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121  932 


DENT 
"MES 
BUCHANAN 

A  BIOGRAPHY 


PHILIP   S.  KLEIN 


PRESIDENT  JAMES  BUCHANAN 
A  BIOGRAPHY 


THE  PENNSYLVANIA  STATE  UNIVERSITY  PRESS 

UNIVERSITY  PARK,  PENNSYLVANIA 


PRESIDENT 

JAMES 

BUCHANAN 

A  BIOGRAPHY 


PHILIP  SHRIVER  KLEIN 


Copyright  O  1962  by  The  Pennsylvania  State  University 
Library  of  Congress  Catalog  Card  No,  62-12623 

Printed  in  the  United  States  of  America 
Second  Printing 


To  my  Father 
H.  M.  J.  Klein 


CONTENTS 


PREFACE  xiii 

PROLOGUE  xvii 

1  PENNSYLVANIA  PIONEER  .   1783-1809  1 

Wagons  in  the  Wilderness 
Mercersburg 
Dickinson  College 

2  PREFACE  TO  POLITICS  -   1809-1819  13 

Country  Lawyer 
State  Assemblyman 
Counsel  for  the  Defense 

3  BIRTH  OF  A  BACHELOR  *  1819-1820  27 

Ann  Coleman 

Flight  to  Politics 

The  Seventeenth  Congress 

4  THE  KING  MAKER  •   18214827  44 

The  Calhoun  Band  Wagon 
Three  Cheers  for  Old  Hickory 
The  Disputed  Election  of  1824 
Buchanan's  Amalgamation  Party 
Bargain  and  Sale 

5  FAREWELL  TO  FEDERALISM  *  18284832  60 

The  Buchanan-Jackson  Party 

The  Fight  for  the  Spoils 

The  Culmination  of  a  Congressional  Career 

vii 


6  RELUCTANT  DIPLOMAT  .  1831-1833  78 

The  Politics  of  the  Russian  Mission 

St.  Petersburg 

The  Conclusion  of  the  Mission 

7  DAYS  OF  DECISION  •  1833-1834  95 

Return  from  Russia 
Demoralized  Democrats 
Senator  Buchanan 

8  THE  GENTLEMAN  FROM  PENNSYLVANIA  •  1835-1837         105 

The  Wolves  and  the  Mules 
The  Election  of  1836 
Relations  with  Van  Buren 

9  THE  ROOT  OF  ALL  EVIL  .  1837-1840  116 

The  Second  Bank  of  the  United  States 
Buchanan  and  the  Subtreasury  Bill 
The  Role  of  the  Rich  Uncle 

10  WISE  AS  THE  SERPENT  *  1838-1841  129 

Trial  Balloon 

The  Whigs  Attack 

A  Regular  Chinese  Puzzle 

11  THIS  I  BELIEVE  -  1834-1845  142 

The  Creed  of  a  Conservative 
Foreign  Affairs 
Expansion  and  Slavery 

12  AN  OFFICE  NOT  TO  BE  SOUGHT  .  1844  151 

No  Peace  for  Pennsylvania 

The  Democratic  Nomination  of  1844 

Red  Herring 

13  POLITICS  UNDER  POLK  *  1845-1846  163 

The  State  Department 
The  Perils  of  the  Patronage 
The  Walker-McKay  Tariff 

viii 


14  CONQUERING  A  CONTINENT  .  1845-1849  175 

Texas 

Oregon 

Mexico 

The  Life  of  a  Galley  Slave 

15  STILL  HUNT  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  .  1848  194 

Recipe  for  Political  Pie 
Disciplining  Democrats 
Convention  Blues 

16  THE  SAGE  OF  WHEATLAND  .  1849-1852  206 

Country  Squire 

The  Compromise  of  1850- 

The  Band  Wagon  Rolls  Again 

17  A  MISSION  FOREDOOMED  .  1852-1854  221 

Advice  and  Dissent 

The  Man  Who  Was  Ordered  to  Fail 

The  Court  of  St.  James 

The  Caribbean  Crisis 

18  PLAYING  THE  OLD  TROUPER  •  1854-1856  234 

Cuba— Pearl  of  the  Antilles 
An  Unthinkable  War 
Dear  Miss  Lane 

19  THE  RIGHT  MAN  FOR  THE  TIMES  .  1856  248 

The  Shape  of  Things  to  Come 
The  People's  Choice 
Conservatives  to  the  Rescue 

20  CHARTING  THE  COURSE  .  1856-1857  261 

A  National  and  a  Conservative  Government 
Union  above  Section,  Party  above  Faction 
"I  do  solemnly  swear" 

21  THE  PRESIDENT'S  FAMILY  •  1857  273 

Bachelor  in  the  White  House 
The  Captain  and  the  Crew 
Payday  for  Politicians 
The  Old  Chief 


22  KANSAS-A  TRAGEDY  OF  ERRORS  -  1854-1857  286 

Crisis  in  Kansas 

A  Governor  of  National  Stature 

Popular  Sovereignty  in  Action 

23  LECOMPTON-PYRRHIC  VICTORY  •  1858  300 

"By  God,  Sir,  Andrew  Jackson  Is  Dead!" 
"I  Acknowledge  No  Master  but  the  Law1* 
Drive  This  Bill  "Naked"  through  the  House 

24  A  FLOOD  OF  INNOVATIONS  .  1857-1860  313 

Panic  and  War 

Policeman  of  the  Caribbean 

An  Extravagant  List  of  Magnificent  Schemes 

25  CHAOS  AT  CHARLESTON  •  1860  328 

A  Fatal  Feud 

The  Loneliest  Job  in  the  World 
Downgrading  the  Presidency 
Democracy  Dividing 

26  MR.  LINCOLN  IS  ELECTED  .  1860  3*15 

War  on  the  While  House 
How  to  Stop  Lincoln 
Imperial  Visitors 
The  Election  of  1860 


27  THE  IMPENDING  CRISIS  .  1860  353 

Spotlight  on  Charleston 
Strategy  and  Tactics 
The  President  Proposes 
A  Challenge  to  Mr,  Lincoln 

28  CURSED  ARE  THE  PEACEMAKERS  *  1860  368 

"We  Will  Hold  the  Forts*1 
Swiftly  Changing  Circumstances 
The  Cabinet  Explodes 
"Mr.  Lincoln,  Will  You  Help?" 


29  FORTY  DAYS  AND  FORTY  NIGHTS  •  1861  388 

The  Star  of  the  West 
What  Will  Congress  Do? 
A  Temporary  Truce 
The  Final  Effort 

30  ON  THE  ROCK  OF  ST.  HELENA  .  1861-1868  403 

The  Old  Public  Functionary- 
President  Lincoln's  Policy 
The  Making  of  a  Myth 
Mr.  Buchanan's  Book 
Old  Man  Democrat 
The  Road  Home 


NOTES 

BIBLIOGRAPHY  473 

INDEX  491 


PREFACE 


The  man  who  elects  to  play  the  role  of  peacemaker  may,  if  he  succeeds,  be 
soon  buried  in  historical  oblivion,  for  it  is  the  perverse  tendency  of  man- 
kind to  glorify  war  but  to  forget  those  who  surmount  crises  by  thought 
rather  than  by  threat.  A  peacemaker  who  fails,  on  the  other  hand,  is 
likely  to  receive  for  his  efforts  only  resounding  curses  from  both  the 
warring  camps.  Such  was  the  fate  of  James  Buchanan. 

His  presidential  career  was  dedicated  to  peace,  but  his  administra- 
tion culminated  in  a  frenzy  of  secession  which  was  immediately  followed  by 
a  civil  war  of  unprecedented  fury.  These  events  challenge  our  interest  and 
curiosity.  Why  was  Buchanan's  peace  policy  unproductive?  To  what  degree 
was  its  failure  attributable  to  the  chief  executive,  or  to  the  people  who 
chose  him  as  their  representative,  or  to  the  existing  method  of  government? 
James  Buchanan,  fifteenth  president  of  the  United  States,  remains 
one  of  the  least  known  statesmen  of  the  American  nation.  To  date  the 
only  useful  biography  of  him  is  the  two-volume  documentary  work  by 
George  Ticknor  Curtis  which  was  published  in  1883  and  financed  by 
Buchanan's  heirs.  Many  people  remember  Buchanan  only  as  the  bachelor 
in  the  White  House  who  either  caused  the  Civil  War  or  who  ought,  some- 
how, to  have  prevented  it.  It  is  time,  a  century  after  the  end  of  his  presi- 
dential term,  to  re-create  the  life  of  James  Buchanan  and  to  reconsider  his 
place  in  the  American  heritage. 

A  good  many  years  ago,  Professor  Frederick  L.  Schuman,  then 
at  the  University  of  Chicago,  put  me  to  work  on  Buchanan's  diplomatic 
career.  Later,  at  the  University  of  Pennsylvania,  Professors  St.  George 
Leakin  Sioussat  and  Roy  F.  Nichols  guided  me  in  the  study  of  Buchanan's 
early  activities  in  politics  and  encouraged  me  to  project  a  biography  of  him. 
The  present  volume,  which  grew  slowly  and  was  completed  only  after  many 
interruptions,  is  the  fruit  of  their  suggestion- 
After  preparing  what  would  have  been  a  more  extensive  work,  I 
concluded  that  it  would  serve  a  better  purpose  to  present  not  an  exhaustive 
but  a  concise  account  of  Buchanan's  career,  with  the  primary  emphasis  on 

xiii 


balance.  Thus,  while  I  have  tried  to  treat  at  least  briefly  all  the  episodes 
which  Buchanan  thought  important,  I  could  not  in  a  book  of  this  size  give 
the  details  of  all  the  activities  of  a  man  who  served  almost  continuously  in 
public  office  from  1813  to  1861.  I  have  sought,  however,  to  deal  with  the 
subject  in  a  constructively  critical  spirit;  that  is,  to  consider  Buchanan's 
problems  with  understanding,  but  without  any  desire  either  to  exalt  or  to 
degrade  him  for  the  decisions  he  made.  The  reader  may  decide  the  wisdom 
or  the  error  of  his  ways. 

The  Buchanan  described  by  his  own  contemporaries  in  the  years 
before  1861  is  a  person  very  different  from  the  Buchanan  portrayed  by 
many  writers  of  post-Civil  War  reminiscences.  This  biography  seeks  to 
present  the  former.  Buchanan's  associates  up  to  the  outbreak  of  the  war 
judged  him  by  values  and  standards  then  prevalent;  but  the  war  changed 
many  of  these  patterns.  Jeremiah  S.  Black  in  1879  complained  that  the 
story  of  Buchanan's  life  had  "never  been  honestly  told."  "Abolition  lies," 
he  wrote,  "will  take  the  place  of  history,  fand  none  shall  see  the  day  when 
the  cloud  will  pass  away.'  "  The  existence  of  sharply  conflicting  opinions 
about  Buchanan  means  that  the  modern  biographer  must  bear  a  heavy 
responsibility  to  prove  his  interpretation.  Hence,  this  work  will  be  docu- 
mented in  detail,  mostly  by  reference  to  manuscripts  and  newspapers  of 
the  pre-Civil  War  era. 

The  presentation  is  chronological,  and  material  has  been  selected 
for  emphasis  chiefly  according  to  Buchanan's  own  concept  of  what  was 
important  or  trivial.  However,  I  have  sketched  only  the  main  lines  of 
Buchanan's  extensive  participation  in  foreign  affairs;  the  details  may  be 
found  in  numerous  specialized  studies.  Also,  I  have  purposely  condensed 
the  treatment  of  the  presidential  years  because  these  have  been  described 
very  fully  by  many  scholars,  notably  by  Roy  F.  Nichols  in  hia  Disruption 
of  American  Democracy. 

But  very  little  is  generally  known  about  the  first  forty  years  of 
Buchanan's  public  service.  Before  he  became  president,  he  had  already 
engaged  in  as  long  and  energetic  a  political  career  *s  that  of  Webster,  day, 
Calhoun,  or  Benton.  This  era  of  his  life,  his  schooling  for  the  highest  office, 
has  not  hitherto  been  adequately  explored.  I  have  tried  to  explain  his  role 
in  party  politics,  especially  Pennsylvania  politics,  before  he  came  to  occupy 
the  White  House.  Judgments  of  Buchanan  as  president  ought  to  be  based 
upon  knowledge  of  the  man  prior  to  that  time.  He  was,  after  all,  nearly 
sixty-seven  years  old  when  he  was  inaugurated. 

I  have  been  concerned  with  his  work  as  a  lawyer  and  with  the 
influence  of  his  legal  experience  upon  his  political  thinking.  Also, !  have 
sought  to  expose  the  many  ramifications  of  his  personal  life,  his  relationship 
with  his  friends,  his  management  of  the  complicated  family  problems  which 


xiv 


engaged  much  of  his  attention,  and  the  conduct  of  his  private  business 
affairs. 

I  have  used,  in  several  parts  of  this  book,  some  of  my  writing 
published  earlier  under  the  titles:  The  Story  of  'JPkeatland  (Lancaster,  1936), 
Pennsylvania  Politics,  1817-1832,  a  Game  without  Rules  (Philadelphia,  1940), 
"James  Buchanan  and  Ann  Coleman,"  Pennsylvania  History*  XXI  (Jan., 
1954),  1-20;  "The  Inauguration  of  James  Buchanan,"  Lancaster  County 
Historical  Society  Journal,  LXI  (1957),  145-171;  and  "James  Buchanan  at 
Dickinson,"  in  John  and  Mary's  College  (Carlisle,  Pa.,  1956),  pp.  157-180. 

Many  people  have  helped  me  gather  material.  The  staifs  of 
libraries,  historical  societies,  and  archives  have  given  me  friendly  guidance 
and  greatly  aided  me  in  my  search.  I  am  especially  indebted  to  the  Hamilton 
Library  and  Historical  Society  of  Cumberland  County,  the  Lancaster  County 
Historical  Society,  the  Crawford  County  Historical  Society,  the  Historical 
Society  of  Berks  County,  the  Northumberland  County  Historical  Society, 
the  Wyoming  Historical  and  Geological  Society,  the  Historical  Society  of 
York  County,  the  Historical  Society  of  Western  Pennsylvania,  the  Histori- 
cal Society  of  Pennsylvania,  the  Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts,  the 
Essex  Institute,  the  Boston  Public  Library,  the  Pennsylvania  Historical 
and  Museum  Commission,  the  Library  of  Congress,  the  National  Archives, 
the  State  Library  of  Pennsylvania,  the  Library  Company  of  Philadelphia, 
and  the  Libraries  of  the  University  of  Pennsylvania,  the  University  of 
Georgia,  Franklin  and  Marshall  College,  Dickinson  College,  and  The 
Pennsylvania  State  University. 

Those  persons  who  kindly  sent  me  copies  of  privately  owned 
Buchanan  manuscripts  or  permitted  me  to  study  their  collections  have  been 
named  in  the  bibliography.  I  wish  here  to  express  my  appreciation  to  them, 
I  am  grateful  to  Lancaster  Newspapers,  Inc.,  for  providing  me  with  facilities 
for  a  protracted  search  of  their  files  of  early  Lancaster  newspapers,  to  the 
late  E.  E.  Bausman  for  permission  to  use  the  papers  that  Buchanan  de- 
posited with  his  executors,  and  to  Louis  S,  May,  Esq.,  for  making  his  office 
available  for  work  on  these.  I  would  like  also  to  express  my  thanks  to 
Horace  Montgomery,  Malcolm  Freiberg,  Sylvester  K.  Stevens,  Sanford  W. 
Higginbotham,  Whitfield  Bell,  Jr.,  the  late  John  Lowry  Ruth,  Talbot  T. 
Speer,  William  A.  Russ,  Jr.,  Asa  E.  Martin,  George  D.  Harmon,  the  late 
C.  H.  Martin,  H.  Hanford  Hoskins,  Maurice  G.  Buchanan,  Annie  Gilchrist, 
Henry  J.  Young,  Charles  Coleman  Sellers,  the  Reverend  E.  J.  Turner, 
Herbert  B.  Anstaett,  John  B.  Rengier,  and  J.  Bennett  Nolan  for  many  and 
varied  kinds  of  assistance.  In  concluding  this  list,  I  want  to  mention 
especially  the  friendly  help  and  encouragement  given  me  by  the  late  Philip 
Gerald  Auchampaugh,  the  most  assiduous  student  of  Buchanan  in  this 
generation. 

It  is  a  further  pleasure  to  acknowledge  the  useful  work  of  some 


former  students  whose  research  illuminated  many  obscure  points:  Dorothy 
Airhart,  Leon  Davidheiser,  Richard  F.  Fralick,  Robert  E.  Franz,  Robert  F. 
Himmelberg,  Dirck  Parkin,  .Margaret  Strobe!,  Gerald  L  Wagner,  Guy  J. 
Way,  and  Dale  G.  Wheelwright. 

Dean  Roy  F.  Nichols  of  the  University  of  Pennsylvania,  Professor 
Norman  A.  Graebner  of  the  University  of  Illinois,  and  Professor-Emeritus 
Burke  M.  Hermann  of  The  Pennsylvania  State  University  rea«l  the  entire 
manuscript  and  greatly  aided  me  in  shortening  it  and  in  eliminating  errors. 
Professors  Holman  Hamilton  of  the  University  of  Kentucky  and  Blwurd  J. 
Nichols  of  The  Pennsylvania  State  University  also  gave  me  valuable  con- 
structive criticism.  I  thank  these  gentlemen  for  their  interest,  their  time, 
and  their  help.  For  those  mistakes  of  fact  and  judgment  which  may  be 
found  in  a  book  of  this  scope,  I  take  entire  responsibility. 

The  Council  on  Research  of  The  Pennsylvania  State  University 
gave  financial  support  to  this  study  over  a  number  of  year*,  and  the  Social 
Science  Research  Center  of  the  University  aided  me  by  the  purchase  of 
microfilms.  For  these  marks  of  confidence  I  thank  them.  Finally,  true 
to  tradition,  my  wife,  Dorothy  Orr  Klein,  typed  the  manuscript  in  its 
entirety  through  several  drafts  and  participated  in  all  the  essential  chores 
from  beginning  to  end.  I  acknowledge  my  greatest  debt  of  gratitude  to  her, 

P.  S.  K. 

Union  Mills,  Md. 
August,  1961 


xvi 


PROLOGUE 


Worry  and  anxiety  marked  the  faces  of  the  people  fleeing  eastward  along 
the  Marietta  Pike  toward  Lancaster,  Pennsylvania.  Constantly  they  looked 
back  from  their  carts  piled  with  boxes  and  furniture  at  the  faint  red  glow  in 
the  darkening  sky  beyond  Chestnut  Hill,  Occasionally  small  squads  of 
horsemen  came  galloping  out  from  town  and  headed  for  the  Susquehanna 
River  ten  miles  to  the  west.  Most  of  the  riders  seemed  intent  on  their  own 
business;  but  where  the  pike  ran  past  the  spacious  grounds  of  Wheatland, 
home  of  former  President  Buchanan,  some  would  shout,  "You  damned 
rebel!"  or  "I  hope  they  burn  you  out  like  they  did  Thad  Stevens." 

It  was  Sunday  night,  June  28,  1863.  The  latest  reports  warned  of 
35,000  Confederate  troops  at  York,  a  southern  army  closing  in  on  Harris- 
burg,  and  a  skirmish  in  progress  between  the  rebel  advance  guard  and  local 
militia  at  Wrightsville.  The  river  bridge  between  Columbia  and  Wrightsville 
was  said  to  be  aflame,  and  the  glow  in  the  sky  seemed  to  confirm  that,  but 
could  Lee's  army  storm  across  the  shallow  Susquehanna  somewhere  else? 

James  Buchanan  had  walked  down  from  his  house  to  the  spring 
on  the  lower  lawn  which  bordered  the  pike,  his  favorite  spot  in  the  evening. 
He  liked  to  look  over  the  low  stone  parapet  into  the  clear  water  and  watch 
the  moss  and  white  sand  swirling  gently  in  the  undercurrent.  Nowhere 
else  in  the  world  had  he  ever  found  the  sunsets  more  relaxing  or  the  world 
more  serene  than  here,  under  the  willow  by  his  Wheatland  spring.  But  not 
so  this  night.  Would  Wheatland  be  standing  tomorrow,  or  in  ashes? 
Would  he  be  alive,  or  dead,  or  some  kind  of  ridiculous  trophy  of  this  sense- 
less, unthinkable  war?  He  did  not  know,  nor  did  he  really  care  very  much. 

With  the  first  news  of  Lee's  advance  into  Pennsylvania,  he  had 
packed  Harriet  off  to  Philadelphia  and  shipped  away  his  most  important 
papers.  He  had  tried  to  make  Miss  Hetty  leave,  but  she  said  firmly  that  she 
would  stay  if  he  did.  He  had  told  friends  who  urged  him  to  get  out  of  the 
invasion  area  that  he  would  remain  at  Wheatland  if  it  should  be  surrounded 
by  a  hundred  thousand  rebels.  He  and  Miss  Hetty  would  see  it  through 
together. 

xvii 


As  he  walked  through  the  oak  grove  and  back  to  the  house, 
Buchanan  felt  the  crushing  certainty  that  his  whole  life  had  been  a  failure. 
Such  a  thought  he  rarely  admitted  to  his  consciousness,  but  tonight  he 
could  not  banish  it.  The  Columbia  Bridge  seemed  the  symbol  of  the  two 
great  tragedies  of  his  career.  Nearly  half  a  century  before,  while  trying  to 
save  that  bridge  in  a  law  court,  he  had  lost  Ann  Colt-man.  Through  all  his 
later  years,  eschewing  domesticity  for  politic?,  he  haw!  labored  to  keep  strong 
the  bridge  of  understanding  and  mutual  regard  between  people  of  the  North 
and  the  South.  The  bridge  was  burning  now,  ruined  as  completely  a«  his 
own  life's  work. 

Exactly  fifty  years  ago,  he  remembered  with  nostalgia,  he  had  for 
the  first  time  accepted  a  public  office.  Since  then  he  had  served  con- 
tinuously in  nearly  every  public  capacity,  from  the  lowest  to  the  highest  in 
steady  progression.  He  had  worked  unceasingly  to  strengthen  ami  to 
develop  the  best  political  society  that  man  ever  invented;  but  now  the  South 
had  broken  off  half  of  it,  and  Lincoln's  party  seemed  intent  upon  making 
the  other  half  into  a  form  of  government  that  would  have  horrified  the 
Fathers  of  the  Constitution.  Buchanan  had  once  dared  to  hope  that  his 
presidency  might  rank  in  history  with  that  of  George  Washington;  now 
the  very  name  Buchanan  was  one  for  people  to  curse  and  spit  at,  north 
and  south. 

His  father  had  warned  him.  Buchanan,  with  the  vivid  memory 
of  early  days  peculiar  to  old  people,  recalled  distinctly  it  letter  his  father 
had  written  to  him  at  a  time  of  youthful  crisis  ''Often  when  people  have 
the  greatest  prospect  of  temporal  honor  and  aggrandisement,"  the  old 
gentleman  had  said,  "they  are  all  blasted  in  a  moment  by  a  fatality  con* 
nected  with  men  and  things,  and  no  doubt  the  design*  of  Providmre  may 
be  seen  very  conspicuously  in  our  disappointments." 

Buchanan  suddenly  felt  a  twinge  of  chagrin  that  hix  father  never 
lived  to  see  him  rise  to  fame.  In  what  other  twiety,  he  wondered,  could 
the  child  of  a  poor,  orphaned  immigrant  be  able  to  work  his  way  up  to  the 
first  chair  of  state?  Some  eighty  years  before,  his  father  had  come  to 
America.  He  had  trained  his  son  for  eminence.  ffl  am  not  dfcpmed  to 
censure  you  for  being  ambitious/*  he  used  to  tell  young  Jamcn,  and  he  hail 
set  a  good  example.  When  he  had  arrived  from  Ireland,  he  had  little  hut 
ambition  to  help  him.  James  wished  that  his  father  had  told  him  more  about 
the  family  background  and  the  early  years  in  Ireland;  but  he  had  not* 

After  entering  the  house,  Buchanan  went  directly  to  the  ttudy 
and  began  to  write.  If  the  rebels  came,  they  would  find  him  at  work— 
preparing  his  story  of  "Mr,  Buchanan's  Administration  on  the  Eve  of 
Rebellion." 


xvm 


PRESIDENT  JAMES  BUCHANAN 
A  BIOGRAPHY 


1 

PENNSYLVANIA  PIONEER  •  1783  - 1809 

WAGONS  IN  THE  WILDERNESS 

James  Buchanan  paused  often  in  his  chores  around  the  Irish  farmstead 
during  the  early  spring  of  1783.  For  several  years  he  had  been  thinking 
about  migrating  to  America  after  the  Revolutionary  War.  Now  that  the 
United  States  had  won  independence  the  young  man  faced  the  moment  of 
decision.  He  had  deep  roots  in  the  land  of  his  birth.  As  he  looked  out 
over  the  fields  toward  the  nearby  waters  of  Lough  S willy,  he  worried  about 
leaving  a  green  and  settled  land  where  the  name  he  bore  signified  kinship 
with  a  considerable  part  of  the  local  population.  The  Clan  Buchanan  had 
been  proliferating  in  Scotland  and  northern  Ireland  for  seven  centuries. 

As  a  baby,  he  had  been  brought  to  the  forty-acre  farm  in  County 
Donegal  called  the  "Big  Airds,"  the  home  of  his  mother's  brother,  Samuel 
Russell.  Samuel's  daughter,  Molly,  remembered  the  cold,  rainy  day  when 
her  father  came  riding  in  with  little  James  bundled  up  snugly  under  his 
greatcoat.  What  happened  to  the  parents  of  James  Buchanan  remains  a 
mystery.  His  father,  John  Buchanan,  had  married  Jane  Russell  in  1750, 
and  the  couple  had  several  children  before  James  was  born  in  1761.  There 
is  some  evidence  that  the  mother  died  about  that  time  and  that  the  father 
then  disappeared*  After  1764,  no  trace  of  the  parents  can  be  found,1 

The  Russells  had  given  a  good  home  and  a  good  education  to  their 
adopted  nephew.  He  was  twenty-two  now,  he  had  a  little  money  of  his  own, 
his  uncle  had  done  all  that  could  be  expected,  and  America  in  the  spring  of 
1783  seemed  fabulously  inviting.  Uncle  Samuel  had  a  brother,  Joshua 
Russell,  a  tavern  owner  near  Gettysburg,  Pennsylvania,  who  had  written 
that  he  could  meet  the  boy  in  Philadelphia  and  provide  for  his  immediate 
care.2 

On  July  4, 1783,  young  Buchanan  went  aboard  the  brig  Providence 
as  a  paying  passenger.  We  can  imagine  some  of  his  thoughts  and  dreams 
as  he  stood  at  the  rail  while  the  lines  were  cast  off  and  the  creaking  ship 
slowly  eased  her  way  out  of  the  channel  from  Londonderry,  but  even  his 


wildest  flights  of  fancy  would  scarcely  have  approached  the  reality  of 
the  future. 

Joshua  Russell  met  Buchanan  in  Philadelphia  and  returned  with 
him  to  the  Russell  Tavern  on  the  Hunterstown  road.  During  the  leisurely 
trip  on  horseback,  James  acquainted  himself  with  the  new  country  and 
with  his  uncle  Joshua.  They  passed  through  Valley  Forge.  Here,  flamed 
Joshua,  he  had  served  as  wagonmaster  during  the  grim  winter  of  17774778, 
carrying  flour  from  York  to  the  starving  Continental  army.  In  Lancaster 
the  street  names  sounded  more  European  than  American— King,  Qut*enT 
Duke,  Prince,  and  Earl;  and  the  names  of  the  nearby  townships  reminded 
him  of  home— Drumore,  Antrim,  East  Earl,  Donegal,  Lelterkenny,  Manor, 
and  Coleraine. 

The  broad  Susquehanna,  which  they  crossed  by  fiatboat  at 
Wright's  Ferry,  sparkled  in  the  late  summer  sunlight,  its  clear  blue  shallows 
studded  with  projecting  rocks  and  framed  with  low  wooded  hills.  West  of 
the  river  the  settlements  grew  sparse  and  the  road,  rough.  Joshua  Russell, 
having  travelled  it  many  times,  had  at  last  decided  to  use  his  experience  on 
the  pike  as  the  means  of  an  easier  livelihood.  He  had  bought  a  200-acre 
tract  in  what  was  then  Cumberland  Township,  York  County,  and  had  built 
a  large  stone  tavern  along  the  main  road  west. 

James  had  nearly  forgotten  Ireland  by  the  time  the  two  came  in 
sight  of  Russell's  Tavern.  His  uncle,  he  found,  had  become  a  man  of 
consequence  in  this  country;  he  was  known  by  sight  all  along  the  road* 
His  estate  comprised  not  only  the  inn  but  outbuilding,  quarters  for  eight 
Ne#ro  slaves,  and  fenced  fields  for  scores  of  cattle.  Joshua'*  wife  Jane 
greeted  him  with  all  the  warmth  he  might  have  expected  from  one  bearing 
his  mother's  name,3 

Uncle  Joshua's  nearest  neighbor  was  James  Sp^er,  *  widower  with 
five  children,  who  farmed  a  270*acre  tract  just  up  the  road.  The  youngest 
of  the  Speers,  Elizabeth,  soon  stopped  at  the  tavern  to  meet  the  «fw  nephew 
from  Ireland,  She  was  sixteen  and  ahe  was  pretty.  James  took  her  walking, 
trading  his  Irish  charm  for  information  about  herself,  her  family,  and 
Pennsylvania,  Elizabeth  had  been  raised  in  southern  Lancaster  County, 
but  her  father,  a  strict  Presbyterian,  had  moved  west  because  of  a  theologi* 
cal  disagreement  with  his  pastor*  Her  mother,  Mary  Patterson  Speer,  had 
died  and  Elizabeth  now  kept  house  for  her  father  and  four  older  brothers.4 

Buchanan  soon  learned  from  the  passing  wagoners  of  an  oppor- 
tunity for  work  at  John  Tom's  little  trading  post  called  "the  stony  batter/' 
40  miles  west  of  the  Russell  Tavern,  Here,  in  Cove  Gap,  freight  wagons 
from  the  East  met  pack  trains  from  Bedford  and  John  Tom  handled  the 
exchange.  The  modem  pilgrim  to  this  spot,  a  wild  and  gloomy  gorge 
hemmed  in  on  all  but  the  eastern  side  by  towering  hills  and  now  far  removed 


from  any  center  of  commercial  activity,  properly  asks  what  induced  an 
ambitious  young  man  to  go  there  to  seek  his  fortune. 

But  Cove  Gap  was  important  in  1783.  Three  parallel  ranges  of 
the  Allegheny  Mountains  barred  the  way  to  the  West  except  at  this  point 
where  a  double  gap  pierced  the  two  most  easterly  ridges,  leaving  Tuscarora 
Mountain  the  only  remaining  barrier.  Travellers  from  Philadelphia  and 
Baltimore  headed  for  Cove  Gap  on  their  way  to  Pittsburgh.  At  Stony 
Batter,  inside  the  Gap,  roads  ended,  goods  piled  up,  and  John  Tom  ran  his 
backwoods  store.  At  times  as  many  as  a  hundred  horses  jammed  a  corral 
there,  but  goods  came  in  by  wagon  so  much  faster  than  they  could  be 
shipped  out  by  pack  train  that  John  Tom  had  to  run  a  warehouse  as  well  as 
a  trading  post.6 

After  a  few  years  as  Tom's  helper,  Buchanan  got  the  chance  to 
buy  the  Stony  Batter  property.  Legend  has  long  had  it  that  this  transaction 
involved  some  sharp  practice,  but  the  court  records  show  only  that  on 
December  15, 1786,  John  Tom  offered  to  sell  his  property  to  Buchanan  for 
200  pounds,  Pennsylvania  currency,  promising  in  the  contract  that  the 
land  was  "free  of  all  Taxes,  Debts,  dues  or  demands."  A  few  days  after 
Buchanan  had  recorded  these  terms  of  sale,  however,  John  Ferguson  of 
Chambersburg  sued  Tom  for  over  500  pounds  owing  to  him  and  guaranteed 
by  the  property.  The  December  County  Court  confirmed  this  judgment 
against  Tom,  and  the  February  Court  ordered  a  sheriff's  sale  of  Stony 
Batter,  the  proceeds  to  go  to  Ferguson.  Buchanan  bought  the  100-acre 
tract  for  142  pounds  at  the  public  sale  on  June  23, 1787.6 

After  buying  Stony  Batter,  Buchanan  rode  off  to  the  foot  of 
South  Mountain  to  claim  Elizabeth  Speer  as  his  bride.  She  was  just 
twenty-one,  and  he  twenty-seven  when  they  married  on  April  16,  1788. 
The  young  couple  moved  into  Tom's  log  cabin  which,  though  crude  and 
rustic  by  later  standards,  was  quite  comfortable  for  their  day.  Their 
property  included  several  log  cabins,  some  barns  and  stables,  a  storehouse 
and  store  building,  cleared  fields,  and  an  orchard. 

The  Buchanans7  first  child,  christened  Mary,  was  born  in  1789. 
On  April  23, 1791,  Elizabeth  presented  her  husband  with  a  son  whom  they 
named  after  his  father.  Tragedy  marred  what  should  otherwise  have  been 
a  very  happy  year:  little  Mary  died.  The  Presbyterian  philosophy  of  pre- 
destination combined  with  the  melancholy  prevalence  of  infant  mortality 
doubtless  softened  the  blow,  but  it  would  have  been  an  unnatural  mother 
who  after  this  experience  did  not  lavish  more  than  the  usual  care  upon  her 
surviving  child.  James  Buchanan,  from  the  very  first  year  of  his  life, 
occupied  a  position  of  special  importance  in  the  household.  His  status 
might  appear  to  have  been  threatened  by  the  birth  of  more  children,  but 
the  reverse  seems  closer  to  the  fact.  The  next  five  additions  to  the  family 
were  girls:  Jane  in  1793,  Maria  in  1795,  Sarah  in  1798,  Elizabeth  in  1800 


(who  died  within  a  year),  and  Harriet  in  1*12.  IV  wnnd  ivy  «»f  the 
family,  born  in  1804,  died  the  «HW  year.  Not  until  the  birth  of  William 
Speer  Buchanan  in  1805  was  thnr  another  boy  in  tin*  Buchanan  homr, 
and  by  that  time  Janu*  was  almost  rrady  to  Iravr  for  rnllrp*.  Two  nuw 
boys  were  born  after  lie  left  home  in  1807. 

Thus,  for  the  first  fourteen  years  *>f  his  life,  James*  Hurhanun,  as 
the  eldest  child  and  only  hoy,  retained  the  plare  of  favoritism  into  whii-h  he- 
had  been  born.  He  lived  in  a  woman's  world  at  horm\  and  until  the  family 
moved  to  Mereeraburjs  he  had  no  playmate*  except  his  Mstrrs.  over  whom 
he  exercised  an  acknowledged  authority.  While  he  commanded  more  than 
the  usual  child's  prerogative  to  be  waited  upon,  ht*  afeo  had  more  than  the 
usual  childhood  responsibility,  and  he  w»«»n  drvt'li»prd  a  p'«»d  opinion  of 
himself  that  was  daily  strengthened  by  the  ifrfmner  »>f  the 
children.  When  he  reached  hi*  <karly  teens,  he  nui«t  have  been  ob 
conceited  and  self-assured. 


MERCERSBURG 

Stony  Batter  proved  a  poor  place  to  raise  a  family.  The  clearing  re- 
sounded  with  the  turmoil  of  stamping  hc«w*s  drunken  drovers  and  ruling 
wagoners.  Elizabeth  Buchanan  dittlikwl  thin  raw  and  unrwith  sorirty 
lived  in  constant  fear  for  the  safety  of  her  small  children  who 
through  the  ceaseless  confusion  of  honte*,  wagon*,  and  »ratfrr*d 
The  business  prospered  enough  that  the  father,  in  17*1,  wan  able  to 
buy  the  "Dunwoodie  Farm/*  a  *pk*nd«<i  300*acrr  tract  of  rirh  Hmwtnne 
land  and  timber  located  about  five  milcB  cut  of  the  Gap  Along  the  Weat 
Conococheague  Creek,  near  the  village  of  Mem*r*lwrg.r 

The  new  farm*  pleasant  w  a  retreat,  atill  did  not  get  th^  family 
out  of  the  Gap  except  at  the  sacrifice  of  th<*  rton>  bwinr m.  Therefore  in 
1796,  Buchanan  bought  a  large  lot  in  the  renter  t>f  ^ferrer^burg  and  built 
on  it  a  two-story  brick  house  to  serve  both  at*  a  hoot?  and  platT  "f  butinn*. 
Putting  his  brother-in-law,  John  Speer,  temporarily  in  char#*  «>f  Stony 
Batter,  he  moved  the  family  to  Mercersfaurg*  Hen*  life  proved!  much  more 
genteel  and  orderly*  The  community  of  several  dozen  hinuuu  w«*  alrnont 
entirely  Scotch.  To  the  Presbyterian  Church,  one  of  the  dktot  in  the 
State,  came  the  Campbells,  Wilsons,  McCMlands  M^Dtmellt*,  Burrs, 
Findkya,  Welshed  and  Smitlia.  Buchanan  gradually  tramfrrmi  hifl 
business  into  town  and  soon  established  himself  as  one  of  ihe  leading 
citizens.  For  a  time  he  served  as  local  justice  of  the  peace*8 

When  the  family  moved  to  town,  James  was  six;  Jane*  three;  and 
Maria,  one.  Until  now  Elizabeth  Buchanan  had  been  their  only  teacher. 
In  spite  of  her  lack  of  schooling,  she  had  accumulated  extensive  knowledge 


of  literature  and  could  quote  verbatim  and  at  length  from  Milton  or  Pope 
or  Cowper.  She  read  a  good  deal  of  theology,  probably  more  as  a  kind  of 
good  work  than  as  a  matter  of  philosophical  inquiry,  but  she  had  sincere 
piety  which  she  unconsciously  passed  on  to  her  children.  She  was  a 
good  storyteller  and  loved  particularly  to  dwell  on  the  career  of  George 
Washington,  whom  she  painted  in  glowing  colors  which  the  children  never 
forgot.  She  named  her  tenth  child  after  their  hero  and  George  became  her 
favorite  in  the  latter  years  of  her  life.  The  Buchanans  in  all  probability 
met  President  Washington  when  he  stayed  at  the  Russell  Tavern  during 
the  excitement  of  the  Whiskey  Rebellion  in  the  winter  of  1794-95.° 

James  attended  the  Old  Stone  Academy  at  Mercersburg  where 
he  studied  Greek  and  Latin,  first  under  the  Reverend  James  R.  Sharon, 
later  with  Mr.  McConnell,  and  finally  under  Dr.  Jesse  Magaw  who  had 
just  completed  his  studies  at  Dickinson  College  and  who  later  married 
Buchanan's  sister,  Maria* 

The  events  of  that  magic  decade  in  life  between  the  ages  of  five 
and  fifteen  impress  a  permanent  mark  on  men.  Any  biographer  would  like 
to  have  all  the  information  possible  on  those  creative  years;  yet  seldom  is 
much  to  be  found.10  Here  the  tangible  evidence  is  almost  always  frag- 
mentary. 

There  were  some  lasting  influences,  however,  which  can  be  seen 
without  reference  to  pen  and  ink  records.  The  little  village  of  Mercersburg 
was  one  of  them.  It  was  a  homogeneous  community  where  the  tempo  of 
life  was  leisurely  and  sedate.  Even  the  scenery  conduced  to  a  sense  of 
peace  and  calm.  The  rich  farmscape,  studded  with  oak  groves  and  framed 
by  the  beautiful  Tuscarora  in  the  West,  brought  from  at  least  one  traveller 
of  that  day  the  involuntary  exclamation:  "What  a  Paradise!"  James 
Buchanan  lived  in  Mercersburg  only  ten  years,  but  for  the  remainder  of 
his  life  he  tried  when  he  could  to  duplicate  those  surroundings.  His  sym* 
pathies  were  always  rural.  His  summers  on  Dunwoodie  Farm  gave  him  a 
personal  attachment  to  that  manner  of  life  which  he  never  lost;  at  his 
Wheatland  plantation  near  Lancaster  he  re-created,  in  a  sense,  the  scenes 
of  his  boyhood.  Manufacturers  and  their  problems  he  never  understood; 
cities  and  their  ways  made  him  miserable.  He  was  at  heart  an  agrarian 
and  never  adjusted  his  thinking  to  the  requirements  of  a  growing  in- 
dustrial society. 

His  father's  store  was  also  a  significant  influence.  Here  he  heard, 
not  entirely  understanding  but  taking  it  all  in  nevertheless,  many  a  political 
argument.  Even  as  a  lad  of  eight  he  had  no  difficulty  in  knowing  that  his 
father  was  an  uncompromising  Washington  Federalist;  by  the  time  he  was 
fourteen  he  had  absorbed  a  good  many  of  the  reasons  why. 

The  store  also  introduced  the  boy  to  the  problem  of  keeping 
things  accounted  for  and  in  their  proper  places.  It  gave  him  a  daily  object 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


lesson  in  the  practical  utility  of  legible  handwriting  and  of  reckoning 
figures  with  absolute  accuracy.  And  it  illustrated  the  way  in  which  money 
could  grow  from  an  exchange  of  property.  Anyone  who  has  taken  the 
trouble  to  look  at  Buchanan's  mathematics  notebooks  will  recognize  that 
he  had  a  passion  for  neatness  and  for  figures.  Practically  every  penny  that 
he  gave  or  received  throughout  his  life  he  methodically  recorded  in  his 
account  books.  While  American  Minister  to  Great  Britain,  with  an  estate 
already  in  excess  of  $200,000,  he  kept  a  careful  day-by Jay  record  of  the 
petty  disbursements  of  his  valet,  down  to  the  last  ha'penny  for  pins  or 
tuppence  for  suspender  buttons.  He  once  refused  to  accept  a  check  for 
over  815,000  from  his  friend  Jeremiah  S.  Black,  because  there  was  an  error 
of  ten  cents  in  it.  When  as  president  he  paid  three  cents  too  little  for  an 
order  of  fine  food  for  the  White  House  and  the  merchant  receipted  the  bill 
as  paid  in  full,  he  discovered  the  error  and  forwarded  the  three  cents, 
explaining  that  he  wished  not  to  pay  too  little  or  loo  much  but  precisely 
what  was  due. 

His  parents  influenced  him  strongly.  Buchanan,  by  the  time 
James  was  ten,  had  become  one  of  the  leading  businessmen  of  the  Mercers- 
burg  region.  His  heavy  features,  his  bluff  and  hearty  countenance,  and 
his  watery  blue  eyes  suggested  more  of  canniness  than  of  kindness,  and 
conveyed  a  hint  of  animal  force  guided  by  wariness  and  suspicion  of  his 
fellows.  "The  more  you  know  of  mankind/*  he  would  say,  "the  more  you 
will  distrust  them.*'  Though  middle  age  and  success  wer*  softening  him 
somewhat,  he  still  worked  like  a  man  of  restless  and  unsatisfied  ambition. 
The  community  considered  him  a  "hard  man,"  If  honest,  h*  was  also 
unyielding.  He  gave  credit  but  not  extensions  of  credit,  and  he  never 
loaned  money  except  on  excessive  guarantee*  He  idolized  Jamt%  who  h<* 
long  thought  would  be  his  only  son,  but  made  him  firmly  toe  thts  mark  m 
practicing  the  idea  that  hard  work  and  scrupulous  attention  to  business 
make  wealth.  John  Tom  had  practiced  neither  and  had  lost  his  property; 
Buchanan  practiced  both  and  had  supplanted  his  erstwhile  employer* 

James  both  loved  and  feared  his  father*  The  squire  assigned 
chores  to  the  boy  beyond  the  competence  of  his  years,  carefully  scrutinized 
his  performance,  and  was  always  more  ready  with  criticism  than  with  praise. 
James  learned  fast  and  outstripped  those  his  own  age  in  handling  assigned 
work,  but  he  rarely  experienced  the  joyous  sense  of  a  task  well  done;  it 
was  never  done  well  enough  for  the  squire.  The  boy  hungered  for  coin- 
mendation,  but  he  seldom  got  it.  There  was  little  friendly  informality  and 
playtime  between  father  and  son;  it  was  a  man  to  man  relationship  between 
man  and  boy,  full  of  mutual  reliance  and  respect,  but  without  humor 
or  comradeship. 

Elizabeth  Buchanan,  much  more  easygoing  and  humane  than  her 
husband,  became  the  center  of  the  finer  feelings  of  the  household.  Modest 


PENNSYLVANIA  PIONEER  •   1783  - 1809 


and  self-effacing  as  the  father  was  proud  and  arrogant,  she  tried  actively  to 
live  the  Christian  life.  Her  philosophy  was  that  of  the  Ten  Commandments 
and  the  Sermon  on  the  Mount,  applied  to  every  little  act  within  her  view. 
Her  ambition  was  to  get  to  Heaven;  her  life  a  quiet  acceptance  of  every 
event  as  the  particular  manifestation  of  God's  will  directed  to  her  family. 
Young  James  could  never  quite  accept  such  blind  faith  or  such  utter 
resignation,  yet  it  impressed  him  deeply  and  embedded  itself  in  his  inquisi- 
tive mind-  It  was  odd:  his  father  was  never  satisfied,  and  his  mother  was 
always  satisfied;  but  anyone  looking  at  the  daily  course  of  their  lives 
without  knowing  their  minds  might  guess  exactly  the  opposite. 

Doctor  John  King,  pastor  of  the  Presbyterian  Church  at  Mercers- 
burg  and  a  trustee  of  Dickinson  College  at  Carlisle,  also  exerted  a  strong 
influence.  Some  men  have  that  rare  combination  of  qualities  which, 
unknown  to  themselves,  inspires  admiration  and  imitation  in  others. 
Doctor  King  had  such  qualities.  He  was  a  fine  scholar  but  so  unpretentious, 
witty,  and  human  that  no  one  talking  with  him  casually  would  have  sensed 
a  formidable  mind.  He  had  strong  convictions  of  Christian  living  which 
he  practiced,  without  apparent  purpose  or  effort,  as  a  simple  matter  of 
course.  He  had  dignity  and  poise  which  he  seemed  to  communicate  to 
others,  rather  than  making  them  unhappily  conscious  of  their  own  de- 
ficiencies in  manner  or  address.  When  he  preached,  people  stayed  awake 
from  sheer  personal  respect  for  the  man.  James  Buchanan  later  wrote 
that  he  had  "never  known  any  human  being  for  whom  I  felt  greater 
reverence  than  for  Dr.  King,'*  and  he  took  with  him  into  maturity  a  vivid 
memory  of  the  conduct  and  the  kindly  spirit  of  his  Mercersburg  pastor.11 

DICKINSON  COLLEGE 

When  Buchanan  became  sixteen,  King  urged  his  father  to  send  him  to 
college.  He  saw  in  the  boy  a  dual  prospect:  the  development  of  a  keen 
young  mind  and  the  addition  of  a  cash  customer  to  the  sorely  depleted 
student  rolls  of  Dickinson  College.  Though  the  elder  Buchanan  really 
needed  his  son  in  business  and  around  the  farm,  he  knew  from  his  own 
limited  experience  the  advantages  of  education.  He  worried  about  the 
future  security  of  his  growing  family.  In  addition  to  James  he  now  had 
four  small  daughters  and  a  baby  boy,  and  another  child  was  on  the  way. 
If  he  should  die  or  suffer  a  setback  in  his  business,  his  own  children  might 
find  themselves  in  the  same  unhappy  situation  in  which  he  had  been  reared; 
they  might  have  to  be  distributed  around  among  those  who  could  provide 
for  them. 

Mrs.  Buchanan  would  have  been  happy  to  see  her  son  enter  the 
ministry,  but  her  husband  knew  better  what  pursuit  would  fit  the  require- 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


ments.  Money  could  be  made  in  buying  and  selling  property,  but  one 
needed  a  lawyer  to  protect  it.  He  wanted  his  son  to  prepare  for  the  study 
of  law.  The  decision  was  soon  made,  arrangements  were  completed  to 
enroll  James  in  the  junior  class  of  college,  and  in  September,  1807,  the 
young  man  and  his  father  saddled  their  horses  for  the  trip  to  Carlisle.13 

Dickinson  College,  when  Buchanan  went  there,  was  slowly 
rallying  from  a  series  of  misfortunes.  After  twenty  years  of  effort,  the 
trustees  had  finally  been  able  to  provide  the  college  with  "a  new  and  elegant 
building."  Scarcely  six  weeks  after  the  dedication,  someone  carelessly 
left  a  scuttleful  of  hot  ashes  in  the  cellar  and  burned  it  to  the  ground. 
Then  Dr.  Charles  Nisbet,  who  had  been  headmaster  of  the  college  since  its 
inception,  died,  and  good  relations  between  the  students,  the  faculty,  and 
the  trustees  rapidly  deteriorated.  But  the  town  of  Carlisle  posed  the  main 
problem.  Jeremiah  Atwater,  the  new  president,  reported  that  the  pleasures 
"of  high  life,  of  parade,  of  the  table  &  ball  chamber'*  appeared  to  be  the 
main  object  of  life.  "Drunkenness,  swearing,  lewdness  &  duelling  seemed 
to  court  the  day."  The  students  were  ''indulging  in  the  dissipation  of  the 
town,  none  of  them  living  in  the  college/*  It  was  folly,  he  concluded,  "to 
expect  that  a  college  could  flourish  without  a  different  state  of  things  in 
the  town;"  and  in  a  final  burst  of  outrage  he  exclaimed,  "I  hope  that  as 
God  has  visited  other  states,  he  will  yet  visit  Pmruykania"1* 

These  were  the  circumstances  to  which  James  Buchanan  referred 
when  he  wrote  of  Dickinson,  many  years  later,  that  the  enlist  wax  "in 
wretched  condition"  while  he  was  a  student  there.  When  Buchanan 
arrived  in  Carlisle  a  new  college  building  designed  by  Benjamin  lalrabe 
had  been  almost  completed  and  classes  were  being  held  in  itt  though  no 
student  rooms  were  ready  for  occupancy.14 

Left  on  his  own  for  the  first  lime  in  his  life,  Jimmie  Burhaiian 
began  to  canvass  his  prospects  in  this  enticing  environment.  Of  the 
forty-two  students  enrolled,  eight  were  seniors,  nineteen  were  hia  matw 
in  the  junior  class—- all  of  them  Pennsylvanians  but  two— and  the  remaining 
fifteen  were  freshmen  or  assigned  to  the  Latin  School.  The  college  course 
did  not  yet  include  the  sophomore  year. 

His  courses  would  include  Latin,  Greek,  mathematics,  geography, 
history,  literature,  and  philosophy.  Acting  President  Davidson  wouM  be 
his  teacher  in  history,  geography  and  philosophy;  Professor  John  Hayes 
would  be  in  charge  of  languages;  and  Professor  McConnick,  of  mathematics. 
These  three  comprised  the  entire  teaching  staff. 

Teachers  often  stamp  upon  the  student  mind  a  more  vivid  and 
lasting  impression  of  their  own  personality  than  they  do  of  their  subject 
matter.  Dr.  Davidson  was  a  teacher  whom  the  students  remembered  with 
discomfort  during  their  college  days  but  with  sentimental  attachment 
thereafter.  He  had  written  a  geography  text  in  very  poor  verso,  required 

8 


PENNSYLVANIA  PIONEER  •   1783  -  1809 


the  students  to  buy  it,  and  demanded  that  they  memorize  and  recite  from 
it  verbatim.  A  pedagogue  in  school  and  out,  formal,  solemn  and  precise, 
Dr.  Davidson  was,  nevertheless,  a  kind  and  gentle  man.  He  never  liked  to 
take  a  strong  stand,  much  less  to  translate  it  into  action,  and  in  dealing  with 
administrative  problems  he  always  tried  to  avoid  solutions  by  the  exercise 
of  authority.  Whenever  possible  he  took  the  line  of  least  resistance, 
seeking  to  solve  problems  by  a  peaceful  and  pleasant  meeting  of  minds. 
In  town  and  on  the  campus  he  was  known  by  the  appropriate  nickname  of 
"Blessed  Peacemaker."  Such  was  the  man  who,  within  the  year,  was  to 
burn  an  impression  on  James  Buchanan's  callow  mind  as  with  a  red- 
hot  poker.18 

Buchanan  especially  liked  Professor  James  McCormick  who  for 
years  had  lodged  and  boarded  half  a  dozen  students  at  his  home.  One  boy 
recalled  that  "Mr.  McCormick  and  his  wife  were  as  kind  to  us  as  if  they 
had  been  our  parents.  He  was  unwearied  in  his  attentions  to  us  in  our 
studies,  full  of  patience  and  good  nature,  and  sometimes  seemed  quite 
distressed  when,  upon  examining  a  pupil,  he  found  him  not  quite  as  learned 
as  he  was  himself,"16 

Buchanan  at  first  took  his  work  as  a  student  very  seriously, 
spending  most  of  his  time  in  preparation  and  trying  his  best  to  make  a  good 
impression  in  the  classroom.  But  it  did  not  take  him  long  to  find  that  the 
life  of  a  "grind"  was  no  passport  to  comradeship  among  his  classmates.  To 
the  contrary,  he  wrote  that  "to  be  a  sober,  plodding,  industrious  youth 
was  to  incur  the  ridicule  of  the  mass  of  the  students."  Discovering  that 
he  had  little  difficulty  In  keeping  up  his  class  assignments,  he  began  to 
participate  more  freely  in  the  extra-curricular  activities  of  the  day.  "With- 
out much  natural  tendency  to  become  dissipated,"  he  said,  "and  chiefly 
from  the  example  of  others,  and  in  order  to  be  considered  a  clever  and 
spirited  youth,  I  engaged  in  every  sort  of  extravagance  and  mischief."17 

From  knowledge  of  his  later  activities,  we  may  reasonably  assume 
that  he  got  into  drinking  bouts  sufficiently  rowdy  to  come  to  the  attention 
of  the  faculty;  that  he  smoked  cigars  contrary  to  the  regulations  of  the 
college;  and  that  he  manifested  in  and  out  of  the  classroom  a  conceit  which 
proved  at  first  irritating  and  at  length  intolerable  to  his  professors.  On 
the  Fourth  of  July,  1808,  which  the  Dickinson  boys  celebrated  with  a 
huge  dinner  at  the  Glebe  Farm,  he  downed  sixteen  regular  toasts  before 
starting  on  the  volunteers.18 

Despite  all  the  distractions,  Buchanan  kept  up  with  his  class  work, 
passed  his  public  examinations  in  August,  and  concluded  the  college  year 
with  an  excellent  academic  record.  He  returned  to  Mercersburg  in  the 
autumn  of  1808,  quite  satisfied  with  himself  and  ready  to  go  back  to  school 
in  a  few  weeks  as  a  senior.  On  a  lovely  Sunday  morning  of  September  he 
was  lounging  at  ease  in  the  sitting  room  of  his  home,  enjoying  those 


JAKES  BUCHANAN 


deliciously  languorous  sensations  of  well-being  that  the  gods  confer  only 
upon  college  students  on  vacation.  His  reverie  was  interrupted  by  a  knock 
at  the  door.  His  father  answered  it  and  returned  shortly  with  a  letter 
which  he  tore  open  with  curious  interest.  As  he  began  to  read,  his  expres- 
sion  changed  to  one  of  pain  and  anger.  Whatever  this  was,  it  was  un- 
commonly bad  news.  Buchanan  senior  abruptly  thrust  the  paper  at  his 
son,  turned,  and  left  the  room  without  a  word. 

James  looked  down  at  the  cause  of  this  sudden  shattering  of  his 
thoughts.  The  letter,  in  Dr.  Davidson's  writing,  said  that  Dickinson  College 
had  expelled  Buchanan  for  disorderly  conduct.  He  road  it  again  to  pet  it 
all.  Dr.  Davidson  wrote  the  elder  Buchanan  that  his  son  would  have  bern 
dismissed  earlier  except  for  the  respect  which  the  faculty  entertained  for 
the  father.  They  had  tolerated  young  James  to  the  very  limit  of  endurance 
and  would  not  have  him  back  under  any  circumstances, 

James  was  thunderstruck.  Knowing  that  it  would  be  useless  to 
take  up  the  matter  with  his  irate  father,  he  turned  for  advice  to  his  friend 
Doctor  King,  who  had  just  become  President  of  the  Board  of  Trustees  of 
Dickinson,  "He  gave  me  a  gentle  lecture,"  »aid  Buchanan  of  the  interview. 
"He  then  proposed  to  me,  that  if  I  would  pledge  on  my  honor  to  him  to 
behave  better  at  college  than  I  had  done,  he  felt  such  confidence  in  me  that 
he  would  pledge  himself  to  Dr.  Davidson  on  my  behalf,  and  he  did  not 
doubt  that  I  would  be  permitted  to  return."1* 

While  the  board  minutes  disclose  no  discussion  of  Buchanan's 
case,  it  is  impossible  to  believe  that  King  did  not  know  in  advance  that  hi* 
neighbor  and  prot^gS  from  Mercersburg  was  getting  into  serious  trouble- 
It  is  more  than  likely  that  Dr.  Davidson's  action  had  been  approved  in 
advance  by  the  board,  or  may  have  originated  there,  as  a  means  of  bracing 
up  the  lad  by  a  sound  scare  which  would  both  tame  his  spirit  and  exert  * 
sobering  influence  upon  the  rest  of  the  students,*0 

Chastened  and  with  the  resolution  to  be  more  circumspect  in 
his  conduct,  Buchanan  returned  to  Dickinson  for  the  winter  term.  Un- 
fortunately* his  strenuous  application  to  work  had  the  result  of  further 
inflating  his  intellectual  vanity— the  trait  which  had  been  the  root  of  his 
difficulty  in  the  first  place*  Take,  for  example,  the  problem  in  navigation 
which  he  prepared  for  Professor  McCormick,  requiring  the  construction 
of  an  imaginary  ship's  journal  in  which  the  exact  latitude  and  longitude  of 
the  point  of  destination  were  to  be  determined  from  the  daily  sailing  data* 
Buchanan  chose  for  his  journal  a  trip  from  Boston  to  Madeira— an  island 
which  he  had  frequently  visited  in  fancy  while  quaffing  iu>  amber  produce 
in  the  taverns  of  Carlisle*  After  some  thirty  pages  of  careful  notations  of 
traverse  tables,  estimates  of  drift,  and  calculations  of  magnetic  variation 
and  deviation,  he  found  that  his  final  figures  on  the  location  of  the  western 
tip  of  Madeira  varied  by  only  one  mile  from  the  values  given  on  the  printed 

10 


PENNSYLVANIA  PIONEER  -1783-1809 


geographical  charts.  The  concluding  sentence  in  this  problem  illustrates 
perfectly  the  mental  attitude  of  the  boy.  "I  therefore  conclude,"  he  wrote, 
"that  my  journal  was  nearly  exact,  and  that  the  latitude  and  longitude  of 
that  part  of  Madeira  were  well  laid  down."21 

All  too  soon  the  year  was  over.  On  September  25,  1809,  the 
faculty  presented  to  the  Board  of  Trustees  the  names  of  fifteen  young 
gentlemen  whom  they  certified  "as  prepared  to  receive  their  Bachelor's 
degree,  they  having  gone  through  the  usual  courses,  and  been  publicly 
examined  in  the  Languages  and  Sciences."  Buchanan's  name  was  on 
the  list. 

In  the  meantime,  however,  trouble  had  been  brewing  over  the 
award  of  senior  honors.  Two  literary  societies,  the  Belles-Lettres  and  the 
Union  Philosophical,  met  weekly  in  rooms  at  opposite  ends  of  the  fourth 
floor  of  the  college  building.  All  the  student  competition  of  the  day 
centered  in  these  societies.  Each  society  chose  one  candidate  for  the  award 
of  first  honors  of  the  college;  the  faculty  chose  the  winner,  and  the  other 
man  automatically  received  the  second  honor.  The  award  of  first  honors 
was  not  only  a  society  victory  but  also  gave  to  the  successful  student  the 
distinction  of  having  first  place  on  the  program  of  senior  orations  at  the 
commencement  exercises. 

The  Union  Philosophical  Society  unanimously  chose  Buchanan 
as  their  candidate  for  the  first  honor.  But  this  did  not  satisfy  James.  He 
thought  the  Union  Philosophical  Society  so  much  superior  to  its  rival  that 
it  should,  this  year,  have  both  the  first  and  the  second  honor.  He  therefore 
put  through  a  motion  that  the  Union  P.  should  present  two  candidates, 
himself  for  first  place  and  Robert  Laverty  for  the  second. 

This  was  too  much  for  the  faculty.  They  had  observed  some 
improvement  in  Buchanan's  outward  conduct  but  none  in  his  conceit,  and 
they  determined  on  this  occasion  to  deflate  it.  They  gave  the  first  honor 
to  the  candidate  of  the  Belles-Lettres  Society,  second  honor  to  Laverty, 
and  rejected  Buchanan  entirely  on  the  ground  that  it  would  have  a  bad 
effect  on  the  morale  of  the  college  to  honor  a  student  who  had  been  so 
troublesome  and  had  shown  so  little  respect  for  the  professors. 

This  announcement  completely  outraged  the  young  man.  He 
wrote  an  agitated  letter  to  his  father,  complaining  bitterly  of  the  injustice 
and  prejudice  of  the  faculty.  The  first  honor  should  go  to  the  best  scholar; 
he  was  the  best  scholar,  as  everyone  knew  and  the  record  showed.  He 
refused  to  believe  the  decision  was  final  and  kept  his  oration  ready. 

His  father  replied  with  a  masterful  letter  of  condolence,  full  of 
sly  innuendo.  He  had  received  his  son's  letter,  he  wrote,  "though  without 
date*'  (inexcusable  carelessness!),  and  was  mortified  that  James  would 
receive  no  honors,  especially  as  this  "was  done  by  the  professors  who  are 

11 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


acknowledged  by  the  world  to  be  the  best  judges  of  the  students  under 
their  care."  He  hoped  that  his  son  had  fortitude  enough  to  take  the 
decision  like  a  man.22  James  read  this  over  carefully  several  times,  smart- 
ing  with  embarrassment,  but  his  temper  subsided,  and  he  turned  to  another 
polishing  of  his  oration,  very  appropriately  entitled  "The  Utility  of 
Philosophy." 

In  the  meantime  the  Union  Philosophical  Society  was  in  an 
uproar.  Laverty  withdrew  as  second  honor  man  and  offered  the  place  to 
Buchanan.  When  he  refused  to  consider  this,  the  seniors  of  the  society 
proposed  that  they  all  refuse  to  speak  at  commencement,  but  Buchanan 
also  opposed  this  proposal  because  he  did  not  wish  others  to  become 
involved  on  his  account.  At  length  the  faculty  itself  resolved  the  impasse 
by  writing  a  kind  letter  to  James,  stating  that  he  would  be  expected  to 
present  his  oration,  though  not  in  the  first  place  on  the  program.23  By 
Commencement  Day,  September  19,  1809,  the  air  had  cleared.  Alfred 
Foster  of  Carlisle  would  deliver  the  salutatory  oration  in  Latin  on  "The 
Excellence  of  Knowledge,"  Buchanan  would  follow  him  on  the  program, 
and  Laverty  would  deliver  the  valedictory.2* 

Buchanan  wrote  in  his  autobiography  that  he  left  college  "frrling 
but  little  attachment  towards  the  Alma  Mater,"  Regardless  of  this  senti- 
ment he  could  scarcely  have  denied  that  his  two  years  at  Dickinson  Ml  a 
lasting  imprint  upon  his  life.  He  learned  respect  for  the  law  there.  Time 
was  to  come  when  President  Buchanan  would  assert  to  extremists,  both 
northern  and  southern,  in  a  land  torn  by  passion:  "I  acknowledge  no 
master  but  the  law."  He  also  learned  respect  for  property,  whirh  he 
translated  into  a  veritable  obsession  for  precision  in  all  his  later  hunine** 
dealings.  He  developed  a  respectful  altitude  toward  religion,  whirh  he 
considered  a  matter  of  individual  belief  rather  than  a  formal  creed  to  be 
unquestioningly  accepted.  Finally,  one  can  see  Jn  his  later  life  the  shadow 
of  his  Dickinson  teachers.  Buchanan  the  student  played  ringleader  in 
making  fun  of  old  Dr.  Davidson,  but  Buchanan  the  man  came  to  resemble 
him.  The  description  of  Davidson  could  be  applied  almost  withnut  change 
to  Buchanan  in  maturity:  vain,  formal*  solemn  and  precise;  yet  withal 
kindly  and  gentle,  always  eager  to  settle  disputes  without  force  and  solve 
problems  by  a  friendly  and  pleasant  meeting  of  minds.  The 
Peacemaker* 


12 


James  Buchanan  as  a  Congressman, 
Portrait  by  Jacob  Kicholtz,  Smithsonian 
Institution. 


Above:  Ann  (Caroline  Ooleman,  Buchanan's  fiancee,  who  died  mvrtrriottaiy  in  )Hl«*. 
Buchanan  Foundation.  W<*/««':  Buchanan's  lu'rthplare  at  Stony  mix**r.  Tart  t»f  thi* 
log  cabin  has  Iwen  preserved  at  Menrershurg  Aradcmy,  Mercrrt*bur^  IVn»sylv4ntifj, 
Herbert  Beard.sUjy. 


Above:  East  King  Street,  Lancaster,  looking  toward  the  square.  Buchanan  s  law  office 
occupied  the  second  floor  of  the  building  in  the  center  of  the  picture.  Lancaster  County 
Historical  Society.  Below:  A  sketch  of  Wheatland  published  during  the  campaign 
of  1856,  Author's  Collection. 


\ 


r«p;  Buchanan *s  penmantthip  and  signature.  Of  Harri«burg  he  writes,  "It  i»  not  a 
to  vi«it,  if  your  talking  apparatus  S«  out  of  order.*'    Pttwse  Library^  Thi»  Penn 
State  Univmity.     Bottom  left:    Prmident  Martin  Van  Buren.     Author'*  Co 
Bottom  ri#ht;   John  Wiftn  Forney,  Buchanan's  energetic  and  devoted  political  manager 
for  twenty  years.    Library  of  Congress* 


wfew.  rr'ft  »An7*i 


rufitrwt  ST«Tttnir  »«•  Wtanitnrtwn-- 


A  Whig  cartoon  of  1840  exploits  the  "Ten  Cent  Jimmy"  lie.  Buchanan  ^  made  to  tell 
Van  Buren  to  reduce  the  price  of  labor  while  unemployment  reigns  and  children  starve. 
Lancaster  County  Historical  Society. 


the  ^'Rock  of  Disunion.** 


A  SERVICEABLE    GARMENT- 

on  ncvcmc  or  A  »*c» r ton. 


Two  anti-Buchanan  cartoons  of  18.%. 


ucn  ..    Ahwe:   The  ha.-hri,,r  ,-MtMMr  *ur»f»  >n-  "l'| 

"Weral  coa  "  with  its  "Democratic  pat.-h.-x"  ami  Ajfcfc".  t\M  'I  h«-  »•«•  »"•  ';'»  •'"''"' 
t  new  TOtfi"  Buchanan  KoumU.ti.rn.'  /W,mv  Th-  ftw-wlrrj  «•!  -lavrr*  r.-l.  .«  ihr 
Democratic  platform  (Buchanan),  u.u-,-rtai»ly  M.j.p.,rt.-,l  by  Brnhm.  1'wr.  M>|  J.m» 
Van  Buren.  Library  of  Coiigrws. 


He  WAS  elected  President  by  ft  ami  *wd  trickery!  unJfr  Ms  aJ- 
ministration  the  Treasury  was  robbed  1  duplicity  and  cowardice 
marked  bin  cortwr!  flnnUy,  he  sold  hia  country  to  u  b*n«l  <tf 
Suutheru  conspirators,  and  now  lives  to  be  point*!  at  vich  tLe 
of  scorn,  by  all  true  men.'  and  will  go  Jowntuh;* 


TVm:  On«-  of  th«  many  forma  of  abuse  of  Buchanan  during  the  Civil  War—a  northern 
pnveloii*  charging  him  with  Hftlling  the  country  to  "a  bawl  of  wmHpiratoro.  Smuh»onian 
Imtitution  (Kalph  E.  Bftcker  Collection).  Bottoms  Simon  Cam«ron,  a  political  mavftnck 
who  became  a  powerful  en«my  of  Buchanan  after  1848.  National  Archives  (Brady 
Collection}  > 


Top:  Pierre  Soul«  of  Louisiana.  Library  of  Congrew.  <^-**^£*&$ft* 
Ill&ioia.  National  Archives  (Brady  OoIIectipii).  Botum:  William  H.  S«w«td  »f  New 
York.  National  Archives  (Brady  Collection). 


Two  contemporary  drawing*  by  newspaper  artists.  Top:  East  Portico  of  the  Capitol 
during  Buchanan's  inaugural  address.  Bottom:  The  inaugural  parade,  with  the  model 
warship  in  the  foreground.  Library  of  Congress. 


Above*  Minimum  on  iwry  of  Buchanan  and  lUrrirt  bnf  by  J.  Henry  Brown.      m. 
8on£  IwSST  /MoK-7 Buchanan  precis  a  guest  at  a  Whit*  Him*  rm,*.*.  l4l»-r> 

of  Congress. 


Ton;  Washington,  1853,  after  the  new  wings  had  been  added  to  the  Capitol.  Between 
Pennsylvania  Avenue,  center,  and  Maryland  Avenue,  left,  appear  the  Smithsonian 
Institution  and  the  projected  Washington  Monument.  Library  of  Congress,  fffittom: 
Th*  East  Front  of  the  Capitol,  1857,  with  the  new  dome  under  construction.  National 
Archive*. 


Chamber  of  the  United  States  HOUM ,  of Reprewimtive. 

a«  they  appeared  before  being  remodelled  in  the  I850'».   Library  o 


Buchanan's  Cabinet  in  mid- 1859.  Seated  left  to  right:  Jacob  Thompson,  Interior;  John  B. 
Floyd,  War;  Isaac  Toueey,  Navy;  Jeremiah  S.  Black,  Attorney  General.  Standing  left 
to  right:  Lewis  Cass,  State;  President  Buchanan;  Ho  well  Cobb,  Treasury;  Joseph  Holt, 
Postmaster  General.  Library  of  Congress  (Brady-Hand  Collection). 


Top:  Black  who  replaced  Cum  in  Pwrmher,  1860.  National  A™hiv<-*  (Brady  Odin-nun). 
Ctntfr:  Vice-President  John  (I  Breckinridge,  Lincoln'**  opponent  in  IHc>0.  Library  of 
Congress.  Bottom  left:  Lcwia  Cam  wh«  also  wrvrd  t»  J^rkMinV  <itJ»i««.  .NiUHtiuI 
Archives  (Brady  Collection).  Bottom  right;  Aaron  V.  Br(»w«,  PcwtiMiii<nr  (;««rr*lf  wh«> 
died  in  office.  National  Archives  (Brady  Collection) , 


.  Library 


National  Ar«hiv«i  (Brady  CoJlection). 


President  Buchanan  at  th«  time  of  ;hr  Kama* 
crisis,  1858.   National  Archive**  (Brariy  Ullectton). 


2 

PREFACE  TO  POLITICS  *  1809-1819 

COUNTRY  LAWYER 

The  most  immediate  question  in  James  Buchanan's  mind  when  he  graduated 
from  Dickinson  College  was  where  to  find  a  good  legal  preceptor.  His 
father  already  had  the  answer.  He  had  observed  James  Hopkins  of  Lancaster 
as  he  tried  a  case  in  the  Cumberland  Valley  and  had  been  so  impressed  by 
the  performance  that  he  urged  James  to  study  with  him.  Hopkins  was  a 
leader  of  the  Lancaster  bar  and  an  attorney  of  state-wide  reputation.  James 
welcomed  the  prospect  of  working  at  the  State  Capital,  applied  to  Hopkins 
for  a  preceptorship,  and  was  accepted.1 

Lancaster,  when  Buchanan  came  there  in  December,  1809,  to 
begin  his  legal  career,  had  for  generations  claimed  the  distinction  of  being 
the  largest  inland  town  in  the  United  States,  though  its  resident  population 
scarcely  exceeded  6000.  It  lay  ten  miles  north  of  Mason  and  Dixon's  line, 
ten  miles  east  of  the  Susquehanna  River,  and  sixty-two  miles  west  of 
Philadelphia.  The  Conestoga  Creek  which  bordered  the  town  had  given 
its  name  to  the  famous  freight  wagons  which  plied  the  broad  turnpike  to 
Philadelphia,  the  finest  road  in  all  America.  Lancaster's  business  rested  on 
factors  of  long-range  dependability — thrifty,  industrious  people,  fine  farms, 
a  thriving  iron  industry,  and  excellent  travel  facilities.  The  working  popula- 
tion was  mostly  German,  but  Lancaster  boasted  an  English  aristocracy 
which  rivalled  Philadelphia  society.  Politically  the  town  had  been  domi- 
nated for  years  by  the  Federalists. 

The  courthouse,  a  small  two-story  building  modelled  roughly  on 
Independence  Hall,  occupied  the  square  at  the  intersection  of  the  two 
main  streets.  It  was  terribly  crowded,  serving  simultaneously  as  the  State 
Capitol  building  and  as  headquarters  for  county  business.  King  and  Queen 
Streets,  running  off  at  right  angles  from  the  square,  were  lined  by  close-set 
brick  houses,  most  of  them  inns.  Newly  arrived  legislators  or  strangers 
like  young  Buchanan  were  greeted,  when  they  got  off  the  stage,  by  a 
complete  outdoor  gallery  of  tavern  signs  depicting  the  crowned  heads  of 

13 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


all  Europe,  Indian  chiefs,  and  national  heroes;  the  animal  kingdom  with 
its  lions,  leopards,  stags,  bulls,  bears,  horses,  swans  and  eagles;  and  symbols 
of  the  crafts,  such  as  the  plough,  the  wheat  sheaf,  the  grape,  the  cross  keys, 
the  compass  and  square,  or  the  hickory  tree.2 

Buchanan  found  quarters  at  the  Widow  Duchman's  inn  on  East 
King  Street,  just  a  block  and  one  half  from  the  courthouse  and  nearly  across 
the  street  from  Hopkins's  imposing  mansion  at  the  corr-er  of  East  King 
and  Duke  Streets.  Within  a  city  block  of  Buchanan's  rooms  lived  not  only 
his  college  chum,  Jasper  Slaymaker,  but  also  the  Governor  of  Pennsylvania, 
the  Judge  of  the  District  Court,  and  iron  baron  Robert  Coleman  reputed  to 
be  the  richest  man  in  Pennsylvania.  James  Buchanan  felt  that  although  he 
stood  on  the  bottom  rung  of  the  ladder,  it  was  the  right  ladder. 

After  a  month  he  wrote  home  enthusiastically  about  his  work 
under  Hopkins  whom  he  described  as  courteous,  instructive  and  interested 
in  his  pupils.  His  father  advised  him  to  cultivate  his  preceptor's  good 
opinion  and  told  him  to  tend  strictly  to  business  and  "not  be  carried  off  by 
the  many  amusements  &  temptations  that  are  prevalent  in  that  place." 
"Go  on  with  your  studies/*  he  said,  "and  endeavor  to  be  Eminent  in 
your  profession."3 

The  pressure  which  the  father  put  on  his  son  to  make  good  pro- 
ceeded not  entirely  from  paternal  pride.  He  really  wanted  James  to  prepare 
himself  so  that  he  might  better  help  support  his  brothers  and  sisters,  in 
case  of  necessity.  Four  more  sons  had  arrived  in  the  household  within  the 
past  seven  years,  three  of  whom  survived.4  The  Mercersburg  family  now 
consisted  of  four  girls  and  three  boys,  the  latter  between  the  ages  of  one  and 
six.  "Your  company  and  assistance  in  this  family  are  wanted  very  much, 
and  desired,"  he  wrote  to  James  when  Edward  Young  was  born,  "but  I  am 
willing  to  forego  all  these  advantages  in  order  that  you  may  have  an  oppor- 
tunity of ...  preparing  yourself  -  . .  in  the  profession  you  have  chosen." 
A  little  later  he  remarked,  "I  hope  the  privation  I  have  suffered  &  will 
suffer  in  giving  you  a  good  education  will  be  compensated  by  the  station  Jn 
society  you  will  occupy."5 

James  worked  hard.  "I  determined/'  he  said,  "that  if  severe 
application  would  make  me  a  good  lawyer,  I  should  not  fail  in  this  particular* 
*  .  .  I  studied  law,  and  nothing  but  law/*  Day  and  night  he  read  and 
straggled  to  extract  the  full  meaning  from  pages  of  print  and  to  incorporate 
it  accurately  in  his  mind.  For  relaxation  he  got  into  the  habit  of  strolling 
out  to  the  edge  of  town  in  the  evening  where,  while  watching  the  sun 
descend  below  the  gentle  slope  of  Chestnut  Hill,  he  tried  to  put  into  spoken 
words  the  material  he  had  studied  during  the  day. 

At  length,  in  1812,  the  term  of  his  preceptorship  drew  near  its 
end  and  he  had  to  consider  what  to  do  next.  Lancaster  seemed  a  logical 
place  to  "hang  out  his  shingle,"  but  there  were  some  drawbacks*  The 

14 


PREFACE  TO  POLHICS  •   1809  - 1819 


State  Capitol  was  being  shifted  to  Harrisburg,  leaving  Lancaster  crowded 
with  expert  lawyers  facing  reduced  opportunities.  There  would  be  stiff 
competition. 

About  this  time  the  name  Kentucky  began  to  exercise  a  magnetic 
charm  on  Buchanan.  The  West  had  recently  come  into  the  news.  The 
first  Mississippi  River  steamboat  had  just  opened  a  new  two-way  trade 
between  Pittsburgh  and  New  Orleans;  Harrison  had  defeated  Tecumseh  at 
Tippecanoe;  Henry  Clay,  Felix  Grundy  and  other  western  "War  Hawks" 
in  Congress  clamored  for  war  against  England-  But  beyond  the  promise  of 
adventure,  Buchanan  saw  a  practical  opportunity  in  the  West.  His  father 
was  part  owner  of  a  tract  of  some  3600  acres  of  Kentucky  land.  Its  title 
had  been  recently  challenged.  James  wanted  to  go  to  the  site  and  handle 
the  case  before  the  court  at  Elizabethtown. 

The  father,  not  eager  to  hazard  his  property  to  the  efforts  of  his 
inexperienced  son,  tried  for  two  months  to  discourage  the  venture.  A  new 
country  would  be  a  poor  place  for  a  lawyer,  he  wrote  to  James.  "He  may 
obtain  land,  but  that  is  all.  Were  I  commencing  the  practice  of  law  & 
knew  I  had  talents  &  attention,  I  would  open  an  office  in  a  county  where 
both  suits  and  money  were  plenty  &  although  I  might  have  many  difficulties 
in  establishing  myself  there,  yet  I  would  have  no  fears  of  not  coming  in 
for  a  share  of  the  business  finally.  Lancaster  is  such  a  place  as  I  describe, 
&  when  you  first  went  to  the  place,  that  was  one  of  my  objects,  that  you 
might  have  an  opportunity  of  settling  there."6  When  James  replied  that 
he  wanted  to  take  the  trip  for  his  health,  as  a  vacation,  the  elder  Buchanan 
warned  him  that  it  would  be  nonsense  to  expect  such  a  trip  to  benefit  the 
health.  It  would  be  more  likely  to  ruin  it.  "  I  speak  from  experience," 
he  said.7 

Nevertheless,  James  Buchanan  bought  a  horae  and  started  for 
Kentucky.  He  stopped  on  the  way  to  see  the  family,  made  the  acquaintance 
of  his  new  brother,  Edward,  and  learned  with  delight  that  his  favorite 
sister,  Jane,  uow  nineteen,  had  become  engaged  to  Elliot  Tole  Lane  of 
Mercersburg,  and  that  sister  Maria  was  in  love  with  his  old  school  teacher, 
Jesse  Magaw.  He  got  the  details  of  the  land  litigation,  the  permission  of  his 
father  to  act  as  his  attorney,  and  resumed  his  journey.  As  he  jogged  along, 
his  pack  trunk  scuffing  gently  at  the  back  of  his  saddle,  he  dreamed  of  the 
impact  he  would  make  in  the  shirt-sleeve  courts  of  that  wild  new  country. 

Buchanan  spent  the  summer  in  Kentucky,  most  of  it  at  Elizabeth- 
town,  but  he  made  side  trips  to  Bowling  Green  and  Russellville.  He  very 
probably  encountered  Thomas  Lincoln  who  lived  near  Elizabethtown  and 
was  on  the  court  docket  for  some  land-title  cases  at  this  time.  His  son, 
Abraham  Lincoln,  was  three  years  old.  The  Buchanan  case,  which  had 
been  in  litigation  since  1803,  had  become  so  entangled  that  any  hope  of  a 
quick  solution  soon  faded.  Buchanan  reported  of  a  trip  to  court:  "I  went 

15 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


there  full  of  the  big  impression  I  was  to  make— and  whom  do  you  suppose 
I  met?  There  was  Henry  Clay!  John  Pope,  John  Allan,  John  Rowan, 
Felix  Grundy— why,  sir,  they  were  giants,  and  I  was  only  a  pigmy.  Next 
day  I  packed  my  trunk  and  came  back  to  Lancaster— that  was  big  enough 
for  me.  Kentucky  was  too  big."  Kentucky's  Ben  Hardin  reported  that 
Buchanan  told  him  that  he  had  expected  to  be  a  great  man  there,  but  that 
"every  lawyer  I  met  at  the  bar  was  my  equal,  and  more  than  half  of  them 
my  superiors,  so  I  gave  it  up."8 

These  reminiscences,  though  not  quite  accurate,  emphasized  the 
main  reason  for  Buchanan's  decision.  He  left  Kentucky  convinced  that  if 
the  professional  competition  there  would  be  as  keen  as  in  Lancaster,  there 
was  a  great  deal  more  wealth  in  Lancaster,  and  he  might  best  put  his  wits  to 
work  where  the  fees  were  highest.  After  turning  the  land  case  over  to 
Ben  Hardin,  he  set  out  for  home. 

James  was  back  in  Lancaster  by  November  17, 1812,  in  time  to  be 
admitted  to  the  bar  along  with  Jasper  Slaymaker  and  two  other  young 
lawyers.  Wishing  to  remain  there,  but  uncertain  whether  he  would  be 
able  to  maintain  an  office,  he  appealed  to  Hopkins  for  advice.  His  preceptor 
suggested  that  he  apply  to  Attorney  General  Jared  Ingersoll  for  the  post  of 
deputy  prosecutor  (now  district  attorney)  in  newly  created  Lebanon 
County.  "I  am  a  young  man  just  about  selecting  a  place  of  future  settle- 
ment," he  wrote  to  liigersoll,  "and  your  determination  will  have  a  con- 
siderable influence  on  my  choice."9  On  February  20,  1813,  Buchanan 
started  his  practice  in  Lancaster,  inserting  a  notice  in  the  papers  that  he 
would  maintain  his  office  on  East  King  Street  "two  doors  above  Mr. 
Duchman's  Inn,  and  nearly  opposite  to  the  Fanner's  Bank."10  A  month 
later  Buchanan  learned  that  he  had  been  appointed  prosecutor  for  Lebanon 
County.11  That,  at  least,  would  take  care  of  the  office  rent.  His  father  was 
pleased,  but  tempered  his  congratulations  with  the  hope  that  James  would 
act  "with  compassion  &  humanity  for  the  poor  creatures  against  whom 
you  may  be  engaged.**12 

Buchanan's  first  two  years  of  practice  barely  kept  him  going;  he 
made  $938  during  1813  and  $1,096  the  following  year.13  The  odds  and 
ends  of  practice  which  were  the  usual  lot  of  a  young  attorney  came  his  way 
and  he  gratefully  took  whatever  business  the  older  lawyers  referred  to  him 
and  handled  it  promptly.14  As  he  approached  his  twenty-third  birthday  he 
bought,  in  partnership  with  the  town's  jovial  400-pound  prothonotary, 
John  Passmore,  the  small  tavern  on  East  King  Street  which  the  two  of  them 
already  used  for  offices  and  living  quarters*  Buchanan's  father  must  have 
assisted  him  in  this  deal,  or  else  he  had  a  good  local  credit  rating,  for  he 
paid  $4000  in  cash  on  the  property  in  1814  and  promised  to  pay  another 
$1000  within  a  year.  He  visited  his  old  home  occasionally  during  this 
period.  While  there  he  talked  politics  with  his  father*  Loyal  Federalists 

16 


PREFACE  TO  POLITICS  •   1809  -  1819 


both,  they  deplored  the  attacks  of  the  Democratic  Legislature  on  Federalist 
judges,  and  condemned  the  government  for  its  mismanagement  of  the  war 
with  England.15  In  1813  Jane  Buchanan  married  Elliot  Lane,  and  James 
was  probably  in  Mercersburg  for  the  wedding  ceremony. 

STATE  ASSEMBLYMAN 

On  August  24, 1814,  the  British  army  routed  the  Americans  at  Bladensburg, 
marched  on  Washington,  and  burned  the  public  buildings  almost  before 
their  occupants  had  time  to  flee.  That  same  day  the  Lancaster  Federalists 
met  to  nominate  their  slate  for  the  fall  elections.  In  due  course  delegate 
Peter  .Diller  arose  to  nominate  James  Buchanan  as  the  district's  choice 
for  State  Assemblyman. 

At  that  time  he  was  serving  as  president  of  the  local  Washington 
Association— a  young  Federalist  organization.  He  had  aroused  enthusiasm 
in  the  party  by  his  recent  speech  at  the  Fourth  of  July  barbecue  in  which 
he  had  roundly  lambasted  Madison  for  bungling  the  war  effort  and  called 
on  Federalists  to  pitch  into  the  fighting  to  force  an  honorable  peace  as 
quickly  as  possible.16  The  Federal  party,  though  it  had  controlled  Lancaster 
since  1789,  had  long  been  the  minority  party  of  the  state  and  was  growing 
steadily  weaker.  Its  older  leaders  welcomed  the  addition  to  their  ranks  of 
a  popular  and  forceful  young  man.  Buchanan,  on  his  part,  wanted  to  enter 
politics  and  hoped  that  campaign  publicity  and  service  in  Harrisburg  would 
improve  his  law  business.  There  was  no  chance  of  his  losing  the  election; 
in  Lancaster,  the  Federalist  candidate  always  won.  His  father,  still  never 
willing  to  admit  that  his  son  had  done  just  the  right  thing,  told  him  he  had 
made  a  mistake  and  would  do  better  to  become  a  leader  of  the  bar  than  to 
be  "partly  a  politician  and  partly  a  lawyer."17 

At  the  very  moment  that  Buchanan  committed  himself  to  politics, 
his  first  political  duty  bore  down  swiftly  and  unexpectedly  upon  him. 
When  news  of  the  burning  of  Washington  reached  Lancaster  the  morning 
after  his  nomination,  he  knew  he  would  have  to  go  to  war  if  he  expected 
to  get  any  votes.  The  local  Federalist  party  deplored  the  war,  but  its 
members  would  defend  their  country. 

At  a  general  mobilization  in  Lancaster  on  August  25,  Buchanan 
made  a  speech  and  was  among  the  first  to  register  his  name  as  a  volunteer. 
Two  days  later  a  company  of  young  men  of  the  borough,  led  by  Henry 
Shippen,  Esq.,  "mounted  their  horses,  armed  with  sword,  pistols  &c., 
and  marched  to  Baltimore,  without  waiting. for  formal  orders,  to  aid  in 
defending  that  place."18 

Shippen's  Company,  composed  of  about  two  dozen  of  the  "most 
respectable  young  gentlemen  of  Lancaster,"  had  no  official  status  as  part 
either  of  the  militia  or  the  regular  army;  it  was  simply  a  group  of  private 

17 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


volunteers.  After  arriving  at  Baltimore,  the  "Lancaster  County  Dragoons/' 
as  the  troop  called  itself,  offered  their  services  to  Major  Charles  Sterret 
Ridgely  of  the  Third  Cavalry  Regiment.  Major  Ridgely  called  for  ten 
volunteers  to  go  on  a  secret  mission;  Buchanan  joined  this  squad  and  all 
proceeded  four  miles  beyond  the  city,  full  of  excitement  in  the  belief  they 
were  on  a  dangerous  mission — until  they  opened  their  sealed  orders  at 
the  designated  point. 

They  were  to  go  to  Ellicott's  Mills  and  seize  about  sixty  good 
horses  from  the  residents  of  the  vicinity,  "always  preferring  to  take  them 
from  Quakers."  It  was  an  assignment  not  particularly  gratifying  to  the 
"young  gentlemen  of  Lancaster,"  all  of  whom  had  their  own  mounts  and 
had  n^ver  until  now  seriously  considered  horse-stealing.  A  steady  deluge 
of  rain  added  to  their  discomfort.  That  night  Buchanan  had  the  ill-luck 
to  draw  a  bunk  space  next  to  the  tent  wall  and  got  thoroughly  soaked. 
They  encountered  no  Redcoats,  but  by  the  time  they  had  accomplished 
their  mission  the  Marylanders  of  the  locality  had  become  nearly  as  serious 
an  enemy  as  the  British.  Nonetheless,  they  seized  the  horses,  rejecting 
"several  pairs  for  ladies  who  were  sick  and  required  them"  and  paraded 
down  Market  Street  past  Gadsby's  Hotel  in  Baltimore  where  the  rest  of  the 
Lancaster  volunteers  gave  them  a  burlesque  salute  amid  guffawing  laughter. 
In  a  few  days  the  British  withdrew  from  the  city  and  Major  Ridgrfy  dis- 
charged Captain  Shippen's  Dragoons.19  James  wrote  to  his  parents  that 
night  to  relieve  the  anxiety  he  knew  they  must  feel  after  reading  the  news- 
paper accounts  of  the  British  assault  on  Baltimore.20 

Only  a  month  remained  until  election  day.  The  Pennsylvania 
Federalists  now  began  for  the  first  time  in  years  to  have  some  hopes  of 
regaining  their  power.  Pennsylvania's  Democratic  governor,  Simon 
Snyder,  although  still  popular  with  his  party,  had  been  losing  strength 
because  of  the  defection  of  disappointed  office  seekers.  Furthermore,  the 
public  linked  his  name  with  the  failures  of  the  national  government  to 
wage  effective  war. 

Snyder  was  ie-elected,  but  the  Federalists  cut  his  majority  to  half 
of  what  it  had  been  in  1811.  All  through  the  state  there  was  increasing 
support  for  Federalist  tickets.  Buchanan  was  elected  by  a  poll  which 
delighted  him,  for  he  led  the  ticket  in  the  borough  and  ran  third  highest 
among  sixteen  Federalist  candidates  in  the  full  county  vote-21 

In  the  midst  of  his  jubilation,  James  received  a  sobering  note 
from  his  father,  full  of  doubts,  cautions,  and  admonitions.  "Perhaps  your 
going  to  the  Legislature  may  be  to  your  advantage  &  it  may  be  otherwise,** 
wrote  his  parent,  "I  hope  you  will  make  the  best  of  the  thing  now  .  .  .  , 
I  ain  fearful  of  this  taking  you  from  the  bar  at  a  time  when  perhaps  you 
may  feel  it  most."22 

18 


PREFACE  TO  POLITICS  •   1809  - 1819 


The  stage  rode  smoothly  from  Lancaster  to  Middletown,  but  in 
the  last  ten  miles  of  the  trip  to  Harrisburg  it  jolted  fearfully  over  an  ancient 
path  which  no  repair  crew  had  ever  touched.  Most  travellers  passed  this 
short  distance  on  horseback  rather  than  risk  an  upset.  Buchanan  thought 
that  Harrisburg  looked  a  little  less  like  a  sleepy  country  village  since  the 
Legislature  had  moved  there  in  October,  1812.  Front  Street,  shaded  by  a 
row  of  stately  poplars  regularly  spaced,  opened  on  the  Susquehanna  River 
to  the  west  and  was  bordered  by  a  wide  paved  footwalk  to  the  east,  a  favorite 
promenade  in  summer  but  now  swept  with  early  December  snow.  The 
river  bank,  about  twenty  feet  above  the  water  level,  afforded  a  fine  view  of 
the  upriver  rapids  and  the  long  ridge  of  the  Blue  Mountains  to  the  north- 
west. The  ferry  landing  which  had  been  the  town's  origin  was  right  next 
to  the  great  stone  mansion  of  founder  John  Harris,  and  a  little  below  it 
construction  work  progressed  on  a  line  of  stone  piers  stretching  toward 
the  opposite  shore.  Theodore  Burr,  the  famous  bridge  architect,  had  begun 
his  stupendous  project  of  a  two-span  covered  wooden  bridge  over  half  a 
mile  long.  If  he  succeeded,  Harrisburg  would  boom. 

With  a  flourish,  the  stage  drew  up  in  front  of  the  Golden  Eagle 
Inn  on  Market  Square.  The  driver,  as  he  unloaded  the  baggage,  growled 
that  they  would  have  to  travel  lighter— there  was  a  fourteen-pound  limit 
per  passenger.  The  courthouse,  then  serving  as  State  Capitol,  stood  at  the 
head  of  the  square  about  three  blocks  from  the  river  and  overlooking  it 
down  the  row  of  brick  homes  and  business  houses  which  faced  the  covered 
market  stall  in  the  center.  The  temporary  capitol  building  was  a  brick 
structure,  two  stories  high.  It  had  two  small  wings  and  a  semirotunda  in 
front,  the  whole  surmounted  by  a  circular  wooden  cupola  containing  a  bell. 
On  its  small  roof  was  mounted  a  vane  of  copper  gilt,  representing  an  Indian 
chief  as  large  as  life,  with  a  bow  in  his  left  hand  and  a  tomahawk  in  his  right. 
The  Dauphin  County  courtroom  on  the  first  floor  which  served  as  the 
chamber  of  the  Assembly  was  scarcely  large  enough  to  accommodate  the 
hundred  legislators.  The  thirty  Senators  were  more  comfortably  housed 
in  a  second-floor  room  nearly  the  same  size. 

The  functions  of  a  Pennsylvania  Assemblyman,  Buchanan  dis- 
covered, were  pettier  than  he  had  first  imagined.  Everyone  had  half  a 
dozen  local  petitions  and  a  few  paltry  private  bills  on  the  clerk's  file.  The 
court  dockets  were  so  jammed,  judicial  procedure  so  slow,  and  decisions  so 
partisan  (for  Federalists  monopolized  the  bench  and  bar)  that  many  Demo- 
crats appealed  directly  to  their  friends  in  the  Assembly  for  private  legislative 
relief  rather  than  depend  upon  judicial  process.  Buchanan  had  little  such 
business  to  present,  but  he  did  press  for  the  incorporation  of  new  textile 
manufacturing  plants  in  Lancaster,  offered  petitions  to  place  the  property 
of  drunkards  in  trusteeship,  recommended  a  reduction  of  the  tax  on 
whiskey,  and  urged  the  creation  of  new  judicial  districts.23  Through 

19 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Hopkins's  influence  he  was  immediately  made  a  member  of  the  six-man 
Judiciary  Committee  of  the  House.  After  hearing  a  few  speeches  he  made 
up  his  mind  to  avoid  impromptu  expressions  on  the  floor  and  to  speak  only 
after  thorough  preparation.24 

His  first  formal  speech  grew  out  of  the  national  crisis  on  military 
man  power.  Although  Congress  had  rejected  a  conscription  bill,  the 
Pennsylvania  Senate  had  adopted  such  a  measure  because  Philadelphia 
feared  a  British  attack  and  the  Federal  Government  seemed  helpless  to 
defend  the  port.  The  Pennsylvania  bill  divided  all  draftees  into  groups  of 
twenty-two,  from  each  of  which  one  man  should  be  called  to  service.  The 
other  twenty-one  then  had  to  make  up  a  $200  bounty  purse  for  the  con- 
script. The  legislators  who  opposed  this  scheme  proposed  simply  to  raise 
six  more  regiments  of  volunteers  at  state  expense. 

On  February  1,  1815  Buchanan  spoke  at  length  against  the  con* 
scription  plan  and  in  favor  of  a  volunteer  bill  which  had  been  introduced 
in  the  House.   This  maiden  speech  proved  more  significant  than  Buchanan 
realized  at  the  time.  He  attacked  special  privilege  in  the  city  of  Philadelphia, 
championed  the  interests  of  the  West  against  the  East,  defended  the  poor 
against  abuse  by  the  rich,  and  balanced  the  wishes  of  the  State  against  the 
different  interest  of  a  minority  from  Philadelphia.    His  speech  was  good 
debate,  but  it  was  not  good  politics.   So  far  from  Federalist  doctrine  did  it 
stray  that  William  Beale,  Democratic  Senator  from  Mifflin  County,  urged 
Buchanan  to  change  his  party  at  once  and  join  the  Democrats,  asserting 
that  he  would  have  no  need  to  change  his  principles.25    Buchanan  encoun- 
tered such  political  repercussions  from  his  maiden  effort  that  when  the 
volunteer  bill  came  up  for  final  vote  in  the  House,  he  was  "necessarily 
absent,"    Fortunately  for  him,  the  whole  issue  terminated  when,  on 
February  17,  Governor  Snyder  announced  the  news  of  peace  with  England* 
For  the  remainder  of  his  term,  James  Buchanan  kept  quiet.    His 
speech  had  warned  him  of  the  danger  of  proclaiming  private  opinions  from 
a  political  rostrum  and  had  provoked  such  resentment  that  he  doubted  the 
wisdom  of  trying  for  renomination.    His  father  advised  him  to  go  ahead; 
to  put  a  law  student  in  his  office  and  get  enough  legislative  experience  to 
be  ready,  later,  for  Congress.    As  to  opposition,  he  would  have  to  expect 
that  to  develop  in  the  same  ratio  that  his  fortunes  improved;  he  had  better 
depend  upon  Providence  to  shield  him  "from  the  shafts  of  malicious 
enemies."26 

Thus  admonished  and  encouraged,  James  decided  to  run  again 
in  1815.  In  order  to  re-establish  himself  in  the  confidence  of  his  party  be 
planned  to  demonstrate  the  soundness  of  his  Federalism  on  the  Fourth  of 
July  in  an  oration  at  the  big  rally  of  Lancaster's  Washington  Association. 
He  would  make  it  a  real  political  speech,  a  partisan  harangue,  a  "rouser" 
that  would  clear  up  any  doubt  whether  he  was  a  Democrat  or  a  Federalist. 

20 


PREFACE  TO  POLITICS  •   1809  - 1819 


Early  in  the  afternoon  the  crowd  began  to  assemble  in  the  front 
of  the  courthouse  to  hear  young  Jimmie.  He  was  already  a  familiar  figure 
about  town,  but  a  newcomer  to  the  hustings.  Lawyers'  Row  knew  him  as  a 
conscientious,  tireless  plugger  who  was  not  more  intelligent,  but  usually 
more  painstaking  and  better  prepared,  than  his  colleagues.  The  tavern 
fraternity  found  him,  in  regular  attendance  at  meetings,  affable,  easygoing, 
always  equipped  with  a  black  cigar  and  ready  for  another  glass  of  Madeira. 
Parlor  society  had  discovered  him,  and  the  local  Masons  had  their  eye 
on  him. 

His  distinguished  appearance,  emphasized  by  a  peculiar  man- 
nerism, singled  him  out  for  attention  in  any  group.  A  tall,  broad-shouldered 
young  man  with  wavy  blond  hair,  blue  eyes,  and  fine  features,  he  had 
developed  an  odd  posture.  He  had  a  defect  in  one  eye.  In  order  to  com- 
pensate  for  it  he  tilted  his  head  slightly  forward  and  sideways  in  a  perpetual 
attitude  of  courteous  deference  and  attentive  interest.  The  mere  appearance 
conveyed  so  definite  an  impression  of  assent  and  approbation  that  many 
people,  on  early  acquaintance,  sincerely  believed  that  they  had  completely 
captivated  James  Buchanan  and  reciprocated  by  attentions  to  him  which 
he  attributed  to  traits  more  complimentary  to  him  than  a  wry  neck.  Partly 
because  of  this  physical  peculiarity,  Buchanan  made  a  good  "first  impres- 
sion" on  almost  everybody  he  met.  Difficulties  often  arose  when  those 
who  thought  they  were  close  to  him  realized  that  they  had  been  reading  his 
looks  rather  than  his  mind,  and  such  persons  would  break  off  with  a  sense 
of  personal  injury. 

As  he  stood  on  the  courthouse  steps  facing  his  friends,  Assembly- 
man James  Buchanan  looked  the  part  of  distinction,  and  he  knew  it.  With 
sonorous  voice  he  now  set  out  to  prove  his  Federalism.  This,  he  said,  was 
a  celebration  of  men  who  had  "burst  asunder  the  chains  that  bound  them 
to  Great  Britain"  and  had  "presented  to  the  world  a  spectacle  of  wisdom 
and  firmness  which  has  never  been  excelled."  On  this  foundation  was 
built  the  glorious  Constitution  of  the  United  States.  But  there  was  a 
powerful  faction  in  the  nation  which  had  bitterly  opposed  the  Constitution. 
"The  individuals  of  which  it  was  composed  were  called  anti-Federalists, 
and  were  the  founders  of  the  Democratic  party."  Having  failed  to  destroy 
the  Constitution,  these  men  transferred  their  hatred  of  it  to  the  glorious 
Administration  of  General  Washington,  reviling  and  cursing  both  the  man 
and  his  measures.  Who  were  these  dark  and  malignant  characters? 
"Demagogues,"  said  James  Buchanan,  "Factionaries,"  "friends  of  the 
French,"  men  of  the  "blackest  ingratitude"  who  were  obsessed  by  "diabolic 
passions,"  Such  were  the  leaders  of  Democracy. 

And  how  did  the  factiomsts  use  the  power  they  had  won  by  foul 
means  in  1800?  They  began  with  the  destruction  of  the  navy.  Then  they 

21 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


declared  war  on  commerce;  not  satisfied  with  depriving  it  of  naval  protec- 
tion, they  proceeded  to  annihilate  it  by  embargo.  Having  wrecked  business 
until  "the  stillness  of  death  pervaded  every  street,'*  they  proceeded  system- 
atically  to  wreck  credit  by  destroying  the  Bank  of  the  United  States  and 
by  stopping  national  taxation. 

Then,  having  totally  prostrated  the  national  economy,  they 
declared  war.  Why?  There  was  no  invasion.  There  was  no  longer  a 
serious  question  of  rights  on  the  high  seas;  few  ships  were  out,  the  mer- 
chants made  no  protest,  and  England  was  already  offering  to  adjust  this 
issue.  What  then  was  the  cause?  It  was,  said  Buchanan,  "the  over-weaning 
partiality  of  the  Democratic  party  for  France."  Napoleon  Bonaparte 
dictated  Democratic  party  policy,  and  James  Madison,  in  following  this 
direction,  "preferred  his  private  interest  to  the  public  good." 

And  what  were  the  results?  The  country  was  wholly  unprepared 
for  war.  Without  any  remaining  basis  for  taxation,  and  now  afraid  to  try 
new  taxes,  the  government  borrowed  at  ruinous  rates  until  it  was  on  the 
verge  of  bankruptcy.  Instead  of  conquering,  the  nation  had  itself  been 
invaded.  "The  very  capital  of  the  United  States,  the  lofty  temple  of  liberty, 
which  was  reared  and  consecrated  by  Washington,  has  been  abandoned 
to  its  fate  by  his  degenerate  successor,  who  ought  to  have  shed  his  last 
drop  of  blood  in  its  defence/'27 

The  throng  in  the  square  was  getting  excited;  young  Jimmie  was 
giving  them  more  than  they  had  bargained  for.  "Thanks  to  Heaven," 
Buchanan  went  on,  "that  we  have  obtained  a  peace,  bad  and  disgraceful  as 
it  is;  otherwise,  the  beautiful  structure  of  the  federal  government,  supported 
by  the  same  feeble  hands,  might  have  sunk,  like  the  capitol  into  ruins," 
The  true  policy  of  the  future  would  be  to  abandon  forever  the  wild  project* 
of  that  "philosophic  visionary/*  Thomas  Jefferson,  and  to  "turn  out  of 
power  those  weak  and  wicked  men*  who  have  abandoned  the  political  path 
marked  out  for  this  country  by  Washington."28 

The  speech  was  a  political  success.  The  Washington  Association 
ordered  a  large  number  of  copies  to  be  printed  for  state  distribution,,  and 
the  local  Federalists  within  a  month  had  named  Buchanan  to  k*d  again 
their  ticket  of  Assemblymen.  But  the  attack  provoked  a  hatred  of  Buchanan 
among  the  Jeffersonian  Democrats  of  Lancaster  County  which  wa*  destined 
to  endure  from  that  moment  to  the  day  of  his  death-  Even  James's  rabidly 
pro-Federalist  father  thought  his  attack  was  too  severe  and  wouW  hurt 
the  feelings  of  his  friends  of  the  opposite  party.50 

Buchanan's  speech  on  the  theme  "turn  the  rascal*  out'*  put  him 
in  tune  with  the  national  political  movement  to  rejuvenate  the  Federalist 
party  by  alliance  with  disgruntled  conservative  Democrats.  This  combina* 
tion  would  soon  promote  DeWitt  Clinton  for  the  presidency  and  a  little 
later  would  take  control  of  Pennsylvania.30 

22 


PREFACE  TO  POLITICS  •    1809  - 1819 


COUNSEL  FOR  THE  DEFENSE 

On  his  return  to  Harrisburg  in  December,  1815,  Buchanan  again  sat  with 
the  Judiciary  Committee  and  was  named  also  to  the  Committee  on  Banks.31 
Most  of  the  session  was  devoted  to  banking  problems  which  had  grown  out 
of  the  chartering,  the  year  before,  of  41  new  state  banks,  few  of  which 
could  now  redeem  their  note  issues.  A  majority  of  the  Committee  on  Banks 
recommended  that  the  state,  by  law,  should  require  banks  to  redeem  their 
notes  in  specie  by  a  given  date  or  forfeit  their  charters.  Buchanan  prepared 
a  minority  report  urging  the  legislature  to  stay  out  of  the  matter  until  the 
banks  had  been  given  more  time  to  solve  their  own  problems.  With  the 
same  laissez-faire  point  of  view,  Buchanan  opposed  the  recharter  of  the 
United  States  Bank  which  was  then  under  hot  discussion  in  Washington. 

Although  the  Assembly  took  no  action  on  the  Bank  proposals,  the 
discussions  bothered  Buchanan  and  made  him  reconsider  his  political 
ideas.  The  impetuous,  unstable  and  mob-produced  actions  of  the  radical 
Democracy  he  found  revolting,  sometimes  frightening.  Control  of  business 
and  politics  by  a  closed  corporation  of  the  wealthy  he  could  not  accept  as 
just.  He  had  respect  for  the  will  of  the  majority,  but  he  had  an  equal 
respect  for  individual  rights  in  property.  He  believed  that  the  greatest 
glory  of  the  American  Constitution  was  that  it  embodied  this  dual  concept; 
that  it  drew  a  careful  balance  between  the  demands  of  persons  and  of 
property.  But  no  existing  political  party  accepted  both  of  these  doctrines. 
With  his  ideas,  Buchanan  was  not  sure  in  which  party  he  belonged. 

Nor  was  he  certain,  at  the  end  of  the  session,  what  to  do  next. 
The  Lancaster  Federalists  believed  in  passing  around  the  loaves  and  fishes; 
one  term  in  the  Assembly  was  usual,  two  the  maximum  tolerated  by  local 
tradition.  His  friend  Jasper  Slaymaker  was  next  in  line  for  the  job.  He 
was  not  even  sure  that  he  wanted  to  return  to  Lancaster,  for  it  had  been 
less  cordial  to  him  since  he  had  entered  politics.  He  had  angered  some 
leading  Federalists  by  his  militia  biU  speech  and  infuriated  practically  all  of 
the  Democrats  by  his  Fourth  of  July  oration.  For  a  time  he  dallied  with  the 
thought  of  going  to  Philadelphia  to  practice,  but  his  father  counselled  him 
against  making  rash  and  hasty  changes.32  After  struggling  with  the  decision 
until  he  got  an  attack  of  bilious  fever,  which  generally  accompanied  his 
emotional  crises,  he  determined  to  go  back  to  Lancaster  and  try  to  improve 
his  practice.  He  was  still  making  only  $2000  a  year  and  had  notes  to  meet.83 

During  the  next  four  years,  therefore,  Buchanan  plunged  into 
"unremitting  application  to  the  practice  of  the  law/'  His  cases  covered  the 
whole  range  of  a  country  lawyer's  practice.  He  engaged  in  criminal  and 
civil  suits,  tried  cases,  consulted,  settled  estates,  served  notices,  arranged 
property  transfers,  drew  up  articles  of  incorporation,  unsnarled  tax  con- 
troversies,  and,  in  short,  took  up  any  litigation  or  question  of  legal  opinion 

23 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


which  came  his  way.  Although  most  of  his  business  was  transacted  in  the 
Lancaster  courts,  he  frequently  appeared  before  the  bench  in  York, 
Dauphin,  Lebanon,  and  Cumberland  Counties.34 

Slowly,  by  dint  of  sheer  mental  labor  and  the  application  of  time 
to  his  business,  Buchanan  built  up  a  reputation  for  thoroughness  and 
competence  which  brought  more  and  more  property  work  to  his  desk.  His 
arguments  before  court  and  addresses  to  juries  were  anything  but  brilliant 
or  spell-binding,  but  they  achieved  their  object  by  sheer  mass  of  data  tightly 
knit  by  logic.  Some  called  him  a  hair-splitter.  He  did  not,  however. 
emphasize  detail  at  the  expense  of  the  main  point.  He  carried  argument 
into  areas  so  minute  they  were  boring,  but  he  never  lost  connection  with 
the  basic  issue.  This  habit  was  to  affect  his  political  speeches,  from  which 
it  is  extremely  difficult  to  extract  any  sentence  without  materially  damaging 
a  train  of  thought.  He  was  long-winded,  but  in  planned  papers  never  re- 
petitive. A  Lancaster  judge  wrote  of  him:  "he  was  cut  out  by  nature  for  a 
great  lawyer,  and  I  think  was  spoiled  by  fortune  when  she  made  him 
a  s 


. 

Buchanan  was  at  this  time  called  to  a  case  which  tremendously 
enhanced  his  legal  reputation.  The  Democrats  in  the  Pennsylvania 
Legislature  for  years  had  been  warring  upon  the  Federalist  judges  of  the 
state  by  bringing  indiscriminate  charges  against  them.  Tho  root  of  the 
problem  was  political,  stemming  from  the  efforts  of  the  Jffferson  Adminis- 
tration in  the  early  1800's  to  get  rid  of  Federalists  in  the  courts.  Judges, 
both  state  and  federal,  held  life  tenure  in  those  days,  subject  to  "pood 
behavior,"  but  were  removable  for  cause  by  impeachment.  The  Pennsyl- 
vania Democrats  had  been  gunning  for  Judge  Walter  Franklin  for  years; 
now  they  thought  they  had  him. 

After  the  Pennsylvania  militia  had  ham  mustered  into  Federal 
service  in  July,  1814,  a  Lancastrian  named  Houston  refused  to  serve.  A 
state  militia  court-martial  convicted  and  fined  him.  Houston  appealed  the 
case  through  the  courts,  and  Judge  Franklin  gave  him  a  favorable  verdict, 
on  the  ground  that  state  authority  ended  when  the  militia  entered  the 
national  army.  The  Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  reversed  this 
decision,  and  the  Democratic  legislature  impeached  Franklin  for  rendering 
a  faulty  opinion.36 

Franklin  selected  Buchanan  to  handle  his  defense  for  many 
reasons.  He  had  been  outspoken  against  the  judge-hunting  activities  of 
the  Legislature,  he  was  a  personal  friend  and  neighbor  of  Franklin,  he  had 
had  recent  experience  in  the  Assembly,  and  he  would  certainly  spare  no 
effort  in  preparing  his  argument.  It  was  nonetheless  remarkable  that  the 
sole  responsibility  was  handed  to  a  twenty-five*year-old  attorney. 

Buchanan  argued  that  if  a  legislature  destroyed  a  judge  merely 
because  it  objected  to  the  legal  opinion  he  expressed  in  a  trial,  without  any 

24 


PREFACE  TO  POLITICS  •   1809  -  1819 


hint  of  crime  or  misdemeanor,  it  equally  destroyed  the  constitution  which 
established  the  legislature  and  judiciary  as  independent  and  co-ordinate 
branches  of  government.  A  witness  in  the  Senate  wrote  that  the  argument 
"was  conducted  with  great  ingenuity,  eloquence,  and  address.  It  made  a 
deep  impression."37  The  impeachment  managers  were  nonplussed  and 
adjourned  the  trial  for  several  weeks  until  they  could  prepare  their  reply- 
It  was  not  convincing,  and  the  Senate  acquitted  Franklin. 

But  this  decision  did  not  end  the  matter.  On  February  24,  1817, 
a  committee  of  the  House  drew  up  another  set  of  impeachment  articles 
against  Franklin  and  his  lay  associates,  this  time  on  the  grounds  that 
Franklin  had  refused  to  force  two  Lancaster  attorneys,  W.  C.  Frazer  and 
Patton  Ross,  to  turn  over  a  $300  judgment  they  had  collected  for  a  plaintiff, 
having  kept  the  sum  as  a  part  of  legal  fees  due  them.  The  House  entered 
a  two-to-one  vote  for  impeachment.  Buchanan  again  conducted  the  defense, 
hut  this  time  he  requested  the  assistance  of  his  preceptor.  They  achieved 
an  acquittal  before  the  Senate  by  a  vote  of  21  to  9.38 

As  if  this  were  not  enough,  still  another  set  of  articles  of  impeach- 
ment against  Franklin  was  adopted  by  the  Legislature  in  March,  1818. 
Franklin  wrote  Buchanan  to  collect  half  a  dozen  witnesses  he  would  need 
from  Lancaster  and  come  to  Harrisburg  on  March  5th  or  6th.  Buchanan 
tried  to  secure  the  help  of  Hopkins  and  Parker  Campbell  of  Philadelphia, 
but  neither  was  able  to  be  at  Harrisburg  at  the  required  time.  "Of  course," 
wrote  Campbell,  "y°u  will  have  to  proceed  in  the  case  of  the  Judges  per  se. . . 
You  will  have  to  'cry  aloud  and  spare  not.'  If  some  of  the  principal  actors 
in  this  disgraceful  scene  are  unmasked,  it  may  prevent  a  recurrence  of 
their  sinister  projects,"39 

This  trial  terminated  in  a  fight  between  the  House  and  the  Senate 
which  threw  the  impeachment  into  the  background.  The  Senate  originally 
agreed  to  sit  as  a  court  in  the  House  chamber,  with  the  House  in  attendance 
in  Committee  of  the  Whole;  but  after  a  few  days  the  Senators  decided  to 
meet  in  their  own  chamber,  inviting  the  House  to  sit  with  them  there. 
This  the  House  chose  to  consider  an  intentional  insult,  perpetrated  in 
defiance  of  parliamentary  rules.  The  House  held  an  indignation  meeting 
in  its  own  hall  and  when  sufficiently  inflamed  by  oratory,  tumultuously 
invaded  the  Senate,  bursting  through  the  door,  climbing  through  the 
windows,  jamming  the  gallery,  and  packing  the  aisle.  Everyone  began 
shouting  at  once.  Eventually  the  leaders  of  both  groups  exchanged  apolo- 
gies, and  the  trial  reconvened,  but  by  that  time  the  Legislature  was  so  much 
absorbed  in  its  own  contest  over  rules  of  order  that  the  impeachment 
seemed  a  perfunctory  interruption.40  Franklin  was  again  acquitted. 

Buchanan's  success  at  these  trials  greatly  extended  his  reputation 
and  expanded  his  practice.  Probably  not  many  people  read  his  arguments, 

25 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


but  everyone  knew  that  a  lawyer  who  had  three  times  in  three  years  success- 
fully defended  the  President  Judge  before  whom  he  tried  most  of  his  cases 
would  be  a  good  man  to  have  as  counsel.  Buchanan's  income  rose  from 
$2000  in  1815  to  $8000  in  1818.  He  now  began  to  experience,  as  his  father 
had  predicted,  the  kind  of  whispering  campaign  which  commonly  centers  on 
a  young  man  who  progresses  fast. 


26 


3 

BIRTH  OF  A    BACHELOR  •  1819-1820 

ANN  COLEMAN 

Buchanan's  associations  in  Lancaster  rapidly  broadened  as  he  settled  down 

to  practice.    His  first  close  friend  in  town,  except  for  Jasper  Slayznaker, 

was  Amos  Ellmaker,  a  Yale  graduate  who  had  later  studied  law  under 

Judge  Reeve  at  the  Litchfield  School  in  Connecticut  and  finished  his 

training  in  James  Hopkins's  office  while  Buchanan  was  a  student  there. 

Through  Ellmaker,  Buchanan  met  Molton  C.  Rogers,  son  of  the  Governor 

of  Delaware,  who  had  also  studied  at  Litchfield  and  was  admitted  to  the 

Lancaster  bar  in  1811.    Buchanan  dined  at  the  same  bachelor  mess  as 

Rogers  and  in  1816,  when  these  two  formed  a  loose  partnership,  Rogers 

moved  into  Buchanan's  law  offices  on  East  King  Street     Many  local 

Dickinson  alumni  expanded  the  circle  of  Buchanan's  acquaintances,  some 

of  them  men  of  influence  like  Judge  Alexander  Hayes  and  William  Norris 

and  others,  young  men  of  prominent  families  such  as  Henry  Shippen, 

George  Ross  Hopkins,  and  William  A.  Boyd.    James  saw  much  of  Gerardus 

Clarkson,  son  of  the  Episcopal  Rector,  and  of  John  Reynolds,  both  officers 

of  the  Farmers  Bank.    He  associated  in  many  law  cases  with  William 

Jenkins,  a  Hopkins  student  of  1801  who  had  grown  rich  in  the  iron  business. 

By  October,  1816,  Buchanan  had  progressed  along  the  road  to 

acceptance  in  Lancaster  far  enough  to  be  named  as  one  of  the  managers  for 

the  annual  society  ball.    In  November  he  petitioned  for  admittance  to  the 

Masonic  Lodge  and  was  sponsored  by  Rogers  and  Reynolds.    After  his 

initiation  on  December  11,  1816,  he  rose  rapidly  to  Junior  Warden, 

Worshipful  Master  and  after  a  few  years  to  Deputy  Grand  Master  of  the 

First  District.    As  his  responsibilities  in  the  community  grew,  he  spent 

less  and  less  time  with  the  footloose  young  men  who  nightly  frequented 

the  back  rooms  of  the  local  taverns.    He  had  enjoyed  their  company  as  an 

escape  from  work  and  loneliness,  but  he  had  no  talent  for  stories,  hated 

gambling,  and  had  too  often  made  a  fool  of  himself  by  getting  drunk  and 

winding  up  dancing  on  a  table  top.    He  now  received  more  invitations  to 

27 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


dinner  and  often  spent  evenings  at  fashionable  homes.  He  did  have  a 
talent  for  making  himself  agreeable  to  families  of  standing  in  the  town  and 
for  raising  the  hopes  of  their  unmarried  daughters.  As  the  years  passed 
and  his  reputation  as  a  promising  young  lawyer  continued  to  grow,  he 
became  Lancaster's  most  eligible  bachelor.  He  relished  the  role.1 

Sometime  in  1818,  Molton  Rogers  began  courting  Eliza  Jacobs, 
daughter  of  Cyrus  Jacobs  who  had  amassed  great  wealth  as  an  ironmaster 
and  now  lived  at  Pool  Forge,  east  of  Lancaster.  Eliza's  brother  was  studying 
law  under  Buchanan  at  the  time.  Before  long  Rogers  proposed  that 
Buchanan  should  join  him  some  evening  as  an  escort  for  Eliza's  cousin, 
Ann  Caroline  Coleman.  He  was  delighted  with  the  suggestion. 

Ann  Coleman  was  the  belle  of  the  town  and  the  daughter  of  one 
of  the  richest  men  in  the  country.  A  willowy,  black-haired  girl  with  dark, 
lustrous  eyes,  she  was  by  turns  proud  and  self-willed,  tender  and  affec- 
tionate, quiet  and  introspective,  or  giddy  and  wild.  That  she  remained 
unmarried  at  twenty-two  may  have  been  because  she  was  emotionally 
unstable,  but  more  likely  it  was  due  to  the  stubborn  insistence  of  her 
parents  that  she  make  an  advantageous  marriage. 

Her  father,  Robert  Coleman,  had  been  born  near  Castle  Finn, 
in  County  Donegal,  Ireland,  not  far  from  the  ancestral  home  of  Buchanan. 
Migrating  to  America  in  1764  as  a  youth  of  sixteen,  he  had  worked  first  as 
a  laborer  and  then  as  a  clerk  for  ironmaster  James  Old  of  Reading,  Pennsyl- 
vania, and  later  married  his  daughter.  By  1800,  he  had  come  into  possession 
of  half  a  dozen  fine  iron  properties  and  ranked  as  one  of  the  nation's  first 
millionaires.  A  strong-willed,  hot-tempered  and  vindictive  man,  he  had  an 
inordinate  pride  in  his  wealth  and  was  continually  suspicious  that  others 
had  designs  on  it.  He  was  sensitive  about  social  prestige,  possibly  because 
he  had  once  had  none,  and  enjoyed  public  deference.  He  had  served  as  a 
lay  judge  of  the  Lancaster  County  court,  was  a  trustee  of  Dickinson  College, 
and  a  warden  in  the  local  Episcopal  Church,2 

Coleman  moved  to  Lancaster  in  1809  and  established  his  family 
of  five  sons  and  four  daughters  in  a  town  house  on  East  King  Street,  half  a 
block  from  the  square.8  The  eldest  daughter,  Margaret,  married  Judge 
Joseph  Hemphill  of  Philadelphia,  commonly  known  as  "Single-Speech 
HemphiU"  because  his  maiden  speech  in  the  7th  Congress  proved  also  to 
be  his  last  For  years  Ann  Coleman  had  watched  Jimmy  Buchanan,  the 
Handsome  six-footer  from  Mercersburg,  walking  between  his  office  and  the 
Courthouse  past  her  front  window.  They  undoubtedly  met  before  1818 
at  one  or  another  of  the  annual  balls  in  the  great  room  of  the  White  Swan 
Inn,  but  there  is  no  indication  that  they  saw  much  of  each  other  until  then* 

Now  Ann  and  Buchanan  began  a  serious  courtship,  and  things 
moved  rapidly.  The  winter  of  1818-1819  must  have  been  a  revelation  to 
him.  Once  he  had  penetrated  the  mysterious  circle  of  the  iron  families,  a 

28 


BIRTH  OF  A  BACHELOR*   1819.  1820 


whole  new  world  opened.  Robert  Coleman  seemed  to  have  as  many 
mansions  as  kings  had  castles.  Buchanan  could  visit  with  Ann  at  the 
Elizabeth  Furnace  Mansion,  or  at  Cornwall,  or  at  Speedwell  Forge,  or 
Hopewell  Furnace,  or  Colebrookdale,  or  Martic  Forge  and  always  be  within 
the  family.  Or  they  might  go  on  a  sleigh-ride  with  Rogers  and  Eliza  Jacobs 
to  Pool  Forge  and  stop  by  on  the  way  home  at  the  Jenkins'  estate,  Windsor 
Forge.  Everywhere  there  was  food,  wine,  brandy,  gaiety  and  an  invitation 
to  stay  a  few  days.  Buchanan  sometimes  wondered  whether  he  was  not 
aspiring  too  far  above  his  station,  for  he  could  not  return  such  hospitality. 

James  and  Ann  became  engaged  during  the  summer  of  1819. 
About  the  same  time,  Molton  Rogers  gave  his  heart  to  Eliza  Jacobs,  Lan- 
caster ladies  whipped  up  a  whirlwind  of  excited  speculation  and  gossip 
about  the  possibility  of  a  double  wedding,  with  two  of  the  community's 
richest  fathers  footing  the  bill  for  what  would  surely  be  a  festive  occasion 
unmatched  in  the  past.  But  not  everyone  viewed  the  prospect  with 
pleasure.  Mrs.  Coleman  did  not  approve  of  her  daughter's  choice  and  her 
father,  now  71  years  old,  also  had  his  doubts.  It  is  very  likely  that  as  a 
trustee  of  Dickinson,  he  wondered  whether  Ann  ought  to  marry  a  man  who 
had  been  once  dismissed  and  twice  under  faculty  discipline  there.  As 
a  careful  businessman  he  probably  disapproved  of  the  wager  on  the  1816 
election,  by  which  Buchanan  lost  three  tracts  of  Warren  County  land  to 
Rogers.4  He  may  also  have  been  dismayed  by  the  antics  of  some  of  Bu- 
chanan's associates,  such  as  Jasper  Slaymaker  and  John  Reynolds,  who  had 
gained  notoriety  a  few  years  before  by  a  practical  joke  which  cost  them 
$6700.  These  two,  while  riding  past  a  public  sale  in  a  carriage,  had  shouted 
out  a  bid,  then  whipped  up  the  horse  and  driven  off.  They  were  recognized, 
and  the  auctioneer  knocked  down  to  them  as  high  bidders  a  hotel  and 
ferryboat  line  in  Columbia.5  According  to  Robert  Coleman's  lights,  these 
were  not  the  ways  to  protect  or  develop  a  fortune. 

In  the  latter  part  of  the  summer,  Buchanan  drove  to  Mercersburg 
to  tell  his  parents  about  his  bride-to-be  and  then  set  out  for  Bedford  Springs 
for  a  brief  rest.  He  had  gone  there  for  the  past  two  summers  and  had  been 
delighted  with  the  sparkling  waters,  the  beautiful  serpentine  walks  up 
Constitution  Hill  and  Federal  Hill,  the  quiet  artificial  lake,  and  the  magnifi- 
cent hotel  with  its  broad  verandas.  He  thought  he  would  try  the  new 
Pennsylvania  turnpike  and  got  as  far  as  Sideling  Hill  when  he  encountered 
a  short  unfinished  stretch  of  the  road  which  proved  impassable.  As  he 
was  about  to  turn  back,  a  young  Irishman  from  a  group  of  nearby  workmen 
came  up  and  offered  to  have  his  crew  carry  the  gig  over  the  rocks  and  get 
him  on  his  way  again*  In  fifteen  minutes  they  had  done  the  job,  "My 
name  is  John  Hughes,"  said  the  genial  foreman.6  Many  years  hence 
Buchanan  would  have  occasion  to  remember  that  name. 

29 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


On  his  return  to  Lancaster,  Buchanan  found  his  office  in  pande- 
monium. The  autumn  of  1819  had  developed  into  a  nightmare  for  men  of 
property  and  the  lawyers  who  handled  it.  The  delirium  of  the  financial 
panic  had  reached  its  peak,  land  was  selling  so  fast  and  cheap  that  even  the 
sheriff's  fees  could  not  be  realized,  and  Buchanan  was  frantically  busy. 
One  complex  case  proved  a  particularly  heavy  drain  on  his  time—a  suit 
upon  which  depended  the  continued  existence  of  the  Columbia  Bridge 
Company,  an  enterprise  in  which  many  of  his  local  friends  had  a  financial 
interest.  William  Jenkins  and  the  Farmers  Bank  were  deeply  involved, 
and  the  case  had  ramifications  which  required  Buchanan  to  go  to  Phila- 
delphia several  times.7 

As  if  this  were  not  enough,  the  political  scene  was  in  turmoil. 
The  local  Federalist  party  was  falling  apart  and  had  turned  to  its  young 
men  for  help.  Furthermore,  the  Missouri  Compromise  question  was  at 
this  moment  alarming  the  country  "like  a  fire  bell  in  the  night."  During 
the  week  of  November  23,  Buchanan  attended  public  meetings  and  served 
on  a  committee  with  James  Hopkins  and  William  Jenkins  to  prepare  official 
resolutions  instructing  the  District  Congressman  to  oppose  the  extension 
of  slavery  to  Missouri.8 

With  these  preoccupations,  he  did  not  spend  very  much  time 
courting  during  October  and  November.  Always  conscientious  and  willing 
to  serve,  he  applied  himself  to  business  without  pausing  to  recognize  the 
implications  of  his  activity.  The  town  did  otherwise.  Since  his  engage- 
ment to  Ann  Coleman,  he  had  become  a  major  subject  of  conversation  and 
his  every  act  or  omission  was  subjected  to  special  scrutiny.  The  teacup  set 
soon  agreed  that  Buchanan  was  in  love  not  with  Ann  but  with  the  Coleman 

fortune. 

Sometime  in  November,  Ann  began  to  worry  about  this  gossip, 
which  inevitably  found  its  way  into  the  Coleman  household.  When  her 
parents  further  poisoned  her  mind  on  the  subject,  she  gradually  began  to 
believe  "that  Mr,  Buchanan  did  not  treat  her  with  that  affection  that  she 
expected  from  the  man  she  would  marry,  and  in  consequence  of  his  coolness 
she  wrote  him  a  note  telling  him  that  she  thought  it  was  not  regard  for  her 
that  was  his  object,  but  her  riches."9 

Ann's  letter  put  Buchanan  in  a  difficult  dilemma,  and  her  reflec- 
tion upon  his  integrity  hit  him  where  he  was  most  sensitive;  it  hurt  his 
pride  and  self-respect.  He  must  have  felt  that,  in  the  light  of  Ann's 
suspicions,  any  marked  quickening  of  his  interest  thereafter  would  only 
be  construed  by  her  as  additional  proof  of  her  charge*  Hurt  and  frustrated 
he  answered  Ann's  note  politely  but  in  a  tone  of  injured  innocence  and 
made  no  apology  or  explanation.  There  was  as  yet,  however,  no  formal 
breach,  and  matters  might  have  been  happily  resolved  had  not  another 
incident  occurred. 

30 


BIRTH  OF  A  BACHELOR  •   1819  - 1820 


This  event  is  best  explained  in  the  words  of  a  niece  of  the  lady 
who  unwittingly  precipitated  the  crisis.  "Some  time  after  the  engagement 
had  been  announced,"  she  wrote,  "Mr.  Buchanan  was  obliged  to  go  out  of 
town  on  a  business  trip.  He  returned  in  a  few  days  and  casually  dropped  in 
to  see  ...  Mrs.  William  Jenkins,  with  whose  husband  he  was  on  terms  of 
intimate  friendship.  With  her  was  staying  her  sister,  Miss  Grace  Hubley, 
...  a  pretty  and  charming  young  lady.  From  this  innocent  call  the  whole 
trouble  arose.  A  young  lady  told  Miss  Coleman  of  it  and  thereby  excited 
her  jealousy.  She  was  indignant  that  he  should  visit  anyone  before  coming 
to  her.  On  the  spur  of  the  moment  she  penned  an  angry  note  and  released 
him  from  his  engagement.  The  note  was  handed  to  him  while  he  was  in 
the  courthouse.  Persons  who  saw  him  receive  it  remarked  afterward  that 
they  noticed  him  turn  pale  when  he  read  it.  Mr.  Buchanan  was  a  proud 
man.  The  large  fortune  of  his  lady  was  to  him  only  another  barrier  to  his 
trying  to  persuade  her  to  reconsider  her  rejection  of  himself."10 

For  several  days  thereafter  Ann  was  so  distressed  and  low-spirited 
that  her  mother  persuaded  her  to  go  to  Philadelphia  hoping  that  a  change 
of  scene  would  improve  her  mental  state.  Her  vitality  was  already  low, 
and  she  caught  cold  on  the  way  to  the  city.  She  left  Lancaster  on  Saturday, 
December  4,  in  company  with  her  younger  sister,  Sarah,  to  visit  with  sister 
Margaret,  apparently  intending  to  see  the  series  of  plays  and  operas  cur- 
rently being  offered  at  the  Philadelphia  Theatre. 

After  Ann's  departure,  Buchanan  immersed  himself  in  business. 
On  Monday,  December  6,  he  succeeded  in  getting  a  settlement  out  of  court 
of  the  Columbia  Bridge  Company  case.  He  was  at  the  prothonotary's  office 
for  a  considerable  part  of  the  day,  entering  the  decisions  of  the  arbitrators, 
getting  signatures  of  the  principal  parties  to  the  agreement,  and  winding 
up  the  details.11  It  was  a  great  triumph  for  him. 

Early  Thursday  morning,  December  9,  the  thunderbolt  struck, 
A  special  messenger  from  Philadelphia  brought  the  shocking  news  that 
Ann  Coleman  had  died  suddenly  at  her  sister's  home  shortly  after  midnight. 
Judge  Thomas  Kittera  of  Philadelphia,  who  knew  the  Colemans,  recorded 
in  his  diary  the  events  of  that  fatal  day  which  changed  the  course  of 
James  Buchanan's  life  and  with  it  possibly  the  course  of  American  history. 
"At  noon  yesterday,"  wrote  Kittera,  "I  met  this  young  lady  on 
the  street,  in  the  vigour  of  health,  and  but  a  few  hours  after  [,]  her  friends 
were  mourning  her  death.  She  had  been  engaged  to  be  married,  and  some 
unpleasant  misunderstanding  occurring,  the  match  was  broken  off.  This 
circumstance  was  preying  on  her  mind.  In  the  afternoon  she  was  laboring 
under  a  fit  of  hysterics;  in  the  evening  she  was  so  little  indisposed  that  her 
sister  visited  the  theatre.  After  night  she  was  attacked  with  strong  hysteri- 
cal convulsions,  which  induced  the  family  to  send  for  physicians,  who 
thought  this  would  soon  go  off,  as  it  did;  but  her  pulse  gradually  weakened 

31 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


until  midnight,  when  she  died.  Dr.  Chapman, . . .  says  it  is  the  first  instance 
he  ever  knew  of  hysteria  producing  death.  To  affectionate  parents  sixty 
miles  off  what  dreadful  intelligence— to  a  younger  sister  whose  evening  was 
spent  in  mirth  and  folly,  what  a  lesson  of  wisdom  does  it  teach.  Beloved 
and  admired  by  all  who  knew  her,  in  the  prime  of  life,  with  all  the  ad- 
vantages  of  education,  beauty,  and  wealth,  in  a  moment  she  has  been 

cut  off."12 

Judge  Kittera  might  well  have  added,  what  crushing  intelligence 
to  her  ex-fianc&  The  news  swept  through  Lancaster  like  a  soul-chilling 
wind.  One  gentleman  wrote  of  it  as  "the  most  affecting  circumstance  that 
has  ever  taken  place  here  since  I  have  been  an  inhabitant.1'13  There  im- 
mediately arose  the  hint  of  suicide,  though  no  one  could  produce  any  valid 
evidence  of  it.  The  hideous  part  was  that  nobody  apparently  did  know 
exactly  what  had  happened,  and  it  is  entirely  probable  that  James  Buchanan 
lived  out  his  whole  life  haunted  by  doubts  and  self-accusations.  But  people 
thought  and  talked  even  if  they  did  not  have  the  facts.  One  Lancaster  lady 
wrote  of  the  public  reaction  against  Buchanan:  "I  believe  that  her  friends 
now  look  upon  him  as  her  Murderer."14  The  Colemans  seemed  to  feel 
that  way  about  it. 

Buchanan  immediately  wrote  an  anguished  letter  to  Ann's  father 
requesting  permission  to  see  the  corpse  and  to  walk  as  a  mourner.  The 
letter,  despatched  to  the  Coleman  home  by  messenger,  was  refused  at  the 
door  and  returned  unopened.  In  tins  note,  Buchanan  had  written:  "It  is 
now  no  time  for  explanation,  but  the  time  will  come  when  you  will  discover 
that  she,  as  well  as  I,  have  been  much  abused.  God  forgive  the  authors  of 
it . ,  .  I  may  sustain  the  shock  of  her  death,  but  I  feel  that  happiness  has 
fled  from  me  forever."15 

As  he  came  face  to  face  with  the  bitter  hatred  of  the  CotananH 
and  the  insidious  suicide  rumors,  Buchanan  slowly  began  to  recognise  the 
fuU  horror  of  his  situation.  Unable  to  endure  solitude*  and  even  le«s  able 
to  confront  people  on  the  street,  he  fled  to  the  rooms  of  Judge  Walter 
Franklin,  who  was  then  living  next  door  to  the  Coleman  home.  Here  he 
tried  to  compose  a  fitting  last  tribute  to  Ann  for  publication  in  the  Lancaster 
Journal.  A  printer's  devil  from  editor  Dickson's  office,  who  was  sent  for 
the  copy,  recalled  finding  Buchanan  "so  disturbed  by  grief  that  he  was 
unable  to  write  the  notice."  Judge  Franklin  finally  composed  it  himself.16 

The  Hemphills  brought  Ann  Coleman's  body  to  Lancaster  on 
Saturday,  December  11,  and  on  the  Sabbath  she  was  buried  in  the  St.  James 
Episcopal  churchyard  in  a  ceremony  witnessed  by  a  vast  number  of  people. 
Buchanan  tried  unsuccessfully  to  get  a  grip  on  himself  and  go  back  to  work. 
A  Lancaster  girl's  report  suggests  what  he  had  to  face*  "After  Mr,  Buchanan 
was  denied  his  requests/9  she  wrote,  "he  secluded  himself  for  a  few  days 
and  then  sallied  forth  as  bold  as  ever.  It  is  now  thought  that  this  affair  will 

32 


BIRTH  OF  A  BACHELOR  •   1819  -  1820 


lessen  his  Consequence  in  Lancaster  as  he  is  the  whole  conversation  of 
the  town."17 

A  few  days  after  the  funeral,  James  Buchanan  stepped  from  the 
rear  door  of  his  quarters  into  the  gloomy  morning  darkness  of  December, 
made  his  way  carefully  across  the  cobblestone  courtyard  back  of  the 
Leopard  Tavern,  passed  under  the  stone  archway  which  led  out  to  Duke 
Street,  and  there  climbed  aboard  the  early  stage  for  the  West.  Huddled  in 
his  greatcoat,  he  made  no  effort  to  lean  forward  when  the  coach  passed  by 
the  St.  James  churchyard. 

In  later  years  he  could  not  have  reconstructed  if  he  had  wished 
that  agonizing,  endless  ride  from  Lancaster  to  Mercersburg.  His  mind  was 
numb;, his  spirit,  in  utter  confusion.  What  now?  He  could  not  stay  in 
Lancaster,  nor  could  he  leave  without  tremendous  sacrifice.  And  in  the 
background  of  his  thought  there  dinned  one  half-formed  yet  persistent 
conclusion:  that  this  tragedy  marked  the  end  of  James  Buchanan.  What 
he  would  be  hereafter  would  have  to  be,  somehow,  different  from  what  he 
had  been  before.  Buchanan  shivered  from  more  than  the  cold,  and  let  his 
thoughts  merge  with  the  bleak  greyness  of  the  winter  dawn. 

The  family  impressed  itself  upon  him  this  Christmas  in  a  way  he 
had  not  before  appreciated.  In  it  he  found  warmth  and  sympathy,  trust 
and  admiration,  expectation  of  great  achievement  from  the  eldest  son  and 
brother  as  well  as  the  assumption  that  he,  very  soon,  might  be  their  guardian 
and  provider.  The  realization  of  his  increasing  importance  within  the 
family  and  of  the  responsibility  that  he  bore  for  others  gave  to  James  a 
renewed  sense  of  purpose  in  life.  It  appealed  to  his  already  strong  concept 
of  personal  duty  and  pleasantly  nourished  his  ambition  for  eminence, 
giving  to  both  a  gratifying  quality  of  unselfishness.  While  the  Coleman 
marriage  would  probably  have  eased  the  path  and  quickened  his  pace  to 
achievement,  position,  and  wealth,  he  did  not  doubt  after  the  first  shock 
of  the  tragedy  had  passed  that  with  determination  and  application  he  could 
attain  these  objects  without  outside  help.  In  fact,  the  gossip  attending 
Ann's  death  made  it  almost  a  mandate  that  he  prove  himself,  in  order  to 
maintain  his  self-respect 

But  even  such  rationalization  could  not  quite  overcome  James's 
reluctance  to  face  again  what  he  knew  must  await  him  when  he  returned. 
His  pride  and  vanity  were  wounded  lo  a  degree  that  he  had  to  have  some 
armor  to  protect  him.  His  mother  supplied  the  material  for  it.  She  had 
that  kind  of  faith  which  assumed  that  whatever  happened  was  an  act  of  the 
Deity  intended  especially  for  her  instruction  and  benefit.  On  one  occasion 
when  a  fire  destroyed  the  homes  of  several  neighbors  and  her  own  was 
saved  by  a  sudden  shift  in  the  wind,  she  had  written:  "Our  situation  was 
indeed  deplorable,  but  that  Omnipotent  being  who  governs  all  nature 
graciously  interposed  in  our  behalf.1*18 

33 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


On  this  solid  rock  of  faith,  James  Buchanan  built  his  protective 
wall.  His  armor  would  be  an  unquestioning  acceptance  of  what  is,  as  the 
manifestation  of  divine  order.  There  now  began  to  appear  in  Buchanan's 
correspondence  those  sentences  which,  over  the  years,  he  was  to  repeat 
incessantly:  "Sufficient  unto  the  day  is  the  evil  thereof."  "It  is  better  to 
bear  the  ills  we  have  than  to  fly  to  others  we  know  not  of.'*  He  used  them 
as  a  statement  of  resignation,  as  a  balm  for  personal  disappointments,  and 
as  a  convenient  means  of  side-tracking  the  necessity  of  seeking  original 
courses  of  action.  Today  he  would  do  the  routine  work  for  today;  God 
would  take  care  of  tomorrow.  This  attitude  brought  peace  of  mind  but 
stifled  imagination;  it  lowered  emotional  tension  but  destroyed  zest  for 
any  cause;  it  counselled  patience  but  obscured  the  importance  of  right 
timing  in  human  affairs;  it  eased  adjustment  but  eliminated  experiment. 
It  was  fortunate  that  his  desk  was  piled  high  with  unfinished 
business  when  he  got  back  to  his  office  in  January,  1820.  He  plunged  into 
preparations  for  the  February  session  of  court  and  found  that  attention  to 
the  troubles  of  others  distracted  him  from  his  own.  He  spent  some  time 
developing  his  "casebook,"  a  bound  volume  in  which,  with  meticulous 
neatness,  he  transcribed  the  main  facts  of  cases  he  had  tried,  noting  at  the 
end  the  judgment  of  the  bench  and  the  general  principles  of  law  which 
applied.  He  indexed  this  volume  in  another  notebook  in  such  a  manner 
that  he  could  continue  into  the  future,  making  the  references  cumulative19 
Before  long  it  became  fairly  apparent  that  his  recent  notoriety 
would  improve  his  law  business.  His  tragedy  had  resulted,  in  part,  from 
his  neglect  of  private  affairs  in  order  to  attend  to  the  interests  of  his  clients. 
This  was  good  advertising.  He  also  found  cases  coming  to  him  from  those 
who  had  no  love  for  the  Colemans  and  from  persons  who  sympathized  with 
his  plight  at  the  same  time  that  they  trusted  his  legal  ability. 

Several  trials,  unimportant  in  themselves,  contributed  to  his 
expanding  reputation.  A  man  charged  with  threatening  the  life  of  another 
retained  Buchanan  to  defend  him.  When  the  plaintiff  took  the  stand 
Buchanan  asked  him: 

"Well,  sir,  suppose  you  were  a  man  of  more  nerve,  a  man  not 
easily  frightened  by  threat— put  yourself  in  the  position  of  a  courageous 
man— would  you  have  cared  for  the  threat  of  my  client?" 

"I  am  a  man,*'  replied  the  plaintiff,  "of  as  much  courage  as  any* 
body,  sir." 

"Then  you  were  not  frightened  when  my  client  threatened  you?" 
"No,  sir." 

"You  are  not  afraid  of  him?" 
"No,  I  am  not" 

"Well,  then,  what  did  you  bring  this  charge  for?  I  move  **» 
dismissal." 

34 


BIRTH  OF  A  BACHELOR  •   1819  - 1820 

The  court  dismissed  the  case.20 

In  another  case,  tried  in  Harrisburg,  Buchanan  was  retained  by 
the  plaintiff  in  an  action  of  ejectment.  After  examining  the  deeds  to  the 
property,  James  told  his  client  that  he  had  no  case— that  a  link  in  the  title 
was  missing.  The  client  insisted,  however,  that  Buchanan  go  ahead  with 
the  case.  At  the  trial  the  attorneys  for  the  defendant  overlooked  the  weak 
point  in  the  title.  When,  after  the  conclusion  of  testimony,  they  saw  and 
tried  to  remedy  their  error,  Buchanan  held  that  under  the  rules  then  in 
force  they  could  not  introduce  further  evidence.  The  court  so  charged 
the  jury,  and  Buchanan's  client  won.  The  Supreme  Court  of  Pennsylvania 
later  upheld  the  verdict  of  the  lower  court.21 

An  observer  in  the  courtroom  during  the  famous  property  trial  of 
Bowman  v.  KBnigmacher  in  1820  wrote:  "I  never  heard  better  pleading  in 
the  Court  House  of  Lancaster  before:  Hopkins  &  Jenkins  for  Konigmacher 
&  Buchanan  for  Bowman, — who  argued  very  ably."22  Judge  Alexander  L. 
Hayes  of  the  County  Court  stated  that  "he  never  listened  to  an  advocate 
who  was  equal  to  Mr.  Buchanan,  whether  in  clear  &  logical  arguments  to 
the  Court,  or  in  convincing  appeals  to  the  reason  and  sympathies  of  the 
jury."23  This  developing  reputation  brought  to  Buchanan  not  only  personal 
gratification  and  more  business  but  led  to  an  increasing  number  of  applica- 
tions by  young  law  students  to  take  their  preceptorship  under  him.  James 
was  particularly  pleased  when  ironmaster  Cyrus  Jacobs  engaged  him  as  his 
legal  advisor  in  June,  1820.2* 

FLIGHT  TO  POLITICS 

In  the  meantime,  Pennsylvania  politics  built  up  to  a  high  pitch  of  excite- 
ment. Many  persons,  it  is  true,  referred  to  the  election  of  1820  as  an 
"era  of  good  feeling,"  but  this  expression  had  a  very  special  meaning  and 
was  limited  to  the  presidential  canvass.  There  was  little  "good  feeling" 
among  political  rivals  for  state  and  local  office. 

The  Pennsylvania  contest  for  the  governorship  in  1820  developed 
into  a  bitter,  violent  fight  which  the  Federalists  confidently  hoped  to  win 
because  of  a  split  among  the  Democrats.  William  Findlay,  a  neighbor  of 
the  Buchanans  in  Mercersburg,  had  served  one  term  as  Democratic  governor 
and  was  standing  for  re-election.  The  Federalists  now  coalesced  with  a 
disgruntled  portion  of  the  Democrats  to  form  a  party  called  the  Independent 
Republicans,  who  nominated  Joseph  Hiester,  a  Revolutionary  veteran  and 
an  old  Federalist.26 

The  Federalists  of  Lancaster,  casting  about  for  a  Congressional 
candidate  to  head  their  ticket  for  the  district  comprising  Dauphin,  Lebanon 
and  Lancaster  Counties,  settled  on  Buchanan.  The  election  contest  hinged 
almost  wholly  upon  the  office  of  governor  and  by  midsummer  had  become 

35 


JAMES  BUCHANAN* 


acrimonious  and  bitter,  as  campaigns  always  do  when  a  large  party  splits 
and  a  portion  of  it  allies  itself  with  the  traditional  enemy.  Buchanan's 
opponents  not  only  dragged  out  the  Coleman  affair  but  also  brought  his 
father  prominently  into  the  mud-slinging. 

One  long  effusion  of  July,  in  the  form  of  a  public  "Letter  to 
James  Buchanan,  Esquire"  made  cruel  reference  to  his  recent  tragedy  and 
blamed  him  for  a  vile  attack  on  Findlay  for  ownership  of  a  Negro  slave, 
Hannah,  alleging  that  Hannah  had  formerly  been  the  property  of  Bu- 
chanan's father.  As  a  final  touch,  the  letter  was  signed  "Colebrook,"  to 
suggest  authorship  by  one  of  the  Colemans. 

If  Buchanan  was  angry  at  the  crude  references  to  Ann,  he  was 
furious  that  his  father  and  old  Hannah  should  be  dragged  into  a  political 
smear.  Until  the  Findlays  took  her,  Hannah  had  been  his  childhood  nurse, 
ignorant,  innocent  and  devoted.  His  father  had  become  responsible  for 
her  as  executor  of  an  estate,  and  had  eventually  fixed  her  with  the  neighbor- 
ing Findlay  family  who  provided  a  home  for  hen  Buchanan  hat!  an  affection 
for  the  old  lady  and  never  left  Mercersburg  without  visiting  her  and  taking 
her  some  little  remembrance.26  The  newspaper  charge  that  he  had  assailed 
Governor  Findlay  for  enslaving  old  Hannah  made  him  see  red/*7  His  father 
cautioned  him,  "That  piece  is  well  calculated  to  irritate  &  hurt  your 

feelings Let  not  your  passions  get  the  better  of  your  sober  judgment. 

If  you  are  the  author,  meet  the  dispute  with  firmness  and  truth,  &  if  you 
are  not  the  author,  let  them  expose  themselves  a  little  further  that  they 
may  be  taken  in  their  own  snare.  I  will  be  anxious  to  hear  from  you  on 
this  subject."28  Buchanan  categorically  denied  that  he  had  anything  to 
do  with  the  "Hannah"  stories,  but  the  episode  abated  some  of  his  youthful 
idealism  about  politics.20 

On  the  evening  of  August  25,  the  Lancaster  "Fwleral-Rtf  publican" 
delegates  got  together  to  select  formally  the  slate  agreed  upon  privately 
long  before.  They  named  Buchanan  for  Congress  and  Edward  Coleman, 
Ann's  brother,  for  the  State  Senate.  The  whole  ticket  was  pledged  to  work 
for  the  election  of  Joseph  Hiester  to  the  governorship.  A  few  w«*t»k«  later 
the  conference  committee  of  the  three  counties  comprising  the  district 
nominated  Buchanan  and  John  Phillips  of  Dauphin  County  for  Congress 
as  "friends  of  reform."  The  terminology  was  significant.  Locally  Bu- 
chanan's supporters  were  "Republican  Federalists'*  signifying  the  coalition 
back  of  Hiester;  but  for  national  office  his  supporters  were  "friends  <»f 
reform,"  a  designation  which  openly  recognized  the  current  uaetatsneiftR  <»f 
party  labels  in  Washington.  On  September  1,  the  supporters  of  Findlay 
held  meetings  and  reported  a  "Democratic  ticket'*  including  Jacob  Hibeh- 
man  of  Lancaster  for  Congress,  and  Molton  C.  Rogers  for  State  Senator.30 

Buchanan  stayed  aloof  from  the  rough  and  tumble  political  fight. 
He  made  only  a  few  formal  speeches  and  sent  no  contributions  to  the 

36 


BIRTH  OF  A  BACHELOR  •   1819  -  1820 


newspapers,  letting  the  editors  write  on  his  behalf.  His  political  metier 
was  not  the  hustings  and  the  editorial  column;  it  was  the  private  letter  and 
the  personal  conference.  He  liked  to  discuss  strategy  but  left  it  to  others 
to  execute  the  tactical  maneuvers.  The  Findlay  men  tried  hard  to  draw- 
Buchanan  into  an  open  skirmish,  but  he  always  parried  by  a  purposeful 
disdain  to  join  in  a  newspaper  brawl.  His  editor  friends,  explaining  his 
refusal  to  stump  the  district,  wrote:  "Those  acquainted  with  the  gentleman, 
know  that  his  time  is  more  usefully  as  well  as  more  profitably  employed." 
For  a  conservative  constituency  this  was  psychologically  sound.  In  the 
fall  election  Buchanan  and  Phillips  carried  their  district  by  a  comfortable 
majority,  and  Federalist  Joseph  Hiester  became  governor. 

Buchanan  would  not  go  to  Washington  for  more  than  a  year; 
the  session  of  Congress  to  which  he  had  been  elected  would  convene  in 
December,  1821.  In  the  meantime  he  faced  a  heavy  schedule  of  cases  at 
court,  and  had  to  familiarize  himself  with  his  approaching  duties  as  Con- 
gressman. December  court  awarded  him  a  decision  in  the  long  drawn  out 
case  of  Bowman  v.  Konigmacher,  In  January  he  defended  a  group  of  men 
charged  with  manslaughter,31  and  in  May  scored  one  of  his  greatest  court- 
room triumphs  by  successfully  defending  William  Hamilton  against  a 
charge  of  the  murder  of  Ann  Piersol.32 

On  June  11,  1821,  Buchanan's  father  died.  The  old  gentleman 
was  just  entering  the  driveway  of  his  Mercersburg  home  in  a  rig  he  had 
driven  from  Dunwoodie  Farm  when  the  horse  bolted,  throwing  Mr. 
Buchanan  out  of  the  carriage.  His  head  struck  the  iron  tire,  and  he  died 
soort  thereafter.  James  went  to  Mercersburg  immediately  to  take  charge 
and  found,  to  his  chagrin,  that  his  father  had  failed  to  leave  a  will.  James 
spent  the  resc  of  the  summer  working  out  details  of  the  settlement  of  the 
complicated  estate  in  a  manner  that  would  enable  his  mother  to  get  along 
with  as  little  worry  as  possible,  finance  the  education  of  the  three  boys, 
William,  George  and  Edward,  and  care  for  the  unmarried  girls,  Sarah 
and  Harriet 

THE  SEVENTEENTH  CONGRESS 

Late  in  November,  James  left  by  stage  for  the  national  capital,  entrusting 
his  King  Street  rooms  to  a  housekeeper.  Rogers  would  stop  in  occasionally, 
he  told  her,  to  pick  up  some  wine  and  jugs  of  apple  brandy.  He  wanted  the 
rooms  kept  clean  but  otherwise  undisturbed,  as  he  would  be  back  in 
Lancaster  from  time  to  time  to  attend  to  his  practice. 

In  Washington  he  found  quarters  at  the  establishment  of  a 
Mrs.  Peyton  in  company  with  Representatives  Andrew  R.  Govan  of  South 
Carolina,  Henry  D.  Dwight  of  Massachusetts,  and  George  Blake,  aBostonian 
friend  of  Daniel  Webster.33  The  capital  city  itself  was  a  disappointment 

37 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


he  had  been  forewarned  to  expect.  The  national  Capitol  stood  unfinished 
since  its  destruction  by  the  British,  in  1814.  From  Capitol  Hill  stretched 
Pennsylvania  Avenue,  lined  with  poplars  and  conveying  a  hint  of  dignity 
when  viewed  at  a  distance,  but  it  presented  only  a  morass  of  mudholes  to 
those  who  had  to  travel  it  on  their  way  to  the  president's  house  at  the 
other  end.  The  White  House  had  been  rebuilt  and  repainted,  and  at  each 
of  the  corners  of  the  square  it  occupied  stood  one  of  the  department 
buildings.  Between  here  and  the  Potomac  stood  a  small  group  of  shabby 
houses  near  the  Navy  Yard  and  another  along  the  river's  edge  farther  north, 
A  few  fine  edifices,  mostly  private  homes  or  foreign  embassies,  dotted  the 
terrain  north  of  Pennsylvania  Avenue,  but  most  of  the  buildings  were  small 
and  shoddy — even  the  hotels. 

On  December  3,  Buchanan  and  a  number  of  other  new  members, 
including  John  Tod  of  Pennsylvania  and  George  McDuffie  and  Joel  Poinsett 
of  South  Carolina,  were  introduced  to  the  House.  The  chamber  itself  was 
poorly  designed  for  its  purpose.  The  gallery  was  simply  rfa  platform  raised 
a  foot  or  two  above  the  floor,  which  gave  the  honorable  members  an  excel- 
lent opportunity  of  attending  to  the  ladies  who  had  come  to  listen  to 
them."34  Huge  pillars  so  blocked  the  view  that  no  one  could  see  the  whole 
assembly  and  many  legislators  could  not  see  the  Chain 

Buchanan  found  a  few  familiar  faces— John  Findlay  from  Franklin 
County,  Joseph  Hemphill  of  Philadelphia,  Ben  Hardin  of  Kentucky  and 
John  Sergeant  with  whom  Buchanan  had  associated  in  legal  work  in 
Philadelphia.  Sergeant,  Chairman  of  the  Judiciary  Committee,  briefed 
him  on  the  various  members.  "I  well  remember  Mr.  Sergeant  putting  me 
on  guard  against  Mr.  Randolphs  friendship,"35  he  wrote,  John  Randolph 
of  Roanoke,  brilliant,  eccentric  and  vitriolic,  was  the  showman  of  Congress, 
a  man  who  could  always  electrify  the  gallery  but  he  was  not  considered  a 
"business  member**  of  the  House. 

Philip  P.  Barbour  of  Virginia  occupied  the  Speaker's  chair,  and 
Henry  Baldwin  of  Pennsylvania  had  been  named  chairman  of  the  powerful 
Ways  and  Means  Committee.  Buchanan  quickly  got  acquainted  with 
Ninian  Edwards  of  Illinois,  an  old  Dickinson  alumnus.  But  William 
Lowndes  of  South  Carolina  commanded  his  chief  interest.  He  had  learned 
of  Lowndes  through  Langdon  Cheves,  former  President  of  the  Second  Bank 
of  the  United  States,  a  South  Carolinian  who  had  for  several  years  been 
living  in  Lancaster.  The  news  that  the  South  Carolina  Legislature  had  just 
unanimously  nominated  Lowndes  for  the  presidency  in  1824  gave  special 
interest  to  his  presence  in  the  House. 

Buchanan  made  Lowndes  his  ideal,  for  he  displayed  those  qualities 
which  James  admired  and  tried  to  cultivate  in  himself—sincerity  of 
purpose,  full  command  of  information,  gentleness  of  address,  an  aversion 
to  giving  offense  to  an  opponent,  and  utter  fairness  in  debate.  Randolph 

38 


BIRTH  OF  A  BACHELOR  •   1819  -  1820 


once  remarked  after  hearing  Lowndes  present  the  argument  of  an  adversary 
prior  to  demolishing  it,  "He  will  never  he  ahle  to  answer  himself."36 

Buchanan  quickly  showed  that  he  planned  to  be  a  "business 
member"  of  Congress.  He  was  appointed  to  the  Committee  on  Agriculture 
two  days  after  the  House  organized,  and  he  made  his  first  speech  ten  days 
after  his  arrival.  Within  three  weeks  he  had  taken  the  floor  formally  on 
three  occasions.  Writing  to  Judge  Franklin  of  his  early  impressions,  he 
confided  that  after  hearing  various  members  speak,  he  was  "forcibly  struck 
with  the  idea  that  the  reputation  of  many  of  them,  stands  higher  than  it 
deserves.5*  His  own  speeches,  he  reported,  had  received  a  "tolerable  share 
of  attention,  which  in  a  very  great  degree  I  attributed  to  the  curiosity  of 
the  Members,"  though  he  himself  had  felt  much  embarrassed.  Most  im- 
portant, he  could  make  himself  distinctly  heard,  a  rare  achievement  because 
of  the  poor  acoustics  of  the  hall.37 

Just  before  Congress  adjourned  for  Christmas,  Buchanan  received 
news  from  Harrisburg  that  gave  him  something  to  think  about  during  the 
brief  recess.  The  State  Legislature  had  just  elected  William  Findlay  to 
the  United  States  Senate  by  an  overwhelming  majority.  That  meant  that 
Buchanan's  party  was  defunct  in  Pennsylvania.  The  confused  Washington 
scene  would  doubtless  provide  new  issues  and  bases  of  allegiance,  but  these 
would  have  to  be  worked  out.  At  the  moment  he  was  literally  a  man 
without  a  party. 

A  few  days  before  Congress  reconvened,  several  gentlemen  called 
on  Buchanan  with  a  proposition.  They  wanted  him  to  accept  the  notes 
collected  by  Lowndes  on  the  War  Department  Deficiency  Bill,  construct 
them  into  a  speech,  and  deliver  it.  Lowndes  was  ill  and  unable  to  do  this 
job  himself.  He  wished  to  save  John  C.  Calhoun,  Secretary  of  War,  from 
his  present  embarrassment.  Would  Mr.  Buchanan  take  over?  He  would, 
indeed!  With  the  most  exquisite  pleasure.38 

There  was  in  the  House  at  this  time  a  group  calling  itself  the 
Radical  party  whose  object  was  to  limit  the  activities  of  the  federal  govern- 
ment to  the  narrowest  possible  range.  One  means  to  this  end  was  re- 
trenchment, a  rigorous  cutting  down  of  the  expenses  of  government. 
William  Harris  Crawford  of  Georgia  led  this  party,  which  was  particularly 
hostile  to  John  C.  Calhoun.  The  root  of  their  antagonism  was  doubtless 
their  conflicting  ambition  for  the  presidency,  but  the  immediate  source  of 
trouble  was  Calhoun's  alleged  extravagance  in  administering  the  War 
Department.  Congress  had  appropriated  $100,000  for  Indian  Administra- 
tion for  the  year  1821— only  half  the  usual  amount  provided  for  this 
purpose.  The  Secretary  of  War  had  spent  $170,000  which  was  less  than 
usual  but  $70,000  more  than  Congress  had  provided.  The  Deficiency  Bill 
on  which  Lowndes  had  planned  to  speak  would  enable  Calhoun  to  pay  the 
debts  incurred  by  the  Indian  Bureau  of  his  Department. 

39 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

To  be  asked  to  do  a  favor  for  both  Lowndes  and  Calhoun  during 
his  first  month  in  Congress  indicated  fast  progress.  It  gave  Buchanan  the 
opportunity  he  wanted  to  stake  out  some  political  lines  in  Washington. 
Rumors  that  Buchanan  would  speak  for  Lowndes  leaked  out,  and  the  House 
listened  with  careful  attention  to  his  remarks. 

This  speech  revealed  Buchanans  debating  technique  and  identified 
his  particular  talents  in  the  forum.  He  entered  the  problem  tentatively, 
without  convictions,  admitted  the  plausibility  of  the  opposition  view,  and 
asserted  his  personal  opinion  with  modesty  and  calculated  understatement. 
This  introductory  statement  had  the  ring  of  sincerity  and  created  a  sympa- 
thetic attitude  in  the  audience— a  lawyer's  bid  for  the  jury. 

He  then  stated  the  general  principle  from  which  the  rest  of  the 
reasoning  would  flow.  "It  ought  to  be  a  maxim  in  politics,  as  well  as  in 
law,  that  an  officer  of  your  Government,  high  in  the  confidence  of  the 
people,  shall  be  presumed  to  have  done  his  duty,  until  the  reverse  of 
the  proposition  is  proved." 

From  this  platform  Buchanan  launched  into  the  details  of  his 
problem,  examining  every  possible  meaning  and  ramification,  ?*nd  tracing 
all  to  the  stage  of  reductio  ad  absurdum  except  the  one  he  supported,  which 
at  length  stood  out  like  a  beacon  of  sanity  and  good  judgment  by  contrast. 
Had  Calhoun  violated  the  Constitution?  No.  Was  he  to  pay  the  bills  of 
his  Department  out  of  his  own  pocket?  No.  Was  he  intended  to  be  a  seer, 
able  to  predict  precisely  the  expenses  of  the  army  for  years  in  advance?  No. 
Would  the  nation  be  safe  if  every  executive  officer  ceased  to  function  when 
the  previously  voted  funds  ran  out?  Should  the  president  admit  the 
invader  because  Congress  had  failed  to  budget  for  an  invasion?  Was  it 
reasonable  to  expect  that  the  Indian  Bureau,  after  a  generation  of  activity, 
could  suddenly  cut  its  program  in  half?  If  that  were  done,  would  not  the 
Secretary  of  War  then  be  compelled  to  legislate  in  deciding  what  portions 
of  his  functions,  defined  by  statute,  should  be  performed?  Would  this 
decision  not  destroy  the  function  of  Congress  in  defining  the  scope  of 
executive  action?  Did  Congress  intend  to  force  the  executive  to  alter  the. 
laws  of  the  land?  If  as  a  result,  the  border  settlements  were  exposed  to 
Indian  massacre,  would  Congress  approve?  Or  did  Congress  expect  the 
executive  to  be  endowed  with  the  power  to  perform  miracles— to  do  the 
accustomed  work  without  funds?  Even  if  the  Department  of  War  had 
erred,  did  Congress  plan  to  repudiate  contracts  honestly  entered  into  by 
individuals  with  responsible  agents  of  the  United  States  Government, 
punishing  the  innocent  instead  of  the  guilty?  "Why,  then,  considering 
this  question  in  every  point  of  view  in  which  it  can  be  presented,  is  there 
any  objection  against  voting  $70,000  to  supply  the  deficiency  in  the  appro* 
priation  of  last  year?"39 

40 


BIRTH  OF  A  BACHELOR  •   1819-1820 


This  speech  serves  as  a  fair  sample  of  Buchanan's  platform 
manner.  Reason,  supported  by  quantities  of  illustrative  and  supporting 
data,  embellished  by  pathos  ("the  shrieks  of  helpless  women  and  children 
under  the  scalping  knife!"),  converged  upon  an  inevitable  answer.  In  a 
reasoned  debate,  Buchanan  could  so  exhaust  a  subject  that  any  reply  was 
bound  to  be  a  reiteration.  Against  wit  or  ridicule  he  was  helpless,  but  in 
serious  debate  he  was  formidable. 

Many  complimented  him  on  his  defense  of  the  Deficiency  Bill 
which  quickly  passed  by  a  large  majority,  despite  a  sarcastic  sally  by  John 
Randolph.  Buchanan  then  settled  down  to  work  on  the  two  main  objectives 
of  his  current  tenure:  to  achieve  re-election  and  to  keep  in  touch  with 
presidential  politics. 

He  obtained  free  public  documents  for  the  home  constituency. 
When  these  were  unavailable  for  distribution,  he  laboriously  copied  some 
in  longhand  for  particular  friends.  He  worked,  through  the  War  Depart- 
ment, for  the  appointment  of  some  Lancaster  boys  to  West  Point.  He 
demanded  an  inquiry  to  determine  who  had  pocketed  Pennsylvania's 
militia  fines  and  got  himself  appointed  chairman  of  a  select  committee  to 
conduct  the  probe.40  He  introduced  a  group  of  resolutions  to  extend  the 
post-road  system  throughout  his  Congressional  district;  and  he  busied 
himself  in  other  ways  to  keep  his  name  in  the  newspapers  and  show  that  he 
was  an  active  public  servant.41  Returning  home  at  the  end  of  the  session, 
Buchanan  learned  that  he  was  to  be  the  guest  of  honor  at  the  Federalist 
celebration  of  the  Fourth  of  July  at  Swenk's  Spring,  along  the  wooded 
Conestoga.  At  the  party  enthusiastic  supporters  assured  him  that  his 
services  were  duly  appreciated  and  would  be  "long  remembered  by  his 
constituents.**42  The  toasts,  written  in  advance  by  the  arrangements 
committee,  were  indications  of  renomination.  In  fact  the  Federalists, 
meeting  at  the  end  of  August,  did  renominate  him.  It  was  quite  a  distinc- 
tion to  be  run  for  Congress  a  second  time,  for  the  local  Federalist  practice 
had  always  been  to  pass  this  job  around  among  deserving  workers.  Bu- 
chanan felt  certain  that  in  this  case  it  was  his  industry  that  had  broken 
the  precedent. 

James  kept  his  ears  open  for  rumors  on  the  presidential  race. 
William  Lowndes  soon  drifted  out  of  the  picture  because  of  a  serious  illness 
which  forced  him  to  leave  Congress  early  in  1822.  "Whose  chance  from 
present  appearances  is  best  for  the  office  of  President?"  Buchanan  wrote 
in  March.  "In  my  opinion  should  the  election  take  place  tomorrow  the 
contest  would  be  chiefly  between  Calhoun  and  Crawford.  I  consider  Adams 
out  of  the  question  ...  his  disposition  is  as  perverse  and  mulish  as  that  of 
his  father."43  Among  the  members  of  Congress  Buchanan  found  not  the 
slightest  trace  of  distinction  between  Federalist  and  Democrat;  the  names 
persisted,  but  they  no  longer  signified  anything*  Many  Democrats  held 

41 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Federalist  ideas,  while  as  many  nominal  Federalists  were  Democratic  in 
principle.  He  thought  that  Monroe's  administration,  though  Democratic 
in  name,  generally  pursued  the  Federalist  policy.44 

Two  events  during  this  first  session  of  the  17th  Congress  showed 
new  trends  in  Buchanan's  political  thought.  The  Bankrupt  Bill  raised  the 
question  whether  the  federal  government  should  admit  to  bankruptcy 
proceedings  all  classes  of  citizens— farmers,  laborers,  artisans  and  others—- 
or whether  bankruptcy  procedures  should  be  restricted  to  the  mercantile 
class,  as  had  been  customary.  Federalist  John  Sergeant  sponsored  the  bill 
and  during  the  Christmas  recess  of  1821  persuaded  Buchanan  to  support  it; 
but  as  debate  proceeded,  James  wavered  and  in  March  made  a  long  speech 
in  opposition  which  contributed  to  the  defeat  of  the  measure.  As  Buchanan 
had  a  strong  personal  attachment  to  Sergeant,  his  action  must  have  been 
based  on  some  serious  political  soul-searching.  What  had  he  discovered? 
A  simple  but,  to  him,  a  basic  assumption:  that  in  an  organized  society 
property  rights  had  to  take  precedence  over  human  rights.  He  did  not 
develop  this  idea  in  its  full  implications,  but  he  had  the  main  point.  To 
extend  .the  bankruptcy  privilege  would  destroy  property  because  of  the 
impossibility  of  controlling  abuse  of  the  privilege  if  it  were  extended  to  all 
classes.  To  destroy  property  would  be  to  destroy  government  and  society, 
He  began  dimly  to  see  that  human  rights  might  conceivably  be  developed 
together  with  property  rights,  but  that  without  the  security  of  property 
every  man  would  be  doomed  to  the  law  of  cannibalism  in  which  no  right 
of  any  kind  could  be  guaranteed. 

This  speech- has  usually  been  cited  as  the  beginning  of  Buchanan's 
adherence  to  the  doctrine  of  States'  rights.  It  is  true  that  in  his  compre- 
hensive argument  he  warned  that  to  give  the  federal  courts  jurisdiction 
over  bankrupts  from  the  entire  population  would  lead  to  federal  cf>n£<>lida» 
tion.  But  this  was  a  subsidiary  argument.  His  main  theme  was  that  the 
bill  would  increase  the  perpetration  of  fraud  because  man  was  basically 
criminal  and  would  give  way  to  temptation.  "Rest  assured/11  he  concluded, 
"that  our  population  require  the  curb  more  than  the  rein."  This  was 
Hamiltonian,  not  Jeffersonian, 

A  second  Congressional  event  that  also  arbused  Buchanan  to 
some  original  thinking  was  President  Monroe*1*  veto  message  of  a  bill  to 
finance  repairs  on  the  Cumberland  Road  by  permitting  the  federal  govern* 
meat  to  collect  tolls,  Buchanan  had  supported  several  proposals  to  improve 
the  Cumberland  Road  because  he  thought  the  road  would  strengthen  the 
Union  and  benefit  Pennsylvania,  but  Monroe's  veto  pointed  out  the  Con- 
stitutional difficulties  involved  in  a  federal  effort  to  collect  a  local  tax* 
Buchanan  was  so  impressed  by  his  own  failure  to  see  what  a  Pandora's  box 
of  federal  intervention  this  would  open  that  he  tried  repeatedly  thereafter 
to  have  the  whole  Cumberland  Road  rctroceded  to  the  individual  states, 

42 


BIRTH  OF  A  BACHELOR  •   1819  -  1820 


In  this  instance,  he  did  lean  to  the  States'  rights  view,  defending  the  domain 
of  state  jurisdiction  from  invasion  by  federal  authority. 

What  political  complexion  did  Buchanan  hold  in  1822?  Was  he 
Federalist  or  Democratic  in  principles?  It  seemed  that  he  was  both. 
Fortunately  for  him,  so  were  many  of  his  constituents. 


43 


4 
THE  KING  MAKER  •  1821  -  1827 

THE  CALHOUN  BAND  WAGON 
Since  1800  New  York  and  Virginia  had  divided  the  honors  of  control  of  the 


national  government,  Virginia  teWag  the  presidency  and  New  York  the 
lion's  share  of  the  federal  patronage.  This  "dynastic  alliance"  always 
controlled  presidential  nominations  by  the  old  scheme  of  the  Congressional 
caucus  and  planned  again  to  exercise  its  power  by  selecting  William  Harris 
Crawford  as  the  presidential  nominee  in  1824.  As  there  would  be  no 
Federalist  candidate,  the  Democratic  nomination  would  be  equivalent  to 
election;  it  would  be,  at  least,  unless  someone  contested  the  nomination. 
Pennsylvania's  younger  politicians  readied  themselves  for  just  such  a 
contest. 

To  overcome  the  New  York-Virginia  alliance  they  thought  it 
necessary  to  establish  a  counteralliance  and  to  manage  a  nomination  by 
some  means  other  than  the  traditional  method*  Pennsylvania  had  no 
favorite  son  ready  for  the  presidency  in  1821,  but  she  had  a  unique  and 
original  system  of  making  nominations  which,  together  with  her  28  votes 
in  the  electoral  college,  might  very  well  upset  Crawford  and  elect  someone 
of  her  choice.  The  Pennsylvanians  proposed  to  use  the  method  of  nomina- 
tion by  a  state  convention  of  delegates  chosen  for  the  purprme,  the  same 
procedure  by  which  they  had  picked  their  gubernatorial  candidates  in 
1817  and  1820. 

Buchanan  found  the  prospects  fascinating,  "I  have  long  thought 
that  the  general  government  have  rested  so  secure  in  the  support  of 
Pennsylvania  that  they  have  thought  it  unnecessary  to  do  her  common 
justice,7*  he  wrote  in  1821*1  Along  with  others,  he  welcomed  the  plan  of  a 
combination  of  Ohio,  South  Carolina,  and  Pennsylvania  to  take  the  measure 
of  New  York  and  Virginia,  John  C  Calhoun,  Secretary  of  War,  would  be 
the  logical  leader  of  such  a  coalition.  He  waa  a  striking  man  with  piercing 
eyes  and  thick  black  hair,  brushed  back  defiantly,  a  man  of  experience  and 
leadership;  a  nationalist,  a  friend  of  internal  improvements,  of  a  national 

44 


THE  KING  MAKER  •   1821  -  1827 


bank,  and  of  a  protective  tariff;  a  man  of  honor  who  would  not  slight  his 
friends.  If  he  were  to  become  president,  Pennsylvania's  turn  could  not 
be  far  behind,  and  some  cabinet  offices  would  be  scattered  along  the  road 
to  the  White  House. 

Calhoun  visited  Pennsylvania's  Bedford  Springs  in  1821  and  made 
a  tour  of  observation  until  mid-September.  He  returned  to  Washington 
full  of  rosy  hopes  for  the  future,  for  in  the  course  of  his  expedition  he  had 
signed  up  the  leading  representatives  of  the  Family  party  of  the  state,  an 
organization  which  was  destined  to  guide  Pennsylvania  politics  and  to 
plague  James  Buchanan  for  many  years  to  come. 

George  Mifflin  Dallas  of  Philadelphia,  patrician  son  of  Alexander 
J.  Dallas,  created  the  Family  party  which  got  its  name  from  the  fact  that 
nearly  all  the  lieutenants  were  kin  to  their  captain.  Favored  with  reputa- 
tion, money,  brains,  and  political  ties  strengthened  by  blood  and  marriage, 
Dallas  nourished  the  hope  of  outstripping  in  distinction  his  famous  father. 
Samuel  D.  Ingham  of  New  Hope  along  the  Delaware,  William  Wilkins  of 
Pittsburgh,  Richard  Bache,  Thomas  Sergeant,  and  John  Norvall  of  Phila- 
delphia, Thomas  J.  Rogers  of  Easton,  and  a  few  others  formed  the  backbone 
of  the  Family  party's  leadership. 

During  Buchanan's  first  weeks  in  Congress  in  December  1821, 
the  Family  Congressmen  from  Pennsylvania  called  on  Calhoun  in  a  body 
to  invite  him  formally  to  stand  as  a  candidate  for  president.  After  his 
grateful  acceptance,  the  Family  spread  pro-Calhoun  literature  all  over 
Pennsylvania  and  systematically  attacked  John  Quincy  Adams.  Plans  to 
secure  a  nomination  of  Calhoun  by  the  State  Legislature  proved  premature 
in  1822,  but  Dallas  and  Ingham  indoctrinated  their  followers  with  the  idea 
that  support  of  Calhoun  would  be  one  of  the  main  issues  of  the  1823  contest 
for  the  governorship.2  By  January  1823,  George  McDuffie  thought  ^  that 
Pennsylvania  would  "unquestionably  support  Calhoun"  and  nominate 
him  at  a  state  convention.3 

Buchanan  became  interested  in  Calhoun's  prospects,  partly 
because  so  many  of  his  Pennsylvania  colleagues  were  talking  about  the 
subject  and  partly  because  he  happened  to  live  with  George  McDuffie.  It 
was  probably  no  accident  that  Buchanan's  first  real  speech  was  a  ringing 
defense  of  Calhoun's  administration  of  the  War  Department,  and  the  rather 
unusual  attention  accorded  to  this  effort,  which  mystified  the  orator,  may 
have  proceeded  from  genuine  curiosity  whether  Calhoun  had  carried 
Pennsylvania's  Federalists  into  camp.  Buchanan  refused  to  commit  himself 
to  Calhoun,  but  kept  a  position  from  which  he  could  at  any  time  go  along 
with  the  movement  without  apparent  inconsistency  or  embarrassment. 

Early  in  1823,  Buchanan's  friend  Stephen  Pleasanton  dropped  a 
hint  that  a  change  in  Monroe's  Cabinet  was  imminent.  "Poor  Penna./' 
he  wrote,  "has  not  a  man  in  the  dominant  party  ...  fit  to  be  placed  in  the 

45 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

Cabinet.  All  the  large  states  can  have  a  man  in  the  Cabinet  but  her.  If 
she  had  a  prominent  man  she  would  clearly  be  entitled  to  the  Appt.  of 
Secretary  of  Navy Canvyou  name  one?"4 

It  was  extremely  odd  that  such  a  letter  should  have  been  addressed 
to  Buchanan.  He  assumed  that  Calhoun  was  back  of  it  and  used  it  in  the 
way  in  which  Pleasanton  presumably  intended.  He  consulted  with  his 
Democratic  law  partner,  Molton  Rogers,  in  framing  a  reply  which  was 
prepared  for  Calhoun's  eye.  Calhoun,  he  wrote,  could  gain  the  presidency 
by  pressing  Pennsylvania's  claim  for  recognition  in  the  Cabinet,  or  destroy 
his  chances  if  he  disregarded  the  Keystone  State.  This  exchange  brought 
Buchanan  almost  within  the  ranks  of  pro-Calhoun  Democrats.5  As  it 
developed,  the  incumbent  Navy  Secretary,  S.  L.  Southard,  surprised  every- 
one  by  keeping  his  Cabinet  place  in  preference  to  the  offer  of  a  seat  on  the 
Supreme  Court.  Calhoun  promised,  however,  that  Buchanan  could  count 
him  ccamong  the  friends  of  the  state  here"  whenever  the  occasion  de- 
manded.6 

George  McDuffie  wrote  Buchanan  a  flattering  letter  at  this  same 
time,  commenting  that  "though  you  are  called  a  federalist  &  myself  a 
republican,  we  agree  upon  almost  every  question  of  importance  .  *  .  not 
excepting  the  interesting  question  of  who  shall  be  the  next  president." 
McDuffie  then  proceeded  to  instruct  Buchanan  on  the  ''safest  course"  for 
those  who  were  backing  Calhoun's  prospects.  He  wanted  to  obtain  a  strong 
public  expression  from  Pennsylvania;  that  would  bring  Ohio  along  im- 
mediately.7 

Buchanan  at  this  point  would  probably  have  come  out  openly 
for  Calhoun  except  for  complications  created  by  the  state  election  of  1823, 
The  Federalists  would  have  to  run  a  candidate  for  governor;  they  rould  not 
at  the  same  time  back  a  presidential  candidate  already  appropriated  by 
the  opposition. 

The  pro-Calhoun  Democrats  selected  John  A,  Shuhe  as  the 
Democratic  candidate  for  governor.  Although  Shulze  said  nothing  on  the 
subject  of  the  presidency,  his  backers  spread  the  word  that  a  vote  for 
Shulze  in  1823  meant  a  vote  for  Calhoun  in  1824  Except  for  the  fact 
that  Shulze's  chief  competitor  for  the  Democratic  nomination,  George 
Bryan  of  Lancaster,  had  been  double-crossed  at  the  convention,  there 
probably  would  have  been  no  Federalist  nomination  and  no  contest*  but 
Bryan's  friends  were  so  outraged  that  it  seemed  sure  that  they  could  be 
induced  to  bolt.  The  Federalists*  therefore,  placed  a  candidate  in  the 
running  and  succeeded  in  influencing  the  angry  Bryanitcs  to  join  them.* 

These  activities  put  Buchanan  in  a  quandary.  He  tried  to  keep 
the  presidential  question  out  of  the  state  election  and  also  to  keep  himwlf 
clear  of  it.  Before  the  Federalist  nominating  convention,  he  strongly  dis- 
suaded John  Sergeant  from  standing  as  a  candidate  for  governor  because  he 

46 


THE  KING  MAKER  •   1821  - 1827 


knew  that  if  his  friend  Sergeant  ran,  he  would  be  compelled  to  campaign 
actively.9  After  Sergeant  declined  and  Andrew  Gregg  accepted  the  Feder- 
alist nomination,  Buchanan  gave  only  perfunctory  attention  to  his  party's 
canvass.10  His  colleagues  censured  him  for  his  conduct.  "It  is  bruited 
about  that  you  have  rather  held  back  in  this  business  which  rumor  is  I 

presume  no  secret  to  you,  nor  the  cause  of  it The  presidential  question 

is  assigned  as  the  cause  of  this  backwardness."11 

It  was  certainly  a  frustrating  summer  for  everybody.  Although 
the  presidential  issue  was  officially  taboo  and  not  to  be  mentioned  formally, 
everyone  privately  talked  of  nothing  else.  The  frequent  appearance  of 
Jackson's  name  during  the  summer  came  as  a  surprise  to  the  politically 
informed,  for  his  candidacy  seemed  to  spring  out  of  thin  air.  No  one  of 
standing  sponsored  him,  but  on  the  only  occasion  when  his  name  was 
publicly  brought  forward— at  the  state  convention  which  nominated  Shulze 
for  governor — the  chairman  had  to  smother  the  wild  demonstration  which 
greeted  the  pro-Jackson  resolution  by  calling  loudly  for  a  vote  on  a  different 
subject.12 

Buchanan  had  hoped  to  escape  part  of  this  awkward  political 
campaign  by  going  to  Boston  in  June  with  Mrs.  George  Blake,  one  of  his 
dining  companions  for  the  past  two  years  at  Mrs.  Peyton's.  Mrs.  Blake 
teased  him  about  his  apparent  aversion  to  the  fair  sex,  persuaded  him  to 
escort  her  to  public  functions  in  Washington,  and  conducted  a  vigorous 
campaign  to  find  a  wife  for  him.  But  he  had  to  forego  the  Boston  trip  at 
that  time  because  the  Pennsylvania  Supreme  Court  had  scheduled  an 
adjourned  session  for  the  first  three  weeks  of  July,  and  he  was  concerned  in 
nearly  every  case  on  the  docket.  He  wrote  Mrs.  Blake  in  midsummer  that 
Lancaster  was  as  dull  as  could  be  and  that,  like  the  children  of  Israel  in  the 
wilderness,  he  longed  after  the  fleshpots  of  Egypt 

He  had  been  having  a  good  time  in  Washington  where,  among 
the  ladies,  the  knowledge  of  the  Ann  Coleman  affair  had  given  him  a  kind 
of  romantic  appeal.  He  had  not  forgotten  Ann,  nor  had  he  lived  the  life  of 
a  recluse.  Washington  was  full  of  lovely  maids  and  matrons,  but  person- 
able young  bachelors  were  few.  Buchanan  knew  the  Van  Ness  girls,  Cora 
Livingston  and  Catherine  Van  Rensselaer  of  New  York,  the  Crowninshield 
misses  from  Vermont,  Priscilla  Cooper,  who  became  the  wife  of  his  friend 
Robert  Tyler,  the  Caton  sisters  from  Baltimore,  and  many  others,  including 
a  sprightly  Julia  and  a  giddy  Matilda  about  whom  he  wrote  glowing  en- 
comiums. He  spent  August  with  the  Slakes  in  Boston;  but  despite  the  best 
efforts  of  his  kind  hostess,  he  returned  home  no  closer  to  matrimony  than 
he  had  been  before.13 

In  Lancaster  he  learned  that  the  Federalist  campaign  for  governor 
had  fallen  apart.  In  October  Shulze  won  the  governorship  by  the  largest 
majority  in  the  history  of  Pennsylvania. 

47 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


THREE  CHEERS  FOR  OLD  HICKORY 

The  first  few  months  of  the  new  Congressional  session,  from  December  1823 
to  March  1824,  were  filled  with  the  excitement  of  president-making. 
Calhoun  thought  that  his  election  was  certain  if  only  Pennsylvania  would 
nominate  him;  but  Ingham,  Dallas,  and  his  other  friends  in  the  Family 
party  hesitated,  for  they  had  not  been  able  to  bring  Governor  Shulze  into 
their  plans.  Meanwhile  the  cry  for  Jackson  spread  wildly. 

In  February,  1824  the  Congressional  caucus  in  Washington 
nominated  Crawford  according  to  plan.  A  rump  affair,  boycotted  by  all 
but  two  or  three  Pennsylvania  representatives,  it  would  not  be  an  important 
factor  in  Pennsylvania.  On  the  other  hand  the  caucus  made  it  startlingly 
clear  that  there  would  have  to  be  either  a  knockdown  fight  between  the 
friends  of  Jackson  and  the  friends  of  Calhoun  or  some  kind  of  jointure 
between  them,  for  supporters  of  these  two  seemed  to  be  divided  fairly 
evenly.  The  Family  party,  however,  considered  it  safe  to  push  a  plan  for  a 
State  nominating  convention  in  Harrisburg  on  March  4  at  which  they 
intended  to  introduce  Calhoun's  name  as  presidential  candidate,  with 
Jackson  as  his  running  mate. 

After  carefully  sounding  out  public  opinion,  Buchanan  now 
abandoned  his  earlier  preference  for  Calhoun.  Some  of  the  Federalists  had 
taken  hold  of  the  sprouting  Jackson  movement  and  stood  a  good  chance  of 
appropriating  the  management  of  it.  This  was  too  good  an  opportunity  to 
ignore,  particularly  since  many  western  Democrats  had  become  enthusiastic 
Jacksonians  but  lacked  leadership.  Even  Judge  John  Bannister  Gibson,  a 
Democratic  party  regular,  wrote  to  Buchanan  in  January:  "Heaven  knows 
what  will  be  the  upshot ...  but  it  seems  to  me  that  Jackson  is  carrying  it 
away  from  all  the  rest.  Next  to  J.  C.  Calhoun  he  is  my  man/*14  During 
this  time  of  uncertainty,  Buchanan  kept  his  own  counsel. 

In  February,  four  days  after  the  Crawford  nomination,  Callxum's 
friends  in  Pennsylvania  held  a  meeting  in  Philadelphia  to  select  delegates 
to  the  Harrisburg  convention.  Their  courage  broke  at  this  point  arid 
George  Dallas  himself  urged  the  meeting  to  select  delegates  favorable  to 
Jackson,  with  Calhoun  as  their  second  choice.15  This  was  a  bombshell  to 
Calhoun,  and  made  Jackson  the  choice  of  all  parties  in  Pennsylvania.  From 
here  on  it  would  be  a  scramble  to  see  who  could  gain  control  of  the  whole 
Jackson  movement  and  thus  control  the  Pennsylvania  patronage.  Three 
groups  of  Pennsylvania  politicians  accepted  the  fact  of  Jackson's  popularity, 
and  each  of  these  became  a  Jacksonian  faction  determined  to  dominate 
the  whole. 

The  first  to  propose  Jackson's  candidacy  were  a  number  of  small- 
fry  editors  and  country  politicians  who  were  the  real  "original  Jacksonian**' 
of  the  Commonwealth.  The  second  group  of  Jacksonians  had  been  the 

48 


THE  KING  MAKER  •    1821  -  1827 


supporters  of  Governor  Hiester  in  1820;  they  were  men  of  both  Federalist 
and  Democratic  parties  who  called  themselves  the  Independent  Republicans 
and  were  soon  to  adopt  the  name  "Amalgamators."  These  men,  after  the 
Jacksonian  movement  had  gotten  fairly  well  started  in  the  West,  assumed 
for  themselves  the  title  of  ''original  Jacksonians."  Among  the  Democrats 
were  Henry  Baldwin  of  Pittsburgh,  Molton  C.  Rogers  of  Lancaster,  Isaac  D. 
Barnard  of  West  Chester,  Robert  Patterson  of  Harrisburg,  and  others 
opposed  to  the  Family  or  Dallas  faction  of  their  party.  Among  the  promi- 
nent Jacksonian  Federalists  were  Andrew  Gregg  and  James  Buchanan. 

Finally  leaders  of  the  Family  party,  belatedly  observing  which  way 
the  wind  was  blowing,  pledged  themselves  to  Jackson  and  claimed  the 
privilege  of  dictating  to  all  the  others.  They  became  known  as  the  "Eleventh 
Hour  Men.*'  Everyone  assumed  that  their  object  was  to  put  Jackson  into 
the  White  House  for  one  term  only,  as  a  necessary  preliminary  to  the 
election  of  their  favorite,  Calhoun.16 

The  Federalists  renominated  Buchanan  for  a  third  Congressional 
term  in  the  fall  of  1824.  The  nomination  was  a  tribute  to  his  work  in 
Washington,  for  the  Lancaster  party  had  never  before  endorsed  anyone 
for  a  third  successive  term.  But  another  influence  was  also  at  work*  Many 
Federalists  admitted  that,  sooner  or  later,  they  would  have  to  make  a  clean 
break  with  the  past,  either  by  starting  a  new  party  or  by  joining  some  faction 
of  the  traditional  enemy.  Buchanan  endorsed  the  latter  plan  and  ran  on  a 
ticket  labelled  "Federal-Republican."  Some  of  the  old-guard  Federalists 
resisted  by  throwing  away  their  votes  in  the  election,  but  Buchanan  won 
his  race  with  the  support  of  "amalgamators"  of  both  parties.  The  varied 
preferences  for  president  which  the  rival  candidates  for  Congress  held 
played  no  part  in  this  campaign.  The  local  elections  continued  to  be  fought 
on  the  traditional  local  issues. 

In  the  presidential  election,  held  three  weeks  later,  the  popular 
vote  surprised  even  the  winners  in  Pennsylvania.  Jackson's  poll  was 
35,929;  Adams's,  5,436;  Crawford's,  4,182;  and  Clay's,  1,705.17  But  the 
Electoral  College  vote  showed  no  such  landslide.  There  Jackson  received 
99  votes;  Adams,  83;  Crawford,  41;  and  Clay,  37.  Since  no  candidate  had 
a  majority,  the  choice  devolved  upon  the  House  of  Representatives  which 
had  to  make  a  selection  from  the  three  strongest  candidates.  Clay  was  free 
to  throw  his  influence  where  he  wished. 

THE  DISPUTED  ELECTION  OF  1824 

Exactly  what  happened  in  Washington  in  the  interim  between  the  meeting 
of  the  Electoral  College  and  the  vote  by  the  House  of  Representatives  will 
probably  never  be  known.  Politicians  from  all  over  the  Union  swarmed 
into  the  national  capital  to  add  their  voices  to  the  Congressional  hubbub, 

49 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


and  those  from  Pennsylvania  were  perhaps  more  involved  in  it  than  any. 
James  Buchanan,  George  Kremer,  Samuel  Ingham,  Philip  Marklcy,  Molton 
Rogers,  Walter  Lowrie,  William  Findlay,  and  even  Albert  Gallatin,  had  a 
finger  in  the  presidential  pic. 

James  Buchanan  was  one  of  the  most  willing  "fixers'*  of  the 
Pennsylvania  delegation.  Two  rumors  current  about  the  capital  in 
December  gave  him  the  impetus  to  action.  One  was  that  Henry  Clay  would 
use  his  influence  to  elect  Adams  if  Adams  would  promise  to  appoint  him  as 
Secretary  of  State.  The  other  was  that  Jackson,  if  elected,  would  continue 
John  Quincy  Adams  in  the  State  Department.  Buchanan  felt  that  these 
rumors  placed  Jackson  at  a  disadvantage  in  his  contest  with  Adams,  and 
put  Clay  in  an  awkward  situation.  The  premiership  in  the  Cabinet  had 
become'  a  stepping  stone  to  the  presidency,  and  Buchanan  thought  that  if 
Clay's  friends  could  be  informed  that  Jackson  had  not  determined  to  appoint 
Adams  (implying  that  Jackson  might  appoint  Clay),  a  good  many  Clay  men 
would  support  Old  Hickory.  Only  this  backing  could  elect  him. 

Buchanan  disliked  Adams  and,  like  most  Pennsylvania  politicians 
had  to  support  Jackson  whether  he  liked  him  or  not.  It  was  natural, 
therefore,  that  he  should  have  been  anxious  to  prevent  an  Adams- Jarks<  m 
alliance.  In  the  fall  of  1824  Buchanan  was  supporting  Jacknn  with  Clay 
as  his  second  choice.18 

Congressman  Philip  S.  Markley,  an  ardent  Pennsylvania  supporter 
of  Clay,  urged  Buchanan  to  get  a  statement  from  Jackson  that  he  had  not 
promised  to  appoint  Adams.  "The  friends  of  Jackson/1  he  wrote*  "or 
rather  the  people  of  Pennsylvania  feel  a  more  than  ordinary  interest  in  thr 
election  of  GenL  Jackson  by  Congress.  I  have  heard  many  of  the  most 
influential  and  prominent  republican*  of  the  State  ,  *  ,  expreft*  their  *inr«»rf 
desire  that  the  friends  of  Mr,  Clay  cooperate  with  the  friends  of  Jackson  in 
his  election— as  Mr,  Clay  is  at  present  decidedly  the  second  choire  of  IVnna, 
They  hope  that  his  friends  on  the  present  occasion  will  not  take  a  course 
which  will  mar  his  future  prospects  in  this  State,1119  Mohnn  C  Rogers, 
now  Secretary  of  the  Commonwealth  and  Chairman  of  the  Jackson  State 
Committee  assured  Buchanan  that f  'it  would  give  great  pleasure  to  a  number 
of  the  friends  of  Mr,  Clay  in  this  State,  if  he  should  use  his  influence  in 
favor  of  Jackson.  In  that  event  he  might  hope  for  the  vote  of  Pennsylvania 
on  some  future  occasion-'*20  Buchanan  later  denied  under  fire  that  he  had 
ever  been  a  political  agent  of  Mr.  Clay,  but  it  was  no  secret  in  Washington 
in  the  winter  of  1824-1825  that  Buchanan**  particular  wi»h  was  the  election 
of  Jackson  by  the  aid  of  Henry  Clay,  and  it  was  a  natural  assumption  that, 
should  this  occur,  Buchanan  would  later  welcome  Gay's  elevation. 

By  the  last  week  in  December  Buchanan  decided  the  time  for 
action  had  come.  In  the  hope  of  getting  the  support  of  Clay's  friends  for 
Jackson  and  in  the  hope  also  of  preventing  Clay  from  consummating  what 

50 


THE  KING  MAKER  •    1821  - 1827 

he  felt  would  be  a  fatal  move  (alliance  with  Adams)  Buchanan  determined 
to  learn  from  General  Jackson's  own  lips  whether  or  not  he  had  ever  said 
that  Adams  would  head  his  Cabinet.21  Not  wishing  to  act  entirely  upon  his 
own  responsibility,  however,  he  wrote  to  Rogers  at  Harrisburg,  inquiring 
whether  to  ask  the  proposed  question.  "I  can  perceive  no  impropriety  in 
Gen.  Jackson  making  the  declaration  you  mention,"  Rogers  replied,  "if  it 
will  contribute  to  his  election.  Although  I  have  the  highest  opinion  of 
Mr.  Adams'  qualifications  for  Secretary  of  State,  yet,  I  would  not  endanger 
Gen.  Jackson  on  that  account."22 

Thus  reinforced,  Buchanan  approached  Jackson's  friend,  Major 
John  Henry  Eaton,  with  his  question;  but  receiving  no  satisfactory  answer, 
he  prepared  to  interview  General  Jackson  himself.  On  December  30, 1824, 
Buchanan  called  on  Jackson.  After  the  company  which  was  present  had 
left  the  apartment,  Jackson  asked  Buchanan  to  take  a  walk  with  him.  The 
General  could  scarcely  have  been  unprepared  for  the  propounding  of  some 
proposition  of  more  than  ordinary  importance;  even  if  Eaton  had  not  fore- 
warned him  he  must  have  noticed  that  Buchanan  was  purposely  waiting 
out  the  other  guests.  Jackson's  practiced  eye  must  surely  have  seen  the 
tension  under  which  the  young  man  was  laboring. 

The  Hero  of  New  Orleans,  now  Senator  from  Tennessee,  was 
something  of  an  enigma  in  Washington.  Albert  Gallatin  described  him  as 
"a  tall,  lank,  uncouth  looking  personage,  with  long  locks  of  hair  hanging 
over  his  face,  and  a  cue  down  his  back  tied  in  an  eel  skin;  his  dress  singular, 
his  manners  and  deportment  that  of  a  backwoodsman."23  Josiah  Quincy 
called  him  "a  knightly  personage,"  and  "vigorously  a  gentleman,"  but  not 
a  man  with  whom  to  differ  because  he  thought  that  "Heaven  would  not 
suffer  his  opinions  to  be  other  than  right.9'241  James  Parton  characterized 
the  Old  Hero  as  "honest,  yet  capable  of  dissimulation;  often  angry,  but 
most  prudent  when  most  furious; . . .  among  dependents,  all  tenderness  . . .; 
to  opponents,  violent,  ungenerous,  prone  to  believe  the  very  worst  of 
them."  Some  thought  Jackson  a  boor,  a  villain  and  a  murderer,  others  a 
paragon  of  the  virtues  of  an  honest  freeman,  but  all  agreed  that  he  had  a 
mysterious  presence,  that  he  looked  the  part  of  a  leader  of  men,  and  that  he 
possessed  a  dangerously  unpredictable  temper.  He  was  no  one  to  trifle 
with.  Buchanan,  when  he  went  directly  to  Old  Hickory  with  the  delicate 
question  that  the  whole  capital  had  been  covertly  asking,  took  up  a  task 
which  wiser  men  had  been  unwilling  to  risk. 

After  some  desultory  conversation,  Buchanan  spoke  of  the 
presidential  situation  and  of  the  rumors  current  in  Washington.  These 
had  already  done  some  harm,  he  said,  and  would  do  more-  He  repeated 
what  Marldey  had  said:  that  many  of  Clay's  friends  would  like  to  vote  for 
Jackson,  but  they  were  distressed  by  the  rumor,  which  had  never  been 
contradicted,  that  the  General  had  made  up  his  mind  to  put  Adams  into 

51 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


the  State  Department.  Then  Buchanan  "popped"  the  question.  Had 
General  Jackson  "ever  declared  that  in  case  he  should  be  elected  President 
he  would  appoint  Mr.  Adams  Secretary  of  State?"  Without  hesitation 
Old  Hickory  rejoined  that  he  had  never  said  whether  he  would  or  whether 
he  would  not  make  such  an  appointment,  "that  these  were  secrets  he  would 
keep  to  himself— he  would  conceal  them  from  the  very  hairs  of  his  head/' 
Buchanan  asked  if  he  were  at  liberty  to  repeat  this  answer  and,  after  being 
assured  that  he  was,  terminated  the  interview.  "I  need  scarcely  remark," 
he  said  later,  "that  I  afterward  availed  myself  of  the  privilege."-5 

A  few  days  later  Buchanan  called  on  Congressman  George  Kremer 
of  Pennsylvania  and  repeated  to  him  the  gist  of  Marfcley's  conversations 
and  the  outcome  of  his  talk  with  Jackson.  Buchanan's  object  was  apparently 
to  get  the  Jacksonians  to  refine  on  the  statement  already  made;  that  is,  to 
change  the  negative  declaration  that  Jackson  had  not  decided  to  appoint 
Adams  into  a  positive  one:  he  had  decided  not  to  appoint  him.  Buchanan 
certainly  hinted  to  Clay  that  Adams  would  not  be  the  appointee.  On  one 
occasion  and  in  Clay's  very  lodgings,  Buchanan  "introduced  the  subject 
of  the  approaching  Presidential  election,  and  spoke  of  the  uncertainty  of 
the  election  of  his  favorite  (Jackson),  adding  that  'he  would  form  the  must 
splendid  cabinet  that  the  country  ever  had.'  "  When  one  of  the  group 
present  asked  how  it  would  be  possible  to  have  one  more  distinguished  than 
that  of  Mr.  Jefferson,  Buchanan  replied,  looking  at  Mr.  Clay,  that  he  "would 
not  have  to  go  out  of  this  room  for  a  Secretary  of  State."  Buchanan  was 
worried.  On  January  2  he  wrote  to  Thomas  Elder:  "If  I  were  to  inform 
you  that  I  consider  [Jackson's]  .  .  .  election  certain,  it  would  not  he  what 
I  believe  myself/'  But  he  had  done  all  he  could  and  more  than  he  should. 
He  now  sat  back  to  await  developments.26 

James  was  pleased  with  his  little  excursion  into  the  turbulent 
waters  of  presidential  politics.  He  had  been  prudent  and  remained  on 
terms  of  friendship  with  the  three  chief  prospects  of  the  future:  Calhoun, 
Jackson,  and  Clay.  He  had  helped  each  and  hurl  non*.  Whatever  happened, 
he  had  laid  his  groundwork  well. 

But  Buchanan  had  embarked  on  deeper  waters  than  he  knew. 
Had  he  been  aware  of  the  full  extent  of  the  bargaining,  intrigm%  and  bribery, 
he  would  have  felt  more  apprehension  at  being  involved  in  the  business  at 
all  If  anyone  got  caught,  everyone  associated  with  him  would  be  in  for  a 
hard  time  trying  to  prove  his  innocence,  Ingham  was  busy  with  Cook  of 
Illinois,  whose  vote  would  control  that  state,  guaranteeing  him  a  territorial 
governorship  for  his  support  of  Jackson*  Some  of  Buchanan's  friends  spent 
their  time  peddling  the  idea  that  a  Jackson  victory  now  would  mean  sure 
success  for  Clay  the  next  time.  The  Jackson  promoters,  of  course,  had 
one  basic  advantage  over  the  others.  They  alone  could  legitimately  claim 
that  they  wanted  to  honor  the  mandate  of  a  majority  of  the  nation's  voters, 

52 


THE  KING  MAKER  •   1821  - 1827 


If  adherents  of  minority  candidates  intrigued,  it  could  be  set  down  as 
corruption,  but  for  the  Jackson  men  to  do  it  would  seem  merely  an  effort 
to  execute  the  will  of  the  people. 

On  January  24,  three  weeks  after  Buchanan's  interview  with 
Jackson,  the  Clay-controlled  Kentucky  and  Ohio  delegations  publicly 
announced  their  decision  to  support  Adams.  It  was  a  bold  decision  in  the 
face  of  threats  that  the  election  of  Adams  would  bring  violence,  Lafayette, 
who  was  on  a  triumphal  tour  of  the  United  States  at  the  time,  probably 
thought  he  was  going  to  see  action  on  the  old  stamping  grounds  again,  for 
his  chronicler  reported  that  "the  Pennsylvania  militiamen  talked  of  laying 
seige  to  Washington  if  Jackson  were  not  chosen,"27 

On  January  28,  the  Columbian  Observer  of  Philadelphia  published 
a  letter  from  Congressman  George  Kremer— an  Ingham  satellite— baldly 
charging  that  Clay  had  offered  to  vote  for  whoever  would  give  him  the 
State  Department;  that  Jackson  had  turned  him  down;  that  Adams  had 
signed  the  bargain;  and  that  Clay  would  be  announced  as  Secretary  of 
State  shortly.  Clay  called  Kremer  a  liar  and  challenged  him  to  a  duel  but 
backed  down  after  Kremer  started  the  rumor  that  he  would  duel  with 
squirrel  rifles. 

In  due  course,  the  House  elected  Adams,  and  he  appointed  Clay 
to  the  State  Department.  The  Jacksonians  did  not  revolt,  but  some  of  them 
vented  their  fury  by  burning  Clay  and  Adams  in  effigy.  Two  Pittsburghers 
who  sent  a  barrel  of  whiskey  to  treat  the  fellows  were  indicted  for  inciting 
a  riot— "That  is  to  say  for  holding  out  inducements  to  other  persons,  to 
roast  in  effigy  a  Kentucky  Gambler  over  a  burning  tar  barrell,"  but  the 
County  Commissioners  quickly  disposed  of  the  case  by  announcing  they 
would  pay  no  witness  fees.28  The  Jacksonian  editors  in  Pennsylvania 
bannered  their  papers  with  the  huge,  black  headline:  "Shameful." 

James  Buchanan  was  prudent.    He  said  nothing. 

BUCHANAN'S  AMALGAMATION  PARTY 

If  ever  a  man  needed  the  talent  of  compromise,  that  man  was  James 
Buchanan  in  the  years  of  the  presidency  of  John  Quincy  Adams.  During 
those  years,  he  tried  to  weld  into  a  single  political  organization  as  motley 
a  political  assortment  as  anyone  ever  attempted  to  control  It  would  be  a 
personal  party,  a  Buchanan  party;  one  based  on  his  reputation  for  personal 
integrity,  his  concrete  achievements  for  his  constituents,  and  his  promises 
for  the  future.  Jackson  would  be  the  cement  of  this  miscellany,  but  when 
it  took  form  it  would  stand  solidly  as  a  monument  to  Buchanan. 

The  challenge  fascinated  him,  demanding  techniques  well  suited 
to  his  personality.  In  the  first  place,  party-making  was  a  bookkeeping 
matter.  Each  county  leader,  in  this  confused  state  of  politics,  had  his  own 

53 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


following.  Buchanan  knew  the  votes  each  commanded  as  well  as  the 
strength  of  his  local  opposition.  He  kept  accounts;  determined  where  he 
needed  strength  and  how  much;  figured  the  percentage  of  increase  from 
particular  appointments;  pondered  what  approach  would  influence  local 

groups. 

The  man  who  had  the  patience  and  the  sharpness  of  eye  could 
assemble  into  a  meaningful  picture  this  mathematical  jigsaw  puzzle.  Un- 
troubled by  the  distractions  of  poverty  or  parenthood,  Buchanan  had  the 
time  to  devote  to  such  a  task.  He  followed  up  careful  calculation  by  careful 
action:  a  complimentary  letter  here,  a  mild  disengagement  there,  a  letter 
of  recommendation  to  this  man,  an  appearance  at  one  strategic  meeting, 
and  meaningful  absence  from  another,  a  loan  to  a  newspaper  editor,  a  hint 
that  so  and  so  would  be  good  material  for  a  vacant  judgeship,  a  batch  of 
public  documents  to  one,  a  bundle  of  National  Intelligencers  to  another, 
some  whiskey  to  a  third— these  were  the  things  that  absorbed  James 
Buchanan  in  the  years  of  the  Adams  Administration. 

They  were  busy,  tantalizing,  frustrating,  exhilarating  yeans  full 
of  political  promise.  His  planning  was  as  arduous,  devious  and  logical  as 
that  of  a  chess  game,  and  as  devoid  of  the  appearance  of  emotion.  Like  a 
chess  player,  Buchanan  worked  single-handedly.  He  had  associates  col- 
leagues, partisans,  and  friends,  but  he  took  none  of  these  as  a  partner  in 
his  political  activities.  Not  even  his  brother  George,  though  his  trusted 
agent,  was  his  confidant.  He  had  the  added  advantage  of  private  means 
and  thus  could  follow  a  political  career  without  depending  on  it  for  a  living. 
Since  his  father's  death  he  had  been  making  money  fast  by  purchasing 
property  around  Lancaster  at  sheriffs  sales.  Values  had  been  rising  at  a 
fantastic  rate.  Pennsylvania  land  that  had  gone  for  62  cents  an  acre  in 
1814  now  brought  $400  an  acre.  Just  recently  he  had  bought  several 
buildings  on  the  southwest  corner  of  the  square  in  Lancaster,  because  he  felt 
that  they  would  be  a  sound  investment.  He  would  use  some  of  hi*  cash 
to  play  politics  instead  of  playing  politics  to  make  money. 

In  the  Pennsylvania  elections  of  1826,  the  Federalists  left  the 
state  scene,  as  ten  years  before  they  had  withdrawn  from  national  politics. 
Shube  was  unanimously  nominated  on  March  4,  1826,  by  the  Democratic 
convention  in  Harrisburg  and  the  Federalists  ran  no  candidate,  ShubeVi 
72,000  votes  indicated  that  he  had  the  Democrats  plus  the  rapport  of  ail 
the  rest*  Buchanan's  aid  to  Shulze  was  his  personal  statement  that,  while 
not  yet  a  Democrat,  he  certainly  was  no  longer  a  Federalist, 

At  the  level  of  the  Congressional  District  and  the  county,  how- 
ever, the  old  party  names  stuck*  Buchanan  was  nominated  and  elected  to 
Congress  again  on  a  Federalist  ticket  of  the  4th  Distrust,  along  with  his 
friend  Charles  Miner  of  West  Chester,  now  an  ardent  Adams  man.  The 
Democratic  Congressional  candidates,  who  were  Jacksonians,  lost.  Their 

54 


THE  KING  MAKER  •   1821  -  1827 

defeat  was  almost  incredible  in  a  region  where,  on  the  presidential  question, 
the  people  would  have  voted  a  twenty-to-one  majority  for  Jackson. 

After  the  1826  elections  Buchanan  planned  to  cut  loose  from  the 
old  party  names  and  to  begin  his  fight  for  control  of  the  Pennsylvania  Jack- 
sonians.  Using  the  pressure  of  the  approaching  presidential  campaign,  he 
proposed  to  amalgamate  into  a  voting  bloc  the  Federalist  German  farmers 
of  the  East  and  the  Scotch-Irish  frontier  Democrats  of  the  West.  Though 
formerly  political  antagonists,  these  two  groups  now  both  enthusiastically 
acclaimed  Jackson  and  both  resented  the  Philadelphia-centered  control  of 
the  Family  party.  They  could  do  one  of  three  things:  endorse  Adams, 
follow  Ingham  and  Dallas  who  worked  mainly  for  Calhoun  and'kept  all  the 
offices  to  themselves,  or  join  Buchanan's  Amalgamation  party  which  stood 
solidly  for  Jackson  and  promised  to  share  its  power  with  the  yeomanry  of 
the  State. 

Buchanan's  associates  in  the  Amalgamation  movement  were  men 
to  be  reckoned  with.  Henry  Baldwin  of  Pittsburgh  could  stand  eye  to  eye 
with  William  Wilkins,  the  Family's  only  strong  representative  there. 
Molton  C.  Rogers  of  Lancaster  had  just  finished  a  tenn  as  Secretary  of  the 
Commonwealth.  General  Isaac  D.  Barnard  who  had  served  brilliantly 
during  the  War  of  1812  before  settling  down  to  the  practice  of  law  in 
West  Chester,  had  been  among  the  first  prominent  Pennsylvanians  to  come 
out  for  Jackson  and  had  demonstrated  his  power  by  frightening  Dallas  out 
of  his  plan  to  nominate  Calhoun  at  Harrisburg  in  March,  1824.  In  1826, 
Governor  Shulze  gave  him  Rogers's  place  as  Secretary  of  the  Common- 
wealth and  in  1827  the  Legislature  selected  him  as  United  States  Senator. 
Barnard's  connection  with  the  Amalgamation  group  gave  the  Family 
something  to  worry  about.  George  B.  Porter,  a  young  Lancaster  lawyer  of 
great  influence  among  the  lower  classes,  a  militia  general,  a  man  of  explo- 
sive, picturesque  language,  and  of  political  ambition,  abandoned  the  Family 
party  to  join  Buchanan. 

Many  others  prominent  in  Pennsylvania  came  to  the  support 
of  Amalgamation  and  through  it  became,  for  the  time,  co-workers  of 
Buchanan:  Calvin  Blythe  of  Mifflin  County,  Secretary  of  the  Common- 
wealth  after  Barnard's  election  to  the  national  Senate;  George  G.  Leiper, 
veteran  Congressman  from  Delaware  County;  Daniel  Sturgeon  of  Fayette 
County;  John  Wurts  and  Thomas  Kittera,  Federalist  Congressmen  from 
Philadelphia;  John  B.  Sterigere  of  Montgomery  County;  Joshua  Evans, 
Congressman  from  Chester  County;  and  of  special  importance,  Henry  A. 
Muhlenberg  of  Berks  County* 

These  men  defined  the  nature  of  the  Amalgamation  organization. 
It  included  those  high  in  the  state  administration,  many  of  the  Federalist 
Congressmen,  a  number  of  old-line  Democrats  who  were  disgusted  with 
or  excluded  from  the  Ingham  group,  and  key  representatives  in  every 

55 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


portion  of  the  Commonwealth.  They  were  all  for  Jackson,  all  for  the 
creation  of  a  new  party,  and  nearly  all  for  the  future  elevation  of  Henry 
Clay  to  the  White  House,  though  this  phase  of  Amalgamation  was  purposely 

left  vague. 

One  of  the  leaders  of  the  Family  party,  observing  these  develop- 
ments,  wrote  that  the  rapidly  growing  Amalgamation  scheme  was  "fairly 
attributable  to  Mr.  Buchanan,  who  has  for  some  years  past  been  fond  of 
being  considered  a  Democrat  in  the  liberality  of  his  principles,  whilst  he 
desired  the  support  of  the  federalists  as  their  Magnus  Apollo/'  The  day 
would  come,  he  feared,  when  "Mr.  Buchanan  would  have  'bestridden  our 
narrow  world  like  a  Colossus'  with  the  patronage  and  power  of  Pennsylvania 
at  his  feet."29 


BARGAIN  AND  SALE 

Buchanan  was  congratulating  himself  daring  the  week  before  the  state 
election  of  1826  upon  how  nicely  the  Amalgamation  plans  were  progressing. 
He  began  to  see  the  whole  prospect  unfolding  before  him  in  logical,  in- 
evitable steps  that  must  shortly  sink  the  Family  claims  to  control  in 
confusion  and  bring  him  to  the  forefront  as  one  of  the  top  managers  of  a 
triumphant  Jackson  organization  in  Pennsylvania.  Then  he  got  that  letter. 
It  was  from  Duff  Green,  Calhoun's  campaign  manager,  dated 
October  12,  1826. 

You  will  discover  from  the  Journal  &  Telegraph  that  Mr.  Clay  & 
myself  are  at  issue.  The  part  taken  by  you  on  the  occasion 
referred  to,  is  known  to  me;  and  a  due  regard  to  your  feelings  has 
heretofore  restrained  me  from  using  your  name  before  the  public. 
The  time,  however,  Js  now  approaching  when  il  will  become  the 
duty  of  every  man  to  do  all  in  his  power  to  expose  the  bargain 
which  placed  the  Coalition  in  power.  Will  you,  upon  the  receipt 
of  this,  write  to  me  and  explain  the  causes  which  induced  you  to 
see  GenL  Jackson  upon  the  subject  of  the  vote  of  Mr.  Clay  &  hi» 
friends  a  few  days  before  it  was  known  that  they  had  conclusively 
determined  to  vote  for  Mr.  Adams;  also  advise  me  of  the  manner 
in  which  you  would  prefer  that  subject  to  be  brought  before 
the  people.30 

He  read  it  and  his  vision  collapsed.  If  that  "bargain  and  sale" 
business  was  ever  opened  up  again  in  a  formal  way,  he  was  done  for,  not 
because  he  had  done  anything  wrong  but  because  all  the  appearances  would 
be  against  him.  He  had  done  it  again*— had  tried  to  act  in  good  faith,  but 
he  had  proceeded  in  a  manner  that  laid  him  wide  open  to  misinterpretation 
and  every  kind  of  malicious  gossip. 

56 


THE  KING  MAKER  •   1821  -  1827 


Who  was  responsible  for  disinterring  this  dead  cat  and  tying  it  to 
his  coattails,  he  wondered.  Green  and  Calhoun  probably  wished  a  re- 
hashing of  the  political  deal  for  the  purpose  of  guaranteeing  to  Jackson 
his  single  term  and  of  blasting  forever  Adams  and  Clay  in  order  that  Calhoun 
might  be  the  only  presidential  candidate  with  unsinged  reputation  in  1832. 
Ingham,  too,  was  certainly  in  it.  He  knew  that  no  public  discussion  of 
president-making  in  the  first  two  weeks  of  1825  could  go  very  far  without 
embarrassing  his  rival,  Buchanan.  Ingham  would  find  this  move  especially 
serviceable:  not  only  would  the  candidates  opposed  to  Calhoun  be  ruined, 
but  Buchanan  and  his  Amalgamators,  sympathetic  to  the  future  prospects 
of  Clay,  would  be  completely  upset  in  Pennsylvania. 

Buchanan  worked  for  four  days  phrasing  a  reply  that  would  suit 
the  requirements:  one  which  would  assert  his  innocence  and  at  the  same 
time  threaten  unpleasant  consequences,  should  the  issue  be  forced.  "The 
facts  are  before  the  world,"  he  wrote,  "that  Mr.  Clay  &  his  particular  friends 
made  Mr*  Adams  President,  &  that  Mr.  Adams  immediately  thereafter 
made  Mr.  Clay  Secretary  of  State.  The  people  will  draw  their  own  in- 
ferences from  such  conduct  &  from  the  circumstances  connected  with  it. 
They  will  judge  the  cause  from  the  effects.  I  am  clearly  of  opinion  that 
whoever  shall  attempt  to  prove  by  direct  evidence  any  corrupt  bargain 
between  Mr.  C.  and  Mr.  A.  will  fail;  for  if  it  existed  the  parties  to  it  will 
forever  conceal  it."31 

With  this  the  matter  simmered  for  a  while,  but  the  following 
summer  Jackson  himself  came  out  against  Clay  alleging,  in  a  public  letter 
to  Carter  Beverly  of  Virginia,  that  a  Congressman  had  sought  to  make  a 
corrupt  bargain  with  him  on  Clay's  behalf.  Clay  then  demanded  to  know 
who  was  this  Congressman.  Now  Ingham  began  a  correspondence  with 
Buchanan  to  force  him  into  as  unfavorable  a  position  as  possible. 

"It  is  useless  now  to  regret,"  he  wrote,  after  everything  had  been 
made  public  but  Buchanan's  name.  "Shd  Clay  demand  of  Genl  Jackson 
his  author  he  will  have  no  alternative,  nor  could  he  have  had  from  the 
first. .  .  :  You  will  therefore  be  joined  into  the  battle  under  a  fire,— but  I 
see  no  difficulty  in  the  case  if  you  take  your  ground  well  and  maintain 

it  boldly.'** 

If  Ingham  saw  no  difficulty,  Buchanan  saw  a  great  deal.  He  now 
had  the  hard  choice  of  publicly  confessing  agency  in  a  dirty  bargain  attempt, 
or  of  openly  calling  Andrew  Jackson  a  liar.  After  a  month  of  agonizing,  he 
brought  the  "bargain  and  sale"  controversy  to  its  climax  by  a  long  letter 
to  the  public,  in  which  he  denied  the  truth  of  Jackson's  charge:  "I  called 
upon  General  Jackson . . .  solely  as  his  friend,  upon  my  individual  responsi- 
bility," he  wrote,  "and  not  as  the  agent  of  Mr.  Clay  or  any  other  person."83 

Everyone  interpreted  the  affair  according  to  his  own  lights.  "It 
places  Jackson  in  a  most  awkward  predicament,"  wrote  a  friend  of  Adams. 

57 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


"I  am  surprised  at  his  indiscretion It  turns  out  exactly  as  I  suspected  . . . 

that  the  author  of  the  communication  would  prove  to  be  a  warm  partisan 
of  the  opposition.  ...  But  what  surprises  me  more  than  anything  else  is 
the  situation  in  which  the  General  places  his  friend.  From  this  statement 
he  not  only  carried  the  proposal  but  advised  him  to  accede  to  it;  and  yet 
he  is  still  worthy  of  esteem.  Buchanan  is  ruined  if  anything  can  ruin  a  man 
who  is  a  partisan  in  party  times.''34  Another  gentleman^of  the  same  party 
wrote:  "Buchanan  ...  is  in  a  pitiable  predicament.  Nothing  short  of  a 
miracle  can  save  him.  His  advice  [to  Jackson]  is  perfectly  understood  by 
the  public.  I  wish  that  rascal  Ingham  was  in  his  place.  I  doubt  if  in  fact 
he  is  not  more  steeped  in  guilt  than  any  of  them."35 

Henry  Clay  declared  that  while  Buchanan  labored  to  "spare  and 
cover  General  Jackson"  he  failed  in  every  essential  point  to  sustain  him. 
"Indeed,"  he  continued,  "I  could  not  desire  a  stronger  statement  from 
Mr.  Buchanan."36  R>  P.  Letchcr  held  the  same  tone,  writing  that  he  was 
truly  delighted  that  Buchanan  had  extricated  himself  from  the  dilemma  in 
which  Jackson  had  placed  him  and  had  "come  forth  victoriously/'37 
William  Rawle  of  Philadelphia  confided  to  his  diary  on  the  night  Buchanan *s 
public  reply  was  received:  "The  question  must  now  turn  upon  the  veracity 
of  Mr.  Buchanan  or  of  Gen.  Jackson.  If  we  believe  the  former,  General  J. 
must  have  quite  misapprehended— or  wilfully  misrepresented  the  con- 
nection. If  the  latter,  the  Gen.  had  reasonable  grounds  for  believing  that 

Mr.  Clay's  friends  collectively  authorized  Buck— to  make  the  overture 

Jackson  appears  to  great  disadvantage  unless  we  discard  all  that  is  assertetj 
by  Buchanan."38 

John  C.  Calhoun  felt  that  the  Buchanan  letter  would  "procure  a 
reaction"  against  Jackson,  but  that  it  would  not  be  so  serious*  as  to  jwtpaniusp 
his  election-  "Mr.  B.  it  is  clear  feels  the  awkwardness  of  his  utuatittu" 
he  said,  "which  has  throughout  modified  hits  conception  of  the  «tai<*  t>f  the 
case.  Hence  we  see  throughout  the  statement  an  effort  to  get  d«>ar  of  all 
conception  of  agency  on  his  part,  and  to  give  a  character  of  innoceiicy  to 
the  whole  aflat,'** 

By  and  large  the  Jackson  press  agreed  to  say  that  Buchanan's 
letter  did  support  General  Jackson  in  all  his  charges  agamst  Gay.40  Not  so, 
however,  the  Jacksonians  of  the  Amalgamation  branch  in  Pennsylvania 
who  were  wild  with  rage.  Molton  Rogers  told  Buchanan :  r"My  own  < »pmion 
is  that  Jackson's  prospects  for  the  presidency  are  much  taueiitti,  if  "<>t 
totally  destroyed  by  his  impolitic  if  not  unkind  conduct  in  relation  to  you 
in  this  affair.  There  is  as  far  as  I  have  been  able  to  learn,  but  one  opinion. 
The  Governor  is  indignant  at  his  conduct,  &  there  would  be  no  difficulty 
in  bringing  him  out  decidedly  on  the  occasion,  together  with  all  the  officer* 
of  the  Government. . .  You  owe  it  to  your  own  character  to  defend  your- 
self, and  I  would  suggest  a  meeting  in  Lancaster  to  express  this  opinion  on 

58 


THE  KING  MAKER  •    1821  -  1827 


the  subject.  ,  .  It  will  be  impossible  for  you  to  support  Genl.  Jackson. 
He  has  left  you  and  your  friends  no  alternative."41  The  situation  had 
changed.  Temporarily,  at  least,  it  appeared  as  if  Buchanan  held  the  pivotal 
position.  The  Adams  men  threw  open  their  arms  in  the  hope  that  Buchanan 
would  rush  into  their  embrace,  and  there  were  many  who,  when  asked  what 
side  they  would  take  if  the  matter  were  made  a  sheer  issue  of  veracity, 
replied  in  the  words  of  James  Stevenson  of  Pittsburgh,  "Why,  by  God, 
I  will  believe  Buchanan  in  preference  to  Gen.  Jackson."42 

To  Ingham,  Buchanan  wrote:  "If  General  Jackson  and  our 
editors  should  act  with  discretion  the  storm  may  blow  over  without  injury. 
Should  they  on  the  contrary  force  me  to  the  wall  and  make  it  absolutely 
necessary  for  the  preservation  of  my  own  character  to  defend  myself,  I 
know  not  what  may  be  the  consequence.  ...  It  is  in  your  power  to  do 
much  to  give  this  matter  a  proper  direction.  . .  .  My  friends  here  are  very 
indignant  but  I  believe  I  can  keep  them  right."43  To  Duff  Green,  who  had 
thought  it  prudent  two  weeks  before  to  apologize  for  making  so  much 
trouble,  Buchanan  wrote  stiffly  that  although  he  would  never  join  the 
Adams  party,  he  could  not  be  responsible  for  damage  to  the  Jackson  cause 
that  might  result  from  a  further  attempt  to  pin  the  bargain  on  him.44 

The  controversy  did  not  destroy  Buchanan,  but  it  did  earn  for 
him  the  life-long  distrust  of  General  Jackson,  and  it  cooled  noticeably  the 
ardor  of  his  friends  for  Old  Hickory.  Buchanan  wrote  of  Jackson's  state- 
ment that  it  was  "a  most  extraordinary  production  so  far  as  I  am  con- 
cerned;"45 Jackson,  on  his  part,  confided  to  Amos  Kendall  that  Buchanan's 
address  was  "such  a  production  as  surely  I  had  not  a  right  to  expect  from 
him."46  Jackson,  too,  may  justly  have  felt  some  irritation  with  the  Calhoun 
leaders  who  for  a  year  had  known  the  ground  on  which  Buchanan  stood, 
although  they  had  never  troubled  to  point  out  the  wide  difference  in  their 
views.  Van  Buren  assured  Jackson  that  "Although  our  friend  Buchanan 
was  evidently  frightened  and  therefore  softened  and  obscured  the  matter, 
still  the  fact  of  your  entire  aversion  to  all  and  any  intrigue  or  arrangement 
is  clearly  established."47  The  widespread  publicity  given  the  affair  probably 
strengthened  the  belief  of  the  average  voter  on  each  side  that  the  opposition 
was  crooked  and  added  bitterness  to  an  already  violent  campaign.  As  a 
result  Buchanan  became  more  secretive  and  cautious  than  ever  in  his 
subsequent  political  maneuvers. 


59 


5 

FAREWELL  TO  FEDERALISM  *  1828-1832 

THE  BUCHANAN-JACKSON  PARTY 

Buchanan  now  staked  his  political  future  on  an  outright  change  of  party. 
He  would,  after  having  been  four  times  elected  to  Congress  as  a  Federalist, 
run  as  a  Democratic  candidate  for  the  same  office.  "It  will  require  the 
greatest  excitement  of  party  feelings,  to  induce  many  of  the  Jackson 
Democrats  to  vote  for  a  Jackson  Federalist/'  wrote  one  of  his  friends.1 

He  opened  his  personal  campaign  in  1828  by  a  speech  to  Congress 
on  February  4  in  which  he  broke  his  usual  habit  of  keeping  election  politics 
out  of  policy  speeches  and  joined  the  Adams-baiting  pack  in  the  House, 
As  the  attack  on  the  Administration  progressed,  Buchanan  at  length 
jumped  into  the  fight  and  made  a  truculent  speech  against  the  President. 
While  moderate  in  comparison  to  the  efforts  of  many  of  his  Jacksonian 
colleagues,  it  still  was  a  deliberate  political  onslaught.  Buchanan  brought 
to  bear  against  Adams  not  epithets  and  slander,  but  a  lawyer's  marshalled 
evidence  which  proved  the  more  damning  for  its  restraint  of  phraseology 
and  the  evidences  of  scholarship  it  suggested.  It  was  not  a  rant;  it  was  the 
presentation  of  proof,  wrought  into  argument,  that  the  Administration  had 
been  despotic,  unconstitutional,  dishonest,  immoral,  corrupt,  and  would 
imperil  the  nation  if  continued  in  office.  It  set  Buchanan  before  the 
country  as  a  powerful  champion  of  Jackson  and  initiated  the  Amalgamation 
campaign  in  his  own  election  district.2 

During  the  last  week  of  May,  1828,  Federalists  and  Democrats 
favorable  to  Jackson  met  at  the  Lancaster  Courthouse.  Their  resolutions 
announced  Buchanan's  new  organization  which  had,  until  now,  been  only 
a  prospect: 

Resolved:  That  at  the  county  meeting  to  be  held  on  the  27th 
day  of  August  next,  the  Delegates  be  requested  to  nominate  and 
settle  such  ticket,  as  will  give  as  general  satisfaction  as  possible 
to  the  friends  of  Andrew  Jackson  throughout  the  county  & 

60 


FAREWELL  TO  FEDERALISM  «   1828  - 1832 


district,  without  reference  to  the  political  distinctions  which 
have  heretofore  divided  us.3 

There  it  was,  out  in  the  light  of  day,  over  the  signatures  of  twoscore  men 
who,  for  a  generation  past,  had  run  against  each  other  for  office  under  the 
labels  of  Federalist  or  Democrat. 

After  the  storm  signal  went  up,  it  took  less  than  a  week  for  the 
hurricane  to  descend.  Its  violence  was  aggravated  by  informal  agreements 
which  could  not  be  kept  secret  regarding  the  candidates  who  would  be 
chosen  in  the  fall.  As  the  new  Jackson  party  had  to  choose  between  leaders 
of  two  groups,  it  was  inevitable  that  there  should  be  twice  as  many  claimants 
as  there  were  nominations  to  be  made.  John  McCamant,  for  example,  who 
had  been  a  frequent  Democratic  candidate  for  Congress,  had  to  move  aside 
in  favor  of  Buchanan.  McCamant  was  broad-minded  enough  to  understand 
the  necessity  and  to  retire  gracefully.  He  accepted  (against  the  advice  of 
his  friends)  a  nomination  to  the  State  Legislature.4 

Other  plans  terminated  less  happily.  E.  C.  Reigart,  who  had  long 
been  a  Congressional  aspirant  of  the  Federalist  party,  but  who  had  been 
turned  down  at  every  nomination  meeting  in  favor  of  Buchanan  and  at  last 
had  gone  over  to  the  Adams  party,  was  beside  himself  with  rage.  He  became 
obsessed  with  the  determination  to  ruin  Buchanan,  and  through  the  summer 
months  poured  forth  in  the  Marietta  Pioneer  such  slander  as  Lancaster 
County  had  never  known  in  an  election. 

Benjamin  Champneys,  a  brilliant  young  lawyer  of  Lancaster  who 
had  formerly  worked  closely  with  the  Family  party,  had  been  persuaded  to 
join  the  Amalgamation  movement  by  General  George  B.  Porter.  Champneys 
grudgingly  accepted  a  place  on  the  state  assembly  ticket  He  felt  that  this 
post  was  far  beneath  his  dignity  and  took  the  assignment  only  as  a  means 
of  keeping  in  the  public  eye. 

In  Chester  County,  Charles  Miner,  who  had  been  a  Federalist 
colleague  of  Buchanan  for  two  terms,  wrote  to  his  wife  that  he  planned 
not  to  stand  for  Congress  again.  Miner  had  become  an  Adams  supporter, 
despite  his  recognition  that  Adams  would  undoubtedly  lose  in  Chester.  Why 
not  retire  now  rather  than  wait  and  "risk  being  run  out?"  "Buchanan," 
he  concluded,  "is  really  a  strong  man,  and  much  as  we  differ  on  the  presi- 
dential question,  I  should  be  sorry  to  see  him  out  of  Congress.  This  to 
your  private  ear.1'5  But  Miner's  friends  would  not  hear  of  his  retirement, 
and  it  was  not  long  before  he  was  placed  in  the  Congressional  race  against 
Buchanan,  with  whom  he  had  been  accustomed  to  run  in  double  harness.6 

By  July  4  the  campaign  reached  full  tide.  Buchanan  managed  to 
be  at  three  meetings  that  day— at  Yellow  Springs,  later  at  Downingtown, 
and  at  the  end  of  the  day  at  a  huge  Jackson  banquet  in  the  woods  of  Langdon 
Cheves's  residence,  "Abbeville,"  in  Lancaster,7 

61 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


The  toasts  at  these  affairs  fairly  well  summarized  the  particular 
points  of  Buchanan's  political  strength  in  his  district.  His  backers  praised 
him  for  his  successful  support  of  duties  on  iron,  hemp,  molasses,  and  liquor 
during  the  tariff  debate  of  the  spring;  for  his  exertions  to  get  the  Pennsyl- 
vania militia  fines  of  1814  turned  back  to  the  state;  for  obtaining  a  large 
refund  from  the  federal  government  to  Pennsylvania  distillers  who  had 
been  overtaxed;  for  exposing  corruption  in  the  Adams  Administration; 
for  aiding  the  Irishmen  of  the  district  by  moderating  the  naturalization 
laws;  for  asserting  the  rights  of  farmers  and  manufacturers;  for  supporting 
local  internal  improvements;  for  endorsing  a  system  of  public  education; 
and  most  particularly  for  the  early  and  loyal  fight  for  Jackson. 

Buchanan  expected  to  face  violent  opposition,  but  the  reality 
exceeded  anything  he  had  imagined.  His  old  partisans  portrayed  him  as 
the  architect  of  the  whole  "bargain  and  sale"  plan.  They  circulated  a 
garbled  account  of  his  1815  speech  against  Jefferson  and  Madison,  mis- 
quoting  him  as  saying  on  that  occasion:  "If  I  ever  hat!  a  drop  of  Demo- 
cratic blood  in  my  veins,  I  would  let  it  out."  The  Adams  men  also  published 
handbills  recalling  Buchanan's  former  presidency  of  the  Lancaster  Wash- 
ington Society,  the  official  committee  of  the  Federalist  party.8 

They  represented  his  speeches  on  the  tariff  as  antagonistic  to 
protection  and  favorable  only  to  the  wishes  of  southern  freetraders.  They 
characterized  his  part  in  the  inquiry  into  the  conduct  of  Adams's  Adminis- 
tration as  an  example  of  his  political  profligacy  and  eagerness  to  promote 
himself  by  tearing  down  the  reputation  of  others.  They  charged  him  with 
being  a  friend  of  slavery  and  of  the  slave  trade— a  charge  particularly 
effective  in  the  Quaker  and  Pennsylvania  German  regions— and  they 
claimed  that  he  frequently  absented  himself  from  Congress  to  attend  lo  his 
private  law  business,  although  he  drew  pay  during  his  absence.1* 

Buchanan  kept  out  of  the  mess,  letting  his*  party  editurn  handle 
all  rebuttal  until  the  Marietta  Pioneer  of  August  15  came  nut  with  the 
headlines: 

Fathers!   Husbands!!   Brothers!!! 

Read.    Pause.    Reflect.    AndThm 

Vote  for  James  Buchanan  if  You  Can! 

The  article  charged  that  Buchanan  had  asserted,  "within  the  hearing  of  two 
or  more  respectable  witnesses,  that  Mrs.  Adams,  the  wife  of  the  Chief 
Magistrate,  was  born  out  of  wedlock."10 

Upon  seeing  this  Buchanan  sat  down  and  wrote  a  letter  to  the 
presumed  author,  demanding  all  particulars  of  the  charge,  names  of  the 
people  claiming  to  be  witnesses,  and  details  of  the  occurrence*21  Editor 
Reigart  replied  in  phraseology  which  quite  failed  to  support  the  charge  in 

62 


FAREWELL  TO  FEDERALISM  •   1828  - 1832 


the  original  article.  Later  a  number  of  Buchanan's  friends  who  had  been 
at  Yellow  Springs  stated  that  they  had  heard  Buchanan  speak  of  the  lady 
"in  terms  of  the  most  unqualified  praise."12 

Reigart  was  not  the  only  editor  who  helped  to  make  this  national 
campaign  notorious  for  scandal-mongering  and  slander.  Many  Adams 
papers  broadcast  that  Jackson's  mother  had  been  a  common  prostitute  with 
the  British  Army,  that  the  General  was  the  son  of  a  Negro,  and  that  his 
wife  was  a  bigamist.  It  was  then  that  the  Jackson  press  retaliated  with 
the  canard  about  Mrs.  Adams. 

Buchanan  refuted  the  charge  about  absence  from  Congress  so 
thoroughly  that  his  enemies  came  back  with  another  accusation:  he  had 
started  the  inquiry  himself  in  order  to  have  the  advantage  of  showing  his 
rebuttal.  With  characteristic  precision,  Buchanan  had  kept  an  account 
book  listing  every  day  spent  in  Congress.  He  proved  that  he  had  reported 
every  absence  to  the  Treasury,  and  had  his  pay  for  these  days  deducted 
from  his  salary.  He  had  missed  only  one  roll  call  of  importance  because  of 
a  case  in  court,  and  in  that  instance  the  fate  of  the  bill  had  not  depended 
upon  his  vote.13 

The  tariff  question  had  become  extremely  important  to  citizens 
of  Pennsylvania  by  1828.  In  the  Keystone  State,  protection  had  ceased 
to  be  an  economic  issue  interesting  only  to  manufacturers;  as  early  as  1824, 
when  the  tariff  problem  seriously  entered  politics,  the  farmers  of  the  state 
also  wanted  high  duties.  By  1827  nearly  every  economic  class  and  every 
political  party  favored  the  protective  system. 

Jackson,  Calhoun,  Adams  and  Clay  all  posed  as  the  ardent 
champions  of  protection  in  Pennsylvania,  but  the  first  two  came  from  the 
South  where  the  protective  tariff  now  encountered  heavy  opposition. 
Adams  and  Clay  were  strongest  in  New  England  which  was  devoted  to 
protection.  Buchanan  had  to  develop  a  position  on  the  tariff  which  would 
coincide  with  Jackson's,  be  competitive  with  the  view  of  Adams  and  Clay, 
and  satisfy  Pennsylvania.  He  had  already  devised  the  required  formula. 
In  his  first  speech  on  the  tariff  he  laid  down  ideas  which  he  never  there- 
after  abandoned,  even  though  he  was  at  times  under  strong  political  pressure 

to  do  so. 

Buchanan  advocated  a  national  economy  based  upon  self- 
sufficiency.  A  tariff,  he  believed,  should  first,  protect  agriculture,  and 
particularly  agricultural  products  which  were  the  raw  material  of  domestic 
manufactures;  second,  protect  those  manufactures  which  used  domestic 
raw  materials  or  were  essential  for  national  defense;  and  third,  guarantee 
some  equality  of  protection  for  the  products  of  every  section  of  the  country. 
Buchanan  opposed  prohibitive  tariffs,  tariffs  which  would  tend  to  give  any 
type  of  producer  a  monopoly,  and  rates  which  would  give  an  exclusive 
advantage  to  any  single  region  or  whose  impact  would  affect  chiefly  the 

63 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


poor.  All  of  these  viewpoints  he  had  clearly  defined  in  speeches  in  1823 
and  1824. 

The  tariff  question  came  to  the  forefront  in  1827,  when  the 
Woolens  Bill  was  introduced  in  Congress.  This  bill  taxed  the  cheapest 
woolen  goods  at  the  highest  rate;  the  most  expensive  were  not  taxed  at  all. 
It  provided  for  duties  on  raw  wool,  but  they  were  much  lower  relatively 
than  those  on  imported  cloth. 

The  proposed  statute  put  Pennsylvania's  Congressmen  in  a 
dilemma.  It  worked  hardship  on  everyone  who  bought  woolen  cloth  and 
brought  relief  to  only  a  few  wool  raisers  of  western  counties.  It  also  gave 
a  monopoly  of  wool  manufacture  to  the  New  England  States,  without  any 
quid  pro  quo  for  other  sections.  It  was  an  Adams  measure  which,  if  opposed 
by  Jacksonians,  would  give  the  Adams  Coalition  a  wonderful  opportunity 
to  assert  that  it  was  for,  and  Jackson  against,  the  protective  principle.  In 
Pennsylvania  this  idea  would  possibly  be  fatal  to  Jackson's  popularity. 

Buchanan  considered  the  Woolens  Bill  so  bad  that  he  would  not 
support  it  even  in  exchange  for  new  duties  on  Pennsylvania's  favorite 
commodities:  iron,  hemp  and  molasses.  It  was  exclusively  a  New  England 
bill.  If  it  passed,  Pennsylvania  would  need  a  tariff  against  New  England 
more  than  against  Old  England,  It  taxed  the  poor  of  the  whole  Union  to 
give  New  England  exclusive  control  of  the  cloth  market.  Let  his  opponents 
call  his  course  inconsistent:  he  would  not  sacrifice  American  farmers  and 
the  interests  of  three  sections  of  the  Union— South*  Middle  and  West— to 
the  greed  of  a  few  New  England  manufacturers.  They  had  been  at  the 
committee  hearings  by  the  drove.  But  how  many  farmers  were  thrre  to 
testify?  How  many  westerners  or  middle  state  men?  None.  The  bill 
was  a  New  England  fraud  from  start  to  finish. 

This  line  of  debate  got  a  cool  reception  at  home,  Buchanan  wan 
one  of  only  seven  of  Pennsylvania's  26  Congressmen  to  vote  against  the 
Woolens  Bill.  Many  of  those  who  supported  it,  Buchanan  charged,  dis- 
approved it,  but  "believed  their  constituents  to  be  so  Tariff  mad  that  they 
were  afraid  to  vote  against  it."w  Ingham,  too,  opposed  it:  the  Jadksanian 
leaders  agreed  that  they  could  not  afford  to  permit  it  to  pass  under  Adminis- 
tration auspices  and  believed  they  had  grounds  enough  to  justify  their 
opposition  because  of  the  defects  in  the  details  of  the  proposal. 

But  the  measure  passed  the  House.  In  the  Senate  Martin 
Van  Buren,  now  a  staunch  Jackson  adherent,  caused  a  tie  by  refusing  to 
vote,  thus  forcing  Vice-President  Galhoun  to  make  the  decision  and  incur 
the  odium  of  one  side  or  the  other.  Calhoun,  venom  in  his  heart  against 
Van  Buren,  took  the  only  course  he  could:  he  sided  with  his  own  section 
and  voted  down  the  bill  In  Pennsylvania,  newspaper  editors  let  loose  with 
the  headline:  "John  C.  Calhoun — The  Arch  Traitor"  and  under  this  printed 

64 


FAREWELL  TO  FEDERALISM  •   1828  - 1832 


the  names  of  the  seven  Congressmen  who  had  opposed  the  bill,  labelled 
"The  seven  Traitors  of  Pennsylvania  "  Buchanan  headed  the  list.15 

Pennsylvania  reacted  sharply  to  the  defeat  of  the  Woolens  Bill. 
A  state  convention  in  favor  of  tariff  protection  which  met  in  Harrisburg  on 
June  27  assumed  the  aspect  of  a  Clay-Adams  electioneering  meeting  and 
became  the  basis  for  a  second  at  the  same  place  on  July  30,  which  was 
advertised  as  a  national  convention  of  all  friends  of  protection.  Henry  Clay 
was  scheduled  to  be  there,  and  all  friends  of  the  manufacturing  interest 
were  invited.  The  Jacksonians  boycotted  both  meetings,  stating  that  the 
program  was  "actuated  only  by  a  desire  to  seduce  Pennsylvania  from  the 
cause  of  Jackson,  under  false  pretences  that  himself  &  friends  are  opposed 
to  the.  Tariff,  while  Mr.  Adams  is  in  its  favor."16  Buchanan's  brother 
George  wrote  worriedly  from  Pittsburgh,  "The  Woolens  Bill  is  the  great 
handle  of  Mr.  Adams's  friends  here."17 

During  the  summer,  as  the  tide  against  Jackson  continued  to  rise, 
Buchanan  began  to  receive  letters  of  this  tenor:  "I  now  prefer  Mr.  Adams 
.  .  ,  from  a  conviction  that  the  interests  of  Pennsylvania  are  more  likely 
to  be  promoted  by  the  ascendency  of  northern  men  &  northern  measures 
than  of  southern  men  and  southern  measures."18 

In  order  to  meet  the  charge  of  "southern  men  and  southern 
measures"  Buchanan  seized  upon  the  only  real  stand  Jackson  had  ever 
taken  in  regard  to  the  tariff,  his  Coleman  letter  of  1824,  and  made  as  much 
of  it  as  he  dared. 

In  a  letter  to  the  Lancaster  JTecMy  Journal,  he  wrote: 

Although  the  mass  of  the  population  of  the  Southern  states  may 
be  hostile  to  the  tariff  policy,  yet  some  distinguished  individuals 
have  risen  above  the  prejudice  by  which  they  are  surrounded. 
Among  them  I  take  pleasure  in  mentioning  .  ,  .  General  Jackson 
...»  I  do  know  and  I  wish  to  be  understood  as  speaking  from 
personal  knowledge,  that  General  Jackson  not  only  voted  for  the 
Tariff  [of  1824],  but  that  he  was  its  decided  and  efficient  friend. 
He  did  more  to  reconcile  many  of  the  Southern  members  of 
Congress  to  it  than  any  other  man  in  the  country  did  or  could 
have  done.19 

True,  but  Jackson  supported  this  bill  because  he  thought  it 
necessary  to  the  national  defense;  he  did  not  support  it  because  he  believed 
in  the  protective  principle,  and  he  urged  his  southern  colleagues  to  support 
it  for  the  same  reason. 

Buchanan  had  to  show,  somehow,  that  the  New  England  States 
and  the  Adams  Administration  were  opposed  to  a  tariff.  Early  in  July  1827, 
while  on  a  brief  electioneering  trip  to  western  Pennsylvania,  he  dropped  a 
remark  which  foreshadowed  the  plan.  A  communication  to  the  Franttln 

65 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Repository  signed  "Agricola"  quoted  him  as  saying:  "We  [meaning 
Jackson's  friends]  will  next  session  bring  before  Congress  a  tariff  bill  so 
larded  with  other  than  protection  to  wool  growers  and  manufacturers  of 
wool,  and  involving  principles  which  we  know  the  East  will  not  agree  to, 
[that]  we  will  .  .  .  throw  the  odium  of  its  rejection  off  the  South  on  ... 

the  East."20 

The  story  of  the  Tariff  of  Abominations  is  well  known.  But  as 
soon  as  the  trick  bill  was  proposed  Pennsylvania  took  it  up  with  an  enthusi- 
asm which  had  not  been  anticipated.  All  the  Pennsylvania  Jacksonians 
worked  hard  for  it,  and  the  Adams  men  supported  it.  The  bill,  once  passed, 
was  received  with  joyful  acclaim  in  Pennsylvania.  By  midsummer  of  1828, 
reports  were  widespread  that  the  cause  of  Jackson  was  "rising  rather  than 

declining." 

The  result  was  a  good  deal  of  an  impasse.  Neither  side  could 
daim  a  clear  victory  on  the  tariff  issue,  but  the  important  thing  for  the 
Jacksonians  was  that  a  tariff  bill  of  their  making  had  passed.  In  the  North 
this  was  used  as  prima  facie  evidence  of  Jackson's  soundness  on  the  ques- 
tion. But  the  individual  Congressmen  who  had  voted  against  the  1827 
Woolens  Bill  had  not  been  forgiven.  Every  one  of  them  faced  a  hard 
struggle  to  retain  his  place  in  Congress,  and  none  more  so  than  James 
Buchanan. 

James  wrote  that  "the  persecution  against  me  in  this  county  has 
exceeded  all  reasonable  bounds.  Some  of  the  leaders  of  the  Adams  party 
have  transferred  all  their  abuse  from  Genl.  Jackson  to  me.  The  purest  & 
most  disinterested  acts  of  my  life  have  been  misconstrued,  &  out  of  them 
charges  have  been  raised  to  destroy  my  reputation/* 

In  view  of  the  state  of  public  feeling,  the  tactics  of  the  campaign 
were  of  great  importance.  Anything  might  happen  in  such  an  emotionally 
charged  atmosphere,  and  the  letters  Buchanan  got  from  his  lieutenants  in 
various  parts  of  the  state  showed  no  assurance  that  Jackson  would  carry 
the  state,  or  that  Buchanan  was  safe  in  the  district.21 

In  the  local  election  early  in  October,  however,  Buchanan  demon- 
strated the  strength  of  his  hold  on  the  voters  of  Lancaster  by  polling  1371 
votes  in  the  city  against  309  for  his  opponent;  and  5203  in  the  District 
against  3904.  These  results,  which  carried  through  the  entire  local  ticket, 
showed  that  the  Amalgamation  plan  of  uniting  Jackson  Federalists  and 
Jackson  Democrats  had  been  a  resounding  success.22  In  the  presidential 
election  of  November  Jackson  defeated  Adams  in  the  Lancaster  County 
District  by  a  majority  of  1467  out  of  a  total  of  8905  votes*23 

THE  FIGHT  FOR  THE  SPOILS 

Sitting  in  the  quiet  of  his  study  on  East  King  Street*  Buchanan  reviewed 
the  course  of  recent  events  and  tried  to  sketch  out  in  his  mind  the  imme- 

66 


FAREWELL  TO  FEDERALISM  •    1828  -  J832 


diate  future.  He  could  not  stand  many  more  contests  like  this  one.  What 
had  been  accomplished?  The  most  remarkable  thing  was  his  own  election 
as  a  Democrat  after  having  been  elected  to  Congress  four  times  as  a  Feder- 
alist. That  was  a  gratifying  testimony  to  his  personal  reputation  and  had 
been  worth  the  violence  of  the  campaign.  The  battle  had  left  a  good  many 
wounded  veterans,  but  the  important  thing  was  that  it  had  been  won  and 
the  victory  proclaimed  the  existence  of  a  strong  new  party  in  Pennsylvania 
of  which  James  Buchanan  was  the  leader. 

Pennsylvania  cast  so  impressive  a  vote  for  Andrew  Jackson  that 
everyone  took  it  for  granted  that  the  Keystone  State  would  have  a  dis- 
tinguished place  in  the  new  Cabinet,  but  to  find  a  man  combining  personal 
capacity  and  political  availability  proved  a  thorny  task  for  the  new  Adminis- 
tration. Old  Hickory  would  "have  his  own  trouble  with  Pennsylvania," 
wrote  one  of  Buchanan's  editors  from  Harrisburg;  there  were  "more 
quarters  than  one"  in  which  "something  like  a  vice-royalty  will  be  ex- 
pected."24 As  the  original  Jackson  men  cut  no  figure  in  state  politics,  it 
was  certain  that  the  main  struggle  for  influence  would  develop  between 
Buchanan's  Amalgamators  and  the  Family  party,  neither  of  whom  appealed 
particularly  to  General  Jackson.  The  Amalgamators  were  tainted  by  their 
partiality  for  Henry  Clay,  the  support  of  the  Federalists,  and  Buchanan's 
part  in  the  "bargain  and  sale"  scandal  The  Family  party  suffered  from 
the  deserved  stigma  of  its  nickname,  "Eleventh  Hour  men."  It  represented 
the  city  and  business  element  of  politics,  which  the  western  frontier  voters 
hated,  and  openly  proclaimed  its  intention  to  put  Calhoun  in  the  White 
House  as  soon  as  possible* 

Buchanan  had  worked  out  a  comprehensive  plan  for  his  party: 
get  Henry  Baldwin  into  the  Cabinet;  promote  Senator  Isaac  Barnard  for 
governor  in  1829;  after  his  election,  let  him  use  his  influence  to  persuade 
the  Legislature  to  send  Buchanan  to  the  Senate  as  the  replacement;  and 
run  George  B.  Porter  for  Congress  in  Buchanan's  place  to  assume  direction 
of  the  Amalgamation  men  in  the  House.  The  scheme  showed  clearly  that 
Buchanan  had  advanced  from  the  county  and  district  level,  and  had 
broadened  his  view  to  encompass  the  state  and  the  nation.  The  new 
program  appealed  to  the  rural  and  poorer  class  of  Pennsylvanians  against 
the  urban  and  richer  class.  The  voting  strength  of  the  western  frontiersmen 
led  by  Baldwin,  the  latent  power  of  the  German  farmers,  organized  by 
Buchanan  and  Henry  A.  Muhlenberg,  and  the  class  consciousness  of  the 
newly  aroused  workingmen  of  Philadelphia  would  be  combined  to  challenge 
the  political  and  financial  monopoly  which  Philadelphia  and  Pittsburgh,  now 
controlled  by  the  Family  party,  had  long  imposed  on  the  Commonwealth. 
Buchanan  went  to  Washington  shortly  after  the  presidential 
election  to  superintend  the  details.  He  had  been  rooming  with  Senator 
Barnard  for  a  year,  but  the  two  of  them  now  moved  to  Mrs.  Cottinger's 

67 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


where  they  could  be  joined  by  Congressmen  James  S.  Stevenson  of  Pitts- 
burgh and  John  B.  Sterigere  of  Chester  County.25  Buchanan  was  in  poor 
shape  for  the  job  which  had  to  be  done;  he  had  been  violently  ill  for  several 
months  during  the  latter  part  of  the  election  campaign  with  bilious  fever. 
These  attacks,  which  seized  him  whenever  he  faced  a  hard  fight,  gave  him 
nausea,  violent  headache,  and  diarrhea  and  kept  him  near  the  slop  bucket 
into  which  he  vomited  bile  until  he  was  empty  and  then  painfully  retched 
air.  He  was  scarcely  well  when  he  returned  to  Congress  in  December,  and 
by  the  beginning  of  the  new  year  suffered  a  recurrence  of  the  fever  which 
lasted  throughout  February.26 

Rumor  had  early  picked  Samuel  D.  Ingham  and  Henry  Baldwin 
as  the  two  Pennsylvanians  most  likely  to  be  honored  by  a  Cabinet  post  and 
until  February,  1829,  it  was  a  question  who  would  succeed.  Buchanan  had 
no  hopes  for  himself,  but  he  did  expect  that  Jackson  would  select  Baldwin 
for  the  Treasury  Department.27  He  had  defended  Jackson  in  1819  when 
he  had  been  under  attack  for  his  Florida  expedition,  had  been  the  first 
Pennsylvaman  to  ask  him  formally  to  be  a  presidential  candidate,  and  had 
worked  ardently  for  the  cause  ever  since.  Baldwin's  son  had  recently 
bought  a  plantation  next  to  the  Hermitage  in  Tennessee  and  had  been  on 
terms  of  intimacy  with  Jackson  throughout  the  summer  of  1828. 

The  prospects  seemed  so  good  that  the  Amalgamators  failed  to 
exert  themselves  as  hard  as  circumstances  demanded  When  Buchanart 
had  discussed  with  Baldwin  the  possibility  of  nominating  him  for  governor 
in  the  spring  of  1829,  he  had  positively  declined  under  an  assurance  from 
Jackson  that  he  would  be  placed  at  the  head  of  the  Treasury,  and  when  the 
president-elect  invited  Baldwin  to  come  to  Washington  for  a  conference  in 
February,  it  was  assumed  that  the  appointment  would  now  be  offered 
to  him.38 

On  the  other  hand,  Ingham  appeared  to  have  little  chance.  Just 
a  year  before  he  had  been  defeated  in  the  contest  for  United  Stales  Senator 
by  a  vote  of  11  to  108  in  favor  of  Barnard.  Furthermore,  Ingham  was  now 
so  ill  at  his  home  in  New  Hope  that  his  friends  feared  for  his  life, 

But  Buchanan  and  his  partisans  did  not  know  that  the  Eleventh 
Hour  Men  had  sowed  all  manner  of  doubts  about  Baldwin  among  Jackson's 
advisors,  and  that  a  few  of  them  had  called  upon  Jackson,  representing 
themselves  as  spokesmen  for  the  whole  Pennsylvania  delegation,  and  had 
demanded  the  highest  place  for  Ingham.  Calhoun's  friends  joined  in  the 
effort29  Their  strongest  argument  was  that  the  appointment  of  Ingham 
would  ensure  the  nomination  of  a  strong  pro-Jackson  governor  of  Pennsyl- 
vania. The  Amalgamators,  warned  the  Calhoun  men,  hoped  to  see  Clay 
in  the  White  House,  and  if  they  got  control  of  the  state  administration 
they  might  succeed. 

68 


FAREWELL  TO  FEDERALISM  •    1828  .  1832 

Late  in  February  Jackson  announced  the  appointment  of  Ingham 
as  Secretary  of  the  Treasury.  The  loss  of  this  key  appointment  to  the 
enemy  was  bad  enough,  but  for  Buchanan  it  was  only  half  of  the  disaster. 
Baldwin,  cut  to  the  core  by  the  ridicule  heaped  upon  him  by  the  Family 
press,  considered  himself  entirely  crushed  and  announced  his  "complete 
withdrawal  from  political  contests."30  To  lose  the  services  of  Baldwin  in 
the  western  region  would  nearly  cripple  the  Amalgamation  plan. 

Buchanan  could  do  little  to  help  in  Washington  because  Jackson 
distrusted  him  and  he  had  been  counting  on  Baldwin  to  be  his  direct  channel 
to  the  White  House.  He  tried  to  promote  the  appointment  of  his  faction's 
candidates  for  various  federal  offices,  but  Jackson  gave  the  appointments 
to  the  Dallas  men. 

By  June,  Buchanan's  enthusiasm  for  Andrew  Jackson  had  cooled 
perceptibly.  The  love  and  admiration  which  Pennsylvanians  had  expressed 
for  Jackson  personally  had  not,  he  wrote,  "been  transferred  to  his  ad- 
ministration/'31 The  Amalgamators  had  lost  the  fight  in  Washington  and 
had  to  salvage  what  they  could  in  Harrisburg. 

On  March  4, 1829,  while  a  howling  mob  wrecked  the  White  House 
in  an  effort  to  congratulate  the  newly  inaugurated  president,  his  friends  in 
Pennsylvania  congregated  in  Harrisburg  to  stage  a  bitter  grudge  fight  for 
control  of  the  state  Jacksonian  party. 

Buchanan  stayed  away  from  the  Harrisburg  convention.  He 
had  worked  out  the  strategy,  informed  everyone  of  the  task  to  be  done, 
and  now  left  it  up  to  the  county  workers  to  go  into  the  fight  and  win.  But 
these  men  were  no  match  for  some  of  the  old  and  skillful  politicians  work- 
ing for  Ingham,  whose  convention  delegation  was  managed  by  Dr.  Joel  B. 
Sutherland  of  Philadelphia.  Barnard,  after  leading  a  field  of  ten  candidates 
through  thirteen  ballots,  finally  lost  the  nomination  for  governor  to  the 
Family  candidate,  George  Wolf,  by  the  unexpected  switch  of  three  western 
delegates.  The  defeat  was  particularly  galling  to  the  Amalgamators,  not 
so  much  because  the  final  three  votes  which  nominated  Wolf  had  been 
bought  by  Sutherland  as  because  Barnard's  own  five-man  delegation  froip 
Chester  County  had  been  barred  from  the  convention  on  the  first  day  in 
favor  of  a  contesting  Family  delegation.  The  Barnard  men  shouted  "foul," 
called  a  general  party  conclave  to  condemn  the  Harrisburg  proceedings, 
and  planned  another  convention  in  May  to  place  Barnard  in  the  field.  They 
denounced  Wolfs  nomination  as  the  result  of  "intrigue  and  management 
in  order,  if  possible,  to  secure  the  vote  of  Pennsylvania  at  the  next  presi- 
dential election  for  John  C.  Calhoun."32  It  seemed  clear  that  the  nomination 
of  Wolf  would  be  contested  and  that  Barnard,  or  even  Shulze,  might  be 
selected  to  run  against  him. 

Buchanan  wrote  hastily  to  Barnard,  expressing  his  mortification 
at  the  proceedings  of  the  convention.  There  should  have  been  an  imme- 

69 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

diate  protest,  he  thought,  but  now  that  the  convention  had  adjourned,  it 
was  too  late;  they  would  all  have  to  support  Wolf.  "There  is  no  course 
left  but  submission.  .  .  .  Your  enemies  would  be  delighted  if  you  should 
consent  to  be  a  candidate.  This,  however,  I  feel  certain  you  will  not  do."33 

By  April,  matters  approached  a  crisis,  for  Barnard's  friends 
seemed  determined  to  hold  another  convention  in  May.  By  valiant  work 
Buchanan  at  last  managed  to  avert  an  open  split  among  the  Jacksonian* 
and  to  prevent  the  meeting  of  the  proposed  convention.  He  saw  no  ad- 
vantage in  fighting  the  men  supported  by  the  Jackson  Administration, 
especially  at  this  time.  Anti-Masonry  had  rapidly  come  to  the  fullness  of 
its  mushroomlike  growth  and,  in  alliance  with  the  old  Adams  party,  would 
certainly  defeat  a  Democracy  split  in  two, 

Buchanan  therefore  urged  the  Amalgamators  to  abandon  all 
formal  opposition  to  Wolf  and  develop  a  campaign  to  gain  some  influence 
over  him.  Barnard  should  remain  quietly  in  the  Senate;  Shulze  should 
make  all  the  removals  he  could,  filling  the  places  with  supporters  of  Wolf 
so  that  the  new  governor  would  be  placed  in  the  predicament  of  bring 
unable  to  give  office  to  men  of  his  own  choice  without  firing  political 
friends.34  Buchanan's  county  organizations  would  circulate  the  idea  that 
Wolf  was  strong  for  Calhoun  but  lukewarm  for  Jackson.  This  would  give 
them  some  leverage  at  Harrisburg  after  the  election. 

In  June  1829,  the  anti-Masons  nominated  Joseph  Ritner  for  the 
governorship.  He  had  the  advantages  of  residence  in  the  western  part  of 
the  state,  Pennsylvania-Dutch  Wood,  and  a  reputation  as  an  ardent  pro- 
tectionist,  but  the  Jacksonians  felt  these  were  more  than  counteracted  by 
his  support  of  Adams  in  1828,  his  ridiculous  conduct  when  Speaker  of  the 
state  House  of  Representatives,  and  the  deplorable  absence  of  delegates  at 
the  anti-Masonic  nominating  convention.  The  Family  party  did  not  fear 
Ritner;  it  feared  the  defection  of  the  Buchanan  men. 

Buchanan  worked  throughout  the  summer  trying  to  keep  hta 
partisans  in  line,  a  task  very  much  complicated  by  the  type  of  fallowing  he 
had  purposely  created.  Diverse  elements  could  be  held  together  under  the 
pressures  and  expectations  of  1828,  but  it  was  a  different  matter  to  keep 
them  united  in  the  face  of  defeat  and  without  proHpirt*  of  reward.3'* 
Barnard  made  no  real  effort  to  keep  the  Amalgamation  group  intact  in 
Chester  County,  letting  his  followers  drift  to  the  anti-Masons  or  the  Family 
without  protest.  He  occupied  himself  chiefly  with  the  buttle,  trying  t*» 
forget  his  recent  defeat,  "For  God's  sake/'  Buchanan  wrote  to  htm, 
"summon  up  that  resolution  which  belongs  to  your  character  &  abandon 
the  practice  forever-  .  .  .  You  have  been  but  once  disappointed;  &  dis- 
appointment is  the  common  fate  of  public  men*  The  Senate  of  the  United 
States  is  a  theatre  as  exalted  a$  that  to  which  your  friends  wished  IP  elevate 
you.  *  .  ,  Pardon  my  frankness  &  attribute  it  altogether  to 

70 


FAREWELL  TO  FEDERALISM  •    1828  - 1832 

Barnard,  however,  never  recovered.  He  was  a  dead  weight  on  the  Amal- 
gamation party  and  became  useless  in  the  Senate  from  which,  within  a 
little  more  than  a  year,  he  resigned. 

Buchanan  took  his  two-week  vacation  at  Bedford  Springs  as  usual, 
but  returned  home  in  mid-August  to  take  the  stump  for  Wolf.  He  talked 
mostly  at  meetings  of  Barnard  men,  telling  them  that,  although  he  had 
not  been  in  favor  of  the  nomination  of  Wolf,  it  was  now  the  duty  of  all 
Jacksonians  to  support  him.  His  speeches  placed  him  on  perfectly  open 
ground  with  Wolf,  but  hardly  quieted  the  apprehensions  of  the  Family 
party  that  Barnard's  friends,  for  revenge,  would  vote  anti-Masonic  or  not 
vote  at  all. 

The  poll  in  October  gave  shocking  evidence  that  Joseph  Ritner 
had  support  other  than  that  of  the  anti-Masons.  Wolfs  victory  was  no 
landslide,  and  explanations  of  why  it  was  not  were  soon  pouring  in  from 
every  direction.  Buchanan  wrote, 

Anti-Masonry  has  overwhelmed  us  like  a  tornado  in  this  county. 
Until  within  a  few  days  of  the  election  none  of  us  had  an  idea  of 
its  extensive  influence. .  .  .  The  majority  against  us  will  exceed 
1500.  It  was  1300  in  our  favor  last  election. ...  In  the  face  of 
our  enemies,  it  would  be  miserable  policy  to  divide  ourselves  into 
hostile,  opposing  factions.37 

The  Amalgamators,  while  they  knew  that  they  could  expect  no 
voluntary  favors  from  the  new  governor,  did  feel  that  they  were  sufficiently 
strong  to  demand  recognition  and  hoped  to  benefit  from  Wolfs  fears  if  not 
from  his  gratitude.  Unless  he  conciliated  them,  said  they,  he  would  not 
have  a  chance  of  re-election  in  1832,  and  the  only  policy  which  could 
possibly  save  him  from  being  run  out  at  the  end  of  one  term  was  a  dis- 
tribution of  the  offices  between  the  two  factions.  The  alternative  was 
anti-Masonic  victory. 

During  November  and  December,  Buchanan  wrote  letters  every 
day  or  two  to  Governor  Wolf,  recommending  friends  for  office.38  Tfhe 
major  struggle  of  the  Amalgamators  centered  on  the  Attorney-Generalship, 
an  appointment  they  determined  to  make  a  test  of  the  governor's  attitude 
toward  them.  Wolf  displayed  great  political  acumen  when  he  side-stepped 
the  factional  fight  by  declaring  that  he  would  make  residence  at  Harrisburg 
a  sine  qua  non  for  this  appointment.  Thus,  he  summarily  eliminated  every 
candidate  except  the  one  of  this  choice,  Samuel  Douglass.39 

The  contest  between  the  friends  of  Champneys  and  Buchanan  in 
Lancaster  touched  off  a  fight  which  illustrated  the  state  of  feeling  between 
the  rival  factions  throughout  the  state.  The  Wolf  Democrats  held  a  victory 
meeting  after  election,  whereupon  Buchanan's  friends  resolved' likewise  to 
celebrate.  They  selected  the  courthouse  as  a  meeting  place  and  made 

71 


JAMES  'BUCHANAN 


preparations  to  gather  immediately  upon  the  adjournment  of  the  current 
session  of  the  court.  Champneys,  in  the  hope  of  effecting  a  reconciliation, 
agreed  to  appear  on  the  platform  with  Buchanan  and  G.  B.  Porter,  but  the 
harder  core  of  the  Wolf  party  and  the  local  sheriff  determined  that  there 
would  be  no  celebration.  The  minute  court  adjourned  they  rushed  to 
the  building,  had  the  bell  rung,  surged  into  the  court  room,  hoisted  the 
sheriff  into  the  chair,  and  enacted  a  scene  "seldom  witnessed  in  a  civilized 
country."  The  would-be  speakers,  teetering;  atop  the  judges'  bench, 
attempted  to  harangue  the  crowd  but  became  a  target  for  flying  inkstands, 
pitchers,  glasses,  and  spittoons.40 

The  opponents  of  Amalgamation  blamed  Buchanan,  stating  that 
nothing  less  than  riot  could  be  expected  from  an  effort  to  unite  red-blooded 
Democrats  with  Federalists  and  that  Buchanan's  hostility  to  Wolf  was  the 
reason  for  the  outbreak.  Buchanan  made  haste  to  write  to  the  governor 
to  "learn  whether  my  enemies  have  made  any  impression  against  me  on 
your  mind"  since  the  famous  meeting  at  Lancaster.  "I  anticipated  no 
disturbance,"  he  said,  "and  .  . .  attended  for  the  single  purpose  of  uniting, 
not  of  dividing  the  party,  as  my  preamble  and  resolutions  abundantly 
testify,  ...  I  confess  I  think  my  case  a  very  hard  one.  Having  actively 
supported  not  only  your  election,  I>ut  that  of  the  whole  county  tidkrt.  .  .  . 
I  find  myself  now  denounced  as  if  I  had  been  your  cold  friend  if  not  your 

enemy It  is  my  determination  firmly  to  sustain  your  administration 

Having  long  since  announced  my  determination  to  retire  from  Om^n^s  at 
the  close  of  the  present  term,  I  have  no  interest  but  the  pood  of  the  country 
&  the  party  in  desiring  to  save  the  District  .  .  „  from  the  #ra*{>  of  anti- 
Masonry.  This  can  be  done,  only  by  a  thorough  union  &  pre-ron<rt»rted 
action  of  your  friends,  under  the  name  of  Democrats.  •  •  •  I'liion  is 
absolutely  necessary  to  our  auorcffift.  Nothing  shall  l>e  wanting  on  my  part 
to  promote  a  reconciliation  of  your  friends,  provided  1  **an  interfere  with 
any  reasonable  hope  of  accomplishing  so  desirable  a  purponi*."*1 

This  letter  lacked  something  of  candor,  ami  Wolf  knew  it.  In 
fact,  there  lay  on  the  governor's  desk  half  a  duacrn  others  from  friend*  hr 
trusted  explaining  in  minute  detail  that  "in  every  county  when** (the 
Amalgamators]  had  any  influence,"  that  party  "playml  iw  false/'4*  But 
when  it  was  all  said,  Wolf  still  faced  the  plain  fact  that  Buchanan's  {>arty 
held  a  balance  of  power  which  could  destroy  him.  Reluctantly  the  govr rni »r 
asked  Champneys  to  swallow  his  pride  and  to  "act  cordially  with  Porter 
and  Buchanan."  When  Champneys  resisted,  an  administration  spokesman 
wrote  more  urgently:  "My  intention  was  with  deference  to  intimate  my 
own  opinion  that  no  sacrifice  of  personal  feeling  on  your  part  which  might 
produce  a  strong  Union  &  ultimate  success  could  puwibly  place  you  in  a 
less  enviable  situation.  I  do  not  now,  nor  have  I  ever  supposed  that 
fBuchanan]  will  ever  very  cordially  support  us.  Still  I  have  hoped  that 

72 


FAREWELL  TO  FEDERALISM  *    1828  . 1832 


something  like  the  course  I  have  suggested  might  give  a  little  hetter  aspect 
generally  to  the  politics  of  Lancaster,  and  essentially  strengthen  the  real  & 
sound  democracy  at  home."43 

Buchanan  succeeded  better  in  forcing  the  idea  of  union  on  the 
governor  than  he  did  on  his  own  partisans.  Scarcely  had  the  ink  of  his 
protestations  of  friendship  to  Wolf  dried  on  the  page  when  he  was  invited 
to  a  Chester  County  meeting  called  for  the  specific  purpose  of  rejecting 
resolutions  favorable  to  the  state  administration.  Barnard  remarked  to 
him  at  this  affair  that  "any  attempt  to  identify  you  with  the  Gov.  was  cal- 
culated to  do  you  mischief."44  A  little  later  the  anti-Wolf  Democrats  of 
Philadelphia  invited  Buchanan  to  a  dinner.  The  committee  had  purposely 
extended  invitations  only  to  persons  living  in  the  city  in  order  that  the 
governor  would  not  have  to  be  invited  (a  ruse  intended  to  mock  Wolfs 
"residence  rule"  for  naming  the  Attorney  General),  but  it  informed 
Buchanan  that  "if  you,  Barnard,  &c.  should  happen  to  be  here,  the  Com. 
would  at  once  call  upon  you."45 

The  situation,  indeed,  appeared  to  be  hopeless.  Buchanan, 
observing  the  political  chaos,  formally  announced  in  the  spring  of  1830 
that  he  would  retire  from  politics;  he  knew  he  could  be  nominated  only  by 
his  own  faction,  and  he  knew  with  equal  certainty  that  this  faction  could 
not  elect  him.  The  death  of  Judge  John  Tod  of  the  State  Supreme  Court 
led  him  to  hope  for  that  appointment.  Many  of  his  friends  wrote  to  Wolf 
that  Buchanan  might  be  persuaded  to  accept  the  position  if  it  were  "offered 
to  him  without  a  recommendation  being  presented,"  but  that  he  would 
not  seek  it.46  This  peculiar  approach  originated  with  Buchanan  himself; 
the  mere  thought  of  rejection  affected  him  like  salt  on  a  snail's  back.  Wolf 
eventually  named  John  Ross  of  Bucks  County  to  the  judgeship,  thereby 
giving  to  Ingham  an  unexpected  and  staggering  blow,  for  Ross  and  Ingham 
for  years  had  been  at  loggerheads  with  each  other.  The  governor  wrote 
later  that  Buchanan  "wanted  me  to  appoint  him,"  and  that  the  "refusal  to 
do  so  has  made  xne  appear  very  contemptible  in  his  eyes."47 

In  December,  1830,  William  Wilkins  was  elected  to  the  United 
States  Senate  by  a  last  minute  coalition  of  the  warring  Democrats  who,  on 
the  twenty-first  ballot,  got  together  rather  than  permit  the  imminent 
victory  of  the  anti-Masonic  contender.  A  year  later,  upon  the  resignation 
of  Senator  Barnard  because  of  ill  health,  the  Pennsylvania  Legislature 
named  George  M.  Dallas  to  fill  the  unexpired  term. 

Buchanan  glumly  reviewed  the  ruins— Baldwin  shelved,  Barnard 
retired  and  dying,  himself  withdrawn  until  the  storm  should  blow  over; 
the  Family  installed  in  Jackson's  Cabinet,  in  control  of  the  governorship, 
and  in  command  of  both  seats  in  the  United  States  Senate;  the  Democratic 
party  in  Pennsylvania  split  hopelessly  and  facing  inevitable  defeat  by  a 
political  rag,  tag,  and  bobtail  united  in  the  weird  idiocy  of  anti-Masonry. 

73 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Life  was  a  vast  joke,  and  hope  was  futile.  The  situation  was  nearly  as 
ridiculous  as  it  was  painful. 

"Sufficient  unto  the  day  is  the  evil  thereof."  At  least  he  could 
finish  his  work  in  Congress  with  some  6elat  and  distinction.  There  was 
important  work  to  do,  and  he  would  be  called  upon  as  a  veteran  to  direct  it. 
Without  any  certainty  of  the  future,  and  without  a  great  deal  of  interest  in 
it,  Buchanan  settled  down  to  his  last  two  years  as  a  legislator. 

THE  CULMINATION  OF  A  CONGRESSIONAL  CAREER 

The  first  session  of  the  Twenty-first  Congress,  which  convened  in  December 
1829,  found  Buchanan  in  an  unusually  dour  and  touchy  frame  of  mind. 
He  grumped  about  a  departure  from  the  customary  mode  of  selecting  a 
Clerk  of  the  House,  and  let  go  a  blast  at  Congressman  James  K.  Polk,  a 
young  member  from  Tennessee,  which  was  quite  out  of  keeping  with  his 
normally  placid  deportment.  Polk  had  made  a  speech  on  an  important 
resolution,  concluding  with  a  motion  to  lay  the  matter  on  the  table,  a 
motion  which,  by  rule,  admitted  no  debate.  Buchanan  requested  Polk  to 
withdraw  his  motion  and  allow  him  to  say  a  few  words,  but  Polk  refused. 
The  House  then  voted  down  the  motion  to  table,  and  Buchanan  got  the 
floor.  He  was  aorry,  he  said,  that  he  had  to  bother  the  House  with  a  vote 
because  his  colleague  lacked  common  courtesy.  The  gentleman  from 
Tennessee  was  withiu  his  rights  but  very  ungracious,  after  speaking  at 
length  himself,  .to  conclude  with  a  motion  which,  if  successful,  would 
prevent  anybody  else  from  saying  anything.  Polk  flushed  with  angry 
embarrassment.  A  little  incident;  a  little  incident  such  as  a  man  never 


One  of  the  most  conspicuous  contributions  which  James  Bu- 
chanan ever  made  to  the  government  of  the  United  States  was  his  Minority 
Report  opposing  a  proposal  to  abrogate  the  25th  Section  of  the  Judiciary 
Act  of  1789.  The  motion  to  repeal  went  to  the  House  Committee  on  the 
Judiciary  of  which  Buchanan  was  now  chairman,  succeeding  Daniel 
Webster.  A  large  majority  of  the  Committee,  representing  a  comparable 
majority  in  the  House,  favored  the  repeal  and  reported  a  bill  for  the  purpose. 
But  Buchanan  showed  that  "though  he  may  have  quit  the  Federalist  Party, 
he  had  not  abandoned  Federalist  doctrine.'*  He  prepared  his  report*  got 
the  signatures  of  two  of  his  committee  members,  and  took  his  case  to 
the  House.49 

The  Constitution  gave  to  the  federal  courts  jurisdiction  in  "all 
cases  in  law  and  equity,  arising  under  this  Constitution,  the  laws  of  the 
United  States,  and  treaties."  The  25th  section  of  the  Act  of  1789  further 
defined  this  general  grant,  assigning  to  the  Supreme  Court  final  judgment  in 

74 


FAREWELL  TO  FEDERALISM  •    1828  - 1832 


three  classes  of  cases:  1)  those  in  which  a  state  court  should  decide  that 
a  law  or  treaty  of  the  United  States  was  void;  2)  those  in  which  the  validity 
of  a  state  law  was  called  in  question  on  the  ground  that  it  violated  the 
federal  Constitution;  and  3)  cases  involving  appellate  jurisdiction  on  con- 
struction of  the  Constitution,  laws,  and  treaties  of  the  United  States  when 
their  protection  had  been  invoked,  but  denied,  to  parties  in  state  suits. 

Buchanan  rested  his  defense  of  these  jurisdictions  of  the  Supreme 
Court  upon  three  propositions.  First,  he  said,  "it  ought  to  be  the  chief 
object  of  all  Governments  to  protect  individual  rights."  Without  the  25th 
Section,  state  courts  could  deny  any  or  all  of  the  rights  supposed  to  be 
guaranteed  to  citizens  by  the  federal  Constitution,  and  the  citizen  so  de- 
prived of  his  rights  would  have  no  recourse. 

Second,  there  could  be  no  uniformity  in  the  construction  of  the 
federal  Constitution,  of  the  laws  of  Congress,  or  of  treaties,  without  the 
ultimate  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court.  Without  the  25th  Section, 
each  state  could  decide  for  itself  the  meaning  of  a  phrase  in  the  Constitution 
or  federal  statute  or  treaty.  Thus,  a  federal  law  or  international  agreement 
might  be  valid  in  one  state  and  in  another  be  held  void. 

Third,  the  only  alternative  to  these  jurisdictions  of  the  Supreme 
Court  was  disunion.  "The  chief  evil  which  existed  under  the  old  con- 
federation, and  which  gave  birth  to  the  present  constitution,  was,  that  the 
General  Government  could  not  act  directly  upon  the  people,  but  only  by 
requisition  upon  sovereign  States.  The  present  Constitution  was  intended 
to  enable  the  Government  of  the  United  States  to  act  immediately  upon  the 
people  of  the  States,  and  to  carry  its  own  laws  into  execution  by  virtue  of 
its  own  authority." 

"We  have  in  this  country,"  he  concluded,  "an  authority  much 
higher  than  that  of  the  sovereign  States.  It  is  the  authority  of  the  sovereign 
people  of  each  State.  In  their  State  Conventions,  they  ratified  the  Con- 
stitution of  the  United  States;  and  so  far  as  the  Constitution  has  deprived 
the  States  of  any  of  the  attributes  of  sovereignty,  they  are  bound  by  it, 
because  such  was  the  will  of  the  people.  The  Constitution  thus  called  into 
existence  by  the  will  of  the  people  of  the  several  States,  has  declared  itself 
. ,  „  to  be  'the  supreme  law  of  the  land';  and  the  judges  in  every  State  shall 
be  bound  thereby."60 

Buchanan  presented  the  case  for  the  Minority  Report  with  such 
force  that  the  House  adopted  it  by  a  vote  of  138  to  5L  Buchanan  properly 
considered  it  "a  most  signal  and  permanent  victory  for  national  unity  and 
federal  sovereignty."  Personally  it  was  a  victory  of  the  constitutional 
lawyer  over  the  party  politician,  but  in  a  larger  sense  it  preserved  the 
national  jurisdiction  of  the  Supreme  Court.  Had  the  popular  sentiment  for 
repeal  of  the  25th  Section  prevailed,  wrote  a  modern  judge,  "who  can  say 
that  the  eloquence  of  Webster  or  the  political  skill  of  Lincoln  or  the  mUitary 

75 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


genius  of  Grant  would  have  availed  to  save  the  Union  from  disintegra- 
tion?"51 More  likely,  none  of  these  would  ever  have  had  the  chance  to 
try  his  powers. 

As  a  final  flourish  to  his  Congressional  career,  Buchanan  acted 
as  chief  manager  of  the  prosecution  of  Judge  James  H.  Peck  of  Missouri, 
against  whom  the  Judiciary  Committee  reported  articles  of  impeachment 
in  March,  1830.  Judge  Peck  had  imprisoned  and  disbarred  a  St.  Louis 
attorney,  Luke  E.  Lawless,  citing  him  for  contempt  because  Lawless  had 
written  newspaper  articles  which  criticized  Judge  Peck's  opinions.  Bu- 
chanan conducted  the  prosecution  in  collaboration  with  Henry  R.  Storrs  of 
N,  Y.,  one  of  the  readiest  debaters  in  the  House,  George  McDuffie  of  South 
Carolina,  Ambrose  Spencer,  for  twenty  years  a  Judge  of  the  New  York 
Supreme  Court,  and  Charles  Wickliffe,  a  lawyer  from  Kentucky.  William 
Wirt  and  Jonathan  Meredith  acted  as  attorneys  for  Judge  Peck. 

The  Senate  acquitted  Peck  by  a  vote  of  22  to  21.  John  Quincy 
Adams  confided  to. his  diary  that  it  was  "highly  probable  that  Jackson  did 
not  wish  to  see  an  impeachment  of  a  Judge,  commenced  by  Buchanan, 
successfully  carried  through."52 

The  chairmanship  of  the  Judiciary  Committee  and  the  imprach- 
ment  proved  a  welcome  distraction  to  Buchanan  in  the  dismal  days  after 
the  election  of  Governor  Wolf  and  the  triumph  of  the  Family,  but  as  the 
Jackson  Administration  grew  older  some  new  rays  of  hop*'  bepan  to  shine 
for  the  Amalgamators.  On  January  4,  1$JO,  President  Jaek.<wi  appointed 
Henry  Baldwin  to  a  seat  on  the  Supreme  Court  left  vacant  by  the  death  of 
Judge  Bushrod  Washington  in  November,  1829.  The  Family  had  pushed 
hard  to  have  John  Bannister  Gibson  appointed,  but  the  Buchanan  men 
pressed  for  Baldwin,  urging  as  a  main  reason  for  choosing  him  tlu*  fact 
that  the  Calhoun  newspapers  in  Pennsylvania  and  the  national  capital  had 
been  denouncing  Baldwin  so  bitterly/3  In  the  Senate,  Baldwin's  nomination 
was  approved  by  everyone  except  the  two  members  from  South  Carolina. 

Within  eighteen  months,  events  occurred  which  completely 
destroyed  Calhoun's  chances  for  the  presidency  as  a  successor  of  Jackson, 
estranged  the  Calhoun  forces  in  Pennsylvania  from  the  president,  and 
revived  the  influence  of  Buchanan  and  his  Amalgamator*.  The*  violent 
threats  of  South  Carolina  to  nullify  the  federal  tariff  laws,  the  dramatic  un- 
closeting  of  the  long-hidden  skeleton  of  Calhcwn's  attack  on  Jaekwm  during 
the  Florida  war  of  1818-1819,  and  the  breakup  of  the  Cabinet  over  the 
Peggy  Eaton  affair,  which  for  months  had  been  the  main  topif  of  drawing 
room  conversation  in  Washington,  made  it  clear  to  all  that  Jackson  and 
Calhoun  had  come  to  the  parting  of  the  ways.  The  vice-president's  break 
with  Jackson  left  the  Family  party  of  Pennsylvania  with  little  influence  in 
the  national  capital.  As  the  feud  sharpened  it  became  a  certainty  that 
Jackson  would  accept  a  second  term.  Much  as  the  Family  party  tried  to 

76 


FAREWELL  TO  FEDERALISM  *   1828  - 1832 


prevent  it,  Buchanan  and  his  associates  joined  with  Jackson's  promoter, 
William  B.  Lewis,  to  have  Pennsylvania  take  the  lead  in  calling  for  the 
renomination  of  "Old  Andy"  and  got  the  State  Legislature  to  issue  a  formal 
call  on  February  3,  1831.5* 

By  the  spring  of  1831,  at  Van  Buren's  suggestion,  the  national 
Cabinet  dissolved  and  all  the  Calhoun  men  in  it,  including  Ingham,  quit 
the  Jackson  Administration.  This  set-back  to  the  prestige  of  the  Family 
proved  a  life-giving  tonic  to  the  Amalgamators,  who  now  tried  to  get 
Jackson  to  appoint  Buchanan  to  the  Attorney-Generalship,  or  possibly  to 
the  Treasury  Department.65  Van  Buren  astutely  obtained  for  George 
Washington  Buchanan,  James's  brother,  an  appointment  as  federal  attorney 
for  the  Pittsburgh  district.56 

At  the  same  time  Buchanan's  friends  began  to  plug  him  for  the 
vice-presidency,  as  running  mate  to  Jackson  in  1832.  Newspapers  in 
Amalgamation  counties  in  Pennsylvania  and  in  nearby  states  where 
Buchanan  had  supporters  placed  his  name  on  their  mastheads  under 
Jackson's  and  called  public  meetings  to  endorse  the  plan.  Buchanan  had 
already  announced  his  determination  to  retire  from  politics  and  had  turned 
down  an  invitation  to  run  for  the  State  Legislature,  but  the  vice-presidency 
was  a  little  different.  The  Calhoun  movement  which  had  long  dominated 
the  Pennsylvania  scene  now  lay  prostrate;  but  Buchanan's  party  was  still 
very  much  alive  and  he  decided  to  let  the  vice-presidential  business  boom 
a  little  just  to  prove  it. 


77 


6 

RELUCTANT  DIPLOMAT  *  1831  - 1833 

THE  POLITICS  OF  THE  RUSSIAN  MISSION 

At  the  very  time  that  there  was  so  much  talk  about  Buchanan  for  a  Cabinet 
post  or  Buchanan  for  the  vice-presidency,  he  received  a  letter  from  John 
Henry  Eaton.  In  it  Eaton  invited  him  to  become  the  Minister  to  Russia.  The 
offer  of  the  Russian  Mission  was  a  distinct  letdown,  sine**  this  assignment 
was  a  sort  of  genteel  exile  for  those  political  figures  who  could  neither  be 
ignored  nor  trusted,  and  it  came  at  a  most  inopportune  moment.  Buchanan 
had  no  desire  to  leave  the  United  States  when  the  political  scene  was  so 
exciting.  Ingham  was  out  of  the  picture;  his  absence  had  created  a  vacuum 
in  Pennsylvania  politics,  and  Buchanan  stood  poised  to  fill  it.  Now  that 
Ingham  was  also  out  of  the  Jackson  Administration,  people  wanted  to  know 
what  place  Buchanan  would  have  in  it.  For  the  time  being  he  rould  give 
no  hint  of  his  plans  for  the  immediate  future,  because  Eaton  had  informed 
him  that  the  invitation  was  to  be  considered  entirely  confidential.1 

Buchanan  replied  to  Eaton  that  he  ought  not  to  accept.  He  did 
not  know  French;  he  was  very  busy  with  his  law  practice  and  could  not 
leave  for  some  time  without  grave  injury  to  his  clients,2  Eaton  responded 
that  the  president  would  not  ask  him  to  leave  for  a  year,  "unless  something 
more  than  is  now  expected  arises.**  With  this  foggy  assurance  Burhanan 
had  to  be  satisfied.  He  accepted  the  mission  on  June  12>  and  asked  again 
that  he  be  allowed  to  make  public  the  appointment.  His  preparations  for 
departure  and  his  sudden  interest  in  the  study  of  French  would  give  it  away 
anyhow.  "Is  there  any  reason  why  I  should  „  * .  defer  these  pre parations?" 
he  plaintively  inquired,  Jackson  scrawled  an  impatient  note  to  Eaton 
which  the  Major  forwarded:  "Say  to  him  in  reply,  to  go  on  and  make  his 
preparations  and  let  the  newspapers  make  any  comments  that  they  may 
think  proper,  and  mind  them  not  It  is  only  necessary  that  he  should  not 
give  them  any  information."  There  would  be  no  announcement  of  the 
appointment  until  the  present  minister,  John  Randolph  of  Roanoke, 
returned  to  America;  and  no  one  knew  when  that  would  be.* 

78 


RELUCTANT  DIPLOMAT  •   1831  - 1833 


Throughout  the  summer  of  1831  hints  of  all  kinds  of  appoint- 
ments, including  the  right  one,  circulated  widely  in  the  press,  as  did  stories 
that  Buchanan  had  been  snubbed  by  Jackson.4  His  vice-presidential 
prospects  continued  to  boom,  but  they  were  considerably  hampered  by  the 
unconfirmed  rumors  that  he  would  get  a  mission.5  Another  manifestation 
of  Jackson's  kindness  which  perturbed  Buchanan  was  the  appointment  of 
his  colleague  in  the  Amalgamation  plan,  George  B.  Porter,  to  the  governor- 
ship of  Michigan  Territory  in  place  of  General  Lewis  Cass,  who  was  now  in 
charge  of  the  War  Department.  With  Ingham  "sacked"  and  Porter  and 
Buchanan  about  to  be  shipped  out,  Pennsylvania's  Democratic  party  was 
without  leadership.  The  whole  development  appeared  to  be  no  accident; 
the  parts  fitted  together  too  well  The  object  was  to  build  a  Van  Buren 
party  on  the  wreckage  of  both  the  Family  and  the  Amalgamation  factions. 

During  July  Buchanan  had  a  bilious  attack.  He  used  it  as  an 
excuse  to  travel  north  under  doctor's  orders.  In  late  August  and  early 
September  he  went  "wandering  about  among  the  New  Yorkers  &  the 
Yankees,"  centering  his  activities  at  Saratoga  and  Boston,  while  he  tried 
to  learn  about  American  trade  problems  with  the  Baltic  and  the  Black  Sea.6 

By  the  time  he  got  back  to  Lancaster  on  September  9,  he  knew 
that  his  vice-presidential  hopes  had  gone  aglimmering.  Pennsylvania  would 
probably  name  Dallas  as  its  candidate.  Buchanan  wrote  to  Jackson:  "Now 
I  have  no  wish  to  be  a  candidate  for  the  Vice  Presidency,  on  the  contrary 
my  nomination  was  got  up  without  my  consent  &  it  is  my  intention  to 

decline I  think  no  man  ought  to  hold  that  office  but  one  of  mature  age 

who  has  obtained  the  confidence  of  the  American  people  by  distinguished 

services In  short,  he  ought  to  be  next  in  the  confidence  of  the  people 

to  the  President  himself,"7  Shortly  after  Jackson  received  this,  he  publicly 
announced  the  appointment  to  Russia. 

Buchanan's  mother  now  learned  for  the  first  time  of  the  assign- 
ment. "Would  it  not  be  practicable  even  now  to  decline  its  acceptance?'* 
she  asked,  "Your  political  career  has  been  of  that  description  which  ought 
to  gratify  your  ambition  &  as  to  pecuniary  matters,  they  are  no  object  to 
you.  If  you  can  consistently  with  the  character  of  a  gentleman  &  a  man 
of  honor,  decline,  how  great  a  gratification  it  will  be  to  me. . . .  P.S.  At 
what  time  do  you  intend  paying  us  that  visit,  previous  to  your  departure 
from  the  country  which  gave  you  birth,  and  I  expect,  to  me,  the  last  visit? 
Do  not  disappoint  me,  but  certainly  come,"8  Elizabeth  Speer  Buchanan 
was  sixty-six. 

For  the  next  several  months,  Buchanan  tried  to  pull  together  all 
the  loose  ends  of  his  many  activities  in  preparation  for  a  two-year  absence. 
He  visited  Jackson  in  Washington  and  his  mother  at  Mercersburg.  He 
worked  actively  among  Pennsylvania  politicians  to  try  to  salvage  something 
from  the  chaos  which  the  previous  months  had  brought,  and  answered 

79 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Jackson's  effort  to  create  a  new  Pennsylvania  leadership  by  joining  forces 
with  his  old  rivals,  Wolf  and  Dallas.  Governor  Wolf  was  in  the  worst 
predicament  of  all.  Immediately  upon  hearing  of  Ingham's  dismissal  from 
the  Cabinet,  he  had  written  asking  Ingham  to  swallow  his  anger  and  refrain 
from  attacking  Jackson.  Otherwise,  everyone  would  assume  "that  the 
Administration  of  the  State  was  in  hostility  with  that  of  the  Union— a 
position  in  which  for  the  present  I  have  no  desire  to  be  placed."9 

In  the  Pennsylvania  election  for  Senator  on  December  13,  1831, 
Buchanan  agreed  that  his  friend,  Henry  A.  Muhlenberg,  should  throw  his 
floor  ballots  to  Dallas  in  order  to  prevent  the  election  of  an  anti-Mason  or 
an  Adams  man.  Ironically,  it  was  Barnard's  seat  which  was  to  be  filled* 
Nonetheless,  anything  but  support  of  Dallas  meant  a  complete  destruction 
of  the  Jackson  party,  which  would  carry  all  down  with  it.  Pennsylvania 
had  an  obligation  to  look  out  for  her  own  interests,  interests  which  a 
Van  Buren  control  would  readily  sacrifice, 

On  January  12,  1832,  Buchanan's  nomination  to  the  Russian 
Mission  was  almost  unanimously  confirmed  by  the  U.  S.  Senate.  On  the 
13th  Van  Buren's  confirmation  as  Minister  to  Great  Britain  was  defeated 
by  the  casting  vote  of  Vice-President  Calhoun— sweet  revenge  for  Uttle 
Van's  trick  on  the  Woolens  Bill  vote  of  1827.  Within  a  week.  Governor 
Wolf  wrote  a  letter  to  Jackson  which  Benjamin  Champneys  showed  to 
Buchanan  prior  to  sending  it  to  its  destination.  Wolf  urged  Jackson  to 
appoint  Buchanan  to  the  English  Mission*  in  place  of  Van  Buren.l(* 

Buchanan  understood  perfectly  the  meaning  of  the  epistle  and 
the  mode  of  its  delivery,  Champneys  had  become  the  most  unrelenting  foe 
of  Amalgamation.  His  visit  was  the  olive  branch,  and  Wolfs  letter  itself 
was  a  declaration  to  Andrew  Jackson  that  the  Democrats  of  Pennsylvania 
stood  united  for  him,  but  not  for  Martin  Van  Buren.12  As  to  the  proposal, 
Buchanan  sent  his  thanks  to  the  governor  and  acknowledged  that  "London 
would  to  me  be  a  pleasant  exchange  for  St.  Petersburg,"  but  he  added  that 
he  had  no  intention  of  pressing  the  suggestion. 

In  the  meantime,  he  completed  preparations  for  his  new  duties 
and  for  the  supervision  of  his  personal  affairs  during  his  absence.  Edward 
Livingston,  Secretary  of  State,  wrote  him  detailed  instructions  for  managing 
the  Legation12  and  suggested  that  Buchanan,  in  case  he  did  not  wish  to 
continue  John  Randolph  Clay  as  Secretary  of  Legation,  avail  himself  of 
the  services  of  a  department  clerk,  Dr.  Robert  Greenhow,  who  knew 
languages  and  had  travelled  much  in  Europe.15  Buchanan  selected  Clay. 
He  gave  power  of  attorney  to  two  Lancaster  friends,  John 
Reynolds,  editor  of  the  Lancaster  Journal,  and  Dr.  Nathaniel  W.  Sample,  in- 
structing them  to  sell  his  library  and  all  his  personal  property  in  Lancaster, 
to  superintend  the  management  of  his  real  estate,  to  collect  his  dividends 
and  interest,  and  to  conduct  prosecutions  of  all  who  failed  to  pay  on  time. 

80 


RELUCTANT  DIPLOMAT  •   1831-1833 


He  authorized  them  to  invest  his  income  in  state  and  federal  bonds  or  in 
Lancaster  real  estate.14 

On  March  21, 1832,  he  left  for  Washington.  He  was  in  a  dismal 
frame  of  mind,  reasonably  certain  that  he  was  permanently  severing  his 
connection  with  Lancaster  and  positive  that  he  was  about  to  embark  on  a 
pursuit  "in  which  my  heart  never  was:  to  leave  the  most  free  and  happy 
country  on  earth  for  a  despotism  more  severe  than  any  which  exists  in 
Europe."16 

In  Washington  he  visited  his  friend  Stephen  Pleasanton  of  the 
Auditor's  office  and  got  the  details  of  his  pay  straightened  out.  He  would 
receive  $9000  per  year,  an  "outfit"  fee  of  one  year's  salary,  and  also  the 
cost  of  passage  home.  The  Legation  was  provided  with  a  special  contingent 
fund  for  the  purchase  of  postage,  newspapers,  minor  gifts,  and  stationery.16 
He  made  final  arrangements  for  John  W.  Barry,  of  the  U.  S.  Army,  a  son 
of  Postmaster  General  William  T.  Barry,  to  accompany  him  as  private 
secretary,  and  acquired  the  services  of  a  mulatto  servant,  Edward  Landrick, 
as  valet. 

Returning  to  Lancaster  he  found  everything  in  order  except  his 
arrangements  with  the  English  Presbyterian  Church,  where  he  was  a 
regular  worshipper,  although  as  yet  not  a  member.  While  attending 
service  on  April  1,  his  last  Sunday  in  Lancaster,  he  was  reminded  that  his 
rent  for  Pew  35  was  due,  and  wrote  a  check  to  cover  the  matter.17 


ST.  PETERSBURG 

At  New  York  the  following  Sunday  he  boarded  the  "Silas  Richards."  "I 
suffered  from  seasickness  during  nearly  the  whole  voyage,"  he  confided  to 
his  diary.  He  was  particularly  impressed  and  respectful  of  Captain  Henry 
Holdridge,  who  had  crossed  the  Atlantic  88  times.  "An  excellent  seaman," 
he  called  him,  and  "possessed  of  much  more  information  than  could  have 
been  expected  from  one  in  his  profession."  After  a  25-day  voyage,  they 
arrived  at  Liverpool,  where  Buchanan  presided  at  the  passengers'  dinner 
for  Captain  Holdridge  at  "The  Star  and  Garter."  A  year  later,  however, 
after  he  had  had  more  sailing  experience,  he  began  to  refer  to  Holdridge  as 
"the  Yankee  captain  with  whom  I  crossed  the  Atlantic,  who  would  cany 
sail  in  a  hurricane.**18 

Buchanan's  two-week  sojourn  in  England  was  a  whirl  of  sight- 
seeing and  social  life  to  which  he  responded  with  a  combination  of  the 
eager  enthusiasm  of  a  touring  schoohnarm  and  the  steely-eyed  appraisal  of 
an  investment  banker.  Mr.  Ogden,  the  consul  at  Liverpool,  inaugurated 
his  exclusion  into  high  life  by  having  him  invited  to  the  estate  of  Mr. 
William  Brown,  the  international  banker.  "Both  its  external  and  internal 

81 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


appearance,"  wrote  Buchanan,  very  much  impressed,  "prove  the  wealth 
and  the  taste  of  its  opulent  and  hospitable  owner/'  Ogden  warned  Bu- 
chanan of  the  need  for  security  in  diplomatic  activity  and  gave  him  a  special 
cipher  he  had  invented— "so  that  my  secretary  may  decipher  one  letter 
and  yet  know  nothing  about  any  other."19 

After  five  days  in  Liverpool,  he  set  out  for  Manchester  on  the 
railroad— his  first  ride  in  this  new  contrivance:  "a  distance  of  thirty  miles 
—in  one  hour  and  twenty-five  minutes,"  and  through  two  tunnel?.  On 
the  way  to  London  he  made  the  basic  stops— Birmingham,  Kenilworth 
Castle,  Warwick  Castle,  Stratford  upon  Avon,  Blenheim,  and  Oxford. 
After  several  weeks  in  London  he  proceeded  to  Hamburg  and  on  May  24 
set  sail  for  Lubeck  and  St.  Petersburg,  arriving  at  Ins  destination  on  June  2. 

The  Russian  capital,  built  by  order  of  Peter  the  Gu  at  a  century 
before,  was  at  this  time  one  of  the  most  brilliant  cities  in  the  world:  a  center 
of  literature,  music,  the  theater  and  ballet.  Built  cm  the  drlta  through 
which  the  Neva  River  flows  into  the  Gulf  of  Finland,  it  serve*!  as  Russia's 
"window  looking  out  on  Europe/'  Along  its  main  avenue,  the  Nevs«ky 
Prospekt,  stood  the  Winter  Palace  and  the  Mariinsky  Palatv,  the*  great- 
domed  cathedral  of  St.  Isaac,  and  the  Admiralty  Palare  crowned  with 
delicate  spires.  Buchanan  had  learned  something  of  St.  Petersburg  from 
the  charming  Mrs.  George  W.  Campbell  who  had  been  a  pn»at  favorite  of 
the  late  Czar  Alexander  while  her  huaband  served  as  Ameriran  Minister  to 
Russia  some  years  before.  lie  had  abo  talked  with  Baron  Krudcner, 
Russian  Minister  to  Washington,  and  to  his  delicate  blonde*  wife  who,  in 
earlier  days,  had  been  a  power  at  Alexander**  Court,  He  had  been  prepared 
for  lavish  splendor,  but  the  reality  exceeded  his*  expectation*. 

By  the  middle  of  June  he  hud  rented  as  Legation  headquarters  the 
Ville  Dame  Brockhauser  at  Watwilinfthoff  on  the  Grand  Neva  *t»5%  a  rite 
which  commanded  a  delightful  view  of  the  river  and  of  al!  thr  activity  of 
the  port,  though  it  was  considerably  removed  from  the  activities  of  tin* 
government.  The  villa  was  spacious,  with  a  courtyard,  HUM**  for  *ix 
horses,  a  carriage  and  sleigh  houae,  and  a  special  apartment  fur  the  nervanK 
Buchanan  took  it  furnished  with  bronzes,  marble*,  fciMw,  buffet*,  rflvar- 
ware,  linen,  pottery,  porcelains,  crystal,  cooking  utenrih,  and  oth«r 
household  appurtenances— enough  equipment  to  provide  regular  nettings 
for  six  and  occasional  parties?  of  thirty.90 

On  June  11  he  presented  his  letter  of  credence  to  the  Emperor 
Nicholas  L  After  the  usual  exchange  of  civilities*  the  monarch  rather 
surprised  the  new  envoy  by  coming  forward,  shaking  hands  with  warmth 
and  cordiality,  and  wishing  him  a  happy  stay  in  the  city.  The  Kmpre**, 
too,  was  congenial,  and  very  talkative.  She  thought  the  American*  werw 
wise  to  keep  out  of  European  troubles,  because  they  had  enough  of  their 
own  at  home,  especially  with  the  southern  states  and  their  resistance  to 

82 


RELUCTANT  DIPLOMAT  •    1831  - 1833 


the  tariff,  C'I  endeavored  in  a  few  words  to  explain  this  subject  to  her," 
said  Buchanan,  "but  she  still  persisted  in  expressing  the  same  opinion,  and, 
of  course,  I  would  not  argue  the  point."21 

Nicholas,  who  had  assumed  the  throne  upon  the  death  of  his 
elder  brother  Alexander  in  1825,  had  been  trained  more  for  war  than  for 
statecraft.  Although  he  liked  to  pose  as  cea  simple,  honest  officer  and 
servant  of  the  state,"  his  political  ingenuity  scarcely  extended  beyond  the 
imposition  of  police  rule  throughout  his  domain.  Just  the  year  before 
Buchanan's  arrival,  he  had  ruthlessly  crushed  a  liberal  uprising  in  Poland 
under  the  slogan,  "orthodoxy,  autocracy  and  national  unity."  In  foreign 
policy  he  was  especially  interested  in  maintaining  the  integrity  of  Turkey 
in  order  that  no  other  powers  could  force  an  entry  into  the  Black  Sea. 

Buchanan  soon  had  a  long  conversation  with  Count  Nesselrode, 
the  Russian  Foreign  Minister,  about  the  objectives  of  his  mission.  He 
found  that  Nesselrode  already  knew  a  good  deal  about  him  from  Prince 
Lieven,  the  Russian  Minister  in  London,  and  Baron  Krudener,  the  Minister 
to  the  United  States  who  was  happily  on  furlough  at  St.  Petersburg  that 
summer.  There  was  little  new  business  to  introduce.  John  Randolph,  in 
his  short  sojourn  in  the  city,  had  already  presented  to  the  Foreign  Office  a 
complete  file  of  papers  covering  the  wish  of  the  United' States  to  conclude 
a  treaty  of  navigation  and  commerce  and  a  treaty  concerning  maritime 
rights  with  Russia.  As  the  Russian  Ministry  had  been  in  possession  of  all 
the  documents  for  over  a  year  and  had  given  no  hint  whether  it  wished  to 
treat  on  either  subject,  Buchanan  determined  for  the  present  not  to  ask 
Count  Nesselrode  for  any  answer  to  the  propositions  made  by  Mr.  Randolph. 
WI  shall  wait  until  I  become  better  acquainted  with  the  views  and  wishes 
of  the  Imperial  Ministry,"  he  said,  "before  I  introduce  the  Negotiation  to 
their  attention,  or  do  any  act  which  can  subject  me  to  the  charge  of  im- 
portunity."22 

The  first  months  were  both  leisurely  and  exciting.  Buchanan  had 
occasional  conferences  with  Baron  Krudener  and  with  Count  Nesselrode, 
feeling  out  their  sentiments  on  the  pending  negotiation,  but  mostly  he  sat 
in  the  Legation  studying  French,  reading  international  law,  writing  letters 
home,  and  wishing  for  mail.  In  fact,  he  had  not  been  in  St.  Petersburg 
twenty-four  hours  before  he  wrote  to  Secretary  of  State  Livingston  the 
extraordinary  fact  that  the  American  Legation  had  received  no  news  from 
the  home  country  for  over  a  year,  and  its  personnel  had  no  idea  what  might 
be  going  on  in  the  United  States.  He  requested  the  immediate  inauguration 
of  a  monthly  courier  service  to  London. 

To  his  friend,  John  Reynolds,  he  gave  a  pretty  clear  picture  of 
his  state  of  mind  and  mode  of  life.  "I  would  much  rather  for  my  own  part 
occupy  a  seat  in  the  Senate  or  in  the  House;  I  say  this  not  from  despond- 
ency, for  that  would  be  without  reason;  but  simply  from  the  circumstance 

83 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


that  a  man  devoted  to  free  principles  cannot  be  happy  in  the  midst  of 

slavery. 

"So  far  as  it  regards  my  own  person  I  shall  dress  so  as  not  to 
compromise  the  Republican  simplicity  of  my  country.  Over  my  equipage 
I  have  in  a  manner  no  control.  I  must  submit  to  the  established  customs, 
or  forfeit  many  of  the  most  essential  privileges  of  a  foreign  minister.  If  I 
were  to  drive  through  the  streets  of  Lancaster  in  the  same  style  I  do  here, 
I  should  soon  have  a  mob  of  men,  women  &  children  in  my  train.  I  must 
drive  four  horses;  otherwise  I  could  not  go  to  court.  My  driver  like  the 
rest  is  a  Russian  with  a  long  flowing  black  beard,  dressed  in  the  peculiar 
costume  of  his  country.  There  is  a  postilion  on  the  leader:  but  what  is  the 
most  ridiculous  of  all  is  the  Chasseur  who  stands  behind.  He  is  decked 
out  in  his  uniform  more  gaudy  than  that  of  our  Militia  Generals  with  a 
sword  by  his  side  &  a  large  chapeau  on  his  head  surmounted  by  a  plume  of 
feathers.  It  is  this  dress  which  constitutes  the  peculiar  badge  of  a  foreign 
minister.  The  soldiers  at  their  stations  present  arms  to  the  carriage,  on 
the  streets  they  take  off  their  hats  to  it,  &  it  is  everywhere  received  with  so 
much  deference,  that  I  feel  ashamed  of  myself  whenever  I  pass  through  the 
City.  It  is  ridiculous  flummery.  ,  .  . 

"What  a  dunce  I  was  not  to  have  learned  the  German  language! 
It  would  have  been  almost  as  useful  to  ine  here  as  the  French.  I  now 
understand  the  latter  tolerably  well;  but  it  will  be  long  before  I  shall  speak 
it  fluently* 

"When  you  write,  do  not  say  anything  which  would  be  offensive 
to  the  Government.  They  are  not  very  delicate  about  opening  letters  here. 

You  had  better  perhaps  give  this  caution  to  my  other  friend* We  can 

send  out  what  we  please  by  American  Captains,  but  everything  which 
comes  in  must  pass  through  the  Pom-Officer."1*3 

The  treaty  negotiation  proceeded  in  a  mast  peculiar  and  erratic 
manner.  Buchanan,  after  study  of  the  documents,  discovered  that  Ran- 
dolph's arguments  all  urged  the  benefits  of  th<t  projected  treaty  to  the 
people  of  the  United  States  but  failed  to  present  the  corresponding  ad- 
vantages to  Russia.  Buchanan  proposed  to  convince  the  Imperial  Ministry 
that  the  treaty  would  also  promote  the  best  interests  of  Russia,24  Good 
diplomacy  always  emphasized  the  quid  pro  quo. 

In  an  unofficial  talk  with  Baron  Krudencr  he  taunted,  with  some 
surprise,  that  Russia  was  much  irritated  by  the  American  tariff  of  1828  and 
held  it  accountable  for  a  sharp  decline  in  trade,  Buchanan  got  lute  statistics 
to  prove  that  Russo-American  trade  had  greatly  increased  in  1831  and  1832; 
the  sugar  refining  plants  around  St,  Petersburg  had  received  almost 
all  of  their  imported  raw  sugar  from  the  IL  S.  ships  alcmt.  He  made  it 
plain  that  with  a  treaty  giving  security  to  commercial  enterprise,  hundreds 
of  American  vessels  would  ply  the  rich  Black  Sea  area,  bringing  in  needed 

84 


RELUCTANT  DIPLOMAT  •   1831  - 1833 


raw  materials  from  all  over  the  world  and  taking  back  hemp  and  bar  iron. 
At  St.  Petersburg  the  sugar  import  trade  would  be  greatly  enlarged,  and  the 
wool  export  comparably  increased.  Russian  internal  manufacture  would 
be  greatly  diversified  by  the  import  of  more  raw  materials  and  Russian 
shipping  would  be  stimulated  by  the  export  of  her  excess  raw  materials 
to  America. 

Krudener  insisted,  however,  that  Russia  desired  a  relaxation  of 
the  tariff  of  1828.  It  was  with  some  excitement,  therefore,  that  Buchanan 
received  New  York  newspapers  which  contained  a  draft  of  the  Tariff  Bill 
of  1832,  proposing  reduction  of  duties  on  hemp,  sail  duck,  and  hammered 
iron.  He  informed  Krudener  of  it  immediately  and  received  a  call  from 
him  the  next  day.  He  said  that  this  was  pleasing  news,  and  that  Count 
Nesselrode  was  at  that  moment  on  his  way  to  Peterhoffto  bring  the  question 
of  the  commercial  treaty  to  the  attention  of  the  Emperor. 

For  two  weeks  thereafter,  the  Russians  pointedly  ignored  and 
avoided  Buchanan.  He  was  at  a  loss  to  know  why  until  he  gathered  from 
some  source  that  they  had  taken  offense  at  some  comments  in  the  recently 
arrived  batch  of  American  newspapers  (which  the  Russian  government 
agents  had  perused  with  care  before  delivering  them  to  the  American 
Legation).  Obviously,  Krudener  and  his  colleagues  had  known  of  the 
tariff  revision  before  Buchanan  did. 

Eventually,  Krudener  called  and  stayed  to  dinner  but  appeared 
"studiously  to  avoid  every  allusion  to  the  proposed  negotiation."  After 
they  rose  from  the  table,  the  Baron  casually  remarked  that  the  Emperor 
had  referred  the  American  proposals  to  Count  Cancrene,  the  Minister 
of  Finance. 

This  news  dumfounded  Buchanan.  Noting  his  confusion, 
Krudcner  asked:  "Do  you  not  consult  your  Secretary  of  the  Treasury 
on  similar  occasions?" 

"But  you  mean,"  replied  Buchanan,  "that  the  Treaty  has  been 

before  the  Emperor?" 

"Yes,  certainly,"  replied  Krudener,  laughing. 

Buchanan  promptly  obtained  an  audience  with  Count  Nesselrode 
and  found  Baron  Krudener  already  in  the  chamber.  They  talked  freely, 
and  both  Russians  conveyed  the  impression  that  it  was  almost  a  certainty 
that  a  commercial  treaty  would  be  concluded.  Buchanan  now  believed 
that  if  the  tariff  bill  passed,  "without  any  essential  change  in  the  duties 
proposed  on  Russian  productions,  ...  we  shall  obtain  a  Treaty  without 
much  difficulty**725 

Baron  Krudener  left  for  the  United  States  in  the  middle  of 
August  Buchanan  hurried  off  letters  to  his  friends  Reynolds,  Reigart,  and 
Jenkins,  inf onning  them  that  the  Baron  intended  to  visit  Lancaster  County 
to  examine  its  agriculture  and  urging  them  to  "treat  him  kindly  and  with 

85 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


special  distinction He  is  fond  of  the  good  things  of  this  life  &  certainly 

I  have  not  yet  seen  any  place  where  they  abound  more  than  in  Lancaster."26 

On  August  19,  an  American  ship  brought  news  to  Buchanan  that 
the  Tariff  of  1832  had  passed  both  houses  of  Congress  and  had  become  law 
without  the  president's  signature.  He  promptly  transmitted  to  Nesselrode 
the  information  that  duties  on  iron  were  down  from  S22.-10  to  $18  per  ton; 
on  sail  duck,  from  12H  cents  per  square  yard  to  15  per  cent  ad  valorem 
(a  radical  reduction);  and  on  hemp,  from  $60  to  &JQ  per  ton.  He  hoped 
the  commercial  treaty  would  now  be  speedily  negotiated  in  order  that  it 
could  be  acted  upon  by  Congress  soon  enough  to  give  shippers  time  to 
prepare  for  spring  voyages. 

Then  a  month  and  a  half  passed  without  a  word.  Rumor  said 
that  the  treaty  would  be  rejected,  and  Buchanan  heard  several  times  that 
"it  was  vain  for  any  nation  to  attempt  to  conclude  a  Treaty  of  Commerce 
with  the  Russian  Government,  whilst  Count  Cancrene  continued  as  Minister 
of  Finance.*'27  Nonetheless,  the  American  Minister  tried  to  use  his  time 
to  advantage.  He  contrived  an  interview  with  Baron  Stieglits,  the  Court 
Banker,  who  was  a  good  friend  of  both  Nesselrode  and  Canerene  and, 
perhaps  of  more  importance,  financed  most  of  the  Russian  trade*  with  the 
United  States.  He  maintained  a  New  York  office  and  had  large  personal 
interests  in  the  Black  Sea  area  which  improved  trade  would  stimulate, 
Buchanan  repeated  all  the  arguments  to  him,  invited  him  to  dinner  several 
times,  and  was  gratified  to  discover  later  that  Stifglitfc  had  carried  th<*  con- 
versation back  to  Nesselrode.28 

The  time  passed  pleasantly.  Buchanan  wa«  much  entertained, 
and  responded  by  giving  a  series  of  stag  parties.  He  found  Russian  society 
to  be  a  strange  compound  of  barbarism  and  civilization.  The  Russians* 
employed  the  best  French  cooks  but  usually  ate  a  sour  soup  that  would 
have  repulsed  a  Delaware  Indian.  The  Russian  ladies  of  high  c«*xe  w*r* 
beautiful  and  educated,  yet  they  seemed  hugely  entertained  when  Buchanan 
told  them  fairy  stories  to  which  they  responded  like  children.29  Perhaps 
their  credulity  was  not  so  remarkable  when  one  considered  that  part  of  the 
reverence  for  Russia's  patron  saint,  Alexander  Nevsky>  stemmed  from  th* 
tradition  that  he  once  sailed  up  the  Neva  on  a  grindstone.30 

Buchanan  was  greatly  surprised  to  discover  that  the  Russian 
nobility  drank  very  little  and  that  the  ladies  regularly  wit  with  the  nirn 
after  dinner.  "They  have  been  too  quiet  for  me!**  he  wrote  to  Reynold*. 
The  lower  classes  were  more  convivial  and  drank  e*a  species  of  hot  white 
brandy  enough  to  kill  the  Devil**1 

One  morning  Captain  Barry  rushed  into  Buchanan's  quarter*  in 
great  agitation.  He  had  just  seen  one  of  the  Legation  servants,  a  Russian, 
going  through  the  papers  in  the  record  room*  Buchanan  frowned  and  told 
Barry  to  sit  down.  "Let  him  go/*  be  said  "It  can't  possibly  do  u»  «y 


RELUCTANT  DIPLOMAT  1831  -  1833 


harm,  and  it  just  might  do  some  good."  He  had  known,  before  he  ever  got 
to  St.  Petersburg,  that  there  was  no  security  of  information  in  Russia,  and 
he  had  made  it  a  point  never  to  put  in  writing  anything  that  could  give 
offense  or  disclose  a  secret.  In  practically  every  document  he  wrote, 
official  and  private,  he  included  some  comments  highly  complimentary  to 
the  Emperor.32 

Then,  in  October,  Buchanan  received  a  formal  note  stating  that 
his  Imperial  Majesty  declined  to  negotiate  a  commercial  treaty.  It  was  a 
blow,  but  it  was  not  entirely  unexpected.  The  note  suggested  several 
reasons  for  the  negative  decision:  the  project  did  not  sufficiently  protect 
Russian  masters  against  the  desertion  of  their  seamen  in  American  ports; 
reciprocity  was  not  clearly  provided  in  all  cases;  and  there  was  an  implied 
limitation  upon  the  right  of  the  Russian  government  to  change  its  tariff 
duties  at  will.  Buchanan  drafted  a  reply  giving  his  solutions  to  the  various 
problems  and  went  to  bed  discouraged.  He  was  certain  that  the  reasons 
offered  were  not  the  real  ones.  The  personal  opposition  of  Count  Cancrene, 
Minister  of  Finance,  and  Mr.  de  Bloudoff,  Minister  of  Interior,  had  led  the 
Emperor  to  reject  negotiations. 

A  few  days  later,  in  response  to  a  call  from  Count  Nesselrode,  he 
went  to  the  Foreign  Office  and  engaged  in  a  conversation  so  amazing  that, 
as  he  told  Livingston,  "you  will,  I  think,  be  satisfied  that  but  few  more 
singular  occurrences  have  been  recorded  in  the  history  of  modern  di- 
plomacy." 

Nesselrode  reviewed  the  rejection  of  the  treaty,  and  mentioned 
emphatically  that  Cancrene  and  de  Bloudoff  had  brought  the  Emperor, 
very  reluctantly,  to  their  point  of  view.  Then  he  dropped  his  wary  diplo- 
matic manner,  became  "frank  and  candid,"  and  told  the  astonished  Bu- 
chanan that  if  he  should  rewrite  his  modifications  to  the  treaty,  stressing 
certain  points  which  the  Count  would  mention,  he  would  take  it  straight 
to  the  Emperor,  with  the  hope  that  it  would  be  accepted. 

Buchanan  returned  to  the  Legation  with  his  head  swimming. 
Although  he  had  too  much  to  do  to  spend  time  speculating  on  this  odd 
turn  of  events,  he  could  not  doubt  that  Nesselrode,  for  some  Reason, 
planned  to  put  through  the  treaty  against  the  wishes  of  the  Cabinet,  and 
that  the  Emperor  was  sympathetic.  All  day  Tuesday  he  worked,  and  on 
Wednesday,  after  a  short  absence,  found  a  card  in  the  tray  from  the  Baron 
de  Brthmow,  a  Counsellor  of  State  and  confidential  friend  of  Nesselrode. 
Thursday  Brtinnow  came  again  and  this  time  sat  with  Buchanan  for  half 
the  day,  carefully  coaching  him  on  the  phraseology  of  his  proposed  note. 
Where  Buchanan  had  written:  "In  pursuance  of  the  wish  expressed  by 
His  Excellency  the  Vice  Chancellor,"  Brttnnow  wrote:  "In  pursuance  of 
the  conversation  between  his  Excellency  and  the  Vice  Chancellor,  &c." 
BrOnaow  must  have  laughed  at  Buchanan.  To  announce  in  the  formal 

87 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


note  that  Nesselrode  had  engineered  this  plan  would  wreck  the  Counts 
career  and  destroy  the  possibility  of  further  negotiations.  The  matter  was 
to  be  kept  in  strictest  secrecy,  and  the  English  Minister,  m  particular, 
must  get  no  hint  of  what  was  maturing.33  ,,„,«•• 

Buchanan  wrote  happily  to  Livingston  that  he  had  the  fairest 
prospect  of  speedily  concluding  a  Commercial  Treaty,"  but  despite  the 
apparent  rush  of  mid-October,  nothing  happened  during  November.  He 
a~in  began  to  wonder  whether  he  had  been  hoaxed  and  complained  to 
Nesselrode  that  Mr.  Clay,  his  Legation  Secretary,  had  already  miwtd  the 
last  boat  of  the  season  while  waiting  to  take  the  treaty  to  America.  In 
December  Buchanan  had  an  idea.  The  Emperor's  birthday  was  on  the  18th 
of  thatmonth,  an  occasion  celebrated  with  agrand  fete.  "I  thought  it  might 
expedite  the  conclusion  of  the  Treaty, ...  to  manifest  a  wish  that  it  m.ght 
be  signed  on  that  anniversary,"  he  said.  Nesselrode  was  delighted,  but  he 
questioned  whether  copies  could  be  prepared  in  time.  Buchanan  put  extra 
secretaries  into  service  to  make  the  necessary  drafts  in  English  and  in 
French  and  on  December  15  learned  that  Nesselrode  had  been  authorized 

to  sign  the  treaty.34  ,.  , 

On  Tuesday  morning,  December  18,  the  whole  diplomatic  corp* 
went  to  the  Emperor's  birthday  feufe  The  corps  wa«  arranged  in  line  to 
receive  the  Emperor  and  Empress,  with  Mr.  Bligh,  the  newly  arrived  British 
Minister,  in  the  lowest  station.  "You  may  judge  of  my  astonishment, 
wrote  Buchanan,  "when  the  Emperor  accosting  me  in  trench,  in  a  tour  of 
voice  which  could  be  heard  all  around,  staid,  'I  signed  the  order  yesterday 
that  the  Treaty  should  be  executed  according  to  your  wirfiw,  &  then 
immediately  turning  to  Mr.  Bligh  asked  him  to  become  the  interpreter  «f 
this  information.  ...  His  astonishment  and  embarrassment  were  »o 
striking,  that  I  felt  for  him  most  sincerely. . . .  There  can  be  no  dwubt  hut 
all  that  occurred  was  designed  on  the  part  of  the  Emperor. . . .  After  the 
Emperor  had  retired,  Mr.  Bligh,  in  manifest  eonfuwon  . . .  artrt  mr  what 

kind  of  a  Treaty  we  had  been  concluding  with  RUM» Thw  incident 

has  already  given  rise  to  considerable  speculation  among  the  knowinjt  «»<* 
of  St  Petersburg."  That  afternoon  Buchanan  went  to  the  F«.mgn  <  >mce 
and  signed  the  treaty.38 

The  treaty  opened  a  new  era  in  Russian  diplomacy.  It  was  the 
first  agreement  of  its  kind  which  the  Imperial  Government  had  made  w»«h 
any  nation,  though  others  had  long  sought  such  a  compact.  It  put  the 
ships,  cargoes,  and  crews  of  each  country  on  a  basb  of  nviprncity.  »»*• 
shippers  of  the  one  country  were  to  receive  the  wme  treatment  in  the  port* 
of  the  other  that  they  received  in  their  home  port*.  Furthermore .  •  mwi 
favored  nation"  dause  had  been  included.  It  vr«  perfwlly  well  known 
that  more  than  a  hundred  American  ships  vfeitwl  Rwwton  port*  for  every 
Russian  vessel  sailing  to  America  and  that  Russian  discrimination  against 


88 


RELUCTANT  DIPLOMAT  •   1831-1833 

foreign  shippers  was  much  more  extensive,  petty,  and  exasperating  than 
the  American  practice.  Therefore,  Buchanan  and  others  could  well  ponder 
why  the  treaty  had  been  made  at  all. 

There  were  many  aspects  of  high  policy  and  domestic  planning 
which  formed  a  part  of  the  decision.  Europe  was  a  powder  teg,  and  Russia 
needed  friends  who  could  carry  supplies  to  her  if  she  became  involved  in 
war.  England  had  just  reached  an  agreement  with  France  on  the  Belgian 
question,  a  coalition  that  weakened  Russia's  position  in  the  balance  of 
power.  Russia  desired  to  improve  the  economy  of  her  southern  regions 
around  the  Black  Sea,  to  increase  her  merchant  marine,  and  to  achieve 
greater  internal  diversification.  A  fight  for  cabinet  prestige  between 
Nesselrode  and  Cancrene  had  something  to  do  with  the  result.  But 
probably  most  important  of  all  was  the  Polish  question.  Only  later  did 
Buchanan  begin  to  understand  what  the  Emperor  really  expected  of  him. 
Buchanan  noted  an  immediate  change  in  the  attitude  of  the 
Russian  nobles  who  now  summoned  him  from  his  comparative  isolation 
across  the  Neva  to  their  balls  and  parties.  He  reported  becoming  "a 
favorite  in  several  of  their  first  families,"36  and  that  both  the  Emperor  and 
Empress  had  "been  marked  in  their  attentions"  to  him,  "indeed,  so  much 
so  as  to  excite  some  little  observation  &  perhaps  envy."  Baron  Cancrene 
made  the  amende  honorable,  praising  the  treaty  and  paying  Buchanan 
compliments  "of  such  a  character,"  he  wrote,  "as  I  know  I  do  not  deserve, 
and  therefore  I  shall  not  repeat.7'37  On  several  occasions,  the  Emperor 
while  walking  along  the  streets  of  the  city  in  plain  dress,  as  was  his  custom, 
encountered  the  American  Minister  and  made  it  a  point  to  stop  and  chat 
with  him,  calling  him  "Buchanan/*38  The  Empress,  whom  Buchanan 
praised  as  a  fine  dancer,  often  took  him  as  a  partner  at  court  balls.39  It 
was  no  wonder  that  Buchanan  found  his  prestige  miraculously  mounting. 
For  a  time  he  took  all  these  attentions  at  face  value,  though  somewhat 
astonished,  for  he  knew  he  possessed  "but  few  of  the  requisites  for  being 
successful  in  St.  Petersburg  society."40  Then  an  aflair  began  to  develop 
which  suggested  some  ulterior  reasons  for  his  lionization. 

Emperor  Nicholas  was  terribly  sensitive  to  criticism  which 
foreigners  directed  against  him  personally  for  ^  instigating  the  horrible 
atrocities  of  the  Polish  War  and  for  the  enslavement  of  the  Polish  people 
thereafter.  The  newspapers  of  England  and  France  heaped  abuse  upon 
him  as  the  brutal  author  of  the  outrages,  and  the  British  Parliament  had 
taken  up  the  cry.  For  democratic  insurgents  all  over  Europe  this  was  the 
best  possible  ammunition  and  they  fired  it  broadside  with  abandon. 

Buchanan's  remarks  in  all  his  letters  and  notes  to  the  State 
Department  had  been  very  temperate  on  the  Polish  issue,  and  in  several 
instances  he  had  stated  that  the  atrocities  proceeded  only  from  the  age-old 
hostility  of  the  peoples  and  had  been  inflicted  by  unruly  officers  at  the 

89 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


front;  he  indicated  that  the  Emperor  was  not  the  author  of  the  system;  that, 
given  the  violent,  unreasoning  disposition  of  the  Poles,  the  Emperor  had 
no  alternative  but  to  use  force  with  them.  If  Buchanan  represented  the 
United  States,  or  could  have  any  influence  there;  if  the  United  States  took 
a  view  of  the  Polish  struggle  more  temperate  than  that  of  the  western 
Europeans,  this  would  have  an  important  quieting  effect  on  the  revolu- 
tionary impulse,  the  Emperor  reasoned.  America  was  its  home;  America 
was  its  spokesman.  If  America  saw  mitigating  factors,  it  would  moderate 
the  frenzy  of  European  revolutionaries  on  the  subject. 

Two  days  after  the  treaty  had  been  signed,  Count  Nesselrode 
began  a  conversation  with  Buchanan  on  an  entirely  new  subject  and  in  a 
manner  so  formal  and  solemn  that  Buchanan  was  wholly  nonplussed.  In 
two  minutes  more  he  was  completely  flabbergasted.  The  Washington 
Globe,  it  appeared,  had  been  reprinting  from  the  French  and  English 
journals  some  of  the  worst  attacks  against  the  Emperor.  That  these  should 
appear  in  the  administration  organ  at  the  very  moment  that  the  new  treaty 
was  in  transit  seemed  in  very  poor  taste.  Would  Buchanan  not  write  to 
Jackson  and  request  him  to  have  the  editor  of  the  Globe  stop  printing  this 
kind  of  material  and  to  direct  him  to  publish  some  compliments  about  the 
Emperor?  Nesselrode  had  a  note  on  the  subject  already  prepared  which 
Buchanan  could  send  to  the  president. 

Buchanan  saw  in  an  instant  what  he  was  up  against.  He  tried  to 
explain  that  in  the  United  States  even  the  president  could  not  tell  &  news- 
paper editor  what  to  print;  there  was  no  government  control;  in  fact,  the 
Constitution  forbade  such  control.  Why,  Buchanan  askrci,  did  not  the 
Russian  papers  print  some  denials  of  the  French  and  English  article*  and 
have  them  translated  and  circulated  so  that  the  American  editors  would 
have  the  other  side  of  the  story?  He  himsdf  had  tried  to  get  at  the  truth 
of  recent  events  in  Poland  but  had  not  been  able  to  learn  anything  even  in 
St.  Petersburg.  He  would  welcome  the  true  story,  and  he  was  nur<»  that 
the  American  editors  also  would. 

But  Nesselrode  persisted,  wondered  why  the  Globe  WAR  called  an 
"official"  paper  if  it  was  entirely  independent  of  the  government,  and 
suggested  "that  General  Jackson  himself  must  certainty  have  some  in- 
fluence over  the  editor."  Buchanan  finally  concluded  the  subject  by 
telling  a  story  about  Baron  Sacken  who  had>  on  one  occasion  complained 
to  Jackson  of  the  attacks  which  had  been  made  upon  the  Emperor  in  the 
American  newspapers.  In  reply,  the  president  requested  him  to  examine 
the  papers  again,  and  "if  they  did  not  contain  a  hundred  articles  abusing 
himself  to  every  one  that  attacked  His  Imperial  Majesty*  he  would  then 
agree  there  was  cause  for  complaint/*41  Nesselrode  laughed  heartily, 
passed  to  other  matters,  and  Buchanan  thought  he  had  disposed  of  the 
problem.  He  was  wrong. 


RELUCTANT  DIPLOMAT  •   1831  - 1833 


On  January  9,  a  cart  drew  up  before  #65  Grand  Neva,  where  the 
draymen  removed  three  large  boxes,  struggled  with  their  load  into  the 
Legation,  and  presented  a  bill  for  1638  rubles— $330,  for  postage!  Until 
this  day,  James  Buchanan  had  never  received  a  single  piece  of  mail  from 
the  Department  of  State;  now  he  got  nearly  half  a  ton  of  it:  files  of  American 
newspapers,  journals  of  the  House  and  Senate,  books,  dispatches,  and 
letters.  "Such  a  mass  was  never  sent  by  Mail  before  from  Havre  to  St. 
Petersburg,"  he  exclaimed. 

By  the  time  Buchanan  had  waded  through  the  most  recent  of 
this  material  he  learned  a  few  things.  Baron  Sacken,  temporarily  in  charge 
of  the  Russian  Mission  at  Washington,  had  become  involved  in  a  squabble 
with  Livingston  and  Jackson  which  Nesselrode  presumably  knew  all  about. 
The  Baron  had  again  asked  for  some  action  to  put  an  end  to  the  Globe 
articles.  When  he  received  no  satisfaction,  he  wrote  a  note,  charging 
Jackson  with  insincerity;  he  proclaimed  friendship  for  Russia  in  his 
messages  to  Congress  but  encouraged  the  Globe  to  print  articles  abusive  of 
the  Emperor.  This  was  a  pretty  mess  to  be  brewing  at  the  very  time  that 
the  treaty  was  about  to  come  up  for  discussion  in  the  Senate! 

Livingston,  apparently,  expected  Sacken  to  send  a  letter  with- 
drawing the  charge  against  Jackson,  but  it  had  not  yet  been  received. 
Buchanan  talked  to  Nesselrode  about  this  unfortunate  business  and  learned 
that  no  disavowal  was  likely  to  be  made,  primarily  because  Sacken  insisted 
that  he  had  shown  his  letter  informally  to  the  Secretary  of  State  before 
sending  it,  and  that  Livingston  had  read  and  approved  it!42  Buchanan 
thought  that  there  must  be  some  misunderstanding,  and  he  promised  to 
get  more  exact  information.  What  was  the  news  of  the  treaty?  asked 
Nesselrode.  The  Emperor  had  acted  with  great  dispatch;  he  was  very  eager 
to  know  when  the  United  States  would  ratify.  Buchanan  had  no  idea.  The 
only  late  word  he  got  from  America  was  through  "scraps  contained  in 
English  newspapers  kindly  furnished  ...  by  Mr.  Bligh,  &  an  occasional 
remark  in  the  letters  received  from  the  United  States  by  Baron  Steiglitz." 

The  last  three  months  of  the  Mission  were  like  scenes  from  a 
comic  opera,  Buchanan's  position,  as  he  came  to  learn  with  shock  after 
shock,  was  that  of  the  only  man  in  the  cast  who  did  not  know  the  plot 
beforehand-  The  cause  was  the  combination  of  the  assininity  with  which 
the  State  Department  handled  its  communications  and  the  assiduity  with 
which  the  Russian  secret  police  tapped  them. 

Not  until  July  31,  for  example,  did  Buchanan  receive  any  infor- 
mation from  Livingston,  He  had  indeed  read  the  Sacken  letter  in  advance 
and  had  not  objected  to  itl  This  took  all  the  wind  out  of  Buchanan's  sails. 
It  was  obvious  that  Nesselrode  had  had  a  copy  of  Livingston's  note  for 
months,  for  the  American  chargS  at  Paris— "a  jack-ass"  Buchanan  called 
him  with  kindness— had  placed  all  the  dispatches  in  the  hands  of  the 

91 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Russian  Embassy  to  be  forwarded.  The  Russians  copied  everything,  sent 
duplicates  to  their  own  Ministry,  and  delivered  the  originals,  with  all  seals 
broken,  to  Buchanan  four  months  later. 

Apparently  the  Russians  read  everything  before  Buchanan  did. 
Nesselrode  had  known  about  the  passage  of  the  American  tariff  three 
weeks  before  Buchanan  had  gotten  word  of  it— and  that  from  unofficial 
sources.  Buchanan  pleaded  with  the  State  Department  never  to  send 
dispatches  by  mail  "unless  they  be  of  such  a  character  that  they  may  be 
perused  &  copied  not  only  at  St.  Petersburg,  but  in  all  the  Governments 
through  which  they  may  have  passed/*  Never  once,  he  said,  had  he 
received  a  piece  of  mail  which  had  not  been  opened.  'The  letters  have 
been  sent  to  me  either  almost  open,  or  with  such  awkward  imitation  of 
the  seals  as  to  excite  merriment.  The  Post  Office  Eagle  here  is  a  sorry 
ted."* 

By  the  end  of  May  Buchanan  had  still  not  heard  officially  that 
the  treaty  had  been  ratified  by  the  Senate.  The  Emperor,  at  an  audience, 
inquired  "with  a  good  deal  of  earnestness  in  his  manner"  about  the  ratifica- 
tion, and  Buchanan  had  to  answer  lamely  that  he  had  no  official  verification, 
but  he  had  heard  indirectly  that  the  treaty  had  been  ratified  some  months 
ago. 

Worst  of  all,  the  State  Department  failed  to  send  any  reply  to 
Buchanan's  Dispatch  #8,  describing  the  inside  mechanics  of  th.e  commercial 
treaty  negotiation  and  requesting  instructions  about  the  treaty  on  maritime 
rights,  which  was  still  pending.  Buchanan  feared  that  a  reply  might  have 
been  "transmitted  through  the  Russian  Post  office/*  Eventually  the 
answer  came,  but  it  was  too  late. 

The  maritime  treaty  was  intended  to  define  the  legal  nature  of 
blockades,  to  enumerate  articles  constituting  contraband  of  war,  and  to 
establish  the  principle  that  "free  ships  make  free  goods/'  When  Buchanan 
proposed  that  talks  be  instituted  on  the  maritime  treaty  he  soon  discovered 
that  Nesselrode  was  "not  disposed  to  enter  upon  the  subject/*  Buchanan's 
disappointment  was  all  the  more  bitter,  for  Jackson  had  written,  not  too 
enthusiastically,  after  the  conclusion  of  the  commercial  treaty— "(it)  is 
as  good  a  one  as  we  could  expect ,  .  * ,  and  if  you  can  close  the  other  aa 
satisfactory,  it  will  be  a  happy  result/1**  But  Nesaelrode  had  shut  the 
door,  and  there  was  no  use  pushing  at  it. 

THE  CONCLUSION  OF  THE  MISSION 

More  happily*  Jackson  had  given  Buchanan  permission  to  come  home 
whenever  he  wished.  He  had  feared  he  was  in  for  a  two-year  tour  of  duty, 

92 


RELUCTANT  DIPLOMAT  •   1831  - 1833 


but  he  might  be  able  to  get  out  of  Russia  that  summer  and  be  home  in  time 
for  the  next  senatorial  elections.  Feeling  that  he  had  done  all  he  could,  he 
took  advantage  of  the  tempbrary  lull  in  Legation  business  to  travel  to  the 
interior  of  Russia.  During  June  he  went  to  Novgorod  and  Moscow.  At  the 
end  of  the  month  he  was  back  at  the  Legation,  refreshed  by  his  vacation, 
and  ready  to  make  plans  for  his  return  home.45 

Buchanan's  personal  world  had  changed  with  astonishing  and 
sobering  rapidity.  His  sister  Harriet  had  married  without  even  telling  him 
in  advance,  and  he  chided  her  for  her  neglect.  *CI  felt  toward  you  both  as  a 
father  &  as  a  brother. ...  Do  not  for  a  moment  suppose  that  I  am  offended; 
I  am  only  disappointed.  I  confess  I  did  not  feel  very  anxious  that  you 
should  be  married.  This  indifference  was  no  doubt  partly  selfish.  I  had 
often  indulged  the  hope  that  we  might  spend  the  evening  of  our  days 
together  in  my  family."46  His  youngest  brother,  Edward,  had  joined  the 
ministry  largely  to  gratify  the  hope  of  his  mother  that  one  of  her  children 
should  be  a  clergyman.  He,  too,  had  married.  He  did  not  mention  the 
girl,  though  James  later  learned  it  was  Ann  Eliza  Foster  of  Pittsburgh, 
whose  brother  was  the  young  song  writer,  Stephen  Collins  Foster.47 

His  favorite  brother,  George,  a  brilliant  young  lawyer  with  whom 
James  had  hoped  to  share  practice,  had  died  of  tuberculosis.  In  July, 
just  before  leaving  St.  Petersburg,  he  received  the  news  that  his  mother 
had  died  two  months  earlier.  His  best  drinking  crony  in  Lancaster,  George 
Louis  Wager,  was  critically  ill.  Washington  Hopkins,  son  of  his  old  pre- 
ceptor and  a  close  friend,  had  died.  To  Reynolds  he  wrote:  "How  many 
of  my  friends  and  acquaintances  shall  I  miss  from  the  social  circle  after  an 
absence  of  less  than  two  short  years.  .  .  .  Truly  this  is  not  our  abiding 

place/'4* 

Since  he  was  to  return  much  earlier  than  he  had  expected, 
Buchanan  now  turned  his  thoughts  to  his  private  business.  During  his 
absence  Reynolds  and  Sample  had  managed  his  estate  well.  They  had 
bought  a  house  for  him  in  Lancaster;  it  was  the  former  home  of  Robert 
Coleman.  "Although  I  do  not  think  it  was  a  great  bargain,"  he  wrote  to 
Reynolds,  "I  feel  as  much  indebted  to  you  &  the  Doctor  as  if  you  had  got 
it  cheaper/'40 

Reynolds  reported  that  he  had  banked  $12,268  from  Buchanan  s 
local  enterprises:  about  $5,000  interest  from  investments  such  as  bonds, 
mortgages,  and  loans  and  the  rest  from  the  collection  of  debts.  He  had 
purchased  several  properties  for  investment  and  had  finally  sold  the  Sterrett 
Gap  property  for  $6,500.  Furthermore,  he  had  paid  for  the  Coleman  estate 
and  insured  it.  Financially,  it  had  been  a  fairly  good  year  for  Buchanan. 

Buchanan  had  his  last  audience  at  Peterhoff  on  Monday,  August  5, 
1833-  Of  this  occasion  he  wrote  that  the  Emperor  "bade  me  adieu-— and 
embraced  and  saluted  me  according  to  the  Russian,  custom—a  ceremony 

93 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


for  which  I  was  wholly  unprepared,  and  which  I  had  not  anticipated.  Whilst 
we  were  taking  leave,  he  told  me  to  tell  General  Jackson  to  send  him 
another  Minister  exactly  like  myself.  He  wished  for  no  better  .  .  .  Thus 
has  my  mission  terminated."50 


7 

DAYS  OF  DECISION  *  1833  - 1834 

RETURN  FROM  RUSSIA 

Buchanan  took  a  tour  of  the  Continent  on  his  way  home,  travelling  hy 
steamboat  from  St.  Petersburg  to  Lubecfc,  then  to  Hamburg,  Amsterdam, 
the  Hague,  Brussels,  Paris,  London,  Edinburgh,  Glasgow,  Belfast,  Dublin, 
and  at  last  to  Liverpool  for  passage  to  Philadelphia.  At  Hamburg  he 
visited  for  several  days  with  Henry  Wheaton,  the  international  lawyer, 
before  starting  his  tour  of  the  Low  Countries  and  the  Rhine  Valley.  "Al- 
though not  given  to  ecstasies,"  he  wrote,  "I  felt  a  little  romantic  in  descend- 
ing the  Rhine.  ...  I  never  took  much  to  the  Rhenish  until  I  got  into  its 
native  country.  There  I  became  acclimated  to  it  &  now  feel  that  the  taste 
will  accompany  me  through  life.  But  I  have  some  talent  in  this  line."1 

In  Paris  he  had  to  resume  the  role  of  an  active  diplomat  for  he 
discovered  that  he  was  the  only  American  Minister  in  western  Europe  and, 
with  a  threat  of  war  on  the  horizon,  he  had  to  act  as  spokesman  for  his 
country.  Lafayette  called  on  him,  and  the  French  Foreign  Minister,  the 
Duke  de  Broglief  sought  him  out,  as  did  Count  Pozzo  di  Borgo,  Russian 
Ambassador  at  Paris.2 


over  the  recent  claims  dispute  and  hoped  that  the  French  Chamber  of 
Deputies  would  soon  appropriate  funds  to  meet  the  provisions  of  the 
American  Treaty  and  terminate  the  difficulty.  Count  Borgo  of  Russia  made 
fun  of  the  French— "a  turbulent  and  restless  people.77  Buchanan  should 
sit  in  on  some  sessions  of  the  Chamber  of  Deputies— "They  were  like  cats, 
all  in  a  passion,  and  all  making  a  noise,  and  afterwards  laughing;  wholly 
unfit  for  liberty/*  They  wanted  Napoleon  and  glory  again,  not  liberty.3 
In  case  of  war,  the  central  Europeans  would  stick  together;  there  was  no 
telling  what  would  happen  with  England  and  France  except  that  England 
would  try  to  raid  neutral  commerce  and  set  up  illegal  blockades.  He  hoped 
the  United  States  would  not  stand  for  such  nonsense.  Buchanan  agreed 
and  reminded  him  that  this  was  the  object  of  the  maritime  treaty  he  had 

95 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


tried  to  negotiate.  The  very  reason  why  it  was  refused,  replied  Borgo.  It 
would  have  been  an  obvious  attack  by  Russia  on  England;  would  have  set 
her  aflame,  possibly  have  been  a  trigger  for  the  very  war  all  were  trying 

to  avoid. 

In  London,  Buchanan  found  himself  in  the  heart  of  European 
power  politics.  All  the  members  of  the  London  Conference  to  settle  the 
fate  of  Belgium  were  still  in  residence.  At  dinner  at  Prince  Lieven's  in 
the  Russian  embassy  he  sat  with  Talleyrand  of  France,  Esterhazy  of  Austria, 
Biilow  of  Prussia  and  Lord  Palmerston  of  Britain.  Talleyrand,  in  conver- 
sation later,  asked  him  about  the  family  of  Alexander  Hamilton  and  told 
him  the  story  of  the  day  Aaron  Burr  had  sent  up  his  card,  "I  returned  the 
card,"  said  Talleyrand,  "with  a  message  that  I  had  the  portrait  of  General 
Hamilton  hanging  up  in  my  parlor.*'4 

Buchanan  conferred  and  dined  with  Palmerston  and  found  him 
unusually  interested  in  promoting  friendly  relations  between  England  and 
the  United  States.  Esterhazy  and  Biilow  assured  Buchanan  that  their 
governments  hoped  soon  to  open  diplomatic  relations  with  the  Americans. 
"Our  position  in  the  world  is  now  one  of  much  importance,"  he  wrote  to 
Jackson.  "Indeed,  the  freedom  and  friendship  with  which  I  have  been 
treated  everywhere  are  an  evidence  of  the  high  character  of  our  Country 
abroad."5 

Buchanan  finally  journeyed  to  the  Emerald  Isle  where  he  visited 
the  home  of  his  ancestors  at  Ramelton.  "There  I  sinned  much  in  the 
article  of  hot  whiskey  toddy  which  they  term  punch,"  he  wrote  to  Reynolds. 
"The  Irish  women  are  delightful."0 

The  autumn  passage  of  the  North  Atlantic  gave  Buchanan  some 
time  to  reflect  upon  recent  events  and  his  political  prospects.  He  had  gone 
to  St.  Petersburg  as  a  used-up  politician  and  was  returning  something  of  a 
hero.  Though  a  tyro  in  diplomacy  he  had,  with  a  little  practical  common 
sense,  knowledge,  and  downright  honesty,  met  successfully  on  their  own 
ground  the  most  adroit  and  skillful  politicians  in  the  world.  The  emperors 
and  empresses,  the  dukes  and  counts,  the  chancellors  and  ministers  who 
wore  the  medals  and  ribbons  seemed  to  him  not  much  better  informed  than 
he  was.  For  the  first  time  in  his  life  he  began  to  think  seriously  about  the 
presidency.  Why  not?  He  could  do  Jt7 


DEMORALIZED  DEMOCRATS 

The  politics  of  Pennsylvania  had  changed  during  Buchanan's  absence. 
After  he  had  pulled  out  of  the  vice-presidential  race,  Senators  Wilkins  and 
Dallas  had  jumped  into  the  contest  and  got  the  endorsement  of  the  Penn- 
sylvania convention  in  1832.  Van  Burea,  in  ten  ballots  at  Harroburg, 

96 


DAYS  OF  DECISION  •   1833  - 1834 


never  received  more  than  4  out  of  132  votes.8  But  at  the  national  Demo- 
cratic Convention  at  Baltimore  in  May,  Pennsylvania's  entire  block  of  30 
votes  went  to  Van  Buren.  Simon  Cameron  took  credit  for  this  astonishing 
defiance  of  the  instructions  of  the  state  convention,  "I  had  more  enjoy- 
ment," he  told  Buchanan,  "by  pestering  the  folks  at  Harrisburg,  until  they 
actually  swallowed  the  dose  of  Van  Burenism,  than  I  ever  had  in  anything 
connected  with  politics."9  Dallas  and  Wilkins  completed  their  downfall 
by  voting  in  the  Senate  for  a  recharter  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States. 
After  Jackson's  veto  of  the  recharter  bill,  and  his  triumphant  re-election 
with  Van  Buren  as  vice-president,  the  political  stock  of  Wilkins,  Dallas  and 
Co.  fell  to  a  record  low. 

Buchanan  took  it  for  granted  that  Van  Buren  would  succeed 
Jackson  in  1836,  but  he  told  Reynolds  that  he  had  "some  misgivings  upon 
this  subject,"  and  would  remain  uncommitted  "because  I  cannot  see  clearly 
the  course  of  duty."  "I  shall  support  the  candidate  of  the  party  who  may 
be  regularly  nominated,"  he  said.  "To  Mr.  V.  B.  I  have  no  personal 
objection."10 

Pennsylvania  deserved  a  Cabinet  post  as  reward  for  her  steady 
support  of  Jackson,  but  the  internal  politics  of  the  state  made  it  more 
difficult  than  ever  to  find  the  right  man.  Jackson  made  the  Treasury  post 
available,  but  he  would  not  have  Wilkins  or  Dallas  and  was  dubious  about 
Buchanan.  Buchanan,  on  his  part,  gave  no  chance  for  a  rejection  when  he 
learned  his  name  was  under  discussion,  writing  that  he  would  not  for  a 
moment  accept  "a  Department  so  thankless,  so  laborious  &  so  perplexing 
as  that  of  the  Treas."11  He  did  not  want  to  be  the  agent  to  destroy  the 
Bank  of  the  United  States.  The  president  eventually  appointed  William  J. 
Duane  of  Philadelphia,  a  friend  of  Van  Buren,  who  was  not  deeply  involved 
in  the  state  power  stru^le. 

Buchanan  considered  himself  lucky  to  have  been  out  of  Congress 
during  1832  and  1833.  The  violent  controversies  over  nullification  and 
the  Bank  had  battered  the  fortunes  of  many  legislators,  especially  those 
from  Pennsylvania.  The  folks  back  home,  with  careless  illogic,  wanted 
the  Bank  rechartered,  and  their  hero,  Old  Andy,  re-elected— an  easy 
combination  for  a  backwoods  farmer  to  vote  for  but  a  devilish  hard  program 
for  a  Congressman  to  live  with  at  Washington.  The  Bank  vote  was  a  test, 
there;  any  friend  of  the  Bank  was  an  enemy  of  Jackson. 

Buchanan  wanted  to  be  a  Senator  and  therefore  had  to  clarify  his 
stand  on  the  Bank  and  nullification.  He  told  Jackson  that  he  was  pleased 
with  the  Bank  veto,  but  added  that  he  had  been  "inclined  to  be  friendly  to 
the  recharter  of  the  Bank  of  the  United  States."  He  promised  to  vote  for 
no  Bank  bill  that  did  not  remedy  the  objections  raised  in  the  veto  message.12 

South  Carolina's  Ordinance  of  Nullification  of  November  24, 
1832,  declaring  the  tariff  laws  of  1828  and  1832  "null,  void,  and  no  law," 

97 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


threw  the  nation  into  a  panic.  One  of  Buchanan's  friends  wrote:  "I  am 
firmly  of  the  opinion  rebellion  will  be  the  order  of  the  day,  accompanied  by 
all  its  horrors."  Duff  Green  was  calling  for  recourse  to  the  sword,  and 
tempers  were  so  inflamed  that  it  was  "indeed  time  for  the  people  seriously 
to  think  of  a  civil  war."  Secretary  of  State  Louis  McLane  reported  that 
there  was  good  reason  to  believe  that  the  southerners  were  planning  to  set 
up  a  separate  confederacy.13 

Buchanan  considered  the  nullification  doctrine  "against  both  the 
letter  &  spirit  of  the  Constitution,  as  well  as  absurd  in  itself."  He  was  not 
so  sure  about  the  question  of  secession;  that  problem  was  shrouded  in 
"shadows,  clouds  &  darkness."  He  had  no  sympathy  for  South  Carolina 
in  this  nullification  affair,  but  he  would  stand  on  his  principle  of  strict  con- 
struction and  would  not  go  along  with  some  of  his  friends  in  toasting 
resolutions  to  a  consolidated  government.14  The  question  of  secession,  he 
feared,  would  "be  the  touchstone  of  the  party  for  the  next  twenty  years/9 
Secession  was  much  more  reasonable  than  nullification;  it  was  no  half-baked 
measure,  but  it  meant  revolution  and  dissolution  of  the  nation.  For  this 
very  reason  Buchanan  felt  the  fear  of  it  would  tend  to  destroy  sectional 
parties,  since  no  party  would  openly  stand  for  war  on  the  government.15 

In  Pennsylvania,  George  Wolf,  who  had  been  re-elected  governor 
in  1832,  wanted  to  keep  on  good  terms  with  the  national  Administration. 
This  meant  he  could  no  longer  favor  Wilkins  and  Dallas,  both  of  whom  had 
discredited  themselves  by  supporting  the  Bank  and  opposing  Van  Buren. 
Dallas's  short  term  as  senator  was  about  to  expire,  and  all  through  the 
spring  of  1833  the  State  Legislature  had  been  balloting  in  vain  to  try  to 
choose  his  successor.  Dallas  himself  had  no  chance.  Governor  Wolf 
supported  one  of  his  cabinet,  Samuel  McKean,  but  he  could  not  muster  a 
majority  partly  because  Buchanan's  friends  had  lambasted  McKean,  de- 
spite Buchanan's  intimation  that  no  senator  could  be  elected  in  opposition  to 
the  Governor.  Finally  the  Legislature  adjourned  without  naming  a  senator 
and  postponed  the  decision  until  the  next  session  in  December  1833.16 

Buchanan's  friends  worked  hard  for  him.  Had  he  been  at  home 
during  the  spring,  they  said,  he  would  surely  have  won.  To  such  ktters, 
Buchanan  replied  that  he  could  probably  not  win  and  did  not  much  care; 
his  public  career  was  finished,  and  he  was  concerned  only  about  what  to  do 
after  his  return,  "To  recommence  the  practice  of  the  law  in  Lancaster 
would  not  be  very  agreeable.  If  my  attachments  for  that  place  as  well  as 
my  native  state  were  not  so  strong,  I  should  have  no  difficulty  in  arriving 
at  a  conclusion*  I  would  at  once  go  either  to  New  York  or  Baltimore;  and 
even  if  I  should  ever  desire  to  rise  to  political  distinction,  1  believe  I  could 
do  it  sooner  in  the  latter  place  than  in  any  part  of  Pennsylvania.  What  do 
you  think  of  the  project?"17  It  was  quite  obvious  what  his  political 
managers  would  think  of  it.  They  would  think  that  they  had  better  get 

98 


DAYS  OF  DECISION  •   1833  - 1834 


busy  and  line  up  the  votes  for  that  senatorship,  or  they  would  lose  a  good 
meal  ticket.  They  went  to  work  at  the  Fourth  of  July  party  barbecues 
where  they  proposed  toasts  to  Buchanan  for  U.  S.  senator,  for  vice-president 
and,  as  George  Plitt  reported,  even  "for  the  Presidency  itself."18 

The  "Susquehanna"  docked  in  Philadelphia  on  November  24, 
1833.  A  crowd  of  friends  met  Buchanan  at  the  gangplank,  escorted  him 
to  his  quarters,  and  explained  the  details  for  a  homecoming  celebration— 
a  huge  $5-a-plate  dinner  that  night.  Dallas  and  his  friends  had  refused  to 
attend,  but  nonetheless  the  banquet  hall  was  jammed.19 

The  balloting  for  senator  would  be  renewed  on  December  7.  That 
left  two  weeks  for  work.  Simon  Cameron,  electioneering  like  a  demon  in 
Harrisburg,  reported  that  he  had  drummed  up  thirty  sure  votes  against 
McKean  and  thought  that  the  Legislature  would  concentrate,  after  a  few 
ballots,  on  Buchanan,  but  Buchanan  remained  fairly  certain  that  McKean 
would  win.  The  results  of  the  election  caused  considerable  astonishment. 
McKean  was  elected  on  the  third  ballot  by  a  majority  of  74  out  of  130  votes, 
while  Buchanan  polled  only  five  votes.  There  was  more  here  than  met  the 
eye.  The  day  before,  Cameron  asserted  he  had  43  votes  promised  against 
McKean,  which  were  presumably  to  go  to  Buchanan.  It  was  quite  clear 
that  Buchanan  himself  insisted  that  he  did  not  want  to  tangle  with  the  Wolf 
Administration  at  this  moment.20 

Between  his  return  from  Russia  and  the  election,  Buchanan  had 
been  to  Washington  to  talk  to  the  president.  Jackson  wanted  Wolf  and 
Buchanan  to  work  together.  The  party  needed  them  both;  a  split  between 
them  would  throw  Pennsylvania  to  the  anti-Masons.  Buchanan  would  get 
his  chance  later,  for  Jackson  said  he  planned  to  send  William  Wilkins  to 
Russia  leaving  the  senatorship  vacant,  and  Buchanan  would  then  succeed 
Wilkins  in  Washington.21  Buchanan  knew  this  before  McKean's  election. 
He  wrote  to  one  of  his  backers:  "Mr.  Wilkins  will  soon  obtain  an  Executive 
appointment. , .  ,  I  must  be  greatly  mistaken  if  in  that  event  I  should  not 
be  elected  to  the  Senate  without  difficulty."  "All's  well  at  Harrisburg," 
he  concluded.  "The  party  are  firm  &  decided  in  support  of  Gen.  Jackson's 
administration  &  in  opposition  to  the  Bank."22 

The  picture  was  clear.  The  Pennsylvania  Senators  who  had 
voted  for  the  Bank  would  be  out,  the  anti-Bank  men  in;  the  State  Adminis- 
tration would  be  at  peace  with  the  Buchanan  party,  and  both  groups 
reconciled  to  Van  Buren.  What  could  be  a  happier  prospect  for  the 
election  of  1836?  Buchanan  would  join  McKean  in  the  Senate  and  stood 
a  good  chance  for  the  vice-presidential  nomination.  Much  as  the  Pennsyl- 
vania voters  had  formerly  resented  Van  Buren,  a  union  of  Wolf  and 
Buchanan  in  support  of  him  should  bring  his  opponents  into  the  fold,23 

99 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


SENATOR  BUCHANAN 

The  year  1834  proved  a  busy  one  for  Buchanan.  He  furnished  and  moved 
into  the  house  where  he  had  so  often  visited  Ann  Coleman.  At  night  he 
lay  awake  thinking  about  the  past  and  imagining  what  might  have  been. 
Damn  the  whole  episode,  he  thought.  They  had  both  acted  like  lunatics. 
He  still  had  Ann's  letters  tied  in  a  packet  with  silk  ribbon,  but  he  wished 
sometimes  that  he  could  forget  about  their  courtship  and  its  aftermath. 
Now  he  had  to  find  someone  to  take  care  of  his  house.  For  a  while  he  had 
part-time  servants,  but  he  anticipated  a  tour  of  duty  in  Washington  before 
long  and  wanted  a  permanent  and  trustworthy  caretaker.  He  often  ate  his 
meals  at  the  old  White  Swan  Hotel  on  the  town  square.  The  proprietor, 
had  a  niece,  Esther  Parker,  who  was  helping  around  the  inn  that  summer. 
She  had  just  turned  28,  was  clean,  neat,  happy  in  disposition,  and  a  fine 
cook  and  housekeeper.  Buchanan  mentioned  that  he  was  looking  for 
someone  to  manage  his  establishment  at  42  East  King  Street  and  was  a 
little  surprised  when  Parker  asked  if  he  would  consider  Esther,  or  Miss 
Hetty,  as  he  called  her,  for  the  job.24 

Buchanan  talked  to  the  girl  and  set  up  a  tentative  arrangement: 
she  should  stay  at  the  White  Swan  but  work  part-time  at  the  King  Street 
house  during  the  summer  and  fall.  If  he  should  be  elected  to  the  Senate 
they  would  then  decide  whether  she  would  take  a  permanent  position  as 
housekeeper,  in  which  case  he  would,  of  course,  expect  her  to  move  int  for 
he  would  be  away  most  of  the  time  and  wanted  the  house  occupied  in  his 
absence  and  ready  for  him  on  quick  trips  home.25 

In  the  course  of  the  summer  he  visited  Washington,  Philadelphia, 
Harrisburg,  and  New  York.  He  also  went  to  see  hfa  sister  Jane,  now 
Mrs.  Elliott  T.  Lane,  at  Mercersburg,  and  while  there  inspected  the  grave- 
stones for  his  mother  and  brother  George  at  nearby  Spring  Grow  Cemetery. 
After  a  stop  at  Bedford  Springs,  he  made  a  trip  to  Greensburg  and  saw  his 
sister  Harriet  who  had  married  the  Reverend  Robert  Henry.  There 
Buchanan  learned  to  his  dismay  that  Henry's  family  in  Sheperdbtown, 
Virginia,  owned  two  slaves.  This  was  political  dynamite,  and  he  lost  no 
time  in  informing  his  brother-in-law  that  he  wanted  to  buy  thowfr  slam 
into  freedom-  Buchanan  drew  up  a  deed  of  transfer,  known  as  a  f 'deed  of 
complete  emancipation"  in  Virginia,  and  a  "deed  of  conditional  manu- 
mission*' in  Pennsylvania,  providing  for  the  sale  of  Daphne  Cook,  aged  22, 
and  Ann  Cook,  aged  5,  by  Ann  D.  Henry  to  James  Buchanan,  under  the 
provisos  that  they  should  leave  Virginia,  that  Daphne  should  give  service 
to  Buchanan  for  seven  years  and  then  become  free,  aa  provided  in  Penn- 
sylvania law;  and  that  Ann  should  be  bound  until  the  age  of  28— seven 
years  past  the  age  of  maturity.  Terms  of  the  sale  were  to  be  arranged  later. 
Anyway,  thought  Buchanan,  this  might  help  to  solve  his  house-servant 


1AA 


DAYS  OF  DECISION  •   1833  - 1834 


problem.26    He  found  sister  Harriet  in  poor  health  but  rejoicing  in  her 
infant  son,  James  Buchanan  Henry. 

At  Pittsburgh  he  called  on  his  loyal  political  manager,  David 
Lynch,  a  hard-drinking,  hard-hitting  son  of  the  canal-digging  Irish,  who 
had  worked  his  way  into  politics  by  outroaring  and  outfighting  the  opposi- 
tion. Davy  was  not  much  appreciated  by  Pittsburgh  society,  but  he 
rounded  up  votes  whenever  they  were  needed.  He  was  postmaster  now, 
and  doing  well  in  every  respect  except  that  of  getting  the  mail  delivered. 
Buchanan  then  visited  his  sister  Maria  and  her  husband,  Dr-  Yates,  in 
Meadville  and  his  brother  Edward  who  had  moved  there  with  his  new  wife, 
Eliza  Foster. 

About  this  time  Buchanan  became  involved  in  some  kind  of  a 
romantic  affair  which,  like  most  of  his  episodes  with  women,  remains  more 
of  a  mystery  than  a  story.  It  centered  at  518  Walnut  Street,  Philadelphia, 
the  home  of  his  friend  Thomas  Kittera.  With  Kittera  lived  his  widowed 
mother,  his  sister  Ann,  and  three  young  girls  all  of  whom  had  lost  their 
mothers  in  infancy.  Two  of  them  were  Kittera's  own  nieces,  Mary  Kittera 
Snyder  and  Elizabeth  Michael  Snyder,  children  of  his  dead  sister  and 
"Handsome  John"  Snyder,  a  son  of  former  Governor  Simon  Snyder. 
Grandmother  Kittera  and  Aunt  Ann  had  taken  charge  of  these  children 
after  their  mother's  death  in  1821.  The  third  child  living  at  the  Kittera's 
was  Elizabeth  Huston,  the  daughter  of  Buchanan's  sister  Sarah,  who  had 
died  in  1825.  James  at  that  time  had  made  arrangements  for  the  Huston 
baby  to  be  raised  by  his  friends,  among  girls  her  own  age. 

Whether  Buchanan  became  attached  to  Aunt  Ann  or  to  Mary 
Snyder  remains  an  unsolved  puzzle.  There  seem  to  be  no  letters  extant 
between  Buchanan  and  either  of  them,  but  there  are  a  number  of  letters 
from  Buchanan  to  Thomas  Kittera  which  end  with  such  cryptic  statements 
as  "be  particular  in  giving  my  love  to  my  intended,"  or  refer  to  "my 
portion  of  the  world's  goods,"  or  to  that  part  of  the  family  "in  which  I  feel 
a  peculiar  interest."  Even  from  such  crumbs  of  evidence  one  can  discern 
that  the  affair  in  progress  had  little  mark  of  the  divine  passion.  Rather, 
Buchanan's  life  Jong  friendship  with  all  of  the  Kitteras  suggests  a  marriage 
of  convenience  in  the  making,  and  probably  with  Mary  when  she  became 
a  few  years  older.27 

The  election  of  United  States  Senator  to  replace  William  Wilkins 
would  be  held  on  December  6,  1834.  Buchanan,  apparently,  believed  he 
had  thia  under  control  for  he  did  little  open  electioneering  and  stayed  out 
of  Harrisburg*  Cameron  was  on  hand  acting  as  manager,  but  it  is  probable 
that  Governor  Wolfs  known  approval  of  Buchanan  was  the  more  effective 

force. 

The  anti-Masons  backed  Amos  Ellmaker;  the  Whigs  put  up 
Joseph  Lawrence;  the  Wolf  Administration  supported  Buchanan;  and  the 

101 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

Philadelphia  Dallas  faction  used  Joel  B.  Sutherland  as  its  man  to  block 
Buchanan's  election.  If  the  anti-Masons  and  Whigs  had  been  able  to 
work  together  they  could  easily  have  elected  a  senator,  but  they  found  it 
impossible  to  cooperate.  Buchanan  got  25  votes  on  the  first  ballot,  42  on 
the  second,  58  on  the  third,  and  a  winning  majority  of  66,  on  the  fourth 
and  final  vote.  The  large  scattering  of  Democrats  came  over  to  Buchanan 
after  it  was  clear  that  none  of  the  others  could  win;  but  Sutherland  held 
back  until  the  very  end,  true  to  the  Eleventh  Hour  tradition,  ami  then 
threw  his  votes  to  the  last  remaining  Buchanan  competitor  within  his  own 
party.  Nothing  was  to  be  gained  by  the  move.  It  simply  demonstrated 
spectacularly  that  the  Philadelphia  City  group  would  not  bend  the  knee  to 
anyone,  be  it  Jackson,  Wolf,  or  Buchanan. 

There  was  one  problem  of  the  senatorship  about  which  Buchanan 
worried  a  great  deal.  It  had  placed  Wilkins  and  Dallas  in  an  impossible 
situation,  and  it  would  plague  any  Pennsylvania  senator  as  long  as  there 
was  serious  discussion  in  Washington  of  the  tariff,  the  Bank,  and  the 
slavery  issues.  How  could  a  senator  work  with  the  national  Administration 
and  with  his  own  State  Legislature  when  these  two  took  opposite  views  on 
a  particular  bill,  especially  if  the  vote  on  it  was  made  a  party  test  at  Washing- 
ton or  at  Harrisburg? 

Buchanan  told  the  committee  of  the  Legislature  which  informed 
him  of  his  election  that  he  held  the  right  of  instruction  to  be  sacral.  "If 
it  did  not  exist,*'  he  said,  "the  servant  would  be  superior  to  his  master/' 
He  would  cither  obey  instructions  from  the  State  Legislature  or  resign, 
but  in  giving  a  vote  against  his  own  judgment,  he  continue*},  "I  act  merely 
as  their  agent.  The  responsibility  is  theirs,  not  mine."28  In  rare  instances 
however,  he  might  question  whether  the  instructions  of  the  legislature 
did  in  fact  represent  the  public  will,  and  in  such  a  case  he  would  try  to 
speak  for  the  people.  He  wanted  to  make  his  position  very  clear  on  the 
instruction  doctrine,  for  if  the  anti-Masons  got  control  of  the  State  Legis- 
lature they  would  certainly  try  to  embarrass  him  by  ordering  him  to  vote 
against  all  the  Democratic  measures. 

This  statement,  ho  thought,  protected  him  all  around.  When  h<» 
voted  with  the  national  party  under  instruction,  he  could  take  the  credit; 
when  he  voted  against  it  under  instruction,  he  could  pass  the  buck  to  the 
State  Legislature;  when  the  issue  was  extremely  obscure,  he  could  do  what 
he  pleased  by  challenging  the  Legislature's  interpretation  of  the  public  will; 
and  if  matters  were  hopeless,  he  could  resign  on  principle  without  the 
appearance  of  losing  his  temper.  "Be  wise  as  the  serpent  and  harailemt  a* 
the  dove.1'  He  hoped  this  set  of  rules  conformed  to  the  maxim. 

The  following  week  he  went  to  Harrisburg  with  (iuneron  and  had 
a  high  time.  "No  man  has  ever  left  Harrisburg  under  more  favorable 
auspices,"  wrote  Cameron.  Back  in  Lancaster  Buchanan  went  to  the 

102 


DAYS  OF  DECISION  •    1833  -  1834 


Swan  Hotel  and  engaged  Miss  Hetty  as  housekeeper.  He  then  began  to 
pack  and  to  make  final  arrangements  for  the  winter's  absence.  He  called 
on  his  brother  Edward  who  had  just  moved  from  Meadville  to  a  new  charge, 
the  Protestant  Episcopal  Church  in  Leacock  Township,  Lancaster  County, 
stopped  in  Philadelphia  for  a  short  visit  to  his  "intended"  at  the  Kitteras' 
and  then  hastened  on  to  Washington. 

On  December  15,  he  appeared  in  the  Senate,  a  cozy,  clublike  body 
in  1834.  Buchanan  had  served  with  a  good  many  of  its  members  when 
they  had  been  colleagues  in  the  House.  The  desks  surrounded  the  speaker's 
rostrum  in  concentric  half-circles,  the  fireplaces  were  spaced  evenly  around 
the  back  wall,  the  small  semicircular  visitors'  gallery  was  set  above  the 
main  floor  like  boxes  in  a  theater,  and  the  red  velvet  drapes  and  mural 
paintings  created  an  atmosphere  at  once  elegant  and  intimate. 

Van  Buren  presided  with  confidence,  urbanity,  and  good  humor. 
Buchanan's  friend,  Webster  and  his  tormentor,  Clay,  sat  on  the  other  side 
of  the  chamber  with  their  Whig  colleagues:  Ewing  of  Ohio,  Frelinghuysen 
and  Southard  of  New  Jersey,  Clayton  of  Delaware,  and  many  others— too 
many;  the  Whigs  had  a  majority.  Among  the  Democrats  were  Benton  of 
Missouri,  Silas  Wright  of  New  York,  W.  R.  King  of  Alabama,  Felix  Grundy 
of  Tennessee,  John  Tyler  of  Virginia,  McKean  from  Pennsylvania,  and 
Calhoun.  The  latter  had  changed  in  many  ways.  No  one  was  sure  what 
party  he  belonged  to— he  had  made  a  peculiar  one  for  himself  based  on  that 
"peculiar  institution,7*  the  South.  He  no  longer  looked  or  acted  like  a 
favored  presidential  aspirant. 

Buchanan  realized  that  despite  his  original  disappointment  with 
the  Russian  Mission  it  had  been  a  lucky  break  for  him,  for  the  United 
States  in  the  period  of  his  absence  had  been  through  violent  political 
storms.  The  Senate  had  made  war  on  Jackson,  and  the  Hero  had  carried 
it  into  their  own  country*  Buchanan  considered  himself  fortunate  in  not 
getting  the  senatorial  seat  in  1833,  when  he  would  have  had  to  vote  for  the 
resolution  censuring  Jackson  in  response  to  the  instructions  of  the  State 
Legislature.  That  act  would  have  finished  him;  it  ruined  Wilkins,  snd 
marie  McKean  powerless  to  promote  patronage.  But  the  main  fight  seemed 
now  to  be  over. 

Buchanan  analyzed  the  political  future  in  these  terms.  A 
Democrat  had  to  be  a  Jacksonian,  and  that  meant  also  being  a  follower  of 
Van  Buren.  He  had  to  give  up  all  hopes  for  salvage  of  the  Bank,  and  fight 
its  recharter  to  the  death,  Pennsylvanians  would  not  like  to  do  this,  but 
they  could  risk  the  demise  of  the  Bank  better  than  the  hatred  of  Old  Andy. 
The  opposition,  while  seeming  to  unite  under  a  new  party  name,  the  Whigs, 
was  still  disorganized;  in  fact,  its  main  unity  lay  simply  in  hatred  of  Jackson 
himself.  When  he  left  the  scene,  the  Whig  party  would  disintegrate,  and 
the  Democrats  were  bound  to  win  unless  they  foolishly  permitted  them- 

103 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


selves  to  fall  apart.    If  they  could  bury  some  of  their  local  grudges  and 
work  together,  their  party  was  certain  to  control  for  years  to  come. 

Buchanan  wanted  a  part  of  that  control;  if  possible,  the  most 
important  part.  He  analyzed  his  duty  logically,  and  proceeded  to  business. 
He  had  to  support  Jackson  in  the  Senate  undeviatingly.  He  would  have  to 
overcome  the  widespread  hatred  of  Pennsylvania^  for  Van  Buren.  That 
would  be  more  difficult  but  not  impossible,  for  most  politicians  knew  how 
their  bread  was  buttered.  He  had  to  bring  to  a  conclusion  the  Pennsylvania 
feud  between  the  Amalgamators  and  the  other  Democrats,  He  had  made 
his  peace  with  Wolf,  and  had  seen  the  Ingham-Dallas-Wilkins  faction  lose 
its  influence,  but  there  was  still  trouble  in  his  own  back  yard,  Henry  A. 
Muhlenberg,  his  choice  as  successor  to  Barnard  as  a  partner  in  control, 
had  been  flying  the  track.  His  friends  thought  he  should  have  had  the 
senatorship  but,  having  sacrificed  that  to  Buchanan,  they  felt  that  he  surely 
Ought  to  replace  Wolf  as  governor  in  1835.  This  would  be  fatal,  for  the 
Wolf-Buchanan  team  had  just  been  brought  firmly  into  Jackson's  con- 
fidence. If  Muhlenberg  could  wait  until  1838,  he  and  Buchanan  could  cut 
the  whole  cake.  If  not,  well,  God  knew  what  the  result  would  be. 


1O4 


8 

THE  GE3MTLEMAN  FROM  PENNSYLVANIA  •  1835-1837 

THE  WOLVES  AND  THE  MULES 

After  Buchanan's  election  to  the  Senate,  many  of  his  friends  urged  him  to 
consummate  the  destruction  of  the  Family  party  and  to  consolidate  his 
triumph  by  ousting  Wolf  from  the  governorship  and  installing  his  own  man, 
Henry  A.  Muhlenberg.  Muhlenberg  was  ready  for  it.  Most  of  the  Amal- 
gamators were  ready  for  it.  But  Buchanan  knew  that  the  times  were  not 
ready.  Governor  Wolf  after  two  terms  in  office  had  too  much  strength  both 
in  Harrisburg  and  in  Washington  to  give  up  without  a  struggle,  and  in  a 
fight  he  had  this  advantage:  control  of  the  county  officeholders.  The 
sensible  course  was  to  permit  Wolf  to  fill  his  constitutional  term  and  then, 
in  1838,  let  Muhlenberg  succeed  him  as  head  of  a  united  Democracy.  It 
would  be  foolish  to  try  to  replace  him  in  1835  at  the  cost  of  a  split  party. 
But  to  convince  the  Muhlenberg  enthusiasts  that  they  should  adopt  the 
long-range  plan  was  a  different  matter. 

Buchanan  tried  to  reconcile  the  contesting  factions  by  bringing 
both  parties  to  higher  ground  where  they  could  agree.  To  this  end  he  wrote 
letter  after  letter  to  friends  all  over  the  state,  urging  that  the  key  factor 
should  be  loyalty  to  Van  Buren.  He  fathered  the  idea  that  a  resolution 
should  be  presented  to  Democratic  members  of  the  State  Legislature,  prior 
to  the  March  4  nominating  convention,  pledging,  positive  support  of 
Van  flEren  for  the  presidency.  This  proposal,  he  hoped,  would  focus 
attention  on  the  Imger  aims  of  the  party  and  provide  a  platform  on  which 
all  could  stand.  And  if,  they  could  agree  to  one  thing,  maybe  they  could 
reach  an  agreement  on  others.  The  scheme  might  have  worked  if  precisely 
the  right  person  had  introduced  the  Van  Buren  resolution,  but  a  staunch 
pro-Muhlenberg  partisan  brought  it  to  the  floor.  Wolfs  friends  immedi- 
ately sensed  an  attack  on  the  governor  and  for  this  reason  defeated  it, 
though  they  wrote  to  Buchanan  afterward  assuring  him  that  they  had  acted 
only  from  local  motives  and  thought  highly  of  Van  Buren.1 

105 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


No  further  conciliatory  efforts  were  made,  due  to  shortage  of 
time;  and  the  county  meetings  held  for  the  purpose  of  selecting  convention 
delegates  became  scenes  of  heated  controversy  and  factional  recrimination, 
In  many  counties  the  "Wolves"  and  the  "Mules,"  as  the  rival  partisans 
were  called,  held  separate  party  conclaves  and  sent  opposing  delegations 
to  Harrisburg  where,  for  the  first  three  days,  each  group  contested  the 
other's  right  to  be  seated.  At  length  practically  everyone  was  admitted. 
As  soon  as  the  delegates  were  accredited,  the  Mules  won  a  close  decision 
to  adjourn  the  meeting  and  to  reconvene  at  Lewistown  on  May  6,  They 
hoped,  by  delaying  and  moving  the  convention  out  of  Harrisburg,  to 
improve  their  chances.  But  the  Wolf  minority  remained  in  session  and 
renominated  the  governor  on  March  7.  The  Mules  met  as  scheduled,  and 
placed  their  man  officially  in  the  race.  Thus  the  schism  was  hopelessly 
widened.  Two  Democrats  were  going  to  run  for  the  governorship,  each  with 
strong  backing  and  each  protesting  loyalty  to  Buchanan  and  Van  Buren. 
Buchanan  tried  again.  In  a  letter  to  Jacob  Kern,  Speaker  of  the 
State  Senate,  he  urged  the  retirement  of  both  candidates  and  the  rail  for  a 
new  convention.  Instead  of  easing  the  tension,  this  suggestion  aggravated 
it,  and  both  factions  now  tried  to  win  Buchanan's  support.  The  Mult* 
promised  to  back  him  for  the  vice-presidency  if  he  would  come  out  for 
them,  but  he  refused.  "Will  you  forsake  your  friends,"  Muhleniwrg  wrote 
him,  *cand  go  over  to  your  enemies  who  are  only  waiting  opportunity  to  cut 
your  throat?"2  Wolf,  on  his  part,  gratified  Buchanan  by  appointing 
Thomas  Kittera  to  a  judgeship.3 

After  the  formal  nomination  of  Muhlenberg,  Buchanan  stated 
that  he  would  vote  for  Wolf  but  would  take  no  part  whatever  in  th«*  canvass. 
If  Muhlenberg  drew  enough  votes  from  the  anti-Masons,  Buchanan  had 
weak  hopes  that  Wolf  might  be  elected,  but  hi«  best  guess  WOK  that  the 
anti-Masonic  candidate,  Joseph  Ritner,  would  win.  When  rumor*  !x*gan 
to  circulate  that  Van  Buren  was  pulling  strings  to  help  Muhlenherg, 
Buchanan  counselled  noninterference,  frl  have  been  defending  little  Van 
on  this  point  everywhere,*'  he  wrote.  'Those  who  know  him  will  feel  at 
once  how  ridiculous  the  charge  is. . . ,  There  shoulU  be  a  studied  neutrality 
in  Washington."4 

Shortly  after  the  Muhlenberg  convention  at  Lewistown,  the 
national  nominating  convention  of  the  Democratic  party  met  at  Baltimore. 
Everyone  knew  that  Jackson  intended  Martin  Van  Buren  to  sucmid  him 
as  president  In  fact  he  suggested  that  if  no  other  way  were  open  to 
accomplish  this,  he  might  resign  before  his  term  had  expired,  and  person- 
ally put  in  Little  Van.  But  Jackson's  increasingly  dictatorial  handling  of 
national  problems  had  caused  wholesale  secession  from  his  party,  and  his 
attempt  to  hand-pick  his  successor  did  nothing  to  quiet  the  anger  of  his 
former  friends.  Instead  of  die  "Old  Hero,"  he  now  became  "King  Andrew/* 

106 


THE  GENTLEMAN  FROM  PENNSYLVANIA  •   1835  - 1837 

The  Baltimore  Convention  was  called  a  year  early,  at  the  presi- 
dent's request,  in  order  to  get  Van  Buren's  name  in  front  of  the  people 
before  other  candidates  had  a  chance  to  build  an  organization.  Pennsyl- 
vania, as  expected,  sent  60  delegates,  30  Mules  and  30  Wolves,  all  of  whom 
backed  Van  Buren.  After  adopting  the  two-thirds  rule,  in  order  to  achieve 
a  "more  imposing  effect,"  the  convention  proceeded  unanimously  to 
nominate  Van  Buren  for  president.  Col.  Richard  M.  Johnson  of  Kentucky 
received  the  vice-presidential  nomination.  Buchanan  wrote  to  Van  Buren 
during  the  Baltimore  convention:  "My  opinion  is  that  the  division  in  our 
party  will  make  Ritner  Governor;  but  that  will  not  seriously  affect  the 
Presidential  election.  .  .  .  The  friends  of  Muhlenberg  in  our  party,  are 
almost  to  a  man  your  sincere  and  devoted  friends.  So  is  a  very  large 
majority  of  the  friends  of  Wolf."6 

In  the  election  for  Governor  of  Pennsylvania  in  October,  1835, 
Ritner  received  94,023  votes;  Wolf,  65,801;  and  Muhlenberg,  40,586.  The 
combination  of  Whigs  and  anti-Masons  elected  76  of  the  100  members  of 
the  State  Assembly  and  captured  six  of  the  eight  senatorial  vacancies. 
Although  the  Democrats  had  enough  "holdovers"  in  the  Senate  to  give 
them  a  small  majority  in  that  body,  it  was  a  thumping  defeat  all  round. 
It  was  a  bitter  lesson,  but  probably  the  only  kind  that  could  chasten  the 
selfishness  and  jealousy  that  pervaded  both  factions.  They  were  all  out 
of  jobs  now— Wolf,  Muhlenberg,  and  all  their  friends  and  partisans;  they 
would  stay  out  of  office  until  they  swallowed  their  pride,  shook  hands,  and 
began  working  for  their  party  again.  Buchanan  resisted  the  temptation 
to  say,  "I  told  you  so."  He  had  a  job,  to  be  sure,  but  not  for  long.  In 
December  1836,  the  Legislature  would  ballot  again  to  fill  his  senatorial 
post  for  another  term. 


THE  ELECTION  OF  1836 

James  Buchanan  always  did  things  the  slow  way,  the  hard  way,  the  sure  way. 
He  had  no  talent  for  the  sudden  devastating  move,  the  brilliant  stroke,  the 
daring  gamble,  or  the  quick  quip  which  by-passed  a  problem  in  a  gale  of 
laughter.  He  did  not  try  to  change  his  own  position  or  to  give  new  meaning 
and  direction  to  the  Pennsylvania  Democracy.  He  began  laboriously  to 
rebuild  his  power  from  the  bottom  up,  starting  again  in  Lancaster  County. 
The  usual  Democratic  state  convention  would  be  held  on  March  4, 
1836,  at  Harrisburg  to  determine  the  composition  of  the  electoral  ticket 
for  the  presidential  vote  in  the  fall  For  a  time  it  looked  as  if  the  Wolves 
and  Mules  would  each  run  separate  sets  of  electors,  for  each  faction  per- 
sisted in  holding  its  own  county  meetings,  but  Buchanan  persuaded  the 
Wolf  meeting  in  Lancaster,  for  the  sake  of  conciliation,  to  endorse  the  idea 

107 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


of  placing  pro-Muhlenberg  electors  on  the  ticket  from  the  eight  Congres- 
sional  districts  in  which  Muhlenberg  had  recently  polled  a  majority.  The 
Mules  had  their  general  meeting  scheduled  for  January  8  when  they  in- 
tended to  choose  an  electoral  ticket.  If  they  insisted  on  having  none  but 
their  own  men  as  electors  and  would  not  acquiesce  in  a  ticket  which  gave 
them  representation  only  in  the  areas  where  they  had  a  voting  majority, 
then  they  would  have  to  be  excluded  from  the  Harrisburg  convention 
entirely,  with  a  "pray,  what  the  Devil  brought  you  here?"  "I  have  told 
them,"  Buchanan  explained  to  the  Wolf  managers,  "that  they  have  to  yield 
to  the  majority.  But  I  hope  they  will  not  have  to  be  forced  into  submission. 
It  is  better  to  receive  them  cordially  at  once,  &  have  an  end  of  it."e 

This  left  it  up  to  the  Mules,  at  their  January  meeting,  to  accept 
the  olive  branch  and  to  include  on  their  own  proposed  ticket  the  names  of 
Wolf  men  in  appropriate  districts.  It  was  a  sane  proposal,  calculated  to 
bring  out  the  maximum  Van  Buren  vote  in  every  district  by  running  as 
electors  the  men  most  popular  locally.  Buchanan  pointed  out  another 
significant  reason  for  adopting  this  plan.  Pennsylvania  reformers,  after 
twenty  years  of  effort,  had  succeeded  in  forcing  the  Legislature  to  call  a 
convention  to  revise  the  state  Constitution  of  1790.  Delegates  to  it  would 
be  elected  a  month  before  the  presidential  election  of  1836,  Unless  the 
Democrats  in  each  county  got  together,  it  was  certain  that  the  opposition 
would  control  this  convention  and,  as  Buchanan  warned,  "make  sad  work 
of  it"  A  single  electoral  college  ticket  would  help  to  maintain  a  united 
front  among  Democrats  when  they  voted  for  delegates  to  the  constitutional 
convention. 

Buchanan  worked  effectively  to  reunite  the  Pennsylvania  Demo- 
crats»  but  the  anti-Masons,  especially  Governor  Ritner  and  Assemblyman 
Thaddeus  Stevens,  helped  even  more*  The  Democracy  in  Pennsylvania 
was  so  flat  on  its  back  that  Stevens  could  not  resist  the  temptation  to  kick  it. 
On  December  19,  1835,  he  moved  the  appointment  of  &  legislative  eom- 
mittee  "to  investigate  the  evils  of  Free  Masonry/'  This  proved  a  mere 
pretext  to  bring  prominent  Democrats  to  the  bar  of  the  Legislature  and 
make  them  sweat.  Ex-governor  Wolf,  Chief  Justice  Gibson*  George  M- 
Dallas,  Francis  Shunk  and  others  were  called.  Even  Buchanan  would 
probably  have  had  a  summons  if  he  had  not  been  in  Washington.  When 
these  gentlemen  refused  to  testify,  and  the  crowd  applauded  Skunk's 
spirited  protest  against  invasion  of  his  civil  rights,  Stevens  thundered  the 
warning  that  the  gallery  itself  would  be  arrested  for  contempt.  The  pro* 
ceedings  were  so  transparent,  so  useless,  and  so  vindictive  that  they 
boomeranged  against  the  committee;  but  even  more  important,  the  Attack 
on  the  Democrats  made  them  forget  some  of  their  own  differences  and  unite 
in  self-defense.  The  Whigs  were  disgusted  and  threatened  to  break  off 
their  coalition  with  the  anti-Masons. 


THE  GENTLEMAN  FROM  PENNSYLVANIA  •   1835  -  1837 

On  top  of  this  upheaval  came  the  Bank  proposal.  Wolf  had  been 
for  retrenchment  of  the  hugefc  State  canal  building  program  and  had  urged 
taxation  to  put  the  state  on  a  firmer  financial  basis.  Governor  Ritner  now 
proposed  a  repeal  of  taxes,  great  extension  of  the  public  transportation 
system,  and  the  issuing  of  a  State  charter  for  the  Bank  of  the  United  States 
for  which  the  Bank  was  to  pay  the  State  $9,000,000  to  be  used  for  internal 
improvements. 

When  the  Bank  Bill  passed  the  Assembly  as  expected,  it  was 
assumed  that  the  Democratic  majority  in  the  Senate  would  kill  it.  But 
Nicholas  Biddle's  men  had  done  their  work  well;  the  Senate  passed  the 
recharter  bill  on  February  15,  1836,  with  the  aid  of  eight  of  the  leading 
Democratic  members.  One  of  them  had,  only  a  month  before,  presided  at 
the  Muhlenberg  Democratic  Convention  which  adopted  resolutions  de- 
nouncing a  recharter  of  the  institution.  How  the  Bank  agents  persuaded 
these  men  or  how  much  they  paid  them  to  turn  renegade,  no  one  knows; 
but  the  enormity  of  their  treachery  formed  the  basis  of  the  presidential 
canvass  in  Pennsylvania  and  proved  to  be  the  incident  which  saved  the  day 
for  Van  Buren  and  Buchanan. 

Democratic  indignation  over  the  arrogant  investigation  by 
Stevens  and  the  recharter  of  the  Bank  under  circumstances  redolent  of 
bribery  paved  the  way  for  a  reasonably  harmonious  Democratic  meeting  on 
March  4.  Buchanan's  project  for  a  unified  electoral  ticket  was  approved, 
and  the  party  prepared  to  spend  the  next  four  months  taking  revenge  on 
the  anti-Masons  and  assailing  the  Bank  as  a  monster  even  more  hideous 
than  Jackson  had  painted  it. 

Buchanan  turned  down  an  invitation  to  speak  to  the  Democratic 
mass  meeting  at  Harrisburg  on  the  4th  of  July  for  the  Senate  remained  in 
session  beyond  this  date,  but  he  did  send  along  a  vigorous  anti-Bank  speech. 
The  approaching  struggle  in  Pennsylvania,  he  concluded,  "would  be  a 
struggle  for  life  or  death.  The  Democracy  must  either  triumph  over  the 
Bank,  or  the  Bank  will  crush  the  Democracy."7 

The  Bank  issue  grew  so  hot  that  Buchanan  had  to  modify  some 
of  his  personal  arrangements  to  keep  himself  dear  of  attack.  The  transfer 
of  treasury  funds  from  the  U.  S.  Bank  to  other  selected  institutions  led  to 
a  scramble  among  bankers  for  a  share  of  the  money.  "I  have  refused  in 
every  instance  to  interfere  in  obtaining  public  Deposits  for  any  Bank,"  he 
wote  to  an  applicant  "I  have  been  repeatedly  &  strongly  urged  upon 
this  subject  from  different  quarters  and  have  always  given  the  same  answer. 
If  as  a  Senator  it  would  have  been  improper  for  me  to  interfere  in  behalf  of 
other  banks  in  which  I  had  no  stock— how  much  more  so  would  it  be  in  the 
case  of  the  Harrisburg  Bank?  When  the  question  of  the  distribution  of 
the  public  deposits  was  before  Congress,  I  sold  out  my  stock  in  the  Man- 
hattan Bank— a  large  Depository— at  a  very  great  sacrifice."8 

109 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


In  the  October  elections  the  people  of  Pennsylvania  gave  a  re- 
sounding rebuke  to  the  Legislature  which  hail  reehartered  the  Bank;  only 
18  old  members  were  returned.  Of  72  Democrats  elected,  63  were  new- 
comers.  But  the  vote  on  delegates  to  the  Constitutional  Convention  told  a 
different  story.  Of  133  delegates  elected,  66  were  Democrat?,  66  Whig- 
anti-Masons,  and  one  an  independent  with  Whig  leanings.  It  was  a  split 
right  down  the  middle  which  carried  with  it  a  serious  threat  to  the  presi- 
dential prospects  of  Van  Buren  in  the  national  election  in  November. 

The  Constitutional  Convention,  with  a  majority  of  one  nn  the 
Whig  side,  would  undoubtedly  adopt  an  amendment  abolishing  offices  for 
life.  This  measure  would  jeopardize  the  position  of  every  justice  of  the 
peace  in  the  state,  and  make  his  tenure  dependent  upon  current  politics. 
As  this  provision  would  undoubtedly  go  into  effect  before  the  end  of  the 
Ritner  Administration,  it  would  probably  be  used  to  eliminate  any  J.  P.'s 
who  had  been  leaders  in  Van  Buren's  cause.  So,  at  least,  they  thought  in 
the  panic  of  the  moment.  For  this  reason  these  key  leaders  in  the  little 
communities,  almost  all  of  the.m  Democrats,  hung  back.  When  the 
November  vote  was  counted,  Pennsylvania  brought  in  not  the  15*000 
majority  for  Van  Buren  which  Buchanan  had  predicted,  but  a  thin  2,183 
out  of  nearly  200,000  votes  cast.  Had  these  votes  gone  the  other  way* 
Pennsylvania's  electoral  college  votes  would  have  been  lost  to  Van  Buren, 
and  that  would  have  thrown  the  election  into  the  House- 
Now  that  Van  Buren  had  won,  Buchanan  had  his  own  future  to 
worry  about.  In  three  weeks  the  new  State  Legislature  would  ballot  to  fill 
his  place  in  the  Senate.  He  wrote  to  Van  Bunm  that  he  would  have 
Muhlcnberg  as  his  opponent,  a  wholly  unexpected  turn  of  events,  for 
Muhlenberg  in  October  had  publicly  announced  that  he  favored  Buchanan. 
The  Bank  men  had  manipulated  the  change  by  flattering  Muhlenberg  and 
offering  him  their  support,  though  their  real  purpose  was  to  keep  the 
Democrats  divided.9 

Buchanan  was  furious  with  Muhlenberg,  Could  he  not  see  that 
there  was  no  conceivable  prospect  of  party  victory  in  the  future  except  by 
re-union?  Wolf  had  been  voted  out,  but  his  partisans  remained  active  and 
important  and  would  never  ally  with  the  Bank  crowd.  Buchanan's  friends 
held  the  same  view.  Muhlenberg  commanded  one-third  of  a  minority 
•party  in  Pennsylvania,  and  a  poor  third  at  that.  His  strongest  supporters 
were  those  apostate  Democrats  who  had  voted  for  the  State  recharier  of 
the  Bank,  men  who  cared  nothing  about  Muhlenberg  except  as  a  pawn  to 
keep  alive  the  fight  among  the  Democrats.  And  this  was  the  man  Buchanan 
had  picked  as  a  partner  three  years  ago!  Well*  sufficient  unto  the  day*  .  *  * 
Muhlenberg  saw  another  picture.  Berks  wss  the  strongest 
Democratic  county  in  the  state.  A  few  years  before,  the  Democrats  of 
Berks  and  Lancaster  combined  were  polling  so  large  a  vote  that  a  union 


11A 


THE  GENTLEMAN  FROM  PENNSYLVANIA  •   1835  -  1837 

might  well  have  commanded  control  of  the  party.  Since  Lancaster  had 
gone  over  to  anti-Masonry  and  the  Bank,  Buchanan  could  not  even  poll  a 
majority  in  his  own  county,  but  nevertheless  he  sat  in  the  Senate.  Ex- 
Governor  Wolf  had  been  named  Comptroller  of  the  U.  S.  Treasury.  Muhlen- 
berg,  who  kept  his  county  strong  for  the  party,  had  received  nothing  but 
requests  to  stand  aside,  first  in  the  contest  for  governor,  and  now  in  the 
campaign  for  Senator.  Why  should  he  not  get  his  share?  Why  should 
Buchanan  continue  to  have  the  glory,  and  others  trail  along  with  mere 
promises  for  the  future,  probably  as  hollow  as  those  made  in  the  past? 

The  legislators  at  Harrisburg,  however,  snuffed  out  the  Muhlen- 
berg  hopes.  The  Whigs  and  anti-Masons  could  make  no  headway  in 
promoting  a  coalition  to  elect  him  and  failed  in  their  effort  to  force  a 
postponement  of  the  election.  Finally,  they  gave  up.  The  two  houses  met 
and  quickly  re-elected  James  Buchanan  to  the  Senate  by  a  party  vote.10 

RELATIONS  WITH  VAN  BUREN 

Buchanan  found  it  a  pleasant  relief  to  get  back  to  the  Senate.  He  now  had 
a  job  for  six  more  years  and,  for  the  first  time  in  a  decade,  could  make  some 
solid  plans.  He  sought  out  his  friend  Senator  William  R.  King  of  Alabama 
and  they  arranged  for  lodgings  together.  The  usual  talk  about  the  sterling 
character  of  "southern  gentlemen"  caused  a  good  deal  of  amusement 
among  northerners,  but  if  anyone  merited  respect  for  his  personal  qualities, 
it  was  King.  He  would  now  be  vice-president  if  the  party  had  heeded 
Buchanan's  advice,  but  because  of  a  nonelection  by  the  Electoral  College, 
the  Democrats  would  probably  wind  up  with  CoL  Richard  M.  Johnson,  a 
profligate  from  Kentucky  who  lived  with  a  mulatto  and  gave  northerners 
good  reason  to  sneer  at  southern  pretensions  to  gentility.  King  presently 
sat  as  president,  pro  tempore,  of  the  Senate.  Washington  had  begun  to 
refer  to  him  and  Buchanan  as  "the  Siamese  twins/'11 

Shortly  after  his  re-election,  Buchanan  became  involved  in  a 
debate  on  the  admission  of  Michigan  to  statehood.  The  dispute  concerned 
a  constitutional  question  as  to  the  proper  mode  of  calling  a  state  conven- 
tion. Senator  Calhoun  challenged  the  validity  of  a  Michigan  Constitutional 
Convention  which  had  met  at  the  suggestion  of  Congress  and  without  prior 
sanction  of  the  State  Legislature.  Calhoun  asserted  that  the  action  of  the 
convention  was  a  nullity. 

Because  it  was  a  partisan  matter,  the  discussion  of  the  Michigan 
issue  ranged  far  and  wide,  bringing  in  eventually  Pennsylvania's  recharter 
of  the  U.  S*  Bank.  What  would  happen,  a  Senator  asked  Buchanan,  if  the 
constitutional  convention  now  preparing  to  meet  in  Pennsylvania  should 
determine  that  the  state  charter  recently  awarded  to  the  Bank  was  a  nullity? 
Would  not  this  be  breach  of  contract?  On  this  subject  Senator  Morris  of 

111 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Ohio  introduced  a  letter  from  George  M.  Dallas  stating  that  the  Pennsyl- 
vania convention  should  repeal  the  Bank  charter.  Morris  called  this  advice 
"incendiary,"  "revolutionary,"  and  "calculated  to  excite  the  people  to 
rise  up  in  rebellion  against  the  laws."  It  attacked  the  United  States 
Constitution  which  guaranteed  the  sanctity  of  contracts. 

Had  Buchanan  been  a  mere  ward  heeler  he  would  have  sat  back 
to  relish  this  attack  on  his  hated  enemy;  had  he  been  vindictive,  he  could 
have  found  ways  to  turn  the  knife  in  the  wound,  but  his  objectives  were 
larger  than  these.  For  years  he  had  been  trying  to  patch  up  the  broken 
Democracy  of  Pennsylvania,  and  for  years  Dallas  had  been  the  primary 
impediment  to  union.  Now  he  saw  a  chance,  quite  accidentally,  to  put 
Dallas  in  his  debt.  Jumping  to  the  defense,  he  demolished  the  arguments 
of  Morris. 

"Mr.  Dallas  never  did  assert  that  the  convention  about  to  be  held 
in  Pennsylvania  will  possess  any  power  to  violate  the  constitution  of  the 
United  States,"  he  began.  "Why,  sir,  such  propositions  would  be  rank 
nullification;  and  although  I  never  had  the  pleasure  of  being  on  intimate 
terms  with  Mr.  Dallas,  I  can  venture  to  assert  that  he ...  is  opposed  to  this 
political  heresy.  ...  No,  Sir;  Mr.  Dallas  has  expressly  referred  to  the 
Supreme  Court  of  the  United  States  as  the  tribunal  which  must  finally 
decide  whether  the  convention  possesses  the  power  to  repeal  the  bank 
charter."  But  what,  asked  Calhoun,  if  the  Supreme  Court  upheld  the 
Bank  in  such  a  litigation?  "I  can  tell  the  Senator  from  South  Carolina," 
rejoined  Buchanan,  "that  we  shall  never  rrsort  to  nullification  as  the 
rightful  remedy."12 

Buchanan's  vigorous  defense  of  Dallas  brought  a  prompt  message 
from  the  latter  expressing  his  "warm  personal  thanks"  and  a  wish  "to 
cultivate  greater  intimacy*"  Buchanan  replied  on  the  same  day  that  he 
was  "not  only  willing,  but  anxious"  to  let  bygones  be  bygones  and  to 
become  friends.18  The  exchange  marked  the  point  at  which  Buchanan,  for 
the  first  time  in  his  life,  became  the  acknowledged  leader  of  the  state 
Democracy  and  fountainhead  of  federal  patronage  for  Pennsylvania. 

Unfortunately,  a  good  many  Pennsylvania  Democrats  now 
favored  the  Bank,  higher  tariff  rates,  extension  of  internal  improvements 
and  other  anti-Jacksonian  policies;  hence  the  slim  Van  Buren  majority  of 
the  previous  November-  To  ignore  these  people  in  the  patronage  distribu- 
tion would  further  damage  the  Democracy  in  Pennsylvania;  to  get  jobs 
for  them  would  be  the  task  of  a  magician,  Wilkins,  who  had  the  stature 
for  an  important  office,  had  ruined  his  chances  by  running  for  vice-president 
against  the  winning  ticket,  Cameron  had  frankly  joined  the  friends  of 
the  Bank*  Dallas,  though  no  longer  a  Calhoun  partisan*  had  voted  to 
recharter  the  Bank  and  still  acted  as  one  of  its  solicitors*  To  promote  Wolf 
or  Muhlenberg  would  only  start  that  old  feud  anew.  Buchanan  might  take 


THE  GENTLEMAN  FROM  PENNSYLVANIA  •   1835  -  1837 


a  Cabinet  post  but  at  the  risk  of  angering  the  many  Pennsylvania  Democrats 
who  thought  that  he  already  had  taken  more  than  his  share  of  the  offices. 
Furthermore,  if  he  left  the  Senate  he  would  invite  a  new  scramble  for  his 
place  which  the  anti-Masons  might  win. 

Buchanan  talked  with  both  Jackson  and  Van  Buren,  telling  them 
that  Pennsylvania  deserved  and  expected  a  place  in  the  Cabinet,  but  he 
declined  to  name  his  man.  If  he  supposed  that  he  would  get  a  Pennsylvania 
appointment  by  this  course,  he  was  destined  to  disappointment.  "I  fear 
from  what  I  have  heard,"  he  wrote  Van  Buren  in  February,  "that  I  may 
not  have  made  myself  understood, ...  It  is  my  finn  conviction  . . .  that  if 
a  Cabinet  officer  should  not  be  selected  from  Pennsylvania,  it  will  give 
great  and  general  dissatisfaction."14 

The  president-elect  undoubtedly  recognized  more  clearly  than 
Buchanan  the  hopelessness  in  1837  of  acquiring  much  grace  in  the  Keystone 
State  by  such  an  appointment.  More  could  be  gained  elsewhere  by  this 
means.  The  Pennsylvania  Democrats  would  have  to  unsnarl  their  own 
mess,  and  it  would  take  more  than  a  Cabinet  office  to  do  it.  Van  Buren 
could  help,  however,  without  risking  an  invasion  of  Washington  by  these 
factionists.  There  was  always  the  foreign  service. 

Van  Buren  appointed  Dallas  to  the  Russian  Mission.  Buchanan 
apparently  had  not  been  consulted  on  this  move,  though  it  undoubtedly 
gave  him  secret  joy.  In  writing  to  the  president-elect  about  it,  he  signed 
the  letter  not  with  the  usual  "Yours  very  respectfully"  but  with  a  rare  and 
intimate  "ever  yours."  Nonetheless,  the  party  still  demanded  a  Cabinet 
officer  from  the  state.  "In  writing  thus,"  said  Buchanan  "you  know,  I 
have  no  views  towards  myself,  as  I  should  not  change  my  present  situation 
for  any  other."15  Just  how  sincere  was  he  about  this?  Would  he  not  take 
the  State  Department  if  it  were  offered?  He  had  just  been  voted  Chairman 
of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  in  a  two-to-one  victory  over 
Henry  day,  a  triumph  he  keenly  relished.  Would  it  not  be  the  cream  of 
the  jest  to  be  Secretary  of  State  while  Dallas  was  at  St.  Petersburg?  Of 
course,  and  he  would  take  the  job  if  it  were  offered,  but  these  were  matters 
which,  as  Old  Hickory  used  to  say,  "he  would  hide  from  the  very  hairs 
of  his  head*" 

The  Cabinet  appointments  were  finally  announced.  No  Pennsyl- 
vania name  was  on  the  list.  Buchanan  was  disappointed  in  the  extreme, 
particularly  because  John  Forsyth  was  continued  as  Secretary  of  State. 
His  relations  with  the  Secretary  had  recently  been  soured  when  Forsyth 
rejected  Buchanan's  first  report  as  Chairman  of  the  Foreign  Relations 
Committee  with  the  tart  observation  that  "the  Committee  seem  to  have 
had  an  imperfect  knowledge  of  the  facts  in  relation  to  our  affairs  with 
Mexico." 

113 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Buchanan  had  slaved  over  this  report,  read  everything  available, 
and  spared  no  effort.  "Imperfect  knowledge  of  the  facts!"  He  knew  the 
facts,  to  be  sure.  One  of  the  facts  was  that  the  recent  Secretaries  of  State, 
McLane  excluded,  were  either  lazy  or  ignorant,  or  both.  His  reply  was 
sarcastic: 

Mr.  Buchanan  has  been  honored  with  the  opinion  of  Mr.  Forsyth 
that  'the  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  of  the  Senate  seem  to 
have  had  an  imperfect  knowledge,  of  the  facts  in  relation  to 
Mexico.*  Such  an  opinion  emanating  from  the  Secretary  of 
State  cannot  fail  to  produce  a  happy  effect  in  promoting  harmony 
between  the  different  branches  of  the  Government.  The  Com- 
mittee will  not,  however,  reciprocate  the  compliment  paid  them 
by  the  Secretary,  lest  they  might  do  him  an  injustice,  which 
would  be  extremely  repugnant  to  their  feelings.10 

The  exchange  brought  on  a  storm,  the  intervention  of  the  presi- 
dent, a  letter  of  explanation  from  Forsyth  which  included  a  guarded 
apology,  and  a  response  from  Buchanan  that  the  fracas  was  ''happily 
terminated"  and  would  be  considered  "a  family  matter/*17  However,  the 
men  despised  each  other  from  then  on  and  welcomed  every  opportunity  to 
show  their  feelings,  Buchanan  later  wondered  whether  he  might  not  have 
replaced  Forsyth  in  March,  if  he  had  managed  to  muzzle  his  temper  in 
February. 

Buchanan  was  on  such  poor  terms  with  I*evi  Wondhury  of 
New  Hampshire,  the  n«w  Secretary  of  the  Treasury,  that  he  aciflrowed  all 
requests  for  appointments  in  that  department  directly  to  Van  Buren.  r*I 
am  discouraged  from  making  any  requests  in  that  quarter,1*  he  told  the 
president.18  The  Secretary  of  War,  Joel  Poinaett,  was  from  South  Carolina* 
which  had  not  even  voted  for  Van  Buren.  Poinsett  was  an  able  man  and 
had  strongly  supported  Jackson  in  the  nullification  criste,  but  hi»  appoint* 
ment  gave  gratification  only  to  Whigs  in  Pennsylvania.  The  Harrison 
paper  in  Pittsburgh,  the  Manufacturer,  highly  approved.1*  The  selection 
of  Benjamin  F.  Butler,  a  New  Yorker,  as  Attorney  General  galled  IVnnayl- 
vanians  and  heightened  the  rivalry  between  New  York  and  Pennsylvania, 
Amos  Kendall,  the  Postmaster  General,  had  nourished  Jacknon'a  belief  in 
Buchanan's  duplicity  in  the  old  "bargain  and  sale'*  affair.  He  would  receive 
no  favors  from  Kendall,  and  he  feared  for  the  fate  of  Dave  Lynch,  whose 
scandalous  ineptitude  in  the  management  of  the  Pittsburgh  post  office 
would  not  escape  Kendall's  efficient  eye.  Finally,  there  was  Mahlon 
Dickerson  of  New  Jersey  in  the  Navy  Department.  Dickerson  would  be 
no  problem,  although  he  could  not  be  expected  to  exert  himself  very  much 
to  provide  a  new  dry  dock  for  Philadelphia. 


THE  GENTLEMAN  FROM  PENNSYLVANIA  •   1835  -  1837 


After  the  Cabinet  appointments  were  made  known,  Buchanan 
changed  his  subscript  "ever  yours"  to  "ever  your  friend"  on  his  letters  to 
Van  Buren.  At  the  end  of  three  weeks  of  job-seeking  for  his  political 
creditors,  he  reverted  to  the  customary  "Yours  very  respectfully."  He 
was  not  going  to  be  a  big  wheel  in  this  administration,  he  realized,  but  just 
another  cog  in  the  machine. 

According  to  Buchanan's  philosophy  of  life  and  of  politics,  the 
way  to  act  in  such  a  circumstance  was  to  function  as  smoothly  and  as 
quietly  as  possible.  He  saw  neither  truth  nor  virtue  in  the  homely  maxim 
that  the  squeaky  wheel  gets  the  grease,  nor  in  Cameron's  view  that  the 
best  way  to  progress  was  to  fight  or  buy  the  man  who  might  be  able  to 
gratify  your  wish.  Patience,  acquiescence,  logically  contrived  procedure, 
the  appearance  of  consistency,  refusal  to  make  irretrievable  commitments, 
and  a  ready  willingness  to  capitulate  in  matters  of  minor  political  advantage 
•—these  constituted  Buchanan's  political  temperament. 

Van  Buren  recognized  these  traits  of  character  and  keenly 
appreciated  the  perplexities  of  the  Pennsylvania  Democrats.  New  York 
had  taught  him  all  there  was  to  learn  about  factional  fights.  Therefore, 
Buchanan  was  able  to  make  more  progress  than  he  had  anticipated.  He 
secured  a  position  in  the  Treasury  for  Henry  Petriken  who  had  led  the 
opposition  to  the  Bank  charter  in  the  Pennsylvania  Legislature,  and  placed 
George  Plitt  in  the  Wisconsin  Land  Office.  Simon  Cameron,  through 
Buchanan's  influence,  obtained  a  good  job  (which  he  disgraced)  settling 
Winnebago  Indian  claims.  Henry  Muhlenberg  went  to  the  newly  created 
Austrian  Mission  in  which  Buchanan  was  especially  interested,  since  he 
had  worked  for  its  establishment  during  his  sojourn  iu  Europe.  Muhlen- 
berg's  appointment  so  infuriated  George  Wolf  that  he  immediately  resigned 
from  his  Treasury  post,  declaring  that  his  old  rival  had  walked  off  with  the 
honors.  Buchanan  persuaded  Van  Buren  to  pacify  Wolf  by  offering  him 
the  best  federal  job  in  Pennsylvania:  the  collectorship  of  the  Port  of 
Philadelphia.  One  of  the  Dallas  supporters  had  to  be  discharged  in  order 
to  make  way  for  Wolf,  and  they  became  incensed. 

It  was  a  patchwork  of  patronage,  but  at  least  it  demonstrated  that 
neither  Van  Buren  nor  Buchanan  was  playing  favorites  with  any  Democratic 
faction.  On  the  contrary  they  were  acting  on  the  assumption  that  they 
would  all  have  to  pull  together  during  the  1838  campaign  for  the  governor- 
ship if  they  wished  to  rid  the  Commonwealth  of  anti-Masonry  and  prevent 
a  Whig  success  in  the  national  election  of  1840. 


115 


9 

THE  ROOT  OF  ALL  EVIL  *  1837-1840 

THE  SECOND  BANK  OF  THE  UNITED  STATES 

March  4,  1837,  dawned  bright  and  clear  and  by  midmorning  when  Martin 
Van  Buren  drove  to  the  White  House  to  join  Jackson,  the  sun  had  brought 
warmth  and  gaiety  to  the  crowds  which  lined  the  avenue  from  the  White 
House  to  the  Capitol  At  the  eastern  portico  the  members  of  the  Senate, 
the  Cabinet  and  the  Diplomatic  Corps  led  the  way  to  the*  rostrum.  The 
stately  Hero  of  New  Orleans,  just  up  from  a  sickbed,  acknowledged  a  roaring 
ovation  from  the  crowd,  and  Mr.  Van  Buren  advanced  to  deliver  his 
inaugural  address.  Buchanan  stayed  for  the  inauguration  ball  at  Carusfs 
that  evening  and  then  headed  for  HarrJsburg  as  fast  as  he  could  go. 

There  the  Legislature  was  in  an  uproar  over  the  Bank.  The 
Van  Buren  partisans,  variously  known  as  the  "radicals*'  or  the  "hard 
money  men,"  had  instituted  an  investigation  of  the  Bank  which  they 
were  using  as  a  weapon  of  attack,  while  Wlriga,  "improvement  men/*  and 
"paper  money  boys"  were  trying  to  make  the  inquiry  serve  the  Bank's  ends. 
One  of  the  Whigs  noted  that  the  anti-Bank  crowd  was  led  on  by  f  ra  gang  of 
scoundrels  .  .  .  including  Buchanan,  and  Jesse  Miller."1 

The  Legislature  vindicated  the  Bank,  whereupon  George  R*  Espy 
unexpectedly  moved  to  repeal  the  Bank's  charter.  This  motion  renewed 
the  fight  at  the  worst  possible  time,  for  the  Panic  of  1837  had  now  descended 
upon  the  nation*  Even  the  Bank's  enemies  had  no  wish  to  outlaw  the 
institution  at  this  particular  moment,  for  they  would  be  blamed  for  aggra- 
vating the  financial  distress.  Fifty-two  Democrats  in  the  House  had  at  first 
agreed  to  support  the  repeal  motion,  but  when  the  roll  was  called  only 
twenty-one  of  them  actually  voted  for  it. 

Back  in  Lancaster  Buchanan  tried  to  think  out  some  solution  to 
the  problem.  It  appeared  to  him  that  the  Bank  had  first  bought  up  the 
national  Congress  to  get  its  charter  renewed,  and  now  it  had  bought  up 
the  Commonwealth  of  Pennsylvania.  He  had  learned  in  Harrisburg  that 
the  leading  Democratic  members  of  the  investigating  committee,  who  were 


THE  ROOT  OF  ALL  EVIL  *   1837  - 1840 

supposed  to  produce  proof  that  the  institution  was  corrupt,  had  been  bribed 
by  the  Bank.  Two  junior  members,  who  respected  the  opinion  of  their 
elder  colleagues,  had  signed  the  whitewash  report  on  the  assumption  that 
it  was  bona  fide.  Later  they  learned  that  their  senior  committeemen  had 
withheld  a  lot  of  damning  evidence  and,  after  the  vindication  of  the  Bank, 
had  been  its  guests  at  a  big  dinner  celebration  in  Philadelphia.2  Buchanan, 
mortified  by  the  result,  wrote,  "This  bank  business  will  divide  the  party 
for  years  to  come."3 

His  friends  agreed,  "I  begin  to  believe  that  [the  Bank]  will  get 
the  uppermost  of  us  again,"  wrote  one  of  them.4  And  why  should  it  not? 
The  issue  cut  clean  through  party  lines  in  Pennsylvania;  there  were  Bank 
and  anti-Bank  followers  in  each  major  party  and  in  every  faction. 

The  question  presented  two  very  different  aspects.  To  the  rank 
and  file  of  Democratic  voters  the  destruction  of  Biddle's  "monster"  sym- 
bolized the  transfer  of  political  privilege  from  the  aristocracy  to  the  "common 
man";  but  to  informed  politicians  Jackson's  war  on  the  Bank  signified 
rather  the  transfer  of  the  money  center  of  the  nation  from  Philadelphia  to 
New  York;  from  Chestnut  Street  to  Wall  Street.  Whatever  Jackson's 
reasons  for  the  attack,  there  seems  to  be  little  doubt  that  the  chief  motive 
of  his  intimate  advisors,  Van  Buren  and  half  a  dozen  others,  was  to  oust 
Biddle  in  order  to  seize  financial  control  themselves.5  Thus  the  struggle 
over  the  Bank  proved  to  be  an  important  phase  of  the  ancient  rivalry 
between  Pennsylvania  and  New  York.  This  feature  of  ante-bellum  politics, 
the  incessant  contest  for  power  and  position  between  the  two  wealthiest 
and  most  populous  states  of  the  Union,  may  perhaps  bear  a  heavier  re- 
sponsibility for  the  disruption  of  the  Democracy  and  the  later  breakup  of 
the  Union  than  historians  now  suspect.  Here  parochialism  played  its 
divisive  role  at  the  center  of  the  nation  rather  than  at  its  extremities. 

Trade  reports  of  the  early  1830's  had  already  shown  that  New  York 
City  had  supplanted  Philadelphia  as  the  leading  import-export  city  of 
America,  a  distinction  the  latter  had  enjoyed  since  colonial  times.  The 
rapid  rise  of  New  York  City,  hastened  by  Van  Buren's  political  connection 
with  Jackson,  was  the  underlying  fact  which  explained  why  the  Bank  issue 
in  the  Pennsylvania  Legislature  always  disrupted  the  Democrats  and  why 
the  Dallas  faction  had  to  find  some  formula  to  keep  the  Bank,  backbone  of 
Philadelphia's  financial  eminence,  in  operation. 

Buchanan  had  to  choose  between  supporting  the  financial 
interests  of  eastern  Pennsylvania  and  sustaining  the  national  policy  of  the 
Democrats.  As  the  fonner  course  would  have  threatened  his  influence 
nationally  and  placed  him  locally  in  the  camp  of  his  Philadelphia  rivals,  he 
chose  the  latter,  fully  aware  of  the  many  pitfalls  which  the  decision  opened. 
In  order  to  emphasize  the  national  aspect  of  his  position,  he  raised  a 
question  in  the  Senate  which  made  everyone  sit  up  tod  take  notice,  for  it 

117 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


had  apparently  been  overlooked  before.  "Suppose,"  he  said,  "General 
Jackson  and  the  bank  had  been  in  alliance  and  not  in  opposition.  What 
then  might  have  been  the  consequences,  had  he  been  an  enemy  to  the 
liberties  of  the  people?  Can  any  man  say  that  our  liberties  would  not  have 
been  in  danger?"  All  the  forms  of  the  Constitution  might  have  remained, 
but  who  could  believe  that  any  subsequent  election  would  ever  be  bcmafide; 
that  the  whole  framework  of  public  information  could  not  be  bought  up 
and  rigged;  that  frauds  could  not  be  excused  by  mercenary  courts;  or  that 
a  president  would  not  always  be  able  to  name  his  successor?6 

At  home,  Buchanan  restricted  his  talking  to  a  reiteration  of  his 
simple  maxim,  "The  party  must  crush  the  bank,  or  the  bank  will  crush  the 
party."  His  followers,  desperately  worried  by  the  schism  created  by  the 
Bank  issue,  had  no  better  advice  to  offer.  One  wrote,  "What  have  we 
gained  by  opposition  to  the  Bank?  Principle— what  does  it  mean?  Patri- 
otism—where is  it?  Pledges— in  the  pocket!!  Politics— I  am  ready  to 
quit."7  Another  asked,  "What  do  you  think  of  a  conciliation  party?  I 
mean  to  organize  the  old  fashioned  Democratic  party?  It  must  come  to 
that."8  That,  thought  Buchanan,  would  be  like  trying  to  take  the  eggs  out 
of  the  omelette  and  put  them  back  in  the  shells.  A  third  proposed  to  foip-t 
about  the  Bank  and  to  take  up  "fresher,  more  interesting  topics/'0  Bu- 
chanan's friends  coincided  only  on  one  point:  they  thought  that  he  could 
strengthen  and  unify  the  state  Democracy  by  consenting  to  run  for  governor 
in  1838.  "You  alone  can  unite  our  divided  party,"  ran  their  plea.  But 
those  who  knew  him  best  predicted  that  he  would  refuse,  "He  aims  at 
higher  game,"  they  said.10  They  were  right,  for  Buchanan  announced 
that  he  would  not  exchange  the  senatorship  for  a  three-year  scramble  in 
Hamsburg.  Of  all  political  positions,  the  governorship  of  Pennsylvania 
traditionally  carried  the  least  prospect  for  subsequent  honor- 
By  the  time  the  Legislature  had  finished  its  indecisive  discussion 
of  the  Bank,  Buchanan  found  himself  in  the  midst  of  another  series  of 
personal  attacks  like  those  in  the  election  of  1828.  Perhaps  his  enemfr* 
thought  there  might  be  some  truth  in  the  idea  that  he  alone  could  unite 
his  party. 

The  Lancaster  Intelligencer  started  the  assault  with  a  new  version 
of  the  old  "bargain  and  sale'*  story  which,  to  Buchanan's  utter  astonish- 
ment, Francis  P.  Blair  republished  in  the  Washington  Globe,  the  administra- 
tion organ.11  In  May  Buchanan  went  to  Harrishurg  where  he  dropped  in 
at  a  session  of  the  Constitutional  Convention*  Some  of  his  friends  invited 
him  to  come  front  and  sit  inside  the  bar.  Immediately  thereafter,  one  of 
the  delegates,  Coxe  of  Somerset,  arose  and  delivered  a  tirade  of  abuse 
against  him  which  Buchanan  reported  "had  no  more  connexion  with  the 
subject  under  discussion  than  it  had  with  the  question  that  distracted  the 
sages  of  Lilliput,  whether  eggs  ought  to  be  beaten  from  the  larger  or  the 


THE  ROOT  OF  ALL  EVIL  •    1837  -  1840 


smaller  end."  Buchanan's  one-time  warm  friend,  John  Sergeant,  Chairman 
of  the  Convention,  made  no  effort  to  call  Coxe  to  order.  The  central  theme 
of  his  philippic  was  that  old  chestnut:  "that  Buchanan  had  once  thanked 
his  God  that  he  had  not  a  drop  of  Democratic  blood  in  his  veins,  and  if  he 
had,  he  would  let  it  out."12 

Coxe  had  once  asked  certain  people  of  Lancaster  to  sign  an 
affidavit  that  they  had  heard  Buchanan  make  the  alleged  statement,  but 
Anthony  McGlinn  was  the  only  person  who  was  willing  to  furnish  a  sworn 
signature.  Buchanan  also  swore,  caliing  Coxe  "a  dirty,  low,  malicious 
fellow."  Did  anyone  believe  that  he  had  been  at  any  period  of  his  life 
"such  an  arrant  fool?"13  He  demanded  evidence  and  wanted  the  con- 
vention to  give  him  a  chance  to  refute.  But  Coxe  was  not  after  debate;  he 
merely  wanted  to  get  the  item  back  into  circulation  and  he  succeeded 
brilliantly.  Picking  up  .the  cue  from  Coxe,  others  began  to  use  the  con- 
vention as  their  forum  to  attack  Buchanan. 

Some  members  of  the  convention  at  length  became  so  accustomed 
to  spreading  poison  that  one  of  them  forgot  himself  and  gave  a  dose  to  one 
of  his  friends.  Thaddeus  Stevens,  in  a  speech  about  apportionment  of 
votes  in  Philadelphia,  referred  to  that  proud  city  as  "a  great  and  growing 
ulcer  on  the  body  politic,"  and  then,  without  any  apparent  reason,  launched 
into  a  slurring  commentary  on  Whig  leader  William  Morris  Meredith. 
Meredith,  not  a  man  to  sit  back  and  listen  quietly  to  an  insult,  rose  and  for 
two  days  poured  forth  a  stream  of  personal  invective  against  Stevens  while 
the  Democrats,  now  out  of  the  picture,  sat  back  entranced.  Stevens 
manufactured  venom  so  fast,  said  Meredith,  that  when  he  ran  out  of 
enemies,  which  was  hard  to  imagine,  he  had  to  spray  it  on  whoever  stood 
nearby.  He  was  a  great  man  in  little  things— by  far  the  greatest  in  the 
littlest  that  the  country  could  boast.  "You  sneaking  catamount,"  he 
shouted,  "you  and  your  vulpine  Coxe."  The  affair  temporarily  broke  up 
the  Constitutional  Convention,  and  threatened  to  break  up  the  Whig-anti- 
Masonic  alliance.  "Whether  this  dissolves  the  coalition  remains  to  be 
seen,9'  wrote  C.  J.  IngersolL14 

Senator  John  P.  King  of  Augusta,  Georgia,  had  invited  Buchanan 
to  come  south  for  a  visit  during  the  summer,  but  the  growing  political 
pressure  and  a  number  of  priyate  affairs  discouraged  the  expedition.  "Until 
the  fit  of  fault-finding  is  over,"  he  replied,  he  would  have  to  stay  at  home.15 
His  private  business  needed  care  in  these  days  of  panic,16  and  he  also  had 
to  work  out  the  estates  of  his  mother  and  his  brother  George,  both  of  whom 
had  died  without  leaving  wills.17  But  most  important  of  all,  Mary  Kittera 
Snyder  (or  was  it  Aunt  Ann?)  had  said  "yes-"  Senator  W.  R.  King  had 
ribbed  him  during  the  early  spring  about  neglecting  his  usual  affairs  from 
"the  anxieties  of  love."18  On  June  3,  Buchanan  wrote  to  Mrs.  Francis 
Preston  Blair,  "I  would  gladly  join  your  party  to  the  Hermitage  next  year, 

119 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


,  .  .  but  long  ere  that  time  I  expect  to  be  married  &  have  the  cares  of  a 
family  resting  upon  my  shoulders."10 

The  happy  prospect  clouded  that  particular  spring,  for  the  state 
of  feeling  in  Philadelphia  was  so  violent  against  him  for  attacking  the  U.  S. 
Bank  that  he  had  been  mobbed  by  a  gang  of  political  roughnecks  on  one  of 
his  visits.  Charles  J.  Ingersoll  told  him  that  the  assaults  upon  him  in  the 
Constitutional  Convention  had  still  further  inflamed  public  opinion,  and 
that  he  really  ought  to  stay  out  of  the  city  until  things  calmed.  Possibly 
for  this  reason  Mary  Snyder  went  to  Baltimore  where  Buchanan  visited 

her.20 

Buchanan  went  to  Bedford  Springs  in  July  for  several  weeks  of 
pleasant  recreation,  walking  with  his  old  friend  Judge  Henry  Shippcn  of 
Meadville  along  the  wooded  stream  which  rippled  through  the  glades  below 
the  huge  hotel.  In  the  morning  they  would  stop  at  the  little  white  summer- 
house  enclosing  the  beautiful  mineral  spring  and  "drink  of  the  waters,'* 
according  to  their  doctor's  prescription.  Until  noon  the  guests  ordinarily 
stayed  within  easy  reach  of  the  other  little  white  houses  until  the  volcanic 
eflects  of  the  "waters"  had  subsided.  After  midday  all  sought  the  rocking 
chairs  which  lined  the  huge  porch  or  promenaded  up  and  down,  greeting 
newly  arrived  friends  and  gossiping.  In  the  evening  there  was  dancing  in 
the  great  ballroom  with  schottisches,  polkas,  and  a  new  step  called  the 
hop-trot  dubbed  by  some  rakes  the  rabbit-hop-  Buchanan  hived  to  dance 
and  spent  more  evenings  in  society  than  he  should  have,  considering  the 
amount  of  work  he  had  planned  to  do-  But  the  ladies  insisted  and  he  was 
always  a  willing  respondent  to  a  roguish  eye. 

By  the  end  of  August  he  was  back  in  Lancaster  and  hard  at  work 
on  a  series  of  important  Senate  speeches  he  was  to  give  on  the  new  Adminis- 
tration program  to  solve  the  currency  and  banking  problems 


BUCHANAN  AND  THE  SUBTREASURY  BILL 

Although  the  Panic  of  1837  grew  very  serious  during  the  ftprinp  and 
summer*  President  Van  Buren  decided  not  to  call  a  »prd«l  *w»ion  of 
Congress  to  deal  with  it  until  September.  During  the  summer  months, 
Buchanan  had  been  in  constant  correspondence  with  Jackson  and 
Van  Buren  about  the  financial  crisis.  The  latter  had  asked  for  suggestions 
to  be  included  in  the  presidential  message  to  the  forthcoming  special 
session  of  Congress  and  Buchanan,  anticipating  that  he  would  be  ft  leading 
spokesman  for  the  president,  proposed  that  Congress  should  establish  a 
new  bank  or,  as  that  name  had  come  into  disrepute, f 'an  Agency'1  connected 
with  the  Treasury  and  the  Mint  to  collect  and  disburse  public  money. 
The  agency  should  neither  issue  notes  nor  discount  paper;  its  function 


THE  ROOT  OF  AIL  EVIL  •   1837  -  1840 

should  be  to  receive  bullion  for  deposit  both  from  the  collectors  of  the 
United  States  and  from  individuals.  It  could  issue  to  individuals  receipts 
which  could  then  be  sent  to  any  part  of  the  nation  and  be  cashed  back  into 
bullion  at  a  branch  agency  for  a  slight  transmission  fee.  This  system 
would  facilitate  domestic  exchange  and  prevent  wide  variations  in  exchange 
rates  in  different  parts  of  the  land.  More  particularly,  it  would  prevent 
exchange  merchants  from  periodically  squeezing  businessmen  who  needed 
specie  when  there  happened,  temporarily,  to  be  a  local  shortage.  But 
Buchanan  was  certain  that  neither  the  government  nor  the  nation  could 
function  on  a  specie  basis,  as  Senator  Benton  and  others  believed.  The 
notes  of  state  banks  would  have  to  be  used  and  the  government  would  have 
to  receive  these  notes  in  payment  of  land  and  of  customs  duties.  The 
Treasury,  however,  ought  to  accept  only  the  notes  of  specie-paying  banks 
in  the  vicinity  of  the  new  agency  and  its  branches,  and  "nearly  all  danger  in 
dealing  with  such  Institutions  might  be  avoided  by  frequent  settlements,"21 

President  Van  Buren,  in  his  message,  proposed  a  "sub-treasury" 
system  or  federal  collection,  deposit,  and  exchange  agency  very  much  like 
the  one  Buchanan  had  described. 

Buchanan  made  one  of  the  best  speeches  of  his  life  in  support  of 
the  subtreasury  proposal  on  September  28, 1837,  when  he  and  Silas  Wright 
of  New  York  contested  the  issue  with  Webster  and  Clay.  He  divided  the 
honors  with  his  opponents  on  constitutional  phases  of  the  argument,  but 
he  had  the  better  of  them  on  practical  finance.  Both  Clay  and  Webster, 
continually  in  need  of  money,  had  long  experience  as  debtors  to  the  Bank 
of  the  U.  S.,  but  Buchanan  was  a  private  banker  himself.  Jackson  thought 
enough  of  the  Bank  speech  to  write  that  it  "must  become  a  lasting  monu- 
ment" to  the  talent  of  its  author,  and  a  "text-book"  of  the  party  for  all 

time  to  come*22 

The  Subtreasury  Bill  passed  the  Senate,  but  it  was  laid  on  the 
table  in  the  House  and  did  not  become  law  until  1840.  Pennsylvania 
Democrats  were  amazed  at  the  Senate  line-up,  on  the  vote:  Van  Buren's 
best  friends  opposed  him;  his  enemies,  like  Calhoun,  supported  him.  "No 
wonder  he  is  called  a  magician,"  George  Plitt  observed.33  In  New  York 
the  Democrats  split  wide  apart  on  the  issue  and  were  soundly  whipped  in 
the  state  elections.  Their  defeat  demonstrated  to  the  Democrats  of 
Pennsylvania  the  necessity  for  united  action.  Buchanan's  friends  wrote: 
"Our  good  old  State  is  now  the  last  hope  for  the  party,  and  if  she  fails  us, 
through  the  headstrong  perversity  of  a  few  leaders,  we  shall  be  beaten  in 
the  Union  for  years  to  come."24  If,  however,  New  York  remained  split 
and  Pennsylvania  delivered  a  victory  in  1838,  there  was  every  prospect 
that  Buchanan  could  become  the  key  man  in  the  Van  Buren  Administration* 
A  great  deal  would  depend  on  the  nominating  contest  for  governor  in 
the  spring. 

121 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Buchanan  insisted  that  Muhlenberg  and  Wolf  each  withdraw  his 
name  as  candidate  for  governor  and  urged  the  party  to  unite  on  someone 
previously  unconnected  with  that  schism.  Wolf,  who  had  protested 
Muhlenberg's  appointment  to  the  Austrian  Mission,  now  promised  to  stay 
out  of  the  governor's  race  and  to  keep  his  friends  loyal  to  a  convention 
choice.  Buchanan  got  comforting  news  from  prominent  Democrats— 
"whether  it  be  Porter,  Blythe,  Carpenter  or  Klingensmith,  that  receives 
the  nomination,  not  a  man  will  demur/'25 

Two  weeks  before  the  Democratic  nominating  convention  in 
Harrisburg,  the  State  Legislature  passed  resolutions  instructing  the 
Pennsylvania  Senators  to  vote  against  the  Subtreasury  Bill.  Supported 
by  the  Whigs  and  signed  by  Governor  Ritner,  the  motion  pledged  "full 
confidence  in  Martin  Van  Buren."  These  idiotic  resolutions,  "an  absurd 
medley  and  damnable  humbug,"  were  intended  to  force  Buchanan  to  resign 
the  senatorship  so  that  he  could  be  replaced  by  one  of  the  "recreants." 
As  one  of  the  originators  of  the  Subtreasury  Bill  he  could  not  oppose  it; 
but  under  the  instruction  system,  he  would  have  to  kill  his  own  bill  or 
resign.  The  Bank  crowd  thought  they  had  him  this  time.  Whatever 
decision  he  made  would  disrupt  the  harmony  of  the  Democratic  meeting 

of  March  4. 

Buchanan  thought  it  over  thoroughly,  pushed  aside  the  pile  of 
letters  appealing  to  him  by  all  that  was  holy  to  tear  up  the  instructions  and 
vote  the  party  line,  and  wrote  out  his  announcement  to  the  Seriate.  "If  a 
Senator  can  look  behind  his  instructions,"  he  declared,  frth<r  right  is  at 
once  abandoned.  .  .  .  My  only  alternative,  then,  is  either  to  obey  or  to 
resign."  But,  if  he  should  resign,  "the  right  of  instruction  itself  would 
soon  grow  into  disrepute,  and  the  Senatorial  term  of  six  years  .  .  <  would 
terminate  whenever  such  a  conflict  of  opinion  should  arise,  ,  ,  .  I  shall, 
therefore,  obey  my  instructions  honestly  and  in  good  faith.'*6  He  would 
move  to  table  the  Subtreasury  Bill  in  the  hope  that  by  next  session  he  could 
get  the  support  of  Pennsylvania  for  it. 

This  decision  did  not  precisely  delight  Van  Buren,  but  he  could 
scarcely  protest;  it  at  least  offered  hope,  which  was  more  than  he  could  say 
for  his  own  state  of  New  York,  And,  while  the  announcement  disappointed 
all  those  who  had  been  engaged  in  the  fight  against  the  Bank,  they  swallowed 
it  and  kept  a  bold  front,  praising  its  forthrighlness*  Fortunately,  it  came 
too  late  to  affect  the  county  meetings  to  elect  delegates  to  the  state  nominat- 
ing convention,  or  there  would  certainly  have  been  a  swarm  of  contesting 
claimants  to  seats.  As  it  was,  there  had  been  numerous  Democratic  county 
meetings  sponsoring,  in  one  hall,  "Van  Buren  and  a  new  hank/'  and  across 
the  street  "Van  Buren  and  down  with  the  bank"  The  Democrats  nominated 
David  R.  Porter  for  governor  without  difficulty-- a  tremendous  triumph 
for  Buchanan's  unity  platform;  but  the  convention  members  made  no 


THE  ROOT  OF  ALL  EVIL  •    1837 . 1840 

statement  at  all  on  the  Bank  issue.  Their  silence  on  this  point  might  have 
caused  trouble  except  for  the  fact  that  the  other  parties  were  even  more 
splintered  on  the  question  than  the  Democrats  and  could  make  no  capital 
of  the  glaring  omission. 

The  Pennsylvania  gubernatorial  contest  aroused  more  excitement 
than  any  event  of  the  preceding  decade.  The  members  of  all  Democratic 
factions  pulled  strong  enough  in  harness  that  Buchanan  felt  he  could  afford 
to  keep  his  distance.  He  stayed  out  of  the  state  campaign  and  immersed 
himself  in  the  business  of  the  Senate.  "Really,"  wrote  an  old  crony,  "you 
have  become  public  property,  and  have  lost  sight  altogether  of  the  domestic 
relation.  No  one  in  Lancaster  has  heard  from  you  since  Congress  began."27 
There  was  some  reason  for  this,  for  the  Committee  on  Foreign  Affairs  was 
suddenly  confronted  with  a  whole  docket  full  of  crises,  and  many  problems 
corollary  to  the  Subtreasury  came  up  for  individual  study  and  discussion. 

A  new  fight  arose  over  a  scheme  that  Biddle  had  worked  out  to 
give  the  newly  chartered  Bank  of  the  United  States  of  Pennsylvania  millions 
of  dollars  which  it  ought  not  to  have.  Under  the  old  federal  charter,  the 
Bank  had  an  unspecified  period  of  time  to  liquidate  the  bank  notes  which 
had  been  circulating  for  twenty  years.  Instead  of  calling  these  in,  Biddle  per- 
mitted them  to  circulate  as  usual;  and  on  top  of  them  the  Bank  issued  new 
notes  authorized  under  the  Pennsylvania  charter.  Thus,  this  "monster," 
which  Jackson  thought  he  had  destroyed,  now  roamed  the  countryside  more 
than  twice  as  big  as  ever  and  exercised  a  national  influence  far  greater  than 
it  had  in  the  heyday  of  1828.  But  worse  than  this,  its  note  issues  were  now 
swollen  as  badly  as 'those  of  an  old  wildcatter,  though  the  public,  con- 
ditioned by  two  decades  of  assurance  that  these  notes  were  the  best  security 
in  the  nation,  took  them  avidly  as  if  they  were  solid  gold.  Biddle  expected 
that  he  would  receive  gold  for  them;  he  was  currently  engaged  in  a  quiet 
endeavor  to  get  a  corner  on  the  southern  cotton  crop,  and  if  he  succeeded 
he  would  have  plenty  of  specie  to  cover  those  "resurrection  notes."  Even 
if  Congress  outlawed  them,  he  would  still  have  the  gold.  All  that  was 
needed  was  to  prevent  any  sudden  resumption  of  specie  payments,  and  he 
could  certainly  protect  himself  against  that  at  Harrisburg.  Biddle  was  a 
man  of  ideas. 

Buchanan  fought  to  proscribe  Biddle's  old  notes  by  means  of  a 
federal  bill  imposing  fine  and  imprisonment  on  any  director,  trustee,  or 
officer  of  a  corporation1  chartered  by  Congress  who  permitted  notes  of  a 
defunct  corporation  to  remain  in  circulation.  He  analyzed,  with  a  clarity 
which  should  have  made  Biddle  revise  his  plans,  the  nature  of  the  cotton 
speculation  then  in  progress  in  open  defiance  of  a  prohibitory  clause  in  the 
Pennsylvania  charter  of  the  Bank.  He  pointed  out  that  the  Bank  never 
bothered  to  make  the  periodic  reports  to  the  Auditor  General  of  Pennsyl- 
vania which  the  new  charter  specified,  and  that  the  Bank  effectively  blocked 

123 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


all  efforts  to  revive  specie  resumption  in  the  Commonwealth.  "In  vain 
you  may  talk  to  me  about  paper  restrictions,"  he  concluded.  "When  did  a 
vast  moneyed  monopoly  ever  regard  the  law,  if  any  great  interest  of  its  own 
stood  in  the  way?  It  will  then  violate  its  charter,  and  its  own  power  will 
secure  it  immunity."28  Biddle,  he  proclaimed,  "like  all  other  men,  must 
yield  to  his  destiny."  This  was  prophetic.  He  eventually  yielded  to 
bankruptcy  but  never  to  the  United  States  Government. 

By  mid  July,  the  Senate  session  was  over  and  the  critical  Pennsyl- 
vania gubernatorial  election  of  1838  drew  near.  The  great  day  arrived. 
Votes  were  counted,  recounted,  counted  again.  Great  God  in  Heaven! 
Between  Ritner  and  Porter  the  vote  was  so  close  that  no  one  knew  who  had 
been  elected,  and  each  claimed  the  victory, 

THE  ROLE  OF  THE  RICH  UNCLE 

In  November,  the  death  of  sister  Harriet's  husband,  the  Reverend  Robert 
Henry  of  Greensburg,  raised  family  problems  so  serious  and  immediate 
that  James  spent  the  entire  month  attending  to  them  before  going  to 
Washington.  The  family  was  like  politics.  He  loved  both  and  felt  duty 
bound  to  both,  but  their  problems,  demands,  and  feuds  were  ever  on  his 
doorstep.  For  a  long  while  he  had  anticipated  the  difficulties  that  now 
faced  him.  He  had  already  acquired  major  responsibility  for  half  a  dozen 
young  nephews  and  nieces,  and  if  tuberculosis  continued  to  afflict  the 
family,  as  he  feared  it  would,  he  would  soon  have  a  whole  orphanage  on 
his  hands. 

He  told  Harriet  that  he  would  come  to  Greensburg  and  then  tried 
to  formulate  some  plans*  The  family  problem  had  several  aspects:  mom*y, 
proper  care  of  the  children,  and  the  resolution  of  jealousies  and  disagree- 
ments among  the  surviving  elders.  Moreover,  he  was  al  this  time  especially 
concerned  about  Mary  Snyder,  Some  of  the  family  opposed  the  idea  of 
his  marriage,  particularly  Edward  who  anticipated  sharing  a  goodly  in- 
heritance from  his  brother.  Mary  herself  may  have  been  disturbed  by  the 
thought  of  becoming  an  unwanted  addition  to  the  circle,  Buchanan 
wondered  whether  he  had  the  right  to  ask  her  to  undertake  the  role  of 
foster-mother,  and  whether  it  was  wise  to  let  his  money  get  out  of  the 
immediate  family. 

He  worked  late  in  his  study  in  the  King  Street  house,  his  mind 
wandering  back  over  the  past  to  his  mother  and  her  ambitions  for  him  and 
to  sister  Sarah,  who  had  run  off  to  get  married  and  then  died  at  twenty- 
seven,  leaving  a  little  girl,  Elizabeth  Huston.  Mr.  Huston  had  since  died 
and  Elizabeth  had  been  living  with  the  Kitteras  in  Philadelphia  or  with 
Miss  Hetty  in  Lancaster  during  vacations  from  the  boarding  school  in 


THE  ROOT  OF  ALL  EVIL  •   1837  . 1840 


New  Jersey  which  Uncle  James  had  chosen  for  her.  But  her  school  days 
were  nearly  over,  for  she  was  sixteen,  and  more  permanent  provision  had 
to  be  made.  Uncle  Edward  stuffily  announced  that  he  would  not  have  her 
because  she  was  "too  giddy,  too  fond  of  company"  and  too  little  impressed 
with  the  responsibilities  of  life.  What  would  the  parish  think?  It  put 
Buck  in  a  quandary.  He  could  not  leave  her  with  Miss  Hetty.  John  N. 
Lane,  a  relative  of  his  sister  Jane's  husband,  lived  in  Lancaster  and  would 
have  liked  to  keep  Elizabeth,  but  James  feared  that  this  arrangement  would 
"raise  a  talk  here  which  might  be  injurious  to  Edward  or  his  wife."  But, 
he  said,  "if  it  becomes  my  duty  to  fix  her  in  this  County,  they  must  take 
the  consequences  of  their  own  conduct,  and  should  it  become  necessary 
that  I  should  express  an  opinion  on  the  subject,  it  will  be  against  them  and 
in  favor  of  Elizabeth."29 

Robert  Henry's  death  left  sister  Harriet  with  very  little  money, 
an  advanced  case  of  tuberculosis,  and  a  five-year-old  boy,  James  Buchanan 
Henry.  Buck  wrote  to  her  urging  her  to  take  care  of  her  health  "for 
the  sake  of  your  child  and  other  relatives.  You  are  welcome,  most  welcome 
to  a  home  with  me  where  I  think  you  may  promote  my  happiness  as  well 
as  your  own."  In  his  distraction,  he  addressed  the  letter  to  "My  dear  sir" 
from  force  of  habit,  and  dated  it  1837  instead  of  1838,30  Harriet  would  now 
have  to  go  to  live  with  her  sister  Jane  in  Mercersburg  for  a  while  and  then 
move  to  Edward's  home  in  Lancaster  County  until  the  end  of  the  next 
Congress,  when  Buchanan  could  have  things  ready  for  her  in  the  King 
Street  house. 

Jane  posed  an  equally  distressing  problem.  She  was  confined  to 
her  room,  spit  blood  copiously,  and  was  resigned  to  death  in  a  matter  of 
months.  She  had  four  children:  James  Buchanan  Lane,  who  was  already 
in  his  twenties;  Elliot  Eskridge,  thirteen;  Mary  Elizabeth,  twelve;  and 
Harriet,  eight 

Sister  Maria,  now  married  to  Dr.  Charles  Yates  of  Meadville, 
had  her  troubles*  The  Doctor  was  her  third  husband.  By  her  first, 
Buchanan's  old  school  teacher,  Jesse  E.  H.  Magaw,  she  had  had  one 
daughter,  named  Jessie.  She  had  four  more  children  by  Dr.  Yates,  their 
house  was  cramped,  their  income  small,  and  Jessie  was  suffering  from 
tuberculosis  and  needed  to  get  out  of  the  Meadville  climate.  Of  all  his 
nieces,  she  was  probably  Buchanan's  favorite-  Jessie  went  to  live  with  her 
Aunts  Harriet  and  Jane  at  Mercersburg  for  a  time,  until  she  could  be  sent 
to  school  James  told  Maria  that  he  planned  to  send  Jessie  "to  the  very  best 
country  female  school  I  can  find.  I  have  seen  enough  of  the  effects  of 
sending  country  girls  whose  expectations  are  moderate  to  Philadelphia 
Boarding  Schools."  Jessie,  he  thought,  "will  make  a  fine  woman,  if  she 
lives.  If  not  very  smart,  she  is  very  good,  and  that  is  better."31  He  would 
send  her  to  school  at  Mt.  Joy,  near  Lancaster,  but  Jessie  was  so  fond  of 

125 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Aunt  Harriet  that  it  might  be  best  if  all  stayed  at  the  family  homestead  at 
Mercersburg,  and  she  attended  school  there. 

Finally  there  was  Edward,  his  only  surviving  brother,  who  seemed 
increasingly  to  resent  the  contrast  between  his  own  poverty  and  James's 
affluence.  Edward  was  ready  for  college  when  his  brother  William  died, 
and  it  was  this  event  which  influenced  him  to  gratify  the  wish  of  hi?  mother 
that  one  son  would  study  for  the  ministry.  George  and  James  had  already 
prepared  for  law,  and  no  one  was  left  but  him  to  follow  the  cloth.  Now 
that  George  had  died,  he  and  James  had  to  take  care  of  the  family.  Edward 
complained  that  he  had  more  expenses  than  James  and  scarcely  income 
enough  to  keep  himself  in  clean  shirts;  why  should  he  take  care  of  the 
family  wanderers  while  James  kept  an  empty  house  in  Lancaster  and  had 
other  quarters  in  Washington.  James  had  been  kind  but  strict  with 
Edward.  "You  shall  not  be  at  any  loss  for  money,"  he  often  said  but  he 
always  kept  track  of  the  loans,  and  when  there  was  a  little  estate  to  divide, 
he  acted  as  executor  and  deducted  the  amount  of  his  advances.  "Rely  uf »« »n 
your  own  judgment  in  all  things,  and  I  shall  be  content,"  he  would  write, 
but  took  occasion  to  disapprove  strongly  of  the  judgments  Edward  had 

made.32 

James  thought  wryly  of  Edward,  the  "baby  brother."  He  was 
even  now  only  twenty-seven,  proud,  impatient,  suspicious,  and  coiummn! 
with  ambition.  He  had  wanted  to  make  a  big  impression  on  hw  superiors 
by  making  a  fine  donation  to  help  endow  a  chair  of  theology  at  one  *«f  the 
church  colleges,  but  the  parish  had  contributed  only  86.  JanifK  sent  htm 
$144  more  to  enable  him  to  forward  a  thumping  cheek  for  $150—  that 
would  help  make  them  remember  where  Pequea  Church  wart, 

Now  there  was  trouble  over  Harriett  desire  to  sell  the  old  Dun- 
woodie  property,  "Bridge  farm/1  near  Mmuwburg.  The  income  from  this 
would  be  shared  by  all  the  children,  but  they  had  to  iipree  to  it*  *<al«», 
Edward  felt  that  it  should  be  held  until  prices  improved,  but  Harriot  inrdri) 
money  so  desperately  that  she  could  sec  no  other  solution,  Jamw  had  then 
proposed  to  buy  it  himself,  matching  the  best  offer  they  could  jset  from  the 
outside.  After  a  general  family  conference  at  Mercersburg,  he  conrluA-d 
the  purchase,  much  to  Edward's  dissatisfaction.  "Nothing  hut  family 
pride,"  James  wrote,  "induced  me  to  purchase  your  farm.  I  couW  not  b«ar 
to  see  the  last  vestige  of  father's  property  in  Franklin  County  go  into  the 
hands  of  strangers."  Significantly  he  added,  "You  will  at  last  prnhaUy  #**t 
my  property  or  the  greater  part  of  it  among  al!  of  you."8*  Whatever  hopes 
he  may  have  had  of  marrying  were  not  very  bright  when  he  wrote  that 
sentence. 

On  the  same  trip  to  Mercersburg  he  had  a  long  talk  with  hi* 
sister  Jane  and  made  all  arrangements  for  the  distribution  of  her  property 
after  her  death.  She  named  him  trustee  of  her  inheritance  (some  $6,000) . 


THE  ROOT  OF  ALL  EVIL  •   1837  -  1840 


He  was  to  hold  it  during  her  life  and  use  it  later  to  pay  for  the  care  and 
education  of  the  children.  The  remainder  was  to  be  apportioned  and  paid 
to  them  with  interest  when  tfiey  reached  maturity.  Elliott  T.  Lane,  her 
husband,  agreed  to  this  plan  and  signed  a  release  which  was  recorded 
at  Chambersburg. 

James  was  glad  to  see  Maria  at  the  family  conclave.  Like  her 
daughter  Jessie,  she  was  very  good,  but  not  very  smart.  Fortunately  her 
latest  husband  was  both  and  he  managed  to  keep  the  household  in  order. 
Buchanan  had  grown  to  be  very  fond  of  him,  and  the  doctor  reciprocated 
by  getting  into  politics  in  Meadville.  He  endorsed  every  Buchanan  move- 
ment so  enthusiastically  that  he  insulted  patients  who  disagreed  with  him 
and  almost  ruined  his  practice,  Buchanan  had  loaned  them  the  money 
to  buy  a  house  years  before  and  had  gotten  his  first  taste  of  Maria's  financial 
capabilities.  On  the  strength  of  his  guarded  assent  to  make  a  loan,  she 
had  gone  right  out  and  bought  a  place,  without  ever  having  the  title  checked. 
He  had  upbraided  her  for  her  negligence  and  withheld  his  aid  until  his 
friend  Henry  Shippen,  county  judge  in  Meadville,  had  recorded  a  clear 
title  and  prepared  a  first  mortgage.  "It  is  my  inflexible  rule  in  life,"  he 
had  told  Maria,  "never  to  invest  a  dollar  in  any  property  except  it  has  a 
clean  title  and  is  free  of  every  incumbrance." 

Maria  soon  complained  that  the  new  house  was  too  small.  "That 
which  I  feared  has  come  to  pass,"  he  wrote  back.  "It  seems  you  are  now 
dissatisfied  with  the  use  of  the  front  room  as  a  shop  and  are  anxious  that 
Dr.  Yates  should  build  one.  I  confess  I  am  somewhat  astonished  at  this. 
Besides  your  promise  to  me,  you  ought  to  reflect  that  your  circumstances 
are  very  limited  and  that  your  expenses  will  be  increasing  annually.  Were 
I  residing  in  that  house  myself,  I  should  never  think  of  any  other  law  office 
but  the  front  room/'3* 

As  the  years  passed,  odd  little  incidents  occurred.  Dr.  Yates  bet 
one  of  his  patients  $200  that  Buchanan  would  be  elected  Senator  in  1833, 
lost  both  the  wager  and  the  patient,  and  thus  the  means  of  paying  the  bet. 
Buchanan  got  him  out  of  trouble  in  his  usual  way,  not  by  sending  money 
but  by  giving  Yates  a  receipt  for  $200  which  he  said  he  had  deducted  from 
the  sum  the  doctor  already  owed  him.  His  letter  had  the  qualities  which 
his  relatives  came  to  recognize  and  to  dread;  it  was  at  once  both  kind  and 
nasty.  "Be  firm  in  politics,  but  avoid  giving  personal  offence,"  he  ad- 
monished. "I  did  not  know  you  were  in  debt  to  anyone  but  myself,  but 
if  you  do  owe  to  others,  you  ought  to  pay  it."86  Once  in  a  while,  he  would 
ask  Dr.  Yates  to  send  only  two  thirds  of  the  usual  $150  instalment  on  the 

mortgage  and  8ive  the  other  third  to  Maria'    On  such  occasion8  he  would 
not  enter  the  credit  until  he  got  a  formal  receipt  from  Maria  that  she  had 

actually  received  her  fifty.36 
127 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


James  knew  what  the  family  thought  of  him,  and  wondered  if 
their  view  was  not  justified.  Often  he  wondered  just  what  he  thought  of 
himself.  He  felt  kindly  to  nearly  everyone,  but  he  could  scarcely  believe 
that  anyone  felt  kindly  toward  him.  Any  manifestation  of  friendship  or 
appeal  to  his  better  nature  set  little  red  flags  flying  in  his  mind;  what  was  this 
person  after?  No  one  ever  surmounted  his  suspicion;  no  one  in  his  family 
ever  expected  from  him  other  than  what  decency,  bounded  by  the  letter  of 
the  law,  absolutely  required.  But  to  give  to  one  would  raise  a  howl  from  all 
the  others.  To  make  gifts  to  the  family  with  no  strings  attached  would 
make  them  wasteful  and  dependent,  and  soon  the  time  would  come  when 
he  would  necessarfly  have  to  refuse.  Then  they  would  hate  him.  He  knew 
that  much  about  human  nature.  No,  the  best  course  was  to  give  only  when 
the  need  was  critical,  and  then  in  a  way  that  showed  he  expected  to  be  paid 
back.  That  method  would  keep  them  all  independent  and  self-respecting, 
it  would  protect  him  from  voracious  demands,  and  while  it  might  not 
promote  any  outburst  of  emotional  gratitude,  it  would  maintain  a  long- 
range  family  stability.  As  he  told  Edward,  they  would  all  probably  share 
everything  he  had,  anyway.  And  right  now,  he  had  $120,000  of  his  own  at 
work  for  interest,  and  some  $25,000  of  funds  in  trust  for  the  various 
children.  He  hoped  that  if  they  let  him  manage*  they  would  all  some  day 
have  financial  security. 


10 

WISE  AS  THE  SERPENT  •  1838  - 1841 

TRIAL  BALLOON 

According  to  unofficial  election  returns,  David  R.  Porter  led  Governor 
Ritner  by  5,540  votes  in  the  election  of  1838,  but  the  seats  of  eight  Assem- 
blymen and  several  State  Senators  were  in  dispute  because  of  frauds  in 
Philadelphia.  The  award  of  these  contested  seats  would  determine  which 
party  controlled  the  Legislature,  and  the  Legislature  would  control  the 
outcome  of  the  election  for  governor,  for  it  certified  the  vote.  Secretary 
of  the  Commonwealth  Burrowes  issued  a  circular  advising  the  public  to 
"treat  the  election  as  if  it  had  never  taken  place,"  and  Thaddeus  Stevens 
proclaimed  emphatically  that  Porter  would  never  be  governor. 

At  Harrisburg  the  anti-Masons  and  the  Democrats  each  organized 
an  Assembly  and  a  Senate  and  proceeded  independently  to  business.  At  one 
stage  a  mob  invaded  the  House  chamber,  threw  the  anti-Masonic  speaker 
from  the  rostrum  into  the  aisle  and  then  rushed  into  the  Senate,  chasing 
Stevens  and  Burrowes  "out  of  a  window  twelve  feet  high,  through  three 
thorn  bushes,  and  over  a  seven  foot  picket  fence."  As  excitement  mounted, 
the  anti-Masons  seized  the  Harrisburg  armory  and  Governor  Ritner  called 
out  a  militia  battalion  to  sustain  him.  These  troops,  by  stopping  for  a 
supply  of  buckshot  at  the  Frankford  arsenal,  gave  the  name  "Buckshot 
War"  to  the  fracas.  Meanwhile  the  Democrats  mobilized  thousands  of 
volunteer  "minutemen"  who  now  began  a  march  on  Harrisburg  to  defend 
their  rights* 

When  the  militia  officers  refused  to  obey  Governor  Ritner,  he 
wrote  to  President  Van  Buren,  of  all  people,  demanding  the  aid  of  U.  S. 
troops,  presumably  to  prevent  a  Democrat  from  assuming  the  governorship 
to  which  he  had  been  duly  elected!  Van  Buren  felt  that  Pennsylvania  ought 
to  take  care  of  its  own  troubles.  At  length,  several  of  the  Whigs  became 
so  thoroughly  disgusted  with  proceedings  that  they  announced  they  would 
vote  with  the  Democrats,  a  switch  that  deprived  the  anti-Masons  of  even  a 
phony  majority  in  the  House  and  enabled  the  Democrats  to  proceed  legally. 

129 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


The  Senate  continued  its  turmoil  for  ten  days  longer  when  it,  too,  organized. 
The  Legislature  now  declared  David  R.  Porter  to  have  been  elected  gover- 
nor, barely  in  time  to  meet  the  January  1  inauguration  date. 

Buchanan  did  not  join  the  throng  of  Democrats  which  descended 
on  Huntingdon  to  press  claims  on  the  governor-elect.  He  had  long  since 
impressed  upon  Porter  that  his  nomination  had  resulted  from  the  voluntary 
retirement  from  the  field  of  both  Wolf  and  Muhlenberg,  and  that  the  new 
Administration  ought  to  conciliate  these  two  factions.  If  Porter  should 
ally  with  either  one  or  try  to  create  his  own  Democratic  machine,  he  would 
surely  wreck  himself  and  jeopardize  the  national  prospects  of  the  party 
in  1840.  Porter  recognized  the  problem  and  did  his  best  to  steer  a  middle 
course,  giving  important  jobs  to  representatives  of  all  the  major  Democratic 
segments.  Buchanan  urged  him  to  support  the  Van  Burcu  program  and 
promised  to  promote  appropriate  federal  appointments. 

Buchanan  now  began  to  work  out  the  details  of  a  plan  which  he 
had  been  toying  with  for  the  past  several  years.  Van  Buren  would  certainly 
run  for  a  second  term  as  president,  but  lie  would  probably  not  demand  the 
renomination  of  Richard  M.  Johnson  as  his  running  mate.  As  Johnson 
had  dragged  down  the  ticket  in  1836,  a  number  of  men  were  already  openly 
canvassing  for  his  place,  among  them  Senator  Thomas  Hart  Bcnton  and 
Secretary  of  State  Forsyth.  Buchanan  proposed  William  R.  King  of 
Alabama  for  the  vice-presidency. 

King's  nomination  would  have  multiple  advantages.  It  would 
eliminate  both  Forsyth  and  Johnson;  it  would  put  on  the  ticket  a  man 
whom  Buchanan's  partisans  in  Pennsylvania  could  consider  to  be  his 
choice,  and  this  belief  would  help  to  bring  out  the  vote;  and  it  would 
please  the  South.  But  most  important  of  all>  it  would  pave  the  way  for 
the  election  of  James  Buchanan  as  president  in  1844.  King  frankly  told 
his  roommate  that  if  he  became  vice-president,  he  would  not  permit  the 
consideration  of  his  name  for  the  presidency  in  '44.  Furthermore,  he 
would  use  his  influence  to  promote  Buchanan's  nomination* 

This  plan  looked  good  to  Buchanan.  Pennsylvania's  Democrats 
were  closer  to  real  unity  than  they  had  been  since  the  governorship  of 
Simon  Snyder;  if  Porter  played  the  game  he  would  be  re-elected  and  the 
state  administration  would  support  Buchanan  in  the  18*14  convention. 
New  York  Democracy  was  in  the  midst  of  schism;  but  New  York,  like 
Pennsylvania,  would  have  learned  its  lesson  and  would  be  back  on  the 
Democratic  track  in  five  years.  New  York  by  then  would  have  had  the 
vice-presidency  and  the  presidency  for  twelve  years:  she  would  be  com- 
pelled to  relinquish  further  claims  and  support  a  neighbor*  The  border 
states,  too,  had  been  favored:  Virginia,  Tennessee,  and  Kentucky,  Van 
Buren  was  the  only  uncertain  part  of  the  program.  What  would  he  think? 


130 


WISE  AS  THE  SERPENT  •   1838  - 1841 

Would  he  deliver  the  goods  in  Pennsylvania  to  men  who  would  work 

for  King?1 

At  Buchanan's  suggestion,  Democratic  editors  began  puffing 
King  and  laying  the  propaganda  groundwork  for  a  formal  movement.  The 
appearance  of  their  articles,  however,  touched  off  countermoves.  The 
Dallas  men  of  Philadelphia  and  the  pro-Bank  Democrats  of  western  Pennsyl- 
vania, who  were  hostile  to  Buchanan,  hoomed  Forsyth  as  the  Pennsylvania 
choice  for  vice-president.2  By  the  summer  of  1839,  Buchanan  thought 
that  the  Forsyth  movement  had  failed  and  that  King  would  be  nominated 
unless  "Old  Tecumseh"  (Richard  M.  Johnson)  should  insist  upon  running 
again.3  The  Democratic  members  of  the  Legislature  even  gave  Buchanan 
a  testimonial  dinner,  together  with  the  governor  and  other  dignitaries, 
an  unprecedented  mark  of  party  harmony.4 

This  happy  augury  failed  to  take  into  account  the  vagaries  of 
state  politics.  Governor  Porter  did  his  part,  giving  Buchanan's  friends  a 
fair  share  of  the  patronage,  but  the  leaders  of  the  factions  refused  to  be 
disciplined.5  The  governor,  for  example,  bestowed  favors  on  the  Harris- 
burg  Keystone,  which  had  been  in  the  past  a  violent  anti-Muhlenberg, 
anti-Buchanan  sheet.  The  Keystone  kept  pounding  at  the  anti-Buchanan 
line  and  spread  abroad  a  conclusion,  quite  erroneous,  that  the  governor 
had  gotten  into  a  fight  with  the  Senator.  As  a  result,  the  Buchanan 
journals  began  to  lambast  the  Keystone  and  from  here  it  was  natural  to  go 
on  to  attack  the  governor.  The  Dallas  men  took  advantage  of  this  presumed 
rupture  to  promote  their  interests  by  cultivating  the  anti-Buchanan  move- 
ment centering  on  Forsyth.  Cameron,  just  back  from  his  Winnebago 
Indian  Mission,  saw  a  chance  to  trouble  the  waters  to  his  advantage  and 
quietly  encouraged  all  Pennsylvania  Democrats  to  insist  upon  a  free  and 
easy  Bank  program,  the  very  thing  against  which  Porter  and  Buchanan 
had  pledged  themselves.  By  September,  Buchanan  was  discouraged.  "My 
name  has  often  been  mentioned  in  connection  with  the  Presidency  in 
1844,"  he  wrote,  but  Pennsylvania  would  never  unite  on  one  of  her  own 
sons  "with  such  energy  and  enthusiasm  as  to  make  him  successful. . . .  They 
care  little  for  their  own  men."6 

Felix  Grundy,  Attorney  General  of  the  United  States,  resigned 
in  December.  After  the  various  factions  got  in  their  bids,  Van  Buren 
offered  the  post  to  Buchanan  "although,"  he  added,  "I  have  no  reason  to 
suppose  that  it  would  be  desirable  to  you."7  It  was  not.  Buchanan  saw 
no  use  in  exchanging  the  senatorship  for  a  belated  invitation  to  take  a 
one-year  job  in  the  lowest  Cabinet  place.  In  declining  he  earnestly  urged 
the  appointment  of  the  governor's  brother,  James  M.  Porter,  but  the 
president  next  offered  the  appointment  to  George  M.  Dallas,  recently  back 
from  Russia.  Dallas  refused  and  the  office  went  to  Henry  M.  Gilpin  of  Phila- 
delphia, a  gentleman  unpopular  both  with  Porter's  and  Buchanan's  friends. 

131 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


"The  President's  disposition  towards  myself  is  proclaimed  upon 
the  house-top,"  Buchanan  wrote  to  Porter.  The  King  movement  in  Penn- 
sylvania never  recovered  from  this  blow  to  Buchanan's  prestige  at  the 
critical  moment,  and  Vice-President  Johnson  embraced  the  opportunity 
to  announce  that  he  would  run  again.  Porter  could  have  used  aid  and 
comfort  from  the  national  administration  and  with  such  aid  he  might  well 
have  been  influenced  by  Van  Buren's  wishes,  but  without  it  he  would  have 
to  go  ahead  and  settle  the  state  banking  problem  on  the  basis  of  local 
interest.  As  a  result,  the  state  administration  ran  head-on  into  a  policy 
collision  with  the  national  administration  in  a  critical  election  year. 

Both  Democratic  party  policy  and  state  law  required  that  dis- 
tressed banks  should  resume  specie  payment  after  a  given  date.  This 
deadline  had  passed,  but  the  Pennsylvania  banks  insisted  that  they  could 
not  pay  specie";  let  the  governor  enforce  this  law,  and  a  new  panic  would 
immediately  ensue.  Porter  agreed  that  summary  specie  resumption  under 
existing  conditions  would  be  foolhardy,  but  he  had  a  variety  of  courses  he 
could  have  taken  which  would  have  protected  both  the  party  and  the  banks* 

His  decision,  announced  in  the  message  to  the  Legislature  in 
January,  1840,  emphasized  the  necessity  of  the  resumption  of  specie  pay- 
ments, but  Porter  declared  his  intention  not  to  force  this  until  it  could  be 
done  with  safety  to  the  general  economy.  Letters  quickly  piled  up  on 
Buchanan's  desk,  Anti-Bank  Democrats  were  "out  in  full  cry  against  the 
Message.  .  .  .  Many  are  looking  to  you  for  an  expression  of  opinion."8 
Buchanan  replied  to  Porter,  "You  have  perhaps  never  witnessed  anything 
like  the  exaltation,  either  felt  or  affected,  of  the  Whigs  here  when  the 
first  news  of  your  special  message  arrived."  He  knew  the  necessity  which 
prompted  the  message,  but  he  hoped  that  the  Legislature  would  settle  an 
early  date  for  resumption;  if  it  adjourned  without  action,  leaving  the 
banks  without  any  mandate  for  resumption,  "the  integrity  of  our  party 
will  be  in  great  danger."* 

THE  WHIGS  ATTACK 

The  Whigs  exploited  the  Bank  controversy  in  Pennsylvania  at  a  "union 
and  harmony"  meeting  at  Harrisbuxg  in  September  and  by  holding  their 
national  nominating  convention  at  the  same  place  on  December  4,  where 
they  chose  General  William  Henry  Harrison  for  president  and  John  Tyler 
of  Virginia  for  vice-president.  So  diverse  were  the  elements  of  Whiggery 
that  the  delegates  decided  to  issue  no  platform  statement  at  all;  if  they 
concentrated  on  hatred  of  Van  Buren  and  made  a  hero  of f  f01d  Tippecanoe," 
they  could  faring  in  Masons  and  anti-Masons,  slaveholders  and  abolitionists, 
friends  and  enemies  of  the  banks,  high  and  low  tariff  men,  manufacturers 

132 


WISE  AS  THE  SERPENT  •   1838  -  1841 


and  employees,  radicals  and  conservatives.  "The  Whig  party  is  very 
Catholic,"  Buchanan  declared.  "It  tolerates  great  difference  of  opinion."10 

The  situation  was,  indeed,  ridiculous.  The  party  which  but  a 
few  years  before  had  acknowledged  its  descent  from  the  Federalist  tradition 
of  government  by  the  rich  and  well-born,  now  turned  on  the  party  of  the 
"common  man,"  and  tried  to  make  it  appear  a  regime  of  royalty.  The 
Whigs  contrasted  King  Van  Buren,  riding  in  an  English-made  coach  more 
sumptuous  than  a  coronation  carriage  and  dining  regally  from  platters  of 
gold,  with  Old  Tippecanoe,  who  had  been  reared  in  a  log  cabin.  The 
Whigs  simply  took  the  pro-Jackson  campaign  program  of  1828,  used  it  for 
themselves,  and  created  a  wildly  exciting  canvass  with  hard  cider,  coon- 
skins,  and  log  cabin  festivals  all  over  the  country.  The  Democrats  vainly 
tried  to  stem  the  tide  with  sweet  reason  and  sarcasm. 

The  program  of  attack  on  Van  Buren  presupposed  attacks  on  all 
his  lieutenants.  In  Pennsylvania  there  was  a  very  effective  propaganda 
campaign  to  prove  that  Buchanan  had  urged  a  banking  program  that  would 
reduce  the  wages  of  labor  to  ten  cents  a  day.  "Ten  Cent  Jimmy,"  the 
pamphlets  were  labelled.  Buchanan,  in  formal  debate,  always  presented 
as  strongly  as  he  could  the  case  of  the  opposition,  and  then  proceeded  to 
demolish  it  systematically  by  his  own  arguments.  In  supporting  the 
Independent  Treasury  Bill,  he  had  outlined  the  terrible  conditions  which 
would  prevail  unless  banks  were  reformed  and  had  then  gone  on  to  show 
how  much  better  all  would  fare  under  the  proposed  bill.  Senator  John 
Davis  of  Massachusetts  took  the  first  section  of  this  speech,  and  offered  it 
as  Buchanan's  reasons  for  supporting  the  Independent  Treasury.  He 
took  the  "10  cents  a  day"  phrase  and  quoted  it  out  of  context,  asserting 
that  Buchanan  supported  the  Independent  Treasury  Bill  in  the  hope  that 
it  would  reduce  wages,  destroy  banks  and  deflate  property  values.  Davis's 
speeches,  when  circulated  in  print,  had  tremendous  political  impact. 

Forney  reported  from  Pennsylvania:  "I  do  not  know  when  I 
have  been  so  much  disgusted  with  the  course  of  any  political  opponent  as 
with  that  of  this  Mr.  Davis—.  .  .  He  must  be  either  a  mere  catspaw  of 
others,  or  a  weak,  addle-brained  man,  or  a  malignant  and  unscrupulous 

mffian When  I  see  the  effect  they  are  making  here,  by  means  of  his 

villainous  perversion  of  your  intelligible  Defence  of  the  laborer,  I  cannot 
but  put  such  a  construction  upon  his  unworthy  conduct.  Why,  Sir,  they 

have  flooded  this  county  with  his  so-called  Reply  to  you A  copy  has 

been  sent  to  nearly  every  Democrat His  whole  speech  is  the  assump- 
tion of  the  broad  ground  that  the  people  are  ignorant,  and  unable  to  dis- 
criminate between  right  and  wrong,"11 

The  human  mind  has  not  yet  discovered  the  way  of  counter- 
acting promptly  the  effect  of  the  bold  lie  propagated  by  the  prominent  man. 
History  is  full  of  pertinent  illustrations.  If  representative  government  has  a 

133 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


nemesis,  this  is  probably  it.  The  "Ten  Cent  Jimmy"  lie  seriously  weakened 
Buchanan  in  Pennsylvania. 

Forney  proposed  that  the  Democrats  "challenge  any  responsible 
member  of  the  opposition  here  to  join  in  the  republication  of  both  yours 
and  Davis'  speeches,  both  of  which  are  to  be  published  correctly  and  .  .  , 

bound  together,  and  so  circulated If  they  do  not  accept,  they  are  down 

forever."12  The  opposition  did  not  accept,  nor  was  it  down  forever. 
Instead,  it  proceeded  to  improve  its  advantage  by  reviving  the  "drop  of 
blood"  smear  and  sending  that  out  with  the  "Ten  Cent  Jimmy"'  pamphlets. 
Editor  Middleton,  of  the  Lancaster  Examiner,  did  much  of  the  printing.  He 
had  recently  distinguished  himself  by  shooting  James  Cameron  when 
Cameron  came  in  to  beat  him  up  for  other  lies  he  had  published.13  Bu- 
chanan was  for  "carrying  the  war  into  Carthage,"  but  his  friends  advised 
against  it.  "It's  only  giving  tone  to  falsehoods  by  heeding  them,"  wrote 

Judge  Champneys, 

Buchanan  made  several  long  defensive  speeches  in  the  Senate 
on  the  "Ten  Cent  Jimmy"  accusations.  "If  the  most  artful  and  unfair  man 
in  the  world  had  determined  to  destroy  any  public  measure,"  he  asked, 
"in  what  manner  would  he  most  effectually  damn  it  in  public  estimation? 
It  would  be  to  enumerate  all  the  terrible  consequences  which  would  flow 
from  it,  according  to  the  predictions  of  its  enemies,  and  put  them  into  the 
mouth  of  its  friends  as  arguments  in  its  favor.  There  could  not  by  possi- 
bility be  any  stronger  admission  of  its  evil  tendency.  .  .  .  This  is  the 
ridiculous  attitude  in  which  I  am  placed  by  the  Senator's  speech.  If  these 
imputations  were  well  founded,  I  must  be  one  of  the  most  ferocious  mm 
in  existence.  Destruction  must  be  my  delight.  No  wild  agrarian  in  the 
country  has  ever  thought  of  waging  such  an  indiscriminate  war  against 
all  property,  my  own  among  the  rest,  as  that  which  has  been  attributed  to 
me  by  the  Senator."14  But  Buchanan's  exposure  of  Davids  fraud  proved 
a  futile  effort.  People  found  it  easier  to  say  'Ten  Cent  Jimmy"  than  to  read 
a  rebuttal,  and  the  nickname  stuck. 

Meanwhile  the  Pennsylvania  Democratic  convention  met  on 
the  4th  of  March.  Except  for  the  Lancaster  County  delegation  which  cast 
its  votes  for  William  R.  King  as  vice-president  in  token  of  esteem  for 
Buchanan,  the  convention  voted  for  Van  Buren  and  Johimon  and  passed  a 
resolution  of  confidence  in  Porter.  But  it  did  not  dare  to  bring  upon  the 
floor  any  of  the  current  issues  and  adjourned,  like  the  Whigs,  with  no 
statement  of  policies. 

The  United  States  Senate  kept  Buchanan  in  Washington  until 
its  adjournment  late  in  July.  He  tried  to  manipulate  the  strings  of  politics 
in  the  Keystone  State  by  correspondence,  but  he  grew  more  and  more 
discouraged  because  of  the  attacks  on  him*  Furthermore,  it  seemed  utterly 
hopeless  to  reconcile  the  Democratic  factions  by  patronage,  though  both 


WISE  AS  THE  SERPENT  •    1838 -  1841 


he  and  Governor  Porter  were  in  full  agreement  on  "the  absolute  necessity 
of  union  and  harmony  between  the  state  and  national  administrations" 
and  the  wisdom  of  apportioning  the  state  offices.  Pittsburgh  and  Phila- 
delphia were  the  two  great  centers  of  trouble.  In  the  West,  Buchanan's 
friends  fought  Porter  and  demanded  that  a  new  name  be  introduced  for 
governor  in  1841.15  In  the  East,  the  pro-Bank  party  of  Dallas  knifed  both 
Buchanan  and  Porter  on  every  occasion.  Yet  both  groups  professed  their 
solid  support  of  Van  Buren.  The  president  had  contributed  some  of  the 
trouble  by  appointing  several  anti-Porter  Democrats  in  the  Pittsburgh  area. 
In  order  to  offset  these,  Buchanan  induced  Van  Buren  to  select  a  staunch 
Porter  man,  Calvin  Blythe,  for  the  collectorship  of  the  Port  of  Philadelphia, 
a  position  left  open  by  the  recent  death  of  George  Wolf.  Porter  gave 
evidence  of  his  solidarity  with  Buchanan  by  naming  some  of  his  particular 
friends  to  Philadelphia  judgeships.16  As  a  result  the  Philadelphia  Demo- 
crats were  so  furious  with  these  two  that  they  organized  gangs  to  break  up 
political  rallies  held  by  the  friends  of  Buchanan  and  Porter  in  that  city. 
The  leading  Democratic  journal  in  Philadelphia,  the  Pennsylvania^, 
refused  to  publish  any  of  Buchanan's  replies  to  the  Whig  attacks  on  him, 
charged  him  by  the  line  for  every  Senate  speech  which  he  wished  printed, 
and  purposely  omitted  the  complimentary  toasts  given  him  in  the  lists  of 
those  reported  from  various  meetings.17 

The  Muhlenberg  Democrats  of  Berks  County  invited  Buchanan 
to  appear  on  a  huge  program  they  had  arranged  for  the  4th  of  July.  Vice- 
President  Richard  M.  Johnson  was  to  be  the  main  attraction.  With 
intention  to  insult,  the  arrangements  committee  failed  to  invite  Governor 
Porter,  but  Buchanan  replied  sharply  that  he  would  appear  on  no  program 
of  such  general  interest  which  ignored  Porter  and  thus  forced  the  com- 
mittee to  send  him  an  invitation.18 

The  Fourth  of  July  celebrations  demonstrated  that  the  assaults 
on  Buchanan  had  begun  to  boomerang.  "Look  at  the  East— at  the  West—- 
at the  South— and  here  in  the  middle  states,"  wrote  Forney.  "Their 
celebrations  are  full  of  your  name.  You  are  right  when  you  say  that  this 
attack  upon  you  has  done  you  good.  It  has  been  a  god-send,  indeed!"19 
Whether  this  was  true  or  not,  the  Whig  campaign  against  Buchanan  only 
increased  in  intensity,  Simon  Cameron,  playing  a  game  of  political  black- 
mail,  dug  out  a  copy  of  an  old  1814  handbill  headed  "We  as  Federalists," 
signed  by  Buchanan  as  president  of  the  old  Washington  Association,  and 
sent  this  for  dissemination  to  Charles  B.  Penrose,  one  of  the  Democrats 
who  had  sold  himself  to  the  Bank  several  years  before,  and  was  now 
presumably  a  Whig.20 

But  more  was  yet  to  come.  In  a  campaign  speech  in  Lancaster 
Buchanan  spoke  of  the  efforts  of  the  anti-Masonic  Whigs  to  steal  the 
election  of  1838  by  the  Buckshot  War  in  Pennsylvania  aixd  of  a  similar 

135 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


affair  in  New  Jersey  the  same  year.  He  then  quoted  Whig  Senator  William 
C.  Preston  of  South  Carolina  who  had  stated  in  a  recent  speech  that  "he 
believed  Mr.  V.  Buren's  election  would  be  defeated  by  Constitutional  means, 
yet  if  those  means  were  insufficient— if  the  ballot  box  should  fail  him  — 
he,  for  one,  was  willing  to  resort  to  the  rights  and  arms  that  Nature  gave 
him."  A  few  days  later  the  Philadelphia  Whig  papers  came  out  with  an 
article  quoting  Buchanan  as  saying, 

I  believe  General  Harrison  will  be  defeated  by  Constitutional 
means,  yet  if  these  means  are  insufficient,  if  the  baJlot  box  should 
fail,  I  for  one  would  resort  to  the  rights  and  the  arms  which 
nature  gave  me.21 

Though  never  very  enthusiastic  about  stump-speaking  around 
the  circuit,  Buchanan  now  set  out  on  a  six-weeks  tour  of  the  Common- 
wealth, speaking  nearly  every  day.  He  opened  the  campaign  at  a  huge 
Democratic  jamboree  in  Lancaster  which  attracted  some  25,000  people. 
For  two  hours,  he  poured  fire  and  brimstone  into  the  enemy.  With  his 
speech  in  hand,  he  set  out  for  the  West:  Chamhersburg,  Greensburg, 
Pittsburgh,  Meadville,  Erie,  He  also  visited  the  northern  counties  and 
returned  home  by  the  end  of  September.  crl  arrived  here  from  Western 
Pennsylvania,"  he  wrote  Van  Buren,  "broken  down  in  voice  and  so  hoarse 
that  I  fear  I  shall  not  again  be  able  to  take  the  field  until  after  our  first 
election.  The  effort  of  frequently  addressing  immense  multitudes  of  people 
in  the  open  air  is  more  severe  than  I  could  have  anticipated.1*32  It  took 
some  stamina  to  be  a  working  politician*  Buchanan  much  preferred  his 
usual  method  of  campaigning  with  the  pen.  When  someone  chided  Clay 
for  a  particularly  cutting  remark  to  Buchanan  in  the  Senate,  he  replied: 
f 'Oh,  damn  him,  he  deserved  it*  He  writes  letterff*® 

The  state  elections  of  October  brought  uncertainty,  for  state 
politics  commanded  allegiances  and  represented  issues  «o  di&tinct  from 
the  national  contest  that  all  predictions  tasted  on  it  were  shaky.  The 
excitement  continued  hot  up  until  the  balloting  for  presidential  fhi'tor* 
in  November,  which  drew  almost  twice  as  many  voters  to  the  polls  aa  had 
the  fight  of  1836.  The  final  Pennsylvania  tallies  showed  that  the  Whigs 
had  a  grand  majority  of  350  votes  out  of  a  total  of  nearly  300,000,  The 
returns  were  heartbreakingly  close;  in  several  counties  a  few  dozen  votes 
spelled  the  difference  between  victory  and  defeat;  but  across  the  nation 
Harrison  captured  the  presidency  by  an  electoral  vote  of  294  to  60»  and  the 
Whigs  won  control  of  both  houses  of  Congress.34 

"I  never  was  so  much  astonished  or  disappointed  as  at  the  result 
in  Pennsylvania,"  Buchanan  wrote  to  Van  Buren.  "But  it  is  useless  to 
indulge  in  vain  regrets*  .  *  ,  The  Whigs  &  Anti-Masons  are  now  gloating 

136 


WISE  AS  THE  SERPENT*   1838  -  1841 


over  the  prospect  of  driving  me  from  the  Senate. . . .  Let  them  instruct  me 
to  vote  for  a  national  Bank,  and  I  shall  glory  in  my  political  martyrdom."25 

A  REGULAR  CHINESE  PUZZLE 

Buchanan  found  the  meaning  of  the  election  peculiarly  hard  to  decipher. 
His  own  county  of  Lancaster  and  that  of  his  birthplace,  Franklin,  had  given 
huge  Whig  majorities;  in  Huntingdon,  home  county  of  Governor  Porter, 
the  Whigs  had  also  won.  The  opposition,  of  course,  had  put  all  the  money 
and  men  it  could  into  these  particular  areas,  which  had  been  in  the  un- 
certain column  since  1828.  But  Philadelphia  had  gone  Democratic,  if 
only  by  a  whisker.  Here  the  pro-Bank  Democrats  did  better  against  the 
Whigs  than  anti-Bank  Democrats — a  regular  Chinese  puzzle.  Did  the 
election  mean  that  Van  Buren  would  have  to  be  run  in  1844  to  vindicate 
his  program,  or  did  his  defeat  mean  that  he  should  not  run  again?  Did 
the  election  mean  that  Porter  should  step  down  in  1841?  What  was  the 
political  aspect  of  the  State  Legislature?  The  anti-Masonic  Whigs  con- 
trolled the  Senate,  but  in  the  House  the  control  lay  in  the  hands  of  Phila- 
delphia Democrats,  who  agreed  with  the  Whigs  on  almost  all  financial 
questions.  Would  the  Legislature  instruct  Pennsylvania's  Senators  to 
destroy  the  Independent  Treasury  and  create  a  new  national  Bank?  And 
what  bearing  had  these  matters  on  Buchanan's  chances  for  the  presidency 
in  four  years?  He  was  sure  he  did  not  know,  but  he  did  know  one  thing: 
they  were  a  great  deal  less  promising  than  they  would  have  been  if  Little 
Van  were  in  the  White  House  with  King  as  his  vice-president. 

For  the  time  being  there  was  nothing  to  do  but  wait.  "Everything 
here  is  quiet,"  Buchanan  wrote  in  December.  "Our  true  policy  is  for  the 
present  to  leave  the  Whig  party  to  themselves.  This  party  contains  in 
itself  the  seeds  of  its  own  destruction,  if  they  are  permitted  to  germinate 
and  bring  forth  their  natural  fruit."26  "The  Whigs  are  composed  of  such 
heterogeneous  materials,"  he  assured  his  brother,  "that  they  will  probably 
fall  to  pieces."27 

Actually,  the  election  of  Harrison  helped  the  Pennsylvania  Demo- 
crats to  solve  their  major  problem,  the  Bank  issue,  for  the  state  politicians 
could  now  proceed  to  act  on  this  without  facing  pressure  and  loyalty-tests 
from  a  national  administration.  Buchanan  had  long  agreed  with  Porter 
on  the  common  sense  course,  though  the  two  had  been  forced  to  pull  in 
opposite  directions  because  of  the  political  requirements  of  their  respective 
positions.  Now  Buchanan  went  to  work  for  the  renomination  of  Porter 
for  governor,  as  the  move  best  calculated  to  promote  his  own  interests 

in  1844. 

William  Henry  Harrison  died  exactly  one  month  after  taking  the 
oath  of  office,  leaving  the  presidency  in  the  hands  of  Democrat  John  Tyler 

137 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


who  had  been  placed  on  the  Whig  ticket  as  part  of  a  weird  horse-trade  in 
Virginia  to  get  William  C.  Rives  into  the  Senate.  Rives,  elected  by  Virginia 
Democrats,  joined  with  the  Whigs  in  Congress;  Tyler,  elected  by  the  Whigs, 
now  rejoined  the  Democrats.28 

To  compound  the  shock,  Biddle's  Bank  suffered  a  run  shortly 
after  resuming  specie  payments  and  closed  its  doors  with  such  a  resounding 
crash  that  few  expected  they  would  ever  open  again.  "The  third  crash  of 
the  Bank  of  the  United  States  so  soon  after  its  resumption,"  wrote  Bu- 
chanan, "has  taken  us  all  by  surprise.  I  sincerely  hope  it  has  made  its  last 
struggle.  ...  As  long  as  it  shall  continue  to  exist,  it  will  continue  to 
derange  the  business  of  the  country."29 

What,  in  January,  had  looked  like  a  bleak  and  hopeless  prospect 
for  the  Democrats,  by  April  had  blossomed  into  a  whole  garden  of  new 
political  promise.  Porter  was  renominated  for  governor  with  the  united 
support  of  Buchanan,  Muhlenberg,  and  the  Philadelphia  Democrats,  a 
"devilish  strong  team/'30  There  was  scarcely  a  canvass;  the  Democrats 
sent  him  back  for  a  second  term  in  November,  1841  by  a  huge  majority 
over  his  Whig  opponent,  John  Banks. 

Porter  continued  to  be  the  key  to  Buchanan's  revived  aspirations 
for  the  presidency  in  1844,  for  the  fall  of  the  Bank  would  flatten  Dallas  in 
Philadelphia,  leaving  the  Commonwealth  solidly  in  the  hands  of  the 
governor  and  senator  in  alliance,  a  combination  that  seemed  to  be  the 
condition  precedent  to  a  serious  bid  for  the  White  House.  Porter,  under 
the  terms  of  the  new  state  Constitution,  would  have  to  retire  at  the  end 
of  his  second  term  and  leave  the  field  clear  for  Muhlenberg, 

By  August,  1841,  the  prospects  looked  even  better  than  they  had 
in  the  spring.  President  Tyler  had  just  vetoed  the  darling  measure  of  the 
Whigs,  a  bill  for  a  new  Federal  Bank.  His  message  had  prefaced  "prayers 
and  thanks  to  God  on  the  one  side;  and  imprecations  anil  eternal  vows  of 
vengeance  on  the  other."31  "Never  was  there  a  party  so  completely  used 
up  as  the  Whigs  have  been  in  so  short  a  time,"  wrote  Buchanan.  "A 
Manifesto  .  .  .  will  appear  tomorrow  from  the  Whigs  in  Congress  reading 
John  Tyler  out  of  the  Whig  Church  and  delivering  him  over  to  Satan  to 
be  buffeted."32 

Still,  there  were  plenty  of  thorny  problems*  to  solve.  Pennsylvania 
had  gone  bankrupt;  it  could  not  pay  the  interest  on  its  bomb.  Portrr  had 
delivered  a  strong  message  on  banking  reform  which  coincided  with 
Buchanan's  favorite  views:  prohibition  of  speculation  in  commodities  by 
banks;  state  supervision  of  note  issues  to  keep  them  within  the  limits 
permitted  by  charter;  elimination  of  bank  notes  under  $10  or  $20  in  order 
that  employers  would  have  to  pay  workmen  in  coin;  and  the  summary 
revocation  of  the  charter  of  any  bank  which  refused  to  redeem  its  notes 
in  specie  on  demand. 

138 


WISE  AS  THE  SERPENT  •    1838  -  1841 


But  the  Legislature,  still  closely  balanced  bet-ween  Whig  and 
Democratic  control,  drew  up  its  own  bill  and  proceeded,  with  the  usual 
support  of  pro-Bank  Democrats,  to  pass  it  over  the  governor's  veto.  By 
the  new  measure,  Pennsylvania  borrowed  $3,100,000  from  the  various 
banks  for  which  they  were  permitted  to  issue  paper  currency  against  the 
promissory  note  of  a  bankrupt  state!  There  was  no  requirement  of  specie 
payment,  no  control  of  bank  issues,  no  curtailment  of  small  notes — 
nothing  that  was  desired.  Buchanan  hit  the  ceiling,  "My  public  life  has 
been  stormy  and  tempestuous,"  he  wrote,  "but  no  political  event  has  ever 
made  me  despond  before.  The  last  night  was  the  first  which  I  have  ever 
spent  in  sleepless  anxiety. ...  It  would  seem  that  whether  the  Democratic 
party  are  successful  or  defeated  in  the  popular  elections,  the  result  in 

regard  to  Banks  is  always  the  same The  value  of  this  new  currency  will 

fluctuate  with  the  ever  fluctuating  value  of  [the  State  loan]  on  which 
alone  it  rests  , . . .  What  a  standard  of  value!  .  .  .  The  State  gives  ...  the 
Banks  .  .  .  the  privilege  of  perpetual  suspension.  What  miserable  hum- 
buggery!  What  could  have  been  the  reason  why  twelve  Democrats  de- 
serted us  and  voted  against  the  veto?"33 

The  same  combination  of  Whigs,  anti-Masons  and  pro-Bank 
Democrats  at  Harrisburg  used  their  tenure  up  to  the  election  of  October, 
1841,  to  embarrass  Buchanan  by  instructing  him  to  vote  against  the  Inde- 
pendent Treasury,  in  favor  of  Clay's  Bank  Bill,  in  favor  of  a  resolution  to 
expunge  the  expunging  resolution,  and  in  favor  of  the  Whig  land  program. 
He  obeyed  the  obnoxious  instructions  to  avoid  the  necessity  of  resigning, 
but  debated  vigorously  in  every  case  against  the  view  he  had  to  support 
on  roll  call,  justifying  himself  by  the  declaration  that  he  spoke  his  own 
views  but  was  bound  to  respect  his  instructions. 

The  1844  presidential  race  began  the  moment  General  Harrison's 
coffin  was  lowered  into  the  grave.  Van  Buren?  Calhoun?  Benton? 
Buchanan?  Tyler?  R.  M.  Johnson?  Who  would  lead  the  Democracy? 
The  field  looked  so  large  and  the  results  so  uncertain  that  the  friends  of 
Dallas  and  the  Bank  got  up  their  own  private  movement  in  favor  of  Com- 
modore Charles  Stewart  as  Pennsylvania's  favorite  son.  "The  Commodore 
has  money  enough,"  reported  Forney,  "as  those  fellows  know,  and  if  he 
is  willing  to  bleed  to  have  his  name  in  print  everyday,  why  let  him  enjoy 
the  novel  immortality."34 

Ridiculous  as  the  drive  was,  Buchanan  got  quite  excited  about  it. 
The  Stewart  mangers  bought  up  a  whole  string  of  editors  who  divided  their 
efforts  between  belittling  Buchanan  and  puffing  Stewart.  If  anything  could 
upset  his  prospects,  Buchanan  thought,  just  such  a  program  might  do  it; 
you  could  meet  an  antagonist  who  was  well  known,  but  how  could  you 
handle  a  man  with  no  political  record?  As  the  rash  of  "Old  Ironsides" 
Clubs  spread,  Buchanan  marshalled  his  editors  into  defensive  line.  The 

139 


battle  turned  out  to  be  mainly  a  newspaper  fight,  but  in  the  course  of  it  the 
Buchanan  and  Porter  journals  resumed  their  old-time  feud  and  spread 
abroad  the  suggestion  that  Porter  would  oppose  Buchanan's  bid  for  re- 
election  to  the  Senate  which  was  just  a  year  away.35 

From  Pittsburgh  Buchanan  got  the  warning:  "Porter  is  no  friend 
of  yours  and  a  dishonest  politician,"  He  would  trample  his  best  friend  to 
get  ahead  and  was  covertly  promoting  a  southern  candidate  for  president 
to  get  the  second  office  himself.36  But  Philadelphia  reported  that  "Porter 

is  opposed  to  Stewart,  and  will  take  bold  ground  for  you The  Stewart 

business  is  directed  entirely  against  you."37 

Buchanan's  friends  worked  desperately  to  bolster  him  up.  "You 
must  drive  through!"  they  told  him.38  "Put  your  hand  fairly  to  the  plough 
and  play  the  game.  Lay  aside  your  usual  modesty  and  neither  look  back  nor 
hesitate."39  ''Pennsylvania  will  be  all  right"  they  assured  him.  "Stewart 
is  hung  at  the  political  yardarm,  and  knows  you  are  the  rising  and  strong 
man."  Forget  about  them  all,  even  Van  Buren.  People  were  "furiously 
at -loggerheads"  about  him,  and  as  for  Tyler,  "he  don't  go  with  the 
democrats."40 

These  men  had  some  reason  for  their  concern,  because  Buchanan 
had  developed  a  reputation  for  being  unwilling  to  fight  on  his  own  behalf. 
This  trait  governed  much  of  his  political  thinking,  and  no  phase  of  his 
character  bred  more  doubts,  misunderstanding,  and  contempt  among  his 
contemporaries.  Buchanan  had  a  phenomenal  capacity  for  detachment; 
he  could  view  himself  from  outside  himself  and  criticize  freely  what  he 
saw.  He  even  wrote  his  'memoirs  in  the  third  person.  He  continually 
placed  himself  and  his  friends  on  stage  and  went  to  the  back  of  the  theater 
to  look  the  cast  over  and  figure  out,  with  total  lack  of  appreciation  of  the 
personal  impulses  of  the  actors,  what  they  ought  to  do  to  perfect  the  play. 
He  was  the  very  opposite  of  John  Forney,  his  excitable,  hotly  emotional, 
young  editor  of  the  Lancaster  Intelligencer. 

Forney  lived  in  cycles  of  Stygian  gloom  or  celestial  happiness; 
all  men  were  either  his  bosom  friends  or  bitter  enemies;  insults  had  to  be 
promptly  avenged,  if  possible  by  a  fist  fight,  and  favors  had  to  be  promptly 
repaid  by  favors.  His  was  a  life  of  lavish  generosity  and*  bankruptcy,  of 
jubilation  and  hangover.  Forney's  life  depended  upon  Buchanan's  political 
success;  he  attached  himself  like  a  leech,  worked  his  heart  out,  and  frankly 
admitted  that  his  object  was  to  get  future  patronage. 

Because  of  his  violent  temper,  Forney  continually  got  Buchanan 
into  trouble.  He  would  see  an  insult  where  none  was  intended,  and  fre- 
quently took  the  bait  of  a  sly  remark  purposely  tendered  to  get  a  rise  out 
of  him.  An  able  and  powerful  advocate,  Forney  regarded  himself  as 
Buchanan's  confidential  political  manager,  explosively  attacked  any  pre- 
sumed rival,  and  caused  a  great  deal  of  resentment  among  Buchanan's 

140 


other  friends.  For  years  Buchanan  kept  the  tight  rein  on  Forney,  writing 
him  to  stop  his  attacks  on  editors  or  politicians  whose  support  he  needed. 
Why,  Forney  complained,  did  he  not  stick  100  per  cent  with  his  true 
friends  and  throw  the  others  out  of  the  window?  Because,  Buchanan 
would  explain  patiently  but  with  tart  precision,  no  man  had  enough  100 
per  cent  true  friends  to  elect  him  dogcatcher;  only  united  effort  could  win; 
union  could  only  be  achieved  by  compromise,  never  by  force.  Force  only 
achieved  two  things:  either  the  total  destruction  of  one  part  of  those  who 
disagreed,  or  a  fight  which  destroyed  both  parties.  Both  results  lost 
elections.  Forney  must  curb  his  personal  feelings  oy  Buchanan  would 
lose;  and  if  Buchanan  lost,  Forney  would  certainly  lose.  Could  anything 
be  plainer? 

Buchanan  used  the  dependence  of  others  on  him  by  threatening, 
when  they  became  insubordinate,  to  withdraw  from  politics  or  from  Penn- 
sylvania. When  he  felt  that  his  editors  were  not  active  enough  in  repelling 
the  "drop  of  blood"  and  "Ten  Cent  Jimmy"  canards,  he  used  this  technique 
and  received  the  answer  he  expected  from  Forney:  "I  am  sorry,  indeed  I 
may  say  alarmed  at  the  intimation  you  threw  out  of  leaving  Lancaster. . . . 
The  whole  county  have  taken  you  to  their  heart  of  hearts;  defending  you 
the  more  you  are  assailed. . . .  Depart  from  Lancaster!  Besides  the  shock  it 
must  be  to  your  friends— and  I  confess  I  speak  interestedly— it  would  be, 
as  a  matter  of  policy,  .  .  .  wrong  in  the  extreme.  Pardon  me  when  I  say 
that  we  look  up  to  you  as  our  stay  and  support."41  Time  and  again 
Buchanan  resorted  to  this  technique,  but  Forney  caught  on  quickly  and  in 
times  of  crisis  would  play  the  same  game,  announcing  his  intention  to  quit 
his  newspaper  and  take  up  law,  a  threat  usually  good  for  a  kind  letter  and  a 
loan  of  several  hundred  dollars  from  his  patron. 

Buchanan  wanted  the  presidency  but  in  a  peculiar  way;  he  did 
not  want  to  win  it,  he  wanted  to  be  invited  into  it.  In  September,  1841, 
he  wrote,  "I  would  not  wish  you  to  bring  out  my  name  as  a  candidate  for 
the  Presidency.  It  is  yet  too  soon  to  agitate  this  question  in  the  Public 
Journals;  and  any  premature  movement  would  only  injure  the  individual 
it  was  intended  to  benefit.  Besides  I  have  no  ambitious  longings  on  this 
subject.  Let  events  take  their  course;  and  iny  only  desire  is  that  at  the 
proper  time,  the  individual  may  be  selected  as  our  candidate  who  will  best 
promote  the  success  of  the  party  &  its  principles."42  He,  of  course,  would 
be  this  person  but  a  gentleman  could  not  say  so.  "In  regard  to  the  Presi- 
dency," he  told  Reynolds,  "the  real  contest  would  seem  to  be  between  Van 
Buren  &  myself;  &  if  the  Democracy  of  Penna.  would  sustain  me  with  an 
unbroken  front  I  think  my  chances  are  fully  equal  if  not  superior  to  his. . . . 
Should  there  be  even  the  appearance  of  a  serious  division  in  Penna.,  I 
shall  make  my  bow  and  retire.9943 


141 


11 

THIS  I  BELIEVE  •  1834-1845 

THE  CREED  OF  A  CONSERVATIVE 

By  the  time  the  election  of  1844  drew  near,  Buchanan  had  already  served 
twenty  years  as  a  legislator.  The  decade  he  spent  in  the  Senate  brought 
him  into  daily  contact  with  probably  the  most  distinguished  group  of 
American  statesmen  ever  assembled  there,  a  company  including  not  only 
five  future  Presidents  of  the  United  States  (Van  Buren,  Tyler,  Polk, 
Fillmore,  and  Pierce)  but  also  such  parliamentary  giants  as  Webster,  Clay, 
Calhoun  and  Benton.  In  this  remarkable  galaxy  of  American  politicians, 
Buchanan  always  stood  on  the  periphery.  He  never,  in  all  his  legislative 
career,  had  his  name  attached  to  an  important  bill  or  became  the  focal 
point  of  public  interest  in  a  debate.  He  had  talent  for  clear  thinking  but 
none  for  self-dramatization.  He  brought  to  the  senatorship  great  serious- 
ness of  purpose,  readiness  to  debate  and  forensic  ability,  loyalty  to  party, 
diligence  in  seeking  facts,  and  a  consistency  of  view  which  made  his  stand 
on  public  questions  easily  predictable  and  gained  him  the  nickname  "friend 
of  the  obvious."  With  these  tools  of  his  trade  he  quietly  exerted  a  great 
deal  of  influence  on  important  legislation,  but  his  steady  craftsmanship 
attracted  little  public  attention.  It  did,  however,  gain  the  respect  and 
often  the  admiration  and  thanks  of  his  colleagues. 

The  well-ordered  intellectual  world  of  James  Buchanan  rested 
upon  principles  behind  which  he  rarely  probed,  and  upon  them  he  logi- 
cally developed  his  political  views.  "Abstract  propositions,'*  he  once  said, 
"should  never  be  discussed  by  a  legislative  body/7  and  he  might  have  added 
that  concrete  propositions  should  never  depart  very  far  from  the  status 
quo  or  anticipate  any  very  rapid  change  of  society. 

Buchanan  believed  that  the  essence  of  self-government  was 
restraint.  Written  constitutions,  he  thought,  were  the  most  useful  inven- 
tion of  his  age,  but  what  were  constitutions  "but  restraints  imposed,  not 
by  arbitrary  authority,  but  by  the  people  upon  themselves  and  their  own 
representatives?"  "Restraint,*'  he  said,  "restraint.  ...  Sir,  this  Federal 

142 


THIS  I  BELIEVE  •   1834-1845 


Government ...  is  nothing  but  a  system  of  restraints  from  beginning  to 
end."  That  alone  could  preserve  a  Union  of  several  dozen  states  which 
differed  from  each  other  in  their  institutions,  their  people,  their  language, 
their  soil,  climate,  and  products.  In  an  enlarged  view  their  interests 
might  appear  to  be  identical,  but  "to  the  eye  of  local  and  sectional  preju- 
dice," he  noted,  "they  always  appear  to  be  conflicting."  Therefore, 
jealousies  would  perpetually  arise  which  could  be  repressed  only  "by 
that  mutual  forbearance  which  pervades  the  Constitution."1  Mutual 
forbearance,  mutual  accommodation,  the  avoidance  of  extremes,  the 
willingness  of  a  majority  to  extend  some  consideration  to  the  minority, 
the  acceptance  of  compromise  as  the  only  method  short  of  war  or  despot- 
ism for  settling  political  disputes,  these  attitudes  alone  could  perpetuate 
self-government  and  the  federal  system. 

In  his  senatorial  career,  Buchanan  approached  most  closely  the 
role  of  statesman,  for  here  he  uniformly  took  the  long  view.  His  recom- 
mendations on  domestic  and  foreign  policy,  though  attacked  at  one  time 
or  another  by  every  geographic  section,  were  consistent  and  have  remained 
remarkably  sound.  At  the  base  lay  the  conviction  that  political  power, 
in  whatever  form  it  existed,  must  always  be  held  in  check,  and  that  the 
United  States  Constitution  provided  all  the  machinery  necessary  for 
this  purpose. 

Buchanan  remained  continually  alert  to  partisan  attacks  upon 
the  delicate  balances  which  the  Constitution  provided.  As  a  Representative 
he  had  led  the  battle  to  prevent  Congress  from  emasculating  the  power  of 
the  Supreme  Court  by  repealing  its  authority  to  review  state  legislation. 
As  a  Senator,  he  vigorously  and  successfully  fought  an  effort  of  Clay  and 
Webster  to  deprive  the  president  of  the  power  to  remove  executive  officers, 

*_± ^______^_i«  _..1_  ^  M.1*.  MBAVMA.JI  lf?wt  •fr/'v  AVMVVI  ATI/»A  &mr\Y\fe  c  01*1  one  stuff  ATI  "fro 


of  constitutional  law.  To  give  the  Senate  power  to  pass  on  executive  re- 
movals would  subordinate  the  president  to  the  Congress,  "a  position,*' 
said  Buchanan,  "in  which  the  Constitution  of  the  country  never  intended 
to  place  him."2 

In  the  debate  to  expunge  the  Senate's  resolution  censuring  Presi- 
dent Jackson,  he  pointed  out  the  constitutional  problem:  the  Senate  by 
convicting  an  executive  officer  without  a  hearing,  witnesses,  or  counsel 
had  destroyed  its  competence  to  act  later  as  a  court  of  impeachment.  But 
if  the  resolution  condemning  the  president  as  a  tyrant  and  usurper  had 
any  basis  of  fact,  then  the  executive  should  stand  trial.  Buchanan  warned 
that  the  procedure  of  legislative  censure  could  easily  lead  to  a  star-chamber 
substitute  for  impeachment,  enable  the  Senate  to  destroy  at  will  any 
executive  officer,  and  thus  overthrow  the  structure  defined  in  the  Consti- 
tution.3 On  another  occasion  he  jumped  to  the  defense  of  the  veto  power 
of  the  president  which  angry  Whigs,  after  Tyler's  veto  of  the  Bank  Bill, 

143 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


tried  to  amend  out  of  the  Constitution.  Throughout  his  political  career, 
Buchanan  could  be  found  among  those  who  tried  to  define  clearly  and  to 
keep  strong  the  delicate  lines  which  separated  the  three  branches  of 
government  and  the  functions  of  state  and  federal  administrations.  He 
did  not,  like  Calhoun,  propose  state  supremacy;  or  like  Webster,  seek  a 
consolidated  national  government;  but  he  sought  to  keep  the  state  and 
federal  entities  in  their  separate  orbits,  revolving  without  collision  around 
the  sun  of  the  system,  the  Constitution. 

The  great  national  economic  issues  of  the  1830's  were  the  tariff, 
banking,  and  public  land.  Buchanan  condemned  both  free  trade  and 
prohibitive  tariffs  because  either  system  would  impoverish  one  or  another 
part  of  the  nation.  Why  should  the  northern  Whigs  and  Democrats  want 
to  bankrupt  the  South  by  the  protective  tariff  of  1842?  And  why  should 
the  southerners  think  it  sensible  to  hold  conventions  in  favor  of  free  trade, 
which  would  only  put  northern  manufacturers  out  of  business?  Thus  he 
addressed  the  Senate,  complaining  all  the  while  that  he  was  "exposed  to 
fires  from  both  sides,  Mr.  Clay  and  Mr.  Calhoun." 

Buchanan  voted,  under  instruction,  for  the  high  protective  tariff 
of  1842  but  stated  that  he  disapproved  of  the  bill.  He  predicted,  accurately, 
that  the  measure  would  be  replaced  by  another  bill  sponsored  by  the  South 
which  would  be  too  low,  and  that  both  enactments  would  prove  contrary 
to  the  best  public  interest.  Why  not  split  the  difference  and  permit  both 
sections  to  share  in  a  modest  local  prosperity,  instead  of  using  partisan 
politics  to  aid  one  section  to  grow  rich  upon  the  ruins  of  another?  Such 
a  political  program  he  would  always  resist.  Let  people  call  him  a  trimmer, 
or  vacillating,  or  whatever  they  wished;  he  would  sustain  a  balanced  tariff 
as  constructive  policy  for  the  United  States,  and  he  would  urge  it  in  the 
face  of  Webster,  Calhoun,  the  Pennsylvania  ironmasters,  and  the  Mis- 
sissippi planters.  "I  am  viewed,"  he  said,  "as  the  strongest  advocate  of 
protection  ...  in  other  States:  whilst  I  am  denounced  as  its  enemy  in 
Pennsylvania."4 

Buchanan  took  the  same  middle-ground  position  on  the  Bank 
question.  He  strongly  opposed  unregulated  state  banking  but,  with  equal 
vigor,  opposed  the  control  of  banks  by  the  state.  He  wanted  enough  hard 
money  in  circulation  to  pay  workingmen's  wages,  but  he  was  enough  of  a 
businessman  and  banker  himself  to  know  that  an  expanding  national 
economy  demanded  an  elastic  currency.  His  proposals  for  banks  showed 
there  was  a  wide  range  of  alternatives  between  wildcat  banking  and 
total  control. 

Tariff  and  banking  problems  became  entangled  with  the  public 
land  policy  of  the  federal  government.  Demand  for  public  land  encouraged 
rash  overissues  of  state  bank  notes;  this  currency,  when  paid  into  the 
public  treasury  for  land,  created  a  surplus  on  the  government  books;  and 

144 


THIS  I  BELIEVE  •   1834  - 1845 


when  a  surplus  showed,  pressure  mounted  to  cut  down  the  tariff  rates. 
Then,  when  the  paper  money  forwarded  by  the  treasury  to  the  state  banks 
for  redemption  proved  worthless,  the  surplus  was  wiped  out  and  the 
treasury  could  not  pay  its  bills  with  the  tariff  duties  alone.  Thus,  tariff, 
banks,  and  public  land  formed  parts  of  a  single  economic  problem. 

For  years  the  politicians  had  agreed  to  distribute  any  surplus 
arising  from  the  sale  of  federal  land  to  the  individual  states  in  order  to 
draw  off  this  eccentric  source  of  revenue  and  to  render  the  tariff  fixed  and 
certain.  In  opposing  this  practice,  Buchanan  shrewdly  observed  that  no 
legislator  would  vote  money  for  federal  projects  if  he  knew  that  a  share 
of  any  unspent  money  went  to  his  home  state.  "Man  at  his  best  is  but  a 
frail  being,"  he  said.  If  you  placed  his  interest  on  the  one  side  and  his 
duty  on  the  other,  he  would  generally  promote  his  private  advantage. 
Buchanan  also  foresaw  a  fight  over  the  terms  of  distribution,  whether  pro 
rata  to  the  states  or  in  proportion  to  their  population,  the  very  question 
which  had  nearly  wrecked  the  Constitutional  Convention  of  1787.  To 
avoid  all  these  problems  he  proposed  to  apply  the  surplus  to  the  national 
defense  establishment.  "With  this  money,"  he  said,  "you  might  increase 
your  navy,  complete  your  fortifications,  and  prepare  for  war;  and  you 
would  thus  distribute  its  benefits  more  equally  and  justly  among  the  people 
than  you  could  do  in  any  other  manner."6  This  proposal,  side-tracking 
local  interest  and  concentrating  attention  on  a  new  and  larger  objective, 
typified  Buchanan. 


FOREIGN  AFFAIRS 

Buchanan's  reference  to  preparing  for  war  reflected  the  agitated  state  of 
foreign  affairs  in  the  1830's.  A  war  with  France  had  narrowly  been 
averted;  war  with  Mexico  over  Texas  seemed  a  real  possibility;  and  rela- 
tions with  England  were  strained  by  a  succession  of  events:  the  Caroline 
affair  of  1837-1838,  the  Aroostook  War  in  1839,  the  Creole  affair  of  1841, 
and  the  Oregon  Question. 

Buchanan,  chairman  of  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee 
for  five  years  before  the  election  of  Tyler  and  an  active  member  of  the 
Committee  thereafter,  brought  in  several  reports  on  the  Maine  boundary 
dispute  before  Webster  became  Secretary  of  State  and  began  formal 
negotiations  with  the  British. 

Buchanan  reported  that  the  Committee  did  not  "entertain  a 
doubt  of  the  title  of  the  United  States  to  the  whole  of  the  disputed  terri- 
tory," but  three  years  later  Secretary  of  State  Webster,  considering  the 
maintenance  of  friendly  relations  with  Britain  to  be  more  important  to 
the  United  States  than  the  acquisition  of  a  small  segment  of  Maine,  met 

145 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Lord  Ashburton  in  a  conciliatory  spirit  and  agreed  to  a  compromise 
settlement.6 

The  Webster-Ashburton  Treaty  passed  the  Senate  in  1842  by  a 
large  majority,  but  Buchanan  voted  against  it  for  reasons  which  he  ex- 
plained at  great  length.  After  detailing  the  voluminous  evidence  sustaining 
the  American  claim,  he  denounced  Webster  for  failing  to  use  his  bargaining 
power  to  advantage.  If  he  had  insisted  on  America's  rights  in  this  matter, 
he  might  have  won  concessions  in  others.  He  might  have  negotiated  a 
settlement  of  the  Northwest  Boundary  Dispute,  obtained  redress  for  the 
Creole  and  Caroline  outrages,  and  forced  Britain  to  abandon,  her  policy  of 
impressment  on  the  high  seas.  Webster  had  not  used  diplomacy.  He  had 
given  up  American  territory  for  nothing,  and  prospects  for  settling  other 
Anglo-American  problems  were  now  no  better  than  ever.  Buchanan  called 
the  treaty  c'an  unqualified  surrender  of  our  territory  to  British  dictation.'*7 

At  the  opposite  end  of  the  country,  along  the  southwestern  border, 
tension  had  risen  nearly  to  the  breaking  point.  The  Mexican  government 
found  it  difficult  to  maintain  order  and  could  not  protect  the  lives  and 
property  of  foreigners.  Claims  of  injured  United  States  citizens  against 
Mexico  multiplied  rapidly  and  American  business  there,  once  estimated  at 
$3,000,000  per  year,  dropped  to  $300,000.  Then  Texas  revolted.  The 
Texans,  most  of  them  emigrants  from  the  United  States,  set  up  the  Lone 
Star  Republic,  invited  diplomatic  recognition,  and  petitioned  for  admission 
to  the  United  States. 

The  Texas  revolution  of  1836  and  the  Canadian  revolution  of 
1837  soon  demonstrated  the  need  for  a  stiffening  of  the  American  neu- 
trality laws,  for  American  citizens  became  involved  in  both  affrays. 
Buchanan  now  proclaimed  the  doctrine  of  the  good  neighbor.  "We  have 
three  neighbors  on  our  frontiers,"  he  said,  "Canada,  Texas  and  Mexico; 
and  the  duties  of  good  neighborhood  require  something  more  from  us  in 
relation  to  them  than  could  be  strictly  demanded  under  the  law  of  nations. 
...  It  is  our  duty  to  prevent  our  citizens  from  aiding  in  every  revolutionary 
movement  against  a  neighboring  government.  ...  It  is  against  all  reason 
and  justice  that  in  case  of  a  sudden  commotion  in  a  neighboring  country 
. . .,  the  citizens  of  the  United  States  should  be  permitted  to  take  part  with 
the  insurgents."8 

Carrying  this  doctrine  one  step  further,  he  urged  a  policy  of 
nonintervention  in  the  domestic  affairs  of  foreign  nations.  Petitions  had 
been  flooding  the  Senate  in  the  spring  of  1836  praying  Congress  "to  recog- 
nize the  independence  of  Texas,  and  ...  to  interpose  to  terminate  the 
conflict  which  now  rages  in  that  country."  It  was  natural,  Buchanan 
admitted,  for  the  sympathies  of  American  citizens  to  be  "earnestly  enlisted 
in  favor  of  those  who  drew  the  sword  for  liberty,"  but  to  act  on  such 
feelings  was  to  ignore  the  teaching  of  the  wisdom  of  the  past.  "We  should 

146 


THIS  I  BELIEVE  •   1834  -  1845 


never  interfere  in  the  domestic  concerns  of  other  nations,"  he  asserted. 
The  people  of  every  nation  had  the  absolute  right  to  adopt  any  form  of 
government  they  thought  proper,  and  the  United  States  ought  to  preserve 
the  strictest  neutrality.  "The  world  must  be  persuaded,"  he  insisted. 
"It  could  not  be  conquered."  Acting  on  these  principles,  the  United 
States  had  "always  recognized  existing  Governments  de  facto,  whether 
they  were  constitutional  or  despotic.  It  was  their  affair,  not  ours."9 

But  should  the  United  States  render  aid  to  Americans  struggling 
for  freedom  in  Texas?  No,  answered  Buchanan,  lest  there  be  "suspicion 
that  we  have  got  up  this  war  for  the  purpose  of  wresting  Texas  from  those 
to  whom  ...  it  justly  belongs."10  Should  the  independence  of  Texas  be 
recognized?  Yes,  "when  the  fact  of  their  actual  independence  was  estab- 
lished—then—and  not  till  then."  Was  any  act  of  the  United  States 
required  during  the  period  of  uncertainty?  Yes,  the  United  States  Govern- 
ment  should  rigorously  prosecute  "all  persons  who  might  attempt  to 
violate  our  neutrality  in  the  civil  war  between  Mexico  and  Texas"  and 
should  inform  Mexico  and  Texas  that  the  United  States  would  require 
them  both  to  scrupulously  respect  American  territory. 

On  March  3,  1837,  President  Jackson  recognized  the  independ- 
ence of  the  Republic  of  Texas.  The  Texans  had  already  voted  in  favor  of 
immediate  annexation  to  the  United  States.  These  acts  brought  the 
American  people  face  to  face  with  the  two  most  crucial  problems  of  the 
age:  territorial  expansion  and  slavery. 

EXPANSION  AND  SLAVERY 

Buchanan  vigorously  urged  territorial  expansion.  "This  I  believe,"  he 
said.  "Providence  has  given  to  the  American  people  a  great  and  glorious 
mission  to  perform,  even  that  of  extending  .  .  .  liberty  over  the  whole 
North  American  continent.  Within  less  than  fifty  years,  there  will  exist 
one  hundred  millions  of  free  Americans  between  the  Atlantic  and  Pacific 
oceans.  .  .  .  What,  sir!  prevent  the  American  people  from  crossing  the 
Rocky  Mountains?  You  might  as  well  command  Niagara  not  to  flow.  We 
must  fulfill  our  destiny."11 

But  how  could  the  nation  fulfill  this  destiny  without  spreading 
abroad  the  slavery  system?  "I  feel  a  strong  repugnance  by  any  act  of 
mine,"  wrote  Buchanan,  "to  extend  the  present  limits  of  the  Union  over 
a  new  slave-holding  territory."  The  acquisition  of  Texas,  he  hoped,  might 
"be  the  means  of  limiting,  not  enlarging,  the  dominion  of  slavery."  In 
every  state  not  dependent  upon  cotton  culture,  economic  pressure  would 
force  gradual  abolition.  Where  grain  became  a  staple,  slavery  would  bring 
bankruptcy,  and  "if  the  slave  don't  run  away  from  his  master,  the  master 
must  run  away  from  the  slave."  In  Texas,  slaves  would  run  off  into 

147 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Mexico  and  there  "mingle  with  a  race  where  no  prejudice  exists  against 
their  color."  Buchanan  thought  that  if  Texas  should  be  annexed,  it  would 
he  divided  into  four  or  five  states,  in  only  one  of  which  the  soil  and  climate 
would  support  slavery.  But  the  annexation  treaty  itself  ought  to  determine 
the  proportion  of  free  and  slave  states.  "Should  this  not  be  done,  we  may 
have  another  Missouri  question  to  shake  the  Union  to  its  center."12 

The  Senate,  in  Buchanan's  day,  was  full  of  the  sound  and  fury 
of  debates  on  slavery.  He  entered  prominently  into  the  discussions  about 
the  circulation  of  abolitionist  propaganda,  presided  over  the  committee 
which  had  to  solve  the  controversy  over  the  right  of  petition,  and  acted 
as  spokesman  for  the  North  against  Calhoun's  proposal  to  outlaw  all 
"intermeddling"  with  slavery  in  the  national  capital  or  the  territories. 

Several  southern  states,  facing  an  inundation  of  abolitionist 
writings  which  they  considered  an  incitation  to  riot,  outlawed  the  circula- 
tion of  such  literature.  The  Senate  considered  a  bill  authorizing  postmasters 
to  withhold  mail  they  knew  to  be  prohibited  by  state  law  and  destroy  it  if 
it  were  not  claimed  by  the  sender.  Buchanan  and  Webster  debated  this 
measure.  The  latter  argued  that  it  infringed  the  freedom  of  the  press  and 
that  mail,  as  private  property,  could  not  be  destroyed.  Buchanan  defended 
the  freedom  of  the  press,  but  he  stoutly  maintained  that  the  government 
had  the  right  to  refuse  to  distribute  pamphlets  intended  to  destroy  it.  He 
asserted  that  no  person  could  have  any  property  right  in  articles  which  the 
law  forbade  him  to  possess,  whether  the  prohibitory  law  was  state  or 
federal.  It  was,  said  Buchanan,  "a  question  not  of  property,  but  of  public 
safety,"  applicable  only  in  states  where  the  people  had  declared,  by  law, 
that  their  safety  was  threatened.13 

The  discussion  of  the  mails  linked  the  cause  of  abolition  with 
the  cause  of  civil  liberties.  This  connection,  so  exasperating  to  the 
defenders  of  the  Union,  was  further  emphasized  by  the  long  struggle  over 
the  right  of  petition.  The  House  of  Representatives,  faced  with  a  mountain 
of  petitions  from  some  500  antislavery  societies,  eventually  adopted  a  reso- 
lution to  tabl*  them  all.  This  so-called  "Gag  Resolution"  seemed  a  clear 
denial  of  the  right  of  petition  guaranteed  to  citizens  by  the  Constitution. 

Buchanan  became  the  center  of  the  Senate  fight  over  abolition 
petitions  when  his  colleagues  made  him  chairman  of  the  Committee  to 
consider  the  question  of  the  prohibition  of  slavery  and  the  skve  trade  in 
the  District  of  Columbia,  the  subject  of  most  of  the  petitions.  Buchanan 
fought  strenuously  against  an  outright  gag,  but  at  the  same  time  insisted 
that  no  splinter  group  of  citizens  should  be  permitted  to  stop  the  machinery 
of  government  by  abuse  of  the  petition  device.  As  the  debates  on  the 
circulation  of  abolition  mail  had  brought  him  into  conflict  with  Webster 
and  the  antislavery  forces,  the  debates  on  petitions  now  brought  him  into 
conflict  with  Calhoun  and  the  proslavery  advocates.  "I  have  not  found, 

148 


THIS  I  BELIEVE  •   1834  -  1845 


upon  the  present  occasion,"  he  noted  wryly,  "the  maxim  to  be  true,  that 
'in  medio  tutissimus  ibis.'  " 

When  Buchanan  presented  a  petition  from  the  Cain  Quarterly 
Meeting  of  the  Society  of  Friends,  referring  to  the  abolition  of  slavery  in 
the  District  of  Columbia,  Calhoun  moved  not  to  receive  it.  Buchanan 
replied:  "Let  it  once  be  understood  that  the  sacred  right  of  petition  and 
the  cause  of  the  abolitionists  must  rise  or  fall  together,  and  the  conse- 
quences may  be  fatal.  ...  We  have  just  as  little  right  to  interfere  with 
slavery  in  the  South,  as  we  have  to  touch  the  right  of  petition."14 

Calhoun  alleged  that  the  people  of  no  state  were  aggrieved  by 
conditions  in  the  District  of  Columbia;  what  went  on  there  was  none  of 
their  business;  it  was  the  concern  only  of  Congress  and  the  local  inhabit- 
ants. But  who,  asked  Buchanan,  is  to  judge  "whether  the  People  are 
aggrieved  or  not?  Is  it  those  who  suffer,  or  fancy  they  suffer,  or  the 
Senate.  The  Constitution  secures  the  right  of  being  heard  by  petition  to 
every  citizen;  and  I  would  not  abridge  it  because  he  happened  to  be  a  fool."15 

Buchanan  asked  Calhoun  to  withdraw  his  motion.  "Why  select 
the  very  weakest  position,  one  on  which  you  yourselves  will  present  a 
divided  front  to  the  enemy,"  he  asked,  "when  it  is  in  your  power  to  choose 
one  on  which  you  and  we  can  unite?  .  .  .  You  place  us  in  such  a  position 
that  we  cannot  defend  you,  without  infringing  the  sacred  right  of  petition. 
Do  you  not  perceive  that  the  question  of  abolition  may  thus  be  indissolubly 
connected  . .  .  with  a  cause  which  we  can  never  abandon?" 

Buchanan  proposed  that  the  Senate  should  accept  the  petitions 
but  reject  their  prayer.  To  those  who  could  not  see  any  difference  between 
tabling  and  rejecting  the  prayer,  he  suggested  the  difference  between  in- 
viting a  man  into  the  house,  hearing  his  proposition,  and  then  declining 
to  accept  it  or  kicking  him  downstairs  before  he  had  a  chance  to  speak. 
And  why  should  the  prayer  be  rejected?  Only  because  the  nation  was 
bound  in  honor  to  respect  the  promise  to  the  original  donors  of  the  District, 
that  slavery  would  not  be  disturbed  there  so  long  as  it  existed  in  Maryland 
and  Virginia. 

After  two  months  of  heated  discussion,  Buchanan's  motion  to 
accept  the  petition  but  reject  its  prayer  finally  came  up  for  a  vote  on  March 
9,  1836,  and  passed  36  to  10.  "I  rejoice  at  the  result  of  the  vote,"  he 
wrote.  "Abolition  is  forever  separated  from  the  right  of  petition.  The 
abolitionists  .  . .  must  now  stand  alone."16 

Buchanan's  mail  had  been  heavy  during  the  height  of  the  con- 
troversy. A  Quaker  wrote  him  that  the  question  had  broken  up  the  Cain 
meeting.17  Another  wrote  that  the  North  ought  to  thank  God  it  was  rid 
of  slavery  and  be  satisfied.18  Buchanan's  roommate,  King  of  Alabama, 
told  him  frankly  that  if  the  North  persevered  in  its  current  course,  "then 
we  will  separate  from  them."19  On  hearing  this,  Thomas  Elder  commented: 

149 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


"Let  them  withdraw  and  wade  in  blood  before  six  months."20  "It  is 
rapidly  becoming  a  question  of  union  or  disunion,"  wrote  Buchanan  to 
the  mayor  of  Pittsburgh.  "If  the  progress  of  the  abolition  societies  cannot 
be  arrested,  I  fear  the  catastrophe  may  come  sooner  than  any  of  us  antici- 
pate  Would  it  not  be  well  to  get  up  counter-societies  of  friends  of  the 

Union?"21 

John  C.  Calhoun  now  presented  to  the  Senate  an  inflammatory 

resolution: 

That  the  intermeddling  of  any  State  or  States,  or  their  citizens, 
to  abolish  slavery  in  this  District,  or  any  of  the  Territories,  .  .  .; 
or  the  passage  of  any  act  or  measure  of  Congress,  with  that  view, 
would  be  a  direct  attack  on  the  institutions  of  all  the  slave- 
holding  states.22 

Buchanan,  Benton,  and  most  of  the  northern  Democratic  Sen- 
ators labored  to  get  these  resolves  buried  in  a  select  committee  as  rapidly 
as  possible,  for  they  promised  nothing  but  another  acrimonious  and 
fruitless  debate  which  would  spread  its  poison  throughout  the  nation. 
Why,  asked  Buchanan,  are  our  southern  friends  continually  "driving  us 
into  positions  where  their  enemies  and  our  enemies  may  gain  important 
advantages."  Were  not  the  abolition  attacks  enough?  Did  the  South, 
too,  have  to  assault  the  Union  men  of  the  North?  "Abolition  thus  acquires 
force,"  he  said.  "Those  of  us  in  the  Northern  States  who  have  determined 
to  sustain  the  rights  of  the  slave-holding  states  at  every  hazard,  are  placed  in 
a  most  embarrassing  position.  We  are  almost  literally  between  two  fires*"23 

But  what  irked  Buchanan  most  was  the  fact  that  the  abolitionists 
were  preventing  the  achievement  of  the  very  result  which  nearly  everyone 
sought,  the  ultimate  solution  of  the  slavery  problem.  "Before  this  un- 
fortunate agitation  commenced,"  he  said,  "a  very  large  and  growing  party 
existed  in  several  of  the  slave  States  in  favor  of  the  gradual  abolition  of 
slavery;  and  now  not  a  voice  is  heard  there  in  support  of  such  a  measure. 
The  Abolitionists  have  postponed  the  emancipation  of  the  slaves  in  three 
or  four  States  of  this  Union  for  at  least  half  a  century."  If  they  continued 
urging  their  mad  schemes,  they  would  "cover  the  land  with  blood." 
"The  Union  is  now  in  danger,  and  I  wish  to  proclaim  the  fact,"  Buchanan 
warned.24 

He  reiterated  this  theme.  "This  question  of  domestic  slavery  is 
the  weak  point  in  our  institutions,"  he  insisted.  "Touch  this  question  of 
slavery  seriously  .  .  ,  and  the  Union  is  from  that  moment  dissolved.  . . . 
Although  in  Pennsylvania  we  are  all  opposed  to  slavery  in  the  abstract, 
yet  we  will  never  violate  the  constitutional  compact  we  have  made  with 
our  sister  states  ,  Their  rights  will  be  held  sacred  by  us.  Under  the  Consti- 
tution it  is  their  own  question;  and  there  let  it  remain."25 

ISO 


12 

• 

AN  OFFICE  NOT  TO  BE  SOUGHT  •  1844 

NO  PEACE  FOR  PENNSYLVANIA 

Buchanan  hoped  to  complete  the  first  stage  of  his  plans  for  the  presidential 
nomination,  firm  control  of  Pennsylvania,  before  he  came  up  for  re-election 
to  the  Senate  in  December,  1842.  He  had  stated  clearly  that  he  would  bid 
for  the  presidency  only  if  the  Pennsylvania  Democracy  united  solidly  back 
of  him.  With  the  Pennsylvania  votes  to  manipulate  in  the  national  con- 
vention, his  prospects  might  be  good,  especially  if  the  convention  came 
to  a  deadlock. 

The  State  Legislature  in  the  spring  of  1842  eliminated  the  main 
cause  of  Democratic  schism  by  passing  a  banking  act  which  provided 
for  gradual  resumption  of  specie  payments  and  conformed  closely  to 
Buchanan's  ideas.  The  new  law  would,  he  wrote,  enable  the  people  "to 
enjoy  the  advantages  of  well-regulated  specie-paying  Banks,  without  being 
cursed  by  the  evils  of  the  present  unrestricted  system."  Biddle's  "monster" 
lay  dead,  Tyler's  veto  had  put  an  end  to  the  threat  of  a  new  Federal  Bank, 
and  the  Democrats  after  ten  years  were  at  last  relieved  of  the  ordeal  of 
party  tests  on  the  Bank  question.1 

The  Dallas  party  was  weakened  because  it  had  lost  its  chief  source 
of  funds,  and  it  could  no  longer  create  dissension  by  intruding  the  banking 
issue;  Buchanan  was  strengthened  among  the  working  classes  because  their 
pay  envelopes  would  now  contain  sound  money  rather  than  depreciated 
shinplasters.  As  his  popularity  grew  among  the  Irish  Catholic  laborers, 
the  millworkers  and  clerks,  his  managers  in  metropolitan  areas  urged  him 
to  get  busy  and  capitalize  on  his  advantage.  "If  we  now  had  a  paper 
in  Philadelphia,  what  an  impression  we  could  make!"  cried  Forney.2 
Cameron  advised  Buchanan  to  move  permanently  to  Philadelphia. 

Buchanan  wrote  noncommittal  replies.  He  would  not  promote 
his  own  elevation;  he  would  not  run  away  from  home  for  political  reasons; 
he  would  let  his  friends  work  for  him  if  they  thought  he  was  worth  it,  and 
if  not,  he  would  be  satisfied.  He  would  do  all  he  could  to  unite  the  party, 

151 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


but  would  not  stir  a  finger  for  the  presidency.    He  would  follow  Jackson's 
motto:  The  presidency  is  an  office  not  to  be  sought.3 

Such  replies  went  down  hard  with  those  in  the  field  who  were 
spending  their  days  making  contacts  and  writing  articles,  and  their  nights 
attending  strategy  meetings.  They  were  spending  their  money,  too, 
keeping  bankrupt  editors  out  of  the  hands  of  the  sheriff  and  entertaining 
for  the  party.  They  agreed  heartily  with  Benjamin  F.  Brewster  of  Phila- 
delphia, but  few  had  the  guts  to  write,  as  he  did:  "Mr.  Buchanan,  we  do 
need  some  action.  We  do  need  some  concert.  We  do  need  some  decided 
proclamation."4 

Forney  urged  Buchanan  to  take  a  political  barnstorming  trip, 
for  work  was  needed  in  New  York,  Ohio,  Indiana,  and  the  southern  States; 
but  instead,  Buchanan  got  out  his  two  "little  black  books"  in  which  he 
kept  annotated  lists  of  state  and  national  politicians  and  campaigned  by 
direct  mail.6  Within  Pennsylvania,  a  friend  reported,  "everything  looks 
bright,  very  bright.  The  ball  has  rolled  on  with  a  force  and  velocity  alike 
gratifying  and  astonishing.  The  feeling  in  your  favor  in  this  State  is  very 
strong."  The  Pittsburgh  Manufacturer,  a  Whig  paper,  the  Erie  Observer, 
formerly  against  Buchanan,  and  the  Spirit  of  the  Times,  which  had  been 
Stewart's  chief  mouthpiece,  all  joined  the  Buchanan  movement.6 

But  trouble  developed  in  the  quarter  where  Buchanan  had  tried 
hardest  to  prevent  it.  At  the  beginning  of  Porter's  second  term,  Buchanan's 
enemies  tempted  the  governor  to  set  up  his  own  party,  to  try  to  get  control 
of  the  state  delegation  in  the  1844  convention,  and  to  use  it  to  promote 
himself.  He  would  be  out  of  a  job  in  January,  1845;  why  give  everything 
to  Buchanan  when  he  might  very  well  capture  the  vice-presidency?  He 
held  Buchanan's  future  in  the  hollow  of  his  hand.  Irritated  by  some  of 
Buchanan's  friends  who  made  excessive  demands  for  their  fidgity  support, 
Porter  succumbed. 

The  game  would  be  to  have  the  state  Administration  evince 
interest  in  all  the  prospective  presidential  candidates  so  that  when  the 
field  narrowed,  Porter  could  name  his  price  for  the  Pennsylvania  delegation. 
Rumors  had  been  flying  about  that  the  governor's  henchmen  had  been 
cultivating  Vice-President  Richard  M.  Johnson,  and  in  January,  1842,  the 
truth  erupted  with  dramatic  suddenness  in  a  breakup  of  the  state  Cabinet, 
Secretary  of  the  Commonwealth  Shunk  resigned  rather  than  obey  Porter's 
order  to  transfer  the  state  printing  in  Harrisburg  from  a  Buchanan  paper 
to  a  journal  which  had  been  praising  Johnson.  Henry  Petrikin,  Shunk's 
deputy,  also  resigned,  as  did  the  Auditor  General,  the  Treasurer  and  the 
Librarian,  all  of  them  friends  of  Buchanan. 

Porter's  new  Cabinet  became  a  kind  of  electioneering  head- 
quarters for  Johnson  during  the  summer.  The  governor  arranged  to  have 
"Old  Tecumseh"  visit  Pennsylvania  in  October,  ostensibly  to  celebrate 

152 


AN  OFFICE  NOT  TO  BE  SOUGHT  •   1844 


the  anniversary  of  his  victory  at  the  Battle  of  the  Thames.  Buchanan 
received  an  invitation  to  join  the  official  party  under  an  assurance  that  the 
occasion  was  a  historic  observance,  "entirely  non-political,"  but  of  course 
he  declined.  Long  before  the  celebrations  at  Williamsport  and  Danville, 
however,  Porter  himself  admitted  that  the  Johnson  movement  had 
burned  out.7 

Porter  continued  to  write  cordially  to  Buchanan,  explaining  his 
Cabinet  changes  with  the  comment,  "I  would  as  soon  attempt  to  control 
the  wind  as  manage  some  of  these  people."8  He  renewed  his  promise  to 
treat  all  factions  fairly  and  Buchanan,  for  his  part,  tried  to  calm  his  associ- 
ates, which  was  not  an  easy  matter  for  they  were  wild  with  rage  at  the 
governor* 

The  Porter  men  now  turned  their  interest  to  General  Lewis  Cass 
of  Michigan,  who  had  just  returned  from  his  diplomatic  mission  in  France. 
A  bluff  westerner  who  had  served  as  Secretary  of  War  under  President 
Jackson,  Cass  aroused  American  chauvinism  by  his  violent  Anglophobia 
and  his  ardent  support  of  expansion.  "Pennsylvania  is  the  soil  for  Presi- 
dent-making," wrote  Buchanan.  He  did  not  fear  Cass  as  a  presidential 
rival,  for  the  Pennsylvania  Cassites,  he  predicted,  would  "damn  any  cause 
in  which  they  embark,"  but  he  did  fear  that  the  local  Cass  movement  would 
be  used  to  influence  the  coming  senatorial  election.9 

Toward  the  end  of  1842,  Forney  ferreted  out  a  plot.  Buchanan's 
organization  had  decided  to  hold  a  convention  at  Harrisburg  on  Jackson 
Day,  1843,  in  order  to  place  Buchanan's  name  officially  in  nomination  for 
the  presidency.  This  meeting  would  convene  just  before  the  Legislature 
began  balloting  for  his  re-election  to  the  Senate.  Governor  Porter's  friends 
now  prepared  to  bring  General  Cass  to  Harrisburg  for  a  demonstration 
immediately  on  the  heels  of  the  Buchanan  convention,  and  to  use  the 
general's  visit  as  a  means  of  obtaining  the  senatorship  for  one  of  themselves. 
The  Cass  men  demanded  that  Buchanan  should  make  his  re-election  con- 
ditional upon  his  withdrawal  from  the  presidential  race  or,  if  he  wanted 
to  run  for  president,  get  out  of  the  senatorial  race.  "If,"  they  said, 
"Buchanan's  friends  insist  on  filling  every  office  ...  at  Harrisburg  .  .•  . 
with  none  but  his  adherents,  we  will  unite  with  the  Whigs  to  defeat  his 

election."10 

The  answer  rested  with  the  Legislature  and,  as  Buchanan  freely 
admitted,  "our  past  experience  in  Penna.  has  proven  that  the  Representa- 
tive does  not  always  obey  the  will  of  his  Constituents Our  security  now 

is  that  the  Whigs  have  no  money  to  pay  the  wages  of  iniquity."11  It 
would  be  close,  for  the  "rebels"  could  count  on  the  votes  of  ten  Democratic 
Cassites.  "They  must  have  Thirteen,  at  least,  to  effect  what  they  desire," 
reported  Forney.  "This  they  never  can  get."1* 

Forney's  prediction  proved  correct.     By  Christmas,  the  Cass- 

153 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Porter  men  gave  up  and  publicly  announced  their  readiness  to  support 
Buchanan.  The  Buchanan  convention  met  on  January  8,  endorsed  its 
man  and  adjourned  to  await  the  action  of  the  Legislature.  That  body 
quickly  re-elected  Buchanan  to  the  Senate  and  the  convention  then  im- 
mediately resumed  its  sessions.13  Forney  made  the  address  and  introduced 
resolutions  proposing  Buchanan  for  the  presidency.  The  convention 
"closed  in  a  burst  of  such  enthusiasm  as  never  was  known  in  Harrisburg, 
except  during  the  Jackson  campaign."14 

With  the  senatorial  election  past  and  the  presidential  struggle 
just  beginning,  what  were  Buchanan's  prospects?  Van  Buren  had  gone  on 
a  western  tour  during  which  he  had  visited  Jackson  at  the  Hermitage  and 
received  the  general's  blessing.  The  people,  said  Old  Hickory,  would 
survey  Little  Van's  record  and  on  "sober  second  thought"  repair  their 
error  of  1840.  Buchanan's  friends,  however,  asserted  that  "every  fool 
will  see  that  a  course  more  destructive  to  the  party  [than  the  renomination 
of  Mr.  Van  Buren]  could  not  be  recommended  by  its  most  decided  enemy."15 
But  Van  Buren  would  run,  and  Jackson  wanted  James  K.  Polk  of  Tennessee 
to  go  in  as  vice-president.  Calhoun,  too,  would  run  with  any  assistance 
he  could  get.  He  would  promote  the  aspirations  of  as  many  competitors 
as  possible  in  order  to  throw  the  election  into  the  House  of  Representatives. 
Cass,  with  Pennsylvania's  aid,  planned  to  take  advantage  of  a  convention 
deadlock  between  Calhoun  and  Van  Buren.  Tyler  saw  the  same  prospect 
and  made  a  bid  for  Buchanan's  support,  offering  him  a  seat  on  the  Supreme 
Court.  When  Tyler  failed  to  enlist  Buchanan,  he  turned  to  Porter. 

The  best  Buchanan  could  make  of  it  was  that  Van  Buren  and 
Polk,  endorsed  by  Jackson,  had  the  lead  and  would  be  supported  by  Dallas. 
This  ticket  was  sure  to  lose  Pennsylvania  and  with  it  the  national  election, 
but  if  Van  Buren  insisted,  all  would  have  to  go  along;  the  party  could 
survive  a  defeat  better  than  a  split.  Calhoun  would  try  anything  and 
remained  an  uncertain  quantity.  Tyler  wanted  to  start  a  third  party,  but 
he  would  discover  he  had  no  party  at  all,  and  anyone  who  played  his  game 
would  go  down  with  him.  Cass  might  prove  formidable.  Buchanan  had 
fewer  enemies  than  any,  but  he  lacked  a  national  organization  and  had  to 
depend  upon  the  effect  of  a  united  Pennsylvania  delegation  introduced 
into  a  confused  and  uncertain  convention.  With  the  support  of  his  home 
state  delegates  working  in  harmony,  there  was  a  possibility  that  he  would 
be  nominated.  Otherwise,  his  chances  were  hopeless. 

Buchanan  predicted  that  Tyler  would  take  the  governor's  brother 
into  his  Cabinet  and  "we  shall  have  a  Tyler  party  in  Pennsylvania."16  On 
March  4,  the  president  exploded  his  political  bomb  by  naming  Judge  James 
M.  Porter  Secretary  of  War,  thus  blasting  Buchanan's  hopes  of  a  united 
Pennsylvania.  Governor  Porter  now  dismissed  the  few  remaining  "Bu- 
chanan men— by  God!"  from  state  offices  and  tried  to  force  Tyler  down  the 

154 


AN  OFFICE  NOT  TO  BE  SOUGHT  •   1844 


throats  of  his  followers,  but  here  he  got  a  shock.  Even  the  old  faithful 
Harrisburg  Keystone,  long  Porter's  mainstay,  refused  to  endorse  Tyler. 
When  Porter  took  the  state  printing  from  it,  Editor  Orville  Barrett  quit 
and  joined  Buchanan.  The  governor  had  written  his  political  death  war- 
rant. "His  fall,"  wrote  Buchanan,  "has  been  more  sudden  than  that  of 
any  other  public  man  I  have  ever  known."17 

From  New  York  came  the  word  that  Van  Buren  was  regularly  in 
the  field.  "You  are  aware,"  Buchanan  wrote,  "that  he  never  has  been 
popular  in  Pennsylvania  and  that  feeling  which  was  formerly  one  of 
indifference  has  been  converted  into  positive  dislike*  I  am  sincerely  sorry 
for  it;  because  should  he  be  nominated  he  shall  receive  my  decided  sup- 
port."18 By  midsummer  the  Van  Buren  band  wagon  began  to  pick  up 
speed  in  many  states.  The  Philadelphians  (Dallas,  Gilpin,  Henry  Horn, 
John  K.  Kane  and  others)  jumped  aboard.  They  invited  Buchanan  to  be 
their  speaker  at  a  celebration  but  he  declined  politely.  Certainly  his 
chances  had  gone  hopelessly  overboard.  The  state  administration  had 
become  his  enemy,  Philadelphia  had  slipped  out  of  his  grasp,  he  had  no 
trustworthy  support  left  but  his  own  fraction  of  the  party,  and  that  was 
committed,  by  his  own  orders,  to  Van  Buren.  And  who  would  control  if 
Van  Buren  won?  Dallas!  After  Congress  adjourned  on  March  3,  Buchanan 
returned  to  Lancaster  and  went  to  bed  with  a  bilious  attack  which  tormented 
him  until  the  middle  of  June.19 

Buchanan  took  his  usual  tour  through  western  Pennsylvania 
during  July  and  August,  going  to  Mercersburg,  Bedford,  Pittsburgh  and 
Meadvifle.  He  had  family  business  and  political  affairs  to  look  after  but 
most  of  all  he  needed  a  rest  cure.  He  thought  of  making  a  trip  to  the  deep 
South  and  stopping  at  the  Hermitage  to  pay  his  respects  to  Jackson,  but 
ruled  out  the  southern  visit  for  fear  of  exposing  himself  to  the  charge  of 
electioneering. 

The  family  visits  gave  welcome  diversion,  but  not  exactly  relief. 
The  Mercersburg  establishment  was  gloomy  and  beset  with  difficulties; 
Jane  Lane  had  passed  on,  and  soon  thereafter  her  husband  had  died  veiy 
unexpectedly.  They  left  four  more  orphaned  children  in  Buchanan's 
charge:  two  boys  who  were  grown  and  could  manage  and  two  young  girls, 
Mary  and  Harriet,  who  needed  homes.  They  were  now  in  Charlestown, 
Virginia,  with  their  father's  relatives,  where  Buchanan  would  stop  to  see 
them  on  his  way  home.20 

Harriet  Henry's  death  a  year  after  that  of  her  husband  left 
nothing  in  Greensburg  but  melancholy  memories.  Her  only  son,  ten- 
year-old  James  Buchanan  Henry,  now  lived  in  Lancaster  under  Miss 
Hetty's  care.  Harriet  Lane  would  also  move  in  very  shortly,  and  possibly 
her  sister.  He  had  prepared  for  them  by  buying  a  lot  of  Henry  Slaymaker's 
furniture  at  a  sheriff's  sale  and  would  set  up  quarters  for  half  a  dozen  perma- 

155 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


nent  or  wandering  family  guests.  It  was  time  the  King  Street  house  was 
fully  furnished;  he  and  Miss  Hetty  had  used  only  a  few  rooms.  He  hoped 
Miss  Hetty  would  enjoy  managing  seven  bedrooms  and  taking  care  of  the 
new  kitchen  equipment;  and  he  hoped  little  Harriet  would  enjoy  the  piano. 
He  had  paid  $17.50  for  it.21 

Since  the  breakoff  with  his  "intended"  of  the  Kittera  household, 
Buchanan  had  become  seriously  interested  in  young  Anna  Payne  who 
lived  with  her  famous  aunt  Dolly  Madison  in  the  gray  house  on  Lafayette 
Square  in  Washington,  a  popular  resort  of  capital  society.  He  grew  quite 
devoted  to  her  and  would  in  all  probability  have  married  her  except  for 
the  disparity  in  their  ages.  It  had  become  a  vogue  in  this  period  for  young 
girls  to  marry  men  old  enough  to  be  their  grandfathers,  but  the  results  did 
not  always  prove  happy.  Letting  his  better  judgment  overrule  his  heart, 
Buchanan  gave  her  up  in  an  outburst  of  poetry. 

In  thee  my  chilled  &  blighted  heart  has  found 

A  green  spot  in  the  dreary  waste  around. 

Oh!  that  my  fate  in  youthful  days  had  been 

T'have  lived  with  such  an  one,  unknown,  unseen, 

Loving  and  lov'd,  t'have  passed  away  our  days 

Sequestered  from  the  world's  malignant  gaze! 

A  match  of  age  with  youth  can  only  bring 

The  farce  of  'winter  dancing  with  the  spring.' 

Blooming  nineteen  can  never  well  agree 

With  the  dull  age  of  half  a  century. 

Thus  reason 'speaks  what  rebel  passion  hates, 

Passion, — which  would  control  the  very  fates. 

Meantime,  where'ere  you  go,  what  e're  your  lot 

By  me  you'll  never,  never  be  forgot. 

May  Heaven's  rich  blessings  crown  your  future  life! 

And  may  you  be  a  happy,  loving  wife!22 

His  growing  responsibilities  as  a  guardian  for  nieces  and  nephews 
and  his  increasing  preoccupation  with  politics  at  length  banished  all  ex- 
pectation of  a  marriage  for  love.  He  put  his  thoughts  »very  frankly  to  his 
old  friend,  Mrs.  James  J.  Roosevelt,  some  years  later.  "I  feel  that  it  is  not 
good  for  a  man  to  be  alone,"  he  wrote,  "and  should  not  be  astonished  to 
find  myself  married  to  some  old  maid  who  can  nurse  me  when  I  am  sick, 
provide  good  dinners  for  me  when  I  am  well,  and  not  expect  from  me  any 
very  ardent  or  romantic  affection."28 

THE  DEMOCRATIC  NOMINATION  OF  1844 

By  1843  his  political  prospects  looked  almost  as  forlorn  as  his  prospects 
for  romance.    Davy  Lynch,  for  example,  had  been  charged  with  accepting 

156 


AN  OFFICE  NOT  TO  BE  SOUGHT*    1844 

overpayments  from  the  government  for  rent  of  the  Pittsburgh  post  office 
building.  He  faced  trial  and  wanted  Buchanan  to  get  him  out  of  trouble. 
In  the  meantime  Tyler  would  certainly  remove  Lynch  and  probably  appoint 
in  his  place  J.  B.  Moorhead,  who  had  voted  against  Buchanan's  re-election 
to  the  Senate  and  had  been  working  hard  to  seize  control  of  the  western 
Pennsylvania  Democrats.24 

But  Moorhead's  threat  was  only  one  of  many  worries.  The 
Democrats  had  to  select  a  candidate  for  governor  in  the  spring,  and  Henry 
A.  Muhlenberg,  just  back  from  the  Austrian  Mission,  expected  Buchanan 
to  help  him  get  the  nomination.  Muhlenberg,  however,  tried  to  fit  back 
into  the  associations  of  years  before,  allying  with  the  old  "improvement 
men,"  now  friends  of  Porter;  the  old  Van  Buren  men,  now  the  Dallas 
party;  and  the  Moorhead  faction  in  Pittsburgh.  "I  believe,"  Buchanan 
said,  "I  have  not  a  personal  enemy  in  the  Democratic  party  of  the  State 
who  is  not  a  devoted  friend  of  Mr.  Muhlenberg/'26 

Francis  R.  Shunk  also  wanted  to  be  the  gubernatorial  candidate 
and  demanded  Buchanan's  help.  Had  he  not  resigned  as  Secretary  of  the 
Commonwealth  in  order  to  conduct  the  fight  against  Porter  in  Hamsburg? 
Were  not  all  of  Buchanan's  friends  in  the  present  canvass  solidly  back  of 
Shunfc  and  against  Muhlenberg?  Could  Buchanan  withhold  his  support 
under  these  circumstances? 

The  difficulty  reached  its  most  acute  stage  in  Lancaster  County 
where  all  the  jarring  elements  came  into  close  contact.  Buchanan  stalled 
Muhlenberg,  explained  the  local  events  of  the  past  several  years,  and 
expressed  a  wish  to  stay  entirely  out  of  the  contest.  He  would,  however, 
as  an  evidence  of  good  faith,  promise  to  deliver  Lancaster  County  to 
Muhlenberg.  But  he  would  take  no  part  in  the  contest  between  his  two 
friends.  Muhlenberg  went  back  to  Reading  where  his  local  party  promptly 
nominated  delegates  pledged  to  Van  Buren  to  the  coming  state  convention. 

Van  Buren's  partisans  won  so  sweeping  a  victory  in  the  organi- 
zation of  the  national  Congress  that  his  subsequent  nomination  now  seemed 
assured.  Buchanan  was  prepared  for  this  eventuality,  but  not  for  the 
angry  reaction  of  his  friends  at  home.  Despite  his  repeated  pledges  that 
he  would  not  contest  the  nomination  against  Van  Buren  and  that  he  would 
not  take  sides  between  Muhlenberg  and  Shunk,  he  learned  two  weeks  before 
Christmas  that  his  Lancaster  newspaper  was  flying  from  its  masthead  the 
slogan:  "Win  with  Buchanan  and  Shunk!"26  The  game  was  up.  He 
closed  himself  in  his  Washington  room  and  worked  all  night  on  the  draft 
of  an  important  letter;  the  most  important,  he  knew,  that  he  had  ever 
written. 

Pushing  aside  half  a  dozen  scratched  over  and  interlined  copies, 
he  took  up  a  fair  draft  and  read  it.  "Washington,  December  14,  1843. 
To  the  Democrats  of  Pennsylvania,  Fellow  Citizens :  After  long  and  serious 

157 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


reflection,  I  have  resolved  to  withdraw  my  name  from  the  list  of  presidential 
candidates  to  be  presented  before  the  democratic  national  convention. 
This  resolution  has  been  dictated  by  an  anxious  desire  to  drive  discord 
from  the  ranks  of  the  party,  and  secure  the  ascendancy  of  democratic 
principles,  both  in  the  state  and  throughout  the  union.  In  arriving  at 
this  conclusion  I  have  consulted  no  human  being.  It  is  entirely  my  own 
spontaneous  act,  and  proceeds  from  the  clearest  and  strongest  conviction 

of  duty." 

Now,  what  else?  He  must  thank  his  friends  for  their  work  and 
show  where  the  fault  lay.  When  he  had  accepted  the  state  nomination  a 
year  ago  he  had  said  plainly  that  he  would  run  only  if  the  Democracy  of 
Pennsylvania  "should  resolve  to  offer  my  name  to  the  national  convention 
with  that  degree  of  unanimity  which  could  alone  give  moral  force  to 
their  recommendation."  Anyone  who  had  observed  current  politics  would 
have  to  grant  there  was  now  no  unanimity,  and  that  "the  moral  force  of 
Pennsylvania  with  her  sister  states  would  be  exerted  in  vain."  It  would 
be  a  hopeless  contest;  even  his  friends  must  admit  it.  He  expected  by  his 
withdrawal  to  "purchase  harmony  and  unanimity  in  the  selection  of  a 
democratic  candidate."  After  sealing  the  letter,  he  addressed  it  to  the 
editor  of  the  Lancaster  Intelligencer?* 

During  January  and  February  of  1844,  Buchanan  essayed  the 
awkward  task  of  remaining  on  friendly  terms  with  both  Muhlenberg  and 
Shunk.  Lancaster  County  did  not  help  when  it  elected  delegates  committed 
to  Shunk  to  the  state  nominating  convention,  contrary  to  Buchanan's 
wishes  and  his  earlier  promise  to  Muhlenberg.  On  March  4,  the  Democrats 
meeting  at  Harrisburg  nominated  Muhlenberg  for  governor  by  a  close  vote 
on  the  first  ballot,  thus  giving  at  least  an  indirect  endorsement  to  Van 
Buren  for  president.  Under  pressure  from  Buchanan,  Shunk  agreed  not 
to  split  the  party  and  promised  his  support  to  the  settled  ticket. 

The  road  ahead  now  seemed  clear  for  Van  Buren,  but  that  was 
reckoning  without  Calhoun,  Tyler,  and  Texas.  On  February  28,  Secretary 
of  State  Abel  P.  Upshur  was  killed  by  the  explosion  of  the  great  gun  "Peace- 
maker" aboard  the  U.S.S.  Princeton.  Within  a  week,  President  Tyler  had 
determined  upon  a  stroke  of  policy  which,  he  hoped,  would  promote  a 
second  term  for  himself.  He  would  appoint  John  C.  Calhoun  to  the  State 
Department  and  annex  Texas.  Calhoun  had  already  withdrawn  from  the 
presidential  race,  but  he  had  not  yet  committed  his  support  to  any  of  the 
remaining  aspirants;  as  a  member  of  the  Tyler  Cabinet  he  might  be  induced 
to  support  his  chief. 

John  Calhoun  accepted  the  State  Department  on  April  1,  and 
by  the  16th  had  completed  a  Texas  Treaty,  which  Tyler  submitted  to  the 
Senate  for  action  on  April  22, 1844,28 

The  acquisition  of  Texas  under  the  leadership  of  Tyler  and 


158 


AN  OFHCE  NOT  TO  BE  SOUGHT-   1844 


Calhoun  by  means  which  seemed  sure  to  provoke  a  war  with  Mexico  put 
every  presidential  aspirant  on  guard.  To  the  North  it  appeared  crystal 
clear  that  a  southern  plot  was  afoot  to  spread  slavery.  To  the  South  it 
seemed  equally  apparent  that  her  only  future  security  lay  in  expansion. 
Thus  the  questions  of  slavery  and  expansion  were  locked  together  and 
thrust  into  the  midst  of  the  presidential  canvass. 

On  April  20,  Van  Buren  had  written  a  letter  to  Congressman 
W.  H.  Hammet  of  Mississippi,  published  a  week  later,  stating  that  the 
United  States  ought  not  to  annex  Texas.  Clay  came  out  the  same  day  with 
a  letter  taking  essentially  the  same  stand.  Historians  assume  that  this 
simultaneous  pronouncement  by  leaders  of  the  two  opposing  parties  had 
been  prearranged  between  them.  Tyler,  by  his  submission  of  the  treaty 
of  annexation  on  April  22,  stood  before  the  country  as  the  champion  of 
expansion. 

Buchanan's  friends  immediately  urged  him  to  reconsider  his 
withdrawal  and  to  fight  actively  for  the  nomination.  Cameron  and  J.  M. 
Read  called  a  hurried  meeting  of  the  Pennsylvania  Democratic  Central 
Committee  to  have  delegates  to  the  Baltimore  Convention  reinstructed 
for  Buchanan  but  failed  because  frenzied  efforts  of  the  Van  Buren  men 
prevented  the  appearance  of  a  quorum.29  Many  begged  Buchanan  only 
"to  say  one  word  to  give  the  Baltimore  Convention  a  chance  to  nominate 
him"  and  Pennsylvania  would  swing  into  line,  carrying  other  states  with  it.30 

By  the  middle  of  May,  he  had  decided  on  the  position  he  would 
take,  although  it  was  not  all  that  his  friends  demanded.  He  would  not  com- 
pete with  Van  Buren  for  the  nomination.  But  should  the  latter  voluntarily 
withdraw  either  before  or  during  the  convention,  Buchanan's  supporters 
could  offer  his  name.31 

Many  Pennsylvanians  considered  his  attitude  craven,  but  they 
did  not  know  the  national  picture  as  well  as  Buchanan  did.  General 
Jackson  disapproved  of  Van  Buren's  stand  on  Texas,  and  was  pressing  the 
name  of  James  K.  Polk  openly  for  vice-president  and  covertly  for  the  first 
place  if  a  convention  deadlock  should  develop.  Buchanan  could  expect 
no  favors  or  public  support  from  Jackson,  and  should  he  run  independ- 
ently he  would  be  flying  in  the  face  of  both  Van  Buren  and  Jackson.  "I 
confess,"  he  said,  "that  if  I  should  ever  run  for  the  Presidency,  I  would 
like  to  have  an  open  field  &  a  fair  start.  The  battle  has  already  been  more 
than  half  fought ...  and  it  would  be  difficult  for  any  new  man  to  recall  the 
forces  which  have  already  gone  over  to  the  enemy."32 

The  Democratic  Convention  opened  at  Baltimore  on  May  27, 
elected  Hendrick  B.  Wright  of  Pennsylvania  to  the  chair,  and  adopted  the 
two-thirds  rule  for  nominations.  With  this  regulation,  Van  Buren  could 
not  be  nominated;  without  it,  he  would  go  in  on  the  first  ballot.  Pennsyl- 
vania's delegates,  who  were  instructed  for  Van  Buren,  voted  nonetheless 

159 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


for  the  two-thirds  rule  which  they  well  knew  would  exclude  their  candidate. 
Having  sabotaged  Van  Buren,  these  gentlemen  then  proceeded  to  vote  for 
him  on  the  roll  call  for  nominees,  but  after  the  first  few  ballots  the  Penn- 
sylvanians  went  over  to  Buchanan,  giving  him  the  unanimous  vote  of  the 
state  on  the  fifth  ballot.  Lewis  Cass  of  Michigan  ran  strongly  on  the  sixth 
and  seventh  ballots,  while  Van  Buren's  strength  declined,  but  none  of  the 
candidates  came  near  the  178  votes  needed. 

The  convention  adjourned  overnight,  and  by  morning  leaders  of 
the  Pennsylvania  and  Massachusetts  delegations  had  completed  plans  to 
introduce  Folk's  name  to  the  deadlocked  meeting.  Polk  drew  44  votes  on 
the  eighth  ballot,  but  before  the  ninth  could  be  taken,  the  New  York 
delegation  retired  for  consultation.  Upon  its  return,  Benjamin  F.  Butler 
got  the  floor  and  read  a  letter  of  withdrawal  from  Van  Buren.  The  con- 
vention,  in  riotous  confusion,  then  gave  its  unamimous  approval  to  James 
K.  Polk  as  the  presidential  nominee.  The  vice-presidency  went  almost 
unamimously  to  Silas  Wright  of  New  York  as  a  peace  offering  to  the  Van 
Burenites,  but  he  declined  the  offer  in  order  not  to  profit  from  his  friend's 
defeat.  George  M.  Dallas  gladly  accepted  the  vice-presidential  nomination. 


RED  HERRING 

Along  with  other  Senators  who  remained  in  Washington  during  the  con- 
vention, Buchanan  learned  the  news  from  Baltimore  via  the  first  official 
trial  of  Samuel  F.  B.  Morse's  telegraph  instrument,  which  the  inventor 
himself  was  operating  in  the  basement  of  the  Capitol  Building.  The 
Democratic  platform  included  all  the  principles  of  1840  with  two  additions, 
the  "re-annexation  of  Texas  and  the  re-occupation  of  Oregon."  The  key 
issues  would  be  expansion  and  the  tariff. 

The  Whigs  had  already  nominated  Henry  Clay  on  May  1,  and 
had  adopted  a  platform  which  significantly  failed  to  mention  Texas  and 
which  took  a  stand  on  the  tariff  just  about  as  vague  as  that  of  the  Demo- 
crats. In  Pennsylvania,  at  least,  this  issue,  above  all  others,  required 
clarification. 

Polk  amplified  his  views  on  the  tariff  in  a  letter  to  John  K.  Kane 
of  Philadelphia,  stating  that  "in  adjusting  the  details  of  a  revenue  tariff  I 
have  heretofore  sanctioned  such  moderate  discriminating  duties  as  would 
produce  the  amount  of  revenue  needed,  and  at  the  same  time  afford 
reasonable  protection  to  our  home  industry."33  This  stand  was  weak 
enough,  to  be  sure,  but  it  could  be  made  to  serve  if  editors  like  Forney 
harped  enough  on  the  last  phrase.  The  campaign  ground  was  also  defined 
by  the  Senate's  rejection  of  the  Texas  Treaty,  June  8.  At  that  time  Bu- 
chanan made  a  long  speech  in  support  of  the  treaty  and  urged  annexation 

160 


AN  OFFICE  NOT  TO  BE  SOUGHT  •    1844 


for  many  reasons.  Chief  of  these  was  his  fear  that  Britain  would  take 
control  if  the  United  States  failed  to  annex.84  Folk's  letter  to  Kane  and 
the  defeat  of  the  Texas  measure  enabled  Buchanan  to  sidetrack  the  two 
main  sectional  issues  of  the  canvass.  He  would  simply  state  that  Polk 
was  sounder  on  the  tariff  than  Clay  and  merely  point  to  the  speech  on  Texas. 

It  was  a  busy  and  perplexing  summer.  Congress  adjourned  late 
in  June,  and  Buchanan  took  the  usual  fortnight's  vacation  at  Bedford 
Springs.  In  the  meantime,  all  manner  of  complications  vexed  the  campaigns 
of  both  parties.  A  Native  American  party  grew  strong  in  urban  centers 
and  became  involved  in  violent  anti-Catholic  riots  in  Philadelphia  during 
midsummer,  requiring  the  presence  of  the  governor  and  the  state  militia. 
The  Liberty  party,  with  James  G.  Birney  as  its  candidate,  posed  an  uncertain 
threat  both  to  Whigs  and  Democrats.  Clay  befogged  his  position  by  hedg- 
ing on  his  antiannexation  stand,  and  Tyler,  supported  by  office  holders, 
was  running  independently  for  re-election. 

Cameron  urged  Buchanan  to  campaign  vigorously  for  Polk  in 
Pennsylvania.  "He  must  owe  the  state  to  you;  and  you  can  .  . .  command 
the  nomination  in  '48."35  Judge  John  Catron  of  the  Supreme  Court,  a 
Tennessean,  wanted  Buchanan  to  stump  through  the  West  for  Polk.  He 
could  pay  a  final  visit  to  General  Jackson,  establish  the  personal  contacts 
he  needed  in  that  region  for  1848,  and  place  himself  in  debt  to  Polk  who, 
Catron  added,  especially  wanted  him  to  make  the  trip.  There  was  added 
appeal  in  the  invitation  because  Buchanan  was  an  intimate  friend  and 
great  admirer  both  of  Mrs.  Catron  and  of  Mrs.  Polk,  and  these  charming 
ladies  repaid  his  good  opinion  of  them  with  flattery  and  kindness.36 

The  canvass  in  Pennsylvania  changed  rapidly.  Henry  Muhlen- 
berg  died  on  August  11,  and  Shunk  immediately  became  the  Democratic 
candidate  for  governor.  On  August  20,  President  Tyler  announced  his 
withdrawal  from  the  presidential  race,  blasting  Governor  Porter's  hopes 
of  future  eminence.  Buchanan  at  once  sought  to  pacify  the  disappointed 
friends  of  Muhlenberg  by  obtaining  pledges  from  Shunk  that  he  would 
divide  the  patronage  with  them.  Buchanan's  next  task  was  to  persuade 
Cameron  to  agree  to  call  off  his  attacks  on  Shunk  and  obtain  Shunk's 
promise  not  to  proscribe  Cameron's  friends  for  adhering  to  Muhlenberg.37 

Buchanan  left  on  a  speaking  tour  of  northern  Pennsylvania 
during  the  first  week  of  September.  He  was  much  worried  by  Folk's 
desire  to  make  himself  too  clear  on  some  things.  "For  Heaven's  sake  let 
our  friend  . . .  write  nothing  more  on  the  subject  of  the  tariff,"  he  pleaded. 
"Let  us  alone  &  we  shall  do  it."38  He  then  proceeded  to  Danville,  Milton, 
Williamsport,  and  on  up  to  Towanda  where  he  addressed  large  crowds. 
"I  have  raised  an  excitement  everywhere  I  have  gone  on  the  Bank  ques- 
tion," he  wrote  on  September  18,  the  day  after  his  return.  "Our  friends 
in  that  portion  of  the  state  will  denounce  the  Bank  as  loudly  as  the  Whigs 

161 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


do  free  trade.  One  excitement  will  countervail  the  other."39  The  Bank 
was  a  red  herring  to  distract  the  attention  of  these  people  from  the  tariff, 
which  posed  the  most  serious  threat  to  the  party.  He  advised  Polk, 
cautiously,  that  Pennsylvania  would  probably  be  safe,  but  by  no  huge 
majorities.  As  for  himself,  he  would  have  nothing  to  ask  of  the  new 
president,  but  would  "expect  much  from  the  President's  lady.  During 
her  administration  I  intend  to  make  one  more  attempt  to  change  my 
wretched  condition,  and  should  I  fail  under  her  auspices  I  shall  then 
surrender  in  despair."40 

In  the  October  elections,  Shunk  carried  his  ticket  for  governor, 
and  in  November  Polk  won  the  presidency.  It  was  a  close  election;  but 
the  Democrats  had  squeaked  through,  and  Buchanan  deserved  credit  for 
right  guessing  and  canny  manipulation  in  achieving  the  result.  The  next 
four  months  would  see  the  distribution  of  the  rewards. 


162 


13 

POLITICS  UNDER  POLK  •  1845  - 1846 

THE  STATE  DEPARTMENT 

Buchanan  wrote  to  Polk  immediately  after  the  election,  urging  him  to 
make  "young  Democrats"  the  core  of  his  Administration.  "The  old  office 
holders,"  he  said,  "generally  have  had  their  day  &  ought  to  be  content."1 
This  advice  may  possibly  have  been  intended  for  self-protection  in  case 
the  president-elect  ignored  him,  but  it  also  meant  to  flatter  Polk,  the 
nation's  youngest  president,  and  it  might  serve  to  eliminate  some  of  the 
old  party  hacks. 

The  Pennsylvania  electors  unanimously  recommended  Buchanan 
for  the  State  Department,  but  Polk  seemed  in  no  hurry  to  move,2  There 
were  those  who  said  that  General  Jackson  had  explicitly  warned  Polk 
against  including  Buchanan  in  the  Cabinet.3  By  the  end  of  January 
Buchanan  could  stand  the  suspense  no  longer  and  asked  Judge  Catron,  a 
neighbor  of  Folk's,  to  find  out  how  matters  stood.  Catron  replied  that 
Polk  had  "not  indicated  to  any  one  the  appointments  he  intends  to  make."4 

In  the  meantime,  Buchanan  tried  desperately  to  achieve  unity 
within  the  new  state  administration,  insisting  that  Shunk  should  appoint 
a  Muhlenberg  man  to  a  prominent  cabinet  post  and  avoid  participating  in 
the  election  for  United  States  Senator  which  would  take  place  in  Harrisburg 
just  after  the  governor's  inauguration.  He  advised  Shunk  "not  to  take 
part  in  favour  of  any  candidate  for  the  Senate,  but  to  express  your  opinion 
strongly  and  decidedly  in  favour  of  an  adherence  to  caucus  nominations."6 
Shunk  tried  to  foster  a  union  of  the  state  factions  by  his  appointments, 
but  he  achieved  only  the  curses  of  both  sides  for  his  efforts.6  The 
Democratic  caucus  for  Senator  ran  into  a  deadlock  between  George  W. 
Woodward,  the  Shunk  candidate,  and  Nathaniel  B.  Eldred  of  the  Muhlen- 
berg faction  with  the  result  that  the  Legislature  elected  Daniel  Sturgeon, 
the  incumbent. 

Shortly  thereafter,  on  February  17,  Buchanan  got  a  letter  from 
Polk  inviting  him  to  be  Secretary  of  State.  The  form  letter,  which  Polk 

163 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


sent  to  all  appointees,  was  unique  in  the  history  of  presidential  invitations 
to  Cabinet  service.  It  read,  "Should  any  member  of  my  Cabinet  become  a 
Candidate  for  the  Presidency  or  Vice-Presidency  of  the  United  States,  it 

will  be  expected  .  .  .  that  he  will  retire  from  the  Cabinet I  will  myself 

take  no  part  between  gentlemen  of  the  Democratic  party  who  may  become 
aspirants  or  Candidates  to  succeed  me  in  the  Presidential  office,  and  desire 
that  no  member  of  my  Cabinet  shall  do  so."  Polk  wanted  no  Department 
head  to  use  the  federal  patronage  to  promote  the  interests  of  his  personal 
political  machine.7 

Buchanan's  letter  of  acceptance  clearly  demonstrated  his  fitness 
for  the  diplomatic  post.  "I  cheerfully  and  cordially  approve  the  terms  on 
which  this  offer  has  been  made,"  he  wrote.  But  he  could  not  control 
what  others  might  do  in  his  behalf,  and  he  could  not  in  justice  to  his 
friends  take  the  office  "at  the  expense  of  self-ostracism."  "I  cannot 
proclaim  to  the  world  that  in  no  contingency  shall  I  be  a  candidate  for  the 
Presidency  in  1848,"  he  continued.  But  in  that  event,  he  would  retire 
from  the  Cabinet,  unless  Polk  asked  him  to  remain.  "If  under  these 
explanations,  you  are  willing  to  confer  upon  me  the  office  of  Secretary  of 
State,  I  shall  accept  it."8 

Buchanan  terminated  his  senatorial  career  with  a  ringing  speech 
in  favor  of  the  resolutions  for  the  immediate  annexation  of  Texas.  These 
contained  a  provision  applying  the  Missouri  Compromise  line  to  all  land 
which  should  be  acquired  under  the  term  "Texas."  "I  am  not  friendly 
to  slavery  in  the  abstract,"  he  said.  "I  need  not  say  that  I  never  owned  a 
slave,  and  I  know  that  I  never  shall  own  one."  But  the  price  of  continued 
unity  rested  on  the  willingness  of  all  to  recognize  the  plain  constitutional 
rights  granted  to  each  part.  "The  constitutional  rights  of  the  south,  under 
our  constitutional  compact,  are  as  much  entitled  to  protection  as  those  of 
any  other  portion  of  the  Union."  If  it  was  a  question  of  slavery  south  of 
36°  30'  or  the  end  of  the  Union,  he  would  "never  risk  the  blessings  of  this 
glorious  confederacy."*  Three  days  before  the  inauguration,  President 
Tyler  signed  the  joint  resolution  for  Texan  annexation. 

In  the  weeks  remaining  between  the  profer  of  the  State  Depart- 
ment and  the  date  of  assuming  his  new  duties,  Buchanan  worked  day  and 
night,  writing  letters,  seeing  visitors,  consulting  upon  the  political  problems 
of  Pennsylvania,  and  arranging  for  new  quarters  befitting  the  social  obliga- 
tions of  a  Cabinet  member.  On  the  advice  of  Mrs.  Stephen  Pleasanton  he 
eventually  decided  upon  a  house  on  F  Street,  between  13th  and  14th,  next 
to  the  residence  of  John  Quincy  Adams  and  just  a  block  from  the  State 
Department  building.  He  could  rent  it  for  $2,000  per  year,  elegantly 
furnished  and  with  nearly  enough  chinaware  for  state  occasions.  He  sent 
to  Paris  immediately  for  an  ornament  for  the  center  of  the  table  for,  as 

164 


POLITICS  UNDER  POLK.   1845-1846 


the  ladies  informed  him,  "you  cannot  set  a  handsome  dinner  without  one 
and  they  are  not  to  be  had  in  this  country."10 

But  most  pressing  of  all,  he  had  to  master  the  details  of  the  work 
of  the  Department.  Handling  the  diplomatic  functions  gave  him  little 
concern,  but  the  State  Department  was  not  only  a  diplomatic  office;  it  had 
become  a  receptacle,  so  to  speak,  for  all  kinds  of  odd  jobs  which  Congress 
for  thirty  years  had  been  dumping  into  it,  without  providing  sufficient 
personnel. 

The  Department  had  been  divided  into  the  Diplomatic,  the 
Consular,  and  the  Home  Bureaus.  In  the  Diplomatic  Bureau,  five  clerks 
handled  the  correspondence  with  all  the  American  embassies,  but  none  of 
them  had  the  authority  to  sign  a  paper  or  to  decide  any  question,  however 
trivial.  In  the  Consular  Bureau,  three  clerks  tried  vainly  to  keep  in  touch 
with  over  150  American  consuls,  with  the  result  that  almost  all  the  infor- 
mation the  consuls  forwarded  was  useless  because  there  was  no  one  to 
digest,  arrange,  or  publish  it.  But  the  third  bureau  was  the  one  most 
understaffed.  It  had  the  functions  of  accounting  and  disbursing  funds  for 
diplomatic  agents,  receiving  bills  from  Congress  and  transmitting  them  to 
the  president,  filing  official  papers,  printing  the  laws,  and  translating  diplo- 
matic correspondence.  The  Home  Bureau  was  also  in  charge  of  issuing 
patents  and  copyrights,  taking  the  federal  census,  affixing  the  seal  of  the 
United  States  on  innumerable  documents,  keeping  the  government  ar- 
chives, issuing  passports,  preparing  and  filing  correspondence  relating  to 
pardons,  and  handling  various  other  tasks  which  made  its  functions  an 
administrative  monstrosity.  Seven  clerks  were  assigned  to  handle  this 
mountain  of  business.  "The  consequences  of  this  accumulation  of  business 
upon  the  head  of  the  department,"  Buchanan  wrote  after  brief  acquaint- 
ance with  his  task,  "must  be  manifest  to  everyone.  He  must  either 
neglect  the  national  interests  or  the  subordinate  but  pressing  business 
involving  the  rights  of  individuals."11 

After  an  introduction  to  the  mechanics  of  his  office,  Buchanan 
requested  Calhoun  to  assist  him  for  a  while  after  inauguration  day  and  the 
South  Carolinian  courteously  remained  for  an  extra  week.  Buchanan 
asked  Caleb  Gushing  to  take  the  Chief  Clerkship  with  the  explanation  that 
he  hoped  to  have  it  made  an  Assistant  Secretaryship  soon,  but  Cushing 
declined.12  William  S.  Derrick,  who  had  served  in  the  Department  since 
1827,  remained  Chief  Clerk  until  August  when  Buchanan  selected  Nicholas 
P.  Trist,  former  consul  at  Havana,  for  the  post.  He  appointed  Robert 
Greenhow,  husband  of  the  young,  beautiful  and  impish  Rose  O'Neal 
Greenhow,  as  Librarian  and  Translator,  and  Lund  Washington,  Jr.  as 
Archivist. 

James  Knox  Polk  ushered  onto  the  American  scene  a  program 
known  as  the  "New  Democracy."  He  called  to  its  standard  men  whose 

165 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


devotion  to  national  causes  outweighed  their  sectional  loyalty,  men  who 
believed  that  it  was  better  to  achieve  a  large  growth  of  national  power 
along  with  a  small  growth  of  slavery  than  to  stop  American  expansion  in 
order  to  prevent  any  further  extension  of  the  slave  labor  system.  Most 
of  them  would  have  agreed  with  Buchanan's  statement  that  slavery  could 
not  be  treated  in  politics  as  a  matter  of  general  morality  affecting  the  con- 
sciences of  men  but  only  as  a  question  of  constitutional  law.  The  New 
Democracy  sought  the  development  of  commerce  by  promoting  free  trade; 
advocated  the  acquisition  of  Oregon  and  California;  and  tried  to  minimize 
the  slavery  issue. 

The  giants  of  Jackson's  day  found  no  place  in  Folk's  Cabinet. 
Van  Buren's  Barnburners  had  already  become  strongly  tinged  with  political 
antislavery  and  opposed  Texan  annexation.  Calhoun  had  gone  too  far  on 
the  subject  of  the  slave  system  as  a  positive  good,  alienating  many  who  had 
once  politically  defended  the  South,  even  if  they  deplored  the  system  of 
slavery.  Old  Benton,  fearing  a  fight  over  slavery  in  new  lands,  opposed 
expansion.  These  leaders  represented  the  three  strongest  factions  of  the 
old  Democracy. 

Polk  appointed  Buchanan  to  utilize  his  diplomatic  experience 
and  placate  his  faction  in  Pennsylvania.  Robert  J.  Walker  of  Mississippi, 
a  shrewd  financier  with  a  keen  interest  in  Texas  bonds  and  transport 
speculations,  became  head  of  the  Treasury.  He  was  a  commercial  man 
and  a  staunch  advocate  of  free  trade.  He  had  married  a  niece  of  Vice- 
President  Dallas  and  favored  his  party.  William  L.  Marcy  of  New  York, 
Secretary  of  War,  was  one  of  the  Hunker  leaders,  an  open  enemy  of  Van 
Buren.  George  Bancroft  of  Massachusetts,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  had 
led  the  movement  to  introduce  Folk's  name  to  the  Baltimore  convention. 
John  Young  Mason  of  Virginia,  Attorney  General,  and  Cave  Johnson  of 
Tennessee,  Postmaster  General,  completed  Folk's  Cabinet. 

THE  PERILS  OF  THE  PATRONAGE 

Polk's  early  decision  not  to  seek  re-election  made  it  more  difficult  for  him 
to  restrain  Cabinet  members  from  working  for  the  1848  nomination.  He 
had  to  give  close  personal  supervision  to  prevent  the  improper  use  of  the 
patronage  by  any  individual  who  might  try  to  start  a  presidential  band 
wagon  for  himself  by  making  strategic  federal  appointments.  Also  the 
president  had  to  maintain  the  strength  and  vitality  of  the  Democratic 
party  in  critical  states  by  a  careful  distribution  of  jobs.  Otherwise,  his 
party  would  lose  the  election  in  the  next  presidential  campaign. 

Pennsylvania  and  New  York  were  politically  the  two  most  im- 
portant states  in  the  Union,  Together  they  controlled  an  electoral  vote 
nearly  equal  to  that  of  the  total  area  south  of  the  Ohio  and  Potomac  Rivers 

166 


POLITICS  UNDER  POLK  •   1845  - 1846 


and  elected  one-fourth  of  the  Congressmen  of  the  whole  nation.  In  both 
of  these  vital  states  the  Democracy  was  critically  split.  In  New  York  the 
differences  were  so  great  that  there  was  no  hope  of  early  unity;  in  Pennsyl- 
vania, however,  the  factions  were  not  so  divided  as  to  rule  out  the  possibility 
of  achieving  harmony. 

When  Buchanan  accepted  the  State  Department  and  resigned  his 
seat  in  the  Senate,  this  prize  came  into  contest  between  the  friends  of  Shunt 
and  the  Muhlenberg  men  who  knew,  by  this  time,  that  Shunk  would  not 
meet  their  demands  for  state  patronage.  Had  Polk  issued  his  invitation  to 
Buchanan  early  in  January  the  Pennsylvania  Democrats  might  have  taken 
a  long  step  toward  reunion  by  electing  to  the  Senate  at  the  same  time  a 
representative  of  each  of  the  two  rivals.  As  it  was,  neither  faction  had 
won  the  January  election  and  now  both  were  bent  on  having  the  remaining 
place.  On  March  12,  most  of  the  Democratic  legislators  held  the  usual 
caucus  and  named  as  their  candidate  George  Woodward,  whose  low  tariff 
and  expansionist  views  agreed  with  Polk's.  Buchanan  avoided  committing 
himself  to  any  person,  but  he  did  advise  all  Democrats  to  follow  the  time- 
honored  procedures,  which  could  be  interpreted  as  a  pat  on  the  back  for 
Woodward. 

But  Cameron's  friends  boycotted  the  caucus  and  laid  their  own 
plans.  Cameron  had  already  told  Buchanan  that  he  wanted  to  be  a  Senator, 
but  having  gotten  no  encouragement  he  planned  to  win  on  his  own.13  Two 
weeks  before  the  March  election  he  wrote  to  a  colleague,  "Strange  as  it 
may  seem,  I  can  be  the  successor  of  Mr.  Buchanan. . . .  The  election  will 
not ...  be  made  by  a  caucus  this  time."14 

Cameron  assured  the  Whigs  in  the  Legislature  that  he  ardently 
wished  to  retain  the  tariff  of  1842  and  got  the  backing  of  more  than  a 
dozen  Democrats  who  favored  high  protectionism.  To  the  Native  Ameri- 
cans, he  confided  his  earnest  wish  to  restrict  foreign  immigration  and  to 
curtail  the  political  power  of  the  Catholics.  On  March  14,  Cameron  won 
the  senatorship  by  a  combination  of  44  Whigs,  16  Democrats,  and  7  Native 
Americans.  It  was  a  blow  to  Polk,  a  blow  to  Shunk,  and  nearly  a  knockout 
to  Buchanan  who  had  just  gone  on  record  in  support  of  caucus  decisions. 
He  could  not  condone  Cameron's  action  but,  with  the  Senate  almost  evenly 
divided,  he  could  ill  afford  to  declare  open  war  on  him  and  forfeit  a  vote. 
Buchanan's  friends  raged  like  wild  animals.  "Simon  Cameron's  the  Sen- 
ator!  God  save  the  Commonwealth,"  groaned  Forney.  With  this  inaus- 
picious beginning,  the  fight  for  federal  patronage  started.15 

The  infuriated  Democrats  of  the  caucus  wrote  to  Vice-President 
Dallas  and  to  Buchanan,  asking  them  to  lend  their  weight  to  the  Democratic 
condemnation  of  Cameron  and  to  read  him  out  of  the  party.  But  Dallas, 
while  decisively  condemning  the  breach  of  party  usage,  refused  to  censure 
a  man  who  now  would  sit  in  the  legislative  body  over  which  he  had  to 

167 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


preside.  Buchanan  replied  in  terms  even  more  discreet,  deploring  the 
breakdown  of  the  caucus  system  but  declining  to  condemn  the  state  Legis- 
lature "for  electing  whom  they  pleased  to  the  senate  of  the  United  States." 
He  hoped  that  this  experience  would  be  convincing  proof  that  legislators 
ought  "to  go  into  caucus  and  be  bound  by  its  decision."16  Cameron's 
position,  to  be  sure,  was  not  enviable.  Shunk  broke  with  him  and  ousted 
his  followers  from  the  state  administration.  Neither  Dallas  nor  Buchanan 
would  seek  patronage  for  him,  and  Polk  considered  him,  properly,  to  be  an 
enemy.  Henceforth,  Cameron  ofiered  himself  for  sale  to  any  faction  that 
would  purchase  his  power  and  sought  to  wreck  the  plans  of  those  who 
repulsed  him.17 

Buchanan  determined  to  play  the  waiting  game  with  Cameron, 
neither  breaking  with  him  nor  giving  him  aid.  His  experience  with  politics 
convinced  him  that  little  would  be  gained  by  declaring  factional  war.  Time 
after  time  he  had  seen  such  struggles  sap  the  energy  of  the  party  without 
any  further  result;  in  fact  the  principal  contenders  had  often  become 
political  bedfellows  within  a  few  years.  Furthermore,  Cameron  could  be 
counted  upon  to  get  on  the  band  wagon  when  it  was  apparent  that  there 
was  no  other  place  to  stand.  He  was  an  opportunist  and  would  support 
Buchanan  for  president  when  the  time  came.  The  real  struggle  would  be 
to  define  the  terms  of  his  support.  He  would  make  the  price  as  high  as 
possible  by  demonstrating  his  capacity  with  the  monkey  wrench;  Buchanan 
would  keep  it  as  low  as  possible  by  showing  the  power  of  his  position*  But 
Cameron  had  too  keen  a  talent  for  mischief  for  Buchanan  to  risk  open 
battle  with  him;  he,  if  anyone,  could  wreck  the  plans  for  '48. 

To  reduce  the  heat  of  the  indignation  against  Cameron,  Buchanan 
removed  Forney  from  Lancaster  by  providing  him  a  surveyorship  in  the 
Philadelphia  customhouse.  In  return,  Forney  pledged  cooperation.  "If 
you  can  keep  Cameron  your  friend,"  he  wrote,  "my  course  will  keep  his 
enemies,  and  they  are  legion,  on  your  side!"18  Forney  henceforth  worked 
valiantly  but  not  very  successfully,  to  dissuade  Champneys  and  Frazer  in 
Lancaster  from  flaying  Cameron  in  their  local  newspaper.19 

Buchanan  also  sought  to  conciliate  Cameron  by  getting  his  first 
lieutenant,  Ben  Brewster,  a  job.  For  weeks,  Brewster  had  been  writing 
letters,  ending  with  the  demand,  "I  want  the  District  Attorneyship!"  Polk 
gave  the  place  to  a  Dallas  man,  whereupon  Brewster  sent  a  scorching  letter 
threatening  "woe  to  the  public  man"  who  would  cross  his  path,  Buchanan 
then  oflered  to  make  Brewster  secretary  of  the  Legation  at  London.  Brewster 
replied  that  he  might  have  taken  the  British  Mission  itself,  if  he  had  been 
given  command  of  the  Oregon  negotiations  but  he  would  have  none  of  the 
secretaryship.  Horace  might  accept  ivy  as  a  reward,  he  wrote,  but  a  politi- 
cian needed  money  and  wanted  to  hear  the  jingle  of  cash.  Buchanan 

168 


POLTITCS  UNDER  POLK  •   1845  -  1846 


eventually  found  him  a  place,  appropriate  for  a  Cameron  disciple,  settling 
Indian  claims,20 

For  a  number  of  months,  Buchanan's  desk  was  piled  high  with 
requests  for  jobs  as  clerks,  postmasters,  inspectors,  sutlers,  mail  agents, 
auditors,  consuls,  registers,  district  attorneys,  prison  wardens,  chaplains, 
storekeepers,  lighthouse  keepers,  and  the  like.  His  careful  record  of  judg- 
ments and  recommendations  survives  in  a  small  black  notebook  which  he 
considered  of  sufficient  importance  to  exclude  it  from  his  political  papers 
and  deposit  with  his  executor.21 

He  had  more  success  in  promoting  jobs  than  Dallas  or  the  Pennsyl- 
vania Senators  even  though  Polk  suspected  his  designs  for  the  presidency. 
Nonetheless,  he  fell  so  far  short  of  the  demands  that  the  rumor  began  to 
circulate  that  every  jobless  politician  was  a  Buchanan  man.  Forney  wrote: 
"Ousted  officers  all  say  they  have  been  sacrificed  for  being  your  friends, 
and  you  may  rely  upon  it,  there  is  quite  a  lot  of  them."22  Buchanan's 
pattern  of  appointments  left  Cameron  so  perplexed  that  he  asked  point 
blank  in  September:  "I  wish  you  would  tell  me  whether  there  is  to  be 
peace  or  war."23 

On  September  23,  1845,  Thomas  Ritchie,  an  editor  of  Folk's 
official  paper,  the  Washington  Union,  confided  to  the  president  that  Bu- 
chanan wished  to  quit  the  Cabinet  and  go  to  the  Supreme  Court.  A  week 
later  Buchanan  asked  Polk  for  the  appointment,  assigning  as  his  reason  the 
trouble  that  was  brewing  in  Pennsylvania  over  the  tariff.24  Buchanan 
assured  the  president,  however,  that  he  would  not  leave  the  Department 
if  war  broke  out  with  Mexico. 

Three  vacancies  had  occurred  on  the  Court  between  1843  and 
1845.  Justices  Smith  Nelson  and  Henry  Baldwin  died  and  Joseph  Story 
resigned.  The  Baldwin  and  Story  seats  were  still  open,  and  Polk  wished 
to  place  in  them  men  who  were  strict  constructionists,  "who  would  be  less 
likely  to  relapse  into  the  Broad  Federal  doctrines  of  Judge  Marshall  & 
Judge  Story."25  President  Tyler,  upon  Baldwin's  death  in  April,  1844,  had 
offered  this  place  to  Senator  Buchanan,  but  he  had  then  declined  it.  Polk 
appointed  Levi  Woodbury  to  the  Story  vacancy  but  reserved  Baldwin's 
place  for  a  Pennsylvanian. 

Buchanan's  request  to  go  into  the  Court  raised  anguished  howls 
from  his  political  friends.  "For  God's  sake,  stay  where  you  are,"  wrote 
Ben  Brewster,  who  accused  Dallas  of  trying  to  put  Buchanan  on  the  shelf 
in  order  to  oust  his  friends  from  their  jobs.26  Forney  hit  where  it  would 
hurt  most.  He  wrote  that  "it  would  be  regarded  by  the  world  in  a  light 
that  must  place  you  in  a  very  unpleasant  position.  That  the  evident  free 
trade  tendencies  of  the  administration  had  made  you  feel  uncomfortable 
in  the  Cabinet,  and  had  induced  you  to  retire  from  it,  to  an  office  conferred 
by  the  very  power  which  struck  down  Pennsylvania  mteresto-thus  showing 

169 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


that  although  you  could  not  stay  in  the  Cabinet,  yet  you  took  your  office 
from  the  administration,  and  refused  to  sacrifice  yourself  for  the  cause  of 
the  state,  leaving  her  to  take  care  of  herself. . .  .  Others  say  that  you  are 
about  to  'desert  your  friends  again'  and  that  you  fear  to  face  any  great 


crisis."27 


While  such  views  had  their  influence,  it  is  also  probable  that 
Buchanan  decided  to  remain  in  the  Cabinet  because  of  encouraging  develop- 
ments  in  the  Oregon  negotiation,  a  story  to  be  told  a  little  later.  On 
November  19,  he  informed  Polk  that  he  could  not  take  the  Court  appoint- 
ment  and  recommended  John  M.  Read,  of  Philadelphia,  whom  he  had 
earlier  suggested  to  Tyler  and  who  would  have  been  agreeable  to  Cameron. 
But  on  December  23,  Polk,  without  consulting  either  Buchanan  or  Cam- 
eron, and  with  the  assent  of  Dallas,  nominated  George  Woodward.  Polk 
rejected  Read  because  he  feared  appointing  "a  former  Federalist  ^to  a 
lifetime  position  where  he  could  fall  back  upon  Federalist  doctrines,"  and 
thought  that  Woodward  might  prove  pleasing  to  Buchanan  and  Shunk, 
since  both  had  supported  him  for  the  Senate.28 

Cameron  considered  the  appointment  a  direct  insult  to  him,  and 
hastened  to  Washington  to  discuss  the  matter  with  Buchanan,  despite  the 
fact  that  the  two  had  neither  been  seeing  each  other  nor  corresponding, 
except  on  essential  public  business,  for  five  months.29  On  Christmas  Day, 
while  Cameron  wrote  complaints  to  Buchanan,  Buchanan  called  on  Polk 
to  complain.  He  had  been  absent  from  Cabinet  when  the  appointment 
was  announced,  he  said;  he  was  directly  involved  in  Pennsylvania  appoint- 
ments but  had  not  been  consulted;  his  friends  grumbled  that  the  patronage 
was  being  wielded  against  him;  and  he  would  not  have  recommendefl 
Woodward.  Polk,  surprised  by  this  outburst,  rather  curtly  stated  that  he 
preferred  Woodward  to  Read,  had  the  power  to  appoint  without  consulta- 
tion, and  would  take  the  responsibility  for  his  act.30 

The  matter  rested  there  until  January  22  when  Cameron,  finding 
a  number  of  Democrats  absent  from  the  Senate,  managed  to  get  Wood- 
ward's confirmation  up  for  a  vote  and  defeated  it  29-20  by  an  alliance  of 
six  Democrats  and  the  entire  Whig  membership.31  James  Shields,  of  the 
Land  Office,  told  Polk  of  the  Senate's  action  late  on  the  afternoon  of  the 
22nd,  and  added  that  both  he  and  Senator  Cass  now  advised  the  appoint- 
ment of  Buchanan  who  had  expressed  a  desire  for  the  office  a  few  days 
previously.  Benton  wrote  the  next  day,  recommending  Buchanan  and 
promising  immediate  Senate  confirmation.32  "I  thought  it  strange,"  wrote 
Polk,  ccthat  Mr.  Buchanan  should  have  expressed  a  wish  to  anyone  pending 
the  nomination  of  Mr.  Woodward  before  the  Senate." 

The  next  night  Buchanan  held  a  grand  ball  at  which  all  the 
rumors  and  gossip  centered  on  his  leaving  the  Cabinet  and  going  upon  the 
Bench.  To  whisperings  that  he  had  been  working  with  Cameron  to  sabotage 

170 


POLITICS  UNDER  POLK*   1845-1846 


Woodward,  Buchanan  replied  that  this  was  "such  stuff  as  dreams  axe 
made  of."3* 

The  ball,  held  at  Carusi's  Saloon,  was  attended  by  more  than  a 
thousand  guests.  Mrs.  Marcy  aided  Buchanan  in  receiving.  On  an 
elevated  platform  at  the  end  of  the  hall  sat  Mrs.  Madison,  "a  young  lady 
of  fourscore  years  and  upwards,"  and  the  aged  widow  of  Alexander  Hamilton 
who  talked  sensibly  about  her  husband  although  her  memory  of  current 
events  had  entirely  ceased.  Daniel  Webster  came  accompanied  by  his  wife 
and  a  Mrs.  Jandon  of  New  York,  and  William  H.  Seward,  who  was  in  town 
arguing  a  patent  case  before  the  Supreme  Court,  promenaded  with  Mrs. 
John  Adams,  widowed  daughter-in-law  of  John  Quincy  Adams.  Old  Baron 
Bodisco's  lovely  teen-aged  Georgetown  wife  wore  a  stunning  set  of  diamonds 
that  excited  the  envy  of  her  sex.  Buchanan  had  attended  her  wedding  as 
escort  for  fourteen-year-old  Jessie  Benton,  one  of  the  bridesmaids.34  The 
famed  Gautier  served  venison,  hams,  beef,  turkey,  pheasant,  chicken, 
oysters,  lobster,  ice  cream,  water  ice,  charlotte  russe,  punch,  fruit  and 
cake  pyramids,  blanc  mange,  apple  toddy,  kisses,  chocolate,  coffee,  300 
bottles  of  wine,  150  bottles  of  champagne,  and  harder  beverages  for  harder 
drinkers.35 

On  January  28,  Representative  David  Wilmot  called  on  Polk  to 
accuse  Buchanan  of  having  brought  about  the  rejection  of  Woodward's 
nomination.  Polk  was  greatly  disturbed.  He  reported  that  Buchanan  had 
been  in  a  "bad  mood  .  .  .  since  Judge  Woodward's  nomination,  .  .  .  and 
since  he  has  discovered  that  he  cannot  control  me  in  the  dispensation  of 
the  public  patronage."  The  president  believed  that  Buchanan  was  differing 
unnecessarily  with  him  in  Cabinet  meetings  and  was  seeking  some 
public  ground  for  making  a  break  with  the  Administration. 

Shortly  thereafter  Buchanan  had  another  skirmish  with  Polk;  it 
was  over  the  appointment  of  a  collector  for  the  Port  of  Philadelphia,  a 
particularly  juicy  plum  of  the  patronage.  The  president  determined  to 
appoint  Henry  Horn,  a  member  of  the  Dallas  wing  of  the  party.  Buchanan 
at  first  opposed  this  choice,  but  he  acquiesced  eventually.  When  Horn's 
name  went  to  the  Senate,  however,  Cameron  demanded  to  see  the  list  of 
Pennsylvanians  who  had  recommended  that  name,  stated  that  he  had  been 
denied  "senatorial  courtesy,"  and  defeated  Horn's  appointment  by  the 
same  trick  he  had  used  to  block  Woodward:  a  thin  Senate,  and  a  union  of 
Whigs  and  a  few  balky  Democrats.  Polk  now  arranged  a  Washington 
conference  of  Horn,  Cameron  and  Buchanan,  in  which  the  latter  was  to 
play  the  arbitrator  between  the  first  two.  Then  he  resubmitted  Horn's 
name,  but  Cameron  persuaded  the  Senate  to  reject  it  a  second  time.  Polk 
wrote  down  Cameron  as  "a  managing  tricky  man,  in  whom  no  reliance  is 
to  be  placed."86  But  how  was  Buchanan  involved?  Polk  could  not  be 

171 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


sure;  nonetheless,  he  determined  to  let  the  Supreme  Court  appointment 
rest  for  a  few  months.  Horn,  meanwhile,  was  furious  with  Dallas  for 
failing  to  push  him  through. 

THE  WALKER-McKAY  TARIFF 

As  summer  approached,  Buchanan  grew  increasingly  restive  in  the  Polk 
administrative  family.  The  McKay  tariff,  framed  largely  by  Secretary 
Walker,  had  passed  the  House  and  was  headed  for  an  extremely  close 
contest  in  the  Senate.  The  bill  proposed  that  no  duty  should  be  placed  on 
any  article  above  the  rate  which  would  produce  the  maximum  revenue, 
and  that  ad  valorem  duties  should  replace  all  specific  duties.  The  bill 
essentially  proposed  free  trade  for  the  nation.  The  former  duty  on  shaped 
iron  products  dropped  from  163  per  cent  to  30  per  cent;  on  shirting  from 
95  per  cent  to  30  per  cent;  on  pig  iron  from  72  per  cent  to  30  per  cent;  and 
on  coal  from  $1.75  per  ton  to  $.40. 

Polk  considered  the  passage  of  this  tariff  bill  by  the  Senate  as 
"the  most  important  measure  of  my  administration,"37  an  opinion  shared 
by  thousands  of  Americans.  Many  of  these,  particularly  the  coal  and  iron 
men  of  Pennsylvania  and  the  textile  makers  of  New  England  considered  it 
the  death  knell  of  all  business,  a  "misshapen  and  monstrous  scheme,"  a 
"fatal  measure  which  strikes  at  the  root  of  all  industry  of  the  country."38 

Buchanan  knew  not  what  to  do.  He  could  not  attack  the  Admin- 
istration;  less  could  he  endorse  its  favorite  measure.  On  Sunday,  June  28, 
when  the  passage  of  the  tariff  seemed  certain,  he  wrote  to  Polk  about  the 
judgeship,  "I  have  concluded,  though  with  much  hesitation,  to  accept  it."39 
At  a  conference  several  days  kter  Buchanan  asked  Polk  to  appoint  him 
immediately,  but  the  president  wished  him  to  stay  with  the  Department 
until  the  end  of  the  Congressional  session.  Buchanan  had  to  be  satisfied 
with  this  plan,  and  he  wrote  his  brother  Edward  in  mid- July  that  he  would 
probably  go  into  the  Court  at  the  close  of  Congress.40  Forney,  too,  was 
reconciled  to  the  inevitable,  though  he  still  insisted  that  Buchanan's 
chances  for  the  *48  nomination  were  brighter  than  ever  and  added  that 
there  was  no  return  from  the  political  grave  of  the  Supreme  Court.41  Dallas 
wrote  of  the  matter:  "Thousands  of  reports  about  Mr.  Buchanan  are  in 
circulation.  His  retreat  from  the  Cabinet  is  spoken  of  as  certain  and  soon — 
and  he  is  said  to  be  destined  for  London.  This  all  smoke— a  method  of 
keeping  up  his  importance,  resorted  to  by  his  partizans.  .  .  .  There  is  a 
growing  discontent  against  the  nomination  of  Mr.  Buchanan  as  Judge,  and 
I  think  the  Whigs  are  moving  in  a  body  against  him.  The  54.40's  will,  of 
course,  go  with  them.'*42 

In  the  Senate,  where  the  fate  of  the  tariff  hung  on  a  vote  or  two, 
it  bqgan  to  look  as  if  there  would  be  a  deadlock.    "Did  I  not  say  so?"  wrote 

172 


POLITICS  UNDER  POLK*   1845 - 1846 


Forney.  "It  would  be  fun  if  Dallas  had  to  untie  the  tariff  knot!  Rare  fun!**43 
Because  Senator  Spencer  Jarnagin  of  Tennessee  refused  to  vote  on  the 
motion  to  bring  up  the  bill  for  its  third  reading,  Vice-President  Dallas  had 
to  cast  the  deciding  vote.  He  supported  the  Administration  at  the  risk  of 
his  own  political  future  and  was  so  fearful  of  the  reaction  in  Philadelphia 
that  he  urged  his  wife  to  move  the  whole  family  to  Washington  at  the  first 
sign  of  trouble.44  He  justified  his  course  at  length  in  a  letter  to  the  Wash- 
ington Union;  nevertheless,  he  suffered  public  condemnation  by  county 
meetings  all  over  Pennsylvania.45  Of  the  state's  entire  delegation,  only 
Dallas  and  Wilmot  voted  for  the  Tariff  of  1846. 

The  Pennsylvania  Whigs  made  war  on  Buchanan  by  republishing 
his  few  remarks  in  favor  of  the  1842  tariff,  and  quoting  him  as  saying, 
during  the  1844  campaign,  that  Polk  was  sounder  than  Clay  on  the  tariff. 
There  was  enough  truth  in  the  charges  to  be  extremely  dangerous,  and 
Buchanan  wrote  quickly  to  Forney,  sketching  out  his  "new  line"  on  the 
tariff.  He  would  stand  by  his  remarks  on  the  1842  tariff:  he  liked  a  revenue 
tariff,  with  incidental  protection,  and  specific  duties.  He  considered  the 
ad  valorem  feature  of  the  1846  tariff  faulty  and  an  invitation  to  fraud,  a 
ruination  of  mechanics  who  lived  by  processing  foreign  raw  materials,  and 
a  heavy  blow  to  Pennsylvania's  coal  and  iron  industries.  He  would  follow 
a  middle  course  so  long  as  he  could,  but  if  forced  to  the  wall,  he  would 
prefer  the  1842  bill  to  the  current  one.46 

Within  two  days,  Buchanan  knew  that  this  position  would  not 
do.  He  now  discarded  the  1842  tariff  as  dead  and  urged  manufacturers 
not  to  get  excited  until  they  were  hurt;  they  could  depend  on  the  Democ- 
racy to  recognize,  in  a  future  session,  the  special  needs  of  Pennsylvania. 
"Repeal  is  not  the  word,  but  modification.  A  protective  tariff  is  not  the 
word;  but  a  revenue  tariff  with  sufficient  discriminations  to  maintain  our 
home  industry."47  Hammering  at  this  line,  he  wrote  a  series  of  articles 
for  Forney's  newly  purchased  Pennsylvcuiian  of  Philadelphia,  which  spread 
abroad  the  theme  of  "modification." 

But  panic  and  economic  collapse  did  not  ensue.  In  general,  the 
tariff  had  not  much  effect  on  the  formerly  protected  industries,  most  of 
which  continued  to  grow  and  prosper  as  a  result  of  many  contemporary 
encouragements  other  than  a  tariff— the  demands  of  a  foreign  war,  a 
European  famine,  heavy  immigration,  rapid  expansion  of  railroads,  and  a 
booming  merchant  marine.  In  fact,  the  tariff  issue  quickly  took  a  back 
seat  because  of  the  exciting  events  of  the  Mexican  War.  Dallas  had  been 
momentarily  wrecked,  but  Buchanan's  prospects  were  so  much  the  better 
for  that.  Having  completed  his  carefully  drawn  statement  for  Forney  on 
"modification,"  Buchanan  paid  an  early  evening  call  on  Polk  and  informed 
him  "that  he  had  decided  to  remain  in  the  Cabinet  and  not  to  accept  the 

173 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


offer  ...  of  the  Supreme  Court."  He  urged  the  appointment  of  his  friend, 
William  B.  Reed,  but  Polk  had  already  decided  on  Judge  Robert  Grier. 
Buchanan  supported  this  decision,  the  nomination  went  to  the  Senate  on 
August  3,  and  the  Senate  approved  it  the  next  day.48 


174 


14 

CONQUERING  A  CONTINENT  •  1845  -  1849 


TEXAS 

President  Polk,  shortly  after  his  election,  confided  to  a  friend  that  he  pro- 
posed to  complete  the  annexation  of  Texas,  to  settle  the  Oregon  boundary 
dispute,  and  to  acquire  California.  The  last  objective  had  not  been  men- 
tioned in  the  Democratic  platform,  but  it  represented  the  president's 
personal  commitment  to  Manifest  Destiny. 

This  term,  which  became  a  synonym  for  the  years  of  Folk's 
Administration,  reflected  a  variety  of  ideas.  Many  antislavery  people 
thought  it  a  mere  ruse  to  hide  a  slave  conspiracy  under  the  cloak  of  national 
patriotism,  a  trick  "so's  to  lug  more  slave  states  in."  Some  feared  that 
territorial  expansion  to  the  Pacific  would  dangerously  upset  the  sectional 
balance  of  politics,  and  others  that  it  would  weaken  the  nation  because  of 
the  difficulty  of  ruling  distant  lands.  Those  who  enthusiastically  supported 
Manifest  Destiny,  especially  in  the  South  and  West,  saw  advantage  in 
changing  the  balance  of  political  control  and  expressed  no  fears  about 
slavery  or  political  administration.  Land  speculators  welcomed  expansion, 
and  commercial  men  eagerly  hoped  for  national  control  of  the  deep-water 
harbors  of  the  Pacific,  from  Puget  Sound  to  San  Diego.  Ownership  of 
these  strategic  bays  would  prove  the  key  to  unlock  the  trade  of  the  Orient 
and  gain  mastery  of  the  Pacific. 

England  and  France  both  were  alive  to  the  prospects  of  such 
commercial  advantage,  and  although  their  governments  placed  no  high 
priority  on  imperialistic  adventures  in  the  Americas,  their  diplomatic,  com- 
mercial, and  military  representatives  scattered  from  Argentina  to  Alaska 
conducted  themselves  aggressively  enough  to  raise  serious  apprehensions 
in  the  United  States.  Particularly  in  Texas,  in  Mexico,  and  in  California 
these  agents  acted  in  ways  that  created  in  Washington  a  fear  of  Europe 
which  became  one  of  the  most  powerful  justifications  of  Manifest  Destiny. 
Buchanan  repeatedly  said  that  unless  the  United  States  established  domi- 
nance in  the  American  Hemisphere,  England  or  France  would  do  it.  This 

175 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

theme  became  a  powerful  weapon  of  the  spread-eagle  "Young  Democrats" 
of  the  day,  for  it  placed  territorial  expansion  on  the  ground  of  national 
security  and  made  Manifest  Destiny  the  slogan  of  patriots.1 

Polk  stated  in  his  inaugural  that  no  foreign  power  had  any  right 
to  interfere  with  Texan  annexation.  "None  can  fail  to  see  the  danger  to 
our  safety  and  future  peace,"  he  said,  "if  Texas  remains  an  independent 
state  or  hecomes  an  ally  or  dependency  of  some  foreign  nation  more 
powerful  than  herself."  A  year  earlier  Buchanan  had  warned  that  Texas 
"must  cast  herself  into  the  arms  of  England,"  unless  the  United  States 
accepted  her.  Even  if  Texas  only  formed  a  commercial  alliance  with 
England  the  result  would  be  that  the  United  States  would  confront  the 
British  to  the  north  and  to  the  south;  "and  British  power  and  British 
influence  will  thus  be  increased  at  our  expense."  On  the  other  hand,  if 
the  United  States  annexed  Texas  and  obtained  this  great  barrier  to  the  west, 
"the  whole  European  world  could  not,  in  combination  against  us,  make 
an  impression  on  our  union."2 

On  March  6,  1845,  Brigadier  General  J.  N.  Almonte,  Mexican 
Minister  to  the  United  States,  protested  the  annexation  of  Texas  as  "an 
act  of  aggression  the  most  unjust  which  can  be  found  recorded  in  the 
annals  of  modern  history"  and  demanded  his  passports.  Buchanan  replied 
that  Texas  had  long  since  achieved  her  independence,  and  that  nothing 
but  the  refusal  of  the  Texans  could  prevent  annexation.  He  instructed 
A.  J.  Donelson,  the  American  Chargg  d'Affaires  in  Texas,  to  avoid  "even 
the  least  appearance  of  interference  with  the  free  action  of  the  people  of 
Texas  on  the  question  of  annexation.  This  is  necessary  to  give  its  full 
effect  to  one  of  the  grandest  moral  spectacles  which  has  ever  been  presented 
to  mankind,  and  to  convince  the  world  that  we  would  not,  if  we  could, 
influence  their  decision  except  by  fair  argument.  We  desire  that  our 
conduct  shall  be  in  perfect  contrast  to  that  pursued  by  the  British  ChargS 
d'Affaires."3 

Despite  these  assurances,  neither  Polk  nor  Buchanan  had  any 
notion  of  leaving  matters  up  to  the  Texans  alone.  On  March  27,  Polk 
appointed  Charles  A.  Wickliffe  as  special  agent  to  Texas,  with  orders  to 
counteract  by  every  means  at  his  command  the  efforts  of  Great  Britain 
and  France  to  defeat  annexation.  Buchanan  cautioned  Wickliffe  to  reveal 
his  official  character  to  no  one  except  Donelson.4 

The  process  of  annexation  involved  several  stages:  first,  approval 
of  the  joint  resolutions  of  the  United  States  Congress  by  the  Congress  of 
Texas;  second,  the  calling  of  a  Texas  convention  to  accept  the  terms  of 
annexation;  third,  the  calling  of  a  Texan  convention  to  frame  a  state 
constitution;  fourth,  the  ratification  of  the  Texan  state  constitution;  and 
fifth,  the  approval  by  the  United  States  Congress  of  this  constitution.  A 
slip  in  any  of  these  steps  might  prove  disastrous. 

176 


CONQUERING  A  CONTINENT  •   1845  - 1849 

The  Texans  worried  about  the  danger  of  a  Mexican  attack  in  the 
transition  period.  This  contingency  also  disturbed  Buchanan  who  had  to 
admit  that  he  did  not  know  what  status  Texas  would  occupy  between  the 
time  of  approving  the  joint  resolution  and  of  admission  as  a  state.  For 
practical  purposes,  however,  he  informed  the  Texan  government  in  May 
that  the  United  States  had  ordered  3,000  troops  to  the  border,  "prepared 
to  enter  Texas  and  to  act  without  a  moment's  delay"  as  soon  as  "the 
Existing  Government  and  the  Convention  of  Texas"  had  accepted  the 
joint  resolutions.5 

Matters  remained  so  uncertain  throughout  June,  due  largely  to 
the  intrigues  of  Charles  Elliott,  the  British  Chargfi  d'Affaires  in  Texas, 
that  Polk  rejected  Donelson's  request  for  leave  on  the  grounds  that  "noth- 
ing ought  to  be  left  to  accident."6  Captain  Elliott  had  fabricated  the 
story  of  a  trip  to  Charleston,  but  he  had  gone  instead  to  Vera  Cruz  where, 
acting  in  the  guise  of  a  secret  Texan  agent,  he  made  an  agreement  with 
the  Mexican  government  that  Mexico  would  recognize  Texan  independence 
on  condition  that  Texas  would  never  join  the  United  States.  He  then 
returned  to  Texas  where  he  informed  the  inhabitants  that  Mexico  had 
massed  7,000  troops  on  the  Rio  Grande  and  would  immediately  invade 
unless  his  proposal  was  adopted.  Buchanan  agreed  with  Polk  that  such 
trickery  demanded  active  resistance.  On  June  15,  the  president  ordered 
General  Zachary  Taylor  to  move  from  Fort  Jesup  to  the  Sabine  River  and 
be  ready,  the  moment  Texas  approved  the  annexation  resolutions,  to 
"consider  her  territory  as  belonging  to  the  United  States."  Buchanan 
pointed  out  that  Elliott's  worst  act  had  been,  in  obtaining  the  consent  of 
Mexico  to  the  independence  of  Texas,  to  deprive  that  power  "of  the  only 
miserable  pretext  which  it  had  for  a  war  aginst  the  United  States,"  although 
at  the  same  time  he  had  stirred  up  such  hatred  in  Mexico  that  war  doubtless 
would  result.7 

The  Texan  Congress  assented  to  annexation  on  June  23,  and  a 
convention  at  San  Felipe  de  Austin  accepted  the  terms  on  July  4.  In  August 
General  Taylor  moved  his  camp  to  the  west  bank  of  the  Nueces  River. 
The  Texans,  meanwhile,  drew  up  their  state  constitution,  and  ratified  it  on 
October  13.  On  December  29,  the  United  States  Congress  approved  the 
constitution,  thus  finally  bringing  Texas  into  the  Union  as  the  twenty- 
eighth  State.  Taylor  now  transferred  his  army  to  the  north  bank  of  the 
Rio  Grande,  opposite  Matamoros,  a  region  which  since  1836  had  been 
claimed  by  the  Texan  Republic.  During  these  years  the  Mexicans  had 
made  no  effort  to  exercise  authority  there.  For  the  moment,  the  Texan 
problem  was  solved. 

177 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


OREGON 

The  negotiation  with  Britain  for  the  Oregon  region  rested  on  a  twenty- 
year-old  contest  in  which  the  foreign  secretaries  of  each  country  claimed  a 
legal  right  to  the  entire  territory  but  talked  of  a  compromise  around  the 
49th  parallel  which  would  divide  the  region  approximately  in  half.  An 
agreement  of  1818  provided  for  the  joint  occupation  of  Oregon,  and  another 
of  1827  permitted  termination  of  the  joint  occupation  upon  one  year's 
notice  by  either  party.  Proposals  of  settlement  at  49°  had  already  been 
made  by  every  president  since  Monroe,  the  latest  under  the  Tyler  Adminis- 
tration. Such  a  project  was  pending  when  Polk  came  to  office  but  he 
pronounced  in  the  inaugural  that  "our  title  to  the  Country  of  Oregon  is 
'clear  and  unquestionable.' "  Americans  were  soon  shouting  a  new  battle 
cry:  "Fifty-four  forty  or  fight."8 

Actually,  the  practical  aspects  of  the  Oregon  question  offered 
little  difficulty.  Neither  government  regarded  the  land  as  particularly 
valuable,  each  had  its  own  strong  reasons  for  wishing  a  settlement  without 
war,  and  both  seemed  agreeable  to  the  49°  line.  This  arrangement  would 
give  the  two  countries  access  to  the  ports  around  Vancouver.  The  real 
difficulty  on  both  sides  lay  in  the  realm  of  national  prestige  and  of  domestic 
politics.  Britain  worried  about  rising  tension  with  France,  needed  American 
grain  to  combat  the  potato  famine,  and  planned  a  major  reversal  of  economic 
policy  by  repealing  the  Corn  Laws,  the  success  of  which  would  depend 
upon  growing  American  friendship  and  trade.  The  Polk  Administration 
worried  about  its  partisan  commitment  to  expansion,  needed  to  'bring  in 
northern  territory  to  balance  Texas,  planned  to  repeal  the  protective 
tariff,  and  anticipated  a  war  with  Mexico.  Notwithstanding,  the  United 
States  could  not  afford  to  appear  soft  in  dealing  with  Britain.  The  interplay 
of  these  forces,  rather  than  legal  claims  to  Oregon  or  estimates  of  its 
intrinsic  value,  governed  the  negotiations. 

In  March  1844,  Lord  Aberdeen,  British  Foreign  Minister,  had 
instructed  the  British  Ambassador  at  Washington,  Richard  Pakenham,  to 
try  to  settle  for  the  Columbia  River  boundary,  but  if  he  failed  in  that  to 
"draw  from  the  American  Negotiator  a  proposal  to  make  the  49th  degree  of 
latitude  the  boundary."  Pakenham  should  also  make  an  effort  to  obtain 
free  ports  for  Britain  south  of  the  49th  parallel  and  free  navigation  of  the 
Columbia  River.  This  proposal,  incidentally,  had  been  made  to  Aberdeen  by 
Edward  Everett,  the  American  Minister  at  London,  on  November  29,  1843. 
But  Folk's  strident  inaugural  and  the  swaggering  talk  of  "54°  40' 
or  fight"  in  the  American  press  complicated  and  slowed  the  plans  for 
settlement  and  required  some  British  bluster  to  redress  the  balance  of 
honor.  Aberdeen  told  a  cheering  House  of  Lords,  in  reference  to  Folk's 
claims,  "We  too,  my  Lords,  have  rights  which  are  clear  and  unquestionable, 

178 


CONQUERING  A  CONHNJBNT  •   J845  -  1849 

and  those  rights,  with  the  blessing  of  God  and  your  support,  we  are  fully 
prepared  to  maintain/'9 

During  the  early  Cabinet  meetings,  Buchanan  had  a  chance  to 
size  up  both  the  traits  of  the  president  and  the  aspect  of  his  own  job. 
Buchanan  felt  himself  superior  to  Polk  in  understanding  of  international 
affairs,  but  he  soon  learned  that  Polk  outranked  him  and  intended  to  use 
his  authority.  The  two  continually  disagreed  on  matters  of  policy,  of 
timing,  of  procedure,  and  of  emphasis.  Polk  sensed  condescension  in 
Buchanan  which  toughened  his  own  attitude.  Buchanan,  confident  of 
his  ability,  forced  Polk  to  take  full  responsibility  for  crossing  him.  During 
the  spring  of  1845,  while  Polk  debated  whether  to  affirm  directly  a  claim 
to  all  of  Oregon,  Buchanan  advised  against  it.  To  claim  all  without  once 
more  attempting  a  compromise  solution,  he  argued,  would  lead  inevitably 
to  war,  invite  the  condemnation  of  the  civilized  world,  and  destroy  the 
support  of  the  nation.  On  the  other  hand,  if  compromise  were  offered  and 
rejected  by  Britain  and  war  followed,  then  the  Administration  could  "appeal 
to  all  mankind  for  the  justice  and  moderation  of  our  demand  .  .  .  and  our 
own  citizens  would  be  enthusiastically  united  in  sustaining  such  a  war."10 

Buchanan's  rivals  urged  that  the  negotiation  be  transferred  to 
London,  but  upon  the  appointment  of  Louis  McLane  of  Delaware  as 
Minister  to  Britain,  Polk  directed  Buchanan  to  take  charge  and  to  continue 
the  talks  on  the  Calhoun  proposal  of  compromise.  On  July  12,  Buchanan 
sent  Pakenham  a  brief  project  for  settlement  at  49°,  explaining  that  Polk 
"would  not  have  consented  to  yield  any  portion  of  the  Oregon  territory," 
except  for  the  acts  of  his  predecessors  who  had  agreed  to  compromise. 
Pakenham,  not  bothering  to  refer  the  offer  to  London  for  advice  though  its 
contents  were  very  close  to  Aberdeen's  own  wishes  of  March,  1844, 
rejected  it.  Probably  he  reacted  to  a  recent  letter  from  Aberdeen,  com- 
menting upon  the  indignation  with  which  Folk's  inaugural  had  been 
received  in  England  and  stating  that  "we^ire  still  ready  to  adhere  to  the 
principle  of  an  equitable  compromise,  but  we  are  perfectly  determined  to 
cede  nothing  to  force  or  menace."11  Consistent  with  the  firmness  of 
Aberdeen's  stand,  Pakenham  concluded  his  note  of  rejection  with  the 
statement  that  he  hoped  the  United  States  would  "be  prepared  to  offer 
some  further  proposal  .  .  .  more  consistent  with  fairness  and  equity,  and 
with  the  reasonable  expectations  of  the  British  government."12  This 
insulting  response  brought  the  Oregon  question  suddenly  to  a  crisis. 

Polk  directed  Buchanan  to  prepare  a  full  argument  for  the 
American  title  to  all  of  Oregon,  withdraw  the  compromise  proposal,  and 
leave  the  rest  to  the  British.  Buchanan  agreed  but  urged  that  some  state- 
ment to  the  effect  that  the  United  States  would  consider  a  British  counter- 
proposal  should  be  included.  Polk  overrode  him,  arguing  that  to  invite  a 
proposal  from  Britain,  when  she  had  just  rejected  an  eminently  fair  one, 

179 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


would  suggest  that  he  might  be  willing  to  settle  for  less  than  had  already 
been  demanded.  Buchanan  then  asked  for  a  postponement  of  the  reply 
until  passions  had  cooled.  He  stood  firm  in  his  opinion  that  to  close  the 
door  to  negotiation  would  lead  to  war  and  that  war  with  England  for 
northern  Oregon  would  not  be  sustained  by  the  country.  Furthermore,  it 
would  be  rash  to  take  such  a  risk  at  a  time  when  conflict  with  Mexico 
loomed.13  Polk  declared  he  would  "firmly  maintain  our  rights,  and  leave 
the  rest  to  God  and  the  country/'  to  which  Buchanan  replied  that  he 
thought  God  would  find  difficulty  in  justifying  us  in  a  war  over  the  country 

north  of  49°.14 

Nonetheless,  he  proceeded  to  draw  up  a  detailed  statement  of 
claim  to  all  of  Oregon.  It  was  lawyer's  work,  and  in  it  he  excelled.  On 
August  30,  he  delivered  to  Pakenham  a  powerful  justification  of  the 
American  demands,  together  with  information  that  the  compromise  offer 
was  withdrawn.  Attending  Cabinet  at  half-past  twelve  he  announced, 
"Well,  the  deed  is  done,"  but  said  he  still  thought  it  was  bad  policy  to  rule 
out  further  talks. 

While  paper  arguments  provided  no  key  to  settlement,  Buchanan's 
Oregon  letter  served  to  strengthen  greatly  the  American  position.  Cave 
Johnson,  after  listening  to  it  in  Cabinet,  said  if  he  had  heard  it  before  he 
never  would  have  sanctioned  the  earlier  compromise.  Bancroft  commented 
on  the  vast  superiority  of  Buchanan's  paper  over  Pakenham's,  and  McLane 
reported  from  London  that  the  clear  enunciation  of  the  American  claim  had 
counteracted  the  idea  that  the  American  demands  were  sheer  brass  and 
much  softened  the  British  attitude.15 

Very  shortly  word  arrived  from  McLane  in  London  that  Aberdeen 
strongly  disapproved  of  Pakenham's  rejection  of  the  American  compromise 
offer  and  would  like  to  negotiate  further.  Buchanan  thought  this  eminently 
sensible,  and  again  tried  to  convince  Polk  to  let  him  pass  along  a  hint  that 
the  United  States  would  receive  a  British  proposal.  He  then  suggested  the 
possibility  of  informing  Pakenham  that  a  proposal  from  Britain  would  be 
submitted  directly  to  the  Senate,  for  its  previous  advice,  thus  relieving 
Polk  of  the  embarrassment  of  altering  his  position.  Polk  thought  this 
procedure  would  be  improper.  Discouraged,  Buchanan  told  the  president 
that  by  diplomatic  means,  he  might  get  Oregon;  but  "by  strong  measures 
hastily  taken,  we  would  have  war  and  might  lose  it."16 

Folk's  annual  message  calling  upon  the  Senate  to  denounce  the 
joint  occupation  agreement  of  1827  caused  excitement  but  no  surprise  for 
it  was  an  inevitable  consequence  of  the  decision  to  assert  the  total  American 
claim.  Aberdeen  welcomed  it,  telling  Pakenham  that  "as  the  crisis  becomes 
more  imminent,  the  chance  of  settlement  improves."17 

Through  December  and  January,  Buchanan,  the  ministers  on 
both  sides  of  the  water,  and  United  States  Senators  tried  to  break  through 

180 


CONQUERING  A  CONTINENT  •   1845  - 1849 


Folk's  intransigence.  The  problem  by  this  time  seemed  clearly  to  be  that 
of  saving  face  for  the  president.  Ex-minister  Everett  wrote  directly  to 
Aberdeen,  and  sent  the  replies  to  Folk's  Cabinet  via  George  Bancroft. 
Buchanan  discussed  the  business  informally  with  Pakenham.  McLane 
talked  freely  in  London.  All  agreed  that  both  nations  would  welcome  a 
49th  parallel  settlement.  The  problem  was  to  persuade  Polk  to  change  his 
position  and  agree  to  accept  a  British  proposal  of  this  line. 

Pakenham,  trying  desperately  to  break  through  the  impasse,  sent 
an  angling  note  to  discover  what  Polk  might  assent  to,  with  the  proviso  that 
it  should  be  considered  "official"  or  "unofficial"  depending  on  the  reply. 
Buchanan  endorsed  this  strategem  as  practical  and  harmless,  hut  Polk 
would  have  none  of  it.  Pakenham  next  proposed  arbitration,  a  stale 
solution  previously  rejected  by  the  United  States,  and  rejected  by  Buchanan 
and  Polk  twice  more.  It  was  a  time-wasting  device  to  keep  up  appearances 
of  a  negotiation  and  was  so  understood  by  all  concerned. 

Buchanan  dragged  his  feet  in  every  possible  way  and  invented 
such  schemes  as  he  could  to  break  Folk's  will.  He  harassed  the  president 
on  appointments,  threatened  to  resign,  blew  hot  and  cold  on  the  Supreme 
Court  appointment,  which  would  have  injured  the  Administration  had  he 
taken  it  in  the  midst  of  the  fight  on  Oregon,  and  continually  urged  objections 
to  Folk's  ideas.  Polk  wrote  him  down  as  differing  with  all  the  Cabinet  and 
laboring  to  upset  the  presidential  policy  in  his  anxiety  to  leave  the  door 
open  for  further  negotiation,18  and  in  this  opinion  Polk  was  precisely  right. 

On  December  13,  Buchanan  presented  for  presidential  approval 
a  dispatch  to  McLane  containing  the  sentence  that  "if  the  British  Govern- 
ment chose  to  offer  as  a  compromise  the  49°  line,  the  president  would  be 
strongly  inclined  to  submit  it  to  the  Senate  for  their  advice."  Polk  struck 
it  out,  and  substituted  the  statement  that  if  Britain  wished  to  proceed 
further  toward  a  settlement,  "the  President  would  judge  of  the  character 
of  any  new  proposition."  Buchanan  said  that  if  the  dispatch  went  as 
amended,  there  had  better  be  some  preparations  for  war.  Polk  told  him 
to  send  it.19  On  the  same  day  that  Buchanan  forwarded  this  official  message 
to  McLane,  he  wrote  a  private  letter  assuring  him  that  practically  everyone 
in  Congress  wanted  to  settle  at  49°  and  that  a  real  war  threat  might  possibly 
bring  some  constructive  results.  Aberdeen,  in  a  letter  to  Everett,  stated 
that  if  McLane  had  full  powers  the  whole  problem  would  be  settled  in 

an  hour/*** 

In  England,  Sir  Robert  Peel  declared,  "We  shall  not  reciprocate 
blustering  with  Polk,  but  shall  quietly  make  an  increase  in  the  Naval  and 
Military  and  Ordnance  Estimates."  But  while  the  Prime  Minister  and  the 
Foreign  Office  prepared  for  war  and  announced,  "if  you  desire  war,  as 
assuredly  you  will  have  it,"  the  London  Times,  mouthpiece  for  the  govern- 
ment,  came  out  strongly  for  compromise  at  49°.  Buchanan,  long  since  in 

181 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


possession  of  information  which  Polk  refused  to  take  seriously,  proposed 
on  February  6  that  the  McLane  correspondence  relative  to  British  war 
measures  be  sent  to  Congress. 

Finally,  on  February  21,  the  stalemate  broke.  Buchanan  received 
a  letter  from  McLane  stating  positively  that  Aberdeen  had  approved  the  use 
of  force  and  decided  to  send  a  naval  force  to  Canada  consisting  of  "thirty 
sail  of  the  line  besides  steamers  and  other  vessels  of  war  of  a  smaller  class."21 
Buchanan  took  the  letter  immediately  to  Polk,  who  observed  that  the 
British  were  "not  altogether  of  so  pacific  a  character  as  the  accounts  given 
in  the  English  newspapers  had  led  me  to  believe."  Most  of  the  Cabinet 
saw  the  letter  on  Monday,  and  discussed  it  on  Tuesday,  February  24. 
Buchanan  read  the  McLane  letter  and  then  his  reply  to  McLane  informing 
Aberdeen  that  if  the  British  proposed  a  settlement  at  the  49th  parallel,  the 
president  would  submit  the  offer  to  the  Senate  for  its  previous  advice. 
Polk  called  on  each  Cabinet  member  individually  before  expressing  his  own 
view.  All  agreed  with  Buchanan  except  Cave  Johnson. 

Polk  now  yielded.  Buchanan  sent  the  dispatch  on  February  26, 
accompanying  it  as  usual  with  an  unofficial  letter  in  which  he  urged  a  hasty 
response  from  the  British  because  of  the  likelihood  of  a  political  change  in 
Congress  by  fall.  He  had  already  canvassed  the  Senate  and  knew  he  could 
count  on  approval  there.  In  fact,  several  Senators  had  threatened  to  bring 
in  a  resolution  forcing  Polk  to  reopen  negotiations  on  Oregon. 

From  this  point,  the  Oregon  settlement  was  merely  a  matter  of 
time.  Everyone  could  guess  what  would  be  proposed  and  how  it  would  be 
received;  the  question  was  not  what,  but  when.  On  June  6,  Pakenham 
delivered  a  British  proposal  to  Buchanan  which  almost  exactly  duplicated 
the  settlement  proposed  by  Buchanan  to  McLane  in  February.  Polk  sent 
it  to  the  Senate  which,  on  June  12,  approved  it  by  a  vote  of  37  to  12,  and 
on  the  15th  of  June  the  Oregon  Treaty  was  signed.  The  negotiation  raised 
Buchanan's  prestige  in  foreign  courts  and  drew  from  Queen  Victoria  the 
statement  that  she  liked  Mr.  Buchanan's  treaty.22 

Between  February  and  June,  after  Buchanan  knew  that  he  had 
won  the  compromise  settlement,  he  assumed,  in  Folk's  words,  "a  most 
warlike  disposition,"  taking  strong  ground  against  England  and  heckling 
the  president  for  giving  in.  Polk  attributed  this  marked  change  of  attitude 
to  presidential  politics  and  accused  Buchanan  of  being  more  concerned 
"with  '48  than  with  49°  or  54°  40V  He  may  have  been  partly  right  in  this 
judgment,  but  he  missed  the  main  point.  Polk  wrote  in  his  diary  that 
regardless  of  how  his  secretary  differed  with  him  on  public  questions,  the 
president  held  the  responsibility.  "I  will  control,"  he  wrote.  "If  I  would 
yield  up  the  government  into  his  hands  and  suffer  him  to  be  in  effect 
President,  ...  I  have  no  doubt  he  would  be  cheerful  and  satisfied.  This  I 
cannot  do."  Buchanan  sensed  that  Polk  often  appeared  to  differ  with  him 

182 


CONQUERING  A  CONTINENT  •   1845  - 1849 


more  to  protect  the  presidential  prerogative  and  to  assert  command  than  for 
reasons  substantially  bearing  on  the  subject  at  issue. 

Buchanan  thought  that  he  could  easily  have  settled  the  Oregon 
boundary  at  49°  months  earlier,  but  because  of  the  prestige  the  accomplish- 
ment might  have  given  him,  Polk  had  obstructed  the  natural  procedure, 
had  made  a  great  show  of  bearding  the  British  lion,  and  had  sought  to  focus 
attention  on  himself.  Now  that  the  public  had  come  to  think  of  a  division 
of  Oregon  at  49°  as  a  retreat,  Polk  wanted  his  Secretary  of  State  to  bear  the 
onus  of  it.  Buchanan  would  not  do  it.  When  Polk  asked  him  to  help 
prepare  the  presidential  message  for  submission  of  the  treaty,  he  refused, 
and  in  Cabinet  meeting  remarked  to  the  president  "that  the  54°  40'  men  were 
the  true  friends  of  the  administration  and  he  wished  no  backing  out  on  the 
subject."23  If  Polk  saw  no  humor  or  irony  in  this  statement,  some  of  the 
Cabinet  did,  for  Buchanan  had  merely  paraphrased  what  the  president  had 
so  often  said  emphatically  to  him.  Buchanan  eventually  did  make  a  little 
political  capital  out  of  the  Oregon  question,  but  not  until  after  the  solution 
he  wanted  had  been  guaranteed.  And  he  undoubtedly  derived  some  satis- 
faction from  making  Polk  take  some  of  his  own  medicine. 

MEXICO 

Polk  proposed,  after  the  admission  of  Texas  as  a  state  with  the  Rio  Grande 
boundary,  to  acquire  the  Mexican  provinces  of  New  Mexico  and  California. 
The  acquisition  of  new  territory  meant  the  readjustment  of  the  sectional 
balance  in  Congress  and  introduced  the  explosive  political  issue,  slavery  in 
the  new  lands.  Oregon  would  presumably  form  a  huge  addition  to  the 
free  region  and  thus  balance  Texas.  How  could  a  similar  balance  of  power 
be  achieved  in  New  Mexico  and  California?  The  Whigs  and  many  northern 
Democrats  would  balk  at  any  further  extension  of  slavery.  The  person  who 
could  participate  conspicuously  in  acquiring  New  Mexico  and  California 
and  prevent  at  the  same  time  a  striking  triumph  of  either  the  slave  or  anti- 
slavery  forces  held  the  key  to  the  presidential  succession.  So,  at  least, 
Buchanan  thought. 

Wilson  Shannon,  United  States  Minister  to  Mexico,  received  his 
passports  on  March  28,  1845,  ending  diplomatic  relations  between  the  two 
countries.  Before  anything  further  could  be  done,  Buchanan  had  to  re- 
establish communications.  He  sent  William  S.  Parrott  of  Virginia  as  a 
secret  agent  to  discover  whether  Mexico  would  continue  negotiations. 
Parrott  reported,  on  August  26, 1845,  that  if  an  envoy  were  sent,  he  would 
be  well  received  and  "might  with  comparative  ease  settle,  over  a  breakfast 
table,  the  most  important  national  problems."  Under  the  government  of 
President  Jos6  Joaqufn  Herrera,  a  kindly,  peaceful  man  who  had  replaced 
Santa  Anna  shortly  after  Folk's  inauguration  and  represented  the  peace 

183 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


party  of  Mexico,  a  Mexican  declaration  of  war  against  the  United  States 
seemed  very  unlikely.24 

This  report  directly  contradicted  other  information  Buchanan 
possessed,  namely,  that  the  war  spirit  ran  high  in  Mexico  and  that  her 
troops  had  begun  to  mass  along  the  Texan  border.  However,  Parrott's 
statement  received  confirmation  through  Col.  Benjamin  Green,  Secretary 
of  Legation  at  Mexico  City,  who  knew  the  party  situation  intimately.  Green 
gave  assurance  that  Herrera  wished  to  settle  peaceably  all  questions  at 
issue,  not  only  claims  and  the  Texan  boundary  but  also  the  cession  of 
New  Mexico  and  California.  The  Mexican  government  would  have  diffi- 
culty in  sustaining  itself  if  the  United  States  sent  a  regular  minister  and 
attempted  to  reopen  diplomatic  relations  in  the  usual  way,  but  if  a  special 
commission  were  appointed  to  discuss  immediate  problems,  Herrera  would 
receive  it.26 

Uncertain  what  to  believe,  Buchanan  questioned  John  Black, 
U.  S.  Consul  at  Mexico  City.  Black  replied  that  the  Mexican  Foreign  Office 
was  "disposed  to  receive  the  Commissioner  of  the  United  States  .  .  .  with 
full  powers  ...  to  settle  the  present  dispute.'*26 

Buchanan  left  for  Bedford  Springs  at  the  end  of  July.  Though 
not  disposed  to  worry,  the  heavy  responsibilities  of  his  office  had  begun  to 
tell  on  him,  and  he  needed  rest.  "To  be  Secretary  of  State  is  not  'what  it 
is  cracked  up  to  be/  "  he  wrote  to  a  friend  before  he  left  Washington.  "Here 
I  am  sitting  in  a  hot  room,  engaged  from  morning  till  night  &  often  after 
night  at  a  season  of  the  year  when  I  had  ever  been  as  free  as  mountain 
breezes.  I  never  much  fancied  a  Cabinet  appointment  &  now  less  than 
ever."27  But  he  was  not  to  get  his  vacation.  Polk  ordered  him  back  to 
advise  on  threatening  new  developments  in  Mexico  and  cautioned  him  to 
leave  Bedford  "in  a  way  to  produce  no  public  sensation."28  Bancroft 
wrote  that  Mexico  probably  would  start  guerrilla  warfare  across  the  Rio 
Grande,  but  he  saw  no  cause  for  worry,  since  Marcy  had  ordered  an  increase 
in  Taylor's  army.  Referring  to  the  continual  fight  in  Cabinet,  he  told 
Buchanan  that  the  president  "will  grow  fat  in  your  absence,  he  sleeps 
so  well  nou>."29 

Polk,  with  unanimous  agreement  of  his  Cabinet,  decided  on 
September  16  to  make  the  effort  to  reopen  diplomatic  relations  with  Mexico. 
Buchanan  picked  as  negotiator  John  Slidell  of  New  Orleans,  who  spoke 
Spanish  fluently  and  had  both  diplomatic  and  political  qualifications  for 
the  work.  His  appointment  was  to  be  kept  a  close  secret,  lest  the  French 
and  British  Ministers  in  Washington  or  elsewhere  should  undermine  the 
mission  in  advance. 

Continued  uncertainty  whether  the  mission  would  be  received 
by  the  Mexicans  delayed  its  dispatch  for  two  months  more.  In  November, 
Buchanan  urged  that  Slidell  be  sent  immediately  with  the  instructions  that 

184 


CONQUERING  A  CONTINENT*   1845.1849 

had  been  prepared.  Polk,  disregarding  Col.  Green's  advice,  commissioned 
Slidell  as  a  regular  minister.  As  such  he  would  have  full  authority,  and 
rejection  of  him  by  the  Mexicans  would  suggest  their  rebuff  of  a  peace  effort. 

Buchanan's  instructions  to  Slidell  opened  with  several  pages 
emphasizing  the  duty  of  the  United  States  to  protect  the  Americas  from 
European  intervention.  'The  march  of  free  Government  on  this  continent 
must  not  be  trammelled  by  the  intrigues  and  selfish  interests  of  European 
powers.  Liberty  here  must  be  allowed  to  work  out  its  natural  results;  and 
these  will,  ere  long,  astonish  the  world."30  Polk,  in  his  annual  message  of 
December  2,  1845,  elaborated  the  same  point,  quoting  nearly  verbatim 
from  Buchanan.  These  statements  created  an  impression  that  the  con- 
templated acquisition  of  Mexican  territory  along  the  Pacific  was,  in  fact,  a 
protection  of  all  America  from  the  military  intrigues  of  Europe  and  placed 
the  expansion  program  on  the  ground  of  national  security. 

Buchanan's  practical  directions  to  the  new  envoy  rehearsed  the 
long  standing  grievances  of  the  United  States  against  Mexico,  the  un- 
satisfied claims,  the  breach  of  treaty  obligations,  the  legal  justification  for 
reprisals,  the  widely  acknowledged  independence  of  Texas,  and  the  failure 
of  Mexico  to  attempt  any  exercise  of  authority  in  the  region  claimed  by 
Texas.  Buchanan  then  proposed  a  sequence  of  settlements :  should  Mexico 
approve  the  boundary  as  defined  by  the  Republic  of  Texas  in  1836,  the 
United  States  would  pay  claims  of  United  States  citizens  against  Mexico; 
for  the  cession  of  New  Mexico,  Slidell  could  offer  $5,000,000;  for  the 
cession  of  California,  "money  would  be  no  object,"  but  $25,000,000 
should  be  offered.31 

First  the  Herrera  government  and  then  that  of  General  Paredes, 
who  had  ousted  Herrera,  refused  to  receive  Slidell.  Having  little  hope  that 
any  government  would  undertake  to  negotiate  with  the  minister,  Buchanan 
instructed  him  to  make  an  effort  "to  throw  the  whole  odium  of  the  failure 
.  .  .  upon  the  Mexican  government,"32  and  to  act  in  such  a  way  that  "it 
may  appear  manifest  to  the  people  of  the  United  States  and  to  the  world 
that  a  rupture  could  not  honorably  be  avoided."33  A  little  later,  when  the 
Paredes  regime  was  on  the  brink  of  bankruptcy,  Buchanan  authorized 
Slidell  to  offer  cash  to  the  general  "if  he  would  do  us  justice  and  settle  the 
question  of  boundary  between  the  two  republics."34 

In  the  meantime  Col.  A.  J.  Atocha  came  to  Polk  with  the  proposal 
that  the  United  States  should  help  the  exiled  dictator  Santa  Anna  return 
to  Mexico.  Once  re-established  in  power,  Santa  Anna  would  make  the 
treaty  of  cession  to  the  United  States,  if  that  country  could  stage  enough, 
of  a  military  show  to  convince  the  Mexican  people  that  their  leader  was 
forced  into  the  demand.  Atocha  suggested  that,  as  a  preliminary,  Slidell 
should  call  for  the  satisfaction  of  claims  against  Mexico  from  the  deck  of 
a  warship  moored  off  Vera  Cruz.35 

185 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Although  Polk  put  little  trust  in  Atocha,  he  did  take  the  bizarre 
scheme  to  the  Cabinet.  Buchanan,  who  had  not  known  of  it  before, 
immediately  judged  it  unacceptable.  It  would  give  the  impression,  he  said, 
that  the  United  States  had  made  Slidell  the  spokesman  of  aggression  rather 
than  a  peace  commissioner.  The  Secretary  of  State,  irritated  and  angry, 

left  the  meeting. 

That  night  Buchanan  wrote  Polk  two  notes  in  which  he  explained 
in  detail  his  objections  to  the  Atocha  plan.  "When  I  difier  with  you," 
he  continued,  "it  is  always  with  reluctance  and  regret.  I  do  not  like  to 
urge  arguments  in  opposition  before  the  whole  Cabinet.  ...  A  little 
previous  consultation  with  me  on  important  questions  .  .  .  would  jalways 
obviate  this  difficulty."36  Buchanan  hoped  that  the  Administration  would 
not  make  any  move  that  might  lead  to  war  until  it  had  convinced  the 
American  people  that  resort  to  hostilities  had  become  the  only  means  of 
preserving  the  national  honor.37 

Polk  wanted  action  and  considered  the  unpaid  claims  sufficient 
excuse  for  a  war  with  Mexico,  but  Buchanan  pleaded  with  him  to  wait  until 
the  Mexicans  should  commit  some  act  of  hostility.38  Private  reports  he 
had  been  receiving  from  General  Taylor's  camp  near  Matamoros  led  him 
to  believe  that  Mexican  soldiers  would  soon  attack.39 

On  May  9,  the  day  after  Slidell  returned  to  Washington  for  a 
conference  with  Polk  and  Buchanan,  news  came  of  a  skirmish  between  the 
Mexican  forces  and  Taylor's  little  army  during  which  several  Americans 
lost  their  lives.  Polk  immediately  called  a  Cabinet  meeting  and  added  to 
a  war  message  which  he  had  already  prepared  the  statement  that  Mexico 
had  "invaded  our  territory  and  shed  American  blood  upon  the  American 
soil."  Congress  promptly  responded  to  Folk's  message  by  a  nearly  unani- 
mous vote  for  a  declaration  of  war. 

Buchanan  meanwhile  prepared  a  circular  for  distribution  to 
foreign  governments  explaining  that  the  United  States  did  not  fight  to 
dismember  Mexico  but  only  to  defend  her  own  territory  as  far  south  as 
the  Rio  Grande  boundary.  Polk  refused  to  tie  his  hands  with  such  a 
proclamation  and  rewrote  the  paragraph  to  read,  "We  go  to  war  with 
Mexico  solely  for  the  purpose  of  conquering  an  honorable  peace."40 
Buchanan  argued  earnestly  for  his  own  version,  for  he  wished  to  distinguish 
clearly  between  initiating  a  war  of  aggression  and  fighting  a  defensive  war. 
If  people  believed  that  the  object  of  hostilities  was  to  make  a  conquest,  the 
war  would  be  rendered  "utterly  odious"  at  home  and  European  inter- 
vention might  follow.41  But  the  Cabinet  thought  otherwise  and  Buchanan 
reluctantly  sent  out  Folk's  explanation.42 

From  the  day  war  was  declared,  Buchanan  asked  for  a  clear 
definition  of  what  territory  the  Administration  proposed  to  demand  from 
Mexico,  in  order  that  he  could  continue  peace  negotiations  on  such  a  basis 

186 


CONQUERING  A  CONTINENT  •   1845  - 1849 

even  while  the  war  proceeded.  Secretary  Walker  wanted  all  Mexican 
territory  north  of  the  26th  parallel,  from  the  mouth  of  the  Rio  Grande  to 
the  Pacific.  Buchanan  preferred  to  demand  only  upper  California,  from 
the  37th  or  38th  parallel,  including  San  Francisco  or  possibly  Monterey, 
and  the  province  of  New  Mexico  north  of  the  32nd  parallel.  To  seek 
southern  California  or  the  region  south  of  Texas  would,  he  feared,  raise  a 
storm  over  slavery  and  "be  the  means  of  dissolving  the  Union."48 

On  July  27,  Buchanan  sent  a  note  under  a  flag  of  truce  to  the 
Mexican  Foreign  Minister  inviting  further  negotiations  either  in  Washing- 
ton or  Mexico.  Polk  asked  Congress  to  appropriate  $2,000,000  for  an 
immediate  payment  to  Mexico  upon  ratification  of  a  treaty.  He  hoped 
that  the  Paredes  government,  now  nearly  bankrupt,  would  accept  this  sum 
as  a  means  of  self-preservation. 

Buchanan  warned  Polk  that  a  request  to  Congress  for  such  an 
appropriation  would  only  start  a  bitter  debate  over  slavery.  Representative 
David  Wilmot  attached  to  the  Administration  money  bill  the  "proviso" 
that  slavery  should  forever  be  excluded  from  any  territory  that  the  United 
States  might  acquire  from  Mexico.  The  Wilmot  Proviso  killed  the  bill. 
Richard  Rush  commented  to  Buchanan  that  the  rejection  of  the  treaty 
fund  would  cost  the  nation  a  hundred  million  dollars  in  war  expenses.44 
Meanwhile,  the  Mexican  Foreign  Minister  chose  to  interpret  Buchanan's 
peace  offer  as  an  insult.  Buchanan  answered  that  no  alternative  remained 
but  to  prosecute  the  war  until  Mexico  proposed  to  stop  it.46 

Although  still  hopeful  of  peace  by  negotiation,  Buchanan  began 
an  effort  to  direct  war  strategy  into  channels  which  would  bring  the  kind 
of  peace  he  wanted.  He  supported  the  "defensive  line"  policy  which 
advocated  military  seizure  of  only  the  territory  desired.  He  bounded  that 
region  by  the  Rio  Grande  to  the  western  edge  of  Texas  and  from  there  by 
a  line  along  the  32nd  parallel  to  the  Pacific.  This  amount,  he  hoped, 
would  be  reasonable  compensation  for  claims  and  indemnity  for  war 
expenses.  Furthermore,  its  acquisition  would  cause  no  serious  division 
in  the  Democratic  party  on  the  question  of  slavery. 

The  Administration  feared  that  a  full-scale  war  carried  to  the 
heart  of  Mexico  would  make  Generals  Zachary  Taylor  and  Winfield  Scott, 
both  Whigs,  popular  heroes  and  permit  them  to  set  themselves  up  ps 
presidential  candidates.  So  probable  did  this  development  appear  that 
Polk,  with  Buchanan's  hearty  approval,  tried  in  vain  to  persuade  the  Senate 
to  commission  Thomas  Hart  Benton  a  lieutenant  general  so  that  he  would 
outrank  both  Taylor  and  Scott.  Polk  then  offered  Benton  a  major-general- 
ship, which  he  refused.  Therefore,  the  Whig  generals  held  the  field  and 
largely  controlled  the  military  policy  of  the  war. 

Meanwhile,  the  army  and  navy,  in  a  series  of  signal  victories,  had 
won  control  not  only  of  New  Mexico  and  California  but  also  of  the  heart  of 

187 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Mexico.  The  news  excited  the  admiration  and  enthusiasm  of  all  Americans, 
silenced  much  of  the  Whig  and  abolitionist  condemnation  of  the  war,  and 
converted  into  howling  patriots  those  who  had  earlier  remained  indifferent. 
Even  from  abroad  came  expressions  of  praise  for  the  conduct  of  American 

arms. 

The  tidings  of  victory  from  Buena  Vista  and  Vera  Cruz  induced 
Polk  to  try  the  olive  branch  again.  The  Cabinet  approved  and  Buchanan 
set  to  work  to  draft  a  peace  treaty.  His  proposal  of  April  13, 1847,  provided 
for  cession  of  the  provinces  of  New  Mexico  and  Upper  and  Lower  California, 
together  with  a  right  of  passage  across  the  isthmus  of  Tehuantepec.  For 
this,  the  United  States  would  pay  all  claims  of  American  citizens  against 
Mexico  and  $15,000,000  in  addition.  Against  Buchanan's  persistent  oppo- 
sition, Polk  and  the  rest  of  the  Cabinet  revised  the  purchase  price  upwards 
to  $30,000,000.46 

For  a  time  Buchanan  considered  going  to  Mexico  as  peace  com- 
missioner, but  he  decided  that  the  negotiations  might  keep  him  away  from 
Washington  too  long.  The  Cabinet  felt  that  domestic  politics  ruled  out 
General  Scott,  otherwise  a  logical  choice,  or  any  prominent  Democrat. 
Buchanan  suggested  the  appointment  of  the  Chief  Clerk  in  the  State 
Department,  Nicholas  Philip  Trist,  for  the  task.  He  had  no  political 
aspirations  and  his  open  suspicion  of  Scott's  designs  on  the  presidency 
made  Trist  even  more  acceptable  to  the  Cabinet. 

Appointed  on  April  15,  Trist  set  out  under  an  assumed  name  and 
arrived  in  Mexico  in  May.  He  opened  negotiations  through  the  British 
embassy  on  June  6;  not,  however,  before  becoming  involved  in  a  violent 
quarrel  with  General  Scott  who  complained,  "I  see  that  the  Secretary  of 
War  proposes  to  degrade  me."  Trist,  on  his  part,  reported  to  Buchanan 
that  Scott  was  "decidedly  the  greatest  imbecile  I  have  ever  had  anything 
to  do  with."47  But  within  a  few  weeks,  both  men  patched  up  their  futile 
quarrel  and  soon  became  good  friends.  Scott,  too,  quickly  realized  that 
Trist  would  be  much  better  than  some  politically  ambitious  Democratic 
Senator  in  the  role  of  peacemaker. 

During  the  summer  Scott,  with  consummate  military  skill,  struck 
out  from  Vera  Cruz  and  fought  his  way  to  Mexico  City.  Trist  now  for  the 
first  time  showed  Scott  the  peace  proposals  and  the  general,  impressed  by 
their  fairness  and  restraint,  began  actively  to  assist  in  the  negotiation. 
Santa  Anna  had  promised  that  he  would  negotiate  for  $10,000  in  advance 
and  $1,000,000  upon  signing  a  treaty.  Scott  put  up  the  $10,000  out  of  the 
army  secret  service  fund,  but  Santa  Anna,  with  the  money  safely  in  his 
pocket,  backed  out  of  the  bargain.  Therefore,  Scott  had  to  carry  the  war 
to  its  final  conclusion.  On  September  14,  after  the  thrilling  but  costly 
victories  at  Molino  Del  Key  and  Chapultepec,  Scott  and  the  American  army 
marched  into  the  Mexican  capital.  By  this  time  Santa  Anna  had  fled  and 

188 


CONQUERING  A  CONTINENT  •   1845  -  1849 

the  Mexican  government  was  so  demoralized  that  for  the  moment  there 
was  no  one  with  whom  to  negotiate. 

When  news  of  these  events  arrived  in  Washington,  Buchanan, 
Walker  and  others  repented  their  willingness  to  accept  a  peace  so  easy  on 
Mexico  as  the  one  outlined  in  the  original  instructions  to  Trist.  Buchanan 
paved  the  way  for  stiffening  terms  as  early  as  June  by  writing  to  Trist  that 
"the  object  of  a  war,  at  any  period  of  its  continuance,  is  not  necessarily 
that  for  which  it  commenced."48  During  the  summer,  Buchanan  pro- 
gressively  altered  his  stand  on  the  amount  of  territory  which  ought  to  be 
demanded  of  Mexico  as  indemnity,  increasing  the  area  in  correlation  to 
American  military  success  and  the  rising  popular  demand  for  all  of  Mexico. 
At  the  time  of  drawing  up  Trist's  instructions,  Buchanan  had 
written  to  a  friend  that  to  annex  most  of  northern  Mexico  "would  not  be 
in  accordance  with  public  opinion,"  and  wanted  to  limit  the  acquisitions  to 
Upper  and  Lower  California.49  In  July,  however,  he  informed  Trist:  "The 
more  I  reflect  upon  the  subject  the  better  I  am  convinced  of  the  importance 
of  running  the  boundary  line  between  the  Rio  Grande  and  the  Gulf  of 
California  along  the  thirty-second  parallel."50  In  September,  when  Polk 
raised  the  question  whether  Trist  should  not  demand  more  territory, 
Buchanan  proposed  again  that  the  offer  of  money  be  cut  from  $30,000,000 
to  $15,000,000,  that  the  cession  of  the  province  of  Lower  California  and 
the  right  to  transit  across  the  Tehuantepec  isthmus  now  be  made  a  sine 
qua  non  of  settlement,  and  that  the  northern  boundary  of  Mexico  be  cut 
from  the  32nd  parallel  to  the  31st.61 

Polk  and  Buchanan  continued  to  disagree  on  war  policy.  Polk 
thought  the  army  ought  to  occupy  the  whole  country,  but  Buchanan 
wanted  the  troops  withdrawn  from  all  territory  except  that  which  was  to 
be  annexed.52  Polk  complained  that  Buchanan  had  increased  his  demands 
on  Mexico.  Buchanan  explained  that  the  invasion  of  the  interior  of  the 
country  (which  he  had  opposed)  had  cost  many  lives  and  a  great  deal  of 
money;  therefore,  it  was  foolish  to  assume  that  previous  terms  would  now 
apply.  But  Polk  thought  that  Buchanan's  change  of  position  was  due  to 
his  desire  for  the  presidency  and  his  unwillingness  "to  incur  the  displeasure 
of  all  those  who  are  in  favor  of  the  conquest  of  all  Mexico."58 

Military  success  rapidly  changed  the  tenor  of  public  opinion. 
All  the  leading  Democratic  newspapers  of  the  West  and  South  now  insisted 
on  the  acquisition  of  all  of  Mexico,  or  a  very  large  slice  of  it,  and  even  the 
more  conservative  eastern  papers  supported  the  same  policy.64  Some  of 
the  British  expressed  the  opinion  that  the  Anglo-Saxon  race  inevitably 
would  appropriate  North  America,  and  the  usually  unfriendly  Palmerston 
was  heard  to  remark:  "They  are  going  to  take  two-thirds  of  Mexico.  Why 
don't  they  take  the  whole?"56  One  of  Buchanan's  military  informants 
wrote:  "All  Mexico  must  soon  be  ours— notwithstanding  the  wish  of  the 

189 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


President  and  the  country  for  Peace Thousands  of  the  present  genera- 
tion will  live  to  see  the  whole  of  North  America  under  one  Confederated 
Government,  and  the  sooner  the  better."56 

In  October,  1847,  when  rumors  seeped  to  Washington  that  Trist 
planned  to  make  a  treaty  recognizing  the  Nueces  boundary  of  Texas  and 
giving  up  other  vital  American  demands,  Buchanan  ordered  Trist  to  return 
home,  treaty  or  no  treaty.  Trist,  however,  determined  to  defy  his  instruc- 
tions. In  a  65-page  letter  of  explanation  and  apology  to  his  chief,  he  stated 
that  he  would  stay  and  conclude  a  treaty  because  he  felt  it  was  the  only 
way  to  prevent  the  summary  seizure  of  the  entire  country.  Polk  denounced 
Trist  as  arrogant,  impudent,  insulting,  destitute  of  honor,  a  scoundrel,  and 
a  worse  public  servant  than  he  had  ever  known.57 

Under  these  unhappy  circumstances,  Trist  proceeded  to  negotiate 
the  Treaty  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo,  which  reached  the  astounded  Administra- 
tion in  Washington  on  Saturday,  February  19.  Trist  clearly  wanted  to 
make  Polk  take  the  responsibility  for  accepting  or  rejecting  a  treaty  con- 
forming to  his  original  instructions.  The  treaty  itself  set  the  present 
southwestern  boundary  of  the  United  States,  excepting  the  Gadsden 
Purchase,  in  return  for  $15,000,000  and  payment  by  the  United  States 
of  claims  against  Mexico. 

Buchanan  sharply  opposed  submitting  this  treaty  to  the  Senate. 
He  wished  to  capitalize,  in  the  months  before  the  Democratic  nominating 
convention,  on  the  political  effect  of  advocating  a  larger  cession.  Polk 
accused  him  of  trying  to  undermine  the  treaty  in  the  Senate,  but  in  this 
the  president  was  mistaken;  as  in  the  case  of  Oregon,  Buchanan  worked 
hard  to  make  sure  that  the  treaty  would  be  ratified  and  privately  wanted 
it  ratified. 

An  exact  transcript  of  the  treaty  and  of  confidential  corre- 
spondence regarding  it  appeared  in  the  New  York  Herald  while  it  was  still 
under  discussion  in  secret  sessions  of  the  Senate.  A  young  Irish  reporter 
named  John  Nugent  who  was  known  to  be  a  close  friend  of  Buchanan  sent 
in  the  story.  Nugent  had  for  some  years  been  writing  for  the  Herald  under 
such  pen  names  as  "Nous  Verrons,"  "Felix,"  "Galviensis,"  and  "Chee- 
Wah-Wah."  Just  a  few  weeks  before,  "Galviensis"  had  published  several 
articles  abusing  the  President,  and  Polk  suspected  Buchanan  of  complicity. 
"If  I  can  obtain  any  reliable  proof  that  Mr.  Buchanan  has  given  countenance 
to  Galviensis,"  he  wrote  in  his  diary,  "he  shall  not  remain  in  the  Cabinet." 
Buchanan  vigorously  denied  any  connection  with  the  articles.  The  Senate 
called  for  an  investigation  of  the  treaty  leak  and  questioned  Nugent  for 
two  weeks,  but  he  refused  to  disclose  anything  except  that  he  had  copied 
all  the  documents  in  his  own  room,  and  that  his  informant  had  no  con- 
nection either  with  the  Senate  or  the  Department  of  State. 

190 


CONQUERING  A  CONTINENT  •   1845  -  1849 

Buchanan's  enemies  built  a  strong  case  of  circumstantial  evidence 
against  him  as  the  informer  and  Polk  accused  him  outright,  but  Buchanan 
positively  asserted  both  his  own  innocence  and  the  trustworthiness  of 
every  member  of  his  Departmental  staff.  He  then  addressed  a  letter  to  the 
Senate  declaring  that  the  secretary  and  all  the  Department  clerks,  waiving 
every  privilege  which  might  exist,  would  appear  before  the  Senators  to 
undergo  examination  until  every  trace  of  suspicion  had  been  removed.68 
Buchanan  suspected  that  the  leak  had  originated  in  the  Senate.59  The 
name  of  Nugent's  informant,  however,  remains  a  mystery  to  this  day.  The 
affair  had  no  effect  on  the  Treaty,  which  was  ratified  by  the  Senate  and 
proclaimed  by  Polk  on  July  4.60 

THE  LIFE  OF  A  GALLEY  SLAVE 

Beyond  the  major  problems  of  the  Department,  Buchanan  directed  in- 
numerable  minor  negotiations.  He  sought  to  induce  Emperor  Dom 
Pedro  II  of  Brazil  to  join  other  nations  in  abolition  of  the  international 
slave  trade.  He  challenged  the  Anglo-French  intervention  in  the  war 
between  Argentina  and  Paraguay,  accusing  both  nations  of  flagrant  violation 
of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  the  principles  of  nonintervention.  In  1846 
he  concluded  a  treaty  with  New  Granada  which  granted  the  United  States 
a  right  of  transit  across  the  Isthmus  of  Panama.  This  important  agreement 
underlay  the  building  of  the  Panama  Railroad  and  later  the  construction 
of  the  Canal. 

After  three  years  of  correspondence,  he  managed  to  draw  up  a 
postal  convention  with  Great  Britain  which  provided  for  uniform  trans- 
atlantic mail  rates,  and  he  adjusted  satisfactorily  a  dispute  with  Britain 
over  the  "most  favored  nation"  clause  of  the  commercial  treaty  which  had 
been  violated  by  illegal  customs  collections  on  both  sides  of  the  ocean. 
Through  Henry  Wheaton,  he  negotiated  six  commercial  treaties  with 
German  states  to  eliminate  the  old  feudal  dues  and  to  put  these  states  on 
the  basis  of  trade  reciprocity  with  the  United  States. 

The  European  revolutions  of  1848  kept  the  State  Department 
busy.  The  United  States  took  the  lead  in  recognizing  the  new  French 
Republic  less  than  a  week  after  the  revolution  started  and  promptly  recog- 
nized the  new  German  Confederation  with  headquarters  at  Frankfort. 
Buchanan  successfully  urged,  against  considerable  American  opposition, 
the  establishment  of  a  diplomatic  Mission  to  the  Vatican  as  a  means  of 
developing  commerce,  for  the  new  Pope,  Pius  IX,  was  a  strong  advocate 
of  a  European  commercial  federation. 

In  May,  1848,  Buchanan  saw  in  the  developing  revolution  in 
Cuba  an  opportunity  to  acquire  that  island,  though  he  wanted  to  wait  until 

191 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


after  the  presidential  election  to  initiate  the  purchase.  Polk  enthusi- 
astically supported  the  plan  to  offer  Spain  $100,000,000  for  Cuba  and 
authorized  Buchanan  to  instruct  his  Minister  at  Madrid  to  explore  the 
possibilities.  Spain  indignantly  rejected  the  idea,  but  Buchanan  blamed 
the  Minister,  Romulus  M.  Saunders,  for  some  responsibility  for  the  failure. 
"A  more  skillful  agent  might  have  been  selected  to  conduct  the  negotiations 
in  Spain,"  he  wrote,  "as  our  present  Minister  speaks  no  language  except 
English,  &  even  this  he  sometimes  murders."61 

Hawaii  showed  signs  of  responding  to  American  influence. 
Buchanan  dispatched  Anthony  Ten  Eyck  of  Michigan  as  Commissioner  to 
Hawaii  early  in  1845  with  instructions  to  make  a  commercial  treaty  and 
thwart  European  influence  there.  Ten  Eyck  wrecked  his  mission  by  asking 
for  special  privileges  for  white  American  citizens,  to  which  the  Hawaiians 
replied  that  such  demands  reminded  them  of  what  happened  to  Texas. 
Ten  Eyck  then  stated  flatly  that  he  thought  what  was  done  in  Texas  ought 
to  be  repeated  in  Hawaii  and  appealed  to  a  United  States  naval  commander 
in  the  waters  to  force  his  treaty  on  the  king.  Buchanan  roundly  rebuked 
the  minister  and  called  for  his  resignation.62 

Buchanan  did  not  find  his  situation  in  the  Cabinet  as  satisfying 
as  he  had  hoped  or  as  enjoyable  as  his  activities  in  the  Senate.  To  be  sure, 
he  relished  the  prestige  which  the  premiership  brought  him,  but  he  never 
quite  gave  himself  wholeheartedly  to  the  job.  In  Cabinet  he  played  the 
lone  wolf  rather  than  the  organization  man,  with  his  eye  constantly  straying 
from  the  main  task  to  possible  alternative  prospects  for  himself,  particularly 
the  presidency.  He  worked  tirelessly,  but  under  a  continual  sense  of 
aggravation,  at  the  archaic  structure  of  the  Department  which  he,  in  vain, 
tried  to  persuade  Congress  to  correct.63 

But  he  found  himself  especially  irritated  by  President  Polk.  It 
seemed  to  Buchanan  that  the  Tennesseean,  not  entirely  sure  of  himself 
and  fearful  lest  he  become  a  puppet  of  the  Cabinet,  went  out  of  his  way  to 
emphasize  his  determination  to  wield  the  scepter.  Folk's  voluminous  diary 
reflects  throughout  a  deep-seated  distrust  of  Buchanan  and  is  filled  with 
uncharitable  comments  about  him.  Yet,  though  the  Secretary  of  State 
disagreed  with  him  on  almost  every  important  diplomatic  decision,  Polk 
retained  him.  In  fact,  Polk  for  the  most  part  arrived  ultimately  at  the 
judgments  Buchanan  had  offered  in  the  beginning.  "Mr.  Buchanan  is  an 
able  man,"  wrote  the  president.6* 

Toward  the  end  of  his  term,  Buchanan  developed  a  nervous  tic 
in  his  leg  and  a  painful  tumor  in  his  nose,  the  latter  requiring  a  series  of 
operations.  It  took  Doctor  Foltz  and  two  other  Navy  surgeons  over  a  year 
and  a  half  to  conclude  the  surgical  treatment  of  the  nasal  polyp.65 

A  diligent  and  laborious  worker,  Buchanan  rarely  ever  complained 
of  tasks  except  while  he  was  Secretary  of  State.  "I  am  an  overworked 


192 


CONQUERING  A  CONTINENT*   1845 -  1849 


man,"  he  wrote  to  John  Reynolds.  "No  man,  I  care  not  what  may  be  his 
talents  &  acquirements,  is  fit  for  the  office  under  its  present  organization, 
unless  his  constitution  will  enable  him  to  work  and  see  company  from  ten 
to  fifteen  hours  out  of  every  twenty-four.66  To  another  he  complained, 
"My  life  is  that  of  a  galley  slave.  I  have  not  read  thirty  consecutive  pages 
in  any  book  since  I  came  into  the  Department  of  State."67  Near  the  end 
of  his  term,  he  told  Arnold  Plumer,  "I  have  wished  1,000  times  that  I  had 
never  entered  this  Dept.  as  Secretary.  I  have  had  to  do  the  important 
drudging  of  the  administration  without  the  power  of  obtaining  offices  for 
my  friends.  .  .  .  /  have  no  power.  I  feel  it  deeply."*8  One  of  the  things 
that  kept  him  going  was  his  respect  for  the  president.  Although  Buchanan 
frequently  mistrusted  Folk's  judgment,  he  respected  his  conscientious 
and  unremitting  application  to  duty. 

When  Polk  died  but  a  few  months  after  the  end  of  his  Adminis- 
tration, Buchanan  commented:  "He  was  the  most  laborious  man  I  have 
ever  known;  and  in  a  brief  period  of  four  years  had  assumed  the  appearance 
of  an  old  man,"69  and  the  Secretary  wondered  how  much  he  had  had  to  do 
with  it.  He  left  Washington  with  the  statement:  "I  am  happy  and  contented 
....  I  would  not  for  any  consideration  return  to  the  State  Department."70 


193 


15 

STILL  HUNT  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  •  1848 

RECIPE  FOR  POLITICAL  PIE 

However  little  he  may  know  about  James  Buchanan,  almost  everyone  has 
encountered  the  comment  of  Ben  Perley  Poore  that  "never  did  a  wily 
politician  more  industriously  plot  and  plan  to  secure  a  nomination  than 
Mr.  Buchanan  did,  in  his  still  hunt  for  the  Presidency."1  What  truth 
there  may  be  in  this  statement  applies  most  forcefully  to  the  campaigns  of 
1848  and  1852,  for  in  these  Buchanan  seriously  set  out  to  bag  the  game. 
He  proceeded  methodically,  according  to  practices  which  years  of  experience 
had  impressed  upon  him  as  necessary.  Had  someone  asked  him  to  enumer- 
ate the  rules  by  which  a  man  might  achieve  the  presidency,  he  might  have 
listed  these:  the  appearance  of  disinterestedness,  the  support  of  the  home 
constituency,  and  national  rather  than  sectional  views  on  burning  issues 
of  the  day. 

Buchanan  preferred  the  role  of  the  statesman  to  that  of  politician. 
He  stayed  aloof  from  rough  and  tumble  meetings,  he  avoided  public  debate 
and  stump  speeches,  and  stayed  close  to  home  to  confer  with  party  leaders, 
leaving  it  to  subordinates  to  work  with  the  voters  and  pay  the  campaign  bills. 
He  still  agreed  with  Jackson  that  no  man  could  achieve  the  presidency  who 
appeared  actively  to  seek  it  and  that  the  successful  candidate  must  display 
utter  indifference  until  he  was  called  to  duty. 

For  this  reason  he  felt  that  an  aspirant  should  have  wealth 
enough  to  be  careless  of  his  political  fortune.  He  confided  to  J.  Clancy 
Jones  that  he  had  never  yet  known  a  public  man  "who  had  abandoned  his 
profession  for  politics  before  he  had  accumulated  something  like  a  com- 
petency that  did  not  regret  his  course."2  It  was  the  urgent  need  of  money 
that  made  men  like  Forney  and  Lynch  and  Brewster  scramble  for  political 
jobs,  and  sparked  the  ambitions  of  many  at  a  much  higher  level,  like  Clay 
and  Webster,  Buchanan  had  no  financial  cause  to  seek  a  government 
salary;  he  had  made  his  competency,  was  proud  of  the  fact,  and  could  in 

194 


SHIX  HUNT  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  •   1848 


good  conscience  assure  his  friends  that  the  loss  of  political  office  would  not 
cost  him  cca  night's  rest  or  a  meal's  victuals." 

The  appearance  of  disinterestedness  could  also  be  used  with 
political  effect.  Buchanan  had  made  the  prospect  of  a  Supreme  Court 
appointment  pay  full  dividends.  The  offer  stimulated  to  action  all  those 
who  looked  to  him  for  political  patronage  and  attracted  national  attention. 
His  decision  to  decline  it  created  exactly  the  effect  Buchanan  wanted,  the 
image  of  a  man  personally  inclined  to  retire  from  active  politics  but  pre- 
vailed upon  by  his  friends  to  remain  in  harness. 

Buchanan  always  believed  that  a  presidential  aspirant,  to  be 
successful,  had  to  have  firm  political  control  of  his  own  county  and  state. 
A  man  defeated  at  home  had  little  prospect  of  developing  strength  abroad. 
For  this  reason  he  devoted  an  inordinate  amount  of  his  time  and  energy  to 
petty  politics  in  Lancaster  and  the  contest  of  factions  in  Pennsylvania. 

The  aspiring  candidate  must  subordinate  sectional  objectives  and 
loyalties  to  national  principles.  This  was  not  merely  an  ingredient  for 
personal  success  but  a  requirement  for  the  continued  existence  of  the 
Union.  By  1847  it  seemed  probable  that  only  a  northern  man  who  viewed 
southern  problems  with  sympathy  and  understanding  could  meet  this 
requirement,  for  there  remained  little  hope,  since  the  Wilmot  Proviso  and 
the  Tariff  of  1846,  of  finding  a  southern  man  with  political  sympathy  for 
the  North  on  either  of  these  issues.  But  there  were  many  northerners  who, 
though  disliking  slavery  and  free  trade,  thought  that  the  South  should 
share  in  new  territory  and  subscribed  to  a  moderate  tariff.  Buchanan  held 
this  position,  believing  it  to  be  both  the  surest  guarantee  of  the  preservation 
of  the  Union  and  the  stand  most  likely  to  gain  broad  support  for  the 
presidency.  The  chief  competition  would  come  from  the  West  where  men 
like  Cass  and  Douglas  would  take  national  ground  by  offering  to  act  as 
mediators  in  the  growing  strife  between  the  North  and  the  South. 

DISCIPLINING  DEMOCRATS 

It  was  impossible  to  know  even  where  to  begin  drilling  Pennsylvania's 
demoralized  Democrats  into  something  like  a  strong  and  dependable 
organization.  In  fact,  Buchanan  had  not  made  up  his  mind  positively  to 
face  the  task  until  he  knew  the  local  reaction  to  the  Walker  Tariff.  Provi- 
dentially for  him  business  remained  good,  industrialists  began  to  admit 
that  the  new  tariff  would  not  ruin  them  and  the  Pennsylvania  Democrats, 
applauding  Buchanan's  proposal  to  modify  rates  on  iron  and  coal,  calmed 
down.  Having  cleared  this  hurdle,  which  had  temporarily  tripped  Dallas, 
Buchanan  decided  to  stay  in  the  presidential  race. 

He  had  a  block  of  influential  friends  who  would  stick  with  him 
through  thick  and  thin:    Forney,  Lynch,  Wilson  McCandless,  Arnold 

195 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Plumer,  Jeremiah  S.  Black,  George  W.  Barton,  W.  A.  Stokes,  William 
Bigler,  X  Clancy  Jones,  Christian  Bachman,  W.  flutter,  and  many  others, 
although  they  were  not  enough  to  control  the  state.  He  faced  the  powerful 
opposition  of  the  followers  of  George  Dallas,  primarily  in  Philadelphia. 
Between  these  major  factions  were  others,  generally  for  sale  to  the  highest 
bidder,  and  some  of  them  led  by  men  who  were  violently  detested  by 
Buchanan's  friends.  Buchanan  had  to  augment  his  certain  support  by 
enough  strength  purchased  from  political  roustabouts  like  Cameron  to 
insure  his  control  of  the  state  delegation. 

A  major  test  of  strength  would  come  in  1847,  when  Pennsylvania 
faced  another  governor's  election.  Buchanan  had  supported  Shunk  before 
and  strongly  backed  him  for  renomination,  despite  the  opposition  of 
Cameron  and  the  lukewarm  adherence  of  Forney's  friends  to  whom  Shunk 
had  shown  no  favor.3  Forney  wanted  Buchanan  to  run  in  order  to  dis- 
entangle himself  from  the  embarrassments  of  the  Polk  Administration  and 
to  command  a  larger  patronage  to  consolidate  his  party  than  he  could 
obtain  in  the  State  Department.4 

The  Harrisburg  Democratic  Convention  of  March  4, 1847,  quickly 
renominated  Shunk  for  governor  but  ran  into  a  bitter  fight  to  decide 
between  Buchanan  and  Dallas  as  the  "favorite  son"  of  Pennsylvania.  The 
delegates  finally  stalled  to  a  deadlock  and  adopted  an  innocuous  statement 
expressing  pride  in  both  the  Vice-President  and  the  Secretary  of  State.5 

Senator  Cameron  discovered  in  this  impasse  an  opportunity  to 
make  a  show  of  strength  which  might  improve  his  bargaining  power  later. 
He  publicly  pronounced  General  Zachary  Taylor  to  be  a  Democrat  and 
endorsed  him  for  president.  Taylor  had  enough  of  the  legendary  appeal 
of  Andrew  Jackson  to  become  immediately  formidable,  but  even  Cameron's 
own  partisans  acknowledged  that  to  call  the  general  a  Democrat  was 
"political  prostitution."6  Nonetheless,  the  movement  grew  apace.  Cameron 
set  up  his  brother  James  as  editor  of  the  Democratic  Sentinel,  a  new  pro- 
Taylor  newspaper  in  Lancaster,  and  took  a  leading  part  on  the  floor  of  a 
convention  at  Harrisburg  on  June  26  which  endorsed  Taylor  and  lauded 
Senator  Cameron.7 

Polk  was  worried  about  the  increasing  popularity  of  Taylor,  and 
some  Congressmen  considered  a  resolution  censuring  him  for  what  they 
considered  disobedience  of  orders.  Buchanan  complained  that  Taylor 
should  never  have  consented  to  an  armistice  after  the  battle  of  Monterey 
but  soon  changed  that  tune  when  public  resentment  rose  against  Folk's 
charge  that  Taylor  was  "incompetent  to  command  a  large  army."  Davy 
Lynch  wrote  that  it  reminded  Pittsburghers  of  the  attempts  to  censure 
General  Jackson,  and  if  Taylor  could  not  command  a  large  army,  he  still 
had  "the  knack  of  flogging  a  larger  one  with  a  very  small  one,"  which 
answered  the  same  purpose.8  By  early  fall,  the  Democratic  drive  for 

196 


STILL  HUNT  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY*   1848 


Taylor  in  Pennsylvania  had  still  further  embittered,  if  that  could  be 
possible,  the  relations  of  Buchanan's  friends  with  Cameron's.  Forney  told 
Buchanan:  "As  for  Cameron,  he  pollutes  Taylor  with  his  prostituted 
praises.  . .  .  Every  enemy  that  you  now  have  was  made  in  some  way  more 
or  less  connected  with  that  bold  intriguer.  God  in  Heaven  knows  you  have 
paid  a  dreadful  penalty  for  the  court  which  he  has  professed  to  pay  you. 
My  deliberate  opinion  is  now  that  you  have  not  an  enemy  who  is  not  a 
more  trusty  friend  than  Simon  Cameron."9  Cameron's  endorsement 
wrote  finis  to  Taylor's  candidacy  among  Pennsylvania  Democrats. 

In  a  very  different  way,  Cameron's  move  also  threatened  Bu- 
chanan's candidacy  by  infuriating  the  Frazer-Champneys  men  in  Lancaster 
to  the  final  breaking  point.  Since  Buchanan  still  refused  to  renounce 
Cameron,  they  at  last  repudiated  Buchanan  and  came  out  strongly  for 
Dallas.  This  movement  had  been  brewing  ever  since  Cameron's  tricky 
capture  of  the  senatorship,  but  until  now  Forney  and  others  had  been 
able  to  prevent  an  open  and  formal  break.  The  truce  abruptly  ended. 
Frazer  declared  war  by  announcing  that  Buchanan  had  refused  to  pay  his 
personal  tax  to  Lancaster  County  for  the  preceding  several  years,  on  the 
ground  that  he  was  now  a  resident  of  Washington.  He  had  disclaimed  his 
state  to  save  a  paltry  ten-dollar  bill  and  now  wanted  to  be  called  a  "favorite 
son.'7  This  story,  developed  in  many  forms  by  Frazer,  ran  the  rounds  of 
the  opposition  press. 

Frazer's  charge  was  partly  true.  A  county  official  had  asked 
Buchanan  whether,  since  he  would  reside  in  Washington  permanently 
while  he  was  Secretary  of  State,  he  should  be  billed  for  local  taxes.  He 
had  replied  that  he  understood  from  other  Cabinet  officers  that  such  tax 
was  usually  remitted  under  these  circumstances.  The  question  was  still 
not  settled  when  Frazer  gave  out  the  story.  Buchanan's  friends  begged 
him  to  ignore  the  fracas  and  by  all  means  to  avoid  a  newspaper  controversy 
with  Frazer,  but  Buchanan  was  more  nettled  than  usual  and  wanted  to  clear 
himself.  He  wrote  a  long  exposition  of  his  relationship  with  Frazer,  con- 
cluding with  the  facts  of  the  tax  matter,  and  then  wisely  sent  it  to  Forney, 
who  read  it  to  selected  politicians  but  kept  it  out  of  print. 

Frazer's  father  had  befriended  Buchanan,  presented  him  with  a 
kw  library,  and  helped  him  build  up  a  practice.  Buchanan  rewarded  this 
kindness  over  the  years  by  using  his  influence  to  secure  political  jobs  for 
most  of  the  family,  both  the  Frazers  and  their  in-laws,  the  Steeles.  Half  a 
dozen  of  them  were  drawing  salaries,  thanks  to  Buchanan,  by  1845.  Reah 
Frazer  wanted  more.  As  Buchanan  told  the  story,  Reah's  break  with  him 
coincided  not  with  the  Cameron  election,  but  with  Buchanan's  refusal  to 
promote  another  sinecure  for  one  of  the  clan.  This,  claimed  Buchanan, 
was  the  source  of  Frazer's  hostility;  the  other  matters  he  raged  about 
merely  served  as  convenient  excuses  to  cloak  his  personal  spite.10 

197 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Private  circulation  of  this  story  served  to  keep  the  effects  of  the 
attack  localized,  and  leading  politicians  recognized  that  Buchanan's  estimate 
of  Frazer's  motive  was  perfectly  defensible;  they  understood  also  that  the 
tax  episode  reflected  a  problem  common  among  men  who  spent  years  away 
from  home  in  government  service.  But  how  would  the  voters  of  Lancaster 
County  react?  Frazer,  Champneys  and  Stambaugh  could  very  likely  control 
them  and  vote  Buchanan  down  in  his  own  ward  and  precinct,  unless  some- 
one took  prompt  action,  and  this  result  would  kill  him  off  in  the  Pennsyl- 
vania contest  for  delegates  to  the  nominating  convention. 

The  Pennsylvania  convention  at  Harrisburg  to  pick  delegates 
to  the  national  convention  of  the  Democratic  party  was  scheduled  for 
March  4,  1848.  Counties  held  their  local  meetings  to  choose  delegates  to 
Harrisburg  at  various  times.  Lancaster  County  Democrats  picked  September 
1,  1847,  for  their  meeting,  a  month  in  advance  of  the  date  of  the  state 
election  for  governor.  At  that  meeting  one  of  Cameron's  friends,  by 
prearrangement,  submitted  a  resolution  in  favor  of  Buchanan.  Frazer,  as 
Cameron  had  anticipated,  denounced  the  resolution  and  had  it  voted  down. 
He  then  obtained  approval  of  a  slate  of  delegates  to  Harrisburg,  all  but  one 
committed  to  Dallas  for  president,  and  concluded  by  ramming  through  a 
resolution  that  Buchanan  ought  to  be  read  out  of  the  Democratic  party!11 

The  attack  shocked  and  frightened  Frazer's  own  colleagues,  for 
it  suddenly  dawned  upon  them,  as  upon  Buchanan,  that  the  Lancaster 
County  movement  might  defeat  Shunk.  The  Lancaster  group  had  identified 
itself  intimately  with  him,  and  if  it  now  appeared  that  a  vote  for  Shunk 
meant  a  vote  against  Buchanan,  they  both  might  ultimately  lose.  Buchanan 
came  out  strongly  for  Shunk  and  the  governor  cut  himself  entirely  loose 
from  the  conflict,  while  Forney  did  his  best  to  soften  the  damage  by  making 
Frazer  look  ridiculous  and  threatening  to  "lug  him  out  by  the  throat"  and 
expose  the  family  salary  grab.  The  suspense  ended  on  October  14,  when 
Shunk  routed  his  Whig  opponent  by  a  comfortable  majority.  Forney  wrote 
to  Buchanan  the  next  day  that  he  would  come  to  Washington  to  prepare 
for  the  future  and  "to  see  how  we  shall  dispose  of  Frazer.  The  fight  for  the 
nomination  will  begin  from  the  jump.  I  see  Dallas  and  his  folks  at  work.  "12 

Buchanan  hoped  for  some  help  from  Governor  Shunk,  but  that 
worthy,  pressed  equally  hard  by  the  friends  of  Dallas,  prayed  good  God, 
good  Devil,  not  knowing  which  way  to  turn,  and  finally  declared  his 
emphatic  neutrality.  He  still  had  his  troubles,  however,  because  the 
presidential  question  whittled  away  his  own  friends  until  there  were 
"devilish  few  of  them  left  to  be  neutral."13 

All  efforts  now  centered  on  control  of  other  county  delegations 
to  the  Harrisburg  Convention  which  would  select  the  Pennsylvania  delega- 
tion to  Baltimore.  Buchanan  felt  confident  of  strong  support  in  all  but  a 
few  scattered  counties  outside  of  Philadelphia,  but  the  key  to  success  lay 

198 


STILL  HUNT  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  •  1848 


in  that  city,  with  its  huge  quota  of  85  delegates.  Forney,  aided  by  half  a 
dozen  aggressive  workers  devoted  to  Buchanan,  undertook  to  reduce  this 
stronghold  and  beat  Dallas  on  his  own  ground.  It  was  a  bold  game  for  a 
newcomer  to  that  aloof  and  aristocratic  region  and  deserved  more  of 
Buchanan's  active  political  and  financial  aid  than  he  gave. 

Forney  began  by  holding  weekly  meetings  with  two  or  three  dozen 
workers  at  his  own  home.  He  instructed  them  on  policy  and  tactics  and 
inspired  them  with  "cold  cuts  and  liquid  refreshment."  Here  the  leaders 
set  up  finance,  ward  and  publications  committees,  inaugurated  a  "Buchanan 
Fund,"  and  named  two  persons  from  each  ward  to  promote  meetings  called 
"political  Wistar  Parties"  in  sarcastic  reference  to  the  legitimate  ones  held 
by  the  city's  aristocracy.  After  much  debate  they  agreed  to  campaign  by 
"quiet,  silent  exertions"  in  preference  to  parades,  drum-beating,  mud- 
slinging,  and  other  blatant  methods.14  Forney  printed  100,000  copies  of 
the  proceedings  of  the  Buchanan  Convention  of  1843  and  mailed  out 
quantities  of  Buchanan  engravings,  but  he  felt  that  they  did  not  match  in 
effect  a  book  dedicated  to  Dallas  who  had  bought  up  the  whole  edition  and 
franked  it  all  over  the  state.  Cameron,  too,  created  a  stir  by  exhibiting  in 
a  Philadelphia  store  window  a  huge  painting  of  himself  resplendent  in  a 
flaming  scarlet  cloak.  In  response  to  Forney's  pleas  to  send  documents  to 
the  back-country  editors,  Buchanan  planned  a  mailing  of  Fremont's  report 
on  his  western  explorations,  but  since  he  did  not  have  the  franking  privilege 
he  concluded  that  the  cost  would  be  prohibitive.15 

A  few  weeks  before  the  Philadelphia  election  of  December,  both 
factions  staged  huge  mass  meetings.  To  the  first  of  these,  called  a  "War 
Meeting"  and  appealing  to  all  Democrats,  the  Dallas  supporters  came  early 
and  organized  the  proceedings  half  an  hour  before  the  Buchanan  men 
arrived.  A  fight  promptly  ensued  which  lasted  until  10  o'clock  and  ended 
with  the  ejection  of  the  Dallas  partisans.  Plitt  assured  Buchanan:  "We 
had  all  the  decency  and,  what  is  better,  the  rough  fellows  who  do  the  voting 
and  the  fighting.  The  battle  being  now  begun  openly,  nothing  remains  but 
to  fight  it  out."16 

The  Philadelphia  election  was  heartbreaking:  Dallas  carried  the 
city  by  three  votes.  If  Buchanan  had  received  them,  he  would  have  won 
Philadelphia  Ward  and  enough  candidates  to  control  the  balance  of  the 
city  delegation.  The  final  tally  gave  Dallas  47  delegates  and  Buchanan  38. 
It  was,  said  Forney,  no  disgrace  to  lose  by  such  a  small  majority,  considering 
that  they  had  had  to  contend  with  the  customhouse  phalanx  and  hostile 
municipal  judges  who  threatened  not  to  renew  the  license  of  any  tavern 
keeper  who  favored  Buchanan. 

Forney  had  done  a  good  job,  and  his  aides  thought  it  so  remarkable 
a  showing  that  they  printed  a  detailed  account  of  the  election  returns  for 
statewide  distribution.  Forney,  in  truth,  had  nearly  worn  himself  out. 

199 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


"My  whole  soul  is  so  absorbed  in  this  fight,"  he  wrote,  "that  I  can  think  of 
nothing  else.  I  dream  of  it  at  night.  I  do  not  go  out  into  company,  for  it 
makes  me  chill  and  distracted.  I  have  even  quit  drinking— and  almost 

ceased  eating."17 

A  sidelight,  at  this  point,  will  illustrate  the  difference  between 
Buchanan's  campaign  methods  and  those  of  his  managers  and  expose  the 
handicaps  under  which  the  latter  had  to  work.  While  the  Philadelphia 
campaign  flamed  to  white  heat,  Forney  took  time  to  try  to  save  Lancaster 
County,  where  Frazer  now  dominated  the  editor  of  the  Lancaster  Intel 
tigencer,  Forney's  old  paper.  May,  the  editor,  wanted  to  get  out  and  Forney 
arranged  that  W.  Hutter  of  Easton,  a  man  of  editorial  courage  and  political 
stature,  should  take  the  paper.  This  would  cost  money,  $2,425  to  be  exact, 
and  furthermore  May  demanded  some  guarantee  of  other  employment. 

Buchanan  arranged  the  loan  by  the  devious  means  of  asking 
James  B.  Lane  of  Lancaster  to  advance  the  amount  to  Christian  Bachman, 
who  would  sign  it  over  to  Nathaniel  W.  Sample,  who  would  then  give  it  to 
Hutter  and  receive  a  note  in  return.  Buchanan  would  then  privately  make 
good  to  Lane,  thus  both  hiding  and  postponing  his  participation  in  the 
transfer.18 

As  to  May,  Forney  wrote:  "James  B.  Lane  and  myself  only  got 
May  out  of  the  paper  by  promising  him  our  influence  to  get  him  a  clerkship. 
You  ...  I  hope,  ...  will  not  hesitate  to  sustain  us  in  all  we  have  done. 
Bold  and  prompt  measures  are  now  of  the  utmost  importance,  and  ordinary 
delicacy  must  not  be  suffered  to  interfere  with  stern  duty.  We  acted  for 
you."  Buchanan  replied:  "I  fear  the  Clerkship  will  be  a  great  obstacle  in 
the  way.  Suppose  May  would  insist  upon  this  promise.  Its  recognition  & 
performance  on  my  part  would  do  me  more  harm  than  ten  Intelligencers 
would  do  me  good,  greatly  as  I  esteem  the  value  of  the  paper.  On  the 
other  hand,  suppose  he  should  not  obtain  the  clerkship,  he  might  publish 
the  fact  that  you  had  got  him  out  of  the  paper  on  this  promise.  A  clerkship 
I  shall  not  procure  for  him,  at  least  not  for  the  present.  The  money  is 
nothing  when  compared  with  an  independent  and  erect  course  of  con- 
duct."19 By  midsummer,  May  still  had  no  clerkship. 

The  Harrisburg  Convention  of  March  4,  far  from  being  a  re- 
sounding triumph  for  Buchanan,  turned  out  to  be  a  two-day  wrangle  in 
which  Cass  and  Dallas  each  came  off  very  strong.  Buchanan  got  a  majority 
of  delegates  to  the  national  convention,  and  the  pledge  of  the  minority  to 
support  him  until  the  majority  should  yield;  but  the  Dallas  delegates,  com- 
mitted to  Cass  as  second  choice,  greatly  weakened  Buchanan's  bargaining 
position.  The  convention  rejected  a  resolution  favoring  Buchanan's  major 
political  plank,  extension  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  line  to  the  Pacific, 
and  in  its  place  accepted  a  resolution  complimenting  Cass  and  Dallas. 
Cameron  threw  everyone  into  confusion  by  suddenly  proposing  a  whole 

200 


SHIX  HUNT  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  •   1848 


slate  of  national  convention  delegates  chosen  from  among  his  own  followers, 
and  no  one  quite  knew  whether  this  move  had  been  sanctioned  hy  Buchanan 
or  was  merely  another  Cameron  fishing  expedition.  Forney,  chagrined  at 
the  outcome  after  all  his  work,  had  at  least  the  satisfaction  to  report  that 
he  could  deliver  the  solid  vote  of  the  state  to  Buchanan  on  the  opening 
ballots  at  Baltimore.20 

While  Forney's  crew  worked  their  hearts  out  to  capture  Penn- 
sylvania, Buchanan  tried  to  develop  the  broader  pattern  of  support  from 
his  headquarters  at  Washington.  Here  he  analyzed  public  opinion  and 
designed  policy  to  fit  its  general  trend.  We  have  already  seen  how  he 
attempted  to  disassociate  himself  from  unpopular  policies-  of  the  Polk 
Administration  while  preserving  his  party  regularity  by  remaining  in  the 
Cabinet.  But  the  big  issue  which  dominated  the  thoughts  of  every  party 
and  every  section  as  the  Mexican  War  drew  to  a  close  was  what  to  do  about 
slavery  in  the  new  territories.  It  was  not  enough  to  condemn  the  Wilmot 
Proviso;  a  workable  solution,  widely  acceptable,  had  to  be  devised.  Bu- 
chanan gave  his  proposal  for  solving  the  puzzle  in  a  letter  to  a  Harvest 
Home  celebration  of  Democrats  in  Reading,  Pennsylvania,  in  August,  1847. 

In  this  "Berks  County  letter,"  as  it  came  to  be  known,  Buchanan 
stated  that  he  did  not  expect  any  northern  Democrats  to  approve  of  slavery, 
but  he  did  expect  them  to  honor  the  Constitution  which  left  the  slavery 
question  up  to  the  states  where  it  existed.  In  new  territories  the  problem 
had  been  settled,  with  great  difficulty,  by  the  Missouri  Compromise  in  1820, 
and  since  then  Texas  had  come  into  the  Union  under  the  same  rule.  For 
the  future,  "the  line  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  should  be  extended  to 
any  new  territory  which  we  may  acquire  from  Mexico."  While  this  would 
safeguard  the  rights  of  the  South  and  keep  faith,  it  would  not,  nevertheless, 
result  in  the  extension  of  slavery.  None  of  the  new  territory  was  adapted 
to  slavery,  there  would  be  no  means  of  recovering  fugitives  to  Mexico,  most 
of  the  settlers  would  certainly  come  from  the  North  and  West,  and  the 
population  already  in  residence  had  long  since  abolished  slavery  under 
Mexican  law. 

He  concluded:  "The  question  is,  therefore,  not  one  of  practical 
importance.  Its  agitation,  however  honestly  intended,  can  produce  no 
effect  but  to  alienate  the  people  of  different  portions  of  the  Union  from 
each  other;  to  excite  sectional  divisions  &  jealousies;  and  to  distract  & 
possibly  destroy  the  Democratic  party,  on  the  ascendancy  of  whose 
principles  &  measures  depends,  as  I  firmly  believe,  the  success  of  our  grand 
experiment  of  Self  Government.1'21 

The  concluding  paragraph  has  been  quoted  in  full  because  writers 
generally  ignore  it  as  a  mere  platitudinous  peroration,  whereas  Buchanan 
considered  it  the  main  element  of  his  idea.  To  him  the  problem  was  not 
slavery  but  the  agitation  it  caused.  Slavery  had  not  destroyed  the  nation 

201 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

and  need  not  destroy  it,  but  the  contest  over  slavery  very  likely  would. 
He  selected  the  Missouri  Compromise  proposal  as  best  suited  to  answer  the 
fundamental  need— to  end  the  agitation,  because  it  had  back  of  it  the 
force  of  tradition.  It  would  permit  the  Southerners  to  take  slaves  into  part 
of  the  Mexican  cession,  but  it  would  not  threaten  the  addition  of  any  new 
slave  states  to  the  Union. 

This  letter,  the  first  formal  pronouncement  by  a  major  political 
figure  on  the  touchiest  question  of  the  day,  got  fairly  wide  and  favorable 
notice,  but  it  raised  the  most  dust  in  Pennsylvania  because  of  the  Wilmot 
Proviso.  Lewis  Cass  professed  himself  to  be  surprised.  Buchanan's  letter, 
he  said,  "was  well  written,  but  there  was  no  call  at  that  particular  moment 
for  its  appearance;  rather  there  was  none  for  his  writing  it,  and  all  experi- 
ence shows  that  politicians  had  better  write  as  little  as  possible/'22  But 
it  took  Cass  only  four  months  to  hear  the  call  himself.  In  December,  he 
announced  his  own  policy,  popular  sovereignty,  in  the  "Nicholson  letter." 
No  one  will  ever  know  how  much  these  competitive  views  in- 
fluenced  the  coming  Democratic  nomination,  but  it  is  worth  pointing  out 
that  the  popular  sovereignty  idea  was  peculiarly  western  in  its  inception 
and  appeal.  To  those  who  would  live  in  the  newly  acquired  area,  the 
Missouri  Compromise  seemed  a  restriction  imposed  by  the  East;  popular 
sovereignty  was  a  freedom  initiated  by  the  West.  Buchanan  never  got  this 
point,  for  he  never  saw  the  West.  He  worked  out  the  practical  operating 
details  of  his  Missouri  line  proposal  with  a  clarity  and  simplicity  not 
matched  by  the  advocates  of  popular  sovereignty,  but  he  failed  to  appreciate 
that  frontiersmen  would  prefer  a  do-it-yourself  policy  to  a  rule  imposed 
from  Washington. 

It  was  an  oddity  of  Buchanan's  life  that  he  never  travelled  very 
much  in  America.  He  saw  more  of  the  continent  of  Europe  during  his 
Russian  Mission  than  he  saw  of  the  United  States  in  his  whole  lifetime. 
Up  to  1848  his  travels  in  his  own  country,  with  the  exception  of  his  jaunt 
to  Kentucky  as  a  youth,  could  be  circumscribed  by  a  line  drawn  from 
Philadelphia,  to  Boston,  to  Buffalo,  to  Pittsburgh,  to  Richmond,  and  back 
to  Philadelphia.  He  had  no  physical  aversion  to  travel,  but  he  hated  to 
lose  touch  with  his  affairs  or  break  his  routine.  Perhaps  most  important, 
he  believed  it  politically  dangerous  to  roam,  and  particularly  so  to  make 
a  pilgrimage  for  political  purposes. 

He  had  no  dearth  of  invitations  to  go  south  or  west  but  he  turned 
them  all  down.  Even  in  his  own  restricted  orbit,  he  kept  a  tight  schedule 
and  visited  little.  Forney  continually  complained  of  his  "comet-like"  trips 
through  Philadelphia,  reporting  "our  boys  here  are  very  sore  because  they 
did  not  see  you."  He  spent  some  time  in  New  York  State  in  the  fall  of 
1846  trying  to  patch  up  an  agreement  between  the  Barnburners  and  the 
Hunkers,  and  joined  President  Polk  on  his  New  England  trip  the  following 

202 


STILL  HUNT  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY  •   1848 


summer,  exasperating  his  friends  by  skipping  Philadelphia  and  joining  Polk 
in  New  York  City.  He  vacationed  at  Bedford  Springs,  visited  his  sister  in 
Meadville,  and  spent  the  rest  of  the  time  in  Lancaster  or  Washington.28 

Even  if  Polk  had  teen  willing  to  permit  political  touring,  Bu- 
chanan would  have  stayed  home.  He  feared  what  he  had  seen  happen  time 
after  time  to  prospective  presidential  candidates  who  travelled  widely- 
They  were  first  of  all  written  down  as  office  seekers  out  to  curry  additional 
favor;  then  they  were  pounced  upon  by  contending  factions  in  each 
locality.  As  a  result,  they  more  often  gave  offense  than  they  built  up 
support.  Buchanan  purposely  avoided  going  to  Philadelphia  with  Polk  in 
1847  because  the  president  had  made  arrangements  to  stay  with  Vice- 
President  Dallas.  When  factionism  reached  its  height  in  the  North,  he 
wrote,  "under  existing  dramstonces,  ...  I  could  not  visit  the  States  of 
New  York  &  Massachusetts  unless  it  might  be  to  pass  through  them  quietly 
&  rapidly."24 

Buchanan  knew  he  could  confer  with  all  the  important  politicians 
at  Washington,  and  he  believed  that  conferences  with  them  were  more 
effective  than  public  appearances  at  the  grass  roots.  Buchanan  had  many 
firm  friends  at  the  common  level  whom  he  cherished  throughout  his  life, 
but  he  had  little  talent  for  making  friends  and  influencing  people  on  a 
political  junket.  One  might  say  that  he  was  democratic  only  in  his  personal 
life.  He  usually  declined  invitations  to  speak  at  public  meetings,  sending 
a  letter  instead,  and  avoided  party  caucuses  and  conventions.  If  these 
methods  constituted  a  "still  hunt  for  the  presidency"  then  Perley  Poore 
was  right. 

Buchanan  had  no  national  political  organization  but  utilized  his 
many  friends  in  a  kind  of  hit  or  miss  program  of  promotion.  In  one  of  his 
thriftiest  maneuvers  he  had  graciously  permitted  the  Ottoman  Porte  to 
finance  part  of  his  campaign.  The  ruler  needed  "two  or  three  agriculturists" 
who  were  willing  to  come  to  his  country  as  technical  assistants  and  teach 
the  people  to  raise  cotton.  He  sent  $2,500  with  which  to  pay  the  agent  who 
would  find  these  technicians.  Buchanan  gave  the  assignment  to  George 
Plitt,  who  travelled  over  the  South  in  the  search  and  conferred  with 
politicians  along  the  route.25 

Starting  on  Christmas  Day,  1847,  Buchanan  undertook  his  most 
strenuous  and  expensive  enterprise  in  personal  politics,  a  series  of  dinners 
which  he  gave  every  week  or  ten  days  until  the  end  of  Folk's  Administration. 
Some  of  these  parties  were  only  for  members  of  the  diplomatic  corps,  but 
most  of  them  were  purely  political  gatherings.  During  this  period  of 
entertainment,  he  wined  and  dined  nearly  all  the  Democratic  Senators  and 
Congressmen,  many  of  the  Whigs,  and  innumerable  visiting  politicos. 
Ordinarily  he  played  host  to  twenty  or  thirty  at  a  time.  On  one  occasion 
he  invited  the  entire  Pennsylvania  Congressional  delegation,  but  only  half 

203 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

of  the  members  came,  and  several  never  had  grace  enough  to  acknowledge 
the  invitation.  He  invited  Judge  Stephen  A.  Douglas  regularly,  but  he 
declined,  as  did  Daniel  Webster  who  in  former  years  had  often  shared  the 
festive  board  with  Buchanan.  The  brandy  flowed  freely,  and  of  champagne 
and  fine  old  Madeira  there  was  plenty;  but  of  the  conversation,  alas,  there 
is  no  record.  Buchanan  considered  these  dinners  a  better  medium  for 
airing  his  views  and  putting  them  into  circulation  than  public  speeches  or 
the  effusions  of  a  controlled  press.26 

CONVENTION  BLUES 

The  Baltimore  Convention  assembled  on  May  22.  Buchanan's  friends  had 
arrived  on  the  ground  ten  days  in  advance  to  hire  a  large  headquarters  room 
and  caretakers  for  it.  They  placed  their  chief  hope  in  the  strategy  of 
holding  off  Cass,  the  strongest  contender,  until  the  convention  admitted  he 
could  not  win.  This  tactic  would  bring  a  contest  between  Buchanan  and 
Levi  Woodbury  of  New  Hampshire,  in  which  Buchanan  stood  by  far  the 
better  chance.  The  delegates  adopted  the  two-thirds  rule  and  then  ran 
into  a  two-day  wrangle  over  New  York  which  had  sent  full  delegations  both 
of  Hunkers  and  Barnburners.  Upon  a  decision  to  admit  both,  but  with  the 
voting  strength  of  only  a  single  delegation,  the  Barnburners  withdrew 
angrily  and  the  Hunkers  refused  to  take  part  in  the  voting.  On  the  first 
presidential  ballot,  Cass  polled  125,  Buchanan  55,  and  Woodbury  53.  On 
the  third  ballot,  Virginia  shifted  from  Buchanan  to  Cass  and  practically 
settled  the  issue,  for  Cass  won  on  the  next  ballot.  Cameron  attributed  the 
result  to  Pennsylvania's  promotion  of  the  futile  effort  to  compromise  the 
New  York  dispute,  when  strong  support  of  either  side  might  have  purchased 
at  least  a  part  or  possibly  all  of  the  New  York  vote.  Buchanan  blamed 
Virginia.  'To  trade  me  off,"  he  wrote,  "for  the  chance  of  making  [John  YJ 
Mason  vice-president  &  then  to  fail  signally  in  the  attempt  was  unworthy 
of  the  ancient  Commonwealth."  But  it  was  all  over,  and  when  the  Whigs 
nominated  Taylor  a  few  weeks  later  Buchanan  felt  he  was  lucky  to  be  out 
of  the  contest.27 

George  Plitt  echoed  Buchanan's  own  thoughts  when  he  wrote: 
"So  soon  as  the  present  campaign  shall  have  ended,  I  shall  go  to  work  for 

that  of  '52 I  shall  not  rest  until  you  are  in  the  Presidential  chair."28 

Buchanan  worked  for  Cass  in  1848,  but  there  is  no  evidence  that  he  over- 
exerted himself  in  the  cause.  He  may  very  possibly  have  felt  that  a  Whig 
victory  would  exercise  a  salutary  effect  upon  his  chances  in  1852,  for  it 
would  demonstrate  that  the  Democracy  would  have  to  hearken  to  the 
Keystone  State's  demands  if  it  wished  to  win. 

The  summer  brought  surprising  and  disturbing  developments. 
The  disappointed  New  York  Barnburners  held  their  own  convention  on 

204 


STCLL  HUNT  FOR  THE  PRESIDENCY^   1848 


June  22  at  Utica,  nominating  Martin  Van  Buren  for  president  on  a  Wilmot 
Proviso  platform.  In  August,  a  convention  of  antislavery  men  at  Buffalo 
also  named  Van  Buren  as  their  presidential  candidate  and  launched  the 
Free-Soil  party  in  a  blaze  of  enthusiasm  and  righteous  indignation  under 
the  slogan:  "Free  Soil,  Free  Speech,  Free  Labor,  and  Free  Men." 

In  Pennsylvania,  Governor  Shunk  grew  desperately  ill  of  tubercu- 
losis and  resigned  on  July  9,  making  William  F.  Johnston,  Whig  Speaker 
of  the  Senate,  the  acting  governor.  Arrangements  were  then  made  to  fill 
the  office  at  the  state  election  of  October  10.  The  Whigs  promptly  nomi- 
nated Johnston,  but  the  Democrats  fell  into  a  welter  of  confusion.  Leaders 
of  all  the  factions  now  converged  on  Buchanan,  demanding  that  he  accept 
the  nomination.  Cameron  wrote  that  "it  can  be  presented  in  such  a  shape 
as  to  make  your  acceptance  the  result  of  a  wish  to  save  the  party — as 
Wright  did  in  1844."  Plitt  predicted  that  "were  we  allowed  to  use 
your  name  for  Governor  ...  we  would  give  the  ticket  an  overwhelming 
majority."29  Forney  was  torn  between  his  wish  to  see  Buchanan  become 
governor  or  return  to  the  Senate,  inclining  somewhat  to  the  latter  because 
he  thought  Cameron  wanted  Buchanan  in  Harrisburg  to  prevent  a  contest 
for  his  own  seat  in  the  Senate.  The  public  hue  and  cry  developed  so  fast 
that  Buchanan  had  to  make  up  his  mind  quickly. 

In  a  letter  to  A.  H.  Reeder,  he  declined  and  gave  the  reasons  for 
his  decision.  He  wished  to  return  to  private  life  and  do  some  writing.  He 
had  already  received  his  share  of  political  honors  and  did  not  wish  to  stand 
in  the  way  of  others.  He  must  take  care  of  some  important  affairs  pending 
in  the  State  Department.  He  could  now  gracefully  retire  with  the  good 
wishes  of  the  party  but  might  not  be  able  to  do  so  later.80  He  privately 
expressed  the  hope  that  Arnold  Plumer,  Jeremiah  S.  Black,  or  William 
Bigler  might  be  nominated.  But  Cameron  controlled  the  issue,  and  the 
nomination  went  to  Canal  Commissioner  Morris  Longstreth. 

In  the  October  elections,  the  Pennsylvania  Whigs  won  the 
governorship  by  a  majority  of  297  votes  of  the  336,747  cast;  with  this 
advantage,  Taylor  was  able  to  carry  the  state  in  November  by  a  margin  of 
13,000.  In  New  York,  the  Democratic  party  was  so  divided  by  the  Van 
Buren  ticket  that  all  36  of  the  state's  electoral  votes  went  to  Taylor.  When 
the  contest  was  over,  Buchanan's  friends  admitted  they  were  glad  that  he 
had  not  been  in  it  "I  do  not  regret  the  defeat  of  Genl.  Cass,"  wrote 
Davy  Lynch,  "for  I  sincerely  believe  that  it  will  be  a  useful  lesson  to  the 
Huckstering  politicians  by  which  his  nomination  was  brought  about"31 


205 


16 

THE  SAGE  OF  WHEATLAND  •  1849-1852 


COUNTRY  SQUIRE 

When  he  retired  from  the  State  Department,  Buchanan  had  reached  the 
age  of  fifty-eight.  He  had  gained  weight  and  his  hair  had  turned  white,  but 
he  still  walked  with  a  spring  in  his  step.  He  now  habitually  wore  a  high 
cloth  collar  with  a  flowing  white  neckerchief  which  emphasized  his  height 
and  gave  a  kind  of  distinction  to  his  appearance.  Nathaniel  Hawthorne 
described  him  as  "heavy  and  sensible,  cool,  kindly  and  good  humored,  with 
a  great  deal  of  experience."  Indeed,  he  had  completed  nearly  thirty  years 
of  continuous  public  service.  What  should  he  do  when  he  left  Washington? 

He  returned  to  Lancaster,  but  because  of  the  recent  political 
bitterness  which  had  erupted  into  fist  fights  between  Frazer's  men  and  his 
own  friends,  he  did  not  want  to  remain  in  the  King  Street  house.  He 
certainly  would  be  a  contender  for  the  presidential  nomination  in  1852, 
and  to  entertain  political  visitors  in  this  exposed  location  adjacent  to  the 
newspaper  offices  would  be  unthinkable. 

Furthermore,  he  needed  a  larger  house.  By  this  time  he  had 
acquired  twenty-two  nephews  and  nieces,  and  thirteen  grandnephews  and 
grandnieces.  Seven  of  these  children  were  full  orphans  in  his  immediate 
care,  and  several  of  the  rest  were  half-orphans.  They  could  no  longer  be 
fanned  out  at  boarding  schools,  nor  could  he,  the  "rich  uncle,"  continue 
to  depend  upon  friends  like  the  Plitts  and  the  Kitteras  to  act  as  foster 
parents.  Brother  Edward,  still  a  poor  country  pastor,  had  too  large  a 
family  himself  to  assume  any  extra  burden  and  plainly  told  James  that  he 
now  ought  to  devote  his  time  and  money  to  his  less  fortunate  kinfolk. 

Consequently,  when  Buchanan  learned  in  the  summer  of  1848 
that  Wheatland,  a  lovely  country  estate  situated  a  mile  west  of  Lancaster, 
was  for  sale,  he  seized  the  opportunity  to  buy  it.  The  mansion  had  many 
personal  associations.  William  Jenkins  had  built  Wheatland  and  lived 
there  until  recently.  His  daughter,  Martha,  had  married  James  B.  Lane. 
To  have  Wheatland  would  keep  Buchanan  in  Lancaster  but  out  of  the  center 

206 


THE  SAGE  OF  WHEATLAND  •   1849-1852 


of  the  city.  Its  spacious  rooms,  broad  lawns  and  well-kept  groves  of  oak 
would  provide  a  happy  playground  for  his  wards,  enable  him  to  assume 
the  politically  strategic  role  of  the  simple,  dignified  country  squire,  and 
give  him  facilities  for  entertainment  in  keeping  with  the  station  of  an 
aspirant  to  the  presidency.  He  purchased  the  estate  from  William  Morris 
Meredith  in  December,  1848,  and  took  up  residence  there  the  following 
spring  after  retiring  from  the  Cabinet. 

No  sooner  had  he  established  himself  at  Wheatland  in  mid-May, 
1849,  than  he  began  to  invite  his  political  friends  to  visit.  To  a  politician 
who  addressed  a  letter  for  him  to  Washington,  he  replied,  "I  presume  you 
may  have  supposed  I  would  be  in  that  City,  now  the  grand  theatre  of 
President  making.  But  this  is  not  my  way."  His  way  was  to  sit  in  the 
study  at  Wheatland;  to  write  letters  day  after  day;  to  receive  calls  quietly; 
and  to  keep  himself  in  a  position  to  say:  "I  leave  my  claims  to  an  intelligent 
and  patriotic  Democracy."  More  than  once  Miss  Hetty  found  him,  late 
at  night,  seated  at  his  desk,  his  head  fallen  onto  the  paper  and  the  candle 
guttering  by  his  side. 

But  all  was  not  politics  at  Wheatland.  Buchanan  soon  discovered 
that  a  country  gentleman  has  more  to  do  than  write  letters.  "I  have  a 
large  and  excellent  garden,"  he  said,  "that  is,  it  would  be  excellent  if 
properly  cultivated."  He  eventually  got  a  gardener,  one  Edward  Bolger, 
and  promptly  set  him  to  work  setting  out  1,200  strawberry  plants.  He 
needed  a  coachman  and  general  handy  man  on  the  place,  but  the  first  man 
he  hired  soon  grew  dissatisfied  with  his  $8.00  per  month  and  keep.  The 
second,  a  coachman  by  the  appropriate  name  of  William  Whipper  stayed 
for  many  years. 

After  he  discovered  that  weeds  grew  on  the  grounds  of  a  country 
home  in  summer,  he  soon  learned  that  cold  winds  howled  round  it  in 
winter  and  that  Wheatland's  equipment  suited  it  far  better  for  summer 
than  for  winter  living.  He  installed  a  new  furnace,  put  in  a  new  kitchen, 
had  bookcases  built,  and  enjoyed  for  the  first  time  in  his  life  the  novelty 
of  house  renovation. 

By  the  end  of  his  first  year,  he  had  become  thoroughly  delighted 
with  his  new  life,  and  he  assumed  with  pride  and  gratification  the  title  which 
politics  now  bestowed  upon  him:  "The  Sage  of  Wheatland."  To  Eliza 
Watterson  he  wrote,  "We  proceed  in  the  same  ejbhn  Trot9  style  as  when 
you  were  here,  without  your  charming  society  to  enliven  the  dullness  of  a 
winter  in  the  country."  He  took  great  pleasure  in  sleighing,  and  many  a 
crisp  wintry  morning  when  the  snow  crunched  underfoot  the  horses  came 
prancing  down  the  lane  of  Wheatland,  their  bells  ajingling,  to  take  him  for 
a  trot  out  the  Marietta  Pike.  But  even  more  he  liked  the  company  of  a  few 
congenial  spirits  with  whom  he  could  crack  a  bottle  of  Madeira,  talk  freely, 
and  "have  a  cozy  time  in  the  country." 

207 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


In  the  springtime  he  made  it  a  practice  to  get  up  with  the  sun  to 
enjoy  the  cool  beauty  of  the  day's  first  hours.  "The  place  now  begins  to 
look  beautiful,"  he  wrote  in  April,  "and  we  have  concerts  of  birds  every 
morning."  In  summer  the  house  and  grounds  came  alive  with  children 
and  young  people  encouraged  by  Harriet  Lane,  now  a  vivacious  and 
beautiful  young  lady  of  nineteen,  who  lived  at  Wheatland  and  became  the 
focal  point  of  social  activities  there.  She  liked  children  and  welcomed 
those  of  the  neighborhood:  Anna,  Ella  and  Eddie  Gable,  Sue  Ripley,  and 
others.  They  hunted  eggs  in  the  barn,  went  on  straw  rides,  knocked  peaches 
and  pears  from  the  trees  with  sticks,  or  invaded  the  kitchen  for  fresh-made 
apple  pie  and  milk.  It  pleased  Harriet  to  go  into  town  with  her  uncle  and 
call  at  his  favorite  tavern,  The  Grapes,  on  North  Queen  Street  where, 
shortly  after  their  arrival,  "the  boys"  would  casually  start  dropping  in.1 

Buchanan  visited  on  Harriet  all  the  care  and  affection  and  disci- 
pline of  a  doting  father  on  a  favorite  child,  and  she  responded  with  love 
and  pride,  although  she  chafed  at  the  firm  restraints  he  placed  on  her 
impetuosity.  When  she  was  fourteen,  soon  after  becoming  his  ward,  he 
wrote  to  her:  "I  would  give  almost  anything  in  the  world  for  a  niece  whom 
all  could  love  for  her  amiability  &  all  respect  for  her  intelligence,  nor 
would  I  be  severe  in  my  requisitions."  Harriet  came  to  doubt  the  last 
phrase,  but  could  not  deny  that  Uncle  James,  or  "Nunc"  as  she  playfully 
called  him,  gave  her  nearly  all  a  young  girl  could  desire.  During  her 
vacations  from  school,  while  he  was  in  the  State  Department,  he  sent  her 
on  summer  vacations  with  various  of  his  friends,  the  Walkers,  the  Ban- 
crofts, the  Pleasantons,  Adele  Cutts,  the  Plitts  and  others  to  the  fashionable 
resorts  at  Rockaway  Beach,  Saratoga  Springs  and  Bedford. 

After  her  first  visit  to  Bedford  Springs  with  her  uncle,  he  expressed 
his  regret  that  he  had  given  permission,  disapproving  of  her  "keen  relish 
for  the  enjoyments  there."  He  turned  down  her  request  to  spend  Christmas 
with  him  in  Washington  because  "it  would  turn  the  head  of  almost  any  girl 
your  age  to  engage  in  the  dissipations  of  this  city  &  particularly  one  of 
your  ardor  for  pleasure.  Your  day  will  come.  .  . .  After  your  education 
shall  have  been  completed  &  your  conduct  approved  by  me,  ...  I  shall  be 
most  happy  to  aid  in  introducing  you  to  the  world  in  the  best  manner.** 
At  the  moment  she  was  in  a  scrape  at  school  for  having  started  a  "clan- 
destine correspondence"  with  a  boy  she  met  at  Bedford.  Her  teacher  had 
intercepted  and  destroyed  his  letters  and  she,  too,  vetoed  the  Washington 
trip.  "With  Harriet's  peculiarity  of  temper,"  she  wrote,  "indulgence  is 
subversive  of  all  discipline  . . .,  one  gratification  excites  a  wish  for  a  second 
until  the  exactions  become  wholly  unreasonable."2 

In  1846,  Buchanan  brought  Harriet  to  the  Convent  School  at 
Georgetown.  "Your  religious  principles  are  doubtless  so  well  settled  that 
you  will  not  become  a  nun,"  he  assured  her.  "My  labors  are  great;  but 

208 


THE  SAGE  OF  WHEATLAND •1849-1852 

they  do  not  way  me  down  as  you  write  the  word.  Now  I  would  say 
weigh;  but  Doctors  differ  on  this  point." 

Shortly  after  Buchanan  moved  into  Wheatland,  Harriet  came  of 
age  and  into  her  inheritance.  For  a  time  she  travelled  about,  spending 
weeks  with  friends  in  Baltimore,  Philadelphia  and  Pittsburgh.  She  charmed 
everyone  she  met,  from  crusty  old  Davy  Lynch  in  Pittsburgh  to  Martin 
Van  Buren,  who  took  her  to  dinner  in  Philadelphia  and  drank  her  health 
first  at  a  formal  party.  His  son,  debonair  "Prince  John/'  paid  her  active 
court,  but  soon  was  left  far  behind  in  the  crush  of  her  admirers.  Buchanan 
began  to  refer  to  her  lovers  in  groups  of  three  to  keep  it  simpler,  but  he 
worried  much  about  her  making  a  suitable  marriage. 

As  Harriet  turned  twenty-one,  he  gave  her  counsel  which  he 
repeated  at  intervals  for  the  next  ten  years:  "I  wish  now  to  give  you  a 
caution.  Never  allow  your  affections  to  become  interested  or  engage  your- 
self to  any  person  without  my  previous  advice.  You  ought  never  to  marry 
any  man  to  whom  you  are  not  attached;  but  you  ought  never  to  marry  any 
person  who  is  not  able  to  afford  you  a  decent  &  immediate  support.  In 
my  experience,  I  have  witnessed  the  long  years  of  patient  misery  &  de- 
pendence which  fine  women  have  endured  from  rushing  precipitately  into 
matrimonial  connexions  without  sufficient  reflection.  Look  ahead  & 
consider  the  future  &  act  wisely  in  this  particular."3 

Harriet's  brothers  were  now  on  their  own.  James  B.  Lane  ran 
a  mercantile  business  in  Lancaster  and  had  acquired  wealth.  Elliot  Eskridge 
Lane  also  lived  in  Lancaster,  boarding  around  the  town  and  helping  his 
uncle  and  his  brother,  by  turns,  until  he  should  decide  upon  a  profession. 
Harriet's  older  sister,  Mary  Elizabeth  Speer  Lane,  lived  with  the  Plitts  in 
Philadelphia,  and  in  1848  married  George  W.  Baker.  She  stayed  for  a 
while  in  Lancaster  until  her  husband  went  to  California  with  the  49'ers. 
Buchanan  was  delighted  to  learn  that  she  had  turned  out  to  be  "a  grand 
housekeeper.  .  .  .  There  is  no  spectacle  more  agreeable  to  me  than  that 
of  a  young  married  woman  properly  sensible  of  the  important  duties  of 
her  station/'4 

Sister  Maria,  of  Meadville,  had  two  children  and  little  money. 
Her  son  James  Buchanan  Yates  held  an  appointment  on  board  a  revenue 
cutter.  Her  daughter  by  the  first  marriage,  Jessie  Magaw,  married  a  young 
man  named  Weaver  who  had  no  job.  Uncle  James  hired  him  as  a  clerk  in 
the  State  Department,  getting  him  a  salary  equal  to  those  who  had  served 
there  for  a  decade  by  the  device  of  promoting  an  $800  raise  for  the  others. 
Upon  retiring  from  the  Department,  Buchanan  urged  his  successor, 
John  M.  Clayton,  to  retain  Weaver,  to  which  Clayton  replied:  "as  to 
young  Weaver,  he  minds  his  business  and  will  be  contented  &  happy, 
provided  his  great  uncle  will  let  him  alone."5 

209 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


James  Buchanan  Henry,  orphan  son  of  sister  Harriet,  was  seven 
years  old  when  Buchanan  became  his  guardian.  Until  now,  he  had  lived 
in  the  King  Street  house  in  Lancaster  cared  for  by  Miss  Hetty.  All  of  his 
uncle's  diplomacy  failed  to  induce  the  youngster  to  eat  vegetables.  Bu- 
chanan promised  him  a  magic  lantern  for  Christmas,  and  young  James  replied 
in  childish  scrawl:  "I  am  trying  hard  for  it  &  think  it  will  please  you  when 
you  hear  that  I  eat  vegetables/'  but  the  flesh  proved  weak.  Three  years 
later,  he  still  had  made  no  progress.  Buchanan  wrote  Harriet  from  Wash- 
ington: "James  Henry  is  here.  I  intend  to  commence  with  him  tomorrow 
&  make  him  eat  vegetables  or  he  shall  have  no  meat.  I  have  not  yet 
determined  on  a  school  for  him."  He  later  sent  Buchanan  Henry  to  Prince- 
ton and  in  1851  arranged  to  have  him  study  law  under  John  Cadwalader 
of  Philadelphia.6 

Brother  Edward  jealously  resented  James's  wealth  and  rarely 
visited  him,  although  his  children  often  summered  at  Wheatland  and  had 
a  wonderful  time.  Edward  dutifully  named  one  of  his  boys  after  his 
famous  uncle,  but  this  was  no  longer  a  novelty.  Forney  did  likewise,  and 
Dr.  Foltz,  and  James  M.  Hopkins  among  many  others. 

In  1851  the  students  of  Dickinson  College  called  upon  the  ex- 
Secretary  of  State  to  negotiate  a  peace  treaty  between  them  and  the  College 
administration  after  an  incident  had  provoked  a  mass  dismissal  of  the 
junior  class.  Buchanan,  acting  as  mediator,  extracted  from  the  outraged 
students  a  pledge  of  good  behavior  and  from  the  faculty  a  retraction  of  the 
penalty.  In  1853  when  Marshall  College  in  Mercersburg  merged  with 
Franklin  College  at  Lancaster,  Buchanan  accepted  the  presidency  of  the 
Board  of  Trustees  of  the  new  institution,  gave  $1,000  to  it,  and  spent  con- 
siderable time  helping  to  select  a  suitable  location  in  Lancaster  for  the 
campus.  His  renewed  associations  with  academic  people  led  him  to  expand 
his  library  and  to  do  more  reading.  He  at  last  had  time  to  look  at  the  five 
volume  Life  of  Washington  by  Jared  Sparks,  and  to  study  Madison's  newly 
published  notes  on  the  Constitutional  Convention  and  Elliott's  Debates  on 
its  ratification.  He  dipped  into  the  works  of  Byron  and  read  a  good  many 
of  Sir  Walter  Scott's  novels  and  the  writings  of  Charles  Dickens. 

Buchanan  could  not  forsee  it,  but  these  days  of  temporary 
political  retirement  at  Wheatland  were  to  be  the  happiest  and  most  carefree 
of  his  life.  His  prestige  was  secure,  his  friends  loyal  and  confident,  and  his 
future  bright.  The  world  caine  to  his  door,  constantly  filling  Wheatland 
with  gay  society  and  the  fascinating  discussion  of  politics.  He  had  money 
to  spare,  a  good  appetite,  and  a  wonderful  vaulted  wine  cellar  fit  for  the 
vintages  he  now  began  to  collect  with  the  appreciation  of  a  connoisseur. 

The  press  often  commented  upon  his  "resisting  power  against 
the  fumes  of  intoxicating  drinks,"  He  performed  feats  that  would  have 
startled  the  statistician.  "The  Madeira  and  sherry  that  he  has  consumed 

210 


THE  SAGE  OF  WHEAT-LAND  •    1849  - 1852 


would  fill  more  than  one  old  cellar,"  wrote  Forney,  who  was  a  good  judge 
of  such  matters,  "and  the  rye  whiskey  that  he  has  'punished'  would  make 
Jacob  Baer's  heart  glad."  The  wine  was  none  of  your  thin  potations,  but 
stout  and  heady;  wine  that  "would  make  an  old  British  sea  captain  weep 
joyful  tears."  He  was  no  single  bottle  man,  either.  He  would  dispose  of 
two  or  three  at  a  sitting,  beginning  with  a  stiff  jorum  of  cognac  and  finishing 
off  with  a  couple  of  glasses  of  old  rye.  "And  then  the  effect  of  it!  There 
was  no  head  ache,  no  faltering  steps,  no  flushed  cheek.  Oh,  no!  All  was 
as  cool,  as  calm  and  as  cautious  and  watchful  as  in  the  beginning.  More 
than  one  ambitious  tyro  who  sought  to  follow  his  ...  example  gathered  an 
early  fall."7 

When  his  stock  ran  low,  Buchanan  could  use  the  Sunday  drive 
to  church  as  an  excuse  for  a  trip  to  Jacob  Baer's  distillery  for  a  ten-gallon 
cask  of  "Old  J.  B.  Whiskey,"  which  he  considered  finer  than  the  best 
Monongahela.  He  also  liked  the  name  and  enjoyed  the  comments  of 
guests  who  thought  that  the  initials  stood  for  James  Buchanan. 

When  Miss  Hetty  began  to  entertain  gentleman  friends,  and  a 
Mr.  Evans  bid  fair  to  capture  her  excellent  services,  Buchanan  again 
thought  about  marrying,  though  we  do  not  know  the  lady  he  had  in  mind. 
Possibly  it  was  Mrs.  Benson,  Mrs.  Catron's  pretty  niece,  whom  he  regarded 
highly  at  the  moment.  "Should  Miss  Hetty  marry  Mr.  Evans,"  he  confided 
to  Harriet,  "I  shall  bring  this  matter  to  a  speedy  conclusion  one  way  or  the 
other.  I  shall  then  want  a  housekeeper,  as  you  would  not  be  fit  to  superin- 
tend; and  whose  society  would  be  so  charming  as  that  of—-."8 

But  rich  and  satisfying  as  were  the  maintenance  of  a  family 
homestead  and  the  epicurean  delights  of  the  life  of  a  country  squire, 
politics  absorbed  Buchanan's  deepest  interest  and  thought. 


THE  COMPROMISE  OF  1850 

The  gold  rush  and  California's  application  for  admission  as  a  free  State  in 
1849  brought  the  slavery  issue  again  to  the  forefront  in  Congress.  The 
Free-Soilers  and  many  Whigs  favored  excluding  slavery  from  the  remaining 
territories  by  Congressional  mandate  based  on  the  Wilmot  Proviso.  Most 
of  the  Democrats  preferred  the  doctrine  of  popular  sovereignty,  which 
denied  by  implication  the  right  of  Congress  to  legislate  on  slavery  in  the 
territories.  Buchanan  thought  Congress  should  act  by  extending  the 
Missouri  Compromise  line  to  California,  thus  prohibiting  slavery  north  of 
36°  30'  and  leaving  the  problem  south  of  that  line  "to  be  decided  by  the 
people."  He  had  formally  proposed  this  solution  in  his  Harvest  Home 
letter  of  August,  1847.  Southern  extremists  demanded  federal  protection 
of  slave  property  in  all  of  the  territories,  while  a  good  many  people  of  all 

211 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


sections  and  parties  hoped  that  the  Supreme  Court  might  finally  decide 
the  status  of  slavery  in  the  territories. 

Congress  had  been  bringing  new  states  and  territories  into  the 
Union  at  a  record  pace  during  the  previous  four  years.  It  had  admitted 
Florida  and  Texas  to  statehood  in  1845,  Iowa  in  1846  and  Wisconsin  in 
1848,  but  Oregon  proved  a  stumbling  block  and  California  a  major  crisis 
because  of  the  slavery  question.  The  bill  to  organize  Oregon  as  a  free 
territory,  introduced  in  January,  1847,  touched  off  a  long  and  acrimonious 
debate  that  lasted  until  August,  1848.  A  year  later,  when  the  Californians 
set  up  a  free  state  government  and  applied  for  admission,  skipping  entirely 
the  territorial  stage,  neither  Congress  nor  the  country  was  in  a  frame  of 
mind  to  consider  the  petition  calmly.  The  South  feared  that  it  would  now 
lose  the  traditional  balance  of  free  and  slave  states  in  the  Senate  and  fall 
into  the  status  of  a  perpetual  minority.  This  risk  it  refused  to  take,  and 
declared  that  California  should  not  be  admitted  unless  the  South  got 
guarantees  which  a  hostile  majority  would  have  to  respect:  adequate 
provision  for  the  return  of  fugitive  slaves;  continuance  of  slavery  in  the 
District  of  Columbia;  and  the  right  of  southerners  to  carry  their  slave 
property  into  at  least  some  of  the  territories. 

The  Thirty-first  Congress,  which  was  almost  evenly  divided 
between  Democrats  and  Whigs,  met  in  December  1849  and  prepared  to 
seek  an  adjustment  of  the  slavery  question.  Failure  would  bring  disunion. 
Both  sides  joined  in  deadly  battle  from  the  very  outset,  casting  sixty-three 
ballots  before  they  could  elect  a  Speaker.  Buchanan  participated  indirectly 
in  the  fight  to  organize  the  House,  strongly  pushing  for  Speaker  young 
Howell  Cobb,  a  Union  Democrat  from  Georgia,  and  supporting  Forney  for 
Clerk.  Forney  reported  that  terrible  scenes  were  enacted.  Congressmen 
shouted  CfLiar"  at  each  other  on  the  floor  and  exchanged  challenges  to  duel. 
"I  fear  the  crisis  is  at  hand,  as  you  have  so  long  predicted,"  he  wrote  to 
Buchanan.  The  southerners  declared  "that  they  would  secede  if  the 
Wilmot  Proviso  were  passed."9  Cobb  at  length  won  and  Forney  lost,  but 
slavery  had  dominated  the  organizational  proceedings  to  the1  extent  that 
even  the  opinions  of  the  doorkeeper  had  to  be  investigated. 

After  Congressional  debates  that  lasted  throughout  the  spring 
of  1850,  Henry  day  reported  out  of  committee  the  Senate  plan  of  compro- 
mise. This  proposed  that  California  should  be  admitted  as  a  free  state;  that 
Congress  should  enact  a  stricter  fugitive  slave  law;  that  New  Mexico  and 
Utah  should  be  admitted  as  territories  whose  inhabitants  would  decide  about 
slavery  at  the  time  of  application  for  statehood;  that  the  slave  trade  in  the 
District  of  Columbia  should  be  abolished;  and  that  the  Texas  boundary 
should  be  reduced,  in  exchange  for  federal  assumption  of  the  Texan  debt. 

212 


THE  SAGE  OF  WHEATLAND  •  1849  - 1852 

In  June  southern  fire-eaters,  meeting  at  Nashville  to  discuss 
secession,  displayed  such  division  of  opinion  about  the  proposed  compro- 
mise that  they  weakened  the  effect  of  their  earlier  threats.  In  July, 
President  Taylor,  an  opponent  of  the  compromise  measures,  suddenly  died, 
His  successor,  Millard  Fillmore,  supported  them.  Friends  of  the  compro- 
mise worked  energetically  in  its  hehalf,  none  more  effectively  than  Senator 
Stephen  A.  Douglas  of  Illinois  who  had  earlier  preferred  the  Missouri  line 
proposal.  By  the  end  of  September  the  plan  had  been  passed  in  the  form 
of  separate  acts  of  Congress  which  Fillmore  speedily  signed.  Many  people 
believed  that  the  crisis  had  passed. 

James  Buchanan  was  not  one  of  these.  Throughout  the  contest 
he  had  been  in  and  out  of  Washington  for  conferences  and  had  been  writing 
letters  incessantly  to  leaders  in  the  Senate.10  He  had  condemned  the  course 
of  Democratic  editors,  like  Ritchie  of  the  Washington  Union,  for  singing 
the  siren  song  that  "all  will  be  well."  "My  firm  conviction  is,"  he  told 
Dr.  Foltz,  "that  in  four  years  from  this  time  the  union  will  not  be  in 
existence  as  it  now  exists.  There  will  be  two  Republics  ,  .  .  there  will  be 
no  civil  war.  ...  I  sincerely  and  fervently  hope  I  am  [wrong],  but  such 
are  my  deliberate  opinions.  Nous  verrons."11 

Few  northerners,  for  example,  knew  that  the  moment  California 
entered  as  a  free  state,  the  Governor  of  Georgia,  in  obedience  to  an  act  of 
the  Legislature,  had  to  call  a  convention  to  consider  secession.  South 
Carolina  was  pressing  Virginia  to  join  her  in  issuing  resolutions  in  favor 
of  secession.  Buchanan  gave  effective  support  to  John  A.  Parker  who 
played  a  leading  role  in  side-tracking  this  movement  in  the  Virginia  Legis- 
lature in  1850.12  Two  days  after  California  became  a  state,  a  rump  session 
of  the  Nashville  Convention  denounced  the  Compromise  of  1850  and 
asserted  the  right  of  secession. 

Buchanan  had  to  announce  his  own  position  on  the  compromise 
measures  in  preparation  for  the  presidential  race  of  1852.  He  thought 
that  Congress  had  both  the  right  and  the  duty  to  define  the  status  of  slavery 
in  the  federal  territories,  a  view  he  maintained  in  opposition  to  the  Demo- 
cratic party  platform  of  1848,  the  Nicholson  letter,  General  Cass's  speeches, 
and  formal  declarations  of  the  Pennsylvania  Democratic  caucus.  Buchanan 
contended  that  the  Constitution  assigned  to  Congress  power  over  the 
territories.  Congress  had  asserted  its  rightful  power  in  the  Missouri 
Compromise  and  ought  to  keep  control.  In  the  vast  reaches  of  the  West, 
without  settled  communities  and  the  means  of  law  enforcement,  there  was 
not  the  slightest  possibility  that  slavery  could  take  root.  If  the  inhabitants 
voted,  they  would  vote  slavery  out;  if  they  did  not  vote,  the  slaves  would 
clear  out  themselves.  The  same  result  would  follow  whether  the  Wilmot 
Proviso,  the  extended  Missouri  Compromise  line  or  popular  sovereignty 
became  law.  No  kind  of  legislative  mandate  could  establish  slavery  in  such 

213 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


a  region;  economics  and  not  politics  would  kill  it.  But  Congress  could 
declare  the  right  of  the  South  to  migrate  with  slaves  to  part  of  the  federal 
domain,  and  such  legislation  would  have  the  advantage  of  abating  the 

current  agitation. 

Southerners,  in  the  tentative  exercise  of  their  right  to  carry 
slaves  west,  would  find  out  for  themselves  the  economic  ineffectiveness  of 
slavery  outside  the  cotton  and  rice  belt.  Such  a  discovery,  proceeding 
from  the  experience  of  southerners,  would  undermine  the  slave  system 
and  gradually  confine  it  to  South  Carolina  and  the  Gulf  Coast  states  where, 
at  last,  it  would  succumb  to  overwhelming  public  pressure  no  longer 
entirely  sectional.  By  the  extension  of  the  Missouri  line,  the  South  would 
have  its  "rights,"  but  slavery  would  not  be  extended  except  experimentally. 
The  experiment  would  bring  in  no  new  slave  state  but  rather  prove  con- 
clusively that  slavery  could  not  endure  in  the  West.  This  economic 
determinist  view  underestimated  the  potency  of  the  white-supremacist 
dogma  among  southerners. 

But  Congressional  abdication  of  control,  as  proposed  by  the 
popular  sovereignty  doctrine  of  Cass  and  now  written  into  the  Utah  and 
New  Mexico  territorial  laws  would,  Buchanan  feared,  raise  the  devil. 
Congressional  nonintervention  would  only  establish  new  fighting  zones  in 
the  West  where  the  opposing  parties  would  go  to  war  over  slavery  during 
the  period  of  territorial  status.  Since  the  question  of  right  was  left  un- 
defined, slavery  would  exist  or  not  exist  as  a  result  of  might,  as  a  result  of 
the  power  of  whatever  local  force  could  subdue  the  opposition  in  any 
territory.  Southerners  would  demand  federal  protection  from  attacks  on 
their  property  in  the  territories;  antislavery  settlers  would  claim  that  the 
question  was  local  and  no  business  of  Congress;  the  abolitionists  would 
provoke  atrocities;  and  the  combination  of  excitements  would  inflame 
sectional  passions  and  consume  the  nation. 

Much  as  he  disliked  the  popular  sovereignty  provisions  of  the 
Compromise  of  1850,  Buchanan  acknowledged  the  need  for  some  kind  of 
settlement.  He  told  Clancy  Jones,  "I  have  passed  a  month  in  Washington. 
.  The  deep  and  bitter  feeling  among  the  Southern  members  in  regard 
to  the  Slavery  question  cannot  be  justly  appreciated  except  by  those  on 
the  spot,  and  not  even  by  them  unless  admitted  behind  the  scenes."13  To 
his  friend  J.  M.  Read  he  confided  that  the  southerners  "say  with  truth, 
that  whilst  the  agitation  of  the  Slave  question  in  the  North  may  be  sport 
to  us,  it  may  also  prove  death  to  them  ...  the  feeling  of  the  South  on  this 
subject  ...  is  not  a  political  feeling;  but  one  that  is  domestic  &  self- 
preserving."14 

After  the  adoption  of  the  compromise,  Buchanan  met  the  mount- 
ing public  demand  for  his  opinion  of  it  in  a  letter  to  a  Democratic  meeting 
in  Philadelphia  on  November  19,  1850.  He  took  no  direct  issue  with  the 

214 


THK  SAGE  OF  WHEATLAND  •   1849-1852 


compromise,  but  by  restricting  himself  to  an  attack  upon  the  continued 
agitation  of  the  slavery  issue  and  a  plea  for  obedience  to  the  Fugitive  Slave 
Law  he  expressed  by  implication  his  lack  of  confidence  in  the  agreement  of 
1850.  The  fanatical  abolitionists,  he  said,  had  wrought  more  damage  to 
the  Negro,  both  slave  and  free,  in  North  and  South,  than  any  group  in  the 
nation.  They  had  postponed  the  course  of  regular  and  constitutional 
emancipation,  raised  anti-Negro  sentiment  in  the  North,  forced  more 
rigorous  control  of  slaves  and  free  Negroes  in  the  South,  and  brought  the 
Union  into  imminent  peril.  "They  have  done  infinite  mischief,"  he  said, 
and  by  their  fanatical  folly  had  prevented  the  achievement  of  the  very 
result  they  claimed  to  seek. 

He  pointed  out  that  the  new  Fugitive  Slave  Law  was  exactly  the 
same  as  the  law  of  1793  except  that  its  enforcement  now  became  the  re- 
sponsibility  of  federal  instead  of  state  officers.  He  hoped  the  North  would 
faithfully  enforce  it,  for  it  was  all  that  the  South  had  salvaged  from  the 
entire  compromise.  Buchanan  concluded  with  an  impassioned  plea  for 
the  Union,  "this,  the  grandest  and  most  glorious  temple  which  has  ever 
been  erected  to  political  freedom  on  the  face  of  the  earth!"16 

This  letter  constituted  Buchanan's  opening  bid  for  the  presidential 
nomination  in  1852.  A  week  after  its  publication,  he  wrote  to  Robert  Tyler: 
"I  have  rarely  known  anything  to  take  as  my  letter  to  the  Union  meeting 
has  done.  Every  mail  brings  me  papers  from  the  South  containing  favorable 
notices  of  it  &  some  of  them  speak  in  very  strong  terms  in  regard  to  the 
Presidency.  .  .  .  Letters  from  Washington  speak  confidentially  of  my 
prospects.  If  the  Pennsylvania  Democracy  were  anything  like  unanimous, 
there  could,  I  think,  be  no  doubt  of  the  result."16 

Buchanan  anticipated  that  Lewis  Cass  would  be  his  most  for- 
midable  rival.  Therefore  he  had  to  make  a  clear  distinction  between  his 
position  and  that  of  Cass  on  the  compromise,  not  an  easy  task.  A  strong 
movement  had  developed  within  both  Whig  and  Democratic  parties  to  lay 
to  rest  the  slavery  issue  by  declaring  the  recent  compromise  a  "finality." 
Buchanan  the  statesman  acknowledged  that  the  country  needed  a  period 
of  calm  after  the  storm  of  1850;  but  Buchanan  the  politician  distrusted 
popular  sovereignty  and  declined  to  endorse  this  panacea  devised  by  his 
chief  competitor.  While  he  determined  not  to  attack  the  Compromise  of 
1850  outright,  explaining  that  he  saw  no  prospect  of  an  early  modification 
of  it,  he  did  express  doubts  that  popular  sovereignty  would  work,  and 
stated  that  it  would  give  the  southerners  no  protection  of  slavery  in  the 
territories.  Southern  extremists  applauded  this  view  and  flocked  to 
Buchanan's  standard;  he  welcomed  their  support  though  he  had  no  sym- 
pathy with  their  secessionist  talk. 

When  Union  Whigs  and  Democrats  invited  Buchanan  to  par- 
ticipate  in  a  great  "peace  meeting"  at  Baltimore  where  the  delegates 

215 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

proposed  to  banish  the  slavery  question  from  the  1852  canvass  by  jointly 
accepting  the  Compromise  of  1850  as  final,  he  declined.  Nothing  would 
be  worse,  he  thought,  than  a  bipartisan  agreement  on  slavery  at  this 
moment,  for  such  a  jointure  would  stimulate  the  formation  of  sectional 
factions  based  on  the  slavery  issue  in  both  the  North  and  the  South, 
exactly  the  result  he  had  been  trying  to  prevent.  Let  the  Whigs  and 
Democrats  remain  enemies  on  the  old,  traditional  ground  that  had  divided 
them  from  the  beginning.  The  Democrats  stood  for  strict  construction 
of  the  Constitution  and  the  reserved  rights  of  the  states.  The  Whigs  stood 
for  consolidated  central  government.  Let  them  fight  the  campaign  on  this 
issue  which  transcended  sectionalism  and  would  emphasize  the  national 
scope  of  each  party. 

At  length,  Buchanan  recognized  that  his  continued  endorsement 
of  the  36°  30'  line  cast  him  in  the  role  of  an  opponent  of  the  Compromise 
of  1850  and  threatened  his  chances  of  nomination.  Although  he  remained 
convinced  that  popular  sovereignty  would  break  down  the  first  time  it  got 
a  practical  trial,  he  saw  no  alternative  except  to  let  the  trial  proceed. 
Then,  perhaps,  the  nation  would  learn  its  lesson  and  adopt  the  other  plan. 
In  February,  1852,  Buchanan  told  a  public  meeting:  "The  Compromise 
measures  are  now  a  'finality'— those  who  opposed  them  honestly  and 
powerfully,  and  who  still  believe  them  to  be  wrong,  having  patriotically 
determined  to  acquiesce  in  them  for  the  sake  of  the  Union." 

THE  BAND  WAGON  ROLLS  AGAIN 

On  the  Pennsylvania  front,  Cameron  declared  open  war  on  Buchanan.  He 
cultivated  anti-Catholic  prejudice  to  raise  a  Protestant  counterweight  to 
Buchanan's  Irish  vote,  agitated  antislavery  excitement,  and  cried  out  for 
a  high  protective  tariff.  He  gained  influence  in  the  Dallas  faction,  added 
Congressman  Richard  Brodhead  to  his  bag,  and  persuaded  his  followers  to 
elect  Whigs  to  the  State  Senate.  Buchanan  wrote  that  Cameron  had  done 
him  more  political  injury  than  "any  man  living."17 

In  the  Pennsylvania  Democratic  convention  to  nominate  a 
governor  in  1851,  however,  Buchanan's  friends  won  a  victory  for  their 
candidate,  William  Bigler,  against  the  Cameron  favorite.  On  the  other  hand, 
the  Pennsylvania  Legislature  named  Richard  Brodhead  to  fill  Sturgeon's 
senatorial  seat.  The  other  Pennsylvania  Senator,  James  Cooper,  had  been 
elected  by  the  triumphant  Whigs  in  1849.  Thus,  in  the  Senate,  Buchanan 
had  to  contend  with  a  Whig  and  a  Cameron  lieutenant,  a  difficult  plight  for 
a  presidential  aspirant  claiming  to  be  the  "favorite  son"  of  his  state.18 

The  campaign  for  the  governorship  of  Pennsylvania  in  1851 
engrossed  the  interest  of  the  nation  and  became  the  subject  of  excited 
editorials  throughout  the  land  because  of  the  Christiana  Riot  of  September 

216 


THE  SAGE  OF  WHEATLAND  •    1849  - 1852 

11.  At  this  little  village  in  southern  Lancaster  County,  a  group  of  Negroes 
and  local  whites  prevented  a  United  States  Marshal  from  serving  papers  dn 
a  fugitive  slave,  shot  the  slaveowner  and  assaulted  others  of  the  official 
party.  Buchanan,  in  all  his  recent  speeches,  had  warned  that  the  effec- 
tiveness of  the  Compromise  of  1850  depended  upon  the  willingness  of 
northerners  to  abide  faithfully  by  the  terms  of  the  new  Fugitive  Slave  Law. 
Now,  twenty  miles  from  Wheatland,  Pennsylvanians  had  committed 
murder  and  interfered  with  agents  of  the  Federal  government  who  had 
sought  only  to  enforce  the  law.  A  student  of  the  event  wrote,  "Many 
Americans  felt  the  Christiana  Riot  tested  crucial  matters:  the  sanctity  of 
law;  the  existence  of  peace  and  order;  the  ethical  course  of  the  country; 
and  the  very  existence  of  the  nation." 

Extremist  newspapers,  north  and  south,  printed  frenzied  edi- 
torials to  voice  their  views.  The  Lancaster  Saturday  Express  headlined: 
"Civil  War— The  First  Blow  Struck,"  and  called  the  Christiana  affray  the 
"murder  fruit"  of  the  horrid  "tree  of  slavery."  Southern  journals  charac- 
terized the  riot  as  "wanton,"  "atrocious,"  "horrible,"  "a  most  foul  and 
damning  outrage,"  and  said  that  if  northerners  were  going  to  shoot  down 
slaveholders  "like  wild  beasts,"  they  would  have  to  leave  the  Union.  But 
most  papers  hoped,  like  the  New  Orleans  Picayune,  that  the  "sober  and 
conservative  spirit"  which  had  always  distinguished  Pennsylvania  in 
sectional  crises  would  "crush  within  her  borders  the  desperate  faction 
whose  teachings  have  produced  and  encouraged  these  lawless  acts."  The 
Christiana  Riot  gave  national  significance  to  the  forthcoming  state  election. 

Bigler's  opponent,  William  F.  Johnston,  represented  the  views 
of  Seward  and  Scott  who  favored  the  Wilmot  Proviso,  desired  a  repeal  of 
the  Fugitive  Slave  Law,  and  welcomed  agitation  of  the  slavery  issue.  Wrote 
Buchanan,  "The  eyes  of  every  true  patriot  in  the  Nation  will  look  ...  to 
the  result  in  Pennsylvania.  Should  her  people  .  .  .  re-elect  Johnston,  this 
would  be  a  fatal  index."  Bigler's  election  in  October,  Buchanan  believed, 
did  more  "to  tranquilize  the  South,  to  restore  peace  &  harmony  between 
the  Slave  and  the  non-slave-holding  States  &  to  preserve  the  Union,  than 
any  event  which  has  occurred  since  the  commencement  of  the  unfortunate 
agitation."19 

Bigler's  victory  proved  a  powerful  antidote  to  the  rumors  which 
Cameron  had  spread  of  Buchanan's  inability  to  carry  Pennsylvania  and 
augured  the  selection  of  a  strong  Buchanan  delegation  to  the  Baltimore 
Convention,  a  delegation  which  would  be  named  at  a  Harrisburg  state 
convention  on  March  4.  The  usual  local  fights  preceded  this.  In  Berks 
County,  a  meeting  unanimously  rejected  a  resolution  in  Buchanan's  favor. 
"Just  the  thing  for  Brodhead  to  frank  around,"  wrote  Buchanan  with  a 
grimace.20  In  Philadelphia,  the  Buchaneers  moved  an  amendment  to  a 
Cass  resolution,  substituting  Buchanan's  name.  The  chairman  put  the 

217 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


motion  to  a  voice  vote,  declared  the  amendment  carried  without  any 
marked  evidence  to  support  his  decision,  received  a  motion  to  adjourn,  and 

'      '    "  '  *~     "    ,who 


got  a  piece  of  his  coat  but  no  endorsement  of  their  candidate.21 

At  Harrisburg,  the  convention  gave  Buchanan  94  votes;  Cass,  31; 
Sam  Houston,  2;  and  Robert  J.  Walker,  2.  On  a  motion  to  make  it  unani- 
mous for  Buchanan,  the  vote  came  out  103  yea  and  30  nay.  The  next  day 
Buchanan  sat  down  at  his  desk  and  wrote  in  his  "Little  Black  Book"  the 
name  of  every  delegate  to  Harrisburg,  endorsing  after  each  the  letter  "B" 
or  "C"  (Buchanan  or  Cass),  and  to  make  sure  he  would  never  forget  the 
traitors,  he  made  an  entry  four  pages  later  headed  ''Protesters  at  the  4 
March  Convention,  1852,"  under  which  he  wrote  again  the  names  of  the 
thirty  whom  Cameron  controlled.22  But  a  ray  of  sunshine  broke  through 
in  the  decision  that  the  majority  would  impose  the  unit  rule  at  Baltimore. 
Buchanan  could  therefore  announce  to  the  world  that  he  went  into  the 
Baltimore  convention  with  the  solid  support  of  the  delegation  of  his  home 
state.  Privately  he  predicted  that  "the  Cameron  clique  will  resort  to  every 
trick  to  diminish  the  force  of  the  State  nomination,"  and  these  rebellious 
delegates,  "while  instructed  to  support  me,  will  stab  me  under  the  fifth  rib 
whenever  an  opportunity  may  offer."23 

In  many  other  states  Buchanan  had  not  exactly  an  organization 
but  a  coterie  of  friends  who  actively  campaigned  for  him.  Anyone  who 
reads  Folk's  diary  will  gather  from  it  the  impression  that  his  Cabinet  had 
no  very  high  regard  for  Buchanan;  yet  most  of  its  members  joined  the  effort 
to  nominate  him  in  1852:  Clifford  of  Maine,  Toucey  of  Connecticut, 
Bancroft  of  Massachusetts,  Mason  of  Virginia,  and  Johnson  of  Tennessee. 
Walker  stood  off,  but  Marcy  would  have  come  along  except  for  the  fact  that 
the  New  York  Barnburners  fired  his  own  ambition  for  the  nomination  as  a 
means  of  bringing  themselves  back  into  the  party.  Slidell  thought  Buchanan 
ought  to  come  to  Saratoga  in  the  summer  for  missionary  work  among  the 
New  Yorkers,  but  this  he  declined  to  do.2* 

The  state  conventions  in  Pennsylvania,  Mississippi,  Tennessee  and 
Alabama  favored  Buchanan,  but  there  the  good  news  stopped.  California 
and  Maryland  rejected  him  and  New  Jersey,  because  of  a  local  fight,  went 
for  Cass.  In  Louisiana  Slidell,  in  order  to  defeat  the  Soute  forces  who 
were  pledged  to  Douglas,  had  to  join  the  Cass  men.25 

Virginia  held  the  key.  Here  Buchanan's  friend,  John  A.  Parker, 
persuaded  Henry  A.  Wise,  the  energetic,  hot-headed  leader  of  the  dominant 
Democratic  faction  in  the  Old  Dominion,  to  back  Buchanan.  Wise  saw 
in  him  a  means  to  combat  his  rival,  R.  M.  T.  Hunter,  who  ran  with  the 
fire-eaters  and  supported  Douglas.  If  Virginia  did  not  support  Buchanan 
at  Baltimore,  Wise  said  he  would  "break  up  the  Democratic  organization 
in  the  State."26  John  Y.  Mason,  Thomas  Ritchie  and  other  Virginia 

218 


THE  SAGE  OF  WHEATLAND  •   1849  -  1852 


worthies  worked  with  Wise,  but  Buchanan  felt  that  so  much  depended  upon 
success  here  that  he  visited  Richmond  for  a  few  days  in  the  spring  of  1852, 

When  he  learned  that  Cameron  had  sent  several  deputies  to 
Richmond,  he  dispatched  Lynch  and  David  R.  Porter  to  the  scene.  They 
arrived  and  helped  Wise  run  the  meeting,  which  proved  something  of  a  job 
as  most  of  the  county  delegates  had  never  attended  such  a  gathering  before 
and  had  no  idea  what  to  do.  Wise  almost  destroyed  his  own  plans  by 
demanding  a  pledged  Virginia  delegation,  contrary  to  all  prior  party  pro- 
cedure, but  he  soon  backed  down  and  delivered  to  Buchanan  an  unpledged 
delegation  friendly  to  him.  Lynch  had  to  write  to  Buchanan  for  money  to 
get  out  of  Richmond,  and  with  the  $40  he  received  proceeded  to  Washing- 
ton. From  there  he  wrote:  "Your  friends  have  no  organization  in  this 
place.  The  friends  of  all  the  other  candidates  have."27 

This  news  stimulated  Buchanan  to  more  letter  writing.  He 
sought  in  this  last  month  before  the  nomination,  to  convince  the  friends 
of  Douglas  that  their  hero  could  not  possibly  win  in  1852,  but  that  he  could 
be  chosen  in  1856  if  he  supported  Buchanan  now.  Buchanan  warned  that 
Cass  could  never  win  Pennsylvania,  and  if  nominated  he  would  be  sure 
to  lose  the  election. 

Delegates  poured  into  Washington  during  the  last  two  weeks  of 
May  to  sniff  the  political  atmosphere  before  going  to  Baltimore  where  the 
nominating  convention  would  open  on  June  1.  There  the  motley  crowd 
overflowed  all  the  hotels.  People  slept  where  they  could,  if  not  in  beds 
then  on  bare  boards.  It  had  recently  dawned  on  some  states  that  by  sending 
large  delegations  they  might  carry  added  influence  through  sheer  mass. 
Pennsylvania  had  doubled  its  delegation,  and  Virginia  sent  69  delegates  to 
cast  15  votes.  On  opening  day  nearly  700  delegates  scrambled  for  the 
296  chairs. 

By  the  next  morning  the  local  arrangements  committee  had 
provided  adequate  seating  facilities,  and  the  convention  finally  got  under- 
way with  its  organization.  Buchanan's  supporters  fought  a  motion  to 
ballot  immediately  for  the  nominees,  demanding  that  the  platform  should 
be  submitted  for  adoption  first,  for  they  wished  to  make  every  candidate 
toe  the  line  on  details  of  the  Compromise  of  1850.  'But  the  convention, 
155  to  123,  decided  to  name  the  candidate  first,  and  then  to  endow  him  with 
principles.  Cass  led  on  the  early  ballots,  and  Buchanan  ran  second  with 
between  90  and  100  votes.  Douglas  and  Marcy  had  20  or  30  each,  and 
half  a  dozen  favorite  sons  polled  scattering  votes.  By  Friday,  Cass  had 
declined  and  Douglas  had  strengthened  his  position,  but  no  decision  seemed 
near.  Then  John  W.  Davis,  chairman,  after  a  heated  debate,  ruled  that 
each  delegation  might  retain  or  reject  the  unit  rule,  as  it  saw  fit. 

After  this  ruling,  Buchanan  jumped  to  the  top  with  104  votes; 
Cass  dropped  down  to  33;  Douglas  came  up  to  80,  and  Marcy  held  on  to  his 

219 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


New  York  votes.  Here  the  procession  stopped.  Buchanan's  friends  begged, 
bargained,  and  bullied  to  get  Marcy  to  lend  a  hand  and  push  the  Buchanan 
band  wagon,  but  the  New  Yorkers  refused,  feeling  sure  that  Buchanan  could 
not  go  further  without  them.  After  this,  Buchanan's  poll  declined,  and  his 
bid  collapsed.  Hearing  the  news  in  Lancaster,  he  immediately  wrote  to 
Porter,  the  head  of  his  delegation:  "From  the  result  of  the  ballotings 
yesterday,  I  deem  it  highly  improbable  that  I  shall  receive  the  nomination." 
He  thanked  his  friends,  declined  positively  to  be  considered  as  vice- 
president,  and  announced  his  determination  to  go  into  final  retirement 

without  regret.28 

Meanwhile  Douglas  went  through  the  cycle,  neared  100  votes, 
and  then  came  down.  Cass,  down  to  27,  made  a  comeback  to  131  votes, 
but  could  get  no  more.  Marcy  then  began  to  climb,  running  his  score  of 
votes  to  98  on  the  forty-sixth  ballot.  New  York  now  came  in  sackcloth  and 
ashes  to  beg  Pennsylvania  and  Virginia  for  Buchanan's  votes,  but  received 
stony  glares  and  curses,  punctuated  by  tobacco  juice.  The  Buchaneers  had 
already  decided  the  next  move:  to  bring  in  by  easy  stages  the  name  of 
Franklin  Pierce  of  New  Hampshire.  On  the  forty-ninth  ballot,  the  under- 
cover  work  of  the  Pierce  men,  supported  by  Buchanan  delegations,  came 
into  play.  After  a  number  of  small  states  had  voted  for  Pierce,  the  delega- 
tions from  New  York,  Indiana,  and  Pennsylvania  retired  to  caucus.  At 
the  critical  moment,  Pennsylvania  returned  to  cast  for  Pierce  the  ballots 
that  pinned  down  his  nomination.  By  the  time  the  roll  call  was  complete, 
Pierce  had  amassed  282  of  the  296  convention  votes.29 

Buchanan  and  his  friends  collected  their  reward  in  the  nomina- 
tion of  William  R.  King  of  Alabama  as  vice-president.  It  constituted  more 
a  personal  tribute  than  a  political  triumph,  for  King  had  an  incurable 
disease  which  made  it  nearly  certain  that  he  would  not  survive  another 
administration. 

Dejected,  Davy  Lynch  wrote  that  "if  New  York  had  not  acted 
the  cDog  in  the  Manger'  you  would  have  been  the  nominee."80  At  Wheat- 
land,  the  Sage  sat  at  his  desk  reading  scores  of  letters  of  condolence,  and 
drafting  appropriate  replies.  Of  these,  his  remarks  to  Robert  Tyler  con- 
tained the  gist  of  all:  "I  have  received  your  favor  of  yesterday,  condoling 
me  on  my  defeat.  You  ought  rather  to  congratulate  me  on  the  ability, 
devotion  &  energy  of  my  friends.  They  have  fought  a  good  fight  &  have 
deserved  success.  It  was  not  their  fault  if  they  could  not  command  it. 
For  the  first  time,  I  have  had  a  fair  trial  &  have  been  fairly  defeated  .... 
I  give  you  now  your  final  discharge  after  long,  able  &  faithful  service,  but 
live  in  the  hope  that  I  may  yet  be  able  to  manifest  my  gratitude  to  you  by 
something  more  decisive  than  words."31 


220 


17 

A  MISSION  FOREDOOMED  •  1852-1854 


ADVICE  AND  DISSENT 

Buchanan  took  little  part  in  the  contest  between  Franklin  Pierce  and 
Winfield  Scott  until  the  autumn  of  1852  when  the  activities  of  the  Free- 
Soilers  threatened  to  upset  the  interparty  truce  on  slavery  and  split  the 
Pennsylvania  Democrats.  The  publication  of  Harriet  Beecher  Stowe's 
vivid  and  inflammatory  novel,  Unck  TonCs  Cabin,  during  the  campaign, 
the  Christiana  Riot,  and  the  Free-Soil  convention  at  Pittsburgh,  which 
nominated  John  P.  Hale  for  president  on  a  platform  that  "Slavery  is  a  sin 
against  God  and  a  crime  against  man,"  fanned  the  slavery  question  in  the 
Keystone  State  to  white  heat. 

Some  of  Buchanan's  friends  advised  him  to  remain  aloof.  "Avoid 
the  crowd,"  they  urged,  "and  in  the  dark  hour  .  .  .  you  will  be  brought  in 
'to  calm  the  troubled  waters  &  allay  the  storm'.  .  .  .  Much  evil  will  grow 
out  of  the  Pittsburgh  Convention,  and  four  years  hence,  you  will  be 
wanted."1 

But  Buchanan  felt  otherwise.  In  September  he  presided  at  a 
Democratic  rally  at  Reading,  Pennsylvania,  sharing  the  platform  with 
Senator  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  Governor  Bigler,  and  visiting  worthies  from 
Massachusetts,  Maryland,  and  Tennessee.2  In  October  he  addressed  a 
mass  meeting  at  Greensburg  where,  in  a  ninety-minute  speech,  he  assailed 
Scott  and  warned  against  "elevating  to  the  highest  civil  trust  the  commander 
of  your  victorious  armies."  General  Scott  and  the  northern  Whigs  had 
been  hedging  on  their  pledge  to  respect  the  finality  of  the  1850  Compromise, 
and  some  of  them  insisted  on  repeal  of  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law,  regardless 
of  the  consequences.  Buchanan  hit  the  keynote  of  the  Democratic  cam- 
paign when  he  said,  "I  view  the  finality  of  the  Compromise  as  necessary  to 

the  peace  and  preservation  of  the  Union The  great  political  question 

...  is,  ...  will  the  election  of  Scott,  or  the  election  of  Pierce,  contribute 
most  to  maintain  the  finality  of  the  Compromise?"3 

Franklin  Pierce  won  the  presidency,  carrying  all  but  four  states. 

221 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Pierce  had  great  personal  charm  but  little  administrative  experience. 
Affable  and  sincere,  he  tried  earnestly  to  please  and  made  promises  in  the 
enthusiasm  of  the  moment  which  later  he  either  forgot  in  the  press  of 
events  or  found  impossible  to  fulfill.  The  forty-eight-year-old  president 
represented  the  "Young  America"  wing  of  the  Democrats  and  hoped  to 
free  his  party  from  the  control  of  the  "Old  Fogies." 

Before  the  inauguration,  Pierce  asked  Buchanan  for  counsel  on 
the  launching  of  the  new  Administration.  His  letter  had  the  ring  of  the 
dedicated  young  man  seeking  advice  from  the  elder  statesman,  but  it 
contained  one  peculiar  sentence.  "I  think,"  Pierce  wrote,  "I  am  expected 
to  call  around  me  Gentlemen  who  have  not  hitherto  occupied  Cabinet 
positions."  This  plan  not  only  excluded  Buchanan  but  rejected  his  entire 
leadership,  for  it  ostracized  the  whole  Polk  Cabinet.  Buchanan  advised 
Pierce  not  to  take  the  "Young  America"  idea  so  seriously  as  to  abandon 
all  the  experienced  men  of  the  party.  This  action  "could  not  be  very 
gratifying  to  any  of  them,"  and  would  appear  to  be  an  intentional  rebuke 
to  the  Polk  Administration.  Buchanan  counselled  delay  in  choosing  the 
Cabinet  and  disagreed  with  Pierce's  proposal  to  incorporate  all  political 
viewpoints  in  it.  "7%e  Cabinet,"  he  said,  "ought  to  be  a  unit.  .  .  .  General 
Jackson,  penetrating  as  he  was,  did  not  discover  this  truth,  until  compelled 
to  dissolve  his  first  Cabinet  on  account  of  its  heterogeneous  &  discordant 
materials."  He  recommended  either  Judge  James  Campbell  or  David  R. 
Porter  as  the  Pennsylvanians  who  most  deserved  a  Cabinet  post.* 

It  suddenly  occurred  to  the  Sage  of  Wheatland  that  he  was 
getting  old.  He  enjoyed  joking  about  himself  as  a  "Middle-Aged  Fogy," 
but  he  now  wrote  to  Forney:  "I  am  surely  becoming  an  old  fogy  and  have 
got  far  behind  the  rapid  march  of  the  age."6  His  teeth  bothered  him,  and 
he  had  suffered  the  worst  bilious  attack  of  his  life  just  before  the  election. 
Staying  at  hotels  aggravated  him,  and  travel  wore  him  out.  cel  am  rapidly 
becoming  a  petrifaction,"  he  told  saucy  Eliza  Watterson.  "In  truth  I 
daily  become  more  and  more  fond  of  my  retirement,  and  always  feel 
reluctant  to  leave  home,  though  this  I  am  often  compelled  to  do."6  He 
was  already  more  than  threescore,  and  had  lived  longer  than  his  father. 
It  seemed  a  long  while  since  anyone  had  called  him  "Jimmy";  now  he  was 
"Old  Buck." 

The  winter  dragged  on  and  there  was  no  word  from  Pierce  about 
Cabinet  appointments  or  policies.  Not  until  after  the  inaugural  address, 
in  which  the  only  Buchanan  influence  seemed  to  be  a  statement  that  the 
Administration  would  "not  be  controlled  by  any  timid  forebodings  of  evil 
from  expansion,"  did  the  country  at  last  learn  who  would  form  the  Cabinet: 
William  L.  Marcy  of  New  York  would  take  the  State  Department;  James 
Guthrie  of  Kentucky,  the  Treasury;  Jefferson  Davis  of  Mississippi,  "War; 
James  C.  Dobbin  of  North  Carolina,  Navy;  Caleb  Gushing  of  Massachusetts, 

222 


A  MISSION  FOREDOOMED  •   1852  - 1854 


the  Attorney-Generalship;  Robert  McClelland  of  Michigan,  Interior;  and 
James  Campbell  of  Pennsylvania,  the  Post  Office.  These  men  represented 
friends  of  all  the  prominent  contenders  of  1852  except  Douglas. 

Buchanan  was  deluged  with  Pennsylvania  requests  for  letters  of 
recommendation  to  the  president.  His  "Application  Book'*  for  the  spring 
of  1853  contains  pages  of  names  of  applicants  and  the  jobs  they  sought. 
But  instead  of  appointments,  Buchanan  got  disappointments.  To  Robert 
Tyler  he  wrote:  "I  urged  the  appointment  of  Governor  Porter  with  all  my 
might  as  collector;  but  my  strong  recommendations  were  disregarded  by 
the  President  as  they  have  been  in  every  instance.  .  .  .  I  not  only  recom- 
mended Porter,  but  opposed  Brown.  How,  then,  can  I  ask  Brown  for 
appointments  for  my  friends?  ...  I  expect  daily  to  hear  of  the  sacrifice  of 
Van  Dyke  &  the  appointment  of  Dallas.  I  now  know  exactly  my  position. . . . 
I  shall  bear  all  philosophically,  but  take  an  outside  seat  &  observe  the 
Grand  Drama."7 

THE  MAN  WHO  WAS  ORDERED  TO  FAIL 

On  the  same  day  that  he  posted  this  letter,  Buchanan  received  a  note  from 
Pierce  asking  him  to  accept  the  Mission  to  England.  Obviously  he  could 
not,  in  view  of  the  prior  rejection  of  so  many  of  his  Pennsylvania  friends, 
nor  did  he  relish  Marcy  as  his  boss;  but  he  could,  perhaps,  make  some 
capital  out  of  the  offer.  He  sent  a  noncommittal  reply.  At  dinner  with 
Pierce  and  Slidell  on  April  8,  Buchanan  raised  questions  which  had  been 
disturbing  him.  Would  not  the  important  negotiations  be  conducted  at 
Washington,  as  was  customary?  "No,"  Pierce  replied.  "It  is  my  intention 
that  you  shall  settle  them  all  in  London." 

"What  will  Governor  Marcy  say  to  your  determination?"  asked 

Buchanan. 

"I  will  control  this  matter  myself,"  replied  the  president. 

Buchanan  thought  that  this  arrangement  would  create  trouble, 
but  Pierce  disagreed.  The  Cabinet  had  understood  that  negotiations  would 
center  in  London  when  they  unanimously  endorsed  Buchanan. 

Buchanan  then  complained  that  "in  all  your  appointments  for 
Pennsylvania,  you  have  not  yet  selected  a  single  individual  for  any  office 
for  which  I  recommended  him . . .  and  if  I  were  now  to  accept  the  mission  to 
London,  they  might  with  justice  say  that  I  had  appropriated  the  lion's  share 
to  myself.  ...  I  could  not  and  would  not  place  myself  in  this  position." 
Pierce  emphatically  assured  him  that  Pennsylvania  would  receive  "not  one 
appointment  more  or  less"  on  account  of  the  British  mission,  which  would 
be  considered  "as  an  appointment  for  the  whole  country." 

With  a  clear  understanding  of  all  these  matters,  Buchanan  felt 
inclined  to  accept  the  post,  but  on  Sunday,  when  he  learned  that  the  Senate 

223 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


planned  to  adjourn  the  next  day,  he  assumed  that  his  name  would  not  be 
proposed,  probably  because  Marcy  did  not  want  to  relinquish  the  negotia- 
tions.  That  noon  Jefierson  Davis  told  him  that  Pierce  would  make  the 
appointment  after  adjournment,  and  the  Senate  would  confirm  it  at  the  fall 
session.  Buchanan  immediately  announced  that  he  had  no  intention  of 
departing  on  a  mission  without  prior  Senate  confirmation.  By  evening 
couriers  had  spread  word  that  Senators  should  not  leave  town  but  be  on 
hand  in  the  morning  to  transact  business.  Pierce  sent  in  Buchanan's  name, 
and  the  Senate  confirmed  the  appointment  on  Monday  morning.  After 
another  call  on  the  president  to  make  sure  all  arrangements  were  clear, 
Buchanan  felt  that  he  stood  on  solid  ground.  Pierce  even  approved  on  the 
spot  his  request  to  have  his  friend,  John  Appleton  of  Maine,  for  Secretary 

of  Legation.8 

After  a  few  weeks  had  passed,  Buchanan  knew  he  had  let  himself 
in  for  a  bad  bargain.  Pennsylvania  got  no  appointments.  His  three 
strongest  recommendations  were  all  turned  down  on  the  ground  that  the 
London  Mission  filled  the  state  quota  for  jobs.  On  May  17  he  went  to 
Washington.  The  president  could  not  explain  what  had  happened,  but  he 
did  reaffirm  the  guarantee  that  Buchanan's  job  should  not  be  counted  as 
any  part  of  the  quota  of  Pennsylvania  patronage.  But  Buchanan  observed, 
"I  had  not  been  in  Washington  many  days  before  I  clearly  discovered  that 
the  President  and  cabinet  were  intent  upon  his  renomination  and  re- 

election It  was  easy  to  perceive  that  the  object  in  appointments  was 

to  raise  up  a  Pierce  party,  wholly  distinct  from  the  former  Buchanan,  Cass, 
and  Douglas  parties; . . .  and  I  readily  perceived  . . .  why  my  recommenda- 
tions had  proved  of  so  little  avail."9 

For  several  weeks,  Buchanan  worked  daily  in  the  State  Depart- 
ment, conferring  frequently  with  Marcy  and  occasionally  with  the  president, 
and  soon  he  began  to  suspect  that  neither  intended  to  transfer  negotiations 
to  London.  In  fact,  it  became  apparent  to  Buchanan  that  Marcy  intended 
to  keep  for  himself  in  Washington  those  negotiations  which  promised  a 
successful  conclusion,  and  to  transfer  to  London  questions  which  seemed 
hopeless  of  settlement. 

During  June,  Buchanan  worked  harder  at  diplomacy  than  ever 
in  his  life.  Personally  he  wanted  no  part  of  a  mission  prearranged  to  fail, 
but  neither  did  he  want  to  sacrifice  the  chance  for  a  full-scale  settlement  of 
the  controversies  with  Great  Britain  merely  to  give  Marcy  the  credit  for 
concluding  a  few  minor  treaties.  He  went  over  the  whole  area  of  Anglo- 
American  relations  time  after  time  with  both  Pierce  and  Marcy,  protesting 
against  handling  some  questions  in  Washington  and  others  in  London,  and 
said  he  would  stay  home  unless  Pierce  kept  his  promise  to  transfer  negotia- 
tions to  London. 

Three  diplomatic  questions  pressed  for  attention.    First,  Great 


224 


A  MISSION  FOREDOOMED  •   1852  -  1854 


Britain,  in  defiance,  Buchanan  believed,  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  and  of  the 
Clay  ton  JBulwer  Treaty,  had  seized  the  Bay  Islands  off  the  coast  of  Honduras 
and  established  a  protectorate  of  the  Mosquito  Coast  in  the  vicinity  of 
Greytown.  These  two  points,  insignificant  as  they  looked  on  a  map,  com- 
manded the  entrance  to  any  isthmian  canal  which  might  be  built  across 
Nicaragua.  Second,  fighting  threatened  in  Nova  Scotia  and  Newfoundland 
over  the  rights  of  Americans  and  Englishmen  to  catch  fish  in  coastal  waters 
and  dry  them  on  uninhabited  shores.  Third,  the  British  government  wished 
to  negotiate  a  reciprocal  trade  treaty  between  Canada  and  the  United  States. 
Marcy  and  Pierce  wanted  to  use  a  treaty  of  reciprocity  as  the 
quid  pro  quo  to  achieve  privileges  for  American  fishermen  and  planned  to 
conduct  these  negotiations  at  Washington.  Buchanan  could  handle  the 
Central  American  business  in  London.  But  he  argued  that  Britain's  foray 
into  Central  America  constituted  a  breach  of  treaty  and  an  insult  to  the 
national  honor,  and  that  prior  abandonment  of  these  colonies  "ought  to 
be  a  sine  qua  non  in  any  negotiation  on  any  subject  with  the  British  govern- 
ment." Said  he: 

With  what  face  could  we  ever  hereafter  present  this  question  of 
violated  faith  and  outraged  national  honor  to  the  world  against 
the  British  government  if  whilst,  flagrante  delicto,  the  wrong  un- 
explained and  unredressed,  we  should  incorporate  the  British 
North  American  provinces,  by  treaty,  into  the  American  Union, 
so  far  as  reciprocal  trade  is  concerned?  How  could  we,  then, 
under  any  circumstances  make  this  a  casus  belli?  If  a  man  has 
wronged  and  insulted  me,  and  I  take  him  into  my  family  and 
bestow  upon  him  the  privileges  of  one  of  its  members,  without 
previous  redress  or  explanation,  it  is  then  too  late  to  turn  around 
and  make  the  original  offense  a  serious  cause  for  personal  hos- 
tilities.10 

Beyond  this,  he  denied  that  fishing  rights  constituted  an  equiva- 
lent for  a  free-trade  agreement  with  Canada.  Let  reciprocal  trade  be  used 
as  the  lever  to  force  England  out  of  Central  America,  with  war  as  the 
alternative  if  she  should  refuse  to  withdraw.  As  to  fishing  grounds,  the 
United  States  had  as  much  right  to  the  ocean  as  England. 

Buchanan  postponed  his  departure,  released  Appleton  from  his 
appointment  as  Secretary  of  Legation,  and  flooded  the  State  Department 
and  the  White  House  with  arguments,  facts,  international  law,  and  threats 
to  resign.  Pierce  neglected  to  answer  some  of  the  letters,  but  he  continued 
to  hold  out  the  prospect  that  Buchanan  might  possibly  be  given  the  chance 
to  run  the  show  in  London. 

Buchanan  had  not  yet  picked  up  his  commission  from  the  State 
Department.  When  Pierce  ignored  two  of  his  letters  in  June  asking  for 

225 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


definite  instructions,  Buchanan  wrote  a  third  requesting  that  he  be  per- 
milled,  "in  case  your  enlightened  judgment  has  arrived  at  the  conclusion 
that  Washington  &  not  London  ought  to  be  the  seat  of  the  negotiations, 
most  respectfully  to  decline  the  mission."  Pierce  answered,  still  keeping 
the  door  open.  Finally,  on  July  7,  Buchanan  for  the  first  time  saw  the 
instructions  which  had  been  drawn  up  for  him.  As  he  expected,  he  got 
only  the  Central  American  negotiation.  Marcy  would  keep  the  leverage 
at  Washington  for  his  own  purposes. 

Buchanan  wrote  back  to  Pierce  that  he  wanted  to  confer  with 
him  during  a  forthcoming  presidential  visit  to  Philadelphia,  and  that  in  the 
meantime,  he  should  look  out  "for  some  better  man  to  take  my  place." 
But  he  had  lost  the  game  and  knew  it  Marcy  knew  it,  too.  "Old  bachelors 
as  well -as  young  maidens  do  not  always  know  their  minds,"  he  told  Edward 
Everett.  "If  he  ever  meant  to  go  he  can  assign  no  sufficient  cause  for 
changing  his  purpose."11  Pierce  said  to  Forney,  who  thought  Buchanan 
ought  to  decline:  "Why  should  he  not  go?  The  greater  the  obstacles 
thrown  in  his  way,  the  greater  will  be  his  triumph  when  he  succeeds."12 
But  to  resign  now  would  make  Buchanan  look  like  a  querulous  old  man, 
quitting  in  a  pet  because  he  could  not  have  everything  his  own  way.  Pierce 
had  trapped  him  and  there  was  no  way  out.  He  had  given  him  a  mission 
foredoomed  to  failure,  robbed  him  of  his  patronage,  and  put  a  gag  in  his 
mouth.  Had  anyone  ever  been  so  taken  to  the  market!13 

The  now  vacant  Secretaryship  of  Legation  brought  a  request 
from  Henry  A.  Wise  who  had  first  urged  Buchanan's  appointment  and  had 
his  heart  set  on  the  selection  of  his  son.  Pierce  had  a  different  suggestion, 
and  Henry  W.  Welsh  also  wanted  the  job.  Forney  learned  to  his  amaze- 
ment that  Daniel  E.  Sickles  of  New  York  would  like  to  go  to  London. 
Sickles  was  a  wealthy  and  influential  Democrat,  a  "hard"  Hunker,  a  good 
friend  of  the  president,  and  had  married  a  beautiful  young  wife.  Buchanan 
interviewed  him  at  Wheatland  and  within  a  week  had  him  appointed.  If 
he  counted  upon  the  pleasure  of  a  cozy  time  with  Mrs.  Sickles  in  London 
he  was  destined  to  disappointment,  however,  for  the  new  secretary  left  her 
at  home  and  travelled  abroad  with  his  mistress,  Fanny  White.14 

Buchanan  turned  his  business  affairs  over  to  his  nephew,  Elliott 
Eskridge  Lane  of  Bellefonte,  Pennsylvania,  and  James  L.  Reynolds  of 
Lancaster,  giving  them  power  of  attorney  to  handle  some  $150,000  in  bonds, 
mortgages  and  stocks.  Another  $50,000  he  assigned  to  his  brother  Edward, 
his  nephew  James  B.  Henry,  and  agents  in  New  York  and  Washington.  He 
kept  smaller  sums  of  ready  cash  on  deposit  with  Riggs  and  Corcoran  of 
Washington  and  the  Chemical  Bank  of  New  York,  and  transferred  some 
funds  to  Rothschild's  in  London.  Having  completed  these  arrangements, 
he  informed  his  agents:  "I  believe  I  do  not  owe  a  debt  in  the  world.  .  .  . 
My  pew  rent  in  the  Presbyterian  Church  is  to  be  paid,  this  date."  He  had 


226 


A  MISSION  FOREDOOMED*   1852-1854 


arranged  to  have  tax  payments  made  for  James  B.  Henry  and  Harriet. 
She  was  to  stay,  first  with  friends  in  Virginia  and  later  with  the  Plitts  in 
Philadelphia,  until  he  could  bring  her  to  London  the  following  summer. 
Lane  and  Reynolds  should  give  Miss  Hetty  any  cash  she  requested  for  the 
care  of  Wheatland,  should  pay  7  per  cent  interest  for  any  money  put  in 
their  keeping  by  his  brother  or  nephews,  and  collect  at  least  5  per  cent  on 
money  put  out  on  loan.15 

Declining  a  farewell  dinner  in  Lancaster,  he  left  quietly  on 
August  3,  disappointed  his  Philadelphia  friends  by  failing  to  stop  to  say 
goodbye  to  them,  and  proceeded  straight  to  New  York  where  he  embarked 
on  the  steamer  Atlantic.  After  a  stormy  passage  of  ten  days,  he  arrived  at 
Liverpool  where  the  Legation  Attach^  met  him  and  took  him  to  the  Claren- 
don House  in  London. 

For  the  first  week  he  could  scarcely  believe  he  was  in  England. 
Slidell  was  there,  and  John  Ward  of  Boston,  and  Robb  of  New  Orleans. 
With  Ambassador  Ingersoll  and  the  New  England  philanthropist,  George 
Peabody,  Buchanan  called  on  the  Marchioness  of  Wellesley,  the  former 
Miss  Caton  of  Baltimore,  now  residing  at  Hampton  Court.  She  had  two 
sisters,  one  of  them  now  Lady  Stafford  and  the  other  the  Duchess  of  Leeds. 
Buchanan  had  known  them  all  in  earlier  days  when  they  were  Baltimorean 
belles  and  through  them  gained  an  immediate  entree  into  the  circle  of 
British  nobility.  On  August  23  he  went  to  the  Isle  of  Wight  with  Ingersoll 
where  the  Earl  of  Clarendon,  British  Secretary  of  Foreign  Affairs,  presented 
him  to  Queen  Victoria. 

THE  COURT  OF  ST.  JAMES 

Buchanan  arrived  in  England  just  a  week  after  Parliament  had  adjourned, 
and  the  nobility  had  already  scattered  to  country  estates  or  to  the  Continent, 
leaving  London  dull  and  deserted  until  the  "season"  should  begin  again  in 
February  with  the  opening  of  Court.  Thus  he  had  several  months  of  very 
welcome  freedom  which  he  used  to  find  quarters  for  the  Legation  and  to 
familiarize  himself  with  his  new  situation.  For  the  time  being  he  continued 
to  live  at  the  Clarendon  House,  but  by  November  1  he  had  rented  an 
establishment  at  56  Harley  Street  which  became  the  United  States  Legation 
during  his  ministry.  On  November  11,  all  hands  turned  out  in  noise  and 
confusion  to  move  the  Legation  files  and  equipment  into  the  new  quarters.16 
John  William  Gates  was  dean  of  the  Legation  servants  by  virtue 
of  eighteen  years'  service  at  the  American  Embassy.  His  son,  William 
John  Cates,  served  as  butler.  Buchanan  had  a  housekeeper  who  had  worked 
for  several  previous  ministers.  He  reported  diplomatically  to  Miss  Hetty 
at  Wheatland  that  he  was  "satisfied  with  her,  without  being  greatly  pleased." 
In  addition  to  these  old  hands,  Buchanan  had  brought  along  Frederick 

227 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


William  Jackson,  a  mulatto  manservant  he  had  hired  in  New  York  a  day 
before  he  sailed.  While  at  first  dubious  of  the  wisdom  of  this  impetuosity, 
he  soon  discovered  that  Jackson  was  very  much  of  a  "find,"  for  he  turned 
out  to  be  a  first-class  valet  and  made  something  of  a  hit  in  London.  "I 
have  been  diverted,"  Buchanan  wrote,  "to  witness  the  attention  he  receives 
here  where  the  same  prejudices  do  not  exist  against  color  as  in  the  United 
States.  And  yet  he  is  homesick  &  thinks  as  I  do,  that  there  is  no  place  in 
in  the  world  to  be  compared  with  our  Country."17 

A  problem  of  Court  etiquette  arose  as  soon  as  Buchanan  had  been 
accredited  because  a  Court  Dress  Circular  issued  by  Secretary  Marcy  in 
June  ran  counter  to  the  ceremonial  procedure  of  most  European  courts. 
Marcy  asked  American  diplomats  to  perform  their  duties  "in  the  simple 
dress  of  an  American  citizen,"  and  to  avoid  the  gold  lace,  ribbons,  jewels, 
patent-leather  boots  and  aristocratic  gewgaws  that  custom  prescribed  for 
diplomats  at  ceremonies  where  a  sovereign  presided.  Buchanan  had  often 
ridiculed  the  peacock  parade  and  urged  the  adoption  of  such  a  rule,  but  at 
the  Court  of  St.  James  it  gave  him  serious  trouble. 

Sir  Edward  Gust,  Master  of  Ceremonies  of  the  Court,  pointed  out 
that  to  appear  before  her  Majesty  in  street  clothes  would  signify  a  lack  of 
respect  and  that  the  outfit  Marcy  prescribed  would  put  the  minister  in 
precisely  the  costume  worn  by  the  Court  servants,  subjecting  him  un- 
intentionally to  indignities  from  everyone.  The  American  rule,  Gust  said, 
would  raise  a  storm  of  indignation  among  the  British  people  who  would 
view  it  as  presumption.  He  had  no  alternative  but  to  require  the  customary 
dress  and  if  Buchanan  could  not  wear  it,  to  deny  him  admittance  to  the 
opening  of  Parliament  and  to  Court  balls  and  dinners. 

Buchanan  appreciated  the  force  of  these  arguments  and  the 
penalty  he  would  pay  for  refusing  to  follow  the  local  code.  He  would  receive 
no  invitations  from  Court,  and  thus  would  receive  none  from  the  courtiers. 
As  he  said,  he  would  be  "socially  placed  in  Coventry  here,"  a  condition 
which  would  not  bother  him  personally  but  which  might  ruin  the  mission, 
for1  it  would  cut  him  off  from  all  normal  sources  of  information.  He 
considered  a  variety  of  costumes  that  might  solve  the  problem.  Someone 
suggested  the  military  uniform  of  George  Washington,  which  he  promptly 
cast  out  as  a  recipe  for  subjecting  him  to  everlasting  ridicule.  He  thought 
about  a  plain  blue  coat  with  gold  buttons  embossed  with  the  American 
eagle,  but  he  soon  abandoned  that  idea.  Having  found  no  answer  when 
Parliament  convened,  he  did  not  attend  the  opening  session  and  thereby 
raised  a  public  storm  in  the  press  of  both  nations.  The  Americans  lauded 
his  independence,  and  the  British  condemned  this  act  of  "Republican  ill 
manners"  and  "American  Puppyism."  The  London  Times  erroneously 
reported  that  Buchanan  sat  in  evening  dress  amid  the  blaze  of  stars,  ribands 

228 


A  MISSION  FOREDOOMED  •  1852  -  1854 


and  crosses  in  the  diplomatic  box,  "unpleasantly  conscious  of  his  singu- 
larity." Only  with  difficulty  did  Buchanan  dissuade  Parliament  from  making 
the  incident  the  subject  of  a  formal  inquiry. 

Political  pressures  raised  by  the  outbreak  of  the  Crimean  war  at 
length  brought  a  calm  to  this  tempest  in  the  wardrobe.  The  Ministry  had 
no  intention  at  this  time  of  promoting  a  breach  with  the  United  States  over 
such  trifling  absurdity.  Buchanan  agreed,  at  British  suggestion,  to  equip 
himself  with  a  plain  black-handled  sword,  everywhere  the  mark  of  a 
gentleman,  a  visible  token  of  respect  to  the  queen,  and  a  ready  means  of 
identification  among  the  servants. 

Dan  Sickles,  who  disliked  Marcy's  circular  because  it  curtailed 
his  chance  to  strut,  donned  the  gaudy  uniform  of  the  New  York  State 
Guards,  daring  Marcy  to  call  it  an  un-American  costume.  Buchanan 
reported  of  his  first  appearance  under  the  new  dispensation:  "Having 
yielded,  they  did  not  do  things  by  halves.  As  I  approached  the  Queen, 
an  arch  but  benevolent  smile  lit  up  her  countenance — as  much  as  to  say, 
you  are  the  first  man  who  ever  appeared  before  me  at  Court  in  such  a  dress. 
I  must  confess  that  I  never  felt  more  proud  of  being  an  American."18 

For  two  months  after  his  arrival,  Buchanan  heard  nothing  from 
the  British  Foreign  Office.  He  spent  his  time  familiarizing  himself  with 
Legation  procedure,  mastering  the  details  of  the  subjects  of  negotiation, 
and  writing  letters  home.  To  politicians  he  uniformly  emphasized  his 
decision  not  to  be  a  candidate  for  president  in  1856.  He  exchanged  letters 
weekly  with  Harriet,  who  was  beside  herself  to  know  how  soon  she  could 
come  to  London  to  see  a  duke  and  meet  a  queen.  She  said  the  trip  would 
be  "the  future  realization  of  a  beautiful  dream."  Buchanan  responded, 
"Like  all  other  dreams  you  will  be  disappointed  in  the  reality."  He  wrote 
to  Miss  Hetty  that  she  gave  him  "more  interesting  news  than  any  other 
friend"  and  asked  her  for  a  full  report  on  Wheatland  and  the  neighbors. 
How  was  Lara,  his  Newfoundland  dog,  and  what  of  the  new  calf,  and  who 
would  fill  the  icehouse?  He  sounded  a  little  homesick. 

Forney  sent  him  a  tirade  against  President  Pierce  and  ended  it 
with  the  prophecy  that  Buchanan  would  next  occupy  the  White  House. 
He  replied, 

In  answer  to  the  last  suggestion  contained  in  your  letter,  I  now 
say  to  you  in  writing  what  I  have  repeatedly  said  in  conversation, 
that  I  have  neither  the  desire  nor  the  intention  'to  play  a  very 
prominent  part  in  politics  for  the  next  seven  years.*  On  the 
contrary,  this  mission  is  alone  tolerable  because  it  will  enable  me 
gracefully  and  gradually  to  retire  from  a  strife  which  is  neither 
suited  to  my  age  nor  my  inclinations.  ...  I  should  have  been 
highly  gratified  had  I  been  nominated  &  elected  President  in 

229 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


1852;  but  the  office  has  no  longer  any  charm  for  me.  I  write 
thus  explicitly  to  you;  because  the  warmth  of  your  friendship 
might  otherwise  induce  you  to  take  part  in  again  bringing  me 
forward  as  a  candidate.19 

At  last  Buchanan  received  the  awaited  summons  to  the  Foreign 
Office  and  Clarendon's  apologies  for  the  long  delay.  In  the  opening  inter- 
view, the  two  ran  over  the  problems  that  might  involve  their  countries: 
the  Russo-Turkish  crisis,  the  Central  American  issue,  the  pending  fishery 
and  reciprocity  treaties,  and  the  movement  developing  in  Cuba  to  liberate 
the  slaves  and  set  up  a  Negro  government.  They  agreed  that  the  Central 
American  question  was  first  in  importance,  but  Clarendon  confessed  that 
he  was  not  familiar  enough  with  the  subject  for  serious  discussion.  A  few 
days  later  Buchanan  prepared  a  summary  of  the  American  position  and 
submitted  it  to  Clarendon. 


THE  CARIBBEAN  CRISIS 

By  1850  the  British  occupied  much  of  the  coastal  area  of  Honduras  and 
Nicaragua.  From  the  time  of  the  Polk  Administration,  the  United  States 
had  protested  English  intervention  in  that  part  of  the  New  World.  After 
the  acquisition  of  Oregon  and  California,  there  was  a  greater  need  than 
ever  for  some  kind  of  passage  across  the  Central  American  isthmus,  and 
in  1849  the  United  States  negotiated  a  treaty  with  Nicaragua  for  the 
exclusive  right  to  build  a  canal.  But  the  English  now  held  the  points  of 
entry  on  the  Gulf:  Greytown,  at  the  head  of  the  San  Juan  River  in  Nica- 
ragua, and  Ruatan  Island  off  the  Honduran  coast.  The  conflicting  interests 
of  the  United  States  and  Great  Britain  became  a  threat  to  peace,  and  in  1850 
the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  was  drawn  up  for  the  purpose  of  removing  the 
danger  of  an  outbreak  of  hostilities. 

By  the  terms  of  the  agreement  neither  nation  would  ever  assume 
exclusive  control  of  any  future  canal  or  fortify  any  portion  of  Central 
America.  Buchanan  condemned  this  pact  from  the  start.  "The  Treaty/' 
he  said,  "altogether  reverses  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  and  establishes  it 
against  ourselves  rather  than  European  Governments."20  Some  day,  he 
feared,  there  would  be  "a  bloody  war  with  England  should  she  remain  as 
powerful  as  she  is  at  present." 

Despite  the  cordiality  and  freedom  that  marked  the  early  con- 
versations with  Lord  Clarendon,  Buchanan  soon  learned  that  back  of  the 
Foreign  Secretary's  smile  lay  the  hard  rock  of  British  policy.  Ruatan, 
largest  of  the  Bay  Islands  and  the  British  protectorate  of  the  Mosquito 
Indians  represented  elements  of  this  policy.  Ruatan  Island,  Buchanan 
declared,  "is  one  of  those  commanding  positions  in  the  world  which  Great 

230 


A  MISSION  FOREDOOMED  •   1852  -  1854 


Britain  has  been  ever  ready  to  seize  and  appropriate.  It  enables  her  to 
control  our  commerce  in  the  Caribbean  Sea  and  on  its  transit  to  California 
and  Oregon."  As  a  point  of  commercial  power  Great  Britain  intended  to 
keep  it,  treaty  or  no  treaty.21 

The  British  protectorate  of  the  Mosquito  King  involved  the  point 
of  international  prestige.  Buchanan  chided  Clarendon  for  making  so  big 
an  issue  of  so  petty  a  territory,  when  friendship  with  the  United  States 
stood  at  stake  over  it,  but  the  Foreign  Secretary  expounded  the  duty  of 
a  nation  with  native  protectorates  all  over  the  world  to  make  good  its 
promises,  even  more  scrupulously  to  the  small  than  to  the  large  princes. 
As  a  point  of  honor,  England  would  sustain  the  Indian  King.22 

Without  any  quid  pro  quo  to  induce  the  abandonment  of  these 
positions,  Buchanan  had  to  establish  that  the  British  posture  in  Central 
America  constituted  a  breach  of  treaty  with  the  United  States.  Success  in 
this  effort  would  have  to  bring  British  capitulation,  or  an  American  retreat, 
or  war.  He  was  therefore  astonished  when  Clarendon  introduced  casually 
into  the  conversation  one  day,  as  if  it  were  a  matter  of  common  assumption, 
that  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  was  entirely  "prospective  in  its  operation."23 
Buchanan,  while  recovering  from  the  shock,  introduced  the  newly  arrived 
fisheries  and  reciprocity  treaty  as  a  manifestation  of  American  friend- 
ship and  generosity  to  compensate  for  British  adjustment  of  the  Central 
American  dispute.  Clarendon  rejoined  that  the  treaty  drove  too  hard  a 
bargain  with  the  Canadians  and  doubtless  would  be  rejected  by  England. 

With  negotiations  at  an  impasse  during  the  spring  of  1854, 
Buchanan  turned  his  efforts  to  building  a  recognition  in  England  of  the 
tremendous  potential  of  good  relations  with  America.  He  propounded  the 
theme  of  Anglo-American  friendship  based  on  kindred  speech,  culture,  and 
principles  of  government.  These  two  nations,  he  thought,  should  jointly 
face  the  continual  threat  of  world  despotism.  "There  have  never  been 
two  nations  on  the  face  of  the  earth,"  he  said,  "whose  material  interests 
are  so  closely  identified."24  Britain  annually  exported  to  the  United  States 
as  much  as  to  all  of  Europe. 

By  the  end  of  March,  the  Crimean  War  became  a  reality  and 
England  and  France,  in  an  entente  corcKo/c,  faced  the  Russian  power  in  the 
eastern  Mediterranean.  Not  until  mid-April  could  Buchanan  get  Clarendon 
back  on  the  Central  American  problem,  so  busy  had  he  been  with  duties 
connected  with  the  war.  At  this  meeting,  the  Foreign  Secretary,  with 
marked  embarrassment,  finally  explained  to  Buchanan  the  official  British 
position.  Britain  considered  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty  "prospective," 
that  is,  it  guaranteed  all  British  rights  as  they  existed  at  the  time  of  ratifica- 
tion and  applied  its  restrictions  only  to  subsequent  acts.  Buchanan  pointed 
out  that  according  to  this  contention  the  treaty  confirmed  Great  Britain's 
right  to  remain  in  Central  America  and  excluded  the  United  States  from  it. 

231 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


He  acidly  asked  his  Lordship  if  he  really  expected  anyone  to  take  seriously 
this  ridiculous  interpretation.  He  had  the  impression  that  Clarendon  very 
reluctantly  asserted  this  view.  Buchanan  then  pointed  out  that  England 
had  occupied  the  Bay  Islands  after  the  conclusion  of  the  treaty,  and  even 
accepting  the  "prospective"  interpretation— which  he  never  would— the 
British  would  have  to  get  out  of  Ruatan.  Clarendon  promised  to  check  the 
date  of  the  occupation  of  the  islands,  and  the  interview  ended  awkwardly. 

For  the  next  two  months,  Buchanan  applied  himself  to  the 
preparation  of  a  long  reply  rebutting  the  British  contention.  In  such  an 
effort  he  showed  at  his  best,  and  his  argument  won  the  warm  commendation 
of  Pierce,  Marcy,  and  the  Cabinet  in  Washington,  but  it  brought  no  reply 
from  Clarendon. 

Whatever  hope  remained  of  softening  the  British  stand  collapsed 
under  the  impact  of  the  Greytown  affair.  Punta  Arenas,  across  the  river 
from  Greytown,  was  occupied  by  Americans  working  for  the  Accessory 
Transit  Company,  an  enterprise  of  Cornelius  Vanderbilt  to  build  a  road 
across  the  isthmus.  The  captain  of  a  Vanderbilt  ship  shot  a  Greytown 
native  who  sought  to  board  his  vessel.  When  some  of  the  residents  tried 
to  arrest  the  captain  for  murder,  Solon  E.  Borland,  the  United  States 
Minister,  joined  a  party  to  prevent  his  capture,  a  fight  ensued,  and  someone 
slashed  Borland's  face  with  a  broken  beer  bottle.  President  Pierce  sent 
Captain  G.  N.  HoUins,  of  the  U.  S.  S.  Cyane  to  Greytown  to  exact  apologies 
and  reparations  for  the  insult  to  Borland;  Hollins,  upon  rejection  of  his 
demands,  bombarded  Greytown  until  not  a  mud  wall  or  thatched  roof 
remained  intact.  The  inhabitants,  warned  in  advance,  had  all  retired  to 
a  safe  distance,  and  no  one  was  hurt. 

News  of  this  affair  arrived  in  London  just  a  few  days  after  Bu- 
chanan had  submitted  his  paper  on  Central  America.  With  no  information 
except  what  he  got  from  British  sources,  Buchanan  expressed  the  hope 
that  Pierce  would  disavow  the  act,  and  Clarendon  observed  that  unless  he 
did,  the  outlook  would  be  bleak  for  a  settlement  of  the  Central  American 
problem.  Much  to  their  displeasure,  Pierce  defended  the  action  of  Captain 
Hollins  as  necessary  and  justifiable.  Buchanan  tried  to  sustain  his  govern- 
ment, according  to  the  policies  outlined  by  Marcy,  but  made  as  poor  a  show 
of  this  as  Clarendon  did  in  support  of  the  "prospective"  interpretation 
of  the  treaty. 

Buchanan  had  long  felt  that  Clarendon  sincerely  wished  to 
compromise  the  issues  in  Central  America  but  that  the  Ministry  would  not 
permit  it.  After  Greytown,  he  changed  his  mind  and  suspected  that 
Clarendon  himself  prevented  a  settlement.  In  one  conversation,  he  told 
Clarendon  that  Britain  could  end  the  whole  Central  American  dispute  in  a 
note  of  twelve  lines,  if  the  Foreign  Office  really  wanted  it  settled.  "If  I  did 
that,"  said  Clarendon,  "our  American  cousins  would  say,  we  have  dis- 

232 


A  MISSION  FOREDOOMED •  1852*  1854 


covered  the  mode  of  dealing  with  the  British — we  went  down  to  Greytown 
and  smashed  it,  whereupon  they  became  alarmed  and  gave  us  all  we  wanted/* 
Buchanan  replied  that  he  would  now  have  to  talk  directly  with  Lord 
Aberdeen,  the  Prime  Minister,  who  might  perhaps  be  willing  to  treat 
America  with  fairness.  Clarendon  angrily  seized  Buchanan  by  the  coat 
lapels  and,  shaking  him,  declared:  "I  am  as  good  a  friend  of  the  United 
States  as  Lord  Aberdeen;  or  any  man  in  the  Three  Kingdoms."  Possibly 
so,  Buchanan  replied,  but  the  friendship  had  certainly  produced  no  results.26 
Lord  Aberdeen  was  polite  but  adamant;  Britain  would  remain  in 
Central  America.  With  this  interview,  except  for  several  more  excited 
sessions  with  Clarendon  over  Greytown,  Buchanan's  Central  American  ne- 
gotiation came  to  an  end.  Clarendon  never  officially  replied  to  Buchanan's 
statement  of  the  American  position.  All  that  remained  was  to  await  Pierce's 
decision  whether  to  let  the  matter  rest,  or  to  issue  an  ultimatum. 


233 


18 

PLAYING  THE  OLD  TROUPER  •  1854-1856 

CUBA— PEARL  OF  THE  ANTILLES 

While  the  Central  American  negotiation  stagnated,  Buchanan  kept  up  a 
steady  campaign  to  promote  the  purchase  of  Cuba.  The  more  he  examined 
August  Belmont's  idea  of  persuading  the  Spanish  bondholders  to  press  for 
the  sale  of  the  island,  the  more  he  liked  it.  He  had  described  the  outlines 
of  the  proposal  to  Pierce  before  leaving  Washington  and  had  recommended 
that  Belmont  be  made  Minister  to  the  Kingdom  of  the  Two  Sicilies.  At 
Naples  he  would  come  into  contact  both  with  many  of  the  bondholders  and 
with  members  of  the  Spanish  royal  family  who  ruled  there.  Buchanan  felt 
that  Pierce  had  made  a  mistake  by  sending  Belmont  to  the  Hague,  but  he 
still  believed  that  with  judicious  management  Spain  might  be  induced  to 
sell  Cuba  to  the  United  States.  The  main  problem  would  be  to  prevent 
interference  from  the  governments  of  England  and  France.  Buchanan  told 
Pierce  in  the  spring  of  1854  that  he  had  shaped  his  course  ever  since  his 
arrival  in  England  "with  a  view  of  reconciling  Great  Britain  to  that  great 
object."1  Clarendon  had  already  confided  to  him  that  "if  Spain  lost  Cuba 
it  would  be  their  own  fault  for  the  wretched  manner  in  which  they  governed 
the  island."2 

In  May,  Buchanan  wrote  to  Slidell  that  the  British  were  prepared 
for  the  acquisition  of  Cuba  by  the  United  States  and  that  the  British  news- 
papers had  on  several  occasions  foreshadowed  the  event.  His  only  fear 
was  France.  He  urged  Pierce  to  define  a  policy  on  Cuba  and  to  prepare 
instructions  for  its  acquisition.  England  and  France  had  their  hands  full 
with  the  Crimean  war.  The  Republican  revolution  which  broke  out  in 
Spain  in  July  further  threatened  the  chaotic  finances  of  that  country  and 
presaged  the  abolition  of  slavery  in  Cuba.  Buchanan  now  prodded  Marcy 
to  decide  what  steps  ought  to  be  taken  "to  give  a  direction  to  the  impending 
revolution  in  Cuba,"  an  outbreak  which  certainly  would  follow  the  in- 
surrection in  Spain. 

234 


PLAYING  THE  OLD  TROUPER  •   1854  - 1856 


In  Europe,  the  fate  of  Cuba  became  a  pawn  in  the  great  revolu- 
tionary movements  then  in  progress  under  the  leadership  of  Kossuth, 
Mazzini,  Louis  Blanc  and  Ledru  Rollin  who,  though  differing  with  each 
other  on  most  things,  agreed  that  it  would  mightily  advance  their  crusade 
if  they  could  enlist  the  support  of  the  United  States  in  their  assault  on 
monarchy  and  aristocracy  in  the  Old  World.  They  held  out  the  inducement 
that  if  the  United  States  would  assist  Spanish  Republicans  in  overthrowing 
the  queen,  the  new  democracy  would  then  agree  to  Cuban  independence 
and  subsequent  annexation. 

Many  "Young  Americans"  worked  actively  with  the  European 
revolutionaries.  George  Sanders,  United  States  consul  in  London,  main- 
tained a  rendezvous  for  political  exiles  from  the  Continent  and  used  the 
diplomatic  pouch  for  sending  inflammatory  letters,  stamped  with  the 
Legation  seal,  throughout  Europe.  Some  of  these  fell  into  the  hands  of 
the  French  authorities  and  caused  a  commotion.  Victor  Fronde,  an 
important  figure  in  the  plan  to  subvert  the  Spanish  monarchy,  used  a 
United  States  courier's  passport,  which  he  had  obtained  by  fraud,  to  aid 
in  his  travels  as  an  agent  of  the  revolutionaries.  Legitimate  governments 
in  Europe  soon  learned  of  his  activities  and  protested.  Pierre  Soute, 
American  Minister  to  Spain,  loudly  proclaimed  his  sympathies  with  the 
antimonarchists.  He  made  himself  thoroughly  obnoxious  to  the  Spanish 
queen  by  his  arrogant  and  insolent  manner  in  dealing  with  her  ministers. 
Worst  of  all,  he  seriously  damaged  American-French  relations  by  shooting 
the  French  Minister  to  Madrid  in  a  quarrel  over  the  latter's  wife. 

The  Spanish  government  was  facing  bankruptcy.  Its  bonds, 
now  nearly  worthless,  were  held  by  the  Barings,  the  Rothschilds,  and  otter 
international  bankers  who  were  reported  ready  to  sanction  the  sale  of  Cuba 
for  something  over  $100,000,000  if  the  money  could  be  kept  out  of  the 
hands  of  the  royal  family  and  used  in  the  development  of  Spanish  resources. 
The  bankers  were  prepared  to  act  as  receivers,  so  to  speak,  of  the  nation 
and  work  to  put  the  economy  on  a  sound  basis.  The  Church  also  had  an 
interest  in  such  a  program,  for  the  monarchy  had  threatened  to  confiscate 
ecclesiastical  properties  as  one  means  of  solving  its  financial  problems. 
Leading  churchmen  seemed  willing  to  join  the  financiers  in  the  effort  to  con- 
vince the  queen  that  the  sale  of  Cuba  was  the  only  way  to  save  her  regime. 

Pierce  and  Marcy  had  to  fit  Buchanan's  plans  for  Cuba  into  the 
general  Administration  program  which,  in  the  spring  of  1854,  had  become 
dependent  upon  the  fate  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  Bill.  Douglas  had  intro- 
duced this  in  January,  Pierce  adopted  it  as  an  Administration  measure,  and 
Congress  did  almost  nothing  but  debate  it  until  the  end  of  May.  Its  passage 
aroused  terrible  political  hatreds  and  split  the  Democrats.  Men  were  "afraid 
to  unbosom  themselves,  lest  they  reveal  the  secrets  of  their  hearts  to  an 

235 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


enemy,  in  disguise,"  wrote  a  Congressman,  "while  scarcely  a  man  knows 
to  a  certainty  whether  he  is  or  is  not  a  friend  of  the  Administration."3 

Around  Washington  no  one  seemed  to  know  what  course  the 
Administration  planned  to  take  in  regard  to  Cuha;  Pierce  and  Marcy  re- 
mained "mum"  but  not  idle.  Pierce  proposed  to  send  a  three-man  com- 
mission  to  Spain  to  try  to  purchase  Cuba,  with  the  warning  that  if  they 
failed,  American  filibusters  might  seize  the  island.  He  then  ordered  strict 
observance  of  neutrality  laws  and  put  port  officials  under  special  instruction 
to  prevent  the  departure  of  suspicious  vessels,  but  presumably  he  would 
revoke  these  orders  if  Spain  refused  to  sell  Cuba. 

Buchanan  approved  of  the  idea  of  the  commission,  but  not  of 
the  threat  of  filibusters  as  a  lever  to  the  negotiation.  Filibustering  he 
opposed  under  any  and  all  circumstances,  and  thought  that  any  mention 
of  the  subject  to  Spain  except  in  terms  of  a  promise  to  prevent  it  would  be 
fatal  to  the  Cuban  purchase.  Sickles  learned  what  was  afoot,  and  wrote  to 
Howell  Cobb  sentiments  which  he  never  uttered  to  Buchanan.  "I  sincerely 
hope  the  rumor  that  you  are  to  go  to  Madrid  is  true.  Now  is  the  time  for 
us  to  get  Cuba— Europe  expects  it  &  is  prepared  to  endure  it.  The  present 
condition  of  Spanish  politics  ...  is  peculiarly  favorable  for  a  TOO;  or  a 
negotiation  to  purchase."  If  Cobb  should  come,  Sickles  wanted  a  week  with 
him  to  tell  him  what  wires  to  pull  at  Madrid,  and  requested  an  appointment 
as  his  secretary.  He  planned  to  return  home  in  autumn.  "I  have  had 
enough  of  London,"  he  wrote.  "It  would  suit  me  better  to  stay  away 
another  year  on  accouAt  of  the  present  condition  of  N.  Y.  politics,  but  I 
am  tired  of  London  and  of  this  ndsdon"* 

If  Sickles  was  bored  with  London,  Buchanan  was  tired  of  Sickles. 
While  he  envied  and  admired  the  young  man's  dash  and  zest  for  life  and 
personally  enjoyed  his  company,  he  found  him  not  only  useless  but  harmful 
to  the  embassy.  He  paid  little  attention  to  business,  and  wrote  so  wretched 
a  hand  that  he  imposed  an  added  burden  of  copying  on  the  rest  of  the  staff. 
These  faults  Buchanan  would  have  tolerated  had  Sickles  lent  the  weight  of 
his  dynamic  personality  to  the  policies  of  the  Legation,  but  he  did  the 
contrary.  He  balked  on  the  program  of  republican  austerity  and  lived  both 
extravagantly  and  ostentatiously.  When  Buchanan  was  in  the  midst  of 
his  campaign  to  foster  Anglo-American  friendship,  Sickles  raised  a  furor 
by  remaining  seated  during  the  toast  to  the  queen  at  a  public  dinner  because 
Victoria  rather  than  Washington  came  first  on  the  list.  Later  he  wrote 
anonymous  letters  to  the  British  newspapers  condemning  his  host,  George 
Peabody,  for  toadyism  to  the  queen  and  implicated  Buchanan  in  the  same 
thing.  The  controversy,  touching  the  tender  nerve  of  national  honor  in 
both  countries,  caused  a  newspaper  storm  on  both  sides  of  the  Atlantic  and 
put  Buchanan,  a  guest  of  honor  at  the  dinner,  in  an  embarrassing  position. 

236 


PLAYING  THE  OLD  TROUPER •  1854-1856 


When  the  Spanish  Revolution  broke  out  during  July  as  the  Sickles  con- 
troversy reached  its  height,  Buchanan  seized  the  opportunity  to  send  him 
to  Washington  to  report  the  news  directly  and  to  urge  immediate  action 
on  Cuban  policy.6 

Sickles  arrived  at  the  White  House  on  August  8.  By  this  time 
Pierce  knew  that  Congress  would  ignore  his  request  of  August  1  for  an 
emergency  appropriation  to  support  a  special  commission  to  Spain.  With 
elections  coining  on  and  the  Democrats  weakened  by  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
struggle,  the  Senate  Foreign  Relations  Committee  decided  not  to  risk 
another  sectional  upheaval  and  declined  to  report  out  a  Cuban  bill.  Pierce 
joyfully  welcomed  Sickles  and  moved  him  into  the  White  House  as  a 
personal  guest  for  a  week  of  conferences.  The  president  already  had 
letters  from  Soute  and  Mason,  Minister  to  France,  stating  that  the  Spanish 
Republicans  would  sell  Cuba  if  the  United  States  contributed  funds  to 
help  their  cause  and  that  the  British  and  French  planned  no  intervention 
to  sustain  the  Spanish  government. 

On  August  16,  after  numerous  Cabinet  discussions,  Marcy  sent 
out  instructions  to  Soute.  Instead  of  the  creation  of  a  special  commission, 
Soulg,  Buchanan,  and  Mason,  should  meet  in  Paris  "to  adopt  measures  for 
perfect  concert  of  action  in  aid  of  your  negotiations  at  Madrid.  .  .  .  This 
whole  subject  in  its  widest  range  is  opened  to  your  joint  consideration." 
The  explanation  of  this  vague  proposal  lay  in  a  disagreement  between  Marcy 
and  Pierce  about  Soul&  Marcy  had  tried  repeatedly  to  have  him  removed 
for  conduct  unbecoming  a  minister  and  defiance  of  instructions,  but  Pierce 
would  not  let  him  go.  Forney,  now  an  editor  of  Pierce's  organ,  the  Wash- 
ington Union,  wrote  Buchanan  at  this  time:  "It  is  said  here  that  Mason 
has  gone  to  meet  Soute,  and  the  idea  is  laughed  at  in  all  quarters,  for  if  ever 
a  man  has  fulfilled  the  prophecies  of  his  enemies,  disappointed  the  hopes 

of  his  friends,  that  man  is  Pierre  Soute He  has  put  back  the  acquisition 

of  Cuba  fifty  years,  .  .  .  made  Spanish  Republicanism  a  jest,  and  ...  by  his 
folly  and  conceit  he  has  enabled  the  enemies  of  our  country  to  hold  him 
up  as  a  sample  of  American  statesmen  &  Diplomatists.  It  is  only  we  who 
must  defend  this  artificial  &  hollow  effigy  of  Democracy,  that  can  realize 
most  sensitively  the  difficulty  of  making  a  silk  purse  out  of  a  sow's  ear."6 

Saddled  with  Soul6  but  required  to  act  at  Madrid,  Marcy  believed 
that  Buchanan  and  Mason  might  serve  as  a  check  on  Soulfi's  wildness  and 
somehow  guide  a  negotiation  along  rational  lines.  This  might,  indeed, 
have  happened  except  for  two  other  factors.  The  first  was  Marcy's  in- 
struction  of  April  3  to  Soute,  still  in  force,  which  authorized  him  to  offer 
as  much  as  $130,000,000  for  Cuba.  If  Spain  appeared  unwilling  to  sell, 
this  instruction  continued,  "you  will  then  direct  your  efforts  to  the  next 
most  desirable  object,  which  is  to  detach  that  Island  from  the  Spanish 
dominion  and  from  all  dependence  on  any  European  power."7  It  is  now 

237 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


clear  that  Marcy  meant  to  say  that  the  independence  of  Cuba  was  the 
object,  next  to  purchase,  most  desired.  But  the  ambiguity  of  the  dispatch 
left  some  question  about  the  explicit  meaning  of  the  important  words 

to  detach. 

Second,  Pierce  in  his  enthusiasm  and  with  his  usual  carelessness 
of  phrase,  filled  Sickles's  mind  with  ideas  never  communicated  to  Marcy 
or  any  of  the  ministers.  Sickles  formed  the  impression  that  Pierce  wanted 
him  to  act  as  a  confidential  agent  to  explain,  verbally,  to  all  the  ministers 
that  the  government  wanted  some  really  drastic  action  on  Cuba  and  was 
ready  to  face  the  consequences.  His  impression  received  reinforcement 
from  the  wording  of  the  instructions  of  August  16,  inaugurating  the  meeting 
of  ministers:  "You  are  desired  to  communicate  to  the  government  here 
the  results  of  opinion  or  means  of  action  to  which  you  may  in  common 
arrive,  through  a  ...  confidential  messenger,  who  may  be  able  to  supply 
any  details  not  contained  in  a  formal  despatch."  Pierce  wrote  to  Buchanan 
that  Sickles  would  "have  much  to  communicate  verbally  with  regard  to 
home  and  other  affairs."8  Sickles  thus  became  in  effect  spokesman  for  the 
president  and  could  turn  the  meaning  of  the  general  instructions  in  any 
direction.  This  freedom  nullified  the  moderating  influence  of  Marcy, 
Mason,  and  Buchanan. 

Buchanan  protested.  He  wrote  to  President  Pierce  on  Sep- 
tember 1: 

I  can  not  for  myself  discover  what  benefit  will  result  from  a 
meeting.  ...  It  is  impossible  for  me  to  devise  any  other  plan 
for  the  acquisition  of  Cuba . . .  than  what  I  have  already  presented 
to  you.  We  are  willing  to  purchase,  and  our  object  is  to  induce 
them  to  sell.  .  .  ,  I  am  glad,  therefore,  that  our  meeting  for  mere 
consultation  and  not  for  decisive  action  is  left  to  [Soul^'s]  dis- 
cretion. ...  P,  S.  Since  the  foregoing  was  written,  I  have  had  a 
long  conversation  with  Col.  Sickles,  and  am  sorry  to  say  this 
has  not  changed  my  views  concerning  the  policy  of  a  meeting. . . . 
No  more  unsuitable  place  than  Paris  could  be  devised  for  such  a 
meeting.  .  .  .  Every  object  which  you  have  in  view  can  ...  be 
accomplished  by  correspondence.0 

Sickles  had  already  ruined  Buchanan's  hopes,  having  blared  his 
way  through  continental  Europe  before  ever  reporting  to  London.  At  Paris 
he  found  Dudley  Mann,  assistant  Secretary  of  State,  John  L  O'Sullivan 
of  "Manifest  Destiny"  fame  and  currently  minister  to  Portugal,  Pierce's 
friend  John  A.  Dix,  and  John  Van  Buren.  Sickles  elaborated  his  plans  to 
all,  and  then  proceeded  to  Spain  where  he  found  Soul£  in  the  haunts  of 
the  revolutionaries  in  the  Pyrenees.  European  newspapermen  sensed 
something  big  in  the  wind  and  broadcast  their  conjectures.  Buchanan 

238 


PLAYING  THE  OLD  TROUPER*   1854.1856 


pointed  out  to  Pierce  that  he  could  quietly  get  the  names  of  the  Spanish 
bondholders  and  unite  with  them  in  an  effort  to  persuade  Spain  to  sell 
Cuba,  but  "Capital  and  Capitalists  ...  are  proverbially  timid,  and  nothing 
of  this  kind  ought  to  be  attempted  until  after  the  6dat  by  the  public  journals 
to  Col.  Sickles'  journey  to  Paris  and  Madrid  shall  have  passed  away.  Matters 
of  this  kind,  in  order  to  be  successful  in  Europe,  must  be  conducted  with 
secrecy  and  caution."10 

Buchanan  succeeded  in  vetoing  Paris  and  Basle  as  the  scene  of 
the  meeting,  agreeing  on  Ostend,  and  with  this  small  success  resigned 
himself  to  obeying  distasteful  orders.  The  conference,  he  wrote  his 
nephew,  "will  probably  make  noise  enough  in  the  world."  After  three 
days  at  Ostend,  the  glare  of  publicity  drove  the  ministers  to  Aix-la-Chapelle 
where,  on  October  18,  they  completed  drafting  the  Ostend  Manifesto. 

Buchanan  bore  the  chief  responsibility  for  restraining  Soute 
during  the  conference.  Mason  looked  on  the  whole  procedure  as  senseless 
and,  so  far  as  he  was  concerned,  "a  chance  to  loaf."  At  the  very  start, 
Buchanan  turned  down  the  request  of  Sickles  to  act  as  secretary  of  the 
meeting  and  after  the  first  few  days  at  Ostend,  pointedly  gave  him  to  under- 
stand that  he  need  not  come  to  Aix-la-Chapelle.  Soute,  who  had  the 
instructions  from  Marcy,  shaped  the  ideas  that  he  thought  should  be 
included,  and  jotted  them  down  in  notes.  Buchanan  then  wrote  out  a 
rough  and  later  a  finished  draft  of  the  document.  Its  first  sentence  placed 
responsibility  directly  on  Pierce.  "The  undersigned,"  it  began,  "in  com- 
pliance with  the  wish  expressed  by  the  President  in  the  several  confidential 
despatches  .  .  .  addressed  to  us"  &c.  &c.  This  meant  that  Marcy's  "to 
detach"  letter  lay  on  the  table,  for  the  only  other  official  instruction  on 
Cuba  was  the  one  calling  the  conference.  The  argument  contained  nothing 
new.  The  United  States  should  promptly  approach  the  Supreme  Con- 
stituent Cortes  of  Spain  with  a  proposition  to  buy  Cuba,  openly,  frankly, 
through  regular  diplomatic  procedures,  and  in  such  a  way  "as  to  challenge 
the  approbation  of  the  world."  This  would  benefit  Cuba,  provide  Spain  a 
golden  opportunity  to  return  to  solvency  and  prosperity,  and  prevent  the 
recurrence  of  troubles  between  the  United  States  and  Cuba  such  as  had 
marred  the  past.  If  the  Cubans  should  rebel,  continued  the  Manifesto, 
"no  human  power  could  .  .  .  prevent  the  people  and  Government  of  the 
United  States  from  taking  part  ...  in  support  of  their  neighbors  and 
friends." 

So  far,  the  report  constituted  an  accurate  statement  of  Buchanan's 
purchase  plan  and  of  Pierce's  concept  of  the  role  of  filibusters.  The  final 
section  added  the  views  of  Sickles  and  Soute,  modified,  or  at  least  phrased, 
by  Buchanan  in  such  a  manner  as  to  pull  their  teeth.  "After  we  shall  have 
offered  Spain  a  price  for  Cuba,  far  beyond  its  present  value,  and  this  shall 
have  been  refused,  it  will  then  be  time  to  consider  the  question,  does  Cuba 

239 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


in  the  possession  of  Spain  seriously  endanger  our  internal  peace  and  the 
existence  of  our  cherished  Union?  Should  this  question  be  answered  in 
the  affirmative,  then,  by  every  law  human  and  Divine,  we  shall  be  justified 
in  wresting  it  from  Spain,  if  we  possess  the  power."  This  version  sub- 
stituted the  words  "to  wrest"  for  Marcy's  "to  detach"  and  thus  followed 
orders,  but  Buchanan  believed  that  he  had  interposed  an  effective  barrier 
to  the  extremist  hope  of  acquiring  Cuba  by  force.  He  had  named  a  number 
of  conditions  precedent  to  seizure  which  he  felt  certain  would  never  arise: 
freeing  of  the  Cuban  slaves,  Africanization  of  the  island's  government,  and 
the  beginning  of  a  race  war  in  the  United  States.  Buchanan  thought  he 
had  successfully  spiked  the  guns  of  the  Young  Americans  and  would-be 
filibusters.  Roy  Nichols,  biographer  of  Pierce,  notes  that  the  final  text 
of  the  Manifesto  was  "not  a  direct  threat,"  as  SoulS  wanted,  but  a  "laborious 
attempt  at  a  guarded  hint,"  which  Buchanan  phrased  as  a  means  to  balk 
rash  action  while  still  obeying  Marcy's  instructions. 

Buchanan  believed  that  he  had  managed  to  salvage  a  little  from 
his  plan  for  purchase  and  had  undermined  the  policy  of  seizure.  But 
Buchanan  did  not  know  that  SouI6  sent  a  private  letter  to  Pierce  along  with 
the  Manifesto,  staling  that  if  Spain  would  not  sell  Cuba,  the  United  States 
ought  to  take  it  by  force  while  England  and  France  were  engaged  in  a  war 
and  would  not  be  likely  to  interfere.  This  message  reversed  the  policy 
Buchanan  intended,  but  Soute's  sentiments  could  be  inferred  from  the 
text  of  the  Manifesto. 

At  home  the  Whigs  and  Know-Nothings  routed  the  Democrats 
in  the  North  and  West  at  the  October  elections.  Hence,  when  the  Ostend 
report  arrived  in  November  the  Administration  sat  on  it;  and  Marcy, 
shocked  at  the  outcome,  wrote  to  Soute  to  proceed  with  the  greatest  caution 
in  broaching  the  idea  of  purchase  and  to  avoid  any  threats. 

As  might  have  been  expected,  the  New  York  Herald  soon  got 
hold  of  a  garbled  version  of  the  Manifesto  which  it  further  distorted  with 
the  paraphrase  "that  our  safety  demanded  and  our  interests  required  we 
purchase  or  take  Cuba  at  once."  Some  newsmen  went  so  far  as  to  state 
that  the  ministers  had  acted  on  their  own  initiative.  Pierce  offered  no 
explanation  or  refutation;  in  his  annual  message  he  did  not  even  mention 
Ostend.  Buchanan  finally  wrote  to  Marcy:  "I  observe  in  a  number  of 
American  Journals  the  statement  made  positively  that  the  Conference  at 
Ostend  was  the  voluntary  action  of  the  American  Ministers.  Surely  this 
ought*  to  be  corrected.  Never  did  I  obey  any  instructions  so  reluctantly." 
Marcy  wrote  privately  that  the  report  itself  did  not  sustain  Soute's  inter- 
pretation, but  still  made  no  public  pronouncement.  "I  am  glad  to  perceive 
that  you  exonerate  us  from  the  charge  .  .  .  that  we  had  recommended  to 
offer  Spain  the  alternative  of  cession  or  seizure,"  Buchanan  replied.  "How 
preposterous  and  suicidal  would  have  been  such  an  idea!  ...  It  would 

240 


PLAYING  THE  OLD  TROUPER  •   1854  *  1856 

have  defeated  the  great  object  we  had  in  view— the  peaceful  acquisition 
of  Cuba."11 

Marcy,  just  as  badly  caught  as  Buchanan  by  the  unwanted 
publicity,  made  his  stand  at  least  officially  clear  by  writing  to  Soute,  tearing 
to  shreds  his  private  proposals  about  Cuba  and  condemning  his  conduct  as 
minister.  Thus  he  achieved  what  he  had  long  wanted,  Soute's  resignation, 
and  took  his  stand  with  Buchanan  and  Mason  against  the  "sell  or  seize" 
doctrine. 

But  the  end  was  not  yet.  The  new  anti-Administration  Congress 
called  for  publication  of  the  Cuban  correspondence.  Thus,  for  the  first 
time,  the  correct  version  of  the  Ostend  Manifesto  became  public  property. 
Unhappily  for  Buchanan,  the  Administration,  after  several  discussions  in 
Cabinet,  decided  that  it  could  not  afford  to  permit  the  publication  of  the 
"detach"  paragraph  of  Marcy's  instructions.  His  biographer  says:  "It  was 
a  bad  business,  either  way,  and  the  expedient  path  was  chosen.  .  .  .  The 
reaction  of  the  public,  which  did  not  know  of  the  ambiguous  "detach"  item, 
was  mostly  favorable  to  Marcy;  the  'three  wise  men  of  Ostend,'  .  .  .  were 
lashed  unmercifully  for  their  part."12  Slidell  attributed  Marcy's  course  to 
his  eagerness  for  the  presidency.  He  told  Buchanan,  "He  fancies  that  he 
sees  in  you  the  only  obstacle  to  the  realisation  of  his  dreams."13  The  public 
impression,  however,  was  that  James  Buchanan  stood  for  the  highwayman's 
principle  that  "if  Spain  will  not  sell  Cuba,  we  will  take  it."  He  should  have 
known  that  people  would  grasp  the  simple,  dramatic,  but  false  dich£, 
rather  than  try  to  understand  the  complex  logic  back  of  the  manifesto 
itself.  But  whatever  he  thought,  he  played  the  old  trouper  and  made  no 
defense.  "I  continue  to  be  entirely  satisfied  with  our  report,"  he  said. 

AN  UNTHINKABLE  WAR 

The  remainder  of  Buchanan's  mission  brought  diplomatic  frustration, 
political  soul-searching,  and  social  triumph.  In  the  months  following 
Ostend  it  appeared  that  everything  at  the  Legation  had  been  going  wrong. 
Sickles  had  been  using  the  Legation  seal  and  diplomatic  pouch  to  send 
around  all  manner  of  personalia.  Miller,  the  London  dispatch  agent  whose 
business  it  was  to  receive  diplomatic  mail  for  all  the  continental  embassies 
and  forward  it  via  courier  had  been  using  his  official  seal  to  cover  and 
protect  from  routine  censorship  correspondence  of  a  very  undiplomatic 
character,  much  of  it  propaganda  of  the  European  revolutionists.  On  one 
occasion  the  British  Customs  at  Liverpool  charged  Buchanan  with  petty 
smuggling.  It  had  discovered  six  pounds  of  American  cigars,  undeclared, 
wrapped  into  a  package  of  books  on  international  law  which  were  addressed 
to  Buchanan.  After  much  unpleasantness  in  England  and  voluminous 
correspondence,  Buchanan  concluded  that  a  courier  from  New  York,  who 

241 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


had  boasted  on  board  ship  what  privileges  awaited  him  in  Liverpool  and 
complained  loudly  that  he  could  not  accompany  the  mail  boat  to  shore,  had 
perpetrated  the  deed.14 

After  the  Ostend  conference  Sickles  again  returned  to  the  United 
States,  thoroughly  disgusted  with  Buchanan.  Forney  had  added  to  the 
trouble  by  printing  some  observations  Buchanan  had  written  him  in 
confidence  condemning  Sickles  for  his  attack  on  the  Peabody  dinner  and 
disparaging  his  competence  as  a  Legation  officer.16  Buchanan  made  a  clean 
breast  of  it  to  Sickles  and  told  him  to  submit  his  resignation.  To  his 
great  satisfaction,  Sickles  complied  and  Pierce  appointed  John  Appleton. 
Appleton  arrived  in  March  and  managed  so  competently  that  Buchanan 
assured  Marcy  that  he  was  "well  qualified  to  perform  the  duties  of  any 
Diplomatic  station  under  the  Government."  "He  is  a  perfect  secretary," 
he  wrote,  "as  well  as  an  excellent  friend."  At  this  time  he  also  got  a  new 
Legation  clerk,  Benjamin  Moran  of  New  York,  whom  he  paid  $800  a  year 
out  of  his  own  pocket  since  federal  statute  forbade  the  government  to  hire 
a  clerk  at  a  foreign  mission.16  Moran  made  himself  indispensable.  He 
could  receive  visitors,  handle  most  of  the  tourist  problems,  and  translate 
foreign  languages,  in  addition  to  keeping  meticulously  ordered  files  of 
correspondence  and  dispatches.  In  this  latter  regard  he  was  very  like 
Buchanan,  and  the  two  quickly  achieved  mutual  respect  which  ripened 
into  warm  friendship.  It  was  a  pity  Buchanan  did  not  have  such  a  staff  at 
the  start,  for  by  the  time  he  got  competent  help  the  negotiating  was  done. 
A  final  blow  came  when  Marcy  informed  him  that  Congress  had  passed  a 
law  substantially  reducing  his  salary  and  the  allowance  for  outfit. 

In  April,  1855,  Buchanan  wrote  that  he  wanted  to  leave  England 
on  August  23,  and  requested  his  letter  of  recall  as  of  that  date.  The  Central 
American  negotiation  had  grown  futile  with  the  elevation  of  Palmerston 
to  the  Premiership  in  January.  Buchanan  talked  occasionally  with 
Clarendon,  who  remained  in  the  Foreign  Office,  but  the  old  rapport  had 
dissolved.  Whenever  Buchanan  mentioned  Ruatan,  Clarendon  brought 
up  Greytown,  and  just  before  Buchanan  sent  in  his  resignation  they  had  a 
very  disagreeable  altercation. 

During  the  summer  of  1855,  when  the  British  began  to  see  a 
triumphal  end  to  the  Crimean  War,  their  relations  with  the  United  States 
rapidly  deteriorated.  Marcy  noted  it  from  the  tone  of  the  British  press, 
and  Buchanan  reported  to  him  that  "there  begins  to  be  an  uneasy  feeling . . . 
that  all  is  not  well  in  the  relations  between  the  two  countries."17 

Nevertheless,  President  Pierce,  on  August  6,  sent  instructions 
to  Buchanan  to  ask  Palmerston  for  an  explicit  statement  of  the  final  British 
position  on  Central  America,  in  reply  to  the  American  statement  of  the 

242 


PLAYING  THE  OLD  TROUPER  •   1854  - 1856 


previous  July.  This  demand  invited  a  showdown  and  Palmerston  con- 
sidered it  an  ultimatum.  He  responded  in  a  tart  communication  condemn- 
ing the  American  position  and  reasserting  British  claims  in  Central  America. 
This  reply  he  supported  by  ordering  a  fleet  of  84-  and  60-gun  battle  cruisers, 
with  auxiliary  vessels,  to  Bermuda  and  the  West  Indies,  allegedly  to  assume 
routine  stations. 

More  than  ever,  Buchanan  wanted  to  go  home.  He  wrote  to 
Marcy  on  October  3  that  he  had  received  dispatches  108, 109  and  111,  but 
not  110  which  contained  his  release.  He  urged  the  appointment  of  J.  Clancy 
Jones  as  his  relief  and  a  search  for  the  missing  letter  of  recall.  He  also 
wrote  to  President  Pierce,  assuring  him  that  Appleton  could  handle  the 
Legation  business  indefinitely.  But  by  the  end  of  October,  Appleton  was 
no  longer  willing  to  take  the  responsibility  of  handling  the  mission.  Bu- 
chanan wrote:  "The  aspect  of  affairs  between  the  two  countries  has  now 
become  squally."  Two  weeks  later,  he  received  his  letter  of  recall  which, 
although  dated  the  12th  of  September,  had  not  been  mailed  from  the  State 
Department  until  October  22.  "It  has  arrived,"  he  told  Marcy,  "at  a  time 
when  the  relations  between  the  two  countries  have  assumed  so  threatening 
an  aspect . . .  that  I  cannot  at  the  present  moment  retire."18 

Buchanan  now  enlisted  all  his  energies  to  reduce  the  growing  war 
fever.  So  far  the  planned  movement  of  the  British  fleet  to  the  Caribbean 
had  not  reached  the  press.  When  Buchanan  asked  the  reason  for  the 
naval  orders,  Clarendon  cited  the  attacks  on  J.  F.  T.  Crampton,  the  British 
minister  in  Washington,  for  recruiting  troops  in  America,  a  letter  of 
Attorney  General  Gushing  which  had  labelled  British  recruiters  "male- 
factors," information  that  an  American  built  steamer  was  about  to  leave 
New  York  as  a  Russian  privateer,  and  a  report  that  thousands  of  Irish- 
Americans  were  plotting  a  descent  upon  the  Emerald  Isle  to  free  it  from 
Britain.  As  Buchanan  already  knew  the  privateer  rumor  to  be  false  and 
the  Irish  invasion  pure  speculation,  he  was  forced  to  the  conclusion  that 
the  British  were  looking  for  a  fight. 

This  attitude  drew  the  issue  sharply.  If  the  United  States  wanted 
war,  they  could  now  have  it.  The  historian  might  well  speculate  what 
result  might  have  emerged  from  such  a  conflict;  whether,  perhaps,  it  might 
have  side-tracked  sectionalism,  united  the  American  nation,  and  postponed 
or  even  averted  the  Civil  War— at  possibly  an  even  higher  price.  Buchanan 
expounded  the  situation  thus  to  Clarendon: 

The  news  of  the  sending  of  the  fleet  .  .  .  would  most  probably 
excite  much  public  indignation.  ...  It  would  find  the  people 
calm  and  tranquil  in  relation  to  their  foreign  affairs  and  wholly 
unprepared  for  it.  It  would  burst  upon  them  suddenly,  and  they 
would  doubtless  manifest  their  feelings  in  strong  and  defying 


243 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


language.  This  would  return  to  England  and  react  upon  the 
people  here  .  ,  ,  until  at  last  by  degrees  the  two  countries  might 
find  themselves  at  war,  although  .  .  .  there  was  no  question  of 
very  serious  importance  between  them.  And  such  a  war!  .  .  . 
I  would  not  have  it  on  my  conscience  for  any  human  consider- 
ation to  be  the  author  of  any  act  which  might  lead  to  such 
consequences.19 

The  British,  in  response  to  the  American  retreat,  cut  in  half 
the  strength  of  the  proposed  West  Indian  squadron.  Clarendon  informed 
Buchanan  "that  three  ships  had  been  sent  to  Bermuda  &  one  to  Jamaica" 
which  would  be  "on  their  guard  against  all  dangers,  ...  let  them  come 
from  what  quarter  they  may."  Buchanan  answered  in  two  sentences  that 
this  reply  fell  far  short  of  his  hopes  and  would  not  "exert  that  happy 
influence  in  restoring  cordial  relations  .  .  .  which  ...  I  shall  always  so 
earnestly  desire."  For  several  weeks  the  possibility  of  war  depressed  the 
Stock  Exchange  and  Buchanan  reported  that  "an  incautious  word  from 
me  would  either  raise  or  sink  the  price  of  consols."  Palmerston  held  his 
position  and  backed  it  up  by  force;  unless  the  United  States  attacked  there 
was  nothing  to  fight  about.  By  the  end  of  November  the  leading  British 
journals  deprecated  the  idea  of  war  and  condemned  the  Ministry  for  risking 
it.  On  December  14,  Buchanan  reported  to  Marcy  that  the  storm  had 
blown  over.  "I  hear  this  sentiment  everywhere  I  go,"  he  said.  "There  is 
certainly  no  disposition  at  present  on  the  part  of  the  British  people  to  have 
serious  difficulties  with  the  United  States."20 

Buchanan  had  a  respite  of  exactly  two  weeks.  On  December  28 
Marcy  sent  him  word  that  the  United  States  had  asked  for  the  recall  of  Lord 
Crampton  and  of  the  British  consuls  at  Cincinnati,  Philadelphia  and 
New  York,  who  had  been  illegally  recruiting  troops  for  the  Crimean  War. 
When  Buchanan  informed  Clarendon  of  the  contents  of  this  dispatch,  the 
latter  jumped  up  and  declared  in  angry  surprise,  "We  will  not  do  it."  Dur- 
ing February,  Buchanan  felt  sure  that  a  diplomatic  rupture  impended.  "As 
soon  as  the  news  shall  arrive  in  this  country,  that  you  sent  Mr.  Crampton 
his  passports,"  he  informed  Marcy,  "I  shall  receive  mine  from  Lord 
Clarendon."21 

Viscount  Palmerston  presented  a  one-sided  picture  of  the  re- 
cruiting controversy  to  Parliament  and  raised  a  storm  of  indignation  in  the 
press.  With  the  end  of  the  Crimean  War  in  sight  and  British  military 
strength  at  its  peak,  the  Premier  rattled  the  saber  against  America  as  a  means 
of  maintaining  himself  in  power;  at  least  so  Buchanan  thought.  He  immedi- 
ately responded  that  the  Viscount  had  falsified  the  facts  by  withholding 
details  that  justified  the  American  position.  When  Lady  Palmerston  later 
gave  a  diplomatic  dinner  and  omitted  Buchanan's  name  from  the  guest  list, 

244 


PLAYING  THE  OLD  TROUPER  •   1854  - 1856 


he  assumed  that  his  time  had  come.  But  Britain  delayed  any  official  reply 
to  the  request  for  Crampton's  recall,  and  Marcy  postponed  dismissing  him. 
Meanwhile,  British  public  opinion  slowly  turned  against  Palmerston.  Lord 
Bulwer  announced  that  he  agreed  with  Buchanan  and  not  the  Ministry  on 
the  interpretation  of  the  treaty  he  himself  had  negotiated  with  Clayton.22 

During  all  this  time,  Buchanan  pleaded  with  Marcy  for  another 
letter  of  recall.  "I  consider  this  mission  as  a  sort  of  waif  abandoned  by  the 
Government,"  he  complained.  "Not  a  word  even  about  a  secretary  of 
Legation.  ...  I  have  to  labor  like  a  drayman.  Have  you  no  bowels?" 
In  February  he  learned  that  George  M.  Dallas  had  been  appointed  his 
successor,  and  by  the  middle  of  March  he  had  the  "long  looked-for,  come 
at  last"— his  final  letter  of  recall. 

After  the  October  elections  of  1854,  when  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
Act  had  split  the  Democracy,  destroyed  the  Whigs,  raised  up  the  new 
Republican  party  and  given  a  fleeting  prominence  to  the  Know-Nothings, 
Buchanan's  friends  began  to  bombard  him  with  petitions,  prognostications 
and  praises  that  no  man  could  ignore.  Pierce  could  not  succeed;  his 
Administration  had  fallen  lower  than  Tyler's.  No  candidate  but  Old  Buck 
could  be  trusted;  Kansas-Nebraska  had  dirtied  all  the  others.  The  country 
was  fearful  to  the  verge  of  panic  and  would  not  accept  a  "speculative 
candidacy."  Everyone  wanted  the  next  president  to  be  a  statesman,  a  man 
whose  integrity  and  experience  had  been  proven  over  the  years.  In  short, 
Buchanan  was  the  only  man  who  could  win  for  the  Democracy.  There  was 
no  doubt  that  he  would  be  drafted. 

By  January,  1855,  Buchanan  caved  in  and  admitted  to  confidential 
friends  that  they  could  have  him  if  they  wanted  him.  Having  decided  to  be 
"available,"  he  laid  a  little  of  the  groundwork  in  England.  He  asked  Sir 
Emerson  Tennent  to  arrange  a  dinner  at  which  Cardinal  Wiseman  would 
be  present.  In  July,  1855,  after  Tennent's  banquet,  Buchanan  held  a  long 
conversation  with  Wiseman,  and  told  the  prelate  of  his  admiration  for 
Archbishop  John  Hughes  of  New  York.  Thurlow  Weed  later  asserted, 
"That  dinner  made  Mr.  Buchanan  President  of  the  United  States!"  Weed 
exaggerated,  but  the  Cardinal's  good  opinion  of  Buchanan  doubtless  had 
some  influence  on  Archbishop  Hughes  and  the  American  Catholics.28 

Buchanan  wrote  to  Marcy  shortly  before  his  recall, 

I  know  .  .  .  that  you  would  consider  me  in  a  state  of  mental 
delusion  if  I  were  to  say  how  indifferent  I  feel  in  regard  to  myself 
on  the  question  of  the  next  Presidency.  You  would  be  quite  a 
sceptic.  One  thing  is  certain:  that  neither  by  word  nor  letter 
have  I  ever  contributed  any  support  to  myself.  I  believe  that 
the  next  Presidential  term  will  be  perhaps  the  most  important 
and  responsible  of  any  which  has  occurred  since  the  origin  of  the 

245 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Government;  and  whilst  no  competent  and  patriotic  man  to  whom 
it  may  be  offered  should  shrink  from  the  responsibility,  yet  he 
may  well  accept  it  as  the  greatest  trial  of  his  life.24 

DEAR  MISS  LANE 

Although  British  society  was  something  of  a  strain  on  his  constitution, 
Buchanan  thought  it  very  congenial.  The  formality  of  the  Court  did  not 
invade  the  drawing  room  where  he  found  the  nobility  as  simple  and  un- 
pretentious as  his  Lancaster  neighbors.  It  took  him  some  time,  however, 
to  become  accustomed  to  dinners  at  eight  and  parties  at  eleven  when  he 
should  have  been  going  to  bed.  He  looked  forward  to  Harriet's  arrival  in 
the  spring  of  1854,  though  he  knew  her  visit  would  double  his  social 

activities. 

Harriet,  now  in  the  full  bloom  of  young  womanhood,  flippant, 
gay,  flirtatious  yet  well-mannered  and  well-read,  became  a  favorite  in  the 
diplomatic  social  world.  She  dined  with  Victoria,  danced  with  Prince 
Albert,  and  received  a  marriage  proposal  from  the  enormously  wealthy, 
fifty-eight-year-old  Sir  Fitz-Roy  Kelly.  At  Oxford,  where  "Nunc"  and 
Alfred  Lord  Tennyson  received  honorary  degrees  at  the  same  ceremony, 
the  students  paid  only  cursory  attention  to  the  dignitaries  and  shouted  and 
whistled  their  approval  of  Hal  Lane.  She  flitted  from  castle  to  castle, 
attended  fashionable  weddings,  and  kept  the  Legation  in  constant  turmoil 
with  preparations  for  parties.  Buchanan  loved  the  gaieties. 

He  also  worried,  for  Harriet  seemed  to  be  succumbing  to  the 
glamor  of  British  titles.  At  the  same  time  a  Philadelphia  suitor  by  the 
name  of  Tyson  was  confidently  planning  to  come  to  England  and  marry  her, 
although  she  had  treated  him  so  badly  during  their  long  courtship  that  he 
had  well  earned  the  name  Job. 

Harriet  did  not  even  let  Tyson  know  that  she  planned  to  return 
to  America  a  few  weeks  after  his  scheduled  arrival  in  England.  She  saw 
him  briefly  in  London  to  tell  him  "No."  Buchanan  was  angry,  not  at  the 
decision  but  at  the  cruel  and  thoughtless  manner  of  her  refusal. 

In  the  fall  of  1855,  Buchanan  received  news  that  Harriet's  older 
sister,  Mary  Baker,  had  suddenly  died  in  California.  Harriet  fell  into  un- 
consolable  grief,  confined  herself  to  her  room  for  weeks,  and  threatened 
to  join  a  convent.  Buchanan  gave  her  some  of  his  own  philosophy:  to 
mourn  the  dead  at  the  expense  of  the  living  is  sinful.  Heart-rending 
afflictions  are  the  common  lot  of  humanity,  man's  duty  on  earth  is  to 
submit  with  humble  resignation.  "In  all  calamitous  events,  we  ought  to 
say,  emphatically,  Thy  will  be  done.'  "  He  himself  was  as  much  distressed 
by  the  recent  death  of  another  niece,  Jessie  Yates  Weaver.  Poor  Jessie. 
What  would  he  do  with  her  children. 

246 


PLAYING  THE  OLD  TROUPER •   1854-1856 

George  Dallas  arrived  in  England  on  March  13, 1856,  accompanied 
by  his  wife,  his  sister,  three  unmarried  daughters,  and  a  son,  who  was  to 
be  Secretary  of  Legation.  Buchanan  wrote,  "The  Legation  will  be  a 
family  party."25 

Before  his  audience  of  leave,  Buchanan  dined  with  the  queen  who, 
with  the  princess  royal,  talked  mostly  about  "dear  Miss  Lane."  He  spent 
two  convivial  weeks  with  Mason  in  Paris  and  then  returned  to  England  to 
sail  for  home  aboard  the  Arago. 


247 


19 

THE  RIGHT  MAN  FOR  THE  TIMES  •  1856 

THE  SHAPE  OF  THINGS  TO  COME 

The  steamship  Arago  slipped  her  cables  and  edged  slowly  out  of  her  dock 
at  noon  on  Wednesday,  April  9,  1856.  By  midafternoon  Buchanan  had 
aflably  acknowledged  the  greetings  of  many  of  his  fellow  passengers,  finished 
his  constitutional  around  the  deck,  and  retired  to  his  stateroom  where  he 
took  off  his  greatcoat,  removed  his  cutaway,  and  then  opened  his  travel 
chest  to  get  his  old  leather  slippers  and  a  bottle  of  Madeira.  After  some 
puttering  about  he  found  the  cork  puller  and  a  glass,  lit  a  "segar"  and  then 
settled  back  on  his  bed,  drew  a  long  sigh  of  solid  comfort,  and  relaxed. 

Had  he  been  less  nervously  exhausted,  the  soft  movement  of  the 
ship  might  have  lulled  him  to  sleep.  Instead,  it  set  him  musing,  hap- 
hazardly at  first  and  then  with  increasing  focus  and  plan.  Well,  thank  God 
that  job  was  done.  He  had  never  wanted  the  mission;  yet  he  had  to  admit 
that  he  had  enjoyed  the  experience,  had  done  his  duty,  and  had  emerged 
better  off  politically  than  if  he  had  stayed  at  home.  He  could  not  help 
wondering  about  the  freak  fate  which  had  kept  him  out  of  Congress  during 
each  of  the  four  most  violent  sectional  controversies  of  the  century:  the 
Missouri  Compromise,  the  nullification  struggle,  the  1850  Compromise, 
and  now  the  Kansas-Nebraska  Bill.  If  he  should  become  president,  he 
feared  he  would  not  escape  the  next  outburst.  He  sipped  some  Madeira 
and  continued  his  reverie.  With  fair  weather  he  might  reach  New  York  on 
his  sixty-fifth  birthday. 

At  that  thought  he  roused  himself,  went  to  his  portfolio,  and 
extracted  a  packet  of  letters.  Sorting  through  he  picked  out  half  a  dozen 
and  settled  back  to  read,  for  he  wanted  to  catch  up  on  the  state  of  political 
affairs,  particularly  in  Pennsylvania  and  Kansas.  The  Pennsylvania  Demo- 
crats had  suffered  from  the  Kansas-Nebraska  controversy,  and  James 
Pollock,  a  Know-Nothing,  Whig  free-soiler  now  sat  in  the  Pennsylvania 
governor's  chair.  Men  who  had  predicted  Bigler's  re-election  in  1854  by  a 
50,000  majority  woke  up  to  find  him  defeated  by  37,000  votes.1 

248 


THE  RIGHT  MAN  FOR  THE  TIMES  •  1856 

Buchanan  felt  sure  that  the  Know-Nothing  movement,  like  anti- 
Masonry,  would  pass  as  quickly  as  it  had  appeared,  but  for  the  moment  it 
was  dangerous.  He  read  a  letter  from  Jeremiah  S.  Black: 

Here  is  a  party  less  than  one  year  old  which  has  already  triumphed 
in  half  the  states  of  the  Union.  Its  members  are  sworn  to  secrecy 
and  to  fidelity.  ...  It  conceals  its  secrets  not  merely  by  silence 
but  by  positive  falsehood.  When  men  are  seduced  into  its  lodges 
they  are  instructed  to  conceal  the  fact  and  preserve  their  previous 
party  attitude.  Know-Nothings  continue  to  speak  at  Democratic 
meetings,  to  argue  for  Democratic  principles,  to  act  as  members 
of  Democratic  Committees,  to  run  as  Democratic  candidates.  The 
consequence  of  this  is  terrible.  The  obligations  of  truth  are 

treated  with  an  awful  frivolity A  majority  of  the  legislature 

have  obtained  their  seats  by  false  pretences  which  would  send 
them  to  the  penitentiary  if  they  got  5  dollars  by  similar  means. 
Cameron  was  nominated  for  Senator  by  a  system  of  secret  voting 

inside  the  secret  order— the  cheats  were  cheated 28  members 

. .  .  certified  that  he  had  got  his  nomination  by  'wholesale  corrup- 
tion and  individual  bribery.'2 

Forney,  in  another  letter,  stated  that  he  did  not  see  how  Cameron 
could  be  beaten  "unless  they  fix  the  charge  of  Bribery  upon  him,  and  it 
looks  as  if  they  would."3  But  Cameron  had  angered  even  the  Know- 
Nothings,  and  William  Bigler  won  the  senatorship. 

Matters  looked  better  than  usual  in  Pennsylvania;  the  Buchaneers, 
except  for  the  governorship,  held  control.  Forney  was  confident  that 
Buchanan  could  win  the  presidency  and  in  order  to  induce  him  to  accept 
the  nomination,  promised  to  relinquish  all  rights  to  patronage.4  From  all 
he  read  in  his  correspondence,  Buchanan  judged  that  at  last  Pennsylvania 
was  "right." 

He  wished  that  he  could  feel  as  optimistic  in  regard  to  the  situa- 
tion in  Kansas.  The  trial  of  popular  sovereignty  had  brought  civil  war 
to  that  territory.  Settlers  had  gone  there  to  claim  land  and  fight  for 
political  control.  These  immigrants,  from  the  North  and  the  South, 
carried  with  them  a  deep  sense  of  mission  and  bitterly  hated  each  other. 
New  Englanders,  because  of  better  organization  and  financing  back  home, 
came  in  greater  numbers  and  with  more  armament  than  the  Southerners, 
but  the  latter  had  the  sympathy  of  the  Missourians  who  cast  ballots  for 
the  first  Kansas  territorial  legislature  and  elected  candidates  favorable  to 
the  South.  The  New  Englanders  called  the  invaders  "border  ruffians," 
but  they  do  not  appear  to  have  been  very  different  from  any  of  the  frontier 
inhabitants  of  their  day.  The  Missourians  thought  that  they  had  as  much 

249 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


right  to  enter  Kansas  as  did  armed  mercenaries  from  Massachusetts.  Those 
tenderfoots  would  not  show  them  how  to  run  the  frontier. 

When  Pierce  removed  Kansas  Governor  Andrew  H.  Reeder,  for 
fraudulent  dealings  in  land,  the  antislavery  men  charged  that  he  had  been 
fired  for  denouncing  the  territorial  election.  The  free  state  men  set  up  a 
legislature  of  their  own  at  Topeka,  elected  Reeder  as  Congressional  repre- 
sentative, and  drafted  a  constitution.  This,  incidentally,  was  an  anti-Negro 
rather  than  an  anti-slavery  constitution;  it  established  white  supremacy  by 
forbidding  any  Negroes  to  live  in  Kansas.  In  January,  1856,  when  they 
elected  their  own  governor,  Pierce,  in  a  special  message  to  Congress,  de- 
nounced the  Topeka  regime  as  revolutionary  and  Congress  sustained  him 
by  affirming  the  legality  of  the  original  Kansas  government,  with  its  capital 
at  Lecompton. 

But  the  Topeka  government  defied  the  United  States  and  con- 
tinued to  rule  wherever  its  guns  could  enforce  submission  to  its  decrees. 
Neither  Pierce  nor  the  new  territorial  governor,  Wilson  Shannon,  would 
risk  use  of  federal  troops  to  enforce  local  law,  but  they  ordered  the  army 
to  prevent  violent  collision  between  the  contesting  factions  and  to  avert 
the  outbreak  of  full-scale  war.  The  troops,  however,  could  do  little  about 
sporadic  outrages  perpetrated  by  small  groups.  Beatings,  shootings,  house- 
wrecking  and  arson  became  so  common  that  the  press  began  to  write  of 
"Bleeding  Kansas."  The  ordeal  of  Kansas  would  not  be  easily  ended.  Few 
settlers  wanted  coexistence;  each  side  determined  to  rule,  and  to  rule  meant 
to  eliminate  the  enemy. 

The  trip  of  the  Arago  proved  calm  and  peaceful,  but  hardly  a 
vacation  for  Buchanan.  He  recognized  that  it  would  very  likely  be  the  last 
fortnight  he  would  have  for  a  long  time  to  collect  his  thoughts  and  formu- 
late his  course  of  action  without  constant  interruption.  If  he  became 
president,  he  would  look  back  longingly  at  this  cruise.  What  were  his 
chances,  and  how  should  the  cards  be  played? 

It  seemed  very  unlikely  that  Pierce  or  Douglas  could  be  nomi- 
nated, but  they  might  be  strong  enough  to  deadlock  the  convention  and 
pave  the  way  for  another  dark  horse.  Plenty  of  willing  spirits  hoped  for 
this  kind  of  result — Hunter,  Davis,  Walker,  Marcy  and  others.  A  little 
management  ought  to  prevent  such  an  occurrence,  particularly  emphasis 
on  the  risk  to  the  country  of  an  accidental  nomination  in  the  hour  of  danger. 
A  nation  in  crisis  needed  an  experienced  and  dependable  candidate. 
Pennsylvania,  which  had  three  times  failed  Buchanan,  now  promised  him 
full  support,  for  the  Harrisburg  Convention  of  March  4  had  given  him  its 
unanimous  endorsement.  Finally,  the  disruption  of  the  Whig  party  over 
the  Kansas-Nebraska  Bill  might  be  turned  to  advantage.  The  Whigs  in 
in  1854  and  1855  had  split  along  north-south  lines  into  rump  segments 
which  stood  helpless  in  a  national  contest.  Whig  leaders  and  voters  were 

250 


THE  RIGHT  MAN  FOR  THE  TIMES  •   1856 


looking  for  a  new  home,  some  of  them  joining  the  Republicans,  some  the 
Know-Nothings,  some  the  Southern  Americans  and  some  the  Democrats. 
Many  Whig  leaders  saw  that  under  the  new  conditions  they  stood  closer  to 
the  conservative  Buchanan  wing  of  the  Democrats  than  to  any  of  the  other 
parties.  Buchanan  already  had  a  sheaf  of  encouraging  letters  from  promi- 
nent Whigs  stating  that  they  considered  their  party  dead  and  would  join 
the  Democrats  if  he  were  nominated. 

Since  Forney  had  become  obligated  to  Pierce,  John  Slidell  actively 
undertook  management  of  Buchanan's  political  future.  He  planned  to 
cultivate  the  growing  popular  demand  for  Buchanan's  nomination  to  give 
it  the  aspect  of  a  spontaneous  movement.  Dr.  Foltz  assured  Buchanan  in 
November,  1855,  "The  People  have  taken  the  next  Presidency  out  of  the 
hands  of  the  politicians.  .  .  .  The  people,  and  not  your  political  friends 
will  place  you  there."5 

Slidell  seized  this  idea  and  promoted  his  candidate  as  the  people's 
own  choice.  He  did  not  create  the  force,  but  he  saw  and  used  with  intelli- 
gence the  latent  public  sentiment  which  needed  only  a  little  cultivation  to 
start  it  growing.  Little  by  little,  he  and  his  co-workers  induced  back- 
country  editors  to  puflf  Buchanan  until,  by  late  in  1855,  scores  of  Demo- 
cratic newspapers  and  quite  a  few  of  Whig  persuasion  carried  Buchanan's 
name  on  the  masthead.  The  "puffs"  followed  the  theme  that  Buchanan's 
name  had  attained  prominence  without  the  aid  of  the  machinery  of  politics 
and  almost  without  the  help  of  politicians.  "The  fact  that  he  has  become 
formidable  without  effort  has  gone  far  to  inspire  a  wide  and  almost  universal 
confidence  in  his  strength."6 

During  1854  Slidell  earnestly  counselled  Buchanan  to  stay  in 
England  as  long  as  he  could.  "The  political  atmosphere  at  Washington  is 
malarious,"  he  wrote,  "and  those  who  are  not  compelled  to  inhale  it  had 
better  keep  away."  A  year  later,  when  the  newspaper  chorus  had  swelled 
to  national  proportions,  SlideU  thought  it  time  for  Buchanan  to  express  to 
some  discreet  friends  his  willingness  to  be  a  candidate.  Instead  of  doing 
this,  Buchanan  sent  off  a  batch  of  letters  reiterating  his  indifference  but 
explaining  with  care  his  views  on  the  slavery  crisis.  Slidell  warned  him  to 
stop  this.  "You  cannot  well  be  in  a  better  position  than  you  are  now,"  he 
said,  "&  those  who  are  not  satisfied  with  your  antecedents  cannot  be  made 
so  by  any  explanations."7  Buchanan  never  did  throw  his  hat  in  the  ring. 
He  did,  however,  admit  that  others  had  taken  him  up.  As  late  as  February, 
1856,  he  could  still  write, 

In  the  present  canvass,  strange  as  it  may  seem  to  you,  I  have  had 
no  part,  either  directly  or  indirectly.  In  the  beginning  I  did  all 
I  could  to  prevent  any  movement  in  my  favor,  &  what  has  since 
been  done  has  been  entirely  spontaneous,  at  least  so  far  as  I  am 
personally  concerned.8 

251 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


This  statement  was  delicate,  prudent,  and  as  technically  correct 
as  a  Philadelphia  lawyer  could  have  made  it,  but  it  was  scarcely  open  and 
candid.  Buchanan  could  have  stopped  the  movement  in  its  tracks  any 
time  he  wished,  but  instead  he  kept  the  door  open.  For  a  time  he  certainly 
went  through  an  agony  of  indecision.  Wheatland  beckoned  strongly,  and 
life  there  looked  heavenly  in  comparison  with  the  presidency  of  a  country 
in  political  shambles  and  with  a  civil  war  at  its  center.  He  summed  up  his 
state  of  mind  to  Harriet  in  a  marim  from  La  Rochefoucauld:  "Les  choses 
que  nous  desirons  rtamventpas,  ou,  si  elles  arrivent,  ce  n'est,  ni  dans  le  temps, 
ni  de  la  mani&re  qui  nous  aurcdentfait  le  plus  de  plcdsir."*  But  a  man  could 
not  turn  down  the  presidency  when  his  friends  threw  it  at  him,  and  the 
family  would  never  forgive  him  if  he  rejected  it.  He  had  been  in  on  all  the 
phases  of  planning  and  knew  how  much  "spontaneity"  there  was.  He  had 
discouraged,  but  not  killed  off,  the  promotion;  and  now,  just  as  with  the 
diplomatic  mission,  he  was  caught. 

After  a  survey  of  the  whole  scene,  Buchanan  determined  to  do 
nothing  to  injure  or  embarrass  the  efforts  of  his  friends.  He  would  keep 
his  mouth  shut  and  make  no  promises.  He  would  stay  at  Wheatland  and 
let  those  who  wished  come  to  see  him.  He  would  put  his  record  on  the 
block  and  let  people  take  it  or  leave  it.  That  would  be  the  fall  of  the  cards 
until  the  convention.  "Sufficient  unto  the  day  is  the  evil  thereof."  With 
the  matter  settled  in  his  mind,  he  gave  himself  up  to  the  pleasures  of  the 
voyage.  Mrs.  Plitt  amused  him.  She  had  sent  a  newspaper  clipping  re- 
porting that  he  would  return  via  New  Orleans  in  order  to  go  on  to  Tennessee 
to  marry  Mrs.  Polk.  Jokingly,  she  said  she  wished  it  were  true.  She  was 
sure  he  would  find  it  "an  agreeable  way  of  Polking  your  way  into  the 
Presidency.'*10 

THE  PEOPLE'S  CHOICE 

The  Arago  failed  to  make  port  on  Buchanan's  birthday,  but  she  docked  at 
New  York  the  next  day,  ahead  of  schedule,  taking  the  local  dignitaries  so 
much  by  surprise  that  the  welcome  fell  far  short  of  what  some  had  predicted 
— "such  a  triumph  as  the  Caesar's  only  have  seen."11  Ai  the  Astor  House 
Buchanan  received  visitors  until  a  formal  reception  committee  could  be 
mustered  at  City  Hall.  He  firmly  declined  the  tender  of  a  public  dinner  and 
supped  quietly  with  the  mayor  and  a  few  friends.  The  New  York  arrival 
confirmed  the  wisdom  of  his  determination  to  remain  aloof.  The  dinner 
would  have  been  dynamite.  It  would  have  widened  the  split  between  the 
Democratic  factions,  required  a  speech  that  could  not  possibly  have  suited 
both,  and  provoked  charges  that  Buchanan  started  electioneering  the 
moment  he  set  foot  on  home  soil.  His  arrival  without  notice  and  the 
refusal  of  ceremony  brought  members  of  both  factions  out  to  see  him, 

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THE  RIGHT  MAN  FOR  THE  TIMES  •   1856 


enabled  him  to  avoid  saying  more  than  that  he  was  glad  to  be  back,  and 
strongly  sustained  the  key  idea  that  he  was  a  simple  citizen  who  had  earned 
and  wished  no  special  honors.  His  scheme  worked  beautifully  and  he  was 
off  to  Philadelphia  before  his  enemies  realized  that  he  had  scored  a  tre- 
mendous psychological  triumph. 

Philadelphia  was  more  exciting,  though  its  celebration,  too,  fell 
considerably  short  of  a  Roman  holiday.  Booming  cannon  welcomed 
Buchanan's  train,  and  the  official  escort  took  him  to  the  Merchant's 
Exchange  where  he  made  a  three-minute  speech  to  a  crowd  of  about  three 
thousand.  The  City  Council  had  rejected  a  request  that  Independence  Hall 
should  be  opened  that  night  for  a  formal  reception,  but  the  Merchant's 
Hotel  served  as  well.  From  its  portico  Buchanan  reviewed  a  parade, 
watched  a  fireworks  display,  and  patiently  endured  a  band  serenade.12 

Joseph  B.  Baker,  superintendent  of  the  state  railroad,  had  a 
special  train  ready  the  next  morning.  The  locomotive  bore  the  name 
"Young  America"  and  had  been  draped  with  bunting  and  signs  reading 
"Welcome  Home,  Pennsylvania's  Favorite  Son."  On  the  trip  to  Lancaster 
the  train  stopped  at  local  stations  while  Buchanan  stood  on  the  back  plat- 
form waving  his  hat.  They  made  a  short  stop  at  Baker's  home  in  Gap,  along 
the  main  line,  where  the  engine  took  on  water  and  the  official  party  cham- 
pagne. 

Buchanan's  home  town  of  Lancaster  gave  him  a  rousing  reception. 
The  "Wheatland  Club"  fired  the  "Old Buck  Cannon,"  and  for  two  days  the 
town  celebrated  with  bands,  transparencies,  torchlight  processions,  and 
fireworks.  Two  weeks  later  Adam  Reigart,  the  wine  merchant,  brought  to 
Wheatland  an  itemized  bill  for  $809.65  for  liquid  merchandise.  The  front 
porch  campaign  was  underway.13 

The  first  few  weeks  of  May  passed  auspiciously.  Forney,  whom 
Pierce  had  released  from  allegiance,  wrote  almost  daily  from  Washington 
with  late  details  on  the  expected  convention  vote  at  Cincinnati  on  June  2. 
Buchanan's  strength  lay  in  the  middle  belt  of  states  from  Delaware  to 
Missouri.  The  New  England  Democracy  was  for  Pierce,  and  the  South 
favored  Douglas,  but  both  of  these  could  be  stopped  by  making  strategic 
promises  to  favorite  son  candidates.  Buchanan  interrupted  a  trip  to 
Washington  to  report  on  the  English  Mission  in  order  to  make  a  speech 
in  Baltimore.  "Disunion  is  a  word  which  ought  not  to  be  breathed  amongst 
us  even  in  a  whisper"  he  warned.  "Our  children  ought  to  be  taught  that 
it  is  a  sacrilege  to  pronounce  it.  ...  There  is  nothing  stable  but  Heaven 
and  the  Constitution."14 

On  May  22,  Congressman  Preston  S.  Brooks,  of  South  Carolina, 
strode  into  the  Senate  Chamber  after  hours,  attacked  white-haired  Senator 
Charles  Sumner  of  Massachusetts  and  beat  him  into  unconsciousness  with 
a  heavy  rubber  cane.  The  Senator  had  invited  trouble  by  subjecting  a 

253 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


relative  of  Brooks  to  one  of  the  vilest  and  most  insulting  diatribes  evei 
heard  in  Congress.  But  regardless  of  the  provocation,  responsible  southern- 
ers were  shocked  by  the  caning  and  wrote  of  it:  "unjustifiable,  unmanly, 
ill-timed,  ill-advised,  cowardly,  dastardly.  Mr.  Brooks  has  outraged 
decency,  and  dishonored  the  South-expel  him."  That  was  the  word  from 
Savannah.  From  Boston  came  the  same  cry,  and  Brooks  in  all  likelihood 
would  have  been  turned  out  except  for  the  events  of  two  days  later. 

About  11  p.  m.  of  May  24,  John  Brown,  his  three  sons,  and  four 
henchmen  headed  for  Pottawatomie  Creek  in  Kansas  and  later  knocked  at 
the  door  of  James  Doyle,  a  southerner  whom  none  of  the  party  had  ever 
seen  before.  Doyle,  half  dressed  and  unarmed,  asked  them  to  come  in,  but 
Brown's  men  drew  pistols  and  invited  him  to  come  out.  When  Doyle's 
sons,  William  aged  22,  Drury,  20,  and  John,  16  stepped  to  their  father's 
side,  Brown  ordered  them  to  come  along.  A  few  minutes  later  Mrs.  Doyle 
and  her  youngest  son,  who  had  remained  with  her,  heard  screams  and 
pistol  shots  outside  the  cabin, -and  then  there  was  silence. 

After  midnight  Allen  Wilkinson,  who  was  up  late  because  his 
wife  Louisa  was  sick  with  measles,  went  to  answer  a  thunderous  pounding 
on  the  door.  "In  the  name  of  the  Northern  Army,  open  up,"  came  a  deep 
voice.  Brown's  party  entered  and  ordered  Wilkinson  outside. 

Shortly  thereafter  the  raiders  visited  James  Harris,  who  was  in 
bed  with  his  wife  when  the  door  burst  open  and  the  Brown  gang  entered. 
For  some  inexplicable  reason,  they  ignored  Harris  and  dragged  out  William 
Sherman,  a  guest. 

Not  until  the  next  morning  did  anyone  dare  to  go  out  and  investi- 
gate. James  Doyle  and  two  of  his  sons  lay  near  the  cabin,  with  bullets 
through  their  heads,  their  skulls  split  in  two  with  a  broadaxe,  their  sides 
hacked  open,  and  their  fingers  cut  off.  A  neighbor  found  Allen  Wilkinson 
shot  in  the  head,  his  skull  chopped  apart  and  his  side  pierced.  Bill  Sherman 
was  lying  face  down  in  a  small  creek,  shot  in  the  head,  his  skull  laid  open 
and  the  brains  trailing  down  the  stream,  but  still  attached  to  the  bone,  his 
side  stabbed  full  of  sword  wounds  and  his  hands  cut  off. 

The  Democrats  reacted  with  a  howl  of  rage  and  fury,  and  had  the 
Republicans  equally  expressed  their  horror  of  the  savage  insanity  which 
prompted  this  blind  slaughter,  Brooks  might  have  been  punished  and  the 
country  might  have  become  calmer.  But  antislavery  extremists  hailed 
Brown  as  a  hero.  Slavery  was  a  sin,  and  the  wages  of  sin  was  death.  God 
had  ordained  Brown  to  smite  the  wicked.  When  this  kind  of  report  began 
to  percolate  into  the  South,  it  became  the  fashion  there  to  "present  a  cane" 
to  Preston  Brooks  wherever  he  made  a  public  appearance.  It  is  no  wonder 
James  Buchanan  returned  to  Wheatland  less  optimistic  than  when  he  left. 

At  Cincinnati,  as  convention  time  approached,  there  was  great 
activity  on  the  part  of  the  advance  guard  of  Pierce  and  Douglas  supporters, 

254 


THE  RIGHT  MAN  FOR  THE  TIMES  •    1856 


but  no  Buchanan  team  was  in  evidence.  Rather  quickly  it  became  apparent 
that  Buchanan's  uncoordinated  managers  had  taken  too  literally  the  "spon- 
taneous" idea,  and  that  no  one  was  in  command  of  the  organization.  Slidell 
got  busy,  rounded  up  his  colleagues— Judah  P.  Benjamin  of  Louisiana, 
Jesse  D.  Bright  of  Indiana,  and  James  A.  Bayard  of  Delaware— and  the.four 
Senators  hastened  to  Cincinnati.  Forney  arrived  soon  after,  and  began 
negotiations  to  detach  the  Douglas  forces  from  their  agreement  with  Pierce. 
Pierce  and  Douglas  planned  to  hold  on  to  their  own  delegations  at  all  costs 
and  block  the  Buchanan  bid. 

The  Democratic  National  Convention  opened  noisily  on  June  2 
when  rival  delegations  from  Missouri  and  New  York  overpowered  the 
doormen  and  pummeled  their  way  onto  the  convention  floor.  After  order 
had  been  restored,  the  convention  chose  John  E.  Ward  of  Georgia,  a 
Buchaneer,  as  permanent  chairman.  Buchanan's  friends  succeeded  in 
gaining  early  control  of  most  of  the  convention  machinery  and  began  to 
execute  their  strategy.  Admit  all  contesting  delegations  in  order  to  split 
the  vote  of  the  states  from  which  they  came.  This  plan  would  give  Buchanan 
at  least  fifty  per  cent  where  he  might  otherwise  get  nothing.  Adopt  the 
platform  first  and  include  in  it  a  popular  sovereignty  resolution  to  pro- 
pitiate Douglas.  Promise  Bright  the  patronage  of  the  Northwest,  and  let 
him  use  this  to  seduce  weak  Douglas  delegates.  For  those  strong  on 
Douglas,  promise  the  patronage  to  him  and  remind  them  that  the  Little 
Giant,  still  only  43  years  old,  might  expect  to  be  favored  in  1860  if  he 
played  the  game  now.  Win  Michigan  by  showing  to  her  delegates  evidence 
that  their  favorite  son,  Cass,  had  been  knifed  by  Douglas  in  1852.  Tell 
everyone  who  had  failed  to  secure  a  job  under  Pierce  that  his  only  hope  lay 
with  Buchanan.  Have  the  Buchanan  Committee  continually  circulating 
about  the  floor,  visiting  with  each  state  delegation.  These  visits  might  not 
accomplish  much  directly  but  would  create  a  constant  disturbance  with 
Buchanan's  name  at  the  center.  Speaker  Ward  promised  not  to  interrupt 
this  unparliamentary  procedure.15 

In  a  dozen  ballots  Buchanan  led  but  did  not  approach  a  two-thirds 
majority.  Then  Pierce  withdrew,  throwing  his  votes  to  Douglas,  and  stray 
votes  began  to  drift  over  to  Buchanan.  On  the  sixteenth  ballot  Buchanan 
polled  a  two-to-one  majority  over  Douglas  from  New  England,  the  middle 
States,  and  the  West,  and  Douglas  ran  two-to-one  ahead  of  Buchanan  in 
the  South,  a  conclusive  refutation  of  the  fallacious  story  of  later  years  that 
the  South  had  picked  Buchanan.16  Douglas  finally  withdrew,  hoping  to 
promote  his  chances  for  1860,  and  on  the  seventeenth  ballot  the  convention 
nominated  Buchanan  by  acclamation.  It  chose  John  C.  Breckinridge  of 
Kentucky  as  vice-president,  an  honor  which  came  as  a  total  surprise  to  him. 
The  Democratic  platform,  nearly  identical  with  the  previous  one, 
added  a  new  plank:  opposition  to  further  agitation  of  the  slave  question, 

255 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


a  firm  stand  on  the  Compromise  measures  of  1850,  and  recognition  of  "the 
right  of  the  people  of  all  the  Territories  .  . .  acting  through  the  legally  and 
fairly  expressed  will  of  the  majority  of  the  actual  residents  ...  to  form  a 
constitution  with  or  without  domestic  slavery,  and  be  admitted  into 

the  Union," 

The  Republicans  named  John  C.  Fr&nont,  a  choice  of  expediency. 
Their  strongest  candidate,  William  H.  Seward,  did  not  want  to  risk  the 
defeat  which  he  anticipated  the  party  would  suffer  in  its  first  national 
campaign.  Fremont  had  tremendous  romantic  appeal,  no  political  record, 
and  would  bring  the  northern  Know-Nothings  along  with  him. 

The  Republican  platform  promised  to  promote  the  building  of  a 
railroad  to  the  Pacific,  to  make  big  appropriations  for  rivers  and  harbors, 
and  to  prohibit  in  the  territories  "those  twin  relics  of  barbarism,  polygamy 
and  slavery."  One  resolution  broke  sharply  from  the  old  pattern  of  party 
platforms  and  took  the  form  of  a  revolutionary  manifesto.  It  accused  the 
Pierce  Administration  of  every  crime  in  the  human  calendar,  charging  it 
with  murder,  robbery,  arson,  confiscation  of  private  property,  false  im- 
prisonment, and  the  tyrannical  subversion  of  the  Constitution  in  Kansas. 
The  platform  labelled  as  "spurious  and  pretended"  the  territorial  govern- 
ment of  Kansas  which  Congress  had  recognized  as  legal  and  called  the 
revolutionary  Topeka  government,  whose  members  soon  would  be  under 
federal  indictment  for  treason,  the  "constitutional  government."  But  the 
last  sentence  was  the  serious  one.  It  arraigned  the  Administration,  the 
president,  his  advisors,  agents,  supporters,  apologists,  and  accessories  for 
crimes  against  humanity  and  concluded  "that  it  is  our  fixed  purpose  to 
bring  the  actual  perpetrators  of  these  atrocious  outrages,  and  their  accom- 
plices, to  a  sure  and  condign  punishment  hereafter." 

Had  this  been  the  platform  of  some  insignificant,  crackpot  party, 
the  people  of  the  country  would  have  laughed  it  off  as  pure  moonshine, 
something  like  the  ravings  of  the  suffragettes  or  the  phrenologists.  But 
Kansas  was  no  laughing  matter,  nor  did  the  Republicans  appear  as  a  harm- 
less lunatic  fringe  in  1856.  They  might  win. 

If  they  were  victorious,  the  platform  pledged  them  to  arrest,  jail, 
and  possibly  execute  those  who  disagreed  with  them  on  Kansas.  People 
might  easily  brush  aside  the  Democrats9  sense  of  outrage  at  such  threats  as 
mere  partisan  prejudice  but  northern  Whigs  discovered  the  same  import 
in  the  Republican  platform.  Said  they:  "Can  [the  Republicans]  have  the 
madness  or  folly  to  believe  that  our  Southern  brethren  would  submit  to  be 
governed  by  such  a  chief  magistrate?  I  tell  you  that  we  are  treading  on 
the  brink  of  a  volcano."17  People  who  still  loved  their  country  were 
frightened. 

Fr&nont  posed  no  great  problem  to  the  Democrats.  The  political 
sophisticates  passed  him  off  as  "a  man  whose  only  merit,  so  far  as  history 

256 


THE  RIGHT  MAN  FOR  THE  TIMES  •    1856 


records  it,  is  in  the  fact  that  he  was  born  in  South  Carolina,  crossed  the 
Rocky  Mountains,  subsisted  on  frogs,  lizards,  snakes  and  grasshoppers,  and 
captured  a  woolly  horse."18  A  good  many  agreed  with  Sophie  Plitt: 
"Fr&nont  to  run  in  opposition  .  .  .  What  afarcel  Poor  ignoramus.  And 
Dayton  too — they  want  a  burlesque!"19  It  amused  Buchanan  to  remember 
how  he  had  first  brought  Fr&nont  into  the  public  eye  by  persuading  the 
Senate  to  print  and  distribute  thousands  of  copies  of  the  Exploring  Expedi- 
tion to  the  Rocky  Mountains.  Fr&nont  did  not  worry  him;  the  real  issue  was 
the  Republican  threat  of  disunion  and  civil  war.  Buchanan  feared  this 
possibility,  not  only  as  a  candidate  but  also  as  a  private  citizen.  "In  case 
of  a  dissolution  of  the  Union,"  he  wrote  to  Howell  Cobb  in  July,  "Maryland 
and  Pennsylvania  would  most  probably  be  frontier  states;  &  whilst  we  and 
generations  yet  to  come  would  have  bitter  cause  to  deplore  the  dreadful 
catastrophe,  these  two  states  would  suffer  more  than  any  other  members  of 
the  Confederacy."20 


CONSERVATIVES  TO  THE  RESCUE 

Buchanan  stated  the  keynote  of  his  campaign  in  these  words,  "The  Union  is 
in  danger  and  the  people  everywhere  begin  to  know  it.  The  Black  Republicans 
must  be,  as  they  can  be  with  justice,  boldly  assailed  as  disunionists,  and 
this  charge  must  be  reiterated  again  and  again."  Forget  the  past,  bury  the 
bank,  the  tariff,  and  the  rest  as  historical  fossils.  The  Democrats  must 
publicize  the  statements  of  "the  abolitionists,  free  soilers  and  infidels 
against  the  Union,"  to  show  that  the  Union  was  in  danger.  "This  race 
ought  to  be  run  on  the  question  of  Union  or  disunion."21 

The  Democratic  press  generally  adopted  this  campaign  theme, 
and  devoted  columns  to  the  antiunion  pronouncements  of  prominent 
Republicans.  Ohio's  Representative  Joshua  R.  Giddings  had  announced 
"I  look  forward  to  the  day  when  there  shall  be  a  servile  insurrection  in  the 
South;  when  the  black  man  . .  .  shall  assert  his  freedom,  and  wage  a  war  of 
extermination  against  his  master;  when  the  torch  of  the  incendiary  shall 
light  up  the  towns  of  the  South,  and  blot  out  the  last  vestige  of  slavery; 
and  though  I  may  not  mock  at  their  calamity,  nor  laugh  when  their  fear 
cometh,  yet  I  will  hail  it  as  the  dawn  of  the  millenium." ,  New  York's 
Governor  William  H.  Seward  asserted  that  "there  is  a  higher  power  than 
the  Constitution,"  and  hoped  soon  to  "bring  the  parties  of  the  country 
into  an  aggressive  war  upon  slavery."  Speaker  of  the  House  Nathaniel  P. 
Banks  said  frankly  that  he  was  "willing  ...  to  let  the  Union  slide."  Judge 
Rufus  S.  Spalding  declared  that  if  he  had  the  alternatives  of  the  continuance 
of  slavery  or  a  dissolution  of  the  Union,  "I  am  for  dissolution,  and  I  care 
not  how  quick  it  comes." 

257 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Editor  James  Watson  Webb  predicted  that  if  the  Republicans  lost 
the  election,  they  would  be  "forced  to  drive  back  the  slavocracy  with  fire 
and  sword."  Horace  Greeley  of  the  New  York  Tribune  wrote  that  "the  free 
and  slave  states  ought  to  separate."  The  Union,  he  editorialized,  "is  not 
worth  supporting  in  connexion  with  the  South."  A  Poughkeepsie  clergy- 
man  prayed  "that  this  accursed  Union  may  be  dissolved,  even  if  blood  have 
to  be  spilt."  A  group  of  Republicans  petitioned  Congress  to  take  "measures 
for  the  speedy,  peaceful,  and  equitable  dissolution  of  the  existing  union." 
0.  L  Raymond  told  an  audience  in  Faneuil  Hall,  "Remembering  that  he 
wL  a  slaveholder,  I  spit  upon  George  Washington."  (Hisses  and  applause) 
"You  hissers  are  slaveholders  in  spirit!"22 

Almost  every  day  during  the  campaign,  Democratic  newspapers 
ran  a  column  of  such  (flotations  as  evidence  of  Republican  doctrine.  But 
Buchanan  and  the  Democrats  incorrectly  assessed  the  fundamentally 
revolutionary  nature  of  the  Republican  party.  While  the  Democrats 
published  this  material  to  expose  the  determination  of  the  Republicans  to 
break  up  the  Union,  the  Republicans  joyfully  welcomed  all  the  free  publicity 
and  published  the  same  material  in  their  own  newspapers  as  bright  banners 
of  the  glorious  crusade.  About  175,000,000  copies  of  newspapers  circulated 
annually  in  the  North,  and  about  50,000,000  annually  in  the  South.  The 
southerners  got  only  the  Democratic  viewpoint,  the  terrible  threat;  the 
certainty  that  the  Republicans  planned  for  them  just  what  their  platform 
promised:  fire  and  sword.  The  northerners  got  four  times  as  much  material 
on  the  same  theme,  in  the  papers  of  both  parties,  and  the  Republicans 
believed  it  was  helping  them  more  than  Buchanan.  In  fact,  the  word 
"disunion"  so  dominated  the  campaign  that  it  began  to  take  hold  of 
Democratic  minds.  So  solid  a  Union  Democrat  as  Jeremiah  S.  Black,  in 
urging  Howell  Cobb  to  prevent  the  South  from  acting  politically  without 
prior  consultation  with  friends  in  the  North,  concluded:  "If  you  will  do 
this,  even  the  election  of  Fr&nont  may  result  in  nothing  worse  than  turning 
New  England  with  her  ignorance,  bigotry,  and  superstition  out  of  the  Union; 
and  that  is  a  consummation  most  devoutly  to  be  wished."28 

Buchanan  made  no  speeches  during  the  campaign;  he  stayed  at 
Wheatland  conducting  a  prodigious  correspondence.  Every  question  of 
the  election  dwindled  to  trifling  insignificance,  he  wrote,  "when  compared 
with  the  grand  and  appalling  issue  of  union  or  disunion."  If  Fr&nont  won, 
he  said,  disunion  "will  be  immediate  and  inevitable. . . .  We  have  so  often 
cried  Volf,'  that  now,  when  the  wolf  is  at  the  door,  it  is  difficult  to  make 
people  believe  it."  From  the  South  came  letters  from  men  who  had  once 
opposed  nullification  and  secession  but  who  now  said  "that  the  election  of 
Fi&nont  involves  the  dissolution  of  the  Union.  . . .  Many  now  deem  that 
it  would  be  for  the  mutual  advantage  of  the  parties  to  have  a  Southern 
Confederation." 

258 


THE  RIGHT  MAN  FOR  THE  TIMES  •    1856 


British  newspapers  were  "all  for  Fremont  .  .  .,  and  a  dissolution 
of  the  Union."  French  journals  assumed  that  there  would  be  an  immediate 
declaration  of  war  between  the  sections  if  Fremont  should  win,  and  ex- 
pressed surprise  that  the  word  "disunion,"  once  so  horrifying  to  Americans, 
was  now  spoken  openly  in  all  parts  of  the  country.  The  Abolitionists  and 
Radical  Republicans  of  New  England  and  Ohio  shrilled  to  the  same  chorus. 
When  a  convention  in  Cleveland,  called  for  the  purpose  of  northern 
secession,  failed  to  accomplish  that  object  in  the  fall  of  1856,  Garrison, 
Wendell  Phillips  and  their  partisans  called  another  to  meet  in  Worcester, 
Massachusetts,  in  January,  1857,  where  they  proposed  to  secede  from  a 
union  with  slaveholders.  "It  is  now  with  nine-tenths  only  a  question  of 
time,"  said  Phillips.  Garrison  defiantly  cast  a  copy  of  the  Constitution  into 
a  bonfire  with  the  exclamation:  "So  perish  all  compromises  with  tyranny." 
"Boston  is  a  sad  place,"  wrote  Buchanan.  "In  that  city  they  have  re- 
elected  to  Congress  a  factious  fanatic, .  . .  who,  in  a  public  speech,  said  that 
we  must  have  an  anti-slavery  Constitution,  an  anti-slavery  Bible,  and  an 
anti-slavery  God."24 

The  Democratic  campaign  and  the  adherence  of  many  prominent 
Whigs  to  Buchanan's  cause  seemed  to  guarantee  success  in  November. 
That  supposition  got  a  rude  shock  in  September  when  Maine  held  its  state 
election.  While  the  Democrats  had  no  real  expectation  of  winning  the 
state,  they  had  spent  money  and  sent  speakers  in  the  hope  of  keeping  the 
Republican  victory  small.  But  Maine  went  Republican  by  an  overwhelming 
majority.  This  smashing  defeat  aroused  the  Democrats  to  energetic  action. 
Southerners,  in  a  panic,  mobilized  hurriedly,  declaring  in  the  meantime 
that  if  the  Republicans  won  they  would  have  to  secede  immediately  to  save 
their  lives.  Pennsylvania  now  became  crucial,  for  careful  analysis  showed 
that  Buchanan  had  to  carry  his  home  state  to  win.  But  every  electoral  vote 
became  critically  important.  To  bolster  California,  Buchanan  wrote  a 
letter  endorsing  the  construction  of  a  Pacific  railroad  to  counter  the  Re- 
publicans* strongest  propaganda  weapon  there.  Forney  discovered,  to  his 
horror,  that  Buchanan  had  never  even  written  to  President  Pierce  or  to 
Senator  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  enlisting  their  aid  in  his  campaign.  Buchanan 
recognized  it  as  a  stupid  oversight,  but  he  found  himself  unable  to  repair  it, 
for  to  write  at  this  late  date  would  be  an  insulting  insinuation  that  these 
gentlemen  had  been  dragging  their  feet.  Douglas  became  so  excited  that 
on  his  own  volition  he  sold  some  land  and  gave  the  money  to  the  campaign 
chest:  $100,000  according  to  a  biographer  of  Douglas,  and  $100  according 
to  a  Buchanan  biographer.  In  a  thank  you  letter  for  this,  Buchanan  un- 
fortuijately  addressed  the  envelope  to  "The  Hon.  Samuel  A.  Douglas." 

The  Democratic  party  leaders  converged  on  Pennsylvania  where 
the  state  election  in  October  would  determine  the  fate  of  the  presidential 
balloting.  They  had  two  weeks  in  which  to  work.  Cobb  came  from  Georgia 

259 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


and  made  ten  speeches  in  ten  days  to  huge  audiences  from  Philadelphia  to 
Erie.  At  Meadville  he  talked  to  a  crowd  of  3000  for  an  hour  and  a  half  in 
a  driving  snow  storm,  then  drove  by  buggy  to  Erie  in  the  off-season  blizzard 
and  spoke  another  hour  and  a  half.  For  a  Georgian,  this  was  the  supreme 
sacrifice.25  From  the  South  came  the  word:  "Concentrate  your  entire 
force  of  every  kind  upon  Pennsylvania  until  the  15th— even  the  day  of 
election  have  speakers  everywhere.  Success  here  will  carry  more  votes  . . . 
than  can  possibly  be  accomplished  by  direct  efforts  in  other  states.  Carry 
every  speaker  to  Pennsylvania.  .  .  .  Don't  waste  your  time  replying. 
Carry  Pennsylvania."26 

The  week  before  election  Lancaster  staged  the  greatest  effort  of 
the  campaign.  Some  50,000  people  descended  on  the  little  Dutch  com- 
munity to  hear  the  sons  of  Henry  Clay  and  Daniel  Webster  (both  Whigs) 
and  all  the  prominent  Democrats.  There  was  a  huge  parade  with  booming 
cannon  and  innumerable  bands,  and  placards  were  displayed  at  every  little 
distance  bearing  the  legend: 

Nail  up  the  Flag,  aye,  nail  it  fast; 
The  Union  First,  the  Union  Last. 
We  hail  no  flag — no  party  own 
That  any  of  the  States  Disown.27 

Only  one  mishap  marred  the  occasion.  The  first  section  of  the  special  train 
carrying  2000  Philadelphia^  wrecked,  blocking  all  following  traffic,  with 
the  result  that  the  Dallas  contingent  never  got  to  Lancaster.28 

The  Democrats  won  Pennsylvania  by  a  slim  majority  on  October 
15  and  everyone  relaxed.  A  Democratic  presidency  was  assured.  The 
election  would  not  go  to  the  House  of  Representatives.  Fr&nont  could  not 
win.  In  the  November  elections,  Buchanan  polled  through  the  nation 
some  1,800,000  votes,  Fremont  1,300,000,  and  Fillmore  900,000.  South 
of  the  Mason-Dixon  line,  Fi&nont  drew  less  than  8000  votes.  The  Electoral 
College  gave  174  votes  to  Buchanan,  114  to  Fr&nont  and  8  to  Fillmore. 

The  Union  was  saved.  '*!  believe  now,"  wrote  Howell  Cobb's 
brother,  "that  no  other  man  but  Mr.  Buchanan  could  have  been  elected 
with  the  opposition  we  have  encountered  at  the  North.  He  was  The  Man 
...  the  most  suitable  man  for  the  times."29  Back  at  Wheadand,  his  "segar" 
lit  and  the  Madeira  bottle  open,  President-elect  Buchanan  agreed. 


260 


20 

CHARTING  THE  COURSE  •  1856-1857 

A  NATIONAL  AND  CONSERVATIVE  GOVERNMENT 

On  March  first,  1857,  James  Buchanan,  clad  in  a  dressing  gown  and  slippers, 
sat  alone  in  his  study  trying  to  calm  his  nerves  and  itemize  a  list  of  inci- 
dentals which  needed  attention.  They  must  all  be  ready  in  the  morning 
when  he  would  leave  for  Washington.  He  could  hear  Harriet  and  Miss 
Hetty  walking  about  in  the  room  directly  above  him;  the  murmur  of  their 
conversation  and  the  occasional  thump  of  a  trunk  lid  annoyed  him.  Going 
to  the  door,  he  asked  one  of  the  servants  to  call  J.  B.  Henry  who  had  been 
acting  as  his  private  secretary  during  the  past  hectic  months. 

Buchanan  gave  him  a  few  instructions  and  went  upstairs  to  his 
bedroom  where  he  removed  his  dressing  gown  and  tried  on  the  vest  and 
coat  of  his  inauguration  suit.  Mr.  Metzger,  the  tailor  on  East  King  Street, 
had  delivered  it  the  week  before,  and  it  showed  the  signs  of  his  fine  crafts- 
manship.1 Outwardly  it  was  unobtrusive;  a  plain  black  coat  of  French 
cloth,  but  into  the  lining  was  worked  a  magnificent  design  of  thirty-one 
stars  representing  the  states  of  the  Union,  with  Pennsylvania  dominating 
the  center.  It  would  fit,  he  thought  to  himself.  A  man  ought  always  to  be 
plain,  dignified,  and  restrained  on  the  exterior,  but  he  ought  to  wear  beneath 
this  external  coat  the  knowledge  of  his  true  talents  and  character.  Let 
there  be  more  hidden  in  reserve  than  outwardly  shows.  Thus  would  a  man 
always  be  competent  to  the  tasks  assigned  to  him. 

As  he  tried  on  the  flowered  satin  vest,  he  ruminated  about  his 
inauguration  ceremony.  For  him,  it  would  be  no  inauguration  at  all;  it 
would  be  more  like  a  culmination.  What  would  it  be  for  the  Union?  The 
election  of  1856,  for  the  first  time  in  American  history,  had  probed  down 
to  the  bedrock  question  of  union  or  disunion;  survival  or  disruption.  The 
cliche"  of  editors  and  orators  had  become  the  bona  fide  statement  of  the 
fundamental  problem:  the  Union  was  in  danger. 

After  his  election,  Buchanan  wrote:  "The  great  object  of  my 
administration  will  be  to  arrest,  if  possible,  the  agitation  of  the  slavery 

261 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


question  at  the  North,  and  to  destroy  sectional  parlies.  Should  a  kind 
Providence  enable  me  to  succeed  in  my  efforts  to  restore  harmony  to  the 
Union,  I  shall  feel  that  I  have  not  lived  in  vain."2  He  re-echoed  the  theme 
to  Mr.  Justice  Grier.3  To  the  students  of  Franklin  and  Marshall  College, 
who  visited  at  Wheatland  a  few  weeks  after  the  election,  he  confided  that 
"the  object  of  my  administration  will  he  to  destroy  any  sectional  party, 
North  or  South,  and  harmonize  all  sections  of  the  Union  under  a  national 
and  conservative  government,  as  it  was  fifty  years  ago."' 


»  "4 


UNION  ABOVE  SECTION,  PARTY  ABOVE  FACTION 

In  the  interval  between  the  election  and  the  inauguration  Buchanan  could 
do  little  or  nothing  about  the  slavery  dispute,  but  even  before  taking  the 
oath  of  office  he  could  strike  a  blow  against  sectionalism  by  carefully  picking 
his  Cabinet.  He  would  not  incorporate  into  it  men  of  different  political 
opinions.  He  would  choose  only  those  who  had  proved  their  party 'regu- 
larity and  demonstrated  their  devotion  to  nation  above  section.  There 
would  be  no  extremist  in  the  Cabinet. 

As  soon  as  Buchanan  received  the  facts  and  figures  of  the  election, 
he  made  a  study  to  determine  the  proper  dispensation  of  office  and  political 
favor.  He  wanted  to  unite  the  national  Democrats  with  the  Union  Whigs 
and  to  destroy  the  subversive  league  of  northern  fanatics  and  southern 
rebels.  The  election  returns  showed  that  Buchanan  had  won  all  the  slave 
states  except  Maryland  (which  went  for  Fillmore),  and  had  carried  the  free 
states  of  Pennsylvania,  Indiana  and  California.  Fr&nont  had  won  the  six 
New  England  states  plus  Michigan  and  Wisconsin.  Elsewhere  Buchanan 
and  Fremont  had  run  a  tight  race  and  neither  had  achieved  a  popular 
majority. 

The  election  strongly  highlighted  the  sectional  nature  of  the 
Republicans  and  the  national  appeal  of  the  Democrats.6  Frdmont  com- 
manded  a  majority  in  only  one  of  the  geographical  sections  of  the  nation; 
he  scarcely  had  any  vote  south  of  the  Mason-Dixon  line.  Buchanan  beat 
Fr&nont  in  seven  of  the  eight  geographical  sections.6  But  the  American 
party,  by  running  Millard  Fillmore,  had  complicated  the  election  and  in- 
duced a  critical  21  per  cent  of  the  voters  to  dodge  the  issue  on  which  the 
safety  of  the  nation  rested.  There  was  no  way  of  knowing  what  these 
voters  stood  for. 

Buchanan  knew  definitely  what  kind  of  Cabinet  he  wanted.  To 
keep  a  Democratic  bastion  in  the  heart  of  the  enemy's  country,  he  needed 
a  New  Englander.  Either  Nathan  Clifford  of  Maine  or  Isaac  Toucey  of 
Connecticut  would  meet  the  requirements  of  experience  and  party  regularity. 
New  York  might  as  well  be  left  out;  the  two  Democratic  factions  of  the  state 
were,  after  a  generation  of  feuding,  hopelessly  irreconcilable.  He  could 

262 


CHARTING  THE  COURSE  •   1856  - 1857 


pick  no  New  Yorker  without  widening  the  split.  Pennsylvania  had  to  have 
a  Cabinet  post,  but  the  selection  here  would  be  as  difficult  as  in  New  York. 
The  Democrats  remained  so  faction  ridden  that  the  selection  of  any  veteran 
might  wreck  the  party.  Buchanan  planned  to  avoid  trouble  by  appointing 
a  personal  friend  who  was  a  newcomer  to  Pennsylvania  politics,  J.  Clancy 
Jones  of  Reading,  who  had  once  lived  in  the  South  and  commanded  con- 
fidence and  respect  there. 

Virginia,  which  had  loyally  supported  Buchanan,  had  earned  a 
place.  He  promptly  offered  one  to  Henry  A.  Wise,  but  the  governor  turned 
him  down.  He  also  offered  John  Slidell  a  Cabinet  appointment  but  he,  too, 
declined  because  he  preferred  to  remain  in  the  Senate. 

As  an  antidote  for  northern  suspicion,  Buchanan  wanted  in  a 
position  of  high  responsibility  the  most  outspoken  southern  unionist  he 
could  find.  Howell  Cobb  of  Georgia  was  that  man.  He  had  stumped  the 
North  during  the  campaign  and  had  given  to  thousands  a  thrilling  demon- 
stration that  the  South  contained  some  of  the  most  aggressive  and  deter- 
mined champions  of  union  in  the  land.  After  SlidelFs  refusal,  Buchanan 
wanted  Cobb  to  have  the  State  Department,  and  Cobb  let  it  be  known  that 
he  would  serve  only  in  that  station. 

The  Union  Whigs  had  contributed  so  many  votes  to  Buchanan's 
election  that  he  wished  to  confirm  their  conversion  to  Democracy  by 
including  one  of  their  leaders  in  his  official  staff.  Other  needs,  however, 
would  have  to  be  taken  care  of  first. 

The  Northwest  presented  the  worst  problem.  Here,  in  the  upper 
Mississippi  Valley,  Senator  Stephen  A.  Douglas  of  Illinois  and  Jesse  D. 
Bright  of  Indiana  were  locked  in  mortal  combat  for  control  of  the  power 
and  patronage  of  the  party.  Buchanan  detested  Douglas,  considering  him 
the  irresponsible  destroyer  of  the  slavery  settlement  of  1850.  To  Buchanan, 
the  stupidity  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  Bill  was  overshadowed  only  by  the 
avaricious  personal  ambition  of  its  author.  Unhappily,  Douglas  could  not 
be  ignored  for  he  had  nearly  taken  the  1856  nomination,  and  with  a  strong 
following  in  the  South  he  commanded  a  power  essential  to  the  party. 
Bright  had  brought  in  the  vote  of  Indiana  for  Buchanan  when  Douglas  had 
failed  to  deliver  Illinois,  but  Douglas  threatened  to  wreck  the  party  if  Bright 
went  into  the  Cabinet.  Bright  was  determined  that  no  friend  of  Douglas 
should  receive  an  appointment.  Under  these  circumstances,  Buchanan 
felt  he  dared  not  commit  himself  to  either  for  the  time  being. 

At  this  point  in  his  planning,  Buchanan  received  the  reports 
from  California.  They  gave  him  an  increased  majority  and  suggested  one 
new  idea.  He  could  not  give  California  a  position,  but  he  could  again 
endorse  a  federally-built  railroad  to  the  Pacific  which  would  gratify  the 
westerners  and  weaken  Douglas,  who  was  working  in  political  team  with 
Jefferson  Davis  in  the  South.  The  renewed  prospect  of  a  Pacific  railroad 

263 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


would  trip  one  or  the  other,  for  each  was  determined  to  have  the  eastern 
terminus  of  any  such  road  in  his  own  back  yard.  He  advocated  the  railway 
in  a  letter  which  he  sent  to  the  press  December  8. 

Wheatland  was  open  house  during  November  and  December, 
though  the  stream  of  visitors  never  reached  the  400  daily  that  some  of  the 
newspapers  reported.  John  Appleton  of  Maine,  whom  Buchanan  planned 
to  install  as  the  editor  of  an  Administration  newspaper  in  Washington,  even 
lived  at  Wheatland  for  a  time,  to  the  great  distress  of  John  Forney,  who 
wanted  the  editorial  job.  Forney  rushed  in  and  out  continually  in  the  early 
weeks,  until  he  learned  that  he  was  not  considered  for  the  Cabinet  and 
would  not  be  awarded  the  Washington  editorship. 

Buchanan  did  not  know  what  to  do  with  Forney.  He  had  sup- 
ported Pierce  up  to  the  very  last  moment  before  the  Cincinnati  Convention. 
Although  he  had  cleared  lie  position  with  Buchanan  beforehand,  this  did 
not  mollify  Buchanan's  friends;  and  nothing  would  ever  make  Forney 
acceptable  to  Virginia  Democrats.  He  had  gotten  into  a  violent  fight  with 
the  Wise  faction  while  Buchanan  was  in  London,  and  had  expressed  himself 
with  such  abandon  that  he  was  lucky  to  have  escaped  a  duel.  Buchanan's 
Virginia  friends  would  have  preferred  the  devil  to  Forney  in  any  responsible 
position,  and  Buchanan  needed  Virginia  back  of  him.  Forney  wrote  that 
he  was  staying  close  to  the  foot  of  the  throne  to  counteract  the  southern 
insistence  that  he  should  not  edit  the  Washington  Union.  "I  can  be  elected 
Senator,"  he  said,  "but  I  will  not  be.  I  will  go  into  the  Union,  or  I  will 
stay  home  and  — .  I  confess  I  am  sick  at  heart.  Met  Mr.  Clancy  Jones. 
He  is  for  the  Cabinet.  God  save  us."7 

During  November,  Buchanan  went  on  a  brief  trip  with  Lewis  Cass 
of  Michigan,  and  visited  Governor  Wise  and  Senator  Douglas  in  Phila- 
delphia. The  more  he  listened  and  the  more  mail  he  read,  the  more  complex 
his  Cabinet  problem  became  and  the  more  secretive  he  grew  about  it.  By 
early  December  he  knew  that  Wise  and  Slidell  would  not  serve,  that  Bright 
was  blocked,  that  Clifford  was  unacceptable  to  Pierce,  that  Jones  would  be 
rejected  by  the  Democrats  of  Pennsylvania,  and  that  none  of  the  Democratic 
leaders  was  willing  to  give  up  a  Cabinet  place  to  a  Union  Whig.  Only  Cobb 
remained  a  certainty,  and  he  insisted  on  the  State  Department  or  nothing. 

On  December  1,  Buchanan  wrote  that  he  was  still  "wholly  un- 
committed about  the  cabinet,"8  and  stated  that  he  intended  to  keep  his  own 
counsel  on  the  subject  "even  after  I  shall  have  formed  a  decided  opinion,  so 
that  if  circumstances  should  require  a  change,  this  may  be  made  without 
giving  offence."9  By  the  end  of  the  month  Buchanan  asked  his  friends  to 
keep  out  of  Lancaster  because  "everybody  is  now  looked  upon  with  a 
jealous  &  suspicious  eye  who  visits  Wheatland."10  Howell  Cobb,  who 
should  have  been  first  in  Buchanan's  confidence,  at  last  abandoned  his 

264 


CHARTING  THE  COURSE  •    1856  -  185? 


curiosity  and  told  his  wife  that  he  was  ready  "to  let  Old  Buck  fix  up  his 
Cabinet  to  suit  himself— as  ...  he  will  do  anyhow."11 

Perhaps  Buchanan  was  wise  to  be  silent,  and  to  postpone  any 
appointment  until  he  had  worked  out  a  scheme  incorporating  all.  But 
unhappily  for  him,  his  secrecy  multiplied  his  difficulties.  In  the  absence 
of  a  public  announcement,  every  clique  and  faction  of  the  Democracy 
which  had  a  candidate  to  push  or  a  trade  to  make  got  into  the  game.  Manu- 
facturers of  public  opinion  to  influence  Buchanan's  choice  set  up  in  every 
hole  and  corner  of  the  nation. 

False  rumors  refueled  all  the  old  factional  fights.  Forney  raged 
against  Virginia,  "For  Hunter  we  never  will  or  can  go.  Against  him  we 
shall  wage  war  to  the  knife  and  the  knife  to  the  hilt ...  by  the  Great  God 
they  shall  find  that  if  we  are  Democrats  we  are  not  negro  slaves  and  dogs . . . 
anybody  before  Hunter."12  Wrote  another:  "If  the  Free  Soilers  at  the 
North  have  been  as  busy  as  the  Southern  Rights  men  ...  his  Cabinet  will 
have  to  be  taken  from  the  extremes  of  the  party,  leaving  all  the  national 
men  out."13 

Buchanan  hoped  that  the  first  week  of  the  New  Year  would  settle 
one  worrisome  deadlock,  the  problem  of  Forney  and  Jones.  The  Pennsyl- 
vania Legislature  would  soon  elect  a  Senator  to  replace  Richard  Brodhead 
who  for  the  past  six  years  had  made  it  a  kind  of  religious  mission  to  vilify 
and  discredit  the  Sage  of  Wheadand.  Buchanan  had  hoped  to  send 
Jeremiah  Bkck  to  the  Senate,  but  Forney  now  had  his  heart  set  upon  that 
place.  Something  had  to  be  done  for  Forney.  He  was  now  in  a  state  of 
near  frenzy,  and  if  he  ever  lost  control  of  himself  he  could  and  would  pky 
havoc  with  the  Democracy  in  Pennsylvania.  Buchanan  could  not  possibly 
have  him  in  the  Cabinet  and  he  could  not  trust  him  with  the  Washington 
Union,  but  he  would  be  pretty  safe  in  the  Senate;  at  least  a  vast  improve- 
ment over  Brodhead.  If  Forney  went  into  the  Senate,  there  would  be  no 
resistance  to  Jones  in  the  Cabinet. 

After  much  prodding  Buchanan  wrote  a  letter  to  Harrisburg 
stating  his  personal  preference  for  Forney  as  Senator.  The  letter  was  both 
restrained  and  belated,  but  it  was  nonetheless  a  direct  endorsement,  'which 
was  more  than  Buchanan  had  ever  before  given  to  anyone  in  a  Pennsylvania 
senatorial  race.14 

A  few  days  later  the  telegraph  wires  hummed  with  the  news  of 
the  election  of  Simon  Cameron  as  Senator.  "My  God,  what  a  scene  of 
public  corruption  and  wholesale  bribery  it. was,"  exploded  Forney.15  The 
Democrats  nominated  Forney  but  Cameron,  after  mobilizing  the  opposition, 
discovered  he  needed  only  a  handful  of  votes  to  win.  He  first  utilized 
David  Taggart,  a  state  senator  from  Northumberland  County,  whose  bank 
Cameron  had  threatened  to  close  and  then  relented  on  a  promise  of  political 
subservience.  He  also  enlisted  the  aid  of  Charles  Penrose.  These  two 

265 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


SU< 


successfully  appealed  to  three  Democrats  who  were  looking  for  a  chance  to 
square  old  scores  with  Forney.  For  Buchanan  it  was  the  worst  thing  that 
could  have  happened;  it  destroyed  the  very  keystone  of  his  plan.  Pennsyl- 
vania  Democracy  was  to  have  heen  the  model  and  the  guide;  the  symbol  of 
national  spirit  and  forbearance  in  the  party.  Now  it  was  a  laughing  stock. 
Howell  Cobb  wrote  to  his  wife  "that  Simon  Cameron,  an  abolitionist,  was 
elected. ...  It  is  a  hard  blow  not  only  upon  Forney  but  upon  Mr.  Buchanan 
and  the  democratic  party.  I  have  never  felt  more  deeply  a  result  than 
I  do  this."16 

Forney's  defeat  raised  a  strong  wave  of  sympathy  for  him  which 
broke  in  the  form  of  demands  that  Buchanan  now  put  him  in  the  Cabinet 
on  the  principle  "that  great  generals  ought  to  care  for  ...  the  gallant  and 
true-hearted  that  nobly  fell  with  their  face  to  the  enemy,  particularly  when 
treason  worked  their  fall."17  But  if  Buchanan  had  decided  nothing  else, 
he  had  determined  not  to  have  Forney  in  the  Cabinet  He  now  reconciled 
himself  to  another  firm  conclusion:  he  could  not  have  Jones,  either,  and  in 
great  embarrassment  sat  down  to  ask  Jones  to  release  him  from  his  former 
promise.18  Angry  and  hurt,  Jones  tried  to  maintain  his  claim,  but  he 
ultimately  gave  Buchanan  a  written  release  and  intimated  that  he  might 
accept  a  mission  to  give  the  appearance  of  party  harmony. 

Knowing  that  Forney,  with  five  children,  mounting  debts,  and  no 
job,  desperately  needed  money,  Buchanan  urged  that  he  take  the  Liverpool 
consulate,  the  richest  place  he  could  find  in  the  non-policy  making  branch 
of  the  government,  but  Forney  would  have  none  of  it.  He  would  not  go 
abroad,  and  he  refused  to  serve  at  home  in  any  subordinate  position,19 
Unable  to  find  any  post  he  could  conscientiously  give  which  Forney  would 
accept,  Buchanan  temporarily  gave  up  the  effort;  but  when  he  learned  that 
his  old  friend  was  drinking  heavily  and  had  threatened  to  mortgage  the 
Washington  property  which  was  the  only  remaining  security  for  his  family, 
Buchanan  stepped  in,  arranged  to  act  as  trustee  of  the  property  for  Mrs. 
Forney  and  the  children,  and  devised  a  temporary  income  for  Forney  as  paid 
correspondent  for  various  Democratic  papers.20 

In  January  it  was  rumored  that  Buchanan  was  seriously  con- 
sidering Robert  J.  Walker  for  the  State  Department,  proclaiming  him  for 
Pennsylvania.  Walker  had  been  born  in  Bellefonte,  Pennsylvania,  and 
grown  up  in  Pittsburgh,  but  he  was  now  a  resident  of  Mississippi.  He  had 
strong  national  views  and  personally  opposed  slavery,  although  he  was  rec- 
onciled to  it  politically  as  a  system  sanctioned  by  law  and  tradition.  The 
rumor  concerning  Walker  disturbed  Cobb  and  set  in  motion  his  enemies, 
Jefferson  Davis  and  Stephen  Douglas,  who  now  began  to  push  Lewis  Cass 
for  the  top  post  in  the  Cabinet.  They  sought  by  this  scheme  to  block  Cobb 
and  Bright  so  that  Davis  could  gain  control  in  the  South  and  Douglas  in 

266 


CHARTING  THE  COURSE  •    1856  -  1857 


the  Northwest.21    But  Cobb,  with  great  magnanimity  and  political  astute- 
ness,  endorsed  their  candidate,  "and  that  knocked  all  their  calculations 

into  <pi-'  "22 

Buchanan  neither  liked  nor  respected  Cass,  but  he  did  recognize 
him  as  an  ideal  symbol  of  his  policy  and  saw  in  his  appointment  an  oppor- 
tunity to  resolve  several  of  his  most  embarrassing  problems.  Cass  would 
undoubtedly  accept,  for  he  had  just  been  voted  out  of  his  job  as  Senator 
from  Michigan  and  would  be  reluctant  to  return  home  in  defeat.  He  was  a 
thorough  nationalist,  an  undeviating  party  regular,  an  old-time  Jacksonian, 
and  a  former  presidential  candidate.  He  would  not  make  a  good  Secretary 
of  State,  for  he  was  a  notorious  Anglophobe,  and  he  was  so  old,  lethargic, 
and  indolent  that  Buchanan  planned  to  instruct  others  to  do  the  work.  But 
Cass  would  reinforce  the  idea  of  party  unity,  Cobb  had  agreed  to  defer 
to  him,  though  to  no  other,  as  head  of  the  Cabinet  and  would  take  the  next 
position,  possibly  the  Treasury.23  Cass's  installation  would  break  the 
critical  stalemate;  confound  Davis  and  Douglas  without  giving  them  cause 
for  resentment;  pacify  Bright  who  had  won  his  Senatorship  and  would  not 
contest  the  issue  with  Cass;  permit  Buchanan  to  have  Cobb  in  the  Cabinet; 
and  make  room  for  maneuver  in  other  selections  because  the  greatest 
pressures  were  removed.  So  far  nothing  had  been  given  to  Pennsylvania, 
but  she  would  have  to  wait.  At  this  point  Buchanan  decided  to  go  to 
Washington  and  finish  the  Cabinetmaking. 

He  arrived  in  Washington  on  January  27  during  the  worst  cold 
wave  in  decades  and  went  immediately  to  the  National  Hotel.  Forney 
reported  in  the  Pennsylvanian  that  President  Pierce  and  Senator  Douglas 
sent  Buchanan  dinner  invitations,  which  he  declined,24  but  certain  persons 
who  were  on  the  scene  stated  that  he  dined  with  Pierce,  Douglas,  and  others 
on  the  night  of  January  31  and  the  next  evening  attended  a  dinner  party 
given  by  Mrs.  Douglas.25  One  thing  is  known;  he  talked  with  Douglas,  and 
the  Little  Giant  reported  afterwards  that  the  atmosphere  was  chilly.  He 
was  not  referring  to  the  weather.26 

Buchanan  consulted  at  length  with  men  he  particularly  trusted; 
Cobb,  Wise,  Slidell,  and  others.  Cobb  wrote  to  his  wife  on  January  31  that 
"Old  Buck  still  avers  he  has  not  communicated  to  anyone"  his  Cabinet 
plans,  but  he  included  in  the  same  letter  a  list  of  probabilities.  His  accurate 
"guessing"  leads  one  to  suspect  that  the  decisions  were  made  during 
these  consultations.27' 

Buchanan  returned  home  on  February  3.  A  cryptic  note  in  the 
Wrightsville  Star  reported  that  the'  president-elect  "footed  it"  the  10  miles 
from  Wrightsville  to  Lancaster.28  The  visits  to  Wheatland  continued: 
Bright,  Douglas,  Dan  Sickles,  and  a  stream  of  Pennsylvania  Democrats. 
All  reported  that  Buchanan  was  still  planning  Cabinet  appointments,  but 
more  likely  he  was  giving  most  of  his  time  to  the  inaugural  address. 

267 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Forney's  friends  were  furious  that  Clancy  Jones  was  going  around 
blabbing  that  he  had  been  invited  for  an  advance  perusal  of  the  address  and 
was  acting  very  uppity  about  it.29  Of  the  Cabinet,  Buchanan  wrote  in 
mid-February:  "Applications  are  pouring  in  to  me  recommending  different 
gentlemen  for  the  Cabinet;  but  they  are  too  late  ...  the  testimony  is  closed 
and  the  case  ready  for  judgment. ...  I  shall  announce  it  in  a  few  days."30 

On  February  17,  Buchanan  wrote  the  first  of  a  series  of  letters 
that  would  settle  the  composition  of  the  Cabinet.  He  informed  Clancy 
Jones  that  he  would  definitely  be  out,  and  that  Jeremiah  Sullivan  Black 
was  to  have  the  only  place  available  to  a  Pennsylvanian.31  On  the  18th  he 
had  it  out  with  Forney,  who  wrote  to  Cobb  of  the  interview:  "Just  from 

Lancaster  where  I  have  heard  my  doom It  wounds  me  like  a  blow."32 

On  the  20th  and  21st,  Buchanan  was  "mysteriously  missing,"  according  to 
the  local  press,  but  it  is  certain  that  he  was  at  Wheatland,  for  he  wrote  to 
Cobb  from  there  on  the  21st  and  formally  asked  him  to  accept  the  Treasury 

Department. 

The  same  day  he  wrote  to  Cass,  offering  the  State  Department 
under  conditions  which  would  let  Cass  have  the  honor  but  place  the  work 
and  responsibility  in  the  hands  of  assistants  named  by  Buchanan.  He  then 
invited  Aaron  V.  Brown  of  Tennessee  to  take  the  Post  Office,  and  Jacob 
Thompson  of  Mississippi  the  Interior  Department.  The  Navy  Department 
and  Attorney-Generalship  were  still  unfilled;  into  these  places  he  wanted  to 
put  a  Pennsylvanian  and  a  New  Englander,  one  of  them,  if  possible,  a  Union 
Whig.  Buchanan  felt  he  could  go  no  further  at  the  moment.  On  February 
25  he  published  in  the  newspapers  a  notice  that  positively  no  more  visitors 
would  be  received  at  Wheatland  until  after  the  inaugural  ceremonies. 

To  close  the  door  to  callers  was  very  much  out  of  character  for 
Buchanan,  even  when  he  had  a  presidential  inaugural  address  to  finish. 
His  "mysterious  absence"  and  his  subsequent  seclusion  resulted  from 
something  a  good  deal  more  serious  than  a  wish  for  peace  and  quiet. 
James  Buchanan,  along  with  dozens  of  other  guests,  had  gotten  a  bad  case 
of  the  ctNational  Hotel  disease"  during  his  recent  visit  to  the  Capital.  The 
disorder  was  a  kind  of  dysentery,  accompanied  by  violeitf  diarrhea,  severe 
intestinal  inflammation,  and  distressing  persistence.  The  affair  was 
partially  hushed  up,  but  rumors  amplified  the  brief  reports  which  attributed 
the  cause  to  frozen  plumbing  which  in  some  way  had  contaminated  the 
water  supply.  Some  averred  that  rats,  driven  from  the  walls  by  the  cold, 
had  sought  refuge  in  the  attic  and  there  tumbled  into  the  open  vats  in 
which  rain  water  was  collected  for  the  hotel  system.  This  explanation 
expanded  into  the  tale  that  poisoned  rats  were  purposely  placed  in  the 
water  tanks.  Other  experts  concluded  that  poisonous  gas  from  sewers 
which  were  connected  with  the  kitchen  sinks  had  been  stopped  up  by  the 
freezing  of  sewer  outlets  and  had  poisoned  the  food.  The  probable  reason 


CHARTING  THE  COURSE  •   1856  .  1857 


was  that  sewer  waste  had  backed  up  into  the  kitchen,  contaminated  the  area, 
and  infected  the  servants,  who  passed  the  infection  on  to  the  guests.  At 
such  time  it  was  inevitable  that  there  should  be  an  ugly  rumor  of  an 
attempted  assassination.33 

Whatever  the  cause  of  the  epidemic,  Dr.  Jonathan  Foltz,  who 
treated  Buchanan  after  his  return  to  Wheadand,  ordered  him  to  live  else- 
where during  the  preinaugural  period,  preferably  the  President  House  where 
all  the  water  came  from  a  tested  spring.3* 

Buchanan  felt  he  had  nearly,  completed  the  first  part  of  his  task. 
The  Cabinet  would  represent  national  interests  and  the  inaugural  would 
emphasize  the  same  theme.  Every  extremist  from  Maine  to  Florida  and 
every  faction  from  New  York  to  California  had  had  a  go  at  him  and  been 
given  a  fair  hearing.  They  had  forced  him  to  alter  some  of  his  personal 
choices,  but  he  had  held  firm  on  the  principle  governing  the  final  selections. 
There  would  be  not  one  factionist  or  one  sectional  fanatic  among  his 
advisors;  all  were  devoted  to  the  Union  above  section;  to  the  party  above 
faction;  and  to  a  desire  to  preserve  the  status  quo  at  least  long  enough  to 
calm  the  public  mind.  The  Cabinet  would  be  national  and  conservative. 

Buchanan  had  expected  to  defer  the  second  great  task,  dealing 
with  slavery,  until  after  the  inauguration.  But  during  February  he  was 
drawn  into  a  correspondence  which  gave  him  hope  that  part  of  the  problem 
might  be  solved  at  a  stroke.  While  in  Washington  he  had  learned  that  the 
Supreme  Court  was  nearly  ready  to  bring  in  a  decision  on  the  Dred  Scott 
case.  Eager  to  have  the  backing  of  the  Court,  he  wrote  to  Justices  John 
Catron  and  Robert  Grier  about  the  wisdom  of  having  the  Supreme  Court 
issue  a  thorough  expository  opinion  on  the  power  of  Congress  over  slavery 
in  the  territories.  Buchanan  knew  what  the  majority  decision  would  be- 
that  Scott  had  no  rigjit  to  sue  because  he  was  not  a  citizen— and  he  knew 
that  two  dissenting  Justices  would  prepare  a  statement  supporting  their 
views.  Should  not  the  majority  do  likewise,  and  make  explicit  that  Congress 
had  no  power  over  slavery  in  the  territories;  therefore,  the  Missouri  Com- 
promise had  been  unconstitutional?  Buchanan  strongly  urged  this  action 
as  the  best  possible  way  to  get  the  slavery  debate  out  of  Congress  and  settle 
once  and  for  all  the  sectional  contention.  If  the  country  was  so  far  gone 
that  it  would  attack  the  Supreme  Court,  then  the  Union  was  already  cracked 
beyond  repair.35 

Buchanan  stirred  and  shook  his  head  as  the  room  came  back  into 
focus  and  his  rumination  turned  into  the  realities  of  March  1, 1857.  The 
inaugural  coat  still  lay  upon  the  bed.  Tomorrow  morning  he  was  leaving 
for  Washington* 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


"I  DO  SOLEMNLY  SWEAR" 

Lancaster  was  up  betimes  on  the  cold,  snowy  morning  of  March  2.  The 
church  bells  began  ringing  at  six  to  inform  the  people  it  was  time  to  begin 
the  march  to  the  depot.  The  marshals,  in  their  gaily  colored  silk  scarfs  and 
white  rosettes,  cantered  about  waving  their  batons  and  shouting  lustily  at 
the  straggling  crowd  along  West  King  Street  to  form  a  line  and  close  ranks, 
in  readiness  to  follow  Buchanan's  carriage  the  moment  it  arrived.  After 
half  an  hour  of  shivering  and  foot  stamping,  the  marshals  very  sensibly 
abandoned  their  pride  of  organization  to  the  need  of  action  and  started  a 
parade  toward  Wheatland  to  intercept  the  president-elect.  The  band  fell 
to  its  work  with  zest  but  after  about  five  minutes  had  to  give  up  the  attempt 
because  of  the  cold,  and  clambered  aboard  the  wagon  provided  for  its  use. 
At  Wheatland  it  was  learned  that  Buchanan's  party  was  still  not  ready  to 
leave.  At  last,  to  the  echo  of  rousing  cheers,  the  carriage  came  round  to 
the  front  portico.  Buchanan,  Miss  Lane,  James  Buchanan  Henry,  and 
Miss  Hetty  Parker  stepped  into  it,  and  without  further  ado  the  procession, 
with  Captain  John  H.  Duchman's  Lancaster  Fencibles  proudly  leading  the 
way,  was  off  to  the  railway  station. 

Superintendent  Joseph  B.  Baker  had  provided  a  special  train  of 
four  cars  the  sides  and  windows  of  which  had  been  decorated  with  patriotic 
symbols  and  scenes  from  Wheatland.  The  presidential  party  boarded, 
acknowledged  a  last  rousing  ovation,  and  left  for  Baltimore.  There  a  change 
of  stations  required  passengers  to  go  to  the  other  end  of  the  city  for  the 
Washington  trains. 

En  route  a  message  was  delivered  warning  that  a  rowdy  mob  of 
about  1000  anti-Buchanan  Know-Nothings  was  swarming  around  the 
Calvert  Street  Station  looking  for  trouble.  The  party  therefore  got  oflF 
at  the  Charles  Street  Station,  where  several  companies  of  cavalry,  sabers 
drawn,  waited  to  accompany  the  presidential  party  to  Barnum's  Hotel  for  a 
huge  midday  bantjuet.  But  Buchanan  was  so  ill  that  he  retired  immediately 
until  three  o'clock  when  he  boarded  the  train  for  the  capital.  Meanwhile, 
the  Lancaster  Fencibles,  who  had  to  walk  between  stations,  ran  into  the 
foiled  Know-Nothings,  had  to  fight  their  way  through,  and  were  so  much 
harassed  during  their  march  that  they  missed  the  train.30 

Despite  the  specific  orders  of  Dr.  Foltz  and  the  urgent  pleas  of 
Senators  Slidell,  Bigler,  and  others,  Buchanan  went  to  the  National  Hotel 
as  a  mark  of  confidence  in  its  proprietor,  an  old  personal  friend.  He  still 
had  two  Cabinet  appointments  to  make  and  the  address  to  finish.  The 
politicians  assembled  at  Washington  took  up  every  minute  he  would  spare 
them  and  tried  to  "help"  him  complete  these  tasks.  At  one  stage  he  added 
a  sentence  to  the  inaugural  implying  that  settlers  in  Kansas  and  Nebraska 
had  no  power  over  slavery  in  the  territories  until  the  time  of  framing  a 


CHARTING  THE  COURSE  •   1856 . 1857 


state  constitution.  News  of  this  opinion  leaked  out  to  General  Cass  who, 
as  an  originator  of  the  popular  sovereignty  idea  back  in  1848,  could  not 
swallow  this  interpretation  and  told  Buchanan  bluntly  that  he  would  refuse 
to  serve  in  the  Cabinet  if  this  statement  appeared  in  the  speech.  Buchanan 
cut  it  out.  He  concluded  that  he  could  not  complete  the  Cabinet  in  such 
turmoil  and  decided  to  postpone  the  work  until  the  day  after  the  inaugura- 
tion. Furthermore,  he  was  very  sick  with  a  recurrence  of  the  dysentery, 
and  he  was  shocked  to  learn  that  the  disease  had  broken  out  again  with 
increased  virulence  among  the  guests  at  the  hotel. 

A  faultless  spring  day  dawned  on  March  4  to  grace  the  inaugura- 
tion festivities.  The  thousands  who  had  poured  into  the  city  were  glad  to 
be  up  early  from  their  makeshift  beds  in  the  parlors,  dining  rooms,  and 
public  lobbies  which  had  been  pressed  into  service  to  accommodate  the 
overflow  crowd.  The  bells  began  to  ring,  and  slowly  members  of  military 
companies  in  gay  uniforms  appeared  on  the  streets,  citizens  hung  flags  and 
bunting  from  windows  along  the  line  of  march,  and  members  of  the  Twelfth 
Ward  Democratic  Club  of  Philadelphia  redoubled  their  efforts  to  sell  more 
tickets  at  five  dollars  a  head  to  the  Inauguration  Ball. 

By  noon  the  three  groups  of  parade  marshals,  with  their  white, 
yellow  or  blue  scarfs  and  saddle  cloths  trimmed  with  rosettes  had  the  thirty- 
odd  fire  companies,  militia  battalions,  bands,  floats,  and  groups  of  artisans 
in  line;  and  the  procession  started  down  Pennsylvania  Avenue  to  the 
National  Hotel.  There  Buchanan  was  joined  by  vice-president-elect 
Breckinridge,  and  all  were  ready  to  proceed  when  it  was  found  that  Presi- 
dent Pierce  was  not  on  hand.  A  twenty-minute  delay  ensued  until  someone 
on  the  arrangements  committee  discovered  that  through  an  oversight, 
Pierce  had  been  completely  forgotten.  After  a  flurry  of  excitement  and 
consultation,  the  committee  picked  Pierce  up  at  the  Willard  Hotel  and  at 
last  the  waiting  crowds  were  relieved  of  their  impatience  by  the  sight  of  an 
elegant,  four-horse  barouche,  containing  the  president  and  the  president- 
elect. Ahead  of  them,  leading  the  procession,  was  a  huge  float  drawn  by 
six  white  horses  bearing  a  lady  symbolizing  the  Goddess  of  Liberty  on  a 
high  platform.  Members  of  the  Keystone  Club  rode  beside  the  open 
presidential  carriages,  and  behind  them  came  a  float  with  a  large  model 
of  a  warship. 

At  the  Capitol,  the  group  which  was  to  share  the  inauguration 
platform  gathered  first  in  the  Senate  Chamber  where  Vice-President 
Breckinridge  took  the  oath  of  office.  All  then  filed  out  onto  the  stand  in 
front  of  the  east  portico.  In  the  shuffle  of  getting  seated,  Buchanan  and 
Chief  Justice  Taney  met  momentarily  at  the  front  of  the  rail  and  held  a 
brief  chat.  Some  of  those  who  witnessed  this  exchange  swore  to  their  dying 
day  that  at  this  very  moment  Taney  told  Buchanan  how  the  Supreme  Court 
would  decide  the  Dred  Scott  case,  and  that  Buchanan  instantly  added  this 


271 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

information  to  his  address.    What  they  did  not  know  was  that  he  had  more 
than  a  week  before  learned  the  news  from  one  of  the  Justices.37 

The  address  was  soon  over  and  the  oath  of  office  administered. 
Buchanan  felt  thankful  that  his  queasy  stomach  had  responded  to  the 
brandy  and  medication  which  Dr.  Foltz  had  given  him  just  a  half  hour 
before  and  that  he  had  been  able  to  complete  the  ceremony  with  dignity. 
The  address  had  been  sincere,  if  unexciting;  that  was  its  purpose,  his 
purpose,  and  the  country's  need.  Below,  hawkers  were  already  selling  a 
kerchief-sized  edition  of  it,  printed  on  silk.38  The  audience  discovered 
nothing  new  in  it  except  two  statements— that  Buchanan  would  not  run 
again,  and  that  the  Supreme  Court  would  soon  settle  the  issue  of  slavery 
in  the  Territories.  Foreign  correspondents  wrote  that  the  new  Administra- 
tion would  be  a  compromise,  a  postponement  of  the  solution  of  gripping 

issues. 

That  night  the  whole  of  Washington  seemed  determined  to  crowd 
into  the  Inauguration  Ball  The  managers  had  built  a  temporary  structure 
235  feet  long  and  77  feet  wide  on  Judiciary  Square  for  this  function.  Gold 
stars  winked  against  the  white  ceiling,  and  bunting  of  red,  white  and  blue 
festooned  the  walls.  "Such  a  jam,  such  heat,"  wrote  a  lady  who  was  there, 
"I  never  either  saw  or  felt  before.  . .  .  The  members  of  Congress  got 
so  over-excited  with  wine  that  they  had  to  be  locked  up  in  the  upper  rooms 
lest  they  should  reappear  in  the  ballroom."39 

Miss  Lane,  hailed  by  enthusiastic  newsmen  as  "Our  Democratic 
Queen,"  appeared  resplendent  in  a  white  dress  decorated  with  artificial 
flowers  and  wearing  a  necklace  of  many  strands  of  pearls.  President 
Buchanan  and  Harriet  mingled  with  the  crowd,  talked  to  members  of  the 
diplomatic  corps,  and  enjoyed  the  cheers  and  gaiety.  But  they  soon  left 
and  shortly  thereafter  the  doors  of  the  White  House  closed  gently  upon 
the  new  tenants. 

Back  at  the  Ball,  the  Russian  Minister,  Baron  de  Stoedd,  was 
trying  valiantly  to  dance  with  Madame  Sartiges,  wife  of  the  French  Minister. 
He  remarked  to  her  that  the  current  situation  in  Washington  reminded 
him  of  Paris  just  before  the  Revolution  of  1830.  There,  at  a  ball  given  by 
Louis  Philippe,  Talleyrand  whispered  to  the  monarch,  "Sire,  we  are  dancing 
on  a  volcano."40 


272 


21 

THE  PRESIDENT'S  FAMILY  •  1857 

BACHELOR  IN  THE  WHITE  HOUSE 

Glamorous  as  the  White  House  has  always  seemed  to  those  who  have 
imagined  the  day  when  they  might  occupy  it,  the  reality  of  moving  in  has 
hrought  many  a  new  president  back  to  tie  workaday  world  with  a  thump. 
He  finds  himself,  after  the  tumult  of  inauguration,  just  another  human 
being  walking  into  a  strange  house  hastily  vacated  by  the  previous  tenants. 
Buchanan,  to  be  sure,  fared  better  than  Pierce  who,  after  receiving  visitors 
until  past  midnight  of  his  inauguration  day,  fumbled  his  way  upstairs  to  his 
living  quarters  to  discover  that  they  were  a  shambles  and  no  beds  had  been 
made  up.  Recalling  this  experience,  Pierce  graciously  moved  out  of  the 
White  House  a  day  early  so  that  Miss  Hetty  could  prepare  a  more  homelike 
reception  for  Buchanan  upon  his  return  with  Harriet  from  the  inaugural 
ball. 

Most  of  Pierce's  White  House  staff  stayed  in  service.  Miss  Hetty 
and  Harriet  for  a  time  tried  joint  superintendence  of  household  operations, 
but  the  experiment  soon  raised  such  a  fuss  that  Buchanan  faced  a  domestic 
crisis.  Miss  Harriet  intended  to  be  Mistress  of  the  White  House;  if  not, 
she  would  pack  her  trunks  and  get  out.  Miss  Hetty  said  nothing  but  con- 
tinued quietly  to  give  instructions  to  the  servants.  Buchanan  then  began 
to  understand  Martin  Van  Buren's  recent  advice  that  the  most  important 
appointment  he  would  make  in  his  Administration  would  be  a  good  White 
House  steward.  The  new  president  found  one  and  told  Miss  Hetty  to  return 
to  Wheatland,  but  he  invited  her  to  visit  the  White  House  as  one  of  the 
family  whenever  she  wished.  He  agreed  that  Harriet  should  dictate  all 
matters  of  social  protocol,  leaving  the  execution  of  details  to  the  steward. 

The  White  House  family  included  James  Buchanan  Henry, 
Elliott  Eskridge  Lane,  and  for  a  time  Dr.  Foltz.  As  Buchanan  suffered 
severely  from  the  effects  of  the  National  Hotel  disease  for  six  weeks  after 
the  inauguration,  Foltz  stayed  until  the  affliction  had  run  its  course. 
Eskridge  Lane,  too,  had  caught  the  infection,  thought  he  had  it  under 

273 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


control,  and  tben  suddenly  died  of  a  violent  attack  during  April.  It  was  a 
dreadful  setback  for  Buchanan,  who  had  come  to  rely  heavily  upon  Esk- 
ridge,  and  another  crushing  blow  to  Harriet.  She  determined  at  this  time 
to  devote  her  life  to  "Nunc"  and  become  a  much  more  serious-minded 
young  lady  than  she  had  been  in  the  past. 

The  domestic  routine  slowly  worked  itself  out.  The  household 
arose  about  6:30,  and  finished  breakfast  by  eight.  The  president  retired 
to  his  second  floor  office,  where  he  spent  most  of  his  time  until  noon 
receiving  visitors.  In  an  adjoining  room,  J-  B.  Henry  read  through  all  the 
incoming  mail,  sorted  it  for  forwarding  to  the  Departments  or  to  the 
president,  wrote  a  digest  of  contents  on  the  outer  leaf  of  each  letter,  and 
entered  receipt  of  it  and  the  name  of  the  person  to  whom  it  was  forwarded 
in  his  day  book. 

After  lunch  every  day  except  Sunday  and  reception  days,  Bu- 
chanan met  with  the  Cabinet  and  then  went  for  an  hour's  stroll  about 
Lafayette  Square  and  through  the  residential  district  north  of  the  White 
House.  He  bought  a  new  carriage  with  trappings,  but  he  never  used  it 
except  on  infrequent  state  occasions  or  during  the  midsummer  months. 
In  July  and  August  he  stayed  at  the  "Soldiers'  Home,"  a  stone  cottage  near 
Georgetown,  and  each  morning  drove  in  to  Washington  where  he  worked 
in  a  room  at  the  State  Department.  Harriet  pretty  much  ran  her  own  life, 
spending  the  mornings  planning  or  gracing  social  functions  and  the  after- 
noons riding  out  on  a  beautiful  white  horse  she  had  recently  acquired. 
Riding  side-saddle  and  accompanied  only  by  her  groom,  she  came  to  be  a 
familiar  and  striking  sight  in  Washington. 

In  the  evening  the  whole  White  House  family,  including  Miss 
Hetty  when  she  was  there,  dined  informally  about  seven.  Buchanan  invited 
one  or  two  Cabinet  families  and  a  few  chosen  friends  to  small  weekly  dinners 
with  rarely  more  than  fifteen  present.  Once  a  week  he  also  gave  a  "state 
dinner"  for  about  forty  persons  to  entertain  the  members  of  the  Supreme 
Court,  the  diplomatic  corps,  Senators,  Representatives,  governors,  army 
and  navy  dignitaries,  and  important  visitors.  Buchanan  made  up  the  guest 
lists  for  these  affairs,  Harriet  worked  out  the  details  of  precedence  at  the 
table,  and  Buchanan  Henry  had  the  duty  of  pairing  each  gentleman  with 
the  lady  he  should  escort  to  dinner.  Harriet's  task  was  perhaps  the  most 
difficult,  for  members  of  all  political  parties  came  to  these  dinners,  and  it 
was  a  matter  of  some  delicacy  to  achieve  the  right  order  of  precedence 
without  seating  mortal  enemies  next  to  each  other.  Her  London  training 
stood  her  in  good  stead  and  she  managed  her  part  with  great  cleverness  and 
tact.  After  the  guests  left,  the  president  retired  to  his  study  to  read  over 
the  correspondence  which  his  nephew-secretary  had  digested  and  sorted 
into  appropriate  folders.  He  wrote  his  own  orders  on  papers  he  wished 
personally  to  attend  and  sent  the  rest  back  to  the  secretary's  room  for  filing 

274 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  FAMILY  •    1857 


or  forwarding.  Before  retiring  he  often  read  in  the  Bible  or  some  religious 
work  and  then  went  to  bed  around  midnight.1 

THE  CAPTAIN  AND  THE  CREW 

The  members  of  Cabinet,  too,  had  to  establish  their  households  and  define 
their  role  in  the  new  Administration.  Everyone  sensed  that  the  capital 
faced  the  gayest  social  season  in  its  history.  Little  social  leadership  had 
come  from  the  White  House  since  the  days  of  Van  Buren.  Tyler  had  been 
restrained  by  Harrison's  death,  political  schism,  and  the  loss  of  his  wife. 
Mrs.  Polk  had  governed  social  functions  by  the  sternest  rules  of  Presby- 
terian morality.  She  banned  dancing,  liquor,  and  even  nonalcoholic 
refreshments  at  White  House  functions.  She  disapproved  of  cards,  horse 
racing,  betting  and  loose  joviality,  "This  is  a  very  genteel  affair,"  a 
Congressman  once  remarked  at  one  of  her  parties.  Without  a  smile,  she 
replied,  "I  have  never  seen  it  otherwise."  Mrs.  Taylor,  a  Maryland  blue 
blood,  thought  commerce  with  politicians  was  degrading  and  declined  to 
appear  publicly  with  the  president.  Taylor's  death  threw  a  pall  over  social 
activities  which  Fillmore's  shy  school-teacher  wife  did  nothing  to  raise. 
Mrs.  Pierce  never  recovered  from  the  sudden  death  of  her  son,  Benny,  and 
avoided  public  appearances.  The  election  of  Buchanan  had  brought  release 
from  the  terrible  tensions  which  gripped  the  nation  during  the  campaign  of 
1856  and  put  into  the  White  House  a  wealthy  Epicurean,  a  gay  bachelor 
with  a  flair  for  society  and  a  Chesterfieldian  knowledge  of  its  ways.  And 
Harriet  Lane,  lovely,  sprightly  and  eager  for  the  fun  of  social  competition 
promised  to  bring  an  endhantingly  new  tone  to  White  House  festivities. 
The  president  unofficially  confirmed  the  public  expectation  in  a  note  to  his 
liquor  merchants,  a  few  weeks  after  inauguration,  rebuking  them  for 
sending  champagne  in  small  bottles.  "Pints  are  very  inconvenient  in  this 
house,"  he  wrote,  "as  the  article  is  not  used  in  such  small  quantities." 

Although  the  members  of  the  Cabinet  held  similar  political 
opinions,  none  of  them  had  known  each  other  or  Buchanan  very  well  prior 
to  March  4, 1857.  Lewis  Cass,  who  had  been  a  general  in  the  War  of  1812, 
was  by  1857  a  ponderous  but  feeble  old  fellow  with  a  massive  bald  head 
which  he  kept  covered  with  an  ancient  brown  wig.  He  held  the  State 
Department  only  as  a  symbol  of  old-time  Democracy,  while  the  president 
and  John  Appleton  did  the  work.  Cass  enjoyed  the  prestige  of  his  station. 
He  rented  two  adjacent  houses,  furnished  them  regally,  and  gave  his 
daughters  Mrs.  Henry  Ledyard  and  Belle  Cass  free  rein  to  entertain  on  the 
grand  scale.  Buchanan  had  never  liked  Cass  since  their  days  of  rivalry 
and  the  old  general,  though  grateful  for  his  rescue  from  oblivion,  would 
have  been  less  than  human  had  he  not  felt  a  little  uncomfortable  playing 
the  subordinate.  Black  wrote,  "They  never  spoke  evil  of  one  another,  but 

275 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Buchanan  learned  to  think  unpleasantly  of  Cass's  faults  and  was  not  kind 
to  his  virtues."2  At  <"*binet  meetings  Cass  rarely  said  much,  but  kept 
opening  and  shutting  his  mouth,  and  sucking  his  hreath  between  his  teeth 
as  if  he  constantly  tasted  something  disagreeable. 

Howell  Cobb  became  the  acknowledged  premier  of  the  Cabinet. 
Buchanan  formed  a  warm  attachment  to  the  chubby,  good-natured,  forty- 
one-year-old  Georgian  who  had  come  to  Congress  in  1842,  served  as  Speaker 
of  the  House  during  the  1850  crisis,  and  then  returned  to  Georgia  to  fight 
down  the  secessionists  there  by  allying  with  Union  Whigs  and  capturing 
the  governorship.  He  returned  to  the  House  in  1855  as  an  anti-Douglas, 
pro-Union  Democrat.  Buchanan  found  many  ideas  and  experiences  they 
shared  in  common.  The  University  of  Georgia  had  kicked  Cobb  out  for 
about  the  same  reasons  that  Dickinson  had  expelled  Buchanan,  too  much 
enthusiasm  and  not  enough  respect  for  the  professors  and  the  rules.  They 
often  laughed  about  the  escapades  of  their  college  days.  Cobb,  like  Bu- 
chanan, never  could  gain  solid  political  control  of  his  own  county,  but  he 
never  had  any  trouble  carrying  the  district  or  state.  He  disliked  the 
principle  of  slavery  and  hoped  the  system  would  slowly  die  from  economic 
pressure.  Cobb  calculated  that  he  would  have  more  net  income  if  he  sold 
his  plantation  and  invested  the  money,  but  he  refused  to  cast  his  slaves 
adrift  as  freed  men  with  no  one  responsible  for  their  care  and  did  not  want 
to  sell  them  because  this  would  break  up  the  families. 

It  pleased  Cobb  to  be  the  favorite,  but  he  soon  learned  he  had  to 
pay  for  it.  Buchanan  gave  him  "the  duty"  every  time  he  went  on  vacation 
to  Lancaster  or  Bedford,  often  called  him  for  special  consultation,  and  had 
him  move  into  the  White  House  for  weeks  at  a  time  when  his  wife  was  in 
Georgia.  Howell  tried  for  three  months  to  get  back  to  Athens  to  bring 
Mary  Ann  Cobb  and  a  newborn  son  (their  fourth  child)  to  Washington  and 
told  his  wife  he  would  come  "whether  the  President  will  permit  me  or  not." 
But  he  feared  to  defy  Buchanan  and  finally  sent  his  assistant,  Philip  Clayton, 
for  the  family.  Howell  rented  a  house  from  Corcoran  at  15th  and  I  Streets 
which  he  christened  the  "Widower's  Den"  before  the  arrival  of  his  wife  in 
the  autumn  of  1857.  A  number  of  the  new  members  of  the  Cabinet  who 
had  not  yet  moved  their  families  to  Washington  held  impromptu  stag 
parties  there  in  the  early  months  of  the  Administration.8 

Mary  Ann  Cobb  possessed  qualities  which  Buchanan  much 
esteemed  in  women.  She  was  unpretentious  and  inclined  to  domesticity. 
She  enjoyed  society  but  had  no  particular  ambition  to  cut  a  figure  in  it. 
She  talked  with  frankness,  wit,  and  good  sense,  although  she  felt  a  little 
inadequate  in  small  talk  and  gossip.  Buchanan  admired  her  a  good  deal 
more  than  she  did  him;  she  complained  that  he  worked  Howell  too  hard 
and  acted  too  dignified,  making  her  nervous  for  fear  she  would  not  do  or 
say  the  right  thing. 

276 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  FAMILY  •   1857 


Mrs.  Cobb  brought  with  her  a  sprightly  young  widow,  Mrs, 
Elizabeth  C.  Craig,  who  had  achieved  some  notoriety  by  detonating  a  local 
civil  war  on  the  issue  whether  she  or  a  rival  was  the  most  beautiful  lady  of 
Athens,  Georgia.  This  grave  crisis  split  the  university,  realigned  county 
politics,  and  led  to  combat  between  citizens  of  the  town.  Mrs.  Craig  quit 
the  fray  with  a  flourish,  announcing  that  she  would  go  to  Washington  and 
snare  the  president.  "Nothing  short  of  the  first  man  in  office  will  answer," 
she  wrote  to  Howell  in  advance  of  her  arrival.  When  Buchanan  invited 
her  to  live  at  the  White  House  some  months  later,  betting  odds  began  to 
turn  in  her  favor.4 

Jacob  Thompson  of  Mississippi,  Secretary  of  the  Interior,  proved 
to  be  one  of  the  most  popular  members  of  the  Cabinet  circle.  "Winning, 
able,  persuasive  in  argument,  affectionate,  and  warm  hearted,  he  melted 
opposition  rather  than  destroyed  it."5  Such  a  man  was  after  Buchanan's 
own  heart,  and  the  two  achieved  a  mutual  respect  which  even  the  passions 
of  civil  war  could  not  wholly  destroy.  Thompson  was  well  acquainted 
with  land  policy  and  Indian  affairs,  though  he  had  little  public  experience 
outside  Congress.  He  moved  into  a  house  at  Eighteenth  and  G  Streets 
where  he  let  his  vivacious  wife,  Kate,  and  her  niece,  Miss  Wiley,  run  social 
events  to  suit  their  fancy.  Buchanan  preferred  Kate  Thompson  above  all 
the  Cabinet  wives,  possibly  because  she  was  so  much  of  a  flirt  and  turned 
her  best  coquetry  on  him,  or  perhaps  because  she  was  so  impetuous  and 
passionate,  qualities  that  he  particularly  admired  in  others,  having  so  little 
of  them  himself.  Mrs.  Cobb  called  her  "an  easy  and  free-hearted  woman."6 
Buchanan  used  to  drop  in  unexpectedly  at  her  house  when  her  husband  was 
out  of  town,  but  she  played  the  game  and  generally  walked  him  over  to 
Cobb's  where  they  bantered  away  the  night.  She  was  scatterbrained  and 
bubbly,  but  she  knew  how  to  get  favors  out  of  the  Old  Chief  when  others 
had  failed. 

Postmaster  General  Aaron  V.  Brown  and  his  wife  brought  with 
them  from  Tennessee  more  wealth  than  they  knew  what  to  do  with  and 
determined  to  show  it  off  to  Washington  society.  Mrs.  Brown  fancied 
herself  above  the -standing  rules  of  etiquette  and  brashly  gave  dinners 
without  thought  of  protocol  or  precedence.  She  seated  guests  where  she 
pleased,  and  if  the  French  Minister  found  himself  at  the  wrong  end  of  the 
table  and  beside  some  territorial  representative,  it  did  not  trouble  the 
hostess.  Mrs.  Brown  and  her  daughter  soon  became  known  in  Washington 
as  "the  diamonds."  "They  are  the  only  ladies  of  the  'priory  council'  who 
patronize  jewels  and  trains,"  wrote  an  acquaintance.  "Entre  nous,  they 
evince  something  of  the  vulgarity  of  wealth."7 

Other  members  of  the  Cabinet  lived  more  modestly  and  engaged 
only  in  the  social  activities  which  their  station  demanded.  Jeremiah  S. 
Black  did  not  even  know  he  was  to  be  included  in  the  Cabinet  as  Attorney 

277 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


General  until  after  the  Senate  had  confirmed  him.  Black's  wife  and  his 
daughter  Mary  may  have  had  social  ambitions,  but  they  had  neither  the 
money  nor  the  personal  graces  to  gratify  their  hopes.  Black  was  a  curious 
combination  of  brilliant  lawyer  and  miscast  dramatic  actor.  He  loved  to 
toss  compliments  to  pretty  ladies  and  could  call  Milton,  Shakespeare,  or 
Shelley  to  his  aid  at  will,  but  he  lacked  the  feather  touch  and  seemed  to 
caress  with  a  sledge  hammer.  Some  women  thought  him  disgusting  and 
others,  foolish,  but  closest  to  truth  was  the  remark  of  one  recipient  of  his 
gallantry  who  remarked  that  he  reminded  her  of  an  elephant  trying  to  dance 
a  hornpipe.  He  was  honest  as  the  day,  and  decisive  as  a  thunderclap.  As 
the  Administration  wore  on,  Buchanan  more  and  more  leaned  upon  the 
strength  of  his  mind  and  will.  Black  got  on  better  with  the  Cabinet  than 
did  his  family  and  was  always  welcome  at  formal  or  informal  gatherings. 
Howell  Cobb's  young  son  paid  him  the  ultimate  compliment  by  naming  his 
new  dog  "Jerry  Black." 

John  Buchanan  Floyd,  governor  of  Virginia  as  his  father  had  been 
before  him,  participated  little  in  the  whirlwind  of  society.  His  wife  had  a 
bad  fall  shortly  after  he  assumed  the  War  Department  which  incapacitated 
her,  and  Floyd  himself  was  plagued  by  illness.  Even  had  health  permitted, 
they  would  have  found  no  pleasure  in  the  social  round.  Buchanan  liked 
Floyd  and  granted  him  favors  and  privileges  not  extended  to  others,  insisting 
that  he  take  time  off  to  regain  his  health.  But  he  worried  about  Floyd's 
fitness  for  his  job,  and  found  it  necessary  to  reprimand  him  more  often 
than  any  other  Cabinet  member. 

At  the  beginning  of  the  Administration,  Buchanan  knew  Isaac 
Toucey,  Secretary  of  the  Navy,  better  than  any  of  his  staff,  for  he  had 
served  with  Toucey  in  the  Polk  Cabinet.  Toucey  was  mild,  quiet  and 
industrious.  Because  his  wife  suffered  ill  health,  he  stayed  home  most  of 
the  time  he  was  not  busy  with  office  work. 

This  group  comprised  the  "Administration."  "The  cabinet 
ladies,"  wrote  one  of  them,  "are  aH  pleasant  and  promise  to  be  as  one 
family.  They  are  called  here  The  President's  Family,'  and  surely  the 
gentlemen  are  as  much  at  ease  as  several  sons  with  a  kind,  indulgent  father. 
The  President,  I  think,  is  the  greatest  man  living."8 


PAYDAY  FOR  POLITICIANS 

Buchanan  had  expected  a  wild  scramble  for  patronage,  but  the  reality  far 
exceeded  even  what  he  had  steeled  himself  to  endure.  Not  only  were  there 
more  applicants  than  ever  before  but  also  fewer  jobs.  Not  since  the 
inauguration  of  Van  Buren,  twenty  years  before,  had  one  Democratic 
Administration  succeeded  another.  Now  the  offices  were  filled  with  Pierce 

278 


THE  PRESIDENTS  FAMILY  •  1857 


men  who  could  not  be  swept  out  without  disrupting  the  party.  Further- 
more, Buchanan  for  a  generation  had  been  accepting  political  aid  but  never 
had  achieved  any  office  that  gave  him  power  to  pay  off  party  debts.  In  the 
Secretaryship  of  State  his  influence  on  appointments  had  been  slight.  Now, 
when  he  found  himself  for  the  first  time  in  an  administrative  position  with 
direct  control  over  patronage,  his  obligations  had  grown  larger  and  the 
expectations  greater  than  he  had  realized.  All  his  old-time  friends  came 
for  jobs,  and  they  all  brought  long  lists  of  their  friends  who  had  been 
promised  their  rewards.  Even  if  these  requests  had  not  created  an  im- 
possible situation,  Buchanan's  ancient  policy  of  amalgamation  and  the 
reconciliation  of  contesting  groups  would  have  done  so.  He  had  long 
advocated  a  division  of  the  spoils  between  Democratic  factions,  and  in  the 
recent  elections  he  had  promised  to  let  the  Whigs  come  in  for  a  share. 
Thus,  he  probably  doubled  the  number  of  those  who  felt  justly  entitled  to 
patronage.  In  addition  to  all  these  pressures  there  was  still  another:  the 
ambition  of  presidential  aspirants  for  1860,  whose  appetites  had  been 
whetted  by  Buchanan's  inaugural  pronouncement  that  he  would  retire 
after  a  single  term.  Douglas,  Hunter,  Walker,  Davis,  Cobb,  and  others  all 
demanded  special  consideration  and  were  ready  to  fight  for  it.  It  required 
no  wizard  to  foresee  the  result.  Whatever  patronage  policy  should  be 
developed,  there  would  be  unprecedented  disappointment  and  discontent 
throughout  the  Democratic  ranks,  and  no  "administration  party"  at  all. 
Had  Buchanan  taken  the  governorship  of  Pennsylvania  in  1848,  he  might 
have  been  better  prepared  to  solve  the  problem  he  now  faced,  but  he  came 
to  the  presidency  with  almost  every  kind  of  public  service  experience 
except  executive. 

Buchanan  adopted  the  general  rule  that  Pierce  appointees  who 
were  good  men  and  held  commissions  for  a  specified  time  should  retain 
their  offices  until  their  terms  expired.  In  the  case  of  ministers  and  consuls, 
the  incumbents  should  have  an  automatic  tenure  of  four  years  from  the 
date  of  their  original  appointment  unless  they  requested  relief  earlier. 
Appointees  with  indefinite  tenure  would  have  to  be  judged  on  the  merits 
of  each  case.  Buchanan  hoped  to  spread  the  availability  of  many  choice 
jobs  throughout  his  term.  Pierce  had  installed  a  good  many  of  his  friends 
in  the  last  two  years  of  his  Administration  when  he  hoped  to  promote  his 
own  renomination.  By  leaving  these  men  in  office,  Buchanan  could  hold 
their  jobs  as  prospects  and  have  some  important  gifts  to  offer  in  the  latter 
stages  of  his  term,  without  need  to  remove  his  own  appointees  to  create 
vacancies.9 

The  Cabinet,  meeting  for  four  or  five  hours  nearly  every  day, 
considered  little  but  the  patronage  for  the  first  several  months.  Buck  Henry 
sorted  out  the  thousands  of  requests  and  recommendations  which  came 
directly  to  the  White  House,  and  the  individual  Cabinet  members  got 

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JAMES  BUCHANAN 

hundreds  more  daily  to  add  to  the  pile.  Cobb  reported  returning  to  the 
Treasury  office  late  at  night  after  a  hard  day's  work  to  find  a  bushel  basket 
of  unopened  mail  on  the  floor  beside  his  desk.10 

Even  had  these  men  been  endowed  with  peculiar  genius,  they 
would  have  faced  several  grave  disadvantages  in  making  appropriate 
selections  from  this  mountain  of  requests.  In  the  whole  Cabinet  group 
there  was  not  one  "big  city"  politician;  there  was  no  son  of  the  new  West; 
there  was  no  "Young  American;'*  there  was  no  representative  of  industry; 
there  was  no  spokesman  for  the  free-soil  Democrats.  Buchanan  could  not 
have  had  a  unified  Cabinet  with  these  elements  included,  but  by  surrounding 
himself  with  rural  politicians  and  lawyers  who  frankly  accepted  the  America 
of  Andrew  Jackson  as  their  ideal  he  got  only  a  partial  and  antiquated  view 
of  the  forces  astir  in  the  land.  Buchanan's  supreme  confidence  in  himself 
might  have  been  his  greatest  asset  had  he  become  president  in  1844  or  1848, 
for  he  then  was  in  touch  with  the  national  scene.  But  for  a  decade  he  had 
been  either  out  of  office  or  out  of  the  country,  and  lightning  changes  had 
been  in  progress.  The  friends  he  trusted  and  the  enemies  he  understood 
had  died  or  passed  from  view:  Clay,  Calhoun,  Webster,  Benton,  Jackson, 
Adams,  Polk,  King,  Shunk,  Reynolds,  Muhlenberg— nearly  all  those  he 
had  known  in  the  House  and  Senate  and  in  state  politics— were  gone.  He 
did  not  know  the  new  generation,  and  it  did  not  know  him  except  by 
reputation.  The  president  had  become  very  nearly  a  political  stranger  in 
his  own  country.  But  he  had  the  confidence  of  rectitude  and  past  success 
and  hoped  to  proceed  serenely.  Otherwise  he  would  not  have  remarked  to 
a  friend  who  warned  that  he  would  be  hounded  to  death  by  job-hunters: 
'Til  be  damned  if  I  will." 

Every  one  of  the  thirty-one  states  had  its  peculiar  problems  of 
faction.  The  Administration  considered  each  in  its  turn,  trying  always  to 
figure  out  some  way  to  keep  the  party  intact.11 

The  New  York  Democracy  since  1848  had  gone  from  schism  to 
chaos.  The  Softs,  erstwhile  friends  of  Pierce,  had  split;  the  Hards  had  been 
weakened  by  loss  of  office,  and  an  entirely  new  faction  master-minded  by 
New  York  City's  upstart  mayor,  Fernando  Wood,  had  taken  over  Tammany 
Hall  with  brass  knuckles  and  clubs  wielded  by  a  crudely  disciplined  army  of 
Bowery  thugs.  Not  knowing  quite  what  to  do  with  this  hell's  brew  of 
faction,  Buchanan  gave  his  old  friend,  Augustus  Schell  the  key  federal  job, 
Collector  of  the  Port  of  New  York.  Schell  was  rich,  pious,  aristocratic, 
pompous  and,  by  comparison  with  those  over  whom  he  was  expected  to 
exercise  control,  a  paragon  of  honesty.  He  does  not,  however,  seem  to 
have  been  very  bright,  and  certainly  could  not  supply  the  fight  and  leader- 
ship that  his  job  demanded.  He  was  much  more  at  home  presiding  over 
the  New  York  Historical  Society  than  over  the  water-front  gang  in  his 
charge.  Within  a  few  months  the  slippery  Wood  had  talked  him  into  an 

280 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  FAMILY  •   1857 

alliance  which  split  the  Hards,  creating  faction  worse  confounded.  The 
New  York  Postmaster,  Isaac  V.  Fowler,  who  presumably  was  to  work  in 
harness  with  Schell,  now  became  head  of  the  opposition  to  him,  and 
Buchanan  found  that  he  had  four  Democratic  factions  knifing  each  other 
in  the  Empire  State.12 

Pennsylvania's  problems  proved  peculiarly  exasperating.  The 
Keystone  State  had  been  crying  foul  play  for  its  small  share  in  federal 
patronage  ever  since  the  days  of  Jefferson.  Buchanan  tried  to  redress  the 
balance,  appointing  so  many  Pennsylvanians  that  the  appearance  of  another 
on  the  confirmation  list  came  to  be  the  signal  for  a  roar  of  laughter  in  the 
Senate.  Nevertheless,  he  brought  no  peace  to  the  Democracy  of  Penn's 
land.  To  gratify  Forney's  faction,  he  appointed  Joseph  B.  Baker  as  Collector 
of  the  Port  of  Philadelphia  and  made  G.  G.  Wescott,  one-time  editorial 
assistant  to  Forney,  postmaster  of  the  city.  But  when  he  appointed 
Francis  J.  Grund,  former  henchman  of  Cameron,  to  a  foreign  post,  rum- 
blings began.  And  when  he  made  George  Bowman  of  the  Bedford  Gazette 
the  editor  of  the  Washington  Union,  lightning  flashed.  The  great  objection 
to  Buchanan's  appointments  was  his  failure  to  give  office  to  his  political 
laborers  of  twenty  and  thirty  years  standing,  notably  Lynch,  Forney,  Plitt, 
and  Foltz. 

Each  of  these  cases  was  different,  yet  every  one  was  important. 
Davy  Lynch  was  very  insignificant  in  politics  by  1857,  but  he  remained  a 
symbol  of  loyalty  to  Buchanan  dating  back  to  the  1820's.  He  had  proved 
an  inefficient  public  servant  and  could  not  be  trusted  with  any  place  of 
responsibility,  but  he  spurned  any  minor  situation.  Of  late  his  condition 
had  become  pitiful;  he  drank  incessantly  and  lived  in  abject  poverty.  He 
would  not  beg,  but  his  wife  wrote  letters  constantly  asking  for  loans  and 
Buchanan  sent  money  to  Lynch  regularly.  Davy  talked  with  the  quivering 
emotion  of  the  loyal  veteran,  abandoned  in  the  hour  of  need  by  the  man 
who  had  climbed  to  fame  and  fortune  on  his  bowed  shoulders.13  In  the 
western  region  he  greatly  damaged  Buchanan's  reputation,  for  the  enemy 
publicized  his  plight  as  a  symbol  of  Buchanan's  selfishness  and  ingratitude 

Forney  presented  a  problem  peculiarly  painful.  Buchanan  never 
believed  in  giving  important  posts  in  the  public  service  to  persons  who 
depended  on  politics  for  their  living.  To  favor  and  encourage  them  would 
make  them  utterly  dependent  upon  the  vagaries  of  political  fortune  and 
sooner  or  later,  in  these  days  before  Civil  Service  protection,  place  them  in  a 
position  of  such  insecurity  that  they  would  always  be  for  sale  to  the  highest 
bidder.  A  sound  party  demanded  men  who  could  stand  on  their  own  feet, 
come  success  or  failure  at  the  polls.  Forney  was  not  in  that  category;  he 
always  needed  a  post. 

Having  been  excluded  from  the  Cabinet,  denied  the  editorship  of 
the  Washington  Union,  and  defeated  in  the  race  for  the  Senate,  Forney 

281 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


raved  wildly  in  his  humiliation.  The  president,  he  complained  to  Black, 
has  "never  asked  my  counsel  since  the  election."  When  Forney  indignantly 
rejected  the  Liverpool  consulate  because  he  refused  to  be  "exiled,"  he 
should  have  remembered  that  on  two  occasions  Buchanan  reluctantly 
accepted  foreign  "exile"  for  party  purposes.  Nor  had  the  salary  been  as 
attractive  as  the  one  now  offered  to  Forney. 

Forney  continued  to  clamor.  "Read  this  letter  to  Mr.  B.,"  he 
wrote  Black,  his  intermediary.  "Ask  him  if  he  is  dead  to  the  past  in  which 
I  have  served  him  almost  like  a  slave.  Ask  him  if  he  forgets  the  dark  hours 

when  his  friends  fled  from  him  &  I  stood  alone  a  monument  of  fidelity 

I  speak  not  for  myself  alone,  but  for  hundreds  of  thousands."14  But 
Buchanan  could  offer  nothing  that  Forney  would  take.  "I  mourn  for 
Forney,"  he  wrote.  "I  repeat,  I  mourn  for  Forney."  It  was  misplaced 
pity,  as  Buchanan  soon  learned. 

By  mid-June,  when  Forney  finally  realized  that  Buchanan  would 
not  give  him  the  trust  and  recognition  he  demanded,  he  all  unknowingly 
wrote  the  real  truth  in  an  excited  scrawl  to  Black.  Mr.  Buchanan  insists, 
he  said,  that  "if  I  succeed,  it  is  to  be  as  before,  on  my  own  merits."15 
Forney  decided  to  go  back  to  managing  the  Pennsylvania^.  For  this  he 
needed  money.  Would  Black  please  help  him  sell  his  wife's  property  in 
Washington?  Then  he  learned  that  Buchanan  had  placed  that  property, 
in  trust,  out  of  his  reach.  There  are  those  who  still  maintain  that  John 
Forney  broke  with  Buchanan  over  the  principle  of  Lecompton.  Actually 
they  had  reached  the  point  of  rupture  a  year  before;  Lecompton  would 
serve  as  a  convenient  excuse.  Buchanan  offered  him  no  more  prospects; 
if  Forney  could  not  influence  this  Administration,  he  had  better  get  on  the 
right  track  for  the  next.  By  September  he  was  in  the  Douglas  camp.16 

George  Plitt  and  his  wife  Sophie  had  acted  as  foster  parents  to 
the  Lane  children.  Mary  Lane  made  her  home  with  them,  and  Harriet 
stayed  at  the  Plitt  "Shantee"  in  Philadelphia  with  as  much  freedom  and 
an  even  warmer  welcome  than  she  found  at  Wheatland.  Plitt,  whom 
Buchanan  had  installed  as  clerk  of  the  Philadelphia  federal  circuit  court  in 
1846,  was  a  quiet,  unambitious,  dutiful,  and  devoted  friend.  Before  long 
the  Dallas  Democrats  of  Philadelphia  began  an  attack  on  him,  for  their  man 
Hopkinson  had  been  ousted  to  make  a  pkce  for  Plitt.  Buchanan  offered 
him  a  different  position,  but  he  efrjoyed  the  clerkship  and  declined.  Later, 
faced  with  the  ultimatum  "fire  Plitt  or  lose  four  votes  in  Congress," 
Buchanan  asked  Justice  Grier  to  explain  matters  to  Plitt  and  solicit  his 
resignation.  Grier  emphasized  the  absolute  necessity  of  vacating  the  clerk- 
ship and  assured  Plitt  that  "As  [Buchanan's]  friend  you  deserve  at  his  hands 
&  should  receive  some  appointment  of  far  greater  value."17  Plitt  resigned, 
as  requested,  but  Buchanan  could  not  immediately  find  an  appropriate 
opening  for  him.  By  the  time  there  was  one  Buchanan  could  no  longer 

282 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  FAMILY  •   1857 


command  Senate  confirmation  for  personal  friends.  Late  in  I860,  Sophie 
wrote  ruefully  to  Harriet  about  the  coming  presidential  election:  *CI  don't 
care  who  is  Prest.  I  worked  for  one  nearly  all  my  life— my  husband  was 
removed  from  office,  &  we  have  been  ever  since  counting  every  dollar  to 
keep  our  home.  I  despise  politics.  .  .  .  There  is  too  much  ingratitude  in 
political  men  &  I  am  not  a  spaniel"13  George  viewed  it  more  calmly  and 
remained  friendly;  he  recognized  at  last  the  truth  of  Buchanan's  oft- 
repeated  advice  to  build  his  security  on  a  firmer  rock  than  party  patronage. 
But  Plitt's  many  friends  wrote  off  Old  Buck  as  an  ungrateful  wretch. 

Buchanan  had  recommended  Dr.  Foltz's  appointment  as  a  Naval 
Surgeon  back  in  1829.  Since  then  the  effusive  and  emphatic  young  doctor 
had  kept  up  a  steady  correspondence  with  Buchanan  from  ship  and  shore, 
and  on  numerous  occasions  had  served  as  his  personal  physician.  Since 
1840  he  had  been  keenly  interested  in  politics;  and  whenever  he  was  in 
Pennsylvania,  he  had  worked  hand  in  glove  with  Forney. 

When  Buchanan  became  president,  Foltz  demanded  appointment 
as  Chief  of  the  Bureau  of  Medicine  and  Surgery.  As  the  office  was  already 
in  the  capable  hands  of  Dr.  Whelan  who,  according  to  the  patronage  policy, 
would  continue  to  serve  until  his  term  expired,  Buchanan  declined  to 
replace  him;  and  even  had  he  done  this,  he  almost  certainly  would  not  have 
selected  Foltz.  Foltz  then  began  attacks  on  Dr.  Whelan,  sending  proofs 
that  he  was  a  Douglas  man  and  alleging  that  Buchanan  retained  him  only 
because  he  was  Catholic  and  could  protect  the  Irish  vote.  Buchanan  gave 
Dr.  Foltz  an  appointment  as  physician  to  the  Philadelphia  Lazaretto,  a 
respectable  sinecure  which  permitted  him  to  stay  in  the  city  with  his  family 
and  conduct  private  practice  along  with  his  supervisory  work  at  the  hospital. 
Foltz  took  the  job,  but  in  anger  and  disappointment.  Within  a  short  time 
he  became  one  of  the  most  violent  and  abusive  of  all  Buchanan's  enemies,19 

Buchanan  spent  much  thought  and  emotional  energy  trying  to 
solve  the  patronage  problems  of  New  York  and  Pennsylvania.  His  failure 
to  satisfy  the  wishes  of  his  four  old-time  Pennsylvania  friends,  whose 
names  for  over  a  quarter  century  had  been  synonymous  with  loyalty  to 
him,  damaged  him  politically.  Knowing  what  he  did  of  these  men,  he 
would  have  been  wiser  to  break  with  them  years  before*  than  to  let  himself 
into  the  situation  he  now  faced.  The  rationalization  of  his  course  seemed 
perfectly  sound  to  him;  he  offered  all  he  conscientiously  could;  but  in 
calmly  believing  that  a  rational  excuse  would  satiate  men  who  had  waited 
so  long  in  anticipation  of  their  reward  in  his  day  of  triumph,  he  proved 
that  he  had  been  living  alone  too  much.  He  had  lost  touch  with  human 
feelings  and  reactions. 

Buchanan  left  appointments  in  most  of  the  other  states  to  those 
who  best  knew  the  requirements,  but  he  insisted  upon  reviewing  in  Cabinet 
all  the  major  proposals.  He  appointed  a  Chicago  postmaster  recommended 

283 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


by  Douglas  but  selected  other  federal  officers  in  Douglas's  territory  without 
even  consulting  the  Senator.  He  appointed  J.  Madison  Cutts  to  a  federal 
position  against  the  written  protest  of  Douglas  and  the  advice  of  the  entire 
Cabinet.  Buchanan  had  known  Cutts  long  before  the  Senator  ever  dreamed 
of  politics,  and  had  been  fond  of  his  daughter  Adele,  now  Mrs.  Douglas,  as 
early  as  the  Tyler  administration.  He  replied  to  the  Senator  with  calculated 
and  insulting  frankness.  "Should  I  make  the  appointment,  .  .  .  it  will  be 
my  own  regard  for  Mr.  Cutts  and  his  family,  and  not  because  Senator 
Douglas  has  had  the  good  fortune  to  become  his  son-in-law."20 

In  Louisiana,  Slidell  insisted  that  Buchanan  should  dismiss  the 
old  director  of  the  New  Orleans  mint,  regardless  of  the  tenure  rule.21 
Slidell  was  in  trouble  because  the  New  Orleans  postmaster  he  had  recom- 
mended had  been  caught  in  a  defalcation  by  Postmaster-General  Campbell, 
an  appointee  of  Pierce.  Campbell  charged  that  Kendall  had  been  forced  to 
steal  post-office  money  to  pay  his  gambling  debts  to  Slidell.  The  Senator 
challenged  Campbell  to  a  duel  but  got  no  satisfaction  22  Slidell  now  de- 
manded the  elimination  of  all  remnants  of  the  Pierce  Administration  in 
Louisiana. 

Buchanan  weakened  rapidly  under  the  strain.  Many  of  his  notes 
and  letters  of  April,  1857,  far  from  the  methodical,  delicate,  and  precise 
penmanship  which  is  the  trademark  of  his  manuscripts,  present  a  hurried, 
sloppy  scrawl.  Cobb  remarked  that  the  president  had  been  so  "annoyed 
and  harassed"  during  April  that  he  feared  to  request  Georgia  appointments 
until  the  air  had  cleared.23  For  all  the  routine  procedure  that  Buchanan 
tried  to  establish,  appointments  continued  to  be  made  by  hook  or  crook. 
In  order  to  rush  one  through  the  Interior  Department,  Cobb  took  the  origi- 
nal letter  of  application,  endorsed  on  it  "Request  granted— J.  Thompson, 
Sec'y.  of  Interior"  and  slipped  it  quietly  into  the  "approved"  pile  in 
Thompson's  office.24  Thompson  apparently  never  did  know  about  it.  When 
the  male  applicants  had  worn  themselves  out,  they  hired  the  ladies  to  try. 
"They  take  it  for  granted  that  we  become  so  hardened  that  we  can  resist 
the  importunities  of  men — but  cannot  withstand  the  plaintive  entreaties 
of  the  fairer  portion  of  God's  creation,"  wrote  one  of  the  Cabinet.25 

By  midsummer  the  available  jobs  had  been  assigned,  and  the 
hungry,  unsatisfied  horde  went  home.  Some  monumental  decisions  had 
been  made,  chief  among  them  the  selection  of  Robert  J.  Walker  as  Governor 
of  the  turbulent  Kansas  Territory.  Slidell  would  be  the  Administration 
leader  in  the  Senate;  J.  Glancy  Jones  would  be  the  House  whip  and  Chair- 
man of  the  Committee  on  Ways  and  Means.  With  a  majority  in  both 
branches,  it  began  to  look  by  June  as  if  the  Administration  had  gotten  off 
to  a  fair  start. 

284 


THE  PRESIDENT'S  FAMILY  •   1857 


THE  OLD  CHIEF 

After  the  first  few  months  of  daily  conferences  and  contention,  what  had 
the  Cabinet  come  to  think  of  their  chief?  They  agreed  with  Black's  pro- 
nouncement:  "He  is  a  stubborn  old  gentleman— very  fond  of  having  his 
own  way,  and  I  don't  know  what  his  way  is."26  Floyd  told  a  friend  that 
"Mr.  Buchanan  was  different  from  Genl.  Jackson; . .  .  Genl.  Jackson  could 
be  coaxed  from  his  purpose,  but  .  .  .  Mr.  B.  could  neither  be  coaxed  nor 
driven."27  One  Cabinet  member  remarked  that  they  all  stood  in  awe  of 
him  like  boys  in  the  presence  of  their  schoolmaster  and  called  him  "The 
Squire"  behind  his  back;28  another  said  that  he  "overhauled  the  Secretary 
of  War"  so  scorchingly  that  they  were  all  afraid  of  him.29  Floyd,  on  this 
occasion,  had  sold  Fort  Snelling  in  Minnesota  to  a  New  York  syndicate  for 
a  fraction  of  its  value,  and  although  he  had  not  profited  or  broken  any  law, 
Buchanan  gave  him  a  lashing  for  being  a  dupe.  Mrs.  Craig,  after  a  month 
in  the  White  House,  began  calling  Buchanan  "The  Grand  Turk." 

The  president's  colleagues  found  him  extremely  nosy.  He 
flustered  Cobb  one  day  by  inquiring  in  great  detail  about  his  wife's  fortune 
and  finances.  After  getting  the  information,  Buchanan  asked  abruptly, 
"Well,  if  you  are  so  rich,  why  don't  you  pay  that  $15,000  you  owe?"  Taken 
aback,  Cobb  almost  replied,  "I  will,  if  you  will  loan  it  to  me,"  but  restrained 
the  impulse.  "Don't  you  think  the  old  gentleman  is  quite  curious  about 
such  matters?"  he  asked.30  The  busybody  habit,  not  only  in  matters  of 
private  affairs  but  in  the  activities  of  all  the  departments  brdd  secretiveness 
in  the  Cabinet  that  contributed  to  Buchanan's  ignorance,  later  in  his  term, 
of  some  very  irregular  proceedings  that  went  on  under  his  nose.  But  as  a 
whole,  the  Cabinet  had  great  respect  for  and  confidence  in  the  chief. 
Jerry  Black,  in  characteristic  phrase,  wrote  in  July,  1857,  after  a  flurry  of 
trouble  in  Kansas:  "This  being  the  first  little  gale  we  have  had,  those  who 
have  the  handling  of  the  ship  are  a  little  awkward  for  the  moment.  I  speak 
of  lieutenants  &  sailing  masters.  The  great  old  captain  looks  calmly  up 
into  the  sky  and  gives  his  orders  quietly— orders  which  will  keep  her  head 
steady  on  true  course."31 


285 


22 

KANSAS  — A  TRAGEDY  OF  ERRORS  -  1854-1857 

CRISIS  IN  KANSAS 

One  cannot  imagine  a  more  unfortunate  place  to  have  precipitated  a  crisis 
between  the  North  and  the  South  in  1854  than  Kansas,  for  here  centered 
the  greatest  hopes  of  each  section.  And  what  hopes  they  were!  Fifty 
million  acres  of  level  farm  land;  a  strategic  location  for  the  eastern  terminus 
of  a  transcontinental  railroad  which  would  tap  the  enormous  trade  of  the 
Pacific  coast;  the  promise  of  rich  political  offices  which  might  determine 
the  future  supremacy  of  a  party  or  section.  And  this  region  of  golden 
opportunity  lay  at  the  junction  of  North,  South  and  West,  easily  accessible 
to  adventurous  crusaders  from  each.  Why  did  Douglas  propose  the  Kansas- 
Nebraska  Bill?  Why  did  Congress  by  a  large  majority  sustain  him?  And 
where  did  the  results  leave  James  Buchanan  in  March,  1857? 

Senator  Douglas,  as  Chairman  of  the  Committee  on  Territories, 
had  sweated  his  way  through  many  Congressional  struggles  over  the 
organization  of  the  federal  domain.  In  1847  he  had  proposed  the  extension 
of  the  Missouri  Compromise  line  to  the  Pacific.  In  1850  he  backed  popular 
sovereignty  for  New  Mexico  and  Utah.  His  main  interest  lay  not  in 
method  but  in  speed.  The  West  would  grow  as  fast  as  Congress  would  let 
it  grow;  did  there  need  to  be  a  year's  discussion  every  time  a  new  territory 
was  to  be  created? 

In  January,  1854,  Douglas  reported  out  of  Committee  a  bill  to 
divide  the  Nebraska  Territory.  When  the  two  parts  were  admitted  as  states 
they  should  be  "received  into  the  Union,  with  or  without  slavery,  as  their 
Constitution  may  prescribe  at  the  time  of  their  admission."  This  rendered 
void  in  Kansas  and  Nebraska  the  Missouri  Compromise  restrictions  against 
slavery  north  of  36°  30'.  Having  attacked  the  Missouri  line,  Douglas 
decided  he  might  as  well  eliminate  entirely  the  idea  of  Congressional  control 
and  added  to  the  bill  the  explicit  statement  that  the  Missouri  Compromise 
was  "inoperative  and  void  ...  it  being  the  true  intent  and  meaning  of  this 
act  not  to  legislate  Slavery  into  any  Territory  or  State,  nor  to  exclude  it 

286 


KANSAS—A  TRAGEDY  OF  ERRORS  •   1854  -  1857 

therefrom,  but  to  leave  the  people  thereof  perfectly  free  to  form  and  regulate 
their  domestic  institutions  in  their  own  way,  subject  only  to  the  Constitu- 
tion of  the  United  States."  He  suspected  this  part  would  raise  a  "hell  of 
a  storm"  but  thought  it  would  please  the  South  without  hurting  the  North. 
After  a  violent  debate,  Congress  passed  this  dangerous  measure.  A  little 
later  Douglas's  friends  reported  that  he  looked  "like  a  man  who  sorrows 
for  a  misdeed."1 

Douglas  assumed  that  no  more  slave  states  would  come  in  under 
his  bill.  The  climate  of  Kansas  was  unfavorable  to  crops  which  slaves 
could  profitably  cultivate;  slavery  could  not  rapidly  be  moved  into  an 
unsettled  region;  free  men  by  the  score  could  easily  establish  themselves 
in  the  new  territory  before  a  single  slaveholder  could  transport  his  un- 
wieldy property  to  it.  At  the  same  time,  the  South  would  gain  its  right  to 
settle  the  common  domain  and  therefore  would  permit  the  rapid  admission 
of  western  states.  Douglas  was  "groping  for  a  new  center  of  gravity  in 
politics,"  the  Great  West.  It  would  make  him  rich,  and  unless  he  misread 
his  future,  it  would  make  him  president.2 

Evidence  that  Douglas  had  made  a  mistake  soon  poured  in  from 
every  side.  Forney,  then  Clerk  of  the  House,  reported  that  a  number  of 
Buchanan's  friends  had  supported  the  measure  in  the  very  hope  of  killing 
Douglas  off  for  the  presidency.3  The  abolitionists  promptly  formed  a 
"New  England  Emigrant  Aid  Society"  to  free-load  settlers  into  Kansas, 
and  the  South  organized  competitive  companies  to  stimulate  immigration. 
Douglas  helplessly  appealed  to  Congress  to  outlaw  such  "perversion  of  the 
provisions  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  Act." 

In  Kansas  settlers  sympathetic  to  slavery  established  a  Territorial 
government  with  headquarters  at  Lecompton  which  President  Pierce 
recognized  as  legal.  Antislavery  settlers  set  up  a  competing  government 
at  Topeka  which  both  President  Pierce  and  Congress  declared  illegal  and 
revolutionary,  but  its  adherents  refused  to  disband.  Open  warfare  between 
the  two  governments  soon  broke  out  and  continued  in  Kansas  up  until 
Buchanan's  inauguration.  Federal  troops  supported  the  Lecompton 
officials,  but  General  Jim  Lane's  private  free-state  "army"  provided  effective 
defense  of  the  Topeka  rebels.  Two  sets  of  public  officers  and  competing 
legal  codes  made  Kansas,  in  effect,  not  one  but  two  territories,  one  lawful 
and  the  other  at  war  with  the  United  States  government.  Supporters  of 
both  engaged  in  wholesale  ballot-box  frauds,  graft,  claim-jumping,  intimida- 
tion, and  settlement  of  debatable  questions  by  bullet  and  bowie  knife. 

While  "bleeding  Kansas"  symbolized  the  struggle  over  slavery  to 
most  people  in  the  United  States,  to  Kansans  this  issue  was  incidental  to 
the  main  one— land.  Whoever  controlled  the  government  distributed  the 
political  jobs,  and  the  holders  of  these  supervised  the  disposition  of  land. 

287 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Governor  Geary  reported:  "the  greatest  obstacle  to  overcome  in  the  pro- 
duction  of  peace  and  harmony  in  the  Territory,  is  the  unsettled  condition 
of  the  claims  to  the  public  lands,"  and  the  Squatter  Sovereign  concurred. 
"It  is  a  historical  fact,"  wrote  the  editor,  "that  almost  all  the  contentions 
which  result  in  bloodshed  .  .  .  have  their  origin  in  some  dispute  over  land 
claims."  Another  paper  said:  "Each  week  adds  to  the  list  of  murders  .  .  . 
mostly  growing  out  of  this  one  thing;  and  there  is  no  law  to  come  to  the 

rescue."4 

Slavery  became  an  excuse  for  dissensions  in  Kansas,  and  for  the 
artificial  promotion  of  settlement,  but  as  Paul  Gates  writes,  "The  first 
objective  of  most  people  who  went  to  Kansas  ...  was  to  secure  land  claims 
which  might  be  sold  profitably."5  The  New  England  Emigrant  Aid  Society 
of  Connecticut  sent  out  settlers  to  take  up  land  for  resale,  and  this  company 
quickly  invested  three  times  more  cash  in  Kansas  land  claims  than  any 
other  syndicate.  The  Missouri  "Border  Ruffians,"  who  allegedly  invaded 
Kansas  to  vote  illegally  and  make  it  a  slave  state,  mainly  wanted  to  protect 
their  land  interests.  Only  3%  of  the  Missourians  of  the  region  held  slaves, 
but  nearly  half  of  them  staked  out  claims  the  moment  the  Kansas  Territory 
was  opened.  It  should  be  added  that  the  Missouri-Kansas  boundary  had 
not  yet  been  marked,  and  frontiersmen  near  the  uncertain  border  thought 
they  had  better  vote;  they  might  be  Kansans.  The  entire  border  population, 
when  the  opportunity  arose,  claimed  to  be  residents  of  Kansas,  and  prior 
to  a  federal  survey  there  was  no  way  to  prove  they  were  not.  They  felt, 
at  least,  that  they  had  as  good  a  title  to  residence  in  Kansas  as  the  peripatetic 
mercenaries  of  the  Emigrant  Aid  Society  who  showed  up  en  masse  at  land 
auctions  as  bonafide  resident  "settlers"  but  left  by  boat  the  day  after  the 
sale  for  their  residence  elsewhere.6 

But  outside  Kansas  the  slavery  question  dominated  the  headlines. 
By  the  time  of  Buchanan's  inauguration,  a  variety  of  points  of  view  had 
become  clearly  discernible.  The  Republicans  used  the  "bleeding  Kansas" 
theme  as  party  propaganda.  Any  atrocities  they  could  pin  on  the  Democrats 
strengthened  their  cause  in  the  North.  The  Free-Soilers  and  later  the 
Republicans  jumped  like  grasshoppers  from  one  territorial  policy  to  another, 
espousing  any  one  which  at  the  moment  seemed  best  calculated  to  weaken 
their  Democratic  opponents.  In  1848,  the  antislavery  partisans  wanted 
the  Wilmot  Proviso  and  opposed  both  the  extension  of  the  Missouri  line 
and  squatter  sovereignty.  In  1854,  they  upheld  the  Missouri  line  as  if  they 
considered  this  the  ideal  policy,  and  bksted  popular  sovereignty.  By  1857 
they  championed  popular  sovereignty  more  ardently  than  Douglas,  and 
vilified  Buchanan  for  permitting  frauds  in  its  operation. 

But  despite  their  capricious  territorial  policies,  the  Republicans 
proclaimed  and  exploited  to  the  fullest  a  fundamental  principle  that  stood 
immovable:  that  the  doctrine  of  human  slavery  could  never  be  reconciled 


288 


KANSAS-A  TRACED Y  OF  ERRORS  •   1854-1857 


to  the  tenets  of  free  government.  Let  there  be  no  further  extension  of 
slavery.  In  the  realm  of  theory,  in  political  ideology,  and  in  moral  pro- 
priety they  stood  impregnable.  They  themselves  never  seriously  proposed 
acting  on  the  basis  of  racial  equality,  however.  The  antislavery  party 
demanded  the  exclusion  of  Negroes  from  their  society.  Northern  leaders 
frankly  said  that  they  wanted  Kansas  as  a  "white  man's  country."7  Many 
Republicans  had  little  practical  interest  in  ameliorating  the  lot  of  the  Negro. 
Primarily  they  wanted  to  seize  political  control  from  the  Democrats.  When 
the  Republicans  in  Kansas  could  not  direct  the  legal  government,  they 
seceded  and  lived  under  their  own  revolutionary  regime.  So  soon  as  they 
were  sure  they  could  control  the  legal  government,  they  adopted  that. 
The  main  issue  with  them  was  not  slavery,  nor  the  Negro;  their  prime 
objective  was  political  power. 

Southern  extremists,  or  fire-eaters,  held  very  much  the  same  aims. 
"Kansas  must  come  in  as  a  slave  state  or  the  cause  of  southern  rights  is  dead" 
they  thundered.  "If  Buchanan  should  secretly  favor  the  free-state  men 
of  Kansas  ...  he  will  richly  deserve  death,  and  I  hope  some  patriotic  hand 
will  inflict  it,"  wrote  T.  W.  Thomas  of  Georgia.8  These  defenders  of  slavery 
and  uncompromising  foes  of  the  Yankees  told  their  constituents  that  Kansas 
would  come  in  as  a  slave  state.  By  some  means  or  other,  they  had  to  make 
good  their  promise  or  lose  their  following.  For  them,  too,  the  issue, 
stripped  of  the  verbiage  of  propaganda,  was  political  control. 

Conservative  Democrats,  both  north  and  south,  emphasized  the 
need  for  admitting  Kansas  to  statehood,  free  or  slave,  as  the  quickest  way 
to  quiet  the  abolitionist  furor  in  the  North  and  the  secession  clamor  in  the 
South.  After  the  passage  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  Bill,  many  of  the  moderate 
southern  journals  deplored  it  as  of  no  practical  use  whatever  to  the  South. 
No  one  there  had  been  asking  a  repeal  of  the  Missouri  line  when  Douglas 
proposed  it,  and  the  result  had  been  a  disastrous  revival  of  the  agitation 
which  had  nearly  wrecked  the  country  in  1850.  "All  agree,"  said  the 
Richmond  Enquirer,  "that  slavery  cannot  exist  in  the  territories  of  Kansas 
and  Nebraska."9 

These  Union  Democrats  wanted  to  achieve  not  a  free  or  a  slave 
Kansas,  but  a  Democratic  Kansas.  With  the  Whigs  defunct  and  such  odd 
political  makeshifts  as  the  Southern  American  and  the  Know-Nothing 
parlies  picking  up  thousands  of  voters  set  adrift  by  the  Kansas  storm,  it 
was  of  first  importance  that  the  Union  Democrats  get  clear  of  the  sectional 
dispute  as  speedily  as  possible.  Then  and  not  until  then  could  they  begin 
to  regroup  their  scattering  forces. 

What  did  James  Buchanan  think  of  Kansas  when  he  entered  the 
White  House  other  than  that  it  would  be  the  critical  problem  of  his  Admin- 
istration? Personally  he  disapproved  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  Bill  and  his 
friends  assumed  that  had  he  been  in  Congress  in  1854  he  would  have  fought 

289 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


against  its  passage.10  He  had  clearly  defined  his  reasons  for  opposition  to 
popular  sovereignty  in  his  comments  in  1850  on  the  New  Mexico  and  Utah 
bills.  The  nation  was  a  republic,  not  a  pure  democracy;  the  citizens  did 
not  Inile,  could  not  rule  by  direct  vote;  they  delegated  authority  to  repre- 
sentatives. 

Popular  sovereignty  not  only  denied  the  competence  of  Congress 
and  the  validity  of  the  system  of  representative  government,  it  actually 
invited  local  war.  The  popular  sovereignty  bills  were  drawn  so  loosely  that 
they  did  not  provide  any  legal  mechanism  for  the  expression  of  the  public 
will.  They  left  undefined  the  rules  for  voter  qualification,  registration, 
control  of  polls,  official  count,  election  officers,  jurisdiction  over  disputed 
ballots,  and  the  limits  of  matters  to  be  voted  on.  Finally,  they  made  the 
colossal  assumption  that  a  group  of  unlettered  frontiersmen  could  settle 
in  a  peaceful,  orderly,  and  effective  way  the  slavery  problem  which  had 
defied  tie  intelligence  of  Franklin,  Washington,  Jefferson,  Hamilton,  Clay, 
Calhoun,  Benton,  Jackson,  Webster,  Seward,  Douglas,  and  every  other 
political  figure  who  had  grappled  with  it.  Buchanan's  letters  to  Toucey, 
Foote,  Davis  and  others  in  1850  had  predicted  the  result  of  asking  first 
settlers  to  decide  this  old  question  of  slavery  "in  their  own  way."  They 
would  rush  in  from  opposite  sides  and  murder  each  other. 

Buchanan's  official  endorsement  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  Act 
accounts  for  the  odd  response  he  made  to  the  Keystone  Club  upon  learn- 
ing of  his  nomination  in  June,  1856.  He  was  no  longer  "simply  James 
Buchanan,"  he  said,  but  the  "representative  of  the  great  Democratic  party" 
and  had  to  square  his  conduct  with  the  platform.11  He  would  support  the 
bill  as  his  public  duty,  but  that  did  not  mean  he  thought  privately  it  was 
a  good  law. 

During  the  election  canvass  the  northern  Democrats  developed 
the  idea  that  Buchanan  would  achieve  fair  play  in  Kansas,  and  this  would 
bring  it  in  as  a  free  state.  "Buchanan,  Breckinridge  and  Free  Kansas,"  read 
the  banners  at  party  rallies.  In  the  South  the  electoral  line  was,  obviously, 
not  "free  Kansas"  but  a  quick  and  fair  settlement  which  would  end  the 
agitation  and  write  finis  to  the  Republican  party.  These  elements  of  the 
campaign  impressed  on  Buchanan  the  lines  of  policy  which  he  should 
follow:  first,  a  fair  settlement,  which  meant  submission  of  a  Kansas  consti- 
tution to  an  open,  peaceful  vote;  second,  a  quick  settlement;  and  third,  the 
creation  of  a  Democratic  Kansas  which  would  silence  the  few  southerners 
who  would  complain  because  it  came  in  as  a  free  state.  That  a  fair  vote 
would  create  a  free  Kansas  James  Buchanan  never  doubted — not,  at  least, 
in  the  early  months  of  his  Administration. 

290 


KANSAS— A  TRAGEDY  OF  ERRORS  •   1854.  185? 


A  GOVERNOR  OF  NATIONAL  STATURE 

In  consultation  with  the  Cabinet  and  Senator  Douglas,  Buchanan  decided 
to  appoint  a  Kansas  governor  of  outstanding  prestige.  Ex-Governors 
Reeder,  Shannon,  and  Geary,  hard  as  they  had  tried,  had  failed  to  unify 
the  Territory,  and  the  Kansans  had  broken  them  one  after  the  other.  It 
would  be  interesting  to  know  whether  Buchanan  offered  the  job  to  Douglas, 
for  he  would  admirably  have  met  the  requirements  and  would  have  gratified 
many  by  taking  personal  charge  of  the  hornet's  nest  he  had  stirred  up. 
But  Buchanan  picked  Robert  J.  Walker,  a  politician  of  national  stature- 
even  a  possible  future  president.  Walker  wanted  no  part  of  the  job,  but 
Buchanan  argued  so  earnestly  that  the  safety  of  the  Union  depended  upon 
him  that  lie  eventually  accepted  the  governorship  as  a  public  duty.  To  pin 
down  explicitly  the  terms  of  the  appointment  he  wrote  to  Buchanan:  "I 
understand  that  you  and  all  your  Cabinet  cordially  concur  in  the  opinion 
expressed  by  me,  that  the  actual  bonafide  residents  of  the  Territory,  by  a 
fair  and  regular  vote,  unaffected  by  fraud  or  violence,  must  be  permitted 
in  adopting  their  State  Constitution  to  decide  for  themselves  what  shall  be 
their  social  institutions."12 

Frederick  P.  Stanton,  secretary  of  the  Territory  and  acting 
governor  in  Walker's  absence,  departed  for  Kansas  on  April  2  to  assume 
responsibility  until  the  governor  should  arrive  at  the  end  of  May.  Buchanan 
also  ordered  General  William  S.  Barney  to  take  over  the  1,500  troops  in 
Kansas  and  prevent  civil  disorder  there.  Walker  in  the  meantime  con- 
ferred in  Washington  to  clarify  further  his  policy  and  then  left  for  Kansas 
via  New  York  where,  at  a  public  dinner,  he  explained  his  purposes  in 
language  that  stretched  considerably  the  proposals  which  had  been  cleared 
in  Washington.  Instead  of  promising  a  fair  vote  to  permit  Kansans  "to 
decide  for  themselves  what  shall  be  their  social  institutions,"  (that  is,  to 
vote  on  slavery)  he  now  declared  his  determination  to  secure  a  full  vote 
upon  any  constitution  which  might  be  offered  for  adoption.18 

Walker  arrived  in  Kansas  on  May  24,  hobnobbed  for  two  days 
with  the  free-state  men  at  Leavenworth  and  Lawrence,  and  then  proceeded 
to  the  ramshackle,  clapboard  capital  village  of  Lecompton  where  he  de- 
livered his  inaugural  address  to  a  restless  and  uninterested  assemblage  of 
frowzy  frontiersmen.  The  address  had  two  parts,  one  describing  the 
political  and  the  other  the  economic  prospects.  "In  no  contingency,"  he 
said,  would  Congress  admit  Kansas  as  a  state  without  a  popular  vote  on  the 
adoption  of  a  constitution.  Unless  the  entire  constitution  should  be 
submitted  to  direct  vote,  it  eewill  and  ought  to  be  rejected  by  Congress." 
There  should  be  no  cause  for  quarrel  about  slavery,  he  continued.  Nature 
had  already  decided  that  issue;  the  thermometer  drew  an  "isothermal  line" 
beyond  which  slavery  could  not  possibly  exist,  and  Kansas  lay  north  of  this 
line.  Climate,  not  politics,  would  inevitably  make  Kansas  free. 

291 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Kansas  had  unlimited  promise  of  economic  growth,  he  said,  if 
only  the  people  would  cease  their  quarrels.  The  government  would  recom- 
mend an  enormous  land  grant  upon  the  admission  of  Kansas  to  statehood. 
There  was  everything  to  gain  and  nothing  to  lose  by  voting  on  a  con- 
stitution and  petitioning  promptly  for  admission. 

If  the  New  York  address  had  stretched  instructions,  the  inaugural 
hroke  entirely  away  from  them.  Buchanan  had  talked  with  Walker,  but  he 
had  never  seen  a  draft  of  the  inaugural.14  He  had  not  committed  himself 
to  submission  of  the  whole  constitution  but  only  of  the  slavery  question; 
and  he  certainly  never  dreamed  that  the  governor  would  tell  the  territorials 
how  to  adopt  their  constitution,  under  threat  of  rejection  by  Congress  if 
they  did  not  follow  his  advice.  Buchanan  disapproved  of  this  part  of  the 
inaugural;  nevertheless,  he  prepared  to  make  the  best  of  it.  He  agreed 
with  Walker  that  Kansas  inevitably  would  become  a  free  state,  but  he  felt 
that  the  governor's  indiscreet  speech  at  a  time  when  the  Administration 
wanted  to  emphasize  its  rigid  impartiality  in  guiding  the  two  sections  of 
Kansas  toward  statehood  would  cause  trouble. 

Walker  had  reasons  for  his  address.  He  had  become  convinced 
in  the  weeks  before  going  to  Kansas  that  his  main  task  would  be  to  persuade 
the  free-state  people  to  vote.  Many  of  these  were  Democrats,  and  he 
gambled  on  the  hope  that  they  would  join  with  the  Lecomptonites  in  a 
movement  to  make  Kansas  a  free  Democratic  state  in  preference  to  a  Black 
Republican  and  abolitionist  state.  He  assumed  that  the  proslavery  minority 
would  come  along.  The  Republicans  could  be  mollified  by  special  con- 
siderations in  land  distribution.  Walker  foresaw  himself  as  conqueror  of 
the  Kansas  dragon  and  soon  to  be  Senator  from  the  new  state.  He  wanted 
the  free-state  people  to  trust  him,  to  abandon  their  Topeka  organization, 
and  to  vote.  He  offered  everything:  a  free  Kansas,  control  of  the  new 
government  (which  would  follow  a  full  vote) ,  and  land.  If  this  prospect  did 
not  gain  their  cooperation,  nothing  would. 

Walker  had  expected  his  frank  and  undiplomatic  remarks  to 
raise  a  few  dust  devils,  but  not  the  tornado  which  swept  the  land.  He  did 
not  yet  know  that  Stanton  had  told  the  Lecomptonites  that  only  the  slavery 
question  had  to  be  put  to  a  public  vote,  and  that  it  would  be  wise  to  handle 
this  issue  independently  of  the  constitution.  Let  that  document  be  on  the 
regular  pattern,  without  mention  of  slavery.  "Then,"  he  said,  "the 
convention  ought  to  prepare  a  separate  article  on  the  subject  of  slavery" 
for  the  voters.15  This  proposal  apparently  came  right  from  headquarters 
and  did,  in  fact,  accurately  represent  Buchanan's  view.16  Nor  did  Walker 
know  that  before  he  even  left  Washington  some  of  the  proslavery  men  of 
Kansas  who  had  come  east  to  interview  him  had  returned  home  with  the 
report  that  he  was  dangerous  and  would  have  to  be  "broken"  like  the 
other  governors.  One  of  them,  hulking,  red-headed  L.  A.  Maclean  of  the 

292 


KANSAS-A  TRAGEDY  OF  ERRORS  •   1854-1857 


surveyor's  office,  got  up  after  the  inaugural  banquet  and  towering  over  the 
shrivelled  little  man  in  the  governor's  chair,  ridiculed  him  as  a  "pigmy"  and 
told  him  to  mind  his  own  business  or  be  run  out  of  the  territory.17 

But  the  reaction  in  Kansas  was  mild  compared  to  that  of  the 
southern  fire-eaters  who  had  only  with  the  greatest  difficulty  been  brought 
to  a  grudging  and  distrustful  support  of  Buchanan  in  1856.  "We  care 
betrayed"  they  roared.  "Our  victory  is  turned  to  ashes  on  our  lips,  and 
before  God  I  will  never  say  well  done  to  the  traitor  [Walker]  or  to  his 
master  who  lives  in  the  White  House."  "I  wish  Walker  had  been  hung 
before  he  went  [to  Kansas]  to  try  &  make  himself  next  President."18  The 
letters  flew,  damning  Buchanan's  "vile  treachery"  and  Walker's  harlotry 
with  free-soilers  and  abolitionists.  Then  came  the  direct  pressure  for 
Walker's  summary  dismissal;  if  he  were  not  dismissed,  southern  Senators 
would  block  his  confirmation.  This  was  no  bluff,  for  five  southern  states 
held  congressional  elections  in  midsummer,  and  if  the  fire-eaters  beat  the 
Union  Democrats  in  them,  the  whole  Administration  policy  of  creating  a 
strong  Democracy  would  crumble.  But  Buchanan  could  not  possibly 
remove  Walker  after  one  speech,  and  particularly  when  the  northern 
Democrats  hailed  that  speech  as  straightforward,  manly,  and  honest.19 

Buchanan  tried  to  calm  the  storm,  inserting  in  the  Washington 
Union  an  article  explaining  that  the  people  of  Kansas  ought  to  vote  on  their 
constitution  but  disclaiming  the  right  of  anyone  to  make  them  do  this.  He 
then  put  Cobb  to  work  writing  letters  intended  to  pacify  the  southern 
extremists.  To  clear  the  Administration,  Cobb  pointed  out  that  Walker's 
instructions  did  not  demand  submission  of  the  constitution  to  a  vote;  only 
the  slavery  question  required  a  plebiscite.  The  governor  in  his  initial 
enthusiasm  had  overstepped  the  mark.  To  justify  Walker,  the  Administra- 
tion emphasized  "that  it  was  better  to  make  [Kansas]  a  Constitutional 
Democratic  state  than  to  let  it  be  Black  Republican,"  and  Walker  therefore 
had  taken  the  free-state  Democrats  into  the  movement.20 

Alexander  H.  Stephens,  a  strong  southern  Unionist  and  keen 
interpreter  of  the  Constitution,  complained  that  those  who  applauded 
Walker's  address  always  overlooked  the  main  point.  They  thought  only 
of  the  propriety  of  submitting  the  constitution  for  ratification.  On  this  all 
could  agree.  But  suppose  the  convention  chose  not  to  do  it?  Who  had 
the  right  to  tell  a  constitutional  convention  what  to  do?  The  governor 
certainly  had  not,  and  if  Congress  should  try  to  exercise  such  a  power,  it 
would  "strike  at  the  foundation  of  our  government"  and  extinguish  "every- 
thing recognized  as  States  Rights  and  State  Sovereignty."21 

No  one  could  dispute  the  correctness  of  Stephens's  contention 
that  the  ultimate  sovereignty  in  the  United  States  lay  in  the  people  in 
their  constitution-making  capacity,  in  convention  assembled.  The  exercise 
of  outside  control  over  a  constitutional  convention  meant  subversionof 

293 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


the  basic  principle  upon  which  the  government  rested.  Some  of  Stephens's 
friends,  however,  observed  that  his  comments  came  with  very  bad  grace 
from  a  man  who  had  recently  "voted  for  that  clause  in  the  Minnesota  bill 
requiring  that  the  Constitution  shall  be  submitted  to  the  people."22 

Buchanan,  deep  in  the  midst  of  patronage  problems  and  pestered 
to  distraction  by  office  seekers,  gave  little  attention  to  the  uproar  about 
Kansas.  He  would  sustain  Walker,  but  he  would  not  endorse  his  foolish 
talk.  In  the  meantime  finicky  southerners  in  and  out  of  Kansas,  resentful 
of  Walker's  "arrogant  and  insolent  threats,"  began  to  think  that  because  of 
Wtdker,  the  convention  "ought  never  under  any  circumstances  to  comply 
with  his  demand."  Its  refusal  would  not  only  establish  the  sovereignty  of 
the  people  but  also  force  Walker  "to  carry  out  his  threat,  and  join  the 
free-soil  traitors."23  On  the  other  hand,  word  spread  that  the  free-state 
men  in  Kansas  would  never  vote  in  an  election  administered  by  the  Lecomp- 
ton  government.  If  there  were  no  submission  and  no  vote  on  slavery,  it 
would  be  a  double  catastrophe. 

Walker  continued  to  make  the  bold  and  unequivocal  speeches 

which  he  believed  necessary  to  promote  his  program,  and  they  naturally 

aggravated  partisanship.    He  told  the  free-state  people  that  if  the  coming 

constitutional  convention  did  not  submit  the  slavery  issue  to  a  vote,  "I 

will  join  you,  fellow  citizens,  in  lawful  opposition  to  their  course.    And  I 

cannot  doubt,  gentlemen,  that  one  much  higher  than  I,  the  chief  magistrate 

of  the  Union,  will  join  you  in  opposition."    From  this  statement,  the 

southerners  assumed  Walker  had  completely  gone  over  to  the  free-soilers. 

It  should  be  carefully  noted,  however,  that  this  time  Walker  had  pledged 

himself  and  Buchanan  to  a  submission  only  of  the  slavery  question.    After 

this  encouraging  pronouncement  from  the  governor,  the  free  staters  in 

Lawrence  proceeded  to  ignore  the  Lecompton  government  and  framed  their 

own  city  charter  without  authorization  from  anyone.    Walker  now  spoke 

again  but  in  terms  that  cheered  the  hearts  of  the  proslavery  men.    Any 

citizens  who  defied  the  legal  government  at  Lecompton  would  be  guilty  of 

treason,  and  Walker  would  not  hesitate  to  use  the  army  to  impose  the  usual 

penalty  for  it.    "If  you  have  wrongs,"  he  said,  "redress  them  through  the 

instrumentality  of  the  ballot  box."    Otherwise,  Walker  would  declare  them 

rebels  and  use  the  army  "to  perform  the  painful  duty  of  arresting  your 

revolutionary  proceedings."2*   In  the  face  of  this  threat,  the  city  fathers  of 

Lawrence  backed  down,  and  the  free-soilers  modified  some  of  their  earlier 

hopes  for  Walker. 

The  governor  wrote  to  Buchanan  on  June  28,  taking  full  personal 
responsibility  for  his  pledges  to  achieve  submission  of  the  forthcoming 
constitution  and  for  his  assertions  that  Kansas  would  have  to  be  a  free  state. 
He  apologized  for  taking  this  position  and  outlined  in  detail  the  conditions 
in  Kansas  which  required  him  to  do  so.  He  believed  that  had  he  not  come 

294 


KANSAS—A  TRAGEDY  OF  ERRORS  •   1854  -  1857 

out  for  submission  and  acknowledged  the  "axiomatic  truth"  that  the 
"existence  of  slavery  here  is  preposterous,"  he  would  have  faced  a  renewal 
of  bloodshed.  "The  expression  of  these  great  truths  ...  was  a  solemn 
duty,"  he  told  Buchanan.  "Now  unless  I  am  sustained  thoroughly  and 
cordially  by  the  administration  here,  I  cannot  control  the  convention,  and 
we  shall  have  anarchy  and  civil  war."25 

Buchanan  had  to  make  a  decision.  Walker  had  gone  beyond  his 
instructions  and  initiated  a  new  policy;  could  the  Administration  support 
it?  The  president  replied  that  Walker's  letter  which  he  had  just  read  to 
the  Cabinet  contained  views  which  "were  not  calculated  to  assure  us  of 
your  success."  Buchanan's  position  was  extremely  awkward.  He  could 
not  come  out  in  opposition  to  Walker,  for  this  would  wreck  all  chance  of 
uniting  the  Democrats  in  Kansas.  On  the  other  hand,  to  sustain  the  policy 
that  the  constitution  had  to  be  submitted  was  to  deliver  the  Administration 
into  the  hands  of  the  delegates  who  soon  would  meet  at  Lecompton  to  do 
whatever  they  pleased. 

Buchanan  collected  as  much  information  as  possible  from  other 
sources.  He  received  assurances  from  people  he  trusted  that  Walker  was 
merely  echoing  the  opinions  that  prevailed  in  Kansas  when  he  arrived.  It 
seemed  likely  that  the  convention  would  draw  up  a  constitution  in  which 
there  was  no  mention  of  slavery  and  submit  it  to  the  voters.  The  question 
of  slavery  would  be  decided  separately.  Walker  said  he  planned  to  visit 
every  delegate.  Even  the  southerners  admitted  that  the  only  reason  for  not 
submitting  was  the  fear  that  the  majority  ballot  would  make  Kansas  free, 
for  it  was  presumed  that  most  of  the  9,251  persons  legally  registered  to  vote 
for  delegates  favored  submission  and  a  free  state. 

Buchanan  finally  wrote  Walker,  "On  the  question  of  submitting 
the  Constitution  to  the  bona  fide  residents  of  Kansas,  I  am  willing  to  stand 
or  fall."26  He  put  his  Administration  on  the  line  with  this  statement  and 
explained  very  carefully  to  the  Cabinet  what  he  meant  by  it.  He  would 
sustain  as  party  policy  Walker's  unfortunate  pledge  to  achieve  submission 
of  the  whole  constitution  to  a  public  vote.  He  did  not  say  that  if  the  con- 
stitutional convention  ignored  this  policy  and  failed  to  submit,  he  would  as 
president  defy  and  oppose  their  action.  That  would  be  a  different  matter, 
a  matter  not  only  of  policy  but  also  of  law,  to  be  handled  if  the  problem 
arose.  "Sufficient  unto  the  day."  Howell  Cobb  wrote  that  the  possibility 
of  the  convention  refusing  to  submit  its  work  to  a  vote  was  "full  of  diffi- 
culty   With  all  my  heart,  I  trust  that  such  an  issue  will  not  come  upon 

us.  I  am  not  authorized  to  say  what  course  the  Administration  will  pursue. 
We  have  not  anticipated  it  and  have  made  no  programme."27  With  the 
matter  temporarily  disposed  of,  Buchanan  left  for  a  much  needed  two 
weeks'  vacation  at  Bedford  Springs. 

295 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


POPULAR  SOVEREIGNTY  IN  ACTION 

Meanwhile,  Kansas  officials  had  begun  the  long  process  of  calling  a  con- 
stitutional  convention.  Those  of  the  modern  age  who  deplore  the  skull- 
duggery which  both  sides  practiced  ought  now  to  pause  and  reflect  upon 
the  nature  of  the  problem.  Nothing  has  so  taxed  the  ingenuity  or  so 
frustrated  students  of  human  affairs  as  the  conduct  of  a  plebiscite  to 
determine  by  a  fair  vote  the  fate  of  a  locality  inhabited  by  people  of  antago- 
nistic loyalties  and  ideologies,  supported  by  strong  and  equally  matched 
outside  allies.  In  the  case  of  Kansas,  the  balloting  would  be  administered 
and  the  results  tabulated  by  one  of  the  parties  to  the  contest,  the  Lecompton 
government.  If  the  people  of  Kansas  achieved  less  than  a  quiet  and  peaceful 
delivery  of  the  presumed  rights  of  one  party  into  the  hands  of  the  other  by 
a  vote,  they  at  least  did  better  than  might  have  been  expected. 

Buchanan  had  hoped,  by  the  most  rigid  observance  of  impartiality 
and  technically  correct  application  of  legal  form,  to  play  the  part  of  umpire. 
Walker  thwarted  the  president  by  publicly  appearing  to  take  sides  with  the 
free-state  party.  Black  reported  in  July  that  Buchanan  would  apply  the  law 
and  "take  no  care  who  frets,  who  chafes,  or  who  the  conspirers  are."28 

On  February  19,  1857,  the  Lecompton  legislature  provided  for 
an  election  in  June  of  delegates  to  a  constitutional  convention  to  meet  in 
September.  A  census  was  taken  during  March.  Kansans  were  given  the 
month  of  April  in  which  to  correct  errors,  and  registration  of  voters 
followed.  Rules  of  eligibility  were  stricter  than  they  were  for  ordinary 
elections.  Each  person  had  to  show  proof  of  three  months'  continuous 
residence  and  a  receipt  for  payment  of  some  territorial  tax.  Quite  a  few 
illiterate  squatters  thought  the  census  takers  were  checking  land  claims 
and  drove  them  away.  .Others  sought  to  avoid  taxation  by  keeping  their 
names  off  the  list.  The  census  officials  did  not  visit  several  remote  counties, 
assuming  that  only  Indians  lived  in  them.  The  Republicans  caused  serious 
trouble.  Apparently  the  majority  of  them  felt  that  their  registration  would 
signify  acknowledgment  of  the  legitimacy  of  the  Lecompton  government, 
and  they  therefore  boycotted  the  listing.29 

Obviously  the  census  and  registration  were  incomplete.  But  the 
statement,  repeatedly  made,  that  only  nineteen  of  the  thirty-four  counties 
got  representation  in  the  Lecompton  convention  does  not  convey  a  correct 
picture.  Because  of  widely  scattered  population,  Kansas  counties  had  been 
grouped  into  units  for  electoral  purposes.  In  several  units  where  no  white 
population  existed,  no  census  was  taken;  in  other  units,  census  work  went 
normally  in  some  counties  but  ran  into  opposition  in  others  so  that  the 
electoral  unit  got  representation,  even  if  some  counties  did  not.  The 
convention,  however,  was  not  a  rump  affair  from  which  the  Republican 
half  of  Kansas  was  intentionally  excluded,  as  some  charged.  Anyone  not 

296 


KANSAS— A  TRAGEDY  OF  ERRORS  •   1854  -  1857 


registered  had  an  opportunity  to  add  his  name  to  the  rolls,  Jbut  the  Repub- 
licans wanted  to  keep  the  registration  down  to  create  the  appearance  of 
of  foul  play  and  an  unfair  vote. 

Despite  Walker's  inaugural  promises  to  the  free-state  people, 
only  about  2,000  Kansans  voted  for  delegates,  nearly  all  of  them  proslavery 
adherents.  The  free-state  Republicans  who  had  purposely  refused  to 
qualify  for  voting  apparently  convinced  the  free-state  Democrats  not  to 
exercise  their  right  after  getting  it.  The  election  was  peaceful,  no  flitting 
border  ruffians  or  floating  New  England  Emigrants  appeared  to  stuff  the 
ballot  boxes,  and  all  those  registered  had  an  opportunity  to  vote.  The 
delegates  who  would  meet  at  Lecompton  on  September  seventh  were  duly 
and  legally  authorized  to  act  for  the  people  of  Kansas. 

While  at  Bedford,  Buchanan  drafted  an  answer  to  forty  prominent 
educators  and  preachers  of  Connecticut  who  had  protested  his  "tyrannical" 
use  of  the  army  to  "force  the  people  of  Kansas  to  obey  laws  not  their  own, 
nor  of  the  United  States."  In  his  reply  Buchanan  exposed  some  of  the 
misinformation  being  circulated  about  Kansas  and  explained  his  policy. 
The  Topeka  regime,  he  reminded  them,  was  "a  usurpation  of  the  same 
character  as  it  would  be  for  a  portion  of  the  people  of  Connecticut  to  under- 
take to  establish  a  government  within  its  chartered  limits,  for  the  purpose 
of  redressing  any  grievance  .  .  .  against  the  legitimate  State  government." 
He  emphasized  the  fairness  of  the  Kansas  election  law  which  sought  to  make 
every  bonafide  resident  a  qualified  voter,  and  the  efforts  to  achieve  a  full 
vote.  When  "lawless  men  .  .  .  refused  either  to  register  or  to  vote,*'  the 
convention  members  "were  elected,  legally  and  properly"  by  those  who 
were  willing  to  exercise  their  voting  right.  He  would  use  the  Army  in 
Kansas,  he  concluded,  only  "to  resist  actual  agression."  In  words  clearly 
prophetic  of  his  policy  in  1861,  he  continued:  "Following  the  wise  example 
of  Mr.  Madison  towards  the  Hartford  convention,  illegal  and  dangerous 
combinations,  such  as  that  of  the  Topeka  convention,  will  not  be  disturbed, 
unless  they  shall  attempt  to  perform  some  act  which  will  bring  them  into 
actual  collision  with  the  Constitution  and  the  laws.  In  that  event  they 
shall  be  resisted  by  the  whole  power  of  the  government."30 

When  Buchanan  returned  to  Washington  in  August  the  future 
of  his  Administration  looked  bright.  He  had  just  about  disposed  of  the 
patronage,  the  southern  state  elections  had  brought  a  triumph  of  the  Union 
Democrats  over  the  secessionists,  it  seemed  a  certainty  that  the  Kansas  con- 
vention would  submit  its  work  to  a  vote,  and  the  "Silliman  letter"  to  the 
Connecticut  preachers  satisfied  most  northern  Democrats,  and  brought 
cheers  from  the  South.  HoweU  Cobb's  brother  wrote  "that  B.'s  letter  to  the 
Forty  Fools  from  Connecticut  is  the  greatest  state  paper  for  the  South,  that  has 
ever  emanated  from  the  executive  chair  since  the  days  of  Washington."81 

297 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


The  days  of  peace  and  good  will  proved  to  be  short.  On  August  24 
the  New  York  Stock  Exchange  collapsed  from  a  rush  to  unload  securities 
that  signalled  the  Panic  of  1857.  For  the  next  two  months  the  financial 
problems  of  the  nation  and  the  task  of  preparing  his  first  annual  message 
occupied  Buchanan's  attention.  He  kept  in  touch  with  Kansas  affairs,  but 
ceased  to  worry  about  them  for  he  believed  that  the  trouble  there  had 
nearly  come  to  an  end.  The  Lecompton  Convention  met  on  September  7, 
but  agreed  to  adjourn  until  after  the  election  of  Territorial  ofilcers  so  that 
no  one  could  accuse  the  delegates  of  playing  politics.  A  month  before  the 
October  election  of  a  new  Territorial  legislature,  Walker  asked  Buchanan 
for  information  to  help  him  handle  conflicts  over  interpretation  of  the 
election  laws.  Cass  replied  that  a  Territorial  governor  had  no  authority  to 
judge  the  qualification  of  voters;  this  power  by  law  belonged  to  election 
judges  who  were  appointed  by  County  Commissioners.  Nor  did  the 
governor  have  legal  authority  to  pass  judgment  on  disputed  election  returns. 
Members  of  the  legislature  had  jurisdiction  over  disputed  returns  for  their 
own  members;  and  judges  of  the  courts  had  jurisdiction  if  returns  for 
court  officers  were  in  dispute.  The  governor  ought  to  express  no  opinion 
on  the  elections.32 

The  Territorial  law  permitted  "free"  voting;  that  is,  neither  proof 
of  residence  nor  tax  receipt  was  required.  Walker  disposed  his  troops  with 
the  utmost  care  to  keep  order  and  assure  a  fair  contest,  but  his  effort  failed. 
McGee  County,  which  had  polled  14  votes  in  June,  showed  1,226  in  the 
October  returns.  It  was  in  a  remote  region,  and  for  this  reason  no  troops 
were  sent  there.  In  Oxford  County,  boasting  a  total  of  11  shacks,  1,828 
votes  mysteriously  appeared.  Outraged  and  shocked,  Walker  personally 
examined  the  polling  districts  of  these  two  counties.  He  could  find  no 
population.  On  these  fraudulent  returns  depended  the  complexion  of  the 
new  legislature:  with  them  it  would  be  proslavery;  without  them,  free- 
state.  After  hearing  about  the  McGee-Oxford  trickery,  the  adherents  of 
the  Topeka  government  quickly  formed  their  army  under  General  Jim  Lane 
and  marched  on  Lecompton.  The  fraud  was  so  palpable  and  the  probability 
of  armed  conflict  so  imminent  that  the  governor,  on  October  19,  issued  a 
public  proclamation:  he  would  transmit  no  returns  from  McGee  and 
Oxford  Counties. 

The  proslavery  delegates  to  the  constitutional  convention  called 
their  adjourned  session  to  order  at  Lecompton  the  very  day  of  Walker's 
pronouncement  on  the  voting  frauds.  Furious  at  his  breach  of  instructions, 
they  determined  never  to  be  guided  by  his  wishes.  Understanding  that  his 
presence  was  a  detriment,  Walker  departed  from  Lecompton,  leaving 
Surveyor  General  John  C.  Calhoun  to  work  with  the  convention. 

Calhoun  had  the  able  assistance  of  Colonel  H.  L.  Martin  who  had 
recently  arrived,  ostensibly  to  check  some  land  records.  Actually  he  had 


298 


KANSAS-A  TRAGEDY  OF  ERRORS  •   1854  - 1857 


come  as  an  agent  of  Buchanan  to  propose  that  the  convention  draw  up  two 
constitutions:  one  would  protect  slavery;  the  other  would  not.  The  White 
House  sponsors  thought  this  plan  would  please  Douglas  and  create  a  free, 
Democratic  Kansas.  Calhoun  and  Martin  believed  they  had  won  over  the 
convention,  but  it  suddenly  voted  to  draft  a  proslavery  constitution  and 
send  it  directly  to  Washington. 

Working  frantically  to  prevent  such  a  bombshell  from  landing 
on  Buchanan's  desk,  Calhoun  induced  the  convention  to  adjourn  for  a 
few  days  and  reconsider  the  two-constitution  scheme.  Almost  by  a  miracle, 
he  persuaded  the  delegates  to  approve  his  proposal  by  a  vote  of  27  to  25. 
Kansas  would  have  some  kind  of  constitution  and  could,  therefore,  become 
a  state.  In  case  the  vote  went  antislavery,  as  Calhoun  presumed  it  would, 
the  owners  of  the  200  slaves  in  the  Territory  were  to  be  temporarily  pro- 
tected by  the  anticonfiscation  feature  common  to  the  abolition  laws  of 
the  northern  states,  and  slavery  would  vanish  as  speedily  in  Kansas  as  it 
had  in  Massachusetts  or  Pennsylvania.  Calhoun  felt,  with  reason,  that  he 
had  prevented  a  renewal  of  civil  war,  guaranteed  the  political  loyalty  of 
Kansas  to  the  Democrats,  and  saved  both  Douglas  and  the  Buchanan  Ad- 
ministration from  certain  ruin.38 


299 


23 

LECOMPTON  — PYRRHIC  VICTORY  •  1858 

"BY  GOD,  SIR,  ANDREW  JACKSON  IS  DEAD!" 

News  of  the  action  of  the  Lecompton  Convention  brought  shouts  of 
"swindle"  from  all  parts  of  the  country.  Free-state  men  were  outraged  at 
the.  refusal  of  the  convention  to  permit  a  vote  on  the  constitution  and 
Douglas  told  the  Senate  that  "all  those  who  are  in  favor  of  this  Constitution 
may  vote  for  or  against  slavery  as  they  please;  but  all  those  who  are-  against 
this  constitution  are  disfranchised."  The  Republicans  rejoiced  that  the 
convention  had  offered  them  so  inviting  a  target  and  asserted,  erroneously, 
that  Kansas  would  remain  a  slave  state  whether  people  voted  for  the  pro- 
slavery  or  antislavery  constitution.  Southern  extremists  also  jumped  hard 
on  the  Lecompton  Convention  for  submitting  anything  to  a  popular  vote, 
and  damned  Buchanan  for  Sustaining  a  free-soiler  like  Walker  as  governor. 
"Nothing  short  of  seeing  the  Holy  Ghost  descending  on  Old  Buck  in  the 
shape  of  a  dove  patent  to  my  eyesight,"  wrote  one  of  them,  "could  ever 
make  me  trust  him  again."1 

Governor  Walker  never  revisited  the  convention  and  soon  left 
the  territory.  Far  from  returning  home  in  triumph,  he  would  be  ruined 
unless  he  could  make  out  of  the  unexpected  rebellion  of  the  convention 
an  issue  that  would  vindicate  his  mistaken  judgment.  In  Chicago,  Walker 
found  Douglas  much  troubled  by  the  events  in  Kansas.  But  Buchanan 
occupied  the  most  difficult  position  of  all;  he  would  be  denounced  for  the 
Lecompton  Constitution  whichever  side  he  took.  Political  capital  might 
be  made  of  his  certain  discomfiture  if  it  were  known  what  course  he  planned. 
Walker  proceeded  to  Washington  to  find  out. 

He  found  Buchanan  greatly  distressed  but  still  hopeful  that  the 
people  of  Kansas  would  go  to  the  polls,  take  one  constitution  or  the  other, 
achieve  statehood  and  end  the  controversy.  After  that  they  could  do  what 
they  pleased  with  their  constitution.  Buchanan  said  he  would  urge  this 
course  in  his  forthcoming  message  to  Congress.  Walker  pressed  him  to 
reject  the  Lecompton  trick  and  join  in  a  demand  for  a  new  convention,  but 

300 


LBCOMPTON— PYRRHIC  VICTORY  •   1858 


Buchanan  would  have  none  of  it  and  Walker  left,  declaiming  with  fire  and 
brimstone  that  the  president  had  betrayed  him. 

Douglas  called  at  the  White  House  on  December  3,  angry  because 
Buchanan  had  already  released  the  Kansas  portion  of  his  message  without 
having  consulted  him.  Buchanan,  thinking  that  the  Calhoun  compromise 
at  Lecompton  had  the  support  of  Douglas  and  sure  that  the  product  of  the 
convention,  provocative  as  it  was,  nevertheless  met  precisely  the  terms  of 
the  Kansas-Nebraska  law,  had  not  expected  the  Little  Giant  to  be  up  in  arms. 
But  Douglas  believed  that  he  could  not  possibly  survive  in  Illinois  politics 
unless  he  denounced  the  Lecompton  Constitution;  fifty-five  of  fifty-six 
Illinois  newspapers  were  out  against  it.  The  president  and  the  senator 
discussed  the  problem,  dispassionately  at  first,  but  with  increasing  im- 
patience and  rancor,  since  each  remained  blind  to  those  features  of  the 
issue  which  appeared  most  obvious  and  compelling  to  the  other.  Buchanan 
maintained  that  unless  Kansas  came  in  promptly,  the  Republicans  would 
keep  it  stirred  up  for  the  next  three  years  and  undoubtedly  win  both 
Kansas  and  the  national  election  of  1860.  That  would  bring  civil  war. 
He  granted  there  had  been  fraud  and  trickery  draped  all  around  Kansan 
political  affairs,  but  the  constitutional  elections  had  been  honest.  The 
basest  action  in  these  had  been  the  opposition's  refusal  to  register  and  to 
vote.  The  constitution-making  procedure  had  been  scrupulously  legal  and 
the  president  was  under  oath  to  execute  the  law.  He  had  no  right  to  use  his 
authority  to  force  a  constitutional  convention  to  comply  with  his  private 
wishes.  Lecompton  had  to  be  sustained;  there  was  no  other  course. 

Douglas  said  he  would  have  to  oppose  it;  his  people  would  never 
accept  so  palpable  a  fraud.  It  was  a  dirty  business  and  a  breach  of  the 
basic  principle  of  majority  rule.  A  minority  had  swindled  the  majority 
and  made  popular  sovereignty  a  joke.  Finally,  with  positions  solidified 
by  argument  and  tempers  mounting,  Buchanan  rose  and  said:  "Mr. 
Douglas,  I  desire  you  to  remember  that  no  Democrat  ever  yet  differed 
from  an  Administration  of  his  own  choice  without  being  crushed.  Beware 
of  the  fate  of  Tallmadge  and  Rives."  Years  before,  Jackson  had  destroyed 
the  careers  of  these  two  men  who  had  opposed  him.  "Mr.  President," 
replied  Douglas,  "I  wish  you  to  remember  that  General  Jackson  is  dead!" 
and  with  this  he  stalked  out.2 

Buchanan,  in  his  first  Annual  Message  on  December  8,  explained 
1frhy  he  would  be  duty  bound  to  transmit  the  Kansas  constitution  to 
Congress,  no  matter  which  one  the  voters  chose.  The  convention  had  been 
legally  elected,  and  federal  law  only  required  submission  to  a  public  vote 
of  the  question  "with  or  without  slavery."  The  citizens  of  Kansas  had 
been  given  every  opportunity  to  register  and  vote,  and  the  refusal  of  any 
of  them  to  avail  themselves  of  their  right  could  in  no  manner  affect  the 
legality  of  the  convention.  Under  the  existing  government,  said  Buchanan, 

301 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


"a  majority  of  those  who  vote— not  the  majority  who  may  remain  at  home, 
from  whatever  cause— must  decide  the  result  of  an  election.*'  Abraham 
Lincoln,  faced  with  a  similar  case  in  West  Virginia  in  1863,  wrote  that  "it 
is  universal  practice  in  popular  elections  in  all  of  these  states  to  give  no 
legal  consideration  whatever  to  those  who  do  not  choose  to  vote,  as  against 
the  effect  of  the  votes  of  those  who  do  choose  to  vote."3 

Buchanan  approved  of  submission,  and  he  had  hoped  that  the 
convention  would  agree.  But  he  had  never  suggested  that  he  would  require 
it.  Douglas  himself,  in  his  Springfield  speech  of  June  12, 1857,  had  declared 
that  submission  was  not  at  all  necessary.  The  convention  had  done  what 
it  had  a  right  to  do,  and  the  president  could  not  reject  its  work  because  he 
had  preferred  a  different  decision.  Under  these  circumstances  Buchanan 
questioned  "whether  the  peace  and  quiet  of  the  whole  country  are  not  of 
greater  importance  than  the  mere  temporary  triumph  of  either  of  the 
political  parties  in  Kansas."4 

Next  day  in  the  Senate,  Douglas  attacked  the  legitimacy  of  the 
Lecompton  Constitution.  On  December  15,  Governor  Walker  resigned, 
charging  Buchanan  with  betrayal.  On  December  21,  the  people  of  Kansas 
cast  6,143  votes  for  the  constitution  "with  slavery"  and  569  "without 
slavery."  Meanwhile,  in  mid-December,  acting  governor  Stanton  called 
a  special  session  of  the  newly  elected  territorial  legislature  which  otherwise 
would  not  have  met,  Buchanan  hoped,  until  after  the  admission  of  Kansas 
as  a  state.  Buchanan  immediately  removed  Stanton  and  appointed  Indian 
Commissioner  James  W.  Denver,  but  the  damage  had  already  been  done. 
The  legislature  quickly  called  for  another  vote  on  January  4  on  the  whole 
Lecompton  Constitution.  The  results  of  this  referendum  showed: 

Against  the  Lecompton  Constitution 10,226 

For  it,  with  slavery 138 

For  it,  without  slavery 24 

Despite  this  blow,  Buchanan  remained  firm  and  on  February  2  transmitted 
the  Lecompton  Constitution  to  Congress  accompanied  by  a  long  explanatory 
message.  "I  am  decidedly  in  favor  of  its  admission,  and  thus  terminating 
the  Kansas  question,"  he  concluded. 

What,  exactly,  was  the  issue  raised  by  Lecompton?  Douglas  and 
his  allies  said  it  was  a  question  of  morality:  the  vote  on  the  constitution 
had  been  fraudulent  and  unfair,  and  violated  the  principle  of  popular 
sovereignty.  Buchanan  and  his  allies  said  it  was  a  question  of  administra- 
tive law  and  practical  politics:  a  scabby  and  unfortunate  affair,  but  legal, 
constitutional,  and,  given  the  antecedents,  inevitable.  These  differing 
points  of  view  augured  an  irreconcilable  conflict  from  the  start.  The 
argument  of  those  who  emphasized  the  moral  issue  quickly  degenerated 
into  ridicule  and  vilification  of  Buchanan.  The  president  pointed  out  the 
futility  of  trying  to  settle  political  questions  by  appeal  to  moral  principles. 


302 


IECOMPTON-PYRRHIC  VICTORY  •   1858 

"The  Bible  for  Heaven,  the  Constitution  for  earth,"  he  would  say;  or, 
"You  cannot  legislate  morality."  Douglas  agreed  with  these  maxims  when 
he  talked  of  slavery,  for  he  declined  to  discuss  its  moral  aspects,  but  not 
when  he  talked  of  Lecompton  and  popular  sovereignty. 

A  great  many  reasons  combined  to  make  Buchanan  take  the 
position  of  "no  parley  with  Douglas,"  and  Douglas  to  threaten,  "By  God, 
sir,  I  made  Mr.  James  Buchanan,  and  by  God,  sir,  I  will  unmake  him." 
Their  personalities  clashed.  Buchanan  was  the  kind  of  man  who  tried  to 
avoid  risk,  Douglas  the  kind  who  welcomed  it  as  a  relish  and  stimulus. 
No  amount  of  arbitration  could  alter  these  differences  in  their  nature. 
Buchanan  had  little  ambition  for  further  political  honor,  but  he  was  tre- 
mendously eager  to  achieve  a  "historical"  reputation.  He  would  attain 
this,  he  thought,  if  he  could  settle  the  problem  of  slavery  in  the  Territories 
by  the  swift  admission  of  Kansas.  Thus  would  he  not  only  preserve  the 
Union  but  also  encourage  a  final  solution  of  the  sectional  problem,  for  he 
thought  that  slavery  would  die  out  in  time  "by  the  silent  operation  of 
economic  and  moral  forces."5 

Furthermore,  Buchanan  took  a  certain  spiteful  satisfaction  that 
Douglas's  principle  of  popular  sovereignty  had  turned  out  to  be  such  a 
catastrophe.  Finally,  as  a  party  politician,  Buchanan  knew  that  36  of  the 
39  Democratic  Senators  and  probably  110  of  the  130  Democratic  Congress- 
men would  vote  to  admit  Kansas  under  the  Lecompton  Constitution.  The 
president  could  not  reject  the  Lecompton  Constitution  without  renouncing 
the  Democratic  party. 

Douglas,  on  the  other  hand,  believed  that  he  would  lose  the 
senatorship  in  1858  If  he  supported  Lecompton,  and  he  had  to  stay  in  the 
Senate  to  attain  the  presidency  in  1860.  By  denouncing  Lecompton  as  a 
fraud,  he  could  make  a  case  for  popular  sovereignty  and  at  the  same  time 
embarrass  Buchanan. 

"I  ACKNOWLEDGE  NO  MASTER  BUT  THE  LAW" 

The  anti-Lecompton  forces  brought  six  indictments  against  the  constitution 
and  the  Buchanan  Administration:  that  the  principle  of  majority  rule  had 
been  violated;  that  the  constitution  was  invalid  because  it  had  not  been 
ratified  by  popular  vote;  that  the  people  had  no  opportunity  to  choose 
between  slavery  or  no  slavery;  that  the  constitution  could  not  be  amended 
until  1864;  that  Buchanan  had  betrayed  Walker;  and  that  the  president 
had  become  the  captive  of  a  southern  "Directory." 

The  debate  on  majority  rule  ran  wild  and  revealed  that  Americans 
could  not  agree  on  a  definition  of  it.  Buchanan  held  that  a  majority  meant 
a  plurality  of  votes  cast  by  legally  registered  voters  in  an  election  called  by 
proper  procedure  to  decide  a  question  that  had  a  legitimate  place  on  the 

303 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


ballot.  According  to  this  definition,  the  Lecompton  Constitution  met 
every  challenge.6  Anti-Lecompton  newspapers  variously  defined  a  majority 
as  "fifty-one  percent  of  all  the  potential  voters,"  "a  preponderance  of  those 
registered/'  "most  of  those  who  actually  voted,"  or  "a  plurality  of  the 
representatives"  of  any  of  these  three  groups,7 

If  Douglas  meant  to  protest  a  violation  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska 
Act  because  the  Lecompton  vote  failed  to  comprise  a  majority  of  all  the 
potential  voters,  then  he  had  to  admit  that  the  October  vote  for  the  free- 
state  Legislature  and  the  January  4  vote  against  Lecompton  also  violated 
the  principle,  as  none  of  these  comprised  a  plurality  of  the  24,000  bona  fide 
male  inhabitants  of  voting  age.  That  Douglas  believed  sincerely  in  majority 
rule  seemed  refuted  by  the  fact  he  disregarded  the  overwhelming  majority 
of  his  own  party  in  opposing  Lecompton.  Backed  by  twenty-two  colleagues, 
he  defied  150  Democratic  Senators  and  Congressmen,  using  every  power 
and  parliamentary  trick  at  his  command  to  obstruct  the  policy  of  seven- 
eighths  of  his  party's  legislators. 

The  opponents  of  the  Lecompton  Constitution  complained  of 
fraud  and  harped  on  the  term  "fair  vote,"  Douglas  wanted  resubmission, 
but  Buchanan  thought  that  another  election  would  only  produce  more 
confusion;  it  would  be  an  unwarranted  admission  that  the  first  ballot  was 
dishonest  and  permit  the  Republicans  to  prolong  the  agitation  and  again 
sabotage  the  effort  of  the  Lecompton  government  to  get  out  the  vote.8 

The  Douglas  bloc  declaimed:  "We  must  stand  on  the  popular 
sovereignty  principle,"  but  when  Buchanan  proposed  to  implement  this 
procedure  they  all  repudiated  his  proposal.  If  they  wished  the  people  to 
act  for  themselves  in  their  sovereign  capacity,  said  Buchanan,  place  them 
immediately  in  a  sovereign  capacity.  Make  Kansas  a  state  and  then,  indeed, 
its  people  could  vote  all  of  their  domestic  problems  up  or  down.  But 
Douglas,  emphasizing  that  his  doctrine  applied  only  to  the  territorial  stage, 
jettisoned  the  main  principle  and  feared  to  admit  Kansas  to  statehood. 
Buchanan,  by  urging  the  speedy  admission  of  Kansas  and  inviting  its 
people  to  scrap  the  Lecompton  Constitution  immediately  thereafter,  placed 
more  faith  in  the  basic  principle  of  popular  sovereignty  than  Douglas. 
Buchanan  freely  admitted  that  the  proslavery  part  of  the  constitution  ought 
to  be  thrown  out,  but  the  president  could  not  do  it.  This  was  a  job  for  the 
people  of  Kansas.  Admit  them  to  statehood  and  let  them  act. 

Some  historians,  while  admitting  that  the  procedures  of  the 
Lecompton  Convention  were  "quite  legal,"  have  airily  dismissed  this  fact 
as  a  "lame  technicality"  and  condemned  Buchanan  for  his  failure  to 
"cling  to  principle.*'9  Buchanan  would  have  admitted  privately  that  many 
of  his  arguments  for  Lecompton  were  expedient  and  shallowly  political, 
but  not  his  defense  of  its  legality.  He  would  not  subvert  the  law  just 

304 


LECOMPTON-PYRRfflC  VICTORY  •   1858 

because  the  law  happened  to  be,  in  his  judgment,  bad.  The  game  of  govern- 
ment had  to  be  played  by  the  rule  book  no  matter  how  the  crowd  reacted. 
Said  he,  "I  acknowledge  no  master  but  the  law." 

Douglas  repeatedly  accused  Buchanan  of  trying  to  "force"  the 
Lecompton  Constitution  on  the  people  of  Kansas  "against  their  will, 
in  opposition  to  their  protest,"  and  with  foreknowledge  that  they  would 
have  voted  it  down  if  given  the  chance.  "It  does  not  mitigate  the  evil," 
Douglas  argued,  "that  you  are  forcing  a  good  thing  upon  them."10  Bu- 
chanan thought  it  odd  that  there  should  be  such  violent  resistance  to  an 
invitation  to  be  free.  It  seemed  to  him  that  the  protesting  Kansans  did 
not  really  want  statehood  and  a  chance  to  make  whatever  kind  of  con- 
stitution they  wished;  they  liked  the  political  effect  of  continued  agitation. 
"Everybody  with  the  least  foresight,"  wrote  Buchanan,  "can  perceive  that, 
Kansas  admitted,  and  the  Black  Republican  party  are  destroyed;  whilst 
Kansas  rejected,  and  they  are  rendered  triumphant  throughout  the 
Northern  States.  ...  I  very  much  fear  that  the  fate  of  the  Union  is 
involved."11 

The  second  charge,  that  the  Lecompton  Constitution  had  no 
validity  because  the  convention  had  not  submitted  it  to  a  popular  vote  for 
ratification  touched  an  interesting  phase  of  the  Kansas  controversy, 
Buchanan  stated  that  "under  the  earlier  practice  of  the  government,  no 
constitution  framed  by  the  convention  of  a  Territory  .  .  .  had  been  sub- 
mitted to  the  people."  The  Philadelphia  Press  said  that  "Most  State 
Constitutions  have  been  submitted."  Southern  journals  and  letters 
emphasized  that  submission,  while  not  wrong,  was  entirely  unnecessary 
and  contrary  to  general  practice.  Many  western  newspapers  asserted  that 
only  popular  ratification  gave  validity  to  a  constitution.12 

Historically,  out  of  the  63  constitutions  which  had  been  adopted 
by  the  33  states  from  1776  to  1858,  30  had  been  ratified  by  popular  vote 
and  33  had  been  proclaimed  in  force  by  a  constitutional  convention.  Each 
section  developed  a  different  method.  In  the  South,  21  of  30  constitutions 
had  come  into  being  by  convention  edict.  In  the  West,  11  of  14  con- 
stitutions had  been  ratified  by  a  vote  of  the  people.  In  the  New  England 
and  Middle  Atlantic  States,  10  constitutions  had  been  submitted  to  popular 
vote,  and  9  declared  in  effect  by  a  convention.  Thus,  in  the  contest  over 
Lecompton,  each  section  reacted  in  conformity  with  its  own  historical 
tradition.  Southerners  fumed  with  rage  when  Douglas  charged  that  the 
nonsubmission  method  of  constitution-making  was  a  cheat  and  a  fraud. 
Westerners,  so  accustomed  to  popular  ratification  that  they  thought  of  it 
as  a  "right,"  immediately  smefled  a  crooked  deal  when  Kansans  failed  to 
use  this  practice.  By  1858,  only  9  of  the  states  still  lived  under  charters 
never  ratified  by  the  people,  but  of  these  8  were  in  the  South.13  There  was 

305 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


no  historic  basis  for  the  assertion  of  Douglas  that  the  validity  of  a  con- 
stitution  depended  upon  its  ratification  by  the  people,  but  it  would  have 
taken  more  than  a  different  personality  in  the  White  House  to  overcome 
the  prejudices  arising  from  the  differing  constitution-making  traditions 

of  the  two  sections.  «    ,  , .    . 

The  third  charge  was  that  the  "slavery"  or  "no  slavery  plebiscite 
offered  no  choice  but  protected  slavery  no  matter  how  the  vote  went.  This 
certainly  had  all  the  appearance  of  a  swindle.  The  facts  were  these:  if  the 
voters  chose  the  "constitution  with  slavery"  a  four  paragraph  article 
sustaining  slavery  would  be  inserted;  if  the  other  option  won,  the  con- 
stitution would  be  silent  on  slavery.  But  a  "schedule"  accompanied  the 
constitution,  defining  the  details  of  procedure  for  setting  up  the  new  state. 
It  stated  that  "property  in  slaves  now  in  the  territory  shall  in  no  manner 
be  interfered  with"  and  that  the  constitution  could  not  be  amended  before 
1864,  and  only  then  by  a  vote  of  two-thirds  of  both  houses  of  the  legislature 
confirmed  by  a  popular  election.  These  provisions  were  foolish  and 
provocative,  but  they  were  not  nearly  so  ironclad  or  tricky  as  the  anti- 
Lecompton  propaganda  made  them  out  to  be.  Had  the  free-state  people 
of  Kansas  voted  for  the  "no  slavery"  option,  they  would  have  agreed  not 
to  confiscate  summarily  the  200  Negro  slaves  then  in  residence,  but  they 
would  not  have  secured  to  the  owners  any  right  to  hold  the  newborn 
children  in  slavery.  No  court  proclaimed  a  natural  right  in  slavery— that 
is,  its  automatic  existence  without  any  creative  law.  Most  northern  states 
had  abolished  slavery  when  a  few  slaves  still  remained  in  their  region  and 
had  avoided  outright  confiscation.  The  Pennsylvania  abolition  kw  of  1780 
had  projected  for  some  years  into  the  future  the  point  when  complete 
abolition  would  occur.  This  period  gave  opportunity  for  compensated 
emancipation,  manumission  by  slaveowners  or  the  removal  of  slaves  from 
the  state,  but  the  law  did  not  annihilate  property  rights. 

The  Lecompton  Convention  could  easily  have  devised  a  plan  for 
eventual  emancipation  that  would  have  been  less  obnoxious  to  the  North, 
but  defenders  of  the  Kansas  Constitution  could  mam*a"i  with  truth  that 
the  version  "without  slavery"  would  have  made  Kansas  a  free  state  just 
as  quickly  as  the  laws  of  Pennsylvania  or  New  Jersey  had  brought  free 
statehood.  If  Kansas  was  perpetrating  a  swindle,  nearly  every  other 
northern  state  had  done  the  same  thing  years  before.14  Furthermore,  the 
Kansans  could  change  the  "schedule"  after  admission  to  statehood  if 
they  wished. 

The  next  charge  was  that  by  means  of  the  "schedule"  a  trifling 
minority  had  prevented  the  majority  from  making  any  changes  before  1864. 
Buchanan's  repeated  assertion  that  no  power  on  earth  could  keep  the  people 
of  Kansas  from  amending  their  constitution  or  making  a  new  one  whenever 
they  wished,  once  they  had  statehood,  was  confirmed  by  the  practice  of 

306 


LECOMPTON— PYRRHIC  VICTORY-   1858 


other  states.  The  president  contended  that  the  fastest  conceivable  way 
to  enable  the  Kansans  to  create  exactly  the  constitution  they  wanted  would 
be  to  admit  them  to  the  Union. 

Did  Buchanan  betray  Walker?  One  will  read  in  vain  to  find  any 
statement  from  Buchanan  that  he  considered  the  Lecompton  Convention 
bound  to  submit  its  product  to  a  public  vote,  or  that  he  would  reject  a 
constitution  not  so  submitted.  He  said  on  many  occasions  that  he  hoped 
the  convention  would  submit;  that  he  assumed  it  would;  and  that  it  should 
be  encouraged  to  do  so,  but  this  was  a  far  cry  from  a  presidential  order  that 
the  convention  had  to  do  it.  Walker  and  many  others  read  into  Buchanan's 
letters  a  mandate  where  only  a  hope  had  been  expressed. 

Even  the  "stand  or  fall"  letter  to  Walker  on  July  12  did  not 
pledge  the  rejection  of  a  proclaimed  constitution.  It  read,  "On  the  question 
of  submitting  the  Constitution  to  the  bona  fide  residents  of  Kansas,  I  am 
willing  to  stand  or  fall."  Walker  repeatedly  broke  instructions  during  May 
and  June  by  committing  Buchanan  to  the  total  submission  policy,  a  position 
the  president  had  never  approved  or  authorized.  Buchanan  would  have 
removed  Walker  for  his  insubordinate  actions,  but  a  dismissal  at  the  time 
was  politically  impossible*  To  have  broken  with  him  so  soon  after  all  the 
effort  to  induce  him  to  accept  would  have  indefinitely  wrecked  any  Kansas 
program.  Moreover,  no  one  else  of  similar  stature  would  take  the  governor- 
ship under  such  circumstances,  unless  it  would  be  an  ardent  partisan,  and 
such  a  man  could  not  administer  the  policy  Buchanan  deemed  essential. 

The  president,  therefore,  took  the  calculated  risk,  gave  Walker 
the  "stand  or  fall"  pledge,  and  hoped  that  the  governor  might  succeed. 
Had  Buchanan,  at  the  risk  of  national  safety,  supported  Walker  in  the 
abortive  policy  which  the  governor  himself  had  originated,  this  support 
indeed  would  have  demonstrated  a  weak  and  spurious  consistency.  Instead, 
Buchanan  reaffirmed  the  policy  he  had  instructed  Walker  to  observe  in 
the  first  place  and  philosophically  accepted  the  abuse  which  came  when  the 
governor,  with  White  House  backing,  failed  to  deliver  what  he  promised. 
Walker  did  not  seem  to  feel  very  seriously  that  Buchanan  had  "betrayed" 
him.  After  blustering  for  a  while  he  came  to  dinner  at  the  White  House 
and  a  little  later  tried  his  best  to  persuade  Douglas  to  return  to  the  support 
of  the  Administration.15 

A  final  aspect  of  the  "betrayal"  charge  rests  on  an  allegation  that 

Buchanan  had  promised  a  "full  and  fair  vote"  in  Kansas  and,  by  accepting  a 

partial  vote,  had  reneged  on  his  pledge.18    But  Buchanan  never  promised 

anyone  that  he  would  produce  a  full  vote  in  Kansas;  he  could  provide  only 

xthe  opportunity  for  a  full  and  fair  vote,  and  this  he  did. 

Lastly,  many  historians  have  charged  that  Buchanan,  in  accepting 
Lecompton,  weakly  capitulated  to  a  "Directory"  composed  of  southern 
members  of  his  Cabinet  and  the  fire-eaters.  "Through  his  career,"  says  one, 

307 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


"Buchanan  had  been  a  <dough-face'-now  the  Fire-Eaters'  threats  filled  him 
with  unquenchable  alarm ...  if  he  had  not  abandoned  Walker,  the  Southern 
States  would  carry  out  their  threats  'either  to  secede  ...  or  take  up  arms 
against  him/  "  Another  writer  states:  "He  was  swayed  by  timidity:  he 
quailed  before  the  Southern  menaces  transmitted  to  him  by  Cobb,  Thomp- 
son, and  a  hundred  others,"  A  third  asserts  that  the  southern  clique 
"bent  the  president  at  will."17 

There  is  no  valid  evidence  that  before  1860  any  members  of 
Buchanan's  Cabinet  were  fire-eaters,  nor  did  the  president  timidly  give  in 
to  his  advisors.  Buchanan  had  included  no  extremists  in  his  Cabinet;  the 
aggressive  antislavery  wing  of  the  Democracy  had  no  representative  in  it, 
nor  did  the  fire-eaters.  Prior  to  the  election  of  Lincoln,  Cobb  was  one  of 
the  leading  antisecessionists  of  the  South.  His  political  rivals  there  were 
the  fire-eaters.  Buchanan  respected  him,  and  it  was  Cobb,  the  Union 
Democrat  who  influenced  him,  if  anyone  did. 

If  Buchanan  deferred  to  his  Cabinet,  that  was  one  thing;  but  it 
was  not  deference  to  southern  extremists.  But  did  he  defer  to  the  Cabinet? 
He  picked  men  who  he  knew  already  agreed  with  him.  His  ideas  on 


by  him  for  a  generation.  His  support  of  Lecompton  and  the  arguments  in 
behalf  of  it  were  not  prompted  by  threats  or  sweet  talk,  for  he  merely  re- 
stated  his  old  policy.  No  one  needed  to  bend  him  into  a  shape  he  already 
held.  He  was  going  to  enforce  the  letter  of  the  law  in  Kansas,  without 
regard  to  the  advantage  of  one  side  or  the  other.  None  but  the  blind  missed 
the  irony  of  Buchanan's  reply  to  Walker's  bitter  and  denunciatory  letter 
of  resignation.  The  president  had  learned  with  pleasure,  "he  wrote,  that 
Walker  in  all  his  speeches  had  "refrained  from  expressing  any  opinion 
whether  Kansas  should  be  a  slave  or  a  free  state."18  If  Walker  had  ruined 
his  usefulness  as  an  umpire  by  publicly  declaring  he  would  make  trouble 
unless  the  northern  team  won,  Buchanan  would  not  follow  him;  and 
threats  from  the  South  did  not  govern  the  decision. 

Why,  we  may  ask,  was  Buchanan  in  the  camp  of  the  southern 
extremists  in  the  fight  over  the  Lecompton  Constitution?  The  answer  is 
simple:  he  was  a  legalist.  He  based  bis  decision  on  the  legality  of  the 
Kansas  document.  At  that  time  his  stand  happened  to  favor  the  practical 
interests  of  the  South.  Cobb  wrote,  in  the  midst  of  the  Lecompton  struggle, 
that  Buchanan  could  not  be  driven  from  his  course  "by  the  clamor  either 
of  the  South  or  North — for  he  has  encountered  and  resisted  both."19 

DRIVE  THIS  BILL  "NAKED"  THROUGH  THE  HOUSE 

Buchanan  carefully  canvassed  the  Congress  and  found  that  the  Lecompton 
Constitution  would  get  a  large  majority  in  the  Senate,  and  about  100  of 

308 


LECOMPTON— PYRRHIC  VICTORY  •  1858 


the  118  votes  needed  for  passage  in  the  House.  The  prospects  looked  so 
good  and  the  end  to  the  infernal  Kansas  question  seemed  so  near  that  he 
decided  to  make  support  of  the  admission  bill  a  party  measure  and  crack 
the  whip  to  drive  the  few  necessary  stray  votes  into  the  fold.  The  opposi- 
tion of  Douglas  might  prove  less  serious  than  it  had  at  first  appeared. 
Political  insiders  guessed  that  he  and  Walker  were  "both  throwing  Ugh  dice 
for  the  Northern  Democracy  for  Pres,"  and  that  they  wanted  to  destroy 
Cobb,  who  seemed  to  have  the  inside  track  to  the  succession.20  When  this 
word  got  around,  the  Douglas  crusaders  for  the  "great  principle  of  majority 
rule"  might  begin  to  lose  their  zeal  and  Douglas,  when  all  the  chips  were 
down  and  the  Democracy  was  mobilized  for  action  without  him,  might  give 
up  the  fight.  He  could  not  reach  the  White  House  with  only  the  vote 
of  Illinois. 

In  the  South,  the  Legislatures  of  Alabama  and  Georgia  had 
adopted  resolutions  requiring  their  governors  to  call  state  conventions  to 
consider  secession  in  the  event  that  Congress  denied  admission  to  Kansas 
under  the  Lecompton  Constitution.  To  quiet  down  some  of  the  most 
excited  southern  Senators,  Buchanan  unwisely  let  them  know  some  weeks 
in  advance  that  he  planned  to  transmit  the  Lecompton  Constitution  to 
Congress  with  his  blessing  as  soon  as  the  official  copy  should  arrive  from 
Kansas.  This  tied  frfr"  down  completely,  and  denied  him  the  freedom  of 
action  which  he  could  possibly  have  used  to  advantage  later.  He  received 
a  letter  from  Acting  Governor  Denver  shortly  thereafter  advising  him  that 
angry  Republicans  in  Kansas  had  developed  a  new  scheme  which  might 
deprive  Buchanan  of  all  of  the  advantages  he  anticipated  from  quick 
admission.  They  had  worked  up  a  kind  of  "murder  incorporated"  to 
assassinate  systematically  all  officers  who  might  try  to  serve  under  the 
Lecompton  Constitution.  Kansas  would  be  bloodier  as  a  state  than  it  had 
been  as  a  Territory,  and  the  Republicans  would  continue  to  have  their 
campaign  ammunition.  Denver  reported  that  most  influential  Kansans 
preferred  the  passage  of  a  Congressional  enabling  act  which  would  start  the 
constitution-making  process  over  again  under  clear  authority  and  specified 
procedure.  Buchanan  probably  regretted  that  he  could  not  take  up  this 
plan  which  he  had  favored  when  it  was  first  proposed  some  years  before, 
but  he  had  committed  himself  beyond  recall.  He  had  chosen  the  course 
which  seemed  to  offer  the  best  chance  of  success.21 

Buchanan  sent  the  Lecompton  message  to  Congress  on  February  2. 
In  it  he  tried  to  put  the  best  possible  face  on  a  bad  business,  emphasizing 
that  by  no  other  means  than  admission  to  statehood  could  Kansas  achieve 
peace  and  the  nation  be  spared  further  agitation  over  slavery.  In  a  letter 
to  Arnold  Plumer,  he  said, 

I  am  now  thoroughly  convinced  that  the  question  of  the  union 

is  directly  involved.  .  .  .    Should  the  Kansas  Constitution  be 

309 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

rejected  by  Congress  then  the  Topeka  rebels  will  send  a  con- 
stitution  here,  not  merely  providing  for  a  free  state,  but  stuffed 
with  all  manner  of  abominations,  ...  and  everything  which  can 
be  offensive  to  the  South.  , .  . 

There  is  much  talk  about  the  Lecompton  'swindle.'  I  have  no 
doubt  frauds  were  committed  by  both  parties  at  contested 
elections,  but  none  of  these  can  be  charged  at  any  election 

necessary  to  give  validity  to  the  constitution These  elections 

went  by  default It  was  the  law  &  order  party  voting  &  the 

revolutionary  mob  headed  by  Jim  Lane  refused  to  vote.  I  have 
pursued  the  path  of  duty  which  I  saw  clearly  from  the  beginning 

and  I  shall  pursue  it  to  the  end I  believe  . . .  that  Kansas  will 

be  admitted;  but  upon  a  question  involving  the  life  or  death  of 
the  union  neither  my  anxiety  nor  my  exertions  shall  cease  until 
we  are  saved.22 

The  Senate  would  be  safe  with  39  Democrats;  Douglas  would 
oppose  Lecompton,  but  would  carry  with  him  only  David  C.  Broderick, 
George  E.  Pugh  and  Charles  E.  Stuart.  But  in  the  House  the  fate  of 
Lecompton  hung  by  a  hair.  Here  there  were  92  Republicans,  14  Americans, 
about  100  Administration  Democrats  and  21  rebellious  anti-Lecompton 
Democrats,  although  the  exact  number  of  the  latter  remained  uncertain 
from  day  to  day.  Buchanan's  friends  wanted  the  Lecompton  message 
referred  to  the  House  Committee  on  Territories,  but  knowing  in  advance 
that  this  motion  would  not  pass  they  proposed  creating  a  select  committee 
which  Speaker  James  L.  Orr  would  appoint.  The  anti-Lecomptonites 
moved  to  invest  this  committee  with  power  to  investigate.  The  Administra- 
tion wanted  at  all  hazards  to  avoid  an  investigation,  for  it  could  produce 
nothing  but  free  propaganda  for  the  Republicans  and  might  delay  action 
indefinitely.  After  an  excited  week  of  parliamentary  maneuver,  including 
a  filibuster  and  a  fist  fight  on  the  floor,  the  critical  vote  was  called.  The 
Administration  lost,  113-114.  One  Buchanan  Democrat,  who  straggled  in 
a  few  minutes  late,  might  have  changed  the  course  of  American  history. 
The  House  then  proceeded  by  another  close  vote  to  authorize  the  appoint- 
ment of  a  select  committee  with  power  to  investigate  but  Speaker  Orr 
packed  it  with  pro-Lecompton  men.23 

Buchanan  had  to  find  some  way  to  weaken  and  divide  the  Demo- 
cratic auti-Lecompton  bloc  by  just  a  few  votes  in  order  to  win.  The  House 
committee  waited  for  the  Senate  to  act.  During  February  and  March  a 
Senate  proposal  to  admit  Kansas  and  Minnesota  as  a  "package,"  and  a  plan 
by  Senator  John  J.  Crittenden  to  submit  the  Lecompton  Constitution  to 
another  vote  in  Kansas  both  failed.  On  March  23  the  Senate  passed  a  bill 
to  admit  Kansas  under  the  Lecompton  Constitution,  specifying  the  right 

310 


LECOMPTON-PYRRfflC  VICTORY  •   1858 


of  immediate  amendment  and  cutting  down  the  proposed  mammoth  land 
grant  of  over  16,000,000  acres  to  the  customary  size  of  about  4,000,000 
acres. 

Douglas  busied  himself  to  prevent  a  single  adherent  from  wavering 
or  quailing  under  Administration  threats.  He  did  this  organizational  work 
so  well  that  Buchanan  at  length  despaired  of  breaking  down  the  House 
opposition.  The  president  used  every  means  he  could  to  pick  up  the  few 
votes  needed,  dismissing  friends  of  Douglas  wholesale,  holding  up  new 
appointments,  and  offering  patronage,  contracts,  commissions,  and  in  some 
cases  cold  cash.  The  women,  wives  of  Senators  and  Cabinet  members,  used 
their  charms  to  soften  up  opponents  of  the  Administration. 

President  Buchanan  held  conferences  continually,  called  for 
unselfish  patriotism,  and  when  all  the  softer  means  failed,  invoked  massive 
retaliation  against  Douglas.  But  one  factor  nullified  much  of  this  monu- 
mental Administration  effort:  the  approaching  elections  of  Congressmen 
in  the  North.  These  men  feared  they  would  not  be  re-elected  if  they 
sustained  Lecompton. 

Buchanan  got  some  encouragement  from  Pennsylvania,  whose 
legislature  endorsed  the  Lecompton  proposal.  "God  bless  my  good  &  great 
old  State,"  he  wrote.  "They  have  not  deserted  me  in  my  last  political  trial 
nor  deserted  the  cause  of  Union  &  Democracy.  /  say  the  cause  of  Union, 
because  if  the  Lecompton  Constitution  should  be  defeated  in  the  House, . . . 
I  apprehend  it  will  be  the  beginning  of  the  end."2*  But  by  the  end  of 
March  he  knew  he  could  not  succeed  in  his  original  purpose,  to  drive 
Lecompton  "naked"  through  the  House,  Some  compromise  would  have 
to  be  developed,  and  until  it  was  ready  the  Senate  bill  had  to  be  kept  on  ice 
in  the  House  Committee  room. 

Buchanan's  managers  had  to  prevent  a  House  vote  on  the  Senate 
bill,  for  if  it  were  defeated  there  could  be  no  hope  for  further  action.  But 
if  the  House  would  add  amendments,  then  possibly  a  conference  committee 
could  work  out  a  compromise.  Little  risk  would  attach  to  the  work  of  such 
a  committee,  for  the  Administration  would  control  the  appointment  of  its 
members.  Buchanan  cagily  selected  Representative  William  H.  English  of 
Indiana,  an  anti-Lecompton  Democrat  who  favored  some  compromise 
solution,  to  initiate  the  move.  "It  will  be  your  fate,"  the  president  wrote 
to  him,  "to  end  the  dangerous  agitation,  to  confer  lasting  benefits  on  your 
country,  &  to  render  your  character  historical."25  Buchanan  and  Cobb 
fed  ideas  to  English  which  he  in  turn  proposed  to  his  colleagues.  In  due 
course,  the  House  sent  the  Lecompton  bill  back  to  the  Senate  with  the 
Montgomery-Crittenden  amendment  for  resubmission.  The  Senate  voted 
this  down  and  asked  for  a  conference.  The  Administration  used  all  the 
discipline  it  could  muster,  and  English  worked  on  some  of  his  friends  to 
support  the  plan  which  now  had  come  to  bear  his  name.  After  one  of  the 

311 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


most  dramatic  roll  calls  in  the  history  of  the  House,  the  clerk  at  last  read 
the  tally:  108  to  108.  Speaker  Orr  broke  the  tie. 

The  conference  adopted  the  expedient  of  a  referendum  on  the 
land  grant.  If  the  people  of  Kansas  voted  to  accept  a  reduced  grant,  the 
English  Bill  provided  for  immediate  admission  under  Lecompton.  If  they 
rejected  the  offer,  they  could  not  reapply  for  statehood  until  the  population 
had  grown  larger. 

This  proposition  put  Douglas  in  a  difficult  position,  for  it  was, 
in  the  final  analysis,  the  equivalent  of  resubmission.  Douglas  agreed  to 
support  the  measure,  but  his  anti-Lecompton  colleagues  forced  him  to 
change  his  mind  and  fight  the  referendum  on  the  grounds  that  it  was  not 
the  same  as  resubmission.  His  aboutface  calmed  the  rising  fear  of  some 
southerners  that  they  were  being  betrayed  by  Buchanan  into  some  kind 
of  bargain  with  Douglas.  Finally,  on  April  30,  the  English  Bill  passed,  in 
spite  of  Douglas's  opposition. 

Of  course  Douglas  and  his  supporters  would  continue  as  a  separate 
faction,  at  least  for  a  while,  but  Buchanan  was  not  worried.  "I  have  never 
known  the  Democratic  party  in  Congress  more  united  &  compact  than  they 
were  during  the  last  three  or  four  weeks  of  the  session,"  he  wrote.  "From 
what  I  learn,  Douglas  has  determined  to  come  back  to  the  party  with  a 
bound  &  to  acquiesce  cordially  ...  in  the  English  Bill."26  With  gratitude 
and  a  sigh  of  relief,  Buchanan  wrote  to  English,  "It  is  painful  even  to  think 
of  what  would  have  been  the  alarming  condition  of  the  Union  had  Congress 
adjourned  without  passing  your  amendment."27 


312 


24 

A  FLOOD  OF  INNOVATIONS  •  1857-1860 

PANIC  AND  WAR 

When  the  new  Democratic  nominee  told  well-wishers  at  Wheatland  in 
June,  1856,  that  he  was  "no  longer  James  Buchanan,  but  the  representative 
of  the  Qncinnati  platform,"  he  spoke  not  in  jest.  Buchanan  considered 
the  presidential  office  not  as  a  place  of  leadership  but  as  a  post  of  executive 
agency.  The  president  should  faithfully  implement  and  enforce  the 
policies  defined  by  deliberative  bodies:  the  party  convention,  the  Congress 
of  the  United  States,  and  the  federal  courts.  He  should  shoulder  the 
responsibility  not  of  invention  but  of  action;  he  should  not  initiate  policy 
but  execute  it  with  skill  and  efficiency.  Party  delegates  distilled  the  hopes 
and  fears  of  their  constituents  into  a  platform;  the  lawmakers  of  the 
winning  party  sought  to  translate  this  statement  into  statute;  the  president 
set  up  the  administration  of  these  laws,  reporting  from  time  to  time  the 
results  of  his  efforts  and  calling  for  further  legislation  if  needed  to  achieve 
the  proper  execution  of  the  will  of  the  legislature. 

The  Cincinnati  platform  did  not  provide  much  of  a  program. 
Except  in  the  realm  of  foreign  affairs,  it  spoke  in  the  negative.  In  great 
detail  it  expounded  all  the  things  that  the  federal  government  could  not  do: 
assume  state  debts,  inaugurate  a  system  of  internal  improvements,  aid 
private  industry,  give  proceeds  from  sale  of  public  lands  to  the  .states, 
establish  a  bank,  or  interfere  with  domestic  slavery  in  any  of  the  states. 
The  platform  urged  vigorous  opposition  to  all  parties  based  on  prejudice 
against  foreigners  and  non-Protestants  and  pledged  resistance  to  all 
attempts  to  revive  the  agitation  of  the  slavery  question.  It  endorsed  the 
Kansas-Nebraska  Act,  promised  a  fair  vote  to  the  people  of  Kansas,  and 
proclaimed  "adherence  to  those  principles  and  compromises  of  the  Con- 
stitution — which  are  broad  enough  and  strong  enough  to  embrace  and 
uphold  the  Union  as  it  was,  the  Union  as  it  is,  and  the  Union  as  it  shall  be." 

But  the  platform  endorsed  a  vigorous  foreign  policy:  the  establish- 
ment of  "free  seas"  and  "progressive  free  trade"  throughout  the  world, 

313 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


the  building  and  control  of  interoceanic  trade  routes  in  Central  America, 
and  the  imposition  of  "our  ascendancy  in  the  Gulf  of  Mexico." 

'  This  program  of  the  status  quo  at  home  and  active  diplomacy  in 
the  Caribbean  well  suited  Buchanan's  talents  and  desires.  It  had  been  his 
hope  to  settle  the  Kansas  issue  quickly  and  peaceably;  he  would  then  divert 
public  attention  from  sectional  interests  by  such  foreign  adventures  as 
would  raise  the  United  States  to  the  first  rank  among  the  powers  of  the 
world,  and  in  so  doing  renew  the  flagging  spirit  of  national  pride  and 
patriotism.  So  he  hoped.  But  even  had  Kansas  gone  more  nearly  accord- 
ing to  plan,  Buchanan's  timetable  would  have  been  interrupted.  In  August, 
out  of  the  blue  sky,  the  Panic  of  1857  hit,  and  in  September  came  word 
that  Brigham  Young's  Mormons  proposed  to  fight  the  United  States  army 
then  en  route  to  the  new  ZSon. 

In  late  July,  Dr.  Foltz  wrote  from  New  York:  "The  money 
market  is  easy,  and  on  all  sides  we  have  health,  abundance,  and  prosperity. 
We  are  truly  a  favored  people."  A  month  later  the  banks  were  popping 
like  crackers,  and  fear  and  terror  gripped  Wall  Street  where  crowds  of 
trembling  depositors  jammed  against  the  locked  doors  of  banks  and  broker- 
age houses  to  read  the  notices  posted  there.  Specie  payments  stopped, 
making  the  notes  of  some  1,400  state  banks  worthless;  investment  busi- 
nesses went  into  bankruptcy,  mills  closed,  and  before  long  crowds  of 
hungry  workmen  flocked  to  the  public  squares  of  northern  cities  chanting 
"Bread  or  blood."1 

Though  the  causes  of  the  panic  were  manifold,  a  few  outstanding 
abuses  seemed  obvious.  Americans  had  been  buying  goods  from  Europe 
at  such  a  rate  that  specie  was  drained  off.  Railroads,  in  frenzied  com- 
petition, built  lines  where  for  years  there  would  be  little  likelihood  of 
revenue;  land  speculators  mortgaged  themselves  to  the  hilt  for  vast,  vacant 
ranges  which  for  decades  could  not  be  resold  at  a  profit.  The  state  banks, 
in  aggregate,  loaned  $7.50  in  their  own  notes  for  every  $1.00  of  gold  or 
silver  they  had.  Buchanan  attributed  the  panic  to  "the  vicious  system  of 
paper  currency"  and  "wild  speculations  and  gamblings  in  stocks."  Northern 
industrialists  blamed  the  tariff  reduction  of  1857,  which  Congress  had 
passed  the  day  before  Buchanan  took  office. 

Cobb  immediately  concentrated  a  large  stock  of  subtreasury  gold 
in  New  York  and  won  a  memorial  of  thanks  from  New  York  merchants  for 
his  prompt  action.  Other  Departments,  when  revenue  from  customs  and 
land  sales  dried  up,  ordered  curtailment  of  public  works.  "Not  at  this  time 
of  crisis,"  came  the  anguished  howls.  "Labor  needs  the  work.  The 
Government  can  get  the  money.  This  is  exactly  the  wrong  time  for  re- 
trenchment, for  party  and  humanitarian  reasons."2 

In  his  Annual  Message  of  December,  1857,  Buchanan  announced 
his  policy:  reform  not  relief.  The  government  sympathized  but  could  do 

314 


A  FLOOD  OF  INNOVATIONS  •   1857  -  I860 


nothing  to  alleviate  the  suffering  of  individuals.  It  would  continue  to  pay 
its  obligations  in  gold  and  silver;  it  would  not  curtail  public  works,  but  it 
would  start  no  new  ones.  To  prevent  recurrence  of  these  periodic  up- 
heavals, Buchanan  recommended  that  Congress  pass  a  uniform  bankrupt 
law  which  would  provide  for  the  immediate  forfeiture  of  the  charter  of  any 
bank  that  suspended  specie  payments.  He  urged  the  states  to  require  their 
banks  to  reserve  one  dollar  in  specie  for  every  three  issued  as  paper  and  to 
prohibit  the  issuance  of  bank  notes  of  less  than  twenty  dollars  so  that 
employers  would  have  to  pay  the  weekly  wages  in  coin.  Buchanan  held  to 
the  bullion  theory  of  credit,  not  credit  as  value  or  prospects.  He  thus 
discouraged  the  use  of  federal  or  state  bonds  as  security  for  bank  note 
issues,  for  he  feared  that  putting  the  civil  debt  into  circulation  would 
inaugurate  an  endless  spiral  of  inflation. 

This  view  of  the  panic  conformed  not  only  with  the  party  platform 
but  with  Buchanan's  personal  attitude.  Men  who  respected  property 
would  not  put  it  out  to  work  except  with  sound  collateral;  those  who  took 
the  speculative  risk  deserved  the  gambler's  fate.  As  to  the  innocent 
victims,  rugged  individualism  would  triumph  over  adversity;  the  buoyancy 
of  youth  and  the  energy  of  the  people  would  enable  them  to  recover.  The 
prophecy  proved  correct,  but  not  before  untold  thousands  had  suffered  the 
misery  of  broken  lives,  imminent  starvation,  and  despair. 

Two  ideas  which  would  loom  large  in  the  future,  grew  out  of 
the  panic.  In  the  North  the  factory  workers,  abandoned  by  the  Democratic 
Administration,  listened  with  eager  belief  to  the  vehement  assertion  of 
Republican  leaders:  they  could  blame  their  plight  on  the  reduction  of 
the  tariff;  with  the  Republicans  in  power  the  tariff  would  go  up;  and  wages, 
in  the  ensuing  prosperity,  would  go  up,  too.  In  the  South,  where  the  panic 
scarcely  touched  the  cotton  economy,  James  Hammond  of  South  Carolina 
began  to  preach  that  "Cotton  is  King."  "Thirty-five  million  dollars,  we, 
the  slaveholders  of  the  South,  have  put  into  the  charity  box  for  your 
magnificent  financiers,"  he  said.  The  North,  with  its  business  gamblers, 
beggars,  paupers,  and  so-called  free-labor,  "the  very  mud-sill  of  society" 
he  named  it,  could  not  exist  without  the  South.  Wrote  DeBow's  Review: 
"The  wealth  of  the  South  is  permanent  and  real,  that  of  the  North  fugitive 
and  fictitious."3 

In  the  western  territory,  Buchanan  inherited  an  incipient  war. 
The  Mormons,  viciously  persecuted  during  their  early  existence  and 
abominated  by  most  Americans,  had  trekked  to  their  State  of  Deseret  only 
in  time  to  be  reincorporated  into  the  United  States  by  the  Mexican  cession. 
The  Compromise  of  1850  made  their  Zion  the  Territory  of  Utah,  but  for 
five  years  the  government  at  Washington,  except  for  appointing  Brigham 
Young  as  governor,  left  the  Mormons  to  themselves. 

315 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


The  Mormons  had  legitimate  grievances.  Congress  had  twice 
ignored  their  request  for  an  enabling  act  to  form  a  constitution  and  when 
they  finally  drew  up  an  unauthorized  document,  President  Pierce  gave  it 
no  consideration.  There  might  have  been  some  chance  of  recognition  if 
the  leader  of  the  Mormons  had  been  willing  to  outlaw  polygamy.  Another 
cause  of  resentment  was  the  refusal  of  the  government  land  office  to  grant 
title  to  Mormon  lands.  The  reason  was  that  the  Indian  title  had  not  yet 
been  extinguished,  but  the  Mormons  feared  that  the  government  would 
eventually  deprive  them  of  their  homes.  There  was  bitter  conflict  between 
federal  judges  and  local  magistrates. 

In  1855  President  Pierce  appointed  three  federal  judges  to  Utah 
Territory.  Two  were  renegade  Mormons  and  the  third  a  brutal,  dictatorial 
Mormon-hater.  They  soon  had  the  Territory  in  a  turmoil.  In  the  spring  of 
1857  several  Mormon  emissaries  and  the  judges  came  to  Washington 
carrying  conflicting  stories.  The  former  charged  the  judges  with  conspiracy 
and  attempts  to  defraud  them  of  their  land;  the  latter  complained  that  they 
had  been  prevented  from  performing  their  duties,  their  official  papers  had 
been  confiscated  and  burned,  and  they  themselves  had  been  driven  from 

the  Territory. 

Buchanan  should  have  verified  these  tales,  but  Mormon  defiance 
of  federal  authority  was  traditional  and  he  took  the  judges'  version  at  face 
value.  He  appointed  a  new  governor,  Alfred  Gumming,  and  in  May  ordered 
Colond  Albert  Sidney  Johnston  to  proceed  to  Utah  with  2,500  troops  to 
act  as  a  posse  comitotus  to  uphold  federal  law.  It  was  to  be  one  of  the  best 
equipped  and  best  provisioned  expeditions  in  American  history,  but  flaws 
maired  the  planning.  Through  the  pleas  of  Walker,  the  cavalry  was  ordered 
to  stay  in  Kansas,  leaving  the  Utah  expedition  a  helpless  target  for  the 
mounted  Mormon  guerrillas.  Furthermore,  the  official  letter  informing 
Brigham  Young  that  he  was  to  be  replaced  by  a  new  governor  never  arrived 
because  the  Pierce  Administration  had  annulled  the  Utah  mail  contract.4 

Young,  knowing  only  that  a  large  military  force  was  moving 
against  the  Mormons,  mobilized  his  own  aimy  and  ordered  a  scorched  earth 
policy.  'There  shall  not  be  one  building,  nor  one  foot  of  lumber,  nor  a 
stick,  nor  a  tree,  nor  a  particle  of  grass  and  hay  that  will  burn,  left  in 
reach  of  our  enemies,"  he  said.5 

Among  the  miseries  that  were  to  be  the  lot  of  the  Mormon 
expedition  it  will  suffice  to  mention  the  destruction  of  the  wagon  trains, 
the  ambushes,  the  theft  of  the  oxen,  the  snow,  and  the  gruelling  two  weeks 
that  it  took  to  struggle  the  last  thirty  miles  to  Fort  Bridger.  "It  was  a 
scene/9  said  the  Atlantic  Monthly,  "which  could  be  paralleled  only  in  the 
retreat  of  the  French  from  Warsaw."6 

At  this  point  in  the  ridiculous  little  war,  Buchanan's  friend 
Thomas  L.  Kane  of  Philadelphia  convinced  the  president  that  the  Mormons 

316 


A  FLOOD  OF  INNOVATIONS  •   1857 . 1860 


were  a  peace-loving  people  and  that  Brigham  Young  would  cooperate  in 
any  honest  program  of  the  Administration.  Kane  asked  permission  to  go 
as  a  private  agent  to  Utah  and  try  to  make  peace.  His  mission  was  a 
success  and  the  newly  appointed  governor  was  soon  in  office. 

Gumming  made  the  mistake  of  bringing  the  troops  into  Utah 
Territory.  Thousands  of  Mormons  fled  before  the  army  and  burned  their 
buildings  and  crops  as  they  went.  Buchanan  offered  amnesty  to  all  in- 
habitants who  would  respect  the  authority  of  the  government  and  moved 
the  troops  to  a  point  forty  miles  away  where  they  remained  throughout  his 
term  in  the  presidency.  Peace  came  to  Son,  but  it  was  a  year  before  the 
Mormons  who  had  left  their  homes  in  ruins  began  to  return.7 

POLICEMAN  OF  THE  CARIBBEAN 

Buchanan  viewed  the  panic,  Kansas  and  the  Mormon  War  as  unfortunate 
interruptions  of  his  main  administrative  program.  It  was  in  the  realm  of 
foreign  affairs  that  he  proposed  especially  to  engage  the  interest  and 
attention  of  the  nation.  In  his  inaugural  address  he  announced,  "No 
nation  will  have  a  right  to  interfere  or  to  complain  if  ...  we  shall  still 
further  extend  our  possessions."8  In  what  direction  would  this  expansive 
force  flow?  "It  is  beyond  question  the  destiny  of  our  race  to  spread  them- 
selves over  the  continent  of  North  America,  and  this  at  np  distant  day. . . . 

The  tide  of  emigrants  will  flow  to  the  South If  permitted  to  go  there, 

peacefully,  Central  America  will  soon  contain  an  American  population 
which  .  .  .  will  preserve  the  domestic  peace,  while  the  different  transit 
routes  across  the  Isthmus  .  .  .  will  have  assured  protection."9 

Buchanan  had  outstanding  qualifications  for  conducting  foreign 
policy.  No  president  since  John  Quincy  Adams  had  had  such  wide  diplo- 
matic experience  or  had  been  personally  acquainted  with  so  many  foreign 
heads  of  state,  and  none  until  Theodore  Roosevelt  would  propose  so 
aggressive  a  policy  in  the  Caribbean.  The  first  step  would  be  to  sweep 
European  influence  out  of  Central  America;  the  second,  to  establish 
American  control  by  purchase,  annexation,  or  intervention.  If  the 
United  States  insisted  that  Europe  should  get  out,  it  would  have  to  assume 
responsibility  for  protecting  the  lives  and  property  of  European  nationals 
in  Central  America.  Buchanan  urged  an  interpretation  of  the  Monroe 
Doctrine  which  would  provide  for  that  protection.  He  assumed  personal 
direction  of  the  State  Department,  maintained  an  office  there,  and,  with 
John  Appleton,  administered  the  diplomatic  work  of  the  Secretary  of  State. 
Cass,  however,  shared  Buchanan's  views;  he  was  a  rabid  expansionist  who 
for  years  had  fought  against  European  influence  in  the  Americas,  and  the 
two  worked  in  close  cooperation  on  most  matters  of  foreign  policy.10 

317 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


When  Buchanan  took  office  the  Central  American  question  had 
been  substantially  settled  by  the  Dallas-Clarendon  Treaty  which  the  Senate 
ratified  on  March  12, 1857.  This  treaty  provided  that  Great  Britain  would 
withdraw  from  her  several  Central  American  positions  by  agreements  with 
the  countries  immediately  concerned.  But  the  Senate  amended  the  treaty 
to  include  immediate  British  withdrawal  from  the  Bay  Islands  and  the 
British  countered  with  another  amendment  unacceptable  to  Buchanan  who 
would  consider  no  proposal  that  left  the  fate  of  the  Bay  Islands  to  be 
settled  later.  He  wanted  no  British  base  athwart  an  isthmian  canal  route.11 
"That  unfortunate  Clayton  &  Bulwer  Treaty  must  be  put  out  of 
the  way,"  he  wrote  directly  to  Lord  Clarendon,  with  whom  he  maintained  a 
frank  and  amiable  private  correspondence  throughout  his  Administration. 
"It  will  be  the  bone  of  contention  &  a  root  of  bitterness  between  the  two 
Governments  as  long  as  it  exists."  Lord  Napier,  British  Minister  at 
Washington,  had  already  admitted  that  the  British  could  no  longer  maintain 
their  "prospective"  interpretation  of  the  treaty.12 

To  prevent  Buchanan  from  recommending  summary  abrogation 
of  the  treaty  in  his  Annual  Message  of  1857,  Britain  appointed  a  special 
envoy  to  make  the  necessary  withdrawal  from  Central  America  and  in- 
structed  him  to  discuss  his  plans  with  Buchanan  in  Washington  before 
proceeding  south.    The  selection  of  the  envoy  obviously  aimed  at  concilia- 
tion.   Sir  William  Gore  Ousley,  brother-in-law  of  Mrs.  James  Roosevelt, 
had  been  an  intimate  friend  during  Buchanan's  tenure  at  the  Court  of 
St.  James.    Ousley  came  to  Washington  on  November  18,  1857,  and  told 
Buchanan  that  he  would  arrange  cession  of  the  Bay  Islands  to  Honduras, 
place  the  Mosquito  Indians  under  Nicaraguan  sovereignty,  and  define 
clearly  the  boundaries  of  Belize.    This  met  all  American  demands.    But 
despite  these  assurances,  Buchanan  recommended  abrogation   of  the 
Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty.    "The  fact  is,"  he  said,  "that  when  two  nations 
like  Great  Britain  and  the  United  States  .  .  .  have  unfortunately  concluded 
a  treaty  which  they  understand  in  senses  directly  opposite,  the  wisest  course 
is  to  abrogate  such  a  treaty  by  mutual  consent  and  to  commence  anew."13 
This  attitude  irritated  the  British,  who  thought  they  had  leaned 
over  backwards  to  agree,  even  to  the  point  of  raising  no  formal  objection 
to  the  recently  negotiated  Cass-Yrisarri  treaty  between  Nicaragua  and  the 
United  States  which  gave  the  latter  the  right  to  traverse  the  isthmus  and 
protect  the  route  with  troops.   This  treaty  was  a  violation  of  the  Clayton- 
Bulwer  pledges. 

British  interests  in  Central  America  had  changed  since  1850. 
Originally  England  sought  control,  or  at  least  participation  in  control,  of 
transisthmian  routes;  now  she  sought  primarily  commercial  development 
in  Central  America  itself.  As  there  could  be  no  exploitation  of  commerce 
so  long  as  Central  America  remained  the  scene  of  political  chaos,  the  British 

318 


A  FLOOD  OF  INNOVATIONS  •   1857  - 1860 


had  little  objection  if  the  United  States  wished  to  bring  order  to  these 
troubled  nations  and  give  them  the  benefit  of  stable  government.  "Pray 
believe,"  wrote  Clarendon,"  / .  .  that  we  neither  wish  nor  want  to  have 
anything  to  do  with  Central  America."  "We  would  not  accept  such  a 
'damnosa  possessio*  as  Central  America,"  he  said,  "if  it  could  be  oifered  to 
England  as  a  gift."14 

But  Britain  proposed  to  keep  the  treaty  and  accept  the  American 
interpretation  of  it.  Thus  the  United  States  was  still  bound  by  its  own 
interpretation,  and  that  included  the  self-denying  ordinance.  The  United 
States  could  not  seize  Central  American  territory  or  set  up  protectorates; 
the  procedure  would  have  to  be  more  subtle.  Buchanan  thought  that  the 
canny  use  of  claims  and  the  peaceful  migration  of  North  Americans  into 
the  region  might  accomplish  the  desired  results  without  raising  an  issue 
with  England.  Hence  he  violently  attacked  filibustering,  which  nourished 
hatred  and  excitement  and  discouraged  peaceful  immigration. 

Just  about  the  time  of  Ousley's  arrival,  the  notorious  filibuster, 
William  Walker,  "eluded"  the  vigilance  of  federal  officers  and  set  sail  for 
Nicaragua  with  a  fully  equipped  private  army  aboard  his  ship  and  the  best 
wishes  of  southern  sympathizers  ringing  in  his  ears.  Buchanan  assured 
the  nation  that  he  had  alerted  military  and  peace  officers  to  prevent  Walker's 
escape  and  pointed  out  that  they  had  in  fact  apprehended  him  in  New 
Orleans,  but  in  accordance  with  existing  law  he  gained  his  freedom  on 
$2,000  bail  and  set  out  again  on  his  military  adventure.  The  president 
emphatically  denounced  such  buccaneering  enterprises  as  "robbery  and 
murder"  and  called  for  stricter  laws  to  hold  and  punish  their  leaders. 

By  the  end  of  December  word  arrived  that  Commodore  Hiram 
Paulding  of  the  U.  S.  Navy  had  traced  Walker's  ship,  the  Fashion,  to 
San  Juan  de  Nicaragua,  had  seized  Walker,  and  had  brought  him  back. 
A  federal  marshall  took  Walker  to  Washington,  where  the  State  Depart- 
ment set  him  free  on  the  ground  that  it  had  no  jurisdiction  and  no  charge 
against  him.  This  was  true,  though  why  Attorney  General  Black  did  not 
promptly  develop  a  charge  of  violation  of  the  federal  neutrality  laws 
remains  a  mystery. 

Buchanan  reprimanded  Commodore  Paulding  for  exceeding  his 
authority  by  leading  an  armed  force  into  the  territory  of  a  friendly  nation. 
Under  international  law,  he  could  scarcely  avoid  disavowing  this  act;  the 
United  States  would  probably  have  declared  war  had  a  European  naval 
vessel  forced  an  entry  into  New  Orleans  to  seize  one  of  its  nationals  in  that 
city.  The  sectional  issue  immediately  arose,  the  North  commending 
Paulding  and  the  South  condemning  his  rash  violation  of  Nicaraguan  soil 
to  prevent  Walker  from  doing  the  very  same  thing.  After  his  release, 
Walker  went  to  Mobile  and  in  a  public  address  told  the  wild  and  bizarre 
story  that  Buchanan  had  secretly  encouraged  him  to  seize  Nicaragua  but 

319 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


had  then  changed  his  mind  and  double-crossed  him.  Within  two  years 
Walker  met  the  fate  he  courted:  deatkbefore  a  firing  squad  in  Honduras.1* 
In  Central  America,  the  heads  of  state  of  Nicaragua  and  Costa 
Rica  issued  the  Rivas  Manifesto.  In  it  they  accused  the  Buchanan  Admin- 
istration  of  directing  the  attacks  of  filibusters  because  of  Nicaraguan 
resistance  to  the  Cass-Yrissari  treaty.  The  Central  Americans  now  put 
their  countries  under  the  protection  of  France,  England,  and  Sardinia, 
against  the  "barbarians"  of  the  United  States.16  In  response  to  this  out- 
burst, Buchanan  urged  the  American  envoy  to  work  unceasingly  for  the 
creation  in  Central  America  of  "a  federal  system,  resembling ...  that  of  the 
United  States."  Unless  the  Central  Americans  acted  properly,  said  the 
president,  reparations  for  the  insulting  Rivas  Manifesto  would  be  demanded 
and,  if  necessary,  collected  "by  . . .  efficacious  means."  Furthermore,  the 
American  government  would  resist  at  all  times  the  European  intervention 
and  protection  which  had  been  requested.17 

Sir  William  Ousley  lingered  long  in  the  United  States  and  joined 
Buchanan  at  Bedford  Springs  in  August,  1858.  There  they  enjoyed  the 
ovation  which  the  little  town  provided  upon  hearing  the  news  that  the 
Atlantic  Cable  had  been  completed.  Two  weeks  later,  Victoria  sent  to 
Buchanan  the  first  official  message  to  be  carried  by  the  cable.  American 
newspapers  which  printed  the  brief,  almost  insultingly  brusque  text, 
thought  that  the  queen  had  cast  an  intentional  slur  upon  the  nation,  and 
they  called  on  Buchanan  to  respond  with  indignation.  Assuming  that 
some  mistake  had  occurred,  he  prepared  a  highly  complimentary  reply. 
For  a  time  Americans  grumbled  about  Buchanan's  "toadyism,"  but  it  was 
announced  a  short  time  later  that  the  cable  had  failed  before  the  queen's 
communication  was  completed. 

Victoria  was  highly  pleased  that  Buchanan  had,  by  an  act  of  trust, 
sustained  the  good  will  between  the  countries  and  saved  her  from  personal 
embarrassment.  The  incident  was  small;  yet  it  may  be  counted  among  the 
series  that  gradually  diminished  rancor  and  bred  better  Anglo-American 
relations.  Perhaps  the  most  significant  development  in  the  changing 
British  attitude  was  their  abandonment,  in  1858,  of  the  right  of  search  on 
the  high  seas. 

Ousley  eventually  went  to  Central  America,  but  instead  of  con- 
cluding the  anticipated  treaties,  he  "succeeded  in  raising  the  very  D — 1," 
as  Buchanan  complained  to  Clarendon.  The  envoy  not  only  failed  to 
negotiate  the  treaties  which  the  British  government  had  -desired  but  also 
contributed  to  the  Nicaraguan  rejection  of  the  Cass-Yrissari  treaty.  Britain 
replaced  him  with  another  diplomatic  agent,  who  quickly  completed  his 
assignment.  In  his  last  presidential  message,  Buchanan  was  able  to  report: 
"Our  relations  with  Great  Britain  are  of  the  most  friendly  character.  .  .  . 
The  discordant  constructions  of  the  Clayton  and  Bulwer  Treaty  .  .  .  have 

320 


A  FLOOD  OF  INNOVATIONS  •   1857 . 1860 


resulted  in  a  final  settlement  entirely  satisfactory  to  this  government."18 
Buchanan  erred  in  his  prediction  that  a  rapid  flow  of  emigrants  would  now 
move  southward  into  Central  America,  but  he  correctly  assessed  the 
importance  to  the  United  States  of  control  of  isthmian  transit  and  laid  the 
foundation  for  the  building  of  the  Panama  Canal. 

Corollary  to  the  effort  to  drive  European  influence  from  Central 
America,  Buchanan  proposed  to  project  American  power  into  the  r^ion. 
He  firmly  believed  that  the  political  and  economic  ideology  of  the  United 
States  would  bring  peace,  prosperity,  and  happiness  to  these  neighboring 
lands,  and  he  expected  that  unless  the  United  States  maintained  law  and 
order  in  Central  America,  the  major  European  powers  would  intervene  to 
do  so.  The  imperative  need  to  provide  speedy  and  safe  travel  between  the 
East  and  the  West  called  for  prompt  action. 

Buchanan  urged,  in  successive  annual  messages,  that  Congress 
should  authorize  the  president  "to  employ  the  land  and  naval  forces  of  the 
United  States  in  preventing  the  transit  from  being  obstructed  or  closed  by 
lawless  violence,  and  in  protecting  the  lives  and  property  of  American 
citizens  travelling  thereupon.**19  As  incidents  multiplied,  Buchanan  used 
the  claims  of  American  travellers  as  a  club  to  obtain  either  money  repara- 
tions or  privileges,  under  the  threat  of  reprisals.  This  technique  Buchanan 
applied  to  troubles  with  New  Granada,  Costa  Rica,  Nicaragua  and  Mexico. 
Congress,  however,  regularly  declined  to  authorize  the  use  of  troops  at  the 
president's  discretion,  and  the  Administration  had  to  work  almost  entirely 
by  diplomacy. 

During  his  term  of  office,  Buchanan  negotiated  a  treaty  with  New 
Granada  in  which  the  latter  acknowledged  its  responsibility  for  claims 
arising  out  of  the  Panama  riot  of  April  15,  1856,  and  induced  Costa  Rica 
to  refer  claims  against  that  republic  to  a  board  of  commissioners.  Further- 
more,  he  persuaded  Nicaragua  to  grant  transit  rights  to  the  United  States 
and  bullied  Mexico  into  submitting  to  American  military  occupation  in 
times  of  civil  disorder.  But  before  these  diplomatic  objectives  had  been 
fully  achieved,  the  hostile  36th  Congress  came  in,  and  to  win  a  two-thirds 
majority  for  any  Administration-sponsored  treaty  proved  impossible.  Even 
the  South  now  withdrew  from  cooperation  in  an  aggressive  foreign  policy, 
for  the  southern  leaders,  already  thinking  of  secession,  did  not  want  to 
help  strengthen  the  federal  government.  Therefore  Buchanan's  hope  of 
preponderance  in  Central  America  died  a  victim  of  sectionalism. 

The  Administration's  Mexican  policy  went  a  good  deal  beyond 
the  proposals  for  intervention  which  characterized  efforts  to  impose  law 
and  order  on  the  central  republics.  Buchanan  wanted  Mexican  territory, 
either  by  purchase  or  by  the  creation  of  a  protectorate  of  Mexico  which 
might,  in  time,  lead  to  the  annexation  of  the  northern  provinces  of  Chi- 
huahua and  Sonora.20 

321 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


The  Mexican  government  presented  a  scene  of  utter  chaos. 
John  Forsyth,  American  Minister  to  Mexico,  warned  Buchanan  that  unless 
the  United  States  swiftly  offered  Mexico  her  aid,  help  would  come  "in  the 
form  of  a  French  Prince  supported  by  ten  thousand  bayonets,  or  British 
gold  effecting  that  floating  mortgage  on  her  territories  which  we  decline." 
Mexico  had  to  lean  on  some  power.  "Shall  it  be  Europe  or  the  United 

States?"  he  asked.21 

After  Zuloaga  seized  control  in  Mexico  in  January,  1858,  Forsyth 
immediately  broached  the  topic  of  territorial  cession.  "You  want  Sonora?" 
he  wrote  to  Cass  in  April.  "The  American  blood  spilled  near  its  line  would 

justify  you  in  seizing  it Say  to  Mexico  . . .  Give  us  what  we  ask  for  in 

return  for  the  manifest  benefits  we  propose  to  confer  upon  you  for  it,  or  we 
will  take  it."22  This  undiplomatic  language  reflected  American  reaction  to 
the  recent  murder  of  the  Crabbe  expedition,  the  slaying  by  Mexicans  of  a 
group  of  Americans  inside  the  United  States  border,  the  summary  execution 
of  three  American  physicians  in  Tacubaya,  and  a  host  of  less  spectacular 
executions,  arrests,  property  seizures,  and  studied  insults  to  official 
American  agents.  When  Zuloaga,  in  May,  1858,  began  enforcement  of  a 
new  decree  taxing  foreign  property  in  Mexico,  Forsyth  on  his  own  initiative 
broke  diplomatic  relations.28 

In  his  message  of  December,  1858,  Buchanan  reviewed  the 
Mexican  situation  and  concluded  that  it  was  the  duty  of  the  United  States 
"to  assume  a  temporary  protectorate  over  the  northern  portions  of  Chi- 
huahua and  Sonora,  and  to  establish  military  posts  within  the  same."  The 
Senate  Committee  on  Foreign  Relations  favorably  reported  a  bill,  but  the 
Senate  defeated  it  in  February,  1859,  by  a  vote  of  thirty-one  to  twenty-five.24 
One  other  prospect  remained.  A  special  agent  informed  Buchanan 
that  the  newly  established  Juarez  government  might,  if  the  United  States 
backed  it,  part  with  some  land.  Forsyth  was  replaced  by  Robert  McLane, 
who  had  instructions  to  deal  with  any  government  that  seemed  able  to  rule. 
McLane  recognized  the  Ju&rez  regime  but  soon  found  that  he  could  expect 
no  territorial  cessions  from  it;  the  best  he  could  do  without  upsetting  the 
government,  he  reported,  would  be  to  buy  transit  rights  and  get  authoriza- 
tion for  the  United  States  to  use  its  own  troops  for  protection  of  the  right 
of  way.  "While  he  labored  to  draw  up  a  contract,  the  advocates  of  stronger 
measures,  some  American  and  some  Mexican,  bombarded  Buchanan  with 
pleas  that  he  send  soldiers  to  the  border.25 

In  December,  1859,  Buchanan  urgently  requested  the  power  to 
send  a  military  police  force  of  volunteers  to  Mexico.  Such  troops,  he 
thought,  might  settle  there  and  become  the  nucleus  of  an  American  colony 
that  would  lend  stability  to  the  Sonora-Chihuahua  region  and  promote  its 
annexation.  Congress  did  not  grant  the  request.  Early  in  1860,  Buchanan 
received  the  McLane-Ocampo  Treaty  in  which  Mexico  agreed  to  give  the 

322 


A  FLOOD  OF  INNOVATIONS  •   1857  - 1860 


United  States  transit  rights  and  the  privilege  of  policing  the  route  for  a 
payment  of  $4,000,000.  More  important  than  the  treaty  itself  was  the 
"convention  to  enforce  treaty  stipulations"  which  Ocampo  signed  re- 
luctantly after  McLane  assured  him  that  the  United  States  would  keep  the 
treaty  in  force,  with  or  without  the  Mexican's  signature.26  The  convention 
bound  each  government  to  send  military  forces,  on  request,  to  the  aid  of 
the  other  when  internal  disorder  threatened  violation  of  the  pact. 

The  fate  of  Juarez  lay  in  the  treaty.  If  it  should  he  rejected  and 
Judrez  should  collapse,  McLane  reported,  "anarchy  will  he  the  order  of 
the  day,  and  American  influence  will  cease  here."  "Let  us  take  the  con- 
stitutional  government  firmly  by  the  hand,"  he  urged,  "and  we  will  in  a 
twelve-month  drive  out  of  Mexico  every  anti-American  element  and  pave 
the  way  for  the  acquisition  of  Cuba.  Indeed,  if  Spain  should  execute  the 
threats  she  is  now  making  .  .  .  against  Vera  Cruz,  American  privateers  will 
soon  make  their  anchorage  under  the  Moro."27 

The  treaty  received  wide  discussion  in  the  newspapers;  the  North 
generally  condemned  it  as  another  Administration  plan  to  strengthen  the 
slave  power,  and  the  South  in  general  favored  it.  The  Senate  debated  and 
rejected  the  proposal  in  May,  1860.  European  nations,  except  Spain,  had 
expressed  the  hope  that  the  United  States  might  bring  order  to  Mexico,  but 
with  this  prospect  now  dead  they  had  to  consider  a  plan  to  collect  their  own 
claims  and  protect  their  interests.  Buchanan  saw  that  this  meant  foreign 
intervention,  which  the  United  States  could  not,  under  these  circumstances, 
oppose.  In  order  to  make  his  position  perfectly  clear,  Buchanan  sent  a 
circular  to  Mexico  stating  the  determination  of  the  United  States  to  prevent 
by  arms  any  attempt  of  Europe  to  intervene  in  Mexican  politics,  but  he 
added  that  his  government  could  not  deny  "their  right  to  demand  redress 
for  injuries  inflicted  on  their  respective  subjects."28  Not  for  a  half  century 
would  any  president  of  the  United  States  try  as  hard  to  establish  his  country 
as  the  policeman  of  the  Caribbean.  Buchanan's  forewarning  of  European 
intervention  proved  true  when  Prince  Maximilian  with  a  French  army  took 
control  of  Mexico  during  Lincoln's  presidency. 

Far  to  the  south  Buchanan  achieved  very  quickly  the  settlement 
of  claims  and  protection  of  American  citizens  by  a  show  of  force.  The 
Paraguayans  in  1855  had  fired  on  the  American  steamer,  Water  Witch,  and 
had  killed  a  sailor.  In  addition,  a  number  of  United  States  citizens  claimed 
that  Paraguay  had  seized  their  property  in  violation  of  the  1853  treaty. 
Buchanan  obtained  authorization  from  Congress  to  send  commissioners, 
backed  by  a  strong  naval  force,  to  Paraguay  to  demand  redress.  "We  must' 
not  fail,"  Buchanan  instructed  Secretary  of  the  Navy  Toucey.  "Better 
take  time  than  run  any  risk."29  Toucey  sent  nineteen  warships  mounting 
200  guns  to  convince  Paraguay,  which  had  next  to  no  navy,  that  the  power 
of  the  United  States  must  be  respected.  The  desired  redress  was  speedily 

323 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


forthcoming.  It  must  be  added  that  Buchanan  saw  more  at  stake  than  the 
national  reputation  in  Paraguay.  The  European  countries  had  begun  to 
manifest  as  much  interest  in  the  growing  economy  of  the  area  around  the 
La  Plata  as  earlier  they  had  in  Central  America,  and  the  show  against 
Paraguay  was  put  on  for  a  wider  audience;  its  real  theme  was  that  the 
United  States  had  the  will  and  the  power  to  enforce  the  Monroe  Doctrine. 
Of  all  the  elements  of  his  Latin-American  policy,  Buchanan 
personally  had  most  interest  in  the  acquisition  of  Cuba.  He  had  advocated 
its  purchase  since  the  1830's  and  as  president  he  called  again  for  money 
and  political  support  to  attain  the  "Pearl  of  the  Antilles."  In  his  efforts  to 
persuade  Congress  to  back  the  renewal  of  negotiations,  Buchanan  empha- 
sized Cuba's  strategic  importance  as  the  Gibralter  of  the  Gulf  of  Mexico, 
the  continual  annoyance  it  had  caused  the  United  States,  and  the  confusion 
of  its  government  and  economy.  Most  of  the  claims  against  Spain  arose 
from  injuries  to  United  States  citizens  by  Cubans;  the  African  slave  trade 
centered  in  Cuba,  producing  incidents  which  inflamed  partisan  hatred  in 
the  United  States  and  kept  the  American  Navy  busy  in  efforts  to  apprehend 
slave  ships;  and  finally,  there  existed  the  ever-present  prospect  of  political 
revolt  and  race  war  in  Cuba.  "If  I  can  be  instrumental  in  settling  the 
slavery  question  .  .  .,  and  then  add  Cuba  to  the  Union,"  Buchanan  said 
after  his  nomination,  "I  shall  be  willing  to  give  up  the  ghost." 

The  president  did  not  mention  Cuba  in  his  first  annual  message, 
but  he  did  authorize  the  American  Minister  to  Spain  to  make  cautious 
inquiries  as  to  the  best  way  of  opening  a  negotiation  to  acquire  the  island.80 
The  next  year,  however,  he  came  out  strongly  for  its  purchase  and  asked 
Congress  to  appropriate  funds  with  which  to  pay  Spain  the  long-standing 
debt  that  resulted  from  the  old  Amistad  case.  In  addition,  he  requested  a 
much  larger  sum  to  be  used  as  an  advance  payment  immediately  upon  the 
conclusion  of  a  treaty  with  Spain.  He  termed  the  remittance  prior  to 
ratification  "indispensable  to  success.9' 

On  January  1 ,  1859,  Slidell  introduced  a  bill  in  the  Senate 
Ailing  for  an  appropriation  of  $30,000,000  "to  facilitate  the  acquisition 
of  the  Island  of  Cuba  by  negotiation."  The  bill  was  referred  to  Committee, 
and  reported  back  favorably  within  the  month,  accompanied  by  a  full 
account  of  prior  negotiations.  The  report  concluded  that  there  were  but 
three  solutions  for  the  Cuban  problem:  control  by  some  European  power 
other  than  Spain;  independence,  which  would  probably  result  in  some  form 
of  protectorate;  or  annexation  to  the  United  States. 

Official  introduction  of  the  bill  brought  a  long  debate  in  Congress 
and  a  full-scale  newspaper  war  in  America  and  Europe.  The  opposition 
made  Buchanan  the  chief  target  of  its  attack.  Zachariah  Chandler  called 
the  money  "a  great  corruption  fund  for  bribery."  Doolittle  of  Wisconsin 

324 


A  FLOOD  OF  INNOVATIONS  •   1857  -  1860 

said  the  whole  bill  was  a  fraud;  the  millions  were  never  intended  for  Spain 
but  rather  for  the  Democratic  campaign  chest.31 

Others  argued  that  Buchanan  had  presented  "the  subjugation  of 
Mexico,  the  taking  of  Central  America  and  the  acquisition  of  Cuba"  as  the 
means  to  secure  his  renomination  in  1860.  Crittenden  of  Kentucky 
thought  it  was  a  "mere  piece  of  fanfaronade— a  sort  of  political  fireworks 
set  off ...  to  amuse  and  entertain  the  people."32  The  southerners  described 
Cuba  as  "panting  for  liberty,"  pointed  to  the  advantages  of  making  the 
Caribbean  a  mare  dausum  for  the  United  States  and  banishing  European 
influence  from  the  Americas,  and  stated  their  readiness  to  acquire  territory 
from  Alaska  to  the  Horn.33  To  this,  Collamer  of  Vermont  replied:  "If 
you  take  Cuba,  you  must  Jake  Jamaica;  you  must  take  San  Domingo;  you 
must  take  the  Bahama  Islands,"  for  each  of  these  would  prove  as  much  an 
"annoyance  to  Cuba,  if  part  of  the  Union,  as  Cuba  was  to  the  United 
States."34  A  statement  from  the  Spanish  government  that  it  would  never 
abandon  "the  smallest  portion  of  its  territory,"  arrived  in  the  midst  of  the 
debate  and  was  exploited  to  the  fullest  by  enemies  of  the  Cuban  purchase. 
The  opposition  proved  so  strong  that  Slidell  withdrew  the  bill,  fearing  to 
wreck  the  project  by  letting  it  come  to  an  adverse  vote. 

Buchanan  recommended  the  purchase  of  Cuba  in  his  messages 
of  1859  and  1860,  but  the  proposal  never  again  got  to  the  floor  of  Congress. 
The  Senate  even  rejected  a  Spanish  offer  to  pay  claims  it  owed  to  the 
United  States,  fearing  some  deal  about  Cuba.  Buchanan's  determination 
reflected  his  Scotch  pertinacity  and  his  seriousness  of  purpose.  "We  must 
have  Cuba,"  he  was  in  the  habit  of  saying,  but  his  enemies  took  delight  in 
translating  his  statement  into  the  words,  "We  must  have  slavery." 


AN  EXTRAVAGANT  LIST  OF  MAGNIFICENT 

Buchanan  projected  his  interest  in  territorial  expansion  not  only  to  the 
south,  but  also  to  the  Pacific  northwest.  When  a  contest  arose  over  owner- 
ship  of  San  Juan,  off  Vancouver  Island,  and  American  settlers  challenged 
at  gun  point  the  efforts  of  agents  of  the  Hudson's  Bay  Company  to  drive 
them  out,  he  ordered  navy  units  and  an  army  force  under  General  Scott  to 
hold  possession  and  negotiated  a  joint-occupation  agreement  until  final 
settlement  could  be  arranged.  His  own  papers  of  the  1845  Oregon  negotia- 
tion led  to  British  withdrawal  from  the  disputed  area. 

But  of  much  more  importance  was  Alaska.  During  the  Crimean 
War,  Russia  had  approached  the  Pierce  Administration  with  the  offer  to 
sell  the  huge  Arctic  peninsula.  In  the  fall  of  1857,  the  Russian  Minister, 
Baron  de  Stoeckl,  talked  with  Buchanan  about  it.  Since  the  Monnons 
seemed  determined  to  set  up  an  independent  nation  in  Utah,  Buchanan 

325 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


toyed  with  the  idea  of  colonizing  them  in  Alaska.  There  was  a  rumor  that 
they  might  go  there,  anyway;  and  when  Stoeckl  asked  the  president  whether 
they  would  go  as  conquerors  or  colonists,  Buchanan  replied  with  a  laugh 
that  it  mattered  little  to  him,  provided  he  got  rid  of  them. 

Two  years  later  the  Alaskan  question  was  revived.  Senator  Gwin 
of  California  discussed  it  with  Buchanan  and  they  agreed  that  an  offer 
ought  to  be  made.  Gwin  informed  Baron  de  Stoeckl  that  the  United  States 
proposed  five  million  dollars  as  a  base  of  negotiation  and  urged  that  he 
begin  talks  with  the  State  Department.  Stoeckl  called  the  price  too  low  for 
serious  consideration,  but  Buchanan  would  not  go  higher  because  the 
treasury  was  depleted  and  the  Congress  hostile  to  him;  he  might  carry 
through  a  bargain  but  felt  he  could  not  indulge  in  an  extravagant  outlay 
for  rocks  and  ice.85  Seward  later  took  up  the  proposal  where  Buchanan 

had  left  it.  9 

The  Buchanan  Administration  greatly  extended  American  com- 
mercial  opportunities,  and  opened  the  door  to  diplomatic  relations  with 
Asia.    Reciprocal  trade  privileges  in  selected  commodities  were  arranged 
with  Brazil  and  with  France.    An  exchange  of  ministers  was  projected  with 
Persia  and  initiated  with  Japan  as  a  huge  and  colorful  Japanese  delegation 
visited  Washington  to  officiate  at  the  signing  of  the  first  treaty.    Buchanan 
sent  two  of  his  most  trusted  friends  to  China,  William  B.  Reed  of  Pennsyl- 
vania and  later  John  E.  Ward  of  Georgia.    These  gentlemen  represented 
the  interests  of  the  United  States  during  the  Anglo-French  war  against 
China  and,  coming  in  at  the  end,  succeeded  in  obtaining  for  their  country 
trade  privileges  equivalent  to  those  won  by  the  French  and  the  English. 
Within  a  year  of  the  signing  of  the  Chinese  Treaty,  American  trade  with  the 
Orient  leaped  upward.   Buchanan's  Asiatic  policy  represented  an  extension 
of  his  program  to  achieve  rapid,  safe  transcontinental  transit  and  looked 
to  the  fulfillment  of  Asa  Whitney's  dream  of  the  United  States  as  the  funnel 
of  Oriental  trade  to  Europe.   Had  Congress  been  as  much  interested  in  this 
as  it  was  in  sectional  politics,  the  United  States  might  have  entered  actively 
into  the  commercial  and  political  development  of  Asia  a  half  century  before 
it  did,  and  this  participation  might  have  altered  considerably  the  course  of 
later  international  events. 

Buchanan's  accomplishments  in  diplomacy  fell  far  short  of  his 
early  hopes  and  expectations,  and  he  held  Congress  chiefly  responsible  for 
his  failures.  But  he  had  recommended  the  party  program  and  almost 
without  legislative  aid  carried  out  a  good  deal  of  it.  He  induced  England  to 
give  up  the  long-asserted  right  to  search  American  vessels  on  the  high  seas; 
he  developed  trade  by  treaty  on  three  continents,  and  he  established  rights 
of  transit  in  Central  America.  Beyond  these  things  he  firmly  maintained 
the  rights  of  American  citizens  abroad,  by  force  in  Central  and  South 
America,  and  by  treaty  in  Europe  where  France  finally  acknowledged 

326 


A  FLOOD  OF  INNOVATIONS  •    1857 .  I860 


French-born  naturalized  citizens  of  the  United  States  as  expatriates,  no 
longer  subject  to  French  military  service  or  jurisdiction  when  visiting  in 
that  land.  He  enlarged  the  scope  of  the  Monroe  Doctrine  by  asserting  the 
responsibility  of  the  United  States,  "as  a  good  neighbor,"  to  keep  order 
in  the  Caribbean,  and  by  professional  diplomacy  Buchanan  enhanced  the 
the  reputation  of  the  country  in  foreign  circles. 

Modern  Americans  hear  little  of  Buchanan's  diplomatic  efforts 
which,  after  the  outbreak  of  the  Civil  War,  appeared  insignificant  enough. 
Yet,  during  his  Administration,  the  nation  considered  his  foreign  policy 
aggressive  and  adventuresome.  Wrote  the  National  Intelligencer: 

We  must  retrench  the  extravagant  list  of  magnificent  schemes 
which  has  received  the  sanction  of  the  Executive.  . .  .  The  great 
Napoleon  himself,  with  all  the  resources  of  an  empire  at  his  sole 
command,  never  ventured  the  simultaneous  accomplishment  of 
so  many  daring  projects.  The  acquisition  of  Cuba  .  .  .;  the  con- 
struction of  a  Pacific  Railroad  . . .;  a  Mexican  protectorate;  inter- 
national preponderance  in  Central  America,  in  spite  of  all  the 
powers  of  Europe;  the  submission  of  distant  South  American 
states;  ...  the  enlargement  of  the  navy;  a  largely  increased 
standing  army  . . .  what  government  on  earth  could  possibly  meet 
all  the  exigencies  of  such  a  flood  of  innovations?86 


327 


25 

CHAOS  AT  CHARLESTON  •  1860 

A  FATAL  EEUD 

With  the  passage  of  the  English  Bill,  Buchanan  renewed  his  hope  of 
achieving  an  end  to  the  violent  agitation  of  the  slavery  question.  Only 
Douglas  stood  in  the  way,  and  he  would  have  to  be  conciliated  or  thrown 
out  of  the  party.  Buchanan  knew  which  course  would  be  wisest;  he  wished 
to  end  the  feud.  Although  he  let  the  anti-Douglas  Democrats  in  Illinois, 
led  by  Isaac  Cook,  go  ahead  with  their  preparations  to  name  an  anti-Douglas 
senatorial  ticket,  he  cut  off  further  favors  to  Cook's  faction  and  hinted  that 
he  would  stop  fighting  Douglas  as  soon  as  Douglas  stopped  fighting  him. 

By  June,  1858,  many  Democratic  editors  wrote  as  if  they  could 
not  recall  that  there  had  ever  been  any  differences  between  the  Little  Giant 
and  Old  Buck,  and  even  Abraham  Lincoln  observed  that  Douglas  and 
Buchanan  had  buried  the  hatchet.1  The  anti-Lecomptonites  began  to  drift 
back  to  the  Administration  fold;  only  the  few  consumed  by  personal  hatred 
of  Buchanan,  such  as  Forney,  Broderick,  and  Shields,  remained  adamant. 
Their  refusal  to  return  to  the  party  worried  Douglas,  for  he  perceived  that 
he  might,  indeed,  share  the  fate  of  Tallmadge  and  Rives.  For  a  time  he  tried 
to  concoct  a  deal  with  Illinois  Republicans  to  run  for  Senate  on  both  the 
anti-Lecompton  and  Republican  tickets.  He  took  "steep  free-soil  ground" 
but  soon  found  that  this  position  seriously  damaged  him  in  the  South  and 
failed  to  persuade  the  Illinois  Republicans.  At  length  he  acquiesced  rather 
unhappily  in  the  decision  of  the  stiff-backed  anti-Lecomptonites  that  the 
little  phalanx  should  continue  as  a  distinct  political  bloc. 

On  June  9,  Cook's  convention  of  Administration  Democrats  in 
Illinois  produced  so  weak  a  ticket  that  even  Buchanan  admitted  the  hope- 
lessness of  trying  to  beat  Douglas  on  his  home  ground.  Howell  Cobb,  who 
had  been  in  charge  of  firing  Douglas  officeholders  during  the  spring,  now 
strongly  urged  reconciliation  and  Slidell  agreed.2  Buchanan  remained 
agreeable  but  wary.  He  told  the  Cabinet  that  Douglas  had  betrayed  the 
Administration  once  and  would  not  scruple  to  do  it  again,  but  he  would  not 

328 


CHAOS  AT  CHARLESTON  •   1860 


block  Douglas's  return  to  the  party.  The  door  stood  open;  Douglas  would 
have  to  move  if  he  wished  to  enter.  He  made  that  move  on  June  15, 
announcing  in  the  Senate  that  he  hoped  to  rejoin  the  regular  Democracy. 
A  tentative  agreement  was  reached:  if  Douglas  would  approve  of  the 
English  Bill  and  stop  attacking  Buchanan,  Buchanan  would  withdraw 
Cook's  Democratic  ticket  in  Illinois  and  give  Administration  backing  to 
Douglas's  senatorial  campaign.3 

In  the  meantime,  the  Illinois  Republicans,  on  June  16,  named 
Abraham  Lincoln  as  their  nominee  for  Senator.  This  meant  formidable 
opposition  to  Douglas  and  a  campaign  that  would  center  on  the  Kansas 
issue.  Douglas,  on  his  trip  back  to  Illinois  in  early  July,  encountered 
such  marked  evidence  of  northern  disgust  with  the  English  Bill  that  his 
conciliatory  mood  weakened.  In  a  moment  of  dramatic  inspiration  he 
determined  to  run  for  the  Senate  against  the  Republicans  and  the  Buchanan 
Democrats  and  take  them  both  into  camp.  That  should  make  him  president. 
On  his  arrival  in  Chicago,  on  July  9,  while  telegrams  completing  the  peace 
treaty  were  already  speeding  toward  him  from  Washington,  he  delivered  a 
harsh  public  tirade  against  President  Buchanan. 

Buchanan  thought  the  ensuing  campaign  in  Illinois  a  tragedy. 
Lincoln  challenged  Douglas  to  a  series  of  debates  and  these  contests 
throughout  the  summer  of  1858  drew  the  excited  attention  of  the  nation 
to  the  very  questions  which  the  president  hoped  he  had  removed  from  the 
realm  of  campaign  politics.  Lincoln,  in  order  to  widen  the  Democratic 
split,  said  that  Douglas  "had  a  great  deal  more  to  do  with  the  steps  that  led 
to  the  Lecompton  Constitution  than  Mr.  Buchanan."4  Douglas  spent 
nearly  as  much  effort  assailing  Buchanan  as  he  did  fighting  Lincoln. 

Both  men  scattered  firebrand  statements  about  in  the  heat  of 
debate  which  seemed  to  serve  their  immediate  local  purpose,  and  some  of 
these  caught  the  public  imagination  and  set  the  nation  ablaze.  Lincoln's 
friends  had  made  him  promise  not  to  use  the  provocative  "house  divided" 
argument,  but  he  used  it  anyway.  Lincoln  could  never  thereafter  persuade 
fearful  southerners  that  he  would  not  aggressively  attack  slavery.  Douglas, 
with  equal  lack  of  reserve,  declaimed:  "All  you  have  a  right  to  ask  is  that 
the  people  shall  do  as  they  please."5  Buchanan  observed  that  such  careless 
talk  only  inflamed  public  opinion.  It  would  soon  destroy  all  reason,  render 
powerless  the  tools  of  practical  politics,  and  terminate  in  national  disaster. 
He  might  heal  the  split  in  the  party,  he  might  do  without  Douglas  in  the 
Senate,  but  he  perceived  no  way  to  calm  the  tempest  of  sectional  hatred 
and  bigotry  which  these  debates  were  regenerating  at  the  very  moment 
when  the  storm  seemed  at  last  to  be  receding.  Buchanan  condemned  both 
men  for  sacrificing  the  public  interest  to  their  personal  ends. 

Governor  Wise  of  Virginia  summed  up  Buchanan's  problem 
succinctly.  Douglas's  success  in  Illinois,  he  said,  "without  the  aid  of  the 

329 


JAMES. BUCHANAN 

Administration  will  be  its  rebuke;  his  defeat  with  its  opposition  will  be  the 
death  of  the  Administration;  and  his  success  with  the  aid  of  the  Administra- 
tion might  save  it  and  the  Democratic  party."6  The  president  agreed  with 
Wise.  He  had  ofiered  his  help,  but  Douglas  had  decided  that  Buchanan's 
enmity  was  more  valuable  politically  than  his  support. 

Howell  Cobb  spoke  the  view  of  the  Administration: 

If  Judge  Douglas  had  done  as  he  promised  ...  all  of  us  ought  to 
have  sustained  him.  Such  has  not  been  his  course.  Publidy  he 
attacks  the  administration.  .  .  .  Privately  he  indulges  in  the 

coarsest  abuse  of  the  President Under  these  circumstances 

to  ask  our  support  is  in  my  opinion  asking  too  much. . . .  [Douglas 
is]  determined  to  break  up  the  Democratic  party.  .  .  .  Forney 
announced  in  plain  language  his  purpose  ...  to  unite  with  any- 
body  and  everybody  to  defeat  us.7 

Buchanan  followed  the  election  returns  with  nervous  apprehen- 
sion. Late  summer  reports  raised  his  hopes,  but  by  the  time  the  October 
tallies  had  come  in  the  outlook  became  bleak  as  the  approaching  winter. 
Douglas  made  good  his  threat  to  beat  the  Republicans  and  the  Administra- 
tion Democrats  in  Illinois,  and  his. astounding  triumph  expanded  both  his 
reputation  and  his  ego.  In  Pennsylvania,  New  York,  New  Jersey,  Ohio, 
Indiana,  and  New  England  the  Congressmen  who  had  sustained  the  English 
Bill  were  generally  defeated.  Worst  of  all  for  Buchanan,  J.  Clancy  Jones, 
the  Administration  "whip"  in  the  House,  had  been  beaten  in  Pennsylvania 
by  the  frantic  efforts  of  the  "Forney  mob."  Who  could  replace  him? 

He  wrote  to  Harriet  after  the  election,  "Well!  we  have  met  the 
enemy  ...  &  we  are  theirs.  This  I  have  anticipated  for  three  months. 
Yesterday ...  we  had  a  merry  time  of  it,  laughing  among  other  things  over 
our  crushing  defeat.  It  is  so  great  that  it  is  almost  absurd.  .  .  .  The  con- 
spirators against  poor  Jones  have  at  length  succeeded. . . .  With  the  blessing 
of  Providence,  I  shall  endeavor  to  raise  him  up  &  place  him  in  some  position 
where  they  cannot  reach  him."8 

In  addition  to  Jones,  there  were  many  other  defeated  candidates 
for  whom  some  new  post  had  to  be  found.  Just  at  this  moment  the  terms 
of  many  Pierce  appointees  in  the  foreign  service  came  to  an  end.  Buchanan 
might  have  filled  the  vacancies  with  disturbers  of  the  peace  or  he  might 
have  used  these  choice  appointments  as  a  means  of  purchasing  needed 
support,  in  accordance  with  his  patronage  policy  of  1857.  But  now  he  had 
to  give  the  jobs  to  his  wounded  friends.  In  so  doing  he  would  gain  no 
additional  strength  and  would  send  out  of  the  country  the  very  people  who 
were  most  valuable  on  the  domestic  scene.  Within  the  year  he  had  shipped 
out  of  the  combat  zone  the  strong  leaders  of  the  Democratic  organizations 

330 


CHAOS  AT  CHARLESTON  •   1860 

in  the  northern  states  whom  he  needed  as  delegates  to  the  nominating  con- 
vention at  Charleston.  One  after  another,  he  had  placed  them  in  positions 
where  they  were  safe  from  their  enemies  and  at  the  same  time  unable  to 
help  him.  Buchanan  had  made  an  error  in  tactics  the  magnitude  of  which 
became  apparent  only  in  the  spring  of  1860.  His  consolation  was  in  the 
thought  that  he  had  rewarded  his  friends. 

The  exact  complexion  of  the  36th  Congress  would  not  become 
clear  until  the  last  state  elections  in  the  summer  of  1859.  The  Democrats 
still  might  control  if  Douglas  behaved  himself.  With  his  usual  optimism, 
Buchanan  wrote  to  Hiram  Swarr  in  Lancaster:  "Politically  the  prospects 
are  daily  brightening.  From  present  appearances  the  party  will  ere  long 
be  thoroughly  united.  Douglas  will  stand  alone  in  the  Senate  if  he  does 
not  come  back  fair  &  square."  Apparently  less  confident  of  his  personal 
future  than  of  his  party's,  he  enclosed  an  unsolicited  check  for  $500  for 
Swarr's  church.9 

Buchanan's  second  annual  message  of  December,  1858,  painted 
the  picture  of  a  virile  nation  which  had  weathered  the  storm  of  financial 
panic  and  the  hurricane  of  Kansas,  and  now  sailed  a  calm  sea  of  unlimited 
opportunities.  Britain  had  renounced  the  right  of  search  and  would  soon 
be  forced  to  withdraw  from  Central  America;  commercial  treaties  were 
being  completed  with  China,  Japan,  and  other  countries  of  the  Far  East. 
To  encourage  rapid  expansion  of  the  economy  Buchanan  asked  for  an 
increase  in  the  navy,  authority  to  protect  transport  routes  through  Panama, 
Nicaragua,  and  Mexico,  the  construction  of  a  Pacific  Railroad,  and  a 
revision  of  the  tariff  to  increase  revenue.  Most  important  of  all,  he  urged 
the  purchase  of  Cuba  to  gain  dominance  of  the  Caribbean.  Through  this 
program,  the  United  States  would  "attract  to  itself  much  of  the  trade  and 
travel  of  all  nations  passing  between  Europe  and  Asia"  and  would  soon 
become  the  wealthiest  and  most  powerful  nation  on  the  globe. 

Except  for  the  sectional  passions  aroused  over  Lecompton  and 
the  refusal  of  Douglas  to  rejoin  the  Administration  party,  this  program 
might  have  aroused  national  pride  and  patriotic  enthusiasm.  Instead,  it 
served  only  to  intensify  the  sectional  contest.  The  thepaes.  of  slavery  and 
sectional  advantage  sooner  or  later  came  to  dominate  every  Congressional 
debate.  The  North  -killed  Cuba,  the  South  killed  the  tariff,  and  strange 
combinations  of  vengeful  and  frustrated  lawmakers  prevented  action  on 
the  other  proposals.  The  president's  program  failed  either  to  command  the 
needed  votes  in  Congress  or  to  arouse  enthusiasm  outside.  The  people 
back  home  seemed  to  have  lost  interest  in  national  glory  and  achievement; 
led  on  by  their  local  representatives,  they  could  be  excited  only  by  the 
intramural  contest. 

Some  people  imagined  that  a  stirring  voice  from  the  White  House 
at  this  juncture  might  have  interrupted  such  petty  bickering  and  enlisted 

331 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


powerful  support  behind  a  president  willing  to  act  without  reference  to 
Congress  or  the  Constitution.  Others  admitted  that  even  the  voice  of 
Andrew  Jackson  could  scarcely  have  united  the  discordant  factions  of 
Democrats  or  altered  the  sectional  bias  of  Republicans.  But  Buchanan  had 
no  desire  to  rule  without  Congress,  and  Congress  did  nothing. 

By  March  3, 1859,  the  day  before  adjournment,  Congress  had  not 
even  passed  the  routine  Treasury  bills.  Buchanan,  in  an  agony  of  frustra- 
tion, sent  in  a  hurried  message  warning  that  the  government  could  not  pay 
federal  salaries  unless  Congress  provided  the  means.  The  bill  passed  only 
after  an  all  night  battle,  but  it  failed  to  include  any  provision  to  pay  a  large 
post-office  deficit.  Postmaster  General  A.  V.  Brown,  though  desperately  ill 
of  pneumonia,  conducted  the  fight  for  his  Department  from  his  sickbed, 
but  Congress  adjourned  without  passing  the  post-office  bill.  Brown, 
defeated  and  exhausted,  died  four  days  later.10 

While  Buchanan  continued  to  express  optimism,  he  knew  that 
worse  was  still  to  come.  If  this  was  a  sample  of  control  by  the  Democrats, 
what  would  happen  when  the  Republicans  commanded  the  House  in 
December?  He  could  scarcely  tolerate  the  thought  and  sought  distraction 
in  administrative  work,  visiting  around  the  Department  offices  to  check  up 
on  the  activities.  As  others  began  to  lose  confidence  in  him,  he  boasted 
greater  confidence  in  himself.  A  newspaper  reported,  "Mr.  B.  is  delighted 
at  the  idea  that  any  member  of  his  Cabinet  should  get  sick,  and  is  in  the 
habit  of  saying  every  day,  'I  never  was  in  better  health  in  my  life;  I  can 
take  my  glass  of  Old  Monongahela,  dine  heartily,  indulge  in  Madeira,  and 
sleep  soundly,  and  yet  my  Cabinet  is  always  dilapidated.'  "n  When 
Secretary  Thompson  asked  for  some  time  off,  Buchanan  told  him  that  "he 
thought  all  his  Cabinet  had  better  leave  and  he  and  the  different  clerks 
would  manage  matters  till  their  return."12 


THE  LONELIEST  JOB  IN  THE  WORLD 

But  despite  this  bold  front,  the  impending  collapse  of  his  party  weighed 
heavily  on  him  and  changed  his  conduct  in  ways  which  nearly  everyone 
saw  except  himself.  In  the  privacy  of  the  White  House  he  became  more 
irritable,  impatient,  fussy,  and  dictatorial.  Harriet  complained  and  chafed 
under  the  need  to  suppress  all  her  feelings  for  "Nunc's  sake."  Sophie  Plitt 
urged  her  to  marry  at  once,  for  if  she  felt  lonely  in  the  White  House,  she 
would  be  utterly  forlorn  when  they  all  returned  to  Wheatland.13  After 
completing  her  duty  as  hostess  until  Congress  adjourned,  Harriet  left  for  a 
three  months*  visit  to  New  York,  Philadelphia,  and  Lancaster.  When 
Buchanan's  friends  asked  if  he  did  not  miss  her,  he  replied,  "I  do  not  care 
how  long  she  stays.  I  can  do  very  well  without  her."  Responded  Kate 

332 


Thompson,  "Who  can  expect  anything  better  from  such  a  hardened  old 
Bachelor!"14 

The  row  with  Harriet  arose  in  part  from  Buchanan's  rigid  dis- 
cipline for  White  House  social  events— no  cards  or  dancing— but  more 
especially  from  his  nosiness  about  his  niece's  private  affairs.  Harriet  found 
it  particularly  exasperating  that  "Nunc,"  either  from  suspicion  or  pre- 
occupation, often  opened  her  mail.  On  such  letters  he  would  endorse  the 
words,  "Opened  by  mistake.  I  know  not  whether  it  contains  aught  of  love 
or  treason."  Harriet  at  length  discovered  a  way  to  communicate  in  security 
with  Mrs.  Plitt.  Buchanan  received  fresh  butter  regularly  from  Philadelphia 
in  a  locked,  brass-bound  kettle.  Harriet  obtained  the  White  House  steward's 
key,  sent  a  duplicate  to  Sophie,  and  during  the  last  years  of  the  Administra- 
tion the  two  sent  their  private  mail  "via  the  kettle,"  as  they  wrote  on 
the  envelopes.16 

After  quitting  his  job  as  secretary,  James  Buchanan  Henry  went 
to  New  York  and  proceeded  to  marry  without  his  uncle's  blessing.  To 
celebrate  his  independence,  James  Henry  raised  a  huge  black  moustache 
which,  one  guest  reported,  "looked  awful"  and  which  the  president  would 
have  made  him  shave  off  had  he  been  present,  but  Buchanan  did  not  attend 
the  wedding  and  sent  no  gift— at  least  none  was  on  display,  from  which  the 
guests  concluded  that  none  had  been  given.16 

The  widow  Craig,  who  had  been  living  at  the  White  House  during 
December  and  January,  also  departed.  She  had  affected  Buchanan  more 
deeply  than  most  women;  he  confided  to  Cobb,  much  to  the  latter's  amuse- 
ment, that  he  spent  restless  nights  dreaming  of  her.  The  president  kept  up 
a  bold  front  and  proclaimed  his  indifference,  but  he  felt  hurt  and  lonely* 
During  May  he  practically  took  possession  of  Howell  Cobb,  whose  wife  had 
returned  to  Georgia,  having  him  to  meals  at  the  White  House  every  day  and 
calling  on  him  "to  give  an  account  of  himself'  whenever  he  was  absent.17 

By  mid-Miy  Buchanan's  social  life  had  dwindled  to  informal 
parties  with  his  official  family,  notably  the  Thompsons,  the  Blacks,  Cobb, 
Cass,  the  Gwins,  Judge  Mason  and  Bob  Magraw.  Toward  the  end  of  the 
month  he  accepted  an  invitation  from  the  Mayor  of  Baltimore  to  select  a 
site  for  the  new  courthouse  and  sujbmit  designs  for  the  main  courtroom. 
Accompanied  by  a  dozen  of  the  "regulars,"  he  made  a  frolic  of  the  visit  to 
Baltimore.  The  men  toured  likely  spots,  the  women  window-shopped,  and 
all  concluded  the  affair  by  a  sumptuous  dinner  at  Barnum's,  enlivened  by 
plenty  of  wine  at  $10  a  bottle.  They  returned  on  the  evening  train,  much 
to  the  annoyance  of  the  younger  members  of  the  party,  who  wanted  to  stay 
for  the  theater,  but  the  "old  Chief'  would  have  none  of  this.  The  inside 
circle  considered  it  something  of  a  triumph  to  have  gotten  "Old  Pub  Func" 
out  of  the  capital  at  all.  rtWho  urged  him  up  to  it?"  inquired  Mrs.  Cobb. 
"Mrs.  Gwin  or  Mrs.  Ledyard?1* 

333 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Buchanan  at  length  got  on  the  nerves  of  his  associates.  Thus  it 
was  that  some  of  the  Cabinet  tried  to  get  him  out  of  Washington  and 
cooked  up  a  presidential  tour  to  the  South  in  June.  There  came  to  be 
something  pathetic  in  the  way  the  Cabinet  bobbed,  curtsied,  and  put  on  the 
"happy  family"  act  in  Buchanan's  presence  and  ridiculed  him  in  private. 
They  respected  his  talent  and  feared  his  wrath,  but  they  hated  his  sancti- 
moniousness. Kate  Thompson  called  him  "Old  Gurley"  (for  Phineas 
Gurley,  the  Senate  Chaplain)  or  "The  pride  of  the  Christian  World." 
Mrs.  Cobb  wrote  in  the  broadest  sarcasm  of  'The  greatest  President  that  we 
have  had  since  Washington  and  Jacksonl  And  Miss  Lane,  the  modd  of  an 

American  girl!!" 

On  Monday,  May  30,  President  Buchanan  accompanied  by 
Thompson  and  Magraw  left  Baltimore  by  boat  for  Norfolk;  from  there  they 
went  to  Raleigh  and  Chapel  Hill.  The  newspapers  reported  the  president 
"gay  and  frisky  as  a  young  buck,"  and  Cobb  said  that  "the  old  gentleman 

was  perfectly  delighted  with  his  trip There  has  not  been  since  the  days 

of  Genl.  Jackson  such  an  ovation  to  any  President."  Even  Kate  Thompson 
admitted,  after  hearing  the  report  of  her  husband,  "truly  I  think  the  old 
Rip  Van  Winkle  waked  up  for  this  occasion.  ...  He  had  a  good  time  in 
N.  Carolina  for  Mr.  T.  says  he  kissed  hundreds  of  pretty  girls  which  made 
his  mouth  water!"19 

Buchanan  returned  to  Washington  on  June  7,  and  Harriet  came 
back  from  her  vacation  shortly  thereafter.  Since  the  heat  of  the  summer 
was  beginning  to  set  in,  the  household  moved  to  more  comfortable  quarters 
at  the  Soldiers'  Home.  At  this  time  Buchanan  was  interested  in  a  wealthy 
grass  widow,  Mrs.  Bass  from  Virginia.  One  afternoon  she  drove  out  to  the 
presidential  retreat  for  a  visit.  When  her  rig  came  in  full  view  of  the  group 
on  the  piazza,  according  to  a  report  of  one  of  the  guests,  "the  President 
immediately  left.  In  a  few  moments  after  we  had  said  howdy  &  got  seated 
the  Old  Chief  came  tripping  and  smiling  out,  dressed  in  an  inch  of  his  life— 
&  Mrs.  Gwin  declares  he  changed  his  coat,  pants  &  shoes  in  that  short 
time— to  see  the  widow.  Now,  did  you  think  any  woman  could  make  him 
do  that  much?"20 

Toward  the  end  of  July,  Buchanan  set  out  for  his  regular  fortnight 
at  Bedford  Springs,  talrmg  the  widow  Bass  and  her  three  young  children  with 
him.  The  pleasant  interlude  was  marred  by  only  two  incidents.  Buchanan 
found  himself  placed  in  rooms  next  to  Simon  Cameron,  and  the  abolitionists 
ran  away  with  Mrs.  Bass's  Negro  servant  girl.  People  at  the  Springs  gener- 
ally assumed  that  Cameron  had  arranged  the  episode  to  spite  Buchanan. 
Apparently,  some  people  of  Bedford  had  persuaded  the  girl  to  leave  and 
had  given  her  money  with  which  to  travel  farther  North.  But  Mrs.  Bass 
took  it  calmly,  announcing  that  the  girl  was  honest  and  capable,  and  had 
taken  none  of  the  money  and  jewels  available  in  the  rooms.  She  hoped 

334 


CHAOS  AT  CHARLESTON  •   1860 


only  that  others  would  care  for  her  and  treat  her  kindly,  which  she  feared 
they  would  not.21 

Buchanan  and  his  "Court"  returned  to  Washington  on  the  first 
of  August.  It  had  been  a  gay,  restful  summer,  a  far  cry  from  the  nerve- 
wracking  pressure  of  congressional  politics.  Now  it  was  time  to  get  back 
to  business.  The  last  elections  for  the  36th  Congress  had  been  held  and 
the  exact  nature  of  that  body  stood  revealed.  The  Democrats  would  control 
the  Senate,  but  they  were  a  minority  in  the  House  whenever  the  Republi- 
cans allied  with  Douglas  Democrats  or  Whig-Americans.  What  kind  of  a 
program  could  possibly  achieve  cooperation  from  such  a  Iqjislative  body? 
Buchanan  had  to  figure  out  the  answers  to  that  question  in  the  preparation 
of  his  next  annual  message. 

DOWNGRADING  THE  PRESIDENCY 

While  the  year  1859  outwardly  looked  peaceful  and  calm  in  comparison 
with  the  two  previous  years,  it  bred  its  share  of  ugly  incidents.  Seward's 
dark  prophecy  of  "irrepressible  conflict;"  the  angry  Congressional  debates 
on  Cuba,  the  tariff,  and  public  land;  the  Ohio  trial  of  the  Oberlin-Wellington 
prisoners  whose  crime  had  been  to  rescue  a  human  being  from  slavery; 
the  cases  of  the  Echo  and  the  Wanderer,  highlighting  the  overseas  slave- 
trade;  the  Vicksburg  Convention  proposals  to  reopen  this  brutal  traffic 
under  law;  the  calculated  murder  of  Senator  Broderick  in  a  California 
political  duel;  and  the  pamphlet  war  between  Douglas  and  Attorney  General 
Black  in  August  and  September— all  these  kept  tension  high  and  slavery 
in  the  spotlight.  The  October  elections  brought  the  worst  kind  of  news 
for  Buchanan:  more  Republican  victories  in  Pennsylvania,  Ohio,  and  Iowa. 
Late  on  Monday  morning,  October  17,  Buchanan  received  word 
of  some  trouble  at  Harpers  Ferry.  The  crew  of  the  night  train  from 
Wheeling  to  Washington  had  telegraphed  the  news  that  an  armed  force  of 
abolitionists  at  the  Ferry  had  captured  the  bridge  and  town,  shot  a  watch- 
man, killed  a  Negro  porter,  and  apparently  intended  to  terrorize  the 
countryside.  Buchanan  hurriedly  met  with  Secretary  Floyd  and  ordered 
a  force  of  artillery  and  marines  under  the  command  of  Col.  Robert  E.  Lee 
to  the  scene.  By  two  p.  m.  he  had  on  his  desk  a  copy  of  the  Baltimore  Sun 
Extra  with  headlines:  "Negro  Insurrection  at  Harpers  Ferry.  Headed  by 
250  AboUtionists.  The  Aimory  Seized—Trains  Stopped— Cars  Fired  Into— 
One  Man  Killed"  and  a  more  detailed  account  of  events.  Not  until  the 
next  day  did  he  learn  that  old  John  Brown,  the  Kansas  murderer,  led  the 
rebel  band.  His  few  dozen  followers  soon  capitulated  to  the  state  and 
federal  troops,  and  Brown  himself  was  captured  alive.  Floyd  made  an 
investigation  but  found  no  need  to  proclaim  martial  law.  Governor  Wise 

335 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

of  Virginia  was  on  hand  and  laid  claim  to  Brown  as  a  state  prisoner.  A 
Virginia  court  found  him  guilty  of  murder  and  treason  within  two  weeks  of 
the  affair  and  the  authorities  hanged  him  on  December  2. 

One  can  scarcely  imagine  an  episode  better  designed  to  arouse 
the  worst  passions  of  Americans  than  John  Brown's  raid.  The  South  soon 
learned  that  the  idea  of  the  attack  had  not  been  confined  to  the  diseased 
mind  of  the  perpetrator.  Half  a  dozen  prominent  and  wealthy  New  England 
abolitionists  who  had  at  least  a  partial  knowledge  of  Brown's  plans  had 
financed  the  arming  of  the  raiders.  In  addition  to  the  "Secret  Six,"  other 
distinguished  northerners  had  helped  Brown  and  now  glorified  him  with 
their  pens.  Some  northern  extremists  exploited  him  as  a  latter-day  Christ 
and  set  him  up  as  a  martyr. 

Governor  Wise  saw  to  it  that  Brown's  trial  should  be  conducted 
with  the  utmost  dignity  and  decorum.  He  talked  at  length  with  Brown, 
pronounced  him  entirely  sane,  and  made  clear  to  southerners  what  they 
had  scarcely  dared  to  believe  before— that  a  perfectly  normal  antislavery 
partisan  of  the  North,  financed  by  the  "best  people"  there,  could  calmly 
plot  mass  murder  as  if  it  were  a  part  of  the  day's  business.  Although  Re- 
publican leaders  scurried  to  disassociate  themselves  from  all  connection 
with  Brown,  the  southerners  set  him  up  as  a  stereotype  of  northern 
Republicans. 

John  Brown's  raid  strengthened  the  Republican  party  by  bringing 
to  a  dramatic  focus  the  moral  issue  of  slavery.  Lincoln  and  his  partisans 
might  later  pledge  that  they  wished  to  save  the  Union,  with  slavery  or 
without  it,  but  after  Harpers  Ferry  no  one  south  of  the  Ohio  or  Potomac 
would  ever  believe  them.  The  disturbance  also  widened  the  rift  in  the 
Democratic  party.  Congress  met  three  days  after  John  Brown's  body 
stretched  hemp.  What  now  would  southerners  think  of  Douglas  Democrats 
who,  through  the  whole  past  session,  had  linked  hands  with  Republicans 
on  the  slavery  issue?  How  could  they  tolerate  men  who  had  made  war  on 
the  Democratic  party  by  alliance  with  the  promoters  of  Brown's  foray? 
Southerners  now  called  the  anti-Lecompton  bloc  the  "Black  Republican 
Reserve."  Douglas  might  have  perceived  more  clearly  than  he  did  the 
depth  and  conclusiveness  of  this  southern  attitude.  Finally,  the  raid  made 
the  idea  of  secession,  hitherto  a  radical  or  "ultra"  notion,  thoroughly 
respectable  in  the  deep  South.  To  resist  Republican  rule  now  meant  simply 
to  resist  surrender  to  self-confessed  conspirators  and  murderers.  The 
insurrection  answered  the  question  whether  the  South  could  remain  in  a 
Union  controlled  by  Republicans.  The  reply  was  no. 

The  House  met  on  December  5  and  tried  to  organize.  From  that 
day  until  February  1  the  Congressmen  ballotted  angrily  and  in  vain  to 
select  a  Speaker.  After  two  months  of  wrangling  which  occasionally  boiled 
over  into  fist  fights,  the  Representatives  chose  their  officers.  The  situation 

336 


CHAOS  AT  CHARLESTON  •   1860 


was  foreboding.  The  Administration  party  and  the  southern  Democrats 
had  lost;  the  Republicans  and  the  Douglas  Democrats  were  in.22  Douglas, 
it  appeared,  still  accepted  membership  in  the  Black  Republican  Reserve. 
This  appearance  hardly  coincided  with  the  truth,  but  the  impression  gained 
currency  in  the  South. 

Buchanan,  laboring  over  his  message,  tried  to  pierce  the  darkness 
of  the  future  and  to  plot  some  safe  course.  He  feared  that  John  Brown's 
raid  and  the  wild  enthusiasm  with  which  some  northerners  welcomed  the 
news  had  "made  a  deeper  impression  on  the  southern  mind  against  the 
Union  than  all  former  events."  The  Cabinet  was  gloomy.  Cobb  wrote 
that  "the  North  seems  determined  to  force  upon  us  the  issue  of  Sewardism 
or  disunion."  "The  days  of  the  union  are  numbered,"  he  said.  "I  write 
this  as  my  unwilling  conviction."28 

The  president  sent  his  message  to  the  Senate  on  December  27, 
but  no  one  in  or  out  of  Congress  paid  much  attention  to  it.  "The  message 
has  been  here  a  week  and  I  have  not  yet  seen  the  first  person  who  has  read 
it,"  reported  a  Georgia  politician.  It  was  dull  enough,  to  be  sure,  to  deserve 
this  fate,  but  there  lay  embedded  in  its  routine  comments  some  ideas  that 
were  startling:  the  presidential  warning  that  the  Harpers  Ferry  incident  was 
a  symptom  "of  an  incurable  disease  in  the  public  mind,  which  may  .  .  . 
terminate,  at  last,  in  an  open  war  by  the  North  to  abolish  slavery  in  the 
South;"  the  assertion,  in  direct  defiance  of  Senator  Douglas's  doctrine, 
that  the  Supreme  Court  explicitly  promised  protection  of  slavery  in  the 
Territories;  the  statement  that  "without  the  authority  of  Congress"  the 
president  could  not  fire  a  gun  in  any  "species  of  hostility  however  confined 
or  limited,"  except  to  repel  the  attacks  of  an  enemy;  the  charge  that  in 
failing  to  pass  deficiency  bills,  Congress  had  arrested  the  action  of  govern- 
ment and  could,  by  this  means,  "even  destroy  its  existence."  None  of 
these  points  was,  in  itself,  momentous;  but  all  taken  together,  they  showed 
clearly  that  the  president  placed  squarely  on  the  shoulders  of  Congress  the 
responsibility  for  solving  the  problems  which  confronted  the  nation. 

By  doing  so,  Buchanan  weakened  the  presidential  office.  His 
purpose,  however,  was  to  keep  responsibility  clearly  defined.  Throughout 
his  Administration  the  opposition  in  Congress  had  attacked  him  as  a 
dictator,  a  tyrant,  a  James  the  First.  But  he  had  always  emphasized  that 
his  duty  as  executive  was  only  to  carry  out  the  will  of  Congress.  He  re- 
called the  dictum  of  Governor  Simon  Snyder,  "My  duty  is  to  execute  the 
laws  .  .  .  and  not  my  individual  opinions."  He  now  reiterated  this  idea 
and  called  national  attention  to  it;  he  had  no  intention  to  be  the  scapegoat 
for  Congressional  inattention  to  business.  At  the  same  time  that  Buchanan 
circumscribed  the  presidential  powers,  the  lawmakers  labored  ardently  to 
the  same  end.  Enemy  Congressmen,  hating  Buchanan  and  fearful  of  his 
dictatorial  use  of  power  against  them,  determined  to  destroy  him  by 

337 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


destroying  the  power  of  the  office  he  held.    Between  them,  they  succeeded 
all  too  well. 

On  March  5,  1859,  the  House  adopted  a  resolution  to  investigate 
whether  the  president  had  tried  to  influence  the  votes  of  Congressmen  on 
the  English  Bill  by  improper  means.  Speaker  Pennington  appointed  the 
originator  of  the  resolution,  John  Covode  of  Pennsylvania,  as  chairman  of 
the  investigating  committee.  Buchanan  assumed  that  John  Forney  had 
been  the  real  author  of  the  scheme,  for  he  had  proposed  something  of  this 
sort  in  a  violent  speech  just  before  Pennington's  election.24  He  further 
suspected  that  the  Covode  investigation  was  tied  up  with  Douglas's  plans 
to  carry  off  the  Democratic  nomination  at  Charleston  in  April. 

But  other  factors  were  at  work.  In  the  Senate  a  Democratic  com- 
mittee  had  been  busily  compiling  testimony  which  linked  the  Republican 
party  with  complicity  in  the  John  Brown  raic\  Now  the  Republican- 
controlled  House  would  offer  to  the  public  a  countervailing  exposfi  of 
Democratic  corruption.  Also,  John  Covode  had  a  personal  grudge  to  settle 
with  Buchanan.  As  a  prominent  member  of  a  railroad  company  which 
wanted  a  huge  land  grant  from  several  western  states,  he  had  taken  the 
responsibility  to  put  through  Congress  a  federal  land  donation  act,  cloaked 
as  a  bill  to  establish  agricultural  colleges.  Buchanan  vetoed  this  bill  on 
February  24.  "Hence,"  said  the  Buchanan  press,  "the  bitter  personal 
hostility  of  John  Covode  to  President  Buchanan."25  Finally,  the  Douglas 
Democrats  saw  in  the  investigation  an  opportunity  to  strengthen  the 
prospects  of  their  favorite  at  Charleston.  A  re-examination  of  the  Kansas 
fight  and  the  handling  of  patronage  in  Illinois  would  certainly  damn  the 
Administration  and  strengthen  Douglas. 

Unlike  most  partisan  investigations,  this  one  would  bring  damag- 
ing testimony  from  members  of  both  parties.  Even  Douglas  may  not  have 
realized  how  serious  a  blow  the  Covode  inquiry  might  deal  to  the  nation, 
for  it  aimed  at  discrediting  not  only  a  man,  but  the  power  and  prestige  of 
the  whole  executive  machinery.  Buchanan  promptly  protested.  "Mr. 
John  Covode,"  he  said,  "is  the  accuser  of  the  President.  .  .  .  The  House 
have  made  my  accuser  one  of  my  judges.  .  .  .  Since  the  time  of  the  Star 
Chamber  and  of  general  warrants  there  has  been  no  such  proceeding. ...  I 
defy  all  investigation.  Nothing  but  the  basest  perjury  can  sully  my 
good  name."26 

The  Committee  went  enthusiastically  about  its  business,  question- 
ing all  kinds  of  witnesses,  both  those  in  office  and  disgruntled  ones  who 
had  been  dismissed,  Forney  who  in  an  earlier  day  had  been  an  active 
influence  peddler  now  planned  to  tell  all.  "God  knows  what  he  will  swear," 
groaned  Buchanan  when  Forney  took  the  stand.  "If  he  should  tell  any- 
thing like  the  truth,  I  have  nothing  to  fear."27 

338 


CHAOS  AT  CHARLESTON  •   1860 


The  investigators  unearthed  practices  common  to  every  Adminis- 
tration since  the  days  of  Andrew  Jackson,  namely,  that  politicians  used 
public  offices  and  certain  types  of  public  funds  for  political  purposes. 
Government  printing  contracts  for  decades  had  been  a  source  of  party 
income.  Partisan  editors  received  printing  contracts  as  a  reward  for 
editorial  support  and  then  improved  their  situation  by  overprinting,  over- 
charging, or  farming  out  work  for  a  commission.  Buchanan's  Administra- 
tion permitted  this  well-established  procedure  to  continue.  The  Committee 
thoroughly  overhauled  the  activities  of  the  notorious  Ike  Cook  faction  in 
Illinois  and  spent  a  lot  of  time  examining  the  peculiar  machinations  of 
Cornelius  Wendell,  financial  manager  of  the  Washington  Union,  the 
Administration  paper. 

There  was  evidence  that  naval  contracts  had  been  awarded  for 
political  reasons  and  that  War  Secretary  Floyd  had  offered  to  sell  govern- 
ment property  cheap  and  to  buy  dear.  Buchanan  himself  had  intervened 
to  prevent  the  payment  of  $200,000  for  a  site  in  California  which  he  thought 
a  poor  bargain.  Such  matters  formed  the  burden  of  testimony  before  the 
Covode  Committee.  In  May,  the  Buchanan  Administration  itself  gave 
the  Committee  an  extra  boost  when  the  Postmaster  General  discovered  that 
the  postmaster  of  New  York  City,  I  V.  Fowler,  had  stolen  $160,000  of 
federal  funds.  Fowler  promptly  fled  to  Europe  to  escape  arrest.28 

The  Committee  concluded  its  work  in  June,  had  the  hearings 
printed,  bound  them  in  with  previous  hearings  on  naval  contracts,  and 
franked  the  results  all  over  the  country.  Even  those  who  did  not  read 
must  have  felt  that  such  a  huge  tome  would  record  a  comparable  volume 
of  corruption.  Had  the  report  been  a  mere  partisan  attack,  like  the  censure 
of  Jackson  in  the  1830's,  it  might  have  been  less  damaging;  but  this  time 
there  was  a  difference.  The  Republicans  said  that  the  report  showed  the 
hand  of  treason  at  work,  a  slave  conspiracy  pulling  the  strings  on  a  puppet 
president.  The  Douglas  Democrats  pointed  out  that  the  Administration 
had  used  its  power  to  defraud  the  voters  in  Illinois,  a  kind  of  continued 
Lecompton  swindle.  Both  ideas  set  Buchanan  before  the  public  as  a  willing 
tool  of  the  slave  power,  ready  to  use  the  public  treasure  to  crush  votes 
for  freedom. 

Buchanan  addressed  a  spirited  reply  to  the  House  after  the 
investigation,  asking  why  Congress  had  failed  to  recommend  any  resolutions 
of  impeachment  or  even  of  censure  of  himself  or  any  executive  officer. 
The  House  had  discovered  no  abuse  of  executive  authority,  nor  had  it 
proposed  any  corrective  legislation.  After  spreading  a  drag  net  over  the 
nation  "to  catch  any  disappointed  man  willing  to  malign  my  character," 
after  listening  to  every  coward  that  wished  to  insult  the  president  under 
guaranteed  immunity,  after  hearing  all  the  witnesses  who  wanted  to  swear 
away  their  character  before  the  Committee,  after  proceeding  for  three 

339 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


months  in  secrecy  without  permitting  any  testimony  on  behalf  of  the 
accused,  the  Committee  had  found  nothing  on  which  to  ground  a  specific 
complaint.  Such  procedure,  Buchanan  said,  violated  public  and  private 
honor,  it  denied  to  the  president  a  fair  trial  and  the  right  of  self-defense,  it 
instituted  a  "reign  of  terror,"  and  degraded  the  presidential  office  to  such 
a  degree  that  it  became  "unworthy  of  the  acceptance  of  any  man  of  honor 
or  principle."  "I  have  passed  triumphantly  through  this  ordeal,"  he  con- 
duded.  "My  vindication  is  complete."29 


DEMOCRACY  DIVIDING 

While  the  Covode  Committee  met,  the  Democrats  held  their  nominating 
convention  at  Charleston,  S.  C.,  April  23  to  May  3.  For  over  a  year  the 
Douglas  press  had  made  a  concerted  effort  to  create  the  notion  that  Bu- 
chanan wished  to  have  the  nomination.  Buchanan's  own  friends  had 
helped  foment  the  foolish  idea  through  an  article  in  the  Pittsburgh  Post  on 
July  19,  1859.  Immediately  on  seeing  it,  the  president  wrote  a  statement 
that  he  positively  would  not  accept  a  renomination.  He  called  B.  F.  Meyers, 
editor  of  the  Bedford  Gazette  to  his  room  at  the  Springs  Hotel  at  midnight 
on  the  20th  and  gave  him  the  article  with  instructions  to  print  it  the  next 
day.  Then  he  sent  copies  to  the  Pittsburgh  Post,  the  Pennsylvanian,  and 
the  Washington  Constitution.30  He  wrote  privately  to  Howell  Cobb,  J.  B. 
Baker  and  Wilson  McCandless  during  July,  expressing  his  "final  and 
irrevocable"  determination  to  retire.31 

As  the  second-term  publicity  would  not  stop,  he  wrote  to  Baker 
again  in  February,  1860,  denying  his  candidacy  and,  before  the  Charleston 
Convention  met,  sent  to  Arnold  Plumer,  one  of  the  delegates,  a  letter  in 
which  he  restated  that  he  would  not  "in  any  contingency"  be  a  candidate. 
He  also  sent  a  copy  to  another  delegate.  There  is  no  reason  to  believe  he 
was  not  sincere.  He  told  Mrs.  Polk,  "I  am  now  in  my  sixty-ninth  year  and 
am  heartily  tired  of  my  position  as  President."32 

The  talk  of  another  term  afforded  certain  presidential  aspirants  a 
weapon  for  their  own  cause.  The  New  York  Herald  published  a  letter  of 
Governor  Wise  of  Virginia  stating  that  "Mir.  Buchanan  himself  is  a  can- 
didate for  renomination,  and  all  his  patronage  and  power  will  be  used  to 
disappoint  Douglas  and  all  other  aspirants."33  The  Philadelphia  Press;  a 
Douglas  organ,  alleged  that  Buchanan  swore  to  his  friends  that  he  "had  to 
be"  the  candidate  at  Charleston;  the  times  demanded  it.34  This  had  been 
the  whole  object  of  the  Chapel  Hill  junket.  Ever  since  the  Harpers  Ferry 
raid,  he  had  been  trying  to  frighten  the  nation  about  secession,  "manufac- 
ture a  disunion  panic,"  and  thus  render  the  nomination  of  any  northerner, 
except  himself,  impossible.35  In  the  South,  Toombs  of  Georgia  wrote  that 

340 


CHAOS  AT  CHARLESTON  •   1860 


"Old  Buck  is  determined  to  rule  or  ruin  us.  I  think  he  means  to  continue 
his  own  dynasty  or  destroy  the  party"  and  in  another  letter  said,  "I  think 
Mr,  Buchanan  would  like  to  prevent  the  nomination  of  another  in  order  to 
make  himself  necessary."36 

This  identity  of  hostile  views  from  opposite  sections  highlighted 
Buchanan's  lack  of  rapport  with  either.  He  thoroughly  disapproved  of 
Douglas  and  equally  opposed  the  nomination  of  any  ultrasoutherner,  but 
he  had  strong  hopes  that  a  southern  Unionist,  particularly  Howell  Cobb, 
might  succeed  him.  Cobb,  however,  had  become  discouraged  after  the 
John  Brown  affair.  He  would  not  be  a  candidate,  he  told  his  brother-in-law, 
unless  strongly  pressed  by  Georgia,  and  even  then  he  felt  gloomy  about  the 
future  of  the  country.  "For  that  reason,"  he  said,  "I  feel  less  solicitous 

about  the  matter I  am  more  desirous  of  obtaining  the  full  confidence 

of  the  people  of  Ga.— that  I  may  serve  them  in  the  crisis  that  is  before  us— 
than  I  do  to  obtain  even  presidential  honors."37  On  March  15,  the  Georgia 
Convention  in  a  dose  vote  declined  to  support  Cobb  as  the  favorite  son, 
and  he  publicly  announced  his  retirement  from  the  race.  Buchanan  now 
placed  his  hopes  in  such  men  as  Vice-President  Breckinridge  or  James 
Guthrie  of  Kentucky  or  Joe  Lane  of  Oregon.  These  men  represented  the 
border-state  or  moderate  point  of  view  on  the  major  question  that  would 
face  the  Charleston  delegates:  popular  sovereignty  as  defined  by  Douglas's 
Freeport  Doctrine  or  federal  protection  of  slaves  in  the  territories,  according 
to  Jefferson  Davis's  slave-code  resolutions.  There  was  ground  for  com- 
promise between  these  extremes,  and  on  this  ground  Buchanan  stood. 
Few  others  did. 

At  Charleston,  Murat  Halstead,  a  newspaperman,  observed  that 
Douglas  was  the  pivotal  figure.  "Every  delegate  was  for  or  against  him. 
Every  motion  meant  to  nominate  him  or  not  to  nominate  him.  Every 
parliamentary  war  was  pro  or  con  Douglas."  He  and  his  friends  intended, 
by  focussing  attention  upon  him  as  the  central  figure  of  the  party,  to  force 
everyone  who  opposed  him  into  the  position  of  schismatics.  Only  thus 
could  Douglas  free  himself  from  his  reputation  as  chief  apostate  of  his 
party.  He  would  so  crowd  the  center  of  the  stage  that  he  would  force 
Buchanan,  Cobb,  Bright,  Slidell,  and  all  others  who  opposed  him  into  the 
wings.  The  more  fighting  that  ensued,  the  better;  it  would  further  empha- 
size his  importance.38 

Buchanan  had  some  influence  among  the  delegates.  He  had 
achieved  a  reconciliation  with  Governor  Packer  and  thus  controlled  a 
part  of  the  Pennsylvania  delegation.  The  patronage  had  dictated  the 
choice  of  Administration  delegates  from  California,  Oregon,  Massachusetts, 
New  Jersey,  and  a  scattering  from  other  states.  Senator  Bigler  became 
Buchanan's  chief  spokesman  on  the  floor,  and  Caleb  Cushing,  a  loyal 

341 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Buchaneer,  presided  over  the  meeting  and  guided  the  selection  of  com- 
mittees.  Cobb,  Bright  and  Slidell,  none  of  them  delegates  but  all  bitter 
enemies  of  Douglas,  assumed  local  direction  of  the  Administration  plans 
for  the  convention.  The  president  could  now  have  used  the  help  of  those 
friends  he  had  sent  away  on  foreign  missions. 

Buchanan's  plan  had  grown  out  of  a  careful  study  of  Douglas's 
letter  of  June  22,  1859,  explaining  his  views  on  slavery  in  the  territories. 
Buchanan  had  conferred  at  length  with  Slidell  about  it  and  had  come  to 
the  conclusion  that  Douglas  intended  to  stick  to  the  Freeport  Doctrine  and 
to  deny  the  right  of  the  Supreme  Court  or  of  the  Congress  to  speak  the 
last  word  on  the  question  of  protecting  slave  property  in  a  federal  territory. 
He  also  thought  that  Douglas  would  not  accept  a  nomination  unless  the 
convention  "shall  first  erect  a  platform  to  please  himself."  Slidell  viewed 
the  candidacy  letter  as  "an  unequivocal  declaration  of  war."39  Buchanan 
endorsed  the  strategy  of  insisting  upon  the  adoption  of  the  platform  first; 
Douglas  would  then  have  to  modify  his  views  to  suit  the  party  or  abandon 
his  candidacy. 

Douglas,  surprisingly,  accepted  the  "platform  first"  idea  which 
passed  the  day  after  the  convention  assembled.  The  convention  then 
split  wide  open  over  the  platform  itself.  His  supporters  bent  furthest 
toward  a  compromise,  agreeing  at  last  to  say  nothing  whatsoever  about 
popular  sovereignty  and  stand  on  the  old  Cincinnati  Platform.  But  the 
southerners  demanded  more  of  Douglas  than  silence;  they  wanted  some 
positive  statement  to  the  effect  that  Congress  had  a  right  to  protect  property 
in  the  territories,  and  this  wish  Douglas  would  not  grant.  Bigler,  heading  a 
conference  committee,  tried  his  best  to  translate  the  middle  ground  into 
acceptable  words  but  failed,  like  the  rest. 

Even  in  the  face  of  this  impasse,  something  might  have  been 
salvaged  from  the  convention  had  the  southern  delegates  kept  their  tempers 
and  their  seats.  But  during  the  vote  on  the  Douglas  minority  platform, 
which  reaffirmed  the  Cincinnati  Platform,  the  delegates  of  eight  southern 
states  walked  out  leaving  the  Douglas  men  in  charge.  These,  unable  to 
muster  a  two-thirds  majority  of  the  whole  to  nominate  their  candidate, 
adjourned  the  convention  to  reconvene  in  Baltimore  on  June  18.  The 
southerners  had  done  exactly  what  Douglas  wanted,  but  not  in  the  way  he 
had  anticipated.  By  voluntarily  assuming  the  position  of  bolters,  they  had 
made  Douglas  the  leader  of  the  regular  party.  They  had  torn  the  apostate's 
cloak  from  his  shoulders  and  wrapped  it  around  themselves.  Had  only  a 
few  withdrawn,  the  Douglas  strategy  might  have  worked;  but  instead  of 
the  secession  of  a  mere  lunatic  fringe,  a  major  portion  of  the  party  had 
walked  out  and  made  a  legal  nomination  impossible. 

Buchanan  read  the  results  with  anger.  The  ground  he  occupied 
had  now  been  entirely  cut  away.  He  could  join  the  knaves  or  the  fools. 

342 


CHAOS  AT  CHARLESTON  •   1860 


Well,  be  damned  if  he  would;  he  would  join  neither  of  them.  He  would 
continue  to  urge  the  only  course  he  could  devise  which  might  unite  the 
Democracy  and  bring  victory  in  November.  He  believed  that  neither 
section  should  demand  both  platform  and  candidate  but  should  be  willing 
to  give  in  on  one  to  get  the  other.  If  Douglas  would  accept  a  modified 
guarantee  of  protection  to  slaves  during  the  territorial  period,  or  Davis 
would  run  on  the  Cincinnati  platform,  either  might  win;  if  each  wanted 
everything  for  his  own  section  and  would  concede  nothing  to  the  other,  then 
the  party  would  lose  and  the  Republicans  would  take  over  the  government. 

May  and  June  brought  such  a  press  of  official  duties  that  Buchanan 
had  little  time  to  devote  to  election  politics,  although  he  emphasized  his 
plan  of  give  and  take  whenever  opportunity  offered.  During  May  the 
moderates  of  the  border  states  organized  a  Constitutional  Union  party  and 
nominated  John  Bell  of  Tennessee  for  president  and  Edward  Everett  of 
Massachusetts  for  vice-president.  Their  platform  was:  "The  Constitution 
of  the  country,  the  union  of  the  States,  and  the  enforcement  of  the  laws." 
A  week  later  the  Republicans  at  Chicago  nominated  Abraham  Lincoln  and 
Hannibal  Hamlin  to  lead  them  on  a  program  of  high  tariff,  free  homesteads, 
and  no  extension  of  slavery.  Finally,  in  mid-June,  the  Democrats  met 
again  for  their  adjourned  session  in  Baltimore.  The  split  persisted;  the 
Douglas  faction  placed  him  in  nomination  and  the  Charleston  seceders 
retired  to  a  separate  hall  to  nominate  John  C,  Breckinridge  for  president 
and  Joe  Lane  for  vice-president.  By  June  28,  four  tickets  were  formally 
in  the  field,  but  only  one  of  them,  the  Republican,  represented  a  clear-cut 
party  organization. 

Tragic  irony  marked  the  final  disintegration  of  the  Democratic 
party  at  the  Baltimore  Convention.  At  the  end  Douglas  formally  asked 
that  his  name  be  withdrawn  in  the  interest  of  party  harmony,  but  his 
managers  ignored  his  request  and  shoved  him  through.  At  the  same  time 
they  adopted  the  very  platfonn  which  Buchanan  had  urged  upon  them  all 
along  and  which,  had  it  been  accepted  earlier,  might  have  achieved  peace. 
Douglas  would  run  on  a  promise  to  let  the  Supreme  Court  determine  the 
"subject  of  domestic  relations"  in  a  territory,  thus  abandoning  the  principle 
which  he  had  made  the  central  theme  of  all  his  former  battles.  On  the 
other  hand  the  southerners,  long  champions  of  the  Supreme  Court  prin- 
ciple, now  considered  its  adoption  by  Douglas  sufficient  cause  to  bolt.  Even 
so,  their  own  platform  on  which  Breckinridge  would  run  considerably 
modified  the  slave-code  proposal  of  Jefferson  Davis.  It  stated  merely  that 
the  Federal  Government  had  the  duty  "to  protect,  when  necessary,  the 
rights  of  persons  and  property  in  the  Territories."  It  thus  became  very 
clear  that  the  issue  went  much  deeper  than  a  formula  for  slavery  in  the 
territories.  It  had  come  to  the  point  that  southern  Democrats  would  not 

343 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


trust  their  northern  colleagues,  regardless  of  principle  or  party,  and  the 
northern  Democrats  reciprocated  the  feeling. 

Theoretically,  Buchanan  might  even  now  have  saved  the  party  by 
coming  out  strongly  for  Douglas.  He  had  no  further  ambitions  to  gratify 
for  himself  and  could  scarcely  have  imagined  any  phraseology  of  condemna- 
tion that  had  not  already  been  directed  against  him.  Douglas,  with 
Administration  support,  might  possibly  have  united  the  Democratic  voters 
of  the  upper  South  and  the  lower  North,  the  middle  belt  which  could 
command  an  electoral  college  majority.  Had  the  Douglas  men  not  been 
at  this  very  moment  busily  engaged  in  upsetting  the  tar  barrel  over  the 
Buchaneers  in  the  Covode  inquiry,  such  a  move  might  have  been  con- 
ceivable.  Under  these  conditions,  it  was  not.  Buchanan  had  to  agree  with 
the  Republican  editor  who  wrote:  "A  penitent  prostitute  may  be  received 
into  the  church,  but  she  should  not  lead  the  choir."  He  decided  for  the  time 
being  to  withhold  the  power  of  his  influence  from  either  side.  Whatever 
persuasiveness  he  possessed  he  would  use  to  promote  a  withdrawal  of  both 
Democratic  candidates,  and  to  achieve  a  new  and  legal  nomination  sup- 
ported by  the  border  states  whose  inhabitants  could  still  talk  to  each  other 
as  friends  and  neighbors.  As  for  the  future,  sufficient  unto  the  day.  .  .  . 


344 


26 

MR.  LINCOLN  IS  ELECTED  •  1860 


WAR  ON  THE  WHITE  HOUSE 

The  end  of  the  Congressional  session  reminded  Buchanan  very  much  of 
the  days  of  the  John  Quincy  Adams  Administration.  Bills  were  manu- 
factured or  side-tracked,  it  seemed,  for  the  particular  purpose  of  damning 
the  Administration.  Both  Republicans  and  Democrats  joined  in  the  game. 
The  tariff  bill,  which  Buchanan  favored  as  a  means  of  strengthening  the 
Treasury,  was  left  to  rot  in  Committee.  The  appropriations  bills  were 
kicked  back  and  forth  between  the  Republican  House  and  the  Democratic 
Senate.  The  Senate  Democrats  sabotaged  proposals  to  make  American 
influence  count  in  Central  America,  and  the  two  Houses  adopted  a  Home- 
stead Bill  which  all  knew  Buchanan  would  have  to  veto. 

Buchanan  needed  the  Morrill  Tariff  both  to  get  more  revenue 
and  to  conciliate  the  demands  of  manufacturers.  He  had  gratified  the 
South  by  vetoing  earlier  some  river  and  harbor  bills  which  would  have 
spent  federal  funds  largely  in  the  northwest,  and  he  deserved  southern 
Democratic  support  for  his  firmness  during  the  Lecompton  fracas.  The 
Morrill  Bill  conformed  to  his  ideas  of  a  moderate  tariff  and  would  have 
greatly  eased  his  administrative  problems,  but  the  southern  Senators 
defeated  it 

He  needed  appropriation  bills  to  maintain  the  functions  aftd 
services  of  government.  When  services  had  to  be  curtailed  the  Adminis- 
tration bore  the  brunt  of  the  complaints.  The  political  opposition,  by 
headlining  the  shocking  fact  that  Buchanan  inherited  a  $4,000,000  surplus 
from  Pierce  and  by  1859  had  a  deficit  of  $27,000,000,  drummed  home  the 
idea  that  the  public  funds  had  been  wasted  in  graft  and  corruption.  But 
the  figures  were  misleading. 

Pierce  had  enjoyed  a  rich  revenue  from  land  sales  and  customs 
receipts  amounting  to  $273,000,000  during  his  term  of  office.  In  Bu- 
chanan's Administration,  because  of  the  panic  of  1857  and  the  near 
cessation  of  land  sales,  due  partly  to  the  Lecompton  fight,  the  federal  income 

345 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


dropped  to  $223,000,000.  Thus  Buchanan  had  the  task  of  running  the 
government  for  four  years  with  $50,000,000  less  than  Pierce.  He  did  this, 
conducted  a  war  with  Paraguay  and  a  war  with  the  Mormons,  increased  the 
navy,  and  established  two  new  transcontinental  postal  routes.  At  the  end 
his  net  deficit  was  $7,000,000.  He  had,  with  rigid  economy,  actually  run 
the  country  for  $39,000,000  less  than  his  predecessor,  and  therefore 
deserved  credit  for  efficient  management  of  public  funds.1 

Buchanan  refused  to  give  away  the  public  domain  for  fear  of 
threatening  the  financial  stability  of  the  nation,  since  that  land  formed  the 
collateral  for  public  loans.  Hence  his  veto  of  the  Homestead  Bill  on 
June  22, 1860,  which  has  often  been  cited  as  the  act  which  elected  Lincoln. 
The  Republican  press  proclaimed  that  "this  act  of  oppression  .  .  .  would 
sink  the  administration  of  James  Buchanan  in  infamy  as  long  as  it  will  be 
remembered."2  A  modern  writer  says  that  Buchanan  acted  as  "a  tool  of 
the  slave  power,"  and  that  the  veto  message  was  "perhaps  the  most  irra- 
tional, ill-conceived  and  amazingly  inaccurate  veto  message  that  has  ever 
emanated  from  an  American  President."3 

The  message  may  properly  be  called  labored  and  in  some  places 
specious,  for  it  never  mentioned  the  real  reasons  for  the  veto;  but  neither 
did  the  framers  of  the  bill  publicize  their  real  reasons  for  pushing  it  through. 
It  was  actually  framed  to  draw  a  veto  and  embarrass  the  president,  for 
Buchanan  had  earlier  made  public  his  antagonism  to  its  provisions.  The 
fundamental  purpose  was  to  manufacture  Republican  votes  in  the  1860 
election  and  new  Republican  states  thereafter.  No  one  doubted  that  any 
party  which  offered  free  land  to  small  fanners  would  gain  favor  principally 
in  the  North  and  among  antislavery  people  in  general.  As  had  been  shown 
in  Kansas,  these  would  inundate  the  new  region  and,  in  the  continuing 
uncertainty  about  the  controls  over  slavery,  might  well  reopen  the  half- 
healed  wounds  of  Kansas.  Buchanan  thought  that  the  worst  thing  he  could 
possibly  do  at  this  moment  would  be  to  encourage  a  frenzied  migration  into 
the  new  West.  That  had  been  the  mistake  of  the  Kansas-Nebraska  Bill  and 
he  aimed  not  to  repeat  it. 

He  interpreted  the  Homestead  Bill  as  a  Republican  effort  to  reacti- 
vate the  slavery  furor,  a  demagogic  device  to  buy  northern  votes  with  public 
treasure,  and  a  cheat  because  it  would  give  mainly  to  northerners  land 
which  had  been  acquired  in  great  part  through  the  sacrifice  of  southerners 
during  the  Mexican  war.  In  the  end  even  the  northern  farmers  would  be 
cheated,  Buchanan  believed,  for  as  the  bill  had  been  written,  railroad 
promoters  would  wind  up  with  most  of  the  land.  He  paid  dearly  for  the 
veto,  for  it  placed  the  Administration  in  the  position  of  condemning  the 
West  to  stagnation  and  of  trampling  the  wishes  of  northern  freemen  to 
gratify  the  South.  It  hurt  Douglas,  and  it  gave  the  Republicans  the  chance 
to  stand  as  champions  of  free  workingmen  and  free  farmers,  a  combination 

346 


MR.  LINCOLN  IS  ELECTED  •   1860 


hitherto  the  backbone  of  northern  Democracy.  The  veto  may  well  have 
elected  Lincoln.  But  if  Buchanan  had  signed  the  bill,  he  would  have 
repudiated  his  whole  presidential  policy  by  endorsing  a  measure  that  he 
thought  fiscally  unsound,  sectional  in  its  benefits,  productive  of  renewed 
slavery  agitation,  condemned  by  his  own  party  platform,  and  formally 
sponsored  by  the  Republicans. 


HOW  TO  STOP  LINCOLN 

After  Congress  adjourned,  many  of  the  Democrats  lingered  to  try  once 
again  to  achieve  union  between  the  Douglas  and  Breckinridge  men.  The 
Administration  or  Breckinridge  wing  of  the  party  succeeded  in  persuading 
Senator  Benjamin  Fitzpatrick  to  surrender  his  place  as  vice-presidential 
candidate  on  the  Douglas  ticket  and  promised  that  if  Douglas,  too,  would 
quit  the  race,  both  Breckinridge  and  Lane  would  withdraw,  and  a  new 
nomination  would  be  sought.  To  induce  Fitzpatrick  to  make  the  initial 
sacrifice,  the  Buchaneers  suggested  that  he  might  very  well  be  selected  as 
the  ultimate  presidential  nominee,  in  recognition  of  his  disinterested 
patriotism.  But  Douglas  would  not  retire,  and  his  managers  soon  named 
Herschel  V.  Johnson  of  Georgia  to  take  the  place  of  Fitzpatrick. 

Buchanan's  hope  from  this  point  on  lay  in  working  out  such 
fusion  tickets  in  various  states  as  might  possibly  prevent  an  election  and 
throw  the  decision  to  the  House  of  Representatives.  No  other  plan 
promised  the  slightest  chance  of  defeating  Lincoln.  He  wondered  whether 
he  had  not  erred  in  refusing  to  support  Douglas  at  Charleston.  Here  had 
been  the  great  opportunity  for,  although  nominating  Douglas  would  not 
have  kept  the  Gulf  States  from  walking  out  and  naming  their  own  candidate, 
it  might  have  united  the  border  states  back  of  the  Little  Giant.  These  states, 
if  they  voted  en  bloc,  could  triumph  over  the  Yankee  North  and  the  fire- 
eating  South.  Douglas,  with  Administration  support,  stood  a  good  chance 
of  capturing  161  electoral  votes.  It  took  152  to  win. 

That  chance  had  now  gone  by.  Douglas  would  squander  his 
strength  where  Lincoln  was  stronger;  his  prospects  were  hopeless.  Breckin- 
ridge would  command  the  whole  South  and  just  might  get  Pennsylvania 
and  the  Far  West,  a  combination  that  would  produce  146  electoral  votes- 
enough  to  spike  Lincoln  if  either  Douglas  or  Bell  captured  a  few  electors 
from  him.  If  this  happened  and  the  election  went  to  the  House,  it  seemed 
likely  that  a  deadlock  would  ensue.  The  voting  would  be  by  states,  and  it 
would  require  seventeen  states  to  name  a  president.  The  Republicans  had 
only  fifteen;  the  Democrats  could  be  sure  of  only  thirteen;  Douglas  would 
have  one;  Bell,  one;  and  three  states  would  probably  divide  and  not  vote. 

347 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


If  the  House  failed  to  elect,  the  Senate  would  proceed  to  ballot  for  a  vice- 
president  and,  because  of  its  strong  Democratic  majority,  would  un- 
doubtedly choose  Joe  Lane.  He  then  would  take  the  helm,  in  the  absence 
of  a  president.  This  was  a  guessing  game,  to  be  sure,  but  it  was  educated 
guessing  upon  which  the  fate  of  the  nation  seemed  to  depend.  Buchanan 
thought  it  the  best  prospect. 

He  did  not  actively  campaign,  but  stated  his  position  to  a  Breck- 
inridge  rally  in  front  of  the  White  House  on  the  night  of  July  9.  He 
condemned  breaches  of  traditional  procedure  by  both  Democratic  factions. 
Neither  nomination  had  been  according  to  rule  and  therefore,  he  said, 
"every  Democrat  is  at  perfect  liberty  to  vote  as  he  thinks  proper."  He 
planned  to  vote  for  Breckinridge  because  he  believed  that  property  was 
guaranteed  protection  by  the  Constitution,  and  that  this  guarantee  could 
could  not  be  thrown  out  by  a  local  vote  in  a  territory  as  Douglas  claimed. 
He  would  not  interfere  between  the  factions  in  their  state  campaigns.  His 
main  object  was  to  defeat  the  Republicans. 

The  implication  of  this  speech  was  clear.  Buchanan  would  let 
Douglas  do  all  the  damage  he  could  to  Lincoln  in  the  North.  He  would  try 
to  protect  the  southern  vote  for  Breckinridge  and  most  particularly  try  to 
save  Pennsylvania  where  he  still  held  a  strong  working  force.  To  fight 
Douglas  and  Lincoln  would  be  to  scatter  his  strength. 


IMPERIAL  VISITORS 

Buchanan  found  himself  distracted,  in  the  critical  period  between  the 
Charleston  and  Baltimore  Conventions,  by  a  large  delegation  of  Japanese 
dignitaries  who  had  come  to  the  United  States  for  the  signing  of  the  first 
commercial  treaty  to  be  negotiated  by  this  mysterious  Oriental  Empire. 
The  Nipponese  visitors  took  the  country  by  storm.  "They  are  really  a 
curiosity,"  wrote  Harriet  Lane.  "All  the  women  seem  to  run  daft  about 
them."4  Buchanan  held  a  state  dinner  for  them,  arranging  them  in  small 
groups  at  separate  tables  with  one  or  another  of  the  Cabinet.  The  Dutch 
Minister  gave  a  garden  party,  Mrs.  Slidefl  a  matinfie  dansante,  and  others 
plain  receptions.  "And  still,"  said  Mrs.  Cobb,  "curiosity  is  not  satiated." 
At  the  White  House  the  Japanese  left  a  whole  room  full  of  gifts  which  were 
placed  on  exhibit  for  the  edification  of  the  public.6 

No  sooner  had  the  Japanese  left  Washington  than  the  president 
undertook  other  social  responsibilities.  At  the  wedding  of  Madame 
de  Bodisco,  widow  of  the  Russian  Ambassador,  to  a  British  Army  Captain, 
he  gave  the  bride  away.  About  the  same  time  he  learned,  with  a  shock,  that 
his  old  flame,  Mrs.  Craig,  had  married  and  was  now  living  in  Chicago.6 

348 


MR.  LINCOLN  IS  ELECTED  *  1860 


By  midsummer  the  four-year-old  fight  between  Secretary  Floyd 
and  Captain  Montgomery  C.  Meigs  had  reached  the  breaking  point.  Meigs 
had  been  superintending  a  number  of  construction  projects  in  the  Washing- 
ton area,  including  new  wings  and  a  new  dome  for  the  national  capitol. 
He  had  been  entrusted  with  this  work  by  Jefierson  Davis,  Secretary  of  War 
under  Pierce,  and  deserved  his  reputation  as  an  honest  officer.  He  immedi- 
ately ran  into  trouble  with  Floyd  who  tried  to  use  the  supply  contracts  for 
these  enterprises  as  political  favors. 

The  fight  between  Meigs  and  Floyd  eventually  engaged  the 
interest  of  Congress.  The  anti-Administration  legislators  now  framed 
appropriation  bills  to  prevent  the  War  Department  from  spending  money 
on  these  projects  except  through  Meigs.  Buchanan  had  several  times 
listened  patiently  to  the  story  from  both  men  and  had  tried  to  patch  up 
matters,  but  eventually  Meigs  lost  his  temper.  He  wrote  Buchanan  a  letter 
sharply  accusing  Floyd  of  shoddy  practice  and  demanding  that  one  or  the 
other  be  dismissed.  Meigs  had  justice  on  his  side,  but  he  might  have 
realized  that  his  Commander  in  Chief  would  have  considerable  difficulty  in 
removing  his  Secretary  of  War  on  complaint  of  a  Captain  with  a  long  record 
of  insubordination.  Buchanan  agonized  over  this  episode  longer  than  he 
should  have,  considering  the  weight  of  other  matters  crying  for  his  atten- 
tion. At  length  he  dressed  down  Floyd,  but  at  the  same  time  he  agreed  that- 
Meigs  would  have  to  be  transferred.  The  latter  now  entered  the  growing 
ranks  of  those  who  attacked  Buchanan  as  a  pliant  tool  of  the  South,  an 
ingrate,  and  a  corruptionist.  Meigs's  name  had  become  well  known 
throughout  the  country,  and  his  outraged  voice  carried  wide  and  clear, 
assisted  on  its  way  by  Forney's  sympathetic  pen  in  the  Philadelphia  Press.7 

At  the  end  of  August  Buchanan  went  to  Bedford  Springs  for  a 
rest.  The  townspeople  there,  thinking  that  this  might  be  his  last  visit  as 
president,  prepared  a  huge  celebration  for  him.  The  promoters,  who  wished 
to  surprise  Buchanan,  did  not  notify  him  of  the  plans.  He  did  not  arrive  as 
expected  on  Friday  and  the  crowd,  after  a  four-hour  wait,  went  home 
disappointed.  Next  day  he  came  to  the  hotel  without  fanfare  and  promptly 
went  to  bed.8 

During  his  vacation  Buchanan  had  a  serious  private  talk  with  the 
Rev.  William  M.  Paxton  of  the  First  Presbyterian  Church  of  New  York  City 
on  the  subject  of  religion.  Paxton  related  that  the  president  questioned 
him  "closely  as  a  lawyer  would  question  a  witness  upon  all  points  con- 
nected  with  regeneration,  atonement,  repentance,  and  faith."  At  the  end 
of  the  conversation,  Buchanan  said,  "Weil,  sir . . . ,  I  hope  I  am  a  Christian. 
I  think  I  have  much  of  the  experience  which  you  describe,  and  as  soon  as 
I  retire,  I  will  unite  with  the  Presbyterian  Church."  Paxton  asked  him  why 
he  delayed,  to  which  he  replied,  "I  must  delay  for  the  honor  of  religion. 

349 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


If  I  were  to  unite  with  the  church  now,  they  would  say  'hypocrite'  from 

Maine  to  Georgia."9 

Upon  learning  that  the  Prince  of  Wales  planned  a  visit  to  Canada 
in  September,  Buchanan  wrote  to  Victoria  and  suggested  that  her  son 
conclude  his  trip  with  a  tour  of  the  United  States  and  a  stopover  in  Wash- 
ington.  The  <iueen  approved.  The  first  visit  to  the  United  States  of  a 
member  of  the  British  royal  family  created  great  excitement  throughout 
the  country,  but  especially  in  high  social  circles. 

Harriet  wanted  to  have  a  huge  ball  for  the  prince,  but  the  president 
said,  "No  dancing  in  the  White  House,"  and  when  he  spoke  thus,  his 
decision  was  as  irrevocable  as  the  law  of  the  Medes  and  Persians.  He  also 
ordered  Harriet  to  remove  her  picture  from  the  prince's  bedroom  and  put 
it  in  the  library.  The  evening  of  his  arrival,  Buchanan  held  a  grand  state 
dinner.  Toward  the  end  of  it  the  president  grew  fidgety  and  told  the  waiters 
to  hurry  up  the  courses,  for  he  thought  that  young  Edward  Albert  was 
about  to  fall  asleep  at  the  table.  Later  the  guests  played  cards,  a  great 
concession,  since  Buchanan  detested  card  games  and  had  never  before 
allowed  them  in  the  White  House.  At  the  end  of  the  day,  after  the  royal 
party  had  been  accommodated,  Buchanan  discovered  that  all  the  White 
House  beds  were  full  and  he  had  to  sleep  on  a  sofa. 

Next  day  the  prince  toured  the  public  buildings,  appeared  at  a 
public  reception,  and  in  the  afternoon  visited  a  gymnasium  with  Miss  Lane 
where  he  swung  on  the  rings,  climbed  a  rope  ladder,  and  lost  to  Harriet  in 
a  game  of  ninepins.  To  gratify  the  ladies,  Buchanan  arranged  a  party  on 
board  the  revenue  cutter  Harriet  Lane  to  enliven  the  prince's  cruise  to 
Mt.  Vernon.  Gautier  superintended  a  splendid  lunch  on  deck,  and  on  the 
return  voyage  there  was  music  and  dancing.  The  prince  first  led  out  Miss 
Lane  and  as  he  seated  her  at  the  end  of  the  dance  he  was  heard  to  whisper, 
"Now,  Miss  Lane,  who  must  I  dance  with  next?"10 

In  New  York,  where  the  dance  floor  caved  in  during  the  grand 
ball,  Edward  was  rumored  to  have  escaped  the  eye  of  the  Duke  of  Newcastle 
and  to  have  spent  the  night  disporting  himself  riotously  in  the  city's  most 
luxurious  brothels.11 

After  her  son's  return  home,  Victoria  expressed  her  pride  and 
gratification  at  his  reception  and  described  the  visit  as  "an  important  link 
to  cement  two  nations  of  kindred  origin  and  character."12  The  occasion 
seemed  to  symbolize  an  end  to  the  traditional  hatreds  of  Revolutionary  days 
and  marked  the  beginning  of  stronger  Anglo-American  friendship. 

THE  ELECTION  OF  1860 

The  royal  visit  could  scarcely  have  come  at  a  worse  time.   The  most  critical 
election  in  American  history  was  surging  to  its  climax,  and  Buchanan 

350 


MR.  LINCOLN  IS  ELECTED  •  1860 


should  have  been  devoting  all  of  his  time  to  it.  Three  of  the  candidates, 
Lincoln,  Breckinridge  and  Bell,  had  been  following  the  traditional  pro- 
cedure; they  stayed  home  and  said  nothing.  But  Douglas,  though  sick, 
proved  he  was  still  the  same  old  "Steam  engine  in  breeches."  Breaking 
precedent,  he  began  to  stump  the  nation.  Starting  with  a  trip  to  Boston 
on  the  pretense  of  visiting  his  mother,  he  then  carried  his  campaign  all 
through  the  South.  Here  he  boldly  proclaimed  that  the  election  of  Lincoln 
should  give  no  excuse  for  secession,  but  at  the  same  time  he  accused  the 
Breckinridge  and  Lane  partisans  of  being  bent  on  secession  should  Lincoln 
be  elected.  Presumably  he  intended  by  this  means  to  frighten  pro-Union 
southerners  into  voting  for  him  in  preference  to  Breckinridge.  However, 
Douglas  underestimated  southern  hatred  of  his  past  course,  and  sowed 
broadcast  seeds  of  the  very  movement  he  was  trying  to  avert.  By  smearing 
the  Breckinridge  party  with  the  tar  of  secession  he  weakened  Union 
sentiment  in  the  South,  and  he  strengthened  the  secessionists  by  harping 
on  the  probability  of  a  Lincoln  victory. 

William  M.  Browne,  editor  of  the  Administration's  Washington 
Constitution,  wrote  angrily  in  midsummer,  "I  am  almost  crazy  at  the 
shilly-shally,  dilly-dally  policy  being  pursued.  Make  a  holocaust  of 
Douglas  men  and  even  now  build  an  organization  and  elect  Breckin- 
ridge."13 Cobb  thought  the  only  chance  to  defeat  Lincoln  lay  in  the 
withdrawal  of  Douglas.14  Buchanan,  worried  but  calm,  concentrated  his 
efforts  on  control  of  Pennsylvania  whose  electoral  vote  held  most  promise 
of  deciding  the  issue  and  worked  for  an  agreement  that  all  the  Pennsylvania 
electors  would  vote  as  a  unit  for  either  Douglas  or  Breckinridge— whichever 
choice  would  defeat  Lincoln. 

In  late  August  Breckinridge's  home  state  of  Kentucky  defeated 
the  Administration  party's  local  ticket  by  some  22,000  votes  and  plunged 
the  president  in  gloom.  "All  may  perhaps  depend  upon  Penna.,"  Buchanan 
now  wrote.  "Should  Lincoln  be  elected,  I  fear  troubles  enough  though  I 
have  been  doing  all  I  can  by  conversations  to  prevent  them."15  The  October 
elections  in  Pennsylvania  gave  the  governorship  to  Andrew  Gregg  Curtin, 
candidate  of  the  People's  party  which  backed  Lincoln. 

Hope  now  seemed  nearly  dead.  Cobb  told  his  wife  that  Georgia 
would  "not  stand  for  the  election  of  Lincoln.  Regard  that  as  a  fixed  fact."16 
A  few  weeks  later  he  wrote  his  son  that  when  Lincoln  became  president, 
"the  true  remedy  is  to  withdraw  from  the  Union  on  the  4th  of  March. 
As  the  government  passes  into  the  hands  of  the  Abolitionists— we  should 
pass  out.  To  secede  while  the  Government  is  in  the  hands  .of  our  friends 
would  be  wrong  and  unjustifiable."17 

In  the  November  elections,  Lincoln  polled  some  1,800,000  votes 
to  win  over  the  2,800,000  votes  of  the  combined  opposition.  He  would 
get  180  electoral  votes;  Breckinridge,  72;  Bell,  39;  and  Douglas,  12.  The 

351 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Democrats  got  little  solace  from  the  fact  that  only  39.8  per  cent  of  the 
voters  had  cast  ballots  for  Lincoln.  Even  had  all  the  anti-Lincoln  electoral 
votes  been  concentrated  on  one  candidate,  the  Republicans  would  still 
have  won  in  the  electoral  college.18 

"Lincoln  is  elected  and  we  are  alive  to  tell  it.  J.  B.  must  be  in 
an  agony  of  suspense,"  wrote  Sophie  Plitt  to  Harriet.  In  Georgia  a  hysteri- 
cal politician  cried:  'The  voice  of  the  North  has  proclaimed  at  the  ballot 
box  that  I  should  be  a  slave!  At  the  same  time  I  hear  the  voice  of  God 
command,  'Be  free!  Be  free!'  "19  In  Columbia,  South  Carolina,  Lawrence 
Keitt  orated  hoarsely  at  midnight,  "South  Carolina  will  either  leave  the 
Union  or  else  throw  her  arms  around  the  pillars  of  the  Constitution  and 
involve  all  the  States  in  common  ruin.  Mr.  Buchanan  is  pledged  to 
secession  and  will  be  held  to  it."20  Slidell  wrote  to  the  president  from 
New  Orleans,  "I  deeply  regret  the  embarrassments  which  will  surround 
you  during  the  remainder  of  your  term.  I  need  scarcely  say  that  I  will  do 
everything  in  my  power  to  modify  them . . .  and  to  arrest  any  hostile  action 
during  your  administration.  I  see  no  possibility  of  preserving  the  Union, 
nor  indeed  do  I  consider  it  desireable."21 

Buchanan  retired  to  the  White  House  library  where  he  thumbed 
abstractedly  through  his  Bible  till  he  came  to  Ecclesiastes.  "Vanity  of 
vanities!  All  is  vanity.  What  does  man  gain  by  all  the  toil  at  which 
he  toils?" 


352 


27 

THE  IMPENDING  CRISIS  •  1860 

SPOTLIGHT  ON  CHARLESTON 

South  Carolina  moved  swiftly  after  hearing  the  news  of  Lincoln's  election. 
Her  leaders  had  long  since  proclaimed  that  this  event  would  be  their  signal 
to  withdraw  her  from  the  Union,  and  they  had  taken  public  action  to 
implement  this  threat  in  advance.  On  October  20,  the  Washington  Light 
Infantry  of  Charleston  mobilized,  and  on  the  25th  the  leading  politicians 
of  the  state  met  at  the  Charleston  home  of  Senator  James  H.  Hammond  to 
plan  the  details  of  procedure  for  secession.  By  November  the  machinery  of 
withdrawal  had  been  constructed.  News  of  die  election  of  Lincoln  would 
be  the  only  impulse  needed  to  set  the  wheels  turning. 

The  day  after  election  the  federal  grand  jury  at  Charleston  quit, 
and  all  officers  of  the  federal  district  court  resigned.  Federal  activity 
ceased  in  South  Carolina  except  in  the  post  offices,  the  customhouse,  and 
the  military  posts.  No  one  could  be  charged  with  breaking  federal  law, 
since  there  were  no  federal  courts  to  which  anyone  could  be  brought  for 
trial.  The  resignation  of  court  officers  created  a  kind  of  sit-down  strike 
against  the  federal  authority  for  which,  at  the  moment,  no  constitutional 
remedy  existed. 

Also  on  November  7,  South  Carolina's  Governor  William  H.  Gist 
appealed  to  his  compatriot,  William  H.  Trescot,  Assistant  Secretary  of 
State,  to  find  out  informally  what  action  President  Buchanan  planned  for 
the  federal  forts  around  Charleston.  There  were  four  of  these.  Castle 
Pinckney,  inhabited  only  by  an  old  ordnance  sergeant  and  his  family, 
occupied  a  small  island  well  inside  the  harbor  and  close  to  the  Charleston 
city  docks.  Fort  Johnson  and  Fort  Moultrie  stood  on  tips  of  land  about 
three  miles  apart  which  formed  the  neck  or  entrance  to  the  harbor,  and 
between  them,  in  the  middle  of  the  channel,  was  Fort  Sumter.  Fort 
Johnson,  an  abandoned  barracks  and  hospital  area,  had  no  proper  claim  to 
the  term  "fort."  Sumter,  a  brick  pentagon  fifty  feet  high  resting  on  a  rock 
foundation  no  bigger  than  the  structure,  was  in  the  charge  of  a  lieutenant 

353 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


of  engineers  who  daily  supervised  the  work  of  120  civilian  laborers  engaged 
in  completing  the  interior  construction  of  the  massive  pile.  A  few  cannons 
were  scattered  about  the  parade  ground;  the  fort  contained  no  military 

stores. 

Fort  Moultrie  housed  the  main  defense  command  of  some 
seventy-five  officers  and  men.  It  was  a  strong  work,  well  supplied  with 
heavy  guns  facing  seaward,  but  not  designed  to  repel  an  attack  from  the 
rear.  At  the  moment  it  was  short  on  small  arms;  22,000  of  these  were 
stacked  at  the  federal  arsenal  a  few  blocks  from  the  docks  in  Charleston. 
The  people  of  Charleston  felt  that  they  lay  at  the  mercy  of  these  federal 
forts,  and  the  army  garrison  felt  that  it  was  at  the  mercy  of  the  Charleston 
merchants  who  supplied  the  food.  Here  was  the  recipe  for  trouble. 

Within  twenty-four  hours  after  Lincoln's  election  the  federal 
troops  nearly  ran  into  a  fight  with  the  people  of  Charleston.  Col.  J.  L. 
Gardner,  who  commanded  Fort  Moultrie,  sent  a  squad  of  soldiers  in  civilian 
dress  to  get  some  military  stores  at  the  arsenal.  They  were  in  the  process 
of  loading  boxes  at  a  private  wharf  when  the  owner  ordered  them  off  and 
threatened  to  raise  an  alarm  unless  the  supplies  were  returned.  As  the 
soldiers  wished  to  avoid  a  riot,  they  carried  the  ammunition  back  and 
reported  the  affair  to  their  colonel.  Next  morning  the  mayor  gave  him 
permission  to  load  the  supplies  he  needed,  but  the  colonel  would  not 
acknowledge  the  right  of  the  city  authorities  to  exercise  any  jurisdiction 
over  this  matter. 

Meanwhile,  the  South  Carolinians  telegraphed  W.  H.  Trescot 
to  learn  whether  Gardner  had  acted  on  War  Department  orders.  Trescot 
went  to  the  White  House  and  caught  Floyd,  Cobb  and  Toucey  as  they  were 
leaving  a  Cabinet  meeting.  Floyd  told  him  that  no  orders  had  been  issued 
to  move  ammunition  from  the  arsenal  to  the  fort,  and  none  would  be  given. 
He  had,  in  the  meantime,  sent  Major  Fitz-John  Porter  to  Charleston  to 
observe  conditions  at  first  hand  and  report  back.1 


STRATEGY  AND  TACTICS 

These  events  formed  the  Charleston  background  of  the  important  Cabinet 
meeting  of  November  9.  Buchanan  wished  to  have  Cabinet  advice  on  the 
message  that  he  had  cogitated  for  weeks,  in  anticipation  of  the  situation 
which  now  confronted  the  nation.  He  planned  at  this  point  to  make  dear 
before  the  world  how  little  cause  any  southern  state  had  to  secede  and  to 
portray  the  act  contemplated  by  South  Carolina  as  rash,  foolish,  and  pre- 
cipitate. Buchanan  had  no  great  hope  of  preventing  South  Carolina  from 
adopting  a  secession  ordinance,  but  he  hoped  to  deter  others  from  following 
her,  at  least  during  his  Administration.  No  one  could  properly  charge  him 

354 


THE  IMPENDING  CRISIS  •  1860 


with  hostile  intent  toward  the  South,  and  he  would  keep  this  attitude. 
Secession  in  the  face  of  it  would  throw  the  burden  of  guilt  squarely  on  the 
seceders  and  would  strengthen  the  forces  of  Union  in  both  the  North  and 
the  South.  But  if  Buchanan  assumed  a  menacing  posture  by  threatening 
illegal  executive  action,  this  in  itself  would  add  justification  for  secession, 
strengthen  its  appeal,  and  hasten  its  accomplishment. 

In  addition  to  such  considerations  of  strategy,  Buchanan  had  to 
weigh  the  tactical  military  situation.  For  advice  on  this  he  depended  upon 
Lieutenant  General  Winfield  Scott,  now  aged  seventy-four  and  in  ill-health. 
Scott  had  not  forgotten  insults,  both  real  and  fancied,  that  he  had  suffered 
at  Buchanan's  hands  during  the  Mexican  War  and  the  bitter  political 
campaign  of  1852.  From  his  headquarters  in  New  York  City,  Scott,  on 
October  29,  had  addressed  a  long  communication  to  the  Secretary  of  War 
entitled  "General  Scott's  Views"  on  the  approaching  crisis.  He  sent  a  copy 
to  Buchanan  and  to  others.  "To  save  time,"  Scott  began,  "the  right  of 
secession  may  be  conceded."  He  thought  that  the  president  had  no  power 
to  use  force  to  prevent  any  coastal  state  from  exercising  that  right.  After 
describing  the  horrors  he  anticipated  from  civil  war,  he  added  that  "a 
smaller  evil  would  be  to  allow  the  fragments  of  the  great  Republic  to  form 
themselves  into  new  confederacies." 

This  statement  a  week  before  election,  coming  from  the  com- 
mander of  the  Army,  still  a  towering  national  hero,  could  scarcely  fail  to 
encourage  and  delude  the  southern  ultras.  Buchanan  thought  it  imbecilic 
in  its  ideas  and  highly  improper  politically.  Only  the  final  few  pages  of  the 
"Views"  addressed  themselves  to  the  southern  forts.  Scott  warned  that 
some  rash,  southern  filibuster-type  raid  might  overpower  any  one  of  the 
dozen  forts  scattered  along  the  Atlantic  and  Gulf  coasts.  Few  of  them  were 
manned,  and  not  one  garrisoned  to  the  recommended  strength.  Buchanan 
read  this  with  astonishment  having  assumed  that  it  was  the  general's 
particular  business  to  keep  them  garrisoned  to  the  strength  he  thought 
proper.  "In  my  opinion,"  Scott  concluded,  "all  these  works  should  be 
immediately  so  garrisoned  as  to  make  any  attempt  to  take  any  one  of  them 
by  surprise  or  coup  de  main  ridiculous." 

Scott  suggested  no  means  for  strengthening  the  forts,  but  the 
next  day  he  sent  a  supplement  to  the  "Views"  covering  this  oversight. 
Said  he,  "There  is  one  (regular)  company  at  Boston,  one  here  (at  the 
Narrows),  one  at  Pittsburg,  one  at  Augusta,  Ga.,  and  one  at  Baton  Rouge- 
in  all  five  companies  only,  within  reach,  to  garrison  or  reenforce  the  forts 
mentioned  in  the  'Views.'  "  Although  Buchanan  later  claimed  that  because 
of  their  "strange  and  inconsistent  character"  he  had  dismissed  the  "Views" 
from  his  mind  without  further  consideration,  he  worried  much  about  their 
import  on  his  policy.  He  could  not  replace  Scott,  but  how  far  could  he 
trust  him  if  an  armed  clash  should,  by  some  accident,  occur?  Buchanan 

355 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

feared  the  "Views"  would  convince  the  people  of  the  South  "that  they 
might  secede  without  serious  opposition  from  the  North."2 

The  army  was  in  deplorable  condition  through  no  fault  either  of 
Scott  or  of  Buchanan,  for  both  had  been  continually  calling  upon  Congress 
for  the  means  of  improvement  since  1857.  Some  15,000  men  were  in  active 
service  in  1860,  but  only  1,000  of  these  had  been  assigned  to  the  Department 
of  the  East  at  any  time  during  Buchanan's  presidency.  The  wide-flung 
frontiers  called  desperately  for  more  troops  than  were  ever  available.  To 
withdraw  any  western  company  meant  almost  certain  death  to  the  nearby 
inhabitants,  for  these  military  posts  provided  their  only  protection  against 
hostile  Indians.  General  Scott  told  the  Senate  that  "as  often  as  we  have 
been  obliged  to  withdraw  troops  from  one  frontier  in  order  to  reenforce 
another,  the  weakened  points  have  instantly  been  attacked  or  threatened 
with  formidable  invasion."3  Troops  had  been  moved,  not  only  from  the 
South  but  also  from  every  point  safe  from  Indian  raids,  in  order  to  protect 

the  frontier. 

The  morale  of  the  army  had  suffered  for  years  from  the  excessive 
demands  made  upon  the  soldiers.  Long  marches,  hard  labor,  continued 
Indian  fighting  against  heavy  odds,  and  perpetual  sickness  were  routine. 
Since  there  were  no  replacements,  there  were  no  furloughs. 

Buchanan  urged  Congress  to  make  provisions  for  a  decent  retire- 
ment system  for  disabled  officers,  advocated  laws  to  provide  penalties  for 
assisting  a  deserter,  asked  that  volunteers  be  allowed  to  select  the  branch 
of  service  they  wished  to  join,  and  pleaded  for  a  reform  of  the  system  of 
promotion  which  had  become,  in  fact,  a  system  of  non-promotion;  but 
Congress  rejected  each  of  these  pleas  in  turn.  The  Senate  even  passed  a 
bill  to  decrease  the  pay  of  officers  and  enlisted  men,  but  it  was  buried  in 
the  House.4 

In  1859  and  1860,  the  legislators  rejected  Administration  requests 
for  more  military  funds  and  voted  a  general  cut  in  this  part  of  the  national 
estimates.  When  Buchanan  called  for  an  increase  in  military  man  power 
in  1858,  the  Senate  proposed  an  addition  to  the  regular  army,  and  the 
House  favored  building  up  the  force  temporarily  with  volunteers.  Buchanan 
fought  strongly  for  the  Senate  Bill,  but  only  a  House  measure  which 
restricted  the  use  of  volunteers  to  the  Utah  area  passed.5  This  was  the 
history  of  military  legislation  in  Buchanan's  term,  up  to  the  election  of 
Lincoln.  The  president  believed,  on  the  basis  of  his  past  experience  and 
his  knowledge  of  the  political  temper  of  the  36th  Congress,  that  no  recom- 
mendation for  strengthening  the  army  had  any  prospect  of  being  approved. 
His  policy  necessarily  had  to  take  the  hostile  attitude  of  Congress  into 
consideration. 

The  navy  was  in  somewhat  better  shape.  Although  twenty-three 
ships  were  on  foreign  duty,  the  home  squadron  was  in  1860  exceedingly 

356 


THE  IMPENDING  CRISIS  •  1860 

large*  Twenty-three  warships  and  forty-five  steamers  cruised  the  eastern 
waters  or  lay  at  anchor  at  Boston,  New  York,  Annapolis,  and  Norfolk.6 
These  would  form  an  important  deterrent  to  southern  rashness  and  a  firm 
argument  against  attacks  on  the  coastal  forts.  These  tactical  facts  Buchanan 
carried  with  h™  into  the  Cabinet  meeting  of  November  9. 

The  Cabinet  was  no  longer  the  confident,  comradely  body  that 
had  earlier  stood  in  awe  of  the  Chief  and  united  back  of  his  policies.  Cobb 
and  Thompson  had  already  decided  that  their  active  future  must  lie  with 
their  states,  but  Buchanan  expected  that  they  would  use  their  influence  to 
delay  the  threatened  secession  of  Georgia  and  Mississippi  until  after 
March  4.  Floyd  had  no  patience  or  sympathy  with  the  secessionists  and 
might  have  helped  Buchanan,  except  for  the  personal  difficulties  that  had 
arisen  between  them. 

During  the  Mormon  War  Floyd  had  hired  the  firm  of  Russell, 
Majors  and  Waddell  to  transport  supplies  for  the  army.  Congress  would 
not  appropriate  money  until  the  job  was  done,  and  the  firm  could  not 
complete  the  task  without  an  advance,  because  it  had  tied  up  its  funds  in 
other  ventures.  Floyd,  therefore,  received  bills  from  the  company  for 
services  not  yet  performed,  signed  or  "accepted"  them,  and  returned  them 
to  the  company  to  use  as  collateral  for  loans.  Floyd  assumed  that  Congress 
would  meet  the  obligation  by  passing  deficiency  bills  at  the  end  of  the 
session.  In  1859  Buchanan  asked  Floyd  by  what  law  he  issued  the  accept- 
ances. Floyd  replied  there  was  no  law,  but  the  procedure  had  always  been 
used  in  emergencies.  "Well,"  replied  the  president,  "discontinue  it  at 
once.  If  there  is  no  law  for  it,  it  is  against  the  law."7  The  two  had  many 
disagreements.  Buchanan  had  on  several  occasions  rebuked  Floyd  for  being 
careless  with  Department  funds,  and  Floyd  had  become  sullen  and  bitter. 

Joseph  Holt  of  Kentucky  now  served  as  Postmaster  General.  He, 
with  Black  and  Cass,  represented  the  outspoken  Union  element  in  the 
Cabinet.  Cass,  usually  lethargic,  aroused  himself  to  active  participation 
in  Cabinet  discussion  on  the  preservation  of  the  Union.  While  these  three 
agreed  on  the  need  for  a  firm  stand  against  secession,  they  did  not  get  along 
well  personally.  Black  had  a  light  spirit  and  a  keen  sense  of  humor,  but 
Holt  was  dour,  bitter  and  unhappy.  Cass  mildly  resented  Black's  increasing 
influence  in  the  Cabinet  and  his  tendency  to  meddle  in  the  affairs  of  other 
Departments.  Mild-mannered  Toucey  got  along  with  everybody.  He  held 
no  sympathy  for  secession,  but  he  considered  a  civil  war  to  be  a  worse 
catastrophe  and  inclined  to  whatever  policy  seemed  most  likely  to  avert  an 
armed  collision.  Thus  the  Cabinet,  by  the  fall  of  1860,  had  lost  both  its 
old  political  unity  and  its  personal  esprit  de  corps. 

Buchanan  told  his  Department  Heads  on  November  9  that  "the 
business  of  the  meeting  was  the  most  important  ever  before  the  Cabinet 
since  his  induction  into  office."  The  question  at  issue  was  "the  course  to 

357 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


pursue  in  relation  to  the  threatening  aspect  of  affairs  in  the  South,  and 
most  particularly  in  South  Carolina."8  Two  days  earlier  Buchanan  had 
conferred  with  Floyd  about  the  danger  of  attack  on  the  Charleston  forts, 
and  had  told  him  that  "if  those  forts  should  be  taken  by  South  Carolina  in 
consequence  of  our  neglect  to  put  them  in  defensible  condition,  it  were 
better  for  you  and  me  both  to  be  thrown  into  the  Potomac  with  millstones 
tied  about  our  necks."9  Black  now  "earnestly  urged  sending  at  once  a 
strong  force  into  the  forts  at  Charleston  Harbor,  enough  to  deter  if  possible 
the  people  from  any  attempt  at  disunion."10  Buchanan  assured  him  that 
he  intended  to  protect  the  forts  and  had  already  instructed  Floyd  to  supply 
them  with  such  provisions,  arms,  and  men  as  were  necessary.  He  then 
asked  the  question  uppermost  in  his  mind:  how  to  prevent  general  seces- 
sion, at  least  during  lie  remainder  of  his  Administration? 

Buchanan  thought  that  only  a  constitutional  convention  could 
override  Congressional  politics,  bring  popular  sentiment  to  the  forefront, 
and  succeed  in  averting  disunion.  But  should  such  a  policy  be  immediately 
proposed  by  proclamation,  or  should  it  form  the  theme  of  the  presidential 
message  in  December?  The  Cabinet  split  on  both  the  proposal  and  the 
alternate  methods  of  publicizing  it. 

As  the  meeting  broke  up,  W.  H,  Trescot  brought  news  of  Gardner's 
abortive  effort  to  remove  arms  and  ammunition  from  the  arsenal  at  Charles- 
ton.   Buchanan  now  conferred  with  Black  and  asked  him  to  investigate  the 
legal  powers  of  the  president  to  deal  with  secession  and  state  opposition  to 
federal  law.    At  the  Cabinet  meeting  of  the  10th  to  discuss  the  problems 
raised  by  the  Gardner  incident,  Buchanan  declared  his  intention  to  state 
in  his  message  that  he  would  not  acknowledge  any  "right"  of  secession 
and  would  protect  federal  property.    Cass,  Black,  Holt  and  Toucey  thought 
this  a  sound  position,  but  Cobb,  Thompson,  and  Floyd  thought  it  too  strong 
and  wanted  to  consider  the  more  immediate  question  of  the  arsenal  incident. 
Floyd  had  talked  to  Fitz-John  Porter,  who  had  just  returned  from  Charleston 
with  the  suggestion  that  new  commanders  be  assigned  to  Fort  Moultrie  and 
the  arsenal.    The  Cabinet  agreed  to  send  Major  Robert  Anderson,  a  former 
native  of  Charleston,  to  replace  the  aged  Col.  Gardner  and  to  put  Col. 
Benjamin  Huger,  a  Carolinian,  in  charge  of  the  arsenal.    The  government 
would  thus  gain  a  more  alert  command  and  at  the  same  time  demonstrate 
to  the  Charlestonians  by  these  appointments  the  needlessness  of  their  fears 
of  any  attack  on  them.    General  Scott  sent  orders  effecting  these  changes 
on  November  15. 

Buchanan  talked  with  Black  about  his  investigations  of  the  legal 
powers  of  the  executive  and  soon  discovered  that  the  Attorney  General  had 
drawn  up  a  set  of  policy  recommendations  for  a  president  faced  with 
secession.  Buchanan  rather  tartly  told  him  that  he  had  not  requested 
advice  but  information.  What  legal  powers  had  the  president?  Black  then 

358 


THE  IMPENDING  CRISIS  •   I860 

asked  Buchanan  to  define  exactly  what  he  did  want,  and  the  two  framed  a 
set  of  questions.  Black  wrote  them  down  and,  in  order  to  avoid  any  mistake 
and  fix  responsibility,  had  Buchanan  endorse  them  in  his  own  hand.  The 
questions  were: 

1.  In  case  of  a  conflict  between  the  authorities  of  any  State  and 
those  of  the  United  States,  can  there  be  any  doubt  that  the  laws 
of  the  Federal  Government ...  are  supreme? 

2.  What  is  the  extent  of  my  official  power  to  collect  duties  on 
imports  at  a  port  where  the  revenue  laws  are  resisted  by  a  force 
which  drives  the  collector  from  the  custom  house? 

3.  What  right  have  I  to  defend  the  public  property  (for  instance, 
a  fort,  arsenal,  and  navy  yard),  in  case  it  should  be  assaulted? 

4.  What  are  the  legal  means  at  my  disposal  for  executing  those 
laws  of  the  United  States  which  are  usually  administered  through 
the  courts  and  their  officers? 

5.  Can  a  military  force  be  used  for  any  purpose  whatever  under 
the  Acts  of  1795  and  1807,  within  the  limits  of  a  State  where  there 
are  no  judges,  marshal  or  other  civil  officers?11 

To  these  questions  Black  replied  on  November  20.  First,  a  state, 
while  still  in  the  Union,  could  not  absolve  her  citizens  from  obedience  to 
laws  of  the  United  States.  Second,  federal  law  required  the  president  to 
collect  import  duties  at  specified  points.  A  collector,  if  denied  the  use  of 
buildings  at  the  port,  could  collect  duties  from  the  deck  of  a  government 
vessel  in  the  harbor.  Third,  the  president  had  a  clear  duty  to  protect  public 
property,  a  duty  which  included  the  right  of  recapture  if  the  property  had 
been  unlawfully  taken  by  another. 

The  last  two  questions  proved  more  difficult.  Black  thought  them 
"of  the  greatest  practical  importance,"  for  they  involved  the  executive  use 
of  the  army  to  enforce  federal  law  in  a  case  where  no  state  or  federal  officer 
asked  for  any  help  or  made  any  complaint  that  a  law  had  been  violated.  In 
this  respect  the  case  differed  markedly  from  the  Whiskey  Rebellion  or  from 
the  Nullification  affair  of  1832.  Black  found  that  the  act  of  1807  merely 
authorized  the  use  of  military  force  in  cases  "where  it  is  lawful,"  This  was 
no  help.  The  Act  of  1795  provided  that  the  militia  could  be  called  "when- 
ever the  laws  of  the  United  States  shall  be  opposed  ...  by  any  State,  by 
combinations  too  powerful  to  be  suppressed  by  the  ordinary  course  of 
judicial  proceedings."  It  was  up  to  the  president  to  decide  when  such  a 
condition  existed.  Buchanan  could  readily  have  mobilized  militia  to 
achieve  enforcement  of  federal  laws  under  this  statute,  but  he  would  have 
had  to  use  the  troops  first  against  Massachusetts,  Wisconsin  and  the  other 
northern  states  whose  Personal  Liberty  Laws  had  undermined  enforcement 
of  the  federal  Fugitive  Slave  Act.  These  states  had  committed  overt  acts 

359 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

of  defiance;  South  Carolina  as  yet  had  not.  The  president  could  not  march 
against  people  who  only  talked  against  the  federal  government,  ignoring 
states  which  had  for  years  been  actively  obstructing  the  course  of  federal 

law. 

Black  cautioned  Buchanan  that  the  "whole  spirit  of  our  system" 
was  opposed  to  any  method  of  law  enforcement  other  than  that  of  the 
courts,  "except  in  cases  of  extreme  necessity."  The  resignation  of  federal 
officers  did  not  constitute  such  necessity  and  did  not  give  legal  cause  to 
send  troops.  "You  can  use  force  only  to  repel  an  assault  on  the  public 
property,"  he  said.  If  revenue  could  not  be  collected  and  the  laws  executed 
by  normal  means,  Congress  would  have  to  legislate  new  means.  Black 
advised  Buchanan  that  if  a  state  tried  to  secede,  he  should  try  to  execute 
the  laws  only  by  means  clearly  provided  by  federal  statute  and  should 
assume  that  "the  present  constitutional  relations  between  the  States  and 
the  Federal  Government  continue  to  exist  until  a  new  code  of  laws  shall  be 
established  either  by  force  or  by  law."  The  general  government  had  a 
right  to  preserve  itself  by  repelling  "a  direct  and  positive  aggression  upon 
its  property  or  its  officers,"  but,  he  concluded,  "this  is  a  totally  different 
thing  from  an  offensive  war,  to  punish  the  people  for  the  political  misdeeds 
of  their  State  Government."12 

Both  the  Cabinet  and  the  country  debated  the  problems  of  the 
"right  of  secession"  and  the  "coercion  of  a  state,"  questions  which  probed 
to  the  very  root  of  the  federal  idea.  The  southerners  generally  assumed  a 
"right"  to  secede  and  denounced  coercion,  as  was  to  be  expected.  But  it 
was  remarkable  that  many  northern  journalists,  including  leading 
Republican  editors,  agreed  with  this  view  and  for  six  weeks  after  the 
election  of  Lincoln  contended  that  the  principle  of  government  by  the 
consent  of  the  governed  made  secession  a  natural  right.  Horace  Greeley 
editorialized  on  November  9,  "We  hope  never  to  live  in  a  Republic  whereof 
one  section  is  pinned  to  the  residue  by  bayonets."13 

Curiosity  about  Lincoln's  ideas  ran  high,  but  he  said  very  little, 
and  that  little  augmented  sectional  tension.  On  October  23  Lincoln  told 
a  southern  editor  that  he  would  not  "disclaim  all  intention  to  interfere 
with  slaves  or  slavery  in  the  states."14  In  mid-November  he  said  in  a 
public  speech  that  he  welcomed  a  "practical  test"  of  the  issue  of  State 
Rights  and  was  "glad  of  this  military  preparation  in  the  South."  It  would, 
he  thought,  tend  to  unite  southern  Unionists.15  Pennsylvania  Republi- 
cans assured  the  president-elect  that  although  Republicans  would  be  in  a 
minority  in  Congress,  "the  Union  element  of  the  South  will  naturally  act 
with  us."16  Buchanan  considered  such  optimistic  views  completely  at 
odds  with  reality. 

Getting  no  leadership  or  policy  statement  from  Lincoln,  the 
country  anxiously  speculated  on  Buchanan's  forthcoming  message.  The 

360 


THE  IMPENDING  CRISIS  •   1860 


president  kept  very  quiet  about  it,  refusing  as  late  as  November  28  to  send 
an  advance  copy  to  his  confidential  friend,  Hiram  Swarr.  "The  circum- 
stances of  the  Country,"  he  wrote,  "require  the  retention  of  the  message, 
for  possible  modification,  up  to  the  latest  hour."17  But  Buchanan  did  tell 
a  group  of  secessionists  exactly  where  he  stood.  In  a  long  conference  at 
the  White  House  during  the  third  week  of  November,  he  said  that  he  would 
deny  any  "right"  of  secession  and  oppose  it  strongly.  He  assured  the 
southerners  that  the  "mighty  West"  would  never  permit  the  closing  of  the 
mouth  of  the  Mississippi  by  a  foreign  power,  which  would  be  the  case  if 
Louisiana  tried  to  withdraw.  "South  Carolina,"  he  said,  "wishes  to  enter 
into  a  conflict  with  me — a  conflict  with  myself — and  upon  the  "drawing  of 
the  first  drop  of  blood  to  drag  other  Southern  States  into  the  secession 
movement."  Buchanan  admitted  that  the  South  had  suffered  ill-treatment 
at  the  hands  of  the  North,  but  he  said  that  these  wrongs  did  not  yet  con- 
stitute just  cause  for  disunion.  He  planned  first  to  "appeal  to  the  North 
for  justice  to  the  South,"  and  if  it  was  denied,  "then,"  said  he  emphatically, 
"I  am  with  them."  But  terminating  the  interview,  he  cautioned  his  visitors 
that  the  recent  flamboyant  statements  of  Keitt  and  Yancey  to  the  effect 
that  he  was  "pledged  to  secession"  were  entirely  false,  and  that  the  South 
ought  not  to  assume  any  sympathy  for  secession  from  the  Administration.18 

THE  PRESIDENT  PROPOSES 

Buchanan  sent  his  message  to  Congress  on  December  3.  In  it  he  placed 
the  blame  for  the  crisis  squarely  on  the  northern  antislavery  agitators  and 
warned  them  that  unless  they  left  the  slave  states  alone,  disunion  would  be 
inevitable.  One  hah0  the  nation  would  not  live  "habitually  and  perpetually 
insecure,"  and  only  those  who  had  threatened  to  bathe  the  South  in  blood 
could  dissipate  the  fears  they  had  aroused.  The  southerners,  on  the  other 
hand,  had  no  excuse  to  break  up  the  Union  because  a  president  they  dis- 
trusted had  been  legally  elected.  Even  if  Lincoln  intended  to  usurp  un- 
constitutional powers  and  attack  the  South,  which  Buchanan  doubted,  he 
could  not  do  so  because  the  other  branches  of  the  government  would 
restrain  him.  The  Republicans,  with  a  minority  president,  a  minority  in 
both  houses  of  Congress,  and  a  minority  on  the  Supreme  Court,  had  not 
the  strength  to  act  rashly  unless  the  southerners  withdrew. 

He  counselled  the  South  not  to  secede  from  "apprehensions  of 
contingent  danger  in  the  future."  Only  "some  overt  and  dangerous  act" 
of  the  new  president  would  justify  their  resistance,  and  previous  resistance 
would  be  revolution.  "Let  us  wait  for  the  overt  act,"  he  urged.  In  the 
meantime,  he  would  charge  the  president-elect  to  do  common  justice  to 
the  South  and  try  to  force  a  clear  expression  of  intent  from  him.  Let 
Lincoln's  party  faithfully  execute  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law  in  the  states  where 

361 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Republicans  held  sway.  Should  Lincoln  refuse  to  do  this  duty,  then  he 
would  have  "wilfully  violated'*  the  Constitution.  In  that  event,  "the 
injured  States  .  .  .  would  be  justified  in  revolutionary  resistance  to  the 
government  of  the  Union." 

But  even  in  such  an  eventuality,  there  could  be  no  "right  of 
secession."  The  government  of  the  United  States  was  intended  to  be 
perpetual  and  had  the  duty  to  preserve  itself.  The  framers  had  not  com. 
mitted  the  "absurdity  of  providing  for  its  own  dissolution."  "Let  us  look 
the  danger  fairly  in  the  face.  Secession  is  neither  more  nor  less  than 
revolution.  It  may  or  may  not  be  a  justifiable  revolution;  but  still  it  is 

revolution." 

And  what  ought  the  president  do  about  the  crisis?  He  had  taken 
an  oath  to  execute  the  laws,  but  in  South  Carolina  no  machinery  now 
existed  for  administration  of  the  laws.  Such  machinery  could  be  re- 
established only  by  new  laws  or  by  the  dictatorial  use  of  military  force. 
No  statute  gave  the  president  power  to  use  force  against  South  Carolina. 
Did  the  Constitution  give  Congress  power  to  "coerce  a  State  into  sub- 
mission?"  Buchanan  answered  "that  the  power  to  make  war  against  a 

State  is  at  variance  with  the  whole  spirit  and  intent  of  the  Constitution 

We  could  not,  by  physical  force,  control  the  will  of  the  people  and  compel 
them  to  elect  senators  and  representatives  to  Congress.  .  .  .  Our  Union 
rests  upon  public  opinion,  and  can  never  be  cemented  by  the  blood  of  its 
citizens  shed  in  civil  war.  If  it  cannot  live  in  the  affections  of  the  people 
it  must  one  day  perish.  Congress  possesses  many  means  of  preserving  it 
by  conciliation;  but  the  sword  was  not  placed  in  their  hand  to  preserve  it 
by  force." 

Buchanan  then  defined  the  program  he  wished  Congress  to 
implement.  Let  Congress  call  a  constitutional  convention  into  being,  or 
recommend  that  the  several  state  legislatures  issue  the  call.  This  con- 
vention ought  to  devise  an  explanatory  amendment  to  the  Constitution  on 
three  points: 

1.  An  express  recognition  of  the  right  of  property  in  slaves  in 
the  States  where  it  now  exists  or  may  hereafter  exist. 

2.  The  duty  of  protecting  this  right  in  all  the  common  Territories 
throughout  their  territorial  existence,  and  until  they  shall  be 
admitted  as  States  into  the  Union,  with  or  without  slavery,  as 
their  constituents  may  prescribe. 

3.  A  like  recognition  of  the  right  of  the  master  to  have  his"slave, 
who  has  escaped  from  one  State  to  another,  restored  and  'delivered 
up9  to  him. 

This  procedure,  said  the  president,  "ought  to  be  tried  .  .  .  before  any  of 
these  States  shall  separate  themselves  from  the  Union."19 

362 


THE  IMPENDING  CRISIS  •   I860 


The  message  commanded  praise  or  censure  from  the  press,  de- 
pending upon  the  party  of  the  editor;  but  the  condemnation  of  it  rang  much 
more  loudly  than  the  applause  for  Buchanan  pulled  the  checkrein  on  both 
of  the  major  contending  groups,  and  both  reacted  angrily  to  the  bit.  The 
Lincoln  journals  commented  that  never  had  a  message  been  "cast  aside 
with  such  unqualified  disappointment,"  and  roundly  condemned  Bu- 
chanan's efforts  to  fix  blame  for  the  trouble  on  the  abolitionists  as  a  deadly 
insult,  a  "brazen  lie,"  and  an  "atrocious"  perversion  of  the  truth.20  The 
Breckinridge  sheets  considered  the  message  a  "calm,  patriotic,  consistent 
and  convincing"  statement  of  the  problem,  characterized  by  "energy, 
decision  and  moderation."21  The  Douglas  papers  generally  agreed  that 
Buchanan  had  been  exactly  right  in  "attributing  the  present  unfortunate . . . 
condition  of  the  country  to  the  general  Abolition  agitation,"  but  they 
picked  for  their  target  the  "absurd"  proposition  that  secession  was  un- 
constitutional but  that  no  constitutional  remedy  existed  to  prevent  it. 

The  newspaper  discussions  of  this  apparent  paradox  ranged  from 
rant  through  metaphysics.  Buchanan,  however,  had  merely  stated  an 
inescapable  fact:  admittedly,  there  was  a  flaw  in  the  structure,  and  the 
condition  would  exist  until  remedied  by  some  revision  of  the  Constitution. 
Black  had  heard  Buchanan  reply  scores  of  times  to  southerners  who  urged 
a  "right"  of  secession,  "I  find  no  such  right  laid  down  in  the  Constitution." 
To  northern  advocates  of  "coercion"  (presumably  an  executive  order  for 
the  armed  invasion  of  a  state  in  the  absence  of  any  call  for  help  or  declara- 
tion of  war  by  Congress)  Buchanan  answered  with  equivalent  words. 
Neither  secession  nor  coercion  were  comprehended  in  the  federal  Constitu- 
tion, and  to  say  so  was  not  the  mere  partisan  expression  of  one  president.22 

A  CHALLENGE  TO  MR.  LINCOLN 

While  the  message  failed  to  convince  anyone  to  think  or  act  very  diflFerently, 
it  placed  Lincoln  and  the  Republican  party  in  difficulty.  No  cause  justified 
breaking  the  Union,  Buchanan  said,  except  continued  overt  defiance  of  the 
Constitution.  The  North,  not  the  South,  had  for  ,years  been  practicing 
such  defiance  by  its  Personal  Liberty  Laws.  Unless  the  northern  states 
repealed  these,  the  South  would  be  equally  justified  in  ignoring  or  defying 
the  constitutional  compact.  Buchanan  challenged  the  Republicans  to 
clean  their  own  house  before  raising  the  question  of  obedience  to  federal 
law.  The  northern  states,  he  accused,  actively  defied  the  Constitution;  so 
far  South  Carolina  only  threatened  action.  Now  it  was  Lincoln's  move. 

Buchanan  also  challenged  the  Republicans  to  agree  to  a  national 
constitutional  convention.  If  Lincoln  rejected  this  proposal,  he  rejected 
the  whole  basis  of  the  constitutional  system  and  took  the  position  that  he 
did  not  actually  want  a  solution  based  on  the  will  of  the  public.  Lincoln 

363 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


would  have  to  endorse  a  convention  or  appear  to  admit  publicly  that  his 
minority  party  dared  not  risk  using  traditional  procedures.  Buchanan 
hoped  that  his  message  would  force  the  Republicans  to  face  the  question 
of  a  constitutional  convention  and  to  elicit  from  Lincoln  some  clear  state- 
ment  concerning  it. 

But  the  Republicans,  divided  among  themselves,  chose  to  treat 
Buchanan's  challenge  as  an  insulting  political  trick  designed  to  destroy 
them,  and  they  declined  to  respond  to  it.  One  historian  has  noted  that 
while  it  was  perfectly  clear  that  the  Democrats  had  lost  the  election,  "there 
was  still  grave  doubt  as  to  who  had  won  it."23  Wendell  Phillips  wrote, 
"Lincoln  is  in  place,  Garrison  in  power'9  Who  controlled  the  Republican 
party:  Seward  and  Weed,  the  radical  abolitionists,  the  shrewd  political 
mavericks  like  Cameron  and  Blair,  the  old  Constitutional  Whigs,  or  Lincoln 
and  the  westerners?  Would  Lincoln  run  the  party,  or  would  someone  else 
run  Lincoln?  As  no  one  had  the  answers  to  these  questions,  each  Re- 
publican group  laid  its  own  plans  to  bring  Lincoln  into  camp.  Lincoln 
became  the  key  figure,  the  target  of  conquest  within  his  own  party,  the 
man  to  whom  the  country  looked  for  a  statement  of  the  Republican  program 
to  meet  the  crisis. 

In  the  absence  of  any  word  from  Lincoln,  Republican  spokesmen 
published  all  sorts  of  contradictory  proposals.  The  Pennsylvanians  re- 
ported that  the  state  was  "thoroughly  anti-abolitionist,"  and  wanted  no 
Negro  issue  raised.  They  were  Republican  only  because  of  the  tariff,  and 
would  support  Buchanan's  proposed  amendments  on  the  slave  question, 
if  a  vote  should  be  taken,  by  a  majority  of  two  to  one.24  The  radicals,  like 
Senator  Lyxnan  Trumbull  of  Illinois,  told  Lincoln:  "Republicans  have  no 
concession  to  make  or  compromise  to  offer.  ...  It  is  impolitic  even  to 
discuss  making  them."  These  men  sought  to  prevent  getting  up  any 
convention  or  Congressional  committee  or  private  parley  to  discuss  the 
crisis.  "Proposing  new  Compromises,"  Trumbull  said,  "is  an  admission 
that  to  conduct  the  government  on  the  principles  on  which  we  carried  the 
election  would  be  wrong.  Inactivity  and  a  land  spirit  is  ...  all  that  is  left 
for  us  to  do,  till  the  4th  of  March."  Congress  ought  to  £ive  no  power  to 
Buchanan,  for  he  would  not  know  how  to  use  it.25  Congressman  E.  B. 
Washburne  agreed  that  "what  we  want  most  is  a  'masterly  inactivity,' " 
but  he  warned  Lincoln  that  the  people  in  Illinois  had  not  the  faintest  con- 
ception of  the  depth  of  secession  feeling.26 

Friends  of  Douglas  reported  to  Lincoln  that  the  Little  Giant  had 
said,  "All  government  is  coercion,  and  I  go  in  for  asserting  this  principle 
at  every  hazard.  Rather  a  million  men  should  fall  on  the  battlefield,  than 
that  this  gov't  should  lose  one  Single  State."27  But  a  Chicago  delegate 
thought  that  "we  can  consent  to  no  secession,  and  yet  we  must  avoid  any 

364 


THE  IMPENDING  CRISIS  •   1860 


collision" — queer  doctrine  for  a  Republican  who  denounced  Buchanan's 


Republican  Governor  E.  D.  Morgan  of  New  York  urged  Lincoln 
to  come  out  strongly  in  favor  of  the  acquisition  of  Cuba  in  order  to  gain 
the  support  of  pro-Union  Democrats.29  Thurlow  Weed,  Seward's  spokes* 
man,  recommended  that  Republicans  approve  the  extension  of  the  Missouri 
Compromise  line  to  the  Pacific.  John  Sherman  and  other  Republicans  in 
Congress  applauded  this  suggestion.  David  Kilgore  of  Indiana  proposed 
that  the  federal  government  should  pay  compensation  to  owners  of  fugitive 
slaves.  Eli  Thayer  of  Massachusetts  thought  a  reapplication  of  popular 
sovereignty  in  the  territories  would  end  the  trouble.  Sherman,  after 
getting  no  support  on  the  Missouri  Compromise  proposal,  asked  Congress  to 
admit  all  territories  immediately  as  states,  thus  ending  the  national  phase 
of  the  slavery  controversy.30 

These  diverse  suggestions  to  Lincoln  gradually  tended  to  define 
two  distinct  elements  of  the  Republican  party:  those  who  favored  a  con- 
ciliatory policy  and  admitted  the  necessity  of  some  compromise  and  those 
who  rejected  compromise  and  wished  to  avoid  any  discussion  about  it.  The 
first  group,  led  by  Seward  and  Weed,  hoped  to  attract  the  northern  and 
western  Democrats  and  border-state  Whigs  by  the  compromise  policy. 
The  radical  group,  led  by  Lyman  Trumbull,  Ben  Wade,  and  the  eastern 
abolitionists  thought  compromise  would  wreck  the  party,  and  that  the 
secession  threat  was  only  a  bluff.  It  might  even  be  good- riddance  and 
strengthen  the  nation  to  part  company  with  South  Carolina  and  a  few  of 
the  Gulf  black-belt  states.  But  no  one  knew  who  spoke  for  the  Republicans 
until  Lincoln  made  his  choice. 

"There  is  only  one  man  in  the  United  States  who  has  it  in  his 
power  to  restore  the  country  to  its  happy  and  prosperous  condition,"  wrote 
the  New  York  Herald,  "and  that  man  is  the  president-elect.  ...  If  Mr. 
Lincoln  will  speak  out  in  a  manner  to  reassure  the  conservative  masses  of 
all  the  States,  the  present  cloud  will  pass  away  like  a  summer  shower.'* 
S.  L.  M.  Barlow  of  New  York  wrote  a  letter  to  John  Slidell  for  "private 
circulation  in  D.  C,"  saying  that  if  Lincoln  would  come  out  for  a  con- 
stitutional convention,  the  trouble  would  end.  If  not,  or  if  the  Republicans 
blocked  the  discussion  of  compromise,  then  war  would  be  sure.81 

But  Lincoln  made  no  public  announcement,  and  the  substance  of 
his  private  letters  soon  got  into  circulation  and  spread  the  impression  that 
he  opposed  any  settlement  by  conciliation.  His  enemies  assumed  that  he 
planned  to  subjugate  the  South  by  force.  Lincoln  had  said  almost  nothing 
since  the  Douglas  debates  of  1858.  He  made  no  campaign  speeches,  and 
he  wrote  only  one  public  letter  during  the  entire  election  canvass— the 
one  in  which  he  accepted  his  nomination.  "The  Chicago  Platform," 
Lincoln  wrote,  "meets  my  approval  and  it  shall  be  my  care  not  to  violate 

365 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


or  disregard  it  in  any  part,"  To  dozens  of  letters  requesting  clarification 
of  his  policy,  he  regularly  replied  by  referring  the  writers  to  his  "previous 
statements."  Everyone  could  pick  what  he  wished  from  Lincoln's  past 
utterances.  His  friends  could  mate  him  a  saint,  and  his  enemies  could 
make  him  a  devil.  On  November  28  he  wrote  to  Henry  J.  Raymond  of 
the  New  York  Times  concerning  the  advocates  of  compromise:  "These 

political  fiends  are  not  half  sick  enough  yet "They  seek  a  sign,  and  no 

sign  shall  be  given  them/  At  least  such  is  my  present  feeling  and  purpose."32 
Lincoln  left  even  so  important  a  partisan  as  Weed  in  the  dark. 
Weed  wrote  on  December  11,  in  preparation  for  a  conference  of  Republican 
governors  in  New  York,  "I  have  been  acting  without  knowledge  of  your 
view  upon  vital  questions."33   Lincoln  gave  him  no  satisfaction;  neverthe- 
less, he  invited  him  to  pay  a  visit  to  Springfield.    Private  correspondence 
showed  that  Lincoln  did  have  a  policy  by  early  December  and  had  advised 
certain  friends  of  it.    "Prevent  .  .  .  entertaining  propositions  for  com- 
promise of  any  sort,  on  'slavery  extension,'  "  he  wrote  E.  B.  Washburne. 
"There  is  no  possible  compromise  on  it ...  whether  it  be  the  Mo.  line,  or 
EU  Thayer's  Pop.  Sov.  it  is  all  the  same.  ...    On  that  point  hold  firm,  as 
with  a  chain  of  steel."34    He  later  told  Weed,  "I  will  be  inflexible  on  the 
territorial  question.  .  .  ,"36 

Lincoln  had  in  fact  firmly  adopted  the  radical  position  which 
Buchanan  had  warned  would  be  sure  to  bring  war,  a  belief  shared  by  most 
Americans  of  all  parties  except  for  the  radical  wing  of  the  Republicans. 
But  Lincoln  did  not  publicly  announce  his  position,  nor  did  he  believe  that 
it  would  bring  conflict.  He  thought  the  threat  of  secession  humbug  and 
war  unlikely.  Buchanan,  in  addition  to  keeping  southerners  in  harness, 
faced  the  task  of  convincing  Lincoln  that  his  estimate  of  the  national 
problem  was  oversimple  and  unrealistic  and  that  upon  the  victorious 
Republicans  rested' the  issue  of  union  or  disunion. 

Buchanan  had  a  much  more  accurate  knowledge  of  the  temper 
of  the  South  than  Lincoln,  who  had  not  held  national  office  for  a  decade 
and  who  rarely  visited  outside  Illinois.  The  president  prophesied  to  Hiram 
Swarr  on  December  10: 

I  am  truly  sorry  to  say  that  South  Carolina  will  secede  about  the 
20th  &  the  other  cotton  states  will,  in  all  probability,  speedily 
follow.  The  contagion  of  disunion  is  fast  spreading  in  North 
Carolina  and  Virginia  &  even  in  Maryland  to  a  considerable 
extent.  They  are  proceeding  rashly  &  precipitately  &  will  afford 
no  opportunity  of  trying  the  question  at  the  Ballot  Box  in  the 
North  whether  the  people  will  or  will  not  agree  to  redress  these 
grievances.  The  Black  Republicans  say  nothing  &  I  fear  will  do 
nothing  to  arrest  the  impending  catastrophe.  These  remarks  are 
strictly  private.36 

366 


THE  IMPENDING  CRISIS  •  I860 


With  such  gloomy  forebodings  Buchanan  prepared  to  face  events 
as  they  developed.  He  had  laid  down  certain  general  rules,  a  broad  strat^y 
to  chart  his  course,  but  he  would  have  to  improvise  the  details  of  his 
program.  Of  first  importance,  he  determined  to  avoid  initiating  a  war.  He 
would  take  no  provocative  action  and  would  apply  force  only  to  repel  a 
military  assault  on  the  government.  Second,  he  would  observe  his  oath 
and  act  only  according  to  law.  He  would  not  usurp  power  and  risk  im- 
peachment, giving  Congress  and  the  Republican  leadership  an  excuse  to 
dodge  their  responsibility.  He  would  ask  Congress  for  additional  means  to 
act  under  law;  if  denied  such  lawful  authority  and  the  public  support  that 
legislation  represented,  he  would  act  within  existing  law.  Third,  he  would 
keep  open  the  door  to  compromise.  This  gesture  would  encourage  southern 
Unionists,  invite  the  continuing  loyalty  of  the  border  states,  and  permit 
the  president  to  act  as  a  mediator.  If  war  had  to  come,  it  would  arise  from 
the  obdurate  refusal  of  Republicans  to  make  any  sacrifice  for  the  Union  or 
from  some  rash,  aggressive  act  of  the  secessionists.  The  Buchanan  Ad- 
ministration would  not  start  it. 


367 


28 

CURSED  ARE  THE  PEACEMAKERS  •  1860 

"WE  WILL  HOLD  THE  FORTS" 

The  Charleston  forts  continued  to  pose  the  most  perplexing  problem  for 
the  Administration.  Major  Anderson,  working  at  top  speed  to  put  Fort 
Moultrie  in  a  condition  of  readiness,  reported  at  the  end  of  November  that 
he  had  nearly  completed  this  task.  But  he  still  feared  an  assault  from 
Charleston  which  would  be  hard  to  withstand  because  of  a  series  of  sand 
hills  to  the  north  from  which  sharp-shooters  might  fire  directly  into  the  fort. 
He  had  already  started  to  level  these  hills.  He  asked  Floyd's  permission 
to  repair  Castle  Pinckney  and  garrison  it  lightly  with  troops  from  Fort 
Moultrie.  Floyd  vetoed  the  shift  of  troops,  but  approved  the  employment 
of  civilians  to  repair  Castle  Pinckney.  By  this  time  Fort  Sumter  had  been 
sufficiently  completed  to  receive  a  garrison  of  one  company,  and  Anderson 
asked  the  War  Department  to  assign  such  a  force.1 

During  the  last  week  of  November,  Buchanan  called  Floyd  to 
the  State  Department.  Black  and  Cass  left  when  Floyd  arrived,  and  the 
president  then  told  him  that  he  had  decided  to  reinforce  the  Charleston 
forts.  "I  would  rather  have  my  throat  cut,  sir,"  he  said,  "than  have  Fort 
Moultrie  seized  by  South  Carolina.  You  must  &  shall  send  troops  forth- 
with." Floyd  said  he  would  risk  his  honor  and  his  life  that  South  Carolina 
would  not  molest  the  forts.  "That  is  all  very  well,"  responded  Buchanan, 
"but , . .  does  that  secure  the  forts?"2  Floyd,  who  suspected  the  influence 
of  his  northern  colleagues,  persuaded  Buchanan  to  defer  action  until  both 
of  them  talked  with  General  Scott.  Floyd  kter  confided  to  Trescot  that  he 
would  "cut  off  his  right  hand"  before  he  would  sign  any  order  to  reinforce 
the  forts  and  would  resign  if  Buchanan  persisted  in  his  course,  but  he  would 
resist  any  attempt  of  South  Carolina  to  seize  the  forts.  Cobb  and  Thompson 
held  the  same  views,  he  said. 

Trescot  wrote  this  information  to  Governor  Gist,  warning  him 
that  Buchanan  feared  seizure  of  the  forts  at  any  moment  and  intended  to 
strengthen  them  to  resist  attack.  Trescot  urged  Gist  to  pledge  South 

368 


CURSED  ARE  THE  PEACEMAKERS  •   1860 


Carolina  to  inaction  as  the  only  means  of  preventing  the  movement  of 
additional  troops.  Gist  replied  on  November  29  by  two  letters,  one  appoint- 
ing Trescot  an  unofficial  agent  of  South  Carolina  to  communicate  with  the 
Administration,  and  the  other  empowering  him  to  assure  Buchanan  that 
"everything  is  now  quiet  and  will  remain  so  until  the  ordinance  [of  seces- 
sion] is  passed,  if  no  more  soldiers  or  munitions  of  war  are  sent  on."  The 
governor  added  that  he  would  "use  all  the  military  power  of  the  state  to 
prevent  any  increase  of  troops  in  these  garrisons"  and  invited  Trescot  to 
show  his  letter  to  Buchanan.  This  he  did. 

In  view  of  these  developments,  Buchanan  asked  Trescot  to  carry 
an  advance  copy  of  his  message  to  Governor  Gist.  After  a  long  conversa- 
tion with  the  president,  Trescot  felt  that  Buchanan's  aim  at  the  moment 
was  to  persuade  the  Carolinians  to  postpone  secession  at  least  until  March  4 
and  to  convince  them  that  he  would  maintain  a  status  quo  at  the  forts  if 
South  Carolina  would  stay  in  the  Union.  When  Trescot  brought  this 
report  to  Gist,  the  governor  told  him  to  reply  that  "no  scheme  of  policy, 
however  plausible,  could  induce  delay  until  the  4th  of  March,  either  in 
deference  to  Mr.  Buchanan's  position  or  with  a  view  to  the  cooperation  of 
other  States."3 

On  the  day  that  the  message  went  to  Congress,  Buchanan  met 
with  the  Cabinet  to  discuss  Anderson's  request,  which  had  just  arrived, 
for  men,  ammunition,  and  supplies.4  When  the  Cabinet  divided  on  the 
question,  Buchanan  put  off  mating  a  decision,  for  it  had  now  become  clear 
that  the  Cabinet  would  break  up  whatever  the  answer,  and  this  the  president 
wanted  to  delay  until  he  had  news  of  Trescot's  visit  with  Gist. 

Anderson  grew  increasingly  apprehensive  of  attack  and  multiplied 
his  reports  of  danger  during  the  early  weeks  of  December.  State  troops 
drilled  constantly  in  the  city,  he  said,  and  openly  boasted  of  their  intent 
to  take  Fort  Moultrie.5  He  had  ordered  repair  work  to  begin  on  Castle 
Pinckney  and  in  order  to  protect  workmen  there  and  at  Moultrie,  had 
prepared  a  requisition  to  draw  100  muskets  with  cartridge  belts  and  ammuni- 
tion from  the  Charleston  arsenal.  Col.  Huger  at  the  arsenal  would  not 
issue  these  arms  without  orders  directly  from  the  War  Department,  and 
wrote  to  Floyd  for  authority.  Huger's  inquiry  reached  Washington  on 
December  6  and  soon  became  public  knowledge,  as  there  was  no  security 
of  information  going  into  or  out  of  Charleston.  Floyd  replied  to  Anderson 
that  "the  increase  of  the  force  under  your  command  . . .  would  . . .  judging 
from  the  recent  excitement  produced  on  account  of  an  anticipated  increase 
...  but  add  to  that  excitement  and  might  lead  to  serious  results,"  and  he 
informed  Col.  Huger  that  authority  to  supply  arms  to  the  forts  would  be 
"deferred  for  the  present."6 

On  the  same  day  Floyd  tried  to  relieve  Anderson's  nearly  in- 
tolerable situation  by  sending  Major  Don  Carlos  Buell  from  Washington 

369 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


to  explain  to  him  the  position  of  the  Administration  and  to  give  him 
"explanatory"  orders.  Floyd  did  not  put  these  in  writing,  nor  did  he  inform 
Buchanan  of  the  exact  conversation.  At  Fort  Moultrie,  a  few  days  later, 
Anderson  and  Buell  both  agreed  that  the  instructions  ought  to  be  put  in 
writing  for  Floyd's  positive  approval  and  drew  up  the  following  memo- 
randum  on  December  11:  "You  are  carefully  to  avoid  every  act  which 
would  needlessly  tend  to  provoke  aggression.  ...  But  you  are  to  hold 
possession  of  the  forts  in  this  harbor,  and  if  attacked  you  are  to  defend 
yourself  to  the  last  extremity.  The  smallness  of  your  force  will  not  permit 
you,  perhaps,  to  occupy  more  than  one  of  the  three  forts,  but  an  attack  or 
an  attempt  to  take  possession  of  any  of  them  will  be  regarded  as  an  act  of 
hostility,  and  you  may  then  put  your  command  into  either  of  them  which 
you  may  deem  most  proper,  to  increase  its  power  of  resistance.  You  are 
also  authorized  to  take  similar  steps  whenever  you  have  tangible  evidence 
of  a  design  to  proceed  to  a  hostile  act."7  They  sent  this  note  to  the  War 
Department,  and  Floyd  authenticated  it.  Of  this  exchange  Buchanan 
knew  only  that  Anderson  had  been  instructed  to  act  defensively  and  hold 
the  forts. 

SWIFTLY  CHANGING  CIRCUMSTANCES 

South  Carolina  had  elected  delegates  to  its  secession  convention  on 
December  6,  and  two  days  later  the  members  of  the  South  Carolina  Con- 
gressional delegation  at  Washington  called  on  Buchanan.    The  meeting 
started  on  an  awkward  note  because  the  southerners  believed  that  Buchanan 
had  approved  sending  reinforcements  to  Anderson,  and  Buchanan  believed 
that  the  Charlestonians  intended  shortly  to  assault  Fort  Moultrie.    The 
Carolinians— John  McQueen,  William  Porcher  Miles,  M.  L.  Bonham,  W.  W, 
Boyce,  and  Lawrence  M.  Keitt— expressed  their  desire  to  reach  some  agree- 
ment with  Buchanan  which  would  prevent  bloodshed  until  secession  had 
been  proclaimed.    After  that,  the  independent  nation  of  South  Carolina 
would  send  commissioners  to  Washington  to  discuss  the  future.    Buchanan 
told  his  callers  to  put  whatever  they  wished  to  recommend  in  writing. 
He  told  them  that  "he  would  collect  the  revenues  at  all  hazards,"  avowed 
"his  determination  to  obey  the  laws,"  and  bitterly  denounced  the  in- 
gratitude of  South  Carolina  in  rushing  out  of  the  Union  before  she  had 
been  hurt.    When  someone  asked  him  if  he  would  use  force  to  execute 
the  laws,  he  responded,  "I  will  obey  the  laws.    I  am  no  warrior — I  am  a 
man  of  peace — but  I  will  obey  the  laws."8 

On  the  same  day,  Buchanan  got  Howell  Cobb's  note  of  resignation 
from  the  Cabinet.  This  was  not  a  surprise,  but  no  less  a  blow  for  that. 
Cobb  had  made  up  his  mind  to  resign  shortly  after  Lincoln's  election  but 
had  postponed  action  and  continued  his  work  during  the  last  month  with 

370 


CURSED  ARE  THE  PEACEMAKERS  •   1860 

a  good  deal  of  embarrassment.9  Black  forced  him  to  the  wall  by  proposing 
that  both  of  them  confront  Buchanan  and  state  their  respective  positions 
on  secession.  If  Buchanan  supported  secession,  Black  said  he  would  resign 
in  five  minutes;  if  he  opposed  it,  Cobb  would  resign.10  Cobb  actually 
resigned  on  December  8.  "The  President  and  myself  parted  in  the  most 
friendly  spirit,"  he  wrote  his  wife.  "We  both  see  &  feel  the  necessity  & 
both  regret  that  it  should  be  so." 

Cobb's  resignation  hurt  Buchanan  much  more  than  he  admitted 
at  the  moment.  One  of  his  friends  wrote,  "If  'old  Buck*  loves  anybody  in 

the  world,  that  man  is  Gov.  Cobb He  spoke  of  the  Gov.  in  great  kind- 

ness,  but  with  sorrow."  The  President  believed  Cobb  had  made  a  great 
mistake  and  "believed  firmly  Georgia  would  never  secede."  Harriet  said 
she  thought  Cobb  was  making  "the  greatest  mistake  of  his  life."11  Cobb 
had  nourished  Buchanan's  expectation  that  Georgia  would  stand  as  a  firm 
bastion  against  secession  in  the  deep  South.  Now  both  Cobb  and  Georgia 
were  gone,  and  the  loss  would  be  much  more  serious  than  anything  which 
might  happen  around  Charleston.  Buchanan  appointed  Philip  F.  Thomas 
of  Maryland,  commissioner  of  patents,  to  the  Treasury.12 

On  December  10  the  South  Carolina  Congressmen  came  back  to 
the  White  House  with  their  statement  about  the  Charleston  forts.  This 
document  expressed  the  belief  of  the  signers  that  South  Carolina  would  not 
molest  the  forts  until  some  "amicable  arrangement"  had  been  made  between 
the  state  and  the  federal  government,  "provided  that  no  reinforcements 
shall  be  sent  into  those  forts,  and  their  relative  military  status  shall  remain 
as  at  present."  Buchanan  did  not  like  the  word  "provided"  and  refused  to 
restrict  his  freedom  of  action  by  such  a  guarantee,  particularly  since  the 
delegation  had  no  official  status  and  could  not  bind  anyone  to  the  terms  of 
the  letter.  He  stated  that  although  it  was  his  policy  not  to  alter  the  status 
quo,  he  could  pledge  nothing.  The  South  Carolinians  told  him  that  the 
words  "military  status"  meant  that  the  transfer  of  the  Moultrie  garrison  to 
Sumter  would  be  the  e<piivalent  of  a  reinforcement  and  would  be  the  signal 
for  war  on  the  forts.  Buchanan  made  no  comment  on  this  clarification  but 
said,  as  they  were  leaving,  "After  all,  this  is  a  matter  of  honor  among 
gentlemen;  I  do  not  know  that  any  paper  or  writing  is  necessary;  we  under- 
stand each  other."  The  delegation  wanted  more  than  a  verbal  statement 
and  asked  what  might  happen  if  Buchanan  changed  his  mind  and  did  send 
troops.  "Then  I  would  first  return  the  paper,"  he  answered.18  After  they 
had  left,  Buchanan  took  the  paper  and  wrote  on  it  his  recollection  of  the 
verbal  exchange. 

Why  did  Buchanan  change  his  policy  from  a  determination  to 
garrison  the  forts  at  the  end  of  November  to  a  policy  of  maintaining  the 
status  quo  on  December  10?  Cobb's  resignation  provided  the  answer.  So 
long  as  Buchanan  could  count  on  Georgia,  he  could  deal  strongly  with 

371 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


South  Carolina  as  an  isolated  pocket  of  disunion  without  provoking  a 
general  reaction.  North  Carolina  and  Georgia  would  bracket  her  with 
Union  defenders.  But  with  Georgia  lost,  such  a  policy  would  spread  the 
secession  movement  instead  of  localizing  it.  The  new  situation  required  a 
new  approach.  "What  is  right  and  what  is  practicable  are  two  very  different 
things,"  he  observed.14 

If  December  10  produced  a  spongy  modus  vivendi  between  the 
Administration  and  the  secessionists,  the  next  day  brought  events  that 
were  hard  and  sharp  as  flint.  On  that  day  Buchanan  parted  company  with 
his  chief  advisors  on  both  sides.  Secretary  of  State  Cass  resigned  because 
he  believed  "that  additional  troops  should  be  sent  to  reinforce  the  forts  in 
Charleston."15  Senators  Gwin  and  Slidell  called  a  few  hours  later  to 
remonstrate  against  Buchanan's  refusal  to  promise  not  to  reinforce  the 
forts.  Buchanan  called  them  disunionists  and  expressed  his  regret  that 
he  had  so  long  listened  to  their  advice.  They  left  in  anger,  never  again  to 
communicate  with  him  except  as  enemies.16 

Buchanan  was  very  much  surprised  at  the  resignation  of  Cass 
and  thought  it  "remarkable  on  account  of  the  cause  he  assigned  for  it."17 
But  he  quickly  accepted  it,  to  Cass's  chagrin,  and  told  Black  that  he  con- 
sidered it  not  as  a  calamity  "but  rather  as  a  good  riddance."  Black  as  well 
as  Buchanan  attributed  the  resignation  not  to  a  difference  of  opinion  but 
to  Cass's  wish  to  be  "outside  when  the  structure  should  begin  to  tumble."18 
The  next  day  Cass  asked  for  reconsideration,  but  the  president  said  the 
matter  was  closed.  On  December  17,  Buchanan  appointed  Black  to  the 
State  Department  and  moved  Assistant  Attorney  General  Edwin  M.  Stanton 
to  the  top  position.  People  who  had  observed  Stanton  in  action  on  govern- 
ment business  in  California  had  warned  both  Buchanan  and  Black  not  to 
trust  him,  but  they  could  find  no  one  else  who  knew  so  well  the  background 
of  important  land  cases  then  pending  before  the  Supreme  Court. 

These  events  discouraged  not  only  Buchanan  but  also  the  whole 
nation,  for  it  began  to  be  clear  that  the  simultaneous  break  of  both  Cass 
and  Slidell  with  the  Administration  foreshadowed  the  end.  These  men 
were  not  the  "partizans"  or  the  extremists;  they  were  the  moderates. 
Therefore,  if  Cass  found  Buchanan's  policy  too  "southern"  and  Slidell 
thought  it  too  "northern,"  what  course  could  Buchanan  follow?  Thompson 
said  that  gloom  and  depression  overwhelmed  the  capital — "no  dinners,  no 
parties,  everybody  looks  sad."  "You  will  read  the  President's  proclamation 
for  fasting  and  prayer  on  the  4th  of  Jan. — that  tells  whether  he  sees  the 
danger  or  not."19  Buchanan's  appeal  for  a  day  of  prayer  gave  rise  to  little 
except  a  round  of  new  jokes.20 

Sunday  morning  after  the  Cabinet  changes,  Washington  society 
was  shocked  by  news  of  the  death  of  Secretary  Holt.  People  exclaimed  to 
each  other,  "did  you  ever  see  such  a  fatality  attending  the  administration, 

372 


CURSED  ARE  THE  PEACEMAKERS  •    1860 


two  resignations  and  a  death  in  a  week."    The  wild  rumor  was  dispersed 
when,  lo,  Holt  appeared  at  his  office  on  Monday  morning.21 

The  day  after  Cass  resigned,  General  Scott  at  last  came  to  Wash- 
ington. Buchanan  had  received  no  word  from  him  on  defense  of  the  forts 
since  the  famous  "Views"  of  October  29  and  30.  On  December  14  Scott 
conferred  with  Lyman  Trumbull,  who  assured  the  old  general  that  Buchanan 
had  joined  the  traitors,  was  plotting  the  surrender  of  Fort  Moultrie,  and 
ought  to  be  "gibbeted."22  The  next  day,  Scott  urged  the  president  to  send 
a  force  of  300  men  to  Fort  Moultrie  immediately.  Buchanan  pointed  out 
that  this  advice  came  two  weeks  too  late,  and  that  General  Scott  knew  at  the 
time  he  made  this  recommendation  that  it  must  be  rejected.  The  president 
could  not  have  complied  with  it  "without  at  once  reversing  his  entire  policy, 
and  without  a  degree  of  inconsistency  amounting  almost  to  self-stultifica- 
tion."23 Buchanan's  mail  indicated  that  the  country  solidly  supported  this 
view.  From  Boston  came  the  word:  "The  first  re-inforcement  sent  there 
would  be  the  signal  of  war,  &  you  would  be  put  in  the  position  of  initiating  it 
and  your  successor  be  able  to  carry  it  on  without  responsibility  for  its 
origin."24  A  Georgian  wrote,  "re-inforcing  Anderson  would  as  certainly 
have  produced  a  collision  between  the  Federal  and  State  Governments  .  .  . 
as  there  is  a  God  in  Heaven."26  Congressmen  gave  him  the  same  advice. 

Secretary  Thompson  chose  this  moment  to  make  a  strange  request 
of  the  president.  The  State  of  Mississippi  had  appointed  him  an  agent  to 
visit  North  Carolina  to  discuss  the  secession  movement,  and  Thompson 
wished  Buchanan's  approval  of  the  mission,  offering  to  resign  if  the  presi- 
dent opposed  his  going.  Buchanan  suffered  heavy  condemnation  at  the 
time  and  for  years  afterward  for  allowing  Thompson  to  make  this  journey 
while  he  was  still  a  member  of  the  Cabinet,  for  it  outwardly  appeared  as 
if  the  president  were  actively  promoting  the  secession  movement.  Buchanan 
explained  that  he  had  approved  "only  under  the  belief  that  [Thompson's] 
mission  was  to  prevent,  not  to  precipitate  secession."26  Thompson  had 
disagreed  with  Buchanan's  message,  insisting  that  a  "right"  of  secession 
did  exist  and  expressing  his  determination  to  follow  his  state  if  it  should 
secede.  But  he  thought  that  the  "right"  came  into  existence  only  when 
sufficient  cause  existed  to  justify  revolution,  and  that  there  was  no  such 
reason  yet.  He  strongly  opposed  hasty  action  or  separate  action  by  any 
state;  he  was  a  cooperationist.  Before  there  was  clear  justification  for 
secession,  no  southern  state  ought  to  secede.  With  cause,  all  should  go 
out.  This  was  Thompson's  message  to  North  Carolina  27 

If  the  Thompson  trip  had  not  convinced  many  that  Buchanan 
had  gone  over  to  secession,  the  course  of  the  Washington  Constitution, 
edited  by  William  M.  Browne,  would  have  done  so.  This  journal  acted  as 
the  "Administration  organ,"  and  received  favored  treatment  in  public 
printing  contracts  for  playing  the  party  tunes.  Browne  became  a  red-hot 

373 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


secessionist  who  labelled  the  election  of  Lincoln  "a  concentrated  expression 
of  the  deadly  hatred  of  the  North  to  me  and  all  I  value."28  Assistant  Post- 
master General  Horatio  King  complained  to  Black  on  December  14,  "I  am 
amazed  that  some  decided  action  is  not  taken  by  the  Government  to  cut 
itself  entirely  loose  from  disunion  and  disunionists.  Look  at  the  Con- 
stitution newspaper  of  to-day Its  whole  bearing  is  for  disunion;  and,  say 

what  you  will,  the  Government  is  held,  and  will  be  held,  in  great  degree 
responsible  for  it."29 

King  told  John  A.  Dix  of  New  York  that  "the  course  of  the 
Constitution  is  infamous,  but  the  President,  I  presume,  has  no  means  of 
controlling  it."30  King  complained  that  the  friends  of  the  Union  seemed 
to  stay  away  from  Buchanan  in  the  belief  that  the  Constitution  "speaks  the 
sentiments  of  the  President,  which  is  certainly  not  the  fact."31 

Buchanan,  sensitive  to  executive  interference  with  the  freedom 
of  the  press,  had  Browne  insert  notices  .that  the  newspaper's  editorials  did 
not  represent  the  Administration  views.  At  length,  on  Christmas  Day, 
Buchanan  rebuked  Browne  for  an  editorial  favoring  secession,  and  advised 
him  that  he  had  withdrawn  support  from  the  paper.  Still,  most  of  January 
had  elapsed  before  all  government  patronage  to  the  Constitution  had  been 
cut  off.  Buchanan  desperately  needed  accurate  reporting  of  Administration 
policy  in  friendly  newspapers  of  national  circulation.  Of  these  there  were 
very  few,  notably  the  Philadelphia  Pennsylvania  and  the  Boston  Courier. 
After  he  had  had  to  abandon  the  Constitution,  the  president  wrote  to 
Bennett  of  the  New  York  Herald,  asking  him  as  a  patriotic  citizen  to  publi- 
cize the  compromise  proposals  advocated  by  the  Administration.32 

Suspicion  that  Buchanan  was  in  league  with  the  secessionists 
brought  a  furious  storm  of  public  denunciation  upon  the  president. 
Abraham  Lincoln  received  numerous  warnings.  "Buchanan  is  today  as 
truly  a  traitor  as  was  Benedict  Arnold."  "I  hope  you  are  preparing— in 
case  that  cowardly  old  imbecile  &  traitor  Buchanan  shall  go  on,  &  mischief 
result — to  strike  out  &  sharply  for  his  impeachment.  If  ever  a  man 
deserved  it,  he  does.  If  ever  hanging  were  a  proper  use  to  put  a  man  to 
for  his  political  sins,  he  really  deserves  it."  "What  an  ignominious  exit 
from  public  life  of  James  Buchanan!"33  Northern  Democrats  wrote  the 
same  sentiments.  One  was  "in  favor  of  hanging  Buchanan,  his 
organ  grinder,  [and]  the  Sec'y  of  War."  Another  warned  that  Buchanan 
should  never  plan  to  come  back  to  Pennsylvania.  "Our  people  will  not 
treat  him  with  respect."  Many  called  him  a  traitor  who  favored  secession.34 
Greeley's  New  York  Tribune  ran  a  headlined  editorial  on  December  17 
which  stated  that  the  president  was  insane,  and  others  reported  that  he  was 
a  coward,  an  imbecile,  and  ill  from  sheer  terror.  Cass,  perhaps  to  justify 
his  resignation,  told  people  that  Buchanan  had  become  "pale  with  fear" 

374 


CURSED  ARE  THE  PEACEMAKERS  •   1860 


and  divided  his  time  equally  between  praying  and  crying.  But  guests  at  a 
wedding  reception  on  December  20  which  the  president  attended  found 
him  proclaiming  that  he  had  never  enjoyed  better  health  and  looking 
the  part.35 

In  the  midst  of  the  festivities,  when  a  commotion  started  in  the 
hall,  Buchanan  turned  his  head  and  said  to  a  guest,  "Madam,  do  you 
suppose  the  house  is  on  fire?"  She  went  to  inquire.  In  the  hallway  she 
found  Lawrence  Keitt  "leaping  in  the  air,  shaking  a  paper  over  his  head, 
and  exclaiming,  Thank  God!  Oh,  thank  God!'  .  .  .  South  Carolina  has 
seceded!  Here's  the  telegram.  I  feel  like  a  boy  let  out  from  school." 
On  hearing  this  report  Buchanan  called  for  his  carriage,  and  drove  back 
to  the  White  House.  There  he  found  a  telegram  waiting  for  him  from 
South  Carolina's  new  governor,  F.  W.  Pickens,  confirming  Keitt's  report.36 

The  announcement  was  not  exactly  news  to  Buchanan.  He 
knew  that  action  probably  would  come  on  the  20th,  and  during  the  past 
week  had  sent  Caleb  Cushing  to  South  Carolina  to  make  a  last  ditch  plea 
for  delay.  Cushing  had  informed  him  that  the  convention  would  vote 
for  secession.  What  worried  the  president  more  was  a  letter  from  Governor 
Pickens,  dated  December  17  and  presented  to  him  on  the  morning  of  the 
20th,  demanding  that  he  authorize  South  Carolina  "to  take  possession  of 
Fort  Sumter  immediately."37  The  courier  wanted  an  instant  reply,  but 
Buchanan  told  him  to  come  back  the  next  day.  In  the  meantime,  W.  H. 
Trescot  learned  of  the  contents  of  the  letter.  His  resignation  as  Assistant 
Secretary  of  State  had  been  accepted  only  that  morning,  and  he  now  acted  as 
a  spokesman  for  South  Carolina.  He  saw  that  Pickens's  demand  terminated 
the  status  quo  policy  that  Buchanan  had  informally  stated  on  December  10 
to  the  South  Carolina  Congressmen  and  would  give  the  president  practically 
a  mandate  to  garrison  all  the  forts.  He  sought  out  Slidejl,  Jefferson  Davis, 
and  Congressmen  Bonham  and  McQueen,  and  all  telegraphed  Pickens  to 
withdraw  his  letter.38 

Buchanan  drafted  his  reply  that  night.  He  would  not  surrender 
any  forts  or  public  property  in  South  Carolina,  he  wrote.  "If  South 
Carolina  should  attack  any  of  these  forts,  she  will  then  become  the  assailant 
in  a  war  against  the  United  States.  It  will  not  then  be  a  question  of 

coercing  a  state Between  independent  governments,  if  one  possesses 

a  fortress  within  the  limits  of  another,  and  the  latter  should  seize  it ...  this 
would  not  only  be  a  just  cause  of  war,  but  the  actual  commencement  of 
hostilities."39  By  morning  Pickens  had  withdrawn  his  letter  and  Buchanan 
did  not  send  the  reply  he  had  prepared. 

This  incident  had  grown  out  of  another  altercation  over  the 
delivery  of  arms  from  the  arsenal  at  Charleston.  Captain  Foster,  engineer 
officer  in  charge  of  construction  at  Castle  Pinckney  and  at  Fort  Sumter, 
feared  mob  action  against  his  workmen  and  wanted  muskets  for  them.  As 

375 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


the  War  Department  had  never  sent  authorization  of  the  request  of 

December  6  for  100  muskets,  he  went  to  the  arsenal  on  the  17th  and  showed 

a  storekeeper  the  old  order  of  November  1  for  40  muskets— the  order 

which  had  caused  the  earlier  change  of  command  at  Charleston.     The 

storekeeper  delivered  the  guns,  and  Foster  divided  them  between  Castle 

Pinckney  and  Fort  Sumter.    The  news  enraged  the  people  of  Charleston, 

who  demanded  the  delivering  up  of  Sumter.    Pickens  wrote  his  letter  to 

Buchanan  that  day,  under  the  apprehension  that  the  order  had  originated 

in  Washington,  and  thus  terminated  the  "gentleman's  agreement."    When 

Col.  Huger  learned  of  the  transaction  he  demanded  the  return  of  the 

muskets,  but  Anderson  refused  to  deliver  them.    The  next  day  the  South 

Carolina  authorities  set  up  a  24-hour  patrol  of  Fort  Sumter  by  gunboats. 

When  news  of  these  events  reached  Washington,  Floyd  immediately 

ordered  Anderson  to  return  the  guns  to  the  arsenal,  and  by  the  end  of  the 

day  conditions  were  back  to  normal.    The  incident  made  shockingly  clear 

how  tenuous  was  the  December  10th  "understanding"  and  how  slender  a 

thread  restrained  the  sword  of  war.40 

Only  now,  the  day  after  secession,  did  Buchanan  learn  of  the 
orders  which  Buell  had  written  out  for  Anderson  ten  days  before.  At  a 
Cabinet  meeting  on  December  21  to  consider  afresh  the  position  of  Ander- 
son, Buchanan  asked  exactly  what  orders  had  been  sent  to  Moultrie.  Floyd 
did  not  even  remember  and  had  to  send  for  his  files  at  the  War  Office. 
When  BuelTs  memorandum  had  been  found,  Floyd  read  it  and  stated  that 
it  conformed  to  his  verbal  instructions  to  Buell.  Buchanan  did  not  like 
the  sentence  which  directed  Anderson  to  defend  himself  "to  the  last 
extremity,"  feeling  that  this  called  for  a  needless  sacrifice  of  life,  but  other- 
wise agreed  that  the  directions  were  sound.  The  Cabinet  approved,  and 
Black  then  wrote  out  a  revised  copy  including  a  statement  that  Anderson 
should  "exercise  sound  military  discretion5'  and  not  make  a  useless  sacrifice 
of  his  men.  Floyd  signed  this,  making  it  a  formal  Department  order,  and 
sent  it  by  courier  to  Anderson  at  Fort  Moultrie.41 

While  the  new  orders  were  on  their  way  to  Charleston,  a  letter 
from  Anderson  of  December  22  was  speeding  toward  Washington.  After 
the  proclamation  of  secession,  Anderson  momentarily  expected  an  attack 
on  Fort  Moultrie.  He  had  five  days  more  work  to  complete  his  temporary 
defenses,  but,  he  wrote,  "God  knows  whether  the  South  Carolinians  will 
defer  their  attempt  to  take  this  work  so  long  as  that."  He  reported  that 
the  patrol  boats  had  orders  to  prevent  any  military  occupation  of  Sumter. 
So  many  civilian  workmen  there  had  begun  to  wear  the  blue  cockade, 
he  said,  that  construction  ought  to  be  halted  and  the  fort  left  in  the  charge 
of  a  lieutenant  and  a  few  picked  men.42  Buchanan  also  heard,  on  this  day, 
that  commissioners  from  South  Carolina  would  arrive  in  Washington  on 
December  26  to  discuss  the  problem  of  the  forts. 

376 


CURSED  ARE  THE  PEACEMAKERS  •  1860 

THE  CABINET  EXPLODES 

Before  the  nerve-wracking  22nd  of  December  had  ended,  Buchanan  learned 
of  a  Cabinet  scandal  so  shocking  that  it  forced  every  other  concern  into 
the  background.  Floyd's  easy-going  management  had  at  last  brought 
disaster  growing  out  of  his  continuing  practice,  against  Buchanan's  explicit 
orders,  of  writing  "acceptances"  for  Russell,  Majors  and  Waddell,  the  army 
contractors.  A  relative  of  Floyd,  one  Godard  Bailey,  worked  in  the  office 
of  Secretary  Thompson  and  had  access  to  negotiable  bonds  worth  $1000 
each  which  the  government  held  in  trust  for  the  Indians.  Russell  needed 
money  and  hit  upon  the  scheme  of  offering  Bailey  Floyd's  "acceptances" 
in  return  for  the  bonds.  When  Congress  paid  Russell,  he  would  pick  up 
the  acceptances  and  return  the  bonds.  Bailey  either  wanted  to  help  Floyd 
or  had  been  offered  some  inducement  by  Russell,  but  whatever  the  reason, 
he  cooperated  until  $870,000  had  left  the  Interior  Department.  The  bonds 
soon  came  on  the  market  and  to  Secretary  Thompson's  attention.  He 
learned  the  facts  from  Bailey,  who  seemed  unaware  that  he  had  been  doing 
anything  wrong,  and  then  set  out  to  find  Russell.  Within  several  days  he 
had  them  both  in  jail  and  then  broke  the  disgraceful  news  to  Buchanan. 
The  press  reported  the  story  in  the  most  damaging  and  sensational  way. 
The  Covode  Committee,  it  now  appeared,  had  been  on  the  right  track,  but 
had  quit  too  soon.  As  the  investigation  developed,  the  public  learned 
(whether  with  truth  or  not,  no  one  could  be  sure)  that  half  a  dozen  New 
Yorkers  and  quite  a  few  Washington  officials  had  been  in  on  the  scheme, 
and  that  several  who  might  have  "leaked"  had  been  paid  to  hold  their 
tongues.  The  press  also  reported  that  Riggs  and  Company,  Buchanan's 
bankers,  had  bought  six  of  the  filched  bonds  for  the  president's  private 
account.43 

Buchanan  had  no  alternative  but  to  fire  Floyd,  but  he  so  hated  to 
do  it  that  he  asked  Black  to  convey  his  request  for  the  resignation.  Black 
declined,  and  Buchanan  finally  persuaded  Breckinridge  to  do  it.  But  Floyd 
angrily  refused  to  resign,  and  Buchanan  had  not  the  heart  to  dismiss  him 
on  Christmas  Day. 

Apparently,  Floyd  had  known  nothing  about  Bailey's  trading  and 
he  had  certainly  derived  no  profit  from  it.  True,  he  had  disobeyed  Buchanan 
in  order  to  provide  for  the  army  whose  needs  Congress  had  persistently 
ignored,  but  he  felt  he  deserved  praise  rather  than  blame  for  risking  his 
administrative  neck  to  care  for  the  nation's  troops.  The  district  court 
thought  otherwise  and  planned  to  prosecute  him  for  conspiracy  to  defraud 
the  government. 

Floyd  for  some  weeks  had  been  quite  ill  and  the  bond  affair  com- 
pleted his  breakdown.  On  the  day  he  first  learned  about  it  he  ordered  his 
ordnance  chief,  Captain  Maynadier,  to  send  a  shipment  of  heavy  guns  from 

377 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


the  Pittsburgh  armory  to  some  unfinished  forts  in  Texas.  The  charitable 
view  of  this  was  that  Floyd,  who  never  had  much  knowledge  of  the  detailed 
operations  of  his  department,  issued  this  order  without  any  treasonable 
intent  and  as  a  matter  of  routine.  The  less  charitable  view  was  that  Floyd, 
nervously  awaiting  the  visit  of  the  South  Carolina  commissioners  and 
knowing  that  the  bond  scandal  must  terminate  his  Cabinet  career,  gave  way 
to  despair  and  decided  on  the  spur  of  the  moment  to  cast  his  lot  with  seces- 
sion.  He  abruptly  changed  his  stand  during  the  last  week  of  December 
and 'violently  denounced  in  Cabinet  the  very  policies  he  had  formerly 
supported.  It  seems  most  likely  that  the  impact  of  the  Bailey  business, 
his  poor  health,  and  the  crisis  over  the  forts  combined  to  create  in  his  heart 
an  utter  detestation  of  Buchanan,  the  Administration,  and  the  Union. 

Floyd  spent  Christmas  Day  in  an  emotional  torment,  but  he 
retained  enough  balance  to  reject  in  anger  a  scheme  proposed  to  him  by 
Senator  Wigfall  to  kidnap  Buchanan  and  put  Breckinridge  into  the  presi- 
dency. At  Cabinet  meeting  the  next  day,  Floyd,  who  had  come  uninvited, 
lost  control  of  himself  and  spoke  loudly  and  discourteously  to  Buchanan. 
Black  and  Stanton  did  not  attend  this  session,  which  was  perhaps  fortunate, 
for  Floyd  had  come  to  hate  the  sight  of  them;  but  Thompson  was  present 
and  he  pitched  into  Floyd  for  involving  the  Interior  Department  in  the  bond 
scandal.  Thompson  said  he  would  prosecute  to  the  limit  of  the  law  every- 
one connected  with  the  affair,  and  he  left  no  doubt  that  he  thought  Floyd 
was  among  the  guilty.44 

Buchanan  wanted  the  Cabinet  to  consider  the  treatment  of  the 
South  Carolina  commissioners  who  had  just  arrived  in  Washington,  but 
first  another  problem  had  to  be  settled.  Black  had  received  telegrams  from 
worried  citizens  of  Pittsburgh  protesting  the  shipment  of  cannon  from  the 
local  gun  works  to  the  South.  Inquiry  had  revealed  that  the  Texas  forts 
were  quite  unprepared  to  receive  them,  and  the  transaction  aroused 
suspicion.  The  Pittsburghers  thought  it  plain  treason.  Black  told  Buchanan 
of  Floyd's  orders  on  Christmas  Day,  and  the  president  instantly  cancelled 
the  shipment.  No  guns  left  Pittsburgh,  but  Floyd  considered  Buchanan's 
act  a  direct  slap  at  him.45  The  Cabinet  then  agreed  that  it  would  be  per- 
missible for  Buchanan  to  confer  with  the  South  Carolina  commissioners 
as  "private  gentlemen,"  and  perhaps  to  submit  to  Congress  a  proposition 
which  they  might  make. 

William  H.  Trescot,  acting  as  a  go-between,  scheduled  a  procedural 
meeting  for  December  27.  On  the  morning  of  that  fateful  day  news  arrived 
which  created  wild  excitement.  Major  Anderson  had  just  spiked  the  guns 
of  Moultrie  and  had  moved  his  entire  command  into  Fort  Sumter  under 
cover  of  darkness  in  a  brilliant  military  maneuver  carried  out  under  the 
very  eyes  of  the  South  Carolina  patrol  boats  and  the  state  militia  pickets. 
The  South  Carolina  commissioners  cancelled  their  visit  to  Buchanan  and 


378 


CURSED  ARE  THE  PEACEMAKERS  •  1860 


waited  for  more  information.  Trescot  hurried  to  Floyd's  office  and  obtained 
from  him  a  promise  that  he  would  promptly  order  Anderson  hack  to 
Moultrie  as  soon  as  he  received  official  confirmation  of  the  reports.  Floyd 
immediately  telegraphed  Anderson  that  he  did  not  believe  the  news, 
"because  there  is  no  order  for  any  such  movement,"  but  Anderson  replied, 
"The  telegram  is  correct."46 

While  messages  sped  hack  and  forth,  the  southern  leaders  in 
Washington  headed  for  the  White  House.  Jefferson  Davis  arrived  first 
and  broke  the  news  to  Buchanan.  "Now,  Mr.  President,"  he  said,  "you 
are  surrounded  with  blood  and  dishonor  on  all  sides."  According  to 
Trescot,  Buchanan  "was  standing  by  the  mantelpiece,  crushing  up  a  cigar 
in  the  palm  of  his  hand.  ...  He  sat  down  as  Colonel  Davis  finished,  and 
exclaimed,  'My  God,  are  calamities  never  to  come  singly!  I  call  God  to 
witness,  you  gentlemen  more  than  anybody  know  that  this  is  not  only 
without  but  against  my  orders.  It  is  against  my  policy.'  "  Senators  Hunter, 
Lane,  Yulee,  even  Slidell  called  and  bore  down  on  Buchanan  to  order 
Anderson  out  of  Sumter  or  face  general  secession  and  war.  Buchanan 
paced  nervously,  telling  his  excited  callers  to  keep  calm  and  trust  him. 
He  gave  evidence  of  sympathizing  with  their  position  for  it  seemed  to  him 
at  the  moment  as  if  Anderson  had  ruptured  the  "gentleman's  agreement." 
It  certainly  was  a  move  the  president  had  not  anticipated.  But  for  all  his 
soothing  words,  he  gave  the  southerners  no  promise.  They  left  not  know- 
ing what  Buchanan  intended  to  do.  He  himself  did  not  know. 

The  afternoon  Cabinet  meeting  ran  over  into  the  night.  Black, 
Holt,  and  Stanton  aggressively  defended  Anderson's  action.  "Good,"  said 
Black.  "It  is  in  precise  accordance  with  his  orders."47  "It  is  not,"  said 
Hoyd.  The  orders  were  sent  for  and  read— the  latest  ones  in  Black's 
handwriting,  signed  by  Floyd  and  approved  by  the  Cabinet  only  five  days 
before.  Floyd  had  brought  a  paper  with  him  containing  his  objections  to 
Anderson's  move  and  now  read  it  in  a  "loud  and  discourteous"  tone,  but 
he  got  no  support  from  anyone  except  Thompson.  Toucey  said  little. 
Floyd  asserted  that  the  "solemn  pledges  of  this  Government  have  been 
violated"  and  that  federal  troops  should  now  be  withdrawn  from  all  the 
Charleston  forts.  Black,  with  the  orders  signed  by  Floyd  in  his  hand, 
turned  livid  and,  waving  the  paper  in  Floyd's  face,  shouted:  "There  never 
was  a  moment  in  the  history  of  England  when  a  minister  of  the  Crown 
could  have  proposed  to,  surrender  a  military  post  which  might  be  defended, 
without  bringing  his  head  to  the  ifoci!"48 

The  president  tried  to  calm  his  colleagues,  for  floyd  by  this  time 
had  risen  out  of  his  seat  in  nearly  uncontrollable  rage.  Buchanan  believed 
that  Anderson's  orders  justified  his  maneuver.  The  Cabinet  had  assigned 
the  major  "military  discretion"  and  had  authorized  him  to  take  defensive 
action  in  the  face  of  "tangible  evidence  of  a  design  to  attack  him."  His 

379 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


report  of  a  few  days  before  had  offered  such  evidence,  though  no  hint 
that  he  intended  to  transfer  the  troops.  Buchanan  said  he  would  not 
order  Anderson  to  return  to  Moultrie,  but  he  expressed  deep  concern  over 
the  settlement  of  the  question  of  responsibility.  Neither  the  president  nor 
the  Secretary  of  War  had  commanded  the  transfer,  but  Buchanan  and  the 
Cabinet  had  agreed  to  the  permissive  orders  under  which  Anderson  could 

justify  his  act. 

Floyd's  sharp  difference  with  the  Cabinet  provided  him  the 
excuse  he  needed  to  resign  on  the  pretext  of  a  conflict  of  principles,  rather 
than  to  be  discharged  for  malversion  in  office  and  conspiracy  to  defraud 
the  government.  Many  in  Washington  believed  that  he  had  purposely 
changed  his  views  to  accomplish  this  result.  One  wrote  that  Anderson's 
action  had  been  "a  happy  chance"  for  Floyd,  and  would  "bring  the  mantle 
of  charity  to  his  aid."49 

Before  the  commissioners  called  on  December  28,  Buchanan 
received  news  that  South  Carolina  had  just  seized  Forts  Moultrie,  Castle 
Pinckney,  and  the  U.  S.  Customhouse.  There  was  some  doubt  whether 
Anderson's  move  had  violated  the  December  10th  agreement,  but  do  doubt 
at  all  that  this  act  of  South  Carolina  broke  it.  This  put  the  commissioners 
on  the  defensive. 

Buchanan  had  agreed  to  see  the  South  Carolinians  "only  as 
private  gentlemen."  At  their  interview,  the  only  one  which  was  to  be  held, 
they  informed  the  president  excitedly  and  with  asperity  that  they  would 
not  negotiate  with  him  until  he  ordered  all  federal  troops  out  of  the  Charles- 
ton area.  Buchanan  replied  that  he  could  issue  no  such  order.  He  might, 
however,  refer  to  Congress  any  communication  they  might  wish  to  give  him. 
The  president  reported  that  he  had  said  very  little  but  had  listened  with 
patience.60  The  commissioners  then  withdrew  and  that  night  prepared  a 
statement  which  they  sent  to  the  White  House  the  next  morning.  Their 
letter  had  the  tone  of  a  threat.  It  suggested  that  South  Carolina  had  made 
a  serious  mistake  "to  trust  to  your  honor  rather  than  its  own  power,"  and 
warned  that  unless  the  troops  were  withdrawn,  affairs  would  speedily  come 
to  a  "bloody  issue."51 

The  Cabinet  meeting  of  December  29  was  probably  the  most 
important  of  Buchanan's  career,  and  certainly  it  was  for  him  the  most 
agonizing,  for  he  held  in  his  mind  hopes  and  plans,  privately  wrought,  that 
his  colleagues  did  not  yet  know.  This  story,  which  came  to  its  climax  on 
December  30,  will  be  told  shortly.  Buchanan  wrote  a  reply  to  the  Carolina 
commissioners  which  Black,  Holt,  and  Stanton  refused  to  accept,  feeling 
that  it  granted  too  much  and  demanded  too  little.  Although  this  paper 
has  disappeared,  its  contents  may  be  reconstructed  from  the  objections 
made  to  it  in  the  Cabinet.  Buchanan,  in  his  own  memoir,  states  that  had  the 
commissioners  "simply  requested  that  Major  Anderson  might  be  restored 

380 


CURSED  ARE  THE  PEACEMAKERS  •   1860 


to  his  former  position  at  Fort  Moultrie,  upon  a  guarantee  from  the  State 
that  neither  it  nor  the  other  forts  or  public  property  should  be  molested; 
this,  at  the  moment,  might  have  been  worthy  of  serious  consideration."52 
Certainly  this  was  the  proposal  Buchanan  intended  to  make.  And  why  this? 
Because  he  had  underway  a  secret  negotiation  with  the  president-elect  to 
obtain  his  backing  for  a  national  constitutional  convention,  and  he  expected 
an  answer  from  Lincoln  at  any  hour.  Buchanan  later  wrote  that  he  had 
held  out  the  idea  of  submitting  a  proposal  from  South  Carolina  to  Congress, 
not  in  any  hope  of  its  acceptance,  but  because  he  knew  Congress  would 
waste  some  time  on  it.  "This  was, to  gain  time  ...  to  bring  the  whole 
subject  before  the  representatives  of  the  people"  in  a  general  convention.53 
If  he  promised  enough  to  South  Carolina  to  keep  matters  fluid  for  just  a 
day  or  two  more,  he  might  solve  the  problem.  With  this  hope  he  wrote  his 
first  answer  to  the  commissioners. 

The  Cabinet  argued  the  question  all  afternoon,  but  the  president 
was  inflexible  and  determined  to  submit  the  paper  as  he  had  written  it, 
against  the  will  of  all  except  Thompson  and  Toucey.  Black  went  home  to 
spend  a  "miserable  and  restless  night."  The  next  morning  he  made  the 
rounds  of  the  Cabinet  expressing  his  determination  to  resign  unless  the 
reply  should  be  changed.  Toucey  immediately  reported  this  decision  to 
the  White  House  and  Buchanan  called  Black  away  from  a  conference  with 
Stanton.  "Do  you,  too,  talk  of  leaving  me?"  he  asked.  Black  stated  his 
position  firmly.  "Your  answer  to  the  commissioners  leaves  you  no  cause; 
it  sweeps  the  ground  from  under  our  feet;  it  places  you  where  no  man  can 
stand  with  you,  and  where  you  cannot  stand  alone."54 

Buchanan  did  not  give  up  easily  and  argued  at  length,  but  at  last 
he  gave  in.  "Here,"  he  said  to  Black.  "Take  this  paper  and  modify  it  to 
suit  yourself,  but  do  it  before  the  sun  goes  down."  Before  Black  hurried 
off,  Buchanan  added,  "I  cannot  part  with  you.  If  you  go,  Stanton  and  Holt 
will  leave."55 


"MR.  LINCOLN,  WILL  YOU  HELP?" 

Although  Buchanan  did  not  want  to  lose  his  ministers,  their  threatened 
resignation  was  not  the  only  reason  for  his  change  of  mind.  For  a  month 
Buchanan  had  been  quietly  trying  to  isolate  South  Carolina  by  forcing 
conservative  Republicans  to  endorse  some  kind  of  conciliatory  measure. 

Because  of  the  confused  party  structure  of  Congress,  decisive 
action  there  seemed  unlikely  but  not  impossible.  Unfortunately  for  com- 
promise hopes,  recent  state  elections  showed  that  the  Republicans  would 
lose  some  seats  in  the  new  Congress  of  December,  1861.  A  number  of 
Republicans  thus  believed  that  their  party  would  benefit  if  some  of  the 

381 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


southern  states  seceded.    Without  these  southern  lawmakers,  the  Republi- 
cans  would  control  the  next  Congress. 

The  House  created  a  Committee  of  Thirty-three  to  report  a 
program  of  compromise  on  the  sectional  crisis.  Its  early  meetings  exposed 
the  facts  that  the  Democrats  could  not  agree  among  themselves  and  that 
the  Republicans  did  not  want  to  settle  current  problems  by  compromise. 
Its  southern  members  wrote  to  South  Carolina  a  week  before  secession  that, 
so  far  as  they  could  see,  "all  hope  of  relief  is  extinguished." 

The  Senate  delayed  even  talking  about  the  secession  movement 
until  December  18,  two  days  before  it  became  a  fact.    On  that  day  Senator 
John  J.  Crittenden  of  Kentucky,  a  Whig,  presented  a  comprehensive  plan 
of  compromise  which  became  the  center  of  national  interest  from  then 
until  March  4.    He  proposed  an  extension  of  the  Missouri  Compromise  line 
prohibiting  slavery  to  the  north  of  it,  but  guaranteeing  protection  in 
territories  to  the  south;  the  admission  of  new  states  with  or  without  slavery 
as  their  constitutions  should  provide;  no  abolition  of  slavery  in  the  District 
of  Columbia  or  of  the  local  slave  trade  in  the  South;  payment  for  fugitive 
slaves;  improvement  in  the  enforcement  of  the  Fugitive  Slave  Law;  and 
firm  suppression  of  the  overseas  skve  trade.    The  day  South  Carolina 
seceded  the  Senate  appointed  a  Committee  of  Thirteen  to  consider  these 
proposals  to  avert  secession.    The  nation  looked  with  hopeful  anxiety  to 
the  Senate  Committee,  for  the  Crittenden  proposals  had  brought  widespread 
public  approval,  and  the  Committee  personnel  represented  every  geographic 
sectidn  and  every  important  political  viewpoint.    Work  was  delayed  until 
December  24,  however,  because  Seward  was  out  of  town.    As  chief  repre- 
sentative of  the  Republicans,  his  views  would  be  essential,  for  he  would 
bring  Lincoln's  response  to  the  Crittenden  measures  directly  to  the  Com- 
mittee. 

By  Christmastime  Buchanan  had  despaired  of  any  effective  action 
from  Congress  and  decided  to  try  a  behind-the-scenes  manipulation  of 
political  and  financial  strings  to  force  a  statement  from  Lincoln.  At  first 
he  hoped  that  Lincoln  would  come  to  Washington  for  a  face-to-face  talk; 
but  the  president-elect  refused  to  leave  Springfield,  and  Buchanan  had  to 
work  through  agents. 

Lincoln  already  agreed  .with  Buchanan  on  some  aspects  of  seces- 
sion. They  both  thought  that  it  could  be  contained  within  a  few  states 
and  that  these  would  probably  return  quietly  to  the  Union  in  due  course  if 
war  could  be  averted.  Buchanan  could  concur  with  Lincoln's  statement  of 
December  17  that  "it  is  the  duty  of  the  President,  and  other  government 
functionaries  to  run  the  machine  as  it  is,"56  The  real  question  was:  by 
what  means  could  war  be  averted?  Buchanan  had  faith  in  the  Crittenden 
plan,  but  if  that  should  fail  he  intended  to  fall  back  upon  the  chief  recom- 
mendation of  his  message,  a  national  constitutional  convention.  Would 

382 


CURSED  ARE  THE  PEACEMAKERS  •  1860 


Lincoln  lend  his  support  to  this?    Some  leading  Republicans  thought  he 
would.    Buchanan  also  began  to  hope  so. 

Thurlow  Weed,  editor  of  the  Albany  Evening  Journal  and  a  well- 
known  figure  on  Wall  Street,  had  come  out  boldly  for  a  restoration  of 
the  Missouri  Compromise  line  in  his  edition  of  November  24.  People 
assumed  that  this  trial  balloon  had  been  released  by  Seward.  From  the 
day  Congress  convened,  Seward  had  been  expressing  his  fear  that  five  states 
might  secede  and  his  belief  that  the  Republicans  would  have  to  act  to 
prevent  it.  In  the  absence  of  any  leadership  from  Lincoln,  Seward  hoped 
to  take  the  Republican  helm  and  steer  the  party  to  a  conservative  course, 
that  is,  to  keep  the  door  open  to  compromise  and  thus  preserve  peace.  But 
the  Journal  editorial  raised  such  a  storm  among  the  radical  Republicans 
that  Seward  repudiated  agency  in  it  on  December  5.  Three  days  later 
Lincoln  offered  him  the  State  Department. 

During  the  first  two  weeks  of  December  Lincoln  wrote  many 
letters  declaring  that  he  would  not  budge  one  jot  on  the  subject  of  the 
further  extension  of  slavery,  but  die  more  Seward  observed  in  Washington, 
the  more  convinced  he  became  that  compromise  alone  could  avert  war, 
and  that  the  Republican  party  ought  to  participate  in  the  effort.  He  had 
his  Cabinet  post;  he  could  now  act  more  freely. 

On  December  10,  Lincoln  invited  Weed  to  come  to  Springfield. 
The  next  day  Weed  informed  Lincoln  of  a  plan  to  have  Republican  gover- 
nors meet  in  New  York  on  December  20  to  discuss  compromise  measures 
and  promote  harmony  within  the  party.  There  was  a  clear  hint  of  political 
pressure  in  the  announcement57  Seward  conferred  with  Weed  in  Albany 
on  December  15  and  16  and  told  him  to  obtain  Lincoln's  assent  to  some 
kind  of  Republican  compromise  proposal.  On  December  17  Weed's  paper 
came  out  a  second  time  in  favor  of  the  Missouri  line.  This  stand,  on  the 
heels  of  Seward's  repudiation  of  the  idea,  was  so  ill-timed  and  so  defiant  of 
the  Republican  party  policy  that  it  caused  widespread  comment.  What 
was  behind  it?  Seward  certainly  intended  to  force  a  statement  from  Lincoln 
on  the  plan  that  Crittenden  was  just  about  to  present  to  the  Senate.  Weed 
would  bring  back  the  answer.68 

New  York  City  for  the  next  week  became  the  headquarters  for 
frantic  compromise  activity.  The  financiers  and  merchants  who  stood  to 
lose  some  $150,000,000  in  long  term  notes  owed  them  by  the  South  became 
thoroughly  frightened  by  the  news  of  secession,  and  a  panic  ensued.  Politics 
and  finance  united  in  New  York  in  the  persons  of  August  Belmont,  national 
chairman  for  the  Douglas  Democrats;  Samuel  L.  M.  Barlow,  a  Buchanan 
party  leader;  Thurlow  Weed  and  others.  Judah  P.  Benjamin,  Louisiana 
financier-politician,  and  Duff  Green  of  South  Carolina  also  figured  in  the 
compromise  efforts  of  the  New  York  businessmen. 

383 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


On  the  day  of  secession,  several  Republican  governors  met  in 
New  York,  Weed  interviewed  Lincoln,  and  Royal  Phelps  wrote  to  Buchanan 
that  Seward  had  just  told  him  that  the  Republicans  "are  doing  all  in  their 
power  to  have  the  Personal  Liberty  laws  repealed  ...  and  that  they  are 
willing  for  the  sake  of  the  peace  of  the  Country,  to  have  the  territorial 
question  settled  by  the  Missouri  Compromise  Bill  running  it  to  the  Pacific." 
Many  of  the  most  influential  Whigs  and  Republicans  had  written  Tom 
Corwin,  Chairman  of  the  Committee  of  Thirty-three,  "urging  him  to  advo- 
cate concessions."  The  New  York  Republicans  were  getting  up  a  meeting 
to  "cut  loose  entirely  from  Greeley  and  the  abolitionists."  "These  doings," 
he  concluded,  "are  conducted  very  privately."59 

Van  Buren  and  Belmont  wrote  to  Crittenden  and  Douglas  that 
the  Republicans  had  decided  to  compromise  on  the  Missouri  principle. 
The  news  was  soon  abroad,  and  the  abolitionists  bombarded  Lincoln  with 
warnings.    William  Cullen  Bryant  wrote  that  Lincoln  should  beware  of 
"a  plan  manufactured  in  Wall  Street"  and  that  "the  restoration  of  the 
Missouri  Compromise  would  disband  the  Republican  party."60    Another 
letter  assured  the  president-elect  that  there  were  "multitudes  here  who  will 
plunge  into  blood  to  the  horses  bridles"  to  defend  the  Chicago  Platform- 
young  men  full  of  "a  spirit  of  fierce  rebellion  against  any  compromise."61 
Barlow  had  been  conducting  a  vigorous  correspondence  with 
southern  leaders,  particularly  Slidell  and  Benjamin,  counselling  patience 
and  reason.    The  North  had  not  elected  Lincoln,  he  said,  but  the  stupidity 
of  the  Democrats;  Lincoln  would  be  powerless  unless  the  southerners  quit 
Congress.    Peaceful  secession  was  a  delusion.    The  North,  in  alarm,  was 
receding  in  horror  from  the  results  of  abolitionism  but  if  the  South  started 
a  revolution  the  North  would  unite  solidly  in  opposition.    A  constitutional 
convention  should  solve  all  the  problems.62 

Barlow  told  Benjamin  that  Weed's  compromise  articles  had  been 
written  by  Seward;  that  the  governors  had  agreed  that  the  slavery  issue 
ought  to  be  decided  by  the  present  Congress  on  the  basis  of  the  Crittenden 
proposals;  that  Weed  had  gotten  Lincoln's  assent  to  this  method  of  settle- 
ment; that  Lincoln  had  assured  Weed  that  he  would  break  with  the  aboli- 
tionist faction  of  the  party  if  necessary;  and  that  the  Missouri  line  proposal 
would  pass  the  House  with  the  aid  of  the  needed  Republican  votes.  Seward, 
Barlow  said,  would  oppose  this  proposal  in  order  to  maintain  the  appearance 
of  party  regularity  but  would  nevertheless  deliver  enough  Republican  votes 
to  pass  the  measure.  This  report  does  not  agree  with  Weed's  recollections 
but  the  discrepancies  are  less  important  than  the  fact  that  Barlow  sent  this 
story  to  Benjamin  on  December  26.  Important  southern  leaders  had 
assurance  from  a  source  they  trusted  that  the  Republicans,  led  as  they 
presumed  by  the  conciliatory  Seward,  had  committed  themselves  to  an 
adjustment.63 


384 


CURSED  ARE  THE  PEACEMAKERS  •  1860 

But  affairs  did  not  stand  as  Barlow  reported.  Lincoln  had  vetoed 
the  Crittenden  plan  and  had  given  Weed  written  instructions  to  govern 
Seward's  course  in  the  Committee  of  Thirteen.  They  constituted  more  an 
insult  than  a  compromise,  considering  the  Committee  personnel.  Lincoln 
said  that  Congress  ought  to  pass  a  new  fugitive  slave  law  without  the  clause 
which  required  private  persons  to  assist  in  its  execution,  that  all  state  laws 
in  conflict  with  federal  laws  "if  there  be  such"  ought  to  be  repealed,  and 
that  the  Union  ought  to  be  preserved.  Seward  presented  these  terms  to  an 
expectant  Committee.  Editor  W.  M.  Browne  wrote  that  Seward's  talk 
"almost  made  a  disunionist  out  of  Crittenden."  Within  the  Committee, 
all  base  for  compromise  had  been  wiped  out.64 

Buchanan  had  not  entertained  much  hope  that  the  Republicans 
could  be  moved  to  accept  the  Missouri  line.  "I  have  no  reason  to  believe," 
he  wrote  to  Phelps  on  December  22,  "that  this  is  at  present  acceptable  to 
Northern  Senators  and  representatives,  though  the  tendency  is  in  that 
direction.  They  may  arrive  at  this  point  when  it  is  too  late."66  But  Seward's 
capitulation  to  Lincoln,  and  Lincoln's  apparent  capitulation  to  the  radicals 
of  his  party  dramatically  changed  the  issue.  The  Union  Democrats  who 
had  continually  urged  compromise  and  who  had  been  led  by  Seward  to 
expect  help  from  him,  now  suddenly  found  their  hopes  dashed  when  they 
were  brightest.  There  had  been  as  little  warning  of  Seward's  change  of 
position  as  of  Anderson's.  That  they  occurred  simultaneously  confirmed 
the  worst  fears  of  the  South.  Compromise  was  dead,  killed  by  false  promises 
of  the  Republicans  and  betrayal  by  the  Administration. 

Buchanan  now  considered  the  time  ripe  for  his  final  effort.  If 
Lincoln  would  not  compromise,  if  Congress  would  not  compromise,  would 
the  Republicans  permit  the  people  of  the  United  States  to  express  then- 
views  in  a  constitutional  convention?  This  would  not  be  a  compromise;  it 
would  be  only  a  recognition  of  the  validity  of  constitutional  government. 
He  sent  Duff  Green  to  Springfield  to  ask  Lincoln  about  a  convention.  Green 
wrote  back  the  night  of  his  interview,  Friday,  December  28,  that  Lincoln 
thought. that  "the  question  on  the  amendments  to  the  Constitution  and 
the  questions  submitted  by  Mr.  Crittenden  belonged  to  the  people  and 
states  in  legislatures  or  conventions,  and  that  he  would  be  inclined  not  only 
to  acquiesce,  but  to  give  full  force  to  their  will  thus  expressed."66  Though 
foggily  phrased,  this  sounded  like  good  news;  Lincoln  would  back  a  con- 

vention. 

Lincoln  had  asked  Green  to  call  again  at  9  o'clock  the  next 
morning  to  receive  a  written  statement  which  Green  planned  to  telegraph 
to  Buchanan.  Lincoln  wrote  the  letter  on  Friday  night  but  apparently  did 
not  give  it  to  Green  on  Saturday,  for  he  had  changed  his  mind.  He  sent 
the  letter  to  Senator  Lyman  Trumbull  first,  requesting  him  to  deliver  it  to 
Green  if  he  approved  its  message.  "I  do  not  desire  any  amendment  to  the 

385 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Constitution,"  it  read.  But  Lincoln  would  not  permit  this  statement  to  be 
made  public  unless  "six  of  the  twelve  United  States  Senators  from  Georgia, 
Alabama,  Mississippi,  Louisiana,  Florida,  and  Texas  shall  sign  their  names 
to  what  is  written  on  this  sheet  below  my  name,  and  allow  the  whole  to  be 
published  together."  The  statement  pledged  the  southern  States  "to 
suspend  all  action  for  dismemberment  of  the  Union"  until  the  incoming 
Administration  had  committed  some  act  violating  their  rights, 

No  one  has  reported  what  Lincoln  said  at  the  second  interview, 
but  it  seems  certain  that  he  did  not  give  Green  any  further  encouragement. 
This  in  itself  should  have  told  Green  that  the  president-elect  had  backed 
away  from  his  statement  of  the  previous  day.  Green  had  orders  to  tele- 
graph Buchanan  the  moment  he  got  a  "satisfactory"  response  from  Lincoln. 
Did  he  telegraph  his  fears  on  Saturday  or  Sunday,  or  keep  silence  until 
he  got  Lincoln's  written  statement?  Either  course  meant  bad  news  to 
Buchanan. 

It  seems  likely  that  by  Sunday  afternoon,  December  30,  Buchanan 
had  either  learned  from  Green  that  Lincoln  would  not  endorse  a  convention 
or  anticipated  this  result  from  Green's  silence.  Certainly  if  Lincoln,  who 
knew  Buchanan's  crisis  as  well  as  anyone,  had  not  responded  by  Sunday 
to  Green's  plea  of  Friday  morning,  he  was  not  likely  to  respond  favorably. 
With  these  thoughts  running  through  his  mind,  Buchanan  guessed  that  he 
would  get  no  help  from  Lincoln.  This  opinion  brought  him  to  the  end  of 
the  first  phase  of  his  policy,  his  attempt  to  achieve  some  constructive 
action  to  allay  southern  fears.  He  now  embarked  on  the  second  phase  and 
told  Black  to  rewrite  the  reply  to  the  South  Carolina  commissioners.67 

Buchanan  soon  learned  the  text  of  Lincoln's  letter  to  Green.  It 
had  been  framed,  he  saw,  to  repel  the  pledge  demanded  of  the  South,  thus 
keeping  secret  Lincoln's  rejection  of  a  convention.  Lincoln  had  quoted 
copiously  from  the  Chicago  Platform  and  now  asked  the  southerners  to 
suspend  secession  in  return  for  an  endorsement  of  the  Republican  articles 
of  faith.  Buchanan  could  not  repress  a  wry  smile  at  such  a  transparent 
"offer."  Yet  it  helped  him  to  interpret  Lincoln.  The  man  certainly  had  a 
grip  on  practical  politics.  He  had  done  exactly  what  Buchanan  himself  had 
done  in  1856  when  called  upon  to  answer  difficult  questions  as  spokesman 
for  a  faction-ridden  party — quoted  the  platform.  Buchanan  now  recognized 
that  Lincoln  did  not  dare  to  support  any  peaceful  move  which  might  settle 
the  crisis  for  fear  of  disrupting  his  own  party.  But  Lincoln  had  significantly 
emphasized  a  particular  sentence  from  the  Chicago  Platform.  "I  denounce," 
he  quoted,  "the  lawless  invasion,  by  armed  force,  of  the  soil  of  any  State 
or  Territory,  no  matter  under  what  pretext,  as  the  gravest  of  crimes."  In 
short,  he  could  not  afford  to  come  out  openly  for  compromise,  but  he  did 
not  want  war.  This  was  language  a  politician  could  understand. 

386 


CURSED  ARE  THE  PEACEMAKERS  •  1860 


Black  and  Stanton  worked  over  the  reply  to  the  commissioners, 
and  on  the  basis  of  their  recommendations  Buchanan  rewrote  his  own 
draft,  mostly  by  editing  out  the  parts  that  Black  had  condemned.68  He  held 
his  ground  on  the  "gentleman's  agreement,"  stating  that  he  had  never  sent 
reinforcements  or  authorized  any  alteration  of  the  status  of  the  forts.  He 
quoted  the  orders  to  Anderson  and  then  wrote,  "it  is  clear  that  Major 
Anderson  acted  upon  his  own  responsibility."  His  "first  promptings"  to 
have  Anderson  return  had  been  nullified  by  the  summary  seizure  of  the 
forts  by  South  Carolina,  "without  waiting  or  asking  for  any  explanation." 
Buchanan  said  he  could  find  no  ground  for  any  grievance  of  South  Carolina, 
accused  the  state  of  stealing  half  a  million  dollars  in  federal  property,  and 
stated  his  intention  "to  defend  Fort  Sumter  .  .  .  against  hostile  attacks, 
from  Whichever  quarter  they  may  come."69  The  stunned  commissioners 
replied  to  this  on  January  2  in  an  angry  blast  which  the  Cabinet  termed  "so 
violent,  unfounded  and  disrespectful"  that  Buchanan  returned  it  with  the 
endorsement:  "This  paper,  just  presented  to  the  President,  is  of  such  a 
character  that  he  declines  to  receive  it."70 

The  simultaneous  failure  of  parleys  with  the  Republicans  and 
with  the  secessionists  unnerved  Buchanan  more  than  anything  that  had 
yet  happened.  Importuned,  threatened,  warned,  begged,  pushed,  pulled, 
and  shoved  in  every  direction,  bombarded  by  plans  and  propositions  until 
he  resentfully  complained  that  he  had  not  time  even  to  say  his  prayers,  the 
president  at  length  became  distraught  and  despaired  of  achieving  a  solution. 
His  two  chief  hopes— that  conservative  Republicans  might  give  a  little  help 
and  that  his  erstwhile  southern  friends  might  continue  to  trust  his  pacific 
intentions— both  blew  up  in  his  face  at  once.  He  believed  that  he  and  his 
advisors  represented  the  views  of  a  vast  majority  of  Americans,  but  the 
Administration  no  longer  spoke  for  any  political  party.  The  only  two 
organized  parties,  the  inflexible  secessionists  and  the  unyielding  Republi- 
cans, controlled  the  issue.  Their  leaders  offered  no  quarter.  Their 
representatives  in  Congress  united  their  votes  to  prevent  the  registration 
of  public  opinion  in  a  convention  and  to  prevent  the  President  of  the 
United  States  from  obtaining  any  legal  means  to  handle  the  crisis.  There 
was  no  New  Year's  Eve  jollification  at  the  White  House,  December  31, 1860. 


387 


29 

FORTY  DAYS  AND  FORTY  NIGHTS  •  1861 

THE  STAR  OF  THE  WEST 

During  the  first  weeks  of  1861  Buchanan  leaned  heavily  upon  the  advice  of 

Black,  Holt,  Toucey,  and  Scott.    At  the  Cabinet  meeting  of  Wednesday, 

January  2,  they  considered  again  the  subject  of  reinforcing  Major  Anderson. 

Scott  had  written  a  few  days  before  that  he  could  instantly  supply  150 

recruits  and  ample  foodstuffs  to  Sumter  and  recommended  that  orders  to 

reinforce  be  issued.    He  also  urged  Buchanan  to  garrison  Forts  Taylor, 

Jefferson,  Pickens,  Jackson,  and  others  along  the  Gulf  Coast.    Some  of 

these,  which  controlled  access  to  the  Mississippi,  could  be  taken,  he  said, 

by  "a  rowboat  of  pirates."1    On  New  Year's  Day  South  Carolina  had  cut 

off  mail  service  to  Fort  Sumter,  seized  the  lighthouse  in  the  harbor,  and 

announced  that  all  United  States  ships  were  excluded  from  the  vicinity. 

It  had  been  during  the  discussion  of  these  matters  that  the  final  reply  of 

the  South  Carolina  commissioners  had  been  delivered  and  indignantly 

rejected.    As  the  president's  secretary,  Adam  Glossbrenner,  left  the  room 

to  return  the  commissioners'  letter,  Buchanan  exclaimed,  "It  is  now  over, 

and  reinforcements  must  be  sent."2   Secretary  Thompson  later  claimed  not 

to  have  heard  this  statement,  but  Toucey  and  Stanton  said  they  did,  and 

Holt  must  have,  for  he  immediately  acted  upon  it.8 

Buchanan,  having  decided  to  reinforce  Anderson,  left  the  tactical 
arrangements  to  Holt,  Scott,  and  Toucey  with  the  understanding  that  they 
should  observe  the  utmost  secrecy  in  preparations.  They  hoped  to  send 
the  reinforcements  in  without  raising  an  alarm  and  encountering  resistance. 
Buchanan  and  Toucey  strongly  urged  the  use  of  the  navy's  Z7*  5. 5.  Brooklyn, 
but  General  Scott  insisted  that  a  ship  of  lighter  draft  should  be  chosen  to 
prevent  grounding  on  the  bar.  The  sidewheel  merchant  steamer,  Star  of 
the  West,  was  therefore  chartered,  quietly  loaded  with  foodstuffs  at  New 
York,  and  then  ordered  to  proceed  down  the  bay  to  the  Narrows  where  she 
took  on  recruits  out  of  sight  of  the  public  eye.  The  men  were  ordered 

388 


FORTY  DAYS  AND  FORTY  NIGHTS  •   1861 


below  decks  in  order  that  the  steamer  might  appear  to  chance  observers  as  a 
commercial  vessel.  She  weighed  anchor  on  January  5.4 

On  the  same  day  Buchanan  got  further  word  from  Major  Anderson 
that  he  considered  his  command  safe  in  its  present  position  and  that  the 
government  could  reinforce  him  at  its  leisure.  On  hearing  this,  Scott,  with 
Buchanan's  approval,  sent  word  posthaste  to  stop  the  relief  expedition,  but 
the  ship  had  sailed  shortly  before  the  countermanding  orders  arrived. 
That  night  a  visitor,  after  spending  an  hour  with  Buchanan,  reported, 
"I  have  never  seen  him  so  solemn.  ...  He  remarked  that  nothing  but  the 
interposition  of  all-wise  Providence  could  save  our  Country  —  that  he  had 
despaired  of  being  able  to  do  anything  himself."5 

Rumors  of  the  expedition  soon  got  into  print.  In  fact,  to  expect  to 
carry  out  any  government  maneuver  in  secrecy  was  almost  a  fool's  hope. 
No  war  existed;  no  censorship  or  martial  law  had  been  proclaimed;  and 
government  officers  felt  within  their  rights  to  report  to  their  political 
friends  what  was  going  on.  Seward,  for  example,  had  just  assured  Lincoln 
that  he  had  "gotten  a  position  in  which  I  can  see  what  is  going  on  in  the 
Councils  of  the  President."  Stanton  had  agreed  to  "leak"  to  him.  Others 
wrote,  "I  am  not  sure  who  are  my  friends  anymore."6 

The  pro-Union  Cabinet  members  kept  Thompson  and  Thomas  in 
the  dark  about  the  relief  expedition,  but  they  learned  of  it  through  the  press. 
Thompson  immediately  resigned  the  Interior  Department.  He  had  told 
Black  at  the  end  of  the  Cabinet  meeting  of  January  3  that  he  would  have 
to  do  so  if  Buchanan  sent  reinforcements.  On  the  day  the  Star  of  the  West 
sailed,  he  had  telegraphed  to  friends  in  South  Carolina  and  Mississippi  that 
no  troops  had  been  sent,  "nor  will  be,  while  I  am  a  member  of  the  Cabinet."7 
Naturally,  he  felt  he  had  been  deceived,  and  with  good  reason.  Buchanan 
promptly  accepted  his  resignation,  asserting  that  Thompson  had  no  cause 
for  complaint,  since  the  decision  to  reinforce  had  been  made  openly  in  a 
Cabinet  meeting.  But  Thompson  had  not  so  understood  the  meaning  of 
Buchanan's  remark  at  that  meeting,  and  it  seems  probable  that  the  matter 
was  left  vague  at  that  time  in  order  that  he  should  not  know  the  exact  plans. 
Although  his  resignation  would  have  been  unmistakable  evidence  that 
more  troops  were  on  the  way  to  Sumter,  Thompson  informed  his  southern 
friends  of  the  reinforcements  the  moment  he  learned  the  truth.  Many 
condemned  him  for  treason,  but  that  judgment,  if  it  had  been  generally 
applied,  would  have  made  a  traitor  of  almost  every  politician  in  the  land, 
for  practically  all  of  them  were  passing  important  news  along  to  their 
fellow-citizens. 

Thompson  thought  the  President  had  treated  him  shabbily  and 
Buchanan,  while  trying  to  justify  himself,  knew  that  Thompson  was  right. 
But  he  had  to  sacrifice  Thompson  in  order  to  protect  the  expedition.8  Kate 
Thompson  reacted  characteristically:  "Now  you  can  guess  what  I  think  of 


389 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


the  President's  heart— as  Hack  as  the  man  of  War  Brooklyn.  .  .  .  Judge 
Black  is  the  meanest  man  living Stanton  ...  a  mean  low-life  Pen- 
Scamp.  I  wish  I  was  a  Military  Dictator.  I  would  take  his  head  off  to  the 
tune  of  Yankee  Doodle!"9 

For  a  few  days  after  his  repulse  of  the  South  Carolina  commis- 
sioners Buchanan  had  been  something  of  a  hero  in  the  North.  He  seemed 
at  last  to  provide  a  rallying  point  for  "union-loving  men."  One  of  Harriet 
Lane's  correspondents  reported  that  in  New  York  "you  could  read  the 
President's  course  .  .  .  on  the  faces  of  the  people  in  the  streets,"  a  deep  and 
patriotic  feeling  rare  in  that  cosmopolitan  city.  "Our  suburb  of  Brooklyn,^" 
wrote  this  confident  gentleman,  "has  more  population  than  South  Carolina's 
whites  ,  , .  &  our  fire  department  would,  I  think,  be  able  alone  to  protect 
the  government  from  her  misdeeds,*'10 

But  after  the  Star  of  the  West,,  driven  off  by  shore  batteries,  had 
returned  with  its  cargo,  northern  denunciation  fell  upon  Buchanan,  and 
the  southern  leaders  joined  the  chorus.  Mrs.  Gwin,  who  stated  at  this  time, 
"lam  not  yet  a  secessionist"  wrote  that  "The  feeling  here  with  the  Southern 
members  is  most  violent  against  the  President.  The  denunciation  of  him 
is  fearful.  I  often  wonder  how  he  can  stand  i*.  He  has  given  up  his  evening 
walk.  I  think  that  makes  him  feel  worse.  ...  My  heart  warms  to  the 
President.  1  feel  for  and  love  him.  I  think  him  a  better  man  than  the 
world  gives  him  credit  for.  He  looks  badly.  His  face  indicates  much 
unhappiness  &  when  I  see  him  I  feel  like  comforting  him,  but  you  know 
him  well  enough  to  know  no  one  could  approach  him  in  that  way."11 
Phil  Clayton,  former  Treasury  official,  spoke  of  the  bitterness  of  the 
southern  Senators  against  Buchanan,  and  William  Browne,  editor  of  the 
Constitution,  was  beside  himself  with  rage.12 

Within  a  few  days  Philip  F.  Thomas,  the  last  of  the  Cabinet 
who  had  any  strong  southern  leanings,  resigned  from  the  Treasury  De- 
partment and  Buchanan  decided  to  give  that  post  to  John  A.  Dix  of  New 
York.  Mrs.  Thompson  sneered,  "Mr.  Dix  is  in  his  glory  with  an  empty  box 
(no  money),"18  Buchanan  could  find  no  one  suitable  to  take  the  Interior 
Department  and  finally  assigned  the  work  to  the  Chief  Clerk,  Moses  Kelly. 
By  January  11  the  Cabinet  had  again  become  a  unit,  representing  views 
which  coincided  with  the  president's. 


WHAT  WILL  CONGRESS  DO? 

These  views  became  much  more  sharply  defined  during  January.  The 
customs  collector  at  Charleston  had  resigned  when  Anderson  moved  to 
Fort  Sumter.  On  the  day  of  decision  to  reinforce  Sumter,  Buchanan  had 
sent  to  the  Senate  his  nomination  for  a  new  collector,  one  Peter  Mclntire 

390 


FORTY  DAYS  AND  FORTY  NIGHTS  •   1861 

of  York,  Pennsylvania,  who  would  be  ordered  to  receive  duties  from  the 
deck  of  a  naval  vessel.  The  Senate  refused  to  confirm  him. 

On  January  8,  Buchanan  sent  to  Congress  a  special  message 
concerning  relations  with  South  Carolina.  "The  prospect  of  a  bloodless 
settlement  fades  away,"  he  warned.  He  intended  "to  collect  the  public 
revenues  and  to  protect  the  public  property"  so  far  as  existing  laws  per- 
mitted, but  "my  province  is  to  execute,  and  not  to  make,  the  laws." 
Congress,  and  Congress  alone  had  the  responsibility  and  the  power  to 
authorize  the  use  of  troops,  to  declare  war,  or  to  legislate  the  removal  of 
grievances.  "We  are  in  the  midst  of  a  great  revolution,"  he  said.  "The 
present  is  no  time  for  palliations;  action,  prompt  action  is  required."  But 
he  added,  "the  Union  must  and  shall  be  preserved  by  all  constitutional 
means"  That  part  of  Buchanan's  policy  infuriated  the  direct-action  men. 
He  repeated  that  although  neither  the  president  nor  Congress  had  any 
constitutional  authority  to  make  aggressive  war  on  a  state,  "the  right  and 
duty  to  use  military  force  defensively  against  those  who  resist  the  federal 
officers  ...  am/  ...  assail  the  property  of  the  federal  government  is  dear 
and  undeniable.99 

Buchanan  appealed  again  for  the  question  to  be  "transferred 
from  political  assemblies  to  the  ballot  box"  where  the  people  would  soon 
achieve  a  solution.  "But,  in  Heaven's  name,  let  the  trial  be  made  before 
we  plunge  into  armed  conflict  upon  the  mere  assumption  that  there  is  no 
other  alternative."  From  the  beginning,  concluded  the  president,  he  had 
determined  that  if  the  difficulties  were  to  end  in  war,  no  act  of  his  should 
commence  it,  "nor  even  .  .  .  furnish  an  excuse  for  it  by  any  act  of  this 
government.  My  opinion  remains  unchanged."14 

This  policy,  to  collect  the  revenue,  to  defend  the  public  property, 
if  assaulted,  to  avoid  any  provocative  act,  and  to  strive  for  a  full  expression 
of  public  opinion  outside  of  Congress,  constituted  Buchanan's  program 
for  the  remainder  of  his  term.  In  addition,  he  determined  to  give  every 
inducement  to  the  border  states  to  remain  in  the  Union  and  took  action  to 
protect  the  national  capital  against  any  southern  effort  to  prevent  the 
peaceful  inauguration  of  Lincoln. 

The  inactivity  of  Congress  convinced  Buchanan  that  although 
the  Republicans  agreed  with  his  policy  and  had  nothing  different  to  propose, 
they  nonetheless  did  not  wish  a  solution  of  the  crisis  during  a  Democratic 
Administration.  He  presumed  that  they  would  proceed  with  the  same 
program  once  they  came  to  power  and  thus  take  credit  for  a  triumphant 
result  which,  if  Buchanan  achieved  it,  would  annihilate  their  party. 
Lincoln's  repudiation  of  the  use  of  armed  force  indicated  that  the  new 
Administration  would  not  pursue  a  course  of  coercion.15 

The  Senators,  north  and  south,  knew  that  in  refusing  to  confirm 
Buchanan's  nomination  for  a  customs  collector  at  Charleston  they  deprived 

391 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


the  president  of  the  only  legal  means  he  had  to  call  up  the  militia.  Had 
such  a  federal  officer  appealed  for  aid,  Buchanan  could  have  mobilized 
forces  under  existing  law;  without  such  an  appeal  he  could  not  mobilize 
troops  except  by  special  act  of  Congress.  Proposals  to  enact  such  special 
legislation  were  repeatedly  introduced  and  voted  down  in  Congress  by  a 
combination  of  Republicans  and  secessionists.  But  why,  asked  some  of 
the  proponents  of  "action"  and  a  "bold  policy,"  did  not  the  president  forget 
about  the  law  and  use  the  army  in  his  own  name?  Buchanan  never  dignified 
such  suggestions  by  a  formal  answer,  but  he  could  have  recited  the  reasons: 
impeachment,  no  army,  no  money,  no  public  support,  which  even  dictators 
need.  But  most  important,  such  a  course  would  destroy  exactly  what  he 
was  trying  to  save — a  government  under  law. 

When  on  January  16  the  Senate  was  asked  to  consider  the  least 
controversial  point  in  the  Crittenden  plan,  whether  to  initiate  a  constitu- 
tional convention,  every  Republican  voted  against  letting  the  question  even 
come  to  the  floor.  Thus  ended  the  work  of  Jie  Committee  of  Thirteen.16 
Baron  Stoeckl,  Russian  Minister  in  Washington,  commented  that  the  great 
Congressional  leaders  of  the  past  had  been  replaced  "by  men  undis- 
tinguished either  by  ability  or  reputation.  Totally  lacking  in  patriotism, 
they  have  but  one  purpose:  the  increase  of  the  antislavery  agitation.  .  .  . 
They  preach  war  against  the  South  and  demand  the  extirpation  of  slavery 
by  iron  and  fire."17 

Under  these  conditions  Buchanan  had  to  manage  the  last  two 
months  of  his,  Administration.  Because  he  had  no  control  in  Congress,  he 
was  forced  by  the  Republicans  to  follow  Lincoln's  policy  of  "masterly 
inactivity."  The  Congress  rejected  seriatum  each  element  of  Buchanan's 
active  policy:  extension  of  the  Missouri  line,  confirmation  of  a  customs 
collector  at  Charleston,  a  constitutional  convention,  and  a  new  force  bill 
which  would  enable  the  president  to  mobilize  troops  for  use  in  federal  law 
enforcement.  Buchanan  was  a  seasoned  enough  politician  to  know  better 
than  to  try  single-handed  to  break  the  stalemate  imposed  by  the  disunionists 
and  the  Republicans.  As  the  best  hope  of  peace  and  reunion,  he  reconciled 
himself  to  Lincoln's  passive  position  and  continued,  by  the  exercise  of  that 
self-control  and  the  art  of  diplomatic  parley  he  had  so  long  practiced,  to  try 
to  hold  the  government  together.  He  hoped,  in  the  six  weeks  remaining  of 
his  term,  to  avoid  further  alarms  and  explosions  and  to  maintain  the  status 
quo.  This  in  itself  proved  a  task  of  the  utmost  complexity  and  delicacy. 
The  events  of  the  first  week  of  January  gave  impetus  to  the 
secession  movement,  for  the  Gulf  States  now  abandoned  hope  of  any 
sympathy,  even  from  Buchanan.  Georgia  elected  a  prosecession  convention 
on  January  2,  and  the  governor  seized  Fort  Pulaski  at  Savannah  the  same 
day.  Florida  and  Alabama  took  over  federal  property  in  their  area.  At 
Washington,  southern  Senators  planned  the  creation  of  a  confederacy  of 

392 


FORTY  DAYS  AND  FORTY  NIGHTS  •   1861 

seceding  states  to  be  brought  into  being  before  the  end  of  Buchanan's  term. 
By  the  time  the  Star  of  the  West  expedition  had  returned,  the  secession 
conventions  of  Mississippi,  Alabama,  and  Florida  had  already  begun  to 
meet,  and  popular  elections  in  Louisiana  and  Texas  showed  majorities 
for  secession. 

Senators  of  the  border  states  set  up  a  new  committee  to  break 
the  deadlock  which  Lincoln's  orders  had  created  in  the  Committee  of 
Thirteen  and  worked  out  new  modifications  of  the  Critteuden  plan  which 
Douglas  and  Buchanan  strongly  supported,  but  the  usual  combination 
of  Republicans  and  secessionists  defeated  the  resolution  to  introduce  the 
plan  for  discussion.  Following  this,  southern  Senators  telegraphed  their 
state  conventions  on  January  7  and  8,  "Secede  at  once."18  They  planned 
tentatively  to  have  a  general  convention  of  delegates  from  South  Carolina, 
Georgia,  Florida,  Alabama,  Louisiana,  Texas,  and  possibly  others  at  Mont- 
gomery, Alabama,  around  the  middle  of  February  to  create  a  new  general 
government. 

Buchanan  found  no  way  to  stop  such  activity,  but  he  did  see 
many  ways  to  prevent  the  upper  South  from  joining  the  disunion  move- 
ment and  to  keep  alive  hope  among  the  pro-Union  people  of  the  seceding 
states  who,  because  of  the  prevailing  excitement,  had  little  chance  to  air 
their  views.  Buchanan's  mail  brought  scores  of  letters  from  the  South 
asserting  that  most  southerners  were  "not  in  favor  of  Secession  uncon- 
ditional—We want  our  rights  in  the  Union  and  not  secession  out  of  it."19 


A  TEMPORARY  TRUCE 

But  Fort  Sumter  remained  the  matter  of  immediate  concern  to  the  president 
and  the  Cabinet.  Why  had  not  Major  Anderson  replied  to  the  fire  on  the 
Star  of  the  West?  His  guns  could  have  commanded  the  Charleston  shore 
batteries.  When  the  Star  came  in  close  to  Fort  Moultrie  in  the  dawn  of 
January  9,  the  captain  had  run  a  large  garrison  flag  up  and  down  the  fore- 
mast as  a  signal  for  Anderson  to  protect  the  ship.  But  he  had  no  orders 
to  do  so.  In  fact,  he  had  learned  only  by  accident  that  a  relief  expedition 
was  afoot.  The  major  had  discounted  the  news  as  rumor,  and  when  the 
vessel  appeared,  he  could  only  guess  its  contents  and  mission.  After  a 
consultation  with  his  officers,  he  determined  not  to  fire;  but  he  wrote 
immediately  to  Governor  Pickens  and  protested  the  assault  on  the  fl^g.  He 
also  demanded  a  disavowal  and  stated  his  intention  of  using  the  fort's  guns 
to  stop  all  subsequent  movement  of  ships  in  the  harbor. 

Pickens  responded  with  the  demand  that  Sumter  be  surrendered 
to  South  Carolina.  Still  lacking  official  information  of  the  attempt  at 
reinforcement,  Anderson  answered  that  he  intended  "to  refer  the  whole 

393 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


matter  to  my  Government,"  and  to  send  one  of  his  officers  to  Washington 
for  instructions.  Pickens  also  determined  to  send  an  emissary  to  Washing- 
ton  and  agreed  to  respect  a  local  "truce"  until  his  agent  returned.  Anderson 
sent  Lieutenant  Norman  J.  Hall,  and  Pickens  chose  Attorney  General 

Isaac  W.  Hayne. 

Before  these  gentlemen  arrived  in  Washington,  another  officer 
from  Fort  Sumter  had  already  reported  to  Buchanan  and  the  Cabinet. 
On  the  basis  of  his  statement,  Holt  wrote  to  Anderson,  approving  his 
decision  to  withhold  fire  in  the  absence  of  any  foreknowledge  of  the  relief 
mission,  and  said  that  the  government  would  not  again  send  reinforcements 
until  requested  to  do  so  but  would  make  a  "prompt  and  vigorous-  effort" 
the  moment  Anderson  asked  for  help,20 

Hayne  called  on  Buchanan  the  morning  of  January  12,  but  the 
president  told  him  he  should  communicate  only  in  writing.  Before  Hayne 
had  a  chance  to  submit  Governor  Pickens's  demand  for  the  evacuation 'of 
Sumter,  the  southern  Senators  descended  on  Hayne  to  force  him  to  delay. 
They  anticipated  rejection  of  Pickens's  letter  and  the  immediate  opening 
of  hostilities,  which  would  greatly  complicate  the  organization  of  the  new 
confederacy.  For  three  weeks,  Hayne's  mission  took  the  center  of  the 
stage  and  arguments  about  it  filled  reams  of  paper.  While  the  "truce" 
prevailed  at  Charleston  during  this  long  controversy,  Anderson  busily 
prepared  Fort  Sumter  for  action  and  South  Carolina  built  up  her  shore 
batteries  and  sank  hulks  across  the  entrance  to  the  harbor. 

The  truce  proved  both  a  boon  and  an  embarrassment  to  Buchanan. 
It  delayed  what  appeared  to  be  a  certain  outbreak  of  war,  but  at  the  same 
time  it  prevented  sending  another  expedition  which  the  Cabinet  now 
thought  necessary.  Black  particularly  insisted  upon  prompt  action  to 
garrison  Sumter  and  wrote  a  long  inquiry  to  Scott  about  practical  methods 
of  accomplishing  it,  but  the  General  failed  to  respond.  Instead,  without 
consulting  anybody,  he  released  to  the  press  his  strange  "Views"  of 
October  29th,  much  to  Buchanan's  disgust.  No  document  could  have 
given  secession  more  encouragement  than  this,  hitting  the  newspapers  on 
January  18,  1861. 

The  southern  Senators  during  the  last  two  weeks  of  January 
hounded  Buchanan  to  get  a  promise  from  him  either  to  withdraw  Anderson 
from  Sumter  or  to  pledge  not  to  send  any  aid  to  the  fort.  They  had  per- 
suaded the  South  Carolinians  that  if  they  could  get  this  much  out  of  the 
president,  the  demand  for  surrender  of  the  fort  could  safely  be  dropped. 
One  of  their  arguments  was  that  a  war  started  under  Buchanan  would  help 
only  Lincoln,  who  could  escape  the  responsibility  for  starting  it  while 
gaining  the  power  of  a  dictator  in  fighting  it.  Senator  Clay  of  Alabama 
called  on  Wednesday  afternoon,  January  16,  to  press  again  for  the  return 
of  Anderson  to  Moultrie,  under  a  Carolina  guarantee  that  he  would  have 

394 


FORTY  DAYS  AND  FORTY  NIGHTS  •  1861 


access  to  all  the  supply  facilities  in  Charleston  and  would  not  be  molested. 
It  was  understood  that  the  current  truce  would  last  only  until  Colonel 
Hayne  returned  to  the  South.  Buchanan  answered  that  he  "could  not  & 
would  not  withdraw  Major  Anderson  from  Fort  Sumter."21  He  was  not 
now  planning  to  order  reinforcements  to  Sumter,  he  said,  but  would  send 
aid  the  moment  Anderson  asked  for  it.  This  statement  left  the  matter  up 
to  Anderson. 

The  Cabinet  earnestly  discussed  the  reinforcement  question  at 
successive  meetings  during  the  last  two  weeks  of  January.  Black,  in  a 
letter  to  Buchanan  which  he  asked  the  president  to  keep  secret  from  the 
rest  of  the  Cabinet,  complained  about  the  gullibility  of  the  Administration 
for  believing  southern  threats  of  war.  The  refusal  of  the  Brooklyn  to  engage 
the  shore  batteries  which  were  firing  on  the  Star  of  the  West,  he  continued, 
had  made  the  government  "the  laughter  and  derision  of  the  world.'*  Black 
concluded,  "In  the  forty  days  and  forty  nights  yet  remaining  to  this 
administration)  responsibilities  may  be  crowded  greater  than  those  which 
are  usually  incident  to  four  years  in  more  quiet  times.  I  solemnly  believe 
that  you  can  hold  this  revolution  in  check,  and  so  completely  put  the 
calculations  of  its  leaders  out  of  joint  that  it  will  subside  after  a  time  into 
peace  and  harmony."22  He  hoped  for  an  early  reinforcement  of  Sumter. 

Buchanan  did  not  agree,  and  neither  did  General  Scott.  The 
Anderson-Pickens  truce  dragged  on  until  January  31,  when  Hayne  finally 
presented  Pickens's  letter  to  Buchanan.  Four  days  later  the  delegates  of 
the  six  states  that  had  already  seceded  met  at  Montgomery  to  frame  a 
constitution  for  the  Confederate  States  of  America,  Holt  replied  to  Hayne 
on  February  6,  commenting  on  the  "unusual  form"  of  Pickens's  request — 
"an  offer  on  the  part  of  South  Carolina  to  buy  Fort  Sumter  .  .  .  sustained 
by  a  declaration  .  .  .  that  if  she  is  not  permitted  to  ...  purchase,  she  will 
seize  the  fort."  The  United  States,  Holt  said,  would  keep  the  fort  and 
reinforce  it  whenever  Anderson  made  the  request.  The  next  day  Hayne 
delivered  his  answer,  which  Buchanan  termed  "insulting,"  and  speedily 
left  Washington.23  Buchanan  maintained  his  policy  on  Sumter  for  the 
rest  of  his  term.  Thenceforth,  the  Cabinet  debated  not  whether  to  reinforce 
Sumter  when  Anderson  should  call  for  aid,  but  how  to  'do  it. 

Scott,  Toucey,  and  Holt  prepared  a  relief  expedition  of  four  small 
Treasury  steamers  which  would  maintain  a  ready  status  in  New  York. 
Commander  J.  H.  Ward,  id  command  of  this  force,  had  orders  to  be  prepared 
to  sail  instantly  in  response  to  a  call  for  help  from  Major  Anderson,  The 
Administration  also  pondered  the  plan  of  Navy  Captain  Gustavus  V.  Fox 
who  proposed  a  convoy  of  several  large  ships  carrying  launches  and  two 
light-draft  harbor  tugs.  The  tugs  would  load  supplies  outside  the  harbor 
and,  protected  by  cotton  bales,  make  a  run  for  Sumter  in  darkness,  while  the 
launches  brought  in  the  troops.  Most  later  strategists  agree  that  Fox's  plan 

395 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


had  the  best  chance  of  success,  but  by  the  time  it  had  gotten  a  fair  hearing, 
the  southerners  had  arranged  to  buy  the  two  tugs  that  Fox  wanted  and  the 
plan  had  to  be  abandoned.  Scott  and  several  of  the  Cabinet  wanted 
Buchanan  to  send  Commander  Ward's  fleet  to  Charleston  before  the 
southern  batteries  grew  too  strong;  but  Buchanan  withheld  assent,  unless 
Major  Anderson  should  call  for  relief.  There  seems  little  doubt  that  both 
the  president  and  the  major  believed  a  relief  expedition  would  bring  an 
immediate  outbreak  of  war,  and  it  is  equally  probable  that  Buchanan 
believed,  if  he  did  not  know,  that  Anderson  would  make  no  appeal.  Thus 
Sumter  would  be  delivered  intact,  but  still  the  central  issue,  to  the  Lincoln 
Administration.  Lincoln  had  asked  for  this.  Buchanan  would  give  it  to  him. 

THE  FINAL  EFFORT 

Congress  all  the  while  continued  its  private  war  against  Buchanan.  The 
president  asserted  that  Congress,  "throughout  the  entire  session,  refused 
to  adopt  any  measures  of  compromise  to  prevent  civil  war,  or  to  retain  first 
the  cotton  or  afterwards  the  border  States  within  the  Union.*'24  In  addition 
to  sabotaging  every  compromise  proposal,  Congress  failed  to  provide  for 
any  judicial  process  in  South  Carolina  after  the  resignation  of  all  the 
federal  court  officers.  It  then  declined  to  give  the  president  any  authority 
to  call  out  militia  or  volunteers  to  help  suppress  insurrection.  Even  after 
Buchanan's  message  of  January  8  which  declared  the  existence  of  revolution 
and  reminded  Congress  of  its  exclusive  power  to  muster  troops,  no  bill 
authorizing  the  calling  of  militia  was  introduced  until  three  weeks  later, 
and  it  was  immediately  withdrawn.  Not  until  February  18,  two  months 
after  South  Carolina  seceded  and  ten  days  after  the  formation  of  the 
Confederate  States,  was  another  more  limited  militia  bill  proposed.  The 
House  killed  this  on  February  26  by  a  resolution  to  postpone.25 

Even  had  either  of  these  measures  passed,  Buchanan  could  not 
have  used  them  to  advantage  because  no  bill  was  ever  proposed  ceto  raise 
or  appropriate  a  single  dollar  for  the  defense  of  the  government  against 
armed  rebellion."  The  Senate  ignored  the  need  for  special  kws  to  imple- 
ment the  collection  of  duties  from  a  warship.  Bingham  of  Ohio,  on 
January  3,  had  reported  a  bill  similar  to  the  old  Force  Bill  of  Jackson's  day 
to  enable  the  president  to  collect  revenue  "either  upon  land  or  any  vessel," 
hut  the  Senate  let  it  lie  dormant  until  March  2,  and  then  voted  down  a 
resolution  to  consider  it.  People  asked  why  Buchanan  did  not  act  boldly 
on  his  own  without  consulting  Congress.  He  responded  that  to  have  done 
this  while  Congress  sat  ready  to  do  business  a  few  blocks  away  would  have 
been  to  make  war  not  only  on  South  Carolina  but  also  on  the  representatives 
of  the  whole  American  nation.  Buchanan  interpreted  the  persistent 

396 


FORTY  DAYS  AND  FORTY  NIGHTS  •  1861 


refusal  of  Congress  to  act  as  proof  "that  the  friends  of  Mr.  Lincoln  .  .  . 
believed  he  would  be  able  to  settle  existing  difficulties  ...  in  a  peaceful 
manner,  and  that  he  might  be  embarrassed  by  any  legislation  contemplating 
the  necessity  of  a  resort  to  hostile  measures."26 

But  Congressional  inaction  told  only  half  the  story.  Congress  did 
act  in  many  ways  to  embarrass  and  distract  the  president.  On  December  31, 
1860,  a  House  Committee  began  inquiry  into  the  question  whether  ex- 
Secretary  Floyd  had  been  engaged  in  a  conspiracy  to  ship  huge  quantities 
of  arms  from  northern  to  southern  arsenals.  The  Committee,  after  a 
thorough  investigation,  found  no  cause-  for  alarm.  It  learned  that  since 
January  1,  1860,  some  8500  of  the  best  army  rifles  had  been  distributed 
among  the  states,  of  which  the  South  got  less  than  one-fourth.  Of  heavy 
cannon,  the  South  received  only  one-third  of  the  distribution.  Inquiry 
into  the  Pittsburgh  heavy  ordnance  shipment  revealed  facts  already  told. 
Despite  the  failure  of  the  House  Committee  to  find  evidence  of  an  arms 
conspiracy,  many  northerners  preferred  to  believe  that  the  Buchanan 
Administration  had  knowingly  tried  to  arm  the  South  in  preparation  for 


secession.27 


On  January  16th  the  Senate  demanded  to  know  why  it  had  not 
been  asked  to  confirm  the  appointment  of  a  new  Secretary  of  War.  Bu- 
chanan replied  that  he  had  appointed  Holt  in  accordance  with  a  statute 
empowering  the  president  to  make  interim  Cabinet  appointments  for  a 
period  of  six  months  without  Senate  confirmation  and  implied  that  the 
Senators  should  have  been  acquainted  with  their  own  laws.28 

An  exasperating  controversy  arose  over  the  defense  of  Washing- 
ton. The  city  seethed  with  rumors  of  a  southern  conspiracy  to  take  posses- 
sion of  the  capital  before  Lincoln's  inauguration.  An  attempt  at  seizure 
could  be  entirely  practicable.  Buchanan  therefore  brought  extra  troops 
into  the  city  to  discourage  any  such  effort.  Since  the  threat  to  kidnap  him, 
he  could  take  seriously  the  rumored  plan  to  seize  Washington,  declare 
Breckinridge  president,  and  claim  the  city  as  the  capital  of  a  nation  com- 
posed of  the  southern  states  and  such  others  as  would  join  the  new  Adminis- 
tration. The  Republicans  feared  an  armed  southern  endeavor  to  prevent 
the  counting  of  the  electoral  votes  on  February  13. 

The  Howard  Committee,  appointed  to  consider  legislation  to 
strengthen  the  military  arm  of  the  president  in  accordance  with  his  January 
message,  investigated  evidence  of  a  conspiracy  to  capture  the  capital. 
Congress  got  into  the  peculiar  dilemma  of  fearing  an  attack  on  the  govern- 
ment if  no  troops  occupied  Washington,  and  fearing  an  attack  by  such 
troops  if  Buchanan  had  command  of  them.  They  thus  belabored  the 
president  simultaneously  for  having  too  small  and  too  large  a  force  in  the 
city.  Buchanan  mobilized  a  force  of  653  men  to  keep  the  peace.  When 
these  troops  arrived  after  the  return  of  the  Sumter  expedition,  tension  rose 

397 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


high  and  frightened  observers  wrote,  "Old  Buck  has  so  many  soldiers  there 
it  looks  more  like  a  Camp  Ground  than  a  City.  I  believe  the  poor  old  man 
is  crazy."29  "Constitution"  Browne  wrote  on  January  11  that  the  city  had 

become  "a  great  military  camp In  the  vacant  lots  behind  the  city  hall 

there  is  an  artillery  camp,  and  another  on  Capitol  Hill Orderly  officers 

are  galloping  through  the  streets  from  morning  till  night.*'30  Kate  Thomp- 
son reported  that  "the  Departments  are  all  filled  this  morning  with  guns 
and  pistols  stacked  ready  for  use.  Was  there  ever  such  Tomfoolery."*1 

But  it  did  not  seem  tomfoolery  to  Buchanan,  Black,  Holt,  or 
Scott.  Black  warned  the  President  that  "the  possession  of  this  city  is 
absolutely  necessary  to  the  ultimate  designs  of  the  secessionists.  ...  If 

they  can  take  it  and  do  not  take  it,  they  are  fools I  take  it  for  granted 

that  they  have  their  eyes  fixed  on  Washington.*'32    Buchanan  did  not 

answer  the  Committee's  inquiry  whether  he  had  actual  knowledge  of  a 

conspiracy  until  March  1,  and  then  only  under  urgent  pressure  from  Holt. 

After  the  Committee  reported  that  it  could  find  no  support  for  the  rumors, 

he  considered  the  matter  finished.    But  during  the  last  two  weeks  of 

February,  reports  spread  over  the  country  "intended  to  show  that  the 

safety  of  the  capital  [had]  never  been  menaced,  and  of  course  that  all .  -  . 

preparations  here  have  been  prompted  by  cowardice,  or  the  spirit  of 

despotism."38    After  Lincoln  had  come  into  Washington  by  stealth  in  the 

dead  of  night  to  escape  a  rumored  plot  to  kill  him  in  Baltimore  on  February 

22  and  the  newspapers  took  up  this  story,  the  attacks  on  Buchanan  for 

trying  to  protect  Washington  diminished.    On  March  1  he  sent  Congress 

a  message  explaining  his  reasons  for  bringing  troops  to  the  capital.    Of 

all  people  to  complain  about  this,  he  thought  the  Republicans  least  entitled 

to  the  privilege.34 

Along  with  excitement  about  conspiracy  in  Washington  came 
suspicion  of  subversion  elsewhere.  When  Holt  learned  that  the  Superin- 
tendent of  the  United  States  Military  Academy  at  West  Point,  Captain 
P.  G.  T.  Beauregard,  was  a  secessionist  sympathizer  he  dismissed  him. 
Slidell  stormed  into  the  White  House  demanding  that  Buchanan  disavow 
this  act;  but  the  president  declared  that  Holt's  acts  "are  my  acts  for  which 
I  am  responsible."35  Slidell  never  spoke  to  him  again. 

In  Buchanan's  mind  these  surface  flurries  assumed  much  less 
importance  than  Virginia's  'efforts  to  promote  a  national  expression  of 
opinion  through  an  "unofficial"  convention,  in  the  absence  of  the  real 
thing.  The  Virginia  Legislature,  on  January  19,  adopted  resolutions  invit- 
ing delegates  from  all  states  interested  in  promoting  peace  to  assemble  at 
Washington  on  February  4.  It  named  ex-President  John  Tyler  a  com- 
missioner to  the  President  of  the  United  States  and  Judge  John  Robertson 
a  commissioner  to  the  seceded  states  to  obtain  from  them  a  pledge  to 
refrain  from  hostile  action  until  the  convention  had  concluded  its  efforts. 


398 


FORTY  DAYS  AND  FORTY  NIGHTS  •  1861 


The  convention  was  asked  to  consider  the  Crittenden  plan  and  to  recom- 
mend constitutional  amendments  to  Congress.  The  proposal  obviously 
aimed  at  two  things:  first,  to  prolong  the  "truce"  in  Charleston  harbor 
which  Hayne's  imminent  return  would  automatically  terminate;  and 
second,  to  force  on  the  country  an  expression  of  public  opinion  independent 
of  Congress. 

Buchanan  submitted  Virginia's  resolutions  to  Congress  on 
January  28  with  his  enthusiastic  endorsement,  but  he  dulled  considerably 
the  impact  of  his  message  by  stating  emphatically  that  he  would  not  promise 
during  the  meeting  to  abstain  "from  any  and  all  acts  calculated  to  produce 
a  collision  of  arms."  Such  a  pledge  must  come  from  the  seceding  states, 
he  said,  and  "then  the  danger  .  .  .  will  no  longer  exist.  Defence  and  not 
aggression  has  been  the  policy  of  the  administration  from  the  beginning."36 
This  was  a  good  deal  less  conciliatory  than  the  Virginians  had  hoped,  but 
it  at  least  gave  official  recognition  to  their  proposal. 

Although  Congress  paid  no  attention  and  insulted  Virginia  by 
failing  even  to  refer  her  resolutions  to  committee,  twenty-one  states  sent 
delegates  to  the  Virginia  Peace  Convention.  Its  work  got  underway  on 
February  4,  the  same  day  that  the  Confederate  constitutional  convention 
began.  John  Tyler,  the  presiding  officer,  took  his  task  very  seriously,  for 
he  felt  that  Lincoln's  silence,  Buchanan's  legalistic  view  of  his  duties,  and 
the  continued  inaction  of  Congress  left  no  remaining  point  of  origin  for 
conciliatory  action  except  this  meeting.  The  conference  made  its  greatest 
appeal  to  the  border  states,  but  in  a  remarkable  way  it  furthered  the  interests 
of  almost  everyone.  It  gave  South  Carolina  a  good  excuse  to  avoid  termi- 
nating the  Sumter  truce  after  Hayne's  return,  the  secessionists  a  way 
to  gain  time  to  perfect  their  organization  and  preparations  for  future 
resistance,  and  the  Republicans  a  chance  to  pose  before  the  country  as 
supporters  of  conciliation  and  drive  a  wedge  between  the  border  states 
and  the  deep  South.  Buchanan  welcomed  any  delay  which  would  reduce 
the  danger  of  war  during  his  Administration  and  sought  all  the  encourage- 
ment anyone  could  offer  to  Unionists  in  the  border  region. 

Tyler  recognized  these  advantages  and  kept  in  close  touch  with 
Buchanan  to  prevent  the  slightest  rocking  of  the  delicate  balance  between 
the  South  and  the  Administration.  Even  before  the  sessions  began  he  had 
questioned  the  president  about  the  dispatch  of  the  Brooklyn  on  a  secret 
mission  and  the  rumor  that  the  troops  at  Fort  Monroe  had  turned  the  guns 
inland.  "When  Virginia  is  making  every  possible  effort  to  redeem  and 
save  the  Union,"  he  complained,  "it  is  seemingly  ungracious  to  have 
Cannon  levelled  at  her  bosom."37  Buck  assured  him  that  he  would 
investigate  the  cannon  story,  and  that  the  Brooklyn  had  gone  on  an  innocent 
assignment.  Actually  she  was  bound  for  Fort  Pickens  with  orders  to  stand 
by  unless  Florida  tried  to  take  this  position. 

399 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Tyler  later  urged  Buchanan  to  prevent  any  military  display  in  the 
annual  Washington's  birthday  parade  in  the  capital  for  fear  the  appearance 
of  federal  troops  might  emphasize  northern  preparedness  and  create  an 
incident.  Buchanan  explained  that  he  could  hardly  prevent  militia 
companies  from  marching  in  a  parade,  and  that  it  would  appear  odd  if  the 
United  States  Government  went  unrepresented  in  such  an  affair,  but 
nonetheless  he  promised  that  the  army  would  not  appear.  Unknown  to 
him,  Holt  had  already  issued  orders  calling  out  the  troops  and 
sent  an  announcement  to  the  newspapers.  When  Buchanan  learned  about 
it  late  the  night  of  the  21st,  he  asked  Scott  to  prevent  the  assembly  of  the 
troops.  The  citizens  of  Washington  waited  impatiently  for  the  parade  the 
next  morning,  and  after  an  hour's  delay  got  wind  of  the  news  that  the  affair 
had  been  cancelled.  Dan  Sickles  rushed  to  the  War  Department  where  he 
found  Buchanan  and  Holt  and  soon  convinced  them  that  more  trouble 
would  arise  if  the  parade  were  forbidden  than  if  it  were  permitted.  Wearily 
Buchanan  gave  in,  wearily  Scott  learned  the  orders  had  been  reversed  again, 
and  most  wearily  of  all,  the  officers  and  men  who  had  been  dismissed  several 
hours  before  got  back  into  their  uniforms  and  prepared  to  celebrate  the 
birthday  of  the  father  of  their  tottering  country.38 

The  Peace  Convention  in  the  meantime  worked  out  a  program 
which  its  members  believed  might  meet  Republican  objections  to  an 
extension  of  the  Missouri  line.  In  response  to  arguments  that  slavery 
could  not  exist  in  the  New  Mexico  region,  the  only  area  affected  by  an 
extension  of  the  line,  the  Republicans  had  protested  that  the  Missouri 
principle  would  legalize  slavery  in  new  territory,  say  Cuba  or  northern 
Mexico,  if  these  should  later  be  acquired.  The  convention  therefore  agreed 
to  make  the  acquisition  of  any  new  territory  nearly  impossible.  Lincoln 
termed  this  the  "one  compromise  which  would  really  settle  the  slavery 
question."  But  so  soon  as  the  compromisers  met  the  objections  of  the 
Republicans,  the  latter  found  new  ones  to  interpose.  The  Peace  Convention 
made  its  recommendations  at  the  end  of  February,  but  in  view  of  the 
opposition  to  them  from  the  radical  Republicans,  they  aroused  little  interest 
in  the  nation  and  none  at  all  in  Congress. 

Kentucky  proposed  that  Congress  call  a  convention  to  amend 
the  Constitution,  and  Buchanan  supported  this  proposal,  as  he  sustained 
eyery  attempt  to  bring  a  constitutional  convention  into  being,  but  it  got 
no  Congressional  consideration.  On  February  27  the  House  Republicans 
voted  down  even  the  proposed  Thirteenth  Amendment  which  stated  a 
part  of  their  own  party  platform — that  slavery  should  not  be  interfered 
with  in  the  states  where  it  already  existed.  Some  members  later  changed 
their  votes  and  this  measure  did  pass  at  the  end  of  the  session,  but  it 
accomplished  nothing. 

400 


FORTY  DAYS  AND  FORTY  NIGHTS  •   1861 


Of  these  events,  Roy  F.  Nichols,  historian  of  the  politics  of  the 
Buchanan  Administration,  writes,  "compromise  had  been  killed  by  two 
power  aggregates.  The  secession  Democrats,  confronted  with  loss  of  power, 
could  see  no  compromise  which  would  restore  their  accustomed  domi- 
nance. .  .  .  The  victorious  Republicans— the  new  power— eager  to  enjoy 
the  fruits  of  their  triumph,  could  see  nothing  in  compromise  but  the 
destruction  of  that  control  which  they  had  just  won."39  During  the  last 
two  months  of  his  term,  Buchanan  occupied  the  position  of  the  most 
important  official  of  the  United  States  government  who  remained  un- 
committed to  either  power  aggregate.  What  influence  he  had  lay  in  this 
position;  what  strength  he  had  lay  in  seeking  areas  of  honorable  agreement 
and  in  holding  the  balance,  a  tricky,  tightrope  procedure.  That  he  succeeded 
seemed  clear  from  the  attacks  on  him  by  both  the  secessionists  and  the 
Radical  Republicans. 

In  the  closing  months  of  his  stay  in  the  White  House,  Buchanan's 
old  southern  friends  put  him  down  as  "against  the  South."40  Mrs.  Thomp- 
son learned  with  amazement  that  one  of  her  friends,  calling  at  the  White 
House,  found  Senator  and  Mrs.  Lyman  Trumbull  there  "on  very  social 
terms"  with  Buchanan  and  Harriet.  "What  a  change!  .  .  .  Forney  wants 

to  make  up  with  the  President AH  their  old  friends  are  thrown  off  and 

new  ones  in  their  place."41  Another  southerner  reported  that  Buchanan 
had  "allowed  Holt  &  Scott  to  exercise  the  powers  they  have,  from  a 
knowledge  that  their  acts  will  conform  to  Lincoln's  policy.  .  .  .  There  has 
been  for  some  time  a  perfect  understanding  between  Lincoln  and  the  War 
Department."  Charles  F.  Adams  regarded  Seward  as  "the  guiding  hand  at 
the  helm  of  the  Buchanan  Administration."42 

Buchanan  still  maintained  cordial  relations  with  such  of  his 
former  friends  as  would  meet  him  on  purely  social  ground.  Even  after 
the  difficulties  which  led  to  the  resignation  of  the  Secretary  of  the  Interior, 
he  invited  the  Thompsons  to  a  farewell  dinner  at  the  White  House,  and 
they  reluctantly  accepted  the  invitation.  Said  the  once  vivacious  Kate, 
"I  went  in  with  the  Old  Chief.  Mr.  T.  with  Miss  Lane— &  Genl.  Dix  (who 
is  staying  there)  with  Mrs.  Ellis  (niece  of  the  late  W.  R.  R.  King),  who  was 
also  staying.  .  .  .  There  was  nothing  disagreeable  said  or  done,  but  I  felt 
very  much  embarrassed.  The  President  asked  me  at  dinner  who  was  to  be 
our  President"  She  told  him  Cobb.  It  was  Buchanan's  last  social  event 
of  the  old  style.43 

During  these  days  many  occasions  took  on  the  aspect  of  "the 
last."  Harriet,  especially,  felt  pangs.  Her  last  visit  to  the  "Lyons  Den," 
the  last  matinee  and  review,  the  last  dance.  "I  receive  so  many  evidences 
of  kindness  and  good  feeling,"  she  said,  "and  so  many  regrets  at  my  leaving 
that  it  makes  me  feel  very  sad."  Lincoln's  arrival  to  pay  his  first  call  at  the 
White  House  at  11  a.  m.,  February  24,  made  the  departure  seem  chillingly 

401 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


imminent  to  Harriet,  gloriously  close  to  her  nearly  prostrate  uncle.  Of 
Lincoln  she  wrote,  "the  glimpse  I  caught  of  him  was  the  image  of  Burns— 
our  tall,  awkward  Irishman  who  waits  on  the  door.  Burns  is  the  best 
looking,  but  I  only  had  a  side  view.  They  say  Mrs.  L  is  awfully  western, 
loud  &  unrefined."44 

The  press  of  last-minute  routine  came  as  a  welcome  relief  from 
the  incessant  pressure  of  the  past  two  months.  In  the  few  days  immediately 
preceding  the  inauguration,  the  Department  clerks  came  to  farewell  parties 
for  the  Old  Chief  at  the  White  House  and  the  judges  and  foreign  ministers 
called  to  pay  their  respects.  Copies  of  bills  had  to  be  hurried  to  and  from 
Congress  which  concluded  its  affairs  in  a  torrent  of  angry  talk  that  did 
nothing  to  reduce  the  mountain  of  unfinished  business. 

The  long  awaited  Fourth  of  March  blew  in  crisp  and  windy. 
Buchanan  spent  the  hour  before  noon  signing  the  final  bills  which  came 
from  the  tumultuous  proceedings  of  Congress.  While  he  was  thus  engaged 
in  the  president's  room  at  the  Capito1,  Holt  came  racing  in  excitedly  with  a 
dispatch  from  Anderson  which  had  just  arrived.  The  major  wrote  that  it 
would  now  take  20,000  men  to  reinforce  successfully  his  command  at 
Sumter!  But  there  was  no  time  to  handle  this  red  hot  chestnut  for  the 
parade  would  soon  begin.  Buchanan  ordered  his  carriage  and  went  to  pick 
up  the  president-elect.45 

Buchanan  and  Lincoln  drove  in  procession  from  Willard's  to 
the  Capitol,  chatting  affably  to  the  astonishment  of  many  onlookers  who 
seem  to  have  expected  that  they  would  be  pointing  pistols  at  each  other's 
heads.  Buchanan,  said  a  reporter,  "appeared  pale  and  wearied;  yet  his  face 
beamed  with  radiance,  for  he  felt  relieved  from  the  crushing  care  and 
anxiety  he  had  borne  for  four  years."46  He  turned  to  Lincoln  and  said, 
"My  dear  sir,  if  you  are  as  happy  in  entering  the  White  House  as  I  shall 
feel  on  returning  to  Wheatland,  you  are  a  happy  man  indeed."  Lincoln 
replied  with  courtesy,  "Mr.  President,  I  cannot  say  that  I  shall  enter  it  with 
much  pleasure,  but  I  assure  you  that  I  shall  do  what  I  can  to  maintain  the 
high  standards  set  by  my  illustrious  predecessors  who  have  occupied  it."47 
Of  more  small  talk  there  is  no  record.  The  two  entered  the  Senate  Chamber 
arm  in  arm  and  after  Hannibal  Hamlin  had  been  sworn  in  as  vice-president, 
the  whole  party  proceeded  to  the  East  Portico  for  Lincoln's  inaugural. 
Buchanan  sat  quietly  breathing  in  a  kind  of  freedom  he  had  not  known  for 
fifty  years.  He  was  out  of  politics.  He  could  go  home  in  peace;  peace  for 
himself  and  his  country. 


402 


30 

ON  THE  ROCK  OF  ST.  HELENA  •  1861-1868 

THE  OLD  PUBLIC  FUNCTIONARY 

On  the  night  after  Lincoln's  inauguration,  Buchanan  should  have  relaxed 
and  eased  his  spirits  in  Old  Custom  House  Madeira  at  the  home  of  his  host, 
Robert  Ould.  Instead,  he  held  another  Cabinet  meeting.  Anderson's 
letter  stating  that  it  would  require  20,000  troops  to  relieve  Fort  Sumter  had 
shocked  Buchanan.  The  next  morning  he  again  met  with  the  Cabinet  at 
the  War  Department  where  Holt  read  a  letter  which  he  planned  to  send  to 
Lincoln  along  with  Major  Anderson's  dispatch.  In  it  he  quoted  from 
Anderson's  earlier  reports  that  he  could  easily  hold  Fort  Sumter,  and  the 
War  Department  replies  that  reinforcements  would  be  sent  the  instant 
Anderson  should  request  them.  Holt  further  explained  to  Lincoln  the 
existence  of  the  force  which  for  over  a  month  had  been  waiting  in  New  York 
ready  to  sail  for  Sumter  on  a  few  hours  notice.  Before  Buchanan  left 
Washington  that  afternoon,  Holt  reported  that  he  had  sent  these  documents 
to  President  Lincoln.1 

At  two  o'clock  Buchanan  waved  farewell  to  the  friends  who  had 
gathered  at  Quid's  to  see  him  off  and  set  out  with  his  escort  to  board  the 
special  train  prepared  for  him  by  the  Baltimore  and  Ohio  Railroad.  He 
told  the  crowd  that  he  felt  confident  that  President  Lincoln  intended  no 
harm  to  anyone  in  the  South,  and  that  there  was  no  occasion  for  the  hostile 
reaction  of  some  of  the  southerners  to  his  election.  At  Baltimore  he 
received  a  wildly  enthusiastic  ovation  and  had  considerable  difficulty 
getting  through  the  crowds  to  the  home  of  his  host,  Zenos  Barnum. 
Although  he  had  already  made  one  speech  upon  leaving  the  train,  he  had 
to  make  another  at  eleven  that  night.  Leaning  out  of  an  upstairs  window, 
he  thanked  the  demonstrators  for  their  "attention  to  an  old  man  going  out 
of  office,"  They  responded  with  a  series  of  cheers  which  epitomized  the 
political  confusion  of  the  city.  "Three  cheers  for  Old  Buck."  'Three 
more  for  the  last  President  of  the  United  States."  "Three  for  the  South." 
"Three  for  the  Union,"  "Three  for  the  Border  States." 

403 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Buchanan's  party  left  the  next  morning  at  eight  for  Lancaster  in 
the  same  decorated  car  that  had  carried  it  to  the  inauguration  four  years 
before.  York  welcomed  the  ex-president  with  a  military  parade,  speeches 
and  a  "handsome  collation,"  and  Columbia  had  everything  in  readiness  for  a 
celebration,  but  the  train  arrived  so  late  that  it  stopped  there  only  momen- 
tarily to  add  cars.  Lancaster  gave  its  home-town  boy  a  hero's  welcome 
starting  with  a  blast  from  the  "Old  Buck  Cannon,"  a  34-gun  presidential 
salute,  and  the  ringing  of  church  bells.  There  was  a  two-mile  parade  from 
the  railroad  to  the  town  square  for  speeches,  and  another  to  Wheatland 
where,  as  a  final  flourish,  the  Baltimore  City  Guards  presented  a  poetic 
address  and  the  band  played  "Home  Sweet  Home."  Buchanan  was  a  little 
embarrassed.  His  latch  string  was  always  out,  he  said,  but  since  he  had  not 
had  time  to  lay  in  supplies,  he  hoped  they  would  all  call  at  some  future 

time.2 

During  the  first  month  after  his  return  to  Lancaster,  Buchanan 

savored  all  the  anticipated  delights  of  an  honored  retirement.    Wheatland 

teemed  with  visitors  who  came  to  bless  the  "old  Public  Functionary"  for 

pursuing  steadfastly  his  quest  for  peace  and  to  wonder  at  the  suddenness 

with  which  the  Republicans  had  adopted  Buchanan's  policy.     Musical 

organizations  came  out  in  the  evenings  to  serenade  in  the  hope  of  being 

invited  in  for  a  crack  at  Wheatland's  newly  stocked  cellar.    Buchanan 

enjoyed  strolling  about  the  estate  again.    He  loved  the  circular,  stone-girt 

spring  with  water  ten  feet  deep  and  so  clear  that  he  could  nearly  read  the 

lettering  of  a  new  coin  on  the  white  sand  at  the  bottom.    He  poked  into 

the  icehouse,  sniffing  the  wet  sawdust;  checked  on  the  supply  of  barked 

hickory  for  the  fireplace  in  his  study;  looked  at  his  horses  and  wondered 

what  to  do  with  the  new  carriage  he  had  bought  for  ceremonial  occasions 

in  Washington.   He  could  not  use  this  deluxe  conveyance  around  Lancaster 

without  becoming  a  butt  of  ridicule.   He  missed  Lara,  his  old  Newfoundland 

dog,  but  was  happy  that  the  chained  eagles  had  been  disposed  of.    In  the 

house  his  library  began  to  take  shape  again:   familiar  books  back  on  the 

familiar  shelves,  the  comfortable  chair  before  his  desk,  his  slippers,  the 

old  dressing  gown,  a  good  "segar,"  and  a  bottle  of  Madeira.   Life  was  almost 

worth  living. 

PRESIDENT  LINCOLN'S  POLICY 

The  newspapers  and  letters  on  his  desk  were  full  of  accounts  of  Lincoln's 
inaugural.  Offhand  he  could  not  see  much  in  it  that  he  had  not  said  himself 
on  many  occasions,  except  the  part  about  the  Supreme  Court.  The 
National  Intelligencer  reported  that  on  the  subjects  of  the  right  of  secession 
and  the  coercion  of  a  state,  Mr.  Lincoln's  opinions  appeared  to  be  "identical 
with  those  announced  by  Mr.  Buchanan  in  his  message  to  Congress  at  the 

404 


ON  THE  ROCK  OF  ST.  HELENA  •   1861  - 1868 


opening  of  the  late  session."3  The  North  Carolina  Standard  said  that  "so 
far  as  coercion  is  concerned,  Mr.  Lincoln  occupies  the  very  ground  occupied 
by  Mr.  Buchanan."4 

But  most  editors  treated  the  inaugural  with  a  wild  abandon  of 
partisan  prejudice  that  reminded  Buchanan  of  the  reception  of  his  own 
recent  messages.  Republican  papers  labelled  Lincoln's  language  "strong, 
straightforward,  manly,  plain,  terse,  all  bone  and  iron  muscle,  clear  as  a 
mountain  brook,"  and  characterized  by  "perspicacity,  unmistakable 
decision,  firmness,  integrity  and  will."  The  Democrats  called  it  "involved, 
coarse,  colloquial,  devoid  of  ease  and  grace,  bristling  with  obscurities  and 
outrages  against  the  simplest  rules  of  syntax,  trite,  commonplace,  lifeless, 
cold,  phlegmatic,  rambling,  discursive,  questioning,  loose-jointed,  feeble, 
and  unworthy  of  a  schoolboy."  A  neutral  editor  remarked  that  the  Re- 
publicans would  certainly  have  denounced  the  speech  had  Buchanan,  Cass, 
or  Douglas  made  it.5 

It  interested  Buchanan  particularly  that  the  Republican  press  now 
discovered  it  a  great  thing  to  enforce  the  laws  under  a  promise  "that  no 
blood  shall  be  shed"  unless  by  the  act  of  "those  who  resist  the  laws."  The 
idea  of  a  constitutional  convention  suddenly  became  respectable.6 

The  Republican  somersault  made  Buchanan  laugh,  but  it  angered 
him,  too,  and  he  decided  to  take  a  good  look  at  the  text  of  Lincoln's  inaugu- 
ral and  to  compare  it  carefully  with  his  own  messages.  He  discovered  that 
the  similarities  were  greater  than  he  had  at  first  suspected.  Where  he  had 
written,  "The  Union  was  designed  to  be  perpetual.  ...  Its  framers  never 
intended  ...  the  absurdity  of  providing  for  its  own  destruction,"  Lincoln 

had  paraphrased,  "The  Union  of  these  States  is  perpetual It  is  safe  to 

assert  that  no  government  proper  ever  had  a  provision  in  its  organic  law 
for  its  own  termination."  Buchanan  had  asserted,  "No  State  has  a  right 
upon  its  own  act  to  secede  from  the  Union,"  whereas  Lincoln  said,  "No 
State  upon  its  own  mere  motion  can  lawfully  get  out  of  the  Union."  Where 

Buchanan  had  proclaimed,  "My  province  is  to  execute  the  laws It  is 

my  duty  at  all  times  to  defend  and  protect  the  public  property  ...  as  far  as 
this  may  be  practicable,"  Lincoln  said,  "I  shall  take  care . . .  that  the  laws . . . 

shall  be  faithfully  executed  in  all  the  States  ...  so  far  as  practicable 

[My  power]  will  be  used  to  hold,  occupy  and  possess  the  property  belonging 
to  the  Government."  Where  Buchanan  had  stated,  "If  the  seceding  States 
abstain  efrom  a  collision  of  arms,1  then  the  danger  ...  will  no  longer  exist. 
Defence  and  not  aggression  has  been  the  policy  of  the  Administration," 
Lincoln  declared  that  "There  needs  to  be  no  bloodshed  ...  and  there  shall 
be  none,  unless  it  is  forced  upon  the  national  authority." 

Buchanan  wrote,  "The  people  themselves  would  speedily  redress 

the  serious  grievances In  Heaven's  name,  let  the  trial  be  made  before 

we  plunge  into  armed  conflict.  .  .  .  Time  is  a  great  conservative  power." 

405 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Lincoln  urged,  "Why  should  there  not  be  a  patient  confidence  in  the 
ultimate  justice  of  the  people?  .  .  .  Nothing  can  be  lost  by  taking  time." 
Buchanan  said  that  disunion  "ought  to  be  the  last  desperate  remedy  of  a 

despairing  people I  earnestly  recommend  an  'explanatory  amendment' 

of  the  Constitution  on  the  subject  of  slavery."  Lincoln,  who  had  rejected 
Buchanan's  plea  for  a  convention,  now  proclaimed  in  the  inaugural, 
"Whenever  [the  people]  grow  weary  of  existing  government,  they  can 
exercise  the  constitutional  right  of  amending  it.  ...  I  should,  under 
existing  circumstances,  favor  rather  than  oppose  [amending  the  Con- 
stitution].  I  will  venture  to  add  that  to  me  the  convention  mode  seems 
preferable."  Where  Buchanan  had  pleaded,  "If,  with  aU  the  ...  proofs  . . . 
of  the  President's  anxiety  for  peace,  [the  South]  shall  assault  Fort  Sumter 
and  thus  plunge  our  common  country  into  the  horrors  of  civil  war, 
then  upon  them  .  .  .  must  rest  the  responsibility,"  Lincoln  said,  "In  your 
hands,  my  dissatisfied  fellow-countrymen,  and  not  in  mine,  is  the  momen- 
tous issue  of  civil  war.  The  government  will  not  assail  you.  You  can  have 
no  conflict  without  yourself  being  the  aggressors."  So  far  as  Buchanan 
could  determine,  he  could  have  no  conflict  with  Lincoln  or  Lincoln  with 
him,  on  the  grounds  of  principle  or  policy  regarding  the  subjects  of  these 
quotations.7 

During  March  news  poured  into  Wheatland  steadily  from  the 
capital.  "I  need  not  tell  you  that  the  new  administration  is  a  failure*" 
wrote  Black.  "If  it  made  peace  its  abolitionist  force  would  desert  it;  &  if 
it  made  war  it  would  be  broken  into  fragments.  . . .  Everything  wears  the 
aspect  of  a  most  painful  uncertainty.  ...  It  now  seems  to  be  absolutely 
certain  that  Fort  Sumter  is  to  be  evacuated.  Sic  Transit."8  Dix  wrote,  "I 

envy  you  the  quietude  of  Wheatland.   There  is  none  here Fort  Sumter 

will  be  abandoned."9  Stanton  kept  Buchanan  as  well  supplied  with  inside  in- 
formation about  Seward's  plans  as  he  had  formerly  kept  Seward  acquainted 
with  Buchanan's  activities.  In  half  a  dozen  letters  between  March  10  and 
April  10,  Stanton  repeated  the  phrase,  with  the  words  underlined,  "Major 
Anderson  Witt  be  withdrawn"  "A  continuation  of  your  policy  to  avoid 
collision  will  be  the  course  of  the  present  administration,"  he  wrote.  "The 
embarrassments  that  surrounded  you  they  now  feel;  and  whatever  may  be 
said  against  you  must  recoil  against  them."10  Holt  also  reported  that 
Sumter  would  be  evacuated  and  advised  Buchanan  that  he  need  not  worry 
about  his  policy  on  Fort  Sumter;  the  Republicans  were  caught  in  the  same 
trap  and  could  not  adopt  coercive  measures  without  reversing  their 
announced  policy  of  peace  and  losing  the  border  states. 

These  rumors  emerged  in  part  from  Seward's  frantic  negotiation 
with  the  emissaries  of  the  Confederate  States  to  whom  he  gave  his  word 
that  the  Administration  would  order  Anderson  to  evacuate  Sumter  as  soon 
as  his  supplies  ran  out.  His  promise  proved,  however,  to  be  premature, 

406 


ON  THE  ROCK  OF  ST.  HELENA  •   1861  - 1868 


for  the  counsel  of  the  radical  Republicans  prevailed  and  Lincoln  took  a 
different  course.  By  April  3,  Stanton  reported  that  an  effort  would  be  made 
to  reinforce  Sumter.  By  the  10th,  talk  in  Washington  centered  on  the 
expectancy  of  an  immediate  outbreak  of  war.  Senator  Bigler  wrote  on  the 
llth,  "I  am  convinced  that  Mr.  Lincoln  is  about  to  initiate  civil  war."11 

One  feature  in  all  these  reports  especially  interested  Buchanan: 
the  idea  that  the  evacuation  of  Sumter  would  be  a  vindication  of  his  own 
policy.  "I  do  not  believe  there  will  be  much  further  effort  to  assail  you," 
wrote  Stanton.  "In  giving  reasons  for  their  action,  they  must  exhibit  the 
facts  that  controlled  you  in  respect  to  Sumter.'*  "I  do  not  think  there  will 
be  any  serious  effort  to  assail  your  administration  in  respect  to  Fort 
Sumter,"  he  added.  "That  would  imply  .  .  .  hostility  to  your  pacific 
measures."  Dix  wrote,  "I  tfrfafc  it  is  decided  to  withdraw  Major  Anderson 
without  holding  your  administration  to  any  responsibility  for  &,"12 

Buchanan  believed  that  here  lay  the  very  crux  of  the  matter. 
If  the  Republicans  should  abandon  Sumter  they  would  indeed  vindicate 
his  pacific  policy.  This  might  allay  the  excitement  in  South  Carolina, 
retain  the  loyalty  of  the  border  states,  and  avert  war;  but  it  would  be  sure 
to  split  the  Republican  party.  Furthermore,  a  war  might  still  break  out 
somewhere  else  and  in  this  event  the  Republicans  would  have  to  shoulder 
the  blame  for  it.  Buchanan's  name  was  already  indelibly  connected  with 
Fort  Sumter.  Hence  his  anxiety  that  the  fort  should  continue  a  symbol  of 
peace  and  reunion;  hence  also  tike  Republican  anxiety  that  if  a  war  had  to 
come,  it  ought  to  start  at  Sumter  where  they  could  blame  it  squarely  on  the 
Buchanan  Administration. 

The  adoption  of  a  reinforcement  policy  could  not  have  been 
easy  for  Lincoln  in  the  face  of  Anderson's  recent  estimate  of  forces  needed 
to  succeed.  General  Scott,  furthermore,  had  written  the  new  Adminis- 
tration strongly  urging  compromise  or  letting  the  South  go  out  in  peace. 
A  serious  effort  to  coerce,  he  warned,  would  take  300,000  trained  troops, 
$250,000,000,  and  two  or  three  years  of  hard  fighting.  Scott  advised 
Lincoln  to  permit  Anderson  to  evacuate  Sumter  when  his  food  supplies  ran 
out,  which  would  be  around  April  15.  Seward  advocated  the  same  plan; 
let  Sumter  go  on  the  ground  of  military  necessity,  but  hold  all  the  other 
forts  as  a  proclamation  of  future  policy;  and  set  up  a  naval  blockade. 
Lincoln  acted  initially  on  this  policy,  gave  orders  to  reinforce  Fort  Pickens 
as  a  sign  of  federal  purpose,  and  made  ready  to  give  up  Sumter  as  a  matter 
of  military  tactics.  But  on  April  7,  Lincoln  learned  that  the  relief  expedi- 
tion he  had  sent  to  Fort  Pickens  had  failed. 

At  that  moment  Lincoln  had  to  make  his  choice.  Against  the 
presumption  that  full-scale  war  would  follow  any  attempt  to  relieve 
Anderson,  he  had  to  weigh  other  factors:  that  the  abandonment  of  Sumter 
at  this  moment  would  invite  foreign  recognition  of  the  Confederacy;  that  a 

407 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


southern  attack  on  Sumter  would  unite  the  North  solidly  behind  the 
president  and  ensure  the  dominance  of  his  party;  that  a  war  would  not  in 
any  event  last  very  long;  and  that  the  Republicans  could  blame  it  on 
Buchanan.  The  Republicans  would  never  have  a  better  chance.  If  they 
missed  it,  they  might  have  to  fight  a  war  under  much  less  favorable  con- 
ditions. 

Lincoln  notified  Governor  Pickens  that  he  proposed  to  re- 
provision,  but  not  to  reinforce,  Major  Anderson  and  sent  off  the  relief 
expedition.  Anderson,  in  the  meantime,  had  already  notified  the  South 
Carolina  authorities  that  he  would  have  to  evacuate  Fort  Sumter  on  April  15 
because  he  had  no  more  food.  The  Confederate  Government  now  ordered 
General  P.  G.  T.  Beauregard  to  reduce  Fort  Sumter  before  the  relief  ships 
should  arrive.  At  dawn  of  April  12, 1861,  old  Edmund  Ruffin  yanked  a  gun 
lanyard  at  Fort  Moultrie,  sending  the  first  shell  arching  over  the  water 
toward  the  flag  at  Sumter.  He  wanted  the  privilege  of  initiating  the  war, 
but  the  Republicans  had  already  determined  to  award  that  dishonor  to 
James  Buchanan. 


THE  MAKING  OF  A  MYTH 

"The  Confederate  States  have  deliberately  commenced  the  civil  war,  & 
God  knows  where  it  may  end,"  Buchanan  wrote  to  his  nephew  the  morning 
he  heard  the  news.  "They  were  repeatedly  warned  by  my  administration 
that  an  assault  on  Fort  Sumter  would  be  civil  war  &  they  would  be  re- 
sponsible for  the  consequences."13  People  who  gathered  around  the 
bulletin  boards  m  Lancaster  had  no  idea  of  the  seriousness  of  the  news. 
They  boasted  they  would  go  south  and  wipe  out  "those  damned  nigger 
drivers"  in  a  month.  The  crowd  shouted  "Traitor"  at  a  man  who  said 
soberly,  "Gentlemen,  this  will  be  a  three  years*  war."  "Why,  man,  you're 
crazy,"  they  cried,  or  "Oh,  my  God,  this  means  nothing.  It'll  all  be  over 
in  a  month."14 

Buchanan  had  no  such  optimism.  From  Lincoln's  call  for  75,000 
volunteers  on  April  15  and  other  news  he  anticipated  grim  results.  During 
the  first  weeks  of  retirement  he  went  into  town  frequently  and  spent  many 
pleasant  hours  at  the  old  Grapes  Tavern  or  in  conversation  with  friends 
along  Lawyers'  Row.  Now  the  ugly  mutterings  that  he  had  better 
not  show  his  face  in  the  city  began  to  be  heard,  and  every  day  there  were 
"violent,  insulting  &  threatening  letters,"  especially  from  Philadelphia. 
Miss  Hetty  found  anonymous  notes  stuck  under  the  back  door  of  Wheatland 
which  warned  that  the  house  would  be  set  on  fire  some  night.  Buchanan 
refused  to  hire  a  guard  of  detectives  because  he  did  not  want  to  broadcast 
his  plight,  but  he  did  accept  help  from  the  local  Masons.  Lodge  #43  of 

408 


ON  THE  ROCK  OF  ST.  HELENA  •   1861  - 1868 


Lancaster,  of  which  he  had  been  past  master,  held  a  special  meeting  at 
which  each  member  pledged  "to  protect  his  person  and  his  property  from 
injury."  From  that  day  until  the  course  of  the  war  diverted  the  public 
interest,  several  Masons  stood  guard  at  his  home.15 

On  May  18  Harriet  heard  from  Sophie  Plitt  that  someone  in 
Philadelphia  had  printed  a  story  in  which  he  said  that  Dr.  Foltz  had  billed 
"Nunc"  for  medical  services  that  dated  from  1848.  Buchanan  had  actually 
received  a  bill  for  $1,000  on  March  8  and  had  asked  his  lawyers  to  obtain 
an  itemized  statement  under  the  physician's  oath  which  he  proposed  to 
send  to  Washington  "to  be  dealt  with  there  under  the  rules  &  regulations 
of  the  Navy  against  an  officer  for  abusing  and  vilifying  his  Commander  in 
Chief.  ...  I  think  a  Naval  Court  martial  would  make  short  work  of 
Dr.  Foltz."16 

Some  stores  exhibited  banknotes  which  bore  Buchanan's  vignette, 
the  eyes  bunged  with  red  ink,  a  gallows  drawn  above  his  head  with  a  rope 
around  his  neck,  and  the  word  "Judas"  inscribed  on  the  forehead.  The 
Pottsville,  Pennsylvania,  bank  had  to  call  in  its  issue  of  these  notes,  "so 
unmistakable,"  said  a  newspaper  account,  "are  the  manifestations  of 
popular  indignation  against  the  man  who  might,  had  he  had  the  will  or 
pluck,  have  nipped  this  rebellion  in  the  bud,  as  Jackson  did  before  him."17 

The  suddenness  of  the  attacks,  their  virulence  and  their  cruHeness 
sent  Buchanan  to  bed  with  a  bilious  seizure.  He  had  just  celebrated  his 
71st  birthday,  a  day  which  he  had  long  anticipated  as  the  time  when  he 
would  begin  to  enjoy  the  ease  of  an  honored  old  age  at  Wheatland.  Now  he 
knew  that  the  greatest  fight  of  his  life  still  lay  ahead.  These  assaults,  he 
believed,  were  not  spontaneous  or  mere  hysteria.  They  signalled  what  he 
had  feared  during  the  first  month  of  Lincoln's  Administration,  a  studied, 
calculated,  prearranged  campaign  against  him  with  the  object  of  making 
him  appear  to  be  responsible  for  the  war.  This  would  be  good  politics  for 
the  Republicans,  and  some  of  their  editors  would  do  the  job  with  relish 
and  without  scruple. 

For  the  next  five  years  Buchanan  faced  a  lonely  struggle  against 
overwhelming  odds  to  counteract  the  lies  about  him  which  filled  northern 
newspapers  in  intervals  between  the  more  exciting  battle  news.  The  Admin- 
istration temporarily  sealed  the  lips  of  those  who  might  have  refuted  many 
of  these  stories  with  offers  of  political  reward  and  threats  of  retaliation. 

President  Lincoln  announced  the  Republican  doctrine  on  war 
guilt  in  his  message  to  the  special  session  of  Congress  which  convened  on 
July  4.  Though  his  language  was  careful  and  restrained,  he  made  a  number 
of  charges  that  clearly  applied  to  Buchanan:  that  "a  disproportionate  share 
of  the  Federal  muskets  and  rifles"  had  found  their  way  to  the  South,  that 
quantities  of  money  lay  ready  for  seizure  at  southern  mints,  that  "the  Navy 
was  scattered  in  distant  seas,  leaving  but  a  very  small  part  of  it  within  the 

409 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


immediate  reach  of  the  Government;"  and  that  the  effort  to  reinforce 
Fort  Pickens  had  been  foiled  by  "some  quasi  armistice  of  the  late  Adminis- 
tration."  These  statements  from  such  a  source  carried  the  strongest 
implication  of  foul  play  by  the  Buchanan  Administration.  They  inaugurated 
serious  newspaper  efforts  to  foment  the  idea  of  a  Buchanan  conspiracy  to 
aid  secession,  an  undertaking  which  got  a  tremendous  additional  impetus 
from  the  shocking  defeat  suffered  by  the  North  at  First  Bull  Run  a  short 
time  later.  This  shattered  the  northern  pipe  dream  of  a  "three-months 
war,"  and  brought  home  brutally  an  awareness  of  the  titanic  struggle  which 
must  ensue.  The  author  of  such  a  terrible  war  must  be  made  to  pay.  The 
world  should  know  how  President  Buchanan  brought  this  holocaust  upon 
his  countrymen* 

Much  of  the  attack  fell  in  terms  too  vague  to  make  any  short, 
decisive  rebuttal  possible.  The  resolution  submitted  to  the  Senate  by 
Garrett  Davis  of  Kentucky  on  December  15,  1862,  put  the  charges  into 
official  language.  "Resolved,  That  after  it  had  become  manifest  that  an 
insurrection  against  the  United  States  was  about  to  break  out  in  several  of 
the  Southern  States,  James  Buchanan,  then  President,  from  sympathy 
with  the  conspirators  and  their  treasonable  project,  failed  to  take  necessary 
and  proper  measures  to  prevent  it;  wherefore  he  should  receive  the  censure 
and  condemnation  of  the  Senate  and  the  American  people."  The  resolution 
did  not  passt  but  Buchanan  nonetheless  received  the  public  "censure  and 
condemnation."  Said  he,  "If  two  years  after  a  Presidential  term  has 
expired  the  Senate  can  go  back  &  try,  condemn,  &  execute  the  former 
incumbent,  who  would  accept  the  office?"18 

Buchanan  quickly  learned,  as  the  assault  developed,  that  he 
could  not  make  any  public  defense  while  the  war  lasted.  His  first  short 
"Letter  to  the  Editor"  provoked  such  a  storm  of  denunciation  that  he 
resigned  himself  to  silence.  Any  explanation  he  offered  would  only  be 
seized  and  turned  as  a  weapon  against  him.  Hence  he  began  collecting 
documents  and  letters  which  he  hoped,  some  day,  to  publish  in  vindication 
of  his  presidential  policies.  In  the  meantime  he  catalogued  the  charges 
against  him  and  jotted  down  the  main  errors  in  them. 

Why,  the  newspapers  asked,  had  not  President  Buchanan  sent 
troops  to  Charleston  early  and,  like  Jackson,  nipped  secession  in  the  bud? 
Because,  he  noted  in  the  privacy  of  his  study  at  Wheatland,  his  Cabinet  and 
the  leaders  of  every  political  party  opposed  such  a  move  in  the  months 
before  Lincoln's  election;  because  General  Scott  saw  no  danger  until 
October  29,  and  at  that  time  he  could  muster  only  300  troops  (Congress 
would  not  authorize  a  call  for  more) ;  because  a  provocative  mobilization  of 
strength  at  Charleston  would  most  probably  activate  secession  and  war 
rather  than  avert  them;  because  no  one  knew  how  the  election  would  go  or 
what  Lincoln  might  have  to  say,  if  he  were  successful. 


410 


ON  THE  ROCK  OF  ST.  HELENA  *  1861  -  1868 


Why  had  Buchanan  not  cracked  down  immediately  when  South 
Carolina  seceded,  occupying  the  rebellious  state  by  troops  who  could 
enforce  obedience  to  federal  laws?  Because,  Buchanan  wrote,  no  request 
for  troops  had  come  from  any  federal  or  state  officer;  because  the  govern- 
ment could  not  attack  people  for  threatening  talk;  because  South  Carolina 
had  violated  no  law;  because  an  order  to  the  army  to  proceed  on  an  illegal 
mission  in  the  face  of  the  opposition  of  Congress  while  it  was  in  session 
would  be  an  attack  on  Congress  as  much  as  on  South  Carolina  and  would 
probably  have  brought  deserved  impeachment.19 

Why  had  Buchanan  negotiated  with  the  agents  of  secession  and 
made  one  truce  after  another  with  them?  But  he  had  not  negotiated  or 
made  any  truce,  he  asserted.  He  had  talked  with  some  United  States 
Senators  and  told  them  that  his  policy  would  be  peaceful,  but  he  had 
rejected  their  demand  for  a  pledge  of  the  status  quo  at  Sumter.  He  had 
talked  to  some  South  Carolinians  after  secession  as  "private  gentlemen," 
informing  them  that  he  would  hold  Fort  Sumter  and  reinforce  it  on 
Anderson's  request.  With  the  concurrence  of  his  Cabinet  he  had  honored 
a  limited  field  truce  entered  into  by  his  commanders  at  Forts  Sumter  and 
Pickens.  In  January  he  told  an  agent  of  South  Carolina  of  decisions 
already  made  public — that  Anderson  would  stay  in  Sumter,  had  orders  to 
resist  attack,  and  would  be  reinforced  whenever  he  called  for  help.  This 
was  not  negotiation  but  information.  If  anyone  had  negotiated  with 
secession  agents,  that  man  was  Seward. 

Why,  asked  the  press,  had  Buchanan  overruled  General  Scott's 
demand  to  send  the  warship  Brooklyn  to  Charleston  harbor  and  sent  the 
unarmed  Star  of  the  West  instead?  And  why  had  he  vetoed  Scott's  proposal 
to  send  reinforcements  after  the  Star's  failure?  Buchanan  assembled 
records  to  prove  that  these  assertions  exactly  contradicted  Scott's  position 
at  the  time.  Scott  had  rejected  the  Brooklyn  and  insisted  on  using  the  Star; 
he  had  favored  restraining  the  secret  relief  expedition  which  lay  in  readiness 
at  New  York  until  the  peace  convention  ended  or  Anderson  called  for  it.20 

Why  did  Buchanan  scatter  the  navy  all  over  creation  and  skeleton- 
ize the  home  fleet?  Toucey's  reports  which  had  already  been  examined  by 
two  Congressional  committees  showed  that  the  navy  'had  been  greatly 
expanded  under  Buchanan's  Administration  and  that  the  home  squadron 
had  been  abnormally  large,  but  the  press  did  not  publicize  this,21 

But  what  about  those  stolen  guns?  Republican  editors  insisted 
that  Buchanan  and  Floyd  had  connived  to  arm  the  South  in  anticipation  of 
the  rebellion.  Scott  even  published  a  telegram  ("from  a  high  officer— not 
of  the  Ordnance  Bureau")  purporting  to  show  that  the  South  had  drawn 
arms  far  in  excess  of  her  quota  in  1860.  Buchanan  had  before  him  reports 
from  officers  still  in  the  Ordnance  Bureau,  which  Congress  had  examined 
in  February,  1861,  showing  that  the  South  had  drawn  far  less  than  her 

411 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


quota  of  arms;  that  the  transfer  for  storage  of  obsolete  weapons  had 
occurred  a  year  before  the  election  of  1860;  and  that  he  had  personally 
intervened  to  prevent  the  first  and  only  suspicious  shipment  of  arms  to  the 
South— the  cannon  from  Pittsburgh.  As  to  militia  arms  quotas,  the  seven 
seceded  states  had  drawn  an  average  of  only  300  rifles  each  in  1860,  and 
three  southern  states  had  drawn  none  at  all.22 

Why  had  Buchanan  worked  hand  in  hand  with  Colonel  Twiggs 
who,  the  moment  Texas  seceded,  turned  over  his  United  States  command 
to  the  Confederates?  Was  not  this  the  rankest  treason?  It  was,  thought 
Buchanan.  He  had  cashiered  Twiggs  before  the  event  and  had  branded 
him  a  traitor  after  it.  Twiggs  had  threatened  to  visit  Wheatland  and  wreak 
personal  vengeance  on  the  "Old  Pub  Func"  for  the  insult.  But  the  press 
did  not  report  or  the  public  learn  it  thus.  The  popular  story  had  Buchanan 
retaining  Twiggs  in  command  so  that  he  could  deliver  his  post  to  the 

enemy.23 

On  February  9,  1862,  the  London  Observer  published  an  article 
prepared  by  Thurlow  Weed  that  galled  Buchanan  more  than  any  prior 
attack.  It  gave  a  garbled  account  of  a  dramatic  "cabinet  scene"  of  February, 
1861,  when  Floyd's  resignation  and  Anderson's  move  to  Sumter  allegedly 
came  under  discussion.  Weed  related  that  Buchanan  urged  Anderson's 
return  to  Moultrie  whereupon  Stanton  arose  in  cold  anger,  lashed  Floyd 
and  the  president,  and  scornfully  tendered  his  resignation.  Black,  Holt  and 
Dix  immediately  followed  his  lead.  "This  of  course  opened  the  bleared 
eyes  of  the  President,"  ran,  the  tale,  "and  the  meeting  resulted  in  the 
acceptance  of  Mr.  Floyd's  resignation."24  Such  a  story,  coming  from 
Weed  and  involving  men  who  could  readily  refute  it,  if  false,  received 
international  circulation  and  widespread  belief.  The  article  contained 
enough  internal  errors  to  condemn  it.  Anderson  had  moved  to  Sumter 
not  in  February  but  in  December;  Dix  had  not  yet  entered  the  Cabinet; 
Buchanan  had  asked  Floyd  to  resign  two  days  before  the  Sumter  movement 
took  place,  and  Stanton  had  not  opened  his  mouth  during  the  tense  meeting 
of  December  29— the  one  obviously  referred  to  by  Weed. 

Buchanan  called  Weed's  article  a  "tissue  of  falsehood"  and  asked 
his  old  Cabinet  members  to  disprove  this  story.  They  did,  in  letters  to  him; 
but  each  in  turn  insisted  that  no  refutation  be  made  public.  "Weed's 
letter  is  now  lying  before  me,"  .wrote  Black.  "The  story  is  wholly  fic- 
titious." But  to  Buchanan's  plea  that  he  repeat  this  statement  to  an  editor, 
Black  responded  that  "this  request  is  more  than  I  can  comply  with  at 
present."26  Horatio  King,  who  had  attended  the  meeting,  also  refused  to 
defend  Buchanan,  although  in  later  years,  after  the  myth  of  the  president's 
treason  had  been  firmly  established  in  the  public  mind,  King  wrote  a  book 
in  which  he  stated  the  facts  that  Buchanan  had  asked  frin?  to  verify  earlier. 
William  Flynn  wrote  to  Buchanan  that  "fear  of  Lincoln's  and  Seward's 

412 


ON  THE  ROCK  OF  ST.  HELENA  •   1861  -  1868 


penitentiary  . . .  has  greatly  weakened  the  power  of  the  pen. ...  I  showed 
the  Weed  letter  to  Mr.  Horatio  King,  and  asked  him  to  submit  it  to  the 
criticism  of  Mr.  Holt.  He  looked  scared  and  hegan  to  chaw,  remarking  that 
I  had  better  see  him  myself.  .  .  .  Power  and  patronage  have  a  wonderful 
and  mysterious  influence  upon  men."26 

General  Dix  would  not  state  publicly  that  at  the  time  of  the 
alleged  incident  he  had  not  yet  been  invited  to  join  the  Cabinet.27  Stanton, 
when  confronted  with  the  article,  "was  greatly  embarrassed"  but  made  no 
reply.  He  knew  that  Buchanan  had  a  dozen  letters  from  him  referring  to 
Lincoln  and  his  policies  in  the  most  scurrilous  language,  but  he  also  knew 
Buchanan  well  enough  to  be  sure  that  he  would  not  put  such  private 
correspondence  to  public  use,  even  to  defend  himself.  Holt,  like  Stanton, 
said  nothing.  Those  not  in  Lincoln's  employ,  such  as  Toucey,  hesitated  to 
speak  out  because  of  hostile  public  sentiment  and  fear  of  summary  im- 
prisonment, since  the  habeas  corpus  privilege  had  been  suspended. 

Buchanan  wrote,  "Is  it  not  strange  that  four  members  of  my 
Cabinet .  .  .  should  have  witnessed  without  contradiction  a  statement  made 
by  an  official  of  government .  .  .  that  they  had  one  after  the  other  offered 
me  the  grossest  insult?  Had  such  a  scene  transpired  in  my  Cabinet,  they 
should  not  have  been  in  office  fifteen  minutes."  "Well,  be  it  so,"  he 
concluded  philosophically,  "for  the  present:'  He  knew  the  difficulty. 
"They  all  stand  mute.  They  will  not  contradict  Weed,  who  is  powerful  & 
stands  high  with  Mr.  Lincoln.  They  are  willing  to  profit  with  their  new 
masters  by  the  slander,  rather  than  speak  a  word  of  truth  in  justice  to  the 
old  President.  ...  I  was  going  to  say,  such  is  human  nature,  but  I  will 
not  say  it  because  the  case  is  without  a  parallel."28 

Buchanan  often  commented  upon  the  peculiar  fact  that  five  of 
his  Cabinet  officers  had  been  awarded  federal  jobs  by  Lincoln  while  the 
Republican  party  editors  condemned  their  prior  activity  as  treasonable. 
The  jobs  were  not  very  good,  to  be  sure,  but  they  guaranteed  these  men 
some  immunity  from  the  Republican  tar  brush  while  at  the  same  time  they 
guaranteed  the  new  Administration  immunity  from  the  exposure  of 
Republican  prewar  obstructionism  and  of  the  recent  fabrications  against 
Buchanan.  This  was  the  deal  and  Buchanan  could  understand  why  his 
old  friends  took  it.  They  were  all  still  young  and  had  hopes  for  a  political 
future.  Dix,  Stanton,  and  Holt  actually  had  lively  ambitions  for  the  White 
House,  and  Black  for  the  Supreme  Court.29  For  the  time  being  they  would 
serve  menially.  Dix,  appointed  a  major  general  of  New  York  militia, 
received  such  scandalous  treatment  from  Secretary  of  War  Cameron  that 
he  resigned  but  later  accepted  command  of  the  Baltimore  police.30  Holt 
got  the  dirty  job  of  auditing  General  Fi6nont's  accounts  and  exposing  the 
massive  thefts  of  material  and  supplies  in  that  western  command.31  King 
consented  to  appraise  Negroes  in  Washington,  work  which  few  would  have 

413 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


taken  for  five  times  the  salary.32  Black  became  reporter  for  the  Supreme 
Court  when  he  should  have  sat  on  the  bench.  Stanton  alone,  master 
sycophant,  achieved  high  place;  he  supplanted  Cameron  in  the  spring 

of  1862. 

This  demonstration  that  the  wartime  gag  would  securely  muzzle 
even  the  staunchest  defenders  of  Buchanan's  Administration,  those  who 
had  themselves  comprised  it,  marked  the  point  at  which  Republican  editors 
knew  that  they  could  say  anything  without  fear  of  refutation.  Buchanan 
now  realized  that  he  stood  alone  in  his  fight  for  vindication.  But  during 
the  war  he  would  have  to  keep  quiet,  "on  the  rock  of  St.  Helena,"  as  he 
said,  watching  the  lies  piled  one  on  another  until  they  comprised  such  a 
mass  of  uncontradicted  vilification  that  neither  his  effort  nor  the  passage  of 
a  century  would  sponge  it  from  the  public  mind. 

Now  came  the  petty  assaults.  Congress  abolished  the  franking 
privilege  of  ex-presidents  in  order  to  gag  him.33  The  abolition  papers 
reported  that  Buchanan  was  in  constant  correspondence  with  foreign 
governments,  urging  the  recognition  of  the  confederacy;34  they  described 
in  vivid  detail  fictitious  copperhead  meetings  at  Wheatland,  complete  with 
lists  of  all  the  villainous  guests  who  were  supposed  to  have  been  on  hand 
for  the  plotting;35  and  even  on  one  occasion  announced,  on  successive  days, 
that  the  ex-president  was  in  Leamington,  England,  selling  Confederate 
bonds,  and  at  Bedford  Springs  plotting  with  spies.36  Suspicion  mounted 
so  high  that  his  outgoing  and  incoming  mail  was  opened  and  sometimes 
pilfered.37 

The  story  of  the  Indian  bonds  came  in  for  another  round  of  press 
coverage,  with  the  amount  rising  to  six  million  dollars  allegedly  stolen,  and 
Buchanan  was  made  the  culprit.38  The  Commissioner  of  Public  Buildings 
reported  that  he  had  to  remove  Buchanan's  portrait  from  the  rotunda  of 
the  Capitol  to  prevent  its  defacement.30  Thaddeus  Stevens  told  Congress 
that  Buchanan  had  swindled  the  government  out  of  $8,000  for  private 
furnishings  for  the  White  House-  The  Commissioner  of  Public  Buildings, 
who  disbursed  these  funds,  had  reported  as  early  as  1862  that  Buchanan 
had  kept  within  the  Congressional  allowance,  but  in  1866  Stevens  was  still 
franking  around  public  documents  containing  his  charge.  Buchanan  sent 
him  a  copy  of  the  commissioner's  published  report.  "Whether  you  may 
think  proper  to  correct  the  error  I  leave  entirely  to  your  own  discretion," 
he  said-  Stevens  corrected  it.40  New  York  papers  accused  Buchanan  and 
Miss  Lane  of  stealing  portraits  from  the  White  House  and  walking  off  with 
the  gifts  brought  by  the  Japanese.  It  appeared  that  the  pictures  involved 
were  the  portraits  of  the  British  royal  family  which  Victoria  had  sen* 
personally  to  Buchanan.  The  gifts  had  all  gone  to  the  Patent  Office  except 
a  couple  of  stuffed  birds  which  Harriet  had  brought  home.  Buchanan  held 
on  to  the  portraits  and  challenged  his  tormentors  to  let  Lord  Lyons  or 

414 


ON  THE  ROCK  OF  ST.  HELENA  •   1861  -  1868 


Victoria  herself  decide  the  question  of  ownership.  The  birds  he  would 
send  back  if  Harriet's  having  them  seemed  to  taint  the  national  honor.41 
A  sarcastic  squib  in  the  New  York  Tribune  announced  that  Buchanan  had 
forwarded  an  engraving  of  Harriet  to  the  publishers  of  the  Almanac  de 
Gotha,  social  register  of  European  royalty,  for  inclusion  among  the  reigning 
families.42  Another  report  erroneously  stated  that  Buchanan  had  been 
fired  as  President  of  the  Board  of  Trustees  of  Franklin  and  Marshall  College. 
One  editor  said  that  Buchanan  hoped  Lincoln's  troops  would  "die  like 
rotten  sheep"  in  the  South.  Such  trifling  but  vicious  stuff  kept  appearing, 
and  people  made  sure  he  got  the  clippings  in  his  mail.  "If  there  is  anything 
disagreeable  in  it,"  he  remarked,  "some  person  will  be  sure  to  send  it 

tome.'943 

After  Lincoln's  death  the  New  York  Post  and  the  Tribune  ran  a  sen- 
sational story  about  the  Cincinnati  Convention,  claiming  that  Jeremiah  S. 
Black  had  bought  the  votes  of  the  southern  secessionists  for  Buchanan  by 
pledging  him  to  work  for  a  southern  confederacy  during  his  Administration. 
Buchanan  answered  this  accusation  like  a  shot.  Jeremiah  S.  Black,  he 
wrote,  had  not  been  within  500  miles  of  Cincinnati  at  the  time  the  con- 
vention met.  A  Col.  Samuel  W.  Black  of  Pittsburgh  had  indeed  supported 
the  nomination,  but  he  had  since  died  for  the  Union  at  the  head  of  his 
regiment  in  the  field.44 

The  pattern  of  the  campaign  of  character  assassination  convinced 
Buchanan  that  it  was  the  deliberate  policy  of  the  Republican  party.  Dix 
had  warned  him  to  expect  this  when  he  explained  the  reasons  for  Lincoln's 
decision  to  draw  the  issue  at  Sumter.  'The  course  pursued,"  he  said,  "had 
been  the  means  of  fixing  the  eyes  of  the  nation  on  Sumter,  so  that  when  it 
fell  its  fall  proved  the  instrumentality  of  arousing  the  national  enthusiasm 

&  loyalty, to  maintain  the  honor  of  the  flag.'*46  Stanton  admitted  that 

"of  course,  an  attempt  will  be  made  to  cast  the  responsibility  on  you," 
adding  at  the  same  time,  "But  there  is  a  complete  defence,  as  we  know.'*46 
Buchanan  wrote  of  the  tide  of  abuse,  "It  is  one  of  those  great  national 
prosecutions,  such  have  occurred  in  this  &  other  countries,  necessary  to 
vindicate  the  character  of  the  Government.  .  .  .  The  world  .  .  .  have  for- 
gotten the  circumstances  .  .  -  [and]  blame  me  for  my  supineness.  ...  It 
will  soon  arrive  at  the  point  of  denouncing  me  for  not  crushing  out  the 
rebellion  at  once,  &  thus  try  to  make  me  the  author  of  the  war.  Whenever 
it  reaches  that  poifct,  it  is  my  purpose  to  indict ...  for  libeL"47  That  time 
came  very  quickly,  but  Buchanan  recognized  the  futility  of  lawsuits  against 
a  few  editors.  Forney,  Greeley,  and  Bennett  led  the  pack,  and  he  longed 
to  force  them  to  match  their  stories  under  oath  against  the  records  he  had. 
By  the  fall  of  1862,  he  had  accepted  the  inevitable.  'The  spirit  to  do  me 
injustice  still  prevails  in  the  Republican  party,"  he  wrote.  "They  will  at 
last,  without  the  least  just  cause,  endeavor  to  throw  the  responsibility  of 

415 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

the  war  on  myself.  Although  this  is  simply  ridiculous  in  itself,  they  will 
endeavor  to  make  it  appear  a  reality."48 

MR.  BUCHANAN'S  BOOK 

His  consuming  purpose  in  life  now  became  the  defense  of  his  policy,  his 
character  and  his  reputation— his  "vindication,"  as  he  called  it.  "Nobody 
seems  to  understand  the  course  pursued  by  the  late  administration,"  he 
complained.49  Black  at  first  strongly  urged  countenneasures.  "You  owe 
it  to  your  friends  and  to  your  country,"  he  wrote,  "to  give  them  a  full  and 
dear  vindication  of  your  conduct  &  character.  If  this  be  not  done,  you 

will  continue  to  be  slandered  for  half  a  century  to  come Nothing  is 

easier  than  a  perfect  defence  of  every  important  measure  which  you  ever 
adopted  or  carried  out."50  Black  offered  to  prepare  a  biography  for  $7,000, 
Buchanan  agreed,  and  Black  began  the  task. 

It  soon  became  evident,  however,  that  they  could  not  achieve 
historical  agreement.  Buchanan  had  firmly  endorsed  the  war  policy  since 
the  attack  on  Fort  Sumter  and  in  September,  1861,  sent  a  letter  to  a 
Democratic  political  meeting  in  Chester  County.  He  emphasized  in  this 
message  that  the  war  would  have  to  be  loyally  sustained  until  the  bitter  end 
and  urged  the  Democrats  to  stop  wasting  their  time  on  a  futile  demand  for 
peace  proposals.  The  minute  he  saw  this  letter,  Black  wrote: 

Your  endorsement  of  Lincoln's  policy  will  be  a  very  serious 
drawback  upon  the  defence  of  your  own.  It  is  vain  to  think  that 
the  two  administrations  can  be  made  consistent.  The  fire  upon 
the  Star  of  the  West  was  as  bad  as  the  fire  on  Fort  Sumter;  and 
the  taking  of  Fort  Moultrie  &  Pinckney  was  worse  than  either. 
If  this  war  is  right  and  politic  and  wise  and  constitutional,  I 
cannot  but  think  you  ought  to  have  made  it.  I  am  willing  to 
vindicate  the  last  administration  .  .  .  but  I  can't  do  it  on  the 
ground  which  you  now  occupy.51 

But  much  as  he  wanted  a  "vindication"  prepared  by  so  brilliant  a 
thinker  and  so  dose  a  friend,  Buchanan  would  not  agree  with  Black  that 
there  was  anything  but  a  superficial  similarity  between  the  threatening 
incidents  at  the  end  of  his  Administration  and  the  sustained  bombardment 
and  capture  of  Fort  Sumter  on  April  12.  He  also  disagreed  with  Black's 
view  that  the  war  itself  was  unconstitutional,  that  Lincoln  had  started  it, 
and  that  it  ought  to  be  stopped  as  soon  as  possible  by  a  negotiated  peace. 
Lincoln  had  no  choice,  said  Buchanan,  except  to  give  up  Sumter  or  to 
strengthen  it.  This  had  been  his  own  position:  to  abandon,  which  he  had 
refused  to  do,  or  to  reinforce  on  request  of  Anderson,  which  he  had 
equipped  a  force  to  do  on  two  hours'  notice.  And,  said  Buchanan,  he  would 
most  certainly  have  done  it,  but  no  request  came  from  Anderson.  "As  to 

416 


ON  THE  ROCK  OF  ST.  HELENA  •  1861 .  1868 


my  course  since  the  wicked  bombardment  of  Fort  Sumter,"  he  told  Black, 
"it  is  but  a  regular  consequence  of  my  whole  policy  towards  the  seceding 
States,  They  had  been  informed  over  &  over  again  by  me  what  would  be 
the  consequence  of  an  attack  upon  it.  They  chose  to  commence  civil  war, 
&  Mr.  Lincoln  had  no  alternative  but  to  defend  the  country  against  dis- 
memberment. I  certainly  should  have  done  the  same  thing  had  they  begun 
the  war  in  my  time,  &  this  they  well  knew."52  After  a  talk  with  Black  he 
ruefully  wrote  Harriet,  "I  presume  the  Biography  is  all  over.  I  shall  now 
depend  on  myself,  with  God's  assistance."53  Despite  the  difference  of 
opinion,  the  two  men  remained  warm  friends. 

Buchanan  now  set  himself  to  the  task  of  compiling  a  record  of 
his  Administration  from  the  published  documents  of  the  government  and 
the  private  correspondence  of  his  administrative  associates.  He  pestered 
his  friends  for  extracts  of  letters  he  did  not  have,  or  for  confirmation  of 
minor  points,  or  copies  of  fugitive  pamphlets  and  committee  reports.  They 
replied  with  speed  and  vehemence,  stating  generally  their  temporary  in- 
ability  to  find  the  data  he  wanted  and  pressing  him  in  the  strongest  terms 
not  to  publish  any  defense  of  his  Administration  while  the  war  continued. 
Even  Black  now  wrote,  "The  breath  that  kindled  those  grim  fires  of  per- 
secution  has  the  power  to  blow  them  into  sevenfold  wrath  and  plunge  us 
into  the  flames.  The  tribunal  that  condemned  you  against  evidence  will 
drown  your  defense  with  the  sound  of  its  drums."54  The  witch  hunt  had 
frightened  everyone,  and  the  last  thing  Buchanan's  friends  wanted  at  this 
moment  was  the  truth  about  the  political  events  preceding  Lincoln's 
inauguration.  The  Republicans  were  equally  unwilling  to  have  the  facts 
made  public;  they  would  crucify  anyone  who  attempted  to  give  a  true 
account. 

In  October,  1862,  General  Scott  gave  Buchanan  a  chance  to 
bring  part  of  his  defense  to  the  public.  The  National  Intelligencer  published 
a  long  article  including  Scott's  secret  letter  to  Seward  of  March  3, 1861,  and 
his  lengthy  "observations"  to  Lincoln  a  few  days  later.  Buchanan  had 
been  trying  unsuccessfully  to  get  copies  of  these  for  18  months.  "I  view 
it  as  a  merciful  dispensation  of  Providence,"  he  said,  "that  the  report .  .  . 
has  been  published  during  my  lifetime."55  The  communication  obviously 
invited  a  reply,  and  Buchanan  set  joyfully  to  the  task.  It  gave  him  a  chance 
to  publicize  his  defense  under  the  best  possible  conditions,  for  Scott's 
material  was  full  of  errors,  and  it  exposed  features  of  Lincoln's  early  policy 
which  the  Republicans  in  1862  vigorously  denied.  Buchanan  now  learned 
for  the  first  time  that  Lincoln  had  excerpted  from  Scott's  material  the 
misleading  statements  about  Buchanan  in  the  war  message  of  July  4, 1861. 
He  also  read  with  amazement  Scott's  letter  of  March  3  urging  Lincoln  to 
let  the  South  go  out  in  peace  and  predicting  a  long  and  almost  hopeless  war 
as  a  result  of  a  coercive  policy. 

417 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Within  a  week  Buchanan  had  his  answer  in  the  press.  He  had 
not  reinforced  the  southern  forts  because  Scott  could  not  mobilize  the 
necessary  soldiers,  and  Congress  would  not  call  up  more.  He  had  not 
refused  to  issue  orders  to  hold  the  Charleston  forts  until  he  had  met  with 
the  Carolina  commissioners,  but  had  sent  Anderson  written  orders  to  this 
effect  two  weeks  before  their  arrival.  He  had  not  refused  to  send  the 
Brooklyn  to  relieve  Sumter,  but  had  reluctantly  agreed,  at  Scott's  insistence, 
to  permit  the  Star  to  be  used  instead.  There  was  much  more,  perhaps  too 
much,  for  people  would  be  too  busy  to  wade  through  the  quantity  of  refuta- 
tion presented.  But  it  relieved  him  to  get  his  story  in  print. 

Scott  issued  a  "Rqoinder"  which  introduced  some  new  charges 
but  scarcely  dented  the  evidence  that  Buchanan  had  compiled.   The  general 
said  that  he  had  prepared  his  material  "without  a  printed  document  and 
my  own  official  papers"  and  admitted  that  "I  may  have  made  an  unimportant 
mistake  or  two."    He  had  indeed  made  a  mistake  or  two,  Buchanan  re- 
sponded, and  not  unimportant.    For  instance,  Scott  had  not  told  Holt  to 
rescind  Floyd's  order  to  ship  cannon  from  Pittsburgh  to  the  South  during 
the  first  week  in  March,  1861;  Buchanan  had  cancelled  that  order  himself 
on  December  26, 1860,  before  Holt  took  the  War  Office.  The  interplay  of 
letters  introduced  the  subjects  Buchanan  wanted  most  to  explain.    Scott 
brought  up  the  topic  of  the  "115,000  extra  muskets  and  rifles,  with  all  their 
implements  and  ammunition,"  which  he  alleged  Floyd  had  stolen  for  the 
South,  giving  Buchanan  his  chance  to  nail  that  old  carcass  to  the  wall. 
While  the  affair  looked  to  the  public  like  a  spirited  controversy,  the  matters 
introduced  by  Scott  suggested  that  the  retired  commander  might  have 
wished  to  let  Buchanan  have  his  day  on  the  front  page.    Certainly  the 
points  the  general  raised  were  those  against  which  Buchanan  could  bring 
almost  conclusive  refutation.    The  "Scott  Controversy"  became  the  first 
public  chapter  of  Buchanan's  "vindication.*'56 

He  finished  the  draft  of  his  book  late  in  1862  and  sent  the  copy 
around  for  criticism  to  Augustus  Schell,  Judge  Ellis  Lewis  and  William  B. 
Reed.  The  latter  wrote  a  preface,  but  Buchanan  rejected  it  because  Reed 
denied  that  the  bombardment  of  Sumter  offered  cause  for  war.  John 
Appleton  published  the  book  in  1866  under  the  title:  Mr.  Buchanan's 
Administration  on  the  Eve  of  the  Rebellion.  In  his  own  preface,  Buchanan 
explained  that  he  had  delayed  publication  "to  avoid  the  possible  imputation 
. . .  that  any  portion  of  it  was  intended  to  embarrass  Mr.  Lincoln's  adminis- 
tration." The  war,  he  said,  grew  out  of  fifty  years  of  persistent  hostility 
and  violence  between  the  North  and  South  over  slavery.  "Many  grievous 
errors  were  committed  by  both  parties  from  the  beginning,"  he  concluded, 
"but  the  most  fatal  of  them  all  was  the  secession  of  the  cotton  States." 
Even  after  secession,  Congress  had  not  only  rejected  compromise  but  had 

418 


ON  THE  ROCK  OF  ST.  HELENA*   1861  - 1868 


also  "persistently  refused  to  pass  any  measures  enabling  him  or  his  suc- 
cessor to  execute  the  laws  against  armed  resistance,  or  to  defend  the 
country  against  approaching  rebellion."  This  was  Buchanan's  own  con- 
sidered interpretation  of  the  causes  of  the  Civil  War  and  of  his  role  as 
president. 

The  book,  like  its  author,  was  dignified,  restrained  and  rather 
dull,  but  it  marshalled  the  evidence  in  orderly  array,  documented  it  from 
official  records,  and  presented  a  powerful  case  for  his  presidential  policy. 
It  also  manifested  the  anxiety  of  its  author,  in  common  with  everyone  else 
of  his  day,  to  escape  all  appearance  of  agency  in  promoting  the  conflict. 
This  preoccupation  showed  particularly  in  the  sections  where  Buchanan 
assigned'  primary  responsibility  for  the  nonreinforcement  of  Sumter  to 
Holt,  Scott,  and  Anderson.  Abner  Doubleday,  an  officer  at  Sumter, 
claimed  that  Anderson  had  told  the  War  Department  that  he  needed  no 

reinforcement  because  "he  did  not  want  it Its  arrival  would  be  sure 

to  bring  on  a  collision,  and  that  was  the  one  thing  he  wished  to  avoid." 
Buchanan  would  not  have  reproached  him  for  this  wish,  for  it  was  in  line 
with  his  own  policy,  but  not  to  the  point  of  abandoning  the  fort.  Buchanan 
recalled  Holt's  "tragical  face"  when  he  first  saw  the  famous  Anderson  letter 
of  March  4,  and  remarked  that  its  publication  would  "doubtless  excite 
disagreeable,  I  will  not  say  tragical,  feelings  in  the  mind  of  the  major." 
While  Buchanan  thus  implied  that  Anderson's  political  thinking  had  inter- ' 
fered  with  his  military  judgment,  he  also  implied  that  he  had  remained 
satisfied  to  let  an  artillery  major  shoulder  a  burden  of  decision  which 
properly  belonged  to  his  Commander  in  Chief.57 

Buchanan  wrote  his  book  as  a  historical  document  in  the  hope 
that  in  the  years  after  his  death,  when  passions  had  cooled,  an  oiganized 
record  of  his  efforts  to  prevent  the  war  might  be  available.  He  also  wanted 
an  anecdotal  biography.  For  part  of  a  year  James  F.  Shunk  and  his  wife 
lived  at  Wheadand  to  take  notes  of  Buchanan's  reminiscences  for  a  papular 
account.  After  they  had  enough  material,  the  Skunks  went  back  to  York 
but  never  wrote  the  book.  Buchanan  then  hired  his  literary  friend, 
William  B.  Reed  of  Philadelphia,  to  undertake  a  biography,  paying  him  an 
outright  fee  plus  a  conditional  grant  to  his  wife,  for  he  knew  that  Reed 
procrastinated  and  thought  that  his  wife  might  keep  him  at  work  if  she 
knew  she  would  get  $5,000  when  the  job  was  done.  Reed  asked  Shunk 
for  his  notes  but  never  got  them;  to  this  day  they  are  missing  from  the 
Buchanan  papers.58  Reed  never  finished  the  biography,  and  none  appeared 
based  on  Buchanan's  own  papers  until  1883  when  George  Ticknor  Curtis 
completed  the  two  volume  documentary  Life  of  James  Buchanan  under  a 
commission  from  the  president's  heirs  and  executors. 

419 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


OLD  MAN  DEMOCRAT 

Vindication  and  the  protection  of  his  "historical  character"  constituted 
Buchanan's  major  interest  in  the  years  of  his  retirement,  but  the  course  of 
politics  ran  a  close  second.  From  the  day  of  the  startling  news  from 
Sumter,  Buchanan  outspokenly  supported  the  war  effort.  "The  present 
administration  had  no  alternative  but  to  accept  the  war  initiated  by  South 
Carolina  or  the  Southern  Confederacy,"  he  told  General  Dix.  "The  North 
will  sustain  the  administration  almost  to  a  man;  and  it  ought  to  be  sus- 
tained at  all  hazards."59 

A  few  weeks  after  the  outbreak  of  war  he  addressed  a  public  letter 
to  the  National  Intelligencer  condemning  military  officers  who  broke  their 
oath  by  joining  the  enemy.    Unfortunately  he  also  said  that  Sumter  had 
"lighted  a  flame  which  it  will  require  a  long  time  to  extinguish,"  heretical 
doctrine  in  May,  1861,  and  reaped  such  abuse  that  he  thereafter  kept  quiet 
before  the  public.    But  privately  he  contributed  to  equip  volunteer  com- 
panies ("to  keep  the  mob  from  hanging  him,"  said  Cameron),60  denounced 
the  Southern  attack  as  "wickedly  outrageous,"  encouraged  volunteering 
("If  I  were  a  young  man  I  should  be  there  myself'),61  strongly  supported 
the  draft  law  which  Democrats  generally  opposed,  and  warned  against  any 
effort  at  peace  talk  in  advance  of  a  military  decision.    The  South,  he  said, 
"would  consent  to  nothing  less  than  a  recognition  of  their  independence, 
&  this  it  is  impossible  to  grant."62   After  the  disastrous  battle  of  First  Bull 
Run  he  wrote,  "I  sometimes  feel  strongly  tempted  to  leave  my  retirement 
so  far  as  to  take  an  active  part  in  assisting  to  rally  the  people  ...  to  battle 
in  support  of  our  time  honored  and  glorious  flag;  but  the  abuse  which  I 
received  .  .  .  admonishes  me  to  desist."68 

Despite  the  harsh  and  bitter  epithets  coined  by  the  party  presses 
for  both  Buchanan  and  Lincoln,  these  two  never  spoke  ill  of  each  other. 
Each  knew,  as  did  no  other  two  people  in  America,  the  staggering  com- 
plexities and  uncertainties  which  the  president  must  bear,  and  how  many 
forces  defied  executive  control.  Buchanan  spoke  of  Lincoln  as  "a  man  of 
honest  heart  &  true  manly  feelings"64  and  "an  honest  and  patriotic  man."65 
"Mr.  Lincoln  may  now  make  an  enviable  name  for  himself,"  he  said,  "and 
perhaps  restore  die  Union."66  After  President  Lincoln's  assassination  he 
wrote  to  Horatio  King:  "I  feel  the  assassination  ...  to  be  a  terrible  mis- 
fortune   My  intercourse  with  our  deceased  President,  both  on  his  visit 

to  me ...  and  on  the  day  of  his  first  inauguration,  convinced  me  that  he  was 
a  man  of  a  kindly  and  benevolent  heart  and  of  plain,  sincere  and  frank 
manners.  I  have  not  since  changed  my  opinion  of  his  character.  Indeed, 
I  felt  for  him  much  personal  regard."67 

Buchanan  kept  out  of  active  politics  in  retirement  and  willingly 
passed  the  torch  of  responsibility  to  younger  hands.    Nonetheless,  party 

420 


ON  THE  ROCK  OF  ST.  HELENA  •   1861  -  1868 


managers  called  on  him  continually  for  advice  and  visited  constantly  at 
Wheatland.  In  the  spring  of  1863  Congress  passed  a  conscription  act  which 
Pennsylvania  Democrats  attacked  as  unconstitutional  and  sought  to  upset 
in  the  State  Supreme  Court.  Judge  George  Woodward  of  the  State  Court 
had  been  nominated  for  governor  by  the  Democrats  in  1863  and  made 
opposition  to  the  draft  a  main  feature  of  his  campaign.  Buchanan  urged 
strongly  that  his  partisans  abandon  this  policy.  "The  Constitution  confers 
upon  Congress  in  the  clearest  terms  the  power  to  raise  &  support  armies. . . . 
It  would  be  very  unfortunate  if,  after  the  present  administration  have 
committed  so  many  clear  violations  of  the  Constitution,  the  Democratic 
party  should  place  itself  in  opposition  to  [the  draft]."68 

As  the  national  election  of  1864  drew  near,  the  Democrats  hoped 
to  carry  the  nation  with  a  military  hero.  They  nominated  General  George 
B.  McClellan  whose  military  potential  they  thought  had  been  purposely 
stifled  by  White  House  politics.  The  war  had  by  this  time  dragged  on  so 
long,  with  so  little  apparent  result,  that  many  northerners  grew  lukewarm 
and  lost  heart  in  it.  Lincoln's  Emancipation  Proclamation,  which  seemed 
to  change  the  war  aims  from  maintenance  of  the  Union  to  freedom  for 
the  slaves  and  subjugation  of  the  South,  contributed  to  the  unhappiness 
of  the  Democrats.  Many  of  them  now  urged  the  immediate  cessation  of 
war  by  a  negotiated  peace  with  the  Confederacy. 

Buchanan  said  it  was  a  year  too  late  to  raise  a  storm  over  the 
changed  war  aims,  though  that  might  have  been  a  sound  issue  if  it  had  been 
joined  at  once.  The  party  ought  not  to  go  on  a  peace  platform.  "Peace," 
he  said,  "would  be  too  dearly  purchased  at  the  expense  of  the  Union."69 
He  rejoiced  when  McClellan  stated  this  idea  clearly  in  his  acceptance,  but 
Buchanan  anticipated  that  the  Democrats  would  lose  the  election.  "Have 
you  ever  reflected  upon  .  .  .  the  embarrassments  of  a  Democratic  adminis- 
tration, should  it  succeed  to  power  with  the  war  still  existing  and  the 
finances  in  their  present  unhappy  condition?"  he  asked.70  After  Lincoln's 
second  victory  he  wrote,  "They  have  won  the  elephant;  &  they  will  find 

difficulty  in  deciding  what  to  do  with  him Now  would  be  the  time  for 

conciliation  on  the  part  of  Mr.  Lincoln.  A  frank  and  manly  offer  to  the 
Confederates  that  they  might  return  to  the  Union  just  as  they  were  before 
.  . .  might  possibly  be  accepted."71  This  rather  more  hopeful  view  tiban  he 
had  expressed  during  the  campaign  may  have  arisen  from  reports  of  a 
meeting  between  Black  and  Jacob  Thompson  in  Canada.  At  this  time 
Thompson  believed  that  the  South  would  settle  for  the  old  Union  if  it  could 
come  back  in  without  universal  emancipation. 

The  assassination  of  Lincoln  at  the  very  moment  of  peace  and 
victory  stunned  the  nation  and  soon  raised  horrid  apprehensions  of  con- 
tinued violence  and  bloodshed.  Buchanan  had  all  along  held  the  view 


421 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Lincoln  later  expressed,  namely,  that  the  southern  states  never  had  left 
the  Union.  "I  considered  the  acts  of  Secession  to  be  absolutely  void,"  he 
said,  "and  that  the  States  were  therefore  members,  though  rebellious 
members,  of  the  Union."72  He  was  gratified  that  President  Johnson  pro- 
posed to  continue  Lincoln's  policy  "not  of  reconstruction,  but  of  restora- 
tion."73 Before  long,  however,  it  became  clear  that  the  radicals  intended 
no  such  program.  Hang  Jeff  Davis,  disfranchise  the  southern  whites,  and 
impose  military  rule  on  the  conquered  region;  then  reconstitute  the  states 
by  the  rule  of  the  freedmen.  That  would  be  the  Congressional  policy. 
Johnson  wavered  and  at  last  defied  the  program  enacted  by  the  radicals. 
For  this,  they  impeached  him.  Buchanan's  friends  in  England  wrote  in 
bewilderment  about  the  American  system  of  government  where  "the  Chief 
Justice  of  the  U,  S.  could  not  try  the  President  of  the  Confederate  States 
because  he  was  so  busy  trying  the  President  of  the  United  States."74  The 
Democrats  at  last  had  their  issue.  They  had  been  helpless  during  the  war, 
but  opposition  to  radical  Reconstruction  put  them  on  solid  ground. 

A  large  body  of  Philadelphians  tendered  a  public  dinner  to 
Buchanan  in  the  spring  of  1867  which  he  had  to  decline,  but  for  it  he  wrote 
his  last  serious  political  message.  In  it  he  proclaimed  the  heart  of  his 
concept  of  a  constitutional  republic,  a  type  of  government  which,  despite 
the  recent  military  victory,  stood,  he  feared,  in  imminent  danger  of  destruc- 
tion by  politicians.  The  unique  quality  of  the  United  States  as  devised  by 
the  maters  of  the  Constitution  had  been  to  define  powers  of  federal  and 
state  governments  as  separate  and  distinct.  "They  dreaded  lest  the  vast 
powers  . . .  conferred  upon  the  Federal  Government . . .  might  be  perverted 
to  ...  usurp  the  reserved  rights  of  the  States.  .  .  ,  They  knew  it  would  be 
impossible  for  one  Central  Government  to  provide  for  the  ever  varying 
wants  and  interests  of  separate  people  of  different  lineage,  laws  &  customs, 
scattered  over  many  States.  .  .  .  Consolidation  .  .  .  must  finally  end  in 
Despotism." 

"The  true  touchstone,"  he  said,  "as  to  whether  the  exercise  of 
any  proposed  federal  power  has  a  warrant  in  the  Constitution  is  to  ask  for 
the  specific  clause  which  authorizes  it,  or,  if  this  cannot  be  shewn,  then  to 

prove  that  it  is  'necessary  &  proper'  without  any  strained  construction 

If  this  cannot  be  clearly  pointed  out,  then  .  .  .  5The  powers  not  delegated 
to  the  United  States  by  the  Constitution,  nor  prohibited  by  it  to  the  States, 
are  reserved  to  the  States  respectively,  or  to  the  people.'  "75  For  this 
reason  he  strongly  opposed  a  federal  mandate  for  Negro  suffrage.  "Eman- 
cipation is  now  a  Constitutional  fact,"  he  said,  "but  to  prescribe  the  right 
and  privilege  of  suffrage  belongs  exclusively  to  the  States.  This  principle 
the  Democracy  must  uphold."76 

422 


ON  THE  ROCK  OF  ST.  HELENA  •  1861  -  1868 


THE  ROAD  HOME 


The  days  of  retirement,  filled  as  they  were  with  study,  writing,  politics, 
and  prophecy,  were  varied  by  all  the  continuing  threads  of  a  long  and  active 
life  and  rudely  interrupted  on  occasion  by  the  near  surge  of  battle.  At  the 
time  of  Antietam  and  the  first  Chambersburg  raid,  rumor  put  the  Con- 
federate troops  on  the  banks  of  the  Conestoga.  Buchanan's  friends  pleaded 
with  him  to  vacate  Wheatland  before  the  Gettysburg  campaign.  William 
Bigler  urged,  "if  the  rebels  get  down  to  about  Port  Deposit,  your  best  plan 
will  be  to  retire  to  Clearfield" — a  town  buried  inaccessibly  in  the  central 
Pennsylvania  mountains;  and  Augustus  Schell  told  him  to  come  to  New 
York.  Buchanan  sent  Harriet  to  Philadelphia,  but  he  stayed  at  Wheatland. 
A  week  after  the  battle  of  Gettysburg  he  wrote  to  Black,  "I  felt  no  alarm  at 
the  approach  of  the  rebels  &  with  the  help  of  God  should  not  have  removed 
from  Wheatland  had  I  been  surrounded  by  a  hundred  thousand  of  them. 
I  have  schooled  my  mind  to  meet  the  inevitable  evils  of  life  with  Christian 
fortitude."77  The  Confederate  advance  guard  came  within  ten  miles  of 
Wheatland  and,  except  for  the  demolition  of  the  Susquehanna  Bridge  at 
Wrightsville,  would  very  likely  have  made  a  bonfire  of  Buchanan's  home. 

He  enjoyed  the  opportunity  to  work  at  his  financial  affairs  without 
distraction.  Black  told  him,  just  before  his  retirement,  that  he  had  dis- 
covered in  the  State  Department  accounts  a  record  of  $1,209  still  owing 
him  for  per  diem  salary  from  the  English  mission.  He  verified  his  claim 
and  sent  it  to  Seward,  but  no  record  shows  whether  he  ever  got  his  pay  or 
not.  All  through  the  war  he  tried  to  take  only  par  funds  for  returns  on  his 
investments.  "We  cannot  use  any  currency,"  he  wrote  his  agents.  When 
paper  money  began  to  decline,  he  went  in  for  barter  and  tried  to  sell  the 
old  family  farm  for  whiskey.  Apparently  he  drove  too  sharp  a  bargain,  for 
the  distiller  replied,  "I  can  not  make  an  exchange  of  whiskey  for  your  farm 
because  I  cannot  take  those  prices  for  the  whiskey."78  He  stuck  to  his  old 
principle  of  investment,  informing  his  agent,  Swarr,  C7  lend  no  money  to 
any  person  on  a  simple  bond."79 

He  ran  the  financial  affairs  of  nearly  the  whole  family  and  not  a 
few  of  his  friends.  Between  1855  and  1865  he  developed  the  estate  of 
the  Pleasanton  sisters  from  $22,000  to  $34,000  and  by  1867  had  it  up  to 
$42,000.  They  exclaimed  that  it  was  "delicious"  to  get  more  than  6 
per  cent.80  He  still  kept  close  track  of  the  financial  needs  of  Dr.  Yates  and 
his  family,  his  brother  Edward,  J.  B.  Henry,  Harriet,  and  the  now  married 
children  of  his  deceased  sisters.  The  family  farm  he  eventually  sold  to 
Jerry  Black.  When  Black  paid  for  it  and  covered  a  further  debt  of  long 
standing— something  around  $15,000— Buchanan  looked  at  the  check  and 
said,  "You  have  made  a  mistake.  Your  check  is  ten  cents  too  little." 
Jerry  handed  over  the  extra  ten  cents.81 


423 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


He  took  great  pride  in  finally  terminating  the  Luanda  Furnace 
investment,  closing  out  the  whole  deal  after  thirty  years  of  accounting  for 
S48.4882  Buchanan  loved  bookkeeping.  He  pored  over  his  bank  state- 
ments, covered  page  after  page  with  neat  figures  in  precisely  ruled  columns 
and  at  the  end  would  put  the  proud  endorsement,  "Exactly  corresponding 
with  their  account  &  balance,"  or,  "Their  statement  is  exactly  correct."** 
When  the  war  had  ended  and  the  prospects  of  securities  seemed  more  firm, 
he  meticulously  calculated  the  value  of  his  estate,  to  which  he  had  been 
adding  at  the  rate  of  $15,000  a  year  from  interest  since  retirement.  A  list 
of  his  total  assets  showed  $205,600  in  stocks  and  bonds,  mostly  state, 
municipal,  and  railroad;  $41,190  in  personal  loans;  $46,560  in  real  estate; 
and  $16,650  owed  by  members  of  the  family— a  total  of  $310,000.  With 
characteristic  caution,  Buchanan  summed  up  his  calculation  with  the  note: 
"Dec.  16,  1866— Making  all  reasonable  deductions,  I  am  worth  about 
$250,000."** 

The  household  routine  at  Wheatland  had  its  ups  and  downs.  The 
staff  of  half  a  dozen  servants  was  in  continual  circulation.  One  of  the 
gardeners  was  perpetually  in  Alderman's  court  waiting  for  the  master  to 
come  and  bail  him  out.  Thomas  and  Rosana  Gordon  quit  and  came  back  to 
service  half  a  dozen  times  in  as  many  years,  and  the  house  boys  seemed 
always  to  be  drafted  shortly  after  taking  a  job  at  Wheatland.  The  two  men 
in  charge  of  cutting  the  huge  Wheatland  lawn  received  $10  and  a  gallon 
and  one-half  of  Buchanan's  best  whiskey  for  the  job.  Miss  Hetty  kept 
them  all  in  tight  rein,  so  much  so  that  Buchanan  got  into  the  habit  of 
writing  at  the  top  of  his  monthly  remittance  for  household  expenses: 
"Paid  to  the  order  of  My  Lord  Chamberlain."85 

Though  the  winters  were  quiet  and  lonesome,  the  house  in  the 
fair  seasons  was  generally  full  of  guests.  Harriet  flitted  in  and  out,  spending 
a  good  deal  of  time  in  New  York,  Philadelphia,  Baltimore,  and  Washington. 
Annie  Buchanan,  Edward's  daughter,  lived  at  Wheatland  more  than  with 
her  father.  Buchanan's  neighbor,  the  Rev.  Dr.  John  W.  Nevin,  professor 
of  history  at  Franklin  and  Marshall  College,  spent  many  evenings  in  the 
Wheatland  study,  philosophizing  and  talking  about  religion,  the  war,  and 
the  problems  of  the  College  of  which  Buchanan  was  still  President  of  the 
Board.  Old  Lancaster  cronies  stopped  for  dinner  several  nights  a  week, 
and  frequently  his  former  political  associates,  ex-Governor  Porter  from 
Harrisburg,  Judge  Cadwalader,  and  William  B.  Reed  and  Joseph  Baker  from 
Philadelphia,  Henry  Welsh  and  Judge  Black  from  York  visited  for  a  week 
or  two.  The  invitations  generally  ran  in  this  style:  "I  am  happy  that  our 
tastes  on  so  many  subjects  are  the  same  &  that  we  both  delight  in  the 
classical  dish  of  sauer  kraut.  Many  pretenders  to  refinement  despise  this 
honest  German  dish;  but  we  know  better.  I  shall  therefore  expect  you. . . ." 

424 


ON  THE  ROCK  OF  ST.  HELENA  •  1861  - 1868 


Miss  Hetty  filled  him  with  sauer  kraut  till  he  groaned,  but  he  never  com- 
plained. He  could  not  do  without  her,  and  she  knew  it.  He  often  told 
intimate  guests  that  she  was  the  only  person  in  the  world  who  could  give 
him  a  sound  raking  over  the  coals  and  get  away  with  it. 

Buchanan  had  the  usual  round  of  public  dinners  in  Lancaster 
and  nearby  towns,  and  received  with  regularity  the  fire  companies  and  glee 
clubs  that  came  to  Wheatland  to  honor  the  venerable  ex-president  and  to 
partake  of  his  liquid  hospitality.  Whenever  he  bought  a  stock  of  particu- 
larly good  quality,  he  anticipated  that  Wheatland  might  shortly  have  such 
a  visitation,  for  the  word  always  leaked  out  He  occasionally  travelled  to 
Harrisburg,  York,  Philadelphia,  or  Baltimore,  but  apparently  he  never 
revisited  Washington  after  Lincoln's  inauguration.  He  went  regularly  to 
Bedford  where  he  thoroughly  enjoyed  himself,  for  the  ladies  still  made  a 
great  fuss  over  him  and  the  "waters"  seemed  to  ease  his  gout.  Once  he 
tried  a  New  Jersey  seashore  resort,  but  the  experiment  proved  a  dismal 
failure.  The  gout  struck  while  he  was  there  and,  for  the  first  time  in  his 
life,  he  could  not  drink  a  drop  of  wine. 

At  home  the  mail  daily  brought  nostalgic  and  saddening  news  of 
old  friends.  For  Christmas,  1861,  Varina  Davis  sent  him  a  pair  of  slippers 
—"of  no  value,"  she  wrote,  "save  that  I  worked  them"  as  a  token  of  regard 
and  that  he  might  be  reminded  "of  those  who  love  you."86  Mrs.  Bass,  an 
outspoken  Unionist,  had  seen  her  Virginia  estate  destroyed  by  the  rebels, 
and  had  with  great  difficulty  escaped  through  the  lines  under  federal 
military  escort  to  get  medical  care  in  New  York.87  Davy  Lynch's  daughter, 
Isabel,  wrote,  "Everything  that  could  be  sold  out  of  the  house  has  gone  & 
I  am  lying  on  a  hard  straw  bed  &  my  back  so  sore  that  every  time  I  move  it 
causes  it  to  bleed."  Buchanan  sent  her  $50  immediately  and  made  arrange- 
ments to  pay  her  expenses  at  a  convent,  but  this  she  refused.  He  had 
given  her  widowed  mother  nearly  $1000  during  the  war,  and  eventually 
did  persuade  Isabel  to  enter  the  Visitation  Convent  in  Brooklyn,  giving  his 
New  York  agents  instructions  to  pay  all  her  bills.  But  within  a  year,  to  his 
distress,  she  ran  away  and  was  never  heard  from  again.  He  learned,  with 
sincere  regret,  of  the  tragic  death  of  Rose  O'Neal  Greenhow,  a  Confederate 
spy  who  had  drowned  while  trying  to  run  the  Union  blockade.  The 
brilliance  of  her  mind  and  personality  had  influenced  the  actions  of  im- 
portant men  since  the  days  of  the  Mexican  War.  Buchanan  greatly  admired 
her,  and  during  the  period  of  their  intimate  friendship  in  the  1850's  he  had 
absorbed  from  her  many  of  his  ideas  about  the  South.88 

From  Washington  he  found  out  that  most  of  the  White  House 
servants  of  his  term  had  left.  In  1867  he  received  a  pathetic  letter  from 
Mary  Wall:  "I  am  nearly  seventy  years  old,  Sir,  I  am  the  old  Chamber 
Maid  ...  I  write  myself  as  I  should  not  wish  your  Excellency  to  think  any 
Imposter  had  made  use  of  my  name,  as  there  are  so  many  bad  people  in  the 

425 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


present  day."  She  wanted  money  to  go  back  to  England.  Buchanan  tried 
to  discourage  her  from  the  trip,  but  he  finally  sent  her  about  half  the 
passage  money.89  Leonora  Clayton  wrote  to  Harriet  of  their  condition  at 
the  war's  end.  "Do  you  think  of  those  pleasant  Euchre  parties  in  those 
happy  times?  How  sad  now  to  think  of  the  actors  in  those  scenes.  The 
Thompsons  exiles,  the  Gwins  abroad  .  .  .  Major  McC  fills  a  hero's  grave, 
the  Cobbs  fallen  in  power,  and  only  you  who  are  still  invested  with  radiance 
and  hope."90  Even  before  the  war  was  half  over,  one  of  Harriet's  southern 
friends  reported  that  her  children  were  "playing  masquerade—have  the 
character  and  costumes  of  darkies,  &  are  ordering  the  white  people  out  of 
the  way  in  a  style  that  we  may  expect  to  witness  some  day."91 

Katherine  Ellis,  a  niece  of  Senator  King,  had  her  own  sad  tale. 

King's  home  had  been  wrecked,  she  wrote,  and  a  brigade  of  Negroes  "broke 

into  my  home  and  committed  outrages  in  my  sight— I  was  protected  by  an 

officer,  but  others  were  not."92    Buchanan  wrote  back  to  her,  "We  must 

meet  again,  God  willing"  but  it  was  not  to  be.    Harriet  met  Howell  Cobb 

in  Baltimore  after  the  war  and  immediately  wrote  to  her  uncle,  inquiring 

if  he  wished  to  see  his  old  friend.    With  pain,  Buchanan  replied,  "I  do  not 

wish  to  meet  him  now  or  hereafter. ...    I  wish  him  well  and  hope  he  may 

obtain  his  pardon;  but  this  is  all.  ...    I  truly  pity  him."93    In  January, 

1868,  he  got  news  of  Mrs.  Robb's  death.    Her  life  in  Chicago  during  the 

war  had  been  a  living  hell.    Her  stepchildren  considered  her  a  rebel  and 

would  not  speak  to  her,  and  the  political  tension  eventually  broke  up  her 

marriage.   The  hardest  blows  came  from  those  former  friends  who  had  lost 

a  father  or  husband  or  son  or  brother  in  the  war.    When  General  John  F. 

Reynolds  fell  on  the  first  day  at  Gettysburg,  the  family  held  Buchanan 

almost  personally  responsible.    All  the  intimacy  of  fifty  years  turned  to 

impassioned  hate.    Ellie  Reynolds,  who  had  been  as  close  as  a  sister  to 

Harriet  and  for  years  had  come  to  Wheatland  as  one  of  the  family,  could 

no  longer  abide  the  mention  of  Buchanan's  name.   He  wondered  painfully 

how  many  of  the  families  broken  by  war  felt  the  same.    In  Lancaster,  he 

knew,  there  were  many. 

It  was  pleasant,  on  the  other  hand,  to  hear  from  children  who 
had  been  named  after  him  and  asked  for  a  photograph  or  an  autograph. 
Literary  societies  sent  him  notices  of  honorary  membership,  and  gifts  often 
came  in  the  mail  or  were  delivered  by  deputation — canes,  poems,  wine, 
books,  and  a  huge  liberty  pole  on  one  occasion.  He  was  flattered  that  some 
people  in  Mercersburg  had  bought  as  an  historical  relic  the  log  cabin  at 
Stony  Batter  where  he  had  been  born,  but  he  declined  the  invitation  to  pay 
a  ceremonial  visit.  "I  am  now  in  my  76th  year,"  he  wrote,  "and  all  the 
friends  and  acquaintances  of  my  youth  in  your  vicinity  have  been  gathered 
to  their  fathers."94 

426 


ON  THE  ROCK  OF  ST.  HELENA  •  1861  - 1868 

Indeed,  the  allotted  time  had  nearly  gone  by.  A  friend  wrote  that 
Buchanan  now  had  become  "the  only  surviving  member  of  the  House  of 
Representatives  as  it  was  on  the  first  Monday  of  December,  1821."  "Truly," 
he  replied,  "we  both  live  'in  the  midst  of  posterity/  "9S 

New  life  started  as  the  old  declined.  Harriet  had  married  Henry  E. 
Johnston,  of  Baltimore,  in  January,  1866,  at  a  private  ceremony  performed 
by  Uncle  Edward  at  Wheatland.  Mr.  Johnston,  a  banker,  did  not  participate 
in  the  high  society  to  which  Harriet  had  accustomed  herself,  but  "Nunc" 
heartily  approved  of  her  choice.  "You  have  chosen  the  wiser  part,"  he 
said,  "in  selecting  for  your  husband  a  gentleman  of  education,  of  good 
manners  &  of  excellent  character.  .  .  .  You  must  forget  'the  pride,  pomp 
&  circumstance'  of  public  life  in  which  you  have  been  raised.  In  truth,  it 
no  longer  exists."96  Buchanan  lived  to  fondle  Harriet's  first  child  on  his 
knee  at  Wheatland  and  to  visit  her  once  at  her  Baltimore  home,  but  this 
trip  greatly  distressed  him  because  his  old  friends  declined  to  come  to  see 
him  at  the  Johnston  home,  and  he  vowed  never  to  return  to  the  city. 

At  Wheatland  his  thoughts  turned  increasingly  to  religion. 
During  the  war  the  Presbyterian  Church  declined  to  accept  him,  presumably 
over  some  doctrinal  matter.  At  last,  on  September  23,  1865,  the  elders 
eventually  examined  him  "on  his  experimental  evidence  of  piety"  and 
admitted  him  to  communion.97 

In  May,  1868,  Buchanan  took  seriously  ill  of  a  cold  and  various 
complications  of  old  age.  He  knew  the  end  had  come  and  lay  in  his  upstairs 
bedroom  at  Wheatland,  spending  much  time  with  Hiram  Swarr  who  would 
be  one  of  his  executors.  The  family  came,  and  Miss  Hetty  flew  about  in  a 
panic.  The  will  he  had  drawn  needed  revision.  Certain  stocks  ought  to 
be  sold  while  the  market  was  good.  He  wanted  to  be  buried  in  Woodward 
Hill  Cemetery,  Lancaster,  with  no  pomp,  public  ceremony,  or  parade  and 
to  have  Dr.  John  W.  Nevin  perform  the  burial  service,  but  had  no  objections 
if  the  Masons  wished  to  participate.  He  carefully  specified  a  plain  white 
marble  tombstone  and  dictated  its  legend.  He  talked  much  at  the  end 
about  what  men  in  the  future  would  say  of  him.  The  day  before  he  died 
he  told  Swarr,  "I  have  always  felt  and  stffl  feel  that  I  discharged  every 
public  duty  imposed  on  me  conscientiously.  I  have  no  r^ret  for  any 
public  act  of  my  life,  and  history  will  vindicate  my  memory." 

Near  half-past  eight  on  Monday  morning,  June  1,  1868,  James 
Buchanan  died  at  the  age  of  seventy-eight,  ffis  request  to  be  buried  without 
pomp  or  parade  went  unheeded.  Lancaster  held  a  public  meeting  in  his 
honor  on  Tuesday  morning,  and  later  in  the  day  thousands  of  country  folk 
travelled  to  Wheatland  to  file  past  the  casket  Over  20,000  people  attended 
the  funeral  on  Thursday,  including  official  delegations  from  all  over  the 
nation  and  scores  of  reporters.  Orators  recalled  his  remarkable  power  of 
clear  and  logical  argument  and  bore  testimony  to  his  "great  private  virtues, 

427 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


integrity,  charity,  kindness  and  courtesy."  One  speaker  compared  him 
with  Lincoln.  "Starting  at  Stony  Batter,  a  barefoot  hoy  climbed  to  the 
highest  office  in  the  world.  A  rail-splitter  of  lUinois  did  the  same  thing. 
The  effect  of  such  an  example  is  incalculable.  A  Republic  is  the  only  place 
on  earth  where  such  a  thing  is  possible."98 

Buchanan's  will  defined  his  legacy  to  his  friends  and  relatives. 
He  gave  generous  gifts  to  the  Presbyterian  Church  and  to  the  city  of 
Lancaster  for  the  purchase  of  fuel  for  the  poor.  He  provided  for  Miss  Hetty 
and  remembered  by  small  bequests  the  Wheatland  servants.  The  remainder 
of  the  estate  he  divided  carefully  among  the  eleven  surviving  descendants 
of  his  father's  family. 

What  was  Buchanan's  larger  legacy,  his  bequest  to  the  society  to 
which  he  had  devoted  his  life?  He  exemplified  in  his  private  conduct 
simplicity  of  manners,  unfailing  courtesy,  and  a  kindly  consideration  for 
others*  Although  proud  of  his  own  attainments,  he  remained  familiar  and 
unaffected  in  his  relations  with  others,  treating  his  barber,  his  gardener 
and  his  poor  relatives  with  no  less  regard  and  attention  than  he  gave  to 
people  of  eminence.  In  the  sense  that  he  appreciated  and  respected  people 
for  their  personal  qualities,  regardless  of  station,  he  practiced  the  re- 
publican ideal. 

Buchanan  believed  implicitly  that  a  constitutional  republic 
represented  man's  greatest  invention  in  the  art  of  government.  The  success 
of  its  trial  in  America  depended,  in  his  opinion,  upon  the  willingness  of 
people  in  and  out  of.  office  to  exercise  self-restraint  and  to  be  willing  to 
accommodate  their  differing  ideas  and  ambitions  to  the  preservation  of  the 
system.  Neither  state  nor  federal  government  should  dominate;  secession 
or  consolidation,  each,  would  wreck  the  constitutional  structure.  Nor 
should  any  branch  of  government,  executive,  legislative  or  judicial,  try  to 
assert  an  overriding  control.  A  "strong"  president,  one  who  overpowered 
or  ignored  the  Congress  and  the  courts,  meant  an  executive  who  would 
destroy  the  republican  form. 

Which  did  James  Buchanan  regard  more  highly,  the  national 
entity  or  the  principles  of  free  government  defined  in  the  United  States 
Constitution?  A  friend  accurately  answered  this  fundamental  question  on 
the  day  of  the  presidential  nomination  at  Cincinnati.  Ever  since  James 
Buchanan  had  been  old  enough  to  marry,  he  observed,  "he  has  been  wedded 
to  the  Constitution.*'99 

Buchanan,  in  his  public  and  private  life,  demonstrated  mental 
toughness  and  moral  stamina.  Beyond  common  humanity  he  was  devoted 
to  duty,  industrious  in  ascertaining  facts,  tenacious  of  his  principles,  and 
nearly  always  in  control  of  himself.  He  never  approved  of  the  maxim  that 
in  the  affairs  of  mankind,  while  the  intellect  may  persuade,  the  heart 
controls.  He  preferred  to  hope  that  in  a  self-governing  society,  while  the 

428 


ON  THE  ROCK  OF  ST.  HELENA  •   1861  -  1868 

heart  might  persuade,  the  intellect  would  control.    Only  thus  could  men 
curb  their  passions  and  achieve  peaceful  solutions  to  recurrent  crises. 

Buchanan  assumed  leadership  of  the  United  States  when  an 
unprecedented  wave  of  angry  passion  was  sweeping  over  the  nation.  That 
he  held  the  hostile  sections  in  check  during  these  revolutionary  times 
was  in  itself  a  remarkable  achievement.  His  weaknesses  in  the  stormy 
years  of  his  presidency  were  magnified  by  enraged  partisans  of  the  North 
and  the  South.  His  many  talents,  which  in  a  quieter  era  might  have  gained 
for  him  a  place  among  the  great  presidents  of  his  country,  were  quickly 
overshadowed  by  the  cataclysmic  events  of  civil  war  and  by  the  towering 
personality  of  Abraham  Lincoln.  Of  Buchanan  it  might  be  said,  as  it  was 
later  of  another,  "He  staked  his  reputation  on  the  supremacy  of  reason, 
and  lost." 


429 


NOTES 


CHAPTER  1  (pp.  1-12) 

1.  "Buchanan  Chart"  by  L.  D.  Buchanan,  Houston,  Texas,  and  Genealogy  and  History 
(Washington,  D.  C.),  Aug.  15,  1940. 

2.  Records  on  the  lineage  of  President  James  Buchanan  are  incomplete  and  contra- 
dictory.   The  following  sources  have  been  useful:  Moore,  Works,  ,  XIL  289;  A.  w  . 
Patrick  Buchanan,  The  Buchanan  Book  (Montreal,  1911);  D.  B.  Landis,  '  Rev. 
Edward  Young  Buchanan,"  Lancaster  County  Historical  Society  Papers,  XXXII  (1928), 
nos.  9  and  10;  MS.  record  prepared  by  Madeline  B.  Gill,  De  Land,  Fla.,  in  papers  of 
Mrs.  B.  C.  Landis,  Lancaster,  Penna.;  Buchanan  papers,  YCHS;  letters  to  the  author 
from  the  Rev.  Maurice  G.  Buchanan,  Indianapolis,  Ind.;  Genealogy  and  History, 
Aug.  15,  1940,  and  Sept.  15,  1940;  James  Buchanan  to  W.  E.  Robinson,  Feb.  6,  1844, 
Buchanan  MSs.,  BF;  James  Buchanan  to  Charles  W.  Russell,  Apr.  10,  1858,  Bu- 
chanan MSs.,  HSP. 

3.  There  is  considerable  data  on  Joshua  Russell,  most  of  it  in  the  York  Coim^Hjstorical 
Society  and  in  the  Office  of  Public  Records,  Harrisburg,  Penna.    In  YCHS:  Requisi- 
tion for  Recruits,  1781;  Tax  List,  1783;  Tombstone  Entries  of  Black's  L  Graveyard, 
Cumberland  Township;  Orphans  Court  Records,  Dec.  1,  1784,  E203-204;  York 
County  Deed  Book,  Jan.  7,  1785,  2-C,  1784-1786,  p.  33.    In  the  Office  of  Pubhc 
Records:  Jas.  Darah  to  Joshua  Russell,  May  5,  1778,  Revolutionary  Papers,  XXI, 
14;  York  County  Census  (property  tax  lists),  1783;  Post-Revolutionary  Papers, 
XXXV,  Dec.  1786;  York  County  Deeds,  Grantee  Index  (microfilm),  Feb.  4,  1786, 
Thomas  Armstrong  to  Joshua  Russell.    Other  data  are  in  Penna.  Statutes  at  Large, 
XI,  175-177,  and  XII,  502-509;  History  of  Cumberland  and  Adams  Counties  (Chicago, 
1886),  part  III,  108,  184,  251-252;  Adams  County  Wills,  I,  319,  #253,  Jan.  5,  1807; 
Adams  County'  Orphans'  Court,  p.  21,  Jan.  7,  l8l2,  and  p.  30  ;  Mar.  3,  1812;  and 
Bureau  of  Census,  Heads  of  Families  at  the  First  Census  .  .  .  1790  .  .  .  Pennsylvania 
(G.  P.  0.,  1908),  p.  288. 

4.  On  the  Speer  family:   Franklin  County  Deed  Book,  Mar.  4,  1802,  VII,  428,  and 
Sept.  7,  1804,  VI,  328;  The  Speer  Family  Record  (privately  printed,  Baltimore,  n.d.); 
G.T.  Curtis,  Life  of  James  Buchanan  (New  York,  1883),  I,  3. 


5.  For  the  early  history  of  Cove  Gap  and  Stony  Batter:   I  F. 

Franklin  County  (Chicago,  1887);  Joshua  Gilpin,  "A  Toy  from  Phfladdliifl 
in  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History  and  Biography,  L  (1926),  169; 
(New  York,  1912)  ;  Sherman  Day,  Historical  Collections  < 
1843),  pp.  124-125,  354-355;  J«M  HrfngomL  The  .  .  .„ 

1780-1860  (Harrisburg,  1947),  Chap.  II;  Historical  Commission  of  Penna., 
(Harrisburg,  1896),  I,  534-550;  A.  J.  Morrison  (ed.),  TraveUm  the 
1783-1784,%?  John  Schoepf  (Philadelphia,  1911),  pp.  220,  223. 


6.  For  the  John  Tom  story:  Bureau  of  Census,  Heads  of  Families  ..  .Jtoww*.  •  ••  179°* 
p.  114;  Franklin  County  Deed  Book  I,  371;  II,  145-147;  article  by  Thomas  W.  Lane 
m  scrapbook  of  John  Lowry  Ruth,  pp.  68-69,  in  YCHS. 

7  Franklin  County  Deed  Book,  XVII,  561-562,  Dec.  29,  1838.    Buchanan  paid  $7500 
"  for  the  property.   The  1838  deed  recites  a  history  of  the  tract. 


431 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


8.  Property  of  James  Buchanan,  Sr.,  is  recorded  m  Franklin  County  Deed  Books  II, 
145-147;  IV,  183;  VI,  140,  328;  VII,  428;  VIII,  110,  413.  Also,  Old  Mercersburg, 
p.  55. 

9  Alice  L.  Black,  "George  Washington  at  the  Carev  House,  1794,"  typescript  in L  YCHS. 
This  thoroughly  documented  article  gives  a  fairly  full  history  of  tlie  Russell  Tavern, 
later  the  Carey  House. 

10   Descriptions  of  James  Buchanan's  childhood  are  found  in:    John  L.  Finefrock's 
addrel£ on  "Stony  Batter,"  delivered  at  Wheatland,  April  27, 1940;  ^eodore  Annel, 
Recollections  of  CoUege  Life  at  Marshall  Cotte&9  Mercersbur*,  Pa.  (Reading,  1886), 
pp   56-59;  the  autobiography  in  Moore,  Works,  XII;  speech  of  Dr.  Philip  Schaff, 
Le,  Spring  1857,  Described  by  J.  Hassler  in  PubKc  Opinion,  Chambersburg, 

l**^     *•***    ***OL  --*        _      A....  •.%•  •»»        i  M   •  _    V?^i !_.M* _-_  T3f     O      T> «.___» 


(Jarlisie.  spring  JLOD/,  aescriDea  »y  j.  uaaajivi.  w  *  *w«*o  v^w*-™,  w*,™* 
April,  1893;  and  W.  Rush  Gfflan,  "James  Buchanan,"  in  Kittochtinny  H.  S.  , 

IL  1901.  For  the  birthplace  of  James  Buchanan  and  descendants  of  his  parents: 
Old  Mercersbur&  letter  to  the  Harrisbure  Patriot,  in  John i  Lowry  Ruth  Scrapbook, 
p.  64;  Reginald  B.  Henry  to  R.  F.  Nichols,  Mar.  12,  1937;  Buchanan,  privately 
printed  genealogy  of  descendants  of  James  and  Elizabeth  Buchanan,  prepared  by 
Reginalof  Buchanan  Henry;  J.  M.  Cooper  to  0.  E.  Shannon,  Aug.  7,  1866  (photostat 
in  possession  of  author),  relating  story  of  Buchanan  birthplace  and  proposing  to  buy 
cabin  as  historic  shrine. 

11.  Information  from  conversations  with  the  Rev.  E.  J.  Turner,  formerly  of  the  Presby- 
terian Church,  Mercersburg,  and  church  records,  including  a  letter  from  Buchanan 
to  the  Rev.  Thomas  Creigh,  July  10,  1848,  describing  Dr.  King.    Also,  Alexander 
Harris,  Biographical  History  of  Lancaster  County  (Lancaster,  1872),  pp.  341-342, 

12.  Appel,  Recollections  ofCoUege  Life,  pp.  56-59. 

13.  Carlisle  Herald,  Oct.  13,  1809;  James  H.  Morgan,  Dickinson^ College:  The  History  of 
One  Hundred  and  Fifty  Years,  2783-1933  (Carfisle,  Penna.,  1933),  p.  183;  Atwater  to 
Beniamin  Rush,  Aprfl  22,  1810;  Atwater  to  the  Rev.  Ashbel  Green,  May  11,  1810, 
Gratz  Collection,  HSP.    For  a  full  account,  see  Philip  S.  Klein,  "James  Buchanan  at 
Dickinson,"  in  John  and  Mary's  College  (Carlisle,  Penna.,  1956),  pp.  157-179. 

14.  Morgan,  Dickinson  College,  p.  95. 

15.  Ibid.,  pp.  170-171.    Roger  B.  Taney's  recollections. 

16.  Ibid.,  p.  112. 

17.  Moore,  Works,  XII,  291. 

18.  Carlisle  Herald,  July  8,  1808. 

19.  Moore,  Works,  XII,  292. 

20.  Minutes  of  the  Board  of  Trustees,  I,  348-349,  Sept.  28,  1808,  DC;  Carlisle  Herald, 
Oct.  5, 1808;  Morgan,  Dickinson  College,  p.  196. 

21.  Buchanan's  mathematics  workbook,  in  the  Dickinsoniana  Collection,  DC.    Another 
volume  is  in  the  library  at  Wheatland. 

22.  Sept.  6, 1809,  in  Curtis,  Buchanan,  I,  6-7. 

23.  Moore,  Works,  XII,  293. 

24.  Carlisle  Herald,  Sept.  29,  1809. 


CHAPTER  2  (pp.  13-26) 

1.  W.  U.  Hensel,  James  Buchanan  as  a  Lawyer  (Lancaster,  1912),  p.  2. 

2.  Day,  Historical  Collections,  p.  395. 

3.  Father  to  James,  Feb.  10  and  Mar.  12,  1810,  Buchanan  Sr.  MSs.,  BF. 

432 


NOTES*   CHAPTER 2 


4.  John,  born  and  died,  1804;  William  Speer,  born  1805;  George  Washington,  born 
1808;  and  Edward  Young,  born  1811. 

5.  Father  to  James,  February  7  and  April  19, 1811,  Buchanan  Sr.  MSs.,  BF. 

6.  Same  to  same,  July  11,  1811,  Buchanan  Sr.  MSs.,  BF. 

7.  Same  to  same,  March  18,  1812,  Buchanan  Sr.  MSs.,  BF. 

8.  Lucius  P.  Little,  Ben  Hardin,  His  Times  and  Contemporaries  (Louisville,  1887), 
pp.  352-353.    The  best  study  of  the  whole  episode  is:  R.  Gerald  McMurtry,  "James 
Buchanan  in  Kentucky,  1813,"  The  Filson  Club  Historical  Quarterly,  April,  1934, 
pp.  73-87. 

9.  Moore,  Works,  I,  1,  note  1;  2. 

10.  Lancaster  Intelligencer  and  Weekly  Advertiser,  Feb.  20,  1813. 

11.  Ibid.,  March  20,  1813. 

12.  Father  to  James,  March  26,  1813,  Buchanan  Sr.  MSs.,  BF. 

13.  Curtis,  Buchanan,  I,  15. 

14.  Buchanan  to  Smith,  Feb.  14,  1814,  Dickinsoniana  Collection,  DC;  fragments  of  legal 
correspondence  mostly  on  debt  collection  in  Buchanan  MSs.,  BF;  and  miscellaneous 
items  m  the  Buchanan  MSs.  and  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSR    Appearance  Dockets  of 
the  Courts  of  Quarter  Sessions  and  Common  Pleas,  1812-1821,  stored  in  Lancaster 
County  Courthouse,  list  Buchanan  as  counsel  in  more  than  150  cases  from  1812  to 
1815.    In  1819,  November  term,  he  was  on  the  docket  as  counsel  in  32  separate 
actions. 

15.  Father  to  James,  July  11,  1811,  and  Sept.  10,  1813,  Buchanan  Sr.  MSs.,  BF. 

16.  Lancaster  Weekly  Journal,  Aug.  26,  1814,  and  Oct.  3, 1828;  Moore,  Works,  XII,  293. 

17.  Father  to  James,  Sept.  22,  1814,  and  Jan.  20,  1815,  Buchanan  Sr.  MSs.,  BF. 

18.  Lancaster  Intelligencer  and  Weekly  Advertiser,  Sept.  3, 1814;  Moore,  Works^l,  294. 
19   Members  of  this  troop  did  not  qualify  as  veterans  of  the  war,  and  their  names  will 

not  be  found  on  official  rolls.  But  there  is  ample  evidence  of  the  expedition  and  of 
the  names  of  the  volunteers.  See  Lancaster  Intelligencer  and  Weekly  Advertiser, 
Sept.  3,  10,  17,  1814;  Moore,  Works,  XII,  294;  Harris,  BiograMcal  History  of 
l£icaster  County,  p.  478;  C.  S.  Foltz,  Surgeon  of  the  &as  (Indianapolis, ,1931),  p.  190; 
H.  M.  J.  Klein,  Lancaster  County,  a  History  (New  York,  1924),  II,  596. 

20.  Father  to  James,  Sept.  22,  1814,  Buchanan  Sr.  MSs.,  BF. 

21.  Lancaster  Weekly  Journal,  Sept.  30,  Oct  21,  and  Nov.  18, 1814;  S.  W.  Higginbotham, 
Keystone  of  the  Democratic  Arch  (Hanisburg,  1952),  pp.  297-299. 

22.  Father  to  James,  Oct.  21,  1814*  Buchanan  Sr.  MSs.,  BF. 

23.  Philadelphia  Aurora,  Feb.  3,  1815;  and  Meadville  Crawford  Register,  Feb.  23,  1817, 
rive  interesting  accounts  of  the  daily  legislative  routine.   For  Buchanan  s  proposals, 
see  Aurora,  Jan.  6, 1815;  Lancaster  AtteBixencer  and  Weekly  Advertiser,  Dec.  24, 1814, 
Feb.  10,  1815;  Lancaster  Weekly  Journal,  Feb.  3,  1815. 

24.  Father  to  James,  Jan.  20, 1815,  Buchanan  Sr.  MSs.f  BF. 

25.  Curtis,  Buchanan,  I,  9-10. 

26.  Father  to  James,  June  23,  1815,  Buchanan  Sr.  MSs.,  BF. 

27.  This  sentence  may  possibly  have  been  the  origin  of  the  famous  "Drop  of  Blood" 
*  story  of  1828.    See  Chap.  5,  note  8. 

28.  Moore,  Works,  I,  2-8;  XII,  316-320. 

29.  Father  to  James,  July  14,  Sept.  1,  1815,  Buchanan  Sr.  MSs.,  BF. 

30.  Lancaster  Intelligencer  and  Weekly  Advertiser,  Oct.  14,  1815. 

31.  Ibid.,  Dec.  15,  1815. 

32.  Father  to  James,  Feb.  23,  1816,  Buchanan  Sr.  MSs.f  BF. 

33.  Ibid,  and  Curtis,  Buchanan,  I,  15. 

433 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

34.  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP,  contains  most  of  the  legal  papers,  1816-1835. 

35.  Hensel,  Buchanan  as  a  Lawyer,  p.  7f 

36  Out  of  this  controversy  grew  the  case  Moore  v.  Houston,  3  Sergeant  and  Rawle,  170, 
m  which  Justice  Tilghian  of  the  Pennsylvania  Supreme  Court  enunciated  one  of  hxs 
most  famous  doctrines:  "Where  the  states  are  prohibited  expressly  by  the  Con- 
stitution  of  the  United  States,  from  the  exercise  of  power,  all  their  power  ceases 
from  the  adoption  thereof;  but  where  the  power  of  the  state  is  taken  awav  by  imph- 
cation,  they  may  continue  to  act  until  the  United  States  exclude  them."  Cf.  Hensel, 
Buchanan  as  a  Lawyer,  p.  8. 

37.  Curtis,  Buchanan,  1, 17. 

38.  Lancaster  Journal,  March  1,  1817,  et  sec;.;  Lancaster  Intelligencer  and  Weekly  Ad- 
writer,  Mar.  22,  1817. 

39  Franklin  to  Buchanan,  March  3,  Campbell  to  Buchanan,  March  7,  1818,  Buchanan 

"  MSs.,  HSP. 
40.  John  Norvall  to  Roberts  Vaux,  March  15, 1818,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 


CHAPTER  3  (pp.  27-43) 

L  G.  F.  Reed,  Alumni  Record  of  Dickinson  College,  passim;  Frank  K.  Diffenderfer, 
History  of  the  Farmers  Bank  of  Lancaster  (Lancaster,  1910),  p  46;  WiUiam  Riddje, 
Story  of  Lancaster,  Pennsylvania,  Old  and  New  (Lancaster,  1917), _p?.  122-123; 
invitations  to  parties  and  Masonic  items  in  Buchanan  MSs.,  BF;  S.  R.Fraim,  mimeo- 
graphed history  of  Buchanan's  work  in  Lodge  #43,  F.  and  A.  M.,  dated  Sept  13, 1950, 
Lancaster. 

2  For  the  Coleman  family,  see  Frederic  S.  Klein,  "Robert  Coleman,  Millionaire  Iron- 
master,"  LCES  Journal,  LXIV  (1960),  17-33;  Committee  on  Historical  Research, 
Forges  and  Furnaces  in  the  Province  of  Pennsylvania  (Philadelphia,  1944);  H.  M.  J. 
KleSa  and  Wm.  F.  Diller,  History  of  St.  James  Church  (Lancaster,  1944) ;  Frankkn 
Ellis,  History  of  Lancaster  County  (Philadelphia,  1883),  pp.  305,  465-466  and  911; 
and  Robert  Coleman's  Will,  Book  0, 1,  pp.  347-352,  in  Lancaster  County  Courthouse. 

3.  Purchased  from  Christopher  Hager,  June  18, 1807,  Deed  Book  Y,  3,  p.  561,  Lancaster 
County  Courthouse.    Buchanan  later  bought  this  as  his  home. 

4.  Ruth  Scrapbook,  p.  70,  YCHS.    This  item  from  an  undated  clipping  of  the  Phila- 
delphia Press,  notes  an  oil  land  title  transaction  in  Warren  County,  wnich  attorneys 
had  traced  back  to  this  deal. 

5.  Ellis,  History  of  Lancaster  County,  p.  547. 

6.  Ruth  Scrapbook,  p.  70,  and  Annie  Gilchrist,  "First  on  the  Turnpike,"  Bedford 
Inquirer,  Dec.  30,  1950,  quoting  the  reminiscences  of  Dr.  C.  N.  Hickok  of  Bedford. 

7.  Buchanan  to  William  Wright,  President  of  Columbia  Bridge  Company,  Sept.  13, 
1819,  Buchanan  MSs.,  BF;  the  Philadelphia  Union,  or  United  States  Gazette  and  True 
American,  Nov.  30,  1819;  Sheriff's  Appearance  Dockets,  Lancaster  entries  for 
autumn,  1819,  especially  pp.  84-85  which  contain  notes  on  the  bridge  case  in 
Buchanan's  handwriting. 

8.  Lancaster  Journal,  Sept.  16  and  Oct.  19,  1818;  Oct.  22,  1819,  for  the  local  political 
situation;  and  Nov.  27,  1819,  for  the  Missouri  Resolutions. 

9.  Hannah  Cochran  to  her  husband,  Dec.  14,  1819,  Slaymaker  Collection,  Lancaster. 

10.  Article  in  Ruth  Scrapbook,  p.  44,  by  Blanche  Nevin,  daughter  of  the  Rev.  John  W. 
Nevin  and  Martha  Jenkins  Nevin,  daughter  of  Robert  Jenkins  of  Windsor  Forge. 

11.  Sheriff's  Appearance  Dockets,  1819-1820,  pp.  84-85. 

434 


NOTES*   CHAPTERS 


12.  Nathaniel  Chapman  (1780-1853).    See  Charles  Morris  (ed.),  Makers  of  Pkilctdefyhia 
(Philadelphia,  1894),  p.  37.    Extract  from  Kittera  Diary  is  in  notes  of  G.  T.  Curtis, 
Buchanan  M Ss.,  HSP.    Extensive  search  failed  to  turn  up  the  original  of  this  diary. 

13.  Samuel  Dale  to  Jacob  Hibshman,  Dec.  16,  1819,  Hibshman  MSs.,  The  Pennsylvania 
State  University  Library. 

14.  Hannah  Cochrau  to  her  husband,  Dec.  14, 1819,  Slaymaker  Collection. 

15.  Curtis,  Buchanan,  I,  18. 

16.  Ruth  Scrapbook,  pp.  56  and  64,  undated  clippings  from  the  Wyandot  Union  and  the 
Boston  Budget.    Curtis,  Buchanan,  I,  16,  says  that  Buchanan  wrote  the  notice 
basing  this  statement  on  an  unidentified  diary,  presumably  that  of  Judge  Franklin. 

17.  "Hannah  Cochran  letter,  op.  cto.   For  a  more  detailed  account  of  the  whole  Ann  Cole- 
man  episode,  cf.  Philip  S.  Klein,  "James  Buchanan  and  Ann  Coleman,"  Pennsylvania 
History,  XXI  (Jan.,  1§54),  1-20. 

18.  Mother  to  James,  Mar.  21,  1826,  Buchanan  Sr.  MSs.,  BF. 

19.  In  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

20.  Story  told  by  Judge  Henry  G.  Long  of  Lancaster  to  "Swede"  of  the  Cincinnati 
Commercial,   Swarr  Scrapbook,   Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

21.  "Recollections  of  J.  Montgomery  Forster,"  in  dippings  from  the  Mercersburg 
Journal,  Rankin  Scrapbook,  Presbyterian  Church,  Mercersburg. 

22.  Charles  Montelius  to  Jacob  Hibshman,  Dec.  11,  1820,  Hibshman  MSs.,  The  Penn* 
sylvania  State  University  Library. 

23.  Swarr  Scrapbook,  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

24.  Buchanan  to  Cyrus  Jacobs,  June  9,  1820,  Buchanan  MSs.,  BF. 

25  Philip  S.  Klein,  "Early  Lancaster  County  Politics,"  Pennsylvania.  History,  III 
(Aprfl,  1936),  98-114,  and  his  PemsykanL  Politics,  1817-1832;  A  Game  without 
Rules  (Philadelphia,  1940),  Chaps.  V-VL 

26.  Copy  of  the  "Colebrook"  letter  is  in  Buchanan  MSs.,  BF.    The  Sneer  Family  Record, 
pp.  2-3,  refers  to  earlier  portions  of  the  career  of  the  "black  girl,  Hannah,"  as  do  the 
reminiscences  of  John  C.  Finefrock,  Mercersburg,  in  the  author's  possession. 

27.  Articles  in  Lancaster  Journal  and  Pennsylvania  Gazette,  and  especially  article  signed 
"Investigator"  in  Harrisburg  Republican,  July  21,  1820. 

28.  July  26,  1820,  Buchanan  Sr.  MSs.,  BF.    This  was  the  father's  last  letter  to  James 
of  which  we  have  any  record. 

29.  Lancaster  Journal,  August  11,  1820. 

30.  Ibid.,  Aug.  25,  Sept.  1, 15,  1820. 

31.  Commonwealth  v.  Christian  Weldy,  Lancaster  Journal,  Jan.  26*  1821. 

32.  Commonwealth  v.  William  Hamilton,  Lancaster  Journal,  May  4,  1821. 

33.  George  McDuffie  to  Buchanan,  March  28,  1823,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

34.  Josiah  Quincy,  Ft&nt  of  ike  Past  (Boston,  1926),  p.  241. 

35.  Curtis,  Buchanan,  I,  29. 

36.  Ibid.,  I,  26. 

37.  Buchanan  to  Walter  Franklin,  Dec.  21, 1821,  Moore,  Works,  1, 10-11. 

38.  Notes  of  Judge  John  Cadwalader  on  Buchanan  biography,  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP. 

39.  Moore,  Works,  I,  11-20. 

40.  Buchanan  to  Calhoun,  Jan.,  1822,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP;  Buchanan  to  John 
Reynolds,  Jan.  1,  1822,  Reynolds  MSs.,  FM.;  Lancaster  Journal,  Feb.  15,  1822. 

41.  Lancaster  Journal,  Mar.  29,  1822. 

42.  Ibid.,  July  12,  1822. 

435 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


43   Buchanan  to  Hugh  Hamilton,  Mar.  22,  1822   letter  printed  in  sale  catalogue  of 
Alw^Tsheuer,  #5,  1929,  filed  in  New  York  Public  Library. 

44.  Moore,  Works,  XII,  300-301. 


CHAPTER  4  (pp.  44-59) 

1.  Buchanan  to  ?,  Aug.  18,  1821,  Buchanan  MSB.,  HSP. 

2.  Klein,  Pennsylvania  Politics,  pp.  128-130. 

3.  Marquis  James,  Andrew  Jackson  (New  York,  1938);  p.  370. 

4.  Pleasanton  to  Buchanan,  March  20,  1823,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

5.  Buchanan  to  Pleasanton,  March  25,  1823,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

6.  Pleasanton  to  Buchanan  and  Molton  C.  Rogers,  April  15, 1823,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

7.  McDuffie  to  Buchanan,  March  28,  1823,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

8.  Klein,  Pennsylvania  Politics,  pp.  132-149. 

9.  Buchanan  to  John  Sergeant,  May  9,  1823,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

10.  Lancaster  Journal,  August  1,  15,  1823, 

11.  Hugh  Hamilton  to  Buchanan,  Sept.  13,  1823,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

12.  Klein,  Pennsylvania  Politics,  p.  138. 

13.  Undated  drafts  of  letters  from  Buchanan  to  Mrs  Blake,  of  1823,  are  misfikd  in  die 
box  containing  letters  to  Buchanan,  Nov.  1840,  in  Buchanan  MSs.,  rlbr.    Also, 
George  Blake  to  Buchanan,  Mar.  30,  1823. 

14.  Gibson  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  13,  1824,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

15.  Klein,  Pennsylvania  Politics,  pp.  161-162. 

16.  Ibid.,  pp.  120-124. 

17.  Pennsylvania  Manual,  1933,  p.  388;  the  Philadelphia  Democratic  Press,  Nov.  18, 1814, 
gives  slightly  different  returns. 

18.  Buchanan  to  Thomas  Elder,  Jan.  2,  1825,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

19.  Markley  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  23,  1825,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

20.  Rogers  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  27,  1824,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

21.  Marquis  James  says:  "Mr.  Buchanan's  motive  [in  interviewing  Jackson]  seems  not 
to  have  been  more  reprehensible  than  an  effort  to  help  Jackson  despite  nunself, jwd 
to  spare  Clay  the  possible  consequences  of  a  dangerous  game."   Jackson  (1938  ed.j, 
Chap.  XXV. 

22.  Rogers  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  27,  1824,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

23.  A.  H.  Wharton,  Sodal  Life  in  the  Early  Republic  (Philadelphia,  1902),  p.  196. 

24.  Quincy,  Figures  of  the  Past,  pp.  296-298. 

25.  Buchanan  to  the  editor  of  the  Lancaster  Journal,  Aug.  8,  1827;  Moore,  Works,  I* 
263-267;  Richard  Stenherg,  "The  Corrupt  Bargain  Calumny,"  Pennsylvania  Magazine 
of  History  and  Biography,  Jan.  1934;  Curtis,  Buchanan,  I,  41-44;  J.  S.  Bassett, 
Life  of  Andrew  Jac&on  (Garden  City,  1911),  I,  356-362;  James,  Jackson  (1938  ed.), 
pp.  414445. 

26.  Calvin  Colton  (ed.),  The  Works  of  Henry  day  (New  York,  1904),  I,  418;  Bassett, 
Jackson,  I,  356-362;  Buchanan  to  Elder,  Jan.  2,  1825,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

27.  Klein,  Pennsylvania  Politics,  pp.  182-183. 

436 


NOTES*  CHAPTERS 

28.  L.  D.  Baldwin,  Pittsburgh,  the  Story  of  a  City  (Pittsburgh,  1937),  p.  289. 

29.  A.  L.  Hayes  to  George  Wolf,  Nov.  9,  1829,  Wolf  MSs.,  HSP. 

30.  Green  to  Buchanan,  Oct.  12,  1826,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

31.  Buchanan  to  Green,  Oct.  16,  1826,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

32.  Ingham  to  Buchanan,  July  6,  1827,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

33.  "To  the  Editor  of  the  Lancaster  Journal,  August  8, 1827,"  Moore,  Works,  I,  263-267. 

34.  Andrew  Porter  to  J.  S.  Johnston,  Aug.  6,  1827,   Johnston  MSs.,  HSP. 

35.  J.  H.  Pleasants  to  J.  S.  Johnston,  Aug.  6,  1827,  Johnston  MSs.,  HSP. 

36.  day  to  Francis  Brooke,  Aug.  14,  1827,  Colton  (ed.),  Works  of  Henry  Clay,  I,  169. 

37.  R.  P.  Letcher  to  Clay,  Aug.  27,  1827,  ibid.,  I,  171. 

38.  Aug.  11,  1827,  Rawle  MSs.,  HSP. 

39.  Calhoun  to  John  McLean,  Sept.  3,  1827,  McLean  MSs.,  LC. 

40.  Daniel  Webster  to  Clay,  Aug.  22,  1827,  Colton,  op.  dt.,  I,  170. 

41.  Rogers  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  12,  1827,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

42.  J.  R.  Speer  to  Buchanan,  Feb.  1,  1828,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

43.  Buchanan  to  Ingham,  Aug.  9,  1827,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

44.  Green  to  Buchanan,  July  19;  Buchanan  to  Green,  Aug.  17,  1827,  Buchanan  MSs, 
HSP, 

45.  Buchanan  to  Ingham,  Aug.  9,  1827,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

46   Jackson  to  Kendall,  Sept.  4,  1827,  J.  S.  Bassett  and  J.  F.  Jameson  (eds.),  Corre- 
"  spondence  (Washington,  1926-1935),  III,  381. 

47.  Van  Buren  to  Jackson,  Sept.  14, 1827,  Van  Buren  MSs.,  LC. 


CHAPTER  5  (pp.  60-77) 

1.  William  B.  Fordney  to  Buchanan,  April  15,  1828,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

2.  Moore,  Works,  I,  283-312. 

3.  Lancaster  Journal,  May  30,  1828. 

4.  Pottstown  Times,  Mar.  9,  1891  (letter  of  Thos.  J.  McCamant). 

5  C  F  and  E.  M.  Richardson,  Charles  Miner,  a  Pennsylvania  Pioneer  (Wflkes-Barre, 
"  1926),  p.  126. 

6  J  W   G   Lescure  to  Buchanan,  June  11,  1828;  Isaac  D.  Barnard  to  Buchanan, 
"  July  1,  1828,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

7.  Lancaster  Journal,  July  11,  1828. 

8  It  seems  very  unlikely  that  Buchanan  made  this  statement.  His  1815  speech  was 
formal  written  in  advance,  and  printed  from  the  manuscript  ;  immediateTy  after  its 
o£™err  Nomention  of  the  alleged  statement  appeared  until  thirteen  years  later, 
during  tie  1828  election  when  Buchanan's  change  of  party  became  the  main  issue. 
A*  +iil+  rim  A  an  antiJRnphanan  oartisan  made  an  anadavi!:  that  ne  bad.  neara  JDUcnanan 
^^?DwpH$^WTml815.  Otfan  who  had  attended  the  1815 
meeting  denied  that  Buchanan  had  used  the  word*.  No  one  in  1828  seenw  to  hare 

ated  version  eluded 


437 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

The  Lancaster  Journal,  July  25  and  Aug.  1,  1828,  prints  the  contemporary  charge 

SmdbiS^rfSie  activities  of  the  Washington  Society  in  1814-1815,  listing  Buchanan 
as  an  officer,  are  in  collections  of  the  LCHS. 

9.  Lancaster  Journal,  Aue.  1,  1828,  Letter  of  "Volunteer  "  and  Aug.  8,  «*  answer  to 
Marietta  Pioneer',  Joseph  Sharp  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  6, 1828;  L.  Edwards  to  Buchanan, 
Aug.  15,  1828,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

10.  Lancaster  Journal,  Aug.  22,  1828,  cites  part  of  the  Pioneer  article  with  material 
to  refute  charges. 

11.  Buchanan  to  E.  C.  Reigart,  Aug.  19,  1828,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

12   E.  C.  Reigart  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  19, 1828;  James  Humes  to  the  Public,  Aug.  21, 1828, 
Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP;  Moore,  Works,  I,  303. 

13.  Lancaster  Journal,  Aug.  29,  Sept.  5,  1828. 

14.  Buchanan  to  Thomas  Elder,  Feh.  13,  1827,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

15   Hanisburg  Argus,  July  12,  1828.    On  the  tariff,  see  also:  M.  R.  Eiselen,  Rife  of 
'  Protectionism  fn  Pennsylvania  (Philadelphia,   1921);  Klein,  Pennsylvania  Pohtics, 
Chap  IX;  and  Robert  V.  Rimini,  Martin  Van  Buren  and  the  Making  oftne  Democratic 
Party  (New  York,  1959),  Chap.  XII. 

16.  Amos  Kendall  to  Henry  Baldwin,  July  15,  1827,  Reynolds  Collection,  Meadville,  Pa. 

17.  George  Buchanan  to  brother  James,  July  20,  1827,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

18.  J.  R.  Speer  to  Buchanan,  Feb.  1,  1828,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

19.  Buchanan's  remarks  of  June  23,  printed  in  Lancaster  Journal,  June  29,  1827. 

20.  Lancaster  Journal,  July  20, 1827. 

21.  Buchanan  to  Joseph  Sharpe,  Aug.  9,  1828,  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

22.  Lancaster  Journal,  Oct.  17, 1828. 

23.  Ibid.,  Nor.  14,  1828. 

24.  Hugh  Hamilton  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  6,  1825,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

25.  Buchanan  to  Thomas  Kittera,  Jan.  2,  1829,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

26.  Sam  Cochran  to  Hannah  Cochran,  Sept.  10, 1828,  Slaymaker  MSs.;  Simon  Cameron 
to  Buchanan,  Feb.  4,  1829,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP.    The  Commencement  Program 
of  Dickinson  College,  Sept.  24,  1828,  contains  a  note  that  the  scheduled  address  by 
Buchanan  had  to  be  cancelled  because  of  his  illness. 

27.  Louis  McLane  to  Van  Buren,  Feb.  19, 1829,  Van  Buren  MSs.,  LC. 

28.  John  Kerlin  to  W.  M.  Meredith,  Feb.  12,  1829,  Meredith  MS.,  HSP;  Franklin  Re- 
pository (Chambersburg,  Penna.),  April  7,  1829. 

29.  James,  Jackson  (1938  ed.),  p.  491. 

30.  Baldwin  to  Stephen  Simpson,  July  21,  1829,  quoted  in  Franklin  Repository,  T>ec. 
27, 1831. 

31.  Buchanan  to  John  McLean,  June  11, 1829,  McLean  MSs.,  LC. 

32.  Crawford  Messenger  (Meadville,  Penna.),  April  16,  1829. 

33.  Buchanan  to  Barnard,  Mar.  11,  1829,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

34.  Joel  Sutherland  to  George  Wolf,  May  12,  1829,  Wolf  MSs.,  HSP. 

35.  George  Barton  to  Buchanan,  July  16,  1829,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

36.  Buchanan  to  Barnard,  Aug.  20, 1829,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

37.  Buchanan  to  George  Wolf,  Oct.  15,  1829,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

38.  Group  of  letters,  NOT.,  Dec.,  1829,  in  Miscellaneous  Collection,  Office  of  Public 
Records,  Harrisburg. 

39.  Klein,  Pennsylvania  Politics,  p.  291. 

438 


NOTES*   CHAPTER  6 

40.  Crawford  Messenger,  Nov.  26,  1829,  quoting  Carlisle  Herald.    The  Lancaster  papers 
printed  nothing  about  the  local  fracas. 

41.  Buchanan  to  Wolf,  Dec.  12,  1829,  Miscellaneous  Collection,  Office  of  Public 
Records,  Harrisburg. 

42.  Sutherland  to  Wolf,  Dec.  20,  1829;  Van  Amringe  to  Wolf,  Nov.  18,  1829;  A.  S. 
Hayes  to  Wolf,  Dec.  9,  1829,  Wolf  MSs.,  HSP, 

43.  Samuel  McKean  to  Benjamin  Champneys,  April  4  and  26,  1830,  Miscellaneous 
Collection,  Office  of  Public  Records,  Harrisburg. 

44.  I.  D.  Barnard  to  Buchanan,  April  1,  1830,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

45.  W.  Stewart  to  Buchanan,  June  19,  1830,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

46.  H.  A.  Muhlenberg  to  Wolf,  April  15,  1830;  D.  H.  Miller  to  Wolf,  April  23,  1830, 
Wolf  MSs.,  HSP. 

47.  Wolf  to  S.  D.  Ingham,  April  23,  1831,  Miscellaneous  Collection,  Office  of  Public 
Records,  Harrisburg. 

48.  Moore,  Works,  I,  421. 

49.  Hensel,  James  Buchanan  as  a  Lawyer,  p.  15. 

50.  Moore,  Works,  II,  67-73. 

51.  Hensel,  op.  eft.,  p.  16. 

52  C.  F.  Adams  (ed.),  Memoirs  of  John  Quincy  Adams  (Philadelphia,  1874-1877),  VIII, 
306-307.    Jan.  31,  1831. 

53  Culver  H.  Smith,  "Washington  Press  of  the  Jacksonian  Era"  (Ph.D.  thesis,  Duke 
"  University),  pp.  245-246;  Klein,  Pennsylvania  Politics,  p.  299. 

54.  Klein,  op.  at.,  pp.  301-310. 

55.  George  Wolf  to  S.  D.  Ingham,  April  23,  1831,  Miscellaneous  Collection,  Office  of 
Public  Records,  Harrisburg. 

56.  Curtis,  Buchanan,  I,  110. 


CHAPTER  6  (pp.  78-94) 

1.  J.  H.  Eaton  to  Buchanan,  May  31,  1831,  Curtis,  Buchanan,  1, 130. 

2.  Buchanan  to  Eaton,  June  4,  1831,  ibid. 

3.  Curtis,  Buchanan,  I,  130-134,  prints  the  correspondence. 

4.  George  Plitt  to  Buchanan,  July  3, 1831,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  I,  LC. 

5.  Ibid,  and  Crawford  Messenger,  July  14*  Aug.  18, 1831. 

6   Buchanan  to  John  Reynolds,  Sept.  25,  1831,  Reynolds  MSs.,  FM;  Buchanan  to 
"  Jackson,  Sept.  10, 1831,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

7.  Buchanan  to  Jackson,  Sept.  10, 1831,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

8.  Elizabeth  Speer  Buchanan  to  Buchanan,  Oct.  21,  [1831],  Buchanan  Sr.  MSs.,  BF. 

9.  George  Wolf  to  S.  D.  Ingham,  April  23,  1831,  Miscellaneous  Collection,  Office  of 
*  Public  Records,  Harrisburg. 

10.  Buchanan  to  Wolf,  Jan.  31, 1832,  Miscellaneous  Collection,  Office  of  Public  Records, 
Harrisburg. 

11.  Ibid. 

12.  Edward  Livingston  to  Buchanan,  Feb.  24*  1832,  Buchanan  MSs.,  BF. 

439 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

13.  Livingston  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  12,  1832,  Moore,  Works,  II,  182. 
14   Reynolds  MSs.,  FM.,  has  a  series  of  letters,  1831-1834,  dealing  with  Buchanan's 
personal  finances  and  Reynolds's  management  of  them. 

15.  Diary  entry  of  Mar.  21, 1832,  Moore,  Works,  II,  182. 

16.  Stephen  Pleasanton  to  Buchanan,  Mar.  30,  1832,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  I,  LC. 

17.  Receipt  in  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

18.  Moore,  Works,  II,  384. 

19.  Ibid.,  II,  184. 

20  Rental  contract,  June  17,  1832,  between  Buchanan  and  Anna  Michavlova,  agent  for 
"  Brockhauser.     Document  is  in  Buchanan's  handwriting,  in  French.     Buchanan 

MSs.,  BF. 

21  The  dates  used  by  Buchanan  in  his  correspondence  from  this  point  until  his  de- 
"  parture  from  Russia  are  according  to  the  New  Style  Russian  calendar.    Most  of  his 

fetters  are  endorsed  (N.S.)  to  indicate  the  use  of  the  Gregorian  calendar  system, 
12  days  ahead  of  the  Julian  calendar  which  was  still  used  by  many  in  Russia. 

22.  Buchanan  to  Livingston,  June  12,  1832,  Moore,  Works,  II,  194-195. 

23.  Buchanan  to  Reynolds,  Aug.  6,  1832,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

24.  Moore,  Works,  II,  195. 

25.  Ibid.,  II,  226. 

26.  Buchanan  to  Reynolds,  Aug.  16,  1832,  Reynolds  MSs.,  FM. 

27.  Moore,  Works,  II,  282. 

28.  Ibid.,  II,  288. 

29   Reminiscences  of  L  Montgomery  Forster,  in  the  Mercersburg  Journal.    Clipping  in 
Rankin  Scrapbook,  in  possession  of  the  Rev.  E.  J.  Turner,  Mercersburg. 

30.  Moore,  Works,  II,  232. 

31.  Buchanan  to  Reynolds,  Aug.  16,  1832,  Reynolds  MSs.,  FM. 

32.  Moore,  Works,  II,  198,  199,  218,  265. 

33.  Ibid.,  II,  244,  253-254. 

34.  Ibid.,  II,  280-281. 

35.  Ibid.,  II,  282-283. 

36.  Buchanan  to  James  Humes,  Oct.  13,  1832,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

37.  Moore,  Works,  II,  288. 

38.  Reminiscences  of  J.  Montgomery  Forster,  loc.  cto. 

39.  Moore,  Works,  II,  205. 

40.  Ibid.,  II,  334. 

41.  Ibid.,  II,  302. 

42.  Ibid.,  II,  323: 

43.  Ibid.,  II,  320. 

44.  Ibid.,  II,  329. 

45.  Ibid.,  II,  360-366,  diary  entries  of  June,  1833. 

46.  Buchanan  to  Harriet  Henry,  Aug.  3,  1832,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

47.  Curtis,  Buchanan,  I,  210. 

48.  Buchanan  to  John  Reynolds,  July  3,  1833,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

49.  Buchanan  to  Reynolds,  Jan.  2,  Mar.  20,  May  19,  1833,  Reynolds  MSs.,  FM. 

440 


NOTES*   CHAPTER? 

50.  Moore,  Works,  II,  381.  For  an  interesting  analysis  of  the  mission,  see  Joseph  0. 
Baylen,  "James  Buchanan's  'Calm  of  Despotism,' "  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of 
History  and  Biography,  LXXVII  (July,  1953),  294-310;  also  Thomas  P.  Martin, 
"Initiation  of  James  Buchanan  as  an  American  Diplomat — His  Mission  to  Russia, 
1832,"  Junto  SefectoiwJPennsylvania  Historical  Junto,  Washington,  D.  C.,  1946), 
pp.  48-60.  See  also  W.  B.  Hatcher,  Edward  Livingston  (University,  La.,  1940), 
Chap.  15,  and  Francis  Rawle,  "Edward  Livingston,"  in  American  Secretaries  of  State 
and  Their  Diplomacy,  ed.  by  5.  F.  Bemis,  vol.  lV. 


CHAPTER  7  (pp.  95-104) 

1    August  18,  19,  20,  1833.    Packet  of  endorsed  travel  folders  and  itemized  bills, 
Buchanan  MSs.,  BF;  Buchanan  to  John  Reynolds,  Sept  17,  1833,  Reynolds  MSs., 


FM. 

2.  Moore,  Works,  II,  387;  Buchanan  to  John  Reynolds,  Sept.  17, 1833,  Reynolds  MSs., 
FM. 

3.  Moore,  Works,  II,  390. 

4.  Ibid.,  II,  394. 

5.  Ibid.,  II,  392,  393. 

6.  Buchanan  to  John  Reynolds,  Oct.  7,  1833,  Reynolds  MSs.,  FM. 

7.  Moore,  Works,  II,  267. 

8.  Lee  Crippen,  Simon  Cameron  (Oxford,  Ohio,  1942),  p.  21. 

9.  Cameron  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  29,  1836,  Crippen,  Cameron,  p.  21. 

10.  Curtis,  Buduman,  I,  147;  Buchanan  to  John  Reynolds,  May  19,  1833,  Reynolds 
MSs.,  JbJVl. 

11.  Buchanan  to  Campbell  P.  White,  Jan.  2,  1833,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

12.  Curtis,  Buduman,  I,  152, 

13.  Ibid.,  I,  184-185,  192. 

14.  Buchanan  to  John  Reynolds,  Mar.  20, 1833,  Reynolds  MSs.,  FM. 

15.  Buchanan  to  Reynolds,  July  3, 1833,  Dicldnsoniana,  DC. 

16.  Buchanan  to  John  Reynolds,  Jan.  21,  May  19, 1833,  Reynolds  MSs.,  FM. 

17   Buchanan  to  J.  B.  Sterigere,  May  19,  to  G.  Leiper,  July  3.  1833,  Curtis,  flucftomw, 
I,  189,  206. 

18.  George  Plitt  to  Buchanan,  July  19, 1833,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  I,  LC. 

19.  Buchanan  to  Reynolds,  Nov.  24, 1833,  Reynolds  MSs.,  FM. 

20.  Cameron  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  4,  7,  1833,  Crippen,  Cameron,  pp.  22-23. 

21.  Buchanan  to  Jackson,  Jan.  18, 1834,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

22.  Moore,  Works,  II,  397;  III,  248. 

23.  Ibid.,  II,  398. 

24.  Obituary  notices  of  Esther  Parker,  Ruth  Scrapbook,  YCHS,  p.  14. 

25.  Buchanan  to  Thomas  Kittera,  Oct.  9,  1834,  Schoch  MSs.,  BF. 

441 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


26.  Agreement  of  Mar.  10,  1835,  in  Buchanan's  handwriting,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

27.  Buchanan  to  Thomas  Kittera,  Oct.  9,  1834;  Sept.  25,  1837,  April  25,  1843,  Schoch 
"  MSs    BF.    Buchanan  was  on  terms  of  intimacy  with  the  whole  Kittera  family,  from 

the  grandmother  (Ann  Moore,  nee  Hopkins  of  Lancaster)  to  the  grandchildren. 
Mary  Kittera  Snyder's  sister,  Elizabeth,  married  a  close  friend  of  Buchanan,  James 
C  Van  Dyke  of  Philadelphia,  in  this  period.  Buchanan  regularly  stayed  at  the 
Kittera  or  the  Van  Dyke  home  when  on  visits  to  Philadelphia.  For  more  information 
on  Mary  Snyder,  see  William  A.  Russ,  Jr.,  "Mary  Kittera  Snyder's  struggle  for  an 
Income,"  in  Snyder  County  Historical  Society  Bulletin,  IV,  #1  (1959),  1-27. 

28.  Buchanan  to  Jacoh  Kern,  et  al.,  Dec.  22,  1834,  Curtis,  Buchanan,  I,  229,  and 
Buchanan  draft  in  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP. 


CHAPTER  8  (pp.  105-115) 

1  J  Mitchell  to  Buchanan,  Ian.  15,  1835;  John  Dickey  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  9,  1835; 
"  Henry  Buehler  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  15,  1835,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP.  Charles  M. 
Snyder,  "Pennsylvania  Politics,  1833-1847,"  Ph.D.  thesis,  University  of  Pennsyl- 
vania,  clearly  explains  the  details  of  much  that  is  summarized  in  this  chapter.  See 
p%  111  et  seq.  of  the  typescript.  Though  Snyder's  work  is  published  as  The  Jadcsonian 
Heritage  (Hanishurg,  1958),  all  my  references  are  to  the  thesis  which  is  more 
detailed. 

2.  Muhlenherg  to  Buchanan,  March  24,  1835,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

3   Buchanan  to  Thomas  Kittera,  Mar.  28,  1835;  Buchanan  to  George  Wolf,  Mar.  28, 
1835,  Buchanan  MSs.,  BF. 

4.  Buchanan  to  Mahlon  Dickerson,  June  18,  1835,  Dickinsoniana,  DC 

5.  Moore,  Work,  II,  443. 

6.  Buchanan  to  ?,'Nov.  18,  1835,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

7.  Buchanan  to  Ovid  Johnston,  May  2,  1836,  Dickinsoniana,  DC;  Moore,  Works,  III, 
114  ff.,  quotes  the  speech. 

8.  Buchanan  to  Thomas  Elder,  Oct.  15, 1836,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP, 

9.  Buchanan  to  Van  Buren,  Nov.  18, 1836,  Moore,  Works,  III,  128-129. 

10.  Snyder,  "Pennsylvania  Politics,"  pp.  154-156. 

11.  Buchanan  to  Thomas  Elder,  Nov.  7, 1836,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

12.  Moore,  Works*  HI,  147-154. 

13.  Jan.  12  and  14, 1837,  ibid.,  Ill,  166-167. 

14.  Feb.  19, 1837,  ibid^  III,  220. 

15.  Feh.  28, 1837,  ibid.,  Ill,  247. 

16.  Rid.,  HI,  213-214. 

17.  Ibid.,  HI,  220. 

18.  Ibid.,  Ill,  249. 

19.  J.  Fred  Rippy,  Joel  Poinsett  Purham,  N.  C.,  1935),  p.  168. 

442 


NOTES*  CHAPTER  9 


CHAPTER  9  (pp.  116-128) 

1.  Snyder,  "Pennsylvania  Politics,"  p.  167. 

2.  John  McCahen  to  Buchanan,  April  7,  1837,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

3.  Buchanan  to  John  McCahen,  April  1,  1837,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

4.  Peter  Wager  to  Buchanan,  March  30,  1837,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

5.  Bray  Hammond,  Banks  and  Politics  in  America  (Princeton,  1957),  Chap.  12. 

6.  Moore,  Works,  III,  273. 

7.  Wager  to  Buchanan,  March  30,  1837,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

8.  John  Miles  to  Buchanan,  April  7,  1837,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

9.  Benjamin  Parker  to  Buchanan,  April  4,  1837,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

10.  Charles  Miner  to  Buchanan,  April  23, 1837,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

11.  Buchanan  to  F.  P.  Blair,  April  22,  1837,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

12.  Moore,  Works,  III,  250. 

13.  Buchanan  to  James  M.  Porter,  June  9,  1837,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

14.  C.  J.  Ingersoll  to  Buchanan,  June  6,  1837,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

15.  Buchanan  to  F.  P.  Blair,  June  3,  1837,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

16.  Moore,  Works,  III,  265;  Kittera  to  Buchanan,  May  15, 1837,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP, 

17.  Buchanan  to  James  M.  Porter,  June  9, 1837,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

18.  William  R.  King  to  Buchanan,  April  2, 1837,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

19.  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

20.  Samuel  Parke  to  Buchanan,  April  4,  1837,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

21.  Buchanan  to  Van  Buren,  June  5,  1837,  Moore,  Works,  III,  252-254. 

22   Jackson  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  26,  1837,  Curtis,  Buchanan,  I,  421,  and  Moore,  Works, 
III,  264-314. 

23.  George  Plitt  to  Buchanan,  Oct.  13,  1837,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

24.  George  Plitt  to  Buchanan,  Nov.  20,  1837,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

25.  J.  W.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Feh.  27, 1838,  Buchanan  MSa.,  HSP. 

26.  Moore,  Works,  III,  380-385. 

27.  William  B.  Fordney  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  22, 1838,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

28.  Moore,  Works,  III,  451. 

29.  Buchanan  to  Harriet  Henry,  Oct.  26, 1839,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

30.  Buchanan  to  Harriet  Henry,  Nov.  4,  1838  (misdated  1837),  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

31.  Buchanan  to  Dr.  C.  M.  Yates,  Nov.  21, 1838,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

32.  Buchanan  to  Edward  Y.  Buchanan,  Sept.  1,  1832,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

33.  Same  to  same,  Dec.  10,  1838,  Cadwdader  MSs.,  HSP. 

34.  Buchanan  to  Maria  Yates,  Jan.  3,  1831,  Nichols  photostats. 

35.  Same  to  same,  Dec.  26,  1834,  Nichols  photostats. 

36.  Buchanan  to  Dr.  C.  M.  Yates,  Oct.  25  and  30,  1840,  Nichols  photostats. 

443 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

CHAPTER  10  (pp.  129-141) 

1.  Buchanan  to  John  McClintock,  Mar.  11, 1839;  Buchanan  to  S.  W.  Randall,  Sept  16, 
1839,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP;  Snyder,  "Pennsylvania  Politics,"  pp.  246,  261-262. 

2.  Buchanan  to  Dr.  C.  M.  Yates,  undated  [summer,  1839],  Nichols  photostats. 

3.  Ibid. 

4.  Moore,  Works,  IV,  121. 

5.  J.  W.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  16,  1839,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

6.  Buchanan  to  S.  W.  Randall,  Sept.  16,  1839,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

7.  Van  Buren  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  27,  1839,  Moore,  Works,  IV,  124. 

8.  J.  V.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Feb.  5,  1840,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

9.  Buchanan  to  D.  R.  Porter,  Feb.  24,  1840,  Grate  Collection,  HSP. 

10.  Curtis,  Buchanan,  I,  400. 

11.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Mar.  10,  1840,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

12.  Same  to  same,  April  11,  1840,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

13.  Same  to  same,  Dec.  2,  1829,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

14.  Moore,  Works,  IV,  210. 

15.  David  Lynch  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  3,  1840,  Lynch  MSs.,  LCHS. 

16.  Snyder,  "Pennsylvania  Politics,"  pp.  264-266. 

17.  Buchanan  to  Benjamin  Mifflin,  Aug.  20,  1840,  Moore,  Works,  IV,  321. 

18.  R.  M.  Barr  to  Buchanan,  June  19,  27,  28,  1840,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

19.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  July  13, 1840,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

20.  Same  to  same,  April  16, 1840,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

21.  Moore,  Works,  IV,  319,  324. 

22.  Ibid.,  IV,  322. 

23.  J.  W.  Forney,  Anecdotes  of  Public  Men  (New  York,  1873),  p.  182. 

24.  W.  D.  Burnham,  Presidential  Battots,  1836-1892  (Baltimore,  1955),  pp.  704-720. 

25.  Nov.  18,  1840,  Moore,  Works,  IV,  325. 

26.  Buchanan  to  Dr.  Edward  C.  Gazzam,  Dec.  11,  1840,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

27.  Buchanan  to  Edward  Y.  Buchanan,  Jan.  19,  1841,  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP. 

28.  Edward  Stanwood,  A  History  of  the  Presidency  (New  York,  1898),  p.  195,  note  1. 

29.  Buchanan  to  D.  R.  Porter,  Feb.  9,  1841,  Moore,  Works,  IV,  380. 

30.  David  Lynch  to  ?,  June,  1841,  Lynch  MSs.,  LCHS. 

31.  Jonathan  M.  Foltz  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  17, 1841,  Buchanan-Swan  MSs.,  Section  G,  BF. 

32.  Buchanan  to  Edward  C.  Gazzam,  Sept.  14,  1841,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

33.  Buchanan  to  Francis  R.  Shunk,  May  6,  1841,  Moore,  Works,  IV,  405. 

34.  J.  W.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  June  4,  1841,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

35.  Snyder,  "Pennsylvania  Politics,"  p.  296. 

36.  David  Lynch  to  Buchanan,  Nov.  21, 1841  and  Jan.  8, 1842,  Lynch  MSs.,  LCHS. 

37.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  June  16, 1841,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

38.  Ibid. 

39.  David  Lynch  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  9,  1841,  Lynch  MSs.,  LCHS. 

40.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  10,  1841,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

444 


NOTES*   CHAPTER  11 


41.  April  16,  1840,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

42.  Buchanan  to  William  Fiynn,  Sept.  5,  1841,  Moore,  Works,  V,  72. 

43.  Buchanan  to  John  Reynolds,  Feb.  22,  1841,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 


CHAPTER  11  (pp.  142-150) 

1.  Moore,  Works,  V,  117-119. 

2.  Ibid.,  II,  421  ff. 

3.  Ibid.,  Ill,  168494. 

4.  Buchanan  to  John  Reynolds,  Dec.  19,  1844,  Reynolds  MSs.,  FM. 

5.  Moore,  Works,  III,  239-246,  259-264;  V,  30. 

6.  J.  M.  Callahan,  American  Policy  in  Canadian  Relations  (New  York,  1937),  pp.  148- 
149,  188. 

7.  Moore,  Works,  V,  363-364,  368,  383;  Curtis,  Buchanan,  I,  505, 

8.  Moore,  Works,  III,  359. 

9.  Ibid.,  Ill,  61-62. 

10.  Ibid.,  Ill,  64. 

11.  Ibid.,  V,  477. 

12.  Ibid.,  VI,  15-17. 

13.  Ibid.,  Ill,  86. 

14.  For  the  debate,  see  Moore,  Works,  III,  1,  8,  24,  205,  328;  Congressional  Globe,  24th 
Congress,  1st  session,  78,  85,  95,  182-183,  221-222. 

15.  Moore,  Works,  III,- 14-16. 

16.  Ibid.,  Ill,  18,  and  Congressional  Globe,  24th  Congress,  1st  session,  222. 

17.  Jeremiah  Cooper  to  Buchanan,  Feb.  26,  1838,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

18.  P.  W.  Pell  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  9,  1838,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

19.  King  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  20,  1837,  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP. 

20.  Elder  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  23,  1837,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

21.  Buchanan  to  Jonas  McClintock,  Jan.  12,  1838,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

22.  Congressional  Globe,  25th  Congress,  2nd  session,  55. 

23.  Moore,  Works,  III,  343. 

24.  Ibid.,  Ill,  344-345. 

25.  Ibid.,  Ill,  27. 


CHAPTER  12  (pp.  151-162) 

1.  Moore,  Works,  IV,  264;  Snyder,  "Pennsylvania  Politics,"  pp.  294-295. 

2.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  16, 1841,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

3.  Buchanan  to  Dr.  Jonathan  Foltz,  Dec.  14,  1842,  Buchanan  MSs.f  HSP. 

445 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

4.  Brewster  to  Buchanan,  Nov.  19,  1843,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

5    David  Lynch  to  Buchanan,  April  8,  1842,  Lynch  MSs.,  LCHS;  Buchanan-Swarr 

"  MSs.,  BF,  contains  these  political  notebooks. 

6.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  10,  1841,  Jan.  2,  1842,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 
7   Snyder,  "Pennsylvania  Politics,"  p.  303;  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Feb.  7  and  Mar.  4, 

'  1842,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

8.  Porter  to  Buchanan,  Feb.  20,  1842,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

9.  Buchanan  to  T.  L.  Hamer,  Nov.  29,  1842,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

10.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  5,  1842,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

11.  Buchanan  to  T.  L.  Hamer,  Nov.  29,  1842,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

12.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  5,  1842,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

13.  Note,  dated  Jan.  10,  1843,  in  Buchanan's  County  Index  book,  Buchanan-Swarr 
MSs    BF  describes  these  events.  Also  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  10, 1843,  Buchanan 
MSsl,  HSP. 

14.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  13,  1843,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

15.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  15,  1840,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

16  Buchanan  to  Benjamin  Champneys,  Jan.  13,  1843;  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  25, 
'  1843,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP;  Buchanan  to  Reah  Frazer,  Feb.  18,  1843,  Dickm- 

soniana,  DC. 

17  Buchanan  to  George  L.  Leiper,  July  22, 1843 ;  Buchanan  to  George  Plitt,  Mar.  9, 1843, 
"  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

18.  Buchanan  to  Dr.  Jonathan  Foltz,  April  21,  1843,  Foltz  MSs. 
19   A.  C.  Ramsey  to  Buchanan,  Apr.  17, 1843,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  I,  LC;  Buchanan  to 
'  Mrs.  Heister,  June  16,  1843,  collection  of  the  late  C.  H.  Martin,  Lancaster,  Penna. 

20.  Buchanan  to  Harriet  Lane,  July  25, 1843,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  I,  LC. 

21   list  of  purchases  by  Buchanan  at  sheriff's  sale  of  property  of  H.  Y.  Slaymaker  in 
York  County,  Nov.  3,  4,  1842,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

22.  Mar.  18,  1842,  draft  in  Buchanan's  handwriting,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

23.  Curtis,  Buchanan*  I,  519. 

24.  David  Lynch  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  2,  1842,  Lynch  MSs.,  LCHS. 

25.  Buchanan  to  John  M.  Read,  Dec.  5,  1843,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

26.  Snyder,  "Pennsylvania  Politics,"  pp.  329-330. 

27.  Moore,  Works,  V,  437-439. 

28.  Charles  M.  Wiltse,  John  C.  Calhoun,  Sectionalism  (Indianapolis,  1951),  pp.  158-171. 

29.  Snyder,  "Pennsylvania  Politics,"  p.  310;  Henry  Welsh  to  Buchanan,  May  20,  1844, 
Buchanan  MSs./ HSP. 

30.  Buchanan  to  Mr.  J.  L  Roosevelt,  May  13,  1844,  Moore,  Works,  ,VI,  1-3. 

31.  Moore,  Works,  VI,  4. 

32.  Ibid.,  VI,  3. 

33.  Niles  National  Register,  LXVI,  259. 

34.  Moore,  Works,  VI,  5-44. 

35.  Cameron  to  Buchanan,  July  2,  1844,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

36.  Moore,  Works,  VI,  61. 

37.  Buchanan  to  Shunk,  Aug.  14,  15,  30,  1844;  Shunk  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  17,  1844; 
Cameron  to  Buchanan,  Sept.  5, 1844,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

38.  Moore,  Works,  VI,  70. 

446 


NOTES*   CHAPTER  13 

39.  Buchanan  to  ?,  Sept.  18,  1844,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

40.  Moore,  Works,  VI,  71. 


CHAPTER  13  (pp.  163-174) 

1.  Buchanan  to  Polk,  Nov.  4,  1844,  Moore,  Works,  VI,  72. 

2.  Penna.  Electors  to  Polk,  Dec.  5,  1844,  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP. 

3.  Franklin  P.  Hillman,  "The  Diplomatic  Career  of  James  Buchanan,"  The  George 
Washington  Univ.  Ph.D.  thesis,  1953,  typescript,  p.  77. 

4.  Catron  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  23,  1845,  Moore,  Works,  VI,  82. 

5.  Buchanan  to  Shunk,  Dec.  18,  1844,  Moore,  Works,  VI,  76. 

6    Cameron  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  7,  1844,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  I,  LC;  B.  F.  Brewster  to 
Buchanan,  Jan.  19,  1845,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

7.  Polk  to  Buchanan,  Feb.  17,  1845,  Moore,  Works,  VI,  110. 

8.  Buchanan  to  Polk,  Feb.  18,  1845,  Moore,  Works,  VI,  111-112. 

9.  Moore,  Works,  VI,  108-109. 

10   Mrs  S  Pleasanton  to  Buchanan,  Feh.  1845,  Buchanan  MSs.,  LC;  Ben  Perley  Poore, 
'  Pertey's  Reminiscences  (Philadelphia,  1886),  1, 332;  Wharton,  Social  Life,  pp.  303*304. 
The  Lancaster  Dotty  Intettieencer,  Feb.  1,  1935,  describes  a  Buchanan  residence  at 
918  E.  Street,  N.W.  in  1845. 

11.  Moore,  Works,  VI,  411-412,  gives  a  full  description  of  the  organization  of  the  State 
Department  which  shows  that  in  the  previous  twenty-eight  years  the  staff  had 
increased  35  per  cent;  the  foreign  missions  of  the  U.  S.,  236  per  cent;  and  the  con- 
sulates,  153  per  cent.    An  even  greater  increase  in  Department  functions  had  taken 
place  in  the  Home  Bureau.    See  also  Graham  H.  Stuart,  The  Department  of  State 
{New  York,  1949),  Chap.  9. 

12.  Buchanan  to  Caleb  Gushing,  April  26,  1845,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

13.  Cameron  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  7,  1844,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  I,  LC. 

14.  Cameron  to  Col.  Schoch,  Feb.  27,  1845,  Cameron  item,  LCHS. 

15.  Forney  to  Morton  McMichael,  Mar.  14,  1845,  Forney  MSs.  LC;  the  eruption  over 
the  election  of  Cameron  is  described  in  detail  in  Snyder,  "Pennsylvania  Politics," 
pp.  347  ff,,  and  Crippen,  Cameron,  pp.  58  ff. 

16.  Moore,  Works,  VI,  136-138. 

17.  Snyder,  op.  at.,  p.  352. 

18.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Mar.  21,  23,  1845,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

19.  Series  of  letters,  March  through  October,  1845,  Forney  to  Buchanan,  in  Forney  Box, 
Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

20.  Brewster  to  Buchanan,  Maj  6,  July  1,  Nov.  12,  1845,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

21.  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

22.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  June  28,  1845,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

23.  Cameron  to  Buchanan,  Sept.  17,  1845,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  1, 1C. 

24.  Milo  M.  Quaife  fed.),  Diary  of  James  K.  Polk  (Chicago,  1910),  I,  39,  45-47.    Here- 
after  cited  as  Polk,  Diary. 

25.  Ibid.,  I,  138. 

26.  Brewster  to  Buchanan,  Nov.  7,  1845,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

447 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

27.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Oct.  30,  1845,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

28.  Polk,  Diary,  I,  137. 

29    Snyder,   "Pennsylvania  Politics,"  pp.    376-377;   Crippen,    Cameron,   pp.    79-81; 
"  Cameron  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  25,  1845,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  I,  LC. 

30.  Polk,  Diary,  I,  144-146. 

31.  Snyder,  op.  cit.,  pp.  349-352,  notes  that  the  Democrats  were  Benton  of  Missouri, 
Sevier  iW  Ashley  of  Arkansas,  and  Yulee  and  Westcott  of  Florida.    Allan  Neyms's 
short  edition  of  Folk's  Diary  (New  York,  1929),  p.  44,  note  6,  states  that  Woodward 
was  also  opposed  by  two  Virginia  Senators  who  hoped  to  place  Buchanan  in  the 
Supreme  Court  and  persuade  Polk  to  appoint  Virginia's  Andrew  Stevenson  Secretary 
of  State. 

32.  Polk,  Diary,  I,  189. 

33.  Buchanan  to  E.  E,  Lester,  Gratz  Collection,  HSP. 

34   Boston  Journal,  Jan.  26,  1883,  "Old  Time  Washington  Gayeties;"  Wharton,  Social 
'  Life,  p.  278. 

35.  Accounts  of  George  Plitt,  manager  of  the  affair,  Jan.  23, 1846,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

36.  Crippen,  Cameron,  p.  82. 

37.  Polk,  Diary,  II,  27. 

38.  Niles  National  Register,  Aug.  1,  1845,  p.  345. 

39.  Buchanan  to  Polk,  June  28,  1846,  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP. 

40.  James  to  Edward  Y.  Buchanan,  July  13,  1846,  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP. 

41.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  June  21,  1846,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

42   Roy  F.  Nichols  (ed.),  "Mystery  of  the  Dallas  Papers,"  Pennsylvania  Magazine  of 
History  <fc  Biography,  LXXIII  (1949),  384-385. 

43.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  July  9,  1846,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

44.  Nichols,  "Mystery  of  the  Dallas  Papers,"  op.  dt.,  385.386. 

45.  Niles  National  Register,  Aug.  29,  1849,  p.  405. 

46.  Buchanan  to  Forney,  July  29,  1846,  Moore,  Works,  VII,  43-45. 

47.  Buchanan  to  Forney,  Aug.  1,  1846,  Ibid.,  VII,  46-47. 

48.  Polk,  Diary,  II,  60. 


CHAPTER  14  (pp.  175-193) 

1.  Norman  A.  Graebner,  Empire  on  the  Pacific  (New  York,  1955),  emphasizes  the  specific 
commercial  objectives  of  the  Manifest  Destiny  policy. 

2.  Moore,  JForfcs,  VI,  10-15. 

3.  Ibid.,  VI,  165. 

4.  Rid.,  VI,  131. 

5.  Ibid.,  VI,  152, 159. 

6.  Ibid.,  VI,  165. 

7.  Ibid.,  VI,  174. 

8.  Edwin  A.  Miles,  "Fifty-four  Forty  or  Fight— an  American  Political  Legend,"  Miss. 
Valley  Hist.  Rev.,  XLIV  (Sept.,  1957),  dates  this  slogan  after  Folk's  election. 

448 


NOTES  •   CHAPTER  14 

9.  Wilbur  D.  Jones  and  J.  C.  Vinson,  "British  Preparedness  and  the  Oregon  Settle- 
ment,"  Padfic  Hist.  Rev.,  XXII  (Nov.,  1953),  355;  Lady  Frances  Balfour,  Life  of 
George,  Fourth  Earl  of  Aberdeen,  K.  G.,  K.  T.  (London,  1913),  II,  133. 

10.  Moore,  Works,  VI,  191. 

11.  Jones  and  Vinson,  op.  dt.,  357. 

12.  Moore,  Works,  VI,  220. 

13.  Polk,  Diary,  I,  2-5,  9-12,  62-65. 

14.  Ibid.,  I,  2-5. 

15.  M.  A.  DeWolfe  Howe  (ed.),  Life  and  Letters  of  George  Bancroft  (New  York,  1908), 
I,  280-281. 

16.  Polk,  Diary,  I,  62-65. 

17.  Jones  and  Vinson,  op.  dt.,  360. 

18.  Polk,  Diary,  I,  77-82. 

19.  Moore,  Works,  VI,  341. 

20.  Jan.  3,  1846.    Jones  and  Vinson,  op.  dt.,  360. 

21.  Ibid.,  361-363;  Charles  S.  Parker  (ed.),  Sir  Robert  Peel,  III,  324. 

22.  Richard  Rush  to  Buchanan,  Oct.  7,  1846,  Curtis,  Buchanan,  I,  604. 

23.  Polk,  Diary,  I,  235,  453-454. 

24.  Franklin  P.  Hillman,  "Diplomatic  Career  of  James  Buchanan,"  p.  153.    Typescript 
Ph.D.  thesis,  The  George  Washington  University,  1953. 

25.  Lyon  G.  Tyler,  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers  (Richmond,  1884-1886),  III,  175-177. 

26.  Hillman,  op.  dt.,  p.  156. 

27.  Buchanan  to  the  Hon.  F.  W.  Pickens,  June  6,  1845,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

28.  Polk  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  7,  1845,  Curtis,  Buchanan,  I,  589. 

29.  Bancroft  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  7,  1845,  ibid.,  I,  590. 

30.  Buchanan  to  Slidell,  Instructions  #1,  .Nov.  10,  1845,  Moore,  Works,  VI,  295. 

31.  Ibid.,  VI,  296-305. 

32.  Buchanan  to  Slidell,  Instructions  #5,  Jan.  20,  1846,  ibid.,  VI,  361. 

33.  Jan.  28,  1846,  ibid.,  VI,  364. 

34.  Mar.  12,  1846,  ibid.,  VI,  403. 

35.  Polk,  Diary,  I,  226-230. 

36.  Feb.  17,  1846,  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP. 

37.  Moore,  Works,  VI,  403. 

38.  Polk,  Diary,  I,  384-385. 

39   From  Dr.  J.  M.  Foltz,  interpreter  for  Taylor;  series  of  letters,  Buchanan-Swarr 
"  MSs.,  BF. 

40.  May  14,  1846,  Moore,  Works,  VI,  484-485. 

41.  Polk,  Diary,  I,  397-399. 

42.  Ibid.,  II,  254-257. 

43.  Ibid.,  I,  496;  II,  15-16,  254-257. 

44.  Moore,  Works,  VII,  66. 

45.  Sept.  26,  1846,  ibid.,  VII,  88. 

46    Polk  Diary,  II,  229,  234,  240,  432.    For  Buchanan's  original  draft,  ibid.,  II,  471-475; 
for  fcefiSj  msmictions,  Senate  Ex.  Doc.  #52,  30th  Congress,  1st  session,  81-89. 


449 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


47.  J.  G.  Van  Deusen,  The  Jacksonian  Era  (New  York,  1959),  pp.  237-238. 

48.  Buchanan  to  Trist,  June  2,  1847,  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP. 

49.  Buchanan  to  Gen.  James  Shields,  April  25,  1847,  Moore,  Works,  VII,  286-287. 

50.  July  19,  1847,  Instructions  #2,  ibid.,  VII,  368. 

51.  Polk,  Diary,  III,  163-164. 

52.  Ibid.,  Ill,  225-229. 

53.  Ibid.,  Ill,  333-334,  348-350,  400-410,  414. 

54.  W.  E.  Dodd,  "The  West  and  the  War  with  Mexico,"  Illinois  State  Hist.  Transactions, 
1912  p  23;  E.  G.  Bourne,  "The  Proposed  American  Absorption  of  Mexico,    Amer. 
Hist/Assoc.  Annual  Report,  1899,  p.  164. 

55.  Howe,  Life  and  Letters  of  George  Bancroft,  II,  23-24. 

56.  Foltz  to  Buchanan,  May  12,  1848,  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

57   Hillman,  "Diplomatic  Career  of  James  Buchanan,"  pp.  198-200;  Polk,  Diary,  III, 

"  300-301. 
58.  Moore,  Works,  VIII,  29. 

59  New  York  Herald,  May  3,  1848,  prints  a  "Statistical  Table  of  the  Leaks  of  the 
'  U.  S.  Senate." 

60  Frederick  B.  Marbut,  "Washington  Staff  Correspondents  before  the  Civil  War." 
Typescript  Ph.D.  thesis,  Harvard  University,  1950,  devotes  a  chapter  to  the  Nugent 
episode. 

61.  Buchanan  to  John  Clayton,  April  14  and  17,  1849,  Moore,  Works,  VIII,  360-361. 

62.  Buchanan  to  Ten  Eyck,  Aug.  28,  1848,  ibid.,  VIII,  181-190. 

63.  Ibid.,  VI,  411-422;  VII,  154-166. 

64.  Polk,  Diary,  III,  66,  97-99;  IV,  355. 

65.  Foltz  to  Buchanan,  Nov.  23,  1847,  Dec.  12,  1849,  and  a  series  of  letters,  Foltz  to 
Buchanan  and  Buchanan's  executors,  1861-1875,  especially  March  8  and  Aonl  15, 
1861,  and  Buchanan  to  William  B.  Reed,  Mar.  21,  1861,  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

66.  Buchanan  to  Reynolds,  Nov.  12,  1847,  Reynolds  MSs.,  FM. 

67.  Buchanan  to  Gen.  James  Tallmadge,  Jan,  5,  1846,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

68.  Buchanan  to  Plumer,  Mar.  19,  1848,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

69.  Buchanan  to  A.  J.  Donelson,  Donelson  MSs.,  LC. 

70.  Buchanan  to  Dr.  Foltz,  April  18,  1849,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP.    Charles  A.  McCoy, 
Polk  and  the  Presidency  (Austin,  Texas,  1960),  gives  a  revealing  analysis  of  the 
relations  of  Buchanan  and  Polk  in  Chap.  4. 


CHAPTER  15  (pp.  194-205) 

1.  tPoore,  Reminiscences,  I,  332. 

2.  Buchanan  to  Jones,  Mar.  30, 1847,  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP. 

3.  Buchanan  to  H.  D.  Foster,  Nov.  19,  1846,  Moore,  Works,  VII,  117-118. 

4.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Nov.  11,  1846,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

5.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Mar.  7,  30, 1847,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

6.  B.  F.  Brewster  to  Buchanan,  Apr.  11,  1847,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

7.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  June  29,  1847,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

450 


NOTES  •   CHAPTER  16 


8.  Lynch  to  Buchanan,  June  15,  1847,  Lynch  MSs.,  LCHS. 

9.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  May  4,  1847,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

10.  Many  letters  and  Buchanan's  memorandum  on  the  subject  are  in  the  Forney  Box 
and  the  Buchanan  letter  section  of  the  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP,  summer  of  1847. 

11.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Sept.  2,  3,  8, 1847,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

12.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Oct.  15,  1847,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

13.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Nov.  8,  Dec.  2,  1847,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

14.  Plitt  to  Buchanan,  Nov.  23,  1847,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  II,  LC;  Foltz  to  Buchanan, 
Dec.  ?,  1847,  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

15.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Nov.  9,  1847,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

16.  Plitt  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  9,  1847,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  II,  LC. 

17.  Circular  of  the  Philadelphia  Buchanan  Committee,  Jan.  11,  1848,  HSP.;  Forney  to 
Buchanan,  Jan.  7,  1848,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

18.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Nov.  26,  1847,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

19.  Buchanan  to  Forney,  Dec.  10;  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  10,  11,  1847,  Buchanan 
"  MSs.,  HSP,  and  memorandum  of  Buchanan  to  James  B.  Lane,  April  15,  1848, 

£.  E.  Lane  MSs. 

20   Plitt  to  Buchanan,  Mar.  4,  1848,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  II,  LC;  Forney  to  Buchanan, 
Mar.  7,  12,  1848,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

21.  Aug.  25, 1847,  Moore,  Works,  VII,  385-387. 

22.  Cass  to  Daniel  Sturgeon,  Oct.  27,  1847,  Ruth  Scrapbook,  YCHS. 

23.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Sept.  1,  1846,  Mar.  26,  Sent.  17,  1848,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP; 
Buchanan  to  Polk,  Sept.  5,  10,  1846,  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP;  Plitt  to  Buchanan, 
June  19,  Sept.  5,  1847,  Buchanan  MSs.,  LC;  Buchanan  to  John  Reynolds,  June  21, 
1847,  Reynolds  MSs.,  FM. 

24.  Buchanan  to  Miss  Lane,  Aug.  2,  1848,  Moore,  Works,  VIII,  150. 

25.  Moore,  Works,  VI,  400-402,  433-434, 487.   Plitt  used  only  about  $400  of  the  $2,500. 

26.  Application  Book  in  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF,  lists  all  those  attending  and  de- 
clining the  dinners. 

27  Buchanan  received  reports  of  the  Baltimore  Convention  from  Plitt,  May  12,  Cam- 
"  eron,  May  22,  23,  24,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  II,  LC;  Foltz,  May  19,  Buchanan-Swarr 
MSs.,  BF;  Forney,  May  21,  23;  Robert  Tyler,  July  13,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

28.  Plitt  to  Buchanan,  May  28,  1848,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  II,  LC. 

29  Cameron  to  Buchanan,  July  7,  Plitt  to  Buchanan,  July  11,  1848,  Buchanan  MSs., 
"  Box  II,  LC. 

30.  Buchanan  to  A.  H.  Reeder,  July  22, 1848,  privately  owned,  Richmond  Myers. 

31.  Lynch  to  Buchanan,  Sept.  21,  1849,  Lynch  MSs.,  LCHS. 


CHAPTER  16  (pp.  206-220) 

1.  Philip  S.  Klein,  Storr  ofWheatland  (I^caste&1936),  PP- 19-25;  Application  Book 
Buchanan-Swarr  MSa.,  BF;  memorandum  of  Mar.  28,  1851,  Buchanan  MSs.,  H51S 
JBuchSan  to  John  Cadwalader,  Dec.  4, 1851,  Dec.  20,  1852,  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP. 

2  Buchanan  to  Harriet  Lane,  Dec.  21,  1844,  Oct.  14,  1845,  Taylor  MSs.;  Mary  E. 
Menitt  to  James  B.  Lane,  Oct.  15,  1845,  E.  E.  Lane  MSs. 

3.  Moore,  Works,  VII,  25,  278. 
451 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


4    Buchanan  to  Harriet  Lane,  July  8,  1848,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP,    Also  numerous 

"  family  letters  in  Taylor  MSs.  and  E.  E.  Lane  MSs. 
5.  Moore,  Work*,  VII,  357-360. 

6   J  B  Henry  to  Buchanan,  Nov.  6,  1843,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  I,  LC;  Buchanan  to 
Harriet  Lane,  July  3, 1846,  Moore,  Works,  VII,  26;  Buchanan  to  Cadwalader,  July  16, 
1852,  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP. 
7.  Philadelphia  Press,  Jan.  24,  1860. 

8    Curtis,  Buchanan,  II,  16;  Plitt  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  10,  1847,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  II, 
"  LC. 
9.  Buchanan  to  Cobb,  June  12,  Nov.  10,  1849   Cobh  MSs.,  UG;  Buchanan  to  Foltz, 

Dec.  ?,  1849,  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  13,  1849,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 
10   To  W.  R.  King,  May  13, 1850,  Moore,  Works,  VIII,  383;  Buchanan  to  Foote,  May  31, 
1850,  i&VVni,  385-388;  and  to  Jefferson  Davis,  Mar.  16, 1850,  ibid.,  VIII,  372-373. 

11.  Foltz,  Surgeon  of  the  Seas,  p.  140. 

12.  Buchanan  to  J.  A.  Parker,  Feb.  3,  1862,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  249. 

13.  Buchanan  to  J.  Clancy  Jones,  Mar.  8,  1850,  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP. 

14.  Buchanan  to  J.  M.  Read,  Aug.  18,  1849,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

15.  Letter  to  a  Union  meeting,  Nov.  19,  1850,  Moore,  Works,  VIII,  390-404. 

16.  Buchanan  to  Robert  Tyler,  Dec.  26, 1850,  de  Coppet  Collection,  Princeton  University 
Library. 

17  Rov  F.  Nichols,  The  Democratic  Machine,  1850-1854  (New  York,  1923),  Chap.  4; 
Crippen,  CamTron,  pp.  118-128;  Moore,  Works,  VIII,  369-376,  416-417;  Buchanan  to 
Welsh,  W  24,  iS50,  Buchanan  MSs.,  YCHS;  Buchanan  to  Welsh,  Apr.  22,  1851, 
to  John  Hastings,  Mar.  18,  1851,  to  ?,  Aug.  28,  1851,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

18.  Buchanan  to  ?,  Jan.  22,  1850,  Ruth  Scrapbook,  p.  71,  YCHS. 

19.  Buchanan  to  William  Hopkins,  July  14,  Nov.  i^lSSl,  private    Craig  Wylie; 
R.  W.  Nash,  "The  Christiana  Riot,"  LCHS  Journal,  LXV  (Spring,  1961),  66-91. 

20.  Buchanan  to  Clancy  Jones,  Sept.  ?,  1851,  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP. 

21.  New  York  Tribune,  Feb.  6,  1852. 

22.  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

23.  Buchanan  to  William  Hopkins,  Nov.  13,  1851,  private,  Craig  Wylie. 

24.  Buchanan  to  Cave  Johnson,  Dec.  22,  1851,  Moore,  Works,  VIII,  428-430. 

25.  Nichols,  Democratic  Machine,  Chap.  4. 

26.  Foltz  to  Buchanan,  Mar.  25,  1851,  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

27.  Lynch  to  Buchanan,  April  6,  21,  1851,  Lynch  MSs.,  LCHS. 

28.  Buchanan  to  David  R.  Porter,  June  4,  1852,  Moore,  Works,  VIII,  451-452. 

29.  Nichols,  Democratic  Machine,  Chap.  9;  Ivor  D.  Spencer,  The  Victor  and  the  Spoils, 
A  Life  of  Wmam  L.  Marcy  (Providence,  R.  I.,  1959),  Chap.  16. 

30.  Lynch  to  Buchanan,  June  11,  1852,  Lynch  MSs.,  LCHS. 

31.  Buchanan  to  Robert  Tyler,  June  8,  1852,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 


CHAPTER  17  (pp.  221-233) 


1.  Foltz  to  Buchanan,  Sept.  1,  1852,  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

2,  Lancaster  Intelligencer,  Aug.  31,  Sept.  7,  1852. 


452 


NOTES*   CHAPTER  18 

3.  Speech  of  Oct.  7,  1852,  Moore,  Works,  VIII,  460-491;  Plitt  to  Buchanan,  Oct.  20, 
1852,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  III,  LC. 

4.  Pierce  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  7,  1852,  Buchanan  to  Pierce,  Dec.  11,  1852,  Moore, 
Works,  VIII,  492-499. 

5.  Buchanan  to  Forney,  Dec.  15,  1852,  Ruth  Scraphoofc,  YCHS. 

6.  Buchanan  to  Watterson,  Nov.  18, 1852,  Moore,  Works,  VIII,  491-492. 

7.  Buchanan  to  Tyler,  April  1,  1853,  Dickinsoniana,  DC 

8.  Buchanan  Memorandum  of  July  12,  1853,  Moore,  Works,  IX,  12-25;  Roy  F.  Nichols, 
Franklin  Pierce,  Young  Hickory  of  the  Granite  Hitts  (2nd  ed.,  Philadelphia,  1958), 
pp.  256-257;  Spencer,  Marcy,  pp.  229-230. 

9.  Moore,  Works,  IX,  17. 

10.  Buchanan  to  Pierce,  June  29,  1853,  Moore,  Works,  IX,  7-8. 

11.  Marcy  to  Everett,  July  12,  1853,  Spencer,  Marcy,  p.  248. 

12.  Plitt  to  Buchanan,  July  6,  1853,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  III,  LC. 

13.  Moore,  Works,  IX,  1-25,  contains  the  pertinent  letters. 

14.  H.  A.  Wise  to  R.  M.  T.  Hunter,  Apr.  16,  1853,  in  "Correspondence  of  R.  M.  T. 
Hunter,"  Amer.  Hist.  Assoc.  Annual  Report,  1916,  II,  156;  Forney  to  Buchanan, 
July  16, 1853,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP;  A.  Swanberg,  Sickles  the  Incredible  (New  York, 
1956),  pp.  89-91. 

15.  Power  of  Attorney  in  Franklin  County  Deed  Book,  XXVI,  345;  accounts  in  Buchanan 
MSs.,  HSP;  hank  books  and  notes  on  finances  in  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF;  Bu- 
chanan to  Lane  and  Reynolds,  July  30,  Aug.  22, 1853,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

16.  Buchanan  to  Miss  Lane,  Sept.  30,  Nov.  1,  1853;  to  Marcy,  June  8,  1855,  Moore, 
Works,  IX,  61,  87,  357;  to  J.  L.  Reynolds,  Nov.  11,  1853,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

17.  Moore,  Works,  IX,  103,  114. 

18.  J.  F.  Rhodes,  History  of  the  U.  5.  (new  ed.,  New  York,  1920),  I,  507-511;  Moore, 
Works,  IX,  146,  152,  194;  Curtis,  Buchanan,  II,  Chap.  4. 

19.  Buchanan  to  Forney,  Sept.  30,  1853,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

20   Buchanan  to  Edmund  Burke,  Dec.  3,  1849,  in  "Letters  of  Bancroft  and  Buchanan,9' 
Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  V,  99. 

21.  Buchanan  to  Marcy,  June  29,  1855,  Moore,  Works,  IX,  365. 

22.  Buchanan  to  Marcy,  Jan.  10,  1854,  Moore,  Works,  IX,  135. 

23.  Ibid. 

24.  April  6, 1854*  to  the  Lord  Elgin  Banquet,  Moore,  Works,  IX,  174-175. 

25.  Rid.,  IX,  250. 


CHAPTER  18  (pp.  234-247) 

1.  Buchanan  to  Pierce,  April  7,  1854,  Moore,  Works,  IX,  176. 
2  J  M  Callahan,  Cuba  and  International  Relations  (Baltimore,  1899),  p.  266;  Buchanan 
"  to  Marcy,  Nov.  1,  1853,  Moore,  Works,  IX,  83-85. 

3.  Tom  Harris  to  Howell  Cobb,  April  10,  1854,  Cobb  MSa.,  UG. 

4.  Sickles  to  Cobb,  June  23, 1854,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

5.  For  Sickles  affair  at  Peabody  Dinner,  cf.  memoranda  for  July,  1854  in  P«£ody  MSs., 
Box  XCI,  Essex  Institute;  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF;  and  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP; 

453 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

also  Buchanan  to  J.  L  Reynolds,  July  14, 1854,  Reynolds  MSs.,  FM;  and  W.  W.  Stell 
?o  PeSod^autumn,  1854,  Peabody^MSs.,  Box  Xtf,  Essex  Institute. 

6.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Sept.  26,  1854,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

7  W  R  Manning  (ed.),  Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  U.  S.  Inter-American  Affairs, 
*  1831*1860  (12  Vols.,  Washington,  1932-1939),  XI,  175-178. 

8.  Nichols,  Pierce,  p.  359;  Spencer,  Marcy,  pp.  320-325. 

9.  Moore,  Works,  IX,  251-253. 

10.  Ibid.  The  best  accounts  of  the  Ostend  affair  are  found  in  Amos  A.  fittinger,  The 
Mtedon  to  Spam  of  Pierre  SoulS  (New  Haven,  1932),  Nichols,  Pierce,  and  Spencer, 
Marcy. 

11  Buchanan  to  Marcy,  Dec.  22,  1854,  Moore,  Works,  IX,  289;  Nichols,  Pierce,  pp. 
368-369. 

12.  Spencer,  Marcy,  p.  338. 

13.  Slidell  to  Buchanan,  April  3,  1855,  Moore,  Works,  IX,  332, 

14.  Moore,  Works,  IX,  290,  292,  294,  304,  390,  406. 

15  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Nov.  27,  Dec.  14,  1854,  Jan.  9,  1855;  Buchanan  to  Sickles, 
"  Dec,  22,  1854,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

16.  Moore,  Works,  IX,  356,  460,  465. 

17.  Ibid.,  IX,  354,  365. 

18  Buchanan  to  Marcy,  Oct.  3;  to  Pierce,  Oct.  4,  1855;  to  Miss  Lane,  Oct.  26,  1855;  to 
ffiS^NoY.  7,  18&,  Moore,  Works,  IX,  417-421,  435-437,  447. 

19.  Buchanan  to  Marcy,  Nov.  9,  1855,  Moore,  Works,  IX,  452-453. 

20.  Moore,  Works,  IX,  459,  469,  476, 

21.  Ibid.,  X,  30. 

22.  Buchanan  to  Marcy,  Feb.  5,  1856,  Moore,  Works,  X,  31-32. 

23.  Wilfrid  Ward,  The  Life  and  Times  of  Cardinal  Wiseman  (London,  1897),  II,  166. 

24.  Buchanan  to  Marcy,  Feb.  15,  1856,  Moore,  Works,  X,  49. 

25.  Buchanan  to  E.  E.  Lane,  Feb.  29,  1856,  E.  E.  Lane  MSs. 


CHAPTER  19  (pp.  248-260) 

1.  Lynch  to  Buchanan,  Feb.  16,  1855,  Lynch  MSs.,  LCHS. 

2.  Black  to  Buchanan,  Feb.  17,  1855,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

3.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Feb.  23,  1855,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

4.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Apr.  25,  1856,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

5.  Foltz  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  9,  1855,  Nov.  22,  1855,  Buchanan-Swan:  MSs.,  BF. 

6.  Lancaster  Intettigencer,  Feb.  26,  1856.    The  InteUigencer  at  frequent  intervals  ran  a 
list  of  all  U.  S.  papers  that  favored  Buchanan. 

7.  Jan.  17,  1855,  Moore,  Works,  X,  8. 

8.  Buchanan  to  William  B.  Reed,  Feb.  29,  1856,  Moore,  Works,  X,  63. 

9.  Buchanan  to  Harriet  Lane,  Jan.  25,  1856,  Moore,  Works,  X,  21. 

10.  Sophie  Plitt  to  Buchanan,  Sept.  17,  1855,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  III,  LC. 

11.  Foltz  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  17,  1856,  Buchanan-Swart  MSs.,  BF. 

454 


NOTES*   CHAPTER  20 


12.  Intelligencer  and  Lancastrian,  April  29,  1856. 

13.  Ibid.,  and  Reigart  bill,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

14.  Baltimore  Sun,  May  13,  1856. 

15.  R.  F.  Nichols,  Disruption  of  American  Democracy  (New  York,  1948),  Chap.  I. 

16.  Official  Proceedings  of  the  National  Democratic  Convention . . .  1856;  Gerald  M.  Capers, 

*          '  ~         s  (Boston,  1959),  p.  142;  W.  B.  Hesseltine  and  R.  G.  Fisher  (eds.), 

..    —  J   T -—,*—-    /1WT.J:.An     \t7,V«««0;«      IQ^n      nn      TO     51 


Stephen  A.  Douglas  (Boston,  1959),  p.  142;  W.  B.  Hesseltine  and  R.  G.  Fisher  ( 
Trimmers,  Trucklers  and  Temporizers  (Madison,  Wisconsin,  1961),  pp.  19,  51. 


17.  Statement  of  Millard  Fillmore,  Congressional  Globe,  34th  Congress,  1st  session, 
App.  716. 

18.  Short  Answers  to  Reckless  Fabrications  (1856),  p.  9. 

19.  To  Harriet  Lane,  June  16,  1856,  Buchanan  MSs.,  Box  IV,  LC. 

20.  Buchanan  to  Cobh,  July  10,  1856,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

21.  Buchanan  to  Jones,  June  27,  29,  1856,  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP. 

22.  Lancaster  Intelligencer,  July  15,  1856,  quoting  exchanges.    A  column  of  squibs  such 
as  this  formed  a  regular  feature  in  many  Democratic  papers  through  the  nation. 

23.  Black  to  Cobb,  Sept.  23,  1856,  in  U.  B.  Phillips  (ed.),  "Correspondence  of  Robert 
Toombs,  A.  H.  Stephens  and  Howell  Cobb,"  Amer.  Hist.  Assoc.  Annual  Report9 
1911,  II,  383. 

24.  Curtis,  Buchanan,  II,  180-183,  quoting  Buchanan  to  Nahum  Capen,  Aug.  27,  to 
William  B.  Reed,  Sept.  14,  and  to  Joshua  Bates,  Nov.  6,  1856;  AUan  t  Nevms,  The 
Emergence  of  Lincoti  (New  York,  1950),  I,  345;  and  box  labelled  "Clippings"  m 
Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

25.  Z.  T.  Johnson,  Political  Policies  of  Howell  Cobb  (Nashville,  1929),  pp.  147-148. 

26.  D.  H.  Branham  to  Howell  Cobb,  Oct.  1,  1856,  Cobb  MSs.f  UG. 

27.  Collection  of  handbills,  notices  and  clippings,  Oct.  8,  1856,  in  Buchanau-Swarr 
MSs.,  BF. 

28.  Reminiscences  of  Alfred  Sanderson,  July  1,  1887,  in  Ruth  Scrapbook,  YCHS. 

29.  T.  R.  R.  Cobb  to  Howell,  Nov.  15,  1856,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 


CHAPTER  20  (pp.  261-272) 

1.  Intelligencer  and  Lancastrian,  MarchJS,  1857. 

2.  Buchanan  to  John  Y.  Mason,  Dec.  29,  1856,  Curtis,  Buchanan,  II,  185. 

3.  Nichols,  Disruption,  p.  54. 

4.  New  York  Herald,  Dec.  3,  1856. 

5.  Lancaster  Intelligencer,  Dec.  9,  1856. 

6.  Burnham,  Presidential  Ballots,  pp.  246-257,   The  sections  referred  to  are  those  used 
by  Burnham  for  analyses  of  the  vote. 

7.  J.  W,  Forney  to  Howell  Cobb,  Nov.  30,  1856,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

8.  Buchanan  to  J.  Clancy  Jones,  Nov.  29, 1856,  Jones  MSs.,  Philadelphia. 

9.  Same  to  same,  Dec.  8,  Jones  MSs. 

10.  Same  to  same,  Dec.  29,  Jones  MSs. 

11.  Cobb  to  his  wife,  Dec.  20,  1856,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

12.  Forney  to  Howell  Cobb,  Feb.  18,  1857, b"Correspondence  of  Toombs,  Stephens  and 
Cobb/'  in  Amer.  Hist.  ASBOC.  Annual  toport,  1911,  II,  396-397. 

455 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


13.  John  B.  Lamar  to  Cobb,  Jan.  24,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

14   Buchanan  to  Henry  S.  Mott,  Jan.  7,  1857,  Intelligencer  and  Lancastrian,  Feb.  3,  1857; 

also  Recollections  of  J.  Montgomery  Forster,  undated  clippings  from  the  Mercersburg 

Journal*  Rankin  Scrapbook. 

15.  Foniey  to  Cobb,  Jan.  21,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

16.  Cobb  to  his  wife,  Jan.  13,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG.;  Crippen,  Cameron,  pp.  160-165. 

17.  David  Lynch  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  18,  1857,  Lynch  MSs.,  LCHS. 

18.  Buchanan  to  Jones,  Feb.  17,  1857,  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP. 

19.  Forney  to  Cobb,  Jan.  21,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

20.  Recollections  of  Forster,  op.  dt. 

21.  John  B.  Lamar  to  Cobb,  Jan.  21,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

22.  Cobb  to  his  wife,  Jan.  6,  185T,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG;  "Correspondence  of  Toorabs, 
"  Stephens  and  Cobb,"  op.  dt.,  389. 

23.  Cobb  to  his  wife,  Feb.  3,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

24.  Philadelphia  Pennsylvania*,  Jan.  28,  1857. 

25   Leonora  Clayton  to  Mrs.  Howell  Cobb,  Jan.  31,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG;  Baltimore 
Siat,  Feb.  2,  1857. 

26.  Nichols,  Disruption,  p.  63. 

27.  Cobb  to  his  wife,  Jan.  31,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

28.  Quoted  in  the  Baltimore  Sun,  Feb.  7,  1857. 

29.  David  Lynch  to  Buchanan,  Feb.  16,  1857,  Lynch  MSs.,  LCHS. 

30.  Robert  foombs  to  Howell  Cobb,  Feb.  18,  1857,  quoting  letter  from  Buchanan  to 
Toombs,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

31.  Buchanan  to  Jones,  Feb.  17,  1857,  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP. 

32  Forney  to  Cobb,  Feb.  18,  1857,  "Correspondence  of  Toombs,  Stephens  and  Cobb/' 
"  op.  at.,  396-397. 

33  Oliver  H.  P.  Parker  to  Abraham  Lincoln,  Sept.,  1860,  in  David  C.  Mearns  (ed.), 
The  Lincoln  Papers  (New  York,  1948),  I,  284. 

34.  Jonathan  Foltz  to  Buchanan,  Feb,  23,  1857,  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

35.  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP,  contains  rough  notes  in  Buchanan's  hand,  dated  1857,  which 
deal  with  the  concept  of  the  sanctity  of  law.    Some  sentences  were  later  incorporated 
into  the  Lecompton  Message  of  1858. 

36.  Series  of  clippings  in  John  Lowry  Ruth  Scrapbook,  YCHS.;  Nichols,  Disruption, 
pp.  69-70. 

37.  Intelligencer  and  Lancastrian,  Mar.  10,  1857,  and  Frank  Leslie's  Illustrated  Weekly, 
Mar.  21, 1857,  give  full  descriptions  of  the  inauguration  ceremonies.   Leslie's  report 
has  many  errors, 

38.  One  of  these  is  in  the  Buchanan  MSs.,  BF. 

39.  LilHe  to  Eugene  B.  Cook,  Mar.  4,  1857,  Robert  J.  Walker  MSs.,  LC. 

40.  A.  A.  Woldman,  Lincoln  and  the  Russians  (New  York,  1952),  p.  18. 


CHAPTER  21  (pp.  273-285) 

1.  Sketch  by  J.  B.  Henry,  Moore,  Works,  XII,  323-333;  notes  on  White  House  staff  in 
Cadwalader  MSs.  and  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP;  Commonplace  Book  in  Buchanan-Swarr 

456 


NOTES*   CHAPTER  21 


MSs.,  BF;  Howell  Cobb  to  wife,  Mar.  22, 29;  Mary  Ann  Cobb  to  son,  Sept  7, 24, 1857, 
Cobb  MSs.,  UG;  Harriet  Lane  to  Ellie  Reynolds,  June  4,  1857,  Reynolds  MSs.,  FM; 
Foltz,  Surgeon  of  the  Seas,  p.  186;  Philadelphia  Press,  Aug.  1,  Sept.  30,  and  Oct. 
20, 1857. 


3.  Howell  Cobb  to  wife,  Mar.  8,  22,  19,  and  June  6,  1857;  Mary  Ann  Cobb  to  Howell, 
Mar.  9,  13,  and  Aug.  4,  1857;  Philip  Clayton  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  Mar.  17;  Howell  Cobb  to 
son,  Apr.  17;  J.  S?  Black  to  Cobb;  Apr.  15;  Cobb  to  Black,  Apr.  26,  1857;  Cobb 
MSs.,  UG. 

4.  E.  C.  Craig  to  Howell  Cobb,  June  23,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

5.  Philip  G.  Auchampaugh,  James  Buchanan  and  His  Cabinet  on  the  Eve  of  Secession 
(Lancaster,  1926),  p.  115. 

6.  Mrs.  Cobb  to  son,  Sept.  7,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

7.  Mrs.  Cobb  to  ?,  June  17,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG.    The  Browns  lived  at  19th  and  G 
Streets,  William  Wirt's  old  home. 

8.  Mrs.  Cobb  to  son,  Sept.  24,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

9.  Slidell  to  Cobb,  Apr.  5,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG;  Buchanan  to  Thos.  H.  Seymour, 
May  11, 1857,  Buchanan  Papers,  Boston  Public  Library;  J.  B.  Henry  to  Father  Kenna, 
June  12,  1857,  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP. 

10.  Cobb  to  wife,  Mar.  8,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

11.  Nichols,  Disruption,  Chap.  5. 

12.  Ibid.,  pp.  82-83,  207-209;  Dan  Sickles  to  Cobb,  July  23,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

13.  Series  of  letters  in  Lynch  MSs.,  LCHS. 

14.  Forney  to  Black,  May  6,  1857,  Black  MSs.,  LC. 

15.  Same  to  same,  June  15,  1857,  Black  MSs.,  LC. 

16.  Forney  papers  in  the  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP.  and  Black  MSs.,  LC.,  for  1856  and  1857 
sustain  this  view. 

17.  Grier  to  Plitt,  dated  only  1857,  Buchanan  MSs.,  LC. 

18.  Sophie  Plitt  to  Miss  Lane,  Sept.  5,  1860,  Buchanan  MSs.,  LC. 

19.  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP,  and  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF,  contain  the  correspondence 
on  the  subject. 

20.  Philadelphia  Press,  Sept.  7,  Oct.  20,  1857. 

21.  SHdeli  to  Cobb,  Apr.  5,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

22.  New  Orleans  Daily  True  Delta,  Apr.  4,  1858. 

23.  Cobb  to  Black,  Apr.  26,  1857,  Black  MSs.,  LC. 

24.  Cobb  to  son,  May  16,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

25.  Cobb  to  wife,  June  10,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

26.  Black  to  Cobb,  Apr.  30,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

27  C  W.  C  Dunnington  to  R.  M.  T.  Hunter,  Oct.  6,  1857,  in  "Correspondence  of 
"  Hunter,"  Amer.  Hist.  Assoc.  Annual  Report,  1916,  H,  236. 

28.  Mary  B.  Clayton  (ed.),  Reminiscences  ofj.  5.  Black  (St.  Louis,  1887),  p.  106. 

29.  Dunnington  to  Hunter,  Oct.  6,  1857,  op.  dt. 

30.  Cobb  to  wife,  June  6,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

31.  Black  to  Forney,  July  ?,  1857,  Black  MSs.,  LC. 

457 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

CHAPTER  22  (pp.  286-299) 

1.  Tom  D.  Harris  to  Howell  Cobb,  Apr.  10,  1854,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

2.  George  F.  Milton,  Eve  of  Conflict,  Stephen  A.  Douglas  and  the  Needless  War  (Boston, 
"  1934),  p.  183;  Capers,  Douglas,  pp.  87-88. 

3.  Forney  to  Buchanan,  Mar.  19,  1854,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

4.  Paul  W.  Gates,  50  Million  Acres  (Ithaca,  1943),  pp.  60-61. 

5.  Ibid.,  pp.  48-49. 

6.  Ibid.,  Chap.  2. 

7   Leverett  W.  Spring,  Kansas,  the  Prelude  to  ike  War  for  ike  Union  (New  York,  1885), 
'  pp.  64-65. 

8.  T.  W.  Thomas  to  A.  H.  Stephens,  Jan.  12,  1857,  "Correspondence  of  Toombs, 
Stephens  and  Cobb,"  Amer.  Hist.  Assoc.  Annual  Report,  1911,  II,  392. 

9.  Richmond  Enquirer,  March  2,  1854;  Henry  H,  Simms,  A  Decade  of  Sectional  Con- 
troversy, 1851^1861  (Durham,  N.  C.,  1942),  pp.  67-68. 

10.  Cobb  to  ?,  April  21,  1856,  "Correspondence  of  Toombs,  Stephens  and  Cobb,'* 
op.  cit.,  363. 

11.  Moore,  Works,  X,  81. 

12   Walker  to  Buchanan,  Mar.  26,  1857,  quoted  in  Intelligencer  and  Lancastrian,  Mar. 

30,  1857. 

13.  Intelligencer  and  Lancastrian,  May  19,  1857. 
14   A.  Iverson  to  Cobb,  reporting  conversation  with  Buchanan,  Sept.  17,  1857,  Cobb 

MSs.,  UG. 

15.  Nichols,  Disruption,  p.  105. 

16.  Cobb  to  Stephens,  June  17, 1857,  "Correspondence  of  Toorabs,  Stephens  and  Cobb," 
"  op.  cit.,  402. 

17.  Nichols,  Disruption,  p.  109. 

18.  T.  W.  Thomas  to  A.  H.  Stephens,  June  15,  1857,  "Correspondence  of  Toombs, 
Stephens  and  Cobb,"  op.  at.,  400-401;  James  Jackson  to  Cobb,  Aug,  27,  1857, 
Cobb  MSs,,  UG. 

19.  For  many  southern  letters,  cf.  "Correspondence  of  Toombs,  Stephens  and  Cobb," 
op.  cit.,  400  ff  and  "Correspondence  of  nunter,"  Amer.  Hist.  Assoc.  Annual  Report, 
1916,    II,    200   ff. 

20.  F.  W.  Pickens  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  5,  1857,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

21.  Address  by  A.  H.  Stephens,  Aug.  14, 1857,  in  "Correspondence  of  Toombs,  Stephens 
and  Cobb,"  op.  dx.,  pp.  417-418. 

22.  William  H.  Stiles  to  Cobb,  Aug.  26,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

23.  Robert  Toombs  to  W.  W.  Burwell,  July  11,  1857,  "Correspondence  of  Toombs, 
Stephens  and  Cobb,"  op,  cit.,  404. 

24.  Speech  of  July  15,  1857,  at  Lawrence. 

25.  Covode  Committee  Report,  36th  Congress,  1st  session,  #648,  pp.  115-119. 

26.  Ibid.,  pp.  112-113. 

27.  Cobb  to  Stephens,  Sept.  19, 1857,  "Correspondence  of  Toombs,  Stephens  and  Cobb," 
op.  cit.,  pp.  423-424. 

28.  Black  to  Forney,  July,  1857,  Black  MSs.,  I,  LC. 

29.  Spring,  Kansas,  p.  212;  Simms,  Decade  of  Sectional  Controversy,  pp.  93-96. 

30.  Buchanan's  reply  to  a  memorial,  Aug.  15, 1857,  Moore,  Works,  X,  117*122. 
33.  T.  R.  R.  Cobb  to  Howell  Cobb,  Oct.  1,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

458 


NOTES*   CHAPTER 23 

32.  Secretary  of  State,  Instructions  to  Walker  of  Sept.  2,  1857,  Walker  MSs.,  LC. 
Proslavery  Judge  Cato  issued  a  ruling  on  the  election  law  stating  that  only  tax 
payers  could  vote.    As  few  of  the  Topeka  people  ever  had  paid  any  tax  to  the  Le- 
compton  government,  it  seemed  clear  that  the  object  was  to  prevent  the  free-state 
people  from  voting.    Walker  immediately  protested  this  decision  to  Washington, 
and  Attorney  General  Black  promptly  overruled  Cato's  decision. 

33.  Nichols,  Disruption,  pp.  118-126. 


CHAPTER  23  (pp.  300-312) 

1.  Spring,  Kansas,  p.  223;  Political  Textbook  for  1860  (New  York,  1860),  pp.  76-126; 
T;  W.  Thomas  to  A.  H.  Stephens,  Feb.  7,  1858,  "Correspondence  of  Toombs, 
Stephens  and  Cobb,"  Amer.  Hist.  Assoc.  Annual  Report,  1911,  II,  430. 

2.  Nichols,  Disruption,  p.  130;  Milton,  Eve  of  Conflict,  p.  273. 

3.  Moore,  Works,  X,  236;  C.  R.  Fish,  The  American  Civil  War  (New  York,  1937),  p.  337. 

4.  Moore,  Works,  X,  145-151. 

5.  Edward  A.  Ross,  in  the  last  5  chapters  of  his  Social  Psychology  (New  York,  1908), 
sheds  much  light  on  the  behavior  of  Americans  during  the  Buchanan  Administration. 

6.  See  Buchanan's  first  three  annual  messages  and  the  Lecompton  Message. 

7.  Political  Textbook  for  1860,  pp.  114,  ff.  and  Forney's  Press  throughout  the  debate. 
Issue  of  Nov.  2,  1857,  is  a  good  example. 

8.  Roberts  to  Cameron,  Jan.  16, 1868,  Cameron  microfilms,  Museum  Bldg.,  Harrisburg. 

9.  Nevins,  Emergence,  1,  246;  Capers,  Douglas,  p.  165. 

10.  Political  Textbook  for  1860,  p.  115, 

11.  Buchanan  to  Robert  Tyler,  Feb.  15,  1858,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  514. 

12.  Moore,  Works,  X,  149;  Philadelphia  Press,  Aug.  3,  1857;  Nevins,  Emergence,  I,  236, 
note  19;  Intelligencer  and  Lancastrian,  July  21,  1857,  quotes i  exchanges  on  this 
point  from  editors  all  over  the  country;  Philadelphia  Press  of  Nov.  2,  1857,  has 
long  discussion. 

13.  Gerald  Wagner,  "Adoption  of  State  Constitutions  to  1860,  a  statistical  study." 
Typescript,  The  Penna.  State  Univ.,  1958. 

14.  Spring,  Kansas,  p.  223. 

15.  I  B.  Floyd  to  Buchanan,  July  31,  1858,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP.  wrote  that  Walker 
"intends  at  all  hazards  to  regain  his  position,  or  to  throwthe  blame  for  his  failure 
upon  someone  else—either  the  administration  or  the  ^w  D^wtment       Lass 
wrote  in  similar  vein  on  the  same  date,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP;  Philadelphia  Press, 
June  16,  1859. 

16.  Nevins,  Emergence,  I,  241. 

17.  Milton,  Eve  of  Conflict,  p.  271;  Nevins,  Emergence,  I,  240;  Capers,  Douglas,  p.  155. 
18   T.  W.  Thomas  to  A.  H.  Stephens,  "Correspondence  of  Toombs,  Stephens  and  Cobb," 

'  Amer.  Hist.  Assoc-  Annual  Report,  1911,  II,  428. 
19.  Cobb  to  John  B.  Lamar,  Mar.  10,  1858,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG, 
20   T  R.  R.  Cobb  to  Howeli,  Dec,  11,  1857;  J.  W.  H.  Underwood  to  Cobb,  Feb.  5, 1858, 

'  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

21.  Spring,  Kansas,  pp.  230-231. 

22.  Buchanan  to  Arnold  Plumer,  Feb.  14,  1858,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

459 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


23.  Nichols,  Disruption,  p.  161. 

24.  Buchanan  to  Hiram  Swarr,  Mar.  12,  1858,  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

25.  Buchanan  to  W.  H.  English,  Mar.  22,  1858,  Dickinsoniana,  DC. 

26.  Buchanan  to  Hiram  Swarr,  June  30,  1858,  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

27.  Buchanan  to  W.  H.  English,  July  2,  1858,  Dicfcinsoniana,  DC. 


CHAPTER  24  (pp.  313-327) 

1  Folte  to  Buchanan,  July  18, 1857,  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF;  Mrs.  Cobb  to  her  son, 
IS  30,18577  Cobb  MSs.,  UG;  New  York  Herald,  Oct.  14,  1858. 

2.  E.  B.  Hart  to  Howsll  Cobb,  Oct.  23,  1857,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

3-  grSsT-as^ 

1943). 

*•  MiSsS  S3  0^^Ksf^c&A^^^ 

5.  Ray  A.  Billington,  The  Far  Western  Frontier  (New  York,  1956),  p.  214. 

6.  Atlantic  Monthly,  III  (Mar.,  1859),  369. 

7.  Billington,  op.  at.,  pp.  206-217;  Nichols,  P^p^n,  pp.  17^m,  193;  House  Ex. 
D*».r35th  Congress,  1st  session,  Vol.  9,  #33;  Vol.  10,  #71;  Vol.  12  #99;  Vol.  13, 


ffioo;  OCIKHB  of.  x/««.,  o*u*  Congress,  1st  session, .Vol.  13,  #67.    Best  account  is 
Nonnan  F.  Furniss,  The  Mormon  Conflict,  1850-1SS9  (New  Haven,  1960). 

8.  Moore,  Works,  X,  113. 

9.  Ibid.,  X,  173-175. 

10.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  50,  59,  63;  Curtis,  Buchanan, 11,  399',  Andrew  C.  McLaughlin, 
Lewis  Cass  (New  York,  1899),  pp.  16M62;  Frank  B,  Woodford,  Lewis  Cass  (New 
Brunswick,  N.J.,  1950),  p.  316. 

11.  Clarendon  to  Buchanan,  Oct.  19,  1857,  Moore,  Works,  X,  122;  M.  W.  Williams, 
Anglo-American  tofonian  Diplomacy,  1825-1915  (Washington,  1916),  p.  228, 

12.  Moore,  Works,  X,  123;  Williams,  op.  at.,  pp.  231-232. 

13.  Moore,  Works,  X,  139-140. 

14.  Clarendon  to  Buchanan,  Mar.  13,  April  22,  1857,  Moore,  Works,  X,  114-116. 

15.  W.  0.  Scroggs,  Filibusters  and  financiers  (New  York,  1916),  pp.  339:340;  Pierce 
Butler,  Judah  P.  Benjamin  (Philadelphia,  1907),  pp.  185-190; :  Mobile  Mercury, 
Jan.  26, 1858;  New  York  Herald,  Feb.  2, 1858;  New  York  Times,  Feb,  2, 1858. 

16.  Rivas  Manifesto,  May  1,  1857,  in  Instruction  #9,  Cass  to  Lamar,  July  25,  1858, 
Senate  Ex.  Docs.,  35th  Congress,  2nd  session,  Vol.  1,  #1,  62-64. 

17.  Ibid.,  52-53. 

18.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  26. 

19.  Ibid.,  X,  259. 

20.  J.  Fred  Rippy,  The  Untied  States  and  Mexico  (New  York,  1926)  and  "The  United 
States  andlSexican  Policy,9'  Miss.  Valley  Hist.  Rev.,  VI  (1919-1920) ;  J.  M.  Callahan, 
"The  Mexican  Policy  of  Southern  Leaders  under  Buchanan's  Administration, 
Amer.  Hist.  Assoc.  Annual  Report,  1910,  and  "The  Evolution  of  Seward's  Mexican 
Policy,"  West  Virginia  University  Studies,  I;  H.  L  Wilson,  "James  Buchanan's 
Proposed  Intervention  in  Mexico/  Amer.  Hist.  Ru>.,  V  (1899-1900) ;  Lewis  Einstein, 
"Lewis  Cass,"  in  Bemis,  American  Secretaries  of  State,  VI. 

460 


NOTES  •  CHAPTER  25 

21.  April  4,  1857.    Rippy,  The  United  States  and  Mexico,  p.  204. 

22.  Mexican  Despatches,  #21,  April  12,  1858,  Rippy,  op.  dt.9  p.  216. 

23.  Senate  Ex.  Docs.,  35th  Congress,  2nd  session,  Vol.  I,  #1,  46. 

24.  Congressional  Globe,  35th  Congress,  2nd  session,  1118-1143,  passim;  Senate  Journal, 
35th  Congress,  2nd  session,  343. 

25.  Rippy*  The  United  States  and  Mexico,  Chap.  10. 

26.  Wilson,  "Buchanan's  Proposed  Intervention,"  Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  V,  197. 

27.  J.  M.  Callahan,  "Evolution  of  Seward's  Mexican  Policy,"  West  Virginia  University 
Studies,  I. 

28.  House  Ex.  Docs.,  37th  Congress,  2nd  session,  #100, 17-18. 

29.  Moore,  Works,  X,  226. 

30.  Buchanan  to  Fallon,  Dec.  14,  1857,  Moore,  Works,  X,  165;  Nichols,  Disruption, 
p.  228. 

31.  Congressional  Globe,  35th  Congress,  2nd  session,  Pt.  I,  907  ff.,  Pt.  II,  1079. 

32.  Callahan,  Cuba  and  International  Relations,  p.  313. 

33.  Congressional  Globe,  35th  Congress,  2nd  session,  Pt.  I,  541-543,  935-940. 

34.  Ibid.,  Pt.  II,  1187. 

35.  F.  A.  Colder,  "The  Purchase  of  Alaska,"  Amer.  Hist.  Rev.,  XXV  (1919-1920), 
411-417. 

36.  National  Intelligencer,  Jan.  24,  1859. 


CHAPTER  25  (pp.  328-344) 

1  Lincoln  to  Elihu  B.  Washhurne,  May  15, 17, 1860,  Roy  P.  Basler  (ed.),  The  Collected 
Works  of  Abraham  Lincoln  (New  Brunswick,  N.  J.,  1953),  II,  447,  455;  B.  F.  Brewster 
to  Buchanan,  May  27,  1858,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

2,  New  York  Herald,  Oct.  26,  1858. 

3.  Nichols,  Disruption,  p.  214. 

4  Speeches  at  Springfield,  July  17  and  Galesburg,  Oct.  4,  1858,  Basler,  Works  of 
"  Abraham  Lincoln,  ft,  508;  III,  226. 

5.  Speech  at  Alton,  Oct.  15,  1858. 

6.  Henry  A.  Wise  to  Buchanan,  Oct.  12,  1858,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

7.  Howell  Cobb  to  A.  H.  Stephens,  Sept.  8,  1858,  in  "Correspond^e  of  Toomhs, 
Stephens  and  Cobb,"  Amer.  Hist.  Assoc.  Annual  Report,*19ll,  II,  443. 

8.  Oct.  15,  1858,  Moore,  Works,  X,  229. 

9.  Buchanan  to  Swarr,  Dec.  31,  1858,  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

10.  Nichols,  Disruption,  p.  '242. 

11.  Philadelphia  Press,  April  5, 1858. 

12.  Jacob  Thompson  to  Howell  Cobb,  Aug.  7,  1859,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

13.  Sophie  Plitt  to  Harriet  Lane,  Mar.  18,  1858,  Buchanan  MSs.,  LC. 

14.  Kate  Thompson  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  June  8, 1859,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

15.  Sophie  Plitt  to  Harriet  Lane,  Dec.  12,  1859,  Buchanan  MSs.,  LC. 

16.  Leonora  Clayton  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  Aug.  19,  1859,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

461 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

17.  Kate  Thompson  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  May  18,  1859,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

18  Howell  Cobb  to  wife,  May  17,  Kate  Thompson  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  May  18,  Mrs.  Cobb 
to  Howell,  May  20,  1859,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

19  Howell  Cobb  to  wife,  June  7,  Kate  Thompson  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  June  8,  I860,  Cobb 
'  MSs.,  UG. 

20.  Kate  Thompson  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  July  10,  1859,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

21   Philadelphia  Press,  July  23,  25,  1859;  Philip  H.  Clayton  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  Leonora 

'  Clayton  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  Aug.  4,  1859,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 
22.  Nichols,  Disruption,  pp.  274-275. 

23   James  Buchanan,  Mr.  Buchanan's  Administration  on  the  Eve  of  Rebellion  (New  York, 
1866),  p  63;  Howell  Cobb  to  wife,  Nov.  19,  1859,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

24.  Buchanan  to  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  n.d.,  1860,  Dickinsoniana  Coll.,  DC. 

25.  Lancaster  IntelKgencer9  April  17,  1860. 

26.  Moore,  Works,  X,  399-405. 

27.  Buchanan  to  Stanton,  n.d.,  1860,  Dickinsoniana  Coll.,  DC. 

28.  John  Cadwalader  to  Buchanan,  Mar.  28,  June  12,  1859,  Cadwalader  MSs.,  HSP; 
Philadelphia  Press,  April  1,  June  29,  Aug.  16, 1859,  and  issues  of ^the  spring  of  1860; 
Report  of  the  Covode  Committee,  House  Report  #648,  36fh  Congress,  1st  Seas. 

29.  Moore,  Works,  X,  435-443. 

30.  Bedford  Gazette,  July  28, 1859,  and  reminiscences  of  the  editor,  ibid.,  Sept.  21,  1906. 

31.  Buchanan  to  J.  B.  Baker,  July  25,  1859,  Moore,  Fork,  X,  327;  to  Cobb,  July  23, 
Cobb  MSs.,  UG;  to  McCandless,  July  25,  in  "Letters  of  James  Buchanan,     LCHS 
Papers,  XXXVI,  317. 

32.  Buchanan  to  J.  B.  Baker,  Feb.  28,  1860,  in  Moore  Works,  X,  393;  to  Swarr,  April  13, 
1860  privately  owned  by  E.  E.  Bausman,  Lancaster,  Penna.;  to  Mrs.  Polk,  Meade 
Minnegerode,  Presidential  Years  (New  York,  1928),  p.  348. 

33.  New  York  Tribune,  Aug.  5,  1859,  quoting  the  New  York  Herald. 

34.  Philadelphia  Press,  March  24,  May  28, 1859. 

35.  Ibid.,  Nov.  15,  17,  1859. 

36.  Toombs  to  T.  W.  Thomas,  Dec.  4,  1859;  to  A,  H.  Stephens,  Jan.  11,  1860, tf Corre- 
spondence of  Toombs,  Stephens  and  Cobb,"  op.  a*.,  450,  456. 

37.  Howell  Cobb  to  John  B.  Lamar,  Jan.  15,  1860,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

38.  Milton,  Eve  of  Conflict,  p.  357. 

39.  Buchanan  to  Slidell,  June  24;  Slidell's  reply,  July  3,  1859,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP, 


CHAPTER  26  (pp.  345-352) 

1.  Historical  Statistics  of  the  United  States,  1789-1945,  (G.  P.  0.  1949),  p.  297. 

2.  Gates,  Fifty  Million  Acres,  pp.  77-79,  89-91. 

3.  Ibid.,  pp.  86,  89. 

4.  Harriet  Lane  to  Ellie  Reynolds,  July  21,  1860,  Reynolds  MSs.,  FM. 

5.  Philadelphia  Press,  May  31, 1860;  Mrs.  Cobb  to  son,  May  29,  I860,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

6.  Mrs.  E.  C.  (Craig)  Robb  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  July  30, 1860,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

462 


NOTES*   CHAPTER 27 

7.  Russell  Weigley,  Quartermaster  General  of  the  Union  Army,  Montgomery  C,  Meigs 
(New  York,  1959),  describes  the  feud  fully  in  the  early  chapters. 

8.  Philadelphia  Press,  Aug.  23,  1860. 

9.  Gillan,  "James  Buchanan,"  in  Kittochtinny  Hist.  Soc.  Papers,  II  (1901),  196-197. 

10.  Mrs.  Cobb  to  Lamar  Cobb,  Oct.  13,  14,  15,  1860,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

11.  L.  R.  Morris,  Incredible  New  York  (New  York,  1951),  pp.  23-24;  Edmund  0.  Stedman, 
The  Prince's  Batt  (New  York,  1860). 

12.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  3. 

13.  W.  M.  Browne  to  S.  L.  M.  Barlow,  July  1,  1860,  Barlow  MSs.,  HEH. 

14.  Howell  to  Lamar  Cobb,  July  9,  1860,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

15.  Buchanan  to  Hiram  Swarr,  Oct.  3,  I860,  £  E,  Bausman  (private),  Lancaster,  Penna. 

16.  Howell  Cobb  to  wife,  Oct.  10,  1860,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

17.  Howell  to  Lamar  Cobb,  Oct.  31,  1860,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

18.  Burnham,  Presidential  Ballots,  p.  86. 

19.  Henry  Hull,  Annals  of  Athens,  1S01-1901  (Athens,  Ga.,  1906),  p.  217. 

20.  Philadelphia  Press,  Nov.  14, 1860. 

21.  Slidell  to  Buchanan,  Nov.  13,  1860,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 


CHAPTER  27  (pp.  353-367) 

1.  Trescot  is  also  spelled  Trescott.  The  best  treatment  of  the  last  months  of  Buchanan's 
Administration  is  Kenneth  M,  Stampp,  And  the  War  Came  (Baton  Rouge,  1950). 

2.  Buchanan,   Mr.  Buchanan's  Administration,  pp.   99-103. 

3.  Sen.  Ex.  Doc.  #1,  35th  Congress,  2nd  Session,  VoL  III,  Pt.  II,  761. 

4.  Congressional  Globe,  35th  Congress,  2nd  session,  Pt.  I,  1032-1038;  36th  Congress, 
Istlession,  Pt.  I,  1351;  Pt.  Ill,  3137;  Senate  Reports,  36th  Congress,  1st  session, 
I,  172. 

5.  Congressional  Globe,  35th  Congress,  1st  session,  Pt.  II,  1425-1427. 

6.  Nahum  Capen  to  Buchanan,  Nov.  8,  1862,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP,  enclosing  Toucey's 
deposition  Wore  the  Senate  Committee  on  the  disposition  of  the  Navy  in  1850. 

7.  Buchanan  to  Nahum  Capen,  Jan.  27,  1864,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  355. 

8   Floyd's  Diary,  Nov.  10,  I860,  MSs.,  in  HSP;  William  N.  Brigance,  Jeremiah  Sullivan 

'  Black  (Philadelphia,  1934),  p.  82. 
9.  Nichols,  Disruption,  p.  381. 

10.  Floyd's  Diary,  Nov.  10,  1860,  HSP. 

11.  November  17,  1860,  in  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

12.  Opinions  of  the  Attorneys  General,  IX,  517;  copy  in  Black  MSs.,  LC,  dated  Nov.  20, 
1MO. 


13.  Howard  C.  Perkins,  Northern  Edtoorials  on  Secession  (New  York,  1942), 

and  Chapters  II,  IV;  also  Dwight  L  Dumond,  Southern  Editorials  on  Secession 
(New  York,  1931). 

14.  Lincoln  to  William  Speer,  Oct.  23,  1860,  Basler,  Works  of  Lincoln,  IV,  30. 

15.  David  Potter,  Lincoln  and  His  Party  in  the  Secession  Crisis  (New  Haven,  1942),  p.  141. 


463 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

16.  J.  R.  Moorhead  to  Lincoln,  Nov.  23, 1860,  Robert  Todd  Lincoln  MSs.,  LC. 

17.  A.  J.  Glossbrenner  to  Hiram  Swarr,  Nov.  28,  1860,  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

18.  New  York  Herald,  Nov.  22,  1860;  Philadelphia  Press,  Nov.  24,  1860. 

19.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  7-25. 

20.  Philadelphia  North  American  and  U.  S.  Gazette,  Dec.  5,  I860;  Jersey  City '  Daily 
Courier  and  Adviser,  Dec.  5,  1860;  New  Haven  Morning  Journal  and  Courier,  Dec.  6, 
im  Qrincy  Daily  Whig  and  Republican,  Dec.  10,  12,  1860,  in  Perkins,  Northern 
trials,  I,  125/133,  136-138,  152-153. 

21.  New  York  Herald,  Dec.  5, 1860;  Harrisburg iP^riotand  Union,  Dec.  6,  I860;  Phila- 
delphia Morning  Pennsylvanian,  Dec.  5,  1860,  m  Perkins,  op.  at.,  I,  127,  133-134, 
142-145. 

22.  Buffalo  Daily  Courier,  Dec.  6, 1860;  Cincinnati  Daily  Enauirer,  Dec.  6, 1860;  Detroit 
Free  Press,  Dec.  7,  1860;  Utica  Daily  Observer,  Dec.  7,  i860,  in  Perkins,  op.  dt.,  I, 
138-142,  147-152. 

23.  Potter,  Lincoln  and  His  Party,  p.  39. 

24  Francis  Blackburn  to  Lincoln,  Nov.  24,  1860,  R.  T.  Lincoln  MSs.,  LC;  John  Welsh 
"  to  William  Bigler,  Dec.  14,  1860,  Bigler  MSs.,  HSP. 

25.  Trumbull  to  Lincoln,  Dec.  4,  1860,  R.  T.  Lincoln  MSs.,  LC, 

26.  E.  B.  Washburne  to  Lincoln,  Dec.  9,  1860,  R.  T.  Lincoln  MSs.,  LC. 

27.  W.  G.  Snethin  to  Lincoln,  Dec.  13,  1860,  R.  T.  Lincoln  MSs.,  LC. 

28.  P.  A.  Hackleman  to  ?,  forwarded  to  Lincoln,  Nov.  27, 1860,  R.  T.  Lincoln  MSs.,  LC. 

29.  E.  D.  Morgan  to  Lincoln,  Dec.  16,  I860,  R.  T.  Lincoln  MSs.,  LC. 

30.  Potter,  Lincoln  and  His  Party,  pp.  93-94. 

31.  Barlow  to  Slidell,  Nov.  27,  1860,  S.  L.  M.  Barlow  MSs.,  HEH. 

32.  Lincoln  to  H.  J.  Raymond,  Nov.  28,  1860,  R.  T.  Lincoln  MSs.,  LC. 

33.  Weed  to  Lincoln,  Dec.  11,  I860,  R.  T.  Lincoln  MSs.,  LC. 

34.  Lincoln  to  E.  B.  Washburne,  Dec.  13,  1860,  Basler,  Works  of  Lincoln,  IV,  151. 

35.  Lincoln  to  Weed,  Dec.  17,  I860,  ibid..  IV,  154. 

36.  Buchanan  to  Hiram  Swarr,  Dec.  10, 1860,  E.  E.  Bailsman  (private),  Lancaster. 


CHAPTER  28  (pp.  368-387J 

1.  Samuel  W.  Crawford,  Genesis  of  the  GM  War  (New  York,  1887),  pp.  66,  75. 

2.  Barlow  to  Butterworth,  Dec.  3, 1860,  quoting  a  report  of  the  incident,  Barlow  MSs., 
HEH;  Auchampaugh,  Mr,  Buchanan's  Cabinet,  p.  150. 

3.  Crawford,  Genesis,  pp.  30-35. 

4.  W.  M.  Browne  to  S.  L  M,%  Barlow,  Dec.  I860,  Barlow  MSs.,  HEH. 
'  5.  Crawford,  Genesis,  p.  68. 

6.  Ibid.,  p.  76. 

7.  Ibid.,  p.  73. 

8.  Philadelphia  Press,  Dec.  8, 1860. 

9.  Cobb  to  J.  C.  Lamar,  Nov.  16,  1860,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 
10.  Brigance,  /.  5.  Black,  p.  90. 

464 


NOTES*  CHAPTER 28 


11.  Cobb  to  wife,  Dec.  10,  1860;  Leonora  Clayton  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  Dec.  30t  1860;  Mrs. 
Thompson  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  April  15, 1861,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

12.  Auchampaugh,  Mr.  Buchanan's  Cabinet,  pp.  66-69. 

13.  Crawford,  Genesis,  pp.  38-39. 

14.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  56-57,  358. 

15.  Cass  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  12,  1860,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  58. 

16.  Philadelphia  Press,  Dec.  11,  1860. 

17.  Buchanan's  memorandum  of  Dec.  15, 1860,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  59-60. 

18.  Black  to  G.  T.  Curtis,  Sept.  16,  1881,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP;  Buchanan  to  Cass, 
Dec.  15, 1860,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  59-65. 

19.  Mrs.  Thompson  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  Dec.  15,  1860,  Cobb  MSs,,  UG. 

20.  W.  M.  Browne  to  S.  L.  M.  Barlow,  Dec.  16,  1860,  Barlow  MSs.,  HEH. 

21.  Mrs.  Cobb  to  a  "friend,"  Dec.  19, 1860,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

22.  Trumbull  to  Lincoln,  Dec.  14,  1860,  R.  T.  Lincoln  MSs.,  LC. 

23.  Curtis,  Buchanan,  II,  367. 

24.  Levi  Woodbury  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  17,  I860,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

25.  E.  G.  W.  Butler  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  17, 1860,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

26.  Lancaster  New  Era,  Sept.  29,  1872.    Harriet  Lane's  letter  to  the  editor. 

27.  Mrs.  Thompson  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  Dec.  15,  I860,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG,  and  newspaper  letter 
from  Thompson  in  Ruth  Scrapbook,  YCHS. 

28.  W.  M.  Browne  to  S.  L.  M.  Barlow,  Nov.  24, 1860,  Barlow  MSs.,  HEH. 

29.  Horatio  King  to  J.  S.  Black,  Dec.  14,  1860,  Horatio  King,  Turning  on  the  Light 
(Philadelphia,  1895),  p.  34. 

30.  King  to  Dix,  Nov.  25,  1860,  ibid.,  p,  27. 

31.  King  to  Nahum  Capen,  Nov.  25, 1860,  ibid.,  p.  29. 

32.  Buchanan  to  Bennett,  Dec.  20, 1860,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  69-70. 

33.  C.  S.  Henry  to  Lincoln,  Dec.  23,  1860;  G.  G.  Fogg  to  Lincoln,  Dec.  13, 1860;  A.  J. 
Randall  to  Seward,  Dec.  15,  1860,  R.  T.  LmcohTMSs.,  LC. 

34.  S.  L,  M.  Barlow  to  H.  D.  Bacon,  Dec.  29,  1860,  Barlow  MSs.,  HEH;  F.  P.  James  to 
William  Bigler,  Dec.  15,  1860,  Bigler  MSs.,  HSP. 

35.  Mrs,  Roger  A.  Pryor,  Reminiscences  of  Peace  and  War  (New  York,  1905),  pp.  110-111. 

36.  Ibid.,  p.  111.    Telegram  is  in  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

37.  Crawford,  Genesis,  pp.  81-83. 

38.  Ibid.,  p.  84. 

39.  Buchanan  to  Pickens,  Dec.  20, 1860,  in  Moore,  Works,  XI,  71-72. 

40.  Crawford,  Genesis,  pp.  77-78. 

41.  Ibid.,  p.  75;  Nichols,  Disruption,  p.  423. 

42.  Crawford,  Genesis,  pp.  93-94. 

43.  Barlow  Letterbook,  VI,  863,  HEH;  Philadelphia  Press,  Dec.  31, 1860. 

44.  Leonora  Clayton  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  Dec.  30f  1860,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

45.  Memorandum  of  Black  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  27,  I860.   Comesof  this  and  of  the  orders 
are  in  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP;  Brigance,  /.  S.  Black,  pp.  92-93. 

46.  Crawford,  Genesis,  p.  145;  Nichols,  Disruption,  p.  428;  Brigance,  /.  5.  Black,  p.  94. 

47.  Crawford,  Genesis,  p.  144.   Memorandum  of  Black  dated  1861  in  Black  MSs.,  LC. 

48.  Memorandum  of  Black  in  Black  MSs.,  LC. 

465 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

49.  Leonora  Clayton  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  Dec.  30,  1860,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

50.  Moore,  Works,  XII,  160. 

51.  Ibid..  XI,  76-77. 

52.  Ibid.,  XII,  161. 

53.  Ibid.,  XII,  162. 

54.  Brigance,  /.  5.  Black,  p.  98. 

55.  F,  A.  Burr  in  Phaadclphia  Press,  Sept.  10,  1883;  Brigance,  /.  5.  Black,  p.  98. 

56.  Basler,  Works  of  Lincoln,  IV,  154. 

57.  Weed  to  Lincoln,  Dec.  11,  I860,  ibid. 

58.  Seward  to  Lincoln,  Dec.  16,  1860,  R.  T.  Lincoln  MSs.,  LC;  Potter,  Lincoln  and  His 
Party*  PP- 163-164. 

59.  Phelps  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  20,  1860,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

60   Bryant  to  Lincoln,  Dec.  25,  1860;  Lincoln  to  Bryant,  Dec.  29,  1860,  in  Basler, 
Works  of  Lincoln,  IV,  163-164,  and  note. 

61.  Horace  White  to  Lincoln,  Dec.  22,  1860,  R.  T.  Lincoln  MSs.,  LC. 

62.  Barlow  to  Slidell,  Nov.  27,  1860;  Barlow  to  Bayard,  Nov.  27,  1860,  Barlow  MSs., 
HEH. 

63.  Barlow  to  Benjamin,  Dec.  26,  1860,  Barlow  MSs.,  HER;  Harriet  A.  Weed  (ed.), 
Autobiography  ofThurlow  Weed  (Boston,  1883),  pp.  603-614. 

64.  W.  M.  Browne  to  Barlow,  Dec.  26,  1860,  Barlow  MSs.,  HEH. 

65.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  73-74. 

66.  Duff  Green  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  28,  1860,  Curtis,  Buchanan,  II,  426427;  Green  to 
Jefferson  Davis,  May  26,  1863,  J.  G.  Nicolay  and  John  Hay,  Abraham  Lincoln  (New 
York,  1904),  III,  286-288. 

67.  Lincoln  to  Green,  Dec.  28,  1860;  Lincoln  to  Trumbull,  Dec.  28,  1860;  Green  to 
Lincoln,  Dec.  31,  1860,  Basler,  Works  of  Lincoln,  IV,  162-163. 

68.  Black  file,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

69.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  79-84. 

70.  Ibid.,  XII,  162. 


CHAPTER  29  (pp.  388-402) 

1.  Scott  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  28,  1860,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

2.  Buchanan  to  Thompson,  Jan.  9,  1860,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  191. 

3.  Nichols,  Disruption,  pp.  434435. 

4.  Crawford,  Genesis,  pp.  169-171. 

5.  Mrs.  Gwin  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  Jan.  5,  1861,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

6.  L,  K.  Bowen  to  Howell  Cobb,  Jan.  3»  1861;  Seward  to  Lincoln,  Dec.  29,  1860, 
R.  T.  Lincoln  MSs.,  LC. 

7.  Crawford,  Genesis,  p.  178. 

8.  Thompson  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  8,  1861;  Buchanan  to  Thompson,  Jan.  8,  1861,  in 
Moore,  Works,  XI,  100-101. 

466 


NOTES*  CHAPTER 29 

9.  Mrs.  Thompson  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  Jan.  13,  1861,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

10.  T/JBailey  Myers  to  Miss  Lane,  Jan.  3,  1861,  Buchanan  MSs.,  LC, 

11.  Mrs.  Gwin  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  Jan.  5,  1861,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

12.  Clayton  to  Cobb,  Jan.  4, 1861;  Browne  to  Cobb,  Jan.  11, 1861,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

13.  Mrs.  Thompson  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  Jan.  14,  1861,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

14.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  94-99. 

15.  Lincoln  to  Duff  Green,  Dec.  28,  1860,  Basler,  Forks  of  Lincoln,  IV,  162-163. 

16.  Potter,  Lincoln  and  His  Party*  P- 184- 

17.  A.  A.  Woldman,  Lincoln  and  the  Russians  (Cleveland,  1952),  p.  17. 

18.  Nichols,  Disruption,  pp.  440-443. 

19.  A.  T.  W.  Lytle  to  Buchanan.    These  are  in  the  "Letters  to  Buchanan,"  Dec.,  1860, 
Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

20.  Crawford,  Genesis,  p.  205. 

21.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  109411. 

22.  Black  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  22,  1861,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

23.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  126-143,  gives  the  correspondence, 

24.  Ibid.,  XII,  134. 

25.  Nichols,  Disruption,  p.  478. 

26.  Moore,  Works,  XII,  134-141. 

27.  Curtis,  Buchanan,  II,  413-417. 

28.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  106-109. 

29.  Sarah  R.  Cobb  to  Mrs.  Howell  Cobb,  Jan.  20,  1861,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

30.  W.  M.  Browne  to  Howell  Cobb,  Jan.  11,  1861,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

31.  Mrs.  Thompson  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  Jan.  14,  1861,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

32.  Black  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  22,  1861,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

33.  Holt  to  Buchanan,  Feb.  20, 1861,  Moore,  Forks,  XI,  154-155. 

34.  Ibid.,  XI,  152-154. 

35.  SHdell  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  27;  Buchanan  to  Slidell,  Jan.  29,  1861,  Buchanan  MSs., 
HSP. 

36.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  116-118. 

37.  Tyler  to  Buchanan,  Jan.  28, 1861,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  120421. 

38.  King,  Turning  on  the  Light,  pp.  52-54. 

39.  Nichols,  Disruption,  p.  491. 

40.  Philip  Clayton  to  Cobb,  Jan.  4,  1861,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

41.  Mrs,  Thompson  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  Jan.  14,  1861,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

42   Richard  H.  Clark  to  Cobb,  Feb.  16,  1861,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG;  C.  F.  Adams  Diary, 
"  Jan.  15,  1861.    Microfilm,  The  Pennsylvania  State  University  Library. 

43.  Mrs.  Thompson  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  Feb.  3,  1861,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

44.  Miss  Lane  to  Sophie  Plitt,  Feb.  24,  1861,  Buchanan  MSs.,  LC. 

45.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  156;  memorandum  of  Mar.  4-9,  1861. 

46.  Auchampaugh,  Mr.  Buchanan's  Cabinet,  p.  188. 

47.  Asa  E.  Martin,  After  the  White  House  (State  College,  Penna.,  1951),  p.  225. 

467 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

CHAPTER  30  (pp.  403-429J 

1.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  156. 

2.  Lancaster  JnteUigencer,  Mar.  12,  1861;  Baltimore  County  Advocate,  Mar.  23,  1861. 

3.  National  Intelligencer,  Mar.  9,  1861, 

4.  Raleigh  North  Carolina  Standard,  Mar.  9,  1861. 

5.  Perkins,  Northern  Editorials,  Chap.  XV,  "The  Inaugurals,  South  and  North." 

6.  Indianapolis  Daily  Journal,  Mar.  5,  1861. 

7   Excerpts  are  from  Lincoln's  first  inaugural;  from  Buchanan's  4th  annual  message 
*  and  his  special  messages  of  January  8,  28,  1861. 

8.  Black  to  Buchanan,  Mar.  8, 1861,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

9.  Dix  to  Buchanan,  Mar.  14,  1861,  Curtis,  Buchanan,  II,  533. 

10   Stanton  to  Buchanan,  Mar.  10,  12,  14,  16,  and  April  3,  1861,  Moore,  Works,  XI, 

163-178. 

11.  Ibid.,  XI,  176-178;  Bigler  to  Buchanan,  April  11,  1861,  Buchanan-Swan:  MSs.,  BF. 
12   Stanton  to  Buchanan,  Mar.  16,  1861;  Dix  to  Buchanan,  Mar.  28,  1861,  Moore, 

Works,  XI,  170-171,  176. 

13.  Buchanan  to  J,  B.  Henry,  April  12,  1861,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  181. 

14.  Harris,  Biographical  History  of  Lancaster  County,  p.  485,  note. 

15.  Buchanan  to  J.  B.  Baker,  April  26,  1861,  Moore,  Work,  XI ,186;  Buchanan  to 
James  L.  Reynolds,  May  8, 1861,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP;  Gfflan,  "James  Buchanan," 
Kittochtiuny  H.  S.  Popery,  196. 

16.  Sophie  Plitt  to  Harriet  Lane,  May  18,  1861»  Buchanan  MSs.,  LC;  J.  M.  Foltz to 
A.  J.  Steinman,  June  16,  1868,  Foltz  MSs.,  FM;  Buchanan  to  W.  B.  Reed,  Mar.  21, 
1861,  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

17.  Lancaster  Examiner  and  Herald,  Aug.  1,  1863. 

18.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  323-324. 

19.  Aid.,  XI,  192;  Curtis,  Buchanan,  II,  501,  506. 

20.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  163, 171-172,  211,  280-293. 

21.  Ibid.,  XI,  215,  363;  Curtis,  Buchanan,  II,  513. 

22.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  229,  316,  322. 

23.  Rid.,  XI,  179, 182. 

24.  Curtis,  Buchanan,  II,  518-519. 

25.  Buchanan  to  J.  H.  Dillon,  Oct.  24, 1865,  May  MSs.  (private);  Curtis,  Buchanan.  II, 
520;  Moore,  Works,  XI,  263,  266,  note. 

26.  Flynn  to  Buchanan,  May  14,  1862,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  269. 

27.  Ibid.,  XI,  266. 

28.  Ibid.,  XI,  271-272. 

29.  Ibid.,  XI,  266,  269. 

30.  Ibid.,  XI,  252. 

31.  Ibid.,  XI,  244. 

32.  Ibid.,  XI,  267-268. 

33.  Ibid.,  XI,  340. 

34.  Ibid.,  XI,  275. 

35.  Ibid.,  XI,  318. 

468 


NOTES*  CHAPTER  30 

36.  Lancaster  Intelligencer,  Aug.  25,  1864. 

37.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  256,  337,  382,  412. 

38.  Ibid.,  XI,  243. 

39.  Report  from  the  Commissioner  of  Public  Buildings,  July  20,  1860,  Buchanan  MSs., 
ESP. 

40.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  251,  418-419. 

41.  Ibid.,  XI,  235,  239,  240;  Curtis,  Buchanan,  II,  524. 

42.  Ibid.,  II,  526. 

43.  Lancaster  Intelligencer,  Sept.  12,  1865;  Moore,  Works,  XI,  412. 

44.  Lancaster  Intelligencer,  May  24,  June  7,  1865. 

45.  Dix  to  Buchanan,  May  24,  1861,  in  Moore,  Works,  XI,  197. 

46.  Stanton  to  Buchanan,  Mar.  14,  1861,  in  Moore,  Works,  XI,  168, 

47.  Buchanan  to  J.  B.  Henry,  May  17,  1861,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  192. 

48.  Same  to  same,  Dec.  19,  1862,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  325. 

49.  Ibid.,  XI,  183. 

50.  Black  to  Buchanan,  June  ?,  18,  1861,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  198. 

51.  Same  to  same,  Oct.  5,  1861,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  224. 

52.  Buchanan  to  Black,  Mar.  4,  1862,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  261. 

53.  Ibid.,  XI,  226. 

54.  Black  to  Buchanan,  Mar.  1,  1862,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  258. 

55.  Ibid.,  XI,  352. 

56.  Both  Scott's  and  Buchanan's  letters  appear  in  Moore,  Works,  XI,  280  ff. 

57.  Preface  to  Mr.  Buchanan's  Administration  on  the  Eve  of  Rebellion;  Abner  Doubleday, 
Forts  Sumter  and  MouMe  (New  York,  1876),  129;  Moore,  Works,  XI,  248. 

58.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  450,  457. 

59.  Ibid.,  XI,  183-184. 

60.  Mrs.  Gwin  to  Mrs.  Cobb,  May  5,  1861,  Cobb  MSs.,  UG. 

61.  Buchanan  to  William  B.  Rose,  Sept.  14,  1861,  Ruth  Scrapbook,  YCHS. 

62.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  216. 

63.  Buchanan  to  the  Hon.  J.  C.  G.  Kennedy,  July  24, 1861,  Ruth  Scrapbook,  YCHS. 

64.  Buchanan  to  Charles  V.  Pene,  Dec.  21, 1861,  Dicfcinsoniana  Coll.,  DC. 

65.  Buchanan  to  John  A.  Parker,  Feb.  3,  1862,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  250. 

66.  Buchanan  to  Dix,  Mar.  1861,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  173. 

67.  Ibid.,  XI,  386. 

68.  Ibid.,  XI,  341,  346. 

69.  Ibid.,  XI,  373. 

70.  Buchanan  to  Nahura  Capen,  Mar.  14, 1864,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  358. 

71.  Buchanan  to  Dr.  J.  B.  Blake,  Nov.  21,  1864,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  377. 

72.  Ibid.,  XI,  385. 

73.  Ibid.,  XI,  405. 

74.  William  B.  Reed  to  Buchanan,  May  2,  1868,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

75.  Moore,  Works,  XI,  440-441. 

76.  Buchanan  to  Schell,  Nov.  9,  1867,  Moore,  Works,  XI,  455. 

469 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


77.  Buchanan  to  Black,  July  17,  1863,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

78.  David  Unger  to  Buchanan,  Oct.  21,  1861,  E.  E.  Lane  MSs. 

79.  Buchanan  to  Hiram  Swarr,  Mar.  24,  1864,  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.#  BF. 

80.  Accounts  in  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

81    Gfflan,  "James  Buchanan,"  in  Kittochtinny  H.  S.  Papers,  199;  J.  Montgomery 
*  Forster  Recollections,  Rankin  Scrapbook,  Mercersburg,  Penna. 

82.  Correspondence  is  in  Reynolds  MSs.,  FM. 

83.  In  Buchanan's  Commonplace  Book,  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

84.  In  Buchanan's  passbook  for  the  Chemical  Bank  of  New  York,  N.  Y.,  Buchanan- 
"  Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

85.  Commonplace  Book,  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

86.  Varina  Davis  to  Buchanan,  Dec.  1861,  Buchanan  MSs.,  HSP. 

87.  Sophie  Plitt  to  Harriet  Lane,  Oct.  18,  1863,  Buchanan  MSs.,  LC. 

88.  Letters  of  Feb.  12, 1862,  and  July  17, 1866,  from  Buchanan  to  Isabel  Lynch,  Buchanan 
MSs.,  HSP;  also  correspondence  in  Lynch  MSs.,  LCHS;  Ishbel  Ross,  Rebel  Rose 
(New  York,  1954),  p.  53. 

89.  Wall  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  26,  1867,  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.,  BF. 

90.  Leonora  Clayton  to  Harriet  Lane,  Jan.  23,  1866,  Buchanan  MSs.,  LC. 

91.  ?  to  Miss  Lane,  Jan.  6,  1863,  Buchanan  MSs.,  LC. 

92.  Mrs.  Ellis  to  Miss  Lane,  Oct.  1,  1866,  Buchanan  MSs.,  LC. 

93.  Buchanan  to  Harriet  Lane  (Mrs.  Johnston),  Feb.  22,  1867,  Taylor  MSs. 

94.  D.  M.  B.  Shannon  to  Buchanan,  Aug.  7,  1866,  in  author's  possession;  Buchanan 
to  Shannon,  July  6,  1866,  Turner  Scrapbook,  Mercersburg. 

95   Buchanan  to  Daniel  Sturgeon,  April  23,  1866;  Ambrose  Dudley  to  Miss  Lane, 
Jan.  18,  1866,  Ruth  Scrapbook,  YCHS. 

96.  Buchanan  to  Harriet  Lane,  April  5,  1866,  Taylor  MSs. 

97.  Commonplace  Book,  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs.;  Theodore  Appel,  Life  of  John  Nevin 
(Philadelphia,  1889),  pp.  601-604,  analyzes  Buchanan's  religious  views. 

98.  Lancaster  Intelligencer,  June  3, 10, 1868. 

99.  Hessdtine  and  Fisher  (eds.),  Trimmers,  Trucklers  and  Temporizers*  p.  57. 


470 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


ABBREVIATIONS 

The  following  abbreviations  have  been  used  to  designate  manuscript  repositories 
frequently  mentioned  in  the  notes: 

BF  Buchanan  Foundation  for  the  Preservation  of  Wheatland,  collections  in  the 

Lancaster  County  Historical  Society. 

DC  Library  of  Dickinson  College,  Carlisle,  Penna. 

FM  Library  of  Franklin  and  Marshall  College,  Lancaster,  Penna. 

HEH  Henry  E,  Huntington  Library,  San  Marino,  California. 

HSP  Historical  Society  of  Pennsylvania,  Philadelphia,  Penna. 

LC  Manuscripts  Division,  Library  of  Congress,  Washington,  D.  C. 

LCHS  Lancaster  County  Historical  Society,  Lancaster,  Penna. 

UG  Library  of  the  University  of  Georgia,  Athens,  Ga. 

YCHS  York  County  Historical  Society,  York,  Penna. 

The  printed  correspondence  of  Buchanan,  fully  cited  as  John  Bassett  Moore 
(ed.),  The  Works  of  James  Buchanan,  12  vols.  (Philadelphia,  1908-1911),  wUl  be  abbre- 
viated in  the  notes  as  Moore,  Works. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

MANUSCRIPTS 

Library  of  Congress,  Manuscripts  Division  (LC) 
Jeremiah  S.  Black  MSs. 
Buchanan-Johnston  MSs. 
Simon  Cameron  MSs. 
W.  W.  Corcoran  MSs. 
A.  J.  Donelson  MSs. 
Joseph  Holt  MSs. 
Andrew  Jackson  MSs. 
Horatio  King  MSs. 
Robert  Todd  Lincoln  MSs. 
John  McLean  MSs. 
William  L.  Marcy  MSs. 
Edwin  M.  Stanton  MSs. 
Martin  Van  Buren  MSs. 
Robert  J.  Walker  MSs. 

Historical  Society  of  Pennsylvania  (HSP) 
William  Bigler  MSs. 
James  Buchanan  MSs. 
John  Cadwalader  MSs.,  Buchanan  section 
Lewis  S.  Coryell  MSs. 
John  B.  Floyd  MS.  Diary 
Gratz  Collection 
J.  S.  Johnston  MSs. 
W.  M.  Meredith  MSs. 
William  Rawle  MSs. 
George  Wolf  MSs. 

Library  Company  of  Philadelphia,  Ridgway  Branch 
John  M.  Read  MSs. 

Dickinson  College  Library,  Carlisle,  Penna.  (DC) 

Minutes  of  the  Board  of  Trustees,  1807-1809 
Dickinsoniana,  Buchanan  section 

Fackenthal  Library,  Franklin  and  Marshall  College,  Lancaster,  Penna.  (FM) 
Jonathan  Foltz  MSs.  and  diaries 
John  Reynolds  MSs. 
Minutes  of  the  Board  of  Trustees,  1853-1868 

Houghton  Library,  Harvard  University 
Autograph  Collection 
Buchanan  MSs. 
Jared  Sparks  MSs. 

Historical  Society  of  Massachusetts 
C.  E.  French  Collection 
Presidents  of  the  United  States  Collection 
Edward  Everett  MSs. 
W.  B.  Washburae  MSs. 

Essex  Institute,  Salem,  Massachusetts 
N.  P.  Banks  MSs. 
George  Peabody  MSs. 

Princeton  University  Library 
de  Coppet  Collection 

Henry  E.  HwUington  Library  and  Art  Gallery 
S.  L.M7  Barlow  MSs. 

473 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Buchanan  Foundation  for  the  Preservation  of  Wheatland  (BF).  Collections  maintained 
in  the  Historical  Society  of  Lancaster  County,  Penna. 

James  Buchanan  Sr.  MSs. 

James  Buchanan  MSs. 

Agnes  Selin  Schoch  Collection  of  Buchanan-Kittera  MSs. 

ETE.  Bausman  Collection  of  Buchanan-Swarr  MSs, 

Lancaster  County  Historical  Society  (LCHS) 
David  Lynch  MSs. 

York  County  Historical  Society  (YCHS) 
Buchanan-Russell  family  MSs. 

Wvoming  Historical  and  Geological  Society,  Wilkes-Barre,  Penna. 
y         Hendrick  B.  Wright  MSs. 

Pennsylvania  Historical  and  Museum  Commission,  Division  of  Public  Records,  Harris- 
burg,  Penna, 

Simon  Cameron  MSs. 

County  records  (microfilm) 

Papers  of  the  governors,  MSs. 

George  Wolf  MSs. 

Miscellaneous  Collection 

Pattee  Library,  The  Pennsylvania  State  University,  University  Park,  Penna. 
Adams  MSs.  (microfilm) 
Jacob  Hibshman  MSs. 

nVE       Howell'cobb  MSs.  (UG),   courtesy  of  William  Erwin,  Esq.,  Athens,  Georgia. 

Collection  maintained  in  the  Library  of  the  University  of  Georgia 

Buchanan  MSs.,  courtesy  of  Mrs.  Charles  S.  Foltz,  Lancaster,  Penna. 

Harriet  Lane  MSs.,  courtesy  of  Mrs.  Edmund  Taylor,  Charlestown,  West  Va. 

Charles  M.  Yates  MSs.  (photostats),  courtesy  of  Roy  F.  Nichols,  Philadelphia 

J.  Glancy  Jones  MSs.  (photostats),  courtesy  of  Roy  F.  Nichols,  Philadelphia 

Elliot  Eskridge  Lane  MSs.,  courtesy  of  Patty  Lane  Fay  Eldridge,  San  Luis 

Obispo,  Papers  now  at  Buchanan  Foundation. 

Henry  and  Jasper  Slaymaker  MSs.,  courtesy  of  Samuel  C.  Slaymaker,  Lancaster, 

Penna. 

Henry  Baldwin  MSs.,  courtesy  of  John  Reynolds,  Meadvffle,  Penna. 

Fugitive  Buchanan  material  was  made  available  to  me  by  C.  H.  Martin,  William 
mer,  H,  M.  J.  Klein,  and  Richmond  Myers,  Lancaster,  Penna.;  Craig  Wylie,  Bos- 
ton Mass.;  Oliver  Keller,  Springfield,  HI.;  £.  J.  Turner,  Mercersburg,  Penna.;  Gilbert, 
Mcdintock,  Wilkes-Barre,  Penna.;  John  Lowry  Ruth,  York,  Penna.;  H.  Hanford  Hopkins, 
Baltimore,  Md.;  Maurice  G.  Buchanan,  Indianapolis,  Ind.;  William  Hubley  Potter, 
Alexandria,  Va.;  Herman  Blum,  Philadelphia,  Penna.;  George  D.  Harmon,  Bethlehem, 
Penna.;  and  Asa  £.  Martin,  Tuscon,  Ariz. 


NEWSPAPERS 

Most  of  the  newspapers  listed  are  located  in  the  Pennsylvania  State  Library, 
Harrisburg;  the  Historical  Society  of  Pennsylvania;  the  Library  Company  of  Philadelphia, 
Ridgway  Branch;  the  office  of  Lancaster  Newspapers,  Inc.;  the  Lancaster  County  Histori- 
cal Society ;  or  the  Library  of  Congress.  A  number  of  items,  however,  were  found  in  the 
file  of  clippings  preserved  by  Buchanan  which  form  a  part  of  the  Buchanan  MS*,  collec- 
tion of  the  Historical  Society  of  Pennsylvania,  or  in  the  John  Lowry  Ruth  Scnmbook, 
York  County  Historical  Society,  or  the  Hiram  Swarr  Scrapbook,  Buchanan  Foundation. 

Baltimore,  Md. 

Niks  National  Register 

474 


Worner, 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Bedford,  Penna. 
Gazette 
Inquirer 

Boston,  Mass. 

Budget 
Herald 

Car]  isle,  Penna. 
Herald 

Chambersburg,  Penna. 

Franklin  Repository 
Public  Opinion 

Cincinnati,  Ohio 

Commercial 
Enquirer 

Doylestown,  Penna. 
Democrat 

Harrisburg,  Penna. 
Argus 
Keystone 

Patriot  (and  Union) 
Republican 

Indianapolis,  Ind. 

Daily  Journal 

Lancaster,  Penna. 
Express 
Intelligencer 

Intelligencer  and  Lancastrian 
Intelligencer  and  Weekly  Advertiser 
Intelligencer-Journal 
Journal 
New  Era 
Weekly  Journal 

Marietta,  Penna. 
Pioneer 

Meadville,  Penna. 

Crawford  Register 

Mercersburg,  Penna. 
Journal 

Mobile,  Ala. 

Mercury 

New  Orleans,  La. 

Daily  True  Delta 
DeBoufs  Review 
Picayune 

New  York,  N.  Y. 

Frank  Leslie1*  Illustrated  Weekly 

Herald 

Times 

Tribune 

475 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Philadelphia,  Penna. 
Aurora 

Democratic  Press 
Pennsylvania  Gazette 
Pennsylvanian 

Philadelphia  North  American  and  U.  S.  Gazette 
Press 
Union,  or  United  States  Gazette  and  True  American 

PottrtOTO,  Penna. 
Times 

Raleigh,  N.  G. 

North  Carolina  Standard 

Richmond,  Va. 

Enquirer 

Towson,  Md. 

Baltimore  County  Advocate 

Washington,  D.  G. 
Constitution 
National  Intelligencer 
Telegraph 

TV     • 

Union 

York,  Penna. 

Gazette 


OFFICIAL  DOCUMENTS 

Party  Documents 

James  Buchanan,  His  Doctrines  and  Policy  as  Exhibited  by  Himself  and  his 

Friends,  n.p.,  1856 

Leaven  for  Doughfaces  or  Threescore  and  Ten  Parables  Touching  Slavery, 

Cincinnati,  1856 

Official  Proceedings  of  the  National  Democratic  Convention  .  .  .  1856,  n.p.,  1S56 

Old  Line  Whigs  for  Buchanan  and  Breckinridge,  n.p.,  1856 

Political  Textbook  for  I860,  N.  Y.t  1860 

Republican  Campaign,  Documents  of  1856,  a  Collection,  Washington,  D.  G,  1857 

Short  Answers  to  Reckless  Fabrications,  n.p.,  1856 

Pennsylvania 

Appearance  Dockets.  Courts  of  Quarter  Sessions  and  Common  Pleas,  1812- 

1821,  Lancaster  County  Courthouse 

Deed  Books  and  Will  Books,  Adams,  Cumberland,  Franklin*  Lancaster  and 

York  County  Courthouses 

Pennsylvania  Archives,  Fourth  Series,  "Papers  of  the  Governors,"  12  vofo,, 

Harrisburg,  1900-1902 

Journal  of  the  Assembly  of  Pennsylvania,  1814-1819 

Journal  of  the  Senate  of  Pennsylvania,  1814-1819 

Relations,  United  States 
1,  56th  Congress,  2nd 

Correspondence  in  Relation  to  the  Proposed  Interoceanic  Canal,  the  Clayton* 
Bulwer  Treaty,  and  the  Monroe  Doctrine,  Washington,  D,  C.,  1885 

476 


Senate,   1789-1909/'  Senate  Executive  Document 


BIBUOCRAPHY 

Correspondents  Relative  to  the  Negotiations  of  the  Question  of  Disputed  Right  to 
ike  Oregon  Territory .  .  .  1842,  London,  1846 

Department  of  Commerce  and  Labor,  Bureau  of  the  Census,  Heads  of  Families 
at  the  First  Census  of  the  U.  S.»  taken  in  the  Year  1790,  Pennsylvania,  Wash* 
ington,  D.  C.,  1908 

,  Historical  Statistics  of  the  United  States,  1789-1945,  Washington,  D.  C., 

1949 

Diplomatic  Correspondence  of  the  United  States,  Inter-American  Affairs,  1831- 
I860,  "W.  R.  Manning  (ed.),  12  vols.,  Washington,  D.  C.,  1932-1939 
Haase,  Adelaide,  Index  to  United  States  Documents  relating  to  Foreign  Affairs, 
182&S.861,  3  vols.,  Washington,  D.  C.,  1914-1921 

Official  Records  of  the  Union  and  Confederate  Navies  in  the  War  of  the  Rebellion, 
ed.  IT  Richard  Rush  et  aL,  30  vols.,  Washington,  D.  C.,  1894-1914 
RegisGer  of  Debates  in  Congress  and  Congressional  Globe 

WM  tofike  Rebellion:  a  Compilation  of  the  Official  Records  of  the  Union  and 
Confederate  Armies,  R.  N.  Scott  et  al.  (eds.),  130  vols.,  Washington,  D.  C., 
1880- 1901 

Committee  Reports  and  Executive  Documents  of  the  Congressional  Series  of 
Publications  oCthe  United  States,  cited  fully  in  the  notes,  are  not  listed  individually  here. 


BIOGRAPHICAL 


I  liLve  incorporated  under  this  heading  not  only  biographies,  hut  diaries, 
memoirs  and  the  major  published  writings  of  persons  included  in  the  section. 
ABERDEEN:    Balfour,  Lady  Frances,  Life  of  George,  Fourth  Earl  of  Aberdeen,  K.  G.,  K.  T,, 
2  vols.,  London,  1913 

ANDERSON::  Cravford,  Samuel  W.,  The  Genesis  of  the  CivU  War,  The  Story  ofSumter, 
1860-1862,  New  York,  1887 

Swanberg,  W,  A.,  First  Blood,  The  Story  ofSumter,  New  York,  1957 
BANCROFT:;  Hove,  M.  A.  DeWolfe  (ed.),  Life  and  Letters  of  George  Bancroft,  2  vols., 
New  York,  JL908 

Nyc,  Russell  B.,  George  Bancroft,  Brahmin  Rebel,  New  York,  1944 
BARLOW:    Gorton,  Richard  M.,  "The  Political  Activities  of  Samuel  Latham  Mitchell 
Barlovr,  1856-1864,"  M.  A.  thesis,  Columbia  University,  1947 
BELL:    Parka,  J.  H.,  John  Ml  of  Tennessee,  Baton  Rouge,  1930 
BELMOOT:    Bclwont,  August,  Letters  and  Speeches  of  August  Bebnont,  New  York,  1890 
BENJAMIN  :  Butler,  Pierce,  Judah  P.  Benjamin,  Philadelphia,  1907 
Mcade,  Robert  D.,  Judah  P.  Benjamin,  New  York,  1943 

Onterweis,  R.  G.,  Judah  P.  Benjamin,  Statesman  of  the  Lost  Cause,  New  York,  1933 
BENNETT:    Seitz,  Don  C.,  The  James  Gordon  Bennetts,  New  York,  1928 
BENTON;    Benton,  Thomas  H.,  Thirty  Years*  View  .  .  .  1820-1850,  2  vols.,  New  York, 
1854-1856 

Chamber*,  William  N.,  Old  Bullion  Benton,  Senator  from  the  New  West,  Boston,  1956 
Meigs,  V.  M.,  Life  of  Thomas  Rart  Benton,  Philadelphia,  1904 
BIDDtE:    Govan,  Thomas  P.,  Nicholas  Biddle,  Chicago,  1959 
BLACKf   Brigance,  William  N.,  Jeremiah  Sullivan  Black,  Philadelphia,  1934 
Clayton,  Mfary  B.t  Reminiscences  ofj.  S.  Blade,  St.  Louis,  1887 
Nichols,  Hoy  F.,  "Jeremiah  S.  Black,*'  in  Amer^an  Secretaries  of  State  and  Their  Di- 
ptowwy,  ad/  by  S.  F.  Bemis,  10  vols.,  New  York,  1929 
BRODERECK:   Lynch,  Jeremiah,  Life  of  David  C.  Broderick,  New  York,  1911 
BRECKIISSRIPGE:    StWwell,  Lucille,  John  Cdbell  Breckinrid#e9  Caldwell,  Id.,  1936 

477 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


BUCHANAN:    Auchampaugh,  Philip  G.,  James  Buchanan  and  His  Cabinet  on  the  Eve 
of  Secession,  Lancaster,  1926          * 

_  f  james  Buchanan,  a  Political  Portrait,  1856,  according  to  his  Friends  and  Enemies, 
Reno,  Nevada,  1946  ,,«,„.      v      v    i 

Buchanan,  James,  Mr.  Budman's  Administration  on  the  Eve  of  the  Rebellion,  TSew  York, 


_  f  7%e  flPorfcs  of  James  Buchanan,  ed.  by  John  Bassett  Moore,  12  vols.,  Philadelphia, 

1908-1911 

Buchanan,  Patrick  A.  W.,  The  Buchanan  Book,  Montreal,  1911 

Butler,  Thomas  J.,   WTusatland,  1848-1868,  the  Home  of  James  Buchanan   (mimeo), 

Dover,  Del.,  1957 

Curtis,  George  T.,  The  Life  of  James  Buchanan,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1883 

Hensel,  William  U.,  fames  Buchanan  as  a  Lawyer,  Lancaster,  1912 

_  ^  The  Religious  Convictions  and  Character  of  James  Buchanan,  Lancaster,  1912 

_  ^  The  Attitude  of  James  Buchanan  .  .  .  towards  the  Institution  of  Slavey,  Lancaster, 

1911 

_  t  A  Pennsylvania  Presbyterian,  President,  Philadelphia,  1907 

Henry,  J.  B.  (comp.),  The  Messages  of  President  Buchanan  wiA  an  Appendix  Containing 

Sundrj  Letters  from  Members  of  His  Cabinet,  New  York,  1888 

Henry,  Reginald  B.,  Buchanan,  n.p.,  n.d.  (genealogy) 

Hillman,  Franklin  P.,  "The  Diplomatic  Career  of  James  Buchanan,"  Ph.D.  thesis, 

The  George  Washington  University,  1953 

Horton,  R.  G.,  Life  and  Public  Services  of  James  Buchanan,  New  York,  1856 

Irelan,  John  R.,  History  of  the  Life,  Administration  and  Times  of  James  Buchanan,  Chicago, 

1888 

Klein,  Philip  S.,  The  Story  of  Wheatland,  Lancaster,  1936 

Sioussat,  St.  George  L.,  "James  Buchanan,"  in  American  Secretaries  of  State  and  Their 

Diplomacy,  ed.  by  S.  F.  Bemis,  10  vols.,  New  York,  1929 

Speer,  Talbot  T.,  The  Speer  Family  Record,  Baltimore,  n.d. 

CALHOUN:    Boucher,  Chauncey  S.  and  Brooks,  Robert  P.  (eds.),  "Correspondence 

addressed  to  John  C.  Calhoun,"  Amer,  Hist.  Assoc.  Annual  Report,  1929,  Washington, 

1931 

Calhoun,  John  C.,  "Correspondence  of  John  C.  Calhoun,"  ed.  by  F.  Franklin  Jameson, 

Amer.  Hist.  Assoc.  Annual  Report,  1899,  II,  Washington,  1900 

_  9  Works  of  John  C.  Calhoun,  ed.  by  Richard  K.  CrallS,  6  vols.,  New  York,  1854-1857 

Wiltse,  Charles  M.,  John  C.  Calhoun,  3  vols.,  Indianapolis,  1944-1951 

CAMERON:    Crippen,  Lee  F.,  Simon  Cameron,  Ante-Bettum  Years,  Oxford,  Ohio,  1942 

McNair,  James  B.,  Simon  Cameron's  Adventure  in  Iron,  Los  Angeles,  1949 

CASS:    McLaughlin,  Andrew  C.,  Lewis  Cass,  New  York,  1899 

Woodford,  Frank  B.,  Lewis  Cass,  ike  Last  Jeffersonian,  New  Brunswick,  N.  J.,  1950 

CLAY:    Clay,  Henry,  The  Works  of  Henry  Clay,  Comprising  his  Life,  Correspondence  and 

Speeches,  ed.  by  Calvin  Colton,  10  vols,,  New  York,  1904 

Eaton,  Clement,  Henry  Clay  and  the  Art  of  American  Politics,  Boston,  1957 

Van  Deusen,  G.  G.,  The  Life  of  Henry  Clay,  Boston,  1937 

COBB:    Boykin,  Samuel  (ed.),  Memorial  Volume  of  the  Hon.  Howell  Cobb,  Philadelphia, 

1871 

Johnson,  Zachary  T.,  Political  Policies  of  Howell  Cobb,  Nashville,  1929 

CRITTENDEN:  Coleman,  A.  M.  B.,  Life  of  John  /.  Crittenden,  2  vols.,  Philadelphia,  1871 
DALLAS:  Beck,  Virginia,  "George  M.  Dallas,"  M.  A.  thesis,  University  of  Pittsburgh 
Dallas,  G.  M.,  A  Series  of  Letters  from  London,  written  during  the  Years  1856-1860,  Phila- 
delphia, 1869 

DAVIS:    King,  Willard  L.,  Lincoln's  Manager,  David  Davis,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  1960 
Davis,  Varina,  Jefferson  Davis,  a  Memoir,  New  York,  1890 

478 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 


Strode,  Hudson,  Jefferson  Davis,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1955-1959 

Steiner,  B.  C.,  Life  of  Henry  Winter  Davis,  Baltimore,  1916 

DOUGLAS:    Capers,  Gerald  M.,  Stephen  A.  Douglas,  Boston,  1959 

Milton,  George  Fort,  The  Eve  of  Conflict,  Stephen  A.  Douglas  and  the  Needless  War, 

Boston,  1934 

FILLMORE:    Raybacfc,  Robert  J.,  Millard  FUlmore,  Buffalo,  1959 

FLOYD:    Ambler,  C.  H.,  Life  and  Diary  of  John  Floyd,  Richmond,  1918 

FOLTZ:    Foltz,  Charles  S.,  Surgeon  of  the  Seas:   The  Adventurous  Life  of  Jonathan  M. 

FoUz,  Indianapolis,  1931 

FORNEY:    Forney,  John  W.,  Anecdotes  of  Public  Men,  New  York,  1873 

FRfiMONT:    Nevins,  Allan,  Fremont,  Pathmarker  of  the  West,  New  York,  1955 

GREENHOW:    Ross,  Ishbel,  Rebel  Rose,  Life  of  Rose  O'Neal  Greenhow,  New  York,  1954 

HARDIN:    Little,  Lucius  P.,  Ben  Hardin,  His  Times  and  Contemporaries,  Louisville,  1887 

HAYNE:    Jervey,  T.  D.,  Robert  Y.  Hayne  and  His  Times,  New  York,  1909 

HUNTER:    Hunter,  R.  M.  T.,  "Correspondence  .  .  .  1826-1876,"  ed.  by  C.  H.  Ambler, 

Amer.  Hist.  Assoc.  Annual  Report,  1916,  II,  Washington,  1918 

Simms,  Henry  H.,  Life  of  Robert  M.  T.  Hunter,  Richmond,  1935 

JACKSON:  Bassett,  John  S.,  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson,  2  vols.,  Garden  City,  N.  Y.,  1911 

Jackson,  Andrew,  Correspondence,  ed.  by  J.  S.  Bassett,  7  vols.,  Washington,  1926-1935 

James,  Marquis,  Andrew  Jackson,  New  York,  1938 

Parton,  James,  Life  of  Andrew  Jackson,  3  vols.,  New  York,  1860 

JOHNSON:    flippin,  Percy  S.,  Herschel  V.  Johnson  of  Georgia,  Richmond,  1931 

Meyer,  L.  W.,  Life  and  Times  of  Col.  Richard  M.  Johnson,  New  York,  1932 

Steiner,  B.  C.,  Life  ofReverdy  Johnson,  Baltimore,  1914 

JONES:    Jones,  Charles  HM  Life  and  Public  Services  of  J.  Glancy  Jones,  2  vols.,  Phila- 

delphia,  1910 

LAMAR:    Cate,  W.  A.,  Lucius  Q.  C.  Lamar;  Secession  and  Reunion,  Chapel  Hill,  1935 

Mayes,  Edward,  Lucius  Q.  C.  Lamar:  His  Life,  Times  and  Speeches,  Nashville,  1896 

LINCOLN:    Donald,  David,  Lincoln  Reconsidered,  New  York,  1956 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  The  Collected  Works  of  Abraham  Lincoln,  ed,  by  Roy  P.  Basler,  9  vols., 

New  Brunswick,  N.  J.,  1933-1953 

Mearns,  David  C.  (ed.),  The  Lincoln  Papers,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1948 

Nicolay,  John  G.,  and  Hay,  John,  Abraham  Lincoln,  A  History,  10  vols.,  New  York,  1904 

Potter,  David,  Lincoln  and  His  Party  in  the  Secession  Crisis,  New  Haven,  1942 

Randall,  J.  G.,  Lincoln  the  President,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1945 

Thomas,  Benjamin  P.,  Abraham  Lincoln,  New  York,  1952 

Woldman,  A.  A.,  Lincoln  and  the  Russians,  New  York,  1952 

LIVINGSTON:    Hatcher,  W.  B.,  Edward  Livingston,  University,  La.,  1940 

LOWNDES:    Ravenel,  Mrs.  St.  J.,  Life  and  Times  of  William  £owndes,  New  York,  1901 

LYONS:    Newton,  Lord  Thomas  W.  L,  Lord  Lyons,  London,  1913 

McDUFFIE:    Green,  Edwin  L,  George  McDuffie,  Columbia,  S.  C.,  1936 

MARCY:    Spencer,  Ivor  D.,  The  Victor  and  the  Spoils,  A  Life  of  WiUiam  L.  Marcy, 

Providence,  1959 

MEIGS-    Wefoley,  Russell,  Quartermaster  General  of  the  Union  Army,  Montgomery  C. 

Mdgs,  New  Y5rk,  1959 

MINER:    Richardson,  C.  F,  and  E.  M.,  Charles  Miner,  a  Pennsylvania  Pioneer,  Wilkes- 

Barre,  Penna.,  1916 

PEEL:    Parker,  Charles  S,  (ed.),  Sr  Albert  Peel,  3  vols,,  London,  1891-1899 

PIERCE:    Nichols,  Roy  F.,  Franklin,  Pierce,  Young  Hickory  of  the  Granite  Hills,  2nd  ed., 

Philadelphia,  1958 

479 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


POLK:   McCormac,  Eugene  I.,  James  K.  Polk,  a  Political  Biography,  Berkeley,  1922 
McCoy,  Charles,  Polk  and  the  Presidency,  Austin,  Texas,  1960 
Polk,  James  K.,  Diary,  ed.  by  Milo  M.  Quaife,  4  vols.,  Chicago,  1910 
Sellers,  Charles  G.,  James  K.  Polk,  Jacksonian,  1795-1843,  Princeton,  N.  J.,  1957 
POINSETT:    Hippy,  J.  Fred,  Joel  Poinsett,  Durham,  N.  C.,  1935 
RHETT:    White,  L.  A.,  Robert  Barnwett  Rhett,  Father  of  Secession,  New  York,  1931 
RITCHIE:    Ambler,  C.  H.,  Thomas  Ritchie,  A  Study  in  Virginia  Politics,  Richmond,  1913 
SCOTT:    Elliott,  Charles  W.,  Winfield  Scott,  The  Soldier  and  the  Man,  New  York,  1937 
Scott  Winfield,  Memoirs  of  Lieutenant  General  Scott,  LLD,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1864 
Smith,  A.  D.  H.,  Old  Fuss  and  Feathers  . . .  Winfield  Scott,  New  York,  1937 
SEWARD:   Bancroft,  Frederic,  Life  of  William  H.  Seward,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1900 
Seward,  Frederick  W.,  Seward  at  Washington,  New  York,  1891 
SICKLES:    Swanberg,  W.  A.,  Sickles  the  Incredible,  New  York,  1956 
SLIDELL:    Sears,  Louis  M.,  John  Stidett,  Durham,  N-  C.,  1925 
SOULfe:    Ettinger,  Amos  A.,  The  Mission  to  Spain  of  Pierre  Soule,  New  Haven,  1932 
STANTON:    Gorham,  G.  C.,  Life  and  Public  Services  of  Edwin  M.  Stanton,  2  vols., 
Boston,  1899 

Flower,  F.  A.,  Edwin,  M.  Stanton,  New  York,  1905 

STEPHENS:    Abele,  von,  Rudolph,  Alexander  H.  Stephens,  New  York,  1946 
Avery,  Myrta  L,  Recollections  of  Alexander  H.  Stephens,  New  York,  1910 
Waddell,  James  D.,  Biographical  Sketch  ofLinton  Stephens,  Atlanta,  Ga.,  1877 
STEVENS:    Current,  Richard  C.,  Old  Thad  Stevens,  New  York,  1942 
STEVENSON:    Wayland,  Francis,  Andrew  Stevenson^  Democrat  and  Diplomat,  Phila- 
delphia, 1949 

SUMNER:    Donald,  David,  Charles  Sumner  and  the  Coming  of  the  Civil  War,  New  York, 
1960 

TAYLOR:    Dyer,  Brainerd,  Zachary  Taylor,  Baton  Rouge,  1946 
Hamilton,  Holman,  Zachary  Taylor,  2  vols.,  Indianapolis,  1951 
TOOMBS:   Brewton,  W.  W.,  Son  of  Thunder,  an  Epic  of  the  South,  Richmond,  1936 
Phillips,  U.  B.,  Life  of  Robert  Toombs,  New  York,  1913 
TRUMBULL:    White,  Horace,  Life  ofLyman  Trumbull,  Boston,  1913 
TYLER-    Auchampaugh,  Philip  G,,  Robert  Tyler,  Southern  Rights  Champion,  1847-1866, 
Duluth,  Minn.,  1934 

Chitwood,  Oliver  P.,  John  Tyler,  Champion  of  the  Old  South,  Philadelphia,  1939 
Morgan,  Robert  J.,  A  Whig  Embattled,  the  Presidency  under  John  Tyler,  Lincoln,  Neb., 
1954 
Tyler,  Lyon  G.,  Letters  and  Times  of  the  Tylers,  3  vols.,  Richmond,  1884-1886 

VAN  BUREN:    Alexander,  Holmes,  The  American  Talleyrand,  Martin  Van  Burert,  New 

York,  1936 

Lynch,  Dennis  T.,  An  Epoch  and  a  Man,  Martin  Van  Buren  and  His  Times,  New  York,  1929 

Rimini,  Robert  B.,  Martin  Van  Buren  and  the  Making  of  the  Democratic  Party1,  New  York, 

1959 

Van  Buren,  Martin,  "Autobiography  of  Martin  Van  Buren,"  ed.  by  J.  C.  Fitzpatrick, 

Amer.  Hist.  Assoc,  Annual  Report,  1918,  II,  Washington,  1920 

WALKER:    Dodd,  W.  E.,  Robert  J.  Walker,  Imperialist,  Chicago,  1914 

Shenton,  James  R.,  "The  Compleat  Politician,  The  Life  of  Robert  John  Walker,"  Ph.D. 

thesis,  Columbia  University,  1954 

Greene,  Laurence,  The  Filibuster:  The  Career  of  William  Walker,  Indianapolis,  1937 

Scroggs,  W.  0.,  Filibusters  and  Financiers,  the  Story  of  William  Walker  and  his  Associates, 

New  York,  1916 

480 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

WEBSTER:    Current,  Richard,  Daniel  Webster,  Boston,  1955 

Fuess,  Claude,  Daniel  Webster,  2  vols.,  Boston,  1930 

Webster,  Daniel,  Letters  of  Daniel  Webster,  ed.  by  C.  H.  Van  Tyne,  New  York,  1902 

WEED:    Barnes,  T.  W.,  Life  of  Thurlow  Weed,  2  vols.,  Boston,  1884 

Van  Deusen,  G.  G,,  Thurlow  Weed,  Boston,  1947 

Weed,  Thurlow,  Autobiography  of  Thurlow  Weed,  ed.  by  Harriet  A.  Weed,  New  York, 

1883 

WILMOT:    Going,  C.  B.,  David  Wilmot,  Free  Soiler,  New  York,  1924 

WISE:    Wise,  Barton  H.,  Life  of  Henry  A.  Wise,  New  York,  1899 

WOOD:    Pleasants,  Samuel  A.,  Fernando  Wood  of  New  York,  New  York,  1948 

WRIGHT:    Garraty,  J.  A.,  Silas  Wright,  New  York,  1949 

YANCEY:   DuBose,  J.  W,,  Life  and  Times  of  William  Lowndes  Yancey,  Birmingham,  1892 


PRINTED  REMINISCENCES,  DIARIES,  AND 
CONTEMPORARY  WRITING 

In  the  remaining  part  of  this  bibliography  the  following  abbreviations  are  used: 

AHR        American  Historical  Review 

LCHSJ     Lancaster  County  Historical  Society  Papers   (renamed  after  1956   Lancaster 

County  Historical  Society  Journal) 
MVHR     Mississippi  Valley  Historical  Review 
PMHB     Pennsylvania  Magazine  of  History  and  Biography 
TQHGM  Tyler's  Quarterly  Historical  and  Genealogical  Magazine 

,  "Letters  of  Bancroft  and  Buchanan,"  AHR,  V  (1899),  95-102 

,  "Some  letters  to  John  G.  Davis,  1857-1860,"  Indiana  Magazine  of  History, 

XXIV  (1928),  209-213 

.  "Unpublished  Letters  of  James  Buchanan,"  LCHSI,  IX  (1905),  37-42;  XXXII 

(1928),  67-75,  118-121;  XXXV  (1932),  59-83,  143-153,  166-172,  188-196,  222-259, 

297-320;  XXXVII  (1933),  15-20 

Adams,  Henry,  The  Great  Secession  Winter  of  1860-61,  and  Other  Essays,  ed.  by  George 

Hochfield,  New  York,  1958 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  Memoirs,  Comprising  Parts  of  his  Diary  from  1795-1848,  ed.  by 

C.  F.  Adams,  12  vols.,  Philadelphia,  1874-1877 

Appel,  Theodore,  Recollections  of  College  Life  at  Marshall  College,  Mercersburg,  Pa., 

Reading,  Penna.,  1886 

Bates,  Edward,  "Diary  of  Edward  Bates,"  ed.  by  H.  K.  Beale,  Amer.  Hist.  Assoc.  Annual 

Report,  1930,  IV,  Washington,  1932 

Branch,  Lawrence  O'Bryan,  "Letters  of  Lawrence  O'Brvan  Branch,  1856-1860,"  ed.  by 

A.  R.  Newsome,  North  Carolina  Historical  Review,  X  (1933),  44-79 

Brooks,  R.  P.  (ed.),  "The  Howell  Cobb  Papers,"  Georgia  Historical  Quarterly,  V  (1921), 

S 29-53;  #4,  43-65;  VI  (1922),  147473,  $33-264,  351-359 

Browning,  0.  H.,  Diary  ofOrville  Hickman  Browning,  1850-1881,  ed.  by  T.  C.  Pease  and 

J.  G.  RaSdall,  2  vols/Springfield,  111.,  19254931 

Bullard,  F.  Lauriston  (ed.),  The  Diary  of  a  Public  Man,  Chicago,  1945 

Bungay,  George  W.,  Off-Hand  Takings  or  Crayon  Sketches  of  the  Noticeable  Men  of  our  Age, 

New   York,    1854 

Chaae  Henry,  and  Sanborn,  C.  WM  The  North  and  the  South,  a  Statistical  View,  Boston, 

1857  ' 

Chestnut,  Mary  B.,  A  Diary  from  Dixie,  ed.  by  Ben  Ames  Williams,  New  York,  1949 

481 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Chittenden,  L.  E.,  Personal  Reminiscences,  1840-1890,  New  York,  1893 

Clay-Copton,  Virginia,  A  Belle  of  the  Fifties,  New  York,  1905 

Cox,  Samuel  S.,  Eight  Years  in  Congress  from  1857*1865,  New  York,  1865 

t  Three  Decades  of  Federal  Legislation,  1855-1885,  Providence,  1885 

Day,  Sherman,  Historical  Collections  of  Pennsylvania,  Philadelphia,  1843 

Doubleday,  Abner,  Forts  Sumter  and  Moultrie,  New  York,  1876 

Foote,  Henry  S.,  Casket  of  Reminiscence?,  Washington,  1874 

Forster,  J.  Montgomery,  "Recollections,"  in  Rankin  Scrapbook,  Presbyterian  Church, 

Mercersburg,  Penna. 

Gilpin  Joshua,  "A  Tour  from  Philadelphia  in  1809,"  PMHB,  L  (1926),  64-78,  163-178, 

380-382 

Green,  Duff,  Facts  and  Suggestions,  Biographical,  Historical,  Financial  and  Political, 

Addressed  to  the  People  of  the  United  States,  New  York,  1866 

Greeley,  Horace,  Recollections,  New  York,  1868 

Halstead,  Murat,  Three  Against  Lincoln,  Murat  Halstead  Reports  die  Caucuses  of  1860, 

ed.  by  William  B.  Hesseltrne,  Baton  Rouge,  1960 

>  Trimmers,  Trucklers  and  Temporizers,  ed.  by  William  B.  Hesseltine  and  R.  G. 

Fisher,  Madison,  Wis.,  1961 

Hamilton,  James  A.,  Reminiscences  of  Men  and  Events  at  Home  and  Abroad,  New  York, 

1869 

Harris,  Alexander,  Biographical  History  of  Lancaster  County,  Lancaster,  1872 

9  A  Review  of  the  Political  Conflict  in  America,  New  York,  1876 

Barter,  Edwin  P.,  "Recollections  of  the  Campaign  of  1856,"  Indiana  Magazine  of  History, 
XVI  (1920),  69-72 

Hav  T  R   fed.),  "John  C.  Calhoun  and  the  Presidential  Campaign  of  1824 — Some  Un- 
published Calhoim  Letters,"  AHR,  XL  (1934),  82-97 

Hensel,  William  TL,  Reminiscences  of  Thirty-five  Years  in  a  Country  Store,  Lancaster,  1873 
Hickok,  Charles  N.,  Bedford  in  Ye  Olden  Time,  Bedford,  Penna,,  1907 
Hunter  Andrew,  "Andrew  Hunter  Papers,  1859-1861,"  Massachusetts  Historical  Society 
Proceedings,  XLVI  (1913),  243-249 

Julian,  G.  W.,  Political  Recollections,  1840-1872,  Chicago,  1884 
Kendall,  Amos,  Autobiography,  Boston,  1872 

King,  Horatio,  Turning  on  the  Light,  a  Dispassionate  Survey  of  President  Buchanan's 
Administration,  from  1860  to  its  Close,  Philadelphia,  1895 

McClure  Alexander  K.,  Col  Alexander  McClurJs  Recollections  of  Half  a  Century*  Salem, 
Mass.,  1902 

,  Old  Time  Notes  of  Pennsylvania,  2  vols.,  Philadelphia,  1905 

9  Lincoln  and  Men  of  War  Times,  Philadelphia,  1892 

McPherson,  Edward,  Political  History  of  the  U.  5.  of  America  during  the  Great  Rebellion, 

from  Nov.  6,  1860  to  July  4,  1864,  New  York,  1864 

Martineau,  Harriet,  A  Retrospect  of  Western  Travel,  2  vols.,  London,  1838 

Maury,  Sarah  W,,  The  Statesmen  of  America  in  1846,  London,  1847 

Moran,  Benjamin,  The  Journal  of  Benjamin  Moron,  1857-1865,  ed.  by  S.  A.  Wallace  and 

F.  E.  Gfflespie,  2  vols.,  Chicago;  1948 

Nichols,  Roy  F.,  "The  Missing  Diaries  of  George  M.  Dallas,"  PMHB,  LXXV  (1951), 

295-338 

,  "Mystery  of  the  Dallas  Papers,"  PMHB,  LXXIII  (1949),  349-393,  475-517 

Parker,  James  A.,  "How  James  Buchanan  was  Made  President  and  by  Whom/'  Virginia 
Magazine  of  History  and  Biography,  XIII  (1906),  81-87 

Phillips,  U.  B.  (ed.),  "Correspondence  of  Robert  Toombs,  A.  H.  Stephens  and  Howell 
Cobb/'  Amer.  Hist.  Assoc.  Annual  Report,  1911,  II,  Washington,  1913 

482 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Pollard,  Edward  A.,  Lee  and  His  Lieutenants,  New  York,  1866 

Poore,  Ben  Perley,  Perky1*  Reminiscences  of  Sixty  Years,  2  vols.,  Philadelphia,  1886 

Pryor,  Mrs.  Roger  A.,  Reminiscences  of  Peace  and  War,  New  York,  1905 

Quincy,  Josiah,  Figures  of  the  Past,  Boston,  1926 

Rainwater,  Percy  L.  (ed.),  "Letters  to  and  from  Jacob  Thompson,"  Journal  of  Southern 

History,  VI  (1940),  95-112 

Royall,  Anne,  The  Black  Book;  or  a  Continuation  of  Travels,  3  vols.,  Washington,  1828- 

1829 

f  Mrs,  RoyalCs  Pennsylvania,  2  vols.,  Washington,  1829 

Sargent,  Nathan,  Public  Men  and  Events,  1817*1853,  2  vols.,  Philadelphia,  1875 
Schoepf,  John,  Travels  in  the  Confederation,  1783-1784,  ed.  by  A.  J.  Morrison,  Phila- 
delphia, 1911 

Schurz,  Carl,  Reminiscences,  1829-1869,  3  vols.,  New  York,  1907-1908 
Sherman,  John,  Recollections  of  Forty  Fears,  2  vols.,  Chicago,  1895 
Smith,  Mrs.  Samuel  H.,  Forty  Years  of  Washington  Society,  1800-1842,  ed.  by  Gaillard 
Hunt,  New  York,  1906 

Sumner,  Charles,  Memoirs  and  Letters  of  Charles  Sumner,  ed.   by   Edward  L.  Pierce 

Boston,  1893 

Thompson,  Richard  W.,  Recollections  of  16  Presidents,  1789-1865,  2  vols.,  Indianapolis, 

1894 

Trescot,  William  H.,  "Narrative  of  William  H.  Trescot,"  ed.  by  C,  H.  Ambler,  AHR, 

XIII,  April,  1908 

Watmough,  E.  C.,  Scribbling*  and  Sketches,  Diplomatic,  Piscatory  and  Oceanic,  by  a 

Fisher  in  Small  Streams,  Philadelphia,  1844 

Windle,  Mary  J.,  Life  in  Washington  and  Life  Here  and  There,  Philadelphia,  1859 

Wise,  Henry  A.,  Seven  Decades  of  the  Union,  Philadelphia,  1896 

Wise,  John  S.,  Recollections  of  Thirteen  Presidents,  New  York,  1906 


GENERAL  HISTORICAL  WORKS  AND  MONOGRAPHS 

7  Territorial  Kansas,  Studies  Commemorating  the  Centennial,  Lawrence,  Kan.,  1954 

,  History  of  Cumberland  and  Adams  Counties,  Pennsylvania,  Chicago,  1886 

,  Old  Mercersburg,  New  York,  1912 

,  Report  of  the  Commission  to  Locate  the  Site  of  the  Frontier  Forts  of  Pennsylvania, 

2  vols.,  Harrisburg,  1896 

Adams,  E.  D.,  British  Interests  and  Activities  in  Texas,  1838-1846,  Baltimore,  1910 

Adams,  James  T.,  America's  Tragedy,  New  York,  1934 

Baldwin,  Leland  D.,  Pittsburgh,  the  Story  of  a  Gty,  Pittsburgh,  1937 

Bancroft,  H.  H.,  History  of  Utah,  1540*1886,  San  Francisco,  1889 

Baringcr,  William  E.,  A  House  Dividing:  Lincoln  as  President-Elect,  Springfield,  HI.,  1945 

Beale  Howard  K.,  "What  Historians  have  said  about  the  Causes  of  the  Civil  War,"  in 

Theory  and  Practice  in  Historical  Study,  New  York,  1946 

Bemis,  Samuel  F.  (ed.),  American  Secretaries  of  State  and  Their  Diplomacy,  10  vols., 

New  York,  1927-1929 

9  latin- American  Policy  of  the  United  States,  an  Historical  Interpretation,  New  York, 

1943 

Billington,  Ray  A.,  The  Far  Western  Frontier,  New  York,  1956 
Bomberger,  C.  M.  H.,  Twelfth  Colony  Plus,  Jeannette,  Penna.,  1934 
Boykin,  Edward,  Congress  and  the  Civil  War,  New  York,  1955 

483 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Burnham,  W.  D.,  Presidential  Ballots,  1836-1892,  Baltimore,  1955 
Callahan,  James  M.,  Cuba  end  International  Relations,  Baltimore,  1899 

t  American  Policy  in  Canadian  Relations,  New  York,  1937 

t  American  Foreign  Policy  in  Mexican  Relations,  New  York,  1932 

Colman,  Edna  M.,  Seventy-five  Years  of  White  House  Gossip,  New  York,  1925 
Committee  on  Historical  Research,  Forges  and  Furnaces  in  the  Province  of  Pennsylvania, 
Philadelphia,  1944 
Craven,  Avery,  The  Repressible  Conflict,  1830-1861,  Baton  Rouge,  1939 

,  The  Coming  of  the  Civil  War,  New  York,  1942 

f  'The  Growth  of  Southern  Nationalism,  1848-1861,  Baton  Rouge,  1953 

,  The  Civil  War  in  the  Making,  1815-1860,  Baton  Rouge,  1959 

Crawford,  Mary  C.,  Romantic  Days  in  the  Early  Republic,  Boston,  1912 

Crenshaw,  Ollinger,  The  Slave  States  in  the  Presidential  Election  of  I860,  Baltimore,  1945 

Dangerfield,  George,  The  Era  of  Good  Feelings,  New  York,  1952 

Diffenderfer,  Frank  R.,  History  of  the  Farmers  Bank  of  Lancaster,  Lancaster,  1910 

Duhbs,  Joseph  H.,  History  of  FranWn  and  Marshall  College,  Lancaster,  1903 

DunumdJDwight  L,  Anti-slavery  Origins  of  the  Civil  War  in  tlie  United  States,  Ann  Arbor, 

Mich.,  1939 

,  The  Secession  Movement,  1860-1861,  New  York,  1931 

(ed.),  Southern  Editorials  on  Secession,  New  York,  1931 

Eele  William  H.,  History  of  the  County  of  Dauphin  in  the  Commonwealth  of ' Pennsylvania* 
Philadelphia,  1883 

Eiselen,  M.  R.,  The  Rise  of  Protectionism  in  Pennsylvania,  Philadelphia,  1921 

Ellis,  Franklin,  History  of  Lancaster  County,  Philadelphia,  1883 

Fish,  Carl  R.,  The  American  Civil  War,  New  York,  1937 

Fite,  Emerson  D.,  The  Presidential  Campaign  of  I860,  New  York,  1911 

Foner,  Philip,  Business  and  Slavery:  The  New  York  Merchants  and  the  Irrepressible  Conflict, 

Chapel  Hill,  1941 

Fuller,  John  D.  P.,  The  Movement  for  the  Acquisition  of  All  Mexico,  1846-1848,  Baltimore, 

1936 

Furnas,  J.  C.,  The  Road  to  Harpers  Ferry,  New  York,  1959 

Furniss,  Norman  F.,  The  Mormon  Conflict,  1850*1859,  New  Haven,  1960 

Garrison,  Curtis  W.,  "The  National  Election  of  1824,"  Ph.D.  thesis,  The  John  Hopkins 

University,  1928 

Gates,  Paul  W.,  50  Million  Acres,  Ithaca,  N,  Y.,  1953 

Geary,  M.  Theophane,  A  History  of  'Third  Parties  in  Pennsylvania,  1840-1860,  Washington, 

1938 

Glover,  Gilbert  G.,  Immediate  pre-Civft  Wear  Compromise  Efforts,  Nashville,  1934 

Graebner,  Norman  A.,  Empire  on  the  Pacific,  New  York,  1955 

Gray,  Wood,  The  Hidden  Civil  War:  The  Story  of  the  Copperheads,  New  York,  1942 

Green,  Fletcher,  Constitutional  Development  in  the  South  Atlantic  States,  1776-1860, 

Chapel  Hill,  1930 

Hammond,  Bray,  Banks  and  Politics  in  America  from  the  Revolution  to  the  Civil  War, 

Princeton,  1957 

Hendrick,  Burton  J.,  Lincoln's  War  Cabinet,  Boston,  1946 

Hesseltine,  William  B.,  Lincoln  and  the  War  Governors,  New  York,  1948 

Higginbotham,  S.  W.,  Keystone  of  the  Democratic  Arch,  1800*1816,  Harrisburg,  1952 

Hyman,  Sidney,  The  American  President,  New  York,  1954 

Hull,  Henry,  Annals  of  Athens,  1801-1901,  Athens,  Ga.,  1906 

484 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Jackson,  William  T.,  Wagon  Roads  West,  Berkeley*  1952 

Johaxmsen,  Robert  W.,  Frontier  Politics  and  the  Sectional  Conflict,  Seattle,  1955 

Johnson,  Gerald  W.,  The  Secession  of  the  Southern  States9  New  York,  1933 

Kehl,  James  A.,  ///  Feeling  in  the  Era  of  Good  Feeling,  Pittsburgh,  1956 

Kirkland,  E,  C.,  Peacemakers  of  1864,  New  York,  1927 

Klein,  H.  M.  J.,  Lancaster  County,  a  History,  4  vols.,  New  York,  1924 

,  History  of  Franklin  and  Marshall  College,  Lancaster,  1952 

,  A  Century  of  Education  at  Mercersburg,  Mercersburg,  Penna.,  1936 

Klein,  H.  M.  J.,  and  Diller,  W.  F.,  History  of  St.  James  Church,  Lancaster,  Pa.9  Lancaster, 

1944 

Klein,  Philip  S.,  Pennsylvania  Politics,  1817.1832;  A  Game  without  Rules,  Philadelphia, 

1940 

Lamport,  0,  P.,  Presidential  Politics  in  the  United  States,  1841-1844,  Durham,  N.  C.,  1936 

Leech,  Margaret,  Reveille  in  Washington,  1860-1865,  New  York,  1941 

Livingood,  James  W.,  The  Philadelphia-Baltimore  Trade  Rivalry,  1780-1860,  Harrisburg, 

1947 

Logan,  Mary  S.,  Thirty  Years  in  Washington,  Hartford,  Conn.,  1901 

Luthin,  Reinhard  H.,  The  First  Lincoln  Campaign,  Cambridge,  Mass.,  1944 

MacDonald,  Helen  C.,  Canadian  Public  Opinion  on  the  American  Civil  War,  New  York, 

1926 

Malm,  James  V.,  John  Brown  and  the  Legend  of  fifty-Six,  Philadelphia,  1942 

Marbut,  Frederick  B.,  "Washington  Staff  Correspondents  before  the  Civil  War,"  Ph.D. 

thesis,  Harvard  University,  1950 

Martin,  Asa  E.,  After  the  White  House,  State  College,  Penna.,  1951 

Masters,  Donald  C.,  Reciprocity  Treaty  of  1854,  Toronto,  1937 

Meneely,  A.  Howard,  The  War  Department,  1861,  New  York,  1928 

Minnigerode,  Meade,  Presidential  Years,  New  York,  1928 

Morgan,  James  H.,  Dickinson  College:  the  History  of  150  Years,  Carlisle,  Penna.,  1933 

Moore,  J.  W.,  Picturesque  Washington,  Providence,  1884 

Morris,  Charles  (ed.),  The  Makers  of  Philadelphia,  Philadelphia,  1894 

Morris,  L.  R.,  Incredible  New  York,  New  York,  1951 

Mueller,  Henry  F.,  The  WUg  Party  in  Pennsylvania,  New  York,  1922 

Nevins,  Allan,  Ordeal  of  the  Union,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1947 

,  The  Emergence  of  Lincoln,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1950 

,  The  War  for  the  Union,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1959 

Nichols,  Alice,  Bleeding  Kansas,  New  York,  1954 

Nichols,  Roy  F.,  The  Democratic  Machine,  1850-1854,  New  York,  1923 

9  The  Disruption  of  American  Democracy,  New  York,  1948 

,  The  Stakes  of  Power,  1845-1877,  New  York,  1961 

Paul,  James  C.,  Rift  in  the  Democracy,  Philadelphia,  1951 

Perkins,  Dexter,  The  Monroe  Doctrine,  1826*1867,  Baltimore,  1933 

Perkins,  Howard  C.  (ed.),  Northern  Editorials  on  Secession,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1942 

Phelps,   Christine,  Anglo-American  Peace  Movement  of  the  Mid-Nineteenth  Century, 

New  York,  1930 

Phillips,  U.  B.,  The  Course  of  the  South  to  Secession,  New  York,  1939 

Randall,  James  G.,  The  Civil  War  and  Reconstruction,  New  York,  1937 

Rauch,  Basfl,  American  Interest  in  Cuba,  1848-1855,  New  York,  1948 

Ray,  P.  Orman,  Repeal  of  the  Missouri  Compromise,  Cleveland,  Ohio,  1909 

485 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

Reed,  G.  F.,  Alumni  Record  of  Dickinson  College,  Carlisle,  Penna.,  1905 

Reeves,  J.  S.,  American  Diplomacy  under  Tyler  and  Polk,  Baltimore,  1907 

Richard,  J.  F.,  History  of  Franklin  County,  Pa.,  Chicago,  1887 

Riddle,  William,  The  Story  of  Lancaster,  Old  and  New,  Lancaster,  1910 

Rhodes,  J,  F.,  History  of  the  United  States  from  the  Compromise  of  1850, 8  vols.,  New  York, 

1920 

Rippy,  J.  Fred,  The  United  States  and  Mexico,  New  York,  1926 

Rives,  G.  L,  The  United  States  and  Mexico,  1821-1848,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1913 

Roseboom,  Eugene  H.,  A  History  of  Presidential  Elections,  New  York,  1957 

Scrugham,  Mary,  The  Peaceable  Americans  of  1860-1861,  New  York,  1921 

Settle,  R.  W.,  and  M.  L,  Empire  on  JFheels,  Stanford,  Calif.,  1949 

Shanks,  Henry  T.,  The  Secession  Movement  in  Virginia,  1847*1861,  Richmond,  1934 

Simms,  Henry  H.,  A  Decade  of  Sectional  Controversy,  1851-1861,  Durham,  N.  C.,  1942 

Singleton,  Esther,  Story  of  the  White  House,  New  York,  1907 

Smith,  Justin  H.,  The  War  with  Mexico,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1919 

Smith,  'William  E.,  The  Francis  Preston  Blair  Family  in  Politics,  2  vols.,  New  York,  1933 

Snyder,  Charles  M.,  The  Jacksonian  Heritage,  1833-1848,  Harriaburg,  Penna.,  1958 

Sparks,  Edwin  E.  (ed.),  Lincoln  Douglas  Debates  of  1858,  Springfield,  111.,  1908 

Spring,  Leverett  W.,  Kansas,  the  Prelude  to  the  War  for  the  Union,  New  York,  1885 

Stampp,  Kenneth  M.,  And  the  War  Came,  Baton  Rouge,  1950 

,  The  Causes  of  the  Civil  War,  New  York,  1959 

Stanwood,  Edward,  History  of  the  Presidency,  New  York,  1898 

Stedman,  Edmund  0.,  The  Prince's  BaU,  New  York,  1860 

Stephenson,  Nathaniel  W.,  Texas  and  the  Mexican  War,  New  Haven,  1921 

Stuart,  Graham  H.,  The  Department  of  State,  New  York,  1949 

Thomas,  Benjamin  P.,  Russo*Americcn  Relations,  1815-1867,  Baltimore,  1916 

Tilley,  John  S.,  Lincoln  Takes  Command,  Chapel  Hill,  1941 

Van  Deusen,  G.  G.,  The  Jacksonian  Era,  1828*1848,  New  York,  1959 

Van  Vleck,  G.  W,,  The  Panic  of  1857,  an  Analytical  Study,  New  York,  1943 

Ward,  Wilfrid,  Life  and  Times  of  Cardinal  Wiseman,  2  vols.,  London,  1897 

Warren,  Charles,  The  Supreme  Court  in  United  States  History,  3  vols.,  Boston,  1922 

Wharton,  Anne  H.,  Sodal  Life  in  the  Early  Republic,  Philadelphia,  1902 

Weinberg,  Albert  K.,  Manifest  Destiny,  Baltimore,  1935 

White,  Leonard  D.,  The  Jacksonians,  a  Study  in  Administrative  History,  1829-1861, 

New  York,  1954 

Whitton,  Mary  0.,  First  First  Ladies,  1789-1865,  New  York,  1948 

Williams,  Mary  W.,  Anglo-American  Isthmian  Diplomacy,  1815-1915*  Washington,  D.  C., 

1916 

Willson,  Beckles,  America's  Ambassadors  to  England,  London,  1928 

Wise,  Harvey,  and  Cronin,  J.  W.f  A  BMoyraphy  ofZachary  Taylor,  Mtilatd  Fitlmore, 

Franklin  Pierce  and  James  Buchanan,  Washington,  1935 


HISTORICAL  ARTICLES 

,  "Public  Dinner  Tendered  to  Junes  Buchanan,"  LCHSI,  XXXIV  (1930),  7741, 

260261 

486 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

"Sidelights  on  an  Early  Political  Campaign,"  LCHSJ,  XVIII  (1914),  90-95 
paugh,  Philip  G.,  "Washington's  Birthday,   1860,"  TQHGM,  XXV  (1943), 

"A  forgotten  Journey  of  an  Ante-Bellum  President,"  TQHGM,  XVII  (1935), 


42-48 

_  ,  "John  Forney,  Robert  Tyler,  and  James  Buchanan,"  TQHGM,  XV  (1933),  71-90 

_  f  "John  B.  Floyd  and  James  Buchanan,"  TQHGM,  IV  (1922),  381-388 

_  ,  "James  Buchanan,  Bachelor  of  the  White  House,"  TQHGM,  XX   (1939). 

154-166,  216-234 

_  ,  "James  Buchanan,  the  Conservatives'  Choice,  1856,"  The  Historian  (Spring, 

1945),  77-90 

_  "James  Buchanan,  the  Squire  from  Lancaster,"  PMHB,  LV  (1931),  289-300; 

LVI  (1932),  15-33 

_  "James  Buchanan,  the  Squire  in  the  White  House,"  PMHB,  LVIII  (1934), 

270-286 

_  ,  "James  Buchanan  and  Some  Far  Western  Leaders,  1860-1861,"  Pacific  Historical 

Review,  XII  (1943),  169-180 

_  f  "The  Buchanan-Douglas  Feud,"  Illinois  State  Historical  Society  Journal,  XXV 

(1932),  5-48 

_  f  "Buchanan,  the  Court  and  the  Dred  Scott  Case,"  Tennessee  Historical  Magazine, 

XI  (1926),  231-240 

_  ,  "J.  Clancy  Jones  and  the  Nomination  of  James  Buchanan,"  in  Topics  from 

American  History,  #1,  State  Teachers  College,  Duluth,  Minn.,  1932 

_  j  "James  Buchanan  during  the  Administrations  of  Lincoln  and  Johnson,"  LCHSJ, 

XLIII  (1939),  67-110 

,  "political  Techniques—  1856,  or  Why  the  Herald  Went  for  Fr&aont,"  Western 
Political  Quarterly,  I  (1948),  243-251 

_  ,  "Making  Amendments  in  the  Fifties:  the  Story  of  the  New  York  Factions  and 
the  Buchanan  Managers  at  Cincinnati,  1856,"  New  York  State  Historical  Assoc.  Quarterly, 
VII  (1926),  304-316 

Bancroft,  Frederic,  "The  Final  Efforts  at  Compromise,  1860-1861,"  Political  Science 
Quarterly,  VI  (1891),  401-423 

Barhce,  David  R.,  "How  Lincoln  Rejected  the  Peace  Overtures  in  1861,"  TQHGM,  XV 
(1933),  137-144 

Baylen,  Joseph  0.,  "James  Buchanan's  'Calm  of  Despotism/  "  PMHB,  LXVII  (1953), 
294-310 

Beck,  Herbert,  'The  Camerons  of  Domsgal,"  LCHSJ,  LVI  (1952),  86-106 
Black,  Alice  L,  "George  Washington  at  the  Carey  House,"  typescript,  YCHS 
Bourne,  E.  G.,  ffThe  Proposed  American  Absorption  of  Mexico,"  Amer.  Hist  Asaoc. 
Annual  Report,  1899,  I,  157469 

_  ,  "The  United  States  and  Mexico,  1847-1848,"  AHR,  V  (1900),  491-502 
Brady,  Gerard,  "Buchanan's  Campaign  in  Lancaster  County,"  LCBSI,  LIII  (1949), 
97-134 

Brown,  J.  Hay,  "President  Buchanan—Misunderstood—  Wrongly  Judged,"  LCHSJ, 
XXXII  (1928),  88-92 

Callahan,  J,  M.,  "The  Mexican  Policy  of  Southern  Leaders  under  Buchanan's  Adminis- 
tration," Axner.  Hist,  Assoc,  Annual  Report,  1910,  135-151 

_  ,  "The  Evolution  of  Seward's  Mexican  Policy,"  West  Virginia  University  Studies 
in  American  History,  Series  I  (1909),  nos.  4,  5,  6 


Carlson,  Robert  E.,  'Tittsbuwh  Newspaper  Reaction  to  James  .Bu^^v^dJ£€ 

Democratic  Party  in  1856,"  Western  Pennsylvania  Historical  Magazine,  XXXIX  (1956), 

71-81 

Current,  R,  C.,  "Webster's  Propaganda  and  the  Ashburton  Treaty,"  MTHR,  XXXIV 

(1947),  187-200 


487 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

Dodd,  William  E.,  'The  West  and  the  War  with  Mexico,"  Illinois  State  Historical 

Society  Transactions,  1912,  15-23 

Dowdell,  George  R.,  "John  Forney,  Journalist  and  Politician,"  LCHSJ,  LV  (1951),  49-66 

Fehrenbacher,  Don,  "Origins  and  Purpose  of  Lincoln's  House-Divided  Speech,"  MVHR, 

XLVI  (I960),  615-643 

Finefrock,  John  L.,  "Stony  Batter"  and  "Harriet  Lane,"  typescript  in  the  author's 

possession 

Fraim  Samuel  R.,  "Address  at  the  Presentation  of  the  Buchanan  Memorial  Placque  at 

Lodge  #43,  F.  and  A.  M.,  Lancaster,  Pa.,"  Mimeo,  Lancaster,  1950 

Gates  Paul  W    "The  Struggle  for  Land  and  the  Irrepressible  Conflict,"  Political  Science 

Quarterly,  LXVI  (1951),  248-271 

Gillan,  W.  Rush,  "James  Buchanan,"  Kittochtinny  Historical  Society  Papers,  II  (1901) 

Gilchrist,  Annie,  "First  on  the  Turnpike,"  Bedford  Inquirer,  Dec.  20,  1950 

Colder,  F.  A.,  "The  Purchase  of  Alaska,"  AHR,  XXV  (1920)r  411-425 

Graebner,  Norman  A.,  "James  K.  Polk,  a  Study  in  Federal  Patronage,"  MVHR,  XXXVIII 

(1952),  613-632 

Hailperin,  Herman,  "Pro-Jackson  Sentiment  in  Pennsylvania,  1820-1828,"  PMHB,  L 

(1926),  193-240 

Hamilton,  Holman,  "Democratic  Senate  Leadership  and  the  Compromise  of  1850," 

MTHR,  XLI  (1954),  403-418 

s  "Texas  Bonds  and  Northern  Profits,  a  Study  in  Compromise,  Investment  and 

Lobby  Influence,"  MVHR,  XLIII  (1957),  579-594 

Harmon,  George  D.,  "Aspects  of  Slavery  and  Expansion,  1848-1860,"  Lehigh  University 

Publications,  ift,  #7  (1929),  43  pp. 

"President  James  Buchanan's  Betrayal  of  Governor  Robert  J.  Walker,"  PMHB, 

LIU  (1929),  51-91 

,  "The  Northern  Clergy  and  the  Impending  Crisis,  18504860,"  PMHB,  LXV 

(1941),  171-201 

,  "An  Indictment  of  the  Administration  of  President  James  Buchanan  and  His 

Kansas  Policy,"  The  Historian,  III  (1940),  52-68 

Heisey,  M.  Luther,  "Postscript  to  the  Old  Buck  Cannon,"  LCHSJ,  LXV  (1961),  106-107 

Hensel,  William  U.,  "James  Buchanan  as  a  Lawyer,"  University  of  Pennsylvania  taw 

Review,  LX  (1912),  546-573 

,  "A  Buchanan  Myth,"  LCHSJ,  X  (1906),  169-172 

Hodder,  Frank  A.,  "Some  Aspects  of  the  English  Bfll  for  the  Admission  of  Kansas," 

Amer.  Hist.  Assoc,  Annual  Report,  1906,  I,  201-210 

Holmes,    Charles   N.,   "The  First   Republican-Democratic  Presidential   Campaign," 

Journal  of  American  History,  XIV  (1920),  41-48 

Hostetter,  Ida  L.  K.,  "Harriet  Lane,"  LCHSJ,  XXXIII  (1929),  97-112 

Huehes,  Robert  M.,  "Floyd's  Resignation  from  Buchanan's  Cabinet,"  TQHGM,  V  (1923), 

73-95 

Johannsen,  Robert  W.,  "Stephen  A,  Douglas,  'Harpers  Magazine*  and  Popular  Sover- 
eignty," MVHR,  XLV  (1959),  606-631 

Jones,  W.  D.,  and  Vinson,  J.  C.,  "British  Preparedness  and  the  Oregon  Settlement," 

Pacific  Historical  Review,  XXII  (1953),  353-364 

Klein,  Frederic  S.,  "Robert  Coleman,  Millionaire  Ironmaster,"  LCHSJ,  LXIV  (I960), 

17-33 

Klein,  Philip  S.,  "Early  Lancaster  County  Politics,  Pennsylvania  History,  III  (1936), 

98-114 

,  "James  Buchanan  and  Ann  Coleman,"  Pennsylvania  History,  XXI  (1954),  1-20 

,  "The  Inauguration  of  James  Buchanan,"  LCHSJ,  LXI  (1957),  145-161 

,  "James  Buchanan  at  Dickinson,"  The  Boyd  Lee  Spahr  Lectures,  in  John  and 

Mary's  College,  Carlisle,  Penna.,  1956,  157-180 

488 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

Klingberg,  Frank  W.,  "James  Buchanan  and  the  Crisis  of  the  Union,"  Journal  of  Southern 

History,  IX  (1943),  455-474 

Landis,  D.  B.,  "Rev.  Edward  Young  Buchanan,"  LCHSI,  XXXII  (1928),  123-132 

Latan6,  John  H.,  "The  Diplomacy  of  the  United  States  in  regard  to  Cuba,"  Amer.  Hist. 

Assoc.  Annual  Report,  1897,  210-227 

Lewis.  Howard  T.,  "The  Closing  Month  of  the  Buchanan  Administration,"  Americana, 

VI  (1911),  10354044 

Luthin,   Reinhard  H.,  "The  Democratic  Split  during  Buchanan's  Administration," 

Pennsylvania  History,  XI  (1944),  13-35 

"Pennsylvania  and  Lincoln,"  PMHB,  LXVII  (1943),  61-82 

Lynch,  William  0.,  "Indiana  in  the  Buchanan-Douglas  Contest  of  1856,"  Indiana 

Magazine  of  History,  XXX  (1934),  119-132 

McMurtry,  R.  Gerald,  "James  Buchanan  in  Kentucky,  1813,"  Filson  Club  Historical 

Quarterly,  1934,  73-87 

Martin,  Thomas  P.,  "Initiation  of  James  Buchanan  as  an  American  Diplomat:   His 

Mission  to  Russia,"  Washington,  Junto  Selections  (1946),  48-60 

f  "James  Buchanan — American  Diplomat,"  Pennsylvania^  III  (1946),  33-34 

Mendelsohn,  Wallace,  "Chief  Justice  Taney,  Jacksonian  Judge,"  University  of  Pittsburgh 
Law  Review,  XII  (1951),  381-393 

,  "Dred  Scott's  Case  Reconsidered,"  Minnesota  Law  Reviev,  XXXVIII  (1953), 

16-28 

Mianigerode,   Meade,   "Presidential  Campaigns:    The  Buccaneers,   1856,"  Saturday 

Evening  Post,  CC  (1928),  39-40,  42,  157-15^ 

Nash,  Roderick  W.,  "The  Christiana  Riot:  An  Evaluation  of  its  National  Significance," 

LCHSJ*  LXV  (1961),  66-91 

Nichols,  Rov  F,,  "American  Democracy  and  the  Civil  War,"  Proceedings  of  the  American 

Philosophical  Society,  XCI  (1947),  143-149 

,  "The  Kansas  Nebraska  Act— a  Century  of  Historiography,"  MVHR,  XLIII 

(1956),  187-212 

,  "James  Buchanan— Lessons  in  Leadership  in  Trying  Times,"  The  Boyd  Lee 

Spahr  Lectures,  in  Bulwark  of  Liberty,  Carlisle,  Peuna.,  1950 

Owens,  Robert  L,  "James  Buchanan,  Diplomat,  International  Statesman,  President," 

LCHSJ,  XXXII  (1928),  92-97 

Perkins,  Howard  C,  "The  Defense  of  Slavery  in  the  Northern  Press  on  the  Eve  of  the 

Civil  War,"  Journal  of  Southern  History,  IX  (1943),  501-531 

Ranck,  James  B.,  "The  Attitude  of  James  Buchanan  towards  Slavery,"  PMHB,  LI 

(1927),  126-142 

Rayback,  J.  G.,  "Martin  Van  Buren's  Break  with  James  K.  Polk,"  New  York  History, 

XXXIV  (1955),  51-62 

Rawley,  J,  A.,  "Financing  the  Fremont  Campaign,"  PMHB,  LXXV  (1951),  24-35 

Riopy,  J,  Fred,  "Diplomacy  of  the  United  States  and  Mexico  Regarding  the  Isthmus  of 

TeKuaWpec,  1848-1860,"  'wax,  VI  (1919),  503-531 

Robinson,  Elwyn  B.,  "The  Pennsylvania*,  Organ  of  Democracy,"  PMHB,  LXII  (1938), 

350-360 

,  "The  Public  Ledger,  an  Independent  Newspaper,"  PMHB,  LXIV  (1940),  43-55 

Russ,  William  A.,  Jr.,  "Mary  Kittera  Snyder's  Struggle  for  an  Income,"  Snyder  County 
Historical  Society  Bulletin,  IV  (1960),  1-27 

,  'Time  Lag  and  Political  Change  as  Seen  in  the  Administrations  of  Buchanan 

and  Hoover,"  South  Adantk  Quarterly,  XLVI  (1947),  335-343 
Schafer,  Joseph,  "Who  Elected  Lincoln?"  AHR>  XLVII  (1941),  51-64 
Sears,  Louis  M.,  "Slidell  and  Buchanan,"  AHR,  XXVII  (1922),  709-730 
Sellers,  Charles  G.,  "Jackson  Men  with  Feet  of  Clay,"  AHR,  LXII  (1957),  537-551 

489 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

Slick,  SewalL  "William  Wilkins,  Pittsburgher  Extraordinary,"  Western  Pennsylvania 

Historical  Magazine,  XXII  (1939),  217-236 

Sprout.  Oliver  S.,  "James  Buchanan,  'Big  Wheel'  of  the  Railroads,"  LCHSJ,  LVI  (1952), 

21-34 

Stampp,  Kenneth  M.,  "Lincoln  and  the  Strategy  of  Defense  in  the  Crisis  of  1861," 

JourM of  Southern  History,  XI  (1945),  297-323 

Stenberg,  Richard  P.,  "Motivation  of  the  Wilmot  Proviso,"  MTHR,  XVIII  (1932), 

535-551 

>  "Jackson,  Buchanan  and  the  Corrupt  Bargain  Calumny,"  PMHB,  LVIII  (1934), 

61-85 

Thorpe,  Francis  N.,  "Jeremiah  S.  Black,"  PMHB,  L  (1926),  117-133,  273-286 

Van  Alstvne,  Richard  W.,  "British  Diplomacy  and  the  Clayton-Bulwer  Treaty,  1850- 

1860,"  Journal  of  Modern  History,  XI  (1939),  149-183 

>  "Anglo-American  Relations,  1853-1857,"  AHR,  XLII  (1937),  491-500 

,  "John  F.  Crampton,  Conspirator  or  Dupe?"  AHR,  XLI  (1936),  492-502 

Van  Horn,  Lawrence,  "The  Old  Buck  Cannon,"  LCHSf,  LXIV  (1960),  209-222 

Webster,  S.,  "Mr.  Marcy,  the  Cuban  Question  and  the  Ostend  Manifesto,"  Political 

Science  Quarterly,  VIII  (1893),  1-32 

Weisberger,  B.  A.,  "The  Newspaper  Reporter  and  the  Kansas  Imbroglio,"  MVHR, 

XXXVI  (1950),  633-656 

Wild,  Robert,  "Roger  and  James,"  Wisconsin  Magazine  of  History,  VIII  (1924),  111-116 

Wilson,  H,  L.,  "President  Buchanan's  Proposed  Intervention  in  Mexico,"  AHR,  V 

(1899),  687-701 

Worner,  W.  F.,  "James  Buchanan,"  LCHSJ,  XXXVIH  (1934),  103-144 

MISCELLANEOUS 

Rankin  Scrapbook,  parsonage  of  Presbyterian  Church,  Mercersburg,  Penna.,  contains 

clippings  relating  to  Buchanan  and  Lane  families  in  Mercersburg. 

John  Lowry  Ruth  Scrapbook,  York  County  Historical  Society,  contains  annotated 

Buchanan  dippings,  18404890. 

Hiram  Swarr  Scrapbook,  Buchanan  Foundation,  contains  Buchanan  clippings,  1840-1900 

Many  personal  possessions  and  mementoes  of  Buchanan  are  at  Wheatland,  Lancaster 

County  Historical  Society,  Franklin  and  Marshall  College,  Dickinson  College,  and  the 

Smithsonian  Institution. 


490 


INDEX 


Aberdeen,  Lord  (George  Hamilton  Gor* 
don),  178-180,  182,  233 

Abolition,  215,  306,  334,  363;  contest  over 
use  of  mails,  148;  debate  on  petitions, 
148-149;  in  Kansas,  288-289,  292 

Accessory  Transit  Co.,  232 

Adams,  Charles  F.,  401 

Adams,  John  Quincy,  45,  76,  164,  317, 
345;  bargain  and  sale  controversy, 
49-60;  views  on  tariff,  63-66 

Adams,  Mrs.  John  Q.v  62-63 

Agricultural  college  bill,  338 

Alabama,  218,  309,  393 

Alaska,  325-326 

Albany  Evening  Journal*  383 

Albert,  Prince  Consort  of  Britain,  246 

Allan,  John,  16 

Almonte,  J.  N.f  176 

Amalgamation  party,  Penna.,  49,  53-56, 

9**.  ***  *  * 


w-v*» 

American  party,  see  Native  American  party 

Amistad  case,  324 

Amsterdam*  95 

Anderson,  Mai.  Robert,  406-408,  412, 416, 
418;  at  Fort  Moultrie,  358,  368-370, 
373,  376;  move  to  Fort  Sumter,  378- 
380,  387;  and  Star  of  the  West,  388- 
389,  393;  truce  with  Pickens,  394- 
396;  dispatch  of  Mar.  4, 1861, 402-403 

Antietam,  battle  of,  423 

Anti-Lecoxnpton,  see  Lecompton  and 
Douglas 

Anti-Masonic  party,  Penna.,  70-72,  101- 
102;  in  1835  election,  106-108;  in 
1836  election,  110,  115;  decline  of, 
119,  129,  132,  136-139 

Athens,  Ga*,  277 

Atlantic  Cable,  320 

Atlantic  Monthly,  316 

Appleton,  John,  264, 275, 317;  and  English 
**  mission,  224^25, 242-243 

Arago,  247-248,  250,  252 

Argentina,  191 

Army,  XL  S.,  in  Kansas,  291;  in  Utah,  314- 
317;  condition  of,  1860,  356;  supplies 
for,  357;  see  also  War 

Aroostook  War,  145 


Ashburton,  Lord  (Alexander  Baring),  146 
Asia,  U.  S.  policy  in,  326,  331 
Assembly,  Penna.,  17-23,  25 
Atocha,  A.  J.,  185-186 
Atwater,  Jeremiah,  8 
Austria,  96, 115 

Bache,  Richard,  45 

Bachman,  Christian,  196,  200 

Baer,  Jacob,  211 

Bailey,  Godard.377 

Baker,  George  W.,  209 

Baker,  Mrs.  George  W.,  see  Mary  E.  S. 
Lane 

Baker,  Joseph  B.,  253,  270,  281,  340,  424 

Baldwin,  Henry,  38,  49,  55,  67-69,  73, 
76, 169 

Baltimore,  98,  270,  403,  427;  seige  of,  18; 
Democratic  convention  of  1835,  106- 
107;  of  1844,  159-160;  of  1848,  204- 
205;  of  1852,  218-220;  of  1860, 
343-344;  peace  meeting  of,  1851, 
215-216;  plans  for  courthouse,  333 

Baltimore  Sun,  335 

Bancroft,  George,  166,  180,  184,  208,  218 

Bank,  Second  of  the  U.  S.,  chap.  9; 
Buchanan's  view  of,  97-98;  Penna. 
charter,  109;  in  politics,  110-111, 
116-118,  120;  resurrection  notes  of, 
123-124 

Bankruptcy  bill,  of  1822,  42;  of  1857,  315 

Banks,  as  issue  in  Penna.,  23,  132,  138- 
139,  144-145,  151,  161-162;  in  panic 
of  1857, 314 

Banks,  John,  138 

Banks,  Nathaniel  P.,  257 

Barbour,  Philip  P.,  38 

Bargain  and  Sale  controversy,  56-59,  118 

Baring  Brothers,  235 

Barlow,  Samuel  L.  M.,  365,  383-385 

Barnard,  Isaac  D.,  49,  55,  67,  69-70,  73, 
104 

Barnburners,  166,  202,  204,  218 

Barnum,  Zenos,  403 

Barnum's  Hotel,  270,  333 

Barrett,  Orvffle,  155 

Barry,  Capt.  John  W.,  86 


491 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Barton,  George  W.,  196 
Bass,  Mrs.,  333-334,  425 
Bayard,  James  A.,  255 
Bay  Islands,  225,  230-233,  318 
Beale,  William,  20 
Beauregard,  P.  G.  T.,  398,  408 
Bedfor!  Springs,  29,  45,  71, 100,  120, 155, 
161,  184?  203,  208,  295,  297,  320, 
334-335,  349,  414,  425 
Bedford  Gazette,  281,  340 
Belfast,  95 
Belgium,  89 
Belize,  318 
Bell,  John,  343,  347 
Bellefonte,  Penna.,  226 
Belles-Lettres  Society,  11 
Belmont,  August,  234,  383-384 
Benjamin,  Judah  P.,  255,  383-384 
Bennett,  James  Gordon,  374,  415 
Benson,  Mrs.,  211 
Benton,  Jessie,  171 
Benton,  Thomas  Hart,  103,  121,  130,  142, 

150,  166,  170,  187 
Berks  County,  Penna.,  110,  217 
Berks  County  Letter,  201-202,  211 
Bermuda,  243-244 
Beverly,  Carter,  57 
Biddle,  Nicholas,  109,  117,  123-124,  138, 

151 

Big  Airds,  1 

Bigler,  WUliam,  196,  205,  221,  248-249, 
270,  407;  elected  governor,  216-217; 
at  Charleston  Convention,  342 
Bingham,  John  A.,  396 
Biography,  Buchanan's  plans  for,  416,  418 
Birney,  James  G.,  161 

Black,  Jeremiah  S.,  6,  196,  205,  249,  258, 
265,  268,  275,  296,  319,  333;  as  Atty. 
G*n.,  277-278,  282,  285;  pamphlet 
war   with   Douglas,   335;  views   on 
secession,    357-360,    363;    and    the 
Charleston  forts,  368,  370,  374, 376; 
Sec'y  of  State,   372;   and   Cabinet 
break,  377-381,  387;  ideas  on  Fort 
Sumter,  388-390,  394-395;  defense  of 
Washington,  398;  response  to  attacks 
on  Buchanan,  412-415;  and  Buchanan 
biography,  416-417 
Black,  Mrs.  Jeremiah  S.,  278 
Black,  John,  184 
Black,  Mary,  278 
Black,  Samuel  W.,  415 
"Black  Republican  Reserve,11  336-337 
Black  Sea,  79,  83,  86,  89 
Bladensburg,  Md.,  17 
Blair,  Francis  P.,  118,  364 
Blair,  Mrs.  Francis  P.,  119 
Blake,  George,  37 
Blake,  Mrs.  George,  47 
Blanc,  Louis,  235 
"Bleeding  Kansas,11  see  Kansas 
Bligh,  Mr.,  88,  91 
Blythe,  Calvin,  55,  135 
Bodisco,  Madame  de,  171,  348 


Bolger,  Edward,  207 
Bonham,  M.  L.,  370,  375^ 
Borgo,  Count  Pozzo  di,  95-96 
Borland,  Solon  E.,  232 
Boston,  47,  79,  259,  351,  373 
Boston  Courier,  374 
Bowling  Green,  Ky.,  15 
Bowman,  George,  281 
Bowman  v.  Kgnigmacher,  35,  37 
Boyce,  W.  W.,  370 
Boyd,  William  A.,  27 

Brecklnridge,  John  C.,  271,  363,  377-378, 
397;  vice-pres.,  255;  candidate  for 
pres.,  341,  343;  in  1860  campaign, 
347-348,  351 

Brewster,  Benjamin  F.,  152,  168 

Bridge  Farm,  see  Dunwoodie  Farm 

Bright,  Jesse  D.,  255,  263,  266-267, 
341-342 

Broderick,  David  C.,  310,  328,  335 

Brodhead,  Richard,  216-217,  265 

Broglie,  Due  de,  95 

Brooklyn,  U.S.S.,  388,  395,  399,  411,  418 

Brooks,  Preston  S.,  253-254 

Brown,  Aaron  V.,  268,  277,  332 

Brown,  Mrs.  A.  V.,  277 

Brown,  John,  254,  335-338,  341 

Brown,  William,  81 

Browne,  William  M.,  351,  373-374,  390, 
398 

Brunnow,  Count  Philippe  de,  87 

Brussels,  95 

Bryan,  George,  46 

Bryant,  William  Cullen,  384 

Buchanan,  Annie,  424 

Buchanan,  Edward  Young,  14,  37,  93, 101, 
103,  124-126,  128,  206,  210,  226, 
423,  427 

Buchanan,  Elizabeth  Speer,  parents*  2; 
marriage,  3;  as  teacher,  4~a;  sketch  of, 
6*7;  religious  faith,  33;  last  visit  with 
James,  79;  death  of,  93 

Buchanan,  George  Washington,  37,  OD, 
77,  93, 126 

Buchanan,  Harriet,  4,  37,  93,  101;  see  also 
Mrs.  Robert  Henry 

Buchanan,  James,  15th  president,  parents, 
1-3;  birth,  3;  as  a  boy,  4-7;  early  in- 
fluences, 5-6;  at  Dickinson  College, 
7-12;  in  Kentucky,  15-16;  in  War  of 
1812,  17-18;  state  assemblyman,  19- 
23;  appearance,  21;  war  speech,  21- 
22;  law  practice,  23-26,  34-35;  and 
Ann  Coleman,  27-33;  elected  Con- 
gressman, 35-37;  in  17th  Congress, 
37-43;  deficiency  bill  speech,  39-40; 
bankruptcy  bill  speech,  42;  Cumber- 
land Road  speech,  42-43;  in  Penna, 
election  of  1823,  45-47;  in  election  of 
1824,  48*53;  and  corrupt  bargain 
episode,  49-59;  political  technique  of, 
53-54;  trouble  with  Jackson,  57-59; 
attacks  Adams,  60;  election  of  1828, 

492 


INDEX 


61-66;  tariff  of  1828,  62-64;  illness, 
68;  fight  for  federal  patronage,  67-70, 
relations  with  Wolf,  68-72;  in  21st 
Congress,    74-77;   defends    Supreme 
Court,  74-75;  impeachment  of  Judge 
Peck,  76-77;  ministry  to  Russia,  78- 
94;  views  on  2nd  Bank  and  nullifica- 
tion, 97-98;  emancipates  slaves,  100; 
Mary   Kittera   Snyder,    101;   elected 
U.  5.  Senator,  101-102;  Penna.  elec- 
tion of  1835,  105-107;  Muhlenberg 
and  the  Bank,  109-110;  re-election  to 
Senate,  111;  defends  Dallas,  112;  chr. 
Foreign    Affairs    Com.,     113;    fight 
against    2nd    Bank,    116-118;    Whig 
attack  on,   118-119;  plans  marriage, 
119-120;  and  subtreasury  bill,   120- 
124;  family  problems,  124-128;  elec- 
tion  of  1840,    130-136;   "Ten   cent 
Jimmy"  affair,  133-134;  Penna.  bank 
crisis,  138-139;  presidential  hopes  in 
1844,  139-141;  views  on  Constitution, 
142-143;  views  on  national  economy, 
144.145;  views  on  foreign  affairs,  146- 
147;  views  on  expansion  and  slavery, 
147-150;  views  on  civil  liberty,  148- 
150;    re-election    to    Senate,    1842, 
151-154;   bid   for  pres.   nomination, 
1844,    151-160;   Anna   Payne,    156; 
Texan  annexation,  160-161;  SecV  of 
State,  163-194;  patronage  under  Polk, 
166-174;    declines    Supreme    Court 
post,  169-174;  tariff  of  1846,  172-173; 
Texan  negotiation,  175-177;  Oregon 
negotiation,  178-183;  Mexican  nego- 
tiations   and    war,    183-190;    minor 
diplomatic  activities,    191-192;  rela- 
tions with  Polk,  192-193;  nasal  opera- 
tion, 192;  campaign  of  1848,  194-205; 
county  tax  episode,   196-197;  Berks 
County  letter,  201-202;  travels,  202; 
campaign  dinners,  203-204;  declines 
to  run  for  governor,  205;  appearance 
in   1850,  206;  acquires  Wheatland, 
206-207;    family    matters,    208-210; 
reading  habits,  210;  drinking  habits, 
210-211;  views  on  1850  compromise, 
213-216;  seeks  1852  nomination,  216- 
220;    appointed    Minister   to    Great 
Britain,  223-227;  court  dress  affair, 
227-229;  Central  American  negotia- 
tion, 230-233;  and  Ostend  Manifesto, 
234-241;  tries  to  avert  war,  241-246; 
Harriet  Lane  in  England,   246-247, 
nominated  for  president,  1856,  248- 
257;  election  of  1856,  257-260;  forms 
Cabinet,  261-269;  inauguration,  270- 
272;  White  House  routine,  273-278; 
the  patronage,  278-285;  Kansas  prob- 
lems, 286-299;  and  the  Lecompton 
Constitution,  300-312;  panic  of  1857, 
314-315;    Mormon    War,    315-317; 
Central   American   policy,   317-322; 
Mexican  policy,  322-323;  Paraguayan 

493 


War,  323-324;  Cuba,  324-325;  Alas- 
kan  purchase  proposal,  325-326;  trade 
treaties,  326-327;  and  Lincoln-Doug- 
las debates,  328-331;  message  of  1858, 
331;  social  life,  332-335;  Harpers 
Ferry  raid,  335-337;  Covode  investi- 
gation, 338-340;  second  term  talk, 
340-341;  and  Charleston  convention, 
341-344;  health,  332;  trip  to  Chapel 
Hill,  334;  view  of  national  debt,  345- 
346;  veto  of  Homestead  bill,  346-347; 
election  of  1860,  347-348,  350-352; 
Japanese  Embassy,  348;  Meigs-Floyd 
controversy,  349;  religious  views, 
349-350;  visit  of  Prince  of  Wales,  350; 
plans  to  prevent  secession,  353-361; 
message  of  1860,  361-363;  urges 
Republicans  to  obey  laws,  363-367; 
plans  for  defense  of  forts,  368-370; 
status  quo  policy  adopted,  370-376; 
Anderson  moves  to  Fort  Sumter,  378- 
381;  attacked  as  a  secessionist,  374- 
375;  bond  scandal,  377;  break  with 
Floyd,  377-380;  South  Carolina  Com- 
missioners, 378-380;  Cabinet  session 
of  Dec.  29, 1860,  380-381  negotiation 
with  Lincoln,  381-385;  end  of  com- 
promise hopes,  386-387;  sends  Star 
of  the  West,  388-390;  special  message 
on  secession,  391;  Congressional  re- 
fusal to  legalize  executive  action, 
391-392;  the  Hall-Hayne  truce,  393- 
396;  defense  of  Washington,  397- 
398;  Peace  Convention,  398-400;  at 
Lincoln's  inauguration,  401-402;  re- 
turn to  Wheatland,  403-404;  policies 
compared  to  Lincoln's,  404-408; 
Republican  attacks  on,  408-416;  Mr. 
Buchanan's  Administration,  416-419; 
final  political  testament,  420-422;  life 
in  retirement,  423-427;  death  of,  427; 
estimate  of,  428-429 

Buchanan,  James,  Sr.,  birth  in  Ireland,  1; 
trip  to  America,  2;  at  Stony  Batter, 
Penna.,  3;  family,  3-4;  at  Mercers- 
burg,  4-6;  influence  on  son,  10-14;  and 
Kentucky  land,  15-16;  and  election  of 
1820,  36;  death  of,  37 

Buchanan,  Jane,  3,  17,  100;  see  also  Mrs. 
Elliot  T.  Lane 

Buchanan,  John,  1 

Buchanan,  Maria,  3,  5,  15,  101;  see  also 
Mrs.  C.  M.  Yates 

Buchanan,  Mary,  3 

Buchanan,  Sarah,  3,  37 

Buchanan,  William  Speer,  4,  37 

Buchanan-Jackson  party,  aee  Amalgama- 
tion party 

Buckshot  War,  129-130,  135 

Buell,  Maj.  Don  Carlos,  369-370,  376 

Buena  Vista,  battle  of,  188 

Buffalo,  N.  Y.,  205 

Bull  Run,  First  battle  of,  410,  420 

BOlow,  Baron  Heinrich  von,  96 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Bulwer,  Sir  Henry,  225,  230-233,  245, 

318-320 

Burr,  Aaron,  96 
Burrowes,  Thomas  H.,  129 
Butler,  Benjamin  F.  (of  N.  Y.),  114,  160 

Cabinet,  of  Jackson,  67-69,  77;  of  Van- 
Buren,  97,  113-114;  of  Polk,  165-166; 
of  Pierce,  222-223;  of  Buchanan, 
261-269,  275-278;  session  of  Nov.  9, 
1860,  357-360;  of  Dec.  29,  380-381 

Cadwalader,  John,  210,  424 

Calhoun,  John  C.  (of  Kansas),  298-299 

Calhoun,  John  Caldwell,  39-41,  80,  111- 
112,  154,  158-159,  165-166;  sketch 
of,  44-45;  and  1824  election,  45-49; 
and  corrupt  bargain  episode,  58-59; 
break  with  Jackson,  76-77;  on  sub- 
treasury,  121;  debates  Buchanan  on 
slavery,  142,  144,  148-150 

Calhounjackson  party,  see  Family  party 

California,  175,  183-185,  187,  189,  209, 
218,  230-231,  263,  339,  341,  372; 
admission  of,  211-213;  in  1856 
election,  259 

Cain  Quarterly  Meeting,  149 

Cameron,  James,  134,  196 

Cameron,  Simon,  97,  99,  102,  112,  115- 
116,  131,  135,  151,  159,  161,  281, 
334,  364,  420;  elected  Senator,  1845, 
167-168;  and  patronage,  169-172;  in 
1848  campaign,  196-201,  205;  in  1852 
campaign,  216-219;  joins  Know- 
Nothings,  249;  elected  Senator,  1857, 

Campaigns,  see  Elections 

Campbell,  Mrs.  George  W.,  82 

Campbell,  James,  222-223,  284 

Campbell,  Parker,  25 

Canada,  146,  225,  421 

Canal,  isthmian,  225,  230-233 

Cancrene,  Count  Georg,  85-87,  89 

Caribbean,  see  names  of  various  countries 

Caroline  affair,  145-146 

Carusi's  saloon,  116, 171 

Cass,  Belle,  275 

Cass,  Lewis,  79,  160,  170,  213-214,  317, 
322,  333,  405;  and  1844  election,  153- 
154;  and  1848  election,  200-205;  and 
1852  election,  217-220;  considered  for 
Cabinet,  264-268,  271;  as  Sec'v  of 
State,  275-276;  and  Charleston  forts, 
357-358,  368;  resicns,  372-374 

Cass-Yrisarri  Treaty,  318-320 

Castle  Pinckney,  353,  368-369,  375-376, 
380,  416 

Gates,  John  William,  227 

Cates,  William  John,  227 

Catholic  vote,  151,  161,  216,  245,  283 

Catron,  John,  161,  163,  269 

Catron,  Mrs.  John,  161,  211 

Caucus  system,  44,  48,  167-168 

Censorship,  90,  374 

Central  America,  314,  331,  345;  British  in, 


230-233,  242-244;  U.  S.  policy,  317- 
320;  see  also  names  of  various 
countries  in  Central*  America 

Chaxnbersburg,  Penna.,  136,  423 

Champneys,  Benjamin,  61,  71-72,  80,  loo, 
197-198 

Chandler,  Zachariah,  324 

Chapel  Hill,  N.  C.,  334,  340 

Chapultepec,  188 

Charleston,  S.  C.,  338,  347-348,  358,  390; 
Democratic  convention  in,  340-343; 
forts  at,  353-354;  plans  to  defend 
forts,  368-370;  status  quo  policy, 
370-376;  Anderson  at  Sumter,  378- 
381 

Chemical  Bank  of  N.  Y.,  226 

Chester  County,  Penna.,  69-70,  73,  416 

Cheves,  Langdon,  38,  61 

Chicago,  283,  329 

Chicago  Platform,  365-366,  384,  386 

Chihuahua,  321-322 

China,  326,  331 

Christiana  Riot,  216-217,  221 

Cincinnati,  253-255,  428 

Cincinnati  Platform,  313-314;  342-343 

Civil  War,  fear  of,  1832,  98;  begins,  408; 
Buchanan  on  causes  of,  418-420; 
effect  on  Buchanan,  408-416 

Claims,  U.  S.  against  Mexico,  146, 184-185, 
188;  in  Central  America,  321 

Clarendon,  Lord  (George  W.  F.  Vilhers) 
and  Central  American  negotiation, 
227,  230-233;  318-320;  and  recruiting 
controversy,  242-244 

Clarkson,  Gerardus,  27 

Clay,  Clement  C.,  Jr,,  394 

Clay,  Henry,  15-16,  103,  113,  121,  136, 
139,  260;  and  corrupt  bargain  charge, 
49-60;  political  views,  142-144;  stand 
on  Texas,  159-161;  and  1850  Com- 
promise,  212 

Clay,  John  Randolph,  80,  88 

Clayton,  John  M.,  209,  225,  230-233,  245, 
318-320 

Clayton,  Leonora,  426 

Clayton,  Philip,  276,  390 

Clayton  -  Bulwer  Treaty,  225,  230-233, 
318-320 

Clearfield,  Penna.,  423 

Cleveland,  secession  convention  in,  259 

Clifford,  Nathan,  218,  262,  264 

Clinton,  DeWitt,  22 

Cobb,  Howell,  236,  328,  337,  351,  401, 
426;  Speaker  of  House,  212;  in  1856 
campaign,  257-260;  considered  for 
Cabinet,  263-268;  on  Douglas,  330; 
as  Sec'y  of  Treas.,  276,  279-280,  284; 
on  Kansas,  293;  and  panic  of  1857, 
314;  and  English  bill,  308-311;  social 
life,  333-334;  in  1860  campaign  340- 
342;  break  with  Buchanan,  357-358, 
368-371 

Cobb,  Mrs.  Howell  (Mary  Ann  Lamar), 
276-277,  333*334 


494 


INDEX 


Cobb,  Thomas  R.  R.,  297 

Coercion,  debated  I860,  360-362 

Colebrookdale  Furnace,  29 

Coleman,  Ann  Caroline,  27-33,  100 

Coleman,  Edward,  36 

Coleman,  Margaret,  28 

Coleman,  Robert,  14,  28-29,  32,  36,  93 

Coleman,  Sarah,  31 

Coleman  letter  on  1824  tariff,  65 

Collamer,  Jacob,  325 

Columbia,  Penna.,  404 

Columbia  Bridge,  30-31,  423 

Columbia  River,  178 

Committee,  see  by  name 

Committee  of  Thirteen,  382,  393 

Committee  of  Thirty-three,  382 

Committee  on  Agriculture,  39 

Compromise,  of  1850,  211-221,  256,  286, 
315;  Crittenden,  381-387,  392-393; 
Republican  resistance  to,  364-367; 
see  also  Missouri  Compromise 

Conestoga  Creek,  13,  423 

Confederate  States  of  America,  258,  393, 
395,  407-408 

Congress,  17th,  37-41;  31st,  211-216;  36th, 
'331,  335-337,  356;  power  over  terri- 
tories, 269;  responsibility  of,  337;  and 
English  bill,  308-312;  and  1860  elec- 
tion, 347-348;  and  Meigs-Floyd  fight, 
349;  compromise  efforts,  1861,  382- 
387;  rejects  Buchanan's  proposals, 
391-392,  396-397,  399;  see  also  House 
of  Representatives  and  Senate 

Conscription  bill,  Penna.,  20;  U.  S.,  421 

Constitution,  of  Kansas,  291-312;  of  the 
states,  305-306;  of  the  U.  S.,  21,  74- 
75,  112,  259,  428;  Buchanan's  con- 
cept of,  23,  142-144,  422 

Constitutional  Convention,  of  Penna., 
1838, 108,  110, 118-119;  of  Michigan, 
111;  of  Kansas,  298*299;  procedures 
of,  305-306;  proposed  in  1860,  358, 
362-364,  382-387 

Constitutional  Union  party,  343 

Consular  Bureau,  165 

Convent  School,  Georgetown,  208 

Convention,  national  Democratic,  of  1832, 
97;  1835,  106-107;  1844,  159-160; 
1848,  204-205;  1852,  218-220;  1856, 
253-255;  I860,  340-344;  1864,  421; 
Whig,  1840,  132;  Free-Soil,  1848, 
205;  1852,  221;  Republican,  1856, 
256;  1860,  343;  state  Democratic, 
Penna.,  1820,  44;  1824,  48;  1829,  69; 
1835,  105-106;  1836,  107;  1838,  122; 
1840  134;  1843,  153-154,  199;  1847, 
196-200;  1851,  216;  1852,  217.219; 
1856,  250;  Georgia,  1860,  341; 
Kansas,  1857,  298-308;  regional, 
abolitionist,  1856,  259;  1857,  259; 
slave  trade,  1859,  335;  Nashville, 
1850,  213;  tariff,  1827,  65;  Confeder- 
ate, 395;  peace,  398-400;  see  also  under 
place  names 

495 


Cook,  Ann,  100 

Cook,  Daphne,  100 

Cook,  Isaac,  328-329 

Cooper,  James,  216 

Cooper,  Priscilla,  47 

Copperhead  meetings,  414 

Corcoran,  William,  276 

Cornwall  Furnace,  29 

Corwin,  Thomas,  384 

Costa  Rica,  320-321 

Court  dress  circular,  228-229 

Cove  Gap,  Penna.,  2-4 

Covode,  John,  338 

Covode  Committee,  338-339 

Crabbe  expedition,  322 

Craig,  Mrs.  Elizabeth  C,  277,  285,  333, 

348,426 

Crampton,  J.  F.  T.,  243-245 
Crawford,  William  H.,  39,  41,  44,  48-49 
Creole  affair,  145-146 
Crimean  War,  229,  231,  234,  242 
Crittenden,  John  J.,  310;  on  Cuba,  325; 

compromise  plan,  382-387,  392-393, 

399-400 
Cuba,  191-192,  230,  331,  335,  365,  400; 

Ostend  Manifesto,  234-241;  purchase 

proposal  of  1859,  324-325 
Cumberland  County,  Penna.,  24 
Cumberland  Road,  42-43 
Gumming,  Alfred,  316-317 
Curtin,  Andrew  Gregg,  351 
Curtis,  George  T.,  419 
Gushing,  Caleb,  165,  222,  243,  341,  375 
Gust,  Sir  Edward,  228 
Customhouse,  Phfladelphia,  115, 135, 171, 

281;  New  York,  280;  Charleston,  380, 

390 

Cutts,  Adele,  208,  284 
Cutts,  J.  Madison,  284 
Cyane,  U.  S.  S.,  232 

Dallas,  Alexander  J.,  45 

Dallas,  George  M.,  45,  48,  55,  73,  79-80, 
102, 10£  131, 135, 138-139, 155, 166, 
216,  223,  245,  247;  patronage  under 
Jackson,  96-99;  Mission  to  Russia, 
108,  112-113:  vice-Pres,  151  160; 
patronage  under  Polk,  167-171;  and 
tariff  of  1846,  172-173;  in  election  of 
1848.  195-203;  Mission  to  England, 
245,  247 

Dallas-Clarendon  treaty,  318 

Danville,  Penna.,  153,  161 

Dauphin  County,  Penna.,  24 

Davidson,  Dr.  Robert,  8-10,  12 

Davis,  Garrett,  410 

Davis,  Jefferson,  222,  224,  263,  266,  279, 
290,  341,  343,  349, 375, 379,  422 

Davis,  John,  133-134 

Davis,  John  W.,  219 

Davis,  Varina,  425 

Dayton,  William  L.,  257 

DeBow's  Review,  315 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Democratic  party,  in  national  election  of 
1832,  9?;  $36,  106-110;  1840,  132- 
137;  1844,  15M60;  1848,  194-205; 
1852,  216-222;  1856,  248-260;  1860, 
350-352;  1864,  421;  and  1850  Com- 
promise, 211-216;  patronage  under 
Polk,  166-172;  patronage  under  Bu- 
chanan, 279-285;  and  Kansas  policy, 
286-312;  and  Homestead  bill,  345- 
347;  split  of  1860,  328-332,  340-344; 
New  York  split,  121;  in  Penna.,  1814, 
20-24;  1824,  55-56;  1828,  60-74; 
1835,  105-109;  1836,  112;  1842,  151- 
154;  and  U,  S.  Bank,  116-124,  135, 
139;  see  also  Conventions  and  Elec- 
tions 

Denver,  James  W.,  302,  309 
Derrick,  William  S.,  165 
Deseret,  see  Utah 
Dickens,  Charles,  210 
Dickerson,  Mahlon,  114 
Dickinson  College,  5,  7-13,  27-28,  38,  210 
Diller,  Peter,  17 
Diplomatic  Bureau,  165 
District  of  Columbia,   see   Washington, 

D.  C. 
Dix,  John  A.,  238,  374,  390,  401,  406-407, 

412-415,  418,  420 
Dobbin,  James  C.,  222 
Dom  Pedro  II,  191 
Donegal  County,  Ireland,  1,  28 
Donelson,  Andrew  J.,  176-177 
Doolittle,  James  R.,  324 
Doubleday,  Abner,  419 
"      h-face,  308 

'    ,  Stephen  A.,  204,  221,  223,  250, 
-364,  393,  405;  and  1850  Com- 
promise, 213;  in  1852  campaign,  218- 
220;  in  1856  campaign,  254-255,  259; 
and  Buchanan  Cabinet,  263,  266-267; 
and   patronage,   279,   282-284;   and 
Kansas-Nebraska  bill,  286-288,  291, 
299;    attacks    Lecompton,    300-312; 
breaks  with  Buchanan,  301,  328-329; 
debates    Lincoln,    322-330;    attacks 
Black,  335;  and  Covode  Committee, 
338-339;  nominated  pres.,  340-844; 
in  1860  election,  347-348,  351 
Douglass,  Samuel,  71 
Dowmngtown,  Penna.,  61 
Doyle,  James,  254 
Draft  law,  see  Conscription 
Dred  Scott  case,  269,^71-272 
"Drop  of  Blood1*  speech,  62,  119 
Dwigbt,  Henry  D.,  37 
Duane,  William  J.,  97 
Dublin,  95 

Duchman,  Jacob,  14,  16 
Dunwoodie  Farm,  4-5,  37, 126 

Eaton,  John  H.,  51,  78 
Eaton,  Peggy,  76 
Echo,  case  of,  335 
Edinborough,  95 


Edwards,  Ninian,  38 

Elder,  Thomas,  52,  149 

Eldred,  Nathaniel,  163 

Elections,  national  of  1824,  44-53;  of  1828, 
60-66;  of  1832,  77,  96-97;  of  1836, 
110;  of  1840,  132-136;  of  1848,  204- 
205;  of  1852,  218-222:  of  1856,  254- 
260,  of  1860,  347-352;  of  1864,  421; 
Penna.  gubernatorial  of  1820,  35-37; 
of  1823T  46-47;  of  1829,  69-71;  of 
1835,  107;  of  1838,  122-124,  129-130; 
of  1844,  157,  162;  of  1847,  195-198; 
of  1851,  216-217;  Penna.  senatorial 
of  1831,  80;  of  1833,  99;  of  1842, 
153-154;  of  1845,  167;  of  1857,  265- 
266 

"Eleventh  Hour  Men,"  49,  67 

Elizabeth  Furnace,  29 

Elizabethtown,  Ky.,  15 

Ellicott's  Mills,  Md.,  18 

Elliott,  Charles,  177 

Elliott's  Debates,  210 

Ellis,  Katherine,  426 

Ellmaker,  Amos,  27,  101 

Emancipation  Proclamation,  421 

-    "•'  i  bill,  312,  328-329,  338 
«,.i  mission,  see  Great  Britain 

_.e.sh,  William  H.,  311-312 

Era  of  Good  Feeling,  35 

Erie,  Penna.,  136,  260 


Espy,  George  R.,  116 
Esterhazy,  Princ 


., 

,      nce  Pal  Antal,  96 
Europe,  fear  of  in  U.  S.,  89,  175-176; 

influence  of  in  America,  317-326 
Evans,  Joshua,  55 
Everett,  Edward,  181,  226,  343 
Expansion,  see  Territorial  expansion 

Family  party,  composition  of,  45;  in  1824 
election,  48-53;  in  1825,  55;  in  1829 
election,  67-71;  end  of,  97,  105 

Farmers  Bank  of  Lancaster,  27,  30 

Federalist  party,  5,  16-19;  in  Penna.,  1823, 
45-47;  backs  Jackson,  48;  in  1826, 
35-36;  end  of  in  1828,  54,  60-62 

Federal  system,  143-144,  428 

Ferguson,  John,  3 

"Fifty-four  forty  or  fight,"  178 

Filibusters,  236,  319-320 

Fillmore,  Millard,  142,  213,  260,  262,  275 

Findlay,  John,  38 

Findlay,  William,  35-36,  39,  50 

Fire-eaters,  308;  see  under  individual  names 

Fishing  nights,  225 

Fitzpatrick,  Benjamin,  347 

Florida,  68,  76,  212,  392-394,  399 

Floyd,  John  B.,  335,  339,  397,  412,  418; 
as  Sec'y  of  War,  278;  dispute  with 
Meigs,  349;  and  "acceptances,"  357, 
377;  and  Charleston  forts,  354, 


368-370, 376;  leaves  Cabinet,  377-380 
Flynn,  William,  412 
Foltz,  Dr.  Jonathan  M.,  192, 210, 314, 409; 

and  1856  election,  251;  and  National 

496 


INDEX 


Hotel  disease,  269-273;  breaks  with 
Buchanan,  283 

Foote,  Henry  S.,  290 

Force  hill,  396 

Foreign  policy,  Russia,  chap.  6;  Great 
Britain,  chaps.  17,  18;  under  Polk, 
chap.  14;  Buchanan's,  145-147;  317- 
327 

Foreign  Relations  Committee,  U.S.  Senate, 
113,  123 

Forney,  John  W.,  222,  226,  229,  237,  287, 
328, 330, 415;  and  "Ten  Cent  Jimmy" 
canard,  133-135;  traits  of,  140-141; 
and  1844  campaign,  151-154;  relations 
with  Cameron,  167-173;  in  1848 
election,  195-201;  in  1850,  210-212; 
and  Sickles,  226,  242;  in  1856  cam- 
paign, 249,  251,  253;  vainly  seeks 
office,  264-268;  breaks  with  Bu- 
chanan, 281-282;  and  Covode  Com- 
mittee,  338 

Forsyth,  John,  113-114,  130-131,  322 

Fort  Bridger,  316 

Fort  Jackson,  388 

Fort  Jefferson,  388 

Fort  Johnson,  353 

Fort  Moultrie,  353-354,  368-370,  373,  376, 
378-381,  393,  408,  412,  416 

Fort  Pickens,  388,  399,  407,  410-411 

Fort  Pulaski,  392 

Fort  Snelling,  285 

Fort  Sumter,  353,  368,  375-376;  occupied 
by  Anderson,  378-379,  387;  and  Star 
of  the  West,  388-390,  393;  and  truce, 
394-395;  controversy  about  under 
Lincoln,  402-403,  4&-408,  411-412, 
415-420 

Fort  Taylor,  388 

Foster,  Stephen  C.,  93 

Foster,  Eliza,  93,  101;  see  oho  Mrs.  E.  Y. 
Buchanan 

Foster,  Alfred,  12 

Fowler,  Isaac  V.,  281,  339 

France,  145,  175476,  320-323,  326-327 

Fox,  Gustavus  V.,  395-396 

Franklin,  Walter,  24-26,  32,  39 

Franklin  and  Marshall  College,  210,  262, 
415  424 

Frazer,  Aeah,  168,  197-198,  200,  206 

Frazer,  W.  C.,  25 

Freeport  Doctrine,  341-342 

Frtoont,  John  C.,  199,  256-257,  260, 
262,  413 

Free  ships  make  free  goods,  92 

Free-Soil  party,  205,  211,  221,  288 

Free  trade,  see  Tariff 

Friends,  Society  of,  62,  149 

Furitive  slave  law,  201,  212-217,  221,  359, 
361,382 

Gadsden  purchase,  190 

"Gag  Resolutions,"  148-149 

Gallatin,  Albert,  50-51 

Gardner,  Col.  J.  L,  354,  358 

Garrison,  William  Lloyd,  259,  364 


Gates,  Paul,  288 

Gautier  (caterer),  171,  350 

Geary,  John  W.,  288,  291 

Georgia,  213,  284,  309,  340-341,  351-352, 
371-372,392-393 

Georgia,  University  of,  276 

German  Confederation,  191 

German  vote,  55,  62,  67 

Gettysburg,  battle  of,  423,  426 

Gibson,  John  Bannister,  48,  76,  108 

Giddings,  Joshua  R.,  257 

Gilpin,  Henry  M.,  131,  155 

Gist,  William  H.,  353,  368-369 

Good  Neighbor  policy,  146 

Gordon,  Thomas  and  Rosana,  424 

Govan,  Andrew  R.,  37 

Grapes  Tavern,  208,  408 

Great  Britain,  and  Maine  boundary,  145- 
146;  interest  in  Texas,  175-176; 
Oregon  negotiation,  178-183;  Bu- 
chanan's mission  to,  221-247; 
appointed  minister,  223-227;  court 
dress  affair,  227-229;  Central  Ameri- 
can negotiation,  230-233;  and  Cuba, 
234-241;  threat  of  war,  241-246; 
Harriet  Lane  in,  246-247;  relations 
with  in  Buchanan's  term,  318-320, 
325,  331 

Greeley,  Horace,  258,  360,  374,  384,  415 

Gregg,  Andrew,  47,  49 

Green,  Benjamin,  184-185 

Green,  Duff,  56-59,  98,  383-386 

Greenhow,  Robert,  80, 165 

Greenhow,  Rose  O'Neal,  165,  425 

Greensburg,  Penna.,  100,  124, 136,  221 

Greytown,  225,  230,  232-233 

Grier,  Justice  Robert,  174,  262,  269,  282 

Grand,  Francis  J.,  281 

Grundy,  Felix,  15-16,  103, 131 

Guadalupe  Hidalgo,  treaty  of,  190 

Gurley,  Phineas,  334 

Guthrie,  James,  222,  341 

Gwin,  William  M.,  326,  333,  372,  426 

Gwin,  Mrs.  W.  M.,  333-334,  390,  426 

Hague,  the,  95 

Hale,  John  P,,  221 

Hall,  Lt.  Norman  J.,  394 

Halstead,  Murat,  341 

Hamburg,  82,  95 

Hamilton,  Alexander,  96 

Hamilton,  Mrs.  Alexander,  171 

Hamilton,  William,  37 

Hamlin,  Hannibal,  343,  402 

Hammet,  W,  H.,  159 

Hammond,  James  H.,  315,  353 

Hannah,  35-36 

Hardin,  Ben,  38 

Hards,  280-281 

Harney,  Gen,  William  S.,  291 

Harpers  Ferry,  335-337,  340 

Harriet  Lane  (cutter),  350 

Harrisburg,  Penna.,  in  1814,  19;  Demo- 
cratic convention  of  1824,  48;  of 
1829,  69;  of  1835,  105-106;  of  1836, 


497 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


107;  of  1838,  122;  of  1843,  153;  of 

1847,  196-200;  of  1851,  216;  of  1852, 

217-218;  of  1856,  250;  Whig.conyen- 

tion  of  1840,  132;  tariff  convention, 

65 

Harrisburg  Bank,  109 
Harrisburg  Keystone,  131,  155 
Harrison,  William  Henry,  15,  132,  136- 

137,  275 

Hartford  convention,  297 
Harvest  Home  letter,  see  Berks  County 

Letter 
Hawaii,  192 

Hawthorne,  Nathaniel,  206 
Hayes,  Alexander  L,  27-35 
Hayes,  John,  8 

Hayne,  Isaac  W.,  394-395,  399 
Hemphffl,  Joseph,  28,  32,  38 
Hemphill,  Margaret  Coleman,  31 
Henry,  Ann  D.,  100 
Henry,  Harriet  Buchanan,  124-125,  155 
Henry,  James  Buchanan,  101,  125,  155, 

2io,    226-227,    261,    270,    273-274, 

333,423 

Henry,  Robert,  100,  124-125 
Hermitage,  the,  68,  119,  155 
Herrera,  Jos4  Joaqufn,  183,  185 
Hetty,  Miss,  see  Esther  Parker 
Hiester,  Joseph,  35-37,  49 
Holdridge,  Henry,  81 
Hollins,  Capt.  G.  N.,  232 
Holt,  Joseph,  357-358,  372-373,  379-381, 

388,  §9i395,  397-403,  413,  418-419 
Home  Bureau,  165 
Homestead  bill,  345-347 
Honduras,  225,  230-233,  318,  320 
Hopewell  Furnace,  29 
Hopkins,  George  Ross,  27 
Hopkins,  James,  13-14,  16,  20,  25,  27, 

30,  35 

Hopkins,  James  M.,  210 
Hopkins,  Washington,  93 
Horn,  Henry,  155,  171-172 
House  of  Representatives,  see  U.  S. 
Houston,  Sam,  218 
Howard  Committee,  397-398 
Hubley,  Grace,  31 
Hudson's  Bay  Company,  325 
Huger,  Benjamin,  358,  369,  376 
Hughes,  Archbishop  John,  29,  245 
Hunkers,  166,  202,  204,  226 
Hunter,  Robert  M.  T.,  218,  265,  279,  379 
Huston,  Sarah  Buchanan,  124 
Huston,  Elizabeth,  101,  124-125 
Hutter,  W.,  196,  200 

niinois,  329-330,  339 

Impeachment,  of  Penna.  judges,  24-26;  of 

Judge  Peck,  76;  of  Andrew  Johnson, 

422;  threatened,  374,  411 
Inauguration,  Buchanan's,  267-272 
Income,  Buchanan's,  as  lawyer,  16,  23, 

26;  as  minister,  81;  as  senator,  128; 

in  retirement,  423-424 


Independent  Republican  party  (Penna.),  35 

Independent  treasury,  see  Subtreasury 

Indian  bonds,  414 

Indian  Bureau,  39-40 

Indian  threat,  356 

Indiana,  220 

Ingersoll,  Charles  J.,  16,  119,  120,  227 

Ingham,  Samuel  D.,  45,  50,  57-58,  64, 

68-69,  78-80 

Instructions,  senatorial,  102,  122,  139 
Interior   Department,   377-378,   390:   see 

also  imtfer  Jacob  Thompson 
Intervention,  doctrine  of,  320-324 
Investments,  by  Buchanan,  81,  423-424 
Iowa,  212 
Ireland,  1,  2,  243 
Irish  vote,  151,  216,  283 
Isthmian  transit,  321,  323;  see  also  New 

Granada,    Panama,    Nicaragua,    Te- 

huantepec,  and  Clayton-Bulwer  treaty 

Jackson,  Andrew,  143,  147,  154,  159,  161, 
163,  196,  285,  332,  334,  339;  sketch 
of,  51;  in  1824  campaign,  48-53;  and 
corrupt  bargain  affair,  49-60;  and 
Penna.  patronage,  66-74;  and  tariff, 
65;  and  Russian  Mission,  78*80;  and 
parly  in  Penna.,  99;  censure  of,  103; 
names  successor,  106;  and  the  Bank, 
113-121 

Jackson,  Frederick  William,  228 

Jacobs,  Cyrus,  28,  35 

Jacobs,  Eliza,  28-29 

Jamaica,  244 

Japan,  326,  331,  348 

Jefferson,  Thomas,  22 

Jenkins,  Martha,  206;  see  also  Mrs, 
James  B.  Lane 

Jenkins,  William,  27,  30,  35,  85,  206 

Jenkins,  Mrs.  William,  31 

Johnson,  Andrew,  422 

Johnson,  Cave,  166,  180,  182,  218 

Johnson,  Herschel  V.,  347 

Johnson,  Richard  M.,  107,  111,  130-135, 
152453 

Johnston,  Albert  Sidney,  316 

Johnston,  Henry  Elliott,  427 

Johnston,  William  F.f  205,  217 

Jones,  J.  Glancy,  194,  196,  214,  243,  263- 
268,  284,  330 

Juirez,  Benito,  322-323 

Judges,  see  Impeachment 

Judiciary  Act  of  1789,  74-75 

Judiciary  Committee,  Penna.,  20,  23;  U,  S. 
Congress,  76 

Justices  of  the  peace,  110 

Kane,  John  K.,  155,  160-161 

Kane,  Thomas  L,  316-317 

Kansas,  territory  of,  civil  war  in,  249-250, 
256;  settlement  of,  286*290;  terri- 
torial government,  291-295;  constitu- 
tion, 296-312;  as  a  political  issue, 
328-329 

498 


INDEX 


Kansas-Nebraska  bill,  235-245,  248,  250, 

263,  passed,  286-287;  operation  of, 

288-312 

Keitt,  Lawrence  M.,  352,  361,  370,  375 
Kelly,  Moses,  390 
Kelly,  Sir  Fitz-Roy,  246 
Kendall,  Amos,  59,  114 
Kentucky,  15-16,  351,  400 
Kern,  Jacob,  106 
Keystone  Club,  271,  290 
Kilgore,  David,  365 
King,  Horatio,  374,  412-413,  420 
King,  Dr.  John,  7,  10 
Kini,  John  P.,  119 
King  William  R.  R.,  103,  111,  119,  130- 

132,  134,  137,  149,  220,  401,  426 
Kingdom  of  the  Two  Sicilies,  234 
Kittera,  Anne,  101 

Kittera,  Thomas,  31-32,  55,  101,  106 
Know-Nothing  party,  248-249,  251,  256, 

270-289 

Kossuth,  Louis,  235 
Kremer,  George,  50,  52-53 
Krudener,  Baron,  82-83,  85 

Labor,  133,  151 

Lafayette,  Marquis  de,  53 

Lancaster,  Penna.,  13,  15,  30,  41,  71-72, 

81,  98,  107-108,  136,  141,  253,  260, 

270,  404,  408-409,  424-428 
Lancaster   County,   Penna,,   85-86,   110; 

tax  affair,  197-198;  Christiana  Riot, 

216-217 

Lancaster  County  Dragoons,  18 
Lancaster  Fencibles,  270 
Lancaster  Intelligencer,  158,  200 
Land,  see  Public  land 
Lane,  Elliot  Eskridge,  125,  209,  226-227, 

273-274 

Lane,  Elliot  Tole,  15,  17,  127 
Lane)  Mrs.  Elliot  T.,  100,  125,  127,  155; 

see  also  Jane  Buchanan 
Lane,  Harriet  Rebecca,  125,  155-156,  227, 

229,  261,  270,  272,  330,  334,  348, 

352,  401,  423,  426;  education,  208- 

209;  at  Court  of  St.  James,  246; 

mistress  of  the  White  House,  273*275, 

283,  332-333;  abuse  of,  414-415,  417; 

marriage  of,  427 
Lane,  Gen.  Jim,  287,  310 
Lane,  James  Buchanan,  200,  206,  209 
Lane,  Joseph,  341,  347.348,  379 
Lane,  Mary  Elizabeth  Speer,  125, 155,  209f 

246,  282;  see  also  Mrs.  George  W. 

Baker 

Laverty,  Robert,  11-12 
Lawless,  Luke  £.,  76 
Lawrence,  Joseph,  101 
Lawrence,  Kansas,  291,  294 
Lazaretto  (Phila.),  283 
Leavenworth,  Kansas,  291 
Lecompton,  fcansas,  291,  294,  297-299 
Lecompton  Constitution,  282,  296-312 
Lecompton  government,  287,  297-298 

499 


Ledyard,  Mrs.  Henry,  275,  333 

Lee,  Robert  E.,  335 

Legislature,  see  under  United  States  and 
States 

Leiper,  George  G.,  55 

Leopard  Tavern,  33 

Letcher,  Robert  P.,  58 

Lewis,  Ellis,  418 

Lewis,  William  B.,  77 

Lewistown,  Penna.,  106 

Liberty  party,  161 

Lieven,  Prince  Kristofer  Andreevich  de, 
83,96 

Lincoln,  Abraham,  15,  302,  308,  323,  336, 
392-393,  397,  403,  412-418,  428-429; 
runs  for  Senate,  328-329;  nominated 
for  pres.,  343;  in  1860  election,  347- 
348,  351-352;  views  on  Union,  353- 
354,  360-361,  363-366,  370,  warned 
against  Buchanan,  374;  rejects  com- 
promise, 382,  387;  plot  against,  398; 
inauguration,  399-402;  inaugural  ad- 
dress, 404-406;  prepares  for  war, 
407-409;  Buchanan's  opinion  of,  420; 
assassinated,  421 

Lincoln,  Thomas,  15 

Lincoln-Douglas  debates,  329 

Utchfield  School,  27 

Liverpool,  81-82,  95 

Livingston,  Edward,  80,  83,  88,  91 

Livingston,  Cora,  47 

LondSn,  80,  82,  95-96,  178-181,  223-247 

London  Conference,  96 

London  Observer*  412 

London  Times,  228-229 

Louisiana,  218,  361,  393 

Lowndes,  William,  38-41 

Lowrie,  Walter,  50 

Lflbeck,  82,  95 

Lucinda  Furnace,  424 

Lynch,  David,  101, 114, 156-157, 195-196, 
205,209,219-220,281,425 

Lynch,  Isabel,  425 

Lyons,  Lord  Edmund,  414 

McCamant,  John,  61 
McCandless,  Wilson,  195,  340 
McDuffie,  George,  38,  45-46,  76 
McGee  County,  Kansas,  298 
McGlinn,  Anthony,  119 
McKean,  Samuel,  98-99,  103 
McLane,  Louis,  98,  114,  179, 181-182 
McLane,  Robert,  322-323 
McLane-Ocampo  Treaty,  322-323 
McLean,  L.  A.,  292 
McClellan,  George  B.,  421 
McClelland,  Robert,  223 
McCormick,  James,  8-10 
Mclntire,  Peter,  390 
McQueen,  John,  370,  375 
MadJson,  James,  17,  22,  297 
Madison,  Mrs.  James,  156,  171 
Madison's  Notes,  210 
Magaw,  Jesse  E.  H.,  5, 15, 125 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Magaw,  Jessie,  125  127209 

Magraw,  Robert,  333-334 

MaS,  in  Russia,  91-92;  abolitionist,  148; 

seizure  of  Buchanan's,  414 
Maine,  145-146,  259 
Manchester,  England,  82 
Manhattan  Bank,  109 
Manifest  Destiny,  175 

£5.  ife  L!  166,  218-220,  222-245 
Marcy,  Mrs.  W.  L.,  171 
Markley,  Philip  S.,  50-52 
Marshall,  John,  169 

Martin,  CoP'H.  L,  298-299  . 

Maryland,  218,  366;  see  also  Baltimore 
Ifem,  John  Y.,  166,  204,  218,  237-238, 

333 

Mason-Dixon  line,  262 
Masonic  Lodge,   Lancaster,  Penna.,   27, 

408-409,  427 
Massachusetts,  341 
Maximilian,  Archduke  Ferdinand,  323 
Maynadier,  Capt.  H.  E.,  377 


_  ^ 
C.,  349 
,  33,  100,  155, 


12T,  136,  155, 
203,  260 

Meigs,  Capt.  Mont 

Mercersbure,  Penna.,  4- 
125-126,  426 

Meredith,  William  M.,  119,  207 

Meredith,  Jonathan,  76 

Mexican  War,  184-188,  201 

Mexico,  113-114,  145-148,  159,  400;  and 
Texan  annexation,  176-177;  and  U.  5. 
policy,  1845,  183-184;  Slidell  mission, 
184-186;  war  with,  184-189;  peace 
negotiations,  190-191;  Buchanan's 
presidential  policy  toward,  321-323 

Meyers,  B.  F.,  340 

Michigan,  79,  111 

Miles,  William  Porcher,  370 

Militia,  1814,  24 

Miller,  Jesse,  116 

Milton,  Penna.,  161 

Miner,  Charles,  54,  61 

Minnesota,  294,  310 

Mississippi,  218,  373,  393 

Missouri*  'border  ruffians,"  249-250,  288 

Missouri  Compromise,  3D,  164,  201-202, 
216;  in  1850,  211-214;  extension  of, 
286,  283,  365,  383-385,  392,  400 

Mobile,  Ala.,  319 

Molino  del  Key,  battle  of,  188 

Monroe,  James,  42 

Monroe  Doctrine,  191,  225,  317,  324,  327 

Montgomery,  Ala.,  395 

Montgomery-Crittenden  amendment,  311 

Moorhead,  J.  B.,  157 

Moran,  Benjamin,  242 

Morgan,  Gov.  E.  D.,  365 

Mormons,  325-326;  war  against,  314-317 

Morrill  tariff,  345 


Morris,  Thomas,  111-112 

Morse,  Samuel  F.  B.,  160 

Moscow,  93 

Mosquito  Indians,  225,  231,  318 

Mt.  Vernon,  350 

Muhlenberg,  Henry  A.,  55,  67,  80,  104- 

112,   115,   122,   130-131,    135,   138, 

157-158,  161,  163,  167 
"Mules,"  105-107 

Napier,  Lord,  318 
Nashville,  Convention,  213 
National  debt,  345-346 
National  Hotel  disease,  268-271 
National  Intelligencer,  404,  417,  420 
Native  American  party,  161,  167 
Navy,  U.  S.,  in  Paraguayan  war,  323;  and 
slave  trade,  324;  readiness  in  1861, 
323-324,  356-357 
Negroes,  in  Kansas,  250,  289;  in  Penna., 

364;  and  suffrage,  422 
Nelson,  Smith,  169 

Nesselrode,  Count  Karl  Robert,  83,  86*92 
Neutrality  policy,  147 
Nevin,  John  W.,  424,  427 
"New  Democracy,*'  165-166 
New  England,  on  tariff,  64-65;  constitu- 
tion-makmg  process,  306;  Emigrant 
Aid  Society,  287-288,  297 
Newfoundland,  225 
New  Granada,  191,  321 
New  Jersey,  218,  306,  341 
New  Mexico,  183-185,  187,  212,  214,  286, 

290,400 

New  Orleans,  284,  319 
New  York,  seeks  financial  supremacy,  117; 
Democratic  split  in,  121;  political 
importance  of,  166-167;  in  1848  elec- 
tion, 204;  in  1852  election,  218-220; 
welcomes  Buchanan,  252-253;  and 
Cabinet  claims,  262-263;  factions  in, 
280-281;  panic  of  1857  in,  314;  post 
office  fraud  in,  339 

New  York  Herald,  190,  240,  340,  365,  374 
New  York  Post,  415 
New  York  Stock  Exchange,  298 
New  York  Times,  366 
New  York  Tribune,  374,  415 
New  York-Virginia  alliance,  44 
Nicaragua,  225,  230-233,  318-321 
Nicholas  I,  Czar  of  Russia,  82-83,  85, 

87-89,  91-94 

Nichols,  Roy  F.,  240,  401 
Nicholson  letter,  202,  213 
Nisbet,  Dr.  Charles,  8 
Nominating  convention,  see  Caucus  and 

Conventions 

Nonintervention  policy,  146-147,  191 
Norris,  William,  27 
North  Carolina,  366,  372-374 
North  Carolina  Standard,  405 
Norvall,  John,  45 
Nova  Scotia,  225 

500 


INDEX 


Novgorod,  93 

Nugent,  John,  190 

Nullification  controversy,  97-98,  359 

Oberlin- Wellington  trial,  335 

Old,  James,  28 

"Old  Buck  Cannon,"  253,  404 

"Old  Fogies,"  222 

"Old  Ironsides"  dub,  139 

Old  Stone  Academy  (Mercersburg,  Pa.),  5 

Oregon,  as  issue,  145-146;  negotiation  of 

boundary  of,   178-183;  treaty,  182; 

debate  on,  212;  access  to,  230-231;  at 

Charleston,  1860,  341 
"Original  Jacksonians,"  48 
Orr,  James  L,  310,  312 
Ostend  Manifesto,  239-241 
O'Sullivan,  John  L.,  238 
Ould,  Robert,  403 
Ousley,  Sir  William  Gore,  318-320 
Oxford  County,  Kansas,  298 
Oxford  University,  246 

Pacific  railroad,  259,  263-264 
Packenham,  Richard,  178-182 
Packer,  William  F.,  341 
Palmerston,     Viscount      (Henry     John 

Temple),  96,  189,  243-245 
Palmerston,  Lady,  244 
Panama,  isthmus  of,  191,  331 
Panic,  of  1819,  30;  of  1837,  120;  of  1857, 

298,  314-315 
Paraguay,  191,  323-324 
Paredes,  Gen.  Mariano,  185 

Paricer,  Esther,  100,  103,  124,  155-156, 
207,  210-211,  227,  229,  261,  270, 
273^274,  408,  424425,  427-428 

Parker,  John  A.,  213,  218 

Parliament,  228-229,  244-245 

Parrott,  William  S.,  183484 

Parton,  James,  51 

Party,  see  wider  party  name 

Passmore,  John,  16 

Patronage,  under  Jackson,  66-74;  under 
Van  Buren,  113-114;  under  Polk,  166- 
172;  under  Pierce,  223-224;  under 
Buchanan,  278-284,  330-331 

Patterson,  Robert,  49 

Pauldingjairam,  319 

Paxton,  William  M.,  349 

Payne,  Anna,  156 

Peabody,  George,  227,  236 

Peace,  proposed,  1864,  421 

Peace  convention,  1861,  398-400 

Peck,  Judge  James  H.,  76 

Peel,  Sir  Robert,  181 

Pennington,  William,  338 

Pennsylvania,  abolition  in,  306;  bank  issue 
in,  116-117,  132,  151;  bankruptcy  of, 
138-139;  constitution  of  183B,  108- 
110;  cabinet  claims,  262-263;  im- 
portance of,  166;  and  Lecompton, 

501 


311;  politics  in,  1820,  35-37;  1823, 
46-47f  1824,  48-49;  1828,  60-74; 
1832,  96-98;  1835,  104-107;  1836, 
110;  1838,  122-130;  1840,  132-141; 
1842,  153-154;  1844,  154-158;  1845, 
167-168;  1848,  196-200;  1852,  216- 
218,  223-224;  1856,  259-260,  281; 
I860,  351,  364;  1863,  421;  on  the 
tariff,  64-66,  173,  364 

Pennsylvania  Turnpike,  29 

Peirnsylvanian,  The,  135,  282,  340 

Penrose,  Charles  B.,  135,  265 

People's  party,  351 

Persia,  326 

Personal  liberty  laws,  363-364 

Petition,  right  of,  148-149 

Petriken,  Henry,  115,  152 

Phelps,  Royal,  384-385 

Philadelphia,  1,  13,  20,  30-31,  vote  of,  55; 
financial  supremacy  of,  117;  attack 
on,  119;  voting  frauds,  1838,  129; 
Buchanan's  strength  in,  151;  in  1848 
election,  199-200;  Buchanan's  speech 
to,  1850,  214-215;  in  1852  election, 
217-218;  welcomes  Buchanan,  253; 
Buchanan's  speech  to,  1867,  422 

Philadelphia  Pennsylvania^  340 

Philadelphia  Press,  305,  340,  349 

Philippe,  Louis,  272 

Phillips,  John,  36-37 

Phillips,  Wendell,  259,  364 

Pickens,  Francis  W.,  375-376,  393-395, 
408 

Pierce,  Franklin,  142,  229,  232,  267,  271, 
345-346;  nominated,  220;  as  pres.- 
elect,  221-223;  names  Buchanan  to 
mission,  223-227;  and  Ostend  con- 
ference, 234-241;  and  British  war 
scare,  242-244;  in  1856  election,  245; 
and  Kansas,  250*259,  287;  and 
patronage,  278-280,  284;  and  Mor- 
mons, 316 

Pierce,  Mrs.  Franklin,  275 

Piersol,  Ann,  37 

Pittsburgh,  136,  150,  155,  157,  397,  412, 
418,  Free-Soil  convention  in,  221; 
cannon  order  rescinded,  377-378 

Pittsburgh  Post,  340 

Pleasanton,  Laura,  423 

Pleasanton,  Stephen,  45-46,  81,  208 

Pleasanton,  Mrs.  Stephen,  164 

PHtt,  George,  99,  115,  121,  199,  203-205, 
208,  282-283 

PUtt,  Sophia,  252,  257,  283,  332-333, 
352,409 

Plumer,  Arnold,  193,  196,  205,  340 

Poinsett,  Joel,  38,  114 

Poland,  83,  89-90 

Political  party,  see  under  party  name 

Polk,  James  K.,  74, 142, 154, 196, 202-203, 
218;  nominated,  159-160;  elected 
pres.,  161-162;  Cabinet  of,  163-166; 
patronage  under,  166-172;  foreign 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


policy   of,    175-193;   relations   with 
Buchanan,  192-193 

Polk,  Mrs.  James  K,  161,  252,  275,  340 
Pollock,  James,  248 
Polygamy,  316 
Pope,  John,  16 
Pope  Pius  IX,  191 
Pool  Forge,  28-29 

Popular  sovereignty,  202,  211-216,  286- 
312;  sec  also  Kansas-Nebraska  bill, 
Compromise  of  1850,  and  Stephen  A. 
Douglas 

Poore,  Ben  Perley,  194,  203 
Port  Deposit,  Md.,  423 
Porte,  Ottoman,  203 

Porter,    David    RM    122,    222-223,    454; 
elected  gov.,  129-130;  in  1840  cam* 
paign,  131-137;  re-elected,  138-139; 
inl844  campaign,  152-155,  157,  161; 
in  1852  campaign,  219-220 
Porter,  Maj.  FitzJohn,  354,  358 
Porter,  George  B.,  55,  61,  67,  72,  79 
Porter,  James  M.,  131,  154 
Post  office,  Russian,  84,  91-92;  U.  S.,  157, 

191,284,332,339 
Pottawatomie  Creek,  254 
Presbyterian  Church,  4,  7,  81,  226,  349; 
Buchanan  admitted  to,  427;  bequest 
to,  428 

Presidency,  Buchanan's  rules  for  attain- 
ing,  194-195;  Buchanan's  view  of, 
313;  attacks  on,  337-340 
Press,   in   1856   campaign,   257-259;   in 
Illinois,  301;  on  Mexican  policy,  323; 
on  second  term  for  Buchanan,  340- 
341;  on  coercion,  360;  on  presidential 
message  of  1860,  363;  on  Lincoln's 
inaugural,  405 
Preston,  William  C.,  136 
Prince  of  Wales,  350 
Princeton,  U.  S.  S.,  158 
Princeton  University,  210 
Protestant  vote,  21o 

Public  land,  Buchanan's  views  on,  144- 
145;  as  issue  in  Kansas,  287-288; 
Kansas  grant,  310-311;  Mormon,  316; 
and  Homestead  bill,  345-347 
Pugh,  George  E.,  310 

Quakers,  see  Friends 
Quincy,  Josiah,  51 

Radical  party,  39 
Railroads,  259,  263-264,  335,  3*6 
Raleigh,  N.  C.,  334 
Rameiton,  Ireland,  96 
Randolph,  John,  38,  41,  78,  83 
Rawle,  William,  58 
Raymond,  Henry  J.,  366 
Raymond,  0.  L,  258 
Read,  J.  M.,  159,  170,  214 
Reading,    Penna.,   221;   see  also  H.   A* 
Muhlenberg 


Reciprocal    trade   treaties,    with    Russia, 
158-89;  with  Canada,  225,  231;  with 
France  and  Brazil,  326 
Recognition  policy,  147 
Reconstruction  policy,  422 
Recruiting,  controversy  with  Britain,  244; 

in  Civil  war,  420-421 

Reed,  William  B.,  174,  326,  418-419,  424 
Reeder,  Andrew  H.,  205,  250,  291 
Reigart,  Adam,  85,  253 
Reiiart,  E.  C.,  61-63^ 
Renfrew,  Baron,  see  Prince  of  Wales 
Republican  party,  in  election  of  1856,  256- 
260;  an£  "Bleeding  Kansas,"  288-289, 
292;  and  Lecompton  crisis,  300-312; 
in  Illinois,  328-329;  in  36th  Congress, 
335-337;  and  John  Brown,  336;  and 
Homestead   bill,   346;  problems   of, 
361-364;  resistance  to  compromise, 
1860,  364-367;  factions  in,  365-366; 
and  Crittenden  proposals,  381-387; 
and  peace  convention,  400;  policy  on 
forts,  405;  attacks  Buchanan,  413-416 
Resubmission  principle,  304-311 
"Resurrection  notes,"  123 
Revenue,  federal,  145,  345-346 
Revolution,   in   Cuba,   191-192,   239;  in 
Europe,  191,  235,  241;  in   Kansas, 
287;  secession  as,  362,  391;  in  Spain, 
235,  237;  in  Texas,  146 
Reynolds,  Ellie,  426 
Reynolds,  James  L.,  226-227 
Reynolds,  John,  27,  29,  80,  83,  85,  93, 

141,  193 

Reynolds,  Gen.  John  F.,  426 
Richmond,  Va.,  219 
Ridgely,  Maj.  Charles  Sterret,  18 
Riggs  and  Co.,  377 
Riggs  and  Corcoran,  226 
Right  of  search,  320,  326 
Rio  Grande  River,  177 
Ritchie,  Thomas,  169,  213,  218 
Ritner,  Joseph,  nominated,  70-71;  elected 
gov.,  106-108;  and  bank  issue,  109, 
122;  defeated,  124,129-130 
Rivas  Manifesto,  320 
Rivers  and  harbors  bill,  345 
Rives,  William  C,  138 
Rhine  River,  95 
Robb,  Mrs.  £.  C.,  426;  see  also  Mrs.  £.  C. 

Craig 

Robertson,  Judge  John,  398 
Rogers,  Molton  C.,  27-29, 36, 49-51, 55, 58 
Rogers,  Thomas  J.,  45 
Roflin,  Ledru,  235 
Roosevelt,  Theodore,  317 
Roosevelt,  Mrs.  James  J.,  156,  318 
Ross,  John,  73 
Ross,  Patton,  25 
Rothschild,  James,  226,  235 
Rowan,  John,  16 
Ruffin,  Edmund,  408 
Rush,  Richard,  187 
Russell,  Jane  (of  Ireland),  1 

502 


INDEX 


Russell,  Jane  (of  York  County,  Penna.),  2 

Russell,  Joshua,  1-2 

Russell,  Samuel,  1 

Russell,  Majors  and  Waddell,  357-377 

Russell  Tavern,  2,  5 

Russellville,  Ky.,  15 

Russia,  Buchanan's  mission  to,  78-94; 
commercial  treaty,  82-88;  Baron 
Sacken  affair,  89-91;  maritime  treaty, 
92;  Dallas  as  minister  to,  113;  and 
Alaskan  purchase  plan,  325-326 

Ruatan  Island,  230,  232;  see  also  Bay 
Islands 

Sacken,  Baron,  90-91 

Salary,  see  Income 

St.  James  Episcopal  Church,  32-33 

St.  Petersburg,  80-95 

Sample,  Nathaniel  W.,  80,  93,  200 

Sanders,  George  N.,  235 

San  Juan  de  Nicaragua,  319 

San  Juan  Island,  325 

Santa  Anna,  Antonio  L6pez  de,  183,  185, 
188 

Saratoga,  N.  Y.f  79,  218 

Sardinia,  320 

Sartiges,  Madame,  272 

Saunders,  Romulus  M.,  192 

Schell,  Augustus,  280-281,  418,  423 

Scotch-Irish  vote,  55 

Scott,  Sir  Walter,  210 

Scott,  Lt.  Gen.  Winfield,  187-188,  217, 
325;  in  1852  election,  221;  "Views" 
of,  355-356;  and  southern  forts,  358, 
368,  373;  and  Star  of  the  West,  388- 
389,  394-396;  defense  of  Washington, 
398,  400-401;  advises  Lincoln,  407, 
410-411;  newspaper  controversy  with 
Buchanan,  417-419 

Secession,  threatened  in  1832,  98; 
threatened  in  1850,  212-214;  in- 
fluence of  John  Brown  on,  336-337; 
influence  of  S.  A.  Douglas  on,  351; 
South  claims  Buchanan  for,  352;  of 
South  Carolina,  354-367;  proclaimed, 
375;  of  Gulf  States,  392-393,  395; 
views  of  Buchanan  on,  361-363,  391, 
405;  Scott  on,  355;  Lincoln  on,  405- 
406 

Second  Bank  of  U.  S.,  see  Bank 

"Secret  Six,"  336 

Sectionalism,  Buchanan  on,  147-150;  194- 
195,  211-216,  261-262;  in  35th  Con- 
gress, 331-332  YT  n  , 

Senate,  of  Penna.,  24-26;  of  U.  S.,  de- 
scribed, 103;  Buchanan's  activities 
in,  chaps.  9,  10>  11 

Sergeant,  Join,  38,  42,  46-47,  119 


171,  217,  256-257, 
326,  335,  364-365,  383-385,  389,  401, 
406-407,  412-413 

Shannon,  Wilson,  183,  250,  291 

Sharon,  James,  5 


Sherman,  John,  365 

Sherman,  William,  254 

Shields,  James,  170,  328 

Shippen,  Henry,  17,  27,  120,  127 

Shulze,  John  A.,  46-47,  54-55,  69-70 

Shunk,  Francis  R.,  108,  152,  157-158, 
161-163,  167-170,  196,  198,  205 

Shunk,  James  F.,  419 

Sickles,  Daniel  E.,  226,  229,  236-239, 
241-242,  267,  400 

Sickles,  Mrs.  Daniel,  226 

"Silas  Richards,"  81 

"Silliman  letter,"  297 

Slave  trade,  148-149,  335,  382 

Slavery,  and  expansion,  147-150,  abolition 
of  in  D.  C.,  148;  as  issue  in  1848 
election,  201-202;  and"  1850  Com- 
promise, 2 11-216;  .in  territories,  255- 
256,  261-262;  Dred  Scott  case,  269; 
in  Kansas,  286-312;  in  35th  Congress, 
331-332;  issue  at  Charleston  con- 
vention, 340-344;  see  also  Missouri 
Compromise  and  Popular  Sovereignty 

Slaves,  in  Buchanan  family,  2,  36,  100 

Slaymaker,  Henry,  155 

Slaymaker,  Jasper,  14,  23,  27,  29 

Slidell,  John,  218,  223,  227,  328,  348,  352, 
365,  375,  379,  384,  398;  Mexican 
mission,  184-186;  and  Cuba,  234,  241, 
324-325;  in  election  of  1856, 251, 255; 
considered  for  Cabinet,  263-264;  and 
patronage,  267,  270,  284;  and  1860 
election,  341-342;  break  with  Bu- 
chanan, 372 

Snyder,  Elizabeth  Michael,  101 

Snyder,  John,  101 

Snyder,  Mary  Kittera,  101,  119-120,  124 

Snyder,  Simon,  18,  20,  337 

Softs,  280 

Soldiers'  Home,  274,  334 

Sonora,  321-322 

Soul6,  Pierre,  218,  235-241 

Southard,  S.  L.,  46 

South  Carolina,  and  nullification,  98; 
on  Compromise  of  1850,  213-215; 
threatens  to  secede,  353-354;  Cabinet 
discussion  of,  361-366;  and  the  forts, 
368-381;  and  the  Star  of  the  West,  388- 
390;  Buchanan's  policy  toward*  410- 
411 

South  Carolina  commissioners,  378,  380, 
386-387 

Spain,  192,  234-241,  323-325 

Spaulding,  Rufus  S.,  257 

Sparks,  Jared,  210 

Specie  payments,  132,  315 

Speedwell  Forge,  29  t    e 

Speer,  Elizabeth,  see  Elizabeth  Speer 
Buchanan, 

Speer,  James,  2 

Speer,  John,  4 

Speer,  Mary  Patterson,  2 

Spencer,  Ambrose,  76 

Springfield,  111.,  302,  382-383,  385 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 


Stambaugh,  G.  C,  198 

Stanton,TSdwin,  372,  378-381,  387-390, 

406-407,  412,  415 
Stanton,  Frederick  P.,  291,  302 

393,  395,  411, 


418 
State  Department,  chaps.  13,  ,14;  organi- 

zation of  in  1845,  165-166 
States'  rights,  Buchanan  on,  42-43,  A.  n. 

Stephens  on,  293*294 
Stieditz,  Baron,  86,  91 
Stephens,  Alexander  H.,  293-294 
Sterrett  Gap,  Penna,,  93 

cere.  John  B.»  55.  68 

wddeu..  108-109,  119,  129,  414 
,  James  S.,  59,  68 
Stewart,  Charles,  139-140 
Stoeckl,  Baron  Edouard  de,  272,  325-326, 

392 

Stokes,  W.  A,,  196 
Stony  Batter,  2-4,  426,  428 
Storrs,  Henry  R.,  76 
Story,  Justice  Joseph,  169 
Stowe,  Harriet  Breecher,  221 
Stuart,  Charles  £.,  310 
Sturgeon,  Daniel,  55,  163,  216 
Subtreasury  bill,  120-124,  133 
Sugar  trade,  84 
Sumner,  Charles,  253-254 
Surplus,  see  Revenue 

Supreme  Court,  of  Penna.,  35;  of  U.  S., 
F  24,  74.75,  112,  154,  212,  272;  Bu- 

chanan  offered  seat  on,  169-172,  174; 

on  slavery,  269,  337,  342-343 
"Susquehanna,"  99  . 
Susquehanna  Bridge,  423 
Susquehanna  River,  2,  3,  19 
Sutherland,  Joel  B.,  69,  102 
Swarr,  Hiram,  331,  361,  366,  427 

Tacubaya,  322 

Taggart,  David,  265 

Talleyrand,  Charles  Maurice  de,  96,  272 

Tammany  Hall,  280 

TMMAM*      Ujtmaw   Tt        971 
aney,  ixogcr  o«,  **  t  * 

Tariff,  331,  335,  345,  364;  Buchanan  on, 
63-66,  144-145;  Polk  on,  160-161; 
Russian  reaction  to,  85-86;  of  1824, 
65;  of  1827,  62-64;  of  1828,  65-66;  of 
1842,  167;  of  1846,  172-173;  of  1857, 
314-315 

Taylor,  Zachary,  177,  184,  186-187,  196, 
204-205 

Taylor,  Mrs.  Zachary,  275 

Tecumseh,  15 

Tehuantepec,  188-189 

"Ten  Cent  Jimmy,"  133-134 

Ten  Eyck,  Anthony,  192 

Tennent,  Sir  Emerson,  245 

Tennessee,  218 

Tennyson,  Alfred  Lord,  246 

Territorial  expansion,  chap.  14;  147-150, 
201,  317-326,  340-344 


Territories,  see  by  name 

Texas,  158,  160,  164,  212,  412;  inde- 
pendence,  145-148;  annexation,  159, 
175-177,  183-187;  secedes,  393 

Thayer,  Eli,  365-366 

Thomas,  Philip  F.,  371,  389-390 

Thomas,  T.  W .,  289 

Thompson,  Jacob,  268,  308,  332-334,  368, 
421,  426;  as  Sec'y  of  Interior,  277, 
284;  trip  to  North  Carolina,  372; 
bond  scandal,  357-358,  377-378;  view 
on  forts,  379,  381;  resigns,  389-390 

Thompson,  Mrs.  Jacob,  277,  332-334,  398, 


Tod,  John,  38,  73 

Tom,  John,  2-3 

Toombs,  Robert,  340 

Topeka  government,  250,  256,  287,  297. 
298;  310 

Toucey,  Isaac,  218,  262,  278,  290,  323, 
357-358,  379,  381,  388, 395,  411,  413 

Towanda,  Penna.,  161 

Transcontinental  trade,  326,  331 

Treaty,  Cass-Yrisarri,  318,  320;  Chinese, 
326;  Clayton-Bulwer,  225,  318-320; 
Dallas-Clarendon,  318;  German  com- 
mercial, 191;  of  Guadalupe  Hidalgo, 
190;  Japanese,  348;  McLane-Ocampo, 
322,  323;  Oregon,  182;  Russian,  91- 
92;  Texan,  158;  Webster-Ashburton, 

Trescot,  William  H.,  353-354,  358,  368- 

369,375,378-379 
Trist,  Nicholas  R,  165, 188-191 
Trumbull,  Lyman,  364-365,  373,  385,  401 
Turkey,  83 
Twiggs,  David  E.,  412 
Tyfe  John.  103,  138,  140,  142-143,  155, 

164t  1&,  398400 
Tyler,  Robert,  47,  215,  220-223 
Tyson,  Job  Roberts,  246 

Uncle  Tom's  Cabin,  221 

Union,  as  issue  in  1856  election,  257*260 

Union  Philosophical  Society,  11 

United  Statesf  army,  314-317,  356-357; 

House  of  Representatives,  39-43,  212, 

336-337,  382;  Military  Academy,  398; 

Mint,  12p;  Senate,  103,  142,  147-150, 

190-191;  Treasury,  120 
Upshur,  Abel,  158 
Utah,  212,  214,  286,  290,  315-317 
Uttca  convention,  1848,  205 

Valley  Forge,  2 

Vancouver,  325 

Van  Buren,  John,  209,  238 

Van  Buren,  Martin,  59,  96-97,  103*104, 
166,  209,  273,  275,  278,  384;  on 
tariff  of  1827,  64;  Cabinet  break  of 
1831,  77;  rejected  for  British  mission, 
80;  and  Penna.  vote*  105-110;  pres, 
elect,  113-116;  and  Bank,  117;  sub- 

504 


INDEX 


treasury  plan,  129441;  election  of 

1844,  142,  154-160;  in  1848,  205 
Van  Dyke,  James  C.t  223 
Van  Rensselaer,  Catherine,  47 
Vera  Cruz,  185,  188,  323 
Veto,  143,  346 
Vice-presidency,    Buchanan's    prospects, 

77-79;  Porter  seeks,   152-155;  King 

nominated,    130,   220;   Breckinridge 

nominated,  255 

Vicksburg  convention,  1859,  335 
Victoria,  Queen,  182,  227,  229,  236,  246, 

320,  350  414-415 
Virginia,   204,   213,   218-219,   336,  366, 

398-400 
Vote,  see  Elections 

Wade,  Ben,  365 

Wager,  George  L,  93 

Waficer,  Robert  J.,  166, 187, 189, 208, 218, 
266,  279,  284;  as  Kansas  gov.,  291- 
299;  on  Lecompton  Constitution,  300- 
301,  303,  307-309,  316 

Walker,  William,  319-320 

Walker-McKay  tariff,  172-173 

Wall,  Mary,  425-426 

Wall  Street  plan,  384 

Wanderer,  case  of,  335 

War,  of  1812,  17-18;  Buckshot,  129-130; 
Mexican,  184-188, 201;  Crimean,  229, 
231,  234,  242;  threatens  with  British, 
242-245;  Mormon,  314-317;  Para- 
guayan, 323-324;  Civil,  408 

War  Department,  deficiency  hill  on,  39-41; 
see  also  Army,  J.  B.  Floyd,  and  War 

"War  Hawks/*  15 

Ward,  John,  227 

Ward,  John  E.,  255,  326 

Ward,  Cdr.  J.  H.,  395-396 

Washhurne,  E.  B.,  364,  366 

Washington  Association  of  Lancaster,  17, 
20,  22,  62 

Washington,  Bushrod,  76 

Washington  Constitution,  340,  373-374 

Washington,  D.  C.,  burned,  17;  in  1821, 
38;  slavery  in,  148-149,  212;  con- 
struction in,  349;  Japanese  visit,  348; 
Prince  of  Wales  visit,  350;  defense  of, 
397-398,  400 

Washington,  George,  5,  21-22,  334 

Washington  Globe,  90-91 

Washington,  Lund,  Jr.,  165 

Washington  Union,  264,  281 

Water  witch,  323 

Watterson,  Eliza,  207,  222 

Weaver,  Charles  Edward,  209 

Weaver,  Jessie  Yates,  246;  see  also  Jessie 


Weed,  Thurlow,  245,  364-366,  383-385, 
412-413 

Welsh,  Henry  W.,  226,  424 

Wendell,  Cornelius,  339 

Wescott,  G.  G.,  281 

West,  and  1850  Compromise,  213-214;  as 
new  focus  of  power,  286-287;  and 
Missouri  Compromise,  202;  migration 
to,  346 

West  Point,  41,  398 

West  Virginia,  302 

Wheatland,  5,  220,  227,  252,  258,  313, 
406,  414;  purchase  of,  206-210;  dur- 
ing Buchanan's  presidency,  261-272; 
Buchanan's  return  to,  404;  threat- 
ened, 408,  423;  retirement  at,  424- 
426;  Miss  Lane's  marriage  at,  427; 
Buchanan's  death  at,  427-428;  see 
also  Esther  Parker 

"Wheatland  Club,"  253 

Wheaton,  Henry,  95,  191 

Wheeling,  Va.,  335 

Wheian,  Dr.,  283 

Whig  party,  153-154,  167,  250-251,  262- 
2&,  268,  289,  364;  in  Penna.,  101- 
103;  in  1835,  107-108;  in  1836,  110. 
Ill,  115;  break  with  anti-Masons, 
119,  129;  in  1840,  132-139;  in  1848, 
204-205;  in  1850,  211-216;  in  1852, 
216,  221;  in  1857,  279 

Whig-American  party,  335 

Whipper,  William,  207 

Whistey  Rebellion,  5,  359 

White,  fanny,  226 

White  House,  Buchanan's  routine  at, 
273-275 

White  Swan  Inn,  28,  100,  103 

Whitney,  Asa,  326 

Wickliffe,  Charles,  76,  176 

Wigfall,  Louis  T.,  378 

Wilkins,  William,  45,  55,  73,  96-98,  101- 
104,112 

Wilkinson,  Allen,  254 

Willard's  Hotel,  271 

Williamsport,  Penna.,  153,  161 

Wilmot,  David,  171,  173,  187 

Wilmot  Proviso,  187,  201-202,  212,  217, 
288 

Windsor  Forge,  29 

Winnebago  Indians,  115,  131 

Wirt,  William,  76 


Wehb,  James  Watson,  258 

Webster,  Daniel,  37, 74, 103, 121, 142-144, 
171, 204, 260;  Maine  boundary  treaty, 
145-146;  debates  Buchanan  on  civil 
rights,  148-149 

Webster-Ashburton  treaty,  145-146 

505 


T,  218-219,  226,  263-264, 
267,  329-330,  335-336,  340 

Wiseman,  Cardinal  Nicholas  S.  P.,  245 

Wolf,  George,  69-73,  80,  98-101,  105-108, 
112,  115,  122,  130,  135 

Wolf  Democrats,  69*74 

"Wolves,"  105-107 

Wood,  Fernando,  280 

Woodbury,  Levi,  114,  169,  204 

Woodward,  George  W.,  163,  167,  170-171, 
421 

Woodward  Hill  Cemetery,  427 


JAMES  BUCHANAN 

Woolens  Bill,  64,  80  Yates,  James  Buchanan,  209 

Worcester,  Mass.,  259  Yellow  Springs,  Penna.,  61,  63 

Working-men  of  Philadelphia,  67  "Young  America,"  222,  235,  253,  280 

Wright,  Hendrick  B.,  159  Young^righam,  314-317 

Wright,  Silas,  103,  121,  160,  205  "Young  Democrats,"  163,  176 

Wrightsville,  Penna.,  423  York,  Penna.,  2,  24,  404 

Wurts,  John,  55  Yulee,  David  L,  379 

Yancey,  William  L.T  361 

Yates,  Dr.  Charles  M.,  101,  125,  127,  423 

Yates,  Mrs.  C.  M.,  125,  127,  209;  see  also  Zion,  see  Utah 

Maria  Buchanan  Zuloaga,  Felix,  322 


506