PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
"^ SENATE RESOLUTION 60
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase II: Campaign Practices
WASHINGTON, D.C., SEPTEMBER 26 AND OCTOBER 3, 1973
Book 10
Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
FRANKLIN PIEFCr CHNtfp
Concord, New Hampshire 033 f;
^ -'"^'T JVi ;-:4 1974
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
SENATE RESOLUTION 60
HEARINGS
BEFORE THE
SELECT COMMITTEE ON
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
OF THE
UNITED STATES SENATE
NINETY-THIRD CONGRESS
FIRST SESSION
WATERGATE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES
Phase II: Campaign Practices
WASHINGTON, D.C., SEPTEMBER 26 AND OCTOBER 3, 1973
Book 10
Printed for the use of the
Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
U.S. GOVERNMENT PRINTING OFFICE
21-296 WASHINGTON : 1973
For sale by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office
Washington, D.C. 20402 - Price $3.00
SENATE SELECT COMMITTEE ON PRESIDENTIAL
CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES
(Established by S. Res. 60, 93d Congress, 1st Session)
SAM J. BRVIN, Je., North Carolina, Cha:; ,nan
HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr., Tennessee, Vice Chairman
HERMAN E. TALMADGE, Georgia EDWARD J. GURNEY, Florida
DANIEL K. INOUYE, Hawaii LOWELL P. WEICKER, JR., Connecticut
JOSEPH M. MONTOYA, New Mexico
Samuel Dash, Chie] Counsel and Staff Director
Fred D. Thompson, Minority Counsel
RUFDS L. Edmistex, Deputy Chief Counsel
Arthur. S. Miller, Chief Consultant
David M. Dorsen, Assistant Chief Counsel
Terry F. Lenzner, Assistant Chief Counsel
James Hamilton, Assistant Chief Counsel
Carmine S. Bellino, Chief Investigator
Wayne H. Bishop, Chief Field Investigator
Eugene Boyce, Hearings Record Counsel
Marc Lackritz, Assistant Counsel
William T. Matton, Assistant Counsel
Ronald D. Rotunda, Assistant Counsel
Barry Schochet, Assistant Counsel
W. Dennis Sum.mers, Assistant Counsel
James C. Moore, Assistant Counsel
Donald G. Sanders, Deputy Minority Counsel
Howard S. Liebengood, Assistant Minority Counsel
H. William Shure, Assistant Minority Counsel
Robert Stlverstein, Assistant Minority Counsel
Carolyn M. Andrade, Administrative Assistant
Carolyn E. Cohen, Office Manager
Joan C. Cole, Secretary to the Minority
(II)
CONTENTS
HEARING DAYS
page
Wednesday, September 26, 1973 3899
Wednesday, October 3, 1973 3979
CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF WITNESSES
Wednesday, September 26, 1973
Buchanan, Patrick J., special consultant to the President 3899
Wednesday, October 3, 1973
Segretti, Donald H., former employee of the Committee To Re-Elect the
President; engaged in "political tricks" ; accompanied by Victor Sherman,
counsel 3980
INTERROGATION OF WITNESSES BY MEMBERS OF THE
COMMITTEE AND COUNSELS
Ervin, Hon. Sam J., Jr Buchanan: 393^-3942.
Segretti: 4010, 4023, 4025, 4026, 4029-4034, 4037-4042, 4045,
4046, 4052.
Baker, Hon. Howard H., Jr Buchanan: 3942-3947.
Segretti : 4023, 4027-4029, 4038, 4039.
Talmadge, Hon. Herman E Buchanan: 3947-3951.
Segretti: 4022-4027.
Inouve, Hon. Daniel K Buchanan: 3957-3960.
Segretti: 4017-4019, 4044, 4045.
Montoya, Hon. Joseph M Buchanan: 3965-3971.
Segretti: 4012-4015.
Gumey, Hon. Edward J Buchanan: 3951-3957.
Segretti: 4019-4021.
Weicker, Hon. Lowell P., Jr Buchanan: 3960-3965,
3971-3975. Segretti: 4015-4017, 4034-4037, 4041-4044, 4051.
Dash, Samuel, Chief Counsel and Staff Director Buchanan: 3899-3934,
3976, 3977. Segretti: 3979, 3985-4005, 4046-4049, 4052.
Thompson, Fred D., Minority Counsel _ Buchanan: 3907, 3908,
3934-3938. Segretti 4005-4012, 4041, 4049-4051.
(Ill)
IV
EXHIBITS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
No. 158— (3934) Pamphlet about Muskie entitled "Wake Up Liberals" Page
published by "Citizens for a Liberal Alternative" 4055
No. 159 — (3934) Various news articles, advertisements, and letters; docu-
ment entitled "The McGovern Record — A Critical Appraisal"- 4059
No. 160 — (3956) Quicksilver Times article entitled "The People Are Com-
ing to San Diego" re: Plans for demonstrations at Republican
Convention, etc 4107
No. 161 — (3975) Handwritten notes entitled: "Status Report on P's
Requests" 41 09
No. 162 — (3975) Memorandum to Bob Haldeman from the President,
dated October 28, 1969, re: PR aspects of John Lindsay's
victory in New York 4111
No. 163 — (3975) Memorandum to Jeb Magruder from H. R. Haldeman,
dated February 4, 1970, in regard to getting good PR in the
press for the administration 4112
No. 164 — (3975) Memorandum to the President from Patrick J. Buchanan,
dated March 3, 1970, re: Suggestions on how to combat the
institutionalized power of the left concentrated in the founda-
tions that succor the Democratic Party 4114
No. 165 — (3975) Confidential memorandum from H. R. Haldeman to
Colson/Buchanan/Cole/Magruder dated March 12, 1970, re:
Generating support for the administration's position on
Vietnam; with attachments 4120
No. 166 — (3975) Memorandum to Mr. Magruder from L. Higby, dated
July 16, 1970, re: Possible discrediting of Chet Huntley of
NBC 4127
No. 167 — (3975) H. R. Haldeman memorandum for Mr. Magruder, dated
September 11, 1970, re: Advertisement suggestions hitting
radical liberal theme, with focus on Cambodia 4128
No. 168 — (3975) Memorandum from H. R. Haldeman to Buchanan/
Keogh/Klein/Nofziger, re: Using Victor Lasky instead of de-
veloping an in-house columnist, as a basis for general mailings. 4129
No. 169 — (3975) Memorandum for Mr. Haldeman from Jeb Magruder,
dated December 11, 1970, re: PubHc relations after President
Nixon's press conference; with attachments 4130
No. 170 — (3975) Memorandum for the President from Patrick J. Buchanan,
dated March 24, 1971, subject: "The Muskie Watch" 4146
No. 171 — (3975) Buchanan memorandum for the President dated April 19,
1971, subject: "The Resurrection of Hubert Humphrey" 4154
No. 172 — (3975) Memorandum for Jeb Magruder from Gordon Strachan,
dated May 4, 1971, re: Possible establishment of "Humphrey
Watch" and "Kennedy Watch"; with attachment 4164
No. 173^ — (3975) Memorandum for "the President from Patrick J. Buchanan,
dated June 9, 1971, subject: EMK— Political Memorandum.- 4167
No. 174 — (3975) Confidential memorandum from Pat Buchanan for De-
Bolt/ Finch/ Harlow/ Moore/ Nofziger/ Price/ Timmons/ Walker,
dated June 22, 1971, re: Suggested topics for discussion at
meeting 4173
No. 175 — (3975) Memorandum for the Attorney General from Jeb Ma-
gruder, dated July 2, 1971. Subject: "Democratic and Re-
publican Contenders"; with attachment 4174
No. 176— (3975) Memorandum dated July 28, 1971, for the Attorney Gen-
eral from Jeb Magruder. Subject: Tracking Presidential Con-
tenders; with attachment 4185
No. 177 — (3975) Buchanan memorandum to Jeb Magruder, dated Au-
gust 7, 1971, concerning Horida primary; with attachments.. 4192
No. 178— (3975) Memorandum for the Attorney General from Jeb Ma-
gruder, dated August 13, 1971, re: Democratic '72 Sponsors
Club 4196
No. 179— (3975) White House memorandum of October 5, 1971, to the
Attorney General and H. R. Haldeman, re: Exploitation of
"fissures" within the Democratic Party; with attachment 4197
No. 180 — (3975) Buchanan memorandum to the Attorney General and
H. R. Haldeman, dated February 4, 1972, re: New York
Times article about Jackson's strategists seeking earlier Ten-
nessee primary; with attachments 4205
Note.— Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the record.
No.
184-
No.
185
No.
186-
No.
187-
No.
188-
No.
189-
No. 181 — (3975) Memorandum for John Mitchell from PJB/Khachigian,
dated March 14, 1972, entitled: "Attack Organization and Page
Strategy" 4209
No. 182 — (3975) Magruder memorandum for John Mitchell, dated April 12,
1972, concerning plans for activities at the Democratic Na-
tional Convention; with attachment 4221
No. 183 — (3975) Memorandum for John Mitchell from Jeb Magruder,
dated April 14, 1972, re: Attached memorandum concerning
contender tracking and strategy 4225
3975) Buchanan memorandum for John Mitchell/H. R. Halde-
man, dated April 27, 1972, re: Strategy on McGovern 4235
3975) Memorandum for H. R Haldeman and John Mitchell
from Patrick J. Buchanan, dated June 2, 1972, re: Basic attack
strategy 4236
3975) Memorandum dated Junr- 6, 1972, to John Mitchell from
Patrick J. Buchanan, re: McGovern strategy' 4237
3975) Assault strategy by Buchanan and Khachigian, dated
June 8, 1972, on how to undermine McGovern election bid.. 4240
3975) Memorandum for John Dean from Chuck Colson, dated
June 16, 1972, re: Checks on key McGovern staffers 4247
3975) Buchanan memorandum to John Mitchell and II. R.
Haldeman, dated June 25, 1972, re: Manner of McGovern
response 4248
No. 190 — (3975) July 14, 1972, memorandum to Clark MacGregor and
H. R. Haldeman from Pat Buchanan discussing "points of
weakness" in McGovern campaign 4250
No. 191 — (3975) White House memorandum to H. R. Haldeman from
Pat Buchanan, re: "McGovern Assault Book." 4252
No. 192 — (3975) Memorandum from Pat Buchanan to Clark MacGregor,
H. R. Haldeman, and Charles Colson, ro: Political suggestions
of attacks on Mc Govern 4254
No. 193— (3975) Memorandum dated September 11, 1072, for Betty Nolan
from Pat Buchanan suggesting distributi )n and signature of
"Letter to the Editor"; with attachments^ 4256
No. 194 — (3975) Buchanan memorandum to Haldeman/Ehrlichman/
Colson, dated September 13, 1972, re: Strategy in last 7 weeks
of campaign 4259
No. 195 — (3975) Reproduction of "Canuck letter" to Manchester Union
Leader, dated February 28. 1972, signed bv Harold W.
Eldredge i _' 4264
No. 196— (3975) February 17, 1972, letter from Paul Morrison to Mr. Loeb,
Manchester Guardian (Union Leader) alleging Senator
Muskie's "Canucks" remark 4265
No. 197 — (397.5) Letter from Robin Ficker, chairman, United Democrats
for Kennedy, to "New Hampshire Voter." 4266
No. 198 — (3996) Poster: "Help Muskie Support Bussing More Children
Now." 4267
No. 199— (4026) Letter to Donald Segretti from Herbert Kalmbach
concerning payment for services; dated Septemljer 27, 1971 __ 4268
No. 200— (4026) Memorandum dated September 28, 1971, re: Muskie
signs at demonstrations and rallies. . 4269
No. 201 — (4026) "Can you answer . . ." questions for Senator Muskie 4270
No. 202— (4026) Note addressed to Don Segretti entitled "PoHtics" 4271
No. 203 — (4026) Post Office box application form for James R. Norton,
Citizens Committee for Representative Government 4273
No. 204 — (4026) Anti-Muskie-Mc Govern newspaper advertisements 4275
No. 205 — (4026) Letter to Jackson campaign manager from "A Former
Muskie Staff Worker," dated February 25, 1972 4279
No. 206 — (4026) Senators Jackson and Humphrey are charged with sexual
misconduct in bogus letter with Muskie letterhead 4280
No. 207 — (4026) Spanish (Cuban) newspaper advertisement about Muskie- 4281
No. 208 — (4026) "Newsmakers" column about Jane Muskie; alleges
off-the-record remarks by Mrs. Muskie 4282
No. 209— (4026) Display entitled: '"Disgusting— The Secret Money in
Presidential Politics." 4284
Note.— Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the record.
VI
No. 210 — (4026) Handwritten poster: "Free — All You Can Eat" invitation Page
to bogus Humphrey rally 4285
No. 211 — (4026) Bank forms and receipt for $30 to Don Simmons 4286
No. 212 — (4026) Pennsylvania Voice article by Blair Stobaugh, dated April
19, entitled: '^\.B.:\I. (anj'thing but Muskie)" 4289
No. 213 — (4026) Handwritten cards to "Don" with suggestions for
posters 4290
No. 214 — (4026) More handwritten cards with poster suggestions 4292
No. 215 — (4026) J & J Addressing and Mailing Service receipt for Dick
Barton 4294
No. 216— (4026) Poster entitled: "Humphrey— He Started the War, Don't
Give Him Another Chance" 4295
No. 217— (4026) Two letters: "Dear McCarthy Delegate" and "Dear
Chisholm Supporter," both signed by Barbara Barron 4296
No. 218 — (4026) Circular entitled: "George McGovem's Real Record on
the War." 4298
No. 219 — (4026) Anti-Humphrev pamphlet entitled: "A Fishy Smell for
the White House?" 4299
No. 220 — (4026) Publication excerpt Ayith three letters superimposed
Yorty and McCarthy letterheads, with printed comment;
receipt from J. L. Stewart Co. to Tom Wallace 4301
No. 221 — (4026) Letter to Select Committee from Towne Motel enclosing
six copies of records, registers, etc., dated September 19, J973_ 4303
No. 222 — (4026) Western Union money order receipt of $207.90 to Doug
KeUy 4310
No. 223 — (4026) Bank deposit shp, telephone statement, cashiers check
payable to Donald Segretti; with attachments 4311
No. 224— (4026) Telephone log— Morris (Segretti) to Chapin 4314
No. 22.5 — (4026) Various Segretti expense account forms 4315
No. 226^(4026) Notes on "Personal Directory" handbook 43-50
ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Letter and aflBdavit of Mitchell Rogovin 4369
Note. — Figures in parentheses indicate page that exhibit was officially made part of the record.
PRESIDENTIAL CAMPAIGN ACTIVITIES OF 1972
PHASE II: CAMPAIGN PRACTICES
WEDNESDAY, SEPTEMBER 26, 1973
U.S. Sexate.
Select Committee ox
Presidential Campaigx AcrrvrnES,
Washington^ D.C.
The Select. Committee met. pursuant to i-ecess. at 10 :10 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building. Senator Sam J. Erv-in, Jr. (chair-
man), presiding.
Present: Senators Erv'in. Talmadge. Inouye. Montova. Baker, Gur-
ney, and Weicker.
Also present: Samuel Dash, chief counsel and statf director; Fred
D. Thompson, minority counsel: Rufus L. Edmisten. deputy chief
counsel : Arthur S. ^liller. chief consultant : Jed Johnson, inyestigator:
DaA-id ^I. Dorsen. James Hamilton, and Terry F. Lenzner, assistant
chief counsels: Marc Lackritz, Ronald D. Rotunda, and Barry Scho-
chet, assistant majority counsels: H. "William Shure and Robert Sil-
yerstein, assistant minority counsels: Pauline O. Dement, research
assistant; Filer Ra^mholt, office of Senator Inouye: Ron McMahan.
assistant to Senator Baker; A. Searle Field, assistant to Senator
"Weicker: Michael Flanigan. assistant publications clerk.
Senator Enyix. The committee will come to order.
Coimsel will call the fii-st witness.
Mr. Dash. Mr, Patrick J. Buchanan.
Senator Enyix. Mr. Buchanan, will you stand up and raise your
right hand ?
Do you swear that the testimony which you shall giye to the Select
Committee on Presidential Campaign Actiyities will be the truth,
the whole truth, and nothing but the truili, so help you God ?
Mr. BrcHAXAx. I do. Mr, Chairman,
Mr. Dash. Mr. Buchanan, is it trae you are not appearing with
counsel today?
TESTIMCmr OF PATEICZ Z. ETJCHAKAK
Mr. BucHAXAx, That is accurate.
Mr. Dash. Do you haye a statement tlial you prepared that you
wish to rea.d to the committee?
Mr. BucHAXAX, I do. I haye a statement, abbreyiated statement of
about, 1 would think, no more than 15 minutes at the most.
Mr. Daspi, "Would you please read it?
Senator Talmadge. Do we haye copies of it, ^Ir. Chairman?
Mr. BucHAXAX. I haye giyen copies to the
(3899:
3900
Mr. Dash. One copy has just been obtained. No copies under our
rule were submitted to the committee, I think they were submitted
to the press but not to the committee.
Mr. BucHANAx. They were submitted to the committee about 20
minutes ago for Xeroxing. A young Lady came to me and said they
would be distributed to the Senatore and members of the staff.
Senator Giirney. Are they being Xeroxed?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mv. BucHAXAN. Should I proceed with the statement or do you
want to wait for the copies?
Mr. Dash. Proceed with your statement then, Mr. Buchanan.
Mr, Buchanan. Mr. Chairman and members of the committee, for
a variety of reasons, I appreciate the opportunity to appear before
your Select Committee but in candor, I cannot speak with the same
enthusiasm for the manner in which the invitation was delivered. At
the President's personal directive, his White House staff has been
called upon and has cooperated, I believe fully, with the committee.
Specifically, this witness has certainly done so. Nevertheless, the sur-
prise announcement that I was to be called as a public witness before
these hearings was made over national television before even the ele-
mentary courtesy of a telephone call of notification had been extended.
Of greater concern to me. however, has been an apparent campaign
orchestrated from within the committee staff to malign my reputation
in the public press prior to my appearance. In the hours inmiediately
following my well-publicized invitation there appeared in the Wash-
ington Post, the New York Times, the Baltimore Sun, the Chicago
Tribune, and on the national networks, separate stories all attributed
to committee sources alleging that I was the architect of a campaign
of political espionage or dii'ty tricks. According to the Post, committee
sources were in possession of my memorandums recommending infil-
trating the opposition.
In the Times the charge was that the committee had a series of
Buchanan memorandums suggesting "political espionage and sabo-
tage against Edwin S. Muskie of Maine and other candidates for the
Presidential nomination.''
One wire service stated that Mr. Buchanan would be questioned
about "blueprints and plans concerning the scandal."
In the Chicago Tribune, the headline read : "Nixon Speech Writer
Blamed for Muskie Plot." The story read, and I quote: "Senate
investigators have evidence that Patrick J. Buchanan, one of Presi-
dent Nixon's favorite speechwriters, was the secret author of a polit-
ical sabotage scheme."
In the Baltimore Sun under a major front page headline reading:
"Buchanan Linked to 1972 Dirty Tricks," the story ran thus:
Patrick J. Buchanan, a Presidential consultant, may emerge as yet another
architect of the 1972 White House dirty tricks strategy, according to congres-
sional sources.
Mr. Chairman, this covert campaign of vilification carried on by staff
members of your committee is in direct violation of rule 40 of the
Rules of Procedure for the Select Connnittee. That rule strictly pro-
hibits staff members from leaking substantive materials. Repeatedly,
I have asked of Mr. Dash and Mr. Lenzner information that they
might have to justify such allegations. Repeatedly, they have denied
3901
to me that they have such documents. A¥hen I asked Mr. Lenzner wlio
on the committee staff was responsible he responded, "Mr. Buchanan.^
you ought to know that you cannot believe everything you read in the
newspapers." It was his joke and my reputation.
So it seems fair to me to ask how can this Select Committee set itself
up as the ultimate arbiter of American political ethics if it cannot even
control the character assassination in its OAvn ranks.
For the record, Mr. Chairman, let me state the following: I did not
recommend or authorize, nor was I aware of any ongoing campaign of
political sabotage against Senator Muskie or any other Democratic
candidate. I did not recommend either verbally or in memorandums
that the reelection committee infiltrate the campaigns of our opposition.
I have never met nor spoken with nor can I recall ever having heard
the names of Messrs. Hunt, Liddy, McCord, Ulasewicz, Reagan,
Barker, or Segretti, until those names appeared in the public press.
Nor have I ever heard until the terms were made public the code
names of Ruby 1, Ruby 2, Crystal, Sedan Chair, and Sedan Chair 2, or
Fat Jack. Even today I could not testify with certitude as to whom
these terms refer.
Now, let me move quickly to the heart of the public allegations,
against me — but more generally against our Presidential campaign.
It is being argued that illicit Republican strategy and tactics were
responsible for the defeat of the strongest Democratic candidate for
President — and for the nomination of the weakest.
It has been contended publicly that the Democrats were denied —
by our campaign and strategy — a legitimate choice at their own
convention.
It is being alleged that the campaign of 1972 was not only a rigged
campaign but an utter fraud, "a political coup by the President of the
United States." These contentions, Mr. Chairman, are altogether
untrue.
Republicans were not responsible for the downfall of Senator Mus
kie. Republicans were not responsible for the nomination of Senator
McGovern,
To suggest that, is first of all to do a grievous injustice both to Sen-
ator McGovern and his campaign organization.
Senator McGovern was nominated because his men wrote the rule-
book, his men were in the field earlit st and worked hardest; his cam-
paign was precisely targeted on the primaries they could win, and
because he was possessed of the best political organization the Demo-
cratic Party has seen in at least a dozen years.
It was not Donald Segretti who put together the organization that
carried, for Senator McGovern, the crucial Wisconsin primary.
It was not any agent of the Committee To Re-Elect the President
who was out winning McGovern delegates in States like Georgia, Vir-
ginia, and Louisiana.
Senator Gurney. Would you pull your mike a little bit closer? I
am having great difficulty in hearing you, there is so much noise at
the table.
Mr. Buchanan. Thank you.
It was not our personnel, but theirs, who worked out Senators Mc-
Govern's victorious campaign and convention strategies.
The McGovern people won their own nomination — and they lost
their own election.
3902
As Theodore H. "\'\Tiite has written in his latest and best campaign
history : All of the dirty tricks of 1972, added together in the ultimate
balance, had "the weiglit of a feather."
Now, one of the suggestions that I recommended, that Republicans,
in the spring and summer of 1971, concentrate their political resources
upon Senator Muskie — rather than dissipate them on the dozen other
potential aspirants for the nomination.
That statement is essentially true.
Senator Muskie was targeting his political attacks upon the Presi-
dent — as was every single one of the other potential nominees.
No requirement exists in ethics — or logic — or law — that we provide
equal time in political response to each of our potential opponents.
The reasons for reconunending the focus upon Senator Muskie were
basic :
He was the frontrunner. Alone among the Democrats he led the
President in the national polls. He appeared to me to be both the
strongest candidate, and the candidate with the greatest opportunity
of uniting the warring wangs of the Democratic Party.
Candidly, it was my hope, if not my expectation, that our political
counterattacks, concentrated primarily, but not exclusively, upon the
Democratic frontrunner, might contribute to opening up the Demo-
cratic primaries and preventing a closed convention.
There was nothing — and is nothing — in my judgment, illicit or im-
ethical or improper or unprecedented in recommending or adopting
such a political strategy.
The resources which we recommended for employment in that
summer and fall, all of them legitimate, were basically these :
National committee speakers and publications including INlbnday.
Republican chairmen and organizations in States Senator Muskie
visited.
The Committee To Re-Elect — its media resources, and its develop-
ing State organizations.
Surrogate speakers from the national administration including the
Vice President and Cabinet.
Congressmen and Senators from the Republican Party who would
use the forum of the White House or Capitol Hill either to defend the
President against Senator Muskie's allegations — or to put Senator
Muskie himself on the defensive.
Also, use of the media, through briefings and conversations and the
like by political operatives, to carry the message.
There is no Republican individual or organization, Mr. Chairman,
to credit or blame for the decline in the candidacy of Senator Muskie.
The narrowness of his victory in the New Hampshire primary was a
reflection of his declining standing in the national polls.
The enormous margin of his defeat in Florida was a consequence
of the unanticipated appeal of the candidacy of George Wallace.
His defeat in Wisconsin came at the hands of one man, Governor
Wallace, who had been there but a single day and another man. Sena-
tor McGovern, who had organized the State for 18 months.
As for the general election, Mr. Chairman, the President of the
United States did not achieve the greatest landslide of any minority
party candidate in history because of Watergate and dirty tricks —
but in spite of them.
3903
Watergate was the most deleterious issue in our national campaign.
In our own estimation, and that of political analysts, the Watergate
tragedy cost the Keioublican, Part}' millions of votes.
The reasons for the landslide of J 972 are chronicled elsewhere ; they
need not be repeated here at length. Basically they are these :
The President read the mood of the Nation better than his opponent.
The P'-esident had conducted an administration, for 4 years, that
had won the confidence or support of millions of Democrats.
The President's stand upon the issues of defense and welfare, upon
taxes and government, upon coercive integration and busing, were
closer to what tlie American people wanted than those of his opponent.
But we won as well, Mr. Chainnan, because of the quality and char-
acter of our candidate.
If one looks back over the political history of this country, there
is only one other man, other than Richard Nixon, w^ho has been his
party's nominee for President or Vice President five times. That is
Franklin Roosevelt.
No other individual in our political history has served in both of
the same high offices for so long a period of time as has the incumbent
President.
He is not the leader of a majority party.
He had been — since 1946 — a member of the minority party in Amer-
ican politics.
And thus, his political career, I believe, is all the more impressive.
That political record, Mr, Chairman, is no accident. It is no fluke,
and that election of 1972 was not stolen.
And the mandate that the American people gave to this President
and his administration cannot and w^ill not be frustrated or repealed
or overthrown as a consequence of the incumbent trag»'dy.
Mr. Chairman, I thank you for the time.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, I, too, would like to deplore, along with
Mr. Buchanan, any newspaper stories derogatory of him that are in-
dicated as having been leaked or come from sources in this committee
I know o^ no sta ff member wdio has done it ; I have searched to find such
staff members, if there were any. We have had a problem like this be-
fore and I think we all know that the problem of leaks is one that can-
not always be solved. Also, this has been a problem, I think, that has
plagued the inquiry in this area not only with this committee, but with
the Department of Justice and the White House itself. It is not even
known whether or not these sources did come from the Senate com-
mittee. But I would deplore, along with Mr. Buchanan, newsstories
that reflect on his character, reflect on his activities, and I can assure
the committee that they did not come from any source that I know
of in the committee, and certainly not from any counsel that I know of.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could I say a word in that respect ?
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Senator Baker. I join with majority counsel in deploring the al-
legations that Mr. Buchanan alludes to, and I commend him for tak-
ing that position. I have talked to Mr. Dash on a number of occasions
not related to this matter, but to other alleged leaks from the commit-
tee, and I can verify from firsthand information that Mr. Dash on
every occasion, has made a conscientious effort to locate such leaks and
I entirely believe him when he says he deplores such leaks.
3904
Unfortunately, we live in a pretty leaky atmosphere. I am not de-
fending against the allegations that you make Mr. Buchanan ; I am
snnply saying in a sense of fairness to Mr. Dash that I am sure that he
genuniely expresses that regret and that concern, as I do, too. It does
not help the mandate of this committee to have the matter thrashed out
in the press before a witness appears. It does not help to have specula-
tive stories about it. It does not help to have a witness' summary pub-
lished verbatim in the newspaper, wliich once happened.
But let me quickly say as the senior Republican on this committee
that for my part, I am convinced that Sam Dash means exactly what
he said.
Senator Ervin. I would like to say, Mr. Buchanan, that I share your
consternation about leaks. One thing I have never understood, hav-
ing been a lawyer and been accustomed to keeping the secrets of my
clients, I have never understood why such a large part of earth's in-
habitants have such little restraint, that just as soon as they get any-
thing in their minds, it comes tumbling out their mouths. I have noticed
leaks ever since I got to Washington 19 years ago. Somehow or other,
it seems to me that they are increasing, that the number of people
who cannot exercise self-restraint seems to be growing rather than
diminishing. I deplore the leaks which so often reflect on a man's char-
acter. I can guarantee that one man in this committee has never leaked
anything. That is myself. I learned long ago that as Kipling said,
"Man can kiss and tell. Wisely has the poet sung, Man can hold all
kinds of posts, If he'll only hold his tongue."
I notice in recent months leaks have come out of the White House,
come tumbling out of the Department of Justice, have come tumbling
out of every congressional committee of both Houses of Congress. It
is a most deplorable state and very unjust to people who have become
victims of these leaks.
Mr. Buchanan. Mr. Chairman, I appreciate the statement and I
was unaware that you were into the British poets.
Senator Ervin. Yes, sir. Not only the British but the Irish and the
Scottish.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Buchanan, when did you fii-st begin Avorking for
President Nixon in any political campaign ?
Mr. Buchanan. I met President Nixon — frankly, I met him briefly
when I was a caddy at Burning Tree Country Club in 1954. But for-
mally, I met Mr. Nixon in 1965, In December, when he spoke at a polit-
ical meeting filling in for Senator Dirksen in southern Illinois, when I
was an editorial writer with the St. Louis Globe-Democrat. I went over
and indicated to him that if he were going to run in 1968, I would like
to get aboard early. He made some inquiries. We had some long ex-
tended conversations and I joined his staff in January of 1966.
I served with him in the 1966 political campaign. We traveled some
35 States, on one or two occasions into Tennessee, I think. Senator
Baker. That was my first association with him. I remained on his
staff through 1967 and the 1968 cam])aign and joined the AAHiite House
as a special assistant in January of 1969.
]\rr. Dash. A^Hien you joined the White House as special assistant,
what, specifically, were your responsibilities, 'Mr. Buchanan?
Mr. Buchanan. Well, you have got essentially — my functions cor-
respond to that of general assignment reporter for a news))aper. I only
have three definite and ongoing assignments. They would be as speech-
3905
writer for the President on major speeches; oversight of the Presi-
dent's daily news summar}', which is prepared by Mort Allen; and
third, the preparation of the briefing books and briefing materials foi
the President for all his press conferences, which has been a function of
mine for almost 8 years.
Mr. Dash. Xow, to wliom in the '\A'liit^ House did you report from
the period of your appointment to the "White House position that you
held through May of this year ^
Mr. Buchanan. May of this year? Well, through April of this year,
the primary channel of communication with the President would be
H. R. "Bob" Haldeman, President's Chief of Staff. He would not be
the exclusive cliannel. Tlie President would contact me on occasion di-
rectly. But that would be the primary channel.
Mr. Dash. Now, in the course of your duties at the White House, did
you have occasion to writ^ a series of memorandums to tlie President,
or to Mr. Haldeman, or an^'body else ?
Mr. Buchanan. Well, being a writer, yes ; I did. That is the format I
generally used for communication in the lYliite House, was memoran-
dums. I have v/ritten numerous, scores if not hundreds, of memoran-
dums to both the President and, I am sure, to Mr. Haldeman. That is
correct.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Buchanan, did you bring with you or produce
in accordance with the subpena issued to you on Sept. 20, 1973, copies
of your memorandums dealing svith political strategy for the Presi-
dent or Presidential primaries of 1972 and the campaign?
]Mr. Buchanan. No, sir ; I did i^ot. I first went to get the direction of
the Director of the President's Counsel. I believe this matter is in
court. I have read — because of the brevity of the time I was given tc
prepare for this testimony, I have not had an opportunity to read all
of tlie political strategy memos that 1 have sent between 1971 and
1972, but I have read a number of them. Again, I did not bring them
here; I first went for the direction of the Pi-esident's Counsel.
Mr. Dash, Do you have those memorandums in your possession in
your office at the White House ?
Mr. Buchanan. No, thai would not be precise. I have some in my
WHiite House files. Most of my memorandums from 1971 to 1972 are
down in the basement of tlie Executive Office Building. I have had the
opportunity to Xerox some of these, my secretary has. That is a limited
number, just Ijecause of the sheer volume.
While I am allowed to Xerox and read these memorandums, I could
not without authorization from the President's Counsel remove them
from the "Wliite House, nor would I.
Mr. Dash. Would you tell us when did your file of memorandums
become part of the Presidential Papers and not in your complete
Mr. Buchanan. I think they have ahvays been part of the Presiden-
tial Papers.
Mr. Dash. When were they removed from j^our control ?
Mr. Buchanan. They were removed at my direction and frankly,
I thought it was only temporary. It was indicated, an individual who
had worked for me in the campaign in 1972 came back from a com-
mittee hearing and he said, "They are going to subpena all our files."
So 1 said, "Well, let's go down to the counsel's office."
So we 'went down to the counsel's office and the counsel indicated
that it would be best if all our files were ])laced under, taken down-
3906
stairs, at least from 1971 and 107:2, and so they were. But I had that
access and I did have the right to Xerox those particular memoran-
dums
Mr. Dash. "What counsel advised you ^
Mr. BrciiAXAN. I couldn't be certain which individual. It was cer-
tainly Mr. Buzhardt and Mr. Garment and /or Mr. Parker, I would
think.
Mr. Dash. And is it the position of counsel at the White House that
these memorandums dealing "with ])olitical campaign strategy are not
available to us under the subjiena because of executive privilege?
Mr. BucHAXAX. I think you will have to ask counsel what their posi-
tion is, but I think that is not unreasonable in light of the fact that
man}' of the memorandums are to the President of the United States.
Many of the memorandums deal with reconnnendations for Presiden-
tial action. Many of the memorandums were prepared at the direction
of the President.
I think you would have to talk to those individuals to ascertain
what the legal grounds on which they withheld them are.
Senator Ervix. If I ma.y interject myself at this point, the ^^Hiite
House and myself have very fundamental disagreements about the
nature and scope of executive privilege. The Constitution and laws of
the United States place certain obligations upon the President. I
accept executive privilege to a limited extent. I think the President is
entitled to receive the uninhibited advice of his aides, which is being
sought by him or given by them, to enable him to perform in a lawful
manner the official duties of his office.
For that reason, I accept the validity of executive privilege to this
extent : In my judgment, the President is entitled to have kept secret
confidential information, confidential communications made to him by
an aide, or even confidential communications among his aides, which
have for their purpose enabling him to perform in a lawful manner
his constitutional and legal duties.
Further than that, executive privilege does not go. Since it is not a
part of the official duty of a President to run for reelection, and since
it is not the official duty of a President to conceal evidence of wrong-
doing, I do not think the President has the right to withhold any infor-
mation in his possession that deals with political activities, or which
deals with wrongdoing. And I am gi-atified to know that former
Attorney General John X. IMitchell agreed with me on my view of
executive privilege at the time he was before this committee.
Mr. BuciiAXAX. Mr. Chainnan, first, I think it would be a mistake
to make the assumption that anything in my memorandums indicates
a recommendation for wrongdoing.
Second, a number of these memorandums were prepared prior to the
campaign of 1972, and they deal with my analysis of individuals which
would also have an impact on Presidential strategy with regard to
legislation and Presidential strategy, say, with regard to defense
issues, because we were being criticized on those scores.
Third, there is no question that the character of my rhetoric in
some of these memorandums would be. in your term, uninhibited. I
have been writing these confidential memorandums to the President
for close to 8 yeare and — that will be my statement.
Senator Ervix. I didn't intend to intimate that I had any opinion
that there was anj'thing in your memorandums that indicated wrong-
3907
doing. I "was just laying down a proposition. But I do infer that there
is much in your memorandums that dealt with political activities.
Mr. BucHAXAN. That would be true.
Senator Ervin. I do not think the Constitution and laws make it
thu official duty of anybody to rur. for President of the United States
and, therefore, executive privilege can't possibly cover that. That is
my own opinion, and I am glad to say that John Mitchell agreed with
me.
Thank you.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Buchanan, just one last question on that. I think j^ou
mentioned that action was taken concerning the control of these papers
after a witness returned and said the papers might be subpenaed.
Can you tell us what witness ?
Mr. Buchaxax. It was not a formal witness before the committee.
It was my aide, Khachigian. There was no subpena forthcoming.
Mr. Dash. Xow, the committee has been able to acquire by subpena
from the Committee To Re-Elect the President's records, a number
of memorandums — not, certainly, all of your memorandums — and you
will find on your table for later use during questioning, a file of those
memorandums with tabs and a summary.
Mr. Buchaxax. Mr. Dash, let me comment upon that.
The other night, when I had my discussion with you and Mr. Lenz-
ner, I asked you candidly, at that time, if there were any memorandums
in your possession which I could look at and study in prej^aration for
discussion before this committee. You and Mr. Lenzner sliowed me
something like, somewhere between 4 and 6 memorandums. There are
a good deal more than 4 or 6 memorandums here. There are dozens of
them of tremendous length. If you had shown me these memorandums,
I would be a good deal more prepared to testify fully about their
contents.
Mr. Dash. ]Mr. Buchanan, you will recall when you did that, you
also informed me that you had a complete file of your own memoran-
dums. These are from that file ?
Mr. Buchax^ax. No, sir; they are not. You have memorandums dat-
ing back to 1969 — 2 in 1969 — and 1970. I have no memorandums in my
operative file that I would even Xerox that deal with 1969 and 1970.
I understood that was not within the purview of the committee.
Mr. Dash. At the appropriate time a memorandum is referred to,
you can raise whatever questions joii wish. Not all of those memo-
randv.ms may be referred to. The^^ are the memoraadums that the
committee dici receive and we felt you should have them at your table.
Mr. Buchaxax. Mr. Dash, I don't think I need a c )unsei; I need a
librarian more.
Mr. Thompsox". Mr. Chairman, excuse me.
Is my understanding correct, Mr. Buchanan, that you thought yqji
were informed that you would be able to see all the documents you
were being queried on ?
INlr. BucHAXTAK. I had a discussion with Mr. Dash and Mr, Lenzner.
I asked repeatedlj^ 1 said, ''Listen, I did not. recommend any dirty
tricks. If you have any strategy memo that could be misconstrued, I
would like to see it. If you have any memo you want to take up with
me in committee session, let me see it; I will be happy to discuss it.'^
3908
Mr. Thompsox. You were askiiio- to see 3'onr own memorandums ?
Mr. BrcHAXAx. My own memorandums, because in my files there
are thousands of memorandums which I could not have possibly read
in the 24 hours I was given to prepare for this testimony. I am pre-
pared to discuss any of these memorandums if I am given an oppor-
tunit}^ to look them over.
Mr. Thompson'. Mr. Chairman, as a general proposition, I think that
we should have done this with past witnesses and I think we ought to
do it with future witnesses. If we have documents, especially docu-
ments that the witnesses themselves prepared, essentially their own
work product, I don't think it serves the committee's purposes to put
the witness in the position of being able merely to surprise him with a
document that maybe he hasn't seen for a few years. I don't think there
is anything wrong; I think it is only proper and right that a witness,
especially when he has requested it and it is promised him, be able to
review his own memorandums, particularly when he is asked to come
in here and testify in detail, especially about sentences in his own
memorandums, in public. I think he ought to have a chance to sit and
read the whole memorandum.
Senator ER%aN". I agree with you, and I would suggest that we give
Mr. Buchanan all of the memorandums that they are going to ask
him about, and if he wants to adjourn the meeting so he can read them
before we question him, I will be glad to take that up with the com-
mittee; and, on the other hand, if he wants to proceed, I will assure
him I will give him plenty of time to refresh his recollection about
the memorandums.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, this again is in a context of a subpena
that we served on Mr. Buchanan for his memorandums which he
prepared, and which was not forthcoming under the directions of the
Wliite House to give us those. There was no promise to supply him
all of the memorandums that Ave had. It is not for the purpose of
surprise, but direct questioning of this witness by the committee is
not accomplished by providing all of the memorandums in advance,
so that any testimony that can be given may be rehearsed testimony.
Senator Gtjrxey. Mr. Chairman, I would like to point out that in
this very thick folder there are something like 84 memorandums, and
I was presented these memorandums last night about 6 o'clock, so
I do not know about the witness being surprised but I certainly am,
and I have had no opportunity to go over this at all. I have leafed
through a few of these, did it last night. They have nothing to do
with dirty tricks at all. But I think also, in the proper procedure
of this committee, it would be an excellent idea if Senators had an
opportunity of seeing voluminous memorandums that the committee
apparentlv has had for many weeks.
•Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a qnestion to put things
in perspective for my own purpose ? Could I ask where we got these
memorandums ?
Mr. Dash. We got these memorandums bv subnena of the fiVs of
the Committee for the T?e-Elof^tion of the President, that are either
in the archives or from ]Mr. Mairuder's files which are presently in
the possession of the Special Prosecutor.
Senator "Raker. So all of these documents came either from the
Committee To Re-Elect or from the archives ?
3909
Mr. Dash. Or from the Special Prosecutor who was holding Mr,
Magruder's files.
Senator Baker. So one way or the other they came from the Com-
mittee To Re-Elect or the White House files?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Buchanan. If I can make a statement.
Senator Baker. Before you make a statement was any protest made
about the delivery of any of these documents?
Mr. Dash. No protest.
Senator Baker. You have no litigation?
Mr. Dash. Given to us by subpena and by the Special Prosecutor as
well as subpena on the archivist of the Committtee To Re-Elect.
Senator Baker. The only question is whether the witness and the
committee has had a chance to look at this inch-and-a-half folder.
Mr. Dash. We have had this problem before. These foldere and
exhibits come to us over a period of time. We also have had the problem
that has been indicated earlier, and I only feel it is fair to make this
record, since it has been referred to, as to when various membei^
of the committee get exhibits. We have had- the problem of when
exhibits do appear in the press, and I have indicated, how I deplore
the question that INIr. Buchanan raised concerning revelations in the
press, since it is the effort of the committee to hold as tightly as possible
all of its documents so that there are no leaks.
The emphasis is to try to put together for the full committee all of
the material that we have in advance of calling the witness as early
as we can for the committee. Yesterday was the first time that we could
actually index and put these things together for the committee, and
prepare them oui^selves as the staff of this committee.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman. I can verify the difficulties, and
Mr. Dash and I have worked together on these matters trying to get
these things out in sufficient time for members of the committee and
for ourselves.
The problem that I see, though, and one that I think needs verifica-
tion — Mr. Dash in his statements and purposes of the committee is not
served by not providing these documents to the committee in advance.
A criminal defendant under rule 16 of the Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure has a right to copies of his own recorded statements well in ad-
vance of trial, and I do not think it is right to bring a witness in here
and surprise him with one of his own documents. I think he ought to
have a chance to look at his own documents, especially if they have
been promised to him.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, let me say that I think you accurately
summarized the dilemma when you said that it really is up to the
witness to decide whether he wants to proceed at this point or not and
I would recommend, Mr. Chairman, that we leave that decision to
Mr. Buchanan.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. Dash. May I ask Mr. Buchanan one question ? Mr. Buchanan,
did you not tell us that, in fact, you were informed by the archivist as
to the memos vre had Xeroxed ?
Mr. Buchanan. Right, I w^as informed by the archivist as to memos
you had Xeroxed. I was not sure these were in your possession. If
21-296 O — 74-
3910
these memos were in the archives, we were not sure what you had, and
we asked you what you liad, and I was not informed .
Mr. Chairman and Mr, Cochairman, let me just mention, I am
altogether unfamiliar at this point in time with the first 10 memo-
randunis that deal with — going to 1970. I do not believe they have
anything to do with the 1972 campaign.
My first — I am aware of the firet memorandum, INIarch 24, 1971,
which has to do with strategy for the 1972 campaign, and I do not
know if I have read or looked over all of these memos ; I do recognize
a number of them. I am fully prepared to go ahead and testify to
these, and if there are some in here that I have not seen or looked over
in the last couj^le of weeks, then we can take a few minutes and I can
look them over. Would that be fair ? It is up to No. 10. The ones before
that I would have to sit back and read because I have not seen those.
Mr. Dash. We may have to because, on the question of whether they
are relevant to this inquiry, I think I will be able to at least state an
argument as to the relevance of those that I will refer to, and if Mr.
Buchanan would like to read them first, before any questions, then I
would desist, but 1 would like to proceed in a certain line of question-
ing which may
Mr. Buchanan. Sure.
Mr. Dash [continuing]. Lead into some of those memorandums.
Mr. Buchanan. OK. We will do the best we can.
Senator Baker. Let us make sure we understand what we are doing.
Senator Ervin. Let me see if I understand the witness. Do you
want some time to read the memorandums ?
Mr. Buchanan. No, Senator, I would j^refer to go ahead. As I say,
these memorandums, the first 10, deal with prior to the 1970 congres-
sional elections. I do not think, in glancing over it, they have anything
to do with 1972 at all. They may have. I am prepared fully to testify'
now and if we run into a memorandum that they quote from, and I
have not read or seen in 4 years, maybe I can sit back and take a look
at it.
Senator Ervin. We can rule on that when it is presented but my im-
pression is that people run for office about 6 and 7 years in advance
now and 1 think
Mr. Buchanan. We were more successful
Senator Ervin. That was one reason why the Democratic Party suf-
fered a defeat and that so many of its candidates got out and ran so
long in advance.
Senator Baker. 1 take it, Mr. Chairman, I fully agree with you,
and I have been the victim of having to run 6 or 7 years in advance.
I know the symptoms, but 6 or 7 years in advance, according to my
mental arithmetic, would take us back to 1961 and I think we ought to
take that into account as we proceed.
Mr Dash. I do not think v.e will go back to 1961, Mr. Buchanan.
Mr. Buchanan. Right.
Mr. Dash. How were your memorandums routed ?
Mr. B ghav.nn. The primary channel of communication for politi-
cal meuiorandums, it was to the President. It would go through Mr.
Haldeman. other than that the principal strategy memorandums would
go to Ml. R"];:;.omii and a copy to the Attorney General.
3911
Mr. Dash. All ri^ht, now. Sometime during the summer of 1971
were you asked to direct an investigation of Daniel Ellsberg?
Mr. Buchanan. That is correct.
On July 6 — if I recollect the date correctly, I was called to a meet-
ing in Mr. Ehrlichman's office where Mr. Ehrlichman, Mr. Colson, and
Mr. Haldeman were present at various times, and I was asked to not
so much conduct the investigation, I believe, as to oversee the investi-
gation and to serve as White House liaison, an assignment I rejected.
Mr. Dash. In rejecting it — by the way — what reason did you give
for rejecting it?
Mr. Buchanan. I felt that for me an investigation of Daniel Ells-
berg was a waste of my time and my abilities.
Mr. Dash. Did you prepare any memorandums with regard to that
assignment request?
Mr. Buchanan. I did. I rejected the offer verbally, and subsequent
to that I believe on July 8 I did prepare a memorandum foi" Mr.
Ehrlichman indicating my reasons why I not only did not want to
uniertake it myself, but did not see the value of doing so. I do not
have a copy of that memorandum, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. We do not have either.
Mr. Buchanan. I am going to talk to the grand jury tomorrow
about the particular memorandum but I have to go back to the "Wliite
House and sit down and study it before I could give you any details.
Mr. Dash. I am not asking you for that at this moment and we do
not have a copy of it either, Mr. Buchanan. But I would like to show
you a memorandum dated August 26, 1971, from Mr. David Yomig to
Mr. John Ehrlichman which is already in the record of this com-
mittee as exhibit No. 91. Do you have it there? If it is not in the file,
it should be loose.
Mr. Buchanan. Exhibit No. 91 ?*
Mr. Dash. It should be loose on the top of your pile.
Mr. Buchanan. Are these in chronological order the way they are
going to come, right ?
Mr. Dash. If you will turn to page 4 of that memorandum, you will
note that there is an item 9 that raises the question : "How quickly
do we want to try to bring about a change in Ellsberg's image?" And
you see an asterisk
Mr. Buchanan. This thing, is this from David Young, the 28th,
page 4 ?
Mr. Dash. Yes, page 4.
Mr. Buchanan. How far down here ?
Mr. Dash. Down to the last line.
Senator Baker. "VVliat date ?
Mr. Dash. August 26, Senator Baker. I think everyone has it.
Mr. Buchanan. I have got it, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Yes. If you have it, it is No. 9, the last line of the memo
on page 4 and the question put there is: "How quickly do we want
to try to bring about a change in Ellsberg's image?" You will note
there is an asterisk, and if you turn the page
Mr. Buchanan. Riffht.
•See Book 6, p. 2646.
3912
Mr. Dash [continuing]. Tlie last half of the page has an asterisk
and it is followed by the following language :
In connection with issue 9, it is important to point ont that with the recent
article on Ellsberg's lawyer Boudin we have already started on a negiative pres*.
image for EUsberg. If the present Liddy-Hvint project No. 1 is successful, it is
absolutely necessary to have an overall game plan develoiJed for its use in
conjunction with the Congressional investigation. In this connection I believe
that the point of Buchanan's memo attacking Ellsberg in the press should be
borne in mind namely that the situation being attacked is too big to be under-
mined by planted leaks among the friendly press.
Is that a reference to Buchanan's memorandum — the memorandum
you referred to wlien you refused to accept tlie assignment i
Mr. Buchanan. I think it would have to be because I have gone
through all of my chron file, have all of my memorandums thiough
July, August, and September, and that is the only memorandum that
m.akes a reference to Mr. Ellsberg. There are a couple of points 1
would like to make in reference to this. 1 trust I did not have the im-
pression that what the assignment I was being offered was something
illicit or unethical or wrong, it was not, and I did not understand it
that way from Mr. Haldeman, Colson, or Ehrlichman.
Second, in the memorandum, I would not like to be held to the
exact verbiage of my memorandum right now, not having looked at
it, but I did suggest — frankly, my personal view was that a national
address be made and that the subject of the national address would be
the New York Times decision and Washington Post decision, and 1
drafted a speech which was not delivered, but the speech had no men-
tion of INIr. Ellsberg in it, and it was m.y feeling that not having done
that, the situation with regard to the public opinion which had decided
frankly in favor of the newspapers, a decision to publish those docu-
rnents which we disagreed witli, the documents not being particularly
disadvantageous to the Nixon administration since they were from
the early Kennedy and Johnson years, I felt we should argue this
thing out on principle on the front pages in a major address dealing
with the New York Tim.es, and the Washington Post, and not try to,
in effect, speak to columnists who tended to agree ^^ith us and ask
them to argue this issue on the back pages. That would be inefficacious.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Buchanan, in line with your statement that you did
not understand there Avas any request for wrongdoing, I wish tc
stress in questions I will be putting to you, I don't wish you to infer
any inference from the question of any wrongdoing or impropriety on
your part.
As a matter of fact, I think that one of tlie values of your being
here today and being able to testify is to aid the committee in deliber-
ating what is proper, what is not proper. This is a problem that the
committee will have to resolve ultimately under its mandate, and 1
would like to ask you from time to time, your own opinion on that
to aid the committee and that therefore, I would like to express the
fact that my questions are seeking to suggest impropriety on your
part.
Mr. Buchanan. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Dash. Did you know though that a special unit under Mr.
Ehrlichman was contemplated, and was, in fact, set up to investigate
Mr. Ellsberg?
3913
Mr. Buchanan. No, sir ; I did not. The first I heard of the Plumb-
ers unit was when I believe I read it in Newsweek, and my under-
standing of my assignment was it would not be an investigation con-
ducted inside the Wliite House at all, by White House personnel but
it would be outside.
Mr. Dash. Did you know Mr. Krogh and Mr. Young?
Mr. Buchanan. Very well. Mr. Krogh is a good personal friend
of mine. Mr. Young, I worked with on briefing books occasionally
when he worked with Dr. Kissinger. I knew him less well than I
knew Mr. Krogh.
Mr. Dash. Did you have any working relationship at all with
regard to this particular matter ?
Mr. Buchanan. No, I had nothing to do with the thing once we
signed off.
Mr. Dash. After you turned down the offer to sort of coordinate
this investigation of Mr. Ellsberg, did Mr. Colson talk to you about
it and indicate that you had been given first opportunity and that he
had gone ahead and picked somebody else ?
Mr. Buchanan. Well this came very recently. Mr. Colson had called
me, he said, simply to alert me as a courtesy that he had discussed the
Ellsberg thing before some Senate Committee, and he said :
I told the Senate Committee that you had been offered the assignment of
investigating the Ellsberg thing first and that you turned it down and that I
had, after you turned it down, I had spoken to you by telephone to offer it to you
again and that you had turned it down again by telephone.
And I have no recollection of that telephone call with Mr. Colson but
I am sure it is accurate.
Mr. Dash. By the way, when did you first learn of the break-in of
Dr. Fielding's office?
Mr. Buchanan. When Mr. Mort Allen who nms the President's
news summary came walking into my office with the item off the
A wire.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Buchanan, would you turn to your memorandum of
June 8, 1972, which is tab 27 [exhibit No. 187] and turn to page 11
in that?
Mr. Buchanan. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Is that a memorandum that yovi prepared?
Mr. Buchanan. This is known euphemistically as the assault
strategy. This is not — I did a memorandum like this but this does not
look like my typewriter. This is not the format. This is not the — I did
do a memorandum of considerable length on this subject, it looks like
mine but it does not look like the top of it. Mine would be a memoran-
dum from the President to Buchanan and Khachigian and giving the
date, but it is nothing like the format, but I did prepare a fonnat at
great length on the various 40 items on assault strategy ; that is correct.
Mr. Dash. Is it true a number of your memorandums that you did
prepare on a certain form were actually transmitted to Mr. Magruder
of the committee, and sometime they retyped them in another form?
Mr. Buchanan. I think from what you gentlemen showed me the
other night it appears that is what was done to a number of them.
This Avas conceivably done here. I am sure this was my memorandum,
I am sure it was done here. I thought you gentlemen had retyped
them.
3914
Mr. Dash. We have not retyped them.
Mr. BuciiAXAx. OK.
Mr. Dash. Let me point to paragraph 25 which has a heading
"Ellsberg" and reads :
McGovern's personal encouragement of Ellsberg to violate Federal law is a
matter which \.e .should wait to exploit, say, two months after the DemcK-ratic
Convention. It should serve as a centerpiece of a national s^ieech, ix?rhaps by the
Vice President.
Now, was that in your memorandum, do you recall making that
recommendation?
Mr. Buchanan. I am sure it is because what you do not have is,
coupled with this, if you will, the attack strategy was what was known
as a quotations or attack book. In that book t^here is a public state-
ment by Senator McGovern of our paragraphs from Parade magazine
wherein he himself states publicly, I believe that he encouraged, he
told Daniel Ellsberg, I believe, that : "I can't do this because I am a
Senator, but why don't you go to the New York Times f
In my judgment that was a political error on his part — the quota-
tion was a public one — the quotation was in the medical quotations
book and my recommendation was, having researched Senator McGov
ern thoroughly, having gotten ahold of this quotation, we should hold
back and use this as a centerpiece of a speech later in the campaign ;
that is correct.
Mr. Dash. Then it would be fair to say that one of your recom-
mendations during the campaign was to attempt to make some tie-in
between the Ellsberg matter and Senator McGovern's campaign.
Mr. Buchanan. There was no need to make the tie-in. It was going
to use Senator McGovern's own quotations. That was a matter of pub-
lic record.
Mr. Dash. In preparation for the campaign of 1972, Mr. Buchanan,
were task forces created at the White House to deal with various as-
pects of the campaign?
Mr. Buchanan. I don't think they were at the AYhite House. I think
the Committee To Ke-Elect had a number of some 15 task force-typt;
groups which would study various aspects of the campaign, and I
think they were inclusive, tliese groups, of A^^ntc House personnel.
Mr. Dash. Were you given any particular assignment in the cam-
paign of an opposition nature ?
Mr. Buchanan. I think it was around mid-19Tl I was named chair-
man of the opposition research, opposition tracking, opposition analy-
sis group which would be one task force within the campaign.
Mr. Dash. What was your responsibility in that particular position ?
Mr. Buchanan. Well, I saw my responsibility as essentially analysis
of the strength and weaknesses and potential strategies and scenarios
of the potential Democratic candidates for the Presidency.
Mr. Dash. Who worked with you in this task force ; who assisted
you?
Mr. Buchanan. Some of the memorandums I did, quite frankly, be-
fore I was given the assignment. I think the one you mentioned —
Muskie on March 24 — I think the assignment came in either May or
June, I believe with — when Mr. Ken Khachigian was a political assist-
ant of mine.
Mr. Dash. Now, in the course of your duties during the Presiden-
tial campaign of 1972 and also your duties at the White House, were
3915
you of the view that a number of tax exempt foundations were un-
friendly to tlie President or to the Republican Party, and indeed help-
ful to the Democratic Party ?
Mr. BucHANAX. Well, that has — that might have been mentioned
during 1971 or 1972, but there is an idea or thought that I have had
back as far as 1969 and 1970 and it is my view that, for example, the
tax exempt funds of the Ford Foundation, which is the largest of all
foundations, which has something like 18 percent of all assets of
foundations, that these, by and large, were being channeled, when they
were, into public policy institutes, and others wdiich were in l>asic dis-
agreement with our own political philosophy and that these tax ex-
empt multimillions have the effect, in my personal judgment, of un-
balancing the political process, so I have recommended and have
drafted speeches actually to lay this out on the table, much as we laid
out what I felt was the base of the networks on the table, at the same
time to create some of our OAvn institutions which would be a counter-
part of, say, the Brookings Institution which would be conservative in-
stitutions that is true. But I do not think that was an issue or a matter
that was — I may be wrong, I have not read all these memos but it was
under active consideration in the campaign of 1971 or 1972. I know I
Tccommended it to the President after the campaign of 1972 that we
ought to establish our own institutions, our own public policy things
on a competitive basis.
Mr. Dash. Well, did you not believe that the leading contender in the
beginning of the Democratic primaries for the Presidential candidacy,
Senator Muskie, had a special relationship with the Ford Foundation?
Mr. BuciiAXAX. Well, I think Senator Muskie when one — Senator
Muskie went on two trips, I believe, again it was a matter of public rec-
ord, two or three that were sponsored by the Ford Foundation, one of
them was to Japan, I believe, and one of them was elsewhere. Again,
my view is that we ought to make the whole question of tax exempt
foundations and the use of their funds, especially a giant one like
the Ford Foundation, to unbalance the political process, in my judg-
ment, we ought to make it a public and political issue, and I have
recommended speeches dealing with that subject.
Now, on the JNIuskie recommendation, I think you Avould have to —
before moving on that — you would have to make the case nationally
against the Ford Foundation and McGeorge Bundy's oper-ation.
Mr. Dash. Did you make the recommendation that an investigation
should be made concerning the Ford Foundation's activities in politi-
cal affairs with regard to Democrats ?
Mr. Buchanan. I did an investigation myself in 1970, in the sum-
mer of 1970, but again this did not have to do with 1971 or 1972. I read
every article that was written, and the books that were written on the
Ford Foundation in a 10-day vacation period, and you did not need
other than the material that I had at hand in the public sector as to
where these funds were being channeled. It is a matter of public record
where the Ford Foundation puts its funds.
Mr. Dash. All right, now, INIr. Buchanan, would you turn to your
memorandum — 24: to the President, which is tab 10 [exhibit No. 170].
On that subject, "The Muskie Watch." If you will turn to page 7 of
that memorandum.
3916
Mr. BuciiANAx. Your librarian has ma<le an error. My 24 here is a
memorandum to John iMitchell and H. K. Ilaldeman. I do not have
that here.
Mr. Dash. Is that tab 10 ?
Mr. BucHAXAx. Tab 10 ?
Mr. Dash. It is your memorandum of March 24.
Mr. BucHAXAx. I am sorry. "The Muskie Watch,'* yes, sir.
What page is that ?
Mr. Dash. Page 7.
Senator Ervix. There is a vote on in the Senate, so we will have to
suspend.
Mr. Dash. This will give you an opportunity, ^Mr. Buchanan, to
read it.
[Recess.]
Senator Ervix. The committee will resume.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Buchanan, we will resume the questioning.
I directed your attention to the March 24, 1971, memorandum, which
is a memorandum from you to the President on the subject, "The
Muskie Watch." I have asked you to look at page 7 of that memoran-
dum. I will read into the record the short paragraph on the top of
page 7, headed "The Ford Foundation" :
When Whitney Young passetl away, one saw a picture of Ed Muskie in the
surf with Young and one learned that they were gathered in Nigeria on a Ford
Foundation-financed trip. Now, in my research on Ford, this is the third such
trip. Muskie was the only Democrat who made both junkets to Japan (some
of our Republican friends went also on one) financed by Ford. Certainly some
troublesome questions could be raised about Muskie's connection with McGeorge
Bundy's giant institution — and are they beliind hU: candidacy. Investigation
should be done on this score. This goes hand in "globe" — I guess the word is
"glove", really — hand-in-glove with the Foundation si^eeches.
Therefore, you were recommending at that time that investigation
should be done?
Mr. Buchax^ax'. Yes, but the investigation would be investigation
of the public record. All the materials I had on the Ford Foundation
came from huge volumed magazine articles; they came from reading
the voluminous testimony before the Patman Committee, which un
covered, I believe, or elevated the fact that the Ford Foundation had
provided stipends for eight of Senator Kennedy's campaign assistants.
An investigation would be a simple matter to go down the list of
Muskie staffers, and ascertain if any of these were on the payroll of
the Ford Foundation. But that is all I can say on that.
Mr. Dash. Well, then, actually, and I think you have testified to this
briefly, even prior to this particular memorandum, and actually, a
year earlier, in March 1970, you indicated to the President, or the
President indicated to you, the belief that investigation should be
made of the large foundations to learn which foundations supported
the Democratic Party and which were favorable to the administration.
Do you recall that ?
Mr. Buchaxax. Which investigation — what is the date of the
memorandum ?
Mr. Dash. Let me refer you to vour memorandum of March 3, 1970,
tab 4.
Mr. Buchaxax. I think I can explain that very simply for you. The
investigation was made. It was made by me in June of 1970. I got
3917
Reader's Guide, every publication, books, everything I could read on
the Ford Foundation, the Patman hearings. I took them to Florida
and spent 10 days researching and writing. I wrote there. I had every
connection of the Ford Foundation and the Brookings Institution, the
Fund for the Republic, the Institute for Policy Studies, and other
satellite institutions. I made my recommendations in the form of tw'o
addresses. The speeches were written. As written here, they have never
been delivered. But this seemed to me to be a purely legitimate activity
and the fact that
Mr. Dash. I am not questioning that, ]Mr. Buchanan.
Mr. Buchanan. The fact that the Ford Foundation is using its tax-
exempt funds to fund, by and large, liberal or left institutions pre-
sents a distortion, in my judgment, of the American political proc-
ess. There is no conservative foundation which even approaches
the resources of Ford or which is as active in funding either liberal
institutions or social action agencies. So my argiunent was that this
w^as a matter that ought to be put in the public record. That is why I
wrote the speeches and the investigation was not anything done cov-
ertly in any manner.
Mr. Dash. AVell, as a matter of fact, Mr. Buchanan, I would like
you to turn to tab 4 [exhibit No. 16-1:], which is your memorandum of
March 3, 1970, to the President, in wliich you clid put dow^n most of
this on record, and I tliink from this memorandum, must have come
your investigation and later understanding of the foundation.
Mr. Buchanan. This is inaccurate. Let me tell you, Mr. Dash, sec-
ond to the political realinement, the dream of the American consen^a-
tive is to put together our own Brookings Institution. I believe — is
this the idea for the Mac Arthur Institute ?
Mr. Dash. No. Do you have tab 4 ? It is a memorandum on White
House letterhead, March 3, 1970.
Mr. Buchanan. I have not been shown this memorandum before.
Oh, there it is, the MacArthur Institute.
Mr. Dash. I am not talking about the MacArthur Institute at this
point. The first page of the memorandum which has a date, March 3,
1970, on it.
Mr. Thompson. I believe that is the MacArthur Institute.
Mr. Buchanan. I have not been shown this memorandum prior to
todaj^ I have not seen this for close to 4 years.
Mr. Dash. I am going to ask you some questions. You may have time
to read it — take as much time as you want. There was 20 minutes dur-
ing our brief recess in which I had asked you as one of the things to
look at some of these memorandums.
In any event, is it not true that the very opening paragraph of that
memorandum states that the President directed several of us to give
thought to how to combat the institutionalized power of the left con-
centrated in the foundations that succor the Domocratic Party?
Mr. Buchanan. That is an accurate reading of the firet sentence,
yes, sir,
Mr. Dash. Now, have you believed that it is appropriate for the
administration, either the Wliite House or any of its representatives,
to influence Federal Government grant programs in a way to deny
grants to unfriendly foundations in favor of proadministration
foundations ?
3918
Mr. Buchanan. That would depend. I am not that conversant Avith
grants, but if the grants are based on lowest bidder, then it should
be done honestly. If the grants are discretionary within the authority
of the President to turn them o\er to one institution or another, I
would recommend to the President that he turn any grants for studies
or projects like that over to institutions which generally support tlie
values and principles in which we believe, and not to other institutions
such as the Brookings Institution, which in my judgment, amounts
to, really, a government in exile for the Democratic Party.
Mr. Dash. And in fact, if }ou look on page 4 of your memorandum,
which follows your recommendation for the MacArthur Institute,
which would be a Republican conservative foundation, there is a
heading, "What About the Money'' that would fund such an institute?
If you look at item 3 under that, the recommendation is that all
Federal contracts now going to institutions which are essentially anti-
administration would be shifted to this new baby — and to other pro-
administration foundations. Antiadministration foundations should
be cut off without a dime. One good talk to the Cabinet would be all
that would bo required to get cooperation here and Budget could be
on notice to notify the West Wing if Brookings gets any more money.
IVIr. Buchanan. There is nothing in there. Of course, it is a lowest
bidder thing. I do not have any recommendation in here for violating
the law. But I Avould urge that the Nixon administration, if there
are discretionary funds, if there are institutions wliich are su]:»portive
of the values in which we believe, then our discretionary contracts
for studies and the like should go to institutions which concur with
our ideas. I repeat, but what does this have to do with the campaign
of 1972?
Mr. Dash. This is in the contention of the question I asked earlier
about the Ford Foundation and tlie influence of foundations in the
campaign. I think this is the background of that which led up to
that. That is why it is relevant.
Now, do 3^ou also believe, Mr. Buchanan, or did you advocate that
it is an appropriate function of the White House or its representatives
to use the Internal Eevenue Division as a weapon against foundations
you believe are friendly to the Democratic Party and unfriendly to
the administration ?
Mr, Buchanan. I have recommended on several occasions, once
when I received in the mail a political attack on the President and
the Vice President and the Attorney General — it was a strictly political
attack, in violation of the law, in my judgment, because at the end of
the political attack, it said, please send in your tax-exempt dollars
now. On each of these occasions — there Avere two or three when these
things occurred — I recommended to Mr. Haldeman that this
matter be looked into. It appeared to me to be a violation of the law.
It was the use of tax-exem]it funds for political operations; it was
disadvantageous to the administration and if these institutions were
using their tax-exempt status to engage in politics, then Ave should
move to remove their tax-exemption status.
As you Avill recall, in 1969 — I am sorry, 1967 — President Johnson
directed that the tax exemptions of the Sierra Club be removed for
violation of its tax exemption by virtue of its lobbying. It had only
sent out a single ad, I believe, on a conservation issue.
3919
Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, in a single memorandum on the next
l^age, Mr. Buchanan, page 5 of your general memorandum on the so-
called liberal foundations and a requirement for a Republican con-
servative foundation, at the very top of the page, you state that:
One of my primary concerns about this is that it requires a strong fellow run-
ning the Internal Revenue Division
Mr. Buchanan. Right.
Mr. Dash [continues reading] :
And an especially friendly fellow with a friendly staff in the Tax Exempt Office.
Am not sure we have the right now.
Second, we could use a greater willingness on the part of our Internal Revenue
to engage in combat with some of these lesser anti-Administration institutions
like the Stern Foundation.
Mr. Buchanan. Right. Let me give you the reasoning on this thing.
After the election of 1964, when Barry Goldwater was defeated,
there was a conservative foundation that had some personnel that had
worked in Senator Goldwatcr's campaign. They came within an ace
of losing their tax-exempt foundation status even though they had
not engaged in any political activities. There is an apprehension in
my mind that the Democratic Party came into power and any tax-
exempt institution created which was not really as clean as a hound's
tooth, in which any sort of conservative political activity occurred
would have that tax exemption withdrawn.
Mr. Dash. Was there any request that you know of by the adminis-
tration for either tax audits or tax reports from the group of founda-
tions that 3^ou classified as liberal or
Mr. Buchanan. No. I think that is — the expenditures of founda-
tions, I believe, as a result of the 1969 tax act, I believe were a matter
of public record. I have never seen a tax return of anybody, any in-
stitution or any individual, that I can recall since I have been in the
White House. I do not know why you would have to look at a tax re-
turn. It is a public record what the Ford Foundation's income, its
assets, its disbursements are. You can just read their annual report. I
do not believe I recommended that, but again, I have not looked
Mr. Dash. No, I just quoted your recommendation. I have not sug-
gested that you have.
I have asked you whether or not, based on that recommendation,
you are aware of any implementation or followthrough of any request
for tax reports ?
Mr. Buchanan. No, because as I say, it is not a tax report you would
look for if you are trying to remove the tax exemption of an adminis-
tration. It is not a financial hanky-pank. It is whether they are en-
gaged in the political process where they have no business.
For example, I saw a report back in 1967 or 1968 of the National
Student Association. It had decided to engage in lobbying and the like
and it was engaged in wholly political activity. But the same report
that you had which was a public report, incidentally, showed that they
had set up some sort of dual fund which enables them to get tax-
exempt funds in one pot and the other is nontax exempt.
Mr. Dash. But your recommendation of what would be required as a
friendly fellow or friendly staff in the Internal Revenue would mean
some aggressive activity.
Mr. Buchanan. It is well known that the Internal Revenue Service,
in our view, was politically controlled by Democrats, or had been at
that particular time.
3920
Mr. Dash. Do you know whether or not after this
Mr. Buchanan. Did we clean it out ?
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Buchanan. We have only gotten something like 10 schedule C
positions. At this particular time, we had only filled with one of our
own. It has been the impression, I think perhaps justified, in the past
that the tax-exempt division of the IRS had been biased agairist con-
servative tax-exempt organizations and had been very lenient in re-
gard to liberal tax-exempt organizations and their activities which
crossed the bomidary into politics.
Mr. Dash. Now, did you know or do you know, Mr. John Caulfield ?
Mr. Buchanan. I know him very well.
Mr. Dash. Did you know of his Avork at the White House, and what
his work was at the "*A"hite House '(
Mr. Buchanan. I knew he was doing routine investigations. I had
no knowledge of some of the activities which have become public.
Mr. Dash. And you had no relationship in any way with him?
Mr Buchlvnan. I have a closer personal relationship. He is a very
good friend of mine.
Mr. Dash. Did you know about the political activities of a person
known as Fat Jack ? I think in your statement you indicated you did
not know the person.
Mr. Buchanan. The fii-st I heard of Fat Jack is when it came out
in Mr. Hunt's testimony.
Mr. Dash. Were you aware that the Committee for the Ee-Election
of the President had a spy in the Muskie campaign headquarters who
was photographing Muskie material and turning them over to the
Committee for the Re-Election of the President ?
Mr. Buchanan. I was not aware that Ave had a spy. On two occasions
we receiA'ed — I received, personally — documents from the Muskie
campaign which were fairly low-grade political ore. They were sent
over by the Committee To Re-Elect. They were unsolicited papers and
they were in a photographed form, but whether the individual there
was a leak or a spy or whether it was Fat Jack or one of these other
code names or how it came to the Committee To Re-Elect, I could not
tell you to this day.
Mr. Dash. How did you — you say you received some material that
came from the Muskie headquarters ?
Mr. Buchanan. It came out of the Muskie campaign, that is correct.
There Avere several batches of photographed documents and, as I
stated, it was fairly loAv-grade political ore. Leaks are not uncommon
in campaigns, and a recommendation made to the Committee To
Re-Elect asked Avhat I should do Avith it, and I said most of it is
insignificant, but there are two or three items in Avhich Evans and
NoA^ak might be interested — the fact that Senator Muskie proposed
using public funds in public hearings to advance his candidacy, which
would seem to me to be a matter which the people had a right to know.
Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, did Mr. Evans and Mr. Novak,
did they publish the matter in their column ?
Mr. Buchanan. Published, I could not say Avith certitude. What I
recommended that Ave send to them Avas the material that was pub-
lished. I Avould have to be shoAvn by the staff — the columur— and I
would also have to be shoAvn, I think, again the material Ave had. But
3921
we did get material on two occasions, and I did recommend that it
be sent to columnists Evans and Novak. Evans and Novak did print
on two occasions, I believe, material from Muskie's campaign; I do
not know whether this was the same thing. Mr. Hunt testified, maybe
I am mistaken, there were maybe 10 batches of it. If that is true, we
did not see it.
Mr. Dash. Yes, you only saw two batches ?
Mr. Buchanan. Just two occasions.
Mr. Dash. Two occasions.
Now, an important part of your assigmnent in the 1972 campaign
was to recommend strategy, was it not ?
Mr. Buchaxax. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And what, in fact, was your major recommendation at
the beginning of the campaign ?
Mr. Buchanan. I would say that in 1971, as I stated at the outset,
my principal recommendation was that given the fact that we had
12 Democrats opposing us, all of them attacking the President, that
we ought to concentrate and focus our political resources primarily, if
not exclusively, on Senator Miiskie, who was then the frontrunner
leading the President in the polls.
Mr. Dash. Did you put these recommendations in the form of a
memorandum ?
Mr. Buchanan. I certainly did.
Mr. Dash. It was your recommendation, was it not, and I think you
have just indicated, that the Republican Party all through the cam-
paign actually attempted to aft'ect the primaries so as to affect Mr.
Muskie's chances in the primaries ?
Mr. BucHAN^Ax^ Well, there is no doubt about it that in the summer
of 1971, we were counterattacking against Senator Muskie. He had
to run the gauntlet of the political primaries, and — right. If you are
devising a political strategy, you would have to take these into consid-
eration and providing scenarios for the primaries, the Democratic
primaries was one of our functions.
Mr. Dash. And this actually led to one of your — or at least the basic
memorandum was the one I think we referred to already, the memo-
randum of March 24, 1971, which is tab 10 [exhibit No. 170], which
you called the Muskie watch.
Mr. Buchanan. There v.ere four basic ones. One was an analysis of
Senator Muskie. One was an analysis of Senator Humphrey, another
an analysis of Senator Kennedy, and another an analysis of Senator
Jackson.
Mr. Dash. Is it not true, Mr. Buchanan, that you personally be-
lieved that the 1972 election was more than an ordinary Presidential
election but had a direct relationship for the safety of the country?
Mr. Buchanan. That is a line, I believe, out of a memorandum of
mine, the Muskie watch — let me say I would not — I would have been
less apprehensive liad Senator Jackson been the nominee than Senator
Muskie or Senator McGrovern. Senator Muskie or Senator McGovern
had won their election, given their views with regard to American
policy in Southeast Asia, I think it would have been a little short of
a catastrophe, that is correct.
Mr. Dash. If Senator Muskie had won the election ?
Mr. Buchanan. Given his views on Southeast Asia and later in the
campaign of Senator Humphrey. The only Democrat I would have
3922
been mildly comfortable with would have been Senator Henry
Jackson.
Mr. Dash. So actually, you expressed that view on page 7 of the
memorandum ?
Mr. Buchanan. Yes; this is the Muskie watch,
Mr. Dash. Let me just read you the langua<re that you had :
We ought to go down to the kennels and turn all the dogs loose on Ecology EJd.
The President is the only one who should stand clear, while everybody else gets
chewed up. The rest of us are expendable commodities : but if the President
goes, we all go, and maybe the country with us. My view
Mr. Buchanan. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. That was your
Mr. Buchanan. Mr. Dash, if you read my articles in the New York
Times, which are a fourth or fiftli draft, you will loiow my rhetoric
is somewhat hot and you can imagine what the first draft is like and
that is one of them.
Mr. Dash. In your
Mr. Buchanan. Incidentally, let me make a point here. The exag-
gerated metaphor is really the staple of American political language.
In the campaign of 1972, 1 recall Mr. Gary Hart said publicly : "If the
Nixon people do to us wdiat the Humphrey people did to us, which is
underestimate us, we will kill them."
I am. sure Mr. Hart did not mean physical violence on us, and when
I said we are going down to the kennels, the reference w-as not to King
Timahoe. [Laughter.]
Mr. Dash. ^Yliat actually did you have in mind when you were talk-
ing about being chewed up and doing everything that you could in
order to go down the line to see that Muskie would not succeed?
Mr. Buchanan. As I say, others disagreed with this — the Buchanan
memos are not the campaign. I made strategy, others disagreed
with me. Others felt Senator Kennedy perchance would be a stronger
candidate than Senator Muskie and if we focused our political resources
which were formidable, on Senator Muskie and he would decline in the
polls the result might be the nomination of Senator Kennedy would
be stronger. My personal view was otherwise. I always felt Senator
Muskie would be the strongest candidate, that analysis indicates that,
and we do not ha^■e political resources we coidd not focus on all 12 of
the Democrats and I asked the President, or recommended to the Presi-
dent, that the limited resources we were building then, these be focused
on Senator Muskie.
Mr. Dash. Let me put this in somewhat focus to see what your un-
derstanding was as to how far you would want to go because of how
you saw the fate of the countrv at that time. We have had testimonv
before us from Mr. Mitchell, the former Attorney General, who, I
think, in response to Senator Talmadge's question, stated that in order
to reelect the President he would practically do anything, and in that
case he was being questioned involving subornation of perjury and
coverup. Of course, there is no question with you, Mr. Buchanan, with
regard to that.
But would you have gone as far. though, did you feel as strongly as
Mr. Mitchell, do you endorse Mr. Mitchell ?
Mr. Buchanan. Charles Col son was quoted once as saying, "I would
do anything the President of the United States would ask me to do.
3923
period." I would subscribe to that statement for this reason : The
President of the United States would not ask me to do anything un-
ethical, improper, or wrong or illegal.
Mr. Dash. I think your statement really is that I would not go
as far as Mr. MitchelFs statement.
Mr. Buchanan. Well, I do not know that Mr. Mitchell has been
demonstrated to be guilty of anything. I do not know the fact of
these cases involving the Watergate and I think we ought to leave
that up to the courts. I am loyal to the President of the United
States, that is correct. I have been loyal to him for 8 years.
Mr. Dash. I am not questioning that, Mr. Buchanan.
Mr. Buchanan. What is it that you are questioning, Mr. Dash?
Mr. Dash. I am just asking you, in the memorandum, where you
have indicated the nature of the danger that you saw to the country,
and the impoi-tance that the forces of the Republican Party including
the Wliite House be aimed at knocking out the frontrunner, Mr.
Muskie, liow far would you go to do that ? What tactics would you
be willing to use?
Mr. Buchanan. What tactics would I be willing to use ? Anything
that was not immoral, unethical, illegal, or unprecedented in previous
Democratic campaigns. [Laughter.]
Mr. Dash. We will leave that general definition and see whether
or not some of this we might be able to define a little more clearly.
Did you have any discussion with anyone at the AAHiite House about
the possibility of hiring someone like a Donald Segretti ?
Mr. Buchanan. We certainly did. As you know Mr. Richard "Dick"
Tuck is the well-lviiown Democratic prankster, we enjoyed some of
his tricks against us as well as, I am sure, he did. I recall in just
three, briefly three of his favorites, one of them Avas in 1962 when
Mr. Nixon began to deliver a major address from the back of a rail-
road train he put on an engineer's cap and signaled the engineer to
drive off leaving Mr. Nixon standing there.
Another of his favorites w^as during a major political speech just
as the speaker reaches the denouement he drops the fire escape
on him.
The third was, we were at the Hotel Hilton down there in Miami
Beach, and out front demonstrating — I thought it was welfare mothers
or we heard it was welfare mothers at the time, they were all black,
they were all pregnant, and they were all carrying placards that said
"Nixon's the one." [Laughter.]
Some of the things done to us were hilarious. Mr. Haldeman as he
has testified, indicated that maybe it is about time we had ourselves
a political Dick Tuck. I was called into a meeting with Mr. Chapin
and several othei-s and asked how the Dick Tuck should be struc-
tured. My recollection of the meeting is that it should be a small
operation, and that because of 1971 Ave were depoliticizing publicly
the Wliite House, it ought to be under the Committee To Re-Elect
the President. That was the last I have heard. I do not know if that
was the — if Donald Segretti turned out to be the Dick-Tuck-gone-
awry or not.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chapin was at that meeting with you ?
Mr. Buchanan. He was in ]Mr. Chapin's office.
Mr. Dash. Did you learn Mr. Chapin in fact hired Mr. Segretti ?
3924
Mr. Buchanan. No, I never heard the name Mr. Segretti until it
came out in the banner headlines of the Washington Post.
Let me just state, make a point here also. When these things were
done by JNIr. Richard Tuck, tliey were considered humorous, pranks,
stunts, and we thought of them as such. But when some of the things
done by our people which were similar to those that were done, it re-
sulted in screaming banner headlines in the Washington Post about
political sabotage. Now there is a line across which political tricks
should not go, quite clearly. One of them obviously was in Florida. The
salacious attack on Senator Jackson, and Senator Humphrey, and
another I think was against us. against the President when phone
banks of McGovern's campaign, I believe, were used in California tc
get near violent demonstrations denying the President of the United
States a right to speak. These things clearly got out of hand I think
in both campaigns.
Let me move to Donald Segretti. The first I heard of that, as I said,
was the Washington Post and I think you have testified that I was
called in to a meeting at the White House in October of 1969 when
this came out, to discuss the handling of the Segretti matter and that
was the first of any idea we had about the thing or I had about his
activities.
Mr. Dash. What was your relationship with the Committee To Re-
Elect the President and Mr. INIagruder during the campaign?
Mr. Buchanan. My personal relations with the Committee To Re-
Elect was minimal. I had a political aide who had liaison with them on
some matters but my strategy memorandums and my analysis and
things like this, these would go directly up to the President, or to Mr.
Haldeman, or to Mr. Ehrlichman sometimes, so my relationships with
Jeb Magruder were very few. I was on a committee which they ran on
Monday nights, but which was not a significant one, but they were
fairly minimal. I know Jeb Magruder fairly well.
Mr. Dash. I think having said you "did not become aware of Mr.
Segretti," you are not able to really tell us Avhat kind of acts Mr. Se-
gretti may have done ?
Mr. Buchanan. No, I don't ; that is true. I think he has pleaded
guilty, hasn't he, to some things, maybe I am wrong.
Mr. Dash. There is one count.
Now, were you aware that Mr. Magruder actually had working for
the Committee To Re-Elect the President political espionage opera-
tives who, like Segretti, were working in the field ?
Mr. Buchanan. I don't know that Segretti was — you see there is a
differentiation between pranksters and infiltration.
Mr. Dash. I am talking about infiltrators.
Mr. Buchanan. As I mentioned, I received those Muskie docu-
ments. I didn't know if that was a spy or if that was a leak. I don't
know today the source of them. I could not testify to that. I do not
believe I knew of any spie^ in the other campaigns, because I do not
believe I received any other documents other than these two, and the
very fact that I received just these two, would lead me to believe that
we did not have widespread espionage operation going,
Mr, Dash. Were you aware
Mr. Buchanan. Or spies.
3925
Mr. Dash. Were you aware that any activities were going on, as a
political espionage matter under Mr. Magruder through Mr. Segretti
which were also aimed at the candidacy of Mr. Muskie?
Mr. Buchanan. Well, if you set a grand strategy, if the strategy
I recommended and, incidentally, I did not set the strategy. I was not
on the senior strategy board during the campaign, and I did not set
the strateg}^ for the primary thing but I recommended it. If my
recommended strategy were adopted, and if there were pranksters
out there, I am sure they would fit in underneath that but I do not
laiow that. I don't know that for sure.
Mr. Dash. Now, it is true, is it not, that you recommended as a
goal of the Republican campaign effort during the Democratic pri-
maries that the securing of Senator McGovern would be the best can-
didate for Mr. Nixon to run against 'i
Mr. Buchanan. Well, that would not be accurate— I thnik you have
a memo. I have a line in there that says : "We have not been so good in
our lives that providence is going to reward us Avith the nomination of
Senator McGovern." That was a statement in 1971. I did not even do
an analysis on Senator McGovern in 1971 because we did not consider
him a serious candidate. We began to consider Senator McGovern
a serious candidate just prior to the Wisconsin primary when we got
report of the strengths of his organization, and after the Wisconsin
primary we did do an analysis, a strategy analysis of the coming
Democratic primaries which led us to believe that McGovern could
win the nomination. In my judgment, McGovern was the candidate
we wanted most at that point in time, and I believe, I did make a
reconnnendation that all political resources of the Nixon campaign
and of the Nixon public campaigns that they leave Senator McGovern
alone and let him proceed unimpeded on the nomination because there
was a strong chance he would win it.
Mr. Dash. Let me refer you, Mr. Buchanan, to a memorandum of
April 12, 1972, to Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman from you and Mr.
Khachigian which is tab 23 [exhibit No. 183], April 2. Do you. have
that memorandum ? April 12, excuse me.
Mr. Buchanan. Let me see if I am right. The cover memorandum?
Mr. Dash. It is a cover memorandum.
Mr. Buchanan. Right.
Mr. Dash. And then the one that is from you.
Mr. Buchanan. This is right. This is our scenario, I think, of how
we felt projections and predictions of all
jNIr. Dash. Yes; let me read at least the first paragraph which I
think sets forth the position that you have been testifying to :
Our primary objective, to prevent Senator Muskie from sweeping the early
primaries, loclving up the convention in April, and uniting the Democratic Party
behind him for the fall, has been achieved. The 1 livelihood — great three months
ago — that the Democratic Convention could become a dignified coronation cere-
money for a centrist candidate who could lead a united party into the election —
is now remote.
Now, if we look to page 8 of that same memorandum.
Senator Baker. What are you looking at, Sam?
Mr. Dash. Tab 23, April 12, 1972, memorandum.
Senator Baker. Tab 23 ?
21-296 O — 74-
3926
Mr. Dash. Tab 23, and I am now referring to pao:e 8 of that memo-
randum, Senator Baker. And on the very top of that page :
Our next goal. What we need now is a decision on wliom we want to run
against. We believe that McGovern is our candidate for dozens of reasons. He
could be painted as a left radical candidate, the Goldwater of the Democratic
Party, and at this point in time we would inundate him. The Wallace Democrats,
south and north, as well as the Daley and Aleany Democrats would have to take
hemlock to support a fellow whose major plank is to chop $32 billion out of
defense. Also he is weak n'ith the blacks and would have to cater to that vote.
To his great disadvantage Humphrey can take the blacks for granted in a contest
with the President.
So in that memorandum tlie deal was, as stated, to have Mr. McGov-
ern as the candidate for the Democratic Party.
Mr. BucHAXAN. It asks for a decision, I believe, from the campaign
hierarchy in the first sentence.
Mr. Dash. That was your recommendation?
Mr. Buchanan. My recommendation was repeatedly that we ought
not to do anything to Senator McGovern in any way to impede his run
for the nomination and, frankly, Mr. Dash, if anything was done
against — even in the way of pranks or something like tliat — against
Senator McGovern in that period of time, then it Avould certainly have
been contrary to any recommendation that I had made.
Mr. Dash. Well, actually, on page 24 you make — ^on tab 24 [exhibit
No. 184], your next memorandum, dated April 27, 1972, from you to
Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman — that is exactly your recommenda-
tion.
Mr. Buchanan. Right.
Mr. Dash [reading] :
With the great success of McGovern and subsequent pull out of Muskie the
chances of McGovern's nomination are immensely improved. Thus we must do as
little as possible at this time to impede McGovern's race.
Mr. Buchanan. I think the reason for that was there were some
self-starters on our side. We had frankly had one candidate, Senator
Muskie, on whom we have done enormous research who had dropped
out of the race. We had done enormous research on Senator INIcGovern
and there Avere some individuals within the campaign organization of
the Republican Party who were recommending we move now to be
critical and lay on the record Senator McGovern's positions in order to
get him on the record before the convention, postconvention criticisms
being given little credence and my recommendation was that we not do
that, that we not be critical of Senator McGovern, that we stay out of
his effort, and I don't mean that in any pejorative sense but that we
don't criticize him.
Mr. Dash. Yes, you notice a handwritten statement which I think
is legible even in the Xerox at the bottom which says, "T agree with
this. Pass along to our staff. RNC," et cetera, that looks like John
Mitchell.
Mr. Buchanan. That is the very fii'st I have seen of that notation
but that indicates Mr. Mitchell concurred with the strategy.
Mr. Dash. Concurred with your recommendation.
Did you believe during the campaign, or advocate that the admin-
istration should use its power to make judicial appointments, including
the President's power to nominate ]>ersons for Supreme Court vacan-
cies either for political i:)urposes or to deride the Democratic Party ?
3927
Mr. Buchanan. I recommended since back in 1968 or 1969 that the
President of the United States appoint, first, a southern judicial con-
servative to tlie Supreme Court and. secondly, an Ajnerican of ethnic
descent, preferably an Italian to the Supreme Court, a distinguished
jurist, because I feel that Avould be good for the country and I think
it would have been good for us and it is consistent with our philosophy,
that is right.
Mr. Dash. Would you turn to , I think it is, a memorandum on tab
19 of October 6, 1971, and it is a cover memorandum which attaches
to your memorandum.
Mr. BucHAXAN. This is the memorandum on dividing the Demo-
crats' research.
Mr. Dash. Yes, dividing the Democrats.
Mr. Buchanan. They — let me place this in context.
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Buchanan. This says from research as requested. My under-
standing of this — I had been asked to do a long-range analysis of any
issues, of any recommendations, of any move that we could take which
would result in divisions in the Democratic Party, the fact being that
we can't win unless the Democratic — if the Democratic Party is
united, which is about twice the size of ours, there is no way we can
win a national election and we had recommended for a long period of
time that we move to win to our side certain specific segments of the
Democratic Party and my recommendations are the southern Protes-
tants, if you will, and the northern Catholics, both of those strategies,
and I think this is my long-range analysis of all the possible fissures
and faults running through the old Roosevelt coalitions.
Mr. Dash. Right.
Now, on page 3 of that memorandum under regional fissures, num-
ber one.
Mr. Buchanan. Right.
Mr. Dash [reading] :
The Supreme Court nomination of a southern district constructionist will
force Democratic northern liberals and major candidates to anger either the
south or the veto vote or the blacks and the labor movement and the northern
liberals, a highly qualified southern conservative nominee to the Supreme
Court is de facto a divisive issue in the Democratic Party.
Mr. Buchanan. That is one of those occasions where good policy
is also good politics, I think, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. But w^hat is^ — your recommendation here was that even
the President's filling a Supreme Court vacancy
Mr. Buchanan. Mr. Dash, there is no secret to any individual of
the national press corps or any individual Avho knows me that I would
recommend strong conservative judiciary officials be put on the U.S.
Supreme Court. I have been recommending that since 1966 to the
President. I would recommend it today, and the side effect of that
is to be divisive within the National Democrats; that is an ancillary
benefit with which I am delighted.
Mr. Dash. Did you say it was an auxiliary ?
Mr. Buchanan. Ancillary.
Mr. Dash. Ancillary.
Now, did you in a memorandum spell out what breadth there might
be to a Senator Edward Kennedy Presidential candidacy ?
3928
Mr. Buchanan. Eig'ht, but it was an analysis — I think this was on
a request. After I did the Muskie analysis, I was asked to do an analysis
on other Presidential candidates. I did one on Senator Kennedy, I
believe.
Mr. Dash. That would be your June 9, 1971, memorandum, which
is tab 13 [exhibit No. 173].
Were you aware, by the way — I am not making any special refer-
ences to that, but that does take in the possibility of, the strong
possibility of a Kennedy candidacy ?
Mr. Buchanan. That is right. We were low in the polls, or rela-
tively low in the polls in 1971. I think this reflected that it was our
feeling that we were low, that if the President looked extremely vul-
nerable that Senator Kennedy would move, but that if we were strong
and looked fairly invincible, that Senator Kennedy would lay back.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Buchanan, my next question would not directly
relate to anything of your knowledge, but the date of this memorandum
is related to testimony we have already received in this committee. It
is June 9, 1971, which recognizes Kennedy as perhaps a strong
candidate.
Mr. Buchanan. Right.
Mr. Dash. But we received testimony from Mr. Hunt yesterday that
he had received instructions from Mr. Colson to fabricate some State
Department cables that linked the Kennedy administration to the
assassination of Diem.
Mr. Buchanan. Mr. Dash, as I have stated, I never heard of E.
Howard Hunt until June 1972.
Mr. Dash. I am not connecting that with this. I say the date of the
memorandum certainly shows that the administration
Mr. Buchanan. Well, it does not show that. It is a memorandum to
the Preisdent doing an analysis of Edward M. Kennedy, and my
analysis indicated that I thought we should focus on Senator Muskie.
I do not believe there is anything in here which suggests that we
ought to do anything unethical.
Mr. Dash. I think you misunderstood my question, ]Mr. Buchanan.
I am not suggesting that you or your memorandmn suggested any-
thing other than it brought out the fact that Mr. Kennedy was not to
be forgotten as a possible Presidential candidate.
Mr. Buchanan. There was a division of opinion within the "V^^iite
House and even within the opposition reseai'ch room as to who would
be the strongest candidate. I think the feeling of some individuals was
that Senator Kennedy would be a good deal stronger candidate than
Senator Muskie, but I did not share that view.
Mr. Dash. Were you ever asked to help develop a newspaper ad
campaign following up on Vice President Agnew's attacks on radical
liberals?
That is 1969.
Mr. Buchanan. Vice President Agnew's attacks ; you mean, in the
Des Moines speech and other speeches ? This was in 1969.
Mr. Dash. Right. During the 1972 campaign, did you pai-ticipate in
getting attack ads placed in newspapers against Democratic candi-
dates ?
Mr. Buchanan. There was only one candidate, McGovern — right.
We recommended — as a matter of fact, a large portion of what we were
3929
doing — we recommended a significant budget for the political offen-
sive as an approach to the pro-Xixon commercials, and so on. We
recommended placement of those critical materials, but even more im-
portant, to emulate the Johnson commercials against Goldwater and
the Humphrey against Agnew, use of television spots against Senator
iNIcGovern, and we did some which I thought were very successful.
We reviewed those materials and while I do not know if we prepared
them, I certainly reviewed some ads. They brought them over to me
to look at.
Mr. Dash. I would like to just bring your attention to a memoran-
dum from you to Messi-s. Clark MacGregor, Haldeman, and Colson,
August 1, 1972, which is tab 32 [exhibit No. 192].
Do you have that memorandum before you ?
Mr. Buchanan. Right.
Mr. Dash. Now, do you see political suggestions? [Reading:]
1. In the Assault Book, we have the quote from McGovern about not "inanu-
facturiug foolish projects" like the space shuttle. Would it not be wise to have this
put into ads and pamphlets right now in the area of California which just bene-
fited Humphrey from the space shuttle.
No. 2, along the same lines, the old anti-Tydings ad which was so effective,
in my view, in Maryland. "If .Toe wins you lose," would seem to me an ideal
all-purpose ad for GOP'ers in areas affected by McGovem space and defense
cuts. "If McGovern wins, we lose.'' Again, the negative ads, I would think, will do
more to make the President a big winner than a positive "re-elect the President."
Mr. Buchanan. RigJit. Can I explain why I believed that?
Mr. Dash. Of course.
Mr. Buchanan. My feeling was that when the President was in the
polls at 65 percent, every vote — or almost every vote — from 55 per-
cent to 65 was less a pro-Nixon vote or an enthusiastic pro-Nixon, vote
than it was a vote against the candidate of the Democratic Party and
our most effective political strategy, since these were Democrats, rather
than have us say, you know, what a great job we have done, was you
should focus on the reason why they are voting for Richard Nixon.
They were voting for Richard Nixon, quite frankly, and we recog-
nized that, not because they were the most strong supporters of ours —
in fact, they were the most lukewarm — but because they were in strong
opposition to Senator McGovern. That is why we recommended that
we get the strongest slice of the anti-McGovern voters with these com-
mercials rather than with the pro-Nixon commercials.
Mr. Dash. Were these also supposed to be signed by the Committee
To Re-Elect the President or the Republican Party or citizens groups?
jNIr. Buchanan. No, I would think Democrats for Nixon would have
been an effective one at the time. But it did not make much difference.
Mr. Dash. In other words, you would use some sort of group that
would look like a group of citizens ?
Mr. Buchanan. No, there is nothing in there about doing that. Po-
litical advertisements in newspapers are a common staple. We ran ads
in newspapers and I do not know that they were done unethically.
All the attack ads which were run, I think, were run after the Re-
publican Convention. I think most of the attack ads — or the offensive
ads, I should say — these had on them the identification of Democrats
for Nixon, which we felt would be a more effective appeal to Demo-
crats than a Republican group.
Mr. Dash. Did you ever recommend or approve the use of Republi-
can campaign funds to go into an ad of this kind, which would be
3930
placed in the papers, which would have as its support a citizens group ?
Mr. BucHAXAX. A citizens group? Well, in the campaign, there
are hundreds of citizens groups that go up, that are set up. You know,
citizens for honest government, citizens for this, citizens for that.
But here is the thing.
Mr. Dash. You would prepare the ad ?
Mr. Buchanan. I just do the copy. I do the copy or I clear the copy.
I do not go out and find out what the political connnittee is going to
be. I would basically probably not do the copy. The advertising folks
would bring the copy in, I would clear it, say sharpen this, and I would
say, it should be placed in Illinois or this should be placed in Cali-
fornia, The details of these things and whether it was a Kepublican
gr-^ ip or whether it was Democrats for Nixon, these would more than
liiveLy be decisions of other individuals, I think.
Mr. Dash. Well, Avhether anybody did it, whether Republicans or
Democrats, would not such an ad be, in effect, a manufactured ad
because it would give to readers the impression that a group of citi-
zens felt so strongly about a particular issue that they would be put-
ting their own money into purchasing that space and giving the mes-
sage, which in fact
Mr. Buchanan. No, Mr. Dash, I have ghosted speeches for Presi-
dents, Vice Presidents, Senators, Republican chairmen ; I have gliosted
letters to editors. "VYliat is illicit about ghosting an ad in which indi-
viduals are going to put their names on them ?
Mr. Dash. I am asking your advice, not raising any question of
what is illicit. What I am saying is, in effect: although you say you
have ghosted speeches; to ghost or manufacture an ad or a letter to
the editor that purports to be a letter from a citizen and is read by
fellow citizens as an irate citizen's response, which, in fact, is actually
written by a mythical campaign worker and sent to a citizen to sign — ■
really, is that a true waj^ to mold citizen opinion ?
Mr. Buchanan. Well, as long as there is an individual who is will-
ing to sign a letter and asks you to draft it, or you draft it and an indi-
vidual, if it does not conflict with his views, I don't think there is any-
thing, as I say, that would seem to me to be in the same category with
a speechwriter who is told by a candidate or a President or a Vice
President, draft me a speech and make these points on it. It becomes
the property and the views become the vieAvs of the signers. There is
nothing compulsory. It is strictly voluntary.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Buchanan, did you ever recommend any covert or
clandestine activities to be taken on during the campaign?
Mr. Buchanan. Well, it would depend. My own view is that there
are such things as covert and clandestine intelligence activities that are
not wrong, that are not unethical and things like that. It is conceivable,
yes. But what did you have in mind ?
Mr. Dash. Turn to tab 16 [exhibit No. 176] of your July 28, 1971,
memo.
Mr. Buchanan. Did you say 15, sir?
Mr. Dash. 16.
Mr. Buchanan. Here it is.
Mr. Dash. Do you have it ?
Mr. Buchanan. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Turn to page 5.
3931
Mr. BucHAXAX. Right. Incidentally, this memorandum is not in my
memorandum form. The approved-disapproved comment is
Mr. Dash. I know. I think you told us that in executive session, but
that probably is another memorandum which you had prepared, but
was rewritten by the committee with their approved and disapproved
form.
Mr. BucHAX'Ax. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Page five, you see Special Projects. [Heading :]
We would like to utilize Ron Walker's resources where possible to handle some
close-in operations, pickets and the like, and candidates visit various cities.
What did you have in mind in that kind of recommendation?
Mr, BucHANAX'. Well, when you have Senator Muskie traveling to
a city, he will bring with him a traveling national press corps which
will be interested in the size of his crowds at airports, will be inter-
ested in the circumstances surrounding his appearance. If you have at
the airport a group of individuals with a sign that they throw up at
the right moment, "This is Nixon country," for example, you are liable
to get an Associated Press photograph with Senator Muskie with the
sign, which is, we feel, advantageous.
Mr. Dash. Who was Ron Walker ?
Mr. BucHAXAN. Incidentally, this, I believe, was rejected. Ron
Walker was in charge of the President's advance men and so he would
have — there are advance men we have in various cities around the
country who, when you go in there, they handle crowds and scheduling
and they could organize these demonstrations. It would be a less expen-
sive operation than having men travel around in advance and do it.
So, he would have an advance in place. I am not certain of it, but my
recollection is that this idea was rejected and we were not allowed to
use White House advance men for these types of things, and we did
use State chairmen. State committees, and the like.
AVe would phone to them and they would set up the demonstrations
or they would issue the statements there.
Mr. Dash. This would be to give the appearance of a demonstration
against the candidate ?
Mr. BucHAXAX. That would be one example, yes, sir. Or you could
have your literature of the Committee To Re-Elect. Or you could write
up, say, if Senator Muskie were having difficulty with some particu-
lar question, a list of questions, something like that, you could draft
the questions and get the local Republicans there to put them on the
press bus, or to hand out their flyers at the Muskie rally, put them on
the seats of chairs, things like that.
Mr. Dash. Would you turn to your memorandum of August 13, 1971,
which is tab 18 [exhibit No. 178 IJ
Mr. BucHANAx. Right, the '72 sponsors club.
Mr. Dash. There it says :
Attached is a copy of an Evans and Novak column from the July 25 Washing-
ton Post which indicates that the Democrats are setting up a '72 sponsors club
similar to the President's club of the LBJ era. For $72 a month, there are a num-
ber of privileges accorded to those who contribute.
Pat Buchanan has suggested that we have someone we know, preferably a
Democrat not connected with us, join this club. This could be arranged by having
the individual write in explaining that he had read about the club in the news-
paper and is fed up with the Administration's policies and wants to contribute
his share and become a member of the club. This would give us many advantages
in keeping track of Democratic contenders and their strategy.
3932
Mr. BucHANAX. Yes, sir, that idea is taken out of Larry O'Brien's
campaign book. He has recommended in his campaign book that it is a
good thing for Democrats to get on the mailing list for all Republican
materials they could find. Our recommendation was that someone get
on the mailing list for all these Democratic materials so that we get an
ongoing flow of their political literature.
Mr. Dash. Again, Mr. Buchaium, the point is not whether it is done
by Democrats or Republicans, because our mandate is to look into the
entire activity. Is this a form of infiltration ?
Mr. Buchanan. It is. Yes, you get on the mailing list. Our news
summary is on the mailing list of Connnon Cause. tVe get all their
publications. Our reason is we have to put them in the President's news
summary. It is not because we agree with their goals. I don't think it is
any more infiltration than that.
I\Ir. Dash. Were you aware of the covert activities sponsored by the
Republican Party for the Democratic National Committee during the
time of the convention ?
Mr. Buchanan. Was I aware of any? Xo, I was not aware of any.
I would trust we had some intelligence people down at Miami Beach
to see how they handled their convention — that is a gigantic affair —
how they handled their press, how they handled their demonstrations.
Frankly, their scheduling was a little weak in terms of the hour of the
morning at which Senator McGovern spoke. I would hope we would
have people down there looking at this, but this was not my function.
Mr. Dash. "Would you look at vour memorandum of April 10, 1972,
on tab 22 [exhibit No. 182], to' Mr. Mitchell and Mr. Haldeman?
Page 2 of that memorandum.
Mr. Buchanan. Yes, sir
Mr. Dash. Just at the bottom, "the dangers" are :
If all hell breaks loose down there, they could conceivably point up to the
Republicans at the Fontainebleu to distract attention from themselves.
Thirdly, they could get some demonstrators to indicate tliat the Republicans
up there told us to come down here and "raise hell." Anyone at the observation
post should be clean as a hound's tooth — and the observation post should have no
hand in any "covert operations" on-going in Miami.
Mr. Buchanan. That is right.
If you look at the top of that page, it says "The Republican forward
observation post should be made public."
That was my recommendation. I was at the 1968 Democratic Conven-
tion in an observation post, which was made public. I had recom-
mended that we set up a similar observation post at INIiami Beach
with the Democrats and that I go down there from the White House,
with someone else at the White House. I believe we did have one. But
the reason I did not go and this recommendation was withdraAvn was
because, frankly, of the Watergate incident and apprehension on my
part that if, from the podium, they said they have some Republican
spies up there in the Fontainebleu and they are there from the ^AHiite
House, we would never have caught up with the story.
I did recommend a forward observation post down there. We had it
in 1968 at the Chicago convention of the Democrats. Governor Love of
Illinois was in both the observation post and
Mr. Dash. But you recommended that it be kept clear or clean,
away from any covert operations ?
3933
Mr. Buchanan. Rig^ht. There were 2,000 press in Miami Beach.
I certainly hope we had people down there demonstrating for Richard
Xixon. But anything like that should be kept away from the observa-
tion post, we should be clean as a hound's tooth out of apprehension
at the allegations made against us so we could say flatly, no, we had
nothing to do with X, Y, or Z.
Mr, Dash. Mr. Chairman, I have just one more question. I would
like to show you a pamphlet which purports to be issued by Citizens
for a Liberal Alternative.
By the way, do you know of the group, Citizens for a Liberal
Alternative?
Mr. Buchanan. Xo; Len Garment called me one night after some-
one had come back from the committee, and he asked me, Mr.
Buchanan, or Pat, are you familiar with Citizens for a Liberal Alter-
native 'I I said, it sounds like a fine organization.
Senator, this pamphlet has only been shown to me. I have seen a
Xerox of this. This pamphlet has been shown to me by the staff, I
believe ]Monday night. Prior to that, Mr. Lenzner showed me a copy
of it which was not identifiable.
My recollection of this is largely based on my political assistant,
Ken Khachigian, who tells me that I edited it. To my recollection,
this pamphlet was not my idea, I did not draft it, I did not order it
produced, I did not order it distributed. I do not know to whom it
went, but if he says I edited it, I edited it, rather, the text of it. He
is an honest individual and I assume he did it.
Mr. Dash. Did he tell you that he prepared it?
Mr. Buchanan, No, he said he told you that he prepared it.
Mr. Dash. All right. Do you know that the fact is that there is
no such organization as Citizens for a Liberal Alternative ?
jMr. Buchanan. Right. The error in this — from my understand-
ing — is that it failed to have on it the proper identifying name of an
individual avIio belonged to the organization, which is not an unroutine
shortcoming in a Presidential campaign. As a matter of fact, I have
brought with me, ]Mr. Dash, as I said I would the other night, a 47-
page diatribe against Senator McGovern which was released all over
the Democratic Convention and which similarly lacks identification.
From Time magazine ; I understand the author of this is Mr. George
]Meany and sponsorship is Mr. Barkin. I trust that if we could intro-
duce that one into your evidence, they will go through the same 3
hours of discussion of that as we are going through material like this.
Mr. Dash. And what in effect this was aimed to do was to show
liberal Democrats, purportedly from an organization of liberal Demo-
crats, that Senator Muskie was, as it says in the first page, Ed Mnskie
will be no different from the Nixons, Agnews, Mitx:hells that we liaA'e
now, and make him a candidate of the Democratic right.
Mr. Buchanan. The rhetoric is not leftwing rhetoric, but the state-
ments on Senator Muskie's position on gun control is accurate, on
the statement with regard to the black Americans — there is not an in-
accuracy in terms of the writing
Mr. Dash. What I suggest is that the j)urpose of the pamphlet as
you see it is to represent to liberal Democrats that a liberal Democrat
organization is urging them to not vote 'for Senator Muskie.
3934
Mr. Buchanan. Right. Mr. Dash, the thing looks to me, it is a fairly!
unsophisticated document. A fairly unconvincing document. It looksj
to me like more of a joke. It does not look like it is going to convince
an intelligent liberal Democrat to do anything.
Mr. Dash. The record will show that this particular pamphlet was
distributed quite widely throughout the country by different opera-
tives.
Mr. Chairman, I have referred to a number of memorandums and
specifically read from these memorandums during the coui'se of my
questioning of Mr. Buchanan, and also this particular pamphlet. 1
would like to have those particular memorandums, and especially those ;
portions that I have read from, identified for the record and admitted
in evidence.
Mr. Buchanan. Can we introduce the Meany pamphlet, sir? I
brought it with me.
Mr. Dash. Do you have the Meany pamphlet?
Mr. Buchanan. Yes ; this is the document here, the McGovern rec-
ord, a critical appraisal. Attached is the Time article.
Senator P^rvix. Without objection we will receive both documents
for the record at this time.
[The documents were marked exhibits Nos. 158 and 159*,]
Mr. Dash. By the way, is that one of the files we subpenaed !?
Mr. Buchanan. No, it is not ; I do not believe so. I just had this in
hand fairly recently.
Mr. Dash. How did you obtain that ?
Mr. Buchanan. I do not know. I think it was sent to us.
Mr. Dash. Did you request it ?
Mr. Buchanan. No, we have done, in our own spare time, a little
political research into the background of other political activities.
Just as the committee suggested that things went wrong in the Repub-
lican campaign, we felt there were some errors in the Democi-atic cam-
paign and we brought it to your attention.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Buchanan, I am sure we have. If you have any ad-
ditional things, we will be glad to see them.
Mr. Buchanan. No, I only have this one.
Senator Baker. Mr. Dash, I might say there are others and you
will indeed receive copies and you will not be disappointed.
Mr. Dash. I take it they are not presently in the committee files.
Mr. Buchanan. No; I do not know what the committee file has got
other than my memos.
Senator Baker. I do not believe I will tell you.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Buchanan. I think you have given us some in-
struction into the practicalities of American politics that are unfor-
tunate policies of unorthodox matters of both political parties.
The committee will stand in recess until 2 o'clock.
[Whereupon, at 12 : 30 p.m., the hearing recessed, to reconvene at 2
p.m., this same day.]
Afternoon Session, Wednesday, September 26, 1973
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order. Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Buchanan, several documents were referred to
*See pp. 4055 and 4059.
3935
this morning and I would like to go over a few of them with you. You
were asked to respond to particular passages from particular docu-
ments that were read along and I think it is important that we get
the full and complete flavor of the documents in case there is any mis-
understanding. I would refer to page 7, of tab number 10 [exhibit
No. 170], which is a memorandum for the President from you; sub-
ject: the Muskie watch; and I would like to discuss your paper on
Senator Muskie, Senator Kennedy, and Senator Humphrey.
I think in fairness to your position, we might point out, at least
one other than the ones read to you. On page <, the final paragraph,
it says, "The attacks should not be name calling, they should be well
thought out."
Mr. Buchanan. Right.
Mr. Thompson. In the first place, when you say attacks, what are
you talking about ?
Mr. Buchanan. That would be, the reference would be to the politi-
cal offensive, political speeches, political statements, political adver-
tising, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Political speeches by whom ?
Mr. Buchanan. I think I indicated what I felt to be the political
resources which we could utilize. As well as I can recall, in 1971, the
President vetoed our authorization, if you will, to bring in the Cabinet
and to utilize the Vice President. This is not to suggest that we gave
any directives of any kind to the Vice President, but in mid-1971, I
think there was sort of a general rule that the Cabinet and the Vice
President Avould not engage in political colloquy, and the other re-
sources I think I have named were the national committee, of course,
the burgeoning resources of the Committee To Re-Elect. You have
State parties, and you were beginning to get State committees. You
have Republican Congressmen and Senators who were willing to take
a hand in it. Senator Dole, who Avas an extraordinarily effective
spokesman, I felt in our behalf. You have the Republican publication
Monday which had high credibility with the national media and
which was readily picked up on wires. These would be a few of the
resources.
Mr. Thompson. So when a public figure, in effect, made a speech
promoting the candidacy of the President and taking a position
against the leading Democratic opponents, that would be an attack ; is
that right ?
Mr. Buchanan. Right, that would be a political attack, right.
Mr. Thompson. "\Miat was the political climate with regard to name
[^ailing? Was there name-calling throughout the campaign?
Mr. Buchanan. I think if you go through some of these, the
March 14, 1972, memorandum, I think you will find a recognition
and awareness on our part that when the campaign gets heated
things are going to get out of hand. They invariably do. You have
statements made that are too much, that are excessive, so we recom-
mended that one individual, and I named in that memorandum, the
Attornev General, or that he designate a deputy who would be
assigned to clear all political copy coming — 'all attack, offensive copy
?oming out of the campaign in order that we not run into the same
problem we ran into in 1970 when some of the ads were excessive and
counterproductive. But there is an awareness, I think, through a
3936
number of these momorandums that things, when you get into the heat!
of a campaign, individuals do go too far. Some of the — I recall in
Senator McGovern's campaign — I am sure Senator McGovern now, ,
would not like to refer to the fact that he compared American policy
in Indochina with the nationalist extermination of the Jews or that
he compared the President of the United States with Adolf Hitler.
These things were excesses, I think, in the campaign that occurred
and we were cognizant that they would occur. Some things would
occur on our part as they occurred on tiie other side.
Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you to turn over to page 8 of that same
memorandum. In the final paragraph you say :
My recommendation then is for creation of the Muslcie watch, an operation
worlving perliaps within the Republican National Committee, which may even
he a publicized operation, doing constant research on Ed.
Mr. Buchanan. Well, frankly, I had even considered myself — I
was, in my own mind fairly certain, not that Senator Muskie would
get the nomination, so I had thought myself of sort of resigning from
the White House Staff, making a fairly high le\el operation in the
Republican National Committee which would have all the research
and data on Muskie to which the political reporters could come and
which would be a publicized operation and which could issue state-
ments vis-a-\ds Senator Muskie, but even though in some of these
memorandums it said that the Muskie watch was created, in reality
it was not created. The Muskie watch amounted to actually little more
than the research files of Buchanan and Khachigian.
Mr. Thompson. In any of your recommendations regarding the
possible candidacies of the leading Democrats, did you in any way
advocate the defaming of anyone ?
Mr. Buchanan. Well, no. In a public statement that sort of thing
is not only mistaken, it is counterproductive.
Mr. Thompson. I refer you to tab 1?> (exhibit No. 173), if I may,
on page 5. That memorandum is dated June 9, 1971. Confidential.
Mr. Buchanan. This is the Kennedy memorandum.
Mr. Thompson. For the President from you. EMK, political memo-
randum. You discuss pros and cons, his assets, deficiencies, and on page
5 under the heading of Chappaquiddick, yon state : "This, of course,
will be kept in the public mind by the press — speculating on whether
it is helping or hurting EMK."
Mr. Buchanan. Right.
Mr. Thompson [continues reading] : "We ought to stay miles away
from it — indicating even in private, it is hard to say the affect; we
don't know."
Mr. Buchanan. Right.
Mr. Thompson. Was this policy followed ?
Mr. Buchanan. It was. Let me add another case similar to the thing
when Senator Eagleton's problems came over the national wire the
President directed — I was in the room when he did it^ — directed all
Republican spokesmen out on the campaign trail to make no comment
whatsoever about it. This, the Chappaquiddick thing, I think, the
same policy was in effect. This would be my recommendation, that our
speakers make no reference whatsoever to it in public statements, and
this was made in the coui^se of a confidential memorandum. I l>elieve
it was a course that was followed.
3937
Mr. Thompson. In these evaluations, did you set up the strong
points of the candidates as well as their deficiencies ?
Mr. Buchanan. We certainly did. As a matter of fact, the memo on
Hubert Humphrey is very laudatory, as I recall.
Mr. Thompson. That is tab 11 [exhibit No. 171] and thar was next
on my list.
Mr. Buchanan. Right.
As a matter of fact, you lead off — the sources of these were basically
three: One was the files, the excellent files maintained at the Repub-
lican National Committee on tracking of candidates. The second was
our own research operation under Mort Allen, the news summary, we
would get about 30 newspapere and magazines; everything on those
candidates would go in those files. You read that. The third would be
conversations I had on a regular basis with political reporters.
Mr. Thompson. Would you read the first paragraph of that memo-
randum dated April 19, 1971, for the President ?
Mr. Buchanan. Entitled '"Resurrection of Hubert Humphrey." It
reads :
One emerges from a perusal of our "Humphrey file" with a grudging regard
for old Hubert. Since November, with but a few notable exc-^ptions. the ex- Veep
has conducted himself remarkably well. He receives an excellent price. He has
maximized his assets, and minimized his deficiencies. The result is that today,
unlike six months ago, the man is a serious contender for the Democratic
nomination.
And it moves on from there to analyze, how we analyzed, how Sena-
tor Humphrey made a rather, what we felt was a remarkable come-
back and had made himself a credible candidate for the Democratic
nomination in a period of time wherein no one felt that he would have
had another opportunity.
Mr. Thompson. You were asked to address yourself to broader is-
sues respecting the propriety of certain things and I believe multi-
plicity, this in historical context, and to 'preface my next question, I
would like to read certain passages from "Lyndon B. Johnson: The
Exercise of Power,"' written by Evans and Novak, and ask you to
evaluate this in terms of 3^our own political experience. It says:
Behind the slapdash, jerry-built campaign structure, one element of strategy
was devised in comparatively orderly — and extremely secretive — fashion. It was
what was known as the anti-campaign.
Not often did all these members of the anti-campaign meet at the same time.
About the Johnson campaign —
They came and went, and Feldman and Sharon were first among equals. The
job was easily defined : embarrass the Republicans, get under Barry Goldwater's
skin, thereby achieving Johnson's overall goal of winning by the biggest possible
margin.
For example, it was learned early in the campaign that half a dozen small
liberal church journals, one of them published by the Protestant theologian,
Reinhold Niebuhr. had scathingly editorialized against Barry Goldwater as a
man not to be entrusted with the Presidency.
Just a coui:)le of more paragraphs.
Normally these editorials would not have found their way to congregations
across the country until months after publication. The anti-campaign opera-
tion, duplicated them by the hundreds and saw that they got appropriate church
groups throughout the nation in a matter of days.
Another project was more typically in the realm of black politics. If Gold-
water were to speak somewhere at six o'clock, one local anti-Goldwater .speaker —
usually a Democrat but sometimes a Republican — would be scheduled at four
3938
o'clock and then another man at eight o'clock. Thus Goldwater wonld l>e brack-
eted by the opposition. An impression of feverish anti-Goldwater activity would
be given on the very day of his appearance.
Now, the point here :
Another anticampaign ploy was to make generous use of the letters columns
of local newspapers. The anti-campaign group would ask a Republican business-
man known to be backing Johnson to write an anti-Goldwater letter to the
editor of his local newspaper on a day calculated to get the letter published just
as the Groldwater caravan swept into town. Or. just before Gold water's arrival,
a local democratic official would be told to plant a letter in the newspaper pub-
licizing Goldwater's position on a major issue if, as .so often was the case, the
Goldwater position was anathema to the majority of voters in that city.
This clandestine operation was Johnson's campaign pet and he was kept
closely informed of everything the group did.
First of all, is this what we are talking about in regard to the
letter-writing system? How do you evaluate its propriety in Ameri-
can politics?
Mr. BucHAXAN. Well, we had established within the — we did struc-
ture the thing within the Republican National Committee a letter-writ-
ing campaign in 1969. The purpose of it was to make efficacious use
of political volunteers with computers and the like, licking envelopes
and things like that. There are not much more of those assignments.
]More worthwhile would be a letter to the editor operation and what
you do is draft sample letters and you send out letters that are pub-
lished to show your volunteers in various States how to write a short
sharp letter. You recommend they write to their local newspaper and
then you begin to send them fact sheets and other information on
issues that you want — if in favor of welfare reform or in favor of
revenue sharing, something like that — send them short fact sheets and
you have to rely on the individual in the State to do his own job and
then they would send back to you Xeroxes, say, of letters that had
been published. I think it is an effective use of volunteers and we had
a structure like this set up at the Eepublican National Committee
which, I believe, was transferred to the Committee To Re-Elect the
President in 1972.
I think the group that you are referring to could have been ]\Ieyer
Feldman's five o'clock club in Johnson's administration, the counter-
part of which would have been our "9 :15 group'' in the White House
which was known as the — enshrined by John Osborne and Jules Witt
cover as the attack group, which is the phrase of Chairman Ervin,
was not a minor organization. We had similar organizations like that.
Mr. Thompson. It is your opinion, then, that as long as the peo-
ple who sent these letters out ascribed to the viewpoint espoused, those
were proper campaign practices ?
Mr. Buchanan. I believe so, right. If the signatures are not forged,
if the people agree with the point of view, the drafting of a letter for
them is no more unethical, I think, than the ghosting of a speech.
Mr. Thompson. Thank you, sir.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. You say that they contemplated using the Attor-
ney General or somebody in the Depart mejit of Justice to scrutinize
the press releases ?
Mr. Buchanan. Yes, sir. Well, to be candid, it was this memoran-
dum I believe I sent on March 14, recommending that the Attorney
General clear all campaign copy. At that point in time, it was my un-
3939
derstanding or our expectation that the Attorney General would be,
by the time these campaign materials were prepared, the campaign
chairman.
Senator Ervin. So the Attorney General, while drawing a salary
from the Federal Government and ostensibly discharging the duties
of Attorney General, was censoring and passing on campaign releases?
Mr. Buchanan. No, sir; that would not be accurate. The attack or-
ganization strategy, the memorandum that I drafted was for the fall
campaign, which would begin after the Republican Convention in
August. By that time, it would be our expectation that the Attorney
General would no longer be Attorney General, but would be our cam-
paign chairman.
Senator Ervin. But you did not hold back the press releases until
he actually retired and became campaign manager did you ?
Mr. Buchanan. I do not believe we ran any national media ads,
which I was referring to, during the time that Mr. Mitchell was At-
torney General. The national media campaign, all of which was to be
cleared, was post-August, I think.
Senator Ervin. I thought you were talking about press releases. I
make a distinction between a national advertisement and a press re-
lease.
Mr. Buchanan. I would make the same distinction, Mr. Chairman.
If you have a review function by the Attorney General, I would — al-
though I do not know that I stated it — generally restrict it to major
stuff. If you have a small, minor, fairly insignificant release, I think
that can be done down the line. But anything like those ads in 1970,
for example, which were controversial and counterproductive, was de-
signed to make sure the campaign chairman or someone in author-
ity — one person cleared all the materials before the public.
Senator Ervin. It does strike me, as a strict constnictionist, that it
is rather peculiar to have an Attorney General pass upon the wisdom
of issuing press releases while he is still in that office.
Mr. Buchanan. Senator, I am not a lawyer, but there is a precedent
for that in Attorney General Robert Kennedy.
Senator Ervin. Yes, that is one reason I have been advocating di-
vorcing the entire Department of Justice and the Attorney General
from political matters. I would think that — incidentally, I might state
that when the committee passed on the nomination of Mr. Mitchell,
Mr. Mitchell said he agreed with me on that point. That is twice he has
agreed with me, once on my executive privilege and once on stopping
the Attorney General from being a political adviser to the President.
Mr. Buchanan. Well, far be it from me to disagree with both you
and Mr. Mitchell, Senator, but in his book on the Presidency, Clinton
Rossiter indicates that the President of the United States himself, one
of his duties and roles is that of political leader of his party. It seems
to me that political duties are really inseparable from the f miction of
the Office of the Presidency.
On legislation and the like, where I would make recommendation to
the President or he would ask me my view on that, invariablj^ the
political impact of the decision would go in there. There is sort of a —
between issues and politics — there is a sort of symbiosis, and I do not
know that you can really draw a hard and fast line as to what is and
what is not political. It is a difficult thing to do.
3940
Senator Ekvin. Yes, it is. We have tried to draw it in the case of the
FBI and the CIA.
Mr. BucHAXAN. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. It has always seemed to me somewhat incongruous
to unite the functions of being a campaign manager and censor of
campaign materials with the Office of Attorney General. I think the
Attorney General ought to — but that is sometliing you and I are not
responsible for. I would just make this observation, as I frequently
have. The fact that Bobby Kennedy may have done this did not justify
Attorney General John Mitchell doing it.
Mr. Buchanan. No, sir; tu quo que is the weakest of all arguments.
Senator Ervin. Now, you say that the President issued instructions
not to talk about the problems of Senator Eaglet on ?
Mr. Buchanan, Yes, sir. I was in his office the day the report came
in and I recall the President said, "Send out orders I want everybody
who is out on the road, surrogates, everyone, informed that they are
not to discuss this matter in public.'"
Senator Ervin. Now, you made the memorandums to the President
in your function as director of stra/tegy about what should be done in
the campaign ; did you ?
Mr. Buchanan. I have been doing political memorandums of this
kind for the President for almost 8 years. Senator, and some of these
memorandums were done before I had the function and some of them
were done subsequent to the function.
Senator Ervin. Yes. Well, the President was not altogether above
the battle during the campaign of 1972, was he?
Mr. Buchanan. Well, my memorandum would go in. The disposi-
tion or the decision as to what the final strategy would be, as I have
indicated, would be made very often without my knowledge as to
whether m_y strategy or my recommendations were accepted.
Senator ER^^N, Did you make recommendations to Mr, Haldeman ?
Mr. Buchanan. Yes, sir ; I think most of the strategy memorandums
after mid- 1971 were addressed to the Attorney General and to Mr.
Haldeman. I would be fairly confident that the President would have
seen some of them, but that would be something that Mr. Haldeman
would have to testify to.
Senator Ervin. I have been a little troubled by the proposition that
the President stood above the battle in 1972 because I think, having
been a candidate for a number of offices, I have never seen a candidate
who was not interested in what was going on in his campaign.
Mr. Buchanan. There is no doubt about it. The President was inter-
ested in wdiat happened in his campaign, but you can campaign fairly
effectively by being President of the T'^nited States, as the returns of
the Presidential campaign of 1972 would indicate.
Senator Ervin. But he was interested and did issue directives from
time to time, did he not ?
Mr. Buchanan. From my conversations with him, I would say he
indicated a mild interest in the outcome of the 1972 campaign ; yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. I was very much intrigued by your testimony, and I
want to commend you for the frankness of your testimony that you
advised the President that they should see that grants were channeled
to organizations that supported the President's philosophy.
Mr. Buchanan. Can I clarify that, sir ?
3941
Senator Ervin. Yes, sir, I would be glad for you to.
Mr. Buchanan. If you are talking about the grants and contracts
and things like that, that are up for bids, if there are discretionary
funds at the disposal of the White House — in other words, the White
House says the State Department is doing a study of a foreign policy
problem, and it is within our discretion as to whom that contract
should go — my recommendations would invariably be that we give the
contract to those particular public policy institutes which were suppor-
tive of our point of view and philosophy.
Senator Ervin. And you favor that, even in cases that the other party
or applicant was better qualified, as long as the matter was discre-
tionary Avith the President ?
Mr. Buchanan. Well, I certainly would not recommend that he
grant to totally unqualified and incompetent individuals; but if it is
six of one and half a dozen of the other, I would favor our side.
Senator Ervin. Suppose it was seven of one and five of the other ?
Mr. Buchanan. We are getting close, Senator. I think if it were
eight to four, we might go the other way.
Senator Ervin. I would judge from your testimony that if some-
thing had to be submitted to the lowest bidder, the lowest bidder should
get it, but if it is anything that is discretionary, the ones favored
should be the ones whose political philosophy and activities harmo-
nized with those of the President; otherwise, they would be disqual-
ified or should be ?
Mr. Buchanan. No, here is the thing : Let me give you an example
in the Brookings Institution. I am sure if you asked them to do a
study^ — this is purely hypothetical — on some disarmament problem
and they had the capability to do it, and some other public policy in-
stitute also had the capability to make the study effectively, I am sure
both of them would do the best they could. They both would do ob-
jective research. But in my view, if we have discretionary funds and
it is within our decision, we ought to support our own decisions which
support our philosophy and our point of view and our values, that is
right.
Senator Ervin. Well, I suppose that is a practical application of the
"if you scratch my back, I will scratch yours" philosophy.
Mr. Buchanan. Well, it is not uncommon in American politics.
It is not unethical or wrong, I believe, either. Senator.
Senator Ervin. One reason I am a Democrat is because Andrew
Jackson said the Government should emulate the example of heaven's
rain and shed its benefits equally on all people.
Mr. Buchanan. Senator, I believe President Jackson was the father
of the spoils system.
Senator Ervin. Yes, but he ran things pretty well under the spoils
system. [Laughter.]
Well, I realize that in all probability, politicians of both parties
have yielded to that principle. But it is rather disconcerting to have
it asserted here as official policy for the campaign to take the taxpayers'
money and turn it over in the form of grants or compensation to people
on the basis of the fact that they share the President's philosophy
rather than let it go on the basis of merit.
Mr. Buchanan. Well, Senator, as I have stated, my recommenda-
tions would be as they were. But the recommendations of Buchanan
21-296 O — 74-
3942
are not necessarily coterminus with administration policy. I do not
know that this has been followed at all.
Senator Ervix. Well, I will have to say 1 admire the Buchanan
recommendations. They are very forthright.
Mr. Buchanan. Thank you," Senator.
Senator Ervin. I do not fully approve of all of them, however.
[Laughter.]
I think you have a sense of humor and I am glad I have one, be-
cause I do not know how you would get over the rough spots of life
without one. I am like you; I do not object to some humorous things
being done in a political campaign. But I infer from the testimony
that you gave this morning that if it is true, as has been charged, that
some persons in Florida forged, made a forgery on what purport exi
to be the letterhead of Senator Muskie and disseminated it. broadcast
it, making salacious attacks upon Senators Jackson and Hun:iphrey
for the purpose of discrediting them, that is beyond the pale.
Mr. Buchanan. That crosses the line. Senator. My own view is that
there are four gradations. There are things that are cei'tainly utterly
outrageous and I would i^ut that in with the kind of demonstrations
against Vice President Humphrey in 1968 which denied him an op-
portunity to speak for almost a month. Then, there is dirty tricks, then
there is political hardball, then there is pranks. I think you will al-
most have to leave it to the individual and his own sense of ethics
as to what is permissible. There is no question but what the line was
probably breached in both campaigns in 1972 and perhaps previous
ones.
Senator Ervin. Sometimes, that is left to people's determination
that have no ethics and we have very unethical things happen.
Mr. Buchanan. Yes, sir; that is very true.
Senator Ervin. Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
This is really a fascinating line of inquiry, Mr. Buchanan, and you
are a fascinating witness in that you not only have clear perception
of your role in the political realm of the United States, but the verbal
agility to express them most clearly and forthrightly. It is an oppor-
tunity for us to examine some areas of this inquiry that we really have
not had a chance to touch before. I do greatly admire your description
of the gradations of political activity. I think I want to pursue that
just for a moment a little later. Let me make one or two inquiries of
you first.
The question of whether or not the President was above the cam-
paign in 1972 or was engaged to a significant degree in the campaign
in 1972 and what the quality of the Presidential role is in a campaign,
is one that concerns me greatly. For instance, I am concerned as much
for how active a President is, as how disengaged he may be from a
campaign. I happen to think that the President is necessarily a poli-
tician, and I think the tighter his control of the political process is,
the better off we all may be. So I have no quarrel and I hope and trust
you have no quarrel with the President conceptualized as a politician. I
think it is inevitable and essential. Would you agree with that?
Mr. BuciiANAiSr. I would agree ; yes, sir.
3943
Senator Baker. The second point I think you have touched, that has
major significance for us, is not completely spelled out in the man-
date of S. Res. 60 which created this committee, but I think it is
clearly implied in the scope and jurisdiction of our inquiry. That is,
what is the role of the favored, tax-free foundation in public life? I
am not going to prolong ajid extend the conversation and colloquy
that you and the chairman had about the awarding of discretionai-y
grants of contracts. I think I understand what you mean and I think
it means, all other things being equal, we are going to give it to our-
selves instead of theirs.
Mr. Buchanan. Precisely.
Senator Baker. If all other things aren't equal, we may think about
it a little more.
Mr. Buchanan. That is right.
Senator Baker. But there is another question in that, and I am
deeply disturbed about the role of foundations in any event, because
of their tax-free situation, they are able to amass huge sums of money
and control huge blocks, huge amounts of capital in this country and
I think this committee ought to look into what is the apj^ropriate
role, if any, in the formulations by foundations of public policy, pub-
lic attitudes, and political undertakings. That is just as fuzzy and in-
distinct as your gradations of political activity. But I suggest that
that may be an inquiry that we need to approach, and I hope that we
shall.
Would you agree that that is a significant part of the political pic-
ture of this country ?
Mr. Buchanan. I do. My conception that there seems to be an im-
balance in the political process when I don't believe there are any
major foundations that have more than $1 billion in assets, or at one
point they didn't, with the sole exception of the Ford Foundation,
which has $43 billion in assets, generating an income of probably $180
to $200 million. And these funds, of course, have been used for quasi-
political operations. They have been used for public policy institutes
like the Brookings Institution, various funds on the west coast, the
Institution for Policy Studies, and by and large, the institutions they
fund. The quasi-social action movements they fund are on one side of
the political spectrum, which I think, given the enormous power and
wealth of the Ford Foundation, they can tend to tilt the balance in
the other direction.
Frankly, if we, the conservatives, had a foundation such as the
Ford Foundation with similarly funded public policy and study in-
stitutes and the like, I would not complain. The situation is analogous
to that, in my view, of the networks, where a particular p^iii^sophy
and point of view of a small group of men has tended to dominate these
media conglomerates and, really, to control the flow of news and in-
formation to the American people. To me, that is not a satisfactory
situation and it is a matter that ought to be raised in the political
forum. I have recommended since 1970 that we do so.
Senator Baker. Mr. Buchanan, I have neither the time nor the in-
clination at this point to try to fill in the blanks in tliose three broad
categories that I have ti-ied to describe, that is, the role of nonprofit
foundations in the formulation of public policy or public attitudes,
3944
keeping in mind that foundations, by reason of their tax-exempt
status, are, in effect, subsidized by the Federal Government. They are
subsidized to the extent that they ai-e free of taxation which must be
borne by other individuals and not borne by that foundation.
Mr. Buchanan. Precisely.
Senator Baker. And second, tlie question of where do you draw the
line on political activity; and third, to what extent should the Pres-
ident be involved.
Let me focus in on just one of those three, though, for the remain-
ing minutes I have in this series of the inquiry. That is, what is ap-
propriate and what is not appropriate as political activity? I suppose
that is such a subject — I have inquii-y that Ave Avill ever establish it
satisfactorily, but we have to try. We liave to establish some sort of
guidelines if we fulfill the charge of our jurisdiction as a committee.
But precedent is good. Precedent gives us at least some insight into
what has gone on before. I have a copy of the Democratic Cami:)aign
Manual that was delivered to me this morning, which I have had a
chance to peruse briefly. Are you familiar with that manual?
Mr. Buchanan. If it is Mr. O'Brien's manual, I have read seg-
ments of it. I am not totally familiar with it ; yes, sir.
Senator Baker. Neither am I. I have onlv had a chance to scan it
briefly. It was given to me, I believe, by Mr. Khachigian, who works in
your office.
Mr. Buchanan. He is our researcher.
Senator Baker. I would like to call your attention to tAvo or three
sections of it and see if you have some personal knowledge of it. Some
mention was made of letter-rewriting camj^aigns in your campaign
and things of that sort. I notice in the section entitled "Women,"
which I didn't think Avas permissible anymore, but in the section en-
titled "Women," it reads on page 4, it says :
Stay at home volunteors can use their brains and typewriters to promote the
candidate through public letter columns in the local papers. These are read from
cover to cover in many liomes. Letters should be brief and concentrate on one
point. Such letters can serve to set the record straight when mistakes have been
made ; to call attention to the candidates' programs.
And so forth.
There is another section under the section, "Newspapers," on page 11
of that subsection, which says :
The letters to the editor pages haA'e a liigh readership. Most newspapers which
oppose you editorially will print your side of the story in the form of a letter.
Make such letter short and to the y'oint. Don't sjiend your time abusing the paper
or the editor. Use the space you will get to state your argument and be positive
Avhenever possible.
It seems to me in this Democratic manual, they are suggesting, in
effect, a program for Avriting letters to the editor and mass letters to
groups.
Is this, in your experience, a form of political activity that has been
practiced ?
Mr. Buchanan. It certainlv is. Senator. My familiarity Avith that
is partly due to the fact that I used to be an editorial writer and we
ourselves would edit letters to the editor. Our surveys indicated in
a number of cases that the letters-to-the-editor column had a higher
readership than our own editorials. It is a useful device for the Avriter
3945
to present his views in a political campaign. It is a fairl}^ useful activ-
ity.
Senator Baker. There is another reference also under the Women's
section that says, '"Talkers.'' I am sure Larry O'Brien did not pick
that.
Mr. Buchanan. They used the term "Women" before their 1972
convention, I imagine. That would be copersons in there now^, Senator.
Senator Baker. Copersons would be better.
However, it is not my function to advise on the editorial comment.
It says :
"Call in" and "open mike" radio and TV shows offer a good opportunity for
putting across the candidate's views and records — at no cost. Organize teams
to call in to these shows to speak up on the issues of the campaign. They must be
well informed, persuasive, polite, and natural.
That, I take it, is a standard, more or less accepted campaign prac-
tice in the United States.
Mr. Buchanan. Yes.
Senator Baker. We get to a few others, however, that come to my
particular attention. On page 8 of "Research," it says: "Arrange
for some of your staff members to have their names placed on the
opponent's mailing list" et cetera.
Mr. Buchanan. Eight.
That is w^hat Mr. Dash was referring to. That is what we were doing
when we said the Democrats had set up some group called 72 which
cost $72 to join. Some of our people would send in $72 in order to get
some of the literatui-e sent out by those organizations.
Senator Baker. "Candidate exj^enses'' under "Budgeting."
The candidate's first consideration must be paying for permanent expenses :
meals, hotel rooms, telephone calls, et cetera. He pays for them out of his own
pocket, have the treasurer arrange to pay out of a special fund or the general
fund, or allow for a contributor to pick up certain bills. Most of the candidate's
personal exi>enses will be incurred in traveling, but there are many shortcuts to
limiting on-the-road spending. Contributors can be persuaded to lend the candi-
date their telephone, hotel, or gasoline credit cards.
Mr. Buchanan. I don't have any knowledge, or much knowledge
of the financial end of it, but I guess that would come under the terms
of a campaign contribution. I don't know how something like that
would be handled.
Senator Baker. Or how it would l3e reported.
Mr. Buchanan. How it would be rej^orted, right.
Senator Baker. It might be reported under the "in kind" section of
the Federal Reporting Act. There is a section that deals with that,
but if it is in fact a service or a facility and of the amounts to a
certain amount under the Federal statute, it has to be reported.
Another section of budgeting, on page 4, it states :
Some of the finest campaign stationery, for example, is designed and supplied
by the printer or shop favoring the candidate. Buying at wholesale, sympathetic
merchants are often happy to provide supplies as their contribution to the
campaign.
Which I take it as well would be something that should be con-
sidered
Mr. Buchanan. It would have to be reported.
Senator Baker [continuing]. Should be considered in terms of the
3946
general campaign fund. Here is one that particularly caught my
attention also under fund raising on page 8. It says :
If the hotel is running the bar at the social hour, see if you can get i.
percentage of the gross. Normally, 10 to 20 i^ercent.
Mr. Buchanan. Mr. O'Brien goes into some detail.
Senator Ervin. I was just going to inquire whether under the regu-
lations, the gross was the beverage or the receipts for the beverage.
Senator Baker. I was going to inquire whether it was in kind or in
currency.
I think that covers it. But the point I am reaching for, Mr. Bu-
chanan is, that this committee's function is to try to undertake to
identify those things that are illegal, unethical, immoral, or imdesir-
able. To do that, we have to establish some understanding of the
range of political activities of the United States.
Now, I am not alleging by reference to the Democratic campaign
manual that these things are illegal. I am not alleging that they are
necessarily improper. But I do ask you whether or not, in your knowl-
edge as a practicing politician and a Federal official, they fall gen
erally in the purview and scope of what is done in campaigns by both
parties — that is, letter writing, such as letters to the editor, such as
getting your name on the other fellow's mailing list, such as trying
to get stationerv supplies and equipment donated to you and thing's
of that sort?
Mr. Buchanan. Well, in terms of — first, my knowledge would only
deal with getting on the mailing list and getting information in a
legitimate fashion. I think everything you stated up there seems to
me to be routine, although I have no specific knowledge, for example,
when we travel with the candidate or with the President in areas — to
me, I don't know how advance men work to set up rooms, who pays
for what, things like that. We just go in and out.
I tell you, that might be an education if you get a couple of first-rate
advance men up here to tell you how they put these things together.
Senator Baker. We may have to do that.
Mr. Buchanan. I am very, very limited in that area. I have no
knowledge of how they do it.
Senator Baker. Let me ask you one final, concluding line of ques-
tions in the few minutes I have remaining. You were questioned rather
extensively on the political activity in your office and by you in moni-
toring the campaign of Senator Muskie or Senator McGovern or Sena-
tor Humphrey and the like.
Do you know of your own knowledge, or can you tell us whether or
not such political monitoring activity — that is, keeping account of the
political health and x^rospects of potential adversaries, in a Presiden-
tial campaign is the general practice and is always done, or has been as
far as you know ?
Mr. Buchanan. As far as I know, it has, and the Republican Na-
tional Committee, of course, mider Senator Dole was a very effective
organization and their research there was some of the best I have ever
seen. But to my knowledge, there has always been a sort of tracking of
the opposition.
I have read books where it was said that President Kennedy had his
eye on Senator Goldwater and was watching the progress of liis can-
didacy. I am sure Larry O'Brien, Mr. O'Brien when he was in the
3947
White House, might liave liad something to do witli political activity
there. So, I think these sort of things are really, in my judgment, rou-
tine. As I suggested to tlie chairman
Senator Baker. Mt-. Buchanan, do you think they are desirable? I
happen to tliink they are.
Mr. Buchanan. I believe they are. I believe they are.
Certainly, if a President; let us say a President has a program and
policy he wants to have carried out in foreign policy that is going to
take over 8 years, he has to be reelected to do that and he should hav(»
someone on his staff who understands these matters and can research
these matters and can comisel and advise him on how best to be re-
elected without which reelection there cannot be any continuation of
j)olicy.
Senator Baker. I will conclude this time segment by relating quickly
a stoiy they tell on former Speaker Sam Rayburn who was hearing
a glowing account of a distinguished Vice President of philosophei-s,
theorists, doctors of this, that or the other, professiomil men who had
gathered around a duly-elected President. After this long account had
l)een given by tlie newly elected Vice President, he asked, '"What do
you think, Mr. Sam?"' He said, "I think I would feel better if one of
them would run for sheriff."'
I frankly and honestly confess that I think politics is essential to
the functioning of a self-governing system and I do not think you can
separate the President from politics and I do not think you should
and I Iiope you would agree with that.
Mr. Buchanan. I concur with you. Senator.
Senator Ervin, Senator Talmaclge.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Buchanan, I believe you testified this morn-
ing that part of your duties and responsibilities at the White House
was to provide a news analysis to the President and brief him prior
to press conferences ; is that accurate ?
Mr. Buchanan. That would — the President's daily news summary
is something which I do not prepare but which is in my jurisdiction.
It is prepared for tlie President and placed upon his desk every morn-
ing and prepared by a staff' headed by Mort Allen. It is in my juris-
diction and I am genei-ally responsible for it, but I do not make a
significant contribution to its preparation. I did during the campaign
of 1972, which I will mention in a minute.
With regard to press conferences, I am the desk man, if you will,
for all the research and material from the National Security Council,
from the Domestic Council, from the various shops in the White House
and the agencies, the briefing materials which come to me which are
cut, digested, and then presented to the President in his briefing books
for his press conferences. I have been doing that for 6 or 7 years.
Now, with regard to the campaign of 1972, Senator, there was an
aspect of that, a news summary where I did make a contribution. I
would come in in the morning at 6 :30 or so and we would go through
the seven or eight Eastei'n papers and the Chicago Tribune, if it were
available, and through the news summary would do a complete politi-
cal analysis to i:)ut on top of tlie news summary which would go on the
President's desk and we did it from September through the election.
Senator Talmadge. Immediately after the break-in of the AVater-
gate you were aware many of the newspapers had speculative stories
and articles about various people in the White House and in the Com-
3948
mittee To Re-Elcct the President beino; involved in the coverup. Werej
any of those newsstories withheld from the President \
Mr. BuciiAXAx. No, sir, they were not. As a matter of fact, f^iven the
fact that we would not include in the President's news summaries news J
items like, say, a natural disaster abroad and news items that are not I
of specific interest to the President, it would probably be a hi^rher
percentage of copy within the President's news summary devoted to
an issue like Watergate than there would in your average newspaper.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Buchanan, 1 send by a member of the staff
a memorandum prepared by you, Patrick Buchanan, dated Maich ;>,
1070, on White House stationery — Xerox (•o])y including your signa-
ture, and I will ask you to please identify it.
Mr. Buchaxan. Is this one I have seen t
Senator Talmadge. One you testified about this morning. 1 want
your identification for the purpose of inserting it in the record.
Mr. Lenzxer. It is tab 4 [exhibit No. 164] .
Mr. Buciiaxax. This is one that I have not — as I said, this is one of
the ones I was not shown the other night.
Senator Talmadge. It is tlie one you testified about this morning.
Mr. Buchaxan. Right. They asked various facets of me and I testi-
fied
Senator Talmadge. Will you take your time and testify about it and
see if it is a true, accurate Xerox copy with your signature affixed
thereon ?
Mr. Buchax'ax. It appears to be, yes, sir. This is the March 3, 1970.
memorandum, and it appears to be my memorandum, yes, sir.
Senator Talmad<;e. I thank the Chair, and I believe the chief coun-
sel says all these memorandums will be inserted in the record.
Mr. Buchanan, I ask you please to tui-n to page 5 of that document
and follow with me the following language beginning with para-
graph 1 :
One of my primary concerns about this —
And we are referring to foundations and your recommendations to
the President —
is that it required a strong fellow ninuing the Internal Revenue Division and
an especially friendly fellow with a friendly staff in the tax-exempt office. I am
not sure we have this right now.
You may or may not recall that Randolph Thrower, a constituent of
mine
Mr. BucHAX'AX. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. A fine lawyer, fine gentleman, outstanding Re-
publican, was then collector of intei-nal revenue.
Mr. BuciLvxAX. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. He held that office from April 1969 to June
1971. Did Mr. Thrower leave his office under ])ressure I
Mr. Buciiaxax. Not to my knowledge. Senator Tahnadge. 1 just
could not answer that. It is true that Mr. Thrower was in the Internal
Revenue but I believe, as I have stated, my understanding of the
situation was that we had done an unsuccessful, and quite candidly
a very bad job, of taking effective control of the agency as was within
our rights by appointing our own schedule (^'s to those available posi-
tions which we had open to us.
3949
Second, it was our belief, justified or not, that within tlie Tax-
Exempt Division there was basically a hostility to our point of view,
and for us to set up, say, a ]\IacArthur Foundation or a John Adams
Foundation as we talked about it, and to have that set up and say we
left office in 1072 and have politically inspired individual removed, its
tax exemption would be a problem.
Senator Tai.madge. I thought jNIr. Tln-ower was supposed to be a
friendly man. He was appointed by the President.
Mr. BucHAXAX. Sir, this is not just the head of the Internal Revenue
Division. There is an office within it, I believe.
Senator Talmadge. Did he not ran it, did he not head it?
Mr. BuciiAXAX. He headed the entire ao-ency but as I say. Senator,
our view Avas that we did not, we were not statl'ed in depth at the
Internal Revenue, IRS.
Senator Talmadge. Please follow with me further on the same
page. Paragraph 5 :
Some of the essential objectives of the institution —
And this is the proposed foundation that you propose to establish,
\ would have to be blurred, even buried in all sorts of other activities that would
1 be the bulk of its work, that would employ many people, and that would provide
t the cover for the more important efforts.
Are you not recommending the same thing to be set up that you are
( complaining about in other sections of your memorandum ?
Mr. Buchanax, Well, Senator, there is indeed a gray area in the
( thing in terms of political activity. One of my reconnnendations, quite
( candidly, was that within this foundation we would set up a group ;
! a lawyer about 35 years old and with some young law clerks who would
; gage the qualifications of Federal judges across the country in terms
I of both their qualifications and philosophy, and these type of things.
I Quite candidly, if another administration came in they would say
that is political activity and we will take away its tax exeuiption and
' so my recommendation was, basically would be, that this would not be
a highly publicized thing within this institution; that is correct.
Senator Talmadge. Let us read further now. The next paragraph :
Every menial task of Government possible would be sent over to the founda-
tion to carry out at cost-plus-10.
Mr. Buchanax. That is right.
Senator Talmadge. A^^lat do you mean by that?
Mr. BuciiAXAx. Well, that would be instead of sending these as-
signments over to the Brookings Institution and have them do it at
cost-plus-10, we would send them to our new institution. This is only
a discretionary contract. Senator. This would not be
Senator TALMADfiE. Go ahead, are you finished ?
Mr. BucHAXAN. No. This would be — we have not an available in-
stitution, conservatives do not today, to do the kind of work that
that the Brookings Institution does. I am sure the Brookings Insti-
tution, cost-plus-10 simply means that the Brookings Institution —
or, I am not sure a slight margin on what they do in terms of assign-
ments, and we would simply — what this says is we would shift these
assignments over to the new institution if we set it up.
Senator Talmadge. I want to make myself perfectly clear. As a
member of the Finance Committee and as a member of the Joint Com-
mittee on Internal Revenue Taxation, I have worked as hard as I
3950
know how to keep that service out of politics, out of anyone's politics,
Democratic politics and Republican politics alike. I am thorough!
aware, as you are, that some of these foundations have intruded int
the political arena when they should not have. "We have tried to cor-
rect it in legislation. I have even tried to go further, I have inserted
in tax bills provisions to get them out of the arena of voter registra
tion. But I lost that battle on the Senate floor. It seems to me that
what you are proposing here is to try to get unfriendly foundations out ^
of the political arena and get f riencUy foundations in. j
Mr. Buchanan. No.
Senator Talmadge. Is that what you are seeking to do ?
Mr. Buchanan. No, what I am seeking to do is — would be to estab-
lish — first off, it is my belief, as expressed in this memorandum, there
is a bias that had already existed witliin the Internal Revenue Serv-
ice. In my judgment, I do not recommend, incidentally, that you take |
away the tax exemption of the Brookings Institution. I do not believe
in politics.
Senator Talmadge. If they get involved in politics, I think their tax I
exemption should be denied because they violate the law.
Mr. Buchanan. I agree 100 percent but I do not think the Brook-
ings Institution engages in politics. It engages in studies which are
used. I think that law should be very tight. But, we should have in-
stitutions similar to that in my judgment, and secondarily, what you
see here is a reflection of my view that there was a political bias that
existed against conservative institutions, whereby the IRS would
look at them a good deal harder than they look at others.
Senator Talmadge. How were you going to determine what is
political and what is not if you get into the area of thought control ?
Mr. Buchanan. Well, if you are referring to
Senator Talmadge. I do not see how you can outlaw liberal foun-
dations.
Mr. Buchanan. You cannot. Senator.
Senator Talmadge. And say they must be conservative to get the
tax exemption. The only yardstick you can have, as I see it, is whether
or not they engage in politics and if they are engaged in politics.
Democratic, Republican, Liberal, Conservative, or Reactionary they
ought to be put out of business.
Mr. BuciLVNAX. Not put out of business, have their tax exemption
taken away.
Senator Talmadge. Exactly, that is what I mean.
]Mr. Buchanan. I would concur with that but even though I am
critical of the Brookings Institution as biased in the other direction,
I agree with the use of tax exemption for institutions Avhich study
public issues even if they are liberal or conservative as long as they
are studying public issues. But if they are engaged in voter registra-
tion, if they are demonstrating up on the Hill for legislation, if they
are lobbying, if they are taking out ads to influence the votes of Con-
gressmen one way or the other, I would concur. But as long as it is
educational. Senator, even if it is liberal, I have got no objections to
its tax exemption.
Senator Talmaikie. You and I are in thorough accord on that. The
only difference I can see is the one distinction. You are opposed to
3951
unfriendly foundations and favor friendly foundations. Is that an
accurate statement I
Mr. BucHAXAx. I think that would be a fair statement ; that I am
opposed to unfriendly, in favor of friendly, but I would not recom-
mend. I do not believe, removing; the tax exemption from a foundation
which was strictly engaged in studying issues even if it were a liberal
foundation.
Senator Talmadge. All right, let us go one step further in your
memorandum. On page 4, paragraph ;>. Page 4 of your memorandum,
paragraph 3, the second sentence :
Anti- Administration foundations should be cut off without a dime.
Mr. BucHAXAN. Senator, there is a differentiation between giving
antiadministration foundations our money and leaving them with
their tax exemption. I believe that we ought not to fund liberal tax-
exempt foundations. There is no inconsistency in that position, with
the statement that they also ought to be allowed to keep their tax
exemption. I do not think we ought to fund them, simply.
Senator Talmadgk. Are you not talking about tax money belonging
to over 200 million American people ?
Mr. Buc'iiANAX. Well, here is the thing. You are talking about it
two ways. You are talking- about it as if we in the White House are
giving tax exempt — I am sorry, I mean tax funds to a foundation.
They get a death tax exemption and they get a tax exemption as well.
My only recommendation would be to cut off the first.
Senator Talmadge. You use the phrase "our money." You really
are talking about the taxpayers' money.
Mr. BuciiAXAx. Taxpayers' money.
Senator Talmadge. Let me make this suggestion to you.
Mr. BuciiAXAx. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. If you have some recommendations for improve-
ment of foundations to g-et them out of the political arena, you get the
President to send up an appropriate messag:e and you will have my
suppoi-t.
Mr. BucHAXAx. Thank you very much. Senator. It will be appre-
ciated, I can tell you.
Senator Talmadge. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervix. Senator Gurney.
Senator Gurxey. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
I think this matter of foundations has intrigued the Congress for
a long time and I would like to pursue that a little further. As I recall
the testimony this morning, Mr. Buchanan, you did make, I think, a
general statement that the big foundations support liberal Democrat
views. Is that a fair statement to make 'I
Mr. BrcHAXAx. The biggest one, the Ford Foundation does. No. 2,
I believe is the Rockefeller Foundation. But when you get down
below that to Lilly and Duke and some of the others in the top 10 they
are, some of them, Mellon, for example, are supportive of conservative
things but conservative foundations, to be quite candid, are less ag-
gressive than the Ford Foundation.
Senator Gurxey. Could you give us examples of how the Ford
Foundation, the Rockefeller Foundation, give their support '(
Mr. BucHAXAx. Well, exclusive of the Rockefeller Foundation
which I had not studied, the Ford Foundation, for example, provides
3952
funds for the Institute for Policy Studies. The Institute for Policy
Studies liolds, has held, it is my recollection, it is Baskin's and Bar
nett's outfit, they hold seminai-s witli Congressmen, for staffer's and the'
like and they deal in tryino; to influence Congressmen and the like to
vote in one direction. They get very close to the line but they, in turn,
if I am not mistaken, the Institute of Policy Studies has in turn funded
the Quicksilver Times which was a radical — it is one of the radical,
what they call underground newspapers which has a political point
of view which is sold for profit.
Senator Gurxey. Do you have any copies of that ?
Mr. Buchanan. This is, as I say, the studies that I did, Senator,
Avere done in 1970, and I could get the background. All that material
was in the speeches we had drafted and had set for delivery. There is,
of course, the highly celebrated also, the fund that the Ford Founda-
tion provided to ex-Kennedy staft'ei-s in 1968.
Senator Gurnet. Well, would you f ui-nish a copy of the draft of the
speech for the record ?
Mr. Buchanan. I will take a look at the speech and I would have to
take a look at that speech first.
Senator Gurney. Go on.
Mr. Buchanan. In 1968, the Ford Foundation under Mr. Bundy
provided sort, of severance pay foi- the Democratic staffers of Senator
Edward Kennedy. In the mayor's race in Cleveland, in 1968, I be-
lieve, they funded a voter- — Ford Foundation funded a voter regis-
tration drive in the black area which was partially responsible for
the defeat of Seth Taft and a victory for Mr. Stokes in that area.
I believe the legislation now is that you can fund voter registration
drives, but you have to do it over an area of something like five
States. The Southern Christian Leadership Conference under Mr.
Abernathy is the one that caught my attention. What was done there —
they, of course, are funded by the Ford Foundation, or have been.
They sent to me what was a strictly political literature document
which was called in effect, "We did a-, y, and z to Mr. Nixon and
Mr. Agnew,-' and at the bottom of that it said, "Send in your tax-
exempt contributions." Now, this is what we raised Cain about, Mr.
Haldeman and I. It was checked out and some of thcvse groups like
that group in the NSA, I believe, set up dual funds. In other words,
if you send in your check and declare it tax exempt, they say it
goes into educational fmids. I don't know what efforts there has
been made to sec if there is a commingling of funds or not of those
things. These would be a few of the things that I can recollect from
those particular speeches.
Senator Gurney. These are examples of direct political activity.
Mr. Buchanan. These were examples of direct political activity.
But one of the questions I was making earlier was — it is just my
judgment — that if you have a number of public policy institutions that
are of the liberal persuasion, I agree with the tax exemption for
these kinds of institutions even if you disagree with them. But if
you have got a giant like the Ford Foundation which is pouring
tens of millions of dollars into the creation of studies which, in effect,
argue for a particular point of view, persuasively, like you take a
Brookings study, as soon as a study — Brookings study — is done, you
w^ll see it on the front page of the New York Times and the Wash-
3953
ington Post precisely what they recommended, and these things are
moved into the political bloodstream, and one of my basic conten-
tions is that there is an imbalance in resources with regard to these
foundations.
Senator Gurney. Mr. Buchanan, it seems as if a copy of the Quick-
silver Times has turned up here, so if I can have a staff member
take it over to ]\Ir. Buchanan — would he identify this as what he is
talking about. Is that the publication?
Mr. Buchanan. It appears to be. This is a — came across March 23
to April 6, 1972, edition. Eight. The information I have came out
of an article, I believe, in the Washingtonian magazine, or I would
have to check the source but it indicated that IPS.
Senator Gurnet. Mr. Chairman, may we have that marked as
an exhibit and included as an exhibit ?
Mr. BucpiANAN. It indicated that the Institute of Policy Studies
which was the beneficiary of Ford money
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, an exhibit has just been given the witness
which we haven't seen. Frequently, when I have presented exhibits and
minorit}^ counsel has not seen it, questions have been raised about it.
I don't even know what that paper is.
Senator Gurney. I wonder if a staff member would give it to
Mr. Dash so he can look at it. It is a very interesting publication.
Mr. Thompson. I believe Mr, Lenzner has seen that publication.
Mr. Buchanan. Senator Gurney, I do not speak with the authority
of the administration on this issue. This is a matter of personal interest
to me but I have always felt that legislation perhaps which would —
the Ford Foundation is divided into four separate very powerful
divisions, one of them is foreign, I think one of them is national affairs,
which budget has been increased, one of them education,, and the other
is something else. If legislation were passed, say to restrict the founda-
tion to a particular percentage of the gross national products in its
assets, that legislation could result in the dismantling of the Ford
Foundation's essential power structure while leaving all the benefits
there. In other words, you could — national affairs would be one founda-
tion, education would be another separate foundation, this would be
another separate foundation, and if one of those foundations deter-
mined to move into the political arena, then perhaps that could, the
tax exemption on that particular foundation might be, if they wanted
to, the tax exemption could be withdrawn but it seems to me this is
the problem. It is the concentration of political power in all those
resources and frankly something analogous to an antitrust situation
with regard to the Ford Foundation, I think, would be advantageous
to the political process.
Senator Gurney. On page 5 of tab 4 [exhibit No. 164], in the para-
graph marked four — it is about the middle of the page.
Mr. Buchanan. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. You mentioned, you say this: "We would be
striking at the heart of the establishment." What do you mean by the
word "establishment" there.
Mr. Buchanan. Well, that would be, and it might not be, in agree-
ment with this, but in my own view there is existent in the country in
essence an intellectual and political establishment to which the major
networks, the Ford Foundation, some of youi" major public policy
3954
institutes, the dominant media on the eastern seaboard, the liberal
wing of the Democratic Party in the Senate and others can be saicj
to belong. I think, this is my view, I think there is a prevailing Unci
set by these groups and they are in control of significant political!
assets and there is nothing conspiratorial or anything of that nature
about it, but I thiiik it is essentially the political establishment of the
country, the dominant political establishment of the country against
which you might set to be simplistic, Mr. Nixon and his middle Ameri-
can constituency.
Senator Gtjrney. Are you saying that in these large foundations
you are talking about there really is an establishment that directs its
views oriented in the liberal direction ?
Mr. Buchanan. There is tremendous interlocking directorates. If
you take a look at INIr. Kaysen's institute at Princeton, the Brookings
Institution, the Ford Foundation, Harvard Center for the study of,
Kennedy Center for the study of politics and things like that, I think,
you will find the same individuals who move on these various board
of directors and, I think, it is not unfair to characterize that as — and
the term is not necessarily pejorative — as a national establishment.
Senator Gurney. In tab 10 [exhibit No. 170] on page 7, if you would
turn to that, there is also a meaning of the Ford Foundation. Tab 10,
I think is the Muskie watch, isn't it ?
Mr. Buchanan. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. And there is an allegation in there that the Ford
Foundation is behind Muskie's candidacy. Could you elaborate on
that?
Mr. Buchanan. Which page is it ?
Senator Gurney. Page 7 of tab 10.
Mr. Buchanan. I think it is; certainly some troublesome questions
could be raised ; yes. I think it is in a question form, Senator, are they
behind his candidacy? Investigation should be done on this score. I
don't liave any knowledge, the evidence would be clearly circumstan-
tial. I think Senator Muskie on several junkets that had been — or trips
abroad that had been sponsored and funded by the Ford Foundation —
I think Senator Muskie had been prominent on each of these or all of
these, and I think this was available, I think, in Congressman Pat-
man's hearings which I read in the Congressional Record. I think this
is where that came from.
Senator Gurney. You never found any direct evidence that that
was so ?
Mr. Buchanan. No, sir; no, sir. These are just ideas.
Senator Gurney. You gave us some examples of some of Mr. Tuck's
pranks and tricks this morning. Do you have any others; did he do
anything in the 1972 campaign ?
Mr. Buchanan. No. I think he was at our convention, I believe.
They were putting out a newspaper down there. Most of his pranks
in 1972, I think, were directed at Senator jMuskie. He did something
at a tea in New Hampshire. I believe, but it was — I can't recall ex-
actly. I think after the Watergate thing frankly, anybody- who was
involved in these kinds of pranks and things was probably drawn in.
Senator Gurney. Do you recall any further the prank in New
Hampshire ?
Mr. Buchanan. Of his prank ?
3955
' Senator Gurney. Yes.
Mr. Buchanan. I do not. Senator.
Senator Gurnfa*. I wonder if we have settled the issue of the Quick-
silver Times yet, Mr. Dash. Have you had an opportunity to read it?
Mr. Dash. Yes, but was there a question, Senator Gurney, that the
Quicksilver Times was funded by the IPS, the Institute of Policy
Studies, which is part of the Ford Foundation ?
Mr. Buchanan. I think, if I am not mistaken, that is in a public
record in an article that was written on the Institute for Policy
Studies, and I believe it was one of these small Washington magazines
and in all this research going on, since I was familiar with the Quick-
silver Times, I believe as a commercial venture it would seem to me
this would be an illicit use of tax-exempt funds, and the IPS, of course,
is Ford funded.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Rogovin, who is general counsel for the Institute of
Policy Studies, has just contacted the committee and says it has never
funded the Quicksilver Times, and the only money it ever received
from — that IPS received from Ford was $6,000 in 1964.
Mr. Buchanan. Well, as I say, this is my understanding of an
article which I have read. It is a question of fact, and I would be happy
to go back and find the research I did on this.
Senator Gurney. Would you do that?
Mr. Buchanan. I would, Senator.
Senator Gurney. And submit that for the record. I take it the
Quicksilver Times is in jeopardy at the moment; is that, Mr.
Chaii'man
Senator Ervin. No, Senator, I looked at the thing. It seems to be
what you call the sort of undergi'ound hippie paper, and I am- — I
would be glad to put it in the record if you want it there, but so that
I may not remain in a state of ignorance, I would like to know what it
has to do with what Ave are investigating.
Mr. Buchanan. Senator, that is correct.
Senator Gurney. I think it has. Although today I just glanced at
it quickly, but it talks about people coming to San Diego. This has
something to do with the Republican National Convention when we
were going there before we went to Miami Beach and it also says some
unflattering things about the Republicans, so I would say this was
one of the dirty tricks department, I don't know who is responsible
for it.
Senator Ervin. Whose dirty trick ?
Senator Gurney. That is'^what I just said. I don't Imow Avho is
responsible for it. Perhaps we had better make this part of our hear-
ings and find out Avho is responsible for it.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I really suggest that we not get into
a quarrel over this. I have sat here day after day and had stuff put
in the record, much of it I not only did not know about or didn't see,
but much of it I could find only the most tenuous connection with what
we are investigating. I think we are pretty far down the road to start
showing a causal connection between the allegation and source. I know
here, for instance, that the Quicksilver Times suggests that demon-
strations are a crucial part of the range of activities, what the political
goals confronting the GOP are and there should be one massive legal
demonstration past the sports arena and it gives a whole bunch of stuff.
3956
I don't, know who that is, but it is in fact in the mainstream of,
political activity and I su<i<rest rather than ar^rue about it we put it in;
the record for whate\er it is worth.
Senator Ervin. I will put it in the record accompanied by my state-
ment that I can't see what it has got to do with what we are investi-|
gating.
Senator Gurxey. I agree with the chairman.
I don't Avant to upset the Democratic counsel so I will withdraw that
and perhaps we can identify it further on in the dirty tricks depart-
ment.
Senator Baker. If the Senator will yield ; since it is here, let's put it
in the record and we will check it later.
Senator Gurney. I don't want to embarrass the Democrats.
Senator Ervix. AVait a minute.
It doesn't embarrass me. I am a Democrat and I didn't have anything
to do with the Quicksilver Times or the demonstrations. [Applause.]
Senator Gurney. I didn't either, Mr. Chairman. He happened to
mention it and there happened to be a copy back here. So, I intro-
duced it.
Senator Ervin. In fact, I am a good friend
Senator Gurxey. I think we had better turn to gold instead of silver.
Senator Ervix'. Wait a minute. Let's get it in the record if you want
to. Put it in the record and also my statement of ignorance that I am
ignorant about why it is in the I'ecord, but let it go in there.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, put it in the record and I don't
know why it happened but it happens against the Republicans and
not against the Democrats.
Senator Ervix. Let the reporter mark it Avitli the appropriate
number.
[The document referred to was marked exhibit No. 160.* j
Senator Gurxey. I wonder if you could give us any advice, Mr.
Buchanan, you certainly have been the most knowledgeable witness,
I believe, we ha\'e ever had before the committee on the whole area of
issues in the campaign, what the candidates stood for. the various
candidates, attack plans and all that sort of thing, and you are also
acquainted certainly with some of the other political campaigns in
recent years, either actively participating on behalf of Mr. Nixon or I
guess doing research.
Could you give us any idea how tliis campaign of 1972 stacked up
against other campaigns in the sort of strategv^ and tactics done by all
of the candidates ^
Was it a fairly clean campaign? Wns it a very dirty campaign?
What about it, keeping out the Watergate thing now because we are
talking about supposedly dirty tricks department ;'
]Mr. BucnAXAx. I just could not testify with accuracy about what
dirty tricks were played, what allegations are true, but I do have to
concur with Theodore White's statement that these were — these really
had the Meight of a feather in the campaign of 1972.
I think what was unprecedented for us. Senator, was the fact that
we were — that Ave controlled the Office of the Presidency, and this
was the, frankly, some of the, innovations in terms of the offensive
♦Seo p. 4107.
3957
f strategy in media ads, the attack group which has gotten, the 9:15
group which has gotten a bad name, the use of surrogates, and the or-
chestration of our political oliensive, these had nothing to do with
dirty tricks. It was one of the most effective operations and one of
the most enjoyable operations I have been involved in.
When we first started out with Mr. Nixon back in 19(;() and traveled
to-
Senator Gurney. May I interrupt, we are on a strict time limit here
and I have used up my time.
I would like to come back to that because I think it is very important
but I will come to it again.
Mr. BuciiAXAX. May 1 make one point, Senator, in order to com-
pare campaigns, Senator, I think what you really have to do in terms
of strategies you would have to go back to President Johnson who
had the power of incumbency in 1964, and compare his strategy
and strategems and institutions with ours because the others — -the
Democrats this time were going the primary route — in 1964 it was
Senator Goldwater and Governor Rockefeller and the Republicans.
So it would be a better comparison there that you would get between
us and the Democrats.
Senator Gurxey. Thank you.
Senator Ervix. Senator Inouye.
Senator Ixouye. Thank you, sir.
Mr. Buchanan, by your testimony and by your documents you have
proven yourself to be a very effective and very scholarly political
strategist, and some of the tactics you have recommended are time-
honored practices in the American politics.
Now, whether they should be continued will be addressed in our
final report.
I would appreciate your assistance in outlining appropriate limits
of where ethics end and impropriety begins.
Now, lirst, do you feel that it is ethical or proper for campaign funds
contributed to the candidate of one party to be funnelled into the cam-
paign of a candidate running in a primary of the opposition party?
Mr. Bi ciiAXAX. I think a direct transfer of campaign funds from
one party to the candidate of another is currently illegal, Senator. I
may not be sure of that; that is in the funding legislation. I do not
think it is illegitimate, for example, if we went to, say, one of our
large contributors, given the fact that we had considerable financial
resources — if we went to one of our large contril)utors and said : ''The
best thing you could do for the President would be to contribute to his
campaign in the Democratic primary because that is a close race and
he doesn't have any money."
That, it would seem to me, is — I don't know that it has been done in
the past, with the idea of assisting candidates in the other party's
primary, is not unprecedented at all.
Senator Ixouye. Do you think it was ethical or proper to covertly
transmit $400,000 to the primary of fonner Governor Brewer?
Mr. BucHANAx. I do not know the law on the $400,000 contribu-
tion, whether that was legitimate or not. I think if we had told our
financial contributors, if you will, that Governor Brewer can win that
election down there, it is a very close one, he is lagging for funds and
the best thing you could do for the President of the United States
21-296 0—74-
3958
in 1972 is to make a contribution of that amount to Governor Brewer's
campaign ; that to me would be i)roper and legitimate. I do not know
the handling of the transfer of those funds whether that Avas it but I
would think so.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Buchanan, do you feel it would be ethical or
proper to place camf)aign spies in the camp of the opposition and
Mr. BucHAXAx. No, as John Osborne wrote, this is a connnon thing
done in American politics. Xow, is it ethical? I would Jiot sit in judg-
ment of the ethics of an individual who took that assignment. I do not
think myself if I were asked to do it I would want to insinuate myself
into the confidence of an individual and tlien betray that confidence
for cash. It would not be something I would do but I don't — I would
not want to sit in the judgment of the ethics of others who volunteered
or did those things, and I think you made yourself, Senator — go ahead,
well
Senator Inouye. Do you feel it would be ethical or proper to origi-
nate or distribute campaign literature which does not identify the
source and which is designed to embarrass the opposition candidate?
Mr. Buchanan. I think the failure to identify, the failure to have a
source named on the literature or sponsor is a violation of the law, I
believe. It is a misdemanor, I believe. This is somewhat— we referred
to in the documents released by Mr. ]\Ieany and Mr. Barkin and the
other one that w^as referred to this morning.
If you ask is it legitimate, to — let me give you an example, I would
say yes on these grounds: Let's say Senator McGovern was running
against the President of the United States. He is running from a
position on the left of the spectrum. President Nixon, in our campaign
of 1972, we had weaknesses on the right side of the spectrum.
Now, if Senator McGoveni got, say, some conservative Democrats
on the Hill and some conservative money raisers and they formed a
committee which, say, was a committee for a balanced budget or some-
thing like that, and then they criticized the President of the Ignited
States for having spent, say, having run deficits in excess of x^ ?/, and 2,
that would be a political criticism of the President of the United States
from a separate vantage point of Senator McGovern's done by Demo-
crats and that would be entirely legitimate even if Senator McGovern
had laiowledge of that. It doesn't seem to me there is any requirement
there that this has to be a consistency in every argument you make
against a candidate.
Senator Inouye. Do you think it would be ethical or im])roper or
proper for campaign aides of one candidate to involve themselves
in sabotage of the campaign ai)i)earances of the opposition candidate?
^Iv. Buchanan. That would depend — let me see, the Washington
Post uses the terminology "sabotage" for what Ave do and '"pranks"
for w^hat they do.
It would depend precisely on what is done. The examples I gave you
on what Dick Tuck did and there is room in American politics for
])ranksters and hecklei-s and the like, there is room on both side^.
These things are part of the fun of politics but they can get to the
point wdiere they cross the line. I think they would cross the line in
terms of r.umbers. In other woixls. you have one Dick Tuck or two
Dick Tucks, or three Dick Tucks, OK. But suppose you feel, you know,
you have in every field about a hundred of them out there, the cumula-
3959
tive impact of these kinds of disruptions could have such an effect as to
deny a candidate, not merely the right to communicate with the
American people and so foul up his operations, as really to deny him
his legitimate right.
So, I think 3'ou could probably cross the line in excess numbers,
1 think you could probably cross the line in the other direction in
terms of the character of the prank and the stunt.
Senator Inouye. Well, when jNIr. Tuck put on an engineer's cap
and got the train to move, was that not a crime ?
Mr. Buchanan. Impersonating an engineer? Senator, I just do not
know. What would it be, disorderly — ^there are
Senator Inouye. This was interfering with the orderly schedule of
a train in interstate commerce.
]Mr. Buchanan. In interstate commerce? It was a California train,
I understand. It was just going up and down the California line.
I do not think he should be prosecuted — let me say this. If every
time the President began a speech, that train pulled oat of the station
and it was his responsibility, I think somebody ought to put a stoj)
to it. [Laughter.] But I do not think that that singular act was — we
would all be in trouble if something like that — every time something
like that happened, an individual was prosecuted.
Senator Inouye. Do you think it is ethical ?
Mr. Buchanan. Doing that?
Senator Inouye. Yes.
My. Buchanan. I do not think it is unethical. I cannot speak to
the ethics of ]Mr. Tuck doing that. That is his own judgment. I do not
believe it is unethical. It does not strike me as unethical.
Senator Inouye. Do you think it would be ethical to encourage the
voters of one party to participate in the political caucus of the opposi-
tion party?
Mr. Buchanan. The political caucus? I think that is next to im-
possible. I think you have to be a registered — I know in the Demo-
cratic Party, which has caucuses, I believe you have to be a registered
Democrat to get into a caucus. But j^ou raise a broader question.
Senator Inouye. Or a primary.
Mr. Buchanan. How about the primary, right. Now, there is a place
where, on the State level, there could conceivably be reform, and that
is crossover voting. I think the Republicans in 1968 in Wisconsin, when
we were there — because they crossed over in droves for Senator
McCarthy and the purpose was to inflict a defeat on President
Johnson. President Johnson had withdrawn '2 days before. That is
something that could conceivably be recommended. But 3'ou ought to
know what you are doing. The crossover voters in my estimate, the
percentage of Republicans moving into a Democratic primary or the
percentage of Democrats moving into Republican primaries. These
tend to have more of an effect to increase the chances, I think, of
centrist candidates. You remove crossover voting and I think
your candidates will tend to be more ideological in the sense that they
will go to true believers of their own party who are on the left in the
Democratic Party and the conservatives in the Republican Party, and
you allow them to have sharper differentiations in the candidates. So
I think before States do that — I think, my own personal feeling is that
that would be a good thing, to rule out crossover voting, because I think
3960
that each party should have the right, you know, to nominate its own
candidates, and Republicans should have no business voting in Demo-
cratic primaries and vice versa.
Senator Ixouye. Do you believe it is ethical or proper foi- a candidate
to provide information to friendly press or media whicli would prove
damaging to the opposition candidates without the source of that in-
formation being identified publicly ^
Mr. BuciiAXAX. AVell, most of the individuals in the national press
that I know would not print a story which did not have some substan-
tive documentation. You mean to go to — make a false allegation
against an individual '( That is not ethical. That is a detraction, I mean
against an individual. But none of your national press people are going
to run with a story that is just based on the word, I think, of another
individual, about a serious personal charge against someone else.
Senator Inouyk. What about a reliable source ^
Mr. Buchanan. Well, when they have a reliable source, they gener-
ally have a reliable source. Ver}^ few repoi-ters — you are getting into
the ethics of journalism now. I think generally when a reporter says
he has a reliable source, he has got a reliable source.
Senator Inouye. So there are some good leaks and bad leaks ^
Mr. Buchanan. And there are some good reporters and some bad
reporters ; yes, sir.
Senator Inouye. I thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Buchanan. Thank you, sir.
Senator Erv^n. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. I have read your opening statement rather care-
fully, jMr. Buchanan, and I would say that in many areas, I agree with
you. I think some of the mattere that you have raised needed telling;
specifically starting on page 9 of your statement, where you say that
it is being alleged that the campaign of 1972 was not only a rigged
campaign but an utter fraud, a political coup by the President of
the United States. These contentions, Mr. Chairman, are altogether
imtrue.
And I must confess to you that I think any political scientist look-
ing at that election would at least give equal attention to the mattei-
of the Democrats in their primaries being so split, or at least splitting
up the center, that the outcome was fairly much assured. I cannot
disagree, either, where you quote '"Theodore White, that the diity
tricks of 1972, added togethei-, the ultimate balance — at least as far
as I know dirty tricks — had the weight of a feather."
And I would not disagree with those valid activities which you
have set forth before the committee with letterwi'iting campaigns or
issue-oriented speeches by Republicans, either the Senate or the surro-
gates around the countiTside. And again, I cannot argue with you on
a spoils system. Ortainly it still has a certain hold on the AmeT-ican
political scene. So I want to make it clear that in those i-espects, what
I think all of us would agree is legislation, there is little argiunent.
But the pi'oblem is, of course, that the matters that you wei-e en-
gaged on, or rather, matters that you and othei- members of the admin-
istration were engaged on, go way beyond the admittedly legislation,
hardnosed aspects of politics. And unfortunately, and I came here
really expecting to do most of the listening this moniing, I cannot
let this stand insofar as your testimonv is concerned. I would like to
3961
get into certain of these activities and see just how we categorize them
and how you would explain them.
Now, I would like to refer, if I might, to the memorandum which
you wrote of September 13, 1972, to Messrs. Haldeman, Ehrlichman,
and Colson. More specifically, it is at the end of the memorandum, the
bottom of page 4.
Mr. Buchanan. Could I have the exhibit number of that?
Senator Weicker. Yes, indeed ; that is exhibit No. 194, 1 believe, the
last exhibit.
Mr. Buchanan. The bottom of which page, sir ?
Senator Weicker. Let me read, if I might, the memorandum :
Again, tlie critical point is that just as McGovern ouglit to malve "Nixon" tlie
issue — so tlie issue this fall is McGoveni. Will he and the hard core left winger
radicals who took over the party take over America? That is the hottom line.
If the country goes to the polls in November, scared to death of McGovern, think-
ing him vagiiely anti-Amei-ica and radical and proceed the left wingers and
militants, then they will vote against him — ^which means for us. What we have
done thus far, and fairly well, is not put the President 34 points ahead — but
McGovern 34 points l)ehind.
Mr. Buchanan. Yes, sir.
Senator "Wfjecker. I find that a rather interesting statement coming
from a man who is one of the spokesmen, certainly, for this adminis-
tration and for the President. Did you feel at the time that you wrote
the memorandum that there was not enough, sufficient, in the way of
accomplishment by this administration that we could not put Presi-
dent Nixon 34 points ahead, that we had to take the other candidate
and put him 34 poinds behind? Was there a lack of positive material?
Mr. Buchanan. No, there was not a lack of positive material. As a
matter of fact, the budget for the positive or pro side of the media
campaign was far in excess of the anti side. But I am not presumptuous.
Senator, and I am not foolish. We were not 34 points ahead of Sen-
ator McGovern simply on the basis of our record. I think we could
have won on the basis of our record. As I stated earlier, once we moved
up above 60 percent in the polls, toward 70 percent in the national poll,
peoj^le who are voting there or voting for us are almost entirely Dem-
ocrats. If you polled them, most of them would say they were dissatis-
fied with certain aspects of the President's economic program, certain
aspects of his other programs, his personality. In a normal election,
they would go for a Plubert Humphrey, they would go for a Senator
Muskie, they would go for a Senator Kennedy. They were standing
with us. Senator, for the reason that they were strongly opposed to
McGovern.
Now, this goes to a point that you raised earlier in otliei- testimony.
You wanted to know, did we abandon other Bepublicans? The answer
to that question is : No, we did not. In 1966, the President went out and
worked 'for Republicans; in 1970, we worked. We were totally unsuc-
cessful. We felt that the best Avay we could bring in a Republican Con-
gress, that the best way we could bring in Republicans in the Senate
and the House was to identify as President, to run as President, and
win by a landslide and liopefully, they would then come in on the
Presidential coattails, as they did in 1936 and as they did in 1964.
That was unsuccessful for tlie reason that this new ticket-splitter
phenomenon has taken over and candidates at the top of the ticket
less and less can deliver for candidates down the line.
3962
Senator Wkicker. Well, you have raised another issue ^Yhich I Avilll
certainly be irlad to get to, hut let us just stick to the memorandum, if I
wc can, "for a minute. What is it in the course of a campaign that makes i
an incumbent President try to paint his opponent as anti-American ?
I do not quite understand that one.
Mr. BuciiANAX. Wait a minute.
Senator Wkickkr. ''If the country goes to the polls scared to death
of McGovern, thinking uiany vaguely anti-American and radical" —
What does that mean ?
Mr. BuciiAXAN. There were polls taken — Mike Wallace on election
night said there were polls taken indicating that the people went to
the polls and voted for the President as opposed to McGovern on two
issues, as he said: "Patriotism and morality." Walter Cronkite got
ap -y and said: "AAHiat do you mean, George McGovern is not anti-
American and he is not immoral.'"
Then Mike Wallace said : "Wait a minute, what we are talking about
is the American voter's perception of the candidates." When Mc-
Govern said he would go to Hanoi, he would crawl, if necessary, and
\)&g for the release of American prisoners, for example, in the minds
of the people, this is anti-American. I do not say Senator McGovern
is anti-American, but the perception in the voter's mind was that Sen-
ator McGovern was not a figure whom they wanted to put in the Presi-
dency of the United States because he did not share their views with
regard to patriotism and things of that character.
Now, I do not say that Senator McGovern is tliat, but it would be
false for me to stand up here and deny that that was the perception of
millions of Americans.
Senator Weicker. Why do you think this perception came about on
their f)art?
Mv. Buchanan. I think Senator McGoveni contributed to it more
than anybody else in the comitry.
Senator Weicker. Do you think maybe now that you have heard
the evidence of what happened during the campaign of 1972 that has
come before this committee, with various members of the administra-
tion testifying, do you think that maybe you took that lawlessness,
that restlessness, that violence wdiich the American people were leeiy
of, that you maybe took it out of blue jeans and put it into blue suits?
Mr. Buchanan. Are you referring to me, sir?
Senator Weicker. No ; I am asking on the basis of the testimony
which you have heard, as has everybody else, before this committee,
do you believe that the lawlessness, which, obviously, the American
people were concerned w^ith, was in fact taken out of blue jeans and put
into blue suits?
Mr. Buchanan. Well, with regard to that, the individuals against
whom allegations have been made have not yet been tried. There were
errors, mistakes, misjudgment, and wrongdoing on the part of indi-
\-iduals with whom I have been associated, I believe, and perhaps some
of them were within the White House. That is tnie. But I do not think
that to take — I do not think that cei-tainly, what we did — if these
things were done, they were not justified and they cei-tainly do not
justify the things that were done in 1970 by the demonstrators. Both
were wronff.
3963
But I do not see the connection between this and the President of the
United States and I do not see the connection between that and me.
Senator Weioker. Well, let me ask you a question. On page 10 of
your statement before the committee, you made the statement that
Republicans were not responsible for the downfall of Senator Muskie.
And you made the statement that the Republicans were not responsible
for the nomination of Senator McGovern.
And I agree with you. I agree with you. Now, let me ask you this
question: Were Republicans — do you feel that Republicans in the
sense of the party were responsible for Watergate ?
Mr. Buchanan. No; I think individuals have to be held accountable
for what they did. Inclividuals who conceived and carried out the
Watergate break-in, which, in and of itself, I considered wrong but not
just grievously w^'ong
Senator AVeicker. Right.
Mr. Buchanan. Those individuals are accountable. No; the polit-
ical party is not responsible. The Republican Party is not respon-
sible ; no.
Senator Weicker. In other words, it was just four Cubans sitting in
a bar and doing a gratuitous act for the Republicans ?
Mr. Buchanan. Whom do you want me to pass judgment on.
Senator?
Senator Weicker. 1 would like you to tell this committee as to whom
you feel was responsible for the matter called Watergate and its
attendant circumstances.
Mr. Buchanan. You mean Mr. Magruder has, I believe, testified
before this committee that he was cognizant of it. There are seven
individuals, I think, who have been convicted of it. There are other
individuals who I do not believe have yet been indicted and I am in no
position to sit up here and to say that these individuals were guilty.
I just do not know. I am not in control of the evidence. I am not a
judge. That is for a court to decide.
Senator Weicker. I am not trying to judge individual guilt or
innocence. I would like to know who was responsible for these acts,
these things that were precipitated.
Mr. Buchanan. Men are responsible for what they do themselves.
Senator Weicker. Let us keep on going relative to the matter of
what was done, what has been testified to before this conmiittee. I
laughed along with the others as to the matters of Dick Tuck and
trains pulling out of the station. But let us try and fit into one of your
categories the following occurrences which happened in the campaign
of 1972. Now, you have four categories: Utterly outrageous, dirty
tricks, political hardball, and pranks.
The use of the Justice Department, the CIA, the FBI, the State
Department, for political purposes by an incumbent administra-
tion : Which category would that fall into ?
Mr. Buchanan. That reference to those categories is in refer-
ence to the so-called dirty tricks and not in reference to crimes,
Senator.
Senator Weicker. I am not saying they are. I am just asking you,
the use of the Justice Department', the CIA, the FBI, the State Depart-
ment, in behalf of an incumbent administration in a political way —
what would that fall into ? Is that pranks ?
3964
Mr BuciiAXAX. Senator, it is customary in national politics that the
Secretary of Defense, I believe, and the Secretary of State generally
stay out of national politics, although that was not the case m 1964. i
And Secretary Laird, of course, made political speeches. I do not see
anything wrong with that.
The use of the FBI in a political campaign to me would be an un-
justified use of that agency, which should not be done. The Depart-
ment of Justice, Senator Ervin and I would — it has been precedented
tliat both in our administration and President Kennedy's, the Attor-
ney General was a political figure.
Senator Wkickeh. Let me say one thing right now, because I thinl<
I would like to believe that maybe the people elected Richard Nixou
President in 1068 because they did not want any more of these things
to «-o on. Maybe 1 am wrong, but I would like to go on that assumiv
tion. This is what I believed.
As far as I am concerned, Mr. Buchanan, let us restrict ourselves
to matters of this election.
Mr. BuciTAXAX. People have no reason to regret the election of 1968,
in my judgment.
vSenator Wkickeu. I am saying to you let's restrict ourselves to mat-
ters of the campaign of 1972. In other words, the "everybody did it"
theory which has been floated has no bearing in this hearing.
Mr. Buchanan. No one has suggested that the fact tliat things were
done wrong before justifies doing them again.
Senator Weicker. Why cite the examples ?
Mr. Buchanan. You are the one citing the examples of Justice De-
partment, State, and Defense and I am responding to them.
Senator Weicker. In the 1972 campaign and yon are responding to
what went on in 1960 and everything else.
Mr. Buchanan. I would beg to disagree with you. If the Secretary
of Defense and Secretary of State — I would think the Secretarv^ of
State should stay out of politics. But the Secretary of Defense — the
defense budget is a national issue, as it was in 1964, when Secretary
McISTamara spoke out, as it was in 1972 with Secretary Laird. They
are perfectly within their rights to speak out and defend the policies
of the incumbent administration. That has a partisan connotation, I
know, but I see nothing wrong with that.
Senator Weicker. I was not referring to the Secretai-y of Defense,
never made any mention. I said the Justice Department, use of Justice
Department agencies in behalf of political campaigns, what category
does that fall into ?
Mr. Buchanan. They should not be used.
Senator Weicker. CIA ?
Mr. Buchanan. The CIA, I think, by law is forbidden and it should
obev the law.
Senator Weicker. FBI ?
Mr. Buchanan. The FBI should have no role in any national poli-
tical campaign.
Senator Weicker. No. 2, the Ellsberir break-in coverup. A^^lat does
(hat fall into? Is that pranks, iwiitical hardball, dirty tricks, or ut-
terly outrageous?
Ail-. liucHANAN. The coverup?
Senator Weicker. Yes, the Ellsberg break-in covenip.
3965
Mr. Buchanan. You are asking me to talk about a matter for which
ndividuals conceivably could be indicted in the next week. I don't
vuow. I am not a lawyer. I don't know the responsibilities upon law-
yers to — some of the individuals who are said to have known about
his are lawyei-s, to report this to tlie trial judge at which point — these
ire matters with which I am not conversant.
Senator Weicker. Well, of course, it was testified to before this com-
mittee by the former Attorney General that this was the most serious
matter of all.
Mr. Buchanan. The Ellsberg break-in ?
Senator Weicker. The Ellsberg matter and its coverup was abso-
lutely essential to the campaign of 1972.
Mr. Buchanan. The Ellsberg break-in took place m July ot ID —
I am sorry, September, I believe, of 1971.
Senator Ekvin. September of 1971.
Mr Buchanan. I would disagree with the Attorney (Tcneral,
franklv, to this extent. If after that thing had occurred, we luid come
forward and said so and explaiiu'd it, 1 don't think it would have
been a favoraljle element.
Senator Weicker. In other words, you feel that was wrong J
Mr Buchanan. Not doing it t I tliink that would be
Senator Weicker. Revealing all the facts as to the break-in.
Mr Buchanan. If you look l)ack in ivtrospect, I think certainly the
tliimr to have done would be not to have waited until the 1972 cam-
paign, but to have dealt with that problem at that particular time.
T think that is right.
These have nothing to do. Senator Weicker. with the matter under
discussion, which is things done during the campaign by political
organizations. That had nothing to do with the political campaign,
as I recollect.
Senator Weicker. What \
Mr. Buchanan. The Ellsberg break-in.
Senatoi- Weicker. Well, it had a great deal to do— maybe not the
break-ill, but the fact that it would be revealed, this was of deep con-
cern, deep concern, to manv individuals.
My time is up right noW. I will get back to the list after I return.
Senator Ervin. Senator ]Moiitoya.
SenatorMoNTOYA. Thank vou,:Mr. Chairman.
At the end of your testimony this morning with Mr. Dash, you
stated that the b'rochure, although rhetorical, correctly stated Mr.
Muskie's position about blacks.
Mr. Buchanan. Did I?
SenatorMoNTOYA. That is the brochure -,,-,. t ■^
Mr. Buchanan. If I did sav that, that is in error. I believe I said
it stated correctly his position with regard to gun control.
Senator ]Montoya. I will read you from the transcript, page 8Ubi.
These are your words :
The rhetoric is not left wing rhetoric, but the statements on Senator M"sji^«
position on gun control is accurate, on the statement with regaul to black
Americans— there is not an inaccuracy in terms of the writing . . .
Isn't that the same thing? . . , ^ ^^i • • • .
Mr. Buchanan. Well, if I did say that this is a— what this is is a
combination, I believe, where the record is stated— I have only had an
oi)portunity to read this once.
3966
Senator Montoya. This is your testimony.
Mr. Buchanan. Right. Well, let me just state, where the record
is stated witli regard to his view on i^ini control, it is accurate. As I
stated, the rhetoric is something else again. This is not stating fact,
this states basically opinion with i-egai'd to blacks. This is not — well,
go ahead. Senator,
Senator jMoxtoya. "Well, do you say that the statement contained in
the brochure is not accurate ?
Mr. BuciiAXAN. It is exaggerated ])olitical rhetoric; that is correct.
Senator IVIJoxtoya. Isn't that inaccuracy, then ?
Mr. Buchanan. Well, it is — yes, right. Because an awful lot of politi-^
cal speeches, it is exaggerated political rhetoric.
Senator Montoya. Isn't exaggerated political I'hetoric inaccuracy?
Mr. Buchanan. It can be inaccuracy ; yes, sir.
Senator Montoya. All right. Now, let us examine that a little more
carefully. You stated in this brochure
Mr. Buchanan. I did not write the brochure. Senator. It is my recol-
lection that I may have edited it because that is the testimony of some-
body else.
Senator Montoya. Didn't you state this morning on the record that
Mr. Khachigian had told you that you had prepared it and that you
were not about to doubt his word.
Mr. Buchanan. No. Mr. Khachigian, when he came back from the
committee liearing, he said that he had prepared it and that he had
run it by me for editing. That was his recollection. And he is a truthful
individual, so I stand on that recollection.
Senator Montoya. Right. Now, here's what the pamphlet reads, for
the record :
Muskie has told black Americans that there is no room for them in his politics.
Blacks are the backbone of the Democratic Party, and Mr. Muskie told them to
go to hell.
Now, let us examine that against the context of what ]\Ir. Muskie '
said in the press conference. I read from the excerj^t from his press i
conference of September 8, 1971 :
Repokter. What was the purpose of your meeting witli black leaders in Watts
yesterday?
>rr. Muskie. The question was particularly of liow we could move effectively to
deal with the problems that concern bhick people, iiu-ludinjr the elections. So I was
asked in that context whether a Itlack candidate for Vice President could be con-
sidered for the 1072 election if I were a candidate for the Pi-esidency. I said^
that in my judgment, such a ticket was not electable now. I .said I regretted that :
it .should not be so. But my judgment was that such a ticket would be defeated and
that if it were, it would be a setback to our efforts to im])lement our commitment
to equality for blacks in this country. I think we must work to eliminate this
wrong. I consider it a wrong, but I don't think we have done so yet. So this is the
choice that faces blacks and those of us who are committed to the ideals of
equality in America, how best we move effectively in the direction of equality,
including political equality, which will make it realistically possible for blacks,
Mexican-Americans, and representatives of any other minority to aspire to the
Vice Presidency or the Presidency of the United States. That ought to be our goal.
Then the reporter asked a further question :
Reporter. Senator, are you saying that it's the wrong time for a black man to
run for Vice President, or are you .saying that there isn't a black man qualified to
run?
Senator Muskie. Oh, no, there are blacks who are qualified to run, (pialified
to a.spire to the Vice Presidency. T know some of them and they ought to be
eligible for consideration.
3967
Now, do you think that the jDamphlet lias put the whole thing out
of context^
Mr. Buchanan. Senator, I think, if you ask me is this pamphlet,
from what I have read of it, a fair or accurate i-eflection of Senator
Muskie's civil rights position, I would say no. This is exaggerated,
hyperbolic political rhetoric. If you ask me if it should have been
published, 1 would tell you no to that. It is wrong to do this. The vot-
ing record is right on gun control, as I have said. Some of the rhetoric
in here is wrong. It is unjustified about Senator Muskie. This thing
should not have been published. It is lying oversight. If this thing
went tln"ough, and in addition to that it failed to have on it the proper
identification, then I am to blame and I should take the responsibility.
There were things done wrong. But this is not as bad as comparing
the President of the United States to Adolf Hitler. It is not as bad
as comparing American policy in Indochina to that of the Nazis in
Germany. Now, both are mistaken.
Senator ]Montoya. One wrong does not justify another, is that
right ?
Mr. Buchanan. Precisely, Senator.
Senator Montoya. Let us go to the letter that was sent from Miami
to Mr. Loeb of the ^Manchester Guardian under date of February 17,
1972.
Mr. Buchanan. The Union Leader.
Senator ]Montoya. You know about that letter, do you not?
Mr. Buchanan. The ITnion Leader. Yes, the so-called Canuck letter.
Senator Montoya. Do you think that was a fair thing to do?
Mr. Buchanan. It was a political dirty trick.
Senator Montoya. Do you think it was unethical ?
Mr. Buchanan. It was unethical.
Senator Montoya. There was another letter dated February 28
sent to the same editor in the same vein
]\Ir. Buchanan. I w^as unaware of it. Which was the so-called
Canuck letter?
Senator Montoya. Referring to the so-called, supposed Canuck
statement made by Senator Muskie.
Mr. Buchanan. I did not know there were two letters.
Senatoi- Montoya. Do you think that was unethical?
Mr. Buchanan. The Canuck letter is the only one I have seen re-
ferred to. Yes, sir, I do.
Senator Montoya. Do you think that is a dirty trick?
^Ir. Buchanan. Yes, sir; it should be counted a dirty trick. But
there is a myth
Senator Montoya. Do you know who inspired this letter?
Mr. Buchanan. No, sir. But there is a myth building up that this
so-called Canuck letter was responsible for Senator Muskie's emo-
tional moment outside the I^nion Leader Building and that is not true.
As Senator jNIuskie himself has stated, the reason for tliat emotional
moment, the primary reason, was a slur against his wife which was
not made in any Canuck letter, it was made in Women's Wear Daily,
was transmitted by Newsweek magazine, which happens to be a sub-
sidiary of the Washington Post Co. So I think it is unfair to say that
this emotional moment of Senator Muskie was a result of that Canuck
letter. That is not to justify the so-called Canuck letter.
3968
Senator Montoya. They were interconnected in a way, were tliey i
not? ' I
Mr. Buchanan. Senator Muskie liimself says it was a slur on liisl
wife, or what he conceived to be a shir on his wife. i
Senator INIontoya. Now, there was another letter that appeared in j
the New Hampshire primary campaign, on stationery of the TTnitedj
Democrats for Kennedy and signed by Eobin Ficker. |
Yon are acquainted with that letter, are you not?
Mr. Buchanan. No ; I am not. But I am acquainted that Ficker was j
running a write-in for Kennedy in New Hampshire. i
Senator Montoya. In our investigation, it has been ascertained that i
some people contacted Mr. Ficker for a signature to this letter and the
letter was designed to create a write-in atmosphere for Ted Kennedy in
New Hampshire. This was not sponsored actually by United Democrats
for Kennedy, although it appears under the signature Robin Ficker, i
Montgomery County, in Chevy Chase — in Silver Spring, Md. !
Now, do you think that such a tactic, assuming that Mr. Ficker has '
disavowed the contents of the letter, do you think that was a proper \
campaign tactic in New Hampshire ?
Mr. Buchanan. Is Ficker pro-Kennedy, do you know ?
Senator Montoya. Yes.
Mr. Buchanan. And somebody funded him to do this ?
Senator Montoya. Somebody got him to sign the letter under false
pretenses. That Kennedy people were urging him to sign the letter. He
later ascertained that it was not so.
Mr. Buchanan. You mean to file it on an individual ?
Well, that is a borderline case.
Let me just give you one example. Senator Montoya. In 1940 — —
Senator Montoya. If that is a factual situation on the assumptions
I have made, would you say that that was unethical or improper?
Mr. Buchanan. Let me give you an exami^le. When Harry Truman j
ran in 1940 in the State of Missouri against Governor Stark, he was in
some difficulty, as I remember the story, because Governor Stark said
he was the one who had put Tom Pendergast away and Harry Tru-
man's friends got some individual named Morris Milligan, who ap-
parently was the prosecutor in the case, and they ran him as the third
guy in the race, the result of which was to \)vt Harry Truman in the
Senate. That is the same type of oi^eration.
AVlioever did this probably did this to draw votes off from Senator
Muskie, I would guess, in New Hami)shire or to lower his margin. It
is something in the same vein as that, I would think.
Senator Montoya. Well, do you think it was ]n-oper ?
Mr. Buchanan. I would—! would have difficulty making a judg-
ment on filing your opponent, your iwtential opponent, so you can beat
him in the State or getting him. That is a tough call as far as I would
be concerned, ethically.
Senator Montoya. Now, on tab 27 [exhibit No. 187], page 13, under
item 40, is the following :
If Daley is booted out of the Democratic Convention, on his arrival at his
Mayor's office in Chicago, some bearded types can be out front with signs,
"Daley's through in 1972 ; vote McGovern."
Mr. Buchanan. Right.
3969
Senator Moxtoya. Were these to have been paid demonstrators?
Mr. BuciiAXAN. No, you would just call the Republican committee
up there and do it.
Senator INIgxtoya. That was supposed to be volunteers, then ?
i\Ir. BucHAXAX. Oh, sure, you would not pay somebody to picket.
Our funds were not limitless.
Senator Moxtoya. Now, do you think th.d that was proper and
ethical ?
Mr. BucHAXAX. Well, this again. Senator, if I knew I were going
to be up here explaining all my memorandums, this little item woukl
not have been included. Whether it is proper — again, this is a case
of identifying your opponent with an unpopular individual or figure.
Senator Moxtoya. I know what you are doing, but do you think it
is ethical or proper ?
Mr. BuciiAXAX'. Again, I would have to say I don't think this is
unethical, to tell a giiy to go out and get a sign. Mayor Daley comes
back from that convention, angry as he can be, and there is a picket
out there with a sign
Senator Moxtoya. Do you think it is proper?
Mr. BucHAXAX. It is not improper.
Senator Moxtoya. Then it is proper?
Mr. BucHAXAX. No, the two are not the same.
Senator INIoxtoya. Give me tlie differentiation.
Mr. BucHAXAX. Well, by something that is not improper, you mean
that it might be — well, let's classify Avhen you get into the area of
pranks. I think that is in the area of pranks. It is like carrying the
sign, the "Nixon's the one" sign.
Senator Moxtoya. Would you say it is neutral ?
Mr. Buchaxax. I would say it is in the same range with the "Nixon's
the one" sign.
Senator Moxtoya. Now, on tab 21 [exhibit No. 181], page 9, item
4, you suggested "On all the black radio stations in the swing States,
we should run ads on ]\Iuskie's statement about no blacks for Vice
President.''
Mr. Buchaxax. Excuse me. Senator, this is the March
Senator Moxtoya. Tab 21, page 9, item 4.
Mr. Buchaxax. Tab 21, page 9, item 4.
Senator Moxtoya. And you follow that suggestion as follows — tliis
is part of the radio plug :
If lie does not think the time lias come for one of ns to be even considered for
Vice President, then the time has come for black America to tell Ed Muskie we
don't think it's time for him to be considered for President. Write in Shirley
Chisholm.
Mr. BucHAx^Ax. Right.
Senator ]Moxtoya. Now, do you think that was ethical?
Mr. Buchaxax. Yes, I do. in this sense. Senator. There was a point
in time in 1971 when Congressman John Conyers and Senator Eugene
McCarthy each was considering a fourtli party candidacy. In my judg-
ment, that would have been, that would have helped us along to what
I considered a goal for a long time, which is a realinement of political
parties. In my judgment, it would not have been unethical or illicit to
have made an alliance of convenience with a Democrat to the left of
the National Democratic Party, because it would have been advan-
3970
tageous to them, it would liave been advantageous to us. Our objectives
would have been served, their objectives would have been served. It
was the same thing as I would think in the Senate, if you had a Sena-
tor on the — say on the left side of the spectrum get together with a
Senator on the right side of the spectrum to support a bill that he
wanted in exchange for support there. I think it would be in that
category.
Senator Montoya. Now, you are implying that this was politics as
usual and, therefore, it was proper, that is what in effect you are
saying.
Mr. BucHAXAx. No, I don't say everything that has been done,
everything that is done regularly, is proper and ethical. You have to
judge the individuals — I do think — this is, this would come in the area
of Avhat Senator Baker was reading, I believe he was reading.
Senator ISIontoya. Let me go to another page.
Now, you, of course, know that Senator Jackson's headquarters in
Florida were broken into.
Mr. BucHANAX. No, sir; I did not know that.
Senator INIoxtoya. Well, and Senator INIcGovern's headquarters in
Ohio were broken into. Senator Muskie's in Washington. D.C., were
broken into.
Mr. BucHAx-^AX". Senator Muskie's were broken into ?
Senator Moxtoya. Yes, or I should say there was an infiltrator in
there and files were stolen on two occasions from Senator INIuskie's
headquarters.
Mr. BucHAXAX. That was Fat Jack.
Senator Moxtoya. Yes. And one of his agents. I think it was a young-
man by the name of Gregory.
Now, also there were paid infiltrators in Senator Jackson's cam-
paign in Florida.
Mr. BucHAXx\x. That would be unwise as well as — —
Senator Moxtoya. All right. Senator ISIuskie's in Washington, Fat
Jack or John Buckley, and Senator McGovern's, that is Chotiner's
friend, to cite some examples of the infiltration.
Mr. BuciiAXAx. Chotiner's friend, it is my understanding, was a
political or was rather a reporter who traveled aboard the various
campaign planes and was two separate individuals; this is the Avay the |
re])orts have come out.
Senator jMoxtoya. Well, do you think that these were — that these
things were ethical I
Mr. BucirAXAX^. Well, Senator, I would ask, do you think it was
ethical for Joe McGinnis to pose as a reporter and come into our cam-
paign in 1968, find himself an office and aide, and steal my memo-
randums and publish a best-selling book and have it applauded in the
Washington Post?
Senator Moxtoya. No. sir ; it was not.
Do you agree with me
Mr. BuciiAXAX. This sort of thing has been praised and applauded
and cheered until it was done by Kepublicans against Democrats.
Senator Moxtoya. Well, just because there was something wrong
in the Democratic camp, 1 am not going to condone it.
I am asking you if these things were wrong. You ask me if other
things that happened similarly in the Democratic campaign were
wrong, then I will agree with you.
3971
Mr. Buchanan. Which particular is it now, which particular infil-
tration; I have talked about political spies. It is not something I would
do to insinuate myself into an individual's confidence and then betray
that confidence. Now, other people have other stajiclarcls on the ques-
tion of being political spies. It is just not something I would do. I don't
think I should sit in judgment on their ethics. I don't know that I could
really — I Avould want to draw a line that this is thoroughly unethical
to do this. I don't know that I would want to draw it.
Senator Montoya. Thank you very much, sir.
Mr. Buchanan. Thank you, Senator.
Senator Ervin. I have nothing further.
Senator Baker says he has nothing further.
Senator Talmadge is not here.
Senator Inouye is not here.
Senator Gurney is not here.
Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. All right, Mr. Buchanan, if you will try to con-
tinue down the list — I w^ill try to shorten it — of various activities and
your evaluation of them.
Perjury, subornation of perjury, obstruction of justice, is this some-
thing that should form part of a campaign ?
Mr. Bi'Chanan. Senator, this is the famous Weicker litany of
wrongdoings in the campaign. I know you have got the definition
down of every illegal act and things like that but what — to me
what they amount to and what I have seen is that people in our cam-
paign made a grievous error and then they went and compounded the
error and made mistakes. In the process of this thing, they even com-
mitted — I don't know, I don't want to state that they did, but con-
ceivably they committed wrongdoing amounting to crimes and ille-
galities, but I think that, by and large, the sins were of the head and
not of the lieart. They thought that they wanted to make sure the
President of the United States was reelected, and a lot of mistakes
and bad things, and erroneous things were done ; there is no question
about that.
But these people, I think they have got a right to a fair trial and
I don't think I am in a position to sit up and moralize or pontificate
upon their ethics or their morality.
Senator Weicker. Mr. Buchanan, it isn't a question of a litany of
wrongdoing. The problem is that when these matters are equated
with just another Dick Tuck type of operation.
Mr. Buchanan. They have never been so by me.
Senator Weicker. This is exactly the type
Mr. Buchanan. I do not consider Watergate a prank; it is a crime.
Senator Weicker. I see. Tliis is all I am trying to find out from you
since you have thrown Dick Tuck out as sort of the example to be fol-
lowed by the Republicans in the campaign of 1972. I am trying to
differentiate between those activities and these activities, which
clearly you are as dead set against as I am.
What I can't have, I believe — I would hope, anyway, you would
think the same way — I can't have these floated as legitimate campaign
practices.
Mr. Buchanan. Nobody has floated Watergate as a legitimate cam-
paign activitv for the last 15 months.
3972
Senator Weicker. Well, then, certainly you would agree that really
we are not talking in any manner, shape or form about the equivalent
of a Dick Tuck operation so far as Watergate is concerned.
Mr. Buchanan. I did not know I was up here to discuss the Water-
gate break-in.
Senator Weicker. You are here to discuss the matter called Water-
gate which encompasses a great deal of activity and again I have tried
to be very specific with you as to what those activities are. Are they
the same as Dick Tuck-type activities? Do you want me to continue
down the list?
Mr. Buchanan. No, I don't know that Dick Tuck did any break-in
and burglaries; no, sir.
Senator Weicker. Electronic surveillance ?
Mr. Buchanan. No. Electronic surveillance was done on xVdlai
Stevenson at the Democratic Convention in lOGO. They had electronic
surveillance done, I believe, on the Vice President of the United States
13ost-1968 before he was inaugurated. I believe that; I am not sure
of that. Electronic surveillance for political purposes is wrong and
should be outlawed.
Senator Weicker. I think the last pait of your answer is very sig-
nificant. I would agree with you, that is exactly what the work product
of this committee is all about.
How about putting out the story tying the Democratic Party to
Coimnunists and foreign money ? Is this a legitimate tvpe of activity of
the Wliite House?
Mr. Buchanan. I don't know any j)olitical reporter who is going
to pick up a phony story like that and run it if you don't have any
substantiation, and if you tell an individual to go do that, any indi-
vidual who has contacts in the national corps or the political press
corps will tell you to go fly a kite.
I don't know a single political reporter to whom I will say. "Well,
Senator McGovern is getting Comn-iunist money," and he will say,
"Is that right. "Wliere is your evidence ?'■
Every single one — I don't know a single one who would go with a
stoi-y like that based on hearsay.
Senator Weicker. Well, of couree, this wjis the subject of a memoran-
dum within the AVliite House, wasn't it ?
Mr. Buchanan. I have not been watching all the testimony on tele-
vision but I believe it was, I believe, Mr. John Dean, though. But John
Dean is not an individual who dealt with the press. My guess is
Senator Weicker. No, this memorandum was attested to by Mr.
Haldeman.
Mr. Buchanan. Mr. Haldeman sent a memorandum to ]\Ir. Dean,
but that sounded a bit fishy to me because John Dean was not an indi-
vidual who dealt at all with the press, I don't know who he was going
to call.
Senator Weicker. I think what bothers me is in tliis discussion that
you and I are having. I think both of us are fully aware that the Presi-
dent would have won this election. I, like you, voted for our President.
Not only that, I thought I delivered some effective speeches against
Mr. McGovern, but I get bothered with this continued reference to
Communist and anti-American and radical and we go right down the
list, what kind of politics is this ?
3973
Mr. BucHAXAX. Senator, I will tell you this. What do we have here,
you have confidential memorandums of mine to the President of the
United States and to Mr. Haldeman and to Mr. Mitchell.
Now, they are, quite obviously, if I knew my confidential papers,
dozens of them were going to be called up for inspection anct I was
going to be held to account for phrases and paragraphs that I used in a
confidential connnunication with the Presiclent, I certainly would have
written it differently, there is no question about that. But I am sure
that if we went through your own files and got every political mem-
orandum you were sent by staff aides there would be things that would
horrify both you and your own staff aides, not in terms of wrongdoing,
but simply because you would phrase things differently.
When I write a first draft of a column or a speech, some of the copy
is extraordinarily hard and I would not want to make public. I would
like to be held responsible for what I write as a final speech and for
what I say publicly. But with my private communications, in effect,
which are almost your private letters, to be called to account on na-
tional television for your phrases is not a very pleasant, altogether
pleasant, experience and I don't think. Senator, you would find it any
more pleasant than I find it, to have to go through there to see things
I haven't seen in 4 years and find things that maybe were my own per-
sonal rhetoric in the memorandum was excessive. It is not an alto-
gether pleasant experience.
Senator Weicker. Well, number one, let me assure you that these
files are totally available to you or anybody else and always have been
and, to be honest, I am not going to have you sit here and tell me that
the type of language that is used in these memorandums, the refer-
ences and the rather consistency of the reference, to the far left, and
the Communists and the foreign money and radicals and all the rest
of it.
Mr. BucHAXAx. The far left, is suggested by a term and there is no
term that I have seen in my memorandum that connects Senator
McGovem or suggests he is connected with the Communist Party.
Senator McGovern was the candidate of the far left in the last elec-
tion. He was the candidate of the left. He was the candidate of the
Democratic Party. Mr. Schmitz was the candidate I would say, of
the far right. We had the right and the center. These have been cus-
tomary terms over since the French General Assembly in 1789, that
phrase.
Senator Weicker. How about anti-American ? How about that
phrase ?
Mr. BuciiAXAX. Well, there is a phrase in here that Senator
McGovem was perceived by a number of people because of statements
ho made especially Avith regard to foreign policy, especially in regard
to Vietnam in that vein. I don't say he was anti-American.
Senator Weicker. Of course, that was your phrase, it is your memo-
randum.
Mr. BuciiAXAx. What does the phrase say, he is perceived that way ?
Senator Weicker. Well, let's go ahead and see it.
Mr. BuciiAXAX. What you are doing is you are precisely taking par-
ticular minor phrases out of memos written in the heat of a campaign
and that statement, Senator, is far less offensive to me, even now in
public, than is Senator McGovern's statement comparing the Presi-
dent of the United States to Adolf Hitler, and he is a senatorial can-
21_9QR n 7^_
3974
didate and he made that publicly, not in some confidential memo-
randums in the heat of a campaign.
Senatc>r "Weicker. Well, of couree, I think many people, myself in-
cluded, held those comments against Senator McGorem.
Mr. Buchanan. Right.
Senator Wek;ker. I think they are desj^icable.
Mr. Buchanan. I think you should be held accountable for what
you say publicly but I think a man is entitled to the privacy of his
own views that he expressed in his own way in his private papers and,
as I say, it is not an altogether usual experience to have your confi-
dential papers, have to explain them on national television.
Senator Weickek. In the matter of Mr. Ulasewicz, is that — and
the subject matter of those investigations — is that proper politics?
Mr. Buchanan. I never heard Mr. Ulasewicz' name until he ap-
peared on national television.
Senator Weicker. I see. Now, that you know about Mr.
Illasewicz
Mr. Buchanan. What did he investigate?
Senator Weicker. Incidentally, Mr. Caulfield was a very close
friend of yours.
Mr. Buchanan. Yes, he is.
Senator Weicker. Did he ever mention to you any of his activities ?
Mr. Buchanan. Well, Mr. Caulfield's activities, in the 1068 cam-
paign certainly, he was campaign security. He had conducted an
investigation of the things that have come out subsequently, I have
no knowledge of.
Senator Weicker. You had no knowledge of the relationshij) between
Mr. Caulfield and INIr. Ulasewicz ?
Mr. Buchanan. I never heard of Mr. Ulasewicz' name until it was
on national television but I know Jack Caulfield very well. He is very
decent, in my judgment, even though mistakes were made, he is a
very decent individual.
Senator Weicker. The mattei's which Mr. T'lasewicz investigated,
you feel now that you have heard about it
Mr. Buchanan. Which ones are you referring to, Senator?
Senator AVeicker. Well, I can go right down the whole list, but
basically I would say personal matters related to the various candi-
dates, do you tliink that is a proper thing?
Mr. Buchanan. Senator, are you asking do I think that
Senator Weicker. I asked that ([uestion.
Mr. Buchanan. It is not my end of the cam})aign business, as inves-
tigations ai'e done. There was a story in the Atlanta pajier where
Senator McGoveni sent out 100 people to investigate the President
and asked, "Fellows, have we dug up any dirt ?"' And he said, "Well, we
will let that out, too." There aie these aspects to campaigns. I do not
think I have Ix^en in a political campaign where I have not heard
stories about the pi-ivate liv(>s and the persomil habits of individuals,
but that is not my stock in trade.
Senator Weicker. So, in othei- words, you would say that should not
be part of a campaign ?
Mr. Buchanan. There is no way you can halt investigations. I think
investigations of the backgi'ound of candidates, going out, say, to his
hometown newspaper and finding statements say, like Senator Mc-
Govern made in 1948
3975
Senator Weicker. Fair enough.
Mr. Buchanan. In the coui-se of that thing, what do yon do when
you come across, if you come across something that is personally dam-
aging to the individual ? INIaybe it depends on how rough a campaign
is being fought.
Senator Weicker. Is basically your answer — and I am trying to be as
fair as possible in this matter — that matters of public record are cer-
tainly eligible to be pushed out there during the campaign?
Mr. Buchanan. Right.
Senator Weicker. That is a matter of the record ?
Mr. Buchanan. Right.
Senator Weicker. But this was specifically asked of Mr. Ulasewicz
and, of course, his investigations went way beyond what was a matter
of public record. It went way beyond.
Mr. Buchanan. It went into personal — my own view is that the
personal, private lives of candidates should not be part of the cam-
paign; they should not be discussed by a candidate. But there are
political muckrakers just like journalistic — and you can have this
until — as long as you have got politics, people are going to go out and
do these things. I am not involved in it and I would not do it myself,
but I do not want to sit up here and assume that I am a judge of other
people who do these kinds of investigations.
Senator Weicker. But at least I want to thank you for saying that
because you are a part of the administration.
Mr. Buchanan. Yes.
Senator Weicker. And you have made a statement that was not
made before. In other words, we have heard that: "Yesj these are
23roper matters of political campaigns," and it has not been said by
any person but rather representatives of an administration, and to
have the American people believe that pei^onal dirt, for example, is a
valid part of the political process, that type of investigation, not in-
vestigations that are matters of record, but that go into the types of
thing that you and I both decry, it just is something that should not
be allowed to fly in this country, you and I both agree on that point.
Mr. Buchanan. Well, I do not think they have — I do not think they
are a proper subject matter for campaigns ; that is right.
Senator Weicker. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. As I understand it, this morning, the exhibits that
were obtained — the memorandums prepared by Mr. Buchanan that
were obtained from the Committee To Re-Elect the President and
from the Archives department were not admitted in evidence.
They will be appropriately marked as exhibits and i-eceived as such.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Nos. ^ '" thru
194.*]
Senator Montoya. I would like to present for the record, Mr. Chair-
man, and foi- identification and for filing for the record, the three let-
ters to which I referred in my examination of the witness.
Senator Ervin. Without objection, it is so ordered. They will be ap-
propriately marked as exhibits and received as such.
[The letters were marked exhibits Nos. 195, 196, and 197.*]
Senator Ervin. Do counsels have any further questions ?
*See contents pp. iv and v for pages of individual exhibits.
3976
Mr. Dash. I just liavo one that I want to clear up, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Buchanan, I know that Senator Baker, in referrino- to ]\Ir.
O'Brien's manual, referred to the letterwriting campaign. I think the
letterwriting campaigns are well known, not only in politics but in
civic associations and social organizations generally. What I would
like to really get from you as we close this afternoon is: Is there a dif-
ference between what, in fact, is a genuine letterwriting campaign
and — as I ^^nderstood the reference in the manual — that certain wom-
en who would be volunteers would be asked to use their brains and
their writing to write short letters and that they themselves would
write the messages that they wanted to write to the editors? Is there
a difference, Mr. Buchanan, between that and where the message, the
irate feeling, is actually manufactured by the political campaign itself
and that a signature is obtained so that the person who reads the let-
ters-to-the-editor column believes that a citizen really wrote that when
he did not ?
Mr. Buchanan. Do you have in mind that letter to the editor in
Michigan ?
Mr. Dash. Let me just turn to tab 3;> [exhibit No. 193].
Mr. Buchanan. In Michigan?
Mr. Dash. Yes ; the Michigan letter.
Mr. Buchanan. Let me tell you about that, I am a strong — I pei--
sonally feel very strongly about the issue of abortion, and I am opposed
to it, and I drafted that letter. We did get another person's signature
on the letter, and the individual we went to, frankly, was in the Right
to Life movement who believed in that, and in effect, I ghosted that
letter for the individual who signed it and sent it to the papers, I
believe, in Michigan.
Now to me that is on a par, I think, with, you know, my sort of pas-
sionate rhetoric in a political speech which is delivered by a candidate
who believes as well as I do and I write the rhetoric and he delivers it.
I think those things are analogous.
Mr. Dash. Would you say the same thing if you turned to tab
[exhibit No. 169], to the telegrams that are indicated as having been
prepared by you? There is a memorandum which indicates that If*
telegrams have been drafted by Mr. Buchanan and sent to Time and
Newsweek and — let me just read one of them, there are a number:
To the editor : The best proof yet of the allegations of Vice President Agnew
about the Nation's news media was their incredibly arrogant performance be-
fore the entire Nation last Thursday night. Who in the hell elected those people
to stand up and read oft their insults to the President of the United States and
then ask that he comment.
Do you have tab 9?
Mr. Buchanan. Do I have tab 9 ?
Mr. Dash. It is an attachment to tab 9. There are a number of
Buchanan telegrams that were drafted and then sent.
Mr. Buchanan. I don't know that they were sent. Here is — I don't
know — I have not read these memorandums and I don't know who
signed them. I don't know who signed them.
Mr. Dash. What I am saying and what I am asking is for informa-
tion. Isn't there again a difference — and I am talking about the tab —
that a telegram of that nature which is prepai'ed, and assume you do
get someone to sign it, and it apjiears in the letters to the editor col-
umn of Newsweek, and is read as though a citizen thought of the idea
3977
to send a telegram when, as a matter of fact, all of these had been
actually manufactured in a political office, actually in the White
House, and are sent out to news media
Mr. Buchanan. Well
Mr. Dash. Is there a difference ?
Mr. BucHAXAX. There is a difference. But inspiring; an individual
to write a telegram and drafting a telegram for his signature, these
are different things. I mean this seems to me to be a foolish exercise,
I will be quite honest.
Mr. Dash. I am just asking, wasn't this signature requiring a pro
forma kind of thing, you had pro forma volunteers?
Mr. BucHAXAX. No ; I don't see a difference. They asked Buchanan,
"Can you draft something like that?" Once it leaves my desk, I don't
know what they do with my copy. I am not the one who is going to
be
Mr. Dash. You were drafting it not as Buchanan's statement but
as a citizen's kind of statement?
Mr. I^uchaxax. But citizens signed them. I drafted them. I ghosted
them.
Mr. Dash. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Thompsox. No questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervix. Thank you, ]Mr. Buchanan.
Mr. BuciiAXAX. Thank you.
Senator Ervix. The committee will stand in recess until Tuesday
morning at 10 o'clock.
[Whereupon, at 4 :30 p.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at
10 a.m., Wednesday, October 3, 1973.]
[Subsequent to the hearing, a letter and affidavit of Mitchell Rogo-
vin was received by the committee rebutting certain parts of Mr.
Buchanan's testimony and appears on page 4369.]
WEDNESDAY, OCTOBER 3, 1973
U.S. Senate,
Select Committee ox
Presidential Campaign Activities,
Washington, B.C.
The Select Committoe met, pursuant to recess, at 10 a.m., in room
318, Russell Senate Office Building, Senator Sam J. Ervin, Jr. (chair-
man) , presiding.
Present: Senators Ervin, Talmadge, Inouye, Montoya, Baker,
Gurney, and Weicker.
Also present : Samuel Dash, chief counsel and staff director ; Fred
D. Thompson, minority counsel; Rufus L. Edmisten, deputy chief
counsel ; Jed Johnson, investigator ; David M. Dorsen, James Hamil-
ton and Terry F. I^enzner, assistant chief counsels; Marc Lackritz,
Ronald D. Rotunda, James C. Moore, and Barry Schochet, assistant
majority counsels ; Eugene Boyce, hearings record counsel ; Howard S.
Liebengood and Robert Silverstein, assistant minority counsels;
Pauline O. Dement, research assistant; Eiler Ravnholt, office of Sen-
ator Inouye; Robert Baca, office of Senator Montoya; A. Searle Field,
assistant to Senator Weicker; Michael Flanigan, assistant publica-
tions clerk.
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
Counsel will call the first witness.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Donald H. Segretti.
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. Will you stand up, Mr. Segretti, and hold up your
right hand? Do you swear that the evidence which you shall give
to the Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities
shall be the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so help
you God?
Mr. Segretti. I do.
Senator Ervin. Let the record show that Mr. Segretti is testifying
involuntarily pursuant to an order of Judge Sirica extending to him
imnninity as provided in sections 6002 and 6005 of title 18 of the
TTnited States Code. I make that statement in order to protect any
future right you have arising out of that grant of immunity.
Mr. Segretti. Thank you, sir.
Senator Ervin. Counsel will proceed.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Segretti, do you have counsel with you ?
Mr. Segretit. I do.
Mr. Dash. Will counsel identify himself for the record ?
Mr. Sherman. Victor Sherman. My address is 8383 Wilshire Boule-
vard, Beverly Hills, Calif.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Segretti, do you have a statement you wish to read
to the committee ?
(3979)
3980
TESTIMONY OF DONALD H. SEGRETTI, ACCOMPANIED BY VICTOR
SHERMAN, COUNSEL
Mr. Segretti. I do. I do have an opening statement.
Mr. Dash. Would you proceed to read it ?
Mr. Segretti. In 1963 I graduated from the University of Southern
California. I majored in business administration. I then attended the
University of California at Berkeley and graduated from its law
school in 196(). My first job was as an employee of the Offic(> of the
Comptroller of the Currency in Washington, D.C.
After a few months, I was inducted into the U.S. Army. That was
in May 1967. Once in the Army, I applied for a commission in the
Judge Advocate General Corps and Avas accepted. I was released from
Army active duty in September of 1971, after serving 4 years and 1
months, a year of which was in Vietnam.
After my graduation from USC, I maintained infrequent social
contact with two college friends, Dwight Chapin and Gordon
Strachan; so, it did not seem unusual when I was contacted in early
1971 by these two friends about the possibility of doing some work for
them after my release from active duty. I indicated interest although I
had no concept of what they had in mind.
In the summer of 1971 I flew to Washington, D.(^., and met with Mr.
Chapin and Mr. Strachan. It was explained to me that I would bo
employed to perform certain political functions for the reelection of
Pi-esident Nixon. At tliat time I was aware that both men were em-
ployed at the AVliite House. I considered the political functions we
discussed to be similar to college j^ranks which had occurred at USC.
The impression was given to me that these so-called pranks were per-
formed by both parties in Presidential campaigns and that there was
nothing improper or illegal in such traditional activities.
Subsequently, I was told to contact Mr. Herbert Kalmbach in New-
port Beach, Calif., for the purpose of finalizing my employment. I met
with Mr. Kalmbach in August 1971, and was otfered a salary of $16,000
per annum plus expenses for my activities. ^Nlr. Kalmbach and I did
not discuss the specifics of my employment, and I myself had no con-
crete ideas as to what work I was to perform. It was not even clear to
me whether or not I would be working foi' Mr. Kalmbach, Mr. Chapin,
or others. However, I was happy to accept employment from ])eople
who held prominent positions in and out of the Government.
After meeting with Mr. Kalmbach, I met Mith ^Iv. Chai)in. not far
from the Western White House in San Clemente, Calif. Dui-ing this
meeting, Mr. Chapin gave me a list of cities in which I was to acquire
acquaintances to assist me in my future endeavors. Mr. Chapin stressed
the secrecy of my duties and stated that he would be my contact at the
White House. He further explained that my duties Avoidd consist of
A'arious activities tending to foster a split between the various Demo-
cratic hopefuls and to prevent the Democratic Party from uniting be-
hind one candidate. I was told that this was a common campaign
strategy. Even though I had at one time been a registered Democrat
and was ai)oliti('al during my Armv tcuui'e. I uas in agreement with
President Nixon's announced i)olicies of ending the Vietnam war and
the draft. Thus, it was on pi-inciple that I favored his reelection. It
was this combination of factors, my lack of any concrete career ])lans,
my friendship and respect for tlie individuals involved, my belief in
3981
the reelection of President Nixon, the opportunity of working for the
"VVliite House, and the cliang-e of ])ace from my Army duties wliich led
me to accept the employment.
From Septem.ber 1971 to the end of the year, I traveled to various
parts of the United States attempting to line up political associates.
Mr. Chapin had instructed me not to use the names of any pereons
at the White House or the name of any person associated with the
Eepublican Party when making my contacts. I was also told not to
use my real name so that I would never pro\e an embarrassment to
the President or his campaign supporters. It was, therefore, difficult
for me to explain to people exactly what I was doing, who I was work-
ing for, or what wc would be doing together. During the initial period
of my employment, I myself- had no specific idea as to what I was doing
or how I was to do it. t did indicate to people I "recniited"' that their
tasks would be to picket various Democratic candidates under the
guise of working for a rival Democratic candidate, to ask difficult
questions at news conferences, and, if possible, get someone to work
in a candidate's headquarters. The purpose of planting so-called
spies was primarily to obtain candidates* traveling schedules to assist
in the planning of picketing activities. During this period I received
$5,000 traveling expenses from INIr. Kalmbach and the sutu of $667
every 2 weeks as salary.
Apart from the above, T did the following during 1971 :
No. 1, I prepared a list of questions to ask Senator Muskie when
he appeared at '\Aniittiei- College in southern California. Tlie questions
were passed out among the audience, and I believe one of tlie questions
was asked.
No. 2, I contacted an individual in California who provided three
or four persons in San Francisco, who picketed a meeting of various
Democrats, with signs sayinir, "Kennedy foi- President" or words to
that effect.
No. 3, I had Senator ]Muskie followed for 2 days while he was in
Los Angeles, Calif. This was the one and only time that I ever had
any candidate followed, and it was done pursuant to an earlier sug-
gestion from Mi: Chapin that I have a familiarity with how Presi-
dential candidates traveled. To the best of my recollection, those are
the only activities I performed in 1971.
In January of 1972, I received a second sum of $5,000 from Mr.
Kalmbach. This sum was paid following my request for additional
moneys to cover my travel expenses. On or about January 15, 1972, I
received my last biweekly check in the sum of $667 from a trust ac-
count apparently maintained by Mr. Kalmbach. At about this time,
Mr. Kalmbach explained to me that rather than receiving further
moneys by check he preferred that we "switch to green.'' On or about
March 1,^1972, I received the sum of $5,000 in cash from Mr. Kalm-
bach's secretary, and on or about March 28, 1972, I received the sum
of $25,000 in cash from Mr. Kalmbach. This latter payment was made
upon my request for the sum of $5,000 whicli I anticij^ated was needed
to cover my traveling and salary expenses. It was my impression at the
time that the extra $20,000 was given to me so that I would not have
to contact Mr. Kalmbach on a frequent basis. I now believe that the
new campaign law regarding the reporting of income and disburse-
ments, had something to do with this payment. The funds referred to
3982
herein are the only moneys that I have received. I did not at any tiinej
discuss with Mr. Kahnbach any of tlie specifics of my political activity J
and I have no personal knowledge as to whether or not he spoke withj
others about what I was doing. I should add to my statement that I;
did receive also the sum of $400 in casli that sunnner to cover my ex- !
penses for travel to Washington, D.C., to meet with Mr. Kalmbach — ;
meet with, pardon me, Mr. Chapin and Mr. Strachan.
All of the moneys received were spent for traveling and living ex-
j)enses. A complete accounting, to the best of my ability, has been pro- ;
vided to this committee and to the Special Prosecutor's Office.
In December of 1971, I traveled to the State of Florida for the pur-
pose of seeking additional contacts. During uiy visit I met with a Mr.
Kobert Benz in Tampa, Fla., and a Mr. Douglas Kelly in Miami, Fla.j
Mr. Benz and Mr. Kelly seemed knowledgeable as to the inner-
workings of a political campaign and expressed a willingness to assist
me in my endeavors. In fact, both young men seemed to know much ,
more about liow political campaigns operated than I did. Therefore,
I gave to each a modest sum and asked that they make contact with '
other persons who would be of future assistance. The intention was, i
as previously indicated, to line up pickets, recruit persons to ask hard
questions at news conferences, and to obtain the travel schedules of
the various Democratic candidates.
In early January 1972, 1 returned to Florida. At this time Mr. Benz
had obtained two students to picket the opening of Senator Jackson's
headquarters in Tampa, Fla., carrying "Muskie for President" signs
or words to that effect. He also recruited approximately 10 persons to
picket a Muskie rally with signs relating to Muskie's reluctance to
consider a black American as a running mate. These activities of Mr.
Benz wei"e done pursuant to my suggestions. I also understand that I
Mr, Benz, on his own initiative, added a sentence to a Muskie press l
release, which announced the sending of 10,000 invitations for a ISIuskie
rally to be followed by a $l,000-a-plate dinner. This press release was
sent to one or two newspapers.
In addition to the above, Mr. Benz and I collaborated in one way
or another on the following matters :
No. 1, a letter on Senator Muskie *s stationery alleging unauthorized
use of Government typewriters by his staff. This letter was sent to
various persons whom I do not recall at this time. I
No. 2, the placing of posters stating, "Help Muskie In Busing More
Children Now." The poster bore the legend "Mothers Backing Muskie
(^ommittee.-' Approximately 100 to 150 such posters were distributed
or posted by me.
No. 3, the placing of stink bombs at a Muskie picnic and at the
Muskie headquarters.
No. 4, the sending of a letter on Muskie stationery accusing Senators
Jackson and Humphrey of sexual improprieties. I would like to make :
clear that this letter was my idea and was not suggested by any other
person. I assume full responsibility for its contents. Each and every
allegation in the letter was untrue and without any basis in fact. It
was not my desire to have anyone believe the letter, but instead it was
intended to create confusion among the various candidates. It is my
belief that from 20 to 40 such letters were sent out, mainly to Senator
Jackson's supporters. I deeply regret that I initiated this incident and
3983
wish to apologize f)ublicly for this stupid act. I can only hope that this
apology will in some way rectify the harm done to these Senators and
j their families.
I There were other activities performed by Mr. Benz and myself
' which I cannot fully recall at this time but which generally consisted
of picketing candidates and disti'ibuting reprints from various daily
j newspapers and magazines.
j Mr. Douglas Kelly assisted me in posting the aforementioned Muskie
posters, and in placing an ad in a college iiewspaper stating :
"Wanted. Sincere gentleman seeks running mate. AVliite preferred
but natural sense of rhythm no obstacle. Contact E. Muskie.*'
He also helped me place an ad in the classified section of the Miami
Sunday Sun-Keporter stating :
"Senator Muskie, would you accept a Jewish running mate?" and
another ad in the same newspaper stating :
"Senator Muskie. You wouldn't accept a black or an American
Indian, would you accept a Jewisli running mate ?"
There was also an ad that was placed in a local Cuban newspaper
and on a local radio station which stated :
"Muskie believes all people have a right to choose any type of govern-
i ment that they want. Tiie Cuban people are no exception and the
j United States should not interfere. If elected, Muskie will attempt to
ease the tensions between the United States and Cuba. He was born
in Maine and is a good American. Vote for Ed Muskie."'
We also distributed some fliers inviting the public to a nonexistent
open house at Muskie's headquarters in Miami. Mr. Kelly and I per-
formed other activities of a minimal nature which I have disclosed to
this committee by way of staff interviews, to the best of my recollec-
tion. I also understand that Mr. Kelly did other things about ^vhich I
am not totally clear, since ho also operated to a great extent on his
own.
At this time, it is my best recollection that I paid Mr. Kelly and Mr.
i Benz a total of approximately $5,500.
I In February of 1972, a man called me, identifying himself as Ed
• Warren. From a jirior conversation with Mr. Chapin, I had been in-
formed that a i)erson would call me who would give me assistance. In
' Miami, Fla., I met with Mr. Warren and another individual who was
introduced to me as George Leonard. I now recognize Ed Warren as
being Mr. E. Howard Hunt. I have been unable to identify Mr. George
Leonard; however, it is my understanding that iie was probably G.
Gordon Liddy. Mr. Warren provided me with the name of a printer in
' Miami whom I subsequently used for various purposes. I recall meeting
' Mr. Warren a second time in June 1972 at the Sheraton Four Ambas-
sadors Hotel in Miami, Fla. During this meeting Mr. Warren sug-
gested that I put together a group of peaceful demonstrators to picket
the Doral Hotel during the Democratic Convention, at which time
another group of pickets was to join in the demonstration and act in
an unruly manner. It was explained to me that the bad conduct of the
crowd would be blamed on Senator McGovern. It was never my inten-
tion to create, nor did I ever participate in, any kind of physical vio-
lence, and Mr. Warren's ])lan was something in which I did not want
to get involved. As fate would have it, the Watergate burglary pre-
ceded these plans, and they were never carried out.
3984
At this point I would like to state to tlie committee that at no time
did I ever have any knowledo:e of, nor did I participate in, the Water-
gate burglary or any activity involving electronic surveillance.
It is possible that 1 may have met JNIr. Warren on a third occasion,
but I am unsure at this time.
On April 1, 1972 (Ai)ril Fools' Day), in Milwaukee, Wis., Mr. Benz
and I distributed a tlier advertising a free all-you-can-eat lunch with
drinks at Hubert Humphrey's headquarters. I have given the com-
mittee and the Special Prosecutor's Office a copy of the flier. There
was. of course, no such party.
Also in April of 1972, in response to a telephone call from Mr. War-
ren, 1 flew to Washington, D.C. I had Mr. Kelly meet me there. Senator
Muskie was to have a fundraising dinner at the Washington Hilton
Hotel, and Mr. Kelly and I, ostensibly acting for Muskie organizers,
ordered flowers, pizzas, and liquor foi' the campaign workers. In addi-
tion, we invited certain foreign guests and provided for their delivery
to the dinner by chauU'ered limousine. A magician was also hired to
attend the dinner and to entertain. AVe also made inquires about renting
an elephant, but were unable to make the necessary arrangements. The
))urpose of all this was to cause confusion at the Muskie dinner. Mr.
Kelly and I also distributed a flier stating, "Come. Protest the Fat
Cats With Signs." This was in reference to the INIuskie dinner. Mr.
Kelly and I constructed various protest signs, but no one showed up
to protest.
During 1972, I performed activities of a similar, but less extensive
and significant nature, in other States. I have given a full statement
to this committee's staff regarding these events. I believe my activities
in these other States produced little, if any, commotion, and do not
need to be elaborated on in this statement. I also feel that many
innocent persons would be hurt if I were to disclose the names of all
persons I contacted in my travels. Most of these persons are completely
innocent of any wi'ongdoing. and to publicly disclose their names
would be a great disservice to them. I have given the committee's staff
a complete list of all persons whose names I can recall. I understand
that both the committee's staff and the prosecutor's office have in-
vestigated my activities in an intensive manner. I would, therefore,
beg the indulgence of this committee that I not be forced to publicly
disclose the names of innocent persons, which could only damage their
reputations unduly without serving any legitimate legislative purpose.
In July of 1972. Mr. Kelly and I made arrangements for a small
plane to fly over the Democratic Conveiition center with a trailer
reading: "Peace, Pot, Promiscuity. Vote McGovern." This was my last
political activity of the 1972 campaign.
After newsstoiies began mentioning my name, I sought legal counsel
from Mr. John W. Dean. I met ]Mr. Dean through ]Mr. Chapin and
Mr. Strachan. Over a period of months. INfr. Dean acted as my law3'er,
and I confided in him in this capacity. At Mr. Dean's request, I made
a tape I'ecording explaining my activities in 1971 and 1972, and gave it
to him. I also prepared a wi'itten statement and gave it, along with
many documents, to an attorney in Los Angeles, Calif., who was sug-
gested as coimsel by Mr. Dean. It is my understanding that this attor-
ney sent to Mr. Dean copies of the material left with him. and that
Mr. Dean subsequently turned over said material, which were obviously
3985
intended to be confidential and part of the attorney-client privilege,
to this committee. Although I feel that Mr. Dean betraj^ed my con-
fidence, I do wish to state that at no time did he tell me to be anything
but honest and truthful with the Federal Bureau of Investigation
and the U.S. attorney's office.
This general statement was prepared with the advice and assist-
ance of my present counsel, Victor Sherman of Los Angeles, Calif.,
jand was not intended by us to be a complete statement of all my activ-
jities during the months in question. I am sure that this committee is
I now aware that my activities have been blown out of all proportion by
the news media. I accept the fact that most of my present problems
are the direct result of my own conduct. However, I cannot help but
feel that I have been abused by rumor, character assassination, in-
nuendo, and a complete disregard for the privacy of myself, my
friends, and my family. I have literally had to avoid the onslaught
of the media during the past year, and their attempts to get a story
at all costs. I understand that under various guises, some of the news
media illegally obtained my telephone, bank account, and credit card
records, and generally conducted their investigations without any con-
cern for my rights. Nevertheless, this in no way lessens my sincere
belief that my activities were wrong and have no place in the Ameri-
can political system. To the extent my activities have harmed other
persons and the political process, I have the deepest regrets. I am now
ready to answer the questions of this committee.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Segretti, your statement has been quite full. You
have already indicated how you fii^st came to know Mr. Dwiglit Chapin
and Mr. Gordon St radian. As you have indicated in j'our statement,
you knew them as college classmates at the University of Southern
Califoniia.
. Mr. Segketti. That is correct, Mr. Dash.
' Mr. Dash. Now, at the time INIr. Strachan and Mr. Ohapin were in
touch with you while you Avere in the Army in 1971, and also during
the period of July 1971 to June 1972, do you know what Mr. Chapin,
Mr. Dwight Chapin's position was '?
Mr. Segretti. He was employed at the White House and I believe
his position at that time was Presidential appointments secretary.
Mr. Dash. And do you know what Mr. Strachan's, Mr. Gordon
Strachan's }x>sition was ?
Mr. Segretti. All I knew at that time was that he was employed at
the White House.
Mr. Dash. Did you come to know that he was an assistant to Mr.
Haldeman ?
Mr. Segretti. I did, but that was much later into 1972.
Mr. Dash. Now, after the series of contents you have included in
your statement, you did in fact come to Washington on June 23, 1971,
to meet with Mr. Strachan and Mr. Chapin ?
Mr. Segretti. Mr. Dash, I am not quite certain of the exact date on
that, but it is approximately that period of time.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall where you met Mr. Chapin ?
Mr. Segretti. I had dinner with Mr. Chapin and Mr. Strachan
at Mr. Strachan's residence.
Mr. Dash. And it was at that time that Mr. Chapin began to dis-
cuss with you the job opportunities that he had been talking to you
about on the telephone?
3986
Mr. Segretti. Yes; it -svas.
Mr. Dash. Now, is it not true that Mr. Cliapin told you that what'
they Avei-e looking for was someone to do some midei-covei- work fori
the reelection of President Nixon and to engage in political tricks?!
Mr. Skgreti'i. I don't recall if the term "undercover'' was used, but'
secrecy was stressed.
Mr. Dash. Well, is it a question of semantics? I say imdercover-
Mr. Chapin did tell you at a later time that you were to use secrecy,!
tliat you were not to reAcal your identity and mucli of your work was
undercover, was it not?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. And although you use the term of what you had engaged
in with them as college pranks, actually what they wanted you toj
engage in was political tricks?
Mr. Segretti. That is right.
Mr. Dash. You were interested in this job, were you not?
Mr. Segretti. I was.
Mr. Dash. In your statement, you liave already given us for the}
record the information received fi-om Mr. Chapin to contact Mr.
Kalmbach and the meeting you had with Mr. Kalmbach in which
your salary was arranged.
Could you tell us, how much did you receive from Mr. Kalmbach
totally for your work during 1971 and 1072 ?
Mr. Segretti. I can give you an a})})roximate tigure on it, Mr. Dash.
I have it in my financial records somewliere. I think it is in tlie neigh-
borhood of around $45,000. That inc hided salary and moneys for ex-
penses, total.
Mr. Dash. Now, on the same day that you arranged this with Mr.
Kalmbach, and I think the date is July 9, 1971 — do you recall that
date ?
Mr. Segretti. I place that date a little bit later, Mr. Dash, but it is
in the summer of 1971.
Mr. Dash. Did you on that day also have a meeting with Mr.
Chapin?
Mr. SEGRE'nT. I did.
Mr. Dash. And where did you uieet with Mi-. Chajun ?
Mr. Segretti. I met Mr. Cluipin near the San Clemente White House
and we went to a small restaurant in the local area. !
Mr. Dash. Now, what information and instructions did Mr. Chapin i
give you at that meet ing ? '
Mr. Segretti. At that meeting, ^Nfr. (^hajiin, in addition to describ-
ing the general backgi-ound of the political situation, gave me a list
of States to concentrate on in making future political contacts.
Mr. Dash. And were these States ])riniarily the primary States?
Mr. Segretti. Primarily ; yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And it was at this meeting that he indicated to you that
you were to act in secrecy so that there would be no trace back to the
White House?
Mr. Segretti. I don't recall specifically if that was discussed at thar
meeting. That was discussed sevei-al times.
Mr. Dash. I^ut I take it, it was fairly eaily in your discussions with
Mr. Chapin that he emphasized se<'i'e('y ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
3987
Mr. Dash. And that there should be no tracing back to the "White
\ House ?
! Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
i Mr. Dash. And that you were not to use your own name?
i Mr. Segretti. That is correct, ISIr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. What, if anything-, did Mr. Chapin tell you about the
importance of the use of news media and news media impact in your
assignment ?
Mr. Segretti. It was related to me in relationship to pickets that,
for example, at a Muskie rally, if you were to have a Humphrey for
President sign or two, it should be placed in proximity to where the
media could take a photograph of it.
Mr. Dash. Well, was he emphasizing to you that you should use, as
best you could, news media impact ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. At that period of time and in relationship to
that type of activity, yes.
Mr. Dash. Now, did he also talk to you about the candidate you
should spend most of your time on in terms of your political activities*
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir; he did.
Mr. Dash. Who was that candidate ?
Mr. Segrei^t. That ^^ as Senator JMuskie.
Mr. Dash. Did he indicate why ?
Mr. Segretti. It is difficult to recall any exact conversation at this
time — that was some time ago. But Senator Muskie at that time was
certainly the forerunner, shall we say, of likely prospects to run for
the Democratic nomination.
Mr. Dash. He was the front runner at that time, was he not ?
^Ir. Segretti. Yes, I believe he was.
Mr. Dash. Now, also at this meeting, and I think you have indicated
some of this in your statement, Mr. Chapin gave you some of the strat-
egy that you were to use in your activities. Let me state what I believe
you have indicated to the staif, both here and in executive session. I
think what you have indicated in your statement, and tell me if this is
not true, as to what the strategy was — that you were to engage in activ-
ities to weaken the leading candidate, Senator Muskie, and to carry out
political tricks to set one Democratic candidate against the other so that
after the convention the staffs of these candidates would still be bitter
and would not be able to rally behind any chosen candidate. Would
that be a fair statement of the strategy ?
Mr. Segretti. That would be fair except the statement you made
about weakening Senator Muskie. I think you attribute a little more
emphasis than at least was conveyed to me at that point in time.
Mr. Dash. But your emphasis was on Senator JMuskie and your
political tricks and the use of your agents during that period of time
was directed toward him and to confuse the candidates f.nd his cam-
paign, was that not true ?
Mr. Segretti. I think that could be stated, yes.
Mr. Dash. And, therefore, it is not too strong a statement to say
that it was an effort to weaken Senator Muskie's i^rimary campaign.
It was not to strengthen it, was it?
Mr. Segretti. No ; it was not.
Mr. Dash. By the way, when you were first approached you were
in the Army, were you not ?
3988
Mr. Segretti. I was.
Mr. Dash. While you were still in the Army did you recruit somej
persons to work for yon in this pol itical project ? ;
Mr. Segretti. I contacted some indiyiduals. 1
Mr. Dash. Mow, followino- youj- release from the Army, which I|
understand was on Sept(Mnber 15. 1971 j
Mr. Segretti. I bolieye that was September 1,3.
Mr. Dash. What?
Ml". Segretti. I belieye that was September !?>.
Mr. Dash. September 13. Did you «2:o to Washington to meet with
]Mr. Chapin some time toward the latter part of September?
Mr. Segretti. I did.
Mr. Dash. And did Mr. Chapin tell you at that time that "Sir.
Strachan would no longer be inyolved in the project?
Mr. Segre'fit. I tend to belieye that that statement, or a statement
to that etl'ect, was made a little earlier than that, Mr. Dash.
Ml-. Dash. Well, about when, would you say for the record?
Mr. Segretti. Prior to my release from Army actiye duty.
Mr, Dash. And thereafter you had no further contact with ]\Ir.
Strachan in your actiyities ?
INIr. Segretti. The only contact I can remember with INIr. Strachan,
from my release from actiye duty until June 1972, was Mr. Strachan
called me once on the telephone in late Sept(Miiber or Noyember 1971.
Mr. Dash. Did it haye anythino- to do with these activities?
Mr. Segretti. Pardon?
Mr. Dash. Did it have anythinir to do with your assignment?
Mr. Segretti. Yes ; it did.
Mr. Dash. Would you tell what the discussion was about?
Mr. Segretti. Senator ]\Iuskie was traveling in southern California
and some individuals threw some eggs at his staff or at Senator ^luskie,
and it was broadcast on the news media. ]Mr. Strachan called me up
to ask me if I had anything to do with that. I told him I did not, which
is the truth.
Mr. Dash. Did he sound disappointed ?
Mr. Segretti. I just do not recall. I do not believe so.
Mr. Dash. What arrangements — at the meeting now that I think
we have established that took place some time in late September after
you left the Army when you met with Mr. Chapin in Washington — '
what arrangements did ]\Ir. Chapin make with you for the purpose of
contacting each other during the course of the project?
Mr. Segrei'it. Well, I was insti-ucted at some point in time that I
Avould — T was given his home telephone number. Generally speaking,
I was to call the AVfiite House switchboard and I was to use another
name.
Mr. Dash. All right. What name were you to use?
Mr. Segreiit. I was to use and did use
Mr. Dash. Do you recall thv name Don Morris?
Mr. Segre'iti. That was the name that T did — M-o-r-r-i-s — that was
the name that I used, although at the veiy first it may have been an-
other name very similar to that, lk)b AForse, M-o-r-s-e, but I believe
the first time 1 called up the operator said "is that spelled M-o-r-r-i-s",
and I said yes.
Mr. Dash. Was Mr. Chapin to have a code name ?
3989
Mr. Segretti. I was instructed to get an answering service on my
home telephone number in California, which I did. Mr. Chapin, if he
were to call, and I was not in, and if he left a message, he used the
name Mr. Chapman, C-h-a-p-m-a-n.
Mr. Dash. Have you heard the iiame Bob Duane? Have you ever
heard that as a code name?
Mr. Segretti. That, I believe was mentioned — at least was in one of
the notebooks that had been — that I had given to the attorney in Los
Angeles and eventually went to Mr. Dean. That name was never used
to my recollection, and it was probably just part of the discussion at
some point in time.
Mr. Dash. Were you also to open up a post office box so that you
could receive mail ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And did you receive mail during that period of time
from Mr. Chapin?
Mr. Segretti. I did receive some mail from Mr. Chapin.
Mr. Dash. And some instructions or recommendations?
Mr. Segretti. At one time I did ; yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. In order to help you select agents or contacts?
Mr. Segretti. Contacts, I would prefer, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Well, I know we may be dealing with semantics but they
were in fact agents of your work, were they not ? They were follow-
ing your directions and were acting under your supervision in some
cases and sometimes on their own but they were carrying out the
project and the assignments you had been given by Mr. Chapin.
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir ; they were carrying out the assignments, yes,
si I'.
Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Chapin, in order to help you find such persons,
give you a list of the 1968 advance men of President Xixon?
Mr. Segretti. At one point in time he did. I don't know whether it
was a 1968 advance man's list or not but it was a Wiite House list of
advance men.
Mr. Dash. Did you use this list to make contacts?
Mr. Segretti. I did use that list to some extent.
Ml-. Dash. I think you have mentioned that at one time Mr. Chapin
did send you a memo containing suggestions. Would you turn to^ —
3'Ou have before you some memorandums and other exhibits and they
are tabbed and will you turn to tab 2 [exhibit Xo. 200]. Would you
look at that? It is a memorandum, for the record, dated September 28,
1971, 4 p.m.
Mr. Segretti. That is correct, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Yes. Is this a memorandum you received from Mr.
Chapin at your post office box ?
Mr. Segretfi. This is a memorandum I received. I do not believe I
received it at my post office box but at my home address.
Mr. Dash. At your home address.
The memorandum for the record states :
From now on, we want to have at least one Muskie sign in anions demonstra-
tors who are demonstrating against tlie President. It should be MUSKIE FOR
PRESIDENT in big letters and should be held in a location so that it is clearly
visible.
At IMuskie events or events by other Democratic hopefuls, there should be a
sign or two which goads them. For example at a Muskie rally there should be
3990
a large WHY NOT A BLACK VICE PRESIDENT or perhaps WE PREFER
HUMPHREY or something else that would goad him along.
At Humphrey rallies there should be Muskie signs and at Kennedy rallies,
there should be Muskie or Humphrey signs and so on. These signs should be
well placed in relationship to the press area so that a picture is easy to get.
Did you follow that recommendation ?
Mr. SEGRJi-n^i. To some extent I did, yes.
Mr. Dash. That was the o;eneral, one of the general, strategies you
used, did you not ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, that is correct.
Mr. Dash. Now, did Mr. Chapin, also in September 1971, ask you to
fly to Portland, Oreg., and stay at the Benson Hotel where the Presi-
dent and his party were staying ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Tell the committee why he asked you to do that
Mr. Segreitt. Well, some of it is conjecture or speculation and I
hate to really engage in that but perhaps it is not too speculative. I
think perhaps one reason was to get me enthused about the job, but
I think more of a primary reason was to let me get familiar with
the Presidential advance and how a Presidential party was put to-
gether in traveling and in that type of thing.
Mr. Dash. Did he give you at that time an advance man's manual ^
Mr. Segretti. I am not certain whether it was given to me in
Washington, D.C., or Portland.
Mr. Dash. But he did give you one ?
Mr. Segretti. I did receive one.
Mr. Dash. Did he at that time tell you to contact Mr. Kalmbach
to get you the first check ?
Mr. Segretti. My first recollection was that it was told to me by
telephone a little bit prior to that. However, my notes regarding that
meeting do mention, I think, the term operating capitafof $5,000 so
apparently it was discussed at that point then.
Mr. Dash. Well, shortly after that you did go back to Los Angeles
and you did meet with Mr. Kalmbach and did receive a $5,000 check
and expenses i
Mr. Segretti. I don't l:>elieve I did. I received a check in the mail
of that sum.
Mr. Dash. Now, when you started out on your work, how did you
make your political contacts; how many States did you actually visit,
a p p rox i m ate ly ?
^Ir. Segretti. That is really a guess, to some extent, and requires my
going over my records thoroughly. Some were very sporadic. For ex-
ample, T remember one trip I flew. I was flying down South and I hap-
pened to know a friend that was living in Albuquerque, from my peri-
od of time in the military. So, instead of flying direct to Florida or
wherever I was flying, I stopped oft' in New Mexico and it was a com-
l)i nation of both social visit and you might call it a political visit.
Mr. Dash. About how many States did you actually
Mr. Segretti. INIaybe 12.
Mr. Dash [continuing]. Make contacts Avith, is what I am really
getting at, Mr. Segretti. I know you traveled quite a bit throughout
the country.
Mr. Segretti. Riirht.
3991
Mr. Dash. In how many States did j^on actually place, either on the
payroll or for serious business — people who were going to follow up
and do work in the area of j^olitical tricks ?
Mr. Segretti. I would sa}^ half a dozen.
Mr. Dash. And were these primarily the States that Mr. Chapm
had talked to you about — to emphasize your work in ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes ; they were.
yh'. Dash. When you made these contacts with these various people
throughout the country, what name or names did you use ^
Mr. Segretti. At first, I believe for a short period of time, I used the
name Don Durham and the balance of the time I used Don Simmons.
Mr. Dash. You have already in your statement indicated that you
were asked or you did put under surveillance. Senator ISIuskie, when
he was out in Los Angeles ?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall that Mr. Chapin asked you to do this?
Mr. Segretti. Specifically ?
Mr. Dash. Or told you that Senator Muskie was going to be out in
Los Angeles and that you should arrange pickets and things in that
area ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes ; that is correct.
]Mr. Dash. And that came from Mr. Chapin.
Wlien you did have him placed under surveillance, and T am not
asking you now for the name of the individual
Mr. Segretti. I appreciate that, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash [continuing]. But was this just a friend or what was his
occupation ?
]Mr. Segretti. This was an individual whose name I had gotten on a
list from a friend that I knew in the Army, that I had worked with to
some extent in the military service, who was assigned to the CID and
the military which is really — stands for Criminal Investigation Divi-
sion, and this individual was a retired CID individual and at that time
he was working for a detective agency.
Mr. Dash. A private detective ?
Mr. Segretti. I would classify him as that at that time ; yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Now, as your statement has indicated you went out to
Whittier College, I think, in November of 1971 ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Chapin inform you that Senator Muskie was
going to be appearing at Whittier College ?
Mr. Segretti. I believe that is how the scenario went. It is possible
that I called jNIr. Chapin to inform him of that fact, finding out from
a local paper or a news release that I read in the paper, but my best
recollection is that I received a phone call regarding that.
Mr. Dash. All right, your activity at that time, I thinlv you have
indicated in your statement, was that you distributed a list of some
hard questions or questions to be asked Senator Muskie ?
Mr, Segretti. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Will you turn to tab :^> [exhibit No. 201] of the exhibits
that are before you, and would you identify that exhibit as the hand-
out that was given at the appearance of Senator Muskie ?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct ; yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Some of the questions that you were asking to be put to
him were :
3992
Do you refuse to even consider a black or Chicano as a running mate?
Your public answer that they do not yet have political equality only fosters any
bias that exists and avoids the question. '
Do you speak in terms of equality for minority yet send your children to all|
white private schools?
That was the tenor of your question, was it not ?
Mr. Segretti. That is right.
Mr. Dash. During your operation at Whittier, did you receive any
communication from Mr. Chapin ?
Mr. Segretti. I did. ,
Mr. Dash. TVliat was the form of that communication ? !
Mr. Segretti. I received a Xerox copy of what I now believe to be^
a page from the White House press summary.
Mr. Dash. Will you look at tab 4 [exhibit No. 202] I think
Mr. Segretti. We have it.
Mr. Dash. On tab 4, if you have that before you, there appeal's on!
page 10, of what appears to come from the White House press sum-
mary that goes to the President, a reference to Mr. Muskie's appearance!
at Whittier. I just want to read a couple of lines from there :
Reynolds said that he had come prepared for conservative questions, but the
Chicanos gave him no chance and Big Ed proved that he can keep his cool.
Aluskie reported that he was pleased by the reception he received from those
willing to listen. But more importantly, said Reynolds, he proved he can keep
his temi)er under stress.
Now, does there appear on that news summary some handwriting
addressed to you ?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. And is that handwriting Mr. Chapin's ?
Mr. Segretti. I believe it to be Mr. Chapin's.
Mr. Dash. Would you read what the handwriting says with refer-
ence to the item I just referred to ?
Mr. Segretti. It states: "Don — note we really missed the boat on
this. Obviously, the press now wants to prove EM" — I believe that —
Mr. Dash. Ed Muskie, I believe?
Mr. Segretti. Yes. [Continues reading:] "Can keep his temper. Let
us prove he cannot."
Then there is another little notation and there is one more little com-
ment that says, "Your Q," which I take it to mean "My question."
Mr. Dash. And does that refer to the fact that in the news siunmary |
there is a statement that Muskie favored abortions for therapeutic rea- 1
sons and one of the questions you had in your handout referred to
abortions. Is that correct ?
Mr. Segretti. That is true.
Mr. Dash. And he was giving you credit for the fact that your ques-
tion got into this news summary ?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Now, did you do any work in the New Hampshire pri-
mary ?
Mr. Segretti. I did not.
Mr. Dash. What happened in New Hampshire?
Mr. Segretti. I was instructed to go to New Hampshire. I did. I met
with an individual whose name was given to me. I found him to be a
very personable and likeable gentleman — very knowledgeable in poli-
3993
tics. He seemed very receptive to my ideas. I felt so much at ease with
him that I gave him my true name.
Mr. Dash. Then what happened afterwards?
Mr. Segretti. I received a phone call and was told to leave New
Hampshire.
Mr. Dash. Who called you?
Mr. Segretti. Mr. Chapin.
Mr. Dash. And what was his problem? Wliat was your problem?
Mr. Segretti. My problem was that I had used my real name, and
apparently, this individual had called around Washington to find out
who I was.
Mr. Dash. I guess in that sense, you had blown your cover in New
Hampshire ?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Chapin then indicate that you should stay out
I of the New Hampshire campaign and go to another State?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. he did.
Mr. Dash. What State did you next go to and spend most of your
I time at that point ?
Mr. Segretti. Well, tlie next primaiy schedule was Florida and that
is where I went.
Mr. Dash. Now, I think you made, in your statement you have incli-
cated that you recruited two agents in Florida, Mr. Benz and Mr.
Kelly. How did you contact Mr. Benz ?
Mr. Segretti. ^Ir. Benz was quite by accident, really. When I ar-
rived in Tampa, I called a local Republican office and asked whoever
answered the phone if he knew of any individual that might like to
do some part-time work and I was given the name of INIr. Benz.
Mr. Dash. And Mr. Kelly ?
Mr. Segretti. Mr. Kelly's name I received from Mr. Benz and I re-
ceived it from another individual when I went to Miami, whose name
I got from the White House advance list. The name of Mr. Kelly came
up both times, so I subsequently called jNIr. Kelly.
Mr. Dash. Now. did you instruct Mr. Benz and ]VIr. Kelly to engage
in various activities, to create great confusion among the Democratic
candidates in such a way that they would blame one another?
]Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Were they also to infiltrate the Muskie campaign?
Mr. Segretti. They were not. People associated with them were to.
Mr. Dash. I did not hear your answer.
Mr. Segretti. I do not believe they personally were to.
Mr. Dash. Were they given the independence to recruit other per-
sons ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir, they Avere.
INIr. Dash. And did they have other persons infiltrate the Muskie
campaign ?
iSIr. Segretti. I believe they did.
Mr. Dash. What was the' purpose of infiltrating the Muskie cam-
paign ?
Mr. Segretti. Primarilv to obtain campaign schedules.
Mr. Dash. But while they were there, were they to take anything
else they could find ?
3994
i
Mr. Segretti. Anything else they could come across that would be
information would classify as a bonus ; yes, sir. ,
Mr. Dash. You had contacts in Califoiiiia at that time as well, diet
you not ? i
iSIr. Segretti. Any contacts I had in California at that time reallj;',
were rather minimal, but I believe I did. j
Mr. Dash. But you did develop contacts in California ? i
Mr. Segretti. To some extent, yes, sir. {
Mr. Dash. And they also infiltrated, both in Los Angeles and San|
Francisco, the Muskie campaign ? |
Mr. Segretti. That is correct. '
Mr. Dash. Now, during the time you were recmiting and traveling,;
yov have indicated that you maintained contact with Mr. Chapin. Is it;
tr.o. that Mr. Chapin actually received periodic reports from you, that
you sent Mr. Chapin copies of material that you had distributed and
a list of things that would reflect your conduct ?
Mr. Segretti. As a general practice, I would.
Mr. Dash. Now, did there come a time when you received, at your
box in Los Angeles, copies of a Muskie pamphlet ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir, that is correct.
Mr. Dash. "Would you turn to tab 6 [exhibit No. 158*]. This is a
pamphlet that the committee has already received in evidence.
Mr. Segretti. Yes; this is the pamphlet; yes, sir, a copy of it.
Mr. Dash. Purported as being issued by a group called Citizens for
a Liberal Alternative ?
Mr. Segretti. That is right, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. "VVliich has a picture of Mr. Muskie with a large cigar
out of his mouth, identifying him as a person who is no different from
the Nixons, Agnews, Mitchells, Connallys, we have now. The com-
mittee has already had this exhibit introduced during the time
Mr. Buchanan was a witness.
Were you aware, by the way, that that pamphlet was prepared by
Mr. Khachigian, Mr. Buchanan's assistant, was edited by Mr. Bu-
chanan, and Wcis printed by the Committee for the Re-Election of
the President with the approval of Mr. jSIagruder, Mr. Mitchell,
Mr. Haldeman ?
Mr. Segretti. I have absolutely no idea.
Mr. Dash. How many copies of the pamphlet did you receive?
Mr. Segretti. I can take a guess ; 500 to 1,000.
Mr. Dash. What did you do with the pamphlets ; these 500 to 1,000
copies ?
Mr. Segretti. I read it. Upon reading it, it a^ppeared to be somewhat
out of date by the time I received it. It was after the Florida primary.
I have no clear recollection of where it was distributed, but I believe
some were sent on either to a friend of mine in Chicago or perhaps
someone else. I have no real clear recollection, really, what was fully
done with it.
Mr. Dash. All right. I think you have covered fairly fully your
relationship with Mr. Warren who — did you know, by the way, at
that time that he was E. Howard Hunt ?
Mr. Segretti. I had no idea.
Mr. Dash. I think you now know tliat he was ?
♦See p. 4055.
3995
Mr. Segretti. Yes, I do.
Mr. Dash. I think you fairly fully related your relationships ^\ith
Mr. Hunt at that time, but did he also suggest to you, at one point,
that you could be of assistance to the President's policies in Vietnam
by having certain telegrams sent ?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. What did you do in that respect ?
Mr. Segretti. I called my associates, I believe, making — just pri-
marily repeating the suggestions or requests, and I believe some of
those were followed up on.
Mr. Dash. Do you know how many names you had put on the tele-
grams ?
Mr. Segretti. I personally sent two telegrams, a total, perhaps of 200
names.
Mr. Dash. About 200 names.
Where did you get those names ?
Mr. Segretti. A number of them I made up. Another group of names
II took from a list that I had from the California Shirley for Presi-
dent delegates — Shirley Chisholm for President.
Mr. Dash. And on that list of names that you did not make up, that
were real names, did the persons' names appear
Senator GuRNEY. Mr. Chairman, apparently, we have a live quorum.
Senator Ervin. The committee will stand in recess until 1 o'clock.
[Whereupon, at 11:15 a.m., the committee recessed, to reconvene at
1 p.m., the same day.]
Afterxoon Session, AVEcisrESDAY, Octpober 3, 1973
Senator Ervix. The committee will come to order.
Counsel will resume the interrogation of the witness.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Segretti, you have already given the committee infor-
mation that Mr. Benz, through various peoj)le that he had employed,
placed some infiltrators in Muskie's and also in Jackson's campaign ;
is this not right ?
Mr. Segre^iti. I believe that is correct, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Now, was there an occasion when one of these infiltra-
tors in Senator Muskie's campaign in Tampa leaked to the press that
there was to be a secret $1,000 plate fundraising dinner ^
Mr. Segretti. I believe that is correct.
Mr. Dash. Do you know what happened as a result of that leak?
Mr. Segri:tti. I understand that the dinner which was to be attended
by 17 individuals was subsequently canceled.
Mr. Dash. Yes, and, therefore, the dinner was canceled as a result
of that information becoming public.
Mr. Segretti. I heard that, yes. sir.
Mr. Dash. Xow, you have stated in your statement that you had
various schoolbusing posters printed up involving Mr. Muskie.
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Would you look at tab 8 [exhibit No. 198] . You will find
at tab 8 in your series of exhibits, because of the size of the poster,
it is somewhat broken up, Init I think the poster read: "Support
busing now, support more children now." I think I have a copy of this
and you can see it. It says : "Help Muskie support busing more chil-
dren now." Is this the poster you are referring to ?
3996 i
I:
1'
Mr. Segretti. That is correct, Mr. Dash. j
Mr, Dash. And the reference in the bottom ''Mothers backing Muskio
committee,'' was that a committee that you made up ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. There is no committee by that name, to my
knowledge.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman
Mr. Segretti, This, you could say was my committee.
Mr. Dash. Your committee ?
Mr. Segretti. One of them.
Mr. Dash. You were one of tlie mothers backing Muskie ?
Senator Ervin. Counsel, pardon me. That was a committee which i
existed only in your contemplation ?
Mr. Segretti, That is correct, Senator.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chainnan, although I am going to be asking that
the various exhibits be introduced, this particular exhibit is one that
does not appear very clear in our collection of exhibits and I would
like to have this reconstruction of the poster marked for identification ;
and admitted in evidence as part of our record.
Senator Ervin. That will be done. It will be marjved as an exhibit i
and admitted as such. \
[The poster referred to was marked exhibit No. 198,*] ;
Mr. Dash. Do you know how many posters of that kind that you \
had printed up ? I
Mr. Segretii. I believe the total was 300. ]
Mr, Dash, Where were they distributed ?
Mr, Segretti. Primarily in Florida. ]My Ijest guess is 100 to 125 in
Florida. Perhaps a dozen or so were posted in and around Chicago, i
I believe some were sent to an individual I knew in Indiana. However, j
they were never used, to my knowledge, and that is the total. !
Mr, Dash. Did you send copies or a copy of the poster to Mr. •
Chapin ? i
Mr. Segretti, To the best of my recollection, I did,
Mr. Dash. And this was in keeping with your sending him, regu-
larly, various copies of things that you were distribut ing ? i
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Mr, Dash, Now, did your Florida agent distribute anti-Wallace
cards purporting to be backing Mr. Muskie ?
Mr. Segretti. I believe INIr. Benz had some printed up and they were
so distributed.
Mr. Dash. Would you take a look at tab 18 [exhibit No. 214]. You
will notice that part — I only direct your attention to the printed card :
"A vote for Wallace is a wasted vote; on March l^th cast your ballot
for Senator Edmund INIuskie." Is that one of the cards ?
If you turn the page, again looking at the printed part, the printed
card: "If you liked Hitler you'll just love Wallace.'' Under this was;
"Vote for Muskie.'' Was that one of the cards ? I
Mr. Segretti. No, sir. I imdei-stand that the one — this was the same '
card printed on two sides ?
Mr. Dash. Printed on two sides ?
Mr. Segretti. There was only one card, to my recollection.
Mr. Dash. Then, what I just read was on two sides of one card?
Mr, Segretti. That is right.
♦See p. 4267.
3997
Mr. Dash. I think you have also testified that you were aware, in
fact participated in, sending out false letters on Mr. Muskie's cam-
paign stationery.
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. And you referred already to one of them. Now, there is
one particular letter you referred to in your statement which was es-
pecially scurrilous and accused Senator Jackson and Senator Hum-
phrey of, serious accusations of, sexual and drinking misconduct. I
think in due respect to Senator Jackson and Senator Muskie and
Senator Humphrey, against whom this letter was used, that it would
not be fair to read the actual language of the letter into the record.
Mr, Segretti. I agree, Mr. Dash. That letter is untrue. I sincerely
regret that any copies of that were sent out.
Mr, Dash. Would you agree with me without my reading it into the
record, to demonstrate this for the record, that it was an especially
vicious and scurrilous letter ?
Mr, Segretti. I will agree it was a scurrilous letter.
Mr. Dash. How much did it cost you to print that letter and dis-
tribute it?
Mr. Segretti. I believe $20 was sent to Mr. Benz to do that.
Mr, Dash. Did you send a copy of that letter to jNIr. Chapin ?
Mr, Segretti. I believe I did, yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Did you get a response from him '?
Mr. Segretti. No.
Mr. Dash. Do you recall Mr. Chapin telling you that for your $20
you received $10,000 to $20,000 worth of free publicity but to be care-
ful next time ?
Mr, Secjretti. Yes, or words to that etl'ect.
Mr. Dash, Were stink bombs used against Mr. Muskie's campaign in
Florida ?
Mr. Segretti. There were three instances when a substance, which
name I do not recall now, were either attempted or were placed in
places involving Senator Muskie.
Mr. Dash. Was one of them Senator IMuskie's headquarters in
Tampa ?
Mr, Segretti. I understand that did take place.
Mr. Dash. Do you know who placed that particular bomb ?
Mr. Segretti. No, sir, I do not.
Mr. Sherman, Mr, Dash, excuse me, I think it should be made clear
these were not bombs in the sense of exploding bombs or anything of
that nature. It was more to create a smell rather than explode to dam-
age other persons, that should be made clear.
Mr. Dash. Its purpose was to create such an odor that people could
not occupy the place when the bomb did whatever it was supposed to
do, is that correct ?
Mr. Segretti. Well, perhaps that states it a little strong but cer-
tainly to make it unpleasant.
Mr. Dash. Do you know what was — where the particular substance
was placed in the Muskie headquarters in Tampa ?
Mr. Segretti. No ; I do not.
Mr. Dash. Do you know how they were able to place the substance
in the headquarters ?
3998
Mr. Segretti. I have understood, after the fact,, that it was put in
through a window or screen.
Mr. Dash. Do you know, as a matter of fact, that they had to break
into that wnndow to do it ?
Mr. Segretti. No, I do not.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Benz did not report that to you ?
Mr. Segretti. If — my recollection is that a screen was pried open
and a window lifted, something to that effect.
Mr. Dash. Well, would you then say that the prying open of the
screen is breaking into the headquarters ?
Mr. Segretti. It certainly was an unauthorized entry.
Mr. Dash. I won't take you back to your laAv school burglary days
but — not your act of burglary but your definition of burglary — as to
what the breaking in would require but, in fact, it was a breaking in of
that headquarters ; was it not ?
Mr. Segretti. I don't know the complete facts of what occurred
there. I was told after the fact that the substance was placed in
Senator Muskie's headquarters in the Tampa area. Now my recollec-
tion as to the details of how it was put in is somew^hat vague. I do,
however, remember that it seems to me a screen was pried open and a
window lifted.
Mr. Dash. Was this on the primary day itself ?
Mr. Segretti. I don't recall that, Mr. Dash. It could very well have
been.
Mr. Dash. And if it were on the primary day, w^ould you agree that
would be quite disruptive of the activity of the headquartere that day,
that important day ?
Mr. Segretti. It could very well be, yes.
Mr. Dash. Who did you hire to work for you in the Pennsylvania
primaiT ?
Mr. Sherman. Could we have a moment? [Conferring.]
Mr. Segretti. I had a young man in the Philadelphia ai-ea who was
given, I believe, the sum of $100.
Mr. Dash. We have some exhibits which have his name on them and
what was his name ?
Mr. Segretti. His name is Mr. Zimmer.
Mr. Dash. Did he pass out literature and organize anti-Muskie
pickets at Muskie rallies ?
Mr. Segretti. I believe he did some of that.
Mr. Dash. All right. Now, will you turn to tabs 16, 17, and 18
[exhibits Nos. 212, 213, and 214]. Start at 16. Do you recognize what
appeal's to be a clipping from the Pennsylvania Voice, of Wednesday,
April 19 — an article called Points of (Jrder by a journalist whose name
is Blair Stobaugh ?
Mr. Segretti. I do.
INIr. Dash. Without reading the article — specifically that article
refers to Senator Muskie's effort in Philadelphia to speak in the pres-
ence of demonstrators and hecklers during the course of his speaking,
is that not true ?
Mr. Segretti. That is true.
Mr. Dash. Now, all around — by the way, how did you receive this
clipping?
Mr. Segretti. By mail.
: 3999
i Mr. Dash. Is it true that you received this clipping from Mr.
dimmer?
Mr. Segretti. To the best of my lielief , it came from Mr. Zimmer.
Mr. Dash. Do you notice around the clipping some handwriting?
Mr. S'EGRETTi, Yes.
Mr. Dash. Which refers to the clipping itself, and could you read
:hat for us ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, I will, Mr. Dash.
Left-hand side toward the top it says, "This whole article is about,
md by one of my people. Pennsylvania Voice, circulation'' — I believe
hat says 10,000, I am not sure. This may be a student newspaper up
:here, a student-oriented paper, I am not certain of that. It says, ''Don :
Treat ! I didn't think that we could get this in print. Protesters, counter-
protesters, us"
Mr. Dash. There are three, "us, us, us'' underscored, quite bragging.
Mr. Segretti. "Blair" — I can't read the last name, I can't pronounce
it — "Stobaugh was one of my own henchmen."
Mr. Dash. He is the writer of the article ?
]Mr. Segretti. His name is on the article ; yes.
Mr. Dash. Yes.
Mr. Segretti [continues reading] : "I didn't think that this would
make the paper so I forgot to tell you about it. I didn't see it until
riiursday night right after I talked to you."
The rest of it is a little difficult on this copy.
Mr. Dash. Can you make it out on the bottom? "These are all my
protesters' " and the word "great" underneath.
Mr. Segretti. That seems to be what it states.
Mr. Dash. Will you turn to tab 17. Actually as you have them, I
hink, Mr. Segretti, they are put in the wrong order. If you will turn
the next page, and do you see at the top where it says, "Skip — Philly
April 23, 1972."
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Who was Skip ?
Mr. Segretti. That was Mr. Zimmer.
Mr. Dash. Was that his nickname ?
Mr. Segretti. I imagine.
Mr. Dash. He was known as Skip Zimmer. Could you just read — can
lyou read his note to you at that time ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes; it says: "Don, talked to Jack Cannon, Senator
Humphrey's deputy press secretary, tonight about the paying of
demonstrators by M's people" — I assume that means Senator Muskie's
people.
Mr. Dash. Muskie's people.
Mr. Segretti [continues reading] : "Gave him names, places, et
cetera, told him I was reporter Bob Schmidt of the Daily News, and
chat our paper had received calls and letters about it. He said the Sen-
itor had no comment for publication but they said 'off the record'
were in fact
Mr, Dash. If you turn over to the next page it follows "aware"
Mr. Segretti. It looks like "Aware this had been going on and there
were hecklers"
Mr. Dash. "And they were checking further," I think it says, could
yon read that ?
4000
Mr. Segretti. "Checking further into the matter and that the Fair
Campaign Practices Committee had been contacted but that" — his
writing is a little difficult— "but that further proof might be needed
to make the charge stick for publication purposes," et cetera. He also
said 'oti" the record' that the H people"— I assume Humphrey peo-
ple — 'Svere very disturbed and planned to complain to John English
aI)Out it personally on Monday."
Mr. Dash. AVasn't that a case, Mr. Segretti, where Mr. Zimmer had
employed hecklers against Muskie ^
Mr. Segreiti. I don't believe Mr. Zimmer ever employed any heck-
lers, Mr. Dash, to my knowledge.
Mr. Dash. Well, apparently posing as a reporter he contacted Sena-
tor Humphrey's headquartei'S, and told them that Muskie's people had
placed the hecklers.
Mr. Segreii'i. That is right.
Mr. Dash. And this was part again of the strategy of playing one
candidate off against another ?
Mr. SEGiiETTi. That is right.
Mr. Dash. To create divisiveness ?
Mr. Segretti. That is right.
Mr. Dash. Do you know the signs that are drawn underneath the
last statement in red which Mr. Zimmer gives you as illustrations of
the signs they used during the Muskie rally ?
Mr. Segretti. Right.
Mr. Dash. And one says, "Muskie, Florida ; 9 percent, Wisconsin, 10
percent; Pennsylvania, 11 percent (with luck)" in parentheses.
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Mr. Dash. And then the next one says "M-u-s-k-i-e spells loser,
H.H.H. is the man."
Mr. Segretit. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Another one says "probusing Ed's kids go to private
school."
Mr. Segiuetti. That is correct.
Mr Dash. I will read, down at the bottom there appears to be in
handwriting — "Muskie looked right up at these two'' — meaning the
first two — "right in front of him as he left, and scowled perceptibly," —
so apparently, Mr. Segretti, what you were doing had some effect as
Ix'ing icported back to you by your Philadelphia agent, that you were
gottingMr. Humphrey and'Mr. Muskie pretty upset.
Mr. Sk<;retti. Yes. However
Mr. Dash. Is it true?
Mr. Segret-h. I would like to state that Mr. Zinnner at times did
hiive a tendency to perhaps embellish a little bit, so I think to some
extent, such as the term "henchman" and so forth, was embellishment
upon the language.
Mr. Dash. Xow, Mr. Segretti, turning to the California campaign,
did you have copies of the lieadqiuuters stationery, campaign sta-
tioiu'iy, fiom Mr. McGovern, Mr. Yorty, Mr. McCarthy, Mr. Hum-
phrey, printed up?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Did you have them printed up by a printer?
Mr. SEfjREiTi. Tln-ough a pi-inter given to me by Mr. Warren, now
Mr. Hunt.
4001
Mr. Dash. Did you also have anti-Humphrey bumper stickers
printed up ?
Mr. Segretti. I did have some.
Mr. Dash. Would you look at tab 20 [exhibit No. 216] ? I will just
hold this up.
Humphrey ; he started the war ; don't give him another chance ; Democrats
for Peace Candidate.
Is that one of the bumper stickers that you had printed up ^
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Mr. Dash. By the way, that Democrats for Peace Candidate, what
organization was that?
Mr. Segretti. That was me again, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. That was Donald Segretti.
How many of those did you have printed up ?
Mr. Segretti. I really do not recall, without looking into my rec-
ords, the number. I would guess perhaps 1,000.
Mr. Dash. Where were they distributed ?
Mr. Segretti. I believe some were distributed in California. My
guess is the number would be 100, 150.
Mr. Dash. Apparently, now, this is an attack on Humphrey, where
the emphasis had been :Muskie in the past. It shifted to Humphrey. Can
you explain why now the emphasis has shifted to Humphrey?
jNIr. Segretti. Well, I would not want to characterize the emphasis
as switching to Humphrey at all.
Mr. Dash. Well, maybe I can put the question another way.
Did ^Ir. Chapin, after the Wisconsin primary, tell you to stop
focusing upon Senator Muskie and to begin driving a wedge between
the leadmg candidates?
Mr. Segretti. He mentioned two candidates.
Mr. Dash. Which candidates?
Mr. Segretti. Senator Humphrey and Senator Muskie.
Mr. Dash. And \\ as this an effort to do that ?
]Mr. Segretti. Yes. These bumper stickers primarily, perhaps 75 of
them, were mailed to Humphrey delegates.
Mr. Dash. Now, did you also have a pamphlet printed up and dis-
tributed in California with regard to Mr. Himiphrey ? If you look at
page 2o, you can identify this pamphlet — tab 23 [exhibit No. 219].
Now, that pamphlet shows a photograph of Senator Humphrey
holding a billfish, does it not?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
]Mr. Dash. And underneath the photograph is printed "A fishy smell
for the White House"?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. And did you actually — this pamphlet looks very much
like the earlier pamphlet that you identified, which was against Muskie,
which had come out of the White House. You testified that you did not
know it did, but it had been mailed to you and coj)ied in about 5,000
copies.
]Mr. Segretti. That is right.
Mr. Dash. Was this dummied up from that pamphlet?
]\Ir. Segretti. I thought the pamphlet I received relating to Sena-
tor ]\Iuskie was, seemed to be well done. I took that pamphlet and I
4002
patterned this pamphlet after it. The pictures I took from Time or
Newsweek mao^azine.
Mr. Dash. And you have a picture inside of a UMW president,
Tony Boyle, and a picture of Senator Humphrey, "Memories of 1968 —
stop the bomb — end U.S. aggression.''
Is that correct? If you wmII tuni the page, you Avill see those photo-
graphs.
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Mr. Dash. And this particular pamphlet again repeats pretty much
the language that was in the Senator Muskie pamphlet. "Hubert H.
Humphrey would be no different from the Nixons, Agnews, Mitchells,
Reagans, we have now."
"He is the 'boss-candidate'," et cetera, and it is pretty derogatory of
Senator Humphrey, is it not ?
Mr. Segretti. It is pretty much a copy of the same language that
was in the pamphlet regarding Senator Muskie.
Mr. Dash. Well, this one seems to make Humphrey kind of a war-
monger, does it not ?
Mr. Segretti. Well, I do not know if I Avould term it "warmonger."
Mr. Dash. Well, also, it refers to him as a Democratic boss-candi-
date, does it not ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, it does.
Mr. Dash. Apparently, the sponsor on this particular one — differ-
ent from what appeared on the INIuskie one, which said "Democrats for
a Liberal Alternative," says "Democrats Against Bossism, T. Wilson,
Chairman" — is that again you ?
Mr. Segretti. That, again, is a committee of one — me.
Mr. Dash. And who is T. Wilson — chairman? Is that a phony
name?
Mr. Segretti. I do not know. That is just a name.
Mr. Dash. How many of these pamphlets did you have printed up ?
Mr. Segretti. I had printed up, I believe, 3,000, something along
that line.
Mr. Dash. And where were they distributed ?
Mr. Segretti. There Avere some distributed in northern California.
I would say the number distributed up there were 100, 150. A few were
mailed. I would say the total distributed perhaps, I would guess per-
haps 300. Somewhere along that line.
^Ir. Dash. "Wliat impression were you attempting to create with
this kind of pamphlet with the Humphrey supporters ?
Mr. Segretti. That another Democratic camp was distributing such
leaflets.
Mr. Dash. As a matter of fact, did you Imow that Senator Hum-
phrey was quite stirred up and actually believed that Senator Mc-
Govern or Senator Muskie had printed this pamphlet ?
Mr. Segretti. I did not know tliat.
Mr. Dash. Now, using the stationery of the various candidates that
you had printed up — now laiown as bogus stationery — did you send
out a false letter on INIcCarthy campaign stationery over the signa-
ture of Barbara Barron ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes; I did.
Mr. Dash, "\^^lo is Barbara Barron ?
4003
Mr. Segretti. I am not really sure who she is. I believe she was a
campaign worker in McCarthy headqiiarters.
Mr. Dash. Is that her signature that appeared on that letter? If
you will look at the tab, tab 21 [exhibit No. 217] is it ^
Mr. Segretti. I believe a facsimile.
Mr. Dash. This actually was a forgery of her signature, was it
not? Or somebody signed her name ?
Mr. Segreto. Somebody signed her name, yes.
Mr. Dash. Now, the contents of the letter essentially is on McCarthy
1972 headquarters stationei-y.
Mr. Segretti. Right.
Mr. Dash. It is addressed to McCarthy delegates, is it not ?
Mr. Segretti. That is right.
Mr. Dash. And does it not ask that McCarthy delegates switch
their support to Senator Humphrey ?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Also, if you just turn the page, was there not a similar
letter on McCarthy stationei-y, also purportedly signed by Barbara
Barron, sent to Shirley Chisholm supporters ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes; essentially it is the same letter.
Mr. Dash. The same letter?
Mr. Segretti. With a few minor changes.
Mr. Dash. And the letter essentially says, if they were interested
in Senator McCarthy, they should switch their support to Senator
Humphrey, even though Senator McCarthy's ideology is more closely
associated with Senator McGovern. Is that the gist of the letter?
Mr. Segretti. I would say so, essentially.
Mr. Dash. Who got these letters, the McCarthy delegates and
Chisholm delegates, is that correct?
Mr. Segretti. Some McCarthy delegates and some Chisholm dele-
gates did receive these. At the same time the others were mailed, some
were addressed, but intentionally, no stamp was put on so that they
would go back to the McCartliy headquarters so thev would be aware
of it.
Mr. Dash. Now, Mr. Segretti, did you compound this and send a
form letter on Mayor Yorty's campaign stationery, purported to be
written by a disgusted Yorty worker, blaming Yorty for these Mc-
Carthy letters ?
Mr. Segretti. I believe there were four or five such letters typed
and sent.
Mr. Dash. Look at tab 24 [exhibit No. 220].
This appears to be a full page display of May 26, 1972, of the
Los Angeles Free Press. The headline is : 'Ts Mayor Yorty Involved
in a Plot To Sabotage McGovern?" And there is — as you will see —
a photograph of the bogus Yorty letter, which was youi' production,
which purports to be written by a person wlio just says they thought
that politics was dirty, but this is the last bit, that they were going,
they were going to quit the Yorty campaign because of it, and it
attaches copies of the two letters just referred to on the McCarthy
stationery, one to a McCarthy delegate and one to a Chisholm delegate,
is that not tiTie ?
Mr. Segretti. That is true.
Mr. Dash. And all of this was your handiwork ?
4004
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. What was the purpose of all this ?
Mr. Segretti. Just to confuse the candidates.
Mr. Dash. I take it you were quite successful in this ?
Mr. Segretti. It is hard for nie to categorize success or not. The Free
Press is an underground newspaper out there.
Mr. Dash. Now, did you have knowledge of false press releases sent
out on Humphrey press release stationery ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes ; I did three of these.
Mr. Dash. You drafted them yourself ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Did one of them say that Lyndon Johnson favored
Hubert Humphrey ?
Mr. Segretti. Or words to that effect.
Mr. Dash. And did one of them state that Shirley Chisholm was at
one time confined to a mental institution in Virginia ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Mr. Dash. And you made that all up ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Mr. Dash. And in effect, you made a false charge ?
Mr. Segretti. That is not correct.
Mr. Dash. It is not correct 'I
Mr. Segretti. I mean the charge is not correct.
Mr. Dash. These all came out of your imagination ?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Were these sent to the newspapers, false press releases on
Hubert Humphrey stationery ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And were they pi'inted ?
Mr. Segretti. I believe they were mimeographed, Mr. Dash.
Mr. Dash. Did the newspapers pick up the story ?
Mr. Segretti. Not to my knowledge.
Mr. Dash. Did you send copies of these false press releases to Mr.
Chapin ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Mr. Dash. And what was his reaction to that ?
Mr. Segretti. There was a comment that he laughed for a period
of time regarding the press releases.
Mr, Dash. He thought it was funny that you sent a press release
saying that Shirley Chisholm was at one time confined to a mental
institution in Virginia ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Did you have an anti-Muskie ad distributed outside Mus-
kie's fundraising dinner in Los Angeles? Look at tab 1^^ [exhibit No.
209].
Mr. SiiERMAX. May we ]ia\e a moment, Mr. Dash. [Conferring.]
Thank you.
Mr. Dash. If you will look at tab 13, you will see an advertisement
which is under the name of Stewart R. INIott, chairman of the Commit-
tee for Honesty in Politics. And it is headed ''Disgusting, the Secret
Money in Presidential Politics." Theie is a reference to Senator Mus-
kie's failure, according to the ad, of making a full disclosure, financial
disclosure. Now, did you take this ad out of a New York newspaper and
4005
reproduce it for this particular Muskie fundraising dinner in Los
Angeles ?
Mr. Segretti. I don't believe I took it out of a New York newspaper.
I saw it in some newspaper. It was an ad. I clipped it out thought it
Avas quite good, and
Mr. Dash. Did you add the printed language at the bottom?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, I did add that.
Mr. Dash. The language at the bottom says : "Now he says he will
disclose"
Mr. Segretti. That is where it starts.
Mr. Dash. "Now he says he will disclose the fat cats behind him
(after he lost badly in Florida and cried in New Hampshire). "Wliy is
he waiting for full disclosure — is it to fix up his books?"
Then you have at the bottom: "The committee will look for your
names as part of INIuskie's fat cats. They better be there."
You and your operatives were giving this ad to people who were
attending that Muskie dinner at this time and they were being told
that their names better be there. Is that not true ?
Mr. Segretti. I believe some of those were passed out ; yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. And I take it the purpose of passing that out was to put
them in fear that there was some
Mr. Segretti. I don't think the purpose is to put them in any fear.
Mr. Dash. You don't think the language carries a threat of some
sort?
Mr. Shermax. Well, there is a great difference between fear and a
threat.
Mr. Dash. Would you accept a change of the qusocion to saying you
feel that that language poses some threat ?
Mr. Segretti. The purpose of that language was to irritate people
rather than to actually frighten or thi-eaten them. I take this language
now and I took it then to be, to some degree, political rhetoric or
puffing, in a sense.
Mr. Dash. I think you have also given us one of your final acts. You
have said that during the JNIiami Democratic Convention, your agent,
Mr. Kelly, had a plane fly over carrying a sign against ]\IcGovern say-
ing "Peace, Pot, Promiscuity — Vote McGovern."
iNIr. Segretti. That was a trailer, I believe.
Mr. Dash. A trailer.
What caused your own activities to come to a halt ?
Mr. Si:gretti. At one time, I had been visited by the FBI and I think
that sobered me up a great deal. I started to think about these activi-
ties. A little bit later, I was instructed to cease.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions.
SenatoT- Ervix. Senator Montoya — excuse me. Mr. Thompson, par-
don me.
Mr. TiioMPSox. I will yield to the Senator if you prefer to go ahead.
Senator Ervix. No, go ahead.
Mr. TiiOMPsox. Thank you.
Excuse me, Mr. Segretti, let me direct your attention to document
No. 22 [exhibit No. 218]. I believe you liave it there. The sheet en-
titled "George INIcGovern's Eeal Record on the War." It deals chrono-
logically with how Senator McGovern voted on various issues pertain-
21-296 o-
400,6
ing to the %var. Down at the bottom, it says : "Don't believe it. Check the
record. Prepared by Students for Honesty in Government."
Was that another one of your committees ?
Mr. SeCxRetti. AVell, it was and it wasn't, Mr. Thompson. I think
this would be the correct way to g'ive you an answer. Perhaps I should
explain that.
This flier was obtained, I believe, by Mr. Kelly in the Miami area.
I can't recall exactly, whether it was told to me it came from either
Senator Muskie's or Senator Hump]irey''s campaign ; in other words,
people workin<2: with him. It was picked up. I subsequently had some
reproduced and distributed those or had those distributed myself.
Mr. Thompson. This document was picked up at either Muskie's or
Humphrey's headquarters ?
Mr. Segretti. Well, I don't want to say that. It was picked up in
the areas being- distributed by those individuals. W nether it was
actually picked up at their headquarters, I have no knowledge.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Kelly could testify to that, I assume.
Mr. Segretti. I imagine he could.
Mr. Thompson. You redistributed it. is that correct?
Mr. Segretti. Pardon ?
Mr. Thompson. You redistributed this document?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, I did.
Mr. Thompson. I notice at the top there is a signature that appears
to be that of Mr. ]\IcGovern ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. Do vou know liow that came about, who signed
that?
Mr, Segretti. It was related to me that Mr. Kelly attended a rally
somewhere in the Miami area. Mr. Kelly folded this document up and
as a souvenir — after the talk Senator INIcGovern was giving auto-
graphs, and as a personal souvenir of his, he went up and Senator Mc-
Govern signed this document.
jNIr. Thompson. So Senator McGovern signed his autograph on this
particular document I
Mr. Segri:tti. Yes, sir.
^Ir. Thompson. ]Mr. Segretti, you have related, I believe, just about
all of your activities, some anuising and some not amusing at all.
Mr. Segretti. I agree with you, Sir. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Let me ask you this; generally speaking, how were
these ideas thought up ? Were they planned out in advance ? Was there
a game plan, so to speak, as to what you would do at one time?
Mr. Segretti. Xo; to be very frank with you, a number of them
were just thought u]) over a beer or two.
]Mr. Thompson. Thought up over a beer or two ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. By whom, usually ?
Mr. Segretti. Myself, perhaps one or two other individuals assist-
ing me.
Mr. Thompson. Such as who ?
Mr. Segretti. Mr. Kelly or Mr. Benz. Sometimes I would think them
up and suggest them to them. No set pattern.
Mr. Thompson. How long were the sessions in which you would
discuss these ?
Mr. Segretti. Some were lonaei- tliau others, none verv long.
4007
Mr. Thompson, How many of the people you were operating with
knew about AVhat you were going to do before it was done?
Mr. Segretti. Specifically '\
Mr. Thompson. Yes.
Mr. Segretti. Generally, I would have to say no one.
Mr. Thompson. Generally you would have to say what ?
Mr. Segretti. No one.
Mr. Thompson. No one else?
Mr. Segretti. There were a few examples, minor examples, earlier,
however.
Mr. Thompson. Well, who would know about it beforehand — any-
one at the White House, for example ?
Mr. Segretti. I believe i^ossibly Mr. Chapin.
Mr. Thompson. In what sense ?
Mr. Segretti. Some pickets at the Democratic dinner in San Fran-
cisco that had "Kennedy for President'' pickets — I think there were
three or four pickets. There may have been one or two other minor ex-
amples such as that.
Mr. Thompson. But that is the nature of the activity that was known
beforehand at the White House by Mr. Chapin ?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Mr. TiioMPSON. I believe you said you reported to Mr. Chapin on
some regular basis what you were doing?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. Would that be all of your activities, or could you
give us a certain percentage of your activities that were reported to
him?
Mr. Segretti. It is hard to recollect a percentage. I Avould say as a
general matter, of course, I would send what was done to Mr. Chapin.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Segretti, you, as I stated, listed several activities
that you were involved in. Were there activities in the dirty tricks area
or the prank area during the campaign that you were aware of that
you have gotten credit for which you did not in fact do ?
Mr. Segretti. I believe there are, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Could you relate those to us ?
Mr. Segretti. Well, the Canuck letter is one that stands out in my
mind. I am sure there are others.
Mr. Thompson. Are you saying that you did not write the Canuck
letter?
Mr. Segretti. I did not write the Canuck letter. I have no idea who
wrote the Canuck letter. What more can I say?
Mr. Thompson. Did you in fact nm a spy school ?
Mr. Segretti. No.
Mr. Thompson. Was that not reported?
Mr. Segretti. It was reported, I believe in the Washington Post
and perhaps other newspapers, that I was running a spy school in
the Midwest.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know how that story came about?
Mr. Segretti. Yes; I believe that came about from a story given to
the Washington Post by Mr. Lawrence or I^arry Young in California.
Mr. Thompson. Who was Mr. Young ?
Mr. Segretti. Mr. Young was an individual that I knew at the
University of Southern California. I believe he knew Mr. Chapin
and Mr. Strachan also. The Washington Post or one of their reporters
4008
Avent to see Mr. Young and subsequently obtained a storj- in which
it contained, amon^: other things, an allegation that I was running
a spy school in the Midwest.
Mr. Thompson. What about the allegation that you prefaced your
grand jury perfonnance by having been shown FBI 302's. Is that
part of the same story ?
Mr. Seoreiti. I believe that was in the same story and I believe
that came from Mr. Young, too, and that is false.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know why Mr. Young avouIcI state these
things that ha ve been related to you ?
Mr. Segretti. It is very hard for me, sitting here — at other times, I
have thought of it a great deal why Mr. Young, whom I had con-
sidered to be a very close individual to me for a number of yeare,
would do such a thmg. I think part of it was plain politics. He was
a liljeral Democrat and I guess I didn't term my friendships in terms
of Republican or Democrat. Perhaps that was sort of my problem witl
Mr, Young. But after the November election, he did send to my
parents, who he knew, and to myself a card stating to some degree,
the election is over with, it is water under the bridge now, and let's
got together again.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know whetlier or not he submitted a letter
to the Special Prosecutor, Mr, Cox, with regard to these allegations?
Mr, SECJRETri. I have no ide^.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Thompson, we did have a copy of that letter and
we did make it available to the Special Prosecutor's office, I believe i
we showed a copy of the letter to Mr, Lenzner, too.
Mr, Thompson, I am just reminded, I think you probablj^ did. I
would like to knoA\' a little more about it if you remember the contents
of the letter.
Mr. Segretti. As far as I could remember or recall — off the top of
my head now — that letter effectively said, essentially said, he was
visited by individuals from the Washington Post, and that they told
liim that they were going to print a story that tens of thousands of
dollars of campaign funds were channeled through his law finn for
various and sundiy activities. In response to that he felt, along with
that and the fact that he was not
Senator Ervin, There is a vote on in the Senate and I expect we
may have a short roll call and maybe we had better go over there and
vote immediately,
[Recess.]
Senator Ervin, The committee will come to order.
Mr. Thompson, will you resume interrogation of the witness?
Mr. Thompson, Mr, Chairman, I believe the witness was in the mid-
dle of an answei-, and if he recalls the question and his initial response,
I would just like for him to ])ick up where he left off. We were re-
ferring to a letter Mr, Young had written explaining the reason why
he had told newspaper reporters that you had rmi a spy school and
had done various other things which you say you did not in fact do.
Would you pick up on that and tell us what Young related as his rea-
sons for his actions?
Air. SEGRE-rri, Well, essentially, he related to me the fact that if he
did not give the pi-ess a story they were going to print a stoi-y re-
gai-ding him that was untrue. To a great degree it was a letter saying
to let bygones be bygones and to be friends again.
4009
Mr. Thompson. Tlie newspaper reporters told liim they were going
to print a story that was untrue unless he gave them that information ?
Mr. Segretti. That was the thrust of tlie letter written to me.
Mr. Thompson. Wliat information was untrue?
Mr. Segretti. That large sums of money were channeled through
him to be used in the reelection of President Nixon.
Mr. Thompson. Do you know if there is any factual basis for that
at all?
Mr. Segretti. I do not believe there is any factual basis.
Mr. Thompson. Young was not for Nixon, was he ?
Mr. Segretti. So far as I know, he was not.
Mr. Thompson. Did a story subsequently appear in the Washington
Post setting forth these allegations ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes; that is correct, Mr. Thompson. I think that is
right.
Mr. Sherman. I think that article was dated October 10, 1972.
Mr. Thompson. October 10.
I think I will pick that up on another round. I will not take time
to read the entire letter right now. You say you were shown FBI
reports — FD-302 forms — before your grand jury appearance in
August ?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. I will ask you whether or not you have, at any time
since the Watergate breakin, been shown by anyone other than the
FBI any FBI FD-302's ?
Mr. Sherman. At this point we would ask for a ruling from the
Chair. We had discussed this previously, I think, with both you, Mr.
Thompson, and Mr. Dash, that this does go into a matter — another
matter, AS'e do not feel has any relevancy to these hearings at all, and
has been disclosed to the special pix)secutor in this case and I would ask,
unless the question is framed in terms of resolution 60, we would say
it has no relevancy now. We would ask for Senator Ervin's under-
standing on the issue. I explained it fully to Mr. Dash in private and
also Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, if I understand it correctly, and I
do not want to state counsel's case for him ; I really would prefer for
him to state his own case. ISIy own feeling is that any time subsequent to
the break-in — pursuant to the break-in, if he was shown an FBI report
by anyone dealing with the Watergate investigation
Mr. Sherman. We would object to tliat unless the question was
framed within terms of the resolution having to do with the 1972
campaign and it would be irrelevant, and I can state for the record,
if any reports were shown it was certainly after the election was over
and was not part of any coverup and does not involve any persons in
any way that are under investigation by this committee,
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, I would simply state so far as rele-
vance is concerned, we are talking about the investigation of the Water-
gate matter. I will not belabor the point by referring to witness after
witness after wdtness who have related similar matters concerning all
aspects of the Watergate investigation. This pertained to the Water-
gate investigation. Anybody in possession of an FBI report, especially
if he shows it to a person wdio is a subject of the investigation, I think
the facts should be brought out. I am not necessarily asking for a name
4010
of an individual. If that individual is the object of an investigation
by Special Prosecutor Cox, while it is not a courtesy we have shown
other people involved in this case, for my part, I do not necessarily
care to have a name if the source can be identified.
Senator Ervix. I think it would have to be somebody who would be
competent. I cannot see, if some third party that is not involved in any
of the transactions that are authorized to be investigated by the com-
mittee, how it would be admissible. I do no know exactly what the evi-
dence is but we are not investigating the FBI particularly.
Mr. Sherman. The problem is, if I may be more specific and indi-
cate the exact ground of the objection, that in effect we told you any-
how. Hut as I say. we told Mr. Lenzner and Mr. Dash quite sometime
ago and I think t indicated to you yesterday and it certainly is a third
party to this investigation having absolutely nothing to do with it.
If' the chairman feels we must answer the question, then, of course,
]Mr. Segretti will answer it, but certainly I do not think it is within
the Senate resolution.
Mr. TiioMrsox. If the chairman please, I am not really sure that I
understand the nature of the objection as it pertains to Mr. Segretti
or what the objection is.
Senator Ervix. Counsel says that it is not germane to what the
connnittee is authorized to investigate. I cannot tell whether it is, not
knowing what the ansAver would be.
Mr. Shermax. Of course, if I tell you the answer then, in order for
you to make an intelligent judgment, we have answered the question
but I told Mr. Dash and maybe Mr. Dash can tell you.
Mr. Thompson. I would suggest that Mr. Dash inform the chairman
now in private and let the chairman make a ruling.
Senator Ervix' [conferring]. I frankly cannot see where this throws
any light on what we are investigating.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, if you rule that it is not relevant,
then, of course, I won't pursue it.
Senator Erain. Well, on the information supplied to me by Mr.
Dash, I will so rule.
Mr. Shermax. Thank you. Just so it is clear, however, that Mr.
Segretti is in no way protecting any person, is not being forthright
with this committee, he has fully disclosed this information months
ago to Mr. Lenzner and to the si)ecial prosecutoi- and is cooperating
fully in their investigation into this matter.
Ml-. Thompsox". Of course what we arc trying to do is lay out all the
facts of this investigation, which have been repeated many times, be-
fore the American people; to have all aspects of it made public, past
Mr. Lenzner or the prosecutor or myself, so we have a ruling on it.
You understand my concern ; I am not interested in dragging up any-
one's name even though you seem to have firsthand facts regarding
that situation, even if that person is imiocent, but I thought, based upon
prior testimony we have heaid and matters which have been considered
i-elevant by this connnittee, dating back sometime before the election,
sometime after the election, that it Mas relevant; but the chaiinian
has !-uled and I Avon't pursue it any further.
Let me refer to document No. 25 [exhibit No. 221], if I might, Mr.
Segretti.
Mr. SEORETn. All i-ight, Mr. Thompson.
4011
Mr. Thompson. It appears to be a copy of a daily register of the
Towne Motel in Miami, I believe, dated June 10, 1972?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Mr. Thompson. I have noticed this since our interview, frankly, in
reviewing the documents. There is listed a Mr. Simmons, No. 7, I
assume that is you ; is that correct ?
Mr. Segretti. That was me, Mr. Thompson.
Mr. Thompson. What were you doing in Miami that particular
time ? '\^^lat was your reason for being there ?
Mr. Segretti. To talk to Mr. Kelly and to talk to another individual
that I knew at that time under the name of Mr. Warren; in other
words, Howard Hunt.
Mr. Thompson. "W^iat were you discussing at that time ?
Mr. Segretti. The conversation with Mr. Hunt related to a proposed
activity at the Democratic convention.
Mr. Thompson. What was the proposed activity ?
Mr. Segretti. The proposed activity related to creating a peaceful
group of demonstrators ostensibly for Senator McGovern. Mr. Hunt
was going to have another group merge with the peaceful demon-
strators and act in an unruly manner and the unruly demonstration
would be blamed en Senator McGovern.
Mr. Thompson. I direct your attention to this particular document
because I see there listed No. 11 — Mr. Martinez. Have you ever met the
Martinez who participated in the Watergate break-in ?
Mr. Segretti. I have not ; not to my knowledge.
Mr. Thompson. Have you seen him or were you aware he was there
if, in fact, he was the same man ?
Mr. Segretti. As a matter of fact, this was the first time I ever
noticed this and I have no idea. It could be a coincidence — no idea.
Mr. Thompson. Well, if it is, it occurs more than once with regard
to another official, Mr. Gonzales. If you will check over the next
coui)le of pages, on June 11 you have Mr. Simmons listed again under
No. 7, and in No. 12 you have an entry of Mr. Gonzales. Do you know
whether or not that was Mr, Gonzales who participated in the W^ater-
gate break-in ?
Mr. Segretti. I have no idea.
Mr. Thompson. That is June 11, and again on June
Mr. Sherman. ]Mr. Thompson, I might point out the spelling may
be different but there also is another Gonzales staying there on the
same day. No. 23, which indicates a fairly common name.
Mr. Thompson. I was wondering about that or whether or not the
same man checked back in.
Mr. Sherman. It is a different spelling for the name Gonzales, how-
ever.
Mr. Thompson. It apj^ears to be the same to me.
Mr. Segretti. I might state, Mr. Thompson, perhaps this may or
may not explain it, that this motel — it is in close proximity to where I
was told to meet Mr. Warren. It is within a few blocks, perhaps that
would account for it, but if those were the same individuals involved
in the Watergate escapade it is pure coincidence.
Mr. Thompson. On the next one, June 12, No. 23, Mr. Gonzales
again. You have Martinez on the 10th, Gonzales on the 11th and 12th,
and you were there from the 10th through the 12th.
4012
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Ml-. Thompson. But you wore not aware that these people were then
if these were tlie people'involved in the DNC break-in.
Mr. Segretti. 1 am not.
Mr. TiioMPSOX. Mr. Hunt did not discuss their presence with you
Mr. Segretti. He did not.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Chairman, I have no further questions at thi
time.
Senator Ervin. Senator Montoya.
Senator Moxtoya. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
]Mr. Segretti, prior to your indoctrination into these practices, whal
did you conceive to be the preelectoral process under our constitu
tional system in the United States ?
Mr. Segretti. I conceived the electoral process of the United States
to be, one, where hopefully the best candidate for the office woulc
obtain that office. That is essentially through the political process
Senator Montoya. Well, did you conceive as part, of that thinking
that he should obtain the office honestly and by open, free, and undecep^
tive discussion on the campaign trail with the American ])eople?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, that is correct.
Senator Montoya. And what led you to change?
Mr. Segretti. That is a difficult answer for me to give. I hav^
tliought of that myself many times. Senator.
Senator Montoya. Give me the genesis of it, or the transformation
the gradual transfoniiation. if it was gradual.
Mr. Segretti. I have never come up with an adequate answer tc
myself for that.
Senator Montoya. "What ingredients can you supply us with tliaf
led you to transform yourself from that type of thinking into what you
actually did ?
Mr. Segretti. I think there Avere a combination of factors. Senator
I think — Xo. 1, I think it was the individuals who contacted me; the^
fact that they were old friends; the fact that I had — still have — re-
spect foi- them, even though a lot of water has gone under the bridge
I think the fact of, in a sense, working for high officials, that is, the
White House — I think that was a factor. I think the fact that it was
at a particular stage in my life; the Army was not a career that 1
wanted to pursue. I Avas in it for tlie period of time that I was obligatecil
to do the best job I could in the military but after that I wanted to gci
out and do something else. There was a change of pace from that andi
it sounded like a great deal of travel, and I think those are all factors
that must be listed.
Senator Montoya. Did you understand your mission to be in the area;
of prankstorism or dirty tricks ? " ,
Afr. SFXiRE'iiT. I heard ])erhaps a different— or an attempted de-j
lineated difference by Mr. Buchanan. It is veiy hard for me to draw,
the line between the two. I think you can draw the line Iwtween ex-;
tremes. Wien it was first approached to me I certainly looked upor
it as in the category of pranks.
Senatoi- Montoya. You mentioned in your own statement on ]iage 3.
that one of the reasons why you agreed to accept the position was tliej
fact that vou w(M-e now being given tiie oppoi-tunity of working for the
the White House? " ;
4013
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Senator Montoya. Did you, during all this time, think that you were
working under the umbrella of the White House, so to speak?
[ Mr. Segretti. I believe in a sense that would be a correct statement;
[yes, sir.
} Senator Montoya. And I notice from the record of communication
[with Mr. Chapin, who was an employee of the White House, that you
were in quite frequent contact with him from the time that you began
[your employment until after you ceased as a result of the investigation
that began in 1972.
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Senator Montoya. Now, it stands to reason that during all this time,
in addition to the initial contact that you had with Mr. Chapin and Mr.
Strachan, that you were receiving quite a bit of instruction from these
people as to how to conduct youi-self and what to do in the different
State primaries in Florida, New Hampshire, Wisconsin, California,
and the other States. Is that correct?
■ Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Senator Montoya. Now, liow extensive was the instruction that you
received from these two individuals which I have mentioned and other
individuals ? And please name them if you can ?
Mr. Segretti. I had very little contact Avith Mr. Strachan; I wish
to make that clear. Since the time of my, shall we say, employment up
until post- Watergate, and even then, my contact, I believe, was one
meeting — one brief meeting. Other than that, my contact at the White
House, excluding Mr. Dean, was Mr. Chapin. My instructions from
him, if you can call them instructions, were to a very great extent very
passive, rather than do this or do that or any specifics.
Senator Montoya. You were reporting to him what you intended to
ido, say a day or two from now^ and you were reporting, also to him,
what you had done previous to the time that you were calling him. You
were in constant communication with him, were you not, and relating
all these things to him ?
Mr. Segretti. Pretty much. Senator. There were periods of time
later on when Mr. Chapin was out of the country. There was no regu-
lar schedule of contacting him. One week it may be several times and
then perhaps, there may be a 2-week period that there would be no
contact.
Senator Montoya. Were you submitting written reports to him, too?
Mr. Segretti. There may have been one or two very brief ; nothing
formalized.
Senator Montoya. Were you sending him copies of the different
fliers and pamphlets that you were putting out?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, I was.
Senator Montoya. And, of course, you were getting communications
from him in return as to whether they were in proper taste or very
proper within the orbit of the mission that you were performing?
Mr. Segretit. At times; yes, sir. Many times, there was no response
that I can really recall.
Senator Montoya. Now that you look back on what you did and
now that you have reflected quite a bit, would you say that what you
actually did, and especially those things about which you have testi-
fied this morning, fall into the category of being pranks rather than
dirty tricks ?
4014 [
j
yiv. Seorktti. I would say they cover the whole o^amut, Senator.
Senator Moxtoya. Then, is it your testimony that they would W
classified also as dirty tricks ? .
Mr. Skgretti. Some were ; yes, sir. 1
Senator Moxtoya. Well, would you not say most of them were ?
Mr. SEOKfTTTi. I have never- really sat down and cate^rorized them.
Hut 1 a<jree with you. i
Senator Moxtoya. You do atrrep with me ( [
.^^r. SK(;RKi"ri. Yes.
Senator Moxtoya. All right, fine.
Now. in view of this, would you say that you were actually sub-
verting the free electoral process as you envisioned it when you were
a young lawyer fresh out of law school and fresh out of the Army, and
before you were contacted by the White House ^
Mr. SEGRKTTr. I never really analyzed it in that term, but looking
back at it, certainly during the time that I was doing it. I had nc,
thought along that line. I tliink if I had the wisdom at that time tc
look at it in that light and with some degree of perspective and
objectivity, which I really did not have — hindsight is a very valuable
thing at times — I think I would have been long gone from these
activities.
Looking back on it, it is not a — none of these activities, I believe.
are ones that should be included in the American political system.
Senator Moxtoya. Xow, you mentioned on page 10 of your state-
ment, and I quote you as follows :
However, I cannot help but feel that I have been abused by rumor, character
assassination, innuendo, and a complete disregard for the privacy of myself, my
friends, and my family.
Well, this observation leads me to extend my sympathy to you. Now,U
do you not think that you were practicing that very same thing onj
Presidential candidates and also practicing deception on the AmericanJ
people when you were engaged in this mission^
Mr. SEcutEiTi. Yes, I agree. And I regret it very much. Senator.
Senator Moxtoya. And you also submitted some deceptive state-
ments to the press, ostensibly ascribing them to the dift'erent Presi-i
dential candidates. Xow, do you think that this was proper and within
the free press guarantees of the Constitution i
Mr. SEGR?:'n-r. I think it is imi)r()per and T do not think incorrect
distortions, untruths, or anything of that nature should be disseminat-
ed by the press or by any individual.
Senator Moxtoya. In other words. Mr. Segretti, do you not feel
that by virtue of what you did, you have disappointed many people
ill the United States, especially young i)eo])le in your age group? i
Ml'. SEORE'rn. Yes, " i
Senator Moxtoya. And do you not feel that if we are to have a
free electoral process, there should be not only a rededication on the.
pait of both political parties to insure to the American peoi)le the free
electoral process and to exhort the press to disseminate as much in- ^
formation on each candidate on its pages untainted by things such as:
you did in the last campaign ? ' \
Mr. Sfxjretti. I believe that both i)olitical parties and all candidates
should run in the future— that may run in the future— should look at
themselves m a very critical light and any activity such as what I was
4015
engaged in, or others may have been engaged in, should not take place.
Senator Montoya. Now, you have testified that you feel that you
were done a disservice by those vvhom you trusted, those friends with
whom you attended college, in that they recruited you to perform this
task and it degenerated into something that was very distasteful to you
as you look back — in retrospect. Do you have the same feeling with
respect to those young people that you recruited yourself to carry out
some of these missions ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Senator Montoya. And is it now your feeling that there should be
an alertness on the part of youths throught the United States that they
should not lend themselves or permit themselves to be used for this
kind of a mission ^
Mr. Segretti. I think I should answer it in these terms: I heard
Mr. Strachan testify when he was asked whether young people should
come into politics. Mr. Strachan's statement was: "Stay away." I
can certainly understand that statement. There is many a morning
that I have waked up and I have said to myself, I wish I had stayed
away, or I wish I had had that advice myself somewhere along the
line, or have somebody sit down with me and say, Don, do you really
want to get involved in things like this, rather than just by law?
Then, I heard another individual — I do not recall who it was —
perhaps Mr. Haldeman, in a call for young people to come into
politics.
My own feeling is that I think our country would be a lot better
off if young people, particularly young people, were to get involved
in the political system, but not blindly. I think when they come into it,
Ithey should come in with a very critical eye. They should go into it
very carefully. I think there are some good things that have come out
of this entire — the entire events of the last year and a half. I do not
think it is — it has been a tragedy for, certainly, the people involved and
also for our system. But I think the good thing that could come out of
it would be that young people or people that are presently involved,
young or not, would really be very critical of their activities in regard
to the political process.
Senator 3,Iontoya. Thank you very much. INIy time has run out.
Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervix. Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. Thank you, INIr. Chairman. I just have a few
very brief questions.
On page 5 of your statement, Mr. Segretti, you say at the top :
In December of 1971, I traveled to the State of Florida for the purpose of
seeking additional contacts. During my visit, I met a Mr. Robert Benz in Tampa,
Fla., and a Mr. Douglas Kelly in Miami, Fla.
How did you come across these two individuals ? "Were these persons
that had been referred to you? How did you find them?
!Mr. Segretti. I came across Mr. Benz somewhat by chance aft-er I
arrived in Tampa. I really had no one to call there. I did call a local
Republican headquarters and asked the individual who answered the
Dhone if he knew of a young man who might be interested in doing some
political work of some type, part time. He gave me the name of Mr.
4016
Bonz. I talked to Mr. Benz. Mr. Benz seemed knowledgeable about
politics and seemed to be interested in getting involved in the type of
activities I had in mind.
Subsequent to leaving Tampa, I was going to go down to Florida
in conformity to the list that was given to me earlier of places to get
ac<|uaintances to help me out with my endeavors.
Senator AVeicker. What list, was that ?
Mr. Segretti. That was a list of States that I was supplied earlier
in my emiDloyment by Mr. Chapin. Mr. Benz mentioned the name of
Mr. Kelly.
Upon arriving in Miami, I happened to call an individual that
was on the AVhite House advance list that had been supplied me and !
that individual gave me the name of Mr. Kelly. So I had Mr. Kelly-s ;
name from two sources and I subsequently called him.
Senator Weicker. Let me just be clear on this. You got Mr. Kelly's
name from Mr. Chapin's original list?
Mr. Segretti. No, no, sir. I got a name from the White House list
supplied me by ]Mr. Chapin of an individual in Miami. I called that
indiAddual
Senator Weicker. AVlio was that indi\'idual ?
Mr. Segretti. Senator, he is an individual that, other than my con-
tacting him that one time
Senator Weiciler. All right, could you supply his name to the com-
mittee, then ?
Mr. Segretti. I believe I have, and I would be happy to supply it to
you off the public light, shall I say, without any problem.
Senator Weicker. Fine.
]Mr. Segretti. He mentioned the name of Mr. Kelly.
Senator Weicker. Then you also were in touch with the White
House advance man ?
Mr. Segretti. That was the
Senator Weicker. That was the advance man ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes. He was not currently working as an advance man.
He had at one time, I believe, performed functions as an advance
man.
Senator Weicker. I see.
When you called Mr. Chapin, were these calls to the Committee
To Re-Elect the President, or were they calls directly to the White
House ?
Mr. Segretti. They were calls to the White House switchboard.
Senator Weicker. I gather from the statement which you made
earliei-, oi- your opening statement — I beg your pardon. Let me correct
myself. I gather from tlie statement you made before the staff of the
committee that there were occasions when apparently, your operation
was conducted simultaneously, and I am now talking* about protesters,
et cetera, with anothei- Republican operation. Were you aware of this? !
Mr. Segretti. No, sir, I was not. I had no idea that anvbody else
was operating.
Senator Weicker. Well, the reason why I am asking this is, and let
me have you respond any wav you want to. It seems to me that there
might have been soit of two dirty tricks operations going on in water-
tight compartments. Am I correct in assuming that?
4017
Mr. Segretti. Well, it is difficult for me, because I have no personal
knowledge of that from my position, but certainly watching the hear-
ings and from what I have read in the press, it is very possible.
Senator Weicker. But your operation, then, I gather, received its
direction from the White House?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Senator Weicker. And the other operation seemed to have its direc-
tion out of the Committee To Re-Elect the President. You have no
personal knowledge of that ?
Mr. Segretti. I do not.
Senator Weicker. And there is no time that you came into conflict
with each other ?
Mr. Segretti. Not to my knowledge. The only cross there may be —
well, I was thinking about that one pamphlet that was mailed to me
and where that came from, I really don't know. But from testimony,
that apparently originated in the White House also.
Senator Weicker. Then lastly, in the course of your activities dur-
ing that period of time that the Democratic primaries were going on,
were you ever assisted in your task by Democrats, in other words, sup-
porters of any one of the Democratic candidates who might have
shared a similar goal, to put the other candidate under? Was that a
field for recruitment as far as any of your activities were concerned ?
Mr. Segretti. Not really.
Senator Weicker. Or any information supplied to you by
Mr. Segretti. By other Democrats ?
Senator Weicker. Yes.
Mr. Segretti. Not to my knowledge. I believe the one individual I
knew in Philadelphia used one of the Democratic — some Democratic
workers at a rally. He had printed up some fliers that the large print
Avas "Trust jNIuskie'' or "Trust Senator Muskie."' He went to the rally
and I believe he gave a few of those — I think we are talking in terms
of 50, 60, TO — leaflets to some of the local staff workers who then took
those and passed them out themselves. Beyond that, it would be that
type of, it would be extremely minimal, if at all.
Senator Weicker. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervix. Senator Inouye.
Senator Ixouye. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
During the latter part of September, Mr. Segretti, you visited Port-
land, Oreg., and stayed at the Benson Hotel.
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir, I did.
Senator Inouye. Of the many people you communicated with, there
must have been some involved in your special activities.
AYho were these people ?
Mr. Segretti. I beg your pardon, sir ?
Senator Inouye. Did you communicate with anyone in Portland re-
lating to your sabotage activities ?
Mr. Segretti. I called two individuals. They were essentially, to
some extent, social calls. Nothing came of those contacts. They never
did anything for me. That was the extent of it.
Senator Inouye. What was your conversation with the district
attorney ?
Mr. Segretti. He was an individual whom I knew^ from the Army.
He was a reservist and he was the only individual I knew in Portland.
4018
I called him up and I asked him if he knew of anybody that might
want to get involved in political activitj^ He gave me the name of an
individual, and I called him up and he said he was not interested. That
was the extent of it.
Senator Inouye. Did you describe to the district attorney the scope
of your political activity ?
Mr. Segretti. No ; I did not.
Senator Inouye. Before the election day, besides Mr. Chapin, Mr.
Strachan, and Mr. Porter, were there others in the White House who
were aware of your sabotage activities ?
Mr. Segretti. Senator, I did not know Mr. Porter. I have never met
Mr. Porter. As a matter of fact, before all this publicity, I did not even
know the name of Mr. Porter.
Senator Inouye. Besides Mr. Chapin, Mr. Strachan, and Mr. Dean,
were there others who were aware of them ?
Mr. Segretti. If there were, I have no knowledge of that.
Senator Ixouye. Besides Mr. Kalmbach, Mr. Hunt, and Mr. Liddy,
were there others in the Committee To Re-Elect the President who
were aware of j'our special activities?
Mr. Segretti. I don't know whether Mr. Kalmbach was at any
time. So far as Mr. Hunt, his knowledge of what I was doing was ex-
tremely limited. Mr. Liddy's knowledge of what I was doing or Mr.
Leonard, if that is Mr. Liddy — and I assume at this time that it was —
was also extremely limited.
Senator Ixouye. In mid-November of 1972, Mr. Dean is supposed to
have offered you a job in Montego Bay for about $35,000.
Mr. Segretti. What was that date again. Senator?
Senator Ixouye. Mid-November 1972.
Mr. Segretti. That is about the time frame ; yes, sir.
Senator Ixouye. What was the purpose of this ?
Mr. Segretti. The purpose of him offering me a job ?
Senator Ixouye. Was this to get you out of town ?
Mr. Segretti. It could have been. It was not communicated to me as
such, but that could very well have been the reason.
Senator Ixouye. Do you know a Mr. Alex Shipley?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, I do.
Senator Ixouye. Mr. Shipley has indicated that you said the fol-
lowing: "Nixon knows that something is being done. It is a typical
deal. Don't tell me anHhing and I won't talk."
What did you mean by this, sir ?
Mr. Segretti. I am not really sure, Senator. For one thing, that state-
ment is attributed to me and it occurred 2 years ago, practically. Mr,
Shipley at that time when I — I knew him in the military service. At
the time I contacted him, he apparently, as soon as I contacted him,
contacted a friend of his who was on the Democratic staff committee or
something, and subsequently contacted the Washington Post to tell
them that somebody had contacted Mr. Shipley. So it is really hard for
me to really say what I meant by that, for 'the reason that I don't
really recall saying that.
Senator Ixouti'e. Weren't you trying to recruit Mr. Shipley ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, I was, but I had no knowledge whether Mr.
Nixon or President Nixon knew anything that I did.
4019
Senator Inouye. You have indicated that Mr. Hunt suggested that
you disrupt Senator Muskie's April 17 fundraiser in Washington.
Mr, Hunt has denied this. Which version is correct, sir ?
Mr. Segretti. Well, all I can tell you is Mr. Hunt called me on the
telephone and told me about a Muskie dinner in Washington, D.C.,
and asked me if I would be willing to come back to Washington, D.C.,
and do some activities in relation to that dinner.
Senator Inouye. Mr. Hunt has also denied meeting you in New
Fork City and giving you a copy of the Newsweek article on Mrs.
Muskie.
Mr. Segretti. I never met, to my recollection, Mr. Hunt in New
York City.
Mr, Sherman. I don't believe that his part of any statement or part
of any staff interview that was ever given, that Mr. Segretti met with
Mr. Hunt in New York City.
Senator Ixouye. These documents that you received from Washing-
ton, were you made aware of the offer of these pamphlets ?
Mr, Segretti. Are you talking about the pamphlets relating to Sen-
ator Muskie ?
Senator Inouye, Yes, sir.
Mr. Segretti. No, I was not. And, Senator, I am not at this time
clear that they were mailed from Washington to me. I don't know
where they were mailed from.
Senator Inouye. Did Mr. Chapin tell you where they were mailed
from?
Mr. Segretti. No, sir, he did not.
Senator Inouye. And to the best of your recollection, you did not
recruit anyone in Portland to work for you ?
Mr. Segretti. No, I did not ; no, sir.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Ervin. Senator Gurney.
i Senator Gurney. Mr. Segretti, I think in your statement it says
that you started your political activities in college, University of
Southern California ; is that right ?
Mr. Segretti. To some degree, I would say that is correct.
Senator Gurney. Campus politics ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. "What did you do there in campus politics ?
Mr. Segretti. Well, I ran for an office there but I think many people
ran for offices there. It was not that unusual.
Senator Gurney. Is this prank business the sort of thing that goes
on in campus politics ?
Mr. Segretti. Certainly not of this magnitude ; no.
Senator Gurney. "Wliat do they do in campus politics that is any-
thing like this ?
Mr. Segretti. Well, it is really hard for me to recollect that. For
one thing. I was not that involved in campus politics there. I was in-
volved but I had other interests at the same time. I Avas not a political
science major, I was a business major and I think much has been made
of the fact that I was a great activist as far as politics at USC. I think
many people were much more involved in politics at USC than I was.
I think the type of thing that may have been going on there would be
4020
that you could plant a friendly individual in an opponent's camp to
find out what was going on.
Senator Gurney. At least some of your activities in the 1972 cam-
paign was somewhat of an extension of campus politics ; was that it ?
Mr. Segretti. To some extent, 1 would say that is correct.
Senator Gurney. In your statement on page 3 — and I quote from it —
you say : "During the initial period of my employment I myself had
no specific idea as to what I was doing or how 1 was to do it." Is that
not really pretty much the whole operation, really ?
Mr. Segretti. Looking back on it I would say that is true, Senator.
Senator Gurney. Because as I recall your testimony in answer to
questions by Mr. Thomspson, you thought these things up on the spur
of the moment ; is that right ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Senator Gurney. You had no real guidance out of Washington?
Mr. Segretti. Just general — just a general theory to work from.
Senator Gurney. I am curious about the Florida primary which, of
course, was the first big political primary in the 1972 campaign. Any-
body who knew anything about Florida politics, of course, knew what
was going to happen and that was that Gov. George Wallace was going
to take that race going away, as, indeed, he did.He got more votes than
the next three people next to him in line, Humphrey, and Muskie, and
Jackson. Why waste time on the Florida primary; everybody knew
that Wallace was going to win.
Mr. Segretti. Senator, I could not agree with you more. As a matter
of fact, I would even like to extend that and why waste time with
any of this ?
Senator Gurney. I would agree with that, too. [Laughter.] But
Florida especially, since that was so evident as to what was going to
happen.
This McCarthy letter, I am also interested in that.
Mr. Segretti. In what, sir ?
Senator Gurney. The McCarthy letter.
Mr. Segre'iti. Yes, sir.
Senator Gurney. In California. So help me this would seem to
boost the candidacy of Hubert Humphrey, was that what it was
intended to do ?
Mr. Segretti. It was not really intended for that purpose.
Senator Gurney. If I got it I would as a McCarthy supporter, I
think I would view it as that. My observation there is why promote
Hubert Humphrey's candidacy in California when everybody on our
side wanted George McGovem to win ?
Mr. Segretti. Well, as originally
Senator Gurney. It was a pretty hot, close race right down to the
wire. Republicans were really trembling in their boots for fear
Humphrey might win it. Why help out Hiunphrey ?
Mr. Segretti. Well, I think there are two ways to think of that. I
think the more realistic and politically astute thinking would be, that
Senator McGovem would certainly be the best choice the Democrats
could make for the Republicans in the 1972 race for tlie Republican
campaign in this sense.
Perhaps another line of thinking would be. that if the Democrats
went into the campaign without any clear choice, that they would fight
4021
a little harder at the campaign and it would be more difficult for them
to unite. But I think that is not really a very viable theory, certainly
not in the context of 1972.
Senator Gurney. Well, I must say it is too subtle for my political
mind. It seems to me to be a pitch for Humphrey.
Mr. Segretti. Certainly it is way over my head, too.
Senator Gurney. As 1 underetand you — how many people did you
have engaged in your operation ?
Mr. Segretti. Senator, do you mean at any one time or how many
people ?
Senator Gurney. No, the whole bag.
Mr. Segretti. You say, "engaged in your operation." Does that
mean people who actually went out and did something affirmative,
or just people that I talked to and nothing came of it?
Senator Gurney. People who did something affirmative.
Mr. Segretti. Well, primarily I would say there would be two
others, perhaps three others. There were other individuals that did
perhaps one or two activities, one or two small activities, and I would
place their number at another six, seven, perhaps eight.
Senator Gurney. Three principals and about eight others?
Mr. Segretti. That is right.
Senator Gurney. The reason why I am asking the question, if
you read in the media about the Segretti operation, you would get
some idea there were about 5.000 spies in America and some kind of
a great big political operation was about to sink the country?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Senator Gutiney. I am glad to know you only had 11 in this
"rinkydink" operation.
Mr!^ Segretti. Well, even 11, I think, is perhaps overemphasizing.
Senator Gurney. It is true, and this answers some of the colloquy
you have had with others that there were thousands and thousands
of young people on the Republican side working for Richard Nixon
in a legitimate way, is that not a fact ?
Mr. Segretti. That is right, and I cannot help but think at this
point in time that there would be a heck of a lot more benefit to
channel my energies and the energies of others on an aboveboard,
legitimate way.
Senator Gut?ney. Well, I am very glad you think that, and I believe
your sincerity. But the point I wanted to make is, that this was a very
tiny operation involving 11 people where thousands of other fine
young people in this country were working hard for the reelection of
Richard Nixon.
Mr. Segretti. I agree.
Senator Gurney. In retrospect, do you think this $45,000 spent on
this operation really influenced any votes? It really mattered?
Mr. Segretti. Well, I think Theodore White in his book, I think,
assessed it correctly.
Senator Gurney. What did he say ?
Mr. Segretti. He said something to the effect that the Chapin-
Segretti operation, if it could be determined that, had the weight of
a feather.
Senator Gurney. Well, I think I would agree with that, too.
That is all, Mr. Chairman.
4022
Senator Ervin. Senator Talmadge.
Senator Talmadge. Mr. Se^-etti, will you tell us what your activ-
ities were following the breaking and entering of the Watergate
complex ?
Mr. Segrettt [conferring with counsel]. Very briefly, Senator, I
was in California Avhen that occurred. I heard it over the news. I
really — I don't believe I did an\'thing about it. Subsequent to that,
I was contacted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation, and I con-
tacted Mr. Chapin and subsequently was put in touch with Mr. John
Dean
Senator Talmadge. Will you pull the mike a little closer to you?
I cannot hear your voice.
Mr. Segretti [continuing]. And subsequently met Mr. John Dean
in Washington, D.C.
Senator Talmadge. Then what happened after that ?
Mr. Segretti. I talked with — I met Mr. Dean — I talked with him
very briefly the day I met him, and then I talked to him the next day
at his oiRce, and then I flew back to Los Angeles, Calif., and met agents
from the Federal Bureau of Investigation.
Mr. Sherman. Senator, do you mean what were his activities over
a long period of time or
Senator Talmadge. I wanted to know whether or not your acti\nties
of subversion and sabotage continued following the breaking and
entering of Watergate. Just exactly what you did after that.
Mr. Segretti. The only thing that I can recall after that was the
plane that flew over the Democratic convention with the trailer relat-
ing to Senator McGovem.
Senator Talmadge. Was your advice subsequent to that to lay low,
hide, go to a foreign country, or what ?
Mr. Segretti. Xo, I was advised later on
Mr. SrrERMAN. Senator, this raises a problem that I had also dis-
cussed with Mr. Dash and Mr. Thompson. The question is broad
enough that it might refer to conversations Mr. Segretti had with
attorneys and an attorney-client relationship, and if the question is
asked excluding conversations that may be within the attorney-client
privilege, then, of course, he will answer it, but if it is intended to
include conversations with an attorney employed in that capacity,
then, of course, we would raise that as an objection.
Senator Talmadge. If you want to assert that privilege, I will not
pursue it; but I read a synopsis of the staff report, and it indicates
exactly the same coverup operation was pursued with Mr. Segretti
as was pureued with the Watergate, and I wanted to bring that out if
Mr. Segretti wanted to go into that area. If he wants to plead attorney-
client privilege in that area, I shall not go into it. If he wants to
invoke the fifth amendment rights, I shall not go into it; but if he
wants to voluntarily discuss it, I am prepared to ask him questions
about it.
Mr. Sherman. First, he has no fifth amendment rights, I assume,
because he has been given immunity. Second, it was part of the synop-
sis because, at all times. Mr. Segretti has cooperated fully with the
staff of this committee, and has disclosed every single conversation
he ever had with anybody in the world about his activities, because
he wanted to cooperate fully. But it was cooperation with the under-
4023
standing that there were certain attorney-client privileges that ex-
isted, and as an attorney himself, and we both feel as I explained to
Mr. Dash and Mr. Thompson yesterday.
Senator Talmadge. If yon or Mr. Segretti want to extend or in-
voke the attorney-client privilege, I won't go into that area.
Senator Baker. Will Senator Talmadge yield on my time, not on
his?
Senator Talmadge. Certainly I yield.
Senator Baker. Do I understand you are discussing now the possi-
bility of claiming attorney-client privilege with relation to conversa-
tions between Mr. Segretti and John Dean ?
Mr. Sherman. That is correct, and other lawyers.
Senator Baker. And other lawyers.
Mr. Sherman. That is correct. We have fully disclosed to the com-
mittee staff and told tliem exactly the basis of the claim, who he talk-
ed to and what was said, but with a clear understanding that was not
to be a waiver of the attorney-client privilege,
]Mr. Dash. Senator Baker, it is true we have had that discussion
with regard to Mr. Dean and Mv. Segretti. It would be my position
consistently with counsel that I do not see any attorney-client relation-
ship existing.
Senator Baker. Was there any fee paid for instance to John Dean
for this service ?
Mr. Segretti. No : there was not, Senator.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Senator Talmadge.
Mr. Sherman. Possibly to clear that up just a little bit, the commit-
tee is in possession of a tape in which I believe the tape fully indi-
cates
Senator Ervin. I think if he claims Mr. John Dean was his attorney,
frankly, the evidence in this case indicates to me Mr. John Dean was
a messenger boy. But if he, if an attorney conspired with a client to
obstruct the course of justice, I don't think it would be covered by the
attornev-client privilege.
Mr. Sherman. Well, I don't think Mr. Segretti did anything to ob-
struct justice in any manner, shape, or form. I think the staff is aware
of that. too. But he did seek Mr, Dean and Mr. Dean agreed to repre-
sent him as an attorney at some period of time, and we feel it is cov-
ered bv the attoiTiey-client privilege. I mean we are not trying to ob-
struct the committee in any way at all.
Senator Ervin. Maybe if Senator Talmadge would modify his ques-
tion, if he wants to ask about any conversations INIr. Segretti had
with anyone except his attorney, why he certainly is at liberty to do so.
Senator Talmadge. I will pursue it in another way and if, at any
time, you think you ought to assert the attorney-client privilege, or
any other immunity that you may have, don't hesitate to do so.
Mr. Segretti. Thank you. Senator.
Senator Talmadge. Did you engage in any so-called dirty tricks
or espionage following the Watergate break-in?
Mr. Segretti. The only thing that I can recall is what I related to
you regarding the plane with the trailer flying over the Democratic
convention.
Senator Talmadge. Were you advised by anyone to maintain a low
profile ?
4024
Mr. Segretti. Other than an attorney ?
Senator Talmadoe. By anyone.
Mr. Stiermax. WoU^ T tlion^ht wo just had a discussion that the
question implies any person other than ^Ir. Segretti was communicat-
ing with.
Senator Taoiadoe. I didn't ask him if the lawyer advised that; I
asked him if anyone advised him to maintain a low profile.
Mr. Seor?:tti. Perhaps this will answer that question or a part of it.
I did have lunch with Mr. Chapin in the summer of 1972, between my
grand jury appearance, and. I believe, the period of time when news
stories started coming out about me, which was in October, and at
that time I was certainly told to cease all activities, although they
had pretty much ceased prior to that.
Senator Talmadge. Did you check out of a hotel under the name
Segretti and register in another hotel under an assumed name?
Mr. Segretti. A^Tien was this, Senator ?
Senator Talmadge. Shortly after the Watergate break-in in Wash-
ington, D.C.
Mr. Segretti. "WTien I came to Washington, D.C, and met with Mr.
Dean, I was stayinaf at the Mayflower Hotel ; staving there under my
own name. After I talked with Mr. Dean, I checked out and flew
back to Los Angeles and met with the agents.
Senator Talmadge. Before you left Washington, though, didn't
you register in another hotel under an assumed name?
Mr. Segretti. I did not.
Senator Talmadge. You did not ?
Mr. Segretti. T did not.
Senator Talmadge. Now, were you advised that the Grecian Islands
were pretty that time of the year and you might want to take a trip
there?
Mr. Segretti. Senator. T think I now know what area you are talk-
ing about. That period of time was after the news stories about me
started to come out. At that time T was instructed to fly to Washing-
ton, D.C. I did check into a motel under my own name. I was then
instructed to check out of that motel because I was there under my
own name. I had a meeting with !Mr. Dean and ^Vfr. Fielding and I
was instructed to check into another motel under another name.
Senator Talmadge. Were you advised that the Grecian Islands were
beautiful at that time of the year and it might be nice to take a trip
there?
Mr. Segretti. There was a discussion of that but I took it more on
the social level. [Laughter.]
Senator Talmadge. Were you off'ered a job in Jamaica ?
Mr. Segretti. I was — subsequent to. it was after the election — I was.
It certainlv sounded nice. [Laughter.]
Senator Tal:madge. Were you advised to ^et on a train and travel
around the country ? Did you subsequently do so?
Mr. Segretti. I was advised — [Conferring with counsel.] Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. And you did ?
Mr. Segretti. I did.
Senator Talmadge. "^Hiere all did vou travel ?
Mr. Segretti. I took a train from Washington, D.C. up to. I believe,
Philadelphia, I am not sure, and I was, to take a train — I had never
4025
taken a train before and I was going to head back home, out West, and
from Washington, D.C., to go to the west coast you must take the
train, I believe up to Philadelphia, transfer to Chicago and then take
another train from Chicago to the west coast and that is what I did.
Senator Talmadge. By way of Houston, Tex., also, did you not?
Mr. Segretti. I don't know that that train goes through Houston
or not.
Senator Talmadge. Washington, D.C., to Philadelphia, and from
Philadelphia to Chicago, and from Chicago to Houston.
Mr. Segretti. I don't believe I went to Houston.
Senator Talmadge. You did not go to Houston ?
Mr. Segretti. I believe it was some other town.
Senator Talmadge. Did you have a code name at the "\^Tiite House?
Mr. Segretti. I don't know. My code name when I called Mr.
Chapin, I would use the name Don Morris.
Senator Talmadge. Do you loiow how many contacts that you had
with Mr. Chapin from the time of October 5, 1971, to September 1,
1972?
Mr. Segretti. I would have to guess on that. Senator. The records
would reflect that better than my memory.
Senator Talmadge. Would 47 calls from you to Mr. Chapin, not in-
cluding the Chapin calls to you, seem about accurate?
Mr. Segretti. That could very well be. Although many of those
calls were to his office and he was not in, and I would leave a message,
and sometimes I would get a return call, and sometimes I would not
right away, and perhaps there w^ould be two or three phone calls along
that line.
Senator Talmadge. Do you have the folder in front of you that in-
cludes tab 28 [exhibit No. 224] ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. I ask you to look at that and see if you think
that is probably correct.
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Then, Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent
that that be appropriately numbered and marked as an exhibit in the
record at this point.
Senator Ervin. I believe that will be received in evidence as an ex-
hibit appropriately marked. My understanding is that all of these
exhibits were identified.
Mr. Dash. Can we do that now, Mr. Chairman, since I have used
the exhibits? In addition to tab 28 that Senator Talmadge has identi-
fied I would like all of these exhibits entered into the record at this
time.
Senator Ervix. Am I correct in assuming that Mr. Segretti has
identified all those exhibits ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, I will do that on the record. Senator.
Senator Ervin. Let the record show that all of the exhibits identi-
fied in the testimony of this witness will be received in evidence as ex-
hibits and will be appropriately numbered by the reporter as such.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Chairman, I might say that Mr. Segretti has
obviously not been asked about each of these exhibits, and I don't even
know that we have looked at each and every one of these exhibits. I
am sure if Mr. Dash says that at some point in our interviews, he has
4026
identified them, that is fine ; but I wouldn't want him to say that it is
his exhibits.
Senator Ervtn. I believe he just stated, though
Mr. Dash. He has had an opportunity this morning.
Senator Ervix. He identified them ?
Mr. Segrktti. Yes. I went through those exhibits briefly this morn-
ing and prior to appearing before this committee and I am familiar
with most of those. There are one or two that I — that were done by
people that I had contacted, but I am familiar with them now.
Senator Ervin. You do identify them ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
[The documents referred to were marked exhibits Nos. 199-226,
inclusive.*]
^jenator Talmadge. Mr. Segretti, in your opening statement, you
stated: "I was happy to accept employment from people who held
prominent positions in and out of the Government."
You also said a factor in accepting your duties was the opportunity
in working for the T^Hiite House. Would you have accepted those
duties if they had not been proposed to you by your friend in the
White House; but a local campaign organizer ?
Mr. Segretti. I do not believe I would. Senator.
Senator Talmadge. Would you have accepted your duties if you
had received much less compensation or had been asked to do those
things without pay ?
Mr. Segretti. Well. I certainly did not have funds of my own to
travel around the country and expend large amounts of monev, and I
certainly would not have done that for these type of activities. So
certainly, that is a very important factor in this.
Senator Talmadge. Am I correct, then, in sayiriff that the rea^n you
acce]jted those duties that you have described in detail durina: the day,
was because, first, of the glamor of working for the T^Hiite Hoiise,
friends in the Wliite House, plus the fact that you needed a job and
the iob was attractive ?
Mr. Segretti. I think they were certainly some of the factors.
Senator Talmadge. Several times, you have stated that your activ-
ities were to cause confusion. Just exactly what did you mean by
confusion ?
Mr. Segretti. That is a little hard to define. T would say the best
way I could describe that is the word confusion to some extent sneaks
for itself. Perhaps to perplex the staff of the particular candidates
where these were comin.qr from.
Senator Talmadge. You concluded your opening statement by say-
ing, "that vou have been abused by rumor, character assassination, and
innuendo." Is it not rather ironic that the same effect that you com-
plain about wfis vested, in abundance, I may say, on Senators Muskie,
Jackson, and Humphrey, by vou ?
Mr. Segretti. It certainlv is and T know how it feels.
Senator Talmadge. You have had a career in college, graduated from
one of the best colleges in the country. Then von served your country
with responsibility during the Vietnnm war. Wliy would you, as a
bright, young, attractive, articulate fellow, get involved in something
♦See pp. 4268-4350.
4027
that you got into, where you were running around the country, falsi-
fying documents, falsifying letters, falsifying press releases, and doing
all the things that you did, Mr. Segretti ? You had a very bright future.
Yet, you let these people persuade you into getting into something of
this nature.
Mr. ISe(;retti. Very honestly and candidly, Senator, I have net been
able to give myself a satisfactory answer to your question.
Senator Talmadge. You never had any previous criminal record of
any kind before ?
Mr. Segretti. Absolutely none.
Senator Talmadge. Xo involvement with the police, no falsification
no forgeries, anything of that kind ?
Mr. Segretti. No, sir.
Senator Talmadge. Thank you, Mr. Segretti.
I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.
Mr. Segretti, I do not have many questions. I think most of the
principal areas of your testimony have been covered and covered
rather exhaustively, but to continue the line of questioning that Sen-
ator Tahnadge initiated — that is, why did you undertake this — I have
pursued tliat line of questioning with other witnesses and I will not
press you on it now. But let me suggest a hypothetical situation.
If you were approached to do the same sort of job that you did in
1971 and 1972 now, after these hearings and after a full and thorough
public ventilation of the facts and circumstances, would these hearings,
would this record, would this experience have any impact on your
willingness or unwillingness to do that ?
Mr. Segretti. I think the answer, certainly to me, is very obvious,
Senator.
Senator Baker. Well, what is the answer ?
Mr. Segretti. I would not.
Senator Baker. AYell, this has been a painful experience and, I am
sure, an unpleasant experience for you — your interrogation, your in-
dictment and arraignment, your testimony before this committee, I
suppose. It has really been, I would expect, an unpleasant personal
experience. But if you can, lay that aside and put yourself in the role
of a young man who has served his country in the armed services, who
is a graduate of a distinguished law school, someone who had not
suffered the scars and the wounds of this hearing and these investiga-
tions. Do you think that same thing would apply ? Do you think these
hearings and this public ventilation of these circumstances may in fact
have a deterrent effect on others undertaking what you did undertake?
Mr. Segretti. I really believe that they would, and I hope that they
will. I think that is one of the benefits that these hearings have
accomnlislipd.
Senator Baker. What do you think about the possibility that these
hearings or this testimony of yours or other testimony may have an-
other effect? It may have the effect of disillusioning young people,
young men and women, will, instead of accepting this as a deterrent to
such conduct in the future, just simply decide, well, that is politics and
just drop out of the whole political system ? How do you evaluate that?
Mr. Segretti. I think that is a very important factor to consider.
4028
and I think that is one of the dangers of this committee. Very hon-
estly, I feel that to some extent, the committee has done its job in this
regard, insofar as a deterrent, in cleansing the political system. I think
if it were carried on for a great length of time, I think it would create
a great deal of disillusionment in the country. And I think that is
dangerous.
In other words, I think it is a balancing situation and it is very
difficult to make that decision, and I do not think I am the one that
should make that. I think it is up to you Senators to do that.
Senator Baker. Well, I thank you for that information. Sometimes I
hear men and women, particularly young men and women, say, well,
after all, that is politics. And that is not politics. That is not politics as
I know it, and I would even venture the estimates that that is not
politics as you know it, except for the situation that you have testified
to.
What is your concept — is this your concept of what American pol-
itics is all about, that is, a bag of dirty tricks over a period of time?
Mr. Segretti. Not now.
Senator Baker. Was it then ?
Mr. Segretti. I think as it was explained to me, and I think you
should realize that I had no great background in politics, practical
politics, that some of these things were somewhat traditional in Amer-
ican politics.
Senator Baker. How widespread do you think that point of view is ?
Mr. Segretti. I really do not know. Senator.
Senator Baker. What about your experience in campus politics ? Did
that have some impact on how you viewed the propriety of these
activities ?
Mr. Segretti. I am sure it was a factor, yes, sir.
Senator Baker. One or two other questions, ISIr. Segretti. I know you
have touched these matters in previous questions and answers, but tell
me briefly, who gave you your instructions ? "V^Hio was your boss ?
Mr. Segretti. I would, I guess you would say Mr. Chapin.
Senator Baker. All right, who thought up your dirty tricks, if that
is the right word for it ?
Mr. Segretti. I think to a great extent, I did.
Senator Baker. Pardon ?
Mr. Segretti. I think to a major extent, I did.
Senator Baker. In other w^ords, you initiated it, you carried forth
your project on your own ?
Mr. Segretti. Right.
Senator Baker. Did you have any comment from Chapin or anyone
else on the appropriateness or inappropriateness of wliat you were
doing?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Senator Baker. By whom and on what occasions ?
Mr. Segretti. By Mr. Chapin, I believe. It is liard to recall specific
instances at this time.
Senator Baker. What I am driving for is to what extent were you
a free agent or what control did some responsible political official
have on vour conduct and activity ?
Mr. Segretti. Well, I believe at any time, I could have been told
to cease and I would have ceased.
4029
Senator Baker. Mr. Segretti, we have a vote in progress and I
understand we are on 10-minut« rollcalls, Mr. Chairman, so I would
like to suspend.
Senator Ervin. We will recess until we can return and resume the
hearing.
[Eecess.]
Senator Ervin. The committee will come to order.
You were a college mate at the University of Southern California
with not only Dwight Chapin, but also Gordon Strachan and Ron
Ziegler, weren't you ?
Mr. Segretti. I understand that Mr, Ziegler was at USC at about
the same time, although I do not recall Mr. Ziegler at USC. I believe
he was there 3 years prior — in other words, I would have been a
freshman and he would have been a senior. I don't recall ever meeting
Mr. Ziegler.
Senator Erviist. Now, Dwight Chapin and you were verj^ close
friends, weren't you ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. As a matter of fact, you were his roommate and
he was your campaign manager when you were elected to the student
senate there.
Mr. Segretti. I don't think that is exactly correct. Senator. Mr.
Chapin was involved in politics there. One evening, a list was being
made of people that were going to run for different offices. A very
good friend of ours was going to be running for student body presi-
dent. We were short several people that we were going to put on
the slate for student senate, and just because we were short of names,
my name was put on that list. I had no real campaign manager, shall
we say, and there was no real campaign that I conducted.
Senator Ervin. Well, Chapin was a leader of the group which
placed you on the ticket and elected you to the student senate, was
he not?
Mr. Segretti. He was one of those that was involved; yes, sir. But
I was involved, to some extent, in that also.
Senator Ervix. Yes. So you and he had formed a close friendship
before he became an employee of the '\"\niite House ?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct, Senator.
Senator Eratx. Do you know what his office was in the "White House?
Mr. Segretti I believe is was Presidential appointments secretary.
Senator Erven. He was the man who made the President's appoint-
ments day by day?
Mr. Segretti. I really don't know the duties of the job, but the
title Avas Presidential appointments secretary.
Senator Er\tn. Now, did you fly to Washington before you began
this ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, I did.
Senator Ervin. And had a conference with Chapin?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And in that conference, Chapin indicated to you
that he wanted you to engage in what he called dirty tricks?
Mr. Segretti. I don't think he used the term "dirty tricks" at that
time. Senator.
4030
Senator Ervin. Well, he indicated to yoii that he wanted you to
engage in a course of action which he did not want you to expose
under the full glare of the noonday sun, didn't he ?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Senator ER\qx. He told you to keep secret what you did ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Senator Ervin. ^\nd to act in such a way that your activities would
never be traced to him, didn't he? Or the l^Hiite House?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct, Senator.
Senator ER\^N. Now, was he the man who arranged for you to be
paid by Mr. Kalmbach ?
Mr. Segretti. That is a question that is difficult for me to answer.
I believe Mr. Strachan called me and gave me Mr. Kalmbach's name
to contact in Newport Beach, Calif. So who made the real arrange-
ments there, I really don't know.
Senator Er\t:n. Well, anyway, you were told by Mr. Strachan, who
was also a Wiite House aide, to contact Mr. Kalmbach.
Mr. Segretti. I believe it was Mr. Strachan ; yes. It could have been
Mr. Chapin.
Senator Ervin. Did he tell you why you should contact Mr.
Kalmbach ?
Mr. Segretti. To finalize my arrangements on my prospective
employment.
Senator Er\t:n-. To make financial arrangements ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervix. And you did contact Mr. Kalmbach. and he made
financial arrangements which continued for a period of about 12 or
14 months ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes. My last contact with Mr. Kalmbach relating to
financial matters was the latter part of March 1972.
Senator Ervin. Now, during this period of time, how often did you
talk by telephone to Mr. Chapin ?
Mr. Segretti. Well, we ran into the same problem, Senator. I think
the records would reflect more accurately my recollection. To give you
a total, I think it was mentioned, 40-some times during the entire pe-
riod. That could very well be.
Senator Er\t:n. During a period from about August 1971 and ex-
tending at least ud to July 1972, you had at least 40 telephone conver-
sations with Mr. Chapin ?
Mr. Segretti. That could very well be ; yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And each time vou had a telephone conversation
with him, when you called the switchboard and were asked for your
name, you gave the name of Don Morris?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Senator Ervt^n. And you made rather complete reports to Mr.
Chapin of what you had done, the things you have told us about here?
Mr. Segrettt. Well, not necessarily. I certainly didn't tell him all ;
the details.
Senator Ervin. Well, you indicated to him, didn't you, what you had
done?
Mr. Segretti. Yes : but most of that was done bv mail.
Senator Ervtn. Yes. You sent copies of various documents which |
you concocted ?
4031
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Senator Ervin. So Mr. Dwi^ht Chapin knew all the time what you
were doing, what was going on ?
Mr. Segretti. I imagine he must have.
Senator Ervin. And he told yon on most of these 40 phone calls he
was very much pleased with your good work, as he put it, didn't he ?
Mr. Segretti. Well. I don't recall any intercorrespondence relating
to that because I don't really recall the content of those phone calls.
Senator ER\aN. Well, you called him to tell him what you had been
doing. You didn't call to talk about the weather, did you?
Mr. Segretti. I think many times— we did talk on a social level. We
talked on a variety of matters, but many of the matters related to my
political activities.
Senator Ervix. Well, when you did talk about your political activi-
ties, he knew what you were doing; at least you told him what you
were doing ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Senator Ervix. And you sent him the posters. Did you send him
a copy of the letter that you prepared to circulate about Jackson and
Humphrey ?
Mr. Segretti. I believe I did, and I believe I sent him the newsclip-
pings on that.
Senator Er\t[n. You sent him the newsclippings about that. And
he sort of brightened on that, didn't he ?
Mr. Segretti. I am sorry. Senator.
Senator Ervix. When you sent him the newsclipping about the let-
ter that was written on IMuskie's letterhead, he commended you on that
and said you had gotten $10,000 worth of good work out of an expendi-
ture of $20 ?
Mr. Segretti. There was a comment to that effect.
Senator Ervix. In your conversations with Chapin, didn't Chapin
tell you that Muskie was the front runner among the Democrats and
the polls showed that he would make the best race against President
! Nixon and that he wanted to do as much as he could to discredit
Muskie's campaign ?
Mr. Segretti. I am trying to recall any specific conversation and
I can't pin any date on such a conversation. However, that was the
general background of many conversations. Unfortunately, they tend
to merge, because it covered such a period of time.
Senator Era^x. Well, what he said, regardless of what the specific
words were, created in your mind the impression that Chapin wanted
you to do all you could to discredit Muskie and to promote the candi-
dacy of ]McGovern, didn't he ?
Mr. Segretti. I don't believe McGovern was ever mentioned, but
focus on Muskie.
Senator Ervix. Wasn't it the strategy, as outlined by Chapin, that
your efforts would be directed to discredit Muskie because he was at
that time the front runner?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Senator Ervix. And didn't you know at the time that you were
engaged in these activities that it was the strategy of Chapin or the
Republican Party, as outlined to you by Chapin, to promote the nomi-
nation by the Democrats of ]\IcGovern because they considered him
; the weakest candidate?
i
4032
Mr. Segrettt. No, sir; that was never really conveyed to me. In
fact, during the period of time that I was engaged in any activities,
I don't think I, or others, such as Mr. Chapin, believed that Senator
McGovern would ever win the nomination.
Senator Er\t[x. But you did all you could to see that he did win it,
didn't you?
Can you tell me a single thing you ever did to place an obstacle in
the path of ]McGovern obtaining the nomination?
Mr. Segretti. Well, we had the plane fly over Democratic head-
quarters
Senator Ervin. That was after he had the nomination, wasn't it?
Mr. Segretti. No ; I think it was the day before. He had it locked up.
Senator Ervin. Well, it was after he had gone to the Democratic
National Convention in Miami with enough delegates to insure his
nomination, wasn't it?
Mr. Segretti. I am sorry. I was thinking of another example and
I didn't hear the question, Senator.
Senator Ervtcn. I was just asking you, now you have told us about
things that you did to discredit^ — which were calculated to discredit
Jackson, Humphrey, and Muskie and to create confusion among them.
My question was, did you do anything to discredit the campaign efforts
of Senator McGovem prior to the time that he was nominated ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes. sir. I had the flier. "McGovern's real record on
the war," that was obtained in the Miami area and that was reprinted
and distributed.
Senator Ervix. "\^nien was that ?
Mr. Segretti. It was distributed in the California primary. Some
of it was distributed in the Florida primary. That is the only instance
I can remember.
Senator Ervix. Well, in fact, you didn't do much to impede the
nomination of Gov. George Wallace, did you, in your Florida ac-
tivities ?
Mr. Segretti. No, sir.
Senator Ervix. The only thing you ever said about him was that
he was sort of like Hitler?
Mr. Segretti. That is right.
Senator Er\t:x. Now, I want to invite vour attention to exhibit No.
206.
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Senator ER\^x. You stated in your opening statement, that it was
not vour desire to have anyone believe this letter.
Mr. Segretti. That is correct. Senator.
Senator Er\t:x. Well, now. how can you reconcile that statement
with the fact that vou sav in the sixth and seventh lines of that letter,
"However, if you have not made your decision, you should be aware
of several facts."
Mr. Segretti. It is difficult for me to reconcile that at this time. All
I can tell you is my intention at that time — and it is true that the way
this was written — my intentions, I don't think, were as clear as they
should have been. In fact, this letter should never have been written,
obviously.
Senator Ervix. It says, after you have set out statements which you ;
admit constituted scurrilous attacks on two Democratic candidates for
4033
the nomination, you close the letter with this : "These are not pleasant
facts, but they should be considered by you before you vote on
March 14."
Now, I don't understand how a person can assert twice in a letter
that certain things are facts and then say he didn't intend anybody to
believe what he said were facts to be true.
Mr. Segretti. Senator, this letter was put on Citizens for Muskie
stationery and it was really aimed toward Muskie, rather than the
other two individuals involved ; although I agree that it was done very
poorly and there was a great deal of misjudgment, it certainly didn't
work out the way I intended.
Senator Ervin. Well, it looks like to me you were trying to kill
three Democratic birds with just one stone. You issued what was a
scurrilous libel, manufactured out of the whole cloth you admit by
yourself, against Senator Jackson; you circulate what was a libel
against Senator Humphrey, and you say you did that also for the pur-
pose of creating dissension and discord among the three candidates.
Mr. Segretti, That is right.
Senator Ervin. At least, those two candidates with McGovem — ^with
Muskie.
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervix. So you were really — your shaft, was directed at
three different people, and calculated to hurt three different people and
that is what it was intended for, was it not ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes ; I will say this. Perhaps you can better under-
stand, that this letter was not done with a great deal of forethought in
mind.
Senator Ervin. Well you admit there is not a word of truth in the
whole letter, do you not ?
Mr. Segretti. That is true.
Senator Ervin. And you attempted to deceive people into thinking
that it emanated from Muskie's headquarters or from his campaign
organization ?
Mr. Segretti. That is right.
Senator Ervin. Now, you invented the names of these w^omen who
are mentioned here, did you not ?
Mr. Segretfi. Yes.
Senator Ervin. You invented the names of the Mary Ann Cramer
out of the whole cloth, did you not ?
Mr. Segretti. Senator, the letter is made out of the whole cloth. The
facts in the letter are made out of the w^hole cloth. I attempted to
make this letter so outrageous that nobody would really believe it.
Senator Er\tn. "^^Tiy, if you did not want
Mr. Segretti. I did not know what to say.
Senator Ervin [continuing]. If you did not want anybody to believe
it, why did you not put at the head : "You must not believe anything
that is said in this document." ?
Mr. Segretti. I should have.
Mr. Sherman. Senator, T think Mr. Sesfretti has made clear that it
was to create dissension amonjr the candidates and not for the contents
to be believed and, of course, if it would have said that they would
have known it before.
4034
Senator Ervin. If I take the words that he set out — ^the only infer-
ence I can draw from it is that he wanted the people who saw it, or
heard about it, to believe the most reprehensible things about Senator
Jackson and Senator Humphrey.
Mr. Sherman. That may appear on the face of it. However, he
told you what his intention was and that was the intention.
Senator Ervin. I am constrained to say that I, as a lawyer, do not
undertake to say what a man intended when he wrote a document ; 1 1
determine that by the words of the document, rather than what he says i
many months after that. I
Mr. Segretti. Senator, all I can tell you is what my intention was. I
Mr. Sherman. That is, of course, not to excuse the letter and he is i
not attempting to do that at all.
Senator Ervin. Well, he admits that he composed a libelous letter
and mailed it out. Every word he said in the letter referring to repre-
hensible conduct on the part of Senator Jackson and Senator Hum-
phrey is untrue and without any foundation whatever.
Mr. Sherman. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. That he even invented some nonexistent women ?
Mr. Sherman. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. To be named, to make the letter specific.
Mr. Sherman. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. Well, so much for that. [Laughter.]
My time is up, I will come back, I have more questions. I want
to find out how John Dean got such a big law practice. [Laughter.]
Mr. Sherman. I might just comment if he is relying upon fees made
by Mr. Segretti, he must not have a very successful law practice.
Senator Ervin. I was not asking about you, I was not asking about
your law practice.
Mr. Sherman. I was not commenting upon mine.
Mr. Segretti. I am sure Mr. Sherman is quite successful.
Senator Ervin. I was just wondering how Mr. Dean got spread out
so fast. [Laughter] .
Senator Weicker.
Senator Weicker. During the course of your conversation with one
of the Senators, I cannot remember which, Mr. Segretti, you men-
tioned .your meeting with Fred Fielding.
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir. that is correct.
Senator Weicker. Is that correct ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Senator Weicker. What was the occasion of your meeting with Fred
Fielding?
Mr. Sf^retti. OK. I talked to Mr. Dean by telephone. INIr. Dean,
I believe, was in Miami or that area at that time, and he informed me
of a forthcoming article concerning me in the Washington Post. He
wanted to meet with me as soon as possible regarding the allegations
in that article. This was around October 10, 1 believe, 1972. Mr. Dean
told me to fly to Washington, D.C, and that he was going to fly from
Florida up to Washington and meet me there. He said that in case I
arrive prior to liim to call his assistant, Mr. Fielding, and he gave me
Mr. Fielding's telephone number. T did so, I called Mr. Fielding, and
I told him where I was staying. Mr. Dean, I believe, had not yet
arrived. I was subsequently contacted by, I believe it was, Mr. Field-
4035
i ing, although it may have been Mr. Dean, and then told to check out
of that hotel and come and meet with them.
Senator Weicker. Where did you meet ?
Mr. Segretti. We met in Mr. Dean's office in the Executive Office
Building.
Senator Weicker. How was your entry into that building? Was
it the normal routine of signing in?
Mr, Segretti. No, it was around 8 or 9 in the evening. I took a cab,
after I checked out from where I was staying, to within a block of
the Executive Office Building. I called Mr. Dean's office. He told me
to wait where I was and that an individual would come and meet me
and that would be Mr. Fred Fielding.
That was done. When we entered the Executive Office Building,
as you know, there is a check point there, and you are to produce iden-
tification and perhaps sign in. I am not sure of that. Mr. Fielding
stated something to the effect, "This was the individual who lost his
wallet," and I was just ushered in. This was around 9 or 9 :30 at night.
Senator Weicker. How long did this meeting last?
Mr. Segretti. It is hard to really guess now. An hour perhaps. I
was pretty exhausted. I had been up really, that night on the airplane,
and it was certainly a shock to me to see my name and picture on the
front page of the newspaper, so I was exhausted.
Senator Weicker. What was the purpose of this meeting?
Mr. Segretti. To go over the Post article, to see what allegations
were true and untrue.
Senator Weicker. In the course of the meeting did you discuss in
general the matters which you brought to the attention of this
committee ?
Mr. SherMx^n. The problem, Senator, with that question is that it
does ask for privileged communications between an attorney and a
client, and if he answers a question yes or no, then he has told you
the contents, particularly if he answers yes.
Senator Weicker. Would you care to characterize the meeting?
Mr. Sherman. Well, that, of course, does the same thing. I mean,
there is no Avay to talk about the meeting, the contents in the light
of that question. Just 1 second. [Conferring with witness.]
As we have indicated, however, previously, preserving the pri\alege,
we have discussed these matters in detail with Mr. Dash, Mr. Lenzner,
and Mr. Lackritz, and we would be perfectly willing to answer any
questions, any general questions, in private about this but we feel an
obligation to maintain the attorney-client privilege.
Senator Weicker. All right.
And I know you have. I think that point should be made clear, you
have cooperated fully with the staff of the committee.
Senator Ervin. Senator, on that point, I have difficulty accepting
the view that there is any relationship of attorney and client between
the witness and Mr. Dean. Mr. Dean was allegedly the White House
lawyer at the time, and furthermore, when he had a conversation with
Chapin and the witness, a third party was present and you cannot
have a confidential communication between an attorney and his client
when third parties are present. It is not confidential. And furthermore,
Mr. Dean's testimony before this committee indicates that Mr. Dean
was engaged in a conspiracy to obstruct justice, and communications.
4036
If anything transpired in that meeting that had anything to do with
obstructing justice tlien it is not covered by the confidential lawyer's
relation, if it existed, because it only can refer to past activities of a
criminal nature or supposedly criminal nature. That is my under-
standing of the law of attorney-client privilege.
Mr. Sherman. That is also my understanding of the attorney-client
privilege. The point about Mr. Chapin being present, 1 do not —
questions have been asked about that particular conversation, and I
think that w^as only an introduction and the questions about the in-
troduction, Mr. Segretti might be willing to answer the question.
Senator Weicker. May I ask a question as to who was present at |
the meeting ?
Mr. Segretti. Well, which meeting are you talking about ?
Senator Weicker. I am talking about the meeting at the Executive
Office Building at 9 o'clock on the evening of October 10.
Mr. Segretii. That was Mr. Dean, Mr. Fielding, and I.
Mr. Sherman. Well, of course, Mr. Fielding
Senator Ervin. I don't believe a confidential communication can
be had between — a communication can be had which is confidential
in nature within the purview of the rule when it takes place in the
presence of two outside parties.
Mr. Sherman. Unless the third party also happens to be another
lawyer who also in the conversations does maintain an attorney-client
privilege, which was done during this conversation.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, I think this has been the claim counsel
has made. It is my position as chief counsel, and I have stated this
to counsel that this was a fictitious relationship of attorney-client
privilege. Mr. Dean, who was counsel to the President, certainly could
not in any way serve as counsel to Mr. Segretti. Certainly Mr. Fielding
could not, and cannot create a fictitious attorney-client relationship
in order to shield these conversations, and I think the position that
the committee really should have is there was no attorney-client rela-
tionship established.
Mr. Sherman. However, whatever Mr. Dean's purposes were to
shield anything I have no knowledge of. From Mr. Segretti's point of
view, there was a good faith relationship of attorney and client, and
he reasonably believed there was an attorney-client privilege and had
specific conversations with Mr. Dean on that particular point, and
only confided in Mr. Dean because Mr. Dean assured him that that,
was the relationship and he was representing him in that capacity.
Senator Ervin. Are you asking him about a conversation that he
had with Mr. Dean at the time Mr. Fielding and Mr, Chapin were
present ?
Senator Weicker. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. I will rule that is not covered by attorney-client
privilege at all.
Mr. Sherman. Mr. Chapin was not present, sir, during that meet-
ing- and I think. Senator, if vou were to make a ruling
Senator "Weicker. I specificallv asked Mr. Sesretti to sfive to this
committee the contents of the ronvorf=ations heM with Mr. Dean and
Mr. Fieldinjr. in Mr. Dean's office on the night of October 10 in the
Exerutive Office Building;.
Mr. Sherman. I think if the chairman is g-oin<i to make a ruling
Jls to whether or not there was an attorney-client privilege, a founda-
4037
tioii ought to be laid as to whether there was or was not an attorney-
client relationship and the only way to lay the foundation is to ask
Mr. ;Segretti what was said.
tienator Ekvin. 1 don't think we have a scintilla of evidence in this
case that Mr. Dean was practicing law generally and was counsel for
this man.
Mr. t5HEii3iAN. You haven't asked the questions of Mr. Segretti as
to what Mr. Dean told him so how can there be any evidence? If
you want to ask those questions, you should do that hrst before
arguing.
tjenator Ervin. I was on the verge of asking him when my time
expired a while ago.
Mr. Shermax. Of course, we are always — and we have discussed
all of these conversations in private, so we are certainly notwith-
holding any information.
Senator Ervin. You can proceed, Senator.
Senator Weicker. I would like to have Mr. Segretti discuss con-
versations held with Mr. Dean in the presence of Mr. Fielding in
Mr. Dean's office and on the night of October 10.
Mr. Sherman. Can I then request a foundation be first laid as to
whether or not there was an attorney-client relationship in questions
asked of Mr. Segretti in this regard, what was told to him and what
did he reasonably believe ?
Senator Ervin. Let me ask him a question or two on that point.
Did you make any agreement with Mr. Dean to pay him a retainer
fee?
Mr. Segretti. No, sir ; I did not.
Senator Ervin. Did you expect to pay him a retainer fee?
Mr. Segretti. If he had asked for one, 1 would have paid one.
Senator Ervin. Well, he didn't ask you for one and you didn't
offer to pay him one ?
Mr. Segretti. No.
Senator Ervin. And you didn't tell him that you had committed
any violation of the law for which you were seeking legal counsel?
Mr. Segretti. I asked Mr. Dean whether anything that we said
would be privileged and under the attorney-client, otherwise I would
not discuss any matters with him.
Senator Ervin. What did you say about Mr. P^ielding being there?
Mr. Segretti. I asked the same question about Mr. Fielding.
Senator Ervin. You had two lawyers there ?
Mr. Segretti. I asked Mr. Fielding whether he was a lawyer be-
cause, otherwise, I was not going to talk or say anything to him.
Senator Ervin. But Mr. Fielding, was he a lawyer?
Mr. Segretti. He assured me he was.
Senator Ervin. Do you know whether he was practicing law ?
Mr. Segretti. I really don't know.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Segretti, don't you know that neither one of these
men were acting in the capacity of lawyer for you ?
Mr. Segretti. I thought they were.
Senator Ervin. Didn't you ask him to get you a lawyer, isn't that
what happened ?
Mr. Segretti. That was much later on, Senator, when I was going
back to Los Angeles and I asked him if he could suggest a counsel
21-2flRO — 74-
4038
in Los Angeles, in the area. Mr. Dean was back in Washin^on, D.C.
Senator Ervin. You asked him to get a lawyer out in California for
you.
Mr. Segretti. If he could recommend a lawyer to me.
Senator Ervix. Recommend one. You already had a lawyer in Wash-
ington, why did you want one out of town ?
Mr. Segretti. Because I was in Los Angeles, Senator.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, could I ask a qualifying question
in that respect ?
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Senator Baker. Mr. Segretti, can you tell this committee under oath
that at the time you talked to Mr. Dean that, and Mr. Fielding that,
one, you knew they were attorneys ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Senator Baker. That they were qualified to practice law ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Senator Baker. That you expected to employ them as counsel to
advise you on your rights and prepare you for whatever legal proceed-
ings might be in prospect ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Senator Baker. That you intended to compensate them for those
services ?
Mr. Segretti. I don't believe that was — I really considered that at
that time. Senator Baker.
Senator Baker. That you asked for and received assurances of the
privileged nature of the communication ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Senator Baker. Now, the final question I would put to vou in that
respect is this : Did you ask for that assurance of privileged communi-
cation for the purpose of assuring your legal defense, or for the purpose
of concealing the substance of what you were about to communicate?
Mr. Segretti. I will tell you why that is difficult for me to answer,
Senator Baker, because I felt that the privileged nature of any com-
munication would be necessarv in my defense.
Senator Baker. The point I am trying to
Mr, Segretti. So the answer would be, yes.
Senator Baker [continuing]. The point I am trying to reach is
whether or not you are trying to obtain an assurance of confidentiality
for the sake of protecting the confidentiality of that information, or
for the sake of assuring your representation by counsel in any pro-
ceeding that might be brought against you.
Mr. Segretti. I think the latter would be true. Senator.
Mr. Sherman. Of course, Senator, obviously when you seek an at-
torney you also expect it to be confidential so it is kind of a dual
purpose.
Senator Baker. Yes. but the law is well settled that you cannot
cloak yonrself in a claim of confidentiality or attorney-client priv-
ilege simply for the sake of concealing information. It must be a
legitimate intentment of gmployment for the purpose of advancing
the legal defenses that may be available to you under the Constitution
and statute.
Mr. Stierman. I think if the question was asked, did he intend to
cloak it, not to disclose part of the coverup, then the answer would
be no.
4039
Senator Ervin. My understanding is, and I am not able to say this
as a fact, there is a regulation for anybody who is a lawyer for the
Government to engage in private practice, and the inference is that
Mr. Dean at least had the title of counsel to the President. That means
a lawyer for the executive branch of the Government.
Mr. Sherman. As Mr. Dash, of course, raised the same point yester-
day, and my response was, even if that is true, which I asked for such
regulation, he could not. So to me I don't think that would affect
what Mr. Segretti's good faith belief was, and the example, of course,
I gave him yesterday, if you went to somebody who told you he was
a lawyer and he was not a lawyer and you communicated with him in
the good faith belief he was a lawyer, he would be protected.
Senator Ervin. Isn t it a fact that you went to see Mr. Dean at Mr.
Dean's instance?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. At his request?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Senator Ervin. Yes. You didn't go to him to employ a lawyer?
[Conferring.] What did Dean tell you? Mr. Dean wasn't soliciting
employment as an attorney, was he, at the time he invited you to come
and pay him a visit ?
Mr. Segretti. I don't believe so, Senator.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. Segretti. However, if Mr. Dean had informed me there was
such a prohibition against him acting in that capacity and he could
not so advise me in that capacity, that would have been the end of it
right there.
Senator Ervin. Did Mr. Dean ask you to claim the lawyer-client
privilege ?
Mr. Segretti. No ; he did not.
Senator Ervin. I do not know what it is that you would testify to,
but his testimony here indicated that after tliis time, you sort of
vanished from sight.
Mr. Segreiti. 1 did what ?
Senator Ervin. Did Mr. Dean give you advice to trust your two
good legs rather than a bum lawyer ? Is that what you claim to be
Mr. Sherman. Senator, we are not trying to hide any of the facts,
because ]Mr. Dash and Mr. Thompson are in possession of all of the
facts. The whole point is we maintained from the outset that there is
an attorney-client privilege and he is an attorney, and upon my ad-
vice, if he has this privilege, and we feel very strongly about the
attorney-client privilege, as all the lawyers on this committp'^ feel, he
ought to claim it, not to hide anything.
Senator Baker. You mean to claim it just for the sake of claiming
it?
Mr. Sherman. No ; because there is a legitimate attorney-client priv-
ilege here that ought to be recognized.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, I do not believe there is.
Mr. Dash. Even if there were an attorney-client privilege, if Mr.
Segretti were the client, he could waive it. If an attorney were sitting
there, he would have no right to waive another's privilege.
I do not see any principle involved if Mr. Segretti in fact wants to
tell us the facts, because he is the client, if he is the client, and could
4040
waive it by telling lis the facts. He has already told us the facts. In
my own view, there is no attorney-client privilege, but I do not see any
principle, if there were, if Mr. Segretti wants to tell us something that
he wants to tell us.
Mr. SHERjtAX. We are claiming the privilege, and I think the facts
make it clear that there is an attorney-client privilege, and if the
chairman wants to rule there is not and instruct him to answer it, I
will advise him to do so, of course.
Senator Ervin. The evidence just does not satisfy me that there was
any attorney-client privilege, and Mr. Segretti admits that he did not
go there for the purpose of employing Mr. Dean, that he went there in
response to a request from Mr. Dean, because Mr. Dean wanted to get
some information from him.
Mr. Sherman. I do not think that is the tenor of the testimony,
Senator.
Senator Ervin. Is that not true, Mr. Segretti ?
Mr. Segretti. I do not think that is absolutely correct. Senator. I
knew Mr. Dean was an attorney at that time, and from the brief dis-
cussion I had on what was told to me regarding the Post article, I cer-
tainly was desirous of receiving some legal advice at that time.
Senator Ervin. Well, now, did Mr. Dean call you at the instance of
Mr.Chapin?
Mr. Segretti. I believe I called Mr. Dean at that point, and he in-
formed me about that article.
Senator Ervin. Well, how did you know about the existence of Mr.
Dean ? Who did you get information from that there was such a per-
son as John W. Dean III ?
Mr. Segretti. I was introduced to Mr. Dean in June 1972 at the May-
flower Hotel by Mr. Strachan.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Strachan?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. In 1972 ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Senator Ervin. When did this meeting occur that Senator Weicker
was asking you about ?
Mr. Segretti. That was in October, I believe, 1972.
Senator Ervin. And Dean set up the meeting ? Is that not a fact ? Did
you not tell me that ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Senator Ervin. Yes.
Mr. Sherman. Senator, I often call my clients and ask them to come
into the office. That does not destroy the attorney-client ]>rivilege.
Senator Ervin. You do not call your clients to come into your office
before they become a client? He says he has no reason to believe Mr.
Dean was soliciting lecal business. I just hold as a matter of fact that
the attorney-client, the evidence is insufficient to show that the at-
torney-client privilege existed between this Avitness and Mr. Dean.
Mr. Sherman. Might I ask the Senator to look at, I think a tran-
script of the tape, which makes it clear that that, in fact, was a discus-
sion between the participants — that, in fact, there was an attorney-
client privilege.
4041
Senator Weicker. If I am not mistaken, the tape which is being
referred to, however, is a tape that was done on November 10, and I
am referring to a meeting of October 10.
Senator Ervin. And Mr. Dean has testified before this committee
that at that time he was engaged in efforts to cover up the so-called
Watergate affair, that he was engaged in an effort to obstruct justice.
]Mr. TiioMPSOx. Mr. Chairman, if I might, in referring to this
transcript that counsel referred to, part of it reads as follows :
Mr. Dean. I consider anything said in this conversation is completely privileged
by reason of the fact that I serve as general counsel over at the White House.
I am looking at this as it relates to Dwight Chapin, a member of the White
House staff. To our understanding, I will make no copies.
et cetera.
Mr. Steachan. OK, let me clear that such that I will feel confident in speaking
truthfully and freely at this point.
He says something to the effect that it will not be divulged unless I
give my consent.
I think it is clear from here that at least in Mr. Dean's mind, he was
talking about executive privilege at that point and not attorney-client
privilege.
Mr. Segretti. My recollection is on that tape. I put a statement
regarding attorney-client privilege. I have not seen a transcript of
that interview and neither has my attorney, Mr. Sherman.
Senator Ervix. Well, I hold it is a matter of fact that you do not
produce enough evidence to sustain the privilege. The burden is on
you to show that at the time of the conversation Senator Weicker
asked you about, the attorney-client privilege existed between you
and John W. Dean, and the evidence does not satisfy me and I do
not believe it satisfies the other members of the committee to that
effect. ^
Dean says here :
I served as general counsel over at the White House and looking at this as in
relation to Dwight Chapin, a member of the White House staff. To our under-
standing, I will make no copies of the transcript of this other than one for
myself and one I will send you for any use you may want to make of it
personally or to turn over to your attorney so that he has got a record of
exactly what we have talked about.
In other words, there is Mr. Dean's testimony to the effect that he
was not your attorney, that he would give you a copy of the transcript
so that vou could turn it over to your attorney.
Mr. Segretti. I never received a copy of that, and very honestly, I
do not remember that being said on the tape.
Mr. Shermax. Senator, in addition, Mr. Segretti did employ a Los
Angeles counsel who I talked to just in the past few weeks. He told
me that when he turned over certain documents to John Dean — which
apparently, John Dean without authorization turned over to this com-
mittee — he considered John Dean cocounsel for Mr. Strachan and Mr.
Segretti. That was another attornev in Los Anq-eles who advanced this
idea after I asked him why documents were turned over.
Senator Ervix^. This is a transcript of the tape and here is Dean
talking. He says : "He will give Mr. Segretti a transcript of the con-
versation so Mr. Segretti can turn it over to Mr. Segretti's attorney."
4042
Now, if Mr. Dean had been Mr. Segretti's attorney, he would not have
said he was going to give it to him, he would have just kept a copy.
I am going to hold that thei'e is not sufficient evidence to justify
the conclusion that any attorney-client relationship existed between
Mr. Segretti and Mr. Dean. I am going to instruct you to answer the
question.
Mr. Sherman. Then just for the record, because we feel there are
other reasons which I have explained to Mr. Dash why this point is
extremely important, because we feel Mr. Dean, without authoriza-
tion and in his relationship, obtained information from Mr. Segretti
and Mr. Segretti's Los Angeles lawyer and turned it over to this com-
mittee, and we feel there were violations on his part. If you are
forcins: the witness to answer under penalty of contempt of Congress
if he doesn't, I would like to make an objection. And, of course, if he
doesn't want to answer, he has no choice.
Senator Ervin. I hold that there's no privilege for several reasons.
He certainly didn't ask Mr. Fielding and Mr. Dean both to be his
witnesses.
Mr. Sherman. He is testifvinir that when he met with Mr. Dean and
Mr. Fielding, he asked at that time if there was an attorney -client re-
lationship because he wouldn't speak with Mr. Fielding present unless
it was told to him that there was such a relationship.
Certainly if there is a secretarv present in mv office, that is part of
the privileged communications, because she is an agent of the attorney
at that time, which Mr. Fielding was.
Senator Baker. Mr. Chairman, do I understand it to be the Chair's
ruling that the witness and counsel have not made out a case to sup-
port attorney-client privilege?
Senator Ervin. Yes. I direct the witness to answer the question.
Senator B.ucer. And that the witness is instructed to answer Sen-
ator Weicker^ question.
Is that the state of affairs ?
Senator ER\^N. Yes.
Mr. Segretti. I would be ver\^ happy to answer vour question. Sen-
ator Weicker. However, I have really forgotten what it was.
Senator Weicker. "\Yhv don't you just go ahead and describe to the
committer discussions held in the office located in the Executive Office
Buildiner on the night of October 10, at which place, Mr. Dean and
Mr. Fielding and yourself were present?
Mr. Segretti. To the best of mv recollection, the meeting lasted
perhaps a half hour, perhaps an hour. He had a copy of the Post
article that had just come out relating to allegations by Mr. Young.
Mr. Dean read through that to me, line by line and paragraph by
paragraph, and we discussed the truth or falsitv of that article. At
the end of that period of time, there was a brief discuSvsion about me
making a statement or writing up a statement to be considered the
next dav for release.
At about that point, to the best of mv recollection, the meeting
ended and Mv. Dean drove mvself, and I believe Mr. Fieldinc was in
the car. over to a hotel or motel in Crvstal City here in Washington,
at which time, I went in and checked in under another name. They
waited in the car while I did that. Then I went back, got my luggage,
and went to sleep.
4043
The next morning — well, that is
Senator Weicker. Just go ahead in narrative form as you are
doing now.
Mr. Segretti. The next morning, I prepared a brief statement — I
believe the next morning. I was pretty tired that evening. Mr. Field-
ing came by — it is hard for me to guess the time — 9 o'clock, 10 o'clock
in the morning. He had another statement that had been prepared by
someone else — I don't know whether it was Mr, Dean or Mr. Fielding
or others — essentially, that was a denial of most of the allegations.
Something was said to the effect that he wanted me to go over it and
he had to take it back to a meeting at the White House. I don't be-
lieve I was ever told what the meeting involved or who was involved
in the meeting, that type of thing, and he said, read over the statement,
there was time pressure. He read over my statement at the time and he
thought that my statement I had prepared was better.
I read over the statement, I made some corrections on it. There was
some pressure of time, that is certainly clear in my mind, and he left.
Later on, Mr. Dean, I believe, came by where I was staying and
stated something to the effect that the media people decided that things
will die of their own volition rather than making any statement
whatsoever.
Then there was a brief discussion at some point — I don't know
whether it was then or later by phone — it is hard to recall fully; it
was just a few weeks prior to the election — discussion about what I
should do in the meantime, and there was a social discussion regarding
how nice the Greek islands were at that time of the year. But I took
it at that point to be more of a social discussion than anything else.
Then there was a discussion at some period about going back out
West. I told him I wanted to go back to the Los Angeles area and
decided for me to travel by train, and I did.
Senator Weicker. During the course of the meeting on October 10,
did you give essentially the details of your activities to Mr. Dean as
you have given them to this committee — in essence ?
Mr. Segretti. Not in as much detail, but certainly the general out-
lines, yes.
Senator Weicker. The broad outlines.
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Senator Weicker. Now, may I read to you testimony which was
given before this committee by Mr. Richard Moore. He is now referring
to a meeting that took place on October 15.
I can perhaps summarize very quickly. We had that meeting on Friday. The
story appeared Sunday and of course it was a major story. Monday morning,
Mr. Ziegler would he sub.iect to press, a lot of queries at his press conference
(a) ; (b) I rather think Mr. Ehrlichman was going on one of the Sunday inter-
view shows and there was a meeting in the Roosevelt Room to discuss both
those things, how do we respond to this and frankly. Senator Weicker, we did
think. I did. and most of us. that the thrust of it as far as the White House was
concerned, Chapin's role of hiring his old college chum is what he called it. was
wrong, is wrong but we thought the meaning of it is apparent since to get it
closer and closer on the Presidency required that there was a political thing in
the story right in the political season and required, of course, as honest an answer
as we could make but also one that takes into consideration the charge was rather
political so we met and discussed how it could be properly handled.
Now, the response, as I understand it, the brief denial by Mr. Ziegler
that came forth on your story was as follows :
4044
I will not dignify with comment stories based on hearsay, characterization,
innuendo, or guilt by association. That is the White House position.
Do you feel that that was an honest response in light of the informa-
tion which you had given to Mr. Dean and Mr. Fielding in the previous
days ?
Mr. Segretti. The trouble with giving an answer to that question is
that the Post article did contain many allegations that were in fact
not true. There were many truths in that article, however. That is the
best I can do to answer that.
Senator "Weicker. But at that time, John Dean, counsel to the Pres-
ident, had essentially — essentially — the story that you have told to us
here today?
Mr. Segretti. I believe he did, yes.
Senator Weicker. I have no further questions, Mr. Chairman.
Senator Ervin. Senator Inouye.
Senator Inouye. Thank you ; sir.
Mr. Segretti, the city of Washington is a city of rumors and there is
a very persistent one floating around involving you. I would like to
give you an opportunity to respond to this rumor.
Do you know Mr. Arthur Bremer ?
Mr. Segretti. I do not.
Senator Inouye. What does the Greek symbol or letter, delta, mean
to you?
Mr. Segretti. Are you referring to my notes, Senator ?
Senator Inouye. Yes, sir.
Mr. Segretti. I believe that means Mr. Nixon, President Nixon.
Senator Inouye. Who is delta 1 ?
Mr. Segretti. I believe that was, in those notes, Mr. Chapin. Those
were just my own shorthand way of making notes.
Senator Inouye. And delta 2 ?
Mr. Segretti. I believe in that context, it was Mr. Kalmbach.
Senator Inouye. And delta 3 ?
Mr. Segretfi. I don't know whether I had a delta 3 or not. It would
be Mr. Strachan, I would imagine.
Senator Inouye. At the time of your unusual activities, were you
aware that you were breaking the law when you forceably opened a
window and placed a stink bomb in headquarters ?
Mr. Sbgretii. Senator, I was not aw^are of how that stink bomb was
going to be put in that headquarters. I did not at any time envision
that the — that it would be done in that manner.
Senator Inouye. Were you aware that it was a violation of the law
when a political radio commercial was placed under false sponsorship ?
Mr. Segretti. I didn't believe I really thought of it at that time, but
I certainly know it was wrong.
Senator Inouye. Were you aware that it was a crime to falsely
order flowers, limousines, pizzas, liquor, without anv intentions to
pay?
Mr. Segretti. I didn't think of it in those terms at that particular
time. I know it is wrong and I certainly regret it.
Senator Inouye. Were you aware that it was unlawful to send sala-
cious and libelous letters ?
Mr. Segretti. I am certainly aware of it now.
Senator Inouye. And the fraudulent use of U.S. mails?
I
4045
Mr. Segretti. Yes ; although very honestly, Senator, at that time,
we just didn't think of those things. I think to a great extent, we got
caught up in the zeal of the activity and the zeal of the campaign
and these things were not done with any great forethought or
foresight.
Senator Inouye. Throughout all that time, none of you discussed
the possible criminal involvement of these acts?
Mr. Segretti. I don't recall doing that until, really, after the fact.
Senator Ixouye. Now that you look back, wouldn't you say that just
about everything you did was a crime of one sort or another ?
Mr. Segretti. No ; I don't believe I can really characterize it in those
terms. Certainly, many of the things were improper, but things such
as putting a picket at a rally or something, I don't believe that is
illegal.
Senator Inouye. Thank you very much, sir.
Senator Ervix. You don't call forgery or libel a mere prank, do you ?
Mr. Segretti. Senator, I don't call any of the things I did at this
point in time pranks. I have stated many times before this committee
today that they have no place in the American political system. I
don't believe there should be pranks as such or dirty tricks, or how-
ever you want to term it, in the American political system.
Senator Ervin. Well, it appears here from your testimony that you
did in effect forge several letters, that you uttered libelous statements,
and I am glad that you say you don't classify those things as pranks
or mere dirty tricks.
Mr. Segretti. Senator, you know, it is really hard to draw the line
between a lot of these things. Many people have said that pranks in
the American political system have been traditional and in some quar-
ters, humorous and acceptable, and it is a good thing. Well, certainly,
there should be some light and himior in life and I am the first one to
say that there should be. But I don't believe many of these things so
classified in other contexts as humorous and funny should be present.
Senator Ervtcx. You testified under examination by Senator Tal-
madge that you traveled from Washington to, I believe Philadel-
phia
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Senator Er\t;n [continuing]. And then to Chicago and as you trav-
eled — you went by train ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Senator Ervix. What were you trying to do, hide your whereabouts ?
Mr. Segretti. Senator, at that time, I was subject to many news-
paper stories regarding me. I remember getting off, changing trains
in Philadelphia and seeing my picture on the front page and going
up to Chicago and seeing my picture on the front page up there.
And I certainly did not want to talk to any reporters at that period
of time, that is correct. It would have been difficult for me to honestly
deny all the questions put to me and I didn't want, really, to be put
in that position. Plus the fact that it would have been extremely
embarrassing to President Nixon, obviously.
The election was upon us or upon the scene, and I thought it would
just be best for all concerned to stay out of sight until after the
election.
Senator Ervin. Did you talk to anyone about staying out of sight
before you did stay out of sight ?
4046
Mr. Segretti. Mr. Dean.
Senator Ervin. Mr. Dean ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Senator Ervin. And he was not your counsel at that time ?
Mr. Segretti. Well, I disagree with that. I think he was, but in any
case, he agreed.
Senator Ervin. Well, one time down in North Carolina, there was an
accused in a case that had no lawyer. He had no lawyer, so the judge
asked him — asked this lawyer if he would represent the accused. He
said, "Yes."
The judge said, "Well, take the accused out to the side room and
give him the very best advice you can."
He went out to the side room with the accused. In a few minutes,
the lawyer came back without the accused and the judge told the
sheriff to look out in the side room and bring the accused in. The
sheriff came back and reported that the accused was not there.
The judge asked the lawyer, "What does this mean ?"
The lawyer said, "You told me to give him the very best advice I
could, and I did."
So Mr. Dean — assuming that he was your lawyer — seemed to have
given you what you considered good advice, because you followed it.
Mr. Segretti. It certainly sounded like good advice at the time.
Senator Ervin. And didn't you adopt similar tactics after the elec-
tion was all over ?
Mr. Segretti. No, I proceeded to my residence about 2 days after the
election.
Senator Ervin. Weren't you sort of out-of-pocket here about the
time this committee was set up ? We had a little difficulty finding you,
or so I am informed by the staff.
Mr. Segretti. I don't believe so. I was always living at my places of
residence imder my name and I don't believe — many newspapermen
found me. They didn't seem to have much difficulty.
Senator Ervin. Do you have any further questions, Mr. Dash?
Mr. Dash. I just have a few questions.
Senator Gumey asked you about the number of people that you
actually had working for you and I think you said something about 11.
Mr. Segretti. I just made a guess.
Mr. Dash. Actually, your expense record that we have shows that
you actually paid 22 people and that counting those who worked for
some of the others, would bring it to 28. Following a request that you
have made to us, I won't go down the list and name them.
Mr. Segretti. Fine.
Mr. Dash. Now, even if there were only 28, which I take it is not I
necessarily a large number when one speaks of thousands working in
the campaign. Nevertheless, isn't it true, Mr. Segretti, that only one
agent acting in the kind of arena that you were acting in, doing the
kind of work that, say, Mr. Benz was doing, or the work that was
being done in California, could be quite destructive of a candidate's
opportunities ? It doesn't take very many to do it J
Mr. Segretti. It is possible ; yes, sir, assuming that that is correct.
Mr. Dash. The particular letter that we have spoken about, the
very scurrilous letter about Senator Humphrey and Senator Jackson
under Senator Muskie's campaign stationery — Mr. Chapin thought
4047
i that for very little money, one person got quite a bit of return out of
it. So you got quite a bit of pack for one person.
Mr. Segretti. That is the danger for the type of activities that I en-
gaged in.
Mr. Dash. WelL I would like the record to show, so that we are not
misled by numbers, that the fact that there were only 28, that that
does not minimize the impact that 28 may have had on the election.
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. Now, when you were informed that you were going to be
called before the grand jury, you did have a meeting with Mr. Dean
in Miami, did you not ?
Mr. SEGRET-ri. Yes, I did.
Mr. Dash. Did the question come up concerning whether or not
certain parties should be dealt with if it should come up to the grand
]ury
Mr. Shermax. Senator, again we are going to raise — he went back
specifically, I think, to discuss with Mr. Dean his legal rights. If the
Senator makes the same ruling, we will answer the question. We think
this conversation is particularly within the attorney-client privilege
and I believe Mr. Segretti will testify that he was consulting with
' Mr. Dean in that capacity.
Senator Ervix. I think I would hold that the evidence totally fails
to show any attorney-client relationship between Mr. Segretti and
' Mr. Dean.
Mr. Shermax. And that would include this latter meeting?
Senator Ervix. Yes. I would think that is evident.
Mr. Dash. Following that, did you testify before the Senate — did
fyou talk to representatives of the Senate Committee on Administra-
tive Practices in November of 1972 ?
IVIr. Segretti. I never discussed any substance with them, no, sir.
Mr. Dash. No, but did you tell representatives of that committee
that because you had not consulted an attorney, you did not have an
attorney ?
Mr. Segretti. I believe my statement was to the effect that I did
not have an attorney in Los Angeles at that time and I wished to con-
sult with one. At that time. I was in the process, I believe, of obtain-
ing counsel in Los Angeles, which I did, based on Mr. Dean's recom-
mendation.
Mr. Dash. Well, relying on the chairman's ruling, and I will again
ask the question : In ]\Iiami when you went to see Mr. Dean prior to
your being called before the grand jury, was there a discussion con-
cerning certain names of persons you had dealt with during your op-
erations coming up before the grand jury ?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Mr. Dash. What names were there concern about?
Mr. Segretti. Mr. Chapin, Mr. Strachan and Mr. Kalmbach.
Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Dean indicate that he might be able to do
something about those names not being — coming up ?
iSIr. Segretti. Yes.
Mr. Dash. Could you elaborate a little more on that?
Mr. Segretti. He said something to the effect that he might be able
to put parameters on the inquiry. He seemed to be particularly con-
cerned about Mr. Kalmbach's name coming up.
4048
Mr. Dash. All right. Then when you actually went to testify before
the grand jury, did you have a meeting with Mr. Silbert?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, I did just prior.
Mr. Dash. At that time he was acting as the principal Assistant
U.S. Attorney and in charge of the Watergate investigation?
Mr. Segretti. I don't know his exact role but I believe that is essen-
tially correct.
Mr. Dash. During his questioning of you, or preparation with you,
before your testimony before the grand jury, did a discussion come up
concerning Mr. Kalmbach ?
Mr. Segretti. Brief reference was made; yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. How was that reference — how did Mr. Silbert in any way
refer to Mr. Kalmbach ?
Mr. Segretti. He said something to the effect, "Were you receiving
funds from Mr. K?"
Mr. Dash. He used the letter "K" ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. Did that seem strange to you at the time ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Mr. Dash. "What impression did j^ou get?
Mr. Segretti. The impression I had was that there was something
going on behind the scenes.
Mr. Dash. Did you believe then that you were really not being asked
full questions concerning 3'our knowledge of these facts?
Mr. Segretti. Well, I have to look upon it, upon my perspective now.
I believe the questions they asked relating to the Watergate burglary
and wiretap were full and complete. I think they did an adequate job
in that regard.
Mr. Dash. There was no effort to ask you any questions concerning
Mr. Kalmbach or how you were paid ?
Mr. Segretti. Well, there was that very brief prior discussion with
Mr. Silbert which did not go into any detail, and during my testimony
before the grand jury nothing was asked by the U.S. attorneys re-
garding that.
Mr. Dash. The only references Mr. Silbert made were to a Mr. "K"
and not to Mr. Kalmbach to you ?
Mr. Segretti. That is right. That was not in front of the grand jury. :
Mr. Dash. No. no. not in front of the grand jury, before you went
before the grand jury?
Mr. Segretti. That is right.
Mr. Dash. Did Mr. Silbert ask vou any question concerning Mr.
Chapin ?
Mr. Segretti. In the prior meeting ?
Mr. Dash. In the meeting prior to
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
Mr. Dash. How full was his inquiry on that ?
Mr. Segretti. T think I gave him the general outline that I was first
contacted by Mr. Strachan and Mr. Chapin.
Mr. Dash. "\Vlien you appeared before the grand jury, did he ask
you any questions concerning Mr. Kalmbach and Mr. Chapin?
Mr. Segretti. To the best of mv recollection he did not.
Mr. Dash. But did you in fact mention Mr. Kalmbach and Mr.
Chapin and, if so, under what circumstances ?
4049
Mr. Segretti. A g:rand juror asked me questions relating to those
individuals, and I believe I answered all of them.
Mr. Dash. Specifically to those individuals, did the grand juror
know of those individuals ?
Mr. Segretti. No, not to my knowledge.
Mr. Dash. How did it come up ?
Mr. Segretti. It is very hard to remember, Mr. Dash. That was a
long time ago.
Mr. Dash. Weren't you asked how you were paid and how you got
involved ?
Mr. Segretti. Let me give you my best recollection of that. I have
not seen a grand jury transcript of that, of course, but there was a
question by a grand juror regarding my financial arrangements, who
they were with and when was the last money received, and I told
them — I told them it was Mr. Kalmbach and the last sum I received,
I gave them the date as best I could recall it, and I told them the sum.
Mr. Dash. And actually at that time you were really following
what Mr. Dean had suggested to you in Miami, not to answer questions
or volunteer anything that was not asked but to try to keep Mr. Kalm-
bach and Mr. Chapin's names out, but if the questions were put, to tell
the whole ball of wax.
Mr. Segretti. Certainly.
Mr. Dash. All right.
Mr. Segretti. I had no intention to perjure myself before the grand
jury.
Mr. Dash. But if that juror had not asked that question, Mr. Cha-
pin's and Mr. Kalmbach 's names w^ould not have gone before the grand
jurv ?
Mr. Segretti. I don't believe they would have.
Mr. Dash. I have no further questions.
Mr. Thompson. Mr. Segretti, when the question was asked as to
who was paying you, was the question also asked what you were being
paid for ?
Mr. Segretti. I don't recall exactly, Mr, Thompson. There were
some things said that I was engaged in getting pickets, rival pickets,
in other words a Muskie picket in a Humphrey rally or what have
you, that type of thing, but no details were ever gone into, just very
general.
Mr. Thompson. Did you discuss that in the grand jury ?
Mr. Segretti. I believe so.
Mr. Thompson. Did you discuss that with Mr. Silbert?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Mr. Tho:mpson. Beforehand. You have testified about what might
be described as two different categories of activities, things that might
be what have been referred to as Dick Tuck type of activities, per-
haps — amusing things — and things that were possibly violations of
criminal law and not in any wav amusing.
'V^^at are we to understand about Mr. Silbert? Are we getting the
correct impression now? Did he understand the full scope of your
activities or, to the best of your knowledge, did he only think you were
engaged in the prank-type things which we have heard testified about
here for several weeks ?
4050
Mr. Segretti. I do not really know. It is hard to guess ; but to the
best of my knowledge, Mr. Silbert had no knowledge of all the activi-
ties that I engaged in, and probably thought, although this is pure
speculation, that I was engaged in, shall we say, the prank-type
activities.
Mr. Thompson. Did he ask you what you were being paid for ?
Mr. Segretti. He may have. I really do not recall.
Mr. Thompson. Did he ask you how much you had been paid ?
Mr. Segretti. I do not believe he did.
Mr. Thompson. Getting back briefly to who knew what and when,
I understand in your meeting of October 10, Mr. Dean and ]\Ir. Field-
ing were both present, and did you discuss the Humphrey-Jackson
letter with them at that time ?
Mr. Segretti. I believe that was mentioned.
Mr. Thompson. Did you discuss Mr. Chapin's involvement with
them at that time ?
Mr. Segretti. I cannot say whether I did or not. I just do not recall.
Mr. Thompson. Did you have a recollection as to the scope of their
knowledge when you left that meeting with regard to what your acti^d-
ties had been?
Mr. Segretti. I certainly had the general outline of it. I was very
tired that evening ; I had been up the night before traveling.
Mr. Thompson. You talked about the Humphrey-Jackson letter
and you talked about some of the hard stuff anyway ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. The question is whether or not you mentioned other
individuals, Mr. Chapin and other people, who you had dealt with in
setting this up ?
Mr. Segretti. I do not know whether that was brought up at that
time or not.
Mr. Thompson. Did you have
Mr. Segretti. Mr. Dean, so far as I know, knew about those indi-
viduals at that time. I had been introduced to Mr. Dean by Mr.
Strachan so he knew about Mr. Strachan, and he knew that Mr.
Strachan knew me.
Mr. Thompson. You assumed he knew what you were doing — what
Mr. Strachan had done ?
Mr. Segretti. I just — I do not believe I made any assumption at
that point.
Mr. Thompson. Did you have any subsequent meetings, say that
month, the month of October, with anyone at the White House?
Mr. Segretti. No, I did not; not to my recollection.
Mr. Thompson. Fielding, Strachan, Dean, Chapin, anyone?
Mr. Segretti. No ; none.
Mr. Thompson. Was your next meeting with anyone at the White
House — with Mr. Dean ?
Mr. Segretti. It was Mr. Dean in Palm Springs, Calif.
Mr. Thompson. Is that when he taped the conversation that we
have alluded to?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. Going back to October 10, I believe he suggested
that you keep a low profile.
Mr. Segretti. Yes, sir.
4051
Mr. Thompson. Is he the one who suggested the train trip ?
Mr. Sec.retti. I believe he did.
Mr. Thompsox. Senator Talmadge referred to someone asking you
whether or not you thought the Greek Islands were pretty at this
time of year, something to that effect ; was that Mr. Dean?
Mr. Segretti. Yes. I had the impression that he had taken such
a trip at one time and he said they were.
yiv. Thompson. Did he ask you if j'ou needed any money ?
Mr. Segretti. There was a reference to that, I believe, that evening
around October 10 or whatever, whether I had sufficient funds to
sustain myself until the election, and I told him I did, and that was
about the end of that.
Mr. Thompson. Did he, at any time, offer to get you a job or indi-
I cate that perhaps he had a job for you out of the country ?
Mr. Segretti. That was after I returned to my residence after
the election.
Mr. Thompson. About mid-November ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Mr. Thompson. "When you met in Palm Springs with him again,
did he indicate that he had discussed this matter with anyone else in
the l\Tiite House ?
Mr. Segretti. I do not recall that ; no, sir.
Senator Weicker. Just to make sure the record is straight, I under-
stood your previous answers, after the meeting of October 10, as I
understand it, you went to a hotel over in Crystal City ; is that correct?
Mr. Segretti. That is correct.
Senator Weicker. And you did meet with Mr. Dean again on Octo-
ber 11?
Mr. Segretti. If those dates — I believe it was the next day he came
by to the motel room ; yes.
Senator Weicker. With a form of denial ?
Mr. Segretti. No ; I believe that was Mr. Fielding who came by with
that, and Mr. Dean came by later in the day, if my memory is correct
on that.
Senator Weicker. On October 11 ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Senator Weicker. Did you stay in the motel past the 11th ? When did
you leave the motel ?
Mr. Segretti. I do not know whether I left later that day or the next
day ; it was rather soon then.
Senator Weicker. So it was Mr. Fielding who came by first?
Mr. Segretti. That is my best recollection, and then Mr. Dean.
Senator Weicker. Right ; and then Mr. Dean ?
Mr. Segretti. Yes.
Senator Weicker, "V^Hiat was the nature of this denial? Was this
something that you were supposed to sign ?
Mr. Segretti. That was my impression ; yes.
Senator Weicker. Was it in affidavit form ?
Mr. Segretti. No ; just seemed to be a statement.
Senator Weicker. A statement which they attempted to get your
signature on?
Mr. Segretti. I do not recall if there was a signature line on that or
not, but certainly my approval.
4052
Senator Weicker. I see. I have no further questions.
Mr. Dash. Mr. Chairman, I do not want to extend the hearing but I
think I want to make sure our record is clear. I think, as our record
from a prior phase of this hearing already shows, that the only rea-
son the FBI gave, and the U.S. attorney gave, for not pursuing this
particular matter is there was a belief that dirty tricks did not involve
criminal behavior.
Mr. Segretti, you now have pleaded guilty, have you not ?
Mr. Segretti. That is right.
Mr. Dash. In the U.S. district court. To what have you pleaded
guilty ?
Mr. Segretii. To three counts of 18 U.S.C. 612, which is distributing!
or causing to be published unauthorized campaign literature, in other
words, not properly attributed to the source.
Mr. Dash. And if, in fact, Mr. Silbert had pursued all of the ques-
tions he could have pursued concerning your activities, your testimony
before this committee is you would have told him everything that you
have done. You would not have withheld anything from Mr. Silbert ?
Mr. Segretti. Well, I do not know how I would have acted — reacted
to that. I may have taken the fifth amendment at some point. I just do
not know.
Mr. Dash. But you did not have that opportunity because Mr. Sil-
bert did not pursue all these questions with you; did he?
Mr. Segretti. No, he did not.
Mr. Dash. I have no further questions.
Senator Ervin. I understood you to say you told Mr. Silbert you
had engaged in certain activities for which you had been paid by
Mr. Kalmbach, and you outlined in a general way what the nature of
those activities were.
Mr. Segretti. Very general. Senator.
Senator Ervin. Yes. And there was nothing to prevent him from
asking you any further questions if he had had any desire to learn any
more?
Mr. Segretti. No. I believe that is correct. The door may have opened
at that point.
Senator Ervin. Any further questions?
Mr. Segretti, I want to thank you on behalf of the committee for
the cooperation that you have given us — the full cooperation. You
have answered all our questions freely, including those where you re-
lied on the attorney-client privilege that existed between you and John
Dean, and it has been very helpful to the committee. You apparently
made a frank disclosure of things, and you have not tried, so far as I
can tell, to evade answering any question you thought we were entitled
to have answered.
Mr. Segretti. Thank you. Senator. I would like to say it certainly
has not been easy for me or anybody in my position to make some of
these disclosures because, certainly, I regret sincerely many of the acts
I was engaged in. However, I do feel it was necessary, and hopefully
this will, to some extent, in the future prevent other individuals from
getting in the posture that I am today.
I do feel a benefit from these hearings, at least in this area, will more
or less cleanse the system for some time to come. Thank you.
4053
Mr. Sherman. Senator, I think I would also like to thank both Mr.
■ Lenzner, Mr. Lackritz, in particular and, of course, Mr. Dash and Mr.
Thompson, because they have been very kind to us over the past few
months. Thank you.
Senator Ervin. Thank you.
The committee will stand in recess until 10 o'clock tomorrow.
[Whereupon, at 4:45 p.m., the hearing was recessed, to reconvene
at 10 a.m., Thursday, October 4, 1973.]
4055
EXHIBITS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
Exhibit No. 158
WAKE UP LIBERALS
I
I
/.-fit -*«,• \ -'if=Vs«^ '' '
■.>•■:'
IS mis THE MAN YOU WANT
THE OVAL OFFICE?
4056
Ed Muskie would bq no different
from the Nixons, Agnews, Mitchells,
I
Connallys we have now.
He is the candidate of the
Democratic Right, His victory would
be a victory for the old-line reaction-
ary elements in the party.
Will we sit on our hands again
until Muskie locks up the nomination
in the cigar-filled back rooms at
Miami? Or will we work for a New
Politics? He * s a sell-out, and we
know it.
Let's do something about it.
4057
Muskie has always voted against
gun control, (He violated the law in
1965 by hunting in a baited field in
Maryland and was fined, ) He sits
cheek-by-jowl in with the rancid
National Rifle Association lobby.
Muskie is the only of the so-
called Liberal Democrats who crawled
into bed with racist-supercop Frank
Rizzo when Rizzo beat liberal Thatcher
Longstreth for Mayor of Philadelphia
and now plans a meeting with Rizzo in
December to sell out Liberalism for
"law »n order".
4058
Muskie added himself publicly to
the list of political opportunitists in
opposing abortion reform — denying the
right of a woman to have control over
her own body. He is a sexist,
Muskie has told Black Americans
that there is no room for them in his
politics. Blacks are the backbone of
the Democratic party, and Mr, Muskie
told them to go to hell. This is
Muskie 's way of playing on Southern
Strategy, We don't want a racist to
represent Democrats in 1972,
WHAT KIND OF MAN IS ED MUSKIE ?
He's a wheeling-dealing, ward-
healing politician who will fit right
in with the Daley, Meany, Johnson gang
in the Democratic party.
He's sold out. Let's not be
fooled.
We blew our chance in I968; let's
not blow it again.
^O*"
CITIZENS FOR fK tlGER/lt ALTERNATIve
4059
Exhibit No. 159
DAIEY AT I «M CONVENTION IN CHIC ACO
I The si/ence wos ominous.
■ services Both Medny and Daley hjse
I made il clear thai they have been mor-
lally oftended, and neither is one to for-
1 give or forget an insult, much less a pub-
< lie humiliation
"This mans ideas aren't liberal,'
growled Meany last week "This man's
ideas are crazy " Meany s anger has
been building up It is not jusi that he ob-
jects to McGovern's positions on such
issues as pot, abortion and the Viet Nam
War He has also developed a distrust
of the candidate that aides feel can nev-
er t>e dispelled The antagonism dates
back to 1962, when McGovcrn ran for
the Senate from South Dakota Hard-
pressed for cash in a lough campaign
he asked the AH -c lO for a $30.(MKJ loan
The request came lo Meany. who or-
dered 'Give him the money With
that Meany concluded that he had an-
other Senator who was safe for labor
That turned out to be only partly
true McGovern dutifully voted the la-
1 bor line much of the lime, but he
' flunked one crucial lest He voled
against culling ofT a filibuster thai was
preventing a vote on repeal of the righl-
lo-work provision of the Taft-Hartley
Acl— a sacred mailer with labor He
subsequently cast many other votes thai
' were considered anti-labor To Meany,
he was an ingrate He made no notable
effort to conciliate the labor chieftain
Typically, he said thai since he had
made a mistake on right-to-work
Meany should confess that he had been
wrong about the Viet Nam War By con-
vention time. Meany was mad enough
j to have the A( ! C If) distribute a 46-pagc
attack on McGovern's legislative record
I —as if McGovern were the Republican
presidential candidate Most of the rest
of big labor is following Meany's lead
Unless he relents, ihey will not yield, ei-
ther It could cost McGovcrn help ^
. the polls as well as S5,(KH),(KK) in labor
campaign funds
I initially. Daley was not as angry at
TIME. JULY J4.197J
MEANY IN MIAMI (EACH MOTEL lOMY
The distrust wos deep.
McGovcrn as Meany was McGovern
did not encourage delegates to file in
his behalf in Chicago, he wanted the
mayor's support if il was at all possi-
ble But he forfeited it w hen Daley s del-
egates were replaced at the convention
by the challengers, including some of
the mayor's sworn enemies, among
ihem Alderman William Singer Watch-
ing the proceedings from a distance at
his summer home in Ntichigan. Ihe may -
or maintained an ominous silence while
his supporters vowed that they would
never back McGovcrn Said Chicago
Alderman Viio Marzullo "Only the
Lord or Mayor Daley could activate me
for McGovern "
At this point Ihe Lord would be the
belter bet "To Daley.' says an aide.
"McGovcrn is the classic Methodist
— Ihe kind of guy who doesn't sweat
No one is more difficult for an Irish
Catholic to get along with than one of
those non-sweating Methodists "' As de-
vout a Democrat as he Is a Catholic,
Daley would agonize over abandoning
Ihe presidential nominee But short of
that drastic step, there is plenty he can
do lo express his displeasure with Mc-
Govern He can cut off Cook County
funds lo McGovern or hamper the dis-
tribution of his literature or harass his
workers On Election Day. Daley's pre-
cinct workers will be strategically sta-
tioned at polling places. Conceivably.
Daley's services may not be as indis-
pensable as Ihey once were — al least so
the McGovern forces hope A group of
reformers called the Independent Pre-
THi NATION
cinct Organi/ation. led by Bill Singer,
have developed a grassroots organiza-
tion that has proved as effective as Da-
ley's in some local races If it can be
mobilized for McGovern. it might do
Ihe work that Daley seems likely to
shun Then, too. Daley might eventually
be moved lo help McGovern — a lif.lc
If Meany and Daley remain hostile
to McGovern in the campaign or are
at least neutralized. President Nixon has
an advantage he would not have
dreamed possible before the conven-
tion Spokesmen for the Old Politics
though they may be, the two bosses have
enormous appeal for a large part of Ihe
electorate — the ethnics." the kind of
voter that was underrepresentcd at the
Democratic Convention and is likely to
resent McGovern If these voters switch
to the Republicans in large numbers, a
sizable chunk of the Democratic coali-
tion will disappear Would Meany and
Daley, loyal Democrats all these years,
welcome such a development'' In the
past, they have taken exception to the
President Yet they have also learned
to live with him. though not very com-
fortably They are not sure they would
be as comfortable with McGovern. who
so far has made life distinctly trouble-
some for them They might be willing
10 wail out another four years of Re-
publican rule in order to get the kind
of Democrat they want It is Candidate
George McGovern's task to convince
them that it is not worth the wait, that
even if he is not their kind of Dem-
ocrat, it is still in their interest to sup-
port him in Ihe coming campaign
THE DELEGATES
Eve's Operatives
Gazing around the convention
through her blue-tinted glasses. Gloria
Steinem pronounced with satisfaction
"We've changed the population here It
almost looks like the country " What
she meant was that women are 52Vi of
Ihe nation's population, and last week
close to 40'f of the convention dele-
gates were women — a dramatic jump
over their I3'v representation al the
1968 Democratic Convention Decora-
tive as the women were in their bell-bot-
tom trousers, miniskirts, jeans and hoi
pants, they were not there to be on dis-
play but 10 seek power Except for a
couple of setbacks, they got enough to
satisfy and even surprise them
The National Women's Political
Caucus had worked hard to get women
elected as delegates under the liberal-
ized McGovern-Fraser Commission
rules At Ihe convention, they turned
up everywhere in positions of power
— on the Credentials Committee, the
Rules Committee, the Platform Com-
mittee. They came in all sizes, ages and
accents They ranged from Katherine
Harjo. 17. a Seminole Indian from
Oklahoma to Jessie Sanders, 79, a po-
litical pro from South Dakota. The con-
25
4060
[From the Chicago Dally News, July 11, 1972]
IBKED BY Losses, Meant Shuns Convention Hall
(By William J. Eaton)
MLA.MI Beach.— The 77-year-old president of the AFL-CIO, George Meany, has
stayed away from the convention hall.
But Meany's top political adviser, Al Barkan, and about 50 officers of AFL-CIO
unions, watched glumly Monday night as roll call votes registered major victories
for Sen. George S. McGovern.
Meany let loose an across-the-board blast Monday at the foreign and domestic
record of the South Dakota senator, in a last-ditch effort to prevent McGovern's
nomination.
A 23-page "white paper" was released by a Meany aide during the McGovem
camp's successful fight to seat all 271 of his California delegates.
The paper is certain to make good ammunition for President Nixon if McGov-
ern is nominated.
"Senator McGovern has adopted the 'new populism' as a key campaign slogan,"
the AFL-CIO document says. "Yet the record shows that he has repeatedly voted
wrong on legislation affecting working people and the trade union movement."
The "white paper" attacks McGovern's votes dating back to 1957 and scores
his views on civil rights, amnesty, marijuana, crime, violent protests, Vietnam,
Israel and defense budget cuts.
In general, McGovern is pictured as weak on such key labor issues as minimum
wage increases and federal union shop legislation. The document implies that
McGovern has been indifferent on civil rights and is pro-Arab in the Middle East
dispute.
Jerry Wurf. pro-McGovern leader of the AFI^CIO State, County and Municipal
Employees Union, shook his head in dismay over the labor opposition to the
apparent winner.
"Labor cannot dictate to the Democratic Party and now Meany and the others
are painting themselves into a corner," Wurf lamented. "It's sickening."
Leonard Woodcock, president of the United Auto Workers, has been a behind-
the-scenes McGovem supporter. His union is expected to endorse the South
Dakotan against Mr. Nixon.
A labor leader backing Sen. Edmund S. Muskie on the convention floor, Wil-
liam Du Chessi, secretary-treasurer of the Textile Workers Union of America,
said several AFL-CIO unions, including his own, probably would endorse
McGovern before November.
But the APLr-CIO attack raised new doubts about whether federation leaders
would give their traditional allegiance to the Democratic presidential contender.
The AFL-CIO Executive Council is scheduled to meet Aug. 30 to decide whether
to make an endorsement in the presidential contest. No one expects an AFIy-CIO
endorsement of Richard Nixon but federation neutrality would be a plus for the
President.
Meany at one point said he would favor any Democratic contender except
Alabama Gov. George Wallace and New York Mayor John V. Lindsay. But as
McGovern's chances improved on the primary trail, Meany's attitude apparently
changed.
I. W. Abel, president of the Steelworkers, is reported to be behind Meany's
action. Abel is a fervent Humphrey supporter.
PART I
4061
THE McGOVERN RECORD
A Critical Appraisal
DOMESTIC ISSUES
* Labor
* Civil Rights
* Amnesty and the Draft
* Marijuana
* Crime
* Violent Protests
4062
- 1
LABOR ISSUES
Senator McCovern has adopted the "new populism" as a key campaign slogan.
Yet the record shows that he has repeatedly voted wrong on legislation affecting
working people and the trade union movement.
In 1959. McGovern voted for the Landrum-Griff in bill , which was opposed
by organized labor. The overwhelming majority of non-Southern Democrats voted
"no" - among them such Democrats from neighboring states as Senators Anderson
and .Metcalf of Montana and Senator Burdick of North Dakota, as well as four
Democrats from Minnesota and five from Wisconsin. (26)
In 1960, McGovern voted against raising the Minimum Wage to $1.15 and
extending coverage to 1 . 4 million retail workers. He was one of only five non-
Southern Democrats to vote "no." (27)
In 1966, McGovern was one of only 5 Northern Democrats who voted to deny
minimum wage coverage to some 1,000,000 workers in retail and service firms
with gross sales of less than $500,000 annually. McGovern also voted against
raising the minimum wage to $1.55.
Also in 1966, McGovern voted against a Long (D-La.) amendment requiring
states to provide eligible workers a minimum of 26 weeks of unemployment compen-
sation coverage for 20 weeks of employment. Only five other Northern Democrats
voted "no.''
In the same year, McGovern was one of 6 Northern Democrats to vote for
a Divkscn amendment to cut the appropriations for the Departments of Labor and
HEW.
«
4063
- 2 -
In 1968, the man hailed as thf; Candida te of the young, voted, along
with Republicans antiSou'thfrn Democrats, to table a Javits amendment which
would have provided $52.1 million in appropriations to the Labor Department
for summer jobs .
WcGovern and 14(b) . . . or the Case of Great Plains Wheat. Inc.
After the Democratic sweep in 1964, President Johnson and pro-labor
Senators made an all-out effort to repeal section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley
Act. Tlie conservative forces mounted a filibuster to , prevent the repeal
bill (H.R. 77) from coming to a vote in the Senate. On October 11, 1965,
Mansfield moved to invoke cloture. McGovern voted against cloture -- and the
motion failed.
Two more cloture motions were made -- on February 8 and 10, 1966.
iMcGovern voted for cloture the first time, against it the second time — the
lenly Senator to switch his vote. He explained ttiat the first vote was to
indicate his opposition to filibuster in general, while the second vote
indicated his opposition to the repeal bill .
McGovern is quoted as saying:
"It was a straight political decision. It was the at'ly time in
the United States Sfnate I voted against my conscience." (28)
Jlore recently, on May 13, 1972, McGovern told the New York Times that, just as
fte had conceded he had made a mistake on the 14(b) vote, George Meany should
acknowledge that he had made a mistake in supporting the Vietnam War. The
■implication is that the AFL-CIO position on the war was, like McCovern's
position on 14(b), a "straight political decision," a violation of "conscience.
4064
_ 3 - •
What was the politics of HcGovern's decision to vote "against my
conscience?"
In February, 1964, President Johnson had helped to end a maritime
union boycott o^ wheat shipnents to the Soviet Union by pledging thit
fifty percent of such shipments would be carried in U.S. -flag ships. This
had- been the original understanding when President Kennedy had approved the
wheat progran, but several giant wheat export companies sought to increase
their profits by peeking a reduction in tlie 50% requiremsnt.
The wheat companies continued to press for a reduction. On Miy 19,
the companies' views were expressed in a msmorandum from Great Plains
Wheat, Inc. to the Special U.S. Maritime Advisory Co.TOni ttee. Meanwhile,
Paul Hall, president of the Seafarers Union, had sent Senator McGovern a
statement of the Union's position. Mr. Hall received a reply from Senator
McGovern dated May 2'1. It was word for word, page after pags, identical to
the state:-nent of Great Plains Wheat, Inc. Senator McGovern was clearly
serving as a moutlipiece for an organization founded to promote foreign and
doxestic wheat sales.
Three months later, on August 24, Senator McGovern was interviewed
by Sander Vanocur on N!3C's Today show. Tlie following exchange took place:
Vanocur: Senator, to be blunt about it, you have threatened on
the Senate floor, have you not, that there's a possibility the
D^'mocratic Senators fro.-n farm states may not support the union
movement on 14(b), an attempt to wipe out the right-to-work laws.
Are you going to follow through with that, if you don't get your
way on til is?
McGovern: KV.-ll, I can't speak for other Senators, but what I had
said on the Senate floor is, I can't get up very much enthusiasm
personally for a crusade to repeal section 14(b) of the Taft-Hartley
law, the so-called Righ t-to-Work law that exists' in some of our
states, at a time -.vhen the same labor leaders wlio are urging this
repeal of that restriction on labor have placed a restriction on
my wheat farmers. . . .
4065
- 4 -
At issue here was not the well-being of Senator McGovern's farmers
their wheat had already been sold — but the profits of the wheat export
companies as measured against the jobs of maritime workers.
McGovern went with the companies — not only against the maritime
workers but against all workers who do not enjoy the benefits of unionism
because of Right-to-Work laws.
CIVIL RIGHTS
The 1957 Civil Rights Act was the first civil rights law to be enacted
by Congress since thedays of reconstruction. McGovern was absent on the votes
leading to passage of this bill in the House. (29)
In 1959, when the House passed the Rooney Amendment to the Justice
Department Appropriations bill (H.R. 8385) to extend the life of the Civil
Bights Commission for 2 years and appropriate $500,000 to it, McGovern was
absent — and did not pair. (30)
When the Civil Rights Act of i960 was up for final House approval,
McGovern was absent -- and did not pair. (31)
In 1960, McGovern voted against the McDonough Amendment (to the Housing
bill) which would prohibit the Federal National Mortgage Association from
purchasing 'housing where discrimination was involved. (32)
One month later, McGovern voted against the Powell Amendment to the
School Construc^tion bill requiring that facilities built. under the Act be
open to all students without regard to race, color, creed, national origin
or religion.
On June 15, 1964, Senator McGovern joined 22 other Senators -- 18 of
them from Southern and Border states, in supporting a last ditch effort to
4066
emasculate the voting riplus provisions of the la nd mark Civil Rights Act of
1961. The McGovern supported a-nendment was defeated 62-23.
On May 13, 1968, Senator McGovern joined in supporting punitive
legislation that sought to disqualify anyone convicted of participating in a
riot from Federal employment for a period of 6 years. This legislation was a
thinly veiled effort to punish blacks who had participated in the disturbances
that followed the King assassination.
The Atlanta Constitution of June 7, 1972, reported that McGovern
offered two major concessions to the South in meetings at the Democratic
governors' conference in Houston. One was to discourage frivolous challenges
to delegations to the na ti'ral convention. The other was a p.-i.mise "to push
for a chancie in the 1965 V^o ting R ights Act which requires Southern states
including Georgia to submit state reapportionment plans to the Justice
Department." (Portions of Georgia's 1972 plan were turned down.)
Wlien McGovern's stands on these issues are combined with his votec on
minimum wage, youth employment and otiier economic issues of concern to working
people, the result is a record that, with regard to the needs of minorities,
can only be described as ambiguous at best.
AMNr:STY A\'D THE DRAFT
McGovorn has'promised that if elected he would grant amnesty to people vlio I;
gone to jail or left the country to avoid serving in the army in Vietnam . (Tliis
has since become one of the most frequently-repeated McGovern pledges.) He
added:
4067
- 6 -
"It may very well he that statemenls of this kind will lead
people to hold nut ayainst the draft , but i: is a position on v;hich
I feel very stronyly." (33)
McGovern also said he would extend amnesty to those who are accused of leading
Atnerica into the war by war crimes trials on college campuses:
"I think no useful purpose can be served in tlie effort to pin on a
few men the responsibility for the war in which millions of Americans
have shared." (31)
In a "Meet the Press" interview on February 21, 1971, David Broder
referred to a McGovern statement that at his age and n'Mi i:is convictions
he could not participate in the Vietnam War. Broder asked McGovern if that
would be a conviction that he thought would serve as an example to the young
people of the country if he were President. He replied:
"I made very clear that I wouldn't offer advice to any young
man faced ivith the draft or with a decision not to respond to the
draft . I have an 18-year-old son who is in that situation and I
wouldn't advise him. That is a matter of conscience. . .Wha t I said
the other day that you are .-eferring to is that George McGovern, at
the age of 49, feeling the way I do about this war, I could not con-
scientiously support it. I am not rccotnmending that course for any-
one else but I regard this war as the most barbaric and inhumane act
that our country has ever committed . "
In a speech at Ohio Stats University on May 2 McGovern suggested, to
I the delight of his student audience, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff precede the
i troops into any future war. McGovern added that if he were writing new draft
taws, " nobody under 30 woul d be drafted ." (35)
! LEGALIZATIO>J OF MARI.JIJANA
III a speech at a drug counseling center in Boston on February 16, 1972,
McGovern said that
4068
_ 7 _
"experience, along v;ith limitations on enforcement personnel and the
grave costs involved in inposing severe sentences and prison terms on
usually law-abiding young people and young adults, suggests that a more
promising route might be to regulate marijuana along the sqme lines as
alcohol , while continuing and expanding educational programs aimed at
discouraging its use." (36)
On February 17, McGovern sent a qualifying statement to DPI:
"I have not in the past, nor do I now advocate, the legalization of
marijuana. Our knowledge of the possible harmful effects of
marijuana is insufficient to allow us to conclude that it should be
legalized. ' However, I believe that no person should be sent to jail
for the mere possession or use of marijuana. This has been my posi-
tion for some time."
CRIME
Senator McGovern has called for the "decriminalization" of marijuana.
And he denounced J. Edgar Hoover as "a menace to personal citizens" (sic) and
"a chief obstacle to law enforcement." But at a time when millions of Americans
are deeply and rightly concerned about rising crime rates. Senator McGovern has
largely ignored this issue in his campaign.
In his mass mailing fund appeal of 1971 -- 8 pages of McGovern' s positions
on the issues — the only specific item that deals with crime control is this:
"We'musl upgrade the quality of our local police and improve the
understanding and communication between the police and the community.
My policemen's G.I. bill would enable policemen to get a college
education for self-improvement. They v;ould not only gain in socio-
logical understanding of community problems but would mingle with
students as equals in a way that could bring better communication
and mutual respect."
To be sure, McGovern has spoken, in generalities, about the need to
eliminate poverty, slums, and the other conditions that are conducive to crime.
4069
_ 8 -
but in the absence of statements dealing with the need for immediate crime .
control, the implication' is that the victims of crime can expect no relief
until our larger socio-economic problems are solved. And it is doubtful that
better communication between police and college students will significantly
reduce t!ie C'-Lme rate.
POLITICAL VIOLENCE
Senator McGovern's statements on violent demonstrations repeatedly
convey the impression that it is not violent demonstrators who are to blame
but government policies.
Thus, on March 1, 1971, McGovern deplored the bombing of the Capitol
as a "barbaric act" but related it to "our Vietnam madness."
"The massive bombardment we are continuing year after year against the
peoples of Indochina has its counterpart in the mounting destruction
of human values in our land. It is not possible to teach an entire
generation to bomb and destroy others in an undeclared, unjustified,
unending war abroad without paying the price in the derangement of
our own society . " (37)
On March 30, 1971, McGovern extended his support to the upcoming
April 24 "peaceful protest" against Vietnam in Washington and San Francisco.
Then, on May 3, in a statement on the violence that followed the peaceful
demonstrations, McGovern had this to say:
"I regret deeply the events that are taking place in Washington today.
I cannot condone illegal acts by those who seek an end to the Indochina
war. These acts undermine the efforts in Congress to bring about a
withdrawal of our forces by the end of this year.... As much as I
reciret the confrontation between demonstrators and police, I believe
it is the direct result of tlie failure of the Administration to listen
to ttie American people. What we sec today is Just another sign of
the frustration ff,-lt by so many people. I hope it will not bring furtlier
confrontations this week. But even more, I hope tliat the Administration
will finally listen to America and end the war." (30)
4070
_ 9
That same day, McGovern told an Ohio State University audience:
"It's a mistake in terms of one's effectiveness to engage in
disorderly and violent tactics tliat interfere with the rights of
others." (39)
Thus, McGovern's criticism of violent demonstrations seems r-^inly
tactical: they don't work--they drive people over to the other side. One
cannot find a McGovern statement indicating' that violent protests are
inherently wrong, no matter what the protestors feel about government policy,
and tliat those who engage in them must bear full responsibility for the con-
sequences.
Indeed, in urging that the Administration respond to the violent
demonstrations by ending the war. Senator McGovern in effect helps to
legitimate such demonstrations as an effective pressure upon government
po 1 i cy .
I
PART II
4071
FOREIGN POLICY AND NATIONAL DEFENSE
* Basic Assumptions
* View of the Cold War
* The Soviet Union
* Czechoslovakia
* Otiina
* Vietnam
* Israel and the Middle East
* Proposed Military Cuts
4072
- 10
FOREIGN POLICY ASSUMPTIONS
"It is not enough merely to favor withdrawal from Vietnam. If
we are truly to reverse our national priorities and restore
sanity to our national life, we must have a President whose
thinking is completely free from the last vestiges of the cold
war p a ranoia which led to our Vietnam involvement in the first
place." (1)
In the view of Senator George McGovern, our presence in Vietnam
is the outgrowth of an overall foreign policy which has been fundamentally
wrong because it has been based on a paranoid attitude toward Communism.
"This is what I mean by cold war paranoia — the thinking which
dictates that 25 years after World War II, ws must keep half a
million American troops in Europe to defend the 250 million people
of Western Europe from 200 million Russians, who meanwhile have to
worry about 700 million Chinese at their back door!"
"Keeping our NATO forces in Europe alone costs us $14 billion. Yet
many Senators who voted for the McGovern-Hatf ield amendment calling
for total withdrawal from Vietnam by the end of this year voted
against the Mansfield proposal to cut our NATO forces in half." (2)
Senator McGovern would replace our "paranoid" anti-Communism with a different
attitude.
"Speaking for myself, I think Cortmunism is anotlier economic system
that doesn't happen to fit my view of how society ought to be
organized, but I'm willing to live in a world of diversity and I
think we can get along with the Communists. If people ivant to be
flrqanized under a Communist system, we've got to accept the fact
that this is their judgment to make." (3)
And Time reports McGovern as saying:
"I don't like Conmunism, but I don't think we have any great obligation
to save the world from it. That's a ciioice other countries have to
make." (4)
4073
11 -
The Time article continues:
"Going beyond the Nixon Doctrine, McGovern says that he would
prefer that nations like Brazil and India not turn Communist,
but that if they did, it would not fundamentally affect our
interest."
Thus, Senator McGovern sees Conmunism as just "another economic system'
which some people "want to be organized under"--a " choice " they have made.
Presumably, the pftople who live under Communist regime have freely made that
choice.
By contrast, Senator McGovern has a less benigr. view of what he calls
"the so-called free world":
"The establishment center has persisted in seeing the planet as
^engaged in a gigantic struggle to the death between the free world
and the Communist world. The facts are that much of the so-called
free world is not free but a collection of self-seeking military
dictators financed by hard-pressed American workers. And most of
the Com-Tiunist nations are far more obsessed with their own internal
divisions than they are with Washington, London, Bonn or Saigon." (5)
HENRY WALLACE AND THE COLD WAR
In' 1948, McGovern was an avid supporter of Henry Wallace and went as a
delegate from Illinois to the Progressive Party Convention which nominated
Wallace for President. McGovern, according to a biography, was "bewildered
at the 'fanaticism' of some of the people closest to Wallace, and dropped out
of the campaign. Nonetheless, McGovern continues to defend Henry Wallace's
basic foreign policy outlook.
"I felt then, as I do now, that U.S. foreign policy was needlessly
exacerbating tension with the Soviet Union and that we were wrong in
4074
- 2 -
our support of Chiang, the French in Indochina, and Boa Dai. I
wasn't happy with the direction the Democratic Party was taking
in those times. I liked what Wallace ha(j to say about foreign
policy . I still think he was essentially right ." (6)
At issue is not whether McGovern supported Wallace in 1948 — so did
many others: The issue is: how does he feel about it novy . Most others had
second thoughts later on. McGovern did not.
"I'm not at all ashamed that I campaigned for Henry Wallace in
1948. He was a great Secretary of Agriculture and a great Vice
President. I'm very proud of it.
"If we had listened to some of the things that Henry Wallace said,
we might have avoided the Korean War and the Vietnam War." (7)
"I think my judgment was pretty good for a 25-year old." (8)
"So what? I am rather proud of it." (9)
THE SOVIET UNION
There is an echo of the Henry Wallace attitude in some of Senator
McGovern 's statements on the Soviet Union and the Cold War.
"... we're going to have to abandon our paranoia about Russia's
ambition to dominate the world . I think if the Russians had
messianic views at one time, they've largely subsided . The Soviets
are interested in a security zone to protect them from another
invasion from the West , from revived German militarism, and they see
American policy in Western Europe as reviving German power and build-
ing a nuclear cordon around them. I've always felt that's the real
reason they wanted a cushion of Communist states on their western
border, from Poland to the L.lcdi terranean . " (10)
"The enormous American buildup after World War II almost guaranteed
that the Soviets v;ould attempt to offset it. If we tiad moved with
less air±)ition in trying to encircle tliem with nuclear power, they
might have been less fearful and therefore, less belligerent than
they've become." (11)
4075
- 13 -
But if Soviet imperialism has subsided -- if indeed, it ever existed -- how
does Senator McGovern explain the Soviet role in the Middle East? It is,
he says, an exception:
"But the Middle East is different. There's an old czarist carry-over
involved tliere, I think, of wanting to have access to the eastern
Mediterranean. I suppose they're concerned about the oil in the
Middle East, although perhaps not as much as we are. But they're
going to be a force in the Mediterranean whether we like it or not;
they're going to increase their sea power in that area ." (12)
Apparently, the expansionist ambitions of the Soviet Union are confined
to the Middle East, and these are rooted not in Communism but in czarism. Even
so, the Russians' interest in the region's oil supply is less than our own.
Moreover, although McGovern sees an inevitable Soviet military build-up
in the Middle East, his proposed defense budget would preclude an appropriate
American response. (See pp. 12-14.)
CZECHOSLOVAKIA
If any event of modern times has underscored the imperialist character
of the Russian regime, it was the invasion of Czechoslovakia. But even on this
occasion, McGovern found a way to blame American policy.
In a speech at the City Club of Clevelandon August 23, 1968, McGovern
said that, while the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia was in "blatant dis-
regard of international order," the
"Government of the United States, the foreign policy of this
Administration, also bears a considerable part of the blame." (13)
4076
-14-
According to McGovern, we had so "squandered American military might in the
futile war in Vietnam"^ that the Russians did not feel deterred. Moreover, the
Johnson Administration "has helped to establish the claim of large nations to
intervene in small nations." Finally.
"...in bypassing the U.N. in our own unilateral intervention, we
have weakened both international law and the influence of world
opinion. The brave people of Czechoslovakia have paid the price ." (14)
Thus, Senator McGovern adopted the line of the New Left that Vietnam is
America's Czechoslovakia -- and that the Johnson Administration had to bear
the responsibility for what the Russians did to the people of Czechoslovakia!
So blind was McGovern to the meaning of the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia
that less than a year later, he -could say:
"International conditions have changed so radically that I doubt
whether the policy-makers of 25 years ago could find today the
political landmarks most prominent in the world affairs of their
day. . . MoscQ-.v does not and cannot control the action of such diverse
Communist groups as those in China, or Vietnam, or Czechoslovakia.
or Cuba, or Albania."
In the same statement, McGovern also said:
"It is unclear to me how we can expect the Soviets to loosen
their grip over the eastern half ''f Eutop'e so long as the western
fcalf remains militarily dominated by the United States."
It is apparently Senator McGovern' s view that the American military presence
in U'estern Europe is comparable to the Soviet role in Eastern Europe.
CHINA
"The primary re^xisibili ty for the people of Taiwan is in the
hands of the Chinese government. You have to express the hope
that it would deal with its people peacefully." (16)
"China is incapable of any expansionist design." (17)
I 4077
f . " ^'5 - . •
' VIETNAM
Senator McGovern has been critical of only one side in the Vietnam War —
ours. V.'hile frequently condemning American policy and the Saigoii government, he
hai looked upon the North Vietnamese as the bearers of authentic Asian nation-
alism. He has denounced successive South Vietnamese regimes as corrupt dicta-
torships while ignoring the totalitarian character of the Communist regime
in Hanoi.
In a '7tleet the Press" interview, Robert Novak reminded McGovern of an
earlier statement he had made (Jan. 28, 1971) that we were "on the wrong side
of national aspirations throughout Asia." Novak asked whether the North
I Vietnamese troops invading Cambodia and lodged in Southern Laos without the
I consent of the Laotian government represented the right side of national aspira-
"tions in Asia. McGovern's response:
"They are a lot closer to the natioielistic aspirations of their people
than the American troops who are there." (18)
This view was expanded in the interview with Playboy :
McGovern : "I think that Ho Chi Minh has copied our Declaration of
Independence . He was really trying to throw the French out, not
invite the Chinese in. And, as Eisenhower said: 'If there had been
an election after they threw the French out, he would have had
80 percent of the vote, at least, in both North and South Vietnam.'
Similarly, George Washington was ovenvhelmingly elected once he
kicked the British out of the country."
Playboy : "I suppose that Nixon would like to make the late Ho Chi
Minh into the Vietnam Hitler. Are you suggesting he might be the
North Vietnam George Washington ?"
McGovern : " That' s right ." (19)
4078
-16 -
In the same interview, McGovern was asked: "Do you sympathize with the
aspirations of the Viet Cong and their North Vietnamese allies?" [Ie replied:
"In that they are striving for national independence, yes...
(although) I can scarcely condone the terror the Vietcong and
Hanoi have adopted as a military tactic."
In Bedford, New Hampshire, on August 9, 1971, McGovern charged that
"the real w-ar criminals are the people that deceived the Congress
and the American people about this war . "
When asked if he meant the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations, he replied:
"No question about it at all--I think they were very much in error." (20)
In a ir.agazine interview, Mc(Jovern was asked if he agreed with Gloria
Steinem's thesis that the causes of the Vietnam war can be tiaced to the
" masculine mystique " which requires male leaders to pursue aggressive politics.
He replied that the thesis " might be correct . " (21)
McGovern' s proposals for ending the war rest on an indifference to the
fate of South Vietnam and an enormous confidence in the good will of Hanoi.
In an interview with the Washington Post on January 9, 1972, McGovern
criticized President Nixon's November statement on Vietnam, and said that in
November he would have announced a specific withdrawal date. But, he added,
now that the Vietnam elections are over, tlie South Vietnamese are "now ready
to chart their own future." Asked if he would have gone a step further and
said that it no longer natters, how it comes out in Vietnam , McGovern replied:
4079
-17 _
"Well that's what I would have thought privately. I don't
know whether I would have .-^aid that. I've said that as a candidate,
if I were in Nixcn'.s place, I don't know what I would have done."
In a nationally televised debate (June 4, 1972), he explicitly stated
that he would withdraw all American aid from South Vietnam before securing
agreement for the release of American POWs. He said he would depend on the
power of world opinion to induce North Vietnam to release the prisoners.
Then, on June 28, McGovern told a meeting of South Carolina delegates
to the Denocratic Convention:
" Begging is better than bombing . I would go to Hanoi and beg if
I thought that would release the boys one day earlier, but begging
won't help if we bomb and aid the Thieu Government." (22)
The notion that an American President should go begging to Hanoi will make
sense only to those who believe that in the Vietnam war all right is on one
side — Hanoi's -- and all wrong on ttie other -- ours. It is doubtful that
such people will constitute a majority of the electorate in November.
ISRAEL AND THE MIDDLE EAST
In 1957, McGovern was one of a small minority' of Congressmen to vote
against H.R. 117 authorizing President Eisenhower to undertake a program of
military and economic cooperation with Middle Eastern states in order to
counteract Conmunism. The Resolution passed overwlielmingly, .355-61. (23)
In May of 1970, Senator McGovern signed two letters, one to President
Nixon and another to Secretary Rogers, supporting the sale of aircraft to
Israel. 'J'v;o ~onths later, in a position paper on tlie Middle East, McGovern
qualified his stand. "The IJnited States," he said, "should clearly express
its v.ill That the aircraft cold to Israel sliould not be used for irrcursions"
aciDSs the Suez Canal.
4080
- 16-
"Such a declaration would signal to the Arab leaders the American
intention to seek directly some restraint on the part of Israel .
This would help. restore credibility in American policy, 'lliough it
would cost them nothing in strategic terms, the Arabs should
reciprocate by ending the formal sLate of v.'ar between the two sides,
which might have an important psychological effect." (24)
Thus McGovern demanded concrete concessions from the Israelis in return for
Arab expressions of good faith. He was either unaware of or indifferent to
the fact that Israel's air raids over Egypt we're a direct and necessary
response to the War of Attrition which Egypt declared in April, 1969, when
slie announced her unilateral abrogation of the June, 1967 UN cease-fire. "*
Israel's efforts to knock out the Soviet missiles and other sophisticated •
military equipment were basic to her defense. If Israel stipulated that she
would not use her aircraft over Arab territory, Egypt would be able to wage
war against Israel at virtually no cost to herself. Egypt would have no
incentive to maintain a cease-fire.
Despite his protestations that his general "dove" position docs nut
preventhiin from taking a strong position on maintaining Israel's military
strength. Senator McGovern is obviously uncomfortable with the issue of
providing U.S. arms to Israel. Thus, while he voted for the Jackson amendment
authorizing $500 million for Israel, he voted against the final bill because
it also contained military aid for Laos and Cambodia and what McGovern objected
to as "a sustained high level of defense spending."
In July, 1971, when the Administration was withholding a reply to a
long-standing Israeli request to buy more aircraft, McGovern told the Jewish
Telegraphic Agency that he was at that time "not active" in efforts to persuade
Hie Administration to answer the request because he was"not aware of any Con-
gressidnal initiatives." (25)
4081
- 19 -
In the same interview, McGovern said explicitly that he did not believe
freedom of Israel shipping through the Straits of Tiran meant continued Israeli
control of Sharm el-Sheikh .
On March 2, 1971, in a Washington speech. Senator McGovern registered
his approval of the Rogers Plan . He said Israel's borders should be guaranteed
by pledges from the Arab states and possibly also by the United States and the
Soviet Union. McGovern' s statement was prominently featured in the press and
drew an avalanche«of criticism from both Jews and non-Jews in the Democratic
Party. ■'^' ■
McGovern issued a statement on March 5 "expanding on his views." He
said that "I feel the basic thrust of t'le TJixon Administration policy in the
Middle East is correct," that "no solution can or should be imposed on the
Middle East by outside powers," that borders and other issues must be resolved
by "negotiations between the Middle East governments," that "Israel will never
accept a settlement that does not assure her of defensible borders," and that
"our government should not seek to predetermine the outcome of negotiations."
He did not acknowledge that the Nixon Administration was, in effect trying to
impose its border plan on Israel through Jarring at that very time; he did not
■qualify his previous endorsement of the-Rogers plan — in fact, he indicated
his belief that the borders outlined in that Plan were consistent with "defens-
ible borders."
On May 8, 1972, in an interview' with the Christian Science Monitor ,
Senator McGovern said he thought Senator Frank Churcli "would make a great
Secretary of State." Senator Church voted against legislation providing
military credits for Israel in both 1970 and 1971. He was among only seven
leaders who opposed the legislation in 1970 and among only fourteen who
opposed it in 1971.
4082
- 20 -
In the same interview, McGovern said that Richard Stearns -- who was
in charge of the Senator's campaign in the non-primary states -- would have a
key role in the inner core of a McGovern administration. Stearns, formerly
International Affairs Vice President of the National Student Association, was
one of the signers of a viciously anti-Israel ad published in the New York
Times (November 22, 1967) under the sponsorship of the Cambridge Committee for
Respect and Humanity. The ad bore the signatures of such anti-Semites and
Arab propagandists as Arnold Toynbee and Mohammed Mehdi and solicited funds
for Arab "relief" organizations such as American Middle East Rehabilitation,
which sponsors anti-Israel rallies and disseminates anti-Israel propaganda.
On June 19, 1972, McGovern received the endorsement of Mohammed Mehdi.
Dr. Mehdi, an official of the Action Committee for Arab-American Relations,
an Arab propaganda group, said in an interview on WNEW-TV:
"There is of course, a matter of contradictory positions
between the Senator's position on the Far East... but in our
opinion this is just for political purposes. .. In our opinion,
positions given tomorrow are more important tlian the talks
today, and that is why we are supporting him because we
believe essentially in his integrity and independence of
mind, which is more important than any pressure group can
hope to withstand the Zionist pressures."
4083
- 21 -
NATIONAL DEFENSE
On January 19, 1972, Senator McGovern released, under his own name, a
paper entitled "Toward a More Secure America — An Alternative National Defense
Posture." The paper contained proposals designed to reduce Defense Dep3rtmenl
expenditures over the next three years, so as to result in a defense budget of
$54.8 billion in fiscal year 1972. According to McGovern, the current defense
budget -- given inflation -- would amount to $87.3 billion in fiscal 1975.
Therefore, he projects a saving of $32.5 billion in fiscal 1975. This is the
Origin of the phrase: "McGovern will cut the defense budget by $33 billion."
These savings would be achieved by cutbacks in various areas:
(1) Reducing the number of aircraft carriers from 15 to 6 . This would
cripple the ability of the U.S. to react simultaneously to widely separated
crises. A major crisis, say, in tlie Mediterranean, would require denuding
vast areas of the oceans of American naval strength. At present, for example,
there are five carriers off the coast of Vietnam alone and only two carriers
on station in the Mediterranean. Meanwhile, the Soviets are increasing their
naval strength in the Mediterranean, the Baltic and the Indian Ocean.
(2) Cancelling the Navy's F-14 fighter and the Air Force's F-15 fighter .
These two aircraft are so-called "air superiority" fighters, i.e., they are
designed for air-to-tair combat rather than for support of ground operations.
They are our answer to the MIG-23, currently the "hottest" fighter in the
Soviet inventory. Cancellation of F-14 and F-15 will mean that we will have
nothing to match the MIG-23. The F-14 is carrier-based. Its mission in a
place like the Mediterranean, say, would be to guard the air over a carrier
that might be attacked by land-based aircraft. There are already some MIG-23' s
4084
- 22
with Russian pilots stationed in Egypt. Their role in some future crisis might
well be to help neutralize the air cover for our carriers. The consequences of
allowing this to happen are easy to imagine.
(3) Reducing U.S. garrison in Western Europe from 300,000 to about 130.000 .
This would tilt the balance of conventional military strength in favor of the
Warsaw pact, as well as call into question the strength of American commitment.
It would create all sorts of opportunities for the Soviets to apply pressure. It
would deprive us of a "conventional option," in the event of war, leaving us a
choice between using nuclear weapons and capitulating.
(4) Withdraw remaining U.S. troops from South Korea . The U.S. presence in
Korea is symbolic, but is is not merelj' symbolic. Such a U.S. withdrawal, at the
time when discussions between North and South Korea have been initiated, would
deprive the South Koreans of an important bargaining point. The Japanese would
be forced to reconsider their own position, since they would no longer be sure
of what the U.S. would do to keep the Korean peninsula out of hostile liands.
(5) Reduce U.S. bomber force from about 600 to 200 . The efforts would be
felt at both the tactical and strategic level.
(6) Removing all U.S. ground and air forces from Southeast Asia including
air bases in Thailand . Taken together with the suggestion of cutbacks in aircraft
carrier strength, the results could be severe. The current situation in Vietnam
indicates that, in the absence of all U.S. air power, the North Vietnamese army
would overrun South Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia, plus, over tlie long-term, create
serious security problems for Thailand.
(7) Scrapping the Safeguard ABM system . Had this proposal been implemented
before the recently concluded round of SALT talks, the Russians would liave had
4085
- 23 -
little .incentive to limit their Own ABM as part of a strategic arms limitation
agreement.
(8) Reducing overall U.S. military manpower from 2.4 million men to abou t
1.7 million . This would be- the lowest number of men under arms since 195G, i.e.,
since immediately before the Korean War.
(9) Reduce funds for military research and development from $8 billion to
about $5.5 billion . This, at a time when Soviet expenditures for military R&D
are increasing. ],n the last 25 years, the breakthroughs in military technology
have revolutionized warfare. There is obviously a neecj to see that we do not
.'■fall behind in these areas.
(10) Tlis McGovern budget also fails to provide for significant naval
rnization in any area except submarines (increasing the number of nuclear
atiack submarines by 15 - from 69 to 04.) The fact is that the U.S. Navy has
a disproportionately large share of older vessels. Something close to two-thirds
of the U.S. active fleet is more than 20 years old, whereas only about 10}^ of
the Soviet active fleet is more than 20 years old.
TflE SPACE PROGRAM
Senator McCiOvern has underlined his opposition to the space program by
voting to cut back appropriations for NASA every year he has been in the Senate.
21-296 0—74 13
4086
NdTES
(1) From McGovern's mass-mailing fund appeal letter, 1971. No specific date.
(2) Ibid.
(3) f layboy interview, July, 1971.
(4) Time , June 26, 1972.
(5) Speech to Jefferson-Jackson Day Dinner, Detroit, April 1972.
(6) Quoted in MeGoVern , a biography by Robert S. Anson, 1972.
(7) The Washington Daily Netvs , April 27, 1972
(8) The Washington Post , May 1, 1972. f?'-
(9) The Washington Evening Star , May 1, 1972.
(10) Playboy interview, July 1971.
(11) Ibid.
(12) Ibid.
(13) The New York Times , August 24, 1968.
(14) Ibid.
(15) Annals , American Academy of Political and Social Science, July 1969.
(16) Playboy interview, July 1971.
(17) Washington Post interview, January 9. 1972. , ■ •
(JO) "Meet the Press". February 21, 1971
(19) Fo'r some reason, this passage from the Playboy interview never appeared in
the magazine, but it did appear in Robert Anson's biography, McGovern .
(?.0") Mcinchester Union Leader , August 10, 1971.
(^1) New Republic intereview with Paul Wiock, October 29, 1971.
(22) Remarks to South Carolina delegates in Columbia, S.C. Reported in
New York Times. July 1, 1972.
408:
(23) 1957 Congressional Quarterly Almanac , p. 3l8.
(24) McGovern position paper on the Middle East, July 20, 1970.
(25) Interview with Jewish Telegraphic Agency, July 8, 1971.
(26) 1959 Congressional Quarterly Almanac , p. 382.
(27) i960 Congressional Quarterly Almanac , p. 460.
(28) McGovern , Apson. p. 143.
(29) 1957 Congressional Quarterly Almanac , p. 306, 348.
(30) 1959 Congressional Quarterly Almanac , p. 396.
(31) i960 Congressional Quarterly Almanac , p. 434.
(32) Ibid ., p. 436.
(33) News Conference, Washington Press Club, September 23, 1971.
(34) Ibid .
(35) Columbus Dispatch , May 3, 1971.
(36) Quoted by United Press International.
(37) Quoted in the St. Louis Globe-Democrat by special writer, Maj. Gen.
Thomas A. Lane.
I (38) Statement issued by Senator McGovern' s office. May 3, 1971.
I (39) Columbus Pi spatch, May 3, 1971.
4088
APPENDIX
Memorandum fob the Special U.S. Maritime Advisory Committee
Great Plains Wheat, Inc.,
Washington, D.C.
Until November 1963, all commercial U.S. wheat exports (that is all wheat
exports outside of Public Law 480) were exempt from the 50 percent provisions
of the Cargo Preference Act. When the Soviet Union came to the U.S. to buy
wheat in the fall of 1963, the Executive Branch of the government, in authorizing
such exports, applied 50 percent U.S. flag shipping requirements in connection
with the issuance of "validated" export licenses required under the Export Con-
trol Act. This was done even though the business transactions were strictly
commercial, and were in no way related to Public Law 480 or involved any
credit or credit guarantees. Thus, for the first time, the provisions of Cargo
Preference Act was applied to a U.S. commercial cash export transaction.
During the confusion that followed the application of U.S. shipping preference
to Russian wheat purchases, it was discovered that no branch of the government
had authority to absorb U.S./foreign freight rate differentials on commercial
exports. Therefore, the extra cost of the shipping requirements was to have been
borne by the buyer — in this case the U.S.S.R. As might have been expected, the
Russians refused to accept the additional cost. The issue was finally solved by
the U.S. Department of Agriculture's acceptance of an extra high bid for export
subsidy on durum wheat included in the total sales contract. Only half of the
total sales volume to the U.S.S.R. that had been originally mentioned by the
Russians was realized. The remaining two million tons of potential wheat sales
went on the shoals of the 50 percent shipping requirement.
The U.S. non-liner fleet presently derives 90 percent of its business from Public
Law 480, with three-quarters of that business carrying U.S. wheat exports. While
the U.S. merchant fleet is carrying only 8 or 9 percent of total U.S. exports it
is carrying 38 percent of all U.S. wheat exports. The American wheat economy
is already providing substantial business to U.S. flag shipping under Public Law
480. Commercial wheat exports should not be impeded by non -competitive U.S.
flag shipping requirements.
Certainly the effect of the 50 i>ercent U.S. flag shipping requirement imple-
mented in 1963 on validated licenses to export wheat to Russia and other Eastern
European countries has turned out to be unfortunate this year. Since July 1,
1964 Russia has purchased, for cash payment, 2.6 million metric tons of wheat
in addition to what she imported the previous year. These purchases have been
1.4 million tons from Australia, 125 thousand tons from Canada, 750 thousand
tons from Argentina, and 325 thousand from France. No purchases have been
made by the Russians from the United States.
In addition, the other East European countries of Czechoslovakia, Hungary,
Bulgaria and East Germany have purchased 1.740,000 tons of wheat since July
1, 1964, from the.se same countries as well as France and Mexico. The U.S. again
has not shared at all in these sales.
U.S. grain exporters and market development oflBcers have testified that U.S.
wheat sales could have been made, and indeed may still be made, to Soviet bloc
buyers if our delivered price can be competitive with other exi)orting countries.
fCopy illegible.l
Such a subsidy proposal might be patterned after the principles involved in
the direct subsidy system in effect for the U.S. liner fleet. The proposal might
include the provision that the 50 percent rule of the Cargo Preference Act could
still continue on Public Law 480 shipments, but should not be applied to com-
mercial transactions regardless of credit arrangements. A direct subsidy should
enable the U.S. non-liner shipping companies to capture a fair share of U.S. com-
mercial export transportation without preferential guarantees.
Because the U.S. merchant fleet now carries only 8 or 9 percent of the total U.S.
export business, as compared to over 30 percent 30 years ago, there will be a
strong appeal to somehow increase the business volume on U.S. flag shipping in
working out the new merchant marine policy mentioned by the President in his
State of the T^nion message.
The immediate elimination of 50 perr-ent TT.S. shipnine from oomTnerciai aeri-
cultural exports would not in any way adversely affect our merchant marine
because no such business can now be done where the requirement is in effect.
In fact the following benefits would accrue to our over all economy :
4089
(1) Improvement in our balance of international payment from increased
competitive commercial exports — particularly grain including primarily wheat.
Any freight payment to foreign ships in connection with such possible exports
would be vastly more than offset by dollar receipts in payment for the exported
commodities.
(2) Increased jobs for our longshoremen, and business for our docks, from in-
creased exports ; as well as for interior transportation via railroads, trucks and
barges.
(3) Reduced government costs for storage of grain surpluses and for farm
production adjustment programs.
We wish to heartily support a new policy and program for our bulk cargo
merchant fleet. Government aid for construction of modern vessels, better able
to directly compete with foreign shipping rates, would undoubtedly go a long
ways to [copy illegible].
May 19, 1965.
COTt* W. WOW
4090
'^Cnilcb ^iciic^ S^cixcxic
conHiT-rrr. ON-
ACRICULTUHC ANO FORESTRr
May 24, 19G5
Dear Mr. Hall:
Thank you for sending me your May 17 submission to the I'.ariti
Advisory Comraittee. In order to further clarify rr.y position,
which involves commercial sale of agricultural corrmodities
only, permit me to review the matter and offer a suggestion.
Until November 1953, all comixiercial U.S. wheat exports (that'
is all wheat exports outside of Public Law 480) were exempt
from the 50 percent provisions of the Cargo Preference Act.
When the Soviet Union came to the U.S. to buy wheat in the.
fall of 1963, the Executive Branch of the government, in
authorizing such exports, applied 50 percent U.S. flag shippi
requirements in connection with the issuance of "validated"
export licenses required under the Export Control 7sct. This
was done even though the business transactions were strictly
commercial, and were in no. way related to Public Law 480 or
involved any credit or credit guarantees. Thus, for the
first time, the provisions of Cargo Preference Act was applie
to a U.S. commercial cash export transaction.
During the cpnfusion that followed the application of U.S.
shipping preference to Russian wheat purchases, it was dis-
covered that no branch of the government had authority to
absorb U.S. /foreign freight rate differentials on corrimercial
exports. Therefore, the extra cost of the shipping require-
ments was to have been borne by the buyer — in this case,
the U.S.S.R. As might have been expected, the Russians
refused to accept the additional cost. The issue v;as finally
solved by the U.S. Department of Agriculture's acceptance of
an extra high bid for export subsidy on durum wheat included
in the total sales contract. Only half of the total sales
volume to the U.S.S.R. that had been originolly mentioned
by the Russians v/as realized. The remaining two million
tons of potential v/hoat sales v;ent on the shoals of the 50
percent shipping requi rcm.ent .
4091
Peigc t\^"0
May 24, 19G5
Tlic U.S. non-liner fleet presently derives 90 percent of
its business from Public Law 480, vith three-q-jsrters of
that business carrying U.S. wheat exports. vrhile the U.S.
merchant fleet is carrying only 8 or 9 percent cf total
U.S. exports, it is carrying 38 percent of all U.S. v.'heat
exports. The American wheat economy is already providing
substantial business to U.S. flag shipping under Public
Law 480. Comnercial wheat exports should not be inpeded
by non-competitive U.S. flag shipping require— ents .
: Certainly the effect of the 50 percent U.S. fl£c shipping
; jtequirement implemented in 1953 on validated licenses to export
■wheat to Russian and other Eastern European countries has turn;
but to be unfortunate this year. Since July 1, 1964, Russ^ia ,
has purchased, for cash payment, 2.6 million rr.etric tons of
wheat 'in additbn to what she imported the previous year.
These purchases have been 1.4 million tons frorr Australia,
125 thousand tons from Canada, 750 thousand tons from
.Argentina, and 325 thousand from France. No purchases have
been made by the Russians . from the United States. ■
In addition, the other East European countriss of Czechoslovakia
Hungary, Bulgaria and East Germany have purchased 1,740,000
tons of v.'heat since July 1, 1964, from these san-.e countries
■ as well as France and Mexico. The U.S. again has not shared
at all in these sales.
U.S. grain exporters and market development officers have
testified that U.S. v;heat sales could have been made, and
indeed may still be made, to Soviet bloc* buyers if our
delivered price can be competitive v/ith other exporting
countries. This has not been possible because of the dra-
matically higher ocean freight rates associated v/ith 50 percer.;
use of U.S. flag "tramp" ' ships compared v/ith open market rates.
As you knov/, our bulk cargo "tramp" rates range from 50 to 100
{>ercent higher than com.parable foreign rates.
4092
Pago three
Moy 24, 196 5
The unfortunate effects of 50 percent nliipping in connection
with the licensing requirement has been:
1) Lost opportunities in mnkip.g wheat export sales for
dollars, to tlieso destinations in relief of our im-
balance of payments,
2) increased pressure of unsold \s?heat stocks on our
wheat producers and government agencies, and
3) the result that the requirement has yielded our
Merchant Marine 50 percent of no business.
Expanded trade v;ith the Soviet bloc has been expressed as
being in our national interest. Effective support for
expanded agricultural exports to Eastern Europe should be
directed toward general export licensing of commodities
not on the "Positive List" of strategic materials required
under the Export Control Act of 1949.
It is essential that the U.S. develop means of supporting
the U.S. non-liner merchant fleet v;ithout requiring U.S.
flag' shipping to be an impediment to any agricultural exports
financed under U.S. government credit guarantees.
V7e v;ish to outline our general views on a new policy for
U.S. shipping of all future commercial exports. One first
part of this policy should be to immediately exempt by
executive order all agricultrual ' exports outside of Public
Lav; 480 from U.S. shipping requirements. _ This should also
exempt such exports involving government-insured short-term
commercial credits.
An additional step in this nev/ policy should be to provide
a direct subsidy to the U.S. non-liner fleet to enable them
to match foreign freight rates in competing for expanded
comm.ercial export business. Such a subsidy proposal might
be patterned after the principles involved in the direct
subsidy system in effect for the U.S. liner fleet. The
4003
iPagc four
■May 24, 1965
Hie proposal might include the provision that the 50 percent
rule of the Cargo Preference Act could still continue on
Public Law 480 sliipments, but should not be applied to
coTJiiercial transactions regardless of credit arrange-ents .
A direct subsidy saould enable the U.S. non-liner shipping
companies to capture a fair share of U.S. corru-.iercial export
transportation without preferential guarantees.
Because the U.S. merchant fleet now carries only 8 or 9
percent of the total U.S. export business as compared to
over 30 percent 30 years ago, there will be a strong appeal-
to somehow increase the business volume on U.S. flag shipping
in v;orking out the nev/ Kercliant Karine policy mentioned by
the President in his State of the Union message.
The immediate elimination of 50 percent U.S. shipping from
commercial agricultural exports wo-.ild not in any way ad-
versely affect our Merchant Marine because no such business
can now be done where the requirement is in effect. In fact
the follov;ing benefits would accrue to our overall economy:
1) Improvement in our balance of international payment
from increased competitive commercial exports —
particularly grain including primarily wheat. Any
freight pa^Tnent to foreign ship in connection with
such possible exports v.'ould be vastly more than
offset by dollar receipts in payment for the exported
commodities .
2) Increased jobs for our longshoremen, and business for
our docks, from increased exports; as v/ell as -for
interior transportation via railroads , trucks and barges
'3) Reduced government costs for storage of grain surpluses
and for farm production adjustment programs.
4094
Pncjc five
May 24, 1965
Wc wish to l-.cnutily support n new policy and prcgrc:- fcr
our bulk cra-gb r.-icrchnnt fleet. Government aid for con-
struction of modern vessels, better able to directly ccrrpcte
with foreign s'nipping rates, would undoubtedly go a long
ways to strengthen the economic position of our shipping
firms and seafarers unions. Perhaps more could be done
as well.
Unfortunately, the 50 percent requirement of U.S. flag
shipping on wheat and other grain exports licensed to the
Soviet bJ.oc is making no contribution toward this objective.
In fact, it appears to be hindering us in arriving at a more
rationalized and practical solution of the problems of our
maritime industry.
Sincerely,
^-s-^^ W^P^^
George McGovern
Mr. Paul Hall
President
The Seafarers International Union
of North America, AFL-CIO
675 Fourth Avenue
Brooklyn, New York 11232
4095
Radio-TV Monitoring Service, Inc.,
Washington, D.C.
Program : The Today Show.
Network : NBC Television.
SENATOR GEORGE S. McGOVERN
Frank Blair. The recent purchase by the Soviet Union of Canadian wheat has
caused a stir among Democratic and Republican senators from wheat producing
states. They're seeking to have the White House change the requirements set dur-
ing President Kennedy's Administration that 50 per cent of such U.S. wheat
exports be shipped in United States vessels. This requirement, the senators be-
lieve, so raises the cost for the Soviets that they will no longer buy our wheat.
One of the senators who is leading the fight against the requirement is George
McGoveru, Democrat of South Dakota. He is in our Washington studios this
morning with Today Show's Washington correspondent Sander Vanocur. Sander?
Sanuek Vaaocuk. Senator McGovern, since the Soviet Union has recently pur-
chased almost a half a billion dollars worth of wheat, mostly from Canada, and
are likely to continue purchasing western wheat for the next few years, why
can't the American wheat farmer get a share of this market, since the principle
of selling wheat to the Soviet Union was seemingly approved in 1963?
Senator George S. McGovern. Well, the American wheat farmer should have a
share of this busines.--. We have about 8()0 to {XJO million bushels of wheat in sur-
plus in this country, in our reserve stocks, a good part of which we ought to sell.
We have another big crop coming on this year, and as you say, we made a policy
decision two years ago that it was in our national interest to sell wheat to the
Soviet Union, and to the countries of Eastern Europe, then, very mistakenly, in
my view, we put on an administrative ruling that required that 50 per cent of
any wheat that we sell to the Soviet Union, or to the countries of Eastern Europe,
must move in American ships, and that simply raises the price, anywhere from
eleven to fifteen cents a bushel, to the buyer, and as a consequence, the Soviet
Union and the other countries in Eastern Europe are not buying any American
wheat. They're going to Canada, Australia, France, or Argentina, and completely
by-passing the American market, and as long as that shipping restriction exists,
we're not going to sell any wheat, in my view, to the Soviet Union.
Vanocur. Senator, was this an administrative decision by President Ken-
nedy's Administration, in 1963, or did Congress have to do it ?
McGovern. The Congress had nothing at all to do with it. It was a decision that
was reached by the Kennedy Administration at the time of the Russian wheat
proposal in 1963. My understanding is that that restriction v,-as placed on the
deal as a means of winning support from some of the maritime unions. Actually,
it hasn't helped them in any way at all, because the net result of that restriction
placed by the Administration, it's been continued by the present administration,
has been to deny us any opportunity to sell wheat in Eastern Europe, so when we
talk about requiring 30 per cent of the wheat and other grains that might move
into that part of the world going in American ships, we're actually talking about
50 per cent of nothing. We're not helping the maritime unions ; we're not helping
anyone, and we're depriving the wheat farmers of this country of an opportiinity
to sell hundreds of millions of dollars of wheat and other grains to the Soviet
Union, and to the countries in Eastern Europe.
Vanocur. Senator, tell me first, what is the size of the potential market, given
Soviet agricultural diflBculties?
McGovern. Well, I would estimate that this year, the Soviets may be in the
market for as much as 14 or 15 million tons of wheat. Now, they have recently
completed arrangements with the Canadians, and a smaller deal with the Argen-
tineans, and a somewhat smaller deal with the French, to purchase somewhere
around seven million tons, but every indication is that before the end of this year,
they're going to need another six or seven million tons. Now, the Canadians have
just about exhausted their capacity to meet that need. Their port facilities are
strained to the limit ; their shipping opportunities are almost fully utilized, and
they're contra nted now for almost the maximum amount of wheat they can deliver.
Vanocur. Put this in dollar figures on a yearly basis.
McGovern. Well, I would say somewhere around a billion dollars this year.
Now. last year, the Russians purchased something over a half a billion dollars
in wheat from the western world, and they're going to be in the market this year
for an even larger amount, from all indications. The evidence we have is that
this year, their crop is no better than it was in 1963, which was a bad year.
4096
They had a somewhat better crop in 1964, although it was not particularly a good
harvest. Now, from what we can learn, they're back to the level of about 1965,
in terms of production, so that I would think there's still a half a billion dollars
worth of potential business that has not yet been completed in this calendar
year.
Vanooue. And for the foreseeable future?
McGovERN. Well, every indication is that for the next few years, they're going
to be iu the market for several billion tons of wheat each year, in the western
world. There's no reason that I can see why we wouldn't get at least half, and
maybe more than half, of that business.
In other words, we're talking about perhaps as much as 280 million dollars
in wheat sales that the Unite<l States could make, were it not for this restriction
on shipping, what I referred to as a self-defeating restriction ; it's a restriction
that doesn't help anyone.
The maddening thing about it is that it applies only to grain. This is not a
restriction that is applied to machinery. We can sell automobiles, steel, tractors,
industrial equipment to the Soviet Union, and move it in any ships that we
want to. There's no restriction at all on the shipping, but when it comes to
wheat, something that people can eat and that they can't shoot back at us in
the form of ammunition, we apply this restriction that in effect just takes us
out of the market.
Vanocur. I want to get back to 1963. It is commonly assumed, rightly or
wrongly, that the Administration did this at George Meany's behalf, the Presi-
dent of the AFIy-CIO. Now. if that is so, who made Meany do it?
McGovEBx. Well. I think probably the pressure came from the maritime
leaders, the labor leaders of the various maritime unions, who thought that this
would be helpful to their workers and to their members. They thought that if
they could put a restriction on the arrangement that would require at least half
of the wheat to move in American flag vessels, that this would provide greater
employment for the American maritime industry, for the dock workers and
the shippers aiid the various people who are involved in our ocean shipping
industry. But as I have indicated, it didn't work that way. But I do think that's
where the pressure came from.
Vanocur. And persists from?
McGovEBN. Yes, my understanding is that the labor leaders who originally
applied the demand for the 50 per cent shipping requirement are still holding i
out. I can't understand why, because it isn't providing one additional job
for any member of the maritime unions. Quite the contrary, it's hurting them.
It's preventing the movement of wheat through our ports, that would provide
additional work for the dock workers, the shipping industry, the railroads, and
the people who work around our ports. It's actually working against the interests
of the maritime industry. It's certainly working against the interests of the
United States as a whole.
Yanocur. Senator, you're leading a group of Republican and Democratic
senators in the senate on this question. Have you made your views known to the
White House, and if you have, what has been the White House reaction?
McGovERN. Yes. Last spring, a number of us sent a letter to the White House,
in which we expressed our views on this subject, and that letter was signed by
members of the senate, from both political parties, primarily senators who come
from the states that grow a great deal of wheat. We tried to point out to the
Asflministration that a policy decision had been reached two years ago, that it was
in the interest of the United States to sell wheat to the Soviet Union, to take
advantage of this opportunity to improve our balance of payments position, to
receive gold in payment for something that we have in surpluf^, and that we're
storing at great cost to the taxpayers ; we outlined all of those views in a letter
to the White House, and we've been in further contact with the White House
ofl^cials since that time. They expressed great interest in our views, and advised us
that they are under active consideration. I still hope, and hoix* very strongly
that the Administration is going to lift this restriction. We haven't yet had any
such assurance.
Vanocub. Senator, to be blunt about it, you have threatened on the senate
floor, have you not. that there's a possibility the Democratic senators from farm
states may not support the union movement on 14-h. an attempt to wipe out the
right-to-work laws. Are you going to follow through with that, if you don't get
your way on this?
McGovERN. Well. I can't speak for other senators, but what I had said on the
senate floor is, I can't get up very much enthusiasm personally for a crusade
4097
jto repeal Section 14-b of the Taft-Hartley law, the so-called Right-to- Work law
that exists in some of our states, at a time when the same labor leaders who are
urging the repeal of that restriction on labor have placed a restriction on my
wheat farmers, that is doing a lot more damage to the American economy than any
damage that results to us because of Section 14:-b. I think we have to look
at our country as a whole. We can't think in terms of the labor interest or the agri-
cultural interest or the business interest; we're all in those issues together, and
the United States is faced with a very serious problem in its balance of pay-
ments, in the outflow of dollars and gold. Here's an opportunity to correct that
situation to the tune of several hundred million dollars a year.
We're faced with a very serious agricultural problem — depressed income for
farm producers all over this country, and surpluses that have accumulated in
government stocks. Now, I think the same labor leaders that are concerned about
a restriction on the economy as they see it, in the form of 14:-b, ought to be con-
cerned about the restriction that they've placed on the economy, that's hurting
all of us, in the form of restrictions on the sale of American wheat.
Vanocub. Senator, let me put to you a not so hypothetical possibility. Sen-
ator Dirksen has said he is going to try to revive the Dirksen amendment on re-
apportionment and attach it to 14-b when it comes to the senate. If you don't
get your way on this wheat shipping business, is there a possibility you might
support Senator Dirksen when he tries to attach this to 14-b?
McGovETRN. Well, I really haven't reached any judgment on that but I think
it's quite clear that farm state senators have to be concerned first about those
issues that directly affect their own people. I come from a state that's more
dependent on agriculture than any other state in the union. There's no other state
that derives such a large percentage of its income from agriculture. We're a great
wlieat state. But it's very diflScult for us to oppose proposals such as the Dirksen
amendment and to support proposals such as the repeal of the Right-to-Work law
at the very time when the people that are urging us to take that position then
turn around and insist on a foolish and self-defeating restriction that de-
prives the agriculture of America of an opportunity to increase its income, of
an opportunity that the highest officials in this government decided two years
ago was not only in the interests of the wheat farmer, but in the interests of our
country as a whole.
Vanocur. Thank you very much. Senator George McGovern, Democrat of
South Dakota, talking about the difficulty of selling wheat to the Soviet Union,
with the present restriction of shipping half of it in Ameircan vessels. And now,
back to Today in New York.
Fbank Blaie. Thank you, gentlemen. That was live from Washington. . . .
4098
The AD:
The MrGovern Positions on the Arab-Israel Conflict:
Contrast between the infornvation given in McGovern's Jewish newspaper ad
and the information f rem McGovern 's record
The RECORD:
■ Senator McGovern knows that ■
there can be no lasting peace in
the Middle East until the democratic
state of Israel is recognized by her
Arab neighbors --neighbors that still
deny her right to exist.
"The feeling of the Palestinians that they have
unjustly lost their homes and property is perhaps the
most important source of tension and conflict in the
Middle East. A unilateral act of Israel recognizing
this to be the case could be the greatest single steo
toward peace." (From McGovern 's major position paser
on the Middle East, delivered on the Senate Floor on
July 20, 1970, and hereafter referred to only by date,
And McGovern is firm and clear on
what the American posture must be:
''America must do whatever is
necessary to ensure the survival
and independence of Israel, This
- is in the American interest and
is in the interest of justice,
democracy and humanity."
Senator McGovern has repeatedly
pointed out the vast difference
between the corrupt regime v/e have
backed in Saigon and our need to
assist the democratic State of
Israel.
"The United States is committed to aid in the preser-
vation of the State of Israel. This has been American
policy for more than two decades. At the same time
the United States is committed to the preservation of
all Arab states in the area." (July 20, 1970)
On the one hand, McGovern stresses that the United
States should have a commitment to Israel but not
Vietnam because Israel is a democracy; on. the other
hand, he says that the U.S. conmitraent to Israel is
equally applicable to all Arab nations, none of which
except Lebanon are democracies in any sense of the v.-ord
It is difficult to understand v,hat McGovern means by
a U.S. commitment to Israel and all the Arab states
in any event because he also calls for reducing our
commitments all over the v.-orld--cutting our IJATO
strength in half, slashing our Mediterranean fleet
v;hich President Johnson used successfully to deter
Soviet intervention in the June I967 v/ar, and choppin,
$30+ billion from our defense budget would make it
impossible for the Unitqd States to fulfill any commi
to any nation abroad, especially to Israel, v;hich is ni
threatened directly by the massive Soviet buildup in
the Mediterranean and in Egypt.
"I 'am for negotiation betv;een
Israel and the Arab states in
direct face-to-face discussions.
"Both sides should be v;illing to negotiate in any vay
fcasible--directly, through intermediaries, in the openj
or in secret. The unfortunate 'Goldmann affair' in
which Israel missed the opportunity for informal direc!
Contacts with the Arab leaders should not be repeated.
If both the Arabs and Israelis make it clear that they
are sincerely ready to talk about any problem, that woyj
represent a powerful impetus toward negotiations. Shoal
the Arab nations so desire, representatives of the
Palestinian Arab organizations should be permitted to
participate in the negotiations....
"[A]s a token of its v/illingness to negotiate an
agreement with the Arab nations fir.raeTI could ellccat
4099
je.Jisli Nc^soaptT Ad vs. KCuovoni's Hccurd
I'he AD
Thr? R'vCORD:
a specific sun of nonsy for co.-npcnsation and place it
In an cscroj account for thc-_ Palestinicn Arabs.'' (July ;
McCovern thus denies Israel not only the right, to
insist on direct negotiations with Arab officials, but
also the riglit to choose her orfn neijotiators . N'ahuzi
Goldmann, to •.■.'ho.Ti McGovern refers, is not oven a full-
tine resident of Israel, no less an official of the
Israeli Government. Prenier Keir, responding to sons
press reports that Goldmann had been invited to negotia:
with Egyptian officials, nsrely stated that Goldrana
^id not represent Israel; as it turned out, x.hs press
reports v;ere Just rumors--there was never even an
invitation from Egypt ,
McGovern also ignores the fact that Israel has been
pleading with the AraU nations for ?.h years to negotiats
on all issues, while the Arabs have refused to negotiate
with Israel on any issue. It is not Israel that should
be required to give a "token of its willingness to
negotiate." Purthermore, McGovern never suggests that,
the Arab states offer coapensation to the more than
600,000 Jewish refugees from Arab lands who fled to
Israel since 19'tS; Israel believes this would be a fair
exchange for compensation of Arab refugees.
"'There must be acceptance of
the premise that no nation or
group of nations can legitimately
,inpose an outside settlement
of the Arab-Israeli conflict."
"Secure and defensible aad
peaceful borders are essential
ingredients of any settlement."
"Israel must be prepared to yield much of the territor
gained in that Q-96^ war....
" f ll n the spirit of mutual concessions to bring about
a peaceiul settlement, Israel as well as tlie Arab states
should be willing to accept the presence of the Uii
forces on their territories. In the past, Israel has
not welcomed UT! troops....
''The present proposals [Sogers Pla^ are limited to
tactics for getting both sides to negotiate. They
appear to be running into tough o'ostacles. I submit
that if the United States made kno-<m t'ne kind of
equitable solutions of the major issues in the Middle
East it would be prepared to support, chances would be
markedly improved for acceptance of our suggested steps
for opening the talks." (July 20, I97O)
McGovern was asked after a speech in '//ashington on
March 2, I97I, if he supported the Rogers Plan calling
on Israel to withdraw to the pre-1967 boundaries with
only "insubstantial alterations" in territory. McGoverr
'replied: "Yes. Generally, I do." {)n Tiines, March 3)
In an Interview on July 7, 1971, Kcgovem proposed
that rather than Israel remaining at Sharm cl-Sheikh
in Sinai to guarantee her free access through the Suez
Canal and the Straits of Tiran, the U.S. and other
"interested nations" could saf guard access through the
watcr-^ays, perhaps under u:i auspices. (Jewish Telegrapnl
Agency, July 8)
The AD:
4100
McGovern's Jewish Ncjopapcr Ad vs. McGovern's Record
The RECORD:
In Hay 1970, McGovem was one
of only 7 Senators who first
urged the lUxon Adninistration
to stop del^iylng shipment of
Phantom jets that the Israeli
Government needed.
The May 23rd letter to President Hixon, initiated |
by Senator Alan Cranston ond signed by HcGovern and '
5 other Senators, '.vas far fron the first Senatorial
appeal to the Administration on .lets. Throughout
the first half of 1970 the Adninistration v/as bombard
with such appeals from Senators of both political
parties, including the Majority and Minority Leaders
of the Senate. Seventy -three Senators, =any of whoa
had been speaking out on this matter for months,
signed a letter urging jets which v;as delivered to
Secretary of State Rogers on June 1st. The most
significant and successful effort to expedite the
sale of jets to Israel was Senator Henry M. Jackson 'si
anendmeht authorizing unlimited arcs credits for |
Israel, which was in its final stages of completion i
in May and which was reported out favorably by .
the Senate Armed Services Committee in June.
McGovern distinguished himself from other Senators
who had participated in these efforts by qualifying
his advocacy of jets for Israel with a proposal that
the U.S. restrict Israel's use of the jets:
"Such aircraft should not be made available for
forays over Arab territory for the purpose of sus-
taining the limited but real war which has persisted
since the six -day conflict in I967.-..
''The United States should express clearly its
wish that the aircraft sold to Israel should not be
used for such incursions. Such a declaration v.-ould
signal to the Arab leaders the American intention
to seek, directly some restraint 0,1 the part of Israe!
This would help restore credibility in American
policy. Though it v.-ould cost them nothing in •
strategic terms, the Arabs should reciprocate by )
ending the foraal state of v/ar between the two sidei
v/hich might have an important psychological effect.!
(July 20, 1970) 1
The "incursions" to vihich McGovern refers — Israel;
flights across the Sue: Canal — were the direct and
necessary response to Egypt's unilateral abrogation-
of the 1967 Ull cease-fire and declaration of the
V/ar of Attrition against Israel in April 1569-
Egyptian officials publicly declared that since Egyj:
was unable to deal a knock-out blovf to Israel, Egypt
was pursuing this V/ar of Attrition to deplete Israel
manpower cUid weapons supplies. This would be a
no-cost war for Egypt, which she could maintain
indefinitely. But unlike Egypt, Israel does not hav
an unlimited supply of manpower, nor does she regard
her war casualties as mere statistics; and unlike
Egypt, Israel must pay for all her weapons and oust :
suffer delays in tlie approval of her weapons request:
Go Israel refused to ficht the Eg^-ptian- imposed -ar <
4101
McGovern s je.vish r.'c./spapcr Ad vs. McGovern's Record
he AD:
The RECO.TD:
Egyptian-imposed terms. Israel raised the cost for Eg%-t)t bv
flying boaibing missions across the Canal. KcGovern asis
Israel to give up this strategic necessity while he asks
the Arabs to give up "nothing in strategic terns."
Furthermore, America has not been pouring billions of
dollars of arms into nations whose avowed purpose is to destrc
another nation, a member state of the UI). Ansrica is
not the nation with a Dassive troop deployment in the
Middle East. And it was not America and Israel but the
Soviet Union and Egj^pt which violated the new cease-fire
standstill agreement less than a month after McGovern made
his speech. McGovern's concern about credibility and
restraint v;ould more properly be directed tov;ard the
Soviet Union than the United States.
Finally, the Phantom jet is by definition a bomber.
Flying it up and do-.vn over Tel Aviv would not ser/e Israel's
defense needs.
McGovern voted KO on
iraiendments to the Foreign
lllitary Sales Bill in 1970,
hich would have placed severe
imitations on anas to Israel.
The votes to defeat these amendments were routine and
virtually unanimous, with one of the amendments receiving or.J.y
the vote of its sponsor.
McGovern voted YES to amend
he Military Procurement Act
n I97& to provide open ended
xtension of funds for Israel.
McGovern '..'as one of only 5 Senators who -/oted '\0 on the
Military Procurement Act which contained the unlimited
authorization amendment --the Jackson amendment--ajnd thus
made his vote on the amendment itself meaningless. Moreover,
there was no occasion to vote TE3 on the Jackson ajnendmen':: ;
the amendment had been approved by the Armed Ser/ices
Committee and was therefore already in the Military Procuren=
bill '.jhen it reached the floor of the Senate. McGovern
■was merely among the 87 Senators v^ho voted to defeat an
amendment by Senator J.ff. Fulbright v/hich -would have delayed
action on the Jackson amendment.
On July 7> 1971 ) McGovern said in an interview that althc^j
he '^/ould not favor repealing the Jackson amendment, "-..'e dor. 't
want to give anyone a blank check on the U.S. Treasury."
McGovern also said that he was "not active" at present in
efforts to persuade the llixon Administration to answer
Israel's pending arms request because he 'was ''not av.'are
of any Congressional initiatives." (Jewish Telegraphic
Agency, July 8)
; McGovern voted Y".S on a I97I
le.'-.-lcent to ^utho^i^c additional
■gait sales of arms and jets to
■- ra'^l .
In 1971j McGo'/crn introduced a
!-'rf- foreign assisi-anco bill to
j.arantee economic aid and
Llitary sales to Israel.
McGovern voted KO on the entire foreign aid bill in 1971,
'//hich included $300 million in military credits and $50 mill:
in grant supporting assistance for Israel.
McGovern maie no effort whatsoever to bring his foreij,-r.
aid proposal to the Floor for a -/ote or to enlist cospon^ors .
21-296 0—74-
-14
4102
UNITED STATES NATIONAL STUDENT ASSOCIATION
J457 CIIISTNLI JIRttT • rKllAutlPlllA, PtNUSYlVANIA 1V104 • CABiri NAISIUD
HATIOttAl CO/.IMIJSIOM (5J5) 222-I106 • I N I E R » AT I O H A I COUMISSIOIJ (:i5) 2J2.J7JJ
.July 30, 1965
Rabbi and Mrs. Elmer Berger
912 E. 5th Avenue
New York, New York 10017
Dear Rabbi and Mrs. Berger:
I am wrilingon behalf of the participants in the United
States National Stvidcnt Association's Arab Student
Leadership Project to thank you for having us in your
home during our stay in New York. Your speech,
Rabbi Bergc-r, made the largest single impact of any
we heard, particularly among our Arab guests. It
affirmed very graphically in their minds the distinction
Arabs, I believe, have attempted to maintain, betv/een
Zionism on one hand and the Jewish people on the other.
Agreement with your position on Palestine, I think
is 100%.
Our best v/ishes to you and your wife.
Richard Stearns . ^"
Seminar Director
RS/kv/h
4103
A'jY3n'i*T.en#
THE WASHINGTON POSTl '.
BIO
fTtJiwday, /un. :S, IJ47 , I
TO'PftESIDENTadiNSCM
il'MIDDLE ■ EAST SPEGIALISTI
?■ DcarMr. " President; ■ ^ . - ' ■'._ ,, - ' " .
: -',; As ^Vmerlcans concerned with the grave consequences to our countr)'' -which Soviet ' -■"
.- ascendancy in the Middle East would entail, we the undersigned voice our.alarm that '.-,
V '.recent events have caused an unprecedented deterioration in America's relations with •■ ':
: a vital area of the world where the United States hitherto enjoyed friendship and. '■'■
• prestige. There is a real and present danger of America's losing the- Arab world by ..:
^ ^dcf auIr.^We have lost China. We cannot lose the Middle East. ' .■..■''■•"• * '•?.'. J,,''''; ' '
N-' In order to avoid this impending disaster, we respectfully urge, Mr. President;
- .that in facing the realities of this crisis, the United States Government recognize'
< that: ; /,-,>^;^;:;' :- ' ' ; .- ' ' ■.i';^r'\:''\''^'^:i']
..■il-' Peace talks between the antagonists will never occur until there is total mill- .' ".
. tary.withdrav/al from area5 occupied by force of arms. Such withdra-wal need in- ;
vite no repetition of the recent conflict if simultaneously accompanied by a strength-
■ encd United -Nations presence, which we Join Britain in recommending. However,
•contrar)' to the situation in 1957, this strengthened United Nations force must bcpres- . '
ent on both sides. ' . . '> ■ <<■•..- *'"--' ' *' '■'■ -' ' ' :• ..t '
_ -■■'.2. Tlicrc Can be' no Just and lasting solution of the refugee problem while the
•''•world coiinicnanccs the creation of new refugees dally in" a territory held by a bcl- •
.Ii''crent. . . i'' ' ' ' ' . ■ -' . - ' .' ■'• '•' • '-'■■.*''.' " ■ , '..'•. .' . *
^■, -3. Arab provocation cannot be condoned, yet historical perspective, v/c belic-ve,
will show v.ith fearful clarity that It is no favor to Israel to allow her \n the flush
of short-term military victory to deepen the divisions and antagonisms which scpa-
arateiier from those neighbors aoi-aits \VhorTi":<;l)f- iiiust c-t-cjL llibxs'riot t3i'e'ro3J tv
^>eacc-
4104
■1'4. Our cdmnutmcnt to the political indcpcn<^cnc<; arr{ to'ruorlal Ii.tc^ritv of all
nations in the area, recently reaffirmed by yourself and previously rnmciatrd by
.President Truman, President Eisenhower and President Kennedy, v, ill lose its mean-
ing unless ic is made unmistakably clear voiv to all the world and the nations of the
\?»Iiddle East in particular that the United States will not tolerate territorial aggran-'
' dizcment. Wc recall -President Eisenhower's warning of February 20, 1957:
- : ,'; ." "Israel insists on firm guarantees as a condition to withdrawing its forces :" ' ■".'
;■ ; of invasion ,.. . If we agree that armed attack can properly achieve the pur- , •-
'•, .■ poses' of the assailant, then I fear \Ve will have turned back the clock of in- "' -'
•-'■■', ternational order. We will have 'countenanced the use of force as a means of ' - "■
: .■" settling international differences and gaining national advantages .-. •. If :.^-.
.'/- the United Nations once admits that international disputes can be settled by ' ' ,'
•..^,\;' using" force, then wc will have destroyed the very foundation of the organi-
t;;'- zation, and our best hope' for establishing a real world order." '■ '' r.- ;• . •",. "_
r.'; .5. There are, indeed, areas of dispute which can be resolved through negotiation
>in a climate of clear impartiality. These include questions relating to- recognition,
y'lriaritimc rights, borders, refugees and water distribution. But we reiterate, it is vain •.
•/-to. hope for peace talks and settlements deriving from them as long as any aritago-
.,riist enjoys the fruits of military conquest. ' - \- .. .. ;',," ... -^ X- -.".!• '/s'Ju -
','. I *' -.:-,--■ 1- .'. - • -. ■' '•■ •■ • .".•>•■;. ■ Vy'-v"' :' i"v ,'- "*■.-■
;'.W , -4 1^ --••'-■• •:S-^,: .,\ ':-■.■. ■■'■".'/ t ■';•■• :^ ^;^.s:--i '.■■■;,?i^
'.'ij. The loss of the Middle East would be a disaster of" the first magnitude^ It would ".
',..opcn a new path to ultimate confrontation of the super powers and a graver threat
<^than ever of universal nuclear holocaust. Pressure groups, wherever they may be and
-■rliowevcr-vocalrcannorbe perniitted'to obscure America's Iargc"r in teres ts'aliHYranw/^
C/cending issues of. world imperatives. ;•• -■ ..; ... ;'\; ■,.'? '\':1' J.'-v,"^- '.'"
;-"";.-The United States.^ Mr. President, can assure this. does not happen.^,,*'..
ir,--
Profeitor John Ruedf ■
■ Veptrtmtnt of Hlilonr
.' Prcfei:er Chrlstini P. Hirrii
i.- TmptnrytM rf Pollliul Scl«»c«
'. tiaafgrd Univt/tiry
1 Profsijor Alan R. Tiylor
( SchitJ al lnl«i-««i:or»l lankt
f' Ajiv*rlcan Unlvtriity
' Profcisor V^lltird G. Ortaby
' ■ Dertrimpnt o( Rctittov* &lud.t9
• Profssjor Hirbtii B. Huffrntn
Dep^rln.rvt tf M?4r Eatitrn sm*;*!
' Proftssor Lucttia Mo»ry
> Df^arr^n^I cf Hti^tU,*
• Vrll ••-lir C.l.u«
EI:h5rd H. Tetlt. ■ .
(=cu:'Cir o) UIIS In \u—>
Friia Ulley
Ronald G. V/ol>>
fr'c'nW. Soth.Tunn
Rlchird C^ Stearnt
t.itcmstl^af Attain Vic* Pm(cl4nt
t'.iltcd sulci NahOAjl iluatnl
AuociJiloa
Frank C Siltran
LawY*r, Awlaor -
Joiepli 0. Thompion . _. ,
Pflil Direcltj* • •
Lv^^'"on Wodd padvrallon In tM
lAliiH till
Tnt Pev. ChariM R. Ilplie
Prairlt Vlll»«, Kanut
Pabbi Elmer Bersar
Ka« York citr
r-fofcnor Karl Stowamr
-. Profetior Barbara Slowitttr
Ojpartmsnl et Arabic
I tA»r,Un4 Univenlly
Gjorge M^rdikiart
Aul»*r, Ltclunr, Huniannartu
Fred Ellinghaui , .
B«jl«e/. CotoaD*
Pro'eiior Millar Burrow*
.tmk
otr, Ya
Ed
M.Wright
Dc^iailin^nl of SIJI;, Rrllm
Profcisor Ceorgu'Houranl -
UnUirlily <r( Mkmvar.
Profenor Hiiham B. SKarabi
D«p*rln"»nl 0* HM'-rY
Ce.>rHil«Mn Unr.trl'lr
'Mr. HujSO. Auchinilou
Pfofsisor Ri:h»rd P. Ste»eiM
■ "■A. Wiliard'jon'ei "'' -'■
■ ' Pasi SKreltrr' American Prfii
^•>'.iiiK>n, Samalla.-i. J^<Ca»
. K. 8roo<co Anderfon »
, . FcrmerlY Ktzr Em ChftHa'a
. Council (cr Sd.saa Viarn
"Thomaj J. ASxrcrombit
.Wrnar, LtcTjrtt
.' Professor Errert McCaruJ
D<ol. <j* Star Eait Lan:uaM>
. Unt.ari.ly •* MKJi<',aa
• Profctjor 01:9 Grabar .
Det'l. bi Near Eaii.rn Ail ■.
l>K-i
mphrer V/ttz
Ic RIIat.o«i» _
el ANi/1 S
era
Ai(i!Uuon» Irnrd for idenui/cicoo oalf-
ed by Tbt Ad Hoc CommUi,. en tht MUJ!^ Etil
Ih^uIi
thom<d,
■ Mtchtn
> (are of Frjmk Suirs:i, St:rrUrj.
tiitle, M^n^"^
4105
•'■^'"[llOSiSi SAVINGS BANK OF DROOKLYN
rownt«im — fulkn SI. i DtKjil) .«vj. li:01 Consy hUrJ-Vftmild Av«, IW. WihSt 11224
B«nIcn^«^l-£6l(l St. I l?iri Ave. 11214 Eietn icftj-Cr«tn Acres Sfto;;,ng "ctnfer
IIiUb«Ii-A«. J iCcr.fi island Ave. 11230 S'jnis! HiS-"3^ Vjiljy SIrtJn, N. t. 11532
Mill coupon to any DIME oMn li'ttH ibov*
As » starter. I enclose $ .
nao
Q/ 1 y«j' lat«st toljl (
(Mini(numdepositJ5.00. Maximum JS\ /q ind compouVsled
deposit $25,OiOO en Individual Accounts; jjj qujrtetiy
$50.0ClOinTrust or Joint Accounts). . >-»'
Please open a savings account:
□ In my name alone Q Jointly with Q In trust for
O Mr.
Stnet
d Mrs. a Miss
aty
state
_Zi£_
NOTE: C»sh should b» sent registered mail
Member Federal Deposit In
IMSMI
Corporation
L^
A GALL Fen.RESF.EGT AND HUFMflsTY IN THi- MiSSLE EAST CHiSES^
comp«)ifoa f»r
'— « compiiiioit
inrf t>
Y. W« th« ■nrfcnf^nctf ipp««l f« «ll m*
tJit A/«& refugcct in<rets«d In numktr by f
wMch Inclutfct rnpc«t f»r lh« rtfttftci •• vrfl ai
Mtlf4«fic« to h* ylvcn th«fn fr*«fr «nd ti«n>po1itic«ll
W t(r«fi SI ijulckly m ponjbic* : .. ^ _
2. W« «ppf«l ff* lh« lir*«li C«v«(nm«tif U rripcct th
•ntf ihrtnn ef liUm whfch «r« «t preMnt undfr lir«cli juthority
■ftrf to iA«k« them freely trtAtM* f»r w«nhip «nd vtneration
te«nM«illm«.
). Wc «ppeil t0 th* n
h<cp th« vclFjr* of th<
Ihclr de!ib«rAficni en f
• ban^n thi? world fsrui
4. Our appeal li
especially »n4 U a
Inrimatcly and ic
floats.
mbcr itjtes of th* Unifed Halieni r*.
propTci Involved foremojl in mind In
Middle Eatf critrt and to rcfuM |a ''
fe Cold War di9'«<ilont and Intrt^uea.
9n behalf of the pcoplrt of the Third World^ ...
'ratcrnal one made by Individwalt vho Identify'
pectfudr with their (radttiani and crcaliv*
• .- Th^ClmkriJa- ioiT
CO. Bt
niilf!e_CaUirj (srj
I 128, Cambridge, Ma
Respect anJ Human
fr
11.02139
fictul lilt of SiiniloilM: ■
TK. UfV.n S./irli,
Mirll.if j:,>. nj
lurry Pvryi;. B.ojkl>n.
Koi.fo ll'kamjra, '
Pr-f. Rasa?: Mall.kh,
Re/ I ItomohreY W)*r,
Jj-." C T-evor.
ihj.rrru". %(-ul.
Cj;rioi.c v.jrt.-r. iivc-
H:-i;fM-lT,.in. c;tt
Harvard.
■ Un.y. of Co.OradOk
N Y C.
Bil^-in-Waltace
fret. CeoT» W'W.li,
Wo'iaTim?.* *i p.
jn) M).n« ouice.
Chlrhrc Ttub:r,
Prnf. E.l»ra-d Busin,
Day.d ir. S:ow-.
Co:,.-,o.
Hirn't.
Wfymium. /.\---T
M""-!-' Fi'-,.-,'o,
HjrvarJ.
EjsIoo Un.yerily.
Ili.'.cnil Ccjr^ilof
prof. V.orr.s laiercyvill.
pTpr. Hoam OvomilT,
MT- E- 5?h.rr Wnci,
Un y.rvlr Hbranr.
F-li Troi-r.l.-IT.
Assad E. SSonan,
Churcn.-!.
Smilri Coilege-
! MIt.
Boslon, f\Jii
Hl.v;;J.
Pry Chj'IfJ l«a»:.
Columo-a Un.y.-rsily,
londjn Un.y.rs.ly.
lan:y H.CL-S.
AVs 4d-l( df C. H.ll,
Fnl. Mo^^mm-(^ Che.th,
Prof. CSarlf, Ji-f-e
V.-! inrt Tj,:|:'cr
Pnf. ItcTlljAlownr,
Bculder, Colorado.
B.-sUn U.n.v.
Eosfcfi Vnivfz:^,
Jul.cn. 5; br'.-^!.
Sot«. ^.-w Vo'kC.l
• Pf-I. T. Cuylcr Younn
Wcllpsley. -^ E,„„i F-siT.
Dr. Fr^nc.s H. Horn,
P/or. W S:l>l»» Ir«n.r,
Prof. CliuieCaitn. *
Rtv G. B!i?'l..Sinl.
Prnf Ray. L. Cleve'an^,
CjfS'iII, 11 Y.
lorrr.r President,
D )!»lirr! OnKltr,
n Ro»il Insl.f.'.e r;r
Sorbo-'vr.
Prof Ela.f>3 Haita.an,
Simmons Coi'cl?.
Prof. Mvr.« Hjll-. f<II.
SI- 6:na/.nlurf
Ur..e'Vlr, NY.
Rfnp Ta.r.n cr. wrilcr;
Rot^'t Buron. Io'me<
Minuter of Frmr^
Cibinel a-5 Vi-.e
Univ. cl S)skalchey.an
P.Silj J. Canem,
YiOl!ta-o. U H.
E. A K„l„,jr.,
Rider C-.llese, N J.
Prcf, V/.llian> r.
Rn:d? ivand
Un.y.rs.ly.
Pror Join E. Y/wrell,
.Pn.lio, Uni,
11 IfilfjrsficnsI ^l^alrj
RfV CXarIti H Wnm.tr.
Dc»t.. N H.
P-cf. PrJcrl Wc<ibb-/i,
SI Jv.eobs CoIlM!.
Prei. of vrc'Id
A«'x: l;> WjrM
Prol. Francis E. Psle.l,
N Y,U.
S:.-e-,or,n,, Duke
Unive-SilY
Pry J A-a'co'm
WcCaluTi, Pb.lliet
Prof Wirihall C. S.
Dr. SjmuO J. Kerser.
FfCeral on.
Prof Herbert B. Huff.
MicSael Horn. fJarvard.
V'^ vers ty.
Pro'. Pa.jt B. Invii,
Hc^5Mn. Urtiv. cf
erjn?c.s.
Prof Rcharif Slime,
tnzn, Jshns Hcokmi.
R.cnard ^r Teti.e.
, Chcno.
t*Y VInwY p. Vn
■ [l-Jirn. i>reiH.nt
Erft'Hin. Union
IhfOl Scm'njry.
Dr. tir >1J^3I.
Y?rp W'dcji Sdioal.
Je»n ijr Bf-^r. ie«. 6en.
P.L H. Ct'tl-
L'tlcaire Intcrnv
Jacoy^s fl»nfct,
• •:->r, f-antj.
Rrr 0;-j E rioHlt,
N.,VcrkC.ly.
Day 1 Pr,.tkar<.
S.mmor,sCol;.-«.
Prcf J. Rjlani Ramirrr
DuQuasr.e Un,v?.-s ly^
M'!! Ruin 8. Ilandhn,
Prol C. Filihtsb
Sora^'ns. AfF.ansai
Collrgn.
FrelEllnjbjus. 111.
Fcur-cr-r U S. InlorTna-
lion Sery.cts Pn Israel.
;As Wcgar,; j.'cKay.
A^? B- Icb-Par- a'T>enl
Clre-i>r.lCrad.
S-irol
Pro' «!-.> H.Hall,
Xin , oINt.
/ Hj-:shire.
1 PtrT-, Emma»>ycl, pset
tional; S"C Cm.
H-rvi-i)
R)«l lie.
B:jl.rf r, Co;.
Ga^e Borden, Harvard, y
'P.-r £rr,,l Br^m,
Ami! rfe Te.ihard
Jul.nS'-nlcnifrT,
Joel ;n:n^,,. P-rc-lon.
R'CVrdC. S'Mms. v/
Ct'd'l^n U., Cmaf.a.
11 Rr<»n i.lvw, ■
lie CharcJ.n. f rarcf.
Hirva-«.
«- an-l Mfs, Dana'd
Brc»n.,.. Cla-rminf
1»M.S/ lnt.-nal.:nn
P-.'. G-nn Pe-rr.
n f^,rx>„ f,.~.ii
Prct Sluin C. C^i.
P-V r.'urray Erfen,
M-.lan, Siull Al.-,ta.
Ora^ua'eS'.nool.
md.)., S'ale U.
H >»r«,v. CommKftf,
U.iiv. 01 V asMf.g'^o.
.MIT.
R»v K^^st.l J Clir.cr.y,
Prof CI'O GraOar.
us' I'll-S-J':"'
P-o- Ja-^-s JA. Pet •>
. C»mb,i^,f
Pre*. K;cl3lat Hpcr,
Arr Ab'jnjm,
hT.t: Yvc-r> C-iauffin.
Fore'.l Hilis, N Y.
Ass:c.
s-i. Cia'f— ,nl Cel --d'
Oy.nrr, ».r«i.
vi.-iltr, f rjntf.
Mr and f.'.rs td^ard
Frank Mirij. Bnsl-n.
Dii--IG V-l'l-sb.
P.-i;' E^IJ^•"l Hcck.-i,
S'f.'.srl Sjntfcfi,
M ^4 Yvonne Hcm'.y
Jacn^ii-n, Laurence,
AVs. Pal*ic-a kremefs,
P4;.<? V.:e.Pr.s
Sm In Cnilidi.
Rotbunr, Oos'o^
Bulrn.
Kansas.
D-nvrr, Col.
fo- Inl-rna- «lla r).
Pr.'f HanmvdeH Atdal
ScMriTifl. Hitviri
«».. Pcltr R.5.,
SI.MjrY'iConrer.
PrJ V,' llnni Korn..str,
Un,». or ..nsvjchui'l^l.
Mr-.>erl r.^*scn. Harvard.
J. d -y Wc:«frrT,
Birva.iJ,
WiME.-'.n Wrntcnl,
Adfibfl J.'assn,
Abb.ng.-n (r.cndi
Srnool. Fa.
Prcf Josn RuMt.
Ctoffleio/rn Univcrs-lr
J:'n V'.M, Vr , >A
U 5 hal. S'Jdcfl
As---.
fArs Jin.l 5 B elb/.
A'., ur.ca Co-lese,
Pr-.f C-a-d E Casoarr
S-'.ln Cdl.cse.
P'or. lool) K^rrpf, fAJT
Hi.-vj'd"
Dcrc^-yt-r. r.ia«.
P:ol r/.r!.-, tii;„
»'!, Kamcn.re.
Pi.Te, H.Y.
Rey. Ja-nei E. Pierce,
Prof. Ojv.4 Da e^tl,
Pfcf J;r.e'd Kjir. MIT.
Ja-ri ijrjh.n,.
lo.ilfi, V;ellesl«y.
»u-:*i D Aucfilndoss, Jr.
Prof Sl-nUy D.a-n-:n<,
Br rul
.Sun.,,E-,l,„d.
Oji'tr. f.'«l.
Prcf. Kfnal H Karpat
K V C.
K-.Scl-Mlcf Social
Frank S'.vran.
Prcr P.1111,0 Morhlon,
Hpre'erjon, Cam&<ida»,
R.C'i-4, P-;.tanJ
/.'..•sr/i-y JoO'l
R.-s-)th. H Y.C.
I.'c'mcy.lle,
/.MI.
Ul-f D ■■.<••„
Rev E- J la'irrnrlhy.
Sober eclair.
Vet'b 0, Ha-vard.
Pr-f. J. Hrnr, Korson,
(.'■•rl^nd.
P-»'. Rlth»r< fnt.
Prrt V; ll.sm J Cr.i-
Oj.ncr.l.-.!!,
r 8-0-ke Ar.-."-s'n,
Un.v cf A'.ais-cbiiells
A'3''a7rrtd T. A'.ehdI.
«jn,.,<.
■ ».ii.|(. CtXo>a3i>«S'«lf
IV-v AMI i-1-n.n.a,
Pro,.-lrr:.. R 1.
EfC SnrcTder, Cc.r c
>«rt'ijfd r/cnrfi. Ballon.
t-r.i.frr !liJOA,
D-. Wild C.-hanl, ■
Prof Tlo-nas fijif, Uni
ll■a-^ic Arl, Fm»
R-crl A. r/rrdr, eredl-
'^^ •"•! r.'f% H->r'y R
Prof. H.iicn Smiii, Mir.
J^enosba, Vr.'.cacs.n.
vers ■< cl Ptmsyl/ana
dini, Cr»d^a'--S'u-
Alkift^w. Biootl.p?,
V'l. rem fotoM,
Wri, Oi ,ry IcV.r, RN
W.llai H Or-ton.
Mr, l.-.icnlm P-abody,
K-.land F. Sml'h. HI
f.r's lor Ptl,«-e
eo>10n.
Ont «a. I( Y
Ca-nbr.du, Aran.
l.tra-inn, EyjnsloB, Hi
R(' .f, Havcnd'on.
fAr.'lUatForu |lvi
Th« Cariibrl.lE., CcmiTilHes may
Tl.lf^ WotM.-Conlrlbutlonj for
cir-d fr^r bll.lio
elief n-.ax be
r,ii>liles Aiirl oilier scholarly
ent lo the following oreaniz
nine the .Mir1.U« L'rsat and tho
4106
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry,
Washington, B.C., May 20, 1970.
D. B. Geli.haus,
Yankton, S. Dak.
Dear Mr. Gellhaus : T appreciate knowing of your opposition to Section 222
of the President's Postal Reform Bill, H.R. 17070.
It has been my feeling that public employees should have the right to join
a union, but that membership should not be a mandatory incident of their
employment.
I have other serious questions about this legislation and I am glad to have
your views on it.
With every good wish, I am
Sincerely yours,
(s) George McGovebn.
U.S. Senate,
Committee on Agriculture and Forestry,
Washington, D.C., September 12, 1968.
Reed Larson,
Executive Vice President, National Right To Work Committee,
Washington, D.C.
Dear Mr. Larson : Thank you for your letter of September ninth, and for
enclosing the materials on the right-to-work issue.
As you know from my vote in 1966, I favor retention of Section 14-B of the
Taft-Hartley Act. While I have not made a final judgment on the Federal Em-
ployees Freedom of Choice Act my inclination is to support it.
With every good wish, I am
Sincerely,
(s) George McGovebn.
I
4107
Exhibit No. 160
The people are
coming to San Diego
- The fottanng aormuniqut ia fpcm th«
r rij^.qo Co nyant-l.rm CoaUtio n. a group of people •
developing an election year strategy focusing I
on the Republioan national Convention to he
held in San Diego August 21-24.
AUGUST 2l5t - 24th, 1972 . . .
The nUbUshiiMnI of th* city of iSaa Diego (but not its people) wHl
play boat to the Republican National Convention. This present .
"executive committee of the rutin| cla>" will meet in the 6V2 million I
dotUr Sports And*. "V
At the same time, people of Sao Diego, through the San Diego
Convention Coalltian (SDCC). will play boet to (he people of the
United States. The p«ople wlli gather in the streets and parks of the'
elty- " . _'. .
THE MILLION DOLLAR CIRCUS
How It Ended Up In San oSgal '' ' '
News that the Republican Conventian waa coining to S*D Dlage
was met with objections tft>m moat of the people of the city and eves
some oftlciais (the meet vocal of whom are out of ofOoa now). By Itr
the strongest oblections were about the cost of hosting such an event
The city had to come up with an initial bid of 1.5 miUiun doUan, and
estimates for the total cost are running between 2.5 and 4 miilioa
dollars. Despite assurances by pro-convention Republicans that a»
city money would be spent, San Diegans realized that it would be the
people wiio eveatutUy pay.
The same modve, money, is what's bringing the convention to Sao
Diego. Shoaton Inns, a subsidiary of LT. & T., came up with
$400,000 to round out the initial bid. Sheraton owns two hotels lo
San Diego and to bnlidlng a third. I.T. & T. has gained valuable
Udelaods to build cable factories in San Di^o through the local Port
ComnilaBon, which is supposedly controlled by C. Arnhoit Smith.
Smith was Nixon's largest campaign contributor io 1968. The clindMr
is Harold Geneen, I.T. & T.'s Preadent, who was cQ-fiind raising
chairm^ with Smith in 1968.
ThereTs more. Eight days after the aiuouncement that San Diego
would Ik the sit» of the Convention, the Justice Department dropped
an anti-trust suit against I.T. & T. The out-of-court settlement allowed
I.T. & T. to acquire the 1 bUiion dollar Hartford Insurance Company.
C. Amholt Smith got the prestige of hosting Nixon and his convention
(as well as substantial income through his local busiocssea), the
Rep;;aUcaos got 1.5 million dollara, and the people of San Dlago wff
eventually pick up the bills.
Because of thto then is a better chance than evn l>efore that mai^
of the local dtizeos wQl become involved in, or be sympathetic with,
Jainonat CTtlona.
What's At Stdwr
The Coalition isn't planning d^Bonstrationa af tlia Republkatloii
CoDventiou just so we can have a liberal Democrat for president (Wa
know enough history to know that it was Ken^y who Siat seal
large oumlMn of U.S. ground trt>ops to Indochina.) We're moving
agaioat Nixon and the Republicans because they are the present
guardlais of the intetasta of the American establishment They are the
moat visOta, tandble proponents of U.S. imperialism, sexism and
racism, and of the teprcasiop ' '•at underlies all that
tatlona In S an Diego are a crucial part of the-r«n«« nt
nhiqu
h _
^in San Diego we wiu give Nlxoo a bee t«lo b U^ Cffilation of the war
and increasingly repressive domestic polidea. Iluough massive demoo-
strations hoe we can shatter the IBusion of domestic pacification that
to so essential to Nixon's program.
Demonstrations in San Diego, a major military center, also give lu a
opportunity to develop tlie Ifaisiauce^ovemeBt within the
armed forces. Organizing for massive demonstrations can hdp turn the
military apparatus into a Trojan hooe by conaoUdatiog wid»«ptMd
internal diautistaetlon and accelerating instabOlty within the miDtarjr.
The pivaent oian In the U.S. are opening up many people to
altemaUvas from the Left, sod the San Diego actlvitiea can ^e many
" ^ the n a first chance to express their diasattotacUon publidy.
Maailva, nonviolent demonstratioas withdivene constituency reptw-
lantatka wHl have Important effects, both directly 00 the partld-
Puita, gIviDgJiNB a new sense of strength and unity, and indirectly
«B Dm miBioDa who wiD watch 00 TV. If people ttom dl over the U.8.
pour into Sao Diego to join local people In maadva, nonviotont
pcoteat using creulva tactla that show our scriousoaas, we wil
provide an ioatrucUve cootraat to the Republieao rubber-stamp
renomlnation of Richard NIxi ^^
The a*a Dlia«» CojRoa b soada ap of psopls troo a «Ma variety
of local coauBtialty gnupa, iodudli« OX'a, itiiisata, anti-war roupa,
u dla tll isa. profwalnads, and andaayouiid nawsp spats We aaa also
wwklag with pwipie acnias the coualn who ahan ou poOtted loala.
indudhig the raopla's Co ition -f or Peace and Jutl«a, Ndlo^
Lawyers Guild, Paaea AcUoa Council of L.A., and Antl-bspealaUal
i^Coaiitloa of the San Francisco Bay Ana.
flprr has evolved a very flexible structure so It can meet rapidy
cban^hg conditioos. Anyone who agrees with our goals and prindplcs
and who to active in one of its component parts (committee, task
' ^ree, or m. J>lwr collective) is a member of the Coalition. At present,
genenl membenlilp meetings are held every week to consider policy
questions and do intenul education. A Coordinating Committee,
made up of representatives selected by each of the component parta,
meets more frequently. There are also Third World tad women's
^ caucuses in SDCC. ^\^
iu^olitiCT^M]yj^^jjUjlgjJjyjtlh^G^^^are: *-7^^
"l)*^r3eWBi^ai^mmediateen^t^ftin8^ro of the war lo
Indochina. Specifically to expose and stop the barbaric, escalatlBg
technological air war and to demand acceptance of the Peace Plan of
the Provisional Revolutionary Goverrunent of South Vietnam.
2) To expose and struggle against the increasingly unpopular domeatie
policies forced upon the people of the U.S. by the existing economic
and political structure.
3) To mobilize a massive array of people united In their oppodtion to
the war and in their determination to take control of thdr own Uvea.
4 ) To accderate the growth of ongoing movements capable of leading
and sustaining peoples' stmggles both locally and natlonaOy.
We in the Coalition have agreed to work together according to the
following prinicples:
1 ) We will form tbe broadest posaibla coalition to nonviolently and
openly oppoae and confront the Republican Party leadership. We saek
to build a strong radical movement that cannot be used or absort>a4
by tbe Democratic Party and which will include: Third World peupla,
G.l.'s and veterans, working people, the unemployed, gay peopta,
women, students, and freaka.
2) In ttiis coalition and In all the work we do we will reject and
struggle against dl forms of domination based on race, sex, and daaa
evploitation. We will try to bring about ui oursdves and in o<u
manner of working with one another those human changes whkk
must accompany politlcd and economic dunges in order for our
revolution to succeed. We win struggle against racism, sexism, and
class chauvinism io oursdves as well as in all others with whom we
wofk, and will seek continuaUy to isolate and understand the root
causes of the tendencies in each of us to dominate, manipulate, and
control- Skills and experience will be shared broadly among members
of the coalition and a consdous effort made to provide opportunity
for those less experienced to grow stronger in revolutionary skills,
understanding, commitment, and confidence.
3) Because much of our strength will depend on massive numbers of
people coming to the dty, we will make contact and work with
groups and individuals throughout the U.S.. especidly in the western
region.
We are engaged in an experiment with a new model for naQoiid
actions based on deep roots in the host community. As members of
San Diafo groups we fed a respondbrljty to coordinate activities
taking place In San Diego during the Republican Convention. But out
commitment to San Diego does not end in August. It lasts far beyond.
A local movement is t^ing the initiative to organize 3 national action,
an action of international significance. The chdienge will be two-fold;
foe the locd movement to be flexible and be able to incorporate new
paople bom other areas Into ^e decision making process in a
democratic manner and for tbe people from other areas to have a
^eat sensitivity to the toed sitviation, the work that has gone on
before they arrive and that will continue after August
WHAT'S HAPPENING?
Codition plans for the Convention have two thrusts: 1) to
demonstrate our dissent agdnst tlw exbting system, and 2) to
demonstrate dtenutlyes as a concrete indication' of the kind of
aociety we are determined to create for oursdves.
All of us in the Codition (and we cover a broad spectrum of cadlcd
politics) are convinced tbat violence will prove counter-productive at
thto time and place. The more disciplined and together we are , the
more likely It Is that we will be able to get our message across strai^it
without it either being used to thdr advantage by tbe Right or
coH>pted by liberd Democrals.
SDCC has begun planning some projects to build towartls August
and for the time of the Convention itsdf. At thto point we are also
keeping time open for specialized actions around targets of various
conatituendes' choodng. Other actions could range all the way f^om
conUnued masdve marches to small constituency actions to dvil
disobedience.
Our plans to date Uidude:
4108
Expo«e '72
DemoBstnting dissent b just one thing we wint to do during th«
Coaveotlon. We also want to create a setting In which people can learn
firona each other about the speciflc oatuie of our country and the
worid we lire in, and the state of the movement.
We wQl create a humanized People's Worid's Fair, called Expose
*72. This will be a large expositioQ about the victims of injustice and
their liberation struggle*, the institutions, and ideas which perpetuate
this injustice, and some visionary but practical alternatives to the
oppressive system we live under.
Groups and individuals coming to San Diego are invited io send us
their Ideas for Expose *72 between now and August, and to bring
fBms, programs, exhibits, etc.. with th«n. There should be exhibits by
BlacV, Chlcano, Native American, Asian, poor, gay people, women
and youth in this country, as well as international tehibits on China,
Cuba, Vietnam, Palestine, Africa, and Latin America. We could have
workshops, films, and a video net that would lintc all the people
together. Hie art forms and architecture we use would be an
important part of our cultural experience.
We could use Expose '72 as a base from which to go into the
community. We can plant things, build things (playgrounds, recon-
structing condemned buildings, etc.), teach school, etc. People might
want to canvass door-to-door, inviting all San Oiegans to Expose *72
and our other activities.
Tlie People*8 Flatforrii
The People*s Ratform is the unifying political statement of the
demonstrations. It draws together the demands for action against
imperialism, racism, sexlam, exploitation of labor, police and judicial
repression, and poverty.
The People's Platform is seen as an organizing tool that can be used
throughout the country, particulariy in states that hold primaries. A
nationwide People's Platform campaign would raise basic issues ratbw
than merely focusing on candidates. Candidates could be confronted
with the platform and forced to take stands on It, hopefully at both
the Republican and Democratic Conventions. •-
If broadly based enough, the Platform could be used as a means of
uniting the efforts of the Left to relate to new constituencies and hdp
to bring about a considerable degree of unity with already committed
groups.
Finally, we see the Platfonn as a tool to help mobilize pepple
around the country and point the way to San Diego.
SDCC k moving tUttmA to pin support of national organizations
and coalitions for the idea of a People's PUtfoim. If ^ tesponas la
favorabl* enough, we hope to bring together a natkm^ conference to
ratify tt
TTie PetitijMt
SDCC is circulating a petition in San Diego County opposing the
holding of the^epublican Convention here. The petition attacks the
Republican's policies of war and repression and points out that the
people of San Diego will be taxed to pay for the Convention even
though they had no say in bringing it here. The petition is both an
educational tool and a way to create a public climate for the
demonstrations that Is as favorable as poaible.
Logistics and Governance
Besides tactical planning SDCC is \aking re«pooslbtlity tor the
logistics of AugU'4 This Includes getting pennits for marches and
unusual land use. making sure that water, Food, and sanitary facitities
are available, vni. ^ care Is organized, and that legal and medical
assistance Is mobilized.
While we can do the preparatory work In these areas, moH of the
real mprk will have to be done by the people coming here. SDCC Is not
offering hotel services to the movement.
T^p mo«t lmj>ortant demonstration during the (invention will
simply be ourselves. How we act in the encampments and during
actions wilt he the critical message conveyed. Contingents will have to
And ways to govem themselves, lead themselves, and provide for
themselves from the resources available. The sense of social responsibi-
lity wf show towafots ouiDwtvet inayb« more important (hu owr
speeches a nd writt en docuBWntL
AND IN THE OTHER CORNER ...
3«« Ditto, "72 Is DOi Chicago *M. Local ofTlclalls. hoping for a
boost In convtntion trade for San Diego, don't want a repeat of the
1968 Demoeratic Convention demonstrations. Nixon wants a quiet
convention to show the worid he has nailed the coffin shut on dhaent
in America. WhUe masaive security arrangements are being developed,
the muter plan seems to rdy nwre on co^ption than violent
r^reasion.
Instead of discouraging white youth from coming to San Diego in
August, the c^ty has taken a conciliatory line. It has aiuiounc«d Its
willingness to 'give" demonstrators Fieata Island during the Conven-
tion. It has announced that demonstrations can take place along
Sporta Arena Blvd.. paralleling the Convention site. Chief of Folic*
Ray Hoobler has called the Convention the "greatest experience" of
his life as a police officer and said he realizes certain laws may have to
be bent to accommodate a large influx of demonstrators. Rumors of
rock concerts and festivals to be held concurrently with the
Convention are abundant and at least one promoter has approached
the city already with his plans for a festival 30 miles out of town.
City officials perhaps realize that a large number of youth involved
in a dope and music festival during the Convention will actually be
* good press instead of having an adverse effect. The gut issues will be
clouded and smothered by the media portrayal of a scene that is fast
becoming a television re-run - the love and peace Woodstock scene.
Despite the city's slickness there seems to be a rift developing
between it and Washington. A recent article in the N. Y. Times quoted
a city official as saying the Republicans are unhappy with the way
things are being handled here. Nixon's camp wants there to be no
demonstrations at all. To apply a bit of subtle pressure to the city, the
Law Enfot^ceraent Assistance Administration (LEAA) sent San Dies[o's
request for funds back to the city for revisions. The city has asked for
$920,000 from LEAA to pay overtime salaries, purchase riot control
equipment, and provide special training for locE^potice. The city will
undoubtedly receive a large sum of money from LEAA; how much
may depend on the city's decision on how to use it.
In case the cooptation route fails, San Diego Is making extensive
preparations for potential trouble. Security task forces have been
formed by the city and county. Between Uje two, a total of 1.800
uniformed police will be on duty on 12-hour shifts. Using the
state-wide mutual aid plan, police can be brought in from A
surrounding counties. Upon request, all available -California Highway
Patrol officers will be sent to &in Diego. Local National Guard Units
have already received Civil Disturbance training. Also involved in the
^Janning are the F.B.I. , Secret Service, and Naval Intelligence.
The police are working on plans for a computerized radio relay
system that will allow them to process mass arrests In a short time.
The police are also looking into Balboa and San Diego Sodiums as
mass detention sites, should that prove necesary.
The county purcliased three new helicopteis with an LEAA grant.
These will be used as airbom observation platfomos. While the police
can survey any demonstrations, demonstrators mil be unable to
. survey the cops if the $920,000 LEAA grant goes through. The city is
pianmng to use part of it to join with Miami In the purchase of a radio
system which operates on frequencies that citizens cannot monitor.
The fact that thwe is a split developing between the city and th«
fe^' make it impossible to know for sure what the final pcrflcy
towards demonstrators will be. It is obvious that they are trying to be
prepared to handle any violence that occurs. What they may not be
able to handle are demonstrations which are disciplined in conduct,
diverse in participation, uncompromising in content, and beyond their
power to either co-opt or intimidate.
GETTING IT TOGETHER
We feel that the San Diego Convention Coalition represents a
creative effort to arrive at a.new mode) for relating local organizing
and national action. SDCC members have travelled around the
country in the past few months, t&lking with many different people.
We do not expect the August actions to be one-shot actions
detrimental to local organizing efforts. Rather, we think that our
overall program of local initiative combined with tools like the
People's Platform can aid people's organizing efforts wherever they
are. In San Diego, the coming of the Convention has given ua the
incentive to reach out to the entire city and to unify our movement.
We need people to move here to work with us for the period
between now and August — and hopefully beyond. It would be ideal
if collectives could send one person now, to work wlUi us and crate
links with their home community, with the rest of^the collective
following, in August.
If you are interested in moving here now, get in touch with us.
Bring all your creative ideas, your innovative skills, as well as cars,
money, typewriters and otha tools.
If you can't come now, come in June. If you can't come in June,
come In August. And If you can't come at all, you can still help. Let
us know:
— Your name, if you want to be on our mailing list.
— If you will distribute literature and posters
(How many? 10. 25, 50, 100, 500 pieces?)
— If you can help us financially.
(25c. $1, $5, $25, $100, those old postage stamps you
have lying around?)
— If you can assume responsibility as a regional contact. Hds
means you will do educational and publicity work around the Issues
outlined here and bring people to San Diego.
litis Is a crucial historical period. The job is great, but so are ths
possibilities.
""^ "*■ ■i4W4>a^^with Justics.
iDCC
SAH DIEGO CONVEnTIOS COALTTIOfl
P,0, Box 826? San niego, CA 9210$
Phone (714) 234-32S1
4109
Exhibit No. 161
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4111
Exhibit No. 162
October 28, 1969
MEMORANDUM
TO: Bob Haldeman
I FROM: The President
On the PR side, I think it might be well for you
to see how Buchanan, Safire et al could have columnists,
television connmentators and others prepare the way for the
Lindsay victory in New York. Buchanan correctly estimates a
substantial Lindsay sweep due to the Procochino collapse.
The press, of course, will try to interpret this as a referendum
on Vietnann. It is vitally important that this be nailed prior
to the election and, of course, be nailed immediately after-
wards as strongly as possible. Set a task force to work on
this. It occurs to me that Buchanan and Safire could be logical
members. For example, if some of the conservative columnists
like Buckley could hit it and better still if some more in the
center were to do so it would be helpful. What I am suggesting
primarily is to predict in advance a Lindsay victory based on
these major political factors. And then also be ready for the
counter-attack when they try to build it up as a Vietnam
1 referendum.
4112
Exhibit No. 163
tEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHIN OTON
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. MAGRUDER
February 4, 1970
HiG/1 i^hiiJiiiiY
I
A couple of points that I did not want to cover in the general meeting,
but that you do need to move ahead on quickly.
First, I'm sure you have studied that TV summary done by Buchanan,
which is a devastating indictment of NBC, especially of David Brinkley.
Specifically, Brinkley was completely off base factually on his budget
criticism, and we need to get that one straightened out.
The need, probably, is to concentrate on NBC and give some real
thought as to how to handle the problem that they have created in their
almost totally negative approach to everything the Administration
does. I would like to see a plan from you; don't worry about fancy ,
form, just some specific thinking on steps that can be taken to try to
change this, and 1 should have this by Friday.. Get Klein and Ziegler
both involved in the thinking on this, and I would suggest also Nofziger,,
who could be very helpful, and perhaps get Pat Buchanan in. In .fact, I thin
definitely you should get Pat Buchanan in to woTk with you on it; butrnovS
quickly.
Another area is the mobilization of the Silent Majority, which we touched
on briefly in the meeting today. We just haven't really mobiliz;ed them,
and we have got to move now in every effective way we can to get them
working to pound the magazines and the networks in counter -action to
the obvious shift of the establishnnent to an attack on Vietnam again.
Concentrate this on the few places that count, which would be NBC,
TIME, NEWSWEEK and LIFE, the NEW YORK TIMES, and the
WASHINGTON POST. Don't waste your fire on other things.
Next point, and this is also highly urgent priority. The State of the
Union evoked a tremendous number of very strong editorials praising
the content, delivery, etc. Now we need, very quickly, a well-edited,
well-packaged, compellingly-presented mailing piece that summarizes
the highlights of those editorials, especially the ones from surprising
4113
sources like Reston of the TIMJES, so that we can get out to our people
especially the reaction that the country's newspapers have had to the
President's address.
This is something that should have been automatically done immediately,
and perhaps it is underway. The point here is that delay makes any
action much less effective, since it should be an immediate response
and get out while the speech is still alive. Our main failure in this whole
area is dullness, and let's not let this effort fall into that category. Get
it done on good paper in interesting style, rather than just a mimeographed
glob of editorial excerpts. . .
This is the kind of thing our Outside Group should automatically pick up
for us once we get them; but until we have them, we have to fill the gap
ourselves, and it's terribly iinportant to move quickly on this. Perhaps
the National Committee can help you with editorial and layout facilities,
but hold them to very high standards and make it come out good. Leonard
over there is probably. the best guy for this kind of thing and maybe .. _
would be the one to get working on it, but give him about a one -day
I deadline, so that we get it done instead of talked about.
H. R. /lALDEMAN
^^'U:^?^'ii
CONFIDENTIAL
4114
Exhibit No. 164
thc white house
WAS H 1 N G T O N
March 3, 1970
MEMORANDUM TO THE PRESIDENT
FROM: Patrick J. Buchanan
The President directed several of us to give thought to how
to combat the institutionalized power of the left concentrated
in the foundations that succor the Democratic Party.
Following are recommendat ions both of an offensive and defensive
nature -- the major one being the creation of a counter- vailing
power outside the Federal Government.
1. The President "should direct an in-house group of people
preferably outside the Administration to quietly \mdertake a. study
of the top twenty-five Foundations in this country; to identify both
their'leadership and power structure, and to indicate which are
friendly, which are potentially friendly, "vvhich can be co-opted to
support projects the President supports; and which are hostile to
us; which are arms of our political adversaries. In addition, an
inventory should be taken of all snnaller foundations (AEl and Stern),
which are ideologically and clear pro or con.
2. The President should direct the Budget Bureau to come
up -- within one month -- with a listing of all Federal moneys, from
each Department that goes to Founds ions for studies and research. W
should have totals and breakdowns on each Foundation.
3. We should bring together those inside and outside the Wli te
House with knowledge and interest in the field to determine if one of the
huge Foundations -- like Lilly or Duke Endowment -- can be convinced'
to operate on a pro- Administration basis; or whether we need to create
a new institution. Among those I would include in the discussion would j
be Harlow, Anderson, Huston, "VVhclan, Buchanan, Dr. Burns, Jeffrey]
Hart (he wrote some articles on the issue), Glenn Campbell, Bill
Baroody, Sr. , Frank Barnett -- and other individuals fanniliar with
the world of the Foundations.
4115
4. This group would be charged with reporting to the
President specific options on how we could either influence, take
over or create a major institution to acconnplish Administration
objectives.
5. The Administration should begin -- once this information
is gathered -- to initiate a policy of favoritism_in all future Federal
grants to those institutions friendly to us, that want the work -- and
wc should direct future funds away from the hostile foundations,
like Brookings.
MACARTHUR INSTITUTE
However, I think there is a clear national need for a Republican
Conservative counterpart to Brookings, whicTi can generate the ideas
I Republicans can use, which can serve as a repository of conservative
' and Republican intellectuals, the way Brookings and others. do for
the Democrats.
Dcpenxiing on the size of the structure ; I can'conceive of it under-
taking the following political objectives.
a. Serving as a "parking place" for Adnninistration and
other Republican-consei-vative intellectuals, where they can work
at ideas we can use politically, where they can take their sabaticals
at the same time they are communicating regularly with the Republican
Establishment in the White House.
b. A talent bank -- building an inventory of conservative-
j Republicans in each of the following institutions -- locating the best and
I most brilliant in the college system and graduate school system;
I identifying the best conservative reporters and editorial writers
;■ around the country; locating the conservative intellectuals and
academicians -- stockpiling all these names in a talent bank , to be
made available to the Administration, when job openings occur; and
to be used by the President to fill up future task forces and the like.
4116
c. Foreign Policy. The President was committed to clean
house at Stale; \vc have gotten heat on this. The new foundation could !
conceivably -- as it developed -- build a talent bank of individuals
in every area of foreign policy -- five deep -- who might be ready to ,
be moved into the State Department the day after the 1972 victory. ,
d. Judicial inventory. A small group of attorneys and law
students could -- via phone calls to States, via research, in local and '
regional papers, and study of important decisions, prepare for the
President a national ranking of the most brilliant and most conservative
of all Federal Judges, and State Supreme Court judges as well. The
list <:ould be used to move the best of our judges up through the
judicjial ranks. .
e. The Institute could provide $15,000 to $20,000 fellowships
to individual writers and reporters -- to have them expand articles
into )30oks, which books would be promoted by the Institute. Example -•
a Mollenhoff is digging up facts on McNamara and the waste in the
PentcigOB, ^or, a Jeffrey Hart:lia.s. done aisplendidiindictment of ioundalior
in genexal; or" sQirieone.^lse <Has: SonecarsEriea of?articles con the. network
the Irislilute'cc(uIdfgi've;]l3ienla:hese'feliovv:^hips-''-i* rwithvthe, sole .stlpuUitic
that .they tome upwith-aibookjavhichithEiIristitut^JIcouldctKeTi "push. i " .
d. The Institute might bring together experts — on the netwuiks
for example -- to discuss and produce a book of papers on their lack of
objectivity and need for reform. The whole Paul Simpson operation
in Nfeshville could be brought up and put under the Institute.
g. Through a monthly newsletter the Institute coiild keep
conservatives and key Republican thinkers informed of the finest in
thought that was being generated -- and what the institute was up to.
You could have associate memberships for $25 a year to pay the cost
of this communications apparatus.
h. In addition to identifying the top conservative students,
the Institute could keep in touch with them through its communications,
provide perhaps assistance in tuition, and scholarships for summer
work — to bring them in touch with the best in ideological talent on
our ^ide of the fence.
4117
i. The Institute could undertake the kind of routine studies
for the government -- going now to other foundations -- which could
provide a regular income, and keep some of the resident intellectuals
working and earning their keep.
WHAT ABOUT THE MONEY?
The funds could come as I see it from three sources? •
1. The money nnen who are behind the Adnninistration could
provide the seed money needed for the initial operations which
would get it underway. Rather than work on an annual comnnitment,
an endowment would be the best route.
2. It could be pointed out to all th-e Big Contributors to other
Institutions, and all the Big Contractors who get Federal money that
the Institute that should not be lacking for their support is the
Mac-Arthur Institute, as that as one of the President's favoritesv
3. All Federal contracts now going to institutions which are
essentially a-nti-Administration would be shifted to .this jiew baby
and to other pro-Administration foundations. An ti- Admiriistration
foundations should be cut off without a dime. One good talk to the
Cabinet would be all that would be required to get cooperation here --
and Budget could be on notice to notify the West Wing if Brookings gets
any more money.
4. Federal Agencies would be on notice to think if some
of their functions might not better be farmed out to the private sector,
i in particular, to the Institute.
5. All the high rollers we know would be passed the word that
I of the charities the President prefers, this one is the best. The Big
I Supporters vo uld find themselves on White House Guest Lists, while
1 the friends of Brookings would stay in outer darkness.
21-296 O— 74 15
4118
; 1
OTHER NEEDS
One of my primary concerns about this is that it required a
strong fellow running the Internal Revenue Division; and an especially
friendly fellow with a friendly staff in the Tax-Exempt office. Am
not sure we have this right now.
Second, we could use a greater willingness on the part of
our Internal Revenue to engage in combat with some of these lesser
anti-Administration institutions like the Stern Foundation.
Third, this Institute would rapidly attract a host of investigators
from the Times; it would provoke stories and articles; and we would j
have to be prepared to take some real initial political heat as a spin-
off. Also, word of precisely what the Institute was doing would leak out
eventually.
Fourth, it would entail great wrenching for the established
Institutions like Brookings; and we would have to expect a good many
fights; and some outraged and adverse publicity on the left. We would
be striking at the heart of the Establishment -- and we could expect
a response in kind.
Fifth, some of the essential objectives of the Institute v^ould havti
be blurred, even buried, in all sorts of other activity, that woxild be thei
bulk of its work, that would employ many people, and that v.'ould providei
the cover for the nnore important efforts.
Every menial task of government possible should be sent over
to the Foundation to carry out at cost plus ten.
Sixth, the Board of Directors would run from right to center of
the political spectrum; no kooks but unquestioned Pro-Nixon people
would have to have a complete lock on it; we would have to have people
there who knew what was up and agreed to it; and then let the hand-
picked staff run the thing.
4119
Seventh, the name MacArthur Institute was taken, rather
k-jsc'nho\ver Institute to prevent the co-opting of part of it by
■' .,,l)cr of liberal Republicans of the* Scott variety.
Eighth, the crucial job here is Executive Director. We would
fi someone knowledgeable, willing to work all hours, loyal to
.>j an anti-Establishmentarian, broad-gauged, who knew this
!^$iness and its purposes intimately. Wrong fellow here, a soft-
ijBcr or a hustler, and forget the whole thing.
Ninth, we would have to lock it into the Wliite House with probably
two individuals at the top level -- who had the ear of the President
at all times -- and who were intensely familiar with the Institute and
its working. Harlow and Haldeman should do for this. Maybe they
■should be on the Board of Directors -- though this would be a red light.
I Tenth, because of the nature of the Talent Bank, we are going to
(run into conflict with the Wliite House Personnel Shop; but that
seems to me to be unavoidable; this would be a professional on-going
job of locating, indentifying and filing the names of pro-Presidential
people in every area of importance around the country.
Eleventh, one major problem:" if by chance we should be evicted
ifrom the V/hite House, one can bet that the new incumbent would put a
sword to this operation, through IRS, as the first official act on arrival.
Those involved in the operation would have to carry heavy political
insurance. At any time, there might be a sudden distribution of
assets to the stockholders.
[ Finally, to make something like this go you need the right
people with the right frame of mind, and a willingness to work. If we
jl^et the wrong people on the Board, or the wrong individuals running
it, we would be pouring money down a sewer.
Can the White House get some moneyed individual to provide
ithe wherewithall to bring the aforementioned people to Washington to
Siscuss this and propose something if the President agrees?
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
4120
Exhibit No. 165
T)in wiurn nousi:
K A I M I N C T O N
CONFIDENTIAL
March 12, 19V0
MEMORANDUM FOR : MR. COLSON
MR. BUCHANAN
MR. COLE,
MR. MAGRUDER
As you };iiow, the Student Mobilization ComiTiittee and the Young
Americans for Frecdoira have jointly announced a national spring
rcfercndum'on Victnain, It is iinportant that we take the lead in
mal;ing sure that the Administration's position is clearly under-
stood and not just leave it up to YAF. Also, any effort that we
can undertalvC to support YAF and other groups who are actively
supporting our position on this referendum should be explored
and developed to the fullest.
U^^iL s^^-^X.. xy^^Of
4121
T\^E M^ME ©F GaiyL^JAff^OTY
mm
On the Question of IMMEDIATE WITHDRAWAL FROM VIET NAM
Slop th3 killing? ... End tl.e fiGhtir.g? . . . Peace er.d frescJom for Asia? . . . ThssG are ths objec-
\}\'<iS cli Americans should bs &dvocc.'ting. Bui llioy will never ba acco.Tiplishsd by en InimEdiele
withdrawal.
From tii3 beginning of the war until the- piobc-ot tim3, untold nlrocilios have been committed by
Ihe Commu.nisi forces in the nsme of "liberetion." Thes9- Communist mr.ss£cres cro planned
and orijani;=:ed. i hey ?.re an in'.enrr.l part of Communist war policy rivaling in b.'-uicliti' ''""C-- atro-
cities psrne-fraiod by Iho fJazis in VVo;ld War II. TME PEFlPETRATOi^S ARE REWARDED AK'D
PRCVIOTED, fvOT TRIED BY COURTS fi'iAI^TIAL
Whatever America's mista!;oG have been in Vic\ Nam. ihey cannot be remedied by i;-,s horribis
consEciuencas of irfir,'i?.c.':ati wlLiiorawal.
I
"/ think it would
\bea major mistake
j to unileAerclly
■ wilhdfsv,'."
ROBERT F. KENNEDY
V/isconsin St3te Journaf
March 23, 1S58
"W'hils immediate
wiilio'rc'.wal would
end tri3 war, it v/ould
lose liic paace."
EUGENE l/cCABTHY
CBS r.'c-.vs.
March 12. 1£S5
'The first consequence, as anyone can foresee, (of immzo'ir.le v/ithdrev/sl) wil! bs the ccld-
blooded mnsscore of a couple c! miHion South Vlelnzrnese wlio liave put their fe/'-'n and con-
fidence in the Uriiled States.
JOSEPH ALSO?. 0:lob?r. 1S59
Most students support the policy of continued training and arming of the
Soulfi Vietnamese to defend themselves. Most students do not advocate the
dangerous policy of "peace at any price."
RESPONSIBLE VOICES MUST BE HEARD , . . VOTE NO APRIL 13-14
4122
^^C.MORA^■DUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH 1 S O TON
April 6, 1970
\.
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. HAI^DEMAN\
FROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER
\l
On March 12, you asked, in a memorandum to Colson,^!
Buchanan, Cole, and Magruder, that we aid the student
groups who are supporting a "no" vote on the April
campus referendum which poses the question "do you
support an immediate withdrawal of all American troops
fronn Vietnam?" . .■
We called in the various groups (College Republican National
Committee, YAF, etc.) to find out what they were doing and
what we could do to help. We found YAF and the College
Republicans were doing quite a good job, and we could help
by (1) having 100,000 copies of the attached throw-away
sheet printed, and; (2) making the RNC's "WATS" telephone
lines available to the College Republicans and YAF for
generating support on campuses throughout the covmtry.
This has been done.
In the event you are aware, or wish to become aware, of
some of the problems in this area, the effectiveness of the
College Republicans and YAF in battles such as this is
substantially diminished by the opposition which these groups
encounter from the Young Republican National Federation
leadership. For example, even after we met with the YRNF's
executive director and explained to him the White House's
interest in supporting those groups which opposed a "yes" vote,
he attempted to have Jimmy Allison turn down our request to
print the throw-aways.
I do not believe we should become involved in the fighting
among the three youth groups; however, it should be made
clear to Allison and the others at the Committee, as it was
4123
in this case, that White House requests are not to be sabotaged
by any of these groups.
The Young Republican leadership does not want the White House
to work with the College Republicans or YAF, and yet on issues
such as the referendum and the President's forthcoming
message on the draft, the College Republicans and YAF
have offered to help. They can do much good on the campus
for us on issues such as this and we must be in a position to
call upon them.
On the broader issue of youth, it has become apparent that
there are some things we can do to support those student
groups which generally support us. In this regard, Messrs.
Buchanan, Cole, Colson, Magruder, and Odle will meet
Wednesday noon to discuss what we can do to help groups such
as the United Student Alliance and the Association of Student
Governments. Both of these groups have offered to distribute
materials for us, and the former may have potential as an
alternative to SDS.
4124
MEMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASH tN OTON
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
AprU 30, 1970 \
MR. HALDEMAN ,
1\
JEB S. MAGRUDER
I think you should see the attached report from Young Americans
for Freedom on the April national campus referendum question,
"Should the U.S. Immediately Withdraw All Its Troops From
Vietnam?" Although we lost, 43,000 to 25,000, the margin
was much better than it would have been had we not acted.
Also, the vote represents less than 2% of the college student
population in the United States.
As the attached blue-colored sheet shows, YAF did much to
support us - at our request. Do you think i t would jz^pi^inappro-
priate for us to draft a letter for the President's signature
thanKing ilTe~o rga nizatjoi
cc* Mr. Buchanan
Mr, Colson
lo^t
4125
i
.A
STUDENT REFERENDUM
WASHINGTON (AP)-A RECENT NATIONWIDE COLLEGE STUDENT
REFERENDUM ON IMMEDIATE VJITHDRAWAL OF ALL U.S. TROOPS FROM VIETNAM
LISTED 6? PER CENT OF THOSE VOTING AS FAVORING IT, THE SPONSORS
SAID' TODAY.
THEIR FIGURES SHOWED THAT SOME 71,000 STUDENTS OUT OF ABOUT 4
MILLION VOTED.
THE REFERENDUM WAS CONDUCTED BY THE STUDENT ASSOCIATION OF THE
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY HERE. IT WAS HEID DURING THE WEEK OF APRIL
13-19, WHEN OTHER GROUPS SPONSORED ANTIWAR PROTESTS IN VARIOUS
CITIES.
SID SCHWARTZBERG, A COCHAIRMAN OF THE REFERENDUM COMMITTEE,
SAID AT A NEWS CONFERENCE AT AU THAT THE RESULTS WILL BE SENT TO
PRESIDENT NIXON AND VICE PRESIDENT SPIRO T. AGNEW "AND I GUESS
THAT'S ABOUT ALL WE CAN DO."
CZ432PED 4/30
//>ff
4126
iCMORANDUM
THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 9, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. IvIAGRUDER
COKFIDENTIAL
CONFiDENTlAL
In the Harris poll done for the ACE on students' attitudes,
there is a question that says in effect, do you agree or
disagree that America will be in trouble as long as it
continues its arrogant imperialist policies - 70% agreed.
Let's figure out a way to get some mileage out of this
and some similar questions in the Harris poll and use them
as a way of discrediting the Harris poll. Maybe give the
stuff to Human Events or some of Buchanan's friends and
get them cranking on it. There is a lot of dirty work that
could be done here and should be. Get a copy of the poll
and figure out what you can do and let me know.
H, R./ HALDEMAN
4127
Exhibit No. 166
the white house
WASHINGTON
July 16, 1970
SECRET
MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. MAGRUDER
FROM: L. HIGBY V"
. As I indicated to you the other day, we need to get some
iii creative thinking going on an attack on Huntley for his
ii statements in Life. One thought that comes to mind is
I getting all the people to sign, a petition calling for the
i immediate removal of Huntley right now.
The point behind this whole thing is that we don't care
about Huntley - he is going to leave anyway. What we
are trying to do here is to tear down the institution.
Huntley will go out in a blaze of glory and we should
. attennpt to pop his bubble.
'Most people won't see Life Magazine and for that reason ,,,^ ,
I am asking Buchanan to draft a statement for ti ie -Vice~~ j''^/y^i^A^
President to give. We should try to get this statement on
television. Obviously there are many other things that we
can do, such as getting independent station owners to write
NBC saying that they should remove Huntley now; having
broadcasting people look into this due to the fact that this
is proof of biased journalism, etc.
Let's put a full plan on this and get the thing moving. I'll
contact Buchanan and forward copies of iny correspondence
with him to you so that you will know what the Vice President
:is doing.
4128
Exhibit No. 167
September 1 1, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR J MR. MAGRUDER
Please try to develop an ad iKat can bo run hitting tbe
radical liberal thcino of tho Vice Proaident'o epooch
^ith opocliic focuo on Cambodia.
Even the Lou Harris poll nov/ ehows that tho public
reaction is 2 to 1 favorable regarding Ctunbodia ao-
wo ha.v<o & real asset if we figure out bow to ueo it.
The thing to do is to yr»ako an asoet for uo oat of thoco
V7ho took /; pooilioa again.'st Cambodia. Ttio ad chculd
taJJc about tho radical Jibei*als and th;;n probabiy Hot
them by namo - that ic, thoae c;3.Euiidatca that we^*o
trying to defeat thie fall • pick tip some of tho quots«
as tho Vice Prenidtnt c.id in hia apoech of tlilngo that
they said cl the timo about the Cambodia operation and
tlien cnake the point td:^how wrong they were.
You probably ought to got Buchanan to give you eomo
guidance on how to put thie thing together. It should be
a very tough ad and could be very effective if done right.
I*3t*o see a draft on it within a v/eok or bo.
H.R. HAL.de MAN
4129
Exhibit No. 168
T}iE WHITE HOUSE
\VA r ) 1 1 K c T o :»•
COWFlD'^M'nM
December 1, 1970
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
MR.. BUCHANAN
MR. KEOGH
MR. KJ.EIN
MR. NOFZIGER . •
H.R. HALDEMANv /
/V /
■Attaclied 3Tje:T)0 to you of
November 25, 1970
Instead of going alicad v/ith the project of developing an
in-House columnist wliose work we would then use as
the basis for general mailings, it has bec3i suggested
that v.'C covild do better by usijig Victor Lasky in this
regard.
iBecause Easky is already an established, syndicated
colu]Tinist and, because of his willingness to cooperate,
Ave can accomplish the saine objective by providing
him with the kind of things that we want to use for distri-
ibution - ask him to do colurrms on them, and then get
1
'reprints of his colurrm to use as mailing pieces to the
people we want to direct the information to.
Will you please proceed on this basis, instead of on the
basis of the original suggestion.
Utachnient
4130
Exhibit No. 169
December 11, 1970
ADUmiSTPATiy F.IJY C CNFIDENTJAL
MEMOIIANDUM IX R: MR- HALDEMAN
PROM: JEB S. MAGRUDER
Baocd on thio morning'c meeting we have begun moving on €\e followingsj
J, Ten telegramc have been drafted by Buchanan. They will bo
cent to TLME and NEWSV/EEK today by 20 names around the
country fronn our letter writing tystcm, CopioD are attached.
2. Letters to Coborne and Sidoy will be sent tomorrow. Tho
letters, as drafted, follow the line of the Earnplea delivered .
tolas*:..
3. 1^'cters t=.th<;.e<.litc.vr. of the TIJ.-IES, POST, .STAR,' CHICAGO ^
DAILY KEWS, 5T, LOV13 POST DISPATCH are. being, prepared
and sent. - ■
4. Nofziger is having statementa placed in the CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD. Once they appear, they v/ill be printed and distri-
buted together with favorable colunnns to editors, publichcrs,
business leaders, and other opinion leaders.
■■ • • . ■ ■■ ■ I
5. Nofziger has contacted Victor Lasky, who has agreed to run '
a column. Nofziger will also contact Lawrence, Kilpa.trick
and Paul Martin. ■
6. The NEW YORK TD-.IES Op Ed page statement is being drafted
by Keogh. Nofziger is also preparing a draft. Klein ic probabl
tho best signatory. A call is in to Salisbury concerning place-
ment of the piece, . ■ :■
7. lu reviewing the comments of the editors and publishers contact
last night, it is our view that most will run favorable editorialSi
and that xt might bo counter productivo to exert White House
preasuro.
ADMIKISTRATIV.ELY CONFIDENTIAL
4131
8. An attempt io boir.^ n-nde to got a recolutlon from Sigma
Delta Xhi conclen-inin^; the prc-prcoc coiilercnce meeting
by 25 comnientatoro to act. ctralcfjy to cmbarracfl the
President.
JS1.'.:GS:gor
'SM Chron
SM K.imo file
SM Subj file -^YA*^-^«ir^.>^/.^ /^t--^^ O^y^ //z//V^^))
cc: Gordon Strachsn -FYI
4132
THE Wh-ilTE HOUSE
WA S H I N C T O N
MKM0Pv7\KDUM FOR: • JEB MAGRUDER
FROM: , GORDON STIV.CHAN --s^
SUBJl^CT: ■ Fresiclent's Press Confoi-ura
Dwigxit Chapin called last nicht and asked me to work vith you
on "follow-up on the President's press conference." • I
He described the procedures as fairly standard - telephone call,
individuals' assessment of his performance, etc.
Is the plan any different from the follow-up that Rob did
following the Presidents October peace proposal speech?
4133
(Buc>.-.-:nan)
To Tlie Editor:
The best proof yet of the allegations of Vice President
Agnew about the nation's news media was their incredibly
arrogant performance before the entire nation last Thursday
night. Who in the liell elected those people to stand up and
read off their insults to the President of tlie Uiiited States --
and then ask that he comment?
21-296 O — 74 16
4134
(Buc jianan)
To Tlie Editor: I
Wlicrc docs tlic press cojTie off demimding tliat the President
have piess conferences on call. I'he cljoice of nielliods and
means for a President to communicate witli Die people \vlio
elected him is his own -- and he answers for it to the American
people. You people have gotten too big for your britches.
4135
(Buchanan)
To The Editor:
Last Thursday night, the President of the United States
handled that pack of wolves gathered in the White House v/ith
a great deal more gentility and generosity than their conduct
deserved. When will you people recognize that he was elected
President -- and he is entitled to the respect of that office --
no matter what you people think about hiin.
4136
(Khachigian)
To Tlie Editor:
Joseph Pulitzer must be turning over in his. grave. He
believed in an lionest journalism. Instead, at the President's
latest news conference, we got the spectacle of reporters
falling over themselves in their attempts to put down the
Pre sident.
Their silly, slanted questions v.'ere so obNdous that it was
laughable. Three cheers for President Nixon's nnastery over
the Warlocks of V/ashineton.
///o
4137
. (Khachigian)
To Tlic Editor:
With regard to the President's recent news conference,
score it: President Nixoji, 100 - Media, 0.
4138
— (Khaclagian)
To The Kdilor:
Anyone who saw the President's recent news conference
mvisl have bridled in disgvist at tlie blatant attempts by
reporters to embarrass the President. Instead, the President
held back these wolves and showed them a thing or tv/o.
Every hojicst reporter ought to hang his head in shame
at tlie grandstanding of his colleagues before the President
of the United States. I used to wonder why anyone criticized
tlic press. Now I know.
4139
— -(Khachigian)
To T}ic Editor:
'Diank goodness tliis country has President Nixon. At
least he lias the guts to stand up before the media and aive
the news straiglit.
At liis December 10th press conference, President Nixon
was faced with qvicstions planted by a cabal of the liberal
press. V/hile llie media tried their best to embarrass him
with their inane histrionics, Mr. Nixon answered all questions
with candor and honesty.
V/hy don't you fellows spend rmore time on good questioriems
and less time on v.'ondering why the President doesn't have
more press conferences.
///3
4140
(KJiachigian)
To Tlio JOclilor:
Joe KlcGinnis ought to write another book: The Selling of
Tlic Press Corps. At tlie President's press conference of
December lOlh I couldn't believe my eyes and ears. There
they were in all their pompous splendor editorializing on
\-irtually every qucs.Lion they asked of the President.
If the media wi\nt to take positions on public matters, they
ovight to run for public office and leave to honest reporters the
asking of sincere questions. In view of the new role of the
media, I am per sonally .sending all members of the White
House Press Corps jars of pancake niakeup. They need it
more than the President.
4141
(Khaclugian)
To The Editor:
V/c arc told by tliosc of you in the nncdia tlial Presidential
press conferences are held to inform the public. Maybe I
tuned in on the wrong show.
The press conference I witnessed on December 10th looked
like a programmed attack on the President. It is incredible
that prime time has to be given over to glorify a bunch of
prima donna reporters. It's the President's job to inform and
the media's job to transinit. L-et's keep it that way.
4142
(Kliacliigian)
To T}ic Editor:
We cili>:cus depend on the media of this Nation to give us
the news honest and sti-aiglit. Wc also expect that they will
nt least sliow respect towards tlie Presidei:it of the United
States.
Yet, at the President's last news conference, the press
were out like hatcliet men -- seeking neither to show respect II
nor to inform. The glamour beys of tlie media seenj to think
that soineone elected them to high office.
The President's spirited responses to bad questions ha.ve
earned my deep respect.
4143
(Kh<icl-ii[;iuji)
To The KcIiLor:
Ilceivcn {orUtnr] lliat humilily be Uic last i-cfugc of the
nicdia ! V/})y, it would be asking too much that (hey stick
to informing tlic public instead of preening before the
television cameras.
However, I join the media in asjcing tliat tlie President hold
inorc news conferences. 1 rather enjoyed seeing the pres.*;
make iackasses out of tliejnselves on DccemVjer lOtli.
4144
(Kliachigian)
To T]ic ]'2ditor:
Recently, Vice-President Agnew deigned to propose tliat
newsnicn submit tliemselvcs to periodic questioning by
governn-;cnt officials. TItc Press wa;; outraged. How dare
Old Spiro thinlv thiat the press was partisan?
From what I coaJd tell at the Prc-sidcnt's last news con-
ference, Larry 0'Bric;n must have pUnited all the questions.
Our {roe, non-parlinaii press must be sviffering from double
hernias from carrying aroimd all of lliose loaded questions.
Congratulalions to President Nixon for sliowing the media
that he can stand uji to tliem with honest and fortliriglit answers
4145
December 11, 1970
Dear Jock:
px-ouo IrrlLation at Iho lack of prcoa conforcnceo cccma to mc unclei',--
cLiMidablc. But Llicrc nrc cornc qucationo Involved hero th,it go bc/onjj
that. (1) The Frcoident har. tho right: to choose hjs Tjorm of corrsrnuni.ca-
tion with the Aincrican people -- just r.s he will answer for it. (2)
Should tho national prcos be meeting privately or rocrctly to thcnco
come to coerce tho Pronidcnt into hr^ving iTiore press coiiferer.cos --- by
the vehicle of d^nia-'lng his political interests \n.a. concerted telcvicion
and nev/spapcT attacks on him by the participants In the naectings. (3)'
V/bcn docs the qucstioninr; of the Preoidcnt, the interrogation of the Prec-
ident go beyond sharp, tough, incisive quentioninj; and become occaolon
for fulrninationL: and tho prcocntatlon of hostile viev/points and hostile
quectiooc. (4) My ov/n vicv^ \a that tr.e Old Man kept the anirnalo at bay,
v?Lth doftncf.B and oklU ond cornc gentility, and that tho prcsE confer-
ence v.-ac clearly a pluo. But, in talking about tliC inatitution of the orcoo
conicz-cnco, one v.'ondcro wlicthcr it ic logitim/xtc to turn It into t: hszv
Jjaiting cc-soion; ocs: v/ondero v/hothci: it ic wise for the national prccs
co'^'po to a\lo\w it.soli to bccorno noinething of an antl-NIxon particr.ti
cabal ao U seemed to do la&t v^eek before and In tbs coMfflo of the Pics-
ident'o pretja conference. Am enclooing copies cf RN'c preoG coiiferance
and Zicglcr'o meeting v/lth tho prcca for your reflection In Central
Virginia.
With warm, regardo,
Sincerely,
Patrick J. Buchanan
Special AonlGtant
to tbo President
Mr. Jameo J. Kilpatrlck
412 Prixicccc Street
Ale>;andria, VU-glnia«
4146
Exhibit No. 170
THE whitf: house
V.' A S H I N G T O N
March 2-1, 1971
MEMORAivDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT
FROM: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
SUBJECT: THE MUSKIE WATCH
From the Evans-Novak Newslctler: '
"I vluskie: ' He hcs been clcli h' er'a'tcly lyin^ low,
v/hicli'is 'sivrart politic? n.'icmt: Av'ncn' carried too far.
Instead of travcliiig to KigcriD,, Jicmi^'ht have done
bettdr to go to J'Cbw.Y-orlii c to Ctiliforiiia, iHnd Texas
where HHH has been m.^xkint; inroads with Establishment
Democrats. Still, Mur'vic remains by for the strongest
possible candidate against Nixon, according to the
Quayle Poll trial heats: Mviskic -l'8",a; NiKon -1Z%; Wallace
iOTo compared to last month's A'Juskie •i6'>o; Nixon 4-lTo
Wallace lOVo. "
Mr. Muskie seems to have recognized the political peril
in his high visibility strategy of December and January -- and revised
it. The highly publicii'.ed trips to California and AIoscow -- with the
press pack aboard -- have been discontinued. Tlicy did little to
strengthen him, and exposed not a few weaknesses in personality,
in foreign policy. He seems to have arrived separately at the
saine conclusion; and his profile is now perceptibly lower than
it was in the first inonths of the year.
However, if Muskie docsnot come out into the open again,
if ho stays in relative hiheriiat i o n. it is difficult to see wliat it is
that i s troirc t o diminiy.h h i s standing in the polls on v.hi,v-li h e now
tleoiMid.'-.. The country has a good Jn;i)ression of him; he presents
to millions an attractive alternative; he is not the subject of the
kind of attacks whicli would force a response. ' '
Should he niaintain his jjrcsont posture, more or less, for
eight montlis, he will enter tlic primaries, relatively unscathed;
and as I'irolhers Evans-Novak v.-ritc: ^
4147
'=Jf Muskic docs win niost of tlie primaries, lie will be
nominal C'd v.jlli case oji the first ballot.
If Muslvie does not win, he will not even be a factor at
tlic coiK-enlion. "
And if Air. Afuskic is not cut and bleeding before he goes
into Kcw Hamp.nhirc, he will very likely do massively v/cll there,
buildinf; up irrcstible momentum for the nomination. This scenario
is not ia our intcre5:t -- as Muskie today is a figure ideally situated
to unite the warring factions of his party, and if they are united
tljat is bad news for us.
Our interests thus dictate smoking liijn out now; and keeping
hiin out in frojit as long as' we can; . Flis iperformance to date when
out front docs not argue well for his capacity to survive the kind
of pressures and harassments that go with hiring front runner,
pressures and harassmcnts he is not getting today.
One recalls that Nelson Rockefeller had phenomenal i-atings
in tlie Gallup and Harris polls by the end of 1967 --so long as he
i stayed in Albany. When he emei-gcd, half the nation said, "Hey,
it's him again, " and his ineffectual active campaigning actually
cost him votes from tlie lime it began until Miami, when v/e
finally surpassed him in the Gallup Poll. The same v.-as true of
|!Goldwater. .As Mr, Conserva.tivc, unknov.n to the couniry, he was
h an enormous attraction; as Barry Goldwater, campaigning in
New Hampshire, he v.as a disaster. Botli he and Rocky dropped
in the polls from beginning to the ciid of the New Hampshire Primary.
The more specific stands a political figure-takes -- on divisive
issues -- the more people he alienates. This is as true for Mr.
'Muskic as it is for us; and thus he should be forced to take more
stands on more controversial issues. Tlie free ride for Big Ed
Muskie must be terminated.
It seems not in our interest to let him choose his topics,
to wander the land talking about saving our environment which'
■everyone from Robert Welch to Abby Hoffn-:an supports. It is in our
interest --and in ihc interest of the liberal Democratic challtMiners
for the nomination -- to prevent Mr. Atu::kie's uninl errupted march
to Ihc nomination.
n
4148
T)u> Sor.r.s November argument was Hint wo should leave
Musl;ic a)c>nc -- t'.lLack and respond to other Democrats, like HIIH,
to elevate t]-.e:;i. That doesn't seem realistic now, as Muskic
is already ''cflcivulcd. " Me is already at the top, so far as Gallup
and Harris and the democratic Parly are concerned.
There J_s_ a danger in j^oing iif.icr MurJ;ic, making him the
martyr and spokesman of the Democratic Party, and thus insuring
liis iiominatioii, and even enliancing his chances of election. But
the risk should be tal;cn. If \vc don't do it now, we shall liave to
play hurry-up football inthe tvv'o months before election -- and
people tend to disbelieve political, charges inade in that kind of
partisan environment.
Who fiVould v/c get to'pdke th'o's'Harpstick into hiscavcto
bring Muskie howling forth ? More ijniportant. What kind of stick
is most effective.
Frankly, Muskie cannot be effectively assaultc-d froin the
Right -- i. e. he is a Dig Spender; he doesn't stand beliind the
President in tiiTie of conflict abroad. An attack on Muslcie from
his right, by a. Senator Dole or Vice President Agncw, \voukI only
rally all Democrats, who are all to the left of us, around him.
The attack tlieii should conic between tlie center and the left
of the Deinocratic Party. It should focus on those issues tha.t divide
Democrats, not those that unite Republicans. It should exacerbate
and elevate those issvies on which Democrats arc divided -- forcing
Muskic to either straddle, or come down on one side or tlic other.
Many such issues come to mind.
THE WAR, l-vcss and less is tliis an issvxe dividing Democrats;
more and more is it a unifying issue as conservative Democrats
begin to adopt a "let's get the heli out" stance. This would explain
what it v/as inexpensive for Muskic ajid Hum])hrcy to move doveish
.politically in recent weeks on this issue. The price they arc paying
for that move is not so great as it once was; and their need to
mollify the jjeaccnik Dcniocrats is greater than it lias ever been.
4149
TIU: :v:l:SKn: }'j:n;;OWALlTY. There is fertile ground here.
Muskic is sliCirl-fiiiiparcd; he rct;ul.-irly rebuffs reporters who cisk
hostile qu;? t;.-::!,; iic h;i.s n reputation, which dir.lurbs him, of being
unable to ii-..-.-'_- a dici-jion, to lal;e a stand. Political criticism of
Jvl'.iskic a.s a iJ>;:ir.ucratJc JIainlct witli liis finger to the wind and his
nose in a G:-:.\.:]i Pj]] vvould be the kir.d of attack that would be
credited by the Dcinocratic L-eft. Ji is their {^re.nlest susjncion of
Bij: Ed. Slc-ttr.::enLs by .Liberal Repiblicans such as "At least McGovcrn
has the couvai;e of liis convictions, silly thougli they inay be, but who
the hell knowf where Mr. Muskie stands and what lie stands for
other tlian Airs. Muskic. "
THE RACE ISSUE. There arc possibilities provided hern in ■
that Ihc 1930s Eiberal, Abe Ribicoff, has come up .with ?. beautiful .
"forced integration" pro?; ;-am -- .involving a ;F,edcrQl recjuiremcnt that
every school in the entiremctropolilan' area. have within the student
body notniorc than twice p.nd not less ithan half Die rniinority population
in the entire metropolitan. That of couri?c would necessitate inassive
bussing of whites into the cities and blacks into the Suburbs. We oujiht
to look closely at tlic details of this le.^islation, and if it is as radical
a piece of "social eiiginecrin'-.;'' as it ai^pears, then the way miglit
be smoothed for its advance; it could be given considerable publicity;
and we could de;i ounce it as inconcif:tcnt with our principles of freedom
or movement -- and force Mr. Mu.= kie to take the kind of stand that
would cither alienate the suburbanites and etlmics who would bear the
brunt of this -- or aiipear again as an appcaser of the Right in the
eyes of the professional liberals.
REVENUE SHARING.. Muskic has stepped in it up to his ankles
on this one. His virorous opposition to RN's program inct with silence
and disagreement froin the mayors and city officials to v.'hom he spoke --
most of whom want it and most of vx-hom are dejnocratic. Tliis ground
should be cultivated. Public statements by Democrats, preferably
liberal Democrats, calling on Muskic to change his view, and lead
the Democratic Party in defense of the cities .should be made. We
can portray this as a "dog-in-the-manger" stance toward urban
I problems by a Senator, who is playi:'.g the reactionary toward a
progressive proposal simply because he did not conic up with it himself.
Klodcrate and liberal Republicans sliould be able to find in thi.s matter
a political area where they are comfortably supporting the Administration
and opposing Muskic, and they should do so pvdjlicly.
4150
AnOiv "I JO?;. This is, as wc predicted months ago, a rising
issue and a :;,'.it. i.ss'.ic vitli Catliolics. Time tins week Iiad a major
piece on the r;!.i;,'_' rli-riti-.l opjjositioji, not only Catholic. Buckley
has callcfl on (jr.l^c-lic ]jisl)ops to lead a. j)olitical ofCcnj ivc up to
tlic point o/ civi) cli5o':>cdicnf c. Jt is not unliltely tliat one of these
abortion centers, such as D. C. , could be; lar^^etcd with a bomb --
so fiercely do co;iscrva'.ivc Catliolict; lecl on this matter. The
President's stand against the Defense Department should be made
public and strong, would be liappy to write it. Let us take the far-
left losses v.-c would pet on thi;; -- and then send the ball into Mr,
Mviskie's Court. After all, he is & Catholic, and one recalls th.at
in liberal, but Catholic, Mas5;achvisclts, Senator Edward Kennedy
eclioed'hiTj'ultra-liber'al Rcpablican opponent on every, major
is sue: but one -,- abortion.'.! lie opposed aboxtioR.. ' If the' President, :.-L.
should publix;ly'takehis^st?.nd against aborticni, as offensive "to his j
own moral principles, _ \vhile,:as-. President, ' jiot intcriering with the. '::
decision of States; if we shoiUd publicly reverse DOD, Ihcn we can
force Muskie to n-.akc the clioice between his tens of millions of
Catliolic supporters and his lilsoral friends at tlie New York Tiines
and t)ic AVashington Post.
PAROCHAID. Again, thin is the big winner for Northeast
Republicans, v/ho support it, such as Rock.efeller. For while GOPcrs
may be neutral or opposed, it is not life or death to them -- v.-hile to
Democrats, it is a divisive cut issue separating Conservative Catholic
Irish and Italians from Do-Goodcr, liberal, .Tcv.ish Democrats who
adamantly oppose it. The Supreme Court is moving to decide this |
issue as it is to decide the abortion issue -- and before lliose decisions
come down, wc should be or. the side of tlie angels. If the Court decide
in favor of libera)iz;ed abortion a;id no Parochaid, tlien wc will h.ave
lost tv/o of the gut issues that can make inroads into the C^itliolic
Democrats of the Northeast and Midvvcst, and Mr. Muskie will liave ,
two political probler.is of some niagnitude resolved for him by the -jfl
Supreme Court. Tlic President has, I understand, the preliminary '^B
rcj)ort of the non-public scliool task force. Why not make it p».iblic
with an RN endorsement -- let the Catholics know tlicy have a friend
in the White Hovise, concerned about their problems. Some SoutHcrneri
arc going to complain, but v.here will they stand in a shov.down
between the President and a liberal Democrat. Indeed, should-
Muskie push too hard against parochaid -- to move between us and
our Soutliern friends, he will pay an intolerable political price in
loss of sup])ort in tlie Catholic Community.
4151
A mnn is ck-finctl by Uic pus it ions he takes; njid Mr. Mii.skic
docs v.'cll, l)0(:-!i'. ■,'„• Ills j)iii ;;c is fuxy.y; people on opposing sides of
bitter cji.!C;-l^!(.:is (';i not i-nuv/ tlial he ir, citlicr oj5j3o::ed to one of
Ihcni, or the '.<;.:i;r. On this inalter, \vc must become the midwivc^
of the people's ri.ciht to !;no\v --if the press docs not do the jol)
for MS, Y/1'.icli it is not doin;^ today. ,
THE SST -- Every worlccr in Seattle, every union man in the
acrospctcc industry, should be made aware of Ivlr. Kluskie's position
on this issue. He slioukl be targeted as Die prime liberal responsible
for the cutbacl^s in defense and spacf: v/liich have cost their jobs. R/T
should be pictured as the one fif^litinf^ to save tlicir jobs from Dcmorrr.
who would put an end to the space pro,<:ram. In the last cajnpaign v/c
took ithelieat for jobs lost bticaxise of cutbacks -- cutback's v\'hich tlio.
complaining liberal Deniocrats A-oted and themselves "would have
increased. •
THE'EKVmONKIENT.. Mr. "Muskie has rcco{rnized and moved
to solve liis political probl ciiis here -- v/c.ll before v.e did. He is
ti'avcling tlie covmvry, liold?ir^ hearings on the iiiTpact of the cnviror.r.-.i:
decisions on industry and jobs. He is effectively noutralij'.ing our
best issue here -- tlie lactic oi telling conimunities and compa.iics,
"if Madinan Alusicie's enviroiiment bill goes tlirough, this industry si-.-.-,
down and this burg becomes a gliost tov.-n. " The old scare tactics, 0:1
military closings, were U'^ed against us to a farc'-thee-well last fall -■
and we should lia.vc moved to use this against iviuskie. Wc did not.
He seems to be getting v.ell on this -- but he remains vulnerable.
A research teain sliould go over v/liat tlic Muskie oritzinal
[proposal would liave required -- before any compromises -- and tiicn
t have our party people in the affected areas say publicly that had t"nc
' Muskie bill gone through, unemployment here would be ten percent.
Tliis environmental issue titillates the liberals, but the trade-offs
in jobs and income and community recession have not been reckoned,
and not made public.
Tliat new Government- Ford Foundation project -- tliank God
t Enthovcji has departed - would seem the ideal instrument, with
the right man at tlie top, to cost out, in jobs and factories closed,
tlie imp:ict of all of Ed Aluskie's major environmental legislation.
"Jf Ed Muskie's bill is passed," sliould beconic the custoiiiary
prefix oji predictions of economic doom.
4152
Tnr J^ORH FOUNDATJOrN. When Whitjicy Youni,' passed
away, om^ ^,a\v ;•. nicLurc of LW Muskic in the surf v/iLli Voun^, and i
one Icr.j-iicd liiaL i.hcy were j-i'lhcred in Niucria on a Ford Found;;<;ion I
financed t)-i;j. I\ov/, in my rcsearcli on Ford, this is the Hiird sucn
trip. Mu5-;i(; v.as the oiily ])ei":~.ocrc-Ll v/lio jnadc both junlcLets to j
Japan (some of i/ur lie [public; a Ji friends went, also on one) financbd i
by Ford. CerLair.ly soi^-.i c Ironble.^omc questions could be raised j
about Muslcic's connection v.itli J\IcGecirj:c Bandy's giant institution --
and arc they beliind his candidacy. Investigation sh.ould be done on
this score. This could go hand-iji-globe v/ith tlie Foundation spceche.'
THE jMUSKIE advisers. Certainly, Harriman and Clifford,
two of those responsible for the present situation in Vietnam, have
little or no appea.l to the young wlio opposp.tliejwar^ ; •Thcy.arc old
war iiorsbs, who were deeply involved 'in dll.tl:e' failures of Vietnam.
The failures Avould return to power, with Muskie -- and llarrinaan,
"who sold Poland 'dov.-n"theiRivci%'''is, apparently Muskie' s leading
candidate for Secretary of State. How would tliat read on the front
page of the Chicago Polish-American?
These are a few of the areas that could be explored. Tlicse
are some of the issues tliat ca.n be developed --to the immense
disconifort of Mr. Mu.=;kie. Tliis lias been a hayridc for him thus
far; we cannot rely upon t'ne press to do this work for us. V>'c are
going to have to poke Big Ed v.ith some sharp sticks to see liow he
performs. And from what I liavc seen, it is not all that reniarkablc
or impressive. Me is riding two tilings right now -- his Vice
Presidential candidacy in 19u8 where an indulgent pi-ess slobbered
all over him as the great alternative to Spiro T. -Agnew -- ajid his
televised show the night before the election, which was a good
performance, but l\ardly a trial-by-fire.
Wc ought to go down tothe kennels and turn all the dogs loose
on Ecology Ed. The President is tlie only one who sliould stand
clear, while everybody else gets chewed up. Tlic rest of vis arc
expendable commodities; but if the President goes, \vc all go, and
may be the country with us. 2\ly view.
Anyhow, the attacks should )iol_ be name-calling -- they
should be thought out. Tliey should have a specific jjurpose; Ihey
should be designed to injure Mr. Mujkic v.-ith a specific group
wJicrc he now has support. They should be framed to force liim to
howl a bit.
4153
y^^aiii, tlj.j fellow in his bun;',lcc1 trip to tlic Soviet Union, in
his f;hort to:r.p','.' tmd tcslinccs, in liis botcliing of revenue sharing --
to inc doc.'; r.oi licvm to have it. The jndiv-idual v/ho called liiin
the "Ronnicy o-' tiic Seventies" may not be too fai- off the mark.
We will nut be, in this cntcrjjrisc, v,-ithout allies annong
the Silent Air.jorjty in the DcmocrriLic I'arty in tlie Senate. Sonic of
them see us as vulnerable; Dicy see tlic future as the "Democratic
Years," I cannot Vjclicve they view v^-it!i any enthusiasm eight years
of President Ed Muskie tellinrr Ihem v.-!iat is good for America. No,
J think some of these fellows v.Duld jiot be disappointed to see Big
Ed unhorsed and lying in a ditc'n by the. side of Die road. Tlicy.will
shed the saine crocodile te&rs -as tlrat splendid little band who piit
it to Diis V/hipsl:iip, Ted Kennedy, in the secret l>.all6t.
My recommendation, .t;hen, 'is if or creatiajT of THE "MU.SKIIT
WATCH, an operation v.'orkin;^ pcrliaps v/ithin the Republican National
ComjTiittee, which ma.y even be a publici/ced operation, doing constant
research on Ed, a.n.d putting tlic materials out to (he interest groups',,
and to the press. Tlic opcra.lior. should be tied in v\'ith Mori. Allin's
Shop; he caii pro\idc a steady stream of all commentary on Muskic.
It sliould be tied in v/ith Colson'^^ sljop which cs.n provide the names
of tlie proper contacts in each community. Ihe group sliould focus
for nov.' exclusively in MusJiie and not get bogged dov/n on a dox.en
other little projects. It seems an interesting ideii; one that, if.
RN approves, the general aj^proach, sliould be tied iji with Senator
^Dole, and moved on rapidly.
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
4154
Exhibit No. 171
thu white house
V//- C- ^ I N G 7 O .S"
April 19, 1971
MEK'ORANDU.M FOR: THE PRESIDENT " •
FROM: PATRICK J. BUCIiANAN |
SUBJECT: The Resurrection of Hubert Humphrcj
One emerges from a perusal of fiur "I-uuiiphrcy file" with a
grudcinp regard for Old Hi:bcrt. Since November, with but a
few notable exceptions, the cx-Vecp has conducted )>imsclf
remarkably well. He receives an excellent preos. He has
iiiaximi:ied his assets, and minimized )iis deficiencies. The
result is that today, unlilcc sb; montlis ago, the man is a serious
contender for tlie Democratic noininatioii.
Gallup has charted the comeback. The following represents
the shift from Novehibcr to March in Democratic voter sentiment,
about their preference of nominees.
1970 NOVEMBER 1971 MARCH
MUSKIE . 33 . 26
KENNEDY 31 25
Hl-ni 16 21
Tlius, in four nionths, ?Iumpl^rcy gained a net of 12 points
on Muskic, and 11 points on Edward M. Kennedy -- a not insignificant
advance. One reason is surely that, in this period, it is difficult
to find any bad press on Hubert Hvursphrey. The stories -- many
of thein onwomcn's pages -- arc invariably straight or favorable.
Following are some reasons for tlio Humishrcy resurgence,
which underscore elements of his present strategy, a stratcj;y that
appears to be working as well today as that of any man in political
life. ..
4155
A p rir.ultnr c
First, Ilumjjhrcy has moved rajjjdly lo fill an issue vacvivim --
in the farm regions. He had himself named to the Agriculture Cojn.nittee;
has perceived our v.cakness in this area; has niadc himself unofficial
Democratic champion of rural and farm America -- without ignoring
the "cities" issue he shares with the Eastern-oriented candidates.
Press people tell me HHK proniised to stump rural Aanerica
declaiming that, first, "Mr. Xixon took away your prosperity and now
he's trying to talce your Dejjartnient av/ay from you." "I tliink that'll
sell right well ovit there in farm country." So, HHH has been
quoted. Here Ilumplircy can pick up support in an area others ignore,
and is wcU-positJoncd to corral rural delegates to the Dcinocratic
convention.
The Mnskic Decline
Secondly, on analysis, Humphrey's new supjjort is coming
directly out of K'tuskie's hide.
Here is what seems to have liappcned in four mojiths. IvlcGovern's
wld accusations, his far-o\it positions, }iave thrilled the Far Left of
the DeiTJocratic Party, causing McGoveDi to rise from the infinitesimal
two percent to tlie insignificant five percent. McGc^vorn seer-^s pre-
vented from risinv ir.to the teens or twenties, at l)ns •point, because
he is ai'jpcaling to voters v.'j^o alr cr.dv )iavc a ponviliir, firsi-linc ,
lefi-v.in? candid.'.ie in Edward Kennedy, a cai:didate wlio gives tlicm
near all the positions IvlcGovern does -- at the same time Kennedy
offers the realistic liope of winning, with those positions -- and
returning Camelot as well.
But McGovern's candidacy may be having a secondary effect --
on the fortunes of Air. Muskic.
To hold his b ridpe position in the Deinocratic Party, Muskie
XTiust equivocate on divisive issues; he cannot adopt the Far Left
positions, and reiTiain viable nationally. McGovcrn, having 110 such
problem, assumes all these stances and so contrasts himself, as
decisive and inoral and unequivocal, witli Muskie wlio coincs off
indecisive and equivocal. Thus, Muskic fails to "turn people on, "
and in his glaring pviblicity as front-rimner, this is enncrvating
to this candidacy. And as he goes down in the polls, his svipporters.
4156
generally ccjitrist Democrats, looking for a winner, drift off to the
next best tiling -- Hubert Hvimplircy.
Mvis'cie still hiir. brond !;i l opo^'t amo n c; Dei^'iocr.its and
Jndciicnclc 1 1 1 ;;; t-.r-d iic c-an:)(>l be ronovctl 'is a factor. lU-.t a ccillapFinq
Muri!;io can:nai'jn. it s coins to i:V !, would jc ad to an aJn-:oat i:-ic:vitable
Kenne dy-] i' linp'p . rcy , I cU-cen'CV confrontation for the- noininalion - -
an alto;;cther satisfactory deveh-inmcnt.
The Humphrey Positions ;
Humphrey's attacks on the Administration have been of a
scattcr-gun nature; he is a single issue man as Kennedy is the
healtli man, and Muslcie, tlio environmentalist. He criticizes the
Administration on a mucli broader f. ont -- in essence ap])caling,
with his old politics, to the constituency of the New Deal.
1. As mentioned, he has moved early and liard to become
the Democratic cliampion of the American farmer -- a good move,
con.sidcrinj; tliero are 37 other candidates contcndin.g for chamj^ion
of the cities, and HlllI is anion;; the:n.
2. He is back on the arnis control, missile free;ie, "risks
for peace" nonsense. Vriiile, c>ne imagines tliis v/ovCd help a bit
with the left and the ijitellectual comniunity, to inost peoi^le the
issue is too complicated to comprehend.
3. He is making prodigious efforts to get well on the Vietnam
issue. Having decided there is no more to be gained by a "peace
with honor" position, he has all but confessed his sins froiTj the
Johnson years, and daily attennpts to extricate hiinself from tliat
record.
4. He is taking a strong pro-Israeli stand, a stand duplicated
of course by most Democrats -- all of them looking to Jewish money
and backijig at the convention and, hopefully, in the election.
5. He repeatedly attacks the White Koxise for "public relations
gimmicla-y" and "intimidation of the news iTicdia, " even though HIIH's
past quotes show lum jnassively vulnerable on the latter. (Have
some thovights on tlic fornicr problem, forthcoming later. )
4157
6. He is rn}'.-iinr down very lip.rd -- perhaps hardest of all --
on t he bread nuc. butter iss-i pa -- the jjroblems in the economy, the
uncinploycd, poor pcojile out of work, etc. This is, again, the old
politics, whicli Mr. Humplircy continues to mix effectively v/ith
the new. \ . _
T))e IIum;)hrcy Ar.scts
V/ithin the Democratic Party, tliese are not inconsiderable.
He is solid witli the blacks, more than acceptable to Big Labor, a
friend of the farm bloc; he has party strength in the South, and
Texas (especially) and California; he ren:)ains a "centrist" Democrat;
xinlike Muskie, he pays his respects to party regulars. Old Deniocrats
from New Deal days have nothing against him. In every publicity
encounter witli fellow Democrats, he steals the show as he did
at the big pie- eating contest on the Hill and the A.S.N. E. session
last week. He is ebullient and likeable -- very strong with
Democratic women. He is a politician of the old hand-sliaking,
baby-kissing school; not a total disadvantage with many simple
people. He canic within an eyelash of wiiining tljc last time out.
Tlie Humphrey Liabilities
These are very serious. He is a loser, an Old Face wliose
resurrection lias "prodviccd boredom and horror amojig Dcn-.ocrats,
except for some of IIHH's big money friends." (Ey.ins and Novak)
He is tied up inextricably with LB J and Vietnam; he remains
anatliema to the intellectuals and far left of his party, despite
his best efforts to heal the wounds. He generates no great
excitement of enthusiasm. His nomination would aliei'.ate all the
"idealistic" McCarthy kids who would have waited four years --
and gotten Old Hubert again. His nomination could even produce
a fourth party. While he has traveled all over the nation speaking
to youth, it is safe to say his nomination would prodvice ennui among
the activist liberal peace groups and disinterest in an RN-HHH election.
By way of a balance sheet tlicn. it seems Humnhrev would
have a nvmibcr of tlie traditional 5troiif:th.s and supianrts that co
automatically to national DoriTocrats -- but no iiiorc. And lie would
carry into a goicral election serious deficiencies -- which seem
to make hiin a thorougjily acceptable cajitlidatc from our point of view .
4158
The Hnnii^lirc-v Slr-^lcev
111 December, Humphrey volvinteercd t}iat Dcniocrrils should
loolc over lliC field iii 1971, .and by the end of tliis year, sctllc vipon
a candidate, rally about hiin -- tind avoid the divisive primaries.
This has been, I believe, his solo significant j^olitical error since
election. Liberal Dcniocrats pounced upon tlie sclicmc as wholly
out of spirit vitli the new v.-idc-oiDOJi convention concept they liave
been proinoting.
But, when Hujnphrcy advanced that proposal in December,
it would appear tliat he did not, then, seriously consider himself
a potential candidate. For v/ho woiid liave jjredictcd thc_n -- including
Mr. Hujnphrey -- that HIIH could possibly be tlie national favorite
by tliis next December.
Since then, however, Humplirey's fortxijics have risen; lie is
clearly a potential candidate; and sees himself as such.
His strategy seems relatively clear: itjovo about the country,
attacking the Xixon Administration on a broatl variety of issue;
seize all the publicity possible; do t)ie party chores; attack no fcllov/
Democrats; stress ojie's availability -- and wait for events to develop.
Humplircy niust, it seems to me, avoid the early primaries.
And liis derogatory reinariis about primaries thcjiis elves indicate
that lie intends just tliis. Let the other contenders fight it out
with one another, the more tic merrier, to an indecisive conclusion
in the early primaries -- and then cincrge v/ith bi'oad party
acceptance, as the strongest centrist unifying nian around, the
fellow who came within 500, 000 votes, and can now go over the top.
The strategy is working. riu]n]5hrcy has risen at Muskie's
expense; he is now within range of both K'ennedy and Muskie --
although of the three he continues to run weakest against tlie President.
Because Muskie is the frojit-ronncr, it is Muskie who is up in
New Hampshire, being covered by reporters, as he apologiiies for
his role in Vietnam, and attcinpts to cjconeratc himself before the
college young. J^Ir. H\.uiiphrcy is getting no nuch intensive, critical
4159
covcrarjc fron: t!ic press. Hr would be well advised to stay away
frojn the studi-nl Q and A session -- and stick to speeches attacking
one sliorlcor.-iiM;;, speeches wliich net good coverage and little or
no contradiciioj-. in tlie media. Further, so as not tC) alienate ajiy
scfjnioTit of }•'.: ." i ?avty -- ho ?hoi;ld consciously a,void any criticism
of otlicr niiv.v 'i.t . tcIuIs . ar. ii ci naiiii;; i n xho end lliat thcv will ilius
find )ii:n an ac<T ;j'. nhIr'. ii r.c-t ?-.ii exciling alternative. Only if,
well down tJiC road, AlusJ^ic is running strong ov.t front and
needs some chopping, wo\ild Humplirey liave any cause to start
laying down policy differences with the front-runner. Right
now, he sliould hang back a bit and let the front-runner Muskie
weary himself, setting the pace.
Counter -Strategy
As noted in the "Hiuiiphrey Liabilities," his noniination would
engender groat anguish on t)ie left at a Democratic convention, and
rnight trigger a fourth party -- tlius, his nojnination is not some-
thing we should, at tliis point, look ujjon with great apprCiicnsion.
Furlhcr, a continued lil-ill rise in Democratic polls would be
helpful -- as it v/ould likely come at Isluskie's expense, and force
Muskie to re-accelcratc Jiis timetable, and nialic tlic Icind of
precipitous decisions he is jiiaking now -- viz, tlie near
unqualified endorseinent of the upcoming deiTionstration.
However, at the same time v/e v/ant to see Hvunphrcy rise
"with Democrats, we should be associating him wit'n minority
positions tliat alienate Independent and Conservative Democrats
and cannot stand the test of a general election.
The following come to mind:
Catholics . Humphrey, does not have the affinity with tliis
primary Deniocratic bloc that a Muskie or Kennedy miglit -~ the
latter being co-religionists. We \vould thvis start with only a
minimal handicap v/ith Catholics. Therefore, again, 1 would argue
the President associate himself, publicly, with the report he
already has -- from his svib-coanmittee on non-public education,
headed by Dr. Walton. We liave done tlie abortion thing. But,
just today, the Archbishop of Detroit announced the closing of
56 Catliolic scliools, dropping 23, 000 Catliolic students into the
Michigan pviblic school systcni. If the President forces tliis
issue with the Democrats, again, it is an issvic which divides tlicm
d own the middle, and only docs us minimal damage in my opinion.
4160
(In a .slory Ik;: v.- in Uic Wasliinpton Daily News a fortjiirr)it ajjo,
wc v.-crc bci;);' criticized by Catliolic. leaders for not making
Walton's rci^ort j>ublic. )
The Pj-csidcnt 3-nii;ht well use the closing of these Michigan
schools as a pc-:', on wliicii to hinge a brief statement deploring
tl)C trend and calling for tlie one-day conference in D. C. Walton
ct. al. have reconiinendcd.
Farm Area . Hum]:);)rey has the kind of sujjport here, I aaii
confident, tliat we enjoyed back in 1968 -- jnuch of it related to a
faith in tlx; fellow as one of their owi , probably more of it
related to an anti-ins feeling among tliosc rural Americans who have
not been doing so well as in the past. In any event, these are states
on winch we depend for our base of support -- before even considering
the big swing states. If we arc hurting in \iiddlc /imerica, we are
Inirling everywhere. Ihimphrcy obviously feels he has seized a
good issue here, both for support at the convention and supjjort
in the general, sliould he win the noniination. This should be a
top priority concern of the j^dministrntion -- yet as Wild Bill
Schcrle told me, there is really no one in the White House
whom farmers and rural A;iierica types might conceivably look
to as one of their own.
Hard Hats. RN's steps on construction wages, taken for
the national interest, were nevertheless politically damaging,
according to Scammon who spoke to a conservative group last
week. If the demonstratiois turn obnoxious this coming weekend
and beyond -- perhaps we will get back some of these patriotic
types. But Buclianan's view is that a inceting between the President
ajid union men connected v,-ith aerospace and defense might be
highly useful. RN could argue:
"(a) we have got to end this war honorably and
(b) in the present world cnvironinent, we cannot let the
defense budget go down the tubes. I ain doing these
things for America. I know you gentleiiien Jeel you
can't support ine politically, or can't support rnc on
economics in general, but, by God, I am asking for
your support on these issues. You have treincndous
pull with the Democratic Senators, like Muskic and
4161
JIumphrcy and Kennedy and JacI;£on. Can you exercise
public and jjrivatc leverage so that they will not cut
back on tins defense budget, and space budcjet (which
incidentally means jobs to union men) and on our •
commitment to an honorable peace in Victnani. "
A ris]<.y venture perliaps.
But it seems tliere is a natural division betv/een the bell-
bottomed ccologists who want to return to nature -- and the hard
hats wliosc prosperity depends upon, if you will, the miliuary-
industrial cojnplex. Fvirthcr, if and when the President tal;es up
the defense of his defoisc budget, lie might well argue that it is
wrong to indict hundreds of thousands of AjTicrican workers as a.
iDcmber of soinc monolithic "military-industrial complex."
"Tlicse men are building the weapons and niachines that
keep America strong and free."
This is an argument tliat the President might also press
upon labor leaders,
"Gentlemen, one of the problems in this society' is
tliat the Jiicn who design and the men who construct the
weapons that defciid tliis country are being portrayed
as some sort of pawns in a great jTiilitary-industrial
complex -- and this is wrong and not good for America,
If we are going to liave a strong nation, we are going
to liave to have respect for those Ajnericajis v/ho keep
it strong, "
Against us, in 196S and 1970, tlie DciTiocrats were saying:
"If you elect Nixon, you lose your social security; you lose your
medicare, " Our GOP organizations around tlie co<.uitry in the
coming campaign ought to be out at McDoniicll-Douglas, at Lockheed,
at Boeing, with such posters at the plant gate as "If Aluskie
wins, you lose," "If Hvuiiphrey wins, the Defense Budget is lost --
start looking for another job election day. " Li the areas where-
there is high imemployment, at the Boeing Plant in Seattle, GOP
workers shovild be passing out "\Vanted" posters with portraits
of Muskie, Kennedy and IIHII, the inscription underneath "Wanted
for questioning in connection with the death of tlic SST. "
4162
(Note: Ricsci says, in RN's ncv/s summary, that labor was angered
by HFill no-.c or. SS7. )
AcrosTsrice a:-)d defense unemployinent ought to be hung around
the ncclis of those who would increase it.
The Muskic Decline
There is an argument that Muskic is proving himself so
ineffectual that we might actually want him as candidate, and thus
ought not to ■>^iuss him up so badly tliat he loses the noinination.
I can't accept this argujiicnt. One recalls tM Governor Romney
by this point in time v/as well behind F%.N among both Republicans
and Lidcpendenrs -- but he stayed up for fifteen rounds of unexampled
pujiishniGi t. y\nd, tliough others disagree, I believe that, outside
the WH, we should keep the heat on Big Ed. If, then, he docs get
the nomination, ho will be scarred -- as to be politically ineffective.
If lie falls back further, he will yet fight jriore fviriously for it; and
the primaries will be no cake walk for anyone and tlic more brutal
the fight within the opposition party, the greater our advantage.
The V.'ar
Humphrey is struggling heroically to get well on this issue,
to make lainiseli, now, an acceptable alternative, to the party's left.
The Prodigal Son, however is not welcome back home --if the
New Republic and I. F. Stone are to be believed. A little Machiavelli
here might be of use. If the President, who is not revered on the
Left, were to publicly express thanks to Hllli for the quiet support
he has given on Vietnain -- HHH is likely to be astonished and stunned,
and his left-wing courtship broken off on the spot. Perhaps Dole
or the Vice President even might complinicnt HUH on the "strong
support" he has consistently provided for the wai- in Vietnam.
Integration
True to form. Senator Ribicoff is now maneuvering liis
compulsory integration plan toward the floor -- demanding one and
all take a stand on it. We ought to credit Ribicoff s courage in facing
this issue -- but come down b.ard ap.ninst liim -- and force Aluskle,
and Humphrey ar.d Kennedy to take a stai^d on tins issue, a fortlnnght
stan d . Alr.-'.o.sl certainly tlicy will have to waffle on this one. A'-ain._
4163
tl ic i?;siics tl K'.t (livi<lc Dc]-nocr.its must be brnucrht to the public attention ,
jf \vc arc Pf'ir.;: to t^rrvcnt tlic unitin:; of their p.irVy .
Polls
If wc could possibly get a poll showing Humphrey taking
the lead anion;^ Democrats, the "horror" about his re-cmcrgcnce
which E k N detected, would rise inijnediately to the surface,
tlic press would focus on liini, and the Democratic Left would
start chojjping him up, again, advantageous for us in the long run.
LB J ?c Riot s
Hvunplircy iTiade a rejnark about LBJ, "I had a President
who was absolutely paranoid about the Nvar, " which we should
remind liim and the covuitry of. Furtlicr, Humjjhrey's statements
about possible riots tliis siuiimer, if some little Federal bureau
was shut down, can be used again and twinned with his famous,
"I'd lead a miglity good riot" rcmarJi. We can depict him as
the "Bull Agitator" of tlie U.S. Senate.
These issues can be aired this weel^cnd in MOXDAY, in
tlie sequel to The Muskic Watch. Right now, from our vantage
point, it seems to ir>e that "Hujiiphrey's the One. "
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
I
CONFIDENTIAL
EYES ONLY
4164
EXHIBIT No. 172
THE WHITE HOUSE
VVAS.H I N G TO N
May 4, 19 71 "
MEMORANDUM FOR;
FROM :
JEB RAGRUDgK
GORDON STRACHAN
(^
As you know, Buchanan has established a Muslcie "v.'atch"
Please talk to Marik about establishing a similar
structure for Humphrey and Kennedy.
I assxime that the other Democratic contenders are
being watched by your Democratic Contemners Group.
Could ycu lot me know on ir'riday, Z-Iay 7, the status
of tliis project.
Due Date
May 7, 19 71
4165
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^^^^ ^jif/^^^^^ ^-^3/^
'3
21-296 0—74 18
4166
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4167
Exhibit No. 173
the white house
WASHINGTON
COXFIDENTJAL
June 9, 1971
MEM GRAND Ui\I FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT:
THE PRESIDENT
PATRICK J. BUCHANAN •
EMK - POLITICAL MEMORANDUI^'I
A careful analysis of news clippings of recent weeks, coupled
with reports of recent days, rerrioves, I think, vestigal doubts
that EMK is running activcN" for the Presidencv.
II ems :
Last night on tb.e Elizabeth Drew show, Kennedy poiiitedly
refused to issue any Shcrnir.n statcn-icnts. In April, for the first
time, he stated "1 am l;eepijig my mind open" about the nomination.
ABC finds that he lias written to former top a.ides indicating he is
assessing t)ie situation. Haniphrey t]nnl;s he is a potential active
candidate, as does Muskie. Daley, accordiiig to HHH, is "strong
for Teddy. " Riesel claims i-.early all the top AFL-CIO types,
excepting J^'eany, are holding back, waiting for Teddy; the saine
is true of many political pros aroiund the country, according to
Jerry Greene. Andrew TuUy said a month or more ago that
aaiyone who doesn't think Teddy is running "sviffers froiii rocks
in the head," and Andy Biemillcr of AFL-CIO indicates that if a
fellow docs not think Kennedy is running, he is "nuts".
Buchajian's View: Kennedy is Icceping liis options open --
against tlie possibility t'na.t RN may be so strong by suninier '72
tliat the nomination will not be worth jmything. In wliich event,
he can stay out. However, a t tliis noint, he a;id his people have
obviously concluded RN can be beatci^ -- and ihcv are not about
to sit tliis one o-it -- r i r. 1; i :i z SDcndinc cicht vears outside tb.e
i)iner circle of power of a Prcsidenl Humphrey or a President >.Iusl^ic,
If Kennedy believes the Democrats can v.'in -- as he quite appa.rcntly
does now -- he will go after the noniination. If he thinks the Democrats
by spring of 1972 are sure losers, he can yet stand off.
CONFIDENTIAL
4168
CONFJDEKTIAL
Hard Evidcmcc:
Maiikicwicz, Salinger, Goodwin and V/alinsky have all
hooked vip (CSi\l) v/ilh sure-loser George McGovcrn. These arc
not idealistic scliool boys willing to spend a year of their lives
on an ideological lark. They are interested in power -- tlicrc
is no power to be had by going the route with George McGovern.
It appears they liave been given the go-sign by Kennedy
to join McGovern, tliat the purpose is to serve (a) as a "liolding
operation" for the Kennedy staff, (b) to niake top Kennedy
personnel familiar vs'ith all the levers of state Democratic pov/er
when Kennedy makes his move and (c) to elevate McGovern in the
polls and start cutting Humphrey and Muskic down to size v/liere
they can't be noniinated.
McGovern is now moving in line v/ith this strategy, v/ith
his overt violation of O'Brien's 11th Commandinent and attack
on IIHH and Muskie for opposition to the Mansfield /injendment.
Last night, Kennedy himself had the needle out for some of t'ne
"older" voices locked in the thiiilcing of the past -- and he
mcjitioned, specifically, the opposition to Mansfield Amendinent
as his basis -- refusing, hov/cver, to naine names.
Also, in line with the strengthening of the weak sister,
McGovern, is the emergence of candidates Jackson and Mills --
both of whom will corral conservative Democrat delegates v/ho
might otherwise be in the Muskie or Humphrey Camp.
Kennedy Strategy :
Avoid the early priinarics in which the left-handers
McGovcrn, Bayh, Hughes, etc. will all be knocked out of the
box in the early innings -- freeing vip their "Kenncdyites" for the
switch to Teddy. Maneuver' to guarantee that neith.cr Muskie nor
Humphrey moves into the convention with the nomination locked
up. Hold open the option of going into the California Priinary
itself -- if that is necessary to halt the moincntum of a Muskie
or Humphrey. Nearing convention time -- have the left candidates,
one-by-one, throw their support to Teddy and Teddy eiricrgc as
mx'FIDEK'TIAL
4169
CONFIDENTJAL
the sinjjlc chamjjion o^ that wing of the party -- with good laboi'
backing, with good inachinc backing, and with young, poor,
black unanimous behind his candidacy.
Muski c versus Kcn nc cK':
Since No vcin l^cr Musk.ie has lost almost 40 per c ent o f
his first-cl:oice sui;port anion,': Democrats, dronj^intr fro:iT 33-2 1 .
Between March and May, Muskie's 1 point lead among
• Democrats over Kennedy (26-25) disajipcai-cd into an eiglit point
deficit (29-21).
Among Independeaits -- Muskie's l ong suit -- his March
lead over Ke nnedy of 18 points (31-13) was sliced all the way to
four points (19-15) .
Muskie still has trcinendous support among Democratic
Party leaders -- Kennedy, froin the polls, next to nothing -- but
Kennedy support among the rank-and-file Deniocrats, his ability
to attract publicity and generate excitement and the support of the
ideologically conimittcd give him more than enough to balance off
his weakness v/ith the pros.
Impossible for me to believe the Kcnnedyites, who believe
RN is vulnerable, are going to sit by and watch a Muskie or Humphrey
take tlie prize in August -- and perhaps the Presidency, thus putting
off the "Restoration" for four years, possibly eight, possibly forever.
The Kennedy .Assets :
These arc well known. Charm, "commitinent", affinity
with the young, polish, Kennedy looks, mystique, the Myth, charisma
along the canipaign trail; lie generates enorinous excitement -- as is
attested by GOPers traveling with him.
Deficiencies :
1. Even liis best friends never accused Kennedy of being
an intcllcctua^l. On the Drew show,, he tended to retreat into the New
Left cliches, "we can build a better America, " material, which
CONFIDENTIAL
4170
CONFIDr:NTI/>L
reflects a Inck of depth. Further, he tends to react i:omc\vliat
holly lo attack. (PJB suggestion is that it might be well to have
hang one or two on hiin -- from the Vice President or Dole --
taking some particular excessive statemeiit, and really putting
it to him, to ascertain liow he liandles liimself. Thi.s would
perhaps best be doiic by a moderate-liberal Senator v/ho would
unleash a stinging attack on liim -- away from the Senate floor --
before television, about two-minutes of good v/ork -- then v/e could
see how lie reacts. )
2. His far-left foreign policy positions, which v/in him
the i^laudits of the Ncv/ Left journalists and fellov/ travelers in the
media -- should be portrayed as shocking, ala.rniing, frightening,
dangerous to the peace, inviting v.ar in Europe, "imjnalvire" and
irresponsible. Not, of course, from here -- but in bacicgrounders
witli press, he shov^ld be portrayed as too reckless, too immature,
too irresponsible, at his age, to be President of the United States.
This fits liand in globe v/ith tlie iinpression he lias left upon muf:]i
of the country and tlie center of the Democratic Party in the wal;e
of Chappaquiddick.
It is the quiet constant repetition of private and public
comments like, "Sure, Muskie is strong but this "indecisive' thing
is killing him" that is itself injuring Muskie' s chances. He has
been unable to shake the "indecisive" charge with v.hich v/e have --
with his lielp -- tagged him.
3. His far left social policy positions should be broadcast
and re-broadcast. He has the Left and the Radical Kids. We don't
and won't get a one.' The effort should be to identify him with thein,
to associate him with them, to tie hiin to them.
No matter that EMI< is adored by the Party's Left, we have
a serious probleni only if he gets v/ell v/ith the Party's Center. The
more he acts like Brother Bobby the better off we arc; the less he
acts like brother John, the better off we are.
4. Socially, Kennedy is out of touch with the political mood.
The Jet Set, Swinger, e-Through Blouse cum Hot Pants crowd,
the Chappaquiddick Hoc-dov/n and Paris highjinlis -- the niore
publicity tlicy all get, the better. (The pictures of the Kennedy
sisters, in mod attire, at the Kennedy Center, did them no good.)
CONFIDENTIAL
4171
CONFJI^KNTIAL
Cha pp''- C! uic1t1ir)c:_
T}us, of course, will be kept in the public mind by tlie
press -- spcculriLing on whether it is lieljaing or liuvtjnj; JTMK.
\Vc ouj^lit to stay inilcG away frojn it -- indicating even in private,
"it's hard to say the ef/cct; v/c don't know."
Racial Issue ;
Kennedy's sujiport of the social- engineering Ribicoff Plan
should be einphasi^ed -- ajid a clieck made to determine liow many
of Ins own children go to integrated schools -- and then this
fact, if relevant, placed in Mond ay, or some publication to get
attention. Monday could investigate tliis -- if Kennedy is guilty
of hypocrisy on tlie question -- tliis inade knov/n.
The Democ r atic Riirht:
FMK openly endorsed the left-wing Mayoral candidate
who lost to Rizzo in the primary by a wjiopping inargin. The
President might v/ell co'igratulate Riy.z.o --if and when he wins the
Mayorality -- and try to v/ean some of these tough-line conservative
Mayor types to a i^osition of neutrality in a Kcnnedy-RN contest.
Tliey have no reason to love EMK -- and it would appear to
ine that this effort would be at Icart as worthv/hile as the effort
to Y/oo labor chieftains equally locked into the Democratic Party.
JFK:
Since EK'IK will be trafficking on the JFK myth, it
would be v/ell to document JFK's toxlgh line on Defense, foreign
policy, Yietnani, Europe, etc. over against ZMK's positions --
to provide conservative Democrats with sonic rationale for abandoning
the little brother of their hero.
Some of the above are tactical gestures, rather than strategic
planning. But the maiji objective, again, is to keen Kennedy
out
on tl
le
l--ar
L
eit o
f lus !■
'arty -
--
lo
prevent
his
maior
inroads
into
the
center
-
- so
ihzt
. it
lie is
vi-
\c
nominee
aga
in-jt ti;
,e I-'rcsidcnt
-
we 1
liave
a
ciea
r
shoL
at a
il \
Liiose
cons
crvative
Dcjnocra
Is, who iTiak
e
CONFIDENTIAL
4172
CONFJnEXTIAl,
up an in'c'jral part of Ihc Nh:on Xl.njorjly. J/ he is nomirir-itcd,
it
shouU: be bv the Lcj't Wine of his Party r,o that J.D.T, tlic South,
and t}ic Cor.r^Qrvt.iiv: iDc:Tiocr;'.ts will. /cf;i tlicy lir.v(: been run
over to]t of by the unrepresentative radicals and the elite.
CONFIUKXTIAL
4173
Exhibit No. 174
THE V/MITE HOUSE
WA S H I N C. I O N
CONFIDENTIAL June 22, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: ED DKBOl^T
BOB FINCH
BRYCE H All LOW
DICK MOORE
LYN NOFZIGER
RAY PRICE
Bn.L TIMMONS
RON WALKER
FROM: PAT BUCHANAN
For Thursday's ineeting, can you give some thought to the
following questions which we will want to knock abovxt:
1. Who is the likely Democratic nominee at this tiine, and
hov/ should the leading contenders be dealt with by our oide
bcty/eoi now and llxc first of 1972 '>
2. What is the likely opposition v/itliin the Republican Party
to the r enoniinjition of the President ? And hov/ should the
McCloskey niovement be handled frorji the Administration,
and Republican standpoints,
3. What is the best strategy we can employ to defend against
the attackvS of potential Denjocratic noininces, and how active
and intense a strategy should we pursue in going after our
Democratic adversaries.
4. Thoughts on tactics to be used to liighlight the weaknesses
in tlic other party, and the other ca.ndidates, between now and
this coming November.
5. R.clated issues.
4174
Exhibit No. 175
citizens for the re-election of the president
J WASHI^JGTON
SUITE I»
ITOI PCNN$Y^V&M4 AVCNUC. N
WASHIVGTON, D.C. 2000C
•July 2, 1971.
MEMORANDUM FOR:
FROM :
SUBJECT;
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ,
I
JEB S. MAGRUDER
Democratic & Republican Contenccs
"Attached is a report on the current st&tus of our tracking
of the Deinocratic and Republican contencers. You will note
that the planning corruTiittee, under Pat Buchanan, feels that
adequate work is being done in collecting the data. The
emphasis must be on using the information effectively, part-
icularly in this pre-campaign period. Since this does not
require a major change in resources or personnel assigrjients,
ve'will proceed along those lines unless you disagree with
■the conclusions reached in the memorandum.
4175
GENERAL ANALYSI S
Our prevailing judgment at this time is that if Edward M.
Kennedy wants the Democratic Nomination in 1972, he can win it;
that he will make his final decision around the turn of the year;
that the crucial factor in that .decision will be his'judgment as to
whether or not the President can be defeated. If he feels the
President is a loser, he will run. If the Pi-esident appears strong,
he will hang back for 1976 -- and possibly act in a fashion as to
assist the President's chance for re-election.
If Kennedy hangs back, the group is divided as to whether
Muskie or Humphrey %vould prevail at the convention. Humphrey
seen as seriously damaged by the McNamara Papers.
Group divided further over -who would be the most difficult
candidate for RN. Some feel Kennedy would be an ideal opponent --
• others feel Kennedy, because of charisma, myth, enthusiasm, would
be the most difficult. No one mentioned Hun">phrey as the stronges t .
of the three. One felt that Muskie did not have it upstairs to
successfully traverse a Presidenti^il campaign. Thus we should favor
his nomination.
Group believed that it was still too early to make flat predictions.
4176
CANDIDATES ■ . . . ■
KENNEDY -- Great strength among young, poor, black. The
only Democrat who can generate great enthusiasm . Good support
in labor movement, among lower-income Catholics. Charisma, the
Repository o£ the Kennedy Myth, Good Campaigner. Strongest appeal
to 18-21 year-old vote. Looks to bosses in the Northern Cities like
a winner. Strongest among rank-and-file Democrats by Gallup Poll. .
Not likely to drop in coming months. Kis political operation is
among the best. He can generate more and better publicity than any
of the others.
Weaknesses: Chappaquiddick. Impression of immaturity and
irresponsibility to many. Too far left; too associated with hippies
and radicals. Not considered a heav-)'-wei ght either by party pros or
fellow Senators. Anathema to the South. Too much of a left-winger;
too jet set for Middle America. Would generate asmuch veherrient
opposition on Right as support on the Left.
MUSKIE -- Could unite Democrats. Strongest in polls of
party leaders, and among Independents. Has non-partisan, non-
political image. Strong on environment and "new priorities."
Ideal compromise candidate, and current front-runner. Has general
appearance of solid, responsible, able Senator who arouses no great
emotion, but no great animosity. Odds -or.-favorite in the early prima
4177
Weaknesses: Indecisive, fumbling has cost him clean shot
at unopposed nomination. Excessive appeasement of the radical
feft has alienated center-conservative Democratic support. Painted
as intellectually and politically timid by both Democrats and GOP.
Not. very astute politically in handling of issues. Growing impression
he is not presidential timber. No real enthusiasm behind hirn. As
he lives by the polls, so he may perish by the polls.
HUM PHREY -- Excellent party connections, a good party
man. Ran close in 1968 with LBJ albatross around his neck. Has
risen in party polls. Centrist Democrat. Good on bread and butter
issues, economics; positioned almost ideally on the issues for the
JiDemocratic Party. Good anti-Republican cainpaigner. Ebullient and
likeable. Gets good publicity. Strong with the Democratic women.
» Weaknesses: Old Face. Hemlock to the Gene McCarthy Left
after 1968 -- his nomination, again , in 1972 would ris'k a party split,
and possible third or fourth party. Despised by intellectual far left.
No real enthusiasm for his nomination. Weak in the polls agair.st ■
the President. Would bring nothing to a Democratic ticket other
than its basic traditional New Deal strengths. Would be perhaps one
Democratic candidate who would keep the newly enfranchised young
home in droves. Difficult to see how he can win major primaries --
even the late ones, Oregon and California. Removes Vietnam as an
issue to use against Republicans.
4178
JACKSON - - Strong with South, strong with labor, strong
with conservative Democrats, with Jewish voters and money> with
big labor and aerospace and defense contractors. Only Democrat hare
liner on Soviets and Defense Policy -- presents clear alternative to
new isolationist sentiment. Choice not an echo. Anti-radical rhetoricj
Has money backing, good svipport in Senate. - Highly regarded,
tremendous victory record in Washington -- 85 percent. La%v and
order inaru Rallying point for Democratic conserv^.tives. Ideal
Vice Presidential Candidate for gdw.ard M. Kennedy, if party divided
over Kennedy nomination .
Weaknesses: Nomination would surely sunder Democratic
Party. Would generate Fourth Party candidate as in 1948. Party too
far. left to nominate him now. No national recognition. Needs to go
the primary route -- will lose in New Hampshire, a chance in Florida
and Oregon -- but can't win the big ones. Again, less likely a
potential nominee than a potential Vice Presidential nominee.
MCCLOSKEY -- What the ex-Marine has going for him is a
general impression of solid, ex-Marine, honest, tough-minded, anti-
war, candid, likely to capitalize on the anti-Nixon sentiment viithin
the Party on the Left. Strategy against him should be, in our view,
ignore him at the National level --> and publicize in Republican circles
every far-out position, and statement, and appearance. To tarnish
4179
his image as a selfless white knight. Anything that can be seen
as moving him out on the left fringe diminishes the degree of
Republican votes he can possibly win.
GENERAL STRATEGY
-- Attacks should not focus on any single Democrat. All
should be hit now, and hard -- as attacks .coming in mid-or late
1972 will be seen as wholly political, thus less credible, less
newsworthy than attacks in 1971.
-- President should stay utterly aloof from political attacks.
;^ -- The Democratic Party as an entity should be denigrated,
as so irresponsible, such a disaster in the sixties, as not to oe
entrusted with national leadership again. Thus, Clifford, Karriman,
; O'Brien, and all potential candidates become fair game.
-- Public should not be allowed to forget the record of the LBJ
Administration, of HHH's role, of EMK's background, of Muskie's
bumbling s.
Disagreement was expressed over-who should do the attacking.
One view, strongly held, is that Anierican people are fed up with
politics per se, and politicians, and if RN's official family, i. e.
"Vice President, White House Staff, or Cabinet, engage in partisan
warfare, this reflects on the President as a ooliticiaa -- and detracts
4180
from him. Other view is that while. President must stay aloof, '
the deficiency of Republican guns argues that we have to use '
what we have, i. e. the Vice President, occasionally Cabinet |
members, the RNC Chairman, the RNC, the Republican leadership -'
and any Republicans we can find on Capitol Hill to carry the attack
to the Democrats, I
General concurrence that the press and media tend to tolerate)
more partisan and malicious assault on part of Deipocrats, which the;
i
would charge off to dirty politics on part of Republicans.
INVENTORY OF RESOURCES
Research Resources
-- RNC is keeping on-going in-depth files on all potential
Democratic contenders, plus McCloskey, Gardner, Lindsay and
Wallace. This material filed in data bank instant retrieval system.
-- Mort Allin News Summary, contains files of all major
Democratic candidates, major comments and stories from 50
major newspapers.
-- RNC runs monthly digest of each potential candidate listing
outstanding developments, etc.
Withbut going into further dej)th, '.ve have more than enough
political research, 'and filing going on. Any future allocation of '
resources should be away from research, and into production. In
short, a diminution of input, and an increase in output. WTiat is needei
4181
now is not more personnel to squirrel away little nuggets for the
winter -- but rather analysts, writers and producers,- who can
translate the daily grist into daily news copy.
OUTPUT RESOURCES
-- Monday has a high degree of credibility with the press;
has been successful in moving anti-Democratic propaganda into the
national media, i. e. , the Muskie temper, the Muskie indecisivcness,
I the McGovern front for Kennedy, the Gardner_operi ion. Each week
there should be one or more major political news stories coming
out of Monday.
-- Senator Dole, and the Vice President have carried the attack
Fin recent months. Senator Dole especially. Our objective is to
provide more raw material and convince more of our people on the
Hill, in the Cabinet, and in the party nationally to use it. To this
end. Ken Khachigian has been put on full time for solely this
purpose. His job broadly outlined will be to daily view the inconiing
research materials, and to provide a daily diet of political attack
material for party people -- great and s-mall.
-- The letters to the editor operation out of the RNC will be
tied in directly with this operation, bringing out more attack material
on the Democrats nationally.
21-296 0—74 19
4182
-- The Colson Shop, primarily, and less so than the Klein shopj
can move out materials that we find in our research operations -- and
that need to be moved now.
-- Schedules of the primary candidates, especially, will be
gathered -- and of McCloskey -- so that suitable arrival ceremonies
can occasionally be prepared, issue-rated by Walker's advance men. ,
I
-- Some raw data of significant importance -- such as the Godfre'
Sperling article detailing control of McGovern operation by EMK types -
should be inoved unadulterated to national political reporters. We will
have either a covert or open operation on (his later out of RNC to
make sure political columnists are not missing first-rate anti-oppositio;
material.
-- Discussion to- be held with RNC to consider a mid-week
abbreviated Monday version, which inight v/ellbe called Watch on the
Potomac, or some such, which would give insider accurate information \
on Democrats, etc. J
-- Consideration being given to development of possible anti-
opposition ads -- but this is still in the planning process.
-- Because we feel that need to Have, direct access to governmeai
sources of information, we have deternnined that Ken Khachigian, who is
the first new full time man hired for this specific operation should stay
in the White House complex -- not move outside.
4183
THE GUIDING PRINCIPLES OF THE OPERATION FOR THE NEXT
SIX MONTHS
a) Focus not on stock-piling nnaterial but on moving it into
the media -- on output, rather than input. We don't want to wind up
in November of 1972 with 100, 000 unused anti- Democratic documents .
in a super retrieval system.
b) Maintain as guiding political principle that our great hope
for 1972 lies in rrjaintaining or exacerbating the deep Democratic
rift between the elite, chic. New Left, intellectual avant garde,
isolationist, bell-bottomed environmentalist, new priorities types on
I the one hand -- and the hard hat, Dick Daley, Holy Name Society,
ethnic, blue collar. Knights of Columbus, NYPD, Queens Democrats'
on the other.
The liberal Democrats should be pinioned to their hippie
js supporters. The Humphrey Democrats should be reminded of how
they were the fellows who escalated and cheered the w^ar from its
|i inception.
c) Get as much anti -Democratic material into the media as
possible. Eschew the ridictalous and wild as counter-productive.
Finally, we have a strong team at the RNC which has not always
been the case; we have some national spokesmen who can take the
4184
political attack effectively, which was not always the case in the
last decade -- and we have some tempting targets. As of now --
we see no need for any appropriations from Nixon for President
Fund -- we can handle it right now with what v/e have.
If and when we feel we need Tnore people -- writers and
analysts basically -- we will come around.
(There may be a necessity to establish an outside direct
mail group to columnists, editorial writers, and political writers --
in order to get all our negative propaganda into their hands.)
Buchanan
4185
Exhibit No. 176
CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
rre.'oTnV'r^c'''' ^"ly 28, 1971
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
FROM: • JEB S. MAGRUDER -
SUBJECT: TRACKING PRESIDENTIAL CONTENDERS
Attaclied is a memo by Pat .Buchanan outlining a strategy for
dealing v/ith opposition contenders. Several specific recom-
mendations are ir.ade which will establish the direction and
scope of our activities over the next several months.
4186
CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
July 28, 1971
CONFIDENTIAL
The clear and present political danger is that Senator
Muskie, the favorite in the early primaries, v;ill promenade
through the primaries, come into the convention with a clear
majority and enormous momentum for November. That would be
bad nev.'s for us.
If there is to be a contested convention, a divided con-
vention — the first priority is to trip up Muskie in the
primaries.. This is in Kennedy's interest, in Humphrey's inter-
est, in our interest.
Thus, Senator Uuskie is Target A as of mid-summer for our
operation. Our specific goals are (a) to produce political
problems for him, right now, (b) to hopefully help defeat him
in one or more of the pr-imeries (Florida locks nov.' to be the
best early bet, California, the best later bet) , and (c) finally,
to visit upon him some political wounds that will not only
reduce his chances for nomination -- but damage him as a candi-
/date, should he be nominated.
As for the other Democrats, Kennedy, Jackson and Humphrey
are the only credible ones we see - Humphrey the most desirable
from cur viewpoint. But any of these three — especially
Kennedy and even Jackson — should be the subject of attack.
• For the next several months, especially while Muskie is
hibernating in Maine for the summer, we proposed to concentrate
our efforts on liim.
Approve Disapprove Comment
How . In the long run, for the November election, the best
offense against Muskie is to point him as far left as possible,
leaving the President as much of the center as possible. For •
the nomination, however, any stick should be used to beat hint.
He can and should be attacked from Right and Left.
4187
For example, from the right, Muskie can be charged with
cutting space and defense and throwing union workers'out of
jobs, with killing the SST and thus killing Seattle, with smear-
ing the FBI, and fir, Koovcr, with endorsing Communist-Kook dem-
onstrations, with favoring "forced integration," etc. From
the Left — and we should not ignore this line of attack — it
can be argued tliat Muskie is an amoral opportunist who supported
the war when he didn't believe in it, who has protected polluters,
who lacks the political courage of McGovern, who is indecisive
and gutless, who is trying to have his toadies at the DNC
"broker" the convention, instead of have it open — of having
spent a dozen years in the Senate without having accomplished
a single objective.
Further, we should begin now to acquire two, three or sev-
eral tags, to Stick Muskie with -- such as the "Tricky Dick"
that has been so damaging to the President over the years v;hen
utilized by his political enemies.
JACKSON . This presents a serious problem. First, Scoop
is a frj^end of sorts of the President's, a supporter on defense
and most foreign policy issues. Secondly, while he would be a
formidable opponent for tl^ie President, if nominated, he cannot
realistically be nominated — unless the political focus turns
to matters of war and peace and security. Then while it would
be in our interest to have him knock Muskie down in Florida —
such a stunning victory for Jackson would boost him into a long
shot for the nomination and a strong shot Vice President -- on
a Kennedy ticket.
(Any attack on Jackson, whose hard-line credentials are
awfully good, woulji — if it were to be an effective attack —
focus on his "secret liberalism," portraying him as the Errand
Boy of George Meany. This could be done; it might actually
"elevate Jackson (drawing the media to him) to the point where
it would actually assist him in a Democratic Primary.
But, do we want to attack Scoop Jackson at all? This is
a question for higher ups. VJhere, for example would Jackson
stand in a Nixon-Kennedy race, where Jackson was not on the
Kennedy ticket. Scoop is 50 or more -- 1972 is his last run at
the nomination - would he prefer a seat in a Nixon Cabinet or
a Kennedy Cabinet? Again, higher ups should decide if and when
we should pull the lanyard on Scoop Jackson. Surely, it would
make news.
Options : Attack Jackson as any other candidate.
Approve Disapprove Comment
Go easy on Jackson in the hopes of hurting Muskie.
Approve Disapprove Comment
KENNEDY . A major target of opportunity, but not the
primary target. Focus here should be on immaturity, reckless-
ness, jet-setter — not up to the stature required or stability
required o£ a President.
HUMPHREY . If we have to run against someone, we prefer
Humphreit right now, as no President is so virtuous as to be
granted George McGovern to run against. Humphrey's nomination
v/ould be in our interest -- it may be necessary, frankly, to
provide him with support.
McCLOSKEY . At this point, we agree McCloskey should not
be attacked by his superiors within the GOP, or the national Adm-
inistration — in a manner to elevate him. Clearly, we believe
that the proper way to deal with McCloskey is to have his national
appearances (the media gives him network time regularly) jnatched
by someone of Congressional level -- like Jack Kemp, who is be-
ginning to match McCloskey and trouble him on their joint appear-
ances. No major attack from the Cabinet, Vice Presidential or
RNC National level, or Congressional leadership level should be
made at this time — in our view.
The proper way to discredit McCloskey is to (a) paint him
as far left as possible and (b) if at all possible, find his
sources of support, publicize them, and paint him as simply a
pawn or cat's paw of the Democratic Party. Our objective is to
damage his credibility with Republicans.
But we should do nothing to allow him to paint himself as
a political martyr.
Specific options are detailed in the attached memorandum'
from Jeb Kagruder.
4189
RESOURCES
MONDAY is a credible publication — ^which gets irregular
wire copy--and which we shall use weekly to move party line
material aimed at issues dividing Democrats.
Bob Dole can be effective, but only occasionally — like
Ford and Scott, he is inhibited by his relationship, his Senator-
ial courtesy to a fellow member if you will.
The White House Staff which could be utilized to put out
some of this party-line material — not for attribution of
course — on Muskie, is currently inhibited by an edict of "no
politics" in 1971. We might need to- have this altered for some
individuals — as we can serve as regular conduits for the kind
of political material we want to move. The White House staff
should be considered as a resource in the near future to pass
on not-attributed material to the press.
Approve Disapprove Comment
I The Vice President — We will need to know his inclinations
I and the Presid<=nt's desires on his use -- but he could be cx-
; tremely effective in selected political attacks. He gets enor-
; nous coverage — and he can pu* -across a credible line on the
Democrats.
Should the Vice President be used as a resource for opposi-
1 tion attack?
■ /
fYes No Comment
The Republican Party outside Washington — especially state
•chairmen and state officers — should be put to use. We believe
that a co-ordinated system should be set up of calling these
Chairmen, to have them issue coordinated attacks when something
like the Kennedy ^comment on RN re: Vietnam breaks -- and to issue
regular statements on the arrival of major Democratic candidates
in their state.
Approve Disapprove Comment
These last are political animals by choice, and their
attacks upon Democrats do not constitute partisanship on the
part of the White House. (Statements for these individuals
could be drafted in our shop, but transmitted to the states via
M RNC . ) .
4190
Some discussion has gone on of using the Citizens as
Middle Man between V.'H and RNC — we can of course follow that
procedure, but, given a secure man at the RNC of which there
are many, we think that direct contact would be best from
here. We currently follow this procedure in drafting materials
for Monday. We need to know basic policy on this.
(1) Direct contact with RNC be made through Buchanan shop.
Approve Disapprove Comment
(2) Establish in Citizens (target date November I) an
operational arm which will implement strategy and tactics ini-
tiated by Buchanan shop.
Approve Disapprove Comment
Finally, we are giving some thought to preparing paid inedia
advertisements -- issue-oriented -- in here and have thera placed
by the Citizens Group, or some political group formed in the
various .states. This can be an effective tool for driving home
particular issue points we need made -- and drive them home be-
fore the political season starts -- when little is believed
anyhow.
Approve Disapprove Comment
Special Projects . We would like to utilize Ron Walker's
resources where possible to handle some close-in operations,
pickets and the like, when candidates visit various cities. The
candidate normally brings with him his own media; he attracts
local media; and we would like to be able to "piggy back" on that
media — with our own operations, anti-candidate. This requires
support activities from some source; Ron has an operation in
place; and they will need approval — either general or specific ■
— for these covert operations.
Approve Disapprove Comment
Contact with Walker for activities may be made directly
from Buchanan shop.
Approve Disapprove___ Comment
Contact with Walker should be made through operational arm
in "Citizens but initiated in Buchanan shop.
Approve Disapprove Comment
4191
Further, for non close-in operations — we should use
party personnel, working through the national conur.ittee. Bv
these I mean handbills outside factory gates in the morning'
and evening — when Muskie votes against some appropriations
for SST. Something of that nature, which the local party can
surely handle.
Approve Disapprove Comment
4192
Exhibit No. 177
•l-HE WIUIL HOUSE
WAIIIINOTON
August 7, 1971
MEMORANDUM TO: JEB MAGRUDER
FROM: PAT BUCHANAN
Attached from Ken Kliachigian, re: Florida Primary, seems
to me a good idea. Can you check it out with the powers
that be?
Thanks.
^
4193
Mj:MORANDUi\t
THE VVIIITE HOUSE
WASIIINOTON
July 2Z, 1971
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR: PATRICK J. BUCHANAN
FROM: KEN KI^CHIGIAN
SUBJECT: MCCLOSKEY AND FLORIDA PRIMARY
■0^
I
See the attached -- apparently there is a provision in the
Florida primary law by which we could keep pistol-Pete off the
ballot. I think it would be to our advantage to do so since RN
will most likely be on the ballot (unless he files affidavit
declining).
Can we get the word to Florida through Magruder or RNC
to have the state chairman down there do what he can to keep
McCloskey off? An unopposed RN in Florida with a unified party
I behind him might be a nice contrast to the bloodletting that will
; take place with the Democrats. Moreover, this will allow us to
free up our resources to hurt the Democrats in their primary.
'Attachment
4194
CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTlON OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
IIOI PtNN»VI.V»NI« <VCNUC. N
WAS»IINCTON. o.c. ao>oc
ItOll 133-0920
August 11, 1971
CONFIDENTIAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
. SUBJECT: McCloskey and Florida Primary
Enclosed is an article from the July 21st V?ashington Post
which indicates that there is a provision in the Florida
primary law by which we could keep McCloskey off the ballot.
Pat Buchanan suggested that maybe we could have the Florida
State Chairman do whatever he can under this lav/ to keep
McCloskey off the ballot. An unopposed RN in Florida with a
unified party behind him might be a nice contrast to the
bloodletting that will take place with the Democrats. • More-
over, this v/ill allow us to free up our resources to hurt the
Democrats in their primary.
Approve Disapprove , Comment^
Ji33 S. MAGRUDER
Enclosure
bcc: Mr. Haldeman
JSM:ger
JSM Chron
V^M Primaries
CONFIDENTIAL
4195
WASHINGTON P0 5T
July 21, 1971
Nixon Foe
Florida Pr
TALT.AHASSI:E. rin.. July
T.i) (Ai') — l'"li)ricla's lop dec-
lioiii of;lci'r ;:.r.i; ;i ;'.i|' in llu'
sl;i((''s ii«'\v (uimnv ■ l;;'.,- in.'iy
cii.'ilile pro-fv'ixnn (!()i' li-.uli'i;;
lo clii." Ilin ;,\-|-,ubl!(;.Tn hnlfof
rioriria's -iMnich M prc-idcn-
tinl cnnlcsl lo .ill but llic iii-
ciiinbciu inecidcnl.
Sccrelnry n{ SLaic Hirliirii
S'finr s.'iHi in .'U iiilrrvirv.'
MnivK-'.y Inril Hep. JliiLLL-ilij.
piiblic.-.n I ba!i' :i;','r (jJiiUi^boi
f;ovcn-mc m i ,■ o i__^j^c2mn_j: orj •
'niitlrn. i
A raTiTl i d ,-/ cIs— lUin^Ji-^'-uJiiJ-J ■
be dolcjcc] )X_-CJi.-CC'ajmlUi:£^
TiTcmTKM-;;' of Iho 5ainr p-:irty
_ apicc Vo ( io :-.or~0'hc:-e tire '.
IHree j^icubiicaiiS and jTour;
pcmocrnts wiiu have iho linai.
say, he said. j
■ "It is qiiilo po:,siblc Ihcyi
niifjhl feci that way as parly
IncmbiTS," .'iald Stnno, who is'
the. noii-voUnn chairr.iau. ,
Stato party Icadrr.s Mich r.s'
GOP Chaii-niai) L. E. (Tommy)
Th.or.ias of Panama Cily have
been critical of McCioskcy's
vow to rhaUmne President.
Nixon if he doesn't end tlio
Viclnam war before tlic i)rl-
mnries.
'"J'onimy lias indicated he
would not try lo block l\lc-
Clo.'kcy, although lie has said
he would not oi)en any doors
for him," said a GOP spokes-
man.
But if only one of the GOP
May Face
imary Bar
members felt that tlic Califor-
nia coniiressman .■".hould be on
I be b.dlol, lie would he, Slonc
.■;.iid.
y.-'crctaiy Slom- also r.nbl be
would "sci'lt clarifir.:!ion"
from two Soulhern political
,''i'-;iires, Alab.iMi.'i Gov. George
Wallace and (Ji'orgia 1,1. Gov.
Le.' tcr i\Iaddo::, as to whcll,cr
Ibey i)l,inn.'"d to nin as Demo-
crats in the riorida jiriinary.
4196
Exhibit No. 178
('07301608 8 3
CITIZENS FOR THE RE-ELECTlON OF THE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON
ju.rtjT. ' August 13, 1971
iSYLVAMia AVtM'C. K.W.
ilNCTOS. O C 3033C
ir02t 333-O20 . j
I
CONFIDSI'JTrAL
MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORiJEY GENERAL
Attached is a copy of an Evans and Novak colunn from the July
25 Washington Post which indicates the Deraocrats are setting
us a '72 Sponsors Cli±> similar to the President's Club of the
LBJera. For $72 a month, there are a number of privileges
'accordea to those v;ho contribute.
PafBuchanan has suggested that we have someone v.'e know, pre-
ferajDly a Democrat not connected with us, join this club. This
could be arranged by having the individual write in explaining
that he read about the club in the newspaper and is fed up with
the Administration's policies and wants to contribute his share
and become a member of the club. This would give us many advan*
tages in keeping track of Democratic contenders and their
strategy.
Recommendation
That we have someone join tlie '72 Sponsors Club.
Approve Disapprove Comment
JEB S. MAGRUDER
\
bcc: Mr. Haldeman
JSM:ger
JSM Chron
JSM Contenders
CONFIDENTl.^L
CONFIDENTIAL
4197
Exhibit No. 179
t>. 07301602 7^
THE WHITE HOUSE
WAS H 1 NGTON
October 5, 1971
DIVIDING THE DEMOCRATS
MEMORANDUM TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
H. R. HA LD EM AN
FROM: "RESEARCH" (As Requested)
Because the Old Roosevelt Co?.lition was composed of numerous parts,
tlie're is more than one fissure within the Democratic Party which can
today, be exploited to the benefit of the President. Some exaniples:
;. IDEOLOGICAL FISSURES
Thernost readl'.y obvious division among Democrats is along ideological
■'.lines 7" the left and the Nevv Left versus moderate and conservative
Democrats. Militant blacks, the rebellious on the campus, the radical
1 chic of Eastern liberalism are all within the broad confines of the Demo-
cratic Party. So, too, is their most antipathetic adversaries, the blue
collar, white collar conservative Democrats.
|1 To exacerbate the ideological division, a few suggestions which surely
t| can be emended and added to:
1) The Platform Plan k Asainst Extremism, The Democrats mirror to
some extent the Republicans of 19o-^, and pressure for a plank in both
parties denouncing Left-wing extreiDism, and New Left atteinpts to subvert
.and overthrow American institutions would be divisive in the Democratic
Party,- Specific denudations of the Black Panther P§.rty, SDS, those who
have attempted to politicize and destroy the great American universities. --
these are proposals to deeply divide Democrats. The feat is to focus
Democratic attention on this. Could pctrhaps be done by a Dole speech,
calling on both Republicans and Democrats to incorporate such a' plani;
in their party's platform -- a speech made after some particularly
outrageous campus incident preferably.
21-296 0—74 20
4198
1/07301 60 27 5
-2-
2) Republican Praise for Attacks on the Left : Rather than attack the
hard left, dc rigcur for Republicans, we should shower praise upon.
Jackson and the Conservative Democrats who denounce the left wing
within their own party. A specific example is Jackson's attack on
"environmenlcJ extremists." We might well go back, dig up Jackson's
attacks on his party's left wing, and use thein. \Vc did, this to some good
effect in the early 1970 cainpaign witli the Vice President quoting Meany's
and other denunciations of extremism in the Dcniocratip Party.
3) Republican Praise for any Democratic Support on Vietnam. More
injurious to HHH and Muskie, than an attack on their Vietnam position
(which should not be excluded) is "praise" for their support of the President,
on occasion. This goes far toward making them "Establishment" and
driving a wedge between tliein and tl-.e ideological hard core of their p^rty.
4) The N-IcGoN ern-O'Erien Reform. The lyeft is counting licavily on these
reforms. They iriay not be carried out to the letter.- If they are, they will
likely result in one humdinger of a convention; the President's political
campaign personnel sho>.:ld be on th.e watch for violations, which arc alinost
certain to occur -- and ihcn elevate tJ^ose violations in the media as shafting
the young, the poor, the black and the women. We ha\'i2 already had soine
success with thi.s in the Jvlonday piece, v.'hich got national attention, alleging
that O'Brien liad thrown in with Muskie, tliey were putting the "fix" in at
the /Convention, and tiirowing the blocks to the McCarthy kids and McGovern.
Democrats are extremely sensitive about this; and concerned about the
Convention.
(In this quarrel^ our publications and spokesman, it seems to me at present,
should take the side of the Far Left, saying we disagree with them; but
that they have a just cause, and the Power Elite within the Party is denying
them effective participation.)
5) Lcft-A\''ing Democratic Complaints, i.e. from McGovern and his people
should find an echo and an amicus curiae in Republican statements and
publications.
6) A Mailing List should be prepared and kept up to date of all Democratic
convention delegates, as Ih.ey are named. Anything any major candidate
says that is offensive to their faction should be brought to their attention,
and the attention of the press in their area.
Example: Humphrey's statcnicnt ruling out all signers of the Southern
Manifesto should go out, one-page, to Southern delegates, and Southern
papers -- particularly, say, those in Carolina wlicrc Sam Erwin was ruled
out, and Oklalioma, where Carl Albert was ruled out by KIIH.
4199
v-Q 7 3 I 6 q 7 6
-3-
7) \Vc hivc to develop several covert outlets withiri the national press,
who will ask the hard questions ll;at only a political adversary can think
up. In addition, and perhaps as a substitute for this, we should have
several divisive questions v/orkcd up, and distributed at major press
conferences of the leading Deinocrats. Also, direct niail to questioners
of major Dsmocrr.ts -- in short, little briefing papers tcr newsmen -- should
go to those who interrogate them on ABC, NBC and CBS Sunday shows.
REGIONAL FISSURES
South versus North. Here the dividing line is essentially that of the race
issue; but it goes further into :)ie "liberalism" of the national Democratic
Party leaders, and major candidates, which does not sit well v/itli the
essential "suburban conservativism" and even " WallaceisiTj" of Democrats
in the South. " To force a choice here, we need more than just rhetoric
and mailings, 'Actions talcen by the President and Administration arc
decisive here: -. . ,
1) The Supreme Court no:nination of a Southern Strict Constructionist will
force Deinocratic Noriiiern liberals, and inajor Candidates, to anger cither
the Soutli with a veto vote, or the blacks and the labor movement and the
Northern liberals. A liighly qualified Southern Conservative nonnince to
the Supreme Court is de facto a divisive issue in the Democratic Party.
2) Elevation of the issue of coiTipulsory school integration and neigl^borliood
integration, via sucli as "bussing" and the Ribiccff Plaa. Clearly, this puts
Northern liberals like Muskie on an untenable hook. And with the Detroit
horror show shaping up, this is going to be even more a national "voting"
i issue,' V^r. Wallace has recognized this.
The serious problem here is that while Muskie may be in favor of compulsory
integration by his votes -- the Administration is tlie one that is seen as in
: power* while various odious ruling and policies are being enforced.
Many of my sources tell me t'.iat it is the President -- since he is visible in
: office, and has made strong statements -- who is today being hurt worst
;by the bussing fiasco. That is not as it sliould be as I understand that the
: President political and moral position is that it is wrong and contra-productive
ito forcible integrate the races.
i- •
! However, if we are to draw a line between us and the Democratic liberals,
which Icar'cs the Democratic conservatives on our side of the line -- then
action will be required, in my judgment, on the President's part.
Frankly, this requires the kind of historic decision, bringing a constitution<vl
i
4200
.' 0* 7 3 I 6 2 7 7
: -4-
cnd to Die national pressure to integrate races in housing and schooling --
which requires a decision on the psrl of tlie President. This would really
tear vp the pea palcli; and our current policy is one of accommodation v/ith
the courts not confrontation.
In conclvision, this is a potential throw of the dice that could bring the
media on our heads, end cut the Democratic Party and country in half; my
vlow is ll\at wo would l»avc far tlio larger half. But that is not my decision.
3) A Wallace Candidacy in the Primaries: This is an excellent vehicle for
surfacing and liardening the divisions within the Democratic Party, in the
South. Regrettably, such a priirsary run is lilicly to hone his organization
for a pass at the general. And if MusVcic is tlie Democratic choice, "There's
not a dime's wojth of difference between them" is an effective slogan. But
Wallace victories iii Florida, North Carolina and Tennessee -- if they are in
cards -- could create some truly serious probleins for the Democratic
Convention.. ... •
4) The Defense Issue: Though less so than before, defense is an issue
on \vhich,the majority of Republicans and conservative and Southern -r.
Democrats ujiite on one side -- v/ith the liberal DeiTiocrats on the other.
Again, this involves Presidential decision. Should thf President elevate
this issue, it is one which would di\ide the opposition'party straight down
the middle with Meany, Jackson and the Southerners on ono side -- and
Kennedy, McGovern, Lindsay on tlie other.
Again, however, the accomplishment of such a division requires a
Presidential elevation of an issue where we have sought to mute differences
via our thrust, "We have already re-ordered our priorities;*' the Defense
Budget is the "lowest percent of GNP since the Fillmore Administration, "ete
5) The elitism and quasi-anti-Americanisnn of the National Democratic
Party have little appeal below the Mason-Dixon Line; and we should contrast
the Party of Roosevelt, Truman, and JFK — with the party of Ramsey
Clark, Ronald Dellums and George McGovern.
ETHNIC/ RELIGIOUS '
The great Northern cities see a clear dividing line between the liberal,
academic, intellectual Democratic elite in the Party -- and the working
class Roman Catholic, Polisli, Irish, Italian Democrats, from the Bronx,
Queens and Cook County.
1) My view has been that these minorities, Poles, Irish, Italian Catholics,
are larger minoriiicc and easier to win than the "media minoiitics" --
i.e. Blacks, Puerto Ricans, Moxican- Americans, Indians, etc., ihe
darlings of the mass media.
I
4201
:i''lf'7 3 16 2 7
Conspicuous appoinlincnts of the larger iT>inorities, the more available
minorities (Irish, Italian, Poles, Slovalcs, etc.) would reap us greater
diWdcnns, and v/can away from the Democratic Party a more significant
base than the play being given today say to blacks.
2) Aid To Catholic School s. Clearly this divides the Democrats who fun
the New York Ti.-nes from the Democrats who run for office in Queens and
the North Bron>:. The President's strong stand on abortion, a gut issue
with Catholics, is another divisive factor within the Denriocratic Party --
if. we can force Democrats to come down on one side or the other.
Again, however, these issues which have been shown by Governors like
Rockefeller to be deeply divisive to D::mocrats on the 3tate level --have
to be elevated on the National level in order to do us any good. There is
another drawback. They are also divisive to Republicans. The Ripon
Society liberals will be anti-aid to Catliolic schools, pro-abortion, and
more concerned with "censorship" and " repression" than porno.
But the favoxitism toward things Catholic is good politics; there is a trade-
off, but it leaves us with the larger share of the pie. If we want to throw
the dice on this divisive issue, the way to do it is via a specific, tangible
program .of Federal assistance to non- public schools to save them.
Here, too, we have to force Democrats to choose among their vital voting
blocs -- where the interests of tliose blocs directly cqlMde.
3) y Fourth Party Candidacies. Top-level consideration should be given to
ways and means to pronnote, assist and fund a Fourth Party candidacy of
the Left Democrats and/or tl-.e Black Democrats. There is nothing that
can so advance the President's chances for re-election -- not a trip to
China, not four-and-a-half percent unemploynnent -- as a realistic black
Presidential campaign .
4) Black Complaints: As we did with Muskie we should continue to champion
the cause of the Blacks within the Democratic Party; elevate their complaints
of "being taken for granted."
ECONOMIC FISSURES
Where before, the economic interests of the Roosevelt Coalition were
complin-ientory or harmonious, today that is not the case. This, fissurpi
•too, can be exploited:
i'Onc could divide it between the loafing classes (welfare, students) and
the working classes.
4202
.. .0-7 3 I 6 2 7 9
■• . -^ '-. ... .•■.
A cutback in welfare, n hard-line on welfare would /ovco Democrats
to choose between the working class outraged by the excesses in that
program and the welfare class, which is becoming a cohesive voting
bloc.
A specific political position of sta-ting that while the Democratic Left is
constantly spcalting up for tlie welfare class in this country, "the time
has come for someone to represent thq working class" rpight well be
considered philistine or worse by the media, but would seem to be gcod
politics. Tax relief, for example, is of a good dea] inorc interest and
concern for the worl;ing mcvA of this country, tJian t)ie massive svelfare
scheme we. have proposed -- and the President is more likely to get
working class support, Wiley's V/elfare Mommas bcliind him.
Note: Since taking office, the President has increased by 500 percent --
from $400 million to $2 billion -- the food stamp and food assistance funds;
and he still gets it in the neck for "starving the poor." Metlunks there
would have been more gratitude and greater rewards if those funds had
been directed to the President's potential friends in tlie working class, and
their interests.
If the President would become the visible and outspoken champion of the
Forgotten American, the working people of this country -- and as sen that
the welfare types have been taken care of for years; it would force a"--;,
division v/itl>in the Democratic Party, would align the media against us --
but mcthinks it both divides them and assists us.
Like other proposals, the above calls for what the Vice President has
termed "positive polarization" and requires really the kind of go-for-brokc
decision that we may not feel is either necessary or justified by our
comparatively good field position.
The Black Vice President bumper stickers calling for black Presidential
and especially Vice Presidential candidates should be spread out in the
ghettocs of the country. Also, anli-Muskie stickers. V.'e should do what
is within our power to have a black nominated for Number Two at least at
the Democratic National Convention.
INSTRUiMZNTS ■
The President -- Used to the Absolute Minimuin. His Muskic comment was
most helpful (on the Black V. P. ) but the President and the Presidency are
the quintessential political assets wc have and should be used in a partisan,
situation, only in CNlrcmis.
4203
^77 :? I 6 2
The Vice President: V/e nccO. a decision as to whctlicr he can be used, or
should be -- both from liim and from liighcr authority within the ca:npaign.
Of course, he has incoinparablc visibility; he can make political issues in
a way that few others can,
MONDAY -- Excellent credibility in the media; has already been used to
good effect; will continue to utilize it along lines suggested in above
memorandum.
V.AILING OPERATION -= TJ.are should be set up a Wailing Opcr;ttion to
Democrats, on the Hill, and in the Party and Delegates, which will make
sure that none of them misses a majority candidate p6sition thai is against
his interests. Example, pro-abortion statements might bo mailed to all
Catholic newspapers and wire services. Cut-the-Budget-to-the-bone
statements shouid be mailed to military and -conservative publications, e*^c.
This operation would serve as midwife of the Democrats Right to Know,
We ought to consider how to set this up, v/ith perhaps the least possible
"Republican^' credentials; or perliaps if , that cannot b'e avoided, set up soirie.
"Kremllnologist" operation for tiic Democratic Party, acknowledge it; and
play it siraiglit. Would require a full-time operation; and what sliould be
avoided at all cost is the "cNcessivc" rnaiiinp s tliat really turn off editorial
writers and the like.
GOVERNORS/CABINET OFFICERS/PIIEL PEOPLE -- When and how these,
types are to be used is a decision that needs to be made; also, what of
Dole's use. Not much in a major way can be accoinplished, absent a
political operation whicl; can "produce" for them what needs to be said.
It is hard to visualize tliis being done on a part-time basis.
WHITE HOUSE POLITICAL AIDES --'Should they take the risk of "feeding"
these kinds of materials from the WK?
Above are some thoughts on Dividing the Democrats, that need honing and
discussion.
4204
'07301 6 2 7 C5
October 6, 197/
ME2-10RAKDUM FOR: i-iR. WILLIAIi E. TIi'lIlONS
FROM: PXDBnRT C. ODLE, JR.
Attached is Uie Ducyirjicu'i/iOiachicjirji ir.er;orar.du:?> on "Divicing tho
Dcnocrats." Unfortunately, it v;as :^ent directly by ti-iem to tho
AG and Mr. Haldc^non, ratiier ti,£:^ to you and raci lor review beioro
£ub:aission.
l3 thora anything you wish to add to it wliich wo night separately
subnit? lihat do you think of t]-.e n-.cznorv-ndum itself?
Attachment
cc: Mr. Job S. I-lagrudcr
fi
4205
Exhibit No. 180
P nf^yy^ ^K yy^A wh.te: hou;
WAS H I N GTON
Kobruary 4, 1972
\vM^'
O
y-^ -<":/£
:morandum to the attorney general
h. r. haldeman
FROM:
PATRICK J, BUCHANAN
Scoop Jackson is making a desperate effort to have the Tennessee
Primary shifted up from May 4 to March 30, according to the
Tinnes story attached, and it seems in our imir)ediatc political
interest to have that happen, Muskie is a clear underdog in
Tennessee, to both Wallace and to Jackson, and if we can gel the
Tennessee Primary moved to the 30th of March, we could have a
defeat inflicted on Muskie -- five days before the Wisconsin
Primary. That might help take the bloom off the Muskie candidacy
a bit, before thefinal, and perhaps crucial early primary.
The stumbling block to a shift in the Tennes see Primary up to
March 30 is reportedly Governor Winfield Dunn. Seems to mc
that it would be in our interest to have Dunn shift that primary --
in order to have Muskie defeated once more before Wisconsin.
Perhaps Dunn has his reasons; but we ought to knov/ them.
Buchanan
4206
NEW YORK TIMES -- February 4, 1972
Jackson s Strategists SeeJzlng
An Earlier Tennessee Primary
scvrral v/cck";, fiad t.ikcn noi
position at all.
lew politlc.'il professionals
i accept tliat statement. Some of I
. tiicni. belter at wlial Ibcy con-|
Isirler l-lr. UU^z--"'^ "s'c in the!
I defeat of Mr. Gore and Mr.j
Hooker in 1070, want no parli
ny R. W. APPLE Jr,
WASHINGTON, Feb. 3— ,i • A poll taken this week byj'of Mr. Jackson
t^cn'-lor licnry W. J.ickson's:rFloyd-Kep;iarl. poIitic.il nffairsd "i v.-,Tr, for lijm for a v.Iiilc."|
ctrVtr-i-ts feari-^r tbat his'^^'roctor of si.Mion W.SM-TV inHone State Senator .said, "b-jti
sUalc,,...ts. '"'^^'; y- J: . • :;asi;viiic. sho-.vcd A2 per cent'lwiicn Eilinr.lon pot aboard, li
charices .n the pisotil ^lor.J^ ,f ^^^ ^^.„^ legislators favor- .ot off. Jackson Vvould help us
pnnnao' liave been sliarpi> cur-l j.-j, ,,p.i| 20. wiUi 22 per centl'^cct D-mr.rrats and bc'ri be nl
tailed by ti:s candidacy of Gc\.'|opposed and 3.5 per cent undc-|f^ood President. But mv friendsl
Gcori,£- C. Wallace of AlabrJT.a, jcidcd. Gove.'-nnr Dunn is alsoland I just won't ko down the!
arc icn'^wir^g Lhcir effort to jnpP-'rcntiy willin;: to po alonsl road with Buford Ellincton."
V r ,,j vK^ A,ti. r^f fhp ^'•■'I'l t'-'t- compromise, wh
Dush forward inc oaio Oi i.nc ,. > r j wi . >
^uMt iu, . u ^ would he of considerably 1
Tennessee p;imar>'.
■ r.5r. Jackson had hcprd to
use the Florida volinK 0:1 :.:---ir,-h
14 23 2 launchini;
which
ess
help to "-Ir. Jackson
."^■cnator Muskie's standinn
cr,, in^ Tennessee Democrats
r iLT.nietc-'d last fall, when he
i-.-,aue remarks at C.hattanorical;
tliat were widely interpreted as[;
sji endorsement of busing. Sub-i
scqucntls'. he was replaced asj.
the star performer at a De.mn-h^g
cratic fund-raisin" dinner inii'
drive for the Democratic i.csi-
dcntiai nomination. But none
of tlic private polls taken trerc
in recent weeks has sijown him
better than fourth.
Tcrinessec — one of t'-.c few
stales wl-.crc Mr. Jackson is x.,-,hvj|ie by Boots Knndoliih, 1
considered the leader_-y wc:h xhst leaves l.W. Jact,
infowT.ed local pohtici'vns — isir-ron:; position in a state v.-hcrc
schect:;cd to liold its P-mDry icjp.ator liub:rt H. Iiun-,pi-,rcv
on May 4. By that time, r.:ne!.,p,ji others lonp- identified as
other Slates, in most of v.-hirli [liberals arc unpopular.
Mr. Jsckson has ro real I John Jay liookcr. thi! Demo-
ctrcnnth, will have held Ibeirjcr.-.ts' JS7C candidate for G....-
ballf>t>r'f. The slates are Ne'"; e,;ior. a-r,ues, iio.vever. tiiaii
Hainpsiiirc, Florida. n!;noi5,,j"\val!ace is as m\:ch a probicnii
Wisconsin, -, Massa::husetts,ifor Jackson here as in Florida."!
Pennsylvania, Ohio, Indiana,! >4r. Jackson is the only can-|
and Alabama. didate with a Tennessee head-j
T.he J^'ck.son strategists v.'iillq'.:artcr3. But he is thrcatenedj.
try,- therefore, when the Tcn-|by the factionalism ti-.at has dc-li" ^'■.'^
nc.sscc Irgisk-iturc convenes onivoured the Tennessee Di^r.io- ji J.''^^J^^^^P
Monday, to push th.c date up tojcralic party for years, costin^^jl ""
March 30, five days bc'ore thciit the Governorship, both Scn-|i
Wisconsin primary. If ti-.cv arciatc scats and other key offices. jj
unable to do that, thcv wi'll tp,-i V.'ord is circulating in party ji
for April 20. after V/:sconsiri!circic3 that Mr. Jackst.n is for-li
but "before Pennsylvania andlmer Gov. Buford Hliinr.ton'sli
Massachus'-t's iman, and that the activities ofjl
-Wcthinhancarlvvotchcrci''^''- I^l'-'npton's former pressi!
Mr. Blank, the Jackson man-|
agcr, is aware of the problem.;
"Ellington's pone to Florida."
he said, "and I hope he slays
there until after the election. I
admire tlie Governor, and I'd
lovo to have him be part of the
C3:;ipai::n, but liis name drav.s
so dad-riim. much fire we can't
fford hi:n. Best thinp lie could
us v.-ould be if he'd come
out for T*'us'-.ic "
. Dcsiiitc "vir. Blank's disclaim-
er, sjspitioris icmain stronp in
tiie Dy.-.antmc corridors of Ten-
nessee politics.
Tliey .'ire so stronf;. in fact,
that tiiree influential Demo-
IT,". is s.-iid p:-i\-.;teiy th.is \'. eel;
ivcned after reccivinp a tclc-
!phonc call late last year from
Ifor;ncr President Lyndon B.
'.lohnson. .tn old friend v/hom
!:.;r. Fllinpion served as director
Office of Emergency
and v.dth v.'l'.nm. over
Uic years, he traded prize bulls.
Accorcini^ to (he accoimts
of ib.c three Dcmorrats. fdr.
Jolu'iSon told the former Gover-
nor liiat Mr. Jackson v/as the
only candid.-.tc who had not
run out on ti-.e Jolmson Admin-
istration's Vietnam policy and
couM rive Jack.sonaVood boost is„^"^.'3'^ -'"^ P'^'^P- ""'^'^-^if^--^^^ ^'^- l^»'"2l°n 1° l>elp
befo.-c Wisconsin," said State i^'^^'^'^"- Provo the case. — -
nSrr.ator Kdv.-ard C. Blank 2d,l, J^'"- ,C^°"^'^, concedes that
the Washington Democ^^.t'sTcn-|;'" pi-^fcrs Mr. Jackson ni^t savsj
ne:.sce inana-r. "Florida may'- ,^'; done relative yl.tllci
prove to be a problcnn. Ten- ^V^";^' °r i'V^;.Mr- Crockca .sa-u,
ncssee could be a big benefit." ^''^^ ^^';- .^^-'^^Ston, who has.
,^ Ibecn at his Florioa home for
exposition to Liberals
Mr. Blank and other Trnncs-i
sec Democrats conceied thati
cbanrcs v/c;c not pocir:, partly!
bccau'.c of leclinicalities in thcl
state election law. for 1. March]
30 prisriary. ^Cl^ov.V.'infie'd Ourji,
n J'.crjubliraii, is rrp:)r(C(ily_cvj
por.cft to Ihc I'.Ian h*cl.-vei .•)s_.-ice
'Lbc fsjrces of .'^(■iialor iMlmtuiv
.V ^?u■.Ki'• of f.!aine,~v.liiii( ar^
fTeaiifti i;i 'i i-nnessi'c Lv f ormei^
S( n.ui.r AUh'M Gorc^ ''" 1
flJui ti'.c r-.f'sprcts that tliel
prirrapk' will be moved 10 /.prill,
j2q tcz?,% b;ttcr., . : _ . - ^, ,ji
mm.
I Mr. Ellin,':lon could not bt
reached for confi.-mation of
the story, alJhcu^h one source
said, "it sounds ripiit."
r.lr. Johnsi):\ who has said
j nothing publicly ahntit b.is pref-
jercnces in liic 1972 campaipn.
jwas in Acujitilco, Mexico, imri
iunavailable. His press sccre-
Uary, Wilhc Day Taylor, said
lln Austin, Tex., "1 don't know
Jenything at all about It.''
4207
COMMITTEE FOR THE RE-ELECTION OF THE PRESIDENT
February 18, 1972
MEKOR/OsTDUH FOR:
FROM:
SUBJECT: •
MR . HARRY S . FLE>M1NG /
GLEKN J. SEDAiM, JR. /
^/
Tennessee Primary Change of Date
Legislation.
Pat Buchanan's Kcmorandum to- the Attorney General and H. R.
Halderoan dated February 4 indicated that a stumbling block to
a shift in the Tennessee Primary up' to >^rch 30 is reportedly
Governor Windfield Dunn.
My contact point to follow the Tennessee legislation has been
Lee Smith, who is counsel to Governor Dunn, Lee advis_es me
that the Governor has not been opposed to moving the date up
and did not learn of the Campaign Corro-pittee's interest in doing
so until the day tlie vote vas taken in the Tennessee House.
Legislation had been introduced to move the Primary up to March 30
and that legislation did pass the Tennessee Senate. In the House
of Representatives, however, the bill was pigeon-holed in an .
obscure House subcoirjnittee. ' .
On February 15 Representative Ashe, a P-.epublican, moved to have
the bill rerjoved from committee and called to the House floor.
There being 99 members in the Tennessee House, such ti Motion
v?ould require fifty affirmative votes. The vote was 41 to 27 in
favor of calling the bill up — not enough to accomplis'h the call,
and, thereby, effectively killing the bill.
Reportly the reason for the low vote was that the Speaker of the
House and the House Caucus Chairman, both Dcmocrates and both strong
Muskie supporters were able to keep enough Democrates from voting
to be able to keep the vote under 50.
Lee Smith reports that had Governor Dunn known 6f our desire to have
the Primary moved up, he would have been able to support it. They
believed, however, it was a battle au-io.-.g t^e Democrates and didn't
involve themselves in It. Lee reports that it would now be impossi-
ble to rei'iove the bill from committee and establish a date as early
as March 30.
If ve do have an interest In moving the Pri".ary up, it might be •
poEBiblc to call the Bill up and ectablish a date of April 20 (a date
4208
Tennessee Primary _2-
proposed in earlier legislation).
cc: Mr. Jcb Mcgruder
Mr. Bob Marik
Mr. G. Gordon Liddy
4209
Exhibit No. 181
TH E VVHiri; HOUSE
v^,\ s H I fs; G ~ O h;
March 14, 1972
ATTACK ORGANIZATION k STRATEGY
MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN MITCHELL
FROM: PJB/KEN KHACHIGIAN
\Ye have hcen called upon to compose a memorandum delineating the
division of responsibility and the forn-;ations of the "attack" stra.tcc;y
for the f-iU campaign. Herewitli, our views and recommendations.
PRESEN T SITUATIO N
"In my Father's house there arc many mansions."
.lohn:14:2
Tlicj-e arc currently several quasi -i.ndependent attack operations running.
The-!-'.- is l")ole and tin- RNC, not ijifrequently orchestrated by C. Colson
iv.'ith Koci. on drums. There is tlic "Speakers Bureau" run by Pat O'Donnell
again, oui of Colson' s shop, co-ordinatinp; with Parker for the President,
and Da:'"T_:,rd for the Vice Prcsidcr.t. Further, O'Donnell serves as
conduit u. ■ the Adminisl ration "fact sheets." 'I'he;- e is a Hill operation
with Koc-;'- placing tlic matorii-Js at Colson's i ;"ilerii->.itler.t direction. There
are p,->lii;r;,l "suri-ogr.ies" schedvlod out of IVOI by Bart Porter, who
moves l!:li and Administration lyjjcs into Re-Elect settings in tlie I'rimary
Stater-, zrrc: beyond. And there is Van Shimiway who moves the political
"lii-. c ■ oiii nf JVOl to j-cporters and columnists.
CAxViPA;GN
For the campaign, in our judgment, to canalize the attack to focus our
resources, to avoid any embarrassing "gaffes, " we need more
co-ordination of attack materials being used, we need greater central
direction of the scheduling of speakers; we need a central point of
authority and direction over the attack -- holding veto power over what
goes and what does not.
/
tt
4210
The one posilioned to exorcise this authority is the Campaign Manager, I
the Attorney General.
1 . We reconiiiiend that no new controversi?! i^rinted or media atlack ■
be made upon the Oppos i tion Cand i date without the concurrence of tlie
Ali om(:y Gcn.'r?! or his designated Deputy [ar this purpose .
2. There sliould be a marriage of the scheduling operations of 1701 and
the White House; speakers should be placed under the one or other
operation, for the canipaign's dviration; and the scheduling of the two
groups should be regularly and closely co-ordinated so we can avoid
both over-kill in one area and the neglect of another.
The attack materials for both "surrogates" (who will be the majority)
and "Speakers Bureau" should be provided from the same source.
The "scliedulers, " both at 1701 and the White House, should leave their
clients with open dates in October to move them into swing states; and
they should receive regular guidance from the liighest level of the cainpaign
as to where our inanpov.'or should be directed.
THE ANSWER DESK
This operation was most useful in 1968; it can be made more effective
in 1972. We recommend that:
l/\ 1. An Answer Desk be set up and running in the RNC by the first of
Aiv^'ust, with a report by the 15th of May to 1701 and Buchanan/Khachigian
\/) as to how it is to be staffed.
y ' '
'j y Z. That the Ansv/er Desk contain an "expert" on the Democratic
•^ candidate, a; familiaj- with his positions and statements and record as
the candidate's own staff. That this expert, from the end of the
Democratic convention to the first of August, review and glean the entire
roscarrh fil '• on the cajididate --so that we can have available only what
wc v/ill need to use.
3. That by the 1st of August, the Answer Desk have prepared an Attack
Briefing Book on the Democratic candidate that has been gleaned and cut
to usable portions, containing voting records, position on top ten major
issues of the day, etc. , etc. The book should be put together in such a
way as to emphasize the negative and the vulnerable; it should contain
only the best items and quotes, etc. ; it should be brief enough so that it
will not by its very size prohibit inspection. Buchanan/Khachigian
operation will look it over, attempt to glean it further; and provide
paragraphs and pages, which can be inserted into speakers' kits.
4211
Tliis Attack Briefing Book should be updated every several weeks of
tlie campaign; it shovild be provided to all surrogates. Cabinet Officers,
the Vice President, Dole, Klein, etc.
4. Names, functions, home and office phone numbers of members of
the Ans%ver Desk should be in hand at Campaign Headquarters, and
contained in Attack Briefing Books of all speakers, by August 1.
5. Answer Desk will provide daily a report of the Democratic candidate's
attacks (also Vice President and major opposition speakers, if possible)
plus a response --to 1701, to the Vice President, White House, etc. ,
throughout the campaign.
6. The Ansv/er Desk should be provided with direct lines into all
Administration research centers --so they can get immediate access and
first call on needed information to develop the answer to opposition attacks.
NIXON STATE CHAIRMEN
These indi\'iduals should be provided as well with Attack Briefing Books
on the Democrats for their own use; they should be phoned on a regular
basis as to what issues and \vhat aspect of the opposition they should hit;
they should be contacted immediately prior to a \Tisit to their state by the
Democratic candidate.
We cannot keep a daily watch on the Nixon Chairmen; they will be ''left
to their own devices" most of the tinie. But when a Democratic candidate,
l^residential or Vice Presidential arrives, tlic National HQ, 1701, should
have soiTv? tiling available for the State Chairman -- that is consistent with •
the present line of attack being pushed at the national le\ cT.
LETTERS OPERATIO N
CS V^7 We already have had great success in this area. Ken Khachigian should
^-' I be responsible for determining, prior to August 1, that we have
^a) a beefed up operation at the national level b) "letter operations" at
''■^the local level in each of the major swing states. This is an excellent
u" way to put volunteers to work. The "letters" people at both the State and
•'national level should be given the political attack line and regularly; and
much of their work should be on the attack basis, getting guidance from the
campaign leadership. Khachigian will get together with those in 1701 to
determine that this operation is organizationally set -- by August I at the
latest.
J"
4212
TRUTH SQ'JAD
Occasionally, these have been effective; too often, they are a waste
of time and money. We propose making an effort to make it work
this year. Basically, we envision the Squad as small, divided between
the "tough cop" and the "nice cop. " The former handles the gutting of
the Democratic candidate; the latter the achievennents of the President.
Central to this is the advanceman. He need not know how to build a
crowd; but he must know how to attract media, both television and press.
The advanceman further should be responsible for getting to the Truth
Squad, bcfoae they touch down, the "lead" story the Democratic candidate
has left in the headlines of that day -- and the "lead" story of the day in
an issue context.
Reason for above is that the Truth Squad may want to focus on a local
crime -- pointing up RN' s record and statements -- or a local strike --
pointing up an RN proposal -- rather than the Democratic candidate's
attack if it has been of a pro forma character.
ur ideal of a typical first rate Truth Squad would be Hatchet Man Dole
llh Good Guy Rumsfeld; young, tough, aggressive, attractive - ■• and
Pling to !nix it up with the Democratic candidate.
The value of a Truth Squad is not in the faithful it attracts, but the media
it receives. We ought to take a long second look at how our Truth Squad
is doing -- three weeks into the campaign --to determine if it is a
cost-effective operation.
THE AX MAN
In 1968, Humphrey :"nade extremely effective use of George Ball, v/ho
had independent, excellent foreign policy credentials of his own. Ball
was willing, without prodding, or even mention, to gut either the President
or Vice President. He attracted tremendous national inedia simply on
his own stav.cU.ig and expertise. Rob Ellsv/orth perforiTied sometliing of
this function for us on the PriiT~.ary Trail -- whei'c he, as "Campaign
Dircrfor" could attract press in li; s own rij!';!; and say those things the
1 ■ 1 •' -.:uld hi.vi' lo ;;o to co.Tfe: >iion fo''.
In any event, with the Attorney General as Campaign Manager, we should
have a sinnilar "heavyweight" with a similar title, but no organization
responsibility, solely a duty to get national press, to get on national
television shows, and to hammer the opposition candidates. This would
4213
.f
be an added wes.uon in our arsenal; ho could play the role that Ray }31iss
v/as c-onstiialionally ill-designed to play in 1968. The title would not
cost a dime; it would give us an added voice; he should be a man of stature,
of Cabinet weight if not rank -- someone wlio on his Ovvn is worthy news.
We need someone, however, with an instinct for the jugular; he should
be provided the Attack Briefing Book, all the attack materials, and
progr£ii-nmed solely for the national media -- not GOP rallies.
>
A Nelson Rockefeller --if he would turn over New York management to
his aides -- and handle this national attack job, would be the kind of
indi\'iduaJ to whom I am referriji".
SURROG A 1 F.S , HILL f>: ADMINISTRATION SPOKESMEN
By Septeniber, after the GOP convention, our scheduling operations
should be married, or co-ordinated totally at the least. We should
inventory ovir people -- from the Hill, Cabin-jt, White Hovis e, etc. --
and top Campaign Ma.nagement shovild determine what .states we heavy
up in -- then the "schcdiders" from WH and 1701 should co-ordinate
the scheduling of our people into these states.
Running two separate and equal operations is foolish; the needs of the
cainpaign should dictate where ov>- people go; and those needs are best
determined by Ca7iipaign hierarchy.
THE VICE PRESIDENT
On the assi-mption Vice President Agnew is our man, the following
sliould be done. His plane should carry at least two lop spoechwritcrs,
the full atl:ck updated briefing book, a telex for direct communication,
telecopi ei-.- , phones from 1701, etc. Election of 1970 demonstrated
that A'. P. A^',ne\v can get more coverage than any Vice President in
history; tli::! he makes ti'emendovis copy; he will be the bayonet of the
Adniinist ]■;■ lion in 1972.
The error in 1970 was not the "Law and Order" issue; it was in not
realizing how the Vice President could overwhelm the national media in
three weeks to the point where the issue had already been "made"
nationally, to the point where by October I, the Den-iocrats had been
thrown on the defensive, had re-directed their media to defense the
issue, had started talking law and order, and were seen climbing in
and out of police cars. By the time September was over we had played
out "attack" trump and we had no other effective "attack" issues to make.
4214
All our jjains of September were ihus lost in the attrition of October --
when the pendulum swung back.
Again, the Vice President will have a planeload of reporters with him;
lie will get n-iore inedia than any other "attack" resource we have; our
best writers should be aboard his aircraft.
In the 1972 campaign, we should keep before us some of the lessojis
for an attacking candidate -- from 1968 and 1970:
1. Tlie old situation where it took months or weeks to "inake" an
issue, and bring it before the public, no longer obtains. The President
and the Vice President -- with the kilowatts of their office -- can "make'
an issue in a matter of days, by repeated liammering.
»
/^ ^/ 2. Correspondingly, issues coine and go more rapidly. The Democrats
1/ \ ,y got well on "law and order" in October of 1970. This argues strongly
!' for a) flexibility on our part, a flexibility we cUd not show in the last
two campaigns in sliifting cither gears or issues and b) Rn inventory or
■} ^vbank of campaign attack issues so that v»'e can switch off one and onto
'K 1 l\l ?rnother as the need appears and c) a phased attack plan which can provide
\\ ^\^' us ahf:£d of time -- v.hat issue tlie Administra.tion "attack" people will
yV' focus upon that week. Instead of shooting our bolt in the first speech --
/V we should in 1972 be able to shift easily off of one "attack" issue and onto
V/^ another and then a th.ird. d) We may need to demon.strate the ability --
^ in an even race -- to hold back from using available ammunition until
)') a latei- poiul in the cainpaign.
/ \^' Eisenhower- once indicated that wliile plans wore worthless, planning
I was c-ssenlial. We ought to have, by September ) -- a planned schedule
of "atirck" on the opposition candidate, v.hich nioses irom one issu-.^
to anof/icr, in a scolding orde:-, until the major attack' is not ]aunc!;ed
until Ocicjr!c;r 10th at the earliest - - and see if that scivjdul c works ou! in
the early days of t"n.- campaign.
Again, what we are suggesting is that a) we have four or five issues
ready to surface at any time b) we not put all our eggs in a single
basket and start swinging that basket in September and c) despite
pressure to go "all out" in September, due to bad polls or the like, we
"hold back some powder" for October.
\
4215
SKNA TOK UOI. F. fc TO F: RNC
In our view, Bob Dole should be brought in on strategy meetings,
provided with all the attack materials, plus a writer; and he slionld
be kept focused upon the shortcomings of the Democratic candidates --
rather than respond lo O'Brien who wall be attacking tlio President and
Vice President.
His scheduling should likewise be ro-ordinatctd v/ith our surrogates;
he has a jjosition giving him national stature, and access to national
media. Like the Vice President, but to a lesser degree, lie should be
heavied up.
ACCURACY IN MEDIA
f\'e did not need Edith Efron to inform us of what the national networks
id to UN in 1968; this has to be prevented in 1972. Suggest establishment ol
V ,
") /\^J '^s located in the RNC, which \vould "clock" precisely the jsositive and
j*' negative coverage of presidential and vice presidential candidates on the
V netw(-)rkc;. Tf v/e are pellincr anvthincr n-inre (ban "erinp.l timr* _" tlii t;
1 Va "Fair Coverage Committee" or "Equal Time Cominitteo" which might
^
K'
/u-v ,
networks. If v/c arc getting anything more than "equal time," this
commiltc:e can remain silent; if we get anything less than equal time, it
should confirm same with Mort Allin's news monitors -- and then send
a memorandum to John Mitchell who should get on the horn to the network
President and point thin out, indicating that if it is not corrected, and
equal time not provided -- this will be made an issue in the cannpaign,
,and the subject of legislation in the coming Congress. The newspapers
J, r'can do what they -want: but we cannot ^llo^v NBC to start "making" tlie
',f'«>non-iic issue for the Democrats, the way they sought to do it in 1970.
\L7 ,/ 'COPE'S coil NTK RP ART
\ '■•■'' ■
\' The most cfrcctive instrumentality of the Humphrey campaign v/as alleged
to be, no) without justification, the A^FL-CIO Committee on Political
Education (COPE).
CCPF's Herculean efforts in 1968 putting out millions of pamphlets,
attacking specifically the anti-union record of George Wallace, won back
millions of union voters to the Humphrey banner by election day -- and
very nearly carried the day for the former Vice President. We have
nothing to rival COPE -- AMPAC and BIPAC do not have the tens of
thousands of volunteers that COPE can muster in a particular campaign.
4216
But \vc ha%-c the necessary volunteers in our citizens' groups, GOP
and youth groups, etc. , in the various states; and v/e do have the
needed expertise and vv-riting capacity lure in D. C. to emulate tlieir
effort.
Reconimend that soon after the Democratic convention there be
established one General Conimitteo, with a high-sounding name, and
other comnnittees tailored to specific issues, i. e. , "United States
Security Council," which can issue effective attack releases, which
can then be mailed in bulk to GOP and Citizens Groups for distribution
in target states. Chuck Colson's sliop coiild have such, one imagines,
established in a matter of hours.
Y
yj 1\. The spec
K r /,/V.^D'emocra
r\ jj\ ' r^o^ exan:iple, were
r }>^\ y^cfense of the Unit
( P) Y^J^chools, etc.
ific committees should zero in on issues -- depending on the
tic candidate -- where the opposition is especially vulnerable.
were Muskie the noniinee, we would have a Conimittee on
cd States, one on Space, on on Aid to JVon-Public
f^^ / Again, these committees would issue hard-hitting, targeted material,
/^ which we v/ould then have distributed by regular GOP troops, outside
/ churches, plant gates, ball parks, etc.
MEDIA ATTACK
-■'■)
'A
In our view, the Democrats in 1968 were more successful than we in
using "attack" coinmercials. They focused on the Vice President, v/ith
soine nasty materials, but also on Social Security and Aledicare --
suggesting that a vote for Nixon was a vote lo diminish both. These wer<
effective, selected targeted media attacks -- using comn-icricals. We
recommend a program of somcihing similar for this year. Here are
some ideas.
1. In areas where bussing is a gut issue, whicli is lilcely to bo lialf
the metropoUtia;i areas in the Uiiiled States, and all tlie South, in
i6cptem!;er of 1972 -- we run straight one-rninute conimcri cals using
Musl-.ie or Hujnjjli re y or Ke:u:..'dy ;ii.atements in suppoi't of bu.-.srng. They
: ■■■.'"'' ■"^"")'. :.:■•■' ■■^''( , ;^ir-' ii'.-kc IjU'iv 5.i<;Ii;l -- v.'rit-in and Drt>duvi'c
2. In areas where space is a concern, like Houston, Florida and
Southern California, we should have spot ads against the Democratic
votes to cut the space program.
. I
I
4217
3. Sainc v.dth dcft-nsc. The Dcniocrats have voted against" almost
every weapons system proposed by the Administration. Kluskie's
and Kennedy's records arc atrocious. We 5;hou!d have a one -minxite
spot on television and radio, in conservative areas, which documents
these votes against and concludes -- "Senator Muskie voted to strip
A:nerJca's defenses beJow the danger point; President Nixon believes
that peace requires American strength. Ke-elect the President -- Vote
for Richard Nixon. "
Further on this issue. We should have the VFW, at their conventions,
mail the Muskie Defense record to their entire membership. We .sliould
do a direct mailing to the Amci-ican Security Council list, if we can get it.
And lake out ads on defense, contrasting RN and Deniocratic positions
iri all fo\ir conservative publications.
4. On J-ll the black radio stalifins in the Swing States, we should run
ads on i\h-iskie's statement about no blacks for Vice President. "If he
doesn't think tlie time has come for one of us to be even considered for
Vice President, tiien the time has come for Black Ai^icrica to tell Ed
Muskie we don't think it is time for him to be considered for President.
W'ritc in Siiirley Chisholm. "
5. The SST \'ote alone, where the Democrats were against us, shovdd
he ust:d on radio and television and at plant gales throughout the State of
Wasiiingtrin. Again, a television ad or a radio spot -- just stating the
Democrat \otes, v,-hat it did to Seattle and the S'ate of Washington, hav
RN fougl t fo;-it -- and vote for Richard Nixon, In some cases in these
ads, it may be sui'iicient to attack the Democ-atic pos-ifiin, simply to
turn off ihe voter -- where v. e have no possibility to winning that particula
voting bl oc.
6. la tlie f^. ri^i belt, v/e sliould be a.bl c to contrast Bulz "fightitig for
the fariT^cr" with statements by th-c va.rious Democrats thai the prices
of far^n ;jrc:ducts aj-e loo hirh -- again, t; rgc-tod con~merir,a.l3 to
specific groups. IJ'.'ery individual has conlradJ etion.-- in his position --
wc: 'i-.-'lrL to be sure tliat e.ery concerned gro\ip i ?; aware of those of our
■■''- ' , .1 -- 3:id :: cdia all.-ck a. d-.'frti.'un;'. is the wav to do it. Nol ivisi
We will need to get together with the media people prior to the
Democratic convention; we will want a slice of the media resources and
advertising budget: we will need to know soon from the advertising
personnel, what kind of film and tape they can acquire from commercial
networks, which we can put to use.
4218
The Alioi-rii'y General should clc.-xr the mocUa ;'.cls -- ar.d draw off Ihc
poison if llitro is any -- but wc should not hesitate to use them. Most
of the best pro-media we get will be the President himself, live as
PresidonI; and we ought not overlook this effective mechanism.
Just as t)ic Democrats ran that ad of the Vice President -- with the
heart thumping to indicate a heartbeat away in 19^8 -- so we ought to
have the- capacity to put together spot ads in a matter of days and have
theiTi on the air -- as the campaign develops. In any event, we need a
budget for this -- siTvall pre-convcntion and inuch larger post- convention.
Were lUii-.iphrey the candidate, foi- example, wc could run the horror
clippin;^;s of 19f'ti. v.ar, riots, coffins, urban violence, crime and say,
this is the result of what Hubert Hvimphrey called the "politics of joy''
in 1968. Let's not po back to that horrible year, 1968 -- let's ma' e
forward v/ith President Nixon.
THE REPUBLICAN CONVENTION
Just as the largest audience the President had in 1968 was at his August
converlicm, so the largest audience the Republican "attack" surrogates
will have in 1972 is in San Diego. Wc need a Walter Jxidd, or several
of (licm out there -- doing the job in 1972 on the Democrats that Judd
did in I960.
Following the Democratic convention, we should consider v/ho our
speakers v.t.11 be, at what hour and time in San Diego, and guarantee
that some of the inost hard-hitting and tightly drafted attacks on the
Democratic candidates come out of that convention.
The attack speeclies should be orchestrated and advanced, with an
audience cheerinr, at the right lines -- tlic v.'.^y the President did it
himself in 1968, in hi^ accep'nnce speech. We will got no better chance-
to focus the n?.tioL'''s attention on llie wcal^iioss of the Domocrr-.tic
candUk'tcs and the Dctmocratic Party than in 1972 and v/c ough.t !)■:;( blow
all that national tc4c\i sion.
B Vi CT J\ X A N-_K H A C ) 1 1 GLA_N
Our primary role, given the small size, is oversight, and assistance.
1. Provide checks on various "attack" operations to deterinine their
effectiveness in terms of media.
4219
2. Take a direct hand in creating radio, TV, spots on the "attack"
and the pamphlets, and lielp direct where they are to be distributed.
3. Monitor operations, through news summary staff.
4. Recommend to Attorney General shifts in strategy -- point up
v.'hen we feel one line of attack is being exhausted, and another might
be better pursued. In campaign we anticipate regular, if not daily,
oinmunication with the top canipaign staff o;i how \vell things go, and
where there needs to be a new attack or iniprovement.
5. Help draft the speeches the attacks on the Democrats for the
Republican convention.
6. Have a seat on the board vi'hcre the attack strategy on the Democrats
is being considered, and \^■herc states are being selected. Further, we
tJ^- wnll need to have direct access to the poll data of the campaign, so that
we can know where the attacks should be directed, against whom and how
in what states.
7. Prodxice, with a small group, some of the covert materials -- i. e. ,
matter we vvould not want to be identified v.dth, but nothing that would be
wholly destrxictive, if uncovered.
8. Over see \ipdale of the briefing books.
GENERAL THOUGHTS
1. In the turmoil of a campaign, it is likely that centralism will
break dov/n; that is net unexpectcci, nor necessarily bad; however, it is
iinportant tb.at we attempt to impose some kind of strategy upon our
surrogates vvl)0 arc making the attack, and the other instrumeit s v.-c have.
2. After the August convention, for certain, we ought to go at once on
the attack --as we did in 1970. We have the forun-is to command the
media, and we ought to throw the Democrats on the defensive and keep
them there --so that they have no chance to make their issues, in
particular the "economic issue". There is no reason -- given our superior
media position -- that we can't dominate the news.
3. Avoid at all costs the kind of "attack" by individuals or media or
ad that opens us to the "Tricky Dick" charge, or the "Old Gutfighter"
allegation. Granted that the press is less indulgent with us than with
/_ copy illegible_/
^
4220
4. Kcop In mind ihat' Ibore are only two dcacDincs every day, and
one evening ncv/s sliow; If an attnck has captmed the media, no need
to top it with a now one; let it ride.
5. Start the atlacV;s early in the campaign as the number of undecided
is then largest. Ayain, hov^'cver, we should show tlie kind of flexibility
we did not in 1968, by being able to open up an entirely new front in
mid-October, if some other attack is being countered or stalled. The
old military adage -- alv/ays comniit your rererves from a nev/
direction -- should here apply.
6. The last fi\e days of tlie campaign, we sliould close up shop --
and everyone wlio is not tongue-tied r.liould be out in the boonies on as
m'any radio, television, speech appearances as he can fill. The last
voice heard in the campaign may be the one to which some s%ving voter
hearkens. About one v/eek before the end of the campaign, we can no
longer rely on Red Blount's fcllov\'s to deliver our naessage to the
outlanders; we have to start using the phone -- and everybody who can
skate should be out on the ice.
7. When the candidates are determined, there should be a strategy
meeting of sorts to determine v/hal "per sonal " aspects of the Democratic
candidate are vulnerable; and while these may not be the grist for attack
ads, we should get thera out to our speakers. For Muskie, for example,
"instability, " his outb\irst of temper, his breaking do\\'n completely
after criticism from a publisher. For Kennedy, "immaturity, " "playboy,
etc.
•^^ 8. The Congressmen v/ho will be running, especially those who
A/'V^ y^ are safe, sliould be given -- \"ia phone -- the line to hit for the President,
y' the attack line, in a boiler room operation, plus last mailed materials ■■ -
one week ]5rior to election, with phone calls for any late update.
9. Finally, the attack strategy, as stated, should be flexible; it may
be that alter iriaking ai-tacks early in the campaign, we want to go over
to proii'iir.c what we are going to do for America in the second term, to
ignore the opposition. Perh;;ps the polls v,ill tell us tliat is the approach
t(-' take. If r.c, no 'iio'^l: ';i; we Vn'ov.UI ;'.3 .<ioon -.vrA]. (.-. victorv as rr.-:.
/i
4221
Exhibit No. 182
: ^y.
April 12, 1972
MEMOR-AXDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JOHX N. MITCHELL
Attached is a plan for our activities at the Democratic National
Convention which was written by Patrick J. Buchanan and Kenneth
Khachigian. We recomrr.end that you approve this plan.
Approve
Disapprove_
to /0>i^^
lAttachrr.enC
".CNFIDEXTIAL
P
4222
H E \V - . T E i-.OUSZ
v/ A ;: H . X o T o N
April 10, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
iVEViORANDUiVi TO:
JOHN MITCHELL
H. R. HALDEMAK
FROM:
PAT BUCH.'^NAN/KEN KHACHIGIAN
,- iy
Understand that we have a suite of rooms at the Fontainbleau in Miami
Beach, as ■we did at the Conrad Kilton in Chicago. Following plan
outlines our recommendations as to the best use of personnel and
communications in X'liami Beach during the Democrat Confab in July.
PERSONNEL -- Two "spokesmen" who have national credentials, who
are effective on the media, who are politically savvy, who can do
..television, press conferences and backgrounders -- with great credibility.
' One would be a "tough cop" to counter-attack; the other the "nice cop"
to praise the President's record, and to answer more in sorrow than
anger the charges being elevated. One v/riter in residence. Two secre-
•' taries to run the machinery and to do the typing. (They can be provided
by the Dace County GOP. ) A press officer out of 1701 who can gather
the n-iedia.
,-,''>- . EQUIPMENT -- Some Nixonaires should be in the suite regularly, to
J .y attract media, and to serve drinks. One of the primary functions of the
— v" press officer a.id spokesman is to continually feed the "line" to \dsiting
^\ ' -" press. The "reception room" should be functioning almost around the
clock. And the individuals sent should have good rapport w^ith the national
press.
Tvifo typewriters, xerox machines, a dex and telex machine will be
essential, to receive research and background materials from RNC, and
from the Ans\ver Desk -- >A'hich could be operational as of that date.
Further, there should be security in the communications room and all
rooms, excepting the hospitality suite at all times to prevent some of
our friends from seizing in-coming materials --to prevent the "planting"
of salacious anti-Democratic literature in our Quarters.
11 likelv be needed. (~^ ( » y^ J
4223
PVBLICirY -- Tiie Repub)ican Forward Observation Po.s: should be
n-ade public; the I'irsl of Ihe personnel should arri\-e arour. 1 the opening
dav of -...c Convention, when ilie major media starts. It should spend
:;'.m..st all of its time with the national press. As for any "intclli"ence"
iv-.-ic-ion, this seems Inighly unlikely -- that will be done by the networks,
anC the Observation Post will have neither the personnel nor contacts to
be undertaking this kind of assignment.
The purpose of the group is, foremost, to make news --to piQgy back
on the enormous media coverage that will be provided for the Democrats,
to point the finger at running sores in the Democratic convention.
If. however, Miami Beach become s a re - run of Chicago, the best posture
of the Observation Post would be one of near absolute public silence - -
getting out of the way of the best possible story v/e can have. Just serve
drinks then, make background comnients, that if they can't unite and run
, their own convention, how can they unite and run their own country.
if the convention goes well, then the ForiAard Observation Team can
comment^n the proceedings, on who is being "shafted" on any attacks
against the President -- can point up as well any differences between the
Democratic Platform of 1972 and that of 1968.
:' . 7
'. '' J.-'urther, because v>'hat the country sees of the convention will come
, /•'from the tube -- the "line" should go to the Observation Post from
,-■' 'Washington, not the other way around. The political chieftains here,
'■ ' wnc have access to full monitoring of the networks, should be r.iaking
p the decision as to v/hat the response should be.
Or. 'response" to Democratic attacks, in Q and A, of course, the
FOP ■wouid have autonomy.
DANGERS -- If all hell breaks loose down there, they could conceivably
point up to the Republicans at the Fontainbleau to distract attention from
themselves. Secondly, they could "plant" the kind of materials that would
embarrass us; thirdly, they could get some demonstrators to indicate
that the Republicans up there told us to come down here and "raise hell. "
Anyone at the Observation Post should be clean as a hound's tooth -- and
the Observation Post should have no hand in any "covert operations" ongoing
in Miami.
4224
RESEARCH FACILITIES -- There i s in PJB's judsmcnl no great need
lor these down in Miami; any research can be done here -- and iwixed
down io the Command Post. Ai^^o, a phone call from Miami can get that
n~.aterial from Washington.
Presumably the "speakers" in .NUaini will know how to respond to an
O'Srien attack, anc' if any research needs to be done, the "writer" in
Miami can get it froin D. C. Our Answer Desk at RXC could be in
operation by then providing the materials from RXC regularly to Miami.
Further, the Shumway and Magrucer operations and Buchanan and
Khachigian should remain in regular touch with the Command Post --
transmitting any directives that come out of the political operation here.
ISSUES -- The Observation Post can call attention to any groups that
are being shafted at the convention, such as the Wallace delegates, or the
"kids"; it should be little and disparage the Democratic Platform; it
should be able to "leak" stories indicating whom Washington believes to
be strongest or weakest; it should be in a position to mak<; predictions, etc.
The press Vnan at the post should be able to whip up a press release; he
should be in contact with the major network shows; he should be in regular
contact with our operation and 1701 -- and we should be getting instructions
from the top.
O7HER ACTIVITIES -- We should give consideration to scheduling our
primary "surrogates" in major media centers inside and outside of
Washington during the Democratic Convention. They can niake the most
news in their forums --by keying off the Democratic Convention. If it is
a shambles, they should make the point in the city or region where they
are sepaking. This will require some scheduling of top speakers, such
as the Vice President, Senator Dole, and surrogates -- during this period
o: the summer. And thoughts on the "line" should be forthcoming to each
from the Political Operation at 1701, or out of here --as determined by
the political leadership.
This ■will be a time of Democratic dominance of the networks. If their
show is a horror show -- we can just get out of the way, or simply point
to it. If they are doing well, then -we should be "jamming" their
communications a bit by getting on the air and in the press to the maximum
degree possible with rebuttal during the convention's duration.
All "surro{^es" out on the road during this period should be also kept in
touch \vith RXC's Answer Desk, as well as 1701, for information and the
"line. "
4225
Exhibit No. 183
April 14, 1972
CONFIDENTIAL
S£HORAr,'DU>i FOR THE HONOPvABLE JOllN K. MITCHELL
FROM: JES S. tL\GRUDEll
Itached for your coaaideration and review is a ne.r.o-
findum which was prepared by Fat Buchanan nnd Ken
iachiyian coacerning contender tracking and strategy,
kttachiuent
WaJFIDENTIAL
4226
April 12, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
FROM:
JOHN MITCHELL
H. R. HALDEMAN
PAT BUCHANAN/KEN KHACHIGIAN
Our primary objective, to prevent Senator Muskic from sweeping the '
early primaries, locking up the convention in April, and uniting the
Democratic Party behind him for the fall, has been achieved. The
likelihood -- great three months ago -- that the Democratic Convention
could become a dignified coronation ceremony for a centrist candidate
who could lead a united party into the election --is now reinote.
The purpose of this memo is to suggest new goals -- and to elicit
advice from the campaign leadership on how to proceed -- and against
whom. Had we our drxithers, we would at this point choose as
opponents McGovcrn, Humphrey, Muskie and Kennedy in that order.
Here is the way the primaries shape up at present, in both o\ir judginent
and tha.t of the more respected politicians about, in the media and
Democratic Party.
Vi'ISCONSIN -- April 4: The Wi.sconsin returns made McGovern a
credible candidate and whipped up a Goldwaterlike enthusiasm for liim
throughout the country, from which he will benefit from now until July.
He has inherited the media enthusiasin Big Ed retained with the Cape
St. Elizabeth Show 18 months ago. Humphrey lost a golden opportunity
to assume the mantle of front-runner; he was injured in terms of
November; he lost the publicity and momentum that went to McGovern
and covdd have been h.is. But he is still very viable. Muskie was
crippled, but not killed. Wallace was strengthened for the merry month
of May, which we anticipate he will dominate.
MASSAC:''US:^T'J'S t, r-JNNSYLVANTA -- Apri] 2!): Both states have
p.:-rsor. ;i!.'i'i y as v.-<.-)l r.. ^:■ flclcgatc contc-^tf;. }JJl;"i, McGuvorn, Muskie
, ■■ ' \'.' : ' ' ■- ■ ^■■-••- •:- '/ ! ;l!ol Jn iK.th. T:ov.'(
conccL'tra liri'' on l-''.;i;-' .. y l\ n ni a to li;.- i-xcliisj
", IluirulTi-y i:^
cj] M as;;.>chu^eli .■■ ;
i
4227
and McGo\crn is focusing upon Massachusetts with only targeted
districts in Pennsylvania. Muskie, who is in danger of being vvhipsawed
■in the two primaries, sceins to have opted to make his major effort in
(Pennsylvania. The 182 delegates in Pa. , compared to 102 in Mass. is
'clearly one reason. Another is that Muskie seems to believe now that
he stands a better chance of becoixiing the Regulars' candidate acceptable
to the Left, than the Left's candidate acceptable to the Regulars.
At this point Hui-nphray looks like the winner in Pennsylvania, which will
give him a leg up in Ohio a week later. And Muskie who two months ago
was a 4-1 favorite in Massachusetts could conceivably lose both
primaries on April 25. If he docs, he has another bullet hole in hini --
though he may still not be completely dead.
INDIANA, OHIO, ALABAMA, AND THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA -- May 2:
In D. C. Walter Fauntroy is favorite son, about whom no more need be
said. Alabaina is inconsequential. In Indiana, all thernajor candidates
seem to be abandoning this primary to George Wallace, and at this point
Wallace will win the Indiana Primary and the headlines that go with it - -
setting himself up for Michigan, and other good things to come. MusV^ie
has just about pulled up stakes; Hubert is focusing on Ohio, and McGovern
is simply not a statewide winner -- give this one to Vi''allace.
lOhio, however, is another story. The winner of Pennsylvania a week
[before -- we believe HHH will take it for the first primary win in his
Dolitical lifetime -- will have the w^hip hand here. Muskie will contest
his w^ith all he has; if he loses here as well as Pennsylvania, it becomes
difficult to see how he can last another month, till California. I\lcGovern
s here --as everywlierc -- targeting on delegates, to pick up a few
iven if he loses the primary by a major niargin. It's HHH or Musliic in
3hio. V/e pick Humphrey here as well.
WALLACE MONTH
TENNESfJLE -- May 4: Everybody's abandoning this one to Wallace,
vho should sweep it -- along with 40-45 of the delegates.
NORTH CAROLINA -- May 6: Everyone is abandoning North Carolina
iis weU -- everyone ihntis expect Terry Sanford. Wc gi\'c North
Carolin.- lo George \V'a]lacc also. (If Sanford should upt-el Wallace
ri'. ' : ' ' / \.-,lil<t; , lu\-;]l he Toj-n Wich^;-:; "New Sf.'tb" hero for
iiext month. )
4228
NEBRASKA & WEST VIRGINIA -- May 9: West Virginia will feature
a head-on between Wallace and H\ibert Humphrey, the only two
candidates on the popular ballot. If Humphrey whips Wallace he will
get immense favorable publicity -- good both in Maryland and Michigan.
He will look more and more to the Regulars as the Regular to support
all the way. If Wallace beats Huniphrey here, it ■■vill be a humiliation
for Hubert, and the Deniocratic Party nationally -- exposing just how
far away the jiational leadership of the Party has gotten from its base.
Wallace's inomentum for North Carolina and Tennessee will be working
in his favor here. (Anyway to help Mr. Wallace here would help in
Novenibcr. )
Nebraska -- everyone is on the ballot. It is a McGovern target state;
he could do well here. We have no real reading.
MARYLAND & MICHIGAN -- A4ay 16: If Humphrey has defeated Muskie
in both Pennsylvania and Ohio -- then both these states shape up as
Huniphrey versus Wallace contests, and either man could v/in both of
thein, or one of them.
Maryland has 53 delegates and Michigan 132. The latter is the major
northern industrial state most suited to a Wallace cannpaign, as bussing
is "the" i.ssue.
Yet, there is no way to predict the outcome here --as inuch will depend
on what has gone before. If Wallace and Humj^hrey do as we predict
in the previous primaries, then the Maryland and Michigan contests
should be showdowns between the two, with McGovern picking up his
customary handful of delegates in both. Mviskie lias formal UAW
support, but if he loses Pennsylvania and Ohio, and does not win
Massachusetts, that UAW endorsement v/ill be more an embar rascnient
to Woodcock than an advantage to Big Ed.
Note: Cross -over voting is allowed in Michigan. Again, our people
should go for Wallace and McGovern.
OREGON & RHODE ISLAND -- May 16: Rhode Island with 22 delegates
is Muskie country; and if Big Ed is still alive, if not well, these
delegates should be his. Oregon, with 34 delegates, is symbolically
important -- giventhe iia1\irp of llie stale, and tlie media attfntion if
invariably receives. E\-c.i-yonc is on llie ballut in Oregon -- including;
Toddy. Ill tlio wake of Wiscnnpin, j-.ome ha\'(' p,l]-c.?dy cnnrr dcd Ore-eon
l(j AUA^iiw .1,; bul V. ii^i !.;■ .• lu' ea i- i-Li'.i .i-.c. j-t; ic- \/.i] i.:cpv;:ci ,.j-i.atiy
on how well he dot-.s in ilu; int(> )-\c;ni ng six wec:k;i beuveen now and tlum.
4229
Jackson's support is not strong in Oregon; and it is difficult to see
how he can last until then. More likely, this will be a McGovern,
Huinphrey and Muskie contest -- again, depending on whether or not
Muskie is still alive.
Muskie' s polls which showed him leading in Oregon are now as out of
date as all his other polls. No projecftions here -- but this is central
to McGovern' s planning.
CALIFORNIA, NEW MEXICO, SOUTH DAKOTA & NEW JERSEY -- June 6:
Despite Wallace's challenge, Soutli Dakota's 17 have to go to McGovern.
New Mexico's eighteen -- who knows -- likely a split between Humphrey
and Muskie, and perhaps Wallace, who says he may work the state.
New Jersey is one of the two crucial primaries of the day -- though it
^\'ill be overshadowed by California, which is Big Casino. In Jersey
there are 109 delegates; Muskie had the upper hand Iiere, but appears
to have lost it as both former Governor Hughes and Senator Williams
are backing away from hinn. This redounds to Humphrey's benefit.
He is probably the favorite here, with McGovern again targeting on
districts where he can pick up delegates. (Wallace has not decided yet
on a major push here, though he has two wec^ts left to file. )
California is where it is at for the Democrats, v/ith 271 votes -- winner
take all. This is nearly a fifth of w)iat is needed for nomination. This
prize, the possibility of seizing it for bargaining leverage and prestige,
is what may keep a bedraggled Ed Aluskie in the race.
Wallace could not get on the ballot; McCarthy v/ill not canipaign and
Jackson will have pulled out by then --in our estimate. This leaves it
between Humphrey and George McGovern. If Muskie stays in and has
any apprecir.ble support, then what he draws froin Humphrey could well
give the Golden State to George McGovern. JvicGovern has organization
here, entliusj asnn, and iTioney; and it could pay off.
Further, he is the lone candidate on the Left for the balance of the
prin"iaries -- and thus Ihe more "centrists" left in the primaries --
Jackson, IIHH, Muskie- or Wallaco -- tiic me:-vier for George McGovern.
NEV/ Yr^R;: . - Jun- 20: New Yorl.'i; ?.7S d-] <■;',-> tes is \hc- ]r-.rgcst, but
this will bv bjjlil. vij:) considerably l)y tlic time il gets to Mi;: mi. New York
docs not have a statewide vote; moj-.cover, thr- delegate slates do not
i.::\;- <i-,'- c." n'VKi;i t r":' Tin.ni;-fi f' op o " f ! r-.'i . Sf) \'i>" ^l•lf■ lo )• cl o! ••■;"' .it , Jolin
4230
them to run for delegate; strong grass roots effort is essentia) here;
so McGovern should do extrei-nely well in the Empire State, probably-
more delegates than anyone .else, but not more than 100.
THE NON-PRIMARY,STATES
Several points need to be made.
A) Regular Democrats are not doing as well as they have in the
past.
B) A lot of liberals are getting into the convention wlio weren't
there in 1968.
C) Unions are not doing as well.
D) There are sizable nunabers of "undecided" delegates winning --
and we do not knov/ precisely to \vhom they will go.
E) McGovern is doing extremely well in non-primary states,
niaximizing his potential -- when George is -wanning them in Georgia,
and Virginia, a7id picking off two-thirds of the Kansas delegation, it
rrieans they have a Goldwater type operation going, and going well.
THE SCENARIOS
SCOOP JACKSON -- No way we can see him winning the nomination,
and no reason for his continiiing much further. Wallace has eclipsed
him on the party's social conservative right. We predict Jackson will
either be out after Ohio or after Oregon ~- the longer he stays in,
however, the better for us, as he draws votes that would otherv/ise be
Huniphrey' s or Muskie' s -- and so he aids George McGovern.
HUBERT HUMPHREY -- Victory for Hubert lies in knocking Muskie
out of the race in Penj-isylvania and Ohio, in taking West Virginia and
Michigeiri and Klaryliind from George Wallace, a'-id winning California.
Humphrey, in our vi c\\-, is the odds-on favorite to become the East
Befu Hope of the ]-)-'i-ly Rcfnil^r.s against the \'icGc)\'c- rn in.'-, uj-p, cit s. By
and large, hc> docs not contc-t any more niajor prJinary races with
\-cr>, •■.•■.-; -; :-, , M, Vf.-ri :•••, -. li-rr,-,- {'■'■■ ■-'-r!-:i-.-f Califor-nn r; r' :: i' '■;
l-Iis coi-.ij/<-lLtion jr. Pon.-i sy l\-ani a a:i.d Ol-d o is Muskie, and if he lakes
jMusl.i .'■ ou; of the play thej-e -■ }-i e contesl.? V\';h.] lace in Wc-st Virginin,
4231
Clearly, once Muskie is eliminated -- if he is -- Humphrey's approach
in California is to paint George McGovern to the Regulars as the death-
knell of the Democratic Party they have known. Even should Hubert
lose California narrowly, he will likely carry New Jersey and pull some
delegates out of New York.
Our probleiTi with HHFI is that he has never won a contested Democratic
Presidential primary.
ED MUSKIE -- It is truly ten minutes to midnight for Big Ed. If he
loses both Ma.s r.achusetts and Pennsylvania on April 25 -- which he
could -- it is liard to sec how he can regain his iTiomentum to become
the Candidate of the Party Regulars, McGovern has already locked up
the Left.
Muskie' s chance to rehabilitate hiniself conies April 25 in Pennsylvania,
and then a week later in Ohio. If he wins the first, he can conceivably
win the second, and become himself the Candidate of the Regulars --
the last man who can prevent a McGovern nomination. The problein for
the Regulars is tliat unless they settle on a single candidate before
California, they are going to lose California --to McGovern. From
our standiDoint, then, it v/ould be good to ]iave Muskie win something,
good to ]^ave him and Jackson stay around for the California primary.
Muskie is today in a position not dissimilar from RN in 1968 -- had RN
not swept the primaries. Had Miami come dov/n to a three-way contest
between RR, NR and RN -- then as soon as it appeared, the left or right
candidate would win -- ]\.N in the center would become the beneficiary
of the 0]:)posite wing's support. In other v/ords, had Nixon not won on
the first ballot, he cou]d still haive won on a later ballot, by getting the
panicked Rockefeller supj^ort, should Reagan rise, and the panicked
Reagan support should Rockefeller approach the nomination.
Ed's second chcnce lies in the fart that he is more acceptable to the
Left than Hiurijjhrey and to the Regulars than McGovern.
Absenting only Teddy Kennedy, he still has the best chance of uniting
the Demticratic Paj-iy today.
One finnl ]K)!e: Mur.uicr covJd come alivc^ and w c-11 if he slu-uikl two Vveeks
i: O- . i I'^j .. ■.:l:.ijj''.-^ : ;:r; ■. !.\^ .. i ., c- ;^.! ^i >..::-;■ I i; .:.!■ f;. "] 1., 1 C. -uld b i' i :: ;.\
liim lo ]if;- in iin iu.':'arit -- a;i(.l iho'agJi JiighJy imUkely, it is not aliogclhej-
oalsjc'n' il"i(> )'c:3]ni tr, jios si lii li ty .
4232
GEORGE MCGOVERN -- McGovern has these assets going for him:
A) He is maxiinizing his support in the non-priinary states, with
a hustling team maximizing his support and winning him, nickel and
diine, delegates in some of the damndest places.
B) Even in the primary states where he is very nearly conceding
defeat, such as New Jersey; Maryland, Michigan --he will be picking
up sinall pockets of delegates.
C) He has monientun:i after Wisconsin; lie has generated tremendous
enthusiasm on the Left; he has convinced the True Believers that they
czn take over the party; and their challenge now has a "credibility"it
ha.s never pre\'iously had.
D) He is targeting well. The states he says he can win --he can
conceivably win, i. e. , Massachusetts, Nebraska, Oregon, South
Dakota, California and New York.
E) He will go to Miami with support in every section of the coxmtry
if not damn near every state.
D) The convention he goes to will be mor e liberal and conscience
oriented than any previous convention since the GOP in 1964. If
Kennedy stays out and the convention goes more than two ballots, a
lot of delegates are going to vote tlieir hearts instead of their heads --
and the Democratic Party could v/ind up with this fellow as nominee.
McGovern' s problems are apparent; he is of course anallaema to
conservative Deniocrats; but also, after Massachusetts, he is going
to have a dry spell in terms of publicity for a few weeks -- and this
could hurt him if Humphrey is dominating the news and building
inomentum with lieadlinc victories.
GEORGE AvALI^ACE -- As son-icone put it, if Wallace were non"iinated,
the Democratic Party would self-destruct on l:is way to the rostrum.
There is no scenario for a Wallace non^ination. Hov/ever, he could take
300 delegalc:s into the convention; his delegates will be challenged;
anything is li]-.e]y to happen; there is no way now to predict what he v/ill
do or what \\lj] l;o done to liim -- tlie Democrats thcmsclx'cs will hf'.\'c
to docidi- l!iat.
4233
OUR NEXT GOAL
What we need now is a decision on whom we want to ru n against. We
believe that McGovcrn is our candidate for dozens of reasons. He
could be painted as a left- radical candidate, the Goldwater of the
Democratic Party; and at this point iri time v/e would inundate him.
The Wallace Deniocrats, South and North, as well as the Daley and
Meany Democrats, would have to talce hemlock to support a fellow
whose ixiajor planKis to chop 32 billion out of defense. Also, he is
weak with the blacks, and would have to cater to that vote --to his
great disadvantage. Huinphrey can take the blacks for granted in a
contest with the President.
If we want McGovern -- and we believe we should -- then what we want
is a showdown in Miami between the Regulars and the Left -- between
Humphrey and McGovcrn with McGovern winning. And if McGovern
loses that showdown -- then by all means, we want Humphrey. The
Left would never talve him again; lie vi'ould guarantee a horror show in
Miami Beach and a walkout of the Left fol]o\'.Tng.
Muskie is our third choice -- the reason being that Mur.kie, despite his
weaknesses is still a potentially \inifying candidate for the Democrats,
after a Humphrey-McGovern deadlock.
EDWARD MOORE KENNEDY
Evajis -Novak, in a coluinn that looks to have come froiTi the horse's
mouth, say that Kennedy would accept a genuine draft. He is in the
catbird's scat today. TougJi tliere will be pressure on hin~i to endorse
McGovern --if McGo\'crn carries Massachusetts two weeks from today -
he can sit back and observe until July.
If the convention deadlocks on the first ballot, and if there is a deep
division wnlhin the Dtniocratic Party -- he i? the inajor unifying
figure on Ihe national scone today. Though he v/ould be unacceptable
to the So\xili, in a nationa.1 election, he would bring to liis candidacy all
the McGox'crTi supjjort, plus the Kennedy charisina, plus the support
of the- Mc'.-inys and Dnlr^ys. A Deniocratic Pcrty deeply dix'ided, thirsting
fur uriJly c'.:-(] \ictor\ . \.-imId velct'iT'.o a Kcnn '.iy.
1- O J ti ' ■ :. • ■ . •,'li: , V. V ^aj . -.(t Dwi I V . .' , W .-.:..,._, 1 ., J lU. ' 1 ■, . ; V. rU:.r.i:
KvCnntuly onl. As Ki,-nncdy is clr\c>lc(l, AicGo.orn j-ect;dcs -- and
V-' \7:'i.f \;.C"o>. cr'-'.
4234
Just as it. would have been foolish for LBJ -- who wanted Goldwater I
in April --to flush out and elevate the more formidable RN -- so it i
is foolish for \is we believe to flush out and elevate EMK -- when he *
is far stroiiger and more dangerous than McGovern. We should elevate
and assist McGovern in every way conceivable. i
Nor can v.'e surface Kennedy --if he doesn't v/ant to be surfaced. If
we indicate v/e are apprehensive about his candidacy, that makes his i
candidacy more likely. |i
,11
Right nov/, Kennedy is still in the background. There is a liberal media jj
love affair going on with George McGovern; they will help George against
Humphrey and we should help him as well. Every notch we move
Kennedy up, we move McGovern down a peg. What we should do is
begin publicly to take George McGovern seriously, and any pressure
we could place upon EMK to endorse McGovern as the leader of the
Left should be exerted. We niight even attack McGovern to elevate
him -- also, to get the record on him into the media.
McGovern has a long shot at the nomina.tion, a very long shot. But if
he \vins, we win. Let's let him have his run at the nojnination, and
assist him in eveiy way we can. Today, he gets 5 percent of a
Democratic vote nationally; and RN swamps him in the polls -- and
people do not yet know what a v/ild man he is. McGovern' s The One.
4235
Exhibit No. 184
April 27, 1972
MEMORANDUA'I FOR:
JOHN .\1ITCHELL
H. R.. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
With the great success of McGovern and subsequent pullout of
Muskie, the chances of a McGovern nomination are immensely
improved. Thus, we must do as little as possible, at this time,
to impede McGovern' s rise.
Though he i:!")ay act irresponsibly and make v/iid raiacks, we
should, by and large, resist the temptation and leave h.im alone.
A'^ietnam is the exception. He can be hit hard on th.is subject —
a point v.'hicl: not only elevates his candidacy b\;t also gets the
President's position restated v/hile r eijiforcing the strong anti-war
sentiment beliind McGovern.
On the other hand, the ammunition which will be our stock in the
campaign -- the extremist, radical labels; the pro-amnesty and
pro-abortion p-.'Sitions; the radical chic; the gut-the-inilitary
attitude; etc. -- should be held in abeyance until we are reasonably
sure McGo\'ern has tlie nojiiination.
The temptations will be high in many ciuarters to go after
McGo\H'^rn, but word ouglit to go out io lay off with b\it fev.' excep-
tions. U'e have j^lenty of time to attach labels later, and the same
labels whicli v.'ill defeat McGovern for the Presidency are the
same labt Is v/'nich could pre\'(;nt hin; from getting the nomination.
Eet's not do Huljert's work for liim.
U.-M y^^^ -^ff^
A^ ^JMA-/l-^
■^hJQ
4236
Exhibit No. 185
7HZ WHiTC .-.ouse:
WA S H I N' G T O N
June 2, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR:
H.R. HALDEMAN
JOHN m;tc?lsj-i-
FROM:
PATRICK J. BUCMANAN
At your request and wivh the considerable assistance of
the RNC research people, we have put together a basic attack
document. Due to the siniple volur..-; of materials available
and the rush of even;s, we felt i': wov.ld be near impossible as
well as unwise to put this together as zhe coniprehensive
contender attack piece. In point of fact some of the most
damaging things con'jing out of the California primary have
yet to be entered sim'ply cue to zirne constraints.
1
As you are reading this, we are currently v/orking on
anotiier set of i"naterials which takes this basic raw information
s.r:a works it into speech insert formats. The focus is on
Mc Goy ern and v/h,at is being cone is to take one or two out-
rageous quotes on a particular issue -- say, defense -- and
putting it into a text which fra:nes the argument for our spokesmen.
In a sense, we are preparing an attack briefing book the firt-t
complete edition of which should be ready thas coming week. A
separate document for use by the press corps will also be prepared
in the near future.
j.n,tne meantim.e, the attacnea znateriaxs are lor your review,
and no disseinination has been mace, pending your continents.
■Also attached is a copy of the Do:-nestic Council response to the
DNC FA.CT production. I feel this cocun-,ent is not useful to us
in the can-.paign, not because it reflects poor work, hut because the
issues therein are deadbeat issues. I suggest also that the FACT
publication is little 2<nown and probably less quoted, and to use the
Donnestic Council-prepared materials extensively might simply
elevate the DNC attack. At bc^t, we recommend that FICTION 1972
be put in pamphlet for:~ as a "suggested" response by our spokesirien
if_they are confronted by the DKC attacks.
Finally, unless you object, we are going to Defense for a crash
study on >.'lcGovern's defense proposals with breakdowns such as
how many jobs would be lost, how many bases closed down, strategic
considerations, etc. The sarrjc will be done with liis domestic tax
and welfare proposals.
4237
Exhibit No. 186
June 6, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
FROM:
JOHN MITCHELL
PATRICK J. BUCIiANAN
We agree with virtually everyone that post-California, the Mc Govern
Record must begin to become part of the public record. The national
perception of AlcGovern as a moderate and even a conservative must
begin to change -- before McGovern begins changing his positions
from left toward center. We have all the necessary materials in our
judgment --in an Assault Book to be ready tomorrow possibly -- to
tar McGovern as an extreinist. Not in our memory has there been
such a wealth of material with which to tag a national candidate as an
extremist; and if we fail here, the price will be significant as McGovern
could then conceivably march into November as the "Citizens Candidate"
with the cleanest national innage since Mr. Eisenhower. Booting our
opportunity would be a tragedy -- the important questions are not
wjiether we get our materials on the public record; but timing and tone
and degree and e:nphasis.
In our judgment Humphrey's effort to tar- McGovern as an extremist
was a gross failure because a) Humphrey came off as a politician in
panic, making wild accusations against a calm, conservative appearing
fellow; b) his tone of attack was negative and bitchy and strident;
c) it came too late in the game.
In our efforts, which we feel can begin with the Re-elect campaign
statement, following McGovern' s smashing victories -- we can avoid
these pitfalls.
First, McGovern will be in his pinnacle of glory -- he v/ill have a
sympathetic press, even an indulgent one -- and the Nixon Cainpaign
Statement should not go hard against the grain of this national sentiment,
should not be immedir.lely "ro\igh and tough." Some congratulations,
generosity rmd whimsy in that statement might well fit the occasion.
But al leant oi^.c crucial part of oxir message -- perhaps iteration of
his welfare- reform proposals and awe at tlic cost to taxpayers -- should
be reflected in the statement by John Mitchell.
Tlic next occasion we understand will be the appearance by Mr. Mitchell
on Sunday. For thaf, we think we cither ougVit to prepare a briefing
paper, plus a book -- or- make sorvte sort of joint de+ermina'tioa as id
4238
what points we wish to get across in this national forum. The ex-AG
will be able to make headlines on this -- we can dcternnine ourselves
which of the materials we have v.e want dropped here, and iterated
by our speakers around the country.
Our tone should at all costs, avoid any sense of being embattled; we
should be generous to George, if you will, but looking forward with
enthusiasm to the contest. Any talk of McGovern being an easy mark
should be eschewed. AVc probably have on record right now ninety per
cent of the outrageous or idiotic positions or statements Mr. McGovern
will take -- and we have five months in which to get those to the
American people.
There is no need now to shoot it all out of the cannon. We should feed
it out to the public in morsels -- one at a time -- and wait until the
public has digested one outrageous position, and KlcGovern has been
forced to answer -- before moving onto another. Here, rather than a
sudden massive attack -- a very gradual escalation, it seems to me, is
in order -- husbanding our resources, and dealing them out bit by bit.
\"e will proceed -- vinless told otherwise --to draft a statement for
Mr. Mitchell post- California, and have it ready for him by noon on
Wednesday.
1. There is a strong feeling on our part that the term "radical"
was overused in 1970; tliat it has lost much of its electric charge; that
the term "extremist" is a far more difficult one to defend against; and
that in our on-going effort against McGovern -- his positions and he
himself should be characterized as "extremist" in character, not
"radical. "
2. A portion of this Assault Book -- perhaps the seginents dealine
with the au courant and cor.troversial issues -- should be moved out to
coluninists and editorial writers. Some portion of the Assault Book
should l>e put into the hands of surrogates, for their use, in coming weeki
before the Democratic Convention. The segments should be chosen b\-
thc Attoiney General. Again, we v/ould i-econimend that riglit now, we
restiict ourselves to "seconding" the allegations of Hvimphrcy and
Jackson, not using too mich of the. unxiSed material immediately -- and
quoting DeMiocraUc atfacks on McGovern as much as initiating new ones.
1
4239
3. There are already some press appalled at McGovern's potential
candidacy -- and there is no certainty the regular Democrats -- after
their shellacVung today -- are going to roll over and play dead. Far
better if they do the preliminary hatchet work. They are a good deal
more credible than we at this game. Before we move, we should know
what, if anytliing, Daley, Meany and LBJ, etc. , plan to do.
4. There is an interesting development shaping up. McGovern's
ambitious children seem to be busy "stealing" Wallace delegates --
and playing false, by "ripping off" the Wallace delegations in Tennessee
and elsewhere, places like Michigan. This is excellent. We should
hold back coinmenting upon the process, which Governor Carter is
raising hell about, until it is accomplished -- and then accuse tlie
Democratic Convention of shafting the legitimate popular winner, and
stealing the delegates of a bed- ridden martyr.
5. . Quietly, and right now, we should put to work --as far away
from us as possible -- an in-depth of the background, character,
financial deals, land transactions, loa.ns, business associations of
G/:orge McGovern. Was he associated with Billy Sol Estes or Bobby
Baker; who are his sugar daddies back in the Dakotas? In short, a
thorough, intensive investigation of the kind that the liberal press did
on Vice President Agnew in 1968.
6. Post-California, let's proceed along these lines for the next
week. But, on our view, there should be more input, and we should
await more reactions -- from the four primaries Tuesday -- before
"locking in" to any strategy all the v.ay to the Convention.
Again^, our immediate recommendation is a "gracious" response to
McGovern's win -- a response v/hich at the saine time moves onto the
public record McGovern's welfare proposals -- and raises the question
of where the lax monies will be coming from to put all these millions
of Americms on welfare.
4240
Exhibit No. 187
June 8, 1972.
ASSAULT STRATEGY
Buchanan/Khachigian
Herewith the Assault Book on which Ken Khachigian and I have been working
the past week. Within are enough McGovern statements, positions, votes, not only
to defeat the South Dakota Radical — but to have him indicted by a (Jrand Jury.
// we can get these positions before the i)ublic ; and // the election hinges upon
issues — only with enormous effort could we boot this election away.
However, in addition to the statements, issues and positions of George Mc-
Govern there are 'preceptions" which we must address as well — "perceptions"
that, unless dramatically altered, could give us considerable difficulty in the fall.
1. In a country where the "politician'' is in increasing disrepute, George
McGovern is perceived as a candid, honest straightforward, citizen non-politician.
2. In a nation where the "Establishment" is viewed with a mixture of frustra-
tion and contempt by left, right and the angry Wallace center — George McGovern
is perceived by many as an anti-status quo, anti-Establishment figure — the candi-
date of the common man.
3. In a political year when the mood, we are told, is "throw the ra.scals out,"
we are the "ins" and Mr. McGovern is perceived clearly as one of the "outs." He
is outside the power elite of the Democratic Party ; he is perceived as outside
the power elite of the American Government.
4. George McGovern has been and remains the "underdog" in a nation that has
always had a warm spot for the "underdog."
5. In a era when the public yearns constantly for a "new face," George Mc-
Govern is the newest, freshest face on the national scene, and the face of Richard
Nixon is the most familiar of any political figure in the United States.
Before addressing how I feel we should deal generally with each of these "per-
ceptions," and specifically with the assault materials provided let me add these
concerns :
1. The Republican Party is sleek and fat and incumbent. Our Conservative foot
soldiers who out-marched the Democrat's union troops in 1968 are sullen, bitchy,
angry. Our little old ladies in tennis shoes are not all enamoured of H.R. 1. wage
and price controls, and $100 billion in deficits — while George McGovern has an
organization the likes of which the U.S. has not seen since the Goldwater Legions.
He has tens of thousands of True Believers, working night and day for him —
spurred on by unanticipated triumphs and the anticipation of rinining the "Old
Politics" right out of the White House.
As of now, in a seat of the pants judgment. I would say that if we are running
50-50 with George McGovern in the polls election day — he could conceivably beat
us by four to six points, on the basis of his first-rate get-out-the-vote machinery.
2. The hard-fought Democratic parimaries have resulted sharply in increased
registration — especially by McGovern types — and any lopsided registration
figures in the primaries will be lopsided anti-Nixon votes in the fall.
3. While McGovern's positions are wooly-headed. he is an ambitious and prag-
matic politician — who will not hesitate to move crab-wise to the center to win this
election. Some of the more garish of his positions will surely be shed by the fall.
Further, my tmderstanding is that his campaign film biography is an excellent
piece of work — designed to portray him as the antithesis of the "radical," in-
deed, as the bomber pilot who won the war against Nazi Germany. We can antici-
pate that his commercials will be equally designed to hit the Democratic center.
Clearly, in addition to the problems listed, we have tremendous advantages —
the Presidency, the view of millions that McGovern is some sort of wild radical,
the split within the Democratic Party, the tendency of McGovern's red hots to
"stick it" to the Daleys and Meanys when the opiwrtunity arises, etc. But this
memorandum is directed toward both general and specific suggestions to resolve
our problems, to get the radical record of McGovern into the public record, to
change the national perceptions of the two.
GENERAL BECOMMENnATIONS
1. We should move to re-capture the anti-Establishment tradition or theme in
American politics. Incumbent Presidents ran do this ; RN did it in Nevomher
1969. when, as Pre.sident of IT.S., he called on the common man to stand with him
against the elitist-backed mobs in the streets. That, coupled with the Vice Presi-
dent's standing up to the Establishment media, and .slugging it out, raised RN to
4241
the highest point of his Presidency — 69 percent approval. Why did we reach that
level? Because, even though Newsweek led "Nixon in Trouble," even though
Broder was writing of the "Breaking of the President," — RN led both the Presi-
dency position and the anti-Establishrnent position. How do we enhance our anti-
Establishment credentials — and take Mr. McGovern's away — without surrender-
ing the political asset of Incumbent President?
(a) We need to shed the "in bed with Big Business" image. PJB believes we
should seek out the opportunity to "take on" some egregious, giant, preferably,
but not necessarily Democratic, corporation publicly — as Kennedy did with Big
Steel in 1962. Business will be with us in 1972 — but one of our problems is a too
clo.se identification in the public mind with Corporate Power. ITT reinforced that.
Public presidential anger at the price-gouging of some Big Business firm would
be, in my judgment, a good thing.
(b) If we have abandoned the idea of introducing or supporting "tax reform" —
I trust we have not — I would recommend RN publicly veto one, two or three
huge spending bills — on national television. Two minutes would be sufficient.
The focus of the veto is that the taxpayer is already burdened enough by massive
liberal spending programs that accomplish nothing, but break the back of the
taxpayer. And RN believes the time has come in this country, for less massive
federal si>ending, not more; for lower taxes, not new inflation, and not new taxes.
Most likely, McGovern will be voting for all these spending bills.
Our objective : Move him visibly into tlie posture of more and more government
spending — and get ourselves on the "tax cut," working-man side of the issue. In
my political judgment — what the nation wants is not more spending or the taxes
or inflation required to pay for it — but less spending and lower taxes. Government
takes too damn much of the earnings dollar in everyone's view, and we should be
anti-tax in 1972.
(Indeed, in my opinion, this would apply to the so-called added value tax as
well — since the average fellow is not likely to make the distinction between good
and bad taxes). One recalls that some years back, the President, in a quite effec-
tive television piece, vetoed, with a sweep of the pen, a major spending bill.
Suppose we knocked off three in a row — calling for holding the line on spending
and holding the line on taxes.
(c) As the campaign progres.ses, we should increasingly portray McGovem as
the pet radical of Eastern Liberalism, the darling of the A'^ew York Times, the
hero of the Berkeley Hill Jet Set ; Mr. Radical Chic. The liberal elitist are his —
we have to get back the working i)eople ; and the better we portray McGovem
as an elitist radical, the smaller his political base. By November, he should be
postured as the Establishment's fair-haired boy, and RN postured as the Candi-
date of the Common Man, the working man.
(How about RN going to Cadillac Square on Labor Day this year! !)
Just as Goldwater ended up 1964 portrayed both as a 1(X>% Conservative —
and a radical ; so George McGovern must end up in 1972 portrayed both as an ex-
tremist and as the pet of the national liberal Establishment. Both are, after all,
true.
(d) The individual nationally who has done the best job on the above is
Kevin Phillips — who writes of George hobnobbing with Schlesinger, Ford Foun-
dation liberals, the radical chic, prancing around Iiis $100,000 .Japanese palace
in $1.5 Pucci ties. My recommendation is that PJB— using our Radical Chic mate-
rials, as well as the Assault Book materials, write, not a full-length book but a
5000-word piece, using full color, good paper, like Firat Monday, with pictures
of Hiss and Hoffman and ot her endorsees, and that this be printed and distributed
by the millions. A quality, brightly written, colorful, picture biography of
McGovem of 5000 words would be infinitely superior to those old full-length
hatchet biographies that are never read.
(e) "The clammy hand of consistency should never rest for long upon the
shoulder of a statesman." — Senator Ashurst
In addition to portraying McGovem as radical — we .should, at the same time,
never let the public forget he was part and parcel of the Democratic liberal
establishment that passed all the huge spending programs of the fifties and sixties
that failed. McGovern's high spending, high tax proposals have been tried. They
failed to help the poor; they bankrupted the workingman; they are taxing to
death the middle class.
2. We cannot allow McGovern to .succeed in this fraudulent effort to portray
him.self as Mr. Hone.st Citizen — rather than Mr. Politician. He can and should be
nailed as a waffling, deceptive, crafty, politician. In this, I disagree with the
4242
President. We should not only nail him with his radical positions, but also
hold up a mirror to his shifts of position — which are certain to come. There
are any number of sticks to beat him with— including that of the waffler who
doesn't know where he stands. The use of otic docs not exclude use of the other
as well.
Further, though a bit outrageous, McGovem can be charged, among Democrats,
with "packing" caucuses, with "stealing" the nomination from the more popular
candidate, with not representing the average man in the Democratic Party —
but rather the left-wing organizers. As stated in an earlier memo, we should
also wait until his people take delegates from Wallace — and then charge him
with "stealing" delegates from a man in a hospital bed — discrediting his "re-
forms" and his "new politics," as no more than the old Gut Politics of the past.
Also, anything that shows the McGovem people, making deals, softening posi-
tions, backing off, waffling — should be spotlighted — not downplayed.
3. To reverse the "underdog" image of Mr. McGovem — we should, upon his
nomination, cease speaking of an easy win. We should in public, both to rally
our troops and to remove this "underdog George" label — argue that the Democrats
have the largest party. We should leak polls showing us worse off than we are.
We should attempt as well and often as possible, again, to show McGovem as the
Candidate of the ^ew York Times, the Ford Foundation, Harvard, elitist left-
wing professors, snot-nosed demonstrators, black radicals, and the whole elitist
gang. This contest must wind up not as they envision with McGovern, Honest
Man from South Dakota again.st Tricky Dick and his advertising budget — it
should be Richard Nixon, candidate of Middle America, against the radical
darling of the Liberal Establishment.
When Harriman and Clifford, and the old gang assemble around him— that
will be the moment to strike.
4. About the "new face" thing — little we can do. Except to use the attack
materials herein to fill in all the blanks in the McGovern image, fill them in with
some of these materials, in working class neighborhoods, and we cannot but turn
them off of George McGovem. The man has not been known well at all national-
ly — except for two weeks or two months at most. Impressions of McGovern may
be favorable, but they are not fixed. They can be changed. And we should be
moving this material into the public record. How?
(a) Not bitterly or stridently. To do so gives the appearance of arrogance
and power which we want desperately to avoid. Thus, when our "heavies," if
you will — the Vice President, Bob Dole, etc. — use this material they should for
the present be scrupulously exact and precise, and avoid for the present — the
blistering attack. There will be "time enough."
(b) The material should be targeted — not shot-gun. For example, abortion,
amnesty, pot, the removal of the personal tax exemption (a killer for large
Catholic families) these should be targeted for speakers, and for pamphlets and
for ads in Catholic and ethnic areas, Catholic and ethnic papers. Catholic and
etlinic forums.
(c) We should focus at once on the welfare schemes here — and on the military
budget. They hurt George in California. McGovern is clearly moving on these
proposals ; even his friends, at the Post and Times, are signaling hum to get off
them ; and he is indicating tJiat he might. They ought to be hung permanently
around his neck as the first order of business.
(d) We must not blow all of this assault material out of the cannon now;
in 1970, we shot our wad in two weeks. There are five-months between now and
the election, and we should hang these one at a time around McGovem for the
rest of the year.
SPECIFIC RECOMMENDATIONS
Catholics
1. The abortion, PJB statements, aid to parochial schools, and marijuana
statements — as well as the removal of the personal tax exemption, which would
be devastating to large Catholic and ethnic families— should be used in a cam-
paign flyer (contrasted with McGovern positions) to be distributed at Catholic
churches in key states on Sundays — and should be used as the basis of targeted
ads in the Catholic and ethnic press. (Once after the Convention— and last 2
Sundays of campaign) .
2. Volpe could take up McGovern propositions and before a national Knights oi
Columbus grouTi — indicate that unintentionally, some are "anti-Catholic" in
character, which Catholics concerned about Catholic values and the preserva-
tion of the Catholic family should fight. (If we could get Volpe to do this—
PJB could write the two-page speech insert, for release, all media.)
4243
Jeuish voters
3. No reason why, with McGovern, we cannot make strong inroads here.
Sngs^st that Secretary Laird devote a .single speech to the impact of McGovern's
Navy cuts on the American Sixth Fleet — with the conclusion, not unjustified,
that the future of Israel, the survival of Israel — with McGovern's naval cuts —
would be the decision of the Soviet Politburo. Again, the lead should be that —
with George's defense cuts, without building the F-14 and F-15 to combat
the MIG-23. "U.S. Navy could not intervene to save Israel."
4. The gist of the attack materials here on Israel — the HHH, the Jackson
quotes about Israel being endangered by McGovern's position included — and
McGovern's voting record— .'^hould be used in speeches before Jewish groups,
in soliciting funds of Jewish groups. (Needless to say, above should be surfaced
on television stations in N.Y.C., Chicago, Los Angeles.)
Space
5. Again, targeted material here. Llorida, Texas, Southern California. We
.should get a list of the top ten defense plants in the country, the top ten aero-
space plants, as well as the five NASA centers. And leaflets should be prepared
and distributed at each of these entrance.s — at least twice this coming fall.
Lines : // McGovern wins, Los Angeles irill have an unemployment rate that
will match Seattle's and Southern Califorma will he the West Virginia of the
seventies.
The SST votes, as well as Jackson's quotes, should be used in media ads
all over the State of Washington (We lost it in 1960.) McGovern should be
blamed for not only threatening future unemployment in Seattle — but for the
existing unemployment to aerospace. But, again, the pamphlets should be
targeted — and the statements should be made on regional television, primarily.
Defense
6. As stated. Laird is doing an excellent political job. But we ought to go
down this list of military cutbacks of McGovern — determine what firms (such
as McDonnell in St. Louis) build these various weapons. And all these firms
and their employees should be notified l)y campaign workers, by ads and the
like^ — just what plants loill have to he shut down.
7. We have Defense already busy at work on a major speech or statement
by Laird which will name all the bases that will have to be shut down, by
McGovern's defense cuts. This information should be also provided to both
Democratic or Republican Congressmen in that district, and to the local press
there. And the Democrats should be called upon to support or repudiate
McGovern's cuts.
8. In every ''conservative" district- — our people should be provided with the
McGovern book ; and Republican candidates should be encouraged to call upon
their Democrats to repudiate this or that particular stand of their national
candidate. This will require distribution, eventually of hundreds of copies of
our completed book.
9. We believe sections of this attack book should be sent out, piecemeal, to all
pro-Nixon columnists and newspapers in the country. We can have it printed
in .sections by the Republican National Committee — condensed even further than
it is in a tight handy book for newsmen and editorial writers. But this should
be done — only after the specifics in each .section have been used to make front-
page attacks.
10. All military publication.s. Navy League, etc., including the conservative
publications (NR. ACU, HE. YAF. ASC) .should be induced to run in brief, but
full, the McGovern Defense Programs, ASAP.
11. We yet believe that the focus of attack on defense should be — at the
national level — scare the hell out of the public first : and then follow on and
say, that incidentally, this would also mean a loss of X million jobs. McGovern
will want us to focus on jobs first — but we should not lo.se the Defense Argu-
ment — we are stronger here, frankly, than on the jobs argument. (For if we
don't need those planes and ships and missiles, hell, everyone would want to
switch over, as at the end of WWII.)
Welfare
12. McGovern has two proposals. He has tried to get away from the $6500
per family one — but he can be hung with both. Our speakers, our people on the
tube should he conversant with each.
One good line : ''Under George McGovern, tico dozen and one hippies could get
together and set up a commune in Taos, New Mexico, and not do a lick of work all
4244
year — and McGovern would send them every year a check for $25,000. No
wonder Jerry Ruhin and Abby Hoffman enthusiastically support his candidacy."
Program for business
13. Again, these two pages should be double-checked, then used for fund-rais-
ing, and for possible ads in the WSJ, and for scaring the living hell out of the
business community.
14. At appropriate time, Shultz and/or John Ck)nnally should give a hair-rais-
ing speech on what the McGovern proposals would mean to American society, and
the American economy and the stock market.
15. From the way the market is reacting, it is apparent that McGovern's nom-
ination should bring about a sharp drop. We should do nothing to prevent this
from happening. Indeed, if Shultz or Connally or one of them can predict that
McGovern's election would mean a depression or panic on Wall Street, and do
it credibly, then they might well do so.
16. Specific business groups — such as real estate firms and brokers and the
like — should be the target of direct mail, with a brief outline for each of what
the McGovern proposals mean to them. To other business groups — direct mail,
in this case, is the best means of alerting the businessman, without alerting the
liberals — the mailings might well be done (these and others) by independent
groups. (Needless to say, the McGovern plan to phase out the oil depletion allow-
ance should not go unnoticed in the Lone Star State.)
Integration and race
17. This has to be handled gingerly — but on digging up that RibicofE proposal,
we find it legitimate to charge McGovern with wanting to by federal direction
integrate the suburbs, with favoring "racial balance" in the nation's public
schools, with believing that bussing is an "essential" tool to accomplish the job.
On this, our speakers should say, we know George is sincere, but we think
that compulory integration of neighborhoods and schools would lead to racial
tensions and disorders, not racial peace and harmony, we oppose him on all three.
18. Southern Senators and Congressmen should be shown the specifics of the
Black Caucus program which McGovern has endorsed "in toto," — even before
we use these publicly. The Southerners will have to repudiate McGovern or force
McGovern to repudiate these proposals — or take hemlock. Oiir candidates in the
South — Senate and House — should be provided all this material by Harry Dent.
As should our State Chairmen in the South. We can put it into form.
19. When McGovern backs off some of these Black radical schemes, as back
off he must — we should continue to hang them around his neck — and then mail
his recantation to the black media.
20. In Forest Hill, Missouri, and Warren, Michigan — and in blue collar neigh-
borhoods, frankly, speakers should argue against the McGovern integration pro-
posals — and in favor of retaining the integrity and value of ethnic neighborhoods.
Chicago and demonstrators
21. McGovern has said that the May Day demonstrators would not be on the
streets but "having dinner at the White Hoiise" if he were elected. In this sec-
tion — we have an idea for a commercial— juxtaposing RN and McGovern on the
May Day demonstrators and indicating a vote for McGovern is a vote to have
Rubin and Hoffman ("Guess Who's Coming to Dinner") at the White House.
22. McGovern's comments about the Chicago police ( "those sons of bitches . . .
those bastards") should be used — not prudishly, not condemning him for bad
language. He can be excused for that — but condemned for the attitude his state-
ment represents, a lynch mob attitude toward the nation's peace ofiioers, a knee-
jerk tendency to [copy illegible] and condemn the policy. This should be done
also in letters to the editor to all Chicago papers.
(Independent letters operation — as well as speakers — should be using these
materials to target in on sections of the country.)
23. Resurrecting McGovern's comments on Hoover would be most effectively
done by the ex-AG and Pat Gray and the Vice President.
24. MONDAY can do an effective job for us — by back-paging each week one
of a numbered series of effectively written and documented attacks on McGov-
ern — giving readers materials for use themselves, in the boonies. (For example,
suppo.se MONDAY one week simply ran the McGovern Defense Program as out-
lined in our package for the locals. )
Ellsburg
25. McGovern's personal encouragement of Ellsburg to violate Federal law is
a matter which we should wait to exploit . . . say two months after the Demo-
4245
cratic Convention — it should serve as a centerpiece of a national speech — i)er-
haps by the Vice President. (Again, our concern is that we not "mix up" our
attack.) One .specific area per speech, rather than the Scott, "Three A*s — abor-
tion, amnesty, and acid" approach. This last is so "cute" as to make it appear
we are simply political, not serious, in our disagreement with McGovern.
Vietnam,
26. Two points should be hammered here: (a) McGovem has been constantly
wrong in his predictions about what Hanoi would do; he has even been dui)ed
by Xuan Thuy and (b) the SOB would leave our prisoners in Hanoi — and count
on the good will of that barbarous regime to get them back. Any attack on his
Vietnam position should be prefaced by saying "We do not question his
patriotism."
27. McGovern's Right from the Start can be countered — but this is a defensive
maneuver for us since presumably we think his position wrong now and wrong
then. Rather, the approach to be taken here is to charge that he is a) Old Sour
Grapes is harassing and stabbing in the back the President who is ending a
war his President could not win or end and b) McGovern waffled all over the lot
on the War, like every other Democratic politician and we have the quotes here
to prove it.
Rhetoric
28. We have dug up a 1964 quote where McGovern called Goldwater the most
"unstable radical and extremist" ever to run for the Presidency, which can be
used against him. Also, his rhetoric, which we have documented, should be used
to make either a pre-emptive or retaliatory strike for his certain charge that we
are "polarizing" while he is attempting to "bring us together."
29. In terming McGovem as an extremist — we should begin by quoting Demo-
crats like Carter, Yorty, Humphrey and Jackson, of course — just as the Rocke-
feller quotes were more devastating against Goldwater tlian the LBJ attacks.
McGovern's friends
30. This fellow Mott, who bankrolls McGovern, is, I understand a screaming
fairy who makes $800,000 a year and pays no taxes— we are trying to interest
MONDAY in doing a take-out on him in the near future.
Speakers
31. To make the case against McGovem most credible, we not only need our
heavy hitters — but we need the Democrats mentioned — and especially our lib-
erals. Neal Freeman suggests the following be commissioned to do some of the
rough work on "George McGovern extremism."
1. Rockefeller
2. Javits
3. Aiken
4. J. S. Cooper
5. Douglas Dillon
6. Scranton
If of course, we could get Meany, Wallace or Jackson — that would be out-
standing.
32. Ken Khachigian and I will monitor McGovern's appearances and hope-
fully be mailing and phoning questions to any panels or interviewers. If we
have an advanceman traveling ahead of the McGovern campaign — he should be
providing the questions, which we can provide him.
33. Some on the media are slobbering all over George ; they may have to be
charged publicly with being pro-McGovern- — to force them to back off a bit.
In this light, Godfrey Sperling had an excellent piece today, we understand,
which perhaps our people should be quoting (Incidentally, given his performance
the other night, Vanocur is a positive disaster for us — and McGovern's most
effective campaigner. He may have to be fired or discredited — if we are to get
anything approaching an even shake out of that left-wing taxpayer subsidized
network. )
34. Again, we have to be on guard against any too harsh or strident an attack.
With a hostile media out there — they will pounce on the first allegation of
"Tricky Dick," or "smear" campaign. Perhaps an early address — attacking
some of the smear books around already about the President, and some of
McGovern's comments might be used to pre-empt or mitigate this certainty.
35. Mr. Dent can make the argument that George McGovern "said he would be
delighted to run with a black man, but not George Wallace."
21-296 0—74 23
4246
36. We need to dig up film of McGovern at some of these demonstrations with
the VC flag in the background, and with demonstrators chanting and shouting,
etc.
37. From McGovern's statements, it is fair to say he would cut off all assist-
ance to our NATO ally Greece, but consider giving military aid to the black
guerrillas in Southern Africa.
38. McGovern favors giving away (Black Caucus) 1% of U.S. GNP to foreign
aid, with priority on Africa — which amounts to $11 billion — about a 400 percent
increase in foreign aid.
39. McGovern's old statements about Henry Wallace, about the U.S. starting
the Cold War, etc., should be moved into all the ethnic language publications.
And all his far left background should be disseminated to the far right in the
U.S. for them to publish as it is too complicated for us to handle.
Nixon's Thru in '72
40. This is a slogan we can turn to our own advantage. For example, if Daley
is booted out of the Democratic convention — on his arrival at his Mayor's office
in Chicago — some bearded types can be out front with signs — "DALEY'S THRU
IN '72 — VOTE McGOVERN [copy illegible] for an example, come to mind. Or at
Defense Plants "THE M-I-C IS THRU IN '72" (Military Industrial Complex)
VOTE McGOVERN.
We have some other thoughts and ideas — but we are sending these along for
immediate consideration.
PJB/KK
t
4247
Exhibit No. 188
mcnjokan'dum
the white house
WAS)ii;;CTON
June 16, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: JOHN DEAN
FROM: CHUCK COLS ON ^'^>--'*''
Has anyone run any checks or investigations on the key McGovern
staffers? I was told yesterday that Gordon Weil has some very
questionable tilings in liis background. He is apparently one of
the chief brain trusters who travels with McGovern.
cc: Pat Buchanan
4248
>
-^^-
Exhibit No. 189
THE WHIT.E HOUSE
WAS H I {JGTON
June Z5, 1972
MEMORANDUM TO:
JOHN MITCHELL,
H. Jl. HALDEMAN
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
The manner of McGovern's response to our attacks upon his
rhetoric, and positions, has emerged. Responding to a rather
mild critique of his welfare plan and new politics -- by Herb
Stein -- McGovern responded thus:
"He called the attack 'the opening shot of this year's
campaign against me and said, 'Nixon obviously
realizes that this year's campaign is going to be
waged primarily over the rampant unemployinent,
inflation, economic uncertainty and favoritism,
which now burden this country. ' "
- "The attack (Stein's) tipped his (Nixon's) hand that
he is gang to try to cover up with the kind of
political hatchet work which has characterized
every campaign he has ever run. "
Thus, even a mild criticism of McGovern's record will likely
produce charges of "Tricky Dick," "Smear Tactics" the old
"Low Road" so familiar to Nixon and his hatchet men. This is,
it appears, the McGovern strategy for answering all of the
material we have piled up on Georgie; and it is a strategy which
McGovern will be counting upon the press to assist in its
implementation.
What this means for us, I think, is that we must
A) Be scrupulously accurate in our allegations, and calm and
reasoned in quoting his 'wild statements and positions.
4249
B) Get the jump on McGovcrn by using his Adolph Hitler quotes,
and other blood-curdling charges on the record, before he starts
charging us with vicious attacks. We have four or five of McGovern'
statements v/hich justify a demand for an apology to the President,
which justify further, our moving them into the public press -- with
the expressed hope that George McGovern will not do this kind of
vicious name-calling, and comparing of the President with Hitler
in this campaign. Our hope that George McGovern will get his
campaign out of the smear stage, right off the bat, "We intend to
confront Mr. McGovern on his issues and his position, but he has
an obligation to clear the record of the slanderous libels he has
made against the President of the United States; I refer specifically-
to. . . . etc. etc. etc.
Each time McGovern raises tliis charge of "smear" we ought to have
thos quotes to stuff right down hi s throat.
In the last analysis, if the need appears, we should be ready to
|-la^'e the President go, late canipaign, v/ith a "more in sorrow than
anger" speech, detailing the McGovern positions, and denying the
'Hitler" charges.
Buchanan
July 14, 197 2
2M EM ORA M D U M T O:
4250
Exhibit No. 190
CLARK MACGREGOR
H. R. I-LA.LDEMAN
\>
:v'
FROM:
PAT BUCHANAN
Lines that can be moved by backgroxmd, and through interviews,
into the press. The foc\is \ipon the convention will begin to die
after the weekend, and continue until ours; and some of these lines
will lose much of their currency within a few weeks.
1. The McGovern Market -- Since McGovern won the California
nomination the Dow-Jones lias dropped 34 points, had dropped e\'ery
day of the Democratic Convention. McGovern' s e ection v/ould knock
the bottom out of it; given his far-out economic positions.
2. The effect of the "q\iotas" for young, black, Chicano has been
to drive the old people out of the Democratic Convention; wliile those
over 55 arrount to 20% of population; they got only eight percent of
the Convention seats; Democrats will be hurt with this group badly
this fall; as v/ith traditional Catholic and Jewish svipporters who,
like Meany and Daley, have given way to the kids and the zealots.
3. The McGovern Myth --It is a myth to say George was the
candidate of the "people;" he lost N. H. and Illinois to Muskie; Ohio
and Pennsylvania to Humphrey; Michigan, Maryland and Florida to
Wallace; he ducked Indiana and "West Virginia.
Only GOP crciss -ox'ers lielped him get 29 percent in Wisconsin; and
the only n".;-. joj- slate wlicrc he won against a still viable, active
opposilion v.as CalifojTjia -- where lie blew a 15-point lead in the last
' ivi d;iv.'- - '" ■■-'■:■ froi"' ' 1 v.rniy - ;:)oi nl lead t r) a fj\e-poin( xictory.
KWCio: '■ V .' r iiiory io .".ui a pijj^al.ir \iciory, it i ;;• Jiiore a coup d'elnl.
■ .'■':■ •' ■- I', ■■ •. In !-. ;. v.u;t'V"u1 1 . fi i ; : :\:\:\ : ;l!>u i'b.. n lr-r!i::l
i-Ku' h.i. (li.Vi.L'l .l:u1 i);:;:;i>(lI llu' I i',n i i . u) ;Ki 1 C.iiinij >■ aiit! .i<-v.i:^li
Uiidi-rslilp ciL llie Dornoc ralic Paj-iy. I'lio fellow is ;iol the peopled: choice,
4251
McGovcrn has soverf^ly f.arnishcd his reputation for caiidoj- and
credibility; it is lying in shreds on the floor of the Con -/r-nti on.
Here the n-iost [jro-aboj-tion on demand candidate opposed liis own
position in the platform; he deserted the women he promised to
support on the South Carolina Challenge; he had his lieutenants
gut the tax-economic program he hiinself is proposing; he deserted
the "Chart; r" to woo back big labor; v/liere for the last ten years
he was talking about "begging" in Hanoi; now he is going on about a
"residual force. " He went downstairs to rap with a hundred screaining
denionstrators -- simply because they raised ^inshirted hell in the
lobby -- but could not counsel with the office-holders in his own party.
His heart is with tlie extrcniist left-wing.
Downgrading Eagleton -- He was - according to varied reliable
estimates - anywhere from McGo\ern's 4th to 7th choice. In short,
Eagleton is not even the most qualified inan who could be picked,
and when potential candidates continued to turn McGovern down, he
reached down far enougli to get soineone who would finally take it.
Not exactly a tribute to Eagleton' s qvialifications.
McGovcrn and Eagleton are both utter lightweights in foreign policy
in an age when a deft liand is needed niore than ever, to guide the
Nation in a transitional i^eriod of world politics. (SALT, Open Door
to China, So\'iets, etc. ) McGovcrn has to his credit the achieveinent
'of being Food for Peace Director for 18 months, which means handing
out surplus food to third world n3.tions. Eagleton won his foreign
policy spurs as Chai::aan of the Senate District Committee.
McGovcrn' s selection of Eagleton is a triunaph of the "old politics"
he was picked in deference to his religion, geographical location,
purported youthfulncss and self-styled ability to cozy it up with the
labor bosses.
Buchanaji
4252
Exhibit No. 191
THE WHITE house;
■ V^ASHINGTON
• July 23, 1972
ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL ,
MEMORANDUM TO: H. R. HALDEMAN
FROM: PAT BUCHANAN
Attached is the second edition of the McGovern Assault Book. ..i ^
Ain t-urning a copy over to the Vice President (he has his) and [ "^' ^•'^'^
to,MacGrcEor, Dole, RNC, Dent and several others. What is \ • -j^vw iN •'^ •
needed, liowcvcr, in my view, and somev/liat desperately, is ^U'r .
some Xind of co-ordination of the Assault Strategy. To date, it
has been decidedly haphazard and ad hoc, and time is running
by. Rccoinmend thus:
1. An ad hoc committee be set up with JvlacGregor or his man,
Colson, Buchanan, Dole or his man, Lofton, the scheduler of
tlie Surrogates, to lay out the attack strategy for that week or
that several days. Fuilhtsr tiiat this group pass judgment on
what mailings should go out froin White House, RNC, and 1701 --
so that we don't inundate editorial writers and political writers
with so much trivia that nothing is used. Further, that the letters
'operation be tied in, so that we can orchestrate their work -- which
in my view has been qviitc good.
On the briefing material I gave the Vice President, it was used
exactly as written; he is a loyal soldier and we should have one
of his top peoj:)le -- say Goodearle --to sit in on this group as well.
At this poiiit in time, I think \ve sliould be meeting three times a
v.'cck, at least. Again, we have all the material on McGovcri-v we
need to systematically move it before the public.
Z. Suggest that Buchanan be granted authority to do Rome
political backgrounding for tlio political reporters. Have been over
this material niorc than anyone, and today, I probably know McGovern' s
positions, and wild statements better than lie docs. If some of tlic
political reporters were ctcercd over liorc, for a background basic,
wc could move some of this :;tuff out on the record in concert with
the opcakcr.s.
/an
4253
3. 11^-'^ any fonow-Uiro»i[;h process been set \ip to gcc tliat
lliosc rccommcnrlalioiiE we incidc, sonic- forty of tlicm, a monlli
.TDc] .1 Imlf .i[;o, arc bcint] carried through at all. Wc have no way
of knowiiig over licrc whether tlics e. idea;; arc simply sinking dov/n
the iTiemory hole or are being carried out. One gels a fccling'of a
disjointed operation. ■ •
Wc badly need some central governing body or authority that sees
to it that the ideas tlic President wants implemented are implemented,
ajid that can assess llic opposition strategy.
A. Have got everything in thus far, on strategy and opposition, '
willi the single exception of l! o 5000-word piece, which I will try
to get written this week -- d\iring briefing book time. However,
would like to devote as mucli time as possible in the future to
strictly anti-McGovern activities, and if as much as possible of the
other governmental- stuff (except some of those vetos) can be moved
elsewhere, it v/ill free up more time for v/hat is Topic A.
Buchanan
■ 1990
4254
Exhibit No. 192
i>*0 7 3 ^^:C4Mi 3 6
y^DMlXISTRATiVELY CONFIDENTIAL
'^'^'^^^Sp^^
i
uguAt 1, 1972
(MEMORANDUM TO: ^CLARK MSmZTREGOR
ri? R. HALbEMAN
CHARLES CQLSO^
tV^CMi
PAT BUCHANAN
^o^ltici^l Supjt
estions
.;). In the Assault Book, we have the quote from KicGovern'^
^jjliot "inanuif»\tu ring foolish projects," like the space shuttle* Wpi
;it not bor.wise to have this put into ads and pamphlets rlgHt n<^ |ov
'^9lX arci^ of California which just benefited hugely from the •pjfccif:
c contract.
^('1 -,. .,,,...; 1.^.-/1 -v]
^jjji^ ^ .Along the same lines, the old anti-Tydlngs ad which was ioii'
^Iffective, in my view, in Maryland, "If Joe Wins, lYou Lose,** W0il!ll
ji^i^eiTi to me an ideal all-puj ""
WcGovcrn's space and defer
p|r MIf McCovern Wins, We
^Ihlnk, will do more to make the President a big winner thAn tll«
^positive "Re-plect the President, "
'I"' '''.'■ ,. . .,-,,-..,
^■^ Speck- Hob 6 on will get very feN^j. votes; but almost oneifor-ioJ^cfFi
ilh^iy will come out of the hide of George McGovern. In Califoriil* thjb^
jdit^said lo have some 60,000 (?) workers. The more.expo»vr()r tliiBj^fe
ifv'b get, the higher the vote they get, the more they take from O^pygca!';
}.H|pb«on is,' of course, a black militant and if he gets tremendou8''«f^|$l3«u|^
lli' ^hc btarck press -- in adsj etc. — it could draw off • levR th«>u»8J^j^
xJIJUck votes from McGovern. Any private help we ^an give tJtal; tfc;)(;^j^^
jfy^Sde/ jPR nioney, publicity, etc. might help.
||i," ' ♦♦! sm behind Eaglcton 1000%" is now, of course^ 'fcn li«^nfS'l^Pf>S
jlj^hich wc can utilize ourselves, such as George has takeii a B4:r4^nJB^JieVyi^
.f|:snd->he Is behind Israel 1000%, the term used as a prelude <;p |l, l^^ii
,|*idumping; *' anyhow, it is a light line which can and stroyld be ^se^ 1|;«*.^
:>|<^|lect on the McGovern dcviousnoss, and can be done iiri » Ugbl/jCpl^^<iik
Buchanan
4255
Additional Distribution of Momoranda
SUBJECT: ^^' ^ '^■"' ^•yyr^z-y h^y^.^y^^
^J^
Dailey ] ^'^ Porter
LaRue Sedam —
Marik Shumway
Miller Sloan -
Odle . Teeter
• : Other .—
4256
Exhibit No. 193
September 11, 1972
MEMORANDUM FOR: BETTY NOLAN
FROM: PAT BUCHANAN
This letter, bearing a Washington Signature should go
to every paper in the State of Michigan, and especially
to ever^'" Catholic newspaper in tlie State. It should go
to the Catholics papers today, if possible, as i"nany of
them go to bed on Tuesday night. Suggest using a
D. C. name for the letter. Let me know if there are any
problems.
Buchanan
cc: Colson
tFailQ.r
4257
To the Editor:
According to Monday's New York Times, Michigan voters this
fall will decide the abortion-on-demand question for your state --at
the same time they decide on Mr. McGovern's future The two questions
are closely inter-related.
As the attached letter shov.'S, Senator McGovern favors
unrestricted abortion policies. And though, today, he claims that he
would take no Federal action, to carry out his views, on June Z5, 1972,
he told the New York Times, he would reverse the President's order
and make every military liospital in the nation an abortion center. In
an interview by Jaines Naughton:
)"He (McGovern) said that as President he would reverse
Mr. Nixon's order to military hospitals to abandon the
* liberalized abortion rules, but would otherwise do nothing
to implenient his personal view tliat it should be 'up to the
family and doctor' -whether an abortion is warranted. "
With this pledge, Mr. McGovern made abortion-on-demand --
m military hospitals --a national as well as a state issue, and voters
should consider it, going into the polling booth in November. I pray
hat you will support the right-to-life of the unborn and reject Mr. McGovern.
Sincerely,
4258
tU.MOM, CKl^^
QJCTiUcb ^faics ^cnctie
COMMlTTCe ON '
AOniCUUTUHC AND FORESTRY
WASHINGTON. D.C. 205J0
December 2, 1971
Dear Ks . Gibson:
Thank you for your recent and thoughtful communication
regarding abortion -
In my judgment, abortion is a private matter which
should be decided by a pregnant woman and her ov;n
physician.
With every good wish, I am
Sincerely yours-^
George McGovern
Ms. Beatrice Gibson
170 8 Fallowfield Avenue
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15216
4259
MEMORANDUM TO:
FROM:
Exhibit No. 194
the white house
WAS H 1 N GTO N
September 13, 1972
H. R. HALDEMAN
JOI-IN EHRLICHMAN
CHARLES COLSON
PAT BUCI-LANAN
Beginning Monday, there are but seven weeks b>ft~hv.the Presidential
campaign. Our two operative principles on thX j^ttacj^in those sevcii
weeks should be a) the issues of 1972 have long ago been decided and
made and ^b) we should rc-cycle those issues, points and positions
which resulted in the collapse of the McGovern campaign. There seeins
to be a tendency on our part at times to seek out some new indiscretion
on the part of the Opposition and attack that simply because it is "new. "
AVhen we have an airtight case of forcible rape -- this is like saying,
"And yeah, we can get him for jaywalking, too. "
In the last few days, in my judgment, wc have allowed McGovern to
"lead" the national debate; our major political statenncnts have focused
(i. c. , Butz counter-charges, and MacGrcgor) precisely on those issues
McGovern thinks are the only winners he has. In addition, wc have
sought to counter the charges of campaign financing finagling with the
old discredited "tu quoqiae " argument ("you're another")— —which
is the weakest of all arguments. '
, Meanwhile, little has gone into the public record in the last several
days -- from us -- which focuses on and advances the major personal
and political issues which are ours. This is partly our fault; but
partly the reason is that we now need heavier guns than the ones we
have been using.
There may be a point to muddying up the inatter -- but v. c have other
fish to fry this fall; and we ought to be about that business .
THE FIRST WEEK. I would open up with two barrels this week. The
first is Foreign Policy . And the Vice President is the man. High-level
defense of RN's brilliant foreign policy is first third -- and then into
McGovern' s Asian and European policies as enunciated by hini and Chayes.
4260
Filled in wiLh McGovcrn quotes; McGovcrn on the POWs; McGovern I
on the Middle East. Conclusion and lead -- George McGovern is a
well-intentioned, but naive bungler, whose foreign policy views are
foolisli and would be dangerous to the peace and security of the
United States and the world. Call for a national debate on two
opposing views of Ainerica's role in Lhe world. The second barrel
would be a John B. Connally, highly publicized response to McGovern,
hammering on the title Confidence and Credibility . All of the McGovern
waffles would be rolled into this one on the credibility side -- the
McGovcrn flip-flops -- then also, in a peroration, the worst of the
McGovern radical rhetoric. Why John Connally broke with McGovern,
could include Hoover remark, Hitler remarks, etc. Extremist rhetoric
unbefitting a presidential candidate -- least of all these charges is what
he says about me. If we could get that peroration on the air; "the
language of an extremist" we could resurrect our big winner. Also,
to be included here is the Humphrey, Jackson, Muskie and Meany
staterr^ents .-- the irxore brutal ones on McGovern. V/hy Democrats
are staying away in droves.
The two speeches would be on different days -- maybe two days apart.
Given free tiine, I could get done the entire first speech and the "core"
of the second.
What we ought to remember in both these speeches is that the press is
less interested in writing about a pro-speech, than they a re about
attack material -- whether the attack is High level or low level. Both
speeches should be built up -- and we should make our television on
them those nifhts.
Note: The attack group should be aware of what the President is ddng
that day also for media -- he can knock us off the front pages and
the networks quicker than anyone else.
THE SECOND WEEK. Economics and Welfare. Connally and/or
the Veep would be excellent on Economics. Reagan, if he would do
one of our speeches, wovild be ideal on Welfare at the National Press
Club.
The economic speech would give the voters a choice between the present i
prosperity and radical change -- radical change that would iTiean a busted
stock market (capital gains tax), a destroyed aerospace industry and
an undeclared economic war in the Anicrican middle class. The
McGovcrn previous proposals should bo regurgitated; his sin"iplii,tic
and naive approach should bo laid out. His $100 billion increase in
budget and thousand in taxes the lead. The language in an econoirvic
4261
speech is viLal. We could work on Ihis one as well. The Welfare
speech should focus on McGovcrn, of course, as in favor of pouring
millions more in; putting millions more onto the rolls.
These items should serve as the key for surrogate speakers as v/ell.
Plowever, the letters operation need not be geared in to this -- in
our judgment thai should be moving the negative, radical material
on McGovern into the key states at full blast. We can be much more
direct in letters than in rhetoric.
THE THIRD WEEK. The Social Issue. In this week a major address .
should be written, again preferably with the Veep in the lead-off
contrasting the President and McGovorn on social issues. Marijuana
and drugs. McGovern' s endorsement of the Black Caucus and what
it contains. Bussing, bussing, bussing. RN versus McGovcrn on the
use of scatter-site housing; amnesty. While the Vice President can
high level this -- laying out the deep differences between the two --
others can, really start hitting hard on the issue. Also, law and
order, the Hoover quote -- etc. This can all be drawn into this
question. This is 1970 politics, but the issues are ours this time,
and if we can get McGovern talking on them, they are winners. Ko
name-calling -- just point out here the radical record.
THE FOURTH WEEK. Defense, This is one area McGovern has held
fast. We could lay ovit his defense budget at the top level and portray '
it as an invitation to disaster in Europe, the Mideast, the world, the
future. Again, here we have quotes from Jaclcson and Humphrey to
back us up. And two days after the defense speech -- there is released
the "ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE MCGOVERN DEFENSE
BUDGET" from Laird to Capitol Hill, giving state by state the
number of jobs lost by McGovern Defense Budget and aerospace cuts,
also the number of bases shut down and exactly which ones and v/here.
All laid out, special mailing to every newspaper in every state in the
country. Something he will never catch up with.
Within this week as v/ell, we ought to have some real tough speeches
in the aerospace communities, the "Ghost Town" stuff. Also, the
same thing they did to us around the military bases in 1970. Included
in the military stuff would be McGovcrn' s attack on the Military
Industrial Complex whereas what he is talking about is the workers
at GE, McDonnell, etc.
If we go this route, we are at the Middle of October -- there is no need
now to decide what we will do those last three weeks. This includes
our basic inventory of large, overall issues. Other sub-themes
include:
21-296 0—74 24
4262
A) The Ellsberg connection, tying McGovcrn to him and his
criiTic --as soon as the indictment come down, if McGovern insists
on charging people, uncharged by the Grand Jury. This would be a
separate tough attack; and it should be echoes all over the country.
B) Space, and defense should of course be on-going issues for any
speaker in a community near an aerospace plant or military base.
Perhaps our Nixon people ought to be doing what they did to us in
1970 -- put out the rumor around every big base in the country that
if McGovern is elected this base will shut down, this plant will close.
C) The McGovern Quotes need to be gotten out. We will do
another mailing on the Best Twenty-five -- and maybe the time has
come to move them and our Attack Book (truncated) to the National
Press, or at least the nnost friendly of the national columnists.
D) The Democratic Party and its rescue. This is an ideal
Connally Big Speech some time, urging Democrats to take back the
party of their fathers, by repudiating the extremists who have seized
it in November. In the speech, he could lay out cold all the radical
leftism, and extremism of McGovern positions, a real blistering
■speech on McGovern, the kind that the President and the Vice President
cannot make -- but hitting him on the twenty odd issues where he has
been so vulnerable. The kind of thing that Human Events would publish -
genuinely hard, which we could then get out into the hands of our entire
speakers list from top to bottom to use, as their basic text.
E) We have to start back to getting the Democratic anti-McGovern
quotes into the record again -- The Meany, Humphrey, Jackson quotes.
Also, the "elitism" and "extremism" themes need to be renewed to
the average voter.
F) The attack group should continue --making sure that these
themes are moved week-by-week -- still meeting day-by-day to key
off something McGovern has said, to fire at targets of opportunity,
to program our people on the media to keei? moving all these good
materials we have back into the public record again and again.
The Hoover quotes and the quotes on the Chicago Police are two
examples. Our objective should be to either move McGovern off of his
Watergate issue, onto our issues or kill him on our issues; secondly,
to continually break any momentum he develops by changing the
subject in a week.
FINAL NOTE: Again, the critical point is that just as McGovern ovight
to make "Nixon" the iseue --so the issue this fall is McGovern. Will
4263
he and the hard-core left-winger radicals who took over tine party-
take over America. That's the bottom line. If the country goes
to the polls in November, scared to death of McGovern, thinking
him vaguely anti -America and radical and pro the left-wingers and
i-nilitants, then they will vote against him -- which means for us.
What we have done thus far, and fairly well, is not put the President
thrity-four points ahead -- but McGovern thirty-four points behind.
The best tribute to what we have done, 1 think, came from McGovern
I believe just after the convention when he said -- "They've got
fifteen guys shooting at me from all sides while the President's
acting like he's not even in a campaign. " If we can continue that,
we're golden.
Buchanan
4264
Exhibit No. 195
FT, LiD ERDiiLt, PLA,
PEi3 28, 1972
HR. W. LOEB
UA.CmiSTER IvJIO!: LEADER
IIA'CHESTER, H.H.
mm :.Ji loebi
I &: HAROLD W, aiREDGE, RETIRED A:D A LIFELOKC C^E COD
HISIDB:!, forced TD STiY IH FLORIDA DDE TO A HLIART COl.DITICK, A|E 76 YEARS,
I WAS THE PEK30I; THAT A3CED MR mJSaE THE QDEanO-. ABOUT
HIS KNOmiEGE OF THE ULiCKS, A TODKG MAI CaPAlIOH OP HIS, CUT INTO MI
QDEariON AID MiDE A JOKE OUT OF IT, HE DID lH "THAI' MAINE HAD PEW H.ACKS,
BUT HD HAra A LARGE ETHMIC MINORITY, CamOIILY CALLED "CAlUCKf MH THIS
PCIIIT Jt^YOUNG LAD STAI^DING NEilR L'E VIITR S.CtXE PRIHIDS, AJCED WAT 2BEr WTOE/f
AID S0IU3 ONE AtSWERED SriJTTHIKG ABOUT CCME TO HEV/ BiaAID AID SEE.
I READ ABOUT Tmiff HAD HAPPHJED IK MAlCHEtTER IM THIS SOI' DAYS
FT. LAUDERDALE PRESS, I TRIED TO GET IH TOUCH TOTH THE NE^VS EL3C EARLY, THE
YOUliG LADY TELEPH l^E OPERAT « LISTHIELi T -. MY ST RY, AND SAID TO CALL BACK Al
THREE Hi IK THE iOTERlIOOlI , I CiLLED AGiir. Im THREE Kl, AID A YOtt^G MAI
AJSWEIED THE TELEPH IJE LISTEKED TO ME, AID LAI '.HE THE DE3C LlAl TOUL BE
IN AB.-'UT FUR P ,1 UAD MADE TWO TRIPS OUT TO THE TELEPHCKK, 30 I WILL CALL
^iHB; TjDAY. THE YOU^iC LAD PROI.I DEERilHD DID NOT LIE, HE TOLD THE TRUTH.
I DO IIX WANT TO GETT INTO /NT PUSS ABOUT A STUPID RIMARK, MY HEART CONDITION
WILL HOT ALLOW IT. I HASTE REjS) OVLR THIS LHTni TYPED BY A G OD NEICBBOR R)R
ME A;D I 'J IS JUST V.HAT H.TPHIED.
TIIK AnOVK F,HTTKR is rrprndurrd just as i( in effect, railed the Morrison letter a fraud. Readers
arrived at the I nion Leader. It lends to confirni a pre- niav be interested in weiRhinR this additional exidenre
vious letter by I'aul Morrison, reproduced on Page !(> of what was said bv !sen. .Muskie in Florida,
and also postmarked from Florida. Sen. Muskie tias.
4265
Exhibit No. 196
^i\ [Wo^^ktc- 1^1^ uje*^o y'sji/" U<^suU n^v^ "^"^^
S^cdl noo^-e Ki(.t^€.-t one- cpC- 't'U hic-ii^ (^s,ie^ O'it
/
4266
Exhibit No. 197
HeaJquarleis: Tolapliono:
789', GEORGIA AVCNUE ROBIN FICKER (Choi.n-,Hn)
SILVER SPfiiiNG. MARYLAND 20901 Offico; (202) £3:i-2.;;iO
Homo: (30)) 0t)9-5240
Dear New Hampshiri; Voter:
rime arid agiiiii tlie men and women of the Granite Stale have demonstrated their independence
and nifiijed individiiahsm, leading tlie way I'or ihe rest of llie nation. Now is again sucli a time. Through
yonr voles in tlie dcnioeratic Prim;uy (his ye.ir you ran chanije America's course.
All of the Democratic candidates are good men but they are not great men. Only one man - -
Senator Ted Kennedy of Massachusetts - - has the strength, the sensitivity, the personal qualities of
leadership to be a great president.
Moreover, every poil demonstrates that Kennedy is the one Democrat who will surely beat Kicliard
N.xor. in November. He has never wavered in his convictions; he alone can ranyjj ie poor, tlie blacks ine
young, the old, the larmer, the laborer and the middle class into a winning coalition.
The Senator decided not to seek the Deniocratic Presidential nomination. But, if the Citizens oi
New Hanipsliirc call for him to lead us by writing in his name on the Democratic ballot, that example
wi<; be followed by millions of Americans across the country. And Senator Kennedy wijl answer
our call
These are troubled days for America. None of our present candidates - - Republican or DemoLiaiic - -
can inspire our people and lift our nation out of its doldrums; Senator Kennedy can; he can change
America's priorities and direction; he can restore our sense of purpose; he will complete the unfinished
business so nobly begun by his brothers before him.
Robin Ficker
Chairman
United Democrats
for Kennedy
4267
Exhibit No. 198
HELP
Mnskie
DEM.
SUPPORT
BUSSlNt
MORE CHILDREN
NOW
4268
Exhibit No. 199
LAW OFFICES
KALMBACH, DeMARCO, KNAPP & CHILLINGWORTH
SUITE 900 • NEWPORT FINANCIAL PIAZA / 560 NEWPORT CENTER DRIVE
NEWPORT BEACH CALIFORNIA 92660
TELEPHONE (714) 644-41 1 1
September 27, 1971
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
Mr. Donald H. Segretti
14013 West Captains Row
Apartment 117
Marina del Ray, California
Dear Don:
Enclosed are two checks: one for $667 for services
rendered for the last half of September, 1971; the other
($5,000) represents an advance for anticipated expenses.
Please let me know if you have any questions or
if there is any way in which I can be of additional assist-
ance .
Regards ,
Herbert W. Kalmbach
HWK/ah
Enclosures
LAW OFFICES
iLMbACH. DiMARCO. KNAPP * CHILLINGWORTH
SUITE 900 NEWPORT FINANCIAL PLAZA
550 NEWPORT CENTER DRIVE
NEWPORT BEACH CALIFORNIA 92660
Mr, Donald H. Segretti
14013 W. Captains Row
Apt. 117
Marina del Ray, CA 90291
PERSONAL AND CONFIDENTIAL
4269
Exhibit No. 200
September 28, 1971
4;00 p.m.
MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD
From now on, we want to have at least one Muskie sign in among demonstrators
.vho are demonstrating against the President. It slioiild be ML'SKIE FOR PRESIDENT
n big letters and should be hold in a location so that it is clearly visible.
•\I .Muskie events or events by other Democratic hopefuls, ihcre should be a si>:n
jr two which goads ihem. For example, at a Muskie rally there should be a h-.rge
,VHY NOT A BL.\CK VICE PRESIDENT or perhaps WE PREFER HUMPliREY or
;omething else that would goad him along.
\t Humphrey rallies there should be Muskie signs and at Kennedy rallies , there
hould be .Muskie or Humphrey signs and so on. These signs should be well-placed
n relationship to the press area so that a picture is easy to get.
4270
Exhibit No. 201
i
Do you REFUSE to even CONSIDER a Black or Chicano £3 a
running mate? Your public answer that they do not yet havo "political
oquallty" only fosters any bias that exists and avoids the question.
Do you speak in terns of equality for minorities yet send your
childran to all-v.-hite private schools in Wash D,C.? ACTION, not
t'ORDS, are the nark of a true liberal I
Spsak against Vietnam yet continue to support the draft
•:;hich has a bias against nirioritics?
Allow your p^orsonal Catholic views on abortion dictato your I
public stEjnd AC-AIIi ST r:-odcrn abortion laws? Abortion should b3 a
personal natter and not dictated to individuals by YOUR raligtous
views .
'kVhj did you vote FOR TOSK?L0Y7-S1;T IN SOU THS HN C_1LJ?:0R2.'IA by [
*■" — ■ ' ■ " ■ ■" — ■- - " ' 2
voting against the SST7 Such action shows a bias against California I
by an out-of-state carp3 tbagger I
4271
Exhibit No. 202
xidcvHO t; xhoi.uq
<^g7^
-OcFEAT-
Tr:iT-J i
[U
4272
^
(/'''
10
Frank Reynolds reported times have changed since RX
went to W'liittiur, Ijat it is still not a hot bee) of radicil-
isin. Still whi'n Miu'kic can'ip to speal< I'^c foiind a proup
of CliicanOE had talccn ov.^r llie stago. KroLivie on film
said he \vo\ild like lo "make one thins pv-rfeclly clear. "
. . . . ^^')■itlier is I'Ot Die only place RN I-^as been where
I woi'.ld like lo r;o. " I^aughtcr. Reynolds said Ed had
come prepared for consirvalive qoestior.s but the
Cliicajios gavn. tlicm no cliaiicc, and Big Sd proved lie
could keep his cool. jMusJ.ie reportedly v.as j-1'.r.scd
by 'lie recc;.l Ion k.- rccv-ivf-d from IhoSi^ v-illii.;; to
listen, but more impcirtsntiy , said Reynolds, he
proved he c an keep his ten. per under s tress. . . .UPI
says kluskie got an "ontliiisiastic response" at Wliilticr
as he exhorted over 1,000 students to get out and vote
and cliange the country. He speculated that drop in
Gallup may have been due to blacl; VP slaleinent. He
favored aborlions for therapei'lic reasons but oppo;;ed
them as birth control measure. . . . David Carlcy,
k^uskie's AVi .'jconsin chairman, said Frc^xmjir e' s drci = ;o:
lo Oj'i'u out ;":'al,es ih-^t ?-t:;1e's prin~.ary '.'re- n'o~; v'K-'i.':
arid mt;.= ( iivi-jiorla-it in I'S.
HHH s<-..id the Adniin "v/;;! Iry lo s-.'.k'Eti'.v.t.e ad\erii = ;
for £c!iievL.-r,;.;;:i" in a f, i: -i:-.i IJiC'ii c ;.;)■:;"• ;-.i en to rc-e
RN. "Our re.-]-c.nse, " iiun.pkrcy said, ■'i-:ii-. st be ac
progressive leadersliip and bold new policies i'or a
Ijricjhter .-America lcn:;orrov.-. " Kc'.i;-;C 3">;\£ visits t
China and Russia, I'HH .''aid "v.c );-:ay .'■;-e i.im wit!-.
Mao near the Gr.-al Wall, i.u! will wv^ ^u-l- 1.;:i; at
Hu.nters Point, in V.'a'ils or East I.OE .-.r. gales? ". . ..
Gov. Carter of Ca. says Dem nominee v.tII have to
tougher than is now apparent on busing to pet his
support. lie emphasi;ted thatDcms n:\:si!:'t be anti-
South and Soiitiier;-; Dems v.-ant full p.n rtr.c-r skip ir. ;::
AP notes k'o;:d.-,y an-T Dole's fp.-ech ir.cicate GOP it
takiji;.; issue v.-Jli-, KMK's verbal altack.s on RN. T'.e
Star's Paul Hr.po write." on EMK's ■■'d:-a:n jtic robo;:.-
ar:d sees "nim essentially in tlie race •.■-"V.:;a notinp a::;
ruef iioi;;:ip JvTC's ;^.f. pj-ny, as ii;> l:a» so ouen reci^
con.?iderinp Cli.^iipaqurddiek. . . . .(o!i:i IvOclic finds coi
roasor.s tor secir^ij I'k'.K as tk.e lii-.ciy c"r:oice the ;:;-
4273
Exhibit No. 203
r.-.TC-rict }
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/
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^/•PUC^^r ^L£A5i: Aori- Co-^V,,..n o/^/,-,^.rW;--^
o com,i ^ w<(h »</ r-""t
Mtor »rPLlC*NT (/"//nl cr t/2£) .
*7^0CVCS\<:iM L-KUE. CALIF. ^6Z7V
HOME ADDRESS (Wo., J/z^eef, ci/y, Jf«<e, and ZIP coda)
TELtr-nC-IE NO.
S36-S2^?S'
TH£?HO«e HO.
S30-SZ^5 I
S>qN»TURE Of APPUCAKT f ^ ■«-
DATE Of ArPl.lCATtO.1
|0^(\MUf.fZY H, 1^7 2-^ ^
raiSSiSVERlFlEOBT il
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TELtPHOSE hUMBCRS VtRlFrED BY
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for To?.' Cr/.-^ t'ia Onjy ["^
ENTERED IH DITECTOar L
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r«£ FOLLOWinC MUST BE COMPLETEd/aNC JlGliED BEFORE P.O. BOX JS ASSlCilED
mn.
.SHOW MAUE IN r.HlCH tOX IS RENTED KHEM OIHrjl IriiH K^ME OF Ap; l.iCAflT
DELIVER KAIL IN ACCORDANCE WITH INSTRUCTIONS CHECKED eELOW
□ ALL EXCEPT SPECIAL | — I
CCLIVERT IN PCX I I
1771 ONLY HAIL ADO-tSSEO TO EOr tS TO St PLACED IH IT.
|2iJ ALL OTHER i^AlL TO BE DELIV£j<£3 a5 AC-DSESiEO.
SPECIAL OELUERY MAIL G-.LY ^Dr.h.cr 3« checked teiow)
I I DELKtR TO 10:AL P.ZiihlHCt AT
(Wo.. 3trrct, and Z.'P ccc/o)
□
Dn.rVER TO LOCAL BJSINCSS AD
(No., ttrrct. and ZIP cc-ris'i
KAMESCf PERSONS ESTIILCO TO RCCEl . t y-.IL Th;.3j;h FOX (11 ho^ siientnd to n fuzn. includm the lull rLzcr.s ol tiitch of its
cncmb^r9 vhoio mii7 is to t>a p!-^CzJ in box.y
None.
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ITEMS I THROUGH 6. ABOVE ANO I /V A ^ ^ ^C- / '
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POD FORM 1 nno
■IAR.1SM iUc'O
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APPLICATION FOR POST CfflCE BOX
4274
■BHWi>^iijiWiPtjmW . | . 'Wl ^" ii II w 1 1 >i_iiiiiiiiniiii_« I iirrr ruiiprnjTTir TTTT
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70:
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Statio n ; '"orlcv.tiy Por.tal Cento :
uuiao'.v Dervidcs
Loo A ntroloa. CA ^005 2
f.70^\i
mailii;:g REQUIRE? :n<TS .-
107 Torninal A^nox y\ -^ '*^'
oATt Loo Angolofl, CA 90C^a•£^Q^^lX *--^-;^^j:^
':;.U NO. •
^ Bot Addrosa vorifio&tion - Rttr.ch^d .
7ho roflidonco addroaa hT.o boon Torifiod
for tbo pa-'crcn 15.r7t-;d boj,o'.T:
■ ■ ■ Jt-Tiibs H« 27orton, dba ■
Citizens Com, .for Hepresan-'cativa Gov,
. " ■ .". : ' ..T.SuckGkia lane ^ :'■]■, -■:':-■ '.' . .' --. . /
-,^;"U-': :J-'-- - ■ \
POOForra 13
(Ao<v:;^»:l KirtroAa en j.afi—-i) «w>« itia— ^o— iv-rc.Ti-l
4275
Exhibit No. 204
ALTHY— Limbo
.^|-
rescnrch
POMible.
p; dollv J
HKRAPY
SCNATC;! MUSKIE— You Wouldn't
rrf.-:! 3 Dlr.ck or an American
woiiiQ you accept a Jvwlth
iU)
SiiiO/i
Top'co';!
Irk at prices you
) 5% discount to
> . ..OiCOf'U CAST — jr l,,c
•■ - ysiri. Alio Privile
r.....Mjs. j71.3Q:j.
:..T...!.-,r .W.lkil-
V.ii/IJ You Accept
A Jf.Vlif. kuSNINO MATS?
\jr,J lir... -
exerciiej,- jlrelcn-o
malic Multiple Sclerosis research
pays oti Correction now possible.
Reducing and yoga classes dally 3
p.m. 6 pm ALL THERAPY
«IVUAI lUN
SOLARIUM Call 94«-1300e«t. 3718.
ATI
HOT
SERVIC
.-TtOLl
I ta ihora
oom opt.
n« othar
dad. Coll
Found: Mtn't brown horn rim glau-
ei. Found balwian anginearing ond
Memoriol Bldo_Moy bt picked
MISCELLANEOUS
5«niuous 1
Chick, phona /
.■f< MIZZIES, .
A BOUT WITH
RIER . . . W£
GUESS WHO
4276
CAN WE TRUST
USKIE when:
H« aupports bussing OUT children, yet sends hiS children
to priyate all-white schools la Washington D.O*! Is this th«
way a public official should set an example In our deaooraoy?
dd advocates political equality for all persons without regard
to race, religion, or color; yet Huslcie states publicly he
would not: accept a Black or Aaerican Indian for the 71ce-
President nomination. Such a public stateaent by a leading
Denocrat fosters such political inequality. Where does ha
stand with regard to other ainoritieb (such as Jewish petiion.»)t
He talks about the uneaploynent, yet oppOS6Sthe SSX and
the spaoe-shuttle. Has Muskie proposed any viable alternative
to assist this segment of our econoay? How many of as hava
friends who are uneaployed engineers?
He.' actively fester's an iaage of a poor nan's oaapaign; yet
raised $86,000 at a $250 a plate dinner in Los JLngeles on
Peb 21, 1972. In truth isn't EM THE f*at Cat ot the
party? If he hits you for a donation ask hia about this:
MinUe Rdses SlSOOOa
A Rec ord, at Maine Dlimw
WJRTLAND. Me, Jtn. 15—
Vmrij 700 supporten of United
SUte* S«n«tor Edmund S. Mu,-
Ibe turned out here last night
for a dinner tbat raised about
r%t t g> $150,000 for his DemocraUe
O yj O Presdmtlal campaltn.
., . No political dinner in Maine
' Ira* ever before raised so much
MJII lOI^IC money. The previous high was
IVIiJOIVIC JgO.000, ralaed In 1970 when
,■-. : Senator MuskJe successfully
Boaiht r»«tectjoo as a Senator.
nV^kWlKi I l„t nlgbt for those wb» coo-
tribaSd <l.y> ««cfa . Pto ;
tidatsinm itSiL The \^tmiM<
y^ im mat ^ Oaaoe* a»\
I Ma#to yAnvr taofmitB. >m[
' > limmm$f*tim-^ " '-.^
yr.X. tl»»»/Jaaeltf
4277
All otsc-i-v'irs sgres tl'.ot is.'otional st-.Vality , trustworthiness, ?"d "
coolness ur.dc-r Tire rire c::-jr;;tial quf.litic-s Tor c.ny .r.;in sc-sking t'.e r ■.•■--slc:-r.cy .
HrTiwith, so.T.e cc-.-ei.ts en Sd Miskie's qjili ficat.icTis:
T:-S0 LIP?K_AN and son H.C'-^iJi - M-skle's biographers: "A potentip.lly explosive
r.sn vith a vsspish tc-rper . . . often trig;^3red by the trivial . . . "obody
dojots that Muskie's ts^p-ir tg.ntnzas are Ejeninna." — in their bocV:, K;s;ki_s.
SU SAN SHE EH AN - ;-!uEkie biographer: "Kuskie's sisters . . . rer.eiLber him as a
stubborn man with a nasty te~psr, who would tease them but not take t:-asing in
return. A friend recalled that, when he was in his 30' s, he kicked ever a
Monopoly board after another player made a Itjcrative L''Ore." — in th9
N.Y. Tiroes Magazine
IRE' E MUSKIE - The Senator's sister: "Ed . . . has a terrible tesper. Ed
just couldn't bear to lose a game. If he lost he'd throw the cards, yell,
arid staiTp off." --Theo Lippr.an and Don Hansen, in their book, K uski e
PAUL HOPE — Syndicated coluffi.nist: "Muskie . . . has a rather short fuse . . .
He frequently boils and fumes." — V'ss hdneton Star
GODrHEY SP ERL I 'JQ - Political reporter: "He loses his cool under pr;ssue, can
very well evoke voter ir"; certain ties on how the i:.an .'-.ight rsact .iridc-r the rjuch
"eater \incertainties of the Freside.'icy. Vould ve want him to be the one who
: iSt cake the decision on j-ushing the nuclear buttcnV" - — Chr_i_stijyi_ .Soierice
■Ir.Z STAKES IN P/:ESIDE!mAL POLICY MOVES AivE HUGH Gr.-J-.riR T;^AN THOSE I^; A MC^i-I-POLi
C-;j-5;. CAN VE Tn"JST ED MDSKIE ulCBER PRS3SLT:E, FELLOW D?3;0C?-AT3?
SEK. EDMlTvD S. MUSKIE - On hi-self: "I don't urge people to trust r^s. I don't
really thirJ: that as a can I'm Eore trustworthy than other men." — V.'i shingtcr. F;s1
!-vi£. JCSEPHI'S y.'.'SKIE - The Senator's mother: "I don't know why Ec vants to
SEN . VAJJCE K,ARTKE (D-Ind.) - ''M-iskie isn't going to win. I don't frdnl: he has
s political principle in "r:r. cLher than the fact he thirJ-is he ought to be Presizrr
People aren't c_-.b, they're gcing to see through iz.'' — Village Voi ce.
TRUST MUSKII-.?
thirJv Lhet Frasident Xar.-^- Ti-nan put it c-est. Sen. Muikie: ''if you cr-n'1
■-a the heat, get cut of the kitchen." Good politics and bad tezper don't
cz-.-y-.:?^. -XR f. ?T;?hE CA:r;:pc-r. x^sitiNGroN, n.c. t. foley, chaif^'^n
4278
sFyt.t Splfgrs :tp|it °iSif- ^|5s,-.= i5^i
''■^ ^-^i^Sf
> O eilsfeS^ l=&?.3335 io-ggr^la :f |2^ -H-S^fs^
0) ^Et^is^-s 6sii:!^s_gs sss-ii^jsf ^s.---
: «-•- I a ''" ° 5 i 5
■» O " <: . I E S 2 =
•* o ef « „ e
CE5=£i> .-Hgl-S-stlj EoS-„|bE 2^g|fe -^S
s '^. 5 C ™ » t;
Hubert Hvuiiphrey and Kayor Dave Kennedy have conspired in not
supporting Senator Kuskie's military assistance fer Israel
plan that provides $500,000,000 for military sales and crai-
its.
Tne other candidates are lukewarm in their support of Senator
Kuskie's full-scale support of the Israeli's cause, AH labor
supporters are urged to join with the freedom loving people
of Israel to support Senator Ituskie in his valiant fi^t for
the Democratic nomination.
4279
Exhibit No. 205
mimm
citizens for MuEkIs
Committee
Top of the Blecayn*
Terrace Hotel. 340
Blscayne Blvd.,
Miami, Florida
33132
February 25, 1972
Campaign Manager
Jackson for President
Senate Office Building
Room 137
Washington, D.C.
Dear Sir:
I have voted in Democratic campaigns for
several years, but I have never seen the kind of
abuse to the Party going on this year. I have worked
for Senator Muskie for several months and the only
trust and believing I have left in his campaign staff
is that they will continue to lie, cheat, and mislead
the Democratic voters. I have seen his state staff
people invite several thousand people to a rally in
Tampa on January 7, 1972, ajid then Joke about the
fact that the room they rented could only accomodate
400 people. The theory of Alan Baron was that the
press would be impressed vfith the over-flow crowd.
But what of the Senator's responsibility to those who
sincerely want to hear and see him in person? In
addition, these same people planted "loyal" workers
to ask easy questions. Is this moral?
All this I was told is the way to work things
if you really want to win, but I have finally had it...
ajid this is the reason:
United States Congressman Sam Gibbons has
"loaned" full-time to Senator Muskie 's Head-
quarters in Tampa his federally paid assist-
ant Hector Alcade, two U.S. Government-owned
IBM electric typewriters (serial numbers
9064754 and 527^506), continuous use of the
Congressman's secretaries for a whole week
in January when Muskie 's state headquarters
was moved to Miami, and the use of the Cong-
ressman's mailing privileges. The typewrit-
ers are located at 330 W. Piatt Street, Tampa,
Florida.
Perhaps I am naive to object to taxpayer's paying for
Senator Muskie 's campaign — but I do object I This is
not honestl
I have resigned my position on the Muskie staff
and hope that all campaigns are not run the way this
one has been. Perhaps you can do something to straighten
things out.
Sincerely,
A FORJ^ER MUSKIE STAFF WORKER
IN MIAMI (under Mary Gasdat)
cc: Richard Gilliam
Florida State Chairman
Jackson for President
238 W. Kennedy Boulevard
Tampa, Florida 33606
4280
Exhibit No. 206
>
(^pC^Uc^/^r
Citizens for Mutkla
Commitlea
Top of the BlEcayn*
Terrace Hotel. 340
Blscayne Blvd.,
Miami. Florida
33132
Dear Fellow DeinocrAtdi
Primary time la upon us and I am sure you hove
been emothered with literature from man/ condldAtes.
We on the Senator Ed Kuekle staff sincerely hope you
have decided upon Senator Muskle as your choice t...'
he is the best qualified to be President In November*
However, If you have not made your decision you
should be aware of several facts)
Senator Henry Jackson of Everett, Washington, was involved
with a seventeen-year-old girl named Joan Cramer while he was a
senior ap Everett High School. The result was an illegitimate
daughter, named Kary Ann Cramer, born Febrxiary 7, 1929< He refu-
sed to Barry the girl and after a paternity suit paid child support
until September of 1937, when for $4,500 he settled with the mother*
Prior to bis marriage to Helen Hardin on December 16* 1961 he \ras
arrested twice in Washington, D.C. as a homosexual. Once was Kay
S, 1955, and the second October 17, 1957. No charges were ever
brought against hla because of his position.
Sonator Hubert Humphrey has similar skeletons la his closet.
He was arrested for drunk driving in Washington, D.C. on December
3, 1967 after hitting two parked cars and a mailboSf In his car at
the tiae was a known call girl named Kary Virginia Reese. Miss Reese
was paid to entertain Senator Humphrey for the eveninnby Hr. John
ffurray, a lumber lobbyist. Senator Humphrey is on tha Agriculture
and Forestry Committee of the Senate.
Ihesa are not pleasant facts, but they should b« considered by
you before you vote on Karch 14.
4281
Exhibit No. 207
I jiy/sitiA«i®!^l®JI^
I
EL SENADOR EDMUIMD MUSKIE
FUE MIsisSSTER PRETAOa REcIeIM—
TEMEMTE AL DECIr OUE LOS E.U.
DEBEIM AYUDAH A LOS CUBAfVJaS
A BOTAR EL G OBJERMa DE
CASTRO. EO MUSKIE CREE OUE
TODAS LAS PERSQNAS riErMErSI
DERECHO A EL GOSiERMO QUE
BLLOS ELIwIAN Y OEBEfM RESOL-
VE R sus mIsmos PROBLESVIAS.
COrviO BUENOS AMERiCAlNJOS^ HJO
OEBEMOS ilMTERFERIR. MUSKIE
imacio eim maine y es un buen
aiviericano. vote por ed
muskIe
lixJf^kJUu-
TRANSLATION -- Senator Edmund Muskie was recently misunderstood to
say that the U. S. ought to help Cubans overthrow the Castro government.
Ed Muskie believes that everyone has the right to the government they elect
and to solve their own problems. As good Americans, we should not interfere.
Muskie was born in Maine and is a good American. Vote for Ed Muskie.
4282
Exhibit No. 208
4283
NEWSMAKERS
Tlic liiMillifill 11I-..1.I,- .ire Kl M no.
li.)iiTi.| :iK.ui.. uliJii.t; ii.l.) Ill,- Nrw V.iik
nl^Mspol ll..,l h.is oixn.'il .mmI cIom.I \iU-
.. ^,1,:. ,1 .,.,, „.!,..„ ,„ ,,,,■„! ^..„s l„ ,1s
1.,1,'Sl 1, „.,,;,. Il„' ,.,l, s,M„lv I,,mI
ll
/.•l,l
I,.„ Ic'.ll.,,.
sl,,|„'<l l<.,,„|>l,ll,'v 111,' l.,k<
ji„l ,'V<'n /\i,):,'l,, III,' null,,
.,r,'IU ,;„l (),„■ ,l,'|
s- ih,'
|,,.l„,
r I
l'-,,!,,^i, 111,' <',
i', Mill i';i M..
cl.lb. will, .1 S'.OI) i,,il,,ili,,ii (,,' ;,nil S2IK)
jliMi.ul ,1,.,'s (.,r s„<l, „ I.s .,s JdCque-
line jiicJ Aristotle Onassis. wl,i, iii,ii<<l >,,i
ul ,.n.' ,.( l.,sl n,, l,s 1, ,,|.,„,„i; sl„„,ln;s,
Hope Hampton jiul Huntington Hartford
w, 1,' „i. ii.iiid, i,.„, i':iiii,.\,i„iiU'i,'is shii
A-l, l„il prii.'s ar,' jili.isi- Uv,i-a nii'ri'
S2 .'iU f.ir srrainliled i-);e.s and SK..5I) l„r a
d,ni„T Ihal „n< i- wi.uld llaK- uiist ^3(1
— -v-i-j-"' ''V' ■'"•■' "■'''»:■'•''■'. '--''^■■5 ' ^^
TV (leisDiiaiitv Joe Garagiola. 45. a fur-
mcr cakh, r in lliu iiiaj<,rb. la.nc on Ih,'
a.r si.midniK as i( lie had let ill,'
d.iwii liy il;i.|',[iiii(; an rasy foul pop.
"Jl-siis CliMst. fin soiTv, Koddaiiiil," In
fiiiii.'d in frnstral.on afle. i.'ii,' il,',IU
bI.".MnK Inu's Willi,- lap,„K-,.[
•^aCl.iisliiiastoniiiK'riialiorh,
sh.nv on MK; Iclc'ViMori. Ily
a sIikI.o ti'ilniKian iiRhuk-d tl.
si'«ni('iit ill ill,' lapi' ill
l.roadoasl 1>> mori-
around till- rounlry
cliarmd himself willi
ccrc'i, apol
'PI"
The While House could be in for a
drastic change of pace if Jane Muskie
becomes First Lady. Campai^^nin^ in
New Hampshire last week for "Big Dad-
dy," as she jokingly referred to her hus-
band, the Maine Democrat's 44-year-old
wife unleashed the kind of style that
provided a field day for Women's Wear
Daily reporter Kandy Stroud, who look
down all the breezy quotes. "L<et's tell
dirty jokes," shouted Jane to the reporters
and aides aboard her chartered bus.
Also: "I'ass me my purse-I haven't had
my morning cigarette yet." She chewed
gum, sighed that she couldn't wear a
certain dress because someone else had
"the g.d. thing on" and owned up to a
preference for two drinks before dinner
and creme de menihe after-ward "Ik.'-
cause the next day everything seems l,>
work just right. But I can't mix booze and
wine or I get a headache and have little
dreams." Spying Senator Ed's pielure in
a newspaper, his wife hooted; "Theie lie
is. Isn't he cute?"
f
o"* '
\<
<3k
Iripctf and phase. two price:*
N
at Kl Moro.'.'o: Zebi
e first Hiclit over 1
l';J>). Acxordinc to years, and that the man Balchen libels,
ih,' lrir,i'.l.,r ' J,,se|.l,,n,- Konl" Admiral Bvrd, has been dead lor four- |
lUrd ami eopiK.I Floyd Bennett teen vears." fc^
'.,,,1..,, sl.nv lom.ike ll,e roond Irip be- 11
«,',,, Noiujx's Spiisheigen isl.iiids and Lyndon Johnson. 63. who riuil smoking
I,,' .North l',:l,- 111 Ih,' el.ipM'ii liine o( less after a heart attack in 1U53, is back on
hu, siM,,'„ hours. "Huvd told me the cigarettes. How c-ome? "The trials and
.li.lt ,!'.rx.' sai.l liaUliir,, vslio ,„',oiii,ls tribulations of Chrislmas," smiled ihe
Iby
"1,1, il lr.,ni Ills ..ul.ii.i
U l,,mll^ ll,r,',il.'i„-,l
II,' .„lni, Ill's i„
;■/ F. Dyrd Jr., i,
S ,!. 1,'hs,'
n who got tfm.ugh more th.in fise 5i?s
irs ill the Wliite House without a ^
okc, though tlli-r
. fire aplenty.
^
'Iti^'
I),. I ii,.
Rirh,,r,l F. P'nil ,
Yk
>
Jane MuKkir: n,.o8t fi>r 'llig l>a,l,l>'
His first liial for the fatal shooting of a
poliicman resull.'d in a manslaughter ^
e,,iivioli,m that was overturned on ap- '^fci
|.,-al, anil Isso subs, ipieiil trials ended in O
hung ]iin,-s. Tri.il No. 4 for Black Tan- >C
iiher l.-ail,'r Huey P. Newton. 29. was on Bs,
ill O.ikl.ind. C:alit., iiiilil Inst w,'.'kh^
en the CISC was abruplK dismissed at^SH
re,|,i,'sl of Dislriel Aliolnes l.imell ^
s,n -It would U- fruill.sslo h.
.Il„'ili„iigiur),"evpla,iii-dj,'>,„'i,. I
.,,1,1,. I 'We lliluk he IS ab-,,l,il,'lv
lU Defense all, ,r,iev Cluili-s U, C.
...,11,1. led that .N.wton ha,l sers,-d ^'^
irlv ll.ue vears l,.'lund luis in addi- ^^
, l„ l„'i,ig iri.'d Ihr,,' l„n,s Ulorc "V
,.' ,1. ii,' 1 -Xii-l ,„.s. ." s.i.l C.orv, ^B
"IM 1 1" l;.- 'li'" !"•
II, ,, s il„' hnil.l,' John Connally." ^
. Richard Nixon. iiiii,„l e las ">•■.■ ^^
,. ..I il., I,,'., Mil. i„i .,„.,. Ii. II, rniiK^C
.,s|,r Pierre Elliott Trudcau in a ^^
I Ions,' s,,'i„' lii.m lliis u,',l.'s ^V^
i: ,l,„,l„„„litv ,..ll.,l "l).,,'iiil„'r (i. ^'^
.1. A l>,V ,11 111,' r,,'si,l, i,.v." All,'! ^^
I I,..: I.,„.ls Willi Cooii.ilK. Ii.i,l..„i ^.
\., ,1 his I, .111,1 .111,1 ...i.ks -Til .,1,1111^^^
4284
Exhibit No. 209
n
THE SECRET MONEY IN
PRESIDENTIAL POLITICS
Among the various ev!li of p^rsidentia
ties, the existence of secret money is probo
the most disgusting.
Campaign donations ore given under-the
table to protect the identity of donors with
special selfish interests.
Presidential candidates — and their policies —
ore bought ond sold by the big-money people,
It is corruption of the worst kind.
In this present campaign, there ore four differ-
ent kinds of condidote:
1) The candid condidates, namely Chisholm
Lindsay. McCarthy, McCloskcy, one
/.\cCovern. They hava all ogreed to moke c
full voluntary disclosure of their money sourc-
es. They are not embrassed to identify theii
bockcrs. They believe in "honesty in politics."
2' The silent candidates, such os Ashbrook
Hortke, Humphrey, Jackson, Mills, Wolloce,
and Yorty. They're keeping quiet about their
current money — it's onybody's guess os tc
where it's coming from. Probobly fat-cots whe
hove a substantial self-interest in electin;
them. Mcybe defense controctors, oil produc-
ers, or real estote operators. Who knows?
They themselves know but they certainty
don't wont the voting public to know. Se
we're left to use our imoginolion. The under-
world? Good grief! But who knows?
3) The corrupt condidote, and the epitome
this is Richard Nixon. He blotontly helped h
brother Don get a SZ03,000 hond-out fro
Howord Hughes in some political shenonigon
Last year Nixon's Republican Notional Com
mittce hustled some S322,SOO from the
cSoiry farmers in exchange for rigged increases
in the price of milk. And the latest is th«
5400,000 promise from LT.T. which Nixon
legal beagles apparently helped to solicit.
Thank goodness for Ralph Nader. Jock Ander-
son, ond the Senate Judiciory Committee —
THIS PUBLIC SERVICE ANNOUNflfEMONT IS SPONSORED
AND PAID FtfR BY:
COMMITTEE FOR HOhfESTY IN POllTICS
STEWART R. MOTT, CHAIRMAN
515 Madison Avenue,
New York, N.Y.
P.S. This committee is supported by mony concerned citizens who would like to resTore confi-
dence in the political system ond csiure honesty in politics. I( you would like to assist our vrork,
please send your donation and comments to the above address.
Now he scjys he will disclose the fot cats behind him (offer he lost bodly in
Florldo ond cried in New H3mf>shire). Why is he waiting for full disclosure-
is it to fix up his books?
THE COMMITTEE WILL LOOK FOR YOUR NAMES AS PART OF MUSKIE'S
FAT CATS! THEY BETTER BE THERE!
4285
Exhibit No. 210
IT
QJJI Y^ C<^ ^Ut^ ^L.r<X <^.^OtZ
^irCbhJ
-^,^^ i^nyrsjt^ ^QJW>^
TiktA*'^pny{jLitf^
4286
Exhibit No. 211
U4 It;
wee:
our o* 1
cxcjumm:
6««t As:
0X«.» f^^x
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'
DATf tf TTL.
PtAt^U
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AteooHT n ■ ^
HSftSt 30
AitiMUsr
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CfT»: 2iP:
-r3» 0c
r?te-Z*T«dt
Ctvr jp'^x^if- Xa^ 6^,2(±^^in
r«ms i
BY: ibtfcs;
5.0
FfnuTT
Due
PATtf.'
» J .
.
iTZ'^o^.
V/a/7A
4287
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4288
4289
Exhibit No. 212
f
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4290
Exhibit No. 213
J tivc (PA ii^^ z;^ 6^,^^;.^ .
%•
. \AJiy>p o<frVtju^ rt^ s^a>*^^
*K*'~a^>>
&
- i!r tAnfv I>^ *"^ i^^i cu^XtJ^ (L (^
4291
'T^-- '^^^ ^-*^^ ^^c'^^(yK /, / /.
5^1 GK5
5C
t-^^U^
4292
Exhibit No. 214
/i^^/
A VOTE FOR WALLACE ...
IS A WASTED VOTE
On March 14 cast your ballot for
SEN. EDMUND
SKIE
4293
5"a^^^
/c^J
:u=:JSil^^iifviaG£^i£2ii
IF YOU LIKED HITLER
YOU'LL JUST LOVE
r \A\ir Dick Barton
4294
Exhibit No. 215
-821-9760.
Acrot'KT vn
P.O. Box 97? Venice, Ca I i f . _9P29J.,
-'"-'-' ■ y
J70» SOVTirT AVCNUC SUTTt » • UB ANEEUS. CAUfOdMA 90034
•W-171S
4295
Exhibit No. 216
•35B«q_;' '"^s:
feh. I<
1 \
^
y«HE^
4296
Exhibit No. 217
5:S Xo. La Brea Ave Los Angeles, Ca.— 9003G (213) 933-5667
Dear McCarthy Delegate:
Gene McCarthy just completed a campaign tour In California and
wishes to convey his thanks for your support during his appearances.
As yoii know, we do not have the funds to conduct an extensive campaign
here, but Gene assured me the campaign will continue though the con-
vention in Miami, v >
Realistically the race in California is now betiyeen'SeriJTtor
HcGovem and Senator Humphrey. The latest polls indicate it will be
a close election. !• • :; .
It has been deceided that a win by Senator Humphrey would
benefit our cause more than a win by Senator McGovem^ If McGovern takes
California he will win the nomination on an early ballot in Miami. If
Hunphrey wins in California, Miami will deadlock which will enable Gene
McCarthy to gain- the nomination; or at the very least to heavily in-
fluence the drafting of the Party platform. Accordingly, we ask you
to unofficially support Senator Humphrey on June 6. Ue realize Senator
ncGovem's views are more attuned to Gene's, but this sacrifice is
necessary. Anything that can be done to stop McGovem would be helpful,
bat IT SHOULD NOT BE DONE IN THE NAIE OF MCCARTHY.
As a solid McCarthy supporter we know you will keep this letter
and our strategy confidential. Thanks again for your continued support.
Sincerely,
^Qjliccxyi^K^ ^(^y^i^zan^
4297
Dear Chisholin supporter:
Gene McCarthy just completed a campaign tour of California
and while In Los Angeles he had the pleasure to discuss with
Shirley Chi sholm the California political situation. It was felt
by both parties that if George McGovem wins In California he
has all but locked up the nomination; but if Hubert Humphrey wins
In California, the Miami convention will deadlock whidi will enable
both Gene McCarthy and Shirley Chi sholm to heavily influence the
Party platform. The latest polls indicate the. California primary
win be very close.
' . Accordingly, I have been asked to urge you to unofficially '
support Senator Humphrey on June 6. We realize Senator McGovem 's
.views are more attuned to Shirley's or Gene's, but tht^ sacrifice
is necessary to accomplish the basic objectives of the Shirley Chlsholm
and Gene McCarthy movements. Anything that can be done to stop
McGovem would be helpful, but IT SHOULD NOT BE DONE IN THE* NAME
OF .ANY PARHCULAR CANDIDATE.
I have been assured by Shirley Silverstein at Chlsholm State
Headquarters that you will keep this letter and our strategy
confidential.
Sincerely,
4jfi^>^-Ci>»?^ ^»<ail^j«K,.^
4298
Exhibit No. 218
George McGovern'S
REAL Record ON THE WA>R^
I L^V^^-
mQjt^ Aug. 7, 1964 George McGovern voted for the Gulf of Tonkin
• "O^ H.J. Res 1145 Resolution.
■ Q>r c M^y ^« 1965 George McGovern DIDN'T VOTE during passage of Supplemental
'^OO H.J. Res 447 Appropriations of $700 Million for U.S. Military
Operations in Vietnam.
mf^^jr March 1, 1966 George McGovern voted to kill Morse Amendment to
IVOO S2791 to Supplemental Defense Appropriations Bill to
repeal the Gulf of Tonkin Resolution .
March 1, 1966 George McGovern voted to kill Gruening Amendment
S2791 prohibiting the use of drafted serviceman in
Southeast Asia unless they volunteered to go,
March 10, 1966George McGovern voted for Foreign Assistance
HR12169 appropriations of $315 Million for support of
effort in Southeast Asia and the Dominican Republic
and $100 Million for Prooidont'a contingency fund.
March 22, 1966George McGovern voted for Supplemental Appropriations
HR13546 of $13,135,719,000 primarily to support U.S. operations
in Southeast Asia,
|Q>f ^ Aug, 22, 1967 Defense Appropriations Bill, George McGovern voted
*^^l HR10738 against Morse Amendment to reduce appropriations
by 10%.
Aug. 22, 1967 Defense Appropriations Bill, George McGovern voted
HR10738 against Clark motion to recommit the bill to committee
with amendments deleting $3,5 Billion.
March 1, 1967 George McGovern voted for Supplemental Appropriations
S665 for Vietnam of $4,467,200,000.
March 20. 1967 George McGovern voted for Supplemental Defense Department
HR7123 funds for the war in Vietnam of $12,196,520,000,
iQXOJune 26, 1968 George McGovern voted for Supplemental Appropriations
*^^*' HR17734 Bill of $6, 373, 735,498-bulk of which was for increased
costs of Vietnam war.
DON'T BELIEVE IT ? CHECK THE RECORD !
Prepared by Students for Honesty in Government
4299
Exhibit No. 219
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Exhibit No. 220
May 26. 1972 Pari One ,
\^
lo% Ang«lti. Cailloin
II] lloUi/'JOO'i Us/d.
'i AngUti. CaUiu/u
YORTY
FOR PRESIDENT
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dayt ago and pAmittd ta beep qu^cX a6oiU U, I amnat. I
^slanily 'orced lo cl
Ilea and hi9 nor^esty.
II l9 belora an elachon ihal l^« eip«H»[x:»d politician
le, will be STiooi^ lalking ihe public for |l-»lr voias «nd. on
9 Olhor hand, doing anylNng Immorairy r>»C«SMry to
wredll hl9. or har, opporant. Where polltlciflna ar« slkMed
081 owsy wlih h, ihay have even Men knoMn to do tway
!ih aloctions completely, or do away with tfwlr oppooenla.
impleiftly Fonunolely this coonlry la not yet at Ihal point
jpolni
But IM I
tonre t>ehlnd the leiierv as Humphrey *
llleral Inierpreiaiioa Still others were
. MoQovem compalonars ihernteNes
letter* *• a double reverse ploy tc
McQovem appaan u the vlcHra
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view or Euo*n" McCantVa opon
public or private Irtwailge
think the mailer serioui ono-igh
Informatlor^ atap rorvard r
help preserve ar^d deepor>
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consequences, b
abi>^
4302
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4303
Exhibit No. 221
siUE (U. S. 1
D O '
1200 BRICKELL AVfclsiUE (U.S. 1) • MIA//,I, FLORIDA 33i31 • il: 37307-6
September 19, 1973
Senate Select Committee on
Presidential Campaign Activities
Room 6-308
New Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510
Distinguished Gentlemen:
We are enclosing any and all records, files, documents,
ledgers, bills, receipts, telephone messages, order
forms, memoranda, recordings, photographs, corres-
pondence, cancelled checks, relating directly or indirectly
in whole or in part to the Presidential Campaign and
election of 1972, including but not limited to work, service,
and employment ordered and requested by Don Simmons,
Donald Segretti, Donald Durham.
Yours very truly,
^TOWNE MOTEL
JM:ic
encs
BOOM TEVEPHONES • FREE T.V. • AIR CONDITIONED & HEATED • MODERN POOL & PATIO
4304
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TOKNE MOTEL
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TOWNE MOTEL
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4310
Exhibit No. 222
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Exhibit No. 223
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PAID IN AOVft'lCE
CREDIT FOR PORTlOf! Or
MOMTH BILLED nEFORE j
SERVICE co';;;ECTEn i
C:-IAP.3E FOR CON-; -CTP.3
GR CMi.'!GI-;'o SE^.VICt
Ot; OCT 25
LOC^L t;x
us t;x
gf>5 OCT 16 I OCT 2 3
290CR
loiii cA.tic? ;o £111 I
■■15CR
:• 9 C R
"5 5 3 A C R
1 SECUHITY PACIFIC NATIONAL BANK L3 I^ 124390
: .tsnu.-ry lA, 1972
-DCWALD H. SECRETTI- '■ '
PUP.c:!!.'.5:r'S COl'Y of
N'
4312
0'-:.--t irt V.-. K.->:..i sch
V27/71
OESCRlfTION
For sarvicos rinri'irad as nn indeponoent con-
tractor October 15 - 31/71.
4?
T2r-^.,Ov~> ^^ 07f y-.c.j.
5667.00
Heibert W. Kalmbach
Ne..port Saach, CalKornia
1/3/72
Advance for expenses
ESCRIPTION
AMOUNT
$5,000.00
Hctbsrt \V. K3-,t3:h
N'ev.;ori 2 ==:h. Czlilai-ta
i c R 1 PTI o N
ror sarvicTS rencorad as an ind ipsi-scsnt con-
tractor '.Cover.ber 15 - 30, 1971
IS6&7.00
DESCRIPTION
|1 2/1 3/71 I For services rendeciod as an independont
contrcictor DccorrJacr 1-15, 1971
$667.00
4313
NeApoti 3;-2Ch, Cili^ctnia
11/11/71
DESCRIPTION
For services rendered as an independent coji-
tractor Koverpj^er 1-15, 1971.
S567.00
:". W. Ki::-:3;h
D E S C R I PT I t
For services rendered as an independent
contractor Decarriier 15 - 31, 1971
£657.00
li;rt=r; '.V. K='';.b£ch
f.'e.-.pcrt E=a:h. Csliforr.U
c»Te
DESCaiPTION
.,..o...v.
1/17/7,2
For services rendered as an independent con-
tractor January 1 - 15, 1972
$oG7.C0
4314
Exhibit No. 224
Telephone Log — Mobbis [Seqbetti] toChapin
date, numbeb, and location
September 1, 1972— (213) 647-0476— Los Angeles, California
June 19, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California
June 16, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California
June 8, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California
Mav 1, 1972— (415) 848-9214— San Francisco, California
April 18, 1972— 393-9832— Washington, D.C.
March 24, 1972—783-9714 — Washington, D.C.
March 24, 1972— 638-7723— Washington, D.C.
March 21, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles. California
March 14, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California
March 8, 1972— (212) 247-8897— New York, N.Y.
March 6, 1972— (312) 686-9533— Chicago, Illinois
January 31, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California
January 28, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California
January 25, 1972— (212) 679-9798— New York, N.Y.
January 24, 1972— (215) WA2-8185— Philadelphia, Pa.
January 20, 1972— 638-2260— Washington, D.C.
January 19, 1972— 638-8870— Washington, D.C.
January 19, 1972— 341-2580— Washington, D.C.
January 18, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California
January 17, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California
January 12, 1972— (614) 236-9462— Columbus, Ohio
January 10, 1972— (317) 637-0620— Indianapolis, Indiana
January 3, 1972— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California
December 28, 1971— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California
December 17, 1971— (608) 257-8811— Madison, Wisconsin
December 16, 1971— (414) 432-9538— Green Bay, Wisconsin
December 16, 1971— (414) 494-9844 — Green Bay, Wisconsin
December 13, 1971— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California
December 7, 1971— (713) 928-9309— Houston, Texas
December 7, 1971— (214) 351-9087— Texas
Decembers 1971— (305) 634-9381— Florida
November 29, 1971— (415) 822-1750— San Francisco, California
.November 26, 1971— (213) 821-9990— Los Angeles, California
November 20, 1971— 638-2260— Washington, D.C.
November 19, 1971— 638-2260— Washington. D.C.
November 18, 1971— (603) 623-8235— New Hampshire
November 10, 1971— (213) 821-9760— Los Angeles, California
November 9, 1971— (213) 821-9760 — Los Angeles, California
November 8, 1971— (213) 821-9760— Los Angeles, California
November 6. 1971— (213) 821-9760— Los Angeles, California
November 6, 1971— (213) 821-9760— Los Angeles, California
November 2, 1971— 265-2000— Washington, D.C.
November 1, 1971— 265-2000— Washington, D.C.
November 1, 1971— 393-9027— Washington, D.C.
October 28. 1971— (213) 821-9760 — Los Angeles, California
October 15, 1971— (213) 821-9760— Los Angeles, California
October 5, 1971— (213) 821-9760— Los Angeles, California
One outgoing : September 1. 1972.
Marina del Ray (Talked to his mother) .
4315
Exhibit No. 225
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ADDITIONAL MATERIAL SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD
ARNOLD & POETEB
1229 NINETEENTH STREET, N,W.
WASHINGTON, D. C. 20036
October 3, 1973
Samuel Dash, Esquire
Select Committee on Presidential
Campaign Activities
Room 1418
New Senate Office Building
Washington, D. C. 20510
Dear Sam:
In line with the request we received from your
office, I'm enclosing my notarized affidavit with re-
spect to the Institute for Policy Studies and the
testimony of Patrick Buchanan.
If I can be of further assistance, please
give me a call.
Mitchell Rogovin
enclosure
4370
city of Washington )
) ss :
District of Columbia )
AFFIDAVIT OF MITCHELL ROGOVIN
Mitchell Rogovin, being duly sworn, deposes and
says :
1. I am a partner in the law firm of Arnold &
Porter, 1229 19th Street, N.W., Washington, D. C. 20036,
a member of the Bar of the District of Columbia, and
general counsel to the Institute for Policy Studies
( "the Institute") .
2. The Institute is a nonprofit District of
Columbia corporation which is exempt from federal in-
come tax under section 501(c) (3) of the Internal Reve-
nue Code of 1954 as a charitable and educational orga-
nization, and which is not a "private foundation" under
the Code. The Institute engages in research into public
policy matters and is engaged in the training and educa-
tion of individuals through its Ph.D. program. The
Institute engages in no "political activities" that are
forbidden under the internal revenue laws.
3. In testimony before the Senate Select Committee
on' Presidential Campaign Activities on Wednesday, September
26, 1973, Mr. Patrick Buchanan, in the course of his tes-
timony,' made several false allegations concerning the
Institute.
437 L
4. In his testimony, Mr. Buchanan stated that
the Ford Foundation "provides funds" for the Institute
for Policy Studies, that the Institute was a "beneficiary
of Ford money, " and that the Institute "of course is
Ford-funded." Mr. Buchanan sought to leave the impression
that the institute's funding has come primarily or in
large part from the Ford Foundation.
5. In fact, the only funds the Institute has re-
ceived from the Ford Foundation consisted of a one-year
grant of $7,800 received in 1954 for the specific pur-
pose of holding seminars on the subject of the Alliance
for Progress. This grant was a very minor source of
funding for the institute.
5. Mr. Buchanan stated that the Institute "holds
seminars for Congressmen, for staffers, and the like, and
they [the Institute] deal in trying to influence Congress-
men and the like to vote in one direction. "
7. In fact, the Institute has held conferences
and seminars which have been attended by, among others.
Congressmen and their assistants, but at no time has
the Institute attempted to influence the votes of Con-
gressmen.
8. Mr. Buchanan asserted that the Institute
"funded the Quicksilver Times," which he described as
a "radical underground newspaper, " "v/hich .has a political
point of view and which is sold for profit." Mr. Buchanan
4372
stated further that since he was familiar with the Quick-
silver Times as a "commercial venture, it would seem to
me that this [alleged funding by the Institute] would be
an illicit use of tax exempt funds." In the same sentence,
Mr. Buchanan implied that the Institute had used Ford
Foundation money to fund the Quicksilver Times.
9. In fact, the Institute has never funded the
Quicksilver Times. To the best of my knowledge and be-
lief, the Washinqtonian magazine article cited by Mr.
Buchanan does not state that the Institute ever funded
the Quicksilver Times.
10. The names of the Institute for Policy Studies
and its Co-Directors, Marcus Raskin and Richard Barnet,
have been mentioned in the course of the hearings before
the Senate Select Committee in connection with the so-
called list of "enemies" of the Administration, against
whom certain Administration officials urged that the re-
sources of various government agencies be applied. In
addition, an exhibit referred to during Mr. Ehrlichman's
testimony, the Krogh-Young memo to Ehrlichman of August 11,
1971, indicates that both Raskin and Barnet were "over-
heard. "
11. The Instutute has been the subject of an
audit by the Internal Revenue Service ever since the
Nixon Administration took office. The latest audit be-
gan in January of 1970, apparently as part of the IRS
"Special Service Group" program. The scope and nature
of the audit can hardly be described as routine.
4373
12. At present, the Internal Revenue Service,
using quite unusual procedures, has proposed to revoke
the Institute's tax exemption. The grounds for revoca-
tion do not include any of the alleged activities men-
tioned by Mr. Buchanan, but rather concern charitable
and educational activities of the Institute which are
indistinguishable from the activities of other institu-
tions of higher learning in the United States, but which
do involve viewpoints differing sharply from those of
the Administration.
13. It appears that the Internal Revenue Service
in this case has not followed Mr. Buchanan's professed
belief that educational organizations which study social
issues but which do not engage in political activities
should be permitted to maintain their tax exemption re-
gardless of whether they are considered "liberal" or
"conservative. "
14. The Institute has learned from a former FBI
informant that the FBI on several occasions has infil-
trated the Institute for Policy Studies with agents and
informants and on at least one occasion joined with a
member of the Metropolitan Police Department in the theft
of documents from the Institute.
15. We have also been advised by a former Special
Agent of the FBI that the FBI has improperly secured the
bank records of the Institute without the use of legal
process.
4374
16. The Institute has evidence of illegal sur-
veillance of the Institute by governmental agencies by
means of wiretapping, electronic surveillance, and
breaking and entering.
17. Representatives of the Institute will be
able to supply you with further details of these ac-
tivities.
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Subscribed and sworn to before
me this ^ d- day of (^cJC^-A-O'^^ ,
1973.
r^fz.^-^ J?/ ■ U^' :
Notary Public
My Commjsaion Expires Majr 14, 197?
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BOSTON PUBLIC LIBRARY
3 9999 06308 243
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