Diego, a major military center, also give lu a 
opportunity to develop tlie Ifaisiauce^ovemeBt within the 
armed forces. Organizing for massive demonstrations can hdp turn the 
military apparatus into a Trojan hooe by conaoUdatiog wid»«ptMd 
internal diautistaetlon and accelerating instabOlty within the miDtarjr. 
The pivaent oian In the U.S. are opening up many people to 
altemaUvas from the Left, sod the San Diego actlvitiea can ^e many 
" ^ the n a first chance to express their diasattotacUon publidy. 
Maailva, nonviolent demonstratioas withdivene constituency reptw- 
lantatka wHl have Important effects, both directly 00 the partld- 
Puita, gIviDgJiNB a new sense of strength and unity, and indirectly 
«B Dm miBioDa who wiD watch 00 TV. If people ttom dl over the U.8. 
pour into Sao Diego to join local people In maadva, nonviotont 
pcoteat using creulva tactla that show our scriousoaas, we wil 
provide an ioatrucUve cootraat to the Republieao rubber-stamp 
renomlnation of Richard NIxi ^^ 

The a*a Dlia«» CojRoa b soada ap of psopls troo a «Ma variety 
of local coauBtialty gnupa, iodudli« OX'a, itiiisata, anti-war roupa, 
u dla tll isa. profwalnads, and andaayouiid nawsp spats We aaa also 
wwklag with pwipie acnias the coualn who ahan ou poOtted loala. 

indudhig the raopla's Co ition -f or Peace and Jutl«a, Ndlo^ 
Lawyers Guild, Paaea AcUoa Council of L.A., and Antl-bspealaUal 

i^Coaiitloa of the San Francisco Bay Ana. 

flprr has evolved a very flexible structure so It can meet rapidy 
cban^hg conditioos. Anyone who agrees with our goals and prindplcs 
and who to active in one of its component parts (committee, task 
' ^ree, or m. J>lwr collective) is a member of the Coalition. At present, 
genenl membenlilp meetings are held every week to consider policy 
questions and do intenul education. A Coordinating Committee, 
made up of representatives selected by each of the component parta, 
meets more frequently. There are also Third World tad women's 

^ caucuses in SDCC. ^\^ 

iu^olitiCT^M]yj^^jjUjlgjJjyjtlh^G^^^are: *-7^^ 

"l)*^r3eWBi^ai^mmediateen^t^ftin8^ro of the war lo 
Indochina. Specifically to expose and stop the barbaric, escalatlBg 
technological air war and to demand acceptance of the Peace Plan of 
the Provisional Revolutionary Goverrunent of South Vietnam. 

2) To expose and struggle against the increasingly unpopular domeatie 
policies forced upon the people of the U.S. by the existing economic 
and political structure. 

3) To mobilize a massive array of people united In their oppodtion to 
the war and in their determination to take control of thdr own Uvea. 

4 ) To accderate the growth of ongoing movements capable of leading 
and sustaining peoples' stmggles both locally and natlonaOy. 

We in the Coalition have agreed to work together according to the 
following prinicples: 

1 ) We will form tbe broadest posaibla coalition to nonviolently and 
openly oppoae and confront the Republican Party leadership. We saek 
to build a strong radical movement that cannot be used or absort>a4 
by tbe Democratic Party and which will include: Third World peupla, 
G.l.'s and veterans, working people, the unemployed, gay peopta, 
women, students, and freaka. 

2) In ttiis coalition and In all the work we do we will reject and 
struggle against dl forms of domination based on race, sex, and daaa 
evploitation. We will try to bring about ui oursdves and in o<u 
manner of working with one another those human changes whkk 
must accompany politlcd and economic dunges in order for our 
revolution to succeed. We win struggle against racism, sexism, and 
class chauvinism io oursdves as well as in all others with whom we 
wofk, and will seek continuaUy to isolate and understand the root 
causes of the tendencies in each of us to dominate, manipulate, and 
control- Skills and experience will be shared broadly among members 
of the coalition and a consdous effort made to provide opportunity 
for those less experienced to grow stronger in revolutionary skills, 
understanding, commitment, and confidence. 

3) Because much of our strength will depend on massive numbers of 
people coming to the dty, we will make contact and work with 
groups and individuals throughout the U.S.. especidly in the western 

We are engaged in an experiment with a new model for naQoiid 
actions based on deep roots in the host community. As members of 
San Diafo groups we fed a respondbrljty to coordinate activities 
taking place In San Diego during the Republican Convention. But out 
commitment to San Diego does not end in August. It lasts far beyond. 
A local movement is t^ing the initiative to organize 3 national action, 
an action of international significance. The chdienge will be two-fold; 
foe the locd movement to be flexible and be able to incorporate new 
paople bom other areas Into ^e decision making process in a 
democratic manner and for tbe people from other areas to have a 
^eat sensitivity to the toed sitviation, the work that has gone on 
before they arrive and that will continue after August 


Codition plans for the Convention have two thrusts: 1) to 
demonstrate our dissent agdnst tlw exbting system, and 2) to 
demonstrate dtenutlyes as a concrete indication' of the kind of 
aociety we are determined to create for oursdves. 

All of us in the Codition (and we cover a broad spectrum of cadlcd 
politics) are convinced tbat violence will prove counter-productive at 
thto time and place. The more disciplined and together we are , the 
more likely It Is that we will be able to get our message across strai^it 
without it either being used to thdr advantage by tbe Right or 
coH>pted by liberd Democrals. 

SDCC has begun planning some projects to build towartls August 
and for the time of the Convention itsdf. At thto point we are also 
keeping time open for specialized actions around targets of various 
conatituendes' choodng. Other actions could range all the way f^om 
conUnued masdve marches to small constituency actions to dvil 

Our plans to date Uidude: 


Expo«e '72 

DemoBstnting dissent b just one thing we wint to do during th« 
Coaveotlon. We also want to create a setting In which people can learn 
firona each other about the speciflc oatuie of our country and the 
worid we lire in, and the state of the movement. 

We wQl create a humanized People's Worid's Fair, called Expose 
*72. This will be a large expositioQ about the victims of injustice and 
their liberation struggle*, the institutions, and ideas which perpetuate 
this injustice, and some visionary but practical alternatives to the 
oppressive system we live under. 

Groups and individuals coming to San Diego are invited io send us 
their Ideas for Expose *72 between now and August, and to bring 
fBms, programs, exhibits, etc.. with th«n. There should be exhibits by 
BlacV, Chlcano, Native American, Asian, poor, gay people, women 
and youth in this country, as well as international tehibits on China, 
Cuba, Vietnam, Palestine, Africa, and Latin America. We could have 
workshops, films, and a video net that would lintc all the people 
together. Hie art forms and architecture we use would be an 
important part of our cultural experience. 

We could use Expose '72 as a base from which to go into the 
community. We can plant things, build things (playgrounds, recon- 
structing condemned buildings, etc.), teach school, etc. People might 
want to canvass door-to-door, inviting all San Oiegans to Expose *72 
and our other activities. 

Tlie People*8 Flatforrii 

The People*s Ratform is the unifying political statement of the 
demonstrations. It draws together the demands for action against 
imperialism, racism, sexlam, exploitation of labor, police and judicial 
repression, and poverty. 

The People's Platform is seen as an organizing tool that can be used 
throughout the country, particulariy in states that hold primaries. A 
nationwide People's Platform campaign would raise basic issues ratbw 
than merely focusing on candidates. Candidates could be confronted 
with the platform and forced to take stands on It, hopefully at both 
the Republican and Democratic Conventions. •- 

If broadly based enough, the Platform could be used as a means of 
uniting the efforts of the Left to relate to new constituencies and hdp 
to bring about a considerable degree of unity with already committed 

Finally, we see the Platfonn as a tool to help mobilize pepple 
around the country and point the way to San Diego. 

SDCC k moving tUttmA to pin support of national organizations 
and coalitions for the idea of a People's PUtfoim. If ^ tesponas la 
favorabl* enough, we hope to bring together a natkm^ conference to 
ratify tt 

TTie PetitijMt 

SDCC is circulating a petition in San Diego County opposing the 
holding of the^epublican Convention here. The petition attacks the 
Republican's policies of war and repression and points out that the 
people of San Diego will be taxed to pay for the Convention even 
though they had no say in bringing it here. The petition is both an 
educational tool and a way to create a public climate for the 
demonstrations that Is as favorable as poaible. 

Logistics and Governance 

Besides tactical planning SDCC is \aking re«pooslbtlity tor the 
logistics of AugU'4 This Includes getting pennits for marches and 
unusual land use. making sure that water, Food, and sanitary facitities 
are available, vni. ^ care Is organized, and that legal and medical 
assistance Is mobilized. 

While we can do the preparatory work In these areas, moH of the 
real mprk will have to be done by the people coming here. SDCC Is not 
offering hotel services to the movement. 

T^p mo«t lmj>ortant demonstration during the (invention will 
simply be ourselves. How we act in the encampments and during 
actions wilt he the critical message conveyed. Contingents will have to 
And ways to govem themselves, lead themselves, and provide for 
themselves from the resources available. The sense of social responsibi- 
lity wf show towafots ouiDwtvet inayb« more important (hu owr 
speeches a nd writt en docuBWntL 


3«« Ditto, "72 Is DOi Chicago *M. Local ofTlclalls. hoping for a 
boost In convtntion trade for San Diego, don't want a repeat of the 
1968 Demoeratic Convention demonstrations. Nixon wants a quiet 
convention to show the worid he has nailed the coffin shut on dhaent 
in America. WhUe masaive security arrangements are being developed, 
the muter plan seems to rdy nwre on co^ption than violent 

Instead of discouraging white youth from coming to San Diego in 
August, the c^ty has taken a conciliatory line. It has aiuiounc«d Its 
willingness to 'give" demonstrators Fieata Island during the Conven- 
tion. It has announced that demonstrations can take place along 
Sporta Arena Blvd.. paralleling the Convention site. Chief of Folic* 
Ray Hoobler has called the Convention the "greatest experience" of 
his life as a police officer and said he realizes certain laws may have to 
be bent to accommodate a large influx of demonstrators. Rumors of 
rock concerts and festivals to be held concurrently with the 
Convention are abundant and at least one promoter has approached 
the city already with his plans for a festival 30 miles out of town. 

City officials perhaps realize that a large number of youth involved 

in a dope and music festival during the Convention will actually be 

* good press instead of having an adverse effect. The gut issues will be 

clouded and smothered by the media portrayal of a scene that is fast 

becoming a television re-run - the love and peace Woodstock scene. 

Despite the city's slickness there seems to be a rift developing 
between it and Washington. A recent article in the N. Y. Times quoted 
a city official as saying the Republicans are unhappy with the way 
things are being handled here. Nixon's camp wants there to be no 
demonstrations at all. To apply a bit of subtle pressure to the city, the 
Law Enfot^ceraent Assistance Administration (LEAA) sent San Dies[o's 
request for funds back to the city for revisions. The city has asked for 
$920,000 from LEAA to pay overtime salaries, purchase riot control 
equipment, and provide special training for locE^potice. The city will 
undoubtedly receive a large sum of money from LEAA; how much 
may depend on the city's decision on how to use it. 

In case the cooptation route fails, San Diego Is making extensive 
preparations for potential trouble. Security task forces have been 
formed by the city and county. Between Uje two, a total of 1.800 
uniformed police will be on duty on 12-hour shifts. Using the 
state-wide mutual aid plan, police can be brought in from A 
surrounding counties. Upon request, all available -California Highway 
Patrol officers will be sent to &in Diego. Local National Guard Units 
have already received Civil Disturbance training. Also involved in the 
^Janning are the F.B.I. , Secret Service, and Naval Intelligence. 

The police are working on plans for a computerized radio relay 
system that will allow them to process mass arrests In a short time. 
The police are also looking into Balboa and San Diego Sodiums as 
mass detention sites, should that prove necesary. 

The county purcliased three new helicopteis with an LEAA grant. 
These will be used as airbom observation platfomos. While the police 
can survey any demonstrations, demonstrators mil be unable to 
. survey the cops if the $920,000 LEAA grant goes through. The city is 
pianmng to use part of it to join with Miami In the purchase of a radio 
system which operates on frequencies that citizens cannot monitor. 

The fact that thwe is a split developing between the city and th« 
fe^' make it impossible to know for sure what the final pcrflcy 
towards demonstrators will be. It is obvious that they are trying to be 
prepared to handle any violence that occurs. What they may not be 
able to handle are demonstrations which are disciplined in conduct, 
diverse in participation, uncompromising in content, and beyond their 
power to either co-opt or intimidate. 


We feel that the San Diego Convention Coalition represents a 
creative effort to arrive at mode) for relating local organizing 
and national action. SDCC members have travelled around the 
country in the past few months, t&lking with many different people. 
We do not expect the August actions to be one-shot actions 
detrimental to local organizing efforts. Rather, we think that our 
overall program of local initiative combined with tools like the 
People's Platform can aid people's organizing efforts wherever they 
are. In San Diego, the coming of the Convention has given ua the 
incentive to reach out to the entire city and to unify our movement. 

We need people to move here to work with us for the period 
between now and August — and hopefully beyond. It would be ideal 
if collectives could send one person now, to work wlUi us and crate 
links with their home community, with the rest of^the collective 
following, in August. 

If you are interested in moving here now, get in touch with us. 
Bring all your creative ideas, your innovative skills, as well as cars, 
money, typewriters and otha tools. 

If you can't come now, come in June. If you can't come in June, 
come In August. And If you can't come at all, you can still help. Let 
us know: 

— Your name, if you want to be on our mailing list. 

— If you will distribute literature and posters 

(How many? 10. 25, 50, 100, 500 pieces?) 

— If you can help us financially. 

(25c. $1, $5, $25, $100, those old postage stamps you 
have lying around?) 

— If you can assume responsibility as a regional contact. Hds 
means you will do educational and publicity work around the Issues 
outlined here and bring people to San Diego. 

litis Is a crucial historical period. The job is great, but so are ths 


""^ "*■ ■i4W4>a^^with Justics. 


P,0, Box 826? San niego, CA 9210$ 
Phone (714) 234-32S1 


Exhibit No. 161 



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Exhibit No. 162 

October 28, 1969 


TO: Bob Haldeman 

I FROM: The President 

On the PR side, I think it might be well for you 
to see how Buchanan, Safire et al could have columnists, 
television connmentators and others prepare the way for the 
Lindsay victory in New York. Buchanan correctly estimates a 
substantial Lindsay sweep due to the Procochino collapse. 
The press, of course, will try to interpret this as a referendum 
on Vietnann. It is vitally important that this be nailed prior 
to the election and, of course, be nailed immediately after- 
wards as strongly as possible. Set a task force to work on 
this. It occurs to me that Buchanan and Safire could be logical 
members. For example, if some of the conservative columnists 
like Buckley could hit it and better still if some more in the 
center were to do so it would be helpful. What I am suggesting 
primarily is to predict in advance a Lindsay victory based on 
these major political factors. And then also be ready for the 
counter-attack when they try to build it up as a Vietnam 
1 referendum. 

Exhibit No. 163 






February 4, 1970 

HiG/1 i^hiiJiiiiY 


A couple of points that I did not want to cover in the general meeting, 
but that you do need to move ahead on quickly. 

First, I'm sure you have studied that TV summary done by Buchanan, 
which is a devastating indictment of NBC, especially of David Brinkley. 

Specifically, Brinkley was completely off base factually on his budget 
criticism, and we need to get that one straightened out. 

The need, probably, is to concentrate on NBC and give some real 
thought as to how to handle the problem that they have created in their 
almost totally negative approach to everything the Administration 
does. I would like to see a plan from you; don't worry about fancy , 
form, just some specific thinking on steps that can be taken to try to 
change this, and 1 should have this by Friday.. Get Klein and Ziegler 
both involved in the thinking on this, and I would suggest also Nofziger,, 
who could be very helpful, and perhaps get Pat Buchanan in. In .fact, I thin 
definitely you should get Pat Buchanan in to woTk with you on it; butrnovS 

Another area is the mobilization of the Silent Majority, which we touched 
on briefly in the meeting today. We just haven't really mobiliz;ed them, 
and we have got to move now in every effective way we can to get them 
working to pound the magazines and the networks in counter -action to 
the obvious shift of the establishnnent to an attack on Vietnam again. 
Concentrate this on the few places that count, which would be NBC, 
WASHINGTON POST. Don't waste your fire on other things. 

Next point, and this is also highly urgent priority. The State of the 
Union evoked a tremendous number of very strong editorials praising 
the content, delivery, etc. Now we need, very quickly, a well-edited, 
well-packaged, compellingly-presented mailing piece that summarizes 
the highlights of those editorials, especially the ones from surprising 


sources like Reston of the TIMJES, so that we can get out to our people 
especially the reaction that the country's newspapers have had to the 
President's address. 

This is something that should have been automatically done immediately, 
and perhaps it is underway. The point here is that delay makes any 
action much less effective, since it should be an immediate response 
and get out while the speech is still alive. Our main failure in this whole 
area is dullness, and let's not let this effort fall into that category. Get 
it done on good paper in interesting style, rather than just a mimeographed 
glob of editorial excerpts. . . 

This is the kind of thing our Outside Group should automatically pick up 
for us once we get them; but until we have them, we have to fill the gap 
ourselves, and it's terribly iinportant to move quickly on this. Perhaps 
the National Committee can help you with editorial and layout facilities, 
but hold them to very high standards and make it come out good. Leonard 
over there is probably. the best guy for this kind of thing and maybe .. _ 

would be the one to get working on it, but give him about a one -day 
I deadline, so that we get it done instead of talked about. 





Exhibit No. 164 

thc white house 

WAS H 1 N G T O N 

March 3, 1970 

FROM: Patrick J. Buchanan 

The President directed several of us to give thought to how 
to combat the institutionalized power of the left concentrated 
in the foundations that succor the Democratic Party. 

Following are recommendat ions both of an offensive and defensive 
nature -- the major one being the creation of a counter- vailing 
power outside the Federal Government. 

1. The President "should direct an in-house group of people 
preferably outside the Administration to quietly \mdertake a. study 
of the top twenty-five Foundations in this country; to identify both 
their'leadership and power structure, and to indicate which are 
friendly, which are potentially friendly, "vvhich can be co-opted to 
support projects the President supports; and which are hostile to 
us; which are arms of our political adversaries. In addition, an 
inventory should be taken of all snnaller foundations (AEl and Stern), 
which are ideologically and clear pro or con. 

2. The President should direct the Budget Bureau to come 
up -- within one month -- with a listing of all Federal moneys, from 
each Department that goes to Founds ions for studies and research. W 
should have totals and breakdowns on each Foundation. 

3. We should bring together those inside and outside the Wli te 
House with knowledge and interest in the field to determine if one of the 
huge Foundations -- like Lilly or Duke Endowment -- can be convinced' 
to operate on a pro- Administration basis; or whether we need to create 
a new institution. Among those I would include in the discussion would j 
be Harlow, Anderson, Huston, "VVhclan, Buchanan, Dr. Burns, Jeffrey] 
Hart (he wrote some articles on the issue), Glenn Campbell, Bill 
Baroody, Sr. , Frank Barnett -- and other individuals fanniliar with 
the world of the Foundations. 


4. This group would be charged with reporting to the 
President specific options on how we could either influence, take 
over or create a major institution to acconnplish Administration 

5. The Administration should begin -- once this information 
is gathered -- to initiate a policy of favoritism_in all future Federal 
grants to those institutions friendly to us, that want the work -- and 
wc should direct future funds away from the hostile foundations, 
like Brookings. 


However, I think there is a clear national need for a Republican 
Conservative counterpart to Brookings, whicTi can generate the ideas 
I Republicans can use, which can serve as a repository of conservative 
' and Republican intellectuals, the way Brookings and others. do for 
the Democrats. 

Dcpenxiing on the size of the structure ; I can'conceive of it under- 
taking the following political objectives. 

a. Serving as a "parking place" for Adnninistration and 
other Republican-consei-vative intellectuals, where they can work 
at ideas we can use politically, where they can take their sabaticals 

at the same time they are communicating regularly with the Republican 
Establishment in the White House. 

b. A talent bank -- building an inventory of conservative- 

j Republicans in each of the following institutions -- locating the best and 
I most brilliant in the college system and graduate school system; 
I identifying the best conservative reporters and editorial writers 
;■ around the country; locating the conservative intellectuals and 
academicians -- stockpiling all these names in a talent bank , to be 
made available to the Administration, when job openings occur; and 
to be used by the President to fill up future task forces and the like. 


c. Foreign Policy. The President was committed to clean 
house at Stale; \vc have gotten heat on this. The new foundation could ! 
conceivably -- as it developed -- build a talent bank of individuals 

in every area of foreign policy -- five deep -- who might be ready to , 
be moved into the State Department the day after the 1972 victory. , 

d. Judicial inventory. A small group of attorneys and law 
students could -- via phone calls to States, via research, in local and ' 
regional papers, and study of important decisions, prepare for the 
President a national ranking of the most brilliant and most conservative 
of all Federal Judges, and State Supreme Court judges as well. The 
list <:ould be used to move the best of our judges up through the 
judicjial ranks. . 

e. The Institute could provide $15,000 to $20,000 fellowships 
to individual writers and reporters -- to have them expand articles 
into )30oks, which books would be promoted by the Institute. Example -• 
a Mollenhoff is digging up facts on McNamara and the waste in the 
PentcigOB, ^or, a Jeffrey Hart:lia.s. done aisplendidiindictment of ioundalior 
in genexal; or" sQirieone.^lse <Has: SonecarsEriea of?articles con the. network 
the Irislilute'cc(uIdfgi've;]l3ienla:hese'feliovv:^hips-''-i* rwithvthe, sole .stlpuUitic 
that .they tome upwith-aibookjavhichithEiIristitut^JIcouldctKeTi "push. i " . 

d. The Institute might bring together experts — on the netwuiks 
for example -- to discuss and produce a book of papers on their lack of 
objectivity and need for reform. The whole Paul Simpson operation 
in Nfeshville could be brought up and put under the Institute. 

g. Through a monthly newsletter the Institute coiild keep 
conservatives and key Republican thinkers informed of the finest in 
thought that was being generated -- and what the institute was up to. 
You could have associate memberships for $25 a year to pay the cost 
of this communications apparatus. 

h. In addition to identifying the top conservative students, 
the Institute could keep in touch with them through its communications, 
provide perhaps assistance in tuition, and scholarships for summer 
work — to bring them in touch with the best in ideological talent on 
our ^ide of the fence. 


i. The Institute could undertake the kind of routine studies 
for the government -- going now to other foundations -- which could 
provide a regular income, and keep some of the resident intellectuals 
working and earning their keep. 


The funds could come as I see it from three sources? • 

1. The money nnen who are behind the Adnninistration could 
provide the seed money needed for the initial operations which 
would get it underway. Rather than work on an annual comnnitment, 
an endowment would be the best route. 

2. It could be pointed out to all th-e Big Contributors to other 
Institutions, and all the Big Contractors who get Federal money that 
the Institute that should not be lacking for their support is the 
Mac-Arthur Institute, as that as one of the President's favoritesv 

3. All Federal contracts now going to institutions which are 
essentially a-nti-Administration would be shifted to .this jiew baby 
and to other pro-Administration foundations. An ti- Admiriistration 
foundations should be cut off without a dime. One good talk to the 
Cabinet would be all that would be required to get cooperation here -- 
and Budget could be on notice to notify the West Wing if Brookings gets 
any more money. 

4. Federal Agencies would be on notice to think if some 

of their functions might not better be farmed out to the private sector, 
i in particular, to the Institute. 

5. All the high rollers we know would be passed the word that 
I of the charities the President prefers, this one is the best. The Big 

I Supporters vo uld find themselves on White House Guest Lists, while 
1 the friends of Brookings would stay in outer darkness. 

21-296 O— 74 15 


; 1 


One of my primary concerns about this is that it required a 
strong fellow running the Internal Revenue Division; and an especially 
friendly fellow with a friendly staff in the Tax-Exempt office. Am 
not sure we have this right now. 

Second, we could use a greater willingness on the part of 
our Internal Revenue to engage in combat with some of these lesser 
anti-Administration institutions like the Stern Foundation. 

Third, this Institute would rapidly attract a host of investigators 
from the Times; it would provoke stories and articles; and we would j 
have to be prepared to take some real initial political heat as a spin- 
off. Also, word of precisely what the Institute was doing would leak out 

Fourth, it would entail great wrenching for the established 
Institutions like Brookings; and we would have to expect a good many 
fights; and some outraged and adverse publicity on the left. We would 
be striking at the heart of the Establishment -- and we could expect 
a response in kind. 

Fifth, some of the essential objectives of the Institute v^ould havti 
be blurred, even buried, in all sorts of other activity, that woxild be thei 
bulk of its work, that would employ many people, and that v.'ould providei 
the cover for the nnore important efforts. 

Every menial task of government possible should be sent over 
to the Foundation to carry out at cost plus ten. 

Sixth, the Board of Directors would run from right to center of 
the political spectrum; no kooks but unquestioned Pro-Nixon people 
would have to have a complete lock on it; we would have to have people 
there who knew what was up and agreed to it; and then let the hand- 
picked staff run the thing. 


Seventh, the name MacArthur Institute was taken, rather 
k-jsc'nho\ver Institute to prevent the co-opting of part of it by 
■' .,,l)cr of liberal Republicans of the* Scott variety. 

Eighth, the crucial job here is Executive Director. We would 
fi someone knowledgeable, willing to work all hours, loyal to 
.>j an anti-Establishmentarian, broad-gauged, who knew this 
!^$iness and its purposes intimately. Wrong fellow here, a soft- 
ijBcr or a hustler, and forget the whole thing. 

Ninth, we would have to lock it into the Wliite House with probably 
two individuals at the top level -- who had the ear of the President 
at all times -- and who were intensely familiar with the Institute and 
its working. Harlow and Haldeman should do for this. Maybe they 
■should be on the Board of Directors -- though this would be a red light. 

I Tenth, because of the nature of the Talent Bank, we are going to 

(run into conflict with the Wliite House Personnel Shop; but that 
seems to me to be unavoidable; this would be a professional on-going 
job of locating, indentifying and filing the names of pro-Presidential 
people in every area of importance around the country. 

Eleventh, one major problem:" if by chance we should be evicted 
ifrom the V/hite House, one can bet that the new incumbent would put a 
sword to this operation, through IRS, as the first official act on arrival. 
Those involved in the operation would have to carry heavy political 
insurance. At any time, there might be a sudden distribution of 
assets to the stockholders. 

[ Finally, to make something like this go you need the right 

people with the right frame of mind, and a willingness to work. If we 

jl^et the wrong people on the Board, or the wrong individuals running 
it, we would be pouring money down a sewer. 

Can the White House get some moneyed individual to provide 
ithe wherewithall to bring the aforementioned people to Washington to 
Siscuss this and propose something if the President agrees? 



Exhibit No. 165 

T)in wiurn nousi: 

K A I M I N C T O N 


March 12, 19V0 





As you };iiow, the Student Mobilization ComiTiittee and the Young 
Americans for Frecdoira have jointly announced a national spring 
rcfercndum'on Victnain, It is iinportant that we take the lead in 
mal;ing sure that the Administration's position is clearly under- 
stood and not just leave it up to YAF. Also, any effort that we 
can undertalvC to support YAF and other groups who are actively 
supporting our position on this referendum should be explored 
and developed to the fullest. 

U^^iL s^^-^X.. xy^^Of 


T\^E M^ME ©F GaiyL^JAff^OTY 



Slop th3 killing? ... End tl.e fiGhtir.g? . . . Peace er.d frescJom for Asia? . . . ThssG are ths objec- 
\}\'<iS cli Americans should bs &dvocc.'ting. Bui llioy will never ba acco.Tiplishsd by en InimEdiele 

From tii3 beginning of the war until the- piobc-ot tim3, untold nlrocilios have been committed by 
Ihe Commu.nisi forces in the nsme of "liberetion." Thes9- Communist£cres cro planned 
and orijani;=:ed. i hey ?.re an in'.enrr.l part of Communist war policy rivaling in b.'-uicliti' ''""C-- atro- 
cities psrne-fraiod by Iho fJazis in VVo;ld War II. TME PEFlPETRATOi^S ARE REWARDED AK'D 

Whatever America's mista!;oG have been in Vic\ Nam. ihey cannot be remedied by i;-,s horribis 
consEciuencas of irfir,'i?.c.':ati wlLiiorawal. 


"/ think it would 

\bea major mistake 

j to unileAerclly 

■ wilhdfsv,'." 


V/isconsin St3te Journaf 

March 23, 1S58 

"W'hils immediate 
wiilio'rc'.wal would 
end tri3 war, it v/ould 
lose liic paace." 

CBS r.'c-.vs. 
March 12. 1£S5 

'The first consequence, as anyone can foresee, (of immzo'ir.le v/ithdrev/sl) wil! bs the ccld- 
blooded mnsscore of a couple c! miHion South Vlelnzrnese wlio liave put their fe/'-'n and con- 

fidence in the Uriiled States. 

JOSEPH ALSO?. 0:lob?r. 1S59 

Most students support the policy of continued training and arming of the 
Soulfi Vietnamese to defend themselves. Most students do not advocate the 
dangerous policy of "peace at any price." 






April 6, 1970 





On March 12, you asked, in a memorandum to Colson,^! 

Buchanan, Cole, and Magruder, that we aid the student 
groups who are supporting a "no" vote on the April 
campus referendum which poses the question "do you 
support an immediate withdrawal of all American troops 
fronn Vietnam?" . .■ 

We called in the various groups (College Republican National 
Committee, YAF, etc.) to find out what they were doing and 
what we could do to help. We found YAF and the College 
Republicans were doing quite a good job, and we could help 
by (1) having 100,000 copies of the attached throw-away 
sheet printed, and; (2) making the RNC's "WATS" telephone 
lines available to the College Republicans and YAF for 
generating support on campuses throughout the covmtry. 
This has been done. 

In the event you are aware, or wish to become aware, of 
some of the problems in this area, the effectiveness of the 
College Republicans and YAF in battles such as this is 
substantially diminished by the opposition which these groups 
encounter from the Young Republican National Federation 
leadership. For example, even after we met with the YRNF's 
executive director and explained to him the White House's 
interest in supporting those groups which opposed a "yes" vote, 
he attempted to have Jimmy Allison turn down our request to 
print the throw-aways. 

I do not believe we should become involved in the fighting 
among the three youth groups; however, it should be made 
clear to Allison and the others at the Committee, as it was 


in this case, that White House requests are not to be sabotaged 
by any of these groups. 

The Young Republican leadership does not want the White House 
to work with the College Republicans or YAF, and yet on issues 
such as the referendum and the President's forthcoming 
message on the draft, the College Republicans and YAF 
have offered to help. They can do much good on the campus 
for us on issues such as this and we must be in a position to 
call upon them. 

On the broader issue of youth, it has become apparent that 
there are some things we can do to support those student 
groups which generally support us. In this regard, Messrs. 
Buchanan, Cole, Colson, Magruder, and Odle will meet 
Wednesday noon to discuss what we can do to help groups such 
as the United Student Alliance and the Association of Student 
Governments. Both of these groups have offered to distribute 
materials for us, and the former may have potential as an 
alternative to SDS. 






AprU 30, 1970 \ 




I think you should see the attached report from Young Americans 
for Freedom on the April national campus referendum question, 
"Should the U.S. Immediately Withdraw All Its Troops From 
Vietnam?" Although we lost, 43,000 to 25,000, the margin 
was much better than it would have been had we not acted. 
Also, the vote represents less than 2% of the college student 
population in the United States. 

As the attached blue-colored sheet shows, YAF did much to 
support us - at our request. Do you think i t would jz^pi^inappro- 
priate for us to draft a letter for the President's signature 
thanKing ilTe~o rga nizatjoi 

cc* Mr. Buchanan 
Mr, Colson 










CZ432PED 4/30 






July 9, 1970 




In the Harris poll done for the ACE on students' attitudes, 
there is a question that says in effect, do you agree or 
disagree that America will be in trouble as long as it 
continues its arrogant imperialist policies - 70% agreed. 

Let's figure out a way to get some mileage out of this 
and some similar questions in the Harris poll and use them 
as a way of discrediting the Harris poll. Maybe give the 
stuff to Human Events or some of Buchanan's friends and 
get them cranking on it. There is a lot of dirty work that 
could be done here and should be. Get a copy of the poll 
and figure out what you can do and let me know. 



Exhibit No. 166 

the white house 


July 16, 1970 



. As I indicated to you the other day, we need to get some 
iii creative thinking going on an attack on Huntley for his 
ii statements in Life. One thought that comes to mind is 

I getting all the people to sign, a petition calling for the 

i immediate removal of Huntley right now. 

The point behind this whole thing is that we don't care 
about Huntley - he is going to leave anyway. What we 
are trying to do here is to tear down the institution. 
Huntley will go out in a blaze of glory and we should 
. attennpt to pop his bubble. 

'Most people won't see Life Magazine and for that reason ,,,^ , 
I am asking Buchanan to draft a statement for ti ie -Vice~~ j''^/y^i^A^ 
President to give. We should try to get this statement on 
television. Obviously there are many other things that we 
can do, such as getting independent station owners to write 
NBC saying that they should remove Huntley now; having 
broadcasting people look into this due to the fact that this 
is proof of biased journalism, etc. 

Let's put a full plan on this and get the thing moving. I'll 
contact Buchanan and forward copies of iny correspondence 
with him to you so that you will know what the Vice President 
:is doing. 


Exhibit No. 167 

September 1 1, 1970 


Please try to develop an ad iKat can bo run hitting tbe 
radical liberal thcino of tho Vice Proaident'o epooch 
^ith opocliic focuo on Cambodia. 

Even the Lou Harris poll nov/ ehows that tho public 
reaction is 2 to 1 favorable regarding Ctunbodia ao- 
wo ha.v<o & real asset if we figure out bow to ueo it. 

The thing to do is to yr»ako an asoet for uo oat of thoco 
V7ho took /; pooilioa again.'st Cambodia. Ttio ad chculd 
taJJc about tho radical Jibei*als and th;;n probabiy Hot 
them by namo - that ic, thoae c;3.Euiidatca that we^*o 
trying to defeat thie fall • pick tip some of tho quots« 
as tho Vice Prenidtnt in hia apoech of tlilngo that 
they said cl the timo about the Cambodia operation and 
tlien cnake the point td:^how wrong they were. 

You probably ought to got Buchanan to give you eomo 
guidance on how to put thie thing together. It should be 
a very tough ad and could be very effective if done right. 
I*3t*o see a draft on it within a v/eok or bo. 



Exhibit No. 168 

\VA r ) 1 1 K c T o :»• 


December 1, 1970 








/V / 

■Attaclied 3Tje:T)0 to you of 
November 25, 1970 

Instead of going alicad v/ith the project of developing an 
in-House columnist wliose work we would then use as 
the basis for general mailings, it has bec3i suggested 
that v.'C covild do better by usijig Victor Lasky in this 

iBecause Easky is already an established, syndicated 

colu]Tinist and, because of his willingness to cooperate, 

Ave can accomplish the saine objective by providing 

him with the kind of things that we want to use for distri- 

ibution - ask him to do colurrms on them, and then get 


'reprints of his colurrm to use as mailing pieces to the 

people we want to direct the information to. 

Will you please proceed on this basis, instead of on the 
basis of the original suggestion. 


Exhibit No. 169 

December 11, 1970 




Baocd on thio morning'c meeting we have begun moving on €\e followingsj 

J, Ten telegramc have been drafted by Buchanan. They will bo 
cent to TLME and NEWSV/EEK today by 20 names around the 
country fronn our letter writing tystcm, CopioD are attached. 

2. Letters to Coborne and Sidoy will be sent tomorrow. Tho 
letters, as drafted, follow the line of the Earnplea delivered . 

3. 1^'cters<;.e<.litc.vr. of the TIJ.-IES, POST, .STAR,' CHICAGO ^ 
DAILY KEWS, 5T, LOV13 POST DISPATCH are. being, prepared 
and sent. - ■ 

4. Nofziger is having statementa placed in the CONGRESSIONAL 
RECORD. Once they appear, they v/ill be printed and distri- 
buted together with favorable colunnns to editors, publichcrs, 
business leaders, and other opinion leaders. 

■■ • • . ■ ■■ ■ I 

5. Nofziger has contacted Victor Lasky, who has agreed to run ' 

a column. Nofziger will also contact Lawrence, Kilpa.trick 
and Paul Martin. ■ 

6. The NEW YORK TD-.IES Op Ed page statement is being drafted 
by Keogh. Nofziger is also preparing a draft. Klein ic probabl 
tho best signatory. A call is in to Salisbury concerning place- 
ment of the piece, . ■ :■ 

7. lu reviewing the comments of the editors and publishers contact 
last night, it is our view that most will run favorable editorialSi 
and that xt might bo counter productivo to exert White House 



8. An attempt io boir.^ n-nde to got a recolutlon from Sigma 
Delta Xhi conclen-inin^; the prc-prcoc coiilercnce meeting 
by 25 comnientatoro to act. ctralcfjy to cmbarracfl the 


'SM Chron 
SM K.imo file 

SM Subj file -^YA*^-^«ir^.>^/.^ /^t--^^ O^y^ //z//V^^)) 
cc: Gordon Strachsn -FYI 





SUBJl^CT: ■ Fresiclent's Press Confoi-ura 

Dwigxit Chapin called last nicht and asked me to work vith you 
on "follow-up on the President's press conference." • I 
He described the procedures as fairly standard - telephone call, 
individuals' assessment of his performance, etc. 
Is the plan any different from the follow-up that Rob did 
following the Presidents October peace proposal speech? 



To Tlie Editor: 

The best proof yet of the allegations of Vice President 
Agnew about the nation's news media was their incredibly 
arrogant performance before the entire nation last Thursday 
night. Who in the liell elected those people to stand up and 
read off their insults to the President of tlie Uiiited States -- 
and then ask that he comment? 

21-296 O — 74 16 


(Buc jianan) 

To Tlie Editor: I 

Wlicrc docs tlic press cojTie off demimding tliat the President 
have piess conferences on call. I'he cljoice of nielliods and 
means for a President to communicate witli Die people \vlio 
elected him is his own -- and he answers for it to the American 
people. You people have gotten too big for your britches. 



To The Editor: 

Last Thursday night, the President of the United States 
handled that pack of wolves gathered in the White House v/ith 
a great deal more gentility and generosity than their conduct 
deserved. When will you people recognize that he was elected 
President -- and he is entitled to the respect of that office -- 
no matter what you people think about hiin. 



To Tlie Editor: 

Joseph Pulitzer must be turning over in his. grave. He 
believed in an lionest journalism. Instead, at the President's 
latest news conference, we got the spectacle of reporters 
falling over themselves in their attempts to put down the 
Pre sident. 

Their silly, slanted questions v.'ere so obNdous that it was 
laughable. Three cheers for President Nixon's nnastery over 
the Warlocks of V/ashineton. 



. (Khachigian) 

To Tlic Editor: 

With regard to the President's recent news conference, 
score it: President Nixoji, 100 - Media, 0. 


— (Khaclagian) 

To The Kdilor: 

Anyone who saw the President's recent news conference 
mvisl have bridled in disgvist at tlie blatant attempts by 
reporters to embarrass the President. Instead, the President 
held back these wolves and showed them a thing or tv/o. 

Every hojicst reporter ought to hang his head in shame 
at tlie grandstanding of his colleagues before the President 
of the United States. I used to wonder why anyone criticized 
tlic press. Now I know. 


— -(Khachigian) 

To T}ic Editor: 

'Diank goodness tliis country has President Nixon. At 
least he lias the guts to stand up before the media and aive 
the news straiglit. 

At liis December 10th press conference, President Nixon 
was faced with qvicstions planted by a cabal of the liberal 
press. V/hile llie media tried their best to embarrass him 
with their inane histrionics, Mr. Nixon answered all questions 
with candor and honesty. 

V/hy don't you fellows spend rmore time on good questioriems 
and less time on v.'ondering why the President doesn't have 
more press conferences. 




To Tlio JOclilor: 

Joe KlcGinnis ought to write another book: The Selling of 
Tlic Press Corps. At tlie President's press conference of 
December lOlh I couldn't believe my eyes and ears. There 
they were in all their pompous splendor editorializing on 
\-irtually every qucs.Lion they asked of the President. 

If the media wi\nt to take positions on public matters, they 
ovight to run for public office and leave to honest reporters the 
asking of sincere questions. In view of the new role of the 
media, I am per sonally .sending all members of the White 
House Press Corps jars of pancake niakeup. They need it 
more than the President. 



To The Editor: 

V/c arc told by tliosc of you in the nncdia tlial Presidential 
press conferences are held to inform the public. Maybe I 
tuned in on the wrong show. 

The press conference I witnessed on December 10th looked 
like a programmed attack on the President. It is incredible 
that prime time has to be given over to glorify a bunch of 
prima donna reporters. It's the President's job to inform and 
the media's job to transinit. L-et's keep it that way. 



To T}ic Editor: 

We cili>:cus depend on the media of this Nation to give us 
the news honest and sti-aiglit. Wc also expect that they will 
nt least sliow respect towards tlie Presidei:it of the United 

Yet, at the President's last news conference, the press 
were out like hatcliet men -- seeking neither to show respect II 
nor to inform. The glamour beys of tlie media seenj to think 
that soineone elected them to high office. 

The President's spirited responses to bad questions 
earned my deep respect. 



To The KcIiLor: 

Ilceivcn {orUtnr] lliat humilily be Uic last i-cfugc of the 
nicdia ! V/})y, it would be asking too much that (hey stick 
to informing tlic public instead of preening before the 
television cameras. 

However, I join the media in asjcing tliat tlie President hold 
inorc news conferences. 1 rather enjoyed seeing the pres.*; 
make iackasses out of tliejnselves on DccemVjer lOtli. 



To T]ic ]'2ditor: 

Recently, Vice-President Agnew deigned to propose tliat 
newsnicn submit tliemselvcs to periodic questioning by 
governn-;cnt officials. TItc Press wa;; outraged. How dare 
Old Spiro thinlv thiat the press was partisan? 

From what I coaJd tell at the Prc-sidcnt's last news con- 
ference, Larry 0'Bric;n must have pUnited all the questions. 
Our {roe, non-parlinaii press must be sviffering from double 
hernias from carrying aroimd all of lliose loaded questions. 

Congratulalions to President Nixon for sliowing the media 
that he can stand uji to tliem with honest and fortliriglit answers 


December 11, 1970 

Dear Jock: 

px-ouo IrrlLation at Iho lack of prcoa conforcnceo cccma to mc unclei',-- 
cLiMidablc. But Llicrc nrc cornc qucationo Involved hero th,it go bc/onjj 
that. (1) The Frcoident har. tho right: to choose hjs Tjorm of 
tion with the Aincrican people -- just r.s he will answer for it. (2) 
Should tho national prcos be meeting privately or rocrctly to thcnco 
come to coerce tho Pronidcnt into hr^ving iTiore press coiiferer.cos --- by 
the vehicle of d^nia-'lng his political interests \n.a. concerted telcvicion 
and nev/spapcT attacks on him by the participants In the naectings. (3)' 
V/bcn docs the qucstioninr; of the Preoidcnt, the interrogation of the Prec- 
ident go beyond sharp, tough, incisive quentioninj; and become occaolon 
for fulrninationL: and tho prcocntatlon of hostile viev/points and hostile 
quectiooc. (4) My ov/n vicv^ \a that tr.e Old Man kept the anirnalo at bay, 
v?Lth doftncf.B and oklU ond cornc gentility, and that tho prcsE confer- 
ence v.-ac clearly a pluo. But, in talking about tliC inatitution of the orcoo 
conicz-cnco, one v.'ondcro wlicthcr it ic logitim/xtc to turn It into t: hszv 
Jjaiting cc-soion; ocs: v/ondero v/hothci: it ic wise for the national prccs 
co'^'po to a\lo\w it.soli to bccorno noinething of an antl-NIxon particr.ti 
cabal ao U seemed to do la&t v^eek before and In tbs coMfflo of the Pics- 
ident'o pretja conference. Am enclooing copies cf RN'c preoG coiiferance 

and Zicglcr'o meeting v/lth tho prcca for your reflection In Central 


With warm, regardo, 


Patrick J. Buchanan 
Special AonlGtant 
to tbo President 

Mr. Jameo J. Kilpatrlck 
412 Prixicccc Street 
Ale>;andria, VU-glnia« 


Exhibit No. 170 

THE whitf: house 

V.' A S H I N G T O N 

March 2-1, 1971 




From the Evans-Novak Newslctler: ' 

"I vluskie: ' He hcs been clcli h' er'a'tcly lyin^ low, 
v/hicli'is 'sivrart politic? n.'icmt: Av'ncn' carried too far. 
Instead of travcliiig to KigcriD,, Jicmi^'ht have done 
bettdr to go to J'Cbw.Y-orlii c to Ctiliforiiia, iHnd Texas 
where HHH has been m.^xkint; inroads with Establishment 
Democrats. Still, Mur'vic remains by for the strongest 
possible candidate against Nixon, according to the 
Quayle Poll trial heats: Mviskic -l'8",a; NiKon -1Z%; Wallace 
iOTo compared to last month's A'Juskie •i6'>o; Nixon 4-lTo 
Wallace lOVo. " 

Mr. Muskie seems to have recognized the political peril 
in his high visibility strategy of December and January -- and revised 
it. The highly publicii'.ed trips to California and AIoscow -- with the 
press pack aboard -- have been discontinued. Tlicy did little to 
strengthen him, and exposed not a few weaknesses in personality, 
in foreign policy. He seems to have arrived separately at the 
saine conclusion; and his profile is now perceptibly lower than 
it was in the first inonths of the year. 

However, if Muskie docsnot come out into the open again, 
if ho stays in relative hiheriiat i o n. it is difficult to see wliat it is 
that i s troirc t o diminiy.h h i s standing in the polls on v.hi,v-li h e now 
tleoiMid.'-.. The country has a good Jn;i)ression of him; he presents 
to millions an attractive alternative; he is not the subject of the 
kind of attacks whicli would force a response. ' ' 

Should he niaintain his jjrcsont posture, more or less, for 
eight montlis, he will enter tlic primaries, relatively unscathed; 
and as I'irolhers Evans-Novak v.-ritc: ^ 


'=Jf Muskic docs win niost of tlie primaries, lie will be 
nominal C'd v.jlli case oji the first ballot. 

If Muslvie does not win, he will not even be a factor at 
tlic coiK-enlion. " 

And if Air. Afuskic is not cut and bleeding before he goes 
into Kcw Hamp.nhirc, he will very likely do massively v/cll there, 
buildinf; up irrcstible momentum for the nomination. This scenario 
is not ia our intcre5:t -- as Muskie today is a figure ideally situated 
to unite the warring factions of his party, and if they are united 
tljat is bad news for us. 

Our interests thus dictate smoking liijn out now; and keeping 
hiin out in frojit as long as' we can; . Flis iperformance to date when 
out front docs not argue well for his capacity to survive the kind 
of pressures and harassments that go with hiring front runner, 
pressures and harassmcnts he is not getting today. 

One recalls that Nelson Rockefeller had phenomenal i-atings 
in tlie Gallup and Harris polls by the end of 1967 --so long as he 
i stayed in Albany. When he emei-gcd, half the nation said, "Hey, 
it's him again, " and his ineffectual active campaigning actually 
cost him votes from tlie lime it began until Miami, when v/e 
finally surpassed him in the Gallup Poll. The same v.-as true of 
|!Goldwater. .As Mr, Conserva.tivc, unknov.n to the couniry, he was 
h an enormous attraction; as Barry Goldwater, campaigning in 
New Hampshire, he a disaster. Botli he and Rocky dropped 
in the polls from beginning to the ciid of the New Hampshire Primary. 

The more specific stands a political figure-takes -- on divisive 
issues -- the more people he alienates. This is as true for Mr. 
'Muskic as it is for us; and thus he should be forced to take more 
stands on more controversial issues. Tlie free ride for Big Ed 
Muskie must be terminated. 

It seems not in our interest to let him choose his topics, 
to wander the land talking about saving our environment which' 
■everyone from Robert Welch to Abby Hoffn-:an supports. It is in our 
interest --and in ihc interest of the liberal Democratic challtMiners 
for the nomination -- to prevent Mr. Atu::kie's uninl errupted march 
to Ihc nomination. 



T)u> Sor.r.s November argument was Hint wo should leave 
Musl;ic a)c>nc -- t'.lLack and respond to other Democrats, like HIIH, 
to elevate t]-.e:;i. That doesn't seem realistic now, as Muskic 
is already ''cflcivulcd. " Me is already at the top, so far as Gallup 
and Harris and the democratic Parly are concerned. 

There J_s_ a danger in j^oing iif.icr MurJ;ic, making him the 
martyr and spokesman of the Democratic Party, and thus insuring 
liis iiominatioii, and even enliancing his chances of election. But 
the risk should be tal;cn. If \vc don't do it now, we shall liave to 
play hurry-up football inthe tvv'o months before election -- and 
people tend to disbelieve political, charges inade in that kind of 
partisan environment. 

Who fiVould v/c get to'pdke th'o's'Harpstick into hiscavcto 
bring Muskie howling forth ? More ijniportant. What kind of stick 
is most effective. 

Frankly, Muskie cannot be effectively assaultc-d froin the 
Right -- i. e. he is a Dig Spender; he doesn't stand beliind the 
President in tiiTie of conflict abroad. An attack on Muslcie from 
his right, by a. Senator Dole or Vice President Agncw, \voukI only 
rally all Democrats, who are all to the left of us, around him. 

The attack tlieii should conic between tlie center and the left 
of the Deinocratic Party. It should focus on those issues tha.t divide 
Democrats, not those that unite Republicans. It should exacerbate 
and elevate those issvies on which Democrats arc divided -- forcing 
Muskic to either straddle, or come down on one side or tlic other. 

Many such issues come to mind. 

THE WAR, l-vcss and less is tliis an issvxe dividing Democrats; 
more and more is it a unifying issue as conservative Democrats 
begin to adopt a "let's get the heli out" stance. This would explain 
what it v/as inexpensive for Muskic ajid Hum])hrcy to move doveish 
.politically in recent weeks on this issue. The price they arc paying 
for that move is not so great as it once was; and their need to 
mollify the jjeaccnik Dcniocrats is greater than it lias ever been. 


TIU: :v:l:SKn: }'j:n;;OWALlTY. There is fertile ground here. 
Muskic is sliCirl-fiiiiparcd; he rct;ul.-irly rebuffs reporters who cisk 
hostile qu;? t;.-::!,; iic h;i.s n reputation, which dir.lurbs him, of being 
unable to ii-..-.-'_- a dici-jion, to lal;e a stand. Political criticism of 
Jvl'.iskic a.s a iJ>;:ir.ucratJc JIainlct witli liis finger to the wind and his 
nose in a G:-:.\.:]i Pj]] vvould be the kir.d of attack that would be 
credited by the Dcinocratic L-eft. Ji is their {^re.nlest susjncion of 
Bij: Ed. Slc-ttr.::enLs by .Liberal Repiblicans such as "At least McGovcrn 
has the couvai;e of liis convictions, silly thougli they inay be, but who 
the hell knowf where Mr. Muskie stands and what lie stands for 
other tlian Airs. Muskic. " 

THE RACE ISSUE. There arc possibilities provided hern in ■ 
that Ihc 1930s Eiberal, Abe Ribicoff, has come up .with ?. beautiful . 
"forced integration" pro?; ;-am -- .involving a ;F,edcrQl recjuiremcnt that 
every school in the entiremctropolilan' area. have within the student 
body notniorc than twice p.nd not less ithan half Die rniinority population 
in the entire metropolitan. That of couri?c would necessitate inassive 
bussing of whites into the cities and blacks into the Suburbs. We oujiht 
to look closely at tlic details of this le.^islation, and if it is as radical 
a piece of "social eiiginecrin'-.;'' as it ai^pears, then the way miglit 
be smoothed for its advance; it could be given considerable publicity; 
and we could de;i ounce it as inconcif:tcnt with our principles of freedom 
or movement -- and force Mr. Mu.= kie to take the kind of stand that 
would cither alienate the suburbanites and etlmics who would bear the 
brunt of this -- or aiipear again as an appcaser of the Right in the 
eyes of the professional liberals. 

REVENUE SHARING.. Muskic has stepped in it up to his ankles 
on this one. His virorous opposition to RN's program inct with silence 
and disagreement froin the mayors and city officials to v.'hom he spoke -- 
most of whom want it and most of vx-hom are dejnocratic. Tliis ground 
should be cultivated. Public statements by Democrats, preferably 
liberal Democrats, calling on Muskic to change his view, and lead 
the Democratic Party in defense of the cities .should be made. We 
can portray this as a "dog-in-the-manger" stance toward urban 
I problems by a Senator, who is playi:'.g the reactionary toward a 

progressive proposal simply because he did not conic up with it himself. 
Klodcrate and liberal Republicans sliould be able to find in thi.s matter 
a political area where they are comfortably supporting the Administration 
and opposing Muskic, and they should do so pvdjlicly. 


AnOiv "I JO?;. This is, as wc predicted months ago, a rising 
issue and a :;,'.it.'.ic vitli Catliolics. Time tins week Iiad a major 
piece on the r;!.i;,'_' rli-riti-.l opjjositioji, not only Catholic. Buckley 
has callcfl on (jr.l^c-lic ]jisl)ops to lead a. j)olitical ofCcnj ivc up to 
tlic point o/ civi) cli5o':>cdicnf c. Jt is not unliltely tliat one of these 
abortion centers, such as D. C. , could be; lar^^etcd with a bomb -- 
so fiercely do co;iscrva'.ivc Catliolict; lecl on this matter. The 
President's stand against the Defense Department should be made 
public and strong, would be liappy to write it. Let us take the far- 
left losses v.-c would pet on thi;; -- and then send the ball into Mr, 
Mviskie's Court. After all, he is & Catholic, and one recalls 
in liberal, but Catholic, Mas5;achvisclts, Senator Edward Kennedy 
eclioed'hiTj'ultra-liber'al Rcpablican opponent on every, major 
is sue: but one -,- abortion.'.! lie opposed aboxtioR.. ' If the' President, :.-L. 
should publix;ly'takehis^st?.nd against aborticni, as offensive "to his j 
own moral principles, _ \vhile,:as-. President, ' jiot intcriering with the. ':: 
decision of States; if we shoiUd publicly reverse DOD, Ihcn we can 
force Muskie to n-.akc the clioice between his tens of millions of 
Catliolic supporters and his lilsoral friends at tlie New York Tiines 
and t)ic AVashington Post. 

PAROCHAID. Again, thin is the big winner for Northeast 
Republicans, v/ho support it, such as Rock.efeller. For while GOPcrs 
may be neutral or opposed, it is not life or death to them -- v.-hile to 
Democrats, it is a divisive cut issue separating Conservative Catholic 
Irish and Italians from Do-Goodcr, liberal, .Tcv.ish Democrats who 
adamantly oppose it. The Supreme Court is moving to decide this | 

issue as it is to decide the abortion issue -- and before lliose decisions 
come down, wc should be or. the side of tlie angels. If the Court decide 
in favor of libera)iz;ed abortion a;id no Parochaid, tlien wc will h.ave 
lost tv/o of the gut issues that can make inroads into the C^itliolic 
Democrats of the Northeast and Midvvcst, and Mr. Muskie will liave , 
two political of some niagnitude resolved for him by the -jfl 
Supreme Court. Tlic President has, I understand, the preliminary '^B 
rcj)ort of the non-public scliool task force. Why not make it p».iblic 
with an RN endorsement -- let the Catholics know tlicy have a friend 
in the White Hovise, concerned about their problems. Some SoutHcrneri 
arc going to complain, but will they stand in a shov.down 
between the President and a liberal Democrat. Indeed, should- 
Muskie push too hard against parochaid -- to move between us and 
our Soutliern friends, he will pay an intolerable political price in 
loss of sup])ort in tlie Catholic Community. 


A mnn is ck-finctl by Uic pus it ions he takes; njid Mr. Mii.skic 
docs v.'cll, l)0(:-!i'. ■,'„• Ills j)iii ;;c is fuxy.y; people on opposing sides of 
bitter cji.!C;-l^!(.:is (';i not i-nuv/ tlial he ir, citlicr oj5j3o::ed to one of 
Ihcni, or the '.<;.:i;r. On this inalter, \vc must become the midwivc^ 
of the people's ri.ciht to !;no\v --if the press docs not do the jol) 
for MS, Y/1'.icli it is not doin;^ today. , 

THE SST -- Every worlccr in Seattle, every union man in the 
acrospctcc industry, should be made aware of Ivlr. Kluskie's position 
on this issue. He slioukl be targeted as Die prime liberal responsible 
for the cutbacl^s in defense and spacf: v/liich have cost their jobs. R/T 
should be pictured as the one fif^litinf^ to save tlicir jobs from Dcmorrr. 
who would put an end to the space pro,<:ram. In the last cajnpaign v/c 
took ithelieat for jobs lost bticaxise of cutbacks -- cutback's v\'hich tlio. 
complaining liberal Deniocrats A-oted and themselves "would have 
increased. • 

THE'EKVmONKIENT.. Mr. "Muskie has rcco{rnized and moved 
to solve liis political probl ciiis here -- v/c.ll before v.e did. He is 
ti'avcling tlie covmvry, liold?ir^ hearings on the iiiTpact of the cnviror.r.-.i: 
decisions on industry and jobs. He is effectively noutralij'.ing our 
best issue here -- tlie lactic oi telling conimunities and compa.iics, 
"if Madinan Alusicie's enviroiiment bill goes tlirough, this industry si-.-.-, 
down and this burg becomes a gliost tov.-n. " The old scare tactics, 0:1 
military closings, were U'^ed against us to a farc'-thee-well last fall -■ 
and we should moved to use this against iviuskie. Wc did not. 
He seems to be getting v.ell on this -- but he remains vulnerable. 

A research teain sliould go over v/liat tlic Muskie oritzinal 

[proposal would liave required -- before any compromises -- and tiicn 
t have our party people in the affected areas say publicly that had t"nc 
' Muskie bill gone through, unemployment here would be ten percent. 
Tliis environmental issue titillates the liberals, but the trade-offs 
in jobs and income and community recession have not been reckoned, 
and not made public. 

Tliat new Government- Ford Foundation project -- tliank God 
t Enthovcji has departed - would seem the ideal instrument, with 
the right man at tlie top, to cost out, in jobs and factories closed, 
tlie imp:ict of all of Ed Aluskie's major environmental legislation. 
"Jf Ed Muskie's bill is passed," sliould beconic the custoiiiary 
prefix oji predictions of economic doom. 


Tnr J^ORH FOUNDATJOrN. When Whitjicy Youni,' passed 
away, om^ ^,a\v ;•. nicLurc of LW Muskic in the surf v/iLli Voun^, and i 
one Icr.j-iicd liiaL i.hcy were j-i'lhcred in Niucria on a Ford Found;;<;ion I 
financed t)-i;j. I\ov/, in my rcsearcli on Ford, this is the Hiird sucn 
trip. Mu5-;i(; the oiily ])ei":~.ocrc-Ll v/lio jnadc both junlcLets to j 

Japan (some of i/ur lie [public; a Ji friends went, also on one) financbd i 

by Ford. soi^-.i c Ironble.^omc questions could be raised j 

about Muslcic's connection v.itli J\IcGecirj:c Bandy's giant institution -- 
and arc they beliind his candidacy. Investigation sh.ould be done on 
this score. This could go hand-iji-globe v/ith tlie Foundation spceche.' 

THE jMUSKIE advisers. Certainly, Harriman and Clifford, 
two of those responsible for the present situation in Vietnam, have 
little or no appea.l to the young wlio opposp.tliejwar^ ; •Thcy.arc old 
war iiorsbs, who were deeply involved 'in' failures of Vietnam. 
The failures Avould return to power, with Muskie -- and llarrinaan, 
"who sold Poland 'dov.-n"theiRivci%'''is, apparently Muskie' s leading 
candidate for Secretary of State. How would tliat read on the front 
page of the Chicago Polish-American? 

These are a few of the areas that could be explored. Tlicse 
are some of the issues tliat ca.n be developed --to the immense 
disconifort of Mr. Mu.=;kie. Tliis lias been a hayridc for him thus 
far; we cannot rely upon t'ne press to do this work for us. V>'c are 
going to have to poke Big Ed v.ith some sharp sticks to see liow he 
performs. And from what I liavc seen, it is not all that reniarkablc 
or impressive. Me is riding two tilings right now -- his Vice 
Presidential candidacy in 19u8 where an indulgent pi-ess slobbered 
all over him as the great alternative to Spiro T. -Agnew -- ajid his 
televised show the night before the election, which was a good 
performance, but l\ardly a trial-by-fire. 

Wc ought to go down tothe kennels and turn all the dogs loose 
on Ecology Ed. The President is tlie only one who sliould stand 
clear, while everybody else gets chewed up. Tlic rest of vis arc 
expendable commodities; but if the President goes, \vc all go, and 
may be the country with us. 2\ly view. 

Anyhow, the attacks should )iol_ be name-calling -- they 
should be thought out. Tliey should have a specific jjurpose; Ihey 
should be designed to injure Mr. Mujkic v.-ith a specific group 
wJicrc he now has support. They should be framed to force liim to 
howl a bit. 


y^^aiii, tlj.j fellow in his bun;',lcc1 trip to tlic Soviet Union, in 
his f;hort to:r.p','.' tmd tcslinccs, in liis botcliing of revenue sharing -- 
to inc doc.'; r.oi licvm to have it. The jndiv-idual v/ho called liiin 
the "Ronnicy o-' tiic Seventies" may not be too fai- off the mark. 

We will nut be, in this cntcrjjrisc, v,-ithout allies annong 
the Silent Air.jorjty in the DcmocrriLic I'arty in tlie Senate. Sonic of 
them see us as vulnerable; Dicy see tlic future as the "Democratic 
Years," I cannot Vjclicve they view v^-it!i any enthusiasm eight years 
of President Ed Muskie tellinrr Ihem v.-!iat is good for America. No, 
J think some of these fellows v.Duld jiot be disappointed to see Big 
Ed unhorsed and lying in a ditc'n by the. side of Die road. Tlicy.will 
shed the saine crocodile te&rs -as tlrat splendid little band who piit 
it to Diis V/hipsl:iip, Ted Kennedy, in the secret l>.all6t. 

My recommendation, .t;hen, 'is if or creatiajT of THE "MU.SKIIT 
WATCH, an operation v.'orkin;^ pcrliaps v/ithin the Republican National 
ComjTiittee, which ma.y even be a publici/ced operation, doing constant 
research on Ed, a.n.d putting tlic materials out to (he interest groups',, 
and to the press. Tlic opcra.lior. should be tied in v\'ith Mori. Allin's 
Shop; he caii pro\idc a steady stream of all commentary on Muskic. 
It sliould be tied in v/ith Colson'^^ sljop which cs.n provide the names 
of tlie proper contacts in each community. Ihe group sliould focus 
for nov.' exclusively in MusJiie and not get bogged dov/n on a dox.en 
other little projects. It seems an interesting ideii; one that, if. 
RN approves, the general aj^proach, sliould be tied iji with Senator 
^Dole, and moved on rapidly. 



Exhibit No. 171 

thu white house 

V//- C- ^ I N G 7 O .S" 

April 19, 1971 



SUBJECT: The Resurrection of Hubert Humphrcj 

One emerges from a perusal of fiur "I-uuiiphrcy file" with a 
grudcinp regard for Old Hi:bcrt. Since November, with but a 
few notable exceptions, the cx-Vecp has conducted )>imsclf 
remarkably well. He receives an excellent preos. He has 
iiiaximi:ied his assets, and minimized )iis deficiencies. The 
result is that today, unlilcc sb; montlis ago, the man is a serious 
contender for tlie Democratic noininatioii. 

Gallup has charted the comeback. The following represents 
the shift from Novehibcr to March in Democratic voter sentiment, 
about their preference of nominees. 


MUSKIE . 33 . 26 

KENNEDY 31 25 

Hl-ni 16 21 

Tlius, in four nionths, ?Iumpl^rcy gained a net of 12 points 
on Muskic, and 11 points on Edward M. Kennedy -- a not insignificant 
advance. One reason is surely that, in this period, it is difficult 
to find any bad press on Hubert Hvursphrey. The stories -- many 
of thein onwomcn's pages -- arc invariably straight or favorable. 

Following are some reasons for tlio Humishrcy resurgence, 
which underscore elements of his present strategy, a stratcj;y that 
appears to be working as well today as that of any man in political 
life. .. 


A p rir.ultnr c 

First, Ilumjjhrcy has moved rajjjdly lo fill an issue vacvivim -- 
in the farm regions. He had himself named to the Agriculture Cojn.nittee; 
has perceived our v.cakness in this area; has niadc himself unofficial 
Democratic champion of rural and farm America -- without ignoring 
the "cities" issue he shares with the Eastern-oriented candidates. 
Press people tell me HHK proniised to stump rural Aanerica 
declaiming that, first, "Mr. Xixon took away your prosperity and now 
he's trying to talce your Dejjartnient av/ay from you." "I tliink that'll 
sell right well ovit there in farm country." So, HHH has been 
quoted. Here Ilumplircy can pick up support in an area others ignore, 
and is wcU-positJoncd to corral rural delegates to the Dcinocratic 

The Mnskic Decline 

Secondly, on analysis, Humphrey's new supjjort is coming 
directly out of K'tuskie's hide. 

Here is what seems to have liappcned in four mojiths. IvlcGovern's 
wld accusations, his far-o\it positions, }iave thrilled the Far Left of 
the DeiTJocratic Party, causing McGoveDi to rise from the infinitesimal 
two percent to tlie insignificant five percent. McGc^vorn seer-^s pre- 
vented from risinv the teens or twenties, at l)ns •point, because 
he is ai'jpcaling to voters v.'j^o alr cr.dv )iavc a ponviliir, firsi-linc , candid.'.ie in Edward Kennedy, a cai:didate wlio gives tlicm 
near all the positions IvlcGovern does -- at the same time Kennedy 
offers the realistic liope of winning, with those positions -- and 
returning Camelot as well. 

But McGovern's candidacy may be having a secondary effect -- 
on the fortunes of Air. Muskic. 

To hold his b ridpe position in the Deinocratic Party, Muskie 
XTiust equivocate on divisive issues; he cannot adopt the Far Left 
positions, and reiTiain viable nationally. McGovcrn, having 110 such 
problem, assumes all these stances and so contrasts himself, as 
decisive and inoral and unequivocal, witli Muskie wlio coincs off 
indecisive and equivocal. Thus, Muskic fails to "turn people on, " 
and in his glaring pviblicity as front-rimner, this is enncrvating 
to this candidacy. And as he goes down in the polls, his svipporters. 


generally ccjitrist Democrats, looking for a winner, drift off to the 
next best tiling -- Hubert Hvimplircy. 

Mvis'cie still hiir. brond !;i l opo^'t amo n c; Dei^'iocr.its and 
Jndciicnclc 1 1 1 ;;; t-.r-d iic c-an:)(>l be ronovctl 'is a factor. lU-.t a ccillapFinq 
Muri!;io can:nai'jn. it s coins to i:V !, would jc ad to an aJn-:oat i:-ic:vitable 
Kenne dy-] i' linp'p . rcy , I cU-cen'CV confrontation for the- noininalion - - 
an alto;;cther satisfactory deveh-inmcnt. 

The Humphrey Positions ; 

Humphrey's attacks on the Administration have been of a 
scattcr-gun nature; he is a single issue man as Kennedy is the 
healtli man, and Muslcie, tlio environmentalist. He criticizes the 
Administration on a mucli broader f. ont -- in essence ap])caling, 
with his old politics, to the constituency of the New Deal. 

1. As mentioned, he has moved early and liard to become 
the Democratic cliampion of the American farmer -- a good move, 
con.sidcrinj; tliero are 37 other candidates contcndin.g for chamj^ion 
of the cities, and HlllI is anion;; the:n. 

2. He is back on the arnis control, missile free;ie, "risks 
for peace" nonsense. Vriiile, c>ne imagines tliis v/ovCd help a bit 
with the left and the ijitellectual comniunity, to inost peoi^le the 
issue is too complicated to comprehend. 

3. He is making prodigious efforts to get well on the Vietnam 
issue. Having decided there is no more to be gained by a "peace 
with honor" position, he has all but confessed his sins froiTj the 
Johnson years, and daily attennpts to extricate hiinself from tliat 

4. He is taking a strong pro-Israeli stand, a stand duplicated 
of course by most Democrats -- all of them looking to Jewish money 
and backijig at the convention and, hopefully, in the election. 

5. He repeatedly attacks the White Koxise for "public relations 
gimmicla-y" and "intimidation of the news iTicdia, " even though HIIH's 
past quotes show lum jnassively vulnerable on the latter. (Have 
some thovights on tlic fornicr problem, forthcoming later. ) 


6. He is rn}'.-iinr down very lip.rd -- perhaps hardest of all -- 
on t he bread nuc. butter iss-i pa -- the jjroblems in the economy, the 
uncinploycd, poor pcojile out of work, etc. This is, again, the old 
politics, whicli Mr. Humplircy continues to mix effectively v/ith 
the new. \ . _ 

T))e IIum;)hrcy Ar.scts 

V/ithin the Democratic Party, tliese are not inconsiderable. 
He is solid witli the blacks, more than acceptable to Big Labor, a 
friend of the farm bloc; he has party strength in the South, and 
Texas (especially) and California; he ren:)ains a "centrist" Democrat; 
xinlike Muskie, he pays his respects to party regulars. Old Deniocrats 
from New Deal days have nothing against him. In every publicity 
encounter witli fellow Democrats, he steals the show as he did 
at the big pie- eating contest on the Hill and the A.S.N. E. session 
last week. He is ebullient and likeable -- very strong with 
Democratic women. He is a politician of the old hand-sliaking, 
baby-kissing school; not a total disadvantage with many simple 
people. He canic within an eyelash of wiiining tljc last time out. 

Tlie Humphrey Liabilities 

These are very serious. He is a loser, an Old Face wliose 
resurrection lias "prodviccd boredom and horror amojig Dcn-.ocrats, 
except for some of IIHH's big money friends." (Ey.ins and Novak) 
He is tied up inextricably with LB J and Vietnam; he remains 
anatliema to the intellectuals and far left of his party, despite 
his best efforts to heal the wounds. He generates no great 
excitement of enthusiasm. His nomination would aliei'.ate all the 
"idealistic" McCarthy kids who would have waited four years -- 
and gotten Old Hubert again. His nomination could even produce 
a fourth party. While he has traveled all over the nation speaking 
to youth, it is safe to say his nomination would prodvice ennui among 
the activist liberal peace groups and disinterest in an RN-HHH election. 

By way of a balance sheet tlicn. it seems Humnhrev would 
have a nvmibcr of tlie traditional 5troiif:th.s and supianrts that co 
automatically to national DoriTocrats -- but no iiiorc. And lie would 
carry into a goicral election serious deficiencies -- which seem 
to make hiin a thorougjily acceptable cajitlidatc from our point of view . 


The Hnnii^lirc-v Slr-^lcev 

111 December, Humphrey volvinteercd t}iat Dcniocrrils should 
loolc over lliC field iii 1971, .and by the end of tliis year, sctllc vipon 
a candidate, rally about hiin -- tind avoid the divisive primaries. 
This has been, I believe, his solo significant j^olitical error since 
election. Liberal Dcniocrats pounced upon tlie sclicmc as wholly 
out of spirit vitli the new v.-idc-oiDOJi convention concept they liave 
been proinoting. 

But, when Hujnphrcy advanced that proposal in December, 
it would appear tliat he did not, then, seriously consider himself 
a potential candidate. For v/ho woiid liave jjredictcd thc_n -- including 
Mr. Hujnphrey -- that HIIH could possibly be tlie national favorite 
by tliis next December. 

Since then, however, Humplirey's fortxijics have risen; lie is 
clearly a potential candidate; and sees himself as such. 

His strategy seems relatively clear: itjovo about the country, 
attacking the Xixon Administration on a broatl variety of issue; 
seize all the publicity possible; do t)ie party chores; attack no fcllov/ 
Democrats; stress ojie's availability -- and wait for events to develop. 

Humplircy niust, it seems to me, avoid the early primaries. 
And liis derogatory reinariis about primaries thcjiis elves indicate 
that lie intends just tliis. Let the other contenders fight it out 
with one another, the more tic merrier, to an indecisive conclusion 
in the early primaries -- and then cincrge v/ith bi'oad party 
acceptance, as the strongest centrist unifying nian around, the 
fellow who came within 500, 000 votes, and can now go over the top. 

The strategy is working. riu]n]5hrcy has risen at Muskie's 
expense; he is now within range of both K'ennedy and Muskie -- 
although of the three he continues to run weakest against tlie President. 

Because Muskie is the frojit-ronncr, it is Muskie who is up in 
New Hampshire, being covered by reporters, as he apologiiies for 
his role in Vietnam, and attcinpts to cjconeratc himself before the 
college young. J^Ir. H\.uiiphrcy is getting no nuch intensive, critical 


covcrarjc fron: t!ic press. Hr would be well advised to stay away 
frojn the studi-nl Q and A session -- and stick to speeches attacking 
one sliorlcor.-iiM;;, speeches wliich net good coverage and little or 
no contradiciioj-. in tlie media. Further, so as not tC) alienate ajiy 
scfjnioTit of }•'.: ." i ?avty -- ho ?hoi;ld consciously a,void any criticism 
of otlicr niiv.v 'i.t . tcIuIs . ar. ii ci naiiii;; i n xho end lliat thcv will ilius 
find )ii:n an ac<T ;j'. nhIr'. ii r.c-t ?-.ii exciling alternative. Only if, 
well down tJiC road, AlusJ^ic is running strong ov.t front and 
needs some chopping, wo\ild Humplirey liave any cause to start 
laying down policy differences with the front-runner. Right 
now, he sliould hang back a bit and let the front-runner Muskie 
weary himself, setting the pace. 

Counter -Strategy 

As noted in the "Hiuiiphrey Liabilities," his noniination would 
engender groat anguish on t)ie left at a Democratic convention, and 
rnight trigger a fourth party -- tlius, his nojnination is not some- 
thing we should, at tliis point, look ujjon with great apprCiicnsion. 
Furlhcr, a continued lil-ill rise in Democratic polls would be 
helpful -- as it v/ould likely come at Isluskie's expense, and force 
Muskie to re-accelcratc Jiis timetable, and nialic tlic Icind of 
precipitous decisions he is jiiaking now -- viz, tlie near 
unqualified endorseinent of the upcoming deiTionstration. 

However, at the same time v/e v/ant to see Hvunphrcy rise 
"with Democrats, we should be associating him wit'n minority 
positions tliat alienate Independent and Conservative Democrats 
and cannot stand the test of a general election. 

The following come to mind: 

Catholics . Humphrey, does not have the affinity with tliis 
primary Deniocratic bloc that a Muskie or Kennedy miglit -~ the 
latter being co-religionists. We \vould thvis start with only a 
minimal handicap v/ith Catholics. Therefore, again, 1 would argue 
the President associate himself, publicly, with the report he 
already has -- from his svib-coanmittee on non-public education, 
headed by Dr. Walton. We liave done tlie abortion thing. But, 
just today, the Archbishop of Detroit announced the closing of 
56 Catliolic scliools, dropping 23, 000 Catliolic students into the 
Michigan pviblic school systcni. If the President forces tliis 
issue with the Democrats, again, it is an issvic which divides tlicm 
d own the middle, and only docs us minimal damage in my opinion. 


(In a .slory Ik;: v.- in Uic Wasliinpton Daily News a fortjiirr)it ajjo, 
wc v.-crc bci;);' criticized by Catliolic. leaders for not making 
Walton's rci^ort j>ublic. ) 

The Pj-csidcnt 3-nii;ht well use the closing of these Michigan 
schools as a pc-:', on wliicii to hinge a brief statement deploring 
tl)C trend and calling for tlie one-day conference in D. C. Walton 
ct. al. have reconiinendcd. 

Farm Area . Hum]:);)rey has the kind of sujjport here, I aaii 
confident, tliat we enjoyed back in 1968 -- jnuch of it related to a 
faith in tlx; fellow as one of their owi , probably more of it 
related to an anti-ins feeling among tliosc rural Americans who have 
not been doing so well as in the past. In any event, these are states 
on winch we depend for our base of support -- before even considering 
the big swing states. If we arc hurting in \iiddlc /imerica, we are 
Inirling everywhere. Ihimphrcy obviously feels he has seized a 
good issue here, both for support at the convention and supjjort 
in the general, sliould he win the noniination. This should be a 
top priority concern of the j^dministrntion -- yet as Wild Bill 
Schcrle told me, there is really no one in the White House 
whom farmers and rural A;iierica types might conceivably look 
to as one of their own. 

Hard Hats. RN's steps on construction wages, taken for 
the national interest, were nevertheless politically damaging, 
according to Scammon who spoke to a conservative group last 
week. If the demonstratiois turn obnoxious this coming weekend 
and beyond -- perhaps we will get back some of these patriotic 
types. But Buclianan's view is that a inceting between the President 
ajid union men connected v,-ith aerospace and defense might be 
highly useful. RN could argue: 

"(a) we have got to end this war honorably and 
(b) in the present world cnvironinent, we cannot let the 
defense budget go down the tubes. I ain doing these 
things for America. I know you gentleiiien Jeel you 
can't support ine politically, or can't support rnc on 
economics in general, but, by God, I am asking for 
your support on these issues. You have treincndous 
pull with the Democratic Senators, like Muskic and 


JIumphrcy and Kennedy and JacI;£on. Can you exercise 
public and jjrivatc leverage so that they will not cut 
back on tins defense budget, and space budcjet (which 
incidentally means jobs to union men) and on our • 
commitment to an honorable peace in Victnani. " 

A ris]<.y venture perliaps. 

But it seems tliere is a natural division betv/een the bell- 
bottomed ccologists who want to return to nature -- and the hard 
hats wliosc prosperity depends upon, if you will, the miliuary- 
industrial cojnplex. Fvirthcr, if and when the President tal;es up 
the defense of his defoisc budget, lie might well argue that it is 
wrong to indict hundreds of thousands of AjTicrican workers as a. 
iDcmber of soinc monolithic "military-industrial complex." 

"Tlicse men are building the weapons and niachines that 
keep America strong and free." 

This is an argument tliat the President might also press 
upon labor leaders, 

"Gentlemen, one of the problems in this society' is 
tliat the Jiicn who design and the men who construct the 
weapons that defciid tliis country are being portrayed 
as some sort of pawns in a great jTiilitary-industrial 
complex -- and this is wrong and not good for America, 
If we are going to liave a strong nation, we are going 
to liave to have respect for those Ajnericajis v/ho keep 
it strong, " 

Against us, in 196S and 1970, tlie DciTiocrats were saying: 
"If you elect Nixon, you lose your social security; you lose your 
medicare, " Our GOP organizations around tlie co<.uitry in the 
coming campaign ought to be out at McDoniicll-Douglas, at Lockheed, 
at Boeing, with such posters at the plant gate as "If Aluskie 
wins, you lose," "If Hvuiiphrey wins, the Defense Budget is lost -- 
start looking for another job election day. " Li the areas where- 
there is high imemployment, at the Boeing Plant in Seattle, GOP 
workers shovild be passing out "\Vanted" posters with portraits 
of Muskie, Kennedy and IIHII, the inscription underneath "Wanted 
for questioning in connection with the death of tlic SST. " 


(Note: Ricsci says, in RN's ncv/s summary, that labor was angered 
by HFill no-.c or. SS7. ) 

AcrosTsrice a:-)d defense unemployinent ought to be hung around 
the ncclis of those who would increase it. 

The Muskic Decline 

There is an argument that Muskic is proving himself so 
ineffectual that we might actually want him as candidate, and thus 
ought not to ■>^iuss him up so badly tliat he loses the noinination. 
I can't accept this argujiicnt. One recalls tM Governor Romney 
by this point in time v/as well behind F%.N among both Republicans 
and Lidcpendenrs -- but he stayed up for fifteen rounds of unexampled 
pujiishniGi t. y\nd, tliough others disagree, I believe that, outside 
the WH, we should keep the heat on Big Ed. If, then, he docs get 
the nomination, ho will be scarred -- as to be politically ineffective. 
If lie falls back further, he will yet fight jriore fviriously for it; and 
the primaries will be no cake walk for anyone and tlic more brutal 
the fight within the opposition party, the greater our advantage. 

The V.'ar 

Humphrey is struggling heroically to get well on this issue, 
to make lainiseli, now, an acceptable alternative, to the party's left. 
The Prodigal Son, however is not welcome back home --if the 
New Republic and I. F. Stone are to be believed. A little Machiavelli 
here might be of use. If the President, who is not revered on the 
Left, were to publicly express thanks to Hllli for the quiet support 
he has given on Vietnain -- HHH is likely to be astonished and stunned, 
and his left-wing courtship broken off on the spot. Perhaps Dole 
or the Vice President even might complinicnt HUH on the "strong 
support" he has consistently provided for the wai- in Vietnam. 


True to form. Senator Ribicoff is now maneuvering liis 
compulsory integration plan toward the floor -- demanding one and 
all take a stand on it. We ought to credit Ribicoff s courage in facing 
this issue -- but come down b.ard ap.ninst liim -- and force Aluskle, 
and Humphrey ar.d Kennedy to take a stai^d on tins issue, a fortlnnght 
stan d . Alr.-' certainly tlicy will have to waffle on this one. A'-ain._ 


tl ic i?;siics tl K'.t (livi<lc Dc]-nocr.its must be brnucrht to the public attention , 
jf \vc arc Pf'ir.;: to t^rrvcnt tlic unitin:; of their p.irVy . 


If wc could possibly get a poll showing Humphrey taking 
the lead anion;^ Democrats, the "horror" about his re-cmcrgcnce 
which E k N detected, would rise inijnediately to the surface, 
tlic press would focus on liini, and the Democratic Left would 
start chojjping him up, again, advantageous for us in the long run. 

LB J ?c Riot s 

Hvunplircy iTiade a rejnark about LBJ, "I had a President 
who was absolutely paranoid about the Nvar, " which we should 
remind liim and the covuitry of. Furtlicr, Humjjhrey's statements 
about possible riots tliis siuiimer, if some little Federal bureau 
was shut down, can be used again and twinned with his famous, 
"I'd lead a miglity good riot" rcmarJi. We can depict him as 
the "Bull Agitator" of tlie U.S. Senate. 

These issues can be aired this weel^cnd in MOXDAY, in 
tlie sequel to The Muskic Watch. Right now, from our vantage 
point, it seems to ir>e that "Hujiiphrey's the One. " 






EXHIBIT No. 172 



May 4, 19 71 " 




As you know, Buchanan has established a Muslcie "v.'atch" 

Please talk to Marik about establishing a similar 
structure for Humphrey and Kennedy. 

I assxime that the other Democratic contenders are 
being watched by your Democratic Contemners Group. 

Could ycu lot me know on ir'riday, Z-Iay 7, the status 
of tliis project. 

Due Date 
May 7, 19 71 



^^^^ ^jif/^^^^^ ^-^3/^ 


21-296 0—74 18 




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Exhibit No. 173 

the white house 



June 9, 1971 







A careful analysis of news clippings of recent weeks, coupled 
with reports of recent days, rerrioves, I think, vestigal doubts 
that EMK is running activcN" for the Presidencv. 

II ems : 

Last night on tb.e Elizabeth Drew show, Kennedy poiiitedly 
refused to issue any Shcrnir.n statcn-icnts. In April, for the first 
time, he stated "1 am l;eepijig my mind open" about the nomination. 
ABC finds that he lias written to former top a.ides indicating he is 
assessing t)ie situation. Haniphrey t]nnl;s he is a potential active 
candidate, as does Muskie. Daley, accordiiig to HHH, is "strong 
for Teddy. " Riesel claims i-.early all the top AFL-CIO types, 
excepting J^'eany, are holding back, waiting for Teddy; the saine 
is true of many political pros aroiund the country, according to 
Jerry Greene. Andrew TuUy said a month or more ago that 
aaiyone who doesn't think Teddy is running "sviffers froiii rocks 
in the head," and Andy Biemillcr of AFL-CIO indicates that if a 
fellow docs not think Kennedy is running, he is "nuts". 

Buchajian's View: Kennedy is Icceping liis options open -- 
against tlie possibility t'na.t RN may be so strong by suninier '72 
tliat the nomination will not be worth jmything. In wliich event, 
he can stay out. However, a t tliis noint, he a;id his people have 
obviously concluded RN can be beatci^ -- and ihcv are not about 
to sit tliis one o-it -- r i r. 1; i :i z SDcndinc cicht vears outside tb.e 
i)iner circle of power of a Prcsidenl Humphrey or a President >.Iusl^ic, 
If Kennedy believes the Democrats can v.'in -- as he quite appa.rcntly 
does now -- he will go after the noniination. If he thinks the Democrats 
by spring of 1972 are sure losers, he can yet stand off. 




Hard Evidcmcc: 

Maiikicwicz, Salinger, Goodwin and V/alinsky have all 
hooked vip (CSi\l) v/ilh sure-loser George McGovcrn. These arc 
not idealistic scliool boys willing to spend a year of their lives 
on an ideological lark. They are interested in power -- tlicrc 
is no power to be had by going the route with George McGovern. 

It appears they liave been given the go-sign by Kennedy 
to join McGovern, tliat the purpose is to serve (a) as a "liolding 
operation" for the Kennedy staff, (b) to niake top Kennedy 
personnel familiar vs'ith all the levers of state Democratic pov/er 
when Kennedy makes his move and (c) to elevate McGovern in the 
polls and start cutting Humphrey and Muskic down to size v/liere 
they can't be noniinated. 

McGovern is now moving in line v/ith this strategy, v/ith 
his overt violation of O'Brien's 11th Commandinent and attack 
on IIHH and Muskie for opposition to the Mansfield /injendment. 
Last night, Kennedy himself had the needle out for some of t'ne 
"older" voices locked in the thiiilcing of the past -- and he 
mcjitioned, specifically, the opposition to Mansfield Amendinent 
as his basis -- refusing, hov/cver, to naine names. 

Also, in line with the strengthening of the weak sister, 
McGovern, is the emergence of candidates Jackson and Mills -- 
both of whom will corral conservative Democrat delegates v/ho 
might otherwise be in the Muskie or Humphrey Camp. 

Kennedy Strategy : 

Avoid the early priinarics in which the left-handers 
McGovcrn, Bayh, Hughes, etc. will all be knocked out of the 
box in the early innings -- freeing vip their "Kenncdyites" for the 
switch to Teddy. Maneuver' to guarantee that Muskie nor 
Humphrey moves into the convention with the nomination locked 
up. Hold open the option of going into the California Priinary 
itself -- if that is necessary to halt the moincntum of a Muskie 
or Humphrey. Nearing convention time -- have the left candidates, 
one-by-one, throw their support to Teddy and Teddy eiricrgc as 




the sinjjlc chamjjion o^ that wing of the party -- with good laboi' 
backing, with good inachinc backing, and with young, poor, 
black unanimous behind his candidacy. 

Muski c versus Kcn nc cK': 

Since No vcin l^cr has lost almost 40 per c ent o f 
his first-cl:oice sui;port anion,': Democrats, dronj^intr fro:iT 33-2 1 . 

Between March and May, Muskie's 1 point lead among 
• Democrats over Kennedy (26-25) disajipcai-cd into an eiglit point 
deficit (29-21). 

Among Independeaits -- Muskie's l ong suit -- his March 
lead over Ke nnedy of 18 points (31-13) was sliced all the way to 
four points (19-15) . 

Muskie still has trcinendous support among Democratic 
Party leaders -- Kennedy, froin the polls, next to nothing -- but 
Kennedy support among the rank-and-file Deniocrats, his ability 
to attract publicity and generate excitement and the support of the 
ideologically conimittcd give him more than enough to balance off 
his weakness v/ith the pros. 

Impossible for me to believe the Kcnnedyites, who believe 
RN is vulnerable, are going to sit by and watch a Muskie or Humphrey 
take tlie prize in August -- and perhaps the Presidency, thus putting 
off the "Restoration" for four years, possibly eight, possibly forever. 

The Kennedy .Assets : 

These arc well known. Charm, "commitinent", affinity 
with the young, polish, Kennedy looks, mystique, the Myth, charisma 
along the canipaign trail; lie generates enorinous excitement -- as is 
attested by GOPers traveling with him. 

Deficiencies : 

1. Even liis best friends never accused Kennedy of being 
an intcllcctua^l. On the Drew show,, he tended to retreat into the New 
Left cliches, "we can build a better America, " material, which 




reflects a Inck of depth. Further, he tends to react i:omc\vliat 
holly lo attack. (PJB suggestion is that it might be well to have 
hang one or two on hiin -- from the Vice President or Dole -- 
taking some particular excessive statemeiit, and really putting 
it to him, to ascertain liow he liandles liimself. Thi.s would 
perhaps best be doiic by a moderate-liberal Senator v/ho would 
unleash a stinging attack on liim -- away from the Senate floor -- 
before television, about two-minutes of good v/ork -- then v/e could 
see how lie reacts. ) 

2. His far-left foreign policy positions, which v/in him 
the i^laudits of the Ncv/ Left journalists and fellov/ travelers in the 
media -- should be portrayed as shocking, ala.rniing, frightening, 
dangerous to the peace, inviting in Europe, "imjnalvire" and 
irresponsible. Not, of course, from here -- but in bacicgrounders 
witli press, he shov^ld be portrayed as too reckless, too immature, 
too irresponsible, at his age, to be President of the United States. 
This fits liand in globe v/ith tlie iinpression he lias left upon muf:]i 
of the country and tlie center of the Democratic Party in the wal;e 
of Chappaquiddick. 

It is the quiet constant repetition of private and public 
comments like, "Sure, Muskie is strong but this "indecisive' thing 
is killing him" that is itself injuring Muskie' s chances. He has 
been unable to shake the "indecisive" charge with v.hich v/e have -- 
with his lielp -- tagged him. 

3. His far left social policy positions should be broadcast 
and re-broadcast. He has the Left and the Radical Kids. We don't 
and won't get a one.' The effort should be to identify him with thein, 
to associate him with them, to tie hiin to them. 

No matter that EMI< is adored by the Party's Left, we have 
a serious probleni only if he gets v/ell v/ith the Party's Center. The 
more he acts like Brother Bobby the better off we arc; the less he 
acts like brother John, the better off we are. 

4. Socially, Kennedy is out of touch with the political mood. 
The Jet Set, Swinger, e-Through Blouse cum Hot Pants crowd, 
the Chappaquiddick Hoc-dov/n and Paris highjinlis -- the niore 
publicity tlicy all get, the better. (The pictures of the Kennedy 
sisters, in mod attire, at the Kennedy Center, did them no good.) 




Cha pp''- C! uic1t1ir)c:_ 

T}us, of course, will be kept in the public mind by tlie 
press -- spcculriLing on whether it is lieljaing or liuvtjnj; JTMK. 
\Vc ouj^lit to stay inilcG away frojn it -- indicating even in private, 
"it's hard to say the ef/cct; v/c don't know." 

Racial Issue ; 

Kennedy's sujiport of the social- engineering Ribicoff Plan 
should be einphasi^ed -- ajid a clieck made to determine liow many 
of Ins own children go to integrated schools -- and then this 
fact, if relevant, placed in Mond ay, or some publication to get 
attention. Monday could investigate tliis -- if Kennedy is guilty 
of hypocrisy on tlie question -- tliis inade knov/n. 

The Democ r atic Riirht: 

FMK openly endorsed the left-wing Mayoral candidate 
who lost to Rizzo in the primary by a wjiopping inargin. The 
President might v/ell co'igratulate Riy.z.o --if and when he wins the 
Mayorality -- and try to v/ean some of these tough-line conservative 
Mayor types to a i^osition of neutrality in a Kcnnedy-RN contest. 

Tliey have no reason to love EMK -- and it would appear to 
ine that this effort would be at Icart as worthv/hile as the effort 
to Y/oo labor chieftains equally locked into the Democratic Party. 


Since EK'IK will be trafficking on the JFK myth, it 
would be v/ell to document JFK's toxlgh line on Defense, foreign 
policy, Yietnani, Europe, etc. over against ZMK's positions -- 
to provide conservative Democrats with sonic rationale for abandoning 
the little brother of their hero. 

Some of the above are tactical gestures, rather than strategic 
planning. But the maiji objective, again, is to keen Kennedy 


on tl 




eit o 

f lus !■ 

'arty - 











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. it 

lie is 





in-jt ti; 

,e I-'rcsidcnt 


we 1 






at a 

il \ 





Is, who iTiak 





up an in'c'jral part of Ihc Nh:on Xl.njorjly. J/ he is nomirir-itcd, 


shouU: be bv the Lcj't Wine of his Party r,o that J.D.T, tlic South, 
and t}ic Cor.r^Qrvt.iiv: iDc:Tiocr;'.ts will. /cf;i tlicy lir.v(: been run 

over to]t of by the unrepresentative radicals and the elite. 



Exhibit No. 174 


WA S H I N C. I O N 

CONFIDENTIAL June 22, 1971 




For Thursday's ineeting, can you give some thought to the 
following questions which we will want to knock abovxt: 

1. Who is the likely Democratic nominee at this tiine, and 
hov/ should the leading contenders be dealt with by our oide 
bcty/eoi now and llxc first of 1972 '> 

2. What is the likely opposition v/itliin the Republican Party 
to the r enoniinjition of the President ? And hov/ should the 
McCloskey niovement be handled frorji the Administration, 
and Republican standpoints, 

3. What is the best strategy we can employ to defend against 
the attackvS of potential Denjocratic noininces, and how active 
and intense a strategy should we pursue in going after our 
Democratic adversaries. 

4. Thoughts on tactics to be used to liighlight the weaknesses 
in tlic other party, and the other ca.ndidates, between now and 
this coming November. 

5. R.clated issues. 


Exhibit No. 175 

citizens for the re-election of the president 



•July 2, 1971. 




Democratic & Republican Contenccs 

"Attached is a report on the current st&tus of our tracking 
of the Deinocratic and Republican contencers. You will note 
that the planning corruTiittee, under Pat Buchanan, feels that 
adequate work is being done in collecting the data. The 
emphasis must be on using the information effectively, part- 
icularly in this pre-campaign period. Since this does not 
require a major change in resources or personnel assigrjients, 
ve'will proceed along those lines unless you disagree with 

■the conclusions reached in the memorandum. 



Our prevailing judgment at this time is that if Edward M. 
Kennedy wants the Democratic Nomination in 1972, he can win it; 
that he will make his final decision around the turn of the year; 
that the crucial factor in that .decision will be his'judgment as to 
whether or not the President can be defeated. If he feels the 
President is a loser, he will run. If the Pi-esident appears strong, 
he will hang back for 1976 -- and possibly act in a fashion as to 
assist the President's chance for re-election. 

If Kennedy hangs back, the group is divided as to whether 
Muskie or Humphrey %vould prevail at the convention. Humphrey 
seen as seriously damaged by the McNamara Papers. 

Group divided further over -who would be the most difficult 
candidate for RN. Some feel Kennedy would be an ideal opponent -- 
• others feel Kennedy, because of charisma, myth, enthusiasm, would 
be the most difficult. No one mentioned Hun">phrey as the stronges t . 
of the three. One felt that Muskie did not have it upstairs to 
successfully traverse a Presidenti^il campaign. Thus we should favor 
his nomination. 

Group believed that it was still too early to make flat predictions. 


CANDIDATES ■ . . . ■ 

KENNEDY -- Great strength among young, poor, black. The 
only Democrat who can generate great enthusiasm . Good support 
in labor movement, among lower-income Catholics. Charisma, the 
Repository o£ the Kennedy Myth, Good Campaigner. Strongest appeal 
to 18-21 year-old vote. Looks to bosses in the Northern Cities like 
a winner. Strongest among rank-and-file Democrats by Gallup Poll. . 
Not likely to drop in coming months. Kis political operation is 
among the best. He can generate more and better publicity than any 
of the others. 

Weaknesses: Chappaquiddick. Impression of immaturity and 
irresponsibility to many. Too far left; too associated with hippies 
and radicals. Not considered a heav-)'-wei ght either by party pros or 
fellow Senators. Anathema to the South. Too much of a left-winger; 
too jet set for Middle America. Would generate asmuch veherrient 
opposition on Right as support on the Left. 

MUSKIE -- Could unite Democrats. Strongest in polls of 
party leaders, and among Independents. Has non-partisan, non- 
political image. Strong on environment and "new priorities." 
Ideal compromise candidate, and current front-runner. Has general 
appearance of solid, responsible, able Senator who arouses no great 
emotion, but no great animosity. Odds -or.-favorite in the early prima 


Weaknesses: Indecisive, fumbling has cost him clean shot 
at unopposed nomination. Excessive appeasement of the radical 
feft has alienated center-conservative Democratic support. Painted 
as intellectually and politically timid by both Democrats and GOP. 
Not. very astute politically in handling of issues. Growing impression 
he is not presidential timber. No real enthusiasm behind hirn. As 
he lives by the polls, so he may perish by the polls. 

HUM PHREY -- Excellent party connections, a good party 
man. Ran close in 1968 with LBJ albatross around his neck. Has 
risen in party polls. Centrist Democrat. Good on bread and butter 
issues, economics; positioned almost ideally on the issues for the 
JiDemocratic Party. Good anti-Republican cainpaigner. Ebullient and 
likeable. Gets good publicity. Strong with the Democratic women. 
» Weaknesses: Old Face. Hemlock to the Gene McCarthy Left 

after 1968 -- his nomination, again , in 1972 would ris'k a party split, 
and possible third or fourth party. Despised by intellectual far left. 
No real enthusiasm for his nomination. Weak in the polls ■ 
the President. Would bring nothing to a Democratic ticket other 
than its basic traditional New Deal strengths. Would be perhaps one 
Democratic candidate who would keep the newly enfranchised young 
home in droves. Difficult to see how he can win major primaries -- 
even the late ones, Oregon and California. Removes Vietnam as an 
issue to use against Republicans. 


JACKSON - - Strong with South, strong with labor, strong 
with conservative Democrats, with Jewish voters and money> with 
big labor and aerospace and defense contractors. Only Democrat hare 
liner on Soviets and Defense Policy -- presents clear alternative to 
new isolationist sentiment. Choice not an echo. Anti-radical rhetoricj 
Has money backing, good svipport in Senate. - Highly regarded, 
tremendous victory record in Washington -- 85 percent. La%v and 
order inaru Rallying point for Democratic conserv^.tives. Ideal 
Vice Presidential Candidate for gdw.ard M. Kennedy, if party divided 
over Kennedy nomination . 

Weaknesses: Nomination would surely sunder Democratic 
Party. Would generate Fourth Party candidate as in 1948. Party too 
far. left to nominate him now. No national recognition. Needs to go 
the primary route -- will lose in New Hampshire, a chance in Florida 
and Oregon -- but can't win the big ones. Again, less likely a 
potential nominee than a potential Vice Presidential nominee. 

MCCLOSKEY -- What the ex-Marine has going for him is a 
general impression of solid, ex-Marine, honest, tough-minded, anti- 
war, candid, likely to capitalize on the anti-Nixon sentiment viithin 
the Party on the Left. Strategy against him should be, in our view, 
ignore him at the National level --> and publicize in Republican circles 
every far-out position, and statement, and appearance. To tarnish 


his image as a selfless white knight. Anything that can be seen 
as moving him out on the left fringe diminishes the degree of 
Republican votes he can possibly win. 


-- Attacks should not focus on any single Democrat. All 
should be hit now, and hard -- as attacks .coming in mid-or late 
1972 will be seen as wholly political, thus less credible, less 
newsworthy than attacks in 1971. 

-- President should stay utterly aloof from political attacks. 
;^ -- The Democratic Party as an entity should be denigrated, 

as so irresponsible, such a disaster in the sixties, as not to oe 
entrusted with national leadership again. Thus, Clifford, Karriman, 
; O'Brien, and all potential candidates become fair game. 

-- Public should not be allowed to forget the record of the LBJ 
Administration, of HHH's role, of EMK's background, of Muskie's 
bumbling s. 

Disagreement was expressed over-who should do the attacking. 
One view, strongly held, is that Anierican people are fed up with 
politics per se, and politicians, and if RN's official family, i. e. 
"Vice President, White House Staff, or Cabinet, engage in partisan 
warfare, this reflects on the President as a ooliticiaa -- and detracts 


from him. Other view is that while. President must stay aloof, ' 

the deficiency of Republican guns argues that we have to use ' 

what we have, i. e. the Vice President, occasionally Cabinet | 

members, the RNC Chairman, the RNC, the Republican leadership -' 

and any Republicans we can find on Capitol Hill to carry the attack 

to the Democrats, I 

General concurrence that the press and media tend to tolerate) 

more partisan and malicious assault on part of Deipocrats, which the; 

would charge off to dirty politics on part of Republicans. 


Research Resources 

-- RNC is keeping on-going in-depth files on all potential 
Democratic contenders, plus McCloskey, Gardner, Lindsay and 
Wallace. This material filed in data bank instant retrieval system. 

-- Mort Allin News Summary, contains files of all major 
Democratic candidates, major comments and stories from 50 
major newspapers. 

-- RNC runs monthly digest of each potential candidate listing 
outstanding developments, etc. 

Withbut going into further dej)th, '.ve have more than enough 
political research, 'and filing going on. Any future allocation of ' 

resources should be away from research, and into production. In 
short, a diminution of input, and an increase in output. WTiat is needei 


now is not more personnel to squirrel away little nuggets for the 
winter -- but rather analysts, writers and producers,- who can 
translate the daily grist into daily news copy. 


-- Monday has a high degree of credibility with the press; 
has been successful in moving anti-Democratic propaganda into the 
national media, i. e. , the Muskie temper, the Muskie indecisivcness, 

I the McGovern front for Kennedy, the Gardner_operi ion. Each week 
there should be one or more major political news stories coming 
out of Monday. 

-- Senator Dole, and the Vice President have carried the attack 

Fin recent months. Senator Dole especially. Our objective is to 
provide more raw material and convince more of our people on the 
Hill, in the Cabinet, and in the party nationally to use it. To this 
end. Ken Khachigian has been put on full time for solely this 
purpose. His job broadly outlined will be to daily view the inconiing 
research materials, and to provide a daily diet of political attack 
material for party people -- great and s-mall. 

-- The letters to the editor operation out of the RNC will be 
tied in directly with this operation, bringing out more attack material 
on the Democrats nationally. 

21-296 0—74 19 


-- The Colson Shop, primarily, and less so than the Klein shopj 
can move out materials that we find in our research operations -- and 
that need to be moved now. 

-- Schedules of the primary candidates, especially, will be 
gathered -- and of McCloskey -- so that suitable arrival ceremonies 

can occasionally be prepared, issue-rated by Walker's advance men. , 

-- Some raw data of significant importance -- such as the Godfre' 

Sperling article detailing control of McGovern operation by EMK types - 

should be inoved unadulterated to national political reporters. We will 

have either a covert or open operation on (his later out of RNC to 

make sure political columnists are not missing first-rate anti-oppositio; 


-- Discussion to- be held with RNC to consider a mid-week 
abbreviated Monday version, which inight v/ellbe called Watch on the 
Potomac, or some such, which would give insider accurate information \ 
on Democrats, etc. J 

-- Consideration being given to development of possible anti- 
opposition ads -- but this is still in the planning process. 

-- Because we feel that need to Have, direct access to governmeai 
sources of information, we have deternnined that Ken Khachigian, who is 
the first new full time man hired for this specific operation should stay 
in the White House complex -- not move outside. 




a) Focus not on stock-piling nnaterial but on moving it into 
the media -- on output, rather than input. We don't want to wind up 
in November of 1972 with 100, 000 unused anti- Democratic documents . 
in a super retrieval system. 

b) Maintain as guiding political principle that our great hope 
for 1972 lies in rrjaintaining or exacerbating the deep Democratic 
rift between the elite, chic. New Left, intellectual avant garde, 
isolationist, bell-bottomed environmentalist, new priorities types on 

I the one hand -- and the hard hat, Dick Daley, Holy Name Society, 
ethnic, blue collar. Knights of Columbus, NYPD, Queens Democrats' 
on the other. 

The liberal Democrats should be pinioned to their hippie 

js supporters. The Humphrey Democrats should be reminded of how 
they were the fellows who escalated and cheered the w^ar from its 

|i inception. 

c) Get as much anti -Democratic material into the media as 
possible. Eschew the ridictalous and wild as counter-productive. 

Finally, we have a strong team at the RNC which has not always 
been the case; we have some national spokesmen who can take the 


political attack effectively, which was not always the case in the 
last decade -- and we have some tempting targets. As of now -- 
we see no need for any appropriations from Nixon for President 
Fund -- we can handle it right now with what v/e have. 

If and when we feel we need Tnore people -- writers and 
analysts basically -- we will come around. 

(There may be a necessity to establish an outside direct 
mail group to columnists, editorial writers, and political writers -- 
in order to get all our negative propaganda into their hands.) 



Exhibit No. 176 


rre.'oTnV'r^c'''' ^"ly 28, 1971 




Attaclied is a memo by Pat .Buchanan outlining a strategy for 
dealing v/ith opposition contenders. Several specific recom- 
mendations are ir.ade which will establish the direction and 
scope of our activities over the next several months. 



July 28, 1971 


The clear and present political danger is that Senator 
Muskie, the favorite in the early primaries, v;ill promenade 
through the primaries, come into the convention with a clear 
majority and enormous momentum for November. That would be 
bad nev.'s for us. 

If there is to be a contested convention, a divided con- 
vention — the first priority is to trip up Muskie in the 
primaries.. This is in Kennedy's interest, in Humphrey's inter- 
est, in our interest. 

Thus, Senator Uuskie is Target A as of mid-summer for our 
operation. Our specific goals are (a) to produce political 
problems for him, right now, (b) to hopefully help defeat him 
in one or more of the pr-imeries (Florida locks nov.' to be the 
best early bet, California, the best later bet) , and (c) finally, 
to visit upon him some political wounds that will not only 
reduce his chances for nomination -- but damage him as a candi- 
/date, should he be nominated. 

As for the other Democrats, Kennedy, Jackson and Humphrey 
are the only credible ones we see - Humphrey the most desirable 
from cur viewpoint. But any of these three — especially 
Kennedy and even Jackson — should be the subject of attack. 

• For the next several months, especially while Muskie is 
hibernating in Maine for the summer, we proposed to concentrate 
our efforts on liim. 

Approve Disapprove Comment 

How . In the long run, for the November election, the best 
offense against Muskie is to point him as far left as possible, 
leaving the President as much of the center as possible. For • 
the nomination, however, any stick should be used to beat hint. 
He can and should be attacked from Right and Left. 


For example, from the right, Muskie can be charged with 
cutting space and defense and throwing union workers'out of 
jobs, with killing the SST and thus killing Seattle, with smear- 
ing the FBI, and fir, Koovcr, with endorsing Communist-Kook dem- 
onstrations, with favoring "forced integration," etc. From 
the Left — and we should not ignore this line of attack — it 
can be argued tliat Muskie is an amoral opportunist who supported 
the war when he didn't believe in it, who has protected polluters, 
who lacks the political courage of McGovern, who is indecisive 
and gutless, who is trying to have his toadies at the DNC 
"broker" the convention, instead of have it open — of having 
spent a dozen years in the Senate without having accomplished 
a single objective. 

Further, we should begin now to acquire two, three or sev- 
eral tags, to Stick Muskie with -- such as the "Tricky Dick" 
that has been so damaging to the President over the years v;hen 
utilized by his political enemies. 

JACKSON . This presents a serious problem. First, Scoop 
is a frj^end of sorts of the President's, a supporter on defense 
and most foreign policy issues. Secondly, while he would be a 
formidable opponent for tl^ie President, if nominated, he cannot 
realistically be nominated — unless the political focus turns 
to matters of war and peace and security. Then while it would 
be in our interest to have him knock Muskie down in Florida — 
such a stunning victory for Jackson would boost him into a long 
shot for the nomination and a strong shot Vice President -- on 
a Kennedy ticket. 

(Any attack on Jackson, whose hard-line credentials are 
awfully good, woulji — if it were to be an effective attack — 
focus on his "secret liberalism," portraying him as the Errand 
Boy of George Meany. This could be done; it might actually 
"elevate Jackson (drawing the media to him) to the point where 
it would actually assist him in a Democratic Primary. 

But, do we want to attack Scoop Jackson at all? This is 
a question for higher ups. VJhere, for example would Jackson 
stand in a Nixon-Kennedy race, where Jackson was not on the 
Kennedy ticket. Scoop is 50 or more -- 1972 is his last run at 
the nomination - would he prefer a seat in a Nixon Cabinet or 
a Kennedy Cabinet? Again, higher ups should decide if and when 
we should pull the lanyard on Scoop Jackson. Surely, it would 
make news. 

Options : Attack Jackson as any other candidate. 
Approve Disapprove Comment 

Go easy on Jackson in the hopes of hurting Muskie. 
Approve Disapprove Comment 

KENNEDY . A major target of opportunity, but not the 
primary target. Focus here should be on immaturity, reckless- 
ness, jet-setter — not up to the stature required or stability 
required o£ a President. 

HUMPHREY . If we have to run against someone, we prefer 
Humphreit right now, as no President is so virtuous as to be 
granted George McGovern to run against. Humphrey's nomination 
v/ould be in our interest -- it may be necessary, frankly, to 
provide him with support. 

McCLOSKEY . At this point, we agree McCloskey should not 
be attacked by his superiors within the GOP, or the national Adm- 
inistration — in a manner to elevate him. Clearly, we believe 
that the proper way to deal with McCloskey is to have his national 
appearances (the media gives him network time regularly) jnatched 
by someone of Congressional level -- like Jack Kemp, who is be- 
ginning to match McCloskey and trouble him on their joint appear- 
ances. No major attack from the Cabinet, Vice Presidential or 
RNC National level, or Congressional leadership level should be 
made at this time — in our view. 

The proper way to discredit McCloskey is to (a) paint him 
as far left as possible and (b) if at all possible, find his 
sources of support, publicize them, and paint him as simply a 
pawn or cat's paw of the Democratic Party. Our objective is to 
damage his credibility with Republicans. 

But we should do nothing to allow him to paint himself as 
a political martyr. 

Specific options are detailed in the attached memorandum' 
from Jeb Kagruder. 



MONDAY is a credible publication — ^which gets irregular 
wire copy--and which we shall use weekly to move party line 
material aimed at issues dividing Democrats. 

Bob Dole can be effective, but only occasionally — like 
Ford and Scott, he is inhibited by his relationship, his Senator- 
ial courtesy to a fellow member if you will. 

The White House Staff which could be utilized to put out 
some of this party-line material — not for attribution of 
course — on Muskie, is currently inhibited by an edict of "no 
politics" in 1971. We might need to- have this altered for some 
individuals — as we can serve as regular conduits for the kind 
of political material we want to move. The White House staff 
should be considered as a resource in the near future to pass 
on not-attributed material to the press. 

Approve Disapprove Comment 

I The Vice President — We will need to know his inclinations 
I and the Presid<=nt's desires on his use -- but he could be cx- 
; tremely effective in selected political attacks. He gets enor- 
; nous coverage — and he can pu* -across a credible line on the 

Should the Vice President be used as a resource for opposi- 
1 tion attack? 

■ / 

fYes No Comment 

The Republican Party outside Washington — especially state 
•chairmen and state officers — should be put to use. We believe 
that a co-ordinated system should be set up of calling these 
Chairmen, to have them issue coordinated attacks when something 
like the Kennedy ^comment on RN re: Vietnam breaks -- and to issue 
regular statements on the arrival of major Democratic candidates 
in their state. 

Approve Disapprove Comment 

These last are political animals by choice, and their 
attacks upon Democrats do not constitute partisanship on the 
part of the White House. (Statements for these individuals 
could be drafted in our shop, but transmitted to the states via 
M RNC . ) . 


Some discussion has gone on of using the Citizens as 
Middle Man between V.'H and RNC — we can of course follow that 
procedure, but, given a secure man at the RNC of which there 
are many, we think that direct contact would be best from 
here. We currently follow this procedure in drafting materials 
for Monday. We need to know basic policy on this. 

(1) Direct contact with RNC be made through Buchanan shop. 
Approve Disapprove Comment 

(2) Establish in Citizens (target date November I) an 
operational arm which will implement strategy and tactics ini- 
tiated by Buchanan shop. 

Approve Disapprove Comment 

Finally, we are giving some thought to preparing paid inedia 
advertisements -- issue-oriented -- in here and have thera placed 
by the Citizens Group, or some political group formed in the 
various .states. This can be an effective tool for driving home 
particular issue points we need made -- and drive them home be- 
fore the political season starts -- when little is believed 

Approve Disapprove Comment 

Special Projects . We would like to utilize Ron Walker's 
resources where possible to handle some close-in operations, 
pickets and the like, when candidates visit various cities. The 
candidate normally brings with him his own media; he attracts 
local media; and we would like to be able to "piggy back" on that 
media — with our own operations, anti-candidate. This requires 
support activities from some source; Ron has an operation in 
place; and they will need approval — either general or specific ■ 
— for these covert operations. 

Approve Disapprove Comment 

Contact with Walker for activities may be made directly 
from Buchanan shop. 

Approve Disapprove___ Comment 

Contact with Walker should be made through operational arm 
in "Citizens but initiated in Buchanan shop. 

Approve Disapprove Comment 


Further, for non close-in operations — we should use 
party personnel, working through the national conur.ittee. Bv 
these I mean handbills outside factory gates in the morning' 
and evening — when Muskie votes against some appropriations 
for SST. Something of that nature, which the local party can 
surely handle. 

Approve Disapprove Comment 

Exhibit No. 177 



August 7, 1971 



Attached from Ken Kliachigian, re: Florida Primary, seems 
to me a good idea. Can you check it out with the powers 
that be? 







July 2Z, 1971 







See the attached -- apparently there is a provision in the 
Florida primary law by which we could keep pistol-Pete off the 
ballot. I think it would be to our advantage to do so since RN 
will most likely be on the ballot (unless he files affidavit 

Can we get the word to Florida through Magruder or RNC 
to have the state chairman down there do what he can to keep 
McCloskey off? An unopposed RN in Florida with a unified party 
I behind him might be a nice contrast to the bloodletting that will 
; take place with the Democrats. Moreover, this will allow us to 
free up our resources to hurt the Democrats in their primary. 





WAS»IINCTON. o.c. ao>oc 
ItOll 133-0920 

August 11, 1971 



. SUBJECT: McCloskey and Florida Primary 

Enclosed is an article from the July 21st V?ashington Post 
which indicates that there is a provision in the Florida 
primary law by which we could keep McCloskey off the ballot. 

Pat Buchanan suggested that maybe we could have the Florida 
State Chairman do whatever he can under this lav/ to keep 
McCloskey off the ballot. An unopposed RN in Florida with a 
unified party behind him might be a nice contrast to the 
bloodletting that will take place with the Democrats. • More- 
over, this v/ill allow us to free up our resources to hurt the 
Democrats in their primary. 

Approve Disapprove , Comment^ 


bcc: Mr. Haldeman 

JSM Chron 
V^M Primaries 



July 21, 1971 

Nixon Foe 
Florida Pr 

TALT.AHASSI:E. rin.. July 
T.i) (Ai') — l'"li)ricla's lop dec- 
lioiii of;lci'r ;:.r.i; ;i ;'.i|' in llu' 
sl;i((''s ii«'\v (uimnv ■ l;;'.,- in.'iy 
cii.'ilile pro-fv'ixnn (!()i' li-.uli'i;; 
lo clii." Ilin ;,\-|-,ubl!(;.Tn hnlfof 
rioriria's -iMnich M prc-idcn- 
tinl cnnlcsl lo .ill but llic iii- 
ciiinbciu inecidcnl. 

Sccrelnry n{ SLaic Hirliirii 
S'finr s.'iHi in .'U iiilrrvirv.' 
MnivK-'.y Inril Hep. JliiLLL-ilij. 

piiblic.-.n I ba!i' :i;','r (jJiiUi^boi 

f;ovcn-mc m i ,■ o i__^j^c2mn_j: orj • 

'niitlrn. i 

A raTiTl i d ,-/ cIs— lUin^Ji-^'-uJiiJ-J ■ 

be dolcjcc] )X_-CJi.-CC'ajmlUi:£^ 

TiTcmTKM-;;' of Iho 5ainr p-:irty 

_ apicc Vo ( io :-.or~0'hc:-e tire '. 
IHree j^icubiicaiiS and jTour; 
pcmocrnts wiiu have iho linai. 
say, he said. j 

■ "It is qiiilo po:,siblc Ihcyi 
niifjhl feci that way as parly 
IncmbiTS," .'iald Stnno, who is' 
the. noii-voUnn chairr.iau. , 

Stato party Icadrr.s Mich r.s' 
GOP Chaii-niai) L. E. (Tommy) 
Th.or.ias of Panama Cily have 
been critical of McCioskcy's 
vow to rhaUmne President. 
Nixon if he doesn't end tlio 
Viclnam war before tlic i)rl- 

'"J'onimy lias indicated he 
would not try lo block l\lc- 
Clo.'kcy, although lie has said 
he would not oi)en any doors 
for him," said a GOP spokes- 
But if only one of the GOP 

May Face 
imary Bar 

members felt that tlic Califor- 
nia coniiressman .■".hould be on 
I be b.dlol, lie would he, Slonc 

y.-'crctaiy Slom- also r.nbl be 
would "sci'lt clarifir.:!ion" 
from two Soulhern political 
,''i'-;iires, Alab.iMi.'i Gov. George 
Wallace and (Ji'orgia 1,1. Gov. 
Le.' tcr i\Iaddo::, as to whcll,cr 
Ibey i)l,inn.'"d to nin as Demo- 
crats in the riorida jiriinary. 

Exhibit No. 178 

('07301608 8 3 



ju.rtjT. ' August 13, 1971 


ilNCTOS. O C 3033C 

ir02t 333-O20 . j 




Attached is a copy of an Evans and Novak colunn from the July 
25 Washington Post which indicates the Deraocrats are setting 
us a '72 Sponsors Cli±> similar to the President's Club of the 
LBJera. For $72 a month, there are a number of privileges 
'accordea to those v;ho contribute. 

PafBuchanan has suggested that we have someone v.'e know, pre- 
ferajDly a Democrat not connected with us, join this club. This 
could be arranged by having the individual write in explaining 
that he read about the club in the newspaper and is fed up with 
the Administration's policies and wants to contribute his share 
and become a member of the club. This would give us many advan* 
tages in keeping track of Democratic contenders and their 


That we have someone join tlie '72 Sponsors Club. 

Approve Disapprove Comment 



bcc: Mr. Haldeman 


JSM Chron 

JSM Contenders 




Exhibit No. 179 
t>. 07301602 7^ 



October 5, 1971 



FROM: "RESEARCH" (As Requested) 

Because the Old Roosevelt Co?.lition was composed of numerous parts, 
tlie're is more than one fissure within the Democratic Party which can 
today, be exploited to the benefit of the President. Some exaniples: 


Thernost readl'.y obvious division among Democrats is along ideological 
■'.lines 7" the left and the Nevv Left versus moderate and conservative 
Democrats. Militant blacks, the rebellious on the campus, the radical 
1 chic of Eastern liberalism are all within the broad confines of the Demo- 
cratic Party. So, too, is their most antipathetic adversaries, the blue 
collar, white collar conservative Democrats. 

|1 To exacerbate the ideological division, a few suggestions which surely 

t| can be emended and added to: 

1) The Platform Plan k Asainst Extremism, The Democrats mirror to 
some extent the Republicans of 19o-^, and pressure for a plank in both 
parties denouncing Left-wing extreiDism, and New Left atteinpts to subvert 
.and overthrow American institutions would be divisive in the Democratic 
Party,- Specific denudations of the Black Panther P§.rty, SDS, those who 
have attempted to politicize and destroy the great American universities. -- 
these are proposals to deeply divide Democrats. The feat is to focus 
Democratic attention on this. Could pctrhaps be done by a Dole speech, 
calling on both Republicans and Democrats to incorporate such a' plani; 
in their party's platform -- a speech made after some particularly 
outrageous campus incident preferably. 

21-296 0—74 20 


1/07301 60 27 5 


2) Republican Praise for Attacks on the Left : Rather than attack the 
hard left, dc rigcur for Republicans, we should shower praise upon. 
Jackson and the Conservative Democrats who denounce the left wing 
within their own party. A specific example is Jackson's attack on 
"environmenlcJ extremists." We might well go back, dig up Jackson's 
attacks on his party's left wing, and use thein. \Vc did, this to some good 
effect in the early 1970 cainpaign witli the Vice President quoting Meany's 
and other denunciations of extremism in the Dcniocratip Party. 

3) Republican Praise for any Democratic Support on Vietnam. More 
injurious to HHH and Muskie, than an attack on their Vietnam position 
(which should not be excluded) is "praise" for their support of the President, 
on occasion. This goes far toward making them "Establishment" and 
driving a wedge between tliein and tl-.e ideological hard core of their p^rty. 

4) The N-IcGoN ern-O'Erien Reform. The lyeft is counting licavily on these 
reforms. They iriay not be carried out to the letter.- If they are, they will 
likely result in one humdinger of a convention; the President's political 
campaign personnel sho>.:ld be on th.e watch for violations, which arc alinost 
certain to occur -- and ihcn elevate tJ^ose violations in the media as shafting 
the young, the poor, the black and the women. We ha\'i2 already had soine 
success with thi.s in the Jvlonday piece, v.'hich got national attention, alleging 
that O'Brien liad thrown in with Muskie, tliey were putting the "fix" in at 
the /Convention, and tiirowing the blocks to the McCarthy kids and McGovern. 
Democrats are extremely sensitive about this; and concerned about the 

(In this quarrel^ our publications and spokesman, it seems to me at present, 
should take the side of the Far Left, saying we disagree with them; but 
that they have a just cause, and the Power Elite within the Party is denying 
them effective participation.) 

5) Lcft-A\''ing Democratic Complaints, i.e. from McGovern and his people 
should find an echo and an amicus curiae in Republican statements and 

6) A Mailing List should be prepared and kept up to date of all Democratic 
convention delegates, as Ih.ey are named. Anything any major candidate 
says that is offensive to their faction should be brought to their attention, 
and the attention of the press in their area. 

Example: Humphrey's statcnicnt ruling out all signers of the Southern 
Manifesto should go out, one-page, to Southern delegates, and Southern 
papers -- particularly, say, those in Carolina wlicrc Sam Erwin was ruled 
out, and Oklalioma, where Carl Albert was ruled out by KIIH. 

v-Q 7 3 I 6 q 7 6 


7) \Vc hivc to develop several covert outlets withiri the national press, 
who will ask the hard questions ll;at only a political adversary can think 
up. In addition, and perhaps as a substitute for this, we should have 
several divisive questions v/orkcd up, and distributed at major press 
conferences of the leading Deinocrats. Also, direct niail to questioners 
of major Dsmocrr.ts -- in short, little briefing papers tcr newsmen -- should 
go to those who interrogate them on ABC, NBC and CBS Sunday shows. 


South versus North. Here the dividing line is essentially that of the race 
issue; but it goes further into :)ie "liberalism" of the national Democratic 
Party leaders, and major candidates, which does not sit well v/itli the 
essential "suburban conservativism" and even " WallaceisiTj" of Democrats 
in the South. " To force a choice here, we need more than just rhetoric 
and mailings, 'Actions talcen by the President and Administration arc 
decisive here: -. . , 

1) The Supreme Court no:nination of a Southern Strict Constructionist will 
force Deinocratic Noriiiern liberals, and inajor Candidates, to anger cither 
the Soutli with a veto vote, or the blacks and the labor movement and the 
Northern liberals. A liighly qualified Southern Conservative nonnince to 
the Supreme Court is de facto a divisive issue in the Democratic Party. 

2) Elevation of the issue of coiTipulsory school integration and neigl^borliood 
integration, via sucli as "bussing" and the Ribiccff Plaa. Clearly, this puts 
Northern liberals like Muskie on an untenable hook. And with the Detroit 
horror show shaping up, this is going to be even more a national "voting" 

i issue,' V^r. Wallace has recognized this. 

The serious problem here is that while Muskie may be in favor of compulsory 
integration by his votes -- the Administration is tlie one that is seen as in 
: power* while various odious ruling and policies are being enforced. 

Many of my sources tell me t'.iat it is the President -- since he is visible in 
: office, and has made strong statements -- who is today being hurt worst 
;by the bussing fiasco. That is not as it sliould be as I understand that the 
: President political and moral position is that it is wrong and contra-productive 
ito forcible integrate the races. 
i- • 

! However, if we are to draw a line between us and the Democratic liberals, 
which Icar'cs the Democratic conservatives on our side of the line -- then 
action will be required, in my judgment, on the President's part. 

Frankly, this requires the kind of historic decision, bringing a constitution<vl 


.' 0* 7 3 I 6 2 7 7 

: -4- 

cnd to Die national pressure to integrate races in housing and schooling -- 
which requires a decision on the psrl of tlie President. This would really 
tear vp the pea palcli; and our current policy is one of accommodation v/ith 
the courts not confrontation. 

In conclvision, this is a potential throw of the dice that could bring the 
media on our heads, end cut the Democratic Party and country in half; my 
vlow is ll\at wo would l»avc far tlio larger half. But that is not my decision. 

3) A Wallace Candidacy in the Primaries: This is an excellent vehicle for 
surfacing and liardening the divisions within the Democratic Party, in the 
South. Regrettably, such a priirsary run is lilicly to hone his organization 
for a pass at the general. And if MusVcic is tlie Democratic choice, "There's 
not a dime's wojth of difference between them" is an effective slogan. But 
Wallace victories iii Florida, North Carolina and Tennessee -- if they are in 
cards -- could create some truly serious probleins for the Democratic 
Convention.. ... • 

4) The Defense Issue: Though less so than before, defense is an issue 
on \vhich,the majority of Republicans and conservative and Southern -r. 
Democrats ujiite on one side -- v/ith the liberal DeiTiocrats on the other. 
Again, this involves Presidential decision. Should thf President elevate 
this issue, it is one which would di\ide the opposition'party straight down 
the middle with Meany, Jackson and the Southerners on ono side -- and 
Kennedy, McGovern, Lindsay on tlie other. 

Again, however, the accomplishment of such a division requires a 
Presidential elevation of an issue where we have sought to mute differences 
via our thrust, "We have already re-ordered our priorities;*' the Defense 
Budget is the "lowest percent of GNP since the Fillmore Administration, "ete 

5) The elitism and quasi-anti-Americanisnn of the National Democratic 
Party have little appeal below the Mason-Dixon Line; and we should contrast 
the Party of Roosevelt, Truman, and JFK — with the party of Ramsey 
Clark, Ronald Dellums and George McGovern. 


The great Northern cities see a clear dividing line between the liberal, 
academic, intellectual Democratic elite in the Party -- and the working 
class Roman Catholic, Polisli, Irish, Italian Democrats, from the Bronx, 
Queens and Cook County. 

1) My view has been that these minorities, Poles, Irish, Italian Catholics, 
are larger minoriiicc and easier to win than the "media minoiitics" -- 
i.e. Blacks, Puerto Ricans, Moxican- Americans, Indians, etc., ihe 
darlings of the mass media. 


:i''lf'7 3 16 2 7 

Conspicuous appoinlincnts of the larger iT>inorities, the more available 
minorities (Irish, Italian, Poles, Slovalcs, etc.) would reap us greater 
diWdcnns, and v/can away from the Democratic Party a more significant 
base than the play being given today say to blacks. 

2) Aid To Catholic School s. Clearly this divides the Democrats who fun 
the New York Ti.-nes from the Democrats who run for office in Queens and 
the North Bron>:. The President's strong stand on abortion, a gut issue 
with Catholics, is another divisive factor within the Denriocratic Party -- 
if. we can force Democrats to come down on one side or the other. 

Again, however, these issues which have been shown by Governors like 
Rockefeller to be deeply divisive to D::mocrats on the 3tate level --have 
to be elevated on the National level in order to do us any good. There is 
another drawback. They are also divisive to Republicans. The Ripon 
Society liberals will be anti-aid to Catliolic schools, pro-abortion, and 
more concerned with "censorship" and " repression" than porno. 

But the favoxitism toward things Catholic is good politics; there is a trade- 
off, but it leaves us with the larger share of the pie. If we want to throw 
the dice on this divisive issue, the way to do it is via a specific, tangible 
program .of Federal assistance to non- public schools to save them. 

Here, too, we have to force Democrats to choose among their vital voting 
blocs -- where the interests of tliose blocs directly cqlMde. 

3) y Fourth Party Candidacies. Top-level consideration should be given to 
ways and means to pronnote, assist and fund a Fourth Party candidacy of 
the Left Democrats and/or tl-.e Black Democrats. There is nothing that 
can so advance the President's chances for re-election -- not a trip to 
China, not four-and-a-half percent unemploynnent -- as a realistic black 
Presidential campaign . 

4) Black Complaints: As we did with Muskie we should continue to champion 
the cause of the Blacks within the Democratic Party; elevate their complaints 
of "being taken for granted." 


Where before, the economic interests of the Roosevelt Coalition were 
complin-ientory or harmonious, today that is not the case. This, fissurpi 
•too, can be exploited: 

i'Onc could divide it between the loafing classes (welfare, students) and 
the working classes. 


.. .0-7 3 I 6 2 7 9 

■• . -^ '-. ... .•■. 

A cutback in welfare, n hard-line on welfare would /ovco Democrats 
to choose between the working class outraged by the excesses in that 
program and the welfare class, which is becoming a cohesive voting 

A specific political position of sta-ting that while the Democratic Left is 
constantly spcalting up for tlie welfare class in this country, "the time 
has come for someone to represent thq working class" rpight well be 
considered philistine or worse by the media, but would seem to be gcod 
politics. Tax relief, for example, is of a good dea] inorc interest and 
concern for the worl;ing mcvA of this country, tJian t)ie massive svelfare 
scheme we. have proposed -- and the President is more likely to get 
working class support, Wiley's V/elfare Mommas bcliind him. 

Note: Since taking office, the President has increased by 500 percent -- 
from $400 million to $2 billion -- the food stamp and food assistance funds; 
and he still gets it in the neck for "starving the poor." Metlunks there 
would have been more gratitude and greater rewards if those funds had 
been directed to the President's potential friends in tlie working class, and 
their interests. 

If the President would become the visible and outspoken champion of the 
Forgotten American, the working people of this country -- and as sen that 
the welfare types have been taken care of for years; it would force a"--;, 
division v/itl>in the Democratic Party, would align the media against us -- 
but mcthinks it both divides them and assists us. 

Like other proposals, the above calls for what the Vice President has 
termed "positive polarization" and requires really the kind of go-for-brokc 
decision that we may not feel is either necessary or justified by our 
comparatively good field position. 

The Black Vice President bumper stickers calling for black Presidential 
and especially Vice Presidential candidates should be spread out in the 
ghettocs of the country. Also, anli-Muskie stickers. V.'e should do what 
is within our power to have a black nominated for Number Two at least at 
the Democratic National Convention. 


The President -- Used to the Absolute Minimuin. His Muskic comment was 
most helpful (on the Black V. P. ) but the President and the Presidency are 
the quintessential political assets wc have and should be used in a partisan, 
situation, only in CNlrcmis. 


^77 :? I 6 2 

The Vice President: V/e nccO. a decision as to whctlicr he can be used, or 
should be -- both from liim and from liighcr authority within the ca:npaign. 
Of course, he has incoinparablc visibility; he can make political issues in 
a way that few others can, 

MONDAY -- Excellent credibility in the media; has already been used to 
good effect; will continue to utilize it along lines suggested in above 

V.AILING OPERATION -= TJ.are should be set up a Wailing Opcr;ttion to 
Democrats, on the Hill, and in the Party and Delegates, which will make 
sure that none of them misses a majority candidate p6sition thai is against 
his interests. Example, pro-abortion statements might bo mailed to all 
Catholic newspapers and wire services. Cut-the-Budget-to-the-bone 
statements shouid be mailed to military and -conservative publications, e*^c. 

This operation would serve as midwife of the Democrats Right to Know, 
We ought to consider how to set this up, v/ith perhaps the least possible 
"Republican^' credentials; or perliaps if , that cannot b'e avoided, set up soirie. 
"Kremllnologist" operation for tiic Democratic Party, acknowledge it; and 
play it siraiglit. Would require a full-time operation; and what sliould be 
avoided at all cost is the "cNcessivc" rnaiiinp s tliat really turn off editorial 
writers and the like. 

types are to be used is a decision that needs to be made; also, what of 
Dole's use. Not much in a major way can be accoinplished, absent a 
political operation whicl; can "produce" for them what needs to be said. 
It is hard to visualize tliis being done on a part-time basis. 

WHITE HOUSE POLITICAL AIDES --'Should they take the risk of "feeding" 
these kinds of materials from the WK? 

Above are some thoughts on Dividing the Democrats, that need honing and 


'07301 6 2 7 C5 

October 6, 197/ 



Attached is Uie Ducyirjicu'i/iOiachicjirji;orar.du:?> on "Divicing tho 
Dcnocrats." Unfortunately, it v;as :^ent directly by ti-iem to tho 
AG and Mr. Haldc^non, ratiier ti,£:^ to you and raci lor review beioro 

l3 thora anything you wish to add to it wliich wo night separately 
subnit? lihat do you think of t]-.e n-.cznorv-ndum itself? 


cc: Mr. Job S. I-lagrudcr 



Exhibit No. 180 

P nf^yy^ ^K yy^A wh.te: hou; 


Kobruary 4, 1972 



y-^ -<":/£ 

:morandum to the attorney general 
h. r. haldeman 



Scoop Jackson is making a desperate effort to have the Tennessee 
Primary shifted up from May 4 to March 30, according to the 
Tinnes story attached, and it seems in our imir)ediatc political 
interest to have that happen, Muskie is a clear underdog in 
Tennessee, to both Wallace and to Jackson, and if we can gel the 
Tennessee Primary moved to the 30th of March, we could have a 
defeat inflicted on Muskie -- five days before the Wisconsin 
Primary. That might help take the bloom off the Muskie candidacy 
a bit, before thefinal, and perhaps crucial early primary. 

The stumbling block to a shift in the Tennes see Primary up to 
March 30 is reportedly Governor Winfield Dunn. Seems to mc 
that it would be in our interest to have Dunn shift that primary -- 
in order to have Muskie defeated once more before Wisconsin. 
Perhaps Dunn has his reasons; but we ought to knov/ them. 



NEW YORK TIMES -- February 4, 1972 

Jackson s Strategists SeeJzlng 
An Earlier Tennessee Primary 

scvrral v/cck";, fiad t.ikcn noi 

position at all. 

lew politlc.'il professionals 
i accept tliat statement. Some of I 
. tiicni. belter at wlial Ibcy con-| 
Isirler l-lr. UU^z--"'^ "s'c in the! 
I defeat of Mr. Gore and Mr.j 

Hooker in 1070, want no parli 

ny R. W. APPLE Jr, 
WASHINGTON, Feb. 3— ,i • A poll taken this week byj'of Mr. Jackson 
t^cn'-lor licnry W. J.ickson's:rFloyd-Kep;iarl. nffairsd "i v.-,Tr, for lijm for a v.Iiilc."| 
ctrVtr-i-ts feari-^r tbat his'^^'roctor of si.Mion W.SM-TV inHone State Senator .said, "b-jti 
sUalc,,...ts. '"'^^'; y- J: . • :;asi;viiic. sho-.vcd A2 per cent'lwiicn Eilinr.lon pot aboard, li 
charices .n the pisotil ^lor.J^ ,f ^^^ ^^.„^ legislators favor- .ot off. Jackson Vvould help us 
pnnnao' liave been sliarpi> cur-l j.-j, ,,p.i| 20. wiUi 22 per centl'^cct D-mr.rrats and bc'ri be nl 
tailed by ti:s candidacy of Gc\.'|opposed and 3.5 per cent undc-|f^ood President. But mv friendsl 
Gcori,£- C. Wallace of AlabrJT.a, jcidcd. Gove.'-nnr Dunn is alsoland I just won't ko down the! 
arc icn'^wir^g Lhcir effort to jnpP-'rcntiy willin;: to po alonsl road with Buford Ellincton." 

V r ,,j vK^ A,ti. r^f fhp ^'•■'I'l t'-'t- compromise, wh 
Dush forward inc oaio Oi ,. > r j wi . > 

^uMt iu, . u ^ would he of considerably 1 

Tennessee p;imar>'. 
■ r.5r. Jackson had hcprd to 
use the Florida volinK 0:1 :.:---ir,-h 
14 23 2 launchini; 


help to "-Ir. Jackson 

."^■cnator Muskie's standinn 
cr,, in^ Tennessee Democrats 
r iLT.nietc-'d last fall, when he 

i-.-,aue remarks at C.hattanorical; 
tliat were widely interpreted as[; 
sji endorsement of busing. Sub-i 
scqucntls'. he was replaced asj. 
the star performer at a^g 
cratic fund-raisin" dinner inii' 

drive for the Democratic i.csi- 
dcntiai nomination. But none 
of tlic private polls taken trerc 
in recent weeks has sijown him 
better than fourth. 

Tcrinessec — one of t'-.c few 
stales wl-.crc Mr. Jackson is x.,-,hvj|ie by Boots Knndoliih, 1 
considered the leader_-y wc:h xhst leaves l.W. Jact, 
infowT.ed local pohtici'vns — isir-ron:; position in a state v.-hcrc 
schect:;cd to liold its P-mDry icjp.ator liub:rt H. Iiun-,pi-,rcv 
on May 4. By that time, r.:ne!.,p,ji others lonp- identified as 
other Slates, in most of v.-hirli [liberals arc unpopular. 
Mr. Jsckson has ro real I John Jay liookcr. thi! Demo- 
ctrcnnth, will have held Ibeirjcr.-.ts' JS7C candidate for G....- 
ballf>t>r'f. The slates are Ne'"; e,;ior. a-r,ues, iio.vever. tiiaii 
Hainpsiiirc, Florida. n!;noi5,,j"\val!ace is as m\:ch a probicnii 
Wisconsin, -, Massa::husetts,ifor Jackson here as in Florida."! 
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana,! >4r. Jackson is the only can-| 
and Alabama. didate with a Tennessee head-j 

T.he J^'ck.son strategists v.'iillq'.:artcr3. But he is thrcatenedj. 
try,- therefore, when the Tcn-|by the factionalism has dc-li" ^'■.'^ 
nc.sscc Irgisk-iturc convenes onivoured the Tennessee Di^ ji J.''^^J^^^^P 

Monday, to push th.c date up tojcralic party for years, costin^^jl "" 

March 30, five days bc'ore thciit the Governorship, both Scn-|i 
Wisconsin primary. If arciatc scats and other key offices. jj 
unable to do that, thcv wi'll tp,-i V.'ord is circulating in party ji 
for April 20. after V/:sconsiri!circic3 that Mr. Jackst.n is for-li 
but "before Pennsylvania andlmer Gov. Buford Hliinr.ton'sli 
Massachus'-t's iman, and that the activities ofjl 

-Wcthinhancarlvvotchcrci''^''- I^l'-'npton's former pressi! 

Mr. Blank, the Jackson man-| 
agcr, is aware of the problem.; 

"Ellington's pone to Florida." 
he said, "and I hope he slays 
there until after the election. I 
admire tlie Governor, and I'd 
lovo to have him be part of the 
C3:;ipai::n, but liis name drav.s 
so dad-riim. much fire we can't 
fford hi:n. Best thinp lie could 
us v.-ould be if he'd come 
out for T*'us'-.ic " 

. Dcsiiitc "vir. Blank's disclaim- 
er, sjspitioris icmain stronp in 
tiie Dy.-.antmc corridors of Ten- 
nessee politics. 

Tliey .'ire so stronf;. in fact, 
that tiiree influential Demo- 
IT,". is s.-iid p:-i\-.;teiy \'. eel; 

ivcned after reccivinp a tclc- 
!phonc call late last year from 
Ifor;ncr President Lyndon B. 
'.lohnson. .tn old friend v/hom 
!:.;r. Fllinpion served as director 
Office of Emergency 
and v.dth v.'l'.nm. over 
Uic years, he traded prize bulls. 
Accorcini^ to (he accoimts 
of ib.c three Dcmorrats. fdr. 
Jolu'iSon told the former Gover- 
nor liiat Mr. Jackson v/as the 
only who had not 
run out on ti-.e Jolmson Admin- 
istration's Vietnam policy and 

couM rive Jack.sonaVood boost is„^"^.'3'^ -'"^ P'^'^P- ""'^'^-^if^--^^^ ^'^- l^»'"2l°n 1° l>elp 
befo.-c Wisconsin," said State i^'^^'^'^"- Provo the case. — - 

nSrr.ator Kdv.-ard C. Blank 2d,l, J^'"- ,C^°"^'^, concedes that 
the Washington Democ^^.t'sTcn-|;'" pi-^fcrs Mr. Jackson ni^t savsj 
ne:.sce inana-r. "Florida may'- ,^'; done relative yl.tllci 
prove to be a problcnn. Ten- ^V^";^' °r i'V^;.Mr- Crockca .sa-u, 
ncssee could be a big benefit." ^''^^ ^^';- .^^-'^^Ston, who has. 
,^ Ibecn at his Florioa home for 

exposition to Liberals 

Mr. Blank and other Trnncs-i 
sec Democrats conceied thati 
cbanrcs v/c;c not pocir:, partly! 
bccau'.c of leclinicalities in thcl 
state election law. for 1. March] 
30 prisriary. ^Cl^ov.V.'infie'd Ourji, 
n J'.crjubliraii, is rrp:)r(C(ily_cvj 
por.cft to Ihc I'.Ian h*cl.-vei .•)s_.-ice 
'Lbc fsjrces of .'^(■iialor iMlmtuiv 
.V ^?u■.Ki'• of f.!aine,~v.liiii( ar^ 
fTeaiifti i;i 'i i-nnessi'c Lv f ormei^ 
S( n.ui.r AUh'M Gorc^ ''" 1 

flJui ti'.c r-.f'sprcts that tliel 
prirrapk' will be moved 10 /.prill, 
j2q tcz?,% b;ttcr., . : _ . - ^, ,ji 

I Mr. Ellin,':lon could not bt 

reached for confi.-mation of 

the story, alJhcu^h one source 

said, "it sounds ripiit." Johnsi):\ who has said 
j nothing publicly ahntit pref- 
jercnces in liic 1972 campaipn. 
jwas in Acujitilco, Mexico, imri 
iunavailable. His press sccre- 
Uary, Wilhc Day Taylor, said 
lln Austin, Tex., "1 don't know 
Jenything at all about It.'' 



February 18, 1972 




Tennessee Primary Change of Date 

Pat Buchanan's Kcmorandum to- the Attorney General and H. R. 
Halderoan dated February 4 indicated that a stumbling block to 
a shift in the Tennessee Primary up' to >^rch 30 is reportedly 
Governor Windfield Dunn. 

My contact point to follow the Tennessee legislation has been 
Lee Smith, who is counsel to Governor Dunn, Lee advis_es me 
that the Governor has not been opposed to moving the date up 
and did not learn of the Campaign Corro-pittee's interest in doing 
so until the day tlie vote vas taken in the Tennessee House. 

Legislation had been introduced to move the Primary up to March 30 
and that legislation did pass the Tennessee Senate. In the House 
of Representatives, however, the bill was pigeon-holed in an . 
obscure House subcoirjnittee. ' . 

On February 15 Representative Ashe, a P-.epublican, moved to have 
the bill rerjoved from committee and called to the House floor. 
There being 99 members in the Tennessee House, such ti Motion 
v?ould require fifty affirmative votes. The vote was 41 to 27 in 
favor of calling the bill up — not enough to accomplis'h the call, 
and, thereby, effectively killing the bill. 

Reportly the reason for the low vote was that the Speaker of the 
House and the House Caucus Chairman, both Dcmocrates and both strong 
Muskie supporters were able to keep enough Democrates from voting 
to be able to keep the vote under 50. 

Lee Smith reports that had Governor Dunn known 6f our desire to have 
the Primary moved up, he would have been able to support it. They 
believed, however, it was a battle au-io.-.g t^e Democrates and didn't 
involve themselves in It. Lee reports that it would now be impossi- 
ble to rei'iove the bill from committee and establish a date as early 
as March 30. 

If ve do have an interest In moving the Pri".ary up, it might be • 
poEBiblc to call the Bill up and ectablish a date of April 20 (a date 


Tennessee Primary _2- 

proposed in earlier legislation). 

cc: Mr. Jcb Mcgruder 
Mr. Bob Marik 
Mr. G. Gordon Liddy 

Exhibit No. 181 

v^,\ s H I fs; G ~ O h; 

March 14, 1972 


\Ye have hcen called upon to compose a memorandum delineating the 
division of responsibility and the forn-;ations of the "attack" stra.tcc;y 
for the f-iU campaign. Herewitli, our views and recommendations. 


"In my Father's house there arc many mansions." 


Tlicj-e arc currently several quasi -i.ndependent attack operations running. 
The-!-'.- is l")ole and tin- RNC, not ijifrequently orchestrated by C. Colson 
iv.'ith Koci. on drums. There is tlic "Speakers Bureau" run by Pat O'Donnell 
again, oui of Colson' s shop, co-ordinatinp; with Parker for the President, 
and Da:'"T_:,rd for the Vice Prcsidcr.t. Further, O'Donnell serves as 
conduit u. ■ the Adminisl ration "fact sheets." 'I'he;- e is a Hill operation 
with Koc-;'- placing tlic matorii-Js at Colson's i ;"ilerii->.itler.t direction. There 
are p,->lii;r;,l "suri-ogr.ies" schedvlod out of IVOI by Bart Porter, who 
moves l!:li and Administration lyjjcs into Re-Elect settings in tlie I'rimary 
Stater-, zrrc: beyond. And there is Van Shimiway who moves the political 
"lii-. c ■ oiii nf JVOl to j-cporters and columnists. 


For the campaign, in our judgment, to canalize the attack to focus our 
resources, to avoid any embarrassing "gaffes, " we need more 
co-ordination of attack materials being used, we need greater central 
direction of the scheduling of speakers; we need a central point of 
authority and direction over the attack -- holding veto power over what 
goes and what does not. 




The one posilioned to exorcise this authority is the Campaign Manager, I 

the Attorney General. 

1 . We reconiiiiend that no new controversi?! i^rinted or media atlack ■ 
be made upon the Oppos i tion Cand i date without the concurrence of tlie 
Ali om(:y Gcn.'r?! or his designated Deputy [ar this purpose . 

2. There sliould be a marriage of the scheduling operations of 1701 and 
the White House; speakers should be placed under the one or other 
operation, for the canipaign's dviration; and the scheduling of the two 
groups should be regularly and closely co-ordinated so we can avoid 
both over-kill in one area and the neglect of another. 

The attack materials for both "surrogates" (who will be the majority) 
and "Speakers Bureau" should be provided from the same source. 

The "scliedulers, " both at 1701 and the White House, should leave their 
clients with open dates in October to move them into swing states; and 
they should receive regular guidance from the liighest level of the cainpaign 
as to where our inanpov.'or should be directed. 


This operation was most useful in 1968; it can be made more effective 
in 1972. We recommend that: 

l/\ 1. An Answer Desk be set up and running in the RNC by the first of 

Aiv^'ust, with a report by the 15th of May to 1701 and Buchanan/Khachigian 
\/) as to how it is to be staffed. 

y ' ' 

'j y Z. That the Ansv/er Desk contain an "expert" on the Democratic 

•^ candidate, a; familiaj- with his positions and statements and record as 

the candidate's own staff. That this expert, from the end of the 
Democratic convention to the first of August, review and glean the entire 
roscarrh fil '• on the cajididate --so that we can have available only what 
wc v/ill need to use. 

3. That by the 1st of August, the Answer Desk have prepared an Attack 
Briefing Book on the Democratic candidate that has been gleaned and cut 
to usable portions, containing voting records, position on top ten major 
issues of the day, etc. , etc. The book should be put together in such a 
way as to emphasize the negative and the vulnerable; it should contain 
only the best items and quotes, etc. ; it should be brief enough so that it 
will not by its very size prohibit inspection. Buchanan/Khachigian 
operation will look it over, attempt to glean it further; and provide 
paragraphs and pages, which can be inserted into speakers' kits. 


Tliis Attack Briefing Book should be updated every several weeks of 
tlie campaign; it shovild be provided to all surrogates. Cabinet Officers, 
the Vice President, Dole, Klein, etc. 

4. Names, functions, home and office phone numbers of members of 
the Ans%ver Desk should be in hand at Campaign Headquarters, and 
contained in Attack Briefing Books of all speakers, by August 1. 

5. Answer Desk will provide daily a report of the Democratic candidate's 
attacks (also Vice President and major opposition speakers, if possible) 
plus a response --to 1701, to the Vice President, White House, etc. , 
throughout the campaign. 

6. The Ansv/er Desk should be provided with direct lines into all 
Administration research centers --so they can get immediate access and 
first call on needed information to develop the answer to opposition attacks. 


These indi\'iduals should be provided as well with Attack Briefing Books 
on the Democrats for their own use; they should be phoned on a regular 
basis as to what issues and \vhat aspect of the opposition they should hit; 
they should be contacted immediately prior to a \Tisit to their state by the 
Democratic candidate. 

We cannot keep a daily watch on the Nixon Chairmen; they will be ''left 
to their own devices" most of the tinie. But when a Democratic candidate, 
l^residential or Vice Presidential arrives, tlic National HQ, 1701, should 
have soiTv? tiling available for the State Chairman -- that is consistent with • 
the present line of attack being pushed at the national le\ cT. 


CS V^7 We already have had great success in this area. Ken Khachigian should 
^-' I be responsible for determining, prior to August 1, that we have 

^a) a beefed up operation at the national level b) "letter operations" at 
''■^the local level in each of the major swing states. This is an excellent 
u" way to put volunteers to work. The "letters" people at both the State and 
•'national level should be given the political attack line and regularly; and 
much of their work should be on the attack basis, getting guidance from the 
campaign leadership. Khachigian will get together with those in 1701 to 
determine that this operation is organizationally set -- by August I at the 




Occasionally, these have been effective; too often, they are a waste 
of time and money. We propose making an effort to make it work 
this year. Basically, we envision the Squad as small, divided between 
the "tough cop" and the "nice cop. " The former handles the gutting of 
the Democratic candidate; the latter the achievennents of the President. 

Central to this is the advanceman. He need not know how to build a 
crowd; but he must know how to attract media, both television and press. 
The advanceman further should be responsible for getting to the Truth 
Squad, bcfoae they touch down, the "lead" story the Democratic candidate 
has left in the headlines of that day -- and the "lead" story of the day in 
an issue context. 

Reason for above is that the Truth Squad may want to focus on a local 
crime -- pointing up RN' s record and statements -- or a local strike -- 
pointing up an RN proposal -- rather than the Democratic candidate's 
attack if it has been of a pro forma character. 

ur ideal of a typical first rate Truth Squad would be Hatchet Man Dole 
llh Good Guy Rumsfeld; young, tough, aggressive, attractive - ■• and 
Pling to !nix it up with the Democratic candidate. 

The value of a Truth Squad is not in the faithful it attracts, but the media 
it receives. We ought to take a long second look at how our Truth Squad 
is doing -- three weeks into the campaign --to determine if it is a 

cost-effective operation. 


In 1968, Humphrey :"nade extremely effective use of George Ball, v/ho 
had independent, excellent foreign policy credentials of his own. Ball 
was willing, without prodding, or even mention, to gut either the President 
or Vice President. He attracted tremendous national inedia simply on 
his own stav.cU.ig and expertise. Rob Ellsv/orth perforiTied sometliing of 
this function for us on the PriiT~.ary Trail -- whei'c he, as "Campaign 
Dircrfor" could attract press in li; s own rij!';!; and say those things the 
1 ■ 1 •' -.:uld' lo ;;o to co.Tfe: >iion fo''. 

In any event, with the Attorney General as Campaign Manager, we should 
have a sinnilar "heavyweight" with a similar title, but no organization 
responsibility, solely a duty to get national press, to get on national 
television shows, and to hammer the opposition candidates. This would 



be an added wes.uon in our arsenal; ho could play the role that Ray }31iss 
v/as c-onstiialionally ill-designed to play in 1968. The title would not 
cost a dime; it would give us an added voice; he should be a man of stature, 
of Cabinet weight if not rank -- someone wlio on his Ovvn is worthy news. 
We need someone, however, with an instinct for the jugular; he should 
be provided the Attack Briefing Book, all the attack materials, and 
progr£ii-nmed solely for the national media -- not GOP rallies. 


A Nelson Rockefeller --if he would turn over New York management to 
his aides -- and handle this national attack job, would be the kind of 
indi\'iduaJ to whom I am referriji". 


By Septeniber, after the GOP convention, our scheduling operations 
should be married, or co-ordinated totally at the least. We should 
inventory ovir people -- from the Hill, Cabin-jt, White Hovis e, etc. -- 
and top Campaign Ma.nagement shovild determine what .states we heavy 
up in -- then the "schcdiders" from WH and 1701 should co-ordinate 
the scheduling of our people into these states. 

Running two separate and equal operations is foolish; the needs of the 
cainpaign should dictate where ov>- people go; and those needs are best 
determined by Ca7iipaign hierarchy. 


On the assi-mption Vice President Agnew is our man, the following 
sliould be done. His plane should carry at least two lop spoechwritcrs, 
the full atl:ck updated briefing book, a telex for direct communication, 
telecopi ei-.- , phones from 1701, etc. Election of 1970 demonstrated 
that A'. P. A^',ne\v can get more coverage than any Vice President in 
history; tli::! he makes ti'emendovis copy; he will be the bayonet of the 
Adniinist ]■;■ lion in 1972. 

The error in 1970 was not the "Law and Order" issue; it was in not 
realizing how the Vice President could overwhelm the national media in 
three weeks to the point where the issue had already been "made" 
nationally, to the point where by October I, the Den-iocrats had been 
thrown on the defensive, had re-directed their media to defense the 
issue, had started talking law and order, and were seen climbing in 
and out of police cars. By the time September was over we had played 
out "attack" trump and we had no other effective "attack" issues to make. 


All our jjains of September were ihus lost in the attrition of October -- 
when the pendulum swung back. 

Again, the Vice President will have a planeload of reporters with him; 
lie will get n-iore inedia than any other "attack" resource we have; our 
best writers should be aboard his aircraft. 

In the 1972 campaign, we should keep before us some of the lessojis 
for an attacking candidate -- from 1968 and 1970: 

1. Tlie old situation where it took months or weeks to "inake" an 

issue, and bring it before the public, no longer obtains. The President 
and the Vice President -- with the kilowatts of their office -- can "make' 
an issue in a matter of days, by repeated liammering. 


/^ ^/ 2. Correspondingly, issues coine and go more rapidly. The Democrats 

1/ \ ,y got well on "law and order" in October of 1970. This argues strongly 

!' for a) flexibility on our part, a flexibility we cUd not show in the last 

two campaigns in sliifting cither gears or issues and b) Rn inventory or 
■} ^vbank of campaign attack issues so that v»'e can switch off one and onto 
'K 1 l\l ?rnother as the need appears and c) a phased attack plan which can provide 
\\ ^\^' us ahf:£d of time -- v.hat issue tlie Administra.tion "attack" people will 
yV' focus upon that week. Instead of shooting our bolt in the first speech -- 

/V we should in 1972 be able to shift easily off of one "attack" issue and onto 

V/^ another and then a th.ird. d) We may need to demon.strate the ability -- 

^ in an even race -- to hold back from using available ammunition until 

)') a latei- poiul in the cainpaign. 

/ \^' Eisenhower- once indicated that wliile plans wore worthless, planning 

I was c-ssenlial. We ought to have, by September ) -- a planned schedule 

of "atirck" on the opposition candidate, v.hich nioses irom one issu-.^ 
to anof/icr, in a scolding orde:-, until the major attack' is not ]aunc!;ed 
until Ocicjr!c;r 10th at the earliest - - and see if that scivjdul c works ou! in 
the early days of t"n.- campaign. 

Again, what we are suggesting is that a) we have four or five issues 
ready to surface at any time b) we not put all our eggs in a single 
basket and start swinging that basket in September and c) despite 
pressure to go "all out" in September, due to bad polls or the like, we 
"hold back some powder" for October. 




In our view, Bob Dole should be brought in on strategy meetings, 
provided with all the attack materials, plus a writer; and he slionld 
be kept focused upon the shortcomings of the Democratic candidates -- 
rather than respond lo O'Brien who wall be attacking tlio President and 
Vice President. 

His scheduling should likewise be ro-ordinatctd v/ith our surrogates; 
he has a jjosition giving him national stature, and access to national 
media. Like the Vice President, but to a lesser degree, lie should be 
heavied up. 


f\'e did not need Edith Efron to inform us of what the national networks 
id to UN in 1968; this has to be prevented in 1972. Suggest establishment ol 

V , 

") /\^J '^s located in the RNC, which \vould "clock" precisely the jsositive and 

j*' negative coverage of presidential and vice presidential candidates on the 

V netw(-)rkc;. Tf v/e are pellincr anvthincr n-inre (ban "erinp.l timr* _" tlii t; 

1 Va "Fair Coverage Committee" or "Equal Time Cominitteo" which might 



/u-v , 

networks. If v/c arc getting anything more than "equal time," this 
commiltc:e can remain silent; if we get anything less than equal time, it 
should confirm same with Mort Allin's news monitors -- and then send 
a memorandum to John Mitchell who should get on the horn to the network 
President and point thin out, indicating that if it is not corrected, and 
equal time not provided -- this will be made an issue in the cannpaign, 

,and the subject of legislation in the coming Congress. The newspapers 
J, r'can do what they -want: but we cannot ^llo^v NBC to start "making" tlie 

',f'«>non-iic issue for the Democrats, the way they sought to do it in 1970. 

\L7 ,/ 'COPE'S coil NTK RP ART 

\ '■•■'' ■ 
\' The most cfrcctive instrumentality of the Humphrey campaign v/as alleged 

to be, no) without justification, the A^FL-CIO Committee on Political 

Education (COPE). 

CCPF's Herculean efforts in 1968 putting out millions of pamphlets, 
attacking specifically the anti-union record of George Wallace, won back 
millions of union voters to the Humphrey banner by election day -- and 
very nearly carried the day for the former Vice President. We have 
nothing to rival COPE -- AMPAC and BIPAC do not have the tens of 
thousands of volunteers that COPE can muster in a particular campaign. 


But \vc ha%-c the necessary volunteers in our citizens' groups, GOP 
and youth groups, etc. , in the various states; and v/e do have the 
needed expertise and vv-riting capacity lure in D. C. to emulate tlieir 

Reconimend that soon after the Democratic convention there be 
established one General Conimitteo, with a high-sounding name, and 
other comnnittees tailored to specific issues, i. e. , "United States 
Security Council," which can issue effective attack releases, which 
can then be mailed in bulk to GOP and Citizens Groups for distribution 
in target states. Chuck Colson's sliop coiild have such, one imagines, 
established in a matter of hours. 


yj 1\. The spec 

K r /,/V.^D'emocra 

r\ jj\ ' r^o^ exan:iple, were 
r }>^\ y^cfense of the Unit 
( P) Y^J^chools, etc. 

ific committees should zero in on issues -- depending on the 
tic candidate -- where the opposition is especially vulnerable. 
were Muskie the noniinee, we would have a Conimittee on 
cd States, one on Space, on on Aid to JVon-Public 

f^^ / Again, these committees would issue hard-hitting, targeted material, 

/^ which we v/ould then have distributed by regular GOP troops, outside 

/ churches, plant gates, ball parks, etc. 




In our view, the Democrats in 1968 were more successful than we in 
using "attack" coinmercials. They focused on the Vice President, v/ith 
soine nasty materials, but also on Social Security and Aledicare -- 
suggesting that a vote for Nixon was a vote lo diminish both. These wer< 
effective, selected targeted media attacks -- using comn-icricals. We 
recommend a program of somcihing similar for this year. Here are 
some ideas. 

1. In areas where bussing is a gut issue, whicli is lilcely to bo lialf 

the metropoUtia;i areas in the Uiiiled States, and all tlie South, in 
i6cptem!;er of 1972 -- we run straight one-rninute conimcri cals using or Hujnjjli re y or Ke:u:..'dy ;ii.atements in suppoi't of bu.-.srng. They 
: ■■■.'"'' ■"^"")'. :.:■•■' ■■^''( , ;^ir-' ii'.-kc IjU'iv 5.i<;Ii;l -- v.'rit-in and Drt>duvi'c 

2. In areas where space is a concern, like Houston, Florida and 
Southern California, we should have spot ads against the Democratic 
votes to cut the space program. 

. I 



3. Sainc v.dth dcft-nsc. The Dcniocrats have voted against" almost 
every weapons system proposed by the Administration. Kluskie's 
and Kennedy's records arc atrocious. We 5;hou!d have a one -minxite 
spot on television and radio, in conservative areas, which documents 
these votes against and concludes -- "Senator Muskie voted to strip 
A:nerJca's defenses beJow the danger point; President Nixon believes 
that peace requires American strength. Ke-elect the President -- Vote 
for Richard Nixon. " 

Further on this issue. We should have the VFW, at their conventions, 
mail the Muskie Defense record to their entire membership. We .sliould 
do a direct mailing to the Amci-ican Security Council list, if we can get it. 
And lake out ads on defense, contrasting RN and Deniocratic positions 
iri all fo\ir conservative publications. 

4. On J-ll the black radio stalifins in the Swing States, we should run 
ads on i\h-iskie's statement about no blacks for Vice President. "If he 
doesn't think tlie time has come for one of us to be even considered for 
Vice President, tiien the time has come for Black Ai^icrica to tell Ed 
Muskie we don't think it is time for him to be considered for President. 
W'ritc in Siiirley Chisholm. " 

5. The SST \'ote alone, where the Democrats were against us, shovdd 
he ust:d on radio and television and at plant gales throughout the State of 
Wasiiingtrin. Again, a television ad or a radio spot -- just stating the 
Democrat \otes, v,-hat it did to Seattle and the S'ate of Washington, hav 
RN fougl t fo;-it -- and vote for Richard Nixon, In some cases in these 
ads, it may be sui'iicient to attack the Democ-atic pos-ifiin, simply to 
turn off ihe voter -- where v. e have no possibility to winning that particula 
voting bl oc. 

6. la tlie f^. ri^i belt, v/e sliould be c to contrast Bulz "fightitig for 
the fariT^cr" with statements by th-c va.rious Democrats thai the prices 
of far^n ;jrc:ducts aj-e loo hirh -- again, t; rgc-tod con~merir,a.l3 to 
specific groups. IJ'.'ery individual has conlradJ etion.-- in his position -- 
wc: 'i-.-'lrL to be sure tliat e.ery concerned gro\ip i ?; aware of those of our 
■■''- ' , .1 -- 3:id :: cdia all.-ck a. d-.'frti.'un;'. is the wav to do it. Nol ivisi 

We will need to get together with the media people prior to the 
Democratic convention; we will want a slice of the media resources and 
advertising budget: we will need to know soon from the advertising 
personnel, what kind of film and tape they can acquire from commercial 
networks, which we can put to use. 


The Alioi-rii'y General should clc.-xr the mocUa ;'.cls -- ar.d draw off Ihc 
poison if llitro is any -- but wc should not hesitate to use them. Most 
of the best pro-media we get will be the President himself, live as 
PresidonI; and we ought not overlook this effective mechanism. 

Just as t)ic Democrats ran that ad of the Vice President -- with the 
heart thumping to indicate a heartbeat away in 19^8 -- so we ought to 
have the- capacity to put together spot ads in a matter of days and have 
theiTi on the air -- as the campaign develops. In any event, we need a 
budget for this -- siTvall pre-convcntion and inuch larger post- convention. 

Were lUii-.iphrey the candidate, foi- example, wc could run the horror 
clippin;^;s of 19f'ti., riots, coffins, urban violence, crime and say, 
this is the result of what Hubert Hvimphrey called the "politics of joy'' 
in 1968. Let's not po back to that horrible year, 1968 -- let's ma' e 
forward v/ith President Nixon. 


Just as the largest audience the President had in 1968 was at his August 
converlicm, so the largest audience the Republican "attack" surrogates 
will have in 1972 is in San Diego. Wc need a Walter Jxidd, or several 
of (licm out there -- doing the job in 1972 on the Democrats that Judd 
did in I960. 

Following the Democratic convention, we should consider v/ho our 
speakers v.t.11 be, at what hour and time in San Diego, and guarantee 
that some of the inost hard-hitting and tightly drafted attacks on the 
Democratic candidates come out of that convention. 

The attack speeclies should be orchestrated and advanced, with an 
audience cheerinr, at the right lines -- tlic v.'.^y the President did it 
himself in 1968, in hi^ accep'nnce speech. We will got no better chance- 
to focus the n?.tioL'''s attention on llie wcal^iioss of the Domocrr-.tic 
candUk'tcs and the Dctmocratic Party than in 1972 and v/c ough.t !)■:;( blow 
all that national tc4c\i sion. 

B Vi CT J\ X A N-_K H A C ) 1 1 GLA_N 

Our primary role, given the small size, is oversight, and assistance. 

1. Provide checks on various "attack" operations to deterinine their 
effectiveness in terms of media. 


2. Take a direct hand in creating radio, TV, spots on the "attack" 
and the pamphlets, and lielp direct where they are to be distributed. 

3. Monitor operations, through news summary staff. 

4. Recommend to Attorney General shifts in strategy -- point up 
v.'hen we feel one line of attack is being exhausted, and another might 
be better pursued. In campaign we anticipate regular, if not daily, 

oinmunication with the top canipaign staff o;i how \vell things go, and 
where there needs to be a new attack or iniprovement. 

5. Help draft the speeches the attacks on the Democrats for the 
Republican convention. 

6. Have a seat on the board vi'hcre the attack strategy on the Democrats 
is being considered, and \^■herc states are being selected. Further, we 

tJ^- wnll need to have direct access to the poll data of the campaign, so that 

we can know where the attacks should be directed, against whom and how 
in what states. 

7. Prodxice, with a small group, some of the covert materials -- i. e. , 
matter we vvould not want to be identified v.dth, but nothing that would be 
wholly destrxictive, if uncovered. 

8. Over see \ipdale of the briefing books. 

1. In the turmoil of a campaign, it is likely that centralism will 
break dov/n; that is net unexpectcci, nor necessarily bad; however, it is 
iinportant we attempt to impose some kind of strategy upon our 
surrogates vvl)0 arc making the attack, and the other instrumeit s v.-c have. 

2. After the August convention, for certain, we ought to go at once on 
the attack --as we did in 1970. We have the forun-is to command the 
media, and we ought to throw the Democrats on the defensive and keep 
them there --so that they have no chance to make their issues, in 
particular the "economic issue". There is no reason -- given our superior 
media position -- that we can't dominate the news. 

3. Avoid at all costs the kind of "attack" by individuals or media or 
ad that opens us to the "Tricky Dick" charge, or the "Old Gutfighter" 
allegation. Granted that the press is less indulgent with us than with 
/_ copy illegible_/ 



4. Kcop In mind ihat' Ibore are only two dcacDincs every day, and 
one evening ncv/s sliow; If an attnck has captmed the media, no need 
to top it with a now one; let it ride. 

5. Start the atlacV;s early in the campaign as the number of undecided 
is then largest. Ayain, hov^'cver, we should show tlie kind of flexibility 
we did not in 1968, by being able to open up an entirely new front in 
mid-October, if some other attack is being countered or stalled. The 
old military adage -- alv/ays comniit your rererves from a nev/ 
direction -- should here apply. 

6. The last fi\e days of tlie campaign, we sliould close up shop -- 
and everyone wlio is not tongue-tied r.liould be out in the boonies on as 
m'any radio, television, speech appearances as he can fill. The last 
voice heard in the campaign may be the one to which some s%ving voter 
hearkens. About one v/eek before the end of the campaign, we can no 
longer rely on Red Blount's fcllov\'s to deliver our naessage to the 
outlanders; we have to start using the phone -- and everybody who can 
skate should be out on the ice. 

7. When the candidates are determined, there should be a strategy 
meeting of sorts to determine v/hal "per sonal " aspects of the Democratic 
candidate are vulnerable; and while these may not be the grist for attack 
ads, we should get thera out to our speakers. For Muskie, for example, 
"instability, " his outb\irst of temper, his breaking do\\'n completely 
after criticism from a publisher. For Kennedy, "immaturity, " "playboy, 

•^^ 8. The Congressmen v/ho will be running, especially those who 

A/'V^ y^ are safe, sliould be given -- \"ia phone -- the line to hit for the President, 
y' the attack line, in a boiler room operation, plus last mailed materials ■■ - 

one week ]5rior to election, with phone calls for any late update. 

9. Finally, the attack strategy, as stated, should be flexible; it may 

be that alter iriaking ai-tacks early in the campaign, we want to go over 
to proii'iir.c what we are going to do for America in the second term, to 
ignore the opposition. Perh;;ps the polls v,ill tell us tliat is the approach 
t(-' take. If r.c, no 'iio'^l: ';i; we Vn'ov.UI ;'.3 .<ioon -.vrA]. (.-. victorv as rr.-:. 



Exhibit No. 182 

: ^y. 

April 12, 1972 


Attached is a plan for our activities at the Democratic National 
Convention which was written by Patrick J. Buchanan and Kenneth 
Khachigian. We recomrr.end that you approve this plan. 



to /0>i^^ 





H E \V - . T E i-.OUSZ 
v/ A ;: H . X o T o N 

April 10, 1972 






,- iy 

Understand that we have a suite of rooms at the Fontainbleau in Miami 
Beach, as ■we did at the Conrad Kilton in Chicago. Following plan 
outlines our recommendations as to the best use of personnel and 
communications in X'liami Beach during the Democrat Confab in July. 

PERSONNEL -- Two "spokesmen" who have national credentials, who 
are effective on the media, who are politically savvy, who can do 

..television, press conferences and backgrounders -- with great credibility. 

' One would be a "tough cop" to counter-attack; the other the "nice cop" 
to praise the President's record, and to answer more in sorrow than 
anger the charges being elevated. One v/riter in residence. Two secre- 

•' taries to run the machinery and to do the typing. (They can be provided 
by the Dace County GOP. ) A press officer out of 1701 who can gather 
the n-iedia. 

,-,''>- . EQUIPMENT -- Some Nixonaires should be in the suite regularly, to 
J .y attract media, and to serve drinks. One of the primary functions of the 

— v" press officer spokesman is to continually feed the "line" to \dsiting 
^\ ' -" press. The "reception room" should be functioning almost around the 

clock. And the individuals sent should have good rapport w^ith the national 

Tvifo typewriters, xerox machines, a dex and telex machine will be 
essential, to receive research and background materials from RNC, and 
from the Ans\ver Desk -- >A'hich could be operational as of that date. 
Further, there should be security in the communications room and all 
rooms, excepting the hospitality suite at all times to prevent some of 
our friends from seizing in-coming materials --to prevent the "planting" 
of salacious anti-Democratic literature in our Quarters. 

11 likelv be needed. (~^ ( » y^ J 


PVBLICirY -- Tiie Repub)ican Forward Observation Po.s: should be 
n-ade public; the I'irsl of Ihe personnel should arri\-e arour. 1 the opening 
dav of -...c Convention, when ilie major media starts. It should spend 
:;' all of its time with the national press. As for any "intclli"ence" 
iv-.-ic-ion, this seems Inighly unlikely -- that will be done by the networks, 
anC the Observation Post will have neither the personnel nor contacts to 
be undertaking this kind of assignment. 

The purpose of the group is, foremost, to make news --to piQgy back 
on the enormous media coverage that will be provided for the Democrats, 
to point the finger at running sores in the Democratic convention. 

If. however, Miami Beach become s a re - run of Chicago, the best posture 
of the Observation Post would be one of near absolute public silence - - 
getting out of the way of the best possible story v/e can have. Just serve 
drinks then, make background comnients, that if they can't unite and run 
, their own convention, how can they unite and run their own country. 

if the convention goes well, then the ForiAard Observation Team can 
comment^n the proceedings, on who is being "shafted" on any attacks 
against the President -- can point up as well any differences between the 
Democratic Platform of 1972 and that of 1968. 
:' . 7 

'. '' J.-'urther, because v>'hat the country sees of the convention will come 

, /•'from the tube -- the "line" should go to the Observation Post from 
,-■' 'Washington, not the other way around. The political chieftains here, 

'■ ' wnc have access to full monitoring of the networks, should be r.iaking 

p the decision as to v/hat the response should be. 

Or. 'response" to Democratic attacks, in Q and A, of course, the 
FOP ■wouid have autonomy. 

DANGERS -- If all hell breaks loose down there, they could conceivably 
point up to the Republicans at the Fontainbleau to distract attention from 
themselves. Secondly, they could "plant" the kind of materials that would 
embarrass us; thirdly, they could get some demonstrators to indicate 
that the Republicans up there told us to come down here and "raise hell. " 
Anyone at the Observation Post should be clean as a hound's tooth -- and 
the Observation Post should have no hand in any "covert operations" ongoing 
in Miami. 


RESEARCH FACILITIES -- There i s in PJB's judsmcnl no great need 
lor these down in Miami; any research can be done here -- and iwixed 
down io the Command Post. Ai^^o, a phone call from Miami can get that 
n~.aterial from Washington. 

Presumably the "speakers" in .NUaini will know how to respond to an 
O'Srien attack, anc' if any research needs to be done, the "writer" in 
Miami can get it froin D. C. Our Answer Desk at RXC could be in 
operation by then providing the materials from RXC regularly to Miami. 

Further, the Shumway and Magrucer operations and Buchanan and 
Khachigian should remain in regular touch with the Command Post -- 
transmitting any directives that come out of the political operation here. 

ISSUES -- The Observation Post can call attention to any groups that 
are being shafted at the convention, such as the Wallace delegates, or the 
"kids"; it should be little and disparage the Democratic Platform; it 
should be able to "leak" stories indicating whom Washington believes to 
be strongest or weakest; it should be in a position to mak<; predictions, etc. 

The press Vnan at the post should be able to whip up a press release; he 
should be in contact with the major network shows; he should be in regular 
contact with our operation and 1701 -- and we should be getting instructions 
from the top. 

O7HER ACTIVITIES -- We should give consideration to scheduling our 
primary "surrogates" in major media centers inside and outside of 
Washington during the Democratic Convention. They can niake the most 
news in their forums --by keying off the Democratic Convention. If it is 
a shambles, they should make the point in the city or region where they 
are sepaking. This will require some scheduling of top speakers, such 
as the Vice President, Senator Dole, and surrogates -- during this period 
o: the summer. And thoughts on the "line" should be forthcoming to each 
from the Political Operation at 1701, or out of here --as determined by 
the political leadership. 

This ■will be a time of Democratic dominance of the networks. If their 
show is a horror show -- we can just get out of the way, or simply point 
to it. If they are doing well, then -we should be "jamming" their 
communications a bit by getting on the air and in the press to the maximum 
degree possible with rebuttal during the convention's duration. 

All "surro{^es" out on the road during this period should be also kept in 
touch \vith RXC's Answer Desk, as well as 1701, for information and the 
"line. " 


Exhibit No. 183 

April 14, 1972 



Itached for your coaaideration and review is a ne.r.o- 
findum which was prepared by Fat Buchanan nnd Ken 
iachiyian coacerning contender tracking and strategy, 




April 12, 1972 





Our primary objective, to prevent Senator Muskic from sweeping the ' 
early primaries, locking up the convention in April, and uniting the 
Democratic Party behind him for the fall, has been achieved. The 
likelihood -- great three months ago -- that the Democratic Convention 
could become a dignified coronation ceremony for a centrist candidate 
who could lead a united party into the election --is now reinote. 

The purpose of this memo is to suggest new goals -- and to elicit 
advice from the campaign leadership on how to proceed -- and against 
whom. Had we our drxithers, we would at this point choose as 
opponents McGovcrn, Humphrey, Muskie and Kennedy in that order. 
Here is the way the primaries shape up at present, in both o\ir judginent 
and tha.t of the more respected politicians about, in the media and 
Democratic Party. 

Vi'ISCONSIN -- April 4: The Wi.sconsin returns made McGovern a 
credible candidate and whipped up a Goldwaterlike enthusiasm for liim 
throughout the country, from which he will benefit from now until July. 
He has inherited the media enthusiasin Big Ed retained with the Cape 
St. Elizabeth Show 18 months ago. Humphrey lost a golden opportunity 
to assume the mantle of front-runner; he was injured in terms of 
November; he lost the publicity and momentum that went to McGovern 
and covdd have been But he is still very viable. Muskie was 
crippled, but not killed. Wallace was strengthened for the merry month 
of May, which we anticipate he will dominate. 

MASSAC:''US:^T'J'S t, r-JNNSYLVANTA -- Apri] 2!): Both states have 
p.:-rsor. ;i!.'i'i y as v.-<.-)l r.. ^:■ flclcgatc contc-^tf;. }JJl;"i, McGuvorn, Muskie 
, ■■ ' \'.' : ' ' ■- ■ ^■■-••- •:- '/ ! ;l!ol Jn T:ov.'( 
conccL'tra liri'' on l-''.;i;-' .. y l\ n ni a to li;.- i-xcliisj 

", IluirulTi-y i:^ 
cj] M as;;.>chu^eli .■■ ; 



and McGo\crn is focusing upon Massachusetts with only targeted 
districts in Pennsylvania. Muskie, who is in danger of being vvhipsawed 
■in the two primaries, sceins to have opted to make his major effort in 
(Pennsylvania. The 182 delegates in Pa. , compared to 102 in Mass. is 
'clearly one reason. Another is that Muskie seems to believe now that 
he stands a better chance of becoixiing the Regulars' candidate acceptable 
to the Left, than the Left's candidate acceptable to the Regulars. 

At this point Hui-nphray looks like the winner in Pennsylvania, which will 
give him a leg up in Ohio a week later. And Muskie who two months ago 
was a 4-1 favorite in Massachusetts could conceivably lose both 
primaries on April 25. If he docs, he has another bullet hole in hini -- 
though he may still not be completely dead. 

In D. C. Walter Fauntroy is favorite son, about whom no more need be 
said. Alabaina is inconsequential. In Indiana, all thernajor candidates 
seem to be abandoning this primary to George Wallace, and at this point 
Wallace will win the Indiana Primary and the headlines that go with it - - 
setting himself up for Michigan, and other good things to come. MusV^ie 
has just about pulled up stakes; Hubert is focusing on Ohio, and McGovern 
is simply not a statewide winner -- give this one to Vi''allace. 

lOhio, however, is another story. The winner of Pennsylvania a week 
[before -- we believe HHH will take it for the first primary win in his 
Dolitical lifetime -- will have the w^hip hand here. Muskie will contest 
his w^ith all he has; if he loses here as well as Pennsylvania, it becomes 
difficult to see how he can last another month, till California. I\lcGovern 
s here --as everywlierc -- targeting on delegates, to pick up a few 
iven if he loses the primary by a major niargin. It's HHH or Musliic in 
3hio. V/e pick Humphrey here as well. 


TENNESfJLE -- May 4: Everybody's abandoning this one to Wallace, 
vho should sweep it -- along with 40-45 of the delegates. 

NORTH CAROLINA -- May 6: Everyone is abandoning North Carolina 
iis weU -- everyone ihntis expect Terry Sanford. Wc gi\'c North 
Carolin.- lo George \V'a]lacc also. (If Sanford should upt-el Wallace 

ri'. ' : ' ' / \.-,lil<t; , lu\-;]l he Toj-n Wich^;-:; "New Sf.'tb" hero for 
iiext month. ) 


NEBRASKA & WEST VIRGINIA -- May 9: West Virginia will feature 
a head-on between Wallace and H\ibert Humphrey, the only two 
candidates on the popular ballot. If Humphrey whips Wallace he will 
get immense favorable publicity -- good both in Maryland and Michigan. 
He will look more and more to the Regulars as the Regular to support 
all the way. If Wallace beats Huniphrey here, it ■■vill be a humiliation 
for Hubert, and the Deniocratic Party nationally -- exposing just how 
far away the jiational leadership of the Party has gotten from its base. 
Wallace's inomentum for North Carolina and Tennessee will be working 
in his favor here. (Anyway to help Mr. Wallace here would help in 
Novenibcr. ) 

Nebraska -- everyone is on the ballot. It is a McGovern target state; 
he could do well here. We have no real reading. 

MARYLAND & MICHIGAN -- A4ay 16: If Humphrey has defeated Muskie 
in both Pennsylvania and Ohio -- then both these states shape up as 
Huniphrey versus Wallace contests, and either man could v/in both of 
thein, or one of them. 

Maryland has 53 delegates and Michigan 132. The latter is the major 
northern industrial state most suited to a Wallace cannpaign, as bussing 
is "the" i.ssue. 

Yet, there is no way to predict the outcome here --as inuch will depend 
on what has gone before. If Wallace and Humj^hrey do as we predict 
in the previous primaries, then the Maryland and Michigan contests 
should be showdowns between the two, with McGovern picking up his 
customary handful of delegates in both. Mviskie lias formal UAW 
support, but if he loses Pennsylvania and Ohio, and does not win 
Massachusetts, that UAW endorsement v/ill be more an embar rascnient 
to Woodcock than an advantage to Big Ed. 

Note: Cross -over voting is allowed in Michigan. Again, our people 
should go for Wallace and McGovern. 

OREGON & RHODE ISLAND -- May 16: Rhode Island with 22 delegates 
is Muskie country; and if Big Ed is still alive, if not well, these 
delegates should be his. Oregon, with 34 delegates, is symbolically 
important -- giventhe iia1\irp of llie stale, and tlie media attfntion if 
invariably receives. E\-c.i-yonc is on llie ballut in Oregon -- including; 
Toddy. Ill tlio wake of Wiscnnpin, j-.ome ha\'(' p,l]-c.?dy cnnrr dcd Ore-eon 
l(j AUA^iiw .1,; bul V. ii^i !.;■ .• lu' ea i- i-Li'.i .i-.c. j-t; ic- \/.i] i.:cpv;:ci ,.j-i.atiy 
on how well he dot-.s in ilu; int(> )-\c;ni ng six wec:k;i beuveen now and tlum. 


Jackson's support is not strong in Oregon; and it is difficult to see 
how he can last until then. More likely, this will be a McGovern, 
Huinphrey and Muskie contest -- again, depending on whether or not 
Muskie is still alive. 

Muskie' s polls which showed him leading in Oregon are now as out of 
date as all his other polls. No projecftions here -- but this is central 
to McGovern' s planning. 

Despite Wallace's challenge, Soutli Dakota's 17 have to go to McGovern. 
New Mexico's eighteen -- who knows -- likely a split between Humphrey 
and Muskie, and perhaps Wallace, who says he may work the state. 

New Jersey is one of the two crucial primaries of the day -- though it 
^\'ill be overshadowed by California, which is Big Casino. In Jersey 
there are 109 delegates; Muskie had the upper hand Iiere, but appears 
to have lost it as both former Governor Hughes and Senator Williams 
are backing away from hinn. This redounds to Humphrey's benefit. 
He is probably the favorite here, with McGovern again targeting on 
districts where he can pick up delegates. (Wallace has not decided yet 
on a major push here, though he has two wec^ts left to file. ) 

California is where it is at for the Democrats, v/ith 271 votes -- winner 
take all. This is nearly a fifth of w)iat is needed for nomination. This 
prize, the possibility of seizing it for bargaining leverage and prestige, 
is what may keep a bedraggled Ed Aluskie in the race. 

Wallace could not get on the ballot; McCarthy v/ill not canipaign and 
Jackson will have pulled out by then --in our estimate. This leaves it 
between Humphrey and George McGovern. If Muskie stays in and has 
any apprecir.ble support, then what he draws froin Humphrey could well 
give the Golden State to George McGovern. JvicGovern has organization 
here, entliusj asnn, and iTioney; and it could pay off. 

Further, he is the lone candidate on the Left for the balance of the 
prin"iaries -- and thus Ihe more "centrists" left in the primaries -- 
Jackson, IIHH, Muskie- or Wallaco -- tiic me:-vier for George McGovern. 

NEV/ Yr^R;: . - Jun- 20: New Yorl.'i; ?.7S d-] <■;',-> tes is \hc- ]r-.rgcst, but 
this will bv bjjlil. vij:) considerably l)y tlic time il gets to Mi;: mi. New York 
docs not have a statewide vote; moj-.cover, thr- delegate slates do not 

i.::\;- <i-,'- c." n'VKi;i t r":';-fi f' op o " f ! r-.'i . Sf) \'i>" ^l•lf■ lo )• cl o! ••■;"' .it , Jolin 


them to run for delegate; strong grass roots effort is essentia) here; 
so McGovern should do extrei-nely well in the Empire State, probably- 
more delegates than anyone .else, but not more than 100. 


Several points need to be made. 

A) Regular Democrats are not doing as well as they have in the 

B) A lot of liberals are getting into the convention wlio weren't 
there in 1968. 

C) Unions are not doing as well. 

D) There are sizable nunabers of "undecided" delegates winning -- 
and we do not knov/ precisely to \vhom they will go. 

E) McGovern is doing extremely well in non-primary states, 
niaximizing his potential -- when George is -wanning them in Georgia, 
and Virginia, a7id picking off two-thirds of the Kansas delegation, it 
rrieans they have a Goldwater type operation going, and going well. 


SCOOP JACKSON -- No way we can see him winning the nomination, 
and no reason for his continiiing much further. Wallace has eclipsed 
him on the party's social conservative right. We predict Jackson will 
either be out after Ohio or after Oregon ~- the longer he stays in, 
however, the better for us, as he draws votes that would otherv/ise be 
Huniphrey' s or Muskie' s -- and so he aids George McGovern. 

HUBERT HUMPHREY -- Victory for Hubert lies in knocking Muskie 
out of the race in Penj-isylvania and Ohio, in taking West Virginia and 
Michigeiri and Klaryliind from George Wallace, a'-id winning California. 
Humphrey, in our vi c\\-, is the odds-on favorite to become the East 

Befu Hope of the ]-)-'i-ly Rcfnil^r.s against the \'icGc)\'c- rn in.'-, uj-p, cit s. By 
and large, hc> docs not contc-t any more niajor prJinary races with 
\-cr>, •■.•■.-; -; :-, , M, Vf.-ri :•••, -. li-rr,-,- {'■'■■ ■-'-r!-:i-.-f Califor-nn r; r' :: i' '■; 
l-Iis coi-.ij/<-lLtion jr. Pon.-i sy l\-ani a a:i.d Ol-d o is Muskie, and if he lakes 
jMusl.i .'■ ou; of the play thej-e -■ }-i e contesl.? V\';h.] lace in Wc-st Virginin, 


Clearly, once Muskie is eliminated -- if he is -- Humphrey's approach 
in California is to paint George McGovern to the Regulars as the death- 
knell of the Democratic Party they have known. Even should Hubert 
lose California narrowly, he will likely carry New Jersey and pull some 
delegates out of New York. 

Our probleiTi with HHFI is that he has never won a contested Democratic 
Presidential primary. 

ED MUSKIE -- It is truly ten minutes to midnight for Big Ed. If he 
loses both Ma.s r.achusetts and Pennsylvania on April 25 -- which he 
could -- it is liard to sec how he can regain his iTiomentum to become 
the Candidate of the Party Regulars, McGovern has already locked up 
the Left. 

Muskie' s chance to rehabilitate hiniself conies April 25 in Pennsylvania, 
and then a week later in Ohio. If he wins the first, he can conceivably 
win the second, and become himself the Candidate of the Regulars -- 
the last man who can prevent a McGovern nomination. The problein for 
the Regulars is tliat unless they settle on a single candidate before 
California, they are going to lose California --to McGovern. From 
our standiDoint, then, it v/ould be good to ]iave Muskie win something, 
good to ]^ave him and Jackson stay around for the California primary. 

Muskie is today in a position not dissimilar from RN in 1968 -- had RN 
not swept the primaries. Had Miami come dov/n to a three-way contest 
between RR, NR and RN -- then as soon as it appeared, the left or right 
candidate would win -- ]\.N in the center would become the beneficiary 
of the 0]:)posite wing's support. In other v/ords, had Nixon not won on 
the first ballot, he cou]d still haive won on a later ballot, by getting the 
panicked Rockefeller supj^ort, should Reagan rise, and the panicked 
Reagan support should Rockefeller approach the nomination. 

Ed's second chcnce lies in the fart that he is more acceptable to the 
Left than Hiurijjhrey and to the Regulars than McGovern. 

Absenting only Teddy Kennedy, he still has the best chance of uniting 
the Demticratic Paj-iy today. 

One finnl ]K)!e: Mur.uicr covJd come alivc^ and w c-11 if he slu-uikl two Vveeks 

i: O- . i I'^j .. ■.:l:.ijj''.-^ : ;:r; ■. !.\^ .. i ., c- ;^.! ^i >..::-;■ I i; .:.!■ f;. "] 1., 1 C. -uld b i' i :: ;.\ 
liim lo ]if;- in iin iu.':'arit -- a;i(.l iho'agJi JiighJy imUkely, it is not aliogclhej- 
oalsjc'n' il"i(> )'c:3]ni tr, jios si lii li ty . 


GEORGE MCGOVERN -- McGovern has these assets going for him: 

A) He is maxiinizing his support in the non-priinary states, with 
a hustling team maximizing his support and winning him, nickel and 
diine, delegates in some of the damndest places. 

B) Even in the primary states where he is very nearly conceding 
defeat, such as New Jersey; Maryland, Michigan --he will be picking 
up sinall pockets of delegates. 

C) He has monientun:i after Wisconsin; lie has generated tremendous 
enthusiasm on the Left; he has convinced the True Believers that they 
czn take over the party; and their challenge now has a "credibility"it 
ha.s never pre\'iously had. 

D) He is targeting well. The states he says he can win --he can 
conceivably win, i. e. , Massachusetts, Nebraska, Oregon, South 
Dakota, California and New York. 

E) He will go to Miami with support in every section of the coxmtry 
if not damn near every state. 

D) The convention he goes to will be mor e liberal and conscience 

oriented than any previous convention since the GOP in 1964. If 
Kennedy stays out and the convention goes more than two ballots, a 
lot of delegates are going to vote tlieir hearts instead of their heads -- 
and the Democratic Party could v/ind up with this fellow as nominee. 

McGovern' s problems are apparent; he is of course anallaema to 
conservative Deniocrats; but also, after Massachusetts, he is going 
to have a dry spell in terms of publicity for a few weeks -- and this 
could hurt him if Humphrey is dominating the news and building 
inomentum with lieadlinc victories. 

GEORGE AvALI^ACE -- As son-icone put it, if Wallace were non"iinated, 
the Democratic Party would self-destruct on l:is way to the rostrum. 
There is no scenario for a Wallace non^ination. Hov/ever, he could take 
300 delegalc:s into the convention; his delegates will be challenged; 
anything is li]-.e]y to happen; there is no way now to predict what he v/ill 
do or what \\lj] l;o done to liim -- tlie Democrats thcmsclx'cs will hf'.\'c 
to docidi- l!iat. 



What we need now is a decision on whom we want to ru n against. We 
believe that McGovcrn is our candidate for dozens of reasons. He 
could be painted as a left- radical candidate, the Goldwater of the 
Democratic Party; and at this point iri time v/e would inundate him. 
The Wallace Deniocrats, South and North, as well as the Daley and 
Meany Democrats, would have to talce hemlock to support a fellow 
whose ixiajor planKis to chop 32 billion out of defense. Also, he is 
weak with the blacks, and would have to cater to that vote --to his 
great disadvantage. Huinphrey can take the blacks for granted in a 
contest with the President. 

If we want McGovern -- and we believe we should -- then what we want 
is a showdown in Miami between the Regulars and the Left -- between 
Humphrey and McGovcrn with McGovern winning. And if McGovern 
loses that showdown -- then by all means, we want Humphrey. The 
Left would never talve him again; lie vi'ould guarantee a horror show in 
Miami Beach and a walkout of the Left fol]o\'.Tng. 

Muskie is our third choice -- the reason being that Mur.kie, despite his 
weaknesses is still a potentially \inifying candidate for the Democrats, 
after a Humphrey-McGovern deadlock. 


Evajis -Novak, in a coluinn that looks to have come froiTi the horse's 
mouth, say that Kennedy would accept a genuine draft. He is in the 
catbird's scat today. TougJi tliere will be pressure on hin~i to endorse 
McGovern --if McGo\'crn carries Massachusetts two weeks from today - 
he can sit back and observe until July. 

If the convention deadlocks on the first ballot, and if there is a deep 
division wnlhin the Dtniocratic Party -- he i? the inajor unifying 
figure on Ihe national scone today. Though he v/ould be unacceptable 
to the So\xili, in a nationa.1 election, he would bring to liis candidacy all 
the McGox'crTi supjjort, plus the Kennedy charisina, plus the support 
of the- Mc'.-inys and Dnlr^ys. A Deniocratic Pcrty deeply dix'ided, thirsting 
fur uriJly c'.:-(] \ictor\ . \.-imId velct'iT'.o a Kcnn '.iy. 

1- O J ti ' ■ :. • ■ . •,'li: , V. V ^aj . -.(t Dwi I V . .' , W .-.:..,._, 1 ., J lU. ' 1 ■, . ; V. rU:.r.i: 

KvCnntuly onl. As Ki,-nncdy is clr\c>lc(l, AicGo.orn j-ect;dcs -- and 
V-' \7:'i.f \;.C"o>. cr'-'. 


Just as it. would have been foolish for LBJ -- who wanted Goldwater I 

in April --to flush out and elevate the more formidable RN -- so it i 

is foolish for \is we believe to flush out and elevate EMK -- when he * 
is far stroiiger and more dangerous than McGovern. We should elevate 

and assist McGovern in every way conceivable. i 

Nor can v.'e surface Kennedy --if he doesn't v/ant to be surfaced. If 
we indicate v/e are apprehensive about his candidacy, that makes his i 

candidacy more likely. |i 

Right nov/, Kennedy is still in the background. There is a liberal media jj 

love affair going on with George McGovern; they will help George against 
Humphrey and we should help him as well. Every notch we move 
Kennedy up, we move McGovern down a peg. What we should do is 
begin publicly to take George McGovern seriously, and any pressure 
we could place upon EMK to endorse McGovern as the leader of the 
Left should be exerted. We niight even attack McGovern to elevate 
him -- also, to get the record on him into the media. 

McGovern has a long shot at the nomina.tion, a very long shot. But if 
he \vins, we win. Let's let him have his run at the nojnination, and 
assist him in eveiy way we can. Today, he gets 5 percent of a 
Democratic vote nationally; and RN swamps him in the polls -- and 
people do not yet know what a v/ild man he is. McGovern' s The One. 


Exhibit No. 184 

April 27, 1972 





With the great success of McGovern and subsequent pullout of 
Muskie, the chances of a McGovern nomination are immensely 
improved. Thus, we must do as little as possible, at this time, 
to impede McGovern' s rise. 

Though he i:!")ay act irresponsibly and make v/iid raiacks, we 
should, by and large, resist the temptation and leave alone. 
A'^ietnam is the exception. He can be hit hard on subject — 
a point v.'hicl: not only elevates his candidacy b\;t also gets the 
President's position restated v/hile r eijiforcing the strong anti-war 
sentiment beliind McGovern. 

On the other hand, the ammunition which will be our stock in the 
campaign -- the extremist, radical labels; the pro-amnesty and 
pro-abortion p-.'Sitions; the radical chic; the gut-the-inilitary 
attitude; etc. -- should be held in abeyance until we are reasonably 
sure McGo\'ern has tlie nojiiination. 

The temptations will be high in many ciuarters to go after 
McGo\H'^rn, but word ouglit to go out io lay off with b\it fev.' excep- 
tions. U'e have j^lenty of time to attach labels later, and the same 
labels whicli v.'ill defeat McGovern for the Presidency are the 
same labt Is v/'nich could pre\'(;nt hin; from getting the nomination. 
Eet's not do Huljert's work for liim. 

U.-M y^^^ -^ff^ 

A^ ^JMA-/l-^ 



Exhibit No. 185 

7HZ WHiTC .-.ouse: 

WA S H I N' G T O N 

June 2, 1972 



JOHN m;tc?lsj-i- 



At your request and wivh the considerable assistance of 
the RNC research people, we have put together a basic attack 
document. Due to the siniple volur..-; of materials available 
and the rush of even;s, we felt i': wov.ld be near impossible as 
well as unwise to put this together as zhe coniprehensive 
contender attack piece. In point of fact some of the most 
damaging things con'jing out of the California primary have 
yet to be entered sim'ply cue to zirne constraints. 


As you are reading this, we are currently v/orking on 
anotiier set of i"naterials which takes this basic raw information 
s.r:a works it into speech insert formats. The focus is on 
Mc Goy ern and v/h,at is being cone is to take one or two out- 
rageous quotes on a particular issue -- say, defense -- and 
putting it into a text which fra:nes the argument for our spokesmen. 
In a sense, we are preparing an attack briefing book the firt-t 
complete edition of which should be ready thas coming week. A 
separate document for use by the press corps will also be prepared 
in the near future. 

j.n,tne meantim.e, the attacnea znateriaxs are lor your review, 
and no disseinination has been mace, pending your continents. 
■Also attached is a copy of the Do:-nestic Council response to the 
DNC FA.CT production. I feel this cocun-,ent is not useful to us 
in the can-.paign, not because it reflects poor work, hut because the 
issues therein are deadbeat issues. I suggest also that the FACT 
publication is little 2<nown and probably less quoted, and to use the 
Donnestic Council-prepared materials extensively might simply 
elevate the DNC attack. At bc^t, we recommend that FICTION 1972 
be put in pamphlet for:~ as a "suggested" response by our spokesirien 
if_they are confronted by the DKC attacks. 

Finally, unless you object, we are going to Defense for a crash 
study on >.'lcGovern's defense proposals with breakdowns such as 
how many jobs would be lost, how many bases closed down, strategic 
considerations, etc. The sarrjc will be done with liis domestic tax 
and welfare proposals. 


Exhibit No. 186 

June 6, 1972 



We agree with virtually everyone that post-California, the Mc Govern 
Record must begin to become part of the public record. The national 
perception of AlcGovern as a moderate and even a conservative must 
begin to change -- before McGovern begins changing his positions 
from left toward center. We have all the necessary materials in our 
judgment --in an Assault Book to be ready tomorrow possibly -- to 
tar McGovern as an extreinist. Not in our memory has there been 
such a wealth of material with which to tag a national candidate as an 
extremist; and if we fail here, the price will be significant as McGovern 
could then conceivably march into November as the "Citizens Candidate" 
with the cleanest national innage since Mr. Eisenhower. Booting our 
opportunity would be a tragedy -- the important questions are not 
wjiether we get our materials on the public record; but timing and tone 
and degree and e:nphasis. 

In our judgment Humphrey's effort to tar- McGovern as an extremist 
was a gross failure because a) Humphrey came off as a politician in 
panic, making wild accusations against a calm, conservative appearing 
fellow; b) his tone of attack was negative and bitchy and strident; 
c) it came too late in the game. 

In our efforts, which we feel can begin with the Re-elect campaign 
statement, following McGovern' s smashing victories -- we can avoid 
these pitfalls. 

First, McGovern will be in his pinnacle of glory -- he v/ill have a 
sympathetic press, even an indulgent one -- and the Nixon Cainpaign 
Statement should not go hard against the grain of this national sentiment, 
should not be immedir.lely "ro\igh and tough." Some congratulations, 
generosity rmd whimsy in that statement might well fit the occasion. 
But al leant oi^.c crucial part of oxir message -- perhaps iteration of 
his welfare- reform proposals and awe at tlic cost to taxpayers -- should 
be reflected in the statement by John Mitchell. 

Tlic next occasion we understand will be the appearance by Mr. Mitchell 
on Sunday. For thaf, we think we cither ougVit to prepare a briefing 
paper, plus a book -- or- make sorvte sort of joint de+ermina'tioa as id 


what points we wish to get across in this national forum. The ex-AG 
will be able to make headlines on this -- we can dcternnine ourselves 
which of the materials we have v.e want dropped here, and iterated 
by our speakers around the country. 

Our tone should at all costs, avoid any sense of being embattled; we 
should be generous to George, if you will, but looking forward with 
enthusiasm to the contest. Any talk of McGovern being an easy mark 
should be eschewed. AVc probably have on record right now ninety per 
cent of the outrageous or idiotic positions or statements Mr. McGovern 
will take -- and we have five months in which to get those to the 
American people. 

There is no need now to shoot it all out of the cannon. We should feed 
it out to the public in morsels -- one at a time -- and wait until the 
public has digested one outrageous position, and KlcGovern has been 
forced to answer -- before moving onto another. Here, rather than a 
sudden massive attack -- a very gradual escalation, it seems to me, is 
in order -- husbanding our resources, and dealing them out bit by bit. 

\"e will proceed -- vinless told otherwise --to draft a statement for 
Mr. Mitchell post- California, and have it ready for him by noon on 

1. There is a strong feeling on our part that the term "radical" 
was overused in 1970; tliat it has lost much of its electric charge; that 
the term "extremist" is a far more difficult one to defend against; and 
that in our on-going effort against McGovern -- his positions and he 
himself should be characterized as "extremist" in character, not 
"radical. " 

2. A portion of this Assault Book -- perhaps the seginents dealine 
with the au courant and cor.troversial issues -- should be moved out to 
coluninists and editorial writers. Some portion of the Assault Book 
should l>e put into the hands of surrogates, for their use, in coming weeki 
before the Democratic Convention. The segments should be chosen b\- 
thc Attoiney General. Again, we v/ould i-econimend that riglit now, we 
restiict ourselves to "seconding" the allegations of Hvimphrcy and 
Jackson, not using too mich of the. unxiSed material immediately -- and 
quoting DeMiocraUc atfacks on McGovern as much as initiating new ones. 



3. There are already some press appalled at McGovern's potential 
candidacy -- and there is no certainty the regular Democrats -- after 
their shellacVung today -- are going to roll over and play dead. Far 
better if they do the preliminary hatchet work. They are a good deal 
more credible than we at this game. Before we move, we should know 
what, if anytliing, Daley, Meany and LBJ, etc. , plan to do. 

4. There is an interesting development shaping up. McGovern's 
ambitious children seem to be busy "stealing" Wallace delegates -- 

and playing false, by "ripping off" the Wallace delegations in Tennessee 
and elsewhere, places like Michigan. This is excellent. We should 
hold back coinmenting upon the process, which Governor Carter is 
raising hell about, until it is accomplished -- and then accuse tlie 
Democratic Convention of shafting the legitimate popular winner, and 
stealing the delegates of a bed- ridden martyr. 

5. . Quietly, and right now, we should put to work --as far away 
from us as possible -- an in-depth of the background, character, 
financial deals, land transactions, loa.ns, business associations of 
G/:orge McGovern. Was he associated with Billy Sol Estes or Bobby 
Baker; who are his sugar daddies back in the Dakotas? In short, a 
thorough, intensive investigation of the kind that the liberal press did 
on Vice President Agnew in 1968. 

6. Post-California, let's proceed along these lines for the next 
week. But, on our view, there should be more input, and we should 
await more reactions -- from the four primaries Tuesday -- before 
"locking in" to any strategy all the v.ay to the Convention. 

Again^, our immediate recommendation is a "gracious" response to 
McGovern's win -- a response v/hich at the saine time moves onto the 
public record McGovern's welfare proposals -- and raises the question 
of where the lax monies will be coming from to put all these millions 
of Americms on welfare. 


Exhibit No. 187 

June 8, 1972. 

Herewith the Assault Book on which Ken Khachigian and I have been working 
the past week. Within are enough McGovern statements, positions, votes, not only 
to defeat the South Dakota Radical — but to have him indicted by a (Jrand Jury. 
// we can get these positions before the i)ublic ; and // the election hinges upon 
issues — only with enormous effort could we boot this election away. 

However, in addition to the statements, issues and positions of George Mc- 
Govern there are 'preceptions" which we must address as well — "perceptions" 
that, unless dramatically altered, could give us considerable difficulty in the fall. 

1. In a country where the "politician'' is in increasing disrepute, George 
McGovern is perceived as a candid, honest straightforward, citizen non-politician. 

2. In a nation where the "Establishment" is viewed with a mixture of frustra- 
tion and contempt by left, right and the angry Wallace center — George McGovern 
is perceived by many as an anti-status quo, anti-Establishment figure — the candi- 
date of the common man. 

3. In a political year when the mood, we are told, is "throw the ra.scals out," 
we are the "ins" and Mr. McGovern is perceived clearly as one of the "outs." He 
is outside the power elite of the Democratic Party ; he is perceived as outside 
the power elite of the American Government. 

4. George McGovern has been and remains the "underdog" in a nation that has 
always had a warm spot for the "underdog." 

5. In a era when the public yearns constantly for a "new face," George Mc- 
Govern is the newest, freshest face on the national scene, and the face of Richard 
Nixon is the most familiar of any political figure in the United States. 

Before addressing how I feel we should deal generally with each of these "per- 
ceptions," and specifically with the assault materials provided let me add these 
concerns : 

1. The Republican Party is sleek and fat and incumbent. Our Conservative foot 
soldiers who out-marched the Democrat's union troops in 1968 are sullen, bitchy, 
angry. Our little old ladies in tennis shoes are not all enamoured of H.R. 1. wage 
and price controls, and $100 billion in deficits — while George McGovern has an 
organization the likes of which the U.S. has not seen since the Goldwater Legions. 

He has tens of thousands of True Believers, working night and day for him — 
spurred on by unanticipated triumphs and the anticipation of rinining the "Old 
Politics" right out of the White House. 

As of now, in a seat of the pants judgment. I would say that if we are running 
50-50 with George McGovern in the polls election day — he could conceivably beat 
us by four to six points, on the basis of his first-rate get-out-the-vote machinery. 

2. The hard-fought Democratic parimaries have resulted sharply in increased 
registration — especially by McGovern types — and any lopsided registration 
figures in the primaries will be lopsided anti-Nixon votes in the fall. 

3. While McGovern's positions are wooly-headed. he is an ambitious and prag- 
matic politician — who will not hesitate to move crab-wise to the center to win this 
election. Some of the more garish of his positions will surely be shed by the fall. 
Further, my tmderstanding is that his campaign film biography is an excellent 
piece of work — designed to portray him as the antithesis of the "radical," in- 
deed, as the bomber pilot who won the war against Nazi Germany. We can antici- 
pate that his commercials will be equally designed to hit the Democratic center. 

Clearly, in addition to the problems listed, we have tremendous advantages — 
the Presidency, the view of millions that McGovern is some sort of wild radical, 
the split within the Democratic Party, the tendency of McGovern's red hots to 
"stick it" to the Daleys and Meanys when the opiwrtunity arises, etc. But this 
memorandum is directed toward both general and specific suggestions to resolve 
our problems, to get the radical record of McGovern into the public record, to 
change the national perceptions of the two. 


1. We should move to re-capture the anti-Establishment tradition or theme in 
American politics. Incumbent Presidents ran do this ; RN did it in Nevomher 
1969. when, as Pre.sident of IT.S., he called on the common man to stand with him 
against the elitist-backed mobs in the streets. That, coupled with the Vice Presi- 
dent's standing up to the Establishment media, and .slugging it out, raised RN to 


the highest point of his Presidency — 69 percent approval. Why did we reach that 
level? Because, even though Newsweek led "Nixon in Trouble," even though 
Broder was writing of the "Breaking of the President," — RN led both the Presi- 
dency position and the anti-Establishrnent position. How do we enhance our anti- 
Establishment credentials — and take Mr. McGovern's away — without surrender- 
ing the political asset of Incumbent President? 

(a) We need to shed the "in bed with Big Business" image. PJB believes we 
should seek out the opportunity to "take on" some egregious, giant, preferably, 
but not necessarily Democratic, corporation publicly — as Kennedy did with Big 
Steel in 1962. Business will be with us in 1972 — but one of our problems is a too identification in the public mind with Corporate Power. ITT reinforced that. 
Public presidential anger at the price-gouging of some Big Business firm would 
be, in my judgment, a good thing. 

(b) If we have abandoned the idea of introducing or supporting "tax reform" — 
I trust we have not — I would recommend RN publicly veto one, two or three 
huge spending bills — on national television. Two minutes would be sufficient. 
The focus of the veto is that the taxpayer is already burdened enough by massive 
liberal spending programs that accomplish nothing, but break the back of the 
taxpayer. And RN believes the time has come in this country, for less massive 
federal si>ending, not more; for lower taxes, not new inflation, and not new taxes. 
Most likely, McGovern will be voting for all these spending bills. 

Our objective : Move him visibly into tlie posture of more and more government 
spending — and get ourselves on the "tax cut," working-man side of the issue. In 
my political judgment — what the nation wants is not more spending or the taxes 
or inflation required to pay for it — but less spending and lower taxes. Government 
takes too damn much of the earnings dollar in everyone's view, and we should be 
anti-tax in 1972. 

(Indeed, in my opinion, this would apply to the so-called added value tax as 
well — since the average fellow is not likely to make the distinction between good 
and bad taxes). One recalls that some years back, the President, in a quite effec- 
tive television piece, vetoed, with a sweep of the pen, a major spending bill. 
Suppose we knocked off three in a row — calling for holding the line on spending 
and holding the line on taxes. 

(c) As the campaign, we should increasingly portray McGovem as 
the pet radical of Eastern Liberalism, the darling of the A'^ew York Times, the 
hero of the Berkeley Hill Jet Set ; Mr. Radical Chic. The liberal elitist are his — 
we have to get back the working i)eople ; and the better we portray McGovem 
as an elitist radical, the smaller his political base. By November, he should be 
postured as the Establishment's fair-haired boy, and RN postured as the Candi- 
date of the Common Man, the working man. 

(How about RN going to Cadillac Square on Labor Day this year! !) 
Just as Goldwater ended up 1964 portrayed both as a 1(X>% Conservative — 
and a radical ; so George McGovern must end up in 1972 portrayed both as an ex- 
tremist and as the pet of the national liberal Establishment. Both are, after all, 

(d) The individual nationally who has done the best job on the above is 
Kevin Phillips — who writes of George hobnobbing with Schlesinger, Ford Foun- 
dation liberals, the radical chic, prancing around Iiis $100,000 .Japanese palace 
in $1.5 Pucci ties. My recommendation is that PJB— using our Radical Chic mate- 
rials, as well as the Assault Book materials, write, not a full-length book but a 
5000-word piece, using full color, good paper, like Firat Monday, with pictures 
of Hiss and Hoffman and ot her endorsees, and that this be printed and distributed 
by the millions. A quality, brightly written, colorful, picture biography of 
McGovem of 5000 words would be infinitely superior to those old full-length 
hatchet biographies that are never read. 

(e) "The clammy hand of consistency should never rest for long upon the 
shoulder of a statesman." — Senator Ashurst 

In addition to portraying McGovem as radical — we .should, at the same time, 
never let the public forget he was part and parcel of the Democratic liberal 
establishment that passed all the huge spending programs of the fifties and sixties 
that failed. McGovern's high spending, high tax proposals have been tried. They 
failed to help the poor; they bankrupted the workingman; they are taxing to 
death the middle class. 

2. We cannot allow McGovern to .succeed in this fraudulent effort to portray 
him.self as Mr. Citizen — rather than Mr. Politician. He can and should be 
nailed as a waffling, deceptive, crafty, politician. In this, I disagree with the 


President. We should not only nail him with his radical positions, but also 
hold up a mirror to his shifts of position — which are certain to come. There 
are any number of sticks to beat him with— including that of the waffler who 
doesn't know where he stands. The use of otic docs not exclude use of the other 
as well. 

Further, though a bit outrageous, McGovem can be charged, among Democrats, 
with "packing" caucuses, with "stealing" the nomination from the more popular 
candidate, with not representing the average man in the Democratic Party — 
but rather the left-wing organizers. As stated in an earlier memo, we should 
also wait until his people take delegates from Wallace — and then charge him 
with "stealing" delegates from a man in a hospital bed — discrediting his "re- 
forms" and his "new politics," as no more than the old Gut Politics of the past. 
Also, anything that shows the McGovem people, making deals, softening posi- 
tions, backing off, waffling — should be spotlighted — not downplayed. 

3. To reverse the "underdog" image of Mr. McGovem — we should, upon his 
nomination, cease speaking of an easy win. We should in public, both to rally 
our troops and to remove this "underdog George" label — argue that the Democrats 
have the largest party. We should leak polls showing us worse off than we are. 
We should attempt as well and often as possible, again, to show McGovem as the 
Candidate of the ^ew York Times, the Ford Foundation, Harvard, elitist left- 
wing professors, snot-nosed demonstrators, black radicals, and the whole elitist 
gang. This contest must wind up not as they envision with McGovern, Honest 
Man from South Dakota Tricky Dick and his advertising budget — it 
should be Richard Nixon, candidate of Middle America, against the radical 
darling of the Liberal Establishment. 

When Harriman and Clifford, and the old gang assemble around him— that 
will be the moment to strike. 

4. About the "new face" thing — little we can do. Except to use the attack 
materials herein to fill in all the blanks in the McGovern image, fill them in with 
some of these materials, in working class neighborhoods, and we cannot but turn 
them off of George McGovem. The man has not been known well at all national- 
ly — except for two weeks or two months at most. Impressions of McGovern may 
be favorable, but they are not fixed. They can be changed. And we should be 
moving this material into the public record. How? 

(a) Not bitterly or stridently. To do so gives the appearance of arrogance 
and power which we want desperately to avoid. Thus, when our "heavies," if 
you will — the Vice President, Bob Dole, etc. — use this material they should for 
the present be scrupulously exact and precise, and avoid for the present — the 
blistering attack. There will be "time enough." 

(b) The material should be targeted — not shot-gun. For example, abortion, 
amnesty, pot, the removal of the personal tax exemption (a killer for large 
Catholic families) these should be targeted for speakers, and for pamphlets and 
for ads in Catholic and ethnic areas, Catholic and ethnic papers. Catholic and 
etlinic forums. 

(c) We should focus at once on the welfare schemes here — and on the military 
budget. They hurt George in California. McGovern is clearly moving on these 
proposals ; even his friends, at the Post and Times, are signaling hum to get off 
them ; and he is indicating tJiat he might. They ought to be hung permanently 
around his neck as the first order of business. 

(d) We must not blow all of this assault material out of the cannon now; 
in 1970, we shot our wad in two weeks. There are five-months between now and 
the election, and we should hang these one at a time around McGovem for the 
rest of the year. 



1. The abortion, PJB statements, aid to parochial schools, and marijuana 
statements — as well as the removal of the personal tax exemption, which would 
be devastating to large Catholic and ethnic families— should be used in a cam- 
paign flyer (contrasted with McGovern positions) to be distributed at Catholic 
churches in key states on Sundays — and should be used as the basis of targeted 
ads in the Catholic and ethnic press. (Once after the Convention— and last 2 
Sundays of campaign) . 

2. Volpe could take up McGovern propositions and before a national Knights oi 
Columbus grouTi — indicate that unintentionally, some are "anti-Catholic" in 
character, which Catholics concerned about Catholic values and the preserva- 
tion of the Catholic family should fight. (If we could get Volpe to do this— 
PJB could write the two-page speech insert, for release, all media.) 


Jeuish voters 

3. No reason why, with McGovern, we cannot make strong inroads here. 
Sngs^st that Secretary Laird devote a .single speech to the impact of McGovern's 
Navy cuts on the American Sixth Fleet — with the conclusion, not unjustified, 
that the future of Israel, the survival of Israel — with McGovern's naval cuts — 
would be the decision of the Soviet Politburo. Again, the lead should be that — 
with George's defense cuts, without building the F-14 and F-15 to combat 
the MIG-23. "U.S. Navy could not intervene to save Israel." 

4. The gist of the attack materials here on Israel — the HHH, the Jackson 
quotes about Israel being endangered by McGovern's position included — and 
McGovern's voting record— .'^hould be used in speeches before Jewish groups, 
in soliciting funds of Jewish groups. (Needless to say, above should be surfaced 
on television stations in N.Y.C., Chicago, Los Angeles.) 


5. Again, targeted material here. Llorida, Texas, Southern California. We 
.should get a list of the top ten defense plants in the country, the top ten aero- 
space plants, as well as the five NASA centers. And leaflets should be prepared 
and distributed at each of these entrance.s — at least twice this coming fall. 

Lines : // McGovern wins, Los Angeles irill have an unemployment rate that 
will match Seattle's and Southern Califorma will he the West Virginia of the 

The SST votes, as well as Jackson's quotes, should be used in media ads 
all over the State of Washington (We lost it in 1960.) McGovern should be 
blamed for not only threatening future unemployment in Seattle — but for the 
existing unemployment to aerospace. But, again, the pamphlets should be 
targeted — and the statements should be made on regional television, primarily. 


6. As stated. Laird is doing an excellent political job. But we ought to go 
down this list of military cutbacks of McGovern — determine what firms (such 
as McDonnell in St. Louis) build these various weapons. And all these firms 
and their employees should be notified l)y campaign workers, by ads and the 
like^ — just what plants loill have to he shut down. 

7. We have Defense already busy at work on a major speech or statement 
by Laird which will name all the bases that will have to be shut down, by 
McGovern's defense cuts. This information should be also provided to both 
Democratic or Republican Congressmen in that district, and to the local press 
there. And the Democrats should be called upon to support or repudiate 
McGovern's cuts. 

8. In every ''conservative" district- — our people should be provided with the 
McGovern book ; and Republican candidates should be encouraged to call upon 
their Democrats to repudiate this or that particular stand of their national 
candidate. This will require distribution, eventually of hundreds of copies of 
our completed book. 

9. We believe sections of this attack book should be sent out, piecemeal, to all 
pro-Nixon columnists and newspapers in the country. We can have it printed 
in .sections by the Republican National Committee — condensed even further than 
it is in a tight handy book for newsmen and editorial writers. But this should 
be done — only after the specifics in each .section have been used to make front- 
page attacks. 

10. All military publication.s. Navy League, etc., including the conservative 
publications (NR. ACU, HE. YAF. ASC) .should be induced to run in brief, but 
full, the McGovern Defense Programs, ASAP. 

11. We yet believe that the focus of attack on defense should be — at the 
national level — scare the hell out of the public first : and then follow on and 
say, that incidentally, this would also mean a loss of X million jobs. McGovern 
will want us to focus on jobs first — but we should not the Defense Argu- 
ment — we are stronger here, frankly, than on the jobs argument. (For if we 
don't need those planes and ships and missiles, hell, everyone would want to 
switch over, as at the end of WWII.) 


12. McGovern has two proposals. He has tried to get away from the $6500 
per family one — but he can be hung with both. Our speakers, our people on the 
tube should he conversant with each. 

One good line : ''Under George McGovern, tico dozen and one hippies could get 
together and set up a commune in Taos, New Mexico, and not do a lick of work all 


year — and McGovern would send them every year a check for $25,000. No 
wonder Jerry Ruhin and Abby Hoffman enthusiastically support his candidacy." 

Program for business 

13. Again, these two pages should be double-checked, then used for fund-rais- 
ing, and for possible ads in the WSJ, and for scaring the living hell out of the 
business community. 

14. At appropriate time, Shultz and/or John Ck)nnally should give a hair-rais- 
ing speech on what the McGovern proposals would mean to American society, and 
the American economy and the stock market. 

15. From the way the market is reacting, it is apparent that McGovern's nom- 
ination should bring about a sharp drop. We should do nothing to prevent this 
from happening. Indeed, if Shultz or Connally or one of them can predict that 
McGovern's election would mean a depression or panic on Wall Street, and do 
it credibly, then they might well do so. 

16. Specific business groups — such as real estate firms and brokers and the 
like — should be the target of direct mail, with a brief outline for each of what 
the McGovern proposals mean to them. To other business groups — direct mail, 
in this case, is the best means of alerting the businessman, without alerting the 
liberals — the mailings might well be done (these and others) by independent 
groups. (Needless to say, the McGovern plan to phase out the oil depletion allow- 
ance should not go unnoticed in the Lone Star State.) 

Integration and race 

17. This has to be handled gingerly — but on digging up that RibicofE proposal, 
we find it legitimate to charge McGovern with wanting to by federal direction 
integrate the suburbs, with favoring "racial balance" in the nation's public 
schools, with believing that bussing is an "essential" tool to accomplish the job. 

On this, our speakers should say, we know George is sincere, but we think 
that compulory integration of neighborhoods and schools would lead to racial 
tensions and disorders, not racial peace and harmony, we oppose him on all three. 

18. Southern Senators and Congressmen should be shown the specifics of the 
Black Caucus program which McGovern has endorsed "in toto," — even before 
we use these publicly. The Southerners will have to repudiate McGovern or force 
McGovern to repudiate these proposals — or take hemlock. Oiir candidates in the 
South — Senate and House — should be provided all this material by Harry Dent. 
As should our State Chairmen in the South. We can put it into form. 

19. When McGovern backs off some of these Black radical schemes, as back 
off he must — we should continue to hang them around his neck — and then mail 
his recantation to the black media. 

20. In Forest Hill, Missouri, and Warren, Michigan — and in blue collar neigh- 
borhoods, frankly, speakers should argue against the McGovern integration pro- 
posals — and in favor of retaining the integrity and value of ethnic neighborhoods. 

Chicago and demonstrators 

21. McGovern has said that the May Day demonstrators would not be on the 
streets but "having dinner at the White Hoiise" if he were elected. In this sec- 
tion — we have an idea for a commercial— juxtaposing RN and McGovern on the 
May Day demonstrators and indicating a vote for McGovern is a vote to have 
Rubin and Hoffman ("Guess Who's Coming to Dinner") at the White House. 

22. McGovern's comments about the Chicago police ( "those sons of bitches . . . 
those bastards") should be used — not prudishly, not condemning him for bad 
language. He can be excused for that — but condemned for the attitude his state- 
ment represents, a lynch mob attitude toward the nation's peace ofiioers, a knee- 
jerk tendency to [copy illegible] and condemn the policy. This should be done 
also in letters to the editor to all Chicago papers. 

(Independent letters operation — as well as speakers — should be using these 
materials to target in on sections of the country.) 

23. Resurrecting McGovern's comments on Hoover would be most effectively 
done by the ex-AG and Pat Gray and the Vice President. 

24. MONDAY can do an effective job for us — by back-paging each week one 
of a numbered series of effectively written and documented attacks on McGov- 
ern — giving readers materials for use themselves, in the boonies. (For example, MONDAY one week simply ran the McGovern Defense Program as out- 
lined in our package for the locals. ) 


25. McGovern's personal encouragement of Ellsburg to violate Federal law is 
a matter which we should wait to exploit . . . say two months after the Demo- 


cratic Convention — it should serve as a centerpiece of a national speech — i)er- 
haps by the Vice President. (Again, our concern is that we not "mix up" our 
attack.) One .specific area per speech, rather than the Scott, "Three A*s — abor- 
tion, amnesty, and acid" approach. This last is so "cute" as to make it appear 
we are simply political, not serious, in our disagreement with McGovern. 


26. Two points should be hammered here: (a) McGovem has been constantly 
wrong in his predictions about what Hanoi would do; he has even been dui)ed 
by Xuan Thuy and (b) the SOB would leave our prisoners in Hanoi — and count 
on the good will of that barbarous regime to get them back. Any attack on his 
Vietnam position should be prefaced by saying "We do not question his 

27. McGovern's Right from the Start can be countered — but this is a defensive 
maneuver for us since presumably we think his position wrong now and wrong 
then. Rather, the approach to be taken here is to charge that he is a) Old Sour 
Grapes is harassing and stabbing in the back the President who is ending a 
war his President could not win or end and b) McGovern waffled all over the lot 
on the War, like every other Democratic politician and we have the quotes here 
to prove it. 


28. We have dug up a 1964 quote where McGovern called Goldwater the most 
"unstable radical and extremist" ever to run for the Presidency, which can be 
used against him. Also, his rhetoric, which we have documented, should be used 
to make either a pre-emptive or retaliatory strike for his certain charge that we 
are "polarizing" while he is attempting to "bring us together." 

29. In terming McGovem as an extremist — we should begin by quoting Demo- 
crats like Carter, Yorty, Humphrey and Jackson, of course — just as the Rocke- 
feller quotes were more devastating against Goldwater tlian the LBJ attacks. 

McGovern's friends 

30. This fellow Mott, who bankrolls McGovern, is, I understand a screaming 
fairy who makes $800,000 a year and pays no taxes— we are trying to interest 
MONDAY in doing a take-out on him in the near future. 


31. To make the case against McGovem most credible, we not only need our 
heavy hitters — but we need the Democrats mentioned — and especially our lib- 
erals. Neal Freeman suggests the following be commissioned to do some of the 
rough work on "George McGovern extremism." 

1. Rockefeller 

2. Javits 

3. Aiken 

4. J. S. Cooper 

5. Douglas Dillon 

6. Scranton 

If of course, we could get Meany, Wallace or Jackson — that would be out- 

32. Ken Khachigian and I will monitor McGovern's appearances and hope- 
fully be mailing and phoning questions to any panels or interviewers. If we 
have an advanceman traveling ahead of the McGovern campaign — he should be 
providing the questions, which we can provide him. 

33. Some on the media are slobbering all over George ; they may have to be 
charged publicly with being pro-McGovern- — to force them to back off a bit. 
In this light, Godfrey Sperling had an excellent piece today, we understand, 
which perhaps our people should be quoting (Incidentally, given his performance 
the other night, Vanocur is a positive disaster for us — and McGovern's most 
effective campaigner. He may have to be fired or discredited — if we are to get 
anything approaching an even shake out of that left-wing taxpayer subsidized 
network. ) 

34. Again, we have to be on guard against any too harsh or strident an attack. 
With a hostile media out there — they will pounce on the first allegation of 
"Tricky Dick," or "smear" campaign. Perhaps an early address — attacking 
some of the smear books around already about the President, and some of 
McGovern's comments might be used to pre-empt or mitigate this certainty. 

35. Mr. Dent can make the argument that George McGovern "said he would be 
delighted to run with a black man, but not George Wallace." 

21-296 0—74 23 


36. We need to dig up film of McGovern at some of these demonstrations with 
the VC flag in the background, and with demonstrators chanting and shouting, 

37. From McGovern's statements, it is fair to say he would cut off all assist- 
ance to our NATO ally Greece, but consider giving military aid to the black 
guerrillas in Southern Africa. 

38. McGovern favors giving away (Black Caucus) 1% of U.S. GNP to foreign 
aid, with priority on Africa — which amounts to $11 billion — about a 400 percent 
increase in foreign aid. 

39. McGovern's old statements about Henry Wallace, about the U.S. starting 
the Cold War, etc., should be moved into all the ethnic language publications. 
And all his far left background should be disseminated to the far right in the 
U.S. for them to publish as it is too complicated for us to handle. 

Nixon's Thru in '72 

40. This is a slogan we can turn to our own advantage. For example, if Daley 
is booted out of the Democratic convention — on his arrival at his Mayor's office 
in Chicago — some bearded types can be out front with signs — "DALEY'S THRU 
IN '72 — VOTE McGOVERN [copy illegible] for an example, come to mind. Or at 
Defense Plants "THE M-I-C IS THRU IN '72" (Military Industrial Complex) 

We have some other thoughts and ideas — but we are sending these along for 
immediate consideration. 




Exhibit No. 188 


the white house 


June 16, 1972 


FROM: CHUCK COLS ON ^'^>--'*'' 

Has anyone run any checks or investigations on the key McGovern 
staffers? I was told yesterday that Gordon Weil has some very 
questionable tilings in liis background. He is apparently one of 
the chief brain trusters who travels with McGovern. 

cc: Pat Buchanan 




Exhibit No. 189 



June Z5, 1972 





The manner of McGovern's response to our attacks upon his 
rhetoric, and positions, has emerged. Responding to a rather 
mild critique of his welfare plan and new politics -- by Herb 
Stein -- McGovern responded thus: 

"He called the attack 'the opening shot of this year's 
campaign against me and said, 'Nixon obviously 
realizes that this year's campaign is going to be 
waged primarily over the rampant unemployinent, 
inflation, economic uncertainty and favoritism, 
which now burden this country. ' " 

- "The attack (Stein's) tipped his (Nixon's) hand that 
he is gang to try to cover up with the kind of 
political hatchet work which has characterized 
every campaign he has ever run. " 

Thus, even a mild criticism of McGovern's record will likely 
produce charges of "Tricky Dick," "Smear Tactics" the old 
"Low Road" so familiar to Nixon and his hatchet men. This is, 
it appears, the McGovern strategy for answering all of the 
material we have piled up on Georgie; and it is a strategy which 
McGovern will be counting upon the press to assist in its 

What this means for us, I think, is that we must 

A) Be scrupulously accurate in our allegations, and calm and 
reasoned in quoting his 'wild statements and positions. 


B) Get the jump on McGovcrn by using his Adolph Hitler quotes, 
and other blood-curdling charges on the record, before he starts 
charging us with vicious attacks. We have four or five of McGovern' 
statements v/hich justify a demand for an apology to the President, 
which justify further, our moving them into the public press -- with 
the expressed hope that George McGovern will not do this kind of 
vicious name-calling, and comparing of the President with Hitler 
in this campaign. Our hope that George McGovern will get his 
campaign out of the smear stage, right off the bat, "We intend to 
confront Mr. McGovern on his issues and his position, but he has 
an obligation to clear the record of the slanderous libels he has 
made against the President of the United States; I refer specifically- 
to. . . . etc. etc. etc. 

Each time McGovern raises tliis charge of "smear" we ought to have 
thos quotes to stuff right down hi s throat. 

In the last analysis, if the need appears, we should be ready to 
|-la^'e the President go, late canipaign, v/ith a "more in sorrow than 
anger" speech, detailing the McGovern positions, and denying the 
'Hitler" charges. 


July 14, 197 2 



Exhibit No. 190 






Lines that can be moved by backgroxmd, and through interviews, 
into the press. The foc\is \ipon the convention will begin to die 
after the weekend, and continue until ours; and some of these lines 
will lose much of their currency within a few weeks. 

1. The McGovern Market -- Since McGovern won the California 
nomination the Dow-Jones lias dropped 34 points, had dropped e\'ery 
day of the Democratic Convention. McGovern' s e ection v/ould knock 
the bottom out of it; given his far-out economic positions. 

2. The effect of the "q\iotas" for young, black, Chicano has been 
to drive the old people out of the Democratic Convention; wliile those 
over 55 arrount to 20% of population; they got only eight percent of 
the Convention seats; Democrats will be hurt with this group badly 
this fall; as v/ith traditional Catholic and Jewish svipporters who, 
like Meany and Daley, have given way to the kids and the zealots. 

3. The McGovern Myth --It is a myth to say George was the 
candidate of the "people;" he lost N. H. and Illinois to Muskie; Ohio 
and Pennsylvania to Humphrey; Michigan, Maryland and Florida to 
Wallace; he ducked Indiana and "West Virginia. 

Only GOP crciss -ox'ers lielped him get 29 percent in Wisconsin; and 
the only n".;-. joj- slate wlicrc he won against a still viable, active 
opposilion CalifojTjia -- where lie blew a 15-point lead in the last 
' ivi d;iv.'- - '" ■■-'■:■ froi"' ' 1 v.rniy - ;:)oi nl lead t r) a fj\e-poin( xictory. 
KWCio: '■ V .' r iiiory io .".ui a pijj^ \iciory, it i ;;• Jiiore a coup d'elnl. 
■ .'■':■ •' ■- I', ■■ •. In !-. ;. v.u;t'V"u1 1 . fi i ; : :\:\:\ : ;l!>u i'b.. n lr-r!i::l 

i-Ku' h.i. (li.Vi.L'l .l:u1 i);:;:;i>(lI llu' I i',n i i . u) ;Ki 1 C.iiinij >■ aiit! .i<-v.i:^li 
Uiidi-rslilp ciL llie Dornoc ralic Paj-iy. I'lio fellow is ;iol the peopled: choice, 


McGovcrn has soverf^ly f.arnishcd his reputation for caiidoj- and 
credibility; it is lying in shreds on the floor of the Con -/r-nti on. 
Here the n-iost [jro-aboj-tion on demand candidate opposed liis own 
position in the platform; he deserted the women he promised to 
support on the South Carolina Challenge; he had his lieutenants 
gut the tax-economic program he hiinself is proposing; he deserted 
the "Chart; r" to woo back big labor; v/liere for the last ten years 
he was talking about "begging" in Hanoi; now he is going on about a 
"residual force. " He went downstairs to rap with a hundred screaining 
denionstrators -- simply because they raised ^inshirted hell in the 
lobby -- but could not counsel with the office-holders in his own party. 
His heart is with tlie extrcniist left-wing. 

Downgrading Eagleton -- He was - according to varied reliable 
estimates - anywhere from McGo\ern's 4th to 7th choice. In short, 
Eagleton is not even the most qualified inan who could be picked, 
and when potential candidates continued to turn McGovern down, he 
reached down far enougli to get soineone who would finally take it. 
Not exactly a tribute to Eagleton' s qvialifications. 

McGovcrn and Eagleton are both utter lightweights in foreign policy 
in an age when a deft liand is needed niore than ever, to guide the 
Nation in a transitional i^eriod of world politics. (SALT, Open Door 
to China, So\'iets, etc. ) McGovcrn has to his credit the achieveinent 
'of being Food for Peace Director for 18 months, which means handing 
out surplus food to third world n3.tions. Eagleton won his foreign 
policy spurs as Chai::aan of the Senate District Committee. 

McGovcrn' s selection of Eagleton is a triunaph of the "old politics" 
he was picked in deference to his religion, geographical location, 
purported youthfulncss and self-styled ability to cozy it up with the 
labor bosses. 


Exhibit No. 191 

THE WHITE house; 


• July 23, 1972 



Attached is the second edition of the McGovern Assault Book. ..i ^ 

Ain t-urning a copy over to the Vice President (he has his) and [ "^' ^•'^'^ 
to,MacGrcEor, Dole, RNC, Dent and several others. What is \ • -j^vw iN •'^ • 
needed, liowcvcr, in my view, and somev/liat desperately, is ^U'r . 

some Xind of co-ordination of the Assault Strategy. To date, it 
has been decidedly haphazard and ad hoc, and time is running 
by. Rccoinmend thus: 

1. An ad hoc committee be set up with JvlacGregor or his man, 
Colson, Buchanan, Dole or his man, Lofton, the scheduler of 
tlie Surrogates, to lay out the attack strategy for that week or 
that several days. Fuilhtsr tiiat this group pass judgment on 
what mailings should go out froin White House, RNC, and 1701 -- 
so that we don't inundate editorial writers and political writers 
with so much trivia that nothing is used. Further, that the letters 
'operation be tied in, so that we can orchestrate their work -- which 
in my view has been qviitc good. 

On the briefing material I gave the Vice President, it was used 
exactly as written; he is a loyal soldier and we should have one 
of his top peoj:)le -- say Goodearle --to sit in on this group as well. 

At this poiiit in time, I think \ve sliould be meeting three times a 
v.'cck, at least. Again, we have all the material on McGovcri-v we 
need to systematically move it before the public. 

Z. Suggest that Buchanan be granted authority to do Rome 

political backgrounding for tlio political reporters. Have been over 
this material niorc than anyone, and today, I probably know McGovern' s 
positions, and wild statements better than lie docs. If some of tlic 
political reporters were ctcercd over liorc, for a background basic, 
wc could move some of this :;tuff out on the record in concert with 
the opcakcr.s. 



3. 11^-'^ any fonow-Uiro»i[;h process been set \ip to gcc tliat 

lliosc rccommcnrlalioiiE we incidc, sonic- forty of tlicm, a monlli 
.TDc] .1 Imlf .i[;o, arc bcint] carried through at all. Wc have no way 
of knowiiig over licrc whether tlics e. idea;; arc simply sinking dov/n 
the iTiemory hole or are being carried out. One gels a fccling'of a 
disjointed operation. ■ • 

Wc badly need some central governing body or authority that sees 

to it that the ideas tlic President wants implemented are implemented, 

ajid that can assess llic opposition strategy. 

A. Have got everything in thus far, on strategy and opposition, ' 

willi the single exception of l! o 5000-word piece, which I will try 
to get written this week -- d\iring briefing book time. However, 
would like to devote as mucli time as possible in the future to 
strictly anti-McGovern activities, and if as much as possible of the 
other governmental- stuff (except some of those vetos) can be moved 
elsewhere, it v/ill free up more time for v/hat is Topic A. 


■ 1990 


Exhibit No. 192 

i>*0 7 3 ^^:C4Mi 3 6 




uguAt 1, 1972 


ri? R. HALbEMAN 



^o^ltici^l Supjt 


.;). In the Assault Book, we have the quote from KicGovern'^ 

^jjliot "inanuif»\tu ring foolish projects," like the space shuttle* Wpi 
;it not bor.wise to have this put into ads and pamphlets rlgHt n<^ |ov 
'^9lX arci^ of California which just benefited hugely from the •pjfccif: 
c contract. 

^('1 -,. .,,,...; 1.^.-/1 -v] 

^jjji^ ^ .Along the same lines, the old anti-Tydlngs ad which was ioii' 

^Iffective, in my view, in Maryland, "If Joe Wins, lYou Lose,** W0il!ll 

ji^i^eiTi to me an ideal all-puj "" 

WcGovcrn's space and defer 

p|r MIf McCovern Wins, We 

^Ihlnk, will do more to make the President a big winner thAn tll« 

^positive "Re-plect the President, " 

'I"' '''.'■ ,. . .,-,,-.., 

^■^ Speck- Hob 6 on will get very feN^j. votes; but almost oneifor-ioJ^cfFi 

ilh^iy will come out of the hide of George McGovern. In Califoriil* thjb^ 

jdit^said lo have some 60,000 (?) workers. The more.expo»vr()r tliiBj^fe 
ifv'b get, the higher the vote they get, the more they take from O^pygca!'; 
}.H|pb«on is,' of course, a black militant and if he gets tremendou8''«f^|$l3«u|^ 
lli' ^hc btarck press -- in adsj etc. — it could draw off • levR th«>u»8J^j^ 
xJIJUck votes from McGovern. Any private help we ^an give tJtal; tfc;)(;^j^^ 
jfy^Sde/ jPR nioney, publicity, etc. might help. 

||i," ' ♦♦! sm behind Eaglcton 1000%" is now, of course^ 'fcn li«^nfS'l^Pf>S 
jlj^hich wc can utilize ourselves, such as George has takeii a B4:r4^nJB^JieVyi^ 
.f|:snd->he Is behind Israel 1000%, the term used as a prelude <;p |l, l^^ii 
,|*idumping; *' anyhow, it is a light line which can and stroyld be ^se^ 1|;«*.^ 

:>|<^|lect on the McGovern dcviousnoss, and can be done iiri » Ugbl/jCpl^^<iik 



Additional Distribution of Momoranda 

SUBJECT: ^^' ^ '^■"' ^•yyr^z-y h^y^.^y^^ 


Dailey ] ^'^ Porter 

LaRue Sedam — 

Marik Shumway 

Miller Sloan - 

Odle . Teeter 

• : Other .— 


Exhibit No. 193 

September 11, 1972 



This letter, bearing a Washington Signature should go 

to every paper in the State of Michigan, and especially 

to ever^'" Catholic newspaper in tlie State. It should go 

to the Catholics papers today, if possible, as i"nany of 

them go to bed on Tuesday night. Suggest using a 

D. C. name for the letter. Let me know if there are any 



cc: Colson 



To the Editor: 

According to Monday's New York Times, Michigan voters this 
fall will decide the abortion-on-demand question for your state --at 
the same time they decide on Mr. McGovern's future The two questions 
are closely inter-related. 

As the attached letter shov.'S, Senator McGovern favors 
unrestricted abortion policies. And though, today, he claims that he 
would take no Federal action, to carry out his views, on June Z5, 1972, 
he told the New York Times, he would reverse the President's order 
and make every military liospital in the nation an abortion center. In 
an interview by Jaines Naughton: 

)"He (McGovern) said that as President he would reverse 
Mr. Nixon's order to military hospitals to abandon the 
* liberalized abortion rules, but would otherwise do nothing 
to implenient his personal view tliat it should be 'up to the 
family and doctor' -whether an abortion is warranted. " 

With this pledge, Mr. McGovern made abortion-on-demand -- 

m military hospitals --a national as well as a state issue, and voters 

should consider it, going into the polling booth in November. I pray 

hat you will support the right-to-life of the unborn and reject Mr. McGovern. 



tU.MOM, CKl^^ 

QJCTiUcb ^faics ^cnctie 




December 2, 1971 

Dear Ks . Gibson: 

Thank you for your recent and thoughtful communication 
regarding abortion - 

In my judgment, abortion is a private matter which 
should be decided by a pregnant woman and her ov;n 

With every good wish, I am 

Sincerely yours-^ 

George McGovern 

Ms. Beatrice Gibson 
170 8 Fallowfield Avenue 
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15216 




Exhibit No. 194 

the white house 


September 13, 1972 



Beginning Monday, there are but seven weeks b>ft~hv.the Presidential 
campaign. Our two operative principles on thX j^ttacj^in those sevcii 
weeks should be a) the issues of 1972 have long ago been decided and 
made and ^b) we should rc-cycle those issues, points and positions 
which resulted in the collapse of the McGovern campaign. There seeins 
to be a tendency on our part at times to seek out some new indiscretion 
on the part of the Opposition and attack that simply because it is "new. " 
AVhen we have an airtight case of forcible rape -- this is like saying, 
"And yeah, we can get him for jaywalking, too. " 

In the last few days, in my judgment, wc have allowed McGovern to 
"lead" the national debate; our major political statenncnts have focused 
(i. c. , Butz counter-charges, and MacGrcgor) precisely on those issues 
McGovern thinks are the only winners he has. In addition, wc have 
sought to counter the charges of campaign financing finagling with the 
old discredited "tu quoqiae " argument ("you're another")— —which 
is the weakest of all arguments. ' 

, Meanwhile, little has gone into the public record in the last several 
days -- from us -- which focuses on and advances the major personal 
and political issues which are ours. This is partly our fault; but 
partly the reason is that we now need heavier guns than the ones we 
have been using. 

There may be a point to muddying up the inatter -- but v. c have other 
fish to fry this fall; and we ought to be about that business . 

THE FIRST WEEK. I would open up with two barrels this week. The 
first is Foreign Policy . And the Vice President is the man. High-level 
defense of RN's brilliant foreign policy is first third -- and then into 
McGovern' s Asian and European policies as enunciated by hini and Chayes. 


Filled in wiLh McGovcrn quotes; McGovcrn on the POWs; McGovern I 

on the Middle East. Conclusion and lead -- George McGovern is a 
well-intentioned, but naive bungler, whose foreign policy views are 
foolisli and would be dangerous to the peace and security of the 
United States and the world. Call for a national debate on two 
opposing views of Ainerica's role in Lhe world. The second barrel 
would be a John B. Connally, highly publicized response to McGovern, 
hammering on the title Confidence and Credibility . All of the McGovern 
waffles would be rolled into this one on the credibility side -- the 
McGovcrn flip-flops -- then also, in a peroration, the worst of the 
McGovern radical rhetoric. Why John Connally broke with McGovern, 
could include Hoover remark, Hitler remarks, etc. Extremist rhetoric 
unbefitting a presidential candidate -- least of all these charges is what 
he says about me. If we could get that peroration on the air; "the 
language of an extremist" we could resurrect our big winner. Also, 
to be included here is the Humphrey, Jackson, Muskie and Meany 
staterr^ents .-- the irxore brutal ones on McGovern. V/hy Democrats 
are staying away in droves. 

The two speeches would be on different days -- maybe two days apart. 
Given free tiine, I could get done the entire first speech and the "core" 
of the second. 

What we ought to remember in both these speeches is that the press is 
less interested in writing about a pro-speech, than they a re about 
attack material -- whether the attack is High level or low level. Both 
speeches should be built up -- and we should make our television on 
them those nifhts. 

Note: The attack group should be aware of what the President is ddng 
that day also for media -- he can knock us off the front pages and 
the networks quicker than anyone else. 

THE SECOND WEEK. Economics and Welfare. Connally and/or 
the Veep would be excellent on Economics. Reagan, if he would do 
one of our speeches, wovild be ideal on Welfare at the National Press 

The economic speech would give the voters a choice between the present i 
prosperity and radical change -- radical change that would iTiean a busted 
stock market (capital gains tax), a destroyed aerospace industry and 
an undeclared economic war in the Anicrican middle class. The 
McGovcrn previous proposals should bo regurgitated; his sin"iplii,tic 
and naive approach should bo laid out. His $100 billion increase in 
budget and thousand in taxes the lead. The language in an econoirvic 


speech is viLal. We could work on Ihis one as well. The Welfare 
speech should focus on McGovcrn, of course, as in favor of pouring 
millions more in; putting millions more onto the rolls. 

These items should serve as the key for surrogate speakers as v/ell. 
Plowever, the letters operation need not be geared in to this -- in 
our judgment thai should be moving the negative, radical material 
on McGovern into the key states at full blast. We can be much more 
direct in letters than in rhetoric. 

THE THIRD WEEK. The Social Issue. In this week a major address . 
should be written, again preferably with the Veep in the lead-off 
contrasting the President and McGovorn on social issues. Marijuana 
and drugs. McGovern' s endorsement of the Black Caucus and what 
it contains. Bussing, bussing, bussing. RN versus McGovcrn on the 
use of scatter-site housing; amnesty. While the Vice President can 
high level this -- laying out the deep differences between the two -- 
others can, really start hitting hard on the issue. Also, law and 
order, the Hoover quote -- etc. This can all be drawn into this 
question. This is 1970 politics, but the issues are ours this time, 
and if we can get McGovern talking on them, they are winners. Ko 
name-calling -- just point out here the radical record. 

THE FOURTH WEEK. Defense, This is one area McGovern has held 
fast. We could lay ovit his defense budget at the top level and portray ' 
it as an invitation to disaster in Europe, the Mideast, the world, the 
future. Again, here we have quotes from Jaclcson and Humphrey to 
back us up. And two days after the defense speech -- there is released 
BUDGET" from Laird to Capitol Hill, giving state by state the 
number of jobs lost by McGovern Defense Budget and aerospace cuts, 
also the number of bases shut down and exactly which ones and v/here. 
All laid out, special mailing to every newspaper in every state in the 
country. Something he will never catch up with. 

Within this week as v/ell, we ought to have some real tough speeches 
in the aerospace communities, the "Ghost Town" stuff. Also, the 
same thing they did to us around the military bases in 1970. Included 
in the military stuff would be McGovcrn' s attack on the Military 
Industrial Complex whereas what he is talking about is the workers 
at GE, McDonnell, etc. 

If we go this route, we are at the Middle of October -- there is no need 
now to decide what we will do those last three weeks. This includes 
our basic inventory of large, overall issues. Other sub-themes 

21-296 0—74 24 


A) The Ellsberg connection, tying McGovcrn to him and his 
criiTic --as soon as the indictment come down, if McGovern insists 
on charging people, uncharged by the Grand Jury. This would be a 
separate tough attack; and it should be echoes all over the country. 

B) Space, and defense should of course be on-going issues for any 
speaker in a community near an aerospace plant or military base. 
Perhaps our Nixon people ought to be doing what they did to us in 
1970 -- put out the rumor around every big base in the country that 

if McGovern is elected this base will shut down, this plant will close. 

C) The McGovern Quotes need to be gotten out. We will do 
another mailing on the Best Twenty-five -- and maybe the time has 
come to move them and our Attack Book (truncated) to the National 
Press, or at least the nnost friendly of the national columnists. 

D) The Democratic Party and its rescue. This is an ideal 
Connally Big Speech some time, urging Democrats to take back the 
party of their fathers, by repudiating the extremists who have seized 
it in November. In the speech, he could lay out cold all the radical 
leftism, and extremism of McGovern positions, a real blistering 

■speech on McGovern, the kind that the President and the Vice President 
cannot make -- but hitting him on the twenty odd issues where he has 
been so vulnerable. The kind of thing that Human Events would publish - 
genuinely hard, which we could then get out into the hands of our entire 
speakers list from top to bottom to use, as their basic text. 

E) We have to start back to getting the Democratic anti-McGovern 
quotes into the record again -- The Meany, Humphrey, Jackson quotes. 
Also, the "elitism" and "extremism" themes need to be renewed to 

the average voter. 

F) The attack group should continue --making sure that these 
themes are moved week-by-week -- still meeting day-by-day to key 
off something McGovern has said, to fire at targets of opportunity, 
to program our people on the media to keei? moving all these good 
materials we have back into the public record again and again. 

The Hoover quotes and the quotes on the Chicago Police are two 
examples. Our objective should be to either move McGovern off of his 
Watergate issue, onto our issues or kill him on our issues; secondly, 
to continually break any momentum he develops by changing the 
subject in a week. 

FINAL NOTE: Again, the critical point is that just as McGovern ovight 
to make "Nixon" the iseue --so the issue this fall is McGovern. Will 


he and the hard-core left-winger radicals who took over tine party- 
take over America. That's the bottom line. If the country goes 
to the polls in November, scared to death of McGovern, thinking 
him vaguely anti -America and radical and pro the left-wingers and 
i-nilitants, then they will vote against him -- which means for us. 
What we have done thus far, and fairly well, is not put the President 
thrity-four points ahead -- but McGovern thirty-four points behind. 

The best tribute to what we have done, 1 think, came from McGovern 
I believe just after the convention when he said -- "They've got 
fifteen guys shooting at me from all sides while the President's 
acting like he's not even in a campaign. " If we can continue that, 
we're golden. 


Exhibit No. 195 

FT, LiD ERDiiLt, PLA, 
PEi3 28, 1972 



mm :.Ji loebi 




TIIK AnOVK F,HTTKR is rrprndurrd just as i( in effect, railed the Morrison letter a fraud. Readers 

arrived at the I nion Leader. It lends to confirni a pre- niav be interested in weiRhinR this additional exidenre 

vious letter by I'aul Morrison, reproduced on Page !(> of what was said bv !sen. .Muskie in Florida, 
and also postmarked from Florida. Sen. Muskie tias. 

Exhibit No. 196 

^i\ [Wo^^ktc- 1^1^ uje*^o y'sji/" U<^suU n^v^ "^"^^ 
S^cdl noo^-e Ki(.t^€.-t one- cpC- 't'U hic-ii^ (^s,ie^ O'it 



Exhibit No. 197 

HeaJquarleis: Tolapliono: 


SILVER SPfiiiNG. MARYLAND 20901 Offico; (202) £3:i-2.;;iO 

Homo: (30)) 0t)9-5240 

Dear New Hampshiri; Voter: 

rime arid agiiiii tlie men and women of the Granite Stale have demonstrated their independence 
and nifiijed individiiahsm, leading tlie way I'or ihe rest of llie nation. Now is again sucli a time. Through 
yonr voles in tlie dcnioeratic Prim;uy (his you ran chanije America's course. 

All of the Democratic candidates are good men but they are not great men. Only one man - - 
Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts - - has the strength, the sensitivity, the personal qualities of 
leadership to be a great president. 

Moreover, every poil demonstrates that Kennedy is the one Democrat who will surely beat Kicliard 
N.xor. in November. He has never wavered in his convictions; he alone can ranyjj ie poor, tlie blacks ine 
young, the old, the larmer, the laborer and the middle class into a winning coalition. 

The Senator decided not to seek the Deniocratic Presidential nomination. But, if the Citizens oi 
New Hanipsliirc call for him to lead us by writing in his name on the Democratic ballot, that example 
wi<; be followed by millions of Americans across the country. And Senator Kennedy wijl answer 
our call 

These are troubled days for America. None of our present candidates - - Republican or DemoLiaiic - - 
can inspire our people and lift our nation out of its doldrums; Senator Kennedy can; he can change 
America's priorities and direction; he can restore our sense of purpose; he will complete the unfinished 
business so nobly begun by his brothers before him. 

Robin Ficker 

United Democrats 
for Kennedy 

Exhibit No. 198 









Exhibit No. 199 





TELEPHONE (714) 644-41 1 1 

September 27, 1971 


Mr. Donald H. Segretti 
14013 West Captains Row 
Apartment 117 
Marina del Ray, California 

Dear Don: 

Enclosed are two checks: one for $667 for services 
rendered for the last half of September, 1971; the other 
($5,000) represents an advance for anticipated expenses. 

Please let me know if you have any questions or 
if there is any way in which I can be of additional assist- 
ance . 

Regards , 

Herbert W. Kalmbach 





Mr, Donald H. Segretti 
14013 W. Captains Row 
Apt. 117 
Marina del Ray, CA 90291 



Exhibit No. 200 

September 28, 1971 
4;00 p.m. 


From now on, we want to have at least one Muskie sign in among demonstrators 

.vho are demonstrating against the President. It slioiild be ML'SKIE FOR PRESIDENT 

n big letters and should be hold in a location so that it is clearly visible. 

•\I .Muskie events or events by other Democratic hopefuls, ihcre should be a si>:n 
jr two which goads ihem. For example, at a Muskie rally there should be a h-.rge 
;omething else that would goad him along. 

\t Humphrey rallies there should be Muskie signs and at Kennedy rallies , there 
hould be .Muskie or Humphrey signs and so on. These signs should be well-placed 
n relationship to the press area so that a picture is easy to get. 


Exhibit No. 201 


Do you REFUSE to even CONSIDER a Black or Chicano £3 a 
running mate? Your public answer that they do not yet havo "political 
oquallty" only fosters any bias that exists and avoids the question. 

Do you speak in terns of equality for minorities yet send your 
childran to all-v.-hite private schools in Wash D,C.? ACTION, not 
t'ORDS, are the nark of a true liberal I 

Spsak against Vietnam yet continue to support the draft 
•:;hich has a bias against nirioritics? 

Allow your p^orsonal Catholic views on abortion dictato your I 

public stEjnd AC-AIIi ST r:-odcrn abortion laws? Abortion should b3 a 

personal natter and not dictated to individuals by YOUR raligtous 

views . 

'kVhj did you vote FOR TOSK?L0Y7-S1;T IN SOU THS HN C_1LJ?:0R2.'IA by [ 

*■" — ■ ' ■ " ■ ■" — ■- - " ' 2 

voting against the SST7 Such action shows a bias against California I 

by an out-of-state carp3 tbagger I 


Exhibit No. 202 

xidcvHO t; xhoi.uq 



Tr:iT-J i 






Frank Reynolds reported times have changed since RX 
went to W'liittiur, Ijat it is still not a hot bee) of radicil- 
isin. Still whi'n Miu'kic can'ip to speal< I'^c foiind a proup 
of CliicanOE had talccn ov.^r llie stago. KroLivie on film 
said he \vo\ild like lo "make one thins pv-rfeclly clear. " 
. . . . ^^')■itlier is I'Ot Die only place RN I-^as been where 
I woi'.ld like lo r;o. " I^aughtcr. Reynolds said Ed had 
come prepared for consirvalive qoestior.s but the 
Cliicajios gavn. tlicm no cliaiicc, and Big Sd proved lie 
could keep his cool. reportedly j-1'.r.scd 
by 'lie recc;.l Ion k.- rccv-ivf-d from IhoSi^ v-illii.;; to 
listen, but more impcirtsntiy , said Reynolds, he 
proved he c an keep his ten. per under s tress. . . .UPI 
says kluskie got an "ontliiisiastic response" at Wliilticr 
as he exhorted over 1,000 students to get out and vote 
and cliange the country. He speculated that drop in 
Gallup may have been due to blacl; VP slaleinent. He 
favored aborlions for therapei'lic reasons but oppo;;ed 
them as birth control measure. . . . David Carlcy, 
k^uskie's AVi .'jconsin chairman, said Frc^xmjir e' s drci = ;o: 
lo Oj'i'u out ;":'al,es ih-^t ?-t:;1e's prin~.ary '.'re- n'o~; v'K-'i.': 
arid mt;.= ( iivi-jiorla-it in I'S. 

HHH s< the Adniin "v/;;! Iry lo s-.'.k'Eti'.v.t.e ad\erii = ; 
for £c!iievL.-r,;.;;:i" in a f, i: -i:-.i IJiC'ii c ;.;)■:;"• ;-.i en to rc-e 
RN. "Our re.-]-c.nse, " iiun.pkrcy said, ■'i-:ii-. st be ac 
progressive leadersliip and bold new policies i'or a 
Ijricjhter .-America lcn:;orrov.-. " Kc'.i;-;C 3">;\£ visits t 
China and Russia, I'HH .''aid "v.c );-:ay .'■;-e wit!-. 
Mao near the Gr.-al Wall, i.u! will wv^ ^u-l- 1.;:i; at 
Hu.nters Point, in V.'a'ils or East I.OE .-.r. gales? ". . .. 
Gov. Carter of Ca. says Dem nominee v.tII have to 
tougher than is now apparent on busing to pet his 
support. lie emphasi;ted thatDcms n:\:si!:'t be anti- 
South and Soiitiier;-; Dems v.-ant full p.n rtr.c-r skip ir. ;:: 

AP notes k'o;:d.-,y an-T Dole's fp.-ech ir.cicate GOP it 
takiji;.; issue v.-Jli-, KMK's verbal altack.s on RN. T'.e 
Star's Paul Hr.po write." on EMK's ■■'d:-a:n jtic robo;:.- 
ar:d sees "nim essentially in tlie race •.■-"V.:;a notinp a::; 

ruef iioi;;:ip JvTC's ;^.f. pj-ny, as ii;> l:a» so ouen reci^ 
con.?iderinp Cli.^iipaqurddiek. . . . .(o!i:i IvOclic finds coi 
roasor.s tor secir^ij I'k'.K as tk.e lii-.ciy c"r:oice the ;:;- 


Exhibit No. 203 

r.-.TC-rict } 

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for tbo pa-'crcn 15.r7t-;d boj,o'.T: 

■ ■ ■ Jt-Tiibs H« 27orton, dba ■ 

Citizens Com, .for Hepresan-'cativa Gov, 
. " ■ .". : ' ..T.SuckGkia lane ^ :'■]■, -■:':-■ '.' . .' --. . / 

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(Ao<v:;^»:l KirtroAa en j.afi—-i) «w>« itia— ^o— iv-rc.Ti-l 


Exhibit No. 204 

ALTHY— Limbo 


p; dollv J 

SCNATC;! MUSKIE— You Wouldn't 
rrf.-:! 3 or an American 
woiiiQ you accept a Jvwlth 



Irk at prices you 
) 5% discount to 

> . ..OiCOf'U CAST — jr l,,c 
•■ - ysiri. Alio Privile 
r.....Mjs. j71.3Q:j. 

:..T...!.-,r .W.lkil- 
V.ii/IJ You Accept 
A Jf.Vlif. kuSNINO MATS? 

\jr,J lir... - 

exerciiej,- jlrelcn-o 
malic Multiple Sclerosis research 
pays oti Correction now possible. 
Reducing and yoga classes dally 3 
p.m. 6 pm ALL THERAPY 


SOLARIUM Call 94«-1300e«t. 3718. 





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oom opt. 
n« othar 
dad. Coll 

Found: Mtn't brown horn rim glau- 
ei. Found balwian anginearing ond 
Memoriol Bldo_Moy bt picked 


5«niuous 1 
Chick, phona / 

.■f< MIZZIES, . 
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USKIE when: 

H« aupports bussing OUT children, yet sends hiS children 
to priyate all-white schools la Washington D.O*! Is this th« 
way a public official should set an example In our deaooraoy? 

dd advocates political equality for all persons without regard 
to race, religion, or color; yet Huslcie states publicly he 
would not: accept a Black or Aaerican Indian for the 71ce- 
President nomination. Such a public stateaent by a leading 
Denocrat fosters such political inequality. Where does ha 
stand with regard to other ainoritieb (such as Jewish petiion.»)t 

He talks about the uneaploynent, yet oppOS6Sthe SSX and 

the spaoe-shuttle. Has Muskie proposed any viable alternative 
to assist this segment of our econoay? How many of as hava 
friends who are uneaployed engineers? 

He.' actively fester's an iaage of a poor nan's oaapaign; yet 
raised $86,000 at a $250 a plate dinner in Los JLngeles on 
Peb 21, 1972. In truth isn't EM THE f*at Cat ot the 
party? If he hits you for a donation ask hia about this: 

MinUe Rdses SlSOOOa 
A Rec ord, at Maine Dlimw 

WJRTLAND. Me, Jtn. 15— 
Vmrij 700 supporten of United 
SUte* S«n«tor Edmund S. Mu,- 
Ibe turned out here last night 
for a dinner tbat raised about 
r%t t g> $150,000 for his DemocraUe 

O yj O Presdmtlal campaltn. 

., . No political dinner in Maine 

' Ira* ever before raised so much 

MJII lOI^IC money. The previous high was 

IVIiJOIVIC JgO.000, ralaed In 1970 when 

,■-. : Senator MuskJe successfully 

Boaiht r»«tectjoo as a Senator. 

nV^kWlKi I l„t nlgbt for those wb» coo- 

tribaSd <l.y> ««cfa . Pto ; 

tidatsinm itSiL The \^tmiM< 

y^ im mat ^ Oaaoe* a»\ 

I Ma#to yAnvr taofmitB. >m[ 

' > limmm$f*tim-^ " '-.^ 

yr.X. tl»»»/Jaaeltf 


All otsc-i-v'irs sgres tl'.ot is.'otional st-.Vality , trustworthiness, ?"d " 
coolness ur.dc-r Tire rire c::-jr;;tial quf.litic-s Tor c.ny .r.;in sc-sking t'.e r ■.•■ . 
HrTiwith, so.T.e cc-.-ei.ts en Sd Miskie's qjili ficat.icTis: 

T:-S0 LIP?K_AN and son H.C'-^iJi - M-skle's biographers: "A potentip.lly explosive vith a vsspish tc-rper . . . often trig;^3red by the trivial . . . "obody 
dojots that Muskie's ts^p-ir tg.ntnzas are Ejeninna." — in their bocV:, K;s;ki_s. 

SU SAN SHE EH AN - ;-!uEkie biographer: "Kuskie's sisters . . . rer.eiLber him as a 
stubborn man with a nasty te~psr, who would tease them but not take t:-asing in 
return. A friend recalled that, when he was in his 30' s, he kicked ever a 
Monopoly board after another player made a Itjcrative L''Ore." — in th9 
N.Y. Tiroes Magazine 

IRE' E MUSKIE - The Senator's sister: "Ed . . . has a terrible tesper. Ed 
just couldn't bear to lose a game. If he lost he'd throw the cards, yell, 
arid staiTp off." --Theo and Don Hansen, in their book, K uski e 

PAUL HOPE — Syndicated coluffi.nist: "Muskie . . . has a rather short fuse . . . 
He frequently boils and fumes." — V'ss hdneton Star 

GODrHEY SP ERL I 'JQ - Political reporter: "He loses his cool under pr;ssue, can 
very well evoke voter ir"; certain ties on how the .'-.ight rsact .iridc-r the rjuch 
"eater \incertainties of the Freside.'icy. Vould ve want him to be the one who 
: iSt cake the decision on j-ushing the nuclear buttcnV" - — Chr_i_stijyi_ .Soierice 


SEK. EDMlTvD S. MUSKIE - On hi-self: "I don't urge people to trust r^s. I don't 
really thirJ: that as a can I'm Eore trustworthy than other men." — V.'i shingtcr. F;s1 

!-vi£. JCSEPHI'S y.'.'SKIE - The Senator's mother: "I don't know why Ec vants to 

SEN . VAJJCE K,ARTKE (D-Ind.) - ''M-iskie isn't going to win. I don't frdnl: he has 

s political principle in "r:r. cLher than the fact he thirJ-is he ought to be Presizrr 

People aren't c_-.b, they're gcing to see through iz.'' — Village Voi ce. 


thirJv Lhet Frasident Xar.-^- Ti-nan put it c-est. Sen. Muikie: ''if you cr-n'1 
■-a the heat, get cut of the kitchen." Good politics and bad tezper don't 

cz-.-y-.:?^. -XR f. ?T;?hE CA:r;:pc-r. x^sitiNGroN, n.c. t. foley, chaif^'^n 


sFyt.t Splfgrs :tp|it °iSif- ^|5s,-.= i5^i 

''■^ ^-^i^Sf 

> O eilsfeS^ l=&?.3335 io-ggr^la :f |2^ -H-S^fs^ 

0) ^Et^is^-s 6sii:!^s_gs sss-ii^jsf ^s.--- 

: «-•- I a ''" ° 5 i 5 

■» O " <: . I E S 2 = 
•* o ef « „ e 

CE5=£i> .-Hgl-S-stlj EoS-„|bE 2^g|fe -^S 

s '^. 5 C ™ » t; 

Hubert Hvuiiphrey and Kayor Dave Kennedy have conspired in not 
supporting Senator Kuskie's military assistance fer Israel 
plan that provides $500,000,000 for military sales and crai- 

Tne other candidates are lukewarm in their support of Senator 
Kuskie's full-scale support of the Israeli's cause, AH labor 
supporters are urged to join with the freedom loving people 
of Israel to support Senator Ituskie in his valiant fi^t for 
the Democratic nomination. 


Exhibit No. 205 


citizens for MuEkIs 


Top of the Blecayn* 

Terrace Hotel. 340 

Blscayne Blvd., 

Miami, Florida 


February 25, 1972 

Campaign Manager 
Jackson for President 
Senate Office Building 
Room 137 
Washington, D.C. 

Dear Sir: 

I have voted in Democratic campaigns for 
several years, but I have never seen the kind of 
abuse to the Party going on this year. I have worked 
for Senator Muskie for several months and the only 
trust and believing I have left in his campaign staff 
is that they will continue to lie, cheat, and mislead 
the Democratic voters. I have seen his state staff 
people invite several thousand people to a rally in 
Tampa on January 7, 1972, ajid then Joke about the 
fact that the room they rented could only accomodate 
400 people. The theory of Alan Baron was that the 
press would be impressed vfith the over-flow crowd. 
But what of the Senator's responsibility to those who 
sincerely want to hear and see him in person? In 
addition, these same people planted "loyal" workers 
to ask easy questions. Is this moral? 

All this I was told is the way to work things 
if you really want to win, but I have finally had it... 
ajid this is the reason: 

United States Congressman Sam Gibbons has 
"loaned" full-time to Senator Muskie 's Head- 
quarters in Tampa his federally paid assist- 
ant Hector Alcade, two U.S. Government-owned 
IBM electric typewriters (serial numbers 
9064754 and 527^506), continuous use of the 
Congressman's secretaries for a whole week 
in January when Muskie 's state headquarters 
was moved to Miami, and the use of the Cong- 
ressman's mailing privileges. The typewrit- 
ers are located at 330 W. Piatt Street, Tampa, 

Perhaps I am naive to object to taxpayer's paying for 
Senator Muskie 's campaign — but I do object I This is 
not honestl 

I have resigned my position on the Muskie staff 
and hope that all campaigns are not run the way this 
one has been. Perhaps you can do something to straighten 
things out. 



IN MIAMI (under Mary Gasdat) 

cc: Richard Gilliam 

Florida State Chairman 
Jackson for President 
238 W. Kennedy Boulevard 
Tampa, Florida 33606 


Exhibit No. 206 



Citizens for Mutkla 


Top of the BlEcayn* 

Terrace Hotel. 340 

Blscayne Blvd., 

Miami. Florida 


Dear Fellow DeinocrAtdi 

Primary time la upon us and I am sure you hove 
been emothered with literature from man/ condldAtes. 
We on the Senator Ed Kuekle staff sincerely hope you 
have decided upon Senator Muskle as your choice t...' 
he is the best qualified to be President In November* 
However, If you have not made your decision you 
should be aware of several facts) 
Senator Henry Jackson of Everett, Washington, was involved 
with a seventeen-year-old girl named Joan Cramer while he was a 
senior ap Everett High School. The result was an illegitimate 
daughter, named Kary Ann Cramer, born Febrxiary 7, 1929< He refu- 
sed to Barry the girl and after a paternity suit paid child support 
until September of 1937, when for $4,500 he settled with the mother* 
Prior to bis marriage to Helen Hardin on December 16* 1961 he \ras 
arrested twice in Washington, D.C. as a homosexual. Once was Kay 
S, 1955, and the second October 17, 1957. No charges were ever 
brought against hla because of his position. 

Sonator Hubert Humphrey has similar skeletons la his closet. 
He was arrested for drunk driving in Washington, D.C. on December 
3, 1967 after hitting two parked cars and a mailboSf In his car at 
the tiae was a known call girl named Kary Virginia Reese. Miss Reese 
was paid to entertain Senator Humphrey for the eveninnby Hr. John 
ffurray, a lumber lobbyist. Senator Humphrey is on tha Agriculture 
and Forestry Committee of the Senate. 

Ihesa are not pleasant facts, but they should b« considered by 

you before you vote on Karch 14. 

Exhibit No. 207 

I jiy/sitiA«i®!^l®JI^ 



imacio eim maine y es un buen 
aiviericano. vote por ed 


TRANSLATION -- Senator Edmund Muskie was recently misunderstood to 
say that the U. S. ought to help Cubans overthrow the Castro government. 
Ed Muskie believes that everyone has the right to the government they elect 
and to solve their own problems. As good Americans, we should not interfere. 
Muskie was born in Maine and is a good American. Vote for Ed Muskie. 


Exhibit No. 208 



Tlic liiMillifill 11I-..1.I,- .ire Kl M no. 

li.)iiTi.| :iK.ui.. uliJii.t; ii.l.) Ill,- Nrw V.iik 
nl^Mspol ll..,l oixn.'il .mmI cIom.I \iU- 
.. ^,1,:. ,1 .,.,, „.!,..„ ,„ ,,,,■„! ^..„s l„ ,1s 

1.,1,'Sl 1, „.,,;,. Il„' ,.,l, s,M„lv I,,mI 



I,.„ Ic'.ll.,,. 

sl,,|„'<l l<.,,„|>l,ll,'v 111,' l.,k< 
ji„l ,'V<'n /\i,):,'l,, III,' null,, 
.,r,'IU ,;„l (),„■ ,l,'| 

s- ih,' 

r I 

l'-,,!,,^i, 111,' <', 

i', Mill i';i M.. will, .1 S'.OI) i,,il,,ili,,ii (,,' ;,nil S2IK) 
jliMi.ul ,1,.,'s (.,r s„<l, „ I.s .,s JdCque- 

line jiicJ Aristotle Onassis. wl,i, iii,ii<<l >,,i 
ul ,.n.' ,.( l.,sl n,, l,s 1, ,,|.,„,„i; sl„„,ln;s, 
Hope Hampton jiul Huntington Hartford 

w, 1,' „i. ii.iiid, i,.„, i':iiii,.\,i„iiU'i,'is shii 

A-l, l„il prii.'s ar,' jili.isi- Uv,i-a nii'ri' 
S2 .'iU srrainliled i-);e.s and SK..5I) l„r a 
d,ni„T Ihal „n< i- wi.uld llaK- uiist ^3(1 

— -v-i-j-"' ''V' ■'"•■' "■'''»:■'•''■'. '--''^■■5 ' ^^ 

TV (leisDiiaiitv Joe Garagiola. 45. a fur- 
mcr cakh, r in lliu iiiaj<,rb. on Ih,' 
a.r si.midniK as i( lie had let ill,' 
d.iwii liy il;i.|',[iiii(; an rasy foul pop. 
"Jl-siis CliMst. fin soiTv, Koddaiiiil," In 
fiiiii.'d in frnstral.on afle. i.'ii,' il,',IU 
bI.".MnK Inu's Willi,- lap,„K-,.[ 
sh.nv on MK; Iclc'ViMori. Ily 
a sIikI.o ti'ilniKian iiRhuk-d tl. 
si'«ni('iit ill ill,' lapi' ill 
l.roadoasl 1>> mori- 
around till- rounlry 
cliarmd himself willi 
ccrc'i, apol 


The While House could be in for a 
drastic change of pace if Jane Muskie 
becomes First Lady. Campai^^nin^ in 
New Hampshire last week for "Big Dad- 
dy," as she jokingly referred to her hus- 
band, the Maine Democrat's 44-year-old 
wife unleashed the kind of style that 
provided a field day for Women's Wear 
Daily reporter Kandy Stroud, who look 
down all the breezy quotes. "L<et's tell 
dirty jokes," shouted Jane to the reporters 
and aides aboard her chartered bus. 
Also: "I'ass me my purse-I haven't had 
my morning cigarette yet." She chewed 
gum, sighed that she couldn't wear a 
certain dress because someone else had 
"the g.d. thing on" and owned up to a 
preference for two drinks before dinner 
and creme de menihe after-ward "Ik.'- 
cause the next day everything seems l,> 
work just right. But I can't mix booze and 
wine or I get a headache and have little 
dreams." Spying Senator Ed's pielure in 
a newspaper, his wife hooted; "Theie lie 
is. Isn't he cute?" 


o"* ' 



Iripctf and phase. two price:* 


at Kl Moro.'.'o: Zebi 

e first Hiclit over 1 

l';J>). Acxordinc to years, and that the man Balchen libels, 

ih,' lrir,i'.l.,r ' J,,se|.l,,n,- Konl" Admiral Bvrd, has been dead lor four- | 

lUrd ami eopiK.I Floyd Bennett teen vears." fc^ 

'.,,,1..,, sl.nv lom.ike ll,e roond Irip be- 11 

«,',,, Noiujx's Spiisheigen isl.iiids and Lyndon Johnson. 63. who riuil smoking 

I,,' .North l',:l,- 111 Ih,' el.ipM'ii liine o( less after a heart attack in 1U53, is back on 

hu, siM,,'„ hours. "Huvd told me the cigarettes. How c-ome? "The trials and ,!'.rx.' sai.l liaUliir,, vslio ,„',oiii,ls tribulations of Chrislmas," smiled ihe 

"1,1, il lr.,ni Ills ..ul.ii.i 
U l,,mll^ ll,r,',il.'i„-,l 
II,' .„lni, Ill's i„ 

;■/ F. Dyrd Jr., i, 

S ,!. 1,'hs,' 

n who got tfm.ugh more fise 5i?s 
irs ill the Wliite House without a ^ 

okc, though tlli-r 

. fire aplenty. 



I),. I ii,. 

Rirh,,r,l F. P'nil , 



Jane MuKkir: n,.o8t fi>r 'llig l>a,l,l>' 

His first liial for the fatal shooting of a 
poliicman resull.'d in a manslaughter ^ 
e,,iivioli,m that was overturned on ap- '^fci 
|.,-al, anil Isso subs, ipieiil trials ended in O 
hung ]iin,-s. No. 4 for Black Tan- >C 
iiher l.-ail,'r Huey P. Newton. 29. was on Bs, 
ill O.ikl.ind. C:alit., iiiilil Inst w,'.'kh^ 
en the CISC was abruplK dismissed at^SH 
re,|,i,'sl of Dislriel Aliolnes l.imell ^ 
s,n -It would U- fruill.sslo h. 
.Il„'ili„iigiur),"evpla,iii-dj,'>,„'i,. I 
.,,1,1,. I 'We lliluk he IS ab-,,l,il,'lv 
lU Defense all, ,r,iev Cluili-s U, C. 
...,11,1. led that .N.wton ha,l sers,-d ^'^ 
irlv ll.ue vears l,.'lund luis in addi- ^^ 
, l„ l„'i,ig iri.'d Ihr,,' l„n,s Ulorc "V 
,.' ,1. ii,' 1 -Xii-l ,„.s. ." s.i.l C.orv, ^B 

"IM 1 1" l;.- 'li'" !"• 

II, ,, s il„' hnil.l,' John Connally." ^ 

. Richard Nixon. iiiii,„l e las ">•■.■ ^^ 

,. ..I il., I,,'., Mil. i„i .,„.,. Ii. II, rniiK^C 
.,s|,r Pierre Elliott Trudcau in a ^^ 

I Ions,' s,,'i„' lii.m lliis u,',l.'s ^V^ 

i: ,l,„,l„„„litv ,..ll.,l "l).,,'iiil„'r (i. ^'^ 
.1. A l>,V ,11 111,' r,,'si,l, i,.v." All,'! ^^ 

I I,..: I.,„.ls Willi Cooii.ilK. Ii.i,l..„i ^. 

\., ,1 his I, .111,1 .111,1 ...i.ks -Til .,1,1111^^^ 


Exhibit No. 209 



Among the various ev!li of p^rsidentia 
ties, the existence of secret money is probo 
the most disgusting. 

Campaign donations ore given under-the 
table to protect the identity of donors with 
special selfish interests. 

Presidential candidates — and their policies — 
ore bought ond sold by the big-money people, 
It is corruption of the worst kind. 
In this present campaign, there ore four differ- 
ent kinds of condidote: 

1) The candid condidates, namely Chisholm 
Lindsay. McCarthy, McCloskcy, one 
/.\cCovern. They hava all ogreed to moke c 
full voluntary disclosure of their money sourc- 
es. They are not embrassed to identify theii 
bockcrs. They believe in "honesty in politics." 

2' The silent candidates, such os Ashbrook 
Hortke, Humphrey, Jackson, Mills, Wolloce, 
and Yorty. They're keeping quiet about their 
current money — it's onybody's guess os tc 
where it's coming from. Probobly fat-cots whe 
hove a substantial self-interest in electin; 
them. Mcybe defense controctors, oil produc- 
ers, or real estote operators. Who knows? 
They themselves know but they certainty 
don't wont the voting public to know. Se 
we're left to use our imoginolion. The under- 
world? Good grief! But who knows? 

3) The corrupt condidote, and the epitome 
this is Richard Nixon. He blotontly helped h 
brother Don get a SZ03,000 hond-out fro 
Howord Hughes in some political shenonigon 
Last year Nixon's Republican Notional Com 
mittce hustled some S322,SOO from the 
cSoiry farmers in exchange for rigged increases 
in the price of milk. And the latest is th« 
5400,000 promise from LT.T. which Nixon 

legal beagles apparently helped to solicit. 
Thank goodness for Ralph Nader. Jock Ander- 
son, ond the Senate Judiciory Committee — 




515 Madison Avenue, 

New York, N.Y. 

P.S. This committee is supported by mony concerned citizens who would like to resTore confi- 
dence in the political system ond csiure honesty in politics. I( you would like to assist our vrork, 
please send your donation and comments to the above address. 

Now he scjys he will disclose the fot cats behind him (offer he lost bodly in 
Florldo ond cried in New H3mf>shire). Why is he waiting for full disclosure- 
is it to fix up his books? 


Exhibit No. 210 


QJJI Y^ C<^ ^Ut^ ^L.r<X <^.^OtZ 


-^,^^ i^nyrsjt^ ^QJW>^ 



Exhibit No. 211 

U4 It; 


our o* 1 


6««t As: 

0X«.» f^^x 

/Rt: fl: 


DATf tf TTL. 



AteooHT n ■ ^ 

HSftSt 30 



CfT»: 2iP: 

-r3» 0c 

Ctvr jp'^x^if- Xa^ 6^,2(±^^in 

r«ms i 

BY: ibtfcs; 





» J . 


































































































Exhibit No. 212 












Exhibit No. 213 

J tivc (PA ii^^ z;^ 6^,^^;.^ . 


. \AJiy>p o<frVtju^ rt^ s^a>*^^ 



- i!r tAnfv I>^ *"^ i^^i cu^XtJ^ (L (^ 


'T^-- '^^^ ^-*^^ ^^c'^^(yK /, / /. 

5^1 GK5 




Exhibit No. 214 




On March 14 cast your ballot for 








r \A\ir Dick Barton 


Exhibit No. 215 


Acrot'KT vn 

P.O. Box 97? Venice, Ca I i f . _9P29J., 

-'"-'-' ■ y 




Exhibit No. 216 

•35B«q_;' '"^s: 

feh. I< 

1 \ 




Exhibit No. 217 
5:S Xo. La Brea Ave Los Angeles, Ca.— 9003G (213) 933-5667 

Dear McCarthy Delegate: 

Gene McCarthy just completed a campaign tour In California and 
wishes to convey his thanks for your support during his appearances. 
As yoii know, we do not have the funds to conduct an extensive campaign 
here, but Gene assured me the campaign will continue though the con- 
vention in Miami, v > 

Realistically the race in California is now betiyeen'SeriJTtor 
HcGovem and Senator Humphrey. The latest polls indicate it will be 
a close election. !• • :; . 

It has been deceided that a win by Senator Humphrey would 
benefit our cause more than a win by Senator McGovem^ If McGovern takes 
California he will win the nomination on an early ballot in Miami. If 
Hunphrey wins in California, Miami will deadlock which will enable Gene 
McCarthy to gain- the nomination; or at the very least to heavily in- 
fluence the drafting of the Party platform. Accordingly, we ask you 
to unofficially support Senator Humphrey on June 6. Ue realize Senator 
ncGovem's views are more attuned to Gene's, but this sacrifice is 
necessary. Anything that can be done to stop McGovem would be helpful, 

As a solid McCarthy supporter we know you will keep this letter 
and our strategy confidential. Thanks again for your continued support. 


^Qjliccxyi^K^ ^(^y^i^zan^ 


Dear Chisholin supporter: 

Gene McCarthy just completed a campaign tour of California 
and while In Los Angeles he had the pleasure to discuss with 
Shirley Chi sholm the California political situation. It was felt 
by both parties that if George McGovem wins In California he 
has all but locked up the nomination; but if Hubert Humphrey wins 
In California, the Miami convention will deadlock whidi will enable 
both Gene McCarthy and Shirley Chi sholm to heavily influence the 
Party platform. The latest polls indicate the. California primary 
win be very close. 

' . Accordingly, I have been asked to urge you to unofficially ' 
support Senator Humphrey on June 6. We realize Senator McGovem 's 
.views are more attuned to Shirley's or Gene's, but tht^ sacrifice 
is necessary to accomplish the basic objectives of the Shirley Chlsholm 
and Gene McCarthy movements. Anything that can be done to stop 
McGovem would be helpful, but IT SHOULD NOT BE DONE IN THE* NAME 

I have been assured by Shirley Silverstein at Chlsholm State 

Headquarters that you will keep this letter and our strategy 



4jfi^>^-Ci>»?^ ^»<ail^j«K,.^ 


Exhibit No. 218 

George McGovern'S 

I L^V^^- 

mQjt^ Aug. 7, 1964 George McGovern voted for the Gulf of Tonkin 
• "O^ H.J. Res 1145 Resolution. 

■ Q>r c M^y ^« 1965 George McGovern DIDN'T VOTE during passage of Supplemental 
'^OO H.J. Res 447 Appropriations of $700 Million for U.S. Military 
Operations in Vietnam. 

mf^^jr March 1, 1966 George McGovern voted to kill Morse Amendment to 
IVOO S2791 to Supplemental Defense Appropriations Bill to 
repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution . 

March 1, 1966 George McGovern voted to kill Gruening Amendment 
S2791 prohibiting the use of drafted serviceman in 
Southeast Asia unless they volunteered to go, 

March 10, 1966George McGovern voted for Foreign Assistance 
HR12169 appropriations of $315 Million for support of 

effort in Southeast Asia and the Dominican Republic 
and $100 Million for Prooidont'a contingency fund. 

March 22, 1966George McGovern voted for Supplemental Appropriations 
HR13546 of $13,135,719,000 primarily to support U.S. operations 
in Southeast Asia, 

|Q>f ^ Aug, 22, 1967 Defense Appropriations Bill, George McGovern voted 
*^^l HR10738 against Morse Amendment to reduce appropriations 
by 10%. 

Aug. 22, 1967 Defense Appropriations Bill, George McGovern voted 
HR10738 against Clark motion to recommit the bill to committee 
with amendments deleting $3,5 Billion. 

March 1, 1967 George McGovern voted for Supplemental Appropriations 
S665 for Vietnam of $4,467,200,000. 

March 20. 1967 George McGovern voted for Supplemental Defense Department 
HR7123 funds for the war in Vietnam of $12,196,520,000, 

iQXOJune 26, 1968 George McGovern voted for Supplemental Appropriations 
*^^*' HR17734 Bill of $6, 373, 735,498-bulk of which was for increased 
costs of Vietnam war. 


Prepared by Students for Honesty in Government 


Exhibit No. 219 













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Exhibit No. 220 

May 26. 1972 Pari One , 


lo% Ang«lti. Cailloin 

II] lloUi/'JOO'i Us/d. 
'i AngUti. CaUiu/u 




( a ;/C(U new. I ntviA ai^ttd t^ti 

upiicUtd Itla at\d U woi (wi. kfipAoUKUtt^s 1 we<fc* 

'. I iUd I l«U VtM] 

tActtd b,j Salt RJitttl^tid la Vo^iy VtUsatt) 

< contActtd bij HtAAijtMa 

:Vit StnaOH tlimpIiAty. t ta>id 
druji latt^ I ivoi contacttd bij 
I a..ofl,CA -Mfl by tJM m^t oi ic 

ulMfU/c p^oJtcC 

TUt •p'wUcC uioi tilt 4luo Zt^itt* iwm HtCtViXJuf 
K^adquoMtA* u'fUdi I liaise altaciitd. I ttic dn pvjtU a ii 
dayt ago and pAmittd ta beep qu^cX a6oiU U, I amnat. I 

^slanily 'orced lo cl 
Ilea and hi9 nor^esty. 
II l9 belora an elachon ihal l^« eip«H»[x:»d politician 

le, will be STiooi^ lalking ihe public for |l-»lr voias «nd. on 
9 Olhor hand, doing anylNng Immorairy r>»C«SMry to 
wredll hl9. or har, opporant. Where polltlciflna ar« slkMed 
081 owsy wlih h, ihay have even Men knoMn to do tway 
!ih aloctions completely, or do away with tfwlr oppooenla. 
impleiftly Fonunolely this coonlry la not yet at Ihal point 


But IM I 

tonre t>ehlnd the leiierv as Humphrey * 
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Exhibit No. 221 

siUE (U. S. 1 

D O ' 

1200 BRICKELL AVfclsiUE (U.S. 1) • MIA//,I, FLORIDA 33i31 • il: 37307-6 

September 19, 1973 

Senate Select Committee on 
Presidential Campaign Activities 
Room 6-308 

New Senate Office Building 
Washington, D. C. 20510 

Distinguished Gentlemen: 

We are enclosing any and all records, files, documents, 
ledgers, bills, receipts, telephone messages, order 
forms, memoranda, recordings, photographs, corres- 
pondence, cancelled checks, relating directly or indirectly 
in whole or in part to the Presidential Campaign and 
election of 1972, including but not limited to work, service, 
and employment ordered and requested by Don Simmons, 
Donald Segretti, Donald Durham. 

Yours very truly, 






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Exhibit No. 222 

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Exhibit No. 223 

1 1 fil? 


DEPDmTCD \irtn 

-[[^3 10 YO'ji^ ;i;-:c;;k->t 

^30 - "6(3 7.0CC6 


■=XFL^f^ATiON OF otI^ir CHANG'S a:'d c.-oits ON 'fous Ta:;F:Hor;E E!M 

?.13 6S7-'36 2U::-.'-r) *t* 3 

D E S C 8 I P T I O I 


ch:.!<s= is billed i'-< I 



SERVICE co';;;ECTEn i 

GR CMi.'!GI-;'o SE^.VICt 
Ot; OCT 25 

LOC^L t;x 
us t;x 

gf>5 OCT 16 I OCT 2 3 


loiii cA.tic? ;o £111 I 


:• 9 C R 

"5 5 3 A C R 


: .tsnu.-ry lA, 1972 


PUP.c:!!.'.5:r'S COl'Y of 



0'-:.--t irt V.-. K.->:..i sch 



For sarvicos rinri'irad as nn indeponoent con- 
tractor October 15 - 31/71. 


T2r-^.,Ov~> ^^ 07f y-.c.j. 


Heibert W. Kalmbach 
Ne..port Saach, CalKornia 


Advance for expenses 




Hctbsrt \V. K3-,t3:h 
N'ev.;ori 2 ==:h. Czlilai-ta 

i c R 1 PTI o N 

ror sarvicTS rencorad as an ind ipsi-scsnt con- 
tractor '.Cover.ber 15 - 30, 1971 



|1 2/1 3/71 I For services rendeciod as an independont 

contrcictor DccorrJacr 1-15, 1971 



NeApoti 3;-2Ch, Cili^ctnia 



For services rendered as an independent coji- 
tractor Koverpj^er 1-15, 1971. 


:". W. Ki::-:3;h 

D E S C R I PT I t 

For services rendered as an independent 
contractor Decarriier 15 - 31, 1971 


li;rt=r; '.V. K='';.b£ch 
f.'e.-.pcrt E=a:h. Csliforr.U 





For services rendered as an independent con- 
tractor January 1 - 15, 1972 



Exhibit No. 224 

Telephone Log — Mobbis [Seqbetti] toChapin 

date, numbeb, and location 

September 1, 1972— (213) 647-0476— Los Angeles, California 
June 19, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California 
June 16, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California 
June 8, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California 
Mav 1, 1972— (415) 848-9214— San Francisco, California 
April 18, 1972— 393-9832— Washington, D.C. 
March 24, 1972—783-9714 — Washington, D.C. 
March 24, 1972— 638-7723— Washington, D.C. 
March 21, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles. California 
March 14, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California 
March 8, 1972— (212) 247-8897— New York, N.Y. 
March 6, 1972— (312) 686-9533— Chicago, Illinois 
January 31, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California 
January 28, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California 
January 25, 1972— (212) 679-9798— New York, N.Y. 
January 24, 1972— (215) WA2-8185— Philadelphia, Pa. 
January 20, 1972— 638-2260— Washington, D.C. 
January 19, 1972— 638-8870— Washington, D.C. 
January 19, 1972— 341-2580— Washington, D.C. 
January 18, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California 
January 17, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California 
January 12, 1972— (614) 236-9462— Columbus, Ohio 
January 10, 1972— (317) 637-0620— Indianapolis, Indiana 
January 3, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California 
December 28, 1971— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California 
December 17, 1971— (608) 257-8811— Madison, Wisconsin 
December 16, 1971— (414) 432-9538— Green Bay, Wisconsin 
December 16, 1971— (414) 494-9844 — Green Bay, Wisconsin 
December 13, 1971— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California 
December 7, 1971— (713) 928-9309— Houston, Texas 
December 7, 1971— (214) 351-9087— Texas 
Decembers 1971— (305) 634-9381— Florida 
November 29, 1971— (415) 822-1750— San Francisco, California 
.November 26, 1971— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California 
November 20, 1971— 638-2260— Washington, D.C. 
November 19, 1971— 638-2260— Washington. D.C. 
November 18, 1971— (603) 623-8235— New Hampshire 
November 10, 1971— (213) 821-9760— Los Angeles, California 
November 9, 1971— (213) 821-9760 — Los Angeles, California 
November 8, 1971— (213) 821-9760— Los Angeles, California 
November 6. 1971— (213) 821-9760— Los Angeles, California 
November 6, 1971— (213) 821-9760— Los Angeles, California 
November 2, 1971— 265-2000— Washington, D.C. 
November 1, 1971— 265-2000— Washington, D.C. 
November 1, 1971— 393-9027— Washington, D.C. 
October 28. 1971— (213) 821-9760 — Los Angeles, California 
October 15, 1971— (213) 821-9760— Los Angeles, California 
October 5, 1971— (213) 821-9760— Los Angeles, California 

One outgoing : September 1. 1972. 
Marina del Ray (Talked to his mother) . 


Exhibit No. 225 

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WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036 

October 3, 1973 

Samuel Dash, Esquire 

Select Committee on Presidential 

Campaign Activities 
Room 1418 

New Senate Office Building 
Washington, D. C. 20510 

Dear Sam: 

In line with the request we received from your 
office, I'm enclosing my notarized affidavit with re- 
spect to the Institute for Policy Studies and the 
testimony of Patrick Buchanan. 

If I can be of further assistance, please 
give me a call. 

Mitchell Rogovin 



city of Washington ) 

) ss : 
District of Columbia ) 


Mitchell Rogovin, being duly sworn, deposes and 
says : 

1. I am a partner in the law firm of Arnold & 
Porter, 1229 19th Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036, 
a member of the Bar of the District of Columbia, and 
general counsel to the Institute for Policy Studies 

( "the Institute") . 

2. The Institute is a nonprofit District of 
Columbia corporation which is exempt from federal in- 
come tax under section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Reve- 
nue Code of 1954 as a charitable and educational orga- 
nization, and which is not a "private foundation" under 
the Code. The Institute engages in research into public 
policy matters and is engaged in the training and educa- 
tion of individuals through its Ph.D. program. The 
Institute engages in no "political activities" that are 
forbidden under the internal revenue laws. 

3. In testimony before the Senate Select Committee 
on' Presidential Campaign Activities on Wednesday, September 
26, 1973, Mr. Patrick Buchanan, in the course of his tes- 
timony,' made several false allegations concerning the 

437 L 

4. In his testimony, Mr. Buchanan stated that 
the Ford Foundation "provides funds" for the Institute 
for Policy Studies, that the Institute was a "beneficiary 
of Ford money, " and that the Institute "of course is 
Ford-funded." Mr. Buchanan sought to leave the impression 
that the institute's funding has come primarily or in 
large part from the Ford Foundation. 

5. In fact, the only funds the Institute has re- 
ceived from the Ford Foundation consisted of a one-year 
grant of $7,800 received in 1954 for the specific pur- 
pose of holding seminars on the subject of the Alliance 
for Progress. This grant was a very minor source of 
funding for the institute. 

5. Mr. Buchanan stated that the Institute "holds 
seminars for Congressmen, for staffers, and the like, and 
they [the Institute] deal in trying to influence Congress- 
men and the like to vote in one direction. " 

7. In fact, the Institute has held conferences 
and seminars which have been attended by, among others. 
Congressmen and their assistants, but at no time has 
the Institute attempted to influence the votes of Con- 

8. Mr. Buchanan asserted that the Institute 
"funded the Quicksilver Times," which he described as 

a "radical underground newspaper, " "v/hich .has a political 
point of view and which is sold for profit." Mr. Buchanan 


stated further that since he was familiar with the Quick- 
silver Times as a "commercial venture, it would seem to 
me that this [alleged funding by the Institute] would be 
an illicit use of tax exempt funds." In the same sentence, 
Mr. Buchanan implied that the Institute had used Ford 
Foundation money to fund the Quicksilver Times. 

9. In fact, the Institute has never funded the 
Quicksilver Times. To the best of my knowledge and be- 
lief, the Washinqtonian magazine article cited by Mr. 
Buchanan does not state that the Institute ever funded 
the Quicksilver Times. 

10. The names of the Institute for Policy Studies 
and its Co-Directors, Marcus Raskin and Richard Barnet, 
have been mentioned in the course of the hearings before 
the Senate Select Committee in connection with the so- 
called list of "enemies" of the Administration, against 
whom certain Administration officials urged that the re- 
sources of various government agencies be applied. In 
addition, an exhibit referred to during Mr. Ehrlichman's 
testimony, the Krogh-Young memo to Ehrlichman of August 11, 
1971, indicates that both Raskin and Barnet were "over- 
heard. " 

11. The Instutute has been the subject of an 
audit by the Internal Revenue Service ever since the 
Nixon Administration took office. The latest audit be- 
gan in January of 1970, apparently as part of the IRS 
"Special Service Group" program. The scope and nature 
of the audit can hardly be described as routine. 


12. At present, the Internal Revenue Service, 
using quite unusual procedures, has proposed to revoke 
the Institute's tax exemption. The grounds for revoca- 
tion do not include any of the alleged activities men- 
tioned by Mr. Buchanan, but rather concern charitable 
and educational activities of the Institute which are 
indistinguishable from the activities of other institu- 
tions of higher learning in the United States, but which 
do involve viewpoints differing sharply from those of 
the Administration. 

13. It appears that the Internal Revenue Service 
in this case has not