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Author
Title
This book should be returned on or before the date
last marked below.
A
PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
A Primer of Indian Logic
ACCORDING TO
ANNAMBHATTA'S TARKASAMGRAHA
BY
MAHAMAHOPADHVAYA \ 7 IDYAVACASPATI
S. KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI, M.A., I.E.S.
PROFBSJOR OF SANSKRIT AND COMPARATIVE PHILOLOGY
PRESIDENCY COLLEGE
AND
CURATOR, GOVERNMENT ORIENTAL MANUSCRIPTS LIBRARY, MADRAS
SECOND EDITION
THE
KUPPUSWAMI SASTRI RESEARCH INSTITUTE
MYLAPORE, MADRAS
1951
Four EDITION 1932
SECOND EDITION 1951
PRINTED AT
THE MADRAS LAW JOURNAL PRFSS
MYLAPORE, MADRAS
PREFACE TO THE FIRST EDITION
Pdniniyam ca sarvasastropakarakam.
"JLogicand grammar are indispensable aids for
^every branch of knowledge." --.-^*
This little book, called A PRIMER OF IKDI AW
LOGIC, is primarily based on Annambhatta's Tarka-
samgraha and is designed to serve as an introduction,
not only to the btudy of Indian logic as embodied in
the Nyaya-Vaisesika literature in Sanskrit, but also to
the study of Indian philosophy in its diverse systems.
In preparing this book, the oft-quoted Sanskrit dictum
given above was borne in mind. This book comprises
three paits. Part I contains an historical introduction.
Part II gives the Sanskrit text of the Tarkasamgraha
in the Dcvanfijjari script and in English transliteration.
Part III forms the bulk of this work and contains an
English rendering of the Sanskrit text accompanied by
a critical and comparative exposition of each topic in
English. In this exposition, an endeavour is made to
combine strict fidelity to the original Sastraic texts in
Sanskrit with an intelligible presentation of the techni-
cal ideas of Indian systems of philosophy in an English
garb. In the course of this endeavour, it has become
unavoidably necessary to coin and bring into vogue
certain technical terms, which, at first sight, look some-
what uncouth.
ft
Nearly two years ago, I undertook to write this
book for the benefit of modern University students,
more especially B.A. students offering philosophy as
their optional subject, in compliance with a suggestion
made by my esteemed friend, Prof. P. N. Srinivasa-
chariar, M.A., Professor of Philosophy in the Pachai-
yappa's College, Madras. Messrs. P. Varadachari & Co.,
Publishers and Book-sellers, 8, Linga Chett) Street,
Madras.^SSflfJly undertook to publish this work. The
printing of parts II and III was finished in January
1931 and these two parts were separately made avail-
able to students in the beginning of 1931. The com-
plete work, with part I also and a very useful Sanskrit
glossary, is now made available in a complete form;
and in this form, it is hoped that it will be received
well by all the students and scholars interested in
Indian philosophy.
The bulk of the matter in this book is directly
based on Sastraic texts in Sanskrit. In the course of
the preparation of this work, I consulted well-known
English books on Indian philosophy like Prof. Radha-
krishnan's ' Indian Philosophy', Dr. Keith's < Atomism
and Indian Logic', and Dr. Handle's 'Indian Logic in
the Early Schools'. My thanks are due, in particular, to
two of my young friends and former pupils to
Mr. T. R. Chintamani, M.A., Senior Lecturer in Sans-
krit, Madras University, for preparing the table of
contents and the Sanskrit glossary, and to Mr. T.
Chandrasekharan, M.A., (Diploma in German), Profes-
sor of History of Sanskrit Language and Literature,
Madras Sanskrit College, and Manager, Journal of
tts
Oriental Research, Madras, for reading the proofs. I
should also take this opportunity to express my thank-
fulness to the Madras Law Journal Press, Mylapore,
for its very kind and efficient co-operation in seeing
this work through the press and to Pandit T. S.
Subrahmanya Sastri (Sahitya-$iromani) of the M.L.J.
Press* for the alert and willing assistance which he
rendered at various stages in getting me to do the work
in the midst of my multifarious duties.
S. KUPPUSWAM1 SASTRI
5, North Mada Street, Mylapore,
llth March, 1932.
PREFACE TO THE SECOND EDITION
The authorities of the Kuppuswami Sastri
Research Institute have great pleasure in bringing out
this second edition of the Primer of Indian Logfc by
Prof. S. Kuppuswami Sastri, and pnMi hint; it on
the occasion of the Seventh Foundation Day celebra-
tions of the Institute founded in 'the name of the
author.
Dr. A. Sankaran, M.A., PH.D., and Dr. V. Raghavan,
M.A., PH.D., were in charge of the work of !iri;i;;i,i^
out this second edition.
The corrections noted by the author in his own
copy of the book preserved in the Institute Library have
been incorporated here.
Sri K, Venkateswara Sarma, M.A., was of much
assistance in the reading of the proofs and seeing the
work through the press.
The thanks of the Institute authorities are specially
due to Sri N. Ramaratnam, M.A., B.L., Proprietor,
M. L. J. Press, for his continued co-operation in the
work of the Institute.
7th Sept. 1951.
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
PART I
Pages.
Logic in the West and in India : ... iii to v
TFife meaning of the term Logic ... iii
Sanskrit Equivalents of the term Logic
Logic a system of Philosophy ... iv
Tarkasastra contrasted with other
sastras ... ... iv & v
Antecedents and foreshadovvings of the
Vaisesika and Nyaya v to ix
Intuitionistic and rationalistic tenden-
cies ... ... v & vi
^Origin of the Nyaya system of Philo-
sophical thought ... ... vi & vii
Darsanas Astika and Nastika ... vii & viii
^Beginnings of the Vaisesika and Nyaya
systems ... ... viii & Jx
How the Vai : eika and Nyaya schools
emerged and when the doctrines
were redacted into sutras ... ix to xx
Manu and Yajnavalkya: their attitude
to Tarkasastra ... ... ix & x
''Rise of pre-Buddhistic logic and meta-
physics ... ... x & xi
Anti-vedic Vaisesika ... ... xi & xii
"'NySLya-sutras and Vaisc$ika-sutras ... xii
Dill
Date of the sutras, Jacobi's views
criticised
Tarkasastra pre-supposed by Kautalya.
Nyaya in Patanjali
The Names Vaisesika and Nyaya; The
Nature, Aim and Scope of the two
systems
Syncretism and Synthesis ...
Pairs of allied systems
After the sutras to Udayana ... xxvi to xxxiv
Is Vatsyayana himself the author of the
aphoristic statements in the Bhasya? xxviii &xxix
Uddyotakara and Dharmakirti
Vacaspatimisra
Jayanta
Bhasarvajna
Udayana and his contribution
Sridhara
After Udayana to Annambhatta
givaditya's Saptapadarthi
Gangesa and his special contribution
(The categoristic method replaced
by the epistemological) ... xxxv to xxxviii
Vardhamanopadhyaya ... ... xxxviii
Rucidatla ... ... ... xxxviii
Raghunatha-siromani, Jagadisa and
Gadadhara ... ... xxxix & xl
Samkaramisra and Visvanatha ... xl
Annambhatta ... ... xli & xlii
Concluding remarks and general
estimate .. xlii & xliii
xiii to xv
xvi to xviii
xix
xx to xxiii
xxiii to'xxv
xxv
. xxx & xxxi
. xxxi & xxxii
. xxxii
. xxxiii
xxxiii&xxxiv
. xxxiv
. xxxiv to liii
xxxiv& xxxv
ix
PART II
Sanskrit text with English transliteration 1 to 37
PART III
Mangala ... ... 3
Explanation of the term Tarkasamgraha 4
tbe Seven categories ... ... 4 & 5
General Remarks on the Categories ... 5 to 8
The Categories of Annambhatta com-
pared with those of Gautama ... 6
Categories according to the Mimamsakas 6
,, Samkhyas ... 6
Saktias a category ... ... 7 to 8
Category Dravya, Classified ... 8 to 12
General Remarks on the Classification ... 9 & 10
Basis of Classification ..." ... 9 & 10
Definition and its functions ... 10 to 12
Category Guna ... ,.. 13
PaUnjali's conception of Guna ... 13
The Mimamsaka's conception of Guna ... 13
The Samkhya conception of Guna ... 13 & 14
The Vedantin's conception of Guna ... 14
Vista-gunas and Samanya-gunas ... 14 & 15
Category Karma ... ... 15
Kanada's classification of Karma ... 15 & 16
Duration of a Karma ... ... 16 & 17
The Vaiyakarana's view of Karma ... 17
Kriya according to the Mimamsakas ... 17 & 18
Categories Samanya, Visesa, and Sama-
vaya ... ,... 18
General Remarks on these categories ... 18 to 24
Kanada's conception of Saminya ... 24 to 26
General Remarks on ViSesas ... 26 to 28
on Samavaya ... 28 & 29
Varieties of relationship ... ... 29 to 30
The conception of Jati according to the
Vai>akaranas .-30
'Bhattas ... 30 & t ll
Pratftiakaras ... 31 & 32
,, Bauddbas ... 32
M Advaitins ... 32 & 33
Samavaya according to the Prabhakarai
, 9 B h a t a s and
j ^ Advaitins ... 33
Jatibidhaka according to Udayana . 33 to 36
General Discussion on Samanya and
*' Viiesa * ... ... 36 & 37
Category Abhava ... ... 37
Nature and Classification of Abhava ... 37 to 45
Abhava according to the Bhattas ... 45 & 46
Prabhakaras ... 46 & 47
Mok$a a variety of Abhava ... 48
The Nyaya conception of Sambandha as
external relation ... ... 48 to 52
Definition of Prthivl and its classification 52
Definition of Ap ... ... 52 & 53
Tejas ... ... 53 & 54
f , Vayu ... . 54 & 55
Akaia ... ... 55
General remarks on these five substances. 55 & 56
The Atpmic Theory ... ... 56 to 58
Nature of Paramflnu, Dvyanuka and
Tryanuka ... ... ... 58 to 62
Weak points in the Atomic theory ... 62 & 63
Greek influence on the Atomic theory ... 63 & 64
A discussion on Prthivl and Ap ... 64 to 67
. Tejas ... ... 67 & 68
"-! Vayu ... ... 68
Akasa ... ... 69
Definition and classification of Kala and
Dik ... ... ... 69&70
General remarks on Kala and Dik ... 70 to 72
Conception of Mahakala ... ... 72 & 73
The Vaiyakarana conception of Kala ... 73
Bauddha ... 73
Advaita ,, ... 73
Sariikhya ... 73
Definition of Atman and its classification,
Manas ... ... 74 & 75
General discussion on the nature, etc., of
Atman ... .- v . ... 75 to 78
Jivatman and Paramatman ... ... 78 to 80
Atman in the Sariikhya and Yoga sys-
tems ... ... ... 80
Atman according to the Bhattas and the
Prabhakaras ... 80 & 81
Ramanuja ... 81
-> the Bauddhas ... 81
theAdvaitins ... 81
General discussion regarding Manas ... 81 to 83
Manas according to the Bhattas ... 82
Xll
Manas according to the Advaitins 83
Nyaya Realism ... ... ... 83 & 84
God in the Nyaya and Vaisesika systems 84 & 85
Rupa and its classification ... ... 86
Rasa ... ... 86
Gandha ... ... 86 & 87
Sparsa ... ... 87
General remarks on these Gunas ... 87 to 89
Pilupakavada and Pitharapakavada ... 89 & 90
Sarhkhya and its varieties ... ... 90 & 91
General remarks on numbers ... 91 to 93
Apeksabuddhi ... ... ... 91 to 93
Parimana and its varieties ... ... 94
Prthaktva ... ... ... 94
Sarhyoga ... ... ... 94
Vibhaga ... ... ... 94
Paratva and Aparatva 94 & 95
General remarks on these qualities ... 95 to 100
Gurutva ... ... ... 100
Dravatva ... ... 100
Sneha ... ... ... 100 & 101
General remarks on these qualities ... 101
gabda and its kinds ... 101
general remarks on the nature of sound 101 to 103
Conception of sound according to the
Bhattas and the Prabhakaras ... 103
The Doctrine of Sphota ... ... 103 & 104
Cognition and its kinds ... ... 104
Recollection ... ... 104,
Experience and its kinds ... ... 104
Valid experience ... ... 104
xiii
Erroneous experience ... ... 104
"Four kinds of valid experience .' 163
Instruments bf valid experience ... 105
General remarks on the nature of Buddhi '105
Buddhi according to Samkhyas and
Advaitins ... ... 103
NirvrAalpaka and Savikaloaka 'Tftana' ... 105 to 107
Refutation of the Samkhya, vieW' o'f
Buddhi ... ... ..'. 107'to 110
Smrti and Anubhava ... llfrto 112
Varieties of Anubhava 112 & 113
Nyaya theory of Truth and Error ... 113 to 123
Khyativadas (Theories of Error) ... 12^ to
Atmakhyativada... ... ' ..
Asatkhyativada ... ... -. 124' &'
Akhyativada ... ... ..
Anyathakhyativada t ...
An Examination of the Khyativadas ... 127 to 131
The Pragmatism of the Naiyayika ... 131 16 134
RTya'ya theory of truth and error con-
trasted with the views' of other
schools ... ... ' 134 to 138
A synthetic review of the theories of r
Bbrama (error) ... ^ ... 138 & 139
Instruments of knowledge in Indian '
Philosophy... ... ...
Arthapatti as a distinct Pramana ... 14(J to l46
^our kinds of Pramariis s "... 146
Karana ... 146
Karana ... ' 146
B
XIV
Karya ... ... ... 146
Kinds of Karanas ... ... 147
Samavayikarana ... ... 147
Asamavayikarana ... ... 147
Nimittakarana ... ... 147
Asadharanakarana ... ... 147 & J48
General remarks on causality ... 148 & J9
The meaning of Anyathasiddha ... 149 to 154
Conception of Karya ... ... 154 & 155
General remarks on Samavayikarana ... 155 to 157
General remarks on Asamavayikarana ... 157 to 159
theory of causation ... ... 159 to 163
Pratyaksakarana ... ... 163
Pratyakajnana and its varieties ... 163
Nirvikalpakapratyaksa ... ... 163
Savikalpakapratyaksa ... ... 163 & 164
General remarks on Pratyaksa ... 164 to 164
Vaiyakarana view of Nirvikalpakaprat-
yaka ... ... 167 to 169
Advaita view of Nirvikalpakapratyaksa 169 to 171
Intuition in Nyaya-Vaiscika system ... 171 & 172
Definition of Pratyaksa according to the
Bhattas and Prabhakaras ... 172 & 173
Sannikarsa and its varieties ... 173 to 175
General remaks on Sannikarsa ... 176 to 187
Alaukikapratyaksa ... ... 180 to 185
^laukikasannikarsa ... ... 185 to 187
CHAPTER II
Definition of the Inftrument of Inference 188
Inferential cognition ... 188
XV
Definition of Subsumptive reflection . 188
Co-existence 189
Paksadharmata ... 189
Anumana and Anviksa ... ... 189
Inference includes all knowledge ... 189 &. 190
<jeral remarks on the terms Paksa,
Sadhya and Hetu or Sadhana ... 190 & 191
General remarks on Anumiti ... 191 & 192
Explanation of Paksata ... ... 192 to 194
Paramarsa examined 194 to 197
Paramarsa not necessary according to
Mimamsakas and Vedantins ... 195 to 197
Vyapti and its definition ... ... 197 & 198
The history of Vyapti ... ... 198 to 201
Nature of the relation of Vyapti 201 & 202
Early writers on Vyapti ... ... 202 & 203
Process of inference ... ...203 to 207
The negative phase of Vyapti ... 207
Bhattas and Vyapti * ... ... 207 to 209
Prabhakaras and Vyapti ... ... 209 to 211
Adverse criticism of inference by Carva-
kas and the Western Empiricist ... 211 & 212
Refutation of this criticism by the Mi-
mSmsakas, the Naiyayikas and
Bradley ... - 212 to 215
Two kinds of inference ... ... 215
Inference for oneself ... ... 215 & 216
Inference for others ... ... 216
General remarks on the two kinds ... 217
Distinction between Svarthanumana and
Pararthanumana ... ... 217 & 218
XVI
Benedetto Croce's view on the above ... 218 & 21*9
Nyayaprayoga ... ... 220
The five members of a syllogism ... 220 & 221
Lingaparamarsa ... ... 221
General remarks on the above ... 221 to 223
Vatsyayana on the five members ... 223 & 224
Professor Randle on the five members ... 224 to 226
The five-membered syllogism of Nyaya
contrasted with the syllogisms of the
Mimamsakas and the Bauddhas ... 226 to 229
Nyaya syllogism compared with Aristo-
jtelian syllogism ... 229 to 231
Kinds qiprobans ... 231 & 232
Profraijsof.the Anvayavyatirekl type ... 232
Kevlanvayi type ... 232
Kevalavyatireki type ... 232
Paksa .- ... 233
... 234
... ... 234
Probans according to the Advaita
.V.edSntins 234
Bhaftas .- 234
Fallacious reasons ^ ... ... 235
Straying-reason (Vyabhicarin) ... 235
The Common stray er (sddharana) ... 235
The Uncommon strayer (asddhcrana)*.. 236
Non-conclusive strayer (anupasamharin) 236
Adverse reason (viruddha) ... 236
Opposable reason (satpratipaksa) ... 237
Unestablished reason (asiddha) ... 237
Asrayasiddha ... ... 237
Svarupasiddha ... ... 238
Vyopyatvasiddha ... ... 238
Stultified reason (badhita} ... ... 239
General remarks on semblances of reason 240 to 248
Hetvabhasas according to the Vaisesikas 248 & 249
-I ^CHAPTER III
Uj^gaua. ... ... 250
General remarks on Upamana ... 251 & 252
CHAPTER IV
Valid verbal testimony ... ... 253
Definition of word ... ... 253
General remarks on verbal testimony ... 253>to 255
Charge of Dogmatism against Indian
Philosophy examined ... ... 254 & 255
Padasakti ... ... 255
Causes of Verbal ,-.,: i ... 255
Verbal expectancy ... ... 255
Congruity ... ... 256
Proximity ... ... 256
General remarks on the causes of verbal
cognition ... 256 to 259
Sabdavrttis ... ... 259 & 260
Classes of sentences ... ... 260
Erroneous experiences and their kinds ... 261
Doubt ... ... 261
Misapprehension ... ... 261
Indirect argument ... ... 261
Two kinds of recollection ... ... 261
Qualities Pleasure, Pain, Desire, Dis-
like, Volitional effort, Dharma, and
Adharma ... ... ... 262
The Vise$agunas ... ... 262
Three kinds of tendencies (samsktira) ... 263
Activity ... ... 263
Generality ... ... 264
Specialities ... 264
Inherence ... ... 264
Antecedent non-existence ... 265
Annihilative f , 265
Total ... ... 265
Reciprocal 265
Conclusion ... 265 & 266
Sanskrit Glossary ... ... 267 to 282
II wr: u
II d4vHiJ4.5 II
A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
PART I
INTRODUCTION
SECTION I
PRELIMINARY: LOGIC IN THE WEST AND IN INDIA
IrCthe cultural history of Europe, over twenty-two
centuries ago, thinking, like speaking, needed an
elucidative and regulative aid and found it in a distinct
branch of investigation, which was founded and orga-
nised in Greece by Aristotle and which came to be
designated Logic. It is significant that the name logic
is etymologically connected with the Greek word logos,
which denotes both 'thought* and 'word* or 'discourse*.
The significance of this etymological connection can be
adequately appreciated if h is remembered that logic,
in its rise and development in the western world,
particularly in Greece, was closely connected with
rhetoric. Thus the name logic is of a tell-tale character
in its application to logic in the West ; and it may be
taken to indicate how, almost from its very rise, western
logic found, itself in the firm grip of formalism and
how it took more than twenty centuries for the
scientific method underlying Aristotle's Organon to be
redeemed, brought into prominence and implemented
in the Nqvum Organum of Francis Bacon (1561-1626).
The term logic should not be taken to carry with it all
these implications of European history when it is used
in the phrase Indian logic. This phrase is usually
rendered by the Sanskrit equivalents &nvl%fiki
iv A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART r
ny&yavistara, nysyadarsatoa, tarTtoSastra and pramana-
&stra. It is also usual to describe Indian logic by the
anglicised phrase Nyaya-Vaisesika system and it is
usually described thus in this work. ( All these phrases
are significant and appropriate in one way or other,
particularly in view of the place which Indian logic
occupies in the cultural history of India and of the
manner in which it arose and grew not as a mere
grammar of thinking, but as an orthodox (astikay
system of philosophy with a special stress on the science
of methodical reasoning in both its inductive and
deductive aspects, this science forming its dominant
and distinctive part. Indian logic is anviksikl or
nyayavistara or nydyladarsatoa in the sense! that it is a
philosophical system, of which methodical reasoning
or investigation of knowledge got through observation.
or perception and trustworthy verbal testimony forms
the central theme; it is pre-eminently the science of
ratiocination or tarkasdstra; and in contrast with the
fadasdstra or 'the science of grammar' ( Vydkarana)
and with the vdkyasdsira or 'the exegetics' (Mlmdmsa) y
it is described as the pramdnasdstra or the epistemo-
logical science, chiefly concerned with valid knowledge
and its sources. That Indian logic is usually described
as the Nyaya-Vaisesika system is not because it is the
result of the syncretism of the two opposing systems
Nyaya realism and Atomistic pluralism ; rathei; it is so
described because at a very early stage in the history of
Indian logic, the Vaiseika stress on the inductive phase
of inference came to be synthesized with its deductive
phase in the Nyaya theory of * : \\ :,V^ reasoning.
SEC. i] INTRODUCTION v
Those who are familiar with Western logic and desirous
of studying Indian logic from a historical and com-
parative point of view will do well to bear in mind the
fact that, while one may find striking parallels in the
Indian and Western systems of logic, one should not be
misled^ by such parallels and lose sight of the funda-
mental differences in respect of scope and method,
which Indian logic discloses in its rise and development,
as compared with Western logic.
SECTION II
ANTECEDENTS AND FORESHADOWINGS OF THE
VAISESIKA AND NYAYA
The story of India's quest for truth and of India's
attempts to lay out suitable ways and approaches to
truth is long and varied and it has been reconstructed
with a considerable measure of success by several
eminent scholars, Indian and alien, from the ancient
literary monuments of India, which are mostly in the
form of Sanskrit works. In all this quest and these
attempts, a careful student of the history of Indian
philosophical thought may discern, almost from the
very beginning, two tendencies the intwitio'nistic and
the rationalistic, and two chief aims the achievement
of Dharma and the realisation of Brahman. If one of
the Rg-Vedic seers could be said to have boldly intuited
the monistic absolute in the well-known verse " That
One breathed breathlessly by itself " (Anldav&tam
svadhaya tadekam: Rv. .X.129.2), it would not be
Ti A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART
far-fetched to find the rationalistic exhortation of
another Rg-Vedic seer in the verse "Meet one another,
discuss and understand your minds " (Samgacchadh-
vam samvadadhvam saw vo mandmsi j&nat'&m :
Rv. X.191.2). These two tendencies came to exhibit
themselves throughout the Vtdic age, in close
association with the two aims mentioned abovt.. On
one side, as a result of the influence of the rationalistic
tendency on the ritualistic aspect of the Veda, ritualistic
and exegetic doctrines, which, in due time, emerged as
Jaimini's system of Purva-Mimarhsa, were developed.
And, on the other side, the combined workings of the
intuitionistic and rationalistic tendencies in the direc-
tion of spiritual insight and knowledge of truth led to
the emergence of the Upanisadic philosophy of Atman.
This philosophy was marked by a pronounced emphasis
on the efficacy and value of intuition, which culminated
in Badarayana's system of Vedanta. The dominant
feature of the philosophy of the Upanisads is its
monistic absolutism, which led up, within the Upani-
$adic period itself, to rationalistic reactions of different
types^ representing collateral and casual phases of
Upaniadic thought-V-some of them coming to be
systematised later on in the dualism and realism of
Kapila's S&mkhya and the allied discipline of Pata-
fijali's Yoga, some others eventually giving rise to the
pluralistic rationalism of KanSda's Vaisesika system
and its complementary Ny&ya of Gautama, and yet
others emerging as anti- Vedistic rebels ip the form of
the Jaina may-be-ism (sy8dvtida),the Bauddha idealism
and nihilism (Sunyav&da), and the
SEC. n] INTRODUCTION vii
Carvaka materialism. All these post-Upanisadic sys-
tems came to be called darsanos (darfondtoS). It
should be noted here that the term 'system* is very
inadequate as the English equivalent of the Sanskrit
word 'darsana'. While the former word brings into
prominence the idea of systematisation, the latter word
bringjHnto relief the fact that the plenary intuition of
truth or spirit (tatlvadarsana or dtmadarsana), whicl
a gifted saint or seer came to have, lies at the root of
every system of Indian philosophy and forms its fruit
also. A long-established and widely accepted tradition
classifies these darSanas into dstika and nastika. ) The
history of the meaning of these two words throws some
light on the manner in which the ground of classifica-
tion happened to be shifted under varying circums-
tances. Panini's sutra 4.4.60 (asti ndsti distant ntatih)
gives the derivation of the words astika, nastika and
daistika: and according to Panini, dstika is 'one who
believes in the other world', n&stika is 'one who does
not believe in the other world' and daistika is a <pre-
destinarian* or 'fatalist'. This is the oldest recorded
explanation of these words. On the basis of this expla-
nation, even Jainism, and Buddhism in some of its
aspects, could be described as dstika systems. An old
popular tradition would take the word dstika in the
sense of 'one who believes in God'. If this should be
accepted, Jaimini's Purva-MimSmsa and Kapila's
Sariikhya, which are usually included in the astika list,
ought to be dropped from that list, as they do not
recognise Itvara. A post-Buddhistic, but pre-Christian,
tradition fixed the meaning of the word dstika as 'one
Yiii A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PAKT i
who believes in the infallibility and the supreme
authority of the Veda' and of the word ndstika as
'one who does not believe in it*. This tradition has
been widely accepted for a long time. According to
this, the Samkhya and Yoga, the VaiSesika and Nyaya,
the Purva-Mimamsa and Vedanta are described as
dstika-darsanas, and the Carvaka, Jaina and Bauddha
systems as nQstika-dartanas. In this context, whenever
the terms orthodox and heterodox happen to be used as
the English equivalents of Qstika and nastika, it should
be remembered that they have reference to belief and
disbelief in the authority of the Veda.
Though the first beginnings of the Vaiseika and
Nyaya systems are misty in certain respects, a careful
student is not likely to miss the foreshadowings of the
central doctrine of these systems in the Upanisads. In
the well-known three-fold scheme of self-culture lead-
ing to self-realisation, as taught in the oft-quoted
Upanisadic text " Verily, Maitreyi, the Spirit should
be realised, heard, discussed and constantly contem-
plated upon' 9 (Atma vft are dratfavyas srotavyo
mantavyo nididhyasitavyah Brhad. IV. 5), it is
generally accepted that hearing or initial comprehension
(iravana) represents the inaugural stage, investigation
and discussion with the help of reason (manana)
represent the central stage and constant contemplation
(nididhy&sana) stands for the culminating stage. The
grim spiritual teacher of the Katfiopanisad, Death
(Yama), pulls up the rationalist of the Upanisadic age
with the warning " Self-realisation cannot be got
SEC. ii ] INTRODUCTION is
through ratiocination or tarka" (NaisQ tarkena matird-
paneya Katha II. 9). From these foreshadowings
of deliberate attempts to exercise reason, when consi-
dered together with the fact that philosophical debates
such as those that were carried on under the auspices
of Ajatasatru and Janaka were very common during
the Up^anisadic age, the inference is irresistible that,
already during the period of the Uoanisads, some
logical doctrines should have not only begun to appear,
but also progressed beyond the nebulous stage.
SECTION III
How THE VAISESIKA AND NYAYA SCHOOLS
EMERGED AND WHEN THEIR DOCTRINES
WERE REDACTED INTO SUTRAS
(liefore the end of the Upanisadic period and prior
to the advent of the Buddha, the Vedic scriptures
embodying the results of the intuitive insight of the
Vedic and Upanisadic seers had asserted their authority
so far as to persuade a large section of rationalistic
thinkers to agree to play second fiddle to scriptural
authorities. This should have resulted in the develop-
ment of the pre-Buddhistc Nyaya method in close asso-
ciation with Vedic exegesis and accounts for the earlier
use of the term Nyaya in the sense of 'the principles
and the logical method of Mimamsa exegetics/ This
also accounts for the fact that, even after the disentan-
glement of the Nyaya logic from Vedic exegetics, the
legislators of ancient India like Manu and Yajnavalkya
x A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART i
emphatically recognised the importance and value of
logical reasoning (tarka) in a correct comprehension
of dharma as taught by the Vedas (Manu XII. 105
and 106; Yajnavalkya I. 3). Another section of
rationalistic thinkers who did not agree to play second
fiddle to scriptural authorities, perhaps developed and
expounded rationalistic doctrines on independent lines,
without subjecting themselves to the thraldom of Vedic
religion and philosophy. Some of these doctrines-
perhaps shaped themselves into the Samkhya thought
of the pre-Buddhistic stage, with a marked degree of
hostility to Vedic ritualism. Some other doctrines of
this kind gave rise to the pre-Buddhistic logic and
and metaphysics of the Vaisesika, with a special leaning
in favour of the inductive method of reasoning based
on observation and analysis and with a simple rationa-
listic scheme of two sources of valid knowledge
perception and inference (pratyaksa and anumana). It
is very likely that the anti-Vedic speculations of the
pre-Buddhistic Samkhya and the anti-Vedic logic and
epistemology of the pre-Buddhistic Vaisesika paved the
way for the development and systematisation of
Buddhism.} It may here be borne in mind that
Buddhistic tradition, as preserved in ancient Chinese
records, readily recognises the priority of the Samkhya
and the Vaisesika to Buddhism. (See Ui's Vaisesika
Philosophy, pages 3 and 4. )
[About the fifth century B. C., when the anti-Vedic
movements of Buddhism rose and began to spread, the
exponents of Vedic philosophy and religion keenly felt
the need for showing greater accommodation to
SEC. in] INTRODUCTION xi
rationalistic modes of thought. The rationalistic
resources available for Vedic religion and philosophy
had to be pooled together and kept fit for defensive and
offensive use, as against the impact from collision with
avaidika developments. On the one side, it was found
easy to disentangle from its Vedistic environment the
logical method (Nyaya) of Vedic exegetics; and on the
other side, to bring the unfettered methods of reasoning
and analysis known to the early Vaisesika under the
influence of the attempts for rapprochement made by
the Vaidika thinkers turned out to be an easy task r
chiefly as a result of the disquieting nihilistic excesses
of early Buddhism. Thus, the Nydya of the Vedic
exegesis and the logic and metaphysics of the early
anti-Vedic Vaisesika came to fraternise with each other
and gave rise to two sister-schools of philosophical
reasoning the Vaisesika school mainly concerned with
inductive observation and analysis, and the Nyatya
school chiefly concerned with the formulation and
elucidation of the principles of ratiocination on the
basis of inductive reasoning. These two schools should
have appeared in a fairly definite form, with their
characteristic methods of reasoning and metaphysics, by
the middle of the fourth century B. C., though the chief
doctrines of these schools came to be systematised and
redacted in their basic sutras at a relatively later date,
This statement may receive good support from the
following facts, if they could be taken to be conclusively
established. Bhadrabahu, a Jaina sage, whose activity
as a Jaina logician may be assigned to about 357 B. C,
was quite familiar with an old theory of ten-membered
xii A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
syllogism. The Nyaya logic was known to Katyayana
of the fourth century B. C, as Goldstucker has shown
in his work on 'Pflnini and his Place in Sanskrit Litera-
ture*. Badarayana's Vedanta-sutras (Il-ii 11 to 17)
definitely presuppose the VaiSesika. The Lalitavistara
and Milindapaftha mention the Vaiseika. Even the
Vaie?ika-sutras, which were, in all probability, pro-
duced later than the middle of the fourth century
B. C, do not controvert any of the Buddhistic
doctrines, while Buddhistic tradition generally re-
cognises the prc-Buddhistic origin of the Vaiscsika.
These considerations, which tend to show that the
Nyaya and Vaieika schools came into being in a
definite form before the middle of the fourth century
B. C, cannot be lightly brushed aside.
The doctrines of these two sch>ols were syste-
tnatised and redacted in the form of the Nyaya-sutras
and Vaisesika-sutras. The authorship of the former
is ascribed to Gautama, and that of the latter to
Kanada. According to the generally accepted Indian
tradition, which goes back to the early centuries of the
Christian era, Gautama is otherwise known as Aksapada
and Kanada is otherwise known as Uluka and Kasyapa.
It will be obvious to those who are familiar with the
traditions of ancient India that Aksapada was the
personal name and Gautama the gotra name of the
author of the Nyaya-sutras, and that Kanfida and
Ul&ka are the personal names and Kafyafa the gotra
name of the author of the Vaieika-sutras, in the
same way as Paksilasv&min is the personal name and
the gotra name of the author of the
SEC. in] INTRODUCTION xiii
Nyayabhasya. Though the exact dates of Kanada and
Gautama are not known, the dales of their sutras can
be fixed within fairly definite limits. Jacobi, in his
well-known article on the date of the philosophical
sutras (Journal of the American Oriental Society
XXXI. 1911), endeavours to show that the Nyaya-
sutrai and the Brahma-sutras were redacted between
200 and 500 A.D., that the Vaiseika-sutras and
Mimamsa-sutras were redacted at a somewhat earlier
date, that the redaction of the Yoga-sulras should be
assigned to about 450 A. D., and that the sathkhya-
sutras were produced at a much later date, later than
the fourteenth century. With regard to the Sarfikhya-
sutras, it is generally accepted that they were composed
later than the fourteenth century, though the Tattva-
samdsa, which may be regarded as the nucleus of the
basic sutras of the Sarhkhya system, is perhaps older
than Isvarakrna and the Christian era and is certainly
older than the Bhagavadajjuka, a farce earlier than
the seventh century A. D. (See Journal of Oriental
Research, Madras, Vol. II. pages 145 to 147). If the
Bhiksu-sutra referred to in IV. iii.110 of Panini's
Asfadhyayl and the Brahma-sutra mentioned in XIII. 4
of the Gita could be taken to refer to Badarayana's
Brahmasutras, it would be difficult to accept, without
due reservations, Jacobi's argument in its application to
the Vedanta-sutras. The name Patanjali, borne by the
author of the Yoga-sutras, presents some difficulties to
Jacobi, as the date of Patanjali, the author of the
Mahabhasya, is accepted to be the middle of the 2nd
century B. C But Jacobi would attempt to differentiate
xiv A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART i
the author of the Mahabhasya from the author of the
Yoga-sutras, though, as a matter of fact, the ancient
tradition identifying the two Patafijalis is sound and
maintainable on reasonable grounds. The central point
jf Jacobi f s argument relates to the internal evidences
furnished by the nature of the Buddhist doctrines con-
troverted in some of these sutras. The Nyaya-sutras,
according to Jacobi, refute the nihilistic suntya-vdda of
Nagarjuna (3rd century A. D. circa) and do not refute
the idealistic vijft&na-v&da of Asanga and Vasubandhu
(middle of the 4th century A. D.). But, according to
Vatsyayana and VacaspatimiSra, the Nyaya-sutra
IV. 2.26 refutes the vijiiQna-vada. It should also be
remembered here that the Sftnya-vada and vtjn&na-v&da
doctrines were not introduced in the world for the first
time by Nagarjuna and Asanga and Vasubandhu and
that, before these Buddhist teachers, these old doctrines
had been in existence for a long time. Even if this
line of argument adopted by Jacobi should be accepted
as satisfactory, it does not touch the VaiSesika- sutras;
and if the obverse of this argument were to be applied
to these sutras, the logical result would be that they
should be held to be pre-Buddhistic, Kautaliya Artha-
SSstra mentions the types of thought comprising
tinvikfikl in the statement : Sdmkhyam yogo lokdya*
tarn cety&nvikfilti (Vol. I. page 27, Trivandrum edi-
tion). Though the date of the Kautaliya is not yet
finally settled, the general trend of well-informed and
unprejudiced opinion among Indian and alien Indo-
logists is in favour of assigning that great work to 304
B. C. In this extract from the Kautaliya, there is no
SEC.HI] INTRODUCTION xv
specific mention of Nyaya or Vaise$ika as such. Atten-
tion is drawn by Ui and Randle to noteworthy cases of
parallelism between the Vaisesika-siitras and Ny&ya-
sutras, in which it would be more reasonable to say that
the former sutras were used in the composition of the
latter (See Ui's 'VaiseSika philosophy', Introduction,
page 16, note 1 ; and Randle's 'Indian Logic in the
Early Schools', Introduction, page 7, note i ). There is
evidence to show that the sixth Jaina schism ( J8 A,D.)
presupposes the Vaieika redaction (TJi's 'VaiSe-
sika philosophy 9 , Introduction, page 34), Chiefly, on
these grounds, it is surmised by several scholars that
the Vaiseika-sutras should have been redacted in the
pre-Christian era, subsequent to 300 B.C.; and that
the Nyaya-sutras should have been redacted about the
time of Nagarjuna and Deva, between 150 and 250
A. D. may be inferred from the fact that the sutras
2.2.17 19 seem to presuppose the refutatory comments
in Nagarj una's Vigra^avyavartanl on the realistic
position regarding the relation between pramana and
prameya (Ui's Vaihsika Philosophy, Introduction
pages 84 to 86). Randle concludes that the "VaiSe-
ika and Nyaya were systematised between 200 B. C
and 200 A. D., the Vaisesika being the earlier of the
two 1 ' ; and that "the indications, such as they are,
point to the beginning of the first century A. D., as
the latest date for the systematisation of the
Vaieika". (Randle's 'Indian Logic in the Early
Schools 9 , Introduction, pages 16 and 17.)
These conclusions, based as they are on good
grounds as far as they go, would appear to require
xvi A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART i
reconsideration on a careful scrutiny of all the
evidences available. That the redaction of the Nyaya-
sutras presupposes that of the Vaisesika-sutras may be
readily admitted. It is not easy to establish that the
Vaisesika-sutras were redacted subsequent to 300 B. C,
on the ground that the name Vaise?ika is not contained
in the extract from the Kautaliya quoted above. 'Those
who are sufficiently familiar with the use of the word
yoga in its old sense of vaiseslka, as it is found used,
for instance, in Vatsyayana's bhasya on 1.1.29, are not
likely to consider it a strained interpretation to take the
word yoga, as used in the Kautaliya, in the sense of
vaise$iTfa. In fact, according to Vacaspatimisra's
T&tparyatikG and the BhGsyacandra on the bhasya
on 1.1.29, the word yoga may be taken in the
somewhat comprehensive sense of Nyaya, including
the Vaisesika, the Nyaya being a philosophical
school laying special stress upon yoga or yuftti or
reasoning (yogo tyuktih pradhanataya vidyate yesdm
BhQsyacandra). Further, in the extract quoted
above from the Kautaliya, scholars have generally
overlooked one important point, to which sufficient
prominence ought to be given in this connection.
In chapter 2, the Vidyasamuddesa section of the
Kautaliya, the chief branches of knowledge (vidya),
according to Kautalya, are stated at the outset.
These are four: anwKsiki (logic and philosophy),
trayl (the Vedic religion and philosophy of dhartna and
adharma), vartfi (the economic science and philosophy
of wealth) aud dandatnlti (the science and philosophy
of polity). Then there is a reference to the view of
SEC. in] INTRODUCTION xvii
the Manavas (Manu's disciples or ancient legislators),
according to which anviksikl should be regarded as a
special part of trayi. This view, it may be noted, is
consistent with the spirit of the Vedic and Upaniadic
age, when logic (Nyaya) had not yet been disentangled
from its applications to Vedic religion and philosophy.
Ther^ is also a further reference to the materialistic
doctrine of the Carvakas (the followers of Brhaspati),
that trayi (including anviitsikl) is only a pretension or
imposture of one who knows the ways of the world and
that only varta and dandanitl should be reckoned with
as the two real vidyas. The followers of Usanas (the
teacher of the Asuras) are afterwards referred to as
recognising only one vidyd viz., the dandanitl. At the
end of this chapter, Kautalya reiterates his views about
the four branches of learning and explains their nature
and aim. In the concluding para of this chapter, he
makes two important observations. One is to the
effect that anviksikl consists of Sarhkhya, Yoga and
Lokayata. The other is that anviksikl is helpful to the
world through its ratiocinative process in the investiga-
tion of the soundness or unsoundness of the conclu-
sions and doctrines of the different branches of know-
ledge.
Scimkhyam yogo loTt&yatatn cety anviksikl. Dhtr-
madharmau trayySm. Arthanarthau v&rtayam. Bal&bale
cait&s&vn heiubhiranvlksam&na anviksikl lokasyopakti-
roti; vypsvne abhyudaye ca buddhimavasthapayaiit
prajndvtikyflkriy&vaisaradyam ca karoti.
B
xviii A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PARTI
Prodipah sarvavidydnfim updyah sarvakarmantim\
Asraynh sariaihaiM&htim saivadtinvlksiki mat8\\
(Pa^es 27 and 28 of Vol. I of the Kautallya,
Trivandrum edition.)
It is evident here that Ka-ttaliya elucidates the two
tneanings of the term twltsikl. One is the general
rsense, philosophical enquiry or philosophy. In this
tsense, it is used in the first sentence of the above ex-
tract. As already pointed out, the word yogah in this
sentence refers to the VaiSe$tka logic; c r even if it be
taken in the special sense of the yoga discipline of Patafi-
jali's system, the word lok&yata does not refer to the
materialism of the Carvakas, but very probably it refers
to the logic of the Vaisejika and Nya\a in its secular-
ised form and as disentangled from its Vedic associa-
tions. It shonlJ be noted here that the view of the
Carvaka materialist is separately mentioned in a pre-
vious part of the same chapter and Kautalya rejects it
and is not prepared to bring the Can aka doctrine under
any recognised vidyd or branch of learning. VatsyS-
yana, in the concluding part of his bhasya on l.l-l,
amplifies the second sense of the word tinvlksiki, i.e.
Mogic which investigates by means of rationalistic
methods' (hetubhiranviksawans) and gives Kaujalya's
Terse quoted above, with its last quarter modified as
vidyoddefe Pfakirtitd". It is quite clear from this
amended quarter of the verse, as given by Vatsyayana f
that he is quoting from the ^ idyasamuddeSa section of
the Kautallya. It is hardly necessary to point out that
a careful consideration of the above extract from the
SBC. m] INTRODUCTION xix
Kautallya in comparison with its striking parallel in
Vats>ayana's bhasya on 1.1.1 would make it very diffi-
cult to believe that Qnvlksikl, in the sense of 'system of
logic', was not presupposed by the Arthas&stra of
Kautalya. Further, a careful consideration of the ex.
tract from Nagarjuna's Vigrahavyfaartanl, which \3\
gives in pages 84 and 85 of his introduction to th*
'Va'sesitia philosophy', in comparison with its parallel in
the Nyaya-suiras 2.2.17 19, would tend to show that
Nagarjuna is presupposing these sutras and refuting
the view embodied in them, rather than support Ui's
inference in the reverse direct ior\. Patanjali, at the end
of his t.'tdfya on Panini's 3.2.123, remarks "Other
thinkers hold that there is nothing known as the
present time" (Apara dhandsti rartamdnah kdla tti)
and gives five verses in support of this view. This
portion of the Mahabhaya closes with the remark
Another thinker holds that there is such a thing as
the present time, and it is not perceived in the same
way as the Sun's motion is not perceived" (Apara dha
asti v aria man ah kdlah] and supports this view with
one verse. Between this portion of the Mahabhasya
and the Nyaya-sutras 2.1.40 44, there is a striking
parallelism, which none can miss. A careful consider-
ation of these two texts would lead to the impression
that Patanjali is here using not only the ideas in the
Nyaya-sutras referred to, but also the phraseology in
those sutras, in his characteristically graphic narrationof
of a discourse between two imaginary dialogists. All
these considerations may reasonably lead to the
conclusion that the Vaiesika-sutras and the Nyaya-
xx A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART i
sutras were redacted between the middle of the fourth
century and second century B. C., perhaps towards the
end of the fourth century B. C., the Vaisesika-sutras
being earlier than the Nyaya-sutras.
SECTION IV
THE NAMES VAISESIKA AND NYAYA; THE NATURE,
AIM AND SCOPE OF THE TWO SYSTEMS
It is generally accepted that the names Vaisesika-
darsana and Nyaya-dartana are based upon the terms
viSesa and nya$a. It is not possible now to ascertain
exactly what these two terms signified to the early
exponents of these two systems, who were responsible
for devising and introducing these two names. Accor-
ding to an old tradition recorded by the Chinese Bud-
dhists Ci-tsan (549-623 A.D.) and Kwhei-ci (632-
682 A. D.), Kanada's work came to be called the Vai-
Sesika-sastra, since it excelled works of the other
systems, more especially the Sarhkhya and it was diffe-
rentiated from them, the term vaisesika being taken in
the sense of 'superior to* or 'distinct from'. (See Ui's
Vaisesika Philosophy pp, 3 to 7). Indian tradition is
in favour of connecting the name Vaisesika with the
doctrine of specialities (visesah}, visesa being regarded
as the distinctive category of the Vaisesika scheme of
categories. The Vaisesika-sutra 1.1.4 which practi-
cally represents the beginning of Kanada's sutras, lays
special emphasis, not upon any of the categories, but
upon 'the comprehension of truth through similarities
and dissimilarities' (sadhai myavaidharmyabhyam
SEC. iv] INTRODUCTION xxi
tattvajnanam) upon the striking out of the one in the
many- and this amounts to an unmistakable stress on
'the analytic or inductive method of philosophical
reasoning'. Gautama's Nydya-darsana took its name
from nyaya, which means 'the synthetic or deductive
method of syllogistic demonstration*. Gautama's
system 'lays particular stress on the synthetic method
of syllogistic reasoning. One of the earlier mea-
nings of the term nyaya is 'exegetic principle or
maxim'; and after logical reasoning had been
released from Vedic exegesis, the term nydya
developed the specialised sense of syllogistic reasoning.
The appropriateness of using the term toyaya, in this
specialised sense, as the name of Gautama's system lies
not only in the historical connection between the Nyaya
and MImamsa systems; but it lies also in the fact that
the term nyaya means illustration or example and that
example (udaharana) is the most important of the five
members constituting Gautama's syllogistic expression.
Thus it may be seen that the names vaisesikaandnydya
may be connected with the two aspects of sound reaso-
ning the analytic or inductive aspect which mounts
up from particulars (visesa) to the general or universal
(sdmdnya) and the synthetic or deductive aspect which
moves on from the universal (sdmanya) to the parti-
culars (vise$a). In these logical notions, it would be
in keeping with the history of Indian philosophical
thought to recognise the basis of the names, vaifefika '
and nyaya, rather than in the ontological doctrines of
atomism and pluralistic realism. This would account
better for the way in which the interrelation of the
A PRIAJER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART i
Vaiesika and the Njaya came to be conceived of as
two sister systems in spite of their differences on the
metaphysical side.
The Vaisesika and the Nyaya, in their early and
later phases, are not restricted in their scope and aim
to logic in a narrow sense. Like other Indian systems,
these two form sell -contained philosophical disciplines
of a complex character, with a distinctive central theme
correlated to thtir special goal. The final cessation of
all miseries (apavarga) is the goal of the Vaisesika
and the Nyaya. The VaistSfika stresses the analytical
side of rea oning and furnishes the metaphysical back-
ground and the inductive basis of the Njaya system.
With the VaiSesika material, suitably modified in minor
details, the Nyaya builds up a complete system of
pistemology and logic, combined to some extent with
psychology, ethics, ontology and religion. Such a
mixed composition of Indian philosophical systems is
due not to any lack of appreciation of differences of
value in different things, but rather to the cultural
outlook of India, which is dominated by an intense
desire to synthesise all the departments of knowledge
in a scheme ot progressive realisation of life's ends
culminating in final emancipation (mukti) conceived
of as the sunitnmn bonum. Methodical reasoning,
involving a critical investigation of knowledge got
through perceptual experience and verbal testimony,
i.e., anvikfd, with the help of the five-membered scheme
Of syllogistic expression (nydya or pQ%c&vayavavakyti)>
forms the distinctive contribution of the Njaya to phi
SEC. v] INTRODUCTION xxiit
lo&ophical thou< ht. Since its first redaction, the Nyaya
system has permanently secured for itself a position of
importance in the Hindu scheme of Vedic religion ard
philosophy, chiefly by the ancillary role which it has
assumed in its n laiion to the Veda; and if the Vaisesika
also is given a place among- the dstika systems, it is due
mainly to its fraterrity with ih N\aya. Gokulanatha,,
a Naiyayika of the 16 h Century A.D , suggests in his
philosophical drama, called Amrlodaya, that Anviksikl
is the amaz nian oonimander-in-thief of ,>/i-the
empress ruling over the empire of kr.owledge ard
emancipation. This poetic rcpresei tation would be
very helpful in appreciating the exact position of the
Nyaya-vaisesika system in the scheme of astila schools
of philosophy.
SECTION V
SYNCRETISM AND SYNTHESIS
It has now become usual among modern scholars,
when speaking about the historical dtvelopmtnt of tl e
Vais f ka and N^aya systems, to refer to tlie tendency
to syncretism in these two scho<.K In chapter II, part
I of "Inliwi Logic a<id Atomism", Dr. Keith dwells
upon what he describes as "the syncretism of the
schools" and the "syncretist school". Syncretism, in
its strict sense, means the tendency to reconcile and
blend two oppooini; and irreconcilable systems, by
minimising differences. In this sense, it would be
xxiv A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART i
correct to speak about syncretism in the Vaisesika and
Nyaya only with reference to their condition before
their redaction into sutras, and even then, with due
reservations. It may be said that, in the pre- Buddhi-
stic age, rationalistic thinking came to have a schis-
matic split which resulted in two opposing types of
rationalistic thought, one linking itself with Vedic
tradition and the other antagonising it. As already
pointed out at page xi-suj>ra, a rapprochement was
effected between these two types of thought; and as a
result of this, the Vaisesika and Nyaya arose in the
form of two sister schools. The tendency which led to
the first redaction of these two schools in a fraternal
relation may be appropriately described as syncretism.
Since their definite emergence as two distinct and allied
systems about the fourth century B. C. to this day, the
Vaises ; ka and Nyaya have been treated as sister
schools, fundamentally agreeing with each other in
respect of important metaphysical and logical doctrines
and persistently showing some comparatively minor
differences; and in this condition, they were never
regarded as opposing schools and it would not be quite
accurate to speak of syncretism in them, in the strict
sense of the term. In the somewhat larger sense,
however, of synthesis, one may well speak of
syncretism in these two sister schools from and after
their first redaction. In the history of the Nyaya-
Vaisesika system, the Vaisesika and Nyaya schools
were never regarded as rival schools. Nor were their
differences ever forgotten: and till recently, separate
Nyaya and Vaisesika treatises continued to be written.
SEC.V] INTRODUCTION xxv
In fact, even as late as in the seventeenth century A. D.,
separate handbooks dealing with the Vaisesika
doctrines, like Gangadharasuri's Kanadasiddhanta-
candrikd (Trivandrum Sanskrit Series No. XXV),
were written. It should be remembered here that
Aksipjada-Gautama, effected the momentous synthesis
between the inductive (Vaisesika) and deductive
(i^jydya) types of rationalistic thinking, in his doctrine
of five-membered syllogistic expression (nydyaprayoga)
hinging upon the example (udaharana) as the central
member. The Nyaya ontology is built upon the atomic
theory and pluralistic realism of the Vaiseska. The
Nyaya epistemology, with its fourfold scheme of
pramdnas is distinctly pro-Vcdic; and in this respect, it
shows a sharp contrast with the Vaisesika scheme of
pramdnas which consists of perception and inference
and which betrays ar.ti-Vedic leanings. Such points
of contrast have only led to Vaisesik-i gradually losing
its hold and influence. Indian philosophical tradition
recognises three important pairs of allied systems
(samanatantrani) viz., the Samkhya and Yoga, the
Vaisesika and Nyaya, and the Mnndmsd and Vedanta.
Vatsyayana, in his bhasya on the Nyaya- sutra (1.1.22),
speaks of the Vaisesika and the JMydya assanianatantra.
It is noteworthy that, while the Sdmkhya and Yoga,
<ind the Mimdmsd and Vedanla grew as two pairs of
allied systems, the Vaisesika and Nydya came to be
more closely knit together and grew as twin systems,
chiefly as a result of the complete synthesis which the
Nyaya effected in its logical method.
SECTION VI
AFTER THE SUTRAS TO UDAYANA
The extant early works, forming the bas'c source-
books of the Vaisesika system, are Kanada's sutras
and Prasastapa<la's Padarthadharwasamgraho, better
known under the name of Prasastapadabhasya. Accord-
to Udayanacarya's Kirunatall, as interpreted by
PadmanabhamiSra in his Kiran&valibhaskora (Benares
Smskrit Series, Ktraufa'all, page 5), Prasastapatla's
Paddrthadharmasomgraha is a comprehensive epiu me
of the Vais ska system which presupposes an extensive
V.-iiSesikn-hlK's. ;i. known as Ravana-bhasya and attri-
buted to an ancient philosopl er called Ravana. At
page 2/8 of the manuscript of the commentary called
the Prakatarthaviuarana on gimkaru's Brahmasutia-
bha$ya % pre>erved in the Government Oriental Mar us-
cripts Library, Madras, Ravana's bhSsyaon the Vai'e-
sika-sutras is cited. (See p. 491 of Pt. of the edition
of this work in the Madras University Sanskrit Series).
Prakatarthavivarana \* earlier than 13th century A. D.
An interesting confirmation of the tradition about
Ravonn-bhasyd is contained in the vislambha to the
fifth Act of the Anatgharaghava (Nirnayasagara
edition, page 161 ). There is evidence to show that
this drama must be earlier than the Litter part of the
ninth century A. D. In this connection, attention
is invited to my paper on the Ravwa-bhosya,
which appears in volume III of the Journalof Oriental
Reseaicn, Madras, pages 1 to 5. In this paper, it is
indicated that it may not be unreasonable to conjecture
SEC. vi] INTRODUCTION xxvii
that the Ravana-bhdsya was perhaps dominated by
atheistic and pro-Buddhistic proclivities, such as were
quite in keeping with the text of the Vaistsika-sutras
and with the spirit of the tradition characterising the
Vaisesikas as ardhai ainasi kas (semi-nihilists), while
the yirork of Prasastapada gave a theistic turn to the
Vaisesika system and presented its doctrines in an anti-
Buddhistic dstika setting. There is conclusive proof
to show that Prasastapada should be earlier than
LJddyotakara, the author of tbe NyCiyavartika, who
flourished in the latter part of the sixth or the begin-
ning of the seventh century A. D. Professor Ui, in his
introduction to the 'Vaiscsika Philosophy', draws atten-
tion to the evidences showing that Prasastapada should
be earlier than P,iramartha and Dharmauala. 1 hough
Keith emphatically asserts in his 'Indian Logic and
Atomism 9 that Prasastapada's indebtedness to Dignaga
is undoubted, it must be said that Prasastajada's debt
to Dignaga has not yet been proved. If, on the other
hand, Prasastapada could be taken to be presupposed
by Vatsyayana on the ground relied upon by Mr. Bodas
in his introduction to the Tar'.asuh^jial^a (Bombay
Samkrit series, No. LV.), Dignaga, who presupposes
Vatsyayana, must be later than Prasastapada. The
two most authoritative commentaries on Prasasta-
pada's Bhasya are Sridhara's Kandnli and Uda>ana~
carya's Kiranavall Sridhara's date is givui as 991
A. D. in his Kandall and Udayana^ date is given as
984 A. D. in one of his works Laksandvali. Sri-
dhara's reputation is restricted to his Vaiseika work ;
xxviii A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART i
but Udayana holds a far higher place in Indian philo-
sophy and he is held in high esteem as the Nyayacarya
par excellence.
The extant basic works of Nyaya are Gautama's
Nyaya- sutras, the Nyaya-bhasya by Vatsyayana, other-
wise known as Pakilasvamin, and the Nyaya-vartika
by Uddyotakara. In the Nyaya-vartika and other
works, there is sufficient evidence to show conclusively
that Dignaga, th$ famous Buddhistic logician, adverse-
ly criticised the Nyaya-bhasya. Vasubandhu, the
famous teacher of Dignaga, criticised Nyaya-sutras
and the Nyaya-bhasya does not reply to Vasubandhu's
criticisms. From these facts, it would be reasonable
to conclude that the Nyaya-bhaya is earlier than about
the middle of the fourth century A. D., which is the
date for Vasubandhu. Vatsyayana suggests alternative
interpretations to some of the sutras, as, for instance,
in his Bliasya on 1.1.5. This may lead to the inference
that Vatsyayana wrote his Bhasya, long after the
Sutrakara, perhaps at a time when the meaning of some
of the sutras had already become a matter for specu-
lation. There has been some controversy among scho-
lars as to whether there was any commentary on the
Nyya-sutras before Vatsyayana, and whether the
aphoristic statements, which the Bhasyakara introduces
in the course of his exposition, are really quotations
from some earlier commentary on the sutras. Professor
Windisch and several others are inclined to think that
such aphoristic statements are citations from an earlier
commentary. Professor Handle discusses this question
in his recent work "Indian Logic in the Early Schools"
SEC. vi] INTRODUCTION xxix
(pages 19 to 24) and concludes that these aphoristic
statements are not citations from any author but should
be viewed as forming " the heritage of the schcol and
as carrying an authority only less than that of the
sutras themselves''. Indian tradition, however, is
wholly against any speculation of this kind in regard to
to the aphoristic statements in the Bhasya above re-
ferred to. In Sastra literature, more especially in old
works like the Bhasyas on the various systems, it is a
common stylistic device to put forward a main thesis
or argument in the form of a terse aphoristic statement
and amplify it in an expository note. Several old
Bhayakaras have adopted this device and hundreds of
instances can be given from the Mahabhasyaot Patan-
jali and Sankara's Bhasyas on the Brhadaranyakopani-
ad and the Brahma-sutras. In fact, the aphoristic
statements which Vatsyayana makes at the beginning of
his expository sections form integral parts of Vatsya-
yana' s own composition; and it would be as absurd to
ascribe such statements to any author different from
Vatsyayana, as it would be to ascribe the aphoristic
statement, "Since there is no difference from cattle and
other lower animals" in Sankara's Bhasya on the
Brahma-sutras (pavQdiI>hiscavise$at-\.l.l) to some
author different from the BhasyakSra, who amplified
that statement in the following expository paragraph
beginning with the words "yatha hi paSvadayah".
Students of Indian logic will do well to remember that
Vatsyayana is the earliest known writer who drew
pointed attention to the reason why Gautama's JNyaya
came to be regarded as the science of epistemology
xxx A PRIMER OF TND AN LOGIC [PART i
and logic (Pramanasastra, Anviksikior Nyaya-sastra).
It is worth remembering, in this connection, that
Vatsyayana indicates in the very first sentence of his
Bhasyahow valid thinking (/rawd) and fruitful doing
(arthakriya) serve as each other's axle in each other's
wheelings and how they constitute real living with all
its complexity in the pluralistic universe of the Nja-
ya-Vaisesika realism. It is also worth noting that it is
Vatsyayana who first explained how the entire epi^temo-
logical scheme of Pramanas could be synthesised in a
valid syllogistic expression, (vide pages 30 to 42 of his
Bhasya on 1.1.1, Chaukhamba edition) and how, for
this reason, logic proper justly came to exercise a pro-
found influence over the whole realm of philosophical
thought in India.
About the end of the sixth century A.D., or in the
former half of the seventh century, Uddyotak<ira wrote
his Nyaya-v&rtika, the earliest extant commentary on
the Nyaya-bhasya. Some scholars like Dr. Keith
maintain that U Jdyotakara was a contemporary of the
Buddhistic logician Dharmakirii. Hiuen-t^ang (629-
645 A. D.) does not speak of Dharmakirti, while I-tsing
(671-695 A. D.) refers to him. The reference in the
Nyaya-vartika to a Vada-vidhi (page 117, line 21,
Chaukhamba, edition) is the only argument relied upon
for showing that Uddyotakara is not earlier than Dhar-
makirti. Tnis argument assumes that Dharmakirti is
the author of the Vada-vidhi. Sufficient evidence has
not been adduced in support of the view that the Vada-
vidhi is one of Dharmakirti's works. Chinese tradition
definitely lends support to the identification of the
SEC. vi] INTRODUCTION xxxi
Vada-vidhi with one of Vasubandhu's works. Further,
in the Vartika on 1.1.4, Dignaga's definition of percep-
tion is criticised; and it is generally accepted by Brah-
manical and Buddhistic authorities alike that Dharma-
kirti was responsible for the introduction of the addi-
tional word abhranta in that definition, chiefly with a
view to meeting the objections raised by Uddyotakara
against it. These considerations tend to show that it
would be reasonable to assign Uddyotakara to the end
of the sixth or the beginning of the seventh century
A. D. and to assign Dharmaklrti to about the third
quarter of the seventh century A. D. Uddyotakara's
great service to Nyaya consists in his successful en-
deavour to lift it up from the slough into which it was
thrown by Dignaga's confutation of Vatsyayana's
Bhasya. After Uddyotakara, the philosophical contest
between the anti-Vedic and pro-Vedic sides of the
Nyaya thought was keenly carried on by great
Buddhistic logicians like Dharmaklrti, Dharmottara
arid Ratnakirti and eminent Brahmanical logicians like
VacaspatimJsra, Jayantabhatta, Bhasarvajna and
Udayana. Vacaspati has himself given 841 A. D. as
the date of the composition of his index to Gautama's
sutras, called Nydya-suci-nibandha. Vacaspati is
famous for his polymathic learning and dispassionate
philosophical outlook. He is the author of many im-
portant and authoritative treatises, mainly in the nature
of expository and critical commentaries, on almost all
the systems of Indian philosophy. His Brahmatattva-
samlksd on Mandanamisra's Brahmasiddhi and
Bh&mati on Sankara's Brahmasutra-bhaya represent
xxxii A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PARTI
the Advaita system; his Sdmkhya-tattvakaumudi and
Yoga-bhGfya-vati&radl represent the Samkhya-Yoga
system; and his Ny&ya-stici-nibandha and Nyaya-
v&rtiktht&tparya-fika represent the Nyaya system*
There is evidence to show that Bh&matl should have
been his latest work. In his Nydya-vartika-tatparya-
fikft, he renders intelligible the difficult portions of the
Nyaya-vartika and incidentally discusses several obs-
cure portions of the Nyaya-bha?ya and the Nyaya-
sutras, in accordance with the Nyaya tradition banded
down to him by his Nyaya teacher Trilocana. For
the monumental contribution which he made to Nyaya
in his T&tparya-fikfi, he came to be known as the
Tatparyacarya in Nyaya literature. He justly claims,
in his Tatparya-fika> special credit for having re-
deemed from oblivion Uddyotakara's work, which
came to be regarded very old and nearly forgotten in
the ninth century A. D. Jayantabhatta, who presup-
poses Vacaspati in his work and refers to Ananda-
vardhana's Dhvany&loka (Vide page 48 lines 21 to
25, Ny'ayamaiijari, Benares), should be taken to be
later than the middle of the ninth century A.D. ; and
with the help of the particulars furnished by Jayanta's
son, Abhinanda, in the Kadambarikath&sara, Jayanta
may be assigned to the third quarter of the ninth cen-
tury A. D. Jayanta's chief contribution to Nyaya is his
Ny&yamanjart. This work is of the nature of an
elaborate vjtti (expository gloss) on select sutras of
Gautama. Jayanta himself says that the Nyayo-man~
/on was so well appreciated by his contemporaries that
he came to be recognised as the Vrtti-kara of Nyaya.
SEC. vi] INTRODUCTION xxxiii
Bhasarvajna, who flourished perhaps about the begin-
ning of the tenth century A.D., is the author of an im-
portant Nyaya work called Nyaya-sdra; and the dis-
tinctive feature of this work is its epistemology which
deviates in certain respects from established Nyaya
tradition, as for instance, in discarding upamdna as a
distinct Pramana and in recognising six hetv&bh&sas
including anadhyavasita. Udyanacarya is the greatest
Naiyayika of the tenth century A.D. At the end of
one of his works, Laksanavali, he has given 984 A.D.
as the date of its composition. Besides his erudite
commentaries on Prasastapada's Bhaya and Vacas-
pati's Tatparya-tlk& Kirandvali and Tatparya-pari-
sitddhi, he wrote three important Nyaya works
the Prabodhasiddhi, otherwise called Ny&yaparisista,
the Atma-tattva-vivtka, otherwise called Bauddha-
dhikkQra and the Nyaya-kusum&njati. The first of
these three works contains an elucidative and illustra-
tive exposition of the subtleties of /<Ut (futile respon-
dence) and nigrahasthana (vulnerable points) in ac-
cordance with the dialectics of early Nyaya. The
Atma-tattva-viveka is a brilliant exposition of the
Nyaya metaphysics with particular reference to the
Nyaya conception of the self (jlva) and contains a
forcible refutation of the Buddhistic doctrines of
momentariness (ksana-bhanga) and voidness (suny t a).
The Kttsumanjali is Udayana's masterpiece. It is
devoted to a refutation of the anti-theistic theories
maintained by the Vedistic, Samkhya, nihilistic and
naturalistic schools of his age and to the amplification
and vindication of the Nyaya theism, chiefly on the
C
xxxiv A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART i
basis of the creationistic view of causation. Udayana's
thcistic argument consists of two main parts: one part
arguing towards values, design and causation in the
sense of creation and the other part arguing to God
from values, design and creation. His monumental
contribution to Indian theism has secured for him the
high rank of Nyaydc&rya. From the references given
on page 21 of the Sanskrit introduction to the Kaudall
(Vizianagaram Sanskrit Series), it may be safely con-
cluded that Udayana was a contemporary of Sridhara.
SECTION VII
AFTER UDAYANA TO ANNAMBIIATTA
Sivadityamisra's Safrtapadarthl is a short and sim-
ple manual setting forth the essentials of the Vaiseika
system chiefly in accordance with Prasastapada's
Bhasya. It also makes use of the Nyaya material in
Bhasarvajna's Nydya-sara, to some extent. Sivaditya's
text giving his scheme of six fallacious types of
probans with anadhyavasita corresponding to asadhti-
rana (uncommon probans) as a distinct type, is practi-
cally a reproduction of the corresponding text of
Bhasarvajna. (Compare page 23, Saptapadarthl
Viztanagaram Sanskrit Series, with page 25 in the
Nyayasfira Poona Oriental Book Agency). A
careful comparison of Sivaditya's Saptapadarthl
with Udayana's Kiranavall would lead one to believe
that the Saptapadarthl utilised the material in
the Kiranavall. For instance, the definition of dark-
ness on page 71 of Saptapadarthl appears to presuppose
SEC. vii] INTRODUCTION
Udayana's remarks about darkness on pages 111 and
112 of the Kiranavall (Bibliotheca Indica) ; the defini-
tion of /a/I* on page 70 of the Saptapadarthl appears to
presuppose Udayana's enumeration of jdtib&dhdkas on
page 161 of the Kiranavall and the definition of laksana
(definition) found on page 192 of the Kiran&valt is
reproduced on page 35 of the Saptapadarthl. Sriharsa,
the autlior of the Khandatiakhandakhddya, and
Gangesa, the author of the l^attvacintamani, undoubt-
edly refer to Sivaditya. (Vide introduction to the
Saptapadarthl page 2.) On these grounds, it would
not be unreasonable to assign the Saptapadarthl to the
eleventh century A. D. (circa). The importance of
the Saptapadarthl lies in the fact that later writers
like Annambhatta used it as their model for their
primers of Nyaya, as may be unmistakably made out
from the close correspondence between several portions
in the Saptapadarihl and primers like the Tarka-
sanigraha.
The greatest Nyaya work, which was written after
Udayana, is the Tattvacintdwaniby GangeSopadhyaya.
In this monumental work, Gangesa utilised all the con-
structive, expositary, critical and polemical material in
the earlier works on Nyaya and Vaiseika and gave the
final shape and turn to the logic and metaphysics of
Nyaya. In treating the various topics of Nyaya, the
earlier writers usually adopted the categoristic method,
which was inaugurated by Gautama. This method as
expounded by Vatsyayana, consists in enumeration and
classification (uddeta and vibhaga), definition (laksana} t
careful investigation and discussion (fiariksti). Varada-
xxxvi A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART r
raja's Tarkikaraksa (1100 A. D. circa) is the latest im-
portant work on Nyaya, which adopts the old catego-
ristic method in accordance with the Nyaya-sutras and
Bhaya. It was Gangesa who replaced this old method
by what may be described as the epistemological method
or the fyramana method, which definitely shifted the
emphasis from the categoristic treatment of the topics
(padarthah} of Nyaya to the epistemological treat-
ment of the four means of valid cognition (praManam)
recognised by the Naiyayikas. Thus, the Nyaya-sastra
which had remained hitherto a mere pad&rtha-sastra y
for all practical purposes, was turned into a full-fledged
pramana-fastrain Gangesa's Tattvacintamani; and in
this partly lies the epoch-making character of this
monumental work on Nyaya. That the Tattvacintamani
serves as the basic work on which the whole literature
of what is commonly known as toavya-nyaya (modern
N>aya) rests is also another reason for regarding it as
an epoch-making work. The Tattvaciniamani, or the
Mani as it is popularly known, consists of four main
divisions represented by the four chapters (khanda) on
perception ($ratyak$a), inference (anumana}, assimi-
lation in the sense of analogising (upam&na), and
verbal testimony (sabda). In the course of an elabo-
rate elucidation and discussion of the nature and ob-
jective reach and content of these four Pramanas, the
relevant topics of the Nyaya- Vaisesika system are con-
sidered in the Mani in comparison with the kindred
topics of other philosophical systems. The language
of Gangesa's Mani is also of an epoch-making type.
Such of the modern students of Nyaya literature as are
SEC. vn] INTRODUCTION xxxvii
not equipped with the required control over the termi-
nology of navya-riyaya are apt to indulge in the ill-
conceived criticism that the language of the Mani and
the connected works is spoiled by a huge over-growth
of inflated and hair-splitting logic-chopping. The key
to navya-nyaya is its terminology. Those who have
controlled this terminology are sure to find in the Mani
and allied works a discipline of unique subtlety and
value. The history of philosophical thought shows
that lack of precision in expression seriously hampers
its progress. In Indian thought, this defect was sought
to be remedied by Naiyayikas like Gangesopadhyaya
through several thought-measuring devices, which
chiefly consisted of formulas in Sanskrit constructed
with the aid of terms like avacchedaka (the delimiter),.
avacchedya (the delimited), nirapaka (co-forming),
nirupya (co-formed), anuyogin (containing correlate)
and pratiyogin (the other correlate or counter-corre-
late). All the Indian dialecticians, who wrote after
Gangesopadhyaya, were influenced by the thought-
measuring formulas used by Gangesa. By using sucfr
formulas, it was possible for later dialectics in Indian
philosophical literature to achieve a remarkable degree
of quantitative precision in measuring iht* extent
(temporal and spatial), content and intent (purpose
and potency) of cognition (jnana).
Gan gesa quotes Sriharsa (the Khandanakard)
and refutes his view (page 233 of the Mani anu-
mdna, Bibliotheca Indica). There is sufficient evidence
in favour of assigning Sriharsa to 1136 A. D. circa.
Pakadharamisra, otherwise known as Jayadeva, wrote
xxxviii , A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART *
a commentary called Aloka on the Mani. This Jaya-
deva is believed to be identical with Jayadeva, the
author of the Prasatonaraghava. A verse from this
drama (kadali kadall etc., I. 37) is quoted in the
Sahityadarpana, as pointed out by Mr. P. V. Kane in
his introduction to the latter work. Thus Paksadhara-
misra, alias Jayadeva, must have been considerably
earlier than the Sahityadarpana (1300 A. D. circa).
These facts will show that it would not be reasonable
to assign Gangesa to any date much earlier than 1200
A. D. and that he may be assigned to the former half
of the thirteenth century A.D.
Vardhamanopadhyaya, the only son of Gangesa
according to tradition, was also a reputed Naiyayika of
this period. He wrote several learned and illuminating
works, generally known as Prakasa, in the form of
commentaries on Udayana's treatises, Gangesa's Mani
and Vallabhacarya's Nyayalilavatl. Jayadeva's pupil,
Rucidatta, was a logician of considerable repute and
was the author of a well-known commentary called
Makaranda on Vardhamana's P t rakasa.
The end of the fifteenth century, as also the six-
teenth and seventeenth centuries, may well be described
as marking tfie heyday of Nyaya dialectics in Nuddea
{Navadvlpa, Bengal). Vasudeva Sarvabhauma was
the greatest Naiyayika who flourished about the end of
the 15th and the earlier part of the 16th century. He
had the unique privilege and glory of having taught
Nyaya to four of the greatest personalities of the 16th
century: v%z, Caitanya, the greatest Vaisnava teacher
SEC. vii] INTRODUCTION xxxix
and reformer of Bengal in the 16th centujry;
natha, otherwise known as Tarkika-siromani (th$ crest-
jewel of all logicians); Raghunandana, a fstfitous
Bengal lawyer ; and Krsnananda, a reputed tantrika,
who was a great authority on the different forms and
charms of the Sakta cult. Raghunatha (Tarkika-siro-
mani) was admittedly the greatest logician of the six-
teenth century. He wrote several treatises on Nyaya,
mostly in the form of commentaries and the greatest
and the most famous of the works is the Didhiti, an
expository and critical commentary on Gangesa's Mani.
Mathuranatha was the most famous of Raghunatha-
siromani's pupils and wrote authoritative commentaries
on the Mani and the Didhiti. Jagadisa and Gadadhara
were the greatest exponents of navya-nydya as re-
presented by the Mani and the Didhiti, and flourished
in the earlier part of the seventeeth century. Jagadisa
is famous as the author of the commentary on the
Didhiti, popularly known as J&gadlsl, the Sabdasakti-
prakdsika an independent treatise on the speculative
Semantics of Nyaya, a short manual called the Tarka-
mrla and a commentary called the Bhdsya-sukti on
the Bhasya of Prasastapada. Gadadhara is famous as
the author of the commentary, popularly known as the
Gddddhari, on the Didhiii, the commentary called the
Mulagddddhan on portions of the Mani, commentaries
on Udayana's Atmatattvavivcka, and fifty-two dialectic
tracts and treatises such as the Vyufyattivada and
and Saktivada (dialectic treatises on the speculative
Semantics of Nyaya). The more important works of
Jagadis.a and Gadadhara are still studied carefully by
XL A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART r
those students who seek to specialise in navya-nydya
and they are regarded as constituting an indispensable
discipline of high value to every scholar who wishes to
be recognised as a sound sdstrin. The dialectic litera-
ture of later Nyaya is a vast banyan tree, which had its
roots struck deep and its huge trunk fully developed in
Mithila in the Tattvacintumani, had its immense
branches and foliage stretched out and ramified in the
Didhiti in Nuddea, and bore fruit in the rich fruitage
of Jdgadlsl and Gadddhari, which formed the colossal
monument of Indian dialectics in the seventeenth
century. If Tvajjlmnfiiha is regarded as the crest-jewel
(siromani) of logical dialecticians, Gadadhara may well
be characterised as the prince of Nuddea dialecticians,
who wears the diadem inlaid with this brilliant crest-
jewel.
In the latter pa;rt of the seventeenth century, the
NyHya scholars interested themselves chiefly in the
interpretation of the earlier and later works on Nyaya
and in the production of introductory hand-books.
Three of such scholars may be mentioned here Sam-
kara-misra, Visvanatha-paficanana and Annambhatta,
Samkara-misra wrote a commentary on the Jdgadlsi and
a comprehensive commentary called the IJpaskdra oi>
Kanada's sutras. Visvanatha-paficanana wrote a com-
mentary on the Nyaya-sutras in 1634; and he is
famous as the author of the popular hand-book of the
Nyaya- Vaisesika system, called the Bhasdpariccheda or
Karikftvall, which consists of 168 easy verses. The
Kdrikdvall is accompanied by the author's own com-
mentary called the Nyayasiddhantamuktavali. Accord-
SEC. vn] INTRODUCTION
ing to the traditional methods of study, the MuktQvali
is widely studied by students of Nyaya, immediately
after finishing the study of Annambhatta's Tarkasatii-
graha and Dlpika.
Annambhatta was an Andhra scholar who
flourished in the latter part of the seventeenth century.
He was a versatile scholar and a reputed polymath.
He wrote several learned works on almost all the im-
portant branches of Sastraic lc;i ruing. In this connec-
tion, attention may be invited to some of Annam-
bhatta's known works. In the sphere of Purva-
mimarhsa and Vedanta, he is known as the author of
the massive commentary called the Ranakojjlvam on-
Bhatta Somesvara's Nyaya-sudha, otherwise known as
Ranaka, and of a commentary on the Brahma-sutras.
In Vyakarana, he is famous as the author of an easy
commentary on Panini's Astadhydyi and of an exten-
sive commentary called Uddyoiatoa on Kaiyata's
Pradlpa. In the sphere of the Nyaya-Vaisesika
system, he wrote a learned commentary called Sid-
dhanjana on Jayadeva's Manyaloka, as also the most
popular handbook of Indian logic called the Tarka-
samgraha and its expository and supplementary gloss
called the Dipika. The name Tarkasamgraha is inter-
preted by Annambhatta himself as a compendious
elucidation of the nature of substance, qualities and
such other ontological categories of the Vaisesika sys-
tem, which are accepted by Nyaya. These two works
the Tarkasamgraha and the Dlpika fulfil the object
mentioned in the concluding verse of the Tarka
ii fh n
ii afefaf : n
A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
PART II
TEXT
1.
2.
3. (a)
(e)
(0
PRATYAKSA-PARICCHEDAH
1. Nidhdya hrdi visvesam vidhdya guruvanda-
nam{ Bdlandm sukhabodhdya kriyatc tartiasamgrahah\\
2. Dravya-guna-karina-sdm8nya-visesa-sainav&y&-
bhavah sapta padarthah.
3. (a) Tatra dravyani prthivyap-tejo-v&yvak&sa-
k&fa-dih-atma-manamsi navaiva.
( b) RupQ-rasa-gandha-sparsa-sankhya-parim&na-
prthaktvc^samyoga-vibhaga-paratva-aparatva - gurutva-
dravatva - sneha - Sabda - tuddhi - sukha-duhkha -icch& -
dvesa-prayatna-dharmddharma-samsihdrdhcaturvim^atir
gunah.
(c) Utksepana - avak^epana - &Kuncana-pras&-
rana-gaw>andni pafica karmdni.
(d) Param, aparam ceti f'vividham s&m&nyam.
(e) Nityadravyavrttayo vitesastu anantd cva.
(f) Samavayastu eka eva.
A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
(g)
n^urrs*
5.
4. <ra
i fon TOrsTT i
i
PRATYAKSA-PARICCHEDAH 5
(g) Abhdvah caturvUhah, frdgabhdvah, pra-
dhvamsdbhdvaht atyantdbhdvah, anyonydbhdvasca iti.
4. Tatra gandhavatl prthivl. Sd dvividhd, nity&,
anityd'ca. Nityd paramanurupa. Anitya karyarupa.
Punah frividha, Sctfii'a-indriya-visaya-bhed&t. Saflfarit
asmadddindm. Indriyam gandhagrahaUam ghrdnam,
tacca nds&gravarti. Visayo mrtpdfanddih.
5. Sitasparsavatyah dpah. Tah dvividhah, toitydh,
anitydsca. Nitydh faramdnurftpdh. Anitydh k&rya-
rupdh. Punah trividhdh, sarira-indriya-visQya-bhed&t.
Sariram varunalofo. Indriyam rasagrdhakam rasanam
jihvagravarti. Visayah sarit-samudradih.
6. U$nasparsavat tejah. Tacca dvividhatn,
nityam anitypm ca. Nityam paramdnarupam. Anityam
kdryprupam. Punah trividham, iarira-indriya-vlsaya-
Vhed&t. Sariram ddityaloke prasiddhatn. Indriyam
rupagrdhakam caksuh krsnat&rdgravarti. Vifayah
caturvidhah, bhauma - divya-udarya - dkaraja-bhedat.
Bhaumam vahny&diEam. Abindhanam dfvytm
vidyudddi. Bhuktasya parin&nahelurudaryam. Akara-
jam suvarn&di.
A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
7. 5<rcf!?r
12.
is.
n
s.
9.
10.
11.
PRATYAKSA-PARICCHEDAH 7
7. Ruparahitah sporfavdn vdyuh. Sa dvividhah,
nityah, anityasca. Nityah parantanurafah. Anityah
tidryarupah. Punah trividhah, sarjra-indriya-visay -
Shedat. Sariram vayuloke. Indriyam sparfagrahakwh
tvak sarvasarlravarti. Visayo vrksadikampanahetuh.
Sartr&ntah-sancan v&yuh pranah. Sa ca eko'pi ufadhi-
bheddt prdnapdnddi-samjndm labhate.
8. $afdagunakam dkdsam. Tacca ekam, vibhu,
nityam ca.
9. Atltddivyavahdrahetuh Jtdlah. Sa ca eKo,
vibhuh, nityasca.
10. Pfacyddivyavaharahetuh dik. Sd ca ekd,
vibhvl, nityd, ca.
11. Jndnddhikaranam dtmd. Sa dvividhah %
jlvdtmd param&tm& ceti. Tatra Uvarah paramdimd
eka eva. Jlvastu pratisaflram bfo'nno, vibhtth, nityafca.
12. SuKhtidyupalabdhisddhanain Indriyam manah.
Tacca pratydtmaniyatatvdt an ant am, paratnanurupat*,
kityam ca.
13. Caksurmdtragrdhyo guno rUpam. Tacca
suWa-nila-plta-rakta-harita-kapifa-citrat/heddt sapta-
vidham. Prthivl-jala-tejovrtti. Tatra prthivydin sapfa
vidham. Abhdsvarasuklam jale. Bhdsvarafuklam
tejasi.
8 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
14. wroiift fir w i s ^
15.
i
19.
I ^wr: fa I
17.
H
18.
16. ^ttoiirsrRT^ gr: *rih i
H
20. W^cmm WR^ I
PRATYAKSA-PARICCHEDAH 9
14. Rasanagrahyo guno rasah. Sa ca madhura-
amla - lavana-katu - kasaya - tiktabliedat sadvidhah.
Prthivi-jalavrttih. Tatra prthivyam sadvidhah. fale
madhura eva.
15.* Ghr&nagrahyp guno gandhah. Sa dvtvidhah,
surabhih* asurabhisca. Prthivlmatravrttih.
16. Tvagindriyamatragrahyo gunah sparfah. Sa
ca trividhah, slta usna-anusnasltaShedat. Prthivyap-
tejo-vayuvrttih. Tatra sltah jale. Usnah tejasi.
prthivlvayvoh.
17. R&padicatustayam prthivyam paftajam am-
tyam ca. Anyatra apakajam nil yam anityam ca.
Nityagatam nityam. Anityagaiam anityam.
IS. Ekatv&divyavaharahetuh sankhyp. Sa nava-
dravyavrttih, elaatvGdi-pardrdhafaryanta. Ekatvam
nitya^ atoityam ca. Nityagatam nityam, Anityagataw
anityam. Dvitvddikam tu sarvatra anityameva.
19. Mdnavyavahdrakaranam parim&nam, Nava-
dravyavrtti. Taccaturvidham, anu, mahat, dirgham,
hrasvam ceti.
20. Prthagvyavaharak&ranam prthaktvam. Sarva-
dravyavrtti.
10 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
21. ^j^reirct: s^w i
24.
25.
22. tf PRHTO 3"Jfr ww \ qfawifo n
23.
, Rf f^
26.
27. i^fin gn 5^5, wnmnP i
, e^f[^^: qa^^^^ I ^
I fft^W: ^rllWlf^^ II
PRAT YAKS A-PARICCHED AH 1 1
21. Samyufaavyavahdrahetuh samyogah. Sarva-
dravy&vrttih.
22. Samyogan&sako guno vibhdgah. SarvOr
dravylavrttih.
23.- Pardparavyavahdrdsddhdranakdrane ftaratvd-
paratve. Prthivyadicatustaya^anovrttinl. Te dvividhe,
dikkrte kalakrte co. Dtirasthe dikkrtath paratvani.
SaMipasthv dikkrtam aparatvam. Jyesthe kalakrtani
paratvam. Kanisthe k&lakrtam aparatvam.
24. Adyapatanasamavayikaranam gurutvam*
prthivijalavrtti.
25. Adyasyandanasamavayikaranani dravatvam,
prthivyaptejovrtti. Taddvividham, samsiddhikani,
naimittiftam ca. Sdmsiddhikam jale. Naiwittikam
prthivltejasoh. Prthivydm ghrtdddvagnisamyogajam
dravatvam. Tejasi suvarnddau.
26. Curnadipindibhdvahetuh gunah srtehah,
jalamatravrttih.
27. Srotragrdhyo gunah sabdah, dk& amdtravrttih.
Sa dvividhah, dhvanydtmakah varndtmaKafca. Tatra
dhvany&tmakah bheryddau. Varndtmakah samskrt*-
bhdsadirnpah.
(e)
(f)
(g)
12 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
28. (a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
II
29. (a) areiwr *m wii n
(b) vtffrMlfoft ^Rl^ II
(c) *K& jR^wR^^iPir n
(e)
: n
PRATYAKA-PARJCCHEDAH 13
28. (a) Sarvavyavah&rahetuh jn&nam bUddMh.
Sddvividhd, smrtih, anubhavasca.
(b) Samskdramdtrajanyani jndnam smrtih.
(c) TadbHinnam jndnam anubhtivah. Sa
dvividhah, yotharthah, ayafh&rthasca.
(d) Tadvati tatprakarakah anuthavah yothaf-
thah. Saiva pramd ityucyate.
(e) Tadabhavavati tatprak&rakah anuthavah
ayatharthah.
(f) Yatharthdnulhavah caturvidhah, prat-
yakfa-anumfti-updmiti-f&bdabhed&t.
(g) Tatkaranam apt coturvidham, pratyaksa-
anumdna-upani&na-saldathzdat.
29. (a) Asfidh&ranam kdranam Jiaranam.
(b) Kdryaniyatapurvavrtti kdranam.
(c) Kfiryam pr&gabhavapratiyogi.
(d) Kdranam trividham, sawavdyi-asamavdyi-
toimittabheddt. >
(e) Yatsamavetam ktiryam utpadyate tat
samavdyi-karanam ; yathd tantavah patasya ; pafa&a
svagatarupddefr.
14 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
wr 85
(g)
ii
30. ( a )
(b)
, ftffasr*
(c) 3*
(d)
(e)
PRATYAKSA-PARICCHEDAH 15
(f) Karyena karvnena va saha eRasmin art he
samavetam sat karanam asamavdyikdranam; yatha
tantusaihyogah patasya, tanturupam patarupasya.
(g) Tadufyhayabhinnam Kfiranam nimittakara-
nam ; yatha turivem&dikam pvfasya.
(h) Tadetattrividhakdranamadhye yadasfidha-
ranam karanam tadeva karanam.
30. (a) Tatra pratyaksafnonakaranam pratyak-
saw.
(b) Indriydrthasannikarsajanyamjnanam prat-
yaksam. Tat dvividham, nirvikalpakam savikal-
pakam ceti.
(c) Tatra nispraJAdrakam jndnam nirvikol-
pakam.
(d) Saprakdrakam jnanam savikalpakam.
Yatha 'Ditthah ayaW, 'Brahmavah ayam', 'syamah
ayam', 'Pacakah ayam' iti.
(e) PratyaJssajndnahetuh indriydrthasanni-
karsah sadvidhah samyogah, samyuktasamavdyah,
samyukiasamavetasamavdyah, sawavdyah, samaveta~
samavdyah, visesanaviiesyabhavasca iti.
16 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
PRATYAKSA-PARICCHEDAH 17
Caksusa ghatapratyaksajanane samyogah san-
nikarsah. Ghatariifyapra tyaksajanane sathyfuktasaina-
vdyah sannikarsah, sariiyukte ghatc riipasya samavdyat.
Rtipaii'asanianyapratyakse satiiyuktasamaveta-
samavayah sannikarsah, caksussamyukte ghate rupam
, tatra rilpatvasya sawavayat.
Srotrcna sabdasaksatkdrc samavayah sannikarsah,
karnauivaravartyakdsasya srotratvat, sabdasya akasa-
gunatvat, gunaguninosca samavaydi. Sabdatvasdk-
satkare samavetasamavdyah sannikarsah, srotra-
samavete sabde sabdalvasya samavdyat.
Abhdvapratyaksc ,-, : V.v, /*-./. . : v,;.; ; . a 7 //.'?: a/, sanni-
karsah 'ghatabhavavat bhutalain* ityatra caksuhsam-
yuktc bhiitalc ghatabhavasya visesanatvdt.
Evam sannikarsasatkajanyam jndnam pratyaksam,
tatkaranam indriyam. Tasmad indriyam pratyaksapra-
indnam iti siddhatn.
Iti pratyakfaparicchedah.
18 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
si. (a)
(b)
(c)
(d) '
: II
(e) rww fmfiw T^rt m n
32. (a) 3T3TR ftft^, l4 T^W ^ II
(b) ^1^
<? T^ TO
ANUMANA-PAR1CCHEDAH 19
31. (a) Anumitikaranam anumanam.
(b) Paramarsajanyarii jnanatn anumitjh.
(c) Vyaptivihstapaksadharmdtajfoanam $ara-
marsah. Yathd 'VahnivyapyadhumavQn ayam parvatah*
iti jndnam pardmarsah. Taj j any am 'parrato vahni-
man' iti jndnaw annmitih.
(d) 'Yatra yatra dhilmah tatrdgnih 9 iti saha-
caryaniyamo vyaptih.
(e) Vyapyasya parvatddivrttitvam paksadfiar-
matd.
32. (a) Anumanam di'ividham, svdriham parti*
rtham ca.
(b; Svartham srdninnitihetuh. Tathd hi
svayameva bhuyodarsanena 'yalra yatra dhumah tatra
agnih' iti mahdnasddau vyapt'im grhitvd parvatasami-
pam galah, tadyate ca agnail sandihaitah parvate dhil-
mam pasyan vydptim smarati 'yatra yatra dhftmah
tatra agnih' iti. Tadanantaram 'vahnivyapyadhftmavan
ayam parvatah' iti jnanam utpadyate. Ayam eva
lingapardmarsa ityucyate. Tasmdt 'parvato vahnimtin*
20 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
(c)
?irr f n
33 (a)
ANUM ANA- ARICCHEDAH 21
iti fndnam anumitih utpadyatc. Tadetat srdrthd-
nmndnam.
(c) Yattu svayam dhiimat agnim anumdya
parani prati bodhayitum pancdvayavav&kyafn
prayujyatc tat par&rthdnumdnawi. Yathd
Parvato vahmmati.
Dhumavattvdt.
Yo yp dhumai'dn sa vahniman, yathd mahdnasah.
Tathd ca ay am.
Tasmdt tathd iti.
Anena ftratipdditdt liiigdt paro'p'i agnim prati-
padyate.
33. (a) Pratijnd-hetu-uddharana-u'ftanaya niga-
wandnf paiicdvayavdh.
'Parvato vahnimari iti ffratijnd.
'Dhumavattvdf iti hetuh.
( Yo yp dhumavdn sa vahnimdn, yathd
tiasah* iti uddharanam.
22 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
34. (a)
5 Tf
(b)
n
(d)
T tWf tft I 3T5f
: n
(c) apeiTOPWlfi*
' I
ANUMANA-PARICCHEDAH 23
'Tathd ca ayam' iti npanayah.
'Tastndt tathd* iti nigamanam*
(b) Svdrthanumiti-pardrthdnumityoh lihga-
pardmarsa cva karanam. Tasmat lingapardmarfah
aninndnain.
34. (a) Lingam triridham, (it:: ,/ yr \alirc* i t
kcralanvayi, keralaiyalireki ca iti.
(b) Anvayena vyatirekcna ca vydptimat
anyayavyatireki; yathd vahnan sddhye dhumavattvam
' Yatra dhumah tatra agnih, yathd mahdnase ' iti an-
vayavydptih. ' Yatra vahnih ndsti tatra dhumo'pi
ndsti, yathd hradc* iti vyatirekavydptih.
(c) Anvayamdtravydptikam kevalanvayi',
yathd ( ghatah abhidheyah prameyatvdt, patavat.'
Atra prameyatva-abhidheyatvayoh vyatirekavydptih
ndsti, sarvasyapi prameyatvdd abhidheyatvdcca.
(d) Vyatirekamdtravydptikani kevalavyatireki;
yathd prthivl itarebhyo bhidyate, gandhavattvdt; yad
itarebhyo na bhidyate na tad gandhavat, yathd jalam;
na ca iyam tatha; tasmdt na tatha iti. Atra ( yat
gandhavat tad itarabhinnam' ityanvayadrstdnfah ndsti,
prthivimdtrasya paksatvdt.
24 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
35. (a)
: II
36. (a)
: n
(b)
II
(b) raiWRm W
(c)
ANUMANA-PAR1 CCHEDAH 2S
35. (a) Sandigdhasadhy avan paksah, yatha
dhumavattve hetau parvatah
(b) Niscitasadhyavan sapaksah, yatha tatraiva
mahanasah.
(c) Niscitasadhyabhavaran vipaksah, yatha
tatraiva hradah.
36. (a) Savyabhicara-viruddha-satpratipaksa-
asiddha-badhitah panca heivabhasdh.
(d) Savyfabhicdrah anaikantikah. Sa trividhah
sddharana-asadharana-anupasamliaiibhcdat. Tatra
Sad !i$abhdvavadvrt tilt sadhatanah anaikantikah, yathQ
'parvato vahniman, prameyatvai' iti; prameyatvasya
vahnyabhavavati hrade vidyamanatvat.
Sarvasapaksavipaksavydvrltah paksamatravrttih
asadharanah^yatha'sabdo nit yah, sabdatvat' iti. Sabda-
tvam sarvebhyah nityebhy t ah anityebhyasca vyavrttam
sabdam&travrtti.
Anvayavyatirekadrstaniaraliitah anupasamhdri ;
yath& 'sarvam anityam, prameyatvat' iti. Atra sarva-
syapi paksatvat drftdnto nasti.
26 A PRIMER OF INDFAN LOGIC
I fRHwf ft
n
(d)
'sr^r far.
' II
(e)
' I
: i **w
*
ANUMANA-PARICCHEDAH 27
(c) Sddhydbhdvarydpto hetuh riruddhah\
yathd l sabdah nityah krtakatvdt* iti. Krtakatvam hi
nityai'i'dbhdvcna anityatvcna vydptam.
Sadhyabhcivasadhakarii heivatiiararii yasya
sa satpratipdksah; yathd 'sabdo mtyah, srdvanatvdt
sabdatvarat,' 'sabdalj anityah, karyatrdl ghatavat* .
(e) Asiddhah triridhah osraydsiddhali, sv&-
rupasiddhah vyapyatrasidd/iasca Hi.
Asraydsiddah yathd. 'yagandrarindam siirabhi,
araiindatvdt, sarojdravitidavat'. Atfa gagandraiindam
asrayah, sa ca ndstyeva.
Svarupdsiddho yathd 'sabdo gunah cdksusatvdt,
rtipavat.' Atra caksusatram sabde ndsti, Sabdasya
srdvanatvdt.
Sopddhiko hetuh rydpyatvdsiddliah. Sddhya-
vydpakatve sati sddhandvydpakatram npddhih.
Sddhyasamanddhikarana-atyantobhdra - apraiiyogitvam
sddhyavydpakatvam. Sddhanavannistha-atyantdbhdva-
pratiyogitvam sddhandvydpakatvam. 'Parrato dhuma-
van, vahnimattrdt' ityatra ardrendhanasai'nyoyah
upddhih.' Yatra dhuwiah tatra drdrendhanasamyoga
28 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
(f) TOT
37.
(I
UPAMANA-PARICCHEDAH 29
iti sddhyavydpakatd. Yatra vahnih tatra drdrendhana-
sariiyogo todsti, ayogolakc drdrcndhatiasaiiiyogd-
bhGvdt' iti sddhanfivyd'pakatd. Evani sadhya-
vyQpakatve sati sadhanavyapakatvat ardrendhanasam-
yogah upddhih. Sopadhikatvat vahnimativam vyapya-
tvasiddham.
(f) Yasya sadhyabhavah pramananiarena
niscitah sa badhiiah yatJia 'rahnih anusnah, dravya-
tvat' iti. Atra anusnatvam sddhtyam, tadabhavah
itsnatvam spdrsanapratyakscnagrhyate iti badhitatvam.
Iti anumdnaparicchcdah.
UPAMANA-PARICCHEDAH
37. Upatnitikaranam upamdnam. Samjna-
sathjnisambandhajfidnam upamitih, tatkaranam sddr-
syajnanam. Tat ha hitiascit gavayapaddrthamajdnan
'kutascit dranyakapurusat 'gosadrsah gavayah* iti frutva
van am gatah vabydrthath smaran gosadrsath pindam
pasyati. Tadanantaram 'asau gavayapadavacyah*
ityupamitih utpadyate.
Iti ufamdnaparicchedah
30 A PRIMER OF liN'DIAN LOGIC
(b)
39. (a)
(b)
40. (a)
38. (a) *OTWW W I
ii
(d)
(e) ?!ir ^ ^WTfTK^t ^Tf^^ URT-
SABDA-PARICCHEDAH 31
38. (a) Aptavdkyam sabdah. Apastu yathd-
rthavaktd. Vdkyam padasamilhah yathd <gdin
anaya' iti.
(b) Saktam padam. 'Astnat padal ayam
arthah boddhavyah' iti Israrasanketah saktih.
39. (a) Akanksa, yogyatfi, sannidhisca rdkydr-
thajnane hetuh.
(b) Padasya padantararyatirekaprayukta-
anvaya-ananubharakatvcMi Gkaiiksa.
(c) Arthdttadho yogyatd.
(d) Paddndth ainlambena nccdranam sanni-
dliih.
(e) Tathd ca dkdnksddirahitam vdkyam apra-
tndnam. Yathd 'gauh asvah purusah hasti' itina
pramdnam, dkdnksavirahdt. 'Vahnind since? Hi na
pramdnam, yogyatdvirahdt. Prahare prahare asahoccd-
ritdni 'gam dnaya ityddipaddm na pramdnam, sanni-
dhyabhdvat.
40. (a) Vdkyam dvhidham, vaidikam lauki-
kam ca. VaidikaW isvaroktatvdt sarvamera pramd-
nam. Laukikam tu dptoktam pramGnam, anyat
apramanam.
32 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
(b) WFrfow OT8CSR*! <R**>i 33[: H
41. (a)
inl ^R
( C
' II
42.
i
43. (a)
(b)
(c)
(d) *ftt CT: II
GUNA 33-
(b) Vdkydrthajnanam s&bdajnanam. Tai-
karanamsabdah.
Iti sabdaparicchedah.
Evam yatharihanubhavo nirupitah.
41. (a) Ayatharlhdniibhavah trividhah, sam-
saya-zriparyaya-larkabhedat.
(b) Ekasmin dharmini viruddhananadharma-
.:;"'; . ". T ' ; .7">. . samsayah yatha sihanurva
piimso i'd iti.
(c) Mithydjnanam viparyayah yathd suktaw
'idam rajatam'Jti.
(d) Vydpyarofyena vydpakaro'fah tarkah
yathd 'yadi vah'nih na sytt tar hi dhumo'pi na sydt' iti.
42. Smriirapi dvividhd, yathdrthd ayathdrtha
ca. Pramdjanyd yfathdrthd. Apramdjanyd ayathdrthd.
43. (a) Sarvesam anu'kulatayd vedarityam
sukhatn.
(b) Pratikulalayd vedanlyam duhkham.
(c) Icchdkdmah.
(d) Krodlio dvesah.
c
.34 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
(c) ft:
44.
45.
GUXA, KARMA, SAMANYA 35
(e) Krtih prayatnah.
(f ) Vihitakarmajanyah dhartnah.
(g) Nisiddhakarmajanyastu adliannah.
(h) Buddhyddayah as tan dtmamatravisesa-
gunah. Buddhi-iccha-prayatn&h nitydli anitydsca.
Nitydh Isvarasya. Anityah Jivasya.
(i) Saniskdrali trividhah regah, b/ifirand,
sthitasthdpakasca iti.
Vegah prthivyddicatustayawanovrttih.
Anubhavajanyd smrtihetuh bhavand dtmawdtra*
vrttih.
Anyathdkrtasya punah tddarasthydpadakah sthita-
sthdpakah katadiprthivlmdtravrttih.
Iti gundh.
44. Calandtmakani karma. Urdhvadesasamyoga-
hetuh utksepanam. Adhodesasaniyogahetuh avakse-
panatyi- Sanrasya sannikrstasamyogahetuh dkuficanam.
Viprakrstasamyogahctuh prasdrartam. Anyat sarvam
gamanavi.
45. Nityam ekam anckilnnyalain sdmanyam
Dravya-guna-karmarrfti. Par am satfd. A par am
dravyatvddi.
36 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
46.
47.
48. (a)
II
(b)
(c)
'
(d)
49.
so.
, gqgfltfh
II
VISESA, ABHAVA 37
46. Nityadravyavrttayah vyavartakah visesah.
47. Nityasambandhah sawav&yah, ayutasiddha-
vrttiti. Yayoh dvayoh madhye ekamavinasyadavas-
tham, apardsritam evavatisthate /aw ayutatiddhau
yathd avayavavaypvinau, gunaguninau, kriyjakriyd*
vantau, jutivyakti, visesanityadravye ca iti.
48. (a) Anadih sdntah prdgabhavah, utpatteh
purvam kdryasya.
(b) Sddih anantah pradhvamsah t utpattya-
nantaram kdryasya.
( c ) Traikalikasamsargdz'acchinnapratiyogitakah
atyantabhdvah yathd 'tohutale ghatah ndsti' iti.
(d) Tdddtmyasainbandhdi>acchmnapratiyogita-
kah anyonyabhavah yathd 'ghatah Pato no? iti.
49. Sarves&m ftadarthanftm yathtyatham uktes-
vantarbhavdt saptaiva paddrlhdh iti siddham.
50. Kanddanyayamatayoh balavyutpattisiddhaye
Annambhattena vidusd racitastarkasamgrahah\\
ITI TARKASAMGRAHAH SAMAPTAH
II wr: II
II Cf^fa? * II
A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
PART III
TRANSLATION AND EXPOSITION
CHAPTER I
PERCEPTION
1
T In my heart, I devoutly
cherish the Lord of the universe;
my teacher, I respectfully greet;
and I proceed to write this
Primer of Indian Logic, called
Tarka-Samgraha, with a view
to beginners gaining knowledge
easily.
Following the time-honoured practice of orthodox:
Sanskrit writers, Annambhatta begins his Primer witlir
an appropriate mangold, which consists, here, in paying
devout homage to his God and to his teacher. The
expression Visvesa the Lord of the universe is sug-
gestive of the central argument of the Nyaya theism
the creationistic argument. The four preambulary
factors, constituting what is known as anubandha*
catustaya, are also indicated in the second line of the
introductory verse. They are subject-matter (vifayaj,.
the chief aim (prayojana), relation (sambandha) and;
the persons for whom the work is specially designed 1
(adhikarin). Such preambulary details are usually
incorporated in modern books in a separate preface
prefixed to the work in question, while they are briefly
set forth in the opening verses in sastra treatises in?
Sanskrit. The elements of the Nyaya- VaiSesika system
4 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
in its syncretist form constitute the subject-matter of
this Primer and its aim is to enable beginners to
understand them easily. It follows from this that this
Primer is intended for the beginners. Pratifadya-
pratipadaka-bhava the relation of treated and treatise
is generally stated to form thesambandha in almost
all sastra works. This would be useless information,
when understood literally. It would acquire special
significance if it should be interpreted as holding out an
assurance, that the author can be trusted to treat well
in his treatise, the subject in hand.
The name Tarka-samgraha is interpreted by
Annambhatta himself as a compendious elucidation of
the nature of substance, qualities and such other onto-
logical categories of the Vaisesika system, that are
accepted by Nyaya. The term tarka is thus taken by
the author in a somewhat unusual sense. The usual
meanings, however, of the word tarka are logic, reason-
ing, reductio ad absurdum and discussion. Putting all
these ideas together, it would be easy to see how the
title Tarka-samgraha may be taken to be equivalent to
A Primer of the Nyaya- Vaisesika system in its syn-
cretist form*.
2
T Substance, quality, ac-
tivity, generality, particularity,
inherence and non-existence are
the seven categories (pad&rth&h) 9
A paddrtha is literally a nameable or denotable
thing or a fhing which corresponds to a word. Kanada,
CH. i] PERCEPTION 5
in his Vaisesika-sutras, gives the name artha to sub-
stance (dravya), quality (guna) and activity (karma).
Prasastapada, the author of the Vaisesika-bhaya
called Padartha-dharma-saihgraha enumerates the first
six paddrthas out of the seven mentioned above. Later
Vaisesikas add non-existence (abhdra) to Prasasta-
pada' s list of six paddrthas. Gautama, the author of
the Nyaya Sutras, Vatsyayana, the author of Nyaya-
bhiisya and later Naiyayikas : ov'opiNr all these seven
paddrthas.
What is a paddrtha or category as understood in
the above text 2. T.? A paddrtha is usually defined
as a knowable thing (jneya) or as a validly cognisable
thing (pravicya), or as a nameable or denotable thing
(abhidheya). The Nyaya-Vaisesika system maintains
that its scheme of seven padarthas represents a satis-
factory classification of all the knowable or nameable
things. The first six are called bhdva-faddrthas or
existent entities and are thus contrasted, in a marked
way, with abhava, which amounts to non-existence.
Though Kanada speaks of abhava, he does not include
it in his list of arthas for the reason that he under-
stands by artha an entity in which existence or satta,
in the Vaisesika sense, inheres. Prasastapada does not
mention abkava in his scheme of six padfirthas, since
this scheme confines itself to bhavas. But a complete
scheme of all the knowable or validly cognisable or
nameable things must not omit abhava for it is main-
tained in the Nyaya-Vaisesika system that we know
abhava, know it correctly and the negative terms in
language denote it.
6 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
It would be useful to compare in this connection
the above scheme of seven paddrthas with Gautama's
scheme of sixteen pad&rthas and with the correspond-
ing schemes adopted in certain other systems of Indian
philosophy. In the first Sutra of the Nyaya-darsana,
'Gautama enumerates sixteen paddrthas means oi valid
'knowledge (pramana), objects of valid krtowledge
i(prameya), doubt (samsaya), purpose (pray oj ana) ,
instances (drstdnta), established conclusions (sid-
dhanta), members of syllogism (avayava), reduciio ad
<tbsurdum (tarka), decisive knowledge (nirnaya), argu-
iing for truth (vada), arguing constructively as well as
destructively for victory (jalpa), merely destructive
.argument (vitandd), fallacious reasons (hetvabhasa),
quibbling (chala), specious and unavailing objections
(jati), and vulnerable points (nigrahasthana). These
sixteen are not metaphysical categories similar to those
of the Vaibeikas; but they are merely sixteen topics
which one should study in order to master the details of
the Nyaya dialectics. The Mimamsakas of the Bhatta
school recognise five paddrthas substance, generality,
quality, activity and non-existence. The Prabhakaras
recognise eight the five bhavas of the Nyaya-system
(omitting visesa) and potency (sakti), similarity
'(sadrfya) and number (saiikhya), non-existence not being
accepted as a distinct category. The Sariikhyas accept
twoultimate padarthas \ primordial matter (prakrti) and
spirit (purusa). Among the Vedantins, the Advaitins
maintain that there is one ultimate reality Brahman
and there are only two padarthas spirit (cit) and
non-spirit (acit), or soul (atman) and non-soul
CH. i] PERCEPTION 7
(andtman) ; the Visitadvaita school recognises three-
spirit (cit), non-spirit (acit), and God (Isvara); and
the Dvaitins reduce all the padarthas to two main cate-
gories independent and dependent. Among the older
Vaisesikas, we find some, like the author of the Data-
paddrt'ha-sa>stra t who would recognise ten pad&rthas
in all the six bhdvas of the later Vaisesikas, poten-
tiality (sakti), inability (a-sakti), generic differentia
(sdmdnya-visesa) and non-existence (abhdva). Except
Gautama's list of sixteen padarthas, all these schemes
of categories attempt, with a large measure of success,
at a sound metaphysical classification of all nameable
or knowable things; and none of these Indian schemes
can justly be said to exhibit the logical defects that we
notice in similar schemes of categories known to
Western logic such as the somewhat arbitrary scheme
of ten categories or predicates given by Aristotle, and
the schemes of four or three or seven categories put
forward by the Stoics, Descartes, Spinoza, Locke*
Mill and other philosophers.
In most of the syncretist works dealing with the
tenets of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system, the arguments
advanced by the Bhattas as well as the Prabhakaras to
establish the existence of potentiality (sakti) asa distinct
entity (quality or category) and the view upheld by the
latter school of MImamsakas that similarity (sddrsya)
should be given a distinct place in the list of categories
are refuted. Counter-agents (pratibandhaka) counteract
the operation of causes and causes turn out to be un-
availing. The counteraction that we experience in such
8 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART ra
cases cannot be explained otherwise than as consisting
in the destruction of the causal efficacy or sakti of the
causes. Thus according to Mimarhsakas, the existence
of sakti as a distinct category must necessarily be re-
cognised. The Naiyayikas argue that counteraction
consists merely in the presence of counter-agents, the
total non-existence of which is one of the ^elements
constituting the full compliment of the causal apparatus
(sSmagrl) . Thus they disprove the necessity for re-
cognising sakti as a distinct category. Similarity, ac-
cording to Prabhakaras, does not consist merely in the
possession of parts or qualities or features of the same
kind as the Naiyayikas urge; but it is revealed inex-
perience as a distinct category. The Naiyayikas contend
that a careful analysis of experience would show that
similarity consists merely in the possession of parts or
qualities or features of the same kind.
3 (a)
T Of them (the seven cate-
gories), the Substances are only
nine vis.: earth, water, light,
air, ether, time, space, soul and
mind.
The word 'only* in this text is intended to exclude
'darkness', which according to Mimarhsakas, is a dis-
tinct substance. The Mimarhsakas argue that on the
strength of the experience which associates blue colour
and movement with darkness, it should be regarded as
a substance; and it cannot be any of the nine substances
mentioned above. So, it should be given a distinct
OH. i] PERCEPTION 9
place as the tenth substance in the list of substances.
The Naiyayikas point out that the experience which
associates colour and movement with darkness is erro-
neous. For, a substance having colour can be seen only
in the presence of light; and darkness, which is seen in
the absence of light, cannot be a substance having
colour. In fact, darkness, according to Naiyayikas,
is nothing but the total absence of such light as is effec-
tual in normal perception.
In the text under consideration, substances are
divided into nine classes. This may be taken to be a
definition of substances from the point of view of ex-
tension. But the Nyaya method of exposition, according
to Vatsyayana (Nyaya-Bhfisxn 1-2-3, Avatarika)
recognises that expository scheme to be perfect which
consists of uddcsa (enumeration accompanied by
vibhaga or division), laksana (definition) and pariksa
(investigation). Thus a mere enumeration or division
of substances will not do and they should be defined.
A substance is usually defined as that which possesses
the jati (generic attribute) called dravyatva (sub-
stance-ness) ; or as that in which a quality (guna) or
activity (kriya) inheres; or that which is fit to be
treated as the inherent cause (samavtiyi-karana) of
some effect. Of these alternatives, the second and
third, based on quality and activity, are not applicable
to substances in the first moments of their creation ;
for, according to the Naiyayika theory of causation^
every cause should necessarily precede its effect, and
qualities and activities, which are the effects of sub-
10 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
stances, require at least one moment before they could
come into being. If the function of definition should
be to provide a valid reason (hetu) for inferring differ-
ence from others and if inference should be of some-
thing which is not already comprised in the connota-
tion of the minor term (paksa), substance-ness (dra-
vyatva), which is connoted by the term dravya, would
not form a satisfactory definition. In such circum-
stances, by using quality or activity and without
directly using dravyatva, a substance is defined as a
thing possessing a jdti (generic attribute), which is not
satta (existence) and is co-existent with a quality or
activity. This kind of ingenious device, which is com-
monly adopted by the Naiyayikas, is known as jdti-
ghaMa-laksana.
In this connection, it would be of advantage to
elucidate briefly the Naiyayika's view of definitions
and their functions. A definition in Nyaya is not
merely an explication of the connotation of a term; but
it is a proposition specifying the differentia or the
differentiating feature of the species or the thing
defined. A laksana is a specific feature or asddhararia-
d harm a. The term asadhdrana means that which is
free from the three faults of a definition vis: over-
applicability ( ativyapti) , partial inapplicability
(avyapti) and total inapplicability (asambhava). A
definition, that is too wide and that consists of an
attribute which is present in things sought to be defined
as well as those not intended to be defined, has the
defect of atwy&pt'i; while a definition which does not
CH. i] PERCEPTION II
apply to some of the things defined has the defect of
cvydpti' and one which is wholly inapplicable to any of
the things defined has the defect of asambhava. Such
a specific feature (asadharanadharma) is reciprocally
co-extensive with the adjunct that delimits the scope
of laksyald (being sought to be defined); in other
words, wherever that feature is, laksyatavacchedaka or
the delimiting adjunct of laksyata is, and wherever the
latter is, the former is. In the case of a cow or an ox
(gauh), for instance, gotva or bovineness is the laks-
yatavacthedaka, when all the quadrupeds of the bovine
species, and none else, are sought to be defined. In this
case, brown colour or uncloven hoof would be too
narrow to constitute a definition, the former, which is
applicable only to some of the laksyas, being vitiated by
the fault of avyapti (partial inapplicability), and the
latter, which is applicable to none of them, being vitia-
ted by asambhava (total inapplicability), while having
horns would be too wide and therefore vitiated by the
fault of ativtyapti. It will be seen, from this, that the
Nyaya view of the function of a definition is primarily,
differentiation, and incidentally, designation also, while
the latter is the only conceivable function in certain
cases. "Vyavrttir vyavaharo vd laksanasya prayo-
janam" is an oft-quoted dictum in Nyaya literature.
Vydvrttior differentiation consists in the inference of
difference from the other things. Smell in the case of
earth or rationality in the case of a man forms a
differentiating laksana and serves as a valid reason
leading to the inference of difference from not-earth in
the former case, and from not-man in the latter. What
12 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
helps in differentiation also helps in specific designation.
All vy&vartakalaksanas are thus vyavaharikalaksanas
also. In certain cases like nameability (abhidhe-
yatva), all things (paddrtha) are intended to be covered
by the definition ; but no differentiation is possible, as
nothing can be said to be other than a thing (padartha) ;
and in such cases the only function of laksanq is desig.
nation (vyavahara).
It would be interesting to observe here that lak-
sanas or definitions are as important on the positive
side in the pluralistic realism of the N}aya-Vaiscs'ka
system, as they are on the negative side in the monistic
phenomenalism of the Advaita Vcdanta. In the former
system, laksaiias are helpful in arriving at, and main-
taining the reality of, several self-contained and
mutually exclusive units, which, according to the
Advaitic monist are but fragmentary appearances of
the one absolute; while, in the latter system, laksanas
are but so many unsustainable stunts demonstrating
the futility of the <lir< r< i :i;:'.ii -.. efforts of the fissi-
parous phase of human intellect and the soundness of
the doctrine of indefinability (anirvacamyatu) which
the Advaitins seek to uphold.
It may also be useful to remember here that the
conception of substance (dravya) as the substratum of
qualities and movements is the bed-rock of the realism
of Nyaya; and one has only to show the hollowness of
the Nyaya distinctions of substance (dravya), quality
(yuna) and movement (karman or kriya), in order to
knock off the bottom of the Nyaya realism.
CH. i] PERCEPTION 13
3 (b)
T Colour, taste, smell,
touch, number, size, separate-
ness, conjunction, disjunction,
remoteness, proximity, weight f
fluidity, viscidity, sound, cogni-
tion, pleasure, pain, desire,
dislike, volition, merit, demerit,
tendency these are the twenty-
four qualities.
Patanjali, in his Mahabhaya, describes a guna as
something which inheres only in a substance, and, under
certain circumstances, ceases to be there; which is
found in different species of substances but eternal in
some cases and non-eternal in other cases.
"Sattve nivisatc'paili prthagj&tisu vartate
Adheyascakriyajasca so 9 sattva'prakrtirguwah."
This is Patanjali's definition of a guna. It is generally,
adopted by all the grammarians (Vaiyakaranas) and
it amounts to this in plain language: ^ a guna may be
eternal or non-eternal and inheres in a substance; but it
is neither a substance nor an activity. The Vaiyakara-
na's conception of a guna, for all practical purposes,
is the same as the Naiyayika's conception of it. The
Mimamsakas sometimes use the term guna in the sense
of a quality and sometimes in the general sense of
something that is ancillary and comparatively unimpor-
tant. The term guna is sometimes used in the sense of
literary merit and also in the general sense of a good
feature. The Samkhya sense of the word is the com-
14 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
ponent strands of the composite primordial matter
called prakrti which consists of the three gunas good-
ness (sattva), passion (rajas) and darkness (tamas).
The Vedantins generally use the word guna in the
sense of an attribute or dharma. Though the term guna
is thus greatly ambiguous in Sanskrit philosophical lite-
rature, the Naiyayika's technical use of thjs term is
sufficiently precise and does not admit of confusion.
It would be difficult to justify the need for giving
a distinct place in the Naiyayika's list of gunas, to
prthaktva, vibhtga, paratva and aparatva. Prthaktva
(separateness) is not materially different from
difference which, according to Naiyayikas, is anyonya-
bhava or reciprocal negation a species of non-exis-
tence. Vibhaga (disjunction) could hardly be distin-
guished from Samyogan&Sa (loss of contact). What
are remoteness and proximity (paratva and aparatva)
but space-relation or time-relation, the former consist-
ing in a larger number of intervening samyogas (con-
tacts) or viprakrstatva and the latter in a smaller
number of intervening samyogas or sannikrstatva? In
fact, some Navya-Naiyayikas are prepared to discard
these gunas, on the grounds indicated. The realistic
obsession of the Nyaya-Vai$eika writers, who often
go to the length of finding in the external world an
objective reality corresponding to every thought and
every word, is mainly responsible for the retention of
these qualities in the traditional list of gunas.
It would be useful to note here that the Nyaya
system draws a distinction between visesa-gunas and
CH. i] PERCEPTION 15
sdmdtoya-gunas. Colour, smell, taste, touch, viscidity,
natural fluidity, cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, hatred,
effort, irterit, demerit, reminiscent impressions and sound
these are visesa-gunas ; and the rest are sdmdnya-
gunas. The former are special qualities, as the name
visesa-guna signifies ; and they are special qualities in
the sense that they are never found to be common to
two classes of substances, or to be more accurate, that
a visesa-guna, in the specific form in which it is actu-
ally found, has a j&ti which is not present in any
quality co-existing with two classifying attributes
(vibhdjakopadhi) of substances. It is easy to see how
the rest are sdmdnya-gunas or general qualities.
3 (c)
T Activity or motion is of
five kinds: upward motion,
downward motion, contraction,
expansion and going or move-
ment from one place to another.
KanSda's traditional classification of karma
(activity) is here followed, though the classification is
unsatisfactory, as pointed out by Nilakantha in his
PrakSsika and by several others. It is obvious that
gamana in a broad sense would include all other
varieties of activity. In common parlance, karma,
kriyd and krti are used as synonyms. In sastraic
terminology, krti is equivalent to yaina, which is the
inner volitional process immediately and invariably
preceding a voluntary activity. In this sense krti
should not be confounded with kriyd or karma. The
16 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
Nyaya-Vaisesika system distinguishes between volun-
tary activity (yatna-purvakakriya or, as it is sometimes
called, cesta) and involuntary activity (a-ydtna-pw-
vaka-kriya). The term karma used in the sense of
kriya should be distinguished from the syntactic karma
(object); and it should be also differentiated from
karma, used in the sense of the unseen impression or
vestige which every work leaves behind it and which
shadows the doer. It is in this latter sense that the
word karma should be understood in phrases like the
'Karma theory* and ' prarabdha-karma.*
According to Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas, the
essential feature of every activity is to bring about
disjunction (vibhdga), then the destruction of con-
junction with a previous spot (purvadesasamyoganasa)
and lastly conjunction with a further spot (uttaradcsa-
samyoga). The origin of a kriya occupies one moment
(ksana} ; and the three factors that follow its origin
separation, loss of prior contact and further contact
occupy each one moment. An activity, thus, fulfils its
purpose completely in the fourth moment (ksana}, as
soon as the further contact (uttaradesasamyoga) arises
and comes to an end in the fifth ksana. Every activity
lasts only for four ksanas. An important corollary,
deducible from these facts is that one karma can never
cause another karma ; for, an activity cannot be said to
be caused in the second or third or fourth ksana of a
prior activity, the prior contact being destroyed by the
disjunction resulting from the prior activity, the later
activity having no purpose to serve in the second or
CH. i] PERCEPTION 17
third or fourth ksana of the prior activity, and the
fifth ksana being one in which the prior activity
comes to an end and cannot, therefore, be asso-
ciated with the later activity as its cause. In this con-
nection, it should be remembered that a kriyd cannot
be conceived of otherwise than as direct and indepen-
dent cause of disjunction and as leading to further
contact, through loss of prior contact; for, according
to Kanoda and Gautama, to go to is to forego, or, in
other words, to quit, to sunder and touch further on.
(Kriyd, tato vibhdgah, tatah purradesasawyoganatah,
tatah uttaradefa-sathyogah, tatah kriytinasah). It may
also be noted here that the Vaisesikas and Nai>ayikas
use any one of these five factors, from the origin of
kriyd down to its cessation, as the delimiting condition
(upddhi) of a ksana, which is regarded as the smallest
unit of time.
The Nyaya-Vaisesika conception of kriyd stands
in sharp contrast with the Vaiyakarana view of this
category. According to the Vaiyakaranas a kriyd is
what is usually denoted by a verbal root (dhdtu) and
it is ordinarily a process consisting of many activities
(vydpdrah") arising in succession. In its fully accom-
plished state (siddhdvasthd), a kriyd is denoted by a
substantive like pdka; and when it is being done or in
its sddhydvasthd, it is denoted by the radical element in
a finite or infinitival verb.
It would be worthy of notice here that the'Naiya-
yikas and the Bhatta-mimarhsakas maintain that a
kriyd is perceptible and may be visualised under cer-
18 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
tain conditions ; whereas, the Prabhakaras hold that it
falls beyond the scope of the senses and it comes to be
iknown only through inference from fur the j contact
preceded by disjunction (vibhayapurvaka-samyoya).
It should also be remembered that Indian philosophers,
like Sankara, draw pointed attention to the funda-
mental difference between a 'kriyd and a jndna, which
consists in the former being such as directly falls with-
in the scope of the will (purnsatantra) and the latter
never coming within the scope of the will but having its
nature determined by its object (rastutantra).
3 (d)
T Generality is of two
kinds the more comprehensive
and the less comprehensive.
3 (c)
T Particularities, on the
other hand, abide in eternal sub-
stances and are innumerable.
3 (f)
T Whereas, inherence is
merely one.
In common speech, stinidnya means a common fea-
ture; but, in the technical language of Nyaya, it is
equivalent to j&ti and is understood to stand for a
generic feature which inheres in all the individuals
constituting a class and is eternal. The individual units
(vyakti) of a class may come and go, but the generic
attribute common to the whole class exists for ever.
CH. i] PERCEPTION 19
Humanity, or more literally man-ness (manusyatva) ,
which is common to all mankind, is eternal and it
existed before the origin of man and will continue to
exist even after the annihilation of all mankind. A jdti,
in this technical sense, is connected with a vyakti
through the intimate relation known as samavdya or
inherence. An attribute may be common to several
individuals and connected with them either through the
direct relation of svartipa-sambandha, the related object
itself being looked upon as relation, or through some
indirect relation (parampard-sainbandha) ; such an
attribute is called upddhi and should not be confounded
with a yd /i. Mfirtati'a, for instance, is not a ;d/i; and
it amounts to "being the seat of all activity" (kriy&sra-
yatva). It is sometimes called sakhandopadM a
feature which admits of being defined and stands in
need of the help of a definitive expression for its defi-
nite comprehension; and in this sense, a sakhaydopadhi
is said to be nirvacaniya. A jdti like pot-ness (yhatatva)
is anirvacanlya does not stand in need of the help of a
definitive expression for its comprehension. The Naiya-
yikas recognise certain generic attributes called
akhandopadhis, which are not jdtis but similar to them
in all respects except that the relation of the former to
their abodes is self-link (svarupa-sambandha) the
related thing itself constituting its own relation and
that it is not inherence (samavdya) as in the case of
jdti. Visaya is object ;visayat& is object-ness*, visayata-
iva is being object-ness and is an akhandopddhi. Prati-
yogin is correlative; pratiyogitd is correlativeness;
pratiyogitdtva is being correlativeness and is an
20 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
akhandop&dhi. Under which of the seven categories
should an akhandopadhi be brought? In reply to this
question, a Naiyayika would say that it could be
brought under saniunya, if that term should be under-
stood to mean all generic attributes jatis and
akhantfopddhis. Or, if the term sdmanya should be
restricted to a jati, an akhandopadhi could not be
brought under any of the seven categories. It should
be remembered in this connection that these two kinds
of generic attributes (j&ti and akhandopadhi) are the
only things that are presented in thought, by them-
selves, without the help or mediation of their attributes
(svartipatobhdtoa-ioyytih) ; and that thought grasps
Jther things only under the aspect of, or only through
the mediation of, a qualifying attribute (kincitprakara-
'Quraskarenaiva bh&nayogyah). In Nyajja terminology,
a distinction is sometimes made between akhanda-
amtinya and sakhanda-sainanya, the former being a
j&ti directly connected with a vyakti and the latter
being a generic attribute which is reducible to a jati
connected with a vyakti through some indirect relation
(fiaramparCisatnbandha). For instance, kriyatva (mo-
tion-ness) is an akhanda-sawanya-, while uigr/afra
is a sakhanda-s&manya, as it is equivalent to kriy&sra-
yatva (possessing an activity), which is a generic
attribute common to all the tnurtas earth, water, fire,
air and mind, and may be said to consist in the jati
kriy&tva being present through the indirect relation
svasamavfiyi-soniavdyitva (being the intimate substra-
tum of its own intimate substratum).
CH. i] PERCEPTION 21
How do the Naiyayikas show that it is necessary;
to recognise sdtndny t a or jdti as a distinct category?
Our experience, in several cases where it relates to
diverse objects, exhibits a certain degree of uniformity^.
When we see a human being or a beast, our experience
howsoever it may differ in other respects, invariably
takes the. form 'this is a man' (ayam manusyah) or
'this is a beast* (ayam mryah). The uniformity that we
thus observe in our experience cannot be accounted for
otherwise than through the assumption of a generic
feature common to all mankind or all the beasts. This
generic feature is called manusyatra (humanity) in the
case of human beings and nirgatva (beasthood) in the
case of beasts. Parsimony in thought is relied upon by
the Naiyayikas as a criterion of soundness, when it
does not clash with any other criterion which is
stronger or more reliable. The principle of economy
or the law of parsimony or the Idghava-nydya deter-
mines the nature of many a h)pothesis in Nyfiya and
other systems of Indian thought. According to this
principle, a generic feature like manusyatva or mryatva
should be taken to be eternal, one, and connected with
men or beasts through the intimate and eternal relation
called samavaya (inherence). In one word, it should
be taken to be a jdti in the technical sense, in the in-
terest of Idghava, so long as there is nothing preventing
the hypothesis of jdti being put forward in the case
under consideration. Thus, through perceptual ex-
perience, one might arrive at a jdti, in order to account
for uniformity in such experience. There are several
cases in which perceptual experience of a whole class
22 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
is impossible or it happens to be restricted to a few and
not accessible to all. For instance, in the case of
substances (dravya), only three of them earth, water
and fire are perceptible to the external senses, some of
their varieties being imperceptible. Though atvian
(spirit or soul) is perceptible to the inner sense called
wanas (mind), its existence as a dravya cannot be
taken for granted at the stage at which the jati
drQzyatzfa (substancencss) is yet to be established. In
such circumstances, the Nai)fiyikas maintain the neces-
sity for rcn-jjiii -in.; a jati by means of infeicnce
(anmn&na) aided by the principle of parsimony
(laghava). By way of illustration, their argument to
establish dravyaiva may be set forth here. Only a
substance can be samarayikarana (intimate cause or
inherent cause). Human thought, in respect of causa-
lity (karanata) as in other respects, shows a habitual
preference for compactness and unity. The conception
of karanata could serve some useful purpose in life,
only when it takes a definite and comprehensive form;
and it cannot take a form which is at once definite and
comprehensive, so long as it is not specifically delimited
in its scope by a comprehensive and definite adjunct.
In other words, a suitable delimiting adjunct of kara-
nata ( (karanatavacchcdaka), besides a similardelimiting
adjunct of karyata or cffcctness (karyatavacchedaka)
should be thought of in the case of every comprehen-
sive and definite statement of causal relation (Surya-
k5rana-bh&ra). The need for such a statement being
taken for granted in the case of the samav&yi-kdranatd
belonging to substances as a class, it follows that this
CH.I] PERCEPTION 23
kdranatd is definitely determined in its scope by a deli-
miting adjunct which is common to all the substances.
Such a delimiting adjunct in the case of samavdyi-
kCirana (samavtiyi-karanataracchedaka') is called drav-
yati'a. Economy in thought, in the absence of any
outweighing <li>;u:v,'-n!;i^c or difficulty, would neces-
sarily lea(J to dravyatra (substanceness) being assumed!
to be eternal (nitya), one (cka) and connected with all
the substances through samardya, i.e., a jCiti in the
technical sense. This argument is usually stated in
Sanskrit thus:
" Dravyanisthd samavdyikdranatd (yin/aw, saih-
yogam, libhugam vdprati), yatkinciclanugata-
dharniaracchinnu, kdranatutvat, dandanistha-
yjiatakdranattirat."
Some jdtis like draryati'd (substanceness) are
more comprehensive (para) as compared with prthivl-
tra (earthness) and less comprehensive as compared^
with sattd (existence) ; while yhatatza (potness) is the
least comprehensive (apara) of all the jdtis in the
series of jdtis sattd, dravyatia, prthivitva, ghafatva.
In every series of jdtis, it will be seen that sattd is the
most comprehensive jdti and is the generic attribute
characterising the one sttmmmn genus recognised in the
Nyaya-Vaisesika system, which may be called sat and
to which Kanada gives the technical name artha. Every
series of ;a/y ends with its own antya-jdti, which
characterises its infinta species. Thus in the Nyaya-
Vaisesika system, while there are several antya-jdtis
and diverse infimoe species, there is only one higher
24 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
j&ti, viz., satta and one summum genus. Jdtis, in-
cluding satta, can inhere only in substances, qualities
and activities (dravya, guna and karma) and cannot
inhere in any other category. The predication, of
satta with reference to the remaining positive cate-
gories, sdmanya, vifcsa and samavciya, is explained
away by the Naiyayikas, on the basis of co-inherence,
and not on the basis of inherence. Propositions like
'dravyam sat\ 'guriah san', 'karma sat 1 convey that
satta inheres in a dravya or guna or karma; whereas
the propositions 'sam&nyam sat', 'visesah sanfah',
'samavdyah san 9 should be interpreted as referring to
the co-inherence of samtinya, visesa and samai'dya with
sat id in the same place.
In his Sutra, "S&mdnyam visesa iti bttddhyapck-
sam" (ch. I-ah-2-su 3), Kanada observes that 'genera-
lity and speciality are dependent upon the nature of
the view-point*. Some modern writers on Indian logic,
more especially some writers in English, are misled by
this Sutra into the belief that Kanada was in favour of
a conceptualist view of samdnya and would reduce it to
a conceptual factor existing only in thought. This
misapprehension results from an imperfect knowledge
of Kanada's position. Kanada maintains, partly in an
explicit way and implicitly in part, that jdtis are eternal
universals, existing outside the sphere of thought in the
same sense in which other realities exist ; and that a
jdti is looked upon as a generic feature (samdnya) or
a specific differentia (z ( t&?a), according as it is con-
ceived of as a unifying or differentiating factor. For
Cn.i] PERCEPTION 25
instance, substanceness (dravyatva) is a samanya, when
it is looked upon as a generic feature common to all the
substances; but it is a viscsa when it is looked upon as
the differentia of substances, by means of which they
areilibi':i.. i-'.nl from other things like qualities and
activities. One could clearly see how solicitous Kanuda
really is^to establish the reality of jatis, from the signi-
ficant way in which he uses the phrase arttya-iisesa to
designate the distinct category known as rifesah, so
that they may not be confounded with jatis looked upon
as differentia.
To philosophise, according to the exponents of the
Nyaya-Vaisesika system, is to unify, wherever possible,
through universals arrived at on the basis of observed
similarities or uniformities, and to ramify and differen-
tiate, wherever fidelity to experience requires it,
through differentiating features arrived at from ob-
served dissimilarities. This process, in the direction
of generalisation, has led to several jatis being recog-
nised, and in the direction of differentiation, has re-
sulted in the hypothesis that a unique, self-differentia-
ted and cuTl.tMiiig feature called 'particularity'
(viscsa) should be attributed to every everlasting sub-
stance that could not be otherwise ilisiin^uMu'd from
similar everlasting substances. Composite substances
like a jar or a cloth, made of component parts, can
easily be distinguished from each other by means of the
different parts constituting them. Eternal substances,
which are alike in respect of guna, Karma and jati, like
the eternal atoms of earth, water, fire or air, cannot be
26 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
distinguished from similar substances of the same class
without ascribing to them some unique feature called
visesa. In our perceptual experience, one thing is
differentiated from another thing through a distin-
., . : ' ' ., feature. As a matter of fact, in the super-
normal perceptual experience (alaukika-pratyaksa) of
seers and Yogins, one atom of earth is distinguished
from another atom of earth; in such cases, there must
be a differentiating feature; no yuna, karma or jdti can
be relied upon as a di-tinguNhi:!'.; feature, for in those
respects, all atoms of earth are alike; even the super-
normal perception of a Vogin cannot change the funda-
mental nature of things (I'astu-srabhara) and cannot
see a man as a beast or a horse as an ass; it is the
fundamental nature of perception, both normal and
super-normal, that it distinguishes one object from
another through a disiiijuujxlsjug feature; and thus, the
perception of one atom of earth as distinct from
another atom of the same kind, super-normal as it
happens to be, should be accounted for by ascribing to
each atom of earth a unique feature called viscsa. By
following the same line of argument, it would be
necessary to ascribe a rises a to each of the atoms
constituting producible substances (janya-drarya).
These vixcsas should be taken to be self-discrimi-
nating (svatoryavartaka) or self-differentiated (svato
ry&vrtta). If a visesa were to be differentiated
from another vifcsa or from any other object
through some distinctive feature other than itself
or its own svar&pa, it would lead to an endless
CH. i] PERCEPTION 27
assumption of distinctive features and this lire of
thought cannot be sound as it is vitiated by ana-
vasthd or endless regression. It follows necessarily
that each risesa stands isolated and unique; and ex
hypothesi t even a jaii called risesatva, common to all
the risesas, becomes inadmissible for the reason that a
visesa wotrld cease to be self-descriminating were it to
be associated with a jati, every jati including sattd
turning out to be a differentia in cases of contrast with
things devoid of that jtiti.
AH the Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas agree that each
atom should be taken to have a unique visesa inherent
in it, that the relation between a visesa and its abode
is inherence (scMKK'aya) and that visesas are eternal.
There is, however, some difference of opinion as to
whether every eternal substance should be taken to
have a visesa. It is necessary that each jiva (indivi-
dual soul) and each inanas should be assumed to ha' e
a unique visesa; for, though, when a jiva is in a state
of bondage (baddha), he and his mind could be shown
to have distinctive features in the form of distinctive
experiences and such other Characteristics, yet neither
a liberated (mukta) jiva nor his mind could be differ-
entiated from other liberated fivas and their minds,
without ascribing to each of them a unique visesa; and
there can be no difference of opinion about this matter
among the Naiyayikas. With regard to ether (akasa),
while some Naiyayikas hold that a visesa should be as-
cribed to it as the delimiting determinant of its causa-
lity of sound (Sabda-sdmavdyikaraMat&vacchedaka),
28 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
others hold this is unnecessary. In the case of spatial
direction (dik) and time (Mia}, if they are recognised
to be distinct substances, they should be taken to have
distinctive visesas; but, while the earlier Naiy&yikas
recognise dik and kola to be eternal substances, distinct
from others, the later Naiyayikas, like Raghundtha
Siromani, would bring dik and k&lu under God (Isvara),
uncommon attributes like eternal omniscience being
quite adequate to distinguish God from the rest with-
out the help of a visesa of His own. It should be re-
membered in this connection that, when the term vise$a
is taken in its usual sense of differentia, the phrase
antya-visc$a is used to describe the unique category
known as viscsa, it being said to be antya for the reason
that it stands at the end of all differentiating features,
or for the reason that it inheres in eternal substances
which transcend creation and destruction and are,
therefore, denoted by the word ant a.
When two substances come into contact with each
other, their relation is called samyoga; and this relation
is not of an intimate character and is separable. There
is another type of relation which determines determi-
nate cognitions of objects as associated with certain
attributes (visista-pratiti) ; and this relation when it
happens to connect two things of which one, as long as
it does not become moribund or cease to exist, is always
associated with the other two things which are techni-
cally called ayuta-siddha is known as samavaya.
This is an intimate type of relation recognised as sub-
sisting between component parts and composite wholes
CH. i] PERCEPTION 29
(avayaia and arayavin) , qualities and substances
(guna and dravya), movements and moving substances
(kriya and dravya}, generic attributes and the indivi-
duals forming a class (jati and vyaTtti), and particula-
rities and eternal substances (visesaznd nityadravya) .
The intimate relation of satnavdya stands in marked
contrast with contact (saihyoga) which is not an in-
dissoluble relation and is easily lost. With some effort
the Naiyayikas distinguish samavdya from another type
of relation recognised by them, which is known as
svariipa-sambandha or self-relation and which consists
in one of the related things being looked upon as com-
prising a relational phase forming a connecting link.
For instance, time-relation (kdlika-sambandha) is time
(kdla) itself looked upon as a connecting link between
time and things limited in time. Numerous varieties of
svarapa-sambandha are recognised by the Naiyayikas
in all cases where cognition of an object with its
adjunct (visista-pratiti), the configuration of which in-
volves three cognised factors an adjunct (visesana),
an object qualified by it (visesya) and their relation,
has to be accounted for through some relation and
where that relation cannot be contact or inherence
(samyoga or samavdya). The conception of svarupa-
sambandha is pressed into service too much by the
Naiyayikas and is pushed too far in their view regard-
ing the relation of tdddtmya (complete identity), which
forms the relation underlying cognitions like this 'a
jar exists in itself. It is maintained by the Naiyayikas
that, though a relation ordinarily implies difference
30 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
the relation of identity should be considered an ex-
ception and cannot be ignored since it is presented in
valid experience.
The Nyaya conception of jati may, with advan-
tage, be compared with the views held by the Vaiya-
karanas (Grammarians), Bhattas, Prabhakaras, Baud-
dhas and Advaitins on this subject. The term jati, ac-
cording to Indian Grammarians, primarily denotes
class-attributes in the Nyaya sense; and terms denoting
caste, lineage and followers of a Vedic school are also
treated as terms denoting a jati for purposes of the
application of certain grammatical rules framed with
reference to terms denoting jati (jativaci). The
Bhatta-mlmamsakas hold that a jati like cowness
(yolva), horseness (asvatva} is eternal, omnipresent
and perceptible; that, though present everywhere, it is
manifested only in and through the individual objects
comprising a class and that such objects are called
vyaktis chiefly for the reason that they serve to manifest
jati', and that their relation to vyaktis is not inherence
(samavdya) but relative identity or identity compatible
with difference (tadatmya). The relation of tadatmyot
according to the Bhattas, is not absolute identity,
as the Naiyayikas take it to be ; but it is identity in a
relative sense i.e. identity (abheda) compatible with
difference (bheda-sahi$nu). Though difference and
identity are ordinarily opposed to each other, yet they;
are taken by the Bhattas to be compatible with each
other, on the ground that it is experience, after all, that
determines the compatibility or incompatibility of two
^H.IJ PERCEPTION * l
things and that experience warrants the recognition of
difference, associated with identity, as forming the rela-
tion between jdti and vyakti. In the proposition 'this
h a horse' (ayam asvah), for instance, 'this' refers to
a particular vyakti and 'horse 1 , according to the
Bhattas, primarily refers to horseness (osvatva), which
is a jati According to this view, in the judgment em-
bodied in this proposition, a jdti is equated with a
vyakti. But this equation cannot be absolute as, in
that case, the two words 'this* and 'horse* would turn
out to be synonyms. Therefore, the Bhattas argue
that, on the strength of what is presented in cognition,
a peculiar relation ; ' ::, ., in difference-cum-identity
(bhcdabhcdau), should be recognised in the case of
jdti and vyakti. While Naiyayikas restrict jdtis to the
first three categories substances, qualities and acti-
vities, the Bhattas ascribe the highest or the most com-
prehensive j&ti called existence (sattd) to those three
categories and also to the fourth category, generality
(sdmdnya). The Prabhakaras, on the other hand, con-
tend that a jati or generic attribute can be recognised
only in perceptible substances, and any common attri-
bute which cannot be perceived alike by the learned and
illiterate in vydktis should not be regarded as a jati.
It would follow from this that cowness (gcttva) and
such other attributes may be regarded as j&tis, while
-existence (sattd), substanceness (dravyatva), and such
other attributes are not jdtis. According to these
philosophers, the relation between a jati and vyakti is
inherence (samavdya), as in the Nyaya system, the re-
32 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
lation of tdd&tmya consisting in difference-cum-identity
being discarded as an impossible jumble.
The Buddhistic idealists would reduce all jatis to
the negative form of 'difference from the rest* (svetara-
bhcda), cowness (gotva), for instance, being no
more than difference from things other than a cow
(yavetarabheda}. They ridicule the Nyaya doctrine of
jati in this strain: "Eternal cowness, dogness, assness
and such other jatis where do they exist, after all the
cows, dogs and asses cease to exist at the time of uni-
versal dissolution (pralaya) ? Do they exist in God?
To say so would be blasphemy. When a dog or an
ass or a cow dies, does its jati leave it? It cannot do
so, for the reason that only substances can move.
When a cow is just born, how does it come
to have cowness ? It cannot be said that cow-
ness is produced in a new-born calf, for jati is eternal
and has no origin. Nor can it be said that a jati loses
some of its parts when a ryakti ceases to exist, and
acquires additional parts as new vyaktis are produced ;
for eternal jatis can have no parts. Indeed, in your
doctrine of jati, you have brought a hornet's nest to
your ears." The Advaitic monists of the post-Sankara
and pre-Sankara stages in the history of Indian monism
cleverly use the Nyaya theory of jati to their profit, by
showing that the highest jati, existence (satta), is the
grand generality (mahasaManya}, which represents the
only absolute reality called Brahman, and that the
various vyaktis and smaller jatis like yotva and asratva
Cn. i] PERCEPTION 3&
are but appearances super-imposed upon the absolute
satta.
Inherence (samavaya) is recognised by Prabha-
karas in cases where two inseparable things (ayuta-
siddha) are intimately connected with each other; but
it is taken to be eternal in cases where both the related
objects are eternal, and non-eternal in other cases. It is,
the obsession of economy (l&yhava) that has led the
Naiyayikas to hold that inherence is eternal and one..
In the place of saw at' ay a, the Bhattas and Advaitins
recognize the relation of difference-cum-identity (tddat-
mya). Fiscsas, in the sense in which the Vaisesikas-
and Nai>ayikas recognize them, are not recognized by;,
other Indian philosophers, who find it easy to disprove
the necessity for recognizing I'isesas by pointing out that
the self-discriminating capacity ascribed to risesas
might be attributed, with advantage, to eternal bubstan-
ces themselves.
In order to completely understand the Nyaya doc-
trine of jatj, it is necessary to pay some attention to the
principles which Udayanacarya, one of the greatest
exponents of Nyaya in the tenth century, laid down for
determining which of the numerous common attributes
presented in one's experience should be treated as j&tis
and which should not be. These principles are six*:
(1) the individuals in question being only one (vyak-
tyabheda); (2) the individuals in question being the
same neither more nor less (tulyatva) ; (3) attributes
which exclude each other in some places being found
together elsewhere (samkara) ; (4) endless regression
3
34 A PRIMER OF INDIAN" LOGIC [PARTIII
(anai'astha) ; (5) giving up the distinctive feature
made out ex hypothesi (rupahani} ; and (6) the absence
of the necessary relation (asambandha). In his
Kiranavall, Udayana sums up these six principles in
this verse :
^Vyaktcrabhedastulyatvam samkaro'thanaz'asthitih ;
Rupahdnirasambartdho jatibadhakasariiyrahah."
Etherness (akasatra} cannot be a jati, for the
obvious reason that, according to Naiyayikas, ether is
eternal and one and that there is no question of form-
ing a class consisting of several similar individuals.
There can be no distinction between jarness and potness
(kalatatva and ghatatva), as the jars or pots, which
form the class in view and to which the generic attri-
bute in question is ascribed, happen to be the same.
Senseness (indriyaiva} co-exibts with elementness
(bhutatva) in the external senses like the visual sense
constituted by fire; indriyatva is dissociated from
Ithutatva in the mind (manas), which is not a bhuta;
fyhfttatva alone exists in a jar, which is made of earth
and not a sense; the only possible relations that are
warranted by experience, between two attributes re-
cv/.-.ii-.sl to be jatis, are inclusiveness and mutual exclu-
siveness; for instance the sphere of dravyatva includes
that of ghatatva, while ghatatva and patatva (jarness
and clothness) are mutually exclusive; so, neither indri-
yatva nor bhutatva can be regarded as a jati, on the
ground of unwarranted blend (samtiarya). If all the
jatis were to be supposed as having a jati common to
them there would be endless regression in this way.
n. i] PERCEPTION 35
Suppose the jatis we start with are three a, b and c\
if we assume that these three fat is have a jati common
to them called A*, the total number of jatis would become
four 0, 6, c and #; and having committed ourselves to
the position that there should be a jati common to all
jatis, the meaning of the word all will increase at every
step by ofie more jati being added to the list and we
should go on assuming an endless series of jatis com-
mon to all jatis, like x, x*-, x%, x*. Thus, on the ground
of endless regression (anavastha), a jati called fatitva,
common to all jatis t cannot be recognized. To say that
vise satv a is a jati common to all the visesas would be
fatal to the distinctive feature of self -differentiation
(svato-vyavartakatva), which is ascribed ex-hypothcsi
to visesas. The hypothesis of antya-visesas (ultimate
particularities) is put forward for differentiating
eternal substances which could not be otherwise differ-
entiated. If the antya-visesas were to have a jati vtte-
safra common to them, they would cease to be self -differ-
entiating ; for in the case of objects having jatis fit to be
treated as differentia, it is a well-established habit of
thought to rely upon such generic differentia? for pur-
poses of differentiation and not upon the things them-
selves that have to be differentiated. Thus visesatva
cannot be treated as a jati, since it would jeopardise the
distinctive feature of visesas svato-vydvartakatva and
thus involve rupahdni. Negation-ness (abhdvatva) is
a feature common to all the varieties of non-existence
(abhava) ; but this common feature cannot be regarded
as a j&ti, for the reason that there is difficulty in recog-
nizing the relation of inherence (sa/na: -ay a) as a link
36 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
serving to make abhava the substratum of any attribute
or the attribute of any substratum. In cases like this,
the jdtibadhaka is called asambandha, the required re-
lation of inherence being impossible.
Samanya and visesa may appropriately be described
as the two poles of the pluralistic realism of the Nyaya-
Vaisesika system. Satta, the highest sdmcnya, to
which the NaiySyikas rise with a true philosophic in-
stinct, is not allowed to exhibit itself in its full glory as
the all-comprehending absolute reality. Between the
two poles of s&manya and visesa, the pluralistic uni-
verse of Nyaya is sought to be fitted to a threefold
scheme of external relations contact (samyoga), self-
linking relation (svarupa-sambandha) and inherence
(samavdya) a scheme which, with the eternal and
intimate relation of samavdya, turns out to be the Pro-
crustean bed of Nyaya thought. The Nyaya doctrines
of sdtnonya, visesa and samavdya exhibit fatal weak-
nesses. If uniformity of experience should necessitate
the assumption of sdmGnya and if the principle of
parsimony (Idghava) should lead to a sain any a being
taken to be eternal, strict consistency in thought would
necessarily result in one absolute all-comprehending
reality in the shape of satta being recognized and thus
the Advaitic monist would find it easy to demolish the
pluralistic realism of Nyaya. If an tya-viscsas should
be taken to be self-discriminating to avoid anavasthd,
why should not the self-discriminating capacity,
ascribed to them, be attributed to such eternal sub-
stances as could not be otherwise distinguished and
thus save the Nyaya thought from the cumbersome
CH. i] PERCEPTION 37
doctrine of visesasl The Nyaya philosopher, who
takes samavaya to be eternal and one and yet seeks to
avoid inherence of colour (rnpa-samavoya) being ab-
surdly jumbled together with the inherence of touch
(sparsa-sawiavaya) in air, which is a colourless sub-
stance, is only swallowing a camel but straining at a
gnat, when he refuses to accept the relation of relative
identity \tdddtmya=bhedabhedan) in the place of in-
herence on the ground that bheda and abheda are in-
compatible.
3 (g)
T Non-existence is of
four kinds: antecedent non-
existence, annihilative non-exis-
tence, absolute non-existence and
mutual non-existence.
In rendering the term abhava, the two terms non-
existence and negation are commonly used. Of these
two, the former term is nearer to the Sanskrit word
abhava; and the latter term is likely to prove some-
what misleading, as it primarily refers to negative ex-
pression rather than to the negative category denoted
by such expression. In the previous section, it was
pointed out that abhdvatva could not be treated as a jdti.
Some Nai>ayikas take abhavatva to be an akhando-
pddhi, while others describe it as consisting in the
negation of sattd (existence) through the relation of
inherence (samavaya) as well as its negation through
co-inherence (ckdrtha-samavdya). Abhava is defined
as a thing which neither has samavaya nor is
samavaya.
38 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
Things which are yet to be produced are referred
to as non-existent prior to their production. When
threads are ready and a cloth awaits production, it is
said "Here, a cloth will come into being" (atra pato*
lha.'isyati). Such expressions conveying the non-
existence of a product prior to its creation should be
relied upon as evidence of antecedent non-existence
(pr&gabhara). According to the Naiyayikas, every
producible object (knrya) is invariably preceded by its
own antecedent non-existence (pra(jabh<na}, which is
also regarded as a necessary part of the causal machi-
nery required for producing an effect. This forms an
important element in the creationistic theory of causa-
tion upheld by the Naiyayikas. They maintain that a
pragabhai'd has no beginning but comes to an end at
the moment of the creation of its counter-correlative
(pratiyoyin) which is the product in question; that
its abode is invariably the intimate or material cause
(sainavdyi-karana) ; that it is destroyed by the com-
plete causal apparatus which immediately produces the
effect in question; and that it is usually referred to by
an expression which, though affirmative in form, con-
veys an implied negation such as "Here the jar will
come into being" (atra yhato bliavisyati). The Nyaya
theory of creation ism (drambha-vada) is as insepa-
rably bound up with the view that what is destroyed
is annihilated completely and can never arise again, as,
on the other side, with the view that what is created is
produced for the first time and never existed before.
Every created bhava (positive entity) is, therefore,
hemmed in between two kinds of non-existence, ante-
CH.I] PERCEPTION 39
cedent and annihilative (prdgabhava and dhvamsa).
Pradhvamsa is thus produced; and it can never come
to an end, since the end of dhvariisa would mean the
regeneration of what is once annihilated which, ac-
cording to Naiyayikas, is impossible. Dhvamsa, like
frti'iiil>Inl*'a 9 abides in the intimate or inherent cause of
what is destroyed and it is presented in experiences,
such as 'the jar is annihilated* and 'the annihilation of
the jar is produced' ('yhato dhrastah', 'yhatadhvariiso
j'atah'). Some Naiyayikas of the Nuddea school, like
Raglnnulha Siromani, hold that, though it is clearly
necessary to recognize dht'aihsa on the strength of cer-
tain experiences common to all, it cannot be said that
prdyabhdva is supported by any such experience and
antecedent negation may well be explained as no more
than complete non-existence (atyantabhdva) viewed
particularly in association with the time preceding the
creation of the effect in question. The earlier school
of Nyaya, however, argues that, if the prior non-exis-
tence of a cloth (pata-prdyabhava) were not recognized
as a special type of non-existence, having no beginning
but coming to an end at the moment at which the cloth
comes into being, the absurd result that the same cloth
is produced again and again in an endless series of
successive moments (f>atadhdrtif>atti) would follow;
and that, if the prior non-existence of a cloth be re-
cognized as a special type of non-existence forming
one of the factors constituting the causal apparatus
of the cloth, no such absurd result would follow, one
of the causes of the cloth, vis. its own prayabhava,
ceasing to exist at the first moment of the creation of
40 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
the cloth. 'On this spot there is no jar' (atra Vhutale
ghato ndsti) expressions like this, and experien-
ces corresponding to, and embodied in them, refer to a
certain type of non-existence which is not restricted to
the past, present or future but has reference to all
time. In this respect, this variety of abhava stands
out in sharp contrast to the two varieties, already men-
tioned prdgabhdva and dhvamsa and is called atyanta-
bhava, absolute non-existence, its presence being en-
tirely independent of its counter-correlative (prati-
yogin) being produced or destroyed. Absolute non-
existence (atyantdbhdva) is eternal and the pluralistic
universe of Nyaya is wide enough to accommodate in-
numerable such atyantabhdvas.
The concept of abhava is complex and involves
several factors. In order to encompass completely an
abhava in thought, one has to think of it in association
with five factors viz.> counter-correlative (pratiyoyin),
^correlated substratum (anuyoyin), the determining ad-
junct of the former which delimits the scope of
counter-correlativeness (pratiyogitavacchedakadharmu],
the adjunct delimiting the scope of the substratumness
(anuyogitd), and the relation which determines the
counter-correlativeness of an object (pratiyoyitd-
*uaccHedak(asambandIia*). Taking a specific instance of
atyantdbhdva^ such as is embodied in the proposition
<On this spot there is no jar' (atra bhutalc ghato
ndsti), these five factors may be illustrated. What is
intended to be denied, or that object the non-existence
of which is referred to here, is not a particular jar
H. i] PERCEPTION 41
but the whole class of jars. What is sought to be
conveyed is that no jar is present here, not even a
single jar. In this case, jar, in general, is the prati-
yogin and the sphere of its pratiyogitd is delimited by
jarness (yhatatva), i.e. it is found wherever jarness
is found or in every jar. In other words, in this case
jarness (ghatatva) is said to be the pratiyogitavacche-
dakad/iarma. A reference to the non-existence of an
object amounts to a denial of its existence. When one
thinks of the existence of an object, one has to think
of its presence in a certain place through some rela-
tion. This relation which is intended to be brought
within the scope of the denial kept in view is known
as the relation determining the pratiyoyila (pratiyo-
gitavacchcdakasambandha). In other words, it is the
relation through which the counter-correlative is in-
tended to be conceived of as present, in the particular
place, if it were present there. The intended relation
may vary in different cases. In the case of the abhava
referred to in the proposition 'There is no jar in con-
tact with this place' (atra samyogcna yhato nasti), the
relation kept in view as determining the presence of
the object denied (pratiyogitavacchcdakasambandha)
is contact (saihyoya). On the other hand, in the case
of the abhava referred to in the proposition 'There
is no jar inherent in this place' (atra samavayena
fjhato nasti), inherence (samavdya) constitutes such a
relation. The former of these two propositions may
be true where the non-existence of a jar is predicated
*as present in the component part of a jar (kapala) ;
42 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
while in that case the latter proposition would not be
true. For a kapdla may not have any jar in contact
with it; but a kapala must have inherent in it the jar of
which it is a component part. The place in which the
non-existence of an object is said to be present is
anuyoyin and its adjunct which delimits the scope of
the substratumness (anuyoyitd) is called the anu-
'_ .':. '-.* '' / . A specific reference to this
is necessary. To say 'there is no jar on the earth/ is
altogether different. In the former case, this-spot-
ncss (ctadbhulalatva] is the anuyoyitavacchcdaka-
dharma; and in the latter case it is earthness (bhutala-
i va ) a feature common to the whole of this world.
For the reason that the cognition of abhdva is so
complex as to comprise these five factors, it is placed
on a par with a cognition of an object associated with
an adjunct (visistabuddhi), the abliava itself being
treated as the chief object (viscsya) and the remaining
factors set forth above being reminded as adjuncts
(visesana). In the case of prdyabhdvas and dhvam-
sas also, to know them definitely would be to cognise
them in association with these five factors, the contain-
ing correlative or correlated substratum (iinuyoyln)
of these two varieties of abhava being the respective
inherent cause (sawardyi-kdraija) and the relation
determining their pratiyoyitd being inherence (sama-
vdya). These three abhdvas prdyabhdi'a, dhvamsa;
and atyantdbhdra are otherwise known as /,.' '/ -a-
abhdva, varieties of non-existence, the praiiyoyitd of
which is delimited by some relation other than complete-
identity (tdddtniya). Mutual negation or differeri-
CH. i] PERCEPTION 43
tiative non-existence (anyonydbhara bhcda) amounts
to difference; and it is a variety of non-existence, the
pratiyogita of which is determined by identity (tddal-
mya=aikya). <A jar is not a cloth' (yhatah pato na}
in propositions like this, difference (anyonydbhava,
mutual non-existence) is referred to. In this case, the
presence of a jar in a cloth, or of a cloth in a jar,
through die relation of complete identity, is denied; or,
for all practical purposes, the identity of the two ob-
jects referred to is denied. It should be borne in mind
that tadatmya, in the Nyaya sense, is absolute identity
and that tadatmya, in the Bhatta sense, is relative
identity or difference-cum-identity. The variety of
ablidva is eternal in the case of eternal objects and
non-eternal in other cases. Some old Naiy'ayikas
vSpeak of a certain type of ablidva called sdmayikd-
bhdva, which, according to them, ib a temporary
variety of non-existence cognized, for instance, in the
place from which a jar is removed for a time and to
which it is re-introduced afterwards. But the general
sense of the Naiyayikas is in favour of equating
samayikabhdva with ever-lasting atyantdbhtira, which
may be cognized for a time and may not be presented
in certain forms of thought, owing to the absence
of the relation determining the presence of abhava
in a certain place. In the case of an abhava, the rela-
tion which determines its presence in a certain place,
or its being contained (ad hey a) in a container (adhi-
karana) is known as vaisistya. This is but a variety
of self -linking relation (svarupa-sambandha) and con-
sists in the particular container itself viewed in asso-
44 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
ciation with the particular moment at which the
counter-correlative in question (pratiyogin) is not
present on that spot; in other words, the particular
container, as such, constitutes the raiSistya.
It is noteworthy here that, according to the Naiya-
yikas of the older school, total non-existence is never
vogni -od in the substratum of antecedent or annthila-
tive non-existence. (Dhramsaprdyabhtii'tidhikaranc at-
yantdbhdvo ndnyikriyatc). This is not accepted by
the later Naiyayikas. Some Naiyayikas hold that the
delimiting adjunct of pratiyoyitd, in the case of an
atyantQbhava, may be an attribute which never belongs
to the particular pratiyoyin. For instance, in the pro-
position 'A jar does not exist as determined by cloth-
ness* (yhatah patati'ena ndsti) jar is the pratiyogin
and clothness (patatra) is the pratiyogitaracchcdaka-
dharina. This type of atyantdbltdra is known as
I'yadliibarctnadharmtii'acchiHnapratiyoyittikdbhdra a
form of non-existence whose counter-correlativeness
is determined by a dclisiiiiin^ adjunct which is never
co-existent with what is delimited by it. This form
of non-existence is omnipresent (kwaltinrciyi) and is
co-existent even with its own pratiyoyin which is
n >t ordinarily possible. Several later Naiyayika>
reject this view and explain cases like 'yhatahpatati'ciui
ntisti', by taking the total non-existence of clothness
(patati'tityanttibhdz'a) to be referred to. Advanced
students of Advaita would be able to see how the
theory of 'non-existence delimited by an incompatible
adjunct' (vyadhikaranadharniavacchinnapratiyogitaka-
OH. i] PERCEPTION 45
bhara) turns out to be a treacherous device which
Advaitins could conveniently use in proving the un-
reality of the world.
There is much divergence among the different
school^ of Indian philosophy in this matter. A stu-
dent of Nyaya should be able to contrast the Nyaya
view of abhtira with the views of the Bhattas and
Prabhakaras about abhtira. Like the Naiyayikas the
Bhattas also hold that ablidra is a distinct category^
The latter maintain that every reality has a positive
side consisting of positive attributes, and a negative
side represented by non-existence (abhura). Thus-
abhdra is an attribute of reality a bhuradhanna or
rastudharma. According to the Bhattas, abluiva is
cognised by a special instrument of cognition, which is
called non-cognition (annpalabdhi) and which consists
in the non-cognition of an object when all the condi-
tions necessary for its cognition are present. In the
Bhatta scheme of pram anas (instruments of valid
cognition), anupalabdtii is given the sixth place and
it is known as the sasthapramdna and it is itself some-
times called abhdva. The term abhara used in the
sense of anupalabdhi, should not be confounded with
the abhdva which is the object of this pramdna
(prcmcya). The Naiyayikas, on the other hand, con-
sider that abhdva is known through one or the other,
as the case may be, of the pramdnas recognized by
them. In fact, of the four pramdnas recognized by
them viz.: pratyaksa (perception), anumdna (in-
ference), upamana (comparison) and sabda (verbal
46 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
testimony) abhdva may come within the scope of the
first, second or the fourth, as the case may be. The
Naiyayikas contend that non-cognition, or strictly
speaking, effectual non-cognition (yoyyanupalabdhi),
serves as a necessary accessory to pratyaksa, in cogni-
zing abhdva. In the case of a samsaryubhdva, it can
be perceived only when its pratiyoyin happens to be
perceptible; while in the case of anyonyabhara, it can
be perceived only when its annyoyin is perceptible. For
instance, one would be able to perceive the non-ex,is-
tence of a jar on a certain spot, but not the non-exis-
tence of air in a place; whereas, one could perceive the
difference from ether (akasa-bheda) in a jar. The
Naiyayikas further explain that the effectuality
( yoyyalti) of non-cognition (annpalabdhi) when it
helps a pramana in ,.,!", abhdva, consists in there
being no cognition when all the conditions required for
it are present.
The Prabhakaras refute the theories that abhava
is a distinct category and that annpalabdhi is a distinct
pramana. They contend that the basis of negative pro-
positions is the mere container (kcvalddhikarana).
For instance, in the proposition " Here, on this spot,
there is no jar", the only thing which, in fact, is re-
ferred to is the empty floor (kcvala-bhutala). If
abh&va should thus be equated with the empty container
(l^cvalddliikarana) t it might easily be argued from the
opposite camp that this is an evasive trick of the Pra-
bhakaras which could be easily seen through and that
the concept of the 'emptiness of the container* inevi-
tably presupposes non-existence. The Prfibhakaras,
CH. i] PERCEPTION 47
however, meet this difficulty by explaining that the
phrase 'empty container* is only a description of the
form of the cognition underlying negative statements
and that abhara, strictly speaking, is the cognition of
the container, and of nothing ehe, in such circum-
stances as would necessarily lead to the missing object
(pratiyoyin) being cognized, were it present. One of
the greatest Prabhakaras Salikanatha describes
abhara thus in the Prakaranapancika: " Abhdva is
the cognition of that (container) alone, when the
praiiyogin (the thing denied in negative statements)
ought to have been perceived were it present" (drsyc
pratiyoyini yd tadckavisayd buddhih sd tadabhdvo
ryafadisyatc). This view shows a clear idealistic
leaning. The weak spot in this theory is that it fails
to account adequately for the specific reference to
ptatiyogin in negative propositions, since it would be
fatal to the Prabhakara view to connect the cognitions
underlying them with anything other than the container
and it has to be necessarily said that emptiness is not
presented as an adjunct in such cognitions.
In order to avoid needless complications and also
endless regression in some cases, abhdvdbhdva is
equated by the Naiyayikas with the corresponding
bhdva (positive entity), on the ground that a denial
of the non-existence of a thing amounts to an affirma-
tion of the corresponding positive entity. Where one
abhdva is said to be present in another abhava, some
Naiyayikas equate the contained abhdva with the other
abhdva which represents the ,.-:::,ir!iii,; substratum
(adhikarana). It would be useful to note here that
48 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART HI
difference from a certain object is reciprocally co-ex-
tensive with the absolute negation of the differentia of
that object. Difference from a jar (yhatabhcda) is
mutually co-extensive with the absolute non-existence
of jarness ((jhatatvatyantabhava).
Abhava is one of the realities recognized by the
Naiyayikas. In a sense, it might be said that it is the
reality of the greatest moment in the pluralistic universe
of Nyaya. Final emancipation (inukti or apat'arya) is
the highest aim of spiritual life in Nyaya as well as in
other systems of Indian philosophy. In Nyaya, nntkti
consists in the annihilation of all evils (dnhkhas), the
term dithkha in this context comprising everything
connected with voluntary activity and leading directly
or indirectly to the cycle of death and birth (prctya-
bhdva) and including in this manner every form of
pleasure (snklia). In the language of Nyaya, innkti
is Gtyantikadnh'bliadli'i'aiiisa. It would be a mistake to
suppose that the Naiyayikas are pessimists. In fact*
no system of Indian philosophy can be said to be
pessimistic; for pessimism, in a strict sense, affords no
hope or solace, but every system of Indian philosophy
aims at the attainment of what it believes to be the
highest good and expects its adherents to find comfort
in the sumnurtn bonum it offers to them. One can
easily see why Naiyayikas attach so much importance
to abh&va, having due regard to its close relation to the
Nyaya conception of wukti.
At this stage, it would be useful to consider the
Nyaya conception of sainbandha (relation), with f arti-
CH. i] PERCEPTION 49
cular reference to the Nyaya theory of difference
(anyonydbhava). The Naiyayikas maintain that rela-
tion always presupposes difference and that difference
invariably involves total exclusion of identity. Accord-
ing to this view of sambandha, it may be said that
relation in the Nyaya system is wholly external, and in
no case internal. Bearing this in mind, one cannot
easily understand the rationale of the way in which the
Nyaya realists bring relations under different categories
contact (saniyoga) being brought under quality
(guna) t inherence (samavdya) representing a distinct
category, and self-relation (srarftpa-sambandha) being
reducible to the form of one or the other of the seven
categories, as the case may be. The Naiyayikas hole!
that not only the simples which unite into complex
wholes, but the complex wholes also, exist as indepen-
dent entities and that neither the simples nor the wholes,
when they happen to be the rclata of some relation, lose
their independence. In Western philosophical literature
those relations are said to be external which bring the
relata together without unifying them, and internal
relations are said to be rooted in the very nature of
things and serve to transform and to unify, though in
varying degrees. In Indian philosophy, the relation of
difference-cum-identity (tddatmya) is essentially an
internal relation^ according to the Samkhya, Bhatta and
Advaita systems. In these systems, where difference
is not wholly incompatible with identity, where causa-
tion is not new creation, but transformation to some
extent, and where all relations may be said to involve
difference and identity in some sense and no relation
4
50 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
can be recognised in cases of absolute difference, it can
be easily seen that no relation is strictly external and
nothing which does not unify, in some sense, can be
considered a relation. In the Nyaya-Vaiseika system,
difference is uncompromising and amounts to a total
negation of tadatmya in the sense of complete identity;
it is an external reality and not a mere conceptual
product; it is presupposed by every relation, and every
relation is thus external. It may be asked whether
complete identity (atyantdbhcda = tadatmya) , which is
treated as a sambandha by the Naiyayikas in all cases
where a thing is equated with itself, is also an external
relation. To this question, a Naiyayika would reply
that nothing can be said to be rooted in the nature of a
thing, in view of the fact that an attribute (dharnia) is
wholly different from a qualified thing (dhannin), a
composite whole (avayavin} is totally different from
its component parts (avayava), jati is totally different
from vyaki, and that in all cases of relation, the relata, as
such are different from each other. Even in cases where
complete identity (aikya = tadatmya) is recognized to
serve as relation, though the relation amounts to a
negation of difference (bhcdabhava), yet there would be
no inconsistency in recognizing difference between the
relata as such; for, where a jar is conceived of as
existing in a jar through the relation of identity, what
is denied is the difference between a jar and itself, as
determined by jarness (ghatatva), the difference
presupposed by the sambandha, in that case, having
reference to the relata as such i.e. as determined by
relatedness (sambandhitra). The opponents of Nyaya
CH.I} PERCEPTION 51
realism point out that the conception of relation, which
is based upon uncompromising difference incompatible
with identity, is unsustainable, in as much as the
fundamental function of every relation is to unify,
in however small a measure it may be, and fot
the reason that it would be absurd to speak of any
relation of proximity or distance between entirely
different things such as Madras and Monday or Vara-
nasi and Friday. A Naiyayika would meet this kind
of objection by saying that the fundamental function of
relation is to bring together and not to unify to glue
and not to weld or solder or fuse, and that any two
things can be brought together or glued together through
a relation. With an unyielding pertinacity, the Nyaya
realism clings to the conception of uncompromising
difference and seeks to represent that all relations must
be taken to be external. Nevertheless the philosophical
integrity of Nyaya thought pulls in the opposite direc-
tion and inevitably leads to compromises with the phi-
losophical systems recognising infernal relations; and
such compromises are to be found in 'samyoga the
most prominent type of external relation which is
possible only between independent substances (dravya)
being regarded as a quality (guna) which, along with
the related elements (samyukta) where it inheres, forms
pairs of inseparables (ayutasiddha) ; in sawiavftya being
regarded as an intimate relation and in the somewha t
clumsy efforts made to save its externality by making
it eternal and one and by letting it survive its relata in
several cases; and in the very conception of self-rela*
52 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART ID
tion (svarupa-sambandha), more especially in the con-
ception of complete identity (abheda) as a variety of
self-relation. These compromises are indeed the weak
spots in the walls of the realistic fortress of Nyaya,
at which the opponents of Nyaya, like the Bhattas and
Advaitins, find it easy to effect convenient breaches.
4
T Of them, earth is that
which has smell. It is of two
kinds eternal and non-eternal.
Its eternal variety consists of
atoms. Its non-eternal variety
consists of its products. Again,
it is of three kinds the three
varieties being the body (sarira),
the sense (indriya) and other
objects (visaya). The earthen
body is the body that belongs to
the beings of our class. The
earthen sense is the olfactory
sense by which one perceives
smell; and that sense finds its
abode in the tip of the nose. The
earthen objects (vifaya 1 ) are
clay, stones and such other
things.
5
T Water is that which has
cold touch. It is of two kinds
eternal and non-eternal. The
OH. i] PERCEPTION 53
eternal variety consists of atoms.
The non-eternal variety consists
of its products. Again, it is of
three kinds the three varieties
being the body, the sense and
other objects. The body made
of water is found in the world
of the Water-God. The sense
made of water is the gustatory
sense by which one perceives
taste; and that sense resides in
the tip of the tongue. The ob-
jects made of water are rivers*
ocean and such others.
6
T Fire is that which has
hot touch. It is of two kinds
eternal and non-eternal. Its
eternal variety consists of atoms.
Its non-eternal variety consists
of its products. Again, it is of
three kinds the three varieties
being the body, the sense, and
other objects. The body made of
fire is in the world of Sun. The
sense made of fire is the visual
sense by which one perceives
colour; and that sense resides in
the foremost part of the dark
pupil of the eye. The objects
$4 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PAKT m
made of fire are of four kinds r
the four varieties being the light
of the earth, that of the sky, that
of the stomach and that of the
mine. The common fire which
people use and its varieties be-
long to the earth. Lightning and
such other varieties, with water
as fuel, belong to the sky. The
gastric variety is what digests the
food. Gold and such other
lustrous metals form the variety
which is dug out of a mine.
7
T The air is that which
has touch but no colour. It is
of two kinds eternal and non-
eternal. Its eternal variety con-
sists of atoms. Its non-eternal
variety consists of its products.
Again, it is of three kinds -the
three varieties being the body,
the sense and other objects. The
body made of air is found in the
world of the Wind- God. The
sense made of air is the tactus
by which one perceives touch;
and that sense is found all over
the body. The object made of
air is the air that shakes trees
OH. i] PERCEPTION 55
and such other things. The air
that moves about within the
body is the vital air, which,
though one in itself, is called
differently as prana, aptina,
etc., according as its abodes in
the body differ.
8
T Ether is that which has
sound as its quality. That is
one, all-pervasive and eternal.
In the texts given above, the first five substances
are defined and classified. These definitions, with the
required amplification, are faultless, according to the
requirements of what a Naiyayika would consider a
valid definition. In these five definitions, the relation
connecting the respective qualities with the respective
substances is inherence (samavaya). In order to make
the first four definitions quite accurate so as to cover
cases of earth, water, fire and air in the first moments
of their creation (utpatti-ksana), the device of jatigha-
titalaksana, already referred to on page 10 supra, i&
adopted. In the definition of ether (afodsa), the word
quality (guna) is intended to indicate that sound is the
only vifesaguna of this substance. In the Nyaya
system, as in the other systems of Indian philosophy,,
the five substances earth, water, fire, air and ether
are said to be the five elemental beings (bhuta). The
Naiyayikas define a bhuta as a substance having a
special quality which may be perceived by one or the
56 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
other of the external senses (bahirindriyagrahya-
visesagunavat) ; and the bhutas are contrasted with
what are called murtas in Nyaya. There are five
mftrta substances earth, water, fire, air and mind
(manas). A murta is a moving substance (kriya-
Jraya).
In the case of earth, water, fire and air, two
varieties are spoken of the eternal and the non-
eternal. The eternal variety in each case is said to be
represented by atoms (paramanu). This leads to
a consideration of the atomic hypothesis of the Nyaya-
Vaiseika system. This hypothesis is closely connect-
ed with the Nyaya- Vaisesika theory of causation and
it forms the pivotal part of the Nyaya- Vaisesika cosmo-
gony. Though it had its origin mainly in the specu-
lative thought of Nyaya metaphysics, it exercised a
profound influence over many a doctrine of the plura-
listic realism of Nyaya and it is in no sense less worthy
of consideration than the corresponding atomism which,
till recently, swayed scientific thought in the Western
world, until it came to be replaced by the theory reduc-
ing every atom to a miniature solar system consisting
of numerous small electrons gyrating round a sun in
the centre. The course of speculative reasoning which
led the exponents of the Nyaya- Vaisesika system to
formulate the atomic hypothesis should receive due
attention here. All visible substances are composite
structures consisting of component parts joined together
and are large, i.e. have the size (parimana) called
largeness (mahattva). Largeness (mahattva) and
CH. i] PERCEPTION 57
smallness (anutva) are the two main varieties of
size recognized by the Naiyayikas and they vary
between two extreme limits, the highest and the
lowest. The highest limit of mahattva is called
paramamahattva and is ascribed to all-pervasive
substances (vibhudravya). The lowest limit of
mahattva .belongs to the smallest visible substance say
a mote floating in a sunbeam, one of the conditions of
visual preception being association with the size, wahat-
tva, to the minimum degree at least. The highest limit
of smallness (anutva) is the smallest conceivable size
(anuta'*tatva==pdrimandalya), which is attributed to
atoms (paramdnu). Even the smallest visible subs^
tance is a composite structure consisting of component
parts (savayava}, because it is a visible substance
{caksusadravya). We know this from our observation
of the nature of visible substances like a jar. We
know also from our observation of the nature of the
component parts of visible substances that such parts
produce discrete wholes possessing mahattva ( largeness)
and are themselves discrete wholes consisting of
distinct parts. In other words, from our observation,
we arrive at the generalisation whichever forms a
part of a large substance (mahadarambhaka) is itself a
discrete whole made up of parts (sdvatyava) . So, even
the constituent part of the smallest visible substance
-say the smallest mote seen floating in a sunbeam is a
discrete whole made up of parts (savayava). An
endless assumption of parts would involve the defect
of endless regression (atnavastha}, which is generally
regarded in Indian philosophy as a fatal objection to
58 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
the recognition of causal relation or to explanation. It
would, therefore, be necessary that the process of divi-
sion should stop at some point and the point at which it
stops is the last conceivable part (avayava). It would
be most reasonable to recognize that as the last con-
ceivable part, beyond which no kind of argument con-
strains us to recognize further parts. Beyond the parts
constituting the component elements of the smallest
visible motes, there is no necessity to recognise further
parts, the reason constraining the recognition of parts
in the smallest visible substances being that the latter
are visible and, likewise, the recognition of parts in the
constituents of the smallest visible substances being
that those constituents cause a composite whole which
is large (mahadarambhaka), and there being no such
compelling reason in the case of the component parts
of such constituents, since those parts are neither visible
nor members of a large substance. The whole argu-
ment is usually stated thus in the form of two syllo-
gisms in Sanskrit :
" falasuryamaricistham yat suksmatammn drsyate
tat sSvayflvam, cdksusadraryatvat, ghatavat. Tadara-
yavo'fi savayavah, mahadarambhakaivat, kapalavai."
The smallest visible substance forming the minor
term (paksa) in the first of these two syllogisms is
called truti or trasarenu and is regarded as a triad or
ternary product. Its component part forming the minor
term (paksa) of the second syllogism is called anu or
dvyanuka, which is a dyad or binary product. The
smallest conceivable unit x forming a dyad is called ai
OH. i] PERCEPTION 59
atom (parani&nu). The component part of a tr uti is
not visible and does not possess even the minimum
mahattva (largeness) ; and it is, therefore, said to be a
minute part (anu). This minute part forms a member
(avayava) of the smallest visible substance called truti
which has the minimum mahattva; and it is thus maha-
d&rambhaka and, for that reason, consists of parts.
The parts of each component element in a truti must
be at least two and need not be more than two and they
are therefore taken to be two ; and these two parts are
the smallest conceivable units which are taken to be the
smallest ultimates not admitting of further sub-division
and are called atoms (paramanus). It is now apparent
why each component element of a truti is called a dyad
(dvyanukaa. binary product of atoms). For obvious
reasons the component elements of a truti itself cannot
be less than two; and they are taken to be three in the
Nyaya-Vaisesika system. In other words, a truti or
trasarenu is made up of three dyads (dvyanuka). For
this reason, it is also called tryanuka. The reason why
the number of parts in a truti is fixed at three requires
explanation. In our experience, we see that the size
(parimana) of the parts gives rise invariably to an
increased size of the same kind in the composite whole
and that this increase is only an increase in degree.
Our observation is restricted to substances having
mahattva (largeness). This observation leads to the
generalisation that, if a size should serve as the non-
intimate cause (asamavayiktirana) of another size,
both of them, the size that causes and the size that is
caused, belong to the same variety of size, and the size
60 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
that is caused represents a higher type of the same
variety, as compared with the size that causes. (Fari-
mftnanam svasajatiyasvotk'rstaparimanarambha'katva-
niyamah). A strict application of this rule to anutva
would make it clear that, if the anutva (smallness) of
atoms (paramanu) or dyads (dvyanuka) were to be
taken as the non-intimate cause (asamavdyikdrana) of
dyads or triads (tryanuka), the size of the dyads and
triads should represent a higher degree of smallness
(anutaratva) . This is an obviously absurd result, for
the reason that tryanuka must necessarily have the
minimum mahattva at least, since it is the smallest
visible substance. So, from the scope of the rule set
forth above, the sizes of dyads and triads should be
taken away; and this is done by assuming that, in the
case of dyads and triads, the size of the composite
product (avayavin) is caused, not by the size of the
component parts but by their number (samkhyd). in
such circumstances, unless the number of the component
parts of a dyad differs from that of the component
parts of a triad, the difference between a triad and a
dyad in respect of size cannot be accounted for. The
size of a triad is mahattva; the size of a dyad is
anutva ; the number that causes mahattva must be
larger than tivo, which is the number causing the anutva
of the dyads. The simplest thing to do here is to
assume the next higher integer three as the number
of the component parts of a triad. Those who closely
follow the Nyaya- Vaisesika tradition hold that, in the
atomic theory, there is clear justification for some res-
tuction regarding the nature and number of the com.
CH.I] PERCEPTION 61
ponent parts in the case of dyads and triads and there
is no necessity for recognising any such restriction in
the case of composite products (avayavins) beyond the
stage of triads. It is maintained that the parts of a
triad (tryanuka) are composite structures (savayava),
and they cannot be less than three and need not be
more than three and therefore must be three in num-
ber. The constituent elements of the composite pro-
ducts beyond the stage of triads may be four dyads or
five dyads and so on, or four triads or five triads and
so on, according to the varying circumstances in each
case.
It should also be borne in mind that atoms and
dyads are never presented in normal perception and
that they are capable of combining with each other.
In the atomic theory of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system,
it is assumed that the fiat of the omnipotent God, in
conjunction with the inevitable vestiges of the works
done by embodied souls (/*^0/&), causes concretise
activities of various kinds in various atoms; and as a
result of such activities, they come into contact with
each other and composite products in the shape of
dyads, triads, and so on, arise. Thus creation (srsti)
takes place. The Nyaya theory of dissolution involves
what would appear to be an unnatural assumption.
Disintegration or dissolution (pralaya) begins not
from the top, but from the root not in the whole, but
in the parts. The fiat of the omnipotent God, again, in
the absence of any demand for creation on behalf of
jivas, causes descretive activities of various kinds in
atoms, with the result that the contacts (samypgah)
62 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
by which two atoms are held together in dyads are
destroyed and all the composite products, beginning
from dyads, crumble to pieces.
The opponents of the atomic hypothesis of the
Nyaya-Vaisesika system draw pointed attention to its
weak points. In the first place, it is difficult to deter-
mine which is the smallest visible substatice. The
motes in the sunbeam are not all of a uniform size.
What happens to be the smallest visible substance to
the naked eye would not be such to the visual sense
aided by a powerful microscope. Even tj the naked
eye, the smallest visible substance would not be the
same, as visual power varies in different individuals.
In cases where the size of a composite product is the
effect of the size of its component parts, each compo-
nent part is a composite product. Where, however,
the size of the composite product is regarded as result-
ing from the number of its component parts, one may
very well stop with the members of the smallest visible
substance and take these members to be two in number.
The arguments of anavastha and layhani, if pushed a
bit further, would knock off dyads and atoms and
would lead to the smallest visible substances themselves
being regarded as the indivisible ultimates of composite
matter. Further, how can atoms come together?
How can contact (samyoga) arise between two atoms?
In our experience, contact (sawyoga) is possible ordi-
narily between two composite substances (s&i'ayava)
or, in some cases, between one composite substance and
another all-pervasive substance (vibhudravya). Con*
CH. i] PERCEPTION 63
tact is by its very nature spatially non-pervasive
(avyapyavrtti) ; if it is present in one part of a thing
it is missing in another part of the same thing; and it
can never be said to completely pervade its relata.
Such being the case, it is hardly conceivable how an
indivisible atom can come into contact with another
atom. These are the more important defects in the
atomic theory and pointed out by anti-creationistic
philosophers like the Advaitins, the Samkhyas and the
Mlmamsakas.
A disingenuous attempt is made by some writer to
ascribe the origin of the atomic theory of Kanada and
Gautama to Hellenic influence. Luckily and justly,
that attempt has failed. In the first place, it has to be
remembered that, though KanaJa might have been the
earliest complete and systematic exponent of the atomic
theory, he cannot be said to be its discoverer and it
might have been one of the floating theories of the
pre-Kanada period of Indian thought. Further a com-
parison of Kanada's atomic theory with Greek atomism
would show that the divergences between them are
more numerous and striking than similarities. In fact,
the only noteworthy similarity between the Indian and
Greek theories is that both consider atoms impercepti-
ble. On the contrary, the Greek conception of atoms
recognizes quantitative differences in them and totally
dissociates them from qualities; while, in the Nyaya-
Vaisesika system, atoms are of uniform size, their size
representing the extreme limit of minuteness called
parimandalya or paramanuparimana, and they have
64 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART ni
qualities, which are non-eternal in the case of colour,
taste, smell and touch in the atoms of earth, and eternal
in other cases. Another important difference is that
the integration of atoms according to the Nyaya theory
is the result of the deliberate design of the omnipotent
and omniscient God ; while atoms in the Greek theory
are wholly subject to chance drifts and ,v..:i::o '..'\*>\\ of
various types. Professor Keith and those who agree
with him are at liberty to think that these divergences,
however fundamental they may be, need not be taken
to shut out all possibility of Greek influence, it must,
however, be remembered that any suspicion of Greek
influence has to rest almost entirely on the slender basis
of temporal proximity or synchronism and that even
this flimsy ground is shattered by the evidences in the
early philosophical literature of India in favour of the
view that atomic theory might have gained currency in
India, in some form, perhaps long before the age of
Kanada and Gautama.
The first three of the five elements (bhiita)
earth, water and fire are defined through their
characteristic qualities; and the fourth element, air, is
defined through the quality of touch in association with
the negative adjunct of colourlessness (rfipabhdva).
The eternal varieties are represented by the atoms
whose nature is described above. In the textual sec-
tions relating to earth, water, fire and air, the threefold
classification, which follows the twofold classification
into eternal and non-eternal, divides each of these
substances again into body (sarira), sense-organ
(indriya) and object (visaya). Sanra (body), in
CH.I] PERCEPTION 65
Nyaya, is the field within whose bounds, the soul
(atman) has its experiences (bhogdyatanam) ; or it is
antydvayavl or a composite whole which never forms
the component part of another composite whole and it
serves as the seat of voluntary activity. In the Nyaya-
Vaisesika system, a body is constituted wholly by earthy
water, fire or air; and it is not made up of five elements
(pdncabhtiutika) as admitted in the Sdmkhya and
Vcdanta systems. A body made of earth, for instance,
is constituted entirely by earth which forms its material
cause (samavayikarana), the remaining elements form*
ing merely supportive (upastambhaka), not constitutive
(samavtiyi), factors. This is the case also in the
bodies made of water, fire and air. The belief that
these three varieties of bodies (jalryasarira, taijascu
sarira, vdy t avlyasarlra) are ultramundane existences
and are found in the worlds of Varuna, Aditya and
Vdyu is based on Puranic cosmology and does not
require any discussion here. A sense-organ (indriya)
is defined in Nya>a as the seat of such contact with
manas as causes a cognition, there being in it no special
quality which shows (udbhutavifrsaguna), except
sound (sabda). The Sanskrit definition of a sense-
organ runs thus : "Sabdctarodbhutavisesagunana-
srayatve sati jnanakdranamanassamyogasrayatvam
indnyatvam." It may be noted here that perceptible
qualities like colour, touch, etc., may be present in a
substance either in a condition in which it shows
(udbhtitd't'dstha) or in a sub-perceptional condition in
which it does not show (anitdb hut avast hd). Colour
in the former condition, for instance, is visible and
66 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
actually visualised when all the circumstances necessary
for visual perception are present and it is present in
all visible substances; while, colour in a sub-percep-
tional condition (anudbhutavastha) though not in-
herently invisible, is never actually visualised. The term
visaya in the threefold classification of earth, water,
fire and air turns out to be somewhat misleading in
the case of some people. Professor Keith, for instance,
takes this term to mean 'an object of sense-perception*
and accuses Annambhatta of inadvertence for having
brought atoms under vis ay a. It will be seen that there
is no inadvertence on the part of Annambhatta though
some of his readers may lose sight of certain matters
in their bumptious presumption. The term visaya here
means object of cognition (jndnavisaya) ; and in the
classification of earth, etc,, what is referred to is 'a
variety of earth which is neither body (sarlra) nor
sense-organ (indriya)'. In other words though Sarlra
and indriya are also visaya in the sense of object, it is
obvious that, in the classification referred to in the
text, they are not intended to be denoted by the term
visaya. Intelligent students of philosophy would not
find it difficult to appreciate the ontological and episte-
m )l<)^ica1 significance of this threefold classification.
The knowing souls (jivdh) form the fulcra of the
pluralistic universe of the Nyaya realist, in whose
philosophical setting all the things would fall most
naturally into three groups the cognitional group
comprising various forms of cognition, their instru-
ments and their field (bhogayalana), the group of
knowing souls, and the objective group comprising
CH. i] PERCEPTION 67
cognised objects. The Nyaya realist would thus like to
fancy the universe as a bunch of three distinct flowers
fastened together by some kind of external relation;
while monistic philosophers would feel sorry that the
pluralism of Nyaya mistakes an integral three-petalled
-flower for a motley cluster.
In the textual section dealing with fire (iejas),
gold and such other valuable metals are said to come
under the mine-born (d&araya) variety of fire.
Through speculative reasoning, the Naiyayikas seek
to maintain that gold is light. The yellow metal that
we see and handle has some weight. Yellow colour
belongs to earth and weightiness to earth and water.
So, the metal which has these two properties yellow
colour and weightiness, should be taken to be a variety
of earth. However, the yellow and weighty substance
that we see and handle and commonly regard as gold
cannot all be earth; for, however much you may heat
it, it does not completely lose its fluidity (dravatva),
and any variety of earth, which preserves its fluidity
under heat, does so only when it is associated with a
substance which is not earth and has fluidity and is
capable of counteracting the effect of heat on fluidity.
This may be seen in certain varieties of earth, like
ghee, placed in water. Thus the yellow substance
referred to, though it is itself a variety of earth,
should betaken to preserve its fluidity for the reason
that it is associated with some other substance which is
not earth and has fluidity and counteracts the destruction
of fluidity by heat. The latter substance which coun-
teracts and which has occasional fluidity (na\mitt\k<i-
'68 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
dravatva) cannot be brought under water characterised
by natural fluidity (samsiddhikadravatva) ; nor can it
be brought under any of the colourless substances, since
it has colour. So, the counteracting substance associated
with the yellow lump of earth should be a variety of
fire or light (tejas). This reasoning has got merely
an antiquarian interest and rests upon premises involv-
ing pre-scientific notions about solidity and fluidity.
Even the old-world physical science of India, as known
to ancient Ayurvedic writers, would not accept the
assumption that gold never loses its fluidity.
With regard to air, there is some difference of
opinion between the earlier and later Naiyyikas about
its perceptibility. The former hold that air is inferred
is the substratum of touch which is neither hot nor
:old. The latter maintain that air is perceived by the
sense of touch. Though it is the same throughout, it
:omes to have different names as prdna, apdfta, vyana r
uddna and samdna, when it passes through the body,
the heart, the anus, the whole body, the throat and the
navel. These five aspects of the air are known as the
v r ital airs.
The senses of sight, taste, smell and touch are
respectively constituted by light (tejas) , water (/a/a),,
earth (prthivl) and air (yayu). They are all large
enough (mahat), the senses of sight, taste and smell
(caksns, rasana and ghrana) being triads of the res-
pective elements (bhuta) and the sense of touch (tvak)
spreading all over the body. Though they are large
enough, they fall outside the range of external sense-
CH. i] PERCEPTION 69
perception, for the reason that their qualities are sub-
perceptional (atoudbhuta), or to be more accurate, for
the reason that they are not associated with perceptible
colour (udbhntarupa").
Ether (Akasa) is inferred as the eternal and all-
pervasive substratum in which sound inheres. Accord-
ing to the Samkhyas and Advaitins, it is an element
produced and destroyed in the same way as other ele-
ments. In Nyaya, the sense of hearing is represented
by ether delimited by the orifice of the ear. Ether is
all-pervasive (rtbhu) in the sense that it comes into
contact with all the movable (muria) substances of
finite size (paricchinnaparimana*). An all-pervasive
substance does not admit of any movement and is one
and eternal, divisibilty and non-eternity being incom-
patible with all-pervasiveness. The sense of hearing is
equated with space (dik~ spatial direction) by the
Mimamsakas. It should be remembered that the term
ether is the nearest approximation to dkdsa as under-
stood in Nyaya and that the function of serving as the
medium of light and heat, which modern science
ascribes so ether, does not belong to akaSa.
9
T Time is the (distinctive)-
cause of expressions involving
the terms past, etc. It is one,
all-pervasive and eternal.
10
T Direction (in space) is
the distinctive cause of expres-
70 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
sions involving the terms cast,,
etc. It is one, all-pervasive and
eternal.
The above definitions of time and space, or direc-
tion in space, indicate in simple and clear language, the
way in which the exponents of the Nyaya-Vaisesika
realism arrive at the two substances known as kala and
dik. One of the firmest convictions of the Nyaya
realist is that there are objective realities exactly cor-
responding to the elements constituting the subjective
form of every valid experience (annbliara) and that
propositions and expressions recognised to be correct
should be relied upon as the unmistakable indexes of
the forms of experience which they are intended to
express. The Naiyayikas argue that events are refer-
red to as past, present or future, anterior or posterior,
simultaneous or occurring in succession, slow or quick,
and that such references cannot be accounted for except
by the hypothesis that there is a distinct substance
(dravya) known as kala (time). 'Now the jar is'
(idariim ghatah^sudi propositions are understood by
the Naiyayikas as referring to some relation between
the jar and the sun's motion, on the basis of the old-
world astronomical theory that the sun moves on the
sky without ever coming to rest. The Naiyayikas
believe that the sun's motion can be ascertained through
perception as well as inference. The common-sense
view of men connects the concept of now (idanlm)
with the sun's motion (sfiryaparispanda), brought into
relation with the thing denoted by the word collocated
with id&nlm in expressions like 'iddnim ghatah*. The
CH. i] PERCEPTION 71
sun's motion is directly related only with the sun, such
direct relation being inherence (samaraya) in this case.
A jar can be connected with the sun's motion only
through some indirect relation. The principle of eco-
nomy (layhava) makes it necessary that the simplest
conceivable relation of an indirect nature should be
thought of as connecting the sun's motion with a jar.
The simplest form of indirect relation that may be
conceived of in this case is 'contact with the thing
which is in contact with the intimate substratum of the
motion in question viz., the sun' (srasamai'dyisam-
yuktasamyoya). In this chiin of indirect relation the
two extreme ends are the two relata viz., motion on
the one side and jar on the other. The sun is the
intimate substratum of the motion (svasamavayl) ; the
thing in direct contact with it is not the jar, as we
know, but something else; and that something should
be taken to be in contact with the jar. The relation of
contact being possible only in the case of two subst-
ances, the soviet/liny, which forms the intermediate
link between I:ri " :, ~ i, (the sun) on the one side
and contact with the jar (yhatasamyoya) on the other,
must be a substance (dravya). This substance is called
time (kdla).
How are we to know that this intermediate sub-
stance that bridges over the gulf between the sun and
ajar, is one, eternal and all-pervasive, and does not
come under any of the other substances? It is presented!
in every experience or expression, explicitly or impli-
citly, as substratum of other objects; it is not percep-
tible, nor has it the qualities of colour, touch and
72 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
sound; so, it must be different from the five bhutas; it
would be reasonable to suppose that it is of infinite
magnitude (paramamahattva), since it is taken to be
one and eternal for the sake of economy (Idghava) ;
and in view of the distinct cognitions we have of the
past, present and future, as compared with the east,
west, north and south, we should take time (kdia) to
be different from space (dik). In a similar manner
space (dik) is also inferred by the Naijayikas as the
substratum of the contact which serves as the non-
inherent (asamai'dyi) cause of spatial proximity and
distance (aparatva and paratra), referred to in state-
ments like ' This lies farther', 'This lies near'. Both
time and space (kclla and dik) are imperceptible
according to the Naiyayikas and are all-pervading
substances in which all the things in the Universe may
be said to be present through the self-relation of time
or space (kdlikasambandha or daisikasawbandha).
While time or space taken by itself (wahdkdla or
ckhandadik) is regarded as the containing substratum
(adhikarana) of every thing in the world, eternal or
non-eternal, only non-eternal objects, among the rest,
may be regarded as container (adhikarana) of other
objects through time-relation (kdlikasambandha). This
is embodied in the oft-quoted dictum of Nyaya
4t nityesu Kalikayogah."
Any producible thing may serve as the condition-
ing adjunct of wahdkdla (the immense and indivisible
time), and anything of limited size as the conditioning
adjunct of dkhandadesa (the immense and indivisi-
ble space). The Naiyayikas say "Janyamatram
CH. i] PERCEPTION 73
Kdlopddhih, murtamdtram digupddhih." Though time
and space are indivisible and all-pervasive, temporal
and spatial divisions are conceive! of through associa-
tion with delimiting adjuncts in the form of some
producible thing (janya) or of something limited in
size (murta). In this way, divisions of time to a
moment (ksana) downward and divisions of space are
arrived at.
The Vaiyakarana philosophers speak of time and
space as modifications of the subtle sound (sabdatan-
mdtra), which is a substance (dravya) according to
them. The Buddhist idealists regard time and space as
merely forms of momentary and fleeting consciousness
(rijndna). The Advaitic monists look upon time and
space as phenomenal appearances super-imposed upon
the absolute Brahman, which is the only reality trans-
cending them. The SarhUiyas would bring both time
and space under the elemental evolute (bhuta) called
akdsa. Modern Naiyayikas like Rayhnn&tha Siromani
bring time and space under God (Ih'ara) and regard
them as phases of the omnipotent and omnipresent
Lord. In Chapter II, ahnika I, sutras 40 to 44, of the
Nyayasiltrabhtifya, Gautama and Vatsyayana elucidate
the conceptions of the present, past and future.
Vatsyayana points out that time is presented in our
experience mainly through the help of motion and not
through association with distance. The F>lia.*\;ikiira
observes under 11 1 41, "Nadhvavyahgyah kalah,
kim tarhi kriydvyangyah". A kriyd, as understood by
Vatsyayana in this context, is not a single activity but
74 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
a series of activities. The conception of a kriya or
! karma 9 even in its strict sense, is inseparably bound up
with the conception of duration, every kriya lasting for
four ksanas (moments) as already explained in page 16,
part in, supra. In this connection, it should be
remembered that though there can be no contact
between two all-pervasive substances (vibhudravya),
there is contact between one such substance and
another substance limited in size ; for contact presup-
poses movement, and in the case of a substance limited
in size, movement is possible, though it is not possible
in the case of an all-pervasive substance.
11
T The substratum in
which cognition inheres is the
soul (dltnan). It is of two
kinds the supreme Soul and
the individual soul. Of these
tv\o, tlie supreme Soul is one
and is the omniscient Lord.
The individual soul, on the other
hand, is different in association
with different organisms or
bodies, though it is all-pervasive
and eternal.
12
T Mind (manas) is the
sense by means of which plea-
sure and such other (perceptible
qualities of the soul) are direct-
CH.I] PERCEPTION 75
ly apprehended. There are
innumerable minds (manamsi),.
since they are specifically linked
up with each soul and they are
atomic and eternal.
Atvicui (soul) is the substratum in which know-
ledge inheres. This definition is quite adequate to
indicate that the soul is a substance (</nrrw/) and to
differentiate it from other substances. One's own
sotd or self is, ;. v v : lii j to N)fiya, revealed in one's
inner perceptual experience arising through the inner
sense of mind, independently of the external senses,.
i.e., in one's nianasa-pralyaksa which takes the forms
'I know', 'I will 1 , '1 feel', 4 wish' ('ahain j an ami',
'aluvn yale', l aham sukhi', 'aliam icchumi'). It should
be noted that, even in such inner experiences, it is
never presented by itself, but it is presented only as the
substratum of knowledge or consciousness (;fla//a) t
volitional effort (krliyatna), pleasure and pain
(sukha, duhkha) and desire (taVm). For this reason,,
the Naiyayikas hold that one's own soul or self is
revealed in mental perception (in anas a prat yaks a}, only
in association with one or the other of its perceptible
special qualities (yoyyaviscsayunayoycnaiva'). It is
believed by some that the Vaisesikas hold that dtman is
imperceptible and that they differ from the Naiyayikas-
in this respect. The authority of Kanada's sutra VIII
2 (tatratma manatcapratyakse} is also invoked in
this connection. Prasastapada also seems to support
this view in his statement that, though dtman is subtle
76 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
and imperceptible, he is inferred as the conscious agent
who uses the senses as instruments in producing cogni-
tions : Cf.
11 Tasya sauksmyat apratyaksalvc'pi karanaih
sabdddyupalabdhyamtniitaih srotrddibhih somadhi-
(jamah kriyate" (Prasastapddabhdsya Viz. S. S.
page 69). This belief is based on a misapprehension
which threatens to become a permanent feature of many
an English treatise dealing with Indian logic. The
fact, however, seems to be that both Kanada (Cf.
Vais. Su. Ill ii 9 and 10) and Prasastapada (Cf.
Bhtisya Viz. S. S., pages 70 187) admit that one's
own dtwan is revealed in one's own mental perception.
Sridhara also draws attention to this in his Randall
(Viz. S. S. page 71) when he observes that, though
dtman is directly perceived by the wanas, as agent or
owner through association with the body and senses
with which he came to be invested as a result of his
own deeds, yet imperceptibility (atyratyaksatva) happens
to be predicated with reference to &tman t merely in
view of the soul fallingoutside therange of the external
senses. The leading exponents of the Nyaya-Vaisesika
system are, however, agreed that one person's soul
cannot be perceived by the nianas of another person and
that, even in the case of one's own soul, mental percep-
tion (mdnasapratyksa) is misleading since it often
lumps up dtman and body into one jumble. For this
reason, in order to prove the existence of soul as a
distinct entity and to differentiate it from the body, the
senses, the vital airs and such other things, it would
CH. i] PERCEPTION 77
be necessary to resort to inference. Two typical argu-
ments adduced by the Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas in this
connection are worthy of consideration. From the
movement of a chariot, one ordinarily infers the pres-
ence of a charioteer who drives it; even so, one infers
an individual soul who drives a body, from its various
activities. Knowledge and such other qualities, nor-
mally perceived only by the inner sense manas, require
an intimately related substratum in v\hich they inhere,
for the reason that qualities invariably inhere in subs-
tances; all other substances being eliminated, a distinct
substance, in which knowledge and such other qualities
inhere, should be recognised; and that substance is
called dtman. Since individual experiences vary in a
definite manner, the individual dtman associated with
one body should be taken to be different from the
individual dtinan associated with another body. At
the same time, in order to account for remembrance of
previous experiences and for the first instinctive effort
which a new-born baby, immediately after its birth,
puts forth to preserve its life by means of the usual
suck, it would be necessary to assume that every indivi-
dual soul is permanent and eternal. It is an accepted
principle that everybody reaps as he sows and never
reaps what he does not sow; and in order to avoid
conflict with this principle, it would be necessary to
ascribe to every jii'a, pre-natal existence and persistence
after death. The soul cannot be atomic in size; for,
cognition and such other special qualities are perceived
by the inner sense manas, while the qualities of atoms
can never be perceived. Nor can the soul be of medium
78 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
size (madhyamaparimana); for, anything which has
the size called mahattva (largeness) and which is not
all-pervasive (vibhn), is non-eternal and therefore
comes to an end; but Citman cannot come to an end as
already explained. On these grounds, the N"ya)a-Vai-
sesika system maintains that there are innumerable
souls and every dtman is eternal (w/va) and all-perva-
sive (vibhn). Though the soul is present everywhere,
consiousness and other special qualities attributed to it
are produced within the sphere delimited by body
(sarira) ; and this is the reason why body is described
as the field of titman's experience (at memo bhogtiya-
tanam sariram).
According to Nyaya, dtman is of two kinds the
individual soul (jlva) and the supreme Suul (paramat-
jmw). Fourteen qualities are ascribed to the former
vis.: number, size, contact, disjunction, separateness,
cognition, pleasure, pain, desire, dislike, volitional
effort, merit, demerit and reminiscent impressions; and
eight qualities are ascribed to the latter viz. ; number,
size, contact, disjunction, separateness, cognition, desire,
and volitional effort. The Naiyayikas accept the
supreme authority and infallibility of revealed texts
(sruti) and recognise, on the authority of those texts,
the existence of omnipotent and omniscient God. He
should be brought under the class of substances called
dtman, for the reason that he is the intimate substratum
(samavayiii) of eternal knowledge. With a view to
removing such doubts, misapprehensions and difficulties
as may arise in this connection, the Naiyayikas seek to
CH.I] PERCEPTION 79
support their theistic doctrine, ultimately based on
by means of syllogistic arguments. Udayanacarya of
the tenth century A. D., who is the greatest champion
of STyaya theism, suggests no less than eight syllogistic
arguments in support of the Xyaya view that the whole
creation is made by God who is omniscient, omnipotent
and eternal. Earth and such other products (karya]
constituting the created world should have been created
by a conscious agent having a full and definite know-
ledge of all the details relating to the required causal
apparatus; and such an agent in the case of the whole
creation cannot conceivably be a jlva (individual soul)
and should therefore be the supreme Soul (Paramutman
Isvara). At the beginning of creation (vr$/i), the
volitional effort (y t atna) leading to the concretive
activity (dyojana), which produced contact between
two atoms, should be taken to inhere in a conscious
being; and the concious being cannot be jlva and
should be Isvara. The various planets are sustained in
their position and do not sink down or dash against
each other; this should be due to the sustaining effort
(dhrii) of some conscious being, who is Isvara. The
intelligent being, who is originally responsible for the
first introduction (pada) into the world of certain
indispensable crafts and arts like weaving and pot-
making, cannot be jlva and should be taken to be
Isvara. The infallibility of the Vedas depends on the
unfailing validity of the knowledge derived from them;
that knowledge is always valid on account of the
eternal purity of the source from which the Vedas
originated; and that source is the omniscient God. The
80 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
vedic texts consisting of sentences should have been
composed by some intelligent author; and that author
of supreme intelligence is the omniscient God. The
number 'two' (dvitvasoriifchyd), belonging to two
atoms, is the cause of the size of dyads (dvyanuka} \
two and the higher numbers are all products resulting
from the enumerative cognition (apcksdbuddhi) of the
person who counts; and at the beginning of creation,
such enumerative cognition could be attributed only to
the omniscient God and to none else. All these eight
arguments are summed up by Udayana in this verse
(Kusumanjali V. 1): "Kdryayojanadhrtytideh padat
pratyayatah sruteh; Vdkydt samkhydvisesdcca stidhya
visvavidavyayah"
it would be useful to compare the Nyaya view
of dtman with the corresponding theories in other
systems of Indian philosophy. In the Sarhkhya-Yoga
system, there are innumerable souls (pnritsdh) and
every purusa is an unrelated, attributeless, self-lumi-
nous, eternal and omnipresent being who is identical
with consciousness (cit). In the Yoga system, in
addition to the ordinary pnrusa, God is recognised as a
special type of purusa (purusavisesa'), who is not
affected by any of the defects by which the ordinary
purusa is affected and who is pre-eminently and eter-
nally omniscient and functions as the first teacher of
all the ancient teachers. The Bhattas and Prabbakaras,
for all ostensible purposes, banished God from their
systen 1 , for fear lest the sovereign authority and
supreme pre-eminence of the Veda might be detracted
from. The soul in the Bhatta system is the substratum
CH. i] PERCEPTION 81
of consciousness and the object of inner perception
(manasapratyaksa), though cognition itself is only
inferred and not perceived by the man as \ and in each
body a different soul which is eternal and all-pervasive,
is embodied. The Prabhfikaras also recognise differ-
ent, eternal and all-pervasive souls in different bodies;
and the soul, however, is not the object of mental
perception (manasapratyaksa), according to their
system. Expressions like 'I cognize myself (mam
jdnami) are understood to refer to dtmau, not as the
object (karma) of cognition, but merely as coming
within the scope of cognition. The Prabhakara school
holds that in every cognition, three factors are invari-
ably presented viz., the object (visaya), the soul as
knower or the substratum of cognition (jfiata), and
the cognition itself (jnana-svarftpa). The followers
of Sri Ramanuja and certain other Vaisnavas hold that
the individual soul (jlva) is different in different
bodies and is atomic in size (anuparimana). The
Bauddha idealists would not recognise a permanent
soul and would reduce it to momentary consciousness
(ksanikavijnana) ; while the Jaina realists would make
the soul commensurate with the body. The Advaitic
monists hold that the individual soul (jiva), which
appears to vary in association with mind (antahkaraya)
and to partake of the latter's vicissitudes, is in fact
identical with the immutable and absolute reality called
Brahman.
Mind (manas) is described by the Naiyayikas as
the inner sense which directly apprehends pleasure,
82 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
pain, cognition and such other perceptible qualities of
the soul. To avoid confusion of one's experiences
with those of another, it should be taken to be different
in different individuals. On the ground that a percep-
tual experience can arise only through some sense
(indriya) being brought into relation with what is per-
ceived, an inner sense (antarindriya) is inferred to
account for the inner perception of pleasure, pain etc.
One can have only one cognition at a time; v :': .,
to the Naiyayikas, more than one cognition cannot arise
simultaneously. This fact (yugapajjnananutpatti) is
relied upon by Gautama as the chief argument to prove
the existence of man as an an atomic substance. Aivnan
is all-pervasive (vibhu) and comes into relation with all
the senses and their objects at the same time. How
are we then to account for the fact that two or more
cognitions never arise simultaneously but come into
being one after another? This has to be explained
through the assumption ot a substance which can come
into relation with only one of the external senses at a
time; and this substance is the atomic manas ({para-
manuparimanam man ah). The Nyaya-Vaisesika
system ascribes eight qualities to manas number,
atomic size, separateness, contact, disjunction, remote-
ness, proximity and rapidity. The Prabhakaras agree
with the Naiyayikas in the view that manas is an eternal
atomic substance, but would not accept the view that
dtman is the object of mental perception (man as a-
pratyaksa). The Bhattas maintain that manas is all-
pervasive and is in eternal contact with the all-perva-
sive fitman; that dtman and manas, in contact with
CH. i] PERCEPTION 83
each other, function only within the sphere of the body
(sarira) with which they happen to be associated; and
that our experience is inconclusive and cannot be said
to be such as would rule out the possibility of several
cognitions arising at the same time. The Advaitins
regard antaliJtarana or the inner instrument of know-
ledge as a substance constituted by light (tejas) and
maintain that it is not a sense (indriya) in the strict
sense of the term and that its modifications (vrttayah)
may assume a cognitive, volitional or emotional form
according as circumstances vary.
The unswerving fidelity of the Naiyayikas to
realism in a strict sense is mainly responsible for the
somewhat extreme views which they have chosen to
adopt in regard to atman and manas. It would appear
that the fundamental distinction between spirit and
matter is either misled or ignored in the Nyaya theory
which reduces atman to a mere substance and places it
on a par with forms of dead matter like a stone, and
which treats consciousness as a quality arising in atman
under certain conditions. The Nyaya realist, however f
would point out that his theory of atman is free from
the weak holes through which the idealistic inundation
may sweep away everything, such as, for instance, a
shrewd mind might easily notice in the Samkhya view
that the soul (piirusa) is identical with the self-lumi-
nous consciousness. It should be remembered that the
Naiyayikas have provided adequate safeguards against
the materialist (carvaka) fraternising with them, in
the facts that atman is always the seat of reminiscent
84 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
impressions (bhdvana), merit (dhafma) and demerit
(adharma) till the moment of final release and that,
even after final release, dtman is the seat of the annihi-
lation of all evils (dtyantikadiihkhadhvamsa) and not
reduced to the form of an eternal stone, as some critics
may fancy. Manas, in the Nyaya theory, is in no way
better than any form of dead matter, except in respect
of its fitness for a special kind of activity and of
contact with atman\ and it is so in most of the other
systems of Indian philosophy. It is, however, where
the Nyaya theorist endeavours to maintain the eternity
of dtman by making it all-pervasive (vibhu), that he
allows himself to be tripped up by the Advaitic nionist,
who would triumphantly draw attention to the ultimate
merger which the recognition of innumerable all-
pervasive souls might inevitably result in. It is here
that the Nyaya theory of dtman stands foredoomed.
It is suggested by some writers that neither
Kanada nor Gautama could be said to have intended
to give a place in their systems to the conception of
God. But it would be difficult to believe that Kanada,
who believed in seers and the immense scope and capa-
city of their knowledge (drsajndna), did not believe in
the existence of the omniscient God. There are good
reasons to believe that Gautama, who would ascribe the
authorship of the Veda, to the Greatest Apia (truth-
speaker), took God for granted and that Uddyo-
takara, Vacaspatimisra and others were right in
suggesting that the refutation of God's causality
in the fourth chapter of Gautama's sutras should
CH.I] PERCEPTION 85
be understood to have reference to the relation of
material cause (npaddnakdrana) and effect, and not
to that of the agent, an instrumental cause (nimitta-
karana). It is also worthy of notice, in this connec-
tion, that the Nyaya theory of creationistic causa-
tion (dfambhavada) and the atomic theory would
be incomplete and unintelligible in certain respects,
without explaining, as Udayana points out, the first
concretive activities of pairs of atoms to form dyads,
by attributing them to the volitional effort of the omni-
scient Creator, If the Naiyayikas had confined them-
selves to the creationistic argument to prove the
existence of God, their God would be reduced to a
'demiurgic potter of the macrocosmic pot' (Brahmanda-
ktiiala). But luckily for the Nyaya theism, Udayana-
carya based many a theistic argument in his Kusumdn-
jali on the moral values recognised in the Hindu
society. In the history of Indian theism, that
Udayana's theistic contribution is of particular value
in demonstrating the extent to which theism may press
reason into service where revelation fails, as in the
case of anti-Vedic Buddhists, is a fact which every
student of Nyaya should remember. It is this fact
that emboldened Udayana to claim to be the saviour of
the world's Saviour in the following verse which tradi-
tion attributes to Udayana :
"Aisvaryamadamatto'si mdmavajndya vartase \
"Upasthitesii bauddhesu madadhind tava sthiiih\\"
In Thy almighty power, inebriate thou art and
thou dost not care for me. But Thy very existence
depends upon me, when the Bauddhas approach.
86 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
13
T Colour is the quality
which is perceived only by the
sense of vision. It is of seven
kinds the seven varieties being
white, blue, yellow, red, green,
brown and vai legated. It is
found in earth, water and
light. Of these three, in earth,
all the seven varieties are found.
White colour, which is not
brilliant, belongs to water.
White colour, which is brilliant,
belongs to light.
14
T Taste is the quality
which is perceived by the sense
of taste. It is of six kinds, the
six varieties being sweet, acid,
salt, pungent, astringent and
bitter. It is found in earth and
water. Of these two, in earth,
all the six varieties are found ;
while the sweet only belongs to
water.
15
T Smell is the quality
which is perceived by the sense
of smell. It is of two kinds
CH. i] PERCEPTION 82
the fragrant and the non-frag
rant. It is found in earth only
16
T Touch is the qualit;
which can be perceived only tr
the sense of touch. It is of thre<
kinds the three varieties beinj
cool, hot and lukewarm. It i
found in earth, water and fire
Of these three, to water belong
the cool touch, the hot touch t<
fire, and the lukewarm touch t<
earth and air.
17
T The four qualitie
beginning with colour are pro
duced in earth through the appli
cation of heat and are no
eternal. In the case of othe:
substances, they are eternal ir
such of them as are eternal am
they are not eternal in such oi
them as are not eternal.
The word 'only' in the definition of coloui
excludes the sense of touch. Thus the definition
amounts to this: that colour is quality which is per-
ceived in the normal way by the sense of vision and
does not come within the range of the normal percep-
tion arising from the sense of touch. In this definition
it is necessary to refer to 'normal visual perception*,
88 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
since even smell and such other qualities may, accord-
ing to the Naiyayikas, be brought within the range of
the super-normal perception arising from the sense of
vision. The word quality (ginia) in the definition is
necessary and it excludes the jdti, colourness (rupalva),
common to all the colours and the total negation of
colour (riipdbhdva) ; for, a sense which peiceives an
object perceives also its jdti and abhtiva under normal
conditions and rnpatva and rufxlbhdva can thus be
normally perceived by the sense of sight. The defini-
tion of colour, as explained above, is not satisfactory;
it is applicable to contact between a ray of light and a
wall (prabh&bhittisamyoya), the contact in such cases
being visible, though not tangible. To obviate this
ativydfiti, the definition of colour has to be modified in
this manner: 'Colour has the differentia of a species
of gunas, which is normally visible but not tangible' -
(''Tvagagrahyacaksnryrahyagiuiavibhajakopadhimat").
The definitions of taste, smell and touch set forth
above have to be understood in a similar way. These
pre-scientific classifications of colour and other qualities
have only some historical and speculative interest. In
the list of colours, the Naiyayikas have included the
variegated colour (citrariipa) as a distinct variety.
The reason why they have clone so is to be found in
their theory of avayavin (composite structure), which
is ultimately attributable to their creationistic view of
causation. In the Nyaya theory, a composite product
(avayavin) is entirely different from its component
parts (avayava)', a cloth which is made up of threads
of different colours, is seen as having a variegated
OH. i] PERCEPTION 89
colour; the different colours belonging to the threads
cannot be said to produce the corresponding colours in
the single composite whole, for the reason that colour
is a pervasive (vya^yavrtti) quality, unlike the non-
pervasive (avyapyavrtti) contact, which may be at once
present arid not present in a composite unit, and for the
reason that one composite unit can thus have only one
colour; were it true that the cloth of variegated colour
has no colour apart from those of the component
threads, the composite cloth itself would be devoid of
any colour and would therefore become normally invi-
sible, visual perception ordinarily depending upon the
presence of colour which is not sub-perceptional
(amidbhfita) but perceptible (udbhuta) ; and on these
grounds, in order to account for the visual perception
of a variegated cloth, it becomes necessary to recognize
variegated colour (citrarUpa) as a distinct variety of
colour. In cases where a composite product is made
up of component parts having different tastes or
different smells, the avayarin itself has no taste or
smell and the different tastes or smells that may be
perceived belong to the avayavas. In such cases, there
is no necessity for postulating any distinct variety of
taste or smell known as citrarasa (varied taste) or
citragandha (varied smell).
Colour, taste, smell and touch admit of change in
earth through baking (pdka), which is explained by
the Naiyayikas as amomiJiiix to contact of a special
kind with fire (vijdtiyatcjassaniyoya). The Vaisesika
theorists hold that, when a pot is baked or when a
mango ripens through heat, the composite products get
90 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART ni
disintegrated down to the stage of atoms; the qualities
of colour, taste, smell and touch in those atoms are
destroyed by heat; and a different colour, taste, smell
and touch are produced ; and then integration takes
place, new dyads, triads and other composite products
being formed in accordance with the adrstas of the
individual souls concerned with such products. This
theory of pdka is known as pilvpakavuda or 'the theory
of atoms being burnt'. The Nyaya theorists, on the
other hand, hold that composite products are left intact
in pdka and are not disintegrated and that their colour
and such other qualities are replaced by corresponding
qualities of different species. This theory of paka
maintained by the Naiyayikas is known as pitharafdka-
uada or 'the theory of composite wholes being burnt/
It should be remembered, in this connection, that in the
Nyaya- Vaisesika system, earth is the only substance
which admits of the special process of burning called
pdka, though contact with fire is quite possible in the
case of any other substance.
18
T Number is the special
cause of enumerative expres-
sions, such as one, two and so
on. It is present in all the nine
substances and it is represented
by numbers beginning from
one and ending with parardha
(one thousand croresof crores).
Number one may be everlasting
CH. i] PERCEPTION 91
or non-eternal everlasting in
everlasting substances and non-
eternal in non-eternal substances.
Number two and the higher
numbers are non-eternal every-
where.
The -Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of 'number' is one
of the instances of the realistic excesses of the Nyaya-
Vaisesika ontology. Number is a quality (gitna)
according to this system and is an objective reality.
Number being a quality, how would the Nniyayikas
account for propositions like 'there are twenty-four
qualities' (catitrviiiisatirgnnah)? They would explain
such propositions as referring to numbers co-existent
with qualities in substances or as referring to the
relation of objectness (visayata) between qualities and
peculiar type of cognition known as cninneratirc
cognition (apeksdbnddhi). According to the Nyaya-
Vaisesika theory, two (dvitva) and the higher numbers
are produced in the substances which are counted and
come within the scope of cnumerative cognition
(apeksdbnddhi). Apeksdbnddhi in this system is the
cognition involved in the process of counting and it
takes the form 'This is one; this is one; and thus these
are two' (ay am ekati, ayam ekah, dhatya, dvau).
Though a cognition lasts only for two moments
(ftsana) and comes to an end in the third moment from
its origin, apeksdbnddhi lasts three moments from its
origin and comes to an end in the fourth moment.
Why the exponents of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system
92 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
allow a longer lease of life to apeksabuddhi than to
other varieties of cognition requires some explanation.
Apeksabuddhi is the cause of 'two' (dvitva) and the
higher numbers. If apeksabuddhi were to come to an
end at the third moment from its origin, dvitva would
come to an end at the fourth moment of apeksabuddhi.
Apeksabuddhi arises at a particular moment; at the
next moment, dvitva arises, and may come into relation
with an external sense say sight at that moment; the
indeterminate perception of dvitvatva (dvitvatvanirvi-
kalpaka} conies into being at the third moment and the
determinate perception of dvitva arises at the fourth
moment; if apeksabuddhi were to come to an end at
its third moment, dvitva would cease to exist at the
fourth moment, when it is actually seen; and to say
that a thing is seen at the moment at which it ceases to
exist is obviously absurd. In order to avoid this
absurd result, the Nyaya-Vaisesika hypothesis of
apeksabuddlii allows to it a life of three moments, its
end taking place at the fourth moment from its origin
and being followed at its fifth moment by the end of
dvitva, which continues to exist and comes to be seen
at the fourth moment. In Nyaya terminology ekatva,
dvitva and such other terms ordinarily denote number
(samkltya). and may, in certain cases, denote the rela-
tion of being the object of a particular enumerative
cognition (apeksabuddhi-visesa-visayatva). Ekatva
may also be taken occasionally in a negative sense,
when it is understood to mean uniqueness or 'being not
seconded by another thing of the same species' (sva-
sajanyadvitiyarahityam). In Vaisesika treatises like
CH. i] PERCEPTION 95
Sarhkaramisra's Sutropaskara, the process by which
apeksdbnddhi originates and functions is described
thus: "The sense concerned conies into relation with
the thing in which dvitva is to be produced ; then the
indeterminate perception of ekatvatva, common to all
the numbers called ckatva, arises; then the co-ordinat-
ing group-cognition (satnulialaJiibana) of two units of
ckatva arises; then dvitva itself comes into being; then
the indeterminate perception of dv'Uvatva, the jati
common to all the numbers called dvitva > arises; then
follows the determinate perception of dvitva; then the
two substances having dvitva are cognized; and lastly
such a cognition produces the corresponding impres-
sion (saniskara) in the soul/' While ckatva is com-
pletely contained in a single container (pratyeka-
paryapta), dvitva and the higher numbers are partially
contained (vyasajyarrtti) in each of the containers
and completely contained only in groups of two and
so on.
The NySya conception of number more especially
of two and the higher numbers as qualities inhering
in substance may be described by the opponents of the
Nyaya-Vaisesika realism and pluralism, as well as by the
exponents of the modern school of Nyaya (navy a-
ny&ya), as specimens of the warty overgrowths dis-
figuring the complexion of Nyaya realism. But shrewd
critics who can probe into the heart of Nyaya may be
able to find in it an effective check to monistic thought
which seeks to efface completely all the numbers and
their metaphysical implications holding together the
component parts of the social fabric.
94 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
19
T Size is the special cause
of expressions pertaining to
measurement. It is found in all
the nine substances. It is of
four kinds atomic, large, long
and short.
20
T Separateness is the
special cause of expressions
such as 'this is separate from
that'. It is found in all the
substances.
21
T Contact is the special
cause of expressions such as
'these are in contact with each
other/ It is found in all the
substances.
22
T Disjunction is the
quality which destroys contact.
It is found in all the substances.
23
T Remoteness and proxi-
mity are the special causes of
expressions such as 'this is
remote/ 'this is near'. They
are found in the four substances
CH. i] PERCEPTION 95
beginning with earth and in
Dianas. They are of two kinds,
those that are due to time and
those due to space. In a remote
substance, spatial remoteness is
found ; and in a substance lying
near, spatial proximity is found.
In an older person, temporal
remoteness is found; and in a
younger person, temporal proxi-
mity is found.
It will be seen that sections 18 to 21 and section 23
in the text define number, size, contact, remoteness and
proximity as special causes of the respective expressions
which refer to them. The term vyavahdra is used in
the text and is usually understood in the sense of
'expression in words' or 'putting into words' (sabda-
prayoga). One cannot say 'this is one' (ayamckah)
or 'this is large' (ay am mahdn), unless the thing
referred to has the attribute connoted by the words
'one' (cka) or large (niahat). By elimination, the
attribute ekatva or mahattvatzn be shown to be distinct
qualities. In the case of the expressions referred to*
our experience enables us to establish the relation of
causality between them and the qualities connoted by
the expressions used. God, time, space and adrsta
(the unseen impressions resulting from good or bad
deeds) are believed by the Naiyayikas to be common
causes of all products; and to exclude these common
causes (sadharanakarana) , the phrase asadharana-
96 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
karana (special causes) is used in the definitions of
number, size, contact etc. All these definitions are
based on the supposition that the expressions referred
to are all correct and should be taken in their popular
sense.
In the Nyaya-Vaisesika system, the size of the
atoms called tyQrimawdalya and the size of all-perva-
sive substances (vibhu") called paramawahativa are
eternal. The cause which produces a size is the corres-
ponding size of the component parts, as in the case of
all the degrees of mahattva above that of a triad and
below that of an all-pervasive substance; or it is the
number (sanikhya) of the component parts, as in the
case of the sizes of a triad and a dyad; or it is loose
contact (pracaya) of the component parts as in the case
of a ball of cotton. The two sizes denoted by the
words 'long* and *short' (dirghatva and hrasvatva)
may well be brought under mahattva and anutva and
need not be recognised to be distinct varieties of size.
The distinct position which separateness (prthak-
tva) occupies in the list of qualities recognised by the
Vaisesikas is dependent chiefly upon the view that the
experience embodied in the proposition 'A jar stands
out separate from a cloth' (ghatah patat prthak) should
be distinguished from the experience embodied in the
proposition 'A jar is not a cloth' (ghatah pato na) and
that the former should be interpreted as an affirmative
proposition referring to the positive entity called
prthaktva and the latter as a negative proposition refer-
ring to the negative category of reciprocal non-existence
called anyonyabhava. Though the older Naiyayikas
CH. i] PERCEPTION 97
support this view, some of the Naiyayikas like Raghu-
natha Siromani shrewdly see that this way of differ-
entiating prthaktva from anyonyabhava would only
amount to the recognition of some useless distinction
without any real difference and they discard prthaktva
along with similar useless qualities like remoteness and
distance, which are merely temporal and spatial rela-
tions involving a larger or smaller number of interven-
ing contacts (Vide part III p. 14).
It would be useful to refer again, in this connec-
tion, to the remarks at pages 51 and 52 of part III,
about the Nyaya conception of contact (samyoga) as a
quality and as an external relation possible only
between two substances. The N)5,ya theorists would
not recognize contact between two all-pervasive sub-
stances. Contact may arise from activity (kriya) or
from another contact. The latter variety is to be
found in the contact which arises between one's body
taken as a whole and a book, when the book is held in
one's hand; and this variety of s\ii'ii\'oya called samyo-
gaja-samyoga is an inevitable result of the N}aya view
that a composite whole (avayavin) is totally different
from its component parts. The contact which arises when
one hits with force is called abhiyhata (striking) and it
causes sound or some activity resulting in disjunction
between the things joined by such contact; and a con-
tact which does not cause sound or does not cause some
activity of the kind described is called nodana (push-
ing). In the N>aya system, contact is a typical instance
of a non-pervasive object (avyapyavrtti). Certain*
98 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
things are spatially non-pervasive (daisikavyfipyavrtti) ;
for instance, contact with a monkey (kapisamftoga) is
spatially non-pervasive in the sense that it may be said
to be present and not present in the same tree at the
same time, with reference to its top and foot. In a
similar way, all the producible things (jdwyapaddrtha)
are temporally non-pervasive in the sense that they may
be said to be present and not present in undivided time
(Wahakala) , with reference to the periods preceding
and following their production. Advanced students of
Advaita may realise that the conception of avydpya-
vrttitva developed by the Naiyfiyikas is, indeed, used by
them as their life-belt when they have to save their
realism from being drowned in the Advaitic deluge in
which everything other than the absolute Brahman
sinks down to the level of mithyd (unreal) and turns
out to be relatively real in the sense that it co-exists
with its own non-existence.
The Vaisesika theorists argue that disjunction
(vibhtiga) should not be equated with the negation of
contact in any form; and the older Naiyfiyikas support
them. Disjunction cannot be the antecedent negation
of contact (samyoga'prdgabhdra) ; for, in cases where
we have the experience 'these are disunited' (imau
vibhaktau}, we do not have the experience 'these will
come into contact with each other' (imait samynktau
l)havisyo>ia\i). Disjunction cannot be the total negation
of contact (samyogdiyantdbhdva) ; for, in that case,
one should have the experience 'these two qualities are
disunited' (imau gunau vibhaktau), but one never has
CH.I] PERCMPTION 99
such experience of vibhaga in the case of qualities. In
every case of disjunction, one invariably realizes that
contact is destroyed; but disjunction itself cannot be
identified with loss of contact (samyoganasa}, for the
reason that contact is also lost when one of the substan-
ces in contact with each other happens to be destroy-
ed and that, in such cases, one does not speak of dis-
junction (vibhaga}. Loss of contact between two
substances which continue to exist has to be accounted
for. It cannot be the direct result of discretive move-
ment (kriyd). For, in a case where a particular finger,
as a result of its activity, comes into contact with a tree
and the hand likewise comes into contact with the same
tree as a result of its movement, the linger may be
moved away from the tree and thus lose its contact
with the tiee; in that case, one speaks of the hand also
losing contact with the same tree; the movement of tiie
finger may cause the loss of contact between the finger
and the tree; and this movement does not belong to the
hand and cannot, theiefore, have anything to do with
the loss of contact between the hand and the tree. In
such instances, the loss of ? a;;, \otja should be attributed
to a cause other than movement (karma) and this
cause is called vibhaga or disjunction. By a process of
elimination, disjunction is brought under the category
called guna. This argument set forth by the Vaisesikas
to maintain that vibhaga is a distinct quality involves
many an assumption which canLot be satisfactorily
sustained. The later Naiyayikas realize the weak
points in this argument and bring vibhaga under loss of
contact (sathyoganasa).
100 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PARTII?
The qualities mentioned above, viz. number,
size, separateness, contact, disjunction, remoteness
and proximity, and fluidity and viscidity are capable,
of being perceived by two of the external senses
the sight and the touch. Sections 25 and 26 in the
following text deal with fluidity and viscidity.
24
T Weight is the non-inti-
mate cause of the first downward
motion (of a falling substance)
It is found in earth and water.
25
T Fluidity is the non-inti-
mate cause of the first flow (of
a fluid substance). It is found
in earth, water and light. It is
of two kinds natuial fluidity
and artificial fluidity. Natural
fluidity is found in water. Arti-
ficial fluidity is found in earth
and light. In certain varieties
of earth like ghee, etc., fluidity
of the artificial variety is
brought about through contact
with fire; and it is also found in
gold and such other varieties of
light.
26
T Viscidity is the quality
which causes the lumping up of
H. i] PERCEPTION 101
powder etc., i.e. the particles
of powder, etc., to adhere to each
other. It belongs only to water.
The above definitions of gurutva, dravatva and
sneha have hardly any scientific value and they are
based wholly on speculation resting upon certain popular
notions. 'It should be noted that gurutva (weight)*
according to Nyaya theorists, is beyond the range of
sense-perception (atindriya). The Naiyayikas main-
tain that, though oil and such other substances appear
to have viscidity (sneha), it really belongs to water
which forms part of those substances.
27
T Sound is a quality
which is perceived by the ear. It
belongs only to the ether. It is
of two kinds viz., noise and
alphabetic sound. Noise is found
in a drum and alphabetic sounds
form languages like Sanskrit.
The Nyaya- Vaisesika theorists <li*!iiinnMi between
inarticulate noise called dhvani and articulate alpha-
betic sounds called varna. They further distinguish
three varieties of sounds, in view of the three kinds of
causes which may produce them. These three varieties
are: (1) the sound caused by contact (samyogaja),
(2) the sound caused by disjunction (vibhagaja), and
(3) the sound caused by another sound itself (sabdaja).
The first variety arises when a drum is beaten by a
.stick; the second variety arises when a bamboo is split;
102 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
and the third variety is to be found in the series of
sounds successively arising in the akasa intervening
between a drum, for instance, and the sense of hearing*
In Indian philosophy, a considerable measure of specu-
lative value is attached to the N>aya theory of sabdaja-
sabda or series of successive and exactly similar sounds
arising in a continuous chain, beginning with the first
sound caused in the portion of ether delimited by the
substance that is struck, such as a drum, and ending
with the last sound that is caused in the portion of
ether representing the sense of hearing and is actually
heard. The Naiyayikas explain the way in which a
sound-series is produced in auditory perception, by
means of two illustrations vis., the illustration of
'little wave and big wave* (vlcitaranganyuya) and the
illustration of kadamba buds. These two illustrations
suggest two ways of i \;>1, lining how a sound comes to
be heard on all sides and in all the ten directions, in-
cluding the intermediate points and up and down. A
little circular wave springs up; around it a bigger wave
arises; around it a still bigger wave and so on; in this
way, a circular wave of sound is caused, around it a
bigger sound-wave and so on, until at last a certain
sound-wave is produced in such a way that it reaches
the senses of hearing which may be fit and ready to
hear in all the ten directions. In this explanation, there
is only one series consisting of several circular sound-
waves, each coming into relation with all the ten direc-
tions. One kadamba filament which first shoots up,
causes several kadamba filaments to shoot up simul-
taneously in all the parts of a kadamba flower; in the
CH. i] PERCEPTION 103
same way, the first sound, produced at some point,
causes ten sounds to spring up simultaneously in all the
ten directions; and they cause ten other sounds to
spring up in all the ten directions and so on; and thus
the sound in question comes to he heard on all sides. In
this explanation, the series of sabdaja-Sabdas consists
of several groups of sounds, each group being taken to
be a ten. In the illustration of kadamba bud, it should
be remembered that each bud-like filament of a kadambQ
flower is described as a bud in the phrases kadamba-
mukulanydya and Jtadambakorakanyaya. The expla-
nation suggested by the second illustration is consider-
ed unsatisfactory and cumbrous.
The Bhattas and Prabhakaras hold that alphabetic
or articulate sounds (varnatmakasabda) are eternal.
The former maintain that varna is an all-pervasive
eternal substance (nityam vibhu dravyam} ; while the
latter hold that varna is an eternal quality (n'ityaguna}.
The Mimariisakas seek to support their view that varna
is eternal by referring to the recognition which we are
conscious of in the case of the same varna and which
takes a form like this: 'This sound g which I now
hear is the same as that g which I heard several times
before' (So' yam gakarah). One can easily see the
reason why the Mimarnsakas are particularly solicitous
to maintain the theory of the eternity of varnas if one
remembers that the Mimamsa theory of the eternity of
the Vedas rests upon 'the eternity of varnas. The
Vaiyakaranas hold that the transcendental substratum
of varnas called sphota is real and permanent and that
.104 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
varnas themselves are not permanent. The Nyaya-
Vaisesika system maintains that every varna is caused
and the Vedas themselves were produced by God, the
recognition of the same varna like 'This g is that*
(So'yam gakdrah) being interpreted as referring to the
permanent jati called gatva and not to the same
#-sound (ga-vyakti).
28
T (a) BuddJii and Jndna
are the same thing, and stand for
cognition which is the cause of
all verbal expressions. It is of
two kinds recollection and ex-
perience.
(fc) Recollection is the cogni-
tion which is caused only by
reminiscent impression.
(c) All cognitions other
than recollection come under ex-
perience. There are two kinds
of experiences, real and erro-
neous.
(d) The experience which
cognizes an attribute as belong-
ing to a thing which really has
it, is real; and this is known as
pTania (valid knowledge).
(<?) The experience which
cognizes an attribute as belong-
ing to a thing in which it is not
present, is erroneous.
OH. i] PERCEPTION 105
(/) Valid experience is of
four kinds viz., perception, in-
ference, assimilative experience
and verbal experience.
(#) The instrument of
valid expel ience is also of four
kinds the perceptive instru-
ment, the instrument of infer-
ence, assimilation, and sentence
or proposition.
Buddhi is an ambiguous term and it is used in
various senses in Sanskrit philosophical literature.
Sometimes it is used in the sense of antahkarana the
inner organ of knowledge. It is also used in the sense
of determination (niscaya), which is an aspect or
modification of antahkarana, according to the
Sariikhyas and Advaitins: and the connected words
mail and manas are contrasted with bud d hi in this
sense, the word matt being used in the sense of imagi-
nation or imaginative cognition of something yet to
come about (ii:a!inlf f m (linijoc { inl) and the word manas
in the sense of a dubitative activity of antahkarana
which corresponds to doubt (vimarsdlmakam nianah).
The Naiyayikas are quite consistent and definite in
their use of the term budrthi, and they always take it to
be synonymous with matt, upalabdhi and jndna; and
they take manas to be equivalent to antahkarana.
In the text, Annambhatta's definition of buddhi
can be explained in two ways. The former part of
the text sarvavyavyharaheiuh may be taken to form
106 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
the definition with the addition of the word guna
(quality) and the tei m jnana in the text maybe under-
stood as merely emphasizing the idea that there is no
difference between jnana (knowledge) and buddhi
(cognition). Or the latter part of the text jnanam
buddhih may be taken to constitute a satisfactory
definition of buddhi and may also be understood as
incidentally emphasizing the idea that buddhi and jnana
are identical. According to the first explanation, the
definition of buddhi amounts to this "Cognition or
knowledge is a quality which is the cause of all inter-
communication through language/' As the oft-quoted
dictum 'artham buddhva sabdaracawa" puts it, collo-
cation of suitable words always follows ideas of things;
and from this point of view, it is obvious that cogni-
tion is the invariable and indispensable antecedent of
intercommunication through speech. But this mode of
defining cognition is defective for the reason that it
does not cover cases of a peculiar type of cognition
called indeterminate cognition (nirvikalpakajfiana),
which does not involve any kind of relation and which
can only be inferred and can never be embodied in any
proposition. Nirvikalpakajnana is called avyapadesya
and it does not admit of being embodied in words; so,
it cannot be regarded as the cause of intercommunica-
tion through expression; and thus the definition
"sarvavyavahdrahctuli' is vitiated by the defect of
avyapti (partial inapplicability or narrowness). In
order to remove this defect, the usual device of j&ti-
ghatitalaksana is resorted to and the scope of the defi-
nition is increased in this modified form "Knowledge
CH. i] PERCEPTION 107
or cognition has a jati which is not found in colour and
such other qualities and which is co-existent with the
causality of intercommunication through speech".
This is indeed a clumsy definition. Annambhatta him-
self sees this and suggests in his Dipika that the former
part of the text "sarvavyarahdruhctith' 9 may be taken
to be merely explanatory and the latter part "jfianam
buddhih" as the definition. In the Dipika, Annam-
bhatta says "Janamityannvyavasuyayaviyam jnanatva-
meva laksanam iti bhdvah." Thus ;icccnliiii: to him,
Indnatva (cogniticnness), which is the generic attribute
(jati) ^\ , , i :'.. , all cognitions, is the distinctive
feature (asddhdranadharma) of cognition. He also
suggests that the jdti l called jnanatva, is arrived at
through the uniform experience of a cognition which
invariably assumes a form like this 'I cognise a jar*
(y hat am aham janami), or 'I cognise a cloth' ('pat am
ahatu jdwami). In such cases, the speaker is aware
of the fact that he is cognising ajar; or, in other
words, he has the anuvyavasaya of his vyavasaya 9 \i\s
cognition of a jar being called vyavasaya and his
awareness or consciousness of snch cognition being
called anuvyavasaya. It is only by a-Miming a generic
attribute (jati), called jnanatva, as the common
characteristic of all cognitions, that the uniformity in
the anuvyavasaya referred to can be satisfactorily
accounted for. And this jati may, with advantage, be
taken to represent the distinctive feature of cognition.
The phrase jnanam buddhih 9 , in the text under
consideration is also to be understood as implying a
refutation of the Sarhkhya view that buddhi, upalabdhi
108 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
and jnana denote different things. In 1 1 15,
Gautama, the author of the Nyaya-sutras, says that the
terms buddhi (cognition), upalabdhi (apprehension),
and jnana (knowledge) should be understood to signify
-the same thing ( buddhirupalabdhirjhanamiiyanar-
thdntaram). Vatsyayana, Vacaspati and Udayana
interpret this sutra as refuting the Sarhkhya- view that
these three terms denote entirely different things. In
the Sarhkhya system, the term buddhi stands for the
first evolute called inahattattva, the etymological mean-
ing of the word buddhi being that which first springs
up (V &wd/*=V ndbudh=io spring up) and that of the
word jHoAaf being that which grows out of, and into
something else (\/ uiah=to grow or evolve). This
principle called bnddhi is the first evolute evolved out
of the primordial matter, called mfilaprakrti, and is, in
itself, but a form of dead matter. However, through
proximity to the self-luminous consciousness (cit),
called purusa, the mateiial evolute, buddhi, comes to be
enlivened, as it were, by consciousness (cailanya) and
undergoes various transformations, of which one of the
most important is called adhyavasaya (determinative
cognition). Adhyavasaya, in the Sarhkhya sense,
usually takes the form "This should be done by me"
(idam kartavyam may a). The Samkhyas describe
buddhi, in its adhyavasaya phase, as consisting of three
constituent factors (amsaftayavati buddhih). These
three factors are the eyoic element (madamsah), the
element of voluntary decision (kartavyamiti vyaparam-
sah), and the objective element of this* (idaniamsah).
CH. i] PERCEPTION
The egoic element or madamsa, in the Sarbkhya termi-
nology, is said to represent what is called punisoparaga,
which is an unreal element cor. -I'M inn in the reflection
of the absolutely passive and self-luminous cit called
purusa, in the reflectory, mirror-like, matter called buddhi^
or which is the result of the erroneous identification of
purusa with buddlri. The element of voluntary decision
is a real 'factor and represents a real modification of
buddhi. The objective element of 'this' (idawamsah),
is but an objective modification of buddhi unfolding
itself through the sense-organs; and this element is
known as knowledge or cognition (jnana} and is real.
Apprehension or upalabdhi is the relation between the
objective factor, called visayoparagaand represented by
idamaihsa and equated with jfiana, on the one hand,
and the absolute purusa, on the other; and upalabdhi is
thus an unreal factor, for the reason that purusa, ac-
cording to the Samkbyas, cannot be conceived of as
having any real relation. The well-known illustration
of a mirror being held before a person's face is used in
this connection by the Sarhkhyas to explain these dis-
tinctions. When a mirror is held before the face of a
person, the reflection of the face is seen through the
mirror. If that person happens to breath out on the
surface of the mirror, the surface looks dim and the re-
flected image of the face also looks dim. One may
fancy, in these circumstances, that the face also is dim.
In this illustration, the dimness caused on the surface
of the mirror is real and the fancied relation between
this dimness and the face itself that is reflected in the
mirror is unreal. Similarly, jndna which is the cogni-
110 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PARTIH
live modification of the first e volute (buddhi), is a real
factor; and it conies to have a false relation with puru-
sa through his reflection in buddhi, in the same
way as the dimness of the mirror comes to have a false
relation with the real face through its reflection. This
false relation is called upalabdhi (apprehension). It
will be seen that, in the Sarhkhya theory, jnCma is
entirely material in its nature and origin and becomes
apparently spiritualised to some extent when it comes
to have a false relation with purusa,', and this false
relation with the spirit is called upalabdhi and is
presented in experiences like 'I apprehend' (aham
upalabhc). The Naiyayikas contend that the sub-
stratum of voluntary decision (krti) ought to be regard-
ed as the substratum also of knowledge or cognition
(jndna) which there is hardly adequate reason to distin-
guish from consciousness (cailanya) or apprehension
(upalabdhi). This contention is embodied in Gautama's
sutra " uuddhirupalabdhirjildnaniityanarthdntaram " ;
and students of Nyaya, are reminded of the view embo-
died in this sutra, when they consider Annambhatta's
statement jntinam bnddhih ".
Cognition is first divided into two main heads
recollection (smrti) and experience (anubhava).
Annambhatta defines recollection as a cognition caused
solely by impressions. The impressions referred to
here are reminiscent impressions (bhdvand) derived
from prior cognitions. In this definition, the word
'solely' (jndtra) is intended to exclude recognition
(pratyabhijnd), which is a perceptual experience
(pratyaksa) arising through the relation of a sense-
CH.X] PERCEPTION 111
organ with some object (indriydrt/iasarnikarsa) and
through reminiscent impressions derived from a prior
cognition of the same object. 'This is that person*
(so'yam purusdh) : cognitions of this type are ins-
tances of recognition and should not be confounded
with cases of recollection. {While the Advaitins and
Bhattas would explain riTngnitinn (pralyabhijfiu) as a
cognitive complex consisting of two parts, one repre-
senting perceptual experience (pratyaksa) and the
other recollection (smarana), the Naiyayikas, as
champions of consistency, would not accept such
explanations and would banish from their world all such
centaurian and monstrous complexes. Thus, in the
N}fiya theory, it has become necessary to bring recog-
nition under perceptual experience of a special type
and to exclude it from the scope of the definition of
recollection (swrti). The Nyaya theory of smrtt is
that certain kinds of cognition, which are different from
indifference (upeksd), invariably leave reminiscent
impressions (bhuvanaritpasawskara) in at man and that
these impressions are kindled up under certain condi-
tions and cause recollection. Every group of reminis-
cent impressions causing a recollection comes to an end
immediately after its effect is produced. But this
would not mean that after once recollecting ><>;:, i ihing,
it would no longer be possible to recall it again to
memory; for, every recollection would, in its turn,
cause a reminiscent impression. Thus, according to
the older Nyaya theory, every recollection, even when
it relates to the same object, is caused by a different set
of reminiscent impressions. Later Naiyyikas and
112 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
Advaitins, on the other hand, hold that the recollections
of the same object are all produced by the same set of
reminiscent impressions, which merely acquire enhanced
intensity through every recollection. Cognitions which
admit of being reproduced in memory through reminis-
cent impressions are classified under three heads by the
Vaisesikas and Naiyayikas of the older school:
patupratyaya, abhyCisapratyaya and adarapraiyaya.
The normal type of cognition which involves the mini-
mum degree of attention sufficient to ensure reprodu-
cation in memory is called 'vivid cognition' (patupra-
tyaya}. By repeatedly revolving a certain idea in one's
mind, one comes to have what may be called 'repeti-
tional cognition' (abhyasapratyaya}. When one's mind
gets riveted to a wonderful or extraordinary object,
the cognition that arises is known as 'regardful cogni-
tion' (adarapratyaya}. All the cognitions other than
recollection (stnrti) are technically known as anubhava*
This technical use of the term unubhava is common in
sfistraic literature and it has to be rendered by the
English equivalent 'experience'. In its technical sense,
as used in Nyaya- Vaisesika literature, it may denote
any kind of experience direct or indirect, perceptual
(pratyaksika), or inferential (anuw&nika), or verbal
(s&bda). In some places, the word anubhava is
somewhat loosely used in the sense of direct experience
or direct realization. Students of Nyaya should take
care to avoid confusion between these two uses of
word anubhava.
Anubhava is divided in Nyaya literature into real
(yathartha) and unreal (ayathartha). The first variety
CH.I] PERCEPTION US
is also called pram& and the second variety is also called
bhrama. The etymology of the term pramd draws
attention to the fact that the experience denoted by that
term is sound or valid, as the prefix pro, indicates. The
etymology of the term bhrama draws attention to the
fact that the thinker's mind goes astray in every case
of erroneous experience. The term yathartha means
exactly corresponding to the object; and the definition
of valid experience, that it cognises an attribute as
belonging to an object which really has it, is directly
based on the meaning of the term yathdrtha; and
likewise, the definition of erroneous experience, that it
cognizes an attribute as belonging to an object which,,
in fact, does not have it, is based on the meaning of
the term ayathartha. To cognize a piece of silver lying
before one as a piece of silver (purovartini rajate
'idam rajatam 9 iti pratltih) is valid experience; and to
cognize a shell, or mother of pearl, or nacre as it is
called, as a piece of silver (hiktau 'idam rajatam 9 iti
prat) tih) is erroneous experience.
In order to understand correctly the definitions of
valid and erroneous experiences, as given in the text, it
is necessary to acquire some knowledge of the termi-
nology by which the Naiyayikas indicate the content of
a cognition, with a measure of quantitative precision
which is nor ordinarily achieved through English ex-
pression. Every determinate experience involves an
objective complex as representing its objective con-
tent. The objective content of cognition is called
visaya (objective) ; the cognition itself is known as
visayvi (subject) ; and the relation between a cognition
8
114 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
and its object is known as visayavisayibhdva (subject-
object-relation). In the Nya>a-Vaisesika system, this
is conceived of as an external relation between two
distinct relata which are two realities connected with
each other for the time being. The problem of the
relation between the subject (visayin=jndna) and
object (visaya) is solved by the Naiyayikas in this
way. Objects like a jar or a piece of cloth exist out-
side the sphere of cognition (jiiana) as realities inde-
pendent of cognition. Through visayata (objectness),
which is a kind of self-linking relation (svarupasam-
bandha) and is merely a phase of the object cognized,
an object comes into relation with cognition, which has
the correlated counterpart of visayaid known as
visayitd (subjectness). Visayitd is also a kind of
self-linking relation and is merely a phase of the
visayin which cognizes. The Nauayikas hold that,
while several realities n ay exi.st independently of cog-
nition, the latter never exists independently of, and as
dissociated from, the objects that arc cu:;ni/id ; and this
is regarded by the N)fi\a theorists "s a state of things
fatal to idealism. They forget, however, that their
realism ultimately rests upon experience and what is
relied upon as the only guarantee of the objective rea-
lity of the external world is the content or form which
is involved in experience, and which idealism or sub-
jectivism can easily merge in cognition.
The Nyava relation of visayavisayibhava involves
two correlated parts known as visayaid (objectness)
and visayitd (subjectness) and the correlation of these
two parts is denoted by the word nirupita. The
CH.I] PERCEPTION 113
objective content of a ^ determinate cognition or judg-
ment is constituled by three parts, vis., the principal or
leading concept called viscsya (substantive), one or
more subordinate concepts called visesana or prak&ra
(adjunct), and a relation (samsarga^ connecting the
visesana and visesya. These three parts form the
complex object (z'isaya) of a judgment; the aspect of
visayatd which belongs to the viscsya is called viscsyatd
(substantiveness) ; that which belongs to the vises ana
is called viscsanatd (adjunctness) ; and that which
belongs to samsarya is called .^(uii^arijatC: (relation-
ness). In ihe judgment 'the cloth is red* (raklah
patah), cloth i-> the visesya, red col ur is presented as
the visesana, and the relation between the redness and
cloth is inherence (samavtiya) and that is presented as
the samsarya. The visayatd which belongs to these
three things is presented in three forms, viz., viscsyata,
visesanatd or prakarata and samsaryatd. These three
aspects of visayatd are correlated to each other and to
the visayita (subjectness) which belongs to the cogni-
tion in which they are presented. The correlation of
these factois is expressed in Sanskrit by the symbolic
terms nirupaka and ninlpya. The boundary of each of
the objective factors is exactly defined by a reference
to the delimiting feature which is also presented in the
cognition under consideration. In the example referred
to, cloth is presented as visesya, not under the aspect
of dravyatva (substanceness), but amder the specific
aspect of patatva (clothness) ; red colour is presented
as vUesana or prakdra, not under the aspect of gunytva
.{qqalityness), but Under the specific jaspect of raktatva
116 A PKIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
(red-colourness) ; and samavayo (inherence) is pre-
sented as samsarga, not under the aspect of samban-
dhotva (relationness), but under the specific aspect of
samavayatva (inherenceness). The required specifi-
cations in these cases are made by referring to patatva,
raktatvanml samavayatva as the delimiting adjuncts
(avacchedaka) respectively of the viscsyata in the
cloth, the prakarata in the red-colour and the samsar-
gatd in inherence. Thus by a clever use of the terms
avacchedaka (delimiting), ayacchedya or avacchinna
(delimited), and nirupaka or nirupila (correlating or
correlated), in the instance taken for illustration,.
viz., the judgment 'raktah pat ah' (the cloth is red),
the objective content may be described in the following
way, with a considerable measure of quantitative pre-
cision : "It is a ((/Bullion whose visayita (subject-
ness) is correlated to the viscsyata (substantiveness)
delimited by clothness (patatva), the viscsyata in its
turn being correlated to the prakarata (adjunctness)
delimited by red-colourness (rakta-rapatva), and the
sariisargata (relationness) correlated to the said praka-
rata and viscsyat& being delimited by inherenceness
(samavayatva). The Sanskrit expression which
exactly describes the objective content of the judgment,
the cloth is red* (raktah patah), may be set forth
thus : " raktatvdvacchinnaprakaratanirupita patatva-
vacchinnaviSesyataniriipita samavayatvavacchinna-
samsargatanifupita visayitat&li jndtiam". In this way
the disposition of the component factors of the objec-
tive content of a cognition is exactly indicated by
means of the symbolic words avacchedaka and
CH. i] PERCEPTION 117
The definitions of ffama and bhrama, as given in the
text, are somewhat defective, since they do not indicate
correctly the correlation between the visesyatd and
prakdratd. In the definition of pramd, for instance, as
given in the text, the substantive having a certain
attribute is referred to as viscsya and the particular
attribute as prakdra. This amounts to saying that in
Pramd, if silverness is presented as prakdra, silver
having silverness (rajatatva) in it is also presented as
vtiesya. Though, for all practical purpose?, this looks
like a correct definition of pramd, it would break clown
when considered in the light of certain group-cogni-
tions (samiihdlambana), in winch two or more sub-
stantival factors (visesya) are presented as co-ordinate
objects associated witli certain adjuncts. Nacre and
silver (sukti and rajata) may both be present in a cer-
tain place; a gioup-cognition, which at once mistakes
nacre f >r silver and silver for nacre, may arise; it is a
sajnuhdlambanabhraina which takes the form. ''These
are silver and nacre" (ime rajatasitkti) ; the definition
of pramd as given in the text would be applicable to
this case of bhrama for the reason that silverness
(rajatatva) and nacreness (suktitva) are presented as
attributes (prakdra) and the two things, nacre and
silver, which really have the two attributes mentioned,
are presented as leading concepts (visesya). There is
nothing in the definition of pramd, as given in the text,
which would exclude such cases of samuhalambana-
bhrama. To exclude such cases, it is necessary to point
out that the adjunctness (prakdratd) of the attribute
presented in a valid cognition is correlated with the
118 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
substantiveness (visesyata) of the thing really having
that attribute. In the erroneous group-cognition (sannl-
halambana) above referred to, the substantiveness of
nacre is not rightly correlated with the adjunctness of
nacreness but wrongly correlated with the adjunctness
of silverness; and similarly the adjunctness of
nacreness and the substantiveness of silverness are
wrongly correlated with each other. A correct des-
cription of this erroneous group-cognition in accord-
ance with the technical terminology of the Nai^ayikas
would facilitate a correct appreciation of these remarks.
This samuhalambana may be described thus in
Sanskrit:
"rajatatvanistha-prakaratdnirupita- sukiinistha- vi-
sesyata ckd, suktitvanistha-prakarataniriipita-rajatonis-
thaviscsyatd apara, etddrsavisesy itadva\anirupita-visa-
yitasdli 'ime suktirajate' iti saniuh&lanibanam."
Thus it will be seen that the correct and complete
definition of prama or valid cognition is that it is a
cognition in which the thing that is presented as sub-
stantive (v sesya) has the attribute which is presented
as adjunct (prakara) and the substantiveness (vife-
syatd) of the former is presented as correlated with the
adjunctness (prakdratd) of the latter. For a similar
reason, the definition of bhrama, as given in the text,
should be amplified with a view to securing greater
precision. A bhrama is an erroneous cognition in
which the thing that is presented as substantive
(visesya) does not have the attribute presented as
adjunct (Prak&ra), though the substantiveness
(visesyata) of the former is presented as correlated
CH.I] PERCEPTION 119
with the adjunctness (praktiratd) of the latter. This
definition would he applicable to cases of erroneous
cognition like 'this is silver* (idam rajatam), where
nacre is mistaken for silver; and it also excludes cases
of valid group-cognition (sawuhalambanaprama) like
'these are silver and nacre* (imc rajatasuktl), where
both silver and nacre are seen as such and not con-
founded with each other.
In this connection, it is desirahle to say a few
words ahout the way in which the Nyaya theorist
solves the problem of knowledge and the connected
questions of truth and error. The realism of Nyaya,
which recognizes complete difference (bheda) between
the object (visaya) and subject (visayin) or between
the known object (jncya} and the cognizing knowledge
(jnana) lias inevitably to face UK* piobiem of truth and
error and to suggest some solution which may be con-
sistent with the Nyaya theory. If the jneya should be
wholly different f rom jnuna, lu w is the gulf between
these two real factors to be bridged over, seeing that
they are fundamentally different? How is knowledge
possible at all? Knowledge is a real factor and its
object is also a real factor existing independently of
knowledge. To a Naiyayika, esse can never be pcrcipi.
If it is the nature of knowledge, as the Naiyayika con-
tends, to come into relation with a real object existing
outside knowledge, what is it that bridges over
the gulf between these two factors? The Nyaya
theorist who recognizes a scheme of external relations
finds it easy to point out that through the self-linking
120 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
relation (svarupasambandha) of subject and object
(visayavisayibhava} 9 the cogipzid reality (jfieya) and
the cognizing reality (jfiawa) cnn Le brought together.
The secret of the N\aya conception of svariipasam-
Sandha is that relation is but a phase of reality and
every real object involves that phase. From the N>aya
point of view, it is perfectly inuiii^ihlc that knowledge
is knowledge of a real object external to it and is not
simply knowledge of ideas which are only copies of ob-
jects. It is one of the advantages of the Nyaya concep-
tion of relation being wholly external that the Naiya-
yikas can account for cognition without the mediation
of ideas as idealists and subjectivists find it necessary
to do. So, in Nyaya epistcmology, it may be said that
the Naiyayika has no difficulty in solving the problem
of knowledge, the term knowledge being understood as
cognition of objective reality, while there is real diffi-
culty in ' for the difference between truth and
error, or valid cognition and erroneous cognition, con-
sistently with the realistic standpoint oi Nyaya meta-
physics, not to speak of the difficulties involved in the
Nyaya theory of external relation. In a valid cognition
like 'this is silver' (idam raj at am), where silver is seen
correctly as silver, the Naiyayika contends that its
objective content exactly corresponds to the external
realities represented by the attribute 'silverness', the
thing possessing that attribute, vis., silver, and their
relation of inherence (samardya). It should be re-
membered here that according to N>aya epistemology,
the objective content of a cognition is not contained in
cognition but exists outside it and it is called 'content*
CH. i] PERCEPTION 121
only in the sense that the relation of object and subject
(visaya and visayin) connects it with jiidna. In a
valid cognition, the exact correspondence between
jnana and jncya, as already explained, consists in the
correct correlation of the phases of visayavisayibhdva,
viz., adjunctness (prakdratd), substantiveness (vise-
syatd) ai.id relationness (samsargatd). In an errone-
ous cognition like 'this is silver' (idatn rajatam),
where nacre (su /f mother of pearl) is mistaken for
silver, the objective content does not exactly corres-
pond to the external realities represented by silverness,
silver and their relation; and the lack of correspond-
ence in such cases is due to a wrong correlation of the
phases of visayavisayibhava, the a< junctness (prakd-
ratd) of the real silverness \vhich belongs to the real
silver existing elsewhere being erroneously correlated
with the substantiveness (vise sy at a) which belongs to
the nacre presented as id am (this). Thus, a careful
analysis of the Nyaya definition of pramd nnd bhrama
would make it clear that the Naiyfuikas are prepared
to regard truth and error us rmixi.MJng in correspond-
ence and lack of correspondence with objective reality.
The Nyaya theory of bhrama is known as anya-
th&khydtiv&da or the theory which explains erroneous
cognition as misapprehension of one thing as another
thing. In the phrase anyathakhyati, the term khydti
means 'cognition' and anyathd means 'otherwise than
what it is'. When nacre is wrongly seen as silver, the
erroneous cognition that arises takes the form 'this is
silver' (idam rajatam). Here, 'this' stands for nacre
122 A PRIMER OF INDJAN LOGIC [PART m
lying in front of the knower; and it is first seen as a
white piece and not as nacre, the distinctive feature of
nacre being missed cither through some defect in sight
or in the particular situation in which the visual per-
ception arises. The visual perception of racre as 'this*
(idam) arises in the ordinary way, through laukika-
scwnikarsa or through the normal sense-relation of
contact between the sense and the object seen. The
real silverness (rajatatva), which belongs to the real
silver existing elsewhere, is presented in this visual
perception as the attribute of nacre seen as 'id am 9 in a
general form; neither the real rajata nor the real
rajatatva could be said to be connected with the sense
of sight through normal sense-relation (laukikasauni-
karsa) ; and without sannikarsa (sense-relation) being
established between the sense-organ concerned and the
object to be perctivcd, perception cannot arise. So,
the Naiya>ikas hold that the real silver and silverness
come to be connected with the sense of sight through an
extra-normal t) pe of sense-relation (alaitkikasanni-
karsa) which is called jnanalaksanapratyasatti (sense-
relation represented by cognition). The details relating
to the different kinds of extra-normal sense-relation
causing extra-normal perception will be fully explained
under section 30, infra. In the present instance of
erroneous cognition, features like white colour and
brightness, wi.ich nacre possesses in common with
silver, are noticed; they remind the knower of the real
silver and silverness which he might have seen else-
where; and the recollection (smrti) of the real silver-
ness (rajatatva) constitutes the exta-normal relation
CH. i] PERCEPTION 12$
represented by cognition f jiidnalaksanapratydsatti),
which brings silverness within the scope of the visual
sense seeing nacre as 'this 1 (tWaw?) in the ordinary way.
Thus, according to the Naiyayika*, the visual mis-
apprehension of nacre as silver is an extra-normal
variety of visual perception (alaukikacdksusa). It
may he noted here that the proposition 'One thing is
mistaken for another' (any at any at lid grhyate), which
brings out the meaning of the technical phrase anyatha-
khydti, is interpreted in two ways in Nyaya literature.
The earlier Naiyayikas like Vacaspatimisra would take
this proposition to mean 'One reality is mistaken for
another reality' (sadantaram sadantaratmand grhyate) ;
while later Naiyayikas like Garuresopadhyaya would
take it to mean, 'A real object which does not have a
certain attribute is mistaken in an extra-normal percep-
tion as having that attribute, which exists elsewhere'
(tadubhCivavat vaslu [nival jndyatc).
Students of Nyaya epi*>temology cannot adequate-
ly estimate the phil sophical value of the Nyaya theory
of anyathdkhydti without comparing it to some extent
with the theories of bhrama (khyativ&da) propounded
by the other schools of Indian philosophy. There are
five theories of bhrama; viz., the theory of self -appre-
hension (dtmakhydti), the theory of non-being's appre-
hension (asatkhydti), the theory of non-apprehension
(akhydti), the theory of misapprehension (anyathd-
khydti), and the theory of indefinable^ apprehension
(anirvacanly akhydti). The Yogacara school of Bud-
dhism, otherwise known as the Vijfianavada school,
explains erroneous cognition as consisting in (he 'self*
124 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
which is identical with consciousness, externalising
itself in the form of objects like silver; all determinate
cognitions of objects, according to the Yogacara
subjectivists, are erroneous; this theory otbhramais
called atmakhyativada (theory of self -apprehension).
The nihilistic school of Buddhists, otherwise known as
the Madhyamaka school, explains bhrania as consisting
in the cognition of a non-being (asat) ; in the case of the
erroneous cognition 'this is silver* which arises where
there is no silver, the object of the cognition is a non-
being (asat) ; on the strength of experience, even non-
being should be taken to admit of being cognized; this
theory of bhrama is known as asatkhydtivada. The
P^abhakara school of Mimarhsakas explains all cases of
btirama as cases of non-apprehension. They contend
that, in the cognition of silver where only nacre is seen,
two cognitions arise in fact, one cognition being the
perception of nacre in a general way as this (idam)
and not as ; ; -- : the distinctive feature of
nacreness, and the other cognition being the recollection
of silver previously cognized elsewhere. The recollec-
tion of silver in this case is not identified by the knower
as recollection, but is cognized by him merely as cogni-
tion, since the object of recollection viz., silver is
thought of merely as stiver, stripped of its association
with past time and the particular place where it was
seen. The Prabhakaras describe such recollection by
the phrase frramustatattakasmarana or 'recollection of
an object robbed of its thai-ness. 9 In certain other
cases of bhrama like 'the conch is yellow' (pitah
CH. i] PERCEPTION 125
sankhah), the Prabhakara theorist explains that two
imperfect perceptions arise, one being the visual
perception of a conch as such, its real colour being
missed, and the other being the visual perception of
the yellow colour of the bilious matter which causes
jaundice (pittadravyapitima) , the relation of the yellow
colour to the bilious substance being missed. Thus in
all cases of bhratna, two distinct cognitions either a
perception and a recollection or two perceptions arise;
their distinction is missed; and the difference between
objects comes to be missed for the time being; as a
result of such non-discrimination, volitional decision
(pravrtti or y&tna) leading to voluntary activity arises;,
a voluntary activity with a view to seizing the object of
bhrania, such as silver, folows; the knower in such cases,,
acting on his knowledge, realises through his experience
that his activity has become futile, as he finds only
nacre on the particular spot and no silver at all; and ia
those cases, in view of the fact that the volitional
decision {pravrtti) of the knower concerned leads to a
futile activity, the cognitive antecedent of such a futile
pravrtti is technically called bhrama. It will be seen
that, while the Prabhakaras are prepared to give a place
to the term bhrama in their vocabulary, they maintain-
that all experiences are valid (anubhutih prama) and
that the so-called cases of bhrama are only undiscri-
minated jumbles of cognitions whose objects also happen
to be undiscriminated for the time being (jnanayoh
visayayosca vivekagrahat bhramah). In other words,
according to the Prabhakaras, to experience is to
experience validly and to err in experience is to expert*
126 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
<ence imperfectly, though validly, the imperfection con-
sisting merely in non-discrimination and not in
misapprehension. The Nyaya theory of anyathdkhyati
has already been explained. The Bhattas, for all
practical purposes, adopt the Nyaya theory of bhrama,
with this difference that they describe a bhrama as
viparitakhydti or contrary experience; that they do not
account for bhrama through extra-normal sense-rela-
tion; and that the relation (saihsarya) between nacre
and silverness (Yajaiatva) or 'fc/aMand rajatam' ('this'
and 'silver'), in the case of the misapprehension of
nacre as silver, is a non-being (asat). Among the
Vedantins, those of the dualistic school (dvaitinaty)
maintain what they call their own version of anyathd-
khyati and contend that, in cases of erroneous experi-
ence like suktirajatabhrama, the silver which is
presented in bhrama is non-being out-and-out
(atyantdsat) within the sphere of nacre, though it is
real elsewhere; and the chief argument in support of
this view is that the siiblaiing cognition (bddhaka-
pratlti), which arise* later takes the form "There
was no silver at all here in the past; it is not here now;
and it will never be here in the future" (natra rajatam
dslt, asti, bhavisyati), and it totally denies the existence
of silver. within the sphere of nacre in the past, the pre-
sent and the future. The Vedantins of the Visistadvaita
school adopt the Prabhakara theory of akhyati with
certain modifications and their version of akhydti is
known as 'non-apprehension cum apprehension of
reality 9 (akhyatisamvalita-satkhyati). Sri Ramanuja
and his foJJovvers hold that the object of bhrama is
H. i] PERCEPTION 127
always real and there is strictly speaking no invalid
cognition at all. In the perception of nacre as silver,
it is the silver which is included among the component
parts of nacre that is seen. They assume that subs-
tances which are similar must have some component
parts in common, that silver is made up of parts of
nacre and parts of silver and is called silver because
the constituent parts represented by silver predominate;
that in the constitution of nacre, likewise, the pre-
domin; ting part is represented by nacre and there is a
small portion of silver; and that this small portion of
silver it is, that happens to be seen when nacre is seen
as silver. Thus according to the school of Sri Rama-
nuja, a person who errs in cognition really blunders
into a subtle truth which, under normal conditions, is
mi.^sed or ignored.
A critical student of Indian philosophy would find
reason to be dissa f isfied with every one of these
theories of bhiama. The non-existent or mm-! ring
(ova/) is an absolute zero and cannot be perverted in
any experience, though the Madhyamakas insist that
we are helpless in the matter and have to nrogni/.c the
possibility of asat being presented in experience on the
strength of experience itself. The Yogacara idealist
endeavours to improve upon the nothin^istic explana-
tion of the Madhyamakas by saying that consciousness
comprises its configuration (sdkdram vijfianam), and
in its externalised form, it is presented in itself as its
object. But one can easily see that this explanation in-
volves a number of inconsistencies. The Nyaya realist
realizes that nothing but reality (sat) adimtsotbt'mg
128 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
presented in experience; he explains that error consists
in i>inf->;iihlin^ one reality with another reality and
complicates his theory hy trying to bring the absent
reality within the range of the sense-or^an concerned
through the extra-normal relation (a'aukikasannikarsa)
represented by some form of cognition itself (jfiana-
laksanapratydsatti). The Bhatta realists, while adop-
ting the theory of onyathukhytiti, find it necessary to
accommodate themselves to the asatkhyuti theory, in
holding that the samsarga element in the apprehension
of nacre as silver and in such other cases is a non-being
(asat). The Prabhakara realist sees the danger of
compromise with the asatkhyuti on the one side, and on
the other side, sees how the Nyaya theory that one
reality is presented as another reality (sadantaram
sadantardttnand grhyate) would inevitably reduce
itself to a variety of asatkhydti for the obvious reason
that one reality never exists (is asat) in the form of
another reality. In order to avoid these difficulties
the Prabhakara realist adopts the extreme theory of
akhydti. Though this is the only theory which could
be said to be perfectly consistent with realism, it is not
adequate to account for the volitional decision
(Pravrtti) and the further activity that follows a
bhratna. As Vacaspatimisra points out in his Tdtparya-
tika and Bhawatl, (in the akhydiivdda) one could find
as much justification in non-identification (abhedd-
gr&ha), for the two cognitions in cases of bhrama
appearing as two cognitive units and consequently for
the two objects in such cases appearing as different, as
in non-discrimination (bheddgr&ha), for the two-
CH. i] PERCEPTION 129
cognitions and their two objects in such cases appearing
as one and the same; and as a result, if there should
be volitional decision in the direction of activity on the
latter ground, there should be volitional decision in the
opposite direction of abstention on the former ground
and the knovver should hang between pravrlti and
nivrtti. These difficulties, the Advaitins endeavour to
meet by propounding the theory of anirvacanlyaTehydti
and explaining bhrama as experience of a relatively
real object, which is neither absolute being (sat), nor
absolute non-being (asat), nor both. According to
the Advaitins, when nacre is seen as silver, for instance,
what happens is this: over the real substratum
(adhisthana) represented by a nacre, or more correctly,
nacre-delimited spirit (suktyavacchiiinacoitanya) the
beginningless positive mist of nescience (anudibhava-
riipajnarla) happens to be thrown; when the sense of
sight comes into relation with nacre in a general way,
the mist is partly dispelled by the cognitive modification
of antahkorana which takes the form 'this' (idamd-
karavrtti) ; the mist of nescience, however, continues
to veil the nacreness of what is seen as this (idam)
and, reinforced by the prepossessions of the knower's
mind and by the similarity between the object seen as
'this' and silver, undergoes transformation, with the
result that silver comes into being also with the cogni-
tion of silver, which is but a cognitive modification of
nescience (suktyavacchinnacaitanyadhisthitavidya raja-
tarapena rajatakuravrttirupena ca parinamate); silver
which thus conies into being has relative reality ; it is
said to be anirvacaniya in the sense that it does not
9
130 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
admit of being definitely described as sat (being), or
asat (non-being) or both; and it is also said to be
prdtibhdsika in the sense that it is coterminous with its
presentation in cognition. It will thus be seen that the
Advaitin's theory of bhrama regards it as a cognitive
complex consisting of two cognitive factors, one of
them being a vrtti of antahkarana and the other being
a vrtti of avidyd. According to this theory, the object
of a bhrama is real in a relative sense and comes into
being along with the bhrama and lasts as long as the
bhrama lasts; and there is no need for accommodation
to asatkhyati or for any complication in the form of
extra-normal (alaiikika) sense-relation. That the
Advaitins have no particular animus against the
advocates of anyathdkhydtivdda is evident from the
way in which they are readily willing to accept the
explanation of anyathdkhydti in the case of what is
known as sopddhikabhrama, where the object of bhrama
happens to be within the normal scope of the sense-
organ, as, for instance in the erroneous perception of a
crystal (sphatika) as red-coloured when a japd (China
rose) is seen to be in its vicinity. Such students of
Indian philosophy as are capable of critically reviewing
the five 'theories' of bhrama (khyativdda) set forth
here would not find it difficult to conceive of an appro-
priate graph by means of which the epistemological
inter-relation of these theories may be exhibited and
comprehended. If one could imagine that epistemo-
logical thought starts with asatkhydti as centre and, in
its endeavour to escape from it, swings forcibly between
the two diametrical termini of anyathdkhydti and
OH. i] PERCEPTION 131
akhyati, it would not be difficult to imagine that such
thought inevitably describes a comprehensive epistemo-
logicai circle in the form of anirvacanlya'khyati, which
easily accommodates itself to akhydti in respect of the
non-discrimination of the two vrttis constituting a
bhrawa and to anyathdkhycLti by complete surrender in
the case of sopddhikabhrama.
It would be quite appropriate to consider here the
Nya\a view regarding the way in which the validity
and invalidity of a cognition, or truth and error, or
prdmdnya and aprdmdnya have to be accounted for and
ascertained. The Naiyayikas hold that validity and
invalidity of cognitions are made out through extrinsic
considerations and are brought about by extrinsic
circumstances. In other words, according to the
Naiyayikas, validity and invalidity cannot be said to be
intrinsically made out (svalograkya) or intrinsically
brought about (svatojanya). Intrinsicality (svatastva)
in respect of the knowledge of reality consists in reality
being made out by every means by which the cognition
having it is ascertained but not ascertained to be
invalid. This definition of svatogrdhyatva is expressed
thus in the technical language of Nyaya : "(rdmdnyasya
jfiaptau svatastvam 'a !.ipr l ii,;.'!ry.l ;r'i! t j 7 'ayCi: a/;iTJ*:a-
grahakasamagrigrdhyatvam." Whenever a person
knows that he cognizes and does not know for the
moment that he errs, he also knows that he validly
cognizes: this is the contention of the advocates of
svatograhyatva or the theory that validity is intrinsically
made out. THUS, if a person could become aware of
the existence of a cognition in him in a hundred
132 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART UI
without becoming aware that that cognition is erroneous
and in any one of those cases he becomes aware of the
cognition only without becoming aware of its validity,
the definition of svcttograhyatva would not hold good
and the view that validity is made out extrinsically
(paratggrahya) has inevitably to be accepted. The
Naiyayikas explain their position thus in regard to this
question. A determinate cognition like "this is silver"
(idam rajatam) is called vyavasaya and it is presented
first in the anuvyavasdya (after-cognition or conscious-
ness of a cognition) which takes a form like this "I
cognize this silver" (idam rajatam janami), and in this
anuvyavasaya, the validity of the cognition referred to
is not presented. If such anuvyavasaya were to in-
variably take cognizance of the validity of such vyava-
saya, it would not be possible to account for the doubt
which an inexperienced person feels regarding the vali-
dity of such vyavasaya. So, in such cases, the validity
of the vyavasaya "this is silver" should be ascertained
through the practical result to which it leads.- If the
voluntary decision and activity following such vyava-
saya should turn out to be fruitful and if the knower
should actually find himself in a position to get the silver
which he wanted, such vyavasaya (cognition) is recog-
nized to be valid. The process of inference through
which one's mind may pass in such cases is usually put
in this form: "This cognition is valid, because it leads
to a fruitful effort; any cognition that leads to a fruit-
ful effort is valid, as another valid cognition already
realized to be such in experience, (idam jndnam
prama', saphalapravrttijanakatvat; yadyat saphala-
CH. i] PERCEPTION 133
pravrttijanakam tat jnanam prama; yathti praman-
taram). It should be borne in mind, in this connection,
that causing fruitful effort is, according to Nyaya the
ground of inferring validity, while validity itself con-
sists in the cognition in question cognizing a thing as
possessing an attribute which it really has. In that the
Naiyayikas make the ascertainment of the truth of a
cognition 'dependent upon its agreement with its expec-
ted workings or, in other words, with the consequences
which are expected to arise from it in the experience of
the active subject, their view would appear to be closely
similar to that of the modern pragmatist. However,
they do not lose sight of the fact that pragmatism is
only a method of ascertaining truth, that this method
itself presupposes truth whose nature has to be explain-
ed independently of agreement with practical workings
and that, if the truth presupposed by the pragmatic
argument were itself to be ascertained pragmatically,
through inference, the fault of regressus ad infinitum
would inevitably follow. Having due regard to such
difficulties, the KTaiyayikas define truth as consisting in
correspondence with reality and thus combine their
pragmatic theory with a theory which has much in
common with what is known as the correspondence
notion of truth in western philosophical literature. The
Nyaya definition of validity (pramatva) makes it clear
that truth consists in correspondence with reality. The
Nayiyayikas also point out that, only in cases where a
cognition leads to effort in practical experience or it
happens to be pravaftaka, it becomes necessary to
ascertain the validity of such cognition in order to
134 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
ensure unfaltering effort (niskampapravrtti) ; and that,
on the first occasion of halting effort (sakampapra-
vrtti), it is not necessary that the cognition leading to
such effort should have been definitely made out to be
valid and it would do if such cognition should not have
been definitely ascertained to be invalid. It can be
easily seen from this that there is no room for any fear
of anavastha (endless regression) or atmdsraya (self-
dependence) in the pragmatic method of inferring
truth as employed by the Naiyayikas. In respect of
the question how validity and invalidity are brought
about, the Nyaya theory is that they are brought about
by certain extrinsic circumstances which, for the sake
of convenience, are called gunas (good features) and
dosas (defects) ; in other words the Nyaya theorists
maintain paratastva (extrinsicalit)>) in respect of the
utpatti (production) of validity and invalidity of a
cognition as well as in respect of their jnapti (know-
ledge). For instance the validity of a perception is
secured by the good feature (guna) consisting in the
adequacy of the contact between the sense-organ con-
cerned and its object; and its invalidity is the result of
defects such as distance and some disease affecting the
sense-organ.
It would be interesting to contrast the ITyaya
theory of truth and error with the epistemological
theories put forward by other schools of Indian philo-
sophy about truth and error. The Sarhkhyas maintain
that both validity and invalidity are intrinsically made
out in the sense that it is by virtue of the reflection or
proximity of the same cit (self-luminious conscious-
CH. i] PERCEPTION 135
ness), that the existence of a cognitive vftti and its
validity or invalidity are illuminated. PrSbhakaras
make no difference between vyavasdya and anuvyava-
saya and maintain that, in every cognition, the knower,
the known object, and knowledge itself, along with its
validity, are presented. They advocate the theory
of intrinsicality (svatastvapaksa), in so far as validity
(pramdtva) is concerned; and there is no question of
error (apramatva) in their theory, since they maintain
that all experiences are valid (anubhutih pramd). The
Bhattas contend that co-nil ion is to be inferred
through its effect, called jndtatd or prakatya, which
consists in what some of them describe as a temporary
luminosity (prakdsa) arising in known objects andi
referred to in propositions like 'this is known' (ayam
fndtah) ; and that in such inference the cognition which
has caused fndtatd, and its validity are presented. The
validity which is thus intrinsically made out may be
stultified by a subsequent sublating cognition ; and thus,
in the Bhatta theory, invalidity (apramdtva) is extrin-
sically made out. The Bhattas are, therefore, to be
taken to advocate svatastva in the case of validity and
paratastva in the case of invalidity. Murarimisra, who
does not go the whole hog either as a Prabhakara or as
a Bhatta, but who is undoubtedly a A amamsaka, recog-
nizes, like a Naiyayika, that a cognition (vyavasaya) is
cognized by its after-cognition (anuvyavasaia) , but
maintains, unlike a Naiyayika, that the validity of
vyavasaya is also presented in the same anuvyavasdya.
It will thus be seen that Murarimisra is an advocate
of the theory of the intrinsicality of validity (pram&-
136 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
tvam svato grhyate). The Bauddhas, on the other
hand, hold that all determinate knowledge (savikal-
$aka) f in so far as one is conscious of it, is erroneous
(aprama) and its apramdtva is intrinsically made out;
while, through inference, the validity (pramatva) of
indeterminate cognition (nirvikalpaka} is extrinsically
made out. The Buddhists thus advocate the theory of
extrinsicality (paratastvapaksa) in regard to validity
and intrinsicality (svatastvapaksa) in regard to invali-
dity. According to the Advaitins, the validity of a
cognition is intrinsically made out in the sense that the
witnessing inner spirit (saksicaitatoya), which illumi-
nates the valid cognitive vrtti, also illuminates its vali-
dity (prawatva); and the invalidity (apramdlva) of a
cognitive vrtti is inferred extrinsically, through the
resultant effort becoming futile. In order to evaluate
adequately the different theories of pramatva and
apramatva set forth here, it is necessary to note that
the Naiyayikas would answer in the affirmative, the
question 'Is error possible in realism? 1 and would
explain the possibility of error by showing how a real
substantive (visesya) and a real attribute (prakdra)
may be erroneously correlated when they are presented
in cognition and thus save realism itself from being
ruined by conceding the possibility of error. The
Prabhakara realists think that any concession of the
possibility of error (bhrama) would spell the ruin of
realism and insist that all experiences are valid
(anubhfltih pramd) and that the so-called bhramas
involve an element of non-discrimination (aviveka).
The Bhafta realists adopt the anyathdkhyati of Nyaya
CH.I] PERCEPTION 137
with suitable modifications ; and in order to preserve
realism effectively, they would make the knowledge of
cognition (jndna) dependent upon the knownness
(jndtatd) of the object (jneya) and thus provide an
effective counterblast to idealism which seeks to merge
all jneya in jndna. The Buddhist idealist rules out
truth and considers all determinate knowledge (savikal-
paka) erroneous. The advocates of the theory of
intrinsicality of validity (pramdnyasvatastvavddinah'),
more especially the Bhattas and the Advaitins, would
generally emphasise the ideas that, in a valid cognition,
the object is not stultified by a subsequent sublating
cognition and is not merely re-exhibited through a
reminiscent impression, the former of these two fea-
tures being stressed in particular; and this way of
looking at pramdtva would be quite in accord with the
view that aprawiatva is made out extrinsically and
pramatva intrinsically. It may also be noted, with
advantage, that, in the Nyaya theory, anuvyavasaya
(the subject-centred after-cognition) is regarded as
self-luminous (svaprakasa) in the sense that it reve; Is
itself along with the vyavasdya (the object-centred
cognition in which the knower and knowledge are not
presented) ; and that, in this respect, the Nyaya realist
seeks to combine in a way his objectivism with an
aspect of subjectivistic thought which is not incom-
patible with his realism. In this kind of compromise,
a danger is lurking, as students of Advaita may easily
see, and this danger consists in the manner in which
the Nyaya view lends itself to ^anuvyavasaya being
treated as a fragmentary appearance of the absolute
138 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
reality represented by the absolute, self-luminous
consciousness called cit.
An intelligent attempt to review synthetically all
the theories of bhrama known to Indian philosophy
will bring to light the fact that, in some manner or
other, a negative element is involved in every one of
the five khyativadas (theories explaining the nature of
bhrama). In the asatkhyati doctrine, the' negative
element is obvious; and in dtmakhydti doctrine, it is
obvious in so far as objective externality is concerned.
In the anyathakhyati view, the negative element is to be
found in the samsarya part or in the idea that one
reality is presented as another reality which it is not or
that a real substantive is presented as having a real
attribute which it has not; and in the akhydti doctrine,
one can easily detect the negative element in the idea of
non-discrimination (aviveka). The anirvacaniyakhyati
doctrine appears on the surface to eschew the negative
element from the conception of bhiama; but, in fact,
the negative element is replaced by relativity which
implies a negative element and transfers the negative
element from the side of object to the side of definite
predications (nirvacana) with reference to the object.
A careful investigation of the Advaitin's anirvacamya-
khyati, as compared with the other theories of bhrama^
would lead to the mystery of error being unravelled
through the disentanglement of negativity, which is the
inner core of bhrama. But this would not amount to
all the theories of bhrama being reduced to the level of
asatkhy&ti; for, it should be remembered that negativ-
ity is only the other side of relativity and an aspect of
CH. i] PERCEPTION 139
reality. If one might be permitted here to indulge for
a while in epigrammatising, one might well say that yes
(sat) and no (asat) are the fulcra of all epistemology
as they are of all metaphysics ; that yes and no are but
phases of the same reality; that all appearances are the
offspring of a cross between yes arid no\ that it will be
evident through the gemination of yes and no, that yes
is no and no is yes; and 'that error (bkrama) is the
antechamber of truth (pramd).
In subsections (f) and (g) of section 28 of the
text, valid experience (pramd) and its instrument are
each divided into four kinds. The term pramdna is
used in this section in the sense of the efficient special
cause or instrument (karana) of valid experience. The
word pramdna is sometimes used in the sense of valid
experience (pramd), as for instance in the proposition
'idam rajatam iti jfidnani pramd' (this is siver this is
valid experience). /In the word pramdna, the suffix
ana denotes an instrument in the former case; and in
the latter case, it denotes bhava (the meaning of the
root itself). The Indian materialists, called Carvakas,
recognize only one pramdna, viz., perception: the
Bauddhas and the Vaisesikas recognize two pramdnas*
viz., perception and inference; the Samkhyas recognize
three, viz., perception, inference and verbal testimony;
the Naiyayikas recognize four, viz., perception,
inference, assimilation and verbal testimony; the
Prabhakaras recognize five, viz., the above four pra-
mdnas and presumptive testimony (arthdpatti) ; the
Bhattas and Advaitins recognize these five pramdnas
and non-cognition (anupalabdhi) as the sixth pram&na;
140 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART n
and the Pauranikas recognise these six pramdnas and,
in addition, recognize necessary inclusion (sambhava)
and traditional hearsay (aitihya) as the seventh and
the eight prawi&na. The leading exponents of Indian
philosophy are unanimous in discarding the last two,
sambhava and aitihyajf the reason is obvious; the
former which enables one, for instance, to be sure of
fifty when hundred are guaranteed is nothing more
than a plain case of immediate inference; and the latter,
which consists in traditional hearsay like 'a spirit
dwells in this banyan tree* (iha vate yaksastisthati), is
no 'pramdna at all until it is verified, and when verified,
it comes under verbal testimony. The arguments
advanced by Carvakas to reject even anumana and the
grounds on which the Vaisesikas and Bauddhas would
bring upamana (comparison or assimilation) and sabda
(verbal testimony) under inference will be considered
under appropriate heads in chapters II, III and IV,
in/ra. The Naiyayikas would bring presumptive testi-
mony (art hap at ti} under anumdna (inference), and in
some cases, under sabda (verbal testimony). A refer-
ence to pages 44 to 47 supra would show how the
TTaiyayikas and Prabhakaras discard anupalabdhi
(non-cognition) as a distinct pramdna and how the
former reduce it to the level of a necessary acessory to
pratyaksa, in perceiving non-existence (abhava). From
chapter III it will be seen that the PTyaya view of
upamana is different in several respects from the
MImamsaka's view of that pramdna.
It would be useful to consider here how the chief
champions of arthdpatti, the Bhattas and Prabhakaras,
CH. i] PERCEPTION 141
maintain that it is a distinct pramdna and should not be
brought under anumdna or sabda and on what grounds
the Naiyayikas refuse to recognize it as a distinct
prdmana. According to the Bhattas, a knowledge of
some fact which is unaccountable otherwise than by
presumptively granting another fact is the instrument
in the case of arthdpatti and the knowledge presump-
tively arrived at of the explanatory fact is the resultant
cognition (upapdd^ajndnam karanam, upapadakajfidnam
phalam). For instance, Devadatta is alive and not
present in his house; this fact has to be accounted for
(upafddya), and cannot be accounted for otherwise
than by presumptively granting that he must be present
in some place outside his housd[bahissadbhdvakalfa<nam
vind nopapadyate). In the Bhatta view, the etymology
of the word arthdpatti should be explained in two ways
according as the word is taken in thesenseof thejnstru-
mental cognition- (karanibhutajndna) or resultant
QOgftitiQrTl^halibhutajndna). In the former cae y
HuT~~woFd is to be explained as denoting the
knowledge of the fact which has to be accounted
for and is otherwise unaccountable the knowledge
through which the needed explanatory fact is presump-
tively arrived at (arthasya upapddakasya kalpand
yasydh anyathdnupapannasya upapddyasya pratitehsd).
In the latter case, the word denotes the presumptive
knowledge of the required explanatory circumstance
(arthasya upapddakasya kalpand). The Bhattas define
arthdpatti to be a pramdna which consists in such a
conflict between two valid cognitions, of which one
takes a general form and the other takes a specific form
142 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
of a conflicting character, as necessarily leads to the
presumptive knowledge of a fact which removes the
conflict. One of the stock examples given by them
may be set forth thus: It is known for certain that
Caitra is alive; he must be present in some
particular place; he is not present in his house;
so, he is presumably present elsewhere. That
Caitra is alive and present in some particular
place is an established fact which is presented in the
valid cognition taking a general form (sadhdrana-
pramdna). That he is not present in his house is also
an established fact which is presented in the valid
cognition taking a specific form (asddhdranapramdna).
The conflict between these two pramdnas is not of the
nature of the irreconcilable conflict which one notices
between two contradictories; but it is of the nature of
the conflict between a general affirmation and specific
exclusion or between a general rule and an exception
(sdmdnya and visesa). The Naiyayikas contend that, in
such cases, there is no real conflict at all since both the
general affirmation and the specific exclusion may be
true. The Bhattas point out in reply that conflict need
not always be thoroughgoing as in the case of two con-
tradictories, and that partial conflict is quite conceiv-
able. In instances like the one cited above, there is real
conflict, though of a partial nature and there is a stage
in the process of thought, at which the validity of the
general affirmation is about to be completely imperilled.
Caitra is alive and must be present somewhere ; he is
not present in his house; between this stage in thought
and the final stage of presuming Caitra's presence out-
CH. i] PERCEPTION 143
side his house, the truth of the pre-established fact of
his being alive stands imperilled; thus, just at this
intervening stage, there is the possibility of the know-
ledge that Caitra is alive being falsified; and the
knower's conviction that this knowledge is true induces
him to presume that Caitra is present outside his house
and to prevent the possibility of falsification from
becoming actualised. The Bhattas maintain in this
manner that arthdpatti, as an instrument of valid cog-
nition, is represented by a kind of conflict between a
sddhdranapramdna and asddhdranapramdna (a valid
cognition in the form of a general affirmation and a
valid cognition in the form of a specific denial or
exclusion), and that the resultant prama arising from
a consciousness of such a conflict is a presumptive type
of knowledge. If the essential element in arthdpatti is
that a certain fact like Caitra's being alive and n0t
being present in his house is unaccountable without
presuming another fact like Caitra's being outside his
house, could not arthdpatti be reduced to inference
based on negative concomitance (vyatirekyanumaaa) ?
This is what the IsTaiyayikas ask. To get over this
difficulty and to prevent arthdpatti being reduced to
anumarta, the Prabhakaras urge that, in the example
above referred to, it is not the possible falsification of
the knowledge of Caitra being alive that constitutes the
pramdna called arthdpatti ; but it is the doubt regarding
Caitra being alive (fivanasamsaya), which arises from
the conflict indicated above, that serves as the means of
the resultant cognition which consists in the presump-
tive knowledge of Caitra being outside his house
144 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART IB
(bahissattvakalpana) . While the strong point in the
Prabhakara view of arthapatti is that by treating
doubt as the means of presumption, the pramana in
question is redeemed from the grip of anumana, the
weak spot in that view is that it exalts doubt to the
rank of a pramana', but the Prabhakaras, who hold that
all experience is valid, w r ould be quite willing to take
this criticism as a compliment. The Bhattas meet the
difficulty raised by the Naiyayikas, by pointing out that
the fundamental element in the mental process involved
in arthapatti is presumption through negative concomi-
tance (vyatirekavydpti) while the fundamental element
in the mental process called anumdna is subsumption
under positive concomitance (anvayavyapti) ; and that
presumptive knowledge is cognition of a distinct t>pe
belonging more to the side of imagination than to
inference belonging more to the sphere of hypothesis
than to the sphere of inferentially established thesis,
and it is articulated through propositions like 'I pre-
sume* and not through propositions like 'I infer*. The
Bhattas do not approve of the way in which the
Prabhakaras have exalted doubt in this connection to
the rank of a pramana. It is also pointed out by the
Bhattas that there are certain cases of presumptive
knowledge which do not admit of being reduced to
inference. For instance, Devadatta is known to be
present in the third house from mine ; it is presumed
that he is not present in any other house \ this presump-
tive knowledge refuses to be reduced to inference; it
would not be a sound argument to say that any place
other than the third house from mine is not a place
CH.I] PERCEPTION 145
Devadatta is, on tha ground that such a place happens
to be different from the third 5 house from mine and on
the analogy of the second house from mine; for with
equal force it might be argued that any place other
than the three houses which have come within the scope
of my observation is the place where Devadatta is pre-
sent, on the ground that such a place is different from
the two houses adjacent to the third house in which he
is present and on the analogy of that third house. The
Naiyayikas would, however, explain their attitude in
the matter by pointing out that, where one has to rely
exclusively on negative concomitance (vyattrekavyapii)
one's mind has to pass inevitably through a stage ol
positive concomitance (anvayavyapti) before it arrives
at the resultant cognition; that presumptive knowledge
(kalpatoa) is really the anticipatory forestalling by the
imaginative side of one's mind of what its somewhat
slower ratiocinative side arrives at through inference;
and that such foreshadowings through negative con-
comitance (vyaiirekavyapti) may well be brought
under anumana as a distinct variety of it and need not
be exalted to the rank of a distinct pram&na. It should
be remembered in this connection that the Bhattas*
maintain that what the Naiyayikas would treat as in-
ference based exclusively on negative examples and
negative concomitance {kevalavyatirekyanum&na) is.
realty no inference at all and demands a distinct place
as pramana, since it lacks the essential feature of
inference vie., direct subsumption to positive con..
comitance. The Bhattas realize the danger that this
10
146 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
way of merging vyatirekin in artttdpatti may lead to the
entire province of anumana being swallowed up by the
latter; and this fear they remove, by drawing attention
to the fact that the inference of fire in a mountain from
Smoke, for instance, through the concomitance of fire
and smoke in all observed cases, may be reduced to
arthapatti, and that the universal concomitance of all
smokes and all fires, including the few observed and
*nany unobserved cases, is a clear case of inference
-which cannot be accounted for by any pramana other
4han anumana. The Bhattas speak of two kinds of
vrthdpatti, srut&rth&palti and drstarth&patti, according
as the upapadya (the fact requiring explanation) is
made out through perception or through verbal
testimony.
In section 28 of the text, four kinds of pramanas
are referred toby Annambhatta. A pratnanais a karana
of a valid cognition (prama). The concept of karana
has to be elucidated. The author proceeds to define
karana in section 29 (a) and this leads on to a detailed
Consideration of the Nyaya view of causation.
29
T (a) Karana (efficient
or instrumental cause) is a
special cause.
(b) The invariable antece-
dent of an effect is its cause.
(c) -An effect is the coun-
ter-correlative of its antecedent
non-existence.
CH. i] PERCEPTION 147
(</) Cause is of three
kinds, the three varieties being
inherent cause, non-inherent
cause, and occasioning cause.
(e) That is called inherent
cause, in which the effect inheres
when it is produced. For in-
stance, threads are the inherent
cause of a cloth, and a cloth
of its colour and such other
qualities.
(/)_That is called non-
inherent cause, which serves
as a cause, while co-inhering
with its effect, or with the
inherent cause of its effect. For
instance, contact between
threads is the non-inherent
cause of cloth; and the colour
of the threads is the non-inher-
ent cause of the colour of the
cloth.
(9) Occasioning cause is
a cause not coining under either
of the above-mentioned kinds.
For instance, the shuttle, the
loom and such other things are
the occasioning causes of cloth.
(h) Of these three varie-
ties of causes, only that is called
148 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PAfcT iti
an efficient or instrumental cause
(karana), which operates as
special cause.
Annambhatta's definition of karana uses the
phrase asftdharanakGrana. The terms sadharawa
(general) and asQdharana (special) are vague and
have to be interpreted in relation to the context in
which they are used. In the present context, sadharana-
karana should be understood as a cause which is believed
to be the common cause of all the conceivable effects
in the world; and in this sense, according to the Nyaya
theorists, God, time, space and such other things are
general or common causes. Asddharanakarana should
be understood as a cause which is not common to all
the effects but is the special cause of particular effects
or classes of effects; and in this sense, the component
parts of a pot called kapala (potsherd), the potter's
stick and such other antecedents of a pot are its special
causes. The Naiyayikas of the older school would
define a karana as a special and mediate cause (asadha-
ranakarana), its mediacy consisting in its causal opera-
tion depending upon the co-operation of its intermedi-
ate effect in producing its final result. The intermediate
factor which a karana causes and which, in its turn,
co-operates with the karana in producing the final result
is technically called vyapara. The term vyapara, in
this restricted sense, should not be confounded with
the same term used in the general sense of activity.
In the restricted sense of the intermediate accessory
of a karana, a vyapara is defined in Sanskrit
in this way tajjanyah tajf&nyajanakasca vyaparah*
CH, i] PERCEPTION J49
(A vydfdra is caused by a karqnp, and in associa-
tion with it, causes its fin^l effect). The full defini-
tion of a karana, according to the older Naiyayi-
kas, is this: vyapdravat asddhdranakdranam karanam.
Annambhatta considers it expedient to adopt this defi-
nition. A potter's stick (danda) is karana in the sense
that he uses it in revolving his wheel and it causes the
pot through the rotation of the wheel (cakrabhramana).
A sense-organ is pramdJiarana in the sense that in asso-
ciation with its intermediate vydpdra, which consists in
its relation with the object (sannikarsa), it produces a
valid perception (pratyaksaprama). The Navyanaiya-
yikas are not in favour of this definition of karana.
They would define it as a cause which is felt to be most
necessary for having the effect, or for want of which
it is believed that the effect is not produced though all
the other causes are duly .present (phaldyoga-
vyavacchinnaW kdranam karanaw). Understood in this
way, a potter's stick may be looked upon as karana;
and likewise the rotation of the potter's wheel or even
the contact between the component parts of a pot; in
other words, according as the view-point varies, one
may refer to an instrument or to its intermediate func-
tion or even to asamav&yikdrana as karana. The view
of the later Naiyayikas thus agrees with that of the
Vaiydkaranas in respect of 'fyaranatva, the Paninlyan
conception of a karana being that it is most efficient of
all the causes (sddhakatamam karanam).
The Nyaya theorists define a cause (karana) as an
invariable, immediate and indispensable antecedent of
an effect. In Sanskrit, the full definition of a karana
150 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
is set forth thus: MryaniyatGvyavahitapftrvavrtrt
ananyathasiddham ca karanam. This definition insists
upon three conditions being satisfied before an antece-
dent and a consequent could be connected as cause and
effect. The antecedent should immediately precede the
consequent; the two should be invariably co-existent
with each other; and the antecedent in question should
not be made out to be otherwise than indispensable.
Mere co-existence or even invariable co-existence, as
in the case of a pot and threads which may be found in
the same place, or of earthness (prthivitva) and smell,
is not causality. Immediate sequence is one of the
essential elements in causality. The adjunct ananyaiha-
sfddha, introduced in the definition of a cause, literally
means 'not made out to be otherwise t^an indispen-
sable*. Anyatha means otherwise] siddha means
made out; otherwise, in the context of causation,
means other-wise than indispensable; ananyathasiddha r
as an adjunct to an antecedent factor, thus means 'not
made out to be otherwise than indispensable* or 'not
made out to be such as one can do without*. This use
of the word anyathasiddha should not be confounded
with its use as an adjunct with reference to the result
kept in view (prayojana). In phrases like ananyatha-
siddham prayojanatn, the result kept in view is
described as something which cannot be accomplished
otherwise than by particular means. With reference to
a cause, ananyathfisiddha means, as already explained,
an antecedent which is not made out to be otherwise
than indispensable. A may be seen to be an invariable
antecedent of B; still, one may be justified in thinking-
CH.I] PERCEPTION 151
that it is not indispensable ; in that case, A should not
be regarded as cause of B. The Naiyayikas have made
an attempt to classify all the conceivable varieties of
dispensable antecedents (anyathasiddha) and usually
recognize five classes of dispensable antecedents. A
thing is made out to be invariable antecedent, only a&
determined by a delimiting adjunct; for instance^
thread (tantu) is an invariable antecedent of cloth,
under the aspect of threadness (tantutva) ; this delimit-
ing adjunct, though it finds a place in a definite concep-
tion of the causality referred to, does not participate in
the creative process involved in such causality and is
therefore felt to be dispensable in the sense that the
causal process does not depend upon it; all such de-
limiting adjuncts of causeness (karanatavacchedaka)
form the first class of anyathasiddha. Invariable
sequence between an antecedent and a consequent is
generally made out through a knowledge of invariable
concomitance between these two factors and between
their negations in other words, through a knowledge
of anvaya and vtfatireka; the colour of thread may be
made out to be an invariable antecedent of cloth ; but in
this case, the anvaya and vyatireka, with reference to
the colour of thread and cloth, cannot be made out
independently of the invariable concomitance between
thread and cloth on the positive and negative sides; the
colour of thread is therefore anyathasiddha with
reference to cloth and is typical of the second class of
dispensable antecedents. The third class of dispensable
antecedents is represented by ether (dkdsa) in relation
to a cloth; in this case, ether being eternal,, it max be:
152 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
easily shown to precede every effect ; but it has to be
conceived of as cause through the delimiting Adjunct
ctherness (akafatva), which involves causal relation
with sound; a thing which cannot be specifically thought
of except as the cause of a certain effect may well
be imagined to be a tiling whose causal efficacy is com-
pletely pre-occupied in the direction of that effect and is
410 longer available in any other direction; and the
feeling, therefore, in the case of akasa, is that it may
snay be dispensed with in producing a cloth. The
fourth variety of anyathdsiddha is represented by
instances like the weaver's father with reference to a
cloth woven by his son ; only as the weaver's father, he
is made out to be the invariable antecedent of the cloth,
and not in his own right; and the feeling in that case
is that one can do without the weaver's father in ac-
counting for the production of a cloth. The fifth
variety is represented by instances like an ass; it may
so happen that in the case of an individual cloth, a
certain ass precedes it; the particular ass necessarily
turns out to be the invariable antecedent of the parti-
cular cloth; but it is felt that certain antecedents, other
than the ass, which are known to be quite adequate to
account for the production of similar cloths, must be
adequate in the case also of the particular cloth under
reference; and so, the ass, in that case, is anyathasiddha.
Annambhatfca, following Gangesopadhyaya, would
combine the first two varieties into one, and likewise
the third and fourth varieties, and would thus recognise
only three classes of dispensable antecedents. In fact,
later Naiy^yikaa show that all these five varieties inay
OH. i] PERCEPTION
be brought under the fifth variety; the principle
amderlv ing the fifth variety may be stated thus; while
other invariable antecedents are made out to be quite
necessary and adequate for producing similar effect
IK I :i ii.^tothe same plass, or to be more accurate,
while invariable antecedents of a relatively simpler type
are made put to be quite necessary and adequate for
pnK'u.iii;; such effects, in the case also of the effect in
question, an invariable antecedent, which is not one of
such antecedents felt to be necessary in the case of
similar effects belonging to the same class, and which
is less simple than such antecedents in respect of form
(sarlra) or thought (upasthiti) or relation (samban-
dha) as the case may be, should be eliminated as a*
dispensable antecedent (anyathasiddha) ; this principle
holds good in all the five varieties of anyathasiddha.
Thus all the five varieties may be brought under the
comprehensive formula that invariable antecedents of a
simpler type being quite adequate to account for the
effect under reference, another antecedent, though in-
variable, has to be discarded as a dispensable antecedent
(anyathasiddha) . This formula is expressed in thi$
way in Nyaya literature " laghuniyatapurvavartinaiva
karyasqmbhave tadbhinnam anyathasiddham, " The
adjunct anatiyathdsiddha in the definition of a cause is
intended to eliminate all such antecedents as one can
reasonably feel one may well do without. After
introducing the qualification 'not made out to be
otherwise than indispensable* (anayathasiddha), it has
to be considered whether the adjunct 'invariable'
(niyata) is accessary. It would appear that most of
154 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
the antecedents which are not invariably concomitant
with the consequents in question can easily be eliminated
as dispensable antecedents; for instance, an ass is
neither an invariable nor an indispensable antecedent of
a certain cloth. However, when the whole species of
effects represented by cloth is sought to be connected
as effect with some species as cause, the general
formula of anyathdsiddha does not hold good ; for, one
can never say that the antecedents recognized as causing
another species of effects, like a jar, would be adequate
to produce the species under reference, viz., cloth; and
in such cases, the only way in which accidental antece-
dents like an ass can be eliminated would be through
the adjunct 'invariable' (niyata).
The conception of a karya or an effect involves,
according to the Nyaya theory of causation, the idea
that the effect is invariably preceded by its antecedent
non-existence. To say that a jar is produced means r
in the Nya>a theory, that it is created for the first time
and that it never existed before. Consistently with the
creationistic view of causation (arambhavada\ Annam-
bhatta defines an effect as the counter-correlative of
antecedent non-existence. In this connection students are
advised to consider again the remarks about pragabh&va
in pages 37 to 40, part III, supra. Positive product
(bhavakarya) has three kinds of causes; the first being
of the nature of component parts or of the nature of the
substratum in which the effectuated quality or activity
inheres and called 'inherent cause' (samav&yikarana) ;
the second being of the nature of the Conjunction of
parts producing the whole or of the nature of the
CH. i] PERCEPTION 155-
quality or activity inhering in the component parts
or a substratum and producing a corresponding quality
in the whole or disjunction in the same substratum, and
called non-inherent cause (asamav&yikdrana) ; and the
third being of the nature of agent and such other
causes, not falling under either of the first two heads,
and being called occasioning cause (toinrittaltararia). It
would be a mistake to suppose that all the nimittas are
less important than the other two varieties. For, karla
or the intelligent agent, in whose absence the other
causes become ineffectual, is technically a nimitta, but is,
in a sense, the most important of all the varieties of
causes.
That is a samavayikarano, in which the effect
inheres as it comes into being. The component parts
(avayavah), like threads, thus form the inherent cause
of a composite substance (avayavin}, like a cloth; and
likewise a substance, of the quality or activity which is
produced in it. To secure precision and avoid confu-
sion, the delimiting adjuncts of effectness (kdryatd)
and causeness (karanata') karyaiavacchedakadharma
and kfiranatavacchedakadharma should be specified in
defining the relation of cause and effect in every case,
as also the relations which determine the co-existence
of the antecedent and the consequent in question
kdryatuvacchedakasambandha and karanatavacchedaka-
sambandha. Causality involves invariable co-existence
between an antecedent and a consequent; their
co-existence (sam&nddhikaranya) is their presence in
the same place; when they are present in the same place
they should each be connected with the common sub-
156 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
stratum through a relation ; the relation which connects
the antecedent with the common substratum (samdna-
dhikarana) is known as the determinating relation of
causeness (karanatavacchedakasambyndha); and the
relation which connects the consequent with the same
substratum is called the determining relation of effect-
ness (karyatavacchedattasambandha). The exponents
of the Nyaya-Vaisesika doctrine of causation contend
that, by a careful observation of the invariable con-
comitance between an antecedent and a consequent, as
determined by particular delimiting adjuncts and rela-
tions, as also of the invariable concomitance between
the negations of such antecedent and consequent of
anvayasahacdra and vyatireTtasahacdrathe, causal re-
lation in every case can be accurately defined so as to
obviate every conceivable hitch. In the case of a
samavayikurana, like threads in relation to a cloth
(tant avaJi patasya), the simplest and the most accurate
way in which the causal relation may be defined is this:
'the causeness delimited by thrcadness and by the rela-
tion of identity (tantulvdvacchinnd tadqtmyasam-
bandhdvacchinnd ca kdranata) is correlated to the
cffcchu'ss delimited by clothness and by the relation of
inherence (patatvavacchinnasaniavayasQinbandhavac-
chinnakaryatanirupita). It will be seen here that, in
every case of samavayikarana, the simplest way of
defining the cainal relation (karyakaranatyiava) would
be by referring to the cause itself as the common subs-
tratum (samanadhikarana) in which the antecedent and
the consequent under reference co-eaist. In Nyaya
definitions pf cau&ality, the common substratum kept
CH. i] PERCEPTION 157
in view is generally suppressed; and the student of
Nyaya has to find it out first before trying to interpret
such definitions. It should be noted here that the
Nyaya conception of samavayikorana, while it includes
what the Vcdantins call the upadanakarana (material
cause), is not exactly parallel to it ; because, upadana
(material cause) is the substance which enters into the
make-up of its product and this is true, in the Ny&ya
theory, only in the case of the component parts and
their composite product, and not in the case of a sub-
stance and the quality or activity arising in it, the cause
and effect in the latter case representing fundamentally
different categories. It should also be observed here
that the phrase inherent cause, samavayikdrana, is
somewhat misleading, in that it may lead one to
suppose wrongly that it is the cause that inheres in the
effect but the fact is thr.t the phrase here means 'a
cause which is capable of producing an effect that
inheres in it*. It may appear at first view that the
phrase 'intimate cause* is a better equivalent ; but it
turns out to be more misleading when the correspond-
ing phrase non- intimate cause comes to be used as
the equivalent of asamavdyikarana, as may be seen
presently from the next para.
The phrase cu/imar Jv/ foJrii>:a means a cause which,
under no circumstance whatever, could be treated as a
samavayikarana (inherent cause). Substances only
can be treated as samav&yik&rana and they can never
be treated as asamav&yikfirana. Qualities and
activities only can be treated as asamavayjk&rana.
158 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
While the two kinds of causes inherent cause
(samavdyi) and non-inherent cause (asamavdyi) are
absolutely exclusive of each other, the third kind viz.,
.occasioning cause (nimittakdrana) includes causal
factors which, while being the nimitta of certain effects
anay well ba the inherent or non-inherent causes of
certain other effects, as the case may be. The phrase
non-inherent cause used as the equivalent of asama-
vdyikdrana should not be taken to mean that the cause
referred to does not inhere in any substratum, since
every non-inherent cause, on the contrary, inheres
somewhere; but this phrase should be understood to
stand for, like its Sanskrit equivalent, a cause which,
under no circumstance whatever, could be treated as
inherent cause. In defining the causality of a non-in-
herent cause, the inherent cause of the effect in ques-
tion should be kept in view as the common substratum
(samdnddhikarana), inherence (samavaya) should be
referred to as the relation determining the presence of
the effect in question in the common substratum
(kdryatdvacchcdakasambandha), and either inherence
or co-inherence (samavdya or ekartha-sanuwaya)
should be referred to as the relation determining the
presence of the cause in question in the common subs-
tratum (kdranatdvacchedakasantbandha). The con-
junction of threads (tantusarhyoga) is the non-in-
herent cause of cloth; and in that case, the common
substratum is thread; the relation connecting cloth
with such substratum is inherence; and likewise, the
relation connecting the conjunction of threads with such
substratum is inherence; this is one type ofnon-in-
OH. i] PERCEPTION 159
4ierent cause. Another type of non-inherent cause is to
<be found in the colour of the threads forming the com-
ponent parts of a cloth ; in this case, the colour of the
threads is the non-inherent cause of the colour of the
.cloth; the common substratum is the cloth; the relation
connecting the effect with such substratum is inherence
and the relation connecting the cause with it is co-
inherence. It should be remembered here that, accord-
ing to the Nyaya-Vaiseika system, the special qualities
>(visesagunah) of soul (atman) should not be treated
as non-inherent cause in the case of any effect, though
the general definition of such cause holds good in the
-case of knowledge in relation to desire, of desire in
relation to voluntary decision or effort (yatna) and in
such other cases. The chief reason why the special
qualities of soul should not be treated as non-inherent
cause in the case of any, effect is that, in all such cases,
it would be simpler to treat the contact between the soul
.and the mind (dtmamanassamyoga) as non-inherent
cause and in the case of any effect, more than one non-
inherentcause need not be recognized. In view of this, in
the general definition of non-inherent cause given in the
text, it is necessary to introduce the qualification that
such cause is different from the special qualities of soul
{ &tmavise$agunabhinnam ) .
The atomic hypothesis of the Nyaya-Vaieika
system and the creationistic view of oausation main-
tained in that system are closely bound up with each
other. The Nyaya-Vaisesika theory of causation is
known as aratnbhavddd (creationism) as distinguished
from the parindtnavdda (evolutionistic view of causa*
160 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
tion) of the Samkbyas. In the Nyaya- Vaisesika
system, 'to come into being' means 'to spring up at a
certain point of time and not to have existed before';
for this reason, the Nyaya theory of causation is
known as asatkdryavdda. The expression asatkdrya-
vdda, according to Naiyayikas, means 'the view that
every effect is invariably preceded by its antecedent
non-existence' and it should not be understood to imply
that an effect arises out of nothing. On the contrary,
according to the Nyaya theory, a positive product
(bhdvakdrya) is invariably preceded by a causal
machinery, the full complement of which includes
several positive antecedents and two negative antece-
dents,^., the antecedent negation of the effect in ques-
tion (kdryaprdgabhdva) and the absence of counter-
acting causes (fratibandhakdblidva}. The Naiyayikas
are anxious to repudiate the suggestion that their
theory of asatkdryavdda implies that an effect may
arise out of nothing; and they point out that antece-
dent negation (prdgabhdva) would be inconceivable
without thinking of a suitable anuyogin (correlated
substratum ) and pratiyogin ( counter-correlative ) ,
and that in the case of prdgabhdva, as in the case
of annihilattve negation (dhvamsa), while the
effect itself represents the latter, the inherent cause
(sawav&yikdrana) represents the former. Invariable
concomitance between an antecedent and a consequent
(nfyataptirvavartitva) and absence of such circum-
stances as would justify the idea that the antecedent in
question is not indispensable (ananyathdsiddhatva)
these are the two essential elements in the Nyaya con-
CH. i] PERCEPTION 161
cept of causality. The former, according to the
Naiyayikas, is generally made out through a know-
ledge of the invariable sequence between two positive
factors (anvayasahacara) and of the invariable con-
comitance between the negations of those two factors
(vyatirekasahacdra). The formula for anvayasaha~
cdra is usually stated thus: "Whenever C precedes, E
follows"; and that for vyatircksahacara thus;
"Whenever C does not precede, E does not follow/*
The latter formula is intended to serve as a corrective
to the former and effectively eliminates the mistake
which may arise through an exclusive adoption of the
former formula and which consists in mere co-exist*-
ence or sequence being taken for causality. There are
certain cases where it is not possible to make out
negative concomitance (vyatirckasahacara); for ins-
tance, where a cause, like God, is ex hypothesi present
everywhere and the invariable antecedent of every
conceivable effect, the negative formula of vyatireka
cannot possibly apply. In such cases, the affirmative
formula of anvaya alone is available and depended
upon. In all other cases, the Naiyayikas insist that
causality should be determined through an application
of both the formulas of anvaya and vyatireka. Where
these two formulas are applied to instances falling 1
within the range of direct observation (fratya'ksa) and
as a result causality is made out, it is said to be made
out through praiyaksa. Students of Western logic, who
are familiar with the experimental methods formulated
by Mill for determining causal relations, may be able to
162 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
(find in the combination of the Nyftya formulas of
G#vaya and vyatireka a parallel to what is known as the
/* jfil method af agreement and difference. The Naiya-
ylfcas are keenly alive of the difficulties in determining
causality, which are brought about by cases of plurality
of causes and intermixture of effects. They contend
that, strictly speaking, there can be no plurality of
causes or intermixture of effects. If fire appears to be
the effect of straw (trna), or tinder-sticks (arvni), or
lens (wow), the fact is that the same effect is not pro-
duced from these three causes and the effect in each
case has different properties. Such differences in effects
may be apparent in certain cases and may be subtle and
iiave to be noted with care in others. In a similar way,
Che effects of different causes may be mixed up; and in
such cases, these effects should be carefully distinguish-
ed. The Naiyayikas are never tired of reminding
themselves and others of the need for carefully observ-
ing and making out the relation of invariable concomit-
ance between particular classes of antecedents and
^consequents, as also between their negations. This
aaeed is embodied in Udayana's dictum "Concerning
4ie truth about the affirmative and the negative con-
comitance, one should he particularly careful" (tattve
fyRtntwatQ bhavyam wvayavyatire&ayoli). It is con-
tended by the JTaiyayikas that our experience of several
things as existing only during a particular period of
time and never existing before that time in other
words, as being kadacitka in their nature cannot be
satisfactorily explained except by assuming causal rela-
tion between such things and certain antecedents. The
CH. i] PERCEPTION
causa) factors also-r-gpme pf them at least should
themselves be occasional (kaddcitka) and contingent,
for the reason that, otherwise, the prior non-existence
of the effects in question cannot be accounted for.
This would mean that a beginningless chain of causes
and effects should be admitted ; and the Naiyayikas do
not hesitate to say that the stream of causes and effects
is beginningless (karyakaranapravaho'nadih), for the
simple reason that the starting point, if any, of the
causal stream lies far beyond human ken.
30
T (a) Of those prainanas,
perceptive instrument (prat-
yaksa) is the means of percep-
tion.
(&) Perception is the cogni-
tion which is produced through
sense-organ coming into relation
with an object. It is of two
kinds: indeterminate anddeter-
minate.
(c) Indeterminate percep-
tion is a cognition which docs
not involve any attribute or
adjunct (prakfra).
(d) Determinate perception
is cognition which involves an
attribute or adjunct. It is em-
bodied in propositions like
"This is E>itthtf\ Tbtf ii a
164 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
Brahmana", "This is black 9 ',
"This is a cook".
The definition of perceptive instrument (prat-
ya&sapram&na) is based on Gautama's sutra 1. 1. 4,
which runs thus : indriy&rthasannikarsotpannam
jnanam avyapadesyam avydbhicari vyavasayatma-
kam pratyaksam". This s&tra may be rendered
thus: "Perception is cognition which arises
through sense-organ coming into relation with object,
and which is non-verbal, unerring and of the nature of
^dubious knowledge". The Sutrakara is evidently
defining valid perception (pratyaksapramd) in order to
definitely indicate the nature of the instrument of valid
perception (pratyaksapramana). According to the
earlier interpretation of this sutra, as given in Vatsya-
yana's bhafya, the adjunct 'unerring' (avyabhicari)
excludes erroneous perception; and the adjunct 'indubi-
ous 1 (vyavasQyatwaka) excludes doubt. The adjunct
'non-verbal' (ovyapadesyd) in the sutra is understood in
various ways by different scholiasts. Some of the old
scholiasts take this adjunct to mean 'not coming within
the scope of expressions referring to objects' (sabda-
karmatdm dpannam na bhavati yat) ; and in this sense,
it differentiates perception as described by the expres-
sions referring to objects from perception as it arises,
the former having become objectified as prameya and
thus ceased to belong to the subjective sphere of pra-
mana (valid cognition). Some other Naiyayikas of an
early school would take the adjunct 'non-verbal'
(avyapdefya) in the sense of 'not being caused by word
CH. i] PERCEPTION 165
in association with sense-organ* (anubhayafa or
fabdaksobhayajabhinna) ; and, in this sense, it should
be understood as excluding cases where the meaning of
a word is made out through the perceptual observation
of the way in which an object is referred to by that
word, or in other words, cases where a word is first
made out to be significative of a certain object that is
actually being perceived by a sense-organ. In such
cases, they hold that the cognition in question should
be brought under verbal cognition (sfibda} and not
under perception. Another set of early Naiyayikas f
(like Jayantabhatta) would take avyapadesya in the
sense of asabda (non-verbal) and would explain its
purpose as consisting in saving determinate perception
(savikalpaka?) from being merged in verbal cognition
(sdbda) on the ground that the cognitive process
involved in such perception invariably results through
the operation of a sense-organ in association with the
recollection of a scheme of words with which the
knower happens to be familiar. Vacaspatimisra and
several others who follow him 'would take the word
avyapade&ya (non-verbal) and vyfivasay&tmaka
(definite and determinate) as referring to the two kinds
of perception viz., indeterminate (nirvikalpaka) and
determinate (savikalpaka). They maintain that the
former adjunct (avyapadesya) refutes the view of the
grammatical philosophers who refuse to recognize
nirvikalpaka and hold that knowledge is impossible
except though some language and no object is cognized
by itself and without being associated with the word
signifying it (Mi so'sti pratyayo loke yatra iabdo na
1<6& A PRIMER OF ItffclAtf LOGIC [PxfcT m
The latter adjunct (vy&vasaydtmaka) , they
further maintain, refutes the Buddhist doctrine that
indeterminate perception (r.irvikdpaka) is the only
genuine type of valid perception and that all determinate
cognitions (savikalpaka) are illusive. The last expla-
nation given by Vacaspatimisra and his followers is
generally accepted by later Naiyayikas and Gautama's
sfttra dealing with perception (I. 1.4) is believed 10
presuppose both the types of perception determinate
(savikalpaka) and indeterminate (nirvikalpaka).
What exactly is the nature of indeterminate pecep-
tiofc and how does it differ from determinate peception?
The answer suggested by Annambhatta's definitions of
nirvihalpaka and savikalpaka, which follow Gangesa's
view, may be explained in this way. In the first place,
it should be remembered that the Nyaya distinction of
erroneous cognition (bhrawa) and valid cognition
(pramft), which is intended to apply only to cognitions
leading to some activity (pravartaka), holds good only
in the case of determinate cognitions and cannot have
any reference to indeterminate cognitions. The relation
of object and subject (visayavisayibhQva) involved in
a determinate cognition is a definite complex consisting
of three correlated phases adjunctness (prakaratti)*
substantiveness (viSesyata) and relationness (samsar-
g&t&). In an indeterminate cognition, on the other
b&ftd, there is the relation of object and subject; and
while a thing, its attribute such as a generic feature
(//*) and their relation are presented in it, they are
not presented in a specific manner in their respective
forms as a qualified substantive (viscfya), as a qualify-
CH. i] PERCEPTION
ing attribute (vifesantf) a ! nd as a relation of a definite
type (samsarga). Such indeterminate cognitions hanre
only to be inferentially arrived at through determinate
cognitions, on the basis of the observed causal relation
between a cognition of a certain attribute (vifef^n^
jnana) and a complex cognition of a thing as having
that attribute (viSistajtitina). On this ground, the
determinate cognition of a jar, for instance, one cannot
possijly have without previously having an indeterminate
cognition in which the substance in question, its
generic attribute and even their relation are presented
in a vague and undifferentiated form. Indeterminate
cognitions are therefore said to be alindriya (beyond
the scope of any sense), while determinate cognitions
are generally perceived by mental perception (m&nasa*
pratyaksa) and presented in anuvyavas&ya. It may
also be noted that a nirvikalpaka can never be directly
expressed in a proposition and that every proposition*
according to Naiyayikas, embodies and conveys a deter-
minate cognition (samsargavagahijndnaor
The grammatical philosophers (fabdikas) as
already stated, refuse to recognize nirvikqdpoka. All
the otlier philosophers recognize the distinction between
nirvlkalpaka and savikabpaka in one form or other. In
the first place, the Buddhists hold that the nirvikalpako
is the only form of valid perception and it cognizes the
absolute, unrelated, momentary existence called svalak-
sana (the mere thinu-in-it$elf); while the determinate
cognitions (savikalpvka) arc illusive in that they
involve wholly fictitious fabrications (vikalp* of
168 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
fialpana), which usually take the forms of a name
i(n&ma), a generic attribute, (/dtf), a quality (guya),
an activity (kriya) and a substance (dravya). The
Ad vaitins hold that indeterminate cognition (nirvikal-
fiaka) may arise from propositions like 'This is that
Devadatta' (so'yam devadattah) and 'That thou art 1
(tat tvam asi); and that the absolute existence alone
(sanmatram), which is identical with Brahman, is pre-
sented in indeterminate cognitions (nirvikalpaka). The
Mimamsaka view of nfrvikalpaka is that it is an
indeterminate perception which consists in the direct
and simple awareness of an individual object (vyakti)
and its generic attribute (j&ti) which arises immediate-
ly after the sense-organ comes into relation with them;
and that it misses the definite feature of the jati as
being common to several individuals belonging to a
particular class and the specific character of the vyakt \
as being different from others i.e., the element of
anuvrtti in the former case and of vyavrtti in the latter
case. This is closely similar to the old Vaiseika view
of nirvikalpaka. Prasastapada describes indeterminate
perception as simple awareness (tilocanamatra) and
Kumarila, in his description of it, uses the same expres-
sion and compares it to the unverbalised dumb experi-
ence of a child or a dumb person. Indeterminate
perception is only to be inferred like any other cognition,
in the view of Bhattas; while it is presented in itself
along with the knower and the known object, as in the
case of other cognitions, according to the Prabhakaras.
The Vedantins of the Visisjadvaita school adopt the
Prabhakara view of indeterminate perception and main-
CH. i] PERCEPTION 169
tain that every cognition, however simple it may be,
involves a substantive, an attribute and their relation;
that both sdm&nya (generic attribute) and vie$a (the
individual vyakti) are presented in nirvikalpaka along
with difference in the form of the individual object
(vyaktisvarupa); and that, at the stage of nirvikalpafca,
the knower does not realize that the generic attribute pre-
sented in his knowledge is common to all the individuals
belonging to the same class and that these individuals
are different from the individuals belonging to a
different class, and he is not, therefore, in a position to
articulate his indeterminate perception through verbal
expression.
The Advaitic view of nirvikalpaka that the abso-
lute existent (SattaBrahman) is the only thing which
is presented in it and that the highest form of truth-
realisation which leads to final emancipation is a nirtn-
kalpaka is an inevitable development of the doctrine
of nirvikalpaka as adopted by the exponents of the
Nyaya-Vaisesika system. The Nyaya-Vaiseika realists
have shown how a permanent reality, and not a momen-
tary isolated 'this' (svalaksana or thing-in-itself) as in
the case of the Buddhist theory of nirvikalpaka, may be
presented in indeterminate perception; and it has thus
become easy for the Advaitins to push the Nyaya theory
of nirvikalpaka to its logical conclusion and to maintain
that the true nirvikalpaka is one in which Brahman, the
only absolute and permanent reality, is presented.
This 5s, indeed, one of the several instances in which
the Advaitic Monist effectively uses a weapon made in
170 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PAUT iu
the Nyaya forge against its maker himself to annihilate
his pluralistic universe. Jayantabhatta, an authorita-
tive exponent of Nyaya, observes in a significant
manner that the only way in which one may get out of
the mess which various Indian theorists have made of
the content of nirvikalpaka would be by adopting the
view that the same reality that is presented in savifcal-
paka is presented in the nirvikalpaka, the only difference
between them being that the former is invariably bound
up with a linguistic scheme or verbal image while the
latter is not and cannot be specifically articulated
through any verbal expression. The sub-joined extracts
from the Nyayamanj.iri (Viz. S. S. page 99)
deserve a careful consideration in this connection:
"Tasmad ya cva vastvatma savikalpasya gocarah ;
Sa eva nirvikalpasya Sabdollckhavivarjitah.
Kimatmako'saviti ccd yad yada pratibhasatc\
Vastupramitayascaiva prastavya na tit vadinah.
Kvacijjatih kvociddravyam kvacitkarma kvacid
gunah ,
Yadevasavikalpena tadev&nena grhyate.
Iha tabdaMisandhanwnatramabhyadhikam param"
The Nyaya-Vaiseika definition of pratyaksto
(sense-perception) generally imibts that sense-data
forra its essential feature and that it is invariably the
result of a special type of relation called s&ttnikarsa
between a sense and an object. This definition takes
into account only perceptual experiences which are pfo-
duted from certain causes and does not hold good in the
case of the eternal omniscience whidi is also called
CH, 1} PERCEPTION 171
and which is ascribed to God. Strictly speak-
ing, the etymology of the word fraiyaksa would sup-
port its application only to perceptual experiences
arising from the senses. However, usage has extended
the term to all cognitions which are characterised by
immediacy. God's omniscience has the highest degree
of immediacy conceivable. So, in order to cover nitya-
pratyafesa, also, perception is defined as a cognition
which does not arise through the instrumentality of
another cognition ; (jnanakaranakam jnanam prat-
yaksam). It should be remembered that, though a
determinate perception arises from an indeterminate
perception, the latter does not operate as karana
(efficient instrument).
It would be desirable to consider here whether per-
ception, in the sense in which it is used in the Nyaya*
Vaiesika system, may correctly be called intuition.
Without misapprehension, the term intuition may be
used with reference to perception (pratyaksa), only in
the sense that it possesses a comparatively greater degree
of immediacy, as compared with non-perceptual cogni-
tions. If intuition should be taken to exclude absolutely
mediacy of any kind whatever, the praiyaksa of the
Nyaya system, which arises through a special kind of
relation between an object and a sense-organ, cannot
be callel intuition. In the strict sense of the term
intuition, it may be proper to use it only with
reference to what is sometimes called pratibkd
or the innate Capacity of the mind to immediately
perceive certain things ; and it may also be appropriate
to describe the Advaitic realisation of the one absolute
172 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
reality as intuition, in view of the fact that it results
from the intuitive faculty of mind to perceive reality
-coming to have a full, free and efficient play after the
required preliminary discipline of studying and under-
standing (fravana), reflective thinking (manana) and
constant meditation (nididhyasana). In fact, in the
Nyaya system, all knowledge is mediate in a sense,
except the eternal knowledge ascribed to God, even
indeterminate perception depending upon the mediation
of a special kind of relation between sense-organ and
object ( indriyarthasannikarsa ) .
The Bha^ta MImamsakas adopt, for all practical
purposes, the Nyaya definition of perception and
would, like Naiyayikas, lay special stress on indri-
ysrthasannifcarsa. The Prabhakaras, on the other
hand, define perception as 'direct awareness* (sdksat
pratltih)', and according to them, even recollection*
inference and such other cognitions, usually considered
non-perceptual in their character, are really perceptual
on the subjective side, in so far as they themselves and
the knower are concerned (svSmie jnatramse ca),
though they are non-perceptual on the objective side,
in so far as their objects are concerned (visayatnse).
The Advaitic theory of perception rightly points out
that the Nyaya view gives undue prominence to indri-
ytirthasannikarsa and belittles the importance of the
element of immediacy which ought to be treated as the
essential element in pratyaksa. The Advaitins seek to
remedy this defect by treating sense-relation as an
antecedent necessary only for certain kinds of percep-
CH. i] PERCEPTION
tion and by insisting that immediacy consisting in
subject -object-unity is the essential feature of all per-
ceptual forms of experience, and not sense-relation.
Consistently with usage in language, ihe Advaitins dis-
tinguish the pratyaksatva (perceptuality) of a cogni-
tion from the pratyaksatva (perceivedness) of an
object. They describe cognition (jfiana) as pratyaksa
(perceptual experience), when it comes to be unified
for the time being with its object, in the sense that
consciousness as conditioned by cognition (pramana-
caitanya or vrttyavacchinnacaitanya} becomes equated
with consciousness as conditioned by object (visaya-
caitanya). In a similar way, they describe an object
(visaya) as pratyaksa (perceived), when the knower
(pramdtrcaitanya) becomes equated with object or
consciousness as conditioned by object (visayacaitanya)*
It maybe noticed here that the idea that immediacy in
the sense of subject-object-unity forms the essential
element in pratyaksa has turned out to be wholly foreign
to Nyaya realism, mainly because the relational scheme
on which the realistic edifice of Nyaya is erected con-
sists entirely of external relations, and because the
object-subject-relation (risaymisayibhtlru), in parti-
cular, is conceived of as being entirely external in its
character, chiefly with a view to keeping the dangerous
idealist always at a safe distance.
30 (*)
T The sense- relation (san-
nikarsa) which causes a percep-
tual cognition is of six kinds -
viz., contact, inherence in what
174 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART tn
has come into contact, inherence
in what is inherent in a thing
which has come in to contact,
inherence, inherence in an in-
herent thing and adjunct-sub-
stantive relation.
When a jar is perceived by
the sense of sight, the sense-
relation is 'contact'. When the
colour of a jar is seen, the sense-
relation is 'inherence in a thing
which has come into contact',
the jar, in that case, having
come into contact with the visual
sense and colour being connected
with the jar through the relation
of inherence. When colourness
(rtipatva) in the colour of a jar
is seen, the sense-relation is
'inherence in what is inherent in
a thing which has come into
contact'; for, in that case, the
jar has come into contact with
the visual sense, the colour of
the jar inheres in it and colour-
ness inheres in colour.
When sound is perceived by
the sense of hearing, 'inherence'
is the sense-relation; for, the
ether bound within the auricular
orifice is the auditory sense,
. t] PERCEPTION 175
sound is a quality of ether, and
the relation between a quality
and its substratum is inherence.
When soundness (sabdatvd) is
perceived by the auditory sense,
the sense-relation is 'inherence
in a thing which inheres'; for,
soundness inheres in sound
which inheres in the auditory
sense.
In the perception of non-
existence, the adjunct-substan-
tive-relation is the sense-relation ;
for in the case jf the visual per-
ception which takes the form
"The seat of the non-existence
of jar is floor", the 'non-exis-
tence of jar' is an adjunct to
the floor with which the visual
sense has come into contact.
Thus the cognition which
arises from one or the other of
these six sense-relations is per-
ception ; and sense-organ is its
efficient instrument (Tarawa),
Therefore, the senses constitute
the efficient instrt^nent of per-
ceptual experience (pratyakfa*
pram&na).
[THUS ENDS THE CHAPTER ON PERCEPTION] *
176 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
In the foregoing portion of the text, the scheme
of sannikarsa adopted by the Naiyayikas is set forth.
The term sannikarsa is used in a technical sense; it is
not a mere relation, nor is it exactly contact, for the
word 'contact' is generally taken to be equivalent to
samyoga. It would be correct to describe sannikarsa
as a special type sense-relation which determines and
constitutes the extent of the perceptive reach or range
of the sense-organs. In Nyaya literature, the term
sannikarsa is generally used in this technical sense.
The scheme of sannikarsa set forth above relates
to normal perception (laukikapralyaksa) and com-
prises normal sense-relations (laukikasannikarsa}.
The Nyaya-Vaisesika theory rcpii'dintf the nature and
constitution of the sense-organs (indriya) is already
set forth on pages 65, 66 and 68 supra. According to
the Naiyayikas, the visual sense (fafow/i), constituted
as it is by light, travels to the spot where the visible
objects happen to be and visualize them and it is there-
fore said to be prapyakarin; the remaining senses are
said be aprftyyakarin, in the sense that they do not
leave their place but, remaining where they are, they
perceive the objects which come within their reach.
Some early exponents of the Nyaya-Vaisesika system,
like Jayantabhajta and Srldhara, hold that all the
senses are pr&pyak&rins> in the sense that they function
with reference to objects within their reach, it being
immaterial whether a sense reaches an object or an
object reaches a sense. Samavdya (inherence) is
CH.I] PERCEPTION 177
recognized as a distinct type of sannikarsa in order to
account for the auditory perception of sound. The
Nyaya theory of the perception of sound (fabdaprrt*
yaksa) is already set forth and explained on pages 101
to 104 supra. The Nyaya view regarding the percep-
tion of non-existence is that, through the help of
effectual non-cognition (^iiyytihHpalaltilii), a sense-
organ perceives the non-existence of an object which
is perceptible to it. As a rule, a sense-organ which
perceives an object can also perceive its j&ti (generic
attribute) and its abhava (non-existence). The Nyaya
view regarding this matter is usually expressed in this
Sanskrit dictum "Yenendriyena yd vyaktih grhy^ie %
tannistha jatih tadabhavasca tenendriyenaiva grhyate".
It is necessary, in this connection again, to refer to
pages 45 and 46 su'fira. The relation of v\$e$ana-
visefyabhava, which is recognized as the sannikarfa
connecting non-existence with a bense-organ, is, in fact,
an indirect relation iiuvliin^ one or the other of the
other sannikarsas. For instance, in the visual percep-
tion of the non-existence of jar (ghat&bh&va) as
adjunct of the empty floor (bhutala), the visual sense
comes into contact (samyoga) with the empty floor
with which the non-existence of jar is connected as
adjunct ; so, the complete chain of sannikarsa, in this
case, is not mere vise$anata, but caksussamyuktavife-
$anata (being adjunct to a thing with which the visual
sense has come into contact).
In the case of iriner perception through the inner
>ense (antarindriya) called man as, it is necessary to
178 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
recognize three distinct sense-relations; viz., samyoga,
samyuktasamavaya and samyuktasamavetasamavdya, in
order to account respectively lor ihe mental perception
(mdnasapratyaksa) of the soul (atman), of the cogni-
tion in it and of cognitionness (jnauatra). In connec-
tion with the auditory perception of sound (fabda)
and soundness (fabdatva), it is necessary to iccognize
two distinct sense-relations : viz., samavaya and sawa-
vetaswnav&ya. The sense relation of visesanavisesya-
bhava is necessary to account for the perception of
non-existence. Would it be necessary to use the first
three sense-relations (samyoga etc.) in accounting for
external perception through the external senses other
than the auditory sense? No substance which does not
possess at least the minimum degree of mahattva
(largeness) can be perceived by an external sense; and
in the case of every external perception of substance or
quality other than sound, association with mahattva is
a necessary condition. So, in all cases of external
perception, except auditory perception, one has to take
into account only composite substances (avayavin),
from a triad (iryanuka) upward. It would appear that,
in such cases, the first two sense-relations may be
dispensed with, and the third samyuktasamavetasama-
v&ya would be quite adequate to account for any per-
ception. For instance, the visual perception of a triad
of earth (prlhivitryanuka) or its colour (rtipa) or its
colourness (rfcpatva) can easily the accounted for by
taking sathyuktasamavetasamovGya as the sense-rela-
tion ; this chain should be understood in the first case
(tryanuka) as consisting of contact between the visual
CH.I] PERCEPTION 17$
sense and the atoms, the inherence of dyads in those
atoms and the inherence of the triad in those dyads J
the first link in this chain in the second case (r&pa)
is contact between dyads and the visual sense; and m
the third case (rupatza) , the first link in this chain is
contact between the triad and the visual sense. To the
above question, the Nyaya theorists reply that the first
three sense-relations are indispensable and explain thei^
necessity in this way. Take, for instance, visual percep*
tion ; the conditions of visual perception such as udbh&*
tar&pa (perceptible colour) and mahattva (largeness)
should be regarded as the co-existing determinants
(avacchedaka) of contact with the visual sense (indriya-
samyoga) ; it would not do if they are associated in some
manner with^ffie object visualized; otherwise, the earth*
ness (prihivltva) in the atoms of earth and the blueness
(nllatva) in the blue colour \\ -i , :: to an atom of earth
should be visualized, the former (prthivltva) being asso^
ciated with largeness (mahattva) in a jar and the latter
(riilatva) being associated in some manner with large*
ness through the blue colour of a jar; or otherwise, as
a result of indirect association with mahattva and
udbhfttarftpa in a jar, the jati called sattft should be
visualized in air (vdyu) as well as its touch (sparSa);
in order to avoid these absurdities, mahattva and stui
other conditions in the case of visual perception should
be referred to as avacchedaka (co-existing determinant
of contact with the visual sense (caksttssamyoga), in
all cases of visual perception ; In these circumstaftcel^
it becomes necessary to leave entirely out of account:
contact between the visual sense and atoms or djads;
WO A PRIMER OR INDIAN LOGIC [PAIT id
thus, samyoga, samyuktasamavaya and samyuktasama-
fttastmav&ya are shown to be indispensable iti account-
ing for external perception of a substance (dravya),
LU Duality (guna) and the generic attribute (;<Hf ) in
the quality.
The scheme of six sense-relations explained above
relates only to cases of normal perception (laukika-
}r#tyaksa} and these sense-relations are called laukika-
so*nikar$ah (normal sense-relations). In the case of
perception through the external senses, the complete
icheme of relation necessary to bring about perceptual
experience consists of contact between soul and mind,
mind and sense-organ and sense-organ and object (atma
ma*as& samyujyate, mana indriyena, indriyam
wtkena). The first of these three factors viz., con-
tact between mind and soul (dtmamanassamyoga) is
a general condition of knowledge (jndnasantanya). In
cases of m&nasapratyakfa (inner perception through
the internal sense-organ manas), this general condition
tfftelf (Atmamanassamyoga) assumes the specific form
of sense-relation (indriyarthasannifcarsa).
The Naiyayikas also recognize three types of
auper-normal perception (alaukikapratyakja), as aris-
ing from three kinds of super-normal sense relations
{((wawSfJ&arannfftar^a), vis., the relation of sense-
bound generality (samanyalabsanasannikarsa), the
relation of sense-bound cognition (jMnalafifanasainm-
and the relation of yogic power (yogajasanni-
. In NySya literature, the word prattf&satti is
also used in this context, as the equivalent of santti-
CBL ij PERCEPTION HI
The coexistence of smoke and fire is seen in ft
hearth ; this visual perception relates only to the parti-*
cular smoke and particular fire; a doubt arises as to
whether the co-existence between smoke and fire is
invariable or not, and takes the form " Is smoke co-
existent with the non-existence of fire anywhere otf
not?" (dhftmo vahnivyabhican na va) ; such a doubt
relates to all smokes and all fires ; only a particular
smoke and a particular fire happen to be seen in the
hearth; the perceptual doubt referred to arises through
the visual sense and presupposes the visual perception
of all smokes past, present and future, in the hearth
and elsewhere (dhtimas&manyac&ksusflni) ; the normal
sense- relations of contact (samyoga) and inherence in
the thing in contact (samyuktasamavaya) are esta-
blished between the visual sense on the one side, and on
the other side, the particular smoke and smokene**
(dkttmatva) in it; no normal sense-relation can be
shown to connect the visual sense with all the smotas;
in this situation what happens is that the visual percep-
tion of the generic feature, smokeness (dhtimatvfi)
which is present in the particular smoke normally con-
nected with the visual sense and which is common to ajl
smokes, serves as the super-normal link (&laukikas<mn\-
karsa) through which all the unobserved smokes ar* f in
the first instance, connected with the particular
actually observed, and through the latter with
sense which has already come into relation with it in a
normal way. Thus s&mdnyda&santsanm&arf* is $
supernormal sense-relation which immensely <xten4$
the perceptive reach of sense^rgan and 'brings
182 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
classes of perceptible objects within its scope when only
particular individuals of a class have actually come
within its reach. The word s&m&nya in this context
means any common attribute (samanadharma) and not
necessarily a j&ti\ even a jar, for instance, may be
treated as the samGnya of all the places having a jar.
The earlier view is that the phrase samanyalak$aiia
should be understood in the sense 'consisting in
s&m&nya' (samdnyasvarufia} and that this variety of
super-normal sense-relation consists in the common
attribute presented as adjunct (prakata) in the cogni-
tion of a substantive (visesya) which has come into
normal relation with the sense-organ. (Indriyasambad-
dhavifesyafcajnonaprakarib hit tarn sawtinyam sanni-
kar$ah). This view is defective; for, it does not
cover, for instance, the super- normal perception of all
the places having a particular jar which has ceased to
exist and which is remembered as the common attribute
(sam&nadharma) of all such places. In that case, one
visualizes through the super-normal (s&m&nyalakfana)
sfcnse-relation all the places having the particular jar
which no longer exists (tadghatavatah sarv&n pra-
def&n), while seeing in the normal way only one of
such places without the jar and while recollecting the
particular jar previously seen in that place in the
normal way. Tadghata (the particular jar) is the
common feature in that instance; if s&m&nya itself
Were to be understood as constituting the needed
stnse- relation, sdmdnyalakfanasannikar^a would not be
available there, for the reason that the particular jar
representing the sam&nya no longer exists; but if
CH. i] PERCEPTION 183
cognition of sdmdnya (sdmdtiyajndna) should be
treated as sannikarsa, the required sense relation in the
form of recollection (sdmdnyasmarana) would be avail-
able. For these reasons, Naiyayikas of the later school
take the phrase sdmdnyalaksana to mean 'having
sdmdnya as object', the word laksana being taken in the
sense of object (vipaya) ; and they hold that it is
cognition of sdmdnya (sdmdnyajndna) that constitutes
the super-normal relation in question. It should be
remembered in this connection that while (sdmdnya-
jndna) avails as super-normal sense- relation in internal
perception (ndnasapratyaksa) under all circumstances,
it avails as such in external perception (b&hyapratyak$a)
only when the conditions necessary for bringing about
the normal perception of the sdmdnya in question are
present. ( Tadindriyajataddharmabodhastimagryapek-
sitd.) For instance, one can have a super-normal
inner perception (alaukikamdnasapratya'ksa) of all
smokes through the recollection of smokeness (dh&-
matva), even in darkness ; but, in darkness, one can
never have a super-normal visual perception (alauki-
kacdksusa) of all smokes through the sdmdnyajndna
consisting in the recollection of smokeness (dhtimatva-
smarana). It may also be stated here that one could
not become omniscient (sarvajna) for the mere reason
that one could have super-normal perception of all
knowable things (prameya) through the cognition of
their common feature knowableness (jnrameyatva),
since omniscience (s&rvajnya) consists in a detailed
and full knowledge of all things and not in a general,
knowledge of them.
A PRIMER OP INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
A person sees sandal ; his sense of smell does not
function for the moment and his sense of sight alone
functions ; he sees not only sandal but also its fra-
grance; his visual perception assumes the form "the
sandal is fragrant" (surabhi candanam), and he is
conscious of the fact that he is seeing the fragrant
sandal. In cases like this, no normal sense-relation
(laukikasannikarsa) between the visual sense and
fragrance can be recognized and the presentation of
fragrance (saurabha) in visual perceptionas an adjunct
of sandal has to be accounted for by means of the
super-normal sense-relation (alaukikasannikvrsa) f
which consists in the recollection of fragrance smelt in
the sandal on a previous occasion. This variety of
super-normal sense-relation is called jnanalaksanasan-
mg0. By means of s&m&nyajndna (cognition of a
common attribute) representing s&manyalafcsanasanni-
karsa> it woiiid be possible to account for fragrance
bting brought within the scope of the visual perception
of sandal, the required sense-relation being fotmi in the
cognition of fragranceness (saufabhatva) the generic
feature Of fragrance. But the presentation of &aura~
bhatva in the visual perception of sandal cannot be
accounted for by means of s&m&nyalatisan<isannikars6>
since saufabhatva is a fati and is therefore presented
in cognition as adjunct by itstlf (svarupatah) and not
as delimited by any attribute. In this case, it becomes
unavoidably necessary to recognize jnGnalatsanasaHni-
k&rsa as distinct from samdnyal&ksana. Further, where
a person mistakes nacre for silver in visual perception
and has the anuvyavasaya f l see silver*, silverness
CH. ij PERCEPTION IHS
(tajatttva) is presented in the inner consciousness of
visual perception through jfi&nalaksana, and not
through sam&nyalafcsana; for, in the latter case, the
generic attribute, whose cognition is proposed to be
treated as sannifearsa, should be present in the subs-
tantive (vifesya) actually perceived, and in the present
instance^ silverness is not present in the nacre which is
seen. On these grounds, the Naiyayikas maintain that
jnanalaksana should be taken to form a distinct type of
super-normal sannikarsa. They also hold, on the
strength of the evidence furnished by the Yogaf&stra,
that the super-normal capacity, which the mind
(manas) acquires througli the yogic practice, constitutes
the third variety of alaukikasannikarsa described as
yogajadharmalaksana. This variety of super-normal
sense-relation enables any sense to reach any object.
The Nyaya theory of alaukikasannikafsa seeks
to account for certain cognitions which really stand'
on the border line between ordinary perceptual
cognitions and non-perceptual cognitions and would
appear to be more akin to the former than to the latter.
The Mimamsakas and the Advaitins are not in favour
of this theory and refuse to recognize any special type
of pratyaksa known as alaukikapratyakf&. These oppo-
nents of the Nyaya theory argue thus. Universal
judgments relating to smokes and fires in general terms
are the result of the synthesis which a thinker's mind
is capable of making; this synthesis is sometimes effect-
ed through a negative process and sometimes through a
positive process; in the case of a negative synthesis,,
particular individuals only are observed and brought
186: A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PxiT ill
into relation with each other as determined by certain
generic features, the individualities of the individuals
being entirely ignored for the moment; such a negative
synthesis may well be brought under normal perceptual
process (laukikapratayksa). In positive synthesis, a
generalisation of all the conceivable individuals, with-
out ignoring their individualities, is definitely contem-
plated and is effectuated by the thinker's mind passing
from particulars to universals; the mental process in-
volved in such a positive synthesis is essentially one of
inference. In cases like the visual perception of sandal
as fragrant (surabhi candanam), one may see easily
a jumble of visual perception of sandal and recollection
of fragrance through association of ideas. Even in the
case of yogic perception, what happens, in fact, is that
the normal reach of the mind comes to be immensely
extended by yogic powers through the great potentiali-
ties of the mind becoming actualised in experience; and
all instances of yogic perception may be accounted for,
without the help of the theory of super-normal sense-
relation, either as ntanasapratyaksa (inner perception)
or as vivid recollection of the past, or as vivid imagi-
nation of future possibilities. Mtmarhsa theorists dis-
card the doctrine of yogic perception altogether.
However, it should be observed here that the
Nyaya theory of alaukikapralyak$a (super- normal per-
ception) rests on reasons which should not be lightly
brushed aside and which are worthy of very careful
consideration. In the first place, it may be noted that,
in every case which a Naiyayika would bring under the
CH. i] PERCEPTION 187
super-normal variety of perception, the mediacy which
is characteristic of non-perceptual cognitions is entirely
missing and the immediacy- which is characteristic of
perceptual cognitions is invariably felt to be present.
In cases of external perception, where cognition of a
or cognition of some other kind is treated as
rsd) the mind is entirely subordinated to a sense
and if certain impressions derived from previous ex-
perience get mixed up with perceptual elements, such
impressions come to be divested, for the time being, of
their non-perceptual character and invested with a
sense-bound, perceptual garb. The inner consciousness
(anuyyavasaya) of disciplined minds, which takes a
form like this "I sec a fragrant sandal" (surabhi can-
danam pasydmi), is certainly an evidence which the
KTaiyayikas feel bound to respect and rely upon, in this
connection.
CHAPTER II
INFERENCE
31
(a) Anum&na (Inference)
is the efficient instrument
(karana) of inferential cogni-
tion.
(&) Inferential cognition is
a cognition which arises from
subsutnptive reflection (par&-
mar fa).
(c) Paramarsa (subsump*
tive reflection) is a cognition
which cognizes the presence of
the invariably concomitant
factor denoted by the middle
term (probans) in the thing
denoted by the minor term. For
instance, the cognition, "This
mountain has smoke which is
invariably concomitant with fire"
is a subsumptive reflection;
and the cognition resulting
from it and taking the form
"mountain has fire" is inferential
cognition.
CH. uj INFERENCE
(d) "Wtewer there is
smoke there is fire" 'This type
of invariable concomitance is
vyapti (co-extension).
(e) Subject - adjunctness
(paksadharmata) consists in the
invariable concomitant (vyfyya)
being present in things like a
mountain (denoted by pak$a or
the minor term).
S\4num&na t as its etymological sense indicates is
afte**p*oof. It is after-proof in the sense that it uses
the knowledge derived from perception (pratyaksa) or
verbal testimony (agama) and helps the mind to march
on further and add to its knowledge/) As Vitsyayana
puts it, it is equivalent to anvfllsu; and the Nyaya
system is called anviksiki, for the reason that its
immediate and chief aim is to elucidate the nature of
anumana or anviksd as a pramana. (PratyaksQga-
masritam anum&nam; sd anvlk$a; taya pravwrtata
ityanviTzsikl ny&yavidya nyQyasQstram. ) Seeing that
verbal testimony is not recognized as a distinct pfatn&na
by the Bauddhas and the Vaiseikas, the Nyaya writers
prefer to consider sabda at the end and rightly proceed
to consider anum&na immediately after pratyakfd*
f It would be interesting to note here how the Njayfi
realist deals with the criticism that all knowledge may y
in a sense, be brought under inference and that even
perceptual experience may be brought under inference*
It may well be contended that, in the visual experience
190 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
of a composite structure like a horse, only certain parts
of the animal come into relation with the sense of sight
and several parts do not, in fact, come into relation
with the sense; and that in such cases, the experience
of the whole, of which we become conscious, must be
taken as inferencer^Gautama himself refers to this
contention in II ]K-31 and indicates how this difficulty
inay be met by using the N) aya theory that the com-
posite whole (avayavin) is entirely different from its
parts (avayavah). /The Nyaya theorists claim that
their conception of paTts and whole as entirely different
entities has as its chief advantage the preservation of
the province of pratyaksa from being wholly swallowed
up in the province of anumana.j
In the case of every pram&na, the karana (special
or efficient instrument), the vydpdra (intermediate
cause) and the/>/*a/a (final result) should be carefully
distinguished. In the case of anumana (instrument of
inferential experience) the knowledge of co-extension
(vy&ptijnana} is karana; substimptive reflection
(paramarfa) is vyapara; and inferential experience
(anumiti) is phala.
Students of Nyaya, before they proceed to study
the Chapter on anum&na, should start with a clear con-
ception of the meanings of the technical terms paksd f
sadhya and hetu or sddhana. They are usually rendeF-
ecTrespecilvely by theTEnglish equivalents minor term,
major term and middle term. But it should be remem-
bered here that these English terms have primary
reference to certain terms constituting syllogistic
CH. n] INFERENCE 191
expression; whereas, in Sanskrit Nyava, the term
denoting paksa corresponds to the minor term, the term.
pakfa itselFstandlng for'the subs'uritTve with reference
to which something has to be inferred or inferentially
predicated; the term denoting sadhya corresponds to
the major term, the term sadhya itself standTngTorTlie
thing that is sought to be inferred or inferentially pre-
dicated with reference to paksa; and the term denoting
hetu or sddhana corresponds^ Jo the middle term, the
term Jietu'or jflrf/wfia'ltseTf standin^ToFflieTe^son or
ground which is invariably concomitant with whatis
sought to be inferred and whose ^"fenowlcHgcTeadsJo
inference. Thus, one may see in the Indian terminology
itselfevidence of a fundamental difference in the way
in which the topic of inference is treated in Indian logic
as compared with the way in which European tradition
deals with that topic such difference consisting in
greater stress being laid on the material aspects of
inference by the exponents of the Nyaya-Vaisetka
system and undue stress being laid by European tradi-
tion on the formal side of syllogistic expression.
Annambhatta defines anumili as a cognition pro-
duced by subsumptive reflection (parfimarfa). This
definition, as it is, may be applied even to a perceptual
experience following a doubt and arising from a sub-
sumptive reflection. With reference to a man standing
at a distance, a doubt may arise in twilight, as to
whether he is a man or a post. As one approaches the
object, the cognition "This object has hands and such
other features as are found invariably associated with
192 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [flu? m
humanity' 1 (purufatvavytipyakaradimGn ay am) arises;
and immediately follows the perceptual experience
"This is a man" (ay am purtt$ah). Such cases of
sam$ayottarapratyak$a (perceptual decision following
a doubt) and arising from the reflective perception of
certain particulars (vise$aparamarsa) are not instances
of anwniti and have to be excluded by the adjunct 'in
Association with the pakfattf (pak$atQsahakrta) so that
foe complete definition of anumiti will be this
n AtiumitiJiS a cognition which is produced by subsump-
tive reflection in association with subjectness
What is paksatG (subjectness) ? The earlier
school of Nyaya understood subjectness as consisting
in 'doubt regarding the presence of probandum'
(sddhyasandeha) or, in other words, understood a
paksa to be the substantive with reference to which one
doubts whether one may correctly predicate something
or not. This view of pak$ata ignores the fact that
s&dhyasandeha (doubt regarding prodandum) is not a
necessary condition of inference and that a person who
has actually seen clouds on the sky may also infer their
presence from their peal of thunder. The later
Naiyayikas seek to remove this defect in the earlier
definition of paksata and suggest a modified definition
which may be stated thus: "Pakfatd, (subjectness)
amounts to the absence of such indubious knowledge of
the probandum as is associated with the absence of a
desire to establish the probandum" (sifddhayiftiviraha-
pakfata). In experience, it is
CH. 11] INFERENCE
found that indubious knowledge of the frobandum
(sadhyasiddhi) prevents inference unless there is a
positive desire to arrive at the same result through
inference. Sadhyasiddhi is thus a counteracting agent
preventing animiti (anumjtipratibatodhaka) and
si$ddhayi$d neutralises the influence of the counter*
acting agent and is therefore uttejaka. Pak$ata thus
reduces itself to non-existence of such counteracting
agent as is associated with the absence of the
neutralising agent (MttejakdbhdvaviSistam yat prati-
bandhakam tadabhavah}. When the Naiyayikas
include pal^ata in the causal equipment necessary foi-
anumiti, they do not assume anything unusual, but
are simply applying to the specific effect, anumiti,
the general principle that uttejakabhavavitistapratl*
bandha'kdbhdva is one of the things making up the
causal complement of an effect. It must be remem*
bered that universal sadhyasiddhi in every conceivable
instance of fiaksa prevents the inference of the sanre
sddhya in some of the paksas as also in all paksas i
whereas partial sadhyasiddhi in some tfaksas prevents
only the inference of the same sddhya in some pakfas.
Universal s&dhyasiddhi is technically " described as
paksafavacchedakavacchedena sadhyasiddhi and may be
embodied in a proposition like this " All S is P '\
Inference of the same sddhya in all paksas is likewise
described as paksatavacchedakavacchedetoa anumiti and
embodied in a proposistion like this <* All S is P ".
" Some S is P" a proposition of this type embodies
partial sddhyasiddhi, which is technically described as
fralteQtavacchedakas&mtinadhikaranyena sddhyasiddhi.
13
194 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
An inference which may be embodied in a propo-
sition like "Some S is P" is prevented by any
s&dhyasiddhi, universal or partial, while the inference
in the form " All S is P" is prevented only by uni-
versal sddhyasiddhi. It should also be remembered that,
when the conditions necessary for having the perception
of a certain object are present along with those neces-
sary for inferring the same object, only the perception
of that object arises and not its inference; but in cases
where the conditions necessary for perceiving an object
are present along with those required for inferring
another object, inference would arise and not perception.
The Naiyayikas insist that, in every case of infe-
rence, quick or slow, inference for oneself or inference
for others, subsumptive reflection (jMamgri^^jL^n
indispensable anTeeed^nt"^lnct^"sTiould, therefore, be
treated as cause of anumiti.
cognition which arises from a combination of the
knowledge of Invariable concomitance t '(vya'pfijnana^
and that of the presence of the reason (hetu) in the
suEject CJ>ttfcja) technically known as paksadharmatd-
jft&na.^In the stock example of inference "The hill
hasTire; because it has smoke", the pardmarsa takes the
form "The hill has smoke, which is invariably con-
comitant with fire" (vahnivydpyadh&mavdn parvatah) ;
^nd it is contended by the Naiyayikas that, in the
absence of such a pardmarfa, anumiti does not arise.
This cognitive complex called pardtnarfa is also known
as lingapardmarsa or trtiyalingaparamarfa (the third
cognition of the reason). The cognition 6f the presence
CH. n] INFERENCE 195
of the lingo, (reason) in the subject (paksa) may be said
to be the first lingapardmarfa; the cognition of the in-
variable relation between linga and sddhya is the second
lirigaparamarsa; and the complex cognition which arises
from these two cognitions is the third lingapardmarSa.
The MImamsakas and the Vedantins who follow
them hold that the complex cognition called pardmarSa
is not indispensable for anumiti, though it may
actually arise just before anumiti in many cases.
In our experience, we are conscious of having anumiti
directly after becoming aware of the presence of the
hetu (reason) in the paksa (subject) and remembering
vydpti (invariable concomitance) and without any
intervening pardmarsa. In such cases, the Naiyayikas
also cannot help recognizing causal relation (kdrya-
kdranabhdva) between anumiti on the one side and the
two ., " : referred toon the other side (vydpti-
jndna and paksadharmatdjnana} ; and in cases where
pardmarsa intervenes, they should recognize another
causal relation (kdryafcaranabhdva) between pardmaria
and anumiti. Thus the MImamsakas argue and maintain
that, in order to avoid this difficulty, it would be neces-
sary to treat anumiti as the effect of vydptijndna and
pak$adharmatdjndna and to exclude pardmarSa from
the causal complement of anumiti. The Naiyayikas,
however, point out that it would be much simpler to
connect every case of anumiti with pardmarsa as its
cause and to assume that, even in cases where anumiti
appears to arise directly from vydptijndna and pa%fa~
dharmat&jndna, there is an intervening pardmarSa
though one may not be conscious of it on account of the
196 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
quick passage of the mind from the stage of paksa-
dharmatdjfidna to the stage of inference. The con-
troversy between the Mimarhsakas and Naiyayikas, as
to whether anumiii should be taken as the effect of the
two cognitions vydptijndna and pak$adharmatdjfidna
or as the effect of the complex cognition called para-
marfa, appears to hinge on the principle of parsimony
(Idghava) and turns out to be a consideration of the
greater or smaller degree of cumbersomeness which one
might notice in the MImamsaka's or the JTaiyayika's
way of defining the causal relation between anumiti
and its cause. However, a careful estimation of the
arguments advanced by the Mimarhsakas and the
Naiyayikas would reveal the significance of the insis-
tence in Nyaya on pardmarsa being treated as indis-
pensable. If subsumption to a generalisation be the
essential element in inference, it is obvious that infe-
rence of fire in a hill cannot arise from the perception
of smoke in it, until the particular smoke in the hill is
subsumed under the generalisation involving vydpti
between smoke and fire; and the Naiyayikas insist that
subsumption is the essential feature of inference and
insist therefore that every anumiti should betaken to
be preceded by pardmarta, which is but a subsumptive
reflection subsuming the smoke in the hill under the
pre-established vyapii. The Bhatta Mimarhsakas, on
the other hand, hold that it is the subsultive, rather
than the subsumptive, passage of the mind from the
observed relation of particulars to a certain unobserved
particular, that characterises the inferential process
of thought; and this view accounts for their attitude
CH. n] INFERENCE 197
towards partimarSa. From the following exposition
of vyapti, the difference between the views of the
Mimamsakas and the Naiyayikas would become further
clarified.
What .is vytipt4? Annambhatta's definition of
vyaptijis L that it consJtjJjxJj}Ji4/tf (reason or probans)
being co-existent with the sadhya (probandum or the
ining to be "Tn f erentiall} "Vstablislied ) , which is per-
vasive of the hetu (hetuvydpaka). To be pervasive
^^af^aJ^ml^Q context of anumiti, means 'never
being the counter-correlative (ptatiyogin) of a negation
(abhdva) which is co-existent with hetu. 9 In an infe-
rence, where smoke is the hetu and fire is the sadhya
to say that there is ^3^'Lj[.invariable Concomitance)
between smoke and fire implies the followingtli'ingS,
according to this definition. Firstly, it implies that fire
and smoke co-exisXJn the particular form and through
the particular relation, with reference to which they are
intended to be treated as hetu and sadhya respectively,
the particular form of hetuandsddhya being technically
called hetutavacchedakadharma and sadhyatdvacche-
dakadharma and the particular relations intended to
determine the co-existence of hetu and sadhya being
technically known as hetuidvacchedakasambandha and
sddhyatdvacchedakasambandha. Secondly, it implies
that, with reference to the same hetut&vacchedaka-
dharma, sddhyatdvacchedakadharma, hetutdvaccheda-
kasambandha and sddhyatdvcchedakasambandha, fire
is never the counter-correlative (pratiypgin) of any
negation which co-exists with smoke. Where fire in a
hill is inferred from smoke, fire is sadhya, fifeness
198 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
(vahnitva) is said to be s&dhyat&vcchedakadharma in
the sense that fire is proposed to be treated as
sddhya in its general and universal form as fire, and
not in any other form such as that of a substance
(dravya) ; smokeness (dhumatva) is said to be hetuta-
vacchedakadharma in the sense that smoke is proposed
to be treated as hctu in its general and universal form
as smoke, and not in any other form; and conjunction
or contact (samyoya) is said to be sadhyatavacchcdaka-
sambandha, as also hetutaracchcdakasambandtoa, in the
sense that fire and smoke, in their respective form as
sfidhya and hetu, are proposed to be treated as connect-
ed with paksa (subject), through the relation of con-
tact, and not through any other relation such as
inherence (samavaya) or self-linking relation (svarupa).
In later Nyaya literature, based on Gangesopa-
dhyaya's Tattvacint&mani, two types of definitions of
vy&pti are distinguished, one type being called siddhanta-
laksana and the other type being called purvapaksa-
iaksana or purvapaksavyapti. The definition explained
in the preceding para represents the former type and is
briefly set forth in this Sanskrit formula: Hetuvya-
pakasSdhyasanianQdhikaranyam vyaptih. This defini-
tion, when fully amplified, comes to include the
hetutavacchedakadharma, sadhyatavacchedakadharnta 9
hetutdvacchedakasambandha and sadhyat&vacchedaka-
sambatodha. It is affirmative in its main form, the
latter half being affirmative, though the adjunct
hetuvyQpaka reduces itself to the negative form hetu-
sam&n8dhikarandtyantabhavdpratiyogin ( which is
CH. 11] INFERENCE 199
never the counter-correlative of any negation co-exist-
ing with the reason).
The other type of definition of vyapti is known as
pnri'apaksalaksana in the sense that it is provisional
and prima facie satisfactory. It is generally put in a
negative ^form. A typical instance of pftrvapahsavydpti
is this: Co-extension (vyapti) consists in non-exis-
tence of the probans in every place where the probandum
(sadhya) does not exist (sadhyabhavavadavrttitvam).
This definition also, when fully amplified, comes to in-
clude the hetntavacchedakadharma^adhyatavacchedalta-
dharma, hctutavacchcdakasambandha and sadhyata-
vacchcdakasambandha. This prima facie definition of
vyapti is negative in its main part and is a direct
amplification of the conception of avinabhava. The
contrast between the tv/o phrases avinabhava and
sdhacaryaniyama should be clearly understood. The
former phrase is more commonly used in earlier
N> aya literature and the latter in later literature. Vin&
means 'without'; a-bhava means non-existence; and
a-vina-bhava means non-existence (of the probans or
helu) without or in the absence (of the probandum or
sadhya). This is the basis of purvapaksavyapti which
is generally negative in its form. The other phrase
sdhacaryaniyama which is used by Annambhatta is
equivalent to niyatasahacarya, \\ hich means invariable
co-existence. This forms the basis of what is referred
to above as siddhantavy&pti. The prima facie defini-
tion of vydpti set forth above is defective. It does not
hold good incases where the sadhya happens to he a
200 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
thing whose non-existence anywhere is inconceivable
(kevalanvayl) , like abhideyatva (namableness) ; nor
does it apply to the hetu in syllogisms like: "A quality
(guna) has existence (satta), because it has a generic
attribute (jaii)". It will be seen that non-existence of
the probans in a place where the probandum does not
e&ist can be conceived of only when its existence in
such a place through the specific relation in view
(helutavacchedakasambandha) is conceivable and that,
in the latter instance referred to, the presence of the
ptobans, jati, through the relation of inherence, which
is the specific relation in view, in a place like sdmanya
-jwhere the probandum (satta) is not present, is incon-
ceivable. In order to get over difficulties of this kind,
thesiddhantalaksana or conclusive definition of vyapti is
put forward.
The term vyapti literally means pervasion and lays
stress on the universal character of the relation Tcept in
view. The phrase 'universal connection' ""brings' out
exactly the meaning of the term vyapti. In"" early
"Nyaya literature, Ihe term avindbhava is frequently
used as the equivalent of vytipti. It should be observed
that this term, avinGbhSva, brings into prominence the
invariable character of the relation kept in view. The
two ^concepts, universality and invariableness, implj
^Scfi other; but they are not identical. A careful
xlraination of early Nyaya literature would show that,
from Kanada and Gautama downward, all the leading
exponents of the Nyaya- VaiSesika system were quite
familiar with the ideas of universality and invariable-
CH. n] INFERENCE 201-
ness as forming the essential elements in the conception
of vyspti. Vatsyayana, who preceded Dignaga, defini-
tely makes use of the conception of avinabh&va in his
Bhasya on the sutras 2-2-1, 2-2-2 and 2-2-61. The
very conception of vyabhicGra as a fallacy (hctvabhtisa)
presupposes the invariableness of the relation called
avinabhdva or vyapti. Patanjali, in his Mahabhaya
(on 3 2 124), shows a definite knowledge of the
universal character of the relation called vytipti. In
the face of these facts, it would be unreasonable to
hold, as Professor Keith does, that the doctrine of
indissoluble or invariable relation (avindbhava) is
Dignaga's special contribution to Indian logic and that
Prasastapada and others borrowed this idea from
Dignaga and developed it. In this connection, atten-
tion is invited to the article on "The evolution of
vydpti'' contributed by one of my former pupils, Mr.
A. S. Krishna Rao, M.A., in part I Volume I, (1927)
of the Journal of Oriental Research, Madras.
What is the exact nature of the relation of vy&pti,
or avinabhdva? How is it arrived at? Is it arrived at
through perceptual experience? Or does it represent
itself the result of an inferential .process? If vydpti in
its universal form is the basis of inferential reasoning*
does it not already contain in itself the result of the
inferential process and does it not render inference
wholly superfluous? Questions like these were raised
and answered both by Naiyayikas and Mimarfisakas of
the early and later schools. It would be of great value
to students of Indian logic to pay some attention to
202 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
these questions. Vatsyayana remarks in his Bhasya on
1-1-37, that the parallelism between the probans as
found in the paksa and the probans as found in the
example (udaharana), on which the probative character
of the probans rests, is very subtle and diihcult to
explain and can be well understood only by men of
great learning. (Tadidam heiudaharanayoh ^sadhar-
myam paramasak$Mam duhkhabodhain panditarupa-
vedaniyamiti). The Bhasypk&ra sa>s this, not because
he was quite innocent of the nature of the invariable or
universal relation called avlnabhara or vya f pti, as
Professor Keith and some others may fancy, but
because, perhaps, he was keenly alive to the difficulty in
satisfactorily answering the questions raised at the
beginning of this para and to the snares and pitfalls in
the way of generalisation.
Uddyotakara, Vacaspatimisra, Jayanta and some
other early writers on Ny&ya describe vy&pti as an un-
conditioned or necessary relation which is not brought
about by any adventitious circumstance anaupadhikah
sambandhah. For instance, that smoke is pervaded by
fire, i.e., that dhunia is vahnivyCipya*\$ a necessary and un-
conditioned relation and does not depend upon any adven-
titious circumstance; whereas, the relation of vyapti
embodied in the proposition 'Wherever there is fire,
there is smoke' is not a necessary and unconditioned
relation and depends upon the association of fire with
the adventitious contact of wet fuel with fire (Urdren-
dhanasamyoga). Such adventitious circumstances are
called upddhayah. An upadhi is an adventitious factor
which is invariabiy concomitant with the p
CH. n] INFERENCE 203
(s&dhyavydpaka) and not so with the probaw
(sadhanavyapaka). It is called u'p&dhi becabse as
Udayana explains, its invariable concomitance with the
probandum comes to be erroneously associated with the
probans, just in the same way as the redness of a japQ
(China rose) is erroneously associated with a crystal
(sphatika-) in its vicinity. To define vyapti as anau-
pddhikasambandha is significant in several ways. In
the first place, it shows that the earlier schools of
Indian logic, which adopted this definition, do not defi-
nitely insist upon any conscious process of generalisa-
tion or universalisation preceding inference. Secondly,
according to the early schools, it should be made out
that the connection between the probans (hetu) and
probandum (sddhya) is necessary. Thirdly, in order
to satisfy oneself that the connection in question in-
volves necessity, one should know that it is not due to
association with any adventitious circumstance, i.e.,
that it is w&bhavika and not aupddhika. Further, this
definition clearly lays greater stress on the element of
necessity in the relation between the hetu and sddhya
than on the element of invariableness. It should, how-
ever, be remembered, in this connection, that Gautama
who recognised vyabhicdra or absence of invariableness
as a fallacy, and Vatsyayana and Prasastapada who
definitely referred in their works to the concept of
avindbhdva as an essential element in anum&na, were
fully alive to the importance of the idea of invariable-
ness in vyapti.
What is the form in which the relation of vy&pti
comes to be known and leads to inference? How does
204 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
it come to be known ? According to Annambhatta, who
follows GangeSopadhyaya in this as in several other
matters, the cognition of vyapti (vy&ptijfi&na) atise&in
the form of a universal generalisation which is usually
embodied in the proposition "Wherever there is smoke
there is fire" (yatrayatra dhumah tatra vahnih), or in
the proposition "Whatever has smoke, has fire" (yo
yo dhumavan so'gniman) ; in a statement of vyapti, the
vy&pya (pervaded) should be first referred to and the
vydpaba should be the principal predicate; aijcj the
cognition of vyapti arises usually from the observation
ofTfie co-existence of smoke and fire in one or more
instances, in the absence of any knowledge of a place
where the hetu is present and the sddhya is not present'
Annambhatta criticises the view that the relation of in-
variable concomitance is known through bhuyodarsana
or repeated observation. As Nllakantha points out,
the Sanskrit phrase bhtiyo'darsana is ambiguous. It
may refer to the frequent repetition of the same obser-
vation or to observation of several instances of the
stidhya and hctu or to observation of the co-existence
of the sddhya and hetu in several places. In any of
these senses, though the observation of the co-existence
of hetu and sddhya may be repeated a thousand times,
vy&pti cannot be made out, if, even in a single instance,
the hetu is known to be present in the absence of the
stidhya. So, following the Manikara, Annambhatta
points out that a knowledge of the co-existence of the
hetu and sSdhya in association with the absence of a
knowledge of the presence of the hetu where the s&dhya
is not present (vyabhicdrajnanavirahasahakrtam svha-
CH. n] INFERENCE 205
c&rajnanam) causes vyaptijnana. Knowledge of vya-
bhicftfa may arise in the form of a doubt or one may
be sure of the presence of this defect. In the latter
case, unless it is shown that such knowledge is erro-
neous, one cannot make out the relation of vyapti. In
the former case, any doubt, of vyabhicara, which is
otherwise technically known as aprayojakalvasankd and
which is usually expressed in the form ''Let there be
the A<?/; the sadhya need not be present" (heturastu
sadhyam mastu), is removed by an indirect type of
reasoning known as tarka. The indirect argument
called tarka corresponds to rcductio ad absurdum and
consists in showing how the assumption of the oppo-
site leads to an absurd result by coming into conflict
with some established truth. In the case of invariable
concomitance between smoke and fire, for instance, if
one should doubt that smoke may be present some-
where in the absence of fire, the indirect argument of
tarka may be put forward in this form: 'If smoke
were present in the absence of fire, smoke could not be
produced by fire. But the causal relation between fire
and smoke is a well-recognized fact'. Thus according
to later NTaiyayikas, vy&pti is a universal type of gene-
ralisation covering all conceivable case.-, Totii otacTvcd
and unobserved. The element of iiivarial>IerielS H fr > of
greater v^tu^tb^i the element of necessity, in ensuring
HT safe passage of inferential thought from theTEn5wn
__ , - ""** -- " ' ** ' ------- . W ^ ^^ ^ ^^
tSthe^ unknown, though .these two elements mvari-
atJfeness and necessity imply each other. The'elwrTent
oflriecessity looms large only at the "slafF at which the
206 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
element of invariableness happens to be challenged and
comes to be maintained by a suitable tarfta.
fin several instances the universal relation of vyapti
is feir"to be arrived at as perceptual experience
(pratyaksa) through some sense-organ. Perceptual ex-
perience persupposes some sannikarsa (sense-relation)
between the sense concerned and the objects coming
within the scope of the experience in question. Y/hen,
for instance, one comes to have visual perception of the
relation of invariable concomitance between all smokes
and all fires, it is through the super-normal sense-rela-
tion (alaukika-sannikarsa) called samdnyalakfana-
praty&satli that all the smokes and.jfires are brought
within the reach of the visual sense.) The nature of
this super-normal sense-relation is explained in pages
180 to 184 of Chapter I, supra. Thus, according to
later Naiyayikas, the knowledge of vyapti arises in
several cases as super-normal perception through the
super-normal sense-relation of seme-bound generality
(s&manyalaksanasannikarsa) . Jayantabhatta discus-
ses the nature of vyaptijiiana in pages 121 to 123 of
his Nyayamafijari (Viz. S. S.) and arrives at the
conclusion that it arises through the inner sense, manas,
as mental perception (manasapratypTtfa), when co-ex-
istence is observed and no hitch in such co-existence is
seen. Evidently, Jayantabhatta is inclined to think
that manas, though it cannot directly reach external
objects (bahirasvatantram manah) under ordinary
circumstances, is resourceful enough to reach all the
smokes and fires, both observed and unobserved, in the
CH. n] INFERENCE 207
absence of definite obstacles in the way. Jayanta, how-
ever, does not account for the mind's resourcefulness
in this direction and seems to be inclined to attribute it
to its nature and not to the aid of any super-normal
sense-relation known as samanyalaksanasannikarfa.
The nature of this sannikarsa has been explained in
detail on pages 180 to 184, in Chapter I, supra.
Buddhist logicians like Dignaga and Dharmakirti
lay particular stress on the negative phase of vytipti
viz., non-existence of the probans in the absence of
the probandum (avindbhdvd) . They hold that
every case of avindbhava involves a necessary
and indissoluble connection between the hetu and
the sddhya and that this connection is based upon
identity (tdddtmya) or causality (tadutpatti). The
Naiyayikas rightly criticise this view as ignoring such
cases of invariable concomitance as do not rest upon
identity or causality cases like a blind man's inference
of colour (rupa) from taste (rasa).
The Mimarhsakas of the Bhatta school maintain
that vyapti, in the form of a universal generalisation, is
not a necessary condition of inference. Fire is observ-
ed to be co-existent with smoke in two or three places;
and smoke is never seen to be present in a place where
fire is not present When one comes to have this
experience repeatedly within the sphere of one's obser-
vation, one finds oneself in a position to make out
invariable connection between smoke and fire in the
form in which they happen to be seen in the particular
instances which have come within the scope of one's
208 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
observation. When one later on happens to see smoke
in the same form in an unobserved place as in a place
already observed, or even when one happens to see
smoke again in the same form in an observed place as
already observed there, one's mind comes to have a
knowledge of the presence of fire in that place where
smoke is seen for the moment. The knowledge of fiie
which thus arises cannot be regarded as perceptual
experience as fire is not for the moment within the
range of any of the senses; nor can it be regarded as
reproduction in memory of a past experience, since the
knowledge of fire which thus arises is felt to be experi-
ence having reference to the existence of fire in the
present time. Thus, according to the Bhattas, the pro-
position 'Wherever there is smoke, there is fire' repre-
sents ordinarily a icstricted form of synthesis which
has reference only to tlie observed particulars and is
quite adequate as a condition of inference; and anybody
who is equipped with the knowledge embodied in this
proposition would be able to infer the existence of fire
on seeing smoke in any place, provided there is no
suspicion of vyabhicdra (presence of hetu in the
absence of sddhya). At the same time it must be
remembered that Bhattas do not deny that, not inf re*
quently, in the course of inferential reasoning, one may
arrive at a universal generalisation of the type recogniz-
ed by the Naiyayikas, which has reference to the
invariable concomitance between all cases of hetu and
s&dhya, including observed and unobserved instances in
the present, past and future. The Bhattas, however,
insist that such universal generalisations themselves are
Cn.n] INFERENCE 209
cases of inference. Parthasarathimisra, one of the
most reliable exponents of Rumania's views, explains
the inferential process through which such universal
generalizations are arrived at. In this connection, a
reference to Parthasarathi's Nyayaratnamala (Chow-,
khamba edition pages 69 and 70) would show how
unobserved places, which have smoke, may be inferred,
to have fire, from the fact that smoke is predicated it*
those places, on the basis of observed cases. In the
face of this, it would not be correct to suppose, as
Professor Handle does in foot-note (1) to page 282
of his work " Indian Logic in the Early Schools ",
that "there is nowhere in Indian Logic the notion that
Induction or generalization is an inferential process".
The Prabhakaras hold that vydpti is the invariable
relation between hetu and sadhya, which, when it is
made out, happens to be free from temporal and spatial
limitations and thus comes to assume the form of a
universal generalization. In the hearth, for instance
contact between smoke and fire is made out as the
relation connecting the two substances smoke and fire.
In the cognition of such relation, the two relata are the
two principal concepts. The relation on the one sid^
and time and space (kala and deia) on the other are
presented in that cognition only as adjuncts subsidiary
to the two relata. While two subsidiaries agree to
subordinate themselves to a common principal, one
subsidiary does not ordinarily tolerate its subordina-
tion to the other subsidiary. This is as true in the
sphere of thought as in the external world. Thus the
knowledge of the relation between smoke and fire that
JWQ A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [P**T m
arises from the observation of their co-existence in
particular instances takes a universal form, unhamper-
ed by the temporal and spatial limitations of the parti*
cular place and time actually coming within the scope
of observation. With the help of such a universal
generalization, when a person infers fire in a mountain
on seeing smoke there, he is, in fact, cognizing again
ifrhat has already been cognized and forms part of the
content of the generalization at which he arrived as a
result of his observation. Such inference is valid ex-
perience (prama), though it cognizes something already
cognized. According to the Prabhakaras/ all cogni-
tions other than recollection are valid (prama) and it
is not necessary that a prama should cognize something
fiot already cognized. Thus, the Prabhakaras maintain
that inferential experience is re-experience and does
fiot involve the passage of the mind from the known to
the unknown, as is commonly supposed to be the case;
but it involves merely the passage of the mind from a
known object to something that is already known to be
invariably connected with it. In the Prabhakara
scheme of inference, even a single observation (sakrd-
dartana) is enough for having a knowledge of vy&pti
and repeated observation (bh&yodarfana) is, however,
useful in showing that the relation observed between
hit* and s&dhya is not brought about by any adventi-
tious circumstance (upddhi).
/ Fjiff the foregoing account it will be seen that all
tWfleading schools of Indian philosophy are agreed ki
A general way that generalization
CH.n] INFERENCE 211
sents the ground-work of inference. The Naiyiyikas
and the Prabhakaras take this generalization to be of a
universal type and to have reference to all the conceiv-
able particulars unobserved as well as observed. The
Bhattas look upon this generalization as a synthesis
confined to the observed particulars, which is arrived at
by sinking all incompatible differences. For instance,
according to the former, the generalization, "Wherever
there is smoke there is fire" has reference to every
conceivable case of smoke and fire; while, according to
the latter, this generalization represents a S)nthesisof
all the observed cases and sinks such incompatible
differences as are due merely to spatial and temporal
limitations.^)
At a very early stage in the history of Indian logic,
the Carvaka materialist, who recognizes only one
pramana viz., pratyoksa. throws out against inference*
the challenge that vyapti cannot he relied upon as the
basis of anumana. The Carvaka's contention is that,
if vyapti were to be restricted to the known or observed
particulars, it would be impossible to have any infer-
ence regarding unknown or unobserved particulars for
the simple reason that the latter are wholly different
from the former ; and that, if vyapti were to be looked
upon as a universal generalization having reference to
all the conceivable particulars, unobserved as well as
observed, all that has to be known is already known
and nothing remains to be known through inference*
This objection is embodied in an old verse which is
quoted by several old philosophical writers like
SiHJtaniiba and Jayanta aod which rurts
212 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
" Anum&bhangapanke'smin nimagna v&didantinah.
Vi&fe'nugam&bh&vah s&mdnye siddhas&dhyata. '*
(Vide Prakaranapancika Benares edn. Page 71),
The Carvakas contend that Indian logicians are hope-
lessly caught between the two horns of the dilemma
indicated they hopelessly sink down in this slough in
which anumdna is lost. Students of western philoso-
phical literature are here likely to be reminded of the
Empiricist's objection that any inference of a particular
fact from a general principle already known and taken
to be valid would amount to arguing in a circle. They
may think in this connection of objections similar to
what is put forward by Mill when he says "that no
reasoning from generals to particulars can, as such,
prove anything; since from a general principle, we
cannot infer any particulars but those which the prin-
ciple itself assumes as known."
To this kind of objection, the logic of the Bhatta
school, as may be evident from their view set forth
above, gives the answer that inference is really from
particulars to particulars and that, in cases where it
appears to be from a universal to particulars, the real
cause of such appearance is to be found either in the
fact that vydpti, constituting the basis of inference,
assumes a general form, since such differences as are
immaterial, or incompatible, are left out for the time
being; or it is to be found in the fact that a universal
generalization interposes itself, though it does so as an
intermediate inference. In this connection, a reference to
Br^idley's Principles of Logic (pages 323 to 326) would
CH.U] INFERENCE 213
be of great value. One may easily see that Bradley's
criticism of Mill's view holds good as against the Bhatta
view also, in a considerable measure. The Bhatfa
logic, where it insists upon a very close similarity
between the frobans in the paksa and the vy&pya in the
sapaksa (example), reduces inference to reasoning
from resemblance. But where it insists upon diffe-
rences being left out, the reasoning turns out to be one
from identity. Is it not then palpable, cue may ask in
Bradley *s language, that, when the differences are disre-
garded, the residue is a universal? The strong point in
the Bhatta view is that it shows how inference may
really involve an advance in knowledge in two direc-
tions: where one infeis unknown particulars from
known and where one inferentially arrives at a
universal generalization from the observation of parti-
cular instances.
As already explained, the Prabhakaras get over the
difficulty under consideration by saying that every ex-
perience (ai ubhava) though it may not involve any new
element or any advance in knowledge, is valid (prantd).
All that is required to show that anumana is a pramtina
is that inferential cognition (anumiti) resulting from it
is an experience (antt&hava) , and not mere recollection
(smrti). The Prabhakaras do not consider it necessary
to go beyond maintaining that anumiti, though it hap-
pens to be a re-experience (gjhltagrahl anubhavah), is
a valid experience. It should, however, be remembered
that, according to them, vy&$ti assumes the form of a
universal generalization; and this is not because every
214 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [Pate in
conceivable particular is brought within the scope of a
supernormal observation, as the Naiyayikas contend,
but because the elements of time and space do not enter
into the scheme of relation represented by vy&pti, for
the reason already indicated.
y^**"
\The Naiyayikas, who are the generally accredited
exponents of the doctrines of Indian logic, maintain
that inference is not_frqm j^rticulars to .ajQ^culars but
it is from 'universal to .p.articujys. They hold that
s^a^ universal generalization which does not
represent a mere summation of the observed instances.
It has reference to the invariable concomitance between
alt conceivable cases of hetu and sddhya. Such a
generalization, though it involves a big leap from the
f eW obltTve3""aiK ; s (o in'tfun^erable^iFnobserved cases, is
rendered possible through the super-tlermal sense : rela-
tto^cS^d^sanianyalaksanasanniharsa^ Leaving out
tfie technical concept oY aTauftikasdnmkarsa, one might
well say that such a big inductive leap is rendered
possible by the immense resourcefulness of a disciplined
mind in the direction of synthesis. /The Nyaya theory
of inference effectively exorcises tEe~ghost of pelitio
principii, by drawing attention to the fact that infe-
rence helps one to see and understand more. One may
be equipped \\ith the universal generalization
"Wherever there is smoke there is fire" and yet may be
quite unaware of the presence of fire in a particular
mountain ; nd on seeing smoke in that mountain, the
presence of fire may be inferred there. ifl SUfih
inference leads to a distinct addition to knowledge and
On. n] INFERENCE 21S
helps oneto see more. The Naiyayikas also point out
tbST^after acquiring definite knowledge of a certain
thing in a certain place through observation or by some
other means, the same thing may be inferred in the
same place; and in such cases, inference helps one to
understand more by enhancing the degree of clarity or
certitude in the knowledge already got.
32 T
^(a) Inference is of two
Sands: inference for oneself
and inference for others.
, Inference for oneself
causes one's own inferential
experience. For instance, a
person may make out the rela-
tion of invariable concomitance
between smoke and fire and
arrive at the universal generali-
zation "Wherever there is
smoke there is fire" from his re-
peated observation in the hearth
and .such other places and then
approach a mountain. He may
have doubt as to the presence of
fire in that mountain. On seeing
smoke there, he remembers the
generalization "Wherever there
is soke there is fire." Then,
he comes to have the cognition
216 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
"This mountain has smoke which
is pervaded by (or invariably
concomitant with) fire." It is
this cognition that is called linga-
pardmarsa (the subsumptive
reflection of the probans). From
this cognition arises the inferen-
tial cognition "The mountain
has fire". This is what is called
(c) 1 nfetence for ~oik&%3 i s
th^syllogistic expression which
Consists of five members and
which a person employs after
inferring for himself fire
from ^moke, with a view to
enabling another person to have
likewise the same kind of infe-
rential cognition.
E.g. " The mountain has
fire; because it has smoke;
whichever has smoke has fire, as
a hearth; the mountain is such
(has smoke which is invariably
concomitant with fire) ; and
therefore, it is such (has fire). 1 '
From this five-membered syllo-
gism, the other person to whom
it is addressed comes to know
the probans (smoke) and infers
fire from it.
OH. H] INFERENCE 217
Professor Keith and some others believe that the
above distinction of inference into inference for onself
(svartha) and inference for others (parartha) was
first introduced by Dignaga and borrowed from him
by Prasastapada. (Vide Professor Keith's ' Indian
Logic and Atomism', pages 106 to 108). A careful
consideration, however, of what Vatsyayana says in his
Bhasya and Gautama in his Sutras would clearly show
that the distinction in question should be held to be at
least as old as the Sutrakara himself. Vatsyayana,
where he speaks of anuwana as distinct from nydya-
prayoga, presupposes evidently the distinction of
svariha and parartha. Gautama's description of the
five members of a complete syllogistic expression would
be unintelligible, should it be assumed that he was not
familiar with the substance of the distinction in ques-
tion, though the terms parartha and svartha are not
found used in his Sutras.
The distinction of anuwana into svartha and
parartha is not only as old as the Nyayadarsana itself,
but it is also one of the most vital topics in the
KTyaya system. It is a natural result of one of the dis-
tinctive features of Indian logic and it enables intelli-
gent critics to appreciate duly the pivotal idea on which
Indian logic turns both in its scope and its development.
It should be remembered here that Indian logic never
allowed itself to be restricted in its scope and (fevelop-
ment to the exclusively formal side of ratiocination,
but always kept in view as its constant, knowledge or,
more accurately, knowledge of truth (tattvajfitina) in
218 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
relation to what is conceived of as the summum
In this connection, it would be very interestinjfto-
consider what Benedetto Croce, one of the greatest
contributors to contemporary philosophical thought,
has chosen to observe concerning Indian logic, parti-
cularly the distinction of si'&rthanutnana and parar-
thanum&na recognised in Indian logic. Attention is
invited to the subjoined extract from pages 583 to 585
of Benedetto Croce's 'Logic as the Science of Pure
Concept' rendered into English by Douglas Ainslie.
" This error, which appeared very early in our
western world, has spread during the centuries and yet
dominates many minds; so true is this that 'logic' is
usually understood to mean 'illogic' or 'formalist logic',
We say our western world, because if Greece created
and passed on the doctrine of logical forms, which was
a mixture of thoughts materialised in words and of
words become rigid in thoughts, another logic is known
which, as it seems, developed outside the influence of
Greek thought and remained immune from the forma-
list error. This is Indian logic, which is notably anti-
verbalist ...... Indian logic studies the naturalistic
syllogism in itself , as internal thought, distinguishing
it from the syllogism for others, that is to say, from
the more or less usual, but always extrinsic and acci-
dental forms of communication and dispute. It has
not even a suspicion of the extravagant idea (which
still vitiates our treatises) of a truth which is merely
syllogistic and formalist and which may be false in
fact. It takes no account of the judgment, or rather it
considers what is called judgment, add what is really
OH. ii} INFERENCE 219
the proposition, as a verbal clothing of knowledge;
it does not mak^ the verbal distinction of subject,
copula and predicate; it does not admit classes of cate-
gorical and hypothetical, of affirmative and negative
judgments. All these are extraneous to logic, whose
object is the constant, "knowledge considered in itself."
Students of philosophical literature in the west
may find it easy to appreciate, in the light of the above
extractfthe significance of the distinction which Indian
logic recognizes between 'inference for oneself
(svartha) and 'inference for others' (parartha). This
distinction is not merely one of a formal kind. It is
rooted firmly on the fundamental doctrine of Indian
logic that syllogistic reasoning should be viewed, not
apart from the inductive process of thinking, but mere-
ly as a continuation and methodical application of it.
In Indian logic, deduction and induction do not repre-
sent two mutually exclusive types of inference but they
should always be looked upon as inseparably connected
parts of a complete process of thinking called inference
(anuinana) ; and the chief function of annmSna, as a
means of valid cognition, is to enable one to realize
how certain facts are inseparably and necessarily con-
nected with each other in accordance with a general
principle. This view of inference influenced the 1
development of Indian logic for good and saved it from
falling into the grip of formalism which, till very
recently, dominated logic in the west. One of the
chkf advantages which have accrued to Indian logic
from this view is that it never makes the extravagant
220 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART n
claim that formal validity may be viewed apart from,
and independently of, material validityiy
A complete syllogistic expression is called nyaya-
prayoga by Vatsyayana ami all the Naiyayikas who
followed him. It is a synthesis in expression (mah8-
v&kya) built upj>y five parts_ or tiKi)iber& (avayavah),
eachjo^f jwhich embQji^ f orminjjja/necessary
part of a complete ratiounaijxc |n rt-.v, expressSi in
word's in order 10 <lc:r,onMra!c k a fact by iK-ii'^Mifit
iirfiTan established TclfemC of "liniversaT and lifvSfiable
relation. The N>aya doctrine of five-membereH syllo-
gism is at least as old as Gautama and accepted by
Vatsyayana and Prasastapada, and almost all the later
Naiyayikas and Vaisesikas. These five members are
described in the following section of the text.
T 33
(a) The five members of a
syllogism are: (1) the thesis
set down (pratijnd), (2) the
reason (hetu) t (3) the exempli-
fication (udaharana), (4) the
subsumptive COPKlSIion
naya) and (5) conclusion
J^^S) J e -9 f "The mountain has
*tire" this is the thesis. "For
it has smoke" this is the reason.
" Whichever has smoke has fire,
as a hearth" this is the exem-
plification. "And so is this"
this is the subsumptive correla-
CH. n] INFERENCE 221
tion. "Therefore it is such"
this is the conclusion.
(6) In the case of inferen-
tial cognition for oneself as well
as that for others, it is the sub-
sumptive reflection of the reason
(lingaparamaria) that serves as
the efficient and special cause
(karana). So, HngapardmarSa
in this sense is the instrument of
inferential cognition (anumana).
Annambhatta's illustrative description of the five
members of a syllogism set forth above, read together
with the remarks in the dipika, throws adequate light
on the function of each of the members. A typical
pratifnd is in the form of a proposition consisting of a
subject (paksa), which is already known specifically to
bot,h the parties in a discussion, and a predicate which,
in a specific form, is proposed to be established in the
subject; in other words, it is in the form of a definite
thesis to be maintained. Its chief purpose is to bring
about a definite knowledge of the fakfa as such or
what is proposed to be proved as having the pro&andum
(sadkya). The person to whom the pratijnd is
addressed would naturally desire to know first the
reason why the paksa is said to have the sddhya; and
to satisfy this desire, the ling a or the reason which
serves to establish the sddhya in the paksa is indicated
ordinarily by a term in the ablative case in Sanskrit*
It would be possible to satisfy oneself that the reason
A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART n
(linga) adduced is capable of proving the sddhya, only
after ascertaining that the former is invariably con-
comitant with the latter; and the needed knowledge of
the invariable connection between the probans and the
probandum (vyaptijfiatia*) t on which the probative
capacity of the yrobans depends, is derived from the
statement of the example, which is usually in a form
like this: "Whichever has smoke has fire, as a
hearth." The probatos which is made out to be invari-
ably concomitant with the Probandum (sddhyavyapya)
should be specifically known to be present in the paksa;
without such a knowledge, the subsumptive process of
thought on which the conclusion rests would not be
complete; and such a knowledge results from the
member called subsumptive correlation (upanaya).
The final statement of the conclusion called
nigamana is not a purposeless reiteration of the thesis,
as proved. The purpose of the nig am ana is to indicate
that the probans is not vitiated by the presence <pf a
count er-prob CMS proving the contrary (asatpratipaksi-
tatva), nor stultified by a stronger proof (abadhitatva).
According to Gautama and his followers, these five
members are called avayavah in the sense that they
form the necessary parts of a complete syllogistic
expression. Vatsyayana, in his Bhasya, refers to and
rightly discards an earlier view that the total number
of avayavas is ten vie., a desire to know the probate
dum (jijMsS), doubt regarding the probandum or its
reverse (samiaya), belief in the probability of the
probandum and in the probativeness of the proof
(sakyapraptih), the object of discussion
CH.II] INFERENCE 223
and the removal of doubt on proving the probondum
(samsayavyudasa), in addition to the five members of
the Nyaya s\1l'-;,M*rr, already mentioned. Of th^se ten,
the first five are only psychological conditions which
lead to a discussion and they cannot, in any sense, be
said to be logical propositions forming the parts which
constitute a complete syllogistic expression. It may be
noted here that the Vaisesika tradition, as recorded by
Prasastapada uses the terms/>ra/i/fl, apadeta, nidarfaita,
anusandhana and pratyamnaya as the respective equi-
valents of the Nyaya terms pratijna, hetu, udaharana,
upanaya and nigamana.
Vatsyayana, the author of the Nyayabhasya, in his
Bhasya on the first Sutra, equates nyaya with anvlksa,
and explains it as amounting to a critical investigation
of facts by means of instruments of valid cognition
(PramSnairarthapartksanam nydyah). When such in-
vestigation is carried on in a methodical way so as to
convince another person of a fact, it is expressed in the
form of five-membered syllogistic expression which is
described as nyayapratfpga or pancavayavavakya.
Vatsyayana further explains, in his Bhasya on 1-1-1
and 39, how all the four Pram anas accepted by the
Naiyayikas meet in the five-membered syllogism and
tend to demonstrate a fact in a conclusive manner. The
Bhasyakara points out that the statement of the thesis
{pratijfta) may be taken to stand for valid verbal
testimony (fabda), the reason (hetu) for the instru-
ment of inference (anum&na), the example (uddharana)
lor the instrument of perception (pratyakfa) and the
ti ve cor relation (upanaya) for analogy (upa-
224 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART ra
mdnd). According to him, one should find in the conclu-
sion (nigamana) the culminating stage of demonstrative
expression for the reason that it is nigamana that shows
how all the four pramanas have collaborated to
maintain conclusively the fact in question; and on this
ground, nigamana is described as the acme of logical
demonstration (paramo ny ay ah). In order to appreciate
fully the significance of 1 he Bhyakara's account of
ny&yaprayoga as represented by the five-membered
syllogistic expression described above, it should be
remembered that the Naiyayikas, from Gautama down-
ward, look upon logic both as a science and art, that
the function of logic, according to them, comprises both
discovery and proof, induction and deduction, and lays
adequate stress on the material and formal aspects of
reasoning; and that logical debate, even in its apparent-
ly non-logical forms of jalpa (successful advocacy)
and vitanda (destructive objection), is never allowed to
stand completely divorced from the aim of nyaya, v\z.>
conclusive determination of truth (tattvadhyavasaya).
Remembering these facts, one may easily see that the
structure of the five-membered syllogism is designed to
meet in an adequate manner the requirements of logical
demonstration, which seeks to convince another person by
drawing his attention specifically to fact and by enabling
his mind to pass through successive stages of thought
which conclusively establish that fact. Professor
Handle is inclined to believe that Vatsyayana thinks
of the five-membered syllogism "as more than inference
or the expression in words of inference" and that "the
five-membered formula was influenced by its historical
CH. 11] INFERENCE 225
origin in a nyaya which was methodological rather than
logical and its structure must be regarded as in part
vestigial, rather than determined by the requirements
of logical analysis." (Vide pages 165 to 167 of Pro-
fessor Randle's book 'Indian Logic in the Early
Schools'). The learned Professor's estimate of the
five-membered syllogism of Nyaya and his interpreta-
tion of Vatsyayana's remarks in this connection can
hardly be said to have given due weight to the fact that
Indian logic, particularly in its early stages as exhibited
in the Sutras of Gautama and the Bhasya of V'atsya-
yana and in the connected early literature, never allowed
valid anumana (inference) to be divorced from other
Pramanas, at any rate from the more important of
them, viz., perceptual instrument (pratyaksa) and
credible verbal testimony (sabda), and that syllogistic
formalism abstracted from induction is an aberration
unthinkable to the Naiyayikas. A careful consideration
of these facts would show that the structure of the five-
membered formula need not be regarded as in part
vestigial. On the contrary, the considerations indicated
above would show that this formula is based on an
efficient and self-contained type of verbal apparatus
which logical methodology has evolved for the purpose
of demonstration. Professor Randle further observes
that "either hetu or upanaya, and either pratijnd or
nigamana are superfluous and this superfluity is inheri-
ted from the time when the Nyaya was a method of
debate and not yet a syllogism : and in the case of the
Nyaya school, the convention of five members may
have been fixed by a desire to equate the four 'premises'
226 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
yviih the four Pramaijas." If syllogistic expression,
Uks any other exj ression, directly or indirectly presup-
poses a hearer to whom it is addressed, if ny&ya$rayoga
or syllogistic expression finds a place only in inference
for others (\par&rthawimana) 9 and if the process of
^reasoning in inference for oneself (svarthanum&na) is
not syllogising, a strictly logical debate, as recognised
by Gautama and his followers, must involve a self-con-
tained syllogistic expression as its main part. Th$ a,im
of such a self-contained syllogism is to enable th$
hearer, first to specifically think of what has to be
demonstrated, secondly to learn what the reason is,
thirdly to understand how the universal and invariable
relation which forms the basis of inference is arrived
at through observation, -fourthly how the reason
actually relied upon is identical with what is known to
be invariably concomitant with the probandum, and
fifthly to realize that the probandum is conclusively
proved by a probans which is not vitiated by a counter-
probans or by a stultifying proof. As already indicated,
these five requirements can be fully met by the five
members of a syllogism, viz., J>ratijfi&, helu, udaharana*
Wpanaya and nigamana, It wll be seei> from this that
the five-membered syllogism of Gautanaa, far from
fqmprising any superfluous member, is the only com*
plete form of syllogistic expression which would enable
a hearer's mind to pass in a methodical way through
each of the five stages of demonstrative reasoning, as
indicated above.
The Nyaya theory of five-membered syllogism may
here be compared with the theory of three members
CH. n] INFERENCE 387
(avayav&h) put forward by the Mimariisakas and th
Buddhist theory of two members. The Mimamsaka$
maintain that either pratijna, hetu and ud&haraiia, or
udaharana, upanayck and nigamana will do; for, the
conclusion should be specifically stated and a knowledge
of the general relation between the probans and the
probandttm and of the presence of the probans in the
pafcsa (vyaptiand pafcsadharmata) is necessary, and
these requirements are fully met by the three members
above-mentioned. The Buddhists hold that syllogistic
expression is only an aid to reasoning and that it would
be unreasonable to assume that any hearer endowed
with the minimum capacity for reasoning would require
more than the members conveying the needed informa-
tion about vydpti and paksadharmata, and that the tWQ
members necessary for that purpose, viz., the example
and the subsumptive correlation (udaharana and npa-
naya) would be quite adequate to form a sjllogism. It
may also be noted here that the three-membered syl-
logism of the Mimamsakas, represented by the latter
alternative, viz., udaharana, upanaya and nigamana,
may be regarded as a close parallel to the Aristotelian
syllogism of the Barbara mood. The Naiyayikas would
criticise the three-membered syllogism of the MSniarii-
sakas and the two-membered syllogism of the Bauddhas
as incomplete and truncated, for the former, when it
consists of pratijna, hetu and udaharana omits to make
provision for equating the probaws in the paksa with '
the vyapya and for obviating any possible suspicion of
a counter-probans or a stultifying proof (satpratipaKi
satva or badka) ; while, in the form which consists of
228 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
ud&harana, upanaya and nigamana, it startles the hearer
by a generalization without adequately preparing him ;
and the latter adopted by the Bauddhas combines all
these defects.
It may be noticed that all the schools of Indian
logic the Nyaya, Mimamsa, Bauddha and the other
schools agree in regard to the importance and value
of the example (uddharana) as a member[of syllogistic
expression. Ordinarily, udaharaya is in a form like
this "Whichever has smoke, has fire, as the hearth."
Its aim, according to the Naiyayikas, is to show how
the generalization on which deduction rests is arrived
at. Consistently with this aim, the former part refers
to the universal connection between the probans and the
probawdum and the latter part refers to a typical ins-
tance in which the co-existence between the hetu and
s&dhya may be observed. Nyaya tradition, which must
have influenced Gautama's mind when, in his Sutra
1-1-5, he proceeds to give an account of the different
classes of anumana after referring to it as tahpurvakam
(presupposing or resting upon pratyaksa), should have
also left its stamp, in the shape of specific instance, on
the pivotal part of the five-membered syllogism, vis.,
uddharaya. Some writers on Indian logic, who lose
sight of the distinctive features of the Nyaya doctrine
of syllogism, regard the udaharana as a useless and
clumsy excrescence. Some others would historically
account for the present form of the ud&harana by treat-
Ing it as result of the portion expressing the generaliza-
tion (vy&pii) coming to be combined at a later stage in
the history of Nyaya with the latter portion referring
CH.II] INFERENCE 229
to a specific instance, the original form of uddh^rana
being merely like this :as a hearth (yatha tnahfr
basah). It may, however, be pointed out here that if
Gautama's Sutra defining uddharana (1-1-36) is
correctly interpreted, it cannot be held to convey any-
thing other than this: that udaharanais a typical ins-
tance (drstdnta) which, on the strength of the invari-
able connection observed in it between the probafts and
the probandum, enables one's mind to pass in the patosa
from a similar case of the probans to a similar case of
probandum. If it is true that, from the days of Gau-
tama, the inductive basis of deductive reasoning has
been treated by the Naiyayikas as an integral part of a
complete syllogism, it must be accepted that the wdfl-
harana as known to Gautama and his followers com-
prises both the parts, viz., the part representing vydpti
and the part referring to a typical instance, and neither
the former nor the latter of these two parts can be held
to be a later addition. The logic of Nyaya seeks to
combine discovery and proof; the Nyaya syllogism is
such a harmonious blend of induction and deduction as
ensures the safe progress of thinking on right lines ;
and if, sometimes, the syllogism of Nyaya is abused in
Indian philosophical speculation, it is certainly due to
the fact that the basis of syllogistic reasoning in such
cases turns out to be a superficial or unsound induction
and not to any defect in the scientific method of reason*
ing formulated by the Naiyayikas.
Students of western logic, when they compare
the Nyaya syllogism with Aristotelian syllogism,
are not likely to miss the striking contrast between
280 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
theifi. This contrast consists in the Nyaya system
lt tecognizing anything really corresponding to thfe
syllogistic figures and moods known to western
logic. Ordinarily, the generalization on which the
typical Nyaya syllogism rests is a universal affirma-
tive proposition, the proposition corresponding to the
minor premise is usually stated in the form of A and
the conclusion is also usually in A, So, it may be said
that the typical Nyaya syllogism is of the Barbara type*
In this Connection, a student of Nyaya, familiar with
the distinction made in Nyaya literature between
p&Ttsat&vwchedakasamanadhikaranyenanumiti and
paksat&vaccheddkavacchedenanumiti may feel that
there is some reason to find in the former case a con-
clusion in I and to connect such conclusions in I with a
minor premise in I; thus, in such cases, he may feel
inclined to find instances of the mood represented by
Datii. In the same way, one may be inclined to find an
instance of the mood Camestres in a syllogism like this
-"Whichever has negation of fire has negation of
smoke. No tank has fire. No tank, therefore, has
smoke". But a careful consideration of the Nyaya
theory of syllogism in the light of the NySya view
regarding the interpretation of propositions would make
it clear that, strictly speaking, it would not be correct
to find in any Nyaya syllogism, a parallel to any
western figure or mood. CJtl fi Nygyg conception of a
typical syllogism is that it depends chiefly upon a pro-
poaitiojn embodying vyapli. Vyapti is ftn invariable or
univtrpal generalization in the sense that it consists in
unfailing connection between a probans and
CH.H] INFERENCE Hi
looked upon as attributes predicated of certain subjects
rather than as things having such attributes. The Nyaya
view is generally in favour of adopting the 'intensive or
connotatio'tfal method of interpreting propositions and
mostly avoids the extensive or detootational method^
When a proposition like "All S is P" has to be inter-
preted by a Naiyayika, he would first think of the uff
versal and invariable connection between the essential
attribute connoted by S and that connoted by P and
would not so readily think of all the individuals denoted
by S and P. It would also be remembered in this
connection that there is no fundamental difference
between a vyafiti of two positive factors and that of
two negative factors. In fact, the proposition "Wher-
ever there is no fire, there is no smoke" is for all
practical purposes taken by the Naiyayikas to be equiva-
lent to "Wherever there is negation of fire, there is
negation of smoke". A Naiyayika would have as little
hesitation in saying "Negation of fire is" (vahnya-
bhavo'sti) as in saying "Fire is*' (vahnirasti), abhdva
or non-existence being as much a real category as a
bhftva ot positive entity. In these circumstances, one
may easily see how Indian Nyaya did not attach much
importance in syllogistic reasoning to the artificial dis-
tinctions of A, I, E and O propositions, though the
Sanskrit language was quite capable of expressing such
distinctions, and how the formalistic formulas of
different figures and moods cahie to be almost com-
pletely eschewfed in Indian logic.
34 T
(tt) Probans ( ftw#a=literal-
ly, matk) is of three kinds
232 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PAETIH
concomitant in affirmation and
negation (anvayavyatireki), con-
comitant in affirmation alone
(kevalOnvayi) and concomitant
in negation alone (kevalavyati-
reki).
(&) The anvayavyatireki
type of probans is that which
has affirmative concomitance
(anvayavyapti) and negative
concomitance (vyatirekavyapti)
with the probandum; as smoke
when fire is the 'probandum.
"Where there is smoke, there
is fire, as in a hearth" this
is affirmative concomitance.
"Where there is no fire, there is
no smoke, as in a tank" this is
negative concomitance.
(c) The kevalanvayi pro-
bans has affirmative concomit-
ance alone ; as "Jar is namable,
because it is knowable, like a
cloth". In this instance, nega-
tive concomitance is impossible
between knowability (jprame-
yatva) and vamaUlity (abhidhe-
yatva) ; for all things are know*
able and namable.
Cn.n] INFERENCE 233
(d) The kevalavyatireki
proteins has negative concomit-
ance alone ; as in the syllogism
"Earth is different from the
rest (not-earth), for it has
smell; whichever is not different
from the rest (not- earth) has no
smell, as water; this (earth) is
not so i.e., it does not have
absence of smell or gandha-
bhava, with which the absence
of difference from not-earth
(prthivitarabhedabhava) is in-
variably concomitant (vy&pya) ;
therefore, it is not so i.e., it is
not devoid of difference from
non-earth". In cases like this,
there is no example in which the
affirmative concomitance
"Whichever has smell, has
difference from non-earth" may
be made out; for all varieties of
earth come under the paksa
(subject).
35 T
(a) Paksa (subject) is that
in which the presence of the
probandum is not known for
certain and is yet to be proved ;
as a mountain, when Smoke is
relied upon as the probans.
234 /A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC F^AIT til
(b) Sdpak$Q^*is a similar
instance, in which the proban-
dum is known for certain ; as a
hearth, in the same case of
inference.
(a) Vipaksa is a counter-
example in which the non-exis-
tence of the probandum is known
for certain; as a tank, in the
same case of inference.
In section 34 of the text given above Annambhatta
explains the three types of probans recognized by
the Naiyayikas viz., the affirmative-negative probans
(anvayavyatireJsi), the exclusively affirmative (kevalan-
vayi) and the exclusively negative (kevalavyatireki).
The Advaita-Vedantins insist that there is only one type
<of probans, viz., anvayi (affirmative) and that inference
arises always through subsumption to an affirmative
generalization. The Bbattas, though they are inclined
to recognize the anvayavyatireki and kevalanvayi types
of probans, are generally in favour of bringing the
kevalavyatireki type under a distinct pramana called
arthapatti. The MImamsakas maintain that a negative
generalization (vyatirekavyQpti) is fit to be treated
as the basis of a presumptive conclusion (arthapatti)
and only an affirmative generalization admits of being
treated as the basis of a subsumptive conclusion
(otttmt'ti). In this connection, it would be desirable to
peruse again pages 140 to 146 (part III supra), which
contain a full discussion of all the important questions
relating to arthapatti as a distinct prawdna and an
CH, 11] INFURENOE 235
explanation of the chifcf rekjs<>q$ why Naiyayikas would
bring cases of arthdpatti uncfef' the kevalavyatireki
type of reasoning.
36 T
(a) Fallacious reasons (het-
vdbhasdh liter ally, semblances
of reason) are of five kinds:
viz., the reason that strays away
(savygbhicdrg), the adverse rea-
son (viruddha), the opposable
reason (satpratipaksa), the un-
established reason (asiddha), and
the stultified reason (bddhita).
(b) The straying" reason
(savyabhicara) is otherwise
known as anaikantika (literally^
not unfailing in its association
with the probandum). It is of
three kinds: viz., common (sa-
dharana), uncommon (asddha-
rand) and non-conclusive (anupa-
samharin ) .
The common strayer (sd-
dhardna) is that variety of stray-
ing reason which is present in a
place where the frobandum
(s&dhya) is not present; as t in
the argument "The mountain
has fire, because it is knowable"
In this argument "know ability is
236 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
found in a tank where fire is not
present. The uncommon strayer
(asadharana) is that reason
which is present only in the sub-
ject (paksa) and not present in
any similar example (sapaksa)
or counter-example (vipaksa) ;
as sound-ness (sabdatva), in the
argument ''Sound is eternal,
because it is sound", sabdatzv
(sound-ness) being present only
in sound, and nowhere else, eter-
nal or non-eternal.
The non-conchisive strayer
(anupasamharin) is that reason
which has no affirmative or
negative example (anvayadr-
st&ntaor vyatirekadrstanta) ; as
knowableness (prameyatva) in
the argument "All things are
non-eternal, because they are
knowable". Here, no example
is available since all things are
treated as paksa.
(c) The adverse reason
(viruddha) is one which is in-
variably concomitant with the
non-existence of the probandum;
as producibility (krtakatva), in
the argument "Sound is eter-
OH. H] INFERENCE 237
nal, because it is produced".
Here producibility is invariably
concomitant with non-eternality,
which amounts to the non-ex-
istence of eternality.
(rf) The opposablc reason
(satpratipaksa) is one which
admits of beingcounter-balanced
by another reason that proves
the non-existence of the pro-
bandum; as audibility in the
argument "Sound is eternal,
because it is audible, like sound-
ness (sabdatva*)'*. The counter
reason in this case is produci-
bility (karyatva) in the counter-
argument "Sound is non-eter-
nal, because it is producible".
(<?) The uneslablished rea-
son (asiddha) is of three kinds:
viz., uncstablished in respect of
abode (dsraydsiddha), unesta-
blished in respect of itself
(svarapasiddha) and unesia-
blished in respect of its concom-
itance (vyapyatvasiddha}.
The reason is dsraydsiddha
in the argument "Sky- lotus is
fragrant, because it is a lotus,
A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PA*TW
like the lotus of a pond". Here,
sky -lotus is the abode or subject
and it never exists.
The reason is svarup&siddha
in the argument "Sound is a
quality, because it is visible, like
colour". Here, visibility cannot
be predicated of sound, which is
only audible.
The reason is said to be
vydpyatvdsiddha when it is asso-
ciated with an adventitious con-
dition (upadhi). That is said to
be an adventitious condition
(upadhi), which is pervasive of
the probandum but not perva-
sive of the probans. 'To be
pervasive of the probandum'
means 'never to be the counter-
correlative (pratiyogin) of
non-existence (abhava) which
co-exists with the probandum'.
Not to be pervasive of the jpro-
bans* means 'being the counter-
correlative of non-existence
which co-exists with the probans. 9
In the argument "The moun-
tain has smoke, because it has
fire", contact with wet fuel is
the adventitious condition (upd*
dhi). "Where there is smoke,
INFERENCE 239
there is contact with wet fuel"
thus it is pervasive of the pro-
bandum. There is no contact
with wet fuel in every place
where there is fire; for instance,
a red-hot iron ball has no contact
with wet fuel; thus the upadhi is
non-pervasive of the probans. In
this manner, contact with wet
fuel is the up&dhi in the present
instance, because it is pervasive
of the probandum but not perva-
sive of the probans. And fire t
in the argument under reference,
is vyapyatv&siddha, since it is
associated with an adventitious
condition (upadhi).
(/) The stultified reason
(b&dhita) is one which is put
forward to prove a p ( robanduin
whose non-existence is establish,
ed by another proof. "Fire is
not hot, because it is a sub-
stance", the probandum is 'not
being hot'; its reverse 'being
hot' is perceived through tactile
perception; so, the probans is
stultified (badhita).
Thus ends the chapter on
Inference.
240 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
A hetv&bh&sa is a semblance of reason. It is a
fallacious reason or defective reason. It would not be
quite correct to use the term fallacy as an equivalent of
hetvtibhfisa. In western logic, the term fallacy is gene-
rally understood in the sense of 'a defective conclusion
or interpretation/ resulting from a defective process of
thinking. The classification and elucidation of falla-
cies in western logic are generally influenced in a direct
or indirect way by Aristotle's division of fallacies into
those which are related to expression and those which
are not. Students of western logic are aware that the
basis of the Aristotelian classification of fallacies can
hardly be considered satisfactory either from the logi-
cal or from the rhetorical point of view. As early as
in the age of Gautama, the Nyaya system of Indian
thought equipped itself with a fairly satisfactory and
well-defined scheme of hetvabhdsa or defective probans.
Gautama definitely classifies defective reasons under
five heads and uses the significant expression hetva-
bhasa, which suggests the futidanicntum divisionis of
his classification. The expression hetvabhasa literally
means 'a semblance of reason* or 'what appears to be a
reason while it is really not such'. The true function
of a hetu or probans is to prove. The defects which
vitiate a probans are called hetudosah. The common
feature of such defects is that they vitiate the probative
value of a probans. That this common feature viz.*
vitiating the probative value of a prabans is the
fundamental basis of Gautama's classification of defec-
tive reasons is implicitly conveyed by the significant
name hetv&bhtisa used by Gautama. It may be noted
CH.II] INFERENCE 24t
here that the same philosophic instinct, that helped the
Nyaya theories of inference and syllogism over the for*
malistic barriers which western logic still finds it diffi-
cult to surmount, has also made it possible for the
Nyaya system to equip itself with a really helpful
scheme of defective probans, hinging on the concept of
hetu which forms the main ground of syllogistic rea
soning. The Naiyayikas who came after Gautama*
more especially later Naiyayikas like GangeSa, effec-
tively used the hint afforded by Gautama's classification
and clearly and definitely elucidated the principle
underlying the Nyaya classification of hetv&bhds&s.
The principle is taken for granted by writers like
Annambhatta and is embodied in the definition of bet-
v&bh3sa in general. This definition may be set forth
thus: A defective frobans (hetvfibh&sa or dusfahetu)
is a reason whose 'probative value is vitiated by a
circumstance, a valid knowledge of which would pre-
vent the inferential cognition (annmiti) kept in view
or the efficient cause of such cognition (anumitikarana),
For instance, a vyabhicdrihetu, which is of the sadha-
r an a type (common strayer), such as 'a jar' in the
argument "The mountain has fire, because it has a
jar", is a defective probans (dustahetu or hetvabhdsa)
because its probative value is vitiated by the fact that
it happens to be present in a place where fire is not
present and a valid knowledge of this fact would pre-
vent the generalization (vy&ptijnana) "Wherever
there is jar, there is fire". This is a typical case where
the efficient cause of inference (anumitikarana) is
prevented. In an argument like this "Fire is not hofc,
16
142 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PAtx 10
because it is a substance", the hetu is of the bad hit a
tjrpt (stultified probans) ; in this case, the probative
tf Jdae fcf the probans is vitiated by the fact that it hap-
9*113 to bie put forward to prove a thing which is already
disproved by perceptual experience; that fire is not cold
is a fact established by pratyaksa; and a valid know-
ledge of the fact that fire is never cold would directly
prevent the inference that fire is cold. Thus, it will
be seen that a valid knowledge of some vitiating ele-
ments (hetudosa), would directly prevent inferential
cognition (anumiti) and a valid knowledge of some
Others like vyabhic&ra would prevent only the efficient
cause of inference (anumitikarana) , such as generali-
sation, in the form of knowledge of the invariable re-
tfetton between the probans and probandum. The Naiya-
yikas would insist that it is only a real defect, and not
It fancied one, that should be taken to vitiate the pro-
bative value of a probans. Any erroneous notion that
the connection between a valid probans, like smoke,
fttid a probandum f like fire, is not invariable, should
not be held to vitiate the probative value of the probans.
Of the three varieties of the vitiating circumstance
tailed vyabhic&ra (literally, straying away or incon-
stancy), the first, known as sQdharana, is the most im-
portant It generally proceeds from a careless or
hasty generalization and when detected, it prevents a
yalid knowledge of invariable connection (vyapti-
}ff*a) 9 The uncommon stray er (asadh&rana) is con-
ceived of by the earlier Naiyayikas as a reason which
jus known not to co-exist with the probandum in any
CH.U} INFERENCE 143
sapaksa, where the probandum is recognized to be
sent. In the illustration of & ad ha ran a given in the
text, sabdatva (sound-ness) is present only in the^tfJtfa
and nowhere else. According to the earlier Naiyayikas
asadharanatva is anityadosa or operates as a defect only
under certain circumstances. They draw a distinctioa
between nityadofd (permanent defect) a defect*
which, when rightly detected, always vitiates the fro-
bans, and anityadosa (occasional defect) a defect
which, when rightly detected, vitiates the probans only
under certain circumstances. They also hold that orfU
dh&ranatva is an occasional defect (anityado^a) in the
sense that a valid knowledge of its presence vitiates the
reason only so long as there is a doubt regarding the
presence of the probandum in the paksa. For
instance, in the example given in the text, iabdatva
(sound-ness) may be said to be not present in a
sapaksa, only so long as there is some doubt regarding
the presence of the probandum in the pak$a\ and if one
should be sure of the presence of the probandum in the
Pakfa and still desire to confirm one's knowledge by
means of inference, the probans sabdatva cannot be
said to be not present in any place where the probandum
is known for certain to be present, for the obvious
reason that the probaus is present in the pak$a t where
the probandum is already known for certain to be pre-
sent. Annambhatta adopts the view of the earlier
Naiyayikas in this matter. The later Naiyayikas define
atadharana to be a probans which is not co-existent
with its probandum (sadhy&sani&ntidhikaranah) ; and a
knowledge of the no*- existence of the probans and the
244 A PK1MER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PAXT ra
probandunt would prevent a knowledge of their invari-
able co-existence. The non-conclusive strayer (onupa~
samhdrin) is defective reason which has neither an
affirmative example (anvayadrstQnta) nor a negative
example (vyatirekadrstQnta). This is the view of the
earlier Naiyayikns and the illustration given by Annam-
bhatta in his text is based on this view. In this illus-
tration, all things come under paksa\ when there is
doubt regarding the probandum everywhere, there can
be no certainty concerning the co-existence of the pro-
bans and the probandum, anywhere; thus one cannot
have a conclusive knowledge of vyftptim such cases;
and this is how, in such cases, the probative value of
the probans comes to be vitiated. The later Naiyayikas
do not accept this view. They contend that, even
when 'o/r are pakfas, those particular cases in which
one may be sure of the co-existence of the probans and
the probandunt, may well be treated as drstanta; and
so, a toon-conclusive strayer (anupasamharin) should be
defined to be a defective probans, whose 'probandunt
happens to be omni-present (kevalGnvayin). The viti-
ating circumstance in this case is, according to the later
Naiyayikas, that a knowledge of the negative concomit-
ance (vycttirekary^pii) is prevented; and, in spite of
this defect, inferential cognition (anumiti) may arise
from a knowledge of positive concomitance alone
(anvayav^pti).
The adverse probans (viruddha) and the oppos-
able probans (satpratipaksa) should be carefully
distinguished. In the case of viruddha, the same
CH. n] INFERENCE
probans proves the contrary, the probandum being
known to be invariably concomitant with the absence of
the probans. In the case of satpratipaksa, the probans
admits of being counter-balanced by an opposite pro-
bans, which may be put forward to prove the contrary.
The vitiating circumstance in a viruddha is that it
prevents inference (anumiti). In the case of a sahprali-
paksa, the two counter-balancing reasons prevent each
other from producing the inference connected with it.
Some Naiyayikas hold that, in cases of satpratipaksa,
a dubitative type of inferential cognition (samSaya-
rupGnuwHi) arises. It will be seen that viruddhaiva is
a more serious defect than satpratipafaatva, for the
obvious reason that the former involves a greater
degree of carelessness in reasoning.
The unestablished reason (asiddha) is defective
in that a knowledge of the fact that the probans
is unestablished prevents a knowledge of the
presence of the invariably concomitant probans in the
Paksa (i.e., prevents paramaria) in the first two
varieties viz., Gfraydsiddha and svarup&siddha; while,
in the third variety v\z. % vy&pyatvasiddha, it is defec-
tive in that a knowledge of the relation of invariable
concomitance (vydptijiidna) is prevented. In con-
nection with the elucidation of the nature of uptidhi,
which is associated with the third kind of asiddha,
Annambhatta speaks of four kinds of adventitious cir-
cumstance (u pad hi) in his Dlpikd. These four varieties
are: (1) an adventitious circumstance with which, the
ptobandum, taken by itself, is concomitant (kevala-
s&dhyavyapakah) ; (2) one with which, the probvndum,
246 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
as determined by an attribute of paksa, is concomitant
(pakfadharm&vacchinnas&dhyavy&pakah) ; (3) <me
with which, the probandum, as determined by the p*o-
bvns, is concomitant (sadhanavacchinnasOdhyavyG-
P&kah) ; and (4) one with which, the probandum is
concomitant, as determined by an attribute not belong-
ing to the paksa, nor being the protans (udfisiHQ-
dharmfivacchinnasadhyavyaipakah). The instance cited
in the text, vis., con tact with wet fuel (firdrendhanasam-
yoga) is typical of the first variety of upddhi. In the
argument "Air is perceptible; because it has touch
which is perceptible" 'perceptible colour' (udbh&ta-
rftpa) is upadhi of the second variety; ior, with this
upadhi, the probandum perceptibility is invariably
concomitant, as determined by the attribute being an
external substance (bahirdravyatva) which belongs
to the pakfa. In the argument " Antecedent negation
is destructible; because it is producible", bhQvatiw
(ens-ness) is upadhi of the third variety; for, with this
up&dhi, the probandum-~ destruclibilit) is con-
comitant, as determined by the probans producibility.
In the argument "Antecedent negation is destructible;
because it is knowable", bhavatta is upadhi of the
fourth variety; for, with this upadhi, the Probandum is
concomitant as determined by producibility, which is
neither the pro bans nor any other attribute of the pak$a.
In all these four varieties, it will be seen that the
probans may be present in a place where the upadhi
may not be present (i.e., upadhivyabhicarin) ; that the
s&dhya (probandum) 9 in one of its fourformsdepcribcd
above, U invariably associated with the upadhi, which
QH. u] INFERENCE 24*
is thus sadhyavyfyaka] and that the probans, which
strays away from the sphere of sddhyavydpata, must
necessarily stray away from the sphere oisddhya itself.
A thing* whose extent is represented by a circle, which
has a portion falling outside the sphere of a second
thing represented by a second circle, must necessarily
have a portion falling outside the sphere of a third
thing represented by a third circle contained within the
second circle representing the sphere of the second
thing. This relation is embodied in the generalization:
"Whichever strays away from thejervadcr, must strajr
away from the pervaded" (yo yadvydpakavyabhicarQ
sa tadvyabhicdrl). On the basis of this generalization,
every case of upddhi leads to the inference of vyabhicfirv
and through such inference, prevents a knowledge of
vyapti. Some Naiyayikas hold that the vitiating cir-
cumstance in upddhi is that the negation of the parti-
cular upddhi admits of being put forward as a counter-
balancing probans to prove the contrary and that it
leads thus to the inference of satpratipaksatva. These
two vjiews are usually expressed thus in Sanskrit :-~
"Upddhih vyabhicdronndyakah" ; "Upddhih saiprali*
paksonndyakah".
The defect called bddha consists in the negation of
the probandum being already established by a stronger
proof, This defect directly prevents inference (a*lf*?
miti). It is sometimes suggested that it is unnecessary
to recognize bddha as a distinct defect of the probamj
for, it may be merged in vyabhicdra in cases where
probans is known to be present in pakfa which is
248 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART nr
to be devoid of the probandum ; and it may be merged
in asiddhi in cases where the paksa is known to be
devoid of the probans. It should, however, be remem-
bered that the suggested merger is not possible in certain
arguments like this. "A jar at the first moment of its
creation has smell; because it is earth" (ntpattiksane
ghatah gandhavan, prthivltvat); and that, in such
cases, the only defect that may be pointed out is badha.
The Vaisesikas recognize only three hctvdbhasas
viz., viruddha (the adverse probans), asiddha (the
uncstablished probans) and samdigdha (the doubtful
probans}. The last corresponds to what the Naiyayi-
kas call vyabhicara. The satpratipaksatva of the NySya
system may he brought under viruddha, according to
the Vaisesikas, and the badha, partly under samdigdha
and partly under asiddha.
It is necessary to differentiate the defective varie-
ties of the probans (hctvabhasah) described above,
from what are known in Gautama's Nyaya as chala,
j&ti and nigrahasthana. Chala is dialectic quibbling
mainly through equivocation. J&ti is a futile respon-
dence through parity or disparity. Gautama shows at the
end of the first ahnika of the fifth chapter of Nydya-
s&tras, how a debate, carried on exclusively through
j&ti, is bound to become a barren type of dialectic tu
quoque, leading to nothing. Nigrahasth&na is a vulne-
rable point which makes for defeat in a debate and need
not necessarily invalidate an argument. When a person
is described as navakambala in the sense that he has a
new blanket, it would be chala to object to the state-
CH.II] INFERENCE 249
ment by perversely misinterpreting it to mean 'having
nine blankets'. It should be noted here that the expres-
sion navakambala is ambiguous and may mean 'having
a new blanket* or 'having nine blankets/ To the argu-
ment "Sound is non-eternal, because it is produced,
like a jar'*, it would be a futile respondence (j&tyut tara)
to say "Sound may well be said to be eternal, because
it has no activity (niskriya), like ether". To shift
one's ground without adequate reason and give up the
thesis proposed to be maintained (pratifnahani and
fratijfiasariinyctsa), to be unable to give a suitable reply
when a reply is called for (apratibha) weak points
like these are vulnerable points (nigrahasthana) which
make for defeat in a debate. All the defective varie-
ties of probans (hctvabhasah) may also be treated as>
vulnerable points, while the latter, other than defective
reasons, do not invalidate an argument.
CHAPTER III
ASSIMILATION OR ANALOGY (uipamana)
37 T
Assimilation (upamana) is
the instrument of assimilative
cognition. Assimilative cogni-
tion (upamiti) consists in the
knowledge of the relation bet-
ween a name and the object de-
noted by it. Knowledge of simi-
larity is the efficient instrument
(karana} of such cognition.
This may be illustrated thus :
A person happens to be ignorant
of the exact meaning of the
word gavaya (a particular ani-
mal of the bovine species). From
a forester, he learns that a
gavaya is similar to a coze;; he
goes to a forest, sees the animal
called gavaya, which is similar
to a cow and recollects the in-
formation conveyed by the as-
similative proposition (atidefa-
vakya). Then the assimilative
cognition, "This is the animal
(of the bovine species) denoted
by the word gavaya' 9 arises.
Thus ends the chapter on
upamana.
CH. m] ASSIMILATION OR ANALOGY 251
The NyJya conception of upam&na as a distinct
instrument of valid cognition restricts its scope to as-
certainment of the primary denotative or significative
power of a word (saktigraha). The chief object of
the Naiyayikas in so restricting its scope is to save it
from being swallowed up in inference (anumana). It
should be carefully noted here that, according to the
MImamsakas, the cognition embodied in the proposition
"The animal called gavaya is similar to a cow" is the
efficient instrument (karaya) and the cognition <4 My
cow is similar to this animal called gavaya' 9 is the
resultant upamiti (assimilative cognition); whereas,
according to the KTaiyayikas the resultant upamiti is in
the form of the knowledge of the primary significative
power of the word gavaya (gavayapadasaktigraha).
It could be easily seen that the relation between the
karana (efficient instrument) and the phala (result),
according to the MImamsakas, is exactly similar to the
relation between the two propositions "A is similar
to B" and "B is similar to A". The Vaisesikas and
Bauddhas could easily show how the latter, viz. 9 "B is
similar to A" may be taken to be inferred from the
former, viz., "A is similar to B". The Naiyayikas
cleverly escape from this danger by narrowing the
scope of upamana as indicated above. One might,
however, remark that the Nyaya conception of upam&na
is singuhrly unpractical and unfruitful. V&tsy&y ana'f
remarks on upamtina, under l-i-6 and II-i-44 to 48,
throw some light on the practical value of this pramana.
,252 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART ra
The BJt&fyak&ra points out bow it would be of great
practical value to know exactly what is denoted by cer-
tain technical names of medicinal herbs, as used in the
Ayurveda literature. It should be remembered here
that the Indian view of a pram&na is that it is an effi-
cient instrument of valid knowledge, which possesses
such unchallenged certitude as is usually associated with
validity or as is not nullified by subsequent experience;
or according to some Indian thinkers, it is an efficient
instrument of valid knowledge, which possesses such
practical utility and effectiveness as is usually associa-
ted with validity. In this way, it would not be difficult
to appreciate the reasons why the Nai>ayikas regard
upamfina as a distinct pram&na.
CHAPTER IV
VALID VERBAL TESTIMONY. Sentence or
proposition (sab d ha)
38 T
(a) Valid verbal testimony
is a proposition set forth by a
trustworthy person (&pta). One
who habitually speaks only truth
is a trustworthy person (#/>/a) r
A sentence or proposition is a
group of words like "Bring a
cow" (gdntdttaya) .
(b) A word is that which
has significative potency (Sakti).
"From th'.s word, this concept
should be known" God's will
to this effect (Uvarasamketah)
is cabled fakti (significative po-.
tency).
The VaiSesikas would bring valid verbal testimony
also under inference. The Naiyayikas however, con-
tend that, in cases where valid knowledge is derived
from valid verbal testimony (<pram&nafabda) , one is
not conscious of any conclusion through subsumption
to a generalization ; but one is, on the contrary, con-
scious of a valid verbal cognition or judgment (tebda-
bodha) resulting from a knowledge of words, without
the mediacy of any such subsumptive process of
254 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PAtT in
thought. For this reason, the Nyaya system holds that
Jabda deserves the rank of a distinct pram&na.
The recognition of fab da as a distinct firam&nahzs
laid most of the Indian systems of philosophy open to
the charge of dogmatism. Careful students of Indian
philosophy know well that this charge, when put for-
ward in a sweeping form, can easily be exposed as
on certain misapprehensions. Certain objections
be raised by advocates of independent thinking
agaitist the vfcw of the Mlm&rtisakas that the relation
between a word and its meaning is eternal and that the
statements constituting the Vedas should be held to be
eternal and eternally valid and to possess self-evident
validity. But these objections cannot be raised
against the Ny&ya view of sabdapramana. This
view seeks to reconcile the Nyaya stand point of
ra/!0na/u*n with the conception of fabda as a distinct
source of valid knowledge, through the Nyaya theory
of extrinsic validity (paratahpr&manya). According to
the Naiyfiyikas, it should be remembered that a fabda
is a source of valid knowledge only in so far as the
source of sabda is a perfectly trustworthy person and
that validity (framdtva) of the knowledge derived from
a Sabda is extrinsically caused (paratah utpadyate)
through the reliability of the speaker and is also ex-
trinsically made out (faratah j nay ate) through verifi-
cation in direct experience. The Naiyayikas seek to
gain a twofold advantage by this view of tabda* One
advantage consists in the fact that they have succeeded
in freeing their rationalistic system of thought from the
Off. iv} VERBAL TESTIMONY 2*5
reproach of dogmatism ; and the other advantage con-
sists in the fact that they are able to base a theistic
argument on this view by pointing out that belief in the
infallibility of the Veda would necessarily imply a belief
in the Veda having been produced by an infallible
author such an infallible author in the case of Veda
being none other than the Omnipotent and Omniscient
God.
The primary significative potency of a word, called
padasakti, is the eternal significative relation between a
word and its sense, according to the Mimamsakas; and
it should be brought under fakti, which is a distinct
category or quality according to them. The Naiyayikas
refuse to accept this view and hold that the utmost that
could be said about padasakti is that it is the will of
God to the effect that a particular word should convey
a particular sen&e. This is on the assumption that
speech is not a human product but made by God for the
benefit of humanity.
39 T
(a) Vebal expectancy, con-
gruity and proximity these are
the causes which bring about
verbal cognition or judgment
from a proposition,
(t) Verbal expectaacfc
(ak&nk$a) consists in a word not
being capable %f conveying a
complete judgment in the absence
of another word.
256 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PA*T m
(c) Congruity (yogyaid)
consists in the sense being not
stultifiable.
(d) Proximity (sannidhi)
consists in the articulation of
words without undue delay.
(e) A sentence which is
devoid of expectancy and the
other two requirements (con-
gruitytnd proximity) does not
bring about a valid cognition.
For instance, a string of words
like "Cow, horse, man, elephant"
does not produce any judgment ;
for there is no verbal expectancy
(&k&nks&) here. The sentence
"One should sprinkle with fire"
does not produce a valid judg-
ment, as there is no congruity
here. Words like "Bring a
cow", uttered at long intervals,
cannot produce a valid judg-
ment, owing to want of proxi-
mity.
In section 39, Annambhatta briefly states the
Nyaya view regarding the accessories necessary for
arriving at a valid judgment from a proposition. In
every language, ftrtain words necessarily require certain
other words to complete the sense. For instance, a
verb denoting an action necessarily requires a kQraka
OH* tv] VERBAL TESTIMONY 257
such as a word denoting the agent or instrumtnt or
object of the action ; and in the absence of such a word*
it cannot convey a complete sense. This kind of
syntactic need is what is called verbal expectancy or
akfink?&. Words which are not required for syntactic
completeness or which have no kind of syntactic rela-
tion whatever cannot form a proposition. YoyyatA or
congruity of the sense is stated to be another require-
ment. One can easily see that, in the example given in
the text, the concept of fire is incongruous as a means
of sprinkling; because sprinkling is done with water*
and not with fire. When the words constituting a
sentence are uttered at long intervals, one cannot have
any connected thought and complete judgment in the
form of verbal cognition does not arise. With regard
to the causal connection between yogyata and s&bdor
bodha, there is difference of opinion among the Naiylr
yikas. Many Naiyayikas hold that a decisive know*
ledge of congruity (yogyattiniscaya) i a pre-requisite
of verbal cognition. Some of them maintain that a
decisive knowledge of incongruity (ayogyatanticaya)
prevents verbal cognition (Sabdabodhafratitwd/taka)
and the absence of sijch a counteracting 0gent is neces-
sary lot having the effect.
In this connection, attention may be drawn to the
relation between a decisive knowledge of the speaker's
intention (tatparyanifcayo) and the verbal cognition
(fabdabodha) arising from a sentence. Some hoGt
that tatfarywUcaya is an accessory cause of sdbda-
bodhai others hold that it is required only io cases
where ambiguous words or expressions are used ; and
'7 *
258 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
yet others maintain that, though it is required, it need
not be referred to separately as a cause of i&bdabodha*
for the reason that dkankjfl (syntactic expectancy)
consists in the need which one word has for another
word in order to convey the complete sense intended
to be conveyed and that, in this form, akankffi includes
tatparya.
Students of Nyaya will do well to note the essen-
tial features of the NySya theory of sdbdabodha.
This theory is, for all practical purposes, the Nyaya
theory of the import of propositions. The Nyaya view
is that only a determinate judgment (savikalpakajfidna)
is embodied in, and conveyed by, a proposition; every
proposition comprises at least a subject (uddefya) and
predicate (vidheya) ; in a verbal judgment (s&bda-
V.odha) arising in the hearer's mind from a proposition,
the meaning of the chief substantive in the nominative
case (pratham&totartha) plays the role of the leading
concept (mukhyavie?ya) and all the other concepts
are directly or indirectly subordinated to it ; the cogni-
tion arising from a proposition is always non-percep-
tual (par ok f a) ; and the additional element conveyed
by a sentence, over and above the separate concepts
conveyed by separate words, is the intended relation of
the concepts (padfirthasarnsarga) and this additional
element, which is the distinctive feature of a verbal
judgment (v&ky&rtha), is conveyed through the parti-
cular juxtaposition of words (samMrgamarytdd)^ and
not through a primary or secondary significative
power of words (abhidhd or lakfana). It may be
1 observed here that the juxtapositioa
OH. iv] VEDBAL TESTIMONY 259
yad&), referred to here, turns out to be identical with
co-utterance (samabhivydhtra), which i$ reducible to
the form of what is technically known as syntactic
expectancy (&kdnk$a).
It may be useful here to contrast the Nyaya theory
of iabdabodha with the sdbdabodha theories of certain
other Indian schools. According to the Vaiy&karanas,
the activity denoted by the root of the finite verb
(dhatvartha) is the leading concept in a verbal cogni*
tion arising from a sentence ; and according to the
BhaJtas, the wf to do 9 (fyti) denoted by the ending
of the finite verb is the leading concept there. If, from
the stand-point of logical analysis, the subject is the
central concept of a judgment, the meaning of the root
of the finite verb may be regarded as its central concept
from the stand-point of linguistic analysis; or the "will
to do\ denoted by the ending of the finite verb, may J>e
viewed as its central concept from the stand-point of
Mimariisa legalism.
The Nyaya system recognizes only two main types
of significative force (fabdavrtti) viz., abhidhd (the
primary significative force) and lak$an& (the secondary
significative force). It refuses to accept the third type
of significative force called vyanjana or suggestion,
which is recognized by the Alamkarikas as a distinct
type of sabdavrtti, and brings it under inference.
According to the Nyaya system, the primary significa-
tive force (abhidhd) includes two phases, which corres-
pond to connotation and denotation, and relate to j&ti
(generality) as the connoted attribute, and to vyakti
(the individual thing) as the denoted object qualified
260 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC
by such attribute. In other words, the Naiyayikas
generally maintain that the primary sense of & word is
ordinarily an individual qualified by a generic attribute
(jWtvUiftovyakti). Students of modern philosophy
will find it easy to see that, according to the Nyaya
system, the concepts conveyed by separate words are
apparent simples* but really petrified judgments. AH
the names, including proper names, are connotative,
according to Nyaya.
40-T
(a) There are two classes
of sentences : those that belong
to the Veda and those that
belong to secular speech. Those
that belong to the Veda are all
statements of God and therefore
authoritative. Of those that
belong to secular speech, such as
produced by trustworthy persons
are authoritative and others are
not authoritative.
(6) Verbal cognition (Mb*
dajnfaa) is the knowledge of
the meaning of a sentence. Its
efficient instrument (fear ana)
is sentence (iabda).
Here ends the chapter on
Verbal Testimony.
Thus valid experience
(yathtrthfaubhwa) has been
explained,
<?H. iv} ERROR 36!
41 T
(a) Erroneous experience
is of three kinds the three
varieties being doubt, misappre-
hension and indirect argument
(reductio ad alsurdum).
(b) A doubt is a cognition
which relates to several incom-
patible attributes in the same
thing as, in the dubitative cog-
nition "It may be a post or a
man".
(c) Misapprehension is a
false cognition as in the erro-
neous cognition of a nacre, in
the form ''This is silver".
(d) Indirect argument (re-
ductio ad absurdum) consists in
the hypothetical admission of
vyapya (an invariably concomi-
tant fact) which leads to the
admission of the pervasive con-
comitant (vytifiaka) ; as, "If
there were no fire, there would
be no smoke''.
42T
Recollection is also of two
kitfds: true and false. The
former is the result of a valid
experience; and the latter arises
from an erroneous experience.
262 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PAW m
In this connection students may be advised to read
again pages 104 to 146 of chapter I part III.
43 T
(a) Pleasure is a quality
which all consider agreeable.
(6) Pain is a quality which
all consider disagreeable.
(c) Desire is wish.
(d) Dislike is ill-feeling.
(e) Volitional effort is the
will to do.
(/) Dharma is the unseen
spiritual benefit accruing from
the performance of actions
which are enjoined by the Vedic
law.
(g) Adharma is the unseen
spiritual demerit accruing from
the performance of forbidden
actions.
(h) Cognition and the
following seven qualities (eight
in all) are the specific qualities
(vihsagun&h) found only in the
soul. Cognition, desire and
volitional effort may be eternal
or non-eternal; they are eternal
in God and non-eternal in the
ordinary souls of living beings
CH. iv] QUALITIES 26S
(i) There are three kinds
of tendencies or impressions-
speed, reminiscent impression
and elasticity. Speed belongs
to the substances earth, water,
fire, air and mind. Reminiscent
impression belongs only to the
soul and it results from a previ-
ous experience and causes recol-
lection. Elasticity is the ten-
dency of a thing to recover its
original form when it is changed.
Here ends the section dealing
with Qualities.
It would be useful if students read again, in this
connection, pages 13 to 15 of chapter I part III.
44 T
Activity is of the nature of
motion* Upward motion leads
to contact with an upper place.
Downward motion leads to con-
tact with a lower place* Con-
traction leads to contact with a
place near one's body. Expan-
sion leads to contact with a place
remdte from one's body. All
the other varieties of motion
come under 'going*.
264 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PAHTJB
45 T
Generality is a generic attri-
bute which is eternal and one
and inheres in many things. It
is found in substances, qualities
and activities. Existence (sattS)
15 the most comprehensive type
of generality. Substance-ness
and such others are less compre-
hensive.
46 T
Specialities are the differen-
tiating features belonging to
eternal substances.
47 T
Inherence is the eternal
relation, which belongs to the
inseparables. An inseparable
pair consists of two things of
which one thing, so long as it
does not come to an end, exists
only in the other thing: as
component part and the compo-
site whole, quality and subst-
ance, motion and moving body,
generality and the individual
having it, and speciality and the
ternal substance having it.
In this connection, students will do well to read
again pages 18 to 37 pi chapter I, part III.
CM, iV] NON-EXISTENCB
48 T
(a) Antecedent non-exis-
tence has no beginning but has
an end. It relates to the period
preceding the production of art
effect.
(b) Annihilative non-exis-
tence has a beginning but has no
end. It relates to the period
subsequent to the production of
an effect.
(c) Total non-existence is
the negation of a counter-corre-
lative in respect of relation to
all the three times present,
past and future as in the
statement* -"There Is no jar on
this spot"
(rf) Reciprocal non-exist-
ence is the negation of a counter-
correlative in respect of its
identity with another thing
as in the statement "A jar is
not a cloth".
Here, students should peruse again pages 37 to 52
of chapter I, part III.
49 T
All the other padSrthas may
be brought under one or the
other of the seven paddrthas
266 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
enumerated at the beginning of
this work. So, there are only
seven categories.
Here, attention is drawn to pages 4 to 8 of
chapter I, part III.
50 T
Annambhatta has written
this treatise called Tarkasam-
graha with the object of intro-
ducing beginners to a study of
theNyaya and Vaisesika systems
of Gautama and Kanada.
THUS ENDS THE TARKASAMGRAHA
SANSKRIT GLOSSARY
akhandadesa: indivisible space.
akhandopadhi : an attribute which is not a jati but
similar to it.
akhyati: non-apprehension,
acit: non-spirit; matter,
arm: atom; minute part,
anutval smallness.
anuparimana: atomic size,
atidesavakya : assimilative proposition,
ativyapti : over-applicability ; being too wide.
atyantabhSva : absolute non-existence,
atyantasat : non-being out-and-out,
adharma: unseen spiritual dement,
adhikarin: a qualified person or one to whom the
result accrues.
adhisthana: real substratum.
adhyavasaya: determinative cognition.
anavastha: endless regression.
anatman: non-soul.
anadi: without beginning.
anitya: non-eternal,
anityado?a: occasional defect.
anirvacanlyakhyati : indefinable's apprehension.
anirvacaniyata : indefinability.
anudbhuta: sub-perceptional.
anupasamharin ; non-conclusive reason.
268 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
anubhava : experience.
anumana: inference; instrument of inference,
anumiti: inference,
anuyogin: correlated substratum.
anuvyavasaya : after-cognition, in which the subject
also is presented.
anunasita: lukewarm.
antahkarana: inner instrument of knowledge.
antyavisesa: ultimate particularity.
anyathakhyati : misapprehension.
anyathasiddha: dispensable antecedent.
anyonyabhava: reciprocal negation; mutual non-
existence.
anvayadrsjanta : affirmative example.
anvayasahacara: sequence of positive factors.
anvayavyatirekin : concomitant in affirmation and
negation.
anvayav) apti : positive or affirmative concomitance.
ap: water.
apara : less comprehensive.
aparatva : spatial or temporal proximity.
apavarga : final emancipation.
apeksabuddhi : enumerative cognition.
apratyaksa : imperceptibility.
apramanya: error; invalidity.
abhava : non-existence.
abhidheya: denotable thing.
abhidheyatva : namability.
abhighata: striking; a kind of contact producing
sound.
SANSKRIT GLOSSARY 269
abheda: identity.
abhyasapratyaya : repetitional cognition,
amla: acid.
ayathartha: erroneous,
ayatharthanubhava : erroneous experience,
ayutasiddha : inseparable,
arani: tinder-stick,
artha: substance.
arthapatti: presumptive testimony,
alaukika: extra-normal,
avaksepana: downward motion,
avacchedaka : delimiting,
avacchedya: delimited,
avacchinna: delimited.
avayava: member; member of a syllogism; component
part.
avayavin : composite structure or product,
avinabhava: invariable relation,
aviveka : non-discrimination,
avyapadesya: non-verbal; unverbalisable.
avyapti: partial inapplicability,
avyapyavrtti : non-pervasive,
asakti : inability,
asat: non-being.
asatkhyati: non-being's apprehension,
asamavayikarana: non-inherent cause,
asambhava: total inapplicability,
asadharana ; special ; uncommon strayer.
asadharanadharma: specific feature,
asiddha: un-established reason,
asurabhi: non-fragrant.
270 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
akaraja : mine-born ; born of the mine.
akanksa: verbal expectancy; syntactic expectancy.
akaSa : ether.
akasatva: etherness.
akuncana : contraction.
agama ; verbal testimony.
atman: soul.
atmakhy&ti : self-apprehension.
atmasraya: self-dependence.
adarapratyaya : regardful cognition.
Aditya: Sun.
anumanika: inferential.
apta: trustworthy person; truth-teller.
ayojana: concretive activity.
arambhavada : creationistic theory of causation.
aropa : hypothetical admission.
asrayasiddha : unestablished in respect of abode.
iccha: desire.
indriya: sense-organ.
indriyatva: senseness.
indriyarthasannikara : relation between sense-organ
and object,
indhana: fuel.
Isvara : God.
utksepana: upward motion,
utpatti: production,
udarya: that of the stomach ; gastric,
udaharana : exemplification,
uddesa: enumeration.
uddeSya: subject,
udbhuta: perceptible; not sub-perceptional.
SANSKRIT GLOSSARY 271
upanaya : subsumptive correlation.
upamana: instrument of assimilation; assimilative
instrument; comparison,
upamiti : assimilative cognition or experience,
upalabdhi : apprehension,
upastambhaka : supportive,
upasthiti : thought,
upadanakarana: material cause,
upadhi : adventitious condition ; an attribute which is
not a jati.
upeksa: indifference.
usna: hot.
usnasparsa : hot touch.
eka : one.
katu : pungent.
kadamba : a kind of flower.
kapala: potsherd.
kapisa : brown.
kampana: shaking.
karana: efficient or instrumental cause.
karma : activity.
kalasatva : jarness.
kalpana : presumptive knowledge ; fictitious fabrication.
kasaya: astringent.
kama: wish.
karya : product.
kala : time.
kalikasambandha : time-relation.
krtakatva : producibility.
krti : volitional effort.
krsnatara: dark pupil.
272 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
kevalabhutala : empty floor.
kcvalavyatirekin : concomitant in negation alone,
kevaladhikarana : mere container,
kevalanvayin : concomitant in affirmation alone,
kriya : activity,
kriyatva: motion-ness,
krodha : ill-feeling,
ksana: moment.
kanikavijnana : momentary consciousness,
gandha: smell,
gamana: going,
guna: quality,
gurutva : weight,
ghatatva : potness.
ghrana: olfactory sense; sense of smell,
caksus: visual sense; sense of sight,
calana: motion,
cit 2 spirit; consciousness.
citra: variegated,
curna : powder,
chala: dialectic quibbling,
janya: producible thing,
japa: China rose,
jala : water.
jalpa: argument for victory; successful ad^v^x^v-
jati: generic or class attribute; specious and unavail-
ing objections or futile respondence.
jihva: tongue,
jiva: individual soul,
jivatmant individual soul,
jnapti: knowledge.
SANSKRIT GLOSSARY 273
jnana: knowledge,
ineya : knowable thing.
attvadhyavasaya: conclusive determination of truth,
adutpatti : casuality.
antu : thread,
amas: darkness.
arka : reductio ad absurdum ; indirect argument,
.adatmya : complete identity.
;ikta: bitter,
tun: shuttle.
:rna: straw.
:ejas: light; fire.
trasarenu : triad ; ternary product,
truti: triad; ternary product,
tvak: tactus; sense of touch.
Janda: stick,
dik: spatial direction,
divya: that of the sky.
dlrgha: long.
dustahetu: defective probans.
duhkha: pain,
drstanta: typical instance.
Jravatva : fluidity,
dravya: substance,
drav^' *va : substanceness.
dvyanuka : dyad ; binary product,
dvesa : dislike.
dharma : merit ; unseen spiritual benefit; attribute*
dharmin: thing qualified,
dhatu : verbal root,
dbrti : sustaining effort.
#4 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
dhvani: noise.
naman : name.
nigamana : conclusion.
nigrahasthana : vulnerable point.
nitya: eternal.
nityadosa: permanent defect.
nityaguna: eternal quality.
nididhyasana : constant meditation.
nimittakarana: instrumental cause.
niyata: invariable.
niyatapurvavrtti : invariable antecedent.
nirupaka: correlating; correlated.
nirnaya: decisive knowledge.
nirvacana: definite predication.
nirvikalpaka: indeterminate.
niScaya : determination.
nikampapravrtti : unfaltering effort.
nila: blue.
nodana: pushing.
naimittika: artificial.
paksa: minor term; subject.
pakata : subject ness.
paksadharmata : subject-ad junctness.
pata: cloth.
patatva : clothness.
patupratyaya : vivid cognition.
padftrtha ; category.
para: more comprehensive.
paratva: temporal or spatial remoteness.
paratastva : extrinsicality.
paratahprSmanya : theory of extrinsic validity.
SANSKRIT GLOSSARY 275
paratograhya : made out extrinsically.
paramanu : atom.
paramatman : Supreme Soul.
paramparasambandha : indirect relation.
paramarsa: subsumptive reflection.
pararthanumana: inference for others.
parardha: one thousand crores of crores.
parinama: modification; digesting.
parimana: size.
parlksa: investigation.
paroksa: non-perceptual.
paka: heat; baking.
pacaka : a cook.
parimandalya : the smallest size conceivable; atomic
size.
paana: stone,
pinda: lump,
pita: yellow,
puruja: spirit,
pf thaktva : separateness.
prthivl: earth,
prthvi: earth,
prakara: adjunct,
prakarata: adjunctness.
prakasa : luminosity,
prakrti : primordial matter,
pracaya : loose contact,
pratijfia: thesis,
pratipadyapratipadakabhava : relation of the
and the treatise,
pratibandhaka: counter-agent.
276 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART m
pratiyogin: correlative; counter-correlative.
pratiyogitS : correl&tiveness>.
pratiyogitatva: the state of being correlativeness.
pratyaka: perception; perceptive instrument
pradhvmsabhava : annihilative non-existence.
prama : valid knowledge.
pramana: means of valid knowledge; valid knowledge.
pramatva : validity.
prameya: object of valid knowledge; cognizable thing.
prameyatva: knowability.
prayatna: volition,
prayojana : purpose ; aim.
pralaya: dissolution; universal dissolution.
pravrtti: volitional decision.
prasarana: expansion.
pragabhava : antecedent non-existence.
pratyaksika; perceptual.
pramanya: truth; validity.
pretyabhava : cycle of death and birth.
phala: result.
phallbhutajnana: resultant cognition.
baddha: bound.
badhakapratiti: sublating cognition.
badhita : stultified reason.
buddhi : cognition.
bhavakarya : positive product.
bhavana: reminiscent impression.
bhavapadartha : existent entities.
bhasvara; brilliant.
bhitti: wall.
bhuta : elemental being.
SANSKRIT GLOSSARY 277
bhutatva : elementness.
bhuyodarsana : repeated observation.
bheda: difference.
bhedasahisnu : compatible with difference.
bhauma: that of the earth.
mani: lens.
madhura: sweet.
inanas: mind.
manana: reflective thinking.
manusyatva: humanity.
mahat : large.
mahattva: largeness.
mahakala: undivided time.
mahasamanya: grand generality ; the summum genus.
mana: measurement.
manasapratyaksa : mental perception.
mithya: unreal.
mithyajnana: false cognition.
mukti : final emancipation.
murta: moving substance; limited in size.
mrgatva : bcasthood.
mrt: clay.
yatna: volitional effort.
yathartha: real.
yogyata: congruity.
yogyanupalabdhi: effectual non-cognition.
rakta: red.
rajas: passion.
rasa: taste.
rasana: sense of taste; gustatory sense.
rupa: colour.
278 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [?ART m
rupatva: colourness.
lakana: definition.
lavana: salt.
laghava: principle of parsimony or economy.
linga: probans; mark; reason.
lingaparamarsa : subsumptive reflection of the probans.
loka: world.
Varuna: Water-God.
varna: alphabet.
vahni: fire.
vakyarthabodha : verbal judgment.
vada: argument for truth.
vayu: air,
vayuloka : world of Wind-God.
vikalpa : fictitious fabrication.
vijnana: consciousness.
vitaruja: destructive argument or objection.
vidyut: lightning.
vidheya: predicate.
vipaka: counter-example.
viparitakhyati : contrary experience.
viparyaya : misapprehension.
vibhaga: division; disjunction.
vibhagaja: caused by disjunction.
vibhudravya: all-pervasive substance.
viruddba : adverse probans or re; son.
visi|apratiti: determinate cognition.
visesa : particularity.
viSesaguna : specific quality.
vis^sana: adjunct.
visesyata ; substantiveness.
SANSKRIT GLOSSARY 279
visaya; object; subject-matter.
viayata: objectness.
visayatatva : the state of being objectness.
visayita: subjectness.
vrksa: tree.
vrtti: activity; modification,
vega: speed,
veman: loom,
vyakti : individual unit,
vyanjana: suggestion,
vyatirekadrstanta : negative example,
vyatirekavyapti : negative concomitance; negative gene-
ralization.
vyatirekasahacara : concomitance of negation,
vyavasaya : cognition in which an object is presented
and not the subject,
vyapara : activity ; intermediate cause,
vyapti: co-extension; invariable concomitance,
vyapyatvasiddha: unestablished in respect of its con-
comitance.
vyapyavrtti: pervasive,
vyavartaka: differentiating feature,
vyavrtti : differentiation,
vyasajyavrtti : partially contained,
sakti: significative potency or power; potentiality,
sabda: proposition; verbal testimony; sound,
sabdaja: caused by sound,
sabdatanmatra: subtle sound,
sabdavrtti: significative force,
sarira: body; form,
sabda : verbal ; verbal experience.
280 A PRIMER OF INDIAN LOGIC [PART in
Sabdajnana: verbal cognition.
s&bdabodha : verbal cognition.
Ita: cold.
sitasparsa: cold touch.
Sukti: nacre.
Sukla: white.
syama: black.
sravana: understanding.
gruti: Revealed Texts.
sakatnpapravrtti ; halting effort.
sakrddarsana : single observation.
sat : being.
satta: existence.
sattva: goodness.
satpratipaksa : opposable reason.
sapaksa: similar instance.
samavaya: inherence.
samavayin : constitutive.
samavayik3rana : constitutive or inherent or intimate
cause,
samudra: ocean.
samuhalambana : group cognition,
samkhya: number,
sarhdigdha: doubtful probans.
sannikarsa: sense-relation,
sannidhi: proximity,
sambandha: relation,
sarhyoga: conjunction,
sarhyogaja : caused by contact,
sarhsaya: doubt,
samsarga; relation.
SANSKRIT GLOSSARY 281
samsargata:: relationness.
samskara: tendency or impression; reminiscent
impression,
sarit : river.
Sarvajna: Omniscient,
savikalpaka : determinate,
savyabhicara : straying reason,
santa: having an end.
sadrsya: similarity,
sadhana : middle term ; probans.
sadharana: general; common strayer.
sadhya: probandum; major term,
samagri: the whole causal apparatus,
samayikabhava : temporary non-existence,
samanya: generality,
samanyavisesa : generic differentia,
samkarya: unwarranted blend,
samsiddhika: natural,
siddhanta: established conclusion,
sukha: pleasure,
surabhi: fragrant,
suvarna : gold,
srsti: creation,
sthitasthapaka : elasticity,
sneha: viscidity.
sparSa: touch,
sphatika: crystal.
sphota: the eternal substratum of significativcncs?.
smrti: recollection,
smarana: recollection,
svatastya: intrinsicality.
282 A PRIMER OF 1NDIJLN W&IC [ PART .in
svatograhya: intrinsically made out*
svafojanya : intrinsically brought about,
svatovyavartaka : self-discriminating,
svatovyavrtta : self-differentiated,
svarupasambandha : self-relation; self-linking*
svarupasiddha: unestablished in respect of itself .
svarthanumana : inference for oneself,
svetarabheda: difference from the rest,
harita: green.
hetu: probans; reason; valid reason ; middle Ufm.
hetvabhasa : fallacious reason ; semblance of
defective probans.
hrasva: short.
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