121 932
DENT
"MES
BUCHANAN
A BIOGRAPHY
PHILIP S. KLEIN
PRESIDENT JAMES BUCHANAN
A BIOGRAPHY
THE PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIVERSITY PRESS
UNIVERSITY PARK, PENNSYLVANIA
PRESIDENT
JAMES
BUCHANAN
A BIOGRAPHY
PHILIP SHRIVER KLEIN
Copyright O 1962 by The Pennsylvania State University
Library of Congress Catalog Card No, 62-12623
Printed in the United States of America
Second Printing
To my Father
H. M. J. Klein
CONTENTS
PREFACE xiii
PROLOGUE xvii
1 PENNSYLVANIA PIONEER . 1783-1809 1
Wagons in the Wilderness
Mercersburg
Dickinson College
2 PREFACE TO POLITICS - 1809-1819 13
Country Lawyer
State Assemblyman
Counsel for the Defense
3 BIRTH OF A BACHELOR * 1819-1820 27
Ann Coleman
Flight to Politics
The Seventeenth Congress
4 THE KING MAKER • 18214827 44
The Calhoun Band Wagon
Three Cheers for Old Hickory
The Disputed Election of 1824
Buchanan's Amalgamation Party
Bargain and Sale
5 FAREWELL TO FEDERALISM * 18284832 60
The Buchanan-Jackson Party
The Fight for the Spoils
The Culmination of a Congressional Career
vii
6 RELUCTANT DIPLOMAT . 1831-1833 78
The Politics of the Russian Mission
St. Petersburg
The Conclusion of the Mission
7 DAYS OF DECISION • 1833-1834 95
Return from Russia
Demoralized Democrats
Senator Buchanan
8 THE GENTLEMAN FROM PENNSYLVANIA • 1835-1837 105
The Wolves and the Mules
The Election of 1836
Relations with Van Buren
9 THE ROOT OF ALL EVIL . 1837-1840 116
The Second Bank of the United States
Buchanan and the Subtreasury Bill
The Role of the Rich Uncle
10 WISE AS THE SERPENT * 1838-1841 129
Trial Balloon
The Whigs Attack
A Regular Chinese Puzzle
11 THIS I BELIEVE - 1834-1845 142
The Creed of a Conservative
Foreign Affairs
Expansion and Slavery
12 AN OFFICE NOT TO BE SOUGHT . 1844 151
No Peace for Pennsylvania
The Democratic Nomination of 1844
Red Herring
13 POLITICS UNDER POLK * 1845-1846 163
The State Department
The Perils of the Patronage
The Walker-McKay Tariff
viii
14 CONQUERING A CONTINENT . 1845-1849 175
Texas
Oregon
Mexico
The Life of a Galley Slave
15 STILL HUNT FOR THE PRESIDENCY . 1848 194
Recipe for Political Pie
Disciplining Democrats
Convention Blues
16 THE SAGE OF WHEATLAND . 1849-1852 206
Country Squire
The Compromise of 1850-
The Band Wagon Rolls Again
17 A MISSION FOREDOOMED . 1852-1854 221
Advice and Dissent
The Man Who Was Ordered to Fail
The Court of St. James
The Caribbean Crisis
18 PLAYING THE OLD TROUPER • 1854-1856 234
Cuba— Pearl of the Antilles
An Unthinkable War
Dear Miss Lane
19 THE RIGHT MAN FOR THE TIMES . 1856 248
The Shape of Things to Come
The People's Choice
Conservatives to the Rescue
20 CHARTING THE COURSE . 1856-1857 261
A National and a Conservative Government
Union above Section, Party above Faction
"I do solemnly swear"
21 THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY • 1857 273
Bachelor in the White House
The Captain and the Crew
Payday for Politicians
The Old Chief
22 KANSAS-A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS - 1854-1857 286
Crisis in Kansas
A Governor of National Stature
Popular Sovereignty in Action
23 LECOMPTON-PYRRHIC VICTORY • 1858 300
"By God, Sir, Andrew Jackson Is Dead!"
"I Acknowledge No Master but the Law1*
Drive This Bill "Naked" through the House
24 A FLOOD OF INNOVATIONS . 1857-1860 313
Panic and War
Policeman of the Caribbean
An Extravagant List of Magnificent Schemes
25 CHAOS AT CHARLESTON • 1860 328
A Fatal Feud
The Loneliest Job in the World
Downgrading the Presidency
Democracy Dividing
26 MR. LINCOLN IS ELECTED . 1860 3*15
War on the While House
How to Stop Lincoln
Imperial Visitors
The Election of 1860
27 THE IMPENDING CRISIS . 1860 353
Spotlight on Charleston
Strategy and Tactics
The President Proposes
A Challenge to Mr, Lincoln
28 CURSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS * 1860 368
"We Will Hold the Forts*1
Swiftly Changing Circumstances
The Cabinet Explodes
"Mr. Lincoln, Will You Help?"
29 FORTY DAYS AND FORTY NIGHTS • 1861 388
The Star of the West
What Will Congress Do?
A Temporary Truce
The Final Effort
30 ON THE ROCK OF ST. HELENA . 1861-1868 403
The Old Public Functionary-
President Lincoln's Policy
The Making of a Myth
Mr. Buchanan's Book
Old Man Democrat
The Road Home
NOTES
BIBLIOGRAPHY 473
INDEX 491
PREFACE
The man who elects to play the role of peacemaker may, if he succeeds, be
soon buried in historical oblivion, for it is the perverse tendency of man-
kind to glorify war but to forget those who surmount crises by thought
rather than by threat. A peacemaker who fails, on the other hand, is
likely to receive for his efforts only resounding curses from both the
warring camps. Such was the fate of James Buchanan.
His presidential career was dedicated to peace, but his administra-
tion culminated in a frenzy of secession which was immediately followed by
a civil war of unprecedented fury. These events challenge our interest and
curiosity. Why was Buchanan's peace policy unproductive? To what degree
was its failure attributable to the chief executive, or to the people who
chose him as their representative, or to the existing method of government?
James Buchanan, fifteenth president of the United States, remains
one of the least known statesmen of the American nation. To date the
only useful biography of him is the two-volume documentary work by
George Ticknor Curtis which was published in 1883 and financed by
Buchanan's heirs. Many people remember Buchanan only as the bachelor
in the White House who either caused the Civil War or who ought, some-
how, to have prevented it. It is time, a century after the end of his presi-
dential term, to re-create the life of James Buchanan and to reconsider his
place in the American heritage.
A good many years ago, Professor Frederick L. Schuman, then
at the University of Chicago, put me to work on Buchanan's diplomatic
career. Later, at the University of Pennsylvania, Professors St. George
Leakin Sioussat and Roy F. Nichols guided me in the study of Buchanan's
early activities in politics and encouraged me to project a biography of him.
The present volume, which grew slowly and was completed only after many
interruptions, is the fruit of their suggestion-
After preparing what would have been a more extensive work, I
concluded that it would serve a better purpose to present not an exhaustive
but a concise account of Buchanan's career, with the primary emphasis on
xiii
balance. Thus, while I have tried to treat at least briefly all the episodes
which Buchanan thought important, I could not in a book of this size give
the details of all the activities of a man who served almost continuously in
public office from 1813 to 1861. I have sought, however, to deal with the
subject in a constructively critical spirit; that is, to consider Buchanan's
problems with understanding, but without any desire either to exalt or to
degrade him for the decisions he made. The reader may decide the wisdom
or the error of his ways.
The Buchanan described by his own contemporaries in the years
before 1861 is a person very different from the Buchanan portrayed by
many writers of post-Civil War reminiscences. This biography seeks to
present the former. Buchanan's associates up to the outbreak of the war
judged him by values and standards then prevalent; but the war changed
many of these patterns. Jeremiah S. Black in 1879 complained that the
story of Buchanan's life had "never been honestly told." "Abolition lies,"
he wrote, "will take the place of history, fand none shall see the day when
the cloud will pass away.' " The existence of sharply conflicting opinions
about Buchanan means that the modern biographer must bear a heavy
responsibility to prove his interpretation. Hence, this work will be docu-
mented in detail, mostly by reference to manuscripts and newspapers of
the pre-Civil War era.
The presentation is chronological, and material has been selected
for emphasis chiefly according to Buchanan's own concept of what was
important or trivial. However, I have sketched only the main lines of
Buchanan's extensive participation in foreign affairs; the details may be
found in numerous specialized studies. Also, I have purposely condensed
the treatment of the presidential years because these have been described
very fully by many scholars, notably by Roy F. Nichols in hia Disruption
of American Democracy.
But very little is generally known about the first forty years of
Buchanan's public service. Before he became president, he had already
engaged in as long and energetic a political career *s that of Webster, day,
Calhoun, or Benton. This era of his life, his schooling for the highest office,
has not hitherto been adequately explored. I have tried to explain his role
in party politics, especially Pennsylvania politics, before he came to occupy
the White House. Judgments of Buchanan as president ought to be based
upon knowledge of the man prior to that time. He was, after all, nearly
sixty-seven years old when he was inaugurated.
I have been concerned with his work as a lawyer and with the
influence of his legal experience upon his political thinking. Also, ! have
sought to expose the many ramifications of his personal life, his relationship
with his friends, his management of the complicated family problems which
xiv
engaged much of his attention, and the conduct of his private business
affairs.
I have used, in several parts of this book, some of my writing
published earlier under the titles: The Story of 'JPkeatland (Lancaster, 1936),
Pennsylvania Politics, 1817-1832, a Game without Rules (Philadelphia, 1940),
"James Buchanan and Ann Coleman," Pennsylvania History* XXI (Jan.,
1954), 1-20; "The Inauguration of James Buchanan," Lancaster County
Historical Society Journal, LXI (1957), 145-171; and "James Buchanan at
Dickinson," in John and Mary's College (Carlisle, Pa., 1956), pp. 157-180.
Many people have helped me gather material. The staifs of
libraries, historical societies, and archives have given me friendly guidance
and greatly aided me in my search. I am especially indebted to the Hamilton
Library and Historical Society of Cumberland County, the Lancaster County
Historical Society, the Crawford County Historical Society, the Historical
Society of Berks County, the Northumberland County Historical Society,
the Wyoming Historical and Geological Society, the Historical Society of
York County, the Historical Society of Western Pennsylvania, the Histori-
cal Society of Pennsylvania, the Historical Society of Massachusetts, the
Essex Institute, the Boston Public Library, the Pennsylvania Historical
and Museum Commission, the Library of Congress, the National Archives,
the State Library of Pennsylvania, the Library Company of Philadelphia,
and the Libraries of the University of Pennsylvania, the University of
Georgia, Franklin and Marshall College, Dickinson College, and The
Pennsylvania State University.
Those persons who kindly sent me copies of privately owned
Buchanan manuscripts or permitted me to study their collections have been
named in the bibliography. I wish here to express my appreciation to them,
I am grateful to Lancaster Newspapers, Inc., for providing me with facilities
for a protracted search of their files of early Lancaster newspapers, to the
late E. E. Bausman for permission to use the papers that Buchanan de-
posited with his executors, and to Louis S, May, Esq., for making his office
available for work on these. I would like also to express my thanks to
Horace Montgomery, Malcolm Freiberg, Sylvester K. Stevens, Sanford W.
Higginbotham, Whitfield Bell, Jr., the late John Lowry Ruth, Talbot T.
Speer, William A. Russ, Jr., Asa E. Martin, George D. Harmon, the late
C. H. Martin, H. Hanford Hoskins, Maurice G. Buchanan, Annie Gilchrist,
Henry J. Young, Charles Coleman Sellers, the Reverend E. J. Turner,
Herbert B. Anstaett, John B. Rengier, and J. Bennett Nolan for many and
varied kinds of assistance. In concluding this list, I want to mention
especially the friendly help and encouragement given me by the late Philip
Gerald Auchampaugh, the most assiduous student of Buchanan in this
generation.
It is a further pleasure to acknowledge the useful work of some
former students whose research illuminated many obscure points: Dorothy
Airhart, Leon Davidheiser, Richard F. Fralick, Robert E. Franz, Robert F.
Himmelberg, Dirck Parkin, .Margaret Strobe!, Gerald L Wagner, Guy J.
Way, and Dale G. Wheelwright.
Dean Roy F. Nichols of the University of Pennsylvania, Professor
Norman A. Graebner of the University of Illinois, and Professor-Emeritus
Burke M. Hermann of The Pennsylvania State University rea«l the entire
manuscript and greatly aided me in shortening it and in eliminating errors.
Professors Holman Hamilton of the University of Kentucky and Blwurd J.
Nichols of The Pennsylvania State University also gave me valuable con-
structive criticism. I thank these gentlemen for their interest, their time,
and their help. For those mistakes of fact and judgment which may be
found in a book of this scope, I take entire responsibility.
The Council on Research of The Pennsylvania State University
gave financial support to this study over a number of year*, and the Social
Science Research Center of the University aided me by the purchase of
microfilms. For these marks of confidence I thank them. Finally, true
to tradition, my wife, Dorothy Orr Klein, typed the manuscript in its
entirety through several drafts and participated in all the essential chores
from beginning to end. I acknowledge my greatest debt of gratitude to her,
P. S. K.
Union Mills, Md.
August, 1961
xvi
PROLOGUE
Worry and anxiety marked the faces of the people fleeing eastward along
the Marietta Pike toward Lancaster, Pennsylvania. Constantly they looked
back from their carts piled with boxes and furniture at the faint red glow in
the darkening sky beyond Chestnut Hill, Occasionally small squads of
horsemen came galloping out from town and headed for the Susquehanna
River ten miles to the west. Most of the riders seemed intent on their own
business; but where the pike ran past the spacious grounds of Wheatland,
home of former President Buchanan, some would shout, "You damned
rebel!" or "I hope they burn you out like they did Thad Stevens."
It was Sunday night, June 28, 1863. The latest reports warned of
35,000 Confederate troops at York, a southern army closing in on Harris-
burg, and a skirmish in progress between the rebel advance guard and local
militia at Wrightsville. The river bridge between Columbia and Wrightsville
was said to be aflame, and the glow in the sky seemed to confirm that, but
could Lee's army storm across the shallow Susquehanna somewhere else?
James Buchanan had walked down from his house to the spring
on the lower lawn which bordered the pike, his favorite spot in the evening.
He liked to look over the low stone parapet into the clear water and watch
the moss and white sand swirling gently in the undercurrent. Nowhere
else in the world had he ever found the sunsets more relaxing or the world
more serene than here, under the willow by his Wheatland spring. But not
so this night. Would Wheatland be standing tomorrow, or in ashes?
Would he be alive, or dead, or some kind of ridiculous trophy of this sense-
less, unthinkable war? He did not know, nor did he really care very much.
With the first news of Lee's advance into Pennsylvania, he had
packed Harriet off to Philadelphia and shipped away his most important
papers. He had tried to make Miss Hetty leave, but she said firmly that she
would stay if he did. He had told friends who urged him to get out of the
invasion area that he would remain at Wheatland if it should be surrounded
by a hundred thousand rebels. He and Miss Hetty would see it through
together.
xvii
As he walked through the oak grove and back to the house,
Buchanan felt the crushing certainty that his whole life had been a failure.
Such a thought he rarely admitted to his consciousness, but tonight he
could not banish it. The Columbia Bridge seemed the symbol of the two
great tragedies of his career. Nearly half a century before, while trying to
save that bridge in a law court, he had lost Ann Colt-man. Through all his
later years, eschewing domesticity for politic?, he haw! labored to keep strong
the bridge of understanding and mutual regard between people of the North
and the South. The bridge was burning now, ruined as completely a« his
own life's work.
Exactly fifty years ago, he remembered with nostalgia, he had for
the first time accepted a public office. Since then he had served con-
tinuously in nearly every public capacity, from the lowest to the highest in
steady progression. He had worked unceasingly to strengthen ami to
develop the best political society that man ever invented; but now the South
had broken off half of it, and Lincoln's party seemed intent upon making
the other half into a form of government that would have horrified the
Fathers of the Constitution. Buchanan had once dared to hope that his
presidency might rank in history with that of George Washington; now
the very name Buchanan was one for people to curse and spit at, north
and south.
His father had warned him. Buchanan, with the vivid memory
of early days peculiar to old people, recalled distinctly it letter his father
had written to him at a time of youthful crisis ''Often when people have
the greatest prospect of temporal honor and aggrandisement," the old
gentleman had said, "they are all blasted in a moment by a fatality con*
nected with men and things, and no doubt the design* of Providmre may
be seen very conspicuously in our disappointments."
Buchanan suddenly felt a twinge of chagrin that hix father never
lived to see him rise to fame. In what other twiety, he wondered, could
the child of a poor, orphaned immigrant be able to work his way up to the
first chair of state? Some eighty years before, his father had come to
America. He had trained his son for eminence. ffl am not dfcpmed to
censure you for being ambitious/* he used to tell young Jamcn, and he hail
set a good example. When he had arrived from Ireland, he had little hut
ambition to help him. James wished that his father had told him more about
the family background and the early years in Ireland; but he had not*
After entering the house, Buchanan went directly to the ttudy
and began to write. If the rebels came, they would find him at work—
preparing his story of "Mr, Buchanan's Administration on the Eve of
Rebellion."
xvm
PRESIDENT JAMES BUCHANAN
A BIOGRAPHY
1
PENNSYLVANIA PIONEER • 1783 - 1809
WAGONS IN THE WILDERNESS
James Buchanan paused often in his chores around the Irish farmstead
during the early spring of 1783. For several years he had been thinking
about migrating to America after the Revolutionary War. Now that the
United States had won independence the young man faced the moment of
decision. He had deep roots in the land of his birth. As he looked out
over the fields toward the nearby waters of Lough S willy, he worried about
leaving a green and settled land where the name he bore signified kinship
with a considerable part of the local population. The Clan Buchanan had
been proliferating in Scotland and northern Ireland for seven centuries.
As a baby, he had been brought to the forty-acre farm in County
Donegal called the "Big Airds," the home of his mother's brother, Samuel
Russell. Samuel's daughter, Molly, remembered the cold, rainy day when
her father came riding in with little James bundled up snugly under his
greatcoat. What happened to the parents of James Buchanan remains a
mystery. His father, John Buchanan, had married Jane Russell in 1750,
and the couple had several children before James was born in 1761. There
is some evidence that the mother died about that time and that the father
then disappeared* After 1764, no trace of the parents can be found,1
The Russells had given a good home and a good education to their
adopted nephew. He was twenty-two now, he had a little money of his own,
his uncle had done all that could be expected, and America in the spring of
1783 seemed fabulously inviting. Uncle Samuel had a brother, Joshua
Russell, a tavern owner near Gettysburg, Pennsylvania, who had written
that he could meet the boy in Philadelphia and provide for his immediate
care.2
On July 4, 1783, young Buchanan went aboard the brig Providence
as a paying passenger. We can imagine some of his thoughts and dreams
as he stood at the rail while the lines were cast off and the creaking ship
slowly eased her way out of the channel from Londonderry, but even his
wildest flights of fancy would scarcely have approached the reality of
the future.
Joshua Russell met Buchanan in Philadelphia and returned with
him to the Russell Tavern on the Hunterstown road. During the leisurely
trip on horseback, James acquainted himself with the new country and
with his uncle Joshua. They passed through Valley Forge. Here, flamed
Joshua, he had served as wagonmaster during the grim winter of 17774778,
carrying flour from York to the starving Continental army. In Lancaster
the street names sounded more European than American— King, Qut*enT
Duke, Prince, and Earl; and the names of the nearby townships reminded
him of home— Drumore, Antrim, East Earl, Donegal, Lelterkenny, Manor,
and Coleraine.
The broad Susquehanna, which they crossed by fiatboat at
Wright's Ferry, sparkled in the late summer sunlight, its clear blue shallows
studded with projecting rocks and framed with low wooded hills. West of
the river the settlements grew sparse and the road, rough. Joshua Russell,
having travelled it many times, had at last decided to use his experience on
the pike as the means of an easier livelihood. He had bought a 200-acre
tract in what was then Cumberland Township, York County, and had built
a large stone tavern along the main road west.
James had nearly forgotten Ireland by the time the two came in
sight of Russell's Tavern. His uncle, he found, had become a man of
consequence in this country; he was known by sight all along the road*
His estate comprised not only the inn but outbuilding, quarters for eight
Ne#ro slaves, and fenced fields for scores of cattle. Joshua'* wife Jane
greeted him with all the warmth he might have expected from one bearing
his mother's name,3
Uncle Joshua's nearest neighbor was James Sp^er, * widower with
five children, who farmed a 270*acre tract just up the road. The youngest
of the Speers, Elizabeth, soon stopped at the tavern to meet the «fw nephew
from Ireland, She was sixteen and ahe was pretty. James took her walking,
trading his Irish charm for information about herself, her family, and
Pennsylvania, Elizabeth had been raised in southern Lancaster County,
but her father, a strict Presbyterian, had moved west because of a theologi*
cal disagreement with his pastor* Her mother, Mary Patterson Speer, had
died and Elizabeth now kept house for her father and four older brothers.4
Buchanan soon learned from the passing wagoners of an oppor-
tunity for work at John Tom's little trading post called "the stony batter/'
40 miles west of the Russell Tavern, Here, in Cove Gap, freight wagons
from the East met pack trains from Bedford and John Tom handled the
exchange. The modem pilgrim to this spot, a wild and gloomy gorge
hemmed in on all but the eastern side by towering hills and now far removed
from any center of commercial activity, properly asks what induced an
ambitious young man to go there to seek his fortune.
But Cove Gap was important in 1783. Three parallel ranges of
the Allegheny Mountains barred the way to the West except at this point
where a double gap pierced the two most easterly ridges, leaving Tuscarora
Mountain the only remaining barrier. Travellers from Philadelphia and
Baltimore headed for Cove Gap on their way to Pittsburgh. At Stony
Batter, inside the Gap, roads ended, goods piled up, and John Tom ran his
backwoods store. At times as many as a hundred horses jammed a corral
there, but goods came in by wagon so much faster than they could be
shipped out by pack train that John Tom had to run a warehouse as well as
a trading post.6
After a few years as Tom's helper, Buchanan got the chance to
buy the Stony Batter property. Legend has long had it that this transaction
involved some sharp practice, but the court records show only that on
December 15, 1786, John Tom offered to sell his property to Buchanan for
200 pounds, Pennsylvania currency, promising in the contract that the
land was "free of all Taxes, Debts, dues or demands." A few days after
Buchanan had recorded these terms of sale, however, John Ferguson of
Chambersburg sued Tom for over 500 pounds owing to him and guaranteed
by the property. The December County Court confirmed this judgment
against Tom, and the February Court ordered a sheriff's sale of Stony
Batter, the proceeds to go to Ferguson. Buchanan bought the 100-acre
tract for 142 pounds at the public sale on June 23, 1787.6
After buying Stony Batter, Buchanan rode off to the foot of
South Mountain to claim Elizabeth Speer as his bride. She was just
twenty-one, and he twenty-seven when they married on April 16, 1788.
The young couple moved into Tom's log cabin which, though crude and
rustic by later standards, was quite comfortable for their day. Their
property included several log cabins, some barns and stables, a storehouse
and store building, cleared fields, and an orchard.
The Buchanans7 first child, christened Mary, was born in 1789.
On April 23, 1791, Elizabeth presented her husband with a son whom they
named after his father. Tragedy marred what should otherwise have been
a very happy year: little Mary died. The Presbyterian philosophy of pre-
destination combined with the melancholy prevalence of infant mortality
doubtless softened the blow, but it would have been an unnatural mother
who after this experience did not lavish more than the usual care upon her
surviving child. James Buchanan, from the very first year of his life,
occupied a position of special importance in the household. His status
might appear to have been threatened by the birth of more children, but
the reverse seems closer to the fact. The next five additions to the family
were girls: Jane in 1793, Maria in 1795, Sarah in 1798, Elizabeth in 1800
(who died within a year), and Harriet in 1*12. IV wnnd ivy «»f the
family, born in 1804, died the «HW year. Not until the birth of William
Speer Buchanan in 1805 was thnr another boy in tin* Buchanan homr,
and by that time Janu* was almost rrady to Iravr for rnllrp*. Two nuw
boys were born after lie left home in 1807.
Thus, for the first fourteen years *>f his life, James* Hurhanun, as
the eldest child and only hoy, retained the plare of favoritism into whii-h he-
had been born. He lived in a woman's world at horm\ and until the family
moved to Mereeraburjs he had no playmate* except his Mstrrs. over whom
he exercised an acknowledged authority. While he commanded more than
the usual child's prerogative to be waited upon, ht* afeo had more than the
usual childhood responsibility, and he w»«»n drvt'li»prd a p'«»d opinion of
himself that was daily strengthened by the ifrfmner »>f the
children. When he reached hi* <karly teens, he nui«t have been ob
conceited and self-assured.
MERCERSBURG
Stony Batter proved a poor place to raise a family. The clearing re-
sounded with the turmoil of stamping hc«w*s drunken drovers and ruling
wagoners. Elizabeth Buchanan dittlikwl thin raw and unrwith sorirty
lived in constant fear for the safety of her small children who
through the ceaseless confusion of honte*, wagon*, and »ratfrr*d
The business prospered enough that the father, in 17*1, wan able to
buy the "Dunwoodie Farm/* a *pk*nd«<i 300*acrr tract of rirh Hmwtnne
land and timber located about five milcB cut of the Gap Along the Weat
Conococheague Creek, near the village of Mem*r*lwrg.r
The new farm* pleasant w a retreat, atill did not get th^ family
out of the Gap except at the sacrifice of th<* rton> bwinr m. Therefore in
1796, Buchanan bought a large lot in the renter t>f ^ferrer^burg and built
on it a two-story brick house to serve both at* a hoot? and platT "f butinn*.
Putting his brother-in-law, John Speer, temporarily in char#* «>f Stony
Batter, he moved the family to Mercersfaurg* Hen* life proved! much more
genteel and orderly* The community of several dozen hinuuu w«* alrnont
entirely Scotch. To the Presbyterian Church, one of the dktot in the
State, came the Campbells, Wilsons, McCMlands M^Dtmellt*, Burrs,
Findkya, Welshed and Smitlia. Buchanan gradually tramfrrmi hifl
business into town and soon established himself as one of ihe leading
citizens. For a time he served as local justice of the peace*8
When the family moved to town, James was six; Jane* three; and
Maria, one. Until now Elizabeth Buchanan had been their only teacher.
In spite of her lack of schooling, she had accumulated extensive knowledge
of literature and could quote verbatim and at length from Milton or Pope
or Cowper. She read a good deal of theology, probably more as a kind of
good work than as a matter of philosophical inquiry, but she had sincere
piety which she unconsciously passed on to her children. She was a
good storyteller and loved particularly to dwell on the career of George
Washington, whom she painted in glowing colors which the children never
forgot. She named her tenth child after their hero and George became her
favorite in the latter years of her life. The Buchanans in all probability
met President Washington when he stayed at the Russell Tavern during
the excitement of the Whiskey Rebellion in the winter of 1794-95.°
James attended the Old Stone Academy at Mercersburg where
he studied Greek and Latin, first under the Reverend James R. Sharon,
later with Mr. McConnell, and finally under Dr. Jesse Magaw who had
just completed his studies at Dickinson College and who later married
Buchanan's sister, Maria*
The events of that magic decade in life between the ages of five
and fifteen impress a permanent mark on men. Any biographer would like
to have all the information possible on those creative years; yet seldom is
much to be found.10 Here the tangible evidence is almost always frag-
mentary.
There were some lasting influences, however, which can be seen
without reference to pen and ink records. The little village of Mercersburg
was one of them. It was a homogeneous community where the tempo of
life was leisurely and sedate. Even the scenery conduced to a sense of
peace and calm. The rich farmscape, studded with oak groves and framed
by the beautiful Tuscarora in the West, brought from at least one traveller
of that day the involuntary exclamation: "What a Paradise!" James
Buchanan lived in Mercersburg only ten years, but for the remainder of
his life he tried when he could to duplicate those surroundings. His sym*
pathies were always rural. His summers on Dunwoodie Farm gave him a
personal attachment to that manner of life which he never lost; at his
Wheatland plantation near Lancaster he re-created, in a sense, the scenes
of his boyhood. Manufacturers and their problems he never understood;
cities and their ways made him miserable. He was at heart an agrarian
and never adjusted his thinking to the requirements of a growing in-
dustrial society.
His father's store was also a significant influence. Here he heard,
not entirely understanding but taking it all in nevertheless, many a political
argument. Even as a lad of eight he had no difficulty in knowing that his
father was an uncompromising Washington Federalist; by the time he was
fourteen he had absorbed a good many of the reasons why.
The store also introduced the boy to the problem of keeping
things accounted for and in their proper places. It gave him a daily object
JAMES BUCHANAN
lesson in the practical utility of legible handwriting and of reckoning
figures with absolute accuracy. And it illustrated the way in which money
could grow from an exchange of property. Anyone who has taken the
trouble to look at Buchanan's mathematics notebooks will recognize that
he had a passion for neatness and for figures. Practically every penny that
he gave or received throughout his life he methodically recorded in his
account books. While American Minister to Great Britain, with an estate
already in excess of $200,000, he kept a careful day-by Jay record of the
petty disbursements of his valet, down to the last ha'penny for pins or
tuppence for suspender buttons. He once refused to accept a check for
over 815,000 from his friend Jeremiah S. Black, because there was an error
of ten cents in it. When as president he paid three cents too little for an
order of fine food for the White House and the merchant receipted the bill
as paid in full, he discovered the error and forwarded the three cents,
explaining that he wished not to pay too little or loo much but precisely
what was due.
His parents influenced him strongly. Buchanan, by the time
James was ten, had become one of the leading businessmen of the Mercers-
burg region. His heavy features, his bluff and hearty countenance, and
his watery blue eyes suggested more of canniness than of kindness, and
conveyed a hint of animal force guided by wariness and suspicion of his
fellows. "The more you know of mankind/* he would say, "the more you
will distrust them.*' Though middle age and success wer* softening him
somewhat, he still worked like a man of restless and unsatisfied ambition.
The community considered him a "hard man," If honest, h* was also
unyielding. He gave credit but not extensions of credit, and he never
loaned money except on excessive guarantee* He idolized Jamt% who h<*
long thought would be his only son, but made him firmly toe thts mark m
practicing the idea that hard work and scrupulous attention to business
make wealth. John Tom had practiced neither and had lost his property;
Buchanan practiced both and had supplanted his erstwhile employer*
James both loved and feared his father* The squire assigned
chores to the boy beyond the competence of his years, carefully scrutinized
his performance, and was always more ready with criticism than with praise.
James learned fast and outstripped those his own age in handling assigned
work, but he rarely experienced the joyous sense of a task well done; it
was never done well enough for the squire. The boy hungered for coin-
mendation, but he seldom got it. There was little friendly informality and
playtime between father and son; it was a man to man relationship between
man and boy, full of mutual reliance and respect, but without humor
or comradeship.
Elizabeth Buchanan, much more easygoing and humane than her
husband, became the center of the finer feelings of the household. Modest
PENNSYLVANIA PIONEER • 1783 - 1809
and self-effacing as the father was proud and arrogant, she tried actively to
live the Christian life. Her philosophy was that of the Ten Commandments
and the Sermon on the Mount, applied to every little act within her view.
Her ambition was to get to Heaven; her life a quiet acceptance of every
event as the particular manifestation of God's will directed to her family.
Young James could never quite accept such blind faith or such utter
resignation, yet it impressed him deeply and embedded itself in his inquisi-
tive mind- It was odd: his father was never satisfied, and his mother was
always satisfied; but anyone looking at the daily course of their lives
without knowing their minds might guess exactly the opposite.
Doctor John King, pastor of the Presbyterian Church at Mercers-
burg and a trustee of Dickinson College at Carlisle, also exerted a strong
influence. Some men have that rare combination of qualities which,
unknown to themselves, inspires admiration and imitation in others.
Doctor King had such qualities. He was a fine scholar but so unpretentious,
witty, and human that no one talking with him casually would have sensed
a formidable mind. He had strong convictions of Christian living which
he practiced, without apparent purpose or effort, as a simple matter of
course. He had dignity and poise which he seemed to communicate to
others, rather than making them unhappily conscious of their own de-
ficiencies in manner or address. When he preached, people stayed awake
from sheer personal respect for the man. James Buchanan later wrote
that he had "never known any human being for whom I felt greater
reverence than for Dr. King,'* and he took with him into maturity a vivid
memory of the conduct and the kindly spirit of his Mercersburg pastor.11
DICKINSON COLLEGE
When Buchanan became sixteen, King urged his father to send him to
college. He saw in the boy a dual prospect: the development of a keen
young mind and the addition of a cash customer to the sorely depleted
student rolls of Dickinson College. Though the elder Buchanan really
needed his son in business and around the farm, he knew from his own
limited experience the advantages of education. He worried about the
future security of his growing family. In addition to James he now had
four small daughters and a baby boy, and another child was on the way.
If he should die or suffer a setback in his business, his own children might
find themselves in the same unhappy situation in which he had been reared;
they might have to be distributed around among those who could provide
for them.
Mrs. Buchanan would have been happy to see her son enter the
ministry, but her husband knew better what pursuit would fit the require-
JAMES BUCHANAN
ments. Money could be made in buying and selling property, but one
needed a lawyer to protect it. He wanted his son to prepare for the study
of law. The decision was soon made, arrangements were completed to
enroll James in the junior class of college, and in September, 1807, the
young man and his father saddled their horses for the trip to Carlisle.13
Dickinson College, when Buchanan went there, was slowly
rallying from a series of misfortunes. After twenty years of effort, the
trustees had finally been able to provide the college with "a new and elegant
building." Scarcely six weeks after the dedication, someone carelessly
left a scuttleful of hot ashes in the cellar and burned it to the ground.
Then Dr. Charles Nisbet, who had been headmaster of the college since its
inception, died, and good relations between the students, the faculty, and
the trustees rapidly deteriorated. But the town of Carlisle posed the main
problem. Jeremiah Atwater, the new president, reported that the pleasures
"of high life, of parade, of the table & ball chamber'* appeared to be the
main object of life. "Drunkenness, swearing, lewdness & duelling seemed
to court the day." The students were ''indulging in the dissipation of the
town, none of them living in the college/* It was folly, he concluded, "to
expect that a college could flourish without a different state of things in
the town;" and in a final burst of outrage he exclaimed, "I hope that as
God has visited other states, he will yet visit Pmruykania"1*
These were the circumstances to which James Buchanan referred
when he wrote of Dickinson, many years later, that the enlist wax "in
wretched condition" while he was a student there. When Buchanan
arrived in Carlisle a new college building designed by Benjamin lalrabe
had been almost completed and classes were being held in itt though no
student rooms were ready for occupancy.14
Left on his own for the first lime in his life, Jimmie Burhaiian
began to canvass his prospects in this enticing environment. Of the
forty-two students enrolled, eight were seniors, nineteen were hia matw
in the junior class—- all of them Pennsylvanians but two— and the remaining
fifteen were freshmen or assigned to the Latin School. The college course
did not yet include the sophomore year.
His courses would include Latin, Greek, mathematics, geography,
history, literature, and philosophy. Acting President Davidson wouM be
his teacher in history, geography and philosophy; Professor John Hayes
would be in charge of languages; and Professor McConnick, of mathematics.
These three comprised the entire teaching staff.
Teachers often stamp upon the student mind a more vivid and
lasting impression of their own personality than they do of their subject
matter. Dr. Davidson was a teacher whom the students remembered with
discomfort during their college days but with sentimental attachment
thereafter. He had written a geography text in very poor verso, required
8
PENNSYLVANIA PIONEER • 1783 - 1809
the students to buy it, and demanded that they memorize and recite from
it verbatim. A pedagogue in school and out, formal, solemn and precise,
Dr. Davidson was, nevertheless, a kind and gentle man. He never liked to
take a strong stand, much less to translate it into action, and in dealing with
administrative problems he always tried to avoid solutions by the exercise
of authority. Whenever possible he took the line of least resistance,
seeking to solve problems by a peaceful and pleasant meeting of minds.
In town and on the campus he was known by the appropriate nickname of
"Blessed Peacemaker." Such was the man who, within the year, was to
burn an impression on James Buchanan's callow mind as with a red-
hot poker.18
Buchanan especially liked Professor James McCormick who for
years had lodged and boarded half a dozen students at his home. One boy
recalled that "Mr. McCormick and his wife were as kind to us as if they
had been our parents. He was unwearied in his attentions to us in our
studies, full of patience and good nature, and sometimes seemed quite
distressed when, upon examining a pupil, he found him not quite as learned
as he was himself,"16
Buchanan at first took his work as a student very seriously,
spending most of his time in preparation and trying his best to make a good
impression in the classroom. But it did not take him long to find that the
life of a "grind" was no passport to comradeship among his classmates. To
the contrary, he wrote that "to be a sober, plodding, industrious youth
was to incur the ridicule of the mass of the students." Discovering that
he had little difficulty In keeping up his class assignments, he began to
participate more freely in the extra-curricular activities of the day. "With-
out much natural tendency to become dissipated," he said, "and chiefly
from the example of others, and in order to be considered a clever and
spirited youth, I engaged in every sort of extravagance and mischief."17
From knowledge of his later activities, we may reasonably assume
that he got into drinking bouts sufficiently rowdy to come to the attention
of the faculty; that he smoked cigars contrary to the regulations of the
college; and that he manifested in and out of the classroom a conceit which
proved at first irritating and at length intolerable to his professors. On
the Fourth of July, 1808, which the Dickinson boys celebrated with a
huge dinner at the Glebe Farm, he downed sixteen regular toasts before
starting on the volunteers.18
Despite all the distractions, Buchanan kept up with his class work,
passed his public examinations in August, and concluded the college year
with an excellent academic record. He returned to Mercersburg in the
autumn of 1808, quite satisfied with himself and ready to go back to school
in a few weeks as a senior. On a lovely Sunday morning of September he
was lounging at ease in the sitting room of his home, enjoying those
JAKES BUCHANAN
deliciously languorous sensations of well-being that the gods confer only
upon college students on vacation. His reverie was interrupted by a knock
at the door. His father answered it and returned shortly with a letter
which he tore open with curious interest. As he began to read, his expres-
sion changed to one of pain and anger. Whatever this was, it was un-
commonly bad news. Buchanan senior abruptly thrust the paper at his
son, turned, and left the room without a word.
James looked down at the cause of this sudden shattering of his
thoughts. The letter, in Dr. Davidson's writing, said that Dickinson College
had expelled Buchanan for disorderly conduct. He road it again to pet it
all. Dr. Davidson wrote the elder Buchanan that his son would have bern
dismissed earlier except for the respect which the faculty entertained for
the father. They had tolerated young James to the very limit of endurance
and would not have him back under any circumstances,
James was thunderstruck. Knowing that it would be useless to
take up the matter with his irate father, he turned for advice to his friend
Doctor King, who had just become President of the Board of Trustees of
Dickinson, "He gave me a gentle lecture," »aid Buchanan of the interview.
"He then proposed to me, that if I would pledge on my honor to him to
behave better at college than I had done, he felt such confidence in me that
he would pledge himself to Dr. Davidson on my behalf, and he did not
doubt that I would be permitted to return."1*
While the board minutes disclose no discussion of Buchanan's
case, it is impossible to believe that King did not know in advance that hi*
neighbor and prot^gS from Mercersburg was getting into serious trouble-
It is more than likely that Dr. Davidson's action had been approved in
advance by the board, or may have originated there, as a means of bracing
up the lad by a sound scare which would both tame his spirit and exert *
sobering influence upon the rest of the students,*0
Chastened and with the resolution to be more circumspect in
his conduct, Buchanan returned to Dickinson for the winter term. Un-
fortunately* his strenuous application to work had the result of further
inflating his intellectual vanity— the trait which had been the root of his
difficulty in the first place* Take, for example, the problem in navigation
which he prepared for Professor McCormick, requiring the construction
of an imaginary ship's journal in which the exact latitude and longitude of
the point of destination were to be determined from the daily sailing data*
Buchanan chose for his journal a trip from Boston to Madeira— an island
which he had frequently visited in fancy while quaffing iu> amber produce
in the taverns of Carlisle* After some thirty pages of careful notations of
traverse tables, estimates of drift, and calculations of magnetic variation
and deviation, he found that his final figures on the location of the western
tip of Madeira varied by only one mile from the values given on the printed
10
PENNSYLVANIA PIONEER -1783-1809
geographical charts. The concluding sentence in this problem illustrates
perfectly the mental attitude of the boy. "I therefore conclude," he wrote,
"that my journal was nearly exact, and that the latitude and longitude of
that part of Madeira were well laid down."21
All too soon the year was over. On September 25, 1809, the
faculty presented to the Board of Trustees the names of fifteen young
gentlemen whom they certified "as prepared to receive their Bachelor's
degree, they having gone through the usual courses, and been publicly
examined in the Languages and Sciences." Buchanan's name was on
the list.
In the meantime, however, trouble had been brewing over the
award of senior honors. Two literary societies, the Belles-Lettres and the
Union Philosophical, met weekly in rooms at opposite ends of the fourth
floor of the college building. All the student competition of the day
centered in these societies. Each society chose one candidate for the award
of first honors of the college; the faculty chose the winner, and the other
man automatically received the second honor. The award of first honors
was not only a society victory but also gave to the successful student the
distinction of having first place on the program of senior orations at the
commencement exercises.
The Union Philosophical Society unanimously chose Buchanan
as their candidate for the first honor. But this did not satisfy James. He
thought the Union Philosophical Society so much superior to its rival that
it should, this year, have both the first and the second honor. He therefore
put through a motion that the Union P. should present two candidates,
himself for first place and Robert Laverty for the second.
This was too much for the faculty. They had observed some
improvement in Buchanan's outward conduct but none in his conceit, and
they determined on this occasion to deflate it. They gave the first honor
to the candidate of the Belles-Lettres Society, second honor to Laverty,
and rejected Buchanan entirely on the ground that it would have a bad
effect on the morale of the college to honor a student who had been so
troublesome and had shown so little respect for the professors.
This announcement completely outraged the young man. He
wrote an agitated letter to his father, complaining bitterly of the injustice
and prejudice of the faculty. The first honor should go to the best scholar;
he was the best scholar, as everyone knew and the record showed. He
refused to believe the decision was final and kept his oration ready.
His father replied with a masterful letter of condolence, full of
sly innuendo. He had received his son's letter, he wrote, "though without
date*' (inexcusable carelessness!), and was mortified that James would
receive no honors, especially as this "was done by the professors who are
11
JAMES BUCHANAN
acknowledged by the world to be the best judges of the students under
their care." He hoped that his son had fortitude enough to take the
decision like a man.22 James read this over carefully several times, smart-
ing with embarrassment, but his temper subsided, and he turned to another
polishing of his oration, very appropriately entitled "The Utility of
Philosophy."
In the meantime the Union Philosophical Society was in an
uproar. Laverty withdrew as second honor man and offered the place to
Buchanan. When he refused to consider this, the seniors of the society
proposed that they all refuse to speak at commencement, but Buchanan
also opposed this proposal because he did not wish others to become
involved on his account. At length the faculty itself resolved the impasse
by writing a kind letter to James, stating that he would be expected to
present his oration, though not in the first place on the program.23 By
Commencement Day, September 19, 1809, the air had cleared. Alfred
Foster of Carlisle would deliver the salutatory oration in Latin on "The
Excellence of Knowledge," Buchanan would follow him on the program,
and Laverty would deliver the valedictory.2*
Buchanan wrote in his autobiography that he left college "frrling
but little attachment towards the Alma Mater," Regardless of this senti-
ment he could scarcely have denied that his two years at Dickinson Ml a
lasting imprint upon his life. He learned respect for the law there. Time
was to come when President Buchanan would assert to extremists, both
northern and southern, in a land torn by passion: "I acknowledge no
master but the law." He also learned respect for property, whirh he
translated into a veritable obsession for precision in all his later hunine**
dealings. He developed a respectful altitude toward religion, whirh he
considered a matter of individual belief rather than a formal creed to be
unquestioningly accepted. Finally, one can see Jn his later life the shadow
of his Dickinson teachers. Buchanan the student played ringleader in
making fun of old Dr. Davidson, but Buchanan the man came to resemble
him. The description of Davidson could be applied almost withnut change
to Buchanan in maturity: vain, formal* solemn and precise; yet withal
kindly and gentle, always eager to settle disputes without force and solve
problems by a friendly and pleasant meeting of minds. The
Peacemaker*
12
James Buchanan as a Congressman,
Portrait by Jacob Kicholtz, Smithsonian
Institution.
Above: Ann (Caroline Ooleman, Buchanan's fiancee, who died mvrtrriottaiy in )Hl«*.
Buchanan Foundation. W<*/««': Buchanan's lu'rthplare at Stony mix**r. Tart t»f thi*
log cabin has Iwen preserved at Menrershurg Aradcmy, Mercrrt*bur^ IVn»sylv4ntifj,
Herbert Beard.sUjy.
Above: East King Street, Lancaster, looking toward the square. Buchanan s law office
occupied the second floor of the building in the center of the picture. Lancaster County
Historical Society. Below: A sketch of Wheatland published during the campaign
of 1856, Author's Collection.
\
r«p; Buchanan *s penmantthip and signature. Of Harri«burg he writes, "It i» not a
to vi«it, if your talking apparatus S« out of order.*' Pttwse Library^ Thi» Penn
State Univmity. Bottom left: Prmident Martin Van Buren. Author'* Co
Bottom ri#ht; John Wiftn Forney, Buchanan's energetic and devoted political manager
for twenty years. Library of Congress*
wfew. rr'ft »An7*i
rufitrwt ST«Tttnir »«• Wtanitnrtwn--
A Whig cartoon of 1840 exploits the "Ten Cent Jimmy" lie. Buchanan ^ made to tell
Van Buren to reduce the price of labor while unemployment reigns and children starve.
Lancaster County Historical Society.
the ^'Rock of Disunion.**
A SERVICEABLE GARMENT-
on ncvcmc or A »*c» r ton.
Two anti-Buchanan cartoons of 18.%.
ucn .. Ahwe: The ha.-hri,,r ,-MtMMr *ur»f» >n- "l'|
"Weral coa " with its "Democratic pat.-h.-x" ami Ajfcfc". t\M 'I h«- »•«• »"• ';'» •'"''"'
t new TOtfi" Buchanan KoumU.ti.rn.' /W,mv Th- ftw-wlrrj «•! -lavrr* r.-l. .« ihr
Democratic platform (Buchanan), u.u-,-rtai»ly M.j.p.,rt.-,l by Brnhm. 1'wr. M>| J.m»
Van Buren. Library of Coiigrws.
He WAS elected President by ft ami *wd trickery! unJfr Ms aJ-
ministration the Treasury was robbed 1 duplicity and cowardice
marked bin cortwr! flnnUy, he sold hia country to u b*n«l <tf
Suutheru conspirators, and now lives to be point*! at vich tLe
of scorn, by all true men.' and will go Jowntuh;*
TVm: On«- of th« many forma of abuse of Buchanan during the Civil War—a northern
pnveloii* charging him with Hftlling the country to "a bawl of wmHpiratoro. Smuh»onian
Imtitution (Kalph E. Bftcker Collection). Bottoms Simon Cam«ron, a political mavftnck
who became a powerful en«my of Buchanan after 1848. National Archives (Brady
Collection} >
Top: Pierre Soul« of Louisiana. Library of Congrew. <^-**^£*&$ft*
Ill&ioia. National Archives (Brady OoIIectipii). Botum: William H. S«w«td »f New
York. National Archives (Brady Collection).
Two contemporary drawing* by newspaper artists. Top: East Portico of the Capitol
during Buchanan's inaugural address. Bottom: The inaugural parade, with the model
warship in the foreground. Library of Congress.
Above* Minimum on iwry of Buchanan and lUrrirt bnf by J. Henry Brown. m.
8on£ IwSST /MoK-7 Buchanan precis a guest at a Whit* Him* rm,*.*. l4l»-r>
of Congress.
Ton; Washington, 1853, after the new wings had been added to the Capitol. Between
Pennsylvania Avenue, center, and Maryland Avenue, left, appear the Smithsonian
Institution and the projected Washington Monument. Library of Congress, fffittom:
Th* East Front of the Capitol, 1857, with the new dome under construction. National
Archive*.
Chamber of the United States HOUM , of Reprewimtive.
a« they appeared before being remodelled in the I850'». Library o
Buchanan's Cabinet in mid- 1859. Seated left to right: Jacob Thompson, Interior; John B.
Floyd, War; Isaac Toueey, Navy; Jeremiah S. Black, Attorney General. Standing left
to right: Lewis Cass, State; President Buchanan; Ho well Cobb, Treasury; Joseph Holt,
Postmaster General. Library of Congress (Brady-Hand Collection).
Top: Black who replaced Cum in Pwrmher, 1860. National A™hiv<-* (Brady Odin-nun).
Ctntfr: Vice-President John (I Breckinridge, Lincoln'** opponent in IHc>0. Library of
Congress. Bottom left: Lcwia Cam wh« also wrvrd t» J^rkMinV <itJ»i««. .NiUHtiuI
Archives (Brady Collection). Bottom right; Aaron V. Br(»w«, PcwtiMiii<nr (;««rr*lf wh«>
died in office. National Archives (Brady Collection) ,
. Library
National Ar«hiv«i (Brady CoJlection).
President Buchanan at th« time of ;hr Kama*
crisis, 1858. National Archive** (Brariy Ullectton).
2
PREFACE TO POLITICS * 1809-1819
COUNTRY LAWYER
The most immediate question in James Buchanan's mind when he graduated
from Dickinson College was where to find a good legal preceptor. His
father already had the answer. He had observed James Hopkins of Lancaster
as he tried a case in the Cumberland Valley and had been so impressed by
the performance that he urged James to study with him. Hopkins was a
leader of the Lancaster bar and an attorney of state-wide reputation. James
welcomed the prospect of working at the State Capital, applied to Hopkins
for a preceptorship, and was accepted.1
Lancaster, when Buchanan came there in December, 1809, to
begin his legal career, had for generations claimed the distinction of being
the largest inland town in the United States, though its resident population
scarcely exceeded 6000. It lay ten miles north of Mason and Dixon's line,
ten miles east of the Susquehanna River, and sixty-two miles west of
Philadelphia. The Conestoga Creek which bordered the town had given
its name to the famous freight wagons which plied the broad turnpike to
Philadelphia, the finest road in all America. Lancaster's business rested on
factors of long-range dependability — thrifty, industrious people, fine farms,
a thriving iron industry, and excellent travel facilities. The working popula-
tion was mostly German, but Lancaster boasted an English aristocracy
which rivalled Philadelphia society. Politically the town had been domi-
nated for years by the Federalists.
The courthouse, a small two-story building modelled roughly on
Independence Hall, occupied the square at the intersection of the two
main streets. It was terribly crowded, serving simultaneously as the State
Capitol building and as headquarters for county business. King and Queen
Streets, running off at right angles from the square, were lined by close-set
brick houses, most of them inns. Newly arrived legislators or strangers
like young Buchanan were greeted, when they got off the stage, by a
complete outdoor gallery of tavern signs depicting the crowned heads of
13
JAMES BUCHANAN
all Europe, Indian chiefs, and national heroes; the animal kingdom with
its lions, leopards, stags, bulls, bears, horses, swans and eagles; and symbols
of the crafts, such as the plough, the wheat sheaf, the grape, the cross keys,
the compass and square, or the hickory tree.2
Buchanan found quarters at the Widow Duchman's inn on East
King Street, just a block and one half from the courthouse and nearly across
the street from Hopkins's imposing mansion at the corr-er of East King
and Duke Streets. Within a city block of Buchanan's rooms lived not only
his college chum, Jasper Slaymaker, but also the Governor of Pennsylvania,
the Judge of the District Court, and iron baron Robert Coleman reputed to
be the richest man in Pennsylvania. James Buchanan felt that although he
stood on the bottom rung of the ladder, it was the right ladder.
After a month he wrote home enthusiastically about his work
under Hopkins whom he described as courteous, instructive and interested
in his pupils. His father advised him to cultivate his preceptor's good
opinion and told him to tend strictly to business and "not be carried off by
the many amusements & temptations that are prevalent in that place."
"Go on with your studies/* he said, "and endeavor to be Eminent in
your profession."3
The pressure which the father put on his son to make good pro-
ceeded not entirely from paternal pride. He really wanted James to prepare
himself so that he might better help support his brothers and sisters, in
case of necessity. Four more sons had arrived in the household within the
past seven years, three of whom survived.4 The Mercersburg family now
consisted of four girls and three boys, the latter between the ages of one and
six. "Your company and assistance in this family are wanted very much,
and desired," he wrote to James when Edward Young was born, "but I am
willing to forego all these advantages in order that you may have an oppor-
tunity of ... preparing yourself - . . in the profession you have chosen."
A little later he remarked, "I hope the privation I have suffered & will
suffer in giving you a good education will be compensated by the station Jn
society you will occupy."5
James worked hard. "I determined/' he said, "that if severe
application would make me a good lawyer, I should not fail in this particular*
* . . I studied law, and nothing but law/* Day and night he read and
straggled to extract the full meaning from pages of print and to incorporate
it accurately in his mind. For relaxation he got into the habit of strolling
out to the edge of town in the evening where, while watching the sun
descend below the gentle slope of Chestnut Hill, he tried to put into spoken
words the material he had studied during the day.
At length, in 1812, the term of his preceptorship drew near its
end and he had to consider what to do next. Lancaster seemed a logical
place to "hang out his shingle," but there were some drawbacks* The
14
PREFACE TO POLHICS • 1809 - 1819
State Capitol was being shifted to Harrisburg, leaving Lancaster crowded
with expert lawyers facing reduced opportunities. There would be stiff
competition.
About this time the name Kentucky began to exercise a magnetic
charm on Buchanan. The West had recently come into the news. The
first Mississippi River steamboat had just opened a new two-way trade
between Pittsburgh and New Orleans; Harrison had defeated Tecumseh at
Tippecanoe; Henry Clay, Felix Grundy and other western "War Hawks"
in Congress clamored for war against England- But beyond the promise of
adventure, Buchanan saw a practical opportunity in the West. His father
was part owner of a tract of some 3600 acres of Kentucky land. Its title
had been recently challenged. James wanted to go to the site and handle
the case before the court at Elizabethtown.
The father, not eager to hazard his property to the efforts of his
inexperienced son, tried for two months to discourage the venture. A new
country would be a poor place for a lawyer, he wrote to James. "He may
obtain land, but that is all. Were I commencing the practice of law &
knew I had talents & attention, I would open an office in a county where
both suits and money were plenty & although I might have many difficulties
in establishing myself there, yet I would have no fears of not coming in
for a share of the business finally. Lancaster is such a place as I describe,
& when you first went to the place, that was one of my objects, that you
might have an opportunity of settling there."6 When James replied that
he wanted to take the trip for his health, as a vacation, the elder Buchanan
warned him that it would be nonsense to expect such a trip to benefit the
health. It would be more likely to ruin it. " I speak from experience,"
he said.7
Nevertheless, James Buchanan bought a horae and started for
Kentucky. He stopped on the way to see the family, made the acquaintance
of his new brother, Edward, and learned with delight that his favorite
sister, Jane, uow nineteen, had become engaged to Elliot Tole Lane of
Mercersburg, and that sister Maria was in love with his old school teacher,
Jesse Magaw. He got the details of the land litigation, the permission of his
father to act as his attorney, and resumed his journey. As he jogged along,
his pack trunk scuffing gently at the back of his saddle, he dreamed of the
impact he would make in the shirt-sleeve courts of that wild new country.
Buchanan spent the summer in Kentucky, most of it at Elizabeth-
town, but he made side trips to Bowling Green and Russellville. He very
probably encountered Thomas Lincoln who lived near Elizabethtown and
was on the court docket for some land-title cases at this time. His son,
Abraham Lincoln, was three years old. The Buchanan case, which had
been in litigation since 1803, had become so entangled that any hope of a
quick solution soon faded. Buchanan reported of a trip to court: "I went
15
JAMES BUCHANAN
there full of the big impression I was to make— and whom do you suppose
I met? There was Henry Clay! John Pope, John Allan, John Rowan,
Felix Grundy— why, sir, they were giants, and I was only a pigmy. Next
day I packed my trunk and came back to Lancaster— that was big enough
for me. Kentucky was too big." Kentucky's Ben Hardin reported that
Buchanan told him that he had expected to be a great man there, but that
"every lawyer I met at the bar was my equal, and more than half of them
my superiors, so I gave it up."8
These reminiscences, though not quite accurate, emphasized the
main reason for Buchanan's decision. He left Kentucky convinced that if
the professional competition there would be as keen as in Lancaster, there
was a great deal more wealth in Lancaster, and he might best put his wits to
work where the fees were highest. After turning the land case over to
Ben Hardin, he set out for home.
James was back in Lancaster by November 17, 1812, in time to be
admitted to the bar along with Jasper Slaymaker and two other young
lawyers. Wishing to remain there, but uncertain whether he would be
able to maintain an office, he appealed to Hopkins for advice. His preceptor
suggested that he apply to Attorney General Jared Ingersoll for the post of
deputy prosecutor (now district attorney) in newly created Lebanon
County. "I am a young man just about selecting a place of future settle-
ment," he wrote to liigersoll, "and your determination will have a con-
siderable influence on my choice."9 On February 20, 1813, Buchanan
started his practice in Lancaster, inserting a notice in the papers that he
would maintain his office on East King Street "two doors above Mr.
Duchman's Inn, and nearly opposite to the Fanner's Bank."10 A month
later Buchanan learned that he had been appointed prosecutor for Lebanon
County.11 That, at least, would take care of the office rent. His father was
pleased, but tempered his congratulations with the hope that James would
act "with compassion & humanity for the poor creatures against whom
you may be engaged.**12
Buchanan's first two years of practice barely kept him going; he
made $938 during 1813 and $1,096 the following year.13 The odds and
ends of practice which were the usual lot of a young attorney came his way
and he gratefully took whatever business the older lawyers referred to him
and handled it promptly.14 As he approached his twenty-third birthday he
bought, in partnership with the town's jovial 400-pound prothonotary,
John Passmore, the small tavern on East King Street which the two of them
already used for offices and living quarters* Buchanan's father must have
assisted him in this deal, or else he had a good local credit rating, for he
paid $4000 in cash on the property in 1814 and promised to pay another
$1000 within a year. He visited his old home occasionally during this
period. While there he talked politics with his father* Loyal Federalists
16
PREFACE TO POLITICS • 1809 - 1819
both, they deplored the attacks of the Democratic Legislature on Federalist
judges, and condemned the government for its mismanagement of the war
with England.15 In 1813 Jane Buchanan married Elliot Lane, and James
was probably in Mercersburg for the wedding ceremony.
STATE ASSEMBLYMAN
On August 24, 1814, the British army routed the Americans at Bladensburg,
marched on Washington, and burned the public buildings almost before
their occupants had time to flee. That same day the Lancaster Federalists
met to nominate their slate for the fall elections. In due course delegate
Peter .Diller arose to nominate James Buchanan as the district's choice
for State Assemblyman.
At that time he was serving as president of the local Washington
Association— a young Federalist organization. He had aroused enthusiasm
in the party by his recent speech at the Fourth of July barbecue in which
he had roundly lambasted Madison for bungling the war effort and called
on Federalists to pitch into the fighting to force an honorable peace as
quickly as possible.16 The Federal party, though it had controlled Lancaster
since 1789, had long been the minority party of the state and was growing
steadily weaker. Its older leaders welcomed the addition to their ranks of
a popular and forceful young man. Buchanan, on his part, wanted to enter
politics and hoped that campaign publicity and service in Harrisburg would
improve his law business. There was no chance of his losing the election;
in Lancaster, the Federalist candidate always won. His father, still never
willing to admit that his son had done just the right thing, told him he had
made a mistake and would do better to become a leader of the bar than to
be "partly a politician and partly a lawyer."17
At the very moment that Buchanan committed himself to politics,
his first political duty bore down swiftly and unexpectedly upon him.
When news of the burning of Washington reached Lancaster the morning
after his nomination, he knew he would have to go to war if he expected
to get any votes. The local Federalist party deplored the war, but its
members would defend their country.
At a general mobilization in Lancaster on August 25, Buchanan
made a speech and was among the first to register his name as a volunteer.
Two days later a company of young men of the borough, led by Henry
Shippen, Esq., "mounted their horses, armed with sword, pistols &c.,
and marched to Baltimore, without waiting. for formal orders, to aid in
defending that place."18
Shippen's Company, composed of about two dozen of the "most
respectable young gentlemen of Lancaster," had no official status as part
either of the militia or the regular army; it was simply a group of private
17
JAMES BUCHANAN
volunteers. After arriving at Baltimore, the "Lancaster County Dragoons/'
as the troop called itself, offered their services to Major Charles Sterret
Ridgely of the Third Cavalry Regiment. Major Ridgely called for ten
volunteers to go on a secret mission; Buchanan joined this squad and all
proceeded four miles beyond the city, full of excitement in the belief they
were on a dangerous mission — until they opened their sealed orders at
the designated point.
They were to go to Ellicott's Mills and seize about sixty good
horses from the residents of the vicinity, "always preferring to take them
from Quakers." It was an assignment not particularly gratifying to the
"young gentlemen of Lancaster," all of whom had their own mounts and
had n^ver until now seriously considered horse-stealing. A steady deluge
of rain added to their discomfort. That night Buchanan had the ill-luck
to draw a bunk space next to the tent wall and got thoroughly soaked.
They encountered no Redcoats, but by the time they had accomplished
their mission the Marylanders of the locality had become nearly as serious
an enemy as the British. Nonetheless, they seized the horses, rejecting
"several pairs for ladies who were sick and required them" and paraded
down Market Street past Gadsby's Hotel in Baltimore where the rest of the
Lancaster volunteers gave them a burlesque salute amid guffawing laughter.
In a few days the British withdrew from the city and Major Ridgrfy dis-
charged Captain Shippen's Dragoons.19 James wrote to his parents that
night to relieve the anxiety he knew they must feel after reading the news-
paper accounts of the British assault on Baltimore.20
Only a month remained until election day. The Pennsylvania
Federalists now began for the first time in years to have some hopes of
regaining their power. Pennsylvania's Democratic governor, Simon
Snyder, although still popular with his party, had been losing strength
because of the defection of disappointed office seekers. Furthermore, the
public linked his name with the failures of the national government to
wage effective war.
Snyder was ie-elected, but the Federalists cut his majority to half
of what it had been in 1811. All through the state there was increasing
support for Federalist tickets. Buchanan was elected by a poll which
delighted him, for he led the ticket in the borough and ran third highest
among sixteen Federalist candidates in the full county vote-21
In the midst of his jubilation, James received a sobering note
from his father, full of doubts, cautions, and admonitions. "Perhaps your
going to the Legislature may be to your advantage & it may be otherwise,**
wrote his parent, "I hope you will make the best of the thing now . . . ,
I ain fearful of this taking you from the bar at a time when perhaps you
may feel it most."22
18
PREFACE TO POLITICS • 1809 - 1819
The stage rode smoothly from Lancaster to Middletown, but in
the last ten miles of the trip to Harrisburg it jolted fearfully over an ancient
path which no repair crew had ever touched. Most travellers passed this
short distance on horseback rather than risk an upset. Buchanan thought
that Harrisburg looked a little less like a sleepy country village since the
Legislature had moved there in October, 1812. Front Street, shaded by a
row of stately poplars regularly spaced, opened on the Susquehanna River
to the west and was bordered by a wide paved footwalk to the east, a favorite
promenade in summer but now swept with early December snow. The
river bank, about twenty feet above the water level, afforded a fine view of
the upriver rapids and the long ridge of the Blue Mountains to the north-
west. The ferry landing which had been the town's origin was right next
to the great stone mansion of founder John Harris, and a little below it
construction work progressed on a line of stone piers stretching toward
the opposite shore. Theodore Burr, the famous bridge architect, had begun
his stupendous project of a two-span covered wooden bridge over half a
mile long. If he succeeded, Harrisburg would boom.
With a flourish, the stage drew up in front of the Golden Eagle
Inn on Market Square. The driver, as he unloaded the baggage, growled
that they would have to travel lighter— there was a fourteen-pound limit
per passenger. The courthouse, then serving as State Capitol, stood at the
head of the square about three blocks from the river and overlooking it
down the row of brick homes and business houses which faced the covered
market stall in the center. The temporary capitol building was a brick
structure, two stories high. It had two small wings and a semirotunda in
front, the whole surmounted by a circular wooden cupola containing a bell.
On its small roof was mounted a vane of copper gilt, representing an Indian
chief as large as life, with a bow in his left hand and a tomahawk in his right.
The Dauphin County courtroom on the first floor which served as the
chamber of the Assembly was scarcely large enough to accommodate the
hundred legislators. The thirty Senators were more comfortably housed
in a second-floor room nearly the same size.
The functions of a Pennsylvania Assemblyman, Buchanan dis-
covered, were pettier than he had first imagined. Everyone had half a
dozen local petitions and a few paltry private bills on the clerk's file. The
court dockets were so jammed, judicial procedure so slow, and decisions so
partisan (for Federalists monopolized the bench and bar) that many Demo-
crats appealed directly to their friends in the Assembly for private legislative
relief rather than depend upon judicial process. Buchanan had little such
business to present, but he did press for the incorporation of new textile
manufacturing plants in Lancaster, offered petitions to place the property
of drunkards in trusteeship, recommended a reduction of the tax on
whiskey, and urged the creation of new judicial districts.23 Through
19
JAMES BUCHANAN
Hopkins's influence he was immediately made a member of the six-man
Judiciary Committee of the House. After hearing a few speeches he made
up his mind to avoid impromptu expressions on the floor and to speak only
after thorough preparation.24
His first formal speech grew out of the national crisis on military
man power. Although Congress had rejected a conscription bill, the
Pennsylvania Senate had adopted such a measure because Philadelphia
feared a British attack and the Federal Government seemed helpless to
defend the port. The Pennsylvania bill divided all draftees into groups of
twenty-two, from each of which one man should be called to service. The
other twenty-one then had to make up a $200 bounty purse for the con-
script. The legislators who opposed this scheme proposed simply to raise
six more regiments of volunteers at state expense.
On February 1, 1815 Buchanan spoke at length against the con*
scription plan and in favor of a volunteer bill which had been introduced
in the House. This maiden speech proved more significant than Buchanan
realized at the time. He attacked special privilege in the city of Philadelphia,
championed the interests of the West against the East, defended the poor
against abuse by the rich, and balanced the wishes of the State against the
different interest of a minority from Philadelphia. His speech was good
debate, but it was not good politics. So far from Federalist doctrine did it
stray that William Beale, Democratic Senator from Mifflin County, urged
Buchanan to change his party at once and join the Democrats, asserting
that he would have no need to change his principles.25 Buchanan encoun-
tered such political repercussions from his maiden effort that when the
volunteer bill came up for final vote in the House, he was "necessarily
absent," Fortunately for him, the whole issue terminated when, on
February 17, Governor Snyder announced the news of peace with England*
For the remainder of his term, James Buchanan kept quiet. His
speech had warned him of the danger of proclaiming private opinions from
a political rostrum and had provoked such resentment that he doubted the
wisdom of trying for renomination. His father advised him to go ahead;
to put a law student in his office and get enough legislative experience to
be ready, later, for Congress. As to opposition, he would have to expect
that to develop in the same ratio that his fortunes improved; he had better
depend upon Providence to shield him "from the shafts of malicious
enemies."26
Thus admonished and encouraged, James decided to run again
in 1815. In order to re-establish himself in the confidence of his party be
planned to demonstrate the soundness of his Federalism on the Fourth of
July in an oration at the big rally of Lancaster's Washington Association.
He would make it a real political speech, a partisan harangue, a "rouser"
that would clear up any doubt whether he was a Democrat or a Federalist.
20
PREFACE TO POLITICS • 1809 - 1819
Early in the afternoon the crowd began to assemble in the front
of the courthouse to hear young Jimmie. He was already a familiar figure
about town, but a newcomer to the hustings. Lawyers' Row knew him as a
conscientious, tireless plugger who was not more intelligent, but usually
more painstaking and better prepared, than his colleagues. The tavern
fraternity found him, in regular attendance at meetings, affable, easygoing,
always equipped with a black cigar and ready for another glass of Madeira.
Parlor society had discovered him, and the local Masons had their eye
on him.
His distinguished appearance, emphasized by a peculiar man-
nerism, singled him out for attention in any group. A tall, broad-shouldered
young man with wavy blond hair, blue eyes, and fine features, he had
developed an odd posture. He had a defect in one eye. In order to com-
pensate for it he tilted his head slightly forward and sideways in a perpetual
attitude of courteous deference and attentive interest. The mere appearance
conveyed so definite an impression of assent and approbation that many
people, on early acquaintance, sincerely believed that they had completely
captivated James Buchanan and reciprocated by attentions to him which
he attributed to traits more complimentary to him than a wry neck. Partly
because of this physical peculiarity, Buchanan made a good "first impres-
sion" on almost everybody he met. Difficulties often arose when those
who thought they were close to him realized that they had been reading his
looks rather than his mind, and such persons would break off with a sense
of personal injury.
As he stood on the courthouse steps facing his friends, Assembly-
man James Buchanan looked the part of distinction, and he knew it. With
sonorous voice he now set out to prove his Federalism. This, he said, was
a celebration of men who had "burst asunder the chains that bound them
to Great Britain" and had "presented to the world a spectacle of wisdom
and firmness which has never been excelled." On this foundation was
built the glorious Constitution of the United States. But there was a
powerful faction in the nation which had bitterly opposed the Constitution.
"The individuals of which it was composed were called anti-Federalists,
and were the founders of the Democratic party." Having failed to destroy
the Constitution, these men transferred their hatred of it to the glorious
Administration of General Washington, reviling and cursing both the man
and his measures. Who were these dark and malignant characters?
"Demagogues," said James Buchanan, "Factionaries," "friends of the
French," men of the "blackest ingratitude" who were obsessed by "diabolic
passions," Such were the leaders of Democracy.
And how did the factiomsts use the power they had won by foul
means in 1800? They began with the destruction of the navy. Then they
21
JAMES BUCHANAN
declared war on commerce; not satisfied with depriving it of naval protec-
tion, they proceeded to annihilate it by embargo. Having wrecked business
until "the stillness of death pervaded every street,'* they proceeded system-
atically to wreck credit by destroying the Bank of the United States and
by stopping national taxation.
Then, having totally prostrated the national economy, they
declared war. Why? There was no invasion. There was no longer a
serious question of rights on the high seas; few ships were out, the mer-
chants made no protest, and England was already offering to adjust this
issue. What then was the cause? It was, said Buchanan, "the over-weaning
partiality of the Democratic party for France." Napoleon Bonaparte
dictated Democratic party policy, and James Madison, in following this
direction, "preferred his private interest to the public good."
And what were the results? The country was wholly unprepared
for war. Without any remaining basis for taxation, and now afraid to try
new taxes, the government borrowed at ruinous rates until it was on the
verge of bankruptcy. Instead of conquering, the nation had itself been
invaded. "The very capital of the United States, the lofty temple of liberty,
which was reared and consecrated by Washington, has been abandoned
to its fate by his degenerate successor, who ought to have shed his last
drop of blood in its defence/'27
The throng in the square was getting excited; young Jimmie was
giving them more than they had bargained for. "Thanks to Heaven,"
Buchanan went on, "that we have obtained a peace, bad and disgraceful as
it is; otherwise, the beautiful structure of the federal government, supported
by the same feeble hands, might have sunk, like the capitol into ruins,"
The true policy of the future would be to abandon forever the wild project*
of that "philosophic visionary/* Thomas Jefferson, and to "turn out of
power those weak and wicked men* who have abandoned the political path
marked out for this country by Washington."28
The speech was a political success. The Washington Association
ordered a large number of copies to be printed for state distribution,, and
the local Federalists within a month had named Buchanan to k*d again
their ticket of Assemblymen. But the attack provoked a hatred of Buchanan
among the Jeffersonian Democrats of Lancaster County which wa* destined
to endure from that moment to the day of his death- Even James's rabidly
pro-Federalist father thought his attack was too severe and wouW hurt
the feelings of his friends of the opposite party.50
Buchanan's speech on the theme "turn the rascal* out'* put him
in tune with the national political movement to rejuvenate the Federalist
party by alliance with disgruntled conservative Democrats. This combina*
tion would soon promote DeWitt Clinton for the presidency and a little
later would take control of Pennsylvania.30
22
PREFACE TO POLITICS • 1809 - 1819
COUNSEL FOR THE DEFENSE
On his return to Harrisburg in December, 1815, Buchanan again sat with
the Judiciary Committee and was named also to the Committee on Banks.31
Most of the session was devoted to banking problems which had grown out
of the chartering, the year before, of 41 new state banks, few of which
could now redeem their note issues. A majority of the Committee on Banks
recommended that the state, by law, should require banks to redeem their
notes in specie by a given date or forfeit their charters. Buchanan prepared
a minority report urging the legislature to stay out of the matter until the
banks had been given more time to solve their own problems. With the
same laissez-faire point of view, Buchanan opposed the recharter of the
United States Bank which was then under hot discussion in Washington.
Although the Assembly took no action on the Bank proposals, the
discussions bothered Buchanan and made him reconsider his political
ideas. The impetuous, unstable and mob-produced actions of the radical
Democracy he found revolting, sometimes frightening. Control of business
and politics by a closed corporation of the wealthy he could not accept as
just. He had respect for the will of the majority, but he had an equal
respect for individual rights in property. He believed that the greatest
glory of the American Constitution was that it embodied this dual concept;
that it drew a careful balance between the demands of persons and of
property. But no existing political party accepted both of these doctrines.
With his ideas, Buchanan was not sure in which party he belonged.
Nor was he certain, at the end of the session, what to do next.
The Lancaster Federalists believed in passing around the loaves and fishes;
one term in the Assembly was usual, two the maximum tolerated by local
tradition. His friend Jasper Slaymaker was next in line for the job. He
was not even sure that he wanted to return to Lancaster, for it had been
less cordial to him since he had entered politics. He had angered some
leading Federalists by his militia biU speech and infuriated practically all of
the Democrats by his Fourth of July oration. For a time he dallied with the
thought of going to Philadelphia to practice, but his father counselled him
against making rash and hasty changes.32 After struggling with the decision
until he got an attack of bilious fever, which generally accompanied his
emotional crises, he determined to go back to Lancaster and try to improve
his practice. He was still making only $2000 a year and had notes to meet.83
During the next four years, therefore, Buchanan plunged into
"unremitting application to the practice of the law/' His cases covered the
whole range of a country lawyer's practice. He engaged in criminal and
civil suits, tried cases, consulted, settled estates, served notices, arranged
property transfers, drew up articles of incorporation, unsnarled tax con-
troversies, and, in short, took up any litigation or question of legal opinion
23
JAMES BUCHANAN
which came his way. Although most of his business was transacted in the
Lancaster courts, he frequently appeared before the bench in York,
Dauphin, Lebanon, and Cumberland Counties.34
Slowly, by dint of sheer mental labor and the application of time
to his business, Buchanan built up a reputation for thoroughness and
competence which brought more and more property work to his desk. His
arguments before court and addresses to juries were anything but brilliant
or spell-binding, but they achieved their object by sheer mass of data tightly
knit by logic. Some called him a hair-splitter. He did not, however.
emphasize detail at the expense of the main point. He carried argument
into areas so minute they were boring, but he never lost connection with
the basic issue. This habit was to affect his political speeches, from which
it is extremely difficult to extract any sentence without materially damaging
a train of thought. He was long-winded, but in planned papers never re-
petitive. A Lancaster judge wrote of him: "he was cut out by nature for a
great lawyer, and I think was spoiled by fortune when she made him
a s
.
Buchanan was at this time called to a case which tremendously
enhanced his legal reputation. The Democrats in the Pennsylvania
Legislature for years had been warring upon the Federalist judges of the
state by bringing indiscriminate charges against them. Tho root of the
problem was political, stemming from the efforts of the Jffferson Adminis-
tration in the early 1800's to get rid of Federalists in the courts. Judges,
both state and federal, held life tenure in those days, subject to "pood
behavior," but were removable for cause by impeachment. The Pennsyl-
vania Democrats had been gunning for Judge Walter Franklin for years;
now they thought they had him.
After the Pennsylvania militia had ham mustered into Federal
service in July, 1814, a Lancastrian named Houston refused to serve. A
state militia court-martial convicted and fined him. Houston appealed the
case through the courts, and Judge Franklin gave him a favorable verdict,
on the ground that state authority ended when the militia entered the
national army. The Supreme Court of the United States reversed this
decision, and the Democratic legislature impeached Franklin for rendering
a faulty opinion.36
Franklin selected Buchanan to handle his defense for many
reasons. He had been outspoken against the judge-hunting activities of
the Legislature, he was a personal friend and neighbor of Franklin, he had
had recent experience in the Assembly, and he would certainly spare no
effort in preparing his argument. It was nonetheless remarkable that the
sole responsibility was handed to a twenty-five*year-old attorney.
Buchanan argued that if a legislature destroyed a judge merely
because it objected to the legal opinion he expressed in a trial, without any
24
PREFACE TO POLITICS • 1809 - 1819
hint of crime or misdemeanor, it equally destroyed the constitution which
established the legislature and judiciary as independent and co-ordinate
branches of government. A witness in the Senate wrote that the argument
"was conducted with great ingenuity, eloquence, and address. It made a
deep impression."37 The impeachment managers were nonplussed and
adjourned the trial for several weeks until they could prepare their reply-
It was not convincing, and the Senate acquitted Franklin.
But this decision did not end the matter. On February 24, 1817,
a committee of the House drew up another set of impeachment articles
against Franklin and his lay associates, this time on the grounds that
Franklin had refused to force two Lancaster attorneys, W. C. Frazer and
Patton Ross, to turn over a $300 judgment they had collected for a plaintiff,
having kept the sum as a part of legal fees due them. The House entered
a two-to-one vote for impeachment. Buchanan again conducted the defense,
hut this time he requested the assistance of his preceptor. They achieved
an acquittal before the Senate by a vote of 21 to 9.38
As if this were not enough, still another set of articles of impeach-
ment against Franklin was adopted by the Legislature in March, 1818.
Franklin wrote Buchanan to collect half a dozen witnesses he would need
from Lancaster and come to Harrisburg on March 5th or 6th. Buchanan
tried to secure the help of Hopkins and Parker Campbell of Philadelphia,
but neither was able to be at Harrisburg at the required time. "Of course,"
wrote Campbell, "y°u will have to proceed in the case of the Judges per se. . .
You will have to 'cry aloud and spare not.' If some of the principal actors
in this disgraceful scene are unmasked, it may prevent a recurrence of
their sinister projects,"39
This trial terminated in a fight between the House and the Senate
which threw the impeachment into the background. The Senate originally
agreed to sit as a court in the House chamber, with the House in attendance
in Committee of the Whole; but after a few days the Senators decided to
meet in their own chamber, inviting the House to sit with them there.
This the House chose to consider an intentional insult, perpetrated in
defiance of parliamentary rules. The House held an indignation meeting
in its own hall and when sufficiently inflamed by oratory, tumultuously
invaded the Senate, bursting through the door, climbing through the
windows, jamming the gallery, and packing the aisle. Everyone began
shouting at once. Eventually the leaders of both groups exchanged apolo-
gies, and the trial reconvened, but by that time the Legislature was so much
absorbed in its own contest over rules of order that the impeachment
seemed a perfunctory interruption.40 Franklin was again acquitted.
Buchanan's success at these trials greatly extended his reputation
and expanded his practice. Probably not many people read his arguments,
25
JAMES BUCHANAN
but everyone knew that a lawyer who had three times in three years success-
fully defended the President Judge before whom he tried most of his cases
would be a good man to have as counsel. Buchanan's income rose from
$2000 in 1815 to $8000 in 1818. He now began to experience, as his father
had predicted, the kind of whispering campaign which commonly centers on
a young man who progresses fast.
26
3
BIRTH OF A BACHELOR • 1819-1820
ANN COLEMAN
Buchanan's associations in Lancaster rapidly broadened as he settled down
to practice. His first close friend in town, except for Jasper Slayznaker,
was Amos Ellmaker, a Yale graduate who had later studied law under
Judge Reeve at the Litchfield School in Connecticut and finished his
training in James Hopkins's office while Buchanan was a student there.
Through Ellmaker, Buchanan met Molton C. Rogers, son of the Governor
of Delaware, who had also studied at Litchfield and was admitted to the
Lancaster bar in 1811. Buchanan dined at the same bachelor mess as
Rogers and in 1816, when these two formed a loose partnership, Rogers
moved into Buchanan's law offices on East King Street Many local
Dickinson alumni expanded the circle of Buchanan's acquaintances, some
of them men of influence like Judge Alexander Hayes and William Norris
and others, young men of prominent families such as Henry Shippen,
George Ross Hopkins, and William A. Boyd. James saw much of Gerardus
Clarkson, son of the Episcopal Rector, and of John Reynolds, both officers
of the Farmers Bank. He associated in many law cases with William
Jenkins, a Hopkins student of 1801 who had grown rich in the iron business.
By October, 1816, Buchanan had progressed along the road to
acceptance in Lancaster far enough to be named as one of the managers for
the annual society ball. In November he petitioned for admittance to the
Masonic Lodge and was sponsored by Rogers and Reynolds. After his
initiation on December 11, 1816, he rose rapidly to Junior Warden,
Worshipful Master and after a few years to Deputy Grand Master of the
First District. As his responsibilities in the community grew, he spent
less and less time with the footloose young men who nightly frequented
the back rooms of the local taverns. He had enjoyed their company as an
escape from work and loneliness, but he had no talent for stories, hated
gambling, and had too often made a fool of himself by getting drunk and
winding up dancing on a table top. He now received more invitations to
27
JAMES BUCHANAN
dinner and often spent evenings at fashionable homes. He did have a
talent for making himself agreeable to families of standing in the town and
for raising the hopes of their unmarried daughters. As the years passed
and his reputation as a promising young lawyer continued to grow, he
became Lancaster's most eligible bachelor. He relished the role.1
Sometime in 1818, Molton Rogers began courting Eliza Jacobs,
daughter of Cyrus Jacobs who had amassed great wealth as an ironmaster
and now lived at Pool Forge, east of Lancaster. Eliza's brother was studying
law under Buchanan at the time. Before long Rogers proposed that
Buchanan should join him some evening as an escort for Eliza's cousin,
Ann Caroline Coleman. He was delighted with the suggestion.
Ann Coleman was the belle of the town and the daughter of one
of the richest men in the country. A willowy, black-haired girl with dark,
lustrous eyes, she was by turns proud and self-willed, tender and affec-
tionate, quiet and introspective, or giddy and wild. That she remained
unmarried at twenty-two may have been because she was emotionally
unstable, but more likely it was due to the stubborn insistence of her
parents that she make an advantageous marriage.
Her father, Robert Coleman, had been born near Castle Finn,
in County Donegal, Ireland, not far from the ancestral home of Buchanan.
Migrating to America in 1764 as a youth of sixteen, he had worked first as
a laborer and then as a clerk for ironmaster James Old of Reading, Pennsyl-
vania, and later married his daughter. By 1800, he had come into possession
of half a dozen fine iron properties and ranked as one of the nation's first
millionaires. A strong-willed, hot-tempered and vindictive man, he had an
inordinate pride in his wealth and was continually suspicious that others
had designs on it. He was sensitive about social prestige, possibly because
he had once had none, and enjoyed public deference. He had served as a
lay judge of the Lancaster County court, was a trustee of Dickinson College,
and a warden in the local Episcopal Church,2
Coleman moved to Lancaster in 1809 and established his family
of five sons and four daughters in a town house on East King Street, half a
block from the square.8 The eldest daughter, Margaret, married Judge
Joseph Hemphill of Philadelphia, commonly known as "Single-Speech
HemphiU" because his maiden speech in the 7th Congress proved also to
be his last For years Ann Coleman had watched Jimmy Buchanan, the
Handsome six-footer from Mercersburg, walking between his office and the
Courthouse past her front window. They undoubtedly met before 1818
at one or another of the annual balls in the great room of the White Swan
Inn, but there is no indication that they saw much of each other until then*
Now Ann and Buchanan began a serious courtship, and things
moved rapidly. The winter of 1818-1819 must have been a revelation to
him. Once he had penetrated the mysterious circle of the iron families, a
28
BIRTH OF A BACHELOR* 1819. 1820
whole new world opened. Robert Coleman seemed to have as many
mansions as kings had castles. Buchanan could visit with Ann at the
Elizabeth Furnace Mansion, or at Cornwall, or at Speedwell Forge, or
Hopewell Furnace, or Colebrookdale, or Martic Forge and always be within
the family. Or they might go on a sleigh-ride with Rogers and Eliza Jacobs
to Pool Forge and stop by on the way home at the Jenkins' estate, Windsor
Forge. Everywhere there was food, wine, brandy, gaiety and an invitation
to stay a few days. Buchanan sometimes wondered whether he was not
aspiring too far above his station, for he could not return such hospitality.
James and Ann became engaged during the summer of 1819.
About the same time, Molton Rogers gave his heart to Eliza Jacobs, Lan-
caster ladies whipped up a whirlwind of excited speculation and gossip
about the possibility of a double wedding, with two of the community's
richest fathers footing the bill for what would surely be a festive occasion
unmatched in the past. But not everyone viewed the prospect with
pleasure. Mrs. Coleman did not approve of her daughter's choice and her
father, now 71 years old, also had his doubts. It is very likely that as a
trustee of Dickinson, he wondered whether Ann ought to marry a man who
had been once dismissed and twice under faculty discipline there. As
a careful businessman he probably disapproved of the wager on the 1816
election, by which Buchanan lost three tracts of Warren County land to
Rogers.4 He may also have been dismayed by the antics of some of Bu-
chanan's associates, such as Jasper Slaymaker and John Reynolds, who had
gained notoriety a few years before by a practical joke which cost them
$6700. These two, while riding past a public sale in a carriage, had shouted
out a bid, then whipped up the horse and driven off. They were recognized,
and the auctioneer knocked down to them as high bidders a hotel and
ferryboat line in Columbia.5 According to Robert Coleman's lights, these
were not the ways to protect or develop a fortune.
In the latter part of the summer, Buchanan drove to Mercersburg
to tell his parents about his bride-to-be and then set out for Bedford Springs
for a brief rest. He had gone there for the past two summers and had been
delighted with the sparkling waters, the beautiful serpentine walks up
Constitution Hill and Federal Hill, the quiet artificial lake, and the magnifi-
cent hotel with its broad verandas. He thought he would try the new
Pennsylvania turnpike and got as far as Sideling Hill when he encountered
a short unfinished stretch of the road which proved impassable. As he
was about to turn back, a young Irishman from a group of nearby workmen
came up and offered to have his crew carry the gig over the rocks and get
him on his way again* In fifteen minutes they had done the job, "My
name is John Hughes," said the genial foreman.6 Many years hence
Buchanan would have occasion to remember that name.
29
JAMES BUCHANAN
On his return to Lancaster, Buchanan found his office in pande-
monium. The autumn of 1819 had developed into a nightmare for men of
property and the lawyers who handled it. The delirium of the financial
panic had reached its peak, land was selling so fast and cheap that even the
sheriff's fees could not be realized, and Buchanan was frantically busy.
One complex case proved a particularly heavy drain on his time—a suit
upon which depended the continued existence of the Columbia Bridge
Company, an enterprise in which many of his local friends had a financial
interest. William Jenkins and the Farmers Bank were deeply involved,
and the case had ramifications which required Buchanan to go to Phila-
delphia several times.7
As if this were not enough, the political scene was in turmoil.
The local Federalist party was falling apart and had turned to its young
men for help. Furthermore, the Missouri Compromise question was at
this moment alarming the country "like a fire bell in the night." During
the week of November 23, Buchanan attended public meetings and served
on a committee with James Hopkins and William Jenkins to prepare official
resolutions instructing the District Congressman to oppose the extension
of slavery to Missouri.8
With these preoccupations, he did not spend very much time
courting during October and November. Always conscientious and willing
to serve, he applied himself to business without pausing to recognize the
implications of his activity. The town did otherwise. Since his engage-
ment to Ann Coleman, he had become a major subject of conversation and
his every act or omission was subjected to special scrutiny. The teacup set
soon agreed that Buchanan was in love not with Ann but with the Coleman
fortune.
Sometime in November, Ann began to worry about this gossip,
which inevitably found its way into the Coleman household. When her
parents further poisoned her mind on the subject, she gradually began to
believe "that Mr, Buchanan did not treat her with that affection that she
expected from the man she would marry, and in consequence of his coolness
she wrote him a note telling him that she thought it was not regard for her
that was his object, but her riches."9
Ann's letter put Buchanan in a difficult dilemma, and her reflec-
tion upon his integrity hit him where he was most sensitive; it hurt his
pride and self-respect. He must have felt that, in the light of Ann's
suspicions, any marked quickening of his interest thereafter would only
be construed by her as additional proof of her charge* Hurt and frustrated
he answered Ann's note politely but in a tone of injured innocence and
made no apology or explanation. There was as yet, however, no formal
breach, and matters might have been happily resolved had not another
incident occurred.
30
BIRTH OF A BACHELOR • 1819 - 1820
This event is best explained in the words of a niece of the lady
who unwittingly precipitated the crisis. "Some time after the engagement
had been announced," she wrote, "Mr. Buchanan was obliged to go out of
town on a business trip. He returned in a few days and casually dropped in
to see ... Mrs. William Jenkins, with whose husband he was on terms of
intimate friendship. With her was staying her sister, Miss Grace Hubley,
... a pretty and charming young lady. From this innocent call the whole
trouble arose. A young lady told Miss Coleman of it and thereby excited
her jealousy. She was indignant that he should visit anyone before coming
to her. On the spur of the moment she penned an angry note and released
him from his engagement. The note was handed to him while he was in
the courthouse. Persons who saw him receive it remarked afterward that
they noticed him turn pale when he read it. Mr. Buchanan was a proud
man. The large fortune of his lady was to him only another barrier to his
trying to persuade her to reconsider her rejection of himself."10
For several days thereafter Ann was so distressed and low-spirited
that her mother persuaded her to go to Philadelphia hoping that a change
of scene would improve her mental state. Her vitality was already low,
and she caught cold on the way to the city. She left Lancaster on Saturday,
December 4, in company with her younger sister, Sarah, to visit with sister
Margaret, apparently intending to see the series of plays and operas cur-
rently being offered at the Philadelphia Theatre.
After Ann's departure, Buchanan immersed himself in business.
On Monday, December 6, he succeeded in getting a settlement out of court
of the Columbia Bridge Company case. He was at the prothonotary's office
for a considerable part of the day, entering the decisions of the arbitrators,
getting signatures of the principal parties to the agreement, and winding
up the details.11 It was a great triumph for him.
Early Thursday morning, December 9, the thunderbolt struck,
A special messenger from Philadelphia brought the shocking news that
Ann Coleman had died suddenly at her sister's home shortly after midnight.
Judge Thomas Kittera of Philadelphia, who knew the Colemans, recorded
in his diary the events of that fatal day which changed the course of
James Buchanan's life and with it possibly the course of American history.
"At noon yesterday," wrote Kittera, "I met this young lady on
the street, in the vigour of health, and but a few hours after [,] her friends
were mourning her death. She had been engaged to be married, and some
unpleasant misunderstanding occurring, the match was broken off. This
circumstance was preying on her mind. In the afternoon she was laboring
under a fit of hysterics; in the evening she was so little indisposed that her
sister visited the theatre. After night she was attacked with strong hysteri-
cal convulsions, which induced the family to send for physicians, who
thought this would soon go off, as it did; but her pulse gradually weakened
31
JAMES BUCHANAN
until midnight, when she died. Dr. Chapman, . . . says it is the first instance
he ever knew of hysteria producing death. To affectionate parents sixty
miles off what dreadful intelligence— to a younger sister whose evening was
spent in mirth and folly, what a lesson of wisdom does it teach. Beloved
and admired by all who knew her, in the prime of life, with all the ad-
vantages of education, beauty, and wealth, in a moment she has been
cut off."12
Judge Kittera might well have added, what crushing intelligence
to her ex-fianc& The news swept through Lancaster like a soul-chilling
wind. One gentleman wrote of it as "the most affecting circumstance that
has ever taken place here since I have been an inhabitant.1'13 There im-
mediately arose the hint of suicide, though no one could produce any valid
evidence of it. The hideous part was that nobody apparently did know
exactly what had happened, and it is entirely probable that James Buchanan
lived out his whole life haunted by doubts and self-accusations. But people
thought and talked even if they did not have the facts. One Lancaster lady
wrote of the public reaction against Buchanan: "I believe that her friends
now look upon him as her Murderer."14 The Colemans seemed to feel
that way about it.
Buchanan immediately wrote an anguished letter to Ann's father
requesting permission to see the corpse and to walk as a mourner. The
letter, despatched to the Coleman home by messenger, was refused at the
door and returned unopened. In tins note, Buchanan had written: "It is
now no time for explanation, but the time will come when you will discover
that she, as well as I, have been much abused. God forgive the authors of
it . , . I may sustain the shock of her death, but I feel that happiness has
fled from me forever."15
As he came face to face with the bitter hatred of the CotananH
and the insidious suicide rumors, Buchanan slowly began to recognise the
fuU horror of his situation. Unable to endure solitude* and even le«s able
to confront people on the street, he fled to the rooms of Judge Walter
Franklin, who was then living next door to the Coleman home. Here he
tried to compose a fitting last tribute to Ann for publication in the Lancaster
Journal. A printer's devil from editor Dickson's office, who was sent for
the copy, recalled finding Buchanan "so disturbed by grief that he was
unable to write the notice." Judge Franklin finally composed it himself.16
The Hemphills brought Ann Coleman's body to Lancaster on
Saturday, December 11, and on the Sabbath she was buried in the St. James
Episcopal churchyard in a ceremony witnessed by a vast number of people.
Buchanan tried unsuccessfully to get a grip on himself and go back to work.
A Lancaster girl's report suggests what he had to face* "After Mr, Buchanan
was denied his requests/9 she wrote, "he secluded himself for a few days
and then sallied forth as bold as ever. It is now thought that this affair will
32
BIRTH OF A BACHELOR • 1819 - 1820
lessen his Consequence in Lancaster as he is the whole conversation of
the town."17
A few days after the funeral, James Buchanan stepped from the
rear door of his quarters into the gloomy morning darkness of December,
made his way carefully across the cobblestone courtyard back of the
Leopard Tavern, passed under the stone archway which led out to Duke
Street, and there climbed aboard the early stage for the West. Huddled in
his greatcoat, he made no effort to lean forward when the coach passed by
the St. James churchyard.
In later years he could not have reconstructed if he had wished
that agonizing, endless ride from Lancaster to Mercersburg. His mind was
numb;, his spirit, in utter confusion. What now? He could not stay in
Lancaster, nor could he leave without tremendous sacrifice. And in the
background of his thought there dinned one half-formed yet persistent
conclusion: that this tragedy marked the end of James Buchanan. What
he would be hereafter would have to be, somehow, different from what he
had been before. Buchanan shivered from more than the cold, and let his
thoughts merge with the bleak greyness of the winter dawn.
The family impressed itself upon him this Christmas in a way he
had not before appreciated. In it he found warmth and sympathy, trust
and admiration, expectation of great achievement from the eldest son and
brother as well as the assumption that he, very soon, might be their guardian
and provider. The realization of his increasing importance within the
family and of the responsibility that he bore for others gave to James a
renewed sense of purpose in life. It appealed to his already strong concept
of personal duty and pleasantly nourished his ambition for eminence,
giving to both a gratifying quality of unselfishness. While the Coleman
marriage would probably have eased the path and quickened his pace to
achievement, position, and wealth, he did not doubt after the first shock
of the tragedy had passed that with determination and application he could
attain these objects without outside help. In fact, the gossip attending
Ann's death made it almost a mandate that he prove himself, in order to
maintain his self-respect
But even such rationalization could not quite overcome James's
reluctance to face again what he knew must await him when he returned.
His pride and vanity were wounded lo a degree that he had to have some
armor to protect him. His mother supplied the material for it. She had
that kind of faith which assumed that whatever happened was an act of the
Deity intended especially for her instruction and benefit. On one occasion
when a fire destroyed the homes of several neighbors and her own was
saved by a sudden shift in the wind, she had written: "Our situation was
indeed deplorable, but that Omnipotent being who governs all nature
graciously interposed in our behalf.1*18
33
JAMES BUCHANAN
On this solid rock of faith, James Buchanan built his protective
wall. His armor would be an unquestioning acceptance of what is, as the
manifestation of divine order. There now began to appear in Buchanan's
correspondence those sentences which, over the years, he was to repeat
incessantly: "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof." "It is better to
bear the ills we have than to fly to others we know not of.'* He used them
as a statement of resignation, as a balm for personal disappointments, and
as a convenient means of side-tracking the necessity of seeking original
courses of action. Today he would do the routine work for today; God
would take care of tomorrow. This attitude brought peace of mind but
stifled imagination; it lowered emotional tension but destroyed zest for
any cause; it counselled patience but obscured the importance of right
timing in human affairs; it eased adjustment but eliminated experiment.
It was fortunate that his desk was piled high with unfinished
business when he got back to his office in January, 1820. He plunged into
preparations for the February session of court and found that attention to
the troubles of others distracted him from his own. He spent some time
developing his "casebook," a bound volume in which, with meticulous
neatness, he transcribed the main facts of cases he had tried, noting at the
end the judgment of the bench and the general principles of law which
applied. He indexed this volume in another notebook in such a manner
that he could continue into the future, making the references cumulative19
Before long it became fairly apparent that his recent notoriety
would improve his law business. His tragedy had resulted, in part, from
his neglect of private affairs in order to attend to the interests of his clients.
This was good advertising. He also found cases coming to him from those
who had no love for the Colemans and from persons who sympathized with
his plight at the same time that they trusted his legal ability.
Several trials, unimportant in themselves, contributed to his
expanding reputation. A man charged with threatening the life of another
retained Buchanan to defend him. When the plaintiff took the stand
Buchanan asked him:
"Well, sir, suppose you were a man of more nerve, a man not
easily frightened by threat— put yourself in the position of a courageous
man— would you have cared for the threat of my client?"
"I am a man,*' replied the plaintiff, "of as much courage as any*
body, sir."
"Then you were not frightened when my client threatened you?"
"No, sir."
"You are not afraid of him?"
"No, I am not"
"Well, then, what did you bring this charge for? I move **»
dismissal."
34
BIRTH OF A BACHELOR • 1819 - 1820
The court dismissed the case.20
In another case, tried in Harrisburg, Buchanan was retained by
the plaintiff in an action of ejectment. After examining the deeds to the
property, James told his client that he had no case— that a link in the title
was missing. The client insisted, however, that Buchanan go ahead with
the case. At the trial the attorneys for the defendant overlooked the weak
point in the title. When, after the conclusion of testimony, they saw and
tried to remedy their error, Buchanan held that under the rules then in
force they could not introduce further evidence. The court so charged
the jury, and Buchanan's client won. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
later upheld the verdict of the lower court.21
An observer in the courtroom during the famous property trial of
Bowman v. KBnigmacher in 1820 wrote: "I never heard better pleading in
the Court House of Lancaster before: Hopkins & Jenkins for Konigmacher
& Buchanan for Bowman, — who argued very ably."22 Judge Alexander L.
Hayes of the County Court stated that "he never listened to an advocate
who was equal to Mr. Buchanan, whether in clear & logical arguments to
the Court, or in convincing appeals to the reason and sympathies of the
jury."23 This developing reputation brought to Buchanan not only personal
gratification and more business but led to an increasing number of applica-
tions by young law students to take their preceptorship under him. James
was particularly pleased when ironmaster Cyrus Jacobs engaged him as his
legal advisor in June, 1820.2*
FLIGHT TO POLITICS
In the meantime, Pennsylvania politics built up to a high pitch of excite-
ment. Many persons, it is true, referred to the election of 1820 as an
"era of good feeling," but this expression had a very special meaning and
was limited to the presidential canvass. There was little "good feeling"
among political rivals for state and local office.
The Pennsylvania contest for the governorship in 1820 developed
into a bitter, violent fight which the Federalists confidently hoped to win
because of a split among the Democrats. William Findlay, a neighbor of
the Buchanans in Mercersburg, had served one term as Democratic governor
and was standing for re-election. The Federalists now coalesced with a
disgruntled portion of the Democrats to form a party called the Independent
Republicans, who nominated Joseph Hiester, a Revolutionary veteran and
an old Federalist.26
The Federalists of Lancaster, casting about for a Congressional
candidate to head their ticket for the district comprising Dauphin, Lebanon
and Lancaster Counties, settled on Buchanan. The election contest hinged
almost wholly upon the office of governor and by midsummer had become
35
JAMES BUCHANAN*
acrimonious and bitter, as campaigns always do when a large party splits
and a portion of it allies itself with the traditional enemy. Buchanan's
opponents not only dragged out the Coleman affair but also brought his
father prominently into the mud-slinging.
One long effusion of July, in the form of a public "Letter to
James Buchanan, Esquire" made cruel reference to his recent tragedy and
blamed him for a vile attack on Findlay for ownership of a Negro slave,
Hannah, alleging that Hannah had formerly been the property of Bu-
chanan's father. As a final touch, the letter was signed "Colebrook," to
suggest authorship by one of the Colemans.
If Buchanan was angry at the crude references to Ann, he was
furious that his father and old Hannah should be dragged into a political
smear. Until the Findlays took her, Hannah had been his childhood nurse,
ignorant, innocent and devoted. His father had become responsible for
her as executor of an estate, and had eventually fixed her with the neighbor-
ing Findlay family who provided a home for hen Buchanan hat! an affection
for the old lady and never left Mercersburg without visiting her and taking
her some little remembrance.26 The newspaper charge that he had assailed
Governor Findlay for enslaving old Hannah made him see red/*7 His father
cautioned him, "That piece is well calculated to irritate & hurt your
feelings Let not your passions get the better of your sober judgment.
If you are the author, meet the dispute with firmness and truth, & if you
are not the author, let them expose themselves a little further that they
may be taken in their own snare. I will be anxious to hear from you on
this subject."28 Buchanan categorically denied that he had anything to
do with the "Hannah" stories, but the episode abated some of his youthful
idealism about politics.20
On the evening of August 25, the Lancaster "Fwleral-Rtf publican"
delegates got together to select formally the slate agreed upon privately
long before. They named Buchanan for Congress and Edward Coleman,
Ann's brother, for the State Senate. The whole ticket was pledged to work
for the election of Joseph Hiester to the governorship. A few w«*t»k« later
the conference committee of the three counties comprising the district
nominated Buchanan and John Phillips of Dauphin County for Congress
as "friends of reform." The terminology was significant. Locally Bu-
chanan's supporters were "Republican Federalists'* signifying the coalition
back of Hiester; but for national office his supporters were "friends <»f
reform," a designation which openly recognized the current uaetatsneiftR <»f
party labels in Washington. On September 1, the supporters of Findlay
held meetings and reported a "Democratic ticket'* including Jacob Hibeh-
man of Lancaster for Congress, and Molton C. Rogers for State Senator.30
Buchanan stayed aloof from the rough and tumble political fight.
He made only a few formal speeches and sent no contributions to the
36
BIRTH OF A BACHELOR • 1819 - 1820
newspapers, letting the editors write on his behalf. His political metier
was not the hustings and the editorial column; it was the private letter and
the personal conference. He liked to discuss strategy but left it to others
to execute the tactical maneuvers. The Findlay men tried hard to draw-
Buchanan into an open skirmish, but he always parried by a purposeful
disdain to join in a newspaper brawl. His editor friends, explaining his
refusal to stump the district, wrote: "Those acquainted with the gentleman,
know that his time is more usefully as well as more profitably employed."
For a conservative constituency this was psychologically sound. In the
fall election Buchanan and Phillips carried their district by a comfortable
majority, and Federalist Joseph Hiester became governor.
Buchanan would not go to Washington for more than a year;
the session of Congress to which he had been elected would convene in
December, 1821. In the meantime he faced a heavy schedule of cases at
court, and had to familiarize himself with his approaching duties as Con-
gressman. December court awarded him a decision in the long drawn out
case of Bowman v. Konigmacher, In January he defended a group of men
charged with manslaughter,31 and in May scored one of his greatest court-
room triumphs by successfully defending William Hamilton against a
charge of the murder of Ann Piersol.32
On June 11, 1821, Buchanan's father died. The old gentleman
was just entering the driveway of his Mercersburg home in a rig he had
driven from Dunwoodie Farm when the horse bolted, throwing Mr.
Buchanan out of the carriage. His head struck the iron tire, and he died
soort thereafter. James went to Mercersburg immediately to take charge
and found, to his chagrin, that his father had failed to leave a will. James
spent the resc of the summer working out details of the settlement of the
complicated estate in a manner that would enable his mother to get along
with as little worry as possible, finance the education of the three boys,
William, George and Edward, and care for the unmarried girls, Sarah
and Harriet
THE SEVENTEENTH CONGRESS
Late in November, James left by stage for the national capital, entrusting
his King Street rooms to a housekeeper. Rogers would stop in occasionally,
he told her, to pick up some wine and jugs of apple brandy. He wanted the
rooms kept clean but otherwise undisturbed, as he would be back in
Lancaster from time to time to attend to his practice.
In Washington he found quarters at the establishment of a
Mrs. Peyton in company with Representatives Andrew R. Govan of South
Carolina, Henry D. Dwight of Massachusetts, and George Blake, aBostonian
friend of Daniel Webster.33 The capital city itself was a disappointment
37
JAMES BUCHANAN
he had been forewarned to expect. The national Capitol stood unfinished
since its destruction by the British, in 1814. From Capitol Hill stretched
Pennsylvania Avenue, lined with poplars and conveying a hint of dignity
when viewed at a distance, but it presented only a morass of mudholes to
those who had to travel it on their way to the president's house at the
other end. The White House had been rebuilt and repainted, and at each
of the corners of the square it occupied stood one of the department
buildings. Between here and the Potomac stood a small group of shabby
houses near the Navy Yard and another along the river's edge farther north,
A few fine edifices, mostly private homes or foreign embassies, dotted the
terrain north of Pennsylvania Avenue, but most of the buildings were small
and shoddy — even the hotels.
On December 3, Buchanan and a number of other new members,
including John Tod of Pennsylvania and George McDuffie and Joel Poinsett
of South Carolina, were introduced to the House. The chamber itself was
poorly designed for its purpose. The gallery was simply rfa platform raised
a foot or two above the floor, which gave the honorable members an excel-
lent opportunity of attending to the ladies who had come to listen to
them."34 Huge pillars so blocked the view that no one could see the whole
assembly and many legislators could not see the Chain
Buchanan found a few familiar faces— John Findlay from Franklin
County, Joseph Hemphill of Philadelphia, Ben Hardin of Kentucky and
John Sergeant with whom Buchanan had associated in legal work in
Philadelphia. Sergeant, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, briefed
him on the various members. "I well remember Mr. Sergeant putting me
on guard against Mr. Randolphs friendship,"35 he wrote, John Randolph
of Roanoke, brilliant, eccentric and vitriolic, was the showman of Congress,
a man who could always electrify the gallery but he was not considered a
"business member** of the House.
Philip P. Barbour of Virginia occupied the Speaker's chair, and
Henry Baldwin of Pennsylvania had been named chairman of the powerful
Ways and Means Committee. Buchanan quickly got acquainted with
Ninian Edwards of Illinois, an old Dickinson alumnus. But William
Lowndes of South Carolina commanded his chief interest. He had learned
of Lowndes through Langdon Cheves, former President of the Second Bank
of the United States, a South Carolinian who had for several years been
living in Lancaster. The news that the South Carolina Legislature had just
unanimously nominated Lowndes for the presidency in 1824 gave special
interest to his presence in the House.
Buchanan made Lowndes his ideal, for he displayed those qualities
which James admired and tried to cultivate in himself—sincerity of
purpose, full command of information, gentleness of address, an aversion
to giving offense to an opponent, and utter fairness in debate. Randolph
38
BIRTH OF A BACHELOR • 1819 - 1820
once remarked after hearing Lowndes present the argument of an adversary
prior to demolishing it, "He will never he ahle to answer himself."36
Buchanan quickly showed that he planned to be a "business
member" of Congress. He was appointed to the Committee on Agriculture
two days after the House organized, and he made his first speech ten days
after his arrival. Within three weeks he had taken the floor formally on
three occasions. Writing to Judge Franklin of his early impressions, he
confided that after hearing various members speak, he was "forcibly struck
with the idea that the reputation of many of them, stands higher than it
deserves.5* His own speeches, he reported, had received a "tolerable share
of attention, which in a very great degree I attributed to the curiosity of
the Members," though he himself had felt much embarrassed. Most im-
portant, he could make himself distinctly heard, a rare achievement because
of the poor acoustics of the hall.37
Just before Congress adjourned for Christmas, Buchanan received
news from Harrisburg that gave him something to think about during the
brief recess. The State Legislature had just elected William Findlay to
the United States Senate by an overwhelming majority. That meant that
Buchanan's party was defunct in Pennsylvania. The confused Washington
scene would doubtless provide new issues and bases of allegiance, but these
would have to be worked out. At the moment he was literally a man
without a party.
A few days before Congress reconvened, several gentlemen called
on Buchanan with a proposition. They wanted him to accept the notes
collected by Lowndes on the War Department Deficiency Bill, construct
them into a speech, and deliver it. Lowndes was ill and unable to do this
job himself. He wished to save John C. Calhoun, Secretary of War, from
his present embarrassment. Would Mr. Buchanan take over? He would,
indeed! With the most exquisite pleasure.38
There was in the House at this time a group calling itself the
Radical party whose object was to limit the activities of the federal govern-
ment to the narrowest possible range. One means to this end was re-
trenchment, a rigorous cutting down of the expenses of government.
William Harris Crawford of Georgia led this party, which was particularly
hostile to John C. Calhoun. The root of their antagonism was doubtless
their conflicting ambition for the presidency, but the immediate source of
trouble was Calhoun's alleged extravagance in administering the War
Department. Congress had appropriated $100,000 for Indian Administra-
tion for the year 1821— only half the usual amount provided for this
purpose. The Secretary of War had spent $170,000 which was less than
usual but $70,000 more than Congress had provided. The Deficiency Bill
on which Lowndes had planned to speak would enable Calhoun to pay the
debts incurred by the Indian Bureau of his Department.
39
JAMES BUCHANAN
To be asked to do a favor for both Lowndes and Calhoun during
his first month in Congress indicated fast progress. It gave Buchanan the
opportunity he wanted to stake out some political lines in Washington.
Rumors that Buchanan would speak for Lowndes leaked out, and the House
listened with careful attention to his remarks.
This speech revealed Buchanans debating technique and identified
his particular talents in the forum. He entered the problem tentatively,
without convictions, admitted the plausibility of the opposition view, and
asserted his personal opinion with modesty and calculated understatement.
This introductory statement had the ring of sincerity and created a sympa-
thetic attitude in the audience— a lawyer's bid for the jury.
He then stated the general principle from which the rest of the
reasoning would flow. "It ought to be a maxim in politics, as well as in
law, that an officer of your Government, high in the confidence of the
people, shall be presumed to have done his duty, until the reverse of
the proposition is proved."
From this platform Buchanan launched into the details of his
problem, examining every possible meaning and ramification, ?*nd tracing
all to the stage of reductio ad absurdum except the one he supported, which
at length stood out like a beacon of sanity and good judgment by contrast.
Had Calhoun violated the Constitution? No. Was he to pay the bills of
his Department out of his own pocket? No. Was he intended to be a seer,
able to predict precisely the expenses of the army for years in advance? No.
Would the nation be safe if every executive officer ceased to function when
the previously voted funds ran out? Should the president admit the
invader because Congress had failed to budget for an invasion? Was it
reasonable to expect that the Indian Bureau, after a generation of activity,
could suddenly cut its program in half? If that were done, would not the
Secretary of War then be compelled to legislate in deciding what portions
of his functions, defined by statute, should be performed? Would this
decision not destroy the function of Congress in defining the scope of
executive action? Did Congress intend to force the executive to alter the.
laws of the land? If as a result, the border settlements were exposed to
Indian massacre, would Congress approve? Or did Congress expect the
executive to be endowed with the power to perform miracles— to do the
accustomed work without funds? Even if the Department of War had
erred, did Congress plan to repudiate contracts honestly entered into by
individuals with responsible agents of the United States Government,
punishing the innocent instead of the guilty? "Why, then, considering
this question in every point of view in which it can be presented, is there
any objection against voting $70,000 to supply the deficiency in the appro*
priation of last year?"39
40
BIRTH OF A BACHELOR • 1819-1820
This speech serves as a fair sample of Buchanan's platform
manner. Reason, supported by quantities of illustrative and supporting
data, embellished by pathos ("the shrieks of helpless women and children
under the scalping knife!"), converged upon an inevitable answer. In a
reasoned debate, Buchanan could so exhaust a subject that any reply was
bound to be a reiteration. Against wit or ridicule he was helpless, but in
serious debate he was formidable.
Many complimented him on his defense of the Deficiency Bill
which quickly passed by a large majority, despite a sarcastic sally by John
Randolph. Buchanan then settled down to work on the two main objectives
of his current tenure: to achieve re-election and to keep in touch with
presidential politics.
He obtained free public documents for the home constituency.
When these were unavailable for distribution, he laboriously copied some
in longhand for particular friends. He worked, through the War Depart-
ment, for the appointment of some Lancaster boys to West Point. He
demanded an inquiry to determine who had pocketed Pennsylvania's
militia fines and got himself appointed chairman of a select committee to
conduct the probe.40 He introduced a group of resolutions to extend the
post-road system throughout his Congressional district; and he busied
himself in other ways to keep his name in the newspapers and show that he
was an active public servant.41 Returning home at the end of the session,
Buchanan learned that he was to be the guest of honor at the Federalist
celebration of the Fourth of July at Swenk's Spring, along the wooded
Conestoga. At the party enthusiastic supporters assured him that his
services were duly appreciated and would be "long remembered by his
constituents.**42 The toasts, written in advance by the arrangements
committee, were indications of renomination. In fact the Federalists,
meeting at the end of August, did renominate him. It was quite a distinc-
tion to be run for Congress a second time, for the local Federalist practice
had always been to pass this job around among deserving workers. Bu-
chanan felt certain that in this case it was his industry that had broken
the precedent.
James kept his ears open for rumors on the presidential race.
William Lowndes soon drifted out of the picture because of a serious illness
which forced him to leave Congress early in 1822. "Whose chance from
present appearances is best for the office of President?" Buchanan wrote
in March. "In my opinion should the election take place tomorrow the
contest would be chiefly between Calhoun and Crawford. I consider Adams
out of the question ... his disposition is as perverse and mulish as that of
his father."43 Among the members of Congress Buchanan found not the
slightest trace of distinction between Federalist and Democrat; the names
persisted, but they no longer signified anything* Many Democrats held
41
JAMES BUCHANAN
Federalist ideas, while as many nominal Federalists were Democratic in
principle. He thought that Monroe's administration, though Democratic
in name, generally pursued the Federalist policy.44
Two events during this first session of the 17th Congress showed
new trends in Buchanan's political thought. The Bankrupt Bill raised the
question whether the federal government should admit to bankruptcy
proceedings all classes of citizens— farmers, laborers, artisans and others—-
or whether bankruptcy procedures should be restricted to the mercantile
class, as had been customary. Federalist John Sergeant sponsored the bill
and during the Christmas recess of 1821 persuaded Buchanan to support it;
but as debate proceeded, James wavered and in March made a long speech
in opposition which contributed to the defeat of the measure. As Buchanan
had a strong personal attachment to Sergeant, his action must have been
based on some serious political soul-searching. What had he discovered?
A simple but, to him, a basic assumption: that in an organized society
property rights had to take precedence over human rights. He did not
develop this idea in its full implications, but he had the main point. To
extend .the bankruptcy privilege would destroy property because of the
impossibility of controlling abuse of the privilege if it were extended to all
classes. To destroy property would be to destroy government and society,
He began dimly to see that human rights might conceivably be developed
together with property rights, but that without the security of property
every man would be doomed to the law of cannibalism in which no right
of any kind could be guaranteed.
This speech- has usually been cited as the beginning of Buchanan's
adherence to the doctrine of States' rights. It is true that in his compre-
hensive argument he warned that to give the federal courts jurisdiction
over bankrupts from the entire population would lead to federal cf>n£<>lida»
tion. But this was a subsidiary argument. His main theme was that the
bill would increase the perpetration of fraud because man was basically
criminal and would give way to temptation. "Rest assured/11 he concluded,
"that our population require the curb more than the rein." This was
Hamiltonian, not Jeffersonian,
A second Congressional event that also arbused Buchanan to
some original thinking was President Monroe*1* veto message of a bill to
finance repairs on the Cumberland Road by permitting the federal govern*
meat to collect tolls, Buchanan had supported several proposals to improve
the Cumberland Road because he thought the road would strengthen the
Union and benefit Pennsylvania, but Monroe's veto pointed out the Con-
stitutional difficulties involved in a federal effort to collect a local tax*
Buchanan was so impressed by his own failure to see what a Pandora's box
of federal intervention this would open that he tried repeatedly thereafter
to have the whole Cumberland Road rctroceded to the individual states,
42
BIRTH OF A BACHELOR • 1819 - 1820
In this instance, he did lean to the States' rights view, defending the domain
of state jurisdiction from invasion by federal authority.
What political complexion did Buchanan hold in 1822? Was he
Federalist or Democratic in principles? It seemed that he was both.
Fortunately for him, so were many of his constituents.
43
4
THE KING MAKER • 1821 - 1827
THE CALHOUN BAND WAGON
Since 1800 New York and Virginia had divided the honors of control of the
national government, Virginia teWag the presidency and New York the
lion's share of the federal patronage. This "dynastic alliance" always
controlled presidential nominations by the old scheme of the Congressional
caucus and planned again to exercise its power by selecting William Harris
Crawford as the presidential nominee in 1824. As there would be no
Federalist candidate, the Democratic nomination would be equivalent to
election; it would be, at least, unless someone contested the nomination.
Pennsylvania's younger politicians readied themselves for just such a
contest.
To overcome the New York-Virginia alliance they thought it
necessary to establish a counteralliance and to manage a nomination by
some means other than the traditional method* Pennsylvania had no
favorite son ready for the presidency in 1821, but she had a unique and
original system of making nominations which, together with her 28 votes
in the electoral college, might very well upset Crawford and elect someone
of her choice. The Pennsylvanians proposed to use the method of nomina-
tion by a state convention of delegates chosen for the purprme, the same
procedure by which they had picked their gubernatorial candidates in
1817 and 1820.
Buchanan found the prospects fascinating, "I have long thought
that the general government have rested so secure in the support of
Pennsylvania that they have thought it unnecessary to do her common
justice,7* he wrote in 1821*1 Along with others, he welcomed the plan of a
combination of Ohio, South Carolina, and Pennsylvania to take the measure
of New York and Virginia, John C Calhoun, Secretary of War, would be
the logical leader of such a coalition. He waa a striking man with piercing
eyes and thick black hair, brushed back defiantly, a man of experience and
leadership; a nationalist, a friend of internal improvements, of a national
44
THE KING MAKER • 1821 - 1827
bank, and of a protective tariff; a man of honor who would not slight his
friends. If he were to become president, Pennsylvania's turn could not
be far behind, and some cabinet offices would be scattered along the road
to the White House.
Calhoun visited Pennsylvania's Bedford Springs in 1821 and made
a tour of observation until mid-September. He returned to Washington
full of rosy hopes for the future, for in the course of his expedition he had
signed up the leading representatives of the Family party of the state, an
organization which was destined to guide Pennsylvania politics and to
plague James Buchanan for many years to come.
George Mifflin Dallas of Philadelphia, patrician son of Alexander
J. Dallas, created the Family party which got its name from the fact that
nearly all the lieutenants were kin to their captain. Favored with reputa-
tion, money, brains, and political ties strengthened by blood and marriage,
Dallas nourished the hope of outstripping in distinction his famous father.
Samuel D. Ingham of New Hope along the Delaware, William Wilkins of
Pittsburgh, Richard Bache, Thomas Sergeant, and John Norvall of Phila-
delphia, Thomas J. Rogers of Easton, and a few others formed the backbone
of the Family party's leadership.
During Buchanan's first weeks in Congress in December 1821,
the Family Congressmen from Pennsylvania called on Calhoun in a body
to invite him formally to stand as a candidate for president. After his
grateful acceptance, the Family spread pro-Calhoun literature all over
Pennsylvania and systematically attacked John Quincy Adams. Plans to
secure a nomination of Calhoun by the State Legislature proved premature
in 1822, but Dallas and Ingham indoctrinated their followers with the idea
that support of Calhoun would be one of the main issues of the 1823 contest
for the governorship.2 By January 1823, George McDuffie thought ^ that
Pennsylvania would "unquestionably support Calhoun" and nominate
him at a state convention.3
Buchanan became interested in Calhoun's prospects, partly
because so many of his Pennsylvania colleagues were talking about the
subject and partly because he happened to live with George McDuffie. It
was probably no accident that Buchanan's first real speech was a ringing
defense of Calhoun's administration of the War Department, and the rather
unusual attention accorded to this effort, which mystified the orator, may
have proceeded from genuine curiosity whether Calhoun had carried
Pennsylvania's Federalists into camp. Buchanan refused to commit himself
to Calhoun, but kept a position from which he could at any time go along
with the movement without apparent inconsistency or embarrassment.
Early in 1823, Buchanan's friend Stephen Pleasanton dropped a
hint that a change in Monroe's Cabinet was imminent. "Poor Penna./'
he wrote, "has not a man in the dominant party ... fit to be placed in the
45
JAMES BUCHANAN
Cabinet. All the large states can have a man in the Cabinet but her. If
she had a prominent man she would clearly be entitled to the Appt. of
Secretary of Navy Canvyou name one?"4
It was extremely odd that such a letter should have been addressed
to Buchanan. He assumed that Calhoun was back of it and used it in the
way in which Pleasanton presumably intended. He consulted with his
Democratic law partner, Molton Rogers, in framing a reply which was
prepared for Calhoun's eye. Calhoun, he wrote, could gain the presidency
by pressing Pennsylvania's claim for recognition in the Cabinet, or destroy
his chances if he disregarded the Keystone State. This exchange brought
Buchanan almost within the ranks of pro-Calhoun Democrats.5 As it
developed, the incumbent Navy Secretary, S. L. Southard, surprised every-
one by keeping his Cabinet place in preference to the offer of a seat on the
Supreme Court. Calhoun promised, however, that Buchanan could count
him ccamong the friends of the state here" whenever the occasion de-
manded.6
George McDuffie wrote Buchanan a flattering letter at this same
time, commenting that "though you are called a federalist & myself a
republican, we agree upon almost every question of importance . * . not
excepting the interesting question of who shall be the next president."
McDuffie then proceeded to instruct Buchanan on the ''safest course" for
those who were backing Calhoun's prospects. He wanted to obtain a strong
public expression from Pennsylvania; that would bring Ohio along im-
mediately.7
Buchanan at this point would probably have come out openly
for Calhoun except for complications created by the state election of 1823,
The Federalists would have to run a candidate for governor; they rould not
at the same time back a presidential candidate already appropriated by
the opposition.
The pro-Calhoun Democrats selected John A, Shuhe as the
Democratic candidate for governor. Although Shulze said nothing on the
subject of the presidency, his backers spread the word that a vote for
Shulze in 1823 meant a vote for Calhoun in 1824 Except for the fact
that Shulze's chief competitor for the Democratic nomination, George
Bryan of Lancaster, had been double-crossed at the convention, there
probably would have been no Federalist nomination and no contest* but
Bryan's friends were so outraged that it seemed sure that they could be
induced to bolt. The Federalists* therefore, placed a candidate in the
running and succeeded in influencing the angry Bryanitcs to join them.*
These activities put Buchanan in a quandary. He tried to keep
the presidential question out of the state election and also to keep himwlf
clear of it. Before the Federalist nominating convention, he strongly dis-
suaded John Sergeant from standing as a candidate for governor because he
46
THE KING MAKER • 1821 - 1827
knew that if his friend Sergeant ran, he would be compelled to campaign
actively.9 After Sergeant declined and Andrew Gregg accepted the Feder-
alist nomination, Buchanan gave only perfunctory attention to his party's
canvass.10 His colleagues censured him for his conduct. "It is bruited
about that you have rather held back in this business which rumor is I
presume no secret to you, nor the cause of it The presidential question
is assigned as the cause of this backwardness."11
It was certainly a frustrating summer for everybody. Although
the presidential issue was officially taboo and not to be mentioned formally,
everyone privately talked of nothing else. The frequent appearance of
Jackson's name during the summer came as a surprise to the politically
informed, for his candidacy seemed to spring out of thin air. No one of
standing sponsored him, but on the only occasion when his name was
publicly brought forward— at the state convention which nominated Shulze
for governor — the chairman had to smother the wild demonstration which
greeted the pro-Jackson resolution by calling loudly for a vote on a different
subject.12
Buchanan had hoped to escape part of this awkward political
campaign by going to Boston in June with Mrs. George Blake, one of his
dining companions for the past two years at Mrs. Peyton's. Mrs. Blake
teased him about his apparent aversion to the fair sex, persuaded him to
escort her to public functions in Washington, and conducted a vigorous
campaign to find a wife for him. But he had to forego the Boston trip at
that time because the Pennsylvania Supreme Court had scheduled an
adjourned session for the first three weeks of July, and he was concerned in
nearly every case on the docket. He wrote Mrs. Blake in midsummer that
Lancaster was as dull as could be and that, like the children of Israel in the
wilderness, he longed after the fleshpots of Egypt
He had been having a good time in Washington where, among
the ladies, the knowledge of the Ann Coleman affair had given him a kind
of romantic appeal. He had not forgotten Ann, nor had he lived the life of
a recluse. Washington was full of lovely maids and matrons, but person-
able young bachelors were few. Buchanan knew the Van Ness girls, Cora
Livingston and Catherine Van Rensselaer of New York, the Crowninshield
misses from Vermont, Priscilla Cooper, who became the wife of his friend
Robert Tyler, the Caton sisters from Baltimore, and many others, including
a sprightly Julia and a giddy Matilda about whom he wrote glowing en-
comiums. He spent August with the Slakes in Boston; but despite the best
efforts of his kind hostess, he returned home no closer to matrimony than
he had been before.13
In Lancaster he learned that the Federalist campaign for governor
had fallen apart. In October Shulze won the governorship by the largest
majority in the history of Pennsylvania.
47
JAMES BUCHANAN
THREE CHEERS FOR OLD HICKORY
The first few months of the new Congressional session, from December 1823
to March 1824, were filled with the excitement of president-making.
Calhoun thought that his election was certain if only Pennsylvania would
nominate him; but Ingham, Dallas, and his other friends in the Family
party hesitated, for they had not been able to bring Governor Shulze into
their plans. Meanwhile the cry for Jackson spread wildly.
In February, 1824 the Congressional caucus in Washington
nominated Crawford according to plan. A rump affair, boycotted by all
but two or three Pennsylvania representatives, it would not be an important
factor in Pennsylvania. On the other hand the caucus made it startlingly
clear that there would have to be either a knockdown fight between the
friends of Jackson and the friends of Calhoun or some kind of jointure
between them, for supporters of these two seemed to be divided fairly
evenly. The Family party, however, considered it safe to push a plan for a
State nominating convention in Harrisburg on March 4 at which they
intended to introduce Calhoun's name as presidential candidate, with
Jackson as his running mate.
After carefully sounding out public opinion, Buchanan now
abandoned his earlier preference for Calhoun. Some of the Federalists had
taken hold of the sprouting Jackson movement and stood a good chance of
appropriating the management of it. This was too good an opportunity to
ignore, particularly since many western Democrats had become enthusiastic
Jacksonians but lacked leadership. Even Judge John Bannister Gibson, a
Democratic party regular, wrote to Buchanan in January: "Heaven knows
what will be the upshot ... but it seems to me that Jackson is carrying it
away from all the rest. Next to J. C. Calhoun he is my man/*14 During
this time of uncertainty, Buchanan kept his own counsel.
In February, four days after the Crawford nomination, Callxum's
friends in Pennsylvania held a meeting in Philadelphia to select delegates
to the Harrisburg convention. Their courage broke at this point arid
George Dallas himself urged the meeting to select delegates favorable to
Jackson, with Calhoun as their second choice.15 This was a bombshell to
Calhoun, and made Jackson the choice of all parties in Pennsylvania. From
here on it would be a scramble to see who could gain control of the whole
Jackson movement and thus control the Pennsylvania patronage. Three
groups of Pennsylvania politicians accepted the fact of Jackson's popularity,
and each of these became a Jacksonian faction determined to dominate
the whole.
The first to propose Jackson's candidacy were a number of small-
fry editors and country politicians who were the real "original Jacksonian**'
of the Commonwealth. The second group of Jacksonians had been the
48
THE KING MAKER • 1821 - 1827
supporters of Governor Hiester in 1820; they were men of both Federalist
and Democratic parties who called themselves the Independent Republicans
and were soon to adopt the name "Amalgamators." These men, after the
Jacksonian movement had gotten fairly well started in the West, assumed
for themselves the title of ''original Jacksonians." Among the Democrats
were Henry Baldwin of Pittsburgh, Molton C. Rogers of Lancaster, Isaac D.
Barnard of West Chester, Robert Patterson of Harrisburg, and others
opposed to the Family or Dallas faction of their party. Among the promi-
nent Jacksonian Federalists were Andrew Gregg and James Buchanan.
Finally leaders of the Family party, belatedly observing which way
the wind was blowing, pledged themselves to Jackson and claimed the
privilege of dictating to all the others. They became known as the "Eleventh
Hour Men.*' Everyone assumed that their object was to put Jackson into
the White House for one term only, as a necessary preliminary to the
election of their favorite, Calhoun.16
The Federalists renominated Buchanan for a third Congressional
term in the fall of 1824. The nomination was a tribute to his work in
Washington, for the Lancaster party had never before endorsed anyone
for a third successive term. But another influence was also at work* Many
Federalists admitted that, sooner or later, they would have to make a clean
break with the past, either by starting a new party or by joining some faction
of the traditional enemy. Buchanan endorsed the latter plan and ran on a
ticket labelled "Federal-Republican." Some of the old-guard Federalists
resisted by throwing away their votes in the election, but Buchanan won
his race with the support of "amalgamators" of both parties. The varied
preferences for president which the rival candidates for Congress held
played no part in this campaign. The local elections continued to be fought
on the traditional local issues.
In the presidential election, held three weeks later, the popular
vote surprised even the winners in Pennsylvania. Jackson's poll was
35,929; Adams's, 5,436; Crawford's, 4,182; and Clay's, 1,705.17 But the
Electoral College vote showed no such landslide. There Jackson received
99 votes; Adams, 83; Crawford, 41; and Clay, 37. Since no candidate had
a majority, the choice devolved upon the House of Representatives which
had to make a selection from the three strongest candidates. Clay was free
to throw his influence where he wished.
THE DISPUTED ELECTION OF 1824
Exactly what happened in Washington in the interim between the meeting
of the Electoral College and the vote by the House of Representatives will
probably never be known. Politicians from all over the Union swarmed
into the national capital to add their voices to the Congressional hubbub,
49
JAMES BUCHANAN
and those from Pennsylvania were perhaps more involved in it than any.
James Buchanan, George Kremer, Samuel Ingham, Philip Marklcy, Molton
Rogers, Walter Lowrie, William Findlay, and even Albert Gallatin, had a
finger in the presidential pic.
James Buchanan was one of the most willing "fixers'* of the
Pennsylvania delegation. Two rumors current about the capital in
December gave him the impetus to action. One was that Henry Clay would
use his influence to elect Adams if Adams would promise to appoint him as
Secretary of State. The other was that Jackson, if elected, would continue
John Quincy Adams in the State Department. Buchanan felt that these
rumors placed Jackson at a disadvantage in his contest with Adams, and
put Clay in an awkward situation. The premiership in the Cabinet had
become' a stepping stone to the presidency, and Buchanan thought that if
Clay's friends could be informed that Jackson had not determined to appoint
Adams (implying that Jackson might appoint Clay), a good many Clay men
would support Old Hickory. Only this backing could elect him.
Buchanan disliked Adams and, like most Pennsylvania politicians
had to support Jackson whether he liked him or not. It was natural,
therefore, that he should have been anxious to prevent an Adams- Jarks< m
alliance. In the fall of 1824 Buchanan was supporting Jacknn with Clay
as his second choice.18
Congressman Philip S. Markley, an ardent Pennsylvania supporter
of Clay, urged Buchanan to get a statement from Jackson that he had not
promised to appoint Adams. "The friends of Jackson/1 he wrote* "or
rather the people of Pennsylvania feel a more than ordinary interest in thr
election of GenL Jackson by Congress. I have heard many of the most
influential and prominent republican* of the State , * , expreft* their *inr«»rf
desire that the friends of Mr, Clay cooperate with the friends of Jackson in
his election— as Mr, Clay is at present decidedly the second choire of IVnna,
They hope that his friends on the present occasion will not take a course
which will mar his future prospects in this State,1119 Mohnn C Rogers,
now Secretary of the Commonwealth and Chairman of the Jackson State
Committee assured Buchanan that f 'it would give great pleasure to a number
of the friends of Mr, Clay in this State, if he should use his influence in
favor of Jackson. In that event he might hope for the vote of Pennsylvania
on some future occasion-'*20 Buchanan later denied under fire that he had
ever been a political agent of Mr. Clay, but it was no secret in Washington
in the winter of 1824-1825 that Buchanan** particular wi»h was the election
of Jackson by the aid of Henry Clay, and it was a natural assumption that,
should this occur, Buchanan would later welcome Gay's elevation.
By the last week in December Buchanan decided the time for
action had come. In the hope of getting the support of Clay's friends for
Jackson and in the hope also of preventing Clay from consummating what
50
THE KING MAKER • 1821 - 1827
he felt would be a fatal move (alliance with Adams) Buchanan determined
to learn from General Jackson's own lips whether or not he had ever said
that Adams would head his Cabinet.21 Not wishing to act entirely upon his
own responsibility, however, he wrote to Rogers at Harrisburg, inquiring
whether to ask the proposed question. "I can perceive no impropriety in
Gen. Jackson making the declaration you mention," Rogers replied, "if it
will contribute to his election. Although I have the highest opinion of
Mr. Adams' qualifications for Secretary of State, yet, I would not endanger
Gen. Jackson on that account."22
Thus reinforced, Buchanan approached Jackson's friend, Major
John Henry Eaton, with his question; but receiving no satisfactory answer,
he prepared to interview General Jackson himself. On December 30, 1824,
Buchanan called on Jackson. After the company which was present had
left the apartment, Jackson asked Buchanan to take a walk with him. The
General could scarcely have been unprepared for the propounding of some
proposition of more than ordinary importance; even if Eaton had not fore-
warned him he must have noticed that Buchanan was purposely waiting
out the other guests. Jackson's practiced eye must surely have seen the
tension under which the young man was laboring.
The Hero of New Orleans, now Senator from Tennessee, was
something of an enigma in Washington. Albert Gallatin described him as
"a tall, lank, uncouth looking personage, with long locks of hair hanging
over his face, and a cue down his back tied in an eel skin; his dress singular,
his manners and deportment that of a backwoodsman."23 Josiah Quincy
called him "a knightly personage," and "vigorously a gentleman," but not
a man with whom to differ because he thought that "Heaven would not
suffer his opinions to be other than right.9'241 James Parton characterized
the Old Hero as "honest, yet capable of dissimulation; often angry, but
most prudent when most furious; . . . among dependents, all tenderness . . .;
to opponents, violent, ungenerous, prone to believe the very worst of
them." Some thought Jackson a boor, a villain and a murderer, others a
paragon of the virtues of an honest freeman, but all agreed that he had a
mysterious presence, that he looked the part of a leader of men, and that he
possessed a dangerously unpredictable temper. He was no one to trifle
with. Buchanan, when he went directly to Old Hickory with the delicate
question that the whole capital had been covertly asking, took up a task
which wiser men had been unwilling to risk.
After some desultory conversation, Buchanan spoke of the
presidential situation and of the rumors current in Washington. These
had already done some harm, he said, and would do more- He repeated
what Marldey had said: that many of Clay's friends would like to vote for
Jackson, but they were distressed by the rumor, which had never been
contradicted, that the General had made up his mind to put Adams into
51
JAMES BUCHANAN
the State Department. Then Buchanan "popped" the question. Had
General Jackson "ever declared that in case he should be elected President
he would appoint Mr. Adams Secretary of State?" Without hesitation
Old Hickory rejoined that he had never said whether he would or whether
he would not make such an appointment, "that these were secrets he would
keep to himself— he would conceal them from the very hairs of his head/'
Buchanan asked if he were at liberty to repeat this answer and, after being
assured that he was, terminated the interview. "I need scarcely remark,"
he said later, "that I afterward availed myself of the privilege."-5
A few days later Buchanan called on Congressman George Kremer
of Pennsylvania and repeated to him the gist of Marfcley's conversations
and the outcome of his talk with Jackson. Buchanan's object was apparently
to get the Jacksonians to refine on the statement already made; that is, to
change the negative declaration that Jackson had not decided to appoint
Adams into a positive one: he had decided not to appoint him. Buchanan
certainly hinted to Clay that Adams would not be the appointee. On one
occasion and in Clay's very lodgings, Buchanan "introduced the subject
of the approaching Presidential election, and spoke of the uncertainty of
the election of his favorite (Jackson), adding that 'he would form the must
splendid cabinet that the country ever had.' " When one of the group
present asked how it would be possible to have one more distinguished than
that of Mr. Jefferson, Buchanan replied, looking at Mr. Clay, that he "would
not have to go out of this room for a Secretary of State." Buchanan was
worried. On January 2 he wrote to Thomas Elder: "If I were to inform
you that I consider [Jackson's] . . . election certain, it would not he what
I believe myself/' But he had done all he could and more than he should.
He now sat back to await developments.26
James was pleased with his little excursion into the turbulent
waters of presidential politics. He had been prudent and remained on
terms of friendship with the three chief prospects of the future: Calhoun,
Jackson, and Clay. He had helped each and hurl non*. Whatever happened,
he had laid his groundwork well.
But Buchanan had embarked on deeper waters than he knew.
Had he been aware of the full extent of the bargaining, intrigm% and bribery,
he would have felt more apprehension at being involved in the business at
all If anyone got caught, everyone associated with him would be in for a
hard time trying to prove his innocence, Ingham was busy with Cook of
Illinois, whose vote would control that state, guaranteeing him a territorial
governorship for his support of Jackson* Some of Buchanan's friends spent
their time peddling the idea that a Jackson victory now would mean sure
success for Clay the next time. The Jackson promoters, of course, had
one basic advantage over the others. They alone could legitimately claim
that they wanted to honor the mandate of a majority of the nation's voters,
52
THE KING MAKER • 1821 - 1827
If adherents of minority candidates intrigued, it could be set down as
corruption, but for the Jackson men to do it would seem merely an effort
to execute the will of the people.
On January 24, three weeks after Buchanan's interview with
Jackson, the Clay-controlled Kentucky and Ohio delegations publicly
announced their decision to support Adams. It was a bold decision in the
face of threats that the election of Adams would bring violence, Lafayette,
who was on a triumphal tour of the United States at the time, probably
thought he was going to see action on the old stamping grounds again, for
his chronicler reported that "the Pennsylvania militiamen talked of laying
seige to Washington if Jackson were not chosen,"27
On January 28, the Columbian Observer of Philadelphia published
a letter from Congressman George Kremer— an Ingham satellite— baldly
charging that Clay had offered to vote for whoever would give him the
State Department; that Jackson had turned him down; that Adams had
signed the bargain; and that Clay would be announced as Secretary of
State shortly. Clay called Kremer a liar and challenged him to a duel but
backed down after Kremer started the rumor that he would duel with
squirrel rifles.
In due course, the House elected Adams, and he appointed Clay
to the State Department. The Jacksonians did not revolt, but some of them
vented their fury by burning Clay and Adams in effigy. Two Pittsburghers
who sent a barrel of whiskey to treat the fellows were indicted for inciting
a riot— "That is to say for holding out inducements to other persons, to
roast in effigy a Kentucky Gambler over a burning tar barrell," but the
County Commissioners quickly disposed of the case by announcing they
would pay no witness fees.28 The Jacksonian editors in Pennsylvania
bannered their papers with the huge, black headline: "Shameful."
James Buchanan was prudent. He said nothing.
BUCHANAN'S AMALGAMATION PARTY
If ever a man needed the talent of compromise, that man was James
Buchanan in the years of the presidency of John Quincy Adams. During
those years, he tried to weld into a single political organization as motley
a political assortment as anyone ever attempted to control It would be a
personal party, a Buchanan party; one based on his reputation for personal
integrity, his concrete achievements for his constituents, and his promises
for the future. Jackson would be the cement of this miscellany, but when
it took form it would stand solidly as a monument to Buchanan.
The challenge fascinated him, demanding techniques well suited
to his personality. In the first place, party-making was a bookkeeping
matter. Each county leader, in this confused state of politics, had his own
53
JAMES BUCHANAN
following. Buchanan knew the votes each commanded as well as the
strength of his local opposition. He kept accounts; determined where he
needed strength and how much; figured the percentage of increase from
particular appointments; pondered what approach would influence local
groups.
The man who had the patience and the sharpness of eye could
assemble into a meaningful picture this mathematical jigsaw puzzle. Un-
troubled by the distractions of poverty or parenthood, Buchanan had the
time to devote to such a task. He followed up careful calculation by careful
action: a complimentary letter here, a mild disengagement there, a letter
of recommendation to this man, an appearance at one strategic meeting,
and meaningful absence from another, a loan to a newspaper editor, a hint
that so and so would be good material for a vacant judgeship, a batch of
public documents to one, a bundle of National Intelligencers to another,
some whiskey to a third— these were the things that absorbed James
Buchanan in the years of the Adams Administration.
They were busy, tantalizing, frustrating, exhilarating yeans full
of political promise. His planning was as arduous, devious and logical as
that of a chess game, and as devoid of the appearance of emotion. Like a
chess player, Buchanan worked single-handedly. He had associates col-
leagues, partisans, and friends, but he took none of these as a partner in
his political activities. Not even his brother George, though his trusted
agent, was his confidant. He had the added advantage of private means
and thus could follow a political career without depending on it for a living.
Since his father's death he had been making money fast by purchasing
property around Lancaster at sheriffs sales. Values had been rising at a
fantastic rate. Pennsylvania land that had gone for 62 cents an acre in
1814 now brought $400 an acre. Just recently he had bought several
buildings on the southwest corner of the square in Lancaster, because he felt
that they would be a sound investment. He would use some of hi* cash
to play politics instead of playing politics to make money.
In the Pennsylvania elections of 1826, the Federalists left the
state scene, as ten years before they had withdrawn from national politics.
Shube was unanimously nominated on March 4, 1826, by the Democratic
convention in Harrisburg and the Federalists ran no candidate, ShubeVi
72,000 votes indicated that he had the Democrats plus the rapport of ail
the rest* Buchanan's aid to Shulze was his personal statement that, while
not yet a Democrat, he certainly was no longer a Federalist,
At the level of the Congressional District and the county, how-
ever, the old party names stuck* Buchanan was nominated and elected to
Congress again on a Federalist ticket of the 4th Distrust, along with his
friend Charles Miner of West Chester, now an ardent Adams man. The
Democratic Congressional candidates, who were Jacksonians, lost. Their
54
THE KING MAKER • 1821 - 1827
defeat was almost incredible in a region where, on the presidential question,
the people would have voted a twenty-to-one majority for Jackson.
After the 1826 elections Buchanan planned to cut loose from the
old party names and to begin his fight for control of the Pennsylvania Jack-
sonians. Using the pressure of the approaching presidential campaign, he
proposed to amalgamate into a voting bloc the Federalist German farmers
of the East and the Scotch-Irish frontier Democrats of the West. Though
formerly political antagonists, these two groups now both enthusiastically
acclaimed Jackson and both resented the Philadelphia-centered control of
the Family party. They could do one of three things: endorse Adams,
follow Ingham and Dallas who worked mainly for Calhoun and'kept all the
offices to themselves, or join Buchanan's Amalgamation party which stood
solidly for Jackson and promised to share its power with the yeomanry of
the State.
Buchanan's associates in the Amalgamation movement were men
to be reckoned with. Henry Baldwin of Pittsburgh could stand eye to eye
with William Wilkins, the Family's only strong representative there.
Molton C. Rogers of Lancaster had just finished a tenn as Secretary of the
Commonwealth. General Isaac D. Barnard who had served brilliantly
during the War of 1812 before settling down to the practice of law in
West Chester, had been among the first prominent Pennsylvanians to come
out for Jackson and had demonstrated his power by frightening Dallas out
of his plan to nominate Calhoun at Harrisburg in March, 1824. In 1826,
Governor Shulze gave him Rogers's place as Secretary of the Common-
wealth and in 1827 the Legislature selected him as United States Senator.
Barnard's connection with the Amalgamation group gave the Family
something to worry about. George B. Porter, a young Lancaster lawyer of
great influence among the lower classes, a militia general, a man of explo-
sive, picturesque language, and of political ambition, abandoned the Family
party to join Buchanan.
Many others prominent in Pennsylvania came to the support
of Amalgamation and through it became, for the time, co-workers of
Buchanan: Calvin Blythe of Mifflin County, Secretary of the Common-
wealth after Barnard's election to the national Senate; George G. Leiper,
veteran Congressman from Delaware County; Daniel Sturgeon of Fayette
County; John Wurts and Thomas Kittera, Federalist Congressmen from
Philadelphia; John B. Sterigere of Montgomery County; Joshua Evans,
Congressman from Chester County; and of special importance, Henry A.
Muhlenberg of Berks County*
These men defined the nature of the Amalgamation organization.
It included those high in the state administration, many of the Federalist
Congressmen, a number of old-line Democrats who were disgusted with
or excluded from the Ingham group, and key representatives in every
55
JAMES BUCHANAN
portion of the Commonwealth. They were all for Jackson, all for the
creation of a new party, and nearly all for the future elevation of Henry
Clay to the White House, though this phase of Amalgamation was purposely
left vague.
One of the leaders of the Family party, observing these develop-
ments, wrote that the rapidly growing Amalgamation scheme was "fairly
attributable to Mr. Buchanan, who has for some years past been fond of
being considered a Democrat in the liberality of his principles, whilst he
desired the support of the federalists as their Magnus Apollo/' The day
would come, he feared, when "Mr. Buchanan would have 'bestridden our
narrow world like a Colossus' with the patronage and power of Pennsylvania
at his feet."29
BARGAIN AND SALE
Buchanan was congratulating himself daring the week before the state
election of 1826 upon how nicely the Amalgamation plans were progressing.
He began to see the whole prospect unfolding before him in logical, in-
evitable steps that must shortly sink the Family claims to control in
confusion and bring him to the forefront as one of the top managers of a
triumphant Jackson organization in Pennsylvania. Then he got that letter.
It was from Duff Green, Calhoun's campaign manager, dated
October 12, 1826.
You will discover from the Journal & Telegraph that Mr. Clay &
myself are at issue. The part taken by you on the occasion
referred to, is known to me; and a due regard to your feelings has
heretofore restrained me from using your name before the public.
The time, however, Js now approaching when il will become the
duty of every man to do all in his power to expose the bargain
which placed the Coalition in power. Will you, upon the receipt
of this, write to me and explain the causes which induced you to
see GenL Jackson upon the subject of the vote of Mr. Clay & hi»
friends a few days before it was known that they had conclusively
determined to vote for Mr. Adams; also advise me of the manner
in which you would prefer that subject to be brought before
the people.30
He read it and his vision collapsed. If that "bargain and sale"
business was ever opened up again in a formal way, he was done for, not
because he had done anything wrong but because all the appearances would
be against him. He had done it again*— had tried to act in good faith, but
he had proceeded in a manner that laid him wide open to misinterpretation
and every kind of malicious gossip.
56
THE KING MAKER • 1821 - 1827
Who was responsible for disinterring this dead cat and tying it to
his coattails, he wondered. Green and Calhoun probably wished a re-
hashing of the political deal for the purpose of guaranteeing to Jackson
his single term and of blasting forever Adams and Clay in order that Calhoun
might be the only presidential candidate with unsinged reputation in 1832.
Ingham, too, was certainly in it. He knew that no public discussion of
president-making in the first two weeks of 1825 could go very far without
embarrassing his rival, Buchanan. Ingham would find this move especially
serviceable: not only would the candidates opposed to Calhoun be ruined,
but Buchanan and his Amalgamators, sympathetic to the future prospects
of Clay, would be completely upset in Pennsylvania.
Buchanan worked for four days phrasing a reply that would suit
the requirements: one which would assert his innocence and at the same
time threaten unpleasant consequences, should the issue be forced. "The
facts are before the world," he wrote, "that Mr. Clay & his particular friends
made Mr* Adams President, & that Mr. Adams immediately thereafter
made Mr. Clay Secretary of State. The people will draw their own in-
ferences from such conduct & from the circumstances connected with it.
They will judge the cause from the effects. I am clearly of opinion that
whoever shall attempt to prove by direct evidence any corrupt bargain
between Mr. C. and Mr. A. will fail; for if it existed the parties to it will
forever conceal it."31
With this the matter simmered for a while, but the following
summer Jackson himself came out against Clay alleging, in a public letter
to Carter Beverly of Virginia, that a Congressman had sought to make a
corrupt bargain with him on Clay's behalf. Clay then demanded to know
who was this Congressman. Now Ingham began a correspondence with
Buchanan to force him into as unfavorable a position as possible.
"It is useless now to regret," he wrote, after everything had been
made public but Buchanan's name. "Shd Clay demand of Genl Jackson
his author he will have no alternative, nor could he have had from the
first. . . : You will therefore be joined into the battle under a fire,— but I
see no difficulty in the case if you take your ground well and maintain
it boldly.'**
If Ingham saw no difficulty, Buchanan saw a great deal. He now
had the hard choice of publicly confessing agency in a dirty bargain attempt,
or of openly calling Andrew Jackson a liar. After a month of agonizing, he
brought the "bargain and sale" controversy to its climax by a long letter
to the public, in which he denied the truth of Jackson's charge: "I called
upon General Jackson . . . solely as his friend, upon my individual responsi-
bility," he wrote, "and not as the agent of Mr. Clay or any other person."83
Everyone interpreted the affair according to his own lights. "It
places Jackson in a most awkward predicament," wrote a friend of Adams.
57
JAMES BUCHANAN
"I am surprised at his indiscretion It turns out exactly as I suspected . . .
that the author of the communication would prove to be a warm partisan
of the opposition. ... But what surprises me more than anything else is
the situation in which the General places his friend. From this statement
he not only carried the proposal but advised him to accede to it; and yet
he is still worthy of esteem. Buchanan is ruined if anything can ruin a man
who is a partisan in party times.''34 Another gentleman^of the same party
wrote: "Buchanan ... is in a pitiable predicament. Nothing short of a
miracle can save him. His advice [to Jackson] is perfectly understood by
the public. I wish that rascal Ingham was in his place. I doubt if in fact
he is not more steeped in guilt than any of them."35
Henry Clay declared that while Buchanan labored to "spare and
cover General Jackson" he failed in every essential point to sustain him.
"Indeed," he continued, "I could not desire a stronger statement from
Mr. Buchanan."36 R> P. Letchcr held the same tone, writing that he was
truly delighted that Buchanan had extricated himself from the dilemma in
which Jackson had placed him and had "come forth victoriously/'37
William Rawle of Philadelphia confided to his diary on the night Buchanan *s
public reply was received: "The question must now turn upon the veracity
of Mr. Buchanan or of Gen. Jackson. If we believe the former, General J.
must have quite misapprehended— or wilfully misrepresented the con-
nection. If the latter, the Gen. had reasonable grounds for believing that
Mr. Clay's friends collectively authorized Buck— to make the overture
Jackson appears to great disadvantage unless we discard all that is assertetj
by Buchanan."38
John C. Calhoun felt that the Buchanan letter would "procure a
reaction" against Jackson, but that it would not be so serious* as to jwtpaniusp
his election- "Mr. B. it is clear feels the awkwardness of his utuatittu"
he said, "which has throughout modified hits conception of the «tai<* t>f the
case. Hence we see throughout the statement an effort to get d«>ar of all
conception of agency on his part, and to give a character of innoceiicy to
the whole aflat,'**
By and large the Jackson press agreed to say that Buchanan's
letter did support General Jackson in all his charges agamst Gay.40 Not so,
however, the Jacksonians of the Amalgamation branch in Pennsylvania
who were wild with rage. Molton Rogers told Buchanan : r"My own < »pmion
is that Jackson's prospects for the presidency are much taueiitti, if "<>t
totally destroyed by his impolitic if not unkind conduct in relation to you
in this affair. There is as far as I have been able to learn, but one opinion.
The Governor is indignant at his conduct, & there would be no difficulty
in bringing him out decidedly on the occasion, together with all the officer*
of the Government. . . You owe it to your own character to defend your-
self, and I would suggest a meeting in Lancaster to express this opinion on
58
THE KING MAKER • 1821 - 1827
the subject. , . It will be impossible for you to support Genl. Jackson.
He has left you and your friends no alternative."41 The situation had
changed. Temporarily, at least, it appeared as if Buchanan held the pivotal
position. The Adams men threw open their arms in the hope that Buchanan
would rush into their embrace, and there were many who, when asked what
side they would take if the matter were made a sheer issue of veracity,
replied in the words of James Stevenson of Pittsburgh, "Why, by God,
I will believe Buchanan in preference to Gen. Jackson."42
To Ingham, Buchanan wrote: "If General Jackson and our
editors should act with discretion the storm may blow over without injury.
Should they on the contrary force me to the wall and make it absolutely
necessary for the preservation of my own character to defend myself, I
know not what may be the consequence. ... It is in your power to do
much to give this matter a proper direction. . . . My friends here are very
indignant but I believe I can keep them right."43 To Duff Green, who had
thought it prudent two weeks before to apologize for making so much
trouble, Buchanan wrote stiffly that although he would never join the
Adams party, he could not be responsible for damage to the Jackson cause
that might result from a further attempt to pin the bargain on him.44
The controversy did not destroy Buchanan, but it did earn for
him the life-long distrust of General Jackson, and it cooled noticeably the
ardor of his friends for Old Hickory. Buchanan wrote of Jackson's state-
ment that it was "a most extraordinary production so far as I am con-
cerned;"45 Jackson, on his part, confided to Amos Kendall that Buchanan's
address was "such a production as surely I had not a right to expect from
him."46 Jackson, too, may justly have felt some irritation with the Calhoun
leaders who for a year had known the ground on which Buchanan stood,
although they had never troubled to point out the wide difference in their
views. Van Buren assured Jackson that "Although our friend Buchanan
was evidently frightened and therefore softened and obscured the matter,
still the fact of your entire aversion to all and any intrigue or arrangement
is clearly established."47 The widespread publicity given the affair probably
strengthened the belief of the average voter on each side that the opposition
was crooked and added bitterness to an already violent campaign. As a
result Buchanan became more secretive and cautious than ever in his
subsequent political maneuvers.
59
5
FAREWELL TO FEDERALISM * 1828-1832
THE BUCHANAN-JACKSON PARTY
Buchanan now staked his political future on an outright change of party.
He would, after having been four times elected to Congress as a Federalist,
run as a Democratic candidate for the same office. "It will require the
greatest excitement of party feelings, to induce many of the Jackson
Democrats to vote for a Jackson Federalist/' wrote one of his friends.1
He opened his personal campaign in 1828 by a speech to Congress
on February 4 in which he broke his usual habit of keeping election politics
out of policy speeches and joined the Adams-baiting pack in the House,
As the attack on the Administration progressed, Buchanan at length
jumped into the fight and made a truculent speech against the President.
While moderate in comparison to the efforts of many of his Jacksonian
colleagues, it still was a deliberate political onslaught. Buchanan brought
to bear against Adams not epithets and slander, but a lawyer's marshalled
evidence which proved the more damning for its restraint of phraseology
and the evidences of scholarship it suggested. It was not a rant; it was the
presentation of proof, wrought into argument, that the Administration had
been despotic, unconstitutional, dishonest, immoral, corrupt, and would
imperil the nation if continued in office. It set Buchanan before the
country as a powerful champion of Jackson and initiated the Amalgamation
campaign in his own election district.2
During the last week of May, 1828, Federalists and Democrats
favorable to Jackson met at the Lancaster Courthouse. Their resolutions
announced Buchanan's new organization which had, until now, been only
a prospect:
Resolved: That at the county meeting to be held on the 27th
day of August next, the Delegates be requested to nominate and
settle such ticket, as will give as general satisfaction as possible
to the friends of Andrew Jackson throughout the county &
60
FAREWELL TO FEDERALISM « 1828 - 1832
district, without reference to the political distinctions which
have heretofore divided us.3
There it was, out in the light of day, over the signatures of twoscore men
who, for a generation past, had run against each other for office under the
labels of Federalist or Democrat.
After the storm signal went up, it took less than a week for the
hurricane to descend. Its violence was aggravated by informal agreements
which could not be kept secret regarding the candidates who would be
chosen in the fall. As the new Jackson party had to choose between leaders
of two groups, it was inevitable that there should be twice as many claimants
as there were nominations to be made. John McCamant, for example, who
had been a frequent Democratic candidate for Congress, had to move aside
in favor of Buchanan. McCamant was broad-minded enough to understand
the necessity and to retire gracefully. He accepted (against the advice of
his friends) a nomination to the State Legislature.4
Other plans terminated less happily. E. C. Reigart, who had long
been a Congressional aspirant of the Federalist party, but who had been
turned down at every nomination meeting in favor of Buchanan and at last
had gone over to the Adams party, was beside himself with rage. He became
obsessed with the determination to ruin Buchanan, and through the summer
months poured forth in the Marietta Pioneer such slander as Lancaster
County had never known in an election.
Benjamin Champneys, a brilliant young lawyer of Lancaster who
had formerly worked closely with the Family party, had been persuaded to
join the Amalgamation movement by General George B. Porter. Champneys
grudgingly accepted a place on the state assembly ticket He felt that this
post was far beneath his dignity and took the assignment only as a means
of keeping in the public eye.
In Chester County, Charles Miner, who had been a Federalist
colleague of Buchanan for two terms, wrote to his wife that he planned
not to stand for Congress again. Miner had become an Adams supporter,
despite his recognition that Adams would undoubtedly lose in Chester. Why
not retire now rather than wait and "risk being run out?" "Buchanan,"
he concluded, "is really a strong man, and much as we differ on the presi-
dential question, I should be sorry to see him out of Congress. This to
your private ear.1'5 But Miner's friends would not hear of his retirement,
and it was not long before he was placed in the Congressional race against
Buchanan, with whom he had been accustomed to run in double harness.6
By July 4 the campaign reached full tide. Buchanan managed to
be at three meetings that day— at Yellow Springs, later at Downingtown,
and at the end of the day at a huge Jackson banquet in the woods of Langdon
Cheves's residence, "Abbeville," in Lancaster,7
61
JAMES BUCHANAN
The toasts at these affairs fairly well summarized the particular
points of Buchanan's political strength in his district. His backers praised
him for his successful support of duties on iron, hemp, molasses, and liquor
during the tariff debate of the spring; for his exertions to get the Pennsyl-
vania militia fines of 1814 turned back to the state; for obtaining a large
refund from the federal government to Pennsylvania distillers who had
been overtaxed; for exposing corruption in the Adams Administration;
for aiding the Irishmen of the district by moderating the naturalization
laws; for asserting the rights of farmers and manufacturers; for supporting
local internal improvements; for endorsing a system of public education;
and most particularly for the early and loyal fight for Jackson.
Buchanan expected to face violent opposition, but the reality
exceeded anything he had imagined. His old partisans portrayed him as
the architect of the whole "bargain and sale" plan. They circulated a
garbled account of his 1815 speech against Jefferson and Madison, mis-
quoting him as saying on that occasion: "If I ever hat! a drop of Demo-
cratic blood in my veins, I would let it out." The Adams men also published
handbills recalling Buchanan's former presidency of the Lancaster Wash-
ington Society, the official committee of the Federalist party.8
They represented his speeches on the tariff as antagonistic to
protection and favorable only to the wishes of southern freetraders. They
characterized his part in the inquiry into the conduct of Adams's Adminis-
tration as an example of his political profligacy and eagerness to promote
himself by tearing down the reputation of others. They charged him with
being a friend of slavery and of the slave trade— a charge particularly
effective in the Quaker and Pennsylvania German regions— and they
claimed that he frequently absented himself from Congress to attend lo his
private law business, although he drew pay during his absence.1*
Buchanan kept out of the mess, letting his* party editurn handle
all rebuttal until the Marietta Pioneer of August 15 came nut with the
headlines:
Fathers! Husbands!! Brothers!!!
Read. Pause. Reflect. AndThm
Vote for James Buchanan if You Can!
The article charged that Buchanan had asserted, "within the hearing of two
or more respectable witnesses, that Mrs. Adams, the wife of the Chief
Magistrate, was born out of wedlock."10
Upon seeing this Buchanan sat down and wrote a letter to the
presumed author, demanding all particulars of the charge, names of the
people claiming to be witnesses, and details of the occurrence*21 Editor
Reigart replied in phraseology which quite failed to support the charge in
62
FAREWELL TO FEDERALISM • 1828 - 1832
the original article. Later a number of Buchanan's friends who had been
at Yellow Springs stated that they had heard Buchanan speak of the lady
"in terms of the most unqualified praise."12
Reigart was not the only editor who helped to make this national
campaign notorious for scandal-mongering and slander. Many Adams
papers broadcast that Jackson's mother had been a common prostitute with
the British Army, that the General was the son of a Negro, and that his
wife was a bigamist. It was then that the Jackson press retaliated with
the canard about Mrs. Adams.
Buchanan refuted the charge about absence from Congress so
thoroughly that his enemies came back with another accusation: he had
started the inquiry himself in order to have the advantage of showing his
rebuttal. With characteristic precision, Buchanan had kept an account
book listing every day spent in Congress. He proved that he had reported
every absence to the Treasury, and had his pay for these days deducted
from his salary. He had missed only one roll call of importance because of
a case in court, and in that instance the fate of the bill had not depended
upon his vote.13
The tariff question had become extremely important to citizens
of Pennsylvania by 1828. In the Keystone State, protection had ceased
to be an economic issue interesting only to manufacturers; as early as 1824,
when the tariff problem seriously entered politics, the farmers of the state
also wanted high duties. By 1827 nearly every economic class and every
political party favored the protective system.
Jackson, Calhoun, Adams and Clay all posed as the ardent
champions of protection in Pennsylvania, but the first two came from the
South where the protective tariff now encountered heavy opposition.
Adams and Clay were strongest in New England which was devoted to
protection. Buchanan had to develop a position on the tariff which would
coincide with Jackson's, be competitive with the view of Adams and Clay,
and satisfy Pennsylvania. He had already devised the required formula.
In his first speech on the tariff he laid down ideas which he never there-
after abandoned, even though he was at times under strong political pressure
to do so.
Buchanan advocated a national economy based upon self-
sufficiency. A tariff, he believed, should first, protect agriculture, and
particularly agricultural products which were the raw material of domestic
manufactures; second, protect those manufactures which used domestic
raw materials or were essential for national defense; and third, guarantee
some equality of protection for the products of every section of the country.
Buchanan opposed prohibitive tariffs, tariffs which would tend to give any
type of producer a monopoly, and rates which would give an exclusive
advantage to any single region or whose impact would affect chiefly the
63
JAMES BUCHANAN
poor. All of these viewpoints he had clearly defined in speeches in 1823
and 1824.
The tariff question came to the forefront in 1827, when the
Woolens Bill was introduced in Congress. This bill taxed the cheapest
woolen goods at the highest rate; the most expensive were not taxed at all.
It provided for duties on raw wool, but they were much lower relatively
than those on imported cloth.
The proposed statute put Pennsylvania's Congressmen in a
dilemma. It worked hardship on everyone who bought woolen cloth and
brought relief to only a few wool raisers of western counties. It also gave
a monopoly of wool manufacture to the New England States, without any
quid pro quo for other sections. It was an Adams measure which, if opposed
by Jacksonians, would give the Adams Coalition a wonderful opportunity
to assert that it was for, and Jackson against, the protective principle. In
Pennsylvania this idea would possibly be fatal to Jackson's popularity.
Buchanan considered the Woolens Bill so bad that he would not
support it even in exchange for new duties on Pennsylvania's favorite
commodities: iron, hemp and molasses. It was exclusively a New England
bill. If it passed, Pennsylvania would need a tariff against New England
more than against Old England, It taxed the poor of the whole Union to
give New England exclusive control of the cloth market. Let his opponents
call his course inconsistent: he would not sacrifice American farmers and
the interests of three sections of the Union— South* Middle and West— to
the greed of a few New England manufacturers. They had been at the
committee hearings by the drove. But how many farmers were thrre to
testify? How many westerners or middle state men? None. The bill
was a New England fraud from start to finish.
This line of debate got a cool reception at home, Buchanan wan
one of only seven of Pennsylvania's 26 Congressmen to vote against the
Woolens Bill. Many of those who supported it, Buchanan charged, dis-
approved it, but "believed their constituents to be so Tariff mad that they
were afraid to vote against it."w Ingham, too, opposed it: the Jadksanian
leaders agreed that they could not afford to permit it to pass under Adminis-
tration auspices and believed they had grounds enough to justify their
opposition because of the defects in the details of the proposal.
But the measure passed the House. In the Senate Martin
Van Buren, now a staunch Jackson adherent, caused a tie by refusing to
vote, thus forcing Vice-President Galhoun to make the decision and incur
the odium of one side or the other. Calhoun, venom in his heart against
Van Buren, took the only course he could: he sided with his own section
and voted down the bill In Pennsylvania, newspaper editors let loose with
the headline: "John C. Calhoun — The Arch Traitor" and under this printed
64
FAREWELL TO FEDERALISM • 1828 - 1832
the names of the seven Congressmen who had opposed the bill, labelled
"The seven Traitors of Pennsylvania " Buchanan headed the list.15
Pennsylvania reacted sharply to the defeat of the Woolens Bill.
A state convention in favor of tariff protection which met in Harrisburg on
June 27 assumed the aspect of a Clay-Adams electioneering meeting and
became the basis for a second at the same place on July 30, which was
advertised as a national convention of all friends of protection. Henry Clay
was scheduled to be there, and all friends of the manufacturing interest
were invited. The Jacksonians boycotted both meetings, stating that the
program was "actuated only by a desire to seduce Pennsylvania from the
cause of Jackson, under false pretences that himself & friends are opposed
to the. Tariff, while Mr. Adams is in its favor."16 Buchanan's brother
George wrote worriedly from Pittsburgh, "The Woolens Bill is the great
handle of Mr. Adams's friends here."17
During the summer, as the tide against Jackson continued to rise,
Buchanan began to receive letters of this tenor: "I now prefer Mr. Adams
. . , from a conviction that the interests of Pennsylvania are more likely
to be promoted by the ascendency of northern men & northern measures
than of southern men and southern measures."18
In order to meet the charge of "southern men and southern
measures" Buchanan seized upon the only real stand Jackson had ever
taken in regard to the tariff, his Coleman letter of 1824, and made as much
of it as he dared.
In a letter to the Lancaster JTecMy Journal, he wrote:
Although the mass of the population of the Southern states may
be hostile to the tariff policy, yet some distinguished individuals
have risen above the prejudice by which they are surrounded.
Among them I take pleasure in mentioning . , . General Jackson
...» I do know and I wish to be understood as speaking from
personal knowledge, that General Jackson not only voted for the
Tariff [of 1824], but that he was its decided and efficient friend.
He did more to reconcile many of the Southern members of
Congress to it than any other man in the country did or could
have done.19
True, but Jackson supported this bill because he thought it
necessary to the national defense; he did not support it because he believed
in the protective principle, and he urged his southern colleagues to support
it for the same reason.
Buchanan had to show, somehow, that the New England States
and the Adams Administration were opposed to a tariff. Early in July 1827,
while on a brief electioneering trip to western Pennsylvania, he dropped a
remark which foreshadowed the plan. A communication to the Franttln
65
JAMES BUCHANAN
Repository signed "Agricola" quoted him as saying: "We [meaning
Jackson's friends] will next session bring before Congress a tariff bill so
larded with other than protection to wool growers and manufacturers of
wool, and involving principles which we know the East will not agree to,
[that] we will . . . throw the odium of its rejection off the South on ...
the East."20
The story of the Tariff of Abominations is well known. But as
soon as the trick bill was proposed Pennsylvania took it up with an enthusi-
asm which had not been anticipated. All the Pennsylvania Jacksonians
worked hard for it, and the Adams men supported it. The bill, once passed,
was received with joyful acclaim in Pennsylvania. By midsummer of 1828,
reports were widespread that the cause of Jackson was "rising rather than
declining."
The result was a good deal of an impasse. Neither side could
daim a clear victory on the tariff issue, but the important thing for the
Jacksonians was that a tariff bill of their making had passed. In the North
this was used as prima facie evidence of Jackson's soundness on the ques-
tion. But the individual Congressmen who had voted against the 1827
Woolens Bill had not been forgiven. Every one of them faced a hard
struggle to retain his place in Congress, and none more so than James
Buchanan.
James wrote that "the persecution against me in this county has
exceeded all reasonable bounds. Some of the leaders of the Adams party
have transferred all their abuse from Genl. Jackson to me. The purest &
most disinterested acts of my life have been misconstrued, & out of them
charges have been raised to destroy my reputation/*
In view of the state of public feeling, the tactics of the campaign
were of great importance. Anything might happen in such an emotionally
charged atmosphere, and the letters Buchanan got from his lieutenants in
various parts of the state showed no assurance that Jackson would carry
the state, or that Buchanan was safe in the district.21
In the local election early in October, however, Buchanan demon-
strated the strength of his hold on the voters of Lancaster by polling 1371
votes in the city against 309 for his opponent; and 5203 in the District
against 3904. These results, which carried through the entire local ticket,
showed that the Amalgamation plan of uniting Jackson Federalists and
Jackson Democrats had been a resounding success.22 In the presidential
election of November Jackson defeated Adams in the Lancaster County
District by a majority of 1467 out of a total of 8905 votes*23
THE FIGHT FOR THE SPOILS
Sitting in the quiet of his study on East King Street* Buchanan reviewed
the course of recent events and tried to sketch out in his mind the imme-
66
FAREWELL TO FEDERALISM • 1828 - J832
diate future. He could not stand many more contests like this one. What
had been accomplished? The most remarkable thing was his own election
as a Democrat after having been elected to Congress four times as a Feder-
alist. That was a gratifying testimony to his personal reputation and had
been worth the violence of the campaign. The battle had left a good many
wounded veterans, but the important thing was that it had been won and
the victory proclaimed the existence of a strong new party in Pennsylvania
of which James Buchanan was the leader.
Pennsylvania cast so impressive a vote for Andrew Jackson that
everyone took it for granted that the Keystone State would have a dis-
tinguished place in the new Cabinet, but to find a man combining personal
capacity and political availability proved a thorny task for the new Adminis-
tration. Old Hickory would "have his own trouble with Pennsylvania,"
wrote one of Buchanan's editors from Harrisburg; there were "more
quarters than one" in which "something like a vice-royalty will be ex-
pected."24 As the original Jackson men cut no figure in state politics, it
was certain that the main struggle for influence would develop between
Buchanan's Amalgamators and the Family party, neither of whom appealed
particularly to General Jackson. The Amalgamators were tainted by their
partiality for Henry Clay, the support of the Federalists, and Buchanan's
part in the "bargain and sale" scandal The Family party suffered from
the deserved stigma of its nickname, "Eleventh Hour men." It represented
the city and business element of politics, which the western frontier voters
hated, and openly proclaimed its intention to put Calhoun in the White
House as soon as possible*
Buchanan had worked out a comprehensive plan for his party:
get Henry Baldwin into the Cabinet; promote Senator Isaac Barnard for
governor in 1829; after his election, let him use his influence to persuade
the Legislature to send Buchanan to the Senate as the replacement; and
run George B. Porter for Congress in Buchanan's place to assume direction
of the Amalgamation men in the House. The scheme showed clearly that
Buchanan had advanced from the county and district level, and had
broadened his view to encompass the state and the nation. The new
program appealed to the rural and poorer class of Pennsylvanians against
the urban and richer class. The voting strength of the western frontiersmen
led by Baldwin, the latent power of the German farmers, organized by
Buchanan and Henry A. Muhlenberg, and the class consciousness of the
newly aroused workingmen of Philadelphia would be combined to challenge
the political and financial monopoly which Philadelphia and Pittsburgh, now
controlled by the Family party, had long imposed on the Commonwealth.
Buchanan went to Washington shortly after the presidential
election to superintend the details. He had been rooming with Senator
Barnard for a year, but the two of them now moved to Mrs. Cottinger's
67
JAMES BUCHANAN
where they could be joined by Congressmen James S. Stevenson of Pitts-
burgh and John B. Sterigere of Chester County.25 Buchanan was in poor
shape for the job which had to be done; he had been violently ill for several
months during the latter part of the election campaign with bilious fever.
These attacks, which seized him whenever he faced a hard fight, gave him
nausea, violent headache, and diarrhea and kept him near the slop bucket
into which he vomited bile until he was empty and then painfully retched
air. He was scarcely well when he returned to Congress in December, and
by the beginning of the new year suffered a recurrence of the fever which
lasted throughout February.26
Rumor had early picked Samuel D. Ingham and Henry Baldwin
as the two Pennsylvanians most likely to be honored by a Cabinet post and
until February, 1829, it was a question who would succeed. Buchanan had
no hopes for himself, but he did expect that Jackson would select Baldwin
for the Treasury Department.27 He had defended Jackson in 1819 when
he had been under attack for his Florida expedition, had been the first
Pennsylvaman to ask him formally to be a presidential candidate, and had
worked ardently for the cause ever since. Baldwin's son had recently
bought a plantation next to the Hermitage in Tennessee and had been on
terms of intimacy with Jackson throughout the summer of 1828.
The prospects seemed so good that the Amalgamators failed to
exert themselves as hard as circumstances demanded When Buchanart
had discussed with Baldwin the possibility of nominating him for governor
in the spring of 1829, he had positively declined under an assurance from
Jackson that he would be placed at the head of the Treasury, and when the
president-elect invited Baldwin to come to Washington for a conference in
February, it was assumed that the appointment would now be offered
to him.38
On the other hand, Ingham appeared to have little chance. Just
a year before he had been defeated in the contest for United Stales Senator
by a vote of 11 to 108 in favor of Barnard. Furthermore, Ingham was now
so ill at his home in New Hope that his friends feared for his life,
But Buchanan and his partisans did not know that the Eleventh
Hour Men had sowed all manner of doubts about Baldwin among Jackson's
advisors, and that a few of them had called upon Jackson, representing
themselves as spokesmen for the whole Pennsylvania delegation, and had
demanded the highest place for Ingham. Calhoun's friends joined in the
effort29 Their strongest argument was that the appointment of Ingham
would ensure the nomination of a strong pro-Jackson governor of Pennsyl-
vania. The Amalgamators, warned the Calhoun men, hoped to see Clay
in the White House, and if they got control of the state administration
they might succeed.
68
FAREWELL TO FEDERALISM • 1828 . 1832
Late in February Jackson announced the appointment of Ingham
as Secretary of the Treasury. The loss of this key appointment to the
enemy was bad enough, but for Buchanan it was only half of the disaster.
Baldwin, cut to the core by the ridicule heaped upon him by the Family
press, considered himself entirely crushed and announced his "complete
withdrawal from political contests."30 To lose the services of Baldwin in
the western region would nearly cripple the Amalgamation plan.
Buchanan could do little to help in Washington because Jackson
distrusted him and he had been counting on Baldwin to be his direct channel
to the White House. He tried to promote the appointment of his faction's
candidates for various federal offices, but Jackson gave the appointments
to the Dallas men.
By June, Buchanan's enthusiasm for Andrew Jackson had cooled
perceptibly. The love and admiration which Pennsylvanians had expressed
for Jackson personally had not, he wrote, "been transferred to his ad-
ministration/'31 The Amalgamators had lost the fight in Washington and
had to salvage what they could in Harrisburg.
On March 4, 1829, while a howling mob wrecked the White House
in an effort to congratulate the newly inaugurated president, his friends in
Pennsylvania congregated in Harrisburg to stage a bitter grudge fight for
control of the state Jacksonian party.
Buchanan stayed away from the Harrisburg convention. He
had worked out the strategy, informed everyone of the task to be done,
and now left it up to the county workers to go into the fight and win. But
these men were no match for some of the old and skillful politicians work-
ing for Ingham, whose convention delegation was managed by Dr. Joel B.
Sutherland of Philadelphia. Barnard, after leading a field of ten candidates
through thirteen ballots, finally lost the nomination for governor to the
Family candidate, George Wolf, by the unexpected switch of three western
delegates. The defeat was particularly galling to the Amalgamators, not
so much because the final three votes which nominated Wolf had been
bought by Sutherland as because Barnard's own five-man delegation froip
Chester County had been barred from the convention on the first day in
favor of a contesting Family delegation. The Barnard men shouted "foul,"
called a general party conclave to condemn the Harrisburg proceedings,
and planned another convention in May to place Barnard in the field. They
denounced Wolfs nomination as the result of "intrigue and management
in order, if possible, to secure the vote of Pennsylvania at the next presi-
dential election for John C. Calhoun."32 It seemed clear that the nomination
of Wolf would be contested and that Barnard, or even Shulze, might be
selected to run against him.
Buchanan wrote hastily to Barnard, expressing his mortification
at the proceedings of the convention. There should have been an imme-
69
JAMES BUCHANAN
diate protest, he thought, but now that the convention had adjourned, it
was too late; they would all have to support Wolf. "There is no course
left but submission. . . . Your enemies would be delighted if you should
consent to be a candidate. This, however, I feel certain you will not do."33
By April, matters approached a crisis, for Barnard's friends
seemed determined to hold another convention in May. By valiant work
Buchanan at last managed to avert an open split among the Jacksonian*
and to prevent the meeting of the proposed convention. He saw no ad-
vantage in fighting the men supported by the Jackson Administration,
especially at this time. Anti-Masonry had rapidly come to the fullness of
its mushroomlike growth and, in alliance with the old Adams party, would
certainly defeat a Democracy split in two,
Buchanan therefore urged the Amalgamators to abandon all
formal opposition to Wolf and develop a campaign to gain some influence
over him. Barnard should remain quietly in the Senate; Shulze should
make all the removals he could, filling the places with supporters of Wolf
so that the new governor would be placed in the predicament of bring
unable to give office to men of his own choice without firing political
friends.34 Buchanan's county organizations would circulate the idea that
Wolf was strong for Calhoun but lukewarm for Jackson. This would give
them some leverage at Harrisburg after the election.
In June 1829, the anti-Masons nominated Joseph Ritner for the
governorship. He had the advantages of residence in the western part of
the state, Pennsylvania-Dutch Wood, and a reputation as an ardent pro-
tectionist, but the Jacksonians felt these were more than counteracted by
his support of Adams in 1828, his ridiculous conduct when Speaker of the
state House of Representatives, and the deplorable absence of delegates at
the anti-Masonic nominating convention. The Family party did not fear
Ritner; it feared the defection of the Buchanan men.
Buchanan worked throughout the summer trying to keep hta
partisans in line, a task very much complicated by the type of fallowing he
had purposely created. Diverse elements could be held together under the
pressures and expectations of 1828, but it was a different matter to keep
them united in the face of defeat and without proHpirt* of reward.3'*
Barnard made no real effort to keep the Amalgamation group intact in
Chester County, letting his followers drift to the anti-Masons or the Family
without protest. He occupied himself chiefly with the buttle, trying t*»
forget his recent defeat, "For God's sake/' Buchanan wrote to htm,
"summon up that resolution which belongs to your character & abandon
the practice forever- . . . You have been but once disappointed; & dis-
appointment is the common fate of public men* The Senate of the United
States is a theatre as exalted a$ that to which your friends wished IP elevate
you. * . , Pardon my frankness & attribute it altogether to
70
FAREWELL TO FEDERALISM • 1828 - 1832
Barnard, however, never recovered. He was a dead weight on the Amal-
gamation party and became useless in the Senate from which, within a
little more than a year, he resigned.
Buchanan took his two-week vacation at Bedford Springs as usual,
but returned home in mid-August to take the stump for Wolf. He talked
mostly at meetings of Barnard men, telling them that, although he had
not been in favor of the nomination of Wolf, it was now the duty of all
Jacksonians to support him. His speeches placed him on perfectly open
ground with Wolf, but hardly quieted the apprehensions of the Family
party that Barnard's friends, for revenge, would vote anti-Masonic or not
vote at all.
The poll in October gave shocking evidence that Joseph Ritner
had support other than that of the anti-Masons. Wolfs victory was no
landslide, and explanations of why it was not were soon pouring in from
every direction. Buchanan wrote,
Anti-Masonry has overwhelmed us like a tornado in this county.
Until within a few days of the election none of us had an idea of
its extensive influence. . . . The majority against us will exceed
1500. It was 1300 in our favor last election. ... In the face of
our enemies, it would be miserable policy to divide ourselves into
hostile, opposing factions.37
The Amalgamators, while they knew that they could expect no
voluntary favors from the new governor, did feel that they were sufficiently
strong to demand recognition and hoped to benefit from Wolfs fears if not
from his gratitude. Unless he conciliated them, said they, he would not
have a chance of re-election in 1832, and the only policy which could
possibly save him from being run out at the end of one term was a dis-
tribution of the offices between the two factions. The alternative was
anti-Masonic victory.
During November and December, Buchanan wrote letters every
day or two to Governor Wolf, recommending friends for office.38 Tfhe
major struggle of the Amalgamators centered on the Attorney-Generalship,
an appointment they determined to make a test of the governor's attitude
toward them. Wolf displayed great political acumen when he side-stepped
the factional fight by declaring that he would make residence at Harrisburg
a sine qua non for this appointment. Thus, he summarily eliminated every
candidate except the one of this choice, Samuel Douglass.39
The contest between the friends of Champneys and Buchanan in
Lancaster touched off a fight which illustrated the state of feeling between
the rival factions throughout the state. The Wolf Democrats held a victory
meeting after election, whereupon Buchanan's friends resolved' likewise to
celebrate. They selected the courthouse as a meeting place and made
71
JAMES 'BUCHANAN
preparations to gather immediately upon the adjournment of the current
session of the court. Champneys, in the hope of effecting a reconciliation,
agreed to appear on the platform with Buchanan and G. B. Porter, but the
harder core of the Wolf party and the local sheriff determined that there
would be no celebration. The minute court adjourned they rushed to
the building, had the bell rung, surged into the court room, hoisted the
sheriff into the chair, and enacted a scene "seldom witnessed in a civilized
country." The would-be speakers, teetering; atop the judges' bench,
attempted to harangue the crowd but became a target for flying inkstands,
pitchers, glasses, and spittoons.40
The opponents of Amalgamation blamed Buchanan, stating that
nothing less than riot could be expected from an effort to unite red-blooded
Democrats with Federalists and that Buchanan's hostility to Wolf was the
reason for the outbreak. Buchanan made haste to write to the governor
to "learn whether my enemies have made any impression against me on
your mind" since the famous meeting at Lancaster. "I anticipated no
disturbance," he said, "and . . . attended for the single purpose of uniting,
not of dividing the party, as my preamble and resolutions abundantly
testify, ... I confess I think my case a very hard one. Having actively
supported not only your election, I>ut that of the whole county tidkrt. . . .
I find myself now denounced as if I had been your cold friend if not your
enemy It is my determination firmly to sustain your administration
Having long since announced my determination to retire from Om^n^s at
the close of the present term, I have no interest but the pood of the country
& the party in desiring to save the District . . „ from the #ra*{> of anti-
Masonry. This can be done, only by a thorough union & pre-ron<rt»rted
action of your friends, under the name of Democrats. • • • I'liion is
absolutely necessary to our auorcffift. Nothing shall l>e wanting on my part
to promote a reconciliation of your friends, provided 1 **an interfere with
any reasonable hope of accomplishing so desirable a purponi*."*1
This letter lacked something of candor, ami Wolf knew it. In
fact, there lay on the governor's desk half a duacrn others from friend* hr
trusted explaining in minute detail that "in every county when** (the
Amalgamators] had any influence," that party "playml iw false/'4* But
when it was all said, Wolf still faced the plain fact that Buchanan's {>arty
held a balance of power which could destroy him. Reluctantly the govr rni »r
asked Champneys to swallow his pride and to "act cordially with Porter
and Buchanan." When Champneys resisted, an administration spokesman
wrote more urgently: "My intention was with deference to intimate my
own opinion that no sacrifice of personal feeling on your part which might
produce a strong Union & ultimate success could puwibly place you in a
less enviable situation. I do not now, nor have I ever supposed that
fBuchanan] will ever very cordially support us. Still I have hoped that
72
FAREWELL TO FEDERALISM * 1828 . 1832
something like the course I have suggested might give a little hetter aspect
generally to the politics of Lancaster, and essentially strengthen the real &
sound democracy at home."43
Buchanan succeeded better in forcing the idea of union on the
governor than he did on his own partisans. Scarcely had the ink of his
protestations of friendship to Wolf dried on the page when he was invited
to a Chester County meeting called for the specific purpose of rejecting
resolutions favorable to the state administration. Barnard remarked to
him at this affair that "any attempt to identify you with the Gov. was cal-
culated to do you mischief."44 A little later the anti-Wolf Democrats of
Philadelphia invited Buchanan to a dinner. The committee had purposely
extended invitations only to persons living in the city in order that the
governor would not have to be invited (a ruse intended to mock Wolfs
"residence rule" for naming the Attorney General), but it informed
Buchanan that "if you, Barnard, &c. should happen to be here, the Com.
would at once call upon you."45
The situation, indeed, appeared to be hopeless. Buchanan,
observing the political chaos, formally announced in the spring of 1830
that he would retire from politics; he knew he could be nominated only by
his own faction, and he knew with equal certainty that this faction could
not elect him. The death of Judge John Tod of the State Supreme Court
led him to hope for that appointment. Many of his friends wrote to Wolf
that Buchanan might be persuaded to accept the position if it were "offered
to him without a recommendation being presented," but that he would
not seek it.46 This peculiar approach originated with Buchanan himself;
the mere thought of rejection affected him like salt on a snail's back. Wolf
eventually named John Ross of Bucks County to the judgeship, thereby
giving to Ingham an unexpected and staggering blow, for Ross and Ingham
for years had been at loggerheads with each other. The governor wrote
later that Buchanan "wanted me to appoint him," and that the "refusal to
do so has made xne appear very contemptible in his eyes."47
In December, 1830, William Wilkins was elected to the United
States Senate by a last minute coalition of the warring Democrats who, on
the twenty-first ballot, got together rather than permit the imminent
victory of the anti-Masonic contender. A year later, upon the resignation
of Senator Barnard because of ill health, the Pennsylvania Legislature
named George M. Dallas to fill the unexpired term.
Buchanan glumly reviewed the ruins— Baldwin shelved, Barnard
retired and dying, himself withdrawn until the storm should blow over;
the Family installed in Jackson's Cabinet, in control of the governorship,
and in command of both seats in the United States Senate; the Democratic
party in Pennsylvania split hopelessly and facing inevitable defeat by a
political rag, tag, and bobtail united in the weird idiocy of anti-Masonry.
73
JAMES BUCHANAN
Life was a vast joke, and hope was futile. The situation was nearly as
ridiculous as it was painful.
"Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof." At least he could
finish his work in Congress with some 6elat and distinction. There was
important work to do, and he would be called upon as a veteran to direct it.
Without any certainty of the future, and without a great deal of interest in
it, Buchanan settled down to his last two years as a legislator.
THE CULMINATION OF A CONGRESSIONAL CAREER
The first session of the Twenty-first Congress, which convened in December
1829, found Buchanan in an unusually dour and touchy frame of mind.
He grumped about a departure from the customary mode of selecting a
Clerk of the House, and let go a blast at Congressman James K. Polk, a
young member from Tennessee, which was quite out of keeping with his
normally placid deportment. Polk had made a speech on an important
resolution, concluding with a motion to lay the matter on the table, a
motion which, by rule, admitted no debate. Buchanan requested Polk to
withdraw his motion and allow him to say a few words, but Polk refused.
The House then voted down the motion to table, and Buchanan got the
floor. He was aorry, he said, that he had to bother the House with a vote
because his colleague lacked common courtesy. The gentleman from
Tennessee was withiu his rights but very ungracious, after speaking at
length himself, .to conclude with a motion which, if successful, would
prevent anybody else from saying anything. Polk flushed with angry
embarrassment. A little incident; a little incident such as a man never
One of the most conspicuous contributions which James Bu-
chanan ever made to the government of the United States was his Minority
Report opposing a proposal to abrogate the 25th Section of the Judiciary
Act of 1789. The motion to repeal went to the House Committee on the
Judiciary of which Buchanan was now chairman, succeeding Daniel
Webster. A large majority of the Committee, representing a comparable
majority in the House, favored the repeal and reported a bill for the purpose.
But Buchanan showed that "though he may have quit the Federalist Party,
he had not abandoned Federalist doctrine.'* He prepared his report* got
the signatures of two of his committee members, and took his case to
the House.49
The Constitution gave to the federal courts jurisdiction in "all
cases in law and equity, arising under this Constitution, the laws of the
United States, and treaties." The 25th section of the Act of 1789 further
defined this general grant, assigning to the Supreme Court final judgment in
74
FAREWELL TO FEDERALISM • 1828 - 1832
three classes of cases: 1) those in which a state court should decide that
a law or treaty of the United States was void; 2) those in which the validity
of a state law was called in question on the ground that it violated the
federal Constitution; and 3) cases involving appellate jurisdiction on con-
struction of the Constitution, laws, and treaties of the United States when
their protection had been invoked, but denied, to parties in state suits.
Buchanan rested his defense of these jurisdictions of the Supreme
Court upon three propositions. First, he said, "it ought to be the chief
object of all Governments to protect individual rights." Without the 25th
Section, state courts could deny any or all of the rights supposed to be
guaranteed to citizens by the federal Constitution, and the citizen so de-
prived of his rights would have no recourse.
Second, there could be no uniformity in the construction of the
federal Constitution, of the laws of Congress, or of treaties, without the
ultimate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Without the 25th Section,
each state could decide for itself the meaning of a phrase in the Constitution
or federal statute or treaty. Thus, a federal law or international agreement
might be valid in one state and in another be held void.
Third, the only alternative to these jurisdictions of the Supreme
Court was disunion. "The chief evil which existed under the old con-
federation, and which gave birth to the present constitution, was, that the
General Government could not act directly upon the people, but only by
requisition upon sovereign States. The present Constitution was intended
to enable the Government of the United States to act immediately upon the
people of the States, and to carry its own laws into execution by virtue of
its own authority."
"We have in this country," he concluded, "an authority much
higher than that of the sovereign States. It is the authority of the sovereign
people of each State. In their State Conventions, they ratified the Con-
stitution of the United States; and so far as the Constitution has deprived
the States of any of the attributes of sovereignty, they are bound by it,
because such was the will of the people. The Constitution thus called into
existence by the will of the people of the several States, has declared itself
. , „ to be 'the supreme law of the land'; and the judges in every State shall
be bound thereby."60
Buchanan presented the case for the Minority Report with such
force that the House adopted it by a vote of 138 to 5L Buchanan properly
considered it "a most signal and permanent victory for national unity and
federal sovereignty." Personally it was a victory of the constitutional
lawyer over the party politician, but in a larger sense it preserved the
national jurisdiction of the Supreme Court. Had the popular sentiment for
repeal of the 25th Section prevailed, wrote a modern judge, "who can say
that the eloquence of Webster or the political skill of Lincoln or the mUitary
75
JAMES BUCHANAN
genius of Grant would have availed to save the Union from disintegra-
tion?"51 More likely, none of these would ever have had the chance to
try his powers.
As a final flourish to his Congressional career, Buchanan acted
as chief manager of the prosecution of Judge James H. Peck of Missouri,
against whom the Judiciary Committee reported articles of impeachment
in March, 1830. Judge Peck had imprisoned and disbarred a St. Louis
attorney, Luke E. Lawless, citing him for contempt because Lawless had
written newspaper articles which criticized Judge Peck's opinions. Bu-
chanan conducted the prosecution in collaboration with Henry R. Storrs of
N, Y., one of the readiest debaters in the House, George McDuffie of South
Carolina, Ambrose Spencer, for twenty years a Judge of the New York
Supreme Court, and Charles Wickliffe, a lawyer from Kentucky. William
Wirt and Jonathan Meredith acted as attorneys for Judge Peck.
The Senate acquitted Peck by a vote of 22 to 21. John Quincy
Adams confided to. his diary that it was "highly probable that Jackson did
not wish to see an impeachment of a Judge, commenced by Buchanan,
successfully carried through."52
The chairmanship of the Judiciary Committee and the imprach-
ment proved a welcome distraction to Buchanan in the dismal days after
the election of Governor Wolf and the triumph of the Family, but as the
Jackson Administration grew older some new rays of hop*' bepan to shine
for the Amalgamators. On January 4, 1$JO, President Jaek.<wi appointed
Henry Baldwin to a seat on the Supreme Court left vacant by the death of
Judge Bushrod Washington in November, 1829. The Family had pushed
hard to have John Bannister Gibson appointed, but the Buchanan men
pressed for Baldwin, urging as a main reason for choosing him tlu* fact
that the Calhoun newspapers in Pennsylvania and the national capital had
been denouncing Baldwin so bitterly/3 In the Senate, Baldwin's nomination
was approved by everyone except the two members from South Carolina.
Within eighteen months, events occurred which completely
destroyed Calhoun's chances for the presidency as a successor of Jackson,
estranged the Calhoun forces in Pennsylvania from the president, and
revived the influence of Buchanan and his Amalgamator*. The* violent
threats of South Carolina to nullify the federal tariff laws, the dramatic un-
closeting of the long-hidden skeleton of Calhcwn's attack on Jaekwm during
the Florida war of 1818-1819, and the breakup of the Cabinet over the
Peggy Eaton affair, which for months had been the main topif of drawing
room conversation in Washington, made it clear to all that Jackson and
Calhoun had come to the parting of the ways. The vice-president's break
with Jackson left the Family party of Pennsylvania with little influence in
the national capital. As the feud sharpened it became a certainty that
Jackson would accept a second term. Much as the Family party tried to
76
FAREWELL TO FEDERALISM * 1828 - 1832
prevent it, Buchanan and his associates joined with Jackson's promoter,
William B. Lewis, to have Pennsylvania take the lead in calling for the
renomination of "Old Andy" and got the State Legislature to issue a formal
call on February 3, 1831.5*
By the spring of 1831, at Van Buren's suggestion, the national
Cabinet dissolved and all the Calhoun men in it, including Ingham, quit
the Jackson Administration. This set-back to the prestige of the Family
proved a life-giving tonic to the Amalgamators, who now tried to get
Jackson to appoint Buchanan to the Attorney-Generalship, or possibly to
the Treasury Department.65 Van Buren astutely obtained for George
Washington Buchanan, James's brother, an appointment as federal attorney
for the Pittsburgh district.56
At the same time Buchanan's friends began to plug him for the
vice-presidency, as running mate to Jackson in 1832. Newspapers in
Amalgamation counties in Pennsylvania and in nearby states where
Buchanan had supporters placed his name on their mastheads under
Jackson's and called public meetings to endorse the plan. Buchanan had
already announced his determination to retire from politics and had turned
down an invitation to run for the State Legislature, but the vice-presidency
was a little different. The Calhoun movement which had long dominated
the Pennsylvania scene now lay prostrate; but Buchanan's party was still
very much alive and he decided to let the vice-presidential business boom
a little just to prove it.
77
6
RELUCTANT DIPLOMAT * 1831 - 1833
THE POLITICS OF THE RUSSIAN MISSION
At the very time that there was so much talk about Buchanan for a Cabinet
post or Buchanan for the vice-presidency, he received a letter from John
Henry Eaton. In it Eaton invited him to become the Minister to Russia. The
offer of the Russian Mission was a distinct letdown, sine** this assignment
was a sort of genteel exile for those political figures who could neither be
ignored nor trusted, and it came at a most inopportune moment. Buchanan
had no desire to leave the United States when the political scene was so
exciting. Ingham was out of the picture; his absence had created a vacuum
in Pennsylvania politics, and Buchanan stood poised to fill it. Now that
Ingham was also out of the Jackson Administration, people wanted to know
what place Buchanan would have in it. For the time being he rould give
no hint of his plans for the immediate future, because Eaton had informed
him that the invitation was to be considered entirely confidential.1
Buchanan replied to Eaton that he ought not to accept. He did
not know French; he was very busy with his law practice and could not
leave for some time without grave injury to his clients,2 Eaton responded
that the president would not ask him to leave for a year, "unless something
more than is now expected arises.** With this foggy assurance Burhanan
had to be satisfied. He accepted the mission on June 12> and asked again
that he be allowed to make public the appointment. His preparations for
departure and his sudden interest in the study of French would give it away
anyhow. "Is there any reason why I should „ * . defer these pre parations?"
he plaintively inquired, Jackson scrawled an impatient note to Eaton
which the Major forwarded: "Say to him in reply, to go on and make his
preparations and let the newspapers make any comments that they may
think proper, and mind them not It is only necessary that he should not
give them any information." There would be no announcement of the
appointment until the present minister, John Randolph of Roanoke,
returned to America; and no one knew when that would be.*
78
RELUCTANT DIPLOMAT • 1831 - 1833
Throughout the summer of 1831 hints of all kinds of appoint-
ments, including the right one, circulated widely in the press, as did stories
that Buchanan had been snubbed by Jackson.4 His vice-presidential
prospects continued to boom, but they were considerably hampered by the
unconfirmed rumors that he would get a mission.5 Another manifestation
of Jackson's kindness which perturbed Buchanan was the appointment of
his colleague in the Amalgamation plan, George B. Porter, to the governor-
ship of Michigan Territory in place of General Lewis Cass, who was now in
charge of the War Department. With Ingham "sacked" and Porter and
Buchanan about to be shipped out, Pennsylvania's Democratic party was
without leadership. The whole development appeared to be no accident;
the parts fitted together too well The object was to build a Van Buren
party on the wreckage of both the Family and the Amalgamation factions.
During July Buchanan had a bilious attack. He used it as an
excuse to travel north under doctor's orders. In late August and early
September he went "wandering about among the New Yorkers & the
Yankees," centering his activities at Saratoga and Boston, while he tried
to learn about American trade problems with the Baltic and the Black Sea.6
By the time he got back to Lancaster on September 9, he knew
that his vice-presidential hopes had gone aglimmering. Pennsylvania would
probably name Dallas as its candidate. Buchanan wrote to Jackson: "Now
I have no wish to be a candidate for the Vice Presidency, on the contrary
my nomination was got up without my consent & it is my intention to
decline I think no man ought to hold that office but one of mature age
who has obtained the confidence of the American people by distinguished
services In short, he ought to be next in the confidence of the people
to the President himself,"7 Shortly after Jackson received this, he publicly
announced the appointment to Russia.
Buchanan's mother now learned for the first time of the assign-
ment. "Would it not be practicable even now to decline its acceptance?'*
she asked, "Your political career has been of that description which ought
to gratify your ambition & as to pecuniary matters, they are no object to
you. If you can consistently with the character of a gentleman & a man
of honor, decline, how great a gratification it will be to me. . . . P.S. At
what time do you intend paying us that visit, previous to your departure
from the country which gave you birth, and I expect, to me, the last visit?
Do not disappoint me, but certainly come,"8 Elizabeth Speer Buchanan
was sixty-six.
For the next several months, Buchanan tried to pull together all
the loose ends of his many activities in preparation for a two-year absence.
He visited Jackson in Washington and his mother at Mercersburg. He
worked actively among Pennsylvania politicians to try to salvage something
from the chaos which the previous months had brought, and answered
79
JAMES BUCHANAN
Jackson's effort to create a new Pennsylvania leadership by joining forces
with his old rivals, Wolf and Dallas. Governor Wolf was in the worst
predicament of all. Immediately upon hearing of Ingham's dismissal from
the Cabinet, he had written asking Ingham to swallow his anger and refrain
from attacking Jackson. Otherwise, everyone would assume "that the
Administration of the State was in hostility with that of the Union— a
position in which for the present I have no desire to be placed."9
In the Pennsylvania election for Senator on December 13, 1831,
Buchanan agreed that his friend, Henry A. Muhlenberg, should throw his
floor ballots to Dallas in order to prevent the election of an anti-Mason or
an Adams man. Ironically, it was Barnard's seat which was to be filled*
Nonetheless, anything but support of Dallas meant a complete destruction
of the Jackson party, which would carry all down with it. Pennsylvania
had an obligation to look out for her own interests, interests which a
Van Buren control would readily sacrifice,
On January 12, 1832, Buchanan's nomination to the Russian
Mission was almost unanimously confirmed by the U. S. Senate. On the
13th Van Buren's confirmation as Minister to Great Britain was defeated
by the casting vote of Vice-President Calhoun— sweet revenge for Uttle
Van's trick on the Woolens Bill vote of 1827. Within a week. Governor
Wolf wrote a letter to Jackson which Benjamin Champneys showed to
Buchanan prior to sending it to its destination. Wolf urged Jackson to
appoint Buchanan to the English Mission* in place of Van Buren.l(*
Buchanan understood perfectly the meaning of the epistle and
the mode of its delivery, Champneys had become the most unrelenting foe
of Amalgamation. His visit was the olive branch, and Wolfs letter itself
was a declaration to Andrew Jackson that the Democrats of Pennsylvania
stood united for him, but not for Martin Van Buren.12 As to the proposal,
Buchanan sent his thanks to the governor and acknowledged that "London
would to me be a pleasant exchange for St. Petersburg," but he added that
he had no intention of pressing the suggestion.
In the meantime, he completed preparations for his new duties
and for the supervision of his personal affairs during his absence. Edward
Livingston, Secretary of State, wrote him detailed instructions for managing
the Legation12 and suggested that Buchanan, in case he did not wish to
continue John Randolph Clay as Secretary of Legation, avail himself of
the services of a department clerk, Dr. Robert Greenhow, who knew
languages and had travelled much in Europe.15 Buchanan selected Clay.
He gave power of attorney to two Lancaster friends, John
Reynolds, editor of the Lancaster Journal, and Dr. Nathaniel W. Sample, in-
structing them to sell his library and all his personal property in Lancaster,
to superintend the management of his real estate, to collect his dividends
and interest, and to conduct prosecutions of all who failed to pay on time.
80
RELUCTANT DIPLOMAT • 1831-1833
He authorized them to invest his income in state and federal bonds or in
Lancaster real estate.14
On March 21, 1832, he left for Washington. He was in a dismal
frame of mind, reasonably certain that he was permanently severing his
connection with Lancaster and positive that he was about to embark on a
pursuit "in which my heart never was: to leave the most free and happy
country on earth for a despotism more severe than any which exists in
Europe."16
In Washington he visited his friend Stephen Pleasanton of the
Auditor's office and got the details of his pay straightened out. He would
receive $9000 per year, an "outfit" fee of one year's salary, and also the
cost of passage home. The Legation was provided with a special contingent
fund for the purchase of postage, newspapers, minor gifts, and stationery.16
He made final arrangements for John W. Barry, of the U. S. Army, a son
of Postmaster General William T. Barry, to accompany him as private
secretary, and acquired the services of a mulatto servant, Edward Landrick,
as valet.
Returning to Lancaster he found everything in order except his
arrangements with the English Presbyterian Church, where he was a
regular worshipper, although as yet not a member. While attending
service on April 1, his last Sunday in Lancaster, he was reminded that his
rent for Pew 35 was due, and wrote a check to cover the matter.17
ST. PETERSBURG
At New York the following Sunday he boarded the "Silas Richards." "I
suffered from seasickness during nearly the whole voyage," he confided to
his diary. He was particularly impressed and respectful of Captain Henry
Holdridge, who had crossed the Atlantic 88 times. "An excellent seaman,"
he called him, and "possessed of much more information than could have
been expected from one in his profession." After a 25-day voyage, they
arrived at Liverpool, where Buchanan presided at the passengers' dinner
for Captain Holdridge at "The Star and Garter." A year later, however,
after he had had more sailing experience, he began to refer to Holdridge as
"the Yankee captain with whom I crossed the Atlantic, who would cany
sail in a hurricane.**18
Buchanan's two-week sojourn in England was a whirl of sight-
seeing and social life to which he responded with a combination of the
eager enthusiasm of a touring schoohnarm and the steely-eyed appraisal of
an investment banker. Mr. Ogden, the consul at Liverpool, inaugurated
his exclusion into high life by having him invited to the estate of Mr.
William Brown, the international banker. "Both its external and internal
81
JAMES BUCHANAN
appearance," wrote Buchanan, very much impressed, "prove the wealth
and the taste of its opulent and hospitable owner/' Ogden warned Bu-
chanan of the need for security in diplomatic activity and gave him a special
cipher he had invented— "so that my secretary may decipher one letter
and yet know nothing about any other."19
After five days in Liverpool, he set out for Manchester on the
railroad— his first ride in this new contrivance: "a distance of thirty miles
—in one hour and twenty-five minutes," and through two tunnel?. On
the way to London he made the basic stops— Birmingham, Kenilworth
Castle, Warwick Castle, Stratford upon Avon, Blenheim, and Oxford.
After several weeks in London he proceeded to Hamburg and on May 24
set sail for Lubeck and St. Petersburg, arriving at Ins destination on June 2.
The Russian capital, built by order of Peter the Gu at a century
before, was at this time one of the most brilliant cities in the world: a center
of literature, music, the theater and ballet. Built cm the drlta through
which the Neva River flows into the Gulf of Finland, it serve*! as Russia's
"window looking out on Europe/' Along its main avenue, the Nevs«ky
Prospekt, stood the Winter Palace and the Mariinsky Palatv, the* great-
domed cathedral of St. Isaac, and the Admiralty Palare crowned with
delicate spires. Buchanan had learned something of St. Petersburg from
the charming Mrs. George W. Campbell who had been a pn»at favorite of
the late Czar Alexander while her huaband served as Ameriran Minister to
Russia some years before. lie had abo talked with Baron Krudcner,
Russian Minister to Washington, and to his delicate blonde* wife who, in
earlier days, had been a power at Alexander** Court, He had been prepared
for lavish splendor, but the reality exceeded his* expectation*.
By the middle of June he hud rented as Legation headquarters the
Ville Dame Brockhauser at Watwilinfthoff on the Grand Neva *t»5% a rite
which commanded a delightful view of the river and of al! thr activity of
the port, though it was considerably removed from the activities of tin*
government. The villa was spacious, with a courtyard, HUM** for *ix
horses, a carriage and sleigh houae, and a special apartment fur the nervanK
Buchanan took it furnished with bronzes, marble*, fciMw, buffet*, rflvar-
ware, linen, pottery, porcelains, crystal, cooking utenrih, and oth«r
household appurtenances— enough equipment to provide regular nettings
for six and occasional parties? of thirty.90
On June 11 he presented his letter of credence to the Emperor
Nicholas L After the usual exchange of civilities* the monarch rather
surprised the new envoy by coming forward, shaking hands with warmth
and cordiality, and wishing him a happy stay in the city. The Kmpre**,
too, was congenial, and very talkative. She thought the American* werw
wise to keep out of European troubles, because they had enough of their
own at home, especially with the southern states and their resistance to
82
RELUCTANT DIPLOMAT • 1831 - 1833
the tariff, C'I endeavored in a few words to explain this subject to her,"
said Buchanan, "but she still persisted in expressing the same opinion, and,
of course, I would not argue the point."21
Nicholas, who had assumed the throne upon the death of his
elder brother Alexander in 1825, had been trained more for war than for
statecraft. Although he liked to pose as cea simple, honest officer and
servant of the state," his political ingenuity scarcely extended beyond the
imposition of police rule throughout his domain. Just the year before
Buchanan's arrival, he had ruthlessly crushed a liberal uprising in Poland
under the slogan, "orthodoxy, autocracy and national unity." In foreign
policy he was especially interested in maintaining the integrity of Turkey
in order that no other powers could force an entry into the Black Sea.
Buchanan soon had a long conversation with Count Nesselrode,
the Russian Foreign Minister, about the objectives of his mission. He
found that Nesselrode already knew a good deal about him from Prince
Lieven, the Russian Minister in London, and Baron Krudener, the Minister
to the United States who was happily on furlough at St. Petersburg that
summer. There was little new business to introduce. John Randolph, in
his short sojourn in the city, had already presented to the Foreign Office a
complete file of papers covering the wish of the United' States to conclude
a treaty of navigation and commerce and a treaty concerning maritime
rights with Russia. As the Russian Ministry had been in possession of all
the documents for over a year and had given no hint whether it wished to
treat on either subject, Buchanan determined for the present not to ask
Count Nesselrode for any answer to the propositions made by Mr. Randolph.
WI shall wait until I become better acquainted with the views and wishes
of the Imperial Ministry," he said, "before I introduce the Negotiation to
their attention, or do any act which can subject me to the charge of im-
portunity."22
The first months were both leisurely and exciting. Buchanan had
occasional conferences with Baron Krudener and with Count Nesselrode,
feeling out their sentiments on the pending negotiation, but mostly he sat
in the Legation studying French, reading international law, writing letters
home, and wishing for mail. In fact, he had not been in St. Petersburg
twenty-four hours before he wrote to Secretary of State Livingston the
extraordinary fact that the American Legation had received no news from
the home country for over a year, and its personnel had no idea what might
be going on in the United States. He requested the immediate inauguration
of a monthly courier service to London.
To his friend, John Reynolds, he gave a pretty clear picture of
his state of mind and mode of life. "I would much rather for my own part
occupy a seat in the Senate or in the House; I say this not from despond-
ency, for that would be without reason; but simply from the circumstance
83
JAMES BUCHANAN
that a man devoted to free principles cannot be happy in the midst of
slavery.
"So far as it regards my own person I shall dress so as not to
compromise the Republican simplicity of my country. Over my equipage
I have in a manner no control. I must submit to the established customs,
or forfeit many of the most essential privileges of a foreign minister. If I
were to drive through the streets of Lancaster in the same style I do here,
I should soon have a mob of men, women & children in my train. I must
drive four horses; otherwise I could not go to court. My driver like the
rest is a Russian with a long flowing black beard, dressed in the peculiar
costume of his country. There is a postilion on the leader: but what is the
most ridiculous of all is the Chasseur who stands behind. He is decked
out in his uniform more gaudy than that of our Militia Generals with a
sword by his side & a large chapeau on his head surmounted by a plume of
feathers. It is this dress which constitutes the peculiar badge of a foreign
minister. The soldiers at their stations present arms to the carriage, on
the streets they take off their hats to it, & it is everywhere received with so
much deference, that I feel ashamed of myself whenever I pass through the
City. It is ridiculous flummery. , . .
"What a dunce I was not to have learned the German language!
It would have been almost as useful to ine here as the French. I now
understand the latter tolerably well; but it will be long before I shall speak
it fluently*
"When you write, do not say anything which would be offensive
to the Government. They are not very delicate about opening letters here.
You had better perhaps give this caution to my other friend* We can
send out what we please by American Captains, but everything which
comes in must pass through the Pom-Officer."1*3
The treaty negotiation proceeded in a mast peculiar and erratic
manner. Buchanan, after study of the documents, discovered that Ran-
dolph's arguments all urged the benefits of th<t projected treaty to the
people of the United States but failed to present the corresponding ad-
vantages to Russia. Buchanan proposed to convince the Imperial Ministry
that the treaty would also promote the best interests of Russia,24 Good
diplomacy always emphasized the quid pro quo.
In an unofficial talk with Baron Krudencr he taunted, with some
surprise, that Russia was much irritated by the American tariff of 1828 and
held it accountable for a sharp decline in trade, Buchanan got lute statistics
to prove that Russo-American trade had greatly increased in 1831 and 1832;
the sugar refining plants around St, Petersburg had received almost
all of their imported raw sugar from the IL S. ships alcmt. He made it
plain that with a treaty giving security to commercial enterprise, hundreds
of American vessels would ply the rich Black Sea area, bringing in needed
84
RELUCTANT DIPLOMAT • 1831 - 1833
raw materials from all over the world and taking back hemp and bar iron.
At St. Petersburg the sugar import trade would be greatly enlarged, and the
wool export comparably increased. Russian internal manufacture would
be greatly diversified by the import of more raw materials and Russian
shipping would be stimulated by the export of her excess raw materials
to America.
Krudener insisted, however, that Russia desired a relaxation of
the tariff of 1828. It was with some excitement, therefore, that Buchanan
received New York newspapers which contained a draft of the Tariff Bill
of 1832, proposing reduction of duties on hemp, sail duck, and hammered
iron. He informed Krudener of it immediately and received a call from
him the next day. He said that this was pleasing news, and that Count
Nesselrode was at that moment on his way to Peterhoffto bring the question
of the commercial treaty to the attention of the Emperor.
For two weeks thereafter, the Russians pointedly ignored and
avoided Buchanan. He was at a loss to know why until he gathered from
some source that they had taken offense at some comments in the recently
arrived batch of American newspapers (which the Russian government
agents had perused with care before delivering them to the American
Legation). Obviously, Krudener and his colleagues had known of the
tariff revision before Buchanan did.
Eventually, Krudener called and stayed to dinner but appeared
"studiously to avoid every allusion to the proposed negotiation." After
they rose from the table, the Baron casually remarked that the Emperor
had referred the American proposals to Count Cancrene, the Minister
of Finance.
This news dumfounded Buchanan. Noting his confusion,
Krudcner asked: "Do you not consult your Secretary of the Treasury
on similar occasions?"
"But you mean," replied Buchanan, "that the Treaty has been
before the Emperor?"
"Yes, certainly," replied Krudener, laughing.
Buchanan promptly obtained an audience with Count Nesselrode
and found Baron Krudener already in the chamber. They talked freely,
and both Russians conveyed the impression that it was almost a certainty
that a commercial treaty would be concluded. Buchanan now believed
that if the tariff bill passed, "without any essential change in the duties
proposed on Russian productions, ... we shall obtain a Treaty without
much difficulty**725
Baron Krudener left for the United States in the middle of
August Buchanan hurried off letters to his friends Reynolds, Reigart, and
Jenkins, inf onning them that the Baron intended to visit Lancaster County
to examine its agriculture and urging them to "treat him kindly and with
85
JAMES BUCHANAN
special distinction He is fond of the good things of this life & certainly
I have not yet seen any place where they abound more than in Lancaster."26
On August 19, an American ship brought news to Buchanan that
the Tariff of 1832 had passed both houses of Congress and had become law
without the president's signature. He promptly transmitted to Nesselrode
the information that duties on iron were down from S22.-10 to $18 per ton;
on sail duck, from 12H cents per square yard to 15 per cent ad valorem
(a radical reduction); and on hemp, from $60 to &JQ per ton. He hoped
the commercial treaty would now be speedily negotiated in order that it
could be acted upon by Congress soon enough to give shippers time to
prepare for spring voyages.
Then a month and a half passed without a word. Rumor said
that the treaty would be rejected, and Buchanan heard several times that
"it was vain for any nation to attempt to conclude a Treaty of Commerce
with the Russian Government, whilst Count Cancrene continued as Minister
of Finance.*'27 Nonetheless, the American Minister tried to use his time
to advantage. He contrived an interview with Baron Stieglits, the Court
Banker, who was a good friend of both Nesselrode and Canerene and,
perhaps of more importance, financed most of the Russian trade* with the
United States. He maintained a New York office and had large personal
interests in the Black Sea area which improved trade would stimulate,
Buchanan repeated all the arguments to him, invited him to dinner several
times, and was gratified to discover later that Stifglitfc had carried th<* con-
versation back to Nesselrode.28
The time passed pleasantly. Buchanan wa« much entertained,
and responded by giving a series of stag parties. He found Russian society
to be a strange compound of barbarism and civilization. The Russians*
employed the best French cooks but usually ate a sour soup that would
have repulsed a Delaware Indian. The Russian ladies of high c«*xe w*r*
beautiful and educated, yet they seemed hugely entertained when Buchanan
told them fairy stories to which they responded like children.29 Perhaps
their credulity was not so remarkable when one considered that part of the
reverence for Russia's patron saint, Alexander Nevsky> stemmed from th*
tradition that he once sailed up the Neva on a grindstone.30
Buchanan was greatly surprised to discover that the Russian
nobility drank very little and that the ladies regularly wit with the nirn
after dinner. "They have been too quiet for me!** he wrote to Reynold*.
The lower classes were more convivial and drank e*a species of hot white
brandy enough to kill the Devil**1
One morning Captain Barry rushed into Buchanan's quarter* in
great agitation. He had just seen one of the Legation servants, a Russian,
going through the papers in the record room* Buchanan frowned and told
Barry to sit down. "Let him go/* be said "It can't possibly do u» «y
RELUCTANT DIPLOMAT 1831 - 1833
harm, and it just might do some good." He had known, before he ever got
to St. Petersburg, that there was no security of information in Russia, and
he had made it a point never to put in writing anything that could give
offense or disclose a secret. In practically every document he wrote,
official and private, he included some comments highly complimentary to
the Emperor.32
Then, in October, Buchanan received a formal note stating that
his Imperial Majesty declined to negotiate a commercial treaty. It was a
blow, but it was not entirely unexpected. The note suggested several
reasons for the negative decision: the project did not sufficiently protect
Russian masters against the desertion of their seamen in American ports;
reciprocity was not clearly provided in all cases; and there was an implied
limitation upon the right of the Russian government to change its tariff
duties at will. Buchanan drafted a reply giving his solutions to the various
problems and went to bed discouraged. He was certain that the reasons
offered were not the real ones. The personal opposition of Count Cancrene,
Minister of Finance, and Mr. de Bloudoff, Minister of Interior, had led the
Emperor to reject negotiations.
A few days later, in response to a call from Count Nesselrode, he
went to the Foreign Office and engaged in a conversation so amazing that,
as he told Livingston, "you will, I think, be satisfied that but few more
singular occurrences have been recorded in the history of modern di-
plomacy."
Nesselrode reviewed the rejection of the treaty, and mentioned
emphatically that Cancrene and de Bloudoff had brought the Emperor,
very reluctantly, to their point of view. Then he dropped his wary diplo-
matic manner, became "frank and candid," and told the astonished Bu-
chanan that if he should rewrite his modifications to the treaty, stressing
certain points which the Count would mention, he would take it straight
to the Emperor, with the hope that it would be accepted.
Buchanan returned to the Legation with his head swimming.
Although he had too much to do to spend time speculating on this odd
turn of events, he could not doubt that Nesselrode, for some Reason,
planned to put through the treaty against the wishes of the Cabinet, and
that the Emperor was sympathetic. All day Tuesday he worked, and on
Wednesday, after a short absence, found a card in the tray from the Baron
de Brthmow, a Counsellor of State and confidential friend of Nesselrode.
Thursday Brtinnow came again and this time sat with Buchanan for half
the day, carefully coaching him on the phraseology of his proposed note.
Where Buchanan had written: "In pursuance of the wish expressed by
His Excellency the Vice Chancellor," Brttnnow wrote: "In pursuance of
the conversation between his Excellency and the Vice Chancellor, &c."
BrOnaow must have laughed at Buchanan. To announce in the formal
87
JAMES BUCHANAN
note that Nesselrode had engineered this plan would wreck the Counts
career and destroy the possibility of further negotiations. The matter was
to be kept in strictest secrecy, and the English Minister, m particular,
must get no hint of what was maturing.33 ,,„,«••
Buchanan wrote happily to Livingston that he had the fairest
prospect of speedily concluding a Commercial Treaty," but despite the
apparent rush of mid-October, nothing happened during November. He
a~in began to wonder whether he had been hoaxed and complained to
Nesselrode that Mr. Clay, his Legation Secretary, had already miwtd the
last boat of the season while waiting to take the treaty to America. In
December Buchanan had an idea. The Emperor's birthday was on the 18th
of thatmonth, an occasion celebrated with agrand fete. "I thought it might
expedite the conclusion of the Treaty, ... to manifest a wish that it m.ght
be signed on that anniversary," he said. Nesselrode was delighted, but he
questioned whether copies could be prepared in time. Buchanan put extra
secretaries into service to make the necessary drafts in English and in
French and on December 15 learned that Nesselrode had been authorized
to sign the treaty.34 ,. ,
On Tuesday morning, December 18, the whole diplomatic corp*
went to the Emperor's birthday feufe The corps wa« arranged in line to
receive the Emperor and Empress, with Mr. Bligh, the newly arrived British
Minister, in the lowest station. "You may judge of my astonishment,
wrote Buchanan, "when the Emperor accosting me in trench, in a tour of
voice which could be heard all around, staid, 'I signed the order yesterday
that the Treaty should be executed according to your wirfiw, & then
immediately turning to Mr. Bligh asked him to become the interpreter «f
this information. ... His astonishment and embarrassment were »o
striking, that I felt for him most sincerely. . . . There can be no dwubt hut
all that occurred was designed on the part of the Emperor. . . . After the
Emperor had retired, Mr. Bligh, in manifest eonfuwon . . . artrt mr what
kind of a Treaty we had been concluding with RUM» Thw incident
has already given rise to considerable speculation among the knowinjt «»<*
of St Petersburg." That afternoon Buchanan went to the F«.mgn < >mce
and signed the treaty.38
The treaty opened a new era in Russian diplomacy. It was the
first agreement of its kind which the Imperial Government had made w»«h
any nation, though others had long sought such a compact. It put the
ships, cargoes, and crews of each country on a basb of nviprncity. »»*•
shippers of the one country were to receive the wme treatment in the port*
of the other that they received in their home port*. Furthermore . • mwi
favored nation" dause had been included. It vr« perfwlly well known
that more than a hundred American ships vfeitwl Rwwton port* for every
Russian vessel sailing to America and that Russian discrimination against
88
RELUCTANT DIPLOMAT • 1831-1833
foreign shippers was much more extensive, petty, and exasperating than
the American practice. Therefore, Buchanan and others could well ponder
why the treaty had been made at all.
There were many aspects of high policy and domestic planning
which formed a part of the decision. Europe was a powder teg, and Russia
needed friends who could carry supplies to her if she became involved in
war. England had just reached an agreement with France on the Belgian
question, a coalition that weakened Russia's position in the balance of
power. Russia desired to improve the economy of her southern regions
around the Black Sea, to increase her merchant marine, and to achieve
greater internal diversification. A fight for cabinet prestige between
Nesselrode and Cancrene had something to do with the result. But
probably most important of all was the Polish question. Only later did
Buchanan begin to understand what the Emperor really expected of him.
Buchanan noted an immediate change in the attitude of the
Russian nobles who now summoned him from his comparative isolation
across the Neva to their balls and parties. He reported becoming "a
favorite in several of their first families,"36 and that both the Emperor and
Empress had "been marked in their attentions" to him, "indeed, so much
so as to excite some little observation & perhaps envy." Baron Cancrene
made the amende honorable, praising the treaty and paying Buchanan
compliments "of such a character," he wrote, "as I know I do not deserve,
and therefore I shall not repeat.7'37 On several occasions, the Emperor
while walking along the streets of the city in plain dress, as was his custom,
encountered the American Minister and made it a point to stop and chat
with him, calling him "Buchanan/*38 The Empress, whom Buchanan
praised as a fine dancer, often took him as a partner at court balls.39 It
was no wonder that Buchanan found his prestige miraculously mounting.
For a time he took all these attentions at face value, though somewhat
astonished, for he knew he possessed "but few of the requisites for being
successful in St. Petersburg society."40 Then an aflair began to develop
which suggested some ulterior reasons for his lionization.
Emperor Nicholas was terribly sensitive to criticism which
foreigners directed against him personally for ^ instigating the horrible
atrocities of the Polish War and for the enslavement of the Polish people
thereafter. The newspapers of England and France heaped abuse upon
him as the brutal author of the outrages, and the British Parliament had
taken up the cry. For democratic insurgents all over Europe this was the
best possible ammunition and they fired it broadside with abandon.
Buchanan's remarks in all his letters and notes to the State
Department had been very temperate on the Polish issue, and in several
instances he had stated that the atrocities proceeded only from the age-old
hostility of the peoples and had been inflicted by unruly officers at the
89
JAMES BUCHANAN
front; he indicated that the Emperor was not the author of the system; that,
given the violent, unreasoning disposition of the Poles, the Emperor had
no alternative but to use force with them. If Buchanan represented the
United States, or could have any influence there; if the United States took
a view of the Polish struggle more temperate than that of the western
Europeans, this would have an important quieting effect on the revolu-
tionary impulse, the Emperor reasoned. America was its home; America
was its spokesman. If America saw mitigating factors, it would moderate
the frenzy of European revolutionaries on the subject.
Two days after the treaty had been signed, Count Nesselrode
began a conversation with Buchanan on an entirely new subject and in a
manner so formal and solemn that Buchanan was wholly nonplussed. In
two minutes more he was completely flabbergasted. The Washington
Globe, it appeared, had been reprinting from the French and English
journals some of the worst attacks against the Emperor. That these should
appear in the administration organ at the very moment that the new treaty
was in transit seemed in very poor taste. Would Buchanan not write to
Jackson and request him to have the editor of the Globe stop printing this
kind of material and to direct him to publish some compliments about the
Emperor? Nesselrode had a note on the subject already prepared which
Buchanan could send to the president.
Buchanan saw in an instant what he was up against. He tried to
explain that in the United States even the president could not tell & news-
paper editor what to print; there was no government control; in fact, the
Constitution forbade such control. Why, Buchanan askrci, did not the
Russian papers print some denials of the French and English article* and
have them translated and circulated so that the American editors would
have the other side of the story? He himsdf had tried to get at the truth
of recent events in Poland but had not been able to learn anything even in
St. Petersburg. He would welcome the true story, and he was nur<» that
the American editors also would.
But Nesselrode persisted, wondered why the Globe WAR called an
"official" paper if it was entirely independent of the government, and
suggested "that General Jackson himself must certainty have some in-
fluence over the editor." Buchanan finally concluded the subject by
telling a story about Baron Sacken who had> on one occasion complained
to Jackson of the attacks which had been made upon the Emperor in the
American newspapers. In reply, the president requested him to examine
the papers again, and "if they did not contain a hundred articles abusing
himself to every one that attacked His Imperial Majesty* he would then
agree there was cause for complaint/*41 Nesselrode laughed heartily,
passed to other matters, and Buchanan thought he had disposed of the
problem. He was wrong.
RELUCTANT DIPLOMAT • 1831 - 1833
On January 9, a cart drew up before #65 Grand Neva, where the
draymen removed three large boxes, struggled with their load into the
Legation, and presented a bill for 1638 rubles— $330, for postage! Until
this day, James Buchanan had never received a single piece of mail from
the Department of State; now he got nearly half a ton of it: files of American
newspapers, journals of the House and Senate, books, dispatches, and
letters. "Such a mass was never sent by Mail before from Havre to St.
Petersburg," he exclaimed.
By the time Buchanan had waded through the most recent of
this material he learned a few things. Baron Sacken, temporarily in charge
of the Russian Mission at Washington, had become involved in a squabble
with Livingston and Jackson which Nesselrode presumably knew all about.
The Baron had again asked for some action to put an end to the Globe
articles. When he received no satisfaction, he wrote a note, charging
Jackson with insincerity; he proclaimed friendship for Russia in his
messages to Congress but encouraged the Globe to print articles abusive of
the Emperor. This was a pretty mess to be brewing at the very time that
the treaty was about to come up for discussion in the Senate!
Livingston, apparently, expected Sacken to send a letter with-
drawing the charge against Jackson, but it had not yet been received.
Buchanan talked to Nesselrode about this unfortunate business and learned
that no disavowal was likely to be made, primarily because Sacken insisted
that he had shown his letter informally to the Secretary of State before
sending it, and that Livingston had read and approved it!42 Buchanan
thought that there must be some misunderstanding, and he promised to
get more exact information. What was the news of the treaty? asked
Nesselrode. The Emperor had acted with great dispatch; he was very eager
to know when the United States would ratify. Buchanan had no idea. The
only late word he got from America was through "scraps contained in
English newspapers kindly furnished ... by Mr. Bligh, & an occasional
remark in the letters received from the United States by Baron Steiglitz."
The last three months of the Mission were like scenes from a
comic opera, Buchanan's position, as he came to learn with shock after
shock, was that of the only man in the cast who did not know the plot
beforehand- The cause was the combination of the assininity with which
the State Department handled its communications and the assiduity with
which the Russian secret police tapped them.
Not until July 31, for example, did Buchanan receive any infor-
mation from Livingston, He had indeed read the Sacken letter in advance
and had not objected to itl This took all the wind out of Buchanan's sails.
It was obvious that Nesselrode had had a copy of Livingston's note for
months, for the American chargS at Paris— "a jack-ass" Buchanan called
him with kindness— had placed all the dispatches in the hands of the
91
JAMES BUCHANAN
Russian Embassy to be forwarded. The Russians copied everything, sent
duplicates to their own Ministry, and delivered the originals, with all seals
broken, to Buchanan four months later.
Apparently the Russians read everything before Buchanan did.
Nesselrode had known about the passage of the American tariff three
weeks before Buchanan had gotten word of it— and that from unofficial
sources. Buchanan pleaded with the State Department never to send
dispatches by mail "unless they be of such a character that they may be
perused & copied not only at St. Petersburg, but in all the Governments
through which they may have passed/* Never once, he said, had he
received a piece of mail which had not been opened. 'The letters have
been sent to me either almost open, or with such awkward imitation of
the seals as to excite merriment. The Post Office Eagle here is a sorry
ted."*
By the end of May Buchanan had still not heard officially that
the treaty had been ratified by the Senate. The Emperor, at an audience,
inquired "with a good deal of earnestness in his manner" about the ratifica-
tion, and Buchanan had to answer lamely that he had no official verification,
but he had heard indirectly that the treaty had been ratified some months
ago.
Worst of all, the State Department failed to send any reply to
Buchanan's Dispatch #8, describing the inside mechanics of th.e commercial
treaty negotiation and requesting instructions about the treaty on maritime
rights, which was still pending. Buchanan feared that a reply might have
been "transmitted through the Russian Post office/* Eventually the
answer came, but it was too late.
The maritime treaty was intended to define the legal nature of
blockades, to enumerate articles constituting contraband of war, and to
establish the principle that "free ships make free goods/' When Buchanan
proposed that talks be instituted on the maritime treaty he soon discovered
that Nesselrode was "not disposed to enter upon the subject/* Buchanan's
disappointment was all the more bitter, for Jackson had written, not too
enthusiastically, after the conclusion of the commercial treaty— "(it) is
as good a one as we could expect , . * , and if you can close the other aa
satisfactory, it will be a happy result/1** But Nesaelrode had shut the
door, and there was no use pushing at it.
THE CONCLUSION OF THE MISSION
More happily* Jackson had given Buchanan permission to come home
whenever he wished. He had feared he was in for a two-year tour of duty,
92
RELUCTANT DIPLOMAT • 1831 - 1833
but he might be able to get out of Russia that summer and be home in time
for the next senatorial elections. Feeling that he had done all he could, he
took advantage of the tempbrary lull in Legation business to travel to the
interior of Russia. During June he went to Novgorod and Moscow. At the
end of the month he was back at the Legation, refreshed by his vacation,
and ready to make plans for his return home.45
Buchanan's personal world had changed with astonishing and
sobering rapidity. His sister Harriet had married without even telling him
in advance, and he chided her for her neglect. *CI felt toward you both as a
father & as a brother. ... Do not for a moment suppose that I am offended;
I am only disappointed. I confess I did not feel very anxious that you
should be married. This indifference was no doubt partly selfish. I had
often indulged the hope that we might spend the evening of our days
together in my family."46 His youngest brother, Edward, had joined the
ministry largely to gratify the hope of his mother that one of her children
should be a clergyman. He, too, had married. He did not mention the
girl, though James later learned it was Ann Eliza Foster of Pittsburgh,
whose brother was the young song writer, Stephen Collins Foster.47
His favorite brother, George, a brilliant young lawyer with whom
James had hoped to share practice, had died of tuberculosis. In July,
just before leaving St. Petersburg, he received the news that his mother
had died two months earlier. His best drinking crony in Lancaster, George
Louis Wager, was critically ill. Washington Hopkins, son of his old pre-
ceptor and a close friend, had died. To Reynolds he wrote: "How many
of my friends and acquaintances shall I miss from the social circle after an
absence of less than two short years. . . . Truly this is not our abiding
place/'4*
Since he was to return much earlier than he had expected,
Buchanan now turned his thoughts to his private business. During his
absence Reynolds and Sample had managed his estate well. They had
bought a house for him in Lancaster; it was the former home of Robert
Coleman. "Although I do not think it was a great bargain," he wrote to
Reynolds, "I feel as much indebted to you & the Doctor as if you had got
it cheaper/'40
Reynolds reported that he had banked $12,268 from Buchanan s
local enterprises: about $5,000 interest from investments such as bonds,
mortgages, and loans and the rest from the collection of debts. He had
purchased several properties for investment and had finally sold the Sterrett
Gap property for $6,500. Furthermore, he had paid for the Coleman estate
and insured it. Financially, it had been a fairly good year for Buchanan.
Buchanan had his last audience at Peterhoff on Monday, August 5,
1833- Of this occasion he wrote that the Emperor "bade me adieu-— and
embraced and saluted me according to the Russian, custom—a ceremony
93
JAMES BUCHANAN
for which I was wholly unprepared, and which I had not anticipated. Whilst
we were taking leave, he told me to tell General Jackson to send him
another Minister exactly like myself. He wished for no better . . . Thus
has my mission terminated."50
7
DAYS OF DECISION * 1833 - 1834
RETURN FROM RUSSIA
Buchanan took a tour of the Continent on his way home, travelling hy
steamboat from St. Petersburg to Lubecfc, then to Hamburg, Amsterdam,
the Hague, Brussels, Paris, London, Edinburgh, Glasgow, Belfast, Dublin,
and at last to Liverpool for passage to Philadelphia. At Hamburg he
visited for several days with Henry Wheaton, the international lawyer,
before starting his tour of the Low Countries and the Rhine Valley. "Al-
though not given to ecstasies," he wrote, "I felt a little romantic in descend-
ing the Rhine. ... I never took much to the Rhenish until I got into its
native country. There I became acclimated to it & now feel that the taste
will accompany me through life. But I have some talent in this line."1
In Paris he had to resume the role of an active diplomat for he
discovered that he was the only American Minister in western Europe and,
with a threat of war on the horizon, he had to act as spokesman for his
country. Lafayette called on him, and the French Foreign Minister, the
Duke de Broglief sought him out, as did Count Pozzo di Borgo, Russian
Ambassador at Paris.2
over the recent claims dispute and hoped that the French Chamber of
Deputies would soon appropriate funds to meet the provisions of the
American Treaty and terminate the difficulty. Count Borgo of Russia made
fun of the French— "a turbulent and restless people.77 Buchanan should
sit in on some sessions of the Chamber of Deputies— "They were like cats,
all in a passion, and all making a noise, and afterwards laughing; wholly
unfit for liberty/* They wanted Napoleon and glory again, not liberty.3
In case of war, the central Europeans would stick together; there was no
telling what would happen with England and France except that England
would try to raid neutral commerce and set up illegal blockades. He hoped
the United States would not stand for such nonsense. Buchanan agreed
and reminded him that this was the object of the maritime treaty he had
95
JAMES BUCHANAN
tried to negotiate. The very reason why it was refused, replied Borgo. It
would have been an obvious attack by Russia on England; would have set
her aflame, possibly have been a trigger for the very war all were trying
to avoid.
In London, Buchanan found himself in the heart of European
power politics. All the members of the London Conference to settle the
fate of Belgium were still in residence. At dinner at Prince Lieven's in
the Russian embassy he sat with Talleyrand of France, Esterhazy of Austria,
Biilow of Prussia and Lord Palmerston of Britain. Talleyrand, in conver-
sation later, asked him about the family of Alexander Hamilton and told
him the story of the day Aaron Burr had sent up his card, "I returned the
card," said Talleyrand, "with a message that I had the portrait of General
Hamilton hanging up in my parlor.*'4
Buchanan conferred and dined with Palmerston and found him
unusually interested in promoting friendly relations between England and
the United States. Esterhazy and Biilow assured Buchanan that their
governments hoped soon to open diplomatic relations with the Americans.
"Our position in the world is now one of much importance," he wrote to
Jackson. "Indeed, the freedom and friendship with which I have been
treated everywhere are an evidence of the high character of our Country
abroad."5
Buchanan finally journeyed to the Emerald Isle where he visited
the home of his ancestors at Ramelton. "There I sinned much in the
article of hot whiskey toddy which they term punch," he wrote to Reynolds.
"The Irish women are delightful."0
The autumn passage of the North Atlantic gave Buchanan some
time to reflect upon recent events and his political prospects. He had gone
to St. Petersburg as a used-up politician and was returning something of a
hero. Though a tyro in diplomacy he had, with a little practical common
sense, knowledge, and downright honesty, met successfully on their own
ground the most adroit and skillful politicians in the world. The emperors
and empresses, the dukes and counts, the chancellors and ministers who
wore the medals and ribbons seemed to him not much better informed than
he was. For the first time in his life he began to think seriously about the
presidency. Why not? He could do Jt7
DEMORALIZED DEMOCRATS
The politics of Pennsylvania had changed during Buchanan's absence.
After he had pulled out of the vice-presidential race, Senators Wilkins and
Dallas had jumped into the contest and got the endorsement of the Penn-
sylvania convention in 1832. Van Burea, in ten ballots at Harroburg,
96
DAYS OF DECISION • 1833 - 1834
never received more than 4 out of 132 votes.8 But at the national Demo-
cratic Convention at Baltimore in May, Pennsylvania's entire block of 30
votes went to Van Buren. Simon Cameron took credit for this astonishing
defiance of the instructions of the state convention, "I had more enjoy-
ment," he told Buchanan, "by pestering the folks at Harrisburg, until they
actually swallowed the dose of Van Burenism, than I ever had in anything
connected with politics."9 Dallas and Wilkins completed their downfall
by voting in the Senate for a recharter of the Bank of the United States.
After Jackson's veto of the recharter bill, and his triumphant re-election
with Van Buren as vice-president, the political stock of Wilkins, Dallas and
Co. fell to a record low.
Buchanan took it for granted that Van Buren would succeed
Jackson in 1836, but he told Reynolds that he had "some misgivings upon
this subject," and would remain uncommitted "because I cannot see clearly
the course of duty." "I shall support the candidate of the party who may
be regularly nominated," he said. "To Mr. V. B. I have no personal
objection."10
Pennsylvania deserved a Cabinet post as reward for her steady
support of Jackson, but the internal politics of the state made it more
difficult than ever to find the right man. Jackson made the Treasury post
available, but he would not have Wilkins or Dallas and was dubious about
Buchanan. Buchanan, on his part, gave no chance for a rejection when he
learned his name was under discussion, writing that he would not for a
moment accept "a Department so thankless, so laborious & so perplexing
as that of the Treas."11 He did not want to be the agent to destroy the
Bank of the United States. The president eventually appointed William J.
Duane of Philadelphia, a friend of Van Buren, who was not deeply involved
in the state power stru^le.
Buchanan considered himself lucky to have been out of Congress
during 1832 and 1833. The violent controversies over nullification and
the Bank had battered the fortunes of many legislators, especially those
from Pennsylvania. The folks back home, with careless illogic, wanted
the Bank rechartered, and their hero, Old Andy, re-elected— an easy
combination for a backwoods farmer to vote for but a devilish hard program
for a Congressman to live with at Washington. The Bank vote was a test,
there; any friend of the Bank was an enemy of Jackson.
Buchanan wanted to be a Senator and therefore had to clarify his
stand on the Bank and nullification. He told Jackson that he was pleased
with the Bank veto, but added that he had been "inclined to be friendly to
the recharter of the Bank of the United States." He promised to vote for
no Bank bill that did not remedy the objections raised in the veto message.12
South Carolina's Ordinance of Nullification of November 24,
1832, declaring the tariff laws of 1828 and 1832 "null, void, and no law,"
97
JAMES BUCHANAN
threw the nation into a panic. One of Buchanan's friends wrote: "I am
firmly of the opinion rebellion will be the order of the day, accompanied by
all its horrors." Duff Green was calling for recourse to the sword, and
tempers were so inflamed that it was "indeed time for the people seriously
to think of a civil war." Secretary of State Louis McLane reported that
there was good reason to believe that the southerners were planning to set
up a separate confederacy.13
Buchanan considered the nullification doctrine "against both the
letter & spirit of the Constitution, as well as absurd in itself." He was not
so sure about the question of secession; that problem was shrouded in
"shadows, clouds & darkness." He had no sympathy for South Carolina
in this nullification affair, but he would stand on his principle of strict con-
struction and would not go along with some of his friends in toasting
resolutions to a consolidated government.14 The question of secession, he
feared, would "be the touchstone of the party for the next twenty years/9
Secession was much more reasonable than nullification; it was no half-baked
measure, but it meant revolution and dissolution of the nation. For this
very reason Buchanan felt the fear of it would tend to destroy sectional
parties, since no party would openly stand for war on the government.15
In Pennsylvania, George Wolf, who had been re-elected governor
in 1832, wanted to keep on good terms with the national Administration.
This meant he could no longer favor Wilkins and Dallas, both of whom had
discredited themselves by supporting the Bank and opposing Van Buren.
Dallas's short term as senator was about to expire, and all through the
spring of 1833 the State Legislature had been balloting in vain to try to
choose his successor. Dallas himself had no chance. Governor Wolf
supported one of his cabinet, Samuel McKean, but he could not muster a
majority partly because Buchanan's friends had lambasted McKean, de-
spite Buchanan's intimation that no senator could be elected in opposition to
the Governor. Finally the Legislature adjourned without naming a senator
and postponed the decision until the next session in December 1833.16
Buchanan's friends worked hard for him. Had he been at home
during the spring, they said, he would surely have won. To such ktters,
Buchanan replied that he could probably not win and did not much care;
his public career was finished, and he was concerned only about what to do
after his return, "To recommence the practice of the law in Lancaster
would not be very agreeable. If my attachments for that place as well as
my native state were not so strong, I should have no difficulty in arriving
at a conclusion* I would at once go either to New York or Baltimore; and
even if I should ever desire to rise to political distinction, 1 believe I could
do it sooner in the latter place than in any part of Pennsylvania. What do
you think of the project?"17 It was quite obvious what his political
managers would think of it. They would think that they had better get
98
DAYS OF DECISION • 1833 - 1834
busy and line up the votes for that senatorship, or they would lose a good
meal ticket. They went to work at the Fourth of July party barbecues
where they proposed toasts to Buchanan for U. S. senator, for vice-president
and, as George Plitt reported, even "for the Presidency itself."18
The "Susquehanna" docked in Philadelphia on November 24,
1833. A crowd of friends met Buchanan at the gangplank, escorted him
to his quarters, and explained the details for a homecoming celebration—
a huge $5-a-plate dinner that night. Dallas and his friends had refused to
attend, but nonetheless the banquet hall was jammed.19
The balloting for senator would be renewed on December 7. That
left two weeks for work. Simon Cameron, electioneering like a demon in
Harrisburg, reported that he had drummed up thirty sure votes against
McKean and thought that the Legislature would concentrate, after a few
ballots, on Buchanan, but Buchanan remained fairly certain that McKean
would win. The results of the election caused considerable astonishment.
McKean was elected on the third ballot by a majority of 74 out of 130 votes,
while Buchanan polled only five votes. There was more here than met the
eye. The day before, Cameron asserted he had 43 votes promised against
McKean, which were presumably to go to Buchanan. It was quite clear
that Buchanan himself insisted that he did not want to tangle with the Wolf
Administration at this moment.20
Between his return from Russia and the election, Buchanan had
been to Washington to talk to the president. Jackson wanted Wolf and
Buchanan to work together. The party needed them both; a split between
them would throw Pennsylvania to the anti-Masons. Buchanan would get
his chance later, for Jackson said he planned to send William Wilkins to
Russia leaving the senatorship vacant, and Buchanan would then succeed
Wilkins in Washington.21 Buchanan knew this before McKean's election.
He wrote to one of his backers: "Mr. Wilkins will soon obtain an Executive
appointment. , . , I must be greatly mistaken if in that event I should not
be elected to the Senate without difficulty." "All's well at Harrisburg,"
he concluded. "The party are firm & decided in support of Gen. Jackson's
administration & in opposition to the Bank."22
The picture was clear. The Pennsylvania Senators who had
voted for the Bank would be out, the anti-Bank men in; the State Adminis-
tration would be at peace with the Buchanan party, and both groups
reconciled to Van Buren. What could be a happier prospect for the
election of 1836? Buchanan would join McKean in the Senate and stood
a good chance for the vice-presidential nomination. Much as the Pennsyl-
vania voters had formerly resented Van Buren, a union of Wolf and
Buchanan in support of him should bring his opponents into the fold,23
99
JAMES BUCHANAN
SENATOR BUCHANAN
The year 1834 proved a busy one for Buchanan. He furnished and moved
into the house where he had so often visited Ann Coleman. At night he
lay awake thinking about the past and imagining what might have been.
Damn the whole episode, he thought. They had both acted like lunatics.
He still had Ann's letters tied in a packet with silk ribbon, but he wished
sometimes that he could forget about their courtship and its aftermath.
Now he had to find someone to take care of his house. For a while he had
part-time servants, but he anticipated a tour of duty in Washington before
long and wanted a permanent and trustworthy caretaker. He often ate his
meals at the old White Swan Hotel on the town square. The proprietor,
had a niece, Esther Parker, who was helping around the inn that summer.
She had just turned 28, was clean, neat, happy in disposition, and a fine
cook and housekeeper. Buchanan mentioned that he was looking for
someone to manage his establishment at 42 East King Street and was a
little surprised when Parker asked if he would consider Esther, or Miss
Hetty, as he called her, for the job.24
Buchanan talked to the girl and set up a tentative arrangement:
she should stay at the White Swan but work part-time at the King Street
house during the summer and fall. If he should be elected to the Senate
they would then decide whether she would take a permanent position as
housekeeper, in which case he would, of course, expect her to move int for
he would be away most of the time and wanted the house occupied in his
absence and ready for him on quick trips home.25
In the course of the summer he visited Washington, Philadelphia,
Harrisburg, and New York. He also went to see hfa sister Jane, now
Mrs. Elliott T. Lane, at Mercersburg, and while there inspected the grave-
stones for his mother and brother George at nearby Spring Grow Cemetery.
After a stop at Bedford Springs, he made a trip to Greensburg and saw his
sister Harriet who had married the Reverend Robert Henry. There
Buchanan learned to his dismay that Henry's family in Sheperdbtown,
Virginia, owned two slaves. This was political dynamite, and he lost no
time in informing his brother-in-law that he wanted to buy thowfr slam
into freedom- Buchanan drew up a deed of transfer, known as a f 'deed of
complete emancipation" in Virginia, and a "deed of conditional manu-
mission*' in Pennsylvania, providing for the sale of Daphne Cook, aged 22,
and Ann Cook, aged 5, by Ann D. Henry to James Buchanan, under the
provisos that they should leave Virginia, that Daphne should give service
to Buchanan for seven years and then become free, aa provided in Penn-
sylvania law; and that Ann should be bound until the age of 28— seven
years past the age of maturity. Terms of the sale were to be arranged later.
Anyway, thought Buchanan, this might help to solve his house-servant
1AA
DAYS OF DECISION • 1833 - 1834
problem.26 He found sister Harriet in poor health but rejoicing in her
infant son, James Buchanan Henry.
At Pittsburgh he called on his loyal political manager, David
Lynch, a hard-drinking, hard-hitting son of the canal-digging Irish, who
had worked his way into politics by outroaring and outfighting the opposi-
tion. Davy was not much appreciated by Pittsburgh society, but he
rounded up votes whenever they were needed. He was postmaster now,
and doing well in every respect except that of getting the mail delivered.
Buchanan then visited his sister Maria and her husband, Dr- Yates, in
Meadville and his brother Edward who had moved there with his new wife,
Eliza Foster.
About this time Buchanan became involved in some kind of a
romantic affair which, like most of his episodes with women, remains more
of a mystery than a story. It centered at 518 Walnut Street, Philadelphia,
the home of his friend Thomas Kittera. With Kittera lived his widowed
mother, his sister Ann, and three young girls all of whom had lost their
mothers in infancy. Two of them were Kittera's own nieces, Mary Kittera
Snyder and Elizabeth Michael Snyder, children of his dead sister and
"Handsome John" Snyder, a son of former Governor Simon Snyder.
Grandmother Kittera and Aunt Ann had taken charge of these children
after their mother's death in 1821. The third child living at the Kittera's
was Elizabeth Huston, the daughter of Buchanan's sister Sarah, who had
died in 1825. James at that time had made arrangements for the Huston
baby to be raised by his friends, among girls her own age.
Whether Buchanan became attached to Aunt Ann or to Mary
Snyder remains an unsolved puzzle. There seem to be no letters extant
between Buchanan and either of them, but there are a number of letters
from Buchanan to Thomas Kittera which end with such cryptic statements
as "be particular in giving my love to my intended," or refer to "my
portion of the world's goods," or to that part of the family "in which I feel
a peculiar interest." Even from such crumbs of evidence one can discern
that the affair in progress had little mark of the divine passion. Rather,
Buchanan's life Jong friendship with all of the Kitteras suggests a marriage
of convenience in the making, and probably with Mary when she became
a few years older.27
The election of United States Senator to replace William Wilkins
would be held on December 6, 1834. Buchanan, apparently, believed he
had thia under control for he did little open electioneering and stayed out
of Harrisburg* Cameron was on hand acting as manager, but it is probable
that Governor Wolfs known approval of Buchanan was the more effective
force.
The anti-Masons backed Amos Ellmaker; the Whigs put up
Joseph Lawrence; the Wolf Administration supported Buchanan; and the
101
JAMES BUCHANAN
Philadelphia Dallas faction used Joel B. Sutherland as its man to block
Buchanan's election. If the anti-Masons and Whigs had been able to
work together they could easily have elected a senator, but they found it
impossible to cooperate. Buchanan got 25 votes on the first ballot, 42 on
the second, 58 on the third, and a winning majority of 66, on the fourth
and final vote. The large scattering of Democrats came over to Buchanan
after it was clear that none of the others could win; but Sutherland held
back until the very end, true to the Eleventh Hour tradition, ami then
threw his votes to the last remaining Buchanan competitor within his own
party. Nothing was to be gained by the move. It simply demonstrated
spectacularly that the Philadelphia City group would not bend the knee to
anyone, be it Jackson, Wolf, or Buchanan.
There was one problem of the senatorship about which Buchanan
worried a great deal. It had placed Wilkins and Dallas in an impossible
situation, and it would plague any Pennsylvania senator as long as there
was serious discussion in Washington of the tariff, the Bank, and the
slavery issues. How could a senator work with the national Administration
and with his own State Legislature when these two took opposite views on
a particular bill, especially if the vote on it was made a party test at Washing-
ton or at Harrisburg?
Buchanan told the committee of the Legislature which informed
him of his election that he held the right of instruction to be sacral. "If
it did not exist,*' he said, "the servant would be superior to his master/'
He would cither obey instructions from the State Legislature or resign,
but in giving a vote against his own judgment, he continue*}, "I act merely
as their agent. The responsibility is theirs, not mine."28 In rare instances
however, he might question whether the instructions of the legislature
did in fact represent the public will, and in such a case he would try to
speak for the people. He wanted to make his position very clear on the
instruction doctrine, for if the anti-Masons got control of the State Legis-
lature they would certainly try to embarrass him by ordering him to vote
against all the Democratic measures.
This statement, ho thought, protected him all around. When h<»
voted with the national party under instruction, he could take the credit;
when he voted against it under instruction, he could pass the buck to the
State Legislature; when the issue was extremely obscure, he could do what
he pleased by challenging the Legislature's interpretation of the public will;
and if matters were hopeless, he could resign on principle without the
appearance of losing his temper. "Be wise as the serpent and harailemt a*
the dove.1' He hoped this set of rules conformed to the maxim.
The following week he went to Harrisburg with (iuneron and had
a high time. "No man has ever left Harrisburg under more favorable
auspices," wrote Cameron. Back in Lancaster Buchanan went to the
102
DAYS OF DECISION • 1833 - 1834
Swan Hotel and engaged Miss Hetty as housekeeper. He then began to
pack and to make final arrangements for the winter's absence. He called
on his brother Edward who had just moved from Meadville to a new charge,
the Protestant Episcopal Church in Leacock Township, Lancaster County,
stopped in Philadelphia for a short visit to his "intended" at the Kitteras'
and then hastened on to Washington.
On December 15, he appeared in the Senate, a cozy, clublike body
in 1834. Buchanan had served with a good many of its members when
they had been colleagues in the House. The desks surrounded the speaker's
rostrum in concentric half-circles, the fireplaces were spaced evenly around
the back wall, the small semicircular visitors' gallery was set above the
main floor like boxes in a theater, and the red velvet drapes and mural
paintings created an atmosphere at once elegant and intimate.
Van Buren presided with confidence, urbanity, and good humor.
Buchanan's friend, Webster and his tormentor, Clay, sat on the other side
of the chamber with their Whig colleagues: Ewing of Ohio, Frelinghuysen
and Southard of New Jersey, Clayton of Delaware, and many others— too
many; the Whigs had a majority. Among the Democrats were Benton of
Missouri, Silas Wright of New York, W. R. King of Alabama, Felix Grundy
of Tennessee, John Tyler of Virginia, McKean from Pennsylvania, and
Calhoun. The latter had changed in many ways. No one was sure what
party he belonged to— he had made a peculiar one for himself based on that
"peculiar institution,7* the South. He no longer looked or acted like a
favored presidential aspirant.
Buchanan realized that despite his original disappointment with
the Russian Mission it had been a lucky break for him, for the United
States in the period of his absence had been through violent political
storms. The Senate had made war on Jackson, and the Hero had carried
it into their own country* Buchanan considered himself fortunate in not
getting the senatorial seat in 1833, when he would have had to vote for the
resolution censuring Jackson in response to the instructions of the State
Legislature. That act would have finished him; it ruined Wilkins, snd
marie McKean powerless to promote patronage. But the main fight seemed
now to be over.
Buchanan analyzed the political future in these terms. A
Democrat had to be a Jacksonian, and that meant also being a follower of
Van Buren. He had to give up all hopes for salvage of the Bank, and fight
its recharter to the death, Pennsylvanians would not like to do this, but
they could risk the demise of the Bank better than the hatred of Old Andy.
The opposition, while seeming to unite under a new party name, the Whigs,
was still disorganized; in fact, its main unity lay simply in hatred of Jackson
himself. When he left the scene, the Whig party would disintegrate, and
the Democrats were bound to win unless they foolishly permitted them-
103
JAMES BUCHANAN
selves to fall apart. If they could bury some of their local grudges and
work together, their party was certain to control for years to come.
Buchanan wanted a part of that control; if possible, the most
important part. He analyzed his duty logically, and proceeded to business.
He had to support Jackson in the Senate undeviatingly. He would have to
overcome the widespread hatred of Pennsylvania^ for Van Buren. That
would be more difficult but not impossible, for most politicians knew how
their bread was buttered. He had to bring to a conclusion the Pennsylvania
feud between the Amalgamators and the other Democrats, He had made
his peace with Wolf, and had seen the Ingham-Dallas-Wilkins faction lose
its influence, but there was still trouble in his own back yard, Henry A.
Muhlenberg, his choice as successor to Barnard as a partner in control,
had been flying the track. His friends thought he should have had the
senatorship but, having sacrificed that to Buchanan, they felt that he surely
Ought to replace Wolf as governor in 1835. This would be fatal, for the
Wolf-Buchanan team had just been brought firmly into Jackson's con-
fidence. If Muhlenberg could wait until 1838, he and Buchanan could cut
the whole cake. If not, well, God knew what the result would be.
1O4
8
THE GE3MTLEMAN FROM PENNSYLVANIA • 1835-1837
THE WOLVES AND THE MULES
After Buchanan's election to the Senate, many of his friends urged him to
consummate the destruction of the Family party and to consolidate his
triumph by ousting Wolf from the governorship and installing his own man,
Henry A. Muhlenberg. Muhlenberg was ready for it. Most of the Amal-
gamators were ready for it. But Buchanan knew that the times were not
ready. Governor Wolf after two terms in office had too much strength both
in Harrisburg and in Washington to give up without a struggle, and in a
fight he had this advantage: control of the county officeholders. The
sensible course was to permit Wolf to fill his constitutional term and then,
in 1838, let Muhlenberg succeed him as head of a united Democracy. It
would be foolish to try to replace him in 1835 at the cost of a split party.
But to convince the Muhlenberg enthusiasts that they should adopt the
long-range plan was a different matter.
Buchanan tried to reconcile the contesting factions by bringing
both parties to higher ground where they could agree. To this end he wrote
letter after letter to friends all over the state, urging that the key factor
should be loyalty to Van Buren. He fathered the idea that a resolution
should be presented to Democratic members of the State Legislature, prior
to the March 4 nominating convention, pledging, positive support of
Van flEren for the presidency. This proposal, he hoped, would focus
attention on the Imger aims of the party and provide a platform on which
all could stand. And if, they could agree to one thing, maybe they could
reach an agreement on others. The scheme might have worked if precisely
the right person had introduced the Van Buren resolution, but a staunch
pro-Muhlenberg partisan brought it to the floor. Wolfs friends immedi-
ately sensed an attack on the governor and for this reason defeated it,
though they wrote to Buchanan afterward assuring him that they had acted
only from local motives and thought highly of Van Buren.1
105
JAMES BUCHANAN
No further conciliatory efforts were made, due to shortage of
time; and the county meetings held for the purpose of selecting convention
delegates became scenes of heated controversy and factional recrimination,
In many counties the "Wolves" and the "Mules," as the rival partisans
were called, held separate party conclaves and sent opposing delegations
to Harrisburg where, for the first three days, each group contested the
other's right to be seated. At length practically everyone was admitted.
As soon as the delegates were accredited, the Mules won a close decision
to adjourn the meeting and to reconvene at Lewistown on May 6, They
hoped, by delaying and moving the convention out of Harrisburg, to
improve their chances. But the Wolf minority remained in session and
renominated the governor on March 7. The Mules met as scheduled, and
placed their man officially in the race. Thus the schism was hopelessly
widened. Two Democrats were going to run for the governorship, each with
strong backing and each protesting loyalty to Buchanan and Van Buren.
Buchanan tried again. In a letter to Jacob Kern, Speaker of the
State Senate, he urged the retirement of both candidates and the rail for a
new convention. Instead of easing the tension, this suggestion aggravated
it, and both factions now tried to win Buchanan's support. The Mult*
promised to back him for the vice-presidency if he would come out for
them, but he refused. "Will you forsake your friends," Muhleniwrg wrote
him, *cand go over to your enemies who are only waiting opportunity to cut
your throat?"2 Wolf, on his part, gratified Buchanan by appointing
Thomas Kittera to a judgeship.3
After the formal nomination of Muhlenberg, Buchanan stated
that he would vote for Wolf but would take no part whatever in th«* canvass.
If Muhlenberg drew enough votes from the anti-Masons, Buchanan had
weak hopes that Wolf might be elected, but hi« best guess WOK that the
anti-Masonic candidate, Joseph Ritner, would win. When rumor* !x*gan
to circulate that Van Buren was pulling strings to help Muhlenherg,
Buchanan counselled noninterference, frl have been defending little Van
on this point everywhere,*' he wrote. 'Those who know him will feel at
once how ridiculous the charge is. . . , There shoulU be a studied neutrality
in Washington."4
Shortly after the Muhlenberg convention at Lewistown, the
national nominating convention of the Democratic party met at Baltimore.
Everyone knew that Jackson intended Martin Van Buren to sucmid him
as president In fact he suggested that if no other way were open to
accomplish this, he might resign before his term had expired, and person-
ally put in Little Van. But Jackson's increasingly dictatorial handling of
national problems had caused wholesale secession from his party, and his
attempt to hand-pick his successor did nothing to quiet the anger of his
former friends. Instead of die "Old Hero," he now became "King Andrew/*
106
THE GENTLEMAN FROM PENNSYLVANIA • 1835 - 1837
The Baltimore Convention was called a year early, at the presi-
dent's request, in order to get Van Buren's name in front of the people
before other candidates had a chance to build an organization. Pennsyl-
vania, as expected, sent 60 delegates, 30 Mules and 30 Wolves, all of whom
backed Van Buren. After adopting the two-thirds rule, in order to achieve
a "more imposing effect," the convention proceeded unanimously to
nominate Van Buren for president. Col. Richard M. Johnson of Kentucky
received the vice-presidential nomination. Buchanan wrote to Van Buren
during the Baltimore convention: "My opinion is that the division in our
party will make Ritner Governor; but that will not seriously affect the
Presidential election. . . . The friends of Muhlenberg in our party, are
almost to a man your sincere and devoted friends. So is a very large
majority of the friends of Wolf."6
In the election for Governor of Pennsylvania in October, 1835,
Ritner received 94,023 votes; Wolf, 65,801; and Muhlenberg, 40,586. The
combination of Whigs and anti-Masons elected 76 of the 100 members of
the State Assembly and captured six of the eight senatorial vacancies.
Although the Democrats had enough "holdovers" in the Senate to give
them a small majority in that body, it was a thumping defeat all round.
It was a bitter lesson, but probably the only kind that could chasten the
selfishness and jealousy that pervaded both factions. They were all out
of jobs now— Wolf, Muhlenberg, and all their friends and partisans; they
would stay out of office until they swallowed their pride, shook hands, and
began working for their party again. Buchanan resisted the temptation
to say, "I told you so." He had a job, to be sure, but not for long. In
December 1836, the Legislature would ballot again to fill his senatorial
post for another term.
THE ELECTION OF 1836
James Buchanan always did things the slow way, the hard way, the sure way.
He had no talent for the sudden devastating move, the brilliant stroke, the
daring gamble, or the quick quip which by-passed a problem in a gale of
laughter. He did not try to change his own position or to give new meaning
and direction to the Pennsylvania Democracy. He began laboriously to
rebuild his power from the bottom up, starting again in Lancaster County.
The usual Democratic state convention would be held on March 4,
1836, at Harrisburg to determine the composition of the electoral ticket
for the presidential vote in the fall For a time it looked as if the Wolves
and Mules would each run separate sets of electors, for each faction per-
sisted in holding its own county meetings, but Buchanan persuaded the
Wolf meeting in Lancaster, for the sake of conciliation, to endorse the idea
107
JAMES BUCHANAN
of placing pro-Muhlenberg electors on the ticket from the eight Congres-
sional districts in which Muhlenberg had recently polled a majority. The
Mules had their general meeting scheduled for January 8 when they in-
tended to choose an electoral ticket. If they insisted on having none but
their own men as electors and would not acquiesce in a ticket which gave
them representation only in the areas where they had a voting majority,
then they would have to be excluded from the Harrisburg convention
entirely, with a "pray, what the Devil brought you here?" "I have told
them," Buchanan explained to the Wolf managers, "that they have to yield
to the majority. But I hope they will not have to be forced into submission.
It is better to receive them cordially at once, & have an end of it."e
This left it up to the Mules, at their January meeting, to accept
the olive branch and to include on their own proposed ticket the names of
Wolf men in appropriate districts. It was a sane proposal, calculated to
bring out the maximum Van Buren vote in every district by running as
electors the men most popular locally. Buchanan pointed out another
significant reason for adopting this plan. Pennsylvania reformers, after
twenty years of effort, had succeeded in forcing the Legislature to call a
convention to revise the state Constitution of 1790. Delegates to it would
be elected a month before the presidential election of 1836, Unless the
Democrats in each county got together, it was certain that the opposition
would control this convention and, as Buchanan warned, "make sad work
of it" A single electoral college ticket would help to maintain a united
front among Democrats when they voted for delegates to the constitutional
convention.
Buchanan worked effectively to reunite the Pennsylvania Demo-
crats» but the anti-Masons, especially Governor Ritner and Assemblyman
Thaddeus Stevens, helped even more* The Democracy in Pennsylvania
was so flat on its back that Stevens could not resist the temptation to kick it.
On December 19, 1835, he moved the appointment of & legislative eom-
mittee "to investigate the evils of Free Masonry/' This proved a mere
pretext to bring prominent Democrats to the bar of the Legislature and
make them sweat. Ex-governor Wolf, Chief Justice Gibson* George M-
Dallas, Francis Shunk and others were called. Even Buchanan would
probably have had a summons if he had not been in Washington. When
these gentlemen refused to testify, and the crowd applauded Skunk's
spirited protest against invasion of his civil rights, Stevens thundered the
warning that the gallery itself would be arrested for contempt. The pro*
ceedings were so transparent, so useless, and so vindictive that they
boomeranged against the committee; but even more important, the Attack
on the Democrats made them forget some of their own differences and unite
in self-defense. The Whigs were disgusted and threatened to break off
their coalition with the anti-Masons.
THE GENTLEMAN FROM PENNSYLVANIA • 1835 - 1837
On top of this upheaval came the Bank proposal. Wolf had been
for retrenchment of the hugefc State canal building program and had urged
taxation to put the state on a firmer financial basis. Governor Ritner now
proposed a repeal of taxes, great extension of the public transportation
system, and the issuing of a State charter for the Bank of the United States
for which the Bank was to pay the State $9,000,000 to be used for internal
improvements.
When the Bank Bill passed the Assembly as expected, it was
assumed that the Democratic majority in the Senate would kill it. But
Nicholas Biddle's men had done their work well; the Senate passed the
recharter bill on February 15, 1836, with the aid of eight of the leading
Democratic members. One of them had, only a month before, presided at
the Muhlenberg Democratic Convention which adopted resolutions de-
nouncing a recharter of the institution. How the Bank agents persuaded
these men or how much they paid them to turn renegade, no one knows;
but the enormity of their treachery formed the basis of the presidential
canvass in Pennsylvania and proved to be the incident which saved the day
for Van Buren and Buchanan.
Democratic indignation over the arrogant investigation by
Stevens and the recharter of the Bank under circumstances redolent of
bribery paved the way for a reasonably harmonious Democratic meeting on
March 4. Buchanan's project for a unified electoral ticket was approved,
and the party prepared to spend the next four months taking revenge on
the anti-Masons and assailing the Bank as a monster even more hideous
than Jackson had painted it.
Buchanan turned down an invitation to speak to the Democratic
mass meeting at Harrisburg on the 4th of July for the Senate remained in
session beyond this date, but he did send along a vigorous anti-Bank speech.
The approaching struggle in Pennsylvania, he concluded, "would be a
struggle for life or death. The Democracy must either triumph over the
Bank, or the Bank will crush the Democracy."7
The Bank issue grew so hot that Buchanan had to modify some
of his personal arrangements to keep himself dear of attack. The transfer
of treasury funds from the U. S. Bank to other selected institutions led to
a scramble among bankers for a share of the money. "I have refused in
every instance to interfere in obtaining public Deposits for any Bank," he
wote to an applicant "I have been repeatedly & strongly urged upon
this subject from different quarters and have always given the same answer.
If as a Senator it would have been improper for me to interfere in behalf of
other banks in which I had no stock— how much more so would it be in the
case of the Harrisburg Bank? When the question of the distribution of
the public deposits was before Congress, I sold out my stock in the Man-
hattan Bank— a large Depository— at a very great sacrifice."8
109
JAMES BUCHANAN
In the October elections the people of Pennsylvania gave a re-
sounding rebuke to the Legislature which hail reehartered the Bank; only
18 old members were returned. Of 72 Democrats elected, 63 were new-
comers. But the vote on delegates to the Constitutional Convention told a
different story. Of 133 delegates elected, 66 were Democrat?, 66 Whig-
anti-Masons, and one an independent with Whig leanings. It was a split
right down the middle which carried with it a serious threat to the presi-
dential prospects of Van Buren in the national election in November.
The Constitutional Convention, with a majority of one nn the
Whig side, would undoubtedly adopt an amendment abolishing offices for
life. This measure would jeopardize the position of every justice of the
peace in the state, and make his tenure dependent upon current politics.
As this provision would undoubtedly go into effect before the end of the
Ritner Administration, it would probably be used to eliminate any J. P.'s
who had been leaders in Van Buren's cause. So, at least, they thought in
the panic of the moment. For this reason these key leaders in the little
communities, almost all of the.m Democrats, hung back. When the
November vote was counted, Pennsylvania brought in not the 15*000
majority for Van Buren which Buchanan had predicted, but a thin 2,183
out of nearly 200,000 votes cast. Had these votes gone the other way*
Pennsylvania's electoral college votes would have been lost to Van Buren,
and that would have thrown the election into the House-
Now that Van Buren had won, Buchanan had his own future to
worry about. In three weeks the new State Legislature would ballot to fill
his place in the Senate. He wrote to Van Bunm that he would have
Muhlcnberg as his opponent, a wholly unexpected turn of events, for
Muhlenberg in October had publicly announced that he favored Buchanan.
The Bank men had manipulated the change by flattering Muhlenberg and
offering him their support, though their real purpose was to keep the
Democrats divided.9
Buchanan was furious with Muhlenberg, Could he not see that
there was no conceivable prospect of party victory in the future except by
re-union? Wolf had been voted out, but his partisans remained active and
important and would never ally with the Bank crowd. Buchanan's friends
held the same view. Muhlenberg commanded one-third of a minority
•party in Pennsylvania, and a poor third at that. His strongest supporters
were those apostate Democrats who had voted for the State recharier of
the Bank, men who cared nothing about Muhlenberg except as a pawn to
keep alive the fight among the Democrats. And this was the man Buchanan
had picked as a partner three years ago! Well* sufficient unto the day* . * *
Muhlenberg saw another picture. Berks wss the strongest
Democratic county in the state. A few years before, the Democrats of
Berks and Lancaster combined were polling so large a vote that a union
11A
THE GENTLEMAN FROM PENNSYLVANIA • 1835 - 1837
might well have commanded control of the party. Since Lancaster had
gone over to anti-Masonry and the Bank, Buchanan could not even poll a
majority in his own county, but nevertheless he sat in the Senate. Ex-
Governor Wolf had been named Comptroller of the U. S. Treasury. Muhlen-
berg, who kept his county strong for the party, had received nothing but
requests to stand aside, first in the contest for governor, and now in the
campaign for Senator. Why should he not get his share? Why should
Buchanan continue to have the glory, and others trail along with mere
promises for the future, probably as hollow as those made in the past?
The legislators at Harrisburg, however, snuffed out the Muhlen-
berg hopes. The Whigs and anti-Masons could make no headway in
promoting a coalition to elect him and failed in their effort to force a
postponement of the election. Finally, they gave up. The two houses met
and quickly re-elected James Buchanan to the Senate by a party vote.10
RELATIONS WITH VAN BUREN
Buchanan found it a pleasant relief to get back to the Senate. He now had
a job for six more years and, for the first time in a decade, could make some
solid plans. He sought out his friend Senator William R. King of Alabama
and they arranged for lodgings together. The usual talk about the sterling
character of "southern gentlemen" caused a good deal of amusement
among northerners, but if anyone merited respect for his personal qualities,
it was King. He would now be vice-president if the party had heeded
Buchanan's advice, but because of a nonelection by the Electoral College,
the Democrats would probably wind up with CoL Richard M. Johnson, a
profligate from Kentucky who lived with a mulatto and gave northerners
good reason to sneer at southern pretensions to gentility. King presently
sat as president, pro tempore, of the Senate. Washington had begun to
refer to him and Buchanan as "the Siamese twins/'11
Shortly after his re-election, Buchanan became involved in a
debate on the admission of Michigan to statehood. The dispute concerned
a constitutional question as to the proper mode of calling a state conven-
tion. Senator Calhoun challenged the validity of a Michigan Constitutional
Convention which had met at the suggestion of Congress and without prior
sanction of the State Legislature. Calhoun asserted that the action of the
convention was a nullity.
Because it was a partisan matter, the discussion of the Michigan
issue ranged far and wide, bringing in eventually Pennsylvania's recharter
of the U. S* Bank. What would happen, a Senator asked Buchanan, if the
constitutional convention now preparing to meet in Pennsylvania should
determine that the state charter recently awarded to the Bank was a nullity?
Would not this be breach of contract? On this subject Senator Morris of
111
JAMES BUCHANAN
Ohio introduced a letter from George M. Dallas stating that the Pennsyl-
vania convention should repeal the Bank charter. Morris called this advice
"incendiary," "revolutionary," and "calculated to excite the people to
rise up in rebellion against the laws." It attacked the United States
Constitution which guaranteed the sanctity of contracts.
Had Buchanan been a mere ward heeler he would have sat back
to relish this attack on his hated enemy; had he been vindictive, he could
have found ways to turn the knife in the wound, but his objectives were
larger than these. For years he had been trying to patch up the broken
Democracy of Pennsylvania, and for years Dallas had been the primary
impediment to union. Now he saw a chance, quite accidentally, to put
Dallas in his debt. Jumping to the defense, he demolished the arguments
of Morris.
"Mr. Dallas never did assert that the convention about to be held
in Pennsylvania will possess any power to violate the constitution of the
United States," he began. "Why, sir, such propositions would be rank
nullification; and although I never had the pleasure of being on intimate
terms with Mr. Dallas, I can venture to assert that he ... is opposed to this
political heresy. ... No, Sir; Mr. Dallas has expressly referred to the
Supreme Court of the United States as the tribunal which must finally
decide whether the convention possesses the power to repeal the bank
charter." But what, asked Calhoun, if the Supreme Court upheld the
Bank in such a litigation? "I can tell the Senator from South Carolina,"
rejoined Buchanan, "that we shall never rrsort to nullification as the
rightful remedy."12
Buchanan's vigorous defense of Dallas brought a prompt message
from the latter expressing his "warm personal thanks" and a wish "to
cultivate greater intimacy*" Buchanan replied on the same day that he
was "not only willing, but anxious" to let bygones be bygones and to
become friends.18 The exchange marked the point at which Buchanan, for
the first time in his life, became the acknowledged leader of the state
Democracy and fountainhead of federal patronage for Pennsylvania.
Unfortunately, a good many Pennsylvania Democrats now
favored the Bank, higher tariff rates, extension of internal improvements
and other anti-Jacksonian policies; hence the slim Van Buren majority of
the previous November- To ignore these people in the patronage distribu-
tion would further damage the Democracy in Pennsylvania; to get jobs
for them would be the task of a magician, Wilkins, who had the stature
for an important office, had ruined his chances by running for vice-president
against the winning ticket, Cameron had frankly joined the friends of
the Bank* Dallas, though no longer a Calhoun partisan* had voted to
recharter the Bank and still acted as one of its solicitors* To promote Wolf
or Muhlenberg would only start that old feud anew. Buchanan might take
THE GENTLEMAN FROM PENNSYLVANIA • 1835 - 1837
a Cabinet post but at the risk of angering the many Pennsylvania Democrats
who thought that he already had taken more than his share of the offices.
Furthermore, if he left the Senate he would invite a new scramble for his
place which the anti-Masons might win.
Buchanan talked with both Jackson and Van Buren, telling them
that Pennsylvania deserved and expected a place in the Cabinet, but he
declined to name his man. If he supposed that he would get a Pennsylvania
appointment by this course, he was destined to disappointment. "I fear
from what I have heard," he wrote Van Buren in February, "that I may
not have made myself understood, ... It is my finn conviction . . . that if
a Cabinet officer should not be selected from Pennsylvania, it will give
great and general dissatisfaction."14
The president-elect undoubtedly recognized more clearly than
Buchanan the hopelessness in 1837 of acquiring much grace in the Keystone
State by such an appointment. More could be gained elsewhere by this
means. The Pennsylvania Democrats would have to unsnarl their own
mess, and it would take more than a Cabinet office to do it. Van Buren
could help, however, without risking an invasion of Washington by these
factionists. There was always the foreign service.
Van Buren appointed Dallas to the Russian Mission. Buchanan
apparently had not been consulted on this move, though it undoubtedly
gave him secret joy. In writing to the president-elect about it, he signed
the letter not with the usual "Yours very respectfully" but with a rare and
intimate "ever yours." Nonetheless, the party still demanded a Cabinet
officer from the state. "In writing thus," said Buchanan "you know, I
have no views towards myself, as I should not change my present situation
for any other."15 Just how sincere was he about this? Would he not take
the State Department if it were offered? He had just been voted Chairman
of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee in a two-to-one victory over
Henry day, a triumph he keenly relished. Would it not be the cream of
the jest to be Secretary of State while Dallas was at St. Petersburg? Of
course, and he would take the job if it were offered, but these were matters
which, as Old Hickory used to say, "he would hide from the very hairs
of his head*"
The Cabinet appointments were finally announced. No Pennsyl-
vania name was on the list. Buchanan was disappointed in the extreme,
particularly because John Forsyth was continued as Secretary of State.
His relations with the Secretary had recently been soured when Forsyth
rejected Buchanan's first report as Chairman of the Foreign Relations
Committee with the tart observation that "the Committee seem to have
had an imperfect knowledge of the facts in relation to our affairs with
Mexico."
113
JAMES BUCHANAN
Buchanan had slaved over this report, read everything available,
and spared no effort. "Imperfect knowledge of the facts!" He knew the
facts, to be sure. One of the facts was that the recent Secretaries of State,
McLane excluded, were either lazy or ignorant, or both. His reply was
sarcastic:
Mr. Buchanan has been honored with the opinion of Mr. Forsyth
that 'the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate seem to
have had an imperfect knowledge, of the facts in relation to
Mexico.* Such an opinion emanating from the Secretary of
State cannot fail to produce a happy effect in promoting harmony
between the different branches of the Government. The Com-
mittee will not, however, reciprocate the compliment paid them
by the Secretary, lest they might do him an injustice, which
would be extremely repugnant to their feelings.10
The exchange brought on a storm, the intervention of the presi-
dent, a letter of explanation from Forsyth which included a guarded
apology, and a response from Buchanan that the fracas was ''happily
terminated" and would be considered "a family matter/*17 However, the
men despised each other from then on and welcomed every opportunity to
show their feelings, Buchanan later wondered whether he might not have
replaced Forsyth in March, if he had managed to muzzle his temper in
February.
Buchanan was on such poor terms with I*evi Wondhury of
New Hampshire, the n«w Secretary of the Treasury, that he aciflrowed all
requests for appointments in that department directly to Van Buren. r*I
am discouraged from making any requests in that quarter,1* he told the
president.18 The Secretary of War, Joel Poinaett, was from South Carolina*
which had not even voted for Van Buren. Poinsett was an able man and
had strongly supported Jackson in the nullification criste, but hi» appoint*
ment gave gratification only to Whigs in Pennsylvania. The Harrison
paper in Pittsburgh, the Manufacturer, highly approved.1* The selection
of Benjamin F. Butler, a New Yorker, as Attorney General galled IVnnayl-
vanians and heightened the rivalry between New York and Pennsylvania,
Amos Kendall, the Postmaster General, had nourished Jacknon'a belief in
Buchanan's duplicity in the old "bargain and sale'* affair. He would receive
no favors from Kendall, and he feared for the fate of Dave Lynch, whose
scandalous ineptitude in the management of the Pittsburgh post office
would not escape Kendall's efficient eye. Finally, there was Mahlon
Dickerson of New Jersey in the Navy Department. Dickerson would be
no problem, although he could not be expected to exert himself very much
to provide a new dry dock for Philadelphia.
THE GENTLEMAN FROM PENNSYLVANIA • 1835 - 1837
After the Cabinet appointments were made known, Buchanan
changed his subscript "ever yours" to "ever your friend" on his letters to
Van Buren. At the end of three weeks of job-seeking for his political
creditors, he reverted to the customary "Yours very respectfully." He
was not going to be a big wheel in this administration, he realized, but just
another cog in the machine.
According to Buchanan's philosophy of life and of politics, the
way to act in such a circumstance was to function as smoothly and as
quietly as possible. He saw neither truth nor virtue in the homely maxim
that the squeaky wheel gets the grease, nor in Cameron's view that the
best way to progress was to fight or buy the man who might be able to
gratify your wish. Patience, acquiescence, logically contrived procedure,
the appearance of consistency, refusal to make irretrievable commitments,
and a ready willingness to capitulate in matters of minor political advantage
•—these constituted Buchanan's political temperament.
Van Buren recognized these traits of character and keenly
appreciated the perplexities of the Pennsylvania Democrats. New York
had taught him all there was to learn about factional fights. Therefore,
Buchanan was able to make more progress than he had anticipated. He
secured a position in the Treasury for Henry Petriken who had led the
opposition to the Bank charter in the Pennsylvania Legislature, and placed
George Plitt in the Wisconsin Land Office. Simon Cameron, through
Buchanan's influence, obtained a good job (which he disgraced) settling
Winnebago Indian claims. Henry Muhlenberg went to the newly created
Austrian Mission in which Buchanan was especially interested, since he
had worked for its establishment during his sojourn iu Europe. Muhlen-
berg's appointment so infuriated George Wolf that he immediately resigned
from his Treasury post, declaring that his old rival had walked off with the
honors. Buchanan persuaded Van Buren to pacify Wolf by offering him
the best federal job in Pennsylvania: the collectorship of the Port of
Philadelphia. One of the Dallas supporters had to be discharged in order
to make way for Wolf, and they became incensed.
It was a patchwork of patronage, but at least it demonstrated that
neither Van Buren nor Buchanan was playing favorites with any Democratic
faction. On the contrary they were acting on the assumption that they
would all have to pull together during the 1838 campaign for the governor-
ship if they wished to rid the Commonwealth of anti-Masonry and prevent
a Whig success in the national election of 1840.
115
9
THE ROOT OF ALL EVIL * 1837-1840
THE SECOND BANK OF THE UNITED STATES
March 4, 1837, dawned bright and clear and by midmorning when Martin
Van Buren drove to the White House to join Jackson, the sun had brought
warmth and gaiety to the crowds which lined the avenue from the White
House to the Capitol At the eastern portico the members of the Senate,
the Cabinet and the Diplomatic Corps led the way to the* rostrum. The
stately Hero of New Orleans, just up from a sickbed, acknowledged a roaring
ovation from the crowd, and Mr. Van Buren advanced to deliver his
inaugural address. Buchanan stayed for the inauguration ball at Carusfs
that evening and then headed for HarrJsburg as fast as he could go.
There the Legislature was in an uproar over the Bank. The
Van Buren partisans, variously known as the "radicals*' or the "hard
money men," had instituted an investigation of the Bank which they
were using as a weapon of attack, while Wlriga, "improvement men/* and
"paper money boys" were trying to make the inquiry serve the Bank's ends.
One of the Whigs noted that the anti-Bank crowd was led on by f ra gang of
scoundrels . . . including Buchanan, and Jesse Miller."1
The Legislature vindicated the Bank, whereupon George R* Espy
unexpectedly moved to repeal the Bank's charter. This motion renewed
the fight at the worst possible time, for the Panic of 1837 had now descended
upon the nation* Even the Bank's enemies had no wish to outlaw the
institution at this particular moment, for they would be blamed for aggra-
vating the financial distress. Fifty-two Democrats in the House had at first
agreed to support the repeal motion, but when the roll was called only
twenty-one of them actually voted for it.
Back in Lancaster Buchanan tried to think out some solution to
the problem. It appeared to him that the Bank had first bought up the
national Congress to get its charter renewed, and now it had bought up
the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. He had learned in Harrisburg that
the leading Democratic members of the investigating committee, who were
THE ROOT OF ALL EVIL * 1837 - 1840
supposed to produce proof that the institution was corrupt, had been bribed
by the Bank. Two junior members, who respected the opinion of their
elder colleagues, had signed the whitewash report on the assumption that
it was bona fide. Later they learned that their senior committeemen had
withheld a lot of damning evidence and, after the vindication of the Bank,
had been its guests at a big dinner celebration in Philadelphia.2 Buchanan,
mortified by the result, wrote, "This bank business will divide the party
for years to come."3
His friends agreed, "I begin to believe that [the Bank] will get
the uppermost of us again," wrote one of them.4 And why should it not?
The issue cut clean through party lines in Pennsylvania; there were Bank
and anti-Bank followers in each major party and in every faction.
The question presented two very different aspects. To the rank
and file of Democratic voters the destruction of Biddle's "monster" sym-
bolized the transfer of political privilege from the aristocracy to the "common
man"; but to informed politicians Jackson's war on the Bank signified
rather the transfer of the money center of the nation from Philadelphia to
New York; from Chestnut Street to Wall Street. Whatever Jackson's
reasons for the attack, there seems to be little doubt that the chief motive
of his intimate advisors, Van Buren and half a dozen others, was to oust
Biddle in order to seize financial control themselves.5 Thus the struggle
over the Bank proved to be an important phase of the ancient rivalry
between Pennsylvania and New York. This feature of ante-bellum politics,
the incessant contest for power and position between the two wealthiest
and most populous states of the Union, may perhaps bear a heavier re-
sponsibility for the disruption of the Democracy and the later breakup of
the Union than historians now suspect. Here parochialism played its
divisive role at the center of the nation rather than at its extremities.
Trade reports of the early 1830's had already shown that New York
City had supplanted Philadelphia as the leading import-export city of
America, a distinction the latter had enjoyed since colonial times. The
rapid rise of New York City, hastened by Van Buren's political connection
with Jackson, was the underlying fact which explained why the Bank issue
in the Pennsylvania Legislature always disrupted the Democrats and why
the Dallas faction had to find some formula to keep the Bank, backbone of
Philadelphia's financial eminence, in operation.
Buchanan had to choose between supporting the financial
interests of eastern Pennsylvania and sustaining the national policy of the
Democrats. As the fonner course would have threatened his influence
nationally and placed him locally in the camp of his Philadelphia rivals, he
chose the latter, fully aware of the many pitfalls which the decision opened.
In order to emphasize the national aspect of his position, he raised a
question in the Senate which made everyone sit up tod take notice, for it
117
JAMES BUCHANAN
had apparently been overlooked before. "Suppose," he said, "General
Jackson and the bank had been in alliance and not in opposition. What
then might have been the consequences, had he been an enemy to the
liberties of the people? Can any man say that our liberties would not have
been in danger?" All the forms of the Constitution might have remained,
but who could believe that any subsequent election would ever be bcmafide;
that the whole framework of public information could not be bought up
and rigged; that frauds could not be excused by mercenary courts; or that
a president would not always be able to name his successor?6
At home, Buchanan restricted his talking to a reiteration of his
simple maxim, "The party must crush the bank, or the bank will crush the
party." His followers, desperately worried by the schism created by the
Bank issue, had no better advice to offer. One wrote, "What have we
gained by opposition to the Bank? Principle— what does it mean? Patri-
otism—where is it? Pledges— in the pocket!! Politics— I am ready to
quit."7 Another asked, "What do you think of a conciliation party? I
mean to organize the old fashioned Democratic party? It must come to
that."8 That, thought Buchanan, would be like trying to take the eggs out
of the omelette and put them back in the shells. A third proposed to foip-t
about the Bank and to take up "fresher, more interesting topics/'0 Bu-
chanan's friends coincided only on one point: they thought that he could
strengthen and unify the state Democracy by consenting to run for governor
in 1838. "You alone can unite our divided party," ran their plea. But
those who knew him best predicted that he would refuse, "He aims at
higher game," they said.10 They were right, for Buchanan announced
that he would not exchange the senatorship for a three-year scramble in
Hamsburg. Of all political positions, the governorship of Pennsylvania
traditionally carried the least prospect for subsequent honor-
By the time the Legislature had finished its indecisive discussion
of the Bank, Buchanan found himself in the midst of another series of
personal attacks like those in the election of 1828. Perhaps his enemfr*
thought there might be some truth in the idea that he alone could unite
his party.
The Lancaster Intelligencer started the assault with a new version
of the old "bargain and sale'* story which, to Buchanan's utter astonish-
ment, Francis P. Blair republished in the Washington Globe, the administra-
tion organ.11 In May Buchanan went to Harrishurg where he dropped in
at a session of the Constitutional Convention* Some of his friends invited
him to come front and sit inside the bar. Immediately thereafter, one of
the delegates, Coxe of Somerset, arose and delivered a tirade of abuse
against him which Buchanan reported "had no more connexion with the
subject under discussion than it had with the question that distracted the
sages of Lilliput, whether eggs ought to be beaten from the larger or the
THE ROOT OF ALL EVIL • 1837 - 1840
smaller end." Buchanan's one-time warm friend, John Sergeant, Chairman
of the Convention, made no effort to call Coxe to order. The central theme
of his philippic was that old chestnut: "that Buchanan had once thanked
his God that he had not a drop of Democratic blood in his veins, and if he
had, he would let it out."12
Coxe had once asked certain people of Lancaster to sign an
affidavit that they had heard Buchanan make the alleged statement, but
Anthony McGlinn was the only person who was willing to furnish a sworn
signature. Buchanan also swore, caliing Coxe "a dirty, low, malicious
fellow." Did anyone believe that he had been at any period of his life
"such an arrant fool?"13 He demanded evidence and wanted the con-
vention to give him a chance to refute. But Coxe was not after debate; he
merely wanted to get the item back into circulation and he succeeded
brilliantly. Picking up .the cue from Coxe, others began to use the con-
vention as their forum to attack Buchanan.
Some members of the convention at length became so accustomed
to spreading poison that one of them forgot himself and gave a dose to one
of his friends. Thaddeus Stevens, in a speech about apportionment of
votes in Philadelphia, referred to that proud city as "a great and growing
ulcer on the body politic," and then, without any apparent reason, launched
into a slurring commentary on Whig leader William Morris Meredith.
Meredith, not a man to sit back and listen quietly to an insult, rose and for
two days poured forth a stream of personal invective against Stevens while
the Democrats, now out of the picture, sat back entranced. Stevens
manufactured venom so fast, said Meredith, that when he ran out of
enemies, which was hard to imagine, he had to spray it on whoever stood
nearby. He was a great man in little things— by far the greatest in the
littlest that the country could boast. "You sneaking catamount," he
shouted, "you and your vulpine Coxe." The affair temporarily broke up
the Constitutional Convention, and threatened to break up the Whig-anti-
Masonic alliance. "Whether this dissolves the coalition remains to be
seen,9' wrote C. J. IngersolL14
Senator John P. King of Augusta, Georgia, had invited Buchanan
to come south for a visit during the summer, but the growing political
pressure and a number of priyate affairs discouraged the expedition. "Until
the fit of fault-finding is over," he replied, he would have to stay at home.15
His private business needed care in these days of panic,16 and he also had
to work out the estates of his mother and his brother George, both of whom
had died without leaving wills.17 But most important of all, Mary Kittera
Snyder (or was it Aunt Ann?) had said "yes-" Senator W. R. King had
ribbed him during the early spring about neglecting his usual affairs from
"the anxieties of love."18 On June 3, Buchanan wrote to Mrs. Francis
Preston Blair, "I would gladly join your party to the Hermitage next year,
119
JAMES BUCHANAN
, . . but long ere that time I expect to be married & have the cares of a
family resting upon my shoulders."10
The happy prospect clouded that particular spring, for the state
of feeling in Philadelphia was so violent against him for attacking the U. S.
Bank that he had been mobbed by a gang of political roughnecks on one of
his visits. Charles J. Ingersoll told him that the assaults upon him in the
Constitutional Convention had still further inflamed public opinion, and
that he really ought to stay out of the city until things calmed. Possibly
for this reason Mary Snyder went to Baltimore where Buchanan visited
her.20
Buchanan went to Bedford Springs in July for several weeks of
pleasant recreation, walking with his old friend Judge Henry Shippcn of
Meadville along the wooded stream which rippled through the glades below
the huge hotel. In the morning they would stop at the little white summer-
house enclosing the beautiful mineral spring and "drink of the waters,'*
according to their doctor's prescription. Until noon the guests ordinarily
stayed within easy reach of the other little white houses until the volcanic
eflects of the "waters" had subsided. After midday all sought the rocking
chairs which lined the huge porch or promenaded up and down, greeting
newly arrived friends and gossiping. In the evening there was dancing in
the great ballroom with schottisches, polkas, and a new step called the
hop-trot dubbed by some rakes the rabbit-hop- Buchanan hived to dance
and spent more evenings in society than he should have, considering the
amount of work he had planned to do- But the ladies insisted and he was
always a willing respondent to a roguish eye.
By the end of August he was back in Lancaster and hard at work
on a series of important Senate speeches he was to give on the new Adminis-
tration program to solve the currency and banking problems
BUCHANAN AND THE SUBTREASURY BILL
Although the Panic of 1837 grew very serious during the ftprinp and
summer* President Van Buren decided not to call a »prd«l *w»ion of
Congress to deal with it until September. During the summer months,
Buchanan had been in constant correspondence with Jackson and
Van Buren about the financial crisis. The latter had asked for suggestions
to be included in the presidential message to the forthcoming special
session of Congress and Buchanan, anticipating that he would be ft leading
spokesman for the president, proposed that Congress should establish a
new bank or, as that name had come into disrepute, f 'an Agency'1 connected
with the Treasury and the Mint to collect and disburse public money.
The agency should neither issue notes nor discount paper; its function
THE ROOT OF AIL EVIL • 1837 - 1840
should be to receive bullion for deposit both from the collectors of the
United States and from individuals. It could issue to individuals receipts
which could then be sent to any part of the nation and be cashed back into
bullion at a branch agency for a slight transmission fee. This system
would facilitate domestic exchange and prevent wide variations in exchange
rates in different parts of the land. More particularly, it would prevent
exchange merchants from periodically squeezing businessmen who needed
specie when there happened, temporarily, to be a local shortage. But
Buchanan was certain that neither the government nor the nation could
function on a specie basis, as Senator Benton and others believed. The
notes of state banks would have to be used and the government would have
to receive these notes in payment of land and of customs duties. The
Treasury, however, ought to accept only the notes of specie-paying banks
in the vicinity of the new agency and its branches, and "nearly all danger in
dealing with such Institutions might be avoided by frequent settlements,"21
President Van Buren, in his message, proposed a "sub-treasury"
system or federal collection, deposit, and exchange agency very much like
the one Buchanan had described.
Buchanan made one of the best speeches of his life in support of
the subtreasury proposal on September 28, 1837, when he and Silas Wright
of New York contested the issue with Webster and Clay. He divided the
honors with his opponents on constitutional phases of the argument, but
he had the better of them on practical finance. Both Clay and Webster,
continually in need of money, had long experience as debtors to the Bank
of the U. S., but Buchanan was a private banker himself. Jackson thought
enough of the Bank speech to write that it "must become a lasting monu-
ment" to the talent of its author, and a "text-book" of the party for all
time to come*22
The Subtreasury Bill passed the Senate, but it was laid on the
table in the House and did not become law until 1840. Pennsylvania
Democrats were amazed at the Senate line-up, on the vote: Van Buren's
best friends opposed him; his enemies, like Calhoun, supported him. "No
wonder he is called a magician," George Plitt observed.33 In New York
the Democrats split wide apart on the issue and were soundly whipped in
the state elections. Their defeat demonstrated to the Democrats of
Pennsylvania the necessity for united action. Buchanan's friends wrote:
"Our good old State is now the last hope for the party, and if she fails us,
through the headstrong perversity of a few leaders, we shall be beaten in
the Union for years to come."24 If, however, New York remained split
and Pennsylvania delivered a victory in 1838, there was every prospect
that Buchanan could become the key man in the Van Buren Administration*
A great deal would depend on the nominating contest for governor in
the spring.
121
JAMES BUCHANAN
Buchanan insisted that Muhlenberg and Wolf each withdraw his
name as candidate for governor and urged the party to unite on someone
previously unconnected with that schism. Wolf, who had protested
Muhlenberg's appointment to the Austrian Mission, now promised to stay
out of the governor's race and to keep his friends loyal to a convention
choice. Buchanan got comforting news from prominent Democrats—
"whether it be Porter, Blythe, Carpenter or Klingensmith, that receives
the nomination, not a man will demur/'25
Two weeks before the Democratic nominating convention in
Harrisburg, the State Legislature passed resolutions instructing the
Pennsylvania Senators to vote against the Subtreasury Bill. Supported
by the Whigs and signed by Governor Ritner, the motion pledged "full
confidence in Martin Van Buren." These idiotic resolutions, "an absurd
medley and damnable humbug," were intended to force Buchanan to resign
the senatorship so that he could be replaced by one of the "recreants."
As one of the originators of the Subtreasury Bill he could not oppose it;
but under the instruction system, he would have to kill his own bill or
resign. The Bank crowd thought they had him this time. Whatever
decision he made would disrupt the harmony of the Democratic meeting
of March 4.
Buchanan thought it over thoroughly, pushed aside the pile of
letters appealing to him by all that was holy to tear up the instructions and
vote the party line, and wrote out his announcement to the Seriate. "If a
Senator can look behind his instructions," he declared, frth<r right is at
once abandoned. . . . My only alternative, then, is either to obey or to
resign." But, if he should resign, "the right of instruction itself would
soon grow into disrepute, and the Senatorial term of six years . . < would
terminate whenever such a conflict of opinion should arise, , , . I shall,
therefore, obey my instructions honestly and in good faith.'*6 He would
move to table the Subtreasury Bill in the hope that by next session he could
get the support of Pennsylvania for it.
This decision did not precisely delight Van Buren, but he could
scarcely protest; it at least offered hope, which was more than he could say
for his own state of New York, And, while the announcement disappointed
all those who had been engaged in the fight against the Bank, they swallowed
it and kept a bold front, praising its forthrighlness* Fortunately, it came
too late to affect the county meetings to elect delegates to the state nominat-
ing convention, or there would certainly have been a swarm of contesting
claimants to seats. As it was, there had been numerous Democratic county
meetings sponsoring, in one hall, "Van Buren and a new hank/' and across
the street "Van Buren and down with the bank" The Democrats nominated
David R. Porter for governor without difficulty-- a tremendous triumph
for Buchanan's unity platform; but the convention members made no
THE ROOT OF ALL EVIL • 1837 . 1840
statement at all on the Bank issue. Their silence on this point might have
caused trouble except for the fact that the other parties were even more
splintered on the question than the Democrats and could make no capital
of the glaring omission.
The Pennsylvania gubernatorial contest aroused more excitement
than any event of the preceding decade. The members of all Democratic
factions pulled strong enough in harness that Buchanan felt he could afford
to keep his distance. He stayed out of the state campaign and immersed
himself in the business of the Senate. "Really," wrote an old crony, "you
have become public property, and have lost sight altogether of the domestic
relation. No one in Lancaster has heard from you since Congress began."27
There was some reason for this, for the Committee on Foreign Affairs was
suddenly confronted with a whole docket full of crises, and many problems
corollary to the Subtreasury came up for individual study and discussion.
A new fight arose over a scheme that Biddle had worked out to
give the newly chartered Bank of the United States of Pennsylvania millions
of dollars which it ought not to have. Under the old federal charter, the
Bank had an unspecified period of time to liquidate the bank notes which
had been circulating for twenty years. Instead of calling these in, Biddle per-
mitted them to circulate as usual; and on top of them the Bank issued new
notes authorized under the Pennsylvania charter. Thus, this "monster,"
which Jackson thought he had destroyed, now roamed the countryside more
than twice as big as ever and exercised a national influence far greater than
it had in the heyday of 1828. But worse than this, its note issues were now
swollen as badly as 'those of an old wildcatter, though the public, con-
ditioned by two decades of assurance that these notes were the best security
in the nation, took them avidly as if they were solid gold. Biddle expected
that he would receive gold for them; he was currently engaged in a quiet
endeavor to get a corner on the southern cotton crop, and if he succeeded
he would have plenty of specie to cover those "resurrection notes." Even
if Congress outlawed them, he would still have the gold. All that was
needed was to prevent any sudden resumption of specie payments, and he
could certainly protect himself against that at Harrisburg. Biddle was a
man of ideas.
Buchanan fought to proscribe Biddle's old notes by means of a
federal bill imposing fine and imprisonment on any director, trustee, or
officer of a corporation1 chartered by Congress who permitted notes of a
defunct corporation to remain in circulation. He analyzed, with a clarity
which should have made Biddle revise his plans, the nature of the cotton
speculation then in progress in open defiance of a prohibitory clause in the
Pennsylvania charter of the Bank. He pointed out that the Bank never
bothered to make the periodic reports to the Auditor General of Pennsyl-
vania which the new charter specified, and that the Bank effectively blocked
123
JAMES BUCHANAN
all efforts to revive specie resumption in the Commonwealth. "In vain
you may talk to me about paper restrictions," he concluded. "When did a
vast moneyed monopoly ever regard the law, if any great interest of its own
stood in the way? It will then violate its charter, and its own power will
secure it immunity."28 Biddle, he proclaimed, "like all other men, must
yield to his destiny." This was prophetic. He eventually yielded to
bankruptcy but never to the United States Government.
By mid July, the Senate session was over and the critical Pennsyl-
vania gubernatorial election of 1838 drew near. The great day arrived.
Votes were counted, recounted, counted again. Great God in Heaven!
Between Ritner and Porter the vote was so close that no one knew who had
been elected, and each claimed the victory,
THE ROLE OF THE RICH UNCLE
In November, the death of sister Harriet's husband, the Reverend Robert
Henry of Greensburg, raised family problems so serious and immediate
that James spent the entire month attending to them before going to
Washington. The family was like politics. He loved both and felt duty
bound to both, but their problems, demands, and feuds were ever on his
doorstep. For a long while he had anticipated the difficulties that now
faced him. He had already acquired major responsibility for half a dozen
young nephews and nieces, and if tuberculosis continued to afflict the
family, as he feared it would, he would soon have a whole orphanage on
his hands.
He told Harriet that he would come to Greensburg and then tried
to formulate some plans* The family problem had several aspects: mom*y,
proper care of the children, and the resolution of jealousies and disagree-
ments among the surviving elders. Moreover, he was al this time especially
concerned about Mary Snyder, Some of the family opposed the idea of
his marriage, particularly Edward who anticipated sharing a goodly in-
heritance from his brother. Mary herself may have been disturbed by the
thought of becoming an unwanted addition to the circle, Buchanan
wondered whether he had the right to ask her to undertake the role of
foster-mother, and whether it was wise to let his money get out of the
immediate family.
He worked late in his study in the King Street house, his mind
wandering back over the past to his mother and her ambitions for him and
to sister Sarah, who had run off to get married and then died at twenty-
seven, leaving a little girl, Elizabeth Huston. Mr. Huston had since died
and Elizabeth had been living with the Kitteras in Philadelphia or with
Miss Hetty in Lancaster during vacations from the boarding school in
THE ROOT OF ALL EVIL • 1837 . 1840
New Jersey which Uncle James had chosen for her. But her school days
were nearly over, for she was sixteen, and more permanent provision had
to be made. Uncle Edward stuffily announced that he would not have her
because she was "too giddy, too fond of company" and too little impressed
with the responsibilities of life. What would the parish think? It put
Buck in a quandary. He could not leave her with Miss Hetty. John N.
Lane, a relative of his sister Jane's husband, lived in Lancaster and would
have liked to keep Elizabeth, but James feared that this arrangement would
"raise a talk here which might be injurious to Edward or his wife." But,
he said, "if it becomes my duty to fix her in this County, they must take
the consequences of their own conduct, and should it become necessary
that I should express an opinion on the subject, it will be against them and
in favor of Elizabeth."29
Robert Henry's death left sister Harriet with very little money,
an advanced case of tuberculosis, and a five-year-old boy, James Buchanan
Henry. Buck wrote to her urging her to take care of her health "for
the sake of your child and other relatives. You are welcome, most welcome
to a home with me where I think you may promote my happiness as well
as your own." In his distraction, he addressed the letter to "My dear sir"
from force of habit, and dated it 1837 instead of 1838,30 Harriet would now
have to go to live with her sister Jane in Mercersburg for a while and then
move to Edward's home in Lancaster County until the end of the next
Congress, when Buchanan could have things ready for her in the King
Street house.
Jane posed an equally distressing problem. She was confined to
her room, spit blood copiously, and was resigned to death in a matter of
months. She had four children: James Buchanan Lane, who was already
in his twenties; Elliot Eskridge, thirteen; Mary Elizabeth, twelve; and
Harriet, eight
Sister Maria, now married to Dr. Charles Yates of Meadville,
had her troubles* The Doctor was her third husband. By her first,
Buchanan's old school teacher, Jesse E. H. Magaw, she had had one
daughter, named Jessie. She had four more children by Dr. Yates, their
house was cramped, their income small, and Jessie was suffering from
tuberculosis and needed to get out of the Meadville climate. Of all his
nieces, she was probably Buchanan's favorite- Jessie went to live with her
Aunts Harriet and Jane at Mercersburg for a time, until she could be sent
to school James told Maria that he planned to send Jessie "to the very best
country female school I can find. I have seen enough of the effects of
sending country girls whose expectations are moderate to Philadelphia
Boarding Schools." Jessie, he thought, "will make a fine woman, if she
lives. If not very smart, she is very good, and that is better."31 He would
send her to school at Mt. Joy, near Lancaster, but Jessie was so fond of
125
JAMES BUCHANAN
Aunt Harriet that it might be best if all stayed at the family homestead at
Mercersburg, and she attended school there.
Finally there was Edward, his only surviving brother, who seemed
increasingly to resent the contrast between his own poverty and James's
affluence. Edward was ready for college when his brother William died,
and it was this event which influenced him to gratify the wish of hi? mother
that one son would study for the ministry. George and James had already
prepared for law, and no one was left but him to follow the cloth. Now
that George had died, he and James had to take care of the family. Edward
complained that he had more expenses than James and scarcely income
enough to keep himself in clean shirts; why should he take care of the
family wanderers while James kept an empty house in Lancaster and had
other quarters in Washington. James had been kind but strict with
Edward. "You shall not be at any loss for money," he often said but he
always kept track of the loans, and when there was a little estate to divide,
he acted as executor and deducted the amount of his advances. "Rely uf »« »n
your own judgment in all things, and I shall be content," he would write,
but took occasion to disapprove strongly of the judgments Edward had
made.32
James thought wryly of Edward, the "baby brother." He was
even now only twenty-seven, proud, impatient, suspicious, and coiummn!
with ambition. He had wanted to make a big impression on hw superiors
by making a fine donation to help endow a chair of theology at one *«f the
church colleges, but the parish had contributed only 86. JanifK sent htm
$144 more to enable him to forward a thumping cheek for $150— that
would help make them remember where Pequea Church wart,
Now there was trouble over Harriett desire to sell the old Dun-
woodie property, "Bridge farm/1 near Mmuwburg. The income from this
would be shared by all the children, but they had to iipree to it* *<al«»,
Edward felt that it should be held until prices improved, but Harriot inrdri)
money so desperately that she could sec no other solution, Jamw had then
proposed to buy it himself, matching the best offer they could jset from the
outside. After a general family conference at Mercersburg, he conrluA-d
the purchase, much to Edward's dissatisfaction. "Nothing hut family
pride," James wrote, "induced me to purchase your farm. I couW not b«ar
to see the last vestige of father's property in Franklin County go into the
hands of strangers." Significantly he added, "You will at last prnhaUy #**t
my property or the greater part of it among al! of you."8* Whatever hopes
he may have had of marrying were not very bright when he wrote that
sentence.
On the same trip to Mercersburg he had a long talk with hi*
sister Jane and made all arrangements for the distribution of her property
after her death. She named him trustee of her inheritance (some $6,000) .
THE ROOT OF ALL EVIL • 1837 - 1840
He was to hold it during her life and use it later to pay for the care and
education of the children. The remainder was to be apportioned and paid
to them with interest when tfiey reached maturity. Elliott T. Lane, her
husband, agreed to this plan and signed a release which was recorded
at Chambersburg.
James was glad to see Maria at the family conclave. Like her
daughter Jessie, she was very good, but not very smart. Fortunately her
latest husband was both and he managed to keep the household in order.
Buchanan had grown to be very fond of him, and the doctor reciprocated
by getting into politics in Meadville. He endorsed every Buchanan move-
ment so enthusiastically that he insulted patients who disagreed with him
and almost ruined his practice, Buchanan had loaned them the money
to buy a house years before and had gotten his first taste of Maria's financial
capabilities. On the strength of his guarded assent to make a loan, she
had gone right out and bought a place, without ever having the title checked.
He had upbraided her for her negligence and withheld his aid until his
friend Henry Shippen, county judge in Meadville, had recorded a clear
title and prepared a first mortgage. "It is my inflexible rule in life," he
had told Maria, "never to invest a dollar in any property except it has a
clean title and is free of every incumbrance."
Maria soon complained that the new house was too small. "That
which I feared has come to pass," he wrote back. "It seems you are now
dissatisfied with the use of the front room as a shop and are anxious that
Dr. Yates should build one. I confess I am somewhat astonished at this.
Besides your promise to me, you ought to reflect that your circumstances
are very limited and that your expenses will be increasing annually. Were
I residing in that house myself, I should never think of any other law office
but the front room/'3*
As the years passed, odd little incidents occurred. Dr. Yates bet
one of his patients $200 that Buchanan would be elected Senator in 1833,
lost both the wager and the patient, and thus the means of paying the bet.
Buchanan got him out of trouble in his usual way, not by sending money
but by giving Yates a receipt for $200 which he said he had deducted from
the sum the doctor already owed him. His letter had the qualities which
his relatives came to recognize and to dread; it was at once both kind and
nasty. "Be firm in politics, but avoid giving personal offence," he ad-
monished. "I did not know you were in debt to anyone but myself, but
if you do owe to others, you ought to pay it."86 Once in a while, he would
ask Dr. Yates to send only two thirds of the usual $150 instalment on the
mortgage and 8ive the other third to Maria' On such occasion8 he would
not enter the credit until he got a formal receipt from Maria that she had
actually received her fifty.36
127
JAMES BUCHANAN
James knew what the family thought of him, and wondered if
their view was not justified. Often he wondered just what he thought of
himself. He felt kindly to nearly everyone, but he could scarcely believe
that anyone felt kindly toward him. Any manifestation of friendship or
appeal to his better nature set little red flags flying in his mind; what was this
person after? No one ever surmounted his suspicion; no one in his family
ever expected from him other than what decency, bounded by the letter of
the law, absolutely required. But to give to one would raise a howl from all
the others. To make gifts to the family with no strings attached would
make them wasteful and dependent, and soon the time would come when
he would necessarfly have to refuse. Then they would hate him. He knew
that much about human nature. No, the best course was to give only when
the need was critical, and then in a way that showed he expected to be paid
back. That method would keep them all independent and self-respecting,
it would protect him from voracious demands, and while it might not
promote any outburst of emotional gratitude, it would maintain a long-
range family stability. As he told Edward, they would all probably share
everything he had, anyway. And right now, he had $120,000 of his own at
work for interest, and some $25,000 of funds in trust for the various
children. He hoped that if they let him manage* they would all some day
have financial security.
10
WISE AS THE SERPENT • 1838 - 1841
TRIAL BALLOON
According to unofficial election returns, David R. Porter led Governor
Ritner by 5,540 votes in the election of 1838, but the seats of eight Assem-
blymen and several State Senators were in dispute because of frauds in
Philadelphia. The award of these contested seats would determine which
party controlled the Legislature, and the Legislature would control the
outcome of the election for governor, for it certified the vote. Secretary
of the Commonwealth Burrowes issued a circular advising the public to
"treat the election as if it had never taken place," and Thaddeus Stevens
proclaimed emphatically that Porter would never be governor.
At Harrisburg the anti-Masons and the Democrats each organized
an Assembly and a Senate and proceeded independently to business. At one
stage a mob invaded the House chamber, threw the anti-Masonic speaker
from the rostrum into the aisle and then rushed into the Senate, chasing
Stevens and Burrowes "out of a window twelve feet high, through three
thorn bushes, and over a seven foot picket fence." As excitement mounted,
the anti-Masons seized the Harrisburg armory and Governor Ritner called
out a militia battalion to sustain him. These troops, by stopping for a
supply of buckshot at the Frankford arsenal, gave the name "Buckshot
War" to the fracas. Meanwhile the Democrats mobilized thousands of
volunteer "minutemen" who now began a march on Harrisburg to defend
their rights*
When the militia officers refused to obey Governor Ritner, he
wrote to President Van Buren, of all people, demanding the aid of U. S.
troops, presumably to prevent a Democrat from assuming the governorship
to which he had been duly elected! Van Buren felt that Pennsylvania ought
to take care of its own troubles. At length, several of the Whigs became
so thoroughly disgusted with proceedings that they announced they would
vote with the Democrats, a switch that deprived the anti-Masons of even a
phony majority in the House and enabled the Democrats to proceed legally.
129
JAMES BUCHANAN
The Senate continued its turmoil for ten days longer when it, too, organized.
The Legislature now declared David R. Porter to have been elected gover-
nor, barely in time to meet the January 1 inauguration date.
Buchanan did not join the throng of Democrats which descended
on Huntingdon to press claims on the governor-elect. He had long since
impressed upon Porter that his nomination had resulted from the voluntary
retirement from the field of both Wolf and Muhlenberg, and that the new
Administration ought to conciliate these two factions. If Porter should
ally with either one or try to create his own Democratic machine, he would
surely wreck himself and jeopardize the national prospects of the party
in 1840. Porter recognized the problem and did his best to steer a middle
course, giving important jobs to representatives of all the major Democratic
segments. Buchanan urged him to support the Van Burcu program and
promised to promote appropriate federal appointments.
Buchanan now began to work out the details of a plan which he
had been toying with for the past several years. Van Buren would certainly
run for a second term as president, but lie would probably not demand the
renomination of Richard M. Johnson as his running mate. As Johnson
had dragged down the ticket in 1836, a number of men were already openly
canvassing for his place, among them Senator Thomas Hart Bcnton and
Secretary of State Forsyth. Buchanan proposed William R. King of
Alabama for the vice-presidency.
King's nomination would have multiple advantages. It would
eliminate both Forsyth and Johnson; it would put on the ticket a man
whom Buchanan's partisans in Pennsylvania could consider to be his
choice, and this belief would help to bring out the vote; and it would
please the South. But most important of all> it would pave the way for
the election of James Buchanan as president in 1844. King frankly told
his roommate that if he became vice-president, he would not permit the
consideration of his name for the presidency in '44. Furthermore, he
would use his influence to promote Buchanan's nomination*
This plan looked good to Buchanan. Pennsylvania's Democrats
were closer to real unity than they had been since the governorship of
Simon Snyder; if Porter played the game he would be re-elected and the
state administration would support Buchanan in the 18*14 convention.
New York Democracy was in the midst of schism; but New York, like
Pennsylvania, would have learned its lesson and would be back on the
Democratic track in five years. New York by then would have had the
vice-presidency and the presidency for twelve years: she would be com-
pelled to relinquish further claims and support a neighbor* The border
states, too, had been favored: Virginia, Tennessee, and Kentucky, Van
Buren was the only uncertain part of the program. What would he think?
130
WISE AS THE SERPENT • 1838 - 1841
Would he deliver the goods in Pennsylvania to men who would work
for King?1
At Buchanan's suggestion, Democratic editors began puffing
King and laying the propaganda groundwork for a formal movement. The
appearance of their articles, however, touched off countermoves. The
Dallas men of Philadelphia and the pro-Bank Democrats of western Pennsyl-
vania, who were hostile to Buchanan, hoomed Forsyth as the Pennsylvania
choice for vice-president.2 By the summer of 1839, Buchanan thought
that the Forsyth movement had failed and that King would be nominated
unless "Old Tecumseh" (Richard M. Johnson) should insist upon running
again.3 The Democratic members of the Legislature even gave Buchanan
a testimonial dinner, together with the governor and other dignitaries,
an unprecedented mark of party harmony.4
This happy augury failed to take into account the vagaries of
state politics. Governor Porter did his part, giving Buchanan's friends a
fair share of the patronage, but the leaders of the factions refused to be
disciplined.5 The governor, for example, bestowed favors on the Harris-
burg Keystone, which had been in the past a violent anti-Muhlenberg,
anti-Buchanan sheet. The Keystone kept pounding at the anti-Buchanan
line and spread abroad a conclusion, quite erroneous, that the governor
had gotten into a fight with the Senator. As a result, the Buchanan
journals began to lambast the Keystone and from here it was natural to go
on to attack the governor. The Dallas men took advantage of this presumed
rupture to promote their interests by cultivating the anti-Buchanan move-
ment centering on Forsyth. Cameron, just back from his Winnebago
Indian Mission, saw a chance to trouble the waters to his advantage and
quietly encouraged all Pennsylvania Democrats to insist upon a free and
easy Bank program, the very thing against which Porter and Buchanan
had pledged themselves. By September, Buchanan was discouraged. "My
name has often been mentioned in connection with the Presidency in
1844," he wrote, but Pennsylvania would never unite on one of her own
sons "with such energy and enthusiasm as to make him successful. . . . They
care little for their own men."6
Felix Grundy, Attorney General of the United States, resigned
in December. After the various factions got in their bids, Van Buren
offered the post to Buchanan "although," he added, "I have no reason to
suppose that it would be desirable to you."7 It was not. Buchanan saw
no use in exchanging the senatorship for a belated invitation to take a
one-year job in the lowest Cabinet place. In declining he earnestly urged
the appointment of the governor's brother, James M. Porter, but the
president next offered the appointment to George M. Dallas, recently back
from Russia. Dallas refused and the office went to Henry M. Gilpin of Phila-
delphia, a gentleman unpopular both with Porter's and Buchanan's friends.
131
JAMES BUCHANAN
"The President's disposition towards myself is proclaimed upon
the house-top," Buchanan wrote to Porter. The King movement in Penn-
sylvania never recovered from this blow to Buchanan's prestige at the
critical moment, and Vice-President Johnson embraced the opportunity
to announce that he would run again. Porter could have used aid and
comfort from the national administration and with such aid he might well
have been influenced by Van Buren's wishes, but without it he would have
to go ahead and settle the state banking problem on the basis of local
interest. As a result, the state administration ran head-on into a policy
collision with the national administration in a critical election year.
Both Democratic party policy and state law required that dis-
tressed banks should resume specie payment after a given date. This
deadline had passed, but the Pennsylvania banks insisted that they could
not pay specie"; let the governor enforce this law, and a new panic would
immediately ensue. Porter agreed that summary specie resumption under
existing conditions would be foolhardy, but he had a variety of courses he
could have taken which would have protected both the party and the banks*
His decision, announced in the message to the Legislature in
January, 1840, emphasized the necessity of the resumption of specie pay-
ments, but Porter declared his intention not to force this until it could be
done with safety to the general economy. Letters quickly piled up on
Buchanan's desk, Anti-Bank Democrats were "out in full cry against the
Message. . . . Many are looking to you for an expression of opinion."8
Buchanan replied to Porter, "You have perhaps never witnessed anything
like the exaltation, either felt or affected, of the Whigs here when the
first news of your special message arrived." He knew the necessity which
prompted the message, but he hoped that the Legislature would settle an
early date for resumption; if it adjourned without action, leaving the
banks without any mandate for resumption, "the integrity of our party
will be in great danger."*
THE WHIGS ATTACK
The Whigs exploited the Bank controversy in Pennsylvania at a "union
and harmony" meeting at Harrisbuxg in September and by holding their
national nominating convention at the same place on December 4, where
they chose General William Henry Harrison for president and John Tyler
of Virginia for vice-president. So diverse were the elements of Whiggery
that the delegates decided to issue no platform statement at all; if they
concentrated on hatred of Van Buren and made a hero of f f01d Tippecanoe,"
they could faring in Masons and anti-Masons, slaveholders and abolitionists,
friends and enemies of the banks, high and low tariff men, manufacturers
132
WISE AS THE SERPENT • 1838 - 1841
and employees, radicals and conservatives. "The Whig party is very
Catholic," Buchanan declared. "It tolerates great difference of opinion."10
The situation was, indeed, ridiculous. The party which but a
few years before had acknowledged its descent from the Federalist tradition
of government by the rich and well-born, now turned on the party of the
"common man," and tried to make it appear a regime of royalty. The
Whigs contrasted King Van Buren, riding in an English-made coach more
sumptuous than a coronation carriage and dining regally from platters of
gold, with Old Tippecanoe, who had been reared in a log cabin. The
Whigs simply took the pro-Jackson campaign program of 1828, used it for
themselves, and created a wildly exciting canvass with hard cider, coon-
skins, and log cabin festivals all over the country. The Democrats vainly
tried to stem the tide with sweet reason and sarcasm.
The program of attack on Van Buren presupposed attacks on all
his lieutenants. In Pennsylvania there was a very effective propaganda
campaign to prove that Buchanan had urged a banking program that would
reduce the wages of labor to ten cents a day. "Ten Cent Jimmy," the
pamphlets were labelled. Buchanan, in formal debate, always presented
as strongly as he could the case of the opposition, and then proceeded to
demolish it systematically by his own arguments. In supporting the
Independent Treasury Bill, he had outlined the terrible conditions which
would prevail unless banks were reformed and had then gone on to show
how much better all would fare under the proposed bill. Senator John
Davis of Massachusetts took the first section of this speech, and offered it
as Buchanan's reasons for supporting the Independent Treasury. He
took the "10 cents a day" phrase and quoted it out of context, asserting
that Buchanan supported the Independent Treasury Bill in the hope that
it would reduce wages, destroy banks and deflate property values. Davis's
speeches, when circulated in print, had tremendous political impact.
Forney reported from Pennsylvania: "I do not know when I
have been so much disgusted with the course of any political opponent as
with that of this Mr. Davis—. . . He must be either a mere catspaw of
others, or a weak, addle-brained man, or a malignant and unscrupulous
mffian When I see the effect they are making here, by means of his
villainous perversion of your intelligible Defence of the laborer, I cannot
but put such a construction upon his unworthy conduct. Why, Sir, they
have flooded this county with his so-called Reply to you A copy has
been sent to nearly every Democrat His whole speech is the assump-
tion of the broad ground that the people are ignorant, and unable to dis-
criminate between right and wrong,"11
The human mind has not yet discovered the way of counter-
acting promptly the effect of the bold lie propagated by the prominent man.
History is full of pertinent illustrations. If representative government has a
133
JAMES BUCHANAN
nemesis, this is probably it. The "Ten Cent Jimmy" lie seriously weakened
Buchanan in Pennsylvania.
Forney proposed that the Democrats "challenge any responsible
member of the opposition here to join in the republication of both yours
and Davis' speeches, both of which are to be published correctly and . . ,
bound together, and so circulated If they do not accept, they are down
forever."12 The opposition did not accept, nor was it down forever.
Instead, it proceeded to improve its advantage by reviving the "drop of
blood" smear and sending that out with the "Ten Cent Jimmy"' pamphlets.
Editor Middleton, of the Lancaster Examiner, did much of the printing. He
had recently distinguished himself by shooting James Cameron when
Cameron came in to beat him up for other lies he had published.13 Bu-
chanan was for "carrying the war into Carthage," but his friends advised
against it. "It's only giving tone to falsehoods by heeding them," wrote
Judge Champneys,
Buchanan made several long defensive speeches in the Senate
on the "Ten Cent Jimmy" accusations. "If the most artful and unfair man
in the world had determined to destroy any public measure," he asked,
"in what manner would he most effectually damn it in public estimation?
It would be to enumerate all the terrible consequences which would flow
from it, according to the predictions of its enemies, and put them into the
mouth of its friends as arguments in its favor. There could not by possi-
bility be any stronger admission of its evil tendency. . . . This is the
ridiculous attitude in which I am placed by the Senator's speech. If these
imputations were well founded, I must be one of the most ferocious mm
in existence. Destruction must be my delight. No wild agrarian in the
country has ever thought of waging such an indiscriminate war against
all property, my own among the rest, as that which has been attributed to
me by the Senator."14 But Buchanan's exposure of Davids fraud proved
a futile effort. People found it easier to say 'Ten Cent Jimmy" than to read
a rebuttal, and the nickname stuck.
Meanwhile the Pennsylvania Democratic convention met on
the 4th of March. Except for the Lancaster County delegation which cast
its votes for William R. King as vice-president in token of esteem for
Buchanan, the convention voted for Van Buren and Johimon and passed a
resolution of confidence in Porter. But it did not dare to bring upon the
floor any of the current issues and adjourned, like the Whigs, with no
statement of policies.
The United States Senate kept Buchanan in Washington until
its adjournment late in July. He tried to manipulate the strings of politics
in the Keystone State by correspondence, but he grew more and more
discouraged because of the attacks on him* Furthermore, it seemed utterly
hopeless to reconcile the Democratic factions by patronage, though both
WISE AS THE SERPENT • 1838 - 1841
he and Governor Porter were in full agreement on "the absolute necessity
of union and harmony between the state and national administrations"
and the wisdom of apportioning the state offices. Pittsburgh and Phila-
delphia were the two great centers of trouble. In the West, Buchanan's
friends fought Porter and demanded that a new name be introduced for
governor in 1841.15 In the East, the pro-Bank party of Dallas knifed both
Buchanan and Porter on every occasion. Yet both groups professed their
solid support of Van Buren. The president had contributed some of the
trouble by appointing several anti-Porter Democrats in the Pittsburgh area.
In order to offset these, Buchanan induced Van Buren to select a staunch
Porter man, Calvin Blythe, for the collectorship of the Port of Philadelphia,
a position left open by the recent death of George Wolf. Porter gave
evidence of his solidarity with Buchanan by naming some of his particular
friends to Philadelphia judgeships.16 As a result the Philadelphia Demo-
crats were so furious with these two that they organized gangs to break up
political rallies held by the friends of Buchanan and Porter in that city.
The leading Democratic journal in Philadelphia, the Pennsylvania^,
refused to publish any of Buchanan's replies to the Whig attacks on him,
charged him by the line for every Senate speech which he wished printed,
and purposely omitted the complimentary toasts given him in the lists of
those reported from various meetings.17
The Muhlenberg Democrats of Berks County invited Buchanan
to appear on a huge program they had arranged for the 4th of July. Vice-
President Richard M. Johnson was to be the main attraction. With
intention to insult, the arrangements committee failed to invite Governor
Porter, but Buchanan replied sharply that he would appear on no program
of such general interest which ignored Porter and thus forced the com-
mittee to send him an invitation.18
The Fourth of July celebrations demonstrated that the assaults
on Buchanan had begun to boomerang. "Look at the East— at the West—-
at the South— and here in the middle states," wrote Forney. "Their
celebrations are full of your name. You are right when you say that this
attack upon you has done you good. It has been a god-send, indeed!"19
Whether this was true or not, the Whig campaign against Buchanan only
increased in intensity, Simon Cameron, playing a game of political black-
mail, dug out a copy of an old 1814 handbill headed "We as Federalists,"
signed by Buchanan as president of the old Washington Association, and
sent this for dissemination to Charles B. Penrose, one of the Democrats
who had sold himself to the Bank several years before, and was now
presumably a Whig.20
But more was yet to come. In a campaign speech in Lancaster
Buchanan spoke of the efforts of the anti-Masonic Whigs to steal the
election of 1838 by the Buckshot War in Pennsylvania aixd of a similar
135
JAMES BUCHANAN
affair in New Jersey the same year. He then quoted Whig Senator William
C. Preston of South Carolina who had stated in a recent speech that "he
believed Mr. V. Buren's election would be defeated by Constitutional means,
yet if those means were insufficient— if the ballot box should fail him —
he, for one, was willing to resort to the rights and arms that Nature gave
him." A few days later the Philadelphia Whig papers came out with an
article quoting Buchanan as saying,
I believe General Harrison will be defeated by Constitutional
means, yet if these means are insufficient, if the baJlot box should
fail, I for one would resort to the rights and the arms which
nature gave me.21
Though never very enthusiastic about stump-speaking around
the circuit, Buchanan now set out on a six-weeks tour of the Common-
wealth, speaking nearly every day. He opened the campaign at a huge
Democratic jamboree in Lancaster which attracted some 25,000 people.
For two hours, he poured fire and brimstone into the enemy. With his
speech in hand, he set out for the West: Chamhersburg, Greensburg,
Pittsburgh, Meadville, Erie, He also visited the northern counties and
returned home by the end of September. crl arrived here from Western
Pennsylvania," he wrote Van Buren, "broken down in voice and so hoarse
that I fear I shall not again be able to take the field until after our first
election. The effort of frequently addressing immense multitudes of people
in the open air is more severe than I could have anticipated.1*32 It took
some stamina to be a working politician* Buchanan much preferred his
usual method of campaigning with the pen. When someone chided Clay
for a particularly cutting remark to Buchanan in the Senate, he replied:
f 'Oh, damn him, he deserved it* He writes letterff*®
The state elections of October brought uncertainty, for state
politics commanded allegiances and represented issues «o di&tinct from
the national contest that all predictions tasted on it were shaky. The
excitement continued hot up until the balloting for presidential fhi'tor*
in November, which drew almost twice as many voters to the polls aa had
the fight of 1836. The final Pennsylvania tallies showed that the Whigs
had a grand majority of 350 votes out of a total of nearly 300,000, The
returns were heartbreakingly close; in several counties a few dozen votes
spelled the difference between victory and defeat; but across the nation
Harrison captured the presidency by an electoral vote of 294 to 60» and the
Whigs won control of both houses of Congress.34
"I never was so much astonished or disappointed as at the result
in Pennsylvania," Buchanan wrote to Van Buren. "But it is useless to
indulge in vain regrets* . * , The Whigs & Anti-Masons are now gloating
136
WISE AS THE SERPENT* 1838 - 1841
over the prospect of driving me from the Senate. . . . Let them instruct me
to vote for a national Bank, and I shall glory in my political martyrdom."25
A REGULAR CHINESE PUZZLE
Buchanan found the meaning of the election peculiarly hard to decipher.
His own county of Lancaster and that of his birthplace, Franklin, had given
huge Whig majorities; in Huntingdon, home county of Governor Porter,
the Whigs had also won. The opposition, of course, had put all the money
and men it could into these particular areas, which had been in the un-
certain column since 1828. But Philadelphia had gone Democratic, if
only by a whisker. Here the pro-Bank Democrats did better against the
Whigs than anti-Bank Democrats — a regular Chinese puzzle. Did the
election mean that Van Buren would have to be run in 1844 to vindicate
his program, or did his defeat mean that he should not run again? Did
the election mean that Porter should step down in 1841? What was the
political aspect of the State Legislature? The anti-Masonic Whigs con-
trolled the Senate, but in the House the control lay in the hands of Phila-
delphia Democrats, who agreed with the Whigs on almost all financial
questions. Would the Legislature instruct Pennsylvania's Senators to
destroy the Independent Treasury and create a new national Bank? And
what bearing had these matters on Buchanan's chances for the presidency
in four years? He was sure he did not know, but he did know one thing:
they were a great deal less promising than they would have been if Little
Van were in the White House with King as his vice-president.
For the time being there was nothing to do but wait. "Everything
here is quiet," Buchanan wrote in December. "Our true policy is for the
present to leave the Whig party to themselves. This party contains in
itself the seeds of its own destruction, if they are permitted to germinate
and bring forth their natural fruit."26 "The Whigs are composed of such
heterogeneous materials," he assured his brother, "that they will probably
fall to pieces."27
Actually, the election of Harrison helped the Pennsylvania Demo-
crats to solve their major problem, the Bank issue, for the state politicians
could now proceed to act on this without facing pressure and loyalty-tests
from a national administration. Buchanan had long agreed with Porter
on the common sense course, though the two had been forced to pull in
opposite directions because of the political requirements of their respective
positions. Now Buchanan went to work for the renomination of Porter
for governor, as the move best calculated to promote his own interests
in 1844.
William Henry Harrison died exactly one month after taking the
oath of office, leaving the presidency in the hands of Democrat John Tyler
137
JAMES BUCHANAN
who had been placed on the Whig ticket as part of a weird horse-trade in
Virginia to get William C. Rives into the Senate. Rives, elected by Virginia
Democrats, joined with the Whigs in Congress; Tyler, elected by the Whigs,
now rejoined the Democrats.28
To compound the shock, Biddle's Bank suffered a run shortly
after resuming specie payments and closed its doors with such a resounding
crash that few expected they would ever open again. "The third crash of
the Bank of the United States so soon after its resumption," wrote Bu-
chanan, "has taken us all by surprise. I sincerely hope it has made its last
struggle. ... As long as it shall continue to exist, it will continue to
derange the business of the country."29
What, in January, had looked like a bleak and hopeless prospect
for the Democrats, by April had blossomed into a whole garden of new
political promise. Porter was renominated for governor with the united
support of Buchanan, Muhlenberg, and the Philadelphia Democrats, a
"devilish strong team/'30 There was scarcely a canvass; the Democrats
sent him back for a second term in November, 1841 by a huge majority
over his Whig opponent, John Banks.
Porter continued to be the key to Buchanan's revived aspirations
for the presidency in 1844, for the fall of the Bank would flatten Dallas in
Philadelphia, leaving the Commonwealth solidly in the hands of the
governor and senator in alliance, a combination that seemed to be the
condition precedent to a serious bid for the White House. Porter, under
the terms of the new state Constitution, would have to retire at the end
of his second term and leave the field clear for Muhlenberg,
By August, 1841, the prospects looked even better than they had
in the spring. President Tyler had just vetoed the darling measure of the
Whigs, a bill for a new Federal Bank. His message had prefaced "prayers
and thanks to God on the one side; and imprecations anil eternal vows of
vengeance on the other."31 "Never was there a party so completely used
up as the Whigs have been in so short a time," wrote Buchanan. "A
Manifesto . . . will appear tomorrow from the Whigs in Congress reading
John Tyler out of the Whig Church and delivering him over to Satan to
be buffeted."32
Still, there were plenty of thorny problems* to solve. Pennsylvania
had gone bankrupt; it could not pay the interest on its bomb. Portrr had
delivered a strong message on banking reform which coincided with
Buchanan's favorite views: prohibition of speculation in commodities by
banks; state supervision of note issues to keep them within the limits
permitted by charter; elimination of bank notes under $10 or $20 in order
that employers would have to pay workmen in coin; and the summary
revocation of the charter of any bank which refused to redeem its notes
in specie on demand.
138
WISE AS THE SERPENT • 1838 - 1841
But the Legislature, still closely balanced bet-ween Whig and
Democratic control, drew up its own bill and proceeded, with the usual
support of pro-Bank Democrats, to pass it over the governor's veto. By
the new measure, Pennsylvania borrowed $3,100,000 from the various
banks for which they were permitted to issue paper currency against the
promissory note of a bankrupt state! There was no requirement of specie
payment, no control of bank issues, no curtailment of small notes —
nothing that was desired. Buchanan hit the ceiling, "My public life has
been stormy and tempestuous," he wrote, "but no political event has ever
made me despond before. The last night was the first which I have ever
spent in sleepless anxiety. ... It would seem that whether the Democratic
party are successful or defeated in the popular elections, the result in
regard to Banks is always the same The value of this new currency will
fluctuate with the ever fluctuating value of [the State loan] on which
alone it rests , . . . What a standard of value! . . . The State gives ... the
Banks . . . the privilege of perpetual suspension. What miserable hum-
buggery! What could have been the reason why twelve Democrats de-
serted us and voted against the veto?"33
The same combination of Whigs, anti-Masons and pro-Bank
Democrats at Harrisburg used their tenure up to the election of October,
1841, to embarrass Buchanan by instructing him to vote against the Inde-
pendent Treasury, in favor of Clay's Bank Bill, in favor of a resolution to
expunge the expunging resolution, and in favor of the Whig land program.
He obeyed the obnoxious instructions to avoid the necessity of resigning,
but debated vigorously in every case against the view he had to support
on roll call, justifying himself by the declaration that he spoke his own
views but was bound to respect his instructions.
The 1844 presidential race began the moment General Harrison's
coffin was lowered into the grave. Van Buren? Calhoun? Benton?
Buchanan? Tyler? R. M. Johnson? Who would lead the Democracy?
The field looked so large and the results so uncertain that the friends of
Dallas and the Bank got up their own private movement in favor of Com-
modore Charles Stewart as Pennsylvania's favorite son. "The Commodore
has money enough," reported Forney, "as those fellows know, and if he
is willing to bleed to have his name in print everyday, why let him enjoy
the novel immortality."34
Ridiculous as the drive was, Buchanan got quite excited about it.
The Stewart mangers bought up a whole string of editors who divided their
efforts between belittling Buchanan and puffing Stewart. If anything could
upset his prospects, Buchanan thought, just such a program might do it;
you could meet an antagonist who was well known, but how could you
handle a man with no political record? As the rash of "Old Ironsides"
Clubs spread, Buchanan marshalled his editors into defensive line. The
139
battle turned out to be mainly a newspaper fight, but in the course of it the
Buchanan and Porter journals resumed their old-time feud and spread
abroad the suggestion that Porter would oppose Buchanan's bid for re-
election to the Senate which was just a year away.35
From Pittsburgh Buchanan got the warning: "Porter is no friend
of yours and a dishonest politician," He would trample his best friend to
get ahead and was covertly promoting a southern candidate for president
to get the second office himself.36 But Philadelphia reported that "Porter
is opposed to Stewart, and will take bold ground for you The Stewart
business is directed entirely against you."37
Buchanan's friends worked desperately to bolster him up. "You
must drive through!" they told him.38 "Put your hand fairly to the plough
and play the game. Lay aside your usual modesty and neither look back nor
hesitate."39 ''Pennsylvania will be all right" they assured him. "Stewart
is hung at the political yardarm, and knows you are the rising and strong
man." Forget about them all, even Van Buren. People were "furiously
at -loggerheads" about him, and as for Tyler, "he don't go with the
democrats."40
These men had some reason for their concern, because Buchanan
had developed a reputation for being unwilling to fight on his own behalf.
This trait governed much of his political thinking, and no phase of his
character bred more doubts, misunderstanding, and contempt among his
contemporaries. Buchanan had a phenomenal capacity for detachment;
he could view himself from outside himself and criticize freely what he
saw. He even wrote his 'memoirs in the third person. He continually
placed himself and his friends on stage and went to the back of the theater
to look the cast over and figure out, with total lack of appreciation of the
personal impulses of the actors, what they ought to do to perfect the play.
He was the very opposite of John Forney, his excitable, hotly emotional,
young editor of the Lancaster Intelligencer.
Forney lived in cycles of Stygian gloom or celestial happiness;
all men were either his bosom friends or bitter enemies; insults had to be
promptly avenged, if possible by a fist fight, and favors had to be promptly
repaid by favors. His was a life of lavish generosity and* bankruptcy, of
jubilation and hangover. Forney's life depended upon Buchanan's political
success; he attached himself like a leech, worked his heart out, and frankly
admitted that his object was to get future patronage.
Because of his violent temper, Forney continually got Buchanan
into trouble. He would see an insult where none was intended, and fre-
quently took the bait of a sly remark purposely tendered to get a rise out
of him. An able and powerful advocate, Forney regarded himself as
Buchanan's confidential political manager, explosively attacked any pre-
sumed rival, and caused a great deal of resentment among Buchanan's
140
other friends. For years Buchanan kept the tight rein on Forney, writing
him to stop his attacks on editors or politicians whose support he needed.
Why, Forney complained, did he not stick 100 per cent with his true
friends and throw the others out of the window? Because, Buchanan
would explain patiently but with tart precision, no man had enough 100
per cent true friends to elect him dogcatcher; only united effort could win;
union could only be achieved by compromise, never by force. Force only
achieved two things: either the total destruction of one part of those who
disagreed, or a fight which destroyed both parties. Both results lost
elections. Forney must curb his personal feelings oy Buchanan would
lose; and if Buchanan lost, Forney would certainly lose. Could anything
be plainer?
Buchanan used the dependence of others on him by threatening,
when they became insubordinate, to withdraw from politics or from Penn-
sylvania. When he felt that his editors were not active enough in repelling
the "drop of blood" and "Ten Cent Jimmy" canards, he used this technique
and received the answer he expected from Forney: "I am sorry, indeed I
may say alarmed at the intimation you threw out of leaving Lancaster. . . .
The whole county have taken you to their heart of hearts; defending you
the more you are assailed. . . . Depart from Lancaster! Besides the shock it
must be to your friends— and I confess I speak interestedly— it would be,
as a matter of policy, . . . wrong in the extreme. Pardon me when I say
that we look up to you as our stay and support."41 Time and again
Buchanan resorted to this technique, but Forney caught on quickly and in
times of crisis would play the same game, announcing his intention to quit
his newspaper and take up law, a threat usually good for a kind letter and a
loan of several hundred dollars from his patron.
Buchanan wanted the presidency but in a peculiar way; he did
not want to win it, he wanted to be invited into it. In September, 1841,
he wrote, "I would not wish you to bring out my name as a candidate for
the Presidency. It is yet too soon to agitate this question in the Public
Journals; and any premature movement would only injure the individual
it was intended to benefit. Besides I have no ambitious longings on this
subject. Let events take their course; and iny only desire is that at the
proper time, the individual may be selected as our candidate who will best
promote the success of the party & its principles."42 He, of course, would
be this person but a gentleman could not say so. "In regard to the Presi-
dency," he told Reynolds, "the real contest would seem to be between Van
Buren & myself; & if the Democracy of Penna. would sustain me with an
unbroken front I think my chances are fully equal if not superior to his. . . .
Should there be even the appearance of a serious division in Penna., I
shall make my bow and retire.9943
141
11
THIS I BELIEVE • 1834-1845
THE CREED OF A CONSERVATIVE
By the time the election of 1844 drew near, Buchanan had already served
twenty years as a legislator. The decade he spent in the Senate brought
him into daily contact with probably the most distinguished group of
American statesmen ever assembled there, a company including not only
five future Presidents of the United States (Van Buren, Tyler, Polk,
Fillmore, and Pierce) but also such parliamentary giants as Webster, Clay,
Calhoun and Benton. In this remarkable galaxy of American politicians,
Buchanan always stood on the periphery. He never, in all his legislative
career, had his name attached to an important bill or became the focal
point of public interest in a debate. He had talent for clear thinking but
none for self-dramatization. He brought to the senatorship great serious-
ness of purpose, readiness to debate and forensic ability, loyalty to party,
diligence in seeking facts, and a consistency of view which made his stand
on public questions easily predictable and gained him the nickname "friend
of the obvious." With these tools of his trade he quietly exerted a great
deal of influence on important legislation, but his steady craftsmanship
attracted little public attention. It did, however, gain the respect and
often the admiration and thanks of his colleagues.
The well-ordered intellectual world of James Buchanan rested
upon principles behind which he rarely probed, and upon them he logi-
cally developed his political views. "Abstract propositions,'* he once said,
"should never be discussed by a legislative body/7 and he might have added
that concrete propositions should never depart very far from the status
quo or anticipate any very rapid change of society.
Buchanan believed that the essence of self-government was
restraint. Written constitutions, he thought, were the most useful inven-
tion of his age, but what were constitutions "but restraints imposed, not
by arbitrary authority, but by the people upon themselves and their own
representatives?" "Restraint,*' he said, "restraint. ... Sir, this Federal
142
THIS I BELIEVE • 1834-1845
Government ... is nothing but a system of restraints from beginning to
end." That alone could preserve a Union of several dozen states which
differed from each other in their institutions, their people, their language,
their soil, climate, and products. In an enlarged view their interests
might appear to be identical, but "to the eye of local and sectional preju-
dice," he noted, "they always appear to be conflicting." Therefore,
jealousies would perpetually arise which could be repressed only "by
that mutual forbearance which pervades the Constitution."1 Mutual
forbearance, mutual accommodation, the avoidance of extremes, the
willingness of a majority to extend some consideration to the minority,
the acceptance of compromise as the only method short of war or despot-
ism for settling political disputes, these attitudes alone could perpetuate
self-government and the federal system.
In his senatorial career, Buchanan approached most closely the
role of statesman, for here he uniformly took the long view. His recom-
mendations on domestic and foreign policy, though attacked at one time
or another by every geographic section, were consistent and have remained
remarkably sound. At the base lay the conviction that political power,
in whatever form it existed, must always be held in check, and that the
United States Constitution provided all the machinery necessary for
this purpose.
Buchanan remained continually alert to partisan attacks upon
the delicate balances which the Constitution provided. As a Representative
he had led the battle to prevent Congress from emasculating the power of
the Supreme Court by repealing its authority to review state legislation.
As a Senator, he vigorously and successfully fought an effort of Clay and
Webster to deprive the president of the power to remove executive officers,
*_± ^______^_i« _..1_ ^ M.1*. MBAVMA.JI lf?wt •fr/'v AVMVVI ATI/»A &mr\Y\fe c 01*1 one stuff ATI "fro
of constitutional law. To give the Senate power to pass on executive re-
movals would subordinate the president to the Congress, "a position,*'
said Buchanan, "in which the Constitution of the country never intended
to place him."2
In the debate to expunge the Senate's resolution censuring Presi-
dent Jackson, he pointed out the constitutional problem: the Senate by
convicting an executive officer without a hearing, witnesses, or counsel
had destroyed its competence to act later as a court of impeachment. But
if the resolution condemning the president as a tyrant and usurper had
any basis of fact, then the executive should stand trial. Buchanan warned
that the procedure of legislative censure could easily lead to a star-chamber
substitute for impeachment, enable the Senate to destroy at will any
executive officer, and thus overthrow the structure defined in the Consti-
tution.3 On another occasion he jumped to the defense of the veto power
of the president which angry Whigs, after Tyler's veto of the Bank Bill,
143
JAMES BUCHANAN
tried to amend out of the Constitution. Throughout his political career,
Buchanan could be found among those who tried to define clearly and to
keep strong the delicate lines which separated the three branches of
government and the functions of state and federal administrations. He
did not, like Calhoun, propose state supremacy; or like Webster, seek a
consolidated national government; but he sought to keep the state and
federal entities in their separate orbits, revolving without collision around
the sun of the system, the Constitution.
The great national economic issues of the 1830's were the tariff,
banking, and public land. Buchanan condemned both free trade and
prohibitive tariffs because either system would impoverish one or another
part of the nation. Why should the northern Whigs and Democrats want
to bankrupt the South by the protective tariff of 1842? And why should
the southerners think it sensible to hold conventions in favor of free trade,
which would only put northern manufacturers out of business? Thus he
addressed the Senate, complaining all the while that he was "exposed to
fires from both sides, Mr. Clay and Mr. Calhoun."
Buchanan voted, under instruction, for the high protective tariff
of 1842 but stated that he disapproved of the bill. He predicted, accurately,
that the measure would be replaced by another bill sponsored by the South
which would be too low, and that both enactments would prove contrary
to the best public interest. Why not split the difference and permit both
sections to share in a modest local prosperity, instead of using partisan
politics to aid one section to grow rich upon the ruins of another? Such
a political program he would always resist. Let people call him a trimmer,
or vacillating, or whatever they wished; he would sustain a balanced tariff
as constructive policy for the United States, and he would urge it in the
face of Webster, Calhoun, the Pennsylvania ironmasters, and the Mis-
sissippi planters. "I am viewed," he said, "as the strongest advocate of
protection ... in other States: whilst I am denounced as its enemy in
Pennsylvania."4
Buchanan took the same middle-ground position on the Bank
question. He strongly opposed unregulated state banking but, with equal
vigor, opposed the control of banks by the state. He wanted enough hard
money in circulation to pay workingmen's wages, but he was enough of a
businessman and banker himself to know that an expanding national
economy demanded an elastic currency. His proposals for banks showed
there was a wide range of alternatives between wildcat banking and
total control.
Tariff and banking problems became entangled with the public
land policy of the federal government. Demand for public land encouraged
rash overissues of state bank notes; this currency, when paid into the
public treasury for land, created a surplus on the government books; and
144
THIS I BELIEVE • 1834 - 1845
when a surplus showed, pressure mounted to cut down the tariff rates.
Then, when the paper money forwarded by the treasury to the state banks
for redemption proved worthless, the surplus was wiped out and the
treasury could not pay its bills with the tariff duties alone. Thus, tariff,
banks, and public land formed parts of a single economic problem.
For years the politicians had agreed to distribute any surplus
arising from the sale of federal land to the individual states in order to
draw off this eccentric source of revenue and to render the tariff fixed and
certain. In opposing this practice, Buchanan shrewdly observed that no
legislator would vote money for federal projects if he knew that a share
of any unspent money went to his home state. "Man at his best is but a
frail being," he said. If you placed his interest on the one side and his
duty on the other, he would generally promote his private advantage.
Buchanan also foresaw a fight over the terms of distribution, whether pro
rata to the states or in proportion to their population, the very question
which had nearly wrecked the Constitutional Convention of 1787. To
avoid all these problems he proposed to apply the surplus to the national
defense establishment. "With this money," he said, "you might increase
your navy, complete your fortifications, and prepare for war; and you
would thus distribute its benefits more equally and justly among the people
than you could do in any other manner."6 This proposal, side-tracking
local interest and concentrating attention on a new and larger objective,
typified Buchanan.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS
Buchanan's reference to preparing for war reflected the agitated state of
foreign affairs in the 1830's. A war with France had narrowly been
averted; war with Mexico over Texas seemed a real possibility; and rela-
tions with England were strained by a succession of events: the Caroline
affair of 1837-1838, the Aroostook War in 1839, the Creole affair of 1841,
and the Oregon Question.
Buchanan, chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee
for five years before the election of Tyler and an active member of the
Committee thereafter, brought in several reports on the Maine boundary
dispute before Webster became Secretary of State and began formal
negotiations with the British.
Buchanan reported that the Committee did not "entertain a
doubt of the title of the United States to the whole of the disputed terri-
tory," but three years later Secretary of State Webster, considering the
maintenance of friendly relations with Britain to be more important to
the United States than the acquisition of a small segment of Maine, met
145
JAMES BUCHANAN
Lord Ashburton in a conciliatory spirit and agreed to a compromise
settlement.6
The Webster-Ashburton Treaty passed the Senate in 1842 by a
large majority, but Buchanan voted against it for reasons which he ex-
plained at great length. After detailing the voluminous evidence sustaining
the American claim, he denounced Webster for failing to use his bargaining
power to advantage. If he had insisted on America's rights in this matter,
he might have won concessions in others. He might have negotiated a
settlement of the Northwest Boundary Dispute, obtained redress for the
Creole and Caroline outrages, and forced Britain to abandon, her policy of
impressment on the high seas. Webster had not used diplomacy. He had
given up American territory for nothing, and prospects for settling other
Anglo-American problems were now no better than ever. Buchanan called
the treaty c'an unqualified surrender of our territory to British dictation.'*7
At the opposite end of the country, along the southwestern border,
tension had risen nearly to the breaking point. The Mexican government
found it difficult to maintain order and could not protect the lives and
property of foreigners. Claims of injured United States citizens against
Mexico multiplied rapidly and American business there, once estimated at
$3,000,000 per year, dropped to $300,000. Then Texas revolted. The
Texans, most of them emigrants from the United States, set up the Lone
Star Republic, invited diplomatic recognition, and petitioned for admission
to the United States.
The Texas revolution of 1836 and the Canadian revolution of
1837 soon demonstrated the need for a stiffening of the American neu-
trality laws, for American citizens became involved in both affrays.
Buchanan now proclaimed the doctrine of the good neighbor. "We have
three neighbors on our frontiers," he said, "Canada, Texas and Mexico;
and the duties of good neighborhood require something more from us in
relation to them than could be strictly demanded under the law of nations.
... It is our duty to prevent our citizens from aiding in every revolutionary
movement against a neighboring government. ... It is against all reason
and justice that in case of a sudden commotion in a neighboring country
. . ., the citizens of the United States should be permitted to take part with
the insurgents."8
Carrying this doctrine one step further, he urged a policy of
nonintervention in the domestic affairs of foreign nations. Petitions had
been flooding the Senate in the spring of 1836 praying Congress "to recog-
nize the independence of Texas, and ... to interpose to terminate the
conflict which now rages in that country." It was natural, Buchanan
admitted, for the sympathies of American citizens to be "earnestly enlisted
in favor of those who drew the sword for liberty," but to act on such
feelings was to ignore the teaching of the wisdom of the past. "We should
146
THIS I BELIEVE • 1834 - 1845
never interfere in the domestic concerns of other nations," he asserted.
The people of every nation had the absolute right to adopt any form of
government they thought proper, and the United States ought to preserve
the strictest neutrality. "The world must be persuaded," he insisted.
"It could not be conquered." Acting on these principles, the United
States had "always recognized existing Governments de facto, whether
they were constitutional or despotic. It was their affair, not ours."9
But should the United States render aid to Americans struggling
for freedom in Texas? No, answered Buchanan, lest there be "suspicion
that we have got up this war for the purpose of wresting Texas from those
to whom ... it justly belongs."10 Should the independence of Texas be
recognized? Yes, "when the fact of their actual independence was estab-
lished—then—and not till then." Was any act of the United States
required during the period of uncertainty? Yes, the United States Govern-
ment should rigorously prosecute "all persons who might attempt to
violate our neutrality in the civil war between Mexico and Texas" and
should inform Mexico and Texas that the United States would require
them both to scrupulously respect American territory.
On March 3, 1837, President Jackson recognized the independ-
ence of the Republic of Texas. The Texans had already voted in favor of
immediate annexation to the United States. These acts brought the
American people face to face with the two most crucial problems of the
age: territorial expansion and slavery.
EXPANSION AND SLAVERY
Buchanan vigorously urged territorial expansion. "This I believe," he
said. "Providence has given to the American people a great and glorious
mission to perform, even that of extending . . . liberty over the whole
North American continent. Within less than fifty years, there will exist
one hundred millions of free Americans between the Atlantic and Pacific
oceans. . . . What, sir! prevent the American people from crossing the
Rocky Mountains? You might as well command Niagara not to flow. We
must fulfill our destiny."11
But how could the nation fulfill this destiny without spreading
abroad the slavery system? "I feel a strong repugnance by any act of
mine," wrote Buchanan, "to extend the present limits of the Union over
a new slave-holding territory." The acquisition of Texas, he hoped, might
"be the means of limiting, not enlarging, the dominion of slavery." In
every state not dependent upon cotton culture, economic pressure would
force gradual abolition. Where grain became a staple, slavery would bring
bankruptcy, and "if the slave don't run away from his master, the master
must run away from the slave." In Texas, slaves would run off into
147
JAMES BUCHANAN
Mexico and there "mingle with a race where no prejudice exists against
their color." Buchanan thought that if Texas should be annexed, it would
he divided into four or five states, in only one of which the soil and climate
would support slavery. But the annexation treaty itself ought to determine
the proportion of free and slave states. "Should this not be done, we may
have another Missouri question to shake the Union to its center."12
The Senate, in Buchanan's day, was full of the sound and fury
of debates on slavery. He entered prominently into the discussions about
the circulation of abolitionist propaganda, presided over the committee
which had to solve the controversy over the right of petition, and acted
as spokesman for the North against Calhoun's proposal to outlaw all
"intermeddling" with slavery in the national capital or the territories.
Several southern states, facing an inundation of abolitionist
writings which they considered an incitation to riot, outlawed the circula-
tion of such literature. The Senate considered a bill authorizing postmasters
to withhold mail they knew to be prohibited by state law and destroy it if
it were not claimed by the sender. Buchanan and Webster debated this
measure. The latter argued that it infringed the freedom of the press and
that mail, as private property, could not be destroyed. Buchanan defended
the freedom of the press, but he stoutly maintained that the government
had the right to refuse to distribute pamphlets intended to destroy it. He
asserted that no person could have any property right in articles which the
law forbade him to possess, whether the prohibitory law was state or
federal. It was, said Buchanan, "a question not of property, but of public
safety," applicable only in states where the people had declared, by law,
that their safety was threatened.13
The discussion of the mails linked the cause of abolition with
the cause of civil liberties. This connection, so exasperating to the
defenders of the Union, was further emphasized by the long struggle over
the right of petition. The House of Representatives, faced with a mountain
of petitions from some 500 antislavery societies, eventually adopted a reso-
lution to tabl* them all. This so-called "Gag Resolution" seemed a clear
denial of the right of petition guaranteed to citizens by the Constitution.
Buchanan became the center of the Senate fight over abolition
petitions when his colleagues made him chairman of the Committee to
consider the question of the prohibition of slavery and the skve trade in
the District of Columbia, the subject of most of the petitions. Buchanan
fought strenuously against an outright gag, but at the same time insisted
that no splinter group of citizens should be permitted to stop the machinery
of government by abuse of the petition device. As the debates on the
circulation of abolition mail had brought him into conflict with Webster
and the antislavery forces, the debates on petitions now brought him into
conflict with Calhoun and the proslavery advocates. "I have not found,
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THIS I BELIEVE • 1834 - 1845
upon the present occasion," he noted wryly, "the maxim to be true, that
'in medio tutissimus ibis.' "
When Buchanan presented a petition from the Cain Quarterly
Meeting of the Society of Friends, referring to the abolition of slavery in
the District of Columbia, Calhoun moved not to receive it. Buchanan
replied: "Let it once be understood that the sacred right of petition and
the cause of the abolitionists must rise or fall together, and the conse-
quences may be fatal. ... We have just as little right to interfere with
slavery in the South, as we have to touch the right of petition."14
Calhoun alleged that the people of no state were aggrieved by
conditions in the District of Columbia; what went on there was none of
their business; it was the concern only of Congress and the local inhabit-
ants. But who, asked Buchanan, is to judge "whether the People are
aggrieved or not? Is it those who suffer, or fancy they suffer, or the
Senate. The Constitution secures the right of being heard by petition to
every citizen; and I would not abridge it because he happened to be a fool."15
Buchanan asked Calhoun to withdraw his motion. "Why select
the very weakest position, one on which you yourselves will present a
divided front to the enemy," he asked, "when it is in your power to choose
one on which you and we can unite? . . . You place us in such a position
that we cannot defend you, without infringing the sacred right of petition.
Do you not perceive that the question of abolition may thus be indissolubly
connected . . . with a cause which we can never abandon?"
Buchanan proposed that the Senate should accept the petitions
but reject their prayer. To those who could not see any difference between
tabling and rejecting the prayer, he suggested the difference between in-
viting a man into the house, hearing his proposition, and then declining
to accept it or kicking him downstairs before he had a chance to speak.
And why should the prayer be rejected? Only because the nation was
bound in honor to respect the promise to the original donors of the District,
that slavery would not be disturbed there so long as it existed in Maryland
and Virginia.
After two months of heated discussion, Buchanan's motion to
accept the petition but reject its prayer finally came up for a vote on March
9, 1836, and passed 36 to 10. "I rejoice at the result of the vote," he
wrote. "Abolition is forever separated from the right of petition. The
abolitionists . . . must now stand alone."16
Buchanan's mail had been heavy during the height of the con-
troversy. A Quaker wrote him that the question had broken up the Cain
meeting.17 Another wrote that the North ought to thank God it was rid
of slavery and be satisfied.18 Buchanan's roommate, King of Alabama,
told him frankly that if the North persevered in its current course, "then
we will separate from them."19 On hearing this, Thomas Elder commented:
149
JAMES BUCHANAN
"Let them withdraw and wade in blood before six months."20 "It is
rapidly becoming a question of union or disunion," wrote Buchanan to
the mayor of Pittsburgh. "If the progress of the abolition societies cannot
be arrested, I fear the catastrophe may come sooner than any of us antici-
pate Would it not be well to get up counter-societies of friends of the
Union?"21
John C. Calhoun now presented to the Senate an inflammatory
resolution:
That the intermeddling of any State or States, or their citizens,
to abolish slavery in this District, or any of the Territories, . . .;
or the passage of any act or measure of Congress, with that view,
would be a direct attack on the institutions of all the slave-
holding states.22
Buchanan, Benton, and most of the northern Democratic Sen-
ators labored to get these resolves buried in a select committee as rapidly
as possible, for they promised nothing but another acrimonious and
fruitless debate which would spread its poison throughout the nation.
Why, asked Buchanan, are our southern friends continually "driving us
into positions where their enemies and our enemies may gain important
advantages." Were not the abolition attacks enough? Did the South,
too, have to assault the Union men of the North? "Abolition thus acquires
force," he said. "Those of us in the Northern States who have determined
to sustain the rights of the slave-holding states at every hazard, are placed in
a most embarrassing position. We are almost literally between two fires*"23
But what irked Buchanan most was the fact that the abolitionists
were preventing the achievement of the very result which nearly everyone
sought, the ultimate solution of the slavery problem. "Before this un-
fortunate agitation commenced," he said, "a very large and growing party
existed in several of the slave States in favor of the gradual abolition of
slavery; and now not a voice is heard there in support of such a measure.
The Abolitionists have postponed the emancipation of the slaves in three
or four States of this Union for at least half a century." If they continued
urging their mad schemes, they would "cover the land with blood."
"The Union is now in danger, and I wish to proclaim the fact," Buchanan
warned.24
He reiterated this theme. "This question of domestic slavery is
the weak point in our institutions," he insisted. "Touch this question of
slavery seriously . . , and the Union is from that moment dissolved. . . .
Although in Pennsylvania we are all opposed to slavery in the abstract,
yet we will never violate the constitutional compact we have made with
our sister states , Their rights will be held sacred by us. Under the Consti-
tution it is their own question; and there let it remain."25
ISO
12
•
AN OFFICE NOT TO BE SOUGHT • 1844
NO PEACE FOR PENNSYLVANIA
Buchanan hoped to complete the first stage of his plans for the presidential
nomination, firm control of Pennsylvania, before he came up for re-election
to the Senate in December, 1842. He had stated clearly that he would bid
for the presidency only if the Pennsylvania Democracy united solidly back
of him. With the Pennsylvania votes to manipulate in the national con-
vention, his prospects might be good, especially if the convention came
to a deadlock.
The State Legislature in the spring of 1842 eliminated the main
cause of Democratic schism by passing a banking act which provided
for gradual resumption of specie payments and conformed closely to
Buchanan's ideas. The new law would, he wrote, enable the people "to
enjoy the advantages of well-regulated specie-paying Banks, without being
cursed by the evils of the present unrestricted system." Biddle's "monster"
lay dead, Tyler's veto had put an end to the threat of a new Federal Bank,
and the Democrats after ten years were at last relieved of the ordeal of
party tests on the Bank question.1
The Dallas party was weakened because it had lost its chief source
of funds, and it could no longer create dissension by intruding the banking
issue; Buchanan was strengthened among the working classes because their
pay envelopes would now contain sound money rather than depreciated
shinplasters. As his popularity grew among the Irish Catholic laborers,
the millworkers and clerks, his managers in metropolitan areas urged him
to get busy and capitalize on his advantage. "If we now had a paper
in Philadelphia, what an impression we could make!" cried Forney.2
Cameron advised Buchanan to move permanently to Philadelphia.
Buchanan wrote noncommittal replies. He would not promote
his own elevation; he would not run away from home for political reasons;
he would let his friends work for him if they thought he was worth it, and
if not, he would be satisfied. He would do all he could to unite the party,
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JAMES BUCHANAN
but would not stir a finger for the presidency. He would follow Jackson's
motto: The presidency is an office not to be sought.3
Such replies went down hard with those in the field who were
spending their days making contacts and writing articles, and their nights
attending strategy meetings. They were spending their money, too,
keeping bankrupt editors out of the hands of the sheriff and entertaining
for the party. They agreed heartily with Benjamin F. Brewster of Phila-
delphia, but few had the guts to write, as he did: "Mr. Buchanan, we do
need some action. We do need some concert. We do need some decided
proclamation."4
Forney urged Buchanan to take a political barnstorming trip,
for work was needed in New York, Ohio, Indiana, and the southern States;
but instead, Buchanan got out his two "little black books" in which he
kept annotated lists of state and national politicians and campaigned by
direct mail.6 Within Pennsylvania, a friend reported, "everything looks
bright, very bright. The ball has rolled on with a force and velocity alike
gratifying and astonishing. The feeling in your favor in this State is very
strong." The Pittsburgh Manufacturer, a Whig paper, the Erie Observer,
formerly against Buchanan, and the Spirit of the Times, which had been
Stewart's chief mouthpiece, all joined the Buchanan movement.6
But trouble developed in the quarter where Buchanan had tried
hardest to prevent it. At the beginning of Porter's second term, Buchanan's
enemies tempted the governor to set up his own party, to try to get control
of the state delegation in the 1844 convention, and to use it to promote
himself. He would be out of a job in January, 1845; why give everything
to Buchanan when he might very well capture the vice-presidency? He
held Buchanan's future in the hollow of his hand. Irritated by some of
Buchanan's friends who made excessive demands for their fidgity support,
Porter succumbed.
The game would be to have the state Administration evince
interest in all the prospective presidential candidates so that when the
field narrowed, Porter could name his price for the Pennsylvania delegation.
Rumors had been flying about that the governor's henchmen had been
cultivating Vice-President Richard M. Johnson, and in January, 1842, the
truth erupted with dramatic suddenness in a breakup of the state Cabinet,
Secretary of the Commonwealth Shunk resigned rather than obey Porter's
order to transfer the state printing in Harrisburg from a Buchanan paper
to a journal which had been praising Johnson. Henry Petrikin, Shunk's
deputy, also resigned, as did the Auditor General, the Treasurer and the
Librarian, all of them friends of Buchanan.
Porter's new Cabinet became a kind of electioneering head-
quarters for Johnson during the summer. The governor arranged to have
"Old Tecumseh" visit Pennsylvania in October, ostensibly to celebrate
152
AN OFFICE NOT TO BE SOUGHT • 1844
the anniversary of his victory at the Battle of the Thames. Buchanan
received an invitation to join the official party under an assurance that the
occasion was a historic observance, "entirely non-political," but of course
he declined. Long before the celebrations at Williamsport and Danville,
however, Porter himself admitted that the Johnson movement had
burned out.7
Porter continued to write cordially to Buchanan, explaining his
Cabinet changes with the comment, "I would as soon attempt to control
the wind as manage some of these people."8 He renewed his promise to
treat all factions fairly and Buchanan, for his part, tried to calm his associ-
ates, which was not an easy matter for they were wild with rage at the
governor*
The Porter men now turned their interest to General Lewis Cass
of Michigan, who had just returned from his diplomatic mission in France.
A bluff westerner who had served as Secretary of War under President
Jackson, Cass aroused American chauvinism by his violent Anglophobia
and his ardent support of expansion. "Pennsylvania is the soil for Presi-
dent-making," wrote Buchanan. He did not fear Cass as a presidential
rival, for the Pennsylvania Cassites, he predicted, would "damn any cause
in which they embark," but he did fear that the local Cass movement would
be used to influence the coming senatorial election.9
Toward the end of 1842, Forney ferreted out a plot. Buchanan's
organization had decided to hold a convention at Harrisburg on Jackson
Day, 1843, in order to place Buchanan's name officially in nomination for
the presidency. This meeting would convene just before the Legislature
began balloting for his re-election to the Senate. Governor Porter's friends
now prepared to bring General Cass to Harrisburg for a demonstration
immediately on the heels of the Buchanan convention, and to use the
general's visit as a means of obtaining the senatorship for one of themselves.
The Cass men demanded that Buchanan should make his re-election con-
ditional upon his withdrawal from the presidential race or, if he wanted
to run for president, get out of the senatorial race. "If," they said,
"Buchanan's friends insist on filling every office ... at Harrisburg . .• .
with none but his adherents, we will unite with the Whigs to defeat his
election."10
The answer rested with the Legislature and, as Buchanan freely
admitted, "our past experience in Penna. has proven that the Representa-
tive does not always obey the will of his Constituents Our security now
is that the Whigs have no money to pay the wages of iniquity."11 It
would be close, for the "rebels" could count on the votes of ten Democratic
Cassites. "They must have Thirteen, at least, to effect what they desire,"
reported Forney. "This they never can get."1*
Forney's prediction proved correct. By Christmas, the Cass-
153
JAMES BUCHANAN
Porter men gave up and publicly announced their readiness to support
Buchanan. The Buchanan convention met on January 8, endorsed its
man and adjourned to await the action of the Legislature. That body
quickly re-elected Buchanan to the Senate and the convention then im-
mediately resumed its sessions.13 Forney made the address and introduced
resolutions proposing Buchanan for the presidency. The convention
"closed in a burst of such enthusiasm as never was known in Harrisburg,
except during the Jackson campaign."14
With the senatorial election past and the presidential struggle
just beginning, what were Buchanan's prospects? Van Buren had gone on
a western tour during which he had visited Jackson at the Hermitage and
received the general's blessing. The people, said Old Hickory, would
survey Little Van's record and on "sober second thought" repair their
error of 1840. Buchanan's friends, however, asserted that "every fool
will see that a course more destructive to the party [than the renomination
of Mr. Van Buren] could not be recommended by its most decided enemy."15
But Van Buren would run, and Jackson wanted James K. Polk of Tennessee
to go in as vice-president. Calhoun, too, would run with any assistance
he could get. He would promote the aspirations of as many competitors
as possible in order to throw the election into the House of Representatives.
Cass, with Pennsylvania's aid, planned to take advantage of a convention
deadlock between Calhoun and Van Buren. Tyler saw the same prospect
and made a bid for Buchanan's support, offering him a seat on the Supreme
Court. When Tyler failed to enlist Buchanan, he turned to Porter.
The best Buchanan could make of it was that Van Buren and
Polk, endorsed by Jackson, had the lead and would be supported by Dallas.
This ticket was sure to lose Pennsylvania and with it the national election,
but if Van Buren insisted, all would have to go along; the party could
survive a defeat better than a split. Calhoun would try anything and
remained an uncertain quantity. Tyler wanted to start a third party, but
he would discover he had no party at all, and anyone who played his game
would go down with him. Cass might prove formidable. Buchanan had
fewer enemies than any, but he lacked a national organization and had to
depend upon the effect of a united Pennsylvania delegation introduced
into a confused and uncertain convention. With the support of his home
state delegates working in harmony, there was a possibility that he would
be nominated. Otherwise, his chances were hopeless.
Buchanan predicted that Tyler would take the governor's brother
into his Cabinet and "we shall have a Tyler party in Pennsylvania."16 On
March 4, the president exploded his political bomb by naming Judge James
M. Porter Secretary of War, thus blasting Buchanan's hopes of a united
Pennsylvania. Governor Porter now dismissed the few remaining "Bu-
chanan men— by God!" from state offices and tried to force Tyler down the
154
AN OFFICE NOT TO BE SOUGHT • 1844
throats of his followers, but here he got a shock. Even the old faithful
Harrisburg Keystone, long Porter's mainstay, refused to endorse Tyler.
When Porter took the state printing from it, Editor Orville Barrett quit
and joined Buchanan. The governor had written his political death war-
rant. "His fall," wrote Buchanan, "has been more sudden than that of
any other public man I have ever known."17
From New York came the word that Van Buren was regularly in
the field. "You are aware," Buchanan wrote, "that he never has been
popular in Pennsylvania and that feeling which was formerly one of
indifference has been converted into positive dislike* I am sincerely sorry
for it; because should he be nominated he shall receive my decided sup-
port."18 By midsummer the Van Buren band wagon began to pick up
speed in many states. The Philadelphians (Dallas, Gilpin, Henry Horn,
John K. Kane and others) jumped aboard. They invited Buchanan to be
their speaker at a celebration but he declined politely. Certainly his
chances had gone hopelessly overboard. The state administration had
become his enemy, Philadelphia had slipped out of his grasp, he had no
trustworthy support left but his own fraction of the party, and that was
committed, by his own orders, to Van Buren. And who would control if
Van Buren won? Dallas! After Congress adjourned on March 3, Buchanan
returned to Lancaster and went to bed with a bilious attack which tormented
him until the middle of June.19
Buchanan took his usual tour through western Pennsylvania
during July and August, going to Mercersburg, Bedford, Pittsburgh and
Meadvifle. He had family business and political affairs to look after but
most of all he needed a rest cure. He thought of making a trip to the deep
South and stopping at the Hermitage to pay his respects to Jackson, but
ruled out the southern visit for fear of exposing himself to the charge of
electioneering.
The family visits gave welcome diversion, but not exactly relief.
The Mercersburg establishment was gloomy and beset with difficulties;
Jane Lane had passed on, and soon thereafter her husband had died veiy
unexpectedly. They left four more orphaned children in Buchanan's
charge: two boys who were grown and could manage and two young girls,
Mary and Harriet, who needed homes. They were now in Charlestown,
Virginia, with their father's relatives, where Buchanan would stop to see
them on his way home.20
Harriet Henry's death a year after that of her husband left
nothing in Greensburg but melancholy memories. Her only son, ten-
year-old James Buchanan Henry, now lived in Lancaster under Miss
Hetty's care. Harriet Lane would also move in very shortly, and possibly
her sister. He had prepared for them by buying a lot of Henry Slaymaker's
furniture at a sheriff's sale and would set up quarters for half a dozen perma-
155
JAMES BUCHANAN
nent or wandering family guests. It was time the King Street house was
fully furnished; he and Miss Hetty had used only a few rooms. He hoped
Miss Hetty would enjoy managing seven bedrooms and taking care of the
new kitchen equipment; and he hoped little Harriet would enjoy the piano.
He had paid $17.50 for it.21
Since the breakoff with his "intended" of the Kittera household,
Buchanan had become seriously interested in young Anna Payne who
lived with her famous aunt Dolly Madison in the gray house on Lafayette
Square in Washington, a popular resort of capital society. He grew quite
devoted to her and would in all probability have married her except for
the disparity in their ages. It had become a vogue in this period for young
girls to marry men old enough to be their grandfathers, but the results did
not always prove happy. Letting his better judgment overrule his heart,
Buchanan gave her up in an outburst of poetry.
In thee my chilled & blighted heart has found
A green spot in the dreary waste around.
Oh! that my fate in youthful days had been
T'have lived with such an one, unknown, unseen,
Loving and lov'd, t'have passed away our days
Sequestered from the world's malignant gaze!
A match of age with youth can only bring
The farce of 'winter dancing with the spring.'
Blooming nineteen can never well agree
With the dull age of half a century.
Thus reason 'speaks what rebel passion hates,
Passion, — which would control the very fates.
Meantime, where'ere you go, what e're your lot
By me you'll never, never be forgot.
May Heaven's rich blessings crown your future life!
And may you be a happy, loving wife!22
His growing responsibilities as a guardian for nieces and nephews
and his increasing preoccupation with politics at length banished all ex-
pectation of a marriage for love. He put his thoughts »very frankly to his
old friend, Mrs. James J. Roosevelt, some years later. "I feel that it is not
good for a man to be alone," he wrote, "and should not be astonished to
find myself married to some old maid who can nurse me when I am sick,
provide good dinners for me when I am well, and not expect from me any
very ardent or romantic affection."28
THE DEMOCRATIC NOMINATION OF 1844
By 1843 his political prospects looked almost as forlorn as his prospects
for romance. Davy Lynch, for example, had been charged with accepting
156
AN OFFICE NOT TO BE SOUGHT* 1844
overpayments from the government for rent of the Pittsburgh post office
building. He faced trial and wanted Buchanan to get him out of trouble.
In the meantime Tyler would certainly remove Lynch and probably appoint
in his place J. B. Moorhead, who had voted against Buchanan's re-election
to the Senate and had been working hard to seize control of the western
Pennsylvania Democrats.24
But Moorhead's threat was only one of many worries. The
Democrats had to select a candidate for governor in the spring, and Henry
A. Muhlenberg, just back from the Austrian Mission, expected Buchanan
to help him get the nomination. Muhlenberg, however, tried to fit back
into the associations of years before, allying with the old "improvement
men," now friends of Porter; the old Van Buren men, now the Dallas
party; and the Moorhead faction in Pittsburgh. "I believe," Buchanan
said, "I have not a personal enemy in the Democratic party of the State
who is not a devoted friend of Mr. Muhlenberg/'26
Francis R. Shunk also wanted to be the gubernatorial candidate
and demanded Buchanan's help. Had he not resigned as Secretary of the
Commonwealth in order to conduct the fight against Porter in Hamsburg?
Were not all of Buchanan's friends in the present canvass solidly back of
Shunfc and against Muhlenberg? Could Buchanan withhold his support
under these circumstances?
The difficulty reached its most acute stage in Lancaster County
where all the jarring elements came into close contact. Buchanan stalled
Muhlenberg, explained the local events of the past several years, and
expressed a wish to stay entirely out of the contest. He would, however,
as an evidence of good faith, promise to deliver Lancaster County to
Muhlenberg. But he would take no part in the contest between his two
friends. Muhlenberg went back to Reading where his local party promptly
nominated delegates pledged to Van Buren to the coming state convention.
Van Buren's partisans won so sweeping a victory in the organi-
zation of the national Congress that his subsequent nomination now seemed
assured. Buchanan was prepared for this eventuality, but not for the
angry reaction of his friends at home. Despite his repeated pledges that
he would not contest the nomination against Van Buren and that he would
not take sides between Muhlenberg and Shunk, he learned two weeks before
Christmas that his Lancaster newspaper was flying from its masthead the
slogan: "Win with Buchanan and Shunk!"26 The game was up. He
closed himself in his Washington room and worked all night on the draft
of an important letter; the most important, he knew, that he had ever
written.
Pushing aside half a dozen scratched over and interlined copies,
he took up a fair draft and read it. "Washington, December 14, 1843.
To the Democrats of Pennsylvania, Fellow Citizens : After long and serious
157
JAMES BUCHANAN
reflection, I have resolved to withdraw my name from the list of presidential
candidates to be presented before the democratic national convention.
This resolution has been dictated by an anxious desire to drive discord
from the ranks of the party, and secure the ascendancy of democratic
principles, both in the state and throughout the union. In arriving at
this conclusion I have consulted no human being. It is entirely my own
spontaneous act, and proceeds from the clearest and strongest conviction
of duty."
Now, what else? He must thank his friends for their work and
show where the fault lay. When he had accepted the state nomination a
year ago he had said plainly that he would run only if the Democracy of
Pennsylvania "should resolve to offer my name to the national convention
with that degree of unanimity which could alone give moral force to
their recommendation." Anyone who had observed current politics would
have to grant there was now no unanimity, and that "the moral force of
Pennsylvania with her sister states would be exerted in vain." It would
be a hopeless contest; even his friends must admit it. He expected by his
withdrawal to "purchase harmony and unanimity in the selection of a
democratic candidate." After sealing the letter, he addressed it to the
editor of the Lancaster Intelligencer?*
During January and February of 1844, Buchanan essayed the
awkward task of remaining on friendly terms with both Muhlenberg and
Shunk. Lancaster County did not help when it elected delegates committed
to Shunk to the state nominating convention, contrary to Buchanan's
wishes and his earlier promise to Muhlenberg. On March 4, the Democrats
meeting at Harrisburg nominated Muhlenberg for governor by a close vote
on the first ballot, thus giving at least an indirect endorsement to Van
Buren for president. Under pressure from Buchanan, Shunk agreed not
to split the party and promised his support to the settled ticket.
The road ahead now seemed clear for Van Buren, but that was
reckoning without Calhoun, Tyler, and Texas. On February 28, Secretary
of State Abel P. Upshur was killed by the explosion of the great gun "Peace-
maker" aboard the U.S.S. Princeton. Within a week, President Tyler had
determined upon a stroke of policy which, he hoped, would promote a
second term for himself. He would appoint John C. Calhoun to the State
Department and annex Texas. Calhoun had already withdrawn from the
presidential race, but he had not yet committed his support to any of the
remaining aspirants; as a member of the Tyler Cabinet he might be induced
to support his chief.
John Calhoun accepted the State Department on April 1, and
by the 16th had completed a Texas Treaty, which Tyler submitted to the
Senate for action on April 22, 1844,28
The acquisition of Texas under the leadership of Tyler and
158
AN OFHCE NOT TO BE SOUGHT- 1844
Calhoun by means which seemed sure to provoke a war with Mexico put
every presidential aspirant on guard. To the North it appeared crystal
clear that a southern plot was afoot to spread slavery. To the South it
seemed equally apparent that her only future security lay in expansion.
Thus the questions of slavery and expansion were locked together and
thrust into the midst of the presidential canvass.
On April 20, Van Buren had written a letter to Congressman
W. H. Hammet of Mississippi, published a week later, stating that the
United States ought not to annex Texas. Clay came out the same day with
a letter taking essentially the same stand. Historians assume that this
simultaneous pronouncement by leaders of the two opposing parties had
been prearranged between them. Tyler, by his submission of the treaty
of annexation on April 22, stood before the country as the champion of
expansion.
Buchanan's friends immediately urged him to reconsider his
withdrawal and to fight actively for the nomination. Cameron and J. M.
Read called a hurried meeting of the Pennsylvania Democratic Central
Committee to have delegates to the Baltimore Convention reinstructed
for Buchanan but failed because frenzied efforts of the Van Buren men
prevented the appearance of a quorum.29 Many begged Buchanan only
"to say one word to give the Baltimore Convention a chance to nominate
him" and Pennsylvania would swing into line, carrying other states with it.30
By the middle of May, he had decided on the position he would
take, although it was not all that his friends demanded. He would not com-
pete with Van Buren for the nomination. But should the latter voluntarily
withdraw either before or during the convention, Buchanan's supporters
could offer his name.31
Many Pennsylvanians considered his attitude craven, but they
did not know the national picture as well as Buchanan did. General
Jackson disapproved of Van Buren's stand on Texas, and was pressing the
name of James K. Polk openly for vice-president and covertly for the first
place if a convention deadlock should develop. Buchanan could expect
no favors or public support from Jackson, and should he run independ-
ently he would be flying in the face of both Van Buren and Jackson. "I
confess," he said, "that if I should ever run for the Presidency, I would
like to have an open field & a fair start. The battle has already been more
than half fought ... and it would be difficult for any new man to recall the
forces which have already gone over to the enemy."32
The Democratic Convention opened at Baltimore on May 27,
elected Hendrick B. Wright of Pennsylvania to the chair, and adopted the
two-thirds rule for nominations. With this regulation, Van Buren could
not be nominated; without it, he would go in on the first ballot. Pennsyl-
vania's delegates, who were instructed for Van Buren, voted nonetheless
159
JAMES BUCHANAN
for the two-thirds rule which they well knew would exclude their candidate.
Having sabotaged Van Buren, these gentlemen then proceeded to vote for
him on the roll call for nominees, but after the first few ballots the Penn-
sylvanians went over to Buchanan, giving him the unanimous vote of the
state on the fifth ballot. Lewis Cass of Michigan ran strongly on the sixth
and seventh ballots, while Van Buren's strength declined, but none of the
candidates came near the 178 votes needed.
The convention adjourned overnight, and by morning leaders of
the Pennsylvania and Massachusetts delegations had completed plans to
introduce Folk's name to the deadlocked meeting. Polk drew 44 votes on
the eighth ballot, but before the ninth could be taken, the New York
delegation retired for consultation. Upon its return, Benjamin F. Butler
got the floor and read a letter of withdrawal from Van Buren. The con-
vention, in riotous confusion, then gave its unamimous approval to James
K. Polk as the presidential nominee. The vice-presidency went almost
unamimously to Silas Wright of New York as a peace offering to the Van
Burenites, but he declined the offer in order not to profit from his friend's
defeat. George M. Dallas gladly accepted the vice-presidential nomination.
RED HERRING
Along with other Senators who remained in Washington during the con-
vention, Buchanan learned the news from Baltimore via the first official
trial of Samuel F. B. Morse's telegraph instrument, which the inventor
himself was operating in the basement of the Capitol Building. The
Democratic platform included all the principles of 1840 with two additions,
the "re-annexation of Texas and the re-occupation of Oregon." The key
issues would be expansion and the tariff.
The Whigs had already nominated Henry Clay on May 1, and
had adopted a platform which significantly failed to mention Texas and
which took a stand on the tariff just about as vague as that of the Demo-
crats. In Pennsylvania, at least, this issue, above all others, required
clarification.
Polk amplified his views on the tariff in a letter to John K. Kane
of Philadelphia, stating that "in adjusting the details of a revenue tariff I
have heretofore sanctioned such moderate discriminating duties as would
produce the amount of revenue needed, and at the same time afford
reasonable protection to our home industry."33 This stand was weak
enough, to be sure, but it could be made to serve if editors like Forney
harped enough on the last phrase. The campaign ground was also defined
by the Senate's rejection of the Texas Treaty, June 8. At that time Bu-
chanan made a long speech in support of the treaty and urged annexation
160
AN OFFICE NOT TO BE SOUGHT • 1844
for many reasons. Chief of these was his fear that Britain would take
control if the United States failed to annex.84 Folk's letter to Kane and
the defeat of the Texas measure enabled Buchanan to sidetrack the two
main sectional issues of the canvass. He would simply state that Polk
was sounder on the tariff than Clay and merely point to the speech on Texas.
It was a busy and perplexing summer. Congress adjourned late
in June, and Buchanan took the usual fortnight's vacation at Bedford
Springs. In the meantime, all manner of complications vexed the campaigns
of both parties. A Native American party grew strong in urban centers
and became involved in violent anti-Catholic riots in Philadelphia during
midsummer, requiring the presence of the governor and the state militia.
The Liberty party, with James G. Birney as its candidate, posed an uncertain
threat both to Whigs and Democrats. Clay befogged his position by hedg-
ing on his antiannexation stand, and Tyler, supported by office holders,
was running independently for re-election.
Cameron urged Buchanan to campaign vigorously for Polk in
Pennsylvania. "He must owe the state to you; and you can . . . command
the nomination in '48."35 Judge John Catron of the Supreme Court, a
Tennessean, wanted Buchanan to stump through the West for Polk. He
could pay a final visit to General Jackson, establish the personal contacts
he needed in that region for 1848, and place himself in debt to Polk who,
Catron added, especially wanted him to make the trip. There was added
appeal in the invitation because Buchanan was an intimate friend and
great admirer both of Mrs. Catron and of Mrs. Polk, and these charming
ladies repaid his good opinion of them with flattery and kindness.36
The canvass in Pennsylvania changed rapidly. Henry Muhlen-
berg died on August 11, and Shunk immediately became the Democratic
candidate for governor. On August 20, President Tyler announced his
withdrawal from the presidential race, blasting Governor Porter's hopes
of future eminence. Buchanan at once sought to pacify the disappointed
friends of Muhlenberg by obtaining pledges from Shunk that he would
divide the patronage with them. Buchanan's next task was to persuade
Cameron to agree to call off his attacks on Shunk and obtain Shunk's
promise not to proscribe Cameron's friends for adhering to Muhlenberg.37
Buchanan left on a speaking tour of northern Pennsylvania
during the first week of September. He was much worried by Folk's
desire to make himself too clear on some things. "For Heaven's sake let
our friend . . . write nothing more on the subject of the tariff," he pleaded.
"Let us alone & we shall do it."38 He then proceeded to Danville, Milton,
Williamsport, and on up to Towanda where he addressed large crowds.
"I have raised an excitement everywhere I have gone on the Bank ques-
tion," he wrote on September 18, the day after his return. "Our friends
in that portion of the state will denounce the Bank as loudly as the Whigs
161
JAMES BUCHANAN
do free trade. One excitement will countervail the other."39 The Bank
was a red herring to distract the attention of these people from the tariff,
which posed the most serious threat to the party. He advised Polk,
cautiously, that Pennsylvania would probably be safe, but by no huge
majorities. As for himself, he would have nothing to ask of the new
president, but would "expect much from the President's lady. During
her administration I intend to make one more attempt to change my
wretched condition, and should I fail under her auspices I shall then
surrender in despair."40
In the October elections, Shunk carried his ticket for governor,
and in November Polk won the presidency. It was a close election; but
the Democrats had squeaked through, and Buchanan deserved credit for
right guessing and canny manipulation in achieving the result. The next
four months would see the distribution of the rewards.
162
13
POLITICS UNDER POLK • 1845 - 1846
THE STATE DEPARTMENT
Buchanan wrote to Polk immediately after the election, urging him to
make "young Democrats" the core of his Administration. "The old office
holders," he said, "generally have had their day & ought to be content."1
This advice may possibly have been intended for self-protection in case
the president-elect ignored him, but it also meant to flatter Polk, the
nation's youngest president, and it might serve to eliminate some of the
old party hacks.
The Pennsylvania electors unanimously recommended Buchanan
for the State Department, but Polk seemed in no hurry to move,2 There
were those who said that General Jackson had explicitly warned Polk
against including Buchanan in the Cabinet.3 By the end of January
Buchanan could stand the suspense no longer and asked Judge Catron, a
neighbor of Folk's, to find out how matters stood. Catron replied that
Polk had "not indicated to any one the appointments he intends to make."4
In the meantime, Buchanan tried desperately to achieve unity
within the new state administration, insisting that Shunk should appoint
a Muhlenberg man to a prominent cabinet post and avoid participating in
the election for United States Senator which would take place in Harrisburg
just after the governor's inauguration. He advised Shunk "not to take
part in favour of any candidate for the Senate, but to express your opinion
strongly and decidedly in favour of an adherence to caucus nominations."6
Shunk tried to foster a union of the state factions by his appointments,
but he achieved only the curses of both sides for his efforts.6 The
Democratic caucus for Senator ran into a deadlock between George W.
Woodward, the Shunk candidate, and Nathaniel B. Eldred of the Muhlen-
berg faction with the result that the Legislature elected Daniel Sturgeon,
the incumbent.
Shortly thereafter, on February 17, Buchanan got a letter from
Polk inviting him to be Secretary of State. The form letter, which Polk
163
JAMES BUCHANAN
sent to all appointees, was unique in the history of presidential invitations
to Cabinet service. It read, "Should any member of my Cabinet become a
Candidate for the Presidency or Vice-Presidency of the United States, it
will be expected . . . that he will retire from the Cabinet I will myself
take no part between gentlemen of the Democratic party who may become
aspirants or Candidates to succeed me in the Presidential office, and desire
that no member of my Cabinet shall do so." Polk wanted no Department
head to use the federal patronage to promote the interests of his personal
political machine.7
Buchanan's letter of acceptance clearly demonstrated his fitness
for the diplomatic post. "I cheerfully and cordially approve the terms on
which this offer has been made," he wrote. But he could not control
what others might do in his behalf, and he could not in justice to his
friends take the office "at the expense of self-ostracism." "I cannot
proclaim to the world that in no contingency shall I be a candidate for the
Presidency in 1848," he continued. But in that event, he would retire
from the Cabinet, unless Polk asked him to remain. "If under these
explanations, you are willing to confer upon me the office of Secretary of
State, I shall accept it."8
Buchanan terminated his senatorial career with a ringing speech
in favor of the resolutions for the immediate annexation of Texas. These
contained a provision applying the Missouri Compromise line to all land
which should be acquired under the term "Texas." "I am not friendly
to slavery in the abstract," he said. "I need not say that I never owned a
slave, and I know that I never shall own one." But the price of continued
unity rested on the willingness of all to recognize the plain constitutional
rights granted to each part. "The constitutional rights of the south, under
our constitutional compact, are as much entitled to protection as those of
any other portion of the Union." If it was a question of slavery south of
36° 30' or the end of the Union, he would "never risk the blessings of this
glorious confederacy."* Three days before the inauguration, President
Tyler signed the joint resolution for Texan annexation.
In the weeks remaining between the profer of the State Depart-
ment and the date of assuming his new duties, Buchanan worked day and
night, writing letters, seeing visitors, consulting upon the political problems
of Pennsylvania, and arranging for new quarters befitting the social obliga-
tions of a Cabinet member. On the advice of Mrs. Stephen Pleasanton he
eventually decided upon a house on F Street, between 13th and 14th, next
to the residence of John Quincy Adams and just a block from the State
Department building. He could rent it for $2,000 per year, elegantly
furnished and with nearly enough chinaware for state occasions. He sent
to Paris immediately for an ornament for the center of the table for, as
164
POLITICS UNDER POLK. 1845-1846
the ladies informed him, "you cannot set a handsome dinner without one
and they are not to be had in this country."10
But most pressing of all, he had to master the details of the work
of the Department. Handling the diplomatic functions gave him little
concern, but the State Department was not only a diplomatic office; it had
become a receptacle, so to speak, for all kinds of odd jobs which Congress
for thirty years had been dumping into it, without providing sufficient
personnel.
The Department had been divided into the Diplomatic, the
Consular, and the Home Bureaus. In the Diplomatic Bureau, five clerks
handled the correspondence with all the American embassies, but none of
them had the authority to sign a paper or to decide any question, however
trivial. In the Consular Bureau, three clerks tried vainly to keep in touch
with over 150 American consuls, with the result that almost all the infor-
mation the consuls forwarded was useless because there was no one to
digest, arrange, or publish it. But the third bureau was the one most
understaffed. It had the functions of accounting and disbursing funds for
diplomatic agents, receiving bills from Congress and transmitting them to
the president, filing official papers, printing the laws, and translating diplo-
matic correspondence. The Home Bureau was also in charge of issuing
patents and copyrights, taking the federal census, affixing the seal of the
United States on innumerable documents, keeping the government ar-
chives, issuing passports, preparing and filing correspondence relating to
pardons, and handling various other tasks which made its functions an
administrative monstrosity. Seven clerks were assigned to handle this
mountain of business. "The consequences of this accumulation of business
upon the head of the department," Buchanan wrote after brief acquaint-
ance with his task, "must be manifest to everyone. He must either
neglect the national interests or the subordinate but pressing business
involving the rights of individuals."11
After an introduction to the mechanics of his office, Buchanan
requested Calhoun to assist him for a while after inauguration day and the
South Carolinian courteously remained for an extra week. Buchanan
asked Caleb Gushing to take the Chief Clerkship with the explanation that
he hoped to have it made an Assistant Secretaryship soon, but Cushing
declined.12 William S. Derrick, who had served in the Department since
1827, remained Chief Clerk until August when Buchanan selected Nicholas
P. Trist, former consul at Havana, for the post. He appointed Robert
Greenhow, husband of the young, beautiful and impish Rose O'Neal
Greenhow, as Librarian and Translator, and Lund Washington, Jr. as
Archivist.
James Knox Polk ushered onto the American scene a program
known as the "New Democracy." He called to its standard men whose
165
JAMES BUCHANAN
devotion to national causes outweighed their sectional loyalty, men who
believed that it was better to achieve a large growth of national power
along with a small growth of slavery than to stop American expansion in
order to prevent any further extension of the slave labor system. Most
of them would have agreed with Buchanan's statement that slavery could
not be treated in politics as a matter of general morality affecting the con-
sciences of men but only as a question of constitutional law. The New
Democracy sought the development of commerce by promoting free trade;
advocated the acquisition of Oregon and California; and tried to minimize
the slavery issue.
The giants of Jackson's day found no place in Folk's Cabinet.
Van Buren's Barnburners had already become strongly tinged with political
antislavery and opposed Texan annexation. Calhoun had gone too far on
the subject of the slave system as a positive good, alienating many who had
once politically defended the South, even if they deplored the system of
slavery. Old Benton, fearing a fight over slavery in new lands, opposed
expansion. These leaders represented the three strongest factions of the
old Democracy.
Polk appointed Buchanan to utilize his diplomatic experience
and placate his faction in Pennsylvania. Robert J. Walker of Mississippi,
a shrewd financier with a keen interest in Texas bonds and transport
speculations, became head of the Treasury. He was a commercial man
and a staunch advocate of free trade. He had married a niece of Vice-
President Dallas and favored his party. William L. Marcy of New York,
Secretary of War, was one of the Hunker leaders, an open enemy of Van
Buren. George Bancroft of Massachusetts, Secretary of the Navy, had
led the movement to introduce Folk's name to the Baltimore convention.
John Young Mason of Virginia, Attorney General, and Cave Johnson of
Tennessee, Postmaster General, completed Folk's Cabinet.
THE PERILS OF THE PATRONAGE
Polk's early decision not to seek re-election made it more difficult for him
to restrain Cabinet members from working for the 1848 nomination. He
had to give close personal supervision to prevent the improper use of the
patronage by any individual who might try to start a presidential band
wagon for himself by making strategic federal appointments. Also the
president had to maintain the strength and vitality of the Democratic
party in critical states by a careful distribution of jobs. Otherwise, his
party would lose the election in the next presidential campaign.
Pennsylvania and New York were politically the two most im-
portant states in the Union, Together they controlled an electoral vote
nearly equal to that of the total area south of the Ohio and Potomac Rivers
166
POLITICS UNDER POLK • 1845 - 1846
and elected one-fourth of the Congressmen of the whole nation. In both
of these vital states the Democracy was critically split. In New York the
differences were so great that there was no hope of early unity; in Pennsyl-
vania, however, the factions were not so divided as to rule out the possibility
of achieving harmony.
When Buchanan accepted the State Department and resigned his
seat in the Senate, this prize came into contest between the friends of Shunt
and the Muhlenberg men who knew, by this time, that Shunk would not
meet their demands for state patronage. Had Polk issued his invitation to
Buchanan early in January the Pennsylvania Democrats might have taken
a long step toward reunion by electing to the Senate at the same time a
representative of each of the two rivals. As it was, neither faction had
won the January election and now both were bent on having the remaining
place. On March 12, most of the Democratic legislators held the usual
caucus and named as their candidate George Woodward, whose low tariff
and expansionist views agreed with Polk's. Buchanan avoided committing
himself to any person, but he did advise all Democrats to follow the time-
honored procedures, which could be interpreted as a pat on the back for
Woodward.
But Cameron's friends boycotted the caucus and laid their own
plans. Cameron had already told Buchanan that he wanted to be a Senator,
but having gotten no encouragement he planned to win on his own.13 Two
weeks before the March election he wrote to a colleague, "Strange as it
may seem, I can be the successor of Mr. Buchanan. . . . The election will
not ... be made by a caucus this time."14
Cameron assured the Whigs in the Legislature that he ardently
wished to retain the tariff of 1842 and got the backing of more than a
dozen Democrats who favored high protectionism. To the Native Ameri-
cans, he confided his earnest wish to restrict foreign immigration and to
curtail the political power of the Catholics. On March 14, Cameron won
the senatorship by a combination of 44 Whigs, 16 Democrats, and 7 Native
Americans. It was a blow to Polk, a blow to Shunk, and nearly a knockout
to Buchanan who had just gone on record in support of caucus decisions.
He could not condone Cameron's action but, with the Senate almost evenly
divided, he could ill afford to declare open war on him and forfeit a vote.
Buchanan's friends raged like wild animals. "Simon Cameron's the Sen-
ator! God save the Commonwealth," groaned Forney. With this inaus-
picious beginning, the fight for federal patronage started.15
The infuriated Democrats of the caucus wrote to Vice-President
Dallas and to Buchanan, asking them to lend their weight to the Democratic
condemnation of Cameron and to read him out of the party. But Dallas,
while decisively condemning the breach of party usage, refused to censure
a man who now would sit in the legislative body over which he had to
167
JAMES BUCHANAN
preside. Buchanan replied in terms even more discreet, deploring the
breakdown of the caucus system but declining to condemn the state Legis-
lature "for electing whom they pleased to the senate of the United States."
He hoped that this experience would be convincing proof that legislators
ought "to go into caucus and be bound by its decision."16 Cameron's
position, to be sure, was not enviable. Shunk broke with him and ousted
his followers from the state administration. Neither Dallas nor Buchanan
would seek patronage for him, and Polk considered him, properly, to be an
enemy. Henceforth, Cameron ofiered himself for sale to any faction that
would purchase his power and sought to wreck the plans of those who
repulsed him.17
Buchanan determined to play the waiting game with Cameron,
neither breaking with him nor giving him aid. His experience with politics
convinced him that little would be gained by declaring factional war. Time
after time he had seen such struggles sap the energy of the party without
any further result; in fact the principal contenders had often become
political bedfellows within a few years. Furthermore, Cameron could be
counted upon to get on the band wagon when it was apparent that there
was no other place to stand. He was an opportunist and would support
Buchanan for president when the time came. The real struggle would be
to define the terms of his support. He would make the price as high as
possible by demonstrating his capacity with the monkey wrench; Buchanan
would keep it as low as possible by showing the power of his position* But
Cameron had too keen a talent for mischief for Buchanan to risk open
battle with him; he, if anyone, could wreck the plans for '48.
To reduce the heat of the indignation against Cameron, Buchanan
removed Forney from Lancaster by providing him a surveyorship in the
Philadelphia customhouse. In return, Forney pledged cooperation. "If
you can keep Cameron your friend," he wrote, "my course will keep his
enemies, and they are legion, on your side!"18 Forney henceforth worked
valiantly but not very successfully, to dissuade Champneys and Frazer in
Lancaster from flaying Cameron in their local newspaper.19
Buchanan also sought to conciliate Cameron by getting his first
lieutenant, Ben Brewster, a job. For weeks, Brewster had been writing
letters, ending with the demand, "I want the District Attorneyship!" Polk
gave the place to a Dallas man, whereupon Brewster sent a scorching letter
threatening "woe to the public man" who would cross his path, Buchanan
then oflered to make Brewster secretary of the Legation at London. Brewster
replied that he might have taken the British Mission itself, if he had been
given command of the Oregon negotiations but he would have none of the
secretaryship. Horace might accept ivy as a reward, he wrote, but a politi-
cian needed money and wanted to hear the jingle of cash. Buchanan
168
POLTITCS UNDER POLK • 1845 - 1846
eventually found him a place, appropriate for a Cameron disciple, settling
Indian claims,20
For a number of months, Buchanan's desk was piled high with
requests for jobs as clerks, postmasters, inspectors, sutlers, mail agents,
auditors, consuls, registers, district attorneys, prison wardens, chaplains,
storekeepers, lighthouse keepers, and the like. His careful record of judg-
ments and recommendations survives in a small black notebook which he
considered of sufficient importance to exclude it from his political papers
and deposit with his executor.21
He had more success in promoting jobs than Dallas or the Pennsyl-
vania Senators even though Polk suspected his designs for the presidency.
Nonetheless, he fell so far short of the demands that the rumor began to
circulate that every jobless politician was a Buchanan man. Forney wrote:
"Ousted officers all say they have been sacrificed for being your friends,
and you may rely upon it, there is quite a lot of them."22 Buchanan's
pattern of appointments left Cameron so perplexed that he asked point
blank in September: "I wish you would tell me whether there is to be
peace or war."23
On September 23, 1845, Thomas Ritchie, an editor of Folk's
official paper, the Washington Union, confided to the president that Bu-
chanan wished to quit the Cabinet and go to the Supreme Court. A week
later Buchanan asked Polk for the appointment, assigning as his reason the
trouble that was brewing in Pennsylvania over the tariff.24 Buchanan
assured the president, however, that he would not leave the Department
if war broke out with Mexico.
Three vacancies had occurred on the Court between 1843 and
1845. Justices Smith Nelson and Henry Baldwin died and Joseph Story
resigned. The Baldwin and Story seats were still open, and Polk wished
to place in them men who were strict constructionists, "who would be less
likely to relapse into the Broad Federal doctrines of Judge Marshall &
Judge Story."25 President Tyler, upon Baldwin's death in April, 1844, had
offered this place to Senator Buchanan, but he had then declined it. Polk
appointed Levi Woodbury to the Story vacancy but reserved Baldwin's
place for a Pennsylvanian.
Buchanan's request to go into the Court raised anguished howls
from his political friends. "For God's sake, stay where you are," wrote
Ben Brewster, who accused Dallas of trying to put Buchanan on the shelf
in order to oust his friends from their jobs.26 Forney hit where it would
hurt most. He wrote that "it would be regarded by the world in a light
that must place you in a very unpleasant position. That the evident free
trade tendencies of the administration had made you feel uncomfortable
in the Cabinet, and had induced you to retire from it, to an office conferred
by the very power which struck down Pennsylvania mteresto-thus showing
169
JAMES BUCHANAN
that although you could not stay in the Cabinet, yet you took your office
from the administration, and refused to sacrifice yourself for the cause of
the state, leaving her to take care of herself. . . . Others say that you are
about to 'desert your friends again' and that you fear to face any great
crisis."27
While such views had their influence, it is also probable that
Buchanan decided to remain in the Cabinet because of encouraging develop-
ments in the Oregon negotiation, a story to be told a little later. On
November 19, he informed Polk that he could not take the Court appoint-
ment and recommended John M. Read, of Philadelphia, whom he had
earlier suggested to Tyler and who would have been agreeable to Cameron.
But on December 23, Polk, without consulting either Buchanan or Cam-
eron, and with the assent of Dallas, nominated George Woodward. Polk
rejected Read because he feared appointing "a former Federalist ^to a
lifetime position where he could fall back upon Federalist doctrines," and
thought that Woodward might prove pleasing to Buchanan and Shunk,
since both had supported him for the Senate.28
Cameron considered the appointment a direct insult to him, and
hastened to Washington to discuss the matter with Buchanan, despite the
fact that the two had neither been seeing each other nor corresponding,
except on essential public business, for five months.29 On Christmas Day,
while Cameron wrote complaints to Buchanan, Buchanan called on Polk
to complain. He had been absent from Cabinet when the appointment
was announced, he said; he was directly involved in Pennsylvania appoint-
ments but had not been consulted; his friends grumbled that the patronage
was being wielded against him; and he would not have recommendefl
Woodward. Polk, surprised by this outburst, rather curtly stated that he
preferred Woodward to Read, had the power to appoint without consulta-
tion, and would take the responsibility for his act.30
The matter rested there until January 22 when Cameron, finding
a number of Democrats absent from the Senate, managed to get Wood-
ward's confirmation up for a vote and defeated it 29-20 by an alliance of
six Democrats and the entire Whig membership.31 James Shields, of the
Land Office, told Polk of the Senate's action late on the afternoon of the
22nd, and added that both he and Senator Cass now advised the appoint-
ment of Buchanan who had expressed a desire for the office a few days
previously. Benton wrote the next day, recommending Buchanan and
promising immediate Senate confirmation.32 "I thought it strange," wrote
Polk, ccthat Mr. Buchanan should have expressed a wish to anyone pending
the nomination of Mr. Woodward before the Senate."
The next night Buchanan held a grand ball at which all the
rumors and gossip centered on his leaving the Cabinet and going upon the
Bench. To whisperings that he had been working with Cameron to sabotage
170
POLITICS UNDER POLK* 1845-1846
Woodward, Buchanan replied that this was "such stuff as dreams axe
made of."3*
The ball, held at Carusi's Saloon, was attended by more than a
thousand guests. Mrs. Marcy aided Buchanan in receiving. On an
elevated platform at the end of the hall sat Mrs. Madison, "a young lady
of fourscore years and upwards," and the aged widow of Alexander Hamilton
who talked sensibly about her husband although her memory of current
events had entirely ceased. Daniel Webster came accompanied by his wife
and a Mrs. Jandon of New York, and William H. Seward, who was in town
arguing a patent case before the Supreme Court, promenaded with Mrs.
John Adams, widowed daughter-in-law of John Quincy Adams. Old Baron
Bodisco's lovely teen-aged Georgetown wife wore a stunning set of diamonds
that excited the envy of her sex. Buchanan had attended her wedding as
escort for fourteen-year-old Jessie Benton, one of the bridesmaids.34 The
famed Gautier served venison, hams, beef, turkey, pheasant, chicken,
oysters, lobster, ice cream, water ice, charlotte russe, punch, fruit and
cake pyramids, blanc mange, apple toddy, kisses, chocolate, coffee, 300
bottles of wine, 150 bottles of champagne, and harder beverages for harder
drinkers.35
On January 28, Representative David Wilmot called on Polk to
accuse Buchanan of having brought about the rejection of Woodward's
nomination. Polk was greatly disturbed. He reported that Buchanan had
been in a "bad mood . . . since Judge Woodward's nomination, . . . and
since he has discovered that he cannot control me in the dispensation of
the public patronage." The president believed that Buchanan was differing
unnecessarily with him in Cabinet meetings and was seeking some
public ground for making a break with the Administration.
Shortly thereafter Buchanan had another skirmish with Polk; it
was over the appointment of a collector for the Port of Philadelphia, a
particularly juicy plum of the patronage. The president determined to
appoint Henry Horn, a member of the Dallas wing of the party. Buchanan
at first opposed this choice, but he acquiesced eventually. When Horn's
name went to the Senate, however, Cameron demanded to see the list of
Pennsylvanians who had recommended that name, stated that he had been
denied "senatorial courtesy," and defeated Horn's appointment by the
same trick he had used to block Woodward: a thin Senate, and a union of
Whigs and a few balky Democrats. Polk now arranged a Washington
conference of Horn, Cameron and Buchanan, in which the latter was to
play the arbitrator between the first two. Then he resubmitted Horn's
name, but Cameron persuaded the Senate to reject it a second time. Polk
wrote down Cameron as "a managing tricky man, in whom no reliance is
to be placed."86 But how was Buchanan involved? Polk could not be
171
JAMES BUCHANAN
sure; nonetheless, he determined to let the Supreme Court appointment
rest for a few months. Horn, meanwhile, was furious with Dallas for
failing to push him through.
THE WALKER-McKAY TARIFF
As summer approached, Buchanan grew increasingly restive in the Polk
administrative family. The McKay tariff, framed largely by Secretary
Walker, had passed the House and was headed for an extremely close
contest in the Senate. The bill proposed that no duty should be placed on
any article above the rate which would produce the maximum revenue,
and that ad valorem duties should replace all specific duties. The bill
essentially proposed free trade for the nation. The former duty on shaped
iron products dropped from 163 per cent to 30 per cent; on shirting from
95 per cent to 30 per cent; on pig iron from 72 per cent to 30 per cent; and
on coal from $1.75 per ton to $.40.
Polk considered the passage of this tariff bill by the Senate as
"the most important measure of my administration,"37 an opinion shared
by thousands of Americans. Many of these, particularly the coal and iron
men of Pennsylvania and the textile makers of New England considered it
the death knell of all business, a "misshapen and monstrous scheme," a
"fatal measure which strikes at the root of all industry of the country."38
Buchanan knew not what to do. He could not attack the Admin-
istration; less could he endorse its favorite measure. On Sunday, June 28,
when the passage of the tariff seemed certain, he wrote to Polk about the
judgeship, "I have concluded, though with much hesitation, to accept it."39
At a conference several days kter Buchanan asked Polk to appoint him
immediately, but the president wished him to stay with the Department
until the end of the Congressional session. Buchanan had to be satisfied
with this plan, and he wrote his brother Edward in mid- July that he would
probably go into the Court at the close of Congress.40 Forney, too, was
reconciled to the inevitable, though he still insisted that Buchanan's
chances for the *48 nomination were brighter than ever and added that
there was no return from the political grave of the Supreme Court.41 Dallas
wrote of the matter: "Thousands of reports about Mr. Buchanan are in
circulation. His retreat from the Cabinet is spoken of as certain and soon —
and he is said to be destined for London. This all smoke— a method of
keeping up his importance, resorted to by his partizans. . . . There is a
growing discontent against the nomination of Mr. Buchanan as Judge, and
I think the Whigs are moving in a body against him. The 54.40's will, of
course, go with them.'*42
In the Senate, where the fate of the tariff hung on a vote or two,
it bqgan to look as if there would be a deadlock. "Did I not say so?" wrote
172
POLITICS UNDER POLK* 1845 - 1846
Forney. "It would be fun if Dallas had to untie the tariff knot! Rare fun!**43
Because Senator Spencer Jarnagin of Tennessee refused to vote on the
motion to bring up the bill for its third reading, Vice-President Dallas had
to cast the deciding vote. He supported the Administration at the risk of
his own political future and was so fearful of the reaction in Philadelphia
that he urged his wife to move the whole family to Washington at the first
sign of trouble.44 He justified his course at length in a letter to the Wash-
ington Union; nevertheless, he suffered public condemnation by county
meetings all over Pennsylvania.45 Of the state's entire delegation, only
Dallas and Wilmot voted for the Tariff of 1846.
The Pennsylvania Whigs made war on Buchanan by republishing
his few remarks in favor of the 1842 tariff, and quoting him as saying,
during the 1844 campaign, that Polk was sounder than Clay on the tariff.
There was enough truth in the charges to be extremely dangerous, and
Buchanan wrote quickly to Forney, sketching out his "new line" on the
tariff. He would stand by his remarks on the 1842 tariff: he liked a revenue
tariff, with incidental protection, and specific duties. He considered the
ad valorem feature of the 1846 tariff faulty and an invitation to fraud, a
ruination of mechanics who lived by processing foreign raw materials, and
a heavy blow to Pennsylvania's coal and iron industries. He would follow
a middle course so long as he could, but if forced to the wall, he would
prefer the 1842 bill to the current one.46
Within two days, Buchanan knew that this position would not
do. He now discarded the 1842 tariff as dead and urged manufacturers
not to get excited until they were hurt; they could depend on the Democ-
racy to recognize, in a future session, the special needs of Pennsylvania.
"Repeal is not the word, but modification. A protective tariff is not the
word; but a revenue tariff with sufficient discriminations to maintain our
home industry."47 Hammering at this line, he wrote a series of articles
for Forney's newly purchased Pennsylvcuiian of Philadelphia, which spread
abroad the theme of "modification."
But panic and economic collapse did not ensue. In general, the
tariff had not much effect on the formerly protected industries, most of
which continued to grow and prosper as a result of many contemporary
encouragements other than a tariff— the demands of a foreign war, a
European famine, heavy immigration, rapid expansion of railroads, and a
booming merchant marine. In fact, the tariff issue quickly took a back
seat because of the exciting events of the Mexican War. Dallas had been
momentarily wrecked, but Buchanan's prospects were so much the better
for that. Having completed his carefully drawn statement for Forney on
"modification," Buchanan paid an early evening call on Polk and informed
him "that he had decided to remain in the Cabinet and not to accept the
173
JAMES BUCHANAN
offer ... of the Supreme Court." He urged the appointment of his friend,
William B. Reed, but Polk had already decided on Judge Robert Grier.
Buchanan supported this decision, the nomination went to the Senate on
August 3, and the Senate approved it the next day.48
174
14
CONQUERING A CONTINENT • 1845 - 1849
TEXAS
President Polk, shortly after his election, confided to a friend that he pro-
posed to complete the annexation of Texas, to settle the Oregon boundary
dispute, and to acquire California. The last objective had not been men-
tioned in the Democratic platform, but it represented the president's
personal commitment to Manifest Destiny.
This term, which became a synonym for the years of Folk's
Administration, reflected a variety of ideas. Many antislavery people
thought it a mere ruse to hide a slave conspiracy under the cloak of national
patriotism, a trick "so's to lug more slave states in." Some feared that
territorial expansion to the Pacific would dangerously upset the sectional
balance of politics, and others that it would weaken the nation because of
the difficulty of ruling distant lands. Those who enthusiastically supported
Manifest Destiny, especially in the South and West, saw advantage in
changing the balance of political control and expressed no fears about
slavery or political administration. Land speculators welcomed expansion,
and commercial men eagerly hoped for national control of the deep-water
harbors of the Pacific, from Puget Sound to San Diego. Ownership of
these strategic bays would prove the key to unlock the trade of the Orient
and gain mastery of the Pacific.
England and France both were alive to the prospects of such
commercial advantage, and although their governments placed no high
priority on imperialistic adventures in the Americas, their diplomatic, com-
mercial, and military representatives scattered from Argentina to Alaska
conducted themselves aggressively enough to raise serious apprehensions
in the United States. Particularly in Texas, in Mexico, and in California
these agents acted in ways that created in Washington a fear of Europe
which became one of the most powerful justifications of Manifest Destiny.
Buchanan repeatedly said that unless the United States established domi-
nance in the American Hemisphere, England or France would do it. This
175
JAMES BUCHANAN
theme became a powerful weapon of the spread-eagle "Young Democrats"
of the day, for it placed territorial expansion on the ground of national
security and made Manifest Destiny the slogan of patriots.1
Polk stated in his inaugural that no foreign power had any right
to interfere with Texan annexation. "None can fail to see the danger to
our safety and future peace," he said, "if Texas remains an independent
state or hecomes an ally or dependency of some foreign nation more
powerful than herself." A year earlier Buchanan had warned that Texas
"must cast herself into the arms of England," unless the United States
accepted her. Even if Texas only formed a commercial alliance with
England the result would be that the United States would confront the
British to the north and to the south; "and British power and British
influence will thus be increased at our expense." On the other hand, if
the United States annexed Texas and obtained this great barrier to the west,
"the whole European world could not, in combination against us, make
an impression on our union."2
On March 6, 1845, Brigadier General J. N. Almonte, Mexican
Minister to the United States, protested the annexation of Texas as "an
act of aggression the most unjust which can be found recorded in the
annals of modern history" and demanded his passports. Buchanan replied
that Texas had long since achieved her independence, and that nothing
but the refusal of the Texans could prevent annexation. He instructed
A. J. Donelson, the American Chargg d'Affaires in Texas, to avoid "even
the least appearance of interference with the free action of the people of
Texas on the question of annexation. This is necessary to give its full
effect to one of the grandest moral spectacles which has ever been presented
to mankind, and to convince the world that we would not, if we could,
influence their decision except by fair argument. We desire that our
conduct shall be in perfect contrast to that pursued by the British ChargS
d'Affaires."3
Despite these assurances, neither Polk nor Buchanan had any
notion of leaving matters up to the Texans alone. On March 27, Polk
appointed Charles A. Wickliffe as special agent to Texas, with orders to
counteract by every means at his command the efforts of Great Britain
and France to defeat annexation. Buchanan cautioned Wickliffe to reveal
his official character to no one except Donelson.4
The process of annexation involved several stages: first, approval
of the joint resolutions of the United States Congress by the Congress of
Texas; second, the calling of a Texas convention to accept the terms of
annexation; third, the calling of a Texan convention to frame a state
constitution; fourth, the ratification of the Texan state constitution; and
fifth, the approval by the United States Congress of this constitution. A
slip in any of these steps might prove disastrous.
176
CONQUERING A CONTINENT • 1845 - 1849
The Texans worried about the danger of a Mexican attack in the
transition period. This contingency also disturbed Buchanan who had to
admit that he did not know what status Texas would occupy between the
time of approving the joint resolution and of admission as a state. For
practical purposes, however, he informed the Texan government in May
that the United States had ordered 3,000 troops to the border, "prepared
to enter Texas and to act without a moment's delay" as soon as "the
Existing Government and the Convention of Texas" had accepted the
joint resolutions.5
Matters remained so uncertain throughout June, due largely to
the intrigues of Charles Elliott, the British Chargfi d'Affaires in Texas,
that Polk rejected Donelson's request for leave on the grounds that "noth-
ing ought to be left to accident."6 Captain Elliott had fabricated the
story of a trip to Charleston, but he had gone instead to Vera Cruz where,
acting in the guise of a secret Texan agent, he made an agreement with
the Mexican government that Mexico would recognize Texan independence
on condition that Texas would never join the United States. He then
returned to Texas where he informed the inhabitants that Mexico had
massed 7,000 troops on the Rio Grande and would immediately invade
unless his proposal was adopted. Buchanan agreed with Polk that such
trickery demanded active resistance. On June 15, the president ordered
General Zachary Taylor to move from Fort Jesup to the Sabine River and
be ready, the moment Texas approved the annexation resolutions, to
"consider her territory as belonging to the United States." Buchanan
pointed out that Elliott's worst act had been, in obtaining the consent of
Mexico to the independence of Texas, to deprive that power "of the only
miserable pretext which it had for a war aginst the United States," although
at the same time he had stirred up such hatred in Mexico that war doubtless
would result.7
The Texan Congress assented to annexation on June 23, and a
convention at San Felipe de Austin accepted the terms on July 4. In August
General Taylor moved his camp to the west bank of the Nueces River.
The Texans, meanwhile, drew up their state constitution, and ratified it on
October 13. On December 29, the United States Congress approved the
constitution, thus finally bringing Texas into the Union as the twenty-
eighth State. Taylor now transferred his army to the north bank of the
Rio Grande, opposite Matamoros, a region which since 1836 had been
claimed by the Texan Republic. During these years the Mexicans had
made no effort to exercise authority there. For the moment, the Texan
problem was solved.
177
JAMES BUCHANAN
OREGON
The negotiation with Britain for the Oregon region rested on a twenty-
year-old contest in which the foreign secretaries of each country claimed a
legal right to the entire territory but talked of a compromise around the
49th parallel which would divide the region approximately in half. An
agreement of 1818 provided for the joint occupation of Oregon, and another
of 1827 permitted termination of the joint occupation upon one year's
notice by either party. Proposals of settlement at 49° had already been
made by every president since Monroe, the latest under the Tyler Adminis-
tration. Such a project was pending when Polk came to office but he
pronounced in the inaugural that "our title to the Country of Oregon is
'clear and unquestionable.' " Americans were soon shouting a new battle
cry: "Fifty-four forty or fight."8
Actually, the practical aspects of the Oregon question offered
little difficulty. Neither government regarded the land as particularly
valuable, each had its own strong reasons for wishing a settlement without
war, and both seemed agreeable to the 49° line. This arrangement would
give the two countries access to the ports around Vancouver. The real
difficulty on both sides lay in the realm of national prestige and of domestic
politics. Britain worried about rising tension with France, needed American
grain to combat the potato famine, and planned a major reversal of economic
policy by repealing the Corn Laws, the success of which would depend
upon growing American friendship and trade. The Polk Administration
worried about its partisan commitment to expansion, needed to 'bring in
northern territory to balance Texas, planned to repeal the protective
tariff, and anticipated a war with Mexico. Notwithstanding, the United
States could not afford to appear soft in dealing with Britain. The interplay
of these forces, rather than legal claims to Oregon or estimates of its
intrinsic value, governed the negotiations.
In March 1844, Lord Aberdeen, British Foreign Minister, had
instructed the British Ambassador at Washington, Richard Pakenham, to
try to settle for the Columbia River boundary, but if he failed in that to
"draw from the American Negotiator a proposal to make the 49th degree of
latitude the boundary." Pakenham should also make an effort to obtain
free ports for Britain south of the 49th parallel and free navigation of the
Columbia River. This proposal, incidentally, had been made to Aberdeen by
Edward Everett, the American Minister at London, on November 29, 1843.
But Folk's strident inaugural and the swaggering talk of "54° 40'
or fight" in the American press complicated and slowed the plans for
settlement and required some British bluster to redress the balance of
honor. Aberdeen told a cheering House of Lords, in reference to Folk's
claims, "We too, my Lords, have rights which are clear and unquestionable,
178
CONQUERING A CONHNJBNT • J845 - 1849
and those rights, with the blessing of God and your support, we are fully
prepared to maintain/'9
During the early Cabinet meetings, Buchanan had a chance to
size up both the traits of the president and the aspect of his own job.
Buchanan felt himself superior to Polk in understanding of international
affairs, but he soon learned that Polk outranked him and intended to use
his authority. The two continually disagreed on matters of policy, of
timing, of procedure, and of emphasis. Polk sensed condescension in
Buchanan which toughened his own attitude. Buchanan, confident of
his ability, forced Polk to take full responsibility for crossing him. During
the spring of 1845, while Polk debated whether to affirm directly a claim
to all of Oregon, Buchanan advised against it. To claim all without once
more attempting a compromise solution, he argued, would lead inevitably
to war, invite the condemnation of the civilized world, and destroy the
support of the nation. On the other hand, if compromise were offered and
rejected by Britain and war followed, then the Administration could "appeal
to all mankind for the justice and moderation of our demand . . . and our
own citizens would be enthusiastically united in sustaining such a war."10
Buchanan's rivals urged that the negotiation be transferred to
London, but upon the appointment of Louis McLane of Delaware as
Minister to Britain, Polk directed Buchanan to take charge and to continue
the talks on the Calhoun proposal of compromise. On July 12, Buchanan
sent Pakenham a brief project for settlement at 49°, explaining that Polk
"would not have consented to yield any portion of the Oregon territory,"
except for the acts of his predecessors who had agreed to compromise.
Pakenham, not bothering to refer the offer to London for advice though its
contents were very close to Aberdeen's own wishes of March, 1844,
rejected it. Probably he reacted to a recent letter from Aberdeen, com-
menting upon the indignation with which Folk's inaugural had been
received in England and stating that "we^ire still ready to adhere to the
principle of an equitable compromise, but we are perfectly determined to
cede nothing to force or menace."11 Consistent with the firmness of
Aberdeen's stand, Pakenham concluded his note of rejection with the
statement that he hoped the United States would "be prepared to offer
some further proposal . . . more consistent with fairness and equity, and
with the reasonable expectations of the British government."12 This
insulting response brought the Oregon question suddenly to a crisis.
Polk directed Buchanan to prepare a full argument for the
American title to all of Oregon, withdraw the compromise proposal, and
leave the rest to the British. Buchanan agreed but urged that some state-
ment to the effect that the United States would consider a British counter-
proposal should be included. Polk overrode him, arguing that to invite a
proposal from Britain, when she had just rejected an eminently fair one,
179
JAMES BUCHANAN
would suggest that he might be willing to settle for less than had already
been demanded. Buchanan then asked for a postponement of the reply
until passions had cooled. He stood firm in his opinion that to close the
door to negotiation would lead to war and that war with England for
northern Oregon would not be sustained by the country. Furthermore, it
would be rash to take such a risk at a time when conflict with Mexico
loomed.13 Polk declared he would "firmly maintain our rights, and leave
the rest to God and the country/' to which Buchanan replied that he
thought God would find difficulty in justifying us in a war over the country
north of 49°.14
Nonetheless, he proceeded to draw up a detailed statement of
claim to all of Oregon. It was lawyer's work, and in it he excelled. On
August 30, he delivered to Pakenham a powerful justification of the
American demands, together with information that the compromise offer
was withdrawn. Attending Cabinet at half-past twelve he announced,
"Well, the deed is done," but said he still thought it was bad policy to rule
out further talks.
While paper arguments provided no key to settlement, Buchanan's
Oregon letter served to strengthen greatly the American position. Cave
Johnson, after listening to it in Cabinet, said if he had heard it before he
never would have sanctioned the earlier compromise. Bancroft commented
on the vast superiority of Buchanan's paper over Pakenham's, and McLane
reported from London that the clear enunciation of the American claim had
counteracted the idea that the American demands were sheer brass and
much softened the British attitude.15
Very shortly word arrived from McLane in London that Aberdeen
strongly disapproved of Pakenham's rejection of the American compromise
offer and would like to negotiate further. Buchanan thought this eminently
sensible, and again tried to convince Polk to let him pass along a hint that
the United States would receive a British proposal. He then suggested the
possibility of informing Pakenham that a proposal from Britain would be
submitted directly to the Senate, for its previous advice, thus relieving
Polk of the embarrassment of altering his position. Polk thought this
procedure would be improper. Discouraged, Buchanan told the president
that by diplomatic means, he might get Oregon; but "by strong measures
hastily taken, we would have war and might lose it."16
Folk's annual message calling upon the Senate to denounce the
joint occupation agreement of 1827 caused excitement but no surprise for
it was an inevitable consequence of the decision to assert the total American
claim. Aberdeen welcomed it, telling Pakenham that "as the crisis becomes
more imminent, the chance of settlement improves."17
Through December and January, Buchanan, the ministers on
both sides of the water, and United States Senators tried to break through
180
CONQUERING A CONTINENT • 1845 - 1849
Folk's intransigence. The problem by this time seemed clearly to be that
of saving face for the president. Ex-minister Everett wrote directly to
Aberdeen, and sent the replies to Folk's Cabinet via George Bancroft.
Buchanan discussed the business informally with Pakenham. McLane
talked freely in London. All agreed that both nations would welcome a
49th parallel settlement. The problem was to persuade Polk to change his
position and agree to accept a British proposal of this line.
Pakenham, trying desperately to break through the impasse, sent
an angling note to discover what Polk might assent to, with the proviso that
it should be considered "official" or "unofficial" depending on the reply.
Buchanan endorsed this strategem as practical and harmless, hut Polk
would have none of it. Pakenham next proposed arbitration, a stale
solution previously rejected by the United States, and rejected by Buchanan
and Polk twice more. It was a time-wasting device to keep up appearances
of a negotiation and was so understood by all concerned.
Buchanan dragged his feet in every possible way and invented
such schemes as he could to break Folk's will. He harassed the president
on appointments, threatened to resign, blew hot and cold on the Supreme
Court appointment, which would have injured the Administration had he
taken it in the midst of the fight on Oregon, and continually urged objections
to Folk's ideas. Polk wrote him down as differing with all the Cabinet and
laboring to upset the presidential policy in his anxiety to leave the door
open for further negotiation,18 and in this opinion Polk was precisely right.
On December 13, Buchanan presented for presidential approval
a dispatch to McLane containing the sentence that "if the British Govern-
ment chose to offer as a compromise the 49° line, the president would be
strongly inclined to submit it to the Senate for their advice." Polk struck
it out, and substituted the statement that if Britain wished to proceed
further toward a settlement, "the President would judge of the character
of any new proposition." Buchanan said that if the dispatch went as
amended, there had better be some preparations for war. Polk told him
to send it.19 On the same day that Buchanan forwarded this official message
to McLane, he wrote a private letter assuring him that practically everyone
in Congress wanted to settle at 49° and that a real war threat might possibly
bring some constructive results. Aberdeen, in a letter to Everett, stated
that if McLane had full powers the whole problem would be settled in
an hour/***
In England, Sir Robert Peel declared, "We shall not reciprocate
blustering with Polk, but shall quietly make an increase in the Naval and
Military and Ordnance Estimates." But while the Prime Minister and the
Foreign Office prepared for war and announced, "if you desire war, as
assuredly you will have it," the London Times, mouthpiece for the govern-
ment, came out strongly for compromise at 49°. Buchanan, long since in
181
JAMES BUCHANAN
possession of information which Polk refused to take seriously, proposed
on February 6 that the McLane correspondence relative to British war
measures be sent to Congress.
Finally, on February 21, the stalemate broke. Buchanan received
a letter from McLane stating positively that Aberdeen had approved the use
of force and decided to send a naval force to Canada consisting of "thirty
sail of the line besides steamers and other vessels of war of a smaller class."21
Buchanan took the letter immediately to Polk, who observed that the
British were "not altogether of so pacific a character as the accounts given
in the English newspapers had led me to believe." Most of the Cabinet
saw the letter on Monday, and discussed it on Tuesday, February 24.
Buchanan read the McLane letter and then his reply to McLane informing
Aberdeen that if the British proposed a settlement at the 49th parallel, the
president would submit the offer to the Senate for its previous advice.
Polk called on each Cabinet member individually before expressing his own
view. All agreed with Buchanan except Cave Johnson.
Polk now yielded. Buchanan sent the dispatch on February 26,
accompanying it as usual with an unofficial letter in which he urged a hasty
response from the British because of the likelihood of a political change in
Congress by fall. He had already canvassed the Senate and knew he could
count on approval there. In fact, several Senators had threatened to bring
in a resolution forcing Polk to reopen negotiations on Oregon.
From this point, the Oregon settlement was merely a matter of
time. Everyone could guess what would be proposed and how it would be
received; the question was not what, but when. On June 6, Pakenham
delivered a British proposal to Buchanan which almost exactly duplicated
the settlement proposed by Buchanan to McLane in February. Polk sent
it to the Senate which, on June 12, approved it by a vote of 37 to 12, and
on the 15th of June the Oregon Treaty was signed. The negotiation raised
Buchanan's prestige in foreign courts and drew from Queen Victoria the
statement that she liked Mr. Buchanan's treaty.22
Between February and June, after Buchanan knew that he had
won the compromise settlement, he assumed, in Folk's words, "a most
warlike disposition," taking strong ground against England and heckling
the president for giving in. Polk attributed this marked change of attitude
to presidential politics and accused Buchanan of being more concerned
"with '48 than with 49° or 54° 40V He may have been partly right in this
judgment, but he missed the main point. Polk wrote in his diary that
regardless of how his secretary differed with him on public questions, the
president held the responsibility. "I will control," he wrote. "If I would
yield up the government into his hands and suffer him to be in effect
President, ... I have no doubt he would be cheerful and satisfied. This I
cannot do." Buchanan sensed that Polk often appeared to differ with him
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CONQUERING A CONTINENT • 1845 - 1849
more to protect the presidential prerogative and to assert command than for
reasons substantially bearing on the subject at issue.
Buchanan thought that he could easily have settled the Oregon
boundary at 49° months earlier, but because of the prestige the accomplish-
ment might have given him, Polk had obstructed the natural procedure,
had made a great show of bearding the British lion, and had sought to focus
attention on himself. Now that the public had come to think of a division
of Oregon at 49° as a retreat, Polk wanted his Secretary of State to bear the
onus of it. Buchanan would not do it. When Polk asked him to help
prepare the presidential message for submission of the treaty, he refused,
and in Cabinet meeting remarked to the president "that the 54° 40' men were
the true friends of the administration and he wished no backing out on the
subject."23 If Polk saw no humor or irony in this statement, some of the
Cabinet did, for Buchanan had merely paraphrased what the president had
so often said emphatically to him. Buchanan eventually did make a little
political capital out of the Oregon question, but not until after the solution
he wanted had been guaranteed. And he undoubtedly derived some satis-
faction from making Polk take some of his own medicine.
MEXICO
Polk proposed, after the admission of Texas as a state with the Rio Grande
boundary, to acquire the Mexican provinces of New Mexico and California.
The acquisition of new territory meant the readjustment of the sectional
balance in Congress and introduced the explosive political issue, slavery in
the new lands. Oregon would presumably form a huge addition to the
free region and thus balance Texas. How could a similar balance of power
be achieved in New Mexico and California? The Whigs and many northern
Democrats would balk at any further extension of slavery. The person who
could participate conspicuously in acquiring New Mexico and California
and prevent at the same time a striking triumph of either the slave or anti-
slavery forces held the key to the presidential succession. So, at least,
Buchanan thought.
Wilson Shannon, United States Minister to Mexico, received his
passports on March 28, 1845, ending diplomatic relations between the two
countries. Before anything further could be done, Buchanan had to re-
establish communications. He sent William S. Parrott of Virginia as a
secret agent to discover whether Mexico would continue negotiations.
Parrott reported, on August 26, 1845, that if an envoy were sent, he would
be well received and "might with comparative ease settle, over a breakfast
table, the most important national problems." Under the government of
President Jos6 Joaqufn Herrera, a kindly, peaceful man who had replaced
Santa Anna shortly after Folk's inauguration and represented the peace
183
JAMES BUCHANAN
party of Mexico, a Mexican declaration of war against the United States
seemed very unlikely.24
This report directly contradicted other information Buchanan
possessed, namely, that the war spirit ran high in Mexico and that her
troops had begun to mass along the Texan border. However, Parrott's
statement received confirmation through Col. Benjamin Green, Secretary
of Legation at Mexico City, who knew the party situation intimately. Green
gave assurance that Herrera wished to settle peaceably all questions at
issue, not only claims and the Texan boundary but also the cession of
New Mexico and California. The Mexican government would have diffi-
culty in sustaining itself if the United States sent a regular minister and
attempted to reopen diplomatic relations in the usual way, but if a special
commission were appointed to discuss immediate problems, Herrera would
receive it.26
Uncertain what to believe, Buchanan questioned John Black,
U. S. Consul at Mexico City. Black replied that the Mexican Foreign Office
was "disposed to receive the Commissioner of the United States . . . with
full powers ... to settle the present dispute.'*26
Buchanan left for Bedford Springs at the end of July. Though
not disposed to worry, the heavy responsibilities of his office had begun to
tell on him, and he needed rest. "To be Secretary of State is not 'what it
is cracked up to be/ " he wrote to a friend before he left Washington. "Here
I am sitting in a hot room, engaged from morning till night & often after
night at a season of the year when I had ever been as free as mountain
breezes. I never much fancied a Cabinet appointment & now less than
ever."27 But he was not to get his vacation. Polk ordered him back to
advise on threatening new developments in Mexico and cautioned him to
leave Bedford "in a way to produce no public sensation."28 Bancroft
wrote that Mexico probably would start guerrilla warfare across the Rio
Grande, but he saw no cause for worry, since Marcy had ordered an increase
in Taylor's army. Referring to the continual fight in Cabinet, he told
Buchanan that the president "will grow fat in your absence, he sleeps
so well nou>."29
Polk, with unanimous agreement of his Cabinet, decided on
September 16 to make the effort to reopen diplomatic relations with Mexico.
Buchanan picked as negotiator John Slidell of New Orleans, who spoke
Spanish fluently and had both diplomatic and political qualifications for
the work. His appointment was to be kept a close secret, lest the French
and British Ministers in Washington or elsewhere should undermine the
mission in advance.
Continued uncertainty whether the mission would be received
by the Mexicans delayed its dispatch for two months more. In November,
Buchanan urged that Slidell be sent immediately with the instructions that
184
CONQUERING A CONTINENT* 1845.1849
had been prepared. Polk, disregarding Col. Green's advice, commissioned
Slidell as a regular minister. As such he would have full authority, and
rejection of him by the Mexicans would suggest their rebuff of a peace effort.
Buchanan's instructions to Slidell opened with several pages
emphasizing the duty of the United States to protect the Americas from
European intervention. 'The march of free Government on this continent
must not be trammelled by the intrigues and selfish interests of European
powers. Liberty here must be allowed to work out its natural results; and
these will, ere long, astonish the world."30 Polk, in his annual message of
December 2, 1845, elaborated the same point, quoting nearly verbatim
from Buchanan. These statements created an impression that the con-
templated acquisition of Mexican territory along the Pacific was, in fact, a
protection of all America from the military intrigues of Europe and placed
the expansion program on the ground of national security.
Buchanan's practical directions to the new envoy rehearsed the
long standing grievances of the United States against Mexico, the un-
satisfied claims, the breach of treaty obligations, the legal justification for
reprisals, the widely acknowledged independence of Texas, and the failure
of Mexico to attempt any exercise of authority in the region claimed by
Texas. Buchanan then proposed a sequence of settlements : should Mexico
approve the boundary as defined by the Republic of Texas in 1836, the
United States would pay claims of United States citizens against Mexico;
for the cession of New Mexico, Slidell could offer $5,000,000; for the
cession of California, "money would be no object," but $25,000,000
should be offered.31
First the Herrera government and then that of General Paredes,
who had ousted Herrera, refused to receive Slidell. Having little hope that
any government would undertake to negotiate with the minister, Buchanan
instructed him to make an effort "to throw the whole odium of the failure
. . . upon the Mexican government,"32 and to act in such a way that "it
may appear manifest to the people of the United States and to the world
that a rupture could not honorably be avoided."33 A little later, when the
Paredes regime was on the brink of bankruptcy, Buchanan authorized
Slidell to offer cash to the general "if he would do us justice and settle the
question of boundary between the two republics."34
In the meantime Col. A. J. Atocha came to Polk with the proposal
that the United States should help the exiled dictator Santa Anna return
to Mexico. Once re-established in power, Santa Anna would make the
treaty of cession to the United States, if that country could stage enough,
of a military show to convince the Mexican people that their leader was
forced into the demand. Atocha suggested that, as a preliminary, Slidell
should call for the satisfaction of claims against Mexico from the deck of
a warship moored off Vera Cruz.35
185
JAMES BUCHANAN
Although Polk put little trust in Atocha, he did take the bizarre
scheme to the Cabinet. Buchanan, who had not known of it before,
immediately judged it unacceptable. It would give the impression, he said,
that the United States had made Slidell the spokesman of aggression rather
than a peace commissioner. The Secretary of State, irritated and angry,
left the meeting.
That night Buchanan wrote Polk two notes in which he explained
in detail his objections to the Atocha plan. "When I difier with you,"
he continued, "it is always with reluctance and regret. I do not like to
urge arguments in opposition before the whole Cabinet. ... A little
previous consultation with me on important questions . . . would jalways
obviate this difficulty."36 Buchanan hoped that the Administration would
not make any move that might lead to war until it had convinced the
American people that resort to hostilities had become the only means of
preserving the national honor.37
Polk wanted action and considered the unpaid claims sufficient
excuse for a war with Mexico, but Buchanan pleaded with him to wait until
the Mexicans should commit some act of hostility.38 Private reports he
had been receiving from General Taylor's camp near Matamoros led him
to believe that Mexican soldiers would soon attack.39
On May 9, the day after Slidell returned to Washington for a
conference with Polk and Buchanan, news came of a skirmish between the
Mexican forces and Taylor's little army during which several Americans
lost their lives. Polk immediately called a Cabinet meeting and added to
a war message which he had already prepared the statement that Mexico
had "invaded our territory and shed American blood upon the American
soil." Congress promptly responded to Folk's message by a nearly unani-
mous vote for a declaration of war.
Buchanan meanwhile prepared a circular for distribution to
foreign governments explaining that the United States did not fight to
dismember Mexico but only to defend her own territory as far south as
the Rio Grande boundary. Polk refused to tie his hands with such a
proclamation and rewrote the paragraph to read, "We go to war with
Mexico solely for the purpose of conquering an honorable peace."40
Buchanan argued earnestly for his own version, for he wished to distinguish
clearly between initiating a war of aggression and fighting a defensive war.
If people believed that the object of hostilities was to make a conquest, the
war would be rendered "utterly odious" at home and European inter-
vention might follow.41 But the Cabinet thought otherwise and Buchanan
reluctantly sent out Folk's explanation.42
From the day war was declared, Buchanan asked for a clear
definition of what territory the Administration proposed to demand from
Mexico, in order that he could continue peace negotiations on such a basis
186
CONQUERING A CONTINENT • 1845 - 1849
even while the war proceeded. Secretary Walker wanted all Mexican
territory north of the 26th parallel, from the mouth of the Rio Grande to
the Pacific. Buchanan preferred to demand only upper California, from
the 37th or 38th parallel, including San Francisco or possibly Monterey,
and the province of New Mexico north of the 32nd parallel. To seek
southern California or the region south of Texas would, he feared, raise a
storm over slavery and "be the means of dissolving the Union."48
On July 27, Buchanan sent a note under a flag of truce to the
Mexican Foreign Minister inviting further negotiations either in Washing-
ton or Mexico. Polk asked Congress to appropriate $2,000,000 for an
immediate payment to Mexico upon ratification of a treaty. He hoped
that the Paredes government, now nearly bankrupt, would accept this sum
as a means of self-preservation.
Buchanan warned Polk that a request to Congress for such an
appropriation would only start a bitter debate over slavery. Representative
David Wilmot attached to the Administration money bill the "proviso"
that slavery should forever be excluded from any territory that the United
States might acquire from Mexico. The Wilmot Proviso killed the bill.
Richard Rush commented to Buchanan that the rejection of the treaty
fund would cost the nation a hundred million dollars in war expenses.44
Meanwhile, the Mexican Foreign Minister chose to interpret Buchanan's
peace offer as an insult. Buchanan answered that no alternative remained
but to prosecute the war until Mexico proposed to stop it.46
Although still hopeful of peace by negotiation, Buchanan began
an effort to direct war strategy into channels which would bring the kind
of peace he wanted. He supported the "defensive line" policy which
advocated military seizure of only the territory desired. He bounded that
region by the Rio Grande to the western edge of Texas and from there by
a line along the 32nd parallel to the Pacific. This amount, he hoped,
would be reasonable compensation for claims and indemnity for war
expenses. Furthermore, its acquisition would cause no serious division
in the Democratic party on the question of slavery.
The Administration feared that a full-scale war carried to the
heart of Mexico would make Generals Zachary Taylor and Winfield Scott,
both Whigs, popular heroes and permit them to set themselves up ps
presidential candidates. So probable did this development appear that
Polk, with Buchanan's hearty approval, tried in vain to persuade the Senate
to commission Thomas Hart Benton a lieutenant general so that he would
outrank both Taylor and Scott. Polk then offered Benton a major-general-
ship, which he refused. Therefore, the Whig generals held the field and
largely controlled the military policy of the war.
Meanwhile, the army and navy, in a series of signal victories, had
won control not only of New Mexico and California but also of the heart of
187
JAMES BUCHANAN
Mexico. The news excited the admiration and enthusiasm of all Americans,
silenced much of the Whig and abolitionist condemnation of the war, and
converted into howling patriots those who had earlier remained indifferent.
Even from abroad came expressions of praise for the conduct of American
arms.
The tidings of victory from Buena Vista and Vera Cruz induced
Polk to try the olive branch again. The Cabinet approved and Buchanan
set to work to draft a peace treaty. His proposal of April 13, 1847, provided
for cession of the provinces of New Mexico and Upper and Lower California,
together with a right of passage across the isthmus of Tehuantepec. For
this, the United States would pay all claims of American citizens against
Mexico and $15,000,000 in addition. Against Buchanan's persistent oppo-
sition, Polk and the rest of the Cabinet revised the purchase price upwards
to $30,000,000.46
For a time Buchanan considered going to Mexico as peace com-
missioner, but he decided that the negotiations might keep him away from
Washington too long. The Cabinet felt that domestic politics ruled out
General Scott, otherwise a logical choice, or any prominent Democrat.
Buchanan suggested the appointment of the Chief Clerk in the State
Department, Nicholas Philip Trist, for the task. He had no political
aspirations and his open suspicion of Scott's designs on the presidency
made Trist even more acceptable to the Cabinet.
Appointed on April 15, Trist set out under an assumed name and
arrived in Mexico in May. He opened negotiations through the British
embassy on June 6; not, however, before becoming involved in a violent
quarrel with General Scott who complained, "I see that the Secretary of
War proposes to degrade me." Trist, on his part, reported to Buchanan
that Scott was "decidedly the greatest imbecile I have ever had anything
to do with."47 But within a few weeks, both men patched up their futile
quarrel and soon became good friends. Scott, too, quickly realized that
Trist would be much better than some politically ambitious Democratic
Senator in the role of peacemaker.
During the summer Scott, with consummate military skill, struck
out from Vera Cruz and fought his way to Mexico City. Trist now for the
first time showed Scott the peace proposals and the general, impressed by
their fairness and restraint, began actively to assist in the negotiation.
Santa Anna had promised that he would negotiate for $10,000 in advance
and $1,000,000 upon signing a treaty. Scott put up the $10,000 out of the
army secret service fund, but Santa Anna, with the money safely in his
pocket, backed out of the bargain. Therefore, Scott had to carry the war
to its final conclusion. On September 14, after the thrilling but costly
victories at Molino Del Key and Chapultepec, Scott and the American army
marched into the Mexican capital. By this time Santa Anna had fled and
188
CONQUERING A CONTINENT • 1845 - 1849
the Mexican government was so demoralized that for the moment there
was no one with whom to negotiate.
When news of these events arrived in Washington, Buchanan,
Walker and others repented their willingness to accept a peace so easy on
Mexico as the one outlined in the original instructions to Trist. Buchanan
paved the way for stiffening terms as early as June by writing to Trist that
"the object of a war, at any period of its continuance, is not necessarily
that for which it commenced."48 During the summer, Buchanan pro-
gressively altered his stand on the amount of territory which ought to be
demanded of Mexico as indemnity, increasing the area in correlation to
American military success and the rising popular demand for all of Mexico.
At the time of drawing up Trist's instructions, Buchanan had
written to a friend that to annex most of northern Mexico "would not be
in accordance with public opinion," and wanted to limit the acquisitions to
Upper and Lower California.49 In July, however, he informed Trist: "The
more I reflect upon the subject the better I am convinced of the importance
of running the boundary line between the Rio Grande and the Gulf of
California along the thirty-second parallel."50 In September, when Polk
raised the question whether Trist should not demand more territory,
Buchanan proposed again that the offer of money be cut from $30,000,000
to $15,000,000, that the cession of the province of Lower California and
the right to transit across the Tehuantepec isthmus now be made a sine
qua non of settlement, and that the northern boundary of Mexico be cut
from the 32nd parallel to the 31st.61
Polk and Buchanan continued to disagree on war policy. Polk
thought the army ought to occupy the whole country, but Buchanan
wanted the troops withdrawn from all territory except that which was to
be annexed.52 Polk complained that Buchanan had increased his demands
on Mexico. Buchanan explained that the invasion of the interior of the
country (which he had opposed) had cost many lives and a great deal of
money; therefore, it was foolish to assume that previous terms would now
apply. But Polk thought that Buchanan's change of position was due to
his desire for the presidency and his unwillingness "to incur the displeasure
of all those who are in favor of the conquest of all Mexico."58
Military success rapidly changed the tenor of public opinion.
All the leading Democratic newspapers of the West and South now insisted
on the acquisition of all of Mexico, or a very large slice of it, and even the
more conservative eastern papers supported the same policy.64 Some of
the British expressed the opinion that the Anglo-Saxon race inevitably
would appropriate North America, and the usually unfriendly Palmerston
was heard to remark: "They are going to take two-thirds of Mexico. Why
don't they take the whole?"56 One of Buchanan's military informants
wrote: "All Mexico must soon be ours— notwithstanding the wish of the
189
JAMES BUCHANAN
President and the country for Peace Thousands of the present genera-
tion will live to see the whole of North America under one Confederated
Government, and the sooner the better."56
In October, 1847, when rumors seeped to Washington that Trist
planned to make a treaty recognizing the Nueces boundary of Texas and
giving up other vital American demands, Buchanan ordered Trist to return
home, treaty or no treaty. Trist, however, determined to defy his instruc-
tions. In a 65-page letter of explanation and apology to his chief, he stated
that he would stay and conclude a treaty because he felt it was the only
way to prevent the summary seizure of the entire country. Polk denounced
Trist as arrogant, impudent, insulting, destitute of honor, a scoundrel, and
a worse public servant than he had ever known.57
Under these unhappy circumstances, Trist proceeded to negotiate
the Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo, which reached the astounded Administra-
tion in Washington on Saturday, February 19. Trist clearly wanted to
make Polk take the responsibility for accepting or rejecting a treaty con-
forming to his original instructions. The treaty itself set the present
southwestern boundary of the United States, excepting the Gadsden
Purchase, in return for $15,000,000 and payment by the United States
of claims against Mexico.
Buchanan sharply opposed submitting this treaty to the Senate.
He wished to capitalize, in the months before the Democratic nominating
convention, on the political effect of advocating a larger cession. Polk
accused him of trying to undermine the treaty in the Senate, but in this
the president was mistaken; as in the case of Oregon, Buchanan worked
hard to make sure that the treaty would be ratified and privately wanted
it ratified.
An exact transcript of the treaty and of confidential corre-
spondence regarding it appeared in the New York Herald while it was still
under discussion in secret sessions of the Senate. A young Irish reporter
named John Nugent who was known to be a close friend of Buchanan sent
in the story. Nugent had for some years been writing for the Herald under
such pen names as "Nous Verrons," "Felix," "Galviensis," and "Chee-
Wah-Wah." Just a few weeks before, "Galviensis" had published several
articles abusing the President, and Polk suspected Buchanan of complicity.
"If I can obtain any reliable proof that Mr. Buchanan has given countenance
to Galviensis," he wrote in his diary, "he shall not remain in the Cabinet."
Buchanan vigorously denied any connection with the articles. The Senate
called for an investigation of the treaty leak and questioned Nugent for
two weeks, but he refused to disclose anything except that he had copied
all the documents in his own room, and that his informant had no con-
nection either with the Senate or the Department of State.
190
CONQUERING A CONTINENT • 1845 - 1849
Buchanan's enemies built a strong case of circumstantial evidence
against him as the informer and Polk accused him outright, but Buchanan
positively asserted both his own innocence and the trustworthiness of
every member of his Departmental staff. He then addressed a letter to the
Senate declaring that the secretary and all the Department clerks, waiving
every privilege which might exist, would appear before the Senators to
undergo examination until every trace of suspicion had been removed.68
Buchanan suspected that the leak had originated in the Senate.59 The
name of Nugent's informant, however, remains a mystery to this day. The
affair had no effect on the Treaty, which was ratified by the Senate and
proclaimed by Polk on July 4.60
THE LIFE OF A GALLEY SLAVE
Beyond the major problems of the Department, Buchanan directed in-
numerable minor negotiations. He sought to induce Emperor Dom
Pedro II of Brazil to join other nations in abolition of the international
slave trade. He challenged the Anglo-French intervention in the war
between Argentina and Paraguay, accusing both nations of flagrant violation
of the Monroe Doctrine and the principles of nonintervention. In 1846
he concluded a treaty with New Granada which granted the United States
a right of transit across the Isthmus of Panama. This important agreement
underlay the building of the Panama Railroad and later the construction
of the Canal.
After three years of correspondence, he managed to draw up a
postal convention with Great Britain which provided for uniform trans-
atlantic mail rates, and he adjusted satisfactorily a dispute with Britain
over the "most favored nation" clause of the commercial treaty which had
been violated by illegal customs collections on both sides of the ocean.
Through Henry Wheaton, he negotiated six commercial treaties with
German states to eliminate the old feudal dues and to put these states on
the basis of trade reciprocity with the United States.
The European revolutions of 1848 kept the State Department
busy. The United States took the lead in recognizing the new French
Republic less than a week after the revolution started and promptly recog-
nized the new German Confederation with headquarters at Frankfort.
Buchanan successfully urged, against considerable American opposition,
the establishment of a diplomatic Mission to the Vatican as a means of
developing commerce, for the new Pope, Pius IX, was a strong advocate
of a European commercial federation.
In May, 1848, Buchanan saw in the developing revolution in
Cuba an opportunity to acquire that island, though he wanted to wait until
191
JAMES BUCHANAN
after the presidential election to initiate the purchase. Polk enthusi-
astically supported the plan to offer Spain $100,000,000 for Cuba and
authorized Buchanan to instruct his Minister at Madrid to explore the
possibilities. Spain indignantly rejected the idea, but Buchanan blamed
the Minister, Romulus M. Saunders, for some responsibility for the failure.
"A more skillful agent might have been selected to conduct the negotiations
in Spain," he wrote, "as our present Minister speaks no language except
English, & even this he sometimes murders."61
Hawaii showed signs of responding to American influence.
Buchanan dispatched Anthony Ten Eyck of Michigan as Commissioner to
Hawaii early in 1845 with instructions to make a commercial treaty and
thwart European influence there. Ten Eyck wrecked his mission by asking
for special privileges for white American citizens, to which the Hawaiians
replied that such demands reminded them of what happened to Texas.
Ten Eyck then stated flatly that he thought what was done in Texas ought
to be repeated in Hawaii and appealed to a United States naval commander
in the waters to force his treaty on the king. Buchanan roundly rebuked
the minister and called for his resignation.62
Buchanan did not find his situation in the Cabinet as satisfying
as he had hoped or as enjoyable as his activities in the Senate. To be sure,
he relished the prestige which the premiership brought him, but he never
quite gave himself wholeheartedly to the job. In Cabinet he played the
lone wolf rather than the organization man, with his eye constantly straying
from the main task to possible alternative prospects for himself, particularly
the presidency. He worked tirelessly, but under a continual sense of
aggravation, at the archaic structure of the Department which he, in vain,
tried to persuade Congress to correct.63
But he found himself especially irritated by President Polk. It
seemed to Buchanan that the Tennesseean, not entirely sure of himself
and fearful lest he become a puppet of the Cabinet, went out of his way to
emphasize his determination to wield the scepter. Folk's voluminous diary
reflects throughout a deep-seated distrust of Buchanan and is filled with
uncharitable comments about him. Yet, though the Secretary of State
disagreed with him on almost every important diplomatic decision, Polk
retained him. In fact, Polk for the most part arrived ultimately at the
judgments Buchanan had offered in the beginning. "Mr. Buchanan is an
able man," wrote the president.6*
Toward the end of his term, Buchanan developed a nervous tic
in his leg and a painful tumor in his nose, the latter requiring a series of
operations. It took Doctor Foltz and two other Navy surgeons over a year
and a half to conclude the surgical treatment of the nasal polyp.65
A diligent and laborious worker, Buchanan rarely ever complained
of tasks except while he was Secretary of State. "I am an overworked
192
CONQUERING A CONTINENT* 1845 - 1849
man," he wrote to John Reynolds. "No man, I care not what may be his
talents & acquirements, is fit for the office under its present organization,
unless his constitution will enable him to work and see company from ten
to fifteen hours out of every twenty-four.66 To another he complained,
"My life is that of a galley slave. I have not read thirty consecutive pages
in any book since I came into the Department of State."67 Near the end
of his term, he told Arnold Plumer, "I have wished 1,000 times that I had
never entered this Dept. as Secretary. I have had to do the important
drudging of the administration without the power of obtaining offices for
my friends. . . . / have no power. I feel it deeply."*8 One of the things
that kept him going was his respect for the president. Although Buchanan
frequently mistrusted Folk's judgment, he respected his conscientious
and unremitting application to duty.
When Polk died but a few months after the end of his Adminis-
tration, Buchanan commented: "He was the most laborious man I have
ever known; and in a brief period of four years had assumed the appearance
of an old man,"69 and the Secretary wondered how much he had had to do
with it. He left Washington with the statement: "I am happy and contented
.... I would not for any consideration return to the State Department."70
193
15
STILL HUNT FOR THE PRESIDENCY • 1848
RECIPE FOR POLITICAL PIE
However little he may know about James Buchanan, almost everyone has
encountered the comment of Ben Perley Poore that "never did a wily
politician more industriously plot and plan to secure a nomination than
Mr. Buchanan did, in his still hunt for the Presidency."1 What truth
there may be in this statement applies most forcefully to the campaigns of
1848 and 1852, for in these Buchanan seriously set out to bag the game.
He proceeded methodically, according to practices which years of experience
had impressed upon him as necessary. Had someone asked him to enumer-
ate the rules by which a man might achieve the presidency, he might have
listed these: the appearance of disinterestedness, the support of the home
constituency, and national rather than sectional views on burning issues
of the day.
Buchanan preferred the role of the statesman to that of politician.
He stayed aloof from rough and tumble meetings, he avoided public debate
and stump speeches, and stayed close to home to confer with party leaders,
leaving it to subordinates to work with the voters and pay the campaign bills.
He still agreed with Jackson that no man could achieve the presidency who
appeared actively to seek it and that the successful candidate must display
utter indifference until he was called to duty.
For this reason he felt that an aspirant should have wealth
enough to be careless of his political fortune. He confided to J. Clancy
Jones that he had never yet known a public man "who had abandoned his
profession for politics before he had accumulated something like a com-
petency that did not regret his course."2 It was the urgent need of money
that made men like Forney and Lynch and Brewster scramble for political
jobs, and sparked the ambitions of many at a much higher level, like Clay
and Webster, Buchanan had no financial cause to seek a government
salary; he had made his competency, was proud of the fact, and could in
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SHIX HUNT FOR THE PRESIDENCY • 1848
good conscience assure his friends that the loss of political office would not
cost him cca night's rest or a meal's victuals."
The appearance of disinterestedness could also be used with
political effect. Buchanan had made the prospect of a Supreme Court
appointment pay full dividends. The offer stimulated to action all those
who looked to him for political patronage and attracted national attention.
His decision to decline it created exactly the effect Buchanan wanted, the
image of a man personally inclined to retire from active politics but pre-
vailed upon by his friends to remain in harness.
Buchanan always believed that a presidential aspirant, to be
successful, had to have firm political control of his own county and state.
A man defeated at home had little prospect of developing strength abroad.
For this reason he devoted an inordinate amount of his time and energy to
petty politics in Lancaster and the contest of factions in Pennsylvania.
The aspiring candidate must subordinate sectional objectives and
loyalties to national principles. This was not merely an ingredient for
personal success but a requirement for the continued existence of the
Union. By 1847 it seemed probable that only a northern man who viewed
southern problems with sympathy and understanding could meet this
requirement, for there remained little hope, since the Wilmot Proviso and
the Tariff of 1846, of finding a southern man with political sympathy for
the North on either of these issues. But there were many northerners who,
though disliking slavery and free trade, thought that the South should
share in new territory and subscribed to a moderate tariff. Buchanan held
this position, believing it to be both the surest guarantee of the preservation
of the Union and the stand most likely to gain broad support for the
presidency. The chief competition would come from the West where men
like Cass and Douglas would take national ground by offering to act as
mediators in the growing strife between the North and the South.
DISCIPLINING DEMOCRATS
It was impossible to know even where to begin drilling Pennsylvania's
demoralized Democrats into something like a strong and dependable
organization. In fact, Buchanan had not made up his mind positively to
face the task until he knew the local reaction to the Walker Tariff. Provi-
dentially for him business remained good, industrialists began to admit
that the new tariff would not ruin them and the Pennsylvania Democrats,
applauding Buchanan's proposal to modify rates on iron and coal, calmed
down. Having cleared this hurdle, which had temporarily tripped Dallas,
Buchanan decided to stay in the presidential race.
He had a block of influential friends who would stick with him
through thick and thin: Forney, Lynch, Wilson McCandless, Arnold
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JAMES BUCHANAN
Plumer, Jeremiah S. Black, George W. Barton, W. A. Stokes, William
Bigler, X Clancy Jones, Christian Bachman, W. flutter, and many others,
although they were not enough to control the state. He faced the powerful
opposition of the followers of George Dallas, primarily in Philadelphia.
Between these major factions were others, generally for sale to the highest
bidder, and some of them led by men who were violently detested by
Buchanan's friends. Buchanan had to augment his certain support by
enough strength purchased from political roustabouts like Cameron to
insure his control of the state delegation.
A major test of strength would come in 1847, when Pennsylvania
faced another governor's election. Buchanan had supported Shunk before
and strongly backed him for renomination, despite the opposition of
Cameron and the lukewarm adherence of Forney's friends to whom Shunk
had shown no favor.3 Forney wanted Buchanan to run in order to dis-
entangle himself from the embarrassments of the Polk Administration and
to command a larger patronage to consolidate his party than he could
obtain in the State Department.4
The Harrisburg Democratic Convention of March 4, 1847, quickly
renominated Shunk for governor but ran into a bitter fight to decide
between Buchanan and Dallas as the "favorite son" of Pennsylvania. The
delegates finally stalled to a deadlock and adopted an innocuous statement
expressing pride in both the Vice-President and the Secretary of State.5
Senator Cameron discovered in this impasse an opportunity to
make a show of strength which might improve his bargaining power later.
He publicly pronounced General Zachary Taylor to be a Democrat and
endorsed him for president. Taylor had enough of the legendary appeal
of Andrew Jackson to become immediately formidable, but even Cameron's
own partisans acknowledged that to call the general a Democrat was
"political prostitution."6 Nonetheless, the movement grew apace. Cameron
set up his brother James as editor of the Democratic Sentinel, a new pro-
Taylor newspaper in Lancaster, and took a leading part on the floor of a
convention at Harrisburg on June 26 which endorsed Taylor and lauded
Senator Cameron.7
Polk was worried about the increasing popularity of Taylor, and
some Congressmen considered a resolution censuring him for what they
considered disobedience of orders. Buchanan complained that Taylor
should never have consented to an armistice after the battle of Monterey
but soon changed that tune when public resentment rose against Folk's
charge that Taylor was "incompetent to command a large army." Davy
Lynch wrote that it reminded Pittsburghers of the attempts to censure
General Jackson, and if Taylor could not command a large army, he still
had "the knack of flogging a larger one with a very small one," which
answered the same purpose.8 By early fall, the Democratic drive for
196
STILL HUNT FOR THE PRESIDENCY* 1848
Taylor in Pennsylvania had still further embittered, if that could be
possible, the relations of Buchanan's friends with Cameron's. Forney told
Buchanan: "As for Cameron, he pollutes Taylor with his prostituted
praises. . . . Every enemy that you now have was made in some way more
or less connected with that bold intriguer. God in Heaven knows you have
paid a dreadful penalty for the court which he has professed to pay you.
My deliberate opinion is now that you have not an enemy who is not a
more trusty friend than Simon Cameron."9 Cameron's endorsement
wrote finis to Taylor's candidacy among Pennsylvania Democrats.
In a very different way, Cameron's move also threatened Bu-
chanan's candidacy by infuriating the Frazer-Champneys men in Lancaster
to the final breaking point. Since Buchanan still refused to renounce
Cameron, they at last repudiated Buchanan and came out strongly for
Dallas. This movement had been brewing ever since Cameron's tricky
capture of the senatorship, but until now Forney and others had been
able to prevent an open and formal break. The truce abruptly ended.
Frazer declared war by announcing that Buchanan had refused to pay his
personal tax to Lancaster County for the preceding several years, on the
ground that he was now a resident of Washington. He had disclaimed his
state to save a paltry ten-dollar bill and now wanted to be called a "favorite
son.'7 This story, developed in many forms by Frazer, ran the rounds of
the opposition press.
Frazer's charge was partly true. A county official had asked
Buchanan whether, since he would reside in Washington permanently
while he was Secretary of State, he should be billed for local taxes. He
had replied that he understood from other Cabinet officers that such tax
was usually remitted under these circumstances. The question was still
not settled when Frazer gave out the story. Buchanan's friends begged
him to ignore the fracas and by all means to avoid a newspaper controversy
with Frazer, but Buchanan was more nettled than usual and wanted to clear
himself. He wrote a long exposition of his relationship with Frazer, con-
cluding with the facts of the tax matter, and then wisely sent it to Forney,
who read it to selected politicians but kept it out of print.
Frazer's father had befriended Buchanan, presented him with a
kw library, and helped him build up a practice. Buchanan rewarded this
kindness over the years by using his influence to secure political jobs for
most of the family, both the Frazers and their in-laws, the Steeles. Half a
dozen of them were drawing salaries, thanks to Buchanan, by 1845. Reah
Frazer wanted more. As Buchanan told the story, Reah's break with him
coincided not with the Cameron election, but with Buchanan's refusal to
promote another sinecure for one of the clan. This, claimed Buchanan,
was the source of Frazer's hostility; the other matters he raged about
merely served as convenient excuses to cloak his personal spite.10
197
JAMES BUCHANAN
Private circulation of this story served to keep the effects of the
attack localized, and leading politicians recognized that Buchanan's estimate
of Frazer's motive was perfectly defensible; they understood also that the
tax episode reflected a problem common among men who spent years away
from home in government service. But how would the voters of Lancaster
County react? Frazer, Champneys and Stambaugh could very likely control
them and vote Buchanan down in his own ward and precinct, unless some-
one took prompt action, and this result would kill him off in the Pennsyl-
vania contest for delegates to the nominating convention.
The Pennsylvania convention at Harrisburg to pick delegates
to the national convention of the Democratic party was scheduled for
March 4, 1848. Counties held their local meetings to choose delegates to
Harrisburg at various times. Lancaster County Democrats picked September
1, 1847, for their meeting, a month in advance of the date of the state
election for governor. At that meeting one of Cameron's friends, by
prearrangement, submitted a resolution in favor of Buchanan. Frazer, as
Cameron had anticipated, denounced the resolution and had it voted down.
He then obtained approval of a slate of delegates to Harrisburg, all but one
committed to Dallas for president, and concluded by ramming through a
resolution that Buchanan ought to be read out of the Democratic party!11
The attack shocked and frightened Frazer's own colleagues, for
it suddenly dawned upon them, as upon Buchanan, that the Lancaster
County movement might defeat Shunk. The Lancaster group had identified
itself intimately with him, and if it now appeared that a vote for Shunk
meant a vote against Buchanan, they both might ultimately lose. Buchanan
came out strongly for Shunk and the governor cut himself entirely loose
from the conflict, while Forney did his best to soften the damage by making
Frazer look ridiculous and threatening to "lug him out by the throat" and
expose the family salary grab. The suspense ended on October 14, when
Shunk routed his Whig opponent by a comfortable majority. Forney wrote
to Buchanan the next day that he would come to Washington to prepare
for the future and "to see how we shall dispose of Frazer. The fight for the
nomination will begin from the jump. I see Dallas and his folks at work. "12
Buchanan hoped for some help from Governor Shunk, but that
worthy, pressed equally hard by the friends of Dallas, prayed good God,
good Devil, not knowing which way to turn, and finally declared his
emphatic neutrality. He still had his troubles, however, because the
presidential question whittled away his own friends until there were
"devilish few of them left to be neutral."13
All efforts now centered on control of other county delegations
to the Harrisburg Convention which would select the Pennsylvania delega-
tion to Baltimore. Buchanan felt confident of strong support in all but a
few scattered counties outside of Philadelphia, but the key to success lay
198
STILL HUNT FOR THE PRESIDENCY • 1848
in that city, with its huge quota of 85 delegates. Forney, aided by half a
dozen aggressive workers devoted to Buchanan, undertook to reduce this
stronghold and beat Dallas on his own ground. It was a bold game for a
newcomer to that aloof and aristocratic region and deserved more of
Buchanan's active political and financial aid than he gave.
Forney began by holding weekly meetings with two or three dozen
workers at his own home. He instructed them on policy and tactics and
inspired them with "cold cuts and liquid refreshment." Here the leaders
set up finance, ward and publications committees, inaugurated a "Buchanan
Fund," and named two persons from each ward to promote meetings called
"political Wistar Parties" in sarcastic reference to the legitimate ones held
by the city's aristocracy. After much debate they agreed to campaign by
"quiet, silent exertions" in preference to parades, drum-beating, mud-
slinging, and other blatant methods.14 Forney printed 100,000 copies of
the proceedings of the Buchanan Convention of 1843 and mailed out
quantities of Buchanan engravings, but he felt that they did not match in
effect a book dedicated to Dallas who had bought up the whole edition and
franked it all over the state. Cameron, too, created a stir by exhibiting in
a Philadelphia store window a huge painting of himself resplendent in a
flaming scarlet cloak. In response to Forney's pleas to send documents to
the back-country editors, Buchanan planned a mailing of Fremont's report
on his western explorations, but since he did not have the franking privilege
he concluded that the cost would be prohibitive.15
A few weeks before the Philadelphia election of December, both
factions staged huge mass meetings. To the first of these, called a "War
Meeting" and appealing to all Democrats, the Dallas supporters came early
and organized the proceedings half an hour before the Buchanan men
arrived. A fight promptly ensued which lasted until 10 o'clock and ended
with the ejection of the Dallas partisans. Plitt assured Buchanan: "We
had all the decency and, what is better, the rough fellows who do the voting
and the fighting. The battle being now begun openly, nothing remains but
to fight it out."16
The Philadelphia election was heartbreaking: Dallas carried the
city by three votes. If Buchanan had received them, he would have won
Philadelphia Ward and enough candidates to control the balance of the
city delegation. The final tally gave Dallas 47 delegates and Buchanan 38.
It was, said Forney, no disgrace to lose by such a small majority, considering
that they had had to contend with the customhouse phalanx and hostile
municipal judges who threatened not to renew the license of any tavern
keeper who favored Buchanan.
Forney had done a good job, and his aides thought it so remarkable
a showing that they printed a detailed account of the election returns for
statewide distribution. Forney, in truth, had nearly worn himself out.
199
JAMES BUCHANAN
"My whole soul is so absorbed in this fight," he wrote, "that I can think of
nothing else. I dream of it at night. I do not go out into company, for it
makes me chill and distracted. I have even quit drinking— and almost
ceased eating."17
A sidelight, at this point, will illustrate the difference between
Buchanan's campaign methods and those of his managers and expose the
handicaps under which the latter had to work. While the Philadelphia
campaign flamed to white heat, Forney took time to try to save Lancaster
County, where Frazer now dominated the editor of the Lancaster Intel
tigencer, Forney's old paper. May, the editor, wanted to get out and Forney
arranged that W. Hutter of Easton, a man of editorial courage and political
stature, should take the paper. This would cost money, $2,425 to be exact,
and furthermore May demanded some guarantee of other employment.
Buchanan arranged the loan by the devious means of asking
James B. Lane of Lancaster to advance the amount to Christian Bachman,
who would sign it over to Nathaniel W. Sample, who would then give it to
Hutter and receive a note in return. Buchanan would then privately make
good to Lane, thus both hiding and postponing his participation in the
transfer.18
As to May, Forney wrote: "James B. Lane and myself only got
May out of the paper by promising him our influence to get him a clerkship.
You ... I hope, ... will not hesitate to sustain us in all we have done.
Bold and prompt measures are now of the utmost importance, and ordinary
delicacy must not be suffered to interfere with stern duty. We acted for
you." Buchanan replied: "I fear the Clerkship will be a great obstacle in
the way. Suppose May would insist upon this promise. Its recognition &
performance on my part would do me more harm than ten Intelligencers
would do me good, greatly as I esteem the value of the paper. On the
other hand, suppose he should not obtain the clerkship, he might publish
the fact that you had got him out of the paper on this promise. A clerkship
I shall not procure for him, at least not for the present. The money is
nothing when compared with an independent and erect course of con-
duct."19 By midsummer, May still had no clerkship.
The Harrisburg Convention of March 4, far from being a re-
sounding triumph for Buchanan, turned out to be a two-day wrangle in
which Cass and Dallas each came off very strong. Buchanan got a majority
of delegates to the national convention, and the pledge of the minority to
support him until the majority should yield; but the Dallas delegates, com-
mitted to Cass as second choice, greatly weakened Buchanan's bargaining
position. The convention rejected a resolution favoring Buchanan's major
political plank, extension of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific,
and in its place accepted a resolution complimenting Cass and Dallas.
Cameron threw everyone into confusion by suddenly proposing a whole
200
SHIX HUNT FOR THE PRESIDENCY • 1848
slate of national convention delegates chosen from among his own followers,
and no one quite knew whether this move had been sanctioned hy Buchanan
or was merely another Cameron fishing expedition. Forney, chagrined at
the outcome after all his work, had at least the satisfaction to report that
he could deliver the solid vote of the state to Buchanan on the opening
ballots at Baltimore.20
While Forney's crew worked their hearts out to capture Penn-
sylvania, Buchanan tried to develop the broader pattern of support from
his headquarters at Washington. Here he analyzed public opinion and
designed policy to fit its general trend. We have already seen how he
attempted to disassociate himself from unpopular policies- of the Polk
Administration while preserving his party regularity by remaining in the
Cabinet. But the big issue which dominated the thoughts of every party
and every section as the Mexican War drew to a close was what to do about
slavery in the new territories. It was not enough to condemn the Wilmot
Proviso; a workable solution, widely acceptable, had to be devised. Bu-
chanan gave his proposal for solving the puzzle in a letter to a Harvest
Home celebration of Democrats in Reading, Pennsylvania, in August, 1847.
In this "Berks County letter," as it came to be known, Buchanan
stated that he did not expect any northern Democrats to approve of slavery,
but he did expect them to honor the Constitution which left the slavery
question up to the states where it existed. In new territories the problem
had been settled, with great difficulty, by the Missouri Compromise in 1820,
and since then Texas had come into the Union under the same rule. For
the future, "the line of the Missouri Compromise should be extended to
any new territory which we may acquire from Mexico." While this would
safeguard the rights of the South and keep faith, it would not, nevertheless,
result in the extension of slavery. None of the new territory was adapted
to slavery, there would be no means of recovering fugitives to Mexico, most
of the settlers would certainly come from the North and West, and the
population already in residence had long since abolished slavery under
Mexican law.
He concluded: "The question is, therefore, not one of practical
importance. Its agitation, however honestly intended, can produce no
effect but to alienate the people of different portions of the Union from
each other; to excite sectional divisions & jealousies; and to distract &
possibly destroy the Democratic party, on the ascendancy of whose
principles & measures depends, as I firmly believe, the success of our grand
experiment of Self Government.1'21
The concluding paragraph has been quoted in full because writers
generally ignore it as a mere platitudinous peroration, whereas Buchanan
considered it the main element of his idea. To him the problem was not
slavery but the agitation it caused. Slavery had not destroyed the nation
201
JAMES BUCHANAN
and need not destroy it, but the contest over slavery very likely would.
He selected the Missouri Compromise proposal as best suited to answer the
fundamental need— to end the agitation, because it had back of it the
force of tradition. It would permit the Southerners to take slaves into part
of the Mexican cession, but it would not threaten the addition of any new
slave states to the Union.
This letter, the first formal pronouncement by a major political
figure on the touchiest question of the day, got fairly wide and favorable
notice, but it raised the most dust in Pennsylvania because of the Wilmot
Proviso. Lewis Cass professed himself to be surprised. Buchanan's letter,
he said, "was well written, but there was no call at that particular moment
for its appearance; rather there was none for his writing it, and all experi-
ence shows that politicians had better write as little as possible/'22 But
it took Cass only four months to hear the call himself. In December, he
announced his own policy, popular sovereignty, in the "Nicholson letter."
No one will ever know how much these competitive views in-
fluenced the coming Democratic nomination, but it is worth pointing out
that the popular sovereignty idea was peculiarly western in its inception
and appeal. To those who would live in the newly acquired area, the
Missouri Compromise seemed a restriction imposed by the East; popular
sovereignty was a freedom initiated by the West. Buchanan never got this
point, for he never saw the West. He worked out the practical operating
details of his Missouri line proposal with a clarity and simplicity not
matched by the advocates of popular sovereignty, but he failed to appreciate
that frontiersmen would prefer a do-it-yourself policy to a rule imposed
from Washington.
It was an oddity of Buchanan's life that he never travelled very
much in America. He saw more of the continent of Europe during his
Russian Mission than he saw of the United States in his whole lifetime.
Up to 1848 his travels in his own country, with the exception of his jaunt
to Kentucky as a youth, could be circumscribed by a line drawn from
Philadelphia, to Boston, to Buffalo, to Pittsburgh, to Richmond, and back
to Philadelphia. He had no physical aversion to travel, but he hated to
lose touch with his affairs or break his routine. Perhaps most important,
he believed it politically dangerous to roam, and particularly so to make
a pilgrimage for political purposes.
He had no dearth of invitations to go south or west but he turned
them all down. Even in his own restricted orbit, he kept a tight schedule
and visited little. Forney continually complained of his "comet-like" trips
through Philadelphia, reporting "our boys here are very sore because they
did not see you." He spent some time in New York State in the fall of
1846 trying to patch up an agreement between the Barnburners and the
Hunkers, and joined President Polk on his New England trip the following
202
STILL HUNT FOR THE PRESIDENCY • 1848
summer, exasperating his friends by skipping Philadelphia and joining Polk
in New York City. He vacationed at Bedford Springs, visited his sister in
Meadville, and spent the rest of the time in Lancaster or Washington.28
Even if Polk had teen willing to permit political touring, Bu-
chanan would have stayed home. He feared what he had seen happen time
after time to prospective presidential candidates who travelled widely-
They were first of all written down as office seekers out to curry additional
favor; then they were pounced upon by contending factions in each
locality. As a result, they more often gave offense than they built up
support. Buchanan purposely avoided going to Philadelphia with Polk in
1847 because the president had made arrangements to stay with Vice-
President Dallas. When factionism reached its height in the North, he
wrote, "under existing dramstonces, ... I could not visit the States of
New York & Massachusetts unless it might be to pass through them quietly
& rapidly."24
Buchanan knew he could confer with all the important politicians
at Washington, and he believed that conferences with them were more
effective than public appearances at the grass roots. Buchanan had many
firm friends at the common level whom he cherished throughout his life,
but he had little talent for making friends and influencing people on a
political junket. One might say that he was democratic only in his personal
life. He usually declined invitations to speak at public meetings, sending
a letter instead, and avoided party caucuses and conventions. If these
methods constituted a "still hunt for the presidency" then Perley Poore
was right.
Buchanan had no national political organization but utilized his
many friends in a kind of hit or miss program of promotion. In one of his
thriftiest maneuvers he had graciously permitted the Ottoman Porte to
finance part of his campaign. The ruler needed "two or three agriculturists"
who were willing to come to his country as technical assistants and teach
the people to raise cotton. He sent $2,500 with which to pay the agent who
would find these technicians. Buchanan gave the assignment to George
Plitt, who travelled over the South in the search and conferred with
politicians along the route.25
Starting on Christmas Day, 1847, Buchanan undertook his most
strenuous and expensive enterprise in personal politics, a series of dinners
which he gave every week or ten days until the end of Folk's Administration.
Some of these parties were only for members of the diplomatic corps, but
most of them were purely political gatherings. During this period of
entertainment, he wined and dined nearly all the Democratic Senators and
Congressmen, many of the Whigs, and innumerable visiting politicos.
Ordinarily he played host to twenty or thirty at a time. On one occasion
he invited the entire Pennsylvania Congressional delegation, but only half
203
JAMES BUCHANAN
of the members came, and several never had grace enough to acknowledge
the invitation. He invited Judge Stephen A. Douglas regularly, but he
declined, as did Daniel Webster who in former years had often shared the
festive board with Buchanan. The brandy flowed freely, and of champagne
and fine old Madeira there was plenty; but of the conversation, alas, there
is no record. Buchanan considered these dinners a better medium for
airing his views and putting them into circulation than public speeches or
the effusions of a controlled press.26
CONVENTION BLUES
The Baltimore Convention assembled on May 22. Buchanan's friends had
arrived on the ground ten days in advance to hire a large headquarters room
and caretakers for it. They placed their chief hope in the strategy of
holding off Cass, the strongest contender, until the convention admitted he
could not win. This tactic would bring a contest between Buchanan and
Levi Woodbury of New Hampshire, in which Buchanan stood by far the
better chance. The delegates adopted the two-thirds rule and then ran
into a two-day wrangle over New York which had sent full delegations both
of Hunkers and Barnburners. Upon a decision to admit both, but with the
voting strength of only a single delegation, the Barnburners withdrew
angrily and the Hunkers refused to take part in the voting. On the first
presidential ballot, Cass polled 125, Buchanan 55, and Woodbury 53. On
the third ballot, Virginia shifted from Buchanan to Cass and practically
settled the issue, for Cass won on the next ballot. Cameron attributed the
result to Pennsylvania's promotion of the futile effort to compromise the
New York dispute, when strong support of either side might have purchased
at least a part or possibly all of the New York vote. Buchanan blamed
Virginia. 'To trade me off," he wrote, "for the chance of making [John YJ
Mason vice-president & then to fail signally in the attempt was unworthy
of the ancient Commonwealth." But it was all over, and when the Whigs
nominated Taylor a few weeks later Buchanan felt he was lucky to be out
of the contest.27
George Plitt echoed Buchanan's own thoughts when he wrote:
"So soon as the present campaign shall have ended, I shall go to work for
that of '52 I shall not rest until you are in the Presidential chair."28
Buchanan worked for Cass in 1848, but there is no evidence that he over-
exerted himself in the cause. He may very possibly have felt that a Whig
victory would exercise a salutary effect upon his chances in 1852, for it
would demonstrate that the Democracy would have to hearken to the
Keystone State's demands if it wished to win.
The summer brought surprising and disturbing developments.
The disappointed New York Barnburners held their own convention on
204
STCLL HUNT FOR THE PRESIDENCY^ 1848
June 22 at Utica, nominating Martin Van Buren for president on a Wilmot
Proviso platform. In August, a convention of antislavery men at Buffalo
also named Van Buren as their presidential candidate and launched the
Free-Soil party in a blaze of enthusiasm and righteous indignation under
the slogan: "Free Soil, Free Speech, Free Labor, and Free Men."
In Pennsylvania, Governor Shunk grew desperately ill of tubercu-
losis and resigned on July 9, making William F. Johnston, Whig Speaker
of the Senate, the acting governor. Arrangements were then made to fill
the office at the state election of October 10. The Whigs promptly nomi-
nated Johnston, but the Democrats fell into a welter of confusion. Leaders
of all the factions now converged on Buchanan, demanding that he accept
the nomination. Cameron wrote that "it can be presented in such a shape
as to make your acceptance the result of a wish to save the party — as
Wright did in 1844." Plitt predicted that "were we allowed to use
your name for Governor ... we would give the ticket an overwhelming
majority."29 Forney was torn between his wish to see Buchanan become
governor or return to the Senate, inclining somewhat to the latter because
he thought Cameron wanted Buchanan in Harrisburg to prevent a contest
for his own seat in the Senate. The public hue and cry developed so fast
that Buchanan had to make up his mind quickly.
In a letter to A. H. Reeder, he declined and gave the reasons for
his decision. He wished to return to private life and do some writing. He
had already received his share of political honors and did not wish to stand
in the way of others. He must take care of some important affairs pending
in the State Department. He could now gracefully retire with the good
wishes of the party but might not be able to do so later.80 He privately
expressed the hope that Arnold Plumer, Jeremiah S. Black, or William
Bigler might be nominated. But Cameron controlled the issue, and the
nomination went to Canal Commissioner Morris Longstreth.
In the October elections, the Pennsylvania Whigs won the
governorship by a majority of 297 votes of the 336,747 cast; with this
advantage, Taylor was able to carry the state in November by a margin of
13,000. In New York, the Democratic party was so divided by the Van
Buren ticket that all 36 of the state's electoral votes went to Taylor. When
the contest was over, Buchanan's friends admitted they were glad that he
had not been in it "I do not regret the defeat of Genl. Cass," wrote
Davy Lynch, "for I sincerely believe that it will be a useful lesson to the
Huckstering politicians by which his nomination was brought about"31
205
16
THE SAGE OF WHEATLAND • 1849-1852
COUNTRY SQUIRE
When he retired from the State Department, Buchanan had reached the
age of fifty-eight. He had gained weight and his hair had turned white, but
he still walked with a spring in his step. He now habitually wore a high
cloth collar with a flowing white neckerchief which emphasized his height
and gave a kind of distinction to his appearance. Nathaniel Hawthorne
described him as "heavy and sensible, cool, kindly and good humored, with
a great deal of experience." Indeed, he had completed nearly thirty years
of continuous public service. What should he do when he left Washington?
He returned to Lancaster, but because of the recent political
bitterness which had erupted into fist fights between Frazer's men and his
own friends, he did not want to remain in the King Street house. He
certainly would be a contender for the presidential nomination in 1852,
and to entertain political visitors in this exposed location adjacent to the
newspaper offices would be unthinkable.
Furthermore, he needed a larger house. By this time he had
acquired twenty-two nephews and nieces, and thirteen grandnephews and
grandnieces. Seven of these children were full orphans in his immediate
care, and several of the rest were half-orphans. They could no longer be
fanned out at boarding schools, nor could he, the "rich uncle," continue
to depend upon friends like the Plitts and the Kitteras to act as foster
parents. Brother Edward, still a poor country pastor, had too large a
family himself to assume any extra burden and plainly told James that he
now ought to devote his time and money to his less fortunate kinfolk.
Consequently, when Buchanan learned in the summer of 1848
that Wheatland, a lovely country estate situated a mile west of Lancaster,
was for sale, he seized the opportunity to buy it. The mansion had many
personal associations. William Jenkins had built Wheatland and lived
there until recently. His daughter, Martha, had married James B. Lane.
To have Wheatland would keep Buchanan in Lancaster but out of the center
206
THE SAGE OF WHEATLAND • 1849-1852
of the city. Its spacious rooms, broad lawns and well-kept groves of oak
would provide a happy playground for his wards, enable him to assume
the politically strategic role of the simple, dignified country squire, and
give him facilities for entertainment in keeping with the station of an
aspirant to the presidency. He purchased the estate from William Morris
Meredith in December, 1848, and took up residence there the following
spring after retiring from the Cabinet.
No sooner had he established himself at Wheatland in mid-May,
1849, than he began to invite his political friends to visit. To a politician
who addressed a letter for him to Washington, he replied, "I presume you
may have supposed I would be in that City, now the grand theatre of
President making. But this is not my way." His way was to sit in the
study at Wheatland; to write letters day after day; to receive calls quietly;
and to keep himself in a position to say: "I leave my claims to an intelligent
and patriotic Democracy." More than once Miss Hetty found him, late
at night, seated at his desk, his head fallen onto the paper and the candle
guttering by his side.
But all was not politics at Wheatland. Buchanan soon discovered
that a country gentleman has more to do than write letters. "I have a
large and excellent garden," he said, "that is, it would be excellent if
properly cultivated." He eventually got a gardener, one Edward Bolger,
and promptly set him to work setting out 1,200 strawberry plants. He
needed a coachman and general handy man on the place, but the first man
he hired soon grew dissatisfied with his $8.00 per month and keep. The
second, a coachman by the appropriate name of William Whipper stayed
for many years.
After he discovered that weeds grew on the grounds of a country
home in summer, he soon learned that cold winds howled round it in
winter and that Wheatland's equipment suited it far better for summer
than for winter living. He installed a new furnace, put in a new kitchen,
had bookcases built, and enjoyed for the first time in his life the novelty
of house renovation.
By the end of his first year, he had become thoroughly delighted
with his new life, and he assumed with pride and gratification the title which
politics now bestowed upon him: "The Sage of Wheatland." To Eliza
Watterson he wrote, "We proceed in the same ejbhn Trot9 style as when
you were here, without your charming society to enliven the dullness of a
winter in the country." He took great pleasure in sleighing, and many a
crisp wintry morning when the snow crunched underfoot the horses came
prancing down the lane of Wheatland, their bells ajingling, to take him for
a trot out the Marietta Pike. But even more he liked the company of a few
congenial spirits with whom he could crack a bottle of Madeira, talk freely,
and "have a cozy time in the country."
207
JAMES BUCHANAN
In the springtime he made it a practice to get up with the sun to
enjoy the cool beauty of the day's first hours. "The place now begins to
look beautiful," he wrote in April, "and we have concerts of birds every
morning." In summer the house and grounds came alive with children
and young people encouraged by Harriet Lane, now a vivacious and
beautiful young lady of nineteen, who lived at Wheatland and became the
focal point of social activities there. She liked children and welcomed
those of the neighborhood: Anna, Ella and Eddie Gable, Sue Ripley, and
others. They hunted eggs in the barn, went on straw rides, knocked peaches
and pears from the trees with sticks, or invaded the kitchen for fresh-made
apple pie and milk. It pleased Harriet to go into town with her uncle and
call at his favorite tavern, The Grapes, on North Queen Street where,
shortly after their arrival, "the boys" would casually start dropping in.1
Buchanan visited on Harriet all the care and affection and disci-
pline of a doting father on a favorite child, and she responded with love
and pride, although she chafed at the firm restraints he placed on her
impetuosity. When she was fourteen, soon after becoming his ward, he
wrote to her: "I would give almost anything in the world for a niece whom
all could love for her amiability & all respect for her intelligence, nor
would I be severe in my requisitions." Harriet came to doubt the last
phrase, but could not deny that Uncle James, or "Nunc" as she playfully
called him, gave her nearly all a young girl could desire. During her
vacations from school, while he was in the State Department, he sent her
on summer vacations with various of his friends, the Walkers, the Ban-
crofts, the Pleasantons, Adele Cutts, the Plitts and others to the fashionable
resorts at Rockaway Beach, Saratoga Springs and Bedford.
After her first visit to Bedford Springs with her uncle, he expressed
his regret that he had given permission, disapproving of her "keen relish
for the enjoyments there." He turned down her request to spend Christmas
with him in Washington because "it would turn the head of almost any girl
your age to engage in the dissipations of this city & particularly one of
your ardor for pleasure. Your day will come. . . . After your education
shall have been completed & your conduct approved by me, ... I shall be
most happy to aid in introducing you to the world in the best manner.**
At the moment she was in a scrape at school for having started a "clan-
destine correspondence" with a boy she met at Bedford. Her teacher had
intercepted and destroyed his letters and she, too, vetoed the Washington
trip. "With Harriet's peculiarity of temper," she wrote, "indulgence is
subversive of all discipline . . ., one gratification excites a wish for a second
until the exactions become wholly unreasonable."2
In 1846, Buchanan brought Harriet to the Convent School at
Georgetown. "Your religious principles are doubtless so well settled that
you will not become a nun," he assured her. "My labors are great; but
208
THE SAGE OF WHEATLAND •1849-1852
they do not way me down as you write the word. Now I would say
weigh; but Doctors differ on this point."
Shortly after Buchanan moved into Wheatland, Harriet came of
age and into her inheritance. For a time she travelled about, spending
weeks with friends in Baltimore, Philadelphia and Pittsburgh. She charmed
everyone she met, from crusty old Davy Lynch in Pittsburgh to Martin
Van Buren, who took her to dinner in Philadelphia and drank her health
first at a formal party. His son, debonair "Prince John/' paid her active
court, but soon was left far behind in the crush of her admirers. Buchanan
began to refer to her lovers in groups of three to keep it simpler, but he
worried much about her making a suitable marriage.
As Harriet turned twenty-one, he gave her counsel which he
repeated at intervals for the next ten years: "I wish now to give you a
caution. Never allow your affections to become interested or engage your-
self to any person without my previous advice. You ought never to marry
any man to whom you are not attached; but you ought never to marry any
person who is not able to afford you a decent & immediate support. In
my experience, I have witnessed the long years of patient misery & de-
pendence which fine women have endured from rushing precipitately into
matrimonial connexions without sufficient reflection. Look ahead &
consider the future & act wisely in this particular."3
Harriet's brothers were now on their own. James B. Lane ran
a mercantile business in Lancaster and had acquired wealth. Elliot Eskridge
Lane also lived in Lancaster, boarding around the town and helping his
uncle and his brother, by turns, until he should decide upon a profession.
Harriet's older sister, Mary Elizabeth Speer Lane, lived with the Plitts in
Philadelphia, and in 1848 married George W. Baker. She stayed for a
while in Lancaster until her husband went to California with the 49'ers.
Buchanan was delighted to learn that she had turned out to be "a grand
housekeeper. . . . There is no spectacle more agreeable to me than that
of a young married woman properly sensible of the important duties of
her station/'4
Sister Maria, of Meadville, had two children and little money.
Her son James Buchanan Yates held an appointment on board a revenue
cutter. Her daughter by the first marriage, Jessie Magaw, married a young
man named Weaver who had no job. Uncle James hired him as a clerk in
the State Department, getting him a salary equal to those who had served
there for a decade by the device of promoting an $800 raise for the others.
Upon retiring from the Department, Buchanan urged his successor,
John M. Clayton, to retain Weaver, to which Clayton replied: "as to
young Weaver, he minds his business and will be contented & happy,
provided his great uncle will let him alone."5
209
JAMES BUCHANAN
James Buchanan Henry, orphan son of sister Harriet, was seven
years old when Buchanan became his guardian. Until now, he had lived
in the King Street house in Lancaster cared for by Miss Hetty. All of his
uncle's diplomacy failed to induce the youngster to eat vegetables. Bu-
chanan promised him a magic lantern for Christmas, and young James replied
in childish scrawl: "I am trying hard for it & think it will please you when
you hear that I eat vegetables/' but the flesh proved weak. Three years
later, he still had made no progress. Buchanan wrote Harriet from Wash-
ington: "James Henry is here. I intend to commence with him tomorrow
& make him eat vegetables or he shall have no meat. I have not yet
determined on a school for him." He later sent Buchanan Henry to Prince-
ton and in 1851 arranged to have him study law under John Cadwalader
of Philadelphia.6
Brother Edward jealously resented James's wealth and rarely
visited him, although his children often summered at Wheatland and had
a wonderful time. Edward dutifully named one of his boys after his
famous uncle, but this was no longer a novelty. Forney did likewise, and
Dr. Foltz, and James M. Hopkins among many others.
In 1851 the students of Dickinson College called upon the ex-
Secretary of State to negotiate a peace treaty between them and the College
administration after an incident had provoked a mass dismissal of the
junior class. Buchanan, acting as mediator, extracted from the outraged
students a pledge of good behavior and from the faculty a retraction of the
penalty. In 1853 when Marshall College in Mercersburg merged with
Franklin College at Lancaster, Buchanan accepted the presidency of the
Board of Trustees of the new institution, gave $1,000 to it, and spent con-
siderable time helping to select a suitable location in Lancaster for the
campus. His renewed associations with academic people led him to expand
his library and to do more reading. He at last had time to look at the five
volume Life of Washington by Jared Sparks, and to study Madison's newly
published notes on the Constitutional Convention and Elliott's Debates on
its ratification. He dipped into the works of Byron and read a good many
of Sir Walter Scott's novels and the writings of Charles Dickens.
Buchanan could not forsee it, but these days of temporary
political retirement at Wheatland were to be the happiest and most carefree
of his life. His prestige was secure, his friends loyal and confident, and his
future bright. The world caine to his door, constantly filling Wheatland
with gay society and the fascinating discussion of politics. He had money
to spare, a good appetite, and a wonderful vaulted wine cellar fit for the
vintages he now began to collect with the appreciation of a connoisseur.
The press often commented upon his "resisting power against
the fumes of intoxicating drinks," He performed feats that would have
startled the statistician. "The Madeira and sherry that he has consumed
210
THE SAGE OF WHEAT-LAND • 1849 - 1852
would fill more than one old cellar," wrote Forney, who was a good judge
of such matters, "and the rye whiskey that he has 'punished' would make
Jacob Baer's heart glad." The wine was none of your thin potations, but
stout and heady; wine that "would make an old British sea captain weep
joyful tears." He was no single bottle man, either. He would dispose of
two or three at a sitting, beginning with a stiff jorum of cognac and finishing
off with a couple of glasses of old rye. "And then the effect of it! There
was no head ache, no faltering steps, no flushed cheek. Oh, no! All was
as cool, as calm and as cautious and watchful as in the beginning. More
than one ambitious tyro who sought to follow his ... example gathered an
early fall."7
When his stock ran low, Buchanan could use the Sunday drive
to church as an excuse for a trip to Jacob Baer's distillery for a ten-gallon
cask of "Old J. B. Whiskey," which he considered finer than the best
Monongahela. He also liked the name and enjoyed the comments of
guests who thought that the initials stood for James Buchanan.
When Miss Hetty began to entertain gentleman friends, and a
Mr. Evans bid fair to capture her excellent services, Buchanan again
thought about marrying, though we do not know the lady he had in mind.
Possibly it was Mrs. Benson, Mrs. Catron's pretty niece, whom he regarded
highly at the moment. "Should Miss Hetty marry Mr. Evans," he confided
to Harriet, "I shall bring this matter to a speedy conclusion one way or the
other. I shall then want a housekeeper, as you would not be fit to superin-
tend; and whose society would be so charming as that of—-."8
But rich and satisfying as were the maintenance of a family
homestead and the epicurean delights of the life of a country squire,
politics absorbed Buchanan's deepest interest and thought.
THE COMPROMISE OF 1850
The gold rush and California's application for admission as a free State in
1849 brought the slavery issue again to the forefront in Congress. The
Free-Soilers and many Whigs favored excluding slavery from the remaining
territories by Congressional mandate based on the Wilmot Proviso. Most
of the Democrats preferred the doctrine of popular sovereignty, which
denied by implication the right of Congress to legislate on slavery in the
territories. Buchanan thought Congress should act by extending the
Missouri Compromise line to California, thus prohibiting slavery north of
36° 30' and leaving the problem south of that line "to be decided by the
people." He had formally proposed this solution in his Harvest Home
letter of August, 1847. Southern extremists demanded federal protection
of slave property in all of the territories, while a good many people of all
211
JAMES BUCHANAN
sections and parties hoped that the Supreme Court might finally decide
the status of slavery in the territories.
Congress had been bringing new states and territories into the
Union at a record pace during the previous four years. It had admitted
Florida and Texas to statehood in 1845, Iowa in 1846 and Wisconsin in
1848, but Oregon proved a stumbling block and California a major crisis
because of the slavery question. The bill to organize Oregon as a free
territory, introduced in January, 1847, touched off a long and acrimonious
debate that lasted until August, 1848. A year later, when the Californians
set up a free state government and applied for admission, skipping entirely
the territorial stage, neither Congress nor the country was in a frame of
mind to consider the petition calmly. The South feared that it would now
lose the traditional balance of free and slave states in the Senate and fall
into the status of a perpetual minority. This risk it refused to take, and
declared that California should not be admitted unless the South got
guarantees which a hostile majority would have to respect: adequate
provision for the return of fugitive slaves; continuance of slavery in the
District of Columbia; and the right of southerners to carry their slave
property into at least some of the territories.
The Thirty-first Congress, which was almost evenly divided
between Democrats and Whigs, met in December 1849 and prepared to
seek an adjustment of the slavery question. Failure would bring disunion.
Both sides joined in deadly battle from the very outset, casting sixty-three
ballots before they could elect a Speaker. Buchanan participated indirectly
in the fight to organize the House, strongly pushing for Speaker young
Howell Cobb, a Union Democrat from Georgia, and supporting Forney for
Clerk. Forney reported that terrible scenes were enacted. Congressmen
shouted CfLiar" at each other on the floor and exchanged challenges to duel.
"I fear the crisis is at hand, as you have so long predicted," he wrote to
Buchanan. The southerners declared "that they would secede if the
Wilmot Proviso were passed."9 Cobb at length won and Forney lost, but
slavery had dominated the organizational proceedings to the1 extent that
even the opinions of the doorkeeper had to be investigated.
After Congressional debates that lasted throughout the spring
of 1850, Henry day reported out of committee the Senate plan of compro-
mise. This proposed that California should be admitted as a free state; that
Congress should enact a stricter fugitive slave law; that New Mexico and
Utah should be admitted as territories whose inhabitants would decide about
slavery at the time of application for statehood; that the slave trade in the
District of Columbia should be abolished; and that the Texas boundary
should be reduced, in exchange for federal assumption of the Texan debt.
212
THE SAGE OF WHEATLAND • 1849 - 1852
In June southern fire-eaters, meeting at Nashville to discuss
secession, displayed such division of opinion about the proposed compro-
mise that they weakened the effect of their earlier threats. In July,
President Taylor, an opponent of the compromise measures, suddenly died,
His successor, Millard Fillmore, supported them. Friends of the compro-
mise worked energetically in its hehalf, none more effectively than Senator
Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois who had earlier preferred the Missouri line
proposal. By the end of September the plan had been passed in the form
of separate acts of Congress which Fillmore speedily signed. Many people
believed that the crisis had passed.
James Buchanan was not one of these. Throughout the contest
he had been in and out of Washington for conferences and had been writing
letters incessantly to leaders in the Senate.10 He had condemned the course
of Democratic editors, like Ritchie of the Washington Union, for singing
the siren song that "all will be well." "My firm conviction is," he told
Dr. Foltz, "that in four years from this time the union will not be in
existence as it now exists. There will be two Republics , . . there will be
no civil war. ... I sincerely and fervently hope I am [wrong], but such
are my deliberate opinions. Nous verrons."11
Few northerners, for example, knew that the moment California
entered as a free state, the Governor of Georgia, in obedience to an act of
the Legislature, had to call a convention to consider secession. South
Carolina was pressing Virginia to join her in issuing resolutions in favor
of secession. Buchanan gave effective support to John A. Parker who
played a leading role in side-tracking this movement in the Virginia Legis-
lature in 1850.12 Two days after California became a state, a rump session
of the Nashville Convention denounced the Compromise of 1850 and
asserted the right of secession.
Buchanan had to announce his own position on the compromise
measures in preparation for the presidential race of 1852. He thought
that Congress had both the right and the duty to define the status of slavery
in the federal territories, a view he maintained in opposition to the Demo-
cratic party platform of 1848, the Nicholson letter, General Cass's speeches,
and formal declarations of the Pennsylvania Democratic caucus. Buchanan
contended that the Constitution assigned to Congress power over the
territories. Congress had asserted its rightful power in the Missouri
Compromise and ought to keep control. In the vast reaches of the West,
without settled communities and the means of law enforcement, there was
not the slightest possibility that slavery could take root. If the inhabitants
voted, they would vote slavery out; if they did not vote, the slaves would
clear out themselves. The same result would follow whether the Wilmot
Proviso, the extended Missouri Compromise line or popular sovereignty
became law. No kind of legislative mandate could establish slavery in such
213
JAMES BUCHANAN
a region; economics and not politics would kill it. But Congress could
declare the right of the South to migrate with slaves to part of the federal
domain, and such legislation would have the advantage of abating the
current agitation.
Southerners, in the tentative exercise of their right to carry
slaves west, would find out for themselves the economic ineffectiveness of
slavery outside the cotton and rice belt. Such a discovery, proceeding
from the experience of southerners, would undermine the slave system
and gradually confine it to South Carolina and the Gulf Coast states where,
at last, it would succumb to overwhelming public pressure no longer
entirely sectional. By the extension of the Missouri line, the South would
have its "rights," but slavery would not be extended except experimentally.
The experiment would bring in no new slave state but rather prove con-
clusively that slavery could not endure in the West. This economic
determinist view underestimated the potency of the white-supremacist
dogma among southerners.
But Congressional abdication of control, as proposed by the
popular sovereignty doctrine of Cass and now written into the Utah and
New Mexico territorial laws would, Buchanan feared, raise the devil.
Congressional nonintervention would only establish new fighting zones in
the West where the opposing parties would go to war over slavery during
the period of territorial status. Since the question of right was left un-
defined, slavery would exist or not exist as a result of might, as a result of
the power of whatever local force could subdue the opposition in any
territory. Southerners would demand federal protection from attacks on
their property in the territories; antislavery settlers would claim that the
question was local and no business of Congress; the abolitionists would
provoke atrocities; and the combination of excitements would inflame
sectional passions and consume the nation.
Much as he disliked the popular sovereignty provisions of the
Compromise of 1850, Buchanan acknowledged the need for some kind of
settlement. He told Clancy Jones, "I have passed a month in Washington.
. The deep and bitter feeling among the Southern members in regard
to the Slavery question cannot be justly appreciated except by those on
the spot, and not even by them unless admitted behind the scenes."13 To
his friend J. M. Read he confided that the southerners "say with truth,
that whilst the agitation of the Slave question in the North may be sport
to us, it may also prove death to them ... the feeling of the South on this
subject ... is not a political feeling; but one that is domestic & self-
preserving."14
After the adoption of the compromise, Buchanan met the mount-
ing public demand for his opinion of it in a letter to a Democratic meeting
in Philadelphia on November 19, 1850. He took no direct issue with the
214
THK SAGE OF WHEATLAND • 1849-1852
compromise, but by restricting himself to an attack upon the continued
agitation of the slavery issue and a plea for obedience to the Fugitive Slave
Law he expressed by implication his lack of confidence in the agreement of
1850. The fanatical abolitionists, he said, had wrought more damage to
the Negro, both slave and free, in North and South, than any group in the
nation. They had postponed the course of regular and constitutional
emancipation, raised anti-Negro sentiment in the North, forced more
rigorous control of slaves and free Negroes in the South, and brought the
Union into imminent peril. "They have done infinite mischief," he said,
and by their fanatical folly had prevented the achievement of the very
result they claimed to seek.
He pointed out that the new Fugitive Slave Law was exactly the
same as the law of 1793 except that its enforcement now became the re-
sponsibility of federal instead of state officers. He hoped the North would
faithfully enforce it, for it was all that the South had salvaged from the
entire compromise. Buchanan concluded with an impassioned plea for
the Union, "this, the grandest and most glorious temple which has ever
been erected to political freedom on the face of the earth!"16
This letter constituted Buchanan's opening bid for the presidential
nomination in 1852. A week after its publication, he wrote to Robert Tyler:
"I have rarely known anything to take as my letter to the Union meeting
has done. Every mail brings me papers from the South containing favorable
notices of it & some of them speak in very strong terms in regard to the
Presidency. . . . Letters from Washington speak confidentially of my
prospects. If the Pennsylvania Democracy were anything like unanimous,
there could, I think, be no doubt of the result."16
Buchanan anticipated that Lewis Cass would be his most for-
midable rival. Therefore he had to make a clear distinction between his
position and that of Cass on the compromise, not an easy task. A strong
movement had developed within both Whig and Democratic parties to lay
to rest the slavery issue by declaring the recent compromise a "finality."
Buchanan the statesman acknowledged that the country needed a period
of calm after the storm of 1850; but Buchanan the politician distrusted
popular sovereignty and declined to endorse this panacea devised by his
chief competitor. While he determined not to attack the Compromise of
1850 outright, explaining that he saw no prospect of an early modification
of it, he did express doubts that popular sovereignty would work, and
stated that it would give the southerners no protection of slavery in the
territories. Southern extremists applauded this view and flocked to
Buchanan's standard; he welcomed their support though he had no sym-
pathy with their secessionist talk.
When Union Whigs and Democrats invited Buchanan to par-
ticipate in a great "peace meeting" at Baltimore where the delegates
215
JAMES BUCHANAN
proposed to banish the slavery question from the 1852 canvass by jointly
accepting the Compromise of 1850 as final, he declined. Nothing would
be worse, he thought, than a bipartisan agreement on slavery at this
moment, for such a jointure would stimulate the formation of sectional
factions based on the slavery issue in both the North and the South,
exactly the result he had been trying to prevent. Let the Whigs and
Democrats remain enemies on the old, traditional ground that had divided
them from the beginning. The Democrats stood for strict construction
of the Constitution and the reserved rights of the states. The Whigs stood
for consolidated central government. Let them fight the campaign on this
issue which transcended sectionalism and would emphasize the national
scope of each party.
At length, Buchanan recognized that his continued endorsement
of the 36° 30' line cast him in the role of an opponent of the Compromise
of 1850 and threatened his chances of nomination. Although he remained
convinced that popular sovereignty would break down the first time it got
a practical trial, he saw no alternative except to let the trial proceed.
Then, perhaps, the nation would learn its lesson and adopt the other plan.
In February, 1852, Buchanan told a public meeting: "The Compromise
measures are now a 'finality'— those who opposed them honestly and
powerfully, and who still believe them to be wrong, having patriotically
determined to acquiesce in them for the sake of the Union."
THE BAND WAGON ROLLS AGAIN
On the Pennsylvania front, Cameron declared open war on Buchanan. He
cultivated anti-Catholic prejudice to raise a Protestant counterweight to
Buchanan's Irish vote, agitated antislavery excitement, and cried out for
a high protective tariff. He gained influence in the Dallas faction, added
Congressman Richard Brodhead to his bag, and persuaded his followers to
elect Whigs to the State Senate. Buchanan wrote that Cameron had done
him more political injury than "any man living."17
In the Pennsylvania Democratic convention to nominate a
governor in 1851, however, Buchanan's friends won a victory for their
candidate, William Bigler, against the Cameron favorite. On the other hand,
the Pennsylvania Legislature named Richard Brodhead to fill Sturgeon's
senatorial seat. The other Pennsylvania Senator, James Cooper, had been
elected by the triumphant Whigs in 1849. Thus, in the Senate, Buchanan
had to contend with a Whig and a Cameron lieutenant, a difficult plight for
a presidential aspirant claiming to be the "favorite son" of his state.18
The campaign for the governorship of Pennsylvania in 1851
engrossed the interest of the nation and became the subject of excited
editorials throughout the land because of the Christiana Riot of September
216
THE SAGE OF WHEATLAND • 1849 - 1852
11. At this little village in southern Lancaster County, a group of Negroes
and local whites prevented a United States Marshal from serving papers dn
a fugitive slave, shot the slaveowner and assaulted others of the official
party. Buchanan, in all his recent speeches, had warned that the effec-
tiveness of the Compromise of 1850 depended upon the willingness of
northerners to abide faithfully by the terms of the new Fugitive Slave Law.
Now, twenty miles from Wheatland, Pennsylvanians had committed
murder and interfered with agents of the Federal government who had
sought only to enforce the law. A student of the event wrote, "Many
Americans felt the Christiana Riot tested crucial matters: the sanctity of
law; the existence of peace and order; the ethical course of the country;
and the very existence of the nation."
Extremist newspapers, north and south, printed frenzied edi-
torials to voice their views. The Lancaster Saturday Express headlined:
"Civil War— The First Blow Struck," and called the Christiana affray the
"murder fruit" of the horrid "tree of slavery." Southern journals charac-
terized the riot as "wanton," "atrocious," "horrible," "a most foul and
damning outrage," and said that if northerners were going to shoot down
slaveholders "like wild beasts," they would have to leave the Union. But
most papers hoped, like the New Orleans Picayune, that the "sober and
conservative spirit" which had always distinguished Pennsylvania in
sectional crises would "crush within her borders the desperate faction
whose teachings have produced and encouraged these lawless acts." The
Christiana Riot gave national significance to the forthcoming state election.
Bigler's opponent, William F. Johnston, represented the views
of Seward and Scott who favored the Wilmot Proviso, desired a repeal of
the Fugitive Slave Law, and welcomed agitation of the slavery issue. Wrote
Buchanan, "The eyes of every true patriot in the Nation will look ... to
the result in Pennsylvania. Should her people . . . re-elect Johnston, this
would be a fatal index." Bigler's election in October, Buchanan believed,
did more "to tranquilize the South, to restore peace & harmony between
the Slave and the non-slave-holding States & to preserve the Union, than
any event which has occurred since the commencement of the unfortunate
agitation."19
Bigler's victory proved a powerful antidote to the rumors which
Cameron had spread of Buchanan's inability to carry Pennsylvania and
augured the selection of a strong Buchanan delegation to the Baltimore
Convention, a delegation which would be named at a Harrisburg state
convention on March 4. The usual local fights preceded this. In Berks
County, a meeting unanimously rejected a resolution in Buchanan's favor.
"Just the thing for Brodhead to frank around," wrote Buchanan with a
grimace.20 In Philadelphia, the Buchaneers moved an amendment to a
Cass resolution, substituting Buchanan's name. The chairman put the
217
JAMES BUCHANAN
motion to a voice vote, declared the amendment carried without any
marked evidence to support his decision, received a motion to adjourn, and
' ' " ' *~ " ,who
got a piece of his coat but no endorsement of their candidate.21
At Harrisburg, the convention gave Buchanan 94 votes; Cass, 31;
Sam Houston, 2; and Robert J. Walker, 2. On a motion to make it unani-
mous for Buchanan, the vote came out 103 yea and 30 nay. The next day
Buchanan sat down at his desk and wrote in his "Little Black Book" the
name of every delegate to Harrisburg, endorsing after each the letter "B"
or "C" (Buchanan or Cass), and to make sure he would never forget the
traitors, he made an entry four pages later headed ''Protesters at the 4
March Convention, 1852," under which he wrote again the names of the
thirty whom Cameron controlled.22 But a ray of sunshine broke through
in the decision that the majority would impose the unit rule at Baltimore.
Buchanan could therefore announce to the world that he went into the
Baltimore convention with the solid support of the delegation of his home
state. Privately he predicted that "the Cameron clique will resort to every
trick to diminish the force of the State nomination," and these rebellious
delegates, "while instructed to support me, will stab me under the fifth rib
whenever an opportunity may offer."23
In many other states Buchanan had not exactly an organization
but a coterie of friends who actively campaigned for him. Anyone who
reads Folk's diary will gather from it the impression that his Cabinet had
no very high regard for Buchanan; yet most of its members joined the effort
to nominate him in 1852: Clifford of Maine, Toucey of Connecticut,
Bancroft of Massachusetts, Mason of Virginia, and Johnson of Tennessee.
Walker stood off, but Marcy would have come along except for the fact that
the New York Barnburners fired his own ambition for the nomination as a
means of bringing themselves back into the party. Slidell thought Buchanan
ought to come to Saratoga in the summer for missionary work among the
New Yorkers, but this he declined to do.2*
The state conventions in Pennsylvania, Mississippi, Tennessee and
Alabama favored Buchanan, but there the good news stopped. California
and Maryland rejected him and New Jersey, because of a local fight, went
for Cass. In Louisiana Slidell, in order to defeat the Soute forces who
were pledged to Douglas, had to join the Cass men.25
Virginia held the key. Here Buchanan's friend, John A. Parker,
persuaded Henry A. Wise, the energetic, hot-headed leader of the dominant
Democratic faction in the Old Dominion, to back Buchanan. Wise saw
in him a means to combat his rival, R. M. T. Hunter, who ran with the
fire-eaters and supported Douglas. If Virginia did not support Buchanan
at Baltimore, Wise said he would "break up the Democratic organization
in the State."26 John Y. Mason, Thomas Ritchie and other Virginia
218
THE SAGE OF WHEATLAND • 1849 - 1852
worthies worked with Wise, but Buchanan felt that so much depended upon
success here that he visited Richmond for a few days in the spring of 1852,
When he learned that Cameron had sent several deputies to
Richmond, he dispatched Lynch and David R. Porter to the scene. They
arrived and helped Wise run the meeting, which proved something of a job
as most of the county delegates had never attended such a gathering before
and had no idea what to do. Wise almost destroyed his own plans by
demanding a pledged Virginia delegation, contrary to all prior party pro-
cedure, but he soon backed down and delivered to Buchanan an unpledged
delegation friendly to him. Lynch had to write to Buchanan for money to
get out of Richmond, and with the $40 he received proceeded to Washing-
ton. From there he wrote: "Your friends have no organization in this
place. The friends of all the other candidates have."27
This news stimulated Buchanan to more letter writing. He
sought in this last month before the nomination, to convince the friends
of Douglas that their hero could not possibly win in 1852, but that he could
be chosen in 1856 if he supported Buchanan now. Buchanan warned that
Cass could never win Pennsylvania, and if nominated he would be sure
to lose the election.
Delegates poured into Washington during the last two weeks of
May to sniff the political atmosphere before going to Baltimore where the
nominating convention would open on June 1. There the motley crowd
overflowed all the hotels. People slept where they could, if not in beds
then on bare boards. It had recently dawned on some states that by sending
large delegations they might carry added influence through sheer mass.
Pennsylvania had doubled its delegation, and Virginia sent 69 delegates to
cast 15 votes. On opening day nearly 700 delegates scrambled for the
296 chairs.
By the next morning the local arrangements committee had
provided adequate seating facilities, and the convention finally got under-
way with its organization. Buchanan's supporters fought a motion to
ballot immediately for the nominees, demanding that the platform should
be submitted for adoption first, for they wished to make every candidate
toe the line on details of the Compromise of 1850. 'But the convention,
155 to 123, decided to name the candidate first, and then to endow him with
principles. Cass led on the early ballots, and Buchanan ran second with
between 90 and 100 votes. Douglas and Marcy had 20 or 30 each, and
half a dozen favorite sons polled scattering votes. By Friday, Cass had
declined and Douglas had strengthened his position, but no decision seemed
near. Then John W. Davis, chairman, after a heated debate, ruled that
each delegation might retain or reject the unit rule, as it saw fit.
After this ruling, Buchanan jumped to the top with 104 votes;
Cass dropped down to 33; Douglas came up to 80, and Marcy held on to his
219
JAMES BUCHANAN
New York votes. Here the procession stopped. Buchanan's friends begged,
bargained, and bullied to get Marcy to lend a hand and push the Buchanan
band wagon, but the New Yorkers refused, feeling sure that Buchanan could
not go further without them. After this, Buchanan's poll declined, and his
bid collapsed. Hearing the news in Lancaster, he immediately wrote to
Porter, the head of his delegation: "From the result of the ballotings
yesterday, I deem it highly improbable that I shall receive the nomination."
He thanked his friends, declined positively to be considered as vice-
president, and announced his determination to go into final retirement
without regret.28
Meanwhile Douglas went through the cycle, neared 100 votes,
and then came down. Cass, down to 27, made a comeback to 131 votes,
but could get no more. Marcy then began to climb, running his score of
votes to 98 on the forty-sixth ballot. New York now came in sackcloth and
ashes to beg Pennsylvania and Virginia for Buchanan's votes, but received
stony glares and curses, punctuated by tobacco juice. The Buchaneers had
already decided the next move: to bring in by easy stages the name of
Franklin Pierce of New Hampshire. On the forty-ninth ballot, the under-
cover work of the Pierce men, supported by Buchanan delegations, came
into play. After a number of small states had voted for Pierce, the delega-
tions from New York, Indiana, and Pennsylvania retired to caucus. At
the critical moment, Pennsylvania returned to cast for Pierce the ballots
that pinned down his nomination. By the time the roll call was complete,
Pierce had amassed 282 of the 296 convention votes.29
Buchanan and his friends collected their reward in the nomina-
tion of William R. King of Alabama as vice-president. It constituted more
a personal tribute than a political triumph, for King had an incurable
disease which made it nearly certain that he would not survive another
administration.
Dejected, Davy Lynch wrote that "if New York had not acted
the cDog in the Manger' you would have been the nominee."80 At Wheat-
land, the Sage sat at his desk reading scores of letters of condolence, and
drafting appropriate replies. Of these, his remarks to Robert Tyler con-
tained the gist of all: "I have received your favor of yesterday, condoling
me on my defeat. You ought rather to congratulate me on the ability,
devotion & energy of my friends. They have fought a good fight & have
deserved success. It was not their fault if they could not command it.
For the first time, I have had a fair trial & have been fairly defeated ....
I give you now your final discharge after long, able & faithful service, but
live in the hope that I may yet be able to manifest my gratitude to you by
something more decisive than words."31
220
17
A MISSION FOREDOOMED • 1852-1854
ADVICE AND DISSENT
Buchanan took little part in the contest between Franklin Pierce and
Winfield Scott until the autumn of 1852 when the activities of the Free-
Soilers threatened to upset the interparty truce on slavery and split the
Pennsylvania Democrats. The publication of Harriet Beecher Stowe's
vivid and inflammatory novel, Unck TonCs Cabin, during the campaign,
the Christiana Riot, and the Free-Soil convention at Pittsburgh, which
nominated John P. Hale for president on a platform that "Slavery is a sin
against God and a crime against man," fanned the slavery question in the
Keystone State to white heat.
Some of Buchanan's friends advised him to remain aloof. "Avoid
the crowd," they urged, "and in the dark hour . . . you will be brought in
'to calm the troubled waters & allay the storm'. . . . Much evil will grow
out of the Pittsburgh Convention, and four years hence, you will be
wanted."1
But Buchanan felt otherwise. In September he presided at a
Democratic rally at Reading, Pennsylvania, sharing the platform with
Senator Stephen A. Douglas, Governor Bigler, and visiting worthies from
Massachusetts, Maryland, and Tennessee.2 In October he addressed a
mass meeting at Greensburg where, in a ninety-minute speech, he assailed
Scott and warned against "elevating to the highest civil trust the commander
of your victorious armies." General Scott and the northern Whigs had
been hedging on their pledge to respect the finality of the 1850 Compromise,
and some of them insisted on repeal of the Fugitive Slave Law, regardless
of the consequences. Buchanan hit the keynote of the Democratic cam-
paign when he said, "I view the finality of the Compromise as necessary to
the peace and preservation of the Union The great political question
... is, ... will the election of Scott, or the election of Pierce, contribute
most to maintain the finality of the Compromise?"3
Franklin Pierce won the presidency, carrying all but four states.
221
JAMES BUCHANAN
Pierce had great personal charm but little administrative experience.
Affable and sincere, he tried earnestly to please and made promises in the
enthusiasm of the moment which later he either forgot in the press of
events or found impossible to fulfill. The forty-eight-year-old president
represented the "Young America" wing of the Democrats and hoped to
free his party from the control of the "Old Fogies."
Before the inauguration, Pierce asked Buchanan for counsel on
the launching of the new Administration. His letter had the ring of the
dedicated young man seeking advice from the elder statesman, but it
contained one peculiar sentence. "I think," Pierce wrote, "I am expected
to call around me Gentlemen who have not hitherto occupied Cabinet
positions." This plan not only excluded Buchanan but rejected his entire
leadership, for it ostracized the whole Polk Cabinet. Buchanan advised
Pierce not to take the "Young America" idea so seriously as to abandon
all the experienced men of the party. This action "could not be very
gratifying to any of them," and would appear to be an intentional rebuke
to the Polk Administration. Buchanan counselled delay in choosing the
Cabinet and disagreed with Pierce's proposal to incorporate all political
viewpoints in it. "7%e Cabinet," he said, "ought to be a unit. . . . General
Jackson, penetrating as he was, did not discover this truth, until compelled
to dissolve his first Cabinet on account of its heterogeneous & discordant
materials." He recommended either Judge James Campbell or David R.
Porter as the Pennsylvanians who most deserved a Cabinet post.*
It suddenly occurred to the Sage of Wheatland that he was
getting old. He enjoyed joking about himself as a "Middle-Aged Fogy,"
but he now wrote to Forney: "I am surely becoming an old fogy and have
got far behind the rapid march of the age."6 His teeth bothered him, and
he had suffered the worst bilious attack of his life just before the election.
Staying at hotels aggravated him, and travel wore him out. cel am rapidly
becoming a petrifaction," he told saucy Eliza Watterson. "In truth I
daily become more and more fond of my retirement, and always feel
reluctant to leave home, though this I am often compelled to do."6 He
was already more than threescore, and had lived longer than his father.
It seemed a long while since anyone had called him "Jimmy"; now he was
"Old Buck."
The winter dragged on and there was no word from Pierce about
Cabinet appointments or policies. Not until after the inaugural address,
in which the only Buchanan influence seemed to be a statement that the
Administration would "not be controlled by any timid forebodings of evil
from expansion," did the country at last learn who would form the Cabinet:
William L. Marcy of New York would take the State Department; James
Guthrie of Kentucky, the Treasury; Jefferson Davis of Mississippi, "War;
James C. Dobbin of North Carolina, Navy; Caleb Gushing of Massachusetts,
222
A MISSION FOREDOOMED • 1852 - 1854
the Attorney-Generalship; Robert McClelland of Michigan, Interior; and
James Campbell of Pennsylvania, the Post Office. These men represented
friends of all the prominent contenders of 1852 except Douglas.
Buchanan was deluged with Pennsylvania requests for letters of
recommendation to the president. His "Application Book'* for the spring
of 1853 contains pages of names of applicants and the jobs they sought.
But instead of appointments, Buchanan got disappointments. To Robert
Tyler he wrote: "I urged the appointment of Governor Porter with all my
might as collector; but my strong recommendations were disregarded by
the President as they have been in every instance. . . . I not only recom-
mended Porter, but opposed Brown. How, then, can I ask Brown for
appointments for my friends? ... I expect daily to hear of the sacrifice of
Van Dyke & the appointment of Dallas. I now know exactly my position. . . .
I shall bear all philosophically, but take an outside seat & observe the
Grand Drama."7
THE MAN WHO WAS ORDERED TO FAIL
On the same day that he posted this letter, Buchanan received a note from
Pierce asking him to accept the Mission to England. Obviously he could
not, in view of the prior rejection of so many of his Pennsylvania friends,
nor did he relish Marcy as his boss; but he could, perhaps, make some
capital out of the offer. He sent a noncommittal reply. At dinner with
Pierce and Slidell on April 8, Buchanan raised questions which had been
disturbing him. Would not the important negotiations be conducted at
Washington, as was customary? "No," Pierce replied. "It is my intention
that you shall settle them all in London."
"What will Governor Marcy say to your determination?" asked
Buchanan.
"I will control this matter myself," replied the president.
Buchanan thought that this arrangement would create trouble,
but Pierce disagreed. The Cabinet had understood that negotiations would
center in London when they unanimously endorsed Buchanan.
Buchanan then complained that "in all your appointments for
Pennsylvania, you have not yet selected a single individual for any office
for which I recommended him . . . and if I were now to accept the mission to
London, they might with justice say that I had appropriated the lion's share
to myself. ... I could not and would not place myself in this position."
Pierce emphatically assured him that Pennsylvania would receive "not one
appointment more or less" on account of the British mission, which would
be considered "as an appointment for the whole country."
With a clear understanding of all these matters, Buchanan felt
inclined to accept the post, but on Sunday, when he learned that the Senate
223
JAMES BUCHANAN
planned to adjourn the next day, he assumed that his name would not be
proposed, probably because Marcy did not want to relinquish the negotia-
tions. That noon Jefierson Davis told him that Pierce would make the
appointment after adjournment, and the Senate would confirm it at the fall
session. Buchanan immediately announced that he had no intention of
departing on a mission without prior Senate confirmation. By evening
couriers had spread word that Senators should not leave town but be on
hand in the morning to transact business. Pierce sent in Buchanan's name,
and the Senate confirmed the appointment on Monday morning. After
another call on the president to make sure all arrangements were clear,
Buchanan felt that he stood on solid ground. Pierce even approved on the
spot his request to have his friend, John Appleton of Maine, for Secretary
of Legation.8
After a few weeks had passed, Buchanan knew he had let himself
in for a bad bargain. Pennsylvania got no appointments. His three
strongest recommendations were all turned down on the ground that the
London Mission filled the state quota for jobs. On May 17 he went to
Washington. The president could not explain what had happened, but he
did reaffirm the guarantee that Buchanan's job should not be counted as
any part of the quota of Pennsylvania patronage. But Buchanan observed,
"I had not been in Washington many days before I clearly discovered that
the President and cabinet were intent upon his renomination and re-
election It was easy to perceive that the object in appointments was
to raise up a Pierce party, wholly distinct from the former Buchanan, Cass,
and Douglas parties; . . . and I readily perceived . . . why my recommenda-
tions had proved of so little avail."9
For several weeks, Buchanan worked daily in the State Depart-
ment, conferring frequently with Marcy and occasionally with the president,
and soon he began to suspect that neither intended to transfer negotiations
to London. In fact, it became apparent to Buchanan that Marcy intended
to keep for himself in Washington those negotiations which promised a
successful conclusion, and to transfer to London questions which seemed
hopeless of settlement.
During June, Buchanan worked harder at diplomacy than ever
in his life. Personally he wanted no part of a mission prearranged to fail,
but neither did he want to sacrifice the chance for a full-scale settlement of
the controversies with Great Britain merely to give Marcy the credit for
concluding a few minor treaties. He went over the whole area of Anglo-
American relations time after time with both Pierce and Marcy, protesting
against handling some questions in Washington and others in London, and
said he would stay home unless Pierce kept his promise to transfer negotia-
tions to London.
Three diplomatic questions pressed for attention. First, Great
224
A MISSION FOREDOOMED • 1852 - 1854
Britain, in defiance, Buchanan believed, of the Monroe Doctrine and of the
Clay ton JBulwer Treaty, had seized the Bay Islands off the coast of Honduras
and established a protectorate of the Mosquito Coast in the vicinity of
Greytown. These two points, insignificant as they looked on a map, com-
manded the entrance to any isthmian canal which might be built across
Nicaragua. Second, fighting threatened in Nova Scotia and Newfoundland
over the rights of Americans and Englishmen to catch fish in coastal waters
and dry them on uninhabited shores. Third, the British government wished
to negotiate a reciprocal trade treaty between Canada and the United States.
Marcy and Pierce wanted to use a treaty of reciprocity as the
quid pro quo to achieve privileges for American fishermen and planned to
conduct these negotiations at Washington. Buchanan could handle the
Central American business in London. But he argued that Britain's foray
into Central America constituted a breach of treaty and an insult to the
national honor, and that prior abandonment of these colonies "ought to
be a sine qua non in any negotiation on any subject with the British govern-
ment." Said he:
With what face could we ever hereafter present this question of
violated faith and outraged national honor to the world against
the British government if whilst, flagrante delicto, the wrong un-
explained and unredressed, we should incorporate the British
North American provinces, by treaty, into the American Union,
so far as reciprocal trade is concerned? How could we, then,
under any circumstances make this a casus belli? If a man has
wronged and insulted me, and I take him into my family and
bestow upon him the privileges of one of its members, without
previous redress or explanation, it is then too late to turn around
and make the original offense a serious cause for personal hos-
tilities.10
Beyond this, he denied that fishing rights constituted an equiva-
lent for a free-trade agreement with Canada. Let reciprocal trade be used
as the lever to force England out of Central America, with war as the
alternative if she should refuse to withdraw. As to fishing grounds, the
United States had as much right to the ocean as England.
Buchanan postponed his departure, released Appleton from his
appointment as Secretary of Legation, and flooded the State Department
and the White House with arguments, facts, international law, and threats
to resign. Pierce neglected to answer some of the letters, but he continued
to hold out the prospect that Buchanan might possibly be given the chance
to run the show in London.
Buchanan had not yet picked up his commission from the State
Department. When Pierce ignored two of his letters in June asking for
225
JAMES BUCHANAN
definite instructions, Buchanan wrote a third requesting that he be per-
milled, "in case your enlightened judgment has arrived at the conclusion
that Washington & not London ought to be the seat of the negotiations,
most respectfully to decline the mission." Pierce answered, still keeping
the door open. Finally, on July 7, Buchanan for the first time saw the
instructions which had been drawn up for him. As he expected, he got
only the Central American negotiation. Marcy would keep the leverage
at Washington for his own purposes.
Buchanan wrote back to Pierce that he wanted to confer with
him during a forthcoming presidential visit to Philadelphia, and that in the
meantime, he should look out "for some better man to take my place."
But he had lost the game and knew it Marcy knew it, too. "Old bachelors
as well -as young maidens do not always know their minds," he told Edward
Everett. "If he ever meant to go he can assign no sufficient cause for
changing his purpose."11 Pierce said to Forney, who thought Buchanan
ought to decline: "Why should he not go? The greater the obstacles
thrown in his way, the greater will be his triumph when he succeeds."12
But to resign now would make Buchanan look like a querulous old man,
quitting in a pet because he could not have everything his own way. Pierce
had trapped him and there was no way out. He had given him a mission
foredoomed to failure, robbed him of his patronage, and put a gag in his
mouth. Had anyone ever been so taken to the market!13
The now vacant Secretaryship of Legation brought a request
from Henry A. Wise who had first urged Buchanan's appointment and had
his heart set on the selection of his son. Pierce had a different suggestion,
and Henry W. Welsh also wanted the job. Forney learned to his amaze-
ment that Daniel E. Sickles of New York would like to go to London.
Sickles was a wealthy and influential Democrat, a "hard" Hunker, a good
friend of the president, and had married a beautiful young wife. Buchanan
interviewed him at Wheatland and within a week had him appointed. If
he counted upon the pleasure of a cozy time with Mrs. Sickles in London
he was destined to disappointment, however, for the new secretary left her
at home and travelled abroad with his mistress, Fanny White.14
Buchanan turned his business affairs over to his nephew, Elliott
Eskridge Lane of Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, and James L. Reynolds of
Lancaster, giving them power of attorney to handle some $150,000 in bonds,
mortgages and stocks. Another $50,000 he assigned to his brother Edward,
his nephew James B. Henry, and agents in New York and Washington. He
kept smaller sums of ready cash on deposit with Riggs and Corcoran of
Washington and the Chemical Bank of New York, and transferred some
funds to Rothschild's in London. Having completed these arrangements,
he informed his agents: "I believe I do not owe a debt in the world. . . .
My pew rent in the Presbyterian Church is to be paid, this date." He had
226
A MISSION FOREDOOMED* 1852-1854
arranged to have tax payments made for James B. Henry and Harriet.
She was to stay, first with friends in Virginia and later with the Plitts in
Philadelphia, until he could bring her to London the following summer.
Lane and Reynolds should give Miss Hetty any cash she requested for the
care of Wheatland, should pay 7 per cent interest for any money put in
their keeping by his brother or nephews, and collect at least 5 per cent on
money put out on loan.15
Declining a farewell dinner in Lancaster, he left quietly on
August 3, disappointed his Philadelphia friends by failing to stop to say
goodbye to them, and proceeded straight to New York where he embarked
on the steamer Atlantic. After a stormy passage of ten days, he arrived at
Liverpool where the Legation Attach^ met him and took him to the Claren-
don House in London.
For the first week he could scarcely believe he was in England.
Slidell was there, and John Ward of Boston, and Robb of New Orleans.
With Ambassador Ingersoll and the New England philanthropist, George
Peabody, Buchanan called on the Marchioness of Wellesley, the former
Miss Caton of Baltimore, now residing at Hampton Court. She had two
sisters, one of them now Lady Stafford and the other the Duchess of Leeds.
Buchanan had known them all in earlier days when they were Baltimorean
belles and through them gained an immediate entree into the circle of
British nobility. On August 23 he went to the Isle of Wight with Ingersoll
where the Earl of Clarendon, British Secretary of Foreign Affairs, presented
him to Queen Victoria.
THE COURT OF ST. JAMES
Buchanan arrived in England just a week after Parliament had adjourned,
and the nobility had already scattered to country estates or to the Continent,
leaving London dull and deserted until the "season" should begin again in
February with the opening of Court. Thus he had several months of very
welcome freedom which he used to find quarters for the Legation and to
familiarize himself with his new situation. For the time being he continued
to live at the Clarendon House, but by November 1 he had rented an
establishment at 56 Harley Street which became the United States Legation
during his ministry. On November 11, all hands turned out in noise and
confusion to move the Legation files and equipment into the new quarters.16
John William Gates was dean of the Legation servants by virtue
of eighteen years' service at the American Embassy. His son, William
John Cates, served as butler. Buchanan had a housekeeper who had worked
for several previous ministers. He reported diplomatically to Miss Hetty
at Wheatland that he was "satisfied with her, without being greatly pleased."
In addition to these old hands, Buchanan had brought along Frederick
227
JAMES BUCHANAN
William Jackson, a mulatto manservant he had hired in New York a day
before he sailed. While at first dubious of the wisdom of this impetuosity,
he soon discovered that Jackson was very much of a "find," for he turned
out to be a first-class valet and made something of a hit in London. "I
have been diverted," Buchanan wrote, "to witness the attention he receives
here where the same prejudices do not exist against color as in the United
States. And yet he is homesick & thinks as I do, that there is no place in
in the world to be compared with our Country."17
A problem of Court etiquette arose as soon as Buchanan had been
accredited because a Court Dress Circular issued by Secretary Marcy in
June ran counter to the ceremonial procedure of most European courts.
Marcy asked American diplomats to perform their duties "in the simple
dress of an American citizen," and to avoid the gold lace, ribbons, jewels,
patent-leather boots and aristocratic gewgaws that custom prescribed for
diplomats at ceremonies where a sovereign presided. Buchanan had often
ridiculed the peacock parade and urged the adoption of such a rule, but at
the Court of St. James it gave him serious trouble.
Sir Edward Gust, Master of Ceremonies of the Court, pointed out
that to appear before her Majesty in street clothes would signify a lack of
respect and that the outfit Marcy prescribed would put the minister in
precisely the costume worn by the Court servants, subjecting him un-
intentionally to indignities from everyone. The American rule, Gust said,
would raise a storm of indignation among the British people who would
view it as presumption. He had no alternative but to require the customary
dress and if Buchanan could not wear it, to deny him admittance to the
opening of Parliament and to Court balls and dinners.
Buchanan appreciated the force of these arguments and the
penalty he would pay for refusing to follow the local code. He would receive
no invitations from Court, and thus would receive none from the courtiers.
As he said, he would be "socially placed in Coventry here," a condition
which would not bother him personally but which might ruin the mission,
for1 it would cut him off from all normal sources of information. He
considered a variety of costumes that might solve the problem. Someone
suggested the military uniform of George Washington, which he promptly
cast out as a recipe for subjecting him to everlasting ridicule. He thought
about a plain blue coat with gold buttons embossed with the American
eagle, but he soon abandoned that idea. Having found no answer when
Parliament convened, he did not attend the opening session and thereby
raised a public storm in the press of both nations. The Americans lauded
his independence, and the British condemned this act of "Republican ill
manners" and "American Puppyism." The London Times erroneously
reported that Buchanan sat in evening dress amid the blaze of stars, ribands
228
A MISSION FOREDOOMED • 1852 - 1854
and crosses in the diplomatic box, "unpleasantly conscious of his singu-
larity." Only with difficulty did Buchanan dissuade Parliament from making
the incident the subject of a formal inquiry.
Political pressures raised by the outbreak of the Crimean war at
length brought a calm to this tempest in the wardrobe. The Ministry had
no intention at this time of promoting a breach with the United States over
such trifling absurdity. Buchanan agreed, at British suggestion, to equip
himself with a plain black-handled sword, everywhere the mark of a
gentleman, a visible token of respect to the queen, and a ready means of
identification among the servants.
Dan Sickles, who disliked Marcy's circular because it curtailed
his chance to strut, donned the gaudy uniform of the New York State
Guards, daring Marcy to call it an un-American costume. Buchanan
reported of his first appearance under the new dispensation: "Having
yielded, they did not do things by halves. As I approached the Queen,
an arch but benevolent smile lit up her countenance — as much as to say,
you are the first man who ever appeared before me at Court in such a dress.
I must confess that I never felt more proud of being an American."18
For two months after his arrival, Buchanan heard nothing from
the British Foreign Office. He spent his time familiarizing himself with
Legation procedure, mastering the details of the subjects of negotiation,
and writing letters home. To politicians he uniformly emphasized his
decision not to be a candidate for president in 1856. He exchanged letters
weekly with Harriet, who was beside herself to know how soon she could
come to London to see a duke and meet a queen. She said the trip would
be "the future realization of a beautiful dream." Buchanan responded,
"Like all other dreams you will be disappointed in the reality." He wrote
to Miss Hetty that she gave him "more interesting news than any other
friend" and asked her for a full report on Wheatland and the neighbors.
How was Lara, his Newfoundland dog, and what of the new calf, and who
would fill the icehouse? He sounded a little homesick.
Forney sent him a tirade against President Pierce and ended it
with the prophecy that Buchanan would next occupy the White House.
He replied,
In answer to the last suggestion contained in your letter, I now
say to you in writing what I have repeatedly said in conversation,
that I have neither the desire nor the intention 'to play a very
prominent part in politics for the next seven years.* On the
contrary, this mission is alone tolerable because it will enable me
gracefully and gradually to retire from a strife which is neither
suited to my age nor my inclinations. ... I should have been
highly gratified had I been nominated & elected President in
229
JAMES BUCHANAN
1852; but the office has no longer any charm for me. I write
thus explicitly to you; because the warmth of your friendship
might otherwise induce you to take part in again bringing me
forward as a candidate.19
At last Buchanan received the awaited summons to the Foreign
Office and Clarendon's apologies for the long delay. In the opening inter-
view, the two ran over the problems that might involve their countries:
the Russo-Turkish crisis, the Central American issue, the pending fishery
and reciprocity treaties, and the movement developing in Cuba to liberate
the slaves and set up a Negro government. They agreed that the Central
American question was first in importance, but Clarendon confessed that
he was not familiar enough with the subject for serious discussion. A few
days later Buchanan prepared a summary of the American position and
submitted it to Clarendon.
THE CARIBBEAN CRISIS
By 1850 the British occupied much of the coastal area of Honduras and
Nicaragua. From the time of the Polk Administration, the United States
had protested English intervention in that part of the New World. After
the acquisition of Oregon and California, there was a greater need than
ever for some kind of passage across the Central American isthmus, and
in 1849 the United States negotiated a treaty with Nicaragua for the
exclusive right to build a canal. But the English now held the points of
entry on the Gulf: Greytown, at the head of the San Juan River in Nica-
ragua, and Ruatan Island off the Honduran coast. The conflicting interests
of the United States and Great Britain became a threat to peace, and in 1850
the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was drawn up for the purpose of removing the
danger of an outbreak of hostilities.
By the terms of the agreement neither nation would ever assume
exclusive control of any future canal or fortify any portion of Central
America. Buchanan condemned this pact from the start. "The Treaty/'
he said, "altogether reverses the Monroe Doctrine, and establishes it
against ourselves rather than European Governments."20 Some day, he
feared, there would be "a bloody war with England should she remain as
powerful as she is at present."
Despite the cordiality and freedom that marked the early con-
versations with Lord Clarendon, Buchanan soon learned that back of the
Foreign Secretary's smile lay the hard rock of British policy. Ruatan,
largest of the Bay Islands and the British protectorate of the Mosquito
Indians represented elements of this policy. Ruatan Island, Buchanan
declared, "is one of those commanding positions in the world which Great
230
A MISSION FOREDOOMED • 1852 - 1854
Britain has been ever ready to seize and appropriate. It enables her to
control our commerce in the Caribbean Sea and on its transit to California
and Oregon." As a point of commercial power Great Britain intended to
keep it, treaty or no treaty.21
The British protectorate of the Mosquito King involved the point
of international prestige. Buchanan chided Clarendon for making so big
an issue of so petty a territory, when friendship with the United States
stood at stake over it, but the Foreign Secretary expounded the duty of
a nation with native protectorates all over the world to make good its
promises, even more scrupulously to the small than to the large princes.
As a point of honor, England would sustain the Indian King.22
Without any quid pro quo to induce the abandonment of these
positions, Buchanan had to establish that the British posture in Central
America constituted a breach of treaty with the United States. Success in
this effort would have to bring British capitulation, or an American retreat,
or war. He was therefore astonished when Clarendon introduced casually
into the conversation one day, as if it were a matter of common assumption,
that the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty was entirely "prospective in its operation."23
Buchanan, while recovering from the shock, introduced the newly arrived
fisheries and reciprocity treaty as a manifestation of American friend-
ship and generosity to compensate for British adjustment of the Central
American dispute. Clarendon rejoined that the treaty drove too hard a
bargain with the Canadians and doubtless would be rejected by England.
With negotiations at an impasse during the spring of 1854,
Buchanan turned his efforts to building a recognition in England of the
tremendous potential of good relations with America. He propounded the
theme of Anglo-American friendship based on kindred speech, culture, and
principles of government. These two nations, he thought, should jointly
face the continual threat of world despotism. "There have never been
two nations on the face of the earth," he said, "whose material interests
are so closely identified."24 Britain annually exported to the United States
as much as to all of Europe.
By the end of March, the Crimean War became a reality and
England and France, in an entente corcKo/c, faced the Russian power in the
eastern Mediterranean. Not until mid-April could Buchanan get Clarendon
back on the Central American problem, so busy had he been with duties
connected with the war. At this meeting, the Foreign Secretary, with
marked embarrassment, finally explained to Buchanan the official British
position. Britain considered the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty "prospective,"
that is, it guaranteed all British rights as they existed at the time of ratifica-
tion and applied its restrictions only to subsequent acts. Buchanan pointed
out that according to this contention the treaty confirmed Great Britain's
right to remain in Central America and excluded the United States from it.
231
JAMES BUCHANAN
He acidly asked his Lordship if he really expected anyone to take seriously
this ridiculous interpretation. He had the impression that Clarendon very
reluctantly asserted this view. Buchanan then pointed out that England
had occupied the Bay Islands after the conclusion of the treaty, and even
accepting the "prospective" interpretation— which he never would— the
British would have to get out of Ruatan. Clarendon promised to check the
date of the occupation of the islands, and the interview ended awkwardly.
For the next two months, Buchanan applied himself to the
preparation of a long reply rebutting the British contention. In such an
effort he showed at his best, and his argument won the warm commendation
of Pierce, Marcy, and the Cabinet in Washington, but it brought no reply
from Clarendon.
Whatever hope remained of softening the British stand collapsed
under the impact of the Greytown affair. Punta Arenas, across the river
from Greytown, was occupied by Americans working for the Accessory
Transit Company, an enterprise of Cornelius Vanderbilt to build a road
across the isthmus. The captain of a Vanderbilt ship shot a Greytown
native who sought to board his vessel. When some of the residents tried
to arrest the captain for murder, Solon E. Borland, the United States
Minister, joined a party to prevent his capture, a fight ensued, and someone
slashed Borland's face with a broken beer bottle. President Pierce sent
Captain G. N. HoUins, of the U. S. S. Cyane to Greytown to exact apologies
and reparations for the insult to Borland; Hollins, upon rejection of his
demands, bombarded Greytown until not a mud wall or thatched roof
remained intact. The inhabitants, warned in advance, had all retired to
a safe distance, and no one was hurt.
News of this affair arrived in London just a few days after Bu-
chanan had submitted his paper on Central America. With no information
except what he got from British sources, Buchanan expressed the hope
that Pierce would disavow the act, and Clarendon observed that unless he
did, the outlook would be bleak for a settlement of the Central American
problem. Much to their displeasure, Pierce defended the action of Captain
Hollins as necessary and justifiable. Buchanan tried to sustain his govern-
ment, according to the policies outlined by Marcy, but made as poor a show
of this as Clarendon did in support of the "prospective" interpretation
of the treaty.
Buchanan had long felt that Clarendon sincerely wished to
compromise the issues in Central America but that the Ministry would not
permit it. After Greytown, he changed his mind and suspected that
Clarendon himself prevented a settlement. In one conversation, he told
Clarendon that Britain could end the whole Central American dispute in a
note of twelve lines, if the Foreign Office really wanted it settled. "If I did
that," said Clarendon, "our American cousins would say, we have dis-
232
A MISSION FOREDOOMED • 1852* 1854
covered the mode of dealing with the British — we went down to Greytown
and smashed it, whereupon they became alarmed and gave us all we wanted/*
Buchanan replied that he would now have to talk directly with Lord
Aberdeen, the Prime Minister, who might perhaps be willing to treat
America with fairness. Clarendon angrily seized Buchanan by the coat
lapels and, shaking him, declared: "I am as good a friend of the United
States as Lord Aberdeen; or any man in the Three Kingdoms." Possibly
so, Buchanan replied, but the friendship had certainly produced no results.26
Lord Aberdeen was polite but adamant; Britain would remain in
Central America. With this interview, except for several more excited
sessions with Clarendon over Greytown, Buchanan's Central American ne-
gotiation came to an end. Clarendon never officially replied to Buchanan's
statement of the American position. All that remained was to await Pierce's
decision whether to let the matter rest, or to issue an ultimatum.
233
18
PLAYING THE OLD TROUPER • 1854-1856
CUBA— PEARL OF THE ANTILLES
While the Central American negotiation stagnated, Buchanan kept up a
steady campaign to promote the purchase of Cuba. The more he examined
August Belmont's idea of persuading the Spanish bondholders to press for
the sale of the island, the more he liked it. He had described the outlines
of the proposal to Pierce before leaving Washington and had recommended
that Belmont be made Minister to the Kingdom of the Two Sicilies. At
Naples he would come into contact both with many of the bondholders and
with members of the Spanish royal family who ruled there. Buchanan felt
that Pierce had made a mistake by sending Belmont to the Hague, but he
still believed that with judicious management Spain might be induced to
sell Cuba to the United States. The main problem would be to prevent
interference from the governments of England and France. Buchanan told
Pierce in the spring of 1854 that he had shaped his course ever since his
arrival in England "with a view of reconciling Great Britain to that great
object."1 Clarendon had already confided to him that "if Spain lost Cuba
it would be their own fault for the wretched manner in which they governed
the island."2
In May, Buchanan wrote to Slidell that the British were prepared
for the acquisition of Cuba by the United States and that the British news-
papers had on several occasions foreshadowed the event. His only fear
was France. He urged Pierce to define a policy on Cuba and to prepare
instructions for its acquisition. England and France had their hands full
with the Crimean war. The Republican revolution which broke out in
Spain in July further threatened the chaotic finances of that country and
presaged the abolition of slavery in Cuba. Buchanan now prodded Marcy
to decide what steps ought to be taken "to give a direction to the impending
revolution in Cuba," an outbreak which certainly would follow the in-
surrection in Spain.
234
PLAYING THE OLD TROUPER • 1854 - 1856
In Europe, the fate of Cuba became a pawn in the great revolu-
tionary movements then in progress under the leadership of Kossuth,
Mazzini, Louis Blanc and Ledru Rollin who, though differing with each
other on most things, agreed that it would mightily advance their crusade
if they could enlist the support of the United States in their assault on
monarchy and aristocracy in the Old World. They held out the inducement
that if the United States would assist Spanish Republicans in overthrowing
the queen, the new democracy would then agree to Cuban independence
and subsequent annexation.
Many "Young Americans" worked actively with the European
revolutionaries. George Sanders, United States consul in London, main-
tained a rendezvous for political exiles from the Continent and used the
diplomatic pouch for sending inflammatory letters, stamped with the
Legation seal, throughout Europe. Some of these fell into the hands of
the French authorities and caused a commotion. Victor Fronde, an
important figure in the plan to subvert the Spanish monarchy, used a
United States courier's passport, which he had obtained by fraud, to aid
in his travels as an agent of the revolutionaries. Legitimate governments
in Europe soon learned of his activities and protested. Pierre Soute,
American Minister to Spain, loudly proclaimed his sympathies with the
antimonarchists. He made himself thoroughly obnoxious to the Spanish
queen by his arrogant and insolent manner in dealing with her ministers.
Worst of all, he seriously damaged American-French relations by shooting
the French Minister to Madrid in a quarrel over the latter's wife.
The Spanish government was facing bankruptcy. Its bonds,
now nearly worthless, were held by the Barings, the Rothschilds, and otter
international bankers who were reported ready to sanction the sale of Cuba
for something over $100,000,000 if the money could be kept out of the
hands of the royal family and used in the development of Spanish resources.
The bankers were prepared to act as receivers, so to speak, of the nation
and work to put the economy on a sound basis. The Church also had an
interest in such a program, for the monarchy had threatened to confiscate
ecclesiastical properties as one means of solving its financial problems.
Leading churchmen seemed willing to join the financiers in the effort to con-
vince the queen that the sale of Cuba was the only way to save her regime.
Pierce and Marcy had to fit Buchanan's plans for Cuba into the
general Administration program which, in the spring of 1854, had become
dependent upon the fate of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. Douglas had intro-
duced this in January, Pierce adopted it as an Administration measure, and
Congress did almost nothing but debate it until the end of May. Its passage
aroused terrible political hatreds and split the Democrats. Men were "afraid
to unbosom themselves, lest they reveal the secrets of their hearts to an
235
JAMES BUCHANAN
enemy, in disguise," wrote a Congressman, "while scarcely a man knows
to a certainty whether he is or is not a friend of the Administration."3
Around Washington no one seemed to know what course the
Administration planned to take in regard to Cuha; Pierce and Marcy re-
mained "mum" but not idle. Pierce proposed to send a three-man com-
mission to Spain to try to purchase Cuba, with the warning that if they
failed, American filibusters might seize the island. He then ordered strict
observance of neutrality laws and put port officials under special instruction
to prevent the departure of suspicious vessels, but presumably he would
revoke these orders if Spain refused to sell Cuba.
Buchanan approved of the idea of the commission, but not of
the threat of filibusters as a lever to the negotiation. Filibustering he
opposed under any and all circumstances, and thought that any mention
of the subject to Spain except in terms of a promise to prevent it would be
fatal to the Cuban purchase. Sickles learned what was afoot, and wrote to
Howell Cobb sentiments which he never uttered to Buchanan. "I sincerely
hope the rumor that you are to go to Madrid is true. Now is the time for
us to get Cuba— Europe expects it & is prepared to endure it. The present
condition of Spanish politics ... is peculiarly favorable for a TOO; or a
negotiation to purchase." If Cobb should come, Sickles wanted a week with
him to tell him what wires to pull at Madrid, and requested an appointment
as his secretary. He planned to return home in autumn. "I have had
enough of London," he wrote. "It would suit me better to stay away
another year on accouAt of the present condition of N. Y. politics, but I
am tired of London and of this ndsdon"*
If Sickles was bored with London, Buchanan was tired of Sickles.
While he envied and admired the young man's dash and zest for life and
personally enjoyed his company, he found him not only useless but harmful
to the embassy. He paid little attention to business, and wrote so wretched
a hand that he imposed an added burden of copying on the rest of the staff.
These faults Buchanan would have tolerated had Sickles lent the weight of
his dynamic personality to the policies of the Legation, but he did the
contrary. He balked on the program of republican austerity and lived both
extravagantly and ostentatiously. When Buchanan was in the midst of
his campaign to foster Anglo-American friendship, Sickles raised a furor
by remaining seated during the toast to the queen at a public dinner because
Victoria rather than Washington came first on the list. Later he wrote
anonymous letters to the British newspapers condemning his host, George
Peabody, for toadyism to the queen and implicated Buchanan in the same
thing. The controversy, touching the tender nerve of national honor in
both countries, caused a newspaper storm on both sides of the Atlantic and
put Buchanan, a guest of honor at the dinner, in an embarrassing position.
236
PLAYING THE OLD TROUPER • 1854-1856
When the Spanish Revolution broke out during July as the Sickles con-
troversy reached its height, Buchanan seized the opportunity to send him
to Washington to report the news directly and to urge immediate action
on Cuban policy.6
Sickles arrived at the White House on August 8. By this time
Pierce knew that Congress would ignore his request of August 1 for an
emergency appropriation to support a special commission to Spain. With
elections coining on and the Democrats weakened by the Kansas-Nebraska
struggle, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee decided not to risk
another sectional upheaval and declined to report out a Cuban bill. Pierce
joyfully welcomed Sickles and moved him into the White House as a
personal guest for a week of conferences. The president already had
letters from Soute and Mason, Minister to France, stating that the Spanish
Republicans would sell Cuba if the United States contributed funds to
help their cause and that the British and French planned no intervention
to sustain the Spanish government.
On August 16, after numerous Cabinet discussions, Marcy sent
out instructions to Soute. Instead of the creation of a special commission,
Soulg, Buchanan, and Mason, should meet in Paris "to adopt measures for
perfect concert of action in aid of your negotiations at Madrid. . . . This
whole subject in its widest range is opened to your joint consideration."
The explanation of this vague proposal lay in a disagreement between Marcy
and Pierce about Soul& Marcy had tried repeatedly to have him removed
for conduct unbecoming a minister and defiance of instructions, but Pierce
would not let him go. Forney, now an editor of Pierce's organ, the Wash-
ington Union, wrote Buchanan at this time: "It is said here that Mason
has gone to meet Soute, and the idea is laughed at in all quarters, for if ever
a man has fulfilled the prophecies of his enemies, disappointed the hopes
of his friends, that man is Pierre Soute He has put back the acquisition
of Cuba fifty years, . . . made Spanish Republicanism a jest, and ... by his
folly and conceit he has enabled the enemies of our country to hold him
up as a sample of American statesmen & Diplomatists. It is only we who
must defend this artificial & hollow effigy of Democracy, that can realize
most sensitively the difficulty of making a silk purse out of a sow's ear."6
Saddled with Soul6 but required to act at Madrid, Marcy believed
that Buchanan and Mason might serve as a check on Soulfi's wildness and
somehow guide a negotiation along rational lines. This might, indeed,
have happened except for two other factors. The first was Marcy's in-
struction of April 3 to Soute, still in force, which authorized him to offer
as much as $130,000,000 for Cuba. If Spain appeared unwilling to sell,
this instruction continued, "you will then direct your efforts to the next
most desirable object, which is to detach that Island from the Spanish
dominion and from all dependence on any European power."7 It is now
237
JAMES BUCHANAN
clear that Marcy meant to say that the independence of Cuba was the
object, next to purchase, most desired. But the ambiguity of the dispatch
left some question about the explicit meaning of the important words
to detach.
Second, Pierce in his enthusiasm and with his usual carelessness
of phrase, filled Sickles's mind with ideas never communicated to Marcy
or any of the ministers. Sickles formed the impression that Pierce wanted
him to act as a confidential agent to explain, verbally, to all the ministers
that the government wanted some really drastic action on Cuba and was
ready to face the consequences. His impression received reinforcement
from the wording of the instructions of August 16, inaugurating the meeting
of ministers: "You are desired to communicate to the government here
the results of opinion or means of action to which you may in common
arrive, through a ... confidential messenger, who may be able to supply
any details not contained in a formal despatch." Pierce wrote to Buchanan
that Sickles would "have much to communicate verbally with regard to
home and other affairs."8 Sickles thus became in effect spokesman for the
president and could turn the meaning of the general instructions in any
direction. This freedom nullified the moderating influence of Marcy,
Mason, and Buchanan.
Buchanan protested. He wrote to President Pierce on Sep-
tember 1:
I can not for myself discover what benefit will result from a
meeting. ... It is impossible for me to devise any other plan
for the acquisition of Cuba . . . than what I have already presented
to you. We are willing to purchase, and our object is to induce
them to sell. . . , I am glad, therefore, that our meeting for mere
consultation and not for decisive action is left to [Soul^'s] dis-
cretion. ... P, S. Since the foregoing was written, I have had a
long conversation with Col. Sickles, and am sorry to say this
has not changed my views concerning the policy of a meeting. . . .
No more unsuitable place than Paris could be devised for such a
meeting. . . . Every object which you have in view can ... be
accomplished by correspondence.0
Sickles had already ruined Buchanan's hopes, having blared his
way through continental Europe before ever reporting to London. At Paris
he found Dudley Mann, assistant Secretary of State, John L O'Sullivan
of "Manifest Destiny" fame and currently minister to Portugal, Pierce's
friend John A. Dix, and John Van Buren. Sickles elaborated his plans to
all, and then proceeded to Spain where he found Soul£ in the haunts of
the revolutionaries in the Pyrenees. European newspapermen sensed
something big in the wind and broadcast their conjectures. Buchanan
238
PLAYING THE OLD TROUPER* 1854.1856
pointed out to Pierce that he could quietly get the names of the Spanish
bondholders and unite with them in an effort to persuade Spain to sell
Cuba, but "Capital and Capitalists ... are proverbially timid, and nothing
of this kind ought to be attempted until after the 6dat by the public journals
to Col. Sickles' journey to Paris and Madrid shall have passed away. Matters
of this kind, in order to be successful in Europe, must be conducted with
secrecy and caution."10
Buchanan succeeded in vetoing Paris and Basle as the scene of
the meeting, agreeing on Ostend, and with this small success resigned
himself to obeying distasteful orders. The conference, he wrote his
nephew, "will probably make noise enough in the world." After three
days at Ostend, the glare of publicity drove the ministers to Aix-la-Chapelle
where, on October 18, they completed drafting the Ostend Manifesto.
Buchanan bore the chief responsibility for restraining Soute
during the conference. Mason looked on the whole procedure as senseless
and, so far as he was concerned, "a chance to loaf." At the very start,
Buchanan turned down the request of Sickles to act as secretary of the
meeting and after the first few days at Ostend, pointedly gave him to under-
stand that he need not come to Aix-la-Chapelle. Soute, who had the
instructions from Marcy, shaped the ideas that he thought should be
included, and jotted them down in notes. Buchanan then wrote out a
rough and later a finished draft of the document. Its first sentence placed
responsibility directly on Pierce. "The undersigned," it began, "in com-
pliance with the wish expressed by the President in the several confidential
despatches . . . addressed to us" &c. &c. This meant that Marcy's "to
detach" letter lay on the table, for the only other official instruction on
Cuba was the one calling the conference. The argument contained nothing
new. The United States should promptly approach the Supreme Con-
stituent Cortes of Spain with a proposition to buy Cuba, openly, frankly,
through regular diplomatic procedures, and in such a way "as to challenge
the approbation of the world." This would benefit Cuba, provide Spain a
golden opportunity to return to solvency and prosperity, and prevent the
recurrence of troubles between the United States and Cuba such as had
marred the past. If the Cubans should rebel, continued the Manifesto,
"no human power could . . . prevent the people and Government of the
United States from taking part ... in support of their neighbors and
friends."
So far, the report constituted an accurate statement of Buchanan's
purchase plan and of Pierce's concept of the role of filibusters. The final
section added the views of Sickles and Soute, modified, or at least phrased,
by Buchanan in such a manner as to pull their teeth. "After we shall have
offered Spain a price for Cuba, far beyond its present value, and this shall
have been refused, it will then be time to consider the question, does Cuba
239
JAMES BUCHANAN
in the possession of Spain seriously endanger our internal peace and the
existence of our cherished Union? Should this question be answered in
the affirmative, then, by every law human and Divine, we shall be justified
in wresting it from Spain, if we possess the power." This version sub-
stituted the words "to wrest" for Marcy's "to detach" and thus followed
orders, but Buchanan believed that he had interposed an effective barrier
to the extremist hope of acquiring Cuba by force. He had named a number
of conditions precedent to seizure which he felt certain would never arise:
freeing of the Cuban slaves, Africanization of the island's government, and
the beginning of a race war in the United States. Buchanan thought he
had successfully spiked the guns of the Young Americans and would-be
filibusters. Roy Nichols, biographer of Pierce, notes that the final text
of the Manifesto was "not a direct threat," as SoulS wanted, but a "laborious
attempt at a guarded hint," which Buchanan phrased as a means to balk
rash action while still obeying Marcy's instructions.
Buchanan believed that he had managed to salvage a little from
his plan for purchase and had undermined the policy of seizure. But
Buchanan did not know that SouI6 sent a private letter to Pierce along with
the Manifesto, staling that if Spain would not sell Cuba, the United States
ought to take it by force while England and France were engaged in a war
and would not be likely to interfere. This message reversed the policy
Buchanan intended, but Soute's sentiments could be inferred from the
text of the Manifesto.
At home the Whigs and Know-Nothings routed the Democrats
in the North and West at the October elections. Hence, when the Ostend
report arrived in November the Administration sat on it; and Marcy,
shocked at the outcome, wrote to Soute to proceed with the greatest caution
in broaching the idea of purchase and to avoid any threats.
As might have been expected, the New York Herald soon got
hold of a garbled version of the Manifesto which it further distorted with
the paraphrase "that our safety demanded and our interests required we
purchase or take Cuba at once." Some newsmen went so far as to state
that the ministers had acted on their own initiative. Pierce offered no
explanation or refutation; in his annual message he did not even mention
Ostend. Buchanan finally wrote to Marcy: "I observe in a number of
American Journals the statement made positively that the Conference at
Ostend was the voluntary action of the American Ministers. Surely this
ought* to be corrected. Never did I obey any instructions so reluctantly."
Marcy wrote privately that the report itself did not sustain Soute's inter-
pretation, but still made no public pronouncement. "I am glad to perceive
that you exonerate us from the charge . . . that we had recommended to
offer Spain the alternative of cession or seizure," Buchanan replied. "How
preposterous and suicidal would have been such an idea! ... It would
240
PLAYING THE OLD TROUPER • 1854 * 1856
have defeated the great object we had in view— the peaceful acquisition
of Cuba."11
Marcy, just as badly caught as Buchanan by the unwanted
publicity, made his stand at least officially clear by writing to Soute, tearing
to shreds his private proposals about Cuba and condemning his conduct as
minister. Thus he achieved what he had long wanted, Soute's resignation,
and took his stand with Buchanan and Mason against the "sell or seize"
doctrine.
But the end was not yet. The new anti-Administration Congress
called for publication of the Cuban correspondence. Thus, for the first
time, the correct version of the Ostend Manifesto became public property.
Unhappily for Buchanan, the Administration, after several discussions in
Cabinet, decided that it could not afford to permit the publication of the
"detach" paragraph of Marcy's instructions. His biographer says: "It was
a bad business, either way, and the expedient path was chosen. . . . The
reaction of the public, which did not know of the ambiguous "detach" item,
was mostly favorable to Marcy; the 'three wise men of Ostend,' . . . were
lashed unmercifully for their part."12 Slidell attributed Marcy's course to
his eagerness for the presidency. He told Buchanan, "He fancies that he
sees in you the only obstacle to the realisation of his dreams."13 The public
impression, however, was that James Buchanan stood for the highwayman's
principle that "if Spain will not sell Cuba, we will take it." He should have
known that people would grasp the simple, dramatic, but false dich£,
rather than try to understand the complex logic back of the manifesto
itself. But whatever he thought, he played the old trouper and made no
defense. "I continue to be entirely satisfied with our report," he said.
AN UNTHINKABLE WAR
The remainder of Buchanan's mission brought diplomatic frustration,
political soul-searching, and social triumph. In the months following
Ostend it appeared that everything at the Legation had been going wrong.
Sickles had been using the Legation seal and diplomatic pouch to send
around all manner of personalia. Miller, the London dispatch agent whose
business it was to receive diplomatic mail for all the continental embassies
and forward it via courier had been using his official seal to cover and
protect from routine censorship correspondence of a very undiplomatic
character, much of it propaganda of the European revolutionists. On one
occasion the British Customs at Liverpool charged Buchanan with petty
smuggling. It had discovered six pounds of American cigars, undeclared,
wrapped into a package of books on international law which were addressed
to Buchanan. After much unpleasantness in England and voluminous
correspondence, Buchanan concluded that a courier from New York, who
241
JAMES BUCHANAN
had boasted on board ship what privileges awaited him in Liverpool and
complained loudly that he could not accompany the mail boat to shore, had
perpetrated the deed.14
After the Ostend conference Sickles again returned to the United
States, thoroughly disgusted with Buchanan. Forney had added to the
trouble by printing some observations Buchanan had written him in
confidence condemning Sickles for his attack on the Peabody dinner and
disparaging his competence as a Legation officer.16 Buchanan made a clean
breast of it to Sickles and told him to submit his resignation. To his
great satisfaction, Sickles complied and Pierce appointed John Appleton.
Appleton arrived in March and managed so competently that Buchanan
assured Marcy that he was "well qualified to perform the duties of any
Diplomatic station under the Government." "He is a perfect secretary,"
he wrote, "as well as an excellent friend." At this time he also got a new
Legation clerk, Benjamin Moran of New York, whom he paid $800 a year
out of his own pocket since federal statute forbade the government to hire
a clerk at a foreign mission.16 Moran made himself indispensable. He
could receive visitors, handle most of the tourist problems, and translate
foreign languages, in addition to keeping meticulously ordered files of
correspondence and dispatches. In this latter regard he was very like
Buchanan, and the two quickly achieved mutual respect which ripened
into warm friendship. It was a pity Buchanan did not have such a staff at
the start, for by the time he got competent help the negotiating was done.
A final blow came when Marcy informed him that Congress had passed a
law substantially reducing his salary and the allowance for outfit.
In April, 1855, Buchanan wrote that he wanted to leave England
on August 23, and requested his letter of recall as of that date. The Central
American negotiation had grown futile with the elevation of Palmerston
to the Premiership in January. Buchanan talked occasionally with
Clarendon, who remained in the Foreign Office, but the old rapport had
dissolved. Whenever Buchanan mentioned Ruatan, Clarendon brought
up Greytown, and just before Buchanan sent in his resignation they had a
very disagreeable altercation.
During the summer of 1855, when the British began to see a
triumphal end to the Crimean War, their relations with the United States
rapidly deteriorated. Marcy noted it from the tone of the British press,
and Buchanan reported to him that "there begins to be an uneasy feeling . . .
that all is not well in the relations between the two countries."17
Nevertheless, President Pierce, on August 6, sent instructions
to Buchanan to ask Palmerston for an explicit statement of the final British
position on Central America, in reply to the American statement of the
242
PLAYING THE OLD TROUPER • 1854 - 1856
previous July. This demand invited a showdown and Palmerston con-
sidered it an ultimatum. He responded in a tart communication condemn-
ing the American position and reasserting British claims in Central America.
This reply he supported by ordering a fleet of 84- and 60-gun battle cruisers,
with auxiliary vessels, to Bermuda and the West Indies, allegedly to assume
routine stations.
More than ever, Buchanan wanted to go home. He wrote to
Marcy on October 3 that he had received dispatches 108, 109 and 111, but
not 110 which contained his release. He urged the appointment of J. Clancy
Jones as his relief and a search for the missing letter of recall. He also
wrote to President Pierce, assuring him that Appleton could handle the
Legation business indefinitely. But by the end of October, Appleton was
no longer willing to take the responsibility of handling the mission. Bu-
chanan wrote: "The aspect of affairs between the two countries has now
become squally." Two weeks later, he received his letter of recall which,
although dated the 12th of September, had not been mailed from the State
Department until October 22. "It has arrived," he told Marcy, "at a time
when the relations between the two countries have assumed so threatening
an aspect . . . that I cannot at the present moment retire."18
Buchanan now enlisted all his energies to reduce the growing war
fever. So far the planned movement of the British fleet to the Caribbean
had not reached the press. When Buchanan asked the reason for the
naval orders, Clarendon cited the attacks on J. F. T. Crampton, the British
minister in Washington, for recruiting troops in America, a letter of
Attorney General Gushing which had labelled British recruiters "male-
factors," information that an American built steamer was about to leave
New York as a Russian privateer, and a report that thousands of Irish-
Americans were plotting a descent upon the Emerald Isle to free it from
Britain. As Buchanan already knew the privateer rumor to be false and
the Irish invasion pure speculation, he was forced to the conclusion that
the British were looking for a fight.
This attitude drew the issue sharply. If the United States wanted
war, they could now have it. The historian might well speculate what
result might have emerged from such a conflict; whether, perhaps, it might
have side-tracked sectionalism, united the American nation, and postponed
or even averted the Civil War— at possibly an even higher price. Buchanan
expounded the situation thus to Clarendon:
The news of the sending of the fleet . . . would most probably
excite much public indignation. ... It would find the people
calm and tranquil in relation to their foreign affairs and wholly
unprepared for it. It would burst upon them suddenly, and they
would doubtless manifest their feelings in strong and defying
243
JAMES BUCHANAN
language. This would return to England and react upon the
people here . , , until at last by degrees the two countries might
find themselves at war, although . . . there was no question of
very serious importance between them. And such a war! . . .
I would not have it on my conscience for any human consider-
ation to be the author of any act which might lead to such
consequences.19
The British, in response to the American retreat, cut in half
the strength of the proposed West Indian squadron. Clarendon informed
Buchanan "that three ships had been sent to Bermuda & one to Jamaica"
which would be "on their guard against all dangers, ... let them come
from what quarter they may." Buchanan answered in two sentences that
this reply fell far short of his hopes and would not "exert that happy
influence in restoring cordial relations . . . which ... I shall always so
earnestly desire." For several weeks the possibility of war depressed the
Stock Exchange and Buchanan reported that "an incautious word from
me would either raise or sink the price of consols." Palmerston held his
position and backed it up by force; unless the United States attacked there
was nothing to fight about. By the end of November the leading British
journals deprecated the idea of war and condemned the Ministry for risking
it. On December 14, Buchanan reported to Marcy that the storm had
blown over. "I hear this sentiment everywhere I go," he said. "There is
certainly no disposition at present on the part of the British people to have
serious difficulties with the United States."20
Buchanan had a respite of exactly two weeks. On December 28
Marcy sent him word that the United States had asked for the recall of Lord
Crampton and of the British consuls at Cincinnati, Philadelphia and
New York, who had been illegally recruiting troops for the Crimean War.
When Buchanan informed Clarendon of the contents of this dispatch, the
latter jumped up and declared in angry surprise, "We will not do it." Dur-
ing February, Buchanan felt sure that a diplomatic rupture impended. "As
soon as the news shall arrive in this country, that you sent Mr. Crampton
his passports," he informed Marcy, "I shall receive mine from Lord
Clarendon."21
Viscount Palmerston presented a one-sided picture of the re-
cruiting controversy to Parliament and raised a storm of indignation in the
press. With the end of the Crimean War in sight and British military
strength at its peak, the Premier rattled the saber against America as a means
of maintaining himself in power; at least so Buchanan thought. He immedi-
ately responded that the Viscount had falsified the facts by withholding
details that justified the American position. When Lady Palmerston later
gave a diplomatic dinner and omitted Buchanan's name from the guest list,
244
PLAYING THE OLD TROUPER • 1854 - 1856
he assumed that his time had come. But Britain delayed any official reply
to the request for Crampton's recall, and Marcy postponed dismissing him.
Meanwhile, British public opinion slowly turned against Palmerston. Lord
Bulwer announced that he agreed with Buchanan and not the Ministry on
the interpretation of the treaty he himself had negotiated with Clayton.22
During all this time, Buchanan pleaded with Marcy for another
letter of recall. "I consider this mission as a sort of waif abandoned by the
Government," he complained. "Not a word even about a secretary of
Legation. ... I have to labor like a drayman. Have you no bowels?"
In February he learned that George M. Dallas had been appointed his
successor, and by the middle of March he had the "long looked-for, come
at last"— his final letter of recall.
After the October elections of 1854, when the Kansas-Nebraska
Act had split the Democracy, destroyed the Whigs, raised up the new
Republican party and given a fleeting prominence to the Know-Nothings,
Buchanan's friends began to bombard him with petitions, prognostications
and praises that no man could ignore. Pierce could not succeed; his
Administration had fallen lower than Tyler's. No candidate but Old Buck
could be trusted; Kansas-Nebraska had dirtied all the others. The country
was fearful to the verge of panic and would not accept a "speculative
candidacy." Everyone wanted the next president to be a statesman, a man
whose integrity and experience had been proven over the years. In short,
Buchanan was the only man who could win for the Democracy. There was
no doubt that he would be drafted.
By January, 1855, Buchanan caved in and admitted to confidential
friends that they could have him if they wanted him. Having decided to be
"available," he laid a little of the groundwork in England. He asked Sir
Emerson Tennent to arrange a dinner at which Cardinal Wiseman would
be present. In July, 1855, after Tennent's banquet, Buchanan held a long
conversation with Wiseman, and told the prelate of his admiration for
Archbishop John Hughes of New York. Thurlow Weed later asserted,
"That dinner made Mr. Buchanan President of the United States!" Weed
exaggerated, but the Cardinal's good opinion of Buchanan doubtless had
some influence on Archbishop Hughes and the American Catholics.28
Buchanan wrote to Marcy shortly before his recall,
I know . . . that you would consider me in a state of mental
delusion if I were to say how indifferent I feel in regard to myself
on the question of the next Presidency. You would be quite a
sceptic. One thing is certain: that neither by word nor letter
have I ever contributed any support to myself. I believe that
the next Presidential term will be perhaps the most important
and responsible of any which has occurred since the origin of the
245
JAMES BUCHANAN
Government; and whilst no competent and patriotic man to whom
it may be offered should shrink from the responsibility, yet he
may well accept it as the greatest trial of his life.24
DEAR MISS LANE
Although British society was something of a strain on his constitution,
Buchanan thought it very congenial. The formality of the Court did not
invade the drawing room where he found the nobility as simple and un-
pretentious as his Lancaster neighbors. It took him some time, however,
to become accustomed to dinners at eight and parties at eleven when he
should have been going to bed. He looked forward to Harriet's arrival in
the spring of 1854, though he knew her visit would double his social
activities.
Harriet, now in the full bloom of young womanhood, flippant,
gay, flirtatious yet well-mannered and well-read, became a favorite in the
diplomatic social world. She dined with Victoria, danced with Prince
Albert, and received a marriage proposal from the enormously wealthy,
fifty-eight-year-old Sir Fitz-Roy Kelly. At Oxford, where "Nunc" and
Alfred Lord Tennyson received honorary degrees at the same ceremony,
the students paid only cursory attention to the dignitaries and shouted and
whistled their approval of Hal Lane. She flitted from castle to castle,
attended fashionable weddings, and kept the Legation in constant turmoil
with preparations for parties. Buchanan loved the gaieties.
He also worried, for Harriet seemed to be succumbing to the
glamor of British titles. At the same time a Philadelphia suitor by the
name of Tyson was confidently planning to come to England and marry her,
although she had treated him so badly during their long courtship that he
had well earned the name Job.
Harriet did not even let Tyson know that she planned to return
to America a few weeks after his scheduled arrival in England. She saw
him briefly in London to tell him "No." Buchanan was angry, not at the
decision but at the cruel and thoughtless manner of her refusal.
In the fall of 1855, Buchanan received news that Harriet's older
sister, Mary Baker, had suddenly died in California. Harriet fell into un-
consolable grief, confined herself to her room for weeks, and threatened
to join a convent. Buchanan gave her some of his own philosophy: to
mourn the dead at the expense of the living is sinful. Heart-rending
afflictions are the common lot of humanity, man's duty on earth is to
submit with humble resignation. "In all calamitous events, we ought to
say, emphatically, Thy will be done.' " He himself was as much distressed
by the recent death of another niece, Jessie Yates Weaver. Poor Jessie.
What would he do with her children.
246
PLAYING THE OLD TROUPER • 1854-1856
George Dallas arrived in England on March 13, 1856, accompanied
by his wife, his sister, three unmarried daughters, and a son, who was to
be Secretary of Legation. Buchanan wrote, "The Legation will be a
family party."25
Before his audience of leave, Buchanan dined with the queen who,
with the princess royal, talked mostly about "dear Miss Lane." He spent
two convivial weeks with Mason in Paris and then returned to England to
sail for home aboard the Arago.
247
19
THE RIGHT MAN FOR THE TIMES • 1856
THE SHAPE OF THINGS TO COME
The steamship Arago slipped her cables and edged slowly out of her dock
at noon on Wednesday, April 9, 1856. By midafternoon Buchanan had
aflably acknowledged the greetings of many of his fellow passengers, finished
his constitutional around the deck, and retired to his stateroom where he
took off his greatcoat, removed his cutaway, and then opened his travel
chest to get his old leather slippers and a bottle of Madeira. After some
puttering about he found the cork puller and a glass, lit a "segar" and then
settled back on his bed, drew a long sigh of solid comfort, and relaxed.
Had he been less nervously exhausted, the soft movement of the
ship might have lulled him to sleep. Instead, it set him musing, hap-
hazardly at first and then with increasing focus and plan. Well, thank God
that job was done. He had never wanted the mission; yet he had to admit
that he had enjoyed the experience, had done his duty, and had emerged
better off politically than if he had stayed at home. He could not help
wondering about the freak fate which had kept him out of Congress during
each of the four most violent sectional controversies of the century: the
Missouri Compromise, the nullification struggle, the 1850 Compromise,
and now the Kansas-Nebraska Bill. If he should become president, he
feared he would not escape the next outburst. He sipped some Madeira
and continued his reverie. With fair weather he might reach New York on
his sixty-fifth birthday.
At that thought he roused himself, went to his portfolio, and
extracted a packet of letters. Sorting through he picked out half a dozen
and settled back to read, for he wanted to catch up on the state of political
affairs, particularly in Pennsylvania and Kansas. The Pennsylvania Demo-
crats had suffered from the Kansas-Nebraska controversy, and James
Pollock, a Know-Nothing, Whig free-soiler now sat in the Pennsylvania
governor's chair. Men who had predicted Bigler's re-election in 1854 by a
50,000 majority woke up to find him defeated by 37,000 votes.1
248
THE RIGHT MAN FOR THE TIMES • 1856
Buchanan felt sure that the Know-Nothing movement, like anti-
Masonry, would pass as quickly as it had appeared, but for the moment it
was dangerous. He read a letter from Jeremiah S. Black:
Here is a party less than one year old which has already triumphed
in half the states of the Union. Its members are sworn to secrecy
and to fidelity. ... It conceals its secrets not merely by silence
but by positive falsehood. When men are seduced into its lodges
they are instructed to conceal the fact and preserve their previous
party attitude. Know-Nothings continue to speak at Democratic
meetings, to argue for Democratic principles, to act as members
of Democratic Committees, to run as Democratic candidates. The
consequence of this is terrible. The obligations of truth are
treated with an awful frivolity A majority of the legislature
have obtained their seats by false pretences which would send
them to the penitentiary if they got 5 dollars by similar means.
Cameron was nominated for Senator by a system of secret voting
inside the secret order— the cheats were cheated 28 members
. . . certified that he had got his nomination by 'wholesale corrup-
tion and individual bribery.'2
Forney, in another letter, stated that he did not see how Cameron
could be beaten "unless they fix the charge of Bribery upon him, and it
looks as if they would."3 But Cameron had angered even the Know-
Nothings, and William Bigler won the senatorship.
Matters looked better than usual in Pennsylvania; the Buchaneers,
except for the governorship, held control. Forney was confident that
Buchanan could win the presidency and in order to induce him to accept
the nomination, promised to relinquish all rights to patronage.4 From all
he read in his correspondence, Buchanan judged that at last Pennsylvania
was "right."
He wished that he could feel as optimistic in regard to the situa-
tion in Kansas. The trial of popular sovereignty had brought civil war
to that territory. Settlers had gone there to claim land and fight for
political control. These immigrants, from the North and the South,
carried with them a deep sense of mission and bitterly hated each other.
New Englanders, because of better organization and financing back home,
came in greater numbers and with more armament than the Southerners,
but the latter had the sympathy of the Missourians who cast ballots for
the first Kansas territorial legislature and elected candidates favorable to
the South. The New Englanders called the invaders "border ruffians,"
but they do not appear to have been very different from any of the frontier
inhabitants of their day. The Missourians thought that they had as much
249
JAMES BUCHANAN
right to enter Kansas as did armed mercenaries from Massachusetts. Those
tenderfoots would not show them how to run the frontier.
When Pierce removed Kansas Governor Andrew H. Reeder, for
fraudulent dealings in land, the antislavery men charged that he had been
fired for denouncing the territorial election. The free state men set up a
legislature of their own at Topeka, elected Reeder as Congressional repre-
sentative, and drafted a constitution. This, incidentally, was an anti-Negro
rather than an anti-slavery constitution; it established white supremacy by
forbidding any Negroes to live in Kansas. In January, 1856, when they
elected their own governor, Pierce, in a special message to Congress, de-
nounced the Topeka regime as revolutionary and Congress sustained him
by affirming the legality of the original Kansas government, with its capital
at Lecompton.
But the Topeka government defied the United States and con-
tinued to rule wherever its guns could enforce submission to its decrees.
Neither Pierce nor the new territorial governor, Wilson Shannon, would
risk use of federal troops to enforce local law, but they ordered the army
to prevent violent collision between the contesting factions and to avert
the outbreak of full-scale war. The troops, however, could do little about
sporadic outrages perpetrated by small groups. Beatings, shootings, house-
wrecking and arson became so common that the press began to write of
"Bleeding Kansas." The ordeal of Kansas would not be easily ended. Few
settlers wanted coexistence; each side determined to rule, and to rule meant
to eliminate the enemy.
The trip of the Arago proved calm and peaceful, but hardly a
vacation for Buchanan. He recognized that it would very likely be the last
fortnight he would have for a long time to collect his thoughts and formu-
late his course of action without constant interruption. If he became
president, he would look back longingly at this cruise. What were his
chances, and how should the cards be played?
It seemed very unlikely that Pierce or Douglas could be nomi-
nated, but they might be strong enough to deadlock the convention and
pave the way for another dark horse. Plenty of willing spirits hoped for
this kind of result — Hunter, Davis, Walker, Marcy and others. A little
management ought to prevent such an occurrence, particularly emphasis
on the risk to the country of an accidental nomination in the hour of danger.
A nation in crisis needed an experienced and dependable candidate.
Pennsylvania, which had three times failed Buchanan, now promised him
full support, for the Harrisburg Convention of March 4 had given him its
unanimous endorsement. Finally, the disruption of the Whig party over
the Kansas-Nebraska Bill might be turned to advantage. The Whigs in
in 1854 and 1855 had split along north-south lines into rump segments
which stood helpless in a national contest. Whig leaders and voters were
250
THE RIGHT MAN FOR THE TIMES • 1856
looking for a new home, some of them joining the Republicans, some the
Know-Nothings, some the Southern Americans and some the Democrats.
Many Whig leaders saw that under the new conditions they stood closer to
the conservative Buchanan wing of the Democrats than to any of the other
parties. Buchanan already had a sheaf of encouraging letters from promi-
nent Whigs stating that they considered their party dead and would join
the Democrats if he were nominated.
Since Forney had become obligated to Pierce, John Slidell actively
undertook management of Buchanan's political future. He planned to
cultivate the growing popular demand for Buchanan's nomination to give
it the aspect of a spontaneous movement. Dr. Foltz assured Buchanan in
November, 1855, "The People have taken the next Presidency out of the
hands of the politicians. . . . The people, and not your political friends
will place you there."5
Slidell seized this idea and promoted his candidate as the people's
own choice. He did not create the force, but he saw and used with intelli-
gence the latent public sentiment which needed only a little cultivation to
start it growing. Little by little, he and his co-workers induced back-
country editors to puflf Buchanan until, by late in 1855, scores of Demo-
cratic newspapers and quite a few of Whig persuasion carried Buchanan's
name on the masthead. The "puffs" followed the theme that Buchanan's
name had attained prominence without the aid of the machinery of politics
and almost without the help of politicians. "The fact that he has become
formidable without effort has gone far to inspire a wide and almost universal
confidence in his strength."6
During 1854 Slidell earnestly counselled Buchanan to stay in
England as long as he could. "The political atmosphere at Washington is
malarious," he wrote, "and those who are not compelled to inhale it had
better keep away." A year later, when the newspaper chorus had swelled
to national proportions, SlideU thought it time for Buchanan to express to
some discreet friends his willingness to be a candidate. Instead of doing
this, Buchanan sent off a batch of letters reiterating his indifference but
explaining with care his views on the slavery crisis. Slidell warned him to
stop this. "You cannot well be in a better position than you are now," he
said, "& those who are not satisfied with your antecedents cannot be made
so by any explanations."7 Buchanan never did throw his hat in the ring.
He did, however, admit that others had taken him up. As late as February,
1856, he could still write,
In the present canvass, strange as it may seem to you, I have had
no part, either directly or indirectly. In the beginning I did all
I could to prevent any movement in my favor, & what has since
been done has been entirely spontaneous, at least so far as I am
personally concerned.8
251
JAMES BUCHANAN
This statement was delicate, prudent, and as technically correct
as a Philadelphia lawyer could have made it, but it was scarcely open and
candid. Buchanan could have stopped the movement in its tracks any
time he wished, but instead he kept the door open. For a time he certainly
went through an agony of indecision. Wheatland beckoned strongly, and
life there looked heavenly in comparison with the presidency of a country
in political shambles and with a civil war at its center. He summed up his
state of mind to Harriet in a marim from La Rochefoucauld: "Les choses
que nous desirons rtamventpas, ou, si elles arrivent, ce n'est, ni dans le temps,
ni de la mani&re qui nous aurcdentfait le plus de plcdsir."* But a man could
not turn down the presidency when his friends threw it at him, and the
family would never forgive him if he rejected it. He had been in on all the
phases of planning and knew how much "spontaneity" there was. He had
discouraged, but not killed off, the promotion; and now, just as with the
diplomatic mission, he was caught.
After a survey of the whole scene, Buchanan determined to do
nothing to injure or embarrass the efforts of his friends. He would keep
his mouth shut and make no promises. He would stay at Wheatland and
let those who wished come to see him. He would put his record on the
block and let people take it or leave it. That would be the fall of the cards
until the convention. "Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof." With
the matter settled in his mind, he gave himself up to the pleasures of the
voyage. Mrs. Plitt amused him. She had sent a newspaper clipping re-
porting that he would return via New Orleans in order to go on to Tennessee
to marry Mrs. Polk. Jokingly, she said she wished it were true. She was
sure he would find it "an agreeable way of Polking your way into the
Presidency.'*10
THE PEOPLE'S CHOICE
The Arago failed to make port on Buchanan's birthday, but she docked at
New York the next day, ahead of schedule, taking the local dignitaries so
much by surprise that the welcome fell far short of what some had predicted
— "such a triumph as the Caesar's only have seen."11 Ai the Astor House
Buchanan received visitors until a formal reception committee could be
mustered at City Hall. He firmly declined the tender of a public dinner and
supped quietly with the mayor and a few friends. The New York arrival
confirmed the wisdom of his determination to remain aloof. The dinner
would have been dynamite. It would have widened the split between the
Democratic factions, required a speech that could not possibly have suited
both, and provoked charges that Buchanan started electioneering the
moment he set foot on home soil. His arrival without notice and the
refusal of ceremony brought members of both factions out to see him,
252
THE RIGHT MAN FOR THE TIMES • 1856
enabled him to avoid saying more than that he was glad to be back, and
strongly sustained the key idea that he was a simple citizen who had earned
and wished no special honors. His scheme worked beautifully and he was
off to Philadelphia before his enemies realized that he had scored a tre-
mendous psychological triumph.
Philadelphia was more exciting, though its celebration, too, fell
considerably short of a Roman holiday. Booming cannon welcomed
Buchanan's train, and the official escort took him to the Merchant's
Exchange where he made a three-minute speech to a crowd of about three
thousand. The City Council had rejected a request that Independence Hall
should be opened that night for a formal reception, but the Merchant's
Hotel served as well. From its portico Buchanan reviewed a parade,
watched a fireworks display, and patiently endured a band serenade.12
Joseph B. Baker, superintendent of the state railroad, had a
special train ready the next morning. The locomotive bore the name
"Young America" and had been draped with bunting and signs reading
"Welcome Home, Pennsylvania's Favorite Son." On the trip to Lancaster
the train stopped at local stations while Buchanan stood on the back plat-
form waving his hat. They made a short stop at Baker's home in Gap, along
the main line, where the engine took on water and the official party cham-
pagne.
Buchanan's home town of Lancaster gave him a rousing reception.
The "Wheatland Club" fired the "Old Buck Cannon," and for two days the
town celebrated with bands, transparencies, torchlight processions, and
fireworks. Two weeks later Adam Reigart, the wine merchant, brought to
Wheatland an itemized bill for $809.65 for liquid merchandise. The front
porch campaign was underway.13
The first few weeks of May passed auspiciously. Forney, whom
Pierce had released from allegiance, wrote almost daily from Washington
with late details on the expected convention vote at Cincinnati on June 2.
Buchanan's strength lay in the middle belt of states from Delaware to
Missouri. The New England Democracy was for Pierce, and the South
favored Douglas, but both of these could be stopped by making strategic
promises to favorite son candidates. Buchanan interrupted a trip to
Washington to report on the English Mission in order to make a speech
in Baltimore. "Disunion is a word which ought not to be breathed amongst
us even in a whisper" he warned. "Our children ought to be taught that
it is a sacrilege to pronounce it. ... There is nothing stable but Heaven
and the Constitution."14
On May 22, Congressman Preston S. Brooks, of South Carolina,
strode into the Senate Chamber after hours, attacked white-haired Senator
Charles Sumner of Massachusetts and beat him into unconsciousness with
a heavy rubber cane. The Senator had invited trouble by subjecting a
253
JAMES BUCHANAN
relative of Brooks to one of the vilest and most insulting diatribes evei
heard in Congress. But regardless of the provocation, responsible southern-
ers were shocked by the caning and wrote of it: "unjustifiable, unmanly,
ill-timed, ill-advised, cowardly, dastardly. Mr. Brooks has outraged
decency, and dishonored the South-expel him." That was the word from
Savannah. From Boston came the same cry, and Brooks in all likelihood
would have been turned out except for the events of two days later.
About 11 p. m. of May 24, John Brown, his three sons, and four
henchmen headed for Pottawatomie Creek in Kansas and later knocked at
the door of James Doyle, a southerner whom none of the party had ever
seen before. Doyle, half dressed and unarmed, asked them to come in, but
Brown's men drew pistols and invited him to come out. When Doyle's
sons, William aged 22, Drury, 20, and John, 16 stepped to their father's
side, Brown ordered them to come along. A few minutes later Mrs. Doyle
and her youngest son, who had remained with her, heard screams and
pistol shots outside the cabin, -and then there was silence.
After midnight Allen Wilkinson, who was up late because his
wife Louisa was sick with measles, went to answer a thunderous pounding
on the door. "In the name of the Northern Army, open up," came a deep
voice. Brown's party entered and ordered Wilkinson outside.
Shortly thereafter the raiders visited James Harris, who was in
bed with his wife when the door burst open and the Brown gang entered.
For some inexplicable reason, they ignored Harris and dragged out William
Sherman, a guest.
Not until the next morning did anyone dare to go out and investi-
gate. James Doyle and two of his sons lay near the cabin, with bullets
through their heads, their skulls split in two with a broadaxe, their sides
hacked open, and their fingers cut off. A neighbor found Allen Wilkinson
shot in the head, his skull chopped apart and his side pierced. Bill Sherman
was lying face down in a small creek, shot in the head, his skull laid open
and the brains trailing down the stream, but still attached to the bone, his
side stabbed full of sword wounds and his hands cut off.
The Democrats reacted with a howl of rage and fury, and had the
Republicans equally expressed their horror of the savage insanity which
prompted this blind slaughter, Brooks might have been punished and the
country might have become calmer. But antislavery extremists hailed
Brown as a hero. Slavery was a sin, and the wages of sin was death. God
had ordained Brown to smite the wicked. When this kind of report began
to percolate into the South, it became the fashion there to "present a cane"
to Preston Brooks wherever he made a public appearance. It is no wonder
James Buchanan returned to Wheatland less optimistic than when he left.
At Cincinnati, as convention time approached, there was great
activity on the part of the advance guard of Pierce and Douglas supporters,
254
THE RIGHT MAN FOR THE TIMES • 1856
but no Buchanan team was in evidence. Rather quickly it became apparent
that Buchanan's uncoordinated managers had taken too literally the "spon-
taneous" idea, and that no one was in command of the organization. Slidell
got busy, rounded up his colleagues— Judah P. Benjamin of Louisiana,
Jesse D. Bright of Indiana, and James A. Bayard of Delaware— and the.four
Senators hastened to Cincinnati. Forney arrived soon after, and began
negotiations to detach the Douglas forces from their agreement with Pierce.
Pierce and Douglas planned to hold on to their own delegations at all costs
and block the Buchanan bid.
The Democratic National Convention opened noisily on June 2
when rival delegations from Missouri and New York overpowered the
doormen and pummeled their way onto the convention floor. After order
had been restored, the convention chose John E. Ward of Georgia, a
Buchaneer, as permanent chairman. Buchanan's friends succeeded in
gaining early control of most of the convention machinery and began to
execute their strategy. Admit all contesting delegations in order to split
the vote of the states from which they came. This plan would give Buchanan
at least fifty per cent where he might otherwise get nothing. Adopt the
platform first and include in it a popular sovereignty resolution to pro-
pitiate Douglas. Promise Bright the patronage of the Northwest, and let
him use this to seduce weak Douglas delegates. For those strong on
Douglas, promise the patronage to him and remind them that the Little
Giant, still only 43 years old, might expect to be favored in 1860 if he
played the game now. Win Michigan by showing to her delegates evidence
that their favorite son, Cass, had been knifed by Douglas in 1852. Tell
everyone who had failed to secure a job under Pierce that his only hope lay
with Buchanan. Have the Buchanan Committee continually circulating
about the floor, visiting with each state delegation. These visits might not
accomplish much directly but would create a constant disturbance with
Buchanan's name at the center. Speaker Ward promised not to interrupt
this unparliamentary procedure.15
In a dozen ballots Buchanan led but did not approach a two-thirds
majority. Then Pierce withdrew, throwing his votes to Douglas, and stray
votes began to drift over to Buchanan. On the sixteenth ballot Buchanan
polled a two-to-one majority over Douglas from New England, the middle
States, and the West, and Douglas ran two-to-one ahead of Buchanan in
the South, a conclusive refutation of the fallacious story of later years that
the South had picked Buchanan.16 Douglas finally withdrew, hoping to
promote his chances for 1860, and on the seventeenth ballot the convention
nominated Buchanan by acclamation. It chose John C. Breckinridge of
Kentucky as vice-president, an honor which came as a total surprise to him.
The Democratic platform, nearly identical with the previous one,
added a new plank: opposition to further agitation of the slave question,
255
JAMES BUCHANAN
a firm stand on the Compromise measures of 1850, and recognition of "the
right of the people of all the Territories . . . acting through the legally and
fairly expressed will of the majority of the actual residents ... to form a
constitution with or without domestic slavery, and be admitted into
the Union,"
The Republicans named John C. Fr&nont, a choice of expediency.
Their strongest candidate, William H. Seward, did not want to risk the
defeat which he anticipated the party would suffer in its first national
campaign. Fremont had tremendous romantic appeal, no political record,
and would bring the northern Know-Nothings along with him.
The Republican platform promised to promote the building of a
railroad to the Pacific, to make big appropriations for rivers and harbors,
and to prohibit in the territories "those twin relics of barbarism, polygamy
and slavery." One resolution broke sharply from the old pattern of party
platforms and took the form of a revolutionary manifesto. It accused the
Pierce Administration of every crime in the human calendar, charging it
with murder, robbery, arson, confiscation of private property, false im-
prisonment, and the tyrannical subversion of the Constitution in Kansas.
The platform labelled as "spurious and pretended" the territorial govern-
ment of Kansas which Congress had recognized as legal and called the
revolutionary Topeka government, whose members soon would be under
federal indictment for treason, the "constitutional government." But the
last sentence was the serious one. It arraigned the Administration, the
president, his advisors, agents, supporters, apologists, and accessories for
crimes against humanity and concluded "that it is our fixed purpose to
bring the actual perpetrators of these atrocious outrages, and their accom-
plices, to a sure and condign punishment hereafter."
Had this been the platform of some insignificant, crackpot party,
the people of the country would have laughed it off as pure moonshine,
something like the ravings of the suffragettes or the phrenologists. But
Kansas was no laughing matter, nor did the Republicans appear as a harm-
less lunatic fringe in 1856. They might win.
If they were victorious, the platform pledged them to arrest, jail,
and possibly execute those who disagreed with them on Kansas. People
might easily brush aside the Democrats9 sense of outrage at such threats as
mere partisan prejudice but northern Whigs discovered the same import
in the Republican platform. Said they: "Can [the Republicans] have the
madness or folly to believe that our Southern brethren would submit to be
governed by such a chief magistrate? I tell you that we are treading on
the brink of a volcano."17 People who still loved their country were
frightened.
Fr&nont posed no great problem to the Democrats. The political
sophisticates passed him off as "a man whose only merit, so far as history
256
THE RIGHT MAN FOR THE TIMES • 1856
records it, is in the fact that he was born in South Carolina, crossed the
Rocky Mountains, subsisted on frogs, lizards, snakes and grasshoppers, and
captured a woolly horse."18 A good many agreed with Sophie Plitt:
"Fr&nont to run in opposition . . . What afarcel Poor ignoramus. And
Dayton too — they want a burlesque!"19 It amused Buchanan to remember
how he had first brought Fr&nont into the public eye by persuading the
Senate to print and distribute thousands of copies of the Exploring Expedi-
tion to the Rocky Mountains. Fr&nont did not worry him; the real issue was
the Republican threat of disunion and civil war. Buchanan feared this
possibility, not only as a candidate but also as a private citizen. "In case
of a dissolution of the Union," he wrote to Howell Cobb in July, "Maryland
and Pennsylvania would most probably be frontier states; & whilst we and
generations yet to come would have bitter cause to deplore the dreadful
catastrophe, these two states would suffer more than any other members of
the Confederacy."20
CONSERVATIVES TO THE RESCUE
Buchanan stated the keynote of his campaign in these words, "The Union is
in danger and the people everywhere begin to know it. The Black Republicans
must be, as they can be with justice, boldly assailed as disunionists, and
this charge must be reiterated again and again." Forget the past, bury the
bank, the tariff, and the rest as historical fossils. The Democrats must
publicize the statements of "the abolitionists, free soilers and infidels
against the Union," to show that the Union was in danger. "This race
ought to be run on the question of Union or disunion."21
The Democratic press generally adopted this campaign theme,
and devoted columns to the antiunion pronouncements of prominent
Republicans. Ohio's Representative Joshua R. Giddings had announced
"I look forward to the day when there shall be a servile insurrection in the
South; when the black man . . . shall assert his freedom, and wage a war of
extermination against his master; when the torch of the incendiary shall
light up the towns of the South, and blot out the last vestige of slavery;
and though I may not mock at their calamity, nor laugh when their fear
cometh, yet I will hail it as the dawn of the millenium." , New York's
Governor William H. Seward asserted that "there is a higher power than
the Constitution," and hoped soon to "bring the parties of the country
into an aggressive war upon slavery." Speaker of the House Nathaniel P.
Banks said frankly that he was "willing ... to let the Union slide." Judge
Rufus S. Spalding declared that if he had the alternatives of the continuance
of slavery or a dissolution of the Union, "I am for dissolution, and I care
not how quick it comes."
257
JAMES BUCHANAN
Editor James Watson Webb predicted that if the Republicans lost
the election, they would be "forced to drive back the slavocracy with fire
and sword." Horace Greeley of the New York Tribune wrote that "the free
and slave states ought to separate." The Union, he editorialized, "is not
worth supporting in connexion with the South." A Poughkeepsie clergy-
man prayed "that this accursed Union may be dissolved, even if blood have
to be spilt." A group of Republicans petitioned Congress to take "measures
for the speedy, peaceful, and equitable dissolution of the existing union."
0. L Raymond told an audience in Faneuil Hall, "Remembering that he
wL a slaveholder, I spit upon George Washington." (Hisses and applause)
"You hissers are slaveholders in spirit!"22
Almost every day during the campaign, Democratic newspapers
ran a column of such (flotations as evidence of Republican doctrine. But
Buchanan and the Democrats incorrectly assessed the fundamentally
revolutionary nature of the Republican party. While the Democrats
published this material to expose the determination of the Republicans to
break up the Union, the Republicans joyfully welcomed all the free publicity
and published the same material in their own newspapers as bright banners
of the glorious crusade. About 175,000,000 copies of newspapers circulated
annually in the North, and about 50,000,000 annually in the South. The
southerners got only the Democratic viewpoint, the terrible threat; the
certainty that the Republicans planned for them just what their platform
promised: fire and sword. The northerners got four times as much material
on the same theme, in the papers of both parties, and the Republicans
believed it was helping them more than Buchanan. In fact, the word
"disunion" so dominated the campaign that it began to take hold of
Democratic minds. So solid a Union Democrat as Jeremiah S. Black, in
urging Howell Cobb to prevent the South from acting politically without
prior consultation with friends in the North, concluded: "If you will do
this, even the election of Fr&nont may result in nothing worse than turning
New England with her ignorance, bigotry, and superstition out of the Union;
and that is a consummation most devoutly to be wished."28
Buchanan made no speeches during the campaign; he stayed at
Wheatland conducting a prodigious correspondence. Every question of
the election dwindled to trifling insignificance, he wrote, "when compared
with the grand and appalling issue of union or disunion." If Fr&nont won,
he said, disunion "will be immediate and inevitable. . . . We have so often
cried Volf,' that now, when the wolf is at the door, it is difficult to make
people believe it." From the South came letters from men who had once
opposed nullification and secession but who now said "that the election of
Fi&nont involves the dissolution of the Union. . . . Many now deem that
it would be for the mutual advantage of the parties to have a Southern
Confederation."
258
THE RIGHT MAN FOR THE TIMES • 1856
British newspapers were "all for Fremont . . ., and a dissolution
of the Union." French journals assumed that there would be an immediate
declaration of war between the sections if Fremont should win, and ex-
pressed surprise that the word "disunion," once so horrifying to Americans,
was now spoken openly in all parts of the country. The Abolitionists and
Radical Republicans of New England and Ohio shrilled to the same chorus.
When a convention in Cleveland, called for the purpose of northern
secession, failed to accomplish that object in the fall of 1856, Garrison,
Wendell Phillips and their partisans called another to meet in Worcester,
Massachusetts, in January, 1857, where they proposed to secede from a
union with slaveholders. "It is now with nine-tenths only a question of
time," said Phillips. Garrison defiantly cast a copy of the Constitution into
a bonfire with the exclamation: "So perish all compromises with tyranny."
"Boston is a sad place," wrote Buchanan. "In that city they have re-
elected to Congress a factious fanatic, . . . who, in a public speech, said that
we must have an anti-slavery Constitution, an anti-slavery Bible, and an
anti-slavery God."24
The Democratic campaign and the adherence of many prominent
Whigs to Buchanan's cause seemed to guarantee success in November.
That supposition got a rude shock in September when Maine held its state
election. While the Democrats had no real expectation of winning the
state, they had spent money and sent speakers in the hope of keeping the
Republican victory small. But Maine went Republican by an overwhelming
majority. This smashing defeat aroused the Democrats to energetic action.
Southerners, in a panic, mobilized hurriedly, declaring in the meantime
that if the Republicans won they would have to secede immediately to save
their lives. Pennsylvania now became crucial, for careful analysis showed
that Buchanan had to carry his home state to win. But every electoral vote
became critically important. To bolster California, Buchanan wrote a
letter endorsing the construction of a Pacific railroad to counter the Re-
publicans* strongest propaganda weapon there. Forney discovered, to his
horror, that Buchanan had never even written to President Pierce or to
Senator Stephen A. Douglas, enlisting their aid in his campaign. Buchanan
recognized it as a stupid oversight, but he found himself unable to repair it,
for to write at this late date would be an insulting insinuation that these
gentlemen had been dragging their feet. Douglas became so excited that
on his own volition he sold some land and gave the money to the campaign
chest: $100,000 according to a biographer of Douglas, and $100 according
to a Buchanan biographer. In a thank you letter for this, Buchanan un-
fortuijately addressed the envelope to "The Hon. Samuel A. Douglas."
The Democratic party leaders converged on Pennsylvania where
the state election in October would determine the fate of the presidential
balloting. They had two weeks in which to work. Cobb came from Georgia
259
JAMES BUCHANAN
and made ten speeches in ten days to huge audiences from Philadelphia to
Erie. At Meadville he talked to a crowd of 3000 for an hour and a half in
a driving snow storm, then drove by buggy to Erie in the off-season blizzard
and spoke another hour and a half. For a Georgian, this was the supreme
sacrifice.25 From the South came the word: "Concentrate your entire
force of every kind upon Pennsylvania until the 15th— even the day of
election have speakers everywhere. Success here will carry more votes . . .
than can possibly be accomplished by direct efforts in other states. Carry
every speaker to Pennsylvania. . . . Don't waste your time replying.
Carry Pennsylvania."26
The week before election Lancaster staged the greatest effort of
the campaign. Some 50,000 people descended on the little Dutch com-
munity to hear the sons of Henry Clay and Daniel Webster (both Whigs)
and all the prominent Democrats. There was a huge parade with booming
cannon and innumerable bands, and placards were displayed at every little
distance bearing the legend:
Nail up the Flag, aye, nail it fast;
The Union First, the Union Last.
We hail no flag — no party own
That any of the States Disown.27
Only one mishap marred the occasion. The first section of the special train
carrying 2000 Philadelphia^ wrecked, blocking all following traffic, with
the result that the Dallas contingent never got to Lancaster.28
The Democrats won Pennsylvania by a slim majority on October
15 and everyone relaxed. A Democratic presidency was assured. The
election would not go to the House of Representatives. Fr&nont could not
win. In the November elections, Buchanan polled through the nation
some 1,800,000 votes, Fremont 1,300,000, and Fillmore 900,000. South
of the Mason-Dixon line, Fi&nont drew less than 8000 votes. The Electoral
College gave 174 votes to Buchanan, 114 to Fr&nont and 8 to Fillmore.
The Union was saved. '*! believe now," wrote Howell Cobb's
brother, "that no other man but Mr. Buchanan could have been elected
with the opposition we have encountered at the North. He was The Man
... the most suitable man for the times."29 Back at Wheadand, his "segar"
lit and the Madeira bottle open, President-elect Buchanan agreed.
260
20
CHARTING THE COURSE • 1856-1857
A NATIONAL AND CONSERVATIVE GOVERNMENT
On March first, 1857, James Buchanan, clad in a dressing gown and slippers,
sat alone in his study trying to calm his nerves and itemize a list of inci-
dentals which needed attention. They must all be ready in the morning
when he would leave for Washington. He could hear Harriet and Miss
Hetty walking about in the room directly above him; the murmur of their
conversation and the occasional thump of a trunk lid annoyed him. Going
to the door, he asked one of the servants to call J. B. Henry who had been
acting as his private secretary during the past hectic months.
Buchanan gave him a few instructions and went upstairs to his
bedroom where he removed his dressing gown and tried on the vest and
coat of his inauguration suit. Mr. Metzger, the tailor on East King Street,
had delivered it the week before, and it showed the signs of his fine crafts-
manship.1 Outwardly it was unobtrusive; a plain black coat of French
cloth, but into the lining was worked a magnificent design of thirty-one
stars representing the states of the Union, with Pennsylvania dominating
the center. It would fit, he thought to himself. A man ought always to be
plain, dignified, and restrained on the exterior, but he ought to wear beneath
this external coat the knowledge of his true talents and character. Let
there be more hidden in reserve than outwardly shows. Thus would a man
always be competent to the tasks assigned to him.
As he tried on the flowered satin vest, he ruminated about his
inauguration ceremony. For him, it would be no inauguration at all; it
would be more like a culmination. What would it be for the Union? The
election of 1856, for the first time in American history, had probed down
to the bedrock question of union or disunion; survival or disruption. The
cliche" of editors and orators had become the bona fide statement of the
fundamental problem: the Union was in danger.
After his election, Buchanan wrote: "The great object of my
administration will be to arrest, if possible, the agitation of the slavery
261
JAMES BUCHANAN
question at the North, and to destroy sectional parlies. Should a kind
Providence enable me to succeed in my efforts to restore harmony to the
Union, I shall feel that I have not lived in vain."2 He re-echoed the theme
to Mr. Justice Grier.3 To the students of Franklin and Marshall College,
who visited at Wheatland a few weeks after the election, he confided that
"the object of my administration will he to destroy any sectional party,
North or South, and harmonize all sections of the Union under a national
and conservative government, as it was fifty years ago."'
» "4
UNION ABOVE SECTION, PARTY ABOVE FACTION
In the interval between the election and the inauguration Buchanan could
do little or nothing about the slavery dispute, but even before taking the
oath of office he could strike a blow against sectionalism by carefully picking
his Cabinet. He would not incorporate into it men of different political
opinions. He would choose only those who had proved their party 'regu-
larity and demonstrated their devotion to nation above section. There
would be no extremist in the Cabinet.
As soon as Buchanan received the facts and figures of the election,
he made a study to determine the proper dispensation of office and political
favor. He wanted to unite the national Democrats with the Union Whigs
and to destroy the subversive league of northern fanatics and southern
rebels. The election returns showed that Buchanan had won all the slave
states except Maryland (which went for Fillmore), and had carried the free
states of Pennsylvania, Indiana and California. Fr&nont had won the six
New England states plus Michigan and Wisconsin. Elsewhere Buchanan
and Fremont had run a tight race and neither had achieved a popular
majority.
The election strongly highlighted the sectional nature of the
Republicans and the national appeal of the Democrats.6 Frdmont com-
manded a majority in only one of the geographical sections of the nation;
he scarcely had any vote south of the Mason-Dixon line. Buchanan beat
Fr&nont in seven of the eight geographical sections.6 But the American
party, by running Millard Fillmore, had complicated the election and in-
duced a critical 21 per cent of the voters to dodge the issue on which the
safety of the nation rested. There was no way of knowing what these
voters stood for.
Buchanan knew definitely what kind of Cabinet he wanted. To
keep a Democratic bastion in the heart of the enemy's country, he needed
a New Englander. Either Nathan Clifford of Maine or Isaac Toucey of
Connecticut would meet the requirements of experience and party regularity.
New York might as well be left out; the two Democratic factions of the state
were, after a generation of feuding, hopelessly irreconcilable. He could
262
CHARTING THE COURSE • 1856 - 1857
pick no New Yorker without widening the split. Pennsylvania had to have
a Cabinet post, but the selection here would be as difficult as in New York.
The Democrats remained so faction ridden that the selection of any veteran
might wreck the party. Buchanan planned to avoid trouble by appointing
a personal friend who was a newcomer to Pennsylvania politics, J. Clancy
Jones of Reading, who had once lived in the South and commanded con-
fidence and respect there.
Virginia, which had loyally supported Buchanan, had earned a
place. He promptly offered one to Henry A. Wise, but the governor turned
him down. He also offered John Slidell a Cabinet appointment but he, too,
declined because he preferred to remain in the Senate.
As an antidote for northern suspicion, Buchanan wanted in a
position of high responsibility the most outspoken southern unionist he
could find. Howell Cobb of Georgia was that man. He had stumped the
North during the campaign and had given to thousands a thrilling demon-
stration that the South contained some of the most aggressive and deter-
mined champions of union in the land. After SlidelFs refusal, Buchanan
wanted Cobb to have the State Department, and Cobb let it be known that
he would serve only in that station.
The Union Whigs had contributed so many votes to Buchanan's
election that he wished to confirm their conversion to Democracy by
including one of their leaders in his official staff. Other needs, however,
would have to be taken care of first.
The Northwest presented the worst problem. Here, in the upper
Mississippi Valley, Senator Stephen A. Douglas of Illinois and Jesse D.
Bright of Indiana were locked in mortal combat for control of the power
and patronage of the party. Buchanan detested Douglas, considering him
the irresponsible destroyer of the slavery settlement of 1850. To Buchanan,
the stupidity of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill was overshadowed only by the
avaricious personal ambition of its author. Unhappily, Douglas could not
be ignored for he had nearly taken the 1856 nomination, and with a strong
following in the South he commanded a power essential to the party.
Bright had brought in the vote of Indiana for Buchanan when Douglas had
failed to deliver Illinois, but Douglas threatened to wreck the party if Bright
went into the Cabinet. Bright was determined that no friend of Douglas
should receive an appointment. Under these circumstances, Buchanan
felt he dared not commit himself to either for the time being.
At this point in his planning, Buchanan received the reports
from California. They gave him an increased majority and suggested one
new idea. He could not give California a position, but he could again
endorse a federally-built railroad to the Pacific which would gratify the
westerners and weaken Douglas, who was working in political team with
Jefferson Davis in the South. The renewed prospect of a Pacific railroad
263
JAMES BUCHANAN
would trip one or the other, for each was determined to have the eastern
terminus of any such road in his own back yard. He advocated the railway
in a letter which he sent to the press December 8.
Wheatland was open house during November and December,
though the stream of visitors never reached the 400 daily that some of the
newspapers reported. John Appleton of Maine, whom Buchanan planned
to install as the editor of an Administration newspaper in Washington, even
lived at Wheatland for a time, to the great distress of John Forney, who
wanted the editorial job. Forney rushed in and out continually in the early
weeks, until he learned that he was not considered for the Cabinet and
would not be awarded the Washington editorship.
Buchanan did not know what to do with Forney. He had sup-
ported Pierce up to the very last moment before the Cincinnati Convention.
Although he had cleared lie position with Buchanan beforehand, this did
not mollify Buchanan's friends; and nothing would ever make Forney
acceptable to Virginia Democrats. He had gotten into a violent fight with
the Wise faction while Buchanan was in London, and had expressed himself
with such abandon that he was lucky to have escaped a duel. Buchanan's
Virginia friends would have preferred the devil to Forney in any responsible
position, and Buchanan needed Virginia back of him. Forney wrote that
he was staying close to the foot of the throne to counteract the southern
insistence that he should not edit the Washington Union. "I can be elected
Senator," he said, "but I will not be. I will go into the Union, or I will
stay home and — . I confess I am sick at heart. Met Mr. Clancy Jones.
He is for the Cabinet. God save us."7
During November, Buchanan went on a brief trip with Lewis Cass
of Michigan, and visited Governor Wise and Senator Douglas in Phila-
delphia. The more he listened and the more mail he read, the more complex
his Cabinet problem became and the more secretive he grew about it. By
early December he knew that Wise and Slidell would not serve, that Bright
was blocked, that Clifford was unacceptable to Pierce, that Jones would be
rejected by the Democrats of Pennsylvania, and that none of the Democratic
leaders was willing to give up a Cabinet place to a Union Whig. Only Cobb
remained a certainty, and he insisted on the State Department or nothing.
On December 1, Buchanan wrote that he was still "wholly un-
committed about the cabinet,"8 and stated that he intended to keep his own
counsel on the subject "even after I shall have formed a decided opinion, so
that if circumstances should require a change, this may be made without
giving offence."9 By the end of the month Buchanan asked his friends to
keep out of Lancaster because "everybody is now looked upon with a
jealous & suspicious eye who visits Wheatland."10 Howell Cobb, who
should have been first in Buchanan's confidence, at last abandoned his
264
CHARTING THE COURSE • 1856 - 185?
curiosity and told his wife that he was ready "to let Old Buck fix up his
Cabinet to suit himself— as ... he will do anyhow."11
Perhaps Buchanan was wise to be silent, and to postpone any
appointment until he had worked out a scheme incorporating all. But
unhappily for him, his secrecy multiplied his difficulties. In the absence
of a public announcement, every clique and faction of the Democracy
which had a candidate to push or a trade to make got into the game. Manu-
facturers of public opinion to influence Buchanan's choice set up in every
hole and corner of the nation.
False rumors refueled all the old factional fights. Forney raged
against Virginia, "For Hunter we never will or can go. Against him we
shall wage war to the knife and the knife to the hilt ... by the Great God
they shall find that if we are Democrats we are not negro slaves and dogs . . .
anybody before Hunter."12 Wrote another: "If the Free Soilers at the
North have been as busy as the Southern Rights men ... his Cabinet will
have to be taken from the extremes of the party, leaving all the national
men out."13
Buchanan hoped that the first week of the New Year would settle
one worrisome deadlock, the problem of Forney and Jones. The Pennsyl-
vania Legislature would soon elect a Senator to replace Richard Brodhead
who for the past six years had made it a kind of religious mission to vilify
and discredit the Sage of Wheadand. Buchanan had hoped to send
Jeremiah Bkck to the Senate, but Forney now had his heart set upon that
place. Something had to be done for Forney. He was now in a state of
near frenzy, and if he ever lost control of himself he could and would pky
havoc with the Democracy in Pennsylvania. Buchanan could not possibly
have him in the Cabinet and he could not trust him with the Washington
Union, but he would be pretty safe in the Senate; at least a vast improve-
ment over Brodhead. If Forney went into the Senate, there would be no
resistance to Jones in the Cabinet.
After much prodding Buchanan wrote a letter to Harrisburg
stating his personal preference for Forney as Senator. The letter was both
restrained and belated, but it was nonetheless a direct endorsement, 'which
was more than Buchanan had ever before given to anyone in a Pennsylvania
senatorial race.14
A few days later the telegraph wires hummed with the news of
the election of Simon Cameron as Senator. "My God, what a scene of
public corruption and wholesale bribery it. was," exploded Forney.15 The
Democrats nominated Forney but Cameron, after mobilizing the opposition,
discovered he needed only a handful of votes to win. He first utilized
David Taggart, a state senator from Northumberland County, whose bank
Cameron had threatened to close and then relented on a promise of political
subservience. He also enlisted the aid of Charles Penrose. These two
265
JAMES BUCHANAN
SU<
successfully appealed to three Democrats who were looking for a chance to
square old scores with Forney. For Buchanan it was the worst thing that
could have happened; it destroyed the very keystone of his plan. Pennsyl-
vania Democracy was to have heen the model and the guide; the symbol of
national spirit and forbearance in the party. Now it was a laughing stock.
Howell Cobb wrote to his wife "that Simon Cameron, an abolitionist, was
elected. ... It is a hard blow not only upon Forney but upon Mr. Buchanan
and the democratic party. I have never felt more deeply a result than
I do this."16
Forney's defeat raised a strong wave of sympathy for him which
broke in the form of demands that Buchanan now put him in the Cabinet
on the principle "that great generals ought to care for ... the gallant and
true-hearted that nobly fell with their face to the enemy, particularly when
treason worked their fall."17 But if Buchanan had decided nothing else,
he had determined not to have Forney in the Cabinet He now reconciled
himself to another firm conclusion: he could not have Jones, either, and in
great embarrassment sat down to ask Jones to release him from his former
promise.18 Angry and hurt, Jones tried to maintain his claim, but he
ultimately gave Buchanan a written release and intimated that he might
accept a mission to give the appearance of party harmony.
Knowing that Forney, with five children, mounting debts, and no
job, desperately needed money, Buchanan urged that he take the Liverpool
consulate, the richest place he could find in the non-policy making branch
of the government, but Forney would have none of it. He would not go
abroad, and he refused to serve at home in any subordinate position,19
Unable to find any post he could conscientiously give which Forney would
accept, Buchanan temporarily gave up the effort; but when he learned that
his old friend was drinking heavily and had threatened to mortgage the
Washington property which was the only remaining security for his family,
Buchanan stepped in, arranged to act as trustee of the property for Mrs.
Forney and the children, and devised a temporary income for Forney as paid
correspondent for various Democratic papers.20
In January it was rumored that Buchanan was seriously con-
sidering Robert J. Walker for the State Department, proclaiming him for
Pennsylvania. Walker had been born in Bellefonte, Pennsylvania, and
grown up in Pittsburgh, but he was now a resident of Mississippi. He had
strong national views and personally opposed slavery, although he was rec-
onciled to it politically as a system sanctioned by law and tradition. The
rumor concerning Walker disturbed Cobb and set in motion his enemies,
Jefferson Davis and Stephen Douglas, who now began to push Lewis Cass
for the top post in the Cabinet. They sought by this scheme to block Cobb
and Bright so that Davis could gain control in the South and Douglas in
266
CHARTING THE COURSE • 1856 - 1857
the Northwest.21 But Cobb, with great magnanimity and political astute-
ness, endorsed their candidate, "and that knocked all their calculations
into <pi-' "22
Buchanan neither liked nor respected Cass, but he did recognize
him as an ideal symbol of his policy and saw in his appointment an oppor-
tunity to resolve several of his most embarrassing problems. Cass would
undoubtedly accept, for he had just been voted out of his job as Senator
from Michigan and would be reluctant to return home in defeat. He was a
thorough nationalist, an undeviating party regular, an old-time Jacksonian,
and a former presidential candidate. He would not make a good Secretary
of State, for he was a notorious Anglophobe, and he was so old, lethargic,
and indolent that Buchanan planned to instruct others to do the work. But
Cass would reinforce the idea of party unity, Cobb had agreed to defer
to him, though to no other, as head of the Cabinet and would take the next
position, possibly the Treasury.23 Cass's installation would break the
critical stalemate; confound Davis and Douglas without giving them cause
for resentment; pacify Bright who had won his Senatorship and would not
contest the issue with Cass; permit Buchanan to have Cobb in the Cabinet;
and make room for maneuver in other selections because the greatest
pressures were removed. So far nothing had been given to Pennsylvania,
but she would have to wait. At this point Buchanan decided to go to
Washington and finish the Cabinetmaking.
He arrived in Washington on January 27 during the worst cold
wave in decades and went immediately to the National Hotel. Forney
reported in the Pennsylvanian that President Pierce and Senator Douglas
sent Buchanan dinner invitations, which he declined,24 but certain persons
who were on the scene stated that he dined with Pierce, Douglas, and others
on the night of January 31 and the next evening attended a dinner party
given by Mrs. Douglas.25 One thing is known; he talked with Douglas, and
the Little Giant reported afterwards that the atmosphere was chilly. He
was not referring to the weather.26
Buchanan consulted at length with men he particularly trusted;
Cobb, Wise, Slidell, and others. Cobb wrote to his wife on January 31 that
"Old Buck still avers he has not communicated to anyone" his Cabinet
plans, but he included in the same letter a list of probabilities. His accurate
"guessing" leads one to suspect that the decisions were made during
these consultations.27'
Buchanan returned home on February 3. A cryptic note in the
Wrightsville Star reported that the' president-elect "footed it" the 10 miles
from Wrightsville to Lancaster.28 The visits to Wheatland continued:
Bright, Douglas, Dan Sickles, and a stream of Pennsylvania Democrats.
All reported that Buchanan was still planning Cabinet appointments, but
more likely he was giving most of his time to the inaugural address.
267
JAMES BUCHANAN
Forney's friends were furious that Clancy Jones was going around
blabbing that he had been invited for an advance perusal of the address and
was acting very uppity about it.29 Of the Cabinet, Buchanan wrote in
mid-February: "Applications are pouring in to me recommending different
gentlemen for the Cabinet; but they are too late ... the testimony is closed
and the case ready for judgment. ... I shall announce it in a few days."30
On February 17, Buchanan wrote the first of a series of letters
that would settle the composition of the Cabinet. He informed Clancy
Jones that he would definitely be out, and that Jeremiah Sullivan Black
was to have the only place available to a Pennsylvanian.31 On the 18th he
had it out with Forney, who wrote to Cobb of the interview: "Just from
Lancaster where I have heard my doom It wounds me like a blow."32
On the 20th and 21st, Buchanan was "mysteriously missing," according to
the local press, but it is certain that he was at Wheatland, for he wrote to
Cobb from there on the 21st and formally asked him to accept the Treasury
Department.
The same day he wrote to Cass, offering the State Department
under conditions which would let Cass have the honor but place the work
and responsibility in the hands of assistants named by Buchanan. He then
invited Aaron V. Brown of Tennessee to take the Post Office, and Jacob
Thompson of Mississippi the Interior Department. The Navy Department
and Attorney-Generalship were still unfilled; into these places he wanted to
put a Pennsylvanian and a New Englander, one of them, if possible, a Union
Whig. Buchanan felt he could go no further at the moment. On February
25 he published in the newspapers a notice that positively no more visitors
would be received at Wheatland until after the inaugural ceremonies.
To close the door to callers was very much out of character for
Buchanan, even when he had a presidential inaugural address to finish.
His "mysterious absence" and his subsequent seclusion resulted from
something a good deal more serious than a wish for peace and quiet.
James Buchanan, along with dozens of other guests, had gotten a bad case
of the ctNational Hotel disease" during his recent visit to the Capital. The
disorder was a kind of dysentery, accompanied by violeitf diarrhea, severe
intestinal inflammation, and distressing persistence. The affair was
partially hushed up, but rumors amplified the brief reports which attributed
the cause to frozen plumbing which in some way had contaminated the
water supply. Some averred that rats, driven from the walls by the cold,
had sought refuge in the attic and there tumbled into the open vats in
which rain water was collected for the hotel system. This explanation
expanded into the tale that poisoned rats were purposely placed in the
water tanks. Other experts concluded that poisonous gas from sewers
which were connected with the kitchen sinks had been stopped up by the
freezing of sewer outlets and had poisoned the food. The probable reason
CHARTING THE COURSE • 1856 . 1857
was that sewer waste had backed up into the kitchen, contaminated the area,
and infected the servants, who passed the infection on to the guests. At
such time it was inevitable that there should be an ugly rumor of an
attempted assassination.33
Whatever the cause of the epidemic, Dr. Jonathan Foltz, who
treated Buchanan after his return to Wheadand, ordered him to live else-
where during the preinaugural period, preferably the President House where
all the water came from a tested spring.3*
Buchanan felt he had nearly, completed the first part of his task.
The Cabinet would represent national interests and the inaugural would
emphasize the same theme. Every extremist from Maine to Florida and
every faction from New York to California had had a go at him and been
given a fair hearing. They had forced him to alter some of his personal
choices, but he had held firm on the principle governing the final selections.
There would be not one factionist or one sectional fanatic among his
advisors; all were devoted to the Union above section; to the party above
faction; and to a desire to preserve the status quo at least long enough to
calm the public mind. The Cabinet would be national and conservative.
Buchanan had expected to defer the second great task, dealing
with slavery, until after the inauguration. But during February he was
drawn into a correspondence which gave him hope that part of the problem
might be solved at a stroke. While in Washington he had learned that the
Supreme Court was nearly ready to bring in a decision on the Dred Scott
case. Eager to have the backing of the Court, he wrote to Justices John
Catron and Robert Grier about the wisdom of having the Supreme Court
issue a thorough expository opinion on the power of Congress over slavery
in the territories. Buchanan knew what the majority decision would be-
that Scott had no rigjit to sue because he was not a citizen— and he knew
that two dissenting Justices would prepare a statement supporting their
views. Should not the majority do likewise, and make explicit that Congress
had no power over slavery in the territories; therefore, the Missouri Com-
promise had been unconstitutional? Buchanan strongly urged this action
as the best possible way to get the slavery debate out of Congress and settle
once and for all the sectional contention. If the country was so far gone
that it would attack the Supreme Court, then the Union was already cracked
beyond repair.35
Buchanan stirred and shook his head as the room came back into
focus and his rumination turned into the realities of March 1, 1857. The
inaugural coat still lay upon the bed. Tomorrow morning he was leaving
for Washington*
JAMES BUCHANAN
"I DO SOLEMNLY SWEAR"
Lancaster was up betimes on the cold, snowy morning of March 2. The
church bells began ringing at six to inform the people it was time to begin
the march to the depot. The marshals, in their gaily colored silk scarfs and
white rosettes, cantered about waving their batons and shouting lustily at
the straggling crowd along West King Street to form a line and close ranks,
in readiness to follow Buchanan's carriage the moment it arrived. After
half an hour of shivering and foot stamping, the marshals very sensibly
abandoned their pride of organization to the need of action and started a
parade toward Wheatland to intercept the president-elect. The band fell
to its work with zest but after about five minutes had to give up the attempt
because of the cold, and clambered aboard the wagon provided for its use.
At Wheatland it was learned that Buchanan's party was still not ready to
leave. At last, to the echo of rousing cheers, the carriage came round to
the front portico. Buchanan, Miss Lane, James Buchanan Henry, and
Miss Hetty Parker stepped into it, and without further ado the procession,
with Captain John H. Duchman's Lancaster Fencibles proudly leading the
way, was off to the railway station.
Superintendent Joseph B. Baker had provided a special train of
four cars the sides and windows of which had been decorated with patriotic
symbols and scenes from Wheatland. The presidential party boarded,
acknowledged a last rousing ovation, and left for Baltimore. There a change
of stations required passengers to go to the other end of the city for the
Washington trains.
En route a message was delivered warning that a rowdy mob of
about 1000 anti-Buchanan Know-Nothings was swarming around the
Calvert Street Station looking for trouble. The party therefore got oflF
at the Charles Street Station, where several companies of cavalry, sabers
drawn, waited to accompany the presidential party to Barnum's Hotel for a
huge midday bantjuet. But Buchanan was so ill that he retired immediately
until three o'clock when he boarded the train for the capital. Meanwhile,
the Lancaster Fencibles, who had to walk between stations, ran into the
foiled Know-Nothings, had to fight their way through, and were so much
harassed during their march that they missed the train.30
Despite the specific orders of Dr. Foltz and the urgent pleas of
Senators Slidell, Bigler, and others, Buchanan went to the National Hotel
as a mark of confidence in its proprietor, an old personal friend. He still
had two Cabinet appointments to make and the address to finish. The
politicians assembled at Washington took up every minute he would spare
them and tried to "help" him complete these tasks. At one stage he added
a sentence to the inaugural implying that settlers in Kansas and Nebraska
had no power over slavery in the territories until the time of framing a
CHARTING THE COURSE • 1856 . 1857
state constitution. News of this opinion leaked out to General Cass who,
as an originator of the popular sovereignty idea back in 1848, could not
swallow this interpretation and told Buchanan bluntly that he would refuse
to serve in the Cabinet if this statement appeared in the speech. Buchanan
cut it out. He concluded that he could not complete the Cabinet in such
turmoil and decided to postpone the work until the day after the inaugura-
tion. Furthermore, he was very sick with a recurrence of the dysentery,
and he was shocked to learn that the disease had broken out again with
increased virulence among the guests at the hotel.
A faultless spring day dawned on March 4 to grace the inaugura-
tion festivities. The thousands who had poured into the city were glad to
be up early from their makeshift beds in the parlors, dining rooms, and
public lobbies which had been pressed into service to accommodate the
overflow crowd. The bells began to ring, and slowly members of military
companies in gay uniforms appeared on the streets, citizens hung flags and
bunting from windows along the line of march, and members of the Twelfth
Ward Democratic Club of Philadelphia redoubled their efforts to sell more
tickets at five dollars a head to the Inauguration Ball.
By noon the three groups of parade marshals, with their white,
yellow or blue scarfs and saddle cloths trimmed with rosettes had the thirty-
odd fire companies, militia battalions, bands, floats, and groups of artisans
in line; and the procession started down Pennsylvania Avenue to the
National Hotel. There Buchanan was joined by vice-president-elect
Breckinridge, and all were ready to proceed when it was found that Presi-
dent Pierce was not on hand. A twenty-minute delay ensued until someone
on the arrangements committee discovered that through an oversight,
Pierce had been completely forgotten. After a flurry of excitement and
consultation, the committee picked Pierce up at the Willard Hotel and at
last the waiting crowds were relieved of their impatience by the sight of an
elegant, four-horse barouche, containing the president and the president-
elect. Ahead of them, leading the procession, was a huge float drawn by
six white horses bearing a lady symbolizing the Goddess of Liberty on a
high platform. Members of the Keystone Club rode beside the open
presidential carriages, and behind them came a float with a large model
of a warship.
At the Capitol, the group which was to share the inauguration
platform gathered first in the Senate Chamber where Vice-President
Breckinridge took the oath of office. All then filed out onto the stand in
front of the east portico. In the shuffle of getting seated, Buchanan and
Chief Justice Taney met momentarily at the front of the rail and held a
brief chat. Some of those who witnessed this exchange swore to their dying
day that at this very moment Taney told Buchanan how the Supreme Court
would decide the Dred Scott case, and that Buchanan instantly added this
271
JAMES BUCHANAN
information to his address. What they did not know was that he had more
than a week before learned the news from one of the Justices.37
The address was soon over and the oath of office administered.
Buchanan felt thankful that his queasy stomach had responded to the
brandy and medication which Dr. Foltz had given him just a half hour
before and that he had been able to complete the ceremony with dignity.
The address had been sincere, if unexciting; that was its purpose, his
purpose, and the country's need. Below, hawkers were already selling a
kerchief-sized edition of it, printed on silk.38 The audience discovered
nothing new in it except two statements— that Buchanan would not run
again, and that the Supreme Court would soon settle the issue of slavery
in the Territories. Foreign correspondents wrote that the new Administra-
tion would be a compromise, a postponement of the solution of gripping
issues.
That night the whole of Washington seemed determined to crowd
into the Inauguration Ball The managers had built a temporary structure
235 feet long and 77 feet wide on Judiciary Square for this function. Gold
stars winked against the white ceiling, and bunting of red, white and blue
festooned the walls. "Such a jam, such heat," wrote a lady who was there,
"I never either saw or felt before. . . . The members of Congress got
so over-excited with wine that they had to be locked up in the upper rooms
lest they should reappear in the ballroom."39
Miss Lane, hailed by enthusiastic newsmen as "Our Democratic
Queen," appeared resplendent in a white dress decorated with artificial
flowers and wearing a necklace of many strands of pearls. President
Buchanan and Harriet mingled with the crowd, talked to members of the
diplomatic corps, and enjoyed the cheers and gaiety. But they soon left
and shortly thereafter the doors of the White House closed gently upon
the new tenants.
Back at the Ball, the Russian Minister, Baron de Stoedd, was
trying valiantly to dance with Madame Sartiges, wife of the French Minister.
He remarked to her that the current situation in Washington reminded
him of Paris just before the Revolution of 1830. There, at a ball given by
Louis Philippe, Talleyrand whispered to the monarch, "Sire, we are dancing
on a volcano."40
272
21
THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY • 1857
BACHELOR IN THE WHITE HOUSE
Glamorous as the White House has always seemed to those who have
imagined the day when they might occupy it, the reality of moving in has
hrought many a new president back to tie workaday world with a thump.
He finds himself, after the tumult of inauguration, just another human
being walking into a strange house hastily vacated by the previous tenants.
Buchanan, to be sure, fared better than Pierce who, after receiving visitors
until past midnight of his inauguration day, fumbled his way upstairs to his
living quarters to discover that they were a shambles and no beds had been
made up. Recalling this experience, Pierce graciously moved out of the
White House a day early so that Miss Hetty could prepare a more homelike
reception for Buchanan upon his return with Harriet from the inaugural
ball.
Most of Pierce's White House staff stayed in service. Miss Hetty
and Harriet for a time tried joint superintendence of household operations,
but the experiment soon raised such a fuss that Buchanan faced a domestic
crisis. Miss Harriet intended to be Mistress of the White House; if not,
she would pack her trunks and get out. Miss Hetty said nothing but con-
tinued quietly to give instructions to the servants. Buchanan then began
to understand Martin Van Buren's recent advice that the most important
appointment he would make in his Administration would be a good White
House steward. The new president found one and told Miss Hetty to return
to Wheatland, but he invited her to visit the White House as one of the
family whenever she wished. He agreed that Harriet should dictate all
matters of social protocol, leaving the execution of details to the steward.
The White House family included James Buchanan Henry,
Elliott Eskridge Lane, and for a time Dr. Foltz. As Buchanan suffered
severely from the effects of the National Hotel disease for six weeks after
the inauguration, Foltz stayed until the affliction had run its course.
Eskridge Lane, too, had caught the infection, thought he had it under
273
JAMES BUCHANAN
control, and tben suddenly died of a violent attack during April. It was a
dreadful setback for Buchanan, who had come to rely heavily upon Esk-
ridge, and another crushing blow to Harriet. She determined at this time
to devote her life to "Nunc" and become a much more serious-minded
young lady than she had been in the past.
The domestic routine slowly worked itself out. The household
arose about 6:30, and finished breakfast by eight. The president retired
to his second floor office, where he spent most of his time until noon
receiving visitors. In an adjoining room, J- B. Henry read through all the
incoming mail, sorted it for forwarding to the Departments or to the
president, wrote a digest of contents on the outer leaf of each letter, and
entered receipt of it and the name of the person to whom it was forwarded
in his day book.
After lunch every day except Sunday and reception days, Bu-
chanan met with the Cabinet and then went for an hour's stroll about
Lafayette Square and through the residential district north of the White
House. He bought a new carriage with trappings, but he never used it
except on infrequent state occasions or during the midsummer months.
In July and August he stayed at the "Soldiers' Home," a stone cottage near
Georgetown, and each morning drove in to Washington where he worked
in a room at the State Department. Harriet pretty much ran her own life,
spending the mornings planning or gracing social functions and the after-
noons riding out on a beautiful white horse she had recently acquired.
Riding side-saddle and accompanied only by her groom, she came to be a
familiar and striking sight in Washington.
In the evening the whole White House family, including Miss
Hetty when she was there, dined informally about seven. Buchanan invited
one or two Cabinet families and a few chosen friends to small weekly dinners
with rarely more than fifteen present. Once a week he also gave a "state
dinner" for about forty persons to entertain the members of the Supreme
Court, the diplomatic corps, Senators, Representatives, governors, army
and navy dignitaries, and important visitors. Buchanan made up the guest
lists for these affairs, Harriet worked out the details of precedence at the
table, and Buchanan Henry had the duty of pairing each gentleman with
the lady he should escort to dinner. Harriet's task was perhaps the most
difficult, for members of all political parties came to these dinners, and it
was a matter of some delicacy to achieve the right order of precedence
without seating mortal enemies next to each other. Her London training
stood her in good stead and she managed her part with great cleverness and
tact. After the guests left, the president retired to his study to read over
the correspondence which his nephew-secretary had digested and sorted
into appropriate folders. He wrote his own orders on papers he wished
personally to attend and sent the rest back to the secretary's room for filing
274
THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY • 1857
or forwarding. Before retiring he often read in the Bible or some religious
work and then went to bed around midnight.1
THE CAPTAIN AND THE CREW
The members of Cabinet, too, had to establish their households and define
their role in the new Administration. Everyone sensed that the capital
faced the gayest social season in its history. Little social leadership had
come from the White House since the days of Van Buren. Tyler had been
restrained by Harrison's death, political schism, and the loss of his wife.
Mrs. Polk had governed social functions by the sternest rules of Presby-
terian morality. She banned dancing, liquor, and even nonalcoholic
refreshments at White House functions. She disapproved of cards, horse
racing, betting and loose joviality, "This is a very genteel affair," a
Congressman once remarked at one of her parties. Without a smile, she
replied, "I have never seen it otherwise." Mrs. Taylor, a Maryland blue
blood, thought commerce with politicians was degrading and declined to
appear publicly with the president. Taylor's death threw a pall over social
activities which Fillmore's shy school-teacher wife did nothing to raise.
Mrs. Pierce never recovered from the sudden death of her son, Benny, and
avoided public appearances. The election of Buchanan had brought release
from the terrible tensions which gripped the nation during the campaign of
1856 and put into the White House a wealthy Epicurean, a gay bachelor
with a flair for society and a Chesterfieldian knowledge of its ways. And
Harriet Lane, lovely, sprightly and eager for the fun of social competition
promised to bring an endhantingly new tone to White House festivities.
The president unofficially confirmed the public expectation in a note to his
liquor merchants, a few weeks after inauguration, rebuking them for
sending champagne in small bottles. "Pints are very inconvenient in this
house," he wrote, "as the article is not used in such small quantities."
Although the members of the Cabinet held similar political
opinions, none of them had known each other or Buchanan very well prior
to March 4, 1857. Lewis Cass, who had been a general in the War of 1812,
was by 1857 a ponderous but feeble old fellow with a massive bald head
which he kept covered with an ancient brown wig. He held the State
Department only as a symbol of old-time Democracy, while the president
and John Appleton did the work. Cass enjoyed the prestige of his station.
He rented two adjacent houses, furnished them regally, and gave his
daughters Mrs. Henry Ledyard and Belle Cass free rein to entertain on the
grand scale. Buchanan had never liked Cass since their days of rivalry
and the old general, though grateful for his rescue from oblivion, would
have been less than human had he not felt a little uncomfortable playing
the subordinate. Black wrote, "They never spoke evil of one another, but
275
JAMES BUCHANAN
Buchanan learned to think unpleasantly of Cass's faults and was not kind
to his virtues."2 At <"*binet meetings Cass rarely said much, but kept
opening and shutting his mouth, and sucking his hreath between his teeth
as if he constantly tasted something disagreeable.
Howell Cobb became the acknowledged premier of the Cabinet.
Buchanan formed a warm attachment to the chubby, good-natured, forty-
one-year-old Georgian who had come to Congress in 1842, served as Speaker
of the House during the 1850 crisis, and then returned to Georgia to fight
down the secessionists there by allying with Union Whigs and capturing
the governorship. He returned to the House in 1855 as an anti-Douglas,
pro-Union Democrat. Buchanan found many ideas and experiences they
shared in common. The University of Georgia had kicked Cobb out for
about the same reasons that Dickinson had expelled Buchanan, too much
enthusiasm and not enough respect for the professors and the rules. They
often laughed about the escapades of their college days. Cobb, like Bu-
chanan, never could gain solid political control of his own county, but he
never had any trouble carrying the district or state. He disliked the
principle of slavery and hoped the system would slowly die from economic
pressure. Cobb calculated that he would have more net income if he sold
his plantation and invested the money, but he refused to cast his slaves
adrift as freed men with no one responsible for their care and did not want
to sell them because this would break up the families.
It pleased Cobb to be the favorite, but he soon learned he had to
pay for it. Buchanan gave him "the duty" every time he went on vacation
to Lancaster or Bedford, often called him for special consultation, and had
him move into the White House for weeks at a time when his wife was in
Georgia. Howell tried for three months to get back to Athens to bring
Mary Ann Cobb and a newborn son (their fourth child) to Washington and
told his wife he would come "whether the President will permit me or not."
But he feared to defy Buchanan and finally sent his assistant, Philip Clayton,
for the family. Howell rented a house from Corcoran at 15th and I Streets
which he christened the "Widower's Den" before the arrival of his wife in
the autumn of 1857. A number of the new members of the Cabinet who
had not yet moved their families to Washington held impromptu stag
parties there in the early months of the Administration.8
Mary Ann Cobb possessed qualities which Buchanan much
esteemed in women. She was unpretentious and inclined to domesticity.
She enjoyed society but had no particular ambition to cut a figure in it.
She talked with frankness, wit, and good sense, although she felt a little
inadequate in small talk and gossip. Buchanan admired her a good deal
more than she did him; she complained that he worked Howell too hard
and acted too dignified, making her nervous for fear she would not do or
say the right thing.
276
THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY • 1857
Mrs. Cobb brought with her a sprightly young widow, Mrs,
Elizabeth C. Craig, who had achieved some notoriety by detonating a local
civil war on the issue whether she or a rival was the most beautiful lady of
Athens, Georgia. This grave crisis split the university, realigned county
politics, and led to combat between citizens of the town. Mrs. Craig quit
the fray with a flourish, announcing that she would go to Washington and
snare the president. "Nothing short of the first man in office will answer,"
she wrote to Howell in advance of her arrival. When Buchanan invited
her to live at the White House some months later, betting odds began to
turn in her favor.4
Jacob Thompson of Mississippi, Secretary of the Interior, proved
to be one of the most popular members of the Cabinet circle. "Winning,
able, persuasive in argument, affectionate, and warm hearted, he melted
opposition rather than destroyed it."5 Such a man was after Buchanan's
own heart, and the two achieved a mutual respect which even the passions
of civil war could not wholly destroy. Thompson was well acquainted
with land policy and Indian affairs, though he had little public experience
outside Congress. He moved into a house at Eighteenth and G Streets
where he let his vivacious wife, Kate, and her niece, Miss Wiley, run social
events to suit their fancy. Buchanan preferred Kate Thompson above all
the Cabinet wives, possibly because she was so much of a flirt and turned
her best coquetry on him, or perhaps because she was so impetuous and
passionate, qualities that he particularly admired in others, having so little
of them himself. Mrs. Cobb called her "an easy and free-hearted woman."6
Buchanan used to drop in unexpectedly at her house when her husband was
out of town, but she played the game and generally walked him over to
Cobb's where they bantered away the night. She was scatterbrained and
bubbly, but she knew how to get favors out of the Old Chief when others
had failed.
Postmaster General Aaron V. Brown and his wife brought with
them from Tennessee more wealth than they knew what to do with and
determined to show it off to Washington society. Mrs. Brown fancied
herself above the -standing rules of etiquette and brashly gave dinners
without thought of protocol or precedence. She seated guests where she
pleased, and if the French Minister found himself at the wrong end of the
table and beside some territorial representative, it did not trouble the
hostess. Mrs. Brown and her daughter soon became known in Washington
as "the diamonds." "They are the only ladies of the 'priory council' who
patronize jewels and trains," wrote an acquaintance. "Entre nous, they
evince something of the vulgarity of wealth."7
Other members of the Cabinet lived more modestly and engaged
only in the social activities which their station demanded. Jeremiah S.
Black did not even know he was to be included in the Cabinet as Attorney
277
JAMES BUCHANAN
General until after the Senate had confirmed him. Black's wife and his
daughter Mary may have had social ambitions, but they had neither the
money nor the personal graces to gratify their hopes. Black was a curious
combination of brilliant lawyer and miscast dramatic actor. He loved to
toss compliments to pretty ladies and could call Milton, Shakespeare, or
Shelley to his aid at will, but he lacked the feather touch and seemed to
caress with a sledge hammer. Some women thought him disgusting and
others, foolish, but closest to truth was the remark of one recipient of his
gallantry who remarked that he reminded her of an elephant trying to dance
a hornpipe. He was honest as the day, and decisive as a thunderclap. As
the Administration wore on, Buchanan more and more leaned upon the
strength of his mind and will. Black got on better with the Cabinet than
did his family and was always welcome at formal or informal gatherings.
Howell Cobb's young son paid him the ultimate compliment by naming his
new dog "Jerry Black."
John Buchanan Floyd, governor of Virginia as his father had been
before him, participated little in the whirlwind of society. His wife had a
bad fall shortly after he assumed the War Department which incapacitated
her, and Floyd himself was plagued by illness. Even had health permitted,
they would have found no pleasure in the social round. Buchanan liked
Floyd and granted him favors and privileges not extended to others, insisting
that he take time off to regain his health. But he worried about Floyd's
fitness for his job, and found it necessary to reprimand him more often
than any other Cabinet member.
At the beginning of the Administration, Buchanan knew Isaac
Toucey, Secretary of the Navy, better than any of his staff, for he had
served with Toucey in the Polk Cabinet. Toucey was mild, quiet and
industrious. Because his wife suffered ill health, he stayed home most of
the time he was not busy with office work.
This group comprised the "Administration." "The cabinet
ladies," wrote one of them, "are aH pleasant and promise to be as one
family. They are called here The President's Family,' and surely the
gentlemen are as much at ease as several sons with a kind, indulgent father.
The President, I think, is the greatest man living."8
PAYDAY FOR POLITICIANS
Buchanan had expected a wild scramble for patronage, but the reality far
exceeded even what he had steeled himself to endure. Not only were there
more applicants than ever before but also fewer jobs. Not since the
inauguration of Van Buren, twenty years before, had one Democratic
Administration succeeded another. Now the offices were filled with Pierce
278
THE PRESIDENTS FAMILY • 1857
men who could not be swept out without disrupting the party. Further-
more, Buchanan for a generation had been accepting political aid but never
had achieved any office that gave him power to pay off party debts. In the
Secretaryship of State his influence on appointments had been slight. Now,
when he found himself for the first time in an administrative position with
direct control over patronage, his obligations had grown larger and the
expectations greater than he had realized. All his old-time friends came
for jobs, and they all brought long lists of their friends who had been
promised their rewards. Even if these requests had not created an im-
possible situation, Buchanan's ancient policy of amalgamation and the
reconciliation of contesting groups would have done so. He had long
advocated a division of the spoils between Democratic factions, and in the
recent elections he had promised to let the Whigs come in for a share.
Thus, he probably doubled the number of those who felt justly entitled to
patronage. In addition to all these pressures there was still another: the
ambition of presidential aspirants for 1860, whose appetites had been
whetted by Buchanan's inaugural pronouncement that he would retire
after a single term. Douglas, Hunter, Walker, Davis, Cobb, and others all
demanded special consideration and were ready to fight for it. It required
no wizard to foresee the result. Whatever patronage policy should be
developed, there would be unprecedented disappointment and discontent
throughout the Democratic ranks, and no "administration party" at all.
Had Buchanan taken the governorship of Pennsylvania in 1848, he might
have been better prepared to solve the problem he now faced, but he came
to the presidency with almost every kind of public service experience
except executive.
Buchanan adopted the general rule that Pierce appointees who
were good men and held commissions for a specified time should retain
their offices until their terms expired. In the case of ministers and consuls,
the incumbents should have an automatic tenure of four years from the
date of their original appointment unless they requested relief earlier.
Appointees with indefinite tenure would have to be judged on the merits
of each case. Buchanan hoped to spread the availability of many choice
jobs throughout his term. Pierce had installed a good many of his friends
in the last two years of his Administration when he hoped to promote his
own renomination. By leaving these men in office, Buchanan could hold
their jobs as prospects and have some important gifts to offer in the latter
stages of his term, without need to remove his own appointees to create
vacancies.9
The Cabinet, meeting for four or five hours nearly every day,
considered little but the patronage for the first several months. Buck Henry
sorted out the thousands of requests and recommendations which came
directly to the White House, and the individual Cabinet members got
279
JAMES BUCHANAN
hundreds more daily to add to the pile. Cobb reported returning to the
Treasury office late at night after a hard day's work to find a bushel basket
of unopened mail on the floor beside his desk.10
Even had these men been endowed with peculiar genius, they
would have faced several grave disadvantages in making appropriate
selections from this mountain of requests. In the whole Cabinet group
there was not one "big city" politician; there was no son of the new West;
there was no "Young American;'* there was no representative of industry;
there was no spokesman for the free-soil Democrats. Buchanan could not
have had a unified Cabinet with these elements included, but by surrounding
himself with rural politicians and lawyers who frankly accepted the America
of Andrew Jackson as their ideal he got only a partial and antiquated view
of the forces astir in the land. Buchanan's supreme confidence in himself
might have been his greatest asset had he become president in 1844 or 1848,
for he then was in touch with the national scene. But for a decade he had
been either out of office or out of the country, and lightning changes had
been in progress. The friends he trusted and the enemies he understood
had died or passed from view: Clay, Calhoun, Webster, Benton, Jackson,
Adams, Polk, King, Shunk, Reynolds, Muhlenberg— nearly all those he
had known in the House and Senate and in state politics— were gone. He
did not know the new generation, and it did not know him except by
reputation. The president had become very nearly a political stranger in
his own country. But he had the confidence of rectitude and past success
and hoped to proceed serenely. Otherwise he would not have remarked to
a friend who warned that he would be hounded to death by job-hunters:
'Til be damned if I will."
Every one of the thirty-one states had its peculiar problems of
faction. The Administration considered each in its turn, trying always to
figure out some way to keep the party intact.11
The New York Democracy since 1848 had gone from schism to
chaos. The Softs, erstwhile friends of Pierce, had split; the Hards had been
weakened by loss of office, and an entirely new faction master-minded by
New York City's upstart mayor, Fernando Wood, had taken over Tammany
Hall with brass knuckles and clubs wielded by a crudely disciplined army of
Bowery thugs. Not knowing quite what to do with this hell's brew of
faction, Buchanan gave his old friend, Augustus Schell the key federal job,
Collector of the Port of New York. Schell was rich, pious, aristocratic,
pompous and, by comparison with those over whom he was expected to
exercise control, a paragon of honesty. He does not, however, seem to
have been very bright, and certainly could not supply the fight and leader-
ship that his job demanded. He was much more at home presiding over
the New York Historical Society than over the water-front gang in his
charge. Within a few months the slippery Wood had talked him into an
280
THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY • 1857
alliance which split the Hards, creating faction worse confounded. The
New York Postmaster, Isaac V. Fowler, who presumably was to work in
harness with Schell, now became head of the opposition to him, and
Buchanan found that he had four Democratic factions knifing each other
in the Empire State.12
Pennsylvania's problems proved peculiarly exasperating. The
Keystone State had been crying foul play for its small share in federal
patronage ever since the days of Jefferson. Buchanan tried to redress the
balance, appointing so many Pennsylvanians that the appearance of another
on the confirmation list came to be the signal for a roar of laughter in the
Senate. Nevertheless, he brought no peace to the Democracy of Penn's
land. To gratify Forney's faction, he appointed Joseph B. Baker as Collector
of the Port of Philadelphia and made G. G. Wescott, one-time editorial
assistant to Forney, postmaster of the city. But when he appointed
Francis J. Grund, former henchman of Cameron, to a foreign post, rum-
blings began. And when he made George Bowman of the Bedford Gazette
the editor of the Washington Union, lightning flashed. The great objection
to Buchanan's appointments was his failure to give office to his political
laborers of twenty and thirty years standing, notably Lynch, Forney, Plitt,
and Foltz.
Each of these cases was different, yet every one was important.
Davy Lynch was very insignificant in politics by 1857, but he remained a
symbol of loyalty to Buchanan dating back to the 1820's. He had proved
an inefficient public servant and could not be trusted with any place of
responsibility, but he spurned any minor situation. Of late his condition
had become pitiful; he drank incessantly and lived in abject poverty. He
would not beg, but his wife wrote letters constantly asking for loans and
Buchanan sent money to Lynch regularly. Davy talked with the quivering
emotion of the loyal veteran, abandoned in the hour of need by the man
who had climbed to fame and fortune on his bowed shoulders.13 In the
western region he greatly damaged Buchanan's reputation, for the enemy
publicized his plight as a symbol of Buchanan's selfishness and ingratitude
Forney presented a problem peculiarly painful. Buchanan never
believed in giving important posts in the public service to persons who
depended on politics for their living. To favor and encourage them would
make them utterly dependent upon the vagaries of political fortune and
sooner or later, in these days before Civil Service protection, place them in a
position of such insecurity that they would always be for sale to the highest
bidder. A sound party demanded men who could stand on their own feet,
come success or failure at the polls. Forney was not in that category; he
always needed a post.
Having been excluded from the Cabinet, denied the editorship of
the Washington Union, and defeated in the race for the Senate, Forney
281
JAMES BUCHANAN
raved wildly in his humiliation. The president, he complained to Black,
has "never asked my counsel since the election." When Forney indignantly
rejected the Liverpool consulate because he refused to be "exiled," he
should have remembered that on two occasions Buchanan reluctantly
accepted foreign "exile" for party purposes. Nor had the salary been as
attractive as the one now offered to Forney.
Forney continued to clamor. "Read this letter to Mr. B.," he
wrote Black, his intermediary. "Ask him if he is dead to the past in which
I have served him almost like a slave. Ask him if he forgets the dark hours
when his friends fled from him & I stood alone a monument of fidelity
I speak not for myself alone, but for hundreds of thousands."14 But
Buchanan could offer nothing that Forney would take. "I mourn for
Forney," he wrote. "I repeat, I mourn for Forney." It was misplaced
pity, as Buchanan soon learned.
By mid-June, when Forney finally realized that Buchanan would
not give him the trust and recognition he demanded, he all unknowingly
wrote the real truth in an excited scrawl to Black. Mr. Buchanan insists,
he said, that "if I succeed, it is to be as before, on my own merits."15
Forney decided to go back to managing the Pennsylvania^. For this he
needed money. Would Black please help him sell his wife's property in
Washington? Then he learned that Buchanan had placed that property,
in trust, out of his reach. There are those who still maintain that John
Forney broke with Buchanan over the principle of Lecompton. Actually
they had reached the point of rupture a year before; Lecompton would
serve as a convenient excuse. Buchanan offered him no more prospects;
if Forney could not influence this Administration, he had better get on the
right track for the next. By September he was in the Douglas camp.16
George Plitt and his wife Sophie had acted as foster parents to
the Lane children. Mary Lane made her home with them, and Harriet
stayed at the Plitt "Shantee" in Philadelphia with as much freedom and
an even warmer welcome than she found at Wheatland. Plitt, whom
Buchanan had installed as clerk of the Philadelphia federal circuit court in
1846, was a quiet, unambitious, dutiful, and devoted friend. Before long
the Dallas Democrats of Philadelphia began an attack on him, for their man
Hopkinson had been ousted to make a pkce for Plitt. Buchanan offered
him a different position, but he efrjoyed the clerkship and declined. Later,
faced with the ultimatum "fire Plitt or lose four votes in Congress,"
Buchanan asked Justice Grier to explain matters to Plitt and solicit his
resignation. Grier emphasized the absolute necessity of vacating the clerk-
ship and assured Plitt that "As [Buchanan's] friend you deserve at his hands
& should receive some appointment of far greater value."17 Plitt resigned,
as requested, but Buchanan could not immediately find an appropriate
opening for him. By the time there was one Buchanan could no longer
282
THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY • 1857
command Senate confirmation for personal friends. Late in I860, Sophie
wrote ruefully to Harriet about the coming presidential election: *CI don't
care who is Prest. I worked for one nearly all my life— my husband was
removed from office, & we have been ever since counting every dollar to
keep our home. I despise politics. . . . There is too much ingratitude in
political men & I am not a spaniel"13 George viewed it more calmly and
remained friendly; he recognized at last the truth of Buchanan's oft-
repeated advice to build his security on a firmer rock than party patronage.
But Plitt's many friends wrote off Old Buck as an ungrateful wretch.
Buchanan had recommended Dr. Foltz's appointment as a Naval
Surgeon back in 1829. Since then the effusive and emphatic young doctor
had kept up a steady correspondence with Buchanan from ship and shore,
and on numerous occasions had served as his personal physician. Since
1840 he had been keenly interested in politics; and whenever he was in
Pennsylvania, he had worked hand in glove with Forney.
When Buchanan became president, Foltz demanded appointment
as Chief of the Bureau of Medicine and Surgery. As the office was already
in the capable hands of Dr. Whelan who, according to the patronage policy,
would continue to serve until his term expired, Buchanan declined to
replace him; and even had he done this, he almost certainly would not have
selected Foltz. Foltz then began attacks on Dr. Whelan, sending proofs
that he was a Douglas man and alleging that Buchanan retained him only
because he was Catholic and could protect the Irish vote. Buchanan gave
Dr. Foltz an appointment as physician to the Philadelphia Lazaretto, a
respectable sinecure which permitted him to stay in the city with his family
and conduct private practice along with his supervisory work at the hospital.
Foltz took the job, but in anger and disappointment. Within a short time
he became one of the most violent and abusive of all Buchanan's enemies,19
Buchanan spent much thought and emotional energy trying to
solve the patronage problems of New York and Pennsylvania. His failure
to satisfy the wishes of his four old-time Pennsylvania friends, whose
names for over a quarter century had been synonymous with loyalty to
him, damaged him politically. Knowing what he did of these men, he
would have been wiser to break with them years before* than to let himself
into the situation he now faced. The rationalization of his course seemed
perfectly sound to him; he offered all he conscientiously could; but in
calmly believing that a rational excuse would satiate men who had waited
so long in anticipation of their reward in his day of triumph, he proved
that he had been living alone too much. He had lost touch with human
feelings and reactions.
Buchanan left appointments in most of the other states to those
who best knew the requirements, but he insisted upon reviewing in Cabinet
all the major proposals. He appointed a Chicago postmaster recommended
283
JAMES BUCHANAN
by Douglas but selected other federal officers in Douglas's territory without
even consulting the Senator. He appointed J. Madison Cutts to a federal
position against the written protest of Douglas and the advice of the entire
Cabinet. Buchanan had known Cutts long before the Senator ever dreamed
of politics, and had been fond of his daughter Adele, now Mrs. Douglas, as
early as the Tyler administration. He replied to the Senator with calculated
and insulting frankness. "Should I make the appointment, . . . it will be
my own regard for Mr. Cutts and his family, and not because Senator
Douglas has had the good fortune to become his son-in-law."20
In Louisiana, Slidell insisted that Buchanan should dismiss the
old director of the New Orleans mint, regardless of the tenure rule.21
Slidell was in trouble because the New Orleans postmaster he had recom-
mended had been caught in a defalcation by Postmaster-General Campbell,
an appointee of Pierce. Campbell charged that Kendall had been forced to
steal post-office money to pay his gambling debts to Slidell. The Senator
challenged Campbell to a duel but got no satisfaction 22 Slidell now de-
manded the elimination of all remnants of the Pierce Administration in
Louisiana.
Buchanan weakened rapidly under the strain. Many of his notes
and letters of April, 1857, far from the methodical, delicate, and precise
penmanship which is the trademark of his manuscripts, present a hurried,
sloppy scrawl. Cobb remarked that the president had been so "annoyed
and harassed" during April that he feared to request Georgia appointments
until the air had cleared.23 For all the routine procedure that Buchanan
tried to establish, appointments continued to be made by hook or crook.
In order to rush one through the Interior Department, Cobb took the origi-
nal letter of application, endorsed on it "Request granted— J. Thompson,
Sec'y. of Interior" and slipped it quietly into the "approved" pile in
Thompson's office.24 Thompson apparently never did know about it. When
the male applicants had worn themselves out, they hired the ladies to try.
"They take it for granted that we become so hardened that we can resist
the importunities of men — but cannot withstand the plaintive entreaties
of the fairer portion of God's creation," wrote one of the Cabinet.25
By midsummer the available jobs had been assigned, and the
hungry, unsatisfied horde went home. Some monumental decisions had
been made, chief among them the selection of Robert J. Walker as Governor
of the turbulent Kansas Territory. Slidell would be the Administration
leader in the Senate; J. Glancy Jones would be the House whip and Chair-
man of the Committee on Ways and Means. With a majority in both
branches, it began to look by June as if the Administration had gotten off
to a fair start.
284
THE PRESIDENT'S FAMILY • 1857
THE OLD CHIEF
After the first few months of daily conferences and contention, what had
the Cabinet come to think of their chief? They agreed with Black's pro-
nouncement: "He is a stubborn old gentleman— very fond of having his
own way, and I don't know what his way is."26 Floyd told a friend that
"Mr. Buchanan was different from Genl. Jackson; . . . Genl. Jackson could
be coaxed from his purpose, but . . . Mr. B. could neither be coaxed nor
driven."27 One Cabinet member remarked that they all stood in awe of
him like boys in the presence of their schoolmaster and called him "The
Squire" behind his back;28 another said that he "overhauled the Secretary
of War" so scorchingly that they were all afraid of him.29 Floyd, on this
occasion, had sold Fort Snelling in Minnesota to a New York syndicate for
a fraction of its value, and although he had not profited or broken any law,
Buchanan gave him a lashing for being a dupe. Mrs. Craig, after a month
in the White House, began calling Buchanan "The Grand Turk."
The president's colleagues found him extremely nosy. He
flustered Cobb one day by inquiring in great detail about his wife's fortune
and finances. After getting the information, Buchanan asked abruptly,
"Well, if you are so rich, why don't you pay that $15,000 you owe?" Taken
aback, Cobb almost replied, "I will, if you will loan it to me," but restrained
the impulse. "Don't you think the old gentleman is quite curious about
such matters?" he asked.30 The busybody habit, not only in matters of
private affairs but in the activities of all the departments brdd secretiveness
in the Cabinet that contributed to Buchanan's ignorance, later in his term,
of some very irregular proceedings that went on under his nose. But as a
whole, the Cabinet had great respect for and confidence in the chief.
Jerry Black, in characteristic phrase, wrote in July, 1857, after a flurry of
trouble in Kansas: "This being the first little gale we have had, those who
have the handling of the ship are a little awkward for the moment. I speak
of lieutenants & sailing masters. The great old captain looks calmly up
into the sky and gives his orders quietly— orders which will keep her head
steady on true course."31
285
22
KANSAS — A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS - 1854-1857
CRISIS IN KANSAS
One cannot imagine a more unfortunate place to have precipitated a crisis
between the North and the South in 1854 than Kansas, for here centered
the greatest hopes of each section. And what hopes they were! Fifty
million acres of level farm land; a strategic location for the eastern terminus
of a transcontinental railroad which would tap the enormous trade of the
Pacific coast; the promise of rich political offices which might determine
the future supremacy of a party or section. And this region of golden
opportunity lay at the junction of North, South and West, easily accessible
to adventurous crusaders from each. Why did Douglas propose the Kansas-
Nebraska Bill? Why did Congress by a large majority sustain him? And
where did the results leave James Buchanan in March, 1857?
Senator Douglas, as Chairman of the Committee on Territories,
had sweated his way through many Congressional struggles over the
organization of the federal domain. In 1847 he had proposed the extension
of the Missouri Compromise line to the Pacific. In 1850 he backed popular
sovereignty for New Mexico and Utah. His main interest lay not in
method but in speed. The West would grow as fast as Congress would let
it grow; did there need to be a year's discussion every time a new territory
was to be created?
In January, 1854, Douglas reported out of Committee a bill to
divide the Nebraska Territory. When the two parts were admitted as states
they should be "received into the Union, with or without slavery, as their
Constitution may prescribe at the time of their admission." This rendered
void in Kansas and Nebraska the Missouri Compromise restrictions against
slavery north of 36° 30'. Having attacked the Missouri line, Douglas
decided he might as well eliminate entirely the idea of Congressional control
and added to the bill the explicit statement that the Missouri Compromise
was "inoperative and void ... it being the true intent and meaning of this
act not to legislate Slavery into any Territory or State, nor to exclude it
286
KANSAS—A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS • 1854 - 1857
therefrom, but to leave the people thereof perfectly free to form and regulate
their domestic institutions in their own way, subject only to the Constitu-
tion of the United States." He suspected this part would raise a "hell of
a storm" but thought it would please the South without hurting the North.
After a violent debate, Congress passed this dangerous measure. A little
later Douglas's friends reported that he looked "like a man who sorrows
for a misdeed."1
Douglas assumed that no more slave states would come in under
his bill. The climate of Kansas was unfavorable to crops which slaves
could profitably cultivate; slavery could not rapidly be moved into an
unsettled region; free men by the score could easily establish themselves
in the new territory before a single slaveholder could transport his un-
wieldy property to it. At the same time, the South would gain its right to
settle the common domain and therefore would permit the rapid admission
of western states. Douglas was "groping for a new center of gravity in
politics," the Great West. It would make him rich, and unless he misread
his future, it would make him president.2
Evidence that Douglas had made a mistake soon poured in from
every side. Forney, then Clerk of the House, reported that a number of
Buchanan's friends had supported the measure in the very hope of killing
Douglas off for the presidency.3 The abolitionists promptly formed a
"New England Emigrant Aid Society" to free-load settlers into Kansas,
and the South organized competitive companies to stimulate immigration.
Douglas helplessly appealed to Congress to outlaw such "perversion of the
provisions of the Kansas-Nebraska Act."
In Kansas settlers sympathetic to slavery established a Territorial
government with headquarters at Lecompton which President Pierce
recognized as legal. Antislavery settlers set up a competing government
at Topeka which both President Pierce and Congress declared illegal and
revolutionary, but its adherents refused to disband. Open warfare between
the two governments soon broke out and continued in Kansas up until
Buchanan's inauguration. Federal troops supported the Lecompton
officials, but General Jim Lane's private free-state "army" provided effective
defense of the Topeka rebels. Two sets of public officers and competing
legal codes made Kansas, in effect, not one but two territories, one lawful
and the other at war with the United States government. Supporters of
both engaged in wholesale ballot-box frauds, graft, claim-jumping, intimida-
tion, and settlement of debatable questions by bullet and bowie knife.
While "bleeding Kansas" symbolized the struggle over slavery to
most people in the United States, to Kansans this issue was incidental to
the main one— land. Whoever controlled the government distributed the
political jobs, and the holders of these supervised the disposition of land.
287
JAMES BUCHANAN
Governor Geary reported: "the greatest obstacle to overcome in the pro-
duction of peace and harmony in the Territory, is the unsettled condition
of the claims to the public lands," and the Squatter Sovereign concurred.
"It is a historical fact," wrote the editor, "that almost all the contentions
which result in bloodshed . . . have their origin in some dispute over land
claims." Another paper said: "Each week adds to the list of murders . . .
mostly growing out of this one thing; and there is no law to come to the
rescue."4
Slavery became an excuse for dissensions in Kansas, and for the
artificial promotion of settlement, but as Paul Gates writes, "The first
objective of most people who went to Kansas ... was to secure land claims
which might be sold profitably."5 The New England Emigrant Aid Society
of Connecticut sent out settlers to take up land for resale, and this company
quickly invested three times more cash in Kansas land claims than any
other syndicate. The Missouri "Border Ruffians," who allegedly invaded
Kansas to vote illegally and make it a slave state, mainly wanted to protect
their land interests. Only 3% of the Missourians of the region held slaves,
but nearly half of them staked out claims the moment the Kansas Territory
was opened. It should be added that the Missouri-Kansas boundary had
not yet been marked, and frontiersmen near the uncertain border thought
they had better vote; they might be Kansans. The entire border population,
when the opportunity arose, claimed to be residents of Kansas, and prior
to a federal survey there was no way to prove they were not. They felt,
at least, that they had as good a title to residence in Kansas as the peripatetic
mercenaries of the Emigrant Aid Society who showed up en masse at land
auctions as bonafide resident "settlers" but left by boat the day after the
sale for their residence elsewhere.6
But outside Kansas the slavery question dominated the headlines.
By the time of Buchanan's inauguration, a variety of points of view had
become clearly discernible. The Republicans used the "bleeding Kansas"
theme as party propaganda. Any atrocities they could pin on the Democrats
strengthened their cause in the North. The Free-Soilers and later the
Republicans jumped like grasshoppers from one territorial policy to another,
espousing any one which at the moment seemed best calculated to weaken
their Democratic opponents. In 1848, the antislavery partisans wanted
the Wilmot Proviso and opposed both the extension of the Missouri line
and squatter sovereignty. In 1854, they upheld the Missouri line as if they
considered this the ideal policy, and bksted popular sovereignty. By 1857
they championed popular sovereignty more ardently than Douglas, and
vilified Buchanan for permitting frauds in its operation.
But despite their capricious territorial policies, the Republicans
proclaimed and exploited to the fullest a fundamental principle that stood
immovable: that the doctrine of human slavery could never be reconciled
288
KANSAS-A TRACED Y OF ERRORS • 1854-1857
to the tenets of free government. Let there be no further extension of
slavery. In the realm of theory, in political ideology, and in moral pro-
priety they stood impregnable. They themselves never seriously proposed
acting on the basis of racial equality, however. The antislavery party
demanded the exclusion of Negroes from their society. Northern leaders
frankly said that they wanted Kansas as a "white man's country."7 Many
Republicans had little practical interest in ameliorating the lot of the Negro.
Primarily they wanted to seize political control from the Democrats. When
the Republicans in Kansas could not direct the legal government, they
seceded and lived under their own revolutionary regime. So soon as they
were sure they could control the legal government, they adopted that.
The main issue with them was not slavery, nor the Negro; their prime
objective was political power.
Southern extremists, or fire-eaters, held very much the same aims.
"Kansas must come in as a slave state or the cause of southern rights is dead"
they thundered. "If Buchanan should secretly favor the free-state men
of Kansas ... he will richly deserve death, and I hope some patriotic hand
will inflict it," wrote T. W. Thomas of Georgia.8 These defenders of slavery
and uncompromising foes of the Yankees told their constituents that Kansas
would come in as a slave state. By some means or other, they had to make
good their promise or lose their following. For them, too, the issue,
stripped of the verbiage of propaganda, was political control.
Conservative Democrats, both north and south, emphasized the
need for admitting Kansas to statehood, free or slave, as the quickest way
to quiet the abolitionist furor in the North and the secession clamor in the
South. After the passage of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill, many of the moderate
southern journals deplored it as of no practical use whatever to the South.
No one there had been asking a repeal of the Missouri line when Douglas
proposed it, and the result had been a disastrous revival of the agitation
which had nearly wrecked the country in 1850. "All agree," said the
Richmond Enquirer, "that slavery cannot exist in the territories of Kansas
and Nebraska."9
These Union Democrats wanted to achieve not a free or a slave
Kansas, but a Democratic Kansas. With the Whigs defunct and such odd
political makeshifts as the Southern American and the Know-Nothing
parlies picking up thousands of voters set adrift by the Kansas storm, it
was of first importance that the Union Democrats get clear of the sectional
dispute as speedily as possible. Then and not until then could they begin
to regroup their scattering forces.
What did James Buchanan think of Kansas when he entered the
White House other than that it would be the critical problem of his Admin-
istration? Personally he disapproved of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill and his
friends assumed that had he been in Congress in 1854 he would have fought
289
JAMES BUCHANAN
against its passage.10 He had clearly defined his reasons for opposition to
popular sovereignty in his comments in 1850 on the New Mexico and Utah
bills. The nation was a republic, not a pure democracy; the citizens did
not Inile, could not rule by direct vote; they delegated authority to repre-
sentatives.
Popular sovereignty not only denied the competence of Congress
and the validity of the system of representative government, it actually
invited local war. The popular sovereignty bills were drawn so loosely that
they did not provide any legal mechanism for the expression of the public
will. They left undefined the rules for voter qualification, registration,
control of polls, official count, election officers, jurisdiction over disputed
ballots, and the limits of matters to be voted on. Finally, they made the
colossal assumption that a group of unlettered frontiersmen could settle
in a peaceful, orderly, and effective way the slavery problem which had
defied tie intelligence of Franklin, Washington, Jefferson, Hamilton, Clay,
Calhoun, Benton, Jackson, Webster, Seward, Douglas, and every other
political figure who had grappled with it. Buchanan's letters to Toucey,
Foote, Davis and others in 1850 had predicted the result of asking first
settlers to decide this old question of slavery "in their own way." They
would rush in from opposite sides and murder each other.
Buchanan's official endorsement of the Kansas-Nebraska Act
accounts for the odd response he made to the Keystone Club upon learn-
ing of his nomination in June, 1856. He was no longer "simply James
Buchanan," he said, but the "representative of the great Democratic party"
and had to square his conduct with the platform.11 He would support the
bill as his public duty, but that did not mean he thought privately it was
a good law.
During the election canvass the northern Democrats developed
the idea that Buchanan would achieve fair play in Kansas, and this would
bring it in as a free state. "Buchanan, Breckinridge and Free Kansas," read
the banners at party rallies. In the South the electoral line was, obviously,
not "free Kansas" but a quick and fair settlement which would end the
agitation and write finis to the Republican party. These elements of the
campaign impressed on Buchanan the lines of policy which he should
follow: first, a fair settlement, which meant submission of a Kansas consti-
tution to an open, peaceful vote; second, a quick settlement; and third, the
creation of a Democratic Kansas which would silence the few southerners
who would complain because it came in as a free state. That a fair vote
would create a free Kansas James Buchanan never doubted — not, at least,
in the early months of his Administration.
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KANSAS— A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS • 1854. 185?
A GOVERNOR OF NATIONAL STATURE
In consultation with the Cabinet and Senator Douglas, Buchanan decided
to appoint a Kansas governor of outstanding prestige. Ex-Governors
Reeder, Shannon, and Geary, hard as they had tried, had failed to unify
the Territory, and the Kansans had broken them one after the other. It
would be interesting to know whether Buchanan offered the job to Douglas,
for he would admirably have met the requirements and would have gratified
many by taking personal charge of the hornet's nest he had stirred up.
But Buchanan picked Robert J. Walker, a politician of national stature-
even a possible future president. Walker wanted no part of the job, but
Buchanan argued so earnestly that the safety of the Union depended upon
him that lie eventually accepted the governorship as a public duty. To pin
down explicitly the terms of the appointment he wrote to Buchanan: "I
understand that you and all your Cabinet cordially concur in the opinion
expressed by me, that the actual bonafide residents of the Territory, by a
fair and regular vote, unaffected by fraud or violence, must be permitted
in adopting their State Constitution to decide for themselves what shall be
their social institutions."12
Frederick P. Stanton, secretary of the Territory and acting
governor in Walker's absence, departed for Kansas on April 2 to assume
responsibility until the governor should arrive at the end of May. Buchanan
also ordered General William S. Barney to take over the 1,500 troops in
Kansas and prevent civil disorder there. Walker in the meantime con-
ferred in Washington to clarify further his policy and then left for Kansas
via New York where, at a public dinner, he explained his purposes in
language that stretched considerably the proposals which had been cleared
in Washington. Instead of promising a fair vote to permit Kansans "to
decide for themselves what shall be their social institutions," (that is, to
vote on slavery) he now declared his determination to secure a full vote
upon any constitution which might be offered for adoption.18
Walker arrived in Kansas on May 24, hobnobbed for two days
with the free-state men at Leavenworth and Lawrence, and then proceeded
to the ramshackle, clapboard capital village of Lecompton where he de-
livered his inaugural address to a restless and uninterested assemblage of
frowzy frontiersmen. The address had two parts, one describing the
political and the other the economic prospects. "In no contingency," he
said, would Congress admit Kansas as a state without a popular vote on the
adoption of a constitution. Unless the entire constitution should be
submitted to direct vote, it eewill and ought to be rejected by Congress."
There should be no cause for quarrel about slavery, he continued. Nature
had already decided that issue; the thermometer drew an "isothermal line"
beyond which slavery could not possibly exist, and Kansas lay north of this
line. Climate, not politics, would inevitably make Kansas free.
291
JAMES BUCHANAN
Kansas had unlimited promise of economic growth, he said, if
only the people would cease their quarrels. The government would recom-
mend an enormous land grant upon the admission of Kansas to statehood.
There was everything to gain and nothing to lose by voting on a con-
stitution and petitioning promptly for admission.
If the New York address had stretched instructions, the inaugural
hroke entirely away from them. Buchanan had talked with Walker, but he
had never seen a draft of the inaugural.14 He had not committed himself
to submission of the whole constitution but only of the slavery question;
and he certainly never dreamed that the governor would tell the territorials
how to adopt their constitution, under threat of rejection by Congress if
they did not follow his advice. Buchanan disapproved of this part of the
inaugural; nevertheless, he prepared to make the best of it. He agreed
with Walker that Kansas inevitably would become a free state, but he felt
that the governor's indiscreet speech at a time when the Administration
wanted to emphasize its rigid impartiality in guiding the two sections of
Kansas toward statehood would cause trouble.
Walker had reasons for his address. He had become convinced
in the weeks before going to Kansas that his main task would be to persuade
the free-state people to vote. Many of these were Democrats, and he
gambled on the hope that they would join with the Lecomptonites in a
movement to make Kansas a free Democratic state in preference to a Black
Republican and abolitionist state. He assumed that the proslavery minority
would come along. The Republicans could be mollified by special con-
siderations in land distribution. Walker foresaw himself as conqueror of
the Kansas dragon and soon to be Senator from the new state. He wanted
the free-state people to trust him, to abandon their Topeka organization,
and to vote. He offered everything: a free Kansas, control of the new
government (which would follow a full vote) , and land. If this prospect did
not gain their cooperation, nothing would.
Walker had expected his frank and undiplomatic remarks to
raise a few dust devils, but not the tornado which swept the land. He did
not yet know that Stanton had told the Lecomptonites that only the slavery
question had to be put to a public vote, and that it would be wise to handle
this issue independently of the constitution. Let that document be on the
regular pattern, without mention of slavery. "Then," he said, "the
convention ought to prepare a separate article on the subject of slavery"
for the voters.15 This proposal apparently came right from headquarters
and did, in fact, accurately represent Buchanan's view.16 Nor did Walker
know that before he even left Washington some of the proslavery men of
Kansas who had come east to interview him had returned home with the
report that he was dangerous and would have to be "broken" like the
other governors. One of them, hulking, red-headed L. A. Maclean of the
292
KANSAS-A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS • 1854-1857
surveyor's office, got up after the inaugural banquet and towering over the
shrivelled little man in the governor's chair, ridiculed him as a "pigmy" and
told him to mind his own business or be run out of the territory.17
But the reaction in Kansas was mild compared to that of the
southern fire-eaters who had only with the greatest difficulty been brought
to a grudging and distrustful support of Buchanan in 1856. "We care
betrayed" they roared. "Our victory is turned to ashes on our lips, and
before God I will never say well done to the traitor [Walker] or to his
master who lives in the White House." "I wish Walker had been hung
before he went [to Kansas] to try & make himself next President."18 The
letters flew, damning Buchanan's "vile treachery" and Walker's harlotry
with free-soilers and abolitionists. Then came the direct pressure for
Walker's summary dismissal; if he were not dismissed, southern Senators
would block his confirmation. This was no bluff, for five southern states
held congressional elections in midsummer, and if the fire-eaters beat the
Union Democrats in them, the whole Administration policy of creating a
strong Democracy would crumble. But Buchanan could not possibly
remove Walker after one speech, and particularly when the northern
Democrats hailed that speech as straightforward, manly, and honest.19
Buchanan tried to calm the storm, inserting in the Washington
Union an article explaining that the people of Kansas ought to vote on their
constitution but disclaiming the right of anyone to make them do this. He
then put Cobb to work writing letters intended to pacify the southern
extremists. To clear the Administration, Cobb pointed out that Walker's
instructions did not demand submission of the constitution to a vote; only
the slavery question required a plebiscite. The governor in his initial
enthusiasm had overstepped the mark. To justify Walker, the Administra-
tion emphasized "that it was better to make [Kansas] a Constitutional
Democratic state than to let it be Black Republican," and Walker therefore
had taken the free-state Democrats into the movement.20
Alexander H. Stephens, a strong southern Unionist and keen
interpreter of the Constitution, complained that those who applauded
Walker's address always overlooked the main point. They thought only
of the propriety of submitting the constitution for ratification. On this all
could agree. But suppose the convention chose not to do it? Who had
the right to tell a constitutional convention what to do? The governor
certainly had not, and if Congress should try to exercise such a power, it
would "strike at the foundation of our government" and extinguish "every-
thing recognized as States Rights and State Sovereignty."21
No one could dispute the correctness of Stephens's contention
that the ultimate sovereignty in the United States lay in the people in
their constitution-making capacity, in convention assembled. The exercise
of outside control over a constitutional convention meant subversionof
293
JAMES BUCHANAN
the basic principle upon which the government rested. Some of Stephens's
friends, however, observed that his comments came with very bad grace
from a man who had recently "voted for that clause in the Minnesota bill
requiring that the Constitution shall be submitted to the people."22
Buchanan, deep in the midst of patronage problems and pestered
to distraction by office seekers, gave little attention to the uproar about
Kansas. He would sustain Walker, but he would not endorse his foolish
talk. In the meantime finicky southerners in and out of Kansas, resentful
of Walker's "arrogant and insolent threats," began to think that because of
Wtdker, the convention "ought never under any circumstances to comply
with his demand." Its refusal would not only establish the sovereignty of
the people but also force Walker "to carry out his threat, and join the
free-soil traitors."23 On the other hand, word spread that the free-state
men in Kansas would never vote in an election administered by the Lecomp-
ton government. If there were no submission and no vote on slavery, it
would be a double catastrophe.
Walker continued to make the bold and unequivocal speeches
which he believed necessary to promote his program, and they naturally
aggravated partisanship. He told the free-state people that if the coming
constitutional convention did not submit the slavery issue to a vote, "I
will join you, fellow citizens, in lawful opposition to their course. And I
cannot doubt, gentlemen, that one much higher than I, the chief magistrate
of the Union, will join you in opposition." From this statement, the
southerners assumed Walker had completely gone over to the free-soilers.
It should be carefully noted, however, that this time Walker had pledged
himself and Buchanan to a submission only of the slavery question. After
this encouraging pronouncement from the governor, the free staters in
Lawrence proceeded to ignore the Lecompton government and framed their
own city charter without authorization from anyone. Walker now spoke
again but in terms that cheered the hearts of the proslavery men. Any
citizens who defied the legal government at Lecompton would be guilty of
treason, and Walker would not hesitate to use the army to impose the usual
penalty for it. "If you have wrongs," he said, "redress them through the
instrumentality of the ballot box." Otherwise, Walker would declare them
rebels and use the army "to perform the painful duty of arresting your
revolutionary proceedings."2* In the face of this threat, the city fathers of
Lawrence backed down, and the free-soilers modified some of their earlier
hopes for Walker.
The governor wrote to Buchanan on June 28, taking full personal
responsibility for his pledges to achieve submission of the forthcoming
constitution and for his assertions that Kansas would have to be a free state.
He apologized for taking this position and outlined in detail the conditions
in Kansas which required him to do so. He believed that had he not come
294
KANSAS—A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS • 1854 - 1857
out for submission and acknowledged the "axiomatic truth" that the
"existence of slavery here is preposterous," he would have faced a renewal
of bloodshed. "The expression of these great truths ... was a solemn
duty," he told Buchanan. "Now unless I am sustained thoroughly and
cordially by the administration here, I cannot control the convention, and
we shall have anarchy and civil war."25
Buchanan had to make a decision. Walker had gone beyond his
instructions and initiated a new policy; could the Administration support
it? The president replied that Walker's letter which he had just read to
the Cabinet contained views which "were not calculated to assure us of
your success." Buchanan's position was extremely awkward. He could
not come out in opposition to Walker, for this would wreck all chance of
uniting the Democrats in Kansas. On the other hand, to sustain the policy
that the constitution had to be submitted was to deliver the Administration
into the hands of the delegates who soon would meet at Lecompton to do
whatever they pleased.
Buchanan collected as much information as possible from other
sources. He received assurances from people he trusted that Walker was
merely echoing the opinions that prevailed in Kansas when he arrived. It
seemed likely that the convention would draw up a constitution in which
there was no mention of slavery and submit it to the voters. The question
of slavery would be decided separately. Walker said he planned to visit
every delegate. Even the southerners admitted that the only reason for not
submitting was the fear that the majority ballot would make Kansas free,
for it was presumed that most of the 9,251 persons legally registered to vote
for delegates favored submission and a free state.
Buchanan finally wrote Walker, "On the question of submitting
the Constitution to the bona fide residents of Kansas, I am willing to stand
or fall."26 He put his Administration on the line with this statement and
explained very carefully to the Cabinet what he meant by it. He would
sustain as party policy Walker's unfortunate pledge to achieve submission
of the whole constitution to a public vote. He did not say that if the con-
stitutional convention ignored this policy and failed to submit, he would as
president defy and oppose their action. That would be a different matter,
a matter not only of policy but also of law, to be handled if the problem
arose. "Sufficient unto the day." Howell Cobb wrote that the possibility
of the convention refusing to submit its work to a vote was "full of diffi-
culty With all my heart, I trust that such an issue will not come upon
us. I am not authorized to say what course the Administration will pursue.
We have not anticipated it and have made no programme."27 With the
matter temporarily disposed of, Buchanan left for a much needed two
weeks' vacation at Bedford Springs.
295
JAMES BUCHANAN
POPULAR SOVEREIGNTY IN ACTION
Meanwhile, Kansas officials had begun the long process of calling a con-
stitutional convention. Those of the modern age who deplore the skull-
duggery which both sides practiced ought now to pause and reflect upon
the nature of the problem. Nothing has so taxed the ingenuity or so
frustrated students of human affairs as the conduct of a plebiscite to
determine by a fair vote the fate of a locality inhabited by people of antago-
nistic loyalties and ideologies, supported by strong and equally matched
outside allies. In the case of Kansas, the balloting would be administered
and the results tabulated by one of the parties to the contest, the Lecompton
government. If the people of Kansas achieved less than a quiet and peaceful
delivery of the presumed rights of one party into the hands of the other by
a vote, they at least did better than might have been expected.
Buchanan had hoped, by the most rigid observance of impartiality
and technically correct application of legal form, to play the part of umpire.
Walker thwarted the president by publicly appearing to take sides with the
free-state party. Black reported in July that Buchanan would apply the law
and "take no care who frets, who chafes, or who the conspirers are."28
On February 19, 1857, the Lecompton legislature provided for
an election in June of delegates to a constitutional convention to meet in
September. A census was taken during March. Kansans were given the
month of April in which to correct errors, and registration of voters
followed. Rules of eligibility were stricter than they were for ordinary
elections. Each person had to show proof of three months' continuous
residence and a receipt for payment of some territorial tax. Quite a few
illiterate squatters thought the census takers were checking land claims
and drove them away. .Others sought to avoid taxation by keeping their
names off the list. The census officials did not visit several remote counties,
assuming that only Indians lived in them. The Republicans caused serious
trouble. Apparently the majority of them felt that their registration would
signify acknowledgment of the legitimacy of the Lecompton government,
and they therefore boycotted the listing.29
Obviously the census and registration were incomplete. But the
statement, repeatedly made, that only nineteen of the thirty-four counties
got representation in the Lecompton convention does not convey a correct
picture. Because of widely scattered population, Kansas counties had been
grouped into units for electoral purposes. In several units where no white
population existed, no census was taken; in other units, census work went
normally in some counties but ran into opposition in others so that the
electoral unit got representation, even if some counties did not. The
convention, however, was not a rump affair from which the Republican
half of Kansas was intentionally excluded, as some charged. Anyone not
296
KANSAS— A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS • 1854 - 1857
registered had an opportunity to add his name to the rolls, Jbut the Repub-
licans wanted to keep the registration down to create the appearance of
of foul play and an unfair vote.
Despite Walker's inaugural promises to the free-state people,
only about 2,000 Kansans voted for delegates, nearly all of them proslavery
adherents. The free-state Republicans who had purposely refused to
qualify for voting apparently convinced the free-state Democrats not to
exercise their right after getting it. The election was peaceful, no flitting
border ruffians or floating New England Emigrants appeared to stuff the
ballot boxes, and all those registered had an opportunity to vote. The
delegates who would meet at Lecompton on September seventh were duly
and legally authorized to act for the people of Kansas.
While at Bedford, Buchanan drafted an answer to forty prominent
educators and preachers of Connecticut who had protested his "tyrannical"
use of the army to "force the people of Kansas to obey laws not their own,
nor of the United States." In his reply Buchanan exposed some of the
misinformation being circulated about Kansas and explained his policy.
The Topeka regime, he reminded them, was "a usurpation of the same
character as it would be for a portion of the people of Connecticut to under-
take to establish a government within its chartered limits, for the purpose
of redressing any grievance . . . against the legitimate State government."
He emphasized the fairness of the Kansas election law which sought to make
every bonafide resident a qualified voter, and the efforts to achieve a full
vote. When "lawless men . . . refused either to register or to vote,*' the
convention members "were elected, legally and properly" by those who
were willing to exercise their voting right. He would use the Army in
Kansas, he concluded, only "to resist actual agression." In words clearly
prophetic of his policy in 1861, he continued: "Following the wise example
of Mr. Madison towards the Hartford convention, illegal and dangerous
combinations, such as that of the Topeka convention, will not be disturbed,
unless they shall attempt to perform some act which will bring them into
actual collision with the Constitution and the laws. In that event they
shall be resisted by the whole power of the government."30
When Buchanan returned to Washington in August the future
of his Administration looked bright. He had just about disposed of the
patronage, the southern state elections had brought a triumph of the Union
Democrats over the secessionists, it seemed a certainty that the Kansas con-
vention would submit its work to a vote, and the "Silliman letter" to the
Connecticut preachers satisfied most northern Democrats, and brought
cheers from the South. HoweU Cobb's brother wrote "that B.'s letter to the
Forty Fools from Connecticut is the greatest state paper for the South, that has
ever emanated from the executive chair since the days of Washington."81
297
JAMES BUCHANAN
The days of peace and good will proved to be short. On August 24
the New York Stock Exchange collapsed from a rush to unload securities
that signalled the Panic of 1857. For the next two months the financial
problems of the nation and the task of preparing his first annual message
occupied Buchanan's attention. He kept in touch with Kansas affairs, but
ceased to worry about them for he believed that the trouble there had
nearly come to an end. The Lecompton Convention met on September 7,
but agreed to adjourn until after the election of Territorial ofilcers so that
no one could accuse the delegates of playing politics. A month before the
October election of a new Territorial legislature, Walker asked Buchanan
for information to help him handle conflicts over interpretation of the
election laws. Cass replied that a Territorial governor had no authority to
judge the qualification of voters; this power by law belonged to election
judges who were appointed by County Commissioners. Nor did the
governor have legal authority to pass judgment on disputed election returns.
Members of the legislature had jurisdiction over disputed returns for their
own members; and judges of the courts had jurisdiction if returns for
court officers were in dispute. The governor ought to express no opinion
on the elections.32
The Territorial law permitted "free" voting; that is, neither proof
of residence nor tax receipt was required. Walker disposed his troops with
the utmost care to keep order and assure a fair contest, but his effort failed.
McGee County, which had polled 14 votes in June, showed 1,226 in the
October returns. It was in a remote region, and for this reason no troops
were sent there. In Oxford County, boasting a total of 11 shacks, 1,828
votes mysteriously appeared. Outraged and shocked, Walker personally
examined the polling districts of these two counties. He could find no
population. On these fraudulent returns depended the complexion of the
new legislature: with them it would be proslavery; without them, free-
state. After hearing about the McGee-Oxford trickery, the adherents of
the Topeka government quickly formed their army under General Jim Lane
and marched on Lecompton. The fraud was so palpable and the probability
of armed conflict so imminent that the governor, on October 19, issued a
public proclamation: he would transmit no returns from McGee and
Oxford Counties.
The proslavery delegates to the constitutional convention called
their adjourned session to order at Lecompton the very day of Walker's
pronouncement on the voting frauds. Furious at his breach of instructions,
they determined never to be guided by his wishes. Understanding that his
presence was a detriment, Walker departed from Lecompton, leaving
Surveyor General John C. Calhoun to work with the convention.
Calhoun had the able assistance of Colonel H. L. Martin who had
recently arrived, ostensibly to check some land records. Actually he had
298
KANSAS-A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS • 1854 - 1857
come as an agent of Buchanan to propose that the convention draw up two
constitutions: one would protect slavery; the other would not. The White
House sponsors thought this plan would please Douglas and create a free,
Democratic Kansas. Calhoun and Martin believed they had won over the
convention, but it suddenly voted to draft a proslavery constitution and
send it directly to Washington.
Working frantically to prevent such a bombshell from landing
on Buchanan's desk, Calhoun induced the convention to adjourn for a
few days and reconsider the two-constitution scheme. Almost by a miracle,
he persuaded the delegates to approve his proposal by a vote of 27 to 25.
Kansas would have some kind of constitution and could, therefore, become
a state. In case the vote went antislavery, as Calhoun presumed it would,
the owners of the 200 slaves in the Territory were to be temporarily pro-
tected by the anticonfiscation feature common to the abolition laws of
the northern states, and slavery would vanish as speedily in Kansas as it
had in Massachusetts or Pennsylvania. Calhoun felt, with reason, that he
had prevented a renewal of civil war, guaranteed the political loyalty of
Kansas to the Democrats, and saved both Douglas and the Buchanan Ad-
ministration from certain ruin.38
299
23
LECOMPTON — PYRRHIC VICTORY • 1858
"BY GOD, SIR, ANDREW JACKSON IS DEAD!"
News of the action of the Lecompton Convention brought shouts of
"swindle" from all parts of the country. Free-state men were outraged at
the. refusal of the convention to permit a vote on the constitution and
Douglas told the Senate that "all those who are in favor of this Constitution
may vote for or against slavery as they please; but all those who are- against
this constitution are disfranchised." The Republicans rejoiced that the
convention had offered them so inviting a target and asserted, erroneously,
that Kansas would remain a slave state whether people voted for the pro-
slavery or antislavery constitution. Southern extremists also jumped hard
on the Lecompton Convention for submitting anything to a popular vote,
and damned Buchanan for Sustaining a free-soiler like Walker as governor.
"Nothing short of seeing the Holy Ghost descending on Old Buck in the
shape of a dove patent to my eyesight," wrote one of them, "could ever
make me trust him again."1
Governor Walker never revisited the convention and soon left
the territory. Far from returning home in triumph, he would be ruined
unless he could make out of the unexpected rebellion of the convention
an issue that would vindicate his mistaken judgment. In Chicago, Walker
found Douglas much troubled by the events in Kansas. But Buchanan
occupied the most difficult position of all; he would be denounced for the
Lecompton Constitution whichever side he took. Political capital might
be made of his certain discomfiture if it were known what course he planned.
Walker proceeded to Washington to find out.
He found Buchanan greatly distressed but still hopeful that the
people of Kansas would go to the polls, take one constitution or the other,
achieve statehood and end the controversy. After that they could do what
they pleased with their constitution. Buchanan said he would urge this
course in his forthcoming message to Congress. Walker pressed him to
reject the Lecompton trick and join in a demand for a new convention, but
300
LBCOMPTON— PYRRHIC VICTORY • 1858
Buchanan would have none of it and Walker left, declaiming with fire and
brimstone that the president had betrayed him.
Douglas called at the White House on December 3, angry because
Buchanan had already released the Kansas portion of his message without
having consulted him. Buchanan, thinking that the Calhoun compromise
at Lecompton had the support of Douglas and sure that the product of the
convention, provocative as it was, nevertheless met precisely the terms of
the Kansas-Nebraska law, had not expected the Little Giant to be up in arms.
But Douglas believed that he could not possibly survive in Illinois politics
unless he denounced the Lecompton Constitution; fifty-five of fifty-six
Illinois newspapers were out against it. The president and the senator
discussed the problem, dispassionately at first, but with increasing im-
patience and rancor, since each remained blind to those features of the
issue which appeared most obvious and compelling to the other. Buchanan
maintained that unless Kansas came in promptly, the Republicans would
keep it stirred up for the next three years and undoubtedly win both
Kansas and the national election of 1860. That would bring civil war.
He granted there had been fraud and trickery draped all around Kansan
political affairs, but the constitutional elections had been honest. The
basest action in these had been the opposition's refusal to register and to
vote. The constitution-making procedure had been scrupulously legal and
the president was under oath to execute the law. He had no right to use his
authority to force a constitutional convention to comply with his private
wishes. Lecompton had to be sustained; there was no other course.
Douglas said he would have to oppose it; his people would never
accept so palpable a fraud. It was a dirty business and a breach of the
basic principle of majority rule. A minority had swindled the majority
and made popular sovereignty a joke. Finally, with positions solidified
by argument and tempers mounting, Buchanan rose and said: "Mr.
Douglas, I desire you to remember that no Democrat ever yet differed
from an Administration of his own choice without being crushed. Beware
of the fate of Tallmadge and Rives." Years before, Jackson had destroyed
the careers of these two men who had opposed him. "Mr. President,"
replied Douglas, "I wish you to remember that General Jackson is dead!"
and with this he stalked out.2
Buchanan, in his first Annual Message on December 8, explained
1frhy he would be duty bound to transmit the Kansas constitution to
Congress, no matter which one the voters chose. The convention had been
legally elected, and federal law only required submission to a public vote
of the question "with or without slavery." The citizens of Kansas had
been given every opportunity to register and vote, and the refusal of any
of them to avail themselves of their right could in no manner affect the
legality of the convention. Under the existing government, said Buchanan,
301
JAMES BUCHANAN
"a majority of those who vote— not the majority who may remain at home,
from whatever cause— must decide the result of an election.*' Abraham
Lincoln, faced with a similar case in West Virginia in 1863, wrote that "it
is universal practice in popular elections in all of these states to give no
legal consideration whatever to those who do not choose to vote, as against
the effect of the votes of those who do choose to vote."3
Buchanan approved of submission, and he had hoped that the
convention would agree. But he had never suggested that he would require
it. Douglas himself, in his Springfield speech of June 12, 1857, had declared
that submission was not at all necessary. The convention had done what
it had a right to do, and the president could not reject its work because he
had preferred a different decision. Under these circumstances Buchanan
questioned "whether the peace and quiet of the whole country are not of
greater importance than the mere temporary triumph of either of the
political parties in Kansas."4
Next day in the Senate, Douglas attacked the legitimacy of the
Lecompton Constitution. On December 15, Governor Walker resigned,
charging Buchanan with betrayal. On December 21, the people of Kansas
cast 6,143 votes for the constitution "with slavery" and 569 "without
slavery." Meanwhile, in mid-December, acting governor Stanton called
a special session of the newly elected territorial legislature which otherwise
would not have met, Buchanan hoped, until after the admission of Kansas
as a state. Buchanan immediately removed Stanton and appointed Indian
Commissioner James W. Denver, but the damage had already been done.
The legislature quickly called for another vote on January 4 on the whole
Lecompton Constitution. The results of this referendum showed:
Against the Lecompton Constitution 10,226
For it, with slavery 138
For it, without slavery 24
Despite this blow, Buchanan remained firm and on February 2 transmitted
the Lecompton Constitution to Congress accompanied by a long explanatory
message. "I am decidedly in favor of its admission, and thus terminating
the Kansas question," he concluded.
What, exactly, was the issue raised by Lecompton? Douglas and
his allies said it was a question of morality: the vote on the constitution
had been fraudulent and unfair, and violated the principle of popular
sovereignty. Buchanan and his allies said it was a question of administra-
tive law and practical politics: a scabby and unfortunate affair, but legal,
constitutional, and, given the antecedents, inevitable. These differing
points of view augured an irreconcilable conflict from the start. The
argument of those who emphasized the moral issue quickly degenerated
into ridicule and vilification of Buchanan. The president pointed out the
futility of trying to settle political questions by appeal to moral principles.
302
IECOMPTON-PYRRHIC VICTORY • 1858
"The Bible for Heaven, the Constitution for earth," he would say; or,
"You cannot legislate morality." Douglas agreed with these maxims when
he talked of slavery, for he declined to discuss its moral aspects, but not
when he talked of Lecompton and popular sovereignty.
A great many reasons combined to make Buchanan take the
position of "no parley with Douglas," and Douglas to threaten, "By God,
sir, I made Mr. James Buchanan, and by God, sir, I will unmake him."
Their personalities clashed. Buchanan was the kind of man who tried to
avoid risk, Douglas the kind who welcomed it as a relish and stimulus.
No amount of arbitration could alter these differences in their nature.
Buchanan had little ambition for further political honor, but he was tre-
mendously eager to achieve a "historical" reputation. He would attain
this, he thought, if he could settle the problem of slavery in the Territories
by the swift admission of Kansas. Thus would he not only preserve the
Union but also encourage a final solution of the sectional problem, for he
thought that slavery would die out in time "by the silent operation of
economic and moral forces."5
Furthermore, Buchanan took a certain spiteful satisfaction that
Douglas's principle of popular sovereignty had turned out to be such a
catastrophe. Finally, as a party politician, Buchanan knew that 36 of the
39 Democratic Senators and probably 110 of the 130 Democratic Congress-
men would vote to admit Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution. The
president could not reject the Lecompton Constitution without renouncing
the Democratic party.
Douglas, on the other hand, believed that he would lose the
senatorship in 1858 If he supported Lecompton, and he had to stay in the
Senate to attain the presidency in 1860. By denouncing Lecompton as a
fraud, he could make a case for popular sovereignty and at the same time
embarrass Buchanan.
"I ACKNOWLEDGE NO MASTER BUT THE LAW"
The anti-Lecompton forces brought six indictments against the constitution
and the Buchanan Administration: that the principle of majority rule had
been violated; that the constitution was invalid because it had not been
ratified by popular vote; that the people had no opportunity to choose
between slavery or no slavery; that the constitution could not be amended
until 1864; that Buchanan had betrayed Walker; and that the president
had become the captive of a southern "Directory."
The debate on majority rule ran wild and revealed that Americans
could not agree on a definition of it. Buchanan held that a majority meant
a plurality of votes cast by legally registered voters in an election called by
proper procedure to decide a question that had a legitimate place on the
303
JAMES BUCHANAN
ballot. According to this definition, the Lecompton Constitution met
every challenge.6 Anti-Lecompton newspapers variously defined a majority
as "fifty-one percent of all the potential voters," "a preponderance of those
registered/' "most of those who actually voted," or "a plurality of the
representatives" of any of these three groups,7
If Douglas meant to protest a violation of the Kansas-Nebraska
Act because the Lecompton vote failed to comprise a majority of all the
potential voters, then he had to admit that the October vote for the free-
state Legislature and the January 4 vote against Lecompton also violated
the principle, as none of these comprised a plurality of the 24,000 bona fide
male inhabitants of voting age. That Douglas believed sincerely in majority
rule seemed refuted by the fact he disregarded the overwhelming majority
of his own party in opposing Lecompton. Backed by twenty-two colleagues,
he defied 150 Democratic Senators and Congressmen, using every power
and parliamentary trick at his command to obstruct the policy of seven-
eighths of his party's legislators.
The opponents of the Lecompton Constitution complained of
fraud and harped on the term "fair vote," Douglas wanted resubmission,
but Buchanan thought that another election would only produce more
confusion; it would be an unwarranted admission that the first ballot was
dishonest and permit the Republicans to prolong the agitation and again
sabotage the effort of the Lecompton government to get out the vote.8
The Douglas bloc declaimed: "We must stand on the popular
sovereignty principle," but when Buchanan proposed to implement this
procedure they all repudiated his proposal. If they wished the people to
act for themselves in their sovereign capacity, said Buchanan, place them
immediately in a sovereign capacity. Make Kansas a state and then, indeed,
its people could vote all of their domestic problems up or down. But
Douglas, emphasizing that his doctrine applied only to the territorial stage,
jettisoned the main principle and feared to admit Kansas to statehood.
Buchanan, by urging the speedy admission of Kansas and inviting its
people to scrap the Lecompton Constitution immediately thereafter, placed
more faith in the basic principle of popular sovereignty than Douglas.
Buchanan freely admitted that the proslavery part of the constitution ought
to be thrown out, but the president could not do it. This was a job for the
people of Kansas. Admit them to statehood and let them act.
Some historians, while admitting that the procedures of the
Lecompton Convention were "quite legal," have airily dismissed this fact
as a "lame technicality" and condemned Buchanan for his failure to
"cling to principle.*'9 Buchanan would have admitted privately that many
of his arguments for Lecompton were expedient and shallowly political,
but not his defense of its legality. He would not subvert the law just
304
LECOMPTON-PYRRfflC VICTORY • 1858
because the law happened to be, in his judgment, bad. The game of govern-
ment had to be played by the rule book no matter how the crowd reacted.
Said he, "I acknowledge no master but the law."
Douglas repeatedly accused Buchanan of trying to "force" the
Lecompton Constitution on the people of Kansas "against their will,
in opposition to their protest," and with foreknowledge that they would
have voted it down if given the chance. "It does not mitigate the evil,"
Douglas argued, "that you are forcing a good thing upon them."10 Bu-
chanan thought it odd that there should be such violent resistance to an
invitation to be free. It seemed to him that the protesting Kansans did
not really want statehood and a chance to make whatever kind of con-
stitution they wished; they liked the political effect of continued agitation.
"Everybody with the least foresight," wrote Buchanan, "can perceive that,
Kansas admitted, and the Black Republican party are destroyed; whilst
Kansas rejected, and they are rendered triumphant throughout the
Northern States. ... I very much fear that the fate of the Union is
involved."11
The second charge, that the Lecompton Constitution had no
validity because the convention had not submitted it to a popular vote for
ratification touched an interesting phase of the Kansas controversy,
Buchanan stated that "under the earlier practice of the government, no
constitution framed by the convention of a Territory . . . had been sub-
mitted to the people." The Philadelphia Press said that "Most State
Constitutions have been submitted." Southern journals and letters
emphasized that submission, while not wrong, was entirely unnecessary
and contrary to general practice. Many western newspapers asserted that
only popular ratification gave validity to a constitution.12
Historically, out of the 63 constitutions which had been adopted
by the 33 states from 1776 to 1858, 30 had been ratified by popular vote
and 33 had been proclaimed in force by a constitutional convention. Each
section developed a different method. In the South, 21 of 30 constitutions
had come into being by convention edict. In the West, 11 of 14 con-
stitutions had been ratified by a vote of the people. In the New England
and Middle Atlantic States, 10 constitutions had been submitted to popular
vote, and 9 declared in effect by a convention. Thus, in the contest over
Lecompton, each section reacted in conformity with its own historical
tradition. Southerners fumed with rage when Douglas charged that the
nonsubmission method of constitution-making was a cheat and a fraud.
Westerners, so accustomed to popular ratification that they thought of it
as a "right," immediately smefled a crooked deal when Kansans failed to
use this practice. By 1858, only 9 of the states still lived under charters
never ratified by the people, but of these 8 were in the South.13 There was
305
JAMES BUCHANAN
no historic basis for the assertion of Douglas that the validity of a con-
stitution depended upon its ratification by the people, but it would have
taken more than a different personality in the White House to overcome
the prejudices arising from the differing constitution-making traditions
of the two sections. « , , . .
The third charge was that the "slavery" or "no slavery plebiscite
offered no choice but protected slavery no matter how the vote went. This
certainly had all the appearance of a swindle. The facts were these: if the
voters chose the "constitution with slavery" a four paragraph article
sustaining slavery would be inserted; if the other option won, the con-
stitution would be silent on slavery. But a "schedule" accompanied the
constitution, defining the details of procedure for setting up the new state.
It stated that "property in slaves now in the territory shall in no manner
be interfered with" and that the constitution could not be amended before
1864, and only then by a vote of two-thirds of both houses of the legislature
confirmed by a popular election. These provisions were foolish and
provocative, but they were not nearly so ironclad or tricky as the anti-
Lecompton propaganda made them out to be. Had the free-state people
of Kansas voted for the "no slavery" option, they would have agreed not
to confiscate summarily the 200 Negro slaves then in residence, but they
would not have secured to the owners any right to hold the newborn
children in slavery. No court proclaimed a natural right in slavery— that
is, its automatic existence without any creative law. Most northern states
had abolished slavery when a few slaves still remained in their region and
had avoided outright confiscation. The Pennsylvania abolition kw of 1780
had projected for some years into the future the point when complete
abolition would occur. This period gave opportunity for compensated
emancipation, manumission by slaveowners or the removal of slaves from
the state, but the law did not annihilate property rights.
The Lecompton Convention could easily have devised a plan for
eventual emancipation that would have been less obnoxious to the North,
but defenders of the Kansas Constitution could mam*a"i with truth that
the version "without slavery" would have made Kansas a free state just
as quickly as the laws of Pennsylvania or New Jersey had brought free
statehood. If Kansas was perpetrating a swindle, nearly every other
northern state had done the same thing years before.14 Furthermore, the
Kansans could change the "schedule" after admission to statehood if
they wished.
The next charge was that by means of the "schedule" a trifling
minority had prevented the majority from making any changes before 1864.
Buchanan's repeated assertion that no power on earth could keep the people
of Kansas from amending their constitution or making a new one whenever
they wished, once they had statehood, was confirmed by the practice of
306
LECOMPTON— PYRRHIC VICTORY- 1858
other states. The president contended that the fastest conceivable way
to enable the Kansans to create exactly the constitution they wanted would
be to admit them to the Union.
Did Buchanan betray Walker? One will read in vain to find any
statement from Buchanan that he considered the Lecompton Convention
bound to submit its product to a public vote, or that he would reject a
constitution not so submitted. He said on many occasions that he hoped
the convention would submit; that he assumed it would; and that it should
be encouraged to do so, but this was a far cry from a presidential order that
the convention had to do it. Walker and many others read into Buchanan's
letters a mandate where only a hope had been expressed.
Even the "stand or fall" letter to Walker on July 12 did not
pledge the rejection of a proclaimed constitution. It read, "On the question
of submitting the Constitution to the bona fide residents of Kansas, I am
willing to stand or fall." Walker repeatedly broke instructions during May
and June by committing Buchanan to the total submission policy, a position
the president had never approved or authorized. Buchanan would have
removed Walker for his insubordinate actions, but a dismissal at the time
was politically impossible* To have broken with him so soon after all the
effort to induce him to accept would have indefinitely wrecked any Kansas
program. Moreover, no one else of similar stature would take the governor-
ship under such circumstances, unless it would be an ardent partisan, and
such a man could not administer the policy Buchanan deemed essential.
The president, therefore, took the calculated risk, gave Walker
the "stand or fall" pledge, and hoped that the governor might succeed.
Had Buchanan, at the risk of national safety, supported Walker in the
abortive policy which the governor himself had originated, this support
indeed would have demonstrated a weak and spurious consistency. Instead,
Buchanan reaffirmed the policy he had instructed Walker to observe in
the first place and philosophically accepted the abuse which came when the
governor, with White House backing, failed to deliver what he promised.
Walker did not seem to feel very seriously that Buchanan had "betrayed"
him. After blustering for a while he came to dinner at the White House
and a little later tried his best to persuade Douglas to return to the support
of the Administration.15
A final aspect of the "betrayal" charge rests on an allegation that
Buchanan had promised a "full and fair vote" in Kansas and, by accepting a
partial vote, had reneged on his pledge.18 But Buchanan never promised
anyone that he would produce a full vote in Kansas; he could provide only
xthe opportunity for a full and fair vote, and this he did.
Lastly, many historians have charged that Buchanan, in accepting
Lecompton, weakly capitulated to a "Directory" composed of southern
members of his Cabinet and the fire-eaters. "Through his career," says one,
307
JAMES BUCHANAN
"Buchanan had been a <dough-face'-now the Fire-Eaters' threats filled him
with unquenchable alarm ... if he had not abandoned Walker, the Southern
States would carry out their threats 'either to secede ... or take up arms
against him/ " Another writer states: "He was swayed by timidity: he
quailed before the Southern menaces transmitted to him by Cobb, Thomp-
son, and a hundred others," A third asserts that the southern clique
"bent the president at will."17
There is no valid evidence that before 1860 any members of
Buchanan's Cabinet were fire-eaters, nor did the president timidly give in
to his advisors. Buchanan had included no extremists in his Cabinet; the
aggressive antislavery wing of the Democracy had no representative in it,
nor did the fire-eaters. Prior to the election of Lincoln, Cobb was one of
the leading antisecessionists of the South. His political rivals there were
the fire-eaters. Buchanan respected him, and it was Cobb, the Union
Democrat who influenced him, if anyone did.
If Buchanan deferred to his Cabinet, that was one thing; but it
was not deference to southern extremists. But did he defer to the Cabinet?
He picked men who he knew already agreed with him. His ideas on
by him for a generation. His support of Lecompton and the arguments in
behalf of it were not prompted by threats or sweet talk, for he merely re-
stated his old policy. No one needed to bend him into a shape he already
held. He was going to enforce the letter of the law in Kansas, without
regard to the advantage of one side or the other. None but the blind missed
the irony of Buchanan's reply to Walker's bitter and denunciatory letter
of resignation. The president had learned with pleasure, "he wrote, that
Walker in all his speeches had "refrained from expressing any opinion
whether Kansas should be a slave or a free state."18 If Walker had ruined
his usefulness as an umpire by publicly declaring he would make trouble
unless the northern team won, Buchanan would not follow him; and
threats from the South did not govern the decision.
Why, we may ask, was Buchanan in the camp of the southern
extremists in the fight over the Lecompton Constitution? The answer is
simple: he was a legalist. He based bis decision on the legality of the
Kansas document. At that time his stand happened to favor the practical
interests of the South. Cobb wrote, in the midst of the Lecompton struggle,
that Buchanan could not be driven from his course "by the clamor either
of the South or North — for he has encountered and resisted both."19
DRIVE THIS BILL "NAKED" THROUGH THE HOUSE
Buchanan carefully canvassed the Congress and found that the Lecompton
Constitution would get a large majority in the Senate, and about 100 of
308
LECOMPTON— PYRRHIC VICTORY • 1858
the 118 votes needed for passage in the House. The prospects looked so
good and the end to the infernal Kansas question seemed so near that he
decided to make support of the admission bill a party measure and crack
the whip to drive the few necessary stray votes into the fold. The opposi-
tion of Douglas might prove less serious than it had at first appeared.
Political insiders guessed that he and Walker were "both throwing Ugh dice
for the Northern Democracy for Pres," and that they wanted to destroy
Cobb, who seemed to have the inside track to the succession.20 When this
word got around, the Douglas crusaders for the "great principle of majority
rule" might begin to lose their zeal and Douglas, when all the chips were
down and the Democracy was mobilized for action without him, might give
up the fight. He could not reach the White House with only the vote
of Illinois.
In the South, the Legislatures of Alabama and Georgia had
adopted resolutions requiring their governors to call state conventions to
consider secession in the event that Congress denied admission to Kansas
under the Lecompton Constitution. To quiet down some of the most
excited southern Senators, Buchanan unwisely let them know some weeks
in advance that he planned to transmit the Lecompton Constitution to
Congress with his blessing as soon as the official copy should arrive from
Kansas. This tied frfr" down completely, and denied him the freedom of
action which he could possibly have used to advantage later. He received
a letter from Acting Governor Denver shortly thereafter advising him that
angry Republicans in Kansas had developed a new scheme which might
deprive Buchanan of all of the advantages he anticipated from quick
admission. They had worked up a kind of "murder incorporated" to
assassinate systematically all officers who might try to serve under the
Lecompton Constitution. Kansas would be bloodier as a state than it had
been as a Territory, and the Republicans would continue to have their
campaign ammunition. Denver reported that most influential Kansans
preferred the passage of a Congressional enabling act which would start the
constitution-making process over again under clear authority and specified
procedure. Buchanan probably regretted that he could not take up this
plan which he had favored when it was first proposed some years before,
but he had committed himself beyond recall. He had chosen the course
which seemed to offer the best chance of success.21
Buchanan sent the Lecompton message to Congress on February 2.
In it he tried to put the best possible face on a bad business, emphasizing
that by no other means than admission to statehood could Kansas achieve
peace and the nation be spared further agitation over slavery. In a letter
to Arnold Plumer, he said,
I am now thoroughly convinced that the question of the union
is directly involved. . . . Should the Kansas Constitution be
309
JAMES BUCHANAN
rejected by Congress then the Topeka rebels will send a con-
stitution here, not merely providing for a free state, but stuffed
with all manner of abominations, ... and everything which can
be offensive to the South. , . .
There is much talk about the Lecompton 'swindle.' I have no
doubt frauds were committed by both parties at contested
elections, but none of these can be charged at any election
necessary to give validity to the constitution These elections
went by default It was the law & order party voting & the
revolutionary mob headed by Jim Lane refused to vote. I have
pursued the path of duty which I saw clearly from the beginning
and I shall pursue it to the end I believe . . . that Kansas will
be admitted; but upon a question involving the life or death of
the union neither my anxiety nor my exertions shall cease until
we are saved.22
The Senate would be safe with 39 Democrats; Douglas would
oppose Lecompton, but would carry with him only David C. Broderick,
George E. Pugh and Charles E. Stuart. But in the House the fate of
Lecompton hung by a hair. Here there were 92 Republicans, 14 Americans,
about 100 Administration Democrats and 21 rebellious anti-Lecompton
Democrats, although the exact number of the latter remained uncertain
from day to day. Buchanan's friends wanted the Lecompton message
referred to the House Committee on Territories, but knowing in advance
that this motion would not pass they proposed creating a select committee
which Speaker James L. Orr would appoint. The anti-Lecomptonites
moved to invest this committee with power to investigate. The Administra-
tion wanted at all hazards to avoid an investigation, for it could produce
nothing but free propaganda for the Republicans and might delay action
indefinitely. After an excited week of parliamentary maneuver, including
a filibuster and a fist fight on the floor, the critical vote was called. The
Administration lost, 113-114. One Buchanan Democrat, who straggled in
a few minutes late, might have changed the course of American history.
The House then proceeded by another close vote to authorize the appoint-
ment of a select committee with power to investigate but Speaker Orr
packed it with pro-Lecompton men.23
Buchanan had to find some way to weaken and divide the Demo-
cratic auti-Lecompton bloc by just a few votes in order to win. The House
committee waited for the Senate to act. During February and March a
Senate proposal to admit Kansas and Minnesota as a "package," and a plan
by Senator John J. Crittenden to submit the Lecompton Constitution to
another vote in Kansas both failed. On March 23 the Senate passed a bill
to admit Kansas under the Lecompton Constitution, specifying the right
310
LECOMPTON-PYRRfflC VICTORY • 1858
of immediate amendment and cutting down the proposed mammoth land
grant of over 16,000,000 acres to the customary size of about 4,000,000
acres.
Douglas busied himself to prevent a single adherent from wavering
or quailing under Administration threats. He did this organizational work
so well that Buchanan at length despaired of breaking down the House
opposition. The president used every means he could to pick up the few
votes needed, dismissing friends of Douglas wholesale, holding up new
appointments, and offering patronage, contracts, commissions, and in some
cases cold cash. The women, wives of Senators and Cabinet members, used
their charms to soften up opponents of the Administration.
President Buchanan held conferences continually, called for
unselfish patriotism, and when all the softer means failed, invoked massive
retaliation against Douglas. But one factor nullified much of this monu-
mental Administration effort: the approaching elections of Congressmen
in the North. These men feared they would not be re-elected if they
sustained Lecompton.
Buchanan got some encouragement from Pennsylvania, whose
legislature endorsed the Lecompton proposal. "God bless my good & great
old State," he wrote. "They have not deserted me in my last political trial
nor deserted the cause of Union & Democracy. / say the cause of Union,
because if the Lecompton Constitution should be defeated in the House, . . .
I apprehend it will be the beginning of the end."2* But by the end of
March he knew he could not succeed in his original purpose, to drive
Lecompton "naked" through the House, Some compromise would have
to be developed, and until it was ready the Senate bill had to be kept on ice
in the House Committee room.
Buchanan's managers had to prevent a House vote on the Senate
bill, for if it were defeated there could be no hope for further action. But
if the House would add amendments, then possibly a conference committee
could work out a compromise. Little risk would attach to the work of such
a committee, for the Administration would control the appointment of its
members. Buchanan cagily selected Representative William H. English of
Indiana, an anti-Lecompton Democrat who favored some compromise
solution, to initiate the move. "It will be your fate," the president wrote
to him, "to end the dangerous agitation, to confer lasting benefits on your
country, & to render your character historical."25 Buchanan and Cobb
fed ideas to English which he in turn proposed to his colleagues. In due
course, the House sent the Lecompton bill back to the Senate with the
Montgomery-Crittenden amendment for resubmission. The Senate voted
this down and asked for a conference. The Administration used all the
discipline it could muster, and English worked on some of his friends to
support the plan which now had come to bear his name. After one of the
311
JAMES BUCHANAN
most dramatic roll calls in the history of the House, the clerk at last read
the tally: 108 to 108. Speaker Orr broke the tie.
The conference adopted the expedient of a referendum on the
land grant. If the people of Kansas voted to accept a reduced grant, the
English Bill provided for immediate admission under Lecompton. If they
rejected the offer, they could not reapply for statehood until the population
had grown larger.
This proposition put Douglas in a difficult position, for it was,
in the final analysis, the equivalent of resubmission. Douglas agreed to
support the measure, but his anti-Lecompton colleagues forced him to
change his mind and fight the referendum on the grounds that it was not
the same as resubmission. His aboutface calmed the rising fear of some
southerners that they were being betrayed by Buchanan into some kind
of bargain with Douglas. Finally, on April 30, the English Bill passed, in
spite of Douglas's opposition.
Of course Douglas and his supporters would continue as a separate
faction, at least for a while, but Buchanan was not worried. "I have never
known the Democratic party in Congress more united & compact than they
were during the last three or four weeks of the session," he wrote. "From
what I learn, Douglas has determined to come back to the party with a
bound & to acquiesce cordially ... in the English Bill."26 With gratitude
and a sigh of relief, Buchanan wrote to English, "It is painful even to think
of what would have been the alarming condition of the Union had Congress
adjourned without passing your amendment."27
312
24
A FLOOD OF INNOVATIONS • 1857-1860
PANIC AND WAR
When the new Democratic nominee told well-wishers at Wheatland in
June, 1856, that he was "no longer James Buchanan, but the representative
of the Qncinnati platform," he spoke not in jest. Buchanan considered
the presidential office not as a place of leadership but as a post of executive
agency. The president should faithfully implement and enforce the
policies defined by deliberative bodies: the party convention, the Congress
of the United States, and the federal courts. He should shoulder the
responsibility not of invention but of action; he should not initiate policy
but execute it with skill and efficiency. Party delegates distilled the hopes
and fears of their constituents into a platform; the lawmakers of the
winning party sought to translate this statement into statute; the president
set up the administration of these laws, reporting from time to time the
results of his efforts and calling for further legislation if needed to achieve
the proper execution of the will of the legislature.
The Cincinnati platform did not provide much of a program.
Except in the realm of foreign affairs, it spoke in the negative. In great
detail it expounded all the things that the federal government could not do:
assume state debts, inaugurate a system of internal improvements, aid
private industry, give proceeds from sale of public lands to the .states,
establish a bank, or interfere with domestic slavery in any of the states.
The platform urged vigorous opposition to all parties based on prejudice
against foreigners and non-Protestants and pledged resistance to all
attempts to revive the agitation of the slavery question. It endorsed the
Kansas-Nebraska Act, promised a fair vote to the people of Kansas, and
proclaimed "adherence to those principles and compromises of the Con-
stitution — which are broad enough and strong enough to embrace and
uphold the Union as it was, the Union as it is, and the Union as it shall be."
But the platform endorsed a vigorous foreign policy: the establish-
ment of "free seas" and "progressive free trade" throughout the world,
313
JAMES BUCHANAN
the building and control of interoceanic trade routes in Central America,
and the imposition of "our ascendancy in the Gulf of Mexico."
' This program of the status quo at home and active diplomacy in
the Caribbean well suited Buchanan's talents and desires. It had been his
hope to settle the Kansas issue quickly and peaceably; he would then divert
public attention from sectional interests by such foreign adventures as
would raise the United States to the first rank among the powers of the
world, and in so doing renew the flagging spirit of national pride and
patriotism. So he hoped. But even had Kansas gone more nearly accord-
ing to plan, Buchanan's timetable would have been interrupted. In August,
out of the blue sky, the Panic of 1857 hit, and in September came word
that Brigham Young's Mormons proposed to fight the United States army
then en route to the new ZSon.
In late July, Dr. Foltz wrote from New York: "The money
market is easy, and on all sides we have health, abundance, and prosperity.
We are truly a favored people." A month later the banks were popping
like crackers, and fear and terror gripped Wall Street where crowds of
trembling depositors jammed against the locked doors of banks and broker-
age houses to read the notices posted there. Specie payments stopped,
making the notes of some 1,400 state banks worthless; investment busi-
nesses went into bankruptcy, mills closed, and before long crowds of
hungry workmen flocked to the public squares of northern cities chanting
"Bread or blood."1
Though the causes of the panic were manifold, a few outstanding
abuses seemed obvious. Americans had been buying goods from Europe
at such a rate that specie was drained off. Railroads, in frenzied com-
petition, built lines where for years there would be little likelihood of
revenue; land speculators mortgaged themselves to the hilt for vast, vacant
ranges which for decades could not be resold at a profit. The state banks,
in aggregate, loaned $7.50 in their own notes for every $1.00 of gold or
silver they had. Buchanan attributed the panic to "the vicious system of
paper currency" and "wild speculations and gamblings in stocks." Northern
industrialists blamed the tariff reduction of 1857, which Congress had
passed the day before Buchanan took office.
Cobb immediately concentrated a large stock of subtreasury gold
in New York and won a memorial of thanks from New York merchants for
his prompt action. Other Departments, when revenue from customs and
land sales dried up, ordered curtailment of public works. "Not at this time
of crisis," came the anguished howls. "Labor needs the work. The
Government can get the money. This is exactly the wrong time for re-
trenchment, for party and humanitarian reasons."2
In his Annual Message of December, 1857, Buchanan announced
his policy: reform not relief. The government sympathized but could do
314
A FLOOD OF INNOVATIONS • 1857 - I860
nothing to alleviate the suffering of individuals. It would continue to pay
its obligations in gold and silver; it would not curtail public works, but it
would start no new ones. To prevent recurrence of these periodic up-
heavals, Buchanan recommended that Congress pass a uniform bankrupt
law which would provide for the immediate forfeiture of the charter of any
bank that suspended specie payments. He urged the states to require their
banks to reserve one dollar in specie for every three issued as paper and to
prohibit the issuance of bank notes of less than twenty dollars so that
employers would have to pay the weekly wages in coin. Buchanan held to
the bullion theory of credit, not credit as value or prospects. He thus
discouraged the use of federal or state bonds as security for bank note
issues, for he feared that putting the civil debt into circulation would
inaugurate an endless spiral of inflation.
This view of the panic conformed not only with the party platform
but with Buchanan's personal attitude. Men who respected property
would not put it out to work except with sound collateral; those who took
the speculative risk deserved the gambler's fate. As to the innocent
victims, rugged individualism would triumph over adversity; the buoyancy
of youth and the energy of the people would enable them to recover. The
prophecy proved correct, but not before untold thousands had suffered the
misery of broken lives, imminent starvation, and despair.
Two ideas which would loom large in the future, grew out of
the panic. In the North the factory workers, abandoned by the Democratic
Administration, listened with eager belief to the vehement assertion of
Republican leaders: they could blame their plight on the reduction of
the tariff; with the Republicans in power the tariff would go up; and wages,
in the ensuing prosperity, would go up, too. In the South, where the panic
scarcely touched the cotton economy, James Hammond of South Carolina
began to preach that "Cotton is King." "Thirty-five million dollars, we,
the slaveholders of the South, have put into the charity box for your
magnificent financiers," he said. The North, with its business gamblers,
beggars, paupers, and so-called free-labor, "the very mud-sill of society"
he named it, could not exist without the South. Wrote DeBow's Review:
"The wealth of the South is permanent and real, that of the North fugitive
and fictitious."3
In the western territory, Buchanan inherited an incipient war.
The Mormons, viciously persecuted during their early existence and
abominated by most Americans, had trekked to their State of Deseret only
in time to be reincorporated into the United States by the Mexican cession.
The Compromise of 1850 made their Zion the Territory of Utah, but for
five years the government at Washington, except for appointing Brigham
Young as governor, left the Mormons to themselves.
315
JAMES BUCHANAN
The Mormons had legitimate grievances. Congress had twice
ignored their request for an enabling act to form a constitution and when
they finally drew up an unauthorized document, President Pierce gave it
no consideration. There might have been some chance of recognition if
the leader of the Mormons had been willing to outlaw polygamy. Another
cause of resentment was the refusal of the government land office to grant
title to Mormon lands. The reason was that the Indian title had not yet
been extinguished, but the Mormons feared that the government would
eventually deprive them of their homes. There was bitter conflict between
federal judges and local magistrates.
In 1855 President Pierce appointed three federal judges to Utah
Territory. Two were renegade Mormons and the third a brutal, dictatorial
Mormon-hater. They soon had the Territory in a turmoil. In the spring of
1857 several Mormon emissaries and the judges came to Washington
carrying conflicting stories. The former charged the judges with conspiracy
and attempts to defraud them of their land; the latter complained that they
had been prevented from performing their duties, their official papers had
been confiscated and burned, and they themselves had been driven from
the Territory.
Buchanan should have verified these tales, but Mormon defiance
of federal authority was traditional and he took the judges' version at face
value. He appointed a new governor, Alfred Gumming, and in May ordered
Colond Albert Sidney Johnston to proceed to Utah with 2,500 troops to
act as a posse comitotus to uphold federal law. It was to be one of the best
equipped and best provisioned expeditions in American history, but flaws
maired the planning. Through the pleas of Walker, the cavalry was ordered
to stay in Kansas, leaving the Utah expedition a helpless target for the
mounted Mormon guerrillas. Furthermore, the official letter informing
Brigham Young that he was to be replaced by a new governor never arrived
because the Pierce Administration had annulled the Utah mail contract.4
Young, knowing only that a large military force was moving
against the Mormons, mobilized his own aimy and ordered a scorched earth
policy. 'There shall not be one building, nor one foot of lumber, nor a
stick, nor a tree, nor a particle of grass and hay that will burn, left in
reach of our enemies," he said.5
Among the miseries that were to be the lot of the Mormon
expedition it will suffice to mention the destruction of the wagon trains,
the ambushes, the theft of the oxen, the snow, and the gruelling two weeks
that it took to struggle the last thirty miles to Fort Bridger. "It was a
scene/9 said the Atlantic Monthly, "which could be paralleled only in the
retreat of the French from Warsaw."6
At this point in the ridiculous little war, Buchanan's friend
Thomas L. Kane of Philadelphia convinced the president that the Mormons
316
A FLOOD OF INNOVATIONS • 1857 . 1860
were a peace-loving people and that Brigham Young would cooperate in
any honest program of the Administration. Kane asked permission to go
as a private agent to Utah and try to make peace. His mission was a
success and the newly appointed governor was soon in office.
Gumming made the mistake of bringing the troops into Utah
Territory. Thousands of Mormons fled before the army and burned their
buildings and crops as they went. Buchanan offered amnesty to all in-
habitants who would respect the authority of the government and moved
the troops to a point forty miles away where they remained throughout his
term in the presidency. Peace came to Son, but it was a year before the
Mormons who had left their homes in ruins began to return.7
POLICEMAN OF THE CARIBBEAN
Buchanan viewed the panic, Kansas and the Mormon War as unfortunate
interruptions of his main administrative program. It was in the realm of
foreign affairs that he proposed especially to engage the interest and
attention of the nation. In his inaugural address he announced, "No
nation will have a right to interfere or to complain if ... we shall still
further extend our possessions."8 In what direction would this expansive
force flow? "It is beyond question the destiny of our race to spread them-
selves over the continent of North America, and this at np distant day. . . .
The tide of emigrants will flow to the South If permitted to go there,
peacefully, Central America will soon contain an American population
which . . . will preserve the domestic peace, while the different transit
routes across the Isthmus . . . will have assured protection."9
Buchanan had outstanding qualifications for conducting foreign
policy. No president since John Quincy Adams had had such wide diplo-
matic experience or had been personally acquainted with so many foreign
heads of state, and none until Theodore Roosevelt would propose so
aggressive a policy in the Caribbean. The first step would be to sweep
European influence out of Central America; the second, to establish
American control by purchase, annexation, or intervention. If the
United States insisted that Europe should get out, it would have to assume
responsibility for protecting the lives and property of European nationals
in Central America. Buchanan urged an interpretation of the Monroe
Doctrine which would provide for that protection. He assumed personal
direction of the State Department, maintained an office there, and, with
John Appleton, administered the diplomatic work of the Secretary of State.
Cass, however, shared Buchanan's views; he was a rabid expansionist who
for years had fought against European influence in the Americas, and the
two worked in close cooperation on most matters of foreign policy.10
317
JAMES BUCHANAN
When Buchanan took office the Central American question had
been substantially settled by the Dallas-Clarendon Treaty which the Senate
ratified on March 12, 1857. This treaty provided that Great Britain would
withdraw from her several Central American positions by agreements with
the countries immediately concerned. But the Senate amended the treaty
to include immediate British withdrawal from the Bay Islands and the
British countered with another amendment unacceptable to Buchanan who
would consider no proposal that left the fate of the Bay Islands to be
settled later. He wanted no British base athwart an isthmian canal route.11
"That unfortunate Clayton & Bulwer Treaty must be put out of
the way," he wrote directly to Lord Clarendon, with whom he maintained a
frank and amiable private correspondence throughout his Administration.
"It will be the bone of contention & a root of bitterness between the two
Governments as long as it exists." Lord Napier, British Minister at
Washington, had already admitted that the British could no longer maintain
their "prospective" interpretation of the treaty.12
To prevent Buchanan from recommending summary abrogation
of the treaty in his Annual Message of 1857, Britain appointed a special
envoy to make the necessary withdrawal from Central America and in-
structed him to discuss his plans with Buchanan in Washington before
proceeding south. The selection of the envoy obviously aimed at concilia-
tion. Sir William Gore Ousley, brother-in-law of Mrs. James Roosevelt,
had been an intimate friend during Buchanan's tenure at the Court of
St. James. Ousley came to Washington on November 18, 1857, and told
Buchanan that he would arrange cession of the Bay Islands to Honduras,
place the Mosquito Indians under Nicaraguan sovereignty, and define
clearly the boundaries of Belize. This met all American demands. But
despite these assurances, Buchanan recommended abrogation of the
Clayton-Bulwer Treaty. "The fact is," he said, "that when two nations
like Great Britain and the United States . . . have unfortunately concluded
a treaty which they understand in senses directly opposite, the wisest course
is to abrogate such a treaty by mutual consent and to commence anew."13
This attitude irritated the British, who thought they had leaned
over backwards to agree, even to the point of raising no formal objection
to the recently negotiated Cass-Yrisarri treaty between Nicaragua and the
United States which gave the latter the right to traverse the isthmus and
protect the route with troops. This treaty was a violation of the Clayton-
Bulwer pledges.
British interests in Central America had changed since 1850.
Originally England sought control, or at least participation in control, of
transisthmian routes; now she sought primarily commercial development
in Central America itself. As there could be no exploitation of commerce
so long as Central America remained the scene of political chaos, the British
318
A FLOOD OF INNOVATIONS • 1857 - 1860
had little objection if the United States wished to bring order to these
troubled nations and give them the benefit of stable government. "Pray
believe," wrote Clarendon," / . . that we neither wish nor want to have
anything to do with Central America." "We would not accept such a
'damnosa possessio* as Central America," he said, "if it could be oifered to
England as a gift."14
But Britain proposed to keep the treaty and accept the American
interpretation of it. Thus the United States was still bound by its own
interpretation, and that included the self-denying ordinance. The United
States could not seize Central American territory or set up protectorates;
the procedure would have to be more subtle. Buchanan thought that the
canny use of claims and the peaceful migration of North Americans into
the region might accomplish the desired results without raising an issue
with England. Hence he violently attacked filibustering, which nourished
hatred and excitement and discouraged peaceful immigration.
Just about the time of Ousley's arrival, the notorious filibuster,
William Walker, "eluded" the vigilance of federal officers and set sail for
Nicaragua with a fully equipped private army aboard his ship and the best
wishes of southern sympathizers ringing in his ears. Buchanan assured
the nation that he had alerted military and peace officers to prevent Walker's
escape and pointed out that they had in fact apprehended him in New
Orleans, but in accordance with existing law he gained his freedom on
$2,000 bail and set out again on his military adventure. The president
emphatically denounced such buccaneering enterprises as "robbery and
murder" and called for stricter laws to hold and punish their leaders.
By the end of December word arrived that Commodore Hiram
Paulding of the U. S. Navy had traced Walker's ship, the Fashion, to
San Juan de Nicaragua, had seized Walker, and had brought him back.
A federal marshall took Walker to Washington, where the State Depart-
ment set him free on the ground that it had no jurisdiction and no charge
against him. This was true, though why Attorney General Black did not
promptly develop a charge of violation of the federal neutrality laws
remains a mystery.
Buchanan reprimanded Commodore Paulding for exceeding his
authority by leading an armed force into the territory of a friendly nation.
Under international law, he could scarcely avoid disavowing this act; the
United States would probably have declared war had a European naval
vessel forced an entry into New Orleans to seize one of its nationals in that
city. The sectional issue immediately arose, the North commending
Paulding and the South condemning his rash violation of Nicaraguan soil
to prevent Walker from doing the very same thing. After his release,
Walker went to Mobile and in a public address told the wild and bizarre
story that Buchanan had secretly encouraged him to seize Nicaragua but
319
JAMES BUCHANAN
had then changed his mind and double-crossed him. Within two years
Walker met the fate he courted: deatkbefore a firing squad in Honduras.1*
In Central America, the heads of state of Nicaragua and Costa
Rica issued the Rivas Manifesto. In it they accused the Buchanan Admin-
istration of directing the attacks of filibusters because of Nicaraguan
resistance to the Cass-Yrissari treaty. The Central Americans now put
their countries under the protection of France, England, and Sardinia,
against the "barbarians" of the United States.16 In response to this out-
burst, Buchanan urged the American envoy to work unceasingly for the
creation in Central America of "a federal system, resembling ... that of the
United States." Unless the Central Americans acted properly, said the
president, reparations for the insulting Rivas Manifesto would be demanded
and, if necessary, collected "by . . . efficacious means." Furthermore, the
American government would resist at all times the European intervention
and protection which had been requested.17
Sir William Ousley lingered long in the United States and joined
Buchanan at Bedford Springs in August, 1858. There they enjoyed the
ovation which the little town provided upon hearing the news that the
Atlantic Cable had been completed. Two weeks later, Victoria sent to
Buchanan the first official message to be carried by the cable. American
newspapers which printed the brief, almost insultingly brusque text,
thought that the queen had cast an intentional slur upon the nation, and
they called on Buchanan to respond with indignation. Assuming that
some mistake had occurred, he prepared a highly complimentary reply.
For a time Americans grumbled about Buchanan's "toadyism," but it was
announced a short time later that the cable had failed before the queen's
communication was completed.
Victoria was highly pleased that Buchanan had, by an act of trust,
sustained the good will between the countries and saved her from personal
embarrassment. The incident was small; yet it may be counted among the
series that gradually diminished rancor and bred better Anglo-American
relations. Perhaps the most significant development in the changing
British attitude was their abandonment, in 1858, of the right of search on
the high seas.
Ousley eventually went to Central America, but instead of con-
cluding the anticipated treaties, he "succeeded in raising the very D — 1,"
as Buchanan complained to Clarendon. The envoy not only failed to
negotiate the treaties which the British government had -desired but also
contributed to the Nicaraguan rejection of the Cass-Yrissari treaty. Britain
replaced him with another diplomatic agent, who quickly completed his
assignment. In his last presidential message, Buchanan was able to report:
"Our relations with Great Britain are of the most friendly character. . . .
The discordant constructions of the Clayton and Bulwer Treaty . . . have
320
A FLOOD OF INNOVATIONS • 1857 . 1860
resulted in a final settlement entirely satisfactory to this government."18
Buchanan erred in his prediction that a rapid flow of emigrants would now
move southward into Central America, but he correctly assessed the
importance to the United States of control of isthmian transit and laid the
foundation for the building of the Panama Canal.
Corollary to the effort to drive European influence from Central
America, Buchanan proposed to project American power into the r^ion.
He firmly believed that the political and economic ideology of the United
States would bring peace, prosperity, and happiness to these neighboring
lands, and he expected that unless the United States maintained law and
order in Central America, the major European powers would intervene to
do so. The imperative need to provide speedy and safe travel between the
East and the West called for prompt action.
Buchanan urged, in successive annual messages, that Congress
should authorize the president "to employ the land and naval forces of the
United States in preventing the transit from being obstructed or closed by
lawless violence, and in protecting the lives and property of American
citizens travelling thereupon.**19 As incidents multiplied, Buchanan used
the claims of American travellers as a club to obtain either money repara-
tions or privileges, under the threat of reprisals. This technique Buchanan
applied to troubles with New Granada, Costa Rica, Nicaragua and Mexico.
Congress, however, regularly declined to authorize the use of troops at the
president's discretion, and the Administration had to work almost entirely
by diplomacy.
During his term of office, Buchanan negotiated a treaty with New
Granada in which the latter acknowledged its responsibility for claims
arising out of the Panama riot of April 15, 1856, and induced Costa Rica
to refer claims against that republic to a board of commissioners. Further-
more, he persuaded Nicaragua to grant transit rights to the United States
and bullied Mexico into submitting to American military occupation in
times of civil disorder. But before these diplomatic objectives had been
fully achieved, the hostile 36th Congress came in, and to win a two-thirds
majority for any Administration-sponsored treaty proved impossible. Even
the South now withdrew from cooperation in an aggressive foreign policy,
for the southern leaders, already thinking of secession, did not want to
help strengthen the federal government. Therefore Buchanan's hope of
preponderance in Central America died a victim of sectionalism.
The Administration's Mexican policy went a good deal beyond
the proposals for intervention which characterized efforts to impose law
and order on the central republics. Buchanan wanted Mexican territory,
either by purchase or by the creation of a protectorate of Mexico which
might, in time, lead to the annexation of the northern provinces of Chi-
huahua and Sonora.20
321
JAMES BUCHANAN
The Mexican government presented a scene of utter chaos.
John Forsyth, American Minister to Mexico, warned Buchanan that unless
the United States swiftly offered Mexico her aid, help would come "in the
form of a French Prince supported by ten thousand bayonets, or British
gold effecting that floating mortgage on her territories which we decline."
Mexico had to lean on some power. "Shall it be Europe or the United
States?" he asked.21
After Zuloaga seized control in Mexico in January, 1858, Forsyth
immediately broached the topic of territorial cession. "You want Sonora?"
he wrote to Cass in April. "The American blood spilled near its line would
justify you in seizing it Say to Mexico . . . Give us what we ask for in
return for the manifest benefits we propose to confer upon you for it, or we
will take it."22 This undiplomatic language reflected American reaction to
the recent murder of the Crabbe expedition, the slaying by Mexicans of a
group of Americans inside the United States border, the summary execution
of three American physicians in Tacubaya, and a host of less spectacular
executions, arrests, property seizures, and studied insults to official
American agents. When Zuloaga, in May, 1858, began enforcement of a
new decree taxing foreign property in Mexico, Forsyth on his own initiative
broke diplomatic relations.28
In his message of December, 1858, Buchanan reviewed the
Mexican situation and concluded that it was the duty of the United States
"to assume a temporary protectorate over the northern portions of Chi-
huahua and Sonora, and to establish military posts within the same." The
Senate Committee on Foreign Relations favorably reported a bill, but the
Senate defeated it in February, 1859, by a vote of thirty-one to twenty-five.24
One other prospect remained. A special agent informed Buchanan
that the newly established Juarez government might, if the United States
backed it, part with some land. Forsyth was replaced by Robert McLane,
who had instructions to deal with any government that seemed able to rule.
McLane recognized the Ju&rez regime but soon found that he could expect
no territorial cessions from it; the best he could do without upsetting the
government, he reported, would be to buy transit rights and get authoriza-
tion for the United States to use its own troops for protection of the right
of way. "While he labored to draw up a contract, the advocates of stronger
measures, some American and some Mexican, bombarded Buchanan with
pleas that he send soldiers to the border.25
In December, 1859, Buchanan urgently requested the power to
send a military police force of volunteers to Mexico. Such troops, he
thought, might settle there and become the nucleus of an American colony
that would lend stability to the Sonora-Chihuahua region and promote its
annexation. Congress did not grant the request. Early in 1860, Buchanan
received the McLane-Ocampo Treaty in which Mexico agreed to give the
322
A FLOOD OF INNOVATIONS • 1857 - 1860
United States transit rights and the privilege of policing the route for a
payment of $4,000,000. More important than the treaty itself was the
"convention to enforce treaty stipulations" which Ocampo signed re-
luctantly after McLane assured him that the United States would keep the
treaty in force, with or without the Mexican's signature.26 The convention
bound each government to send military forces, on request, to the aid of
the other when internal disorder threatened violation of the pact.
The fate of Juarez lay in the treaty. If it should he rejected and
Judrez should collapse, McLane reported, "anarchy will he the order of
the day, and American influence will cease here." "Let us take the con-
stitutional government firmly by the hand," he urged, "and we will in a
twelve-month drive out of Mexico every anti-American element and pave
the way for the acquisition of Cuba. Indeed, if Spain should execute the
threats she is now making . . . against Vera Cruz, American privateers will
soon make their anchorage under the Moro."27
The treaty received wide discussion in the newspapers; the North
generally condemned it as another Administration plan to strengthen the
slave power, and the South in general favored it. The Senate debated and
rejected the proposal in May, 1860. European nations, except Spain, had
expressed the hope that the United States might bring order to Mexico, but
with this prospect now dead they had to consider a plan to collect their own
claims and protect their interests. Buchanan saw that this meant foreign
intervention, which the United States could not, under these circumstances,
oppose. In order to make his position perfectly clear, Buchanan sent a
circular to Mexico stating the determination of the United States to prevent
by arms any attempt of Europe to intervene in Mexican politics, but he
added that his government could not deny "their right to demand redress
for injuries inflicted on their respective subjects."28 Not for a half century
would any president of the United States try as hard to establish his country
as the policeman of the Caribbean. Buchanan's forewarning of European
intervention proved true when Prince Maximilian with a French army took
control of Mexico during Lincoln's presidency.
Far to the south Buchanan achieved very quickly the settlement
of claims and protection of American citizens by a show of force. The
Paraguayans in 1855 had fired on the American steamer, Water Witch, and
had killed a sailor. In addition, a number of United States citizens claimed
that Paraguay had seized their property in violation of the 1853 treaty.
Buchanan obtained authorization from Congress to send commissioners,
backed by a strong naval force, to Paraguay to demand redress. "We must'
not fail," Buchanan instructed Secretary of the Navy Toucey. "Better
take time than run any risk."29 Toucey sent nineteen warships mounting
200 guns to convince Paraguay, which had next to no navy, that the power
of the United States must be respected. The desired redress was speedily
323
JAMES BUCHANAN
forthcoming. It must be added that Buchanan saw more at stake than the
national reputation in Paraguay. The European countries had begun to
manifest as much interest in the growing economy of the area around the
La Plata as earlier they had in Central America, and the show against
Paraguay was put on for a wider audience; its real theme was that the
United States had the will and the power to enforce the Monroe Doctrine.
Of all the elements of his Latin-American policy, Buchanan
personally had most interest in the acquisition of Cuba. He had advocated
its purchase since the 1830's and as president he called again for money
and political support to attain the "Pearl of the Antilles." In his efforts to
persuade Congress to back the renewal of negotiations, Buchanan empha-
sized Cuba's strategic importance as the Gibralter of the Gulf of Mexico,
the continual annoyance it had caused the United States, and the confusion
of its government and economy. Most of the claims against Spain arose
from injuries to United States citizens by Cubans; the African slave trade
centered in Cuba, producing incidents which inflamed partisan hatred in
the United States and kept the American Navy busy in efforts to apprehend
slave ships; and finally, there existed the ever-present prospect of political
revolt and race war in Cuba. "If I can be instrumental in settling the
slavery question . . ., and then add Cuba to the Union," Buchanan said
after his nomination, "I shall be willing to give up the ghost."
The president did not mention Cuba in his first annual message,
but he did authorize the American Minister to Spain to make cautious
inquiries as to the best way of opening a negotiation to acquire the island.80
The next year, however, he came out strongly for its purchase and asked
Congress to appropriate funds with which to pay Spain the long-standing
debt that resulted from the old Amistad case. In addition, he requested a
much larger sum to be used as an advance payment immediately upon the
conclusion of a treaty with Spain. He termed the remittance prior to
ratification "indispensable to success.9'
On January 1 , 1859, Slidell introduced a bill in the Senate
Ailing for an appropriation of $30,000,000 "to facilitate the acquisition
of the Island of Cuba by negotiation." The bill was referred to Committee,
and reported back favorably within the month, accompanied by a full
account of prior negotiations. The report concluded that there were but
three solutions for the Cuban problem: control by some European power
other than Spain; independence, which would probably result in some form
of protectorate; or annexation to the United States.
Official introduction of the bill brought a long debate in Congress
and a full-scale newspaper war in America and Europe. The opposition
made Buchanan the chief target of its attack. Zachariah Chandler called
the money "a great corruption fund for bribery." Doolittle of Wisconsin
324
A FLOOD OF INNOVATIONS • 1857 - 1860
said the whole bill was a fraud; the millions were never intended for Spain
but rather for the Democratic campaign chest.31
Others argued that Buchanan had presented "the subjugation of
Mexico, the taking of Central America and the acquisition of Cuba" as the
means to secure his renomination in 1860. Crittenden of Kentucky
thought it was a "mere piece of fanfaronade— a sort of political fireworks
set off ... to amuse and entertain the people."32 The southerners described
Cuba as "panting for liberty," pointed to the advantages of making the
Caribbean a mare dausum for the United States and banishing European
influence from the Americas, and stated their readiness to acquire territory
from Alaska to the Horn.33 To this, Collamer of Vermont replied: "If
you take Cuba, you must Jake Jamaica; you must take San Domingo; you
must take the Bahama Islands," for each of these would prove as much an
"annoyance to Cuba, if part of the Union, as Cuba was to the United
States."34 A statement from the Spanish government that it would never
abandon "the smallest portion of its territory," arrived in the midst of the
debate and was exploited to the fullest by enemies of the Cuban purchase.
The opposition proved so strong that Slidell withdrew the bill, fearing to
wreck the project by letting it come to an adverse vote.
Buchanan recommended the purchase of Cuba in his messages
of 1859 and 1860, but the proposal never again got to the floor of Congress.
The Senate even rejected a Spanish offer to pay claims it owed to the
United States, fearing some deal about Cuba. Buchanan's determination
reflected his Scotch pertinacity and his seriousness of purpose. "We must
have Cuba," he was in the habit of saying, but his enemies took delight in
translating his statement into the words, "We must have slavery."
AN EXTRAVAGANT LIST OF MAGNIFICENT
Buchanan projected his interest in territorial expansion not only to the
south, but also to the Pacific northwest. When a contest arose over owner-
ship of San Juan, off Vancouver Island, and American settlers challenged
at gun point the efforts of agents of the Hudson's Bay Company to drive
them out, he ordered navy units and an army force under General Scott to
hold possession and negotiated a joint-occupation agreement until final
settlement could be arranged. His own papers of the 1845 Oregon negotia-
tion led to British withdrawal from the disputed area.
But of much more importance was Alaska. During the Crimean
War, Russia had approached the Pierce Administration with the offer to
sell the huge Arctic peninsula. In the fall of 1857, the Russian Minister,
Baron de Stoeckl, talked with Buchanan about it. Since the Monnons
seemed determined to set up an independent nation in Utah, Buchanan
325
JAMES BUCHANAN
toyed with the idea of colonizing them in Alaska. There was a rumor that
they might go there, anyway; and when Stoeckl asked the president whether
they would go as conquerors or colonists, Buchanan replied with a laugh
that it mattered little to him, provided he got rid of them.
Two years later the Alaskan question was revived. Senator Gwin
of California discussed it with Buchanan and they agreed that an offer
ought to be made. Gwin informed Baron de Stoeckl that the United States
proposed five million dollars as a base of negotiation and urged that he
begin talks with the State Department. Stoeckl called the price too low for
serious consideration, but Buchanan would not go higher because the
treasury was depleted and the Congress hostile to him; he might carry
through a bargain but felt he could not indulge in an extravagant outlay
for rocks and ice.85 Seward later took up the proposal where Buchanan
had left it. 9
The Buchanan Administration greatly extended American com-
mercial opportunities, and opened the door to diplomatic relations with
Asia. Reciprocal trade privileges in selected commodities were arranged
with Brazil and with France. An exchange of ministers was projected with
Persia and initiated with Japan as a huge and colorful Japanese delegation
visited Washington to officiate at the signing of the first treaty. Buchanan
sent two of his most trusted friends to China, William B. Reed of Pennsyl-
vania and later John E. Ward of Georgia. These gentlemen represented
the interests of the United States during the Anglo-French war against
China and, coming in at the end, succeeded in obtaining for their country
trade privileges equivalent to those won by the French and the English.
Within a year of the signing of the Chinese Treaty, American trade with the
Orient leaped upward. Buchanan's Asiatic policy represented an extension
of his program to achieve rapid, safe transcontinental transit and looked
to the fulfillment of Asa Whitney's dream of the United States as the funnel
of Oriental trade to Europe. Had Congress been as much interested in this
as it was in sectional politics, the United States might have entered actively
into the commercial and political development of Asia a half century before
it did, and this participation might have altered considerably the course of
later international events.
Buchanan's accomplishments in diplomacy fell far short of his
early hopes and expectations, and he held Congress chiefly responsible for
his failures. But he had recommended the party program and almost
without legislative aid carried out a good deal of it. He induced England to
give up the long-asserted right to search American vessels on the high seas;
he developed trade by treaty on three continents, and he established rights
of transit in Central America. Beyond these things he firmly maintained
the rights of American citizens abroad, by force in Central and South
America, and by treaty in Europe where France finally acknowledged
326
A FLOOD OF INNOVATIONS • 1857 . I860
French-born naturalized citizens of the United States as expatriates, no
longer subject to French military service or jurisdiction when visiting in
that land. He enlarged the scope of the Monroe Doctrine by asserting the
responsibility of the United States, "as a good neighbor," to keep order
in the Caribbean, and by professional diplomacy Buchanan enhanced the
the reputation of the country in foreign circles.
Modern Americans hear little of Buchanan's diplomatic efforts
which, after the outbreak of the Civil War, appeared insignificant enough.
Yet, during his Administration, the nation considered his foreign policy
aggressive and adventuresome. Wrote the National Intelligencer:
We must retrench the extravagant list of magnificent schemes
which has received the sanction of the Executive. . . . The great
Napoleon himself, with all the resources of an empire at his sole
command, never ventured the simultaneous accomplishment of
so many daring projects. The acquisition of Cuba . . .; the con-
struction of a Pacific Railroad . . .; a Mexican protectorate; inter-
national preponderance in Central America, in spite of all the
powers of Europe; the submission of distant South American
states; ... the enlargement of the navy; a largely increased
standing army . . . what government on earth could possibly meet
all the exigencies of such a flood of innovations?86
327
25
CHAOS AT CHARLESTON • 1860
A FATAL EEUD
With the passage of the English Bill, Buchanan renewed his hope of
achieving an end to the violent agitation of the slavery question. Only
Douglas stood in the way, and he would have to be conciliated or thrown
out of the party. Buchanan knew which course would be wisest; he wished
to end the feud. Although he let the anti-Douglas Democrats in Illinois,
led by Isaac Cook, go ahead with their preparations to name an anti-Douglas
senatorial ticket, he cut off further favors to Cook's faction and hinted that
he would stop fighting Douglas as soon as Douglas stopped fighting him.
By June, 1858, many Democratic editors wrote as if they could
not recall that there had ever been any differences between the Little Giant
and Old Buck, and even Abraham Lincoln observed that Douglas and
Buchanan had buried the hatchet.1 The anti-Lecomptonites began to drift
back to the Administration fold; only the few consumed by personal hatred
of Buchanan, such as Forney, Broderick, and Shields, remained adamant.
Their refusal to return to the party worried Douglas, for he perceived that
he might, indeed, share the fate of Tallmadge and Rives. For a time he tried
to concoct a deal with Illinois Republicans to run for Senate on both the
anti-Lecompton and Republican tickets. He took "steep free-soil ground"
but soon found that this position seriously damaged him in the South and
failed to persuade the Illinois Republicans. At length he acquiesced rather
unhappily in the decision of the stiff-backed anti-Lecomptonites that the
little phalanx should continue as a distinct political bloc.
On June 9, Cook's convention of Administration Democrats in
Illinois produced so weak a ticket that even Buchanan admitted the hope-
lessness of trying to beat Douglas on his home ground. Howell Cobb, who
had been in charge of firing Douglas officeholders during the spring, now
strongly urged reconciliation and Slidell agreed.2 Buchanan remained
agreeable but wary. He told the Cabinet that Douglas had betrayed the
Administration once and would not scruple to do it again, but he would not
328
CHAOS AT CHARLESTON • 1860
block Douglas's return to the party. The door stood open; Douglas would
have to move if he wished to enter. He made that move on June 15,
announcing in the Senate that he hoped to rejoin the regular Democracy.
A tentative agreement was reached: if Douglas would approve of the
English Bill and stop attacking Buchanan, Buchanan would withdraw
Cook's Democratic ticket in Illinois and give Administration backing to
Douglas's senatorial campaign.3
In the meantime, the Illinois Republicans, on June 16, named
Abraham Lincoln as their nominee for Senator. This meant formidable
opposition to Douglas and a campaign that would center on the Kansas
issue. Douglas, on his trip back to Illinois in early July, encountered
such marked evidence of northern disgust with the English Bill that his
conciliatory mood weakened. In a moment of dramatic inspiration he
determined to run for the Senate against the Republicans and the Buchanan
Democrats and take them both into camp. That should make him president.
On his arrival in Chicago, on July 9, while telegrams completing the peace
treaty were already speeding toward him from Washington, he delivered a
harsh public tirade against President Buchanan.
Buchanan thought the ensuing campaign in Illinois a tragedy.
Lincoln challenged Douglas to a series of debates and these contests
throughout the summer of 1858 drew the excited attention of the nation
to the very questions which the president hoped he had removed from the
realm of campaign politics. Lincoln, in order to widen the Democratic
split, said that Douglas "had a great deal more to do with the steps that led
to the Lecompton Constitution than Mr. Buchanan."4 Douglas spent
nearly as much effort assailing Buchanan as he did fighting Lincoln.
Both men scattered firebrand statements about in the heat of
debate which seemed to serve their immediate local purpose, and some of
these caught the public imagination and set the nation ablaze. Lincoln's
friends had made him promise not to use the provocative "house divided"
argument, but he used it anyway. Lincoln could never thereafter persuade
fearful southerners that he would not aggressively attack slavery. Douglas,
with equal lack of reserve, declaimed: "All you have a right to ask is that
the people shall do as they please."5 Buchanan observed that such careless
talk only inflamed public opinion. It would soon destroy all reason, render
powerless the tools of practical politics, and terminate in national disaster.
He might heal the split in the party, he might do without Douglas in the
Senate, but he perceived no way to calm the tempest of sectional hatred
and bigotry which these debates were regenerating at the very moment
when the storm seemed at last to be receding. Buchanan condemned both
men for sacrificing the public interest to their personal ends.
Governor Wise of Virginia summed up Buchanan's problem
succinctly. Douglas's success in Illinois, he said, "without the aid of the
329
JAMES. BUCHANAN
Administration will be its rebuke; his defeat with its opposition will be the
death of the Administration; and his success with the aid of the Administra-
tion might save it and the Democratic party."6 The president agreed with
Wise. He had ofiered his help, but Douglas had decided that Buchanan's
enmity was more valuable politically than his support.
Howell Cobb spoke the view of the Administration:
If Judge Douglas had done as he promised ... all of us ought to
have sustained him. Such has not been his course. Publidy he
attacks the administration. . . . Privately he indulges in the
coarsest abuse of the President Under these circumstances
to ask our support is in my opinion asking too much. . . . [Douglas
is] determined to break up the Democratic party. . . . Forney
announced in plain language his purpose ... to unite with any-
body and everybody to defeat us.7
Buchanan followed the election returns with nervous apprehen-
sion. Late summer reports raised his hopes, but by the time the October
tallies had come in the outlook became bleak as the approaching winter.
Douglas made good his threat to beat the Republicans and the Administra-
tion Democrats in Illinois, and his. astounding triumph expanded both his
reputation and his ego. In Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, Ohio,
Indiana, and New England the Congressmen who had sustained the English
Bill were generally defeated. Worst of all for Buchanan, J. Clancy Jones,
the Administration "whip" in the House, had been beaten in Pennsylvania
by the frantic efforts of the "Forney mob." Who could replace him?
He wrote to Harriet after the election, "Well! we have met the
enemy ... & we are theirs. This I have anticipated for three months.
Yesterday ... we had a merry time of it, laughing among other things over
our crushing defeat. It is so great that it is almost absurd. . . . The con-
spirators against poor Jones have at length succeeded. . . . With the blessing
of Providence, I shall endeavor to raise him up & place him in some position
where they cannot reach him."8
In addition to Jones, there were many other defeated candidates
for whom some new post had to be found. Just at this moment the terms
of many Pierce appointees in the foreign service came to an end. Buchanan
might have filled the vacancies with disturbers of the peace or he might
have used these choice appointments as a means of purchasing needed
support, in accordance with his patronage policy of 1857. But now he had
to give the jobs to his wounded friends. In so doing he would gain no
additional strength and would send out of the country the very people who
were most valuable on the domestic scene. Within the year he had shipped
out of the combat zone the strong leaders of the Democratic organizations
330
CHAOS AT CHARLESTON • 1860
in the northern states whom he needed as delegates to the nominating con-
vention at Charleston. One after another, he had placed them in positions
where they were safe from their enemies and at the same time unable to
help him. Buchanan had made an error in tactics the magnitude of which
became apparent only in the spring of 1860. His consolation was in the
thought that he had rewarded his friends.
The exact complexion of the 36th Congress would not become
clear until the last state elections in the summer of 1859. The Democrats
still might control if Douglas behaved himself. With his usual optimism,
Buchanan wrote to Hiram Swarr in Lancaster: "Politically the prospects
are daily brightening. From present appearances the party will ere long
be thoroughly united. Douglas will stand alone in the Senate if he does
not come back fair & square." Apparently less confident of his personal
future than of his party's, he enclosed an unsolicited check for $500 for
Swarr's church.9
Buchanan's second annual message of December, 1858, painted
the picture of a virile nation which had weathered the storm of financial
panic and the hurricane of Kansas, and now sailed a calm sea of unlimited
opportunities. Britain had renounced the right of search and would soon
be forced to withdraw from Central America; commercial treaties were
being completed with China, Japan, and other countries of the Far East.
To encourage rapid expansion of the economy Buchanan asked for an
increase in the navy, authority to protect transport routes through Panama,
Nicaragua, and Mexico, the construction of a Pacific Railroad, and a
revision of the tariff to increase revenue. Most important of all, he urged
the purchase of Cuba to gain dominance of the Caribbean. Through this
program, the United States would "attract to itself much of the trade and
travel of all nations passing between Europe and Asia" and would soon
become the wealthiest and most powerful nation on the globe.
Except for the sectional passions aroused over Lecompton and
the refusal of Douglas to rejoin the Administration party, this program
might have aroused national pride and patriotic enthusiasm. Instead, it
served only to intensify the sectional contest. The thepaes. of slavery and
sectional advantage sooner or later came to dominate every Congressional
debate. The North -killed Cuba, the South killed the tariff, and strange
combinations of vengeful and frustrated lawmakers prevented action on
the other proposals. The president's program failed either to command the
needed votes in Congress or to arouse enthusiasm outside. The people
back home seemed to have lost interest in national glory and achievement;
led on by their local representatives, they could be excited only by the
intramural contest.
Some people imagined that a stirring voice from the White House
at this juncture might have interrupted such petty bickering and enlisted
331
JAMES BUCHANAN
powerful support behind a president willing to act without reference to
Congress or the Constitution. Others admitted that even the voice of
Andrew Jackson could scarcely have united the discordant factions of
Democrats or altered the sectional bias of Republicans. But Buchanan had
no desire to rule without Congress, and Congress did nothing.
By March 3, 1859, the day before adjournment, Congress had not
even passed the routine Treasury bills. Buchanan, in an agony of frustra-
tion, sent in a hurried message warning that the government could not pay
federal salaries unless Congress provided the means. The bill passed only
after an all night battle, but it failed to include any provision to pay a large
post-office deficit. Postmaster General A. V. Brown, though desperately ill
of pneumonia, conducted the fight for his Department from his sickbed,
but Congress adjourned without passing the post-office bill. Brown,
defeated and exhausted, died four days later.10
While Buchanan continued to express optimism, he knew that
worse was still to come. If this was a sample of control by the Democrats,
what would happen when the Republicans commanded the House in
December? He could scarcely tolerate the thought and sought distraction
in administrative work, visiting around the Department offices to check up
on the activities. As others began to lose confidence in him, he boasted
greater confidence in himself. A newspaper reported, "Mr. B. is delighted
at the idea that any member of his Cabinet should get sick, and is in the
habit of saying every day, 'I never was in better health in my life; I can
take my glass of Old Monongahela, dine heartily, indulge in Madeira, and
sleep soundly, and yet my Cabinet is always dilapidated.' "n When
Secretary Thompson asked for some time off, Buchanan told him that "he
thought all his Cabinet had better leave and he and the different clerks
would manage matters till their return."12
THE LONELIEST JOB IN THE WORLD
But despite this bold front, the impending collapse of his party weighed
heavily on him and changed his conduct in ways which nearly everyone
saw except himself. In the privacy of the White House he became more
irritable, impatient, fussy, and dictatorial. Harriet complained and chafed
under the need to suppress all her feelings for "Nunc's sake." Sophie Plitt
urged her to marry at once, for if she felt lonely in the White House, she
would be utterly forlorn when they all returned to Wheatland.13 After
completing her duty as hostess until Congress adjourned, Harriet left for a
three months* visit to New York, Philadelphia, and Lancaster. When
Buchanan's friends asked if he did not miss her, he replied, "I do not care
how long she stays. I can do very well without her." Responded Kate
332
Thompson, "Who can expect anything better from such a hardened old
Bachelor!"14
The row with Harriet arose in part from Buchanan's rigid dis-
cipline for White House social events— no cards or dancing— but more
especially from his nosiness about his niece's private affairs. Harriet found
it particularly exasperating that "Nunc," either from suspicion or pre-
occupation, often opened her mail. On such letters he would endorse the
words, "Opened by mistake. I know not whether it contains aught of love
or treason." Harriet at length discovered a way to communicate in security
with Mrs. Plitt. Buchanan received fresh butter regularly from Philadelphia
in a locked, brass-bound kettle. Harriet obtained the White House steward's
key, sent a duplicate to Sophie, and during the last years of the Administra-
tion the two sent their private mail "via the kettle," as they wrote on
the envelopes.16
After quitting his job as secretary, James Buchanan Henry went
to New York and proceeded to marry without his uncle's blessing. To
celebrate his independence, James Henry raised a huge black moustache
which, one guest reported, "looked awful" and which the president would
have made him shave off had he been present, but Buchanan did not attend
the wedding and sent no gift— at least none was on display, from which the
guests concluded that none had been given.16
The widow Craig, who had been living at the White House during
December and January, also departed. She had affected Buchanan more
deeply than most women; he confided to Cobb, much to the latter's amuse-
ment, that he spent restless nights dreaming of her. The president kept up
a bold front and proclaimed his indifference, but he felt hurt and lonely*
During May he practically took possession of Howell Cobb, whose wife had
returned to Georgia, having him to meals at the White House every day and
calling on him "to give an account of himself' whenever he was absent.17
By mid-Miy Buchanan's social life had dwindled to informal
parties with his official family, notably the Thompsons, the Blacks, Cobb,
Cass, the Gwins, Judge Mason and Bob Magraw. Toward the end of the
month he accepted an invitation from the Mayor of Baltimore to select a
site for the new courthouse and sujbmit designs for the main courtroom.
Accompanied by a dozen of the "regulars," he made a frolic of the visit to
Baltimore. The men toured likely spots, the women window-shopped, and
all concluded the affair by a sumptuous dinner at Barnum's, enlivened by
plenty of wine at $10 a bottle. They returned on the evening train, much
to the annoyance of the younger members of the party, who wanted to stay
for the theater, but the "old Chief' would have none of this. The inside
circle considered it something of a triumph to have gotten "Old Pub Func"
out of the capital at all. rtWho urged him up to it?" inquired Mrs. Cobb.
"Mrs. Gwin or Mrs. Ledyard?1*
333
JAMES BUCHANAN
Buchanan at length got on the nerves of his associates. Thus it
was that some of the Cabinet tried to get him out of Washington and
cooked up a presidential tour to the South in June. There came to be
something pathetic in the way the Cabinet bobbed, curtsied, and put on the
"happy family" act in Buchanan's presence and ridiculed him in private.
They respected his talent and feared his wrath, but they hated his sancti-
moniousness. Kate Thompson called him "Old Gurley" (for Phineas
Gurley, the Senate Chaplain) or "The pride of the Christian World."
Mrs. Cobb wrote in the broadest sarcasm of 'The greatest President that we
have had since Washington and Jacksonl And Miss Lane, the modd of an
American girl!!"
On Monday, May 30, President Buchanan accompanied by
Thompson and Magraw left Baltimore by boat for Norfolk; from there they
went to Raleigh and Chapel Hill. The newspapers reported the president
"gay and frisky as a young buck," and Cobb said that "the old gentleman
was perfectly delighted with his trip There has not been since the days
of Genl. Jackson such an ovation to any President." Even Kate Thompson
admitted, after hearing the report of her husband, "truly I think the old
Rip Van Winkle waked up for this occasion. ... He had a good time in
N. Carolina for Mr. T. says he kissed hundreds of pretty girls which made
his mouth water!"19
Buchanan returned to Washington on June 7, and Harriet came
back from her vacation shortly thereafter. Since the heat of the summer
was beginning to set in, the household moved to more comfortable quarters
at the Soldiers' Home. At this time Buchanan was interested in a wealthy
grass widow, Mrs. Bass from Virginia. One afternoon she drove out to the
presidential retreat for a visit. When her rig came in full view of the group
on the piazza, according to a report of one of the guests, "the President
immediately left. In a few moments after we had said howdy & got seated
the Old Chief came tripping and smiling out, dressed in an inch of his life—
& Mrs. Gwin declares he changed his coat, pants & shoes in that short
time— to see the widow. Now, did you think any woman could make him
do that much?"20
Toward the end of July, Buchanan set out for his regular fortnight
at Bedford Springs, talrmg the widow Bass and her three young children with
him. The pleasant interlude was marred by only two incidents. Buchanan
found himself placed in rooms next to Simon Cameron, and the abolitionists
ran away with Mrs. Bass's Negro servant girl. People at the Springs gener-
ally assumed that Cameron had arranged the episode to spite Buchanan.
Apparently, some people of Bedford had persuaded the girl to leave and
had given her money with which to travel farther North. But Mrs. Bass
took it calmly, announcing that the girl was honest and capable, and had
taken none of the money and jewels available in the rooms. She hoped
334
CHAOS AT CHARLESTON • 1860
only that others would care for her and treat her kindly, which she feared
they would not.21
Buchanan and his "Court" returned to Washington on the first
of August. It had been a gay, restful summer, a far cry from the nerve-
wracking pressure of congressional politics. Now it was time to get back
to business. The last elections for the 36th Congress had been held and
the exact nature of that body stood revealed. The Democrats would control
the Senate, but they were a minority in the House whenever the Republi-
cans allied with Douglas Democrats or Whig-Americans. What kind of a
program could possibly achieve cooperation from such a Iqjislative body?
Buchanan had to figure out the answers to that question in the preparation
of his next annual message.
DOWNGRADING THE PRESIDENCY
While the year 1859 outwardly looked peaceful and calm in comparison
with the two previous years, it bred its share of ugly incidents. Seward's
dark prophecy of "irrepressible conflict;" the angry Congressional debates
on Cuba, the tariff, and public land; the Ohio trial of the Oberlin-Wellington
prisoners whose crime had been to rescue a human being from slavery;
the cases of the Echo and the Wanderer, highlighting the overseas slave-
trade; the Vicksburg Convention proposals to reopen this brutal traffic
under law; the calculated murder of Senator Broderick in a California
political duel; and the pamphlet war between Douglas and Attorney General
Black in August and September— all these kept tension high and slavery
in the spotlight. The October elections brought the worst kind of news
for Buchanan: more Republican victories in Pennsylvania, Ohio, and Iowa.
Late on Monday morning, October 17, Buchanan received word
of some trouble at Harpers Ferry. The crew of the night train from
Wheeling to Washington had telegraphed the news that an armed force of
abolitionists at the Ferry had captured the bridge and town, shot a watch-
man, killed a Negro porter, and apparently intended to terrorize the
countryside. Buchanan hurriedly met with Secretary Floyd and ordered
a force of artillery and marines under the command of Col. Robert E. Lee
to the scene. By two p. m. he had on his desk a copy of the Baltimore Sun
Extra with headlines: "Negro Insurrection at Harpers Ferry. Headed by
250 AboUtionists. The Aimory Seized—Trains Stopped— Cars Fired Into—
One Man Killed" and a more detailed account of events. Not until the
next day did he learn that old John Brown, the Kansas murderer, led the
rebel band. His few dozen followers soon capitulated to the state and
federal troops, and Brown himself was captured alive. Floyd made an
investigation but found no need to proclaim martial law. Governor Wise
335
JAMES BUCHANAN
of Virginia was on hand and laid claim to Brown as a state prisoner. A
Virginia court found him guilty of murder and treason within two weeks of
the affair and the authorities hanged him on December 2.
One can scarcely imagine an episode better designed to arouse
the worst passions of Americans than John Brown's raid. The South soon
learned that the idea of the attack had not been confined to the diseased
mind of the perpetrator. Half a dozen prominent and wealthy New England
abolitionists who had at least a partial knowledge of Brown's plans had
financed the arming of the raiders. In addition to the "Secret Six," other
distinguished northerners had helped Brown and now glorified him with
their pens. Some northern extremists exploited him as a latter-day Christ
and set him up as a martyr.
Governor Wise saw to it that Brown's trial should be conducted
with the utmost dignity and decorum. He talked at length with Brown,
pronounced him entirely sane, and made clear to southerners what they
had scarcely dared to believe before— that a perfectly normal antislavery
partisan of the North, financed by the "best people" there, could calmly
plot mass murder as if it were a part of the day's business. Although Re-
publican leaders scurried to disassociate themselves from all connection
with Brown, the southerners set him up as a stereotype of northern
Republicans.
John Brown's raid strengthened the Republican party by bringing
to a dramatic focus the moral issue of slavery. Lincoln and his partisans
might later pledge that they wished to save the Union, with slavery or
without it, but after Harpers Ferry no one south of the Ohio or Potomac
would ever believe them. The disturbance also widened the rift in the
Democratic party. Congress met three days after John Brown's body
stretched hemp. What now would southerners think of Douglas Democrats
who, through the whole past session, had linked hands with Republicans
on the slavery issue? How could they tolerate men who had made war on
the Democratic party by alliance with the promoters of Brown's foray?
Southerners now called the anti-Lecompton bloc the "Black Republican
Reserve." Douglas might have perceived more clearly than he did the
depth and conclusiveness of this southern attitude. Finally, the raid made
the idea of secession, hitherto a radical or "ultra" notion, thoroughly
respectable in the deep South. To resist Republican rule now meant simply
to resist surrender to self-confessed conspirators and murderers. The
insurrection answered the question whether the South could remain in a
Union controlled by Republicans. The reply was no.
The House met on December 5 and tried to organize. From that
day until February 1 the Congressmen ballotted angrily and in vain to
select a Speaker. After two months of wrangling which occasionally boiled
over into fist fights, the Representatives chose their officers. The situation
336
CHAOS AT CHARLESTON • 1860
was foreboding. The Administration party and the southern Democrats
had lost; the Republicans and the Douglas Democrats were in.22 Douglas,
it appeared, still accepted membership in the Black Republican Reserve.
This appearance hardly coincided with the truth, but the impression gained
currency in the South.
Buchanan, laboring over his message, tried to pierce the darkness
of the future and to plot some safe course. He feared that John Brown's
raid and the wild enthusiasm with which some northerners welcomed the
news had "made a deeper impression on the southern mind against the
Union than all former events." The Cabinet was gloomy. Cobb wrote
that "the North seems determined to force upon us the issue of Sewardism
or disunion." "The days of the union are numbered," he said. "I write
this as my unwilling conviction."28
The president sent his message to the Senate on December 27,
but no one in or out of Congress paid much attention to it. "The message
has been here a week and I have not yet seen the first person who has read
it," reported a Georgia politician. It was dull enough, to be sure, to deserve
this fate, but there lay embedded in its routine comments some ideas that
were startling: the presidential warning that the Harpers Ferry incident was
a symptom "of an incurable disease in the public mind, which may . . .
terminate, at last, in an open war by the North to abolish slavery in the
South;" the assertion, in direct defiance of Senator Douglas's doctrine,
that the Supreme Court explicitly promised protection of slavery in the
Territories; the statement that "without the authority of Congress" the
president could not fire a gun in any "species of hostility however confined
or limited," except to repel the attacks of an enemy; the charge that in
failing to pass deficiency bills, Congress had arrested the action of govern-
ment and could, by this means, "even destroy its existence." None of
these points was, in itself, momentous; but all taken together, they showed
clearly that the president placed squarely on the shoulders of Congress the
responsibility for solving the problems which confronted the nation.
By doing so, Buchanan weakened the presidential office. His
purpose, however, was to keep responsibility clearly defined. Throughout
his Administration the opposition in Congress had attacked him as a
dictator, a tyrant, a James the First. But he had always emphasized that
his duty as executive was only to carry out the will of Congress. He re-
called the dictum of Governor Simon Snyder, "My duty is to execute the
laws . . . and not my individual opinions." He now reiterated this idea
and called national attention to it; he had no intention to be the scapegoat
for Congressional inattention to business. At the same time that Buchanan
circumscribed the presidential powers, the lawmakers labored ardently to
the same end. Enemy Congressmen, hating Buchanan and fearful of his
dictatorial use of power against them, determined to destroy him by
337
JAMES BUCHANAN
destroying the power of the office he held. Between them, they succeeded
all too well.
On March 5, 1859, the House adopted a resolution to investigate
whether the president had tried to influence the votes of Congressmen on
the English Bill by improper means. Speaker Pennington appointed the
originator of the resolution, John Covode of Pennsylvania, as chairman of
the investigating committee. Buchanan assumed that John Forney had
been the real author of the scheme, for he had proposed something of this
sort in a violent speech just before Pennington's election.24 He further
suspected that the Covode investigation was tied up with Douglas's plans
to carry off the Democratic nomination at Charleston in April.
But other factors were at work. In the Senate a Democratic com-
mittee had been busily compiling testimony which linked the Republican
party with complicity in the John Brown raic\ Now the Republican-
controlled House would offer to the public a countervailing exposfi of
Democratic corruption. Also, John Covode had a personal grudge to settle
with Buchanan. As a prominent member of a railroad company which
wanted a huge land grant from several western states, he had taken the
responsibility to put through Congress a federal land donation act, cloaked
as a bill to establish agricultural colleges. Buchanan vetoed this bill on
February 24. "Hence," said the Buchanan press, "the bitter personal
hostility of John Covode to President Buchanan."25 Finally, the Douglas
Democrats saw in the investigation an opportunity to strengthen the
prospects of their favorite at Charleston. A re-examination of the Kansas
fight and the handling of patronage in Illinois would certainly damn the
Administration and strengthen Douglas.
Unlike most partisan investigations, this one would bring damag-
ing testimony from members of both parties. Even Douglas may not have
realized how serious a blow the Covode inquiry might deal to the nation,
for it aimed at discrediting not only a man, but the power and prestige of
the whole executive machinery. Buchanan promptly protested. "Mr.
John Covode," he said, "is the accuser of the President. . . . The House
have made my accuser one of my judges. . . . Since the time of the Star
Chamber and of general warrants there has been no such proceeding. ... I
defy all investigation. Nothing but the basest perjury can sully my
good name."26
The Committee went enthusiastically about its business, question-
ing all kinds of witnesses, both those in office and disgruntled ones who
had been dismissed, Forney who in an earlier day had been an active
influence peddler now planned to tell all. "God knows what he will swear,"
groaned Buchanan when Forney took the stand. "If he should tell any-
thing like the truth, I have nothing to fear."27
338
CHAOS AT CHARLESTON • 1860
The investigators unearthed practices common to every Adminis-
tration since the days of Andrew Jackson, namely, that politicians used
public offices and certain types of public funds for political purposes.
Government printing contracts for decades had been a source of party
income. Partisan editors received printing contracts as a reward for
editorial support and then improved their situation by overprinting, over-
charging, or farming out work for a commission. Buchanan's Administra-
tion permitted this well-established procedure to continue. The Committee
thoroughly overhauled the activities of the notorious Ike Cook faction in
Illinois and spent a lot of time examining the peculiar machinations of
Cornelius Wendell, financial manager of the Washington Union, the
Administration paper.
There was evidence that naval contracts had been awarded for
political reasons and that War Secretary Floyd had offered to sell govern-
ment property cheap and to buy dear. Buchanan himself had intervened
to prevent the payment of $200,000 for a site in California which he thought
a poor bargain. Such matters formed the burden of testimony before the
Covode Committee. In May, the Buchanan Administration itself gave
the Committee an extra boost when the Postmaster General discovered that
the postmaster of New York City, I V. Fowler, had stolen $160,000 of
federal funds. Fowler promptly fled to Europe to escape arrest.28
The Committee concluded its work in June, had the hearings
printed, bound them in with previous hearings on naval contracts, and
franked the results all over the country. Even those who did not read
must have felt that such a huge tome would record a comparable volume
of corruption. Had the report been a mere partisan attack, like the censure
of Jackson in the 1830's, it might have been less damaging; but this time
there was a difference. The Republicans said that the report showed the
hand of treason at work, a slave conspiracy pulling the strings on a puppet
president. The Douglas Democrats pointed out that the Administration
had used its power to defraud the voters in Illinois, a kind of continued
Lecompton swindle. Both ideas set Buchanan before the public as a willing
tool of the slave power, ready to use the public treasure to crush votes
for freedom.
Buchanan addressed a spirited reply to the House after the
investigation, asking why Congress had failed to recommend any resolutions
of impeachment or even of censure of himself or any executive officer.
The House had discovered no abuse of executive authority, nor had it
proposed any corrective legislation. After spreading a drag net over the
nation "to catch any disappointed man willing to malign my character,"
after listening to every coward that wished to insult the president under
guaranteed immunity, after hearing all the witnesses who wanted to swear
away their character before the Committee, after proceeding for three
339
JAMES BUCHANAN
months in secrecy without permitting any testimony on behalf of the
accused, the Committee had found nothing on which to ground a specific
complaint. Such procedure, Buchanan said, violated public and private
honor, it denied to the president a fair trial and the right of self-defense, it
instituted a "reign of terror," and degraded the presidential office to such
a degree that it became "unworthy of the acceptance of any man of honor
or principle." "I have passed triumphantly through this ordeal," he con-
duded. "My vindication is complete."29
DEMOCRACY DIVIDING
While the Covode Committee met, the Democrats held their nominating
convention at Charleston, S. C., April 23 to May 3. For over a year the
Douglas press had made a concerted effort to create the notion that Bu-
chanan wished to have the nomination. Buchanan's own friends had
helped foment the foolish idea through an article in the Pittsburgh Post on
July 19, 1859. Immediately on seeing it, the president wrote a statement
that he positively would not accept a renomination. He called B. F. Meyers,
editor of the Bedford Gazette to his room at the Springs Hotel at midnight
on the 20th and gave him the article with instructions to print it the next
day. Then he sent copies to the Pittsburgh Post, the Pennsylvanian, and
the Washington Constitution.30 He wrote privately to Howell Cobb, J. B.
Baker and Wilson McCandless during July, expressing his "final and
irrevocable" determination to retire.31
As the second-term publicity would not stop, he wrote to Baker
again in February, 1860, denying his candidacy and, before the Charleston
Convention met, sent to Arnold Plumer, one of the delegates, a letter in
which he restated that he would not "in any contingency" be a candidate.
He also sent a copy to another delegate. There is no reason to believe he
was not sincere. He told Mrs. Polk, "I am now in my sixty-ninth year and
am heartily tired of my position as President."32
The talk of another term afforded certain presidential aspirants a
weapon for their own cause. The New York Herald published a letter of
Governor Wise of Virginia stating that "Mir. Buchanan himself is a can-
didate for renomination, and all his patronage and power will be used to
disappoint Douglas and all other aspirants."33 The Philadelphia Press; a
Douglas organ, alleged that Buchanan swore to his friends that he "had to
be" the candidate at Charleston; the times demanded it.34 This had been
the whole object of the Chapel Hill junket. Ever since the Harpers Ferry
raid, he had been trying to frighten the nation about secession, "manufac-
ture a disunion panic," and thus render the nomination of any northerner,
except himself, impossible.35 In the South, Toombs of Georgia wrote that
340
CHAOS AT CHARLESTON • 1860
"Old Buck is determined to rule or ruin us. I think he means to continue
his own dynasty or destroy the party" and in another letter said, "I think
Mr, Buchanan would like to prevent the nomination of another in order to
make himself necessary."36
This identity of hostile views from opposite sections highlighted
Buchanan's lack of rapport with either. He thoroughly disapproved of
Douglas and equally opposed the nomination of any ultrasoutherner, but
he had strong hopes that a southern Unionist, particularly Howell Cobb,
might succeed him. Cobb, however, had become discouraged after the
John Brown affair. He would not be a candidate, he told his brother-in-law,
unless strongly pressed by Georgia, and even then he felt gloomy about the
future of the country. "For that reason," he said, "I feel less solicitous
about the matter I am more desirous of obtaining the full confidence
of the people of Ga.— that I may serve them in the crisis that is before us—
than I do to obtain even presidential honors."37 On March 15, the Georgia
Convention in a dose vote declined to support Cobb as the favorite son,
and he publicly announced his retirement from the race. Buchanan now
placed his hopes in such men as Vice-President Breckinridge or James
Guthrie of Kentucky or Joe Lane of Oregon. These men represented the
border-state or moderate point of view on the major question that would
face the Charleston delegates: popular sovereignty as defined by Douglas's
Freeport Doctrine or federal protection of slaves in the territories, according
to Jefferson Davis's slave-code resolutions. There was ground for com-
promise between these extremes, and on this ground Buchanan stood.
Few others did.
At Charleston, Murat Halstead, a newspaperman, observed that
Douglas was the pivotal figure. "Every delegate was for or against him.
Every motion meant to nominate him or not to nominate him. Every
parliamentary war was pro or con Douglas." He and his friends intended,
by focussing attention upon him as the central figure of the party, to force
everyone who opposed him into the position of schismatics. Only thus
could Douglas free himself from his reputation as chief apostate of his
party. He would so crowd the center of the stage that he would force
Buchanan, Cobb, Bright, Slidell, and all others who opposed him into the
wings. The more fighting that ensued, the better; it would further empha-
size his importance.38
Buchanan had some influence among the delegates. He had
achieved a reconciliation with Governor Packer and thus controlled a
part of the Pennsylvania delegation. The patronage had dictated the
choice of Administration delegates from California, Oregon, Massachusetts,
New Jersey, and a scattering from other states. Senator Bigler became
Buchanan's chief spokesman on the floor, and Caleb Cushing, a loyal
341
JAMES BUCHANAN
Buchaneer, presided over the meeting and guided the selection of com-
mittees. Cobb, Bright and Slidell, none of them delegates but all bitter
enemies of Douglas, assumed local direction of the Administration plans
for the convention. The president could now have used the help of those
friends he had sent away on foreign missions.
Buchanan's plan had grown out of a careful study of Douglas's
letter of June 22, 1859, explaining his views on slavery in the territories.
Buchanan had conferred at length with Slidell about it and had come to
the conclusion that Douglas intended to stick to the Freeport Doctrine and
to deny the right of the Supreme Court or of the Congress to speak the
last word on the question of protecting slave property in a federal territory.
He also thought that Douglas would not accept a nomination unless the
convention "shall first erect a platform to please himself." Slidell viewed
the candidacy letter as "an unequivocal declaration of war."39 Buchanan
endorsed the strategy of insisting upon the adoption of the platform first;
Douglas would then have to modify his views to suit the party or abandon
his candidacy.
Douglas, surprisingly, accepted the "platform first" idea which
passed the day after the convention assembled. The convention then
split wide open over the platform itself. His supporters bent furthest
toward a compromise, agreeing at last to say nothing whatsoever about
popular sovereignty and stand on the old Cincinnati Platform. But the
southerners demanded more of Douglas than silence; they wanted some
positive statement to the effect that Congress had a right to protect property
in the territories, and this wish Douglas would not grant. Bigler, heading a
conference committee, tried his best to translate the middle ground into
acceptable words but failed, like the rest.
Even in the face of this impasse, something might have been
salvaged from the convention had the southern delegates kept their tempers
and their seats. But during the vote on the Douglas minority platform,
which reaffirmed the Cincinnati Platform, the delegates of eight southern
states walked out leaving the Douglas men in charge. These, unable to
muster a two-thirds majority of the whole to nominate their candidate,
adjourned the convention to reconvene in Baltimore on June 18. The
southerners had done exactly what Douglas wanted, but not in the way he
had anticipated. By voluntarily assuming the position of bolters, they had
made Douglas the leader of the regular party. They had torn the apostate's
cloak from his shoulders and wrapped it around themselves. Had only a
few withdrawn, the Douglas strategy might have worked; but instead of
the secession of a mere lunatic fringe, a major portion of the party had
walked out and made a legal nomination impossible.
Buchanan read the results with anger. The ground he occupied
had now been entirely cut away. He could join the knaves or the fools.
342
CHAOS AT CHARLESTON • 1860
Well, be damned if he would; he would join neither of them. He would
continue to urge the only course he could devise which might unite the
Democracy and bring victory in November. He believed that neither
section should demand both platform and candidate but should be willing
to give in on one to get the other. If Douglas would accept a modified
guarantee of protection to slaves during the territorial period, or Davis
would run on the Cincinnati platform, either might win; if each wanted
everything for his own section and would concede nothing to the other, then
the party would lose and the Republicans would take over the government.
May and June brought such a press of official duties that Buchanan
had little time to devote to election politics, although he emphasized his
plan of give and take whenever opportunity offered. During May the
moderates of the border states organized a Constitutional Union party and
nominated John Bell of Tennessee for president and Edward Everett of
Massachusetts for vice-president. Their platform was: "The Constitution
of the country, the union of the States, and the enforcement of the laws."
A week later the Republicans at Chicago nominated Abraham Lincoln and
Hannibal Hamlin to lead them on a program of high tariff, free homesteads,
and no extension of slavery. Finally, in mid-June, the Democrats met
again for their adjourned session in Baltimore. The split persisted; the
Douglas faction placed him in nomination and the Charleston seceders
retired to a separate hall to nominate John C, Breckinridge for president
and Joe Lane for vice-president. By June 28, four tickets were formally
in the field, but only one of them, the Republican, represented a clear-cut
party organization.
Tragic irony marked the final disintegration of the Democratic
party at the Baltimore Convention. At the end Douglas formally asked
that his name be withdrawn in the interest of party harmony, but his
managers ignored his request and shoved him through. At the same time
they adopted the very platfonn which Buchanan had urged upon them all
along and which, had it been accepted earlier, might have achieved peace.
Douglas would run on a promise to let the Supreme Court determine the
"subject of domestic relations" in a territory, thus abandoning the principle
which he had made the central theme of all his former battles. On the
other hand the southerners, long champions of the Supreme Court prin-
ciple, now considered its adoption by Douglas sufficient cause to bolt. Even
so, their own platform on which Breckinridge would run considerably
modified the slave-code proposal of Jefferson Davis. It stated merely that
the Federal Government had the duty "to protect, when necessary, the
rights of persons and property in the Territories." It thus became very
clear that the issue went much deeper than a formula for slavery in the
territories. It had come to the point that southern Democrats would not
343
JAMES BUCHANAN
trust their northern colleagues, regardless of principle or party, and the
northern Democrats reciprocated the feeling.
Theoretically, Buchanan might even now have saved the party by
coming out strongly for Douglas. He had no further ambitions to gratify
for himself and could scarcely have imagined any phraseology of condemna-
tion that had not already been directed against him. Douglas, with
Administration support, might possibly have united the Democratic voters
of the upper South and the lower North, the middle belt which could
command an electoral college majority. Had the Douglas men not been
at this very moment busily engaged in upsetting the tar barrel over the
Buchaneers in the Covode inquiry, such a move might have been con-
ceivable. Under these conditions, it was not. Buchanan had to agree with
the Republican editor who wrote: "A penitent prostitute may be received
into the church, but she should not lead the choir." He decided for the time
being to withhold the power of his influence from either side. Whatever
persuasiveness he possessed he would use to promote a withdrawal of both
Democratic candidates, and to achieve a new and legal nomination sup-
ported by the border states whose inhabitants could still talk to each other
as friends and neighbors. As for the future, sufficient unto the day. . . .
344
26
MR. LINCOLN IS ELECTED • 1860
WAR ON THE WHITE HOUSE
The end of the Congressional session reminded Buchanan very much of
the days of the John Quincy Adams Administration. Bills were manu-
factured or side-tracked, it seemed, for the particular purpose of damning
the Administration. Both Republicans and Democrats joined in the game.
The tariff bill, which Buchanan favored as a means of strengthening the
Treasury, was left to rot in Committee. The appropriations bills were
kicked back and forth between the Republican House and the Democratic
Senate. The Senate Democrats sabotaged proposals to make American
influence count in Central America, and the two Houses adopted a Home-
stead Bill which all knew Buchanan would have to veto.
Buchanan needed the Morrill Tariff both to get more revenue
and to conciliate the demands of manufacturers. He had gratified the
South by vetoing earlier some river and harbor bills which would have
spent federal funds largely in the northwest, and he deserved southern
Democratic support for his firmness during the Lecompton fracas. The
Morrill Bill conformed to his ideas of a moderate tariff and would have
greatly eased his administrative problems, but the southern Senators
defeated it
He needed appropriation bills to maintain the functions aftd
services of government. When services had to be curtailed the Adminis-
tration bore the brunt of the complaints. The political opposition, by
headlining the shocking fact that Buchanan inherited a $4,000,000 surplus
from Pierce and by 1859 had a deficit of $27,000,000, drummed home the
idea that the public funds had been wasted in graft and corruption. But
the figures were misleading.
Pierce had enjoyed a rich revenue from land sales and customs
receipts amounting to $273,000,000 during his term of office. In Bu-
chanan's Administration, because of the panic of 1857 and the near
cessation of land sales, due partly to the Lecompton fight, the federal income
345
JAMES BUCHANAN
dropped to $223,000,000. Thus Buchanan had the task of running the
government for four years with $50,000,000 less than Pierce. He did this,
conducted a war with Paraguay and a war with the Mormons, increased the
navy, and established two new transcontinental postal routes. At the end
his net deficit was $7,000,000. He had, with rigid economy, actually run
the country for $39,000,000 less than his predecessor, and therefore
deserved credit for efficient management of public funds.1
Buchanan refused to give away the public domain for fear of
threatening the financial stability of the nation, since that land formed the
collateral for public loans. Hence his veto of the Homestead Bill on
June 22, 1860, which has often been cited as the act which elected Lincoln.
The Republican press proclaimed that "this act of oppression . . . would
sink the administration of James Buchanan in infamy as long as it will be
remembered."2 A modern writer says that Buchanan acted as "a tool of
the slave power," and that the veto message was "perhaps the most irra-
tional, ill-conceived and amazingly inaccurate veto message that has ever
emanated from an American President."3
The message may properly be called labored and in some places
specious, for it never mentioned the real reasons for the veto; but neither
did the framers of the bill publicize their real reasons for pushing it through.
It was actually framed to draw a veto and embarrass the president, for
Buchanan had earlier made public his antagonism to its provisions. The
fundamental purpose was to manufacture Republican votes in the 1860
election and new Republican states thereafter. No one doubted that any
party which offered free land to small fanners would gain favor principally
in the North and among antislavery people in general. As had been shown
in Kansas, these would inundate the new region and, in the continuing
uncertainty about the controls over slavery, might well reopen the half-
healed wounds of Kansas. Buchanan thought that the worst thing he could
possibly do at this moment would be to encourage a frenzied migration into
the new West. That had been the mistake of the Kansas-Nebraska Bill and
he aimed not to repeat it.
He interpreted the Homestead Bill as a Republican effort to reacti-
vate the slavery furor, a demagogic device to buy northern votes with public
treasure, and a cheat because it would give mainly to northerners land
which had been acquired in great part through the sacrifice of southerners
during the Mexican war. In the end even the northern farmers would be
cheated, Buchanan believed, for as the bill had been written, railroad
promoters would wind up with most of the land. He paid dearly for the
veto, for it placed the Administration in the position of condemning the
West to stagnation and of trampling the wishes of northern freemen to
gratify the South. It hurt Douglas, and it gave the Republicans the chance
to stand as champions of free workingmen and free farmers, a combination
346
MR. LINCOLN IS ELECTED • 1860
hitherto the backbone of northern Democracy. The veto may well have
elected Lincoln. But if Buchanan had signed the bill, he would have
repudiated his whole presidential policy by endorsing a measure that he
thought fiscally unsound, sectional in its benefits, productive of renewed
slavery agitation, condemned by his own party platform, and formally
sponsored by the Republicans.
HOW TO STOP LINCOLN
After Congress adjourned, many of the Democrats lingered to try once
again to achieve union between the Douglas and Breckinridge men. The
Administration or Breckinridge wing of the party succeeded in persuading
Senator Benjamin Fitzpatrick to surrender his place as vice-presidential
candidate on the Douglas ticket and promised that if Douglas, too, would
quit the race, both Breckinridge and Lane would withdraw, and a new
nomination would be sought. To induce Fitzpatrick to make the initial
sacrifice, the Buchaneers suggested that he might very well be selected as
the ultimate presidential nominee, in recognition of his disinterested
patriotism. But Douglas would not retire, and his managers soon named
Herschel V. Johnson of Georgia to take the place of Fitzpatrick.
Buchanan's hope from this point on lay in working out such
fusion tickets in various states as might possibly prevent an election and
throw the decision to the House of Representatives. No other plan
promised the slightest chance of defeating Lincoln. He wondered whether
he had not erred in refusing to support Douglas at Charleston. Here had
been the great opportunity for, although nominating Douglas would not
have kept the Gulf States from walking out and naming their own candidate,
it might have united the border states back of the Little Giant. These states,
if they voted en bloc, could triumph over the Yankee North and the fire-
eating South. Douglas, with Administration support, stood a good chance
of capturing 161 electoral votes. It took 152 to win.
That chance had now gone by. Douglas would squander his
strength where Lincoln was stronger; his prospects were hopeless. Breckin-
ridge would command the whole South and just might get Pennsylvania
and the Far West, a combination that would produce 146 electoral votes-
enough to spike Lincoln if either Douglas or Bell captured a few electors
from him. If this happened and the election went to the House, it seemed
likely that a deadlock would ensue. The voting would be by states, and it
would require seventeen states to name a president. The Republicans had
only fifteen; the Democrats could be sure of only thirteen; Douglas would
have one; Bell, one; and three states would probably divide and not vote.
347
JAMES BUCHANAN
If the House failed to elect, the Senate would proceed to ballot for a vice-
president and, because of its strong Democratic majority, would un-
doubtedly choose Joe Lane. He then would take the helm, in the absence
of a president. This was a guessing game, to be sure, but it was educated
guessing upon which the fate of the nation seemed to depend. Buchanan
thought it the best prospect.
He did not actively campaign, but stated his position to a Breck-
inridge rally in front of the White House on the night of July 9. He
condemned breaches of traditional procedure by both Democratic factions.
Neither nomination had been according to rule and therefore, he said,
"every Democrat is at perfect liberty to vote as he thinks proper." He
planned to vote for Breckinridge because he believed that property was
guaranteed protection by the Constitution, and that this guarantee could
could not be thrown out by a local vote in a territory as Douglas claimed.
He would not interfere between the factions in their state campaigns. His
main object was to defeat the Republicans.
The implication of this speech was clear. Buchanan would let
Douglas do all the damage he could to Lincoln in the North. He would try
to protect the southern vote for Breckinridge and most particularly try to
save Pennsylvania where he still held a strong working force. To fight
Douglas and Lincoln would be to scatter his strength.
IMPERIAL VISITORS
Buchanan found himself distracted, in the critical period between the
Charleston and Baltimore Conventions, by a large delegation of Japanese
dignitaries who had come to the United States for the signing of the first
commercial treaty to be negotiated by this mysterious Oriental Empire.
The Nipponese visitors took the country by storm. "They are really a
curiosity," wrote Harriet Lane. "All the women seem to run daft about
them."4 Buchanan held a state dinner for them, arranging them in small
groups at separate tables with one or another of the Cabinet. The Dutch
Minister gave a garden party, Mrs. Slidefl a matinfie dansante, and others
plain receptions. "And still," said Mrs. Cobb, "curiosity is not satiated."
At the White House the Japanese left a whole room full of gifts which were
placed on exhibit for the edification of the public.6
No sooner had the Japanese left Washington than the president
undertook other social responsibilities. At the wedding of Madame
de Bodisco, widow of the Russian Ambassador, to a British Army Captain,
he gave the bride away. About the same time he learned, with a shock, that
his old flame, Mrs. Craig, had married and was now living in Chicago.6
348
MR. LINCOLN IS ELECTED * 1860
By midsummer the four-year-old fight between Secretary Floyd
and Captain Montgomery C. Meigs had reached the breaking point. Meigs
had been superintending a number of construction projects in the Washing-
ton area, including new wings and a new dome for the national capitol.
He had been entrusted with this work by Jefierson Davis, Secretary of War
under Pierce, and deserved his reputation as an honest officer. He immedi-
ately ran into trouble with Floyd who tried to use the supply contracts for
these enterprises as political favors.
The fight between Meigs and Floyd eventually engaged the
interest of Congress. The anti-Administration legislators now framed
appropriation bills to prevent the War Department from spending money
on these projects except through Meigs. Buchanan had several times
listened patiently to the story from both men and had tried to patch up
matters, but eventually Meigs lost his temper. He wrote Buchanan a letter
sharply accusing Floyd of shoddy practice and demanding that one or the
other be dismissed. Meigs had justice on his side, but he might have
realized that his Commander in Chief would have considerable difficulty in
removing his Secretary of War on complaint of a Captain with a long record
of insubordination. Buchanan agonized over this episode longer than he
should have, considering the weight of other matters crying for his atten-
tion. At length he dressed down Floyd, but at the same time he agreed that-
Meigs would have to be transferred. The latter now entered the growing
ranks of those who attacked Buchanan as a pliant tool of the South, an
ingrate, and a corruptionist. Meigs's name had become well known
throughout the country, and his outraged voice carried wide and clear,
assisted on its way by Forney's sympathetic pen in the Philadelphia Press.7
At the end of August Buchanan went to Bedford Springs for a
rest. The townspeople there, thinking that this might be his last visit as
president, prepared a huge celebration for him. The promoters, who wished
to surprise Buchanan, did not notify him of the plans. He did not arrive as
expected on Friday and the crowd, after a four-hour wait, went home
disappointed. Next day he came to the hotel without fanfare and promptly
went to bed.8
During his vacation Buchanan had a serious private talk with the
Rev. William M. Paxton of the First Presbyterian Church of New York City
on the subject of religion. Paxton related that the president questioned
him "closely as a lawyer would question a witness upon all points con-
nected with regeneration, atonement, repentance, and faith." At the end
of the conversation, Buchanan said, "Weil, sir . . . , I hope I am a Christian.
I think I have much of the experience which you describe, and as soon as
I retire, I will unite with the Presbyterian Church." Paxton asked him why
he delayed, to which he replied, "I must delay for the honor of religion.
349
JAMES BUCHANAN
If I were to unite with the church now, they would say 'hypocrite' from
Maine to Georgia."9
Upon learning that the Prince of Wales planned a visit to Canada
in September, Buchanan wrote to Victoria and suggested that her son
conclude his trip with a tour of the United States and a stopover in Wash-
ington. The <iueen approved. The first visit to the United States of a
member of the British royal family created great excitement throughout
the country, but especially in high social circles.
Harriet wanted to have a huge ball for the prince, but the president
said, "No dancing in the White House," and when he spoke thus, his
decision was as irrevocable as the law of the Medes and Persians. He also
ordered Harriet to remove her picture from the prince's bedroom and put
it in the library. The evening of his arrival, Buchanan held a grand state
dinner. Toward the end of it the president grew fidgety and told the waiters
to hurry up the courses, for he thought that young Edward Albert was
about to fall asleep at the table. Later the guests played cards, a great
concession, since Buchanan detested card games and had never before
allowed them in the White House. At the end of the day, after the royal
party had been accommodated, Buchanan discovered that all the White
House beds were full and he had to sleep on a sofa.
Next day the prince toured the public buildings, appeared at a
public reception, and in the afternoon visited a gymnasium with Miss Lane
where he swung on the rings, climbed a rope ladder, and lost to Harriet in
a game of ninepins. To gratify the ladies, Buchanan arranged a party on
board the revenue cutter Harriet Lane to enliven the prince's cruise to
Mt. Vernon. Gautier superintended a splendid lunch on deck, and on the
return voyage there was music and dancing. The prince first led out Miss
Lane and as he seated her at the end of the dance he was heard to whisper,
"Now, Miss Lane, who must I dance with next?"10
In New York, where the dance floor caved in during the grand
ball, Edward was rumored to have escaped the eye of the Duke of Newcastle
and to have spent the night disporting himself riotously in the city's most
luxurious brothels.11
After her son's return home, Victoria expressed her pride and
gratification at his reception and described the visit as "an important link
to cement two nations of kindred origin and character."12 The occasion
seemed to symbolize an end to the traditional hatreds of Revolutionary days
and marked the beginning of stronger Anglo-American friendship.
THE ELECTION OF 1860
The royal visit could scarcely have come at a worse time. The most critical
election in American history was surging to its climax, and Buchanan
350
MR. LINCOLN IS ELECTED • 1860
should have been devoting all of his time to it. Three of the candidates,
Lincoln, Breckinridge and Bell, had been following the traditional pro-
cedure; they stayed home and said nothing. But Douglas, though sick,
proved he was still the same old "Steam engine in breeches." Breaking
precedent, he began to stump the nation. Starting with a trip to Boston
on the pretense of visiting his mother, he then carried his campaign all
through the South. Here he boldly proclaimed that the election of Lincoln
should give no excuse for secession, but at the same time he accused the
Breckinridge and Lane partisans of being bent on secession should Lincoln
be elected. Presumably he intended by this means to frighten pro-Union
southerners into voting for him in preference to Breckinridge. However,
Douglas underestimated southern hatred of his past course, and sowed
broadcast seeds of the very movement he was trying to avert. By smearing
the Breckinridge party with the tar of secession he weakened Union
sentiment in the South, and he strengthened the secessionists by harping
on the probability of a Lincoln victory.
William M. Browne, editor of the Administration's Washington
Constitution, wrote angrily in midsummer, "I am almost crazy at the
shilly-shally, dilly-dally policy being pursued. Make a holocaust of
Douglas men and even now build an organization and elect Breckin-
ridge."13 Cobb thought the only chance to defeat Lincoln lay in the
withdrawal of Douglas.14 Buchanan, worried but calm, concentrated his
efforts on control of Pennsylvania whose electoral vote held most promise
of deciding the issue and worked for an agreement that all the Pennsylvania
electors would vote as a unit for either Douglas or Breckinridge— whichever
choice would defeat Lincoln.
In late August Breckinridge's home state of Kentucky defeated
the Administration party's local ticket by some 22,000 votes and plunged
the president in gloom. "All may perhaps depend upon Penna.," Buchanan
now wrote. "Should Lincoln be elected, I fear troubles enough though I
have been doing all I can by conversations to prevent them."15 The October
elections in Pennsylvania gave the governorship to Andrew Gregg Curtin,
candidate of the People's party which backed Lincoln.
Hope now seemed nearly dead. Cobb told his wife that Georgia
would "not stand for the election of Lincoln. Regard that as a fixed fact."16
A few weeks later he wrote his son that when Lincoln became president,
"the true remedy is to withdraw from the Union on the 4th of March.
As the government passes into the hands of the Abolitionists— we should
pass out. To secede while the Government is in the hands .of our friends
would be wrong and unjustifiable."17
In the November elections, Lincoln polled some 1,800,000 votes
to win over the 2,800,000 votes of the combined opposition. He would
get 180 electoral votes; Breckinridge, 72; Bell, 39; and Douglas, 12. The
351
JAMES BUCHANAN
Democrats got little solace from the fact that only 39.8 per cent of the
voters had cast ballots for Lincoln. Even had all the anti-Lincoln electoral
votes been concentrated on one candidate, the Republicans would still
have won in the electoral college.18
"Lincoln is elected and we are alive to tell it. J. B. must be in
an agony of suspense," wrote Sophie Plitt to Harriet. In Georgia a hysteri-
cal politician cried: 'The voice of the North has proclaimed at the ballot
box that I should be a slave! At the same time I hear the voice of God
command, 'Be free! Be free!' "19 In Columbia, South Carolina, Lawrence
Keitt orated hoarsely at midnight, "South Carolina will either leave the
Union or else throw her arms around the pillars of the Constitution and
involve all the States in common ruin. Mr. Buchanan is pledged to
secession and will be held to it."20 Slidell wrote to the president from
New Orleans, "I deeply regret the embarrassments which will surround
you during the remainder of your term. I need scarcely say that I will do
everything in my power to modify them . . . and to arrest any hostile action
during your administration. I see no possibility of preserving the Union,
nor indeed do I consider it desireable."21
Buchanan retired to the White House library where he thumbed
abstractedly through his Bible till he came to Ecclesiastes. "Vanity of
vanities! All is vanity. What does man gain by all the toil at which
he toils?"
352
27
THE IMPENDING CRISIS • 1860
SPOTLIGHT ON CHARLESTON
South Carolina moved swiftly after hearing the news of Lincoln's election.
Her leaders had long since proclaimed that this event would be their signal
to withdraw her from the Union, and they had taken public action to
implement this threat in advance. On October 20, the Washington Light
Infantry of Charleston mobilized, and on the 25th the leading politicians
of the state met at the Charleston home of Senator James H. Hammond to
plan the details of procedure for secession. By November the machinery of
withdrawal had been constructed. News of die election of Lincoln would
be the only impulse needed to set the wheels turning.
The day after election the federal grand jury at Charleston quit,
and all officers of the federal district court resigned. Federal activity
ceased in South Carolina except in the post offices, the customhouse, and
the military posts. No one could be charged with breaking federal law,
since there were no federal courts to which anyone could be brought for
trial. The resignation of court officers created a kind of sit-down strike
against the federal authority for which, at the moment, no constitutional
remedy existed.
Also on November 7, South Carolina's Governor William H. Gist
appealed to his compatriot, William H. Trescot, Assistant Secretary of
State, to find out informally what action President Buchanan planned for
the federal forts around Charleston. There were four of these. Castle
Pinckney, inhabited only by an old ordnance sergeant and his family,
occupied a small island well inside the harbor and close to the Charleston
city docks. Fort Johnson and Fort Moultrie stood on tips of land about
three miles apart which formed the neck or entrance to the harbor, and
between them, in the middle of the channel, was Fort Sumter. Fort
Johnson, an abandoned barracks and hospital area, had no proper claim to
the term "fort." Sumter, a brick pentagon fifty feet high resting on a rock
foundation no bigger than the structure, was in the charge of a lieutenant
353
JAMES BUCHANAN
of engineers who daily supervised the work of 120 civilian laborers engaged
in completing the interior construction of the massive pile. A few cannons
were scattered about the parade ground; the fort contained no military
stores.
Fort Moultrie housed the main defense command of some
seventy-five officers and men. It was a strong work, well supplied with
heavy guns facing seaward, but not designed to repel an attack from the
rear. At the moment it was short on small arms; 22,000 of these were
stacked at the federal arsenal a few blocks from the docks in Charleston.
The people of Charleston felt that they lay at the mercy of these federal
forts, and the army garrison felt that it was at the mercy of the Charleston
merchants who supplied the food. Here was the recipe for trouble.
Within twenty-four hours after Lincoln's election the federal
troops nearly ran into a fight with the people of Charleston. Col. J. L.
Gardner, who commanded Fort Moultrie, sent a squad of soldiers in civilian
dress to get some military stores at the arsenal. They were in the process
of loading boxes at a private wharf when the owner ordered them off and
threatened to raise an alarm unless the supplies were returned. As the
soldiers wished to avoid a riot, they carried the ammunition back and
reported the affair to their colonel. Next morning the mayor gave him
permission to load the supplies he needed, but the colonel would not
acknowledge the right of the city authorities to exercise any jurisdiction
over this matter.
Meanwhile, the South Carolinians telegraphed W. H. Trescot
to learn whether Gardner had acted on War Department orders. Trescot
went to the White House and caught Floyd, Cobb and Toucey as they were
leaving a Cabinet meeting. Floyd told him that no orders had been issued
to move ammunition from the arsenal to the fort, and none would be given.
He had, in the meantime, sent Major Fitz-John Porter to Charleston to
observe conditions at first hand and report back.1
STRATEGY AND TACTICS
These events formed the Charleston background of the important Cabinet
meeting of November 9. Buchanan wished to have Cabinet advice on the
message that he had cogitated for weeks, in anticipation of the situation
which now confronted the nation. He planned at this point to make dear
before the world how little cause any southern state had to secede and to
portray the act contemplated by South Carolina as rash, foolish, and pre-
cipitate. Buchanan had no great hope of preventing South Carolina from
adopting a secession ordinance, but he hoped to deter others from following
her, at least during his Administration. No one could properly charge him
354
THE IMPENDING CRISIS • 1860
with hostile intent toward the South, and he would keep this attitude.
Secession in the face of it would throw the burden of guilt squarely on the
seceders and would strengthen the forces of Union in both the North and
the South. But if Buchanan assumed a menacing posture by threatening
illegal executive action, this in itself would add justification for secession,
strengthen its appeal, and hasten its accomplishment.
In addition to such considerations of strategy, Buchanan had to
weigh the tactical military situation. For advice on this he depended upon
Lieutenant General Winfield Scott, now aged seventy-four and in ill-health.
Scott had not forgotten insults, both real and fancied, that he had suffered
at Buchanan's hands during the Mexican War and the bitter political
campaign of 1852. From his headquarters in New York City, Scott, on
October 29, had addressed a long communication to the Secretary of War
entitled "General Scott's Views" on the approaching crisis. He sent a copy
to Buchanan and to others. "To save time," Scott began, "the right of
secession may be conceded." He thought that the president had no power
to use force to prevent any coastal state from exercising that right. After
describing the horrors he anticipated from civil war, he added that "a
smaller evil would be to allow the fragments of the great Republic to form
themselves into new confederacies."
This statement a week before election, coming from the com-
mander of the Army, still a towering national hero, could scarcely fail to
encourage and delude the southern ultras. Buchanan thought it imbecilic
in its ideas and highly improper politically. Only the final few pages of the
"Views" addressed themselves to the southern forts. Scott warned that
some rash, southern filibuster-type raid might overpower any one of the
dozen forts scattered along the Atlantic and Gulf coasts. Few of them were
manned, and not one garrisoned to the recommended strength. Buchanan
read this with astonishment having assumed that it was the general's
particular business to keep them garrisoned to the strength he thought
proper. "In my opinion," Scott concluded, "all these works should be
immediately so garrisoned as to make any attempt to take any one of them
by surprise or coup de main ridiculous."
Scott suggested no means for strengthening the forts, but the
next day he sent a supplement to the "Views" covering this oversight.
Said he, "There is one (regular) company at Boston, one here (at the
Narrows), one at Pittsburg, one at Augusta, Ga., and one at Baton Rouge-
in all five companies only, within reach, to garrison or reenforce the forts
mentioned in the 'Views.' " Although Buchanan later claimed that because
of their "strange and inconsistent character" he had dismissed the "Views"
from his mind without further consideration, he worried much about their
import on his policy. He could not replace Scott, but how far could he
trust him if an armed clash should, by some accident, occur? Buchanan
355
JAMES BUCHANAN
feared the "Views" would convince the people of the South "that they
might secede without serious opposition from the North."2
The army was in deplorable condition through no fault either of
Scott or of Buchanan, for both had been continually calling upon Congress
for the means of improvement since 1857. Some 15,000 men were in active
service in 1860, but only 1,000 of these had been assigned to the Department
of the East at any time during Buchanan's presidency. The wide-flung
frontiers called desperately for more troops than were ever available. To
withdraw any western company meant almost certain death to the nearby
inhabitants, for these military posts provided their only protection against
hostile Indians. General Scott told the Senate that "as often as we have
been obliged to withdraw troops from one frontier in order to reenforce
another, the weakened points have instantly been attacked or threatened
with formidable invasion."3 Troops had been moved, not only from the
South but also from every point safe from Indian raids, in order to protect
the frontier.
The morale of the army had suffered for years from the excessive
demands made upon the soldiers. Long marches, hard labor, continued
Indian fighting against heavy odds, and perpetual sickness were routine.
Since there were no replacements, there were no furloughs.
Buchanan urged Congress to make provisions for a decent retire-
ment system for disabled officers, advocated laws to provide penalties for
assisting a deserter, asked that volunteers be allowed to select the branch
of service they wished to join, and pleaded for a reform of the system of
promotion which had become, in fact, a system of non-promotion; but
Congress rejected each of these pleas in turn. The Senate even passed a
bill to decrease the pay of officers and enlisted men, but it was buried in
the House.4
In 1859 and 1860, the legislators rejected Administration requests
for more military funds and voted a general cut in this part of the national
estimates. When Buchanan called for an increase in military man power
in 1858, the Senate proposed an addition to the regular army, and the
House favored building up the force temporarily with volunteers. Buchanan
fought strongly for the Senate Bill, but only a House measure which
restricted the use of volunteers to the Utah area passed.5 This was the
history of military legislation in Buchanan's term, up to the election of
Lincoln. The president believed, on the basis of his past experience and
his knowledge of the political temper of the 36th Congress, that no recom-
mendation for strengthening the army had any prospect of being approved.
His policy necessarily had to take the hostile attitude of Congress into
consideration.
The navy was in somewhat better shape. Although twenty-three
ships were on foreign duty, the home squadron was in 1860 exceedingly
356
THE IMPENDING CRISIS • 1860
large* Twenty-three warships and forty-five steamers cruised the eastern
waters or lay at anchor at Boston, New York, Annapolis, and Norfolk.6
These would form an important deterrent to southern rashness and a firm
argument against attacks on the coastal forts. These tactical facts Buchanan
carried with h™ into the Cabinet meeting of November 9.
The Cabinet was no longer the confident, comradely body that
had earlier stood in awe of the Chief and united back of his policies. Cobb
and Thompson had already decided that their active future must lie with
their states, but Buchanan expected that they would use their influence to
delay the threatened secession of Georgia and Mississippi until after
March 4. Floyd had no patience or sympathy with the secessionists and
might have helped Buchanan, except for the personal difficulties that had
arisen between them.
During the Mormon War Floyd had hired the firm of Russell,
Majors and Waddell to transport supplies for the army. Congress would
not appropriate money until the job was done, and the firm could not
complete the task without an advance, because it had tied up its funds in
other ventures. Floyd, therefore, received bills from the company for
services not yet performed, signed or "accepted" them, and returned them
to the company to use as collateral for loans. Floyd assumed that Congress
would meet the obligation by passing deficiency bills at the end of the
session. In 1859 Buchanan asked Floyd by what law he issued the accept-
ances. Floyd replied there was no law, but the procedure had always been
used in emergencies. "Well," replied the president, "discontinue it at
once. If there is no law for it, it is against the law."7 The two had many
disagreements. Buchanan had on several occasions rebuked Floyd for being
careless with Department funds, and Floyd had become sullen and bitter.
Joseph Holt of Kentucky now served as Postmaster General. He,
with Black and Cass, represented the outspoken Union element in the
Cabinet. Cass, usually lethargic, aroused himself to active participation
in Cabinet discussion on the preservation of the Union. While these three
agreed on the need for a firm stand against secession, they did not get along
well personally. Black had a light spirit and a keen sense of humor, but
Holt was dour, bitter and unhappy. Cass mildly resented Black's increasing
influence in the Cabinet and his tendency to meddle in the affairs of other
Departments. Mild-mannered Toucey got along with everybody. He held
no sympathy for secession, but he considered a civil war to be a worse
catastrophe and inclined to whatever policy seemed most likely to avert an
armed collision. Thus the Cabinet, by the fall of 1860, had lost both its
old political unity and its personal esprit de corps.
Buchanan told his Department Heads on November 9 that "the
business of the meeting was the most important ever before the Cabinet
since his induction into office." The question at issue was "the course to
357
JAMES BUCHANAN
pursue in relation to the threatening aspect of affairs in the South, and
most particularly in South Carolina."8 Two days earlier Buchanan had
conferred with Floyd about the danger of attack on the Charleston forts,
and had told him that "if those forts should be taken by South Carolina in
consequence of our neglect to put them in defensible condition, it were
better for you and me both to be thrown into the Potomac with millstones
tied about our necks."9 Black now "earnestly urged sending at once a
strong force into the forts at Charleston Harbor, enough to deter if possible
the people from any attempt at disunion."10 Buchanan assured him that
he intended to protect the forts and had already instructed Floyd to supply
them with such provisions, arms, and men as were necessary. He then
asked the question uppermost in his mind: how to prevent general seces-
sion, at least during lie remainder of his Administration?
Buchanan thought that only a constitutional convention could
override Congressional politics, bring popular sentiment to the forefront,
and succeed in averting disunion. But should such a policy be immediately
proposed by proclamation, or should it form the theme of the presidential
message in December? The Cabinet split on both the proposal and the
alternate methods of publicizing it.
As the meeting broke up, W. H, Trescot brought news of Gardner's
abortive effort to remove arms and ammunition from the arsenal at Charles-
ton. Buchanan now conferred with Black and asked him to investigate the
legal powers of the president to deal with secession and state opposition to
federal law. At the Cabinet meeting of the 10th to discuss the problems
raised by the Gardner incident, Buchanan declared his intention to state
in his message that he would not acknowledge any "right" of secession
and would protect federal property. Cass, Black, Holt and Toucey thought
this a sound position, but Cobb, Thompson, and Floyd thought it too strong
and wanted to consider the more immediate question of the arsenal incident.
Floyd had talked to Fitz-John Porter, who had just returned from Charleston
with the suggestion that new commanders be assigned to Fort Moultrie and
the arsenal. The Cabinet agreed to send Major Robert Anderson, a former
native of Charleston, to replace the aged Col. Gardner and to put Col.
Benjamin Huger, a Carolinian, in charge of the arsenal. The government
would thus gain a more alert command and at the same time demonstrate
to the Charlestonians by these appointments the needlessness of their fears
of any attack on them. General Scott sent orders effecting these changes
on November 15.
Buchanan talked with Black about his investigations of the legal
powers of the executive and soon discovered that the Attorney General had
drawn up a set of policy recommendations for a president faced with
secession. Buchanan rather tartly told him that he had not requested
advice but information. What legal powers had the president? Black then
358
THE IMPENDING CRISIS • I860
asked Buchanan to define exactly what he did want, and the two framed a
set of questions. Black wrote them down and, in order to avoid any mistake
and fix responsibility, had Buchanan endorse them in his own hand. The
questions were:
1. In case of a conflict between the authorities of any State and
those of the United States, can there be any doubt that the laws
of the Federal Government ... are supreme?
2. What is the extent of my official power to collect duties on
imports at a port where the revenue laws are resisted by a force
which drives the collector from the custom house?
3. What right have I to defend the public property (for instance,
a fort, arsenal, and navy yard), in case it should be assaulted?
4. What are the legal means at my disposal for executing those
laws of the United States which are usually administered through
the courts and their officers?
5. Can a military force be used for any purpose whatever under
the Acts of 1795 and 1807, within the limits of a State where there
are no judges, marshal or other civil officers?11
To these questions Black replied on November 20. First, a state,
while still in the Union, could not absolve her citizens from obedience to
laws of the United States. Second, federal law required the president to
collect import duties at specified points. A collector, if denied the use of
buildings at the port, could collect duties from the deck of a government
vessel in the harbor. Third, the president had a clear duty to protect public
property, a duty which included the right of recapture if the property had
been unlawfully taken by another.
The last two questions proved more difficult. Black thought them
"of the greatest practical importance," for they involved the executive use
of the army to enforce federal law in a case where no state or federal officer
asked for any help or made any complaint that a law had been violated. In
this respect the case differed markedly from the Whiskey Rebellion or from
the Nullification affair of 1832. Black found that the act of 1807 merely
authorized the use of military force in cases "where it is lawful," This was
no help. The Act of 1795 provided that the militia could be called "when-
ever the laws of the United States shall be opposed ... by any State, by
combinations too powerful to be suppressed by the ordinary course of
judicial proceedings." It was up to the president to decide when such a
condition existed. Buchanan could readily have mobilized militia to
achieve enforcement of federal laws under this statute, but he would have
had to use the troops first against Massachusetts, Wisconsin and the other
northern states whose Personal Liberty Laws had undermined enforcement
of the federal Fugitive Slave Act. These states had committed overt acts
359
JAMES BUCHANAN
of defiance; South Carolina as yet had not. The president could not march
against people who only talked against the federal government, ignoring
states which had for years been actively obstructing the course of federal
law.
Black cautioned Buchanan that the "whole spirit of our system"
was opposed to any method of law enforcement other than that of the
courts, "except in cases of extreme necessity." The resignation of federal
officers did not constitute such necessity and did not give legal cause to
send troops. "You can use force only to repel an assault on the public
property," he said. If revenue could not be collected and the laws executed
by normal means, Congress would have to legislate new means. Black
advised Buchanan that if a state tried to secede, he should try to execute
the laws only by means clearly provided by federal statute and should
assume that "the present constitutional relations between the States and
the Federal Government continue to exist until a new code of laws shall be
established either by force or by law." The general government had a
right to preserve itself by repelling "a direct and positive aggression upon
its property or its officers," but, he concluded, "this is a totally different
thing from an offensive war, to punish the people for the political misdeeds
of their State Government."12
Both the Cabinet and the country debated the problems of the
"right of secession" and the "coercion of a state," questions which probed
to the very root of the federal idea. The southerners generally assumed a
"right" to secede and denounced coercion, as was to be expected. But it
was remarkable that many northern journalists, including leading
Republican editors, agreed with this view and for six weeks after the
election of Lincoln contended that the principle of government by the
consent of the governed made secession a natural right. Horace Greeley
editorialized on November 9, "We hope never to live in a Republic whereof
one section is pinned to the residue by bayonets."13
Curiosity about Lincoln's ideas ran high, but he said very little,
and that little augmented sectional tension. On October 23 Lincoln told
a southern editor that he would not "disclaim all intention to interfere
with slaves or slavery in the states."14 In mid-November he said in a
public speech that he welcomed a "practical test" of the issue of State
Rights and was "glad of this military preparation in the South." It would,
he thought, tend to unite southern Unionists.15 Pennsylvania Republi-
cans assured the president-elect that although Republicans would be in a
minority in Congress, "the Union element of the South will naturally act
with us."16 Buchanan considered such optimistic views completely at
odds with reality.
Getting no leadership or policy statement from Lincoln, the
country anxiously speculated on Buchanan's forthcoming message. The
360
THE IMPENDING CRISIS • 1860
president kept very quiet about it, refusing as late as November 28 to send
an advance copy to his confidential friend, Hiram Swarr. "The circum-
stances of the Country," he wrote, "require the retention of the message,
for possible modification, up to the latest hour."17 But Buchanan did tell
a group of secessionists exactly where he stood. In a long conference at
the White House during the third week of November, he said that he would
deny any "right" of secession and oppose it strongly. He assured the
southerners that the "mighty West" would never permit the closing of the
mouth of the Mississippi by a foreign power, which would be the case if
Louisiana tried to withdraw. "South Carolina," he said, "wishes to enter
into a conflict with me — a conflict with myself — and upon the "drawing of
the first drop of blood to drag other Southern States into the secession
movement." Buchanan admitted that the South had suffered ill-treatment
at the hands of the North, but he said that these wrongs did not yet con-
stitute just cause for disunion. He planned first to "appeal to the North
for justice to the South," and if it was denied, "then," said he emphatically,
"I am with them." But terminating the interview, he cautioned his visitors
that the recent flamboyant statements of Keitt and Yancey to the effect
that he was "pledged to secession" were entirely false, and that the South
ought not to assume any sympathy for secession from the Administration.18
THE PRESIDENT PROPOSES
Buchanan sent his message to Congress on December 3. In it he placed
the blame for the crisis squarely on the northern antislavery agitators and
warned them that unless they left the slave states alone, disunion would be
inevitable. One hah0 the nation would not live "habitually and perpetually
insecure," and only those who had threatened to bathe the South in blood
could dissipate the fears they had aroused. The southerners, on the other
hand, had no excuse to break up the Union because a president they dis-
trusted had been legally elected. Even if Lincoln intended to usurp un-
constitutional powers and attack the South, which Buchanan doubted, he
could not do so because the other branches of the government would
restrain him. The Republicans, with a minority president, a minority in
both houses of Congress, and a minority on the Supreme Court, had not
the strength to act rashly unless the southerners withdrew.
He counselled the South not to secede from "apprehensions of
contingent danger in the future." Only "some overt and dangerous act"
of the new president would justify their resistance, and previous resistance
would be revolution. "Let us wait for the overt act," he urged. In the
meantime, he would charge the president-elect to do common justice to
the South and try to force a clear expression of intent from him. Let
Lincoln's party faithfully execute the Fugitive Slave Law in the states where
361
JAMES BUCHANAN
Republicans held sway. Should Lincoln refuse to do this duty, then he
would have "wilfully violated'* the Constitution. In that event, "the
injured States . . . would be justified in revolutionary resistance to the
government of the Union."
But even in such an eventuality, there could be no "right of
secession." The government of the United States was intended to be
perpetual and had the duty to preserve itself. The framers had not com.
mitted the "absurdity of providing for its own dissolution." "Let us look
the danger fairly in the face. Secession is neither more nor less than
revolution. It may or may not be a justifiable revolution; but still it is
revolution."
And what ought the president do about the crisis? He had taken
an oath to execute the laws, but in South Carolina no machinery now
existed for administration of the laws. Such machinery could be re-
established only by new laws or by the dictatorial use of military force.
No statute gave the president power to use force against South Carolina.
Did the Constitution give Congress power to "coerce a State into sub-
mission?" Buchanan answered "that the power to make war against a
State is at variance with the whole spirit and intent of the Constitution
We could not, by physical force, control the will of the people and compel
them to elect senators and representatives to Congress. . . . Our Union
rests upon public opinion, and can never be cemented by the blood of its
citizens shed in civil war. If it cannot live in the affections of the people
it must one day perish. Congress possesses many means of preserving it
by conciliation; but the sword was not placed in their hand to preserve it
by force."
Buchanan then defined the program he wished Congress to
implement. Let Congress call a constitutional convention into being, or
recommend that the several state legislatures issue the call. This con-
vention ought to devise an explanatory amendment to the Constitution on
three points:
1. An express recognition of the right of property in slaves in
the States where it now exists or may hereafter exist.
2. The duty of protecting this right in all the common Territories
throughout their territorial existence, and until they shall be
admitted as States into the Union, with or without slavery, as
their constituents may prescribe.
3. A like recognition of the right of the master to have his"slave,
who has escaped from one State to another, restored and 'delivered
up9 to him.
This procedure, said the president, "ought to be tried . . . before any of
these States shall separate themselves from the Union."19
362
THE IMPENDING CRISIS • I860
The message commanded praise or censure from the press, de-
pending upon the party of the editor; but the condemnation of it rang much
more loudly than the applause for Buchanan pulled the checkrein on both
of the major contending groups, and both reacted angrily to the bit. The
Lincoln journals commented that never had a message been "cast aside
with such unqualified disappointment," and roundly condemned Bu-
chanan's efforts to fix blame for the trouble on the abolitionists as a deadly
insult, a "brazen lie," and an "atrocious" perversion of the truth.20 The
Breckinridge sheets considered the message a "calm, patriotic, consistent
and convincing" statement of the problem, characterized by "energy,
decision and moderation."21 The Douglas papers generally agreed that
Buchanan had been exactly right in "attributing the present unfortunate . . .
condition of the country to the general Abolition agitation," but they
picked for their target the "absurd" proposition that secession was un-
constitutional but that no constitutional remedy existed to prevent it.
The newspaper discussions of this apparent paradox ranged from
rant through metaphysics. Buchanan, however, had merely stated an
inescapable fact: admittedly, there was a flaw in the structure, and the
condition would exist until remedied by some revision of the Constitution.
Black had heard Buchanan reply scores of times to southerners who urged
a "right" of secession, "I find no such right laid down in the Constitution."
To northern advocates of "coercion" (presumably an executive order for
the armed invasion of a state in the absence of any call for help or declara-
tion of war by Congress) Buchanan answered with equivalent words.
Neither secession nor coercion were comprehended in the federal Constitu-
tion, and to say so was not the mere partisan expression of one president.22
A CHALLENGE TO MR. LINCOLN
While the message failed to convince anyone to think or act very diflFerently,
it placed Lincoln and the Republican party in difficulty. No cause justified
breaking the Union, Buchanan said, except continued overt defiance of the
Constitution. The North, not the South, had for ,years been practicing
such defiance by its Personal Liberty Laws. Unless the northern states
repealed these, the South would be equally justified in ignoring or defying
the constitutional compact. Buchanan challenged the Republicans to
clean their own house before raising the question of obedience to federal
law. The northern states, he accused, actively defied the Constitution; so
far South Carolina only threatened action. Now it was Lincoln's move.
Buchanan also challenged the Republicans to agree to a national
constitutional convention. If Lincoln rejected this proposal, he rejected
the whole basis of the constitutional system and took the position that he
did not actually want a solution based on the will of the public. Lincoln
363
JAMES BUCHANAN
would have to endorse a convention or appear to admit publicly that his
minority party dared not risk using traditional procedures. Buchanan
hoped that his message would force the Republicans to face the question
of a constitutional convention and to elicit from Lincoln some clear state-
ment concerning it.
But the Republicans, divided among themselves, chose to treat
Buchanan's challenge as an insulting political trick designed to destroy
them, and they declined to respond to it. One historian has noted that
while it was perfectly clear that the Democrats had lost the election, "there
was still grave doubt as to who had won it."23 Wendell Phillips wrote,
"Lincoln is in place, Garrison in power'9 Who controlled the Republican
party: Seward and Weed, the radical abolitionists, the shrewd political
mavericks like Cameron and Blair, the old Constitutional Whigs, or Lincoln
and the westerners? Would Lincoln run the party, or would someone else
run Lincoln? As no one had the answers to these questions, each Re-
publican group laid its own plans to bring Lincoln into camp. Lincoln
became the key figure, the target of conquest within his own party, the
man to whom the country looked for a statement of the Republican program
to meet the crisis.
In the absence of any word from Lincoln, Republican spokesmen
published all sorts of contradictory proposals. The Pennsylvanians re-
ported that the state was "thoroughly anti-abolitionist," and wanted no
Negro issue raised. They were Republican only because of the tariff, and
would support Buchanan's proposed amendments on the slave question,
if a vote should be taken, by a majority of two to one.24 The radicals, like
Senator Lyxnan Trumbull of Illinois, told Lincoln: "Republicans have no
concession to make or compromise to offer. ... It is impolitic even to
discuss making them." These men sought to prevent getting up any
convention or Congressional committee or private parley to discuss the
crisis. "Proposing new Compromises," Trumbull said, "is an admission
that to conduct the government on the principles on which we carried the
election would be wrong. Inactivity and a land spirit is ... all that is left
for us to do, till the 4th of March." Congress ought to £ive no power to
Buchanan, for he would not know how to use it.25 Congressman E. B.
Washburne agreed that "what we want most is a 'masterly inactivity,' "
but he warned Lincoln that the people in Illinois had not the faintest con-
ception of the depth of secession feeling.26
Friends of Douglas reported to Lincoln that the Little Giant had
said, "All government is coercion, and I go in for asserting this principle
at every hazard. Rather a million men should fall on the battlefield, than
that this gov't should lose one Single State."27 But a Chicago delegate
thought that "we can consent to no secession, and yet we must avoid any
364
THE IMPENDING CRISIS • 1860
collision" — queer doctrine for a Republican who denounced Buchanan's
Republican Governor E. D. Morgan of New York urged Lincoln
to come out strongly in favor of the acquisition of Cuba in order to gain
the support of pro-Union Democrats.29 Thurlow Weed, Seward's spokes*
man, recommended that Republicans approve the extension of the Missouri
Compromise line to the Pacific. John Sherman and other Republicans in
Congress applauded this suggestion. David Kilgore of Indiana proposed
that the federal government should pay compensation to owners of fugitive
slaves. Eli Thayer of Massachusetts thought a reapplication of popular
sovereignty in the territories would end the trouble. Sherman, after
getting no support on the Missouri Compromise proposal, asked Congress to
admit all territories immediately as states, thus ending the national phase
of the slavery controversy.30
These diverse suggestions to Lincoln gradually tended to define
two distinct elements of the Republican party: those who favored a con-
ciliatory policy and admitted the necessity of some compromise and those
who rejected compromise and wished to avoid any discussion about it. The
first group, led by Seward and Weed, hoped to attract the northern and
western Democrats and border-state Whigs by the compromise policy.
The radical group, led by Lyman Trumbull, Ben Wade, and the eastern
abolitionists thought compromise would wreck the party, and that the
secession threat was only a bluff. It might even be good- riddance and
strengthen the nation to part company with South Carolina and a few of
the Gulf black-belt states. But no one knew who spoke for the Republicans
until Lincoln made his choice.
"There is only one man in the United States who has it in his
power to restore the country to its happy and prosperous condition," wrote
the New York Herald, "and that man is the president-elect. ... If Mr.
Lincoln will speak out in a manner to reassure the conservative masses of
all the States, the present cloud will pass away like a summer shower.'*
S. L. M. Barlow of New York wrote a letter to John Slidell for "private
circulation in D. C," saying that if Lincoln would come out for a con-
stitutional convention, the trouble would end. If not, or if the Republicans
blocked the discussion of compromise, then war would be sure.81
But Lincoln made no public announcement, and the substance of
his private letters soon got into circulation and spread the impression that
he opposed any settlement by conciliation. His enemies assumed that he
planned to subjugate the South by force. Lincoln had said almost nothing
since the Douglas debates of 1858. He made no campaign speeches, and
he wrote only one public letter during the entire election canvass— the
one in which he accepted his nomination. "The Chicago Platform,"
Lincoln wrote, "meets my approval and it shall be my care not to violate
365
JAMES BUCHANAN
or disregard it in any part," To dozens of letters requesting clarification
of his policy, he regularly replied by referring the writers to his "previous
statements." Everyone could pick what he wished from Lincoln's past
utterances. His friends could mate him a saint, and his enemies could
make him a devil. On November 28 he wrote to Henry J. Raymond of
the New York Times concerning the advocates of compromise: "These
political fiends are not half sick enough yet "They seek a sign, and no
sign shall be given them/ At least such is my present feeling and purpose."32
Lincoln left even so important a partisan as Weed in the dark.
Weed wrote on December 11, in preparation for a conference of Republican
governors in New York, "I have been acting without knowledge of your
view upon vital questions."33 Lincoln gave him no satisfaction; neverthe-
less, he invited him to pay a visit to Springfield. Private correspondence
showed that Lincoln did have a policy by early December and had advised
certain friends of it. "Prevent . . . entertaining propositions for com-
promise of any sort, on 'slavery extension,' " he wrote E. B. Washburne.
"There is no possible compromise on it ... whether it be the Mo. line, or
EU Thayer's Pop. Sov. it is all the same. ... On that point hold firm, as
with a chain of steel."34 He later told Weed, "I will be inflexible on the
territorial question. . . ,"36
Lincoln had in fact firmly adopted the radical position which
Buchanan had warned would be sure to bring war, a belief shared by most
Americans of all parties except for the radical wing of the Republicans.
But Lincoln did not publicly announce his position, nor did he believe that
it would bring conflict. He thought the threat of secession humbug and
war unlikely. Buchanan, in addition to keeping southerners in harness,
faced the task of convincing Lincoln that his estimate of the national
problem was oversimple and unrealistic and that upon the victorious
Republicans rested' the issue of union or disunion.
Buchanan had a much more accurate knowledge of the temper
of the South than Lincoln, who had not held national office for a decade
and who rarely visited outside Illinois. The president prophesied to Hiram
Swarr on December 10:
I am truly sorry to say that South Carolina will secede about the
20th & the other cotton states will, in all probability, speedily
follow. The contagion of disunion is fast spreading in North
Carolina and Virginia & even in Maryland to a considerable
extent. They are proceeding rashly & precipitately & will afford
no opportunity of trying the question at the Ballot Box in the
North whether the people will or will not agree to redress these
grievances. The Black Republicans say nothing & I fear will do
nothing to arrest the impending catastrophe. These remarks are
strictly private.36
366
THE IMPENDING CRISIS • I860
With such gloomy forebodings Buchanan prepared to face events
as they developed. He had laid down certain general rules, a broad strat^y
to chart his course, but he would have to improvise the details of his
program. Of first importance, he determined to avoid initiating a war. He
would take no provocative action and would apply force only to repel a
military assault on the government. Second, he would observe his oath
and act only according to law. He would not usurp power and risk im-
peachment, giving Congress and the Republican leadership an excuse to
dodge their responsibility. He would ask Congress for additional means to
act under law; if denied such lawful authority and the public support that
legislation represented, he would act within existing law. Third, he would
keep open the door to compromise. This gesture would encourage southern
Unionists, invite the continuing loyalty of the border states, and permit
the president to act as a mediator. If war had to come, it would arise from
the obdurate refusal of Republicans to make any sacrifice for the Union or
from some rash, aggressive act of the secessionists. The Buchanan Ad-
ministration would not start it.
367
28
CURSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS • 1860
"WE WILL HOLD THE FORTS"
The Charleston forts continued to pose the most perplexing problem for
the Administration. Major Anderson, working at top speed to put Fort
Moultrie in a condition of readiness, reported at the end of November that
he had nearly completed this task. But he still feared an assault from
Charleston which would be hard to withstand because of a series of sand
hills to the north from which sharp-shooters might fire directly into the fort.
He had already started to level these hills. He asked Floyd's permission
to repair Castle Pinckney and garrison it lightly with troops from Fort
Moultrie. Floyd vetoed the shift of troops, but approved the employment
of civilians to repair Castle Pinckney. By this time Fort Sumter had been
sufficiently completed to receive a garrison of one company, and Anderson
asked the War Department to assign such a force.1
During the last week of November, Buchanan called Floyd to
the State Department. Black and Cass left when Floyd arrived, and the
president then told him that he had decided to reinforce the Charleston
forts. "I would rather have my throat cut, sir," he said, "than have Fort
Moultrie seized by South Carolina. You must & shall send troops forth-
with." Floyd said he would risk his honor and his life that South Carolina
would not molest the forts. "That is all very well," responded Buchanan,
"but , . . does that secure the forts?"2 Floyd, who suspected the influence
of his northern colleagues, persuaded Buchanan to defer action until both
of them talked with General Scott. Floyd kter confided to Trescot that he
would "cut off his right hand" before he would sign any order to reinforce
the forts and would resign if Buchanan persisted in his course, but he would
resist any attempt of South Carolina to seize the forts. Cobb and Thompson
held the same views, he said.
Trescot wrote this information to Governor Gist, warning him
that Buchanan feared seizure of the forts at any moment and intended to
strengthen them to resist attack. Trescot urged Gist to pledge South
368
CURSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS • 1860
Carolina to inaction as the only means of preventing the movement of
additional troops. Gist replied on November 29 by two letters, one appoint-
ing Trescot an unofficial agent of South Carolina to communicate with the
Administration, and the other empowering him to assure Buchanan that
"everything is now quiet and will remain so until the ordinance [of seces-
sion] is passed, if no more soldiers or munitions of war are sent on." The
governor added that he would "use all the military power of the state to
prevent any increase of troops in these garrisons" and invited Trescot to
show his letter to Buchanan. This he did.
In view of these developments, Buchanan asked Trescot to carry
an advance copy of his message to Governor Gist. After a long conversa-
tion with the president, Trescot felt that Buchanan's aim at the moment
was to persuade the Carolinians to postpone secession at least until March 4
and to convince them that he would maintain a status quo at the forts if
South Carolina would stay in the Union. When Trescot brought this
report to Gist, the governor told him to reply that "no scheme of policy,
however plausible, could induce delay until the 4th of March, either in
deference to Mr. Buchanan's position or with a view to the cooperation of
other States."3
On the day that the message went to Congress, Buchanan met
with the Cabinet to discuss Anderson's request, which had just arrived,
for men, ammunition, and supplies.4 When the Cabinet divided on the
question, Buchanan put off mating a decision, for it had now become clear
that the Cabinet would break up whatever the answer, and this the president
wanted to delay until he had news of Trescot's visit with Gist.
Anderson grew increasingly apprehensive of attack and multiplied
his reports of danger during the early weeks of December. State troops
drilled constantly in the city, he said, and openly boasted of their intent
to take Fort Moultrie.5 He had ordered repair work to begin on Castle
Pinckney and in order to protect workmen there and at Moultrie, had
prepared a requisition to draw 100 muskets with cartridge belts and ammuni-
tion from the Charleston arsenal. Col. Huger at the arsenal would not
issue these arms without orders directly from the War Department, and
wrote to Floyd for authority. Huger's inquiry reached Washington on
December 6 and soon became public knowledge, as there was no security
of information going into or out of Charleston. Floyd replied to Anderson
that "the increase of the force under your command . . . would . . . judging
from the recent excitement produced on account of an anticipated increase
... but add to that excitement and might lead to serious results," and he
informed Col. Huger that authority to supply arms to the forts would be
"deferred for the present."6
On the same day Floyd tried to relieve Anderson's nearly in-
tolerable situation by sending Major Don Carlos Buell from Washington
369
JAMES BUCHANAN
to explain to him the position of the Administration and to give him
"explanatory" orders. Floyd did not put these in writing, nor did he inform
Buchanan of the exact conversation. At Fort Moultrie, a few days later,
Anderson and Buell both agreed that the instructions ought to be put in
writing for Floyd's positive approval and drew up the following memo-
randum on December 11: "You are carefully to avoid every act which
would needlessly tend to provoke aggression. ... But you are to hold
possession of the forts in this harbor, and if attacked you are to defend
yourself to the last extremity. The smallness of your force will not permit
you, perhaps, to occupy more than one of the three forts, but an attack or
an attempt to take possession of any of them will be regarded as an act of
hostility, and you may then put your command into either of them which
you may deem most proper, to increase its power of resistance. You are
also authorized to take similar steps whenever you have tangible evidence
of a design to proceed to a hostile act."7 They sent this note to the War
Department, and Floyd authenticated it. Of this exchange Buchanan
knew only that Anderson had been instructed to act defensively and hold
the forts.
SWIFTLY CHANGING CIRCUMSTANCES
South Carolina had elected delegates to its secession convention on
December 6, and two days later the members of the South Carolina Con-
gressional delegation at Washington called on Buchanan. The meeting
started on an awkward note because the southerners believed that Buchanan
had approved sending reinforcements to Anderson, and Buchanan believed
that the Charlestonians intended shortly to assault Fort Moultrie. The
Carolinians— John McQueen, William Porcher Miles, M. L. Bonham, W. W,
Boyce, and Lawrence M. Keitt— expressed their desire to reach some agree-
ment with Buchanan which would prevent bloodshed until secession had
been proclaimed. After that, the independent nation of South Carolina
would send commissioners to Washington to discuss the future. Buchanan
told his callers to put whatever they wished to recommend in writing.
He told them that "he would collect the revenues at all hazards," avowed
"his determination to obey the laws," and bitterly denounced the in-
gratitude of South Carolina in rushing out of the Union before she had
been hurt. When someone asked him if he would use force to execute
the laws, he responded, "I will obey the laws. I am no warrior — I am a
man of peace — but I will obey the laws."8
On the same day, Buchanan got Howell Cobb's note of resignation
from the Cabinet. This was not a surprise, but no less a blow for that.
Cobb had made up his mind to resign shortly after Lincoln's election but
had postponed action and continued his work during the last month with
370
CURSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS • 1860
a good deal of embarrassment.9 Black forced him to the wall by proposing
that both of them confront Buchanan and state their respective positions
on secession. If Buchanan supported secession, Black said he would resign
in five minutes; if he opposed it, Cobb would resign.10 Cobb actually
resigned on December 8. "The President and myself parted in the most
friendly spirit," he wrote his wife. "We both see & feel the necessity &
both regret that it should be so."
Cobb's resignation hurt Buchanan much more than he admitted
at the moment. One of his friends wrote, "If 'old Buck* loves anybody in
the world, that man is Gov. Cobb He spoke of the Gov. in great kind-
ness, but with sorrow." The President believed Cobb had made a great
mistake and "believed firmly Georgia would never secede." Harriet said
she thought Cobb was making "the greatest mistake of his life."11 Cobb
had nourished Buchanan's expectation that Georgia would stand as a firm
bastion against secession in the deep South. Now both Cobb and Georgia
were gone, and the loss would be much more serious than anything which
might happen around Charleston. Buchanan appointed Philip F. Thomas
of Maryland, commissioner of patents, to the Treasury.12
On December 10 the South Carolina Congressmen came back to
the White House with their statement about the Charleston forts. This
document expressed the belief of the signers that South Carolina would not
molest the forts until some "amicable arrangement" had been made between
the state and the federal government, "provided that no reinforcements
shall be sent into those forts, and their relative military status shall remain
as at present." Buchanan did not like the word "provided" and refused to
restrict his freedom of action by such a guarantee, particularly since the
delegation had no official status and could not bind anyone to the terms of
the letter. He stated that although it was his policy not to alter the status
quo, he could pledge nothing. The South Carolinians told him that the
words "military status" meant that the transfer of the Moultrie garrison to
Sumter would be the e<piivalent of a reinforcement and would be the signal
for war on the forts. Buchanan made no comment on this clarification but
said, as they were leaving, "After all, this is a matter of honor among
gentlemen; I do not know that any paper or writing is necessary; we under-
stand each other." The delegation wanted more than a verbal statement
and asked what might happen if Buchanan changed his mind and did send
troops. "Then I would first return the paper," he answered.18 After they
had left, Buchanan took the paper and wrote on it his recollection of the
verbal exchange.
Why did Buchanan change his policy from a determination to
garrison the forts at the end of November to a policy of maintaining the
status quo on December 10? Cobb's resignation provided the answer. So
long as Buchanan could count on Georgia, he could deal strongly with
371
JAMES BUCHANAN
South Carolina as an isolated pocket of disunion without provoking a
general reaction. North Carolina and Georgia would bracket her with
Union defenders. But with Georgia lost, such a policy would spread the
secession movement instead of localizing it. The new situation required a
new approach. "What is right and what is practicable are two very different
things," he observed.14
If December 10 produced a spongy modus vivendi between the
Administration and the secessionists, the next day brought events that
were hard and sharp as flint. On that day Buchanan parted company with
his chief advisors on both sides. Secretary of State Cass resigned because
he believed "that additional troops should be sent to reinforce the forts in
Charleston."15 Senators Gwin and Slidell called a few hours later to
remonstrate against Buchanan's refusal to promise not to reinforce the
forts. Buchanan called them disunionists and expressed his regret that
he had so long listened to their advice. They left in anger, never again to
communicate with him except as enemies.16
Buchanan was very much surprised at the resignation of Cass
and thought it "remarkable on account of the cause he assigned for it."17
But he quickly accepted it, to Cass's chagrin, and told Black that he con-
sidered it not as a calamity "but rather as a good riddance." Black as well
as Buchanan attributed the resignation not to a difference of opinion but
to Cass's wish to be "outside when the structure should begin to tumble."18
The next day Cass asked for reconsideration, but the president said the
matter was closed. On December 17, Buchanan appointed Black to the
State Department and moved Assistant Attorney General Edwin M. Stanton
to the top position. People who had observed Stanton in action on govern-
ment business in California had warned both Buchanan and Black not to
trust him, but they could find no one else who knew so well the background
of important land cases then pending before the Supreme Court.
These events discouraged not only Buchanan but also the whole
nation, for it began to be clear that the simultaneous break of both Cass
and Slidell with the Administration foreshadowed the end. These men
were not the "partizans" or the extremists; they were the moderates.
Therefore, if Cass found Buchanan's policy too "southern" and Slidell
thought it too "northern," what course could Buchanan follow? Thompson
said that gloom and depression overwhelmed the capital — "no dinners, no
parties, everybody looks sad." "You will read the President's proclamation
for fasting and prayer on the 4th of Jan. — that tells whether he sees the
danger or not."19 Buchanan's appeal for a day of prayer gave rise to little
except a round of new jokes.20
Sunday morning after the Cabinet changes, Washington society
was shocked by news of the death of Secretary Holt. People exclaimed to
each other, "did you ever see such a fatality attending the administration,
372
CURSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS • 1860
two resignations and a death in a week." The wild rumor was dispersed
when, lo, Holt appeared at his office on Monday morning.21
The day after Cass resigned, General Scott at last came to Wash-
ington. Buchanan had received no word from him on defense of the forts
since the famous "Views" of October 29 and 30. On December 14 Scott
conferred with Lyman Trumbull, who assured the old general that Buchanan
had joined the traitors, was plotting the surrender of Fort Moultrie, and
ought to be "gibbeted."22 The next day, Scott urged the president to send
a force of 300 men to Fort Moultrie immediately. Buchanan pointed out
that this advice came two weeks too late, and that General Scott knew at the
time he made this recommendation that it must be rejected. The president
could not have complied with it "without at once reversing his entire policy,
and without a degree of inconsistency amounting almost to self-stultifica-
tion."23 Buchanan's mail indicated that the country solidly supported this
view. From Boston came the word: "The first re-inforcement sent there
would be the signal of war, & you would be put in the position of initiating it
and your successor be able to carry it on without responsibility for its
origin."24 A Georgian wrote, "re-inforcing Anderson would as certainly
have produced a collision between the Federal and State Governments . . .
as there is a God in Heaven."26 Congressmen gave him the same advice.
Secretary Thompson chose this moment to make a strange request
of the president. The State of Mississippi had appointed him an agent to
visit North Carolina to discuss the secession movement, and Thompson
wished Buchanan's approval of the mission, offering to resign if the presi-
dent opposed his going. Buchanan suffered heavy condemnation at the
time and for years afterward for allowing Thompson to make this journey
while he was still a member of the Cabinet, for it outwardly appeared as
if the president were actively promoting the secession movement. Buchanan
explained that he had approved "only under the belief that [Thompson's]
mission was to prevent, not to precipitate secession."26 Thompson had
disagreed with Buchanan's message, insisting that a "right" of secession
did exist and expressing his determination to follow his state if it should
secede. But he thought that the "right" came into existence only when
sufficient cause existed to justify revolution, and that there was no such
reason yet. He strongly opposed hasty action or separate action by any
state; he was a cooperationist. Before there was clear justification for
secession, no southern state ought to secede. With cause, all should go
out. This was Thompson's message to North Carolina 27
If the Thompson trip had not convinced many that Buchanan
had gone over to secession, the course of the Washington Constitution,
edited by William M. Browne, would have done so. This journal acted as
the "Administration organ," and received favored treatment in public
printing contracts for playing the party tunes. Browne became a red-hot
373
JAMES BUCHANAN
secessionist who labelled the election of Lincoln "a concentrated expression
of the deadly hatred of the North to me and all I value."28 Assistant Post-
master General Horatio King complained to Black on December 14, "I am
amazed that some decided action is not taken by the Government to cut
itself entirely loose from disunion and disunionists. Look at the Con-
stitution newspaper of to-day Its whole bearing is for disunion; and, say
what you will, the Government is held, and will be held, in great degree
responsible for it."29
King told John A. Dix of New York that "the course of the
Constitution is infamous, but the President, I presume, has no means of
controlling it."30 King complained that the friends of the Union seemed
to stay away from Buchanan in the belief that the Constitution "speaks the
sentiments of the President, which is certainly not the fact."31
Buchanan, sensitive to executive interference with the freedom
of the press, had Browne insert notices .that the newspaper's editorials did
not represent the Administration views. At length, on Christmas Day,
Buchanan rebuked Browne for an editorial favoring secession, and advised
him that he had withdrawn support from the paper. Still, most of January
had elapsed before all government patronage to the Constitution had been
cut off. Buchanan desperately needed accurate reporting of Administration
policy in friendly newspapers of national circulation. Of these there were
very few, notably the Philadelphia Pennsylvania and the Boston Courier.
After he had had to abandon the Constitution, the president wrote to
Bennett of the New York Herald, asking him as a patriotic citizen to publi-
cize the compromise proposals advocated by the Administration.32
Suspicion that Buchanan was in league with the secessionists
brought a furious storm of public denunciation upon the president.
Abraham Lincoln received numerous warnings. "Buchanan is today as
truly a traitor as was Benedict Arnold." "I hope you are preparing— in
case that cowardly old imbecile & traitor Buchanan shall go on, & mischief
result — to strike out & sharply for his impeachment. If ever a man
deserved it, he does. If ever hanging were a proper use to put a man to
for his political sins, he really deserves it." "What an ignominious exit
from public life of James Buchanan!"33 Northern Democrats wrote the
same sentiments. One was "in favor of hanging Buchanan, his
organ grinder, [and] the Sec'y of War." Another warned that Buchanan
should never plan to come back to Pennsylvania. "Our people will not
treat him with respect." Many called him a traitor who favored secession.34
Greeley's New York Tribune ran a headlined editorial on December 17
which stated that the president was insane, and others reported that he was
a coward, an imbecile, and ill from sheer terror. Cass, perhaps to justify
his resignation, told people that Buchanan had become "pale with fear"
374
CURSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS • 1860
and divided his time equally between praying and crying. But guests at a
wedding reception on December 20 which the president attended found
him proclaiming that he had never enjoyed better health and looking
the part.35
In the midst of the festivities, when a commotion started in the
hall, Buchanan turned his head and said to a guest, "Madam, do you
suppose the house is on fire?" She went to inquire. In the hallway she
found Lawrence Keitt "leaping in the air, shaking a paper over his head,
and exclaiming, Thank God! Oh, thank God!' . . . South Carolina has
seceded! Here's the telegram. I feel like a boy let out from school."
On hearing this report Buchanan called for his carriage, and drove back
to the White House. There he found a telegram waiting for him from
South Carolina's new governor, F. W. Pickens, confirming Keitt's report.36
The announcement was not exactly news to Buchanan. He
knew that action probably would come on the 20th, and during the past
week had sent Caleb Cushing to South Carolina to make a last ditch plea
for delay. Cushing had informed him that the convention would vote
for secession. What worried the president more was a letter from Governor
Pickens, dated December 17 and presented to him on the morning of the
20th, demanding that he authorize South Carolina "to take possession of
Fort Sumter immediately."37 The courier wanted an instant reply, but
Buchanan told him to come back the next day. In the meantime, W. H.
Trescot learned of the contents of the letter. His resignation as Assistant
Secretary of State had been accepted only that morning, and he now acted as
a spokesman for South Carolina. He saw that Pickens's demand terminated
the status quo policy that Buchanan had informally stated on December 10
to the South Carolina Congressmen and would give the president practically
a mandate to garrison all the forts. He sought out Slidejl, Jefferson Davis,
and Congressmen Bonham and McQueen, and all telegraphed Pickens to
withdraw his letter.38
Buchanan drafted his reply that night. He would not surrender
any forts or public property in South Carolina, he wrote. "If South
Carolina should attack any of these forts, she will then become the assailant
in a war against the United States. It will not then be a question of
coercing a state Between independent governments, if one possesses
a fortress within the limits of another, and the latter should seize it ... this
would not only be a just cause of war, but the actual commencement of
hostilities."39 By morning Pickens had withdrawn his letter and Buchanan
did not send the reply he had prepared.
This incident had grown out of another altercation over the
delivery of arms from the arsenal at Charleston. Captain Foster, engineer
officer in charge of construction at Castle Pinckney and at Fort Sumter,
feared mob action against his workmen and wanted muskets for them. As
375
JAMES BUCHANAN
the War Department had never sent authorization of the request of
December 6 for 100 muskets, he went to the arsenal on the 17th and showed
a storekeeper the old order of November 1 for 40 muskets— the order
which had caused the earlier change of command at Charleston. The
storekeeper delivered the guns, and Foster divided them between Castle
Pinckney and Fort Sumter. The news enraged the people of Charleston,
who demanded the delivering up of Sumter. Pickens wrote his letter to
Buchanan that day, under the apprehension that the order had originated
in Washington, and thus terminated the "gentleman's agreement." When
Col. Huger learned of the transaction he demanded the return of the
muskets, but Anderson refused to deliver them. The next day the South
Carolina authorities set up a 24-hour patrol of Fort Sumter by gunboats.
When news of these events reached Washington, Floyd immediately
ordered Anderson to return the guns to the arsenal, and by the end of the
day conditions were back to normal. The incident made shockingly clear
how tenuous was the December 10th "understanding" and how slender a
thread restrained the sword of war.40
Only now, the day after secession, did Buchanan learn of the
orders which Buell had written out for Anderson ten days before. At a
Cabinet meeting on December 21 to consider afresh the position of Ander-
son, Buchanan asked exactly what orders had been sent to Moultrie. Floyd
did not even remember and had to send for his files at the War Office.
When BuelTs memorandum had been found, Floyd read it and stated that
it conformed to his verbal instructions to Buell. Buchanan did not like
the sentence which directed Anderson to defend himself "to the last
extremity," feeling that this called for a needless sacrifice of life, but other-
wise agreed that the directions were sound. The Cabinet approved, and
Black then wrote out a revised copy including a statement that Anderson
should "exercise sound military discretion5' and not make a useless sacrifice
of his men. Floyd signed this, making it a formal Department order, and
sent it by courier to Anderson at Fort Moultrie.41
While the new orders were on their way to Charleston, a letter
from Anderson of December 22 was speeding toward Washington. After
the proclamation of secession, Anderson momentarily expected an attack
on Fort Moultrie. He had five days more work to complete his temporary
defenses, but, he wrote, "God knows whether the South Carolinians will
defer their attempt to take this work so long as that." He reported that
the patrol boats had orders to prevent any military occupation of Sumter.
So many civilian workmen there had begun to wear the blue cockade,
he said, that construction ought to be halted and the fort left in the charge
of a lieutenant and a few picked men.42 Buchanan also heard, on this day,
that commissioners from South Carolina would arrive in Washington on
December 26 to discuss the problem of the forts.
376
CURSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS • 1860
THE CABINET EXPLODES
Before the nerve-wracking 22nd of December had ended, Buchanan learned
of a Cabinet scandal so shocking that it forced every other concern into
the background. Floyd's easy-going management had at last brought
disaster growing out of his continuing practice, against Buchanan's explicit
orders, of writing "acceptances" for Russell, Majors and Waddell, the army
contractors. A relative of Floyd, one Godard Bailey, worked in the office
of Secretary Thompson and had access to negotiable bonds worth $1000
each which the government held in trust for the Indians. Russell needed
money and hit upon the scheme of offering Bailey Floyd's "acceptances"
in return for the bonds. When Congress paid Russell, he would pick up
the acceptances and return the bonds. Bailey either wanted to help Floyd
or had been offered some inducement by Russell, but whatever the reason,
he cooperated until $870,000 had left the Interior Department. The bonds
soon came on the market and to Secretary Thompson's attention. He
learned the facts from Bailey, who seemed unaware that he had been doing
anything wrong, and then set out to find Russell. Within several days he
had them both in jail and then broke the disgraceful news to Buchanan.
The press reported the story in the most damaging and sensational way.
The Covode Committee, it now appeared, had been on the right track, but
had quit too soon. As the investigation developed, the public learned
(whether with truth or not, no one could be sure) that half a dozen New
Yorkers and quite a few Washington officials had been in on the scheme,
and that several who might have "leaked" had been paid to hold their
tongues. The press also reported that Riggs and Company, Buchanan's
bankers, had bought six of the filched bonds for the president's private
account.43
Buchanan had no alternative but to fire Floyd, but he so hated to
do it that he asked Black to convey his request for the resignation. Black
declined, and Buchanan finally persuaded Breckinridge to do it. But Floyd
angrily refused to resign, and Buchanan had not the heart to dismiss him
on Christmas Day.
Apparently, Floyd had known nothing about Bailey's trading and
he had certainly derived no profit from it. True, he had disobeyed Buchanan
in order to provide for the army whose needs Congress had persistently
ignored, but he felt he deserved praise rather than blame for risking his
administrative neck to care for the nation's troops. The district court
thought otherwise and planned to prosecute him for conspiracy to defraud
the government.
Floyd for some weeks had been quite ill and the bond affair com-
pleted his breakdown. On the day he first learned about it he ordered his
ordnance chief, Captain Maynadier, to send a shipment of heavy guns from
377
JAMES BUCHANAN
the Pittsburgh armory to some unfinished forts in Texas. The charitable
view of this was that Floyd, who never had much knowledge of the detailed
operations of his department, issued this order without any treasonable
intent and as a matter of routine. The less charitable view was that Floyd,
nervously awaiting the visit of the South Carolina commissioners and
knowing that the bond scandal must terminate his Cabinet career, gave way
to despair and decided on the spur of the moment to cast his lot with seces-
sion. He abruptly changed his stand during the last week of December
and 'violently denounced in Cabinet the very policies he had formerly
supported. It seems most likely that the impact of the Bailey business,
his poor health, and the crisis over the forts combined to create in his heart
an utter detestation of Buchanan, the Administration, and the Union.
Floyd spent Christmas Day in an emotional torment, but he
retained enough balance to reject in anger a scheme proposed to him by
Senator Wigfall to kidnap Buchanan and put Breckinridge into the presi-
dency. At Cabinet meeting the next day, Floyd, who had come uninvited,
lost control of himself and spoke loudly and discourteously to Buchanan.
Black and Stanton did not attend this session, which was perhaps fortunate,
for Floyd had come to hate the sight of them; but Thompson was present
and he pitched into Floyd for involving the Interior Department in the bond
scandal. Thompson said he would prosecute to the limit of the law every-
one connected with the affair, and he left no doubt that he thought Floyd
was among the guilty.44
Buchanan wanted the Cabinet to consider the treatment of the
South Carolina commissioners who had just arrived in Washington, but
first another problem had to be settled. Black had received telegrams from
worried citizens of Pittsburgh protesting the shipment of cannon from the
local gun works to the South. Inquiry had revealed that the Texas forts
were quite unprepared to receive them, and the transaction aroused
suspicion. The Pittsburghers thought it plain treason. Black told Buchanan
of Floyd's orders on Christmas Day, and the president instantly cancelled
the shipment. No guns left Pittsburgh, but Floyd considered Buchanan's
act a direct slap at him.45 The Cabinet then agreed that it would be per-
missible for Buchanan to confer with the South Carolina commissioners
as "private gentlemen," and perhaps to submit to Congress a proposition
which they might make.
William H. Trescot, acting as a go-between, scheduled a procedural
meeting for December 27. On the morning of that fateful day news arrived
which created wild excitement. Major Anderson had just spiked the guns
of Moultrie and had moved his entire command into Fort Sumter under
cover of darkness in a brilliant military maneuver carried out under the
very eyes of the South Carolina patrol boats and the state militia pickets.
The South Carolina commissioners cancelled their visit to Buchanan and
378
CURSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS • 1860
waited for more information. Trescot hurried to Floyd's office and obtained
from him a promise that he would promptly order Anderson hack to
Moultrie as soon as he received official confirmation of the reports. Floyd
immediately telegraphed Anderson that he did not believe the news,
"because there is no order for any such movement," but Anderson replied,
"The telegram is correct."46
While messages sped hack and forth, the southern leaders in
Washington headed for the White House. Jefferson Davis arrived first
and broke the news to Buchanan. "Now, Mr. President," he said, "you
are surrounded with blood and dishonor on all sides." According to
Trescot, Buchanan "was standing by the mantelpiece, crushing up a cigar
in the palm of his hand. ... He sat down as Colonel Davis finished, and
exclaimed, 'My God, are calamities never to come singly! I call God to
witness, you gentlemen more than anybody know that this is not only
without but against my orders. It is against my policy.' " Senators Hunter,
Lane, Yulee, even Slidell called and bore down on Buchanan to order
Anderson out of Sumter or face general secession and war. Buchanan
paced nervously, telling his excited callers to keep calm and trust him.
He gave evidence of sympathizing with their position for it seemed to him
at the moment as if Anderson had ruptured the "gentleman's agreement."
It certainly was a move the president had not anticipated. But for all his
soothing words, he gave the southerners no promise. They left not know-
ing what Buchanan intended to do. He himself did not know.
The afternoon Cabinet meeting ran over into the night. Black,
Holt, and Stanton aggressively defended Anderson's action. "Good," said
Black. "It is in precise accordance with his orders."47 "It is not," said
Hoyd. The orders were sent for and read— the latest ones in Black's
handwriting, signed by Floyd and approved by the Cabinet only five days
before. Floyd had brought a paper with him containing his objections to
Anderson's move and now read it in a "loud and discourteous" tone, but
he got no support from anyone except Thompson. Toucey said little.
Floyd asserted that the "solemn pledges of this Government have been
violated" and that federal troops should now be withdrawn from all the
Charleston forts. Black, with the orders signed by Floyd in his hand,
turned livid and, waving the paper in Floyd's face, shouted: "There never
was a moment in the history of England when a minister of the Crown
could have proposed to, surrender a military post which might be defended,
without bringing his head to the ifoci!"48
The president tried to calm his colleagues, for floyd by this time
had risen out of his seat in nearly uncontrollable rage. Buchanan believed
that Anderson's orders justified his maneuver. The Cabinet had assigned
the major "military discretion" and had authorized him to take defensive
action in the face of "tangible evidence of a design to attack him." His
379
JAMES BUCHANAN
report of a few days before had offered such evidence, though no hint
that he intended to transfer the troops. Buchanan said he would not
order Anderson to return to Moultrie, but he expressed deep concern over
the settlement of the question of responsibility. Neither the president nor
the Secretary of War had commanded the transfer, but Buchanan and the
Cabinet had agreed to the permissive orders under which Anderson could
justify his act.
Floyd's sharp difference with the Cabinet provided him the
excuse he needed to resign on the pretext of a conflict of principles, rather
than to be discharged for malversion in office and conspiracy to defraud
the government. Many in Washington believed that he had purposely
changed his views to accomplish this result. One wrote that Anderson's
action had been "a happy chance" for Floyd, and would "bring the mantle
of charity to his aid."49
Before the commissioners called on December 28, Buchanan
received news that South Carolina had just seized Forts Moultrie, Castle
Pinckney, and the U. S. Customhouse. There was some doubt whether
Anderson's move had violated the December 10th agreement, but do doubt
at all that this act of South Carolina broke it. This put the commissioners
on the defensive.
Buchanan had agreed to see the South Carolinians "only as
private gentlemen." At their interview, the only one which was to be held,
they informed the president excitedly and with asperity that they would
not negotiate with him until he ordered all federal troops out of the Charles-
ton area. Buchanan replied that he could issue no such order. He might,
however, refer to Congress any communication they might wish to give him.
The president reported that he had said very little but had listened with
patience.60 The commissioners then withdrew and that night prepared a
statement which they sent to the White House the next morning. Their
letter had the tone of a threat. It suggested that South Carolina had made
a serious mistake "to trust to your honor rather than its own power," and
warned that unless the troops were withdrawn, affairs would speedily come
to a "bloody issue."51
The Cabinet meeting of December 29 was probably the most
important of Buchanan's career, and certainly it was for him the most
agonizing, for he held in his mind hopes and plans, privately wrought, that
his colleagues did not yet know. This story, which came to its climax on
December 30, will be told shortly. Buchanan wrote a reply to the Carolina
commissioners which Black, Holt, and Stanton refused to accept, feeling
that it granted too much and demanded too little. Although this paper
has disappeared, its contents may be reconstructed from the objections
made to it in the Cabinet. Buchanan, in his own memoir, states that had the
commissioners "simply requested that Major Anderson might be restored
380
CURSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS • 1860
to his former position at Fort Moultrie, upon a guarantee from the State
that neither it nor the other forts or public property should be molested;
this, at the moment, might have been worthy of serious consideration."52
Certainly this was the proposal Buchanan intended to make. And why this?
Because he had underway a secret negotiation with the president-elect to
obtain his backing for a national constitutional convention, and he expected
an answer from Lincoln at any hour. Buchanan later wrote that he had
held out the idea of submitting a proposal from South Carolina to Congress,
not in any hope of its acceptance, but because he knew Congress would
waste some time on it. "This was, to gain time ... to bring the whole
subject before the representatives of the people" in a general convention.53
If he promised enough to South Carolina to keep matters fluid for just a
day or two more, he might solve the problem. With this hope he wrote his
first answer to the commissioners.
The Cabinet argued the question all afternoon, but the president
was inflexible and determined to submit the paper as he had written it,
against the will of all except Thompson and Toucey. Black went home to
spend a "miserable and restless night." The next morning he made the
rounds of the Cabinet expressing his determination to resign unless the
reply should be changed. Toucey immediately reported this decision to
the White House and Buchanan called Black away from a conference with
Stanton. "Do you, too, talk of leaving me?" he asked. Black stated his
position firmly. "Your answer to the commissioners leaves you no cause;
it sweeps the ground from under our feet; it places you where no man can
stand with you, and where you cannot stand alone."54
Buchanan did not give up easily and argued at length, but at last
he gave in. "Here," he said to Black. "Take this paper and modify it to
suit yourself, but do it before the sun goes down." Before Black hurried
off, Buchanan added, "I cannot part with you. If you go, Stanton and Holt
will leave."55
"MR. LINCOLN, WILL YOU HELP?"
Although Buchanan did not want to lose his ministers, their threatened
resignation was not the only reason for his change of mind. For a month
Buchanan had been quietly trying to isolate South Carolina by forcing
conservative Republicans to endorse some kind of conciliatory measure.
Because of the confused party structure of Congress, decisive
action there seemed unlikely but not impossible. Unfortunately for com-
promise hopes, recent state elections showed that the Republicans would
lose some seats in the new Congress of December, 1861. A number of
Republicans thus believed that their party would benefit if some of the
381
JAMES BUCHANAN
southern states seceded. Without these southern lawmakers, the Republi-
cans would control the next Congress.
The House created a Committee of Thirty-three to report a
program of compromise on the sectional crisis. Its early meetings exposed
the facts that the Democrats could not agree among themselves and that
the Republicans did not want to settle current problems by compromise.
Its southern members wrote to South Carolina a week before secession that,
so far as they could see, "all hope of relief is extinguished."
The Senate delayed even talking about the secession movement
until December 18, two days before it became a fact. On that day Senator
John J. Crittenden of Kentucky, a Whig, presented a comprehensive plan
of compromise which became the center of national interest from then
until March 4. He proposed an extension of the Missouri Compromise line
prohibiting slavery to the north of it, but guaranteeing protection in
territories to the south; the admission of new states with or without slavery
as their constitutions should provide; no abolition of slavery in the District
of Columbia or of the local slave trade in the South; payment for fugitive
slaves; improvement in the enforcement of the Fugitive Slave Law; and
firm suppression of the overseas skve trade. The day South Carolina
seceded the Senate appointed a Committee of Thirteen to consider these
proposals to avert secession. The nation looked with hopeful anxiety to
the Senate Committee, for the Crittenden proposals had brought widespread
public approval, and the Committee personnel represented every geographic
sectidn and every important political viewpoint. Work was delayed until
December 24, however, because Seward was out of town. As chief repre-
sentative of the Republicans, his views would be essential, for he would
bring Lincoln's response to the Crittenden measures directly to the Com-
mittee.
By Christmastime Buchanan had despaired of any effective action
from Congress and decided to try a behind-the-scenes manipulation of
political and financial strings to force a statement from Lincoln. At first
he hoped that Lincoln would come to Washington for a face-to-face talk;
but the president-elect refused to leave Springfield, and Buchanan had to
work through agents.
Lincoln already agreed .with Buchanan on some aspects of seces-
sion. They both thought that it could be contained within a few states
and that these would probably return quietly to the Union in due course if
war could be averted. Buchanan could concur with Lincoln's statement of
December 17 that "it is the duty of the President, and other government
functionaries to run the machine as it is,"56 The real question was: by
what means could war be averted? Buchanan had faith in the Crittenden
plan, but if that should fail he intended to fall back upon the chief recom-
mendation of his message, a national constitutional convention. Would
382
CURSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS • 1860
Lincoln lend his support to this? Some leading Republicans thought he
would. Buchanan also began to hope so.
Thurlow Weed, editor of the Albany Evening Journal and a well-
known figure on Wall Street, had come out boldly for a restoration of
the Missouri Compromise line in his edition of November 24. People
assumed that this trial balloon had been released by Seward. From the
day Congress convened, Seward had been expressing his fear that five states
might secede and his belief that the Republicans would have to act to
prevent it. In the absence of any leadership from Lincoln, Seward hoped
to take the Republican helm and steer the party to a conservative course,
that is, to keep the door open to compromise and thus preserve peace. But
the Journal editorial raised such a storm among the radical Republicans
that Seward repudiated agency in it on December 5. Three days later
Lincoln offered him the State Department.
During the first two weeks of December Lincoln wrote many
letters declaring that he would not budge one jot on the subject of the
further extension of slavery, but die more Seward observed in Washington,
the more convinced he became that compromise alone could avert war,
and that the Republican party ought to participate in the effort. He had
his Cabinet post; he could now act more freely.
On December 10, Lincoln invited Weed to come to Springfield.
The next day Weed informed Lincoln of a plan to have Republican gover-
nors meet in New York on December 20 to discuss compromise measures
and promote harmony within the party. There was a clear hint of political
pressure in the announcement57 Seward conferred with Weed in Albany
on December 15 and 16 and told him to obtain Lincoln's assent to some
kind of Republican compromise proposal. On December 17 Weed's paper
came out a second time in favor of the Missouri line. This stand, on the
heels of Seward's repudiation of the idea, was so ill-timed and so defiant of
the Republican party policy that it caused widespread comment. What
was behind it? Seward certainly intended to force a statement from Lincoln
on the plan that Crittenden was just about to present to the Senate. Weed
would bring back the answer.68
New York City for the next week became the headquarters for
frantic compromise activity. The financiers and merchants who stood to
lose some $150,000,000 in long term notes owed them by the South became
thoroughly frightened by the news of secession, and a panic ensued. Politics
and finance united in New York in the persons of August Belmont, national
chairman for the Douglas Democrats; Samuel L. M. Barlow, a Buchanan
party leader; Thurlow Weed and others. Judah P. Benjamin, Louisiana
financier-politician, and Duff Green of South Carolina also figured in the
compromise efforts of the New York businessmen.
383
JAMES BUCHANAN
On the day of secession, several Republican governors met in
New York, Weed interviewed Lincoln, and Royal Phelps wrote to Buchanan
that Seward had just told him that the Republicans "are doing all in their
power to have the Personal Liberty laws repealed ... and that they are
willing for the sake of the peace of the Country, to have the territorial
question settled by the Missouri Compromise Bill running it to the Pacific."
Many of the most influential Whigs and Republicans had written Tom
Corwin, Chairman of the Committee of Thirty-three, "urging him to advo-
cate concessions." The New York Republicans were getting up a meeting
to "cut loose entirely from Greeley and the abolitionists." "These doings,"
he concluded, "are conducted very privately."59
Van Buren and Belmont wrote to Crittenden and Douglas that
the Republicans had decided to compromise on the Missouri principle.
The news was soon abroad, and the abolitionists bombarded Lincoln with
warnings. William Cullen Bryant wrote that Lincoln should beware of
"a plan manufactured in Wall Street" and that "the restoration of the
Missouri Compromise would disband the Republican party."60 Another
letter assured the president-elect that there were "multitudes here who will
plunge into blood to the horses bridles" to defend the Chicago Platform-
young men full of "a spirit of fierce rebellion against any compromise."61
Barlow had been conducting a vigorous correspondence with
southern leaders, particularly Slidell and Benjamin, counselling patience
and reason. The North had not elected Lincoln, he said, but the stupidity
of the Democrats; Lincoln would be powerless unless the southerners quit
Congress. Peaceful secession was a delusion. The North, in alarm, was
receding in horror from the results of abolitionism but if the South started
a revolution the North would unite solidly in opposition. A constitutional
convention should solve all the problems.62
Barlow told Benjamin that Weed's compromise articles had been
written by Seward; that the governors had agreed that the slavery issue
ought to be decided by the present Congress on the basis of the Crittenden
proposals; that Weed had gotten Lincoln's assent to this method of settle-
ment; that Lincoln had assured Weed that he would break with the aboli-
tionist faction of the party if necessary; and that the Missouri line proposal
would pass the House with the aid of the needed Republican votes. Seward,
Barlow said, would oppose this proposal in order to maintain the appearance
of party regularity but would nevertheless deliver enough Republican votes
to pass the measure. This report does not agree with Weed's recollections
but the discrepancies are less important than the fact that Barlow sent this
story to Benjamin on December 26. Important southern leaders had
assurance from a source they trusted that the Republicans, led as they
presumed by the conciliatory Seward, had committed themselves to an
adjustment.63
384
CURSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS • 1860
But affairs did not stand as Barlow reported. Lincoln had vetoed
the Crittenden plan and had given Weed written instructions to govern
Seward's course in the Committee of Thirteen. They constituted more an
insult than a compromise, considering the Committee personnel. Lincoln
said that Congress ought to pass a new fugitive slave law without the clause
which required private persons to assist in its execution, that all state laws
in conflict with federal laws "if there be such" ought to be repealed, and
that the Union ought to be preserved. Seward presented these terms to an
expectant Committee. Editor W. M. Browne wrote that Seward's talk
"almost made a disunionist out of Crittenden." Within the Committee,
all base for compromise had been wiped out.64
Buchanan had not entertained much hope that the Republicans
could be moved to accept the Missouri line. "I have no reason to believe,"
he wrote to Phelps on December 22, "that this is at present acceptable to
Northern Senators and representatives, though the tendency is in that
direction. They may arrive at this point when it is too late."66 But Seward's
capitulation to Lincoln, and Lincoln's apparent capitulation to the radicals
of his party dramatically changed the issue. The Union Democrats who
had continually urged compromise and who had been led by Seward to
expect help from him, now suddenly found their hopes dashed when they
were brightest. There had been as little warning of Seward's change of
position as of Anderson's. That they occurred simultaneously confirmed
the worst fears of the South. Compromise was dead, killed by false promises
of the Republicans and betrayal by the Administration.
Buchanan now considered the time ripe for his final effort. If
Lincoln would not compromise, if Congress would not compromise, would
the Republicans permit the people of the United States to express then-
views in a constitutional convention? This would not be a compromise; it
would be only a recognition of the validity of constitutional government.
He sent Duff Green to Springfield to ask Lincoln about a convention. Green
wrote back the night of his interview, Friday, December 28, that Lincoln
thought. that "the question on the amendments to the Constitution and
the questions submitted by Mr. Crittenden belonged to the people and
states in legislatures or conventions, and that he would be inclined not only
to acquiesce, but to give full force to their will thus expressed."66 Though
foggily phrased, this sounded like good news; Lincoln would back a con-
vention.
Lincoln had asked Green to call again at 9 o'clock the next
morning to receive a written statement which Green planned to telegraph
to Buchanan. Lincoln wrote the letter on Friday night but apparently did
not give it to Green on Saturday, for he had changed his mind. He sent
the letter to Senator Lyman Trumbull first, requesting him to deliver it to
Green if he approved its message. "I do not desire any amendment to the
385
JAMES BUCHANAN
Constitution," it read. But Lincoln would not permit this statement to be
made public unless "six of the twelve United States Senators from Georgia,
Alabama, Mississippi, Louisiana, Florida, and Texas shall sign their names
to what is written on this sheet below my name, and allow the whole to be
published together." The statement pledged the southern States "to
suspend all action for dismemberment of the Union" until the incoming
Administration had committed some act violating their rights,
No one has reported what Lincoln said at the second interview,
but it seems certain that he did not give Green any further encouragement.
This in itself should have told Green that the president-elect had backed
away from his statement of the previous day. Green had orders to tele-
graph Buchanan the moment he got a "satisfactory" response from Lincoln.
Did he telegraph his fears on Saturday or Sunday, or keep silence until
he got Lincoln's written statement? Either course meant bad news to
Buchanan.
It seems likely that by Sunday afternoon, December 30, Buchanan
had either learned from Green that Lincoln would not endorse a convention
or anticipated this result from Green's silence. Certainly if Lincoln, who
knew Buchanan's crisis as well as anyone, had not responded by Sunday
to Green's plea of Friday morning, he was not likely to respond favorably.
With these thoughts running through his mind, Buchanan guessed that he
would get no help from Lincoln. This opinion brought him to the end of
the first phase of his policy, his attempt to achieve some constructive
action to allay southern fears. He now embarked on the second phase and
told Black to rewrite the reply to the South Carolina commissioners.67
Buchanan soon learned the text of Lincoln's letter to Green. It
had been framed, he saw, to repel the pledge demanded of the South, thus
keeping secret Lincoln's rejection of a convention. Lincoln had quoted
copiously from the Chicago Platform and now asked the southerners to
suspend secession in return for an endorsement of the Republican articles
of faith. Buchanan could not repress a wry smile at such a transparent
"offer." Yet it helped him to interpret Lincoln. The man certainly had a
grip on practical politics. He had done exactly what Buchanan himself had
done in 1856 when called upon to answer difficult questions as spokesman
for a faction-ridden party — quoted the platform. Buchanan now recognized
that Lincoln did not dare to support any peaceful move which might settle
the crisis for fear of disrupting his own party. But Lincoln had significantly
emphasized a particular sentence from the Chicago Platform. "I denounce,"
he quoted, "the lawless invasion, by armed force, of the soil of any State
or Territory, no matter under what pretext, as the gravest of crimes." In
short, he could not afford to come out openly for compromise, but he did
not want war. This was language a politician could understand.
386
CURSED ARE THE PEACEMAKERS • 1860
Black and Stanton worked over the reply to the commissioners,
and on the basis of their recommendations Buchanan rewrote his own
draft, mostly by editing out the parts that Black had condemned.68 He held
his ground on the "gentleman's agreement," stating that he had never sent
reinforcements or authorized any alteration of the status of the forts. He
quoted the orders to Anderson and then wrote, "it is clear that Major
Anderson acted upon his own responsibility." His "first promptings" to
have Anderson return had been nullified by the summary seizure of the
forts by South Carolina, "without waiting or asking for any explanation."
Buchanan said he could find no ground for any grievance of South Carolina,
accused the state of stealing half a million dollars in federal property, and
stated his intention "to defend Fort Sumter . . . against hostile attacks,
from Whichever quarter they may come."69 The stunned commissioners
replied to this on January 2 in an angry blast which the Cabinet termed "so
violent, unfounded and disrespectful" that Buchanan returned it with the
endorsement: "This paper, just presented to the President, is of such a
character that he declines to receive it."70
The simultaneous failure of parleys with the Republicans and
with the secessionists unnerved Buchanan more than anything that had
yet happened. Importuned, threatened, warned, begged, pushed, pulled,
and shoved in every direction, bombarded by plans and propositions until
he resentfully complained that he had not time even to say his prayers, the
president at length became distraught and despaired of achieving a solution.
His two chief hopes— that conservative Republicans might give a little help
and that his erstwhile southern friends might continue to trust his pacific
intentions— both blew up in his face at once. He believed that he and his
advisors represented the views of a vast majority of Americans, but the
Administration no longer spoke for any political party. The only two
organized parties, the inflexible secessionists and the unyielding Republi-
cans, controlled the issue. Their leaders offered no quarter. Their
representatives in Congress united their votes to prevent the registration
of public opinion in a convention and to prevent the President of the
United States from obtaining any legal means to handle the crisis. There
was no New Year's Eve jollification at the White House, December 31, 1860.
387
29
FORTY DAYS AND FORTY NIGHTS • 1861
THE STAR OF THE WEST
During the first weeks of 1861 Buchanan leaned heavily upon the advice of
Black, Holt, Toucey, and Scott. At the Cabinet meeting of Wednesday,
January 2, they considered again the subject of reinforcing Major Anderson.
Scott had written a few days before that he could instantly supply 150
recruits and ample foodstuffs to Sumter and recommended that orders to
reinforce be issued. He also urged Buchanan to garrison Forts Taylor,
Jefferson, Pickens, Jackson, and others along the Gulf Coast. Some of
these, which controlled access to the Mississippi, could be taken, he said,
by "a rowboat of pirates."1 On New Year's Day South Carolina had cut
off mail service to Fort Sumter, seized the lighthouse in the harbor, and
announced that all United States ships were excluded from the vicinity.
It had been during the discussion of these matters that the final reply of
the South Carolina commissioners had been delivered and indignantly
rejected. As the president's secretary, Adam Glossbrenner, left the room
to return the commissioners' letter, Buchanan exclaimed, "It is now over,
and reinforcements must be sent."2 Secretary Thompson later claimed not
to have heard this statement, but Toucey and Stanton said they did, and
Holt must have, for he immediately acted upon it.8
Buchanan, having decided to reinforce Anderson, left the tactical
arrangements to Holt, Scott, and Toucey with the understanding that they
should observe the utmost secrecy in preparations. They hoped to send
the reinforcements in without raising an alarm and encountering resistance.
Buchanan and Toucey strongly urged the use of the navy's Z7* 5. 5. Brooklyn,
but General Scott insisted that a ship of lighter draft should be chosen to
prevent grounding on the bar. The sidewheel merchant steamer, Star of
the West, was therefore chartered, quietly loaded with foodstuffs at New
York, and then ordered to proceed down the bay to the Narrows where she
took on recruits out of sight of the public eye. The men were ordered
388
FORTY DAYS AND FORTY NIGHTS • 1861
below decks in order that the steamer might appear to chance observers as a
commercial vessel. She weighed anchor on January 5.4
On the same day Buchanan got further word from Major Anderson
that he considered his command safe in its present position and that the
government could reinforce him at its leisure. On hearing this, Scott, with
Buchanan's approval, sent word posthaste to stop the relief expedition, but
the ship had sailed shortly before the countermanding orders arrived.
That night a visitor, after spending an hour with Buchanan, reported,
"I have never seen him so solemn. ... He remarked that nothing but the
interposition of all-wise Providence could save our Country — that he had
despaired of being able to do anything himself."5
Rumors of the expedition soon got into print. In fact, to expect to
carry out any government maneuver in secrecy was almost a fool's hope.
No war existed; no censorship or martial law had been proclaimed; and
government officers felt within their rights to report to their political
friends what was going on. Seward, for example, had just assured Lincoln
that he had "gotten a position in which I can see what is going on in the
Councils of the President." Stanton had agreed to "leak" to him. Others
wrote, "I am not sure who are my friends anymore."6
The pro-Union Cabinet members kept Thompson and Thomas in
the dark about the relief expedition, but they learned of it through the press.
Thompson immediately resigned the Interior Department. He had told
Black at the end of the Cabinet meeting of January 3 that he would have
to do so if Buchanan sent reinforcements. On the day the Star of the West
sailed, he had telegraphed to friends in South Carolina and Mississippi that
no troops had been sent, "nor will be, while I am a member of the Cabinet."7
Naturally, he felt he had been deceived, and with good reason. Buchanan
promptly accepted his resignation, asserting that Thompson had no cause
for complaint, since the decision to reinforce had been made openly in a
Cabinet meeting. But Thompson had not so understood the meaning of
Buchanan's remark at that meeting, and it seems probable that the matter
was left vague at that time in order that he should not know the exact plans.
Although his resignation would have been unmistakable evidence that
more troops were on the way to Sumter, Thompson informed his southern
friends of the reinforcements the moment he learned the truth. Many
condemned him for treason, but that judgment, if it had been generally
applied, would have made a traitor of almost every politician in the land,
for practically all of them were passing important news along to their
fellow-citizens.
Thompson thought the President had treated him shabbily and
Buchanan, while trying to justify himself, knew that Thompson was right.
But he had to sacrifice Thompson in order to protect the expedition.8 Kate
Thompson reacted characteristically: "Now you can guess what I think of
389
JAMES BUCHANAN
the President's heart— as Hack as the man of War Brooklyn. . . . Judge
Black is the meanest man living Stanton ... a mean low-life Pen-
Scamp. I wish I was a Military Dictator. I would take his head off to the
tune of Yankee Doodle!"9
For a few days after his repulse of the South Carolina commis-
sioners Buchanan had been something of a hero in the North. He seemed
at last to provide a rallying point for "union-loving men." One of Harriet
Lane's correspondents reported that in New York "you could read the
President's course . . . on the faces of the people in the streets," a deep and
patriotic feeling rare in that cosmopolitan city. "Our suburb of Brooklyn,^"
wrote this confident gentleman, "has more population than South Carolina's
whites , , . & our fire department would, I think, be able alone to protect
the government from her misdeeds,*'10
But after the Star of the West,, driven off by shore batteries, had
returned with its cargo, northern denunciation fell upon Buchanan, and
the southern leaders joined the chorus. Mrs. Gwin, who stated at this time,
"lam not yet a secessionist" wrote that "The feeling here with the Southern
members is most violent against the President. The denunciation of him
is fearful. I often wonder how he can stand i*. He has given up his evening
walk. I think that makes him feel worse. ... My heart warms to the
President. 1 feel for and love him. I think him a better man than the
world gives him credit for. He looks badly. His face indicates much
unhappiness & when I see him I feel like comforting him, but you know
him well enough to know no one could approach him in that way."11
Phil Clayton, former Treasury official, spoke of the bitterness of the
southern Senators against Buchanan, and William Browne, editor of the
Constitution, was beside himself with rage.12
Within a few days Philip F. Thomas, the last of the Cabinet
who had any strong southern leanings, resigned from the Treasury De-
partment and Buchanan decided to give that post to John A. Dix of New
York. Mrs. Thompson sneered, "Mr. Dix is in his glory with an empty box
(no money),"18 Buchanan could find no one suitable to take the Interior
Department and finally assigned the work to the Chief Clerk, Moses Kelly.
By January 11 the Cabinet had again become a unit, representing views
which coincided with the president's.
WHAT WILL CONGRESS DO?
These views became much more sharply defined during January. The
customs collector at Charleston had resigned when Anderson moved to
Fort Sumter. On the day of decision to reinforce Sumter, Buchanan had
sent to the Senate his nomination for a new collector, one Peter Mclntire
390
FORTY DAYS AND FORTY NIGHTS • 1861
of York, Pennsylvania, who would be ordered to receive duties from the
deck of a naval vessel. The Senate refused to confirm him.
On January 8, Buchanan sent to Congress a special message
concerning relations with South Carolina. "The prospect of a bloodless
settlement fades away," he warned. He intended "to collect the public
revenues and to protect the public property" so far as existing laws per-
mitted, but "my province is to execute, and not to make, the laws."
Congress, and Congress alone had the responsibility and the power to
authorize the use of troops, to declare war, or to legislate the removal of
grievances. "We are in the midst of a great revolution," he said. "The
present is no time for palliations; action, prompt action is required." But
he added, "the Union must and shall be preserved by all constitutional
means" That part of Buchanan's policy infuriated the direct-action men.
He repeated that although neither the president nor Congress had any
constitutional authority to make aggressive war on a state, "the right and
duty to use military force defensively against those who resist the federal
officers ... am/ ... assail the property of the federal government is dear
and undeniable.99
Buchanan appealed again for the question to be "transferred
from political assemblies to the ballot box" where the people would soon
achieve a solution. "But, in Heaven's name, let the trial be made before
we plunge into armed conflict upon the mere assumption that there is no
other alternative." From the beginning, concluded the president, he had
determined that if the difficulties were to end in war, no act of his should
commence it, "nor even . . . furnish an excuse for it by any act of this
government. My opinion remains unchanged."14
This policy, to collect the revenue, to defend the public property,
if assaulted, to avoid any provocative act, and to strive for a full expression
of public opinion outside of Congress, constituted Buchanan's program
for the remainder of his term. In addition, he determined to give every
inducement to the border states to remain in the Union and took action to
protect the national capital against any southern effort to prevent the
peaceful inauguration of Lincoln.
The inactivity of Congress convinced Buchanan that although
the Republicans agreed with his policy and had nothing different to propose,
they nonetheless did not wish a solution of the crisis during a Democratic
Administration. He presumed that they would proceed with the same
program once they came to power and thus take credit for a triumphant
result which, if Buchanan achieved it, would annihilate their party.
Lincoln's repudiation of the use of armed force indicated that the new
Administration would not pursue a course of coercion.15
The Senators, north and south, knew that in refusing to confirm
Buchanan's nomination for a customs collector at Charleston they deprived
391
JAMES BUCHANAN
the president of the only legal means he had to call up the militia. Had
such a federal officer appealed for aid, Buchanan could have mobilized
forces under existing law; without such an appeal he could not mobilize
troops except by special act of Congress. Proposals to enact such special
legislation were repeatedly introduced and voted down in Congress by a
combination of Republicans and secessionists. But why, asked some of
the proponents of "action" and a "bold policy," did not the president forget
about the law and use the army in his own name? Buchanan never dignified
such suggestions by a formal answer, but he could have recited the reasons:
impeachment, no army, no money, no public support, which even dictators
need. But most important, such a course would destroy exactly what he
was trying to save — a government under law.
When on January 16 the Senate was asked to consider the least
controversial point in the Crittenden plan, whether to initiate a constitu-
tional convention, every Republican voted against letting the question even
come to the floor. Thus ended the work of Jie Committee of Thirteen.16
Baron Stoeckl, Russian Minister in Washington, commented that the great
Congressional leaders of the past had been replaced "by men undis-
tinguished either by ability or reputation. Totally lacking in patriotism,
they have but one purpose: the increase of the antislavery agitation. . . .
They preach war against the South and demand the extirpation of slavery
by iron and fire."17
Under these conditions Buchanan had to manage the last two
months of his, Administration. Because he had no control in Congress, he
was forced by the Republicans to follow Lincoln's policy of "masterly
inactivity." The Congress rejected seriatum each element of Buchanan's
active policy: extension of the Missouri line, confirmation of a customs
collector at Charleston, a constitutional convention, and a new force bill
which would enable the president to mobilize troops for use in federal law
enforcement. Buchanan was a seasoned enough politician to know better
than to try single-handed to break the stalemate imposed by the disunionists
and the Republicans. As the best hope of peace and reunion, he reconciled
himself to Lincoln's passive position and continued, by the exercise of that
self-control and the art of diplomatic parley he had so long practiced, to try
to hold the government together. He hoped, in the six weeks remaining of
his term, to avoid further alarms and explosions and to maintain the status
quo. This in itself proved a task of the utmost complexity and delicacy.
The events of the first week of January gave impetus to the
secession movement, for the Gulf States now abandoned hope of any
sympathy, even from Buchanan. Georgia elected a prosecession convention
on January 2, and the governor seized Fort Pulaski at Savannah the same
day. Florida and Alabama took over federal property in their area. At
Washington, southern Senators planned the creation of a confederacy of
392
FORTY DAYS AND FORTY NIGHTS • 1861
seceding states to be brought into being before the end of Buchanan's term.
By the time the Star of the West expedition had returned, the secession
conventions of Mississippi, Alabama, and Florida had already begun to
meet, and popular elections in Louisiana and Texas showed majorities
for secession.
Senators of the border states set up a new committee to break
the deadlock which Lincoln's orders had created in the Committee of
Thirteen and worked out new modifications of the Critteuden plan which
Douglas and Buchanan strongly supported, but the usual combination
of Republicans and secessionists defeated the resolution to introduce the
plan for discussion. Following this, southern Senators telegraphed their
state conventions on January 7 and 8, "Secede at once."18 They planned
tentatively to have a general convention of delegates from South Carolina,
Georgia, Florida, Alabama, Louisiana, Texas, and possibly others at Mont-
gomery, Alabama, around the middle of February to create a new general
government.
Buchanan found no way to stop such activity, but he did see
many ways to prevent the upper South from joining the disunion move-
ment and to keep alive hope among the pro-Union people of the seceding
states who, because of the prevailing excitement, had little chance to air
their views. Buchanan's mail brought scores of letters from the South
asserting that most southerners were "not in favor of Secession uncon-
ditional—We want our rights in the Union and not secession out of it."19
A TEMPORARY TRUCE
But Fort Sumter remained the matter of immediate concern to the president
and the Cabinet. Why had not Major Anderson replied to the fire on the
Star of the West? His guns could have commanded the Charleston shore
batteries. When the Star came in close to Fort Moultrie in the dawn of
January 9, the captain had run a large garrison flag up and down the fore-
mast as a signal for Anderson to protect the ship. But he had no orders
to do so. In fact, he had learned only by accident that a relief expedition
was afoot. The major had discounted the news as rumor, and when the
vessel appeared, he could only guess its contents and mission. After a
consultation with his officers, he determined not to fire; but he wrote
immediately to Governor Pickens and protested the assault on the fl^g. He
also demanded a disavowal and stated his intention of using the fort's guns
to stop all subsequent movement of ships in the harbor.
Pickens responded with the demand that Sumter be surrendered
to South Carolina. Still lacking official information of the attempt at
reinforcement, Anderson answered that he intended "to refer the whole
393
JAMES BUCHANAN
matter to my Government," and to send one of his officers to Washington
for instructions. Pickens also determined to send an emissary to Washing-
ton and agreed to respect a local "truce" until his agent returned. Anderson
sent Lieutenant Norman J. Hall, and Pickens chose Attorney General
Isaac W. Hayne.
Before these gentlemen arrived in Washington, another officer
from Fort Sumter had already reported to Buchanan and the Cabinet.
On the basis of his statement, Holt wrote to Anderson, approving his
decision to withhold fire in the absence of any foreknowledge of the relief
mission, and said that the government would not again send reinforcements
until requested to do so but would make a "prompt and vigorous- effort"
the moment Anderson asked for help,20
Hayne called on Buchanan the morning of January 12, but the
president told him he should communicate only in writing. Before Hayne
had a chance to submit Governor Pickens's demand for the evacuation 'of
Sumter, the southern Senators descended on Hayne to force him to delay.
They anticipated rejection of Pickens's letter and the immediate opening
of hostilities, which would greatly complicate the organization of the new
confederacy. For three weeks, Hayne's mission took the center of the
stage and arguments about it filled reams of paper. While the "truce"
prevailed at Charleston during this long controversy, Anderson busily
prepared Fort Sumter for action and South Carolina built up her shore
batteries and sank hulks across the entrance to the harbor.
The truce proved both a boon and an embarrassment to Buchanan.
It delayed what appeared to be a certain outbreak of war, but at the same
time it prevented sending another expedition which the Cabinet now
thought necessary. Black particularly insisted upon prompt action to
garrison Sumter and wrote a long inquiry to Scott about practical methods
of accomplishing it, but the General failed to respond. Instead, without
consulting anybody, he released to the press his strange "Views" of
October 29th, much to Buchanan's disgust. No document could have
given secession more encouragement than this, hitting the newspapers on
January 18, 1861.
The southern Senators during the last two weeks of January
hounded Buchanan to get a promise from him either to withdraw Anderson
from Sumter or to pledge not to send any aid to the fort. They had per-
suaded the South Carolinians that if they could get this much out of the
president, the demand for surrender of the fort could safely be dropped.
One of their arguments was that a war started under Buchanan would help
only Lincoln, who could escape the responsibility for starting it while
gaining the power of a dictator in fighting it. Senator Clay of Alabama
called on Wednesday afternoon, January 16, to press again for the return
of Anderson to Moultrie, under a Carolina guarantee that he would have
394
FORTY DAYS AND FORTY NIGHTS • 1861
access to all the supply facilities in Charleston and would not be molested.
It was understood that the current truce would last only until Colonel
Hayne returned to the South. Buchanan answered that he "could not &
would not withdraw Major Anderson from Fort Sumter."21 He was not
now planning to order reinforcements to Sumter, he said, but would send
aid the moment Anderson asked for it. This statement left the matter up
to Anderson.
The Cabinet earnestly discussed the reinforcement question at
successive meetings during the last two weeks of January. Black, in a
letter to Buchanan which he asked the president to keep secret from the
rest of the Cabinet, complained about the gullibility of the Administration
for believing southern threats of war. The refusal of the Brooklyn to engage
the shore batteries which were firing on the Star of the West, he continued,
had made the government "the laughter and derision of the world.'* Black
concluded, "In the forty days and forty nights yet remaining to this
administration) responsibilities may be crowded greater than those which
are usually incident to four years in more quiet times. I solemnly believe
that you can hold this revolution in check, and so completely put the
calculations of its leaders out of joint that it will subside after a time into
peace and harmony."22 He hoped for an early reinforcement of Sumter.
Buchanan did not agree, and neither did General Scott. The
Anderson-Pickens truce dragged on until January 31, when Hayne finally
presented Pickens's letter to Buchanan. Four days later the delegates of
the six states that had already seceded met at Montgomery to frame a
constitution for the Confederate States of America, Holt replied to Hayne
on February 6, commenting on the "unusual form" of Pickens's request —
"an offer on the part of South Carolina to buy Fort Sumter . . . sustained
by a declaration . . . that if she is not permitted to ... purchase, she will
seize the fort." The United States, Holt said, would keep the fort and
reinforce it whenever Anderson made the request. The next day Hayne
delivered his answer, which Buchanan termed "insulting," and speedily
left Washington.23 Buchanan maintained his policy on Sumter for the
rest of his term. Thenceforth, the Cabinet debated not whether to reinforce
Sumter when Anderson should call for aid, but how to 'do it.
Scott, Toucey, and Holt prepared a relief expedition of four small
Treasury steamers which would maintain a ready status in New York.
Commander J. H. Ward, id command of this force, had orders to be prepared
to sail instantly in response to a call for help from Major Anderson, The
Administration also pondered the plan of Navy Captain Gustavus V. Fox
who proposed a convoy of several large ships carrying launches and two
light-draft harbor tugs. The tugs would load supplies outside the harbor
and, protected by cotton bales, make a run for Sumter in darkness, while the
launches brought in the troops. Most later strategists agree that Fox's plan
395
JAMES BUCHANAN
had the best chance of success, but by the time it had gotten a fair hearing,
the southerners had arranged to buy the two tugs that Fox wanted and the
plan had to be abandoned. Scott and several of the Cabinet wanted
Buchanan to send Commander Ward's fleet to Charleston before the
southern batteries grew too strong; but Buchanan withheld assent, unless
Major Anderson should call for relief. There seems little doubt that both
the president and the major believed a relief expedition would bring an
immediate outbreak of war, and it is equally probable that Buchanan
believed, if he did not know, that Anderson would make no appeal. Thus
Sumter would be delivered intact, but still the central issue, to the Lincoln
Administration. Lincoln had asked for this. Buchanan would give it to him.
THE FINAL EFFORT
Congress all the while continued its private war against Buchanan. The
president asserted that Congress, "throughout the entire session, refused
to adopt any measures of compromise to prevent civil war, or to retain first
the cotton or afterwards the border States within the Union.*'24 In addition
to sabotaging every compromise proposal, Congress failed to provide for
any judicial process in South Carolina after the resignation of all the
federal court officers. It then declined to give the president any authority
to call out militia or volunteers to help suppress insurrection. Even after
Buchanan's message of January 8 which declared the existence of revolution
and reminded Congress of its exclusive power to muster troops, no bill
authorizing the calling of militia was introduced until three weeks later,
and it was immediately withdrawn. Not until February 18, two months
after South Carolina seceded and ten days after the formation of the
Confederate States, was another more limited militia bill proposed. The
House killed this on February 26 by a resolution to postpone.25
Even had either of these measures passed, Buchanan could not
have used them to advantage because no bill was ever proposed ceto raise
or appropriate a single dollar for the defense of the government against
armed rebellion." The Senate ignored the need for special kws to imple-
ment the collection of duties from a warship. Bingham of Ohio, on
January 3, had reported a bill similar to the old Force Bill of Jackson's day
to enable the president to collect revenue "either upon land or any vessel,"
hut the Senate let it lie dormant until March 2, and then voted down a
resolution to consider it. People asked why Buchanan did not act boldly
on his own without consulting Congress. He responded that to have done
this while Congress sat ready to do business a few blocks away would have
been to make war not only on South Carolina but also on the representatives
of the whole American nation. Buchanan interpreted the persistent
396
FORTY DAYS AND FORTY NIGHTS • 1861
refusal of Congress to act as proof "that the friends of Mr. Lincoln . . .
believed he would be able to settle existing difficulties ... in a peaceful
manner, and that he might be embarrassed by any legislation contemplating
the necessity of a resort to hostile measures."26
But Congressional inaction told only half the story. Congress did
act in many ways to embarrass and distract the president. On December 31,
1860, a House Committee began inquiry into the question whether ex-
Secretary Floyd had been engaged in a conspiracy to ship huge quantities
of arms from northern to southern arsenals. The Committee, after a
thorough investigation, found no cause- for alarm. It learned that since
January 1, 1860, some 8500 of the best army rifles had been distributed
among the states, of which the South got less than one-fourth. Of heavy
cannon, the South received only one-third of the distribution. Inquiry
into the Pittsburgh heavy ordnance shipment revealed facts already told.
Despite the failure of the House Committee to find evidence of an arms
conspiracy, many northerners preferred to believe that the Buchanan
Administration had knowingly tried to arm the South in preparation for
secession.27
On January 16th the Senate demanded to know why it had not
been asked to confirm the appointment of a new Secretary of War. Bu-
chanan replied that he had appointed Holt in accordance with a statute
empowering the president to make interim Cabinet appointments for a
period of six months without Senate confirmation and implied that the
Senators should have been acquainted with their own laws.28
An exasperating controversy arose over the defense of Washing-
ton. The city seethed with rumors of a southern conspiracy to take posses-
sion of the capital before Lincoln's inauguration. An attempt at seizure
could be entirely practicable. Buchanan therefore brought extra troops
into the city to discourage any such effort. Since the threat to kidnap him,
he could take seriously the rumored plan to seize Washington, declare
Breckinridge president, and claim the city as the capital of a nation com-
posed of the southern states and such others as would join the new Adminis-
tration. The Republicans feared an armed southern endeavor to prevent
the counting of the electoral votes on February 13.
The Howard Committee, appointed to consider legislation to
strengthen the military arm of the president in accordance with his January
message, investigated evidence of a conspiracy to capture the capital.
Congress got into the peculiar dilemma of fearing an attack on the govern-
ment if no troops occupied Washington, and fearing an attack by such
troops if Buchanan had command of them. They thus belabored the
president simultaneously for having too small and too large a force in the
city. Buchanan mobilized a force of 653 men to keep the peace. When
these troops arrived after the return of the Sumter expedition, tension rose
397
JAMES BUCHANAN
high and frightened observers wrote, "Old Buck has so many soldiers there
it looks more like a Camp Ground than a City. I believe the poor old man
is crazy."29 "Constitution" Browne wrote on January 11 that the city had
become "a great military camp In the vacant lots behind the city hall
there is an artillery camp, and another on Capitol Hill Orderly officers
are galloping through the streets from morning till night.*'30 Kate Thomp-
son reported that "the Departments are all filled this morning with guns
and pistols stacked ready for use. Was there ever such Tomfoolery."*1
But it did not seem tomfoolery to Buchanan, Black, Holt, or
Scott. Black warned the President that "the possession of this city is
absolutely necessary to the ultimate designs of the secessionists. ... If
they can take it and do not take it, they are fools I take it for granted
that they have their eyes fixed on Washington.*'32 Buchanan did not
answer the Committee's inquiry whether he had actual knowledge of a
conspiracy until March 1, and then only under urgent pressure from Holt.
After the Committee reported that it could find no support for the rumors,
he considered the matter finished. But during the last two weeks of
February, reports spread over the country "intended to show that the
safety of the capital [had] never been menaced, and of course that all . - .
preparations here have been prompted by cowardice, or the spirit of
despotism."38 After Lincoln had come into Washington by stealth in the
dead of night to escape a rumored plot to kill him in Baltimore on February
22 and the newspapers took up this story, the attacks on Buchanan for
trying to protect Washington diminished. On March 1 he sent Congress
a message explaining his reasons for bringing troops to the capital. Of
all people to complain about this, he thought the Republicans least entitled
to the privilege.34
Along with excitement about conspiracy in Washington came
suspicion of subversion elsewhere. When Holt learned that the Superin-
tendent of the United States Military Academy at West Point, Captain
P. G. T. Beauregard, was a secessionist sympathizer he dismissed him.
Slidell stormed into the White House demanding that Buchanan disavow
this act; but the president declared that Holt's acts "are my acts for which
I am responsible."35 Slidell never spoke to him again.
In Buchanan's mind these surface flurries assumed much less
importance than Virginia's 'efforts to promote a national expression of
opinion through an "unofficial" convention, in the absence of the real
thing. The Virginia Legislature, on January 19, adopted resolutions invit-
ing delegates from all states interested in promoting peace to assemble at
Washington on February 4. It named ex-President John Tyler a com-
missioner to the President of the United States and Judge John Robertson
a commissioner to the seceded states to obtain from them a pledge to
refrain from hostile action until the convention had concluded its efforts.
398
FORTY DAYS AND FORTY NIGHTS • 1861
The convention was asked to consider the Crittenden plan and to recom-
mend constitutional amendments to Congress. The proposal obviously
aimed at two things: first, to prolong the "truce" in Charleston harbor
which Hayne's imminent return would automatically terminate; and
second, to force on the country an expression of public opinion independent
of Congress.
Buchanan submitted Virginia's resolutions to Congress on
January 28 with his enthusiastic endorsement, but he dulled considerably
the impact of his message by stating emphatically that he would not promise
during the meeting to abstain "from any and all acts calculated to produce
a collision of arms." Such a pledge must come from the seceding states,
he said, and "then the danger . . . will no longer exist. Defence and not
aggression has been the policy of the administration from the beginning."36
This was a good deal less conciliatory than the Virginians had hoped, but
it at least gave official recognition to their proposal.
Although Congress paid no attention and insulted Virginia by
failing even to refer her resolutions to committee, twenty-one states sent
delegates to the Virginia Peace Convention. Its work got underway on
February 4, the same day that the Confederate constitutional convention
began. John Tyler, the presiding officer, took his task very seriously, for
he felt that Lincoln's silence, Buchanan's legalistic view of his duties, and
the continued inaction of Congress left no remaining point of origin for
conciliatory action except this meeting. The conference made its greatest
appeal to the border states, but in a remarkable way it furthered the interests
of almost everyone. It gave South Carolina a good excuse to avoid termi-
nating the Sumter truce after Hayne's return, the secessionists a way
to gain time to perfect their organization and preparations for future
resistance, and the Republicans a chance to pose before the country as
supporters of conciliation and drive a wedge between the border states
and the deep South. Buchanan welcomed any delay which would reduce
the danger of war during his Administration and sought all the encourage-
ment anyone could offer to Unionists in the border region.
Tyler recognized these advantages and kept in close touch with
Buchanan to prevent the slightest rocking of the delicate balance between
the South and the Administration. Even before the sessions began he had
questioned the president about the dispatch of the Brooklyn on a secret
mission and the rumor that the troops at Fort Monroe had turned the guns
inland. "When Virginia is making every possible effort to redeem and
save the Union," he complained, "it is seemingly ungracious to have
Cannon levelled at her bosom."37 Buck assured him that he would
investigate the cannon story, and that the Brooklyn had gone on an innocent
assignment. Actually she was bound for Fort Pickens with orders to stand
by unless Florida tried to take this position.
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JAMES BUCHANAN
Tyler later urged Buchanan to prevent any military display in the
annual Washington's birthday parade in the capital for fear the appearance
of federal troops might emphasize northern preparedness and create an
incident. Buchanan explained that he could hardly prevent militia
companies from marching in a parade, and that it would appear odd if the
United States Government went unrepresented in such an affair, but
nonetheless he promised that the army would not appear. Unknown to
him, Holt had already issued orders calling out the troops and
sent an announcement to the newspapers. When Buchanan learned about
it late the night of the 21st, he asked Scott to prevent the assembly of the
troops. The citizens of Washington waited impatiently for the parade the
next morning, and after an hour's delay got wind of the news that the affair
had been cancelled. Dan Sickles rushed to the War Department where he
found Buchanan and Holt and soon convinced them that more trouble
would arise if the parade were forbidden than if it were permitted. Wearily
Buchanan gave in, wearily Scott learned the orders had been reversed again,
and most wearily of all, the officers and men who had been dismissed several
hours before got back into their uniforms and prepared to celebrate the
birthday of the father of their tottering country.38
The Peace Convention in the meantime worked out a program
which its members believed might meet Republican objections to an
extension of the Missouri line. In response to arguments that slavery
could not exist in the New Mexico region, the only area affected by an
extension of the line, the Republicans had protested that the Missouri
principle would legalize slavery in new territory, say Cuba or northern
Mexico, if these should later be acquired. The convention therefore agreed
to make the acquisition of any new territory nearly impossible. Lincoln
termed this the "one compromise which would really settle the slavery
question." But so soon as the compromisers met the objections of the
Republicans, the latter found new ones to interpose. The Peace Convention
made its recommendations at the end of February, but in view of the
opposition to them from the radical Republicans, they aroused little interest
in the nation and none at all in Congress.
Kentucky proposed that Congress call a convention to amend
the Constitution, and Buchanan supported this proposal, as he sustained
eyery attempt to bring a constitutional convention into being, but it got
no Congressional consideration. On February 27 the House Republicans
voted down even the proposed Thirteenth Amendment which stated a
part of their own party platform — that slavery should not be interfered
with in the states where it already existed. Some members later changed
their votes and this measure did pass at the end of the session, but it
accomplished nothing.
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FORTY DAYS AND FORTY NIGHTS • 1861
Of these events, Roy F. Nichols, historian of the politics of the
Buchanan Administration, writes, "compromise had been killed by two
power aggregates. The secession Democrats, confronted with loss of power,
could see no compromise which would restore their accustomed domi-
nance. . . . The victorious Republicans— the new power— eager to enjoy
the fruits of their triumph, could see nothing in compromise but the
destruction of that control which they had just won."39 During the last
two months of his term, Buchanan occupied the position of the most
important official of the United States government who remained un-
committed to either power aggregate. What influence he had lay in this
position; what strength he had lay in seeking areas of honorable agreement
and in holding the balance, a tricky, tightrope procedure. That he succeeded
seemed clear from the attacks on him by both the secessionists and the
Radical Republicans.
In the closing months of his stay in the White House, Buchanan's
old southern friends put him down as "against the South."40 Mrs. Thomp-
son learned with amazement that one of her friends, calling at the White
House, found Senator and Mrs. Lyman Trumbull there "on very social
terms" with Buchanan and Harriet. "What a change! . . . Forney wants
to make up with the President AH their old friends are thrown off and
new ones in their place."41 Another southerner reported that Buchanan
had "allowed Holt & Scott to exercise the powers they have, from a
knowledge that their acts will conform to Lincoln's policy. . . . There has
been for some time a perfect understanding between Lincoln and the War
Department." Charles F. Adams regarded Seward as "the guiding hand at
the helm of the Buchanan Administration."42
Buchanan still maintained cordial relations with such of his
former friends as would meet him on purely social ground. Even after
the difficulties which led to the resignation of the Secretary of the Interior,
he invited the Thompsons to a farewell dinner at the White House, and
they reluctantly accepted the invitation. Said the once vivacious Kate,
"I went in with the Old Chief. Mr. T. with Miss Lane— & Genl. Dix (who
is staying there) with Mrs. Ellis (niece of the late W. R. R. King), who was
also staying. . . . There was nothing disagreeable said or done, but I felt
very much embarrassed. The President asked me at dinner who was to be
our President" She told him Cobb. It was Buchanan's last social event
of the old style.43
During these days many occasions took on the aspect of "the
last." Harriet, especially, felt pangs. Her last visit to the "Lyons Den,"
the last matinee and review, the last dance. "I receive so many evidences
of kindness and good feeling," she said, "and so many regrets at my leaving
that it makes me feel very sad." Lincoln's arrival to pay his first call at the
White House at 11 a. m., February 24, made the departure seem chillingly
401
JAMES BUCHANAN
imminent to Harriet, gloriously close to her nearly prostrate uncle. Of
Lincoln she wrote, "the glimpse I caught of him was the image of Burns—
our tall, awkward Irishman who waits on the door. Burns is the best
looking, but I only had a side view. They say Mrs. L is awfully western,
loud & unrefined."44
The press of last-minute routine came as a welcome relief from
the incessant pressure of the past two months. In the few days immediately
preceding the inauguration, the Department clerks came to farewell parties
for the Old Chief at the White House and the judges and foreign ministers
called to pay their respects. Copies of bills had to be hurried to and from
Congress which concluded its affairs in a torrent of angry talk that did
nothing to reduce the mountain of unfinished business.
The long awaited Fourth of March blew in crisp and windy.
Buchanan spent the hour before noon signing the final bills which came
from the tumultuous proceedings of Congress. While he was thus engaged
in the president's room at the Capito1, Holt came racing in excitedly with a
dispatch from Anderson which had just arrived. The major wrote that it
would now take 20,000 men to reinforce successfully his command at
Sumter! But there was no time to handle this red hot chestnut for the
parade would soon begin. Buchanan ordered his carriage and went to pick
up the president-elect.45
Buchanan and Lincoln drove in procession from Willard's to
the Capitol, chatting affably to the astonishment of many onlookers who
seem to have expected that they would be pointing pistols at each other's
heads. Buchanan, said a reporter, "appeared pale and wearied; yet his face
beamed with radiance, for he felt relieved from the crushing care and
anxiety he had borne for four years."46 He turned to Lincoln and said,
"My dear sir, if you are as happy in entering the White House as I shall
feel on returning to Wheatland, you are a happy man indeed." Lincoln
replied with courtesy, "Mr. President, I cannot say that I shall enter it with
much pleasure, but I assure you that I shall do what I can to maintain the
high standards set by my illustrious predecessors who have occupied it."47
Of more small talk there is no record. The two entered the Senate Chamber
arm in arm and after Hannibal Hamlin had been sworn in as vice-president,
the whole party proceeded to the East Portico for Lincoln's inaugural.
Buchanan sat quietly breathing in a kind of freedom he had not known for
fifty years. He was out of politics. He could go home in peace; peace for
himself and his country.
402
30
ON THE ROCK OF ST. HELENA • 1861-1868
THE OLD PUBLIC FUNCTIONARY
On the night after Lincoln's inauguration, Buchanan should have relaxed
and eased his spirits in Old Custom House Madeira at the home of his host,
Robert Ould. Instead, he held another Cabinet meeting. Anderson's
letter stating that it would require 20,000 troops to relieve Fort Sumter had
shocked Buchanan. The next morning he again met with the Cabinet at
the War Department where Holt read a letter which he planned to send to
Lincoln along with Major Anderson's dispatch. In it he quoted from
Anderson's earlier reports that he could easily hold Fort Sumter, and the
War Department replies that reinforcements would be sent the instant
Anderson should request them. Holt further explained to Lincoln the
existence of the force which for over a month had been waiting in New York
ready to sail for Sumter on a few hours notice. Before Buchanan left
Washington that afternoon, Holt reported that he had sent these documents
to President Lincoln.1
At two o'clock Buchanan waved farewell to the friends who had
gathered at Quid's to see him off and set out with his escort to board the
special train prepared for him by the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad. He
told the crowd that he felt confident that President Lincoln intended no
harm to anyone in the South, and that there was no occasion for the hostile
reaction of some of the southerners to his election. At Baltimore he
received a wildly enthusiastic ovation and had considerable difficulty
getting through the crowds to the home of his host, Zenos Barnum.
Although he had already made one speech upon leaving the train, he had
to make another at eleven that night. Leaning out of an upstairs window,
he thanked the demonstrators for their "attention to an old man going out
of office," They responded with a series of cheers which epitomized the
political confusion of the city. "Three cheers for Old Buck." 'Three
more for the last President of the United States." "Three for the South."
"Three for the Union," "Three for the Border States."
403
JAMES BUCHANAN
Buchanan's party left the next morning at eight for Lancaster in
the same decorated car that had carried it to the inauguration four years
before. York welcomed the ex-president with a military parade, speeches
and a "handsome collation," and Columbia had everything in readiness for a
celebration, but the train arrived so late that it stopped there only momen-
tarily to add cars. Lancaster gave its home-town boy a hero's welcome
starting with a blast from the "Old Buck Cannon," a 34-gun presidential
salute, and the ringing of church bells. There was a two-mile parade from
the railroad to the town square for speeches, and another to Wheatland
where, as a final flourish, the Baltimore City Guards presented a poetic
address and the band played "Home Sweet Home." Buchanan was a little
embarrassed. His latch string was always out, he said, but since he had not
had time to lay in supplies, he hoped they would all call at some future
time.2
During the first month after his return to Lancaster, Buchanan
savored all the anticipated delights of an honored retirement. Wheatland
teemed with visitors who came to bless the "old Public Functionary" for
pursuing steadfastly his quest for peace and to wonder at the suddenness
with which the Republicans had adopted Buchanan's policy. Musical
organizations came out in the evenings to serenade in the hope of being
invited in for a crack at Wheatland's newly stocked cellar. Buchanan
enjoyed strolling about the estate again. He loved the circular, stone-girt
spring with water ten feet deep and so clear that he could nearly read the
lettering of a new coin on the white sand at the bottom. He poked into
the icehouse, sniffing the wet sawdust; checked on the supply of barked
hickory for the fireplace in his study; looked at his horses and wondered
what to do with the new carriage he had bought for ceremonial occasions
in Washington. He could not use this deluxe conveyance around Lancaster
without becoming a butt of ridicule. He missed Lara, his old Newfoundland
dog, but was happy that the chained eagles had been disposed of. In the
house his library began to take shape again: familiar books back on the
familiar shelves, the comfortable chair before his desk, his slippers, the
old dressing gown, a good "segar," and a bottle of Madeira. Life was almost
worth living.
PRESIDENT LINCOLN'S POLICY
The newspapers and letters on his desk were full of accounts of Lincoln's
inaugural. Offhand he could not see much in it that he had not said himself
on many occasions, except the part about the Supreme Court. The
National Intelligencer reported that on the subjects of the right of secession
and the coercion of a state, Mr. Lincoln's opinions appeared to be "identical
with those announced by Mr. Buchanan in his message to Congress at the
404
ON THE ROCK OF ST. HELENA • 1861 - 1868
opening of the late session."3 The North Carolina Standard said that "so
far as coercion is concerned, Mr. Lincoln occupies the very ground occupied
by Mr. Buchanan."4
But most editors treated the inaugural with a wild abandon of
partisan prejudice that reminded Buchanan of the reception of his own
recent messages. Republican papers labelled Lincoln's language "strong,
straightforward, manly, plain, terse, all bone and iron muscle, clear as a
mountain brook," and characterized by "perspicacity, unmistakable
decision, firmness, integrity and will." The Democrats called it "involved,
coarse, colloquial, devoid of ease and grace, bristling with obscurities and
outrages against the simplest rules of syntax, trite, commonplace, lifeless,
cold, phlegmatic, rambling, discursive, questioning, loose-jointed, feeble,
and unworthy of a schoolboy." A neutral editor remarked that the Re-
publicans would certainly have denounced the speech had Buchanan, Cass,
or Douglas made it.5
It interested Buchanan particularly that the Republican press now
discovered it a great thing to enforce the laws under a promise "that no
blood shall be shed" unless by the act of "those who resist the laws." The
idea of a constitutional convention suddenly became respectable.6
The Republican somersault made Buchanan laugh, but it angered
him, too, and he decided to take a good look at the text of Lincoln's inaugu-
ral and to compare it carefully with his own messages. He discovered that
the similarities were greater than he had at first suspected. Where he had
written, "The Union was designed to be perpetual. ... Its framers never
intended ... the absurdity of providing for its own destruction," Lincoln
had paraphrased, "The Union of these States is perpetual It is safe to
assert that no government proper ever had a provision in its organic law
for its own termination." Buchanan had asserted, "No State has a right
upon its own act to secede from the Union," whereas Lincoln said, "No
State upon its own mere motion can lawfully get out of the Union." Where
Buchanan had proclaimed, "My province is to execute the laws It is
my duty at all times to defend and protect the public property ... as far as
this may be practicable," Lincoln said, "I shall take care . . . that the laws . . .
shall be faithfully executed in all the States ... so far as practicable
[My power] will be used to hold, occupy and possess the property belonging
to the Government." Where Buchanan had stated, "If the seceding States
abstain efrom a collision of arms,1 then the danger ... will no longer exist.
Defence and not aggression has been the policy of the Administration,"
Lincoln declared that "There needs to be no bloodshed ... and there shall
be none, unless it is forced upon the national authority."
Buchanan wrote, "The people themselves would speedily redress
the serious grievances In Heaven's name, let the trial be made before
we plunge into armed conflict. . . . Time is a great conservative power."
405
JAMES BUCHANAN
Lincoln urged, "Why should there not be a patient confidence in the
ultimate justice of the people? . . . Nothing can be lost by taking time."
Buchanan said that disunion "ought to be the last desperate remedy of a
despairing people I earnestly recommend an 'explanatory amendment'
of the Constitution on the subject of slavery." Lincoln, who had rejected
Buchanan's plea for a convention, now proclaimed in the inaugural,
"Whenever [the people] grow weary of existing government, they can
exercise the constitutional right of amending it. ... I should, under
existing circumstances, favor rather than oppose [amending the Con-
stitution]. I will venture to add that to me the convention mode seems
preferable." Where Buchanan had pleaded, "If, with aU the ... proofs . . .
of the President's anxiety for peace, [the South] shall assault Fort Sumter
and thus plunge our common country into the horrors of civil war,
then upon them . . . must rest the responsibility," Lincoln said, "In your
hands, my dissatisfied fellow-countrymen, and not in mine, is the momen-
tous issue of civil war. The government will not assail you. You can have
no conflict without yourself being the aggressors." So far as Buchanan
could determine, he could have no conflict with Lincoln or Lincoln with
him, on the grounds of principle or policy regarding the subjects of these
quotations.7
During March news poured into Wheatland steadily from the
capital. "I need not tell you that the new administration is a failure*"
wrote Black. "If it made peace its abolitionist force would desert it; & if
it made war it would be broken into fragments. . . . Everything wears the
aspect of a most painful uncertainty. ... It now seems to be absolutely
certain that Fort Sumter is to be evacuated. Sic Transit."8 Dix wrote, "I
envy you the quietude of Wheatland. There is none here Fort Sumter
will be abandoned."9 Stanton kept Buchanan as well supplied with inside in-
formation about Seward's plans as he had formerly kept Seward acquainted
with Buchanan's activities. In half a dozen letters between March 10 and
April 10, Stanton repeated the phrase, with the words underlined, "Major
Anderson Witt be withdrawn" "A continuation of your policy to avoid
collision will be the course of the present administration," he wrote. "The
embarrassments that surrounded you they now feel; and whatever may be
said against you must recoil against them."10 Holt also reported that
Sumter would be evacuated and advised Buchanan that he need not worry
about his policy on Fort Sumter; the Republicans were caught in the same
trap and could not adopt coercive measures without reversing their
announced policy of peace and losing the border states.
These rumors emerged in part from Seward's frantic negotiation
with the emissaries of the Confederate States to whom he gave his word
that the Administration would order Anderson to evacuate Sumter as soon
as his supplies ran out. His promise proved, however, to be premature,
406
ON THE ROCK OF ST. HELENA • 1861 - 1868
for the counsel of the radical Republicans prevailed and Lincoln took a
different course. By April 3, Stanton reported that an effort would be made
to reinforce Sumter. By the 10th, talk in Washington centered on the
expectancy of an immediate outbreak of war. Senator Bigler wrote on the
llth, "I am convinced that Mr. Lincoln is about to initiate civil war."11
One feature in all these reports especially interested Buchanan:
the idea that the evacuation of Sumter would be a vindication of his own
policy. "I do not believe there will be much further effort to assail you,"
wrote Stanton. "In giving reasons for their action, they must exhibit the
facts that controlled you in respect to Sumter.'* "I do not think there will
be any serious effort to assail your administration in respect to Fort
Sumter," he added. "That would imply . . . hostility to your pacific
measures." Dix wrote, "I tfrfafc it is decided to withdraw Major Anderson
without holding your administration to any responsibility for &,"12
Buchanan believed that here lay the very crux of the matter.
If the Republicans should abandon Sumter they would indeed vindicate
his pacific policy. This might allay the excitement in South Carolina,
retain the loyalty of the border states, and avert war; but it would be sure
to split the Republican party. Furthermore, a war might still break out
somewhere else and in this event the Republicans would have to shoulder
the blame for it. Buchanan's name was already indelibly connected with
Fort Sumter. Hence his anxiety that the fort should continue a symbol of
peace and reunion; hence also tike Republican anxiety that if a war had to
come, it ought to start at Sumter where they could blame it squarely on the
Buchanan Administration.
The adoption of a reinforcement policy could not have been
easy for Lincoln in the face of Anderson's recent estimate of forces needed
to succeed. General Scott, furthermore, had written the new Adminis-
tration strongly urging compromise or letting the South go out in peace.
A serious effort to coerce, he warned, would take 300,000 trained troops,
$250,000,000, and two or three years of hard fighting. Scott advised
Lincoln to permit Anderson to evacuate Sumter when his food supplies ran
out, which would be around April 15. Seward advocated the same plan;
let Sumter go on the ground of military necessity, but hold all the other
forts as a proclamation of future policy; and set up a naval blockade.
Lincoln acted initially on this policy, gave orders to reinforce Fort Pickens
as a sign of federal purpose, and made ready to give up Sumter as a matter
of military tactics. But on April 7, Lincoln learned that the relief expedi-
tion he had sent to Fort Pickens had failed.
At that moment Lincoln had to make his choice. Against the
presumption that full-scale war would follow any attempt to relieve
Anderson, he had to weigh other factors: that the abandonment of Sumter
at this moment would invite foreign recognition of the Confederacy; that a
407
JAMES BUCHANAN
southern attack on Sumter would unite the North solidly behind the
president and ensure the dominance of his party; that a war would not in
any event last very long; and that the Republicans could blame it on
Buchanan. The Republicans would never have a better chance. If they
missed it, they might have to fight a war under much less favorable con-
ditions.
Lincoln notified Governor Pickens that he proposed to re-
provision, but not to reinforce, Major Anderson and sent off the relief
expedition. Anderson, in the meantime, had already notified the South
Carolina authorities that he would have to evacuate Fort Sumter on April 15
because he had no more food. The Confederate Government now ordered
General P. G. T. Beauregard to reduce Fort Sumter before the relief ships
should arrive. At dawn of April 12, 1861, old Edmund Ruffin yanked a gun
lanyard at Fort Moultrie, sending the first shell arching over the water
toward the flag at Sumter. He wanted the privilege of initiating the war,
but the Republicans had already determined to award that dishonor to
James Buchanan.
THE MAKING OF A MYTH
"The Confederate States have deliberately commenced the civil war, &
God knows where it may end," Buchanan wrote to his nephew the morning
he heard the news. "They were repeatedly warned by my administration
that an assault on Fort Sumter would be civil war & they would be re-
sponsible for the consequences."13 People who gathered around the
bulletin boards m Lancaster had no idea of the seriousness of the news.
They boasted they would go south and wipe out "those damned nigger
drivers" in a month. The crowd shouted "Traitor" at a man who said
soberly, "Gentlemen, this will be a three years* war." "Why, man, you're
crazy," they cried, or "Oh, my God, this means nothing. It'll all be over
in a month."14
Buchanan had no such optimism. From Lincoln's call for 75,000
volunteers on April 15 and other news he anticipated grim results. During
the first weeks of retirement he went into town frequently and spent many
pleasant hours at the old Grapes Tavern or in conversation with friends
along Lawyers' Row. Now the ugly mutterings that he had better
not show his face in the city began to be heard, and every day there were
"violent, insulting & threatening letters," especially from Philadelphia.
Miss Hetty found anonymous notes stuck under the back door of Wheatland
which warned that the house would be set on fire some night. Buchanan
refused to hire a guard of detectives because he did not want to broadcast
his plight, but he did accept help from the local Masons. Lodge #43 of
408
ON THE ROCK OF ST. HELENA • 1861 - 1868
Lancaster, of which he had been past master, held a special meeting at
which each member pledged "to protect his person and his property from
injury." From that day until the course of the war diverted the public
interest, several Masons stood guard at his home.15
On May 18 Harriet heard from Sophie Plitt that someone in
Philadelphia had printed a story in which he said that Dr. Foltz had billed
"Nunc" for medical services that dated from 1848. Buchanan had actually
received a bill for $1,000 on March 8 and had asked his lawyers to obtain
an itemized statement under the physician's oath which he proposed to
send to Washington "to be dealt with there under the rules & regulations
of the Navy against an officer for abusing and vilifying his Commander in
Chief. ... I think a Naval Court martial would make short work of
Dr. Foltz."16
Some stores exhibited banknotes which bore Buchanan's vignette,
the eyes bunged with red ink, a gallows drawn above his head with a rope
around his neck, and the word "Judas" inscribed on the forehead. The
Pottsville, Pennsylvania, bank had to call in its issue of these notes, "so
unmistakable," said a newspaper account, "are the manifestations of
popular indignation against the man who might, had he had the will or
pluck, have nipped this rebellion in the bud, as Jackson did before him."17
The suddenness of the attacks, their virulence and their cruHeness
sent Buchanan to bed with a bilious seizure. He had just celebrated his
71st birthday, a day which he had long anticipated as the time when he
would begin to enjoy the ease of an honored old age at Wheatland. Now he
knew that the greatest fight of his life still lay ahead. These assaults, he
believed, were not spontaneous or mere hysteria. They signalled what he
had feared during the first month of Lincoln's Administration, a studied,
calculated, prearranged campaign against him with the object of making
him appear to be responsible for the war. This would be good politics for
the Republicans, and some of their editors would do the job with relish
and without scruple.
For the next five years Buchanan faced a lonely struggle against
overwhelming odds to counteract the lies about him which filled northern
newspapers in intervals between the more exciting battle news. The Admin-
istration temporarily sealed the lips of those who might have refuted many
of these stories with offers of political reward and threats of retaliation.
President Lincoln announced the Republican doctrine on war
guilt in his message to the special session of Congress which convened on
July 4. Though his language was careful and restrained, he made a number
of charges that clearly applied to Buchanan: that "a disproportionate share
of the Federal muskets and rifles" had found their way to the South, that
quantities of money lay ready for seizure at southern mints, that "the Navy
was scattered in distant seas, leaving but a very small part of it within the
409
JAMES BUCHANAN
immediate reach of the Government;" and that the effort to reinforce
Fort Pickens had been foiled by "some quasi armistice of the late Adminis-
tration." These statements from such a source carried the strongest
implication of foul play by the Buchanan Administration. They inaugurated
serious newspaper efforts to foment the idea of a Buchanan conspiracy to
aid secession, an undertaking which got a tremendous additional impetus
from the shocking defeat suffered by the North at First Bull Run a short
time later. This shattered the northern pipe dream of a "three-months
war," and brought home brutally an awareness of the titanic struggle which
must ensue. The author of such a terrible war must be made to pay. The
world should know how President Buchanan brought this holocaust upon
his countrymen*
Much of the attack fell in terms too vague to make any short,
decisive rebuttal possible. The resolution submitted to the Senate by
Garrett Davis of Kentucky on December 15, 1862, put the charges into
official language. "Resolved, That after it had become manifest that an
insurrection against the United States was about to break out in several of
the Southern States, James Buchanan, then President, from sympathy
with the conspirators and their treasonable project, failed to take necessary
and proper measures to prevent it; wherefore he should receive the censure
and condemnation of the Senate and the American people." The resolution
did not passt but Buchanan nonetheless received the public "censure and
condemnation." Said he, "If two years after a Presidential term has
expired the Senate can go back & try, condemn, & execute the former
incumbent, who would accept the office?"18
Buchanan quickly learned, as the assault developed, that he
could not make any public defense while the war lasted. His first short
"Letter to the Editor" provoked such a storm of denunciation that he
resigned himself to silence. Any explanation he offered would only be
seized and turned as a weapon against him. Hence he began collecting
documents and letters which he hoped, some day, to publish in vindication
of his presidential policies. In the meantime he catalogued the charges
against him and jotted down the main errors in them.
Why, the newspapers asked, had not President Buchanan sent
troops to Charleston early and, like Jackson, nipped secession in the bud?
Because, he noted in the privacy of his study at Wheatland, his Cabinet and
the leaders of every political party opposed such a move in the months
before Lincoln's election; because General Scott saw no danger until
October 29, and at that time he could muster only 300 troops (Congress
would not authorize a call for more) ; because a provocative mobilization of
strength at Charleston would most probably activate secession and war
rather than avert them; because no one knew how the election would go or
what Lincoln might have to say, if he were successful.
410
ON THE ROCK OF ST. HELENA * 1861 - 1868
Why had Buchanan not cracked down immediately when South
Carolina seceded, occupying the rebellious state by troops who could
enforce obedience to federal laws? Because, Buchanan wrote, no request
for troops had come from any federal or state officer; because the govern-
ment could not attack people for threatening talk; because South Carolina
had violated no law; because an order to the army to proceed on an illegal
mission in the face of the opposition of Congress while it was in session
would be an attack on Congress as much as on South Carolina and would
probably have brought deserved impeachment.19
Why had Buchanan negotiated with the agents of secession and
made one truce after another with them? But he had not negotiated or
made any truce, he asserted. He had talked with some United States
Senators and told them that his policy would be peaceful, but he had
rejected their demand for a pledge of the status quo at Sumter. He had
talked to some South Carolinians after secession as "private gentlemen,"
informing them that he would hold Fort Sumter and reinforce it on
Anderson's request. With the concurrence of his Cabinet he had honored
a limited field truce entered into by his commanders at Forts Sumter and
Pickens. In January he told an agent of South Carolina of decisions
already made public — that Anderson would stay in Sumter, had orders to
resist attack, and would be reinforced whenever he called for help. This
was not negotiation but information. If anyone had negotiated with
secession agents, that man was Seward.
Why, asked the press, had Buchanan overruled General Scott's
demand to send the warship Brooklyn to Charleston harbor and sent the
unarmed Star of the West instead? And why had he vetoed Scott's proposal
to send reinforcements after the Star's failure? Buchanan assembled
records to prove that these assertions exactly contradicted Scott's position
at the time. Scott had rejected the Brooklyn and insisted on using the Star;
he had favored restraining the secret relief expedition which lay in readiness
at New York until the peace convention ended or Anderson called for it.20
Why did Buchanan scatter the navy all over creation and skeleton-
ize the home fleet? Toucey's reports which had already been examined by
two Congressional committees showed that the navy 'had been greatly
expanded under Buchanan's Administration and that the home squadron
had been abnormally large, but the press did not publicize this,21
But what about those stolen guns? Republican editors insisted
that Buchanan and Floyd had connived to arm the South in anticipation of
the rebellion. Scott even published a telegram ("from a high officer— not
of the Ordnance Bureau") purporting to show that the South had drawn
arms far in excess of her quota in 1860. Buchanan had before him reports
from officers still in the Ordnance Bureau, which Congress had examined
in February, 1861, showing that the South had drawn far less than her
411
JAMES BUCHANAN
quota of arms; that the transfer for storage of obsolete weapons had
occurred a year before the election of 1860; and that he had personally
intervened to prevent the first and only suspicious shipment of arms to the
South— the cannon from Pittsburgh. As to militia arms quotas, the seven
seceded states had drawn an average of only 300 rifles each in 1860, and
three southern states had drawn none at all.22
Why had Buchanan worked hand in hand with Colonel Twiggs
who, the moment Texas seceded, turned over his United States command
to the Confederates? Was not this the rankest treason? It was, thought
Buchanan. He had cashiered Twiggs before the event and had branded
him a traitor after it. Twiggs had threatened to visit Wheatland and wreak
personal vengeance on the "Old Pub Func" for the insult. But the press
did not report or the public learn it thus. The popular story had Buchanan
retaining Twiggs in command so that he could deliver his post to the
enemy.23
On February 9, 1862, the London Observer published an article
prepared by Thurlow Weed that galled Buchanan more than any prior
attack. It gave a garbled account of a dramatic "cabinet scene" of February,
1861, when Floyd's resignation and Anderson's move to Sumter allegedly
came under discussion. Weed related that Buchanan urged Anderson's
return to Moultrie whereupon Stanton arose in cold anger, lashed Floyd
and the president, and scornfully tendered his resignation. Black, Holt and
Dix immediately followed his lead. "This of course opened the bleared
eyes of the President," ran, the tale, "and the meeting resulted in the
acceptance of Mr. Floyd's resignation."24 Such a story, coming from
Weed and involving men who could readily refute it, if false, received
international circulation and widespread belief. The article contained
enough internal errors to condemn it. Anderson had moved to Sumter
not in February but in December; Dix had not yet entered the Cabinet;
Buchanan had asked Floyd to resign two days before the Sumter movement
took place, and Stanton had not opened his mouth during the tense meeting
of December 29— the one obviously referred to by Weed.
Buchanan called Weed's article a "tissue of falsehood" and asked
his old Cabinet members to disprove this story. They did, in letters to him;
but each in turn insisted that no refutation be made public. "Weed's
letter is now lying before me," .wrote Black. "The story is wholly fic-
titious." But to Buchanan's plea that he repeat this statement to an editor,
Black responded that "this request is more than I can comply with at
present."26 Horatio King, who had attended the meeting, also refused to
defend Buchanan, although in later years, after the myth of the president's
treason had been firmly established in the public mind, King wrote a book
in which he stated the facts that Buchanan had asked frin? to verify earlier.
William Flynn wrote to Buchanan that "fear of Lincoln's and Seward's
412
ON THE ROCK OF ST. HELENA • 1861 - 1868
penitentiary . . . has greatly weakened the power of the pen. ... I showed
the Weed letter to Mr. Horatio King, and asked him to submit it to the
criticism of Mr. Holt. He looked scared and hegan to chaw, remarking that
I had better see him myself. . . . Power and patronage have a wonderful
and mysterious influence upon men."26
General Dix would not state publicly that at the time of the
alleged incident he had not yet been invited to join the Cabinet.27 Stanton,
when confronted with the article, "was greatly embarrassed" but made no
reply. He knew that Buchanan had a dozen letters from him referring to
Lincoln and his policies in the most scurrilous language, but he also knew
Buchanan well enough to be sure that he would not put such private
correspondence to public use, even to defend himself. Holt, like Stanton,
said nothing. Those not in Lincoln's employ, such as Toucey, hesitated to
speak out because of hostile public sentiment and fear of summary im-
prisonment, since the habeas corpus privilege had been suspended.
Buchanan wrote, "Is it not strange that four members of my
Cabinet . . . should have witnessed without contradiction a statement made
by an official of government . . . that they had one after the other offered
me the grossest insult? Had such a scene transpired in my Cabinet, they
should not have been in office fifteen minutes." "Well, be it so," he
concluded philosophically, "for the present:' He knew the difficulty.
"They all stand mute. They will not contradict Weed, who is powerful &
stands high with Mr. Lincoln. They are willing to profit with their new
masters by the slander, rather than speak a word of truth in justice to the
old President. ... I was going to say, such is human nature, but I will
not say it because the case is without a parallel."28
Buchanan often commented upon the peculiar fact that five of
his Cabinet officers had been awarded federal jobs by Lincoln while the
Republican party editors condemned their prior activity as treasonable.
The jobs were not very good, to be sure, but they guaranteed these men
some immunity from the Republican tar brush while at the same time they
guaranteed the new Administration immunity from the exposure of
Republican prewar obstructionism and of the recent fabrications against
Buchanan. This was the deal and Buchanan could understand why his
old friends took it. They were all still young and had hopes for a political
future. Dix, Stanton, and Holt actually had lively ambitions for the White
House, and Black for the Supreme Court.29 For the time being they would
serve menially. Dix, appointed a major general of New York militia,
received such scandalous treatment from Secretary of War Cameron that
he resigned but later accepted command of the Baltimore police.30 Holt
got the dirty job of auditing General Fi6nont's accounts and exposing the
massive thefts of material and supplies in that western command.31 King
consented to appraise Negroes in Washington, work which few would have
413
JAMES BUCHANAN
taken for five times the salary.32 Black became reporter for the Supreme
Court when he should have sat on the bench. Stanton alone, master
sycophant, achieved high place; he supplanted Cameron in the spring
of 1862.
This demonstration that the wartime gag would securely muzzle
even the staunchest defenders of Buchanan's Administration, those who
had themselves comprised it, marked the point at which Republican editors
knew that they could say anything without fear of refutation. Buchanan
now realized that he stood alone in his fight for vindication. But during
the war he would have to keep quiet, "on the rock of St. Helena," as he
said, watching the lies piled one on another until they comprised such a
mass of uncontradicted vilification that neither his effort nor the passage of
a century would sponge it from the public mind.
Now came the petty assaults. Congress abolished the franking
privilege of ex-presidents in order to gag him.33 The abolition papers
reported that Buchanan was in constant correspondence with foreign
governments, urging the recognition of the confederacy;34 they described
in vivid detail fictitious copperhead meetings at Wheatland, complete with
lists of all the villainous guests who were supposed to have been on hand
for the plotting;35 and even on one occasion announced, on successive days,
that the ex-president was in Leamington, England, selling Confederate
bonds, and at Bedford Springs plotting with spies.36 Suspicion mounted
so high that his outgoing and incoming mail was opened and sometimes
pilfered.37
The story of the Indian bonds came in for another round of press
coverage, with the amount rising to six million dollars allegedly stolen, and
Buchanan was made the culprit.38 The Commissioner of Public Buildings
reported that he had to remove Buchanan's portrait from the rotunda of
the Capitol to prevent its defacement.30 Thaddeus Stevens told Congress
that Buchanan had swindled the government out of $8,000 for private
furnishings for the White House- The Commissioner of Public Buildings,
who disbursed these funds, had reported as early as 1862 that Buchanan
had kept within the Congressional allowance, but in 1866 Stevens was still
franking around public documents containing his charge. Buchanan sent
him a copy of the commissioner's published report. "Whether you may
think proper to correct the error I leave entirely to your own discretion,"
he said- Stevens corrected it.40 New York papers accused Buchanan and
Miss Lane of stealing portraits from the White House and walking off with
the gifts brought by the Japanese. It appeared that the pictures involved
were the portraits of the British royal family which Victoria had sen*
personally to Buchanan. The gifts had all gone to the Patent Office except
a couple of stuffed birds which Harriet had brought home. Buchanan held
on to the portraits and challenged his tormentors to let Lord Lyons or
414
ON THE ROCK OF ST. HELENA • 1861 - 1868
Victoria herself decide the question of ownership. The birds he would
send back if Harriet's having them seemed to taint the national honor.41
A sarcastic squib in the New York Tribune announced that Buchanan had
forwarded an engraving of Harriet to the publishers of the Almanac de
Gotha, social register of European royalty, for inclusion among the reigning
families.42 Another report erroneously stated that Buchanan had been
fired as President of the Board of Trustees of Franklin and Marshall College.
One editor said that Buchanan hoped Lincoln's troops would "die like
rotten sheep" in the South. Such trifling but vicious stuff kept appearing,
and people made sure he got the clippings in his mail. "If there is anything
disagreeable in it," he remarked, "some person will be sure to send it
tome.'943
After Lincoln's death the New York Post and the Tribune ran a sen-
sational story about the Cincinnati Convention, claiming that Jeremiah S.
Black had bought the votes of the southern secessionists for Buchanan by
pledging him to work for a southern confederacy during his Administration.
Buchanan answered this accusation like a shot. Jeremiah S. Black, he
wrote, had not been within 500 miles of Cincinnati at the time the con-
vention met. A Col. Samuel W. Black of Pittsburgh had indeed supported
the nomination, but he had since died for the Union at the head of his
regiment in the field.44
The pattern of the campaign of character assassination convinced
Buchanan that it was the deliberate policy of the Republican party. Dix
had warned him to expect this when he explained the reasons for Lincoln's
decision to draw the issue at Sumter. 'The course pursued," he said, "had
been the means of fixing the eyes of the nation on Sumter, so that when it
fell its fall proved the instrumentality of arousing the national enthusiasm
& loyalty, to maintain the honor of the flag.'*46 Stanton admitted that
"of course, an attempt will be made to cast the responsibility on you,"
adding at the same time, "But there is a complete defence, as we know.'*46
Buchanan wrote of the tide of abuse, "It is one of those great national
prosecutions, such have occurred in this & other countries, necessary to
vindicate the character of the Government. . . . The world . . . have for-
gotten the circumstances . . - [and] blame me for my supineness. ... It
will soon arrive at the point of denouncing me for not crushing out the
rebellion at once, & thus try to make me the author of the war. Whenever
it reaches that poifct, it is my purpose to indict ... for libeL"47 That time
came very quickly, but Buchanan recognized the futility of lawsuits against
a few editors. Forney, Greeley, and Bennett led the pack, and he longed
to force them to match their stories under oath against the records he had.
By the fall of 1862, he had accepted the inevitable. 'The spirit to do me
injustice still prevails in the Republican party," he wrote. "They will at
last, without the least just cause, endeavor to throw the responsibility of
415
JAMES BUCHANAN
the war on myself. Although this is simply ridiculous in itself, they will
endeavor to make it appear a reality."48
MR. BUCHANAN'S BOOK
His consuming purpose in life now became the defense of his policy, his
character and his reputation— his "vindication," as he called it. "Nobody
seems to understand the course pursued by the late administration," he
complained.49 Black at first strongly urged countenneasures. "You owe
it to your friends and to your country," he wrote, "to give them a full and
dear vindication of your conduct & character. If this be not done, you
will continue to be slandered for half a century to come Nothing is
easier than a perfect defence of every important measure which you ever
adopted or carried out."50 Black offered to prepare a biography for $7,000,
Buchanan agreed, and Black began the task.
It soon became evident, however, that they could not achieve
historical agreement. Buchanan had firmly endorsed the war policy since
the attack on Fort Sumter and in September, 1861, sent a letter to a
Democratic political meeting in Chester County. He emphasized in this
message that the war would have to be loyally sustained until the bitter end
and urged the Democrats to stop wasting their time on a futile demand for
peace proposals. The minute he saw this letter, Black wrote:
Your endorsement of Lincoln's policy will be a very serious
drawback upon the defence of your own. It is vain to think that
the two administrations can be made consistent. The fire upon
the Star of the West was as bad as the fire on Fort Sumter; and
the taking of Fort Moultrie & Pinckney was worse than either.
If this war is right and politic and wise and constitutional, I
cannot but think you ought to have made it. I am willing to
vindicate the last administration . . . but I can't do it on the
ground which you now occupy.51
But much as he wanted a "vindication" prepared by so brilliant a
thinker and so dose a friend, Buchanan would not agree with Black that
there was anything but a superficial similarity between the threatening
incidents at the end of his Administration and the sustained bombardment
and capture of Fort Sumter on April 12. He also disagreed with Black's
view that the war itself was unconstitutional, that Lincoln had started it,
and that it ought to be stopped as soon as possible by a negotiated peace.
Lincoln had no choice, said Buchanan, except to give up Sumter or to
strengthen it. This had been his own position: to abandon, which he had
refused to do, or to reinforce on request of Anderson, which he had
equipped a force to do on two hours' notice. And, said Buchanan, he would
most certainly have done it, but no request came from Anderson. "As to
416
ON THE ROCK OF ST. HELENA • 1861 . 1868
my course since the wicked bombardment of Fort Sumter," he told Black,
"it is but a regular consequence of my whole policy towards the seceding
States, They had been informed over & over again by me what would be
the consequence of an attack upon it. They chose to commence civil war,
& Mr. Lincoln had no alternative but to defend the country against dis-
memberment. I certainly should have done the same thing had they begun
the war in my time, & this they well knew."52 After a talk with Black he
ruefully wrote Harriet, "I presume the Biography is all over. I shall now
depend on myself, with God's assistance."53 Despite the difference of
opinion, the two men remained warm friends.
Buchanan now set himself to the task of compiling a record of
his Administration from the published documents of the government and
the private correspondence of his administrative associates. He pestered
his friends for extracts of letters he did not have, or for confirmation of
minor points, or copies of fugitive pamphlets and committee reports. They
replied with speed and vehemence, stating generally their temporary in-
ability to find the data he wanted and pressing him in the strongest terms
not to publish any defense of his Administration while the war continued.
Even Black now wrote, "The breath that kindled those grim fires of per-
secution has the power to blow them into sevenfold wrath and plunge us
into the flames. The tribunal that condemned you against evidence will
drown your defense with the sound of its drums."54 The witch hunt had
frightened everyone, and the last thing Buchanan's friends wanted at this
moment was the truth about the political events preceding Lincoln's
inauguration. The Republicans were equally unwilling to have the facts
made public; they would crucify anyone who attempted to give a true
account.
In October, 1862, General Scott gave Buchanan a chance to
bring part of his defense to the public. The National Intelligencer published
a long article including Scott's secret letter to Seward of March 3, 1861, and
his lengthy "observations" to Lincoln a few days later. Buchanan had
been trying unsuccessfully to get copies of these for 18 months. "I view
it as a merciful dispensation of Providence," he said, "that the report . . .
has been published during my lifetime."55 The communication obviously
invited a reply, and Buchanan set joyfully to the task. It gave him a chance
to publicize his defense under the best possible conditions, for Scott's
material was full of errors, and it exposed features of Lincoln's early policy
which the Republicans in 1862 vigorously denied. Buchanan now learned
for the first time that Lincoln had excerpted from Scott's material the
misleading statements about Buchanan in the war message of July 4, 1861.
He also read with amazement Scott's letter of March 3 urging Lincoln to
let the South go out in peace and predicting a long and almost hopeless war
as a result of a coercive policy.
417
JAMES BUCHANAN
Within a week Buchanan had his answer in the press. He had
not reinforced the southern forts because Scott could not mobilize the
necessary soldiers, and Congress would not call up more. He had not
refused to issue orders to hold the Charleston forts until he had met with
the Carolina commissioners, but had sent Anderson written orders to this
effect two weeks before their arrival. He had not refused to send the
Brooklyn to relieve Sumter, but had reluctantly agreed, at Scott's insistence,
to permit the Star to be used instead. There was much more, perhaps too
much, for people would be too busy to wade through the quantity of refuta-
tion presented. But it relieved him to get his story in print.
Scott issued a "Rqoinder" which introduced some new charges
but scarcely dented the evidence that Buchanan had compiled. The general
said that he had prepared his material "without a printed document and
my own official papers" and admitted that "I may have made an unimportant
mistake or two." He had indeed made a mistake or two, Buchanan re-
sponded, and not unimportant. For instance, Scott had not told Holt to
rescind Floyd's order to ship cannon from Pittsburgh to the South during
the first week in March, 1861; Buchanan had cancelled that order himself
on December 26, 1860, before Holt took the War Office. The interplay of
letters introduced the subjects Buchanan wanted most to explain. Scott
brought up the topic of the "115,000 extra muskets and rifles, with all their
implements and ammunition," which he alleged Floyd had stolen for the
South, giving Buchanan his chance to nail that old carcass to the wall.
While the affair looked to the public like a spirited controversy, the matters
introduced by Scott suggested that the retired commander might have
wished to let Buchanan have his day on the front page. Certainly the
points the general raised were those against which Buchanan could bring
almost conclusive refutation. The "Scott Controversy" became the first
public chapter of Buchanan's "vindication.*'56
He finished the draft of his book late in 1862 and sent the copy
around for criticism to Augustus Schell, Judge Ellis Lewis and William B.
Reed. The latter wrote a preface, but Buchanan rejected it because Reed
denied that the bombardment of Sumter offered cause for war. John
Appleton published the book in 1866 under the title: Mr. Buchanan's
Administration on the Eve of the Rebellion. In his own preface, Buchanan
explained that he had delayed publication "to avoid the possible imputation
. . . that any portion of it was intended to embarrass Mr. Lincoln's adminis-
tration." The war, he said, grew out of fifty years of persistent hostility
and violence between the North and South over slavery. "Many grievous
errors were committed by both parties from the beginning," he concluded,
"but the most fatal of them all was the secession of the cotton States."
Even after secession, Congress had not only rejected compromise but had
418
ON THE ROCK OF ST. HELENA* 1861 - 1868
also "persistently refused to pass any measures enabling him or his suc-
cessor to execute the laws against armed resistance, or to defend the
country against approaching rebellion." This was Buchanan's own con-
sidered interpretation of the causes of the Civil War and of his role as
president.
The book, like its author, was dignified, restrained and rather
dull, but it marshalled the evidence in orderly array, documented it from
official records, and presented a powerful case for his presidential policy.
It also manifested the anxiety of its author, in common with everyone else
of his day, to escape all appearance of agency in promoting the conflict.
This preoccupation showed particularly in the sections where Buchanan
assigned' primary responsibility for the nonreinforcement of Sumter to
Holt, Scott, and Anderson. Abner Doubleday, an officer at Sumter,
claimed that Anderson had told the War Department that he needed no
reinforcement because "he did not want it Its arrival would be sure
to bring on a collision, and that was the one thing he wished to avoid."
Buchanan would not have reproached him for this wish, for it was in line
with his own policy, but not to the point of abandoning the fort. Buchanan
recalled Holt's "tragical face" when he first saw the famous Anderson letter
of March 4, and remarked that its publication would "doubtless excite
disagreeable, I will not say tragical, feelings in the mind of the major."
While Buchanan thus implied that Anderson's political thinking had inter- '
fered with his military judgment, he also implied that he had remained
satisfied to let an artillery major shoulder a burden of decision which
properly belonged to his Commander in Chief.57
Buchanan wrote his book as a historical document in the hope
that in the years after his death, when passions had cooled, an oiganized
record of his efforts to prevent the war might be available. He also wanted
an anecdotal biography. For part of a year James F. Shunk and his wife
lived at Wheadand to take notes of Buchanan's reminiscences for a papular
account. After they had enough material, the Skunks went back to York
but never wrote the book. Buchanan then hired his literary friend,
William B. Reed of Philadelphia, to undertake a biography, paying him an
outright fee plus a conditional grant to his wife, for he knew that Reed
procrastinated and thought that his wife might keep him at work if she
knew she would get $5,000 when the job was done. Reed asked Shunk
for his notes but never got them; to this day they are missing from the
Buchanan papers.58 Reed never finished the biography, and none appeared
based on Buchanan's own papers until 1883 when George Ticknor Curtis
completed the two volume documentary Life of James Buchanan under a
commission from the president's heirs and executors.
419
JAMES BUCHANAN
OLD MAN DEMOCRAT
Vindication and the protection of his "historical character" constituted
Buchanan's major interest in the years of his retirement, but the course of
politics ran a close second. From the day of the startling news from
Sumter, Buchanan outspokenly supported the war effort. "The present
administration had no alternative but to accept the war initiated by South
Carolina or the Southern Confederacy," he told General Dix. "The North
will sustain the administration almost to a man; and it ought to be sus-
tained at all hazards."59
A few weeks after the outbreak of war he addressed a public letter
to the National Intelligencer condemning military officers who broke their
oath by joining the enemy. Unfortunately he also said that Sumter had
"lighted a flame which it will require a long time to extinguish," heretical
doctrine in May, 1861, and reaped such abuse that he thereafter kept quiet
before the public. But privately he contributed to equip volunteer com-
panies ("to keep the mob from hanging him," said Cameron),60 denounced
the Southern attack as "wickedly outrageous," encouraged volunteering
("If I were a young man I should be there myself'),61 strongly supported
the draft law which Democrats generally opposed, and warned against any
effort at peace talk in advance of a military decision. The South, he said,
"would consent to nothing less than a recognition of their independence,
& this it is impossible to grant."62 After the disastrous battle of First Bull
Run he wrote, "I sometimes feel strongly tempted to leave my retirement
so far as to take an active part in assisting to rally the people ... to battle
in support of our time honored and glorious flag; but the abuse which I
received . . . admonishes me to desist."68
Despite the harsh and bitter epithets coined by the party presses
for both Buchanan and Lincoln, these two never spoke ill of each other.
Each knew, as did no other two people in America, the staggering com-
plexities and uncertainties which the president must bear, and how many
forces defied executive control. Buchanan spoke of Lincoln as "a man of
honest heart & true manly feelings"64 and "an honest and patriotic man."65
"Mr. Lincoln may now make an enviable name for himself," he said, "and
perhaps restore die Union."66 After President Lincoln's assassination he
wrote to Horatio King: "I feel the assassination ... to be a terrible mis-
fortune My intercourse with our deceased President, both on his visit
to me ... and on the day of his first inauguration, convinced me that he was
a man of a kindly and benevolent heart and of plain, sincere and frank
manners. I have not since changed my opinion of his character. Indeed,
I felt for him much personal regard."67
Buchanan kept out of active politics in retirement and willingly
passed the torch of responsibility to younger hands. Nonetheless, party
420
ON THE ROCK OF ST. HELENA • 1861 - 1868
managers called on him continually for advice and visited constantly at
Wheatland. In the spring of 1863 Congress passed a conscription act which
Pennsylvania Democrats attacked as unconstitutional and sought to upset
in the State Supreme Court. Judge George Woodward of the State Court
had been nominated for governor by the Democrats in 1863 and made
opposition to the draft a main feature of his campaign. Buchanan urged
strongly that his partisans abandon this policy. "The Constitution confers
upon Congress in the clearest terms the power to raise & support armies. . . .
It would be very unfortunate if, after the present administration have
committed so many clear violations of the Constitution, the Democratic
party should place itself in opposition to [the draft]."68
As the national election of 1864 drew near, the Democrats hoped
to carry the nation with a military hero. They nominated General George
B. McClellan whose military potential they thought had been purposely
stifled by White House politics. The war had by this time dragged on so
long, with so little apparent result, that many northerners grew lukewarm
and lost heart in it. Lincoln's Emancipation Proclamation, which seemed
to change the war aims from maintenance of the Union to freedom for
the slaves and subjugation of the South, contributed to the unhappiness
of the Democrats. Many of them now urged the immediate cessation of
war by a negotiated peace with the Confederacy.
Buchanan said it was a year too late to raise a storm over the
changed war aims, though that might have been a sound issue if it had been
joined at once. The party ought not to go on a peace platform. "Peace,"
he said, "would be too dearly purchased at the expense of the Union."69
He rejoiced when McClellan stated this idea clearly in his acceptance, but
Buchanan anticipated that the Democrats would lose the election. "Have
you ever reflected upon . . . the embarrassments of a Democratic adminis-
tration, should it succeed to power with the war still existing and the
finances in their present unhappy condition?" he asked.70 After Lincoln's
second victory he wrote, "They have won the elephant; & they will find
difficulty in deciding what to do with him Now would be the time for
conciliation on the part of Mr. Lincoln. A frank and manly offer to the
Confederates that they might return to the Union just as they were before
. . . might possibly be accepted."71 This rather more hopeful view tiban he
had expressed during the campaign may have arisen from reports of a
meeting between Black and Jacob Thompson in Canada. At this time
Thompson believed that the South would settle for the old Union if it could
come back in without universal emancipation.
The assassination of Lincoln at the very moment of peace and
victory stunned the nation and soon raised horrid apprehensions of con-
tinued violence and bloodshed. Buchanan had all along held the view
421
JAMES BUCHANAN
Lincoln later expressed, namely, that the southern states never had left
the Union. "I considered the acts of Secession to be absolutely void," he
said, "and that the States were therefore members, though rebellious
members, of the Union."72 He was gratified that President Johnson pro-
posed to continue Lincoln's policy "not of reconstruction, but of restora-
tion."73 Before long, however, it became clear that the radicals intended
no such program. Hang Jeff Davis, disfranchise the southern whites, and
impose military rule on the conquered region; then reconstitute the states
by the rule of the freedmen. That would be the Congressional policy.
Johnson wavered and at last defied the program enacted by the radicals.
For this, they impeached him. Buchanan's friends in England wrote in
bewilderment about the American system of government where "the Chief
Justice of the U, S. could not try the President of the Confederate States
because he was so busy trying the President of the United States."74 The
Democrats at last had their issue. They had been helpless during the war,
but opposition to radical Reconstruction put them on solid ground.
A large body of Philadelphians tendered a public dinner to
Buchanan in the spring of 1867 which he had to decline, but for it he wrote
his last serious political message. In it he proclaimed the heart of his
concept of a constitutional republic, a type of government which, despite
the recent military victory, stood, he feared, in imminent danger of destruc-
tion by politicians. The unique quality of the United States as devised by
the maters of the Constitution had been to define powers of federal and
state governments as separate and distinct. "They dreaded lest the vast
powers . . . conferred upon the Federal Government . . . might be perverted
to ... usurp the reserved rights of the States. . . , They knew it would be
impossible for one Central Government to provide for the ever varying
wants and interests of separate people of different lineage, laws & customs,
scattered over many States. . . . Consolidation . . . must finally end in
Despotism."
"The true touchstone," he said, "as to whether the exercise of
any proposed federal power has a warrant in the Constitution is to ask for
the specific clause which authorizes it, or, if this cannot be shewn, then to
prove that it is 'necessary & proper' without any strained construction
If this cannot be clearly pointed out, then . . . 5The powers not delegated
to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States,
are reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.' "75 For this
reason he strongly opposed a federal mandate for Negro suffrage. "Eman-
cipation is now a Constitutional fact," he said, "but to prescribe the right
and privilege of suffrage belongs exclusively to the States. This principle
the Democracy must uphold."76
422
ON THE ROCK OF ST. HELENA • 1861 - 1868
THE ROAD HOME
The days of retirement, filled as they were with study, writing, politics,
and prophecy, were varied by all the continuing threads of a long and active
life and rudely interrupted on occasion by the near surge of battle. At the
time of Antietam and the first Chambersburg raid, rumor put the Con-
federate troops on the banks of the Conestoga. Buchanan's friends pleaded
with him to vacate Wheatland before the Gettysburg campaign. William
Bigler urged, "if the rebels get down to about Port Deposit, your best plan
will be to retire to Clearfield" — a town buried inaccessibly in the central
Pennsylvania mountains; and Augustus Schell told him to come to New
York. Buchanan sent Harriet to Philadelphia, but he stayed at Wheatland.
A week after the battle of Gettysburg he wrote to Black, "I felt no alarm at
the approach of the rebels & with the help of God should not have removed
from Wheatland had I been surrounded by a hundred thousand of them.
I have schooled my mind to meet the inevitable evils of life with Christian
fortitude."77 The Confederate advance guard came within ten miles of
Wheatland and, except for the demolition of the Susquehanna Bridge at
Wrightsville, would very likely have made a bonfire of Buchanan's home.
He enjoyed the opportunity to work at his financial affairs without
distraction. Black told him, just before his retirement, that he had dis-
covered in the State Department accounts a record of $1,209 still owing
him for per diem salary from the English mission. He verified his claim
and sent it to Seward, but no record shows whether he ever got his pay or
not. All through the war he tried to take only par funds for returns on his
investments. "We cannot use any currency," he wrote his agents. When
paper money began to decline, he went in for barter and tried to sell the
old family farm for whiskey. Apparently he drove too sharp a bargain, for
the distiller replied, "I can not make an exchange of whiskey for your farm
because I cannot take those prices for the whiskey."78 He stuck to his old
principle of investment, informing his agent, Swarr, C7 lend no money to
any person on a simple bond."79
He ran the financial affairs of nearly the whole family and not a
few of his friends. Between 1855 and 1865 he developed the estate of
the Pleasanton sisters from $22,000 to $34,000 and by 1867 had it up to
$42,000. They exclaimed that it was "delicious" to get more than 6
per cent.80 He still kept close track of the financial needs of Dr. Yates and
his family, his brother Edward, J. B. Henry, Harriet, and the now married
children of his deceased sisters. The family farm he eventually sold to
Jerry Black. When Black paid for it and covered a further debt of long
standing— something around $15,000— Buchanan looked at the check and
said, "You have made a mistake. Your check is ten cents too little."
Jerry handed over the extra ten cents.81
423
JAMES BUCHANAN
He took great pride in finally terminating the Luanda Furnace
investment, closing out the whole deal after thirty years of accounting for
S48.4882 Buchanan loved bookkeeping. He pored over his bank state-
ments, covered page after page with neat figures in precisely ruled columns
and at the end would put the proud endorsement, "Exactly corresponding
with their account & balance," or, "Their statement is exactly correct."**
When the war had ended and the prospects of securities seemed more firm,
he meticulously calculated the value of his estate, to which he had been
adding at the rate of $15,000 a year from interest since retirement. A list
of his total assets showed $205,600 in stocks and bonds, mostly state,
municipal, and railroad; $41,190 in personal loans; $46,560 in real estate;
and $16,650 owed by members of the family— a total of $310,000. With
characteristic caution, Buchanan summed up his calculation with the note:
"Dec. 16, 1866— Making all reasonable deductions, I am worth about
$250,000."**
The household routine at Wheatland had its ups and downs. The
staff of half a dozen servants was in continual circulation. One of the
gardeners was perpetually in Alderman's court waiting for the master to
come and bail him out. Thomas and Rosana Gordon quit and came back to
service half a dozen times in as many years, and the house boys seemed
always to be drafted shortly after taking a job at Wheatland. The two men
in charge of cutting the huge Wheatland lawn received $10 and a gallon
and one-half of Buchanan's best whiskey for the job. Miss Hetty kept
them all in tight rein, so much so that Buchanan got into the habit of
writing at the top of his monthly remittance for household expenses:
"Paid to the order of My Lord Chamberlain."85
Though the winters were quiet and lonesome, the house in the
fair seasons was generally full of guests. Harriet flitted in and out, spending
a good deal of time in New York, Philadelphia, Baltimore, and Washington.
Annie Buchanan, Edward's daughter, lived at Wheatland more than with
her father. Buchanan's neighbor, the Rev. Dr. John W. Nevin, professor
of history at Franklin and Marshall College, spent many evenings in the
Wheatland study, philosophizing and talking about religion, the war, and
the problems of the College of which Buchanan was still President of the
Board. Old Lancaster cronies stopped for dinner several nights a week,
and frequently his former political associates, ex-Governor Porter from
Harrisburg, Judge Cadwalader, and William B. Reed and Joseph Baker from
Philadelphia, Henry Welsh and Judge Black from York visited for a week
or two. The invitations generally ran in this style: "I am happy that our
tastes on so many subjects are the same & that we both delight in the
classical dish of sauer kraut. Many pretenders to refinement despise this
honest German dish; but we know better. I shall therefore expect you. . . ."
424
ON THE ROCK OF ST. HELENA • 1861 - 1868
Miss Hetty filled him with sauer kraut till he groaned, but he never com-
plained. He could not do without her, and she knew it. He often told
intimate guests that she was the only person in the world who could give
him a sound raking over the coals and get away with it.
Buchanan had the usual round of public dinners in Lancaster
and nearby towns, and received with regularity the fire companies and glee
clubs that came to Wheatland to honor the venerable ex-president and to
partake of his liquid hospitality. Whenever he bought a stock of particu-
larly good quality, he anticipated that Wheatland might shortly have such
a visitation, for the word always leaked out He occasionally travelled to
Harrisburg, York, Philadelphia, or Baltimore, but apparently he never
revisited Washington after Lincoln's inauguration. He went regularly to
Bedford where he thoroughly enjoyed himself, for the ladies still made a
great fuss over him and the "waters" seemed to ease his gout. Once he
tried a New Jersey seashore resort, but the experiment proved a dismal
failure. The gout struck while he was there and, for the first time in his
life, he could not drink a drop of wine.
At home the mail daily brought nostalgic and saddening news of
old friends. For Christmas, 1861, Varina Davis sent him a pair of slippers
—"of no value," she wrote, "save that I worked them" as a token of regard
and that he might be reminded "of those who love you."86 Mrs. Bass, an
outspoken Unionist, had seen her Virginia estate destroyed by the rebels,
and had with great difficulty escaped through the lines under federal
military escort to get medical care in New York.87 Davy Lynch's daughter,
Isabel, wrote, "Everything that could be sold out of the house has gone &
I am lying on a hard straw bed & my back so sore that every time I move it
causes it to bleed." Buchanan sent her $50 immediately and made arrange-
ments to pay her expenses at a convent, but this she refused. He had
given her widowed mother nearly $1000 during the war, and eventually
did persuade Isabel to enter the Visitation Convent in Brooklyn, giving his
New York agents instructions to pay all her bills. But within a year, to his
distress, she ran away and was never heard from again. He learned, with
sincere regret, of the tragic death of Rose O'Neal Greenhow, a Confederate
spy who had drowned while trying to run the Union blockade. The
brilliance of her mind and personality had influenced the actions of im-
portant men since the days of the Mexican War. Buchanan greatly admired
her, and during the period of their intimate friendship in the 1850's he had
absorbed from her many of his ideas about the South.88
From Washington he found out that most of the White House
servants of his term had left. In 1867 he received a pathetic letter from
Mary Wall: "I am nearly seventy years old, Sir, I am the old Chamber
Maid ... I write myself as I should not wish your Excellency to think any
Imposter had made use of my name, as there are so many bad people in the
425
JAMES BUCHANAN
present day." She wanted money to go back to England. Buchanan tried
to discourage her from the trip, but he finally sent her about half the
passage money.89 Leonora Clayton wrote to Harriet of their condition at
the war's end. "Do you think of those pleasant Euchre parties in those
happy times? How sad now to think of the actors in those scenes. The
Thompsons exiles, the Gwins abroad . . . Major McC fills a hero's grave,
the Cobbs fallen in power, and only you who are still invested with radiance
and hope."90 Even before the war was half over, one of Harriet's southern
friends reported that her children were "playing masquerade—have the
character and costumes of darkies, & are ordering the white people out of
the way in a style that we may expect to witness some day."91
Katherine Ellis, a niece of Senator King, had her own sad tale.
King's home had been wrecked, she wrote, and a brigade of Negroes "broke
into my home and committed outrages in my sight— I was protected by an
officer, but others were not."92 Buchanan wrote back to her, "We must
meet again, God willing" but it was not to be. Harriet met Howell Cobb
in Baltimore after the war and immediately wrote to her uncle, inquiring
if he wished to see his old friend. With pain, Buchanan replied, "I do not
wish to meet him now or hereafter. ... I wish him well and hope he may
obtain his pardon; but this is all. ... I truly pity him."93 In January,
1868, he got news of Mrs. Robb's death. Her life in Chicago during the
war had been a living hell. Her stepchildren considered her a rebel and
would not speak to her, and the political tension eventually broke up her
marriage. The hardest blows came from those former friends who had lost
a father or husband or son or brother in the war. When General John F.
Reynolds fell on the first day at Gettysburg, the family held Buchanan
almost personally responsible. All the intimacy of fifty years turned to
impassioned hate. Ellie Reynolds, who had been as close as a sister to
Harriet and for years had come to Wheatland as one of the family, could
no longer abide the mention of Buchanan's name. He wondered painfully
how many of the families broken by war felt the same. In Lancaster, he
knew, there were many.
It was pleasant, on the other hand, to hear from children who
had been named after him and asked for a photograph or an autograph.
Literary societies sent him notices of honorary membership, and gifts often
came in the mail or were delivered by deputation — canes, poems, wine,
books, and a huge liberty pole on one occasion. He was flattered that some
people in Mercersburg had bought as an historical relic the log cabin at
Stony Batter where he had been born, but he declined the invitation to pay
a ceremonial visit. "I am now in my 76th year," he wrote, "and all the
friends and acquaintances of my youth in your vicinity have been gathered
to their fathers."94
426
ON THE ROCK OF ST. HELENA • 1861 - 1868
Indeed, the allotted time had nearly gone by. A friend wrote that
Buchanan now had become "the only surviving member of the House of
Representatives as it was on the first Monday of December, 1821." "Truly,"
he replied, "we both live 'in the midst of posterity/ "9S
New life started as the old declined. Harriet had married Henry E.
Johnston, of Baltimore, in January, 1866, at a private ceremony performed
by Uncle Edward at Wheatland. Mr. Johnston, a banker, did not participate
in the high society to which Harriet had accustomed herself, but "Nunc"
heartily approved of her choice. "You have chosen the wiser part," he
said, "in selecting for your husband a gentleman of education, of good
manners & of excellent character. . . . You must forget 'the pride, pomp
& circumstance' of public life in which you have been raised. In truth, it
no longer exists."96 Buchanan lived to fondle Harriet's first child on his
knee at Wheatland and to visit her once at her Baltimore home, but this
trip greatly distressed him because his old friends declined to come to see
him at the Johnston home, and he vowed never to return to the city.
At Wheatland his thoughts turned increasingly to religion.
During the war the Presbyterian Church declined to accept him, presumably
over some doctrinal matter. At last, on September 23, 1865, the elders
eventually examined him "on his experimental evidence of piety" and
admitted him to communion.97
In May, 1868, Buchanan took seriously ill of a cold and various
complications of old age. He knew the end had come and lay in his upstairs
bedroom at Wheatland, spending much time with Hiram Swarr who would
be one of his executors. The family came, and Miss Hetty flew about in a
panic. The will he had drawn needed revision. Certain stocks ought to
be sold while the market was good. He wanted to be buried in Woodward
Hill Cemetery, Lancaster, with no pomp, public ceremony, or parade and
to have Dr. John W. Nevin perform the burial service, but had no objections
if the Masons wished to participate. He carefully specified a plain white
marble tombstone and dictated its legend. He talked much at the end
about what men in the future would say of him. The day before he died
he told Swarr, "I have always felt and stffl feel that I discharged every
public duty imposed on me conscientiously. I have no r^ret for any
public act of my life, and history will vindicate my memory."
Near half-past eight on Monday morning, June 1, 1868, James
Buchanan died at the age of seventy-eight, ffis request to be buried without
pomp or parade went unheeded. Lancaster held a public meeting in his
honor on Tuesday morning, and later in the day thousands of country folk
travelled to Wheatland to file past the casket Over 20,000 people attended
the funeral on Thursday, including official delegations from all over the
nation and scores of reporters. Orators recalled his remarkable power of
clear and logical argument and bore testimony to his "great private virtues,
427
JAMES BUCHANAN
integrity, charity, kindness and courtesy." One speaker compared him
with Lincoln. "Starting at Stony Batter, a barefoot hoy climbed to the
highest office in the world. A rail-splitter of lUinois did the same thing.
The effect of such an example is incalculable. A Republic is the only place
on earth where such a thing is possible."98
Buchanan's will defined his legacy to his friends and relatives.
He gave generous gifts to the Presbyterian Church and to the city of
Lancaster for the purchase of fuel for the poor. He provided for Miss Hetty
and remembered by small bequests the Wheatland servants. The remainder
of the estate he divided carefully among the eleven surviving descendants
of his father's family.
What was Buchanan's larger legacy, his bequest to the society to
which he had devoted his life? He exemplified in his private conduct
simplicity of manners, unfailing courtesy, and a kindly consideration for
others* Although proud of his own attainments, he remained familiar and
unaffected in his relations with others, treating his barber, his gardener
and his poor relatives with no less regard and attention than he gave to
people of eminence. In the sense that he appreciated and respected people
for their personal qualities, regardless of station, he practiced the re-
publican ideal.
Buchanan believed implicitly that a constitutional republic
represented man's greatest invention in the art of government. The success
of its trial in America depended, in his opinion, upon the willingness of
people in and out of. office to exercise self-restraint and to be willing to
accommodate their differing ideas and ambitions to the preservation of the
system. Neither state nor federal government should dominate; secession
or consolidation, each, would wreck the constitutional structure. Nor
should any branch of government, executive, legislative or judicial, try to
assert an overriding control. A "strong" president, one who overpowered
or ignored the Congress and the courts, meant an executive who would
destroy the republican form.
Which did James Buchanan regard more highly, the national
entity or the principles of free government defined in the United States
Constitution? A friend accurately answered this fundamental question on
the day of the presidential nomination at Cincinnati. Ever since James
Buchanan had been old enough to marry, he observed, "he has been wedded
to the Constitution.*'99
Buchanan, in his public and private life, demonstrated mental
toughness and moral stamina. Beyond common humanity he was devoted
to duty, industrious in ascertaining facts, tenacious of his principles, and
nearly always in control of himself. He never approved of the maxim that
in the affairs of mankind, while the intellect may persuade, the heart
controls. He preferred to hope that in a self-governing society, while the
428
ON THE ROCK OF ST. HELENA • 1861 - 1868
heart might persuade, the intellect would control. Only thus could men
curb their passions and achieve peaceful solutions to recurrent crises.
Buchanan assumed leadership of the United States when an
unprecedented wave of angry passion was sweeping over the nation. That
he held the hostile sections in check during these revolutionary times
was in itself a remarkable achievement. His weaknesses in the stormy
years of his presidency were magnified by enraged partisans of the North
and the South. His many talents, which in a quieter era might have gained
for him a place among the great presidents of his country, were quickly
overshadowed by the cataclysmic events of civil war and by the towering
personality of Abraham Lincoln. Of Buchanan it might be said, as it was
later of another, "He staked his reputation on the supremacy of reason,
and lost."
429
NOTES
CHAPTER 1 (pp. 1-12)
1. "Buchanan Chart" by L. D. Buchanan, Houston, Texas, and Genealogy and History
(Washington, D. C.), Aug. 15, 1940.
2. Records on the lineage of President James Buchanan are incomplete and contra-
dictory. The following sources have been useful: Moore, Works, , XIL 289; A. w .
Patrick Buchanan, The Buchanan Book (Montreal, 1911); D. B. Landis, ' Rev.
Edward Young Buchanan," Lancaster County Historical Society Papers, XXXII (1928),
nos. 9 and 10; MS. record prepared by Madeline B. Gill, De Land, Fla., in papers of
Mrs. B. C. Landis, Lancaster, Penna.; Buchanan papers, YCHS; letters to the author
from the Rev. Maurice G. Buchanan, Indianapolis, Ind.; Genealogy and History,
Aug. 15, 1940, and Sept. 15, 1940; James Buchanan to W. E. Robinson, Feb. 6, 1844,
Buchanan MSs., BF; James Buchanan to Charles W. Russell, Apr. 10, 1858, Bu-
chanan MSs., HSP.
3. There is considerable data on Joshua Russell, most of it in the York Coim^Hjstorical
Society and in the Office of Public Records, Harrisburg, Penna. In YCHS: Requisi-
tion for Recruits, 1781; Tax List, 1783; Tombstone Entries of Black's L Graveyard,
Cumberland Township; Orphans Court Records, Dec. 1, 1784, E203-204; York
County Deed Book, Jan. 7, 1785, 2-C, 1784-1786, p. 33. In the Office of Pubhc
Records: Jas. Darah to Joshua Russell, May 5, 1778, Revolutionary Papers, XXI,
14; York County Census (property tax lists), 1783; Post-Revolutionary Papers,
XXXV, Dec. 1786; York County Deeds, Grantee Index (microfilm), Feb. 4, 1786,
Thomas Armstrong to Joshua Russell. Other data are in Penna. Statutes at Large,
XI, 175-177, and XII, 502-509; History of Cumberland and Adams Counties (Chicago,
1886), part III, 108, 184, 251-252; Adams County Wills, I, 319, #253, Jan. 5, 1807;
Adams County' Orphans' Court, p. 21, Jan. 7, l8l2, and p. 30 ; Mar. 3, 1812; and
Bureau of Census, Heads of Families at the First Census . . . 1790 . . . Pennsylvania
(G. P. 0., 1908), p. 288.
4. On the Speer family: Franklin County Deed Book, Mar. 4, 1802, VII, 428, and
Sept. 7, 1804, VI, 328; The Speer Family Record (privately printed, Baltimore, n.d.);
G.T. Curtis, Life of James Buchanan (New York, 1883), I, 3.
5. For the early history of Cove Gap and Stony Batter: I F.
Franklin County (Chicago, 1887); Joshua Gilpin, "A Toy from Phfladdliifl
in Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography, L (1926), 169;
(New York, 1912) ; Sherman Day, Historical Collections <
1843), pp. 124-125, 354-355; J«M HrfngomL The . . .„
1780-1860 (Harrisburg, 1947), Chap. II; Historical Commission of Penna.,
(Harrisburg, 1896), I, 534-550; A. J. Morrison (ed.), TraveUm the
1783-1784,%? John Schoepf (Philadelphia, 1911), pp. 220, 223.
6. For the John Tom story: Bureau of Census, Heads of Families .. .Jtoww*. • •• 179°*
p. 114; Franklin County Deed Book I, 371; II, 145-147; article by Thomas W. Lane
m scrapbook of John Lowry Ruth, pp. 68-69, in YCHS.
7 Franklin County Deed Book, XVII, 561-562, Dec. 29, 1838. Buchanan paid $7500
" for the property. The 1838 deed recites a history of the tract.
431
JAMES BUCHANAN
8. Property of James Buchanan, Sr., is recorded m Franklin County Deed Books II,
145-147; IV, 183; VI, 140, 328; VII, 428; VIII, 110, 413. Also, Old Mercersburg,
p. 55.
9 Alice L. Black, "George Washington at the Carev House, 1794," typescript in L YCHS.
This thoroughly documented article gives a fairly full history of tlie Russell Tavern,
later the Carey House.
10 Descriptions of James Buchanan's childhood are found in: John L. Finefrock's
addrel£ on "Stony Batter," delivered at Wheatland, April 27, 1940; ^eodore Annel,
Recollections of CoUege Life at Marshall Cotte&9 Mercersbur*, Pa. (Reading, 1886),
pp 56-59; the autobiography in Moore, Works, XII; speech of Dr. Philip Schaff,
Le, Spring 1857, Described by J. Hassler in PubKc Opinion, Chambersburg,
l**^ *•*** ***OL --* _ A.... •.%• •»» i M • _ V?^i !_.M* _-_ T3f O T> «.___»
(Jarlisie. spring JLOD/, aescriDea »y j. uaaajivi. w * *w«*o v^w*-™, w*,™*
April, 1893; and W. Rush Gfflan, "James Buchanan," in Kittochtinny H. S. ,
IL 1901. For the birthplace of James Buchanan and descendants of his parents:
Old Mercersbur& letter to the Harrisbure Patriot, in John i Lowry Ruth Scrapbook,
p. 64; Reginald B. Henry to R. F. Nichols, Mar. 12, 1937; Buchanan, privately
printed genealogy of descendants of James and Elizabeth Buchanan, prepared by
Reginalof Buchanan Henry; J. M. Cooper to 0. E. Shannon, Aug. 7, 1866 (photostat
in possession of author), relating story of Buchanan birthplace and proposing to buy
cabin as historic shrine.
11. Information from conversations with the Rev. E. J. Turner, formerly of the Presby-
terian Church, Mercersburg, and church records, including a letter from Buchanan
to the Rev. Thomas Creigh, July 10, 1848, describing Dr. King. Also, Alexander
Harris, Biographical History of Lancaster County (Lancaster, 1872), pp. 341-342,
12. Appel, Recollections ofCoUege Life, pp. 56-59.
13. Carlisle Herald, Oct. 13, 1809; James H. Morgan, Dickinson^ College: The History of
One Hundred and Fifty Years, 2783-1933 (Carfisle, Penna., 1933), p. 183; Atwater to
Beniamin Rush, Aprfl 22, 1810; Atwater to the Rev. Ashbel Green, May 11, 1810,
Gratz Collection, HSP. For a full account, see Philip S. Klein, "James Buchanan at
Dickinson," in John and Mary's College (Carlisle, Penna., 1956), pp. 157-179.
14. Morgan, Dickinson College, p. 95.
15. Ibid., pp. 170-171. Roger B. Taney's recollections.
16. Ibid., p. 112.
17. Moore, Works, XII, 291.
18. Carlisle Herald, July 8, 1808.
19. Moore, Works, XII, 292.
20. Minutes of the Board of Trustees, I, 348-349, Sept. 28, 1808, DC; Carlisle Herald,
Oct. 5, 1808; Morgan, Dickinson College, p. 196.
21. Buchanan's mathematics workbook, in the Dickinsoniana Collection, DC. Another
volume is in the library at Wheatland.
22. Sept. 6, 1809, in Curtis, Buchanan, I, 6-7.
23. Moore, Works, XII, 293.
24. Carlisle Herald, Sept. 29, 1809.
CHAPTER 2 (pp. 13-26)
1. W. U. Hensel, James Buchanan as a Lawyer (Lancaster, 1912), p. 2.
2. Day, Historical Collections, p. 395.
3. Father to James, Feb. 10 and Mar. 12, 1810, Buchanan Sr. MSs., BF.
432
NOTES* CHAPTER 2
4. John, born and died, 1804; William Speer, born 1805; George Washington, born
1808; and Edward Young, born 1811.
5. Father to James, February 7 and April 19, 1811, Buchanan Sr. MSs., BF.
6. Same to same, July 11, 1811, Buchanan Sr. MSs., BF.
7. Same to same, March 18, 1812, Buchanan Sr. MSs., BF.
8. Lucius P. Little, Ben Hardin, His Times and Contemporaries (Louisville, 1887),
pp. 352-353. The best study of the whole episode is: R. Gerald McMurtry, "James
Buchanan in Kentucky, 1813," The Filson Club Historical Quarterly, April, 1934,
pp. 73-87.
9. Moore, Works, I, 1, note 1; 2.
10. Lancaster Intelligencer and Weekly Advertiser, Feb. 20, 1813.
11. Ibid., March 20, 1813.
12. Father to James, March 26, 1813, Buchanan Sr. MSs., BF.
13. Curtis, Buchanan, I, 15.
14. Buchanan to Smith, Feb. 14, 1814, Dickinsoniana Collection, DC; fragments of legal
correspondence mostly on debt collection in Buchanan MSs., BF; and miscellaneous
items m the Buchanan MSs. and Cadwalader MSs., HSR Appearance Dockets of
the Courts of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas, 1812-1821, stored in Lancaster
County Courthouse, list Buchanan as counsel in more than 150 cases from 1812 to
1815. In 1819, November term, he was on the docket as counsel in 32 separate
actions.
15. Father to James, July 11, 1811, and Sept. 10, 1813, Buchanan Sr. MSs., BF.
16. Lancaster Weekly Journal, Aug. 26, 1814, and Oct. 3, 1828; Moore, Works, XII, 293.
17. Father to James, Sept. 22, 1814, and Jan. 20, 1815, Buchanan Sr. MSs., BF.
18. Lancaster Intelligencer and Weekly Advertiser, Sept. 3, 1814; Moore, Works^l, 294.
19 Members of this troop did not qualify as veterans of the war, and their names will
not be found on official rolls. But there is ample evidence of the expedition and of
the names of the volunteers. See Lancaster Intelligencer and Weekly Advertiser,
Sept. 3, 10, 17, 1814; Moore, Works, XII, 294; Harris, BiograMcal History of
l£icaster County, p. 478; C. S. Foltz, Surgeon of the &as (Indianapolis, ,1931), p. 190;
H. M. J. Klein, Lancaster County, a History (New York, 1924), II, 596.
20. Father to James, Sept. 22, 1814, Buchanan Sr. MSs., BF.
21. Lancaster Weekly Journal, Sept. 30, Oct 21, and Nov. 18, 1814; S. W. Higginbotham,
Keystone of the Democratic Arch (Hanisburg, 1952), pp. 297-299.
22. Father to James, Oct. 21, 1814* Buchanan Sr. MSs., BF.
23. Philadelphia Aurora, Feb. 3, 1815; and Meadville Crawford Register, Feb. 23, 1817,
rive interesting accounts of the daily legislative routine. For Buchanan s proposals,
see Aurora, Jan. 6, 1815; Lancaster AtteBixencer and Weekly Advertiser, Dec. 24, 1814,
Feb. 10, 1815; Lancaster Weekly Journal, Feb. 3, 1815.
24. Father to James, Jan. 20, 1815, Buchanan Sr. MSs.f BF.
25. Curtis, Buchanan, I, 9-10.
26. Father to James, June 23, 1815, Buchanan Sr. MSs., BF.
27. This sentence may possibly have been the origin of the famous "Drop of Blood"
* story of 1828. See Chap. 5, note 8.
28. Moore, Works, I, 2-8; XII, 316-320.
29. Father to James, July 14, Sept. 1, 1815, Buchanan Sr. MSs., BF.
30. Lancaster Intelligencer and Weekly Advertiser, Oct. 14, 1815.
31. Ibid., Dec. 15, 1815.
32. Father to James, Feb. 23, 1816, Buchanan Sr. MSs.f BF.
33. Ibid, and Curtis, Buchanan, I, 15.
433
JAMES BUCHANAN
34. Buchanan MSs., HSP, contains most of the legal papers, 1816-1835.
35. Hensel, Buchanan as a Lawyer, p. 7f
36 Out of this controversy grew the case Moore v. Houston, 3 Sergeant and Rawle, 170,
m which Justice Tilghian of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court enunciated one of hxs
most famous doctrines: "Where the states are prohibited expressly by the Con-
stitution of the United States, from the exercise of power, all their power ceases
from the adoption thereof; but where the power of the state is taken awav by imph-
cation, they may continue to act until the United States exclude them." Cf. Hensel,
Buchanan as a Lawyer, p. 8.
37. Curtis, Buchanan, 1, 17.
38. Lancaster Journal, March 1, 1817, et sec;.; Lancaster Intelligencer and Weekly Ad-
writer, Mar. 22, 1817.
39 Franklin to Buchanan, March 3, Campbell to Buchanan, March 7, 1818, Buchanan
" MSs., HSP.
40. John Norvall to Roberts Vaux, March 15, 1818, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
CHAPTER 3 (pp. 27-43)
L G. F. Reed, Alumni Record of Dickinson College, passim; Frank K. Diffenderfer,
History of the Farmers Bank of Lancaster (Lancaster, 1910), p 46; WiUiam Riddje,
Story of Lancaster, Pennsylvania, Old and New (Lancaster, 1917), _p?. 122-123;
invitations to parties and Masonic items in Buchanan MSs., BF; S. R.Fraim, mimeo-
graphed history of Buchanan's work in Lodge #43, F. and A. M., dated Sept 13, 1950,
Lancaster.
2 For the Coleman family, see Frederic S. Klein, "Robert Coleman, Millionaire Iron-
master," LCES Journal, LXIV (1960), 17-33; Committee on Historical Research,
Forges and Furnaces in the Province of Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1944); H. M. J.
KleSa and Wm. F. Diller, History of St. James Church (Lancaster, 1944) ; Frankkn
Ellis, History of Lancaster County (Philadelphia, 1883), pp. 305, 465-466 and 911;
and Robert Coleman's Will, Book 0, 1, pp. 347-352, in Lancaster County Courthouse.
3. Purchased from Christopher Hager, June 18, 1807, Deed Book Y, 3, p. 561, Lancaster
County Courthouse. Buchanan later bought this as his home.
4. Ruth Scrapbook, p. 70, YCHS. This item from an undated clipping of the Phila-
delphia Press, notes an oil land title transaction in Warren County, wnich attorneys
had traced back to this deal.
5. Ellis, History of Lancaster County, p. 547.
6. Ruth Scrapbook, p. 70, and Annie Gilchrist, "First on the Turnpike," Bedford
Inquirer, Dec. 30, 1950, quoting the reminiscences of Dr. C. N. Hickok of Bedford.
7. Buchanan to William Wright, President of Columbia Bridge Company, Sept. 13,
1819, Buchanan MSs., BF; the Philadelphia Union, or United States Gazette and True
American, Nov. 30, 1819; Sheriff's Appearance Dockets, Lancaster entries for
autumn, 1819, especially pp. 84-85 which contain notes on the bridge case in
Buchanan's handwriting.
8. Lancaster Journal, Sept. 16 and Oct. 19, 1818; Oct. 22, 1819, for the local political
situation; and Nov. 27, 1819, for the Missouri Resolutions.
9. Hannah Cochran to her husband, Dec. 14, 1819, Slaymaker Collection, Lancaster.
10. Article in Ruth Scrapbook, p. 44, by Blanche Nevin, daughter of the Rev. John W.
Nevin and Martha Jenkins Nevin, daughter of Robert Jenkins of Windsor Forge.
11. Sheriff's Appearance Dockets, 1819-1820, pp. 84-85.
434
NOTES* CHAPTERS
12. Nathaniel Chapman (1780-1853). See Charles Morris (ed.), Makers of Pkilctdefyhia
(Philadelphia, 1894), p. 37. Extract from Kittera Diary is in notes of G. T. Curtis,
Buchanan M Ss., HSP. Extensive search failed to turn up the original of this diary.
13. Samuel Dale to Jacob Hibshman, Dec. 16, 1819, Hibshman MSs., The Pennsylvania
State University Library.
14. Hannah Cochrau to her husband, Dec. 14, 1819, Slaymaker Collection.
15. Curtis, Buchanan, I, 18.
16. Ruth Scrapbook, pp. 56 and 64, undated clippings from the Wyandot Union and the
Boston Budget. Curtis, Buchanan, I, 16, says that Buchanan wrote the notice
basing this statement on an unidentified diary, presumably that of Judge Franklin.
17. "Hannah Cochran letter, op. cto. For a more detailed account of the whole Ann Cole-
man episode, cf. Philip S. Klein, "James Buchanan and Ann Coleman," Pennsylvania
History, XXI (Jan., 1§54), 1-20.
18. Mother to James, Mar. 21, 1826, Buchanan Sr. MSs., BF.
19. In Buchanan MSs., HSP.
20. Story told by Judge Henry G. Long of Lancaster to "Swede" of the Cincinnati
Commercial, Swarr Scrapbook, Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF.
21. "Recollections of J. Montgomery Forster," in dippings from the Mercersburg
Journal, Rankin Scrapbook, Presbyterian Church, Mercersburg.
22. Charles Montelius to Jacob Hibshman, Dec. 11, 1820, Hibshman MSs., The Penn*
sylvania State University Library.
23. Swarr Scrapbook, Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF.
24. Buchanan to Cyrus Jacobs, June 9, 1820, Buchanan MSs., BF.
25 Philip S. Klein, "Early Lancaster County Politics," Pennsylvania. History, III
(Aprfl, 1936), 98-114, and his PemsykanL Politics, 1817-1832; A Game without
Rules (Philadelphia, 1940), Chaps. V-VL
26. Copy of the "Colebrook" letter is in Buchanan MSs., BF. The Sneer Family Record,
pp. 2-3, refers to earlier portions of the career of the "black girl, Hannah," as do the
reminiscences of John C. Finefrock, Mercersburg, in the author's possession.
27. Articles in Lancaster Journal and Pennsylvania Gazette, and especially article signed
"Investigator" in Harrisburg Republican, July 21, 1820.
28. July 26, 1820, Buchanan Sr. MSs., BF. This was the father's last letter to James
of which we have any record.
29. Lancaster Journal, August 11, 1820.
30. Ibid., Aug. 25, Sept. 1, 15, 1820.
31. Commonwealth v. Christian Weldy, Lancaster Journal, Jan. 26* 1821.
32. Commonwealth v. William Hamilton, Lancaster Journal, May 4, 1821.
33. George McDuffie to Buchanan, March 28, 1823, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
34. Josiah Quincy, Ft&nt of ike Past (Boston, 1926), p. 241.
35. Curtis, Buchanan, I, 29.
36. Ibid., I, 26.
37. Buchanan to Walter Franklin, Dec. 21, 1821, Moore, Works, 1, 10-11.
38. Notes of Judge John Cadwalader on Buchanan biography, Cadwalader MSs., HSP.
39. Moore, Works, I, 11-20.
40. Buchanan to Calhoun, Jan., 1822, Buchanan MSs., HSP; Buchanan to John
Reynolds, Jan. 1, 1822, Reynolds MSs., FM.; Lancaster Journal, Feb. 15, 1822.
41. Lancaster Journal, Mar. 29, 1822.
42. Ibid., July 12, 1822.
435
JAMES BUCHANAN
43 Buchanan to Hugh Hamilton, Mar. 22, 1822 letter printed in sale catalogue of
Alw^Tsheuer, #5, 1929, filed in New York Public Library.
44. Moore, Works, XII, 300-301.
CHAPTER 4 (pp. 44-59)
1. Buchanan to ?, Aug. 18, 1821, Buchanan MSB., HSP.
2. Klein, Pennsylvania Politics, pp. 128-130.
3. Marquis James, Andrew Jackson (New York, 1938); p. 370.
4. Pleasanton to Buchanan, March 20, 1823, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
5. Buchanan to Pleasanton, March 25, 1823, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
6. Pleasanton to Buchanan and Molton C. Rogers, April 15, 1823, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
7. McDuffie to Buchanan, March 28, 1823, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
8. Klein, Pennsylvania Politics, pp. 132-149.
9. Buchanan to John Sergeant, May 9, 1823, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
10. Lancaster Journal, August 1, 15, 1823,
11. Hugh Hamilton to Buchanan, Sept. 13, 1823, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
12. Klein, Pennsylvania Politics, p. 138.
13. Undated drafts of letters from Buchanan to Mrs Blake, of 1823, are misfikd in die
box containing letters to Buchanan, Nov. 1840, in Buchanan MSs., rlbr. Also,
George Blake to Buchanan, Mar. 30, 1823.
14. Gibson to Buchanan, Jan. 13, 1824, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
15. Klein, Pennsylvania Politics, pp. 161-162.
16. Ibid., pp. 120-124.
17. Pennsylvania Manual, 1933, p. 388; the Philadelphia Democratic Press, Nov. 18, 1814,
gives slightly different returns.
18. Buchanan to Thomas Elder, Jan. 2, 1825, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
19. Markley to Buchanan, Jan. 23, 1825, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
20. Rogers to Buchanan, Dec. 27, 1824, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
21. Marquis James says: "Mr. Buchanan's motive [in interviewing Jackson] seems not
to have been more reprehensible than an effort to help Jackson despite nunself, jwd
to spare Clay the possible consequences of a dangerous game." Jackson (1938 ed.j,
Chap. XXV.
22. Rogers to Buchanan, Dec. 27, 1824, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
23. A. H. Wharton, Sodal Life in the Early Republic (Philadelphia, 1902), p. 196.
24. Quincy, Figures of the Past, pp. 296-298.
25. Buchanan to the editor of the Lancaster Journal, Aug. 8, 1827; Moore, Works, I*
263-267; Richard Stenherg, "The Corrupt Bargain Calumny," Pennsylvania Magazine
of History and Biography, Jan. 1934; Curtis, Buchanan, I, 41-44; J. S. Bassett,
Life of Andrew Jac&on (Garden City, 1911), I, 356-362; James, Jackson (1938 ed.),
pp. 414445.
26. Calvin Colton (ed.), The Works of Henry day (New York, 1904), I, 418; Bassett,
Jackson, I, 356-362; Buchanan to Elder, Jan. 2, 1825, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
27. Klein, Pennsylvania Politics, pp. 182-183.
436
NOTES* CHAPTERS
28. L. D. Baldwin, Pittsburgh, the Story of a City (Pittsburgh, 1937), p. 289.
29. A. L. Hayes to George Wolf, Nov. 9, 1829, Wolf MSs., HSP.
30. Green to Buchanan, Oct. 12, 1826, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
31. Buchanan to Green, Oct. 16, 1826, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
32. Ingham to Buchanan, July 6, 1827, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
33. "To the Editor of the Lancaster Journal, August 8, 1827," Moore, Works, I, 263-267.
34. Andrew Porter to J. S. Johnston, Aug. 6, 1827, Johnston MSs., HSP.
35. J. H. Pleasants to J. S. Johnston, Aug. 6, 1827, Johnston MSs., HSP.
36. day to Francis Brooke, Aug. 14, 1827, Colton (ed.), Works of Henry Clay, I, 169.
37. R. P. Letcher to Clay, Aug. 27, 1827, ibid., I, 171.
38. Aug. 11, 1827, Rawle MSs., HSP.
39. Calhoun to John McLean, Sept. 3, 1827, McLean MSs., LC.
40. Daniel Webster to Clay, Aug. 22, 1827, Colton, op. dt., I, 170.
41. Rogers to Buchanan, Aug. 12, 1827, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
42. J. R. Speer to Buchanan, Feb. 1, 1828, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
43. Buchanan to Ingham, Aug. 9, 1827, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
44. Green to Buchanan, July 19; Buchanan to Green, Aug. 17, 1827, Buchanan MSs,
HSP,
45. Buchanan to Ingham, Aug. 9, 1827, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
46 Jackson to Kendall, Sept. 4, 1827, J. S. Bassett and J. F. Jameson (eds.), Corre-
" spondence (Washington, 1926-1935), III, 381.
47. Van Buren to Jackson, Sept. 14, 1827, Van Buren MSs., LC.
CHAPTER 5 (pp. 60-77)
1. William B. Fordney to Buchanan, April 15, 1828, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
2. Moore, Works, I, 283-312.
3. Lancaster Journal, May 30, 1828.
4. Pottstown Times, Mar. 9, 1891 (letter of Thos. J. McCamant).
5 C F and E. M. Richardson, Charles Miner, a Pennsylvania Pioneer (Wflkes-Barre,
" 1926), p. 126.
6 J W G Lescure to Buchanan, June 11, 1828; Isaac D. Barnard to Buchanan,
" July 1, 1828, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
7. Lancaster Journal, July 11, 1828.
8 It seems very unlikely that Buchanan made this statement. His 1815 speech was
formal written in advance, and printed from the manuscript ; immediateTy after its
o£™err Nomention of the alleged statement appeared until thirteen years later,
during tie 1828 election when Buchanan's change of party became the main issue.
A* +iil+ rim A an antiJRnphanan oartisan made an anadavi!: that ne bad. neara JDUcnanan
^^?DwpH$^WTml815. Otfan who had attended the 1815
meeting denied that Buchanan had used the word*. No one in 1828 seenw to hare
ated version eluded
437
JAMES BUCHANAN
The Lancaster Journal, July 25 and Aug. 1, 1828, prints the contemporary charge
SmdbiS^rfSie activities of the Washington Society in 1814-1815, listing Buchanan
as an officer, are in collections of the LCHS.
9. Lancaster Journal, Aue. 1, 1828, Letter of "Volunteer " and Aug. 8, «* answer to
Marietta Pioneer', Joseph Sharp to Buchanan, Aug. 6, 1828; L. Edwards to Buchanan,
Aug. 15, 1828, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
10. Lancaster Journal, Aug. 22, 1828, cites part of the Pioneer article with material
to refute charges.
11. Buchanan to E. C. Reigart, Aug. 19, 1828, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
12 E. C. Reigart to Buchanan, Aug. 19, 1828; James Humes to the Public, Aug. 21, 1828,
Buchanan MSs., HSP; Moore, Works, I, 303.
13. Lancaster Journal, Aug. 29, Sept. 5, 1828.
14. Buchanan to Thomas Elder, Feh. 13, 1827, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
15 Hanisburg Argus, July 12, 1828. On the tariff, see also: M. R. Eiselen, Rife of
' Protectionism fn Pennsylvania (Philadelphia, 1921); Klein, Pennsylvania Pohtics,
Chap IX; and Robert V. Rimini, Martin Van Buren and the Making oftne Democratic
Party (New York, 1959), Chap. XII.
16. Amos Kendall to Henry Baldwin, July 15, 1827, Reynolds Collection, Meadville, Pa.
17. George Buchanan to brother James, July 20, 1827, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
18. J. R. Speer to Buchanan, Feb. 1, 1828, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
19. Buchanan's remarks of June 23, printed in Lancaster Journal, June 29, 1827.
20. Lancaster Journal, July 20, 1827.
21. Buchanan to Joseph Sharpe, Aug. 9, 1828, Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF.
22. Lancaster Journal, Oct. 17, 1828.
23. Ibid., Nor. 14, 1828.
24. Hugh Hamilton to Buchanan, Jan. 6, 1825, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
25. Buchanan to Thomas Kittera, Jan. 2, 1829, Dickinsoniana, DC.
26. Sam Cochran to Hannah Cochran, Sept. 10, 1828, Slaymaker MSs.; Simon Cameron
to Buchanan, Feb. 4, 1829, Buchanan MSs., HSP. The Commencement Program
of Dickinson College, Sept. 24, 1828, contains a note that the scheduled address by
Buchanan had to be cancelled because of his illness.
27. Louis McLane to Van Buren, Feb. 19, 1829, Van Buren MSs., LC.
28. John Kerlin to W. M. Meredith, Feb. 12, 1829, Meredith MS., HSP; Franklin Re-
pository (Chambersburg, Penna.), April 7, 1829.
29. James, Jackson (1938 ed.), p. 491.
30. Baldwin to Stephen Simpson, July 21, 1829, quoted in Franklin Repository, T>ec.
27, 1831.
31. Buchanan to John McLean, June 11, 1829, McLean MSs., LC.
32. Crawford Messenger (Meadville, Penna.), April 16, 1829.
33. Buchanan to Barnard, Mar. 11, 1829, Dickinsoniana, DC.
34. Joel Sutherland to George Wolf, May 12, 1829, Wolf MSs., HSP.
35. George Barton to Buchanan, July 16, 1829, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
36. Buchanan to Barnard, Aug. 20, 1829, Dickinsoniana, DC.
37. Buchanan to George Wolf, Oct. 15, 1829, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
38. Group of letters, NOT., Dec., 1829, in Miscellaneous Collection, Office of Public
Records, Harrisburg.
39. Klein, Pennsylvania Politics, p. 291.
438
NOTES* CHAPTER 6
40. Crawford Messenger, Nov. 26, 1829, quoting Carlisle Herald. The Lancaster papers
printed nothing about the local fracas.
41. Buchanan to Wolf, Dec. 12, 1829, Miscellaneous Collection, Office of Public
Records, Harrisburg.
42. Sutherland to Wolf, Dec. 20, 1829; Van Amringe to Wolf, Nov. 18, 1829; A. S.
Hayes to Wolf, Dec. 9, 1829, Wolf MSs., HSP,
43. Samuel McKean to Benjamin Champneys, April 4 and 26, 1830, Miscellaneous
Collection, Office of Public Records, Harrisburg.
44. I. D. Barnard to Buchanan, April 1, 1830, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
45. W. Stewart to Buchanan, June 19, 1830, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
46. H. A. Muhlenberg to Wolf, April 15, 1830; D. H. Miller to Wolf, April 23, 1830,
Wolf MSs., HSP.
47. Wolf to S. D. Ingham, April 23, 1831, Miscellaneous Collection, Office of Public
Records, Harrisburg.
48. Moore, Works, I, 421.
49. Hensel, James Buchanan as a Lawyer, p. 15.
50. Moore, Works, II, 67-73.
51. Hensel, op. eft., p. 16.
52 C. F. Adams (ed.), Memoirs of John Quincy Adams (Philadelphia, 1874-1877), VIII,
306-307. Jan. 31, 1831.
53 Culver H. Smith, "Washington Press of the Jacksonian Era" (Ph.D. thesis, Duke
" University), pp. 245-246; Klein, Pennsylvania Politics, p. 299.
54. Klein, op. at., pp. 301-310.
55. George Wolf to S. D. Ingham, April 23, 1831, Miscellaneous Collection, Office of
Public Records, Harrisburg.
56. Curtis, Buchanan, I, 110.
CHAPTER 6 (pp. 78-94)
1. J. H. Eaton to Buchanan, May 31, 1831, Curtis, Buchanan, 1, 130.
2. Buchanan to Eaton, June 4, 1831, ibid.
3. Curtis, Buchanan, I, 130-134, prints the correspondence.
4. George Plitt to Buchanan, July 3, 1831, Buchanan MSs., Box I, LC.
5. Ibid, and Crawford Messenger, July 14* Aug. 18, 1831.
6 Buchanan to John Reynolds, Sept. 25, 1831, Reynolds MSs., FM; Buchanan to
" Jackson, Sept. 10, 1831, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
7. Buchanan to Jackson, Sept. 10, 1831, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
8. Elizabeth Speer Buchanan to Buchanan, Oct. 21, [1831], Buchanan Sr. MSs., BF.
9. George Wolf to S. D. Ingham, April 23, 1831, Miscellaneous Collection, Office of
* Public Records, Harrisburg.
10. Buchanan to Wolf, Jan. 31, 1832, Miscellaneous Collection, Office of Public Records,
Harrisburg.
11. Ibid.
12. Edward Livingston to Buchanan, Feb. 24* 1832, Buchanan MSs., BF.
439
JAMES BUCHANAN
13. Livingston to Buchanan, Jan. 12, 1832, Moore, Works, II, 182.
14 Reynolds MSs., FM., has a series of letters, 1831-1834, dealing with Buchanan's
personal finances and Reynolds's management of them.
15. Diary entry of Mar. 21, 1832, Moore, Works, II, 182.
16. Stephen Pleasanton to Buchanan, Mar. 30, 1832, Buchanan MSs., Box I, LC.
17. Receipt in Buchanan MSs., HSP.
18. Moore, Works, II, 384.
19. Ibid., II, 184.
20 Rental contract, June 17, 1832, between Buchanan and Anna Michavlova, agent for
" Brockhauser. Document is in Buchanan's handwriting, in French. Buchanan
MSs., BF.
21 The dates used by Buchanan in his correspondence from this point until his de-
" parture from Russia are according to the New Style Russian calendar. Most of his
fetters are endorsed (N.S.) to indicate the use of the Gregorian calendar system,
12 days ahead of the Julian calendar which was still used by many in Russia.
22. Buchanan to Livingston, June 12, 1832, Moore, Works, II, 194-195.
23. Buchanan to Reynolds, Aug. 6, 1832, Dickinsoniana, DC.
24. Moore, Works, II, 195.
25. Ibid., II, 226.
26. Buchanan to Reynolds, Aug. 16, 1832, Reynolds MSs., FM.
27. Moore, Works, II, 282.
28. Ibid., II, 288.
29 Reminiscences of L Montgomery Forster, in the Mercersburg Journal. Clipping in
Rankin Scrapbook, in possession of the Rev. E. J. Turner, Mercersburg.
30. Moore, Works, II, 232.
31. Buchanan to Reynolds, Aug. 16, 1832, Reynolds MSs., FM.
32. Moore, Works, II, 198, 199, 218, 265.
33. Ibid., II, 244, 253-254.
34. Ibid., II, 280-281.
35. Ibid., II, 282-283.
36. Buchanan to James Humes, Oct. 13, 1832, Dickinsoniana, DC.
37. Moore, Works, II, 288.
38. Reminiscences of J. Montgomery Forster, loc. cto.
39. Moore, Works, II, 205.
40. Ibid., II, 334.
41. Ibid., II, 302.
42. Ibid., II, 323:
43. Ibid., II, 320.
44. Ibid., II, 329.
45. Ibid., II, 360-366, diary entries of June, 1833.
46. Buchanan to Harriet Henry, Aug. 3, 1832, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
47. Curtis, Buchanan, I, 210.
48. Buchanan to John Reynolds, July 3, 1833, Dickinsoniana, DC.
49. Buchanan to Reynolds, Jan. 2, Mar. 20, May 19, 1833, Reynolds MSs., FM.
440
NOTES* CHAPTER?
50. Moore, Works, II, 381. For an interesting analysis of the mission, see Joseph 0.
Baylen, "James Buchanan's 'Calm of Despotism,' " Pennsylvania Magazine of
History and Biography, LXXVII (July, 1953), 294-310; also Thomas P. Martin,
"Initiation of James Buchanan as an American Diplomat — His Mission to Russia,
1832," Junto SefectoiwJPennsylvania Historical Junto, Washington, D. C., 1946),
pp. 48-60. See also W. B. Hatcher, Edward Livingston (University, La., 1940),
Chap. 15, and Francis Rawle, "Edward Livingston," in American Secretaries of State
and Their Diplomacy, ed. by 5. F. Bemis, vol. lV.
CHAPTER 7 (pp. 95-104)
1 August 18, 19, 20, 1833. Packet of endorsed travel folders and itemized bills,
Buchanan MSs., BF; Buchanan to John Reynolds, Sept 17, 1833, Reynolds MSs.,
FM.
2. Moore, Works, II, 387; Buchanan to John Reynolds, Sept. 17, 1833, Reynolds MSs.,
FM.
3. Moore, Works, II, 390.
4. Ibid., II, 394.
5. Ibid., II, 392, 393.
6. Buchanan to John Reynolds, Oct. 7, 1833, Reynolds MSs., FM.
7. Moore, Works, II, 267.
8. Lee Crippen, Simon Cameron (Oxford, Ohio, 1942), p. 21.
9. Cameron to Buchanan, Dec. 29, 1836, Crippen, Cameron, p. 21.
10. Curtis, Buduman, I, 147; Buchanan to John Reynolds, May 19, 1833, Reynolds
MSs., JbJVl.
11. Buchanan to Campbell P. White, Jan. 2, 1833, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
12. Curtis, Buduman, I, 152,
13. Ibid., I, 184-185, 192.
14. Buchanan to John Reynolds, Mar. 20, 1833, Reynolds MSs., FM.
15. Buchanan to Reynolds, July 3, 1833, Dicldnsoniana, DC.
16. Buchanan to John Reynolds, Jan. 21, May 19, 1833, Reynolds MSs., FM.
17 Buchanan to J. B. Sterigere, May 19, to G. Leiper, July 3. 1833, Curtis, flucftomw,
I, 189, 206.
18. George Plitt to Buchanan, July 19, 1833, Buchanan MSs., Box I, LC.
19. Buchanan to Reynolds, Nov. 24, 1833, Reynolds MSs., FM.
20. Cameron to Buchanan, Dec. 4, 7, 1833, Crippen, Cameron, pp. 22-23.
21. Buchanan to Jackson, Jan. 18, 1834, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
22. Moore, Works, II, 397; III, 248.
23. Ibid., II, 398.
24. Obituary notices of Esther Parker, Ruth Scrapbook, YCHS, p. 14.
25. Buchanan to Thomas Kittera, Oct. 9, 1834, Schoch MSs., BF.
441
JAMES BUCHANAN
26. Agreement of Mar. 10, 1835, in Buchanan's handwriting, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
27. Buchanan to Thomas Kittera, Oct. 9, 1834; Sept. 25, 1837, April 25, 1843, Schoch
" MSs BF. Buchanan was on terms of intimacy with the whole Kittera family, from
the grandmother (Ann Moore, nee Hopkins of Lancaster) to the grandchildren.
Mary Kittera Snyder's sister, Elizabeth, married a close friend of Buchanan, James
C Van Dyke of Philadelphia, in this period. Buchanan regularly stayed at the
Kittera or the Van Dyke home when on visits to Philadelphia. For more information
on Mary Snyder, see William A. Russ, Jr., "Mary Kittera Snyder's struggle for an
Income," in Snyder County Historical Society Bulletin, IV, #1 (1959), 1-27.
28. Buchanan to Jacoh Kern, et al., Dec. 22, 1834, Curtis, Buchanan, I, 229, and
Buchanan draft in Cadwalader MSs., HSP.
CHAPTER 8 (pp. 105-115)
1 J Mitchell to Buchanan, Ian. 15, 1835; John Dickey to Buchanan, Jan. 9, 1835;
" Henry Buehler to Buchanan, Jan. 15, 1835, Buchanan MSs., HSP. Charles M.
Snyder, "Pennsylvania Politics, 1833-1847," Ph.D. thesis, University of Pennsyl-
vania, clearly explains the details of much that is summarized in this chapter. See
p% 111 et seq. of the typescript. Though Snyder's work is published as The Jadcsonian
Heritage (Hanishurg, 1958), all my references are to the thesis which is more
detailed.
2. Muhlenherg to Buchanan, March 24, 1835, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
3 Buchanan to Thomas Kittera, Mar. 28, 1835; Buchanan to George Wolf, Mar. 28,
1835, Buchanan MSs., BF.
4. Buchanan to Mahlon Dickerson, June 18, 1835, Dickinsoniana, DC
5. Moore, Work, II, 443.
6. Buchanan to ?,'Nov. 18, 1835, Dickinsoniana, DC.
7. Buchanan to Ovid Johnston, May 2, 1836, Dickinsoniana, DC; Moore, Works, III,
114 ff., quotes the speech.
8. Buchanan to Thomas Elder, Oct. 15, 1836, Buchanan MSs., HSP,
9. Buchanan to Van Buren, Nov. 18, 1836, Moore, Works, III, 128-129.
10. Snyder, "Pennsylvania Politics," pp. 154-156.
11. Buchanan to Thomas Elder, Nov. 7, 1836, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
12. Moore, Works* HI, 147-154.
13. Jan. 12 and 14, 1837, ibid., Ill, 166-167.
14. Feb. 19, 1837, ibid^ III, 220.
15. Feh. 28, 1837, ibid., Ill, 247.
16. Rid., HI, 213-214.
17. Ibid., HI, 220.
18. Ibid., Ill, 249.
19. J. Fred Rippy, Joel Poinsett Purham, N. C., 1935), p. 168.
442
NOTES* CHAPTER 9
CHAPTER 9 (pp. 116-128)
1. Snyder, "Pennsylvania Politics," p. 167.
2. John McCahen to Buchanan, April 7, 1837, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
3. Buchanan to John McCahen, April 1, 1837, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
4. Peter Wager to Buchanan, March 30, 1837, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
5. Bray Hammond, Banks and Politics in America (Princeton, 1957), Chap. 12.
6. Moore, Works, III, 273.
7. Wager to Buchanan, March 30, 1837, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
8. John Miles to Buchanan, April 7, 1837, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
9. Benjamin Parker to Buchanan, April 4, 1837, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
10. Charles Miner to Buchanan, April 23, 1837, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
11. Buchanan to F. P. Blair, April 22, 1837, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
12. Moore, Works, III, 250.
13. Buchanan to James M. Porter, June 9, 1837, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
14. C. J. Ingersoll to Buchanan, June 6, 1837, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
15. Buchanan to F. P. Blair, June 3, 1837, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
16. Moore, Works, III, 265; Kittera to Buchanan, May 15, 1837, Buchanan MSs., HSP,
17. Buchanan to James M. Porter, June 9, 1837, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
18. William R. King to Buchanan, April 2, 1837, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
19. Buchanan MSs., HSP.
20. Samuel Parke to Buchanan, April 4, 1837, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
21. Buchanan to Van Buren, June 5, 1837, Moore, Works, III, 252-254.
22 Jackson to Buchanan, Dec. 26, 1837, Curtis, Buchanan, I, 421, and Moore, Works,
III, 264-314.
23. George Plitt to Buchanan, Oct. 13, 1837, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
24. George Plitt to Buchanan, Nov. 20, 1837, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
25. J. W. Forney to Buchanan, Feh. 27, 1838, Buchanan MSa., HSP.
26. Moore, Works, III, 380-385.
27. William B. Fordney to Buchanan, Jan. 22, 1838, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
28. Moore, Works, III, 451.
29. Buchanan to Harriet Henry, Oct. 26, 1839, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
30. Buchanan to Harriet Henry, Nov. 4, 1838 (misdated 1837), Buchanan MSs., HSP.
31. Buchanan to Dr. C. M. Yates, Nov. 21, 1838, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
32. Buchanan to Edward Y. Buchanan, Sept. 1, 1832, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
33. Same to same, Dec. 10, 1838, Cadwdader MSs., HSP.
34. Buchanan to Maria Yates, Jan. 3, 1831, Nichols photostats.
35. Same to same, Dec. 26, 1834, Nichols photostats.
36. Buchanan to Dr. C. M. Yates, Oct. 25 and 30, 1840, Nichols photostats.
443
JAMES BUCHANAN
CHAPTER 10 (pp. 129-141)
1. Buchanan to John McClintock, Mar. 11, 1839; Buchanan to S. W. Randall, Sept 16,
1839, Buchanan MSs., HSP; Snyder, "Pennsylvania Politics," pp. 246, 261-262.
2. Buchanan to Dr. C. M. Yates, undated [summer, 1839], Nichols photostats.
3. Ibid.
4. Moore, Works, IV, 121.
5. J. W. Forney to Buchanan, Jan. 16, 1839, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
6. Buchanan to S. W. Randall, Sept. 16, 1839, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
7. Van Buren to Buchanan, Dec. 27, 1839, Moore, Works, IV, 124.
8. J. V. Forney to Buchanan, Feb. 5, 1840, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
9. Buchanan to D. R. Porter, Feb. 24, 1840, Grate Collection, HSP.
10. Curtis, Buchanan, I, 400.
11. Forney to Buchanan, Mar. 10, 1840, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
12. Same to same, April 11, 1840, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
13. Same to same, Dec. 2, 1829, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
14. Moore, Works, IV, 210.
15. David Lynch to Buchanan, Dec. 3, 1840, Lynch MSs., LCHS.
16. Snyder, "Pennsylvania Politics," pp. 264-266.
17. Buchanan to Benjamin Mifflin, Aug. 20, 1840, Moore, Works, IV, 321.
18. R. M. Barr to Buchanan, June 19, 27, 28, 1840, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
19. Forney to Buchanan, July 13, 1840, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
20. Same to same, April 16, 1840, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
21. Moore, Works, IV, 319, 324.
22. Ibid., IV, 322.
23. J. W. Forney, Anecdotes of Public Men (New York, 1873), p. 182.
24. W. D. Burnham, Presidential Battots, 1836-1892 (Baltimore, 1955), pp. 704-720.
25. Nov. 18, 1840, Moore, Works, IV, 325.
26. Buchanan to Dr. Edward C. Gazzam, Dec. 11, 1840, Dickinsoniana, DC.
27. Buchanan to Edward Y. Buchanan, Jan. 19, 1841, Cadwalader MSs., HSP.
28. Edward Stanwood, A History of the Presidency (New York, 1898), p. 195, note 1.
29. Buchanan to D. R. Porter, Feb. 9, 1841, Moore, Works, IV, 380.
30. David Lynch to ?, June, 1841, Lynch MSs., LCHS.
31. Jonathan M. Foltz to Buchanan, Aug. 17, 1841, Buchanan-Swan MSs., Section G, BF.
32. Buchanan to Edward C. Gazzam, Sept. 14, 1841, Dickinsoniana, DC.
33. Buchanan to Francis R. Shunk, May 6, 1841, Moore, Works, IV, 405.
34. J. W. Forney to Buchanan, June 4, 1841, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
35. Snyder, "Pennsylvania Politics," p. 296.
36. David Lynch to Buchanan, Nov. 21, 1841 and Jan. 8, 1842, Lynch MSs., LCHS.
37. Forney to Buchanan, June 16, 1841, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
38. Ibid.
39. David Lynch to Buchanan, Dec. 9, 1841, Lynch MSs., LCHS.
40. Forney to Buchanan, Dec. 10, 1841, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
444
NOTES* CHAPTER 11
41. April 16, 1840, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
42. Buchanan to William Fiynn, Sept. 5, 1841, Moore, Works, V, 72.
43. Buchanan to John Reynolds, Feb. 22, 1841, Dickinsoniana, DC.
CHAPTER 11 (pp. 142-150)
1. Moore, Works, V, 117-119.
2. Ibid., II, 421 ff.
3. Ibid., Ill, 168494.
4. Buchanan to John Reynolds, Dec. 19, 1844, Reynolds MSs., FM.
5. Moore, Works, III, 239-246, 259-264; V, 30.
6. J. M. Callahan, American Policy in Canadian Relations (New York, 1937), pp. 148-
149, 188.
7. Moore, Works, V, 363-364, 368, 383; Curtis, Buchanan, I, 505,
8. Moore, Works, III, 359.
9. Ibid., Ill, 61-62.
10. Ibid., Ill, 64.
11. Ibid., V, 477.
12. Ibid., VI, 15-17.
13. Ibid., Ill, 86.
14. For the debate, see Moore, Works, III, 1, 8, 24, 205, 328; Congressional Globe, 24th
Congress, 1st session, 78, 85, 95, 182-183, 221-222.
15. Moore, Works, III,- 14-16.
16. Ibid., Ill, 18, and Congressional Globe, 24th Congress, 1st session, 222.
17. Jeremiah Cooper to Buchanan, Feb. 26, 1838, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
18. P. W. Pell to Buchanan, Jan. 9, 1838, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
19. King to Buchanan, Dec. 20, 1837, Cadwalader MSs., HSP.
20. Elder to Buchanan, Dec. 23, 1837, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
21. Buchanan to Jonas McClintock, Jan. 12, 1838, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
22. Congressional Globe, 25th Congress, 2nd session, 55.
23. Moore, Works, III, 343.
24. Ibid., Ill, 344-345.
25. Ibid., Ill, 27.
CHAPTER 12 (pp. 151-162)
1. Moore, Works, IV, 264; Snyder, "Pennsylvania Politics," pp. 294-295.
2. Forney to Buchanan, Dec. 16, 1841, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
3. Buchanan to Dr. Jonathan Foltz, Dec. 14, 1842, Buchanan MSs.f HSP.
445
JAMES BUCHANAN
4. Brewster to Buchanan, Nov. 19, 1843, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
5 David Lynch to Buchanan, April 8, 1842, Lynch MSs., LCHS; Buchanan-Swarr
" MSs., BF, contains these political notebooks.
6. Forney to Buchanan, Dec. 10, 1841, Jan. 2, 1842, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
7 Snyder, "Pennsylvania Politics," p. 303; Forney to Buchanan, Feb. 7 and Mar. 4,
' 1842, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
8. Porter to Buchanan, Feb. 20, 1842, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
9. Buchanan to T. L. Hamer, Nov. 29, 1842, Dickinsoniana, DC.
10. Forney to Buchanan, Dec. 5, 1842, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
11. Buchanan to T. L. Hamer, Nov. 29, 1842, Dickinsoniana, DC.
12. Forney to Buchanan, Dec. 5, 1842, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
13. Note, dated Jan. 10, 1843, in Buchanan's County Index book, Buchanan-Swarr
MSs BF describes these events. Also Forney to Buchanan, Jan. 10, 1843, Buchanan
MSsl, HSP.
14. Forney to Buchanan, Jan. 13, 1843, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
15. Forney to Buchanan, Dec. 15, 1840, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
16 Buchanan to Benjamin Champneys, Jan. 13, 1843; Forney to Buchanan, Jan. 25,
' 1843, Buchanan MSs., HSP; Buchanan to Reah Frazer, Feb. 18, 1843, Dickm-
soniana, DC.
17 Buchanan to George L. Leiper, July 22, 1843 ; Buchanan to George Plitt, Mar. 9, 1843,
" Buchanan MSs., HSP.
18. Buchanan to Dr. Jonathan Foltz, April 21, 1843, Foltz MSs.
19 A. C. Ramsey to Buchanan, Apr. 17, 1843, Buchanan MSs., Box I, LC; Buchanan to
' Mrs. Heister, June 16, 1843, collection of the late C. H. Martin, Lancaster, Penna.
20. Buchanan to Harriet Lane, July 25, 1843, Buchanan MSs., Box I, LC.
21 list of purchases by Buchanan at sheriff's sale of property of H. Y. Slaymaker in
York County, Nov. 3, 4, 1842, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
22. Mar. 18, 1842, draft in Buchanan's handwriting, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
23. Curtis, Buchanan* I, 519.
24. David Lynch to Buchanan, Dec. 2, 1842, Lynch MSs., LCHS.
25. Buchanan to John M. Read, Dec. 5, 1843, Dickinsoniana, DC.
26. Snyder, "Pennsylvania Politics," pp. 329-330.
27. Moore, Works, V, 437-439.
28. Charles M. Wiltse, John C. Calhoun, Sectionalism (Indianapolis, 1951), pp. 158-171.
29. Snyder, "Pennsylvania Politics," p. 310; Henry Welsh to Buchanan, May 20, 1844,
Buchanan MSs./ HSP.
30. Buchanan to Mr. J. L Roosevelt, May 13, 1844, Moore, Works, ,VI, 1-3.
31. Moore, Works, VI, 4.
32. Ibid., VI, 3.
33. Niles National Register, LXVI, 259.
34. Moore, Works, VI, 5-44.
35. Cameron to Buchanan, July 2, 1844, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
36. Moore, Works, VI, 61.
37. Buchanan to Shunk, Aug. 14, 15, 30, 1844; Shunk to Buchanan, Aug. 17, 1844;
Cameron to Buchanan, Sept. 5, 1844, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
38. Moore, Works, VI, 70.
446
NOTES* CHAPTER 13
39. Buchanan to ?, Sept. 18, 1844, Dickinsoniana, DC.
40. Moore, Works, VI, 71.
CHAPTER 13 (pp. 163-174)
1. Buchanan to Polk, Nov. 4, 1844, Moore, Works, VI, 72.
2. Penna. Electors to Polk, Dec. 5, 1844, Cadwalader MSs., HSP.
3. Franklin P. Hillman, "The Diplomatic Career of James Buchanan," The George
Washington Univ. Ph.D. thesis, 1953, typescript, p. 77.
4. Catron to Buchanan, Jan. 23, 1845, Moore, Works, VI, 82.
5. Buchanan to Shunk, Dec. 18, 1844, Moore, Works, VI, 76.
6 Cameron to Buchanan, Dec. 7, 1844, Buchanan MSs., Box I, LC; B. F. Brewster to
Buchanan, Jan. 19, 1845, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
7. Polk to Buchanan, Feb. 17, 1845, Moore, Works, VI, 110.
8. Buchanan to Polk, Feb. 18, 1845, Moore, Works, VI, 111-112.
9. Moore, Works, VI, 108-109.
10 Mrs S Pleasanton to Buchanan, Feh. 1845, Buchanan MSs., LC; Ben Perley Poore,
' Pertey's Reminiscences (Philadelphia, 1886), 1, 332; Wharton, Social Life, pp. 303*304.
The Lancaster Dotty Intettieencer, Feb. 1, 1935, describes a Buchanan residence at
918 E. Street, N.W. in 1845.
11. Moore, Works, VI, 411-412, gives a full description of the organization of the State
Department which shows that in the previous twenty-eight years the staff had
increased 35 per cent; the foreign missions of the U. S., 236 per cent; and the con-
sulates, 153 per cent. An even greater increase in Department functions had taken
place in the Home Bureau. See also Graham H. Stuart, The Department of State
{New York, 1949), Chap. 9.
12. Buchanan to Caleb Gushing, April 26, 1845, Dickinsoniana, DC.
13. Cameron to Buchanan, Dec. 7, 1844, Buchanan MSs., Box I, LC.
14. Cameron to Col. Schoch, Feb. 27, 1845, Cameron item, LCHS.
15. Forney to Morton McMichael, Mar. 14, 1845, Forney MSs. LC; the eruption over
the election of Cameron is described in detail in Snyder, "Pennsylvania Politics,"
pp. 347 ff,, and Crippen, Cameron, pp. 58 ff.
16. Moore, Works, VI, 136-138.
17. Snyder, op. at., p. 352.
18. Forney to Buchanan, Mar. 21, 23, 1845, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
19. Series of letters, March through October, 1845, Forney to Buchanan, in Forney Box,
Buchanan MSs., HSP.
20. Brewster to Buchanan, Maj 6, July 1, Nov. 12, 1845, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
21. Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF.
22. Forney to Buchanan, June 28, 1845, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
23. Cameron to Buchanan, Sept. 17, 1845, Buchanan MSs., Box 1, 1C.
24. Milo M. Quaife fed.), Diary of James K. Polk (Chicago, 1910), I, 39, 45-47. Here-
after cited as Polk, Diary.
25. Ibid., I, 138.
26. Brewster to Buchanan, Nov. 7, 1845, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
447
JAMES BUCHANAN
27. Forney to Buchanan, Oct. 30, 1845, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
28. Polk, Diary, I, 137.
29 Snyder, "Pennsylvania Politics," pp. 376-377; Crippen, Cameron, pp. 79-81;
" Cameron to Buchanan, Dec. 25, 1845, Buchanan MSs., Box I, LC.
30. Polk, Diary, I, 144-146.
31. Snyder, op. cit., pp. 349-352, notes that the Democrats were Benton of Missouri,
Sevier iW Ashley of Arkansas, and Yulee and Westcott of Florida. Allan Neyms's
short edition of Folk's Diary (New York, 1929), p. 44, note 6, states that Woodward
was also opposed by two Virginia Senators who hoped to place Buchanan in the
Supreme Court and persuade Polk to appoint Virginia's Andrew Stevenson Secretary
of State.
32. Polk, Diary, I, 189.
33. Buchanan to E. E, Lester, Gratz Collection, HSP.
34 Boston Journal, Jan. 26, 1883, "Old Time Washington Gayeties;" Wharton, Social
' Life, p. 278.
35. Accounts of George Plitt, manager of the affair, Jan. 23, 1846, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
36. Crippen, Cameron, p. 82.
37. Polk, Diary, II, 27.
38. Niles National Register, Aug. 1, 1845, p. 345.
39. Buchanan to Polk, June 28, 1846, Cadwalader MSs., HSP.
40. James to Edward Y. Buchanan, July 13, 1846, Cadwalader MSs., HSP.
41. Forney to Buchanan, June 21, 1846, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
42 Roy F. Nichols (ed.), "Mystery of the Dallas Papers," Pennsylvania Magazine of
History <fc Biography, LXXIII (1949), 384-385.
43. Forney to Buchanan, July 9, 1846, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
44. Nichols, "Mystery of the Dallas Papers," op. dt., 385.386.
45. Niles National Register, Aug. 29, 1849, p. 405.
46. Buchanan to Forney, July 29, 1846, Moore, Works, VII, 43-45.
47. Buchanan to Forney, Aug. 1, 1846, Ibid., VII, 46-47.
48. Polk, Diary, II, 60.
CHAPTER 14 (pp. 175-193)
1. Norman A. Graebner, Empire on the Pacific (New York, 1955), emphasizes the specific
commercial objectives of the Manifest Destiny policy.
2. Moore, JForfcs, VI, 10-15.
3. Ibid., VI, 165.
4. Rid., VI, 131.
5. Ibid., VI, 152, 159.
6. Ibid., VI, 165.
7. Ibid., VI, 174.
8. Edwin A. Miles, "Fifty-four Forty or Fight— an American Political Legend," Miss.
Valley Hist. Rev., XLIV (Sept., 1957), dates this slogan after Folk's election.
448
NOTES • CHAPTER 14
9. Wilbur D. Jones and J. C. Vinson, "British Preparedness and the Oregon Settle-
ment," Padfic Hist. Rev., XXII (Nov., 1953), 355; Lady Frances Balfour, Life of
George, Fourth Earl of Aberdeen, K. G., K. T. (London, 1913), II, 133.
10. Moore, Works, VI, 191.
11. Jones and Vinson, op. dt., 357.
12. Moore, Works, VI, 220.
13. Polk, Diary, I, 2-5, 9-12, 62-65.
14. Ibid., I, 2-5.
15. M. A. DeWolfe Howe (ed.), Life and Letters of George Bancroft (New York, 1908),
I, 280-281.
16. Polk, Diary, I, 62-65.
17. Jones and Vinson, op. dt., 360.
18. Polk, Diary, I, 77-82.
19. Moore, Works, VI, 341.
20. Jan. 3, 1846. Jones and Vinson, op. dt., 360.
21. Ibid., 361-363; Charles S. Parker (ed.), Sir Robert Peel, III, 324.
22. Richard Rush to Buchanan, Oct. 7, 1846, Curtis, Buchanan, I, 604.
23. Polk, Diary, I, 235, 453-454.
24. Franklin P. Hillman, "Diplomatic Career of James Buchanan," p. 153. Typescript
Ph.D. thesis, The George Washington University, 1953.
25. Lyon G. Tyler, Letters and Times of the Tylers (Richmond, 1884-1886), III, 175-177.
26. Hillman, op. dt., p. 156.
27. Buchanan to the Hon. F. W. Pickens, June 6, 1845, Dickinsoniana, DC.
28. Polk to Buchanan, Aug. 7, 1845, Curtis, Buchanan, I, 589.
29. Bancroft to Buchanan, Aug. 7, 1845, ibid., I, 590.
30. Buchanan to Slidell, Instructions #1, .Nov. 10, 1845, Moore, Works, VI, 295.
31. Ibid., VI, 296-305.
32. Buchanan to Slidell, Instructions #5, Jan. 20, 1846, ibid., VI, 361.
33. Jan. 28, 1846, ibid., VI, 364.
34. Mar. 12, 1846, ibid., VI, 403.
35. Polk, Diary, I, 226-230.
36. Feb. 17, 1846, Cadwalader MSs., HSP.
37. Moore, Works, VI, 403.
38. Polk, Diary, I, 384-385.
39 From Dr. J. M. Foltz, interpreter for Taylor; series of letters, Buchanan-Swarr
" MSs., BF.
40. May 14, 1846, Moore, Works, VI, 484-485.
41. Polk, Diary, I, 397-399.
42. Ibid., II, 254-257.
43. Ibid., I, 496; II, 15-16, 254-257.
44. Moore, Works, VII, 66.
45. Sept. 26, 1846, ibid., VII, 88.
46 Polk Diary, II, 229, 234, 240, 432. For Buchanan's original draft, ibid., II, 471-475;
for fcefiSj msmictions, Senate Ex. Doc. #52, 30th Congress, 1st session, 81-89.
449
JAMES BUCHANAN
47. J. G. Van Deusen, The Jacksonian Era (New York, 1959), pp. 237-238.
48. Buchanan to Trist, June 2, 1847, Cadwalader MSs., HSP.
49. Buchanan to Gen. James Shields, April 25, 1847, Moore, Works, VII, 286-287.
50. July 19, 1847, Instructions #2, ibid., VII, 368.
51. Polk, Diary, III, 163-164.
52. Ibid., Ill, 225-229.
53. Ibid., Ill, 333-334, 348-350, 400-410, 414.
54. W. E. Dodd, "The West and the War with Mexico," Illinois State Hist. Transactions,
1912 p 23; E. G. Bourne, "The Proposed American Absorption of Mexico, Amer.
Hist/Assoc. Annual Report, 1899, p. 164.
55. Howe, Life and Letters of George Bancroft, II, 23-24.
56. Foltz to Buchanan, May 12, 1848, Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF.
57 Hillman, "Diplomatic Career of James Buchanan," pp. 198-200; Polk, Diary, III,
" 300-301.
58. Moore, Works, VIII, 29.
59 New York Herald, May 3, 1848, prints a "Statistical Table of the Leaks of the
' U. S. Senate."
60 Frederick B. Marbut, "Washington Staff Correspondents before the Civil War."
Typescript Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1950, devotes a chapter to the Nugent
episode.
61. Buchanan to John Clayton, April 14 and 17, 1849, Moore, Works, VIII, 360-361.
62. Buchanan to Ten Eyck, Aug. 28, 1848, ibid., VIII, 181-190.
63. Ibid., VI, 411-422; VII, 154-166.
64. Polk, Diary, III, 66, 97-99; IV, 355.
65. Foltz to Buchanan, Nov. 23, 1847, Dec. 12, 1849, and a series of letters, Foltz to
Buchanan and Buchanan's executors, 1861-1875, especially March 8 and Aonl 15,
1861, and Buchanan to William B. Reed, Mar. 21, 1861, Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF.
66. Buchanan to Reynolds, Nov. 12, 1847, Reynolds MSs., FM.
67. Buchanan to Gen. James Tallmadge, Jan, 5, 1846, Dickinsoniana, DC.
68. Buchanan to Plumer, Mar. 19, 1848, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
69. Buchanan to A. J. Donelson, Donelson MSs., LC.
70. Buchanan to Dr. Foltz, April 18, 1849, Buchanan MSs., HSP. Charles A. McCoy,
Polk and the Presidency (Austin, Texas, 1960), gives a revealing analysis of the
relations of Buchanan and Polk in Chap. 4.
CHAPTER 15 (pp. 194-205)
1. tPoore, Reminiscences, I, 332.
2. Buchanan to Jones, Mar. 30, 1847, Cadwalader MSs., HSP.
3. Buchanan to H. D. Foster, Nov. 19, 1846, Moore, Works, VII, 117-118.
4. Forney to Buchanan, Nov. 11, 1846, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
5. Forney to Buchanan, Mar. 7, 30, 1847, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
6. B. F. Brewster to Buchanan, Apr. 11, 1847, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
7. Forney to Buchanan, June 29, 1847, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
450
NOTES • CHAPTER 16
8. Lynch to Buchanan, June 15, 1847, Lynch MSs., LCHS.
9. Forney to Buchanan, May 4, 1847, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
10. Many letters and Buchanan's memorandum on the subject are in the Forney Box
and the Buchanan letter section of the Buchanan MSs., HSP, summer of 1847.
11. Forney to Buchanan, Sept. 2, 3, 8, 1847, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
12. Forney to Buchanan, Oct. 15, 1847, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
13. Forney to Buchanan, Nov. 8, Dec. 2, 1847, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
14. Plitt to Buchanan, Nov. 23, 1847, Buchanan MSs., Box II, LC; Foltz to Buchanan,
Dec. ?, 1847, Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF.
15. Forney to Buchanan, Nov. 9, 1847, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
16. Plitt to Buchanan, Dec. 9, 1847, Buchanan MSs., Box II, LC.
17. Circular of the Philadelphia Buchanan Committee, Jan. 11, 1848, HSP.; Forney to
Buchanan, Jan. 7, 1848, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
18. Forney to Buchanan, Nov. 26, 1847, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
19. Buchanan to Forney, Dec. 10; Forney to Buchanan, Dec. 10, 11, 1847, Buchanan
" MSs., HSP, and memorandum of Buchanan to James B. Lane, April 15, 1848,
£. E. Lane MSs.
20 Plitt to Buchanan, Mar. 4, 1848, Buchanan MSs., Box II, LC; Forney to Buchanan,
Mar. 7, 12, 1848, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
21. Aug. 25, 1847, Moore, Works, VII, 385-387.
22. Cass to Daniel Sturgeon, Oct. 27, 1847, Ruth Scrapbook, YCHS.
23. Forney to Buchanan, Sept. 1, 1846, Mar. 26, Sent. 17, 1848, Buchanan MSs., HSP;
Buchanan to Polk, Sept. 5, 10, 1846, Cadwalader MSs., HSP; Plitt to Buchanan,
June 19, Sept. 5, 1847, Buchanan MSs., LC; Buchanan to John Reynolds, June 21,
1847, Reynolds MSs., FM.
24. Buchanan to Miss Lane, Aug. 2, 1848, Moore, Works, VIII, 150.
25. Moore, Works, VI, 400-402, 433-434, 487. Plitt used only about $400 of the $2,500.
26. Application Book in Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF, lists all those attending and de-
clining the dinners.
27 Buchanan received reports of the Baltimore Convention from Plitt, May 12, Cam-
" eron, May 22, 23, 24, Buchanan MSs., Box II, LC; Foltz, May 19, Buchanan-Swarr
MSs., BF; Forney, May 21, 23; Robert Tyler, July 13, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
28. Plitt to Buchanan, May 28, 1848, Buchanan MSs., Box II, LC.
29 Cameron to Buchanan, July 7, Plitt to Buchanan, July 11, 1848, Buchanan MSs.,
" Box II, LC.
30. Buchanan to A. H. Reeder, July 22, 1848, privately owned, Richmond Myers.
31. Lynch to Buchanan, Sept. 21, 1849, Lynch MSs., LCHS.
CHAPTER 16 (pp. 206-220)
1. Philip S. Klein, Storr ofWheatland (I^caste&1936), PP- 19-25; Application Book
Buchanan-Swarr MSa., BF; memorandum of Mar. 28, 1851, Buchanan MSs., H51S
JBuchSan to John Cadwalader, Dec. 4, 1851, Dec. 20, 1852, Cadwalader MSs., HSP.
2 Buchanan to Harriet Lane, Dec. 21, 1844, Oct. 14, 1845, Taylor MSs.; Mary E.
Menitt to James B. Lane, Oct. 15, 1845, E. E. Lane MSs.
3. Moore, Works, VII, 25, 278.
451
JAMES BUCHANAN
4 Buchanan to Harriet Lane, July 8, 1848, Buchanan MSs., HSP, Also numerous
" family letters in Taylor MSs. and E. E. Lane MSs.
5. Moore, Work*, VII, 357-360.
6 J B Henry to Buchanan, Nov. 6, 1843, Buchanan MSs., Box I, LC; Buchanan to
Harriet Lane, July 3, 1846, Moore, Works, VII, 26; Buchanan to Cadwalader, July 16,
1852, Cadwalader MSs., HSP.
7. Philadelphia Press, Jan. 24, 1860.
8 Curtis, Buchanan, II, 16; Plitt to Buchanan, Jan. 10, 1847, Buchanan MSs., Box II,
" LC.
9. Buchanan to Cobb, June 12, Nov. 10, 1849 Cobh MSs., UG; Buchanan to Foltz,
Dec. ?, 1849, Forney to Buchanan, Dec. 13, 1849, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
10 To W. R. King, May 13, 1850, Moore, Works, VIII, 383; Buchanan to Foote, May 31,
1850, i&VVni, 385-388; and to Jefferson Davis, Mar. 16, 1850, ibid., VIII, 372-373.
11. Foltz, Surgeon of the Seas, p. 140.
12. Buchanan to J. A. Parker, Feb. 3, 1862, Moore, Works, XI, 249.
13. Buchanan to J. Clancy Jones, Mar. 8, 1850, Cadwalader MSs., HSP.
14. Buchanan to J. M. Read, Aug. 18, 1849, Dickinsoniana, DC.
15. Letter to a Union meeting, Nov. 19, 1850, Moore, Works, VIII, 390-404.
16. Buchanan to Robert Tyler, Dec. 26, 1850, de Coppet Collection, Princeton University
Library.
17 Rov F. Nichols, The Democratic Machine, 1850-1854 (New York, 1923), Chap. 4;
Crippen, CamTron, pp. 118-128; Moore, Works, VIII, 369-376, 416-417; Buchanan to
Welsh, W 24, iS50, Buchanan MSs., YCHS; Buchanan to Welsh, Apr. 22, 1851,
to John Hastings, Mar. 18, 1851, to ?, Aug. 28, 1851, Dickinsoniana, DC.
18. Buchanan to ?, Jan. 22, 1850, Ruth Scrapbook, p. 71, YCHS.
19. Buchanan to William Hopkins, July 14, Nov. i^lSSl, private Craig Wylie;
R. W. Nash, "The Christiana Riot," LCHS Journal, LXV (Spring, 1961), 66-91.
20. Buchanan to Clancy Jones, Sept. ?, 1851, Cadwalader MSs., HSP.
21. New York Tribune, Feb. 6, 1852.
22. Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF.
23. Buchanan to William Hopkins, Nov. 13, 1851, private, Craig Wylie.
24. Buchanan to Cave Johnson, Dec. 22, 1851, Moore, Works, VIII, 428-430.
25. Nichols, Democratic Machine, Chap. 4.
26. Foltz to Buchanan, Mar. 25, 1851, Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF.
27. Lynch to Buchanan, April 6, 21, 1851, Lynch MSs., LCHS.
28. Buchanan to David R. Porter, June 4, 1852, Moore, Works, VIII, 451-452.
29. Nichols, Democratic Machine, Chap. 9; Ivor D. Spencer, The Victor and the Spoils,
A Life of Wmam L. Marcy (Providence, R. I., 1959), Chap. 16.
30. Lynch to Buchanan, June 11, 1852, Lynch MSs., LCHS.
31. Buchanan to Robert Tyler, June 8, 1852, Dickinsoniana, DC.
CHAPTER 17 (pp. 221-233)
1. Foltz to Buchanan, Sept. 1, 1852, Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF.
2, Lancaster Intelligencer, Aug. 31, Sept. 7, 1852.
452
NOTES* CHAPTER 18
3. Speech of Oct. 7, 1852, Moore, Works, VIII, 460-491; Plitt to Buchanan, Oct. 20,
1852, Buchanan MSs., Box III, LC.
4. Pierce to Buchanan, Dec. 7, 1852, Buchanan to Pierce, Dec. 11, 1852, Moore,
Works, VIII, 492-499.
5. Buchanan to Forney, Dec. 15, 1852, Ruth Scraphoofc, YCHS.
6. Buchanan to Watterson, Nov. 18, 1852, Moore, Works, VIII, 491-492.
7. Buchanan to Tyler, April 1, 1853, Dickinsoniana, DC
8. Buchanan Memorandum of July 12, 1853, Moore, Works, IX, 12-25; Roy F. Nichols,
Franklin Pierce, Young Hickory of the Granite Hitts (2nd ed., Philadelphia, 1958),
pp. 256-257; Spencer, Marcy, pp. 229-230.
9. Moore, Works, IX, 17.
10. Buchanan to Pierce, June 29, 1853, Moore, Works, IX, 7-8.
11. Marcy to Everett, July 12, 1853, Spencer, Marcy, p. 248.
12. Plitt to Buchanan, July 6, 1853, Buchanan MSs., Box III, LC.
13. Moore, Works, IX, 1-25, contains the pertinent letters.
14. H. A. Wise to R. M. T. Hunter, Apr. 16, 1853, in "Correspondence of R. M. T.
Hunter," Amer. Hist. Assoc. Annual Report, 1916, II, 156; Forney to Buchanan,
July 16, 1853, Buchanan MSs., HSP; A. Swanberg, Sickles the Incredible (New York,
1956), pp. 89-91.
15. Power of Attorney in Franklin County Deed Book, XXVI, 345; accounts in Buchanan
MSs., HSP; hank books and notes on finances in Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF; Bu-
chanan to Lane and Reynolds, July 30, Aug. 22, 1853, Dickinsoniana, DC.
16. Buchanan to Miss Lane, Sept. 30, Nov. 1, 1853; to Marcy, June 8, 1855, Moore,
Works, IX, 61, 87, 357; to J. L. Reynolds, Nov. 11, 1853, Dickinsoniana, DC.
17. Moore, Works, IX, 103, 114.
18. J. F. Rhodes, History of the U. 5. (new ed., New York, 1920), I, 507-511; Moore,
Works, IX, 146, 152, 194; Curtis, Buchanan, II, Chap. 4.
19. Buchanan to Forney, Sept. 30, 1853, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
20 Buchanan to Edmund Burke, Dec. 3, 1849, in "Letters of Bancroft and Buchanan,9'
Amer. Hist. Rev., V, 99.
21. Buchanan to Marcy, June 29, 1855, Moore, Works, IX, 365.
22. Buchanan to Marcy, Jan. 10, 1854, Moore, Works, IX, 135.
23. Ibid.
24. April 6, 1854* to the Lord Elgin Banquet, Moore, Works, IX, 174-175.
25. Rid., IX, 250.
CHAPTER 18 (pp. 234-247)
1. Buchanan to Pierce, April 7, 1854, Moore, Works, IX, 176.
2 J M Callahan, Cuba and International Relations (Baltimore, 1899), p. 266; Buchanan
" to Marcy, Nov. 1, 1853, Moore, Works, IX, 83-85.
3. Tom Harris to Howell Cobb, April 10, 1854, Cobb MSa., UG.
4. Sickles to Cobb, June 23, 1854, Cobb MSs., UG.
5. For Sickles affair at Peabody Dinner, cf. memoranda for July, 1854 in P«£ody MSs.,
Box XCI, Essex Institute; Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF; and Buchanan MSs., HSP;
453
JAMES BUCHANAN
also Buchanan to J. L Reynolds, July 14, 1854, Reynolds MSs., FM; and W. W. Stell
?o PeSod^autumn, 1854, Peabody^MSs., Box Xtf, Essex Institute.
6. Forney to Buchanan, Sept. 26, 1854, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
7 W R Manning (ed.), Diplomatic Correspondence of the U. S. Inter-American Affairs,
* 1831*1860 (12 Vols., Washington, 1932-1939), XI, 175-178.
8. Nichols, Pierce, p. 359; Spencer, Marcy, pp. 320-325.
9. Moore, Works, IX, 251-253.
10. Ibid. The best accounts of the Ostend affair are found in Amos A. fittinger, The
Mtedon to Spam of Pierre SoulS (New Haven, 1932), Nichols, Pierce, and Spencer,
Marcy.
11 Buchanan to Marcy, Dec. 22, 1854, Moore, Works, IX, 289; Nichols, Pierce, pp.
368-369.
12. Spencer, Marcy, p. 338.
13. Slidell to Buchanan, April 3, 1855, Moore, Works, IX, 332,
14. Moore, Works, IX, 290, 292, 294, 304, 390, 406.
15 Forney to Buchanan, Nov. 27, Dec. 14, 1854, Jan. 9, 1855; Buchanan to Sickles,
" Dec, 22, 1854, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
16. Moore, Works, IX, 356, 460, 465.
17. Ibid., IX, 354, 365.
18 Buchanan to Marcy, Oct. 3; to Pierce, Oct. 4, 1855; to Miss Lane, Oct. 26, 1855; to
ffiS^NoY. 7, 18&, Moore, Works, IX, 417-421, 435-437, 447.
19. Buchanan to Marcy, Nov. 9, 1855, Moore, Works, IX, 452-453.
20. Moore, Works, IX, 459, 469, 476,
21. Ibid., X, 30.
22. Buchanan to Marcy, Feb. 5, 1856, Moore, Works, X, 31-32.
23. Wilfrid Ward, The Life and Times of Cardinal Wiseman (London, 1897), II, 166.
24. Buchanan to Marcy, Feb. 15, 1856, Moore, Works, X, 49.
25. Buchanan to E. E. Lane, Feb. 29, 1856, E. E. Lane MSs.
CHAPTER 19 (pp. 248-260)
1. Lynch to Buchanan, Feb. 16, 1855, Lynch MSs., LCHS.
2. Black to Buchanan, Feb. 17, 1855, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
3. Forney to Buchanan, Feb. 23, 1855, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
4. Forney to Buchanan, Apr. 25, 1856, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
5. Foltz to Buchanan, Aug. 9, 1855, Nov. 22, 1855, Buchanan-Swan: MSs., BF.
6. Lancaster Intettigencer, Feb. 26, 1856. The InteUigencer at frequent intervals ran a
list of all U. S. papers that favored Buchanan.
7. Jan. 17, 1855, Moore, Works, X, 8.
8. Buchanan to William B. Reed, Feb. 29, 1856, Moore, Works, X, 63.
9. Buchanan to Harriet Lane, Jan. 25, 1856, Moore, Works, X, 21.
10. Sophie Plitt to Buchanan, Sept. 17, 1855, Buchanan MSs., Box III, LC.
11. Foltz to Buchanan, Jan. 17, 1856, Buchanan-Swart MSs., BF.
454
NOTES* CHAPTER 20
12. Intelligencer and Lancastrian, April 29, 1856.
13. Ibid., and Reigart bill, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
14. Baltimore Sun, May 13, 1856.
15. R. F. Nichols, Disruption of American Democracy (New York, 1948), Chap. I.
16. Official Proceedings of the National Democratic Convention . . . 1856; Gerald M. Capers,
* ' ~ s (Boston, 1959), p. 142; W. B. Hesseltine and R. G. Fisher (eds.),
.. — J T -—,*—- /1WT.J:.An \t7,V«««0;« IQ^n nn TO 51
Stephen A. Douglas (Boston, 1959), p. 142; W. B. Hesseltine and R. G. Fisher (
Trimmers, Trucklers and Temporizers (Madison, Wisconsin, 1961), pp. 19, 51.
17. Statement of Millard Fillmore, Congressional Globe, 34th Congress, 1st session,
App. 716.
18. Short Answers to Reckless Fabrications (1856), p. 9.
19. To Harriet Lane, June 16, 1856, Buchanan MSs., Box IV, LC.
20. Buchanan to Cobh, July 10, 1856, Cobb MSs., UG.
21. Buchanan to Jones, June 27, 29, 1856, Cadwalader MSs., HSP.
22. Lancaster Intelligencer, July 15, 1856, quoting exchanges. A column of squibs such
as this formed a regular feature in many Democratic papers through the nation.
23. Black to Cobb, Sept. 23, 1856, in U. B. Phillips (ed.), "Correspondence of Robert
Toombs, A. H. Stephens and Howell Cobb," Amer. Hist. Assoc. Annual Report9
1911, II, 383.
24. Curtis, Buchanan, II, 180-183, quoting Buchanan to Nahum Capen, Aug. 27, to
William B. Reed, Sept. 14, and to Joshua Bates, Nov. 6, 1856; AUan t Nevms, The
Emergence of Lincoti (New York, 1950), I, 345; and box labelled "Clippings" m
Buchanan MSs., HSP.
25. Z. T. Johnson, Political Policies of Howell Cobb (Nashville, 1929), pp. 147-148.
26. D. H. Branham to Howell Cobb, Oct. 1, 1856, Cobb MSs.f UG.
27. Collection of handbills, notices and clippings, Oct. 8, 1856, in Buchanau-Swarr
MSs., BF.
28. Reminiscences of Alfred Sanderson, July 1, 1887, in Ruth Scrapbook, YCHS.
29. T. R. R. Cobb to Howell, Nov. 15, 1856, Cobb MSs., UG.
CHAPTER 20 (pp. 261-272)
1. Intelligencer and Lancastrian, MarchJS, 1857.
2. Buchanan to John Y. Mason, Dec. 29, 1856, Curtis, Buchanan, II, 185.
3. Nichols, Disruption, p. 54.
4. New York Herald, Dec. 3, 1856.
5. Lancaster Intelligencer, Dec. 9, 1856.
6. Burnham, Presidential Ballots, pp. 246-257, The sections referred to are those used
by Burnham for analyses of the vote.
7. J. W, Forney to Howell Cobb, Nov. 30, 1856, Cobb MSs., UG.
8. Buchanan to J. Clancy Jones, Nov. 29, 1856, Jones MSs., Philadelphia.
9. Same to same, Dec. 8, Jones MSs.
10. Same to same, Dec. 29, Jones MSs.
11. Cobb to his wife, Dec. 20, 1856, Cobb MSs., UG.
12. Forney to Howell Cobb, Feb. 18, 1857, b"Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens and
Cobb/' in Amer. Hist. ASBOC. Annual toport, 1911, II, 396-397.
455
JAMES BUCHANAN
13. John B. Lamar to Cobb, Jan. 24, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.
14 Buchanan to Henry S. Mott, Jan. 7, 1857, Intelligencer and Lancastrian, Feb. 3, 1857;
also Recollections of J. Montgomery Forster, undated clippings from the Mercersburg
Journal* Rankin Scrapbook.
15. Foniey to Cobb, Jan. 21, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.
16. Cobb to his wife, Jan. 13, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.; Crippen, Cameron, pp. 160-165.
17. David Lynch to Buchanan, Jan. 18, 1857, Lynch MSs., LCHS.
18. Buchanan to Jones, Feb. 17, 1857, Cadwalader MSs., HSP.
19. Forney to Cobb, Jan. 21, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.
20. Recollections of Forster, op. dt.
21. John B. Lamar to Cobb, Jan. 21, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.
22. Cobb to his wife, Jan. 6, 185T, Cobb MSs., UG; "Correspondence of Toorabs,
" Stephens and Cobb," op. dt., 389.
23. Cobb to his wife, Feb. 3, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.
24. Philadelphia Pennsylvania*, Jan. 28, 1857.
25 Leonora Clayton to Mrs. Howell Cobb, Jan. 31, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG; Baltimore
Siat, Feb. 2, 1857.
26. Nichols, Disruption, p. 63.
27. Cobb to his wife, Jan. 31, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.
28. Quoted in the Baltimore Sun, Feb. 7, 1857.
29. David Lynch to Buchanan, Feb. 16, 1857, Lynch MSs., LCHS.
30. Robert foombs to Howell Cobb, Feb. 18, 1857, quoting letter from Buchanan to
Toombs, Cobb MSs., UG.
31. Buchanan to Jones, Feb. 17, 1857, Cadwalader MSs., HSP.
32 Forney to Cobb, Feb. 18, 1857, "Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens and Cobb/'
" op. at., 396-397.
33 Oliver H. P. Parker to Abraham Lincoln, Sept., 1860, in David C. Mearns (ed.),
The Lincoln Papers (New York, 1948), I, 284.
34. Jonathan Foltz to Buchanan, Feb, 23, 1857, Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF.
35. Cadwalader MSs., HSP, contains rough notes in Buchanan's hand, dated 1857, which
deal with the concept of the sanctity of law. Some sentences were later incorporated
into the Lecompton Message of 1858.
36. Series of clippings in John Lowry Ruth Scrapbook, YCHS.; Nichols, Disruption,
pp. 69-70.
37. Intelligencer and Lancastrian, Mar. 10, 1857, and Frank Leslie's Illustrated Weekly,
Mar. 21, 1857, give full descriptions of the inauguration ceremonies. Leslie's report
has many errors,
38. One of these is in the Buchanan MSs., BF.
39. LilHe to Eugene B. Cook, Mar. 4, 1857, Robert J. Walker MSs., LC.
40. A. A. Woldman, Lincoln and the Russians (New York, 1952), p. 18.
CHAPTER 21 (pp. 273-285)
1. Sketch by J. B. Henry, Moore, Works, XII, 323-333; notes on White House staff in
Cadwalader MSs. and Buchanan MSs., HSP; Commonplace Book in Buchanan-Swarr
456
NOTES* CHAPTER 21
MSs., BF; Howell Cobb to wife, Mar. 22, 29; Mary Ann Cobb to son, Sept 7, 24, 1857,
Cobb MSs., UG; Harriet Lane to Ellie Reynolds, June 4, 1857, Reynolds MSs., FM;
Foltz, Surgeon of the Seas, p. 186; Philadelphia Press, Aug. 1, Sept. 30, and Oct.
20, 1857.
3. Howell Cobb to wife, Mar. 8, 22, 19, and June 6, 1857; Mary Ann Cobb to Howell,
Mar. 9, 13, and Aug. 4, 1857; Philip Clayton to Mrs. Cobb, Mar. 17; Howell Cobb to
son, Apr. 17; J. S? Black to Cobb; Apr. 15; Cobb to Black, Apr. 26, 1857; Cobb
MSs., UG.
4. E. C. Craig to Howell Cobb, June 23, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.
5. Philip G. Auchampaugh, James Buchanan and His Cabinet on the Eve of Secession
(Lancaster, 1926), p. 115.
6. Mrs. Cobb to son, Sept. 7, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.
7. Mrs. Cobb to ?, June 17, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG. The Browns lived at 19th and G
Streets, William Wirt's old home.
8. Mrs. Cobb to son, Sept. 24, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.
9. Slidell to Cobb, Apr. 5, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG; Buchanan to Thos. H. Seymour,
May 11, 1857, Buchanan Papers, Boston Public Library; J. B. Henry to Father Kenna,
June 12, 1857, Cadwalader MSs., HSP.
10. Cobb to wife, Mar. 8, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.
11. Nichols, Disruption, Chap. 5.
12. Ibid., pp. 82-83, 207-209; Dan Sickles to Cobb, July 23, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.
13. Series of letters in Lynch MSs., LCHS.
14. Forney to Black, May 6, 1857, Black MSs., LC.
15. Same to same, June 15, 1857, Black MSs., LC.
16. Forney papers in the Buchanan MSs., HSP. and Black MSs., LC., for 1856 and 1857
sustain this view.
17. Grier to Plitt, dated only 1857, Buchanan MSs., LC.
18. Sophie Plitt to Miss Lane, Sept. 5, 1860, Buchanan MSs., LC.
19. Buchanan MSs., HSP, and Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF, contain the correspondence
on the subject.
20. Philadelphia Press, Sept. 7, Oct. 20, 1857.
21. SHdeli to Cobb, Apr. 5, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.
22. New Orleans Daily True Delta, Apr. 4, 1858.
23. Cobb to Black, Apr. 26, 1857, Black MSs., LC.
24. Cobb to son, May 16, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.
25. Cobb to wife, June 10, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.
26. Black to Cobb, Apr. 30, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.
27 C W. C Dunnington to R. M. T. Hunter, Oct. 6, 1857, in "Correspondence of
" Hunter," Amer. Hist. Assoc. Annual Report, 1916, H, 236.
28. Mary B. Clayton (ed.), Reminiscences ofj. 5. Black (St. Louis, 1887), p. 106.
29. Dunnington to Hunter, Oct. 6, 1857, op. dt.
30. Cobb to wife, June 6, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.
31. Black to Forney, July ?, 1857, Black MSs., LC.
457
JAMES BUCHANAN
CHAPTER 22 (pp. 286-299)
1. Tom D. Harris to Howell Cobb, Apr. 10, 1854, Cobb MSs., UG.
2. George F. Milton, Eve of Conflict, Stephen A. Douglas and the Needless War (Boston,
" 1934), p. 183; Capers, Douglas, pp. 87-88.
3. Forney to Buchanan, Mar. 19, 1854, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
4. Paul W. Gates, 50 Million Acres (Ithaca, 1943), pp. 60-61.
5. Ibid., pp. 48-49.
6. Ibid., Chap. 2.
7 Leverett W. Spring, Kansas, the Prelude to ike War for ike Union (New York, 1885),
' pp. 64-65.
8. T. W. Thomas to A. H. Stephens, Jan. 12, 1857, "Correspondence of Toombs,
Stephens and Cobb," Amer. Hist. Assoc. Annual Report, 1911, II, 392.
9. Richmond Enquirer, March 2, 1854; Henry H, Simms, A Decade of Sectional Con-
troversy, 1851^1861 (Durham, N. C., 1942), pp. 67-68.
10. Cobb to ?, April 21, 1856, "Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens and Cobb,'*
op. cit., 363.
11. Moore, Works, X, 81.
12 Walker to Buchanan, Mar. 26, 1857, quoted in Intelligencer and Lancastrian, Mar.
30, 1857.
13. Intelligencer and Lancastrian, May 19, 1857.
14 A. Iverson to Cobb, reporting conversation with Buchanan, Sept. 17, 1857, Cobb
MSs., UG.
15. Nichols, Disruption, p. 105.
16. Cobb to Stephens, June 17, 1857, "Correspondence of Toorabs, Stephens and Cobb,"
" op. cit., 402.
17. Nichols, Disruption, p. 109.
18. T. W. Thomas to A. H. Stephens, June 15, 1857, "Correspondence of Toombs,
Stephens and Cobb," op. at., 400-401; James Jackson to Cobb, Aug, 27, 1857,
Cobb MSs,, UG.
19. For many southern letters, cf. "Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens and Cobb,"
op. cit., 400 ff and "Correspondence of nunter," Amer. Hist. Assoc. Annual Report,
1916, II, 200 ff.
20. F. W. Pickens to Buchanan, Aug. 5, 1857, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
21. Address by A. H. Stephens, Aug. 14, 1857, in "Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens
and Cobb," op. dx., pp. 417-418.
22. William H. Stiles to Cobb, Aug. 26, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.
23. Robert Toombs to W. W. Burwell, July 11, 1857, "Correspondence of Toombs,
Stephens and Cobb," op, cit., 404.
24. Speech of July 15, 1857, at Lawrence.
25. Covode Committee Report, 36th Congress, 1st session, #648, pp. 115-119.
26. Ibid., pp. 112-113.
27. Cobb to Stephens, Sept. 19, 1857, "Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens and Cobb,"
op. cit., pp. 423-424.
28. Black to Forney, July, 1857, Black MSs., I, LC.
29. Spring, Kansas, p. 212; Simms, Decade of Sectional Controversy, pp. 93-96.
30. Buchanan's reply to a memorial, Aug. 15, 1857, Moore, Works, X, 117*122.
33. T. R. R. Cobb to Howell Cobb, Oct. 1, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.
458
NOTES* CHAPTER 23
32. Secretary of State, Instructions to Walker of Sept. 2, 1857, Walker MSs., LC.
Proslavery Judge Cato issued a ruling on the election law stating that only tax
payers could vote. As few of the Topeka people ever had paid any tax to the Le-
compton government, it seemed clear that the object was to prevent the free-state
people from voting. Walker immediately protested this decision to Washington,
and Attorney General Black promptly overruled Cato's decision.
33. Nichols, Disruption, pp. 118-126.
CHAPTER 23 (pp. 300-312)
1. Spring, Kansas, p. 223; Political Textbook for 1860 (New York, 1860), pp. 76-126;
T; W. Thomas to A. H. Stephens, Feb. 7, 1858, "Correspondence of Toombs,
Stephens and Cobb," Amer. Hist. Assoc. Annual Report, 1911, II, 430.
2. Nichols, Disruption, p. 130; Milton, Eve of Conflict, p. 273.
3. Moore, Works, X, 236; C. R. Fish, The American Civil War (New York, 1937), p. 337.
4. Moore, Works, X, 145-151.
5. Edward A. Ross, in the last 5 chapters of his Social Psychology (New York, 1908),
sheds much light on the behavior of Americans during the Buchanan Administration.
6. See Buchanan's first three annual messages and the Lecompton Message.
7. Political Textbook for 1860, pp. 114, ff. and Forney's Press throughout the debate.
Issue of Nov. 2, 1857, is a good example.
8. Roberts to Cameron, Jan. 16, 1868, Cameron microfilms, Museum Bldg., Harrisburg.
9. Nevins, Emergence, 1, 246; Capers, Douglas, p. 165.
10. Political Textbook for 1860, p. 115,
11. Buchanan to Robert Tyler, Feb. 15, 1858, Moore, Works, XI, 514.
12. Moore, Works, X, 149; Philadelphia Press, Aug. 3, 1857; Nevins, Emergence, I, 236,
note 19; Intelligencer and Lancastrian, July 21, 1857, quotes i exchanges on this
point from editors all over the country; Philadelphia Press of Nov. 2, 1857, has
long discussion.
13. Gerald Wagner, "Adoption of State Constitutions to 1860, a statistical study."
Typescript, The Penna. State Univ., 1958.
14. Spring, Kansas, p. 223.
15. I B. Floyd to Buchanan, July 31, 1858, Buchanan MSs., HSP. wrote that Walker
"intends at all hazards to regain his position, or to throwthe blame for his failure
upon someone else—either the administration or the ^w D^wtment Lass
wrote in similar vein on the same date, Buchanan MSs., HSP; Philadelphia Press,
June 16, 1859.
16. Nevins, Emergence, I, 241.
17. Milton, Eve of Conflict, p. 271; Nevins, Emergence, I, 240; Capers, Douglas, p. 155.
18 T. W. Thomas to A. H. Stephens, "Correspondence of Toombs, Stephens and Cobb,"
' Amer. Hist. Assoc- Annual Report, 1911, II, 428.
19. Cobb to John B. Lamar, Mar. 10, 1858, Cobb MSs., UG,
20 T R. R. Cobb to Howeli, Dec, 11, 1857; J. W. H. Underwood to Cobb, Feb. 5, 1858,
' Cobb MSs., UG.
21. Spring, Kansas, pp. 230-231.
22. Buchanan to Arnold Plumer, Feb. 14, 1858, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
459
JAMES BUCHANAN
23. Nichols, Disruption, p. 161.
24. Buchanan to Hiram Swarr, Mar. 12, 1858, Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF.
25. Buchanan to W. H. English, Mar. 22, 1858, Dickinsoniana, DC.
26. Buchanan to Hiram Swarr, June 30, 1858, Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF.
27. Buchanan to W. H. English, July 2, 1858, Dicfcinsoniana, DC.
CHAPTER 24 (pp. 313-327)
1 Folte to Buchanan, July 18, 1857, Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF; Mrs. Cobb to her son,
IS 30,18577 Cobb MSs., UG; New York Herald, Oct. 14, 1858.
2. E. B. Hart to Howsll Cobb, Oct. 23, 1857, Cobb MSs., UG.
3- grSsT-as^
1943).
*• MiSsS S3 0^^Ksf^c&A^^^
5. Ray A. Billington, The Far Western Frontier (New York, 1956), p. 214.
6. Atlantic Monthly, III (Mar., 1859), 369.
7. Billington, op. at., pp. 206-217; Nichols, P^p^n, pp. 17^m, 193; House Ex.
D*».r35th Congress, 1st session, Vol. 9, #33; Vol. 10, #71; Vol. 12 #99; Vol. 13,
ffioo; OCIKHB of. x/««., o*u* Congress, 1st session, .Vol. 13, #67. Best account is
Nonnan F. Furniss, The Mormon Conflict, 1850-1SS9 (New Haven, 1960).
8. Moore, Works, X, 113.
9. Ibid., X, 173-175.
10. Moore, Works, XI, 50, 59, 63; Curtis, Buchanan, 11, 399', Andrew C. McLaughlin,
Lewis Cass (New York, 1899), pp. 16M62; Frank B, Woodford, Lewis Cass (New
Brunswick, N.J., 1950), p. 316.
11. Clarendon to Buchanan, Oct. 19, 1857, Moore, Works, X, 122; M. W. Williams,
Anglo-American tofonian Diplomacy, 1825-1915 (Washington, 1916), p. 228,
12. Moore, Works, X, 123; Williams, op. at., pp. 231-232.
13. Moore, Works, X, 139-140.
14. Clarendon to Buchanan, Mar. 13, April 22, 1857, Moore, Works, X, 114-116.
15. W. 0. Scroggs, Filibusters and financiers (New York, 1916), pp. 339:340; Pierce
Butler, Judah P. Benjamin (Philadelphia, 1907), pp. 185-190; : Mobile Mercury,
Jan. 26, 1858; New York Herald, Feb. 2, 1858; New York Times, Feb, 2, 1858.
16. Rivas Manifesto, May 1, 1857, in Instruction #9, Cass to Lamar, July 25, 1858,
Senate Ex. Docs., 35th Congress, 2nd session, Vol. 1, #1, 62-64.
17. Ibid., 52-53.
18. Moore, Works, XI, 26.
19. Ibid., X, 259.
20. J. Fred Rippy, The Untied States and Mexico (New York, 1926) and "The United
States andlSexican Policy,9' Miss. Valley Hist. Rev., VI (1919-1920) ; J. M. Callahan,
"The Mexican Policy of Southern Leaders under Buchanan's Administration,
Amer. Hist. Assoc. Annual Report, 1910, and "The Evolution of Seward's Mexican
Policy," West Virginia University Studies, I; H. L Wilson, "James Buchanan's
Proposed Intervention in Mexico/ Amer. Hist. Ru>., V (1899-1900) ; Lewis Einstein,
"Lewis Cass," in Bemis, American Secretaries of State, VI.
460
NOTES • CHAPTER 25
21. April 4, 1857. Rippy, The United States and Mexico, p. 204.
22. Mexican Despatches, #21, April 12, 1858, Rippy, op. dt.9 p. 216.
23. Senate Ex. Docs., 35th Congress, 2nd session, Vol. I, #1, 46.
24. Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 2nd session, 1118-1143, passim; Senate Journal,
35th Congress, 2nd session, 343.
25. Rippy* The United States and Mexico, Chap. 10.
26. Wilson, "Buchanan's Proposed Intervention," Amer. Hist. Rev., V, 197.
27. J. M. Callahan, "Evolution of Seward's Mexican Policy," West Virginia University
Studies, I.
28. House Ex. Docs., 37th Congress, 2nd session, #100, 17-18.
29. Moore, Works, X, 226.
30. Buchanan to Fallon, Dec. 14, 1857, Moore, Works, X, 165; Nichols, Disruption,
p. 228.
31. Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 2nd session, Pt. I, 907 ff., Pt. II, 1079.
32. Callahan, Cuba and International Relations, p. 313.
33. Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 2nd session, Pt. I, 541-543, 935-940.
34. Ibid., Pt. II, 1187.
35. F. A. Colder, "The Purchase of Alaska," Amer. Hist. Rev., XXV (1919-1920),
411-417.
36. National Intelligencer, Jan. 24, 1859.
CHAPTER 25 (pp. 328-344)
1 Lincoln to Elihu B. Washhurne, May 15, 17, 1860, Roy P. Basler (ed.), The Collected
Works of Abraham Lincoln (New Brunswick, N. J., 1953), II, 447, 455; B. F. Brewster
to Buchanan, May 27, 1858, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
2, New York Herald, Oct. 26, 1858.
3. Nichols, Disruption, p. 214.
4 Speeches at Springfield, July 17 and Galesburg, Oct. 4, 1858, Basler, Works of
" Abraham Lincoln, ft, 508; III, 226.
5. Speech at Alton, Oct. 15, 1858.
6. Henry A. Wise to Buchanan, Oct. 12, 1858, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
7. Howell Cobb to A. H. Stephens, Sept. 8, 1858, in "Correspond^e of Toomhs,
Stephens and Cobb," Amer. Hist. Assoc. Annual Report,*19ll, II, 443.
8. Oct. 15, 1858, Moore, Works, X, 229.
9. Buchanan to Swarr, Dec. 31, 1858, Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF.
10. Nichols, Disruption, p. '242.
11. Philadelphia Press, April 5, 1858.
12. Jacob Thompson to Howell Cobb, Aug. 7, 1859, Cobb MSs., UG.
13. Sophie Plitt to Harriet Lane, Mar. 18, 1858, Buchanan MSs., LC.
14. Kate Thompson to Mrs. Cobb, June 8, 1859, Cobb MSs., UG.
15. Sophie Plitt to Harriet Lane, Dec. 12, 1859, Buchanan MSs., LC.
16. Leonora Clayton to Mrs. Cobb, Aug. 19, 1859, Cobb MSs., UG.
461
JAMES BUCHANAN
17. Kate Thompson to Mrs. Cobb, May 18, 1859, Cobb MSs., UG.
18 Howell Cobb to wife, May 17, Kate Thompson to Mrs. Cobb, May 18, Mrs. Cobb
to Howell, May 20, 1859, Cobb MSs., UG.
19 Howell Cobb to wife, June 7, Kate Thompson to Mrs. Cobb, June 8, I860, Cobb
' MSs., UG.
20. Kate Thompson to Mrs. Cobb, July 10, 1859, Cobb MSs., UG.
21 Philadelphia Press, July 23, 25, 1859; Philip H. Clayton to Mrs. Cobb, Leonora
' Clayton to Mrs. Cobb, Aug. 4, 1859, Cobb MSs., UG.
22. Nichols, Disruption, pp. 274-275.
23 James Buchanan, Mr. Buchanan's Administration on the Eve of Rebellion (New York,
1866), p 63; Howell Cobb to wife, Nov. 19, 1859, Cobb MSs., UG.
24. Buchanan to Edwin M. Stanton, n.d., 1860, Dickinsoniana Coll., DC.
25. Lancaster IntelKgencer9 April 17, 1860.
26. Moore, Works, X, 399-405.
27. Buchanan to Stanton, n.d., 1860, Dickinsoniana Coll., DC.
28. John Cadwalader to Buchanan, Mar. 28, June 12, 1859, Cadwalader MSs., HSP;
Philadelphia Press, April 1, June 29, Aug. 16, 1859, and issues of ^the spring of 1860;
Report of the Covode Committee, House Report #648, 36fh Congress, 1st Seas.
29. Moore, Works, X, 435-443.
30. Bedford Gazette, July 28, 1859, and reminiscences of the editor, ibid., Sept. 21, 1906.
31. Buchanan to J. B. Baker, July 25, 1859, Moore, Fork, X, 327; to Cobb, July 23,
Cobb MSs., UG; to McCandless, July 25, in "Letters of James Buchanan, LCHS
Papers, XXXVI, 317.
32. Buchanan to J. B. Baker, Feb. 28, 1860, in Moore Works, X, 393; to Swarr, April 13,
1860 privately owned by E. E. Bausman, Lancaster, Penna.; to Mrs. Polk, Meade
Minnegerode, Presidential Years (New York, 1928), p. 348.
33. New York Tribune, Aug. 5, 1859, quoting the New York Herald.
34. Philadelphia Press, March 24, May 28, 1859.
35. Ibid., Nov. 15, 17, 1859.
36. Toombs to T. W. Thomas, Dec. 4, 1859; to A, H. Stephens, Jan. 11, 1860, tf Corre-
spondence of Toombs, Stephens and Cobb," op. a*., 450, 456.
37. Howell Cobb to John B. Lamar, Jan. 15, 1860, Cobb MSs., UG.
38. Milton, Eve of Conflict, p. 357.
39. Buchanan to Slidell, June 24; Slidell's reply, July 3, 1859, Buchanan MSs., HSP,
CHAPTER 26 (pp. 345-352)
1. Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945, (G. P. 0. 1949), p. 297.
2. Gates, Fifty Million Acres, pp. 77-79, 89-91.
3. Ibid., pp. 86, 89.
4. Harriet Lane to Ellie Reynolds, July 21, 1860, Reynolds MSs., FM.
5. Philadelphia Press, May 31, 1860; Mrs. Cobb to son, May 29, I860, Cobb MSs., UG.
6. Mrs. E. C. (Craig) Robb to Mrs. Cobb, July 30, 1860, Cobb MSs., UG.
462
NOTES* CHAPTER 27
7. Russell Weigley, Quartermaster General of the Union Army, Montgomery C, Meigs
(New York, 1959), describes the feud fully in the early chapters.
8. Philadelphia Press, Aug. 23, 1860.
9. Gillan, "James Buchanan," in Kittochtinny Hist. Soc. Papers, II (1901), 196-197.
10. Mrs. Cobb to Lamar Cobb, Oct. 13, 14, 15, 1860, Cobb MSs., UG.
11. L. R. Morris, Incredible New York (New York, 1951), pp. 23-24; Edmund 0. Stedman,
The Prince's Batt (New York, 1860).
12. Moore, Works, XI, 3.
13. W. M. Browne to S. L. M. Barlow, July 1, 1860, Barlow MSs., HEH.
14. Howell to Lamar Cobb, July 9, 1860, Cobb MSs., UG.
15. Buchanan to Hiram Swarr, Oct. 3, I860, £ E, Bausman (private), Lancaster, Penna.
16. Howell Cobb to wife, Oct. 10, 1860, Cobb MSs., UG.
17. Howell to Lamar Cobb, Oct. 31, 1860, Cobb MSs., UG.
18. Burnham, Presidential Ballots, p. 86.
19. Henry Hull, Annals of Athens, 1S01-1901 (Athens, Ga., 1906), p. 217.
20. Philadelphia Press, Nov. 14, 1860.
21. Slidell to Buchanan, Nov. 13, 1860, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
CHAPTER 27 (pp. 353-367)
1. Trescot is also spelled Trescott. The best treatment of the last months of Buchanan's
Administration is Kenneth M, Stampp, And the War Came (Baton Rouge, 1950).
2. Buchanan, Mr. Buchanan's Administration, pp. 99-103.
3. Sen. Ex. Doc. #1, 35th Congress, 2nd Session, VoL III, Pt. II, 761.
4. Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 2nd session, Pt. I, 1032-1038; 36th Congress,
Istlession, Pt. I, 1351; Pt. Ill, 3137; Senate Reports, 36th Congress, 1st session,
I, 172.
5. Congressional Globe, 35th Congress, 1st session, Pt. II, 1425-1427.
6. Nahum Capen to Buchanan, Nov. 8, 1862, Buchanan MSs., HSP, enclosing Toucey's
deposition Wore the Senate Committee on the disposition of the Navy in 1850.
7. Buchanan to Nahum Capen, Jan. 27, 1864, Moore, Works, XI, 355.
8 Floyd's Diary, Nov. 10, I860, MSs., in HSP; William N. Brigance, Jeremiah Sullivan
' Black (Philadelphia, 1934), p. 82.
9. Nichols, Disruption, p. 381.
10. Floyd's Diary, Nov. 10, 1860, HSP.
11. November 17, 1860, in Buchanan MSs., HSP.
12. Opinions of the Attorneys General, IX, 517; copy in Black MSs., LC, dated Nov. 20,
1MO.
13. Howard C. Perkins, Northern Edtoorials on Secession (New York, 1942),
and Chapters II, IV; also Dwight L Dumond, Southern Editorials on Secession
(New York, 1931).
14. Lincoln to William Speer, Oct. 23, 1860, Basler, Works of Lincoln, IV, 30.
15. David Potter, Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis (New Haven, 1942), p. 141.
463
JAMES BUCHANAN
16. J. R. Moorhead to Lincoln, Nov. 23, 1860, Robert Todd Lincoln MSs., LC.
17. A. J. Glossbrenner to Hiram Swarr, Nov. 28, 1860, Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF.
18. New York Herald, Nov. 22, 1860; Philadelphia Press, Nov. 24, 1860.
19. Moore, Works, XI, 7-25.
20. Philadelphia North American and U. S. Gazette, Dec. 5, I860; Jersey City ' Daily
Courier and Adviser, Dec. 5, 1860; New Haven Morning Journal and Courier, Dec. 6,
im Qrincy Daily Whig and Republican, Dec. 10, 12, 1860, in Perkins, Northern
trials, I, 125/133, 136-138, 152-153.
21. New York Herald, Dec. 5, 1860; Harrisburg iP^riotand Union, Dec. 6, I860; Phila-
delphia Morning Pennsylvanian, Dec. 5, 1860, m Perkins, op. at., I, 127, 133-134,
142-145.
22. Buffalo Daily Courier, Dec. 6, 1860; Cincinnati Daily Enauirer, Dec. 6, 1860; Detroit
Free Press, Dec. 7, 1860; Utica Daily Observer, Dec. 7, i860, in Perkins, op. dt., I,
138-142, 147-152.
23. Potter, Lincoln and His Party, p. 39.
24 Francis Blackburn to Lincoln, Nov. 24, 1860, R. T. Lincoln MSs., LC; John Welsh
" to William Bigler, Dec. 14, 1860, Bigler MSs., HSP.
25. Trumbull to Lincoln, Dec. 4, 1860, R. T. Lincoln MSs., LC,
26. E. B. Washburne to Lincoln, Dec. 9, 1860, R. T. Lincoln MSs., LC.
27. W. G. Snethin to Lincoln, Dec. 13, 1860, R. T. Lincoln MSs., LC.
28. P. A. Hackleman to ?, forwarded to Lincoln, Nov. 27, 1860, R. T. Lincoln MSs., LC.
29. E. D. Morgan to Lincoln, Dec. 16, I860, R. T. Lincoln MSs., LC.
30. Potter, Lincoln and His Party, pp. 93-94.
31. Barlow to Slidell, Nov. 27, 1860, S. L. M. Barlow MSs., HEH.
32. Lincoln to H. J. Raymond, Nov. 28, 1860, R. T. Lincoln MSs., LC.
33. Weed to Lincoln, Dec. 11, I860, R. T. Lincoln MSs., LC.
34. Lincoln to E. B. Washburne, Dec. 13, 1860, Basler, Works of Lincoln, IV, 151.
35. Lincoln to Weed, Dec. 17, I860, ibid.. IV, 154.
36. Buchanan to Hiram Swarr, Dec. 10, 1860, E. E. Bailsman (private), Lancaster.
CHAPTER 28 (pp. 368-387J
1. Samuel W. Crawford, Genesis of the GM War (New York, 1887), pp. 66, 75.
2. Barlow to Butterworth, Dec. 3, 1860, quoting a report of the incident, Barlow MSs.,
HEH; Auchampaugh, Mr, Buchanan's Cabinet, p. 150.
3. Crawford, Genesis, pp. 30-35.
4. W. M. Browne to S. L M,% Barlow, Dec. I860, Barlow MSs., HEH.
' 5. Crawford, Genesis, p. 68.
6. Ibid., p. 76.
7. Ibid., p. 73.
8. Philadelphia Press, Dec. 8, 1860.
9. Cobb to J. C. Lamar, Nov. 16, 1860, Cobb MSs., UG.
10. Brigance, /. 5. Black, p. 90.
464
NOTES* CHAPTER 28
11. Cobb to wife, Dec. 10, 1860; Leonora Clayton to Mrs. Cobb, Dec. 30t 1860; Mrs.
Thompson to Mrs. Cobb, April 15, 1861, Cobb MSs., UG.
12. Auchampaugh, Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet, pp. 66-69.
13. Crawford, Genesis, pp. 38-39.
14. Moore, Works, XI, 56-57, 358.
15. Cass to Buchanan, Dec. 12, 1860, Moore, Works, XI, 58.
16. Philadelphia Press, Dec. 11, 1860.
17. Buchanan's memorandum of Dec. 15, 1860, Moore, Works, XI, 59-60.
18. Black to G. T. Curtis, Sept. 16, 1881, Buchanan MSs., HSP; Buchanan to Cass,
Dec. 15, 1860, Moore, Works, XI, 59-65.
19. Mrs. Thompson to Mrs. Cobb, Dec. 15, 1860, Cobb MSs,, UG.
20. W. M. Browne to S. L. M. Barlow, Dec. 16, 1860, Barlow MSs., HEH.
21. Mrs. Cobb to a "friend," Dec. 19, 1860, Cobb MSs., UG.
22. Trumbull to Lincoln, Dec. 14, 1860, R. T. Lincoln MSs., LC.
23. Curtis, Buchanan, II, 367.
24. Levi Woodbury to Buchanan, Dec. 17, I860, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
25. E. G. W. Butler to Buchanan, Dec. 17, 1860, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
26. Lancaster New Era, Sept. 29, 1872. Harriet Lane's letter to the editor.
27. Mrs. Thompson to Mrs. Cobb, Dec. 15, I860, Cobb MSs., UG, and newspaper letter
from Thompson in Ruth Scrapbook, YCHS.
28. W. M. Browne to S. L. M. Barlow, Nov. 24, 1860, Barlow MSs., HEH.
29. Horatio King to J. S. Black, Dec. 14, 1860, Horatio King, Turning on the Light
(Philadelphia, 1895), p. 34.
30. King to Dix, Nov. 25, 1860, ibid., p, 27.
31. King to Nahum Capen, Nov. 25, 1860, ibid., p. 29.
32. Buchanan to Bennett, Dec. 20, 1860, Moore, Works, XI, 69-70.
33. C. S. Henry to Lincoln, Dec. 23, 1860; G. G. Fogg to Lincoln, Dec. 13, 1860; A. J.
Randall to Seward, Dec. 15, 1860, R. T. LmcohTMSs., LC.
34. S. L, M. Barlow to H. D. Bacon, Dec. 29, 1860, Barlow MSs., HEH; F. P. James to
William Bigler, Dec. 15, 1860, Bigler MSs., HSP.
35. Mrs, Roger A. Pryor, Reminiscences of Peace and War (New York, 1905), pp. 110-111.
36. Ibid., p. 111. Telegram is in Buchanan MSs., HSP.
37. Crawford, Genesis, pp. 81-83.
38. Ibid., p. 84.
39. Buchanan to Pickens, Dec. 20, 1860, in Moore, Works, XI, 71-72.
40. Crawford, Genesis, pp. 77-78.
41. Ibid., p. 75; Nichols, Disruption, p. 423.
42. Crawford, Genesis, pp. 93-94.
43. Barlow Letterbook, VI, 863, HEH; Philadelphia Press, Dec. 31, 1860.
44. Leonora Clayton to Mrs. Cobb, Dec. 30f 1860, Cobb MSs., UG.
45. Memorandum of Black to Buchanan, Dec. 27, I860. Comesof this and of the orders
are in Buchanan MSs., HSP; Brigance, /. S. Black, pp. 92-93.
46. Crawford, Genesis, p. 145; Nichols, Disruption, p. 428; Brigance, /. 5. Black, p. 94.
47. Crawford, Genesis, p. 144. Memorandum of Black dated 1861 in Black MSs., LC.
48. Memorandum of Black in Black MSs., LC.
465
JAMES BUCHANAN
49. Leonora Clayton to Mrs. Cobb, Dec. 30, 1860, Cobb MSs., UG.
50. Moore, Works, XII, 160.
51. Ibid.. XI, 76-77.
52. Ibid., XII, 161.
53. Ibid., XII, 162.
54. Brigance, /. 5. Black, p. 98.
55. F, A. Burr in Phaadclphia Press, Sept. 10, 1883; Brigance, /. 5. Black, p. 98.
56. Basler, Works of Lincoln, IV, 154.
57. Weed to Lincoln, Dec. 11, I860, ibid.
58. Seward to Lincoln, Dec. 16, 1860, R. T. Lincoln MSs., LC; Potter, Lincoln and His
Party* PP- 163-164.
59. Phelps to Buchanan, Dec. 20, 1860, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
60 Bryant to Lincoln, Dec. 25, 1860; Lincoln to Bryant, Dec. 29, 1860, in Basler,
Works of Lincoln, IV, 163-164, and note.
61. Horace White to Lincoln, Dec. 22, 1860, R. T. Lincoln MSs., LC.
62. Barlow to Slidell, Nov. 27, 1860; Barlow to Bayard, Nov. 27, 1860, Barlow MSs.,
HEH.
63. Barlow to Benjamin, Dec. 26, 1860, Barlow MSs., HER; Harriet A. Weed (ed.),
Autobiography ofThurlow Weed (Boston, 1883), pp. 603-614.
64. W. M. Browne to Barlow, Dec. 26, 1860, Barlow MSs., HEH.
65. Moore, Works, XI, 73-74.
66. Duff Green to Buchanan, Dec. 28, 1860, Curtis, Buchanan, II, 426427; Green to
Jefferson Davis, May 26, 1863, J. G. Nicolay and John Hay, Abraham Lincoln (New
York, 1904), III, 286-288.
67. Lincoln to Green, Dec. 28, 1860; Lincoln to Trumbull, Dec. 28, 1860; Green to
Lincoln, Dec. 31, 1860, Basler, Works of Lincoln, IV, 162-163.
68. Black file, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
69. Moore, Works, XI, 79-84.
70. Ibid., XII, 162.
CHAPTER 29 (pp. 388-402)
1. Scott to Buchanan, Dec. 28, 1860, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
2. Buchanan to Thompson, Jan. 9, 1860, Moore, Works, XI, 191.
3. Nichols, Disruption, pp. 434435.
4. Crawford, Genesis, pp. 169-171.
5. Mrs. Gwin to Mrs. Cobb, Jan. 5, 1861, Cobb MSs., UG.
6. L, K. Bowen to Howell Cobb, Jan. 3» 1861; Seward to Lincoln, Dec. 29, 1860,
R. T. Lincoln MSs., LC.
7. Crawford, Genesis, p. 178.
8. Thompson to Buchanan, Jan. 8, 1861; Buchanan to Thompson, Jan. 8, 1861, in
Moore, Works, XI, 100-101.
466
NOTES* CHAPTER 29
9. Mrs. Thompson to Mrs. Cobb, Jan. 13, 1861, Cobb MSs., UG.
10. T/JBailey Myers to Miss Lane, Jan. 3, 1861, Buchanan MSs., LC,
11. Mrs. Gwin to Mrs. Cobb, Jan. 5, 1861, Cobb MSs., UG.
12. Clayton to Cobb, Jan. 4, 1861; Browne to Cobb, Jan. 11, 1861, Cobb MSs., UG.
13. Mrs. Thompson to Mrs. Cobb, Jan. 14, 1861, Cobb MSs., UG.
14. Moore, Works, XI, 94-99.
15. Lincoln to Duff Green, Dec. 28, 1860, Basler, Forks of Lincoln, IV, 162-163.
16. Potter, Lincoln and His Party* P- 184-
17. A. A. Woldman, Lincoln and the Russians (Cleveland, 1952), p. 17.
18. Nichols, Disruption, pp. 440-443.
19. A. T. W. Lytle to Buchanan. These are in the "Letters to Buchanan," Dec., 1860,
Buchanan MSs., HSP.
20. Crawford, Genesis, p. 205.
21. Moore, Works, XI, 109411.
22. Black to Buchanan, Jan. 22, 1861, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
23. Moore, Works, XI, 126-143, gives the correspondence,
24. Ibid., XII, 134.
25. Nichols, Disruption, p. 478.
26. Moore, Works, XII, 134-141.
27. Curtis, Buchanan, II, 413-417.
28. Moore, Works, XI, 106-109.
29. Sarah R. Cobb to Mrs. Howell Cobb, Jan. 20, 1861, Cobb MSs., UG.
30. W. M. Browne to Howell Cobb, Jan. 11, 1861, Cobb MSs., UG.
31. Mrs. Thompson to Mrs. Cobb, Jan. 14, 1861, Cobb MSs., UG.
32. Black to Buchanan, Jan. 22, 1861, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
33. Holt to Buchanan, Feb. 20, 1861, Moore, Forks, XI, 154-155.
34. Ibid., XI, 152-154.
35. SHdell to Buchanan, Jan. 27; Buchanan to Slidell, Jan. 29, 1861, Buchanan MSs.,
HSP.
36. Moore, Works, XI, 116-118.
37. Tyler to Buchanan, Jan. 28, 1861, Moore, Works, XI, 120421.
38. King, Turning on the Light, pp. 52-54.
39. Nichols, Disruption, p. 491.
40. Philip Clayton to Cobb, Jan. 4, 1861, Cobb MSs., UG.
41. Mrs, Thompson to Mrs. Cobb, Jan. 14, 1861, Cobb MSs., UG.
42 Richard H. Clark to Cobb, Feb. 16, 1861, Cobb MSs., UG; C. F. Adams Diary,
" Jan. 15, 1861. Microfilm, The Pennsylvania State University Library.
43. Mrs. Thompson to Mrs. Cobb, Feb. 3, 1861, Cobb MSs., UG.
44. Miss Lane to Sophie Plitt, Feb. 24, 1861, Buchanan MSs., LC.
45. Moore, Works, XI, 156; memorandum of Mar. 4-9, 1861.
46. Auchampaugh, Mr. Buchanan's Cabinet, p. 188.
47. Asa E. Martin, After the White House (State College, Penna., 1951), p. 225.
467
JAMES BUCHANAN
CHAPTER 30 (pp. 403-429J
1. Moore, Works, XI, 156.
2. Lancaster JnteUigencer, Mar. 12, 1861; Baltimore County Advocate, Mar. 23, 1861.
3. National Intelligencer, Mar. 9, 1861,
4. Raleigh North Carolina Standard, Mar. 9, 1861.
5. Perkins, Northern Editorials, Chap. XV, "The Inaugurals, South and North."
6. Indianapolis Daily Journal, Mar. 5, 1861.
7 Excerpts are from Lincoln's first inaugural; from Buchanan's 4th annual message
* and his special messages of January 8, 28, 1861.
8. Black to Buchanan, Mar. 8, 1861, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
9. Dix to Buchanan, Mar. 14, 1861, Curtis, Buchanan, II, 533.
10 Stanton to Buchanan, Mar. 10, 12, 14, 16, and April 3, 1861, Moore, Works, XI,
163-178.
11. Ibid., XI, 176-178; Bigler to Buchanan, April 11, 1861, Buchanan-Swan: MSs., BF.
12 Stanton to Buchanan, Mar. 16, 1861; Dix to Buchanan, Mar. 28, 1861, Moore,
Works, XI, 170-171, 176.
13. Buchanan to J, B. Henry, April 12, 1861, Moore, Works, XI, 181.
14. Harris, Biographical History of Lancaster County, p. 485, note.
15. Buchanan to J. B. Baker, April 26, 1861, Moore, Work, XI ,186; Buchanan to
James L. Reynolds, May 8, 1861, Buchanan MSs., HSP; Gfflan, "James Buchanan,"
Kittochtiuny H. S. Popery, 196.
16. Sophie Plitt to Harriet Lane, May 18, 1861» Buchanan MSs., LC; J. M. Foltz to
A. J. Steinman, June 16, 1868, Foltz MSs., FM; Buchanan to W. B. Reed, Mar. 21,
1861, Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF.
17. Lancaster Examiner and Herald, Aug. 1, 1863.
18. Moore, Works, XI, 323-324.
19. Aid., XI, 192; Curtis, Buchanan, II, 501, 506.
20. Moore, Works, XI, 163, 171-172, 211, 280-293.
21. Ibid., XI, 215, 363; Curtis, Buchanan, II, 513.
22. Moore, Works, XI, 229, 316, 322.
23. Rid., XI, 179, 182.
24. Curtis, Buchanan, II, 518-519.
25. Buchanan to J. H. Dillon, Oct. 24, 1865, May MSs. (private); Curtis, Buchanan. II,
520; Moore, Works, XI, 263, 266, note.
26. Flynn to Buchanan, May 14, 1862, Moore, Works, XI, 269.
27. Ibid., XI, 266.
28. Ibid., XI, 271-272.
29. Ibid., XI, 266, 269.
30. Ibid., XI, 252.
31. Ibid., XI, 244.
32. Ibid., XI, 267-268.
33. Ibid., XI, 340.
34. Ibid., XI, 275.
35. Ibid., XI, 318.
468
NOTES* CHAPTER 30
36. Lancaster Intelligencer, Aug. 25, 1864.
37. Moore, Works, XI, 256, 337, 382, 412.
38. Ibid., XI, 243.
39. Report from the Commissioner of Public Buildings, July 20, 1860, Buchanan MSs.,
ESP.
40. Moore, Works, XI, 251, 418-419.
41. Ibid., XI, 235, 239, 240; Curtis, Buchanan, II, 524.
42. Ibid., II, 526.
43. Lancaster Intelligencer, Sept. 12, 1865; Moore, Works, XI, 412.
44. Lancaster Intelligencer, May 24, June 7, 1865.
45. Dix to Buchanan, May 24, 1861, in Moore, Works, XI, 197.
46. Stanton to Buchanan, Mar. 14, 1861, in Moore, Works, XI, 168,
47. Buchanan to J. B. Henry, May 17, 1861, Moore, Works, XI, 192.
48. Same to same, Dec. 19, 1862, Moore, Works, XI, 325.
49. Ibid., XI, 183.
50. Black to Buchanan, June ?, 18, 1861, Moore, Works, XI, 198.
51. Same to same, Oct. 5, 1861, Moore, Works, XI, 224.
52. Buchanan to Black, Mar. 4, 1862, Moore, Works, XI, 261.
53. Ibid., XI, 226.
54. Black to Buchanan, Mar. 1, 1862, Moore, Works, XI, 258.
55. Ibid., XI, 352.
56. Both Scott's and Buchanan's letters appear in Moore, Works, XI, 280 ff.
57. Preface to Mr. Buchanan's Administration on the Eve of Rebellion; Abner Doubleday,
Forts Sumter and MouMe (New York, 1876), 129; Moore, Works, XI, 248.
58. Moore, Works, XI, 450, 457.
59. Ibid., XI, 183-184.
60. Mrs. Gwin to Mrs. Cobb, May 5, 1861, Cobb MSs., UG.
61. Buchanan to William B. Rose, Sept. 14, 1861, Ruth Scrapbook, YCHS.
62. Moore, Works, XI, 216.
63. Buchanan to the Hon. J. C. G. Kennedy, July 24, 1861, Ruth Scrapbook, YCHS.
64. Buchanan to Charles V. Pene, Dec. 21, 1861, Dicfcinsoniana Coll., DC.
65. Buchanan to John A. Parker, Feb. 3, 1862, Moore, Works, XI, 250.
66. Buchanan to Dix, Mar. 1861, Moore, Works, XI, 173.
67. Ibid., XI, 386.
68. Ibid., XI, 341, 346.
69. Ibid., XI, 373.
70. Buchanan to Nahura Capen, Mar. 14, 1864, Moore, Works, XI, 358.
71. Buchanan to Dr. J. B. Blake, Nov. 21, 1864, Moore, Works, XI, 377.
72. Ibid., XI, 385.
73. Ibid., XI, 405.
74. William B. Reed to Buchanan, May 2, 1868, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
75. Moore, Works, XI, 440-441.
76. Buchanan to Schell, Nov. 9, 1867, Moore, Works, XI, 455.
469
JAMES BUCHANAN
77. Buchanan to Black, July 17, 1863, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
78. David Unger to Buchanan, Oct. 21, 1861, E. E. Lane MSs.
79. Buchanan to Hiram Swarr, Mar. 24, 1864, Buchanan-Swarr MSs.# BF.
80. Accounts in Buchanan MSs., HSP.
81 Gfflan, "James Buchanan," in Kittochtinny H. S. Papers, 199; J. Montgomery
* Forster Recollections, Rankin Scrapbook, Mercersburg, Penna.
82. Correspondence is in Reynolds MSs., FM.
83. In Buchanan's Commonplace Book, Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF.
84. In Buchanan's passbook for the Chemical Bank of New York, N. Y., Buchanan-
" Swarr MSs., BF.
85. Commonplace Book, Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF.
86. Varina Davis to Buchanan, Dec. 1861, Buchanan MSs., HSP.
87. Sophie Plitt to Harriet Lane, Oct. 18, 1863, Buchanan MSs., LC.
88. Letters of Feb. 12, 1862, and July 17, 1866, from Buchanan to Isabel Lynch, Buchanan
MSs., HSP; also correspondence in Lynch MSs., LCHS; Ishbel Ross, Rebel Rose
(New York, 1954), p. 53.
89. Wall to Buchanan, Aug. 26, 1867, Buchanan-Swarr MSs., BF.
90. Leonora Clayton to Harriet Lane, Jan. 23, 1866, Buchanan MSs., LC.
91. ? to Miss Lane, Jan. 6, 1863, Buchanan MSs., LC.
92. Mrs. Ellis to Miss Lane, Oct. 1, 1866, Buchanan MSs., LC.
93. Buchanan to Harriet Lane (Mrs. Johnston), Feb. 22, 1867, Taylor MSs.
94. D. M. B. Shannon to Buchanan, Aug. 7, 1866, in author's possession; Buchanan
to Shannon, July 6, 1866, Turner Scrapbook, Mercersburg.
95 Buchanan to Daniel Sturgeon, April 23, 1866; Ambrose Dudley to Miss Lane,
Jan. 18, 1866, Ruth Scrapbook, YCHS.
96. Buchanan to Harriet Lane, April 5, 1866, Taylor MSs.
97. Commonplace Book, Buchanan-Swarr MSs.; Theodore Appel, Life of John Nevin
(Philadelphia, 1889), pp. 601-604, analyzes Buchanan's religious views.
98. Lancaster Intelligencer, June 3, 10, 1868.
99. Hessdtine and Fisher (eds.), Trimmers, Trucklers and Temporizers* p. 57.
470
BIBLIOGRAPHY
ABBREVIATIONS
The following abbreviations have been used to designate manuscript repositories
frequently mentioned in the notes:
BF Buchanan Foundation for the Preservation of Wheatland, collections in the
Lancaster County Historical Society.
DC Library of Dickinson College, Carlisle, Penna.
FM Library of Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Penna.
HEH Henry E, Huntington Library, San Marino, California.
HSP Historical Society of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Penna.
LC Manuscripts Division, Library of Congress, Washington, D. C.
LCHS Lancaster County Historical Society, Lancaster, Penna.
UG Library of the University of Georgia, Athens, Ga.
YCHS York County Historical Society, York, Penna.
The printed correspondence of Buchanan, fully cited as John Bassett Moore
(ed.), The Works of James Buchanan, 12 vols. (Philadelphia, 1908-1911), wUl be abbre-
viated in the notes as Moore, Works.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
MANUSCRIPTS
Library of Congress, Manuscripts Division (LC)
Jeremiah S. Black MSs.
Buchanan-Johnston MSs.
Simon Cameron MSs.
W. W. Corcoran MSs.
A. J. Donelson MSs.
Joseph Holt MSs.
Andrew Jackson MSs.
Horatio King MSs.
Robert Todd Lincoln MSs.
John McLean MSs.
William L. Marcy MSs.
Edwin M. Stanton MSs.
Martin Van Buren MSs.
Robert J. Walker MSs.
Historical Society of Pennsylvania (HSP)
William Bigler MSs.
James Buchanan MSs.
John Cadwalader MSs., Buchanan section
Lewis S. Coryell MSs.
John B. Floyd MS. Diary
Gratz Collection
J. S. Johnston MSs.
W. M. Meredith MSs.
William Rawle MSs.
George Wolf MSs.
Library Company of Philadelphia, Ridgway Branch
John M. Read MSs.
Dickinson College Library, Carlisle, Penna. (DC)
Minutes of the Board of Trustees, 1807-1809
Dickinsoniana, Buchanan section
Fackenthal Library, Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, Penna. (FM)
Jonathan Foltz MSs. and diaries
John Reynolds MSs.
Minutes of the Board of Trustees, 1853-1868
Houghton Library, Harvard University
Autograph Collection
Buchanan MSs.
Jared Sparks MSs.
Historical Society of Massachusetts
C. E. French Collection
Presidents of the United States Collection
Edward Everett MSs.
W. B. Washburae MSs.
Essex Institute, Salem, Massachusetts
N. P. Banks MSs.
George Peabody MSs.
Princeton University Library
de Coppet Collection
Henry E. HwUington Library and Art Gallery
S. L.M7 Barlow MSs.
473
JAMES BUCHANAN
Buchanan Foundation for the Preservation of Wheatland (BF). Collections maintained
in the Historical Society of Lancaster County, Penna.
James Buchanan Sr. MSs.
James Buchanan MSs.
Agnes Selin Schoch Collection of Buchanan-Kittera MSs.
ETE. Bausman Collection of Buchanan-Swarr MSs,
Lancaster County Historical Society (LCHS)
David Lynch MSs.
York County Historical Society (YCHS)
Buchanan-Russell family MSs.
Wvoming Historical and Geological Society, Wilkes-Barre, Penna.
y Hendrick B. Wright MSs.
Pennsylvania Historical and Museum Commission, Division of Public Records, Harris-
burg, Penna,
Simon Cameron MSs.
County records (microfilm)
Papers of the governors, MSs.
George Wolf MSs.
Miscellaneous Collection
Pattee Library, The Pennsylvania State University, University Park, Penna.
Adams MSs. (microfilm)
Jacob Hibshman MSs.
nVE Howell'cobb MSs. (UG), courtesy of William Erwin, Esq., Athens, Georgia.
Collection maintained in the Library of the University of Georgia
Buchanan MSs., courtesy of Mrs. Charles S. Foltz, Lancaster, Penna.
Harriet Lane MSs., courtesy of Mrs. Edmund Taylor, Charlestown, West Va.
Charles M. Yates MSs. (photostats), courtesy of Roy F. Nichols, Philadelphia
J. Glancy Jones MSs. (photostats), courtesy of Roy F. Nichols, Philadelphia
Elliot Eskridge Lane MSs., courtesy of Patty Lane Fay Eldridge, San Luis
Obispo, Papers now at Buchanan Foundation.
Henry and Jasper Slaymaker MSs., courtesy of Samuel C. Slaymaker, Lancaster,
Penna.
Henry Baldwin MSs., courtesy of John Reynolds, Meadvffle, Penna.
Fugitive Buchanan material was made available to me by C. H. Martin, William
mer, H, M. J. Klein, and Richmond Myers, Lancaster, Penna.; Craig Wylie, Bos-
ton Mass.; Oliver Keller, Springfield, HI.; £. J. Turner, Mercersburg, Penna.; Gilbert,
Mcdintock, Wilkes-Barre, Penna.; John Lowry Ruth, York, Penna.; H. Hanford Hopkins,
Baltimore, Md.; Maurice G. Buchanan, Indianapolis, Ind.; William Hubley Potter,
Alexandria, Va.; Herman Blum, Philadelphia, Penna.; George D. Harmon, Bethlehem,
Penna.; and Asa £. Martin, Tuscon, Ariz.
NEWSPAPERS
Most of the newspapers listed are located in the Pennsylvania State Library,
Harrisburg; the Historical Society of Pennsylvania; the Library Company of Philadelphia,
Ridgway Branch; the office of Lancaster Newspapers, Inc.; the Lancaster County Histori-
cal Society ; or the Library of Congress. A number of items, however, were found in the
file of clippings preserved by Buchanan which form a part of the Buchanan MS*, collec-
tion of the Historical Society of Pennsylvania, or in the John Lowry Ruth Scnmbook,
York County Historical Society, or the Hiram Swarr Scrapbook, Buchanan Foundation.
Baltimore, Md.
Niks National Register
474
Worner,
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bedford, Penna.
Gazette
Inquirer
Boston, Mass.
Budget
Herald
Car] isle, Penna.
Herald
Chambersburg, Penna.
Franklin Repository
Public Opinion
Cincinnati, Ohio
Commercial
Enquirer
Doylestown, Penna.
Democrat
Harrisburg, Penna.
Argus
Keystone
Patriot (and Union)
Republican
Indianapolis, Ind.
Daily Journal
Lancaster, Penna.
Express
Intelligencer
Intelligencer and Lancastrian
Intelligencer and Weekly Advertiser
Intelligencer-Journal
Journal
New Era
Weekly Journal
Marietta, Penna.
Pioneer
Meadville, Penna.
Crawford Register
Mercersburg, Penna.
Journal
Mobile, Ala.
Mercury
New Orleans, La.
Daily True Delta
DeBoufs Review
Picayune
New York, N. Y.
Frank Leslie1* Illustrated Weekly
Herald
Times
Tribune
475
JAMES BUCHANAN
Philadelphia, Penna.
Aurora
Democratic Press
Pennsylvania Gazette
Pennsylvanian
Philadelphia North American and U. S. Gazette
Press
Union, or United States Gazette and True American
PottrtOTO, Penna.
Times
Raleigh, N. G.
North Carolina Standard
Richmond, Va.
Enquirer
Towson, Md.
Baltimore County Advocate
Washington, D. G.
Constitution
National Intelligencer
Telegraph
TV •
Union
York, Penna.
Gazette
OFFICIAL DOCUMENTS
Party Documents
James Buchanan, His Doctrines and Policy as Exhibited by Himself and his
Friends, n.p., 1856
Leaven for Doughfaces or Threescore and Ten Parables Touching Slavery,
Cincinnati, 1856
Official Proceedings of the National Democratic Convention . . . 1856, n.p., 1S56
Old Line Whigs for Buchanan and Breckinridge, n.p., 1856
Political Textbook for I860, N. Y.t 1860
Republican Campaign, Documents of 1856, a Collection, Washington, D. G, 1857
Short Answers to Reckless Fabrications, n.p., 1856
Pennsylvania
Appearance Dockets. Courts of Quarter Sessions and Common Pleas, 1812-
1821, Lancaster County Courthouse
Deed Books and Will Books, Adams, Cumberland, Franklin* Lancaster and
York County Courthouses
Pennsylvania Archives, Fourth Series, "Papers of the Governors," 12 vofo,,
Harrisburg, 1900-1902
Journal of the Assembly of Pennsylvania, 1814-1819
Journal of the Senate of Pennsylvania, 1814-1819
Relations, United States
1, 56th Congress, 2nd
Correspondence in Relation to the Proposed Interoceanic Canal, the Clayton*
Bulwer Treaty, and the Monroe Doctrine, Washington, D, C., 1885
476
Senate, 1789-1909/' Senate Executive Document
BIBUOCRAPHY
Correspondents Relative to the Negotiations of the Question of Disputed Right to
ike Oregon Territory . . . 1842, London, 1846
Department of Commerce and Labor, Bureau of the Census, Heads of Families
at the First Census of the U. S.» taken in the Year 1790, Pennsylvania, Wash*
ington, D. C., 1908
, Historical Statistics of the United States, 1789-1945, Washington, D. C.,
1949
Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Inter-American Affairs, 1831-
I860, "W. R. Manning (ed.), 12 vols., Washington, D. C., 1932-1939
Haase, Adelaide, Index to United States Documents relating to Foreign Affairs,
182&S.861, 3 vols., Washington, D. C., 1914-1921
Official Records of the Union and Confederate Navies in the War of the Rebellion,
ed. IT Richard Rush et aL, 30 vols., Washington, D. C., 1894-1914
RegisGer of Debates in Congress and Congressional Globe
WM tofike Rebellion: a Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and
Confederate Armies, R. N. Scott et al. (eds.), 130 vols., Washington, D. C.,
1880- 1901
Committee Reports and Executive Documents of the Congressional Series of
Publications oCthe United States, cited fully in the notes, are not listed individually here.
BIOGRAPHICAL
I liLve incorporated under this heading not only biographies, hut diaries,
memoirs and the major published writings of persons included in the section.
ABERDEEN: Balfour, Lady Frances, Life of George, Fourth Earl of Aberdeen, K. G., K. T,,
2 vols., London, 1913
ANDERSON:: Cravford, Samuel W., The Genesis of the CivU War, The Story ofSumter,
1860-1862, New York, 1887
Swanberg, W, A., First Blood, The Story ofSumter, New York, 1957
BANCROFT:; Hove, M. A. DeWolfe (ed.), Life and Letters of George Bancroft, 2 vols.,
New York, JL908
Nyc, Russell B., George Bancroft, Brahmin Rebel, New York, 1944
BARLOW: Gorton, Richard M., "The Political Activities of Samuel Latham Mitchell
Barlovr, 1856-1864," M. A. thesis, Columbia University, 1947
BELL: Parka, J. H., John Ml of Tennessee, Baton Rouge, 1930
BELMOOT: Bclwont, August, Letters and Speeches of August Bebnont, New York, 1890
BENJAMIN : Butler, Pierce, Judah P. Benjamin, Philadelphia, 1907
Mcade, Robert D., Judah P. Benjamin, New York, 1943
Onterweis, R. G., Judah P. Benjamin, Statesman of the Lost Cause, New York, 1933
BENNETT: Seitz, Don C., The James Gordon Bennetts, New York, 1928
BENTON; Benton, Thomas H., Thirty Years* View . . . 1820-1850, 2 vols., New York,
1854-1856
Chamber*, William N., Old Bullion Benton, Senator from the New West, Boston, 1956
Meigs, V. M., Life of Thomas Rart Benton, Philadelphia, 1904
BIDDtE: Govan, Thomas P., Nicholas Biddle, Chicago, 1959
BLACKf Brigance, William N., Jeremiah Sullivan Black, Philadelphia, 1934
Clayton, Mfary B.t Reminiscences ofj. S. Blade, St. Louis, 1887
Nichols, Hoy F., "Jeremiah S. Black,*' in Amer^an Secretaries of State and Their Di-
ptowwy, ad/ by S. F. Bemis, 10 vols., New York, 1929
BRODERECK: Lynch, Jeremiah, Life of David C. Broderick, New York, 1911
BRECKIISSRIPGE: StWwell, Lucille, John Cdbell Breckinrid#e9 Caldwell, Id., 1936
477
JAMES BUCHANAN
BUCHANAN: Auchampaugh, Philip G., James Buchanan and His Cabinet on the Eve
of Secession, Lancaster, 1926 *
_ f james Buchanan, a Political Portrait, 1856, according to his Friends and Enemies,
Reno, Nevada, 1946 ,,«,„. v v i
Buchanan, James, Mr. Budman's Administration on the Eve of the Rebellion, TSew York,
_ f 7%e flPorfcs of James Buchanan, ed. by John Bassett Moore, 12 vols., Philadelphia,
1908-1911
Buchanan, Patrick A. W., The Buchanan Book, Montreal, 1911
Butler, Thomas J., WTusatland, 1848-1868, the Home of James Buchanan (mimeo),
Dover, Del., 1957
Curtis, George T., The Life of James Buchanan, 2 vols., New York, 1883
Hensel, William U., fames Buchanan as a Lawyer, Lancaster, 1912
_ ^ The Religious Convictions and Character of James Buchanan, Lancaster, 1912
_ ^ The Attitude of James Buchanan . . . towards the Institution of Slavey, Lancaster,
1911
_ t A Pennsylvania Presbyterian, President, Philadelphia, 1907
Henry, J. B. (comp.), The Messages of President Buchanan wiA an Appendix Containing
Sundrj Letters from Members of His Cabinet, New York, 1888
Henry, Reginald B., Buchanan, n.p., n.d. (genealogy)
Hillman, Franklin P., "The Diplomatic Career of James Buchanan," Ph.D. thesis,
The George Washington University, 1953
Horton, R. G., Life and Public Services of James Buchanan, New York, 1856
Irelan, John R., History of the Life, Administration and Times of James Buchanan, Chicago,
1888
Klein, Philip S., The Story of Wheatland, Lancaster, 1936
Sioussat, St. George L., "James Buchanan," in American Secretaries of State and Their
Diplomacy, ed. by S. F. Bemis, 10 vols., New York, 1929
Speer, Talbot T., The Speer Family Record, Baltimore, n.d.
CALHOUN: Boucher, Chauncey S. and Brooks, Robert P. (eds.), "Correspondence
addressed to John C. Calhoun," Amer, Hist. Assoc. Annual Report, 1929, Washington,
1931
Calhoun, John C., "Correspondence of John C. Calhoun," ed. by F. Franklin Jameson,
Amer. Hist. Assoc. Annual Report, 1899, II, Washington, 1900
_ 9 Works of John C. Calhoun, ed. by Richard K. CrallS, 6 vols., New York, 1854-1857
Wiltse, Charles M., John C. Calhoun, 3 vols., Indianapolis, 1944-1951
CAMERON: Crippen, Lee F., Simon Cameron, Ante-Bettum Years, Oxford, Ohio, 1942
McNair, James B., Simon Cameron's Adventure in Iron, Los Angeles, 1949
CASS: McLaughlin, Andrew C., Lewis Cass, New York, 1899
Woodford, Frank B., Lewis Cass, ike Last Jeffersonian, New Brunswick, N. J., 1950
CLAY: Clay, Henry, The Works of Henry Clay, Comprising his Life, Correspondence and
Speeches, ed. by Calvin Colton, 10 vols,, New York, 1904
Eaton, Clement, Henry Clay and the Art of American Politics, Boston, 1957
Van Deusen, G. G., The Life of Henry Clay, Boston, 1937
COBB: Boykin, Samuel (ed.), Memorial Volume of the Hon. Howell Cobb, Philadelphia,
1871
Johnson, Zachary T., Political Policies of Howell Cobb, Nashville, 1929
CRITTENDEN: Coleman, A. M. B., Life of John /. Crittenden, 2 vols., Philadelphia, 1871
DALLAS: Beck, Virginia, "George M. Dallas," M. A. thesis, University of Pittsburgh
Dallas, G. M., A Series of Letters from London, written during the Years 1856-1860, Phila-
delphia, 1869
DAVIS: King, Willard L., Lincoln's Manager, David Davis, Cambridge, Mass., 1960
Davis, Varina, Jefferson Davis, a Memoir, New York, 1890
478
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Strode, Hudson, Jefferson Davis, 2 vols., New York, 1955-1959
Steiner, B. C., Life of Henry Winter Davis, Baltimore, 1916
DOUGLAS: Capers, Gerald M., Stephen A. Douglas, Boston, 1959
Milton, George Fort, The Eve of Conflict, Stephen A. Douglas and the Needless War,
Boston, 1934
FILLMORE: Raybacfc, Robert J., Millard FUlmore, Buffalo, 1959
FLOYD: Ambler, C. H., Life and Diary of John Floyd, Richmond, 1918
FOLTZ: Foltz, Charles S., Surgeon of the Seas: The Adventurous Life of Jonathan M.
FoUz, Indianapolis, 1931
FORNEY: Forney, John W., Anecdotes of Public Men, New York, 1873
FRfiMONT: Nevins, Allan, Fremont, Pathmarker of the West, New York, 1955
GREENHOW: Ross, Ishbel, Rebel Rose, Life of Rose O'Neal Greenhow, New York, 1954
HARDIN: Little, Lucius P., Ben Hardin, His Times and Contemporaries, Louisville, 1887
HAYNE: Jervey, T. D., Robert Y. Hayne and His Times, New York, 1909
HUNTER: Hunter, R. M. T., "Correspondence . . . 1826-1876," ed. by C. H. Ambler,
Amer. Hist. Assoc. Annual Report, 1916, II, Washington, 1918
Simms, Henry H., Life of Robert M. T. Hunter, Richmond, 1935
JACKSON: Bassett, John S., Life of Andrew Jackson, 2 vols., Garden City, N. Y., 1911
Jackson, Andrew, Correspondence, ed. by J. S. Bassett, 7 vols., Washington, 1926-1935
James, Marquis, Andrew Jackson, New York, 1938
Parton, James, Life of Andrew Jackson, 3 vols., New York, 1860
JOHNSON: flippin, Percy S., Herschel V. Johnson of Georgia, Richmond, 1931
Meyer, L. W., Life and Times of Col. Richard M. Johnson, New York, 1932
Steiner, B. C., Life ofReverdy Johnson, Baltimore, 1914
JONES: Jones, Charles HM Life and Public Services of J. Glancy Jones, 2 vols., Phila-
delphia, 1910
LAMAR: Cate, W. A., Lucius Q. C. Lamar; Secession and Reunion, Chapel Hill, 1935
Mayes, Edward, Lucius Q. C. Lamar: His Life, Times and Speeches, Nashville, 1896
LINCOLN: Donald, David, Lincoln Reconsidered, New York, 1956
Lincoln, Abraham, The Collected Works of Abraham Lincoln, ed, by Roy P. Basler, 9 vols.,
New Brunswick, N. J., 1933-1953
Mearns, David C. (ed.), The Lincoln Papers, 2 vols., New York, 1948
Nicolay, John G., and Hay, John, Abraham Lincoln, A History, 10 vols., New York, 1904
Potter, David, Lincoln and His Party in the Secession Crisis, New Haven, 1942
Randall, J. G., Lincoln the President, 2 vols., New York, 1945
Thomas, Benjamin P., Abraham Lincoln, New York, 1952
Woldman, A. A., Lincoln and the Russians, New York, 1952
LIVINGSTON: Hatcher, W. B., Edward Livingston, University, La., 1940
LOWNDES: Ravenel, Mrs. St. J., Life and Times of William £owndes, New York, 1901
LYONS: Newton, Lord Thomas W. L, Lord Lyons, London, 1913
McDUFFIE: Green, Edwin L, George McDuffie, Columbia, S. C., 1936
MARCY: Spencer, Ivor D., The Victor and the Spoils, A Life of WiUiam L. Marcy,
Providence, 1959
MEIGS- Wefoley, Russell, Quartermaster General of the Union Army, Montgomery C.
Mdgs, New Y5rk, 1959
MINER: Richardson, C. F, and E. M., Charles Miner, a Pennsylvania Pioneer, Wilkes-
Barre, Penna., 1916
PEEL: Parker, Charles S, (ed.), Sr Albert Peel, 3 vols,, London, 1891-1899
PIERCE: Nichols, Roy F., Franklin, Pierce, Young Hickory of the Granite Hills, 2nd ed.,
Philadelphia, 1958
479
JAMES BUCHANAN
POLK: McCormac, Eugene I., James K. Polk, a Political Biography, Berkeley, 1922
McCoy, Charles, Polk and the Presidency, Austin, Texas, 1960
Polk, James K., Diary, ed. by Milo M. Quaife, 4 vols., Chicago, 1910
Sellers, Charles G., James K. Polk, Jacksonian, 1795-1843, Princeton, N. J., 1957
POINSETT: Hippy, J. Fred, Joel Poinsett, Durham, N. C., 1935
RHETT: White, L. A., Robert Barnwett Rhett, Father of Secession, New York, 1931
RITCHIE: Ambler, C. H., Thomas Ritchie, A Study in Virginia Politics, Richmond, 1913
SCOTT: Elliott, Charles W., Winfield Scott, The Soldier and the Man, New York, 1937
Scott Winfield, Memoirs of Lieutenant General Scott, LLD, 2 vols., New York, 1864
Smith, A. D. H., Old Fuss and Feathers . . . Winfield Scott, New York, 1937
SEWARD: Bancroft, Frederic, Life of William H. Seward, 2 vols., New York, 1900
Seward, Frederick W., Seward at Washington, New York, 1891
SICKLES: Swanberg, W. A., Sickles the Incredible, New York, 1956
SLIDELL: Sears, Louis M., John Stidett, Durham, N- C., 1925
SOULfe: Ettinger, Amos A., The Mission to Spain of Pierre Soule, New Haven, 1932
STANTON: Gorham, G. C., Life and Public Services of Edwin M. Stanton, 2 vols.,
Boston, 1899
Flower, F. A., Edwin, M. Stanton, New York, 1905
STEPHENS: Abele, von, Rudolph, Alexander H. Stephens, New York, 1946
Avery, Myrta L, Recollections of Alexander H. Stephens, New York, 1910
Waddell, James D., Biographical Sketch ofLinton Stephens, Atlanta, Ga., 1877
STEVENS: Current, Richard C., Old Thad Stevens, New York, 1942
STEVENSON: Wayland, Francis, Andrew Stevenson^ Democrat and Diplomat, Phila-
delphia, 1949
SUMNER: Donald, David, Charles Sumner and the Coming of the Civil War, New York,
1960
TAYLOR: Dyer, Brainerd, Zachary Taylor, Baton Rouge, 1946
Hamilton, Holman, Zachary Taylor, 2 vols., Indianapolis, 1951
TOOMBS: Brewton, W. W., Son of Thunder, an Epic of the South, Richmond, 1936
Phillips, U. B., Life of Robert Toombs, New York, 1913
TRUMBULL: White, Horace, Life ofLyman Trumbull, Boston, 1913
TYLER- Auchampaugh, Philip G,, Robert Tyler, Southern Rights Champion, 1847-1866,
Duluth, Minn., 1934
Chitwood, Oliver P., John Tyler, Champion of the Old South, Philadelphia, 1939
Morgan, Robert J., A Whig Embattled, the Presidency under John Tyler, Lincoln, Neb.,
1954
Tyler, Lyon G., Letters and Times of the Tylers, 3 vols., Richmond, 1884-1886
VAN BUREN: Alexander, Holmes, The American Talleyrand, Martin Van Burert, New
York, 1936
Lynch, Dennis T., An Epoch and a Man, Martin Van Buren and His Times, New York, 1929
Rimini, Robert B., Martin Van Buren and the Making of the Democratic Party1, New York,
1959
Van Buren, Martin, "Autobiography of Martin Van Buren," ed. by J. C. Fitzpatrick,
Amer. Hist. Assoc, Annual Report, 1918, II, Washington, 1920
WALKER: Dodd, W. E., Robert J. Walker, Imperialist, Chicago, 1914
Shenton, James R., "The Compleat Politician, The Life of Robert John Walker," Ph.D.
thesis, Columbia University, 1954
Greene, Laurence, The Filibuster: The Career of William Walker, Indianapolis, 1937
Scroggs, W. 0., Filibusters and Financiers, the Story of William Walker and his Associates,
New York, 1916
480
BIBLIOGRAPHY
WEBSTER: Current, Richard, Daniel Webster, Boston, 1955
Fuess, Claude, Daniel Webster, 2 vols., Boston, 1930
Webster, Daniel, Letters of Daniel Webster, ed. by C. H. Van Tyne, New York, 1902
WEED: Barnes, T. W., Life of Thurlow Weed, 2 vols., Boston, 1884
Van Deusen, G. G,, Thurlow Weed, Boston, 1947
Weed, Thurlow, Autobiography of Thurlow Weed, ed. by Harriet A. Weed, New York,
1883
WILMOT: Going, C. B., David Wilmot, Free Soiler, New York, 1924
WISE: Wise, Barton H., Life of Henry A. Wise, New York, 1899
WOOD: Pleasants, Samuel A., Fernando Wood of New York, New York, 1948
WRIGHT: Garraty, J. A., Silas Wright, New York, 1949
YANCEY: DuBose, J. W,, Life and Times of William Lowndes Yancey, Birmingham, 1892
PRINTED REMINISCENCES, DIARIES, AND
CONTEMPORARY WRITING
In the remaining part of this bibliography the following abbreviations are used:
AHR American Historical Review
LCHSJ Lancaster County Historical Society Papers (renamed after 1956 Lancaster
County Historical Society Journal)
MVHR Mississippi Valley Historical Review
PMHB Pennsylvania Magazine of History and Biography
TQHGM Tyler's Quarterly Historical and Genealogical Magazine
, "Letters of Bancroft and Buchanan," AHR, V (1899), 95-102
, "Some letters to John G. Davis, 1857-1860," Indiana Magazine of History,
XXIV (1928), 209-213
. "Unpublished Letters of James Buchanan," LCHSI, IX (1905), 37-42; XXXII
(1928), 67-75, 118-121; XXXV (1932), 59-83, 143-153, 166-172, 188-196, 222-259,
297-320; XXXVII (1933), 15-20
Adams, Henry, The Great Secession Winter of 1860-61, and Other Essays, ed. by George
Hochfield, New York, 1958
Adams, John Quincy, Memoirs, Comprising Parts of his Diary from 1795-1848, ed. by
C. F. Adams, 12 vols., Philadelphia, 1874-1877
Appel, Theodore, Recollections of College Life at Marshall College, Mercersburg, Pa.,
Reading, Penna., 1886
Bates, Edward, "Diary of Edward Bates," ed. by H. K. Beale, Amer. Hist. Assoc. Annual
Report, 1930, IV, Washington, 1932
Branch, Lawrence O'Bryan, "Letters of Lawrence O'Brvan Branch, 1856-1860," ed. by
A. R. Newsome, North Carolina Historical Review, X (1933), 44-79
Brooks, R. P. (ed.), "The Howell Cobb Papers," Georgia Historical Quarterly, V (1921),
S 29-53; #4, 43-65; VI (1922), 147473, $33-264, 351-359
Browning, 0. H., Diary ofOrville Hickman Browning, 1850-1881, ed. by T. C. Pease and
J. G. RaSdall, 2 vols/Springfield, 111., 19254931
Bullard, F. Lauriston (ed.), The Diary of a Public Man, Chicago, 1945
Bungay, George W., Off-Hand Takings or Crayon Sketches of the Noticeable Men of our Age,
New York, 1854
Chaae Henry, and Sanborn, C. WM The North and the South, a Statistical View, Boston,
1857 '
Chestnut, Mary B., A Diary from Dixie, ed. by Ben Ames Williams, New York, 1949
481
JAMES BUCHANAN
Chittenden, L. E., Personal Reminiscences, 1840-1890, New York, 1893
Clay-Copton, Virginia, A Belle of the Fifties, New York, 1905
Cox, Samuel S., Eight Years in Congress from 1857*1865, New York, 1865
t Three Decades of Federal Legislation, 1855-1885, Providence, 1885
Day, Sherman, Historical Collections of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1843
Doubleday, Abner, Forts Sumter and Moultrie, New York, 1876
Foote, Henry S., Casket of Reminiscence?, Washington, 1874
Forster, J. Montgomery, "Recollections," in Rankin Scrapbook, Presbyterian Church,
Mercersburg, Penna.
Gilpin Joshua, "A Tour from Philadelphia in 1809," PMHB, L (1926), 64-78, 163-178,
380-382
Green, Duff, Facts and Suggestions, Biographical, Historical, Financial and Political,
Addressed to the People of the United States, New York, 1866
Greeley, Horace, Recollections, New York, 1868
Halstead, Murat, Three Against Lincoln, Murat Halstead Reports die Caucuses of 1860,
ed. by William B. Hesseltrne, Baton Rouge, 1960
> Trimmers, Trucklers and Temporizers, ed. by William B. Hesseltine and R. G.
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Hamilton, James A., Reminiscences of Men and Events at Home and Abroad, New York,
1869
Harris, Alexander, Biographical History of Lancaster County, Lancaster, 1872
9 A Review of the Political Conflict in America, New York, 1876
Barter, Edwin P., "Recollections of the Campaign of 1856," Indiana Magazine of History,
XVI (1920), 69-72
Hav T R fed.), "John C. Calhoun and the Presidential Campaign of 1824 — Some Un-
published Calhoim Letters," AHR, XL (1934), 82-97
Hensel, William TL, Reminiscences of Thirty-five Years in a Country Store, Lancaster, 1873
Hickok, Charles N., Bedford in Ye Olden Time, Bedford, Penna,, 1907
Hunter Andrew, "Andrew Hunter Papers, 1859-1861," Massachusetts Historical Society
Proceedings, XLVI (1913), 243-249
Julian, G. W., Political Recollections, 1840-1872, Chicago, 1884
Kendall, Amos, Autobiography, Boston, 1872
King, Horatio, Turning on the Light, a Dispassionate Survey of President Buchanan's
Administration, from 1860 to its Close, Philadelphia, 1895
McClure Alexander K., Col Alexander McClurJs Recollections of Half a Century* Salem,
Mass., 1902
, Old Time Notes of Pennsylvania, 2 vols., Philadelphia, 1905
9 Lincoln and Men of War Times, Philadelphia, 1892
McPherson, Edward, Political History of the U. 5. of America during the Great Rebellion,
from Nov. 6, 1860 to July 4, 1864, New York, 1864
Martineau, Harriet, A Retrospect of Western Travel, 2 vols., London, 1838
Maury, Sarah W,, The Statesmen of America in 1846, London, 1847
Moran, Benjamin, The Journal of Benjamin Moron, 1857-1865, ed. by S. A. Wallace and
F. E. Gfflespie, 2 vols., Chicago; 1948
Nichols, Roy F., "The Missing Diaries of George M. Dallas," PMHB, LXXV (1951),
295-338
, "Mystery of the Dallas Papers," PMHB, LXXIII (1949), 349-393, 475-517
Parker, James A., "How James Buchanan was Made President and by Whom/' Virginia
Magazine of History and Biography, XIII (1906), 81-87
Phillips, U. B. (ed.), "Correspondence of Robert Toombs, A. H. Stephens and Howell
Cobb/' Amer. Hist. Assoc. Annual Report, 1911, II, Washington, 1913
482
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Pollard, Edward A., Lee and His Lieutenants, New York, 1866
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Pryor, Mrs. Roger A., Reminiscences of Peace and War, New York, 1905
Quincy, Josiah, Figures of the Past, Boston, 1926
Rainwater, Percy L. (ed.), "Letters to and from Jacob Thompson," Journal of Southern
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f Mrs, RoyalCs Pennsylvania, 2 vols., Washington, 1829
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Windle, Mary J., Life in Washington and Life Here and There, Philadelphia, 1859
Wise, Henry A., Seven Decades of the Union, Philadelphia, 1896
Wise, John S., Recollections of Thirteen Presidents, New York, 1906
GENERAL HISTORICAL WORKS AND MONOGRAPHS
7 Territorial Kansas, Studies Commemorating the Centennial, Lawrence, Kan., 1954
, History of Cumberland and Adams Counties, Pennsylvania, Chicago, 1886
, Old Mercersburg, New York, 1912
, Report of the Commission to Locate the Site of the Frontier Forts of Pennsylvania,
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Adams, E. D., British Interests and Activities in Texas, 1838-1846, Baltimore, 1910
Adams, James T., America's Tragedy, New York, 1934
Baldwin, Leland D., Pittsburgh, the Story of a Gty, Pittsburgh, 1937
Bancroft, H. H., History of Utah, 1540*1886, San Francisco, 1889
Baringcr, William E., A House Dividing: Lincoln as President-Elect, Springfield, HI., 1945
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Bemis, Samuel F. (ed.), American Secretaries of State and Their Diplomacy, 10 vols.,
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9 latin- American Policy of the United States, an Historical Interpretation, New York,
1943
Billington, Ray A., The Far Western Frontier, New York, 1956
Bomberger, C. M. H., Twelfth Colony Plus, Jeannette, Penna., 1934
Boykin, Edward, Congress and the Civil War, New York, 1955
483
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Burnham, W. D., Presidential Ballots, 1836-1892, Baltimore, 1955
Callahan, James M., Cuba end International Relations, Baltimore, 1899
t American Policy in Canadian Relations, New York, 1937
t American Foreign Policy in Mexican Relations, New York, 1932
Colman, Edna M., Seventy-five Years of White House Gossip, New York, 1925
Committee on Historical Research, Forges and Furnaces in the Province of Pennsylvania,
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Craven, Avery, The Repressible Conflict, 1830-1861, Baton Rouge, 1939
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f 'The Growth of Southern Nationalism, 1848-1861, Baton Rouge, 1953
, The Civil War in the Making, 1815-1860, Baton Rouge, 1959
Crawford, Mary C., Romantic Days in the Early Republic, Boston, 1912
Crenshaw, Ollinger, The Slave States in the Presidential Election of I860, Baltimore, 1945
Dangerfield, George, The Era of Good Feelings, New York, 1952
Diffenderfer, Frank R., History of the Farmers Bank of Lancaster, Lancaster, 1910
Duhbs, Joseph H., History of FranWn and Marshall College, Lancaster, 1903
DunumdJDwight L, Anti-slavery Origins of the Civil War in tlie United States, Ann Arbor,
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, The Secession Movement, 1860-1861, New York, 1931
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Eele William H., History of the County of Dauphin in the Commonwealth of ' Pennsylvania*
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Eiselen, M. R., The Rise of Protectionism in Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, 1921
Ellis, Franklin, History of Lancaster County, Philadelphia, 1883
Fish, Carl R., The American Civil War, New York, 1937
Fite, Emerson D., The Presidential Campaign of I860, New York, 1911
Foner, Philip, Business and Slavery: The New York Merchants and the Irrepressible Conflict,
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Fuller, John D. P., The Movement for the Acquisition of All Mexico, 1846-1848, Baltimore,
1936
Furnas, J. C., The Road to Harpers Ferry, New York, 1959
Furniss, Norman F., The Mormon Conflict, 1850*1859, New Haven, 1960
Garrison, Curtis W., "The National Election of 1824," Ph.D. thesis, The John Hopkins
University, 1928
Gates, Paul W., 50 Million Acres, Ithaca, N, Y., 1953
Geary, M. Theophane, A History of 'Third Parties in Pennsylvania, 1840-1860, Washington,
1938
Glover, Gilbert G., Immediate pre-Civft Wear Compromise Efforts, Nashville, 1934
Graebner, Norman A., Empire on the Pacific, New York, 1955
Gray, Wood, The Hidden Civil War: The Story of the Copperheads, New York, 1942
Green, Fletcher, Constitutional Development in the South Atlantic States, 1776-1860,
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Hammond, Bray, Banks and Politics in America from the Revolution to the Civil War,
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Hendrick, Burton J., Lincoln's War Cabinet, Boston, 1946
Hesseltine, William B., Lincoln and the War Governors, New York, 1948
Higginbotham, S. W., Keystone of the Democratic Arch, 1800*1816, Harrisburg, 1952
Hyman, Sidney, The American President, New York, 1954
Hull, Henry, Annals of Athens, 1801-1901, Athens, Ga., 1906
484
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Jackson, William T., Wagon Roads West, Berkeley* 1952
Johaxmsen, Robert W., Frontier Politics and the Sectional Conflict, Seattle, 1955
Johnson, Gerald W., The Secession of the Southern States9 New York, 1933
Kehl, James A., /// Feeling in the Era of Good Feeling, Pittsburgh, 1956
Kirkland, E, C., Peacemakers of 1864, New York, 1927
Klein, H. M. J., Lancaster County, a History, 4 vols., New York, 1924
, History of Franklin and Marshall College, Lancaster, 1952
, A Century of Education at Mercersburg, Mercersburg, Penna., 1936
Klein, H. M. J., and Diller, W. F., History of St. James Church, Lancaster, Pa.9 Lancaster,
1944
Klein, Philip S., Pennsylvania Politics, 1817.1832; A Game without Rules, Philadelphia,
1940
Lamport, 0, P., Presidential Politics in the United States, 1841-1844, Durham, N. C., 1936
Leech, Margaret, Reveille in Washington, 1860-1865, New York, 1941
Livingood, James W., The Philadelphia-Baltimore Trade Rivalry, 1780-1860, Harrisburg,
1947
Logan, Mary S., Thirty Years in Washington, Hartford, Conn., 1901
Luthin, Reinhard H., The First Lincoln Campaign, Cambridge, Mass., 1944
MacDonald, Helen C., Canadian Public Opinion on the American Civil War, New York,
1926
Malm, James V., John Brown and the Legend of fifty-Six, Philadelphia, 1942
Marbut, Frederick B., "Washington Staff Correspondents before the Civil War," Ph.D.
thesis, Harvard University, 1950
Martin, Asa E., After the White House, State College, Penna., 1951
Masters, Donald C., Reciprocity Treaty of 1854, Toronto, 1937
Meneely, A. Howard, The War Department, 1861, New York, 1928
Minnigerode, Meade, Presidential Years, New York, 1928
Morgan, James H., Dickinson College: the History of 150 Years, Carlisle, Penna., 1933
Moore, J. W., Picturesque Washington, Providence, 1884
Morris, Charles (ed.), The Makers of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, 1894
Morris, L. R., Incredible New York, New York, 1951
Mueller, Henry F., The WUg Party in Pennsylvania, New York, 1922
Nevins, Allan, Ordeal of the Union, 2 vols., New York, 1947
, The Emergence of Lincoln, 2 vols., New York, 1950
, The War for the Union, 2 vols., New York, 1959
Nichols, Alice, Bleeding Kansas, New York, 1954
Nichols, Roy F., The Democratic Machine, 1850-1854, New York, 1923
9 The Disruption of American Democracy, New York, 1948
, The Stakes of Power, 1845-1877, New York, 1961
Paul, James C., Rift in the Democracy, Philadelphia, 1951
Perkins, Dexter, The Monroe Doctrine, 1826*1867, Baltimore, 1933
Perkins, Howard C. (ed.), Northern Editorials on Secession, 2 vols., New York, 1942
Phelps, Christine, Anglo-American Peace Movement of the Mid-Nineteenth Century,
New York, 1930
Phillips, U. B., The Course of the South to Secession, New York, 1939
Randall, James G., The Civil War and Reconstruction, New York, 1937
Rauch, Basfl, American Interest in Cuba, 1848-1855, New York, 1948
Ray, P. Orman, Repeal of the Missouri Compromise, Cleveland, Ohio, 1909
485
JAMES BUCHANAN
Reed, G. F., Alumni Record of Dickinson College, Carlisle, Penna., 1905
Reeves, J. S., American Diplomacy under Tyler and Polk, Baltimore, 1907
Richard, J. F., History of Franklin County, Pa., Chicago, 1887
Riddle, William, The Story of Lancaster, Old and New, Lancaster, 1910
Rhodes, J, F., History of the United States from the Compromise of 1850, 8 vols., New York,
1920
Rippy, J. Fred, The United States and Mexico, New York, 1926
Rives, G. L, The United States and Mexico, 1821-1848, 2 vols., New York, 1913
Roseboom, Eugene H., A History of Presidential Elections, New York, 1957
Scrugham, Mary, The Peaceable Americans of 1860-1861, New York, 1921
Settle, R. W., and M. L, Empire on JFheels, Stanford, Calif., 1949
Shanks, Henry T., The Secession Movement in Virginia, 1847*1861, Richmond, 1934
Simms, Henry H., A Decade of Sectional Controversy, 1851-1861, Durham, N. C., 1942
Singleton, Esther, Story of the White House, New York, 1907
Smith, Justin H., The War with Mexico, 2 vols., New York, 1919
Smith, 'William E., The Francis Preston Blair Family in Politics, 2 vols., New York, 1933
Snyder, Charles M., The Jacksonian Heritage, 1833-1848, Harriaburg, Penna., 1958
Sparks, Edwin E. (ed.), Lincoln Douglas Debates of 1858, Springfield, 111., 1908
Spring, Leverett W., Kansas, the Prelude to the War for the Union, New York, 1885
Stampp, Kenneth M., And the War Came, Baton Rouge, 1950
, The Causes of the Civil War, New York, 1959
Stanwood, Edward, History of the Presidency, New York, 1898
Stedman, Edmund 0., The Prince's BaU, New York, 1860
Stephenson, Nathaniel W., Texas and the Mexican War, New Haven, 1921
Stuart, Graham H., The Department of State, New York, 1949
Thomas, Benjamin P., Russo*Americcn Relations, 1815-1867, Baltimore, 1916
Tilley, John S., Lincoln Takes Command, Chapel Hill, 1941
Van Deusen, G. G., The Jacksonian Era, 1828*1848, New York, 1959
Van Vleck, G. W,, The Panic of 1857, an Analytical Study, New York, 1943
Ward, Wilfrid, Life and Times of Cardinal Wiseman, 2 vols., London, 1897
Warren, Charles, The Supreme Court in United States History, 3 vols., Boston, 1922
Wharton, Anne H., Sodal Life in the Early Republic, Philadelphia, 1902
Weinberg, Albert K., Manifest Destiny, Baltimore, 1935
White, Leonard D., The Jacksonians, a Study in Administrative History, 1829-1861,
New York, 1954
Whitton, Mary 0., First First Ladies, 1789-1865, New York, 1948
Williams, Mary W., Anglo-American Isthmian Diplomacy, 1815-1915* Washington, D. C.,
1916
Willson, Beckles, America's Ambassadors to England, London, 1928
Wise, Harvey, and Cronin, J. W.f A BMoyraphy ofZachary Taylor, Mtilatd Fitlmore,
Franklin Pierce and James Buchanan, Washington, 1935
HISTORICAL ARTICLES
, "Public Dinner Tendered to Junes Buchanan," LCHSI, XXXIV (1930), 7741,
260261
486
BIBLIOGRAPHY
"Sidelights on an Early Political Campaign," LCHSJ, XVIII (1914), 90-95
paugh, Philip G., "Washington's Birthday, 1860," TQHGM, XXV (1943),
"A forgotten Journey of an Ante-Bellum President," TQHGM, XVII (1935),
42-48
_ , "John Forney, Robert Tyler, and James Buchanan," TQHGM, XV (1933), 71-90
_ f "John B. Floyd and James Buchanan," TQHGM, IV (1922), 381-388
_ , "James Buchanan, Bachelor of the White House," TQHGM, XX (1939).
154-166, 216-234
_ , "James Buchanan, the Conservatives' Choice, 1856," The Historian (Spring,
1945), 77-90
_ "James Buchanan, the Squire from Lancaster," PMHB, LV (1931), 289-300;
LVI (1932), 15-33
_ "James Buchanan, the Squire in the White House," PMHB, LVIII (1934),
270-286
_ , "James Buchanan and Some Far Western Leaders, 1860-1861," Pacific Historical
Review, XII (1943), 169-180
_ f "The Buchanan-Douglas Feud," Illinois State Historical Society Journal, XXV
(1932), 5-48
_ f "Buchanan, the Court and the Dred Scott Case," Tennessee Historical Magazine,
XI (1926), 231-240
_ , "J. Clancy Jones and the Nomination of James Buchanan," in Topics from
American History, #1, State Teachers College, Duluth, Minn., 1932
_ j "James Buchanan during the Administrations of Lincoln and Johnson," LCHSJ,
XLIII (1939), 67-110
, "political Techniques— 1856, or Why the Herald Went for Fr&aont," Western
Political Quarterly, I (1948), 243-251
_ , "Making Amendments in the Fifties: the Story of the New York Factions and
the Buchanan Managers at Cincinnati, 1856," New York State Historical Assoc. Quarterly,
VII (1926), 304-316
Bancroft, Frederic, "The Final Efforts at Compromise, 1860-1861," Political Science
Quarterly, VI (1891), 401-423
Barhce, David R., "How Lincoln Rejected the Peace Overtures in 1861," TQHGM, XV
(1933), 137-144
Baylen, Joseph 0., "James Buchanan's 'Calm of Despotism/ " PMHB, LXVII (1953),
294-310
Beck, Herbert, 'The Camerons of Domsgal," LCHSJ, LVI (1952), 86-106
Black, Alice L, "George Washington at the Carey House," typescript, YCHS
Bourne, E. G., ffThe Proposed American Absorption of Mexico," Amer. Hist Asaoc.
Annual Report, 1899, I, 157469
_ , "The United States and Mexico, 1847-1848," AHR, V (1900), 491-502
Brady, Gerard, "Buchanan's Campaign in Lancaster County," LCBSI, LIII (1949),
97-134
Brown, J. Hay, "President Buchanan—Misunderstood— Wrongly Judged," LCHSJ,
XXXII (1928), 88-92
Callahan, J, M., "The Mexican Policy of Southern Leaders under Buchanan's Adminis-
tration," Axner. Hist, Assoc, Annual Report, 1910, 135-151
_ , "The Evolution of Seward's Mexican Policy," West Virginia University Studies
in American History, Series I (1909), nos. 4, 5, 6
Carlson, Robert E., 'Tittsbuwh Newspaper Reaction to James .Bu^^v^dJ£€
Democratic Party in 1856," Western Pennsylvania Historical Magazine, XXXIX (1956),
71-81
Current, R, C., "Webster's Propaganda and the Ashburton Treaty," MTHR, XXXIV
(1947), 187-200
487
JAMES BUCHANAN
Dodd, William E., 'The West and the War with Mexico," Illinois State Historical
Society Transactions, 1912, 15-23
Dowdell, George R., "John Forney, Journalist and Politician," LCHSJ, LV (1951), 49-66
Fehrenbacher, Don, "Origins and Purpose of Lincoln's House-Divided Speech," MVHR,
XLVI (I960), 615-643
Finefrock, John L., "Stony Batter" and "Harriet Lane," typescript in the author's
possession
Fraim Samuel R., "Address at the Presentation of the Buchanan Memorial Placque at
Lodge #43, F. and A. M., Lancaster, Pa.," Mimeo, Lancaster, 1950
Gates Paul W "The Struggle for Land and the Irrepressible Conflict," Political Science
Quarterly, LXVI (1951), 248-271
Gillan, W. Rush, "James Buchanan," Kittochtinny Historical Society Papers, II (1901)
Gilchrist, Annie, "First on the Turnpike," Bedford Inquirer, Dec. 20, 1950
Colder, F. A., "The Purchase of Alaska," AHR, XXV (1920)r 411-425
Graebner, Norman A., "James K. Polk, a Study in Federal Patronage," MVHR, XXXVIII
(1952), 613-632
Hailperin, Herman, "Pro-Jackson Sentiment in Pennsylvania, 1820-1828," PMHB, L
(1926), 193-240
Hamilton, Holman, "Democratic Senate Leadership and the Compromise of 1850,"
MTHR, XLI (1954), 403-418
s "Texas Bonds and Northern Profits, a Study in Compromise, Investment and
Lobby Influence," MVHR, XLIII (1957), 579-594
Harmon, George D., "Aspects of Slavery and Expansion, 1848-1860," Lehigh University
Publications, ift, #7 (1929), 43 pp.
"President James Buchanan's Betrayal of Governor Robert J. Walker," PMHB,
LIU (1929), 51-91
, "The Northern Clergy and the Impending Crisis, 18504860," PMHB, LXV
(1941), 171-201
, "An Indictment of the Administration of President James Buchanan and His
Kansas Policy," The Historian, III (1940), 52-68
Heisey, M. Luther, "Postscript to the Old Buck Cannon," LCHSJ, LXV (1961), 106-107
Hensel, William U., "James Buchanan as a Lawyer," University of Pennsylvania taw
Review, LX (1912), 546-573
, "A Buchanan Myth," LCHSJ, X (1906), 169-172
Hodder, Frank A., "Some Aspects of the English Bfll for the Admission of Kansas,"
Amer. Hist. Assoc, Annual Report, 1906, I, 201-210
Holmes, Charles N., "The First Republican-Democratic Presidential Campaign,"
Journal of American History, XIV (1920), 41-48
Hostetter, Ida L. K., "Harriet Lane," LCHSJ, XXXIII (1929), 97-112
Huehes, Robert M., "Floyd's Resignation from Buchanan's Cabinet," TQHGM, V (1923),
73-95
Johannsen, Robert W., "Stephen A, Douglas, 'Harpers Magazine* and Popular Sover-
eignty," MVHR, XLV (1959), 606-631
Jones, W. D., and Vinson, J. C., "British Preparedness and the Oregon Settlement,"
Pacific Historical Review, XXII (1953), 353-364
Klein, Frederic S., "Robert Coleman, Millionaire Ironmaster," LCHSJ, LXIV (I960),
17-33
Klein, Philip S., "Early Lancaster County Politics, Pennsylvania History, III (1936),
98-114
, "James Buchanan and Ann Coleman," Pennsylvania History, XXI (1954), 1-20
, "The Inauguration of James Buchanan," LCHSJ, LXI (1957), 145-161
, "James Buchanan at Dickinson," The Boyd Lee Spahr Lectures, in John and
Mary's College, Carlisle, Penna., 1956, 157-180
488
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Klingberg, Frank W., "James Buchanan and the Crisis of the Union," Journal of Southern
History, IX (1943), 455-474
Landis, D. B., "Rev. Edward Young Buchanan," LCHSI, XXXII (1928), 123-132
Latan6, John H., "The Diplomacy of the United States in regard to Cuba," Amer. Hist.
Assoc. Annual Report, 1897, 210-227
Lewis. Howard T., "The Closing Month of the Buchanan Administration," Americana,
VI (1911), 10354044
Luthin, Reinhard H., "The Democratic Split during Buchanan's Administration,"
Pennsylvania History, XI (1944), 13-35
"Pennsylvania and Lincoln," PMHB, LXVII (1943), 61-82
Lynch, William 0., "Indiana in the Buchanan-Douglas Contest of 1856," Indiana
Magazine of History, XXX (1934), 119-132
McMurtry, R. Gerald, "James Buchanan in Kentucky, 1813," Filson Club Historical
Quarterly, 1934, 73-87
Martin, Thomas P., "Initiation of James Buchanan as an American Diplomat: His
Mission to Russia," Washington, Junto Selections (1946), 48-60
f "James Buchanan — American Diplomat," Pennsylvania^ III (1946), 33-34
Mendelsohn, Wallace, "Chief Justice Taney, Jacksonian Judge," University of Pittsburgh
Law Review, XII (1951), 381-393
, "Dred Scott's Case Reconsidered," Minnesota Law Reviev, XXXVIII (1953),
16-28
Mianigerode, Meade, "Presidential Campaigns: The Buccaneers, 1856," Saturday
Evening Post, CC (1928), 39-40, 42, 157-15^
Nash, Roderick W., "The Christiana Riot: An Evaluation of its National Significance,"
LCHSJ* LXV (1961), 66-91
Nichols, Rov F,, "American Democracy and the Civil War," Proceedings of the American
Philosophical Society, XCI (1947), 143-149
, "The Kansas Nebraska Act— a Century of Historiography," MVHR, XLIII
(1956), 187-212
, "James Buchanan— Lessons in Leadership in Trying Times," The Boyd Lee
Spahr Lectures, in Bulwark of Liberty, Carlisle, Peuna., 1950
Owens, Robert L, "James Buchanan, Diplomat, International Statesman, President,"
LCHSJ, XXXII (1928), 92-97
Perkins, Howard C, "The Defense of Slavery in the Northern Press on the Eve of the
Civil War," Journal of Southern History, IX (1943), 501-531
Ranck, James B., "The Attitude of James Buchanan towards Slavery," PMHB, LI
(1927), 126-142
Rayback, J. G., "Martin Van Buren's Break with James K. Polk," New York History,
XXXIV (1955), 51-62
Rawley, J, A., "Financing the Fremont Campaign," PMHB, LXXV (1951), 24-35
Riopy, J, Fred, "Diplomacy of the United States and Mexico Regarding the Isthmus of
TeKuaWpec, 1848-1860," 'wax, VI (1919), 503-531
Robinson, Elwyn B., "The Pennsylvania*, Organ of Democracy," PMHB, LXII (1938),
350-360
, "The Public Ledger, an Independent Newspaper," PMHB, LXIV (1940), 43-55
Russ, William A., Jr., "Mary Kittera Snyder's Struggle for an Income," Snyder County
Historical Society Bulletin, IV (1960), 1-27
, 'Time Lag and Political Change as Seen in the Administrations of Buchanan
and Hoover," South Adantk Quarterly, XLVI (1947), 335-343
Schafer, Joseph, "Who Elected Lincoln?" AHR> XLVII (1941), 51-64
Sears, Louis M., "Slidell and Buchanan," AHR, XXVII (1922), 709-730
Sellers, Charles G., "Jackson Men with Feet of Clay," AHR, LXII (1957), 537-551
489
JAMES BUCHANAN
Slick, SewalL "William Wilkins, Pittsburgher Extraordinary," Western Pennsylvania
Historical Magazine, XXII (1939), 217-236
Sprout. Oliver S., "James Buchanan, 'Big Wheel' of the Railroads," LCHSJ, LVI (1952),
21-34
Stampp, Kenneth M., "Lincoln and the Strategy of Defense in the Crisis of 1861,"
JourM of Southern History, XI (1945), 297-323
Stenberg, Richard P., "Motivation of the Wilmot Proviso," MTHR, XVIII (1932),
535-551
> "Jackson, Buchanan and the Corrupt Bargain Calumny," PMHB, LVIII (1934),
61-85
Thorpe, Francis N., "Jeremiah S. Black," PMHB, L (1926), 117-133, 273-286
Van Alstvne, Richard W., "British Diplomacy and the Clayton-Bulwer Treaty, 1850-
1860," Journal of Modern History, XI (1939), 149-183
> "Anglo-American Relations, 1853-1857," AHR, XLII (1937), 491-500
, "John F. Crampton, Conspirator or Dupe?" AHR, XLI (1936), 492-502
Van Horn, Lawrence, "The Old Buck Cannon," LCHSf, LXIV (1960), 209-222
Webster, S., "Mr. Marcy, the Cuban Question and the Ostend Manifesto," Political
Science Quarterly, VIII (1893), 1-32
Weisberger, B. A., "The Newspaper Reporter and the Kansas Imbroglio," MVHR,
XXXVI (1950), 633-656
Wild, Robert, "Roger and James," Wisconsin Magazine of History, VIII (1924), 111-116
Wilson, H, L., "President Buchanan's Proposed Intervention in Mexico," AHR, V
(1899), 687-701
Worner, W. F., "James Buchanan," LCHSJ, XXXVIH (1934), 103-144
MISCELLANEOUS
Rankin Scrapbook, parsonage of Presbyterian Church, Mercersburg, Penna., contains
clippings relating to Buchanan and Lane families in Mercersburg.
John Lowry Ruth Scrapbook, York County Historical Society, contains annotated
Buchanan dippings, 18404890.
Hiram Swarr Scrapbook, Buchanan Foundation, contains Buchanan clippings, 1840-1900
Many personal possessions and mementoes of Buchanan are at Wheatland, Lancaster
County Historical Society, Franklin and Marshall College, Dickinson College, and the
Smithsonian Institution.
490
INDEX
Aberdeen, Lord (George Hamilton Gor*
don), 178-180, 182, 233
Abolition, 215, 306, 334, 363; contest over
use of mails, 148; debate on petitions,
148-149; in Kansas, 288-289, 292
Accessory Transit Co., 232
Adams, Charles F., 401
Adams, John Quincy, 45, 76, 164, 317,
345; bargain and sale controversy,
49-60; views on tariff, 63-66
Adams, Mrs. John Q.v 62-63
Agricultural college bill, 338
Alabama, 218, 309, 393
Alaska, 325-326
Albany Evening Journal* 383
Albert, Prince Consort of Britain, 246
Allan, John, 16
Almonte, J. N.f 176
Amalgamation party, Penna., 49, 53-56,
9**. *** * *
w-v*»
American party, see Native American party
Amistad case, 324
Amsterdam* 95
Anderson, Mai. Robert, 406-408, 412, 416,
418; at Fort Moultrie, 358, 368-370,
373, 376; move to Fort Sumter, 378-
380, 387; and Star of the West, 388-
389, 393; truce with Pickens, 394-
396; dispatch of Mar. 4, 1861, 402-403
Antietam, battle of, 423
Anti-Lecoxnpton, see Lecompton and
Douglas
Anti-Masonic party, Penna., 70-72, 101-
102; in 1835 election, 106-108; in
1836 election, 110, 115; decline of,
119, 129, 132, 136-139
Athens, Ga*, 277
Atlantic Cable, 320
Atlantic Monthly, 316
Appleton, John, 264, 275, 317; and English
** mission, 224^25, 242-243
Arago, 247-248, 250, 252
Argentina, 191
Army, XL S., in Kansas, 291; in Utah, 314-
317; condition of, 1860, 356; supplies
for, 357; see also War
Aroostook War, 145
Ashburton, Lord (Alexander Baring), 146
Asia, U. S. policy in, 326, 331
Assembly, Penna., 17-23, 25
Atocha, A. J., 185-186
Atwater, Jeremiah, 8
Austria, 96, 115
Bache, Richard, 45
Bachman, Christian, 196, 200
Baer, Jacob, 211
Bailey, Godard.377
Baker, George W., 209
Baker, Mrs. George W., see Mary E. S.
Lane
Baker, Joseph B., 253, 270, 281, 340, 424
Baldwin, Henry, 38, 49, 55, 67-69, 73,
76, 169
Baltimore, 98, 270, 403, 427; seige of, 18;
Democratic convention of 1835, 106-
107; of 1844, 159-160; of 1848, 204-
205; of 1852, 218-220; of 1860,
343-344; peace meeting of, 1851,
215-216; plans for courthouse, 333
Baltimore Sun, 335
Bancroft, George, 166, 180, 184, 208, 218
Bank, Second of the U. S., chap. 9;
Buchanan's view of, 97-98; Penna.
charter, 109; in politics, 110-111,
116-118, 120; resurrection notes of,
123-124
Bankruptcy bill, of 1822, 42; of 1857, 315
Banks, as issue in Penna., 23, 132, 138-
139, 144-145, 151, 161-162; in panic
of 1857, 314
Banks, John, 138
Banks, Nathaniel P., 257
Barbour, Philip P., 38
Bargain and Sale controversy, 56-59, 118
Baring Brothers, 235
Barlow, Samuel L. M., 365, 383-385
Barnard, Isaac D., 49, 55, 67, 69-70, 73,
104
Barnburners, 166, 202, 204, 218
Barnum, Zenos, 403
Barnum's Hotel, 270, 333
Barrett, Orvffle, 155
Barry, Capt. John W., 86
491
JAMES BUCHANAN
Barton, George W., 196
Bass, Mrs., 333-334, 425
Bayard, James A., 255
Bay Islands, 225, 230-233, 318
Beale, William, 20
Beauregard, P. G. T., 398, 408
Bedfor! Springs, 29, 45, 71, 100, 120, 155,
161, 184? 203, 208, 295, 297, 320,
334-335, 349, 414, 425
Bedford Gazette, 281, 340
Belfast, 95
Belgium, 89
Belize, 318
Bell, John, 343, 347
Bellefonte, Penna., 226
Belles-Lettres Society, 11
Belmont, August, 234, 383-384
Benjamin, Judah P., 255, 383-384
Bennett, James Gordon, 374, 415
Benson, Mrs., 211
Benton, Jessie, 171
Benton, Thomas Hart, 103, 121, 130, 142,
150, 166, 170, 187
Berks County, Penna., 110, 217
Berks County Letter, 201-202, 211
Bermuda, 243-244
Beverly, Carter, 57
Biddle, Nicholas, 109, 117, 123-124, 138,
151
Big Airds, 1
Bigler, WUliam, 196, 205, 221, 248-249,
270, 407; elected governor, 216-217;
at Charleston Convention, 342
Bingham, John A., 396
Biography, Buchanan's plans for, 416, 418
Birney, James G., 161
Black, Jeremiah S., 6, 196, 205, 249, 258,
265, 268, 275, 296, 319, 333; as Atty.
G*n., 277-278, 282, 285; pamphlet
war with Douglas, 335; views on
secession, 357-360, 363; and the
Charleston forts, 368, 370, 374, 376;
Sec'y of State, 372; and Cabinet
break, 377-381, 387; ideas on Fort
Sumter, 388-390, 394-395; defense of
Washington, 398; response to attacks
on Buchanan, 412-415; and Buchanan
biography, 416-417
Black, Mrs. Jeremiah S., 278
Black, John, 184
Black, Mary, 278
Black, Samuel W., 415
"Black Republican Reserve,11 336-337
Black Sea, 79, 83, 86, 89
Bladensburg, Md., 17
Blair, Francis P., 118, 364
Blair, Mrs. Francis P., 119
Blake, George, 37
Blake, Mrs. George, 47
Blanc, Louis, 235
"Bleeding Kansas,11 see Kansas
Bligh, Mr., 88, 91
Blythe, Calvin, 55, 135
Bodisco, Madame de, 171, 348
Bolger, Edward, 207
Bonham, M. L., 370, 375^
Borgo, Count Pozzo di, 95-96
Borland, Solon E., 232
Boston, 47, 79, 259, 351, 373
Boston Courier, 374
Bowling Green, Ky., 15
Bowman, George, 281
Bowman v. Kgnigmacher, 35, 37
Boyce, W. W., 370
Boyd, William A., 27
Brecklnridge, John C., 271, 363, 377-378,
397; vice-pres., 255; candidate for
pres., 341, 343; in 1860 campaign,
347-348, 351
Brewster, Benjamin F., 152, 168
Bridge Farm, see Dunwoodie Farm
Bright, Jesse D., 255, 263, 266-267,
341-342
Broderick, David C., 310, 328, 335
Brodhead, Richard, 216-217, 265
Broglie, Due de, 95
Brooklyn, U.S.S., 388, 395, 399, 411, 418
Brooks, Preston S., 253-254
Brown, Aaron V., 268, 277, 332
Brown, Mrs. A. V., 277
Brown, John, 254, 335-338, 341
Brown, William, 81
Browne, William M., 351, 373-374, 390,
398
Brunnow, Count Philippe de, 87
Brussels, 95
Bryan, George, 46
Bryant, William Cullen, 384
Buchanan, Annie, 424
Buchanan, Edward Young, 14, 37, 93, 101,
103, 124-126, 128, 206, 210, 226,
423, 427
Buchanan, Elizabeth Speer, parents* 2;
marriage, 3; as teacher, 4~a; sketch of,
6*7; religious faith, 33; last visit with
James, 79; death of, 93
Buchanan, George Washington, 37, OD,
77, 93, 126
Buchanan, Harriet, 4, 37, 93, 101; see also
Mrs. Robert Henry
Buchanan, James, 15th president, parents,
1-3; birth, 3; as a boy, 4-7; early in-
fluences, 5-6; at Dickinson College,
7-12; in Kentucky, 15-16; in War of
1812, 17-18; state assemblyman, 19-
23; appearance, 21; war speech, 21-
22; law practice, 23-26, 34-35; and
Ann Coleman, 27-33; elected Con-
gressman, 35-37; in 17th Congress,
37-43; deficiency bill speech, 39-40;
bankruptcy bill speech, 42; Cumber-
land Road speech, 42-43; in Penna,
election of 1823, 45-47; in election of
1824, 48*53; and corrupt bargain
episode, 49-59; political technique of,
53-54; trouble with Jackson, 57-59;
attacks Adams, 60; election of 1828,
492
INDEX
61-66; tariff of 1828, 62-64; illness,
68; fight for federal patronage, 67-70,
relations with Wolf, 68-72; in 21st
Congress, 74-77; defends Supreme
Court, 74-75; impeachment of Judge
Peck, 76-77; ministry to Russia, 78-
94; views on 2nd Bank and nullifica-
tion, 97-98; emancipates slaves, 100;
Mary Kittera Snyder, 101; elected
U. 5. Senator, 101-102; Penna. elec-
tion of 1835, 105-107; Muhlenberg
and the Bank, 109-110; re-election to
Senate, 111; defends Dallas, 112; chr.
Foreign Affairs Com., 113; fight
against 2nd Bank, 116-118; Whig
attack on, 118-119; plans marriage,
119-120; and subtreasury bill, 120-
124; family problems, 124-128; elec-
tion of 1840, 130-136; "Ten cent
Jimmy" affair, 133-134; Penna. bank
crisis, 138-139; presidential hopes in
1844, 139-141; views on Constitution,
142-143; views on national economy,
144.145; views on foreign affairs, 146-
147; views on expansion and slavery,
147-150; views on civil liberty, 148-
150; re-election to Senate, 1842,
151-154; bid for pres. nomination,
1844, 151-160; Anna Payne, 156;
Texan annexation, 160-161; SecV of
State, 163-194; patronage under Polk,
166-174; declines Supreme Court
post, 169-174; tariff of 1846, 172-173;
Texan negotiation, 175-177; Oregon
negotiation, 178-183; Mexican nego-
tiations and war, 183-190; minor
diplomatic activities, 191-192; rela-
tions with Polk, 192-193; nasal opera-
tion, 192; campaign of 1848, 194-205;
county tax episode, 196-197; Berks
County letter, 201-202; travels, 202;
campaign dinners, 203-204; declines
to run for governor, 205; appearance
in 1850, 206; acquires Wheatland,
206-207; family matters, 208-210;
reading habits, 210; drinking habits,
210-211; views on 1850 compromise,
213-216; seeks 1852 nomination, 216-
220; appointed Minister to Great
Britain, 223-227; court dress affair,
227-229; Central American negotia-
tion, 230-233; and Ostend Manifesto,
234-241; tries to avert war, 241-246;
Harriet Lane in England, 246-247,
nominated for president, 1856, 248-
257; election of 1856, 257-260; forms
Cabinet, 261-269; inauguration, 270-
272; White House routine, 273-278;
the patronage, 278-285; Kansas prob-
lems, 286-299; and the Lecompton
Constitution, 300-312; panic of 1857,
314-315; Mormon War, 315-317;
Central American policy, 317-322;
Mexican policy, 322-323; Paraguayan
493
War, 323-324; Cuba, 324-325; Alas-
kan purchase proposal, 325-326; trade
treaties, 326-327; and Lincoln-Doug-
las debates, 328-331; message of 1858,
331; social life, 332-335; Harpers
Ferry raid, 335-337; Covode investi-
gation, 338-340; second term talk,
340-341; and Charleston convention,
341-344; health, 332; trip to Chapel
Hill, 334; view of national debt, 345-
346; veto of Homestead bill, 346-347;
election of 1860, 347-348, 350-352;
Japanese Embassy, 348; Meigs-Floyd
controversy, 349; religious views,
349-350; visit of Prince of Wales, 350;
plans to prevent secession, 353-361;
message of 1860, 361-363; urges
Republicans to obey laws, 363-367;
plans for defense of forts, 368-370;
status quo policy adopted, 370-376;
Anderson moves to Fort Sumter, 378-
381; attacked as a secessionist, 374-
375; bond scandal, 377; break with
Floyd, 377-380; South Carolina Com-
missioners, 378-380; Cabinet session
of Dec. 29, 1860, 380-381 negotiation
with Lincoln, 381-385; end of com-
promise hopes, 386-387; sends Star
of the West, 388-390; special message
on secession, 391; Congressional re-
fusal to legalize executive action,
391-392; the Hall-Hayne truce, 393-
396; defense of Washington, 397-
398; Peace Convention, 398-400; at
Lincoln's inauguration, 401-402; re-
turn to Wheatland, 403-404; policies
compared to Lincoln's, 404-408;
Republican attacks on, 408-416; Mr.
Buchanan's Administration, 416-419;
final political testament, 420-422; life
in retirement, 423-427; death of, 427;
estimate of, 428-429
Buchanan, James, Sr., birth in Ireland, 1;
trip to America, 2; at Stony Batter,
Penna., 3; family, 3-4; at Mercers-
burg, 4-6; influence on son, 10-14; and
Kentucky land, 15-16; and election of
1820, 36; death of, 37
Buchanan, Jane, 3, 17, 100; see also Mrs.
Elliot T. Lane
Buchanan, John, 1
Buchanan, Maria, 3, 5, 15, 101; see also
Mrs. C. M. Yates
Buchanan, Mary, 3
Buchanan, Sarah, 3, 37
Buchanan, William Speer, 4, 37
Buchanan-Jackson party, aee Amalgama-
tion party
Buckshot War, 129-130, 135
Buell, Maj. Don Carlos, 369-370, 376
Buena Vista, battle of, 188
Buffalo, N. Y., 205
Bull Run, First battle of, 410, 420
BOlow, Baron Heinrich von, 96
JAMES BUCHANAN
Bulwer, Sir Henry, 225, 230-233, 245,
318-320
Burr, Aaron, 96
Burrowes, Thomas H., 129
Butler, Benjamin F. (of N. Y.), 114, 160
Cabinet, of Jackson, 67-69, 77; of Van-
Buren, 97, 113-114; of Polk, 165-166;
of Pierce, 222-223; of Buchanan,
261-269, 275-278; session of Nov. 9,
1860, 357-360; of Dec. 29, 380-381
Cadwalader, John, 210, 424
Calhoun, John C. (of Kansas), 298-299
Calhoun, John Caldwell, 39-41, 80, 111-
112, 154, 158-159, 165-166; sketch
of, 44-45; and 1824 election, 45-49;
and corrupt bargain episode, 58-59;
break with Jackson, 76-77; on sub-
treasury, 121; debates Buchanan on
slavery, 142, 144, 148-150
Calhounjackson party, see Family party
California, 175, 183-185, 187, 189, 209,
218, 230-231, 263, 339, 341, 372;
admission of, 211-213; in 1856
election, 259
Cain Quarterly Meeting, 149
Cameron, James, 134, 196
Cameron, Simon, 97, 99, 102, 112, 115-
116, 131, 135, 151, 159, 161, 281,
334, 364, 420; elected Senator, 1845,
167-168; and patronage, 169-172; in
1848 campaign, 196-201, 205; in 1852
campaign, 216-219; joins Know-
Nothings, 249; elected Senator, 1857,
Campaigns, see Elections
Campbell, Mrs. George W., 82
Campbell, James, 222-223, 284
Campbell, Parker, 25
Canada, 146, 225, 421
Canal, isthmian, 225, 230-233
Cancrene, Count Georg, 85-87, 89
Caribbean, see names of various countries
Caroline affair, 145-146
Carusi's saloon, 116, 171
Cass, Belle, 275
Cass, Lewis, 79, 160, 170, 213-214, 317,
322, 333, 405; and 1844 election, 153-
154; and 1848 election, 200-205; and
1852 election, 217-220; considered for
Cabinet, 264-268, 271; as Sec'v of
State, 275-276; and Charleston forts,
357-358, 368; resicns, 372-374
Cass-Yrisarri Treaty, 318-320
Castle Pinckney, 353, 368-369, 375-376,
380, 416
Gates, John William, 227
Cates, William John, 227
Catholic vote, 151, 161, 216, 245, 283
Catron, John, 161, 163, 269
Catron, Mrs. John, 161, 211
Caucus system, 44, 48, 167-168
Censorship, 90, 374
Central America, 314, 331, 345; British in,
230-233, 242-244; U. S. policy, 317-
320; see also names of various
countries in Central* America
Chaxnbersburg, Penna., 136, 423
Champneys, Benjamin, 61, 71-72, 80, loo,
197-198
Chandler, Zachariah, 324
Chapel Hill, N. C., 334, 340
Chapultepec, 188
Charleston, S. C., 338, 347-348, 358, 390;
Democratic convention in, 340-343;
forts at, 353-354; plans to defend
forts, 368-370; status quo policy,
370-376; Anderson at Sumter, 378-
381
Chemical Bank of N. Y., 226
Chester County, Penna., 69-70, 73, 416
Cheves, Langdon, 38, 61
Chicago, 283, 329
Chicago Platform, 365-366, 384, 386
Chihuahua, 321-322
China, 326, 331
Christiana Riot, 216-217, 221
Cincinnati, 253-255, 428
Cincinnati Platform, 313-314; 342-343
Civil War, fear of, 1832, 98; begins, 408;
Buchanan on causes of, 418-420;
effect on Buchanan, 408-416
Claims, U. S. against Mexico, 146, 184-185,
188; in Central America, 321
Clarendon, Lord (George W. F. Vilhers)
and Central American negotiation,
227, 230-233; 318-320; and recruiting
controversy, 242-244
Clarkson, Gerardus, 27
Clay, Clement C., Jr,, 394
Clay, Henry, 15-16, 103, 113, 121, 136,
139, 260; and corrupt bargain charge,
49-60; political views, 142-144; stand
on Texas, 159-161; and 1850 Com-
promise, 212
Clay, John Randolph, 80, 88
Clayton, John M., 209, 225, 230-233, 245,
318-320
Clayton, Leonora, 426
Clayton, Philip, 276, 390
Clayton - Bulwer Treaty, 225, 230-233,
318-320
Clearfield, Penna., 423
Cleveland, secession convention in, 259
Clifford, Nathan, 218, 262, 264
Clinton, DeWitt, 22
Cobb, Howell, 236, 328, 337, 351, 401,
426; Speaker of House, 212; in 1856
campaign, 257-260; considered for
Cabinet, 263-268; on Douglas, 330;
as Sec'y of Treas., 276, 279-280, 284;
on Kansas, 293; and panic of 1857,
314; and English bill, 308-311; social
life, 333-334; in 1860 campaign 340-
342; break with Buchanan, 357-358,
368-371
Cobb, Mrs. Howell (Mary Ann Lamar),
276-277, 333*334
494
INDEX
Cobb, Thomas R. R., 297
Coercion, debated I860, 360-362
Colebrookdale Furnace, 29
Coleman, Ann Caroline, 27-33, 100
Coleman, Edward, 36
Coleman, Margaret, 28
Coleman, Robert, 14, 28-29, 32, 36, 93
Coleman, Sarah, 31
Coleman letter on 1824 tariff, 65
Collamer, Jacob, 325
Columbia, Penna., 404
Columbia Bridge, 30-31, 423
Columbia River, 178
Committee, see by name
Committee of Thirteen, 382, 393
Committee of Thirty-three, 382
Committee on Agriculture, 39
Compromise, of 1850, 211-221, 256, 286,
315; Crittenden, 381-387, 392-393;
Republican resistance to, 364-367;
see also Missouri Compromise
Conestoga Creek, 13, 423
Confederate States of America, 258, 393,
395, 407-408
Congress, 17th, 37-41; 31st, 211-216; 36th,
'331, 335-337, 356; power over terri-
tories, 269; responsibility of, 337; and
English bill, 308-312; and 1860 elec-
tion, 347-348; and Meigs-Floyd fight,
349; compromise efforts, 1861, 382-
387; rejects Buchanan's proposals,
391-392, 396-397, 399; see also House
of Representatives and Senate
Conscription bill, Penna., 20; U. S., 421
Constitution, of Kansas, 291-312; of the
states, 305-306; of the U. S., 21, 74-
75, 112, 259, 428; Buchanan's con-
cept of, 23, 142-144, 422
Constitutional Convention, of Penna.,
1838, 108, 110, 118-119; of Michigan,
111; of Kansas, 298*299; procedures
of, 305-306; proposed in 1860, 358,
362-364, 382-387
Constitutional Union party, 343
Consular Bureau, 165
Convent School, Georgetown, 208
Convention, national Democratic, of 1832,
97; 1835, 106-107; 1844, 159-160;
1848, 204-205; 1852, 218-220; 1856,
253-255; I860, 340-344; 1864, 421;
Whig, 1840, 132; Free-Soil, 1848,
205; 1852, 221; Republican, 1856,
256; 1860, 343; state Democratic,
Penna., 1820, 44; 1824, 48; 1829, 69;
1835, 105-106; 1836, 107; 1838, 122;
1840 134; 1843, 153-154, 199; 1847,
196-200; 1851, 216; 1852, 217.219;
1856, 250; Georgia, 1860, 341;
Kansas, 1857, 298-308; regional,
abolitionist, 1856, 259; 1857, 259;
slave trade, 1859, 335; Nashville,
1850, 213; tariff, 1827, 65; Confeder-
ate, 395; peace, 398-400; see also under
place names
495
Cook, Ann, 100
Cook, Daphne, 100
Cook, Isaac, 328-329
Cooper, James, 216
Cooper, Priscilla, 47
Copperhead meetings, 414
Corcoran, William, 276
Cornwall Furnace, 29
Corwin, Thomas, 384
Costa Rica, 320-321
Court dress circular, 228-229
Cove Gap, Penna., 2-4
Covode, John, 338
Covode Committee, 338-339
Crabbe expedition, 322
Craig, Mrs. Elizabeth C, 277, 285, 333,
348,426
Crampton, J. F. T., 243-245
Crawford, William H., 39, 41, 44, 48-49
Creole affair, 145-146
Crimean War, 229, 231, 234, 242
Crittenden, John J., 310; on Cuba, 325;
compromise plan, 382-387, 392-393,
399-400
Cuba, 191-192, 230, 331, 335, 365, 400;
Ostend Manifesto, 234-241; purchase
proposal of 1859, 324-325
Cumberland County, Penna., 24
Cumberland Road, 42-43
Gumming, Alfred, 316-317
Curtin, Andrew Gregg, 351
Curtis, George T., 419
Gushing, Caleb, 165, 222, 243, 341, 375
Gust, Sir Edward, 228
Customhouse, Phfladelphia, 115, 135, 171,
281; New York, 280; Charleston, 380,
390
Cutts, Adele, 208, 284
Cutts, J. Madison, 284
Cyane, U. S. S., 232
Dallas, Alexander J., 45
Dallas, George M., 45, 48, 55, 73, 79-80,
102, 10£ 131, 135, 138-139, 155, 166,
216, 223, 245, 247; patronage under
Jackson, 96-99; Mission to Russia,
108, 112-113: vice-Pres, 151 160;
patronage under Polk, 167-171; and
tariff of 1846, 172-173; in election of
1848. 195-203; Mission to England,
245, 247
Dallas-Clarendon treaty, 318
Danville, Penna., 153, 161
Dauphin County, Penna., 24
Davidson, Dr. Robert, 8-10, 12
Davis, Garrett, 410
Davis, Jefferson, 222, 224, 263, 266, 279,
290, 341, 343, 349, 375, 379, 422
Davis, John, 133-134
Davis, John W., 219
Davis, Varina, 425
Dayton, William L., 257
DeBow's Review, 315
JAMES BUCHANAN
Democratic party, in national election of
1832, 9?; $36, 106-110; 1840, 132-
137; 1844, 15M60; 1848, 194-205;
1852, 216-222; 1856, 248-260; 1860,
350-352; 1864, 421; and 1850 Com-
promise, 211-216; patronage under
Polk, 166-172; patronage under Bu-
chanan, 279-285; and Kansas policy,
286-312; and Homestead bill, 345-
347; split of 1860, 328-332, 340-344;
New York split, 121; in Penna., 1814,
20-24; 1824, 55-56; 1828, 60-74;
1835, 105-109; 1836, 112; 1842, 151-
154; and U, S. Bank, 116-124, 135,
139; see also Conventions and Elec-
tions
Denver, James W., 302, 309
Derrick, William S., 165
Deseret, see Utah
Dickens, Charles, 210
Dickerson, Mahlon, 114
Dickinson College, 5, 7-13, 27-28, 38, 210
Diller, Peter, 17
Diplomatic Bureau, 165
District of Columbia, see Washington,
D. C.
Dix, John A., 238, 374, 390, 401, 406-407,
412-415, 418, 420
Dobbin, James C., 222
Dom Pedro II, 191
Donegal County, Ireland, 1, 28
Donelson, Andrew J., 176-177
Doolittle, James R., 324
Doubleday, Abner, 419
" h-face, 308
' , Stephen A., 204, 221, 223, 250,
-364, 393, 405; and 1850 Com-
promise, 213; in 1852 campaign, 218-
220; in 1856 campaign, 254-255, 259;
and Buchanan Cabinet, 263, 266-267;
and patronage, 279, 282-284; and
Kansas-Nebraska bill, 286-288, 291,
299; attacks Lecompton, 300-312;
breaks with Buchanan, 301, 328-329;
debates Lincoln, 322-330; attacks
Black, 335; and Covode Committee,
338-339; nominated pres., 340-844;
in 1860 election, 347-348, 351
Douglass, Samuel, 71
Dowmngtown, Penna., 61
Doyle, James, 254
Draft law, see Conscription
Dred Scott case, 269,^71-272
"Drop of Blood1* speech, 62, 119
Dwigbt, Henry D., 37
Duane, William J., 97
Dublin, 95
Duchman, Jacob, 14, 16
Dunwoodie Farm, 4-5, 37, 126
Eaton, John H., 51, 78
Eaton, Peggy, 76
Echo, case of, 335
Edinborough, 95
Edwards, Ninian, 38
Elder, Thomas, 52, 149
Eldred, Nathaniel, 163
Elections, national of 1824, 44-53; of 1828,
60-66; of 1832, 77, 96-97; of 1836,
110; of 1840, 132-136; of 1848, 204-
205; of 1852, 218-222: of 1856, 254-
260, of 1860, 347-352; of 1864, 421;
Penna. gubernatorial of 1820, 35-37;
of 1823T 46-47; of 1829, 69-71; of
1835, 107; of 1838, 122-124, 129-130;
of 1844, 157, 162; of 1847, 195-198;
of 1851, 216-217; Penna. senatorial
of 1831, 80; of 1833, 99; of 1842,
153-154; of 1845, 167; of 1857, 265-
266
"Eleventh Hour Men," 49, 67
Elizabeth Furnace, 29
Elizabethtown, Ky., 15
Ellicott's Mills, Md., 18
Elliott, Charles, 177
Elliott's Debates, 210
Ellis, Katherine, 426
Ellmaker, Amos, 27, 101
Emancipation Proclamation, 421
- "•' i bill, 312, 328-329, 338
«,.i mission, see Great Britain
_.e.sh, William H., 311-312
Era of Good Feeling, 35
Erie, Penna., 136, 260
Espy, George R., 116
Esterhazy, Princ
.,
, nce Pal Antal, 96
Europe, fear of in U. S., 89, 175-176;
influence of in America, 317-326
Evans, Joshua, 55
Everett, Edward, 181, 226, 343
Expansion, see Territorial expansion
Family party, composition of, 45; in 1824
election, 48-53; in 1825, 55; in 1829
election, 67-71; end of, 97, 105
Farmers Bank of Lancaster, 27, 30
Federalist party, 5, 16-19; in Penna., 1823,
45-47; backs Jackson, 48; in 1826,
35-36; end of in 1828, 54, 60-62
Federal system, 143-144, 428
Ferguson, John, 3
"Fifty-four forty or fight," 178
Filibusters, 236, 319-320
Fillmore, Millard, 142, 213, 260, 262, 275
Findlay, John, 38
Findlay, William, 35-36, 39, 50
Fire-eaters, 308; see under individual names
Fishing nights, 225
Fitzpatrick, Benjamin, 347
Florida, 68, 76, 212, 392-394, 399
Floyd, John B., 335, 339, 397, 412, 418;
as Sec'y of War, 278; dispute with
Meigs, 349; and "acceptances," 357,
377; and Charleston forts, 354,
368-370, 376; leaves Cabinet, 377-380
Flynn, William, 412
Foltz, Dr. Jonathan M., 192, 210, 314, 409;
and 1856 election, 251; and National
496
INDEX
Hotel disease, 269-273; breaks with
Buchanan, 283
Foote, Henry S., 290
Force hill, 396
Foreign policy, Russia, chap. 6; Great
Britain, chaps. 17, 18; under Polk,
chap. 14; Buchanan's, 145-147; 317-
327
Foreign Relations Committee, U.S. Senate,
113, 123
Forney, John W., 222, 226, 229, 237, 287,
328, 330, 415; and "Ten Cent Jimmy"
canard, 133-135; traits of, 140-141;
and 1844 campaign, 151-154; relations
with Cameron, 167-173; in 1848
election, 195-201; in 1850, 210-212;
and Sickles, 226, 242; in 1856 cam-
paign, 249, 251, 253; vainly seeks
office, 264-268; breaks with Bu-
chanan, 281-282; and Covode Com-
mittee, 338
Forsyth, John, 113-114, 130-131, 322
Fort Bridger, 316
Fort Jackson, 388
Fort Jefferson, 388
Fort Johnson, 353
Fort Moultrie, 353-354, 368-370, 373, 376,
378-381, 393, 408, 412, 416
Fort Pickens, 388, 399, 407, 410-411
Fort Pulaski, 392
Fort Snelling, 285
Fort Sumter, 353, 368, 375-376; occupied
by Anderson, 378-379, 387; and Star
of the West, 388-390, 393; and truce,
394-395; controversy about under
Lincoln, 402-403, 4&-408, 411-412,
415-420
Fort Taylor, 388
Foster, Stephen C., 93
Foster, Eliza, 93, 101; see oho Mrs. E. Y.
Buchanan
Foster, Alfred, 12
Fowler, Isaac V., 281, 339
France, 145, 175476, 320-323, 326-327
Fox, Gustavus V., 395-396
Franklin, Walter, 24-26, 32, 39
Franklin and Marshall College, 210, 262,
415 424
Frazer, Aeah, 168, 197-198, 200, 206
Frazer, W. C., 25
Freeport Doctrine, 341-342
Frtoont, John C., 199, 256-257, 260,
262, 413
Free ships make free goods, 92
Free-Soil party, 205, 211, 221, 288
Free trade, see Tariff
Friends, Society of, 62, 149
Furitive slave law, 201, 212-217, 221, 359,
361,382
Gadsden purchase, 190
"Gag Resolutions," 148-149
Gallatin, Albert, 50-51
Gardner, Col. J. L, 354, 358
Garrison, William Lloyd, 259, 364
Gates, Paul, 288
Gautier (caterer), 171, 350
Geary, John W., 288, 291
Georgia, 213, 284, 309, 340-341, 351-352,
371-372,392-393
Georgia, University of, 276
German Confederation, 191
German vote, 55, 62, 67
Gettysburg, battle of, 423, 426
Gibson, John Bannister, 48, 76, 108
Giddings, Joshua R., 257
Gilpin, Henry M., 131, 155
Gist, William H., 353, 368-369
Good Neighbor policy, 146
Gordon, Thomas and Rosana, 424
Govan, Andrew R., 37
Grapes Tavern, 208, 408
Great Britain, and Maine boundary, 145-
146; interest in Texas, 175-176;
Oregon negotiation, 178-183; Bu-
chanan's mission to, 221-247;
appointed minister, 223-227; court
dress affair, 227-229; Central Ameri-
can negotiation, 230-233; and Cuba,
234-241; threat of war, 241-246;
Harriet Lane in, 246-247; relations
with in Buchanan's term, 318-320,
325, 331
Greeley, Horace, 258, 360, 374, 384, 415
Gregg, Andrew, 47, 49
Green, Benjamin, 184-185
Green, Duff, 56-59, 98, 383-386
Greenhow, Robert, 80, 165
Greenhow, Rose O'Neal, 165, 425
Greensburg, Penna., 100, 124, 136, 221
Greytown, 225, 230, 232-233
Grier, Justice Robert, 174, 262, 269, 282
Grand, Francis J., 281
Grundy, Felix, 15-16, 103, 131
Guadalupe Hidalgo, treaty of, 190
Gurley, Phineas, 334
Guthrie, James, 222, 341
Gwin, William M., 326, 333, 372, 426
Gwin, Mrs. W. M., 333-334, 390, 426
Hague, the, 95
Hale, John P,, 221
Hall, Lt. Norman J., 394
Halstead, Murat, 341
Hamburg, 82, 95
Hamilton, Alexander, 96
Hamilton, Mrs. Alexander, 171
Hamilton, William, 37
Hamlin, Hannibal, 343, 402
Hammet, W, H., 159
Hammond, James H., 315, 353
Hannah, 35-36
Hardin, Ben, 38
Hards, 280-281
Harney, Gen, William S., 291
Harpers Ferry, 335-337, 340
Harriet Lane (cutter), 350
Harrisburg, Penna., in 1814, 19; Demo-
cratic convention of 1824, 48; of
1829, 69; of 1835, 105-106; of 1836,
497
JAMES BUCHANAN
107; of 1838, 122; of 1843, 153; of
1847, 196-200; of 1851, 216; of 1852,
217-218; of 1856, 250; Whig.conyen-
tion of 1840, 132; tariff convention,
65
Harrisburg Bank, 109
Harrisburg Keystone, 131, 155
Harrison, William Henry, 15, 132, 136-
137, 275
Hartford convention, 297
Harvest Home letter, see Berks County
Letter
Hawaii, 192
Hawthorne, Nathaniel, 206
Hayes, Alexander L, 27-35
Hayes, John, 8
Hayne, Isaac W., 394-395, 399
Hemphffl, Joseph, 28, 32, 38
Hemphill, Margaret Coleman, 31
Henry, Ann D., 100
Henry, Harriet Buchanan, 124-125, 155
Henry, James Buchanan, 101, 125, 155,
2io, 226-227, 261, 270, 273-274,
333,423
Henry, Robert, 100, 124-125
Hermitage, the, 68, 119, 155
Herrera, Jos4 Joaqufn, 183, 185
Hetty, Miss, see Esther Parker
Hiester, Joseph, 35-37, 49
Holdridge, Henry, 81
Hollins, Capt. G. N., 232
Holt, Joseph, 357-358, 372-373, 379-381,
388, §9i395, 397-403, 413, 418-419
Home Bureau, 165
Homestead bill, 345-347
Honduras, 225, 230-233, 318, 320
Hopewell Furnace, 29
Hopkins, George Ross, 27
Hopkins, James, 13-14, 16, 20, 25, 27,
30, 35
Hopkins, James M., 210
Hopkins, Washington, 93
Horn, Henry, 155, 171-172
House of Representatives, see U. S.
Houston, Sam, 218
Howard Committee, 397-398
Hubley, Grace, 31
Hudson's Bay Company, 325
Huger, Benjamin, 358, 369, 376
Hughes, Archbishop John, 29, 245
Hunkers, 166, 202, 204, 226
Hunter, Robert M. T., 218, 265, 279, 379
Huston, Sarah Buchanan, 124
Huston, Elizabeth, 101, 124-125
Hutter, W., 196, 200
niinois, 329-330, 339
Impeachment, of Penna. judges, 24-26; of
Judge Peck, 76; of Andrew Johnson,
422; threatened, 374, 411
Inauguration, Buchanan's, 267-272
Income, Buchanan's, as lawyer, 16, 23,
26; as minister, 81; as senator, 128;
in retirement, 423-424
Independent Republican party (Penna.), 35
Independent treasury, see Subtreasury
Indian bonds, 414
Indian Bureau, 39-40
Indian threat, 356
Indiana, 220
Ingersoll, Charles J., 16, 119, 120, 227
Ingham, Samuel D., 45, 50, 57-58, 64,
68-69, 78-80
Instructions, senatorial, 102, 122, 139
Interior Department, 377-378, 390: see
also imtfer Jacob Thompson
Intervention, doctrine of, 320-324
Investments, by Buchanan, 81, 423-424
Iowa, 212
Ireland, 1, 2, 243
Irish vote, 151, 216, 283
Isthmian transit, 321, 323; see also New
Granada, Panama, Nicaragua, Te-
huantepec, and Clayton-Bulwer treaty
Jackson, Andrew, 143, 147, 154, 159, 161,
163, 196, 285, 332, 334, 339; sketch
of, 51; in 1824 campaign, 48-53; and
corrupt bargain affair, 49-60; and
Penna. patronage, 66-74; and tariff,
65; and Russian Mission, 78*80; and
parly in Penna., 99; censure of, 103;
names successor, 106; and the Bank,
113-121
Jackson, Frederick William, 228
Jacobs, Cyrus, 28, 35
Jacobs, Eliza, 28-29
Jamaica, 244
Japan, 326, 331, 348
Jefferson, Thomas, 22
Jenkins, Martha, 206; see also Mrs,
James B. Lane
Jenkins, William, 27, 30, 35, 85, 206
Jenkins, Mrs. William, 31
Johnson, Andrew, 422
Johnson, Cave, 166, 180, 182, 218
Johnson, Herschel V., 347
Johnson, Richard M., 107, 111, 130-135,
152453
Johnston, Albert Sidney, 316
Johnston, Henry Elliott, 427
Johnston, William F.f 205, 217
Jones, J. Glancy, 194, 196, 214, 243, 263-
268, 284, 330
Juirez, Benito, 322-323
Judges, see Impeachment
Judiciary Act of 1789, 74-75
Judiciary Committee, Penna., 20, 23; U, S.
Congress, 76
Justices of the peace, 110
Kane, John K., 155, 160-161
Kane, Thomas L, 316-317
Kansas, territory of, civil war in, 249-250,
256; settlement of, 286*290; terri-
torial government, 291-295; constitu-
tion, 296-312; as a political issue,
328-329
498
INDEX
Kansas-Nebraska bill, 235-245, 248, 250,
263, passed, 286-287; operation of,
288-312
Keitt, Lawrence M., 352, 361, 370, 375
Kelly, Moses, 390
Kelly, Sir Fitz-Roy, 246
Kendall, Amos, 59, 114
Kentucky, 15-16, 351, 400
Kern, Jacob, 106
Keystone Club, 271, 290
Kilgore, David, 365
King, Horatio, 374, 412-413, 420
King, Dr. John, 7, 10
Kini, John P., 119
King William R. R., 103, 111, 119, 130-
132, 134, 137, 149, 220, 401, 426
Kingdom of the Two Sicilies, 234
Kittera, Anne, 101
Kittera, Thomas, 31-32, 55, 101, 106
Know-Nothing party, 248-249, 251, 256,
270-289
Kossuth, Louis, 235
Kremer, George, 50, 52-53
Krudener, Baron, 82-83, 85
Labor, 133, 151
Lafayette, Marquis de, 53
Lancaster, Penna., 13, 15, 30, 41, 71-72,
81, 98, 107-108, 136, 141, 253, 260,
270, 404, 408-409, 424-428
Lancaster County, Penna,, 85-86, 110;
tax affair, 197-198; Christiana Riot,
216-217
Lancaster County Dragoons, 18
Lancaster Fencibles, 270
Lancaster Intelligencer, 158, 200
Land, see Public land
Lane, Elliot Eskridge, 125, 209, 226-227,
273-274
Lane, Elliot Tole, 15, 17, 127
Lane) Mrs. Elliot T., 100, 125, 127, 155;
see also Jane Buchanan
Lane, Harriet Rebecca, 125, 155-156, 227,
229, 261, 270, 272, 330, 334, 348,
352, 401, 423, 426; education, 208-
209; at Court of St. James, 246;
mistress of the White House, 273*275,
283, 332-333; abuse of, 414-415, 417;
marriage of, 427
Lane, Gen. Jim, 287, 310
Lane, James Buchanan, 200, 206, 209
Lane, Joseph, 341, 347.348, 379
Lane, Mary Elizabeth Speer, 125, 155, 209f
246, 282; see also Mrs. George W.
Baker
Laverty, Robert, 11-12
Lawless, Luke £., 76
Lawrence, Joseph, 101
Lawrence, Kansas, 291, 294
Lazaretto (Phila.), 283
Leavenworth, Kansas, 291
Lecompton, fcansas, 291, 294, 297-299
Lecompton Constitution, 282, 296-312
Lecompton government, 287, 297-298
499
Ledyard, Mrs. Henry, 275, 333
Lee, Robert E., 335
Legislature, see under United States and
States
Leiper, George G., 55
Leopard Tavern, 33
Letcher, Robert P., 58
Lewis, Ellis, 418
Lewis, William B., 77
Lewistown, Penna., 106
Liberty party, 161
Lieven, Prince Kristofer Andreevich de,
83,96
Lincoln, Abraham, 15, 302, 308, 323, 336,
392-393, 397, 403, 412-418, 428-429;
runs for Senate, 328-329; nominated
for pres., 343; in 1860 election, 347-
348, 351-352; views on Union, 353-
354, 360-361, 363-366, 370, warned
against Buchanan, 374; rejects com-
promise, 382, 387; plot against, 398;
inauguration, 399-402; inaugural ad-
dress, 404-406; prepares for war,
407-409; Buchanan's opinion of, 420;
assassinated, 421
Lincoln, Thomas, 15
Lincoln-Douglas debates, 329
Utchfield School, 27
Liverpool, 81-82, 95
Livingston, Edward, 80, 83, 88, 91
Livingston, Cora, 47
LondSn, 80, 82, 95-96, 178-181, 223-247
London Conference, 96
London Observer* 412
London Times, 228-229
Louisiana, 218, 361, 393
Lowndes, William, 38-41
Lowrie, Walter, 50
Lflbeck, 82, 95
Lucinda Furnace, 424
Lynch, David, 101, 114, 156-157, 195-196,
205,209,219-220,281,425
Lynch, Isabel, 425
Lyons, Lord Edmund, 414
McCamant, John, 61
McCandless, Wilson, 195, 340
McDuffie, George, 38, 45-46, 76
McGee County, Kansas, 298
McGlinn, Anthony, 119
McKean, Samuel, 98-99, 103
McLane, Louis, 98, 114, 179, 181-182
McLane, Robert, 322-323
McLane-Ocampo Treaty, 322-323
McLean, L. A., 292
McClellan, George B., 421
McClelland, Robert, 223
McCormick, James, 8-10
Mclntire, Peter, 390
McQueen, John, 370, 375
MadJson, James, 17, 22, 297
Madison, Mrs. James, 156, 171
Madison's Notes, 210
Magaw, Jesse E. H., 5, 15, 125
JAMES BUCHANAN
Magaw, Jessie, 125 127209
Magraw, Robert, 333-334
MaS, in Russia, 91-92; abolitionist, 148;
seizure of Buchanan's, 414
Maine, 145-146, 259
Manchester, England, 82
Manhattan Bank, 109
Manifest Destiny, 175
£5. ife L! 166, 218-220, 222-245
Marcy, Mrs. W. L., 171
Markley, Philip S., 50-52
Marshall, John, 169
Martin, CoP'H. L, 298-299 .
Maryland, 218, 366; see also Baltimore
Ifem, John Y., 166, 204, 218, 237-238,
333
Mason-Dixon line, 262
Masonic Lodge, Lancaster, Penna., 27,
408-409, 427
Massachusetts, 341
Maximilian, Archduke Ferdinand, 323
Maynadier, Capt. H. E., 377
_ ^
C., 349
, 33, 100, 155,
12T, 136, 155,
203, 260
Meigs, Capt. Mont
Mercersbure, Penna., 4-
125-126, 426
Meredith, William M., 119, 207
Meredith, Jonathan, 76
Mexican War, 184-188, 201
Mexico, 113-114, 145-148, 159, 400; and
Texan annexation, 176-177; and U. 5.
policy, 1845, 183-184; Slidell mission,
184-186; war with, 184-189; peace
negotiations, 190-191; Buchanan's
presidential policy toward, 321-323
Meyers, B. F., 340
Michigan, 79, 111
Miles, William Porcher, 370
Militia, 1814, 24
Miller, Jesse, 116
Milton, Penna., 161
Miner, Charles, 54, 61
Minnesota, 294, 310
Mississippi, 218, 373, 393
Missouri* 'border ruffians," 249-250, 288
Missouri Compromise, 3D, 164, 201-202,
216; in 1850, 211-214; extension of,
286, 283, 365, 383-385, 392, 400
Mobile, Ala., 319
Molino del Key, battle of, 188
Monroe, James, 42
Monroe Doctrine, 191, 225, 317, 324, 327
Montgomery, Ala., 395
Montgomery-Crittenden amendment, 311
Moorhead, J. B., 157
Moran, Benjamin, 242
Morgan, Gov. E. D., 365
Mormons, 325-326; war against, 314-317
Morrill tariff, 345
Morris, Thomas, 111-112
Morse, Samuel F. B., 160
Moscow, 93
Mosquito Indians, 225, 231, 318
Mt. Vernon, 350
Muhlenberg, Henry A., 55, 67, 80, 104-
112, 115, 122, 130-131, 135, 138,
157-158, 161, 163, 167
"Mules," 105-107
Napier, Lord, 318
Nashville, Convention, 213
National debt, 345-346
National Hotel disease, 268-271
National Intelligencer, 404, 417, 420
Native American party, 161, 167
Navy, U. S., in Paraguayan war, 323; and
slave trade, 324; readiness in 1861,
323-324, 356-357
Negroes, in Kansas, 250, 289; in Penna.,
364; and suffrage, 422
Nelson, Smith, 169
Nesselrode, Count Karl Robert, 83, 86*92
Neutrality policy, 147
Nevin, John W., 424, 427
"New Democracy,*' 165-166
New England, on tariff, 64-65; constitu-
tion-makmg process, 306; Emigrant
Aid Society, 287-288, 297
Newfoundland, 225
New Granada, 191, 321
New Jersey, 218, 306, 341
New Mexico, 183-185, 187, 212, 214, 286,
290,400
New Orleans, 284, 319
New York, seeks financial supremacy, 117;
Democratic split in, 121; political
importance of, 166-167; in 1848 elec-
tion, 204; in 1852 election, 218-220;
welcomes Buchanan, 252-253; and
Cabinet claims, 262-263; factions in,
280-281; panic of 1857 in, 314; post
office fraud in, 339
New York Herald, 190, 240, 340, 365, 374
New York Post, 415
New York Stock Exchange, 298
New York Times, 366
New York Tribune, 374, 415
New York-Virginia alliance, 44
Nicaragua, 225, 230-233, 318-321
Nicholas I, Czar of Russia, 82-83, 85,
87-89, 91-94
Nichols, Roy F., 240, 401
Nicholson letter, 202, 213
Nisbet, Dr. Charles, 8
Nominating convention, see Caucus and
Conventions
Nonintervention policy, 146-147, 191
Norris, William, 27
North Carolina, 366, 372-374
North Carolina Standard, 405
Norvall, John, 45
Nova Scotia, 225
500
INDEX
Novgorod, 93
Nugent, John, 190
Nullification controversy, 97-98, 359
Oberlin- Wellington trial, 335
Old, James, 28
"Old Buck Cannon," 253, 404
"Old Fogies," 222
"Old Ironsides" dub, 139
Old Stone Academy (Mercersburg, Pa.), 5
Oregon, as issue, 145-146; negotiation of
boundary of, 178-183; treaty, 182;
debate on, 212; access to, 230-231; at
Charleston, 1860, 341
"Original Jacksonians," 48
Orr, James L, 310, 312
Ostend Manifesto, 239-241
O'Sullivan, John L., 238
Ould, Robert, 403
Ousley, Sir William Gore, 318-320
Oxford County, Kansas, 298
Oxford University, 246
Pacific railroad, 259, 263-264
Packenham, Richard, 178-182
Packer, William F., 341
Palmerston, Viscount (Henry John
Temple), 96, 189, 243-245
Palmerston, Lady, 244
Panama, isthmus of, 191, 331
Panic, of 1819, 30; of 1837, 120; of 1857,
298, 314-315
Paraguay, 191, 323-324
Paredes, Gen. Mariano, 185
Paricer, Esther, 100, 103, 124, 155-156,
207, 210-211, 227, 229, 261, 270,
273^274, 408, 424425, 427-428
Parker, John A., 213, 218
Parliament, 228-229, 244-245
Parrott, William S., 183484
Parton, James, 51
Party, see wider party name
Passmore, John, 16
Patronage, under Jackson, 66-74; under
Van Buren, 113-114; under Polk, 166-
172; under Pierce, 223-224; under
Buchanan, 278-284, 330-331
Patterson, Robert, 49
Pauldingjairam, 319
Paxton, William M., 349
Payne, Anna, 156
Peabody, George, 227, 236
Peace, proposed, 1864, 421
Peace convention, 1861, 398-400
Peck, Judge James H., 76
Peel, Sir Robert, 181
Pennington, William, 338
Pennsylvania, abolition in, 306; bank issue
in, 116-117, 132, 151; bankruptcy of,
138-139; constitution of 183B, 108-
110; cabinet claims, 262-263; im-
portance of, 166; and Lecompton,
501
311; politics in, 1820, 35-37; 1823,
46-47f 1824, 48-49; 1828, 60-74;
1832, 96-98; 1835, 104-107; 1836,
110; 1838, 122-130; 1840, 132-141;
1842, 153-154; 1844, 154-158; 1845,
167-168; 1848, 196-200; 1852, 216-
218, 223-224; 1856, 259-260, 281;
I860, 351, 364; 1863, 421; on the
tariff, 64-66, 173, 364
Pennsylvania Turnpike, 29
Peirnsylvanian, The, 135, 282, 340
Penrose, Charles B., 135, 265
People's party, 351
Persia, 326
Personal liberty laws, 363-364
Petition, right of, 148-149
Petriken, Henry, 115, 152
Phelps, Royal, 384-385
Philadelphia, 1, 13, 20, 30-31, vote of, 55;
financial supremacy of, 117; attack
on, 119; voting frauds, 1838, 129;
Buchanan's strength in, 151; in 1848
election, 199-200; Buchanan's speech
to, 1850, 214-215; in 1852 election,
217-218; welcomes Buchanan, 253;
Buchanan's speech to, 1867, 422
Philadelphia Pennsylvania^ 340
Philadelphia Press, 305, 340, 349
Philippe, Louis, 272
Phillips, John, 36-37
Phillips, Wendell, 259, 364
Pickens, Francis W., 375-376, 393-395,
408
Pierce, Franklin, 142, 229, 232, 267, 271,
345-346; nominated, 220; as pres.-
elect, 221-223; names Buchanan to
mission, 223-227; and Ostend con-
ference, 234-241; and British war
scare, 242-244; in 1856 election, 245;
and Kansas, 250*259, 287; and
patronage, 278-280, 284; and Mor-
mons, 316
Pierce, Mrs. Franklin, 275
Piersol, Ann, 37
Pittsburgh, 136, 150, 155, 157, 397, 412,
418, Free-Soil convention in, 221;
cannon order rescinded, 377-378
Pittsburgh Post, 340
Pleasanton, Laura, 423
Pleasanton, Stephen, 45-46, 81, 208
Pleasanton, Mrs. Stephen, 164
PHtt, George, 99, 115, 121, 199, 203-205,
208, 282-283
PUtt, Sophia, 252, 257, 283, 332-333,
352,409
Plumer, Arnold, 193, 196, 205, 340
Poinsett, Joel, 38, 114
Poland, 83, 89-90
Political party, see under party name
Polk, James K., 74, 142, 154, 196, 202-203,
218; nominated, 159-160; elected
pres., 161-162; Cabinet of, 163-166;
patronage under, 166-172; foreign
JAMES BUCHANAN
policy of, 175-193; relations with
Buchanan, 192-193
Polk, Mrs. James K, 161, 252, 275, 340
Pollock, James, 248
Polygamy, 316
Pope, John, 16
Pope Pius IX, 191
Pool Forge, 28-29
Popular sovereignty, 202, 211-216, 286-
312; sec also Kansas-Nebraska bill,
Compromise of 1850, and Stephen A.
Douglas
Poore, Ben Perley, 194, 203
Port Deposit, Md., 423
Porte, Ottoman, 203
Porter, David RM 122, 222-223, 454;
elected gov., 129-130; in 1840 cam*
paign, 131-137; re-elected, 138-139;
inl844 campaign, 152-155, 157, 161;
in 1852 campaign, 219-220
Porter, Maj. FitzJohn, 354, 358
Porter, George B., 55, 61, 67, 72, 79
Porter, James M., 131, 154
Post office, Russian, 84, 91-92; U. S., 157,
191,284,332,339
Pottawatomie Creek, 254
Presbyterian Church, 4, 7, 81, 226, 349;
Buchanan admitted to, 427; bequest
to, 428
Presidency, Buchanan's rules for attain-
ing, 194-195; Buchanan's view of,
313; attacks on, 337-340
Press, in 1856 campaign, 257-259; in
Illinois, 301; on Mexican policy, 323;
on second term for Buchanan, 340-
341; on coercion, 360; on presidential
message of 1860, 363; on Lincoln's
inaugural, 405
Preston, William C., 136
Prince of Wales, 350
Princeton, U. S. S., 158
Princeton University, 210
Protestant vote, 21o
Public land, Buchanan's views on, 144-
145; as issue in Kansas, 287-288;
Kansas grant, 310-311; Mormon, 316;
and Homestead bill, 345-347
Pugh, George E., 310
Quakers, see Friends
Quincy, Josiah, 51
Radical party, 39
Railroads, 259, 263-264, 335, 3*6
Raleigh, N. C., 334
Rameiton, Ireland, 96
Randolph, John, 38, 41, 78, 83
Rawle, William, 58
Raymond, Henry J., 366
Raymond, 0. L, 258
Read, J. M., 159, 170, 214
Reading, Penna., 221; see also H. A*
Muhlenberg
Reciprocal trade treaties, with Russia,
158-89; with Canada, 225, 231; with
France and Brazil, 326
Recognition policy, 147
Reconstruction policy, 422
Recruiting, controversy with Britain, 244;
in Civil war, 420-421
Reed, William B., 174, 326, 418-419, 424
Reeder, Andrew H., 205, 250, 291
Reigart, Adam, 85, 253
Reiiart, E. C., 61-63^
Renfrew, Baron, see Prince of Wales
Republican party, in election of 1856, 256-
260; an£ "Bleeding Kansas," 288-289,
292; and Lecompton crisis, 300-312;
in Illinois, 328-329; in 36th Congress,
335-337; and John Brown, 336; and
Homestead bill, 346; problems of,
361-364; resistance to compromise,
1860, 364-367; factions in, 365-366;
and Crittenden proposals, 381-387;
and peace convention, 400; policy on
forts, 405; attacks Buchanan, 413-416
Resubmission principle, 304-311
"Resurrection notes," 123
Revenue, federal, 145, 345-346
Revolution, in Cuba, 191-192, 239; in
Europe, 191, 235, 241; in Kansas,
287; secession as, 362, 391; in Spain,
235, 237; in Texas, 146
Reynolds, Ellie, 426
Reynolds, James L., 226-227
Reynolds, John, 27, 29, 80, 83, 85, 93,
141, 193
Reynolds, Gen. John F., 426
Richmond, Va., 219
Ridgely, Maj. Charles Sterret, 18
Riggs and Co., 377
Riggs and Corcoran, 226
Right of search, 320, 326
Rio Grande River, 177
Ritchie, Thomas, 169, 213, 218
Ritner, Joseph, nominated, 70-71; elected
gov., 106-108; and bank issue, 109,
122; defeated, 124,129-130
Rivas Manifesto, 320
Rivers and harbors bill, 345
Rives, William C, 138
Rhine River, 95
Robb, Mrs. £. C., 426; see also Mrs. £. C.
Craig
Robertson, Judge John, 398
Rogers, Molton C., 27-29, 36, 49-51, 55, 58
Rogers, Thomas J., 45
Roflin, Ledru, 235
Roosevelt, Theodore, 317
Roosevelt, Mrs. James J., 156, 318
Ross, John, 73
Ross, Patton, 25
Rothschild, James, 226, 235
Rowan, John, 16
Ruffin, Edmund, 408
Rush, Richard, 187
Russell, Jane (of Ireland), 1
502
INDEX
Russell, Jane (of York County, Penna.), 2
Russell, Joshua, 1-2
Russell, Samuel, 1
Russell, Majors and Waddell, 357-377
Russell Tavern, 2, 5
Russellville, Ky., 15
Russia, Buchanan's mission to, 78-94;
commercial treaty, 82-88; Baron
Sacken affair, 89-91; maritime treaty,
92; Dallas as minister to, 113; and
Alaskan purchase plan, 325-326
Ruatan Island, 230, 232; see also Bay
Islands
Sacken, Baron, 90-91
Salary, see Income
St. James Episcopal Church, 32-33
St. Petersburg, 80-95
Sample, Nathaniel W., 80, 93, 200
Sanders, George N., 235
San Juan de Nicaragua, 319
San Juan Island, 325
Santa Anna, Antonio L6pez de, 183, 185,
188
Saratoga, N. Y.f 79, 218
Sardinia, 320
Sartiges, Madame, 272
Saunders, Romulus M., 192
Schell, Augustus, 280-281, 418, 423
Scotch-Irish vote, 55
Scott, Sir Walter, 210
Scott, Lt. Gen. Winfield, 187-188, 217,
325; in 1852 election, 221; "Views"
of, 355-356; and southern forts, 358,
368, 373; and Star of the West, 388-
389, 394-396; defense of Washington,
398, 400-401; advises Lincoln, 407,
410-411; newspaper controversy with
Buchanan, 417-419
Secession, threatened in 1832, 98;
threatened in 1850, 212-214; in-
fluence of John Brown on, 336-337;
influence of S. A. Douglas on, 351;
South claims Buchanan for, 352; of
South Carolina, 354-367; proclaimed,
375; of Gulf States, 392-393, 395;
views of Buchanan on, 361-363, 391,
405; Scott on, 355; Lincoln on, 405-
406
Second Bank of U. S., see Bank
"Secret Six," 336
Sectionalism, Buchanan on, 147-150; 194-
195, 211-216, 261-262; in 35th Con-
gress, 331-332 YT n ,
Senate, of Penna., 24-26; of U. S., de-
scribed, 103; Buchanan's activities
in, chaps. 9, 10> 11
Sergeant, Join, 38, 42, 46-47, 119
171, 217, 256-257,
326, 335, 364-365, 383-385, 389, 401,
406-407, 412-413
Shannon, Wilson, 183, 250, 291
Sharon, James, 5
Sherman, John, 365
Sherman, William, 254
Shields, James, 170, 328
Shippen, Henry, 17, 27, 120, 127
Shulze, John A., 46-47, 54-55, 69-70
Shunk, Francis R., 108, 152, 157-158,
161-163, 167-170, 196, 198, 205
Shunk, James F., 419
Sickles, Daniel E., 226, 229, 236-239,
241-242, 267, 400
Sickles, Mrs. Daniel, 226
"Silas Richards," 81
"Silliman letter," 297
Slave trade, 148-149, 335, 382
Slavery, and expansion, 147-150, abolition
of in D. C., 148; as issue in 1848
election, 201-202; and" 1850 Com-
promise, 2 11-216; .in territories, 255-
256, 261-262; Dred Scott case, 269;
in Kansas, 286-312; in 35th Congress,
331-332; issue at Charleston con-
vention, 340-344; see also Missouri
Compromise and Popular Sovereignty
Slaves, in Buchanan family, 2, 36, 100
Slaymaker, Henry, 155
Slaymaker, Jasper, 14, 23, 27, 29
Slidell, John, 218, 223, 227, 328, 348, 352,
365, 375, 379, 384, 398; Mexican
mission, 184-186; and Cuba, 234, 241,
324-325; in election of 1856, 251, 255;
considered for Cabinet, 263-264; and
patronage, 267, 270, 284; and 1860
election, 341-342; break with Bu-
chanan, 372
Snyder, Elizabeth Michael, 101
Snyder, John, 101
Snyder, Mary Kittera, 101, 119-120, 124
Snyder, Simon, 18, 20, 337
Softs, 280
Soldiers' Home, 274, 334
Sonora, 321-322
Soul6, Pierre, 218, 235-241
Southard, S. L., 46
South Carolina, and nullification, 98;
on Compromise of 1850, 213-215;
threatens to secede, 353-354; Cabinet
discussion of, 361-366; and the forts,
368-381; and the Star of the West, 388-
390; Buchanan's policy toward* 410-
411
South Carolina commissioners, 378, 380,
386-387
Spain, 192, 234-241, 323-325
Spaulding, Rufus S., 257
Sparks, Jared, 210
Specie payments, 132, 315
Speedwell Forge, 29 t e
Speer, Elizabeth, see Elizabeth Speer
Buchanan,
Speer, James, 2
Speer, John, 4
Speer, Mary Patterson, 2
Spencer, Ambrose, 76
Springfield, 111., 302, 382-383, 385
JAMES BUCHANAN
Stambaugh, G. C, 198
Stanton,TSdwin, 372, 378-381, 387-390,
406-407, 412, 415
Stanton, Frederick P., 291, 302
393, 395, 411,
418
State Department, chaps. 13, ,14; organi-
zation of in 1845, 165-166
States' rights, Buchanan on, 42-43, A. n.
Stephens on, 293*294
Stieditz, Baron, 86, 91
Stephens, Alexander H., 293-294
Sterrett Gap, Penna,, 93
cere. John B.» 55. 68
wddeu.. 108-109, 119, 129, 414
, James S., 59, 68
Stewart, Charles, 139-140
Stoeckl, Baron Edouard de, 272, 325-326,
392
Stokes, W. A,, 196
Stony Batter, 2-4, 426, 428
Storrs, Henry R., 76
Story, Justice Joseph, 169
Stowe, Harriet Breecher, 221
Stuart, Charles £., 310
Sturgeon, Daniel, 55, 163, 216
Subtreasury bill, 120-124, 133
Sugar trade, 84
Sumner, Charles, 253-254
Surplus, see Revenue
Supreme Court, of Penna., 35; of U. S.,
F 24, 74.75, 112, 154, 212, 272; Bu-
chanan offered seat on, 169-172, 174;
on slavery, 269, 337, 342-343
"Susquehanna," 99 .
Susquehanna Bridge, 423
Susquehanna River, 2, 3, 19
Sutherland, Joel B., 69, 102
Swarr, Hiram, 331, 361, 366, 427
Tacubaya, 322
Taggart, David, 265
Talleyrand, Charles Maurice de, 96, 272
Tammany Hall, 280
TMMAM* Ujtmaw Tt 971
aney, ixogcr o«, ** t *
Tariff, 331, 335, 345, 364; Buchanan on,
63-66, 144-145; Polk on, 160-161;
Russian reaction to, 85-86; of 1824,
65; of 1827, 62-64; of 1828, 65-66; of
1842, 167; of 1846, 172-173; of 1857,
314-315
Taylor, Zachary, 177, 184, 186-187, 196,
204-205
Taylor, Mrs. Zachary, 275
Tecumseh, 15
Tehuantepec, 188-189
"Ten Cent Jimmy," 133-134
Ten Eyck, Anthony, 192
Tennent, Sir Emerson, 245
Tennessee, 218
Tennyson, Alfred Lord, 246
Territorial expansion, chap. 14; 147-150,
201, 317-326, 340-344
Territories, see by name
Texas, 158, 160, 164, 212, 412; inde-
pendence, 145-148; annexation, 159,
175-177, 183-187; secedes, 393
Thayer, Eli, 365-366
Thomas, Philip F., 371, 389-390
Thomas, T. W ., 289
Thompson, Jacob, 268, 308, 332-334, 368,
421, 426; as Sec'y of Interior, 277,
284; trip to North Carolina, 372;
bond scandal, 357-358, 377-378; view
on forts, 379, 381; resigns, 389-390
Thompson, Mrs. Jacob, 277, 332-334, 398,
Tod, John, 38, 73
Tom, John, 2-3
Toombs, Robert, 340
Topeka government, 250, 256, 287, 297.
298; 310
Toucey, Isaac, 218, 262, 278, 290, 323,
357-358, 379, 381, 388, 395, 411, 413
Towanda, Penna., 161
Transcontinental trade, 326, 331
Treaty, Cass-Yrisarri, 318, 320; Chinese,
326; Clayton-Bulwer, 225, 318-320;
Dallas-Clarendon, 318; German com-
mercial, 191; of Guadalupe Hidalgo,
190; Japanese, 348; McLane-Ocampo,
322, 323; Oregon, 182; Russian, 91-
92; Texan, 158; Webster-Ashburton,
Trescot, William H., 353-354, 358, 368-
369,375,378-379
Trist, Nicholas R, 165, 188-191
Trumbull, Lyman, 364-365, 373, 385, 401
Turkey, 83
Twiggs, David E., 412
Tyfe John. 103, 138, 140, 142-143, 155,
164t 1&, 398400
Tyler, Robert, 47, 215, 220-223
Tyson, Job Roberts, 246
Uncle Tom's Cabin, 221
Union, as issue in 1856 election, 257*260
Union Philosophical Society, 11
United Statesf army, 314-317, 356-357;
House of Representatives, 39-43, 212,
336-337, 382; Military Academy, 398;
Mint, 12p; Senate, 103, 142, 147-150,
190-191; Treasury, 120
Upshur, Abel, 158
Utah, 212, 214, 286, 290, 315-317
Uttca convention, 1848, 205
Valley Forge, 2
Vancouver, 325
Van Buren, John, 209, 238
Van Buren, Martin, 59, 96-97, 103*104,
166, 209, 273, 275, 278, 384; on
tariff of 1827, 64; Cabinet break of
1831, 77; rejected for British mission,
80; and Penna. vote* 105-110; pres,
elect, 113-116; and Bank, 117; sub-
504
INDEX
treasury plan, 129441; election of
1844, 142, 154-160; in 1848, 205
Van Dyke, James C.t 223
Van Rensselaer, Catherine, 47
Vera Cruz, 185, 188, 323
Veto, 143, 346
Vice-presidency, Buchanan's prospects,
77-79; Porter seeks, 152-155; King
nominated, 130, 220; Breckinridge
nominated, 255
Vicksburg convention, 1859, 335
Victoria, Queen, 182, 227, 229, 236, 246,
320, 350 414-415
Virginia, 204, 213, 218-219, 336, 366,
398-400
Vote, see Elections
Wade, Ben, 365
Wager, George L, 93
Waficer, Robert J., 166, 187, 189, 208, 218,
266, 279, 284; as Kansas gov., 291-
299; on Lecompton Constitution, 300-
301, 303, 307-309, 316
Walker, William, 319-320
Walker-McKay tariff, 172-173
Wall, Mary, 425-426
Wall Street plan, 384
Wanderer, case of, 335
War, of 1812, 17-18; Buckshot, 129-130;
Mexican, 184-188, 201; Crimean, 229,
231, 234, 242; threatens with British,
242-245; Mormon, 314-317; Para-
guayan, 323-324; Civil, 408
War Department, deficiency hill on, 39-41;
see also Army, J. B. Floyd, and War
"War Hawks/* 15
Ward, John, 227
Ward, John E., 255, 326
Ward, Cdr. J. H., 395-396
Washhurne, E. B., 364, 366
Washington Association of Lancaster, 17,
20, 22, 62
Washington, Bushrod, 76
Washington Constitution, 340, 373-374
Washington, D. C., burned, 17; in 1821,
38; slavery in, 148-149, 212; con-
struction in, 349; Japanese visit, 348;
Prince of Wales visit, 350; defense of,
397-398, 400
Washington, George, 5, 21-22, 334
Washington Globe, 90-91
Washington, Lund, Jr., 165
Washington Union, 264, 281
Water witch, 323
Watterson, Eliza, 207, 222
Weaver, Charles Edward, 209
Weaver, Jessie Yates, 246; see also Jessie
Weed, Thurlow, 245, 364-366, 383-385,
412-413
Welsh, Henry W., 226, 424
Wendell, Cornelius, 339
Wescott, G. G., 281
West, and 1850 Compromise, 213-214; as
new focus of power, 286-287; and
Missouri Compromise, 202; migration
to, 346
West Point, 41, 398
West Virginia, 302
Wheatland, 5, 220, 227, 252, 258, 313,
406, 414; purchase of, 206-210; dur-
ing Buchanan's presidency, 261-272;
Buchanan's return to, 404; threat-
ened, 408, 423; retirement at, 424-
426; Miss Lane's marriage at, 427;
Buchanan's death at, 427-428; see
also Esther Parker
"Wheatland Club," 253
Wheaton, Henry, 95, 191
Wheeling, Va., 335
Wheian, Dr., 283
Whig party, 153-154, 167, 250-251, 262-
2&, 268, 289, 364; in Penna., 101-
103; in 1835, 107-108; in 1836, 110.
Ill, 115; break with anti-Masons,
119, 129; in 1840, 132-139; in 1848,
204-205; in 1850, 211-216; in 1852,
216, 221; in 1857, 279
Whig-American party, 335
Whipper, William, 207
Whistey Rebellion, 5, 359
White, fanny, 226
White House, Buchanan's routine at,
273-275
White Swan Inn, 28, 100, 103
Whitney, Asa, 326
Wickliffe, Charles, 76, 176
Wigfall, Louis T., 378
Wilkins, William, 45, 55, 73, 96-98, 101-
104,112
Wilkinson, Allen, 254
Willard's Hotel, 271
Williamsport, Penna., 153, 161
Wilmot, David, 171, 173, 187
Wilmot Proviso, 187, 201-202, 212, 217,
288
Windsor Forge, 29
Winnebago Indians, 115, 131
Wirt, William, 76
Wehb, James Watson, 258
Webster, Daniel, 37, 74, 103, 121, 142-144,
171, 204, 260; Maine boundary treaty,
145-146; debates Buchanan on civil
rights, 148-149
Webster-Ashburton treaty, 145-146
505
T, 218-219, 226, 263-264,
267, 329-330, 335-336, 340
Wiseman, Cardinal Nicholas S. P., 245
Wolf, George, 69-73, 80, 98-101, 105-108,
112, 115, 122, 130, 135
Wolf Democrats, 69*74
"Wolves," 105-107
Wood, Fernando, 280
Woodbury, Levi, 114, 169, 204
Woodward, George W., 163, 167, 170-171,
421
Woodward Hill Cemetery, 427
JAMES BUCHANAN
Woolens Bill, 64, 80 Yates, James Buchanan, 209
Worcester, Mass., 259 Yellow Springs, Penna., 61, 63
Working-men of Philadelphia, 67 "Young America," 222, 235, 253, 280
Wright, Hendrick B., 159 Young^righam, 314-317
Wright, Silas, 103, 121, 160, 205 "Young Democrats," 163, 176
Wrightsville, Penna., 423 York, Penna., 2, 24, 404
Wurts, John, 55 Yulee, David L, 379
Yancey, William L.T 361
Yates, Dr. Charles M., 101, 125, 127, 423
Yates, Mrs. C. M., 125, 127, 209; see also Zion, see Utah
Maria Buchanan Zuloaga, Felix, 322
506