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EXCHANGE 


8061  '12  WiVd 
'A  'N  'asnoBJ 


The  Pre-Socratic  Use  of 


As  a  Term  for  the  Principle  of  Motion 


BY 

SISTER  M.  THOMAS  AQUINAS,  O.  S.  IX,  M.  A 

OF  T; 

SISTEI;-  01     UINT  DOMINI-  ,  StNsiNA 


A  DISSERTATION 

Submitted  to  the  Catholic  Sixters  College  of  the  Catholic 
<  '//  of  America  in  Partial  Fulfillment 

of  the  Requirements  for  the  Degree 
Doctor  of  Philosophy 


WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 
JUNE,  1915 


The  Pre-Socratic  Use  of 


As  a  Term  for  the  Principle  of  Motion 


BY 

SISTER  M.  THOMAS  AQUINAS,  O.  S.  D.,  M.  A. 

OF  THE 

SISTERS  OF  SAINT  DOMINIC,  SINSINAWA,  WISCONSIN 


A  DISSERTATION 

Submitted  to  the  Catholic  Sisters  College  of  the  Catholic 
University  of  America  in  Partial  Fulfillment 
of  the  Requirements  for  the  Degree 
Doctor  of  Philosophy 


WASHINGTON,  D.  C. 
JT-TNE,  1915 


NATIONAL  CAPITAL  PRESS,  INC 

BOOK  MANUFACTURERS 

WASHINGTON,  D.  C 


PREFACE 

The  general  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  modify  some  of  the  effects 
due  to  the  necessities  of  language  among  the  Greek  philosophers 
of  the  fifth  and  sixth  centuries  B.  C.  There  can  be  no  doubt 
that  ideas  conceived  at  this  time  suffered  from  lack  of  adequate 
forms  of  expression.  Later  thinkers,  exhibiting  a  disregard  for 
the  effects  of  inadequate  terminology,  have  assigned  to  the  pre- 
Socratic  philosophers  theories  inconsistent  with  true  growth  of 
thought.  A  study  of  the  word  ^VM  as  standing  for  a  kinetic 
principle  in  the  minds  of  philosophers  preceding  Socrates  cannot 
fail  to  emphasize  the  consideration  of  the  need  of  terms  as  a  factor 
in  the  history  of  philosophy. 

On  the  positive  side,  this  study  would  suggest  an  adjustment  of 
the  sources  for  Greek  terms  for  the  soul  in  an  effort  to  account 
for  the  vocabulary  of  later  philosophers  regarding  ^uxi?  proper. 

The  method  adopted  in  the  collection  of  pre-Socratic  terms 
would  balance  a  too  ready  acceptance  of  words  ascribed  to  early 
thinkers  and  an  absolute  rejection  of  terms  colored  by  Aristotelian 
influence. 

The  scope  of  the  study  includes  terms  for  apx^  for  ^v\ij  as 
a  kinetic  principle,  and  for  would-be  agent  causes  as  used  during 
the  century  and  a  half  of  Greek  speculation  from  Thales  (585  B.C.) 
to  Democritus  (420  B.  C.). 

The  frequent  mention  of  Diels'  Die  Fragmente  der  Vorsokratiker 
(abbreviated  For.),  of  Diels'  Doxographi  Graeci  (Dox.)9  of  Ritter 
and  Preller's  Historia  Philosophiae  Graecae  (R.  P.),  and  of  Hick's 
edition  of  Aristotle's  De  Anima  indicates  the  free  use  of  works 
invaluable  in  this  study. 

To  the  Reverend  William  Turner,  S.  T.  D.,  at  whose  suggestion 
this  thesis  was  written,  is  due  grateful  acknowledgement  of 
encouragement  and  assistance. 

Sister  Thomas  Aquinas. 
Feast  of  Saint  Thomas  Aquinas,  O.  P., 

March  7,  1915. 


TABLE  OF  CONTENTS 

PAGE 
I.  Introduction. 


1.  The  Purpose  of  a  Study  of  Terms  for  Kinetic  foxy-  -       7 

2.  The  Method  of  Treatment  of  Pre-Socratic  Terms.  ...      11 


II.  Study  of  Terms  for  Kinetic 

1.  Early  Ionian  Terms  ..............................  14 

2.  Early  Pythagorean  Terms  .........................  21 

3.  Terms  of  Heraclitus  ..............................  25 

4.  Eleatic  Terms  ...................................  29 

5.  Summary  of  Terms  of  Pre-Socratic  Dynamism  .......  33 

6.  Terms  of  Empedocles  .............................  36 

7.  Terms  of  Anaxagoras  .............................  39 

8.  Terms  of  the  Successors  of  Anaxagoras  .............  43 

9.  Summary  .......................................  46 

III.  Bibliography. 


I.  INTRODUCTION 
1.  THE  PURPOSE  OF  A  STUDY  OF  TERMS  FOR  KINETIC 


Aristotle,  in  the  first  chapter  of  De  Anima,  justified  his  treatise 
on  the  soul  when  he  said:  "It  would  seem,  too,  that  an  acquaint- 
ance with  this  subject  contributes  to  the  whole  domain  of  truth." 
Likewise  a  knowledge  of  the  word  4/vxy  as  used  in  a  particular 
sense  by  the  early  Greek  philosophers  seems  well  worth  while  as 
teaching  that  Truth  is  the  First  and  the  Last. 

Since  an  understanding  of  the  first  attempts  at  a  physical 
system  implies  a  first-hand  rather  than  a  traditional  knowledge 
of  the  words  these  thinkers  used,  a  study  of  the  kinetic  fax?)  is 
proper  to  an  investigation  of  the  theories  of  the  physicists  before 
Socrates. 

The  use  of  faxy  in  another  sense  than  for  the  soul  of  man  recurs 
from  Thales  to  Democritus.  Commonly  held  to  stand  for  a 
principle  of  animation,  in  its  earliest  use  it  may  have  stood  for 
only  the  principle  of  motion.  For  these  early  thinkers  life  was  not 
necessarily  coextensive  with  motion.  Linguistic  poverty  accounts 
for  the  use  of  this  term  to  express  now  the  idea  of  mere  mobility 
and  again  the  quality  of  animation.  According  to  an  imperfect 
analogy  —  "a  likeness  and  a  difference"  (Theophratus  III,  152 
Winimer)  —  objects  could  have  been  thought  of  as  e/^xa  —  en- 
dowed with  if/vxy  —  and  the  whole  term  could  have  been  used 
when  only  the  attribute  of  motion  was  being  predicated  of  things. 

We  cannot  too  often  recall,  in  a  study  such  as  this,  that  the  object 
of  speculation  at  this  period  was  nature  and  that  the  purpose 
of  the  so-called  philosophers  of  these  days  was  to  find  an  under- 
lying principle  —  a  "one."  Sometimes  they  cast  the  problem  into 
another  form  and  set  it  in  terms  of  change  when  they  asked  how 
things  were  "moved." 

It  is  fairly  established  that  there  was  no  definite  speculation 
regarding  the  human  soul  in  the  early  days  of  philosophy.  It  goes 
without  saying  that  the  three  Aristotelian  distinctions  of  ^ux1? 
were  not  in  the  minds  of  the  pre-Socratics.  The  first  philosoph- 
ical ^vxr]  represented  a  kinetic  principle  rich  in  promise.  The 
physiologers  took  the  term  faxy  out  of  popular  phraseology 
and  raised  it  from  its  place  in  their  Homeric  and  pre-philosophical 

7 


3   '  PRE-SGCRATIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  MOTION 

inheritance  to  stand  for  a  would-be  cosmothetic  force  somewhat 
after  the  manner  in  which  they  adopted  apxrj  for  philosophical 
terminology. 

The  knowledge  of  pre-Socratic  systems  has  suffered  from  a  con- 
founding of  the  term  \f/vxn  as  used  for  a  kinetic  principle  with 
the  old  (and  later  the  new-old)  term  \f/vx"n  as  used  for  the  principle 
of  animation  and  for  the  soul  of  man.  The  identification  of  if/vxy 
and  apx*]  has  branded  the  earliest  lonians  with  latent  materialism. 
The  simplest  explanation  of  the  identification  of  these /terms  is 
by  no  means  final.  To  decide  that,  after  the  physicist  had  reduced 
all  things  to  air,  fire,  or  some  other  body,  he  postulated,  by  way  of 
a  corollary,  this  primary  element  as  the  cause  of  vital  function 
is  only  to  include  \j/vxij  taken  as  standing  for  the  human  soul, 
in  apx'n  ^  the  material  substratum  of  all  things.  Commentators 
were  prone  to  read  into  a  term  the  sense  it  held  in  their  own  time. 
The  only  meaning  of  the  term  faxy  in  the  mind  of  most  later 
thinkers  was  ^ux1?  as  it  stood  for  the  human  soul  and  included 
the  principle  of  life.  Again,  the  analysis  of  this  equation  which 
discredits  scepticism  as  a  natural  attitude  is  on  the  side  of  \f/vx~n  as 
a  term  for  soul  proper.  The  fact  that  the  power  of  the  mind  gives 
rise  to  processes  mentally  reproducing  the  nature  of  the  object 
known  has  been  noted  as  potent  enough  to  cause  early  thinkers  to 
infer  that  the  soul  is  a  mixture  of  all  elements.  If  all  things  were 
reduced  to  a  primitive  substance,  then  would  the  mind  that  knows 
them  be  that  substance;  ^ux1?,  the  knowing  part  of  us,  becomes 
identical  with  apx'n  >  the  first  principle.  However  satisfactory  as 
explanations  of  theories  attributed  to  the  philosophers  who  began 
to  give  attention  to  mental  science,  for  the  early  lonians  at  least, 
who,  as  physicists,  certainly  used  \f/vx~n  in  other  than  the  old  sense, 
these  solutions  of  the  equation  are  strained.  The  formation  of 
what  seems  to  us  an  equation  was  probably  due  to  a  lack  of  words, 
while  \f/vxr)  as  the  original  member  of  it  was  merely  kinetic  in  force. 
apx'n  was  the  basis  of  all  things  and  all  things  were  moved,  \f/vxn 
being  the  principle  of  motion.  If  apx'n  and  faxy  coexisted 
hylokinetically,  then  \l/vxrj  as  a  force  in  nature  was  the  kinetic 
aspect  of  apx'n-  Philosophy  from  the  first  tended  toward  physical 
dualism  and  fax*}  buried  in  apx'n  contained  part  of  the  efficient 
cause  in  germ.  The  crude  but  prophetic  half -concept  ion  of  a 
force  causing  things  to  move  was  impeded  by  a  lack  of  words  for 
this  new  element  of  thought.  The  growth  of  the  notion  of  trans- 


INTRODUCTION  9 

lent  force  culminated  in  vovs  or  vovs  /ecu  twh-  Anaxagoras  was 
the  true  successor  of  the  earlier  thinkers;  the  Atomists  were 
unworthy  heirs  of  Ionian  philosophy. 

Recalling  that  distinctions  very  clear  in  our  own  day  had  not 
yet  been  made  in  philosophy  at  this  time,  we  cannot  project  upon 
the  pre-Socratics  a  system  of  causes  which  was  the  outcome  of  a 
synthesis  of  many  threads  of  speculation.  Nevertheless,  the 
philosopher  of  that  day  was  the  forerunner  of  both  the  cosmologist 
and  the  scientist,  whose  conclusions  can  never  be  contradictory. 
These  early  explanations  due  to  natural  processes  of  thought 
carried  phases  belonging  to  separate  fields  of  later  philosophical 
speculation.  When  studying  Greek  philosophy  in  its  beginnings, 
we  must  not  overlook  the  fact  that  there  was  often  mental  dis- 
crimination on  the  part  of  the  early  thinkers  where  we  find  identity 
of  term.  Their  lack  of  words  for  their  new  ideas  should  not  convict 
them  of  the  ancient  errors  of  modern  times. 

Besides  its  effect  on  our  knowledge  of  the  physical  theories  of 
the  pre-Socratics,  a  consideration  of  the  exact  sense  of  their  use 
of  il/vx'n  and  its  derivatives  should  discredit  the  assumption  of 
ethnological  animism.  Recent  theorists,  not  emphasizing  the 
distinction  of  kinetic  \J/vxy  as  a  principle  for  inanimate  objects 
and  ^UXT?  as  a  principle  of  life  and  thought,  have  tried  to  convict 
the  earliest  Greek  philosophers  of  animism  in  support  of  the 
* 'soul-theory"  or  "ghost-theory"  of  religion.  This  theory,  which 
attacks  the  integrity  of  the  history  of  religion,  is  insecurely  based 
on  evidence  afforded  by  the  mere  necessity  of  language  at  a  period 
before  philosophy  distinguished  immanent  and  transient  motion. 
Philology  has  offered  opposition  to  this  evolutionistic  trend  of 
thought  by  pointing  out  that  objects  called  living  were  so  called 
from  a  lack  of  words  to  represent  qualities  they  were  conceived  as 
possessing.  (Cf.  Max  Miiller — Lectures  on  the  Origin  of  Religion.) 

Viewed  in  our  perspective,  many  of  the  terms  for  qualitative 
refinement  and  for  quantitative  indeterminateness  applied  to 
ij/vxy  as  a  term  for  the  principle  of  motion,  now  in  reference  to 
the  kinetic  aspect  of  apx'n  and  again  to  apx'n  without  regard  to 
its  principle  of  motion,  contributed  to  the  vocabulary  used  to 
describe  fax*}  proper  when  the  heirs  of  Socrates  began  to  turn 
their  minds  to  conscious  psychological  speculation.  Philosophy 
now  easily  passes  from  the  notion  of  soul  as  a  life-giving,  animating 
principle  to  the  idea  of  a  sensitive  or  of  a  rational  soul.  The 


10  PRE-SOCRATIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  MOTION 

Greeks  arrived  at  the  complete  notion  of  \l/vx"n  by  two  lines  of 
thought.  One  line  began  in  the  earliest  physical  systems  of  the 
pre-Socratics.  Faintly  drawn  for  themselves,  it  is  almost  obliter- 
ated for  us  through  their  lack  of  words.  We  know  only  that  they 
used  the  term  \l/vxh ;  we  do  not  know  that  they  even  perceived  the 
analogy  which  led  them  to  use  a  term  wider  than  the  power  they 
intended  to  connote  by  it.  We  cannot  regard  the  words  gathering 
around  this  natural  force  as  the  sole  influence  in  the  development 
of  terminology  for  iwxh  proper.  Kinetic  \f/vxri  may  appear  dis- 
torted in  the  isolation  to  which  it  is  subjected  in  an  effort  to  balance 
former  lack  of  consideration  of  its  claims  as  a  factor  in  termi- 
nological progress.  In  offsetting  the  decided  tendency  to  indicate 
the  effect  of  the  old  popular  term  and  idea  and  of  the  vague  philo- 
sophical \f/vxr]  proper  on  the  ^u%i?  of  the  physicist,  we  cannot 
disregard  cross-lines  of  popular  notions  and  terms  with  would-be 
philosophically  technical  thought  and  expression.  Yet,  while 
we  admit  this  interaction  as  well  as  the  unconscious  subjective 
element  in  speculation  by  which  the  power  of  thought  is  trans- 
ferred to  things,  we  would  qualify  for  even  the  first  Greek  philos- 
pher  the  assertion  that  inanimate  were  assimilated  to  animate 
objects. 

When  philosophical  speculation  centered  on  the  human  soul, 
attention  turned  first  to  the  element  of  sensation,  that  other 
source  of  knowledge  and  terms  for  if/vxy  so  often  noted  by  Aris- 
totle. (Cf.  De  Anima  403  b  2).  There  is  no  sharp  definition  of 
the  periods  for  the  use  of  ^vx'n  m  physical  and  psychological 
senses.  When  the  time  came  to  consider  the  element  of  motion 
in  the  definition  of  the  human  soul  and  the  ideas  and  terms  for 
il/vxy  as  an  objective  principle  were  in  turn  caught  up  for  "our 
soul,"  the  use  of  the  word  faxy  had  completed  an  orbit  in  the 
history  of  philosophy.  In  seeking  to  determine  how  part  of  the 
vocabulary  came  to  be  at  hand  for  the  expression  of  Platonic  and 
of  Aristotelian  notions  for  the  new-old  power  in  man,  we  find  at 
least  one  source  of  terms  in  expressions  for  the  force  in  nature  for 
which  the  old  terms  for  power,  human  or  divine,  had  been  borrowed 
by  philosophy  in  its  beginnings.  The  Homeric  and  popular 
inheritance  of  terms  for  faxy  was  not  directly  transmitted  to  the 
greatest  Greek  philosopher.  The  loan  of  terms  was  compensated 
for  with  interest  by  the  physiologers  who  had,  on  the  way,  ground 
down  many  of  these  words  to  terms  fitting  the  ideas  of  incorporeal- 


INTRODUCTION  11 

ity  and  of  immortality  as  defined  on  the  heights  of  philosophic 
thought. 

2.  THE  METHOD  OF  TREATMENT  OF 
PRE-SOCRATIC  TERMS 

We  have  aimed  to  follow  a  via  media  and  to  adopt  in  our  method 
a  mean  between  over-ready  acceptance  of  terms  for  the  pre- 
Socratics  and  a  final  rejection  of  all  terms  attributed  to  them  on 
the  authority  of  those  affected  by  Aristotelian  form  of  expression. 
Truth  cannot  be  sacrificed  to  an  exaggerated  attitude  of  historical 
insight.  The  words  of  those  thinkers  were  pre- Aristotelian,  but 
the  human  mind  philosophized  even  when  the  philosopher  knew 
nothing  of  the  nature  of  his  own  mode  of  thought.  We  shall  not 
deny  to  the  Greek  thinkers  before  Socrates  certain  tendencies 
natural  to  speculation  in  every  age. 

"When  a  given  symbol  which  represents  a  thought  has  lain  for 
a  certain  length  of  time  in  the  mind,  it  undergoes  a  change  like 
that  which  rest  in  a  certain  position  gives  iron.  It  becomes 
magnetic  in  its  relations — it  is  traversed  by  strange  forces  which 
did  not  belong  to  it.  The  word,  and  consequently  the  idea  it 
represents,  is  polarized."  (O.  W.  Holmes.  The  Professor  at  the 
Breakfast  Table.) 

An  appreciation  of  the  early  Ionian  standpoint  often  demands 
that  words  attributed  to  Ionian  thinkers  be  subjected  in  the  days 
of  developed  terminology  to  a  process  of  depolarization.  The 
early  philosophers  themselves,  though  scarcely  realizing  its  need, 
were  unconsciously  influenced  by  some  such  process  when  com- 
pelled to  adopt  for  their  new  ideas  terms  in  use  as  forms  of  religious 
and  popular  expression.  The  terms  of  religion  suggested  them- 
selves through  the  evident  relativity  of  the  new  philosophical 
notions  and  of  the  old  conceptions  of  the  attributes  of  the  gods, 
who,  while  not  then  in  philosophy,  were  deep  in  the  lives  of  these 
philosophers.  The  tendency  of  thinkers  to  stop  on  the  brink  of 
the  great  conclusion  just  short  of  a  great  contribution  and  to  fall 
the  lower  for  their  ascent  often  accounts  for  a  falling  back  on  old 
catch-phrases  and  popular  expressions. 

The  terms  for  kinetic  ^v\ii  used  by  the  philosophers  of  the 
principal  schools  before  the  time  of  Socrates  fall  into  two  general 
classes:  (1)  the  terms  found  at  first  hand  in  the  fragments  of  the 
early  thinkers  themselves  and  (2)  the  terms  occurring  in  mediate 


12  PRE-SOCRATIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  MOTION 

and  secondary  sources  which  state  opinions  attributed  to  these 
thinkers. 

Where  we  have  an  immediate  and  first-hand  source  in  an  authen- 
tic fragment,  we  must  further  consider  the  philosopher's  termino- 
logical inheritance,  whether  popular  or  philosophical,  as  well  as 
his  attitude  of  mind  in  using  his  words.  Later  thinkers  were  often 
inclined  to  overrate  an  unscientific,  popular,  or  casual  use  of  a 
term.  An  unphilosophical  expression  remains  in  the  class  which 
Aristotle  would  call  a  mere  oi/ojua.  On  the  other  hand,  there  was 
sometimes  an  effort  for  exactness  in  an  attempt  to  express  a 
thought  which  was  ahead  of  current  terminology.  An  old  term 
had  then  taken  on  a  new  content  or  inner  sense — Stawta,  as 
Aristotle  would  call  it.  Again,  even  when  the  use  of  the  term  was 
scientific,  the  philosopher's  temperament  often  dictated  his  form 
of  expression,  and  style,  or  Xe£is,  regulated  the  adoption  of  one 
word  above  another,  as  in  the  case  of  Empedocles  and  of  Heraclitus. 
The  point  of  view  of  the  age  and  of  the  philosopher  consciously 
using  these  terms  largely  determined  the  inner  sense  of  the  word. 
Philosophy  in  that  age  was  taking  for  granted  all  things  but  apxrj- 
While  turning  full  attention  on  the  sense  of  faxy  in  one  place, 
the  philosopher  could  have  accepted,  as  his  age  accepted,  tvx*l 
with  other  terms  as  mere  ovonara. 

We  may  locate  the  second  class  of  terms  in  two  principal  mediate 
sources:  Aristotle  and  the  Doxographers.  The  Doxographers 
include  Theophrastus,  the  authors  of  the  Placita,  who,  for  the 
most  part,  drew  from  him,  Plutarch,  Simplicius  and  the  other 
historians  of  opinions.  Plato,  whose  references  to  pre-Socratic 
thinkers  are  comparatively  few,  can  scarcely  be  regarded  as  a 
fruitful  source  for  this  period.  To  the  Pythagoreans  and  Parmen- 
ides  he  gave  some  attention,  presenting  them,  however,  not  as 
historical  characters  but  as  his  own  creations. 

Aristotle  has  been  accused  of  reading  his  own  views  into  the 
theories  of  early  philosophers.  In  the  first  chapter  of  De  Anima 
and  in  the  first  book  of  Metaphysics  he  has  given  a  synopsis  of  the 
opinions  of  those  who  went  before  him.  It  is  true  that  this 
account  is  in  his  own  terms,  and  yet  he  seemed  to  recognize  the 
frequent  attempts  of  the  other  seekers  to  bring  their  phraseology 
up  to  the  level  of  their  new  ideas.  While  he  censured,  in  some 
cases,  it  would  seem,  undeservedly,  he  did  not  fail  to  praise  as  well. 
In  cautious  qualifications,  here  and  there,  of  his  own  terms  in 


INTRODUCTION  13 

explaining  the  theories  of  his  predecessors  (Cf .  De  An.  404  and  405), 
Aristotle  was  evidently  conscious  that  he  was  himself  speaking 
on  the  heights  of  his  own  system. 

We  must  observe  a  cautious  discrimination  of  sources  when 
accepting  terms  occurring  in  the  Doxographers.  (Cf.  Fairbanks 
p.  263).  An  et7T€p  or  a  X&ycrat  were  often  dropped  in  the  tradi- 
tion to  which  the  words  of  Aristotle  and  of  others  were  subjected. 
These  historians  of  opinions,  failing  to  depolarize  the  terms  they 
cited,  exhibit  tendencies  of  "accommodation,"  of  false  inference, 
and  of  inaccurate  listing  of  philosophers.  In  many  cases  the 
historian  of  philosophy  has  accepted  doxographic  tradition  on 
faith.  It  should  not  be  necessary  to  note  that  distinctions  familiar 
enough  today  were  contributed  by  periods  subsequent  to  the  fifth 
century  B.  C.  The  pre-Socratics  did  not  deal  in  the  full-grown 
ideas  and  much  less  in  the  words  often  attributed  to  them.  The 
method  of  Theophrastus  (and  of  those  drawing  on  him  as  a  source) 
of  casting  into  Aristotelian  terms  the  naive  solutions  offered  in 
pre-Socratic  times  was  sometimes  responsible  for  distorted  tradi- 
tion. We  shall  endeavor,  then,  not  to  transform  a  pre-Socratic 
thinker  into  a  post-Aristotelian,  but  thus  forewarned,  we  may 
accept  the  potent  fact  that  the  philosophers  themselves  strove  for 
new  words  and  that  their  minds  "compelled  by  truth  itself " 
(Arist.  Met.  984,  b  8)  spoke  words  other  than  those  afforded  by 
their  language. 


II.  STUDY  OF  TERMS  FOR  KINETIC 
1.  EARLY  IONIAN  TERMS 

The  early  lonians  were  physicists;  they  were  neither  meta- 
physicians nor  psychologists  in  the  sense  these  words  bear  today. 
The  method  of  each  early  Ionian  philosopher  might  be  described 
as  corresponding  to  the  method  of  Thales,  who  was  led  to  his  con- 
clusion about  a  first  principle  by  things  that  appear  to  the  senses. 
(Simpl.  Phys.  23,  21  Dox.  475.)  A  recollection  of  this  objective 
view-point  discredits  over-drawn  deductions  regarding  Ionian 
theories.  If  the  problem  of  change  furnished  by  the  senses  was 
the  problem  these  thinkers  set  out  to  solve,  in  their  solutions  they 
began,  in  a  certain  sense,  to  lay  down  a  doctrine  of  causality. 
The  word  then  used  for  "cause"  was  not  atria  but  apx'n-  By 
this  was  meant  a  principle  approaching  Aristotelian  "material 
cause,'*  and  yet  the  Ionian  said  no  more  than  that  apx'n  furnished 
the  ground  for  the  existence  of  other  things.  That  a  material 
cause  should  be  held  as  actually  giving  being  to  its  effect  had  not 
yet  suggested  itself  to  these  early  thinkers.  Saint  Thomas  noted 
that  those  of  the  ancient  philosophers  who  acknowledged  motion 
in  things  admitted  motion  only  as  to  accidents,  as  in  rarity  and 
density,  aggregation  and  disgregation.  (Summa  Theolog.  I,  Q. 
LXIV,  a.  2.)  Yet  while  they  were  looking  beneath  the  surface 
for  a  fundamental  principle,  they  were  at  the  same  time  developing 
a  principle  of  motion.  Aristotle  (Met.  984  b  I)  seemed  to  see  in 
the  ideas  of  Parmenides  the  first  recognition  of  the  nature  of 
such  a  cause.  If  we  trust  to  the  natural  mode  of  thought  and  go 
back  even  of  Parmenides,  we  find  traces  of  the  crude  conception 
and  of  the  imperfect  and  confused  expression  of  some  kind  of 
force,  which  for  the  pre-Socratics  averaged  into  an  expression 
indicating  kinetic  power.  To  the  Ionian  physiologers  at  this 
point  in  the  development  of  philosophy  we  leave  wide  margin 
for  the  unquestioning  acceptance  of  the  idea  of  a  moving  force. 
The  popular  god  was  dropped  from  the  world  of  the  physicists, 
who  were  considered  adeoi  (Cf.  Simplicius,  Phys.  Dox.  475),  but 
their  habits  of  thought  were  not  so  easily  changed  since  their 
need  of  words  caused  them  to  revert  to  the  term  6e6s  for  this 
newly  conceived  force.  Words  heretofore  used  in  quite  another 
sphere,  yet  bearing  for  pre-Socratic  thinkers  a  suggestive  analogy, 
were  frequently  heard  in  the  childish  accents  of  their  speculations. 
14 


EARLY  IONIAN  TERMS  15 


The  early  Ionian  inheritance  of  foxy  as  a  general  term  for  the 
source  of  human  activity  was  strong  enough  to  keep  that  word 
prominently  before  a  thinker  groping  for  a  form  of  expression  for 
his  latent  agent  cause.  Granting  that  the  first  agents  for  the 
human  language  were  human  agents,  we  may  maintain  that  the 
anthropological  element,  and  with  it  the  element  of  life,  was  drop- 
ped when  the  old  word  foxy  was  retained  by  the  physicist. 

The  two  statements  most  directly  attributed  to  Thales  have 
reference  to  foxy  in  its  kinetic  sense,  as  the  energizing  force 
and  the  source  of  motion,  //he  said  that  the  magnet  has  foxy  be- 
cause it  moves  iron,  said  Aristotle  (De  An.  405  a.  19),  then  Thales 
conceived  the  soul  as  something  having  the  power  of  motion  — 
KLvyriKov  n.  Aristotle,  consciously  treating  irepi  foxy*,  thus 
cited  an  instance  of  the  early  use  of  the  term  foxy-  In  this  passage 
Aristotle  was  calling  attention  to  the  element  of  motion  in  the 
definition  of  the  human  soul  which  he  was  himself  constructing. 
Thales  would  have  regarded  the  soul  as  KivyrLKov  TL  since  he  used 
the  word  foxy  for  his  moving  force,  yet  it  is  quite  possible  that 
he  would  not  recognize  himself  in  the  De  Anima.  His  outlook 
was  in  quite  another  direction  when  he  used  the  significant  form 
foxy. 

Perhaps,  said  Aristotle  (De  An.  411  a.  7),  Thales  said  that  all 
things  are  full  of  gods,  because,  "as  some  say,'*  foxy  is  interfused 
(/z€ju€ix0cu)  in  things  throughout  (tv  ro>  6Xo>).  iravra  here  was 
for  Thales  the  merest  unification  of  the  world  of  phenomena.  The 
expression  0€ooi>  ir\ypy  iravTa,  which  has  been  elaborated  for  him 
as  apxy  Mto,  Kai  KivovfjL&y  (Simpl.  Phys.  Dox.  475),  further  bespeaks 
the  need  of  terms. 

Plato  (Leg.  X,  899  B)  decided  to  include  foxai  under  the 
term  6eoL  whether  they  order  (/COOT/CIV)  the  whole  heavens  as 
living  beings  in  bodies  or  whether  they  accomplish  this  in  some 
other  form  and  manner.  Plato  further  showed  that  he  was  here 
only  repeating  the  apothegm  of  Thales.  We  cannot  explain 
the  form  and  manner  in  which  the  moving  force  acted  on  the 
elementary  water  for  the  first  Ionian  philosopher.  Plato  himself, 
on  the  strength  of  the  statement  that  things  are  full  of  gods,  in 
Platonic  phraseology  called  foxy  y  fox^  •  •  •  amcu.  This  mov- 
ing force,  hylokinetically  present  in  things,  is  an  instance  of  a 
prophetic  conception  held  by  the  Greek  mind. 

Diogenes  Laertius  (1.  27)  asserted  that  Thales  held  the  world 
endowed  with  foxy  (^fox°^)  and  full  of  Scu/zom  in  place  of 


16  PRE-SOCRATIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  MOTION 

the  6eoi  of  the  apothegm  quoted  by  Plato  and  Aristotle.  Thales 
was*  again  (Cf.  Aetius,  Dox.  301)  noted  as  holding  TO  irav  as 
entvxov  and  full  of  daifjuovcs,  but  the  tradition  was  too  hard 
pressed  by  Stoic  influence  when  it  attributed  to  Thales  the  identi- 
fication of  God  with  the  mind  of  the  universe,  (vovs  rov  Kofffwv  6 
0e6s).  Cicero  fell  in  with  this  doxography  (Cf.  Burnet  p.  46) 
and  even  raised  this  tvx'h  to  the  level  of  a  full  grown  agent  cause. 
(Cf .  D.  Deor.  N.  10, 15 — earn  mentem  quae  ex  aqua  cuncta  fingeret.) 

Since  Thales  in  no  conscious  sense  distinguished  matter  and  its 
opposite,  the  heirs  of  Aristotelian  thought  and  terminology  have 
overdrawn  decidedly  in  such  statements  as:  "He  supposed  soul 
to  be  unsubstantial  form."  (Cf .  Simpl.  in  Arist.  De  An.  8  r  31,  32). 
Tradition  has  assigned  to  Thales  a  fuller  vocabulary  than  he 
possessed  and  thoughts  that  are  beyond  his  highest  conceptions. 
Although  his  first  principle  was  "one  and  moved"  (/ua  KCU 
KLvovnevy) ,  his  if/vxrj  was  a  most  elementary  cause,  the  form  and 
manner  of  whose  activity  is  all  hidden  in  the  one  word  KIV&V.  To 
say  that  for  him  a  divine  moving  power  (Swa/us  0ela  /aprjri/o?) 
pervaded  (drfKeiv)  the  elementary  water  (Aet.  Dox.  301)  is  to 
distort  the  thought  and  much  more  the  words  of  Thales.  Yet 
when  he  said  that  the  world  was  full  of  gods,  Thales  had  fallen 
behind  his  own  thought  through  need  of  words. 

It  can  better  be  said  what  this  first  philosophical  \l/vxy  was  not 
than  what  it  was.  It  was  not  water  nor  was  it  the  popular  deity. 
The  first  principle,  the  object  of  speculation  was  one  and  moved. 
Everything  came  from  water,  but  everything  was  full  of  gods. 
The  dpxi?  was  determined  and  its  /aVrjo-is  was  if/vx^l- 

Aside  from  the  inferences  of  his  commentators,  there  is  no 
evidence  of  an  attempt  on  the  part  of  Thales  himself  to  give  any 
terms  to  the  human  soul.  We  have  noted  that  later  efforts  to  fix 
\l/vxi)  proper  were  significant  in  their  appeal  to  the  quality  of 
motion  which  the  physicists  were  forced  to  express  in  the  old 
terms  €%etv  tvxfy- 

The  process  of  how  things  came  out  of  the  elementary  water 
has  been  described  for  Thales  as  the  purely  accidental  process  of 
solidifying  and  melting.  (Cf.  irrjyvvffBat,  and  diavlevBaL  of  Hipp. 
Dox.  555.) 

The  point  of  transition  from  Thales  to  Anaximander  is  in  the  con- 
ception of  a  first  principle.  Thales  was  one  of  those  who  said 
that  the  material  substratum  of  things  was  one  and  moved,  but 


EARLY  IONIAN  TERMS  17 


he  said  also  that  it  was  limited.  (TreTrepao-nevn  —  Simpl.  Phys. 
Dox.  475.)  Anaximander's  first  principle  could  not  be  quanti- 
tatively designated  by  any  word  then  in  use  and  so  he  adopted  for 
philosophy  a  word  to  signify  the  boundlessness  or  the  endlessness 
of  his  apxrj-  He  first  imported  (/co/afci?)  the  term  aireLpos.  (Cf. 
Simpl.  Phys.  Dox.  476).  It  is  not  so  probable  that  Anaximander 
was  the  first  to  employ  the  term  apx'n  (Hipp.  Dox.  559)  in  a 
philosophical  sense.  (Cf  .  Burnet  p.  52.) 

While  there  is  no  evidence  for  the  qualitative  determination  of 
Anaximander's  principle,  we  cannot  doubt  that  he  unquestioningly 
regarded  it  as  material.  Commentators  tried  qualitatively  to 
determine  this  apx'n  which  was  TO  aireLpov  by  fixing  it  between 
air  and  water  and  again  between  air  and  fire  on  the  strength  of 
false  interpretations  of  Aristotle,  De  Caelo  303  b.  (Cf  .  R.  P.  16  b.) 

To  Anaximander,  among  others,  was  attributed  the  statement 
(Theodoret  Dox.  387)  that  the  nature  of  ^vx'h  is  depots. 
This  is  perhaps  significant  as  bringing  into  some  relation  the 
falsely  determined  apx'n  and  the  element  of  motion  within  it, 
which  Anaximander  likewise  may  have  expressed  by  the 
term  fax*]- 

In  the  consideration  of  the  "process"  as  explained  by  early 
thinkers  we  find  traces  of  the  kineticism,  general  or  particular, 
for  which  they  seem  to  have  made  ^vx'n  stand.  Anaximander 
was  not  ready  with  words  to  describe  this  "process."  Theo- 
phrastus  (Dox.  476)  has  noted  his  poetic  form  of  expression  where 
it  is  said  that  things  return  of  necessity  (Kara  TO  xp^v)  to 
that  from  which  they  spring,  "paying  the  penalty  to  one  another 
according  to  the  order  of  time."  The  process  for  him  was  one 
requiring  a  separation  of  the  opposites  (airoKpivoiikvuv  TUV 
havrluv)  and  this  separation  took  place  through  eternal  motion 
(5td  TTJS  cuStou  /ai^o-ccos).  This  "eternal  motion,"  postulated  in 
addition  to  TO  airtipov  (Hipp.  Dox.  559),  is  prominent  in  doxo- 
graphic  tradition  for  Anaximander.  Hermippus  (Dox.  653) 
represented  Anaximander  asserting  that  apx'n  w&s  older  (Trpe<rj3vT€pa) 
than  water  and  was  eternal  motion  (cu5ios  KLVTJO-LS)  by  which  (ravTy) 
things  came  to  be  and  were  destroyed. 

Two  fragments  attributed  to  Anaximander  occur  in  Aristotle's 
Physics  (203  b)  where  Aristotle  himself  assumed  TO  aireLpov  as 
the  subject  of  irepitxew  airavra  Kal  iravra,  Kv&epvav.  Of  whatever 
the  power  to  surround  all  and  to  direct  all  was  predicated,  it  is 


18  PRE-SOCRATIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  MOTION 

significant  that  these  words  are  found  in  a  verbal  citation  of  one 
of  those  thinkers  who,  as  Aristotle  noted,  gave  no  other  cause 
than  TO  aTreipov.  The  Ionian  was  doubtless  giving  in  these  terms 
directive  power  to  the  kinetic  aspect  of  TO  aireipov.  (Cf .  Tannery 
p.  98).  Aristotle  further  assumed  TO  aireipov  to  be  TO  Belov,  be- 
cause it  was  for  Anaximander  and  his  contemporaries  adavaTov 
/cat  avu\edpov.  However,  in  this  passage  Aristotle  did  not  fail 
to  cite  vovs  and  <£iXia  as  instances  of  the  progress  of  philosophy 
whereby  the  full  grown  if/vx'n  cause  came  into  its  own. 

Hippolytus  (Dox.  559)  repeated  irepikxtw  for  Anaximander 
and  gave  to  apx*)  the  aidios  of  the  Kivrjais.  He  added  for  apxn  the 
term  ayrjpcos  as  kindred  of  the  dfldz/aros  and  the  d*>a>Xe0pos  quoted 
by  Aristotle  for  Anaximander.  To  these  may  be  added  the 
terms  cos  aytvrjTov  re  KCLL  &<J)6apTov  attributed  by  Simplicius  (Phys. 
465,  13  D)  to  the  apxy  of  Anaximander.  This  apxy  Simplicius 
called  6elov  TO  aiTiov.  The  use  of  the  term  Qtlov  may  indicate 
Anaximander's  reversion  to  a  form  of  the  word  deos  for  his  partly 
inherent  force.  In  the  days  of  Anaximander  apxh  was  elevated 
from  popular  to  philosophic  terminology  according  to  the  same 
principle  by  which  ^vxh  took  on  its  new  sense. 

The  "eternal  motion"  of  Anaximander  passed  on  to  Anaximenes. 
With  Anaximenes  we  have  the  continuance  of  the  use  of  the  term 
&7T€tpo$  as  found  in  his  predecessor,  but  to  the  qualitative  deter- 
mination of  the  apx^i  this  philosopher  seems  to  have  given  most 
of  his  attention.  Since  we  find  with  him  the  most  definite  apxy, 
we  may  here  endeavor  to  determine  what  these  thinkers  meant 
by  that  term. 

Aristotle  (Met.  983  a  27),  in  giving  his  own  definition  of  "mater- 
ial cause,"  said  (983  b)  that  most  of  the  early  philosophers  thought 
that  only  first  principles  in  the  form  of  matter  were  the  sources  of 
things,  (kv  vX??*  eifct  .  .  .  dpxcu.)  (Cf.  R.  P.  10  a.)  Aristotle, 
attempting  in  the  same  passage  to  define  what  early  thinkers 
meant  by  apxy,  decided  that  e£  ov  'tariv  airavTa  TO,  OVTO,  best 
fitted  their  principle,  however  the  TrXrjflos  and  the  ddos  may  have 
differed  for  the  individual  thinker. 

Anaximenes  identified  his  apxh  with  ar)p,  a  word  said  to  have 
been  used  by  him  synonymously  with  Trvev^a.  (Cf .  Act.  Dox.  278.) 
Simplicius  (De  Caelo  615  Heiberg)  said  that  di?p  was  chosen 
as  apx^i  by  Anaximenes  because  it  was  sufficiently  adaptable  to 
change.  (euaXXotcoros  Trpos  ju 


EARLY  IONIAN  TERMS  19 

Conscious  of  the  need  of  words,  Anaximenes  (Aet.  Dox.  278) 
reverted  to  irepLexew  of  Anaximander  to  express  the  activity  of 
arjp.  Plutarch  (de  prim.  frig,  c  7,  947  F)  gave  x^Xapos  as  a 
new  term  for  Anaximenes  in  attributing  to  him  the  statement 
that  the  relaxed  state  of  matter  is  from  heat. 

Wherever  arip-apx'h  is  assigned  to  Anaximenes,  Klvijais  is  found 
with  it.  Theophrastus  (ap.  Simpl.  Phys.  Dox.  476)  recorded 
that  Anaximenes  held  an  "underlying  nature"  (viroKeLnevrj  <£ixris) 
which  was  fj.'ia  and  aTretpos.  After  describing  the  varying  rarity 
and  density  of  arip,  Theophrastus  added:  "And  he,  too,  posits 
eternal  motion  (idvrjo-Ls  <U5ios)  through  which  change  takes  place. 
(5t'  f)v  Kai  rr\v  fjLerapo\riv  yivtaBai).  We  have  as  another  form 
of  expression  for  this  eternal  motion  of  Anaximenes  Klvrjffis 
e£  aiavos.  (Ps.  Plut.  Strom.  Dox.  579.) 

Olympiodorus  (Berthelot,  Collection  des  anciens  alchimistes 
grecs,  p.  83),  introducing  the  false  fragment  for  Anaximenes 
tanv  6  ar)p  rov  acr^ndrov)  said  piav  5e  KLVovfjLevrjV  aireipov 
iravr&v  r&v  ovrwv  .  .  .  rbv  depa. 

Hippolytus  (Dox.  560)  repeated  aweipos  afip  for  Anaximenes 
and  included  8tol  Kai  6ela  among  the  things  of  which  the  Ionian 
made  it  the  source.  Continuing,  Hippolytus  gave  motion  as 
one  of  the  causes  why  air  becomes  perceptible  and  represented 
Anaximenes  as  having  named  motion  with  other  changes,  but  as 
having  had  a  special  place  for  it  in  his  mind  when  he  added 
KLvtlffdai  8t  ael.  However,  the  remark  that  things  would  not 
change  (/*era/3dXXe«')  unless  arjp  were  in  motion  (el  M  dvoi.ro}  is 
evidently  the  statement  of  the  doxographer  himself. 

In  place  of  being  the  principle  from  which  the  gods  and  divine 
beings  came,  arjp  was  identified  with  0eos  by  Anaximenes  accord- 
ing to  Aetius  (Dox.  302)  who  especially  noted  the  term  0e6s. 

The  fragment  attributed  to  Anaximenes  (Aet.  Dox.  278) 
(olov  17  ifrvx'n  V  flUtTepa  ar)p  ovaa  avYKparel  was,  KCLL  6\ov  rov  Koa^ov  irvev- 
jua  Kai  arjp  Treptex^t.)  is  especially  noteworthy  as  marking  off 
17  \f/vx~n  T?  fintrepa  from  the  new  philosophical  principle  ^vx'n- 
The  term  for  the  human  soul  was  used  here  only  in  a  casual  com- 
parison and  is  seen  to  be  the  same  dpxi?  as  6eol  and  all  other 
things.  Whence  its  power  (rwyKparelv  rmas  if  not  frornihe  funda- 
mental kinetic  \fsvxy  was  a  question  that  remained  to  be  asked. 
The  (rvjKparclv  statement  can  scarcely  be  made  significant  as 


20  PRE-SOCRATIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  MOTION 


describing  a  function  of  the  old  ^vx'n  not  yet  an  object  of  philos- 
ophy. For  Anaximenes  arip-apxr)  was  the  real  subject  of  irtpikyjuv  . 

The  terms  depia  (Dox.  214)  and  depots  (Dox.  287)  assigned 
to  Anaximenes  as  descriptive  of  fax*}  were  doubtless  derived  by 
direct  inference  if  they  refer  to  if/vxy  proper.  All  things  were 
arjp:  then  the  soul  must  have  been  like  d^p.  Again,  they  may 
have  been  affected  by  the  survival  of  the  relation  of  arip-apx'h 
to  fax?)  as  the  kinetic  aspect  of  d^p. 

The  fact  that  he  postulated  a  qualitatively  determined  apxr)  in  no 
wise  convicts  Anaximenes  of  a  retrogression.  We  have  seen  him 
taking  advantage  of  the  direipos  of  Anaximander  to  express  the 
lack  of  quantification  of  his  first  principle.  In  the  accounts  of 
the  process  by  which  things  came  from  "air-mist"  he  seems  to 
have  made  an  effort  for  words  to  describe  differences  demanding 
a  higher  complexity  of  expression  than  the  terms  for  the  "separa- 
tion" process  of  Anaximander. 

Theophrastus  (Dox.  476)  described  the  process  of  "thickening 
and  thinning,"  by  which  the  nature  of  things  was  made  to  differ 
for  Anaximenes,  when  he  said  that  arjp  becomes  apaiovpevos  and 
again  irvwoviJLtvos.  The  forms  dpcucoffis  and  TTVKVUO-IS  are  also 
used  to  describe  the  states  of  Ionian  dpx*?.  (Ps.  Plut.  Dox.  579). 

Diogenes  of  Apollonia  (423  B.  C.)  is  found  in  the  company  of  the 
lonians  of  this  century  as  holding  dpxi?  identical  with  difa  (Cf. 
Aristotle,  Met.  984  a  5).  Aristotle  assigned  the  refinement  of 
the  arip-apx'n  of  Diogenes,  which  was  iravTuv  XeTrroMCpeo-raros,  as 
the  cause  of  the  moving  power  of  soul  proper  for  those  who 
identified  ^ux^  with  "air-mist."  (Cf.  De  An.  405  a.  21—  ^ux^ 
.  .  .  37  dt  \eirT6TdTov  KLVTJTLKOV  elvai).  Anaximenes  had  given  a 
new  turn  to  things  by  all  unconsciously  posing  as  a  representative 
of  immateriality.  He  appears  to  have  sought  a  first  principle  from 
which  all  things  including  motion  could  in  reality  come.  The 
criticism  (Aet.  Dox.  278)  which  rejected  the  semi-monism  of 
Anaximenes  is,  of  course,  out  of  place.  dXXd  KCU  TO  TTOIOVV  alnov 
vwoTiSkvai  was  not  intelligible  to  an  early  Ionian  philosopher. 


2.  TERMS  OF  THE  EARLY  PYTHAGOREANS 

In  a  treatment  of  terms  for  the  Pythagoreans  the  difficulty 
lies  in  keeping  earlier  and  later  Pythagorean  doctrines  and  terms 
distinct.  In  most  statements  of  opinions  for  "the  Pythagoreans" 
Neo-Pythagorean  influence  is  strong.  The  doctrine  of  opposites, 
the  idea  of  harmony,  and  the  substantiality  of  number  colored 
many  of  their  opinions,  and  yet  the  earlier  thinkers  of  this  school 
were  working  in  the  same  direction  as  the  early  lonians. 

The  question  of  the  human  soul  must  have  been  for  the  Pytha- 
goreans, as  members  of  an  ethical  society,  a  vital  one.  Few  of 
these  doctrines,  however  rich  in  significant  phraseology,  were 
connected  with  scientific  speculation.  One  of  the  traditional 
works  of  Pythagoras  himself  is  irepi  ^ux*7*  (Cf.  Diog.  L.  VIII-7). 
Brotinos,  a  Pythagorean  preceding  Hippasus,  has  been  credited 
with  a  work  irepi  vov  KOLL  Stadias.  (Cf.  lamblich.  Vor.  p.  29.) 
Some  of  the  early  terms  of  the  Pythagoreans  for  the  faculties  of 
perception  and  knowledge  would  be  in  place  in  a  study  of  the 
growth  of  terms  for  the  element  of  sensation  in  the  definition  of  the 
soul  proper. 

The  possible  emphasis  with  which  the  "soul  of  man"  was  dis- 
tinguished from  any  other  fax*]  in  statements  for  the  Pythago- 
reans draws  a  line  between  the  popular  term  and  the  term  for  a 
kinetic  principle.  This  distinction  occurred  in  the  traditional 
oath:  "By  him  who  transmitted  to  our  soul  the  tetraktys,  which 
has  the  spring  and  root  of  ever  flowing  nature."  (For  the 
apeTepa.  $VX<L  cf.  avOpuirov  ^vx'h  of  Herodotus,  II,  123  where  he 
ascribed  the  doctrine  of  immortality  to  the  Egyptians  and  to  the 
Pythagoreans.  A  further  instance  occurs  in  a  statement  of 
Pythagorean  divisions  of  the  soul — Alex.  Polyh.  ap.  Diog.  VIII, 
30.) 

The  term  Ke<£aXd  replaces  \l/vxa.  in  one  form  of  the  oath. 
(Cf.  Aet.  Dox.  280  and  R.  P.  65  (a).)  (Od.  2,  237  has  /ce<£aXcu 
for  \l/vxal  of  Od.  3,  74.)  For  the  iraya  aevaov  </>u<rea?s  'plfana  T' 
of  the  oath  cf.  71-77777  KCU  apx^  Kivriffews  of  Plato.  (Phaedr.  245  C.) 

The  terms  aBavaros  (Hipp.  Dox.  557)  and  a<£0apros  (Dox.  392) 
were  traditionally  ascribed  to  Pythagoras  for  ^vx"h-  The  term 
aevaos  of  the  oath  contributes  to  the  notion  of  "eternity"  so 
often  connected  with  the  Ionian  concept  of  motion. 

21 


22  PRE-SOCRATIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  MOTION 

Doxographic  tradition  (Act.  Dox.  280)  assigned  to  Pythagoras 
dpxat  .  .  .  01  apidjioi  /cat  <7U/-t/zerptat  at  kv  rourots,  as  Kat  apfjiovias 
KaXet.  Of  the  dpxal,  continued  the  doxographer,  one  tends 
toward  the  creative  and  form-giving  cause  which  is  intelligence, 
that  is  god  (kiri  TO  TroirjTLKov  CUTIOV  Kat  eldutov,  oirep  kariv  vovs  6 
0e6s)  and  the  other  tends  toward  the  passive  and  material  cause, 
which  is  the  visible  universe,  (tiri  TO  TraOrjTiKdv  TC  Kat  V\IKOV, 

OTTep    kffTlV    6    OpCLTOS    KOO-jUOS.) 

Although  we  may  question  this  assertion  for  Pythagoras  him- 
self, the  words  of  the  early  representatives  of  this  school  indicate  a 
tendency  toward  dualism  and  a  probable  use  of  the  term  ^u%i? 
for  the  principle  of  motion. 

If  we  allow  for  doctrines  peculiar  to  the  philosophers  in  the  west 
(Cf.  Arist.  Met.  987  a.  15),  we  find  a  decided  correspondence 
between  early  Pythagorean  and  early  Ionian  terminology.  For 
Pythagoras  daijjMves  were  ^uxiKat  ouoiat.  (Aet.  Dox.  307.)  Ac- 
cording to  secondary  sources,  Hippasus  of  Metapontum  held 
TreTrepaffjj.€vov  tlvai  TO  irav  Kat  detKt^ryrov.  (Diog.  L.  VIII,  84.) 

For  Hippasus  (and  Heraclitus)  we  have  from  Aristotle  (Met. 
984,  a.  7)  the  word  xup  as  his  dpxr/.  Theophrastus  (Dox.  475) 
filled  in  with  ev  Kat  Kivovptvov  Kat  TrtTrepaffjjievov.  Hippasus  was 
again  named  with  Heraclitus  in  a  statement  containing  for 
TTVP  the  term  deos  (Cf.  Clem.  Protr.  Vor.  p.  31.)  Aetius  (Dox. 
388)  added  to  these  the  name  of  Parmenides  in  the  statement 
17  if/vxy  -  •  •  TrupcbSrjs. 

A  recurrence  of  thought  gives  an  apx'n  one  and  moved  and  here 
and  there  identified  with  Beds',  the  term  ^xh  then  partakes  of 
the  qualitative  determinateness  of  the  double  first  principle.  A 
recognition  of  the  growing  ideas  of  the  early  Pythagoreans  should 
release  them  from  the  class  of  hylozoistic  monists. 

An  instance  of  the  use  of  ^ux1?  at  this  time  as  a  philosophical 
term  to  connote  life  may  be  found  in  the  words  of  Epicharmus 
(480  B.  C.).  In  the  following  first  hand  fragment  (Vor.  p.  91) 
Epicharmus  marked  a  transition  later  to  be  noted  : 

dXX'  6<T<ra  irep  £77,  TravTa  Kat  yv&jjLrjv  <=x€t    " 

OV    TtKT€t 

f  COPT  (a)    dXX'  €7rto£et  Kat  Trotet 


The  context  here  differs  from  that  in  which  the  expression 
is  found   as   a  citation  for  Thales.     When  \f/vx"n  is 


EARLY  PYTHAGOREAN  TERMS  23 

used  in  a  statement  regarding  man,  the  element  of  motion  is  for 
us  covered  by  the  element  of  life,  but  for  pre-Socratic  philosophers 
there  was  as  yet  no  formal  distinction  of  immanent  and  transient 
activity. 

An  epigram  of  Epicharmus  (Vor.  p.  100)  may  be  noted  for  a 
possible  identification  of  777  and  6eos.  Again,  his  terms  in  a 
fragment  (Vor.  p.  93)  wherein  vovs  was  distinguished  from  all 
else  command  attention  as  expressions  for  faxy  proper  on  the 
side  of  perception. 

Even  in  his  so-called  monism,  the  Pythagorean  divided  the 
underlying  substratum  of  things  sometimes  into  two  and  sometimes 
into  ten  principles.  dpt0/*6s,  said  Aristotle  (Met.  986  a.  15)  the 
Pythagoreans  considered  dpx*?,  and  of  number  the  elements 
(oTotxeta)  were  TO  &PTLOV  KCLL  TO  TrepLTTov  (Cf.  Met.  985,  b.  25.) 

Aristotle  placed  Alcmaeon  among  those  who  held  at  dpxat  dixa. 
Aside  from  this  doctrine  peculiar  to  himself  as  a  Pythagorean 
("and  they  seemed  to  be  speaking  about  another  heaven  and  other 
bodies  than  those  perceived  by  senses"  Met.  1090,  a.  34)  Alcmaeon 
continued  in  the  same  direction  as  the  lonians.  A  term  for  per- 
petual motion  occurs  in  De  Anima  (405  a  29)  where  Aristotle 
assigned  to  Alcmaeon  a  reason  for  the  immortality  of  \f/vx"n-  There 
if/vx'n  is  aj9a.va.Tos  on  account  of  its  resemblance  to  ot  d0d*>arot  and 
it  possesses  this  likeness  by  reason  of  being  ever  in  motion 
(cbs  dei  Kivov^kvrf}.  Aristotle  further  said  that  Alcmaeon  had 
held  Kiveladai,  yap  /cat  TO,  0eta  TravTa  avvex&s  det.  The  term  TO.  dela 
as  standing  for  the  heavenly  bodies  (De  An.  405  b.  I)  is  the 
evident  contribution  of  popular  belief. 

Aristotle  noted  (De.  An.  404  a.  18)  that  "some  of  the  Pythago- 
reans" identified  if/vxy  and  TO.  kv  T<#  dept  £u<r/-iara  while  others 
again  called  \f/vx"n  TO  TCLVTCL  KLVOVV. 

To  Alcmaeon  was  assigned  the  opinion  0eot  .  .  .  .  ot  do-repes 
etcrt  e^vxoL  ovTes.  (Clem.  Protr.  Vor.  p.  102.)  Built  on  the 
De  Anima  statement  for  Alcmaeon  is  the  assertion  of  Aetius 
(Dox.  386)  which  repeats  dittos  Kivrjcns  and  gives  ^vxrj  as  <£uerts 
avTOKlvr)Tos.  The  term  <f>vai,s  here  recalls  Plato's  speculation 
(Cratyl.  399  D-400  A)  that  the  word  i^uxi?  is  derived  from  the 
expression  77  fyvviv  6x€t  KGU  €x«.  Diog.  Laert.  VIII,  83  said 
that  Alcmaeon  held  ^x1?  to  be  aBavaTos  and  Kivelvdai  (rvvexus- 

It  is  doubtful  whether  we  have  in  Philolaus  an  instance  of  a 
purely  kinetic  fax*]-  The  term  occurs  with  the  conventional 


24  PRE-SOCRATIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  MOTION 

force  in  several  fragments  of  Philolaus.  (Cf.  Vor.  243,  244,  254.) 
We  meet  with  interesting  and  prophetic  forms  of  expression  in  a 
doubtful  citation  for  Philolaus  regarding  Oeos.  (Cf.  Vor.  247.) 

Worthy  of  note  for  us  is  the  fragment  of  Philolaus  (Vor.  239) 
which  says:  a  Averts  5'  ev  ro>  /coo^ico  apfjLoxOrj  e£  airelpuv  re  /cat 
TrepdLvovTuv.  (Cf.  Act.  Dox.  283.) 

\  further  instance  of  the  harmony  idea  which  illustrates  the 
natural  demand  for  a  directive  and  harmonizing  principle  occurs 
in  a  statement  of  Philolaus  (Vor.  241)  which  granted  to  dtStos 
evcra  /cat  aura  a  (f>v<n,s  a  certain  0cta  /cat  OVK  avOpuTrivi]  yvuais.  He 
significantly  added  here:  advvaTov  rjs  /ca  aurats  (rats  dpxats) 
Koo'iJL'rjdrjvai,  el  JJLT)  apjAovla  eireyevro.  We  meet  the  term  Kparelv  also 
in  another  expression  of  the  idea  of  the  harmonizing  and  ordering 
force  of  Philolaus.  (Procl.  in  Tim.  Vor.  234.) 

The  harmony  notion  was  brought  to  bear  on  \f/vx"fi  proper  in 
Aristotle's  account  of  "a  certain  other  opinion."  (Cf.  De  An. 
407  b.  30).  ^vx'h  is  there  ap^ovia  TLS — that  is  Kpaons  /cat 
(rvvdeais  evavriuv.  Plato  (Phaedo  85  E)  identified  if/vxy  of  Philo- 
laus with  apuovLa  TLS  wav  and  he  further  said  (Polit.  1340  b.  18) 
that  some  of  the  "wise  men"  held  that  the  soul  has  harmony 
and  others  that  it  was  itself  harmony. 

A  new  term  for  Philolaus  is  found  (Theol.  Arith.  Vor.  235) 
as  \I/vxw-s  &  «£dSt,  following  Aristotle's  identification  of  ^ux?7 
Kal  vovs  with  TWV  apiB^v  irddos  (Cf.  Met.  985  b  30). 

The  false  fragment  for  Philolaus  (Stob.  Eel.  Vor.  247),  lending 
itself  to  the  doctrine  of  the  world  soul,  contains  the  expression 
dpxd  rds  KivfjffLos  re  /cat  juera/3oXas  and  the  significant  combina- 
tion vovs  /cat  \^ux^- 

Ecphantus  of  Syracuse,  if  faithfully  represented  by  Hippolytus 
(Dox.  566),  must  be  added  to  the  number  of  those  using  the 
term  if/vx'n  as  a  kinetic  force.  In  him  too  we  see  the  combination 
vovs  /cat  -^vxh-  For  Ecphantus  (Dox.  566)  ra  ff^nara  were  moved 
HTjre  UTTO  jSdpous  fji^re  Tr\rjj^s  but  vw6  Oelas  Si^djuecos  which  Ecphan- 
tus, according  to  the  doxographer,  called  vovs  /cat  ^vx^-  (Cf. 
Plut.  Dox.  217  where  for  Pythagoras,  Plato  and  Aristotle 
vovs  6  KIVOVV  was  said  to  be  do-co/iaros.) 

Although  the  terms  ascribed  to  the  early  Pythagorean  philos- 
ophers are  often  doubtful  or  colored,  yet  they  bear  evidence  of 
the  survival  of  ^vx~n  as  a  term  for  a  kinetic  principle,  at  the  same 
time  foreshadowing  the  terminology  of  an  actual  distinction  of 
matter  and  force. 


3.  TERMS  OF  HERACLITUS 

The  history  of  Ionian  philosophy  after  504  B.  C.  can  be  traced 
in  first-hand  sources  as  well  as  in  the  records  of  opinions.  The 
terms  in  the  fragments  of  Heraclitus,  proverbially  obscure,  are 
influenced  by  the  two  phases  of  a  theory  more  than  half  in  line  with 
the  early  Ionian  solutions  and  yet  carrying  a  new  element  of 
thought.  The  vague  and  figurative  expression  of  a  force  apart 
from  things  appears  to  have  begun  with  Heraclitus. 

In  a  confession  of  his  own  effort  for  precision  of  expression 
Heraclitus  says  (Frag.  2  (Bywater)  Vor.  p.  61):  "Men  seem  un- 
skilled when  they  make  trial  of  words  and  matters  such  as  I  am 
setting  forth  in  my  effort  to  discriminate  each  thing  according  to 
its  nature  and  to  tell  what  its  state  is." 

The  fragments  of  this  heir  of  the  early  lonians  offer  terms  for 
the  material  principle,  for  the  element  of  motion,  and  for  the 
process  by  which  things  came  from  fire.  ^vx"n  in  a  kinetic  sense 
appears  to  have  been  used  by  Heraclitus. 

The  directive  phase  of  irvp  is  shown  in  Frag.  28  (Vor.  p.  71)  where 
the  thunderbolt  is  said  to  direct  the  course  of  all  things,  (oicudfav) 
(Cf.  Frag.  21,  Vor.  67  where  TrpTjarrjp  is  one  of  the  irvpos  rpowaL) 
The  term  oicud£eLV  derived  from  ota£,  the  handle  of  the  rudder, 
recalls  the  Kv^pvdv  of  Anaximander.  Heraclitus  himself  used 
Kvpcpvav  in  relation  to  yvco^rj  of  Frag.  19  (Vor.  68).  A  further 
attempt  to  unfold  two  principles  out  of  irvp  was  seen  by  Hip- 
polytus  in  the  use  by  Heraclitus  (Frag.  24,  Vor.  71)  of  the  words 
XprjvfMxrvvri  and  Kopos.  Hippolytus  thought  that  "want"  was  the 
process  of  arrangement  (Sia/c60>c?7(7is)  by  fire  and  that  "satiety" 
was  the  tKirvpuais,  and  so  this  commentator  decided  that  irvp 
was  <f)p6vLiJ.os  and  called  it  TTJS  Stouiycreajs  ruv  6Xcoj>  atrtos.  The 
activity  of  irvp  may  have  been  further  described  in  Frag.  26 
(Vor.  71).  Heraclitus  characteristically  expressed  his  pan- 
metabolism  in  Frags.  41-42  (Vor.  64). 

Frag.  20  (Vor.  66)  offers  important  terms:  "Order  (KOCT/XOS)  the 
same  for  all  things,  no  one  of  the  gods  or  men  has  made,  but  it 
always  was  and  is  and  ever  shall  be  an  ever  living  fire — wvp 
dei^coof."  For  the  oure  rts  Qeuv  cure  avBp&Truv  e-jroLrjae  of  this  frag- 
ment cf.  Frag.  65  (Vor. 67)  where  wisdom  (TO  ao<t>ov)  is  tv  and  is 
willing  and  yet  unwilling  to  be  called  by  the  name  of  Zeus.  The 

25 


26  .    PRE-SOCRATIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  MOTION 

"process"  is  found  in  the  same  fragment  (20)  in  the  terms 
aTTTOjuej'os  and  aTroa^evvv]ji,€vos  and  this  "kindling  and  quenching" 
took  place  according  to  fixed  measure.  (p.krpa).  Frag.  77  (Vor 
66)  gives  the  same  words  for  the  process  where  Heraclitus  said 
that  man  like  a  light  (<j>aos)  is  kindled  and  put  out.  Frag.  78 
(Vor.  74)  also  emphasizes  the  subjective  view-point  and  applies 
directly  to  the  phases  of  mortal  life  the  universal  law  of  change. 


The  words  of  Heraclitus  so  far  noted  mark  a  tendency  on  the 
part  of  the  philosopher  to  draw  out  the  note  of  efficiency  in  irvp, 
and  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  he  ever  expressed  this  aspect 
of  a.px'n  m  terms  of  faxy-  Heraclitean  terms  for  the  definition 
of  \f/vx'n  proper  on  the  side  of  sensation  occur  in  several  fragments 
where  the  conventional  force  of  \f/vxr)  became  philosophical.  How- 
ever, the  term  ^vx'h  was  evidently  employed  in  a  kinetic  sense 
by  Heraclitus.  In  the  spurious  fragment  (131  Bywater)  faxy 
would  undoubtedly  bear  that  sense.  (Cf.  Diog.  L.  IX,  7— 
Travra  \f/vx&v  elvai  KCLI  daipovuv  7r\rjprj.)  Frag.  71  (Vor.  68) 
ifsvxfis  ireipaTo,  OVK  av  c£cup6io  may  hold  a  survival  of  kinetic 
\l/vxrj-  (Cf.  dTTctpos  .  .  .  apx-f)  of  Anaximander.)  Frag.  68 
(Vor.  67)  states  that  it  is  death  (da.va.Tos)  to  ^uxdt  to  become 
water,  for  e£  u5aros  5e  ^vx'n  (ylvtTai).  (Oavaros  here  stands  for 
17  eis  'drepov  aroix^-ov  /ieraj3o\i7  according  to  Philo.  R.  P.  38  a.) 
With  this  we  take  Frag.  25  (Vor.  73)  where  fire  lives  in  the  death 
of  earth  and  air  lives  in  the  death  of  fire  :  water  lives  in  the  death 
of  air,  and  air  in  that  of  water,  (ftj  irvp  rbv  yys  davarov  K.  r,  X. 
(Cf.  Plut.  de  E.  18,  392  C-Vor.  73).  A  reconciliation  of  Frag.  68 
and  Frag.  25  is  found  in  Frags.  41-42  (Vor.  64)  where  Heraclitus 
uses  the  new  term  avadvfjLLacrdai. 

In  his  elementary  attempt  to  fix  psychological  values,  Heraclitus 
may  have  been  affected  in  his  use  of  tvx'h  by  the  terms  for  the 
process.  (Cf.  Frags.  77-78.)  Arius  Didymus  (Dox.  471)  ascribed 
to  Heraclitus  a  theory  for  \j/vxr)  proper  showing  this  tendency. 
"Wishing  to  make  it  clear  that  at  if/vxat-  aJ'aflu/ucojuepcu  voepai  ael 
ylvovTCLL,  he  likened  them  to  rivers."  Moreover,  we  have  (Dox. 
471)  the  inference  for  Heraclitus  that  \l/vxy  was  CUO-^TIKT) 


It  seems  clear  that  the  term  \l/vxn  will  bear  our  interpretation 
in  this  later  Ionian  thinker.     Standing  for  the  principle  of  motion, 
was  seemingly  identified  with  one  of  the  four  elements  just 


TERMS  OF  HERACLITUS  27 

as  the  material  principle  seemed  to  have  been  identified  with 
irvp.  (R.  P.  38  b  notes  the  explanation  of  Philoponus  for  whom 
the  Heraclitean  irvp  was  17  £rjpa  di>a0ujuia<ns  and  who  also  said 


Aristotle's  statement  (De  An.  405  a  25)  for  Heraclitus  takes 
over  for  faxy  proper  the  earlier  thinker's  terms  for  kinetic  faxy- 
Here  Aristotle,  as  in  the  case  of  Thales,  qualified  his  assertion 
that  Heraclitus  identified  apxrj  and  ^vxr)  by  the  words  "if  he 
identifies  it  with  17  dya0u/ua<ns  from  which  he  derives  all  other 
things."  Aristotle  added  the  terms  do-wjuarcbTaros  and  'peov  det 
for  the  if/vx'n-o-PX'n  of  Heraclitus.  Aetius  (Dox.  389)  represented 
Heraclitus  distinguishing  between  17  rov  KOCT/XOU  $vx"n  (which  he 
called  avadv^iaffLS  kit  ruv  vypuv)  and  the  ^vx'n  &  ™Zs  T4x>ts- 
Theodoret  (Dox.  386)  gave  for  the  \J/vxt  of  Heraclitus  the  term 


Further  secondary  authorities  keep  Heraclitus  in  line  with  the 
early  lonians.  Aristotle  (Met.  984  a.  7)  named  him  with  Hippasus 
as  holding  irvp  for  his  apxrj-  (Cf.  also  Aet.  Dox.  292.)  Theo- 
phrastus  (Dox.  475)  elaborated  this  statement  with  the  terms  ev 
and  KWoviJLtvos  and  TreirepaffiJievos,  with  TTVKUV<TI,S  and  with  navuffis 
as  terms  for  the  process.  The  Heraclitean  process  was  thus 
described  by  Aetius  (Dox.  283)  :  "As  this  (TTUP)  is  quenched  all 
things  come  into  order.  (KO(7juo7roieZ<r0cu)."  In  the  description  of 
the  origin  of  earth,  water  and  air  from  fire,  as  conceived  by  Hera- 
clitus, Aetius  (Dox.  283)  offered  a  repetition  of  the  new  term 
dva0u/ua(70ai  found  in  Frags.  41-42. 

"Motion"  for  Heraclitus  was  variously  described  by  the  second- 
ary authorities.  Plato  (Cratyl.  402  A)  said  that  for  Heraclitus 
TTOLvra  x^P^  K^  °^v  M^ci.  To  the  followers  of  Heraclitus 
(ot  *pkovrts)  he  ascribed  the  doctrine  iravTa  Kivtlrai  (Cf.  Theaet. 
180  D-181  A.)  Again,  Aristotle  (De  An.  405  a.  28)  said  that 
Heraclitus  thought  that  all  things  were  in  idvrivis.  Aetius  (Dox. 
320)  distinguished  for  Heraclitus  between  eternal  motion  (dtStos 
KLvriffis)  and  ^Qapr-q  /averts.  Aetius  (Dox.  303)  offered  for  irvp 
the  term  d(5tos. 

Up  to  this  point  Heraclitus  had  not  departed  from  the  old  order, 
but  the  personification  of  a  dual  activity  in  some  of  the  fragments 
of  his  work  marks  a  turning  point  in  the  early  efforts  of  Greek 
philosophy.  The  term  epts  and  apuovla  vaguely  expressed  the 
notion  of  a  force  apart  from  things. 


28  PRE-SOCRATIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  MOTION 

Frags.  20  and  65  would  put  Heraclitus  philosophically  among 
the  aOtoi.  In  Frag.  36  (Vor.  71)  6  0eos  was  roXe/zos  dp^vrj  by 
one  phase  of  the  power  there  ascribed  in  the  term  dXXotouo-flai.  In 
Frag.  44  (Vor.  69)  we  find  TroXejuos  TTCLVTUP  pev  Trarrjp  tan  iravruv 
51  P<HTL\€vs.  Frag.  62  (Vor.  73-74)  gives  both  terms  epis  and 
TroXejuos  and  all  things  arise  /car'  epiv.  (6(^77  is  here  identified 
with  epis.)  Frag.  46  (Vor.  63)  combines  both  harmony  and  strife. 
"Opposition  unites  and  from  differences  comes  the  most  beautiful 
harmony."  (xaXXto-rr/  apuovia.)  Aristotle  (Eud.  Eth.  1234  a.  25) 
named  Heraclitus  as  blaming  Homer  (S107)  for  his  wish  that  strife 
would  pass  away. 

Heraclitus  himself  was  probably  unconscious  of  the  implications 
of  the  notion  he  conveyed  in  thus  imperfectly  speaking  in  terms  of 
dualism.  His  other  force,  ^vxn  inherent  in  dpx^>  was  not  yet 
supplanted  in  his  mind  and  survived  here  and  there  in  his  term- 
inology as  the  kinetic  phase  of  his  irvp-apxr}.  Frag.  18  (Vor. 
77)  where  ao<J>6v  is  TTCLVTUV  Kex^piff^vov  and  Frag.  19  (Vor.  68) 
by  the  words  yv^rj  ore??  eKvpepvrjve  iravra.  6td  TTOLVTUV  foreshadow 
later  terms  for  a  real  second  cause  which  will  arise  with  the  passing 
of  kinetic  \f/vxr)  into  vovs. 


4.  ELEATIC  TERMS 

Before  tracing  the  idea  of  an  external  force  as  developed  by  the 
lonians,  it  is  worth  while  to  examine  the  terms  of  the  Eleatic 
philosophers  for  the  notion  of  efficient  cause  and  for  the  ever 
growing  tendency  toward  immateriality.  These  philosophers 
furnished  terms  for  the  powers  of  ^vxh  proper  on  the  side  of 
knowledge  and  perception,  but  it  is  doubtful  whether  there  is 
any  trace  in  their  writings  of  the  term  \l/vx"h  in  a  kinetic  sense. 

Xenophanes  was  radical  in  his  differences  with  the  earlier 
philosophers.  For  him  there  was  no  change,  and  the  unity  was 
God.  He  was  the  first  to  philosophize  on  the  Deity.  Aristotle 
and  Theophrastus  have  noted  his  method  as  unusual.  Aristotle 
criticized  Xenophanes  for  failing  to  make  things  clear.  "Looking 
up  into  the  broad  heavens,"  Xenophanes  asserted  that  unity  is 
God.  (Cf.  Met.  986  b.  22.)  Theophrastus  admitted,  according 
to  Simplicius  (Phys.  Dox.  480),  that  the  record  of  the  opinion  of 
Xenophanes  came  from  some  other  source  than  to-ropia  -rrepl 


The  effort  of  Xenophanes  was  strongest  toward  ideas  and  terms 
that  would  take  away  false  notions  of  the  deity  that  was  being. 
Since  for  him  there  was  no  motion,  a  second  principle,  even  as  an 
aspect  of  apxri,  should  have  been  out  of  place.  In  some  of  the 
fragments,  however,  we  find  a  reversion  to  the  Ionian  attitude. 
The  terms  71-77717  and  yeverup  in  Frag.  11  (Karsten)  (Vor.  p.  51) 
and  the  eK  7(1(775  iravra  statement  of  Frag.  8  indicate  a  physi- 
ologer's  interest.  Earth  and  water  form  the  twofold  source  in 
Frags.  9-10.  In  Frag.  9  we  are  all  sprung  (eKyevonevBa)  from  earth 
and  water.  In  Frag.  10  all  things  oaa.  ylvovr'  rjdt  (frvovrai  are 
earth  and  water.  In  Frag.  12,  offering  forms  for  the  limitation  of 
one  phase  of  the  source,  we  find  the  terms  TreZpas  and  aireipov. 

The  doctrine  peculiar  to  Xenophanes  and  his  school  is  found  in 
Frag.  4  where  he  said  Being  or  God  always  abides  in  the  same 
place,  not  at  all  moved,  (mvovnevos  ovbkv).  A  strong  effort  for 
a  term  for  incorporeality  is  found  in  a  fragment  usually  accredited 
to  Xenophanes.  (Frag.  2.)  The  climax  of  the  theodicy  of 
Xenophanes  is  reached  in  the  magnificent  hexameter  of  Frag.  3: 
"Without  effort  (God)  swings  all  things  by  the  power  of  thought." 
(v6ov  <t>ptvi)  (Cf.  Diog.  L.  IX,  19). 

29 


30  PRE-SOCRATIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  MOTION 

The  sole  instance  of  the  use  of  fax*!  by  Xenophanes  occurs 
in  Frag.  18  where  he  attested  the  acceptance  of  the  doctrine  of 
metempsychosis  by  Pythagoras.  Diog.  L.  IX,  19  ascribed  to 
Xenophanes  the  term  irvev^a  for  his  ^vx'fj- 

Parmenides,  striving  to  distinguish  things  according  to  opinion 
from  things  according  to  truth,  although  affected  by  the  ideas  and 
terms  of  Xenophanes,  still  reverted  to  old  notions  and  time-worn 
terms.  In  his  "metaphysics"  according  to  reason  (/card  rov 
\6yov),  as  a  consistent  Eleatic  denying  all  movement,  he  would 
have  been  excluded  from  the  ranks  of  thinkers  whose  terms  offer 
evidence  for  if/vx^i  as  a  principle  of  motion.  Nevertheless,  an 
examination  of  the  terms  in  which  he  expressed  his  "cosmology 
of  the  apparent"  discloses  a  tendency  to  give  to  his  irvp-apx'h  an 
aspect  of  force. 

Aristotle,  censuring  Xenophanes  and  Melissus  for  crudeness, 
said  (Met.  986  b.  27)  that  Parmenides  seemed  to  speak  in  some 
places  with  more  care.  OuaXXoj>  fiKkiruv)  "But  being  compelled 
to  account  for  phenomena,"  continued  Aristotle,  "he  assumed  that 
things  are  one  from  the  standpoint  of  reason  (/card  rov  \byov)  but 
plural  from  the  standpoint  of  sense,  (/card  TT\V  ai<r6r}(TLi>)  " 

Parmenides  (Verses  83-84,  Vor.  p.  120)  said  that  true  belief 
completely  rejected  generation  (7 kvevis)  and  destruction  (6Xe0pos). 
Again  in  v.  77  generation  is  extinguished  (dTreo-jSeorai)  and  des- 
truction is  incredible.  (dTruoros)  Parmenides  (v.  100)  included 
generation  (ylveadai)  and  destruction  (6XXu<r0ai)  among  those 
things  which  mortals  believed  true  but  which  he  would  himself 
consider  but  a  name,  (ow/za). 

In  the  poem  of  Parmenides  entitled  rd  Trpos  a\rjdeLav  we  find 
the  privative  terms  ayevrjTos  and  av&XeOpos  (v.  59),  drpc/z^s  (v. 
60),  aKtvijTOS  (v.  82),  dreXeo-ros  (v.  60),  dreXeurrjros  (v.  88), 
airavaros  (v.  83),  avapxos  (v.  83) — all  applied  to  TO  kbv.  His 
other  expressions  describing  Being  are  important  as  terms  later 
to  be  adopted  generally  by  philosophy.  (Cf .  Verses  60,  62,  78-80, 
and  89). 

The  terms  applied  by  Parmenides  in  his  philosophy  rd  Trpos 
bbfrv  to  a  new  force  on  the  way  to  the  clear  expression  of  the 
idea  of  efficient  cause  may  be  regarded  as  the  results  of  the  efforts 
of  Ionian  thinkers  for  terms  for  their  principle  of  motion.  Aris- 
totle's assertion  (Met.  984  b.  I)  that  none  of  those  who  affirmed 
that  all  is  one  understood  the  nature  of  an  apxh  rijs  K<,vr)<reus  ex- 


ELEATIC  TERMS  31 

cepted  Parmenides  in  so  far  as  this  Eleatic  in  reality  held  two 
causes.  Aristotle  (Met.  986  b.  33)  especially  noted  the  terms  wvp 
and  777  used  by  Parmenides  for  his  two  air  Lai.  Parmenides 
himself  (v.  113)  said  that  there  are  two  /uop<£ai  which  men  have 
determined  to  name.  These  he  described  (vv.  116-117)  as  ethereal 
flame  of  fire  (fine,  (TJTTIOS),  rarefied  (dpcuos),  and  everywhere 
identified  with  itself)  and  (v.  119)  flameless  darkness,  dense  and 
heavy  in  character.  (Cf.  v.  122  for  the  terms  <£dos  and  vv£). 
In  v.  125  he  gave  to  5cu/ioji/  the  term  Kvftepvav. 

In  v.  120  Parmenides  proposed  to  tell  every  seeming  arrange- 
ment (5iaKo<rjuos)  of  his  two  principles.  Aristotle  (Met.  984  b. 
25)  cited  the  verse  of  Parmenides  (132)  which  names  "Epcos  as 
the  first  of  all  deal.  This  "Desire"  Aristotle  called  an  airLa 
the  activity  of  which  he  expressed  by  the  words  Kivclv  and 
Parmenides  (v.  127)  mentioned  a  bainuv  rj  TTCLVTCL 
Simplicius  (Phys.  39,  12)  noted  the  TTOLTJTLKOP  element 
of  thought  here.  However  correct  may  be  the  identification 
(Cf.  Aet.  Dox.  335)  of  AI/CT?  (v.  69)  and  of  'AvayKrj  (v.  86) 
with  this  dalnuv  (v.  127),  the  doxographer  saw  in  this  bai^v 
(which  he  called  Ku/Sep^rts  /cat  /cXTjpouxos)  a  source  of  motion 
and  generation  for  all  things. 

The  tendency  of  the  Doxographers  (cf .  tradition  for  Pythagoras 
and  for  Heraclitus)  to  give  an  efficient  aspect  to  one  phase  of  the 
dpxr?  may  be  seen  in  a  statement  of  Theophrastus  (Dox.  482)  for 
Parmenides  where  TTVP  is  regarded  as  TTOLOVV.  (Cf.  also  Hippolytus 
Dox.  564.)  It  is  a  question  whether  these  statements  are  quite 
consistent  with  the  concessions  of  Parmenides  to  popular  opinion. 
He  appears  to  have  tended  toward  a  second  cause  in  his  dalfju^v 
and  at  the  same  time  to  have  emphasized  the  double  aspect 
of  apx*)  by  the  terms  irvp  and  777. 

The  term  irvp^dijs  was  attributed  to  Parmenides  for  ^i/xr?. 
(Cf.  Aet.  Dox.  388).  Elsewhere  (Aet.  Dox.  443  and  Theophr. 
Dox.  500)  there  is  some  evidence  of  the  confusion  of  \l/vxh  as  a 
physical  principle  and  \l/vxh  perceptive  and  animate. 

As  a  pupil  of  Xenophanes  and  a  contemporary  of  Heraclitus, 
Parmenides  possibly  fell  heir  to  terms  by  which  he  expressed  his 
vague  idea  of  a  second  cause,  but  that  later  division  of  philosophy 
which  treated  of  \f/vx^i  proper  is  particularly  indebted  to  him  for 
the  distinction  of  truth  and  opinion. 


32  PRE-SOCRATIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  MOTION 

Zeno,  the  double-tongued  Eleatic  dialectician  (Cf.  Simpl. 
Phys.  30  r  138,  30),  confined  himself  to  proofs  of  the  unity  of 
being  by  a  method  earning  Aristotle's  irapo\oyi^a6ai.  (Cf. 
Physics  239  b.  5.)  Zeno  brought  out  nothing  peculiar  to  himself, 
but  he  started  further  difficulties.  (Cf.  Plut.  Dox.  581.)  Diog. 
L.  IX,  72  noted  Zeno's  Eleaticism  in  his  superficial  denial  of  motion. 
The  earlier  terms  dittos  and  aTreipos  are  attributed  (Aet.  Dox. 
303)  to  Zeno  and  to  Melissus.  The  doxographer  there  also  as- 
signed to  Zeno  the  term  deia  for  his  ^ux1?-  In  one  of  the  apeo-Kovra 
of  Zeno  (Diog.  L.  IX.  29)  we  find  ^vxy  called  /cpdjua. 

Although  consistent  with  true  Eleaticism,  Melissus  offered 
interesting  and  significant  terms.  The  fragments  of  the  work 
Trepi  <£u(recos  fj  Trepi  TOV  ovros  bring  out  his  method  and  indicate 
his  inheritance  of  terminology.  The  Eleatic  denial  of  motion 
was  expressed  by  him  in  Frag.  10  (Vor.  p.  149)  thus:  (TO  kbv) 
Kivoviievov  5£  OVK  av  elrj.  Discussing  KOCTJUOS  in  Frag.  6,  Melissus 
used  the  terms  erepoioDo-fleu  and  ^ra.Koan.r]Sriva.L. 

Simplicius,  significantly  prefacing  Frag.  8  (Vor.  149),  affirmed 
that  Melissus  meant  Being  to  be  aff&jjLarov.  This  fragment 
seems  to  indicate  a  very  vague  notion  of  incorporeality,  and  yet 
we  cannot  read  the  expression  del  crcbjua  w  exw  as  the  contem- 
porary of  Melissus  read  it.  Olympiodorus  (Vor.  142)  represented 
Melissus  employing  as  terms  for  his  apxy  the  words  /ua,  cudvijTos, 
aTreipos  (Cf.  Parmenides  v.  104)  and  0eZos.  (Cf.  Aet.  Dox.  303.) 

The  Eleatic  philosophers,  not  so  far  from  the  world  of  sense  as 
their  own  apparent  efforts  and  the  traditional  titles  of  their  works 
would  imply,  nevertheless  enriched  philosophic  terminology  and 
laid  up  for  later  thinkers  modes  of  expression  which  could  fairly 
convey  newly  conceived  ideas.  The  field  of  philosophy  had  already 
begun  to  widen  and  the  growth  of  tendencies  in  speculation 
concerning  nature,  in  minds  not  wholly  unaccustomed  to  notions 
shading  into  the  idea  of  the  incorporeal,  could  not  fail  to  be  influ- 
enced by  terms  for  the  activity  that  was  first  expressed  by  kinetic 


5.  SUMMARY  OF  TERMS  OF  PRE-SOCRATIC  DYNAMISM 

Allowing  always  for  the  fact  that  we  are  analyzing  philosophy 
alive  in  men's  minds  when  put  out  in  certain  terms,  we  find  the 
dynamism  of  the  predecessors  of  Anaxagoras  expressed  in  three 
answers  to  the  first  question  of  philosophy.  In  one  sense  we  may 
say  that  these  early  thinkers  found  three  ways  of  avoiding  the 
question  of  causality.  The  simplest  course  was  the  one  taken 
by  the  early  lonians  who,  "not  at  all  displeased  with  themselves," 
said  ev  TO  inroKtlntvov  (Cf.  Arist.  Met.  984  a.  30),  including  an 
unexplained  motion  in  the  substratum  of  things.  The  Eleatics 
avoided  the  question  for  the  time  by  altogether  denying  motion. 
Aristotle  saw  in  this  course  the  method  of  those  who  saw  the 
difficulty  and  were  conquered  by  it.  (Cf.  Met.  984.)  Heraclitus 
took  yet  another  course  in  his  assertion  that  all  is  motion. 

The  early  lonians  reduced  the  many  to  a  "one"  in  terms  of 
physical  matter  and  took  for  granted  as  their  primitive  substance 
a  physical  substratum  which  was  eternally  moved.  Their  genius 
for  relations  had,  very  probably,  not  so  far  exercised  itself  as  to 
combine  with  their  first  principle  physical  things  and  the  move- 
ment observed  in  qualitative  change  (not  then  so  much  as  reduced 
to  physical  energy).  This  gap,  if  at  all  evident  to  them,  they 
bridged  by  terms,  old  or  new,  for  purely  accidental  change.  A 
set  of  terms  for  the  mode  of  action  of  their  dynamic  "one"  is 
found  along  with  the  set  of  terms  for  the  "one"  itself,  and  the 
formula  ^vxy-apx'n  covers  mere  hylokineticism. 

The  phase  of  the  notion  of  causality  to  which  efficient  action  is 
in  last  analysis  reduced  was  presented  by  the  Pythagoreans,  who 
left  the  sense-perceived  world  to  answer  the  same  question  which 
had  proposed  itself  to  the  early  lonians.  The  Pythagoreans 
raised  the  quantitative  property  of  things  into  that  other  sphere 
where  Plato  was  to  find  his  "Idea"  and  Aristotle  his  "Form." 
We  have  no  means  of  knowing  from  the  words  of  the  Pythagoreans 
the  nature  of  the  contents  of  the  quantity  expressed  by  the  earlier 
of  these  philosophers  in  terms  which  hold  them  in  regions  of 
matter.  As  physical  speculation  widened,  that  mode  of  action 
expressed  in  the  condition  of  proportion  was  accounted  for  by  the 
Pythagoreans  in  terms  for  "harmony."  The  union  of  the  opposites 
of  which  their  first  principle  was  composed  called  for  expression 

33 


34  PRE-SOCRATIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  MOTION 

supplied  here  and  there  by  ^vx'h  and  even  by  \j/vxri  *ai  vovs 
denoting  only  a  physical  condition. 

Before  the  Eleatics  began  in  any  way  to  develop  the  notion  of 
cause,  they  struck  a  note  of  criticism.  Before  they  attempted 
to  account  for  things  they  tried  to  reduce  the  object  of  their  inquiry 
by  excluding  from  philosophy  what  they  called  non-Being. 
Although  they  fixed  no  ground  for  the  distinction  of  truth  and 
opinion,  yet  their  efforts  in  this  direction  served  to  raise  and  to 
leave  open  a  future  question  for  philosophy.  If  judged  by  their 
terms,  the  attempt  of  the  philosophers  of  Elea  to  get  away  from 
sense  in  knowledge  and  from  physical  in  object  was  far  from 
successful.  From  the  "all"  of  Thales  to  the  "unity"  and  "Being" 
of  Parmenides  there  was  certainly  an  advance  in  terms,  and  yet 
notions  transcendent  at  first  sound  were  probably  on  the  level 
with  the  Eleatic  concept  of  Being  akin  to  our  idea  of  space. 
However  certainly  the  ideas  of  being  and  of  bodilessness  are 
reduced,  on  evidence  afforded  by  their  own  words,  to  physical 
counterparts,  philosophy  cannot  but  be  grateful  for  the  contribu- 
tion of  such  terms  as  those  of  Parmenides  for  his  "Being."  There 
should  have  been  for  the  Eleatics  no  chasm  from  the  many  to  the 
one,  and  yet  in  their  inconsistency  or  in  their  concessions  to  popular 
thought  they,  too,  accounted  for  plurality  in  terms  of  accidental 
change.  Parmenides  may  have  been  merely  describing  physical 
conditions  of  union  for  the  two  phases  of  his  primitive  substance 
in  words  that  now  seem  to  carry  the  true  note  of  efficiency. 

The  time  had  not  yet  come  for  philosophy  to  see  the  final 
relation  of  things  and  their  ultimate  cause,  but  meanwhile  thinkers 
here  and  there  were  defining  a  less  inadequate  notion  of  the  Deity. 
The  early  Ionian  (to  adapt  the  words  of  Saint  Augustine  (De  Civ. 
Dei  VIII,  2)  for  Anaximenes)  "nee  .  .  .  negavit  aut  tacuit, 
non  tamen  ab  (Ipso)  .  .  .  factum  .  .  .  credidit."  If,  in 
the  eyes  of  the  old  religion,  to  be  a  philosopher  was  to  be  cifleos, 
Truth  soon  supplied  itself  as  an  object  for  the  mind  of  the  philos- 
opher without  a  God.  A  study  of  the  growth  of  terms  for  the 
"Deity"  and  for  "mind"  shows  the  Pythagorean  and  the  Eleatic 
philosophers  at  their  best  in  these  regions  of  thought. 

Heraclitus  addressed  himself  to  the  genetffc  as  opposed  to  the 
static  phase  of  things.  No  longer  primarily  concerned  with 
that  from  which  things  originated,  philosophic  speculation  now 
began  to  ask  how  the  world  came  to  be  what  it  is,  the  very  question 


SUMMARY  OF  TERMS  OF  PRE-SOCRATIC  DYNAMISM      35 

that  would  compel  these  thinkers  to  arrive  at  the  true  notion  of 
efficiency  and  all  that  it  implies.  Heraclitus  was  critical  in  his 
acceptance  of  sense  evidence,  but,  although  he  looked  beneath 
for  reality,  from  his  terms  we  may  conclude  that  he  saw  only 
physical  reality.  For  him  the  mode  of  activity  expressed  in  the 
order  that  remains  was  as  real  as  the  continual  passing  of  the 
individual,  the  truth  of  which  he  arrived  at  by  a  Greek  guess. 
Ultimately  a  dynamist,  Heraclitus  spoke  for  mechanism  the 
strongest  words  thus  far  found  in  philosophical  terminology.  So 
long  as  the  relation  of  the  material  cause  and  its  activity  was 
expressed  as  Heraclitus  expressed  the  relation  of  "fire"  and  its 
motion,  kinetic  faxy  had  still  survived.  Although  he  seemed  to 
raise  "fire"  above  the  other  elements  which  he  postulated  with  it, 
his  terms  sometimes  indicate  that  he  conceived  \f/vxrj  in  the 
sense  of  a  more  special  energy.  If  there  was  a  definite  sense  in 
his  use  of  the  term  aelfaov  for  irvp — an  actual  introduction  of 
the  element  of  life  in  the  motion  of  his  dpxi? — and  if  he  used 
if/vx'n  as  another  term  for  the  activity  of  apxrj,  philosophy  in  the 
person  of  Heraclitus  was  on  the  point  of  seeing  for  the  first  time 
the  immanent  character  of  \f/vxr}  as  a  physical  activity.  (Cf. 
Alcmaeon  who,  on  secondary  authority  (Aet.  Dox.  386),  gave 
to  $ueris  the  term  avTOKlvrjTos).  The  element  of  immanency  of 
the  KlvrjffLs  aldios  of  the  first  apxr}  was  not  immediately  evident 
to  the  first  philosophers.  The  force  directly  combined  with 
matter,  which  they  called  through  dearth  of  words  6e6s  and  ^uxi?>  still 
continued  as  a  \f/vxr}  principle  of  motion.  Dynamism  or  hylo- 
kineticism  we  may  call  a  system  inaccurately  described  as 
hylozoism. 

The  notion  of  efficient  cause  may  have  entered  with  Heraclitus. 
He  may  have  meant  to  convey  by  his  epts  a  new  idea  of  which 
he  half  saw  the  need,  and  yet  this  "Strife"  might  have  been  for 
him  but  a  phase  of  deos  (Frag.  36)  in  the  sense  of  merely  describing 
a  physical  condition.  His  conception  of  TTUP  as  de# uov  is  most 
noteworthy.  If  kinetic  ^u%?7  had  up  to  this  time  for  the  early 
thinkers  no  immanency,  we  take  it  as  an  evidence  of  the  sincerity 
of  their  quest  that  they  henceforth  strove  to  separate  matter  and 
its  motion. 


6.  TERMS  OF  EMPEDOCLES 

From  a  glimmer  of  the  idea  of  efficiency  in  the  figurative  forces 
epis  and  appovia  existing  for  Heraclitus  along  with  the  dynamic 
aspect  of  his  first  principle  irvp,  we  pass  to  Empedocles  who,  in 
his  efforts  to  reconcile  Heraclitus  and  the  Eleatics,  was  the  first 
(if  we  accept  the  word  of  Aristotle,  Met.  985  a.  21)  to  express  the 
notion  of  efficiency. 

In  his  endeavors  to  determine  true  knowledge,  Empedocles 
aimed  at  accuracy  of  expression.  He  believed  that  it  is  hard  to 
get  at  the  mind  of  man  (vv.  367-368  Stein)  and  he  realized  that 
custom  often  dictates  forms  of  expression.  (Cf.  v.  44.)  He 
bade  his  hearers  look  with  the  eye  of  the  mind  (wos)  at  the  well 
pointed  report  (v.  363)  which  he  assumed  they  demanded  from  him 
as  from  an  oracle.  His  effort  appears  again  in  his  desire  to  speak 
forcefully  in  case  there  had  been  in  his  former  words  anything 
defective,  (v.  96.) 

Aristotle  fixed  the  method  of  study  of  the  philosophy  of  Empe- 
docles when  he  advised  (Met.  985  b.  32)  that  we  heed  the  Siawua  of 
the  pre-Socratic  rather  than  a  ^eXXi£"erai  \kyuv.  Although  his 
expression  was  characteristically  poetical  and  mythological, 
Empedocles  has  been  placed  for  us  in  Aristotle's  Poetics  (1447  b.  17) 
as  a  <f>vai,o\6yos  rather  than  a  TTOITJTTJS. 

Trying  to  work  out  a  system  where  things  are  one  and  many 
(TroXXd  re  KO.L  ev)  (Cf.  Plato  Sophist.  242  D  and  Arist.  Phys. 
187,  a.  20),  Empedocles,  in  a  reaction  against  prevailing  thought, 
said  that  "fools"  and  those  to  whom  far-reaching  thoughts  (v.  45) 
are  denied  think  that  "mingling"  is  coming  into  being  and  that 
"separation"  is  destruction.  (Cf.  vv.  36-39.) 

Empedocles  postulated  the  four  elements  as  his  material  cause. 
The  term  71-77777  occurs  with  him  in  v.  128  and  the  form  dp%77  in 
v.  130.  The  elements  are  named  in  mythological  terms  in  vv. 
33-35.  In  vv.  104-107  Empedocles  asserted  that  mortals  and 
even  OeoL  arise  from  these  elements  which  appear  to  have  been 
also  the  means  of  the  power  <t>povelv.  (Cf.  v.  336-337.) 

Aristotle's  statement  (Met.  985  a.  23)  that  Empedocles  set  irvp  by 
itself  (/ca0'  auro)  is  witness  to  the  tendency  of  those  who  are  still 
dynamists  to  limit  the  activity  of  the  material  cause  of  one  element 
and  to  make  the  rest  of  the  apxy  passive.  Although  Empedocles 

36 


TERMS  OF  EMPEDOCLES  37 

seems  to  have  made  one  of  these  elements  predominant  by  setting 
"fire"  over  against  the  other  three,  still  here  and  there  he  gave 
them  all  equal  power.  (Cf.  vv.  87-89  and  v.  112.)  To  "fire"  in 
particular  belong  powers  contained  in  the  term  Kparelv  (Cf.  v. 
112).  In  v.  263  "fire"  separating  (KPLVO^VOV)  caused  men  and 
women  to  arise  (avayciv) .  A  doctrine  peculiarly  Empedoclean 
(vv.  265-267)  maintains  that  irvp  through  its  desire  to  reach  its 
like,  caused  ouXcx^uels  TVTTOL  to  spring  up  out  of  the  earth.  In  a 
special  application  of  the  "elemental  fire"  (dry 67 iov  irvp)  to  the 
theory  of  vision  he  used  the  term  ravawrepos  (v.  325)  to  denote 
the  refined  character  of  his  irvp.  However,  although  "fire"  is 
more  important  than  the  other  elements,  it,  too,  plays  a  sub- 
ordinate part.  (Cf.  vv.  215-216.) 

The  mention  of  KuTrpts  (v.  215)  brings  us  to  a  consideration  of 
the  forces  of  Empedocles  which  Aristotle  (Met.  985  a.  21)  named 
as  3>iXta  and  NeZ/cos.  Empedocles  usually  introduced  these  forces 
along  with  the  elements  and  may  even  have  used  them  as  modes  of 
expression  for  mere  physical  conditions  of  repulsion  and  attraction 
as  Heraclitus  used  the  terms  "Strife"  and  "Harmony."  (Cf.  vv. 
102-103,  66-68,  248-251.) 

The  activity  of  his  own  "Strife"  and  "Love"  in  the  "process" 
was  brought  out  by  Empedocles  in  w.  171-175.  Terms  for  the 
motion  of  things  coming  into  being  are  found  in  vv.  69-73  where  he 
tried  to  reconcile  continual  change  and  immobility.  The  terms 
for  the  forces  of  Empedocles  vary.  He  usually  expressed  them  by 
the  words  Net/cos  and  ^L\6rrjs  (171-172).  V.  250  has  the  term 
epis  coupled  with  $1X67775  of  v.  248.  Again,  in  w.  190-195  he 
used  'AQpodiTT]  and  NcZicos  "which  wrought  the  birth  of  things." 

"Love"  under  the  names  of  Aphrodite  and  Kypris  doubtless  held 
the  strongest  note  of  efficiency  for  Empedocles.  (Cf.  v.  213,  215- 
216,  240-241.)  Empedocles  himself  was  probably  one  of  those 
whom  he  mentioned  (405-407)  as  having  had  no  6eb<s  but  Kvpins 
Bao-t'Xeta. 

The  element  of  chance  enters  in  v.  196  and  again  in  v.  174  and 
v.  255.  The  term  rvxy  occurs  in  v.  195  where  by  the  IOTTJS  of 
TVXIJ  all  things  Tre(f>p6vrjKev.  (Cf.  v.  231  where  it  is  the  property  of 
all  things  to  have  (frpbv^ais  and  a  share  of  j>w/*a.) 

Plato  (Leg.  X  889  B)  named  Empedocles  among  those  who  relied 
on  06(7ts  and  rvxn  rather  than  on  rkx^i  or  vovs  or  any  0eos.  (We 
note  in  this  passage  the  term  fyvxos  which  Plato  applied  to  the 
elements  of  Empedocles.) 


38  PRE-SOCRATIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  MOTION 

Aristotle  (De  gen.  et  corr.  333  b.  20)  said  that  for  Empedocles 
"Love"  separated  the  elements,  which  were  before  0eos  in  origin. 
Empedocles  himself  identified  these  with  Otoi  (Cf.  vv.  104-107.) 
A  noteworthy  attempt  on  the  part  of  Empedocles  to  fix  the  notion 
of  a  deity  is  found  in  vv.  137-138  where  a  sphere  rejoicing  in 
solitude  is  said  to  have  been  fixed  in  a  vessel  of  harmony.  Nearest 
to  incorporeality  of  all  his  notions  and  recalling  a  like  attempt  on 
the  part  of  Xenophanes  are  the  ideas  conveyed  by  the  terms  of 
vv.  344-351  where  a  divine  being  is  defined  as  sacred  and  ineffable 
mind  alone.  (<t>prjv  tepi?  KCU  d0eo-$aros.) 

The  term  ^uxi?  is  not  found  in  the  extant  fragments  of  Empe- 
docles. His  commentators  used  it  when  giving  his  doctrine  of 
metempsychosis  (Cf.  Hipp.  Ref.  Dox.  558),  but  dv^os  is  his  own 
word  for  the  life  of  animals  (v.  414)  and  of  men  (v.  435)  who  have 
changed  their  nop<f>*l  (v.  430).  The  word  (twos  is  found  in  v.  32 
for  the  spirit  in  Hades. 

The  verses  333-335  of  Empedocles  were  quoted  by  Aristotle 
(De  An.  404  b.  11)  as  authority  for  the  statement  that  for  Emped- 
ocles the  elements  were  apxr)  and  each  element  was  ^vx'n-  (Cf 
Theophr.  Dox.  478  where  six  apxai  were  credited  to  Empedocles.) 
The  terms  of  Empedocles  could  not  have  been  omitted  in  an 
examination  of  the  growth  of  words  expressing  the  earliest  notion 
of  a  real  moving  cause. 


7.  TERMS  OF  ANAXAGORAS. 

Aristotle's  assertion  (Met.  984  a.  11)  that  Anaxagoras  preceded 
Empedocles  in  age  but  followed  him  in  works  places  Anaxagoras 
for  our  purpose.  Difficult  as  it  is  to  fix  the  dates  of  the  later 
Ionian  philosophers,  it  is  quite  impossible  exactly  to  determine  the 
influence  and  the  dependence  of  each  on  the  ideas  and  terms  of  the 
other.  The  task  of  all  who  followed  Heraclitus  and  the  Eleatics 
was  to  synthesize  the  elements  of  truth  in  both  systems.  Anaxa- 
goras, a  true  successor  of  the  early  lonians,  inherited  and  developed 
the  tendency  of  Heraclitus  to  advance  toward  ideas  and  terms 
which  would  destroy  the  identification  of  apxr]  and  its  motion. 
Anaxagoras  was  for  Aristotle  (Met.  984  b.  15)  the  first  "sober 
thinker,"  and  yet  by  their  "random  talking"  his  predecessors  had 
assisted  him  in  the  way  of  making  the  terms  for  his  new  ideas 
less  inadequate  than  they  would  otherwise  have  been. 

His  effort  for  precision  of  expression,  even  in  a  particular  instance, 
shows  that  Anaxagoras  realized  the  value  of  accurate  terminology. 
(Cf.  Frag.  17,  Diels.  Vor.  320.)  His  critical  tendency  of  method 
may  be  seen  in  the  apothegm  ascribed  to  him  by  Aristotle  (Met. 
1009  b.  25) :  "Just  such  things  as  men  assume  will  be  real  for  them." 
Aristotle  (Met.  989  b.  4)  recognized  the  efforts  of  Anaxagoras  for 
terms  and  noted  that  while  Anaxagoras  did  not  speak  rightly  or 
clearly,  yet  he  meant  almost  the  same  thing  as  those  who  spoke 
later  with  greater  clearness. 

In  a  study  of  the  terms  of  Anaxagoras,  we  find  safety  only  in 
his  own  words  since  the  whole  tendency  of  his  commentators  has 
been  to  identify  his  term  vovs  with  vovs  as  it  came  into  meaning 
after  Socrates.  We  have  seen  a  growing  tendency  on  the  part  of 
philosophers  to  fix  epistemological  values,  and  yet  we  find  nothing 
of  this  in  the  extant  fragments  of  Anaxagoras.  By  raising  the 
notion  of  vovs,  semi-popular  and  particular,  to  the  idea  of  a 
directive  cause  is  one  way  by  which  Anaxagoras  may  have  come 
to  postulate  an  efficient  force.  However,  this  seems  a  big  step 
for  a  thinker  at  this  stage  of  the  development  of  thought.  He 
might  have  taken  out  the  if/vxy  which  was  the  dynamic  term  for 
the  motion  of  the  apxr]  and  have  made  it  the  separate  cosmothetic 
force  under  a  kindred  term.  By  some  such  process  as  this,  we 
think,  Anaxagoras  postulated  vovs.  He  did  not  all  at  once  arrive 

39 


40  PRE-SOCRATIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  MOTION 

at  a  full  realization  of  the  implication  of  his  new  idea,  and  so  we 
find  with  him  \l/vxn  remaining  in  things  as  a  cause  of  motion  (and 
possibly  restricted  to  animate  being)  while  at  the  same  time  its 
powers  had  already  passed  over  into  vovs. 

Before  giving  attention  to  the  idea  peculiar  to  Anaxagoras,  we 
shall  make  the  transition  from  the  other  lonians  to  him  through 
his  terms  for  what  would  correspond  to  the  former  apxy  and 
Kivrjcris.  Terms  for  the  "surrounding  mass"  (TO  irtpikxov)  of  Anax- 
agoras are  found  in  Frag.  2  (Vor.  314)  and  Frag.  14  (Vor.  320). 
"Air  and  aether"  (arjp  /cat  al6rjp)  occur  in  Frags.  1  (Vor.  313), 
2  (Vor.  314),  12  (Vor.  319).  The  terms  nvclv,  airoKpiveaOai, 
diCLKpiveffdai  for  "motion"  occur  in  Frag.  13  (Vor.  319).  Motion 
is  frequently  expressed  in  terms  of  "rotation"  or  "whirling" 
(Cf.  Frag.  12  Vor.  318).  Force  (Biry)  and  swiftness 
as  sources  of  motion  are  found  in  Frag.  9  (Vor.  317). 
One  phase  of  the  process  of  how  things  came  from  air  and  aether 
is  described  in  Frag.  15  (Vor.  320)  as  a  avyxupelv  and  an 
ixxwpelv.  (Cf.  also  Frag.  16  Vor.  320  and  Frag.  12  Vor.  319.) 

Anaxagoras  appears  sometimes  to  have  overlooked  vovs  as  a 
source  of  special  activity  and  to  have  substituted  for  it  physical 
conditions.  However,  vovs  as  an  omnipresent  TTJS  Kivfoeus  alnov 
was  at  all  times  very  real  for  him.  (Cf.  Frag.  8  Vor.  317  and 
Frag.  14  Vor.  320.)  In  his  analysis  of  things  as  they  now  are, 
Anaxagoras  insisted  that,  excepting  vovs,  nothing  is  absolutely 
separate  or  capable  of  existing  apart  or  of  itself.  Many  of  his 
negative  statements  served  only  to  emphasize  the  attributes  of 
vovs.  He  frequently  reverted  to  wavra  TTCLVTOS  iiolpav  juerexci  of 
Frag.  6  (Vor.  316).  When  things  were  all  together,  nothing  was 
clear  and  distinct  by  reason  of  their  smallness  (UTTO  o-^t/cpor^ros) , 
but  finally  of  whatever  "seeds"  there  were  the  most  (pruv  TrXetcrra) 
each  object  became  and  remained  distinctly  (evdrj\6rara)  qualified 
by  their  character.  (Cf .  Frag.  1  Vor.  313  and  Frag.  12  Vor.  319.) 

In  the  answer  to  the  question  at  once  suggested  by  OTUV  TrXeZcrra 
we  come  upon  the  notion  of  a  "world  of  erTrcp/jara"  peculiar  to 
Anaxagoras.  (0-Trepjuara  became  for  Aristotle  TO,  6/zoiojuepr;) . 
These  are  described  in  Frag.  4  (Vor.  315)  where  Anaxagoras  said 
that  in  every  compound  there  existed  o-irepfiara  iravruv  xPWaruv. 

Anaxagoras,  explaining  nepl  rrjs  CLTTOK  pier  LOS  in  Frag.  4,  made 
certain  mystifying  references  to  another  world  or  another  order. 
Simplicius  (Phys.  157,  9)  noted  this  erepa  TLS  Sta/coo^o-is  as 


TERMS  OF  ANAXAGORAS  41 


not  CU0-077T17  and  considered  that  Anaxagoras  spoke  cos  irepi 

and  that  his  Sid/cpio-is    was  voepd.      (Cf.    Anaxagoras   on   "other 

world  swiftness"  in  Frag.  9  Vor.  317.) 

It  is  safe  to  say  that  the  fragments  of  Anaxagoras  containing 
references  to  vovs  itself  are  the  most  important  words  spoken 
thus  far  in  philosophy.  The  phraseology  is  still  far  from  strict 
terms  for  the  incorporeal,  but  we  can  almost  see  the  efforts  of 
Anaxagoras  in  his  emphasis  on  the  simplicity  of  vovs  as  he  aims 
to  confer  upon  it  powers  yet  new. 

In  Frag.  11  (Vor.  318)  vovs  is  set  apart  from  all  other  things. 
The  end  of  Frag.  12  (Vor.  319)  contains  the  same  thought. 
There  Anaxagoras  maintained  that  vovs  is  mixed  with  no  other 
thing  but  is  ftovos  CLVTOS  eir'  COJTOU.  The  significant  term  avroKpar^s 
occurs  in  Frag  12.  (Cf.  Plato,  Cratyl.  413  C  who  gave  to 
the  vovs  of  Anaxagoras  the  terms  auro/cpdrcop,  ovOevi  fjLeneiyfjLevos, 
Further  terms  for  vovs  are:  aireipos  and  Kparelv  and 
eyicrTOV  (Frag.  12).  The  words  XCTTTOTCLTOV  iravruv  XPV' 
fjLaTuv  Kal  KaOapuTCLTov  of  Frag.  12  indicate  that  the  old  striv- 
ing toward  immateriality  continued  in  Anaxagoras. 

At  this  point  we  may  compare  with  vovs  the  Heraclitean 
\6yos  and  TO  (ro<j>6v  and  yvkw,  which  are  not  always  clear. 
In  Frag.  2  (Vor.  61)  Heraclitus  attested  to  the  ignorance  of  men 
regarding  \6jos  and  further  said  that  all  things  ylvevdai  Kara  TOV 
\6yov.  He  complained  (Frag.  18  Vor.  77)  that  no  one  had  yet 
reached  the  conclusion  that  TO  cro<j>6v  is  TTCLVTUV  Kexupivntvov. 
He  mentioned  yvuM  in  Frag.  19  (Vor.  68),  which  Diels  renders: 
"In  Einen  besteht  die  Weisheit,  die  Vernunft  zu  erkennen,  als 
welche  alles  und  jedes  zu  lenken  weiss."  In  Frag.  65  (Vor.  67) 
Heraclitus  represented  TO  ao<t>6v  as  willing  and  yet  unwilling  to 
be  called  by  the  name  of  Zeus. 

If  Anaxagoras  took  up  for  vovs  the  ideas  of  Heraclitus,  it  cannot 
but  be  seen  that  the  yv&n-ri  of  Anaxagoras  is  something  distinct 
from  vovs  itself.  However  much  vovs,  through  the  power  by 
which  it  €7?co  and  bitKOffwat,  excelled  an  unthinking  agency, 
it  cannot  be  reduced  to  one  of  its  own  attributes,  even  to  the 
highest  power  it  possesses. 

The  only  instances  of  the  use  of  $vxh  by  Anaxagoras  lend  them- 
selves to  the  interpretation  of  $vxh  as  a  term  for  the  principle  of 
motion.  Frag.  4  (Vor.  315)  gives  aiBpuiroL  Kal  TO.  aXXa  froa 
off  a.  x?)*  exct.  If  iK\i?  was  here  actually  used  in  a  restricted 


42  PRE-SOCRATIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  MOTION 

sense  as  the  principle  of  animation,  we  may  conclude  that  it  was 
at  the  point  where  vovs  took  its  place  in  the  terminology  of 
cosmology  that  \f/vxrj  became  peculiar  to  animate  being.  The 
other  instance  of  the  Anaxagorean  \f/vx~n  (Frag.  12)  repeats  the 
expression  6aa  if/vxyv  exet.  ^X5?  may  have  been  restricted  in 
Frag.  4,  but  oaa  \f/vxr)v  exet  (Frag.  12)  has  an  extension  as  wide 
as  ovrjv  eKLvrjcrev  6  vovs  of  Frag.  13  (Vor.  319). 

We  cannot  say  how  definitely  vovs  superseded  \j/vxr)  in  the 
mind  of  Anaxagoras.  In  particular  applications  of  vovs  to  the 
cosmological  process  the  old  way  of  thinking  may  have  led  him 
to  couple  \l/vxr)  with  vovs  in  portions  of  his  work  that  have 
never  reached  us.  Plato  (Cratyl.  400  A)  cited  Anaxagoras  as 
holding  that  the  <£ixns  of  all  things  was  vovs  and  that  it  was 
faxy  which  arranged  (biaKoa^dv}  and  controlled  (exeu>)  all  things. 
(Cf.  Doxographic  tradition  for  Ecphantus.)  Aristotle's  difficulty 
over  the  relation  of  faxy  and  vovs  of  Anaxagoras  is  well  known. 
(Cf.  De  Anima  404  b  1,  405  a  13,  429  a  18). 

It  was  natural  that  Plato  and  Aristotle,  whose  minds  were 
ruled  by  Socratic  standards  and  fixed  conditions  of  knowledge, 
should  have  been  disappointed  at  the  failure  of  Anaxagoras  to 
apply  his  doctrine  of  vovs.  The  new  agency,  vovs,  was  not  yet 
alight  with  finality  for  Anaxagoras.  It  remained  for  Socrates  to 
quicken  vovs  into  a  final  cause.  In  the  act  of  abandoning  \f/vxv  as 
a  kinetic  principle  philosophy  began  to  speak  in  such  terms  as 
t&v,  €fj.\f/vxos,  a\I/vxos  and  ^VX^CTLS.  The  real  substitute  for  kin- 
etic il/vxy  would  appear  only  when  Greek  philosophy  had  reached 
its  height. 


8.  TERMS  OF  THE  SUCCESSORS  OF  ANAXAGORAS. 

It  is  a  question  whether  Anaxagoras  deserved  the  reproach  of 
Aristotle  (Met.  985  a.  18  ff .)  to  the  effect  that,  when  he  had  used 
vovs  as  a  wxavri  irpos  T-qv  KOffnowouav,  he  reverted  to  it  only 
when  at  a  loss  for  a  cause,  in  other  cases  accounting  for  things  by 
any  other  cause  rather  than  vovs.  Philosophy  at  this  period 
found  new  life  in  the  doctrine  of  the  vovs  of  Anaxagoras.  Greek 
thought  had  been  advancing  all  the  way  from  Thales  to  Anaxagoras, 
but  the  heirs  to  the  terms  and  ideas  of  the  great  pre-Socratic 
were  unable  or  unwilling  to  take  advantage  of  their  heritage. 

There  are  no  extant  fragments  of  the  works  of  Archelaus. 
Diogenes  Laertius  (11,  16)  has  placed  him  for  us  as  an  Athenian 
or  a  Milesian,  a  pupil  of  Anaxagoras  and  a  teacher  of  Socrates. 

Aetius,  Dox.  331,  attributed  a  doctrine  to  him  in  these  terms: 
UTTO  depfJLov  Kal  kfjL^vx't'CLS  (rv&Trjvai  rov  KOGIJLOV.  For  him  ayp  and 
vovs  were  6  Qeos  (Aet.  Dox.  302),  but  the  doxographer  qualified 
0eos  as  not  KOOTXOTTOIOS. 

The  influence  of  Anaxagoras  on  Archelaus  is  apparent  in  the 
statement  (Philop.  de  an.  71,  17  Hayd.)  that  Archelaus  was  among 
those  who  said  that  the  all  was  moved  UTTO  rov  vov.  (We  note  in 
this  passage  rfj  \f/vxy  TO  KLvelv.)  A  tendency  to  employ  vovs  in  a 
particular  sense  appears  in  a  statement  attributed  to  Archelaus  by 
Hippolytus  wherein  he  granted  vovs  to  all  living  things  (Dox.  563) . 

If  the  system  of  Anaxagoras  were  to  be  judged  only  by  the 
representation  it  received  at  the  hands  of  Diogenes  of  Apollonia, 
then  Plato  would  have  been  justified  in  his  assertion  (Phaedo  98  B) 
that  Anaxagoras  made  no  use  of  vovs  but  treated  "air"  and 
"aether'*  as  causes.  (Cf.  Plato's  word  aroira  as  descriptive  of 
these  causes.) 

Aristotle's  statements  regarding  the  aWrjp  of  Anaxagoras  are  in 
place  in  a  consideration  of  the  system  of  Diogenes.  Aristotle 
(De  Caelo  302  a.  31)  noted  that  Anaxagoras  used  the  words  irvp 
and  aWrip  synonymously. 

In  an  effort  to  explain  the  phenomena  of  animate  life,  Diogenes 
limited  to  living  things  the  vovs  of  Anaxagoras  which  Aristotle 
(De  An.  405  a.  13)  has  called  the  Anaxagorean  dpx^-  The  term 
used  by  Diogenes  is  vorj<ns  and  vorjffis  was  for  Aristotle  himself 
(De  An.  407  a.  20)  vov  Kivr)<ns. 

43 


44  PRE-SOCRATIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  MOTION 

Simplicius  (Vor.  335)  ascribed  to  Diogenes  (Frag.  4  (Diels) 
Vor.  335)  an  arjp-apxrj  which  was  the  source  of  life  as  well  as 
of  \f/vxri  *cu  voxels.  In  the  words  of  Diogenes  (Frag.  4)  ^u%i?,  the 
same  for  all  living  things,  was  a^p.  (Cf.  Frag.  5.) 

Frag.  5  (Vor.  335)  contains  as  significant  terms  for  d^p-vo^o-is 
Kvftepvav,  Kparelv,  Beds.  Frag.  7  (Vor.  339)  describes  the  first 
principle  as  aldi-ov  KO.L  adavarov  ao>jua.  (Cf.  also  Frag.  8  Vor.  339.) 
Theophrastus  (Dox.  477)  gave  to  the  arjp  of  Diogenes  the  terms 
aTreipos  and  aldios. 

Aristotle's  statement  (De  An.  405  a.  21)  has  been  given  for 
Anaximenes  as  one  of  those  included  under  "certain  others,"  but 
Diogenes  is  deservedly  the  only  one  there  named  as  identifying 
\l/vxh  and  di7p.  di7p  is  there  described  as  TTOLVTUV  XeTrTojucpedraros. 
Aetius  (Dox.  392)  said  that  for  Anaximenes,  Anaxagoras,  Arche- 
laus,  and  Diogenes  ov<rla  ^uxrjs  was  aepudrjs.  However,  Diogenes 
is  the  only  one  whose  words  convict  him  of  that  charge.  Of 
Diogenes  it  can  be  said  as  of  no  other  philosopher  before  him  that 
to  have  faxy  was  to  be  tfj,\l/vxos.  In  Diogenes  we  find  true 
hylozoism.  Whereas  Anaxagoras  caught  his  vovs  from  above 
by  a  brilliant  stroke  that  did  not  fully  succeed  in  bringing  it 
down  to  things,  Diogenes  postulated  vorjcrus  inhering  in  arjp. 
He  outlined  his  monistic  system  with  open  eyes  in  contrast  to 
Xenophanes  whose  pantheism  probably  never  presented  itself 
to  his  own  mind. 

While  on  the  one  hand  the  strivings  of  Anaxagoras  were  wasted 
on  Diogenes  and  their  results  appropriated  by  conscious  dynamism, 
vovs  failed  equally  of  development  with  the  Atomists.  Leucippus 
is  credited  (Aet.  Dox.  321)  with  a  work  irepi  vov  of  which  we 
have  no  fragments.  In  the  fragments  of  the  works  of  Democritus 
we  find  terms  new  and  significant,  ^vxt  as  a  term  for  "our  soul" 
was  frequently  used  by  Democritus  (Cf.  Frags.  171,  159,  187 
Diels).  Frag.  1  (Vor.  385)  contains  the  term  ^uxcoois. 

Frag.  11  (Vor.  389),  describing  the  two  kinds  of  yv^rj  as 
and  ffKorirj,  indicates  a  critical  attitude  and  recalls 
56£a  of  Empedocles  (v.  343).  The  term  aij/vxos 
(Frag.  164  Vor.  414-415)  occurred  for  the  first  time  with  Demo- 
critus. (Cf.  also  the  term  a\oyos  of  this  fragment  (164)  and  the 
terms  ejui/^xos  and  a\f/vxos  of  the  introduction  to  the  fragment 
by  Sextus  Empiricus.) 


TERMS  OF  THE  SUCCESSORS  OF  ANAXAGORAS  45 


The  phrase  oaaa.  if/vx^  ex«  (Cf.  Anaxagoras)  recurs  in  Frag. 
278  (Vor.  435).  Here  ^vxy  is  confined  to  mortals  and  other  £coa. 

We  are  indebted  for  the  most  part  to  Aristotle  for  the  physical 
doctrines  of  the  Atomists.  He  gave  as  their  orotxeta  the  terms 
TO  7r\?7pes  /cat  TO  Kevov.  Simplicius  (Phys.  36,  1)  (Vor.  346)  used 
the  term  arojua  in  describing  the  doctrine  peculiar  to  cosmological 
atomism.  Aristotle  contributed  the  account  regarding  the 
"natural  necessity"  according  to  which  the  atoms  came  together. 
<£i>crts  was  given  as  the  principle  of  motion.  (Cf.  Phys.  265  b.  24.) 
Simplicius  (Phys.  327,  14  Vor.  364)  criticized  the  Atomists  for 
giving  no  atrt'a  but  airo  rauro/idrou  /cat  Tvxns  (Cf.  Aristotle,  Phys. 
196  a.  24.)  Cicero  (De  Deor.  Nat.  1,  24,  66)  in  the  words  "sed 
concursu  quodam  fortuito"  may  have  drawn  on  the  apparent 
identification  of  CLVTOHCLTOV  and  TUXT?  (Cf.  Arist.  Met.  984  b.  8). 

The  latent  materialism  of  Democritus  was  brought  out  by 
Aristotle  (De  Resp.  471  b.  30)  where  17  \f/vx"n  was  TO  Bep^ov  and 
certain  fl-x^a^a  in  the  air  were  called  vovs  /cat  faxy-  As  a 
statement  of  Democritus  we  have  (Plac.  Dox.  390)  the  assertion 
that  all  things  juerexet  tvxw  TTOIO.S.  The  "incorporeality"  of  the 
TTUP  of  the  Atomists  was  described  by  Philoponus  (Vor.  369)  as 
ev  ffujJuiffLV  affunaTov  Stct  \eTTTOfJLepeiav. 

Democritus  received  much  attention  from  Aristotle  in  the 
De  Anima.  Although  Aristotle  admitted  (405  a.  13)  that  Anax- 
agoras meant  by  vovs  something  different  from  \f/vxri,  he  seemed 
certain  that  Democritus  used  vovs  and  if/vx^  as  interchangeable 
terms  (Cf.  404  a.  28).  ^i>xi?  proper  is  for  Democritus 
TTVP  rt  /cat  depfiov  (404  a.  1).  "The  spherical  atoms,"  continued 
Aristotle,  "Democritus  called  irvp  /cat  ^vx"n-  These  spherical  soul- 
atoms  most  easily  find  their  way  through  things  and,  being 
themselves  in  motion,  they  set  other  things  in  motion,  for  the 
Atomists  assumed  17  \j/vxr)  as  that  which  furnished  motion  to 
living  things."  No  such  sharp  lines  as  Aristotle  drew  around  vovs 
existed  for  the  Atomists  whose  use  of  the  term  was  probably  akin 
to  its  force  in  the  phrase  €/c  TTCLVTOS  voov  of  Herodotus  (8,  97)  . 

Aristotle  (De  An.  405  a.  8)  commended  Democritus  for  neatness 
of  expression.  Perhaps  the  greatest  contribution  of  systems 
that  failed  to  develop  the  idea  of  vovs  was  the  contribution  of 
more  precise  and  accurate  terminology  for  ideas  already  in  the 
mind  of  philosophy. 


9.  SUMMARY. 

It  remains  to  review  in  these  systems,  all  of  which  were  incom- 
plete, the  instances  of  the  use  of  \l/vxri  as  a  term  for  motion.  The 
early  lonians,  for  the  most  part  oblivious  of  the  real  problem, 
included  motion  in  the  generic  notion  of  cause.  In  particular 
instances  they  used  the  expression  \f/vx^  exew  as  merely  equiv- 
alent to  KLvrjriKov  won.  Again,  when  speaking  of  beings  of  a 
limited  sphere,  they  expressed  the  property  of  life  by  the  same 
phrase — ^vxhv  'extiv.  \f/vxy  possibly  came  to  stand  with  some 
for  the  general  principle  of  Klvrjcris  which,  while  it  had  not  yet 
worked  itself  out  into  a  separate  force,  was  nevertheless  on  the 
way  to  becoming  a  specific  cause. 

In  the  period  of  transition,  when  \f/vxr]  as  a  dynamic  force  was 
passing  into  if/vxri  KCLL  i>ovs  and  into  vovs  as  a  term  by  itself  for  a 
mechanical  and  a  final  cause,  whether  through  an  over  hasty 
advance  or  through  a  reaction,  thinkers  in  all  good  faith  gave  the 
power  of  thought  even  to  all  things.  \l/vxy  in  their  minds  had  not 
yet  fully  separated  from  things  when,  with  Heraclitus,  a  material 
principle  that  was  falfwov  replaced  the  apx?)  which  had  before 
been  aeiKtvrjTov.  \l/vxh  had  not  so  much  narrowed  as  it  had  con- 
tinued, almost  in  a  faded  sense,  as  the  principle  of  motion  for 
all  things  to  which  the  term  $uov  had  been  extended.  Thus 
"whatever  has  ^ux^"  stood  now  for  all  things  whatsoever  and 
again  for  all  things  with  life.  Moreover,  from  philosophers  yet 
lacking  sharp  distinctions  of  the  power  of  life  and  the  power  of 
thought  we  may  expect  such  statements  as  those  of  Epicharmus 
to  the  effect  that  all  living  being  is  endowed  with  thought  and 
attempts  such  as  those  of  Philolaus  to  distinguish  the  power  of 
thought  in  man  and  in  nature.  Heraclitus  and  Empedocles  were 
marked  by  this  tendency  to  grant  <j>povr)<ris  to  all  things. 

The  pivotal  idea  of  all  philosophy  before  Socrates  is  the  vovs  of 
Anaxagoras.  This  cosmothetic  force,  vovs,  was  for  him  the  only 
thing  absolutely  separate  and  unmixed,  but  his  language  at 
that  time  offered  no  better  terms  for  it  than  XeTrroraros  and 
Kadapuraros .  The  idea  of  an  efficient  force  was  for  Anaxagoras 
paralleled  by  the  notion  of  true  immateriality.  Empedocles  had 
veiled  the  aspects  of  the  separate  moving  power  under  poetical 
and  figurative  terms.  The  genius  of  Diogenes  of  Apollonia  was 

46 


SUMMARY  47 

not  great  enough  for  his  inheritance  and  so,  in  the  answer 
v6r)<ns-br]p  he  returned  to  a  position  which  philosophy  had 
outgrown  and  in  his  self-satisfied  cosmological  monism  he  can  be 
rated  only  below  the  early  lonians.  The  philosophers  before 
Anaxagoras  had  all  tended  towards  a  separation  of  force  from 
matter  and  in  their  hylokineticism  may  be  regarded  as  the  fore- 
runners of  dualism  in  a  sense  in  which  the  acknowledged  hylozoist 
can  never  be  so  considered.  At  this  point  it  took  genius  to  see 
that  the  problem  was  not  solved  by  the  mere  naming  of  yv&fjLrj  or 
voi>s  as  a  separate  force. 

While  philosophy,  rising  to  the  distinction  of  the  element 
of  thought  and  the  element  of  life,  was  separating  a  rational  force 
from  "first  substance,"  it  did  not  all  at  once  desert  its  old  position, 
but  left  the  element  of  life  inhering  in  all  matter.  At  this  time 
terms  for  life  and  terms  for  distinctions  of  powers  came  to  be  used 
in  a  more  conscious  sense. 

In  Diogenes  of  Apollonia  we  find  frequent  use  of  the  terms  for 
life  and  a  distinction  of  \f/vxr]  and  vorj<ns.  txtiv  vorjcriv  took  on 
with  him  definite  meaning,  while  there  seems  to  have  been  in  his 
mind  a  complete  identification  of  the  ideas  connoted  by  the  phrases 
eijuf/vxov  elvai  and  ^vxrjv  txw- 

The  inestimable  value  of  the  Anaxagorean  vovs  was  ceded  away 
and  its  true  development  was  again  thwarted  when  philosophy,  in 
the  system  of  the  Atomists,  turned  into  the  lane  that  must  lead 
to  a  dead  wall.  However,  the  appearance,  at  this  point,  of  the 
first  systems  of  latent  panpsychism  on  the  one  hand  and  of  latent 
materialism  on  the  other  can  be  regarded  as  part  of  the  growth  of 
philosophy  in  the  sense  that,  while  the  natural  tendency  of  the 
sincerely  philosophizing  mind  is  in  neither  direction,  these  systems, 
evolved  before  adequate  notions  or  terms  for  the  immaterial  order 
had  been  advanced,  in  the  light  of  the  system  of  Aristotle  would 
serve  as  instances  of  cast-off  hypotheses. 

Among  the  words  of  Democritus  we  find  the  terms  £"0)77,  \f/vx<*)<Ti>s 
and  the  noteworthy  use  of  aXcryos  and  of  a^vxos.  The  ova  a 
x«t  phrase  recurring  in  Democritus  is  equivalent  to 
without  the  uncertainty  attending  its  use  by  Anaxagoras. 

As  the  extension  of  the  term  \f/vxy  became  more  restricted  by 
lines  of  demarcation  separating  the  regions  of  speculation,  active 
specialization  in  one  sphere  attached  more  definite  sense  to  terms 
hitherto  used  with  a  vague  meaning.  No  clear  notions  of  imma- 


48  PRE-SOCRATIC  PRINCIPLE  OF  MOTION 

nent  and  of  transient  motion  had  yet  been  conceived.  </>u<ns  and 
eaaa  had  appeared  as  terms  of  Philolaus,  and  Plato  tells  us,  in  a 
characteristic  speculation  on  the  derivation  of  the  term  ^vxn,  that 
it  was  a  refinement  of  the  expression  17  fyvaiv  b\el  KCLL  ex**-  The 
Atomists,  less  inexcusably  than  the  philosopher  of  today,  thought 
to  solve  the  problem  of  motion  by  the  doctrine  of  "natural  neces- 
sity" or  self -movement.  We  have  noted  the  terms  </>u<ns  and 
TO  avTOfjLaTov  ascribed  to  them  by  Aristotle.  On  secondary 
authority  Alcmaeon  has  been  credited  with  <£u<7is  auro/d^ros 
KCLT'  aidiov  K.(vi}aiv.  The  term  aeifaov  for  the  dpxi?  of  Heraclitus, 
who  attributed  natural  energy  to  his  TrDp-dpx??,  appeared  simul- 
taneously with  an  incipient  effort  to  separate  original  motion  from 
original  matter.  A  fragment  occurring  in  Stobaeus  (Flor.  1, 
180  a.)  and  credited  to  Heraclitus  by  Diels  (Vor.  78)  reads:  ^UXTJS 
kffTi  \6yos  eavTov  av&v.  Anaxagoras,  refusing  to  other  things 
existence  c<£'  eauroj,  demanded  an  unmixed  and  separate  char- 
acter for  a  vovs  which  was  avroKparr]s.  Aristotle  (De.  An.  404 
a.  8)  credited  the  Atomists  with  KLVov^eva  KO.L  CLVTCL  as  a  term  for 
their  first  principles.  The  language  of  all  these  attempts  fore- 
shadows Plato's  terms  for  the  definition  of  ^vx'n  proper  (Cf. 
Phaedrus  245  C) — TO  O.VTO  eauro  KIVOVV. 

The  "natural  necessity"  explanation,  complete  only  when  sup- 
plemented by  the  theory  of  matter  and  form,  did  not  satisfy  the 
Greek  physicist  whose  science  must  be  crowned  by  his  cosmology. 
The  first  Greek  thinkers  set  the  problem  in  a  question  which  for 
us  would  read:  To  what  shall  we  refer  the  activity  of  transient 
material  energy  and  the  immanent  principle  of  animation?  This 
question  later  widened  to  include:  To  what  shall  we  refer  the 
spiritual  activity  within  us  which  is  but  extrinsically  dependent  on 
its  organism?  faxy  activity  had  from  the  first  demanded  Aris- 
totle's /w>p0i7.  The  connotation  of  kinetic  \f/vxri  in  objective  sys- 
tems which  held  no  adequate  notion  of  immateriality  determines, 
from  a  certain  standpoint,  the  position  of  each  pre-Socratic  phil- 
osopher. 

The  charge  that  the  earliest  of  these  thinkers  endowed  a\f/vxa 
with  \l/vxy  (Diog.  L.  I,  24)  is  unfair  in  the  sense  in  which 
it  is  made.  Out  of  his  wealth  of  thought  and  term  Aristotle 
(De.  gen.  an.  762  a.  18)  could  guardedly  say:  irai>Ta 


SUMMARY  \  : ..;  &Q. 

The  subsequent  history  of  Greek  philosophy  may  be  written 
in  outline  in  the  words  of  three  men.  The  true  development  of 
the  vovs  of  Anaxagoras  came  only  in  the  doctrine,  advanced  on 
empirical  principles  by  Socrates,  that  whatever  exists  for  a  useful 
purpose  must  be  the  work  of  an  Intelligence.  (Cf.  Xen.  Mem.  1, 
4,4.) 

Plato  (Timaeus-29  D)  on  the  way  to  truth  said  that  6  K6<7/zos 
was  foios  €{JL\l/vxos  evvovs  through  the  Trpovoia  rov  Beov. 

Philosophy  made  a  transition  in  the  words  of  Aristotle  (De  Caelo 
271  a.  33):  6  dt  6eos  /ecu  17  <f>v<ns  ovdev  ^arrjv  TTOLOIXTLV.  There  ever 
remains  the  a^oBavfjiaaroTepos  of  Socrates  (Mem.  1,  4)  regarding 
the  Creator  of  foja  en<j>pova  /ecu  evepya.  Nature  must  seek  the 
source  of  its  laws  in  God.  When  the  genius  of  Aristotle,  never 
deserting  his  position  in  passing  from  kingdom  to  kingdom  in 
philosophy,  had  contributed  a  irpurov  KLVOVV  aKivrjTov  (Phys.  256  a.) 
and  a  v6rj<rt,s  vojffeus  (Met.  1071  b.  20),  it  remained  for  Christian 
philosophy  to  complete  this  last  word  of  pagan  thought  with  the 
necessary  ideas  of  the  providence  and  the  personality  of  God. 
Christian  philosophy  in  turn  is  complete  only  when  religion  binds 
the  world  of  the  physicist  and  the  psychologist  back  to  God,  Who 
has  endowed  His  creature  man  with  a  mind  having  as  its  object 
Truth,  the  First  and  the  Last. 


BIBLIOGRAPHY 

I.  Texts  of  Sources  and  Commentaries. 

ARISTOTLE,  Works.     Bekker.     (Berlin,  1831-1870). 

Editions  of  separate  treatises: 

Metaphysica,  Christ.     (Leipsig,  1895). 

De  Caelo,   De  Genera tione  et  Corruptione.     Prantl.     (Leipsig, 
1881). 

Physica.     Prantl.     (Leipsig,  1879). 

De  Anima,  Hicks.     (Cambridge,  1907). 

Aristotle's  Psychology.     Wallace.     (Cambridge,  1882). 
PLATO,  Works.     Bekker.     (Berlin,  1816-1823). 

MULLACH,  Fragmenta  Philosophorum  Graecorum.     (Paris,  1883-1888). 
DIELS,  Die  Fragmente  der  Vorsokratiker.     (Berlin,  1906). 

Doxographi  Graeci.     (Berlin,  1879). 

RITTER  ET  PRELLER,  Historia  Philosophiae  Graecae.     (Gotha,  1913). 
WIMMER,  Theophrasti  Opera.     (Leipsig,  1862). 
JACKSON,  Texts  for  the  History  of  Greek  Philosophy.     (London,  1901). 

II.  Secondary  Authorities. 

ZELLER,  Die  Philosophic  der  Griechen.     (Leipsig,  1892). 

BURNET,  Early  Greek  Philosophy.     (London  and  Edinburgh,  1892). 

TANNERY,  Pour  1'histoire  de  la  science  hellene.     (Paris,  1887). 

GOMPERZ,  Griechische     Denker.     (Leipsiz,     1896).     (Trans,     by     Magnus, 

London,  1901). 
ADAMSON,  The  Development  of  Greek  Philosophy.     (Edinburgh  and  London, 

1908). 

BENN,  Greek  Philosophers,  Vol.  I.     (London,  1883). 
BAEUMKER,  Das    Problem    der    Materie    in    der    Griechische    Philosophic. 

(Minister,  1890). 

BEARE,  Greek  Theories  of  Elementary  Cognition.     (Oxford,  1906). 
MILLERD,  On  the  Interpretation  of  Empedocles.     (Chicago,  1908). 
FAIRBANKS,  The  First  Philosophers  of  Greece.     (London,  1898). 
BAKEWELL,  Source-book  in  Ancient  Philosophy.     (New  York,  1907). 
ROHDE,  Psyche.     (Leipsig,  1898). 

MULLER,  Lectures  on  the  Origin  of  Religion.     (London,  1878). 
TURNER,  History  of  Philosophy.     (Boston  and  London,  1903). 
STOCKL,  Lehrbuch  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophic.     (Ed.  Ill,  Mainz,  1888). 

(Trans,  by  Finlay,  Dublin,  1887). 

WEBER,  History  of  Philosophy  trans,  by  Thilly.     (New  York,  1896). 
WINDELBAND,  History  of  Philosophy  trans,  by  Tufts.     (New  York,  1901). 
UEBERWEG,  Grundriss  der  Geschichte  der  Philosophic.     (Berlin,  1894). 
GONZALEZ,  Historia    de    la    Filosofia.     (Madrid,      1886).     (French     trans. 

Paris,  1890-91). 

TEICHMULLER,  Studien  zur  Geschichte  der  Begriffe.     (Berlin,  1874). 
50 


BIBLIOGRAPHY  51 

EISLER,  Worterbuch  der  Philosophischen  Begriffe.     (Berlin,  1910). 

ARLETH,  in  Archiv  f.  d.  Geschichte  d.  Phil.,  VIII.  1,  pp.  59-85,  VIII,  2,  pp. 

190-205. 

ZELLER,  in  Archiv.  f.  d.  Geschichte  d.  Phil.,  VIII,  2,  pp.  151-152. 
HAMMOND,  in  Philosophical  Review,  Vol.  IV.     (July,  1895). 
AVELING,  in  Catholic  Encyclopedia,  Vol.  III.     (Cause.) 
DRISCOLL,  in  Catholic  Encyclopedia,  Vol.  I.     (Animism,) 


VITA 

The  author  of  this  dissertation,  Sister  Mary  Thomas  Aquinas 
O'Neill,  O.  S.  D.,  was  born  March  7,  1884,  in  Madison,  Wisconsin. 
She  pursued  her  elementary  studies  in  Saint  Raphael's  parochial 
school  of  her  native  city  under  the  direction  of  the  Sisters  of 
Saint  Dominic  of  Sinsinawa,  Wisconsin.  She  was  graduated  from 
the  Madison  High  School  in  1902.  In  1904  she  entered  the 
novitiate  of  the  Sisters  of  Saint  Dominic,  at  Sinsinawa,  Wisconsin. 
From  1906  to  1911  she  taught  in  Saint  Clara  Academy,  Sinsinawa, 
and  worked  at  intervals  in  the  University  of  Chicago  and  in 
Saint  Clara  College.  In  1911  she  began  work  at  the  Catholic 
University  of  America,  receiving  the  A.  B.  degree  in  1912  and  the 
M.  A.  degree  in  1913. 


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