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PUBLICATIONS

OF THE

NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY

VOL. XLVI.

THE SPENCER PAPERS

VOL. I.

*VS *

47702 .

PRIVATE PAPERS '^^PPCD

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^ xi
OF

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(gtorge, second ®arl Spencer

FIRST LORD OF THE ADMIRALTY
1794-1801

EDITED BY

JULIAN S. CORBETT, LL.M.

VOL. i. 4770:2

PRINTED FOR THE NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY
MDCCCCXIII

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ONTARIO

THE COUNCIL

OF THE

NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY

1912-1913

PATRON
THE KING

PRESIDENT
THE RIGHT HON. LORD GEORGE HAMILTON, G.C.S.I.

GRAY, ALBERT, K.C.

VICE-PRESIDENTS

KERR, ADMIRAL OF THE FLEET

KENYON, SIR FREDERICK G.,
K.C.B., F.B.A.

LORD WALTER T., G.C.B.
SANDERSON, LORD, G.C.B.

COUNCILLORS

ACLAND, REGINALD B. D., K.C.
ATKINSON, C. T.
BLOMFIELD, REAR-ADMIRAL SIR
R. MASSIE, K.C.M.G.

BRIDGE, ADMIRAL SIR CYPRIAN
A. G., G.C.B.

BRINDLEY, HAROLD H.
CHILDERS, ERSKINE.
CORBETT, JULIAN S.
COWIE, MAJOR NORMAN, D.S.O.
CUST, REAR-ADMIRAL H. E.

PUREY, C.B.

CUSTANCE, ADMIRAL SIR REGI-
NALD N., K.C.B., K.C.M.G.

DESART, THE EARL OF, K.C.B.

ESHER, VISCOUNT, G.C.B.,
G.C.V.O.

FAWKES, ADMIRAL SIR WILMOT
H., G.C.B., K.C.V.O.

FIRTH, PROFESSOR C. H., LL.D.,
F.B.A.

HUDLESTON, CAPTAIN RALPH,
R.N.

KlLBRACKEN, LORD, G.C.B.

LAUGHTON, SIR JOHN KNOX,
D.Litt, R.N.

MARSDEN, R. G.

SLADE, REAR-ADMIRAL SIR
EDMOND J. W., K.C.I.E.,
K.C.V.O.

SYDENHAM, LORD, G.C.M.G.,
G.C.S.I., G.C.I.E.

TANNER, J.- R., Litt.D.

TARLETON, COMMANDER A. H.,
R.N., M.V.O.

THURSFIELD, J. R.

YORKE, SIR HENRY F. R., K.C.B.

SECRETARY
W. G. PERRIN, Admiralty, S.W.

TREASURER
SIR W. GRAHAM GREENE, K.C.B., Admiralty, S.W.

The COUNCIL of the NAVY RECORDS SOCIETY wish
it to be distinctly understood that they are not answer-
able for any opinions or observations that may appear
in the Society's publications. For these the responsi-
bility rests entirely with the Editors of the several works.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION

A SHORT time before his lamented death our first
President, the fifth Earl Spencer, in final testimony
of the warm interest he had always taken in the
Society, placed at its disposal for publication a
large mass of papers, which had : belonged to
his grandfather and predecessor in the office of
First Lord of the Admiralty. A cursory examina-
tion of the series of documents was enough to
reveal their peculiar historical importance, and
without hesitation the Council decided to avail
themselves of the opportunity which had been
so generously offered, and to issue a full selection
of them at the earliest opportunity.

Consisting as they do of a complete collection
of the unofficial correspondence of the second Earl
Spencer with ministers, officers at sea, and others
during the whole period he presided at the Board,
they form material which, above all, the Society
exists to deal with. For, intimate as they are,
going deeper into the well-springs of history than
do the regular official documents, such papers
seldom or never find their way into the public
archives of the Kingdom, and but for the action

viii THE SPENCER PAPERS

of the Society and the public spirit of their owners
would remain almost inaccessible to students.

The collection comprises, in the first place,
eight cases into which the more important miscel-
laneous documents have been bound on docketed
guards and in chronological order. These cases
contain alone nearly 2000 items, and it is the first
four that are dealt with in the present volume.
The process of selection upon this selection has
been almost painful, so many are the documents
of personal and political interest that it has been
necessary to lay aside. The system adopted
has been to discard all documents relating to
promotions and patronage and all those which
relate to home politics and the working of our
somewhat cumbrous political machine, in which
Lord Spencer, like the good politician he was,
took an active interest. Next have been omitted
letters to and from officers afloat which, however
great their literary and picturesque interest, do
not really concern the main flow of naval affairs.
Foremost amongst this class is a voluminous
correspondence with Sir Sidney Smith while
he was in command of a cruiser squadron in the
Channel. In spite of his activity on the French
coast his facile and garrulous pen was able to
pour out an interminable flow of the half-digested
and sanguine ideas that were always teeming in

his brain, and Lord Spencer endured the flood

possibly with pleasure, certainly without resent-
ment. Indeed, Sir Sidney's lively style was
entertaining enough and sometimes instructive,
as the one or two letters selected for publication

GENERAL INTRODUCTION ix

will show; but it would be impossible to deal
with the whole otherwise than in a special volume.
For reasons of space it has been necessary to
pass over an almost equally lengthy but far more
serious correspondence with General Bentham
on the organisation of the dockyards when he
was appointed to the new office of Inspector-
General of Naval Works.

Besides the selected papers in the cases there
are a number of loose letters tied up in bundles
containing almost as many more items. Most
important are (i) a bundle of Nelson letters,
nearly all of which have been printed by Nicolas
in the Addenda to the seventh volume of his
Despatches and Letters. None of these, however,
relate to the period covered by this volume ;
(2) seven bundles of St. Vincent letters extend-
ing from August 1796 to the end of 1800 ; (3) a
bundle of Duncan letters reporting almost day
by day the tedious details of his interminable
blockade in the North Sea. Besides these there
are bundles containing correspondence with Pitt,
Dundas, Grenville, Portland, Colpoys, Bridport,
and Gardner, and one labelled ' various/

An examination of all these bundles indicates
that they contain the correspondence which was
not regarded as of sufficient importance or interest
to be preserved in the cases. They have been
gone through carefully, however, and submitted
to a process of selection like the rest. A few
items appear in the present volume, but most of
those selected relate to the later years of Lord
Spencer's administration.

I a

x THE SPENCER PAPERS

The process of arranging the papers for
publication was attended with the usual diffi-
culties. A simple chronological presentation would
have been easy enough, but would scarcely have
served the purpose for which the Society exists.
If such papers are to be of real and general service
in illustrating the principles of naval and maritime
warfare an arrangement by subjects is imperative.
At the same time, if the chronological arrangement
is ignored altogether, the mutual reactions of
the various theatres of operation are lost and it
becomes difficult to see the war, to which the
papers relate, as a whole — every part of which
necessarily deflected or assisted every other part.
An attempt therefore at a compromise has been
made by grouping the papers under selected
subject-heads and arranging these groups as far
as possible in their proper sequence.

The period during which George John, second
Earl Spencer, held the office of First Lord of the
Admiralty was one of the most memorable in
our naval annals, for his six years of office saw
fully adopted the tactical and signal system
of Kempenfelt and Howe, and the new discipline
of Jervis which together lifted the art of war
under sail to its zenith ; they saw the victories
of St. Vincent, Camperdown and the Nile which
gave to the British Navy a permanent position of

GENERAL INTRODUCTION xi

dominance throughout the Great War ; and they
saw the great mutinies, during which it touched
perhaps its lowest depths. And to the distinction
which these events give to his administration
must be added the fact that no one before or
since has held the office so long in time of war.

It was in the summer of 1794, when the
Portland Whigs decided to coalesce with Pitt's
government, that he came to office. Already,
though he was still but thirty-six, he had made
his mark not only as a grand seigneur but as a
man of exceptional ability and character. Born
in 1758, great-grandson of Charles Spencer, Earl
of Sunderland, and son of the first Earl Spencer,
with one sister, the ' beautiful duchess/ married
to the Duke of Devonshire and another to the
Earl of Bessborough, he was of the inmost circle
of the Whig aristocracy, and during the brief
Buckingham administration he had been a Junior
Lord of the Treasury. In 1781 he married Lavinia,
daughter of the first Earl of Lucan, a famous
lady whose beauty and charm, no less than
her wit and intellect, made his house the most
brilliant centre of all that was best in English
society. His own inclinations were literary and
scientific. Fostered by Sir William Jones, the
famous oriental scholar, who was his private
tutor from the age of seven, they were ripened
by frequent travel abroad in Italy, France,
Germany, and Holland. Such tastes indeed
became ultimately his most cherished character-
istic, and while playing the part of a great
nobleman, both in town and country, he found

xii THE SPENCER PAPERS

time, apart from his duties of State, to be for
forty years a Trustee of the British Museum
and to spend on the Althorp library so much
enthusiasm that before he died it was held to
be the finest private collection in Europe.1

As Lord Althorp he sat in the House of
Commons, first for Northampton and then for
Surrey, from 1780 to 1783, but on being called
to the Upper House at the death of his father
in October of that year he ceased for some time
to figure prominently in political life. This must
have been by his own desire, for in 1789 he
was offered and declined the Lord-Lieutenancy of
Ireland. The real commencement of his life as a
statesman dates from the year 1794, when the
Portland Whigs, at the instigation of Burke, and
moved by the excesses of the Terror, resolved
to break with Fox. They saw the time had come
to join with Pitt in a united national effort to put
heart into the languishing war, to rouse Europe
to a sense of the common danger, and to inspire
the halting Powers to abandon their self-seeking
pre-occupations and combine in putting an end
to the intolerable European situation. Burke's
patriotic efforts were entirely successful ; the
' Foxites ' went off to Brooks's, it was said, in
a single hackney coach (though George LByng
protested they filled two), and early in July 1794
the new government was formed. Portland him-
self took the Home Office, and should have had

1 Sir John Laughton, in the Dictionary of National Biography,
art. ' George John Spencer,' and information furnished by the
present Earl Spencer. ;

GENERAL INTRODUCTION xiii

the control of military affairs, but Pitt insisted
on the conduct of the war remaining in the hands
of his special friend Dundas and created for him
the new office of Seer etary-of- War. With him
was Windham, as Secretary-at-War, and Spencer
became Privy Seal. At the Admiralty, where
Lord Chatham had presided since 1788, no change
was made, though, whatever may have been his
fitness for times of peace, it was becoming obvious
that his powers were unequal to the strain of war.
Still he was allowed to go on, mainly owing to the
King's favour and partly no doubt because the
' glorious First of June ' had done something to
cover his incompetence and might have appeared
less glorious had he been removed immediately.

Equally unsatisfactory had been the Duke
of York's conduct of the war in Holland, and
thither Windham was despatched at once on
a mission to rouse the Dutch and to study the
situation, while Spencer, in company with Thomas
Grenville, set out for Vienna as Ambassador Extra-
ordinary to endeavour to bring Austria to a sense
of the need of exerting herself in the common
cause for the relief of the military situation in
Holland. But Austria, like Prussia, was too much
occupied with the prospect of the partition of
Poland for him to have a chance of success and he
returned in the autumn practically empty-handed.
By that time the efforts of the new government to
find a better line of operation, more independent of
their exasperating allies, had taken shape in a design
to assist the Royalists in Brittany and La Vendee.
The immediate result was to bring out more

xiv THE SPENCER PAPERS

glaringly than ever the unfitness of Lord Chatham
for his post. The ' First of June ' had opened
the way for military action where it was required,
but delay and confusion in the naval ports
paralysed everything, and Pitt found it necessary
to persuade the King to remove his brother. It
was arranged that he and Lord Spencer should
exchange offices, and accordingly on I7th Decem-
ber, 1794, the young First Lord began his famous
administration.

His 'Sea/ or 'Professional' Lords, as they
were then called, were Lord Hood, Vice- Admiral
Sir Alan Gardner (afterwards Lord Gardner), Vice-
Admiral Philip Affleck, a disciple of Howe and
Kempenfelt, and Vice- Admiral Sir Charles Middle-
ton, Bart. — more famous as Lord Barham, who,
after holding the Comptrollership for twelve years,
had resigned it in disgust in 1790, and, after acting
unofficially for four years as Lord Chatham's
confidential adviser, had joined the Board in
May, I794-1 The First Secretary was the veteran
Philip Stevens who had been appointed Second
Secretary at the end of the Seven Years War in

1 According to Sir John Laughton (Barham Papers, II, p. xx)
he was Senior Naval Lord, but Hood was promoted to Admiral
in April 1794 and Middleton not till June 1795. As Hood,
however, was commander-in-chief in the Mediterranean, Middle-
ton was in effect Senior Naval Lord. Hood, recalled nominally
on sick leave, returned to England in December 1794, and ceased
to be a member of the Board on 7th March, 1795, according to
the official Admiralty List. He continued however to hold the
Mediterranean command nominally till 2nd May, when he was
suddenly ordered to strike his flag. The inner history of this
regrettable step is not known. Nelson put it down to intrigue.
Middleton was nearly related to Dundas, and Hood had never
got on with the military staff and particularly with General
David Dundas.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION xv

1761, and became First Secretary in 1763. In
March 1795, after forty-four years' unrivalled
experience of war, he was made a member of
the Board and Evan Nepean succeeded him with
William Marsden as Second Secretary.

The general situation when Lord Spencer
took up the reins was peculiarly depressing. All
hope of effective co-operation from our allies
was gone; the army in Holland had failed and
Windharn was reporting that the Duke of York
must be removed ; in the Mediterranean, owing
to Austria's failure to relieve Lyons, Lord Hood
had been forced to evacuate Toulon and, being
excluded from Tuscany by the Grand Duke's
submission to France, had been forced in concert
with General Charles Stuart to seize Corsica as
a base ; Lord Howe's victory was known to have
failed in its main strategical object, and the re-
newed activity in Brest showed that it was
indecisive ; in the West Indies, of which more
must be said later, things were going very
badly ; l and, worst of all, the great chance of
assisting the Royalists had been missed.2 On
the other hand the arms of the Revolution were
on all sides successful. Already masters of the
Netherlands, they were pushing into Holland ;
the Rhine for almost its entire length was now
their frontier ; a French army was wintering
in Catalonia and the Piedmontese found them-
selves unable to hold the main passes into
Italy. Prussia and Tuscany had abandoned the

See post, p. 131. 2 See post, p. 20

xvi THE SPENCER PAPERS

struggle, and Spain, beguiled with a hope of
absorbing Portugal, was offering terms of peace.
Seldom has a new British government had to
face so dark an outlook.

Ill

Of the men who were associated with Spencer
in the discouraging task before him, and who
appear as his chief correspondents, the foremost
is Henry Dundas — to whom, as we have seen,
Pitt, having at this time little confidence in his
own powers as a war minister, had committed the
conduct of the war. He is best known to us now
in the pages of Mr. Fortescue, who, in his History
of the British Army and his British Statesmen of
the Great War, has left him with scarcely a rag
to cover his reputation.

No one has so fully earned the right to pass
judgment, and the facts are very hard against
the culprit. Yet those who read his undaunted
and well-reasoned letters to Lord Spencer, and
especially those in which he protests against
excessive concentration in home waters and
against abandoning the Mediterranean, will feel
that the man was not all shallow se|f-confidence
and heady miscalculation — that he Ifad, at least
on occasion, an eye for the great ijnes of a war
and kept at any rate a stout heart that would
not despair of his country.

But here we are concerned mainly with the
personality of a man who was one of Lord Spencer's
chief correspondents. Born in 1742 of a well-

GENERAL INTRODUCTION xvii

known Scottish legal family, he soon acquired
a large practice at the Bar, and made his mark
in Parliament as a bitter opponent of America
and a trenchant supporter of Lord North. Yet
he was clever enough to keep his place as Lord
Advocate under Rockingham and to get from his
successor the Scottish signet for life with a mono-
poly of patronage that made him for thirty years
an uncrowned king in the North. Perceiving early
Pitt's ability he was quick to become one of his
men, and being made Treasurer of the Navy in
his first Administration, was advanced in 1791
to the Home Office and given the conduct of
the war when it broke out. A more ill-assorted
friendship than that which existed between him
and the icy and correct Prime Minister would be
hard to find. ' Dundas,' says Mr. Fortescue, ' was
not only highly convivial over the bottle . . .
but genial to every one, never forgetting, to his
credit, those who had known him before he rose
to high office. Yet his mind was coarse and his
ideals low. . . . Probably, like Pitt, he was at his
best in the House of Commons, where his speeches
are said to have been eloquent and were certainly
disingenuous, but where his cheerful address and
broad Scottish accent doubtless reconciled many
to the chilling superiority of his young leader/

William Wyndham Grenville (Lord Grenville),
the Foreign Secretary, was a man much more of
Lord Spencer's stamp. Born in the same year as
his cousin the Prime Minister, he was an accom-
plished scholar and linguist. A keen student of
all that a Foreign Secretary should know, he

xviii THE SPENCER PAPERS

is said to have possessed every qualification
for the post except that sense of humour and
sympathy which goes so far to give a power
of dealing with men and smoothing rough places
with happy compromise. Seeing how delicate
was the game he had to play and how exalted
and self-seeking were the kings at the table, these
qualities were poorly supplied by his industry,
uprightness, and strength of character, par-
ticularly as that strength too often broke out
in violent public utterance.

William Windham, the Secretary-at-War, was,
after Pitt himself, the most brilliant man in the
Cabinet. A scholar and mathematician who had
been the best beloved of Dr. Johnson's young
friends, he possessed a distinction of manner, a
sparkling wit, and a high capacity for social
enjoyment which have inspired his warmest
admirers to claim for him the character of
the finest gentleman of his time. But here we
are less concerned with his attractive versatility
than with those more solid and sagacious quali-
ties which have earned for him the reputation
of being the one man in Pitt's Cabinet who
knew how such a war should be conducted. It
is supposed, indeed, that the reason for his being
brought to the War Office was to meet the open
dissatisfaction with which the Portland Whigs
regarded Dundas's sprawling and unscientific
war plans. His general view, which he shared
with Sir Charles Middleton, cannot be better given
than in the words he wrote to Gilbert Elliot on
the danger of spreading the war prematurely to

GENERAL INTRODUCTION xix

the West Indies. ' I think/ he said, ' if you see
Dundas it may not be amiss to urge the danger
of running after distant [objects], while the great
object lies still — of hunting the sheep till you have
killed the dog. The most fatal error will be, I ap-
prehend, the seeking to preserve the popularity of
the war by feeding it with conquests/ l Seeing
clearly that the war was one that could not be
ended quickly except on unlimited lines, he was
for concentrating every possible effort on the heart
of the enemy, and to the last remained the prime
mover in the attempts to combine in the fullest
possible strength with the Chouans and Vendeans
for the overthrow of the Republican government.
Again, writing to Pitt on the same subject, he
says : ' I cannot but think that all this [the West
Indian project] belongs to a wrong system, and
a system that will be more wrong because the
enemy will probably adopt the right one. If
you extend your operations, they will, for that
very reason, concentrate theirs. They will see
that they cannot defend all parts and will there-
fore make up their minds to defend those only
where the wound would be mortal ; and, having
succeeded in that endeavour, will soon bring you
to a state in which you can no longer wound
them mortally or otherwise. What will the most
fortunate blow do in any other quarter if the
great enterprise fails ? On the other hand, what
does it signify whether any blow is made or not,
if the great enterprise succeeds ? . . . Whatever

1 Fortescue, British Statesmen ; and see ' Middleton to Spencer,'
post, p. 51.

xx THE SPENCER PAPERS

we may propose, the enemy will, I am persuaded,
put their whole force to repel that which they
see goes to their very existence ; and if we do
not act on the same principle and collect all our
force to give effect to the effort so directed against
them, that effort will probably fail and with it
all the hopes of any satisfactory conclusion of
the war/

Though he thus proclaimed the doctrine of
unlimited war and was right in forecasting that
Dundas's method would end in a lame conclusion,
his prognostication of the line the enemy would
take was wrong. They did not reply by a con-
centration of effort. They too spread their opera-
tions to all the threatened points and did no
more than make a feint of a blow at the heart
which Windham feared. Correct as was his
counsel theoretically, it fell on ears which were
singing with confused memories of the Seven
Years War and were deaf to the voice that
warned them that the present war was of a wholly
different nature. Pitt no less than Dun das was
unable to see that the object in view was not
in the same category as that of his father's war
and that it could not be attained on the same
lines. They were, in fact, making what the great
German strategist characterised as the most fatal
mistake that can be made : ' they were mistak-
ing the war for something and seeking to make
of it something which from its inherent conditions
it can never be/ l

1 For further consideration of Pitt's and Dundas's West
Indian policy, see post, Introductory Note, p. 131.

GENERAL INTRODUCTION xxi

POSTSCRIPT. — When the present volume was
going to press Lord Spencer (the sixth Earl) was
good enough to communicate to the Society the
information that further correspondence of his
grandfather (the second Earl) had come to light
at Althorp, and that it comprised amongst other
matter a quantity of letters and other documents
relating to naval affairs of the same character
as those referred to above. An inspection that
was invited proved it to be of no less value than
that which was already known and available.
The new material, which most generously has been
placed at the disposal of the Society, consists
mainly of bundles of original letters from officers,
with drafts of the First Lord's replies and orders,
but there are also many drafts of secret plans and
projects which should prove of no small interest.

As an example of the value of the new dis-
coveries it may be mentioned that we have now
the private correspondence of a very intimate
character with Sir John Jervis and Admiral
Mann during the critical period which led to the
evacuation of the Mediterranean. We are thus
able to complete our knowledge of that much-
discussed episode, but as it was found impossible
to include the new material in Part VII of the
present volume, to which it properly belongs, it
has had to be held over for the commencement
of the next volume. This arrangement, although

xxii THE SPENCER PAPERS

to some extent inconvenient, is the less to be
regretted in that the new letters deal with the
naval side of the question, while the papers now
printed regard it mainly from its political aspect.
To the obligation under which the Society
is placed in the matter, the Editor would add a
personal acknowledgment of the invaluable help
he has received from Lord Spencer in dealing
with the papers, and particularly from the criti-
cism and suggestions arising out of his peculiarly
intimate knowledge of the times and personality
of his grandfather and his familiarity with the
statesmen who shared the glory and the pain of
that famous Administration.

CONTENTS

PAGE

GENERAL INTRODUCTION vii

PART I. GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE, 1794-5

Introductory Note ...... .3

Correspondence ........ 5

PART II. THE QUIBERON EXPEDITION

Introductory Note . . , -65
Correspondence . 71

PART III. THE WEST INDIAN EXPEDITION

Introductory Note .131

Plans and Preparation . . . . , . ,. 139

Supersession of Middleton and Laforey . . .165

Naval Protest against the Duke of York's Regulations . 191

Cornwallis's Court Martial .... . . 220

PART IV. GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE, 1796-7

Introductory Note 233

Correspondence ...... . 235

xxiv CONTENTS

PART V. OPERATIONS IN THE WEST INDIES, 1796

PAGE

Introductory Note . . . . . 281

Correspondence ...... . 283

PART VI. PROJECTED ATTACK ON THE TEXEL

Introductory Note ....... 299

Correspondence . . . . . . .301

PART VII. ABANDONMENT OF THE MEDITERRANEAN
AND THE WAR WITH SPAIN TO THE
BATTLE OF ST. VINCENT

Introductory Note 313

Correspondence . . . . . . -315

INDEX . . . . . ... 403

MAP

Track chart of the Indefatigable when observing the
sailing of Hoche's expedition of i6th December 1796.
Facsimile of Sir Edward Pellew's original ' traverse '
enclosed in his despatch of the I7th . . . 370

PART I

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

1794-5

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

THE papers printed in this part are selected with a view
to giving an idea of the principal matters with which
Lord Spencer was engaged during his first year of office,
mainly in regard to naval policy and administration.
Those relating to special operations are reserved for
the parts that follow, but it should be borne in mind
that the Quiberon and West Indian expeditions were
also being organised and started.

Among the more interesting documents are those from
the pen of Sir Charles Middleton in which he explains
his methods of administration and strategical views,
while the correspondence concerning them reveals how
his ruthless energy and strong convictions earned him the
reputation of a difficult colleague. His frank condemna-
tion of Dundas's war plans are only what we should
expect. Specially noteworthy are his demands for an
Intelligence Department (p. 13), his warm support of
General Bentham's being employed to reorganise the
dockyards, his continued faith in the value of speed in
ships of the line, and his admiration for Cornwallis's
famous retreat.

On the personal side — particularly in the matters of
the higher commands — we have vivid glimpses of Lord
Spencer's difficulties. We see the embarrassment caused
by Lord Howe's great reputation and failing health ;
how it was agreed that Lord Hood had made his recall
from the Mediterranean imperative ; and how short was
the King's way with men like Lord Bridport if they
were inclined to exaggerate their importance. Sir Sidney
Smith reveals himself in a letter or two selected from the

B 2

4 THE SPENCER PAPERS

interminable correspondence with which he vexed or
amused the first Lord, but never exhausted his courtly
attention.

Special attention will be attracted to an appreciation
of the situation which Sir John Jervis drew up on his
appointment to his famous command of the Mediterranean
station, particularly as it shows he even then contem-
plated the possibility of being forced to retreat outside
the Straits.

With regard to home defence the main anxiety was
for the Channel Islands. After the original ambitious
idea of an invasion had proved illusory, its place was
taken by a project for seizing Jersey and Guernsey, and
during 1794 a section of the Army of the West had been
concentrated at St. Malo for the purpose. The vigilance
of the British cruiser squadrons showed that this idea
also was impracticable, and the Channel Islands began
to be regarded as a base from which the British would
operate offensively against the French coast. Con-
sequently French strategy in this area was devoted to
defence and a flotilla of gunboats was collected as a
defense mobile, which we on our side of course took to
have an offensive intention. One of our precautionary
measures was to seize the Islands of Marcou or St.
Marcouf, on the eastern side of the Cotentin or Cher-
bourg peninsula, as an anchorage from which Harve could
be watched. (See Desbriere, Projets et tentatives, vol. i.)
It was with a view to a return to the offensive that
Hoche induced the Convention to patch up a peace with
the Royalist insurgents. When this was done the con-
centration at St. Malo was resumed, till the Quiberon
expedition put a stop to the whole idea. (Ibid. p. 59.)^

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

PITT TO SPENCER

Wimbledon. Friday Night, 28th November.

My dear Lord, — I came hither from an anxiety
to know the result of your conversation this
morning with Mr. Dundas.1 What I hear from
him gives me the greatest satisfaction I can
receive on a subject, which cannot be to me
without pain and anxiety, and adds to the sense
I before entertained how much the public owes
and will owe to you.2 I shall be happy to con-
verse with you on the subject at two to-morrow,
if you can conveniently call on me at that time.
It is only for the details of the arrangement
that I wish to converse with you, trusting that
the measure itself is considered as fixed.

I am, my dear Lord,
Most faithfully and sincerely yours,

W. PITT.

(Received 2 8th November, 1794.)

DUNDAS TO SPENCER
VERY PRIVATE.

Wimbledon. I4th December, 1794.

My dear Lord, — I thought I had some other
papers on the distribution of the Fleet (entrusted

1 Mr. Henry Dundas, Secretary for War, afterwards as Lord
Melville, First Lord of the Admiralty 1804-5. See General
Introduction, p. xx.

2 Referring to the retirement of his brother, Lord Chatham,
from the Admiralty and Lord Spencer's acceptance of the office
of First Lord.

6 THE SPENCER PAPERS

to me by Sir Charles Middleton) 1 amongst my
papers here, but I cannot find them, and suspect
they are in my drawers in town. If they are
I shall look them out and give them to you, but
at no given time would I ever wish to have it
known that I am in possession of them. In
the meantime I send you a letter on the same
subject. The other papers to which I refer
are the detail of the principle for which Sir
Charles contends in the Private Paper now trans-
mitted to you. It will be proper for me to have
a very confidential conversation with you on
the subject of Sir Charles Middleton. He has
very great official talents and merit, but he
is a little difficult to act with from an anxiety,
I had almost said an irritability of temper,
and he requires to have a great deal of his own
way of doing business in order to do it well.
Different circumstances of long standing have
led him at various times to pour out his opinions
to me without any reserve, and to look up to
me perhaps with more deference than to any
other person. I have received several letters
from him lately, three in particular, and I have
not even thought myself at liberty to communi-
cate some of them to Mr. Pitt ; but from every
consideration public and private I feel myself
almost bound in honour to your lordship to
keep back nothing from you that can in the
smallest degree tend to explain to you the Carte
de Pays 2 on which you are about to enter. Under
that impression and with a perfect reliance on

1 Vice- Admiral Sir Charles Middleton, Bart., since May 12,
1794, had been First Sea Lord, or, as it was then termed, Senior
Professional Lord. The papers referred to may be those printed
in The Barham Papers, II. pp. 386-408.

2 Dundas wrote Paix.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 7

your honour, I have resolved to commit to your
perusal, some letters I have lately received
from Sir Charles Middleton. I am very sorry
for the contents of them, for I cannot help
entertaining doubts how far under all circum-
stances it would be right to urge him to remain,
and at the same time I cannot help feeling that
his retiring from the Admiralty at this time
would be an irreparable loss. I have not seen
him since I received the letters, but I must soon,
and my conversation with him will be entirely
regulated by your wishes.1

I remain, my dear Lord,

Yours very sincerely,

HENRY DUNDAS.

(Received i4th December, 1794.)

MIDDLETON TO SPENCER

[Two enclosures.]

My Lord, — The enclosed papers No. I and 2
were wrote before I knew the issue of the present
change, and intended to give early information
to the succeeding First Lord.

They were written in the hurry of business
but may be easily explained at leisure.

The third Paper was intended for the new
Secretary, and as I have no copy it will help
my memory if your lordship will have the good-
ness to return it.

I trust your lordship will take early measures
for securing the seamen that are still remaining
in the French ships at Portsmouth.2

1 These papers do not appear in Sir John Laughton's collec-
tion of the Barham Papers.

2 The America, Impetueux, Achille, Northumberland, and
Sans Pareil had been captured on June ist.

8 THE SPENCER PAPERS

The patent will be ready for reading on
Monday at furthest. I am with much respect
and esteem,

Your lordship's
Most obedient and faithful servant,

CHAS. MIDDLETON.

Admiralty,

1 9th December.

P.S.— The disposition of the fleet is making
out for your lordship.

If your lordship prevails with Mr. Stephens l
to continue some time after the appointment
of another Secretary, you must of course give
in to his manner of carrying it on.

How far this may be advantageous I am
at a loss to say, but I have no doubts in my own
mind whatever as to going on with the business,
let the Secretary be who he may.

(Received igth December, 1794.)

Enclosure No. i in Sir C. Middletoris Letter of
iqth December, 1794

INFORMATION

When I first came to the Admiralty Board,
I found no regular time fixed for beginning
business nor any plan formed for carrying it
into execution. The office extremely defective
in attendance, and no dependance whatever in
anything being carried into execution.

As Lord Chatham's ministerial concerns did
not allow of a regular attendance in office hours,
the whole of the business very soon fell into my
hands.

!Mr. Philip Stevens had been Secretary since 1761.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 9

I therefore fixed the hours between 12 and 2
for reading and minuting the public letters with
the Secretary, and notice was given in office to
prevent interruption at that time.

When Lord Chatham could not attend the
Board, he generally sent for the Port letters
between 12 and i, and of course prevented the
Clerks from going on with the business. I would
therefore propose n when the First Lord choses
to see them in this way as the most convenient
for office.

If anything occurred to Lord Chatham in
the Port letters he generally sent up for me
after 2 when the reading and minuting were
over, and if I wished to know his commands I
sent notes down in a locked box.

The Port letters contain the whole of the
business of the fleet, and afford every kind of
Information relative to its movements. The
returns and yard progresses shew the state of it
with regard to men and repairs.

What remains of other letters regards the
Ordnance, Navy, Victualling, and Sick and Hurt
Boards, applications of various kinds, and town
business. The whole requires a minute atten-
dance, as the exertion of the fleet in a great
measure depends on the diligence and punctuality
of these boards.

Of all this I can easier explain by word of
mouth than by writing.

All offices and appointments are supposed to
rest with the First Lord. The warrant officers and
movements of lieutenants have been generally
left with the Board as they are in continual
progress.

1 That is, the correspondence now classed as ' In-letters :
Port Admirals/ or ' Letters from Admirals at Naval stations.'

io THE SPENCER PAPERS

Admiral Affleck l managed it when I first
came to the Board, and I have never interfered
further than to prevent from inadvertence in-
justice and improper appointments. It has been
managed in a most irregular and incorrect way and
the service and office has felt the consequences of it.

This however may be easily remedied and
I have prepared measures towards it.

A proper management of the Admiralty will
lead to much improvement in the inferior boards,
and if the reports of the Commissioners of
Enquiry are gradually carried into execution,
they will be the means of saving very great
sums of money to the public.3

Much depends upon the characters of the
men who are put into vacancies as they offer,
and particularly in the dockyards, where great
trust is placed in offices which produce little
salary. It behoves the First Lord therefore to
avoid promises as they may lead to consequences
which he cannot at first be aware of.

The best guard against this, and to avoid a
multiplicity of private correspondence, is to
refer everything to office. By this means he
will have time for consideration. He will restore
the authority of the Board and in no degree
lessen his own power or consequence.

It is by a strong and decisive Board only that
the discipline of the fleet is to be restored, and

1 Vice-Admiral Philip Affleck had been Senior Professional
Lord in Lord Hood's absence until Middleton joined the Board.

2 The reference is to the Commission appointed in 1785
under 25 Geo. III. cap. 19 to enquire into fees, &c., received in
public offices and to examine inio abuses. A succession of
reports, numbered 3 to 9, were issued in MS. from 1786 to 1788,
all relating to the Admiralty and allied offices. They were
printed as Parliamentary Papers in 1806, when the second
Commission of Enquiry, appointed under 43 Geo. III. cap. 16,
was completing its reports.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE n

the officers of all ranks must be brought to know
that submission in service must be observed and
attended to.

It has been customary for the First Lord to
recommend certain officers of their own nomina-
tion to flag officers going abroad, who are to be
the first promoted. The consequence of this
has led to much expence by improper purchases
of vessels, which must be explained verbally,
and a winking at the breach of public orders.
My advice would be not to recommend nor allow
of any improper appointments. By this means
the Commanding Officer will be restrained to
vacancies by Deck and court martials which
are his due, and the public be eased of extra-
ordinary expences. The patronage so far from
being diminished will be increased by this means
to the First Lord, and discipline kept up.

The Jamaica orders being the last issued were
amended in this article and the others ought to
be so as the stations are relieved. It is owing
to the above abuse that our ships are deprived
of men aboard and the magazines of their stores.
Upon the whole, it is too true that the service
is full of abuses. But there are few of them but
what may be corrected, if the Admiralty is in
earnest.

The report of the Commissioners of Enquiry
will give the greatest insight into the duties of
the public offices, and of the abuses existing in
them. Sir John Dick, Mr. Molleson and Mr.
Baring were the gentlemen who drew them up
and can best explain them.1 If these are attended

1 These were the Commissioners named in the Act. Sir John
Dick, Bart., and Mr. Molleson were Controllers of Army Accounts.
Mr. Baring (afterwards Sir Francis) was a director of the East
India Co. and the founder of the house of Baring Brothers.

12 THE SPENCER PAPERS

to, and the instructions which I have at this time
in hand, assisted (with Lord Chatham's con-
currence) by Commissioner Patterson and Mr.
Gambier 1 who are with me on most evenings, there
will appear ample groundwork for restoring the
civil as well as military parts of the service to
its original correctness, and whoever comes into
office with this view has nothing to fear from
either the extent or importance of the object.

Enclosure No. 2 in Sir C. Middletoris Letter of
igth December 1794

PROJECT OF BUSINESS

Letters opened before 10 o'clock, viz. :
Admirals.
Captains.
Public Offices.
Town Letters.

The hours for letter reading and minuting
are from 12 to 2 and no interruption whatever
to be allowed between those hours, nor any
business intermixed with that of the day.

The messengers to be more early in their
attendance.

The clerks to be in their seats by \ past 10,
and not to leave the office while the Board is
sitting.

Town letters excepting those from public
offices received after 2 o'clock to be read next
day before 12 o'clock.

Such letters as require dispatch to have a
preference after they are minuted.

1 Probably his kinsman, Captain James (afterwards Lord)
Gambier, who replaced Affleck on the Board in March 1795.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 13

No interruption to be given to the clerks in
hours of business nor any visitors admitted into
their offices on any account whatever.

If minutes of the Board are wanting to enforce
attendance, they will be passed and hung up in
the offices, and any person neglecting them will
be discharged.

There is no method whatever observed in
arranging or collecting information, and which
is of the utmost consequence in judging of the
enemies' intentions ; no time ought to be lost
in adopting some plan for this purpose.

As all the letters may be very easily read and
minuted between the hours of 12 and 2, the
business for the lords may be then supposed
to be over, and themselves left at liberty till
they are wanted to sign the orders, but the
present method of reading at intervals from
morning till night is beyond degree tiresome.

The several returns that are made to be
docketed by a particular clerk, and placed on
the Board table in exchange for the old ones.

The minute book to be kept up within two
days of the past business, and ready when called
for.

Much business has been done by letters
which ought to have been done by order. This
practice is frequently unavoidable for want of
members to sign and to save time, but the orders
should be made out afterwards and entered in
the order book. The subjects attended to are the
movements of ships and payments of money.

The press warrants, protections, and Mediter-
ranean papers to be placed on the side table, and
not mixed with the business of the Board.

The list of warrant officers who are candi-
dates for employments with their cases and

14 THE SPENCER PAPERS

the list of vacancies to be laid and kept on
the table with the several dates attending them.

Applications from captains and lieutenants
properly arranged for inspection.

A list of the books in the office to be made.

A list of all the clerks and the business they
are employed in. Also the places occupied by
them out of office.

The books in office are not properly arranged
as I shall point out to you at leisure.

No minute book existed when I came to the
Board, and it has been by inconceivable persever-
ance that I have got it begun and continued.

Letters which require reference need only
to have the substance read, as they must be
fully so when the reference is returned.

The minutes to go out from time to time in
letter reading, so that the clerks may be kept
employed, and to give a preference to what the
lords are to sign that they may not be un-
necessarily confined.

The Secretary must be firm in commanding
the attendance of the clerks, and in seeing no
part of the business of the day unexecuted, as
it is not only injurious to the public and indi-
viduals, but a reflection on the Board.

The Secretary will find it convenient to
himself and the public if he allots certain hours
for seeing persons that have applications in
dependance, and not leave himself open to all
calls.

DUNDAS TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

Wimbledon. 2ist December, 1794.

My dear Lord, — I send you another Billet
Doux I have received from my friend. He

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 15

does not explain what he means, but I hope
with this fair wind there is no obstruction to
the sailing of any material fleet. During this
whole war there has been such monstrous delays
in the fleets sailing, that I can't help entertain-
ing great suspicion that there is some blame
somewhere, probably in more quarters than one.
I remain,

My dear lord,

Yours very sincerely,
HENRY DUNDAS.

Return me the enclosed letter from General
Abercromby, which I received last night. Altho'
it is a private letter, I believe I must communicate
it to-morrow to the Cabinet. It does not tend to
lessen the embarrassments to which we are already
subjected in that quarter.

(Received aist December, 1794.)

Sir C. Middleton to H. Dundas enclosed in his to
Lord Spencer

PRIVATE.

My dear Sir, — It is really impossible to get the
King's ships to sea in any given time, and unless
such measures are used as no unprofessional men
will see the necessity of, I see no prospect what-
ever of carrying on the service.

Two strong instances have just occurred —
Lord Spencer will judge for himself, but every
day's post convinces me that I shall lose my
character if I continue here.

I shall only therefore say in confidence to you,
that I will continue here till the intended arrange-
ments take place, if not too long delayed, and try
the issue of them, but if they do not produce the

16 THE SPENCER PAPERS

intended effect, I will not encounter difficulties
which I have not the means of remedying.
I am always,

My dear Sir,
Yours faithfully and affectionately,

CHAS. MIDDLETON.

2oth December, 1794.

No amendments whatever can take place
here till the new arrangements take place, and
I cannot with prudence declare any opinion here
till that is effected.

Lest you should send for me, I shall leave this
at half past two and be at the Bishop of London's
at Fulham till Monday morning.

It never fell to my share before to carry on
business in this fettered way.

MIDDLETON TO SPENCER

A short view of the arrangement which I gave Lord
Chatham for protecting the commerce of the
country and annoying the enemy, and which
in consequence of his approval has employed
my attention since the return of the fleet into
port.1

To bring forward as many ships as possible
for spring service.

To form three squadrons which are to cruize
constantly to the westward for the protection
of the trade and annoying the enemy. One of
these, composed of two-decked ships and frigates,

1 This was an arrangement for the winter in order to exercise
control for commerce protection without exhausting the fleet
by a close blockade of Brest. Compare the principles which he
laid down in 1779. — Barham Papers, I. 302 ; for his summer
arrangement, see Ibid. II. 402.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 17

to be stationed at Cork; one of two-decked
ships only from the Channel fleet, to sail from
St. Helens and Cawsand Bay. The third to be of
heavy frigates stationed at Falmouth.

These squadrons will continue out from four
to five weeks at a time and [are] to be succeeded
by others of the same kind, when they return
and refit.

To refit the three-decked ships and those of
the two decks not employed or cruizing as fast
as possible and keep them ready for sailing on
the shortest notice.

To form a fourth squadron of small ships
for the Baltic and Archangel Trade to be stationed
at Yarmouth Roads and Leith.

To keep a large body of frigates and sloops
in the Downs for coasting convoys, for sudden
emergencies, and to watch the opposite coast
of Ostend, Dunkirk, &c.

To station ships of war at all the great sea-
port towns for convoying and protecting the
coasting trade.

To be punctual in furnishing sufficient con-
voys at the periods fixed by the Trading Com-
mittees for the Foreign markets, and to grant as
many partial ones as appears to be reasonable
and the other services will admit.

To prepare in time and keep up the strength
of the Foreign Stations and in short to be pre-
pared at all points for every demand that can
be made on the fleet.

If this system, subject to variations as the
enemy may change theirs, is strictly adhered
to, and no interruption given to it by partiality
or exemption from any service to which ships
are best adapted, I have no doubts whatever
in being able to accomplish it. My present
I. c

i8 THE SPENCER PAPERS

arrangements are formed with a view to this
object, and the ships preparing to carry it
into execution with as much dispatch as the
services they are now on will admit.

The only obstacle that appears at present
is the want of men to complete the ships in
commission and which must be considered by
the Ministers who conduct the war.

If more soldiers can be allowed to serve as
marines on board the fleet, it will go a great
way in assisting; or if a body of 10,000 young
hired men could be procured from the several
parishes to serve for a time, it would fully
answer every purpose.

But in order to clear our ports of the ships
which are commissioned and without men, I
would propose, not only on the count of economy
but interruption to business, not to commission
any more till these are brought into service.

If these various objects can be accomplished,
the fleet will be soon in great strength. The
merchants can have no just cause for complaint,
and the country will be in safety from any
Foreign attempt; but if we think of going on
without system, without energy, and without
attention to economy in every branch of the
navy where it can be exercised (and they are
numerous), we must fall under the great weight of
maritime power that is now preparing against us.

In all these objects I shall be always ready
to give my best assistance, but in order to prevent
the First Lord of the Admiralty being taken
by surprise, I would earnestly submit a caution
in making promises of any kind till he has
well considered and informed himself of the
consequences.

CHAS. MIDDLETON.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 19

N.B. — This plan keeps no more than five
line of battle-ships of the Channel fleet de-
tached at one time. The rest will be either
fitting or refitted.

(Received a8th December, 1794.)

An Account of the Number of Ships and Vessels in Commission
on -yist December 1794, with the Complements and Men borne.

Rates

No.

Comple-
ment

Borne

Rates

No.

Comple-
ment

Borne

First . . 5

4185

4118

Brought up

277

91,286

77.351

Second .

9594

7632

Floating

Third, 80 guns 2

1359

H93

Batteries

554

414

Third, 74 51

30»490

25.534

Hospital

Third, 64

8888

6785

Ships

546

480

Fourth, 50

336i

2651

Prison Ships

215

211

Fifth, 44 ' 12

3602

2960

Slop Ships .

107

105

Fifth, 40 I

274

270

Convalescent

Fifth, 38

3J24

2924

Ships

274

242

Fifth, 36

3379

2982

Cutters

618

545

Fifth, 32

9694

8590

Luggers

Sixth, 28

3900

3432

Armed

Sixth, 24 & 20

1560

1166

Schooners

Receiving

Arm'd Vessels

467

438

Ships

1178

1090

Gun Boats .

II 02

680

Yachts .

140

I3I

Fire Vessels

1 08

Sloops .

5170

4546

Armed

Store Ships 5

689

680

Tenders

120

Fire Ships 3

165

156

Hired

For Troops ; 2

225

Tenders

278

274

Bomb . j i

Survey

Arm'd Ships 2

242

225

Vessels

Carried up 277

91,286

77»35i

Totals .

385

95,854

81,069

WINDHAM1 TO SPENCER

Thursday Night, I2th December.

Pray let me know to-morrow morning what the
result has been of your deliberations. The more

1 Mr. William Windham, Secretary-at-War, with a seat in the
Cabinet since July 1794- See General Introduction, ante, p. xxii.

c 2

20 THE SPENCER PAPERS

I think of the matter, the more I see in it all
the characters of a wise and masterly project,
and the more I see it to be one of those things
which are stifled and lost by the prevalence of
present over future advantage. The attempt
may not be advisable ; but I am sure that with-
out great care it is one of those points which
will not have a fair consideration. As ' wretches
hang that hangmen may dine/ &c., the finest
opportunities are lost, because the prospect of
distant and possible advantage has not force
enough over the mind to put people in motion
in time. It may be found that had you begun
in time enough, and decided at the first proposal,
accidents would have happened — the continu-
ance of the wind in the same quarter, the
accession of ships sooner than was looked for,
and the injury done to those of the enemy,
which would have rendered success hardly
doubtful, but which will happen in vain, if pre-
paration is not made till they are known.
Had Lord Moira's army been prepared before
any distinct notice had been received of the
co-operation of the Royalists, we should not have
been three days too late at Granville.1 If there
is a force in the country that might safely be
risked in contest with the French fleet, for
God's sake, do not despair of assembling it merely
upon the words of men of official detail. Think

1 General Lord Moira (who as Lord Rawdon had highly dis-
tinguished himself in the American War) had been appointed in
October 1793 to command a force to assist the Royalist insur-
gents. Owing to the difficulty of finding troops, he was not able
to sail till December ist. The insurgents having won a victory at
Autrain were advancing on Granville to meet the British expedi-
tion, but, hearing nothing of it, retired beyond the Loire, and
Moira not being able to get into communication with them had
to return.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 21

of all that has been done with success by the
French. What portion has there been that men,
such as you will consult, would not have said
beforehand to be impracticable ?

Yours truly,

W. W.

(Endorsed ' W. Windham on plans of Lord Spencer for warlike
operations.')

SPENCER TO THE KING

Earl Spencer has the honour to lay before
your Majesty a paper of intelligence brought
from Falmouth last night by Sir Edward Pellew l
together with letters received also by express
last night from Vice-Admiral Sir Richard King
and Vice-Admiral McBride relative to the same
subject. Your Majesty will perceive by these
letters that the large convoys under Rear-
Admiral Parker and Vice-Admiral McBride have
been stopped in consequence of this information,
which is represented by Sir Edward Pellew as
having been given by a man who appeared to
be extremely worthy of credit.

Earl Spencer has thought it his duty to
request a meeting of your Majesty's confidential
servants for to-morrow morning to consider what
advice it will be their duty humbly to submit to
your Majesty on this occasion, and in the mean-
while orders have been issued from the Board of
Admiralty directing that all your Majesty's
ships at Portsmouth and Plymouth, which are

1 Of the Arethusa [38] commanding the cruiser squadron off
Brest in the absence of Sir John B. Warren. Villaret-Joyeuse
had put to sea with 35 of the line, and 13 frigates.

22 THE SPENCER PAPERS

in the forwardest state, shall be immediately
made ready for sea, and that the sailing of the
convoys shall be stopped till further orders.
Earl Spencer also thinks it his duty to acquaint
your Majesty that he has written a letter to the
Earl Howe at Bath requesting his lordship to
come to town as soon as possible that your
Majesty's servants may have the benefit of
his lordship's advice and assistance on this
very important occasion. All which preliminary
matters Earl Spencer humbly hopes may meet
with your Majesty's approbation.

(25th December, 1794.)

SIDNEY SMITH TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

Diamond, Falmouth. 25th December, 1794.

My dear Lord, — The command of our little
squadron having devolved upon me (pro tempore)
during the absence of Sir Edward Pellew, I have
exerted myself in communicating the intelligence
to our outward-bound trade of the enemy's fleet
being at sea. Sir Edward Pellew having sent
the Fortune off the Lizard, I have sent the
Concorde l to lay in such a position, as to enable
the ships she may speak with to ' fetch ' the
port of Falmouth. Any intelligence I may obtain
shall be sent officially and privately to you.

Sir John Warren is not yet arrived, but the
wind being easterly we expect him hourly.

The Fury sloop 3 after having been dis-
mantled in the late gales, has appeared off this
port, and we have sent her every assistance in our
power towards bringing her into a place of safety.

1 Capt. Sir Richard Strachan. 8 Commander Frank Sotheron.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 23

December 26th. — No post going yesterday from
hence gives me the opportunity of saying that
we have been successful in our endeavours to
bring the Fury into this port, where she is now
secure. Her Captain has communicated the cir-
cumstances of his accident through me to the
Board.

Having established telegraphic signals between
the hills before the port, and the Concorde
off, I called her near the coast to-day and went off
in a boat to her. She has been useful in apprising
several vessels of their danger in consequence
of the enemy's fleet being at sea ; thus you see
you have eyes in this quarter. Inward-bound
vessels not having seen the enemy it appears
evident they have not taken a station in the
track of our homeward-bound trade,1 and I
venture to hazard a conjecture on their probable
destination from what the Foreign papers give us
as having been said in the reports to the Conven-
tion. We see troops assembled at Nice and Genoa
and every effort making at Toulon ; but Toulon
being nothing without certain supplies from
other arsenals and then not equal to the con-
struction of ships without the timber of Corsica
with which it was heretofore supplied, is it not
possible that the Brest fleet may have been sent
to the Mediterranean for this double purpose ? 2
What seems to corroborate this idea is the great
secrecy requested by the Committee of War
' pour les preparatifs d'un grand coup qui eton-
neroit FEurope/ and there being no other very

1 The French had really been driven back again by the gale,
and did not finally get to sea till December 31.

2 Hotham was at this time Commander-in-Chief in the Mediter-
ranean operating from Hyeres to blockade Toulon and to assist
the Corsicans.

24 THE SPENCER PAPERS

vulnerable part of our navy or territory imme-
diately within their reach. Much will depend
on this being verified early, for they have sadly
the start of us with three days' north-east gale.
Adieu, my dear lord.

Believe me ever,

Yours most faithfully,
W. SIDNEY SMITH.

(agth December, 1794.)

WINDHAM TO SPENCER

[With Enclosure.']

PRIVATE.

Mr. Windham presents his compliments to
Lord Spencer and encloses the paper brought
to him from Flanders by Lieutenant Popham.1

Hill Street,

3ist December '94.

Enclosure

Naval Establishment proposed to be attached
to the army under the command of H.R.H. the
Duke of York.3

1 Afterwards Sir Home Riggs Popham, who became the
highest authority in the service on combined operations. His
experience began during the Duke of York's operations in
Flanders, where he was in command of the Scheldt flotilla.
Before the flotilla was prepared Pichegru had driven the Duke
of York out of Holland and forced him to retire towards Hanover.

Windham had recently returned from a special mission to
the Duke of York's army. See ante, p. xvii.

2 The Duke of York's army (British and Hanoverian) with
the Dutch was at this time established along the Vaal river from
Thiel to the canal which joins the Vaal to the Leek at Arnheim.
Schoonoven is about fifty miles below Arnheim on the Leek, at
a point where it connects with the Vaal and the Yssel. The
Austrians were to prolong the line eastwards to Wesel. (Fortescue,
British Army, iv. 315.)

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 25

One 5o-gun ship . . . 300")

Two sloops-of-war, 125 men each 250 [• 900 men

Six gunboats, from 50 to 60 ditto 300 )

Two of the above gunboats to carry mortars.

To have also two of the gunboats that carry
a 24-pr. in their prow that were built on the
model of the Spanish launches ; these two must be
manned occasionally from the men-of-war as they
have no place to store either officers or men.

Fifty flat-bottom'd boats, each to have a slide
forward and aft, to mount a g-pounder carronade
either for advance or retreat. These boats would,
I conceive, be particularly useful in advancing, as
they would land 2500 men under the cover of a
battery of 50 nine-pounders, and they might
probably never have more than a redoubt of four
field pieces to oppose them.

There are many creeks in these rivers whose
points would compleatly cover the embarkation,
and I do not conceive it would be at all annoyed,
even if made in the day. The flat-bottom'd boats
might generally have the support of the gunboats
which would always carry a 24-pr. in their prow.

These boats may cost, when completely fitted
with mantelets, about £60 each ; even if they cost
more I do not think it an object.

I believe there are several gunboats lying in
the river and not attached to any service, and
I should conceive the men-of-war might also be
spared. I mention a 50-gun ship on account of
her having a superior complement of men, which
might be made great use of in the rivers. She
would be at the mouth of the Leek, and the
sloops-of-war at Schoonhoven.

Arnheim, 6th December, 1794.

(Enclosure in Mr. Windham's letter of 3ist December, 1794.)

26 THE SPENCER PAPERS

THE KING TO SPENCER

Windsor, 4th January, 1795.

On arriving here last Friday evening I under-
stood that Earl Howe's fever was returned, and
that he certainly is not in a situation at present
to take the command of the Channel Fleet. I
therefore thought, if I instantly wrote to him on
the subject, I should be the cause of the most
unpleasant decision, that of his retiring entirely
from the command. This day I learn that the
fever is much abated and that, probably, with
care and rest his health will be restored. I
therefore now write to Earl Spencer, previous to
taking any step towards Earl Howe, to obtain
his opinion whether in the present situation of
the question I had not better only attempt to
secure that Earl Howe shall not retire, and by
not attempting what seems impossible confirm him
in a wish he has but too much thought of.

As to the idea of Sir J. Bridport not to con-
tinue to serve unless either Earl Howe is able
immediately to go on board, or resigns entirely,
that is too absurd a proposition to require any
serious discussion. Should he persist in that
opinion, I have no doubt that Lord Cornwallis is
fully equal to perform this winter's cruise with
ability and credit, but then it must first be
ascertained that Earl Howe will in the spring
resume the command.

Having thus stated my opinion to Earl
Spencer, I shall wait for his opinion previous to
taking any step, and in the present state of the
weather this cannot occasion any delay.

GEORGE R.

(Received 5th January, 1795.)

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 27

SPENCER TO THE KING

Earl Spencer feels the greatest satisfaction in
having the honour to submit to your Majesty how
entirely the opinion signified in your Majesty's
note of yesterday confirms that which Earl
Spencer had formed in the several conversations
he has had with Earl Howe. The event of Earl
Howe's retiring at this very critical juncture from
your Majesty's service would, in Earl Spencer's
humble opinion, be attended with consequences
so highly prejudicial to your Majesty's interests
and the welfare of the country that no probable
means ought to be left untried to prevent his
coming to such a determination . The means which
your Majesty has pointed out of only endeavouring
to secure the return of Earl Howe to the command
of the Channel Fleet in the spring, instead of
risking the total loss of his services by attempting
what it seems impossible now to obtain, appear
to afford the best prospect of ensuring to the
operations of your Majesty's fleet those exertions
and that public confidence which can alone
render it effectual for the very important services
to which it must be destined.

Earl Spencer has the honour to transmit for
your Majesty's information the dispatches just
received from Office of Admiral Hotham at
Leghorn, and to add that the messenger who
brought the dispatches left the Hague on the
morning of the 3ist ult., at which time it was not
publicly understood there that the enemy had
yet crossed the Waal.

Admiralty, 5th January, 1795.

28 THE SPENCER PAPERS

DUNDAS TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

Somerset Place, Sunday Evening.

My dear Lord, — Lord Cornwallis accepts.1
Two words dropped from Sir John Jervis 2 this
day in the course of dinner that satisfies me that,
if you wish it, the service to the Cape would be
his wish. I think him peculiarly qualified for it.
I thought right to mention this to you ; at the
same time I may be mistaken as to his wishes.
If you mean him either for that or the North
Sea service the sooner you fix it the better,
for I am pretty certain if Lord Howe remains in
the command of the Channel Fleet he will call
upon him. Yours sincerely,

HENRY DUNDAS.

(Endorsed ' February, 1795.')

If you call upon Barrington,3 take care to
have a stout and enterprising officer second in
command ; for the North Seas are boisterous, and
there may be occasion for much enterprise in that
quarter.4

WINDHAM TO SPENCER

Hill Street, Tuesday, i6th.

My dear Lord, — Let me remind you that
the troops from the Weser and Elbe may be

1 General Earl Cornwallis, K.G. He had returned in 1793
from his famous Governor-generalship of India and was now
made Master-General of the Ordnance, with a seat in the Cabinet.

2 MS. ' Jarvis.' He had just come home from the West
Indies. See post, pp. 132-3.

3 Admiral the Hon. Samuel Barrington. He had been much
employed in the last war, but was now 64 years old.

4 By order of the Dutch Government the Texel Squadron had
been handed over to Pichegru's cavalry during the winter.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 29

expected now very soon.1 I think it will be
necessary to have ready the means of escorting
them at once to their destination, whatever that
may be. The force necessary for that purpose
need not, I conceive, be great. It may be the
same that will, I suppose, accompany them from
where they come from. It is right only to have
the object in view, and to be provided so as that
no delay may happen at the moment.

W. WlNDHAM.

(Endorsed ' i6th June, 1795-')

WlNDHAM TO SPENCER

My dear Lord, — I send you a letter just
received from Mudge,2 which it may be as well to
read before any question is brought formally
before the Board. I have nothing particular to
recommend or to say on the subject of any
engagement to be entered into between him and
the Admiralty, nor can I venture even to promise
that his timekeepers will turn out in practice

1 On 3rd March, 1795, the remains of the Duke of York's
army, now no longer under his command, had retired to the line
of the Emms, with its headquarters at Osnabriick, and a week
later it was recalled. A Prussian force took over the line of the
Emms and the British troops began to re-embark at Bremen
on the 22nd. Fortescue, IV. i. p. 323. Three thousand British
cavalry remained to act with the Hanoverians till the end of

1795.

2 Lieut, (afterwards Admiral) Zachary Mudge, R.N. He had
recently been with Captain Vancouver in his famous voyage.
At this time he was serving under Captain Broughton in the
Providence, exploring the South Seas and North Pacific and
experimenting with chronometers. See Sir Clements Markham
in Laird Clowes Royal Navy, iv. p. 562. He was son of a well-
known physician, Dr. John Mudge, F.R.S., a friend of Sir Joshua
Reynolds and John Smeaton of Eddystone fame, who was
awarded the Copley Medal for improvements in reflecting tele-
scopes. Cf. Elphinstone's letter of 5th May, post. p. 32.

30 THE SPENCER PAPERS

better than others ; that can be known for
certain only by trial, though I have a very
strong persuasion that they will do so. But I
can maintain with perfect confidence that they
have merited all that has been done for them
hitherto, and that the invention is a most
ingenious, original and valuable one. Of con-
sequence, that nothing can be more narrow, mean,
and illiberal than the opposition that has been
made, and is still ready to be made, to them.
The Board of Longitude l are already brought to
complete shame upon the subject, and therefore
are, of course, very little disposed to forgive, even
if there was not a person at the head, of as sulky,
boorish a disposition as the one who has taken
the lead in this. I think Mudge's reasoning
seems to be sufficiently just, and that the Board
of Longitude need not be called upon for any
further judgment.

Yours truly,

W. WINDHAM.

You may as well let me have the letter again,
as it may be of use, possibly, to be shown to Long.2

nth April, 1795.

THE KING TO SPENCER

Queen's House, zyth April, 1795, 15 m. past n P.M.

I am much pleased at the agreeable informa-
tion received from Earl Spencer of the captures

1 This Board was constituted in 1714 by 12 Anne, cap. 15 —
' an Act for providing a Public Reward for such person or persons
as shall discover the longitude at Sea.' It was abolished and
the Act repealed in 1828.

2 Possibly Charles Long, afterwards Lord Farnborough,
then Joint-Secretary of the Treasury.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 31

of the Promptitude and Gloire l frigates by the
squadron under the command of Rear-Admiral
Colpoys, which event is a proof of the necessity
of keeping constantly detached squadrons to
keep the Channel, the Bay, and North Sea clear
of the enemy's ships. Had that measure been
uniformly adopted by the Admiralty I am certain
by this time the trade of France would have
been totally annihilated.

GEORGE R.

SPENCER TO THE KING

Earl Spencer has the honour of laying before
your Majesty a letter received by the Board of
Admiralty from Admiral Lord Hood, together
with a copy of the answer returned by the Board
to that letter, and his lordship's acknowledgment
of that answer.

Earl Spencer cannot help feeling great concern
at having been reduced to the necessity of
depriving your Majesty's service at this time
of the exertions of an Admiral who has, on so
many occasions, distinguished himself in the
conduct of your Majesty's fleets when under his
command ; but being fully persuaded that the
discipline and subordination so necessary to be
maintained between the Board of Admiralty and
the officers entrusted by that Board with the
conduct of your Majesty's naval forces would
be entirely at an end, if public and official repre-
sentations of this kind were allowed to pass

1 The Gloire was captured on loth April by the Astraea,
Capt. Lord Henry Paulet, who was in Lord Colpoys's squadron
off Brest. The other frigate captured at the time is recorded by
James as the Guitille, not the Promptitude. She struck to the
Hannibal [74].

32 THE SPENCER PAPERS

unnoticed, he humbly and most anxiously hopes
that your Majesty may approve of the measure
which he has thought it his duty to recommend
to the Board on this occasion.

Admiralty, 3rd May, 1795.

VICE-ADMIRAL SIR GEORGE K. ELPHIN-
STONE TO SPENCER

Monarch, 5th May, 1795.

My Lord, — As the Amiston is about to quit and
may find an opportunity at St. Helena to send
letters to Europe, I will only trouble your lord-
ship so long as to say we are thus far, all the
ships in perfect health excepting the Victorious,
which ship has seventy sick. I have the satisfac-
tion to think the time watches of Mudge continue
to perform to a degree of nicety ; they have not
varied more than a few seconds since we left
Teneriffe. Arnold's does extremely well as did
one of Haley's until last week, when it stopped.1 On
examining I found the spring broken ; they had
never varied above eleven minutes from the
observations.

Cape of Good Hope, June i6th. — As we are
only in the midst of negotiations it is impossible
to tell your lordship much. At the same time,
I do not know of any opportunity from St. Helena.
Mr. Halliday seems a charming young man and
I have permitted him to act as lieutenant in his
sloop, which I send to reconnoitre Saldhana Bay,
and make some acquaintance with the coast.

1 John Arnold, watchmaker, first used the word chrono-
meter. His improvements on Harrison's chronometer, which
had obtained the government reward, were now being tested.
They were chiefly the expansion balance, detached escapement,
and the cylindrical balance spring.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 33

I beg to offer my respects to Lady Spencer. And
have the honour to be, with great regard and
respect,

Your Lordship's
Most obedient humble servant,

G. K. ELPHINSTONE.1
(Received 2oth September, 1795.)

SPENCER TO PELHAM*
PRIVATE.

Dear Pelham, — I am much obliged to you for
your private letter, of the nth instant, received
this morning relative to Hawl Bowline Island,
and lose not a moment in acknowledging it, that
you may be apprised of the nature of our inten-
tions respecting any establishment at that place.

I can easily suppose that the idea of establish-
ing an arsenal and storehouse near Cork will be
popular in Ireland and more particularly in the
neighbourhood of that city ; but what was at
present in contemplation was not of the sort of
magnitude that those expressions appear to imply,
the notion having, as I understand it, only been
to remove the naval storehouses already at
Kinsale to what was supposed to be a more con-
venient situation, and to add to them a victualling
establishment suited to the extent of the squadrons
which are usually on that station. In order to
do this with convenience and at as little charge
to the public as possible, it was desirable to have

1 Afterwards Lord Keith. This was the expedition which, in
combination with a force from India, resulted in the capture of
the Cape, September 1795.

2 Thomas Pelham (afterwards second Earl of Chichester).
He had just accepted office as Chief Secretary to the Lord
Lieutenant of Ireland.

I. P

34 THE SPENCER PAPERS

such a spot as the Island of Hawl Bowline which,
by being detached, was better calculated for the
purpose of preserving the stores than a situation
on the mainland would have been ; and a long
time I am informed that a sort of negotiation was
on foot between the Navy Board and Lord
Inchiquin, who was the lessee under the Crown
of the island, for the purchase of it. Why it
was then dropped I do not know, but the idea
having been again started, and the island appearing
on investigation to belong to the Crown, the most
desirable mode seemed to be a grant of it for this
purpose. I should however be of opinion that
the expense of the establishment (which will be
inconsiderable on the scale on which it is at
present proposed) should be borne from home,
as it will only be dependent on the Navy Board
here, and will be neither of magnitude nor con-
sequence sufficient to justify anything like a
separate establishment, which separation might
also, in other points of view, be attended with
many inconveniences to the service. We are
not, however, yet quite far enough advanced in
this plan to apply for instructions from the Duke
of Portland upon it,1 as it will be first necessary
for us to have a more accurate survey taken of
the place than we now have ; but if it should
proceed, I will take care to give you proper notice
of our intentions and to communicate with you
in time on the manner in which it is wished here
to have this business settled.

I am, very faithfully,

H. SPENCER.

Admiralty, i6th May, 1795.

1 The Duke of Portland was Secretary for the Home Depart-
ment and the Colonies, to which Ireland theri belpnged.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 35

SIDNEY SMITH TO SPENCER

Diamond off Jersey,1 3ist May, 1795.

My dear Lord, — I was going to write at length
to you as I have done to Mr. Windham by this
conveyance, but Sir Richard Strachan having
just joined and communicated my orders to return,
I shall refer you to Mr. Windham for the account
of those objects which concern him most. I,
however, send your lordship a packet of French
letters found among the prizes' papers, and which
I had not leisure to examine before. I have been
obliged to wade through much trash to get at the
matter of information contained in them, and I
have marked it in the margin to save your lord-
ship the same trouble. They all speak of the
extreme scarcity. I have to regret the having
let an American go in to Havre the day before
Sir Peter Parker communicated the secret orders
to detain neutrals. I own I feel myself still
embarassed what to do in such cases. The
wording of the order is as usual ambiguous so as
to leave a possibility of the onus probandi falling
on the officer detaining, and though I hear of the
captains being borne through by the Admiralty

1 Sir Richard Strachan's cruiser squadron in the Channel
Island station — Melampus (flag), Diamond, Hebe, Niger, and
Syren. Its function was to protect the islands, to observe and
blockade the enemy's coast, and to stop their coastwise traffic, but
he had been engaged also on the special service of landing 100
emigre officers to keep alive the Royalist movement in Brittany.
Post, p. 71 n., and Puisaye Memo*res, iv. 439.

After the destruction on gth May of a convoy with naval
stores under Cape Carteret, Smith had been detached with the
Syren and 7 gun-vessels and had ^delivered a bold but unsuccess-
ful attack on a similar French squadron lying at St. Malo. —
Barrow's Life of Smith, i. 169.

D 2

36 THE SPENCER PAPERS

should any expense or demurrage be incurred, it
is not in black and white, which it should be to
bind future Admiralty boards, since litera scripta
manet. I hope your lordship will contrive that
I shall have this ; and also a private hint, how
far it is meant to go in such detainers, would be
acceptable from yourself for my governance.

I am convinced that I could take a station
before and in the mouth of the Seine, .that Paris
never should get a mouthful without sending
force to fight for it, and this was my next plan if
I had not been otherwise disposed of. I must
call to your recollection, my dear Lord, that I
have not yet any swift sailing, rowing thing, so
that I am without distant eyes or hands to put
forth. I have not yet the thing / call a gun BOAT,
though I have by your kind assistance fought the
battle through with the Ordnance and got all my
guns and ammunition actually on the spot at
Plymouth, ready to mount and put afloat when-
ever the bottom is found. I enclose a letter for
your private information which explains where
the two already ordered stand. The twenty
West-country barges promised me are still to be
fixed on when I can give a few days to it, and I
fear the Navy Board are not told officially that
they are to be twenty, though the ordnance are
provided. I must beg of you to recollect, too,
my original request, to which your lordship was
so kind as to acquiesce, contained a demand for
ten light rowing boats. The building these for
the six-pounders, as there specified, may take too
much time now, as they were not begun then ;
but I have to propose a substitute which I have
had proof in my little brushes on this coast will
answer perfectly. I have mounted a carronade
on a long slide in the Diamond's launch after the

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 37

manner Captain Bowen did in the West Indies,
by which single gun in that boat, it is acknow-
ledged, he saved the rear of our troops on the
embarkation at the evacuation of Guadeloupe.1
I therefore propose to your lordship and earnestly
beg that the request I make by this post officially
on this head may meet your decided support in
order that I may really acquit myself of the task
I have undertaken and which I have no doubt of,
if the means as originally settled are given me, and
increased as the enemy increase theirs against me.
By fitting the launches of the navy as they
stand with these long fore and aft slides (removable
at pleasure) for the reception of their quarter-deck
carronades occasionally, and double banking the
oars, you have a most formidable flotilla of gun-
boats annexed to your fleet, and without which
that fleet must frequently find itself embarassed
and unequal to co-operating with an army or
defending itself against gunboats, which really
is a serious deficiency, where the enemy are gone
fairly into the gunboat system for their coast
defence. Naval officers laughed at gunboats
attacking ships, but they learnt to their cost at
Gibraltar that a single gunboat could annoy a
fleet in a calm, dark night with perfect impunity.
This subject is now so well understood and the
fact admitted so generally, by those I mean who
have seen service of the kind, that there would
be no want of active young men to volunteer the
most desperate undertakings of that nature ;
one desperate in appearance but really easy I
have in contemplation, but which, to prove it,

1 Capt. Richard Bowen, of the Terpsichore, brought off the
last of the British troops from Fort Mathilde, loth December,
1794- He was severely wounded in the operation. See post,
P- 133.

38 THE SPENCER PAPERS

I must actually perform to convince people of its
practicability. This I shall not venture to commit
to paper. I only request that my artillery and
ordnance stores may not be suffered to remain in
the hold of the storeships any longer, while I am
daily in action with heavy machines good for
one of the parts of my combination, but less
efficient where not supported by the other, as in
the relation of battalion, light troops, and cavalry
in the field. Excuse my prolixity, my dear lord,
and believe me I know what I am asking when
I say, let me have light rowing boats besides the
larger vessels, one to support the other ; without
them I shall do little. I can assure your lordship
on the authority of the builder at Plymouth yard
that his hands are free to go to work the moment
he receives his orders ; he has even reported
himself to the Navy Board without sufficient
work for the number of men employed.

One more subject and I will release your
lordship's attention from this long letter. The
hospital-ship has been refused me, and as the
Navy Board do not think a gunboat deserving
a surgeon's mate, taking away even from the few
who had them, the evil I feared has happened,
and our men feel themselves devoted to certain
death if they have the misfortune to be wounded.
Besides, the infection generated from undressed
wounds has had pernicious effects on the health
of the sound men. One poor fellow who was
struck by a nine-pound shot had no assistance for
two days till he rejoined the Diamond. The
consequence was mortification, with a discharge
producing live creatures and a noxious smell
that has infected the four men sleeping next him
in such a confined space with putrid fever, which
may cost them, and perhaps others, their lives.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 39

These are really the horrors of war, and much as
I am used to them, my heart recoils at making
a signal to approach an enemy while the men are
exposed to such a frightful dissolution by it.
I have it on my conscience to tell you the fact,
and have put the request on the subject into
official train to be reconsidered, trusting to your
lordship's philanthropy on the occasion. It
will certainly require all your energy to attack a
form of office which coolly tells me a man must
be sent into port to stop a bleeding artery.
You see by the beginning of this letter I sat down
without the intention to say the whole of the
above at one sitting, but I have not been able
to curtail questions of such moment. I trust
your lordship's liberality will excuse me for the
motive's sake. And believe

Your very faithful friend and Humble servant,

W. SIDNEY SMITH.

(Received 3rd June, 1795.)

SPENCER TO SIDNEY SMITH

(Copy.}

Dear Sir Sidney, — I received on the 3rd instant
your letter of the 3ist and have since been ex-
pecting anxiously your arrival at St. Helen's,
as we are very desirous that you should be ready
with as many of your gunboats as are likely to
be serviceable, to assist Sir J. Warren on a cruize
he is about to undertake, in which I hope you will
have an opportunity of distinguishing yourself.1

1 This was the expedition to Quiberon. See post, pp. 65
et seq. Sidney Smith did not take part in it directly, but
remained on the Channel Island station, making diversionary
demonstrations on the coast of Normandy.

40 THE SPENCER PAPERS

I don't understand what you say about the
instructions relative to neutrals, especially that
part which relates to the captains being borne
harmless, as it made part of a letter to the several
commanders-in-chief. I conceive it must also
have been by them communicated in writing. I
see no ambiguity at all in the wording of the
order, as it goes expressly to the stopping and
sending in, for the purpose of detention, all ships
bound to ports in the power of the French armies,
which are laden with articles of provision of
naval stores ; and the hint given to the officers in
the letter I above alluded to was intended to
satisfy them that the Government did not wish
them to be over nice or scrupulous respecting
the nature of the papers of those ships, as we know
the greatest deceptions in this way are now
attempted to be put in practice, and the present
circumstances both with respect to the enemy
and to this country are such as to justify a less
degree of attention to those delicate points than
at another time.

With respect to your gunboats, you know they
are such as we had, and you had your choice of
them you liked best ; but I am afraid it may
be some time before you can be spared to go to
Plymouth for the purpose of fixing on West-
country barges. But if you will point out what
barges they are which you would prefer and give a
description of the manner in which they should
be fitted, I will endeavour to put the business in
train in your absence.

We have ordered a surgeon to be attached
to your flotilla of gunboats, as it is at present
totally impracticable to find surgeons's mates in
a sufficient number for the purpose of having
one in each of them. The hospital-ship, which

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 41

you applied for, would only have proved an
additional incumbrance and would have been as
inconvenient to get at as the Diamond herself.
The deficiency of surgeons's mates is so great that
the last return from the Channel fleet was forty-
one surgeons* mates short of complement, and
though I hope that the additional encouragements
we are holding out to them may induce more
to enter, it is in vain to expect that enough will
be found to supply all the gunboats and other
small vessels we shall be obliged to equip.

I am afraid I shall be under the necessity of
taking La Sibylle from you, as the French begin
to be extremely clamorous on the subject,1 and
no expedient but that of sending her to a con-
siderable distance will be likely to settle the
business ; but if I do deprive you of her assistance
and Captain Cooke's company, you shall have
some substitute to replace him.

Believe me, &c.,

H. F. SPENCER.

I like your idea of the launches to be turned
into gunboats very much, and wish you would
send a draft of the slide necessary for the
purpose.

Pray lose no time in stowing for sea again,
as your vessels are much wanted.

Sir W. S. Smith.

(7th June, 1795.)

1 On 1 7th June, 1794, Capt. Paget, of the Romney [50], had
caught and captured the Sibylle [44] while she was at anchor
in the neutral harbour of Mykonos. See James, i. p. 231. The
Sibylle was not taken from him. He sailed with her, the Syren,
and 4 gun vessels from St. Helens on ist July to resume opera-
tions in the Channel Island area. See Barrow, Life, i. 171.

42 THE SPENCER PAPERS

MEMO. BY MIDDLETON FOR SPENCER

Your lordship will be pleased to observe that
by means of the present expedition,1 our arrange-
ments of cruizing squadrons in the Bay are broken
up, and if not renewed by a preparation of line-
of-battle ships and frigates, we may give the
enemy an opening for recovering that important
station and feel the effects of it on our convoys.

My wish therefore would be to get in forward-
ness five sail of the line and two frigates to
succeed Vice- Admiral Cornwallis2 for a month,
and Sir Edward Pellew to collect at Falmouth
his four frigates and lugger to succeed Sir J.
Warren. By this means we shall gain in security
and the sea open when our great convoys are
passing.

I hope we shall be secure in a three-decked
[ship ?] for the Mediterranean convoy within a
fortnight, as nothing can be depended on that
cometh nearer to the time of its sailing.

If returning ships are to be named, Admiral
Hotham should have early notice, and of the day
fixed for the sailing of the convoy, and I would
propose a messenger as before when the fleet has
got out of the Channel.

The present is a critical time in the Mediter-
ranean unless Admiral Hotham should have

1 This probably refers to the Quiberon expedition (see post
P' 65), which sailed under the command of Commodore Sir
John B. Warren on 25th June, a fortnight after this memo, was
written. His squadron of cruisers had previously been employed
off Brest and ' to the westward ' in accordance with Middle-
ton's system. See Barham Papers, ii. 420.

2 Cornwallis had the observation squadron of five of the line
and three cruisers before Brest. He was detached on 3oth May.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 43

proceeded to Gibraltar to meet Admiral Man,
and which I trust he has done.1

By his letter to me, he is inclined to come
home, but he did not know when he wrote of Lord
Hood's supersession.

Your lordship must not expect any great
progress in our large ships till the arrival of our
foreign convoys, as we are totally destitute of
seamen, and which are now wanted to complete
them.

Admiral Duncan's ships must have a prefer-
ence, as the time draws on when his squadron
should be completed.3

There is nothing more that occurs to me ex-
cept the confinement of the Polyphemus by the
Overyssel.3 That ship is much wanted, and her
attendance on the Dutch ship has cost the public,
at least, £6000 or £7000.

The Cabinet do not consider how much our
active force is diminished by such a waste of its
strength, and especially as the unhanging her
rudder would have equally answered the purpose

nth June, 1795.

MEMO. BY MIDDLETON
RUSSIAN FLEET

As there is very little probability of my being
able to walk soon without help, I will endeavour

1 Rear-Admiral Robert Man, usually spelt Mann, but he
used only one n: He met Hotham at Minorca, on i4th June,
with a reinforcement of nine of the line. Admiral Renaudin
had left Brest on 22nd February with seven of the line and
three frigates, and had reached Toulon on 4th April.

2 Duncan in the Venerable with a small squadron was watch-
ing the Texel. He was joined in August by twelve Russian ships.

3 A Dutch 64, returned as captured in Cork Harbour by the
Polyphemus 64, 22nd October, 1795. — James, i. 442.

44 THE SPENCER PAPERS

to explain through Admiral Gambier l my ideas
concerning the Russian fleet.2

If the Prince does not return in time, I would
prefer sending on the convoy under the Excellent
and two frigates than delay them an hour after
the 8th for a second line-of -battle ship, and after
this convoy it will be necessary to stop our hand
in sending more frigates to the Mediterranean.
When we were inferior in line-of -battle ships, this
measure was unavoidable, but it will no longer
become necessary when the junction is made,3
as the Admiral may occasionally strengthen his
frigate services by a line-of-battle ship.

I mention this because I have been calculating
our wants and resources at home, and foresee
great difficulties if the utmost economy is not
used in the management of our frigates.

They are almost all of them at sea in the
present moment, and I scarcely know where to
look for approaching services.

22nd June, 1795.

MEMO. BY MIDDLETON

24th June.

As I observe a large draught of men to have
arrived from Plymouth, I think it worth a trial
to get the Impregnable completed.

I should submit too, as neither Leda nor
Flora are arrived, whether it may not be as well
to take the Unicorn, as she is of equal force and

1 Rear- Admiral James Gambier (afterwards Lord Gambier),
promoted ist July 1795, and now Second Sea Lord. He was
brother or nephew to Lady Middleton.

" Here follows a paragraph on Manning of Ships recommending
continuance of his system of giving preference to ships that
are strongest in able and ordinary seamen.

3 The junction between Hotham and Mann. See ante, p. 43 «.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 45

in all respects fit. This may rest a few days.
She is at present ordered to be victualled and
stored for Channel service.

24th June.— What a sad struggling business
is that of Sir Sidney Smith's. His ships and
boats are at this time lying about in the different
ports of the Channel, and it is difficult to know
what orders to give them.

The state of the force by this will point out
what is likely to happen to this flotilla when the
autumn advances.

In my own opinion the three frigates and sloop
with four or five of the best gunboats, will do
more execution than 100, and not be attended
with any inconvenience.

In the present way of conducting this business,
the squadron is very seldom at sea, and the use
of the ships as cruizers in a manner lost.

It is indeed impossible they should be active
while composed of so many discordant parts.

Your lordship will have the goodness to
remember my coming through the park, as it
will certainly forward my attendance some weeks.

MEMO. BY MIDDLETON

25th June, 1795.

Your lordship may be assured I shall not
extend the privilege of the garden gate one day
beyond the restriction.

When the use of copper bottoms was first
introduced I had some share in forwarding it, as
his Majesty will inform your lordship. But as
great opposition was made by some of the oldest,
tho' not wisest, officers of the fleet to extending
it to all classes of ships, and the minds of sea-
men in some degree disturbed, it was thought

46 THE SPENCER PAPERS

advisable by Lord Sandwich to have the whole
laid before his Majesty.

I was at that time directed by his lordship
to attend at Buckingham House to explain the
principle on which coppering was to be carried on.
His Majesty at the first view comprehended
the advantages of the improvement, and being
satisfied of the security with which it was
attended, directions were given for carrying it
into immediate execution. The advantage of
this early decision enabled us to combat all the
Maritime Powers of Europe and without the loss
of one line-of-battle ship when the war ended.

General Bentham' s improvements in the dock-
yards strike me as very much in the same
light, and as we cannot hope for the use of his
talents without opposition from our shipwright's
branch, might it not be proper to lay his letter
and plans before his Majesty, who will com-
prehend immediately the advantages that must
result from it, if carried into execution.

My glass is running out fast, but I have that
zeal for the Service as to be in earnest when I
see any prospect of improving it.

The shipbuilding and Civil building have
been too long committed to insufficient men.
An opportunity offers of recalling it out of their
hands, and as General Bentham is undoubtedly
a man of first-rate abilities and of great
experience in practical mechanics, I hope and
trust they may be converted to the benefit of
his native country instead of carrying them again
into Russia.1

1 Sir Samuel Bentham was the son of an attorney, and brother
to Jeremy Bentham the political philosopher. Apprenticed
in his boyhood at Woolwich Dockyard, he afterwards travelled
in Russia to complete his education. There, attracted by his

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 47

I troubled your lordship and Admiral Gam-
bier with some loose thoughts on an inter-
mediate Sea Board, a committee qualified to
inspect and report on all plans of improvement
which may be offered relative to naval matters.
The want of such a committee is severely felt
in the loss of everything that is valuable and
the want of progress in all naval improve-
ments. A very few principals are necessary,
and Bentham might hold a conspicuous place
amongst them. A fund may easily be found for
paying them out of savings that must naturally
be made out of the annual grant of Extra and
Ordinary without going back again to Parliament
for new ones.

MEMO. BY MIDDLETON

27th June, 1795.

Vice-Admiral CornwalhVs conduct, and the
Captains' under him, are very meritorious. But
I am confident the French had some great object
in view, otherwise they would not have quitted him

genius for invention and administration, Prince Potemkin em-
ployed him to create a dockyard at Kritchev, with the honorary
rank of colonel. In 1784 he was given a battalion which he
turned into a dockyard staff. In 1787 he was ordered to Cherson
to equip a flotilla against the Turks. By devising a new
system of non-recoil mountings he succeeded in arming it with
heavy shell-guns, and in 1788 the Turkish fleet was entirely de-
feated and practically destroyed by this novel armament. In
recognition of his service he was promoted to Brigadier-General
and given the Cross of St. George. A few years later he returned
on leave to England and entered into a correspondence with
the Admiralty which ended in his being appointed on 28th March
1796 to the newly-established office of Inspector-General of
H.M. Naval Works,

48 THE SPENCER PAPERS

in the way they did. That object I am afraid was
to defeat our landing on the coast.1

What the issue may have been, we must soon
know, but I know of nothing to be done on our
part but to keep ships in readiness for sea.

I have inclosed to Mr. Nepean my ideas on
the memorial concerning Colonel Bentham when
your lordship is determined on the measure, and
if you have no one in view for the secretary, I
must beg leave to repeat my recommendation of
Mr. Gambier, as I know him to be in every point
of view well qualified.

I like Colonel Bentham's arrangement better
than my own, as being less subject to opposition
cavil, and does not carry the appearance of an
establishment. But an opening must be made
hereafter for a sea officer, without which the
department will not be complete.

I have at last got down stairs, and propose
venturing into the country till Monday, when I
shall meet Mr. Cutforth at the usual hour.

Saturday.

MEMO. BY MIDDLETON

3oth June, 1795.

As it will be prudent to give the Mediterranean
convoy an escort as far as Cape Finisterre, and
the Bellerophon and Brunswick must have their
holds new-stowed and their bottoms looked at, in
order to mend their sailing whenever they can
be spared, might not Vice-Admiral Cornwallis,

1 On 1 6th June Cornwallis, with five of the line which formed
the Brest observation squadron, was surprised off the Penmarcks
by Villaret-Joyeuse with twelve of the line, but succeeded in
effecting a brilliant retreat to Plymouth. The French object
was to release a convoy which they believed Cornwallis was
blockading at Belleisle.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 49

with the ships now under his command, perform
this service and return to Portsmouth and
Plymouth to refit ? l Another reason why they
would be usefully employed to the westward at
that time is, that the Leeward Island fleet
(a very numerous and rich one) may be expected
in the Channel about that time.

I have read with much attention Vice- Admiral
Cornwallis's journal, and think his conduct so
judicious in the management of his squadron
that I should propose its being bound separate,
and marked Vice-Admiral Cornwallis's retreat.

In less skilful hands that squadron must have
been lost, and which points out the necessity of
sending these squadrons under experienced flags,
and the ships as far as can be of an equal rate
of sailing.

If what I have proposed be adopted, we shall
have time to form another line-of-battle squadron
by Admiral Cornwallis's return.

The system of keeping squadrons to the west-
ward in succession must be closely attended to
at this season of the year, when the enemy knows,
as well as we do, the periods of our convoys sailing
from the islands.

The Fox is sent to Spithead to carry the trade
to Halifax and Quebec, and to be in time at the
latter place for the second convoy of corn ships.

I congratulate your lordship on Lord Bridport's
success.2

1 These two ships were reputed good sailers but had im-
perilled Cornwallis's retreat by their slowness — due to bad
stowage. To get away they had to sacrifice some guns and
a good deal of shot and gear and start their water.

2 Lord Bridport had sailed from Spithead with 14 of the
line (8 three-deckers) on 22nd June, and had caught the French
as they returned from Belleisle, just in time to save the Quiberon
expedition. See post, p. 67-8. Lord Howe was still too ill to
take the command.

I. E

50 THE SPENCER PAPERS

If the progress of my health this week equals
the last, I shall hope to be at the office next week.

June 30th, 1795. — As we have a large number
of ships in commission without men, might it
not be proper to avoid commissioning any more
of the line till those coming forward are in some
degree off our hands. The small craft, being much
wanted, may be advantageously commissioned.

We have now collected all the papers relative
to Hawl Bowline Island, but as it will be necessary
to send over a proper surveyor to form plans and
estimates on the spot, and the Navy Board have
no person beyond the description of a house
carpenter for all their great works, I think it will
be best to delay the business till it is determined
what use is to be made of General Bentham, as
I am satisfied much money will be saved by it.1

The stern frames of the ships of Vice- Admiral
Cornwallis's squadron must be considerably shook
from the nature of his defence, and will require
inspection.

What is to be done with the Invincible and
Formidable, as I see the former is ordered to
Plymouth and the latter stopped there? My
fears are, that we shall run ourselves out of
serviceable ships and have none in readiness in
case of urgent calls, and which may prove of
material consequence if not attended to.

MIDDLETON TO SPENCER

I understand clearly what your lordship means
concerning Lord Bridport's ships, but was ignorant
of it before.

If Rear- Admiral Waldegrave is to escort the

1 See note p. 46.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 51

Mediterranean convoy across the Bay, it will be
necessary to give him his orders immediately, as
the time for sailing is fast approaching ; and as
no other reinforcement is intended for Lord
Bridport, the sooner he returns the better, provided
the Leeward Island fleet has entered the Channel.

In this case as frigates are scarce and the
Port l Merchants have asked for a convoy on
the 2Oth, I would wish him to detach the Niger
to that port when he parts with the Mediterranean
ships.

I have sent a minute to this purpose if your
lordship approves.

It would certainly be very desirable to give
separate convoys to the Irish and English regi-
ments,3 but our demand at this time of year is
so great for frigates and sloops that, with all the
forethought and contrivance in my power, I can
scarcely make those under the immediate orders
of the Admiralty equal to the services required
from them.

Everything that goes to the West Indies are
stopped by the commanding officers contrary to
the most strict orders. But we cannot blame
them, because the islands are destitute of troops
and must either be given up or protected by the
ships of war.

It is this system of unlimited conquest that
cripples us everywhere, and diverts the fleet
from its natural use. It is like a farmer wishing
to occupy a large farm without money to manage
it. The consequence is, that he begins a beggar
and ends a ruined man. Our situation is truly
similar : once behindhand and always behindhand.

1 Oporto.

- That is, for Abercromby's expedition to the West Indies.
See post, pp. 131 et seq.

K 2

52 THE SPENCER PAPERS

And but for this system, half the number of
ships now employed in the West Indies and on
army convoys would have been sufficient, and
the French been prevented from sending a ship
to sea.

If I had known of the intention of sending an
express to Sir J. Vaughan, I should have proposed
a letter to Rear- Admiral Caldwell 1 to keep cruizers
to windward of Martinico, where the greatest
danger lays from the Guadeloupe privateers to
the transports who may have lost their convoy,
but it may be still done by the first packet.

I am aware of the necessity of having these
troops early in the West Indies, as nothing less
could have justified their being sent at this
season of the year, and I should not have pro-
posed the Scipio 2 calling at Cork but that I knew
the transports for the Irish regiments must be
sent over from Liverpool and its environs, and
that they would of course be later in their embarka-
sion. However, to obviate any chance of delay
Admiral Kingsmill3 may be directed to send a
ship (not one of his western cruizers) to accompany
the Unicorn [32] into the Trade-winds and then
return, and another to accompany the Scipio in
the same manner. This will render each convoy
independent of the [other], and if approved I
will send a minute accordingly.

I think 200 landsmen may go in the Mediter-
ranean ships and I will take measures accordingly.

1 General Sir John Vaughan, military commander-in-chief of
the Leeward Islands, had died suddenly at Martinique on 3rd June.
Vice- Admiral Benjamin Caldwell had succeeded Sir John Jervis
as commander-in-chief of the Leeward Islands Station in Novem-
ber 1794.

2 Scipio 64, Capt. Francis Laforey.

3 Vice- Admiral Robert Kingsmill was commander-in-chief on
the Irish Station.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

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54 THE SPENCER PAPERS

It will be impossible to get the Melpomene
out in time for Sir E. Pellew1 for want of seamen ;
but as the Leda is expected daily from the Baltic.
she may join them at sea, and the sooner they
are out the better, in the present moment of
the West India convoy being expected.

Endorsed 'Sir C. Middleton, ist July, 1795. Private.'

SPENCER TO THE KING

Earl Spencer has the honour to acquaint your
Majesty that Admiral Hotham having with much
earnestness repeated his request to be permitted
to return home in consideration of the state of
his health, the command in the Mediterranean
has been offered to Sir John Jervis who has
signified his willingness to undertake it. Earl
Spencer was induced to fix on that officer for the
service in question, as well from knowing that
he is honoured by your Majesty's good opinion
as from being persuaded that there is no admiral
of a sufficient standing on the list better cal-
culated to conduct a service of such extent and
importance and attended by difficulties more
likely to increase than diminish under the present
circumstances of the several Powers in that part
of the world.2

The idea once entertained of employing
Admiral Duncan in the Mediterranean was dropped
on account of the great cordiality and good
understanding which seems to be so happily
established between him and the Russian officers,
a circumstance of material consequence to the

1 In command of the cruiser squadron for watching Brest.
~ It was expected that Spain might at any time join France
in the war.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 55

interests of your Majesty's service and which
might be interrupted by any change in the com-
mand at the present very critical juncture.1

Upon these grounds Earl Spencer hopes that
the appointment of Sir John Jervis may meet
with your Majesty's approbation.

Admiralty, 23rd September, 1795.

APPRECIATION BY SIR JOHN JERVIS

OBSERVATIONS UPON THE POSTURE OF PUBLIC
AFFAIRS IN THE MEDITERRANEAN AS IT RE-
LATES TO THE OPERATIONS OF THE BRITISH

FLEET, SUBMITTED TO EARL SPENCER BY

SIR JOHN jERvis.2

(I)

Various pretences may be used by Spain
to employ a squadron in the Mediterranean :
such as conveying the Princess of Parma to
Italy,3 protecting her trade, visiting her ports
(particularly Port Mahon), and under any of these
pretexts a junction with the French at Toulon
is very practicable. Qucere. What measures can
be taken to defeat such a design ?

(2)

In case a junction is effected, which might
give the enemy a very great superiority over his
Majesty's ships, with evident signs of hostility on

1 Duncan had been joined by a Russian squadron of twelve
of the line and Seven frigates in August, and with them was
commanding in the North Sea.

2 A copy written on the left-hand side of the page, leaving
space for the answers to his queries. The only two appearing
are written in pencil, not in Lord Spencer's hand. They are
those printed in the margin of articles 4 and 5, next page.

3 Maria Louisa of Spain, wife of Ferdinand, Duke of Parma

THE SPENCER PAPERS

the part of Spain, what then is to be the conduct
of the British fleet ?

(3)

Should it be found expedient under the above
circumstances to quit the present position
and proceed down the Mediterranean, measures
must be taken respecting Corsica, upon which
some secret instructions may have been given.
In any event the stores and provisions for the
supply of the fleet should be kept afloat, and to
provide for other exigencies a few large armed
transports would afford great resource.

(4)

Gibraltar and its environs will
require a considerable degree of
attention, both on account of sup-
plies to the garrison, and the general
trade to and from the Mediter-
ranean, to effect which and to
furnish occasional convoys two sixty-
four-gun ships, four frigates, and
two sloops, appear to be necessary.

' 6 or 7 sail
of his own
ships with
frigates at
Gib/

(5)

Should Portugal be threatened
with an invasion, she will probably
receive succour from England.
Nevertheless, as she may, upon the
spur of the occasion, look to the
Mediterranean for assistance, I sub-
mit the possible case.

1 The usual limit of the Mediterranean Station was Cape
St. Vincent. Except in case of war with Spain there was a gap
between this and Cape Finisterre, where the station of the Western
Squadron or Channel Fleet began.

Extend
the station
to Cape
Finisterre.' !

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 57

(6)

It will be very desirable to have the point in
dispute, touching the jurisdiction of the Navy
over the troops, serving as marines, terminated
before my departure.1

(Received 6th October, 1795.)

THE KING TO SPENCER

Windsor, nth October, 1795, 54 m. past 5 P.M.

I have received Earl Spencer's note accom-
panying the intelligence brought by one of the
Jamaica homeward-bound fleet, as also the letter
from Sir Borlase Warren.

The directions given for sending immediately
an additional fleet of frigates to look out for the
Jamaica fleet seems the only step the Lord
Commissioners of the Admiralty could take, if
possible, to prevent more from falling into the
hands of the enemy or to retake such as have been
captured, if not sent into the most adjacent ports
in France.

GEORGE R.

(Received nth October, 1795.)

HAMILTON TO SPENCER

Roseau, Dominica, 3ist October, 1795.

My Lord, — Your lordship having expressed a
desire that I should mention any particulars
concerning the Navy in these seas that should
appear to me worthy of remark, I have the honour
to enclose copy of a letter addressed to Captain
Mclver, of His Majesty's Ship Roebuck [44],

1 For this, see p. 135.

58 THE SPENCER PAPERS

which does justice to the vigilance and activity
of that officer, to which I can bear ample testi-
mony.

A report is circulated, and I fear has but too
much foundation, that a French frigate has got
safe into Pointe a Pitre ] having on board 300 or
400 Artillerists, also a Corvette.

At a great expense to Government I have
been obliged to purchase and hire vessels, and to
arm some of them to cruise between Mariegalante
and this island — one of these a schooner mounting
14 guns and having 60 men for crew lately fell
into the hands of the enemy. A ship coppered
and armed I hired for three months certain from the
owners, at £300 per month. Her time is expired,
and I have determined to hire her for one month
more. A third vessel is under repair. I have
acquainted Sir John Laforey of these circumstances,
and that there was not any King's vessel cruising
for the protection of the island, leaving to his
judgment how to act. It is an incontestable
truth that a few French frigates have been
permitted to send off troops to St. Vincent, the
Grenada, and St. Lucia, and keep alive an expiring
war to be deplored for many signal disgraces, and
a ruinous loss of lives. My lord, I entreat you
not to attribute to personal malice, or a rancorous
disposition, the dissatisfied tone of my letters.
I never have seen Sir John, and I am well aware
that the conduct of commanders is often scanned
by persons in no way qualified to criticise, especi-
ally in matters relating to a service they are not
acquainted with. When the Bull Dog quitted
her cruising-ground last June without giving- me
any intimation, her absence was immediately

1 In Grandterre, Guadeloupe.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 59

followed by an invasion of the island, the con-
sequences of which might have been fatal to
Martinique as well as this island, both harbouring
in their bosoms a number of traitorous subjects,
and some ungrateful emigrants who had been re-
ceived with humanity, and treated with generosity.
Our internal force is very small, and necessarily
subdivided into detachments for the security of
the several assailable points. I had sent to
Bermuda to purchase a fine ship, which was cop-
pered, mounted twenty double -fortified twelves,
and was completely found, but she was previously
purchased by Admiral Murray.1 I had designed
her as a guarda costa, seeing the risk we had
lately run. As the Packet has not yet made her
appearance, I shall not close this letter till the
last minute that I may acquaint your lordship
of any extraordinaries.

November 2nd. — This day I have received an
authentic account of the arrival of the French
frigate above mentioned at Point e a Pit re. This
year there has not been any hurricane in this
island, though St. Kitts and Antigua have suffered
by terrible gusts. The equinox has passed with-
out the least of the customary violence of winds.
This day Captain Bathe, of the I5th Regiment, wrho
has commanded the detachments to the north-
ward, and is qualified from the situation of the
posts to make a fair report, assures me that no
King's ship has supplied the place of the Roe-
buck off the north end of the island. He came in
this day. The log-books of the ships-of-war,
anchored in Fort Royal Harbour at Martinique,
will show how long they have been inactive, and
the number of men lost by sickness in the time.

1 Vice- Admiral George Murray, Commander-in-Chief on North
American Station.

6o THE SPENCER PAPERS

Sir R. Bickerton, of the Ramilies, had lost but one
man by sickness in the course of several months.
Vice-Admiral Laforey has buried lately nine men
in one day, as Lieutenant-Colonel Johnstone this
day informed me, and others have assured me
that numbers have died within a short time.
Nor can this surprise any person who is acquainted
with the effects of putrid exhalations from a
swamp in this hot country. The Majestic has,
as I am told, anchored to leeward of an extensive
swamp. The Admiral lives on shore in the
neighbourhood of the same swamp. My lord,
I own I feel a degree of repugnance at speaking
from report to the disadvantage of an officer,
perhaps of great experience and merit; but if
corresponding accounts should reach you, I trust
I shall be considered as acting from a principle
of duty and regard to His Majesty's service.
The particulars I have mentioned are spoken of
without disguise, and as I happen to have a perfect
knowledge of some of the facts asserted above,
I have the less of scruple, considering that persons
on the spot will, without doubt, impart the same
to their friends, with a view of its coming to your
lordship's ear. Captain Archer, of the Ganges,
died a few days since ; at the present reported to
be an excellent officer.

The Packet bringing the first and second
September mails has arrived, but the information
brought by her is not very material.

Should my communications be acceptable to
your lordship I entreat you will give me the
satisfaction of letting me know it, for the reasons
above stated.

Your lordship's wish has operated with me as
a command.

I send this with design to your lordship's

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 61

abode, and hope I am not mistaken in the
address.

I have the honour to be most respectfully,
my lord,

Your most humble servant,

HENRY HAMILTON.

Earl Spencer,

St. James's Place, London.

(Received 2nd January, 1796. Admiralty, 3rd January, 1796.)

SPENCER TO THE EAST INDIA CO.

SECRET.

Gentlemen, — I have had the honour of re-
ceiving your letter relative to the approaching
arrival of the Hector [74] and her convoy, and
suggesting whether it may not be proper that
some further steps should be taken for their
protection. In answer to which I can only at
present say that, from comparing the dates and
taking into consideration the very favourable
windsf which they most likely have had, it appears
highly probable "that they must have reached the
western coast of Ireland before anything which
we could send out from hence could get into their
course, and that as we do not know of any ships
of the enemy of a force sufficient to create any
alarm for their safety likely to be in those seas
at present, I flatter myself there is no occasion
for the least apprehension respecting them.

All that can be done to prevent their going
into the Shannon, with this very favourable wind
for coming up the Channel, is to send out to
Admiral Kingsmill with directions to instruct the
cruizers on that station to keep a good look-out

62 THE SPENCER PAPERS

for them ; and that we have accordingly done
by a messenger dispatched this day to Cork, but
for the reason I have above stated I am appre-
hensive that even that order will come too late
to be of any service.

I have the honour to be, Gentlemen,
Your most obedient, humble servant,

E. SPENCER.

Admiralty, 28th October, 1795.

There will be no objection here to the periods
mentioned in your other letter for the sailing of
the homeward-bound company's ships next year,
and due attention shall be paid to the early
departure of the men-of-war intended for their
protection.

The signals may of course remain the same.

The Chairman and Deputy Chairman

of the East India Company. i

(Copy.)

PART II

THE QUIBERON EXPEDITION

APRIL 1795 TO APRIL 1796

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

VERY full accounts of this expedition exist — the most
detailed being that left by its commander-in-chief,
Comte Joseph de Puisaye, in his Memoir es (6 vols.,
London, 1803-8). It is, of course, written as an apology
for his conduct and entirely from his own point of view ;
but it indicates fairly clearly that, as he contended, the
failure of the enterprise was mainly due to the dissensions
between the Legitimist and Constitutional sections of
the Royalist party. The intrigues that were going on
were, of course, not unknown to the British Government,
and this goes far to explain their hesitation in com-
mitting themselves to a line of operation which, from a
purely strategical point of view, is generally regarded as
obviously the best they could have adopted for crushing
the Revolution.

Of other contemporary accounts the most accurate
and impartial in Puisaye's opinion is that contained in
the ' Life of Sir John B. Warren ' published in the Naval
Chronicle, vol. iii. (See his Memoires, VI. i. p. 96.)

Later accounts exist by C. L. Chassin, Le General
Hoche in Quiberon (Paris, 1897) ; C. T. de Closmodene,
Quiberon, 1795 — Emigres et Chouans (Paris, 1899) ; C.
Robart, Expedition des Emigres a Quiberon, 1795 (Paris,
1899) ; and Hon. J. W. Fortescue, History of the British
Army, vol. iv. pp. 411 et seq. ; while volume iii. of the
Dropmore MSS. (Hist. MSS. Com.) contains many
original documents throwing light on the inner history.

It was Puisaye who finally persuaded Pitt that the

Royalists, in spite of the pacification that had been

patched up between Charette and Hoche, would rise once

more as soon as a British fleet appeared on the coast. As

I. F

66 THE SPENCER PAPERS

he had been taking a really active and prominent part in
the war it was felt he could be trusted, and in the event
he was proved to be right, save for the hostility of the
Legitimists which developed against him as a man
suspected of Constitutionalism. It was he also who
rightly advised that the expedition should be entirely
French, composed of the regiments already in English
pay and others, and that the cadres should be filled by
inviting to England the emigres who had no longer
anything to hope from service on the Continental frontiers
of France. Though at his invitation they flocked to
England in swarms their numbers proved insufficient to
provide the rank and file, and in an evil hour it was
decided to make up the deficiency from the prisoners of
war who crowded the English jails.

The arrangement of the command was equally
unfortunate. As some check on Puisaye's sanguine
temperament the Comte d'Hervilly, an old soldier who
commanded one of the best of the Anglo-French regi-
ments, was placed as a British officer in command of
the Anglo-French troops until they landed, and not till
then did Puisaye's full power as Commander-in-chief
arise. The result was friction from the first, and it never
ceased. Puisaye relates that D'Hervilly, on his death-
bed, sent him a handsome acknowledgment that he
himself was entirely to blame for the failure.

Puisaye's original idea was a landing on the north
coast, as had been intended in Lord Moira's abortive
enterprise a year earlier, but it would seem that the
British authorities, with fuller experience of such work,
insisted on striking to the southward to secure sur-
prise. The secret was admirably preserved. By means
of demonstrations carried out by Sir Sidney Smith and
Sir Richard Strachan with their cruiser squadrons and
flotillas on the north coast, and by a feint of preparing
the Channel Islands as a base, the attention of the Con-
vention was fixed upon Normandy, and when the expedi-
tion appeared off Quiberon there was nothing to oppose
the landing except its slender garrison. (Cf. ante, p. 4.)

On I7th June Sir John Warren put to sea with some

QU I BE RON 67

3500 emigre troops partly in the ships of war and partly
in transports. There sailed also 80 gentlemen volunteers
of the best blood of France, and the transports carried a
large stock of arms, uniforms, and ammunition for the
Royalist insurgents.

Warren's escort and support squadron was composed
as follows : —

Pomone (44) Sir John Warren.

Robust (74) E. Thornborough.

Thunderer (74) A. Bertie.

Standard (64) J. Ellison.

Anson (44) P. C. Durham.

Artois (38) Sir E. Nagle.

Arethusa (36) M. Robinson.

Concorde (36) A. Hunt.

Galatea (32) R. G. Keates.
6 gunboats.
2 luggers.
2 cutters.

The covering squadron was provided by the main
body of the Channel Fleet under Lord Bridport who
sailed the same day. Having escorted the expedition
as far as the Penmarcks he turned back to blockade
Brest. But it so happened that Cornwallis, with the
Ushant observation squadron, had been cutting up a
French convoy and its escort off Belleisle, and Villaret-
Joyeuse had been ordered to sea to rescue it. It was
on this occasion that Cornwallis executed his famous
retreat which founded his great reputation. Villaret-
Joyeuse, after failing to catch him, made for Brest, but
meeting a gale he was driven to take shelter at Belle-
isle — precisely the point for which the expedition was
making. So well had the secret been kept that even
Cornwallis knew nothing about it. He even had at first
refused to listen to the Royalists who had come off. from
the coast to communicate with him thinking he was
the promised expedition. The consequence was that as
Warren drew near, when the gale and the thick weather
that succeeded it had passed, his advanced cruiser

68 THE SPENCER PAPERS

reported the presence of the French fleet. Lord Bridport
was too far away to protect him, but with great readiness
he formed his cruisers into line to cover the transports
as they held away, and the effect appears to have been
to give his force the appearance of a fleet in sailing order.
So much impressed at any rate was the Representa-
tive with Villaret-Joyeuse that, according to Puisaye,
he ordered him to avoid action and retire to Brest.
Meanwhile Warren had warned Bridport, and next
morning an action took place off Isle de Groix in which
three French ships of the line were captured and the
rest, badly cut up, driven into L'Orient.

Thus Warren, as his despatch relates, was able to
land the troops without interference, the Chouans driving
back the nearest Republicans posts and occupying
Vannes. Though the expedition arrived on the 25th
D'Hervilly would not consent to land till the 27th.
The disembarkation was then effected in Carnac Bay
without a shot being fired. Still D'Hervilly refused to
advance, with the result that Hoche recovered Vannes.
On 3rd July, however, two regiments and 150 British
marines were landed at the end of the Quiberon Peninsula,
and Fort Penthievre on its neck, attacked on all sides,
quickly surrendered, and thus a strong base and point
of retreat was secured. From this time, owing to the
intrigues of the Legitimists and D'Hervilly's caution and
suspicions of the Chouans and of Puisaye's loyalty, every-
thing went wrong. D'Hervilly would not advance and
Charette and the other Royalist leaders were induced
to keep inactive or to believe themselves betrayed. A
report was even spread that the whole affair was a dark
design of Pitt's to capture the Counter-revolution in
concert with Tallien and a party in the Convention, and
to place the Duke of York on the French throne ; and
Puisaye was said to be his agent.1

Thus Hoche was given time to concentrate his
scattered detachments, to bring down the troops from
St. Malo, and reinforce himself with the seamen and

1 Puisaye, Memoir es, IV. ii. 405.

QUIBERON 69

marines from the fleet at L'Orient. Not till i6th July did
D'Hervilly attempt an elaborate combined movement
against him in four detached columns — one of which was
landed by Warren on Hoche's left flank. It failed, how-
ever, to arrive in time — owing, according to Puisaye, to the
Legitimist obstruction. It was re-embarked in safety
but D'Hervilly was severely defeated and only saved
from destruction by the British gunboats. This mis-
fortune was followed, on the night of igth July, by some
of the enlisted prisoners of war delivering Fort Penthievre
to the Republicans, and next day the whole emigre force
was either taken, destroyed, or driven into the sea,
the remnants only being saved by the activity of Warren
and his officers.

Meanwhile the Government, elated by the apparent
success of the opening, had sent a frigate to fetch the
Comte d'Artois (now the heir presumptive and Lieutenant-
General of France) and had commissioned Lord Moira
to follow up the blow with a force of 14,000 British
infantry and 3,000 cavalry so soon as they could be
found, with further power to take into British pay
15,000 more French Royalists. General Graham, with
3,000 infantry, was to proceed to Quiberon at once and
hold the place as a base. Before he could sail, however,
the disaster had occurred and Warren had occupied
the Islands of Houat and Hoedic inside Belleisle to await
developments and instructions and to keep in touch with
the Chouans. Belleisle, which had been blockaded from
the first and refused to surrender, occupied a considerable
section of his force ; while Lord Bridport, much to the
disgust of himself and his flag-officers, had to maintain
his watch on the French ships in L'Orient and Port
Louis.

The rest of the unhappy story sufficiently appears from
Warren's letters, and it remains only to note the points
of lasting interest which the letters reveal.

In the first place we see how precarious is the move-
ment of troops over sea when there is an active fleet,
however despicable, within striking distance of their line
of passage. A resolute officer in Villaret-Joyeuse's place,

70 THE SPENCER PAPERS

free to act as he chose, would certainly have destroyed
the greater part of the expedition off Belleisle.

Secondly, we note the danger of keeping admirals
at sea in ignorance of the general war plan, for had
Cornwallis known the expedition was coming he would
hardly have left Brest altogether unwatched when he
struck for the convoy and certainly would have taken
more pains to get home information that the French
were at sea.

Thirdly, the expedition affords an example how suc-
cessfully such combined operations, by the use of skilful
diversion, may secure strategical surprise — the most
difficult and valuable advantage that war can show.

Lastly, it will be noted how concentration of the fleet
on the protection of the expedition tended to throw
open the sea to the enemy's counter-attacks on trade,
indicating that- — as Middleton warned Lord Spencer
(ante, p. 42)— in operations of this character a well-known
maxim requires modification. However true it may be
from a defensive point of view that if we control the
sea for one purpose we control it for all purposes, it is
clearly not true always where we ourselves take the
offensive. By high concentration we may control suffi-
ciently the zone of our offensive operations, but it may
be at the cost of leaving trade routes inadequately pro-
tected.

WINDHAM TO SPENCER

My dear Lord, — I find by a letter, of the 23rd
of last month, from Sir J. B. Warren that he is
not likely to return for some time.1 In the mean-
while I have a man here, whom I think it might
be useful to send to the Vendee; and if upon
further reflection it should appear to be so, it
will be desirable that he should go immediately.
Have you any frigates that you could spare im-
mediately for that purpose ? For though they
might be sent in the chasse maree, that has
been given lately to the person I wrote to you
about, Le Febvre,3 the success of the expedition
would be more sure I think with an escort. Pray
let me know, as my Frenchman is, as usual, ready

1 Charette, despairing of assistance, had concluded an armistice
with the Convention. Stofflet, who commanded the ' army of
Poitou/ refused to be a party to it, and Puisaye had arranged
to send out a number of 'emigvt officers and emissaries to keep
the Royalists in heart till the expedition was ready. Warren
took M. de la Roberie and some companions, including Le
Febvre mentioned below, to the coast of Poitou, but in seeking
to avoid the Republican troops they perished in a morass and
never reached Charette, to whom their mission was. — Puisaye,
M6moires, iv. 428. Warren was waiting off the coast for news
of them.

2 Le Febvre was the most active of the agents who kept up
communication between the Chouans and Vendeans, and the
imigrts in England, till he lost his life in the service. See post,
p. 100. Puisaye mentions him as ' a man called Le Febvre, intelli-
gent and brave, with an exact knowledge of the roads and byways
which must be followed by those who land on the coast of Poitou
in order to reach Charette.' Memoires, iv. 420.

72 THE SPENCER PAPERS

to get off this very night, though I don't appre-
hend that we shall succeed in obtaining so soon
any attention to the object, although one of more
consequence than all the rest put together. I
fear the igih was the day on which the Treaty
by Charette was signed, though you seemed to
think it later.1 The first dreadful neglect was the
not sending some vessels to the coast, in answer
to communications which we had in August. I
can have little doubt that that disappointment
was the foundation of the despair, which has, I
fear, ruined everything.

Yours truly,

W. WINDHAM.

I saw Captain Rudsdale yesterday ; and will
do what is to be done. Will you send me back
Sir George Shee's paper, which he wishes to have
returned to him ?

6th April, 1795.

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

La Pomone, Lymmington. i3th June, 1795.

My Lord, — I have at length arranged every-
thing and got through all my difficulties, which,
I assure your lordship, were not a few, as many of
the vessels, said to be ready, were up the harbour
of Portsmouth wanting water and other things,
which it was absolutely necessary for them to be
supplied with. The flat-boats only arrived yester-
day, and six carpenters have been employed ever
since in making ready for their reception. The

1 Charette's treaty was signed at La Journaie on i5th February.

QUIBERON 73

embarkation of troops was finished yesterday
about three o'clock, and all Monsieur D'Hector's
corps are on board the ships of war, and every
ship filled with officers. I must on that account
solicit your lordship's kind interposition and
protection on behalf of the captains and other
officers, that some allowance may be made them
from the Treasury (as has been done already
when Lord Moira's expedition took place last
year) or many of my comrades will be eat out
of house and home, their furniture destroyed, &c.,
by their hospitality. I have at least twenty of
these people, and am obliged to occupy a cabin
below. It has however saved the additional
number of transports, notwithstanding which
our squadron of vessels amount to thirty-eight
in that line, exclusive of the men-of-war.

I have dispatched a cutter to Cawsand Bay
to order the Standard and Concorde to join me
in my passage down Channel, and a lugger to
Weymouth for some Frenchmen and a chasse
maree at that place, and I fancy your lordship
will not be displeased in learning that I am at
last off bag and baggage. It will afford me much
satisfaction if I shall in future be enabled to send
you a good return of our proceedings. And I have
the honour to remain, with great esteem,

Your lordship's sincere and faithful,

Humble servant, •
JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

Earl Spencer, &c., &c.

(Received i5th June, 1795.)

74 THE SPENCER PAPERS

WARREN TO SPENCER

PRIVATE.

La Pomone, at Sea, 24th June, 1795.
Off the Isle of Groix.

My Lord, — I proceeded with all the dispatch
in my power to collect the chasse-marees, Standard,
La Concorde, &c., in my way down Channel, and
soon afterwards got sight of Lord Bridport's fleet,
who accompanied us off the Penmarcks, when
they hauled their wind and I lost sight of them
towards three, when I was much surprised in
seeing the enemy's fleet of thirteen of the line,
three razes, seven frigates, two brigs and a cutter.1

I immediately tacked and covered our trans-
ports with all my force, except the Thunderer,
Galatea, and Experiment lugger, [detached] to find
his lordship, to whom I wrote upon the occasion,
and the second day was fortunate enough to join
him. We steered exactly where I thought they
were watching, either for the purpose of blocking
up La Vendee or meeting their convoys ; and the
next morning they were again seen, and the
transactions of that day in which I could only be
a spectator, although very near, are related by Lord
Bridport. I had, however, a couple of broadsides

1 Warren had command of the escort squadron in charge of
the transports, and Bridport had orders to cover the expedition
with the Channel Fleet and prevent interference from Brest.
Bridport had fourteen of the line (including eight three-deckers)
and ten cruisers. Villaret-Joyeuse had come out on i6th June
to rescue a convoy from Cornwallis's observation squadron.
After Cornwallis eluded him he was driven by a gale to take
refuge at Belleisle, and was making his way back to Brest when
Lord Bridport encountered him on the 22nd. It was not known
the French were at sea when the expedition sailed, and Bridport,
believing they were still in Brest, was not in position to cover it.
Cf. ante, p. 67, and ' Warren to Spencer/ post, p. 77.

QUIBERON 75

at one of their large frigates, who ran after his
Admiral.1

I shall lose no time in finishing the rest of my
mission which I hope may be successful, and I
trust your lordship will excuse me when I say
that if it should meet with your approbation to
employ me in the command I have hitherto
executed with all the zeal in my power, I should
be very happy if you would allow me to have the
command of La Tigre, taken yesterday with 200
of my men, who, as they were all volunteers
raised by myself, I could not quit with honour to
myself or feelings.

I should then leave 120 in the ship, which
would make a good foundation for any captain
building on. If I might be permitted to hope for
anyone it would be captain,2 my old school-
fellow, who is a most excellent and zealous officer,
and as he has lost his chance of the Revolutionnaire,
I should be glad if your lordship would be kind
enough to take him by the hand.
I am, with great regard,

Your lordship's sincere,

Humble servant,
JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

Earl Spencer, &c., &c.

I have sent a line to Lady Warren under
cover to your lordship, for which I must ask your
pardon.

(Received 2yth June, 1795.)

1 Lord Bridport's action with Villaret-Joyeuse was fought
early on 23rd June off the Isle de Groix. La Tigre, a fine new 54,
was one of the three ships taken. The frigate that Warren engaged
was the Tribune, 36, and Puisaye says the commodore enticed
her within range by covering his figure-head (Pomona) with a
huge red Cap of Liberty, decked with a tricolor cockade. Mtmoires,
VI. i. 85. - Name omitted.

76 THE SPENCER PAPERS

WARREN TO BRIDPORT

La Pomone, Quiberon Bay. 2yth June, 1795.

My dear Lord, — I know you will feel much
pleasure when I inform you of our success yester-
day. I embarked and landed the army at day-
break, in a small bay near a neck of land, without
any loss whatever, only 200 Republicans having
showed themselves upon the heights ; but when
the troops landed, and I had brought up a gun-
boat which took them in flank, they ran most
astonishing. About thirty were killed by 700
Chouans, who were on march to join us. I have
had little or no rest these three nights, and am
busy disembarking all the residue of the stores
for the troops. I have already armed between
three and four thousand Royalists, and the
numbers that come down to join us are incon-
ceivable. I never saw so affecting a scene as the
reception of the troops by our friends. Old men
and young cried ; and men, women and children,
brought butter, eggs, milk, bread, wine, and
whatever they had, both to our people and the
troops, and would not receive a farthing in
payment.

I shall send two frigates according to my
orders, with a small powder vessel for Monsieur
Charette to the southward, to the coast of La
Vendee ; and Ellison,1 who I have stationed in
Belleisle Road, has sent me the correspondence
between himself and the Governor, which latter,
although professing prodigious zeal for his cause
and employers, appears to be ill seconded by the
troops and people. A corvette seems to have

1 Capt. Joseph Ellison of the Standard, 64.

QUIBERON 77

slipped by Ellison's gunboat. I wish the com-
munication between the north-end and Groix was
cut off inshore. If your lordship can only protect
us from anything at L'Orient,1 or ships sent from
Brest about twelve days, I think our affairs will
prosper, and I trust you may then anchor here,
whenever you may want to water, during the
autumn or winter.

I shall send the Stag cutter with the General's,
and my dispatches to England upon her return
from your lordship.

I remain, with great regard,

Your Lordship's sincere

Humble servant,

JN. WARREN.
The Right Honourable
Lord Bridport, &c. &c.

(Received 5th July, 1795, by Lord West.)
[A copy.]

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

La Pomone, Quiberon Bay. 29th June, 1795.

My Lord, — I have a long account of our
proceedings to give you, and very little time to
do it in, as I am to attend an enterprise to-morrow
morning. I shall therefore say that after I had
with great difficulty and much anxiety assembled
the chasse-marees, the Concorde and Standard,
the convoy and squadron, I had a fair wind and
good weather until we joined Lord Bridport's
fleet, with whom we continued in company until
we saw the Penmarcks, where a violent gale of
wind came on that lasted three days, and one of
the gunboats separated from us ; and, indeed,

1 Villaret-Joyeuse had retired into L'Orient after his defeat.

78 THE SPENCER PAPERS

with such strange people as they have on board,
and such miserable tools as they are, it is wonderful
they did not go down altogether. I at last got
them once more assembled, and the next day
two frigates I had sent in chase discovered the
enemy's fleet of thirteen sail, three razes of two
decks, eight or nine frigates, two brigs and a cutter.
They stood towards us, but as soon as I had
certain knowledge of what they were, I made the
signal to tack, and covered the convoy with all
the ships of war under my command. Lord
Bridport's fleet had only quitted us three hours, but
the weather [was] again becoming thick and bad.
Notwithstanding I sent a frigate, the Experiment
lugger, and a chasse maree after his lordship. It
was twenty-four hours before we joined, when the
enemy were again seen, and by his lordship's
desire I sent the three line-of -battle ships to him,
and I ordered the convoy to remain to windward,
and went down with the four frigates to give all
the assistance in my power.

The subsequent events you have undoubtedly
been informed of by his lordship. I was fortunate
enough to have two or three broadsides at a
frigate and to intimidate the Montague, who
considered us as the advance-ship of our fleet,
and instantly cut and ran into the harbour.
I afterwards accompanied his lordship within
sight of Belleisle, and just as I got off the south
point, the fog came on so thick with rain that I
never felt a situation so difficult as at that moment.
I was determined, however, to go on, and at last
anchored in nineteen fathoms of water near the
rocks of Hoedic. The next day I had the same
weather, but got into Quiberon Bay, and having
that evening reconnoitred the coast, I had a
council with Generals de Puisaye and D'Hervilly,

QUIBERON 79

and from the information we received, I determined
to land the troops the next morning at break of
day, and made the signal for them to embark in
the boats as day came on. And the whole pro-
ceeded towards the shore in two divisions, the
particulars of \vhich your lordship will see in my
public letter to the Admiralty. I am happy to
say that from every appearance the business will
succeed if properly sustained and protected by
Government. I have already armed and given
ammunition to ten or twelve thousand Chouans,
and they still are coming in, and the beach re-
sembles a fair. I must at the same time state
that the number of regular troops are too small ;
and the cannon for the artillery, there being no
howitzers or 12-pounders, notwithstanding it was
mentioned as having been embarked by the
Transport Office. This country being drained of
horses it will be necessary they should be supplied
from England, to penetrate with celerity into the
interior parts and also to take possession of
some port. Situated as we are now, I shall
endeavour to do the best I can, if the fleet from
L' Orient or Brest are kept from molesting me.
I have anchored our small force in the strongest
position possible to repel the enemy if they should
escape Lord Bridport, and to guard the transports
that are within us.

I am in great want of small vessels, having
only two cutters left, the Experiment lugger that
I sent after Lord Bridport to bring him up to the
French fleet having missed us, and being my best
vessel is a great loss. I also find a want of frigates
for the different services of blocking up Belleisle,
the business of convoying powder to Monsieur
Charette, and the various expeditions that must
take place every day.

8o THE SPENCER PAPERS

I will however, as I have already, endeavour
to do what I can, but am obliged to be upon
many occasions commissary, engineer, and com-
modore.

I have the honour to remain,

Your lordship's most obedient,

Humble servant,
JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

(Received yth July, 1795-)

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

La Pomone, Quiberon Bay. July 3, 1795.

My Lord, — In consequence of a plan fixed
upon with General de Puisaye I sent two frigates
to cannonade a fort at the south end of the
Peninsula of Quiberon, which had a good effect ;
and yesterday morning, General D'Hervilly having
advanced with a body of our forces, regulars and
irregulars, on the neck which joins the main land,
I proceeded with the Commander-in-Chief, General
de Puisaye, with about 150 of La Chatre Regi-
ment and 1300 Chouans to which I added about
250 marines of the squadron, and landed in a sand}^
bay on the east side, having stationed the frigates
and gunboats, so as to cover the disembarkation.
And when the whole were drawn up, with the
marines to the right of the army by the General's
desire, the whole advanced against Fort Sans
Culottes ; and after some discussion the garrison
surrendered at discretion and I accompanied the
General with a detachment of our marines, and
one of Comte Hector's corps, La Marine Royale
de France, when the White Flag and British
Colours were hoisted together and of equal

QUIBERON 81

height. I directed ours to be hauled down in
the evening.

I have been particularly anxious about obtain-
ing possession of this place, as I by no means
admired the situation of our former post, in case
of a check or being overpowered by superior
numbers. The magazines of provisions, stores,
the hospital for the sick, and a place to drill the
Chouans, who are as wild as Indians, will by
this means be secured, and a communication
with England, to which I look for constant sup-
port to enable us to go on. The cause is good
and will go forward, if there was a sufficient force
to enable us to get into the country.

I cannot dissemble to you that, notwithstanding
our friends the Chouans are numerous and zealous,
yet like all irregulars they are uncertain for any
distant expedition, and sometimes return, that is
to say the married men, in shoals ; and if any
unforeseen bad luck should ensue, our number
of troops are too small to resist the best forces
that the Convention will undoubtedly assemble
against us.

I trust your lordship will excuse my making
use of a confidential secretary, but I liave not
'slept these three nights with any ease, having
been out all night and constantly employed, that
I cannot write without falling asleep, although I
can dictate. Let me conjure you not to lose
a moment's time in sending us troops and sup-
porting us. I am much in want of my lugger
the Experiment and some small craft. ~ Captain
Eyles l will tell you every necessary particular.

1 Capt. Thomas Eyles was made post and appointed Warren's
flag-captain when he was given his broad-pennant. See post,
P. 92.

I. G

82 THE SPENCER PAPERS

I wish you may be kind enough to do something
for him. And believe me, with much regard,1
Your lordship's sincere,

Humble servant,
J. B. WARREN.

(Received I2th July.)

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

La Pomone, Quiberon Bay. loth July, 1795.

My Lord, — I have just received all the public
dispatches from Lord Bridport, and shall act
according to the orders they contain. I have
hitherto done all in my power by sea and land
to forward the cause in which I am engaged, and
had in consequence purchased the cargoes of
several American vessels laden with provisions
for the army, and for which the General has given
his bills upon Government ; so that an addi-
tional supply has been obtained until more arrives
from England.3 And it was in good time as the
numbers that entered into the Peninsula were
near 20,000, of which the army consists of 14,000,
of which 10,000 are Chouans as yet undisciplined ;
the others women and children, who must other-
wise have fallen victims to the relentless fury
of the Republican Arm}'' which, to the amount of
20,000, has taken post at the other end of the
isthmus.3 The situation of this place is strong

1 The last paragraph is in Warren's own hand.

2 There had been an acrimonious dispute with America as to
our claim to seize as contraband provisions in neutral bottoms.
It had brought us to the brink of war, but had been settled
amicably by our agreeing to purchase the cargoes of vessels
detained at the full price which they would obtain delivered in
France.

3 Under General Hoche.

QUIBERON 83

and only wants some guns of a large calibre to
render it inaccessible on the land side, and on
the sea it unites the advantages of a port.

If Government should therefore support us
by sending some more regular troops, officers,
arm}'' provisions and ammunition, it is easy to
join those who are in arms in the country and to
take possession of some other place or port.
The present one will admit of space for our
magazines, troops, hospital, &c., and is open for
communication with England and Charette, from
whom two officers arrived last night and left him
in arms after having had two skirmishes, but in
want of officers, arms, powder and money. I
applied to Lord Bridport for to spare us some
large cannon, but as yet without effect. I trust
your lordship will not think I have acted wrong
in having sent to the fort eight g-pounders from the
ships and four of 32-pounds calibre. I have also
sent the Artois and Concorde with a vessel laden
with powder to the coast of Noirmoutier ; and
as the Arethusa and the Stag cutter and Experi-
ment lugger are gone to England, I have only one
left, as all my gunboats and other ships are
employed here and at Belleisle in protecting
troops, and blocking up the former place which,
as it now is in great distress for provisions, they
are using every effort to relieve.

I trust your lordship will soon afford me the
pleasure of hearing from you, and that you do not
disapprove of my conduct.

I am, with great esteem,

Your lordship's sincere,

Humble servant,
J. B. WARREN.

P.S.— I wish it were possible to have a few

G 2

84 THE SPENCER PAPERS

more gunboats and a lugger or two. I have so
many points to attack and to protect, and no
commissary of stores.

(Received igth July.)

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

La Pomone, Quiberon. I2th July, 1795.

My Lord, — I have desired Mr. Windham in a
letter I wrote to him by an American ship this
morning to inform you of the army having
marched out yesterday morning about 5000 men,
and driven in all the outposts of the enemy and
surprised a camp they had upon the isthmus, with
the loss of two men and about seven wounded,
There were about 3000 of the Chouan corps, who
behaved with much steadiness and intrepidity.

I attended the march of the army with four
launches, each carrying an 18 or 32-pounder, and
covered the right wing and annoy[ed] the enemy's
tirailleurs much, having killed and wounded about
thirty or forty of them, with only one of the
latter on our side.

I am happy to say that our post at the north
point of this Peninsula is now in a respectable
state and strong from situation. I trust there-
fore all our stores, magazines, and hospitals are
safe, and our communication with the Continent
is always open as well as to England. It was
fortunate we took the place at so early a period,
as the next day about 15,000 of the Republicans

Sressed close upon one of the new corps ; and
:om the small space of time since our being
upon the coast, and arming the inhabitants and
forming them into any order, if we had not had

QUIBERON 85

some place to give us time to breathe, the con-
sequences must have been fatal. As it is, we
only want support in provisions, especially biscuit
and arms, and with a greater number of regular
troops to ensure success. It is certain all the
people are with us, and join us wherever we go ;
but it is difficult to form an army, however well
inclined, at once. We had about 16,000 men with
us when we marched into the island, which is
tolerably well in seven days after our arrival and
the enemy coming so soon upon us. It now
depends upon our support from home to rout
these fellows, and if once put into disorder the
whole province must follow.

An officer of Charette's came here two days
ago and told us he had taken up arms again, and
been twice engaged with the enemy. I trust
your lordship will let me have a few more gun-
boats and allow me to retain the line-of-battle
ships. As so many objects occur and [there are]
such various points to defend, I have enough
to do with the force now under my command.
I have been obliged to take four guns from one of
the large ships for our fortifications, which I trust
you will not disapprove.

I shall, as soon as I know what is coming from
home and things are a little arranged, assist
Charette to get the Island of Noirmoutier.

I have the honour to remain, with much regard,
Your lordship's sincere,

Humble servant,
JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

Earl Spencer, &c., &c.

P.S. — I have little rest, and no assistance but
my first lieutenant, having no commissary to

86 THE SPENCER PAPERS

arrange all the Frenchmen who are like children
in periods of distress. I have placed the Bishop
of Dol in the best church in the island.1

(Received igth July.)

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

La Pomone, Quiberon Bay. 2oth July, 1795.

My Lord, — I have sent Captain Durham, in
the Anson,2 home with the convoy as far as
Plymouth, with orders to go in there to complete
and then return to me again, which I trust will
meet with your approbation.

I am very ill off for small vessels to send with
dispatches occasionally, and wish much to see
the Experiment and Valiant luggers.

Our enemies as well as ourselves remain in
statu quo. Some conversation passed between
the general officers at the outposts respecting
prisoners being well treated on both sides, which
was conducted in terms of civility : very different
from former times.

I find the gunboats of great use, and yesterday,
by firing into their camp, obliged the whole line
to be under arms. Charette is within six leagues
of Nantes, with 22,000 men ; Sapineau on his march
this way with 15,000 ; and Tinteniac,3 one of our
people, is upon the skirts of our enemies, that
blockaded by land, with 8000 Chouans. If we
had more troops, however, I can transport them in

1 The Bishop of Dol was appointed by the Pope with charge
of all ecclesiastical arrangements. Puisaye, M6moires, v. 142.

2 Anson, 44, Capt. Philip Calderwood Durham.

3 Sapineau was one of the local leaders. M. de Tinteniac
had been sent in advance by Puisaye to organise co-operation
with the expedition.

QUIBERON 87

chasse marees and flat-boats to any part of this
bay.

We shall soon want fresh water for our ships.
Our position upon this Peninsula, I trust, we shall
retain for our magazines, hospitals, &c. It is large
enough to hold an encampment of 20,000 men, and
unites all the advantages of a port.
I am, with much regard,
My dear lord,

Very sincerely yours,
J. B. WARREN.

P.S. — Nantes, in consequence of our being
here, is in great distress, as well as all the way
along the shore.

(Received 29th July.)

WARREN TO SPENCER

La Pomone, Quiberon Bay. 22nd July, 1795.

My Lord, — I received your letters by Captain
Eyles about four hours after the ships of the
squadron had ceased firing, so as to cover the
embarkation of those troops and people [whom]
we had been, as you will see by the public letter,
enabled to save. The regiments of Beon and
Damas, who with the other troops had retreated
from Fort Penthievre the whole length of the
island to the fort at the south end, whither I had
dropped down with the men-of-war and transports,
stood upon their defence most nobly against the
enemy ; and I only discontinued the fire from
receiving a messenger from Comte Sombreuil, who
commanded them (and who has been the only
active man since D'Hervilly's misfortune in being
wounded), that he had made terms with the

88 THE SPENCER PAPERS

enemy, and that the two regiments were to be em-
barked. Since that time I have been endeavouring
to open a negotiation with the French General to
exchange the prisoners already in my hands for
any number of those regiments ; but as yet I
have not received any answer, and it is doubtful
whether any will be returned as Tallien is at
Vannes, and all the Republicans here drunk with
rum l ; and the stores they have, unfortunately for
us, got hold of.

I must proceed to state to }"ou that in con-
sequence of the attack made by our troops on
the i6th, which proved so much against us, and
which the generals resolved to undertake before
the reinforcements were disembarked, and in
which Comte D'Hervilly received his wound, there
has been little regulation or arrangement among
the troops ; and I am sorry to add, it did not
appear that the General-in-Chief enjoyed the
confidence of the military men in the arm}7". He
is a well-meaning man, and I believe honest and
zealous. As to the military part I am no judge.
The exertions, however, made by the artillery and
others in putting things in a state of defence were
slack beyond measure ; and, notwithstanding every
exertion and assistance on our part, it was im-
possible to get things forward, or to have them
take necessary precautions.

I am happy to say that every assistance and
effort has been made in their favour by the officers
and men in the squadron, who have been inde-
fatigable in the cause. The occasion of the
surprise arose from an advanced guard of D'Her-
villy's regiment deserting with the parole and
countersign, and others that were in the fort

1 Jean Lambert Tallien was the commissioner sent to represent
the Convention with Hoche's army.

QUIBERON 89

joining the Republicans against their own officers
and regiment, upon whom they fired. Many of
the regiments were at too great a distance from
the fort. As from there being no tents in the army,
they were obliged to be quartered in the villages,
and could not arrive in time, and were not able
to unite. The corps, however, of Beon, Damas,
Salm, and a great part of Hector's, behaved
remarkably well.

I have notwithstanding saved near one
thousand troops, and one thousand four hundred
Chouans, including all the generals and three
hundred and fifty of the artillery. As nothing
was embarked from the last transports, every-
thing remains, and all the train of artillery and
the powder.

I find our provisions and water will soon run
short ; but as I think it will be wrong to give up
the business, and when so many people have
declared in our favour that Charette is at work,
I shall wait until General Graham joins me and
Lord Moira ; and in the meanwhile I shall probably
take possession of the Islands of Hoedic and
Houat, which will afford us refreshments, as well
as prove equally advantageous to proceed to any
point whatever ; and I shall still continue to
blockade Belleisle until I receive further orders.

I rely, however, upon being supported by Lord
BridporVs fleet, and trust we shall still succeed.
Five days sooner, if we could have received any
British troops, would have ensured us possession
of our post and all our provisions, which may
now pass into the Republicans' hands. What can
be done notwithstanding shall be, but eatables,
canteens, tents, and forage for the horses must be
had without a moment's loss of time.

I never suffered more in the whole course of

go THE SPENCER PAPERS

my life than from the effects of this disastrous
affair, but on account of which no man or officer,
in the corps I serve, can be said to have included
further than their feelings (sic).

I am under every obligation to His Majesty
for His gracious opinion of me, and to yourself
for my promotion.1

I have the honour to remain,

My lord,
Your sincere, humble servant,

J. B. WARREN.

P.S.2 — I am chagrined beyond measure at the
conduct of the troops having lost us so good a
post after all I had done for them.

The flag of truce I sent to the Republican
General cannot obtain any exchange of prisoners,
all of whom I fear are in prison, and exposed to
insult.

(Received agth July.)

Statement of the Forces on Quiberon, on
Monday, list July, I795-3

Artillery. Officers and Soldiers, 566

Regiment D'Hector. ,, „ 546

Du Dresnay. „ „ 404

D'Hervilly. ,, ,, 1600

LaChatre. „ „ 284
Salms, Damas, Beon, Rohan, and

Perigord 1174

Total 4574

1 He had just been given a broad pennant.

2 In Warren's hand.

3 ' D'Hector ' was raised mainly from officers of the old French
Navy ; ' Du Dresnay ' was Breton ; ' D'Hervilly ' (' Royal Louis')
was largely composed of the Regiment Royal Louis which had been
at Toulon and had come away with Lord Hood when the place

QUIBERON 91

Peasants, including women, children and
men capable of carrying arms, 5365, of
whom one-half may be capable of carry-
ing arms. ...... 2681

General Total 7255

LIST OF THE NUMBER OF OFFICERS AND SOLDIERS
WHO ESCAPED FROM QUIBERON

1. The whole of the staff, except Monsr. Bellou,

aid-de-camp to Monsr. De Puisaye.

Officers. Soldiers.

2. D'Hervilly .... 30 177

The rest of the soldiers de-
serted to the patriots.

De Salms, Du Dresnay, Damas 19 17

We are assured that the
soldiers of Du Dresnay
laid down their arms.

La Chatre .... 12 85

Rohan .... 13 63

Hector, Beon and Perigord . 19 55

Rothalier .... 46 343

Total 139 740

Number of peasants saved, capable

of carrying arms . . 3 1324

General Total 142 2064
The remainder are either killed or taken prisoners.

was evacuated. Puisaye, MSmoires, v. 42. The artillery were
also chiefly from Toulon, and were commanded by Colonel
Rothalier. La Chatre, styled ' Loyal Emigrant,' was commanded
by Major d'Haize in the absence of Comte de la Chatre.

92 THE SPENCER PAPERS

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

La Pomone, Road of Houat, Quiberon Bay.

29th July, 1795.

My Lord, — I must again return my best
acknowledgments for your kindness to me in
promoting myself as well as Captain Eyles to
command my ship, and to assure you of my
grateful remembrance of it in future.

I trust you will approve of the position I have
taken since our disasters of the i6th and 2ist,
but particularly the latter, as I thought our
appearance at home might not only injure the
general cause but also occasion some difficulties
to Government. Added to these considerations,
with respect to military or naval operations, these
islands are full as good, if not more secure and better
than Quiberon, as it is possible to attack Belleisle
from hence without alarms, or to retake possibly
Quiberon, and to land the army upon any point
of the coast, of which there are many. La Vendee
also is but seventeen leagues from us, and I have
complete possession of the anchorage of the bay
as much as ever.

I want for the squadron an immediate supply
of beer and water, and some cattle for fresh meat
for fear of the scurvy. If Lord Bridport's fleet is
relieved by another so as to blockade L'Orient,
I can remain for military operations, otherwise
not. Lord Moira's army should come soon, as
all the Carmagnolles have marched back again to
St. Malo,1 as I am informed, leaving a garrison of
800 men in the fort at Quiberon [and] taking with

1 MS. ' St. Maloes.' They had apparently been attracted to
this place by Sidney Smith's demonstration.

QUIBERON 93

them all the plunder. Fifty of them died, dead
drunk with the rum we left, and 500 men would
have retaken the place the next day. The Chouans
are still in arms and have skirmishes every day
with them.

I am, with much regard,

Your lordship's sincere,
Humble servant,

J. B. WARREN.
Earl of Spencer, &c., &c.

P.S. — My best respects attend Lady Spencer,
who, I trust, is well.

(Received 4th Aug.)

DUNDAS TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

Somerset Place, Thursday, 3oth.

My dear Lord, — We parted abruptly last
night, but I am uncertain if something at our
parting did not drop of writing to somebody,
probably Sir John Warren, to pledge ourselves to
send succour to Quiberon Bay. If you wrote
such a letter I would be very glad to learn the
contents of it. I am perfectly alarmed by some
things which were stated last night. I would
have called upon you myself, but I found my
leg rather more unwieldy than it was yesterday,
owing to moving about too much, and I shall not
go out to-day.

I remain, my dear lord,

Yours sincerely,

HENRY DUNDAS.

(30th July, 1795.)

• 3L- VB

> -<

o \;i'i>^o\O

94 THE SPENCER PAPERS

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

La Pomone, Houat Road, Quiberon Bay, 3ist July, 1795.

My Lord, — I remain here in expectation of
the army under Earl Moira, or for orders to
return. I have continued the blockade of Belle-
isle, supposing it might be of use to have it in
that state, if it should be thought proper to
attack hereafter. I have possession of the islands
of Houat and Hoedic, and have garrisoned the
fort upon the former. They afford some water,
but not sufficient for our consumption, and the
ovens being enlarged bake bread sufficient for
the army, reduced as it is. I have sent off 1300
old men, women and children who fled with us,
and who would soon have consumed all our
eatables. They have been suffered to return to
their own houses, and 500 Chouans now only
remain with us, the rest being in the interior parts
of the country. The anchorage of the bay is in
our power. I therefore remain in hope of soon
having orders, and refreshments of beer, water,
and some cattle for fresh beef, without which
our people will soon have the scurvy. I think
it is of consequence therefore to mention to your
lordship that the enemy are sending detachments
of seamen with all possible dispatch to L'Orient,
and perhaps, with the small supply of provisions
taken at Quiberon, they may meditate some
attack, or at least to get some if not all their
things out of that port. An expedition was in
agitation previous to the action with Lord Brid-
port to send reinforcements to the West Indies
and St. Domingo, and was only delayed in conse-
quence of the defeat on that day. I have a young

QU 1 BE RON 95

captain prisoner who was going round to Brest
to command a sloop upon that service, and who
was taken by our chasse maree a few days ago
coming from Nantes.

I trust therefore they will be taken if they
attempt it at present, and rely upon a fleet being
kept off Belleisle to relieve Lord Bridport, or
our station will be precarious. I should have
been glad if the Grand Fleet had taken possession
of the Island of Groix with the marines, which
might have been done with ease, and would be
a means of affording water and greens to the
ships, and blocking up the enemy.

I have the honour to remain, with great regard,
Your lordship's sincere,

Humble servant,
JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

Earl Spencer, &c., &c.

P.S. — I shall be obliged to your lordship in
communicating to Mr. Windham what I have
stated respecting the army.

I am in want of all kinds of eatables, having
had the pleasure of twelve French officers in my
cabin, and fourteen with my officers below. It is
a satisfaction, however, to be of some use to the
cause ; but I hope soon to hear from you. Mr.
White joined me yesterday. From your lordship's
kind intentions towards him, I trust you will not
allow him to remain long a lieutenant.

Mr. Nepean, in his last letter to me, mentions
the Valiant lugger, who I had requested, as having
had orders to join me and sailed for that purpose.
Will your lordship excuse my saying that Lieu-
tenant Baker, who commands her, has not yet had
any orders, and is still at Portsmouth ?

(Received 5th August, 1795.)

96 THE SPENCER PAPERS

SPENCER TO WARREN
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

[Draft Holograph.']

Dear Sir, — Though very much chagrined and
mortified at the unfortunate event of the 2ist,
the account of which reached me by Captain
Durham the day before yesterday, we are still
willing to hope that matters may not be yet quite
so desperate as to make it necessary to give up
all ideas of further offensive proceedings on the
coast of Brittany, &c. The loss, however, of a
post so favourable as that of Quiberon, with all
its attendant circumstances, was so unexpected as
well as so discouraging an event, as might well
be supposed capable of causing some little hesita-
tion or at least some deliberation on what was
next to be done. I am therefore unable to give
you positive assurances on this subject at present ;
but was unwilling to let a cutter sail for the coast
of France without telling you how much your
exertions and conduct continue to be approved
in the difficult and fatiguing situation you are in,
and how necessary it is for you to continue the
application of them, and to keep up the spirits
of our unfortunate friends that are with you as
well as you can.

Lord Bridport is instructed to use his best
endeavours for communicating with and protecting
you, and as our authorities from Brest only
mention four sail of the line in any state of for-
wardness on the 25th instant, I do not apprehend
that even with your present diminished force
you are in any danger from an attack by sea,
the only one which can now annoy you. The
Thunderer [74] is making every exertion to sail

QU 1 BE RON 97

as soon as possible, and, I hope, may be ready to
put to sea by to-morrow. The Anson will not,
I fear, be able to return immediately; but as
you have the Venus and Leda you will, I flatter
myself, be better able to do without her ; and
we have sent you four revenue cutters, who
may be of great use in any of the operations
for cutting off the communication with Belleisle.
They sailed three days ago. We have ordered
four of the best remaining gunboats to go out
with the Thunderer, if they get round to Ports-
mouth in time. If not, she is not to wait for them,
as Captain Bertie will carry with him everything
he can put on board that can be of the most use.

Pitt and Windham are gone down to-day to
meet Lord Moira in the country, and till the
result of their meeting is known no further in-
structions can be sent to you, but most probably
the Thunderer will carry out instructions to you,
and I hope she may reach you soon after, if not
even before this does.

Believe me, dear Sir,

Your very faithful and obedient servant,

SPENCER.
Sir J. B. Warren.

Admiralty, 3ist July, 1795.

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

La Pomone. 8th August, 1795.

My Lord, — I received your favour of the 3ist
this moment. It gives me great satisfaction to
learn that what I have done merits your lordship's
approbation. I shall endeavour to keep up the
spirits of the people now with me as much as it is
possible so to do ; but there are so many of them,
who think of a return to England before any

I. H

98 THE SPENCER PAPERS

service that I cannot get them to work with
energy or vigour. The arrival of Lord Moira
would perhaps oblige them to look about them,
and inspire some degree of confidence.

I have returned all the old men and women
to the Continent, and I believe they have allowed
them to return to their habitations. I fear, how-
ever, of the troops taken the account on the
other side (which I have received from an officer
of the Chouans and likewise by an officer of the
enemy's a few days ago) is unfortunately true,
although I have not communicated these parti-
culars for obvious reasons. I enclose an account
also of the description of the taking of Quiberon,
with the relation of Le Moine's reception of
Captain Keats and Lieutenant Cotton, who I
sent with a flag to endeavour to ameliorate the
fate of Comte Sombreuil and the other officers
who layed down their arms upon terms. This has,
however, been broken since in the most wanton,
cruel manner.1 I have now about 600 Chouans
that remain with us to feed, but the General
proposes sending them with a supply of powder
to a chief in the interior parts of the country,
and we shall then remain with about 700 or 800
of the remains of corps, including the artillery.
They are what is called disorganised and un-
armed, and clothed piecemeal ; but I want to
persuade the General to band them, and brush
their appearance and manners up a little.

I draw near, however, to the remainder of our
provisions, so that if the Thunderer does not
bring some out I shall not know what to do. I

1 At the suggestion of Tallien they were all massacred to the
number of 600, and their bones may be seen in the Mortuary
Chapel at St. Anne d'Auray. Charette replied by executing an
equal number of Republican prisoners.

QUIBERON 99

get for the ships, however, some fresh bread twice
a week, having built ovens upon the island, and
made out of the American flour. Water we can get,
as I have had wells sunk, but no fresh beef or beer.
I sent the Artois, La Concorde, two revenue
cutters, Le Febvre's chasse maree, and a sloop
laden with powder on Monday last to the coast
of La Vendee, Charette having requested I would
send him some, and promised by Le Febvre that
he would come down by the coast with 25,000
bayonettes to protect it. I sincerely hope my
expedition in that quarter may succeed and I
offered the assistance of the ships, if he thought
proper to retake Noirmoutier, which he said he
would try to do, if I wished it. Everything else
remains statu quo, except my anxiety to have
some decisive orders, which increases daily.
I am always, with much regard,
Your lordship's sincere,

Humble servant,
JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

P.S.— I trust Mr. Pitt and Windham have
settled everything with Lord Moira, and that if
he does come it will be without a moment's loss
of time and in force.1 If he had arrived eighteen
days past, we might have been at Rennes. The
Republicans have sent troops from all other
points to the side of Brest, L' Orient, and as far
as Vannes. There is an opening, notwithstanding,
with Charette and Stofflet, and good forage.

1 On hearing of the initial success of the expedition, Pitt had
decided to send a force of 3000 men to occupy the Peninsula of
Quiberon at once, and as soon as possible to send 11,000 more
infantry and 3000 cavalry, the whole to be under Lord Moira,
and to act in combination with the Royalist Army under the
Comte d'Artois. But the troops were not to be found, and even
the advanced guard was greatly delayed in starting. See
Fortescue, IV. i. 416.

H 2

ioo THE SPENCER PAPERS

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

La Pomone, Quiberon Bay. I4th August, 1795.

My Lord, — I send Lieutenant White, who I
again take the liberty of recommending to your
protection, with the particulars of the expedition
I dispatched under Sir Edmund (sic) Nagle,1 with
stores and ammunition to General Charette.
I have to lament, however, the loss of poor
Le Febvre, who fell a victim to his credulity and
bravery.

I am in the most anxious state of suspense,
having had no orders or received any provisions
since your lordship's letter of the 3ist of last
month, in which you mentioned the arrival of
the Thunderer, which I have looked for in vain.
Our provisions grow [so] short that I have but
about three weeks left in most of the ships, and
500 Chouans and sixteen chasse marees, besides
the troops, to support.

I am, notwithstanding, unwilling to abandon
these islands and this bay whilst offensive measures
continue, as they would afford water and hos-
pital for the sick, and vegetables, if a garrison
were placed in them, and the line of battleships
to anchor here and cruise from hence, as the ports
of Brest, Rochefort, Belleisle and L' Orient would
of course be blocked up in consequence thereof.

I do trust, therefore, your lordship will send
me immediately orders what to do, as the Robust
[74], if we stay, must go home the moment the
Thunderer arrives, owing to the scurvy.

I beg leave to state that the Falcon cutter
[and] the Sprightly, sent with dispatches, are not

xCapt. Sir Edward Nagle, of H.M.S. Artois 138],

QUIBERON 101

yet returned to me, and that it is seldom when
they get once to England that they are willing
to come back again without enforcing the orders
they sailed from hence under.

I have the honour to remain, with much regard,
Your lordship's sincere,

Humble servant,
JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

La Pomone, Quiberon Bay. 28th August, 1795.

My Lord, — I have remained in anxious ex-
pectation of receiving orders to send back the
troops here, who are in a miserable state, and to
blow up the forts at these islands, and to return
home, or to have seen Lord Moira with the
British Army. But as I have not heard from
the Board since the 3ist of last month, and have
only been kept in spirits by your lordship's
obliging letter of the 5th instant, I must now
state that owing to the squadron having been so
long from England without any refreshments,
except what could be obtained from these islands
in a very small quantity, the scurvy will soon
make rapid advances among us. There is a
fever on those with the troops, and some have
died, and near 115 of them [are] in hospital. The
rest are encamped as well as our means and
circumstances would admit ; but of their fidelity,
except the remains of three regiments, very little
can be said, as I am persuaded they would not t
stand a second fire, and many of them join the
enemy.1

1 He refers, of course, to the bmigrb regiments.

102 THE SPENCER PAPERS

The General and the army are not upon good
terms, arid what to do with them if I have not
speedy orders it will be difficult to say, as any
force that might slip out and come within Lord
Bridport, which, from the enclosed letter, your
lordship will observe is by no means difficult to
do. I shall, perhaps, some evening or morning
be attacked and shall dispose of my force as well
as I can until my instructions arrive.

If I had only 5000 troops to have taken and
garrisoned Noirmoutier and to have assisted
Charette, I could have maintained my ground.
As it is, I do not know what may be the con-
sequence, but rely upon your lordship's candour
and exertion to assist me in this crisis.

I have the honour to remain, with much respect
and esteem,

Your lordship's sincere,

Humble servant,
JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

P.S. — I wish the General would head the
Chouans and collect his party, as the enemy will
press on all sides against poor Charette, who has
behaved on all occasions, as well as his people,
with the utmost bravery.

(Received 6th September, 1795.)

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

La Pomone, Quiberon Bay. nth September, 1795.

My Lord, — I have been under the utmost
anxiety and pain for the space of three weeks in
not having received a single line officially from
the Board, or any intelligence of the intentions

QUIBERON 103

of Government respecting the destination of the
troops at this place and the squadron under my
command. In addition to this state of uncer-
tainty, rendered more disagreeable by the sickness
among the troops and scurvy breaking out,
notwithstanding every exertion in my power, on
the ships, I have been perplexed beyond measure
by the remonstrances and letters of Lord Brid-
port, whose letters and my answers your lordship
will see in the packet to the Board. I should
have been under the necessity of leaving this
place on the I4th as the forts were destroyed and
Lord Bridport very much displeased at my not
coming out of the bay immediately. I, however,
certainly wished to remain until the last moment,
knowing the importance of our appearance even
to the general cause. I have harassed the enemy
by frequent attacks at Quiberon with the small
launches of the squadron, into which I had put
an i8-pounder carronade ; and as they draw
little water, in the night by being inshore the
alarm has been general and constant along shore,
and the effect has been the means of cutting off
many of the enemy's troops.

f have kept up the spirits of the Chouans all
in my power, and must say that the country
throughout are well disposed and not discouraged
by the treacherous behaviour at Quiberon and
its fatal consequences. De Puisaye is gone to
the head-quarters, and I enclose his letter by
which your lordship will judge of his representa-
tion of things. I do not give credit, however,
to what he says about Scepaux's army, as I know
it is commanded by a relation of Charette's, who
is not inclined to correspond with him. General
De Puisaye has carried with him the cash of the
chest and refused paying the soldiers here, as he

104 THE SPENCER PAPERS

said it was destined for the Chouans. I believe
he is, if I may be excused speaking freely upon
a point in which my country is concerned, a
character capable of doing much good or being
no inconsiderable enemy and full of intrigue, and,
I wish it were possible to say, pos3essed of equal
bravery. He has lost much of the confidence of
the troops, with whom he has been as it were at
war. It is certain these latter, except the artillery
and La Chatre, Rohan, Salms, and Damas,
have behaved very ill and are not to be trusted,
but one-half of them Republicans. A great deal
may however be placed to discouragement and
no regularity of measures taken in the com-
manding of them since D'Hervilly's being wounded.
I have embarked them all and, thank Heaven,
General Doyle may soon arrive to take charge of
them. I have been much indebted, however, to
Monsieur De Perigord, commanding the regiment
of that name, and to Monsieur Contades, who
have exerted themselves in keeping things together
during the army being encamped at Houat.

I am given to understand, from good authority,
that Charette has cut to pieces ten battalions
out of twelve that marched from hence against
him. If so, the powder and arms I sent him, and
for which he wrote me a most grateful letter, have
been well employed. I have also received a hint
from two Republican regiments upon the Con-
tinent that if they were assured of being received
with their officers, and had some cash, [and] if
we were in any force, they should be glad, as well
as others, to join us. Money will do anything
with them, and encouragement in their present
disposition, which is by no means favourable to
the Convention. And all the Line are enraged
at the treatment our prisoners experienced after

QUIBERON 105

their capitulation at Quiberon, and refused to
shoot them. Only one detachment of Belgians
and the villains who betrayed us at Fort Penthievre
were found equal to the task. I shall communicate
all these circumstances to General Doyle upon his
arrival.

I trust your lordship will excuse the length of
this scrawl and, likewise, at my requesting of you
to communicate whatever part of its contents
you may think proper to Mr. Windham, to whom
I beg to present my compliments. I have only
three gunboats left with me, and of those only
two good ones. The enemy are building several
at Nantes, and they are useful beyond measure
in all desultory expeditions, disembarkations, &c.
I should be glad if your lordship would be kind
enough to let me have an excellent gun-vessel
taken by Sir Richard Strachan some time ago
and carried to Portsmouth. She sails well, and
would be of great use. If I am to remain upon
the business I do hope the Navy Board may be
ordered to send up trawls and seines, as fish of
every description abound in this bay, and from
having a net of my own I have been enabled
generally to keep the crew of this ship free of
disease. I am busily employed in a survey of this
bay and its passages, and I am happy to say it
is nearly complete and may be of great utility in
this or any future war.

I would be pleased to see the Anson return to
us again — who, I hear from Captain Durham, is
ready for sea— and the Robuste also as soon as
she can come to us. The revenue cutters I never
can get back from England when once there,
and the Valiant lugger has never yet joined me.
I have no sloops of war or small craft but the
Dolly cutter. I trust that lemon juice with all

io6 THE SPENCER PAPERS

antiscorbutics, greens, beer, and live stock may
be sent us from Plymouth and Ireland, if it is
our fate to fight through the campaign. At all
events, your lordship may be assured of every
exertion that is practicable on my part, and
that I have the honour to remain, with much
regard,

Your lordship's sincere, humble servant,

JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

P.S. — The convoys are just in sight, thank
Heaven, at last.

Earl Spencer, &c.

(Received iyth September, 1795.)

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

La Pomone, off Isle d'Yeu, 3rd October, 1795.

My Lord, — I have mentioned in my public
letter everything relating to the taking 'possession
of this island,1 which from its vicinity to the
Continent may be of use in throwing in succours
to Charette from time to time, and I have for that
purpose nominated Lieutenant Smith, of the
Teaser gun-vessel, an officer of merit and enter-
prise, to remain in the river with his own schooner
(a large flat vessel taken at Noirmoutier, and

1 About 4000 of the army, which was supposed to be forming for
Lord Moira's command, had been sent out under Major-General
Doyle to take possession of the Island of Noirmoutier and co-
operate with Charette. But as the sands which connected it
with the mainland were nearly always passable it was not
considered tenable by the force available and General Doyle
decided to occupy the Isle d'Yeu instead. — Fortescue, IV. i.
418.

QUIBERON 107

fitted to carry a long 24-pounder and two carronades
of 18 Ibs.) with four launches of my plan, each
with an i8-pounder and a small hired cutter, to
act as a naval establishment for the island to
cover any convoy of chasse-marees or troops in
my absence destined for La Vendee, from which
Isled'Yeu is only separated by three leagues of sea.
I am also selecting all the light brigs to go into
the harbour for the troops in case of necessity,
and an agent, Mr. Tate, to reside upon the spot.
All these precautions are indispensable, from the
road here having a rocky bottom and being
insecure [so] that it is dangerous for any ship
to remain if the wind should come to NW or
NNW, and blow a gale, having no port to
run into. I must therefore still retain my port
at Hoedic and Houat, where I shall be obliged
to always keep some ships ; but I shall come
down to this island as often as the weather
will permit me, so as to shelter it from the
force in Rochefort, which amounts to nine or
ten sail of men-of-war of different classes. I
believe, however, the island is impregnable if
attacked by anything under 40,000 men. Noir-
moutier would, however, have been better in all
respects as the navy could always have assisted
and co-operated with the land forces, and a
constant communication kept up from, home as
well as the interior. It would likewise have made
it easy for troops to disembark all winter, which
may be doubtful upon the coast as Charette has
not any port. The number of infantry sent out
is rather too small as the orders seem to rather
tie up the General from anything that is hazardous,
and without some risk in a war like this nothing
can be done or expected to succeed. I am
extremely anxious to land the French troops and

io8 THE SPENCER PAPERS

the stores as well as H.R. Highness Monsieur1
before the bad weather comes on, as well as the
army of Biscay which is said to be advancing ;
but there is an idea that a few piastres well
bestowed will induce most of those troops to
change their colours, as they are reported to be
very tired with their present business.

I trust that when this latter business of
disembarking the immense convoy that has come
out shall have taken place, if I should be so
fortunate as to succeed, your lordship will allow
me with this ship to come home for a month,
leaving the command with the senior officer until
my return, as my health and business will require
some attention owing to what I have already
gone through, and not being prepared for a
foreign station, I have often been destitute of
everything.

I shall then come back with every necessary
article. And have the honour to remain with
much regard,

Your Lordship's sincere, humble servant,

JOHN B. WARREN.

P.S. — I wish it were possible to have a sloop-
of-war of the new construction to draw little
water. I believe all my dispatches must go to
Quiberon as the only secure anchorage. Any
vessels sent here as transports or victuallers
should not draw more water than nine feet, or
they cannot unlade or be placed in safety.

(Received nth October, 1795.)

1 That is, the Comte d'Artois. He had become ' Monsieur '
since the death of his nephew the ' Dauphin ' (Louis XVII) in
prison on loth June. His eventual failure to land was considered
to have given the death-blow to Royalists.

QUIBERON 109

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

La Pomone, Road of Isle d'Yeu. i6th October, 1795.

My Lord, — I had written to your lordship by
the Swan revenue cutter, which vessel, I learn from
a corvette captured by this ship the day before
yesterday, was captured eight leagues WSW of
Belleisle. I therefore send the Falcon express
with the general's and my dispatches.

The British troops are all on shore and en-
camped and I should hope buildings and houses
may be found for the greatest part of them, as
the season advances, except a small part for which
moveable barracks or planks would be of infinite
service. Fuel and forage are much wanted, as
well as live stock or cattle, as the Republicans
have stripped this place, although it is so fertile,
of most of its productions. I have spared all the
bullocks and provisions it was possible to do
from the men of war, and have been distressed
beyond measure to get the rest of the army
victuallers down here, as only fourteen days' [pro-
visions] were landed upon the island previous to the
six days' bad weather we have experienced in the
road, which is rocky and bad. Owing to Captain
Bertie's having returned to Quiberon again from
Bourgneuf1 (the bay of which place seems to have
frightened him and the transports, although we
found it a tolerable good one) another difficulty
has occurred in getting our provisions and stores
into the pier at this place, which is that it only
will admit brigs and craft that draw from eight to
nine feet of water. I have therefore sent up chasse-
marees to Quiberon and ordered the heavy ships

1 Between Noirmoutier and the mainland.

no THE SPENCER PAPERS

to be unladen, and some brigs and the frigates to
receive the remainder so as to throw in every-
thing as fast as possible before the bad weather
again commences, as it is almost impracticable
to re-embark the troops and stores again before
the spring, if such a measure were advisable.
I have sent two brigs and an agent to Ireland for
provisions also, that the army may be supplied,
and shall spare them a part of any live stock that
may arrive. The cadres are anxious to return
home again, and the cavalry owing to their
retrograde motion have not been able to dis-
embark, if they were in a state for that purpose
which is not the case, as the men are half ill of
the flux and horses dying in numbers, that the
General from seeing their inability and a want
of forage has requested I will return them home
again, which I shall do by the first convoy. I
shall be obliged to keep some transports at a
great risk in Quiberon Bay, where they are
subject to drive in gales of wind, and divide my
force, the half to be out to protect this place
whilst the other half is in harbour.

I am sorry to say that since Charette's second
letter the weather has not permitted any inter-
course with the shore owing to the surf and the
coast opposite to this place being much guarded ;
and I fear the Spanish army pressing him.

I shall lose no opportunity or spare any pains
to execute your lordship's wishes, but I have a
hard task to go through in combating the de-
spondency and want of enterprise of the French
and the impatience of our own side.

I do hope after I have settled things as well
as circumstances will admit, that I may be allowed
to return to Plymouth for a fortnight or three
weeks to get stores and refreshments for three

QU I BE RON in

of the ships who have been out between four and
five months and who are completely in want,
being stripped in assisting the different expeditions
and armies. I have also been extremely unwell,
which now prevents me writing so pretty as I
could wish. I am with much regard,

Your lordship's sincere, humble servant,

J. B. WARREN.

P.S. — I hope the Jason, as Stirling is zealous
and active, may return and one sloop of war.1
Earl Spencer.

(Received 22nd October, 1795.)

SPENCER TO WARREN
PRIVATE.

Dear Sir, — I received your letter of the 3rd
on the nth instant, and your letter of the i6th
this morning. I delayed answering the former
till my answer could be accompanied by some
decisive orders for your further proceedings, and
those have hitherto been delayed from the extreme
difficulty which you may easily be aware existed
in explaining everything to the personage whom
you have with you. By the conveyance which
carries this out to you, you will receive these
orders, and I wish you may find it possible to
execute them speedily and in a manner which
may secure the only object which now seems to
remain from the state of things in the quarter
where you are, namely, that of withdrawing,
with as little loss as possible, the force both
British and French which is with you. I say

1 Capt. (afterwards Vice- Admiral) Charles Stirling had brought
out the Comte d'Artois in the Jason [32], but to Charette's despair
the Prince could not make up his mind to land.

H2 THE SPENCER PAPERS

both British and French because, though we
thought it right to leave an option to the latter
to remain on the island, or even attempt a land-
ing on the mainland if they think fit, yet I feel
very little doubt that they will take the wiser
determination to return if possible.

I am much concerned to see by your letter
that you doubt of the practicability of getting
them off, because I think it will be so very desir-
able a measure when you recollect the great
difficulties and hazards there will be in supplying
them with all necessaries during the winter,
besides the great confinement of our naval force
which will be the consequence of it, that I am
sure every possible effort will be made for the
purpose of effecting it.

We have thought it necessary to give our
orders to Admiral Harvey for this service, who is
directed to avail himself of your knowledge and
experience upon it, because by that means we
brought into use more force for the purpose than
we could otherwise have had to dispose of, and
at the same time we have ordered you as soon
as your frigates can be spared from that service
to take a sweep round the Bay, as we thought
after so long a stationary position as you have
had it might be of use to your men as well as
yourself to take a short cruise, and as your being
in company with your fleet longer than is abso-
lutely (necessary) may be attended with incon-
venience on account of your flag. We do not,
however, mean you to stay out on any such
service a moment longer than may consist with
the state of your stores and the health of your
ships' companies, and from your last letter I
should guess you will not think it proper to keep
them out for any considerable time. You may,

QUIBERON 113

however, perhaps contrive to pick up a few re-
captures, as I am afraid the enemy's squadrons
have availed themselves of our stationary opera-
tions on the coast to be very busy with our trade
without.

I have not time at present to add more but
that I am, dear sir, with great truth,

Yours very faithfully, &c.,
SPENCER.

Admiralty. 22nd October, 1795.
(To Commodore Sir J. B. Warren.)

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

Pomona. [No place or date ; probably Isle d'Yeu.]

My Lord, — I did myself the honour of writing
to your lordship by La Trompeuse informing you
of our transactions at Bourgneuf and this place.
I was extremely sorry that the Island of Noir-
moutier appeared to the officers of the army as
a place not to be defended ; as the communication
by sea with the squadron would have been con-
stantly preserved, and from the anchorage ri\ in
this road being bad in winter, I have experienced
the greatest difficulty in throwing stores and
provisions into the island, and am now waiting
a convoy from Quiberon who have been readyjto
sail several days. If I should be fortunate enough
to succeed and the army should have two months'
provisions, I then propose returning to Quiberon
Bay to see if any orders should have arrived for
the ships of my squadron, who from having been
five months absent and only stored for three, are
in want of candles, coals, wood and everything,
and most of their crews afflicted with the flux,
and some have been lost by a fever. This ship
is one of them and the Standard and Galatea.
I. I

H4 THE SPENCER PAPERS

The others from having been later out may remain
some time longer. I should however request that
your lordship will allow me to be absent from this
station for a fortnight or three weeks, as my
health and personal affairs require it. I believe,
unless a communication can be obtained with
Charette in a very few days, that it must be
delayed until the spring, as he is obliged from so
many troops being sent against him to retire
from the coast for a period. If any opportunity
should offer I leave the Teaser gun-vessel under
Mr. Smith's directions, who is an excellent officer
and a very intelligent man, and also a lugger of
eight guns with two launches that he may escort
any supplies of arms to the Continent or convey
any officers that may be sent there.

With respect to this place, the island is far
from inconsiderable being above two leagues long
and one and a half broad, containing 2500 in-
habitants, eighteen villages, and two towns. The
soil is fertile and almost all the troops are now in
comfortable cantonments and may, if well supplied
with fuel and provisions, remain there until
spring. Indeed, I believe it would be very diffi-
cult if not impossible to embark them and the
stores in the winter, because it would be im-
practicable for transports to remain in the road
upon the appearance of bad weather, and the pier
can only contain eighteen brigs that draw nine feet
water. As to the defence there have been found
upon it twenty or thirty pieces of cannon of a large
calibre; and with those already landed, as it is
only open to attack on one side and would require
15,000 or 20,000 men with several ships of war to
attempt to force it, I should suppose it to be very
safe in the present situation of French affairs.
And if the war goes on, it is surely from its vicinity

QUIBERON 115

to La Vendee and Brittany, as well as being the
only place upon which a body of troops and a
magazine of stores can be established without
being exposed to attack — a post of some use.
I trust your Lordship, however, will excuse me
when I mention in confidence, that I have ex-
perienced no small degree of anxiety and difficulty
in executing my orders upon this expedition,
as I am blamed by all the weak and discontented
of Lord Bridport's and Admiral Harvey's fleet,
who attribute to me their long attendance upon
the enemy's coast and canvass every measure.1

I have one in the squadron who sees everything
with apprehension and difficulty : the captain
of the Thunderer 3 and who I believe has given
a dreadful description to Lord Hugh 3 of the
anchorage here, which is certainly not very good,
but far from being impossible to make use of in
tolerable weather.

I must own that it is my most ardent wish
to serve you faithfully, and I trust you will
pardon my having plagued you with so much
nonsense relative to myself.

I am with great regard,
Your lordship's sincere humble servant,

J. B. WARREN.

P.S. — The Chouans in Brittany talk of making
a general insurrection and I have sent them all
that can be spared with 3000 dollars.

Endorsed : ' No place or date. Admiralty, 5th Nov., 1795.'

1 Rear-Admiral Henry Harvey had been left in command of
the Channel Fleet to watch Brest and L'Orient when, at the
end of September, Lord Bridport went home with part of it.

5 Captain Albemarle Bertie.

3 Vice- Admiral Lord Hugh Seymour, who, during the summer,
had a division in the Channel Fleet, though he had been a Sea
Lord since yth March.

I 2

n6 THE SPENCER PAPERS

SPENCER TO WARREN

[Draft on back of above]

PRIVATE.

Dear Sir, — As I expect that you will so soon
be returned to England in consequence of the
last orders we sent out, I shall not do more at
present than merely acknowledge the receipt of
your letter without date, but which came by the
same conveyance as that to the Board of the 7th
ultimo.

I still hope that the troops may be brought
home notwithstanding the difficulties that you
state ; and I confess I shall feel a very great
weight off my mind when the fleet as well as your
squadron is relieved from the necessity which has
so long tied them down to one particular spot.
I am, dear Sir,

Yours very faithfully,

SPENCER.

Admiralty, 5th November, 1795.
Sir J. B. Warren, K.B.

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

Isle D'Yeu. 3rd December, 1795.

My Lord, — I received the honour of your
lordship's letter from Portsmouth at Quiberon,
where I had arrived with most of the ships of my
squadron, in consequence of the orders from
Admiral Harvey to desist from the embarkation,
which had been begun and would have been
finished in three days afterwards. Since that
period, if I write in confidence, I must say our
destiny has been changed frequently, as the

QUIBERON 117

admiral has been so much alarmed at the idea of
the road, so plagued about water by those with
him that I have been twice recalled ; but at last
in consequence of your lordship's letter, I am now
here with orders to effect the evacuation if it
is practicable : and, as I perceive it is your wish
that it should be so, you may be assured no
endeavour of mine shall be wanting to obtain
this object.

I have at the same time used every means in
my power to throw in succours of arms, clothing,
cash to the Chouans, who have been down once
in force and with whom I have constant com-
munication. Two of their armies are to come
down to receive all the stores, &c., and if they
arrive with 25,000 and the event is fortunate,
I think they will be left in such a state as to in-
crease in numbers, discipline, and strength. I
have also had communication with Charette, two
of whose officers are now with me. He has suffered
little notwithstanding the numerous bodies sent
against him, and if the Prince was now here and
chose to have joined him it might have been done : l
14,000 men with Hoche are ordered from La
Vendee to Paris and the frontiers on account of
the Austrians' progress in that quarter. All
that it is in my power to do for Charette in my
present situation shall be done : but I have no
easy task to fulfil and much to combat. I trust
when these affairs are brought to some degree of
crisis and upon our return, your lordship will
allow me to assemble the remains of my squadron
and to do what good we can ere the contest is
ended, which from some observations on all sides
appears to be approaching. Your lordship will,

1 The Comte d'Artois had decided to return to England in
November.

n8 THE SPENCER PAPERS

I hope, do me the justice to believe, that I shall
continue to answer your wishes as far as it is
in my power : and I have the honour to remain
with much regard,

Your lordship's sincere, humble servant,

JOHN BORLASE WARREN.
Earl Spencer.

P.S. — A report is prevalent in Brittany that
De Puisaye has been arrested by the Royalists :
and that he has corresponded with the enemy.

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

Isle d'Yeu. 9th December, 1795.

My Lord, — I have worked very hard to get
the troops and stores off this island ever since I
had your lordship's letter signifying your wishes
upon this subject, and all will be embarked by
to-morrow night excepting the rear-guard, con-
sisting of 1200 men. And if the vessels can be
got out of the pier, these men will be all that
remain to take off except the general and myself,
as the horses, artillery, and provisions are already
embarked. To effect this point, however, I have
been obliged to fill and send off to Quiberon all
the ships of war except the Galatea, in which
ship my pennant is flying : and as soon as they
arrive I shall proceed to join them with all the
dispatch possible ; and it will afford me much
pleasure to pay my respects to your lordship
and to assure you that I have the honour to remain
with great regard,

Your sincere, humble servant,
JOHN BORLASE WARREN,

(Received i6th December, 1795.)

QUIBERON 119

SIDNEY SMITH TO SPENCER

Portsmouth. I5th December, 1795.

My dear Lord, — The enclosed papers contain-
ing a report on the French marine, cannot
fail of interesting you, and I therefore send
them.

It seems to promise us some good sport. I
wish I felt myself equal to preventing the coasting
trade, which' will be the first consequence of the
decree to re-equip the navy. I cannot interrupt
it with frigates drawing nineteen feet of water,
and inferior in number to those destined to convoy
the vessels of lighter draft, which as we well know
go close to the beach. I have said so much on
this subject that I will not trouble you more on
it. We have many cutters, luggers, brigs, and
even sloops of war, of light draft of water which
sail well and can get off a lee shore if they are
caught on it. Whenever your lordship chooses
to gratify their commanders with a sight of the
enemy, I shall be happy to point out the ground
where this gratification is to be found. They
may lay at Spithead or cruise on our own coast
a long while before they will pay the expense of
their equipment by any real service ; for the
enemy know better than to come across the
Channel to see to them. The scenery squadron
is returned into port, having cruised in a very
orthodox way half-Channel over, so far from
land, that they conceived the Amazon and
Syren to be French frigates come out of
Cherbourg.

The person I landed in October last to go to
Caen with the fishermen whose boats had been

120 THE SPENCER PAPERS

destroyed by a Jersey privateer is returned, after
running many risks from the undefined powers
of government leaving him a prey to the caprice
of faction. In that town, they were going to
transfer him to Paris but the Royalist party
contrived to withdraw him from the power of
those who were plotting his destruction. They
concealed him in Caen till the hue and cry was
over, then conveyed him from house to house
safe to M. de Frotte, commander of the Chouan
Royalists in that quarter, who soon after made
a movement towards Granville. The republicans
attacked this corps of Chouans while he was with
them. The Royalists remained masters of the
field, and facilitated his return by Granville, near
which they now are. Frotte has sent me a letter
expressive of a hope of succour, which if you
enable me to give him, I shall undertake to convey
with pleasure. The Temeraire was in Cancale
the gth instant.

I am, my dear Lord,

Yours very sincerely,

W. SIDNEY SMITH.

WINDHAM TO SPENCER

Fulham. 22nd December, 1795.

My dear Lord, — I was not sorry to miss you
at the Admiralty yesterday, when I found that
the cause of your absence was your having gone
down to Wimbledon. I hope you already feel
the benefit of it.

One of my purposes of calling was to inform
you that Monsieur de Monotier is ready, and
waits for nothing but the vessels that are to

QUIBERON 121

convey him.1 Some time, however, must elapse,
I conceive, before they can be prepared ; some-
thing will be to be done, in order to have the
full benefit of their going. So far as I can collect
from Captain Durham a frigate can stow not
more than 1000 stand of arms ; but he spoke
rather at random, and the feeling of the moment
seemed likely to lead to diminution rather than
exaggeration. I shall have to-day or to-morrow
an answer from Captain Patton,3 stating what
the capacity is with respect to the objects in
question of ships of war, and what of transports.
I wish to recall to you early the use that may be
to be made of the ships of war in this respect, in
order that directions may be given for their
taking on board as many as they conveniently
can before their leaving Portsmouth. It will
then be to be considered what addition it
may be prudent to make to them of trans-
ports.

1 That is, to take supplies, etc., to Stofflet and Charette,
who were still holding out. Both were eventually taken and
executed — Stofflet in January and Charette in March — ' cursing
the cowardice of their traitorous Prince.'

3 Captain Philip Patton's rank raises a curious point. After
highly distinguished service in the last two wars he had been
appointed in 1794 to the newly formed Transport Board, together
with Captain Christian (see post, p. 133). There he showed such
high capacity that, according to Ralph (iii. 396), when his time
came for promotion the First Lord (presumably Lord Spencer)
tried to induce him to forgo flag rank and remain as head of the
Board, with a threat that if he insisted he should never fly
his flag. He did, however, insist and on ist June, 1795, he, Chris-
tian, and eleven others were promoted. Probably the story is
apocryphal, for Ralph says he then went on half pay. But by
the list published by Laird Clowes (iv. 152) there was no change
till September 1795, and he and Christian are described as
' Captain and Admiral.' Now as late as 22nd December, Windham
is consulting him as the authority on transport. He was also
regarded as the highest authority on matters concerning the
lower deck, and he it was who first foretold the mutinies.

122 THE SPENCER PAPERS

I cannot but urge earnestly to your considera-
tion the question of making such an arrangement
of the naval force, as may not risk the loss of the
station of Quiberon Bay. Officers of the fleet,
merely as such, will for a thousand reasons be
inclined to undervalue the importance of that
possession. Many, in the first place, of them know
very little of its advantages or disadvantages.
There are many that partake of the prejudice,
which prevailed so strongly in Lord Bridport's
fleet, against Sir John Warren and all his opera-
tions. Few of the commanders of great fleets
have ever been in the practice of going down into
the Bay, or are willing to do what they have not
been accustomed to and promises upon general
principles to bring them into difficulties, without
any adequate prospect of fame or profit ; and they
all of them consider the question as a mere naval
question, without any idea of what the Royalists
are, or of the importance to be attached to the
support of their cause.

I cannot but think, however, that hardly any
event would be more fatal than the total loss of
that station, and with it the loss of all hopes of
any effectual support to be given to, or even ready
communication with the Royalists. I should,
therefore, according to my own ideas, urge most
strenuously — that unless in the opinion of good
judges we might always dislodge them, if they
were to get there (a power which I cannot but
feel very doubtful of) — that the operations of our
squadron should be such as never to let them get
possession of it — a purpose, which I cannot but
think might be effected, with no greater derange-
ment of the general service than, in the opinion
of those who might rate the object much lower
than I should do, would be amply compensated

QUIBERON 123

by the difference to be made in this respect on
the general success of the war.

I wish that the matter may be considered,
even with respect to the consequences merely
naval. It may not be slight difference that the
possession of that station by them or by us will
make in the effect on their coasting trade,
especially now that the ports of Spain and Portugal
will have become neutral.1 If they are to have
such a station as Quiberon to fly to for safety,
and we have no place of refuge for nearly the
whole extent of the Bay, it will be a work of con-
siderable difficulty, I apprehend to prevent their
carrying on as much coasting trade as they please.
This is a consideration, which I am glad to bring
into play, because I know how little popular the
other. I shall be glad, however, if by whatever
means I can avert so fatal an event as the total
exclusion of all further [help] to the Royalists.
It is by the preservation of that body of men to
France that can alone, in my opinion, make one
termination of the war in any degree materially
better than another. Let Jacobinism be com-
pletely established in France, and I would not give
sixpence for the security of any other country in
Europe.

Yours very truly,

W. WlNDHAM.
(Received 23rd December, 1795.)

1 In July the French army had passed the Pyrenees and
seized Vittoria. Spain then made peace (22nd July), deserting
the cause of the French Bourbons. It was their hope of an
unconditional restoration by Spanish arms that was one of the
causes of their lukewarmness to Puisaye's efforts.

124 THE SPENCER PAPERS

EDWARD PELLEW1 TO SPENCER

My Lord, — I wish it were in my power to
inform your lordship that we had effected the
purposes for which we were sent here completely,
but I hope you will believe that no exertions on
my part have been wanting. Surrounded on
every side by enemies, and hourly expecting a
superior squadron, your lordship will easily credit
that if the operation depended upon us that my
movements would have been rapid, and I can
assure you, my lord, that I have never allowed
myself for a moment to lose sight of what were
the intentions of his Majesty in sending us here.
Our operation from being always carried on by
night, and on the open coast, has been excessively
difficult as well as dangerous both to ships and
boats. Several of the latter have been lost, and
the Argo very near it. The Republican troops, to
a certainty, have been doubled in their numbers
since the Austrian truce, and I fear also, a truth
not to be concealed, that the Royalist parties in
these provinces will be completely overturned in
two months, if some powerful diversion is not
made to draw off some part of the troops which
are now upon them. General Charette has been
completely beat ; his second in command,
Monsieur de Robree, has seceded. The death of
StofHet has rendered his army inactive. Scepeaux
writes me that he cannot move without quantities
of money, arms and ammunition, for which he

1 Early in 1796 Pellew, with a squadron of 5 frigates, had
replaced Warren on the Royalist coast and was endeavouring
to carry out the relief referred to in the last letter. Warren's
squadron was now off Brest.

r QUIBERON

cannot come ; and from General Puisaye l I can
get no answer to my messenger. Such is my
situation at present. General George2 is vastly
dissatisfied with the smallness of his sum of money,
and having received more than his proportion of
stores is quite easy about the rest. I shall make
one more effort between Sable D'Ollone and the
Sands of St. Jean de Mons to give powder to
Charette before I leave the coast, if it be practic-
able, and then I shall return to Falmouth. I have
underneath sketched for your lordship what has
been landed. And am, with all possible gratitude
and respect, your lordship's

Devoted servant,

E. PELLEW.

Viscount Puisaye.

General Charette.

General Stofflet.
General Scepeaux.

General George.

:By Mons: du Bois Ber-\
thelot and General I
D'Allegre. J

rBy Mons. Tyron and)
Bugenau. j

By Mons. de La Garde.
By Mons. Tyron.
'8000 dollars.
Arms
Powder
Cartridges
Sabres

Saddles and bridles

Flints
I Carbines

Indefatigable, off Quiberon.
9th April, 1796.

£5000.

25,000 dollars.

1700.

210 barrels.

25 in number.

i oo bridles and

10 saddles.
4 barrels.
20 in number.

E. PELLEW.

1 Puisaye, despairing of assistance from England, had per-
suaded Warren to land him on 7th September, with two or three
companions. He succeeded in penetrating the Republican lines
and joined the Royalists.

2 Georges Cadoudal, the most famous of the Chouan leaders.

H26 THE SPENCER PAPERS

PELLEW TO SPENCER

My Lord, — Much as I am mortified in re-
turning without effecting completely every part
of my instructions, yet I derive consolation from
knowing that our endeavours were unceasing,
and that the failure is not to be attributed to us,
but to the unlooked-for events which have taken
place since we left England in the Royalist armies ;
and very much do I fear, my lord, that all hopes
of their affairs being retrieved will be ill-founded.
By some officers on board La Unite* , which we have
captured, I am led to believe that Charette is
certainly killed. In this officer, I fear, we have
lost the fairest character among them, and I can-
not but lament the death of a man in every way
respectable. These officers inform me that they
viewed with indifference our landing the Royalist
supplies, as the Austrian truce had afforded them
ample time to reduce them, and I believe their
distresses to be very great. By a man, who
came to us from Isle d'Yeu, there was no doubt
entertained of Charette's complete defeat. I
therefore thought it unnecessary to stay longer
upon the coast, and the day after we left it, we
were so lucky as to capture the frigate La Unite
of thirty-eight guns.1 Captain Cole, my lord, has
great merit upon the occasion not only for his
exemplary look-out in a very dark night, but his
attack was made with such vigour, so close, and
with such judgment as would have rendered the
defence of a much larger ship of little avail in the
same situation ; and I feel much pleasure in

1 She had come out of L'Orient for Brest and struck to the
Revolutionnaire, 38 (Captain Fr. Cole), isth April.

QU I BE RON 127

bearing this testimony to your lordship in his
favour. The cause of so faint a resistance from
the enemy was occasioned by the ship's company
refusing to fight. Many of them were Royalists,
and driven on board only a few days before. I
have been obliged to send the Argo to Plymouth.
As her leaks from her striking on some rocks have
increased, it is necessary to see her bottom before
she goes again to sea. The rest of us are ready
for sea at a moment, and I pray your lordship will
be indulgent to us by setting us out on a cruise as
soon as possible. I cannot close my letter with-
out mentioning Captain Reynolds to your lord-
ship for his conduct in the attack of La Volage,
which 1 can assure you was conspicuous. I enclose
your lordship a list of ships which sailed from
L' Orient to Brest the day La Unite sailed. They
were only half-manned and certainly not intended
to cruise.

On the i6th I fell in with Admiral Vandeput 1
in company with 126 sail ; Ushant bore E. by N.
25 leagues, the wind at NE. With every sentiment
of gratitude and esteem. — I am, my lord,

Your most faithfully devoted,
Humble servant,

ED. PELLEW.

Falcon, 2oth April, 1796.
(Received 25th April, 1796).

1 Vice-Admiral George Vandeput in the St. Albans, 74, out-
ward-bound with the Mediterranean and other trade.

PART III

THE
WEST INDIAN EXPEDITION

AUGUST 1795 TO APRIL 1796

SECTION I. PLANS AND PREPARATION
SECTION II. SUPERSESSION OF SIR CHARLES

MlDDLETON AND SlR JOHN

LAFOREY

SECTION III. NAVAL PROTEST AGAINST THE
DUKE OF YORK'S REGULATIONS
FOR TROOPS ON BOARD SHIP

SECTION IV. CORNWALLIS'S COURT MARTIAL

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

THOUGH it appears to be generally agreed that the
failure of the British policy to deal with the Revolution
in its early stages was mainly due to the absorption and
wastage of troops in the West Indies, it is by no means
easy to see how this strategical error could have been
avoided. The Government was in fact committed before
the war broke out. As early as the end of 1789 the
Declaration of the Rights of Man had led to menacing
unrest amongst the coloured population in the French
islands ; the grant of a constitution and the rights of full
citizenship had intensified the trouble, until the blacks
got quite out of hand. While French refugees poured
into the British islands with hideous stories of the in-
surgents' atrocities, a feeling arose amongst the British
planters akin to that which existed in India at the tune
of the Mutiny. No government charged with the defence
of an empire could turn a deaf ear to the cry of alarm,
and by the eve of the war nearly twenty battalions were
in, or on their way to, the threatened colonies.

Seeing how large a portion of the Army was on the spot,
it was only logical that the troops should have been
employed, if only as a necessary measure for securing the
local command of the sea, in reducing the French islands
which served as bases for the enemy's fleet and privateers.
Such a policy indeed, had it been confined to the Wind-
ward Islands — Guadeloupe, Martinique and St. Lucia —
might well have succeeded ; but that was impossible.
The greatest danger lay to leeward, in St. Domingo.
Apart from the fact that a fleet at its important naval
base Cap Francois dominated the approaches to Jamaica,

K 2

132 THE SPENCER PAPERS

it was also the focus of the black terror, and, being but
a day's sail from Kingston, placed our premier colony
in a condition of unendurable anxiety. Added to this,
the Royalist planters were inviting the British to esta-
blish a protectorate of the island. It must have seemed
a peculiarly opportune way of meeting the situation,
especially when we recall the general belief that the French
Revolution must quickly succumb to financial destitution.
The occupation of the richest French colonies and the
destruction of their trade appeared the most direct
means of hastening the catastrophe, and in addition such
a policy would place in our hands guarantees for the
recovery of part of the enormous cost of the war. This
consideration, moreover, had another inviting aspect.
If the war in Europe was to be carried on successfully,
precedent told that it could only be done at the cost
of huge subsidies to our half-hearted allies, and if Parlia-
ment was to be induced to vote them it was desirable
to have substantial acquisition to ease the purse-strings
and give the country heart for the war. Grenville
and Windham both disapproved the policy, but Pitt
and Dundas, who possibly knew better what could and
what could not be demanded of the country, chose to
pursue it ; and for some time their choice seemed justified.

In April 1793, two months after the declaration of war,
Laforey and Cuyler seized Tobago from Barbadoes ;
in May St. Pierre and Miquelon were occupied from
Halifax ; and in September, after a convention for a
British Protectorate had been signed, troops from Jamaica
occupied Mole St. Nicolas in St. Domingo. Parish after
parish submitted, but an attack on the capital, Port au
Prince, failed and the Government was warned that much
larger forces would be required to make the situation
good. t

In November Sir John Jervis and General Sir Charles
Grey sailed with a strong expedition for Barbadoes,
and before the end of May, by a series of brilliant com-
bined operations, they had not only captured Martinique,
St. Lucia, and Guadeloupe, but had sent reinforcements
on to St. Domingo. By their help on June 4 Port au

ABERCROMBY'S EXPEDITION 133

Prince was taken, and so well did all seem to be that
both Jervis and Grey asked to be called home to report
and concert measures for the next campaign.

As events proved, it was but the high-water mark
of Dundas's policy ; the tide was already receding. He
had calculated without the yellow fever and with little
appreciation of the warlike spirit which the fire of the
Revolution was able to kindle and sustain. That same
week Victor Hugues, one of the most notorious instruments
of the Terror, having stolen out of Rochefort, reached
Guadeloupe with seven sail and 1500 troops. Grey, who
was at St. Kitt's, flew to the rescue, and was able to save
half the island. But the whole population was soon in a
flame, and before the end of the year the remnants of the
fever-stricken garrison which Grey had left in the place
were forced to evacuate their last hold. In St. Domingo
things were little better. Throughout the summer the
troops died in hundreds ; in the autumn the blacks
Mere in full revolt against the British Protectorate ; by
December two of their most important posts, Leogane
and Tiburon, were lost. It was obvious the situation
could not be saved without large reinforcements, and
this was the crying need which greeted Lord Spencer
in his first week of office.

The result was the organisation of a powerful expedi-
tion under Sir Ralph Abercromby and Rear-Admiral
Christian.1 The choice of the naval commander was
curious and led to unpleasant consequences, Though
he had seen much service and had staff experience
he was nearly the most junior admiral on the list,
having only received his flag in the promotion of
ist June, 1795. His selection seems to have been due to
the ability he had shown on the Transport Board, which
marked him out as a man likely to overcome the diffi-
culties and delays from which recent expeditions had
been suffering. The appointment is best explained
by the fact that the military element was dominant in

1 Flag-captain to Commodore Rowley 1778-80 (four actions) ;
frigate captain 1780-2 (three actions) ; second captain to Lord
Howe 1790 and 1793. Cf. ante, p. 121, note.

134 THE SPENCER PAPERS

the Cabinet, and insufficient thought was given to the
naval difficulties it would cause. So great was the
friction it caused that it led incidentally to the raising
of a point of considerable constitutional interest — as to
the responsibility of ministers within the Cabinet for
appointments to high command (see pp. 178-9).

Unfortunately the appointment did not have the
expected effect of expediting the enterprise. Sailing
at last on i6th November the expedition encountered
a terrible gale which drove it back with the loss of
several transports and severe casualties to the escort.
Christian had to shift his flag and was able to sail again
on Qth December, but again it was to meet such severe
weather that after a fortnight's struggle, when he was
already far on his way, his convoy was so much scattered
and damaged that he had to return at the end of Jan-
uary. Part of the transports, with 6000 men belonging
to twenty different corps, managed to reach Barbadoes,
and three regiments arrived from Gibraltar. But it
was not till March that the bulk of the expedition finally
sailed. Abercromby arrived on iyth March, having
gone out independently in a frigate — which Cornwallis,
who meanwhile had been appointed to the naval
command, refused to do.

In the interval the condition of affairs in the Leeward
Islands had become as bad as that in Domingo. Hugues
had received large reinforcements both naval and military
from France, and though he was blockaded at Point a
Pitre in Guadeloupe he was able, by means of small
craft creeping along the coast, to distribute arms to the
Caribs in the British islands. Marie Galante was lost,
and Granada, St. Vincent, and St. Lucia were in possession
of the insurgents except for the capitals where the small
British garrisons managed to retain their hold.

The remaining papers in Sections II to IV relate to
what may be regarded as by-products of this ill-fated
expedition. The whole idea, as we see from Sir Charles
Middleton's protest against it (ante, p. 51), was essentially
a War Office idea, and in conflict with what he at least
regarded as the best traditions of maritime warfare.

THE NEW REGULATIONS 135

It is clear that an impression was gaining ground in the
sea service that the Navy was being subordinated to the
Army, and we are now able to see his resignation as a
protest against War Office domination, and not merely
as resentment at the supersession of his old friend Laf orey.
Christian's appointment was resented not only as the
improper selection of a very junior officer, but also as
a War Office appointment. The angry feeling was
inflamed almost to insubordination by the new regula-
tions which the Duke of York issued exempting soldiers
on board ship from the jurisdiction of naval courts martial
even when they were serving as marines.

This long-standing question had been brought to a
head in July 1795 by the case of Lieutenant Gerald
Fitzgerald of the nth Foot, detachments of which
regiment were serving as marines in the Mediterranean
fleet. Sir John Moore in his Diary (i. 157) tells us that
although naval officers generally treated soldiers with
more attention than they did marines there had been
endless disputes, and no less than three duels, he says,
had taken place between naval and military officers.

The material circumstances are related by Sir John
Moore, and further appear in a petition which Fitzgerald
subsequently sent to the Duke of York, a copy of which
Lord Spencer made with his own hand when it was
submitted to him. In this petition Fitzgerald says :

' Having had a disagreement with Capt. Tyler of
H.M.S. Diadem ... I was considered so much in the
right by every officer in the Army serving in the Mediter-
ranean . . . that General Trigge, C.-in-C. in Corsica,
through Col. Moore, D.A.G., told me that I should by
no means plead to the Court Martial which Admiral
Hotham ordered to try me ; and when in consequence
of its sentence dismissing me the service I arrived at
Bastia, General Trigge ordered me immediately to join
my regiment . . . such a sentence being unprecedented/

The King eventually confirmed the sentence, and
Fitzgerald then petitioned the Duke of York for a new
trial by a military court.

Sir Charles Morgan, Judge- Advocate -General, to

136 THE SPENCER PAPERS

whom the case was referred, gave as his opinion that the
offensive expressions which Fitzgerald had used to the
officer commanding his ship could not be overlooked,
but that as his refusal to apologise had been due to
advice of his superior officers, the King might reinstate
him on the ground of his meritorious services, but that
on no account should a military court martial review
the findings of the naval court.

In submitting these documents to Lord Spencer
the Duke wrote that he could do nothing to countenance
Fitzgerald's improper conduct as against the Navy, and
begged Lord Spencer to give him his views. Lord
Spencer's reply is on p. 207.

From Sir John Moore's account it appears that
General Trigge tried to persuade Lord Hotham to stop
the court martial, as it would only foment the trouble
and force the Government to decide a point they would
rather not have before them. But there was a strong
feeling in the Navy that the question must be settled,
and the court went forward. The sentence, Moore
says, was to dismiss Fitzgerald the ship (not the service),
though General Trigge and Fitzgerald's petition both spoke
of his having been dismissed the service, and it is certain
that the result was an intimation from the King that
his services were no longer required.

Whether he was reinstated or not is unknown, but
it is certain that the Duke of York drew up an order
designed to prevent such a case recurring. The text
has not been found, but from the following letters it
will be seen that it was strongly, even violently, resented
by the Navy. The evil effects of the whole affair, in
a fleet already ripe for mutiny, needs no pointing out,
but that the protesting admirals had much provocation
is not to be denied. However much men like Pakenham
might deplore the attitude which senior officers felt
compelled to take up there is little doubt that with
personalities so strong as Dundas and Abercromby at the
head of affairs, the War Office was inclined to take too
high a hand ; and with the Duke of York as commander-
in-chief it was no light task for a young minister like

CORNWALLIS 137

Lord Spencer, for all his loyalty to the service he repre-
sented, to hold the balance true against such a trio.

Cornwallis had been amongst the most prominent
of the protesters, and his refusal to obey an order which
he regarded as a degradation to a naval officer in high
command was clearly but another outcome of the un-
happy situation. He was now Vice- Admiral of Great
Britain, and that he had the feeling of the service with
him is manifested by the fact that the largest number
of flag-officers ever assembled as a court martial
unanimously acquitted him.

139

SECTION I

PLANS AND PREPARATION
MEMORANDUM BY LORD SPENCER

August, 1795.

If it be granted that an option must be made
between the expedition to St. Domingo and that
to Guadeloupe, the following, among other weighty
considerations, appear to present themselves.

In Favour of Preferring the Attack on St. Domingo

1. The great importance of the possession of
it to the security of Jamaica.1

2. To the safe use of the Windward Passage
for our trade.

3. The great preponderance in the commerce
of West India produce, which its possession would
give to the French.3

4. The greater proportionable facility of gain-
ing possession of it [St. Domingo], both from the
posts we already have on the French part of the
island, the unprepared state of the Spanish part,
the probable willingness of the Spaniards to
submit to the power of the Convention, and the
natural expectation the enemy will form of our

1 Owing to its containing the French naval base at Cape
Francois.

2 I.e. the possession of Jamaica.

140 THE SPENCER PAPERS

being likely to prefer the recovery of Guadeloupe,
which expectation will of course produce a more
complete preparation for resistance from them
in the last-mentioned island.

5. The superior weight of St. Domingo in the
scale of negotiation, should it become necessary
to apply our acquisition of it in that manner.

On the other hand, in Favour of the Attack on
Guadeloupe x

1. The immense danger to all our other islands
in that part of the West Indies from its remaining
in possession of the French, on their present
principles.

2. The difficulty of blockading it so completely
as would be necessary if we did not repossess it,
without wanting as large a force, both by land
and sea, as would be required for its reduction.

3. The necessity of a very large establishment
of land force for all the other islands to defend
them against the inroads to which, notwith-
standing the greatest possible vigilance of our
cruisers, they must be exposed from the enemy if
in possession of it.

ADMIRAL CHRISTIAN TO SPENCER
Plan of Operations for Guadeloupe

23rd August, 1795.

My Lord, — In considering the scheme of
naval force intended for the West India expedi-

1 In April, 1794, a small force of about ten sail of cruisers
and transports had stolen out of Rochefort or L'Orient under
the notorious mulatto, Victor Hugues. Reaching Guadeloupe
early in June, by December he had succeeded in driving the
remnants of the fever-stricken British garrison from the island.

WEST INDIAN PLANS 141

tion, and which has been transmitted to me by
Mr. Huskisson,1 it appears to me requisite that
the intended plan of attack should be submitted
to your consideration, whereby the requisite force
must be determined.

Of the ships proposed, the greater part are at

E resent in the West Indies. It will consequently
e a question for consideration whether they are
efficient in complement, in stores, and in general
repair.

Of the frigates the greater part (indeed all
except the Beaulieu) are not adequate to the
expected services to which they must be applied.
From Captain Sadler's report, and Sir John Jervis's
opinion thereon, I am persuaded that not less
than five heavy frigates, with eighteen pounders,
will be requisite to be opposed to batteries, where-
by the landing of the troops must be effected, and
communications kept between the army and the
fleet.

It is considered as not only advisable, but
absolutely requisite, that three landings must be
effected and in considerable force, the one within
the Point D'Antigue, the other two between
Cozier and St. Ann's.2

To the first (which should consist of four
thousand men) the protection of at least two sail
of the line, or perhaps three, will not only be requi-
site but indispensably necessary; not merely as

1 When in March 1795 Evan Nepean became Secretary to
the Admiralty, William Huskisson succeeded him as Under
Secretary for War. He was specially charged with the West
Indian arrangements. In 1827 he became Secretary for the
Colonies and Leader of the House of Commons and the following
year refused the Governor- Generalship of India.

2 Point d'Antigue is the extreme north cape of Guadeloupe ;
Gozier and St. Ann's are on the southern shore of Grande Terre,
that is, the eastern half of the island.

142 THE SPENCER PAPERS

protection, but as the means by which the fleet
boats must be manned, the cannon landed, and
the other necessary services of fatigue executed,
together with as many frigates, and three or
four brigs, to cover the operations of the smaller
vessels.

The force with the main body of the army, I
think, cannot well be protected and assisted
with less than five ships of the line, seven
frigates, and a proportionate number of brigs
and schooners.

Other frigates must necessarily be employed
in cruising to windward and to leeward for the
purpose of intercepting supplies, and to watch any
arrival of the enemy's force.

Martinique, from its vicinity to St. Lucia, will
have something to apprehend : l and it will be
necessary to have a certain force at that island
not only for its defence, but also to watch any
movement that may be attempted by the
enemy from St. Lucia or the islands to leeward
of it.

Considering such arrangements to be necessary,
it will appear that the proposed naval force will
require considerable augmentation.

It is considered by Sir Ralph Abercromby as
requisite that two bomb vessels should be attached
to the expedition, in which opinion Sir Charles
Grey and Sir John Jervis concur.

The next observation I shall presume to
make is relative to the apparent force, given
as a protection for the convoy to its point
of destination, viz., one ship of seventy-four

1 Martinique was still in the hands of the British, but St. Lucia,
which had been taken by Jervis and Grey early in April 1794,
after their conquest of Martinique, had been recovered by the
French partisans in June 1795.

WEST INDIAN PLANS 143

guns and one of sixty - four, with four small
frigates.

It may be prudent and natural to consider
that the French will direct their attention to
frustrate the execution of a service upon which
so much depends, and it may be permitted me to
argue upon the obstruction which the enemy may
have the power to occasion.

I am aware that it will be urged that the
convoy shall be escorted to a certain distance.
Will not the enemy be aware of such customary
plan, and be inclined to detach a certain force
to a distance beyond that customary point of
protection and endeavour to disperse the convoy ?

The next consideration is from whence this
supposed force may be detached, to which I must
be permitted to reply from Brest and from the
Mediterranean.

The blocking effectually of the port of Brest
will not, I think, be argued. The measure is
impracticable ; and in the present situation of
the Mediterranean I have good reason to believe
the task there is more difficult, while the British
fleet is necessarily called upon to protect Corsica.

Sir John Jervis, who has served long in the
Mediterranean, is decidedly of opinion that the
French fleet cannot be blocked up in Toulon.
It is from thence that I think the enemy will most
likely detach their force, not only of ships but of
men.1

1 This would seem to be a clear case of an appreciation made
without regarding the situation from the enemy's point of view.
Seeing how deeply the French were involved in Italy and what
was the condition of their army nothing was less likely than that
they would detach any serious force from Toulon, on the off-chance
that it might escape the British Fleet. Christian appears to
have laboured under the not uncommon error of neglecting to
gauge the enemy's nervousness by his own.

144 THE SPENCER PAPERS

The services to be required from the crews of
the ships of the line (for the frigates must be
otherwise employed) I estimate at near 2000 men,
who must necessarily serve in flat-boats, land and
remove cannon, water, provisions, &c., &c., &c.,
and this must be a daily and constant task, for
upon Grande Terre there is not any water which
can be applied to use.

The six ships, armes en flute, cannot be con-
sidered as efficient force with their present com-
plements and their lower deck guns in their
holds.

If it be in contemplation to apply them to
such service on their arrival in the West Indies
at St. Domingo, men must be sent to complete
them, which measure will necessarily occasion
difficulty relative to the means of conveyance.

It is in obedience to your lordship's commands
that I have ventured to such length in offering my
opinion which, I do assure you, does not proceed
from other than public motives. I may have
been mistaken, and it will be for your lord-
ship's consideration what force and what power
should be committed to me, as it will be my
duty to conduct and to execute the service
with cheerfulness and the best assiduity I may
profess.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,
my lord,

Your lordship's

Most obedient and faithful,
Humble servant,
HUGH W. C. CHRISTIAN.

23rd August, 1795.

WEST INDIAN PLANS 145

MEMORANDUM BY SPENCER ON
ADMIRAL CHRISTIAN'S APPRECIATION 1

To the consideration of the fitness for service
of those ships now in the West Indies, it may be
answered that in respect of complement, they are
undoubtedly more efficiently manned than any
of the late manned ships at home, having a much
larger proportion of men who may be rated seamen,
though, perhaps, they may be short of land-men.
In point of stores, there is no reason to apprehend
that they are deficient, and a supply will of
course accompany the expedition when it sails.
As to general repair, it is to be presumed that the
ship sent home with the last convoy was selected
as being the worst off in that respect, and it
appears that she wanted so little repair that she
is now nearly ready to go to sea again.

With respect to the strength of the frigates,
amongst which the Beaulieu alone is admitted
to be fit for the service intended, it must be
answered that as she is the only frigate in the
service of the strength, it will be impossible to
add any more that are equal to her in force.
The Pique is a 38-gun frigate and there are five
of thirty-two guns proposed.2 But it must be

1 This memorandum states so clearly and fully the principles
which had governed the conduct and protection of such expe-
ditions throughout the century, that it may fairly be concluded
it was inspired by Middleton ; but it is none the less remarkable
as showing how quickly Lord Spencer had mastered the tra-
ditions of his office and, by contrast, how little Christian knew
about them.

2 The Beaulieu was of 40 guns, built in a private yard and
purchased on the stocks in 1791. She and the 38-gun frigates
carried 25 i8-pdrs. The ' 32*3 ' at that time had nothing heavier
than i2-pdrs.

I. £

146 THE SPENCER PAPERS

remembered that the French frigates in the seas
near home are, almost all of them, armed with
i8-pounders, and if we do not reserve our frigates
of that class to oppose them, we shall be exposed
to much mischief from them in the winter. I am
afraid that it has been sufficiently proved on former
occasions, and more particularly of late by Sir
Sidney Smith's attack on the corvette near La
Hogue, that no frigate, even with heavy metal, is
a match for a battery on shore, and if the batteries
proposed to be attacked are not within the reach
of line of battleships, the attack should be made on
some point where it can be better protected.

There are but two bomb vessels in the navy,
and only one of them is in commission. She
will be ready very soon, but it will probably be
long after the time at which the expedition should
sail before another could be fitted for that service.
However, if it is stated to be necessary, all possible
exertion shall be used to procure one.

The argument on the insufficiency of the
convoy either tends to the conclusion that a large
squadron not intended to remain there must
escort the force all the way, or merely that some
different mode of proceeding with respect to the
escort should be adopted from what has been
heretofore practised.

It will certainly be unadvisable to adopt the
first of these two alternatives, unless we could be
certain that the enemy had sent a strong squadron
to intercept the convoy, for otherwise by detaching
so much of our home force we should lose our
superiority in the home seas.

The second alternative will be very proper to
attend to ; and by sending orders beforehand to
the West Indies for a respectable detachment of
the fleet there to cruise a great way to windward

WEST INDIAN PLANS 147

on the proposed course (which should be a different
one from what has lately been usual), a greater
security for the safe arrival of the whole would be
obtained.

In Admiral Christian's letter the proposed
escort to the convoy is called one ship of 74,
one of 64, and four small frigates. The ships
ordered for this service at present are a 74 of
the largest size, and two of 64, one frigate of 32,
arid three small ones, besides sloops and cutters
which, though not any addition in point of
force, are essentially useful in keeping a convoy
together.

As to blocking either Brest or Toulon, it is
very well known to be impossible to reduce that
operation to any certainty, but when we have on
both those stations squadrons more than equal
to those of the enemy it is scarce to be supposed
that they will venture to detach a part of their
fleet in the face of our superior one, more par-
ticularly when we see that they do not seem very
willing to risk even the whole together.1

It is certain that the ships — armes en flute — are
not efficient ships without their complement of
men, but as one of them (the Commerce de
Marseilles) 2 carries 86 guns on her upper decks
and the others may certainly be looked upon as
pretty strong frigates, if they were to accom-
pany the convoy to the Leeward Islands before
they go down to St. Domingo, I should suppose

1 This appreciation was contrary to historical experience, and
the strategical probabilities, as to the action of an enemy unable
to risk a decisive battle at sea. Compare Dundas's view, below,
p. 148.

• A i2o-gun ship taken at Toulon, but found to be so badly
built that she was never used except for this particular service,
and was taken to pieces about 1802.

L 2

148 THE SPENCER PAPERS

they might be considered as forming a sufficient
protection for it.

I am afraid there will be a difficulty in making
them effective men of war when they arrive at
their destination on account of the men wanted
for that purpose, and the only way of obviating
it that can be proposed at present (which perhaps
may only in part remove it) will be to send out as
many supernumerary land-men in the other ships
as they can carry, and perhaps to add some to the
complements which have been ordered to these
reduced ships, though except in the instance of
the Commerce de Marseilles they will I believe be
sufficiently crowded by the establishment already
proposed.

(24th August, 1795.)

APPRECIATION BY DUNDAS

Wimbledon. 24th August.

Question. What is the wisest course for France
to pursue in the conduct of her military operations
in the present state of the war and with a due
attention to the relative situation of the two
countries ?

Answer. From the crippled state of her fleet,
and the consequent impossibility of gaining any
material advantage at sea in Europe, the whole
attention of France ought to be directed to our
distant possessions, sending out troops on board
their ships of war in small detachments from the
Mediterranean and Brest, gradually endeavouring
in that manner to collect a large naval and
military force in the West Indies to disappoint
the object of our preparations. They ought a like-
wise to endeavour to intercept our armament on
its road to the West Indies. Success in either of

WEST INDIAN PLANS 149

these modes of obstructing our views would put
a decisive end to the war in their favour, and
they risk nothing by the attempt.

If this be their wisdom, it is asked why we
are not to presume it will in both ways be
attempted ? If it should, are our preparations
sufficiently covered to disappoint the attempts ?

H. D.

Endorsed: ' Mr. Dundas on present state of war.'
26th August, 1795.

APPRECIATION BY MIDDLETON

West Indies Expedition

I see no danger whatever in sending the two
embarkations from England and Ireland separate,
as each convoy is strong enough to defend itself
against any force the enemy may have in the
West Indies, and numerous enough to keep the
transports together.

If this measure is approved, I would propose
sending the Dictator [64] and East India ships1
to Cork to join the Polyphemus [64], and proceed
immediately to the island of Barbadoes. The
English embarkation to sail for the same island
under the Russell [74], Com. de Marseilles and
frigates giving them a strong escort across the
Bay. One of Vice-Admiral Kingsmiirs frigates
may accompany the Irish embarkation.

Notwithstanding the dispersion of the last
convoy that went to the islands, it is so un-
common a circumstance in the summer season
that no other precautions need be taken against it
than directing the commanding officer of the convoy
in case of separation to dispatch immediately a

1 Chartered as transports. See post, p. 155.

ISO THE SPENCER PAPERS

frigate to Sir John Laforey * with information so as
to enable him to keep cruisers to windward of
Barbadoes.

Information will of course be sent to Sir John
Laforey of the probable time of the transports
sailing, and a frigate should also be dispatched
from Admiral Christian when his ships have got
clear of the Channel.

Admiral Hotham, too, should have immediate
notice of the sailing of these convoys, so that he
may take a station off Toulon till they have
passed Cape St. Vincent.

If Guadeloupe is made the object of attack, it
cannot possibly hold out, and if [it is] taken the
other islands in the French possession cannot
subsist of themselves.

As soon as I have a little leisure, I will put
down my thoughts on the measures to be taken
with the fleet in consequence of change of cir-
cumstances.

25th August.

The present moment is the time to guard
against supplies being got into Guadeloupe, and
Sir J. Laforey 's cruisers should continue to wind-
ward of Deseada till the arrival of the armament
at that place.

Endorsed: ' Sir Charles Middleton, 25th August, 1795.'

MEDICAL OFFICERS' REPORT TO
ADMIRAL CHRISTIAN

Royal Hospital at Haslar. 25th September, 1795.

Sir, — Agreeable to your desire requiring us to
state our opinion on the means to be adopted

1 Commander-in-chief, Leeward Islands.

WEST INDIAN PLANS 151

for preserving the health of the fleet under your
command, and for the speedy recovery of con-
valescents.—

We are of opinion from the extent of the arma-
ments in a climate peculiarly unfavourable to Euro-
peans employed on military duty — that it would be
of the first importance to the safety of the squadron
that a physician should be appointed to super-
intend the whole of the medical department, and
that an hospital ship should attend on this ex-
pedition. We also beg leave to submit to your
consideration under the subjoined heads what
appears to us the probable means of answering the
important objects you have in view.

We therefore recommend as follows :—
Physician to the expedition.
Hospital ship.

Diet for the ships' companies in health:
Breakfast. — Water gruel with molasses and
a gill of wine or cocoa as may be judged
most eligible.

Dinner. — Every man to have half an ounce
of white pickled cabbage with his salt
meat — and half a pound of potatoes,
either found by Government or by
commutation with the purser - - the
remaining three-quarters of a pint of
wine to be mixed with an equal
quantity of water when served to the
men.

Cocoa and sugar, which will serve them as

a supper, may be changed for some

species of their provisions.

When men are on hard duty, either on board

or on shore — particularly the latter — a pint of

porter might be served to them two or three

times a day — according to circumstances either

152 THE SPENCER PAPERS

in lieu of their wine and spirits, or as an extra
allowance supplied them by Government.
Antiscorbutics :

Lemon- juice for the passage.
Essence of malt.
Cream of tartar, &c.

Medicines in addition to the surgeons' invoice
which they cannot afford to find themselves :

Calomel — being found by late experience
the best remedy for the West India
fever.

Bark, opium, mercurial ointment, quick-
silver, camphor, antimonial powder,
rhubarb, magnesia, ipecacuanha,
yellow bark.

Transports appropriated for convalescents and
placed as much in the sea-breeze as circumstances
will admit.

Every convalescent patient to have a quart of
porter in lieu of his wine or spirits according to
the discretion of the physician or the medical
attendant having them in charge.
We have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient, humble servants,

J. JOHNSTON.
T. TROTTER.

DUNDAS TO SPENCER

Harford Bridge. Monday, 28th [September].

My dear Lord, — There seems nothing to
prevent the advanced detachment of General
Abercromby's troops from embarking on Tuesday
(to-morrow) and sailing immediately. It occurs
to me that your lordship will think it right to give
intimation of this to Admiral Harvey or some

WEST INDIAN PLANS 153

other cruising squadron, in order that an eye
may be kept on Brest, in case any attempt to
intercept or detach from thence should be made.1
Indeed from the intelligence sent me two days
ago from the Admiralty, as transmitted by Sir
John Warren and which is confirmed in the last
intelligence from Mr. Wickham,3 I hope that for
some time to come you will endeavour to cruise
as strong as possible off Brest and in the West
Indies track. The intelligence fears that there
was an intention to reinforce the West Indies by
small detachments from Brest. Altho' Brest is
only mentioned, I take it for granted the same plan
will be followed from the Mediterranean. If our
force to the Leeward Islands and to St. Domingo
were sailed and completely ahead of all rein-
forcements, one would be less anxious, but two
or three thousand men sent at present to Guade-
loupe would greatly increase the difficulty of that
business, and a force of that amount thrown into
St. Domingo might prove fatal to all our views.
In drafting the regiments it appears on the
return of the officers, that there are many men
reported to be fit for garrison or home duty.
Might not these be formed into companies to act
as marines, and to liberate the regiments now on
board the fleet ? Unless we get them we have not
a foundation on which to form the force requisite
to be sent out in the beginning of spring to supply

1 Lord Bridport had returned to Spithead, leaving Rear-
Admiral Harvey in command of a detachment to watch Brest
and L'Orient. See ante, p. 115.

2 Mr. William Wickham, having been sent to Switzerland by
Lord Grenville in 1794 on a highly secret mission, had lately be-
come our Minister for the Swiss Cantons, but was in fact the Chief
Intelligence Agent of the Foreign Office for French internal affairs.
On that ground in 1797 France demanded and obtained his ex-
pulsion and he retired to Frankfort.

154 THE SPENCER PAPERS

the deficiencies which by that time [will] have
arisen in the West India service. If we had the
regiments serving as marines, the regiments now
sent to Noirmoutier, and a body of Guards to
relieve the regiments at that time in Gibraltar,
we can do. Without these different resources I
do not see what we can do. If we cannot do
otherwise, it will be necessary to raise another
ten thousand men by a bill such as passed last
winter.

H. D.

We shall not think it prudent to break in upon
any part of our force now going to the West Indies
unless it is rendered necessary by the situation of
any of our own islands. My instructions go to
restrain them from any offensive operations except
in that urgency ; consequently, we will make no
attempt on the Dutch possessions till after we
shall have finished our business at Guadeloupe and
St. Lucia. As that is the case it would be very
desirable that our cruisers in the West Indies
should receive particular instructions to have a
very watchful look out upon the Dutch pos-
sessions in order to prevent any reinforcements
either from France or Holland. If no such reach
them I should flatter myself they would prove
an easy conquest, but if reinforced, they would
prove a more tedious and difficult operation.
I remain, my dear Lord,

Yours very sincerely,
HENRY DUNDAS.

Not only have M. Monneront and his friend
come to Dover without waiting for either passport
or directions, but our old friend Gillet is likewise
arrived. He came over half seas from Calais in

WEST INDIAN PLANS 155

the same vessel, and then took himself to an open
boat, and was in London all Saturday stock-
jobbing as hard as he could. I suspect you will
find it altogether a stockjobbing affair of M.
Perregaux and Co.1

ABSTRACT OF TRANSPORT CONTRACTS

ist October, 1795.

East India ships chartered for conveying
troops, provisions, and stores, from Portsmouth
to the West Indies, the ist October, 1795, on the
terms and conditions following, viz. :—

Britannia . . . 770 tons.
Sir Edward Hughes . 960 ,,

The ships to sail immediately (wind and
weather permitting) from Gravesend to Ports-
mouth.

The Transport Board agree to fit the ships with
hammacoes, or cabins for the troops.

Each ship shall carry 400 troops, and as many
more as Government may think proper to put on
board them, at the rate of £20 per head for freight
and victualling, to be paid at the expiration of
two months after the time of their sailing from
Portsmouth, on a certificate being produced from
the officer commanding the troops of the mimber
of men embarked on board each ship.

The surplus tonnage to be at the disposal of
Government.

1 M. Monneront's mission seems to have been connected with
the attempts that were now on foot to secure a general peace,
and his arrival led to a public belief that the end of the war
was in sight. (Dropmore MSS. (Hist. MSS. Com.), iii. 148.)
Grenville had told him to come no farther than Dover for the
present. (Ibid. p. 136.) Perregaux was a banker of Neufchatel in
the confidence of the British Government. (Ibid. ii. 256, 562 ; iii.

222, 356, 358.)

156 THE SPENCER PAPERS

In case the troops are victualled more than
two months, either in port or at sea, the owners
are to be allowed is. 6d. for each man, per day,
during the time of their being so victualled ;
otherwise, the provisions to be furnished by
Government.

The premium of insurance at the East India
Company's valuation of £19,200 for each ship, at
ii guineas per centum, amounting to £2217 I2S.
for each ship, for the voyage from London to the
Leeward Islands, and back to London, is to be
paid by Government.

The ships to be confined in their voyage to
the Leeward Islands, but should the urgency of
the case require their being sent on further service,
and should they in consequence thereof be lost,
captured, or damaged, then the value of such loss,
capture, or damage, to be paid by the Government
according to the rate above-mentioned.

Demurrage to be paid to the owners, at the
rate of 2os. per ton per lunar month, commencing
the ist December, 1795, until the time the troops
and stores are landed in the Leeward Islands,
and the ships are discharged from Government
service ; but in case the said ships, after having
completed the service already stipulated for, should
be detained or ordered on any further service,
then demurrage to be paid to the owners, at the
rate of 405. per ton per lunar month, commencing
the I5th December, 1795, and so to continue, until
they arrive in the River Thames.

The payments for demurrage, and extra
victualling the troops, to be made one month
after the return of each ship to Gravesend, pro-
vided proper documents be delivered into the
transport office, accounting for all Government
stores that may be put on board them, and also a

WEST INDIAN PLANS 157

certificate from the officer commanding the troops
of the number of men, and of the length of time
they were so victualled. And in case the ships
should be lost, or captured by the enemy, the
value is to be paid, within one month after such
loss or capture shall be made known to the Trans-
port Board, provided that such loss or capture
shall be made to appear not to have been caused
through any fault or neglect of the masters or
crews of the beforementioned ships, and all pay-
ments on this contract to be by transport bills
with the discount added thereto. The master
of each ship is to account and be accountable
for the whole of such stores, provisions, &c., as
may be put on board them belonging to Govern-
ment. Penalty for non-performance of this
agreement to be £1000 for each ship, to be
recovered and paid by virtue of these presents.

The following East India ships were also
taken up on the ist October, 1795, on the above
terms and conditions:

Sullivan .... 876

Button .... 761

Houghton .... 778

Raymond .... 793

Middlesex .... 852

Phoenix .... 799

King George . . . 776

Rose ..... 801

Duke of Montrose . . 755

Penalty for non-performance of this agreement
to be £1000 for each ship," to be recovered and
paid by virtue of these presents.

158 THE SPENCER PAPERS

DUNDAS TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

Walmer Castle. 2oth October, 1795.

My dear Lord, — These recent interruptions of
convoys have set my anxiety to work on the
subject of our Cork armament, the convoy for
which is certainly not adequate. In truth it is
12,000 troops and a most valuable collection of
ordnance stores, with only one 74 to take care of
them ; for I am afraid the five other ships of
war carrying troops will not be capable of much
resistance. But the deficiency in point of frigates
and cutters will I am afraid be equally felt, con-
sidering the nature and number of the transports.
They will be upwards of 100 sail, two-thirds of
them neutral and manned by Americans and
Danes who will require as much exertion and care
to keep them together and oblige them to obey
signals as would be requisite for the management
of as many prizes before their men are changed.

I am perfectly aware of the pressure you are
under at this moment for every service, but I
would not be at ease without stating the appre-
hensions I entertain.

The recollection I have of your anxiety for the
return of the naval force from the coast of France
was one of the very forcible reasons which operated
with me to resent Lord Grenville's suggestions for
further operations there, and the instructions
have now finally gone from me.1

I am, my dear Lord,

Yours very faithfully,
HENRY DUNDAS.

(Received 2ist October, 1795-)

1 See ante, pp. 116-8. For Pitt's final decision in support of
Dundas's view of confining our operations to supplying the
Royalists with arms, &c., and that the troops must be withdrawn,
see 'Pitt to Grenville, i6th and i8th October,' Dropmore MSS.,
iii. 140-1, and cf. post, p. 162, note i, and p. 166.

WEST INDIAN PLANS 159

DUNDAS TO SPENCER

Portsmouth. 24th November, 1795.

My dear Lord, — The weather has been so foul
and squally it has much retarded the exact
ascertainment of our transport damage.1 I trust
the measures which I have adopted will get it
with more precision than I was likely to get from
the mode the Transport Office and agents were
going about. I have gone through with Admiral
Christian the memorandums of such information
as he has been able to collect ; and from the
rough guess I can form I imagine that exclusive
of those which are either lost or totally disabled
there will be about thirty transports that will
require repairs of different kinds. When the
accurate return is made (which I hope may be
this night or in the course of to-morrow) I shall
then see what the particular nature of the damage
is, and upon talking with any of the naval men
here I can learn what time will be requisite for
making the repair. Till this is ascertained I can
form no judgment when or to what extent of
force the general will be enabled to proceed with
his expedition. From these circumstances and
the distress General Abercromby feels when I
mention going from this, I am now as much at a
loss to guess when I can leave this as I was the
first day I came here.

My chief reason of troubling you at present is
a wish to direct your attention to a subject of

1 Christian had sailed on i6th November with 8 of the line
and some 200 transports and West Indiamen, but on the i7th
and 1 8th encountered a gale of extraordinary violence and was
driven back with his transports and convoy scattered and many
of them lost. Over two hundred bodies were picked up between
Portland and Bridport. See Jaines, i. 281. Dundas went down
to Portsmouth to superintend the reorganisation of the expedition.

160 THE SPENCER PAPERS

most pressing urgency even before my return to
town. I mean the system at present existing of
sending our troops on distant service. I have
no objection to a board for the transport service.
I believe if proper men are appointed it is a
most excellent institution, but I am decidedly of
opinion that if they are not provided with a set of
shipping appropriated to the special purpose of
transports and of a size to accommodate a con-
siderable number of troops at a time, it is impossible
that service can be carried on with any degree of
propriety. Indeed, so much am I impressed with
that conviction, no consideration on earth would
induce me to take charge of any expedition, if
the present system of providing transport in any
chance way you can was to be continued. I am
positive, exclusive of every other advantage, the
saving to the public by such an arrangement
would be immense. Twenty or twenty-five ships
of the size of India ships or 44-gun ships would
be adequate to all the service of the country,
and it would take a volume to point out all the
advantages to the public service which would result
from it. Be so good as to mention the subject to
Mr. Pitt, but in the meantime let me entreat you
without delay to transfer to the transport service
all ships of the description I have mentioned that
either are within your power or can be got. I
repeat it again that unless this measure is adopted
no man can act in the situation I am placed with
the smallest confidence that anything he does will
ultimately redound to the success of the object
for which his exertions have been made. I do
not mean to write at length, for it is too long a
subject to be detailed in a letter. But I trust
your lordship and Lord Hugh l will give a serious

1 Lord Hugh Seymour,

WEST INDIAN PLANS 161

consideration to what I have said and search
through your list of shipping for the purpose of
examining what ships you can spare to transfer
to the transport service, suited to the double
purpose of being both transports and convoys.
I remain, my dear Lord,

Yours very sincerely,

HENRY DUNDAS.

(Received 25th November, 1795.)

[Note by Lord Spencer: ' Answered 25th November, 1795,
agreeing with Mr. Dundas but stating at the present moment we
have no further means than those already adopted.']

DUNDAS TO SPENCER

Portsmouth. 24th November, 1795.

My dear Lord, — If there is no material reason
against it, there would be a convenience in giving
a discretionary power to keep the Canada [74]
some time in the Leeward Islands before she
proceeds to St. Domingo. According to the list
given to me by Lord Hugh Seymour there will
be ten at St. Domingo without her. Sir Ralph
Abercromby has stated to me very forcibly the
importance he attaches to the Virginia pilot boats
and other small craft to cover the landing of the
troops, and likewise hovering on the coast after
the landing is effected in order to give confidence
to the troops that they will not be abandoned
without means of retreat after they are landed.
Upon that ground he insists that Admiral Christian
ought to lay up one of his ships in port and take
the whole of her crew to man the small craft.
I know not whether he is right in that idea or not,
nor whether Christian may agree with him or not ;
but it occurs to me that there can no harm arise
from giving the discretion I have mentioned with
I, M

162 THE SPENCER PAPERS

regard to the Canada because by that means they
will have, if it shall appear to be necessary, the
means of employing three ships for covering the
landing of each island and reserve four for a
general cruising squadron altho' they should be
obliged for a short time to lay up one of their ships
to man the small craft.

Yours sincerely,

HENRY DUNDAS.

(Private. Received 26th November, 1795.)

SPENCER TO [?] WINDHAM
PRIVATE.

Dear Sir, —
• • • • • •

The intelligence we have received of the
destination of the different French squadrons
now supposed to be equipping at Brest and
Rochefort, is extremely vague, and probably not
.worthy of more notice than as far as it shall
appear to coincide with any information we may
receive from other quarters. I have not however,
any apprehensions at present about our force to
the eastward, as I think it clear that Richery's
squadron cannot be destined for that part of the
world,1 and whatever may be fitting out at Brest
or Rochefort will, if these accounts be true, not

1 Rear- Admiral Joseph de Richery, having slipped out of
Toulon in September with 6 of the line and 3 frigates and eluded
Lord Hotham, had put into Cadiz with 32 vessels captured from
a British convoy homeward bound and a French prize (the Censeur
[74]) that was with them. He was still there. It was the fate
of this convoy which seems finally to have decided Pitt to wind
up the Quiberon affair in order to release Harvey's squadron.
See ' Fitt to Grenville, i6th and i8th October,' Dropmore Papers,
Hi. 140-1.

WEST INDIAN PLANS 163

be ready for a month or six weeks at soonest.
In the meantime we shall keep as good a look out
as the time of year will admit on their coast, and
I think we shall be pretty sure to hear if they
are making any considerable preparations. A
small squadron (that is, not exceeding six sail of
the line) would not signify at all.

I cannot help thinking that Richery is going
to the West Indies, if so Mann 1 will follow him
thither, which circumstance, though it will inter-
fere a little with the present arrangement of the
command, will insure us a great superiority in
that quarter.

We have had very satisfactory accounts from
Christian lately and this wind will be sure to
carry him into better weather.2

The name of the young gentleman Lady
Spencer took the liberty of recommending to
you is Roger Martin and his age is nineteen.
Believe me, dear Sir,

Yours very faithfully,
SPENCER.

Admiralty, 26th December, 1795.

DUNDAS TO SPENCER

Somerset Place. Monday Evening.

My dear Lord, — I have had a full conversation
with General Abercromby and have the satisfac-
tion to find the train of his thinking on our future
operations coincides exactly with what I took
the liberty of suggesting cursorily for the con-
sideration of the Cabinet at our last meeting. I

1 Rear- Admiral Mann had been detached by Hotham in pursuit
of Richery on 5th October, with one 3-decker and five 74/3 and
two frigates — too late to overtake him.

2 Christian had sailed with the expedition for the second time
on the gth December. See note post, p. 209.

M 2

164 THE SPENCER PAPERS

think there is not a doubt that every thing
requisite to be forwarded on the proposed plan
of operations will be ready with the first fair
wind, but General Abercromby is anxious that,
without waiting for any convoy, he and such
officers as he proposes to carry with him should
be immediately permitted to sail for Barbadoes
first, to adjust and arrange what is necessary
there, and then to proceed to St. Domingo. For
this purpose it does not occur (sic) that less
than two good strong frigates will be sufficient.
Admiral Cornwallis should be got ready as fast
as possible to sail with all or as much of his pro-
posed squadron as may render him powerful as a
cruising defensive fleet.1 The Cork troops will
now be ordered to sail with the first fair wind
straight for St. Domingo, and your lordship will
have to consider what is the permanent naval
force you propose for St. Domingo ; for that must
now be finally arranged with a view to our present
situation as connected with the lateness of the
season. I have thought it right to mention these
particulars for your consideration, before I even
have digested them for further consideration, that
you may revolve them in your mind, and be aware
of the calls that are likely to be made upon you.
General Abercromby breakfasts with me here
to-morrow at nine o'clock, so that I will not get
very early to Whitehall.

Yours sincerely,

HENRY DUNDAS.

(Received ist February, 1796.)

1 Seep. 181.

SECTION II

SUPERSESSION OF MIDDLETON AND LAFOREY

SPENCER TO DUNDAS
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

Dear Sir, — As I am afraid from the dispersed
state of our colleagues that we shall find it very
difficult to get a Cabinet together to-morrow,
I sit down to write you a few lines on the sub-
ject of our conversation of yesterday for your
consideration.

It appears by some part of the letters received
from Sir J. Warren (if I am not mistaken) that he
has an intention of sending home a considerable
number of the empty transports now in Quiberon
Bay with the Jason and Arethusa frigates, under
the idea, as it would seem, that the troops may be
intended to winter at Isle D'Yeu. In this case
there may be considerable difficulty in bringing
them away, supposing that (as I hope it will) to
be the determination. Should that be so, why
might not the Dictator and the Indiamen armed
en flute be sent under convoy of the Canada to
Quiberon Bay and, receiving on board those four
regiments, take them directly to St. Domingo ?
The ships are completely fitted for the purpose,
and the regiments are, I suppose, as good as any
others that may have been destined to it, and
you would still have an equal number to dispose

166 THE SPENCER PAPERS

of at home of those which were destined to go
thither from Cork. By the by, it appears that
from want of a proper communication between
the Transport and Victualling Boards there are
now 5000 men at Cork who have nearly eaten
up all the provisions appropriated to the trans-
ports there, and are likely to be in great want of
provisions there soon. If that is the case, and they
are the troops destined for St. Domingo and to be
embarked in the Indiamen, it may be an obstacle
to the proposal I have above alluded to ; otherwise
I should think it very well worth considering.

If we could come to a speedy determination to
recall the force from the coast of France, it would
give us the means of taking the best chance which
now remains for the recapture of the West India-
men which have lately been taken by the French.
We have received intelligence to-day, which has
the appearance of probability, of one of them being
retaken by a frigate belonging to the Irish station,
and I am in hopes we may hear of more soon.

I have been reflecting a good deal on the subject
of the command in the Leeward Islands since I
saw you, and am giving it the fullest consideration
I can. I do not feel that it would be justifiable to
supersede an admiral so high on the list as Sir
John Laforey without having a direct charge to
produce against him, more especially in order to
replace him by so very young a flag-officer as
Admiral Christian, who from his standing in the
list of admirals can certainly not be considered
as equal to a command of such extent. In order
however to avoid the inconveniences which
might appear to be likely to arise from Sir John
Laforey retaining the chief command, a positive
instruction might be sent out to him stating that
the details of this expedition having been con-

MIDDLETON AND LAFOREY 167

certed here with his Majesty's servants by Sir
Ralph Abercromby and Admiral Christian, we
require him to carry into execution the plans
fixed upon in the manner which has been so
concerted, of the particulars of which he will
receive more ample information from Admiral
Christian and the General. Some official letter
of this tenor, added to private ones which may
more fully explain our wish on this subject, that
he should not make alterations in the arrange-
ments but co-operate to the utmost of his power
with Sir Ralph and Admiral Christian, and also
accompanied by the strongest injunction to
Christian to act in perfect confidence and harmony
with Sir J. Laforey, will I trust put the matter
upon its proper footing and prevent anything
unpleasant from happening. The truth is that
Admiral Christian is too young an admiral for
the command of so extensive an expedition, and
from this circumstance arises the inconvenience
in the occasion. You know my motives for
having selected him for it, and I really believe
that the event hitherto has justified them ; for
had anyone less acquainted with the practice and
detail of the transport service been appointed to
fit out and superintend an armament so ex-
tensive and at once so complicated, I am almost
confident that it could never have been nearly
accomplished in so short a time as it has been.
On the other hand, were the chief command in
the Leeward Islands to be intrusted to him, all
his senior officers, among whom there are many
very good ones, would have just cause to complain.
And the officer now there who, though old and
therefore perhaps a little less active than one
could wish, is however perfectly acquainted with
that station, would be unprecedently and unjustly

168 THE SPENCER PAPERS

degraded in the eyes of the whole service. These
are the reasons which weigh with me in altering
the view of this subject under which we parted
yesterday, and you will I trust, think them
sufficient to justify the result.

Believe me, dear Sir,
Very faithfully and sincerely yours,

SPENCER.

Admiralty, 7 past 4 P.M., I2th October, 1795.

We have just received intelligence that between
thirty and forty of that part of the Jamaica fleet
which was supposed to be astern of the ships
taken, are arrived safe off Cape Clear.

DUNDAS TO SPENCER

Wimbledon. 1 2th October, 1795.

My dear Lord, — I am afraid the Cabinet will
be very thinly attended to-morrow. We must
however meet, and altho' I am afraid we will
not be of one mind we will be obliged to come
to a decision. Mr. Wyndham was here this fore-
noon; his plan is to send more troops for the
purpose of still taking Noirmoutier, and he
mentioned having recourse to a thousand of the
Guards to make up the force.

I shall give a serious consideration in the
course of the evening to what you suggest of
carrying the troops from the coast of France to St.
Domingo, but on the first statement I am appre-
hensive it will not answer. We know not (for we
have no returns) how these troops stand in point
of health and efficiency, but above all it is clear
that they are not furnished with any one requisite
of clothing, &c., &c., for West India service.

I confess myself truly alarmed by what you

MIDDLETON AND LAFOREY 169

feel relative to Sir John Laforey. That he is very
unpopular in the West Indies is apparent from
every letter one has occasion to see. You may
tell me that is not to be regarded. I doubt if
that is a true maxim in the selection of executive
officers in the service of a country such as this.
You are under the necessity of attending to
popular feelings, and if that sentiment had
operated as it ought Admiral Caldwell would
not have been sent to the West Indies.1 This,
however, I admit to be a matter more proper for
your own consideration. But the ground on which
I am alarmed goes much deeper. I have some-
how or other taken it so much for granted that
Sir John Laforey was to go to St. Domingo, that
I do not believe that in the course of any one
conversation with Sir R. Abercromby I ever held
out an idea or that he ever entertained a con-
ception that in the execution of the service he
would have any other person to call upon or any
interference with anyone but Admiral Christian,
to whom he had, without any reserve, communi-
cated all his ideas, and in fact made them in the
progress and detail as familiar as they are to
himself. If by any mode of instructions, such
as your lordship suggests, it can be so arranged
that Admiral Christian is to be the executive
companion of Sir Ralph Abercromby in his expe-
ditions, and that Admiral Christian is to be the
judge of the quantum and distribution of the
force for these purposes, he would certainly have
no just cause to complain. But to do this would

1 Laforey had succeeded Caldwell as Commander-in-Chief in
June. Caldwell at this time was a marked man as being the
only flag-officer not mentioned by Lord Howe for his conduct
on the loth of June, otherwise no explanation of Dundas's remark f

is forthcoming.

170 THE SPENCER PAPERS

in other words be to leave Laforey the nominal
and Christian the real command, and I do not
see how that would remove the etiquette objec-
tion of office. I could say a great deal more on
the subject ; one thing is obvious — that it must
be immediately decided with intention of its being
communicated to Sir Ralph Abercromby, and he
permitted to judge for himself ; for I am sure if
he entertains the smallest apprehension of being
involved in any dispute with the Department of
the Navy, no consideration on earth will induce
him to risk his reputation by the command, and if
he will not, I may say without a hesitation, that
you have not another to call upon to undertake
it. I have distinctly, my dear lord, stated what
I feel on this subject, and what I am afraid the
nation at large will feel upon it, and it is really
too deep a stake we are contending for to be put
at risk by the etiquette of rank. Suppose any
man on the army list should tell me that General
Abercromby, being only a major-general, was put
on a command beyond his rank, I would answer
that I believe such a command had never before
been given to a major-general, but that I and
not he was responsible for the person in whom
I reposed the safety of his Majesty's troops and
the safety of the State. It is impossible to sleep
sound in one's bed on such occasions, if any other
principle is for a moment to be tolerated.
I remain, my dear Lord,
Yours sincerely,

HENRY DUNDAS.

(Received I2th October, 1795.) l

1 This letter, if it was really received on the i2th, must have
been written in great haste, for Lord Spencer's — to which it is
a reply — was not sent off from the Admiralty till 4.7 the same
afternoon.

MIDDLETON AND LAFOREY 171

ABERCROMBY TO DUNDAS1
PRIVATE.

Southampton. 1 6th October, 1795.

Dear Sir, — I have had the honour to receive
your letter of the i5th instant, together with
Lord Spencer's letter, and Sir John Laforey's
instructions.

It was with a considerable degree of surprise,
that I found a matter of so great importance
to the public had remained so long undecided.
You have already said all that the subject will
admit of, if the proposed expedient is to remain
in force ; but it appears to me that the matter
must be reconsidered, and that an undertaking of
so much importance to the nation must not stand
on a basis so insecure as the collision of the
interests and passions of individuals.

I shall suppose both the admirals to be what
I really believe they are — men of public virtue
and in their private capacities cool and dis-
passionate. Still they are only men ; and will
any one say that they, or those about them, can
always be superior to prejudice, to misconception,
and to those jealousies to which the best are
liable, particularly in matters of command ?

Is the public safe in dividing the responsibility
in one and the same object ? Will an oblique
mode of supersession be less liable to reprehension,
less productive of discontent in the navy, and
less injurious to Sir John Laforey, than a direct
one ?

Will he not feel a marked inferiority in being
allowed to resume the command, should Admira]
Christian be removed by death or inability ?

1 This is the enclosure referred to by Dundas in the next letter.

172 THE SPENCER PAPERS

Is not Admiral Christian deprived of the
assistance of the fleet now in the West Indies,
should Sir John Laforey be of opinion that it
should be otherwise employed ?

Is not the whole unity of design and execution
destroyed by this divided command ?

In matters of so high importance everything
must yield to one consideration, the ultimate
success of the object in view.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your most obedient and humble servant,

R. ABERCROMBY.

The Right Honble. Henry Dundas, &c., &c.

DUNDAS TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

Walmer Castle. i8th October, 1795.

My dear Lord, — When I met Mr. Pitt at
Sittingbourne on Thursday evening and com-
municated to him the result of our deliberations
respecting Laforey he was much alarmed about it
and begged that the instruction might not go till
he had an opportunity of speaking with you.
His general feeling is that the service still remains
in danger from collision, and that your lordship
will be exposed to all the imputations, that the
affront put upon Laforey will be made a handle of,
without feeling the satisfaction in your own mind
of having acted up to the full of what the public
service obviously demands. Altho' I never enter-
tained a doubt that the most desirable thing that
could happen was the return of Sir John Laforey,
still I was not satisfied that the expedient you had
adopted might not reasonably be considered as
giving a reasonable chance for the execution of
the public service, if the adoption of it was

MIDDLETON AND LAFOREY 173

wished for by you on other grounds more imme-
diately within your own observation and cogni-
sance. I own I am much staggered by the
enclosed letter which I have this morning received
from Sir Ralph Abercromby. Mr. Pitt will see
you on Tuesday, and of course you will finally
arrange it.

I have this morning received a letter from Lord
Grenville1 differing to a certain extent on the
resolution for re-calling the British troops from
the coast, and wishing a discretionary power to
the officers to make a further attempt. It gives
me always sincere pain when I radically differ
on points of such importance from the opinions
of persons I respect, but in this instance I would
not feel myself justified to sign such an instruc-
tion, and I own I look back with much feeling
of self-reproach for not having made a serious
stand against this train of conduct immediately
after the business of Quiberon.

I remain, my dear Lord,
Yours sincerely,

HENRY DUNDAS.

(Received igth October, 1795.)

SPENCER TO DUNDAS

[Draff]

Dear Sir, — I have just received your letter
inclosing that of Sir R. Abercromby of the i6th,
and am much surprised I confess that he should
so totally have misunderstood what I'm sure
Admiral Christian in all the conversations I ever
had with him on the subject seemed to be per-
fectly apprised of : namely, that he was to be
under the orders of Sir J. Laforey as commander-
in-chief in the Leeward Islands. That Admiral

1 Secretary for Foreign Affairs .

174 THE SPENCER PAPERS

Christian was fully apprised of this, there can be
no doubt, from his having undertaken to write
a letter to Sir J. Laforey by which he said every-
thing relating to the command would be made
perfectly easy.

To the queries put by Sir R. Abercromby :
ist, Whether the public is safe in dividing the
responsibility in one and the same object : I can
only answer that by the instruction to Sir J.
Laforey, a draft of which I shewed you and you
seemed to approve, the responsibility is not
divided, but rested where Sir R. Abercromby
would wish it, with Admiral Christian. 2ndly,
Whether an oblique mode of supersession is
less liable to reprehension, less productive of
discontent in the navy and less injurious to Sir
J. Laforey than a direct one : I must answer that
if the public service require the conduct of the
expedition to remain in the hands that have
concerted it, no reprehension can be due to an
order which secures that object. The discontent
in the navy intended to be avoided is the super-
session of an officer so high in the list as Sir J.
Laforey by the .appointment of one so low on it
as Admiral Christian, and the latter remaining
commander-in-chief in the Leeward Islands, a
situation to which the service must naturally
expect, and reasonably too, an older officer to
be appointed. As to the injury done to Sir J.
Laforey, his friend Sir C. M.[iddleton] is convinced
he will not consider it as such, and if he should
be so mistaken, I had rather that his return from
the station should arrive from his own desire to
quit it (feeling as I do that the order is perfectly
justifiable on public grounds), than to recall him
without having any charge of any kind to bring
against him.

MIDDLETON AND LAFOREY 175

Should Admiral Christian be removed by
death or inability, then there would no longer
remain the same reason for entrusting the execu-
tion of the service to the junior officer, because
I do not apprehend that Admiral Pole ] is at all
more acquainted with the details of the expedition
than Sir John Laforey might easily become in
case of such an event.

Sir Ralph seems, in his subsequent query
concerning the fleet now in the West Indies, not
to be apprised of what I understood to be perfectly
arranged between us, that the greatest part of
that fleet (at least of the line-of-battle ships)
were to return to Europe in consideration of the
great strength in ships of the line sent out with
the expedition.

I have thus stated what immediately occurs
to me on reading Sir Ralph's letter, but I cannot
help also adding to it, that had I supposed it
was necessary at the outset of this expedition
that the admiral who was to concert it with Sir
R. Abercromby would supersede Sir J. Laforey
and become commander-in-chief in the West
Indies, I should certainly not have proposed
Admiral Christian for this situation, because
tho' I know his ability and activity and decided
upon him on these grounds as much the properest
person to superintend the fitting out of an expedi-
tion of so great an extent and so complicated a
nature, I should certainly have felt the long line
of admirals senior to him would justly have
thought themselves reflected on by our going to
about the youngest on the list for so high a
command as that in question.

You have now my sentiments on this subject,
and as it now stands it must be decided by the

1 Rear- Admiral Charles Morice Pole, second-in-command.

176 THE SPENCER PAPERS

Cabinet, to whom I shall on their first meeting
take the liberty of stating the subject of this
letter. It is no doubt absolutely necessary to
take such means as are likely in all human pro-
bability to secure the ultimate success of the
object in view, but I cannot conceive that it is
impossible to secure this object without adopting
a measure so improper in almost every point of
view as that wished by Sir R. Abercromby.

I am not only truly concerned but seriously
alarmed at what you say of the letter you have
had from Lord Grenville, for every day I feel
more strongly the pressing necessity for dis-
engaging our fleet from that station.

Belive me sincerely yours . . .

To Right Honble. Henry Dundas.

[Answering igth October, 1795.]

DUNDAS TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

Walmer Castle. 2oth October, 1795.

My dear Lord, — I received yours here this
morning, and it is impossible for me not to feel
considerable uneasiness from the state into which
the naval command of the Leeward Islands has
got. From what you state as to Admiral Christian
he certainly had no reason to suppose that he
was not to be under the command of Sir John
Laforey, but it is certain that Sir Ralph Aber-
cromby could have no such idea, and for this
plain reason — that till last Sunday when I saw
your lordship at Wimbledon I most undoubtedly
laboured under the misapprehension that you
intended to send Laforey to St. Domingo. That
Sir R. Abercromby is more apprehensive of

MIDDLETON AND LAFOREY 177

collision and difference between him and the
naval commander than there is just ground for,
I think and believe. At the same time, on a
subject in which the interest of the public and
his own character are so deeply involved, I cannot
be surprised if his anxiety should have the effect
of magnifying the danger which he apprehends,
and I am the less warranted to be surprised on
that score when I again remind your lordship
that every sentiment expressed by him was,
previous to the receipt of his letter, urged upon
me by Mr. Pitt, and altho' I did not feel it to
the extent he does, his opinion is certainly of
authority enough to exculpate the executive
officer, who feels the same difficulties, from the
blame of stating groundless apprehensions. I am
extremely grieved that he does feel them, because
on such occasions the apprehension too often
realises itself. That his apprehensions are not
diminished, I am sorry to learn from a private
letter of his to Huskisson,1 transmitted to me this
morning. I send you an extract of that part
of the letter.3 Be the result what it will I shall
not acquiesce in his 3 declining the command,
but send him His Majesty's Orders to proceed on
the Service. The matter rests therefore entirely
with your lordship. You have it in your power
either to allow the service to remain on the footing
now proposed — or to leave Laf orey in the command
without any restriction on his acting — or to super-
sede both Laforey and Christian and to name
another senior admiral to go out with Pole under
him. In short, settle it in any way you please
and I shall order Abercromby to go ; for whatever

1 Mr.1 William Huskisson, who in 1796 became Under-
secretary for War.

2 See next page. 3 That is, Abercromby.

I. N

178 THE SPENCER PAPERS

way you settle it, I am sure you will do it upon
an exercise of your own understanding un-
influenced either by the partialities or resent-
ments of others. Your lordship talks of its being
a matter for the Cabinet to decide upon. Surely
upon reconsideration you will not adhere to that
idea. It is a subject on which you cannot expect
that any Cabinet Minister will give an opinion.
The responsibility rests with you, and you must
act upon it. Mr. Pitt, to whom I have com-
municated your letter of this morning, feels it
his duty to state to you the apprehensions he
entertains upon the subject of the arrangement
as it now stands, but having done so he will
presume you are in the right and defend it when-
ever he shall be called upon to do so, but would
not feel it as a business upon which he was to
discuss in Cabinet.

I remain, My dear Lord,

Yours very faithfully,
HENRY DUNDAS.

ENCLOSURE

Copy of part of letter from Sir R. Abercromby to
Mr. Huskisson enclosed in Mr. Dundas's
letter of zoth October, 1795

[Copy.] Southampton. i8th October, 1795.

Dear Sir, — From your letter of yesterday I
apprehend you had not seen mine to Mr. Dundas
on the proposed arrangement of the naval com-
mand in the West Indies. I should be unwilling
to enter on a matter not exactly in my line, but
I am so deeply interested in the success of our
expedition that I may be excused if I give my
opinion with freedom. It is an expedient that

MIDDLETON AND LAFOREY 179

never can answer, the worst consequences may
arise from such an arrangement, and it must be
reconsidered. I do not see what Sir J. Laforey's
friends can mean. Do they mean to disgrace
him to entitle him to some dirty dividend of
prize money ? I do not know that I could accept
of the command so involved in difficulty and
contradiction. I shall await the result.

SPENCER TO DUNDAS
PRIVATE.

[Draft — much corrected.] 22nd October, 1795.

Dear Sir, — I consider it as particularly for-
tunate that I had had a conversation with Mr.
Pitt on the subject of the West India command
before I read your letter of the 20th inclosing the
extract of one to Mr. Huskisson from Sir Ralph
Abercromby, because in that conversation I had
an opportunity of explaining to Mr. Pitt my
sentiments on the subject upon a more mature
reconsideration of it, and more especially had
cleared up any idea that could have arisen (from
the expression in my former letter in which I
mentioned the Cabinet), that I intended in any
degree by that expression to convey a notion of
my wishing to shift the smallest part of the
responsibility from myself. I know I am respon-
sible for the measure and appointments ordered
by the Board of Admiralty, and if it were ever
to happen that the majority of the Cabinet should
differ with me in opinion on any important point
relating to such measures or appointments without
at the same time convincing me that their opinion
was the right one, I know that there would be
but one line for me to take. In this case, however,

N 2

i8o THE SPENCER PAPERS

I am very happy to feel that no difference of
opinion is likely to arise between us ; for though
I thought upon the grounds stated in my former
letter that the expedient proposed might be
adopted and might completely answer the purpose
wished for, I am very ready to allow that my own
original opinion upon the subject leant very
strongly (as you know) to the more direct course,
and my altering it in any respect arose entirely
from knowing how very strong an impression was
made on the professional feelings and opinions of
all the professional members of this Board by
the proposition of recalling Sir J. Laforey in this

manner.1

The probability of success to any expedient
such as we had proposed is however so much
diminished by the view which Sir R. Abercromby
seems to have taken of the subject that it is
impossible for me not to feel that circumstance
alone a sufficient inducement to revert to the
determination of removing Sir J. Laforey as
the only means of securing a cordial co-operation
of the two branches of the service on this very
important occasion.

Sir John Laforey will therefore be ordered to
return with some of the line-of-battle ships now
on that station, and Admiral Christian will there-
fore remain in the command of the intended
expedition, but as his rank in the service does
not entitle him to expect a commission of com-

1 Here is the following erasure : ' I am sorry to see Sir R.
Abercromby's mind so strongly impressed with the view he has
taken up of the subject. But though I cannot admit for a
moment that either he or any other land officer has a right to
say that unless a particular admiral has the command of an
expedition in which he is to co-operate he doubts whether he
can accept the command, yet I strongly feel how much the
circumstance diminishes the probability of success.'

MIDDLETON AND LAFOREY 181

mander-in-chief of the Leeward Islands,1 he will
be expressly given to understand that a senior
officer will be sent to take upon him that command
as soon as the other arrangements of the service
will allow of it ; and I shall propose to give that
appointment to Admiral Cornwallis, who will not,
however, be able to take it upon him till after
the termination of the service on which he is
now about to sail, and that delay will in all
probability give full time for the execution of
the affairs and operations in the Leeward Islands
before his arrival.

All that I have further to say on this sub-
ject is that I feel it my duty to make the above
arrangement on public grounds alone with a
view to ensuring the best chance of a success to
our operations ; but at the same time I must beg
it to be unequivocably understood that I cannot
for a moment admit that either Sir Ralph Aber-
cromby or any other land officer has a right to
say that unless a particular admiral has the
command of the naval part of an expedition, in
which he is ordered to co-operate, he doubts
whether he can accept the command allotted to
him. I am very glad to see by what you say in
your letter that you agree with me on this point,
and I only now mention it lest I should be told
by and by from any quarter whatever that Sir J .
Laforey was removed because Sir R. Abercromby

1 Here is the following erasure : ' which would be looked at
by the service as too high a situation for so young a rear-admiral;
he will only be the commanding officer of the expedition, and
I propose giving the commission of commander-in-chief to
Admiral Cornwallis, who is now ordered on a cruise, and who may
go out to the W. Indies when this service is performed, by
which means Christian will remain in the command to complete
the operations he has planned and at the same time will not be
put into a situation from which other officers his seniors might
think they had just cause of complaint.'

182 THE SPENCER PAPERS

did not choose to undertake the command with
him, to which aspersion, if it ever should be
made, I lay in my claim to give a direct con-
tradiction.

Endorsed: 'Mr. Dundas, 2oth October, 1795; received 21 st ;
answered 22nd.'

MIDDLETON TO SPENCER l

My Lord, — Having very freely and candidly
delivered my opinion of Sir John Laforey 's
professional abilities, and the unprecedented
measure of recalling him, I can only lament its
being carried into execution.

If growing in years be an objection to em-
ploying experienced officers in commands of trust,
Sir John Laforey will have to complain, that he
is singled out as the first example, while com-
mands of still greater consequence are entrusted
to officers of much longer standing and more ad-
vanced in years. But whatever conduct may be
observed to Sir John Laforey, his being picked
out by Admiral Boscawen to board a 74-gun ship
with boats in Louisbourg harbour and succeeding
in the attempt, will never be forgotten in naval
history, however it may sleep in the present day.

Sir John Laforey has served through every
station with great reputation as an officer, and will
I doubt not maintain that character through life.

I have put your lordship's letter into Mr.
Nepean's hands, who will carry the contents into
execution, but your lordship will make allowance
for my feelings, when I say that my reputation

1 A ' fair copy ' of this letter is given in Letters of Lord Bar ham,
ii, p. 240 (N.R.S. vol. 38). Its wording differs considerably,
especially in the last paragraphs, from the version here given,
which was that actually sent.

MIDDLETON AND LAFOREY 183

is too much concerned to take an active share in
the business ; and I would submit to your lord-
ship [whether] under every circumstance of this
unusual measure it would not be proper to
screen the Admiralty from the injustice that will
be imputated to it, by desiring a letter from the
Secretary of State on which to ground their order.

In stating my opinion thus freely I have done
my duty to Sir John Laforey and the public
and by this means relieved my mind from the
cloud that has hung over it.

I hope the consequences will turn out to your
lordship's wishes, being with much respect and
esteem, my lord,

Your Lordship's

Most faithful and obedient servant,
CHARLES MIDDLETON.

23rd October, 1795.

MIDDLETON TO SPENCER

My Lord, — No consideration will induce me
to concur in what I think an unjust measure,
however recommended, because I know myself
amenable to a much higher tribunal than any
on earth.

As your lordship seems to insinuate a removal
from office, I can only say that my seat is at your
lordship's service.1

I am with all due respect,

Your lordship's faithful and most
obedient humble servant,
CHARLES MIDDLETON.

26th October, 1795. (Received same date.)

1 On the night of Sunday the 25th Lord Spencer had written
to him to say that the constitution of Board demanded that he
should sign the Laforey minute or withdraw from office. See

184 THE SPENCER PAPERS

MIDDLETON TO SPENCER

My Lord, — The tenor of your lordship's letter
of yesterday having compelled me to a resigna-
tion of my seat at the Admiralty Board, I take
it for granted you will be pleased to signify the
same to his Majesty on Wednesday.

Under these circumstances I trust your lord-
ship will dispense with my further attendance at
the office.

I am with due respect, my lord,
Your lordship's most obedient

humble servant,
CHARLES MIDDLETON,

26th October, 1795.

SPENCER TO CHRISTIAN

[Draft}

Sir, — As you are now on the point of sailing
on the expedition to the West Indies which has
been so long preparing, I think it right to say
a few words to you on the sort of command
with which you will be entrusted, to prevent
any chance of future misunderstanding upon this
subject ; and I am the rather induced to do this
from having observed that some misunderstanding
has (very much to my surprise) already arisen
upon it.

When I first mentioned to you my intention
to name you for this expedition — it must be

Letters oj Lord Barham, ii. p. 421 (N.R.S. vol. 38). Whether
or not Lord Spencer saw him after receiving the above letter is
not known, but the same day Middleton wrote the one that
follows. Fair copies of both, differing slightly in the wording,
are given ibid. p. 422.

MIDDLETON AND LAFOREY 185

within your recollection that I pointed out to
you the absolute necessity there was that a
perfectly good understanding should be kept up
between you and Sir John Laforey, the com-
mander-in-chief on that station, and I was very
well satisfied with your answer on that occasion,
in which you seemed entirely to feel the strength
of what I had observed, and even undertook to
write to that officer such a letter as in your
apprehension would make everything go on as
smoothly as possible. Resting perfectly con-
tented with having, as I thought, so clearly
ascertained and satisfactorily settled this point,
I thought very little more on this part of the
subject, till I found very lately that it had some-
how or other been understood by Mr. Dundas
and thro' him by Sir Ralph Abercromby that
Sir John Laforey was not to remain on the station
and that the sole conduct of the expedition in
concert with Sir Ralph was to remain with you.
Upon investigating this subject a little further
I discovered that the idea of a new person being
implicated in the execution of what you had
projected and arranged together made so strong
an impression on the mind of Sir Ralph Aber-
cromby, that there would perhaps be considerable
danger on your arrival in the West Indies of some
misunderstanding arising which might be fatal
to the success of the expedition ; and as I felt it
my duty in the situation in which I act to use
every endeavour for the ultimate success of so
very important a service and to guard as much
as possible against anything that could possibly
interfere with it, I, on this ground alone, have
come to the determination of making such arrange-
ments respecting Sir John Laforey's return to
this country as will leave the performance of the

186 THE SPENCER PAPERS

service in question to you. You must however
be aware that your standing as a flag-officer does
not, according to the usual practice of the service,
justify your being appointed commander-in-chief
on that station. Therefore in recalling Sir John
Laforey I do not propose that you should succeed
him in that appointment and I shall take His
Majesty's pleasure on the nomination of some
other officer of considerably higher rank on the
list to that command, as soon as the necessary
arrangements of the service will permit. In the
meanwhile you will be charged with the conduct
of the proposed expedition and of the squadron
employed in those islands, and I have no doubt
but that you will discharge that trust with your
acknowledged zeal and activity and in a manner
which will at once do credit to yourself and
effectual service to your country.

I thought it necessary to enter into this
explanation before you sailed as I very much
wish, if possible, to avoid all misapprehensions
on matters of this kind, and as I cannot help
imagining that there must have been a mis-
apprehension somewhere or Sir Ralph Abercromby
could never have remained ignorant of the state
of this command to so late a period.

I shall take the liberty before you sail of
mentioning to you a few young officers who will
be under your command and in whose advance-
ment in the service I feel myself interested.

I am, Sir, with great truth, &c., &c.,

SPENCER.

Admiralty. 25th October, 1795.
(To Rear- Admiral Christian.)

MIDDLETON AND LA FORE Y 187

CHRISTIAN TO SPENCER

Portsmouth. 27th October, 1795.

My Lord, — I am honoured by the receipt of
your lordship's letter of the 25th. It is not very
easy for me to express the sentiments I feel upon
the subject matter of its contents. Every cir-
cumstance your lordship states of the conversation
with me relative to Sir John Laforey is perfectly
in my recollection ; as it equally is, that I have
not in any instance deviated from the assurance
I then gave your lordship.

I trust that I have not assumed either the
wish or the expectation of holding the situation
which you have been pleased to instruct me is
[? not] intended to be conferred, and I can with
equal truth assure you that I have not in any
degree or by any means solicited it.

I am perfectly aware that my standing in the
service does not entitle me to expect the appoint-
ment of commander-in-chief , and feel it is perfectly
my duty to serve in such capacity as your lordship
and the Board of Admiralty may think proper
to direct to the best of my ability.

I hope I may be permitted to call to your
lordship's recollection the line of conduct I took
when you mentioned the probability of Sir John
Laforey's going to Jamaica,1 and your mention
some days after, that it would be considered too
strong a measure to adopt. I am not conscious
that I appeared in either of these instances too
much elate or too much depressed. It is now
with perfect truth I assure your lordship that I
feel (and I hope properly) a considerable weight
of responsibility by the present determination.

1 I.e. being transferred to the Jamaica station.

i88 THE SPENCER PAPERS

I will not disguise that I construe some parts
of your lordship's letter to breathe a kind of
suspicion that I have been led by ambitious
motives to stoop to intrigue and duplicity in the
progress of this arrangement, and I shall not very
comfortably quit England unless I receive from
your lordship the satisfaction of knowing that you
acquit me of such conduct.

Many considerations press upon this occasion,
and I can with truth assure your lordship that
publicly as well as privately I am most anxious
to merit your esteem.

I rather hazard writing in the warmth of the
moment, than by hesitation permit you one
day to be unassured of the respect and considera-
tion with which I have the honour to be, my
Lord,

Your lordship's most obedient and
faithful humble servant,

HUGH C. CHRISTIAN.

I shall receive very great satisfaction whenever
I may by any circumstance be enabled to obey
any commands of yours and shall consequently
be studiously attentive to any person respecting
whom your lordship may be interested.

Endorsed: ' Received 28th October, 1795. Private.'

SPENCER TO CHRISTIAN
PRIVATE.

Dear Sir, — My attendance at the levee has
necessarily made me so late that I have only
time to answer very shortly your letter of yester-
day, but I am unwilling to defer my answer till
to-morrow lest there should appear to be any
hesitation in my assuring you (which I do very

MIDDLETON AND LAFOREY 189

sincerely) that the contents of it have been very
satisfactory to me, as they give me the strongest
reason to be convinced that no misunderstanding
of any kind exists on the subject of your present
command, and therefore that there is every
ground to hope that the very important operations
which are to be carried on under you in conjunction
with Sir Ralph Abercromby will have their full
chance of success.

I am very glad that this matter has been thus
explained, and I perfectly acquit you of any
improper motives on the occasion. I certainly
did regret that an earlier explanation of it with
Sir Ralph Abercromby had not taken place, but
I can very easily conceive it's not having done
so to be entirely owing to the great and continual
exertions you have engaged in to accelerate the
preparation of the expedition, which exertions
and the zeal you have displayed on the occasion
have in my mind already justified your appoint-
ment to the trust, which for the extensive and
complicated nature of the service was such as
to require at least that zeal and those exertions
to carry it through.

I have spoken with implicit sincerity to you
on this subject, and you may depend upon my
always continuing to do so.

The officers whom I should wish more particu-
larly to point out to your notice and protection
are Captain Fellowes l of the Albacore, Lieutenant
W. Champion of the Requin [12], Lieutenant
Dunbar Douglas of L'Eclair [20] and Lieutenant
John Russell of the Impregnable. Captain Fel-
lowes is a very promising young man and a very
near relation of Lady Spencer's ; the other officers

1 Captain Edward Fellowes of the Albacore, 14, was soon given
the frigate Alarm, 32.

igo THE SPENCER PAPERS

are all strongly recommended to me, and I trust
you will find them deserving of your approbation.
Believe me, dear Sir, with great truth,

Your very faithful and obedient
humble servant,

SPENCER.

Admiralty. 28th October, 1795.
(To Rear-Admiral Christian.)

DUNCAN TO DUNDAS

Venerable. Downs [?] 29th October, 1795.

My dear Sir, — What you mentioned about Sir
Charles Middleton I find has now happened, by
a letter from him to say he has left the Admiralty.
Should they want a sea officer to the Board and
you think it right to mention me I should be
much obliged to you, provided it don't take my
present command from me.

I always am,
With much gratitude and esteem,

Very truly yours,
ADAM DUNCAN.

(Enclosure to Mr. Dundas, soth October, 1795.)

igi

SECTION III

NAVAL PROTEST AGAINST THE DUKE OF YORK'S
REGULATIONS

SPENCER TO CHRISTIAN

[Extract]

PRIVATE.

Dear Sir,—

Your letter to the Board of the 4th instant
relative to the very delicate question of troops
on board H.M. ships has been referred to Mr.
Dundas, who has had a special communication
upon it with H.R.H. the Duke of York, and
regulations have been drawn up on the subject
grounded on a deliberative opinion of the Law
Officers of the Crown, which will, I hope, obviate
any chance of a misunderstanding and point out
a line of proceeding calculated to steer clear of
those difficulties, which the contradictory terms
of the Acts of Parliament on this subject naturally
create, and which have been the occasion of the
awkward circumstances that have occurred on the
Mediterranean station. These regulations, accom-
panied by instructions conformable to them, will be
officially transmitted to the commanding officers
of both the branches of the service before you sail.

Yours, &c.,

SPENCER.

Wimbledon Park, Sunday night, nth October, 1795.
Rear-Admiral Christian.

192 THE SPENCER PAPERS

CHRISTIAN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

Portsmouth. 3oth October, 1795.

My /Lord, — In presuming to offer an opinion
upon so important a question as the one upon
which I am about to treat, I trust to your lord-
ship's judgment, and the rectitude of the principle
which induces me to trouble you with this letter.

The public order which I received from the
Board yesterday morning together with transcripts
of the papers on which it is founded, appear to
me to involve in them one of the most important
points which can affect the naval service. The
determination has been long expected, and in
the suspension much conversation has been upon
it in every naval society. It is with the greatest
concern that I state to your lordship that the
decision is not in any degree satisfactory to the
corps, and I particularly allude to those of the
higher rank. As yet I have not conversed upon
the subject with any but the flag officers. Feeling
it much my duty to end and not to retard such
measures as the Admiralty must have considered
with due weight, I now feel that I am greatly
presuming, but in truth, my lord, I apprehend
such unpleasant consequences, that I consider it
but just to your lordship to apprise you of them ;
and in so doing, if I may presume to offer an
opinion, I think that if the proposed regulations
were to be continued to those embarked on board
His Majesty's ships for passage, and not as part
of the established complement, all purposes might
be answered and the approaching storm averted.

I think they might be extended to all troops em-
barked upon any momentary pressure of service,
for conveyance to any point of attack, and indeed

NAVAL PROTEST 193

in all cases except where they become a part of the
efficient strength and complement of the ships.

I am writing this letter in the midst of inter-
ruption. I hope this will plead my excuse for
any inaccuracy in the writing, and venture with-
out hesitation to leave the motive which prompts
me to write it all to your lordship's consideration,
and hope that it will only tend to prove the
respect and esteem with which I have the honour
to be, my Lord,

Your lordship's most obedient and
most humble servant,

HUGH C. CHRISTIAN.

WALDEGRAVE* TO SPENCER

Portsmouth. 3ist October, 1795.

My Lord, — I trust that your lordship will do
me the justice to believe me to be among the last
of those in the service who could wish to give
offence to you in any shape whatsoever ; and yet
however unpleasant it may be to you to hear
what I am now about to state, I should think-
myself highly culpable in every respect were I
to remain silent.

I am extremely sorry to be under the dis-
agreeable necessity of making known to your
lordship that there appears to be a degree of
fermentation in the mind of every naval officer
here that may lead to even more than I dare
venture to explain. To check this torrent has
been impossible ; therefore all I have endeavoured
to do is to lead its course. The enclosed will show
your lordship the state in which the case now

1 Vice- Admiral the Hon. Sir William Waldegrave, afterwards
Lord Radstock.

I. O

194 THE SPENCER PAPERS

stands, and to-morrow we must see what is best
to be done,

I think it proper to acquaint your lordship
that hitherto I have not met two opinions on the
subject in question, as we all feel convinced of
the impossibility of carrying on the discipline of
the service under the new regulations. If these
therefore cannot be alter'd, it is the unanimous
wish of the whole that the regular troops may
be disembark' d from the fleet ; and by all that
I have seen and heard, I am persuaded that there
is not a man amongst us but who would prefer
going to sea eighty short of complement to the
receiving into his ship the most orderly and finest
company of grenadiers under such painful and
humiliating conditions.

Were my friend Lord Hugh Seymour here
I am persuaded he would not hold a different
language to that which necessity now compels
me to address to your lordship. And now, my
Lord, let me further tell you that if neither of the
measures above pointed out can be acceded to
by your Board, an address to Parliament on the
subject will, I fear, be unavoidable ; and the
ferment such a measure would create in this
country at the present moment I think cannot
be look'd to but with horror.

All we ask or hope for is that the troops
serving on board the fleet as marines, may be subject
to the same discipline as heretofore and according
to the present existing Act of Parliament and the
custom of the service. If this cannot be done,
I will honestly tell your lordship that I consider
our navy as ruined past redemption.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,
Your lordship's most obliged and
faithful humble servant,

WILLIAM WALDEGRAVE.

NAVAL PROTEST 195

HOWE TO SPENCER

Porter's Lodge, ist November, 1795.

My Lord, — On my return from the Admiralty
I received by the morning's post the copies of
the papers referred to in the letter from the
admirals at Portsmouth, which I had the honour
to communicate to your lordship.

From those papers I learn that in a letter from
Sir Philip Stephens l dated the I3th of November,
1793, Sir Allan Gardner 2 was informed of the
King's pleasure having been signified to the
Board of Admiralty, by Mr. Secretary Dundas,
that soldiers serving in the ships of war are to
be considered to all intents and purposes subject
to the provisions made for the government of
the fleet. Also, that with a letter to the Board
of the same date (i3th Nov.) from Mr. Dundas
the opinion of the King's Advocate, Attorney- and
Solicitor-Generals was enclosed, expressing their
sentiments thus : ' The officers and men of His
Majesty's land forces when embarked in such
ships (i.e. His Majesty's) were immediately after
their embarkation subject, as persons on board
such ships, to the laws relating to the government
of His Majesty's ships, vessels, and forces by sea,
particularly set forth in the Acts of the 22nd year
of his late Majesty and the igth of his present
Majesty ; and liable to be tried for any breach of
the same, so far as the several provisions in such
Acts extend to all persons in the fleet/

I only trouble you further with a copy of my
answer to the letter from the admirals ; hoping

1 Then Secretary of the Admiralty.

2 Rear- Admiral Sir Allan Gardner in conjunction with Major-
General Bruce had just conducted an unsuccessful expedition
against Martinique from Barbadoes.

O 2

196 THE SPENCER PAPERS

I may have therein conformed to your lordship's
intentions, and consistent with the honour of
being your lordship's

Most faithful and obedient servant,

HOWE.
Earl Spencer.

ENCLOSURE.
[Howe to the Flag-Officers at Portsmouth.]

[Copy.'] Porter's Lodge, ist November, 1795.

Gentlemen, — I did not until yesterday receive
all the papers referred to in the letter you have
favoured me with of the 2Qth of last month ; the
order to Rear-Admiral Christian (not material I
apprehend to the purpose of your communication)
excepted.

I was apprised that special regulations had
been framed, as thought necessary on occasion
of the supposed West-India expedition, before
the receipt of your letter. But I did not sooner
know they were issued or had been ultimately
digested.

The opinions of the King's Advocate, Attorney-
and Solicitor-Generals, transmitted to Sir Allan
Gardner, perfectly correspond with the ideas I
had ever entertained on the subject.

I understand the instructions Rear-Admiral
Christian has received are such, as upon doubts
suggested concerning the legal exercise of the
authorities heretofore assumed on the construction
of our naval laws prevalent in the like cases, were
deemed at least exceptionable for the exigencies
of the present moment : more especially as the
so speedily expected departure of the armament
would not probably allow time to have a more

NAVAL PROTEST 197

eligible provision established, in the extent the
benefit of the King's general service requires.

As at present advised, I can therefore only
express my confidence, that if the armament
leaves this country before such more grateful
expedient has been provided, the unquestionably
prudent example of the two chief commanders
may excite a similar emulation in the subordinates
in each profession, to promote in their respective
lines of duty, the benefit of the King's service,
for the very important purpose of their present
destination.

I have the honour to be, &c., &c. ...

(Enclosure in Lord Howe's letter to Lord Spencer.)

SPENCER TO CHRISTIAN
PRIVATE.

Dear Sir, — The subject of your private letter
to me of last Saturday is of so very difficult and
delicate a nature that I am persuaded you will
not be surprised at my having delayed answering
it for so long. I am truly concerned that it has
been taken up in so decided a manner at this
particular moment, as the discussions we have
had upon it with the gentlemen of the law lead
to conclusions so very unsatisfactory as to be ex-
tremely distressing. I am still, however, sanguine
enough to hope that the question may be deter-
mined on in a manner conducive to the real
interests of His Majesty's service, and in the
meantime I cannot but applaud the temper which
you have shown upon the subject, and I hope
that the steps which have been taken to supply
the Colossus and Impregnable with marines may
prevent any delay being occasioned to your

198 THE SPENCER PAPERS

sailing the very first possible moment on the very
pressing and important service committed to
your charge.

I am, dear Sir, yours, &c.,

E. SPENCER.

Admiralty. 3rd November, 1795.
Rear- Admiral Christian.

SIDNEY SMITH TO SPENCER

Portsmouth. 3rd November, I795.1

My dear Lord, — You have already received a
strong remonstrance from the flag officers on the
order that has issued from the Admiralty enforcing
the ' regulations ' which the Duke of York has
made as grounded on the additional article of
war given out by the King to the army, but in
fact contradicting the spirit of that article.

As you will receive the same from the captains
to-morrow, it is natural for you to expect some
explanation from your friends on the subject,
and as one of your sincerest I feel myself under
the obligation to give you all the light I can
collect. The naval officers are unanimous in a
determination to do all in their power to prevent
the establishment of ' regulations ' which tend
to sharing their authority with a second power
created thereby in the ships. They conceive the
Admiralty must agree with them when their side
of the question is stated and that they strengthen
the hands of the Board towards resisting such
a novel principle by sending their remonstrance
against it. It is conceived that the regulation in
question will give the seamen just cause of com-

1 A meeting of flag-officers and captains was held this day at
Portsmouth to consider the new regulations.

NAVAL PROTEST 199

plaint when they find that the captain of the ship
exerts an authority over them which he has not
the power to exert over another portion of the
ship's crew hitherto considered as equally under
his command and subject to naval discipline as
well as themselves. It is apprehended that the
regulations will establish imperium in imperio
and destroy that unity of will and consequent
co-operation which has hitherto constituted the
very essence of our naval superiority by pro-
ducing that celerity of movement and perfect
order which is peculiar to a British ship of war.
A stronger observation than any I have heard
made is that the ' regulations ' are in direct
violation of an Act of Parliament which our
Articles of War are ipso facto (22 Geo. II.) and
which no army arrangement can or ought to
affect. That Act expressly puts ' soldiers ' and
all persons ' in or belonging to the fleet ' under
naval discipline and excepts those only who are
embarked on board transport ships, which excep-
tion marks the line more precisely. It is con-
tended that nothing can set aside an Act of
Parliament but its repeal, and it is presumed that
Government can never wish to change the mode
of discipline as established in the navy after the
experience of this reign and part of the last in
favour of it as it stands. The Article of War
annexed by the King to the army code adds
weight to the operation of the Act. The ' regula-
tions ' from the Duke of York if enforced do
away the effect of both ; and the Admiralty order
by transmitting the regulation as well as the
article is considered as imposing the authority of
the Duke of York on the navy in contradiction
to that of an Act of Parliament, the obligation to
abide by which Act is imposed on the naval

200 THE SPENCER PAPERS

officers by oath in all cases of trial and must
operate in case a soldier should come under any
article therein. If the additional (army) article
was transmitted without the regulations which
are considered as so injurious to our service,
nothing more could be said on the subject. Marines
on the old approved establishment are much
desired as assisting the preservation of discipline
and order on board. Soldiers, when embarked as
such, do the same, but any difference from what
has been tried and approved is deprecated by
the whole navy ; and the business has so serious
an aspect here, that I feel myself bound by my
attachment to your lordship to assure you that
it is not taken up partially and lightly, but will
be followed up by every step that can be taken
with propriety to obtain a repeal of the order
from the Admiralty to comply with the ' regula-
tions ' in question. Neither is it intended to stop
here, but to ascertain the point once for all between
the two services now that the matter is agitated
with such warmth on both sides, lest its being
undecided should leave things in the unpleasant
way they are at present. Thus you see the
Admiralty will be called on by the navy, of which
they are the head, to prevent their being sacrificed
to the army, on a point which concerns their
jurisdiction on their own element, confided to
them by Parliament, and to which it is meant
ultimately to appeal as to the validity of the
statute. I send Mr. Wright, my secretary, to
overtake the post and deliver you this, hoping
you will accept it as a proof of the sincerity with
which I am, my dear Lord,

Yours very faithfully,

W. SIDNEY SMITH.

NAVAL PROTEST 201

CHRISTIAN TO SPENCER

Prince George, Spithead. 4th November, 1795.

My Lord, — My mind is much relieved by the
receipt of your lordship's letter, and I venture to
hope that the withdrawing the 86th Regiment
from the Colossus and Impregnable will put at a
distance any ill effects of the proposed regulations.

I am truly anxious to impress your lordship's
mind of my determination to exert every means
in my power to keep a check [on] all misunder-
standings upon this very important question, and
it is with great satisfaction that I am enabled to
assure you that Sir Ralph Abercromby is as truly
determined so to act. Circumstanced as I am
with that officer, it was improper I should be
reserved upon this subject, and I have ventured
to communicate freely with him upon it. His
opinion coincides with mine offered to your
lordship's consideration in my first letter, and I
venture privately to express my belief that such
arrangement would be satisfactory to all parties,
at least to the majority.

The matter shall not prevent my proceeding to
sea with the troops whenever the wind may be fair,
and I trust that the perfect understanding which I
hope to cultivate with the General will remove all
prejudices between the two corps, and that the
only contention that may arise will be which shall
be most zealous to aid the service of each other.

I have the honour to remain, with the highest
respect and esteem, my Lord,

Your lordship's most obedient and
most humble servant,

HUGH C. CHRISTIAN:

P.S.—I regret much H.M.S. Alfred has not
arrived.

202 THE SPENCER PAPERS

CORNWALLIS TO THE ADMIRALTY

Sir, — I request that you will be pleased to
state to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty
that I am conscious of having been always ready
and desirous of serving in my station in His
Majesty's navy, and with all deference and
respect to my superiors. I do not or ever did
object to the force put under my direction sup-
posing the whole of those embarked subject to
naval courts martial, but I beg leave to observe
that without they are all alike amenable to naval
discipline according to law, as it has been always
hitherto understood, no good service can (in my
opinion) be performed. Whilst, therefore, the late
regulations made by Field-Marshal H.R.H. the
Duke of York for soldiers embarked on board
the King's ships continues in force, I feel myself
(however painful) obliged to decline serving.

I beg leave further to remark that, if upon
an emergency (such, for instance, as that which
happened in the last winter when the French
fleet unexpectedly put to sea) there should not be
a sufficient number of marines to complete the
complements of the ships, it may, as was then
the case, be thought necessary to embark soldiers
who are now subject to the Duke of York's new
regulations enforced by the Admiralty.

I therefore think it a duty to state my senti-
ments at present to their lordships that an officer
zealous in the service of his country may not be
put to the hard and cruel necessity of declining
service when called upon to face the enemy.
I have the honour to be, etc.

W. CORNWALLIS.

Royal Sovereign, St. Helens. 5th November, 1795.

NAVAL PROTEST 203

SPENCER TO SIDNEY SMITH
MOST PRIVATE.

[Draft.]

Dear Sir Sidney, — I have really been so much
pressed by business lately that it has been impos-
sible for me sooner to acknowledge your letter of
the 30th October. Since that period the Diamond
has been ordered to be docked, which will assist
every purpose you can wish. In the meantime,
lest the enemy should take advantage of your
absence, we have put two other frigates under
your orders that you may send them over to the
coast with the Syren. You will understand,
however, that this is merely a temporary arrange-
ment, as we shall not be able to let them remain
with you any longer than during your re-fitting.
The frigates are the Amazon and Caroline.

I am much obliged to you for your letter of
the 3rd on the subject of this unfortunate business
about soldiers on board men-of-war. I lament
exceedingly that it has arisen, as I see no possible
means of preventing great detriment to the public
service being produced by it. I wish that gentle-
men would look into acts of parliament when they
do apply to those researches with a little attention,
because I am persuaded that if you or any other
man will read through the Act of the 22nd Geo. 2nd
with attention and care you will see that notwith-
standing several expressions in it rather loosely
drawn and tending by an implied construction
to bring all persons on board under the naval
articles, the latter part of the Fourth Section of
that Act very much narrows the jurisdiction
given by it. I am therefore not at all surprised
that the lawyers should entertain great doubts

204 THE SPENCER PAPERS

on the subject. But I regret very much that the
warmth of the officers should have driven it thus
far, as they run a very great risk by having done
so of shaking very fundamentally the whole of
their discipline, which was established by practice
as completely as they could wish, and which I am
much afraid cannot be as completely established
by any legislative provision even if it should be
found right to resort to that expedient.

This letter is written to you in the greatest
confidence, and I desire it may not be shown to
any person whatever.

I have not had time to see your secretary
to-day, but shall see him to-morrow if I can.

Yours very sincerely,

SPENCER.

Admiralty. 5th November, 1795.

CAPT. PAKENHAM* TO SPENCER

Portsmouth. 5th November, 1795.

My Lord, — The Board of Admiralty will receive
by the post which carries this, a sort of memorial
from the captains of this port, relative to their
opinions upon the subject of an order already
issued to the fleet, to which I was invited to concur
and put my name soon after my arrival here, but
which (as I neither feel qualified, nor am ordered,
to give my opinion upon the motives or orders of
those put in authority over me) I could not help
declining to do. The gentlemen of my profession
here, who have been most anxious to procure

1 Captain the Hon. Thomas Pakenham of the Invincible, 74.
He had received the medal for the First of June and had highly
distinguished himself in December, 1794, by suppressing a mutiny
in the Culloden after Bridport, Cornwallis, and Colpoys had failed
to persuade the men to return to duty.

NAVAL PROTEST 205

general concurrence to their representation, are
disposed to think that my declining to sign their
paper amounts in some degree to a desertion of
my brother officers who have voluntarily under-
taken this step for the good of the service. I am
solicitous that your lordship should not so con-
sider it and you are for that reason troubled with
this letter.

If I was to be commanded to give my opinion
upon the order of which they complain, I certainly
must declare it appears dangerous to the full
extent of their statement ; but no conviction of
that kind shall induce me to j oin in a combination
of captains to set an example of insubordination
to the fleet and of jealousy to the army, such
combination or round robin, or whatever else they
may choose to call it, being in captains (to my
mind) as great an outrage against naval discipline
and the plain intention and obvious construction
of the articles of war, as if it had happened among
any inferior officers or men in his Majesty's navy.
Upon that principle, my Lord, I feel so far from
having deserted my profession to have abided by
the subordination of the service, which cannot
be supported if such meetings are generally
countenanced, because, if they are, the zealous
and unsuspecting officers will become the dupes
of disappointed or designing men. I am always
ready to make my complaints known quietly to
my admiral or other superior officer, upon that
or any other subject, whose duty it will then be
to obtain redress by application to the Admiralty ;
but there is no hardship I would not rather submit
to than make a party to support the justice of a
grievance, be it ever so serious, and I hope there
can be little doubt that the good sense of many
of my brother officers will (on reflection and

206 THE SPENCER PAPERS

reading the articles of war) see it in the same light.
I did advise the captains to delay their letter
upon this subject, but the paper being generally
signed it remained for those who had it in posses-
sion to use it as they chose, and I am sorry it did
not suit them to allow it to wait even until this
morning ere they put it in the post, as I should
have had an opportunity to converse upon the
subject with some of that meeting for whose
characters I have the highest respect and in
whose conduct I cannot but feel a hearty concern.

I have the honour to be
Your lordship's most obedient
humble servant,

THOMAS PAKENHAM.

(Received 5th November, 1795.)

SPENCER TO PAKENHAM

[Draft on dorse of last]

Dear Sir, — The reasons you assign in your
letter for declining to concur in the letter sent by
the captains to the Admiralty are certainly very
satisfactory, and though I am by no means sur-
prised at the sort of warmth which a misapprehen-
sion of the extent of the regulations has excited
amongst them, I cannot help regretting their
having taken that mode of conveying it to us.
I trust that when that heat has a little subsided
they will feel the necessity of leaving the subject
to be treated and the grievance remedied by
means which I hope will be better suited to the
purpose and less likely to raise dangerous ani-
mosities on both sides. And under a full confi-
dence that such will be the case, every endeavour
will be used by the Board of Admiralty to take
such measures as may prevent any further mischief

NAVAL PROTEST

207

arising on the subject. I have not time at present
to say anything more to you about it, but I hope
that you will continue to use your influence in
recommending temper and moderation to all
parties on an occasion which so much requires it.

I am, dear sir, &c., &c.,
SPENCER.

Admiralty. 5th November, 1795.

SPENCER TO THE DUKE OF YORK

[Draft]

Sir, — I have many acknowledgements to make
to your Royal Highness for your having graciously
condescended to communicate to me the inclosed
letters (which I have the honour of returning)
before any further proceeding was had on the
subject of them.

I should feel on this occasion that I was
deficient in my duty to your Royal Highness as
well as to the interests of the public service, if
I did not in the strongest manner I am able re-
present to your Royal Highness the very great
mischief which in my humble apprehension is
likely to ensue if either the prayer of Mr. Gerald
Fitzgerald's Memorial for being tried by a Land
Court Martial is acceded to, or if in compliance
with the opinion of Sir Charles Morgan your
Royal Highness should recommend it to His
Majesty to reinstate that gentleman into his
former rank and situation in the Army. I will
not trespass upon your Royal Highnesses time
at this moment by entering into any detail on the
subject now. All I shall presume to say is that
if this step were to be taken I am quite sure it
would immediately revive the very unpleasant

208 THE SPENCER PAPERS

and dangerous irritation which seemed a short
time ago to prevail, and which, however it may
appear to have subsided, has been only for the
present laid asleep by the very temperate manner
in which your Royal Highness proceeded on that
occasion, and by the explanation which was given
to the instructions issued upon the point.

I trust that your Royal Highness will do me
justice to believe I am incapable of wishing any
unnecessary severity to be used in any case, but I
cannot at the same time avoid observing that in
the Memorial in question there does not appear
the smallest trace of any regret or compunction
for a conduct of which His Majesty has already
so strongly marked his disapprobation, and so far
from being conscious of the extreme impropriety
of it the Memorialist takes no small degree of
credit to himself upon it and puts a very incandid
and unfair interpretation upon the lenity and
moderation which Captain Tyler was disposed
to have shown by offering to accept an apology
from him, if Mr. Fptzgerald] had not rather chosen
to drive matters to extremity.

Under all these circumstances I must very
earnestly beg and intreat of your Royal Highness
to consider the very fatal effects which any
relaxation on this point may produce on the minds
of the officers of His Majesty's Navy, who, if so
reprehensible a conduct in any officer is not
marked by the permanent displeasure of His
Majesty and your Royal Highness, will I much fear
be indeed reduced to the necessity of concluding
that their zeal for the support of that discipline
on board His Majesty's ships, without which no
good service can be carried on, is only looked
upon (in the light represented by Mr. Fitzgerald
in his Memorial) as the prejudice of a party.

NAVAL PROTEST 209

I have thought it my indispensable duty to
express myself in rather strong terms on this
subject, and I hope your Royal Highness will
forgive my doing so, as I am so firmly persuaded
of the bad effect which the knowledge of there
having been even a hesitation on this subject
would produce that I have cautiously avoided
communicating the substance of your Royal
Highness's letter and its enclosures to anyone
whatever ; and I must again humbly but earnestly
repeat my entreaty that this matter may be very
maturely reconsidered before any step is taken
upon it.

I have the honour to be, &c.

[Endorsed by Lord Spencer, ' Copy of Answer to the D. of York.
Private, soth November, 1795.']

CORNWALLIS TO SPENCER

My Lord, — I am sensible of your lordship's
obliging attention to me, and particularly in
having named me to command abroad.1

There is however one very material point which
I wish much to have explained. I should, I am
sure, be very sorry if my mentioning it could give
your lordship a moment's uneasiness.

With submission to your lordship, after what
was agitated some time since, concerning land
forces not being subject to the naval articles of
war when embarked on board His Majesty's

1 Christian had sailed again with the expedition on gth Decem-
ber, but once more met with weather of exceptional severity.
After struggling against it for two or three weeks his fleet was so
much scattered and damaged that he was forced to return and
reached Portsmouth on 26th January, 1796. It had then been
decided to appoint Cornwallis commander-in-chief with Chris-
tian as second-in-command. He was to sail at once with Aber-
cromby and so much of the expedition as was fit for sea.

I. P

210 THE SPENCER PAPERS

ships — should it not be understood from authority
to remain as hitherto conceived to be established
by law in His Majesty's naval service ?

I have the honour to be, with the greatest
respect,

Your lordship's most obedient
humble servant,

W. CORNWALLIS.

Wimpole Street. 2nd February, 1796.
(Received 3rd February, 1796.)

CORNWALLIS TO SPENCER

My Lord, — Conceiving from what fell from
your lordship the last time I had the honour of
attending you, that it is not impossible but that
I may be sent away suddenly,

I beg therefore to state to your lordship that
when Lord Hugh Seymour did me the honour to
call and mention your lordship's obliging intention
as to me, he said there were to be eight or ten
good 74-gun ships to be employed upon the most
active service and commanded accordingly for
the protection of the Leeward Islands, and that
Rear-Admiral Pole (of whom I have the best
opinion) was to be second. The only ships I
have heard of all those mention'd by your lord-
ship I am afraid are not exactly of Lord Hugh
Seymour's description. One of the captains I
do not recollect to have ever seen, and the other
I am not at all acquainted with, but I rather
doubt his lordship's making choice of either of
them, if he was going out upon an active cruise.

I never did, my lord, express a desire to go
to the Leeward Islands, considering from the
number of them and jarring interests, that it
was always a station where an officer, instead of
gaining credit, was more likely to lose any little

NAVAL PROTEST 211

reputation he might have acquired. I hardly
know an instance where it has happen'd other-
wise except in the case of Lord Rodney, and
that only the last time he was there ; but he was
particularly a fortunate man.

I fear, my lord, that my secretary would not
have it in his power to exchange with another
purser, where he must give a part of the profits,
and he has found a difficulty in obtaining the
allowance for managing the naval and victualling
departments in those islands, which was set at
three hundred pounds each. The salary formerly
was not a consideration, but it was otherwise with
Mr. Borwicke. He therefore would not wish to
exchange duties, and remain in a state of uncer-
tainty when at a distance and out of the way of any
application being made in his favour, which those
at hand will by an immediate application obtain.

I will not again trouble your lordship by
mentioning the unpleasant situation the late
regulations of the army have put the officers of
the navy into, as your lordship seem'd to be of
opinion it was proper that something should be
done to content minds upon that head.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest
regard,

Your lordship's most obedient
humble servant,

W. CORNWALLIS.

Wimpole Street. 8th February, 1796.
(Received 9th February, 1796.)

[Note by Lord Spencer : ' loth February. — Answered personally
that some of the ships alluded to were not to continue on the
station with him, etc.

' That Mr. Borwicke should be appointed to the Union and
might then exchange with Mr. Jefferson.

' And that the last matter alluded to was under the considera-
tion of Government at this moment.'

P 2

212 THE SPENCER PAPERS

SPENCER TO PITT

Dear Sir, — I hope you have not forgotten to
write to His Majesty about the Ribband ; as it
is really absolutely necessary that Admiral Cn
[Christian] l should if possible be invested with it
on Wednesday. Otherwise a longer delay might
be occasioned than would be right in his joining
his ship which will be ready for him to-day at
Spithead ; and as the wind seems to be settling
in a right point, we must do everything we can to
get out Con5 [Cornwallis] and the ist division of the
troops and ships for the West Indies with which
I propose that Admiral Cornwallis should sail.
I mention this the rather because when we talked
last on the subject I doubted whether Cn [Christian]
ought to go. I have since found that the impres-
sion of his not going would not only be very
unfavourable to him personally, but would involve
in it consequences extremely prejudicial to the
discipline of the service ; as it would be concluded
that he had declined service, and declined it
because he did not choose to be second-in-com-
mand. This is a motive which cannot be allowed
to be attributed to an officer, and in a very long
conversation I had with him the other morning
I explained myself so fully on the subject that he
no longer persisted in making any objection to
serving in the West Indies. After this I conceive
myself so pledged on the subject, that I must
make it a point that he should go, and as it will
be most advisable for him to be under Admiral

1 In this draft Lord Spencer has used two symbols for ad-
mirals' names. One seems to be ' O ' and the other ' Con8.'
The context indicates fairly clearly that they stand respectively
for Christian and Cornwallis.

NAVAL PROTEST 213

Parker < rather l than Cons [Cornwallis] he will be
instructed to go down to St. Domingo as soon as
possible after his arrival in the West Indies, by
which means he will be placed in the same situa-
tion in which he could before have been, at all
events whenever the troops went down to St.
Domingo. Admiral Pole will also go with the
2nd division, which it would have been very
difficult if not impossible to have induced him
to do (at least without considerable injury to his
feelings) if Cn [Christian] had been indulged by
staying at home ; and if Pole had not gone, as
I told you before, I really do not know where I
could with propriety have looked for a proper
second to Cornwallis.

I have taken the liberty of troubling you with
these details which more regularly belong to me
to arrange, because I had an intimation that Sir
Ralph Abercromby had objections to Cornwallis
going. In a former instance I went a great way
in consulting Sir Ralph's wishes respecting the
naval command of the expedition (tho' I allow
that there were other good reasons for deciding
as I did), but where there are such strong grounds
in my mind, of which Sir Ralph cannot be apprised
(and with which if he were he has no business)
to urge me to appoint a particular officer to a
situation adapted to his rank in the service, I
cannot allow his wishes to have much influence on
the decision, however desirous I naturally must
feel that everything should go on as smoothly as
possible.

Believe me, &c. &c. . . .

Admiralty, I5th February, 1796.
(Lord Spencer to Mr. Pitt.)

1 Rear- Admiral William Parker was commander-in-chief on
the Jamaica station.

214 THE SPENCER PAPERS

SPENCER TO CORNWALLIS
PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

Dear Sir, — There are several midshipmen who
have passed their examinations now at Ports-
mouth and Spithead on board of different ships,
whose names I have given to Mr. Nepean in order
that they may be transferred to the quarter-decks
of some of the ships under your orders for the
purposes of supplying the vacancies which may
arise in the squadron when abroad.

If I had not received your letter of yesterday
I proposed to have written a line or two to you
to-day on the subject of the regulation relative
to troops on board ship, which was given out by
Admiral Christian. I understand that Sir Ralph
Abercromby never has officially issued it to the
army under his command, and I am well assured
that, in consideration of the great difficulty which
seems to exist in the question as between the
two services, he will not issue it. It will therefore
not be considered in force, and though an official
notification to this effect is not made to you, I
can take upon myself in this manner to authorise
you to act as if no such regulation had been
issued. At the same time intreating you most
earnestly on account of the extreme delicacy of
the case to use every means in your power when
on your command to prevent any question arising
which may involve the two services on this sub-
ject. I do this in the fullest reliance that you will
find amongst all the officers of every description
employed abroad the best disposition to prevent
any such questions from giving impediment to
His Majesty's service ; and more especially with
respect to Sir Ralph Abercromby himself, I am
quite sure from his former temper and moderation

NAVAL PROTEST 215

in this business that he will coincide with you in
preventing any such disagreeable discussions from
taking place.

I am, Sir, &c.,

SPENCER.

Admiralty. 24th February, 1796.

To the Honble. Vice-Admiral Cornwallis.

CORNWALLIS TO SPENCER

My Lord, — I have been honour'd with your
lordship's letter which came by the express this
morning. I am aware my lord of the extreme
danger in agitating a point of this delicate nature
at this moment.

I had however no conception of its standing
as it now appears to do by the letter which your
lordship has honour'd me with, by which the new
regulations appear to be in force, at least at the
will of the commander-in-chief of the land forces
for the time being. Surely they might have been
recalled from Sir Ralph Abercromby, who, it
seems, has not officially communicated them.
I have as high an opinion of him as any person
can have of another whom he has never seen,
particularly for the moderation which he has
shown upon this occasion, but I understand that
he may soon return from the West Indies. If
not, service or the climate may occasion the
command to fall into a variety of hands, who,
instead of the moderation and love of his country
which I am convinced Sir Ralph Abercromby
possesses, may perhaps show as little of it as
General Trigge by his conduct appear 'd to do.1

1 See ante, Introductory Note, p. 135. General Trigge after-
wards conducted two successful combined operations : one
with Lord Hugh Seymour against Surinam in 1801, and the
other in 1801 with Duckworth against the Swedish West Indies.

216 THE SPENCER PAPERS

I confess to your lordship if I had been in-
formed in what way this very important point
stood, as well as some other matters which do
not appear exactly in the way I was led to
believe, I should most certainly have requested
to be permitted to decline the honour which your
lordship has so obligingly done me. And I do
now most sincerely desire that I may be allowed
to relinquish it.

Your lordship may depend upon it that I
never will mention one word upon the subject
of the troops, which I have carefully avoided since
I have been here, and as I never have shown or
indeed felt any particular pleasure in going upon
this service my not going will not occasion any
surprise, or the topic to be canvassed, which every
friend to the country must most sincerely lament
was ever brought forward. I feel, my lord, very
much the situation which I am unhappily in, and
I trust to your lordship's goodness that you will
not take amiss my earnest request to your lordship
to release me from it.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest
respect,

Your lordship's most obedient
humble servant,

W. CORNWALLIS.

Portsmouth. 25th February, 1796.

SPENCER TO CORNWALLIS

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

Dear Sir, — I have only time to write a few
words by the messenger who is now going to Ports-
mouth in answer to your letter of this morning.

The regulations in question are certainly not
in force as they have not been officially promul-

NAVAL PROTEST 217

gated by Sir Ralph Abercromby who is the only
land officer who has received them, and not having
been officially communicated to you, you are not
bound to take notice of them.

It is not possible for me to say more on the
subject, but I am persuaded that if proper care is
taken to prevent the discussion of the question
the regulations cannot be produced by any other
officer, as they have been issued to none but Sir
Ralph Abercromby.

I am at a loss to know what other matters
you allude to which do not appear to be exactly
as you expected. The only point I remember on
which you seemed to lay much stress was that of
the marines, and in consequence of your repre-
sentation twenty additional marines have been
ordered for the Royal Sovereign ; I am not at all
aware that you can have any other wish which I
have not done everything in my power to gratify,
and I can only add that I should feel myself very
deficient indeed in the duty I owe to the public,
if I could for a moment listen to an intimation
of your declining to undertake this service on
which you are so urgently called to proceed with-
out a moment's loss of time. There never was
a moment in which the speedy departure of any
fleet was of more essential importance to this
country ; and the Board of Admiralty, in confiding
the execution of that service to you, have testified
in the most satisfactory manner their opinion
of the estimation in which you are held both in
the service and with the public.

Believe me dear sir, with great truth,
Your very obedient humble servant,

SPENCER.

Admiralty. £ past n, 25th February, 1796.
(To Admiral Cornwallis.)

218 THE SPENCER PAPERS

CORNWALLIS TO SPENCER

My Lord, — I have had the honour of receiving
your lordship's two letters, one expressing strongly
a wish that we might sail to-morrow morning at
furthest. I beg leave to observe that last night
I had received no intimation that there was any
hurry to send me out. The Royal Sovereign's
pay would be due the First of March ; this has
been regularly reported, and Captain Whitby *
had written to the Navy Board, in consequence
of which the books are now in the office. I have
been with the commissioner and he has at last
agreed to pay the ship (thoj not in course) early
to-morrow morning. It should have been done
to-night if the books had been cast up at the
office. I will not wait one moment after, but
I think your lordship will approve of my not
attempting to go abroad with the payment
within three days of its becoming due, and
thereby occasion a discontent in the men which
indeed under the circumstances might well be
expected and is so very hurtful to the service.

In regard to the other matter, as it is deter-
mined, there can be no use in my troubling your
lordship again upon the subject. You may
depend upon my utmost care to prevent any
disagreement between the two services, when
harmony is so necessary, and I do assure your
lordship that anything I may have said did not
proceed from an idea that you did not wish to
do what was civil and kind to me, and I am
certain that your lordship did accept the high
office which you hold for no other purpose but

1 The Royal Sovereign was his flagship — Captain John Whitby
his flag-captain.

NAVAL PROTEST 219

that of rendering at this critical time the best
service in your power to the country in which I
most sincerely wish you success ; and I have the
honour to be, with the greatest respect, my lord,
Your lordship's most sincere
humble servant,

W. CORNWALLIS.

Royal Sovereign, Spithead. 26th February, 1796.

I hope your lordship will have the goodness
to excuse this scrawl as I am very much hurried.

(Received 2yth February, 1796.)

220

SECTION IV

CORNWALLIS'S COURT MARTIAL

CORNWALLIS TO SPENCER *

My Lord, — I have had the honour of receiving
your lordship's two letters.

It gives me much concern to find by one of
them that your lordship seems to think that I
ought to have gone on.1 If I had only considered
my own conscience, without regarding the state
of the ship and the damage she was likely to receive
by worms, &c., I certainly might have tried it.
The Minotaur was not I believe fit to stay in the
West Indies, and the taking Sir Charles Cotton's
ship from him would have been very distressing ;
the shifting everything from one ship to another
at sea is not always very easy to be done. The
communication which I was obliged to have with
the Minotaur was begun in a calm, but it blew
very fresh before it was finished, and I was very
glad to get my boats back.

I really, my lord, am not able to go out in
the frigate, at which I hope you will not be
displeased.

1 Cornwallis had sailed with the West Indian expedition on
2 gth February, but, meeting a gale, had been forced to put back
to Spithead with flagship disabled. He had been ordered there-
upon to shift his flag to the Astraea, 32, and proceed at once to
his station. At the same time he was nominated Vice- Admiral
of Great Britain, vice Lord Howe, promoted to Admiral of the
Fleet. The expedition did not finally get away till March 20.

CORNWALLIS'S TRIAL 221

I feel myself very much obliged to your lord-
ship for what you are pleas'd to communicate
in the other letter which you honoured me with
that a patent was order' d to be made out appoint-
ing me Vice-Admiral of Great Britain, for which
favour I am entirely obliged to your lordship.
I have the honour to be,

with the greatest respect,

Your lordship's most obedient
humble servant,

W. CORNWALLIS.

P.S. — A copy of the orders which related, to
the destination of the ships and the only one that
appear' d to me necessary was sent to Sir John
Laforey.

Royal Sovereign, at Spithead, the i6th of March, 1796.
(Received iyth March, 1796.)

SPENCER TO CORNWALLIS

Sir, — If the Board had not deemed your speedy
arrival in the West Indies of material importance
to his Majesty's service, they would certainly
not have thought of ordering you out in a frigate,
a mode of conveyance exactly the same as that
in which Sir John Laforey went out to the same
station. Your declining therefore to go out in
that manner can only be considered by them as
indicating your determination to relinquish the
appointment altogether, and I am very sorry to
be obliged to say that under the circumstances of
your case such a determination puts it out of my
power to continue you in employment without
giving what I conceive would be a very dangerous
example to the service, and entirely subverting

222 THE SPENCER PAPERS

every idea of the discipline so necessary to be
maintained in it.

I have the honour to be, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

SPENCER.

Admiralty. iyth March, 1796.
The Honble. Vice- Admiral Cornwallis.

CORNWALLIS TO SPENCER

My Lord, — I must beg leave to observe in
answer to the letter which I had the honour of
receiving from your lordship this morning, that
the frigate was fitted out for Sir John Laforey
and his son appointed captain. He had besides
some establishment when he got upon the station.
If I had gone out in the Astrsea I must have
continued on board that ship, or gone on board
another under the same disadvantages. If Sir
John Laforey had left me, I do not know that I
could (so circumstanced) have performed my duty.
I confess I thought it must have appear'd in that
light to the Admiralty Board, and that the Astraea
was order'd more to show disapprobation, than from
any serious intention that I should have gone out in
that manner. The accident which has befallen the
Royal Sovereign has been very distressing to me.

I hope your lordship will excuse my having
taken up so much of your time, but I thought it
necessary to indicate the motives for my conduct,
which it gives me great concern to find are mis-
understood by your lordship.

I have the honour to be, with the greatest
respect,

Your lordship's most obedient
humble servant,

W. CORNWALLIS.

Royal Sovereign, Spithead. i8th March, 1796.
(Received igth March, 1796.)

CORNWALLIS'S TRIAL 223

MR. S. GRENVILLE TO SPENCER

Charles Street, ist April, 1796.

My dear Lord Spencer, — I left Dropmore
yesterday, where my brother will remain till
Tuesday, and I have given him hopes that Lady
Spencer and you may perhaps make your inn
there at your return. I had once hoped that,
if Bath agreed with you, you would have pro-
longed your stay and [have] left to your fellow-
labourers the defence of the exchequer against
Lord Shelbourne's attack of next Wednesday. But,
in reflecting upon the advantages which Opposition
will try to make of what has passed respecting
Admiral Cornwallis, it seems highly probable that
Lord Lansdowne's desultory speech upon the state
of the nation will include in it some reference to
that transaction, and if so I take for granted you
would not choose to be absent when any such
mention is made. I found Lord G.1 quite as
anxious as I could be both for your having legal
assistance as to wording the charges, and also
for the most speedy conclusion of the trial. Upon
this last subject I hear from General Ross,2 whom
I have just seen, that the admiral has written
to the Board to press them for an early trial, and
therefore I conclude you will no longer have any
delicacy in giving to the business all the expedition
which you can. Ross assures me that Lord C/s 3
opinions and sentiments continue such as you
left them, and that Lord C. has written a letter
to the admiral in which he expresses a perfect

1 Lord Grenville, h'is elder brother, Secretary for Foreign
Affairs.

2 Ross of Bladensburg.

3 Lord Cornwallis, the admiral's elder brother.

224 THE SPENCER PAPERS

conviction that your conduct to the admiral has
always been full of regard and attention to him.
In that letter Lord C. refers to the opinion he
had before given his brother as to the main subject,
and advises him to come to town, and offers him
any such assistance by his advice as it is possible
for him to afford. The admiral, however, has
declined coming to town, is confident as to the
event of his trial, and is impatient for it in order
' to prevent officers of his rank and station being
hereafter liable to be so insulted/ As far as I can
make out I imagine that the admiral is not inclined
to impute any hostile motives to you, but considers
the other members of the Admiralty Board as
inimical to him.

I hear no news of great money speculations
in the City ; Corth has just told me that Boyd
has brought four millions for the next settling
day, the I2th April, and as he is supposed to be
connected with Valkhuys, who is at Paris, this
event gives rise to great speculations.1 Meanwhile
money is very scarce, and Exchequer Bills bearing
3 per cent, interest are at 5 per cent, discount,
and the Prince's 2 debentures are at 12 per cent,
discount. If I had money I would buy them, for
surely they are as good a security as any other
government paper.

Kind remembrances to Lady Spencer. The
old fish passes this year his First of April without
the fear of his neighbours' ball.

Adieu, ever yours,

S. GRENVILLE.

Private. (Received 2nd April, 1796.)

1 Boyd was a banker in Pitt's confidence, engaged at this
time in arranging a loan to Austria. (Dropmore MSS., iii. 192.)
That he was a buyer of Government stock naturally suggested
that the peace overtures were progressing favourabty.

3 The Prince of Wales.

CORNWALLIS'S TRIAL 225

CORNWALLIS TO NEPEAN

Royal Sovereign, Portsmouth Harbour.

ist April, 1796.
[Copy]

Sir, — I request that you will be pleased to
state to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty
that as they did not seem to think it necessary
to call the flag-officers from the different ports
to sit at my court martial, I hope (if their lord-
ships are still inclined to try me), that they will
be pleased to bring it on before the flag-officers
depart, who are, I understand, preparing to sail.
The trial is of a nature which does not require
much evidence, and therefore as it cannot run
out to any great length, or consequently retard
the public service, I should hope their lordships
will not find it necessary upon that account to
deprive me of as many flag-officers as can legally
be assembled in a case of this kind, which
so materially concerns the situation of that
rank of officers when offering to serve their
country.

I beg further to state to their lordships that
I am not conscious of ever having acted in my
public capacity with any view but that of for- ,
warding his Majesty's service in the best manner
I was able. I am far from supposing that my
judgment is always right, and I have been parti-
cularly sorry to find (as I expressed myself in a
former letter), that their lordships were not
pleased with my conduct upon the present occa-
sion. I have never expressed a desire to have it
inquired into at a court martial, but from a
variety of circumstances attending my case, the
public investigation of such a matter might be
I- Q

r^r
*j

fe ' > t

•',"
v>°

226 THE SPENCER PAPERS

hurtful at this moment to the public service,
and I am perfectly ready to sacrifice my feelings
upon their lordships disapprobation having been
made so publicly known; trusting to my general
character in a pretty constant service and of some
duration.

I really was much surprised when I received
your letter acquainting me it was their lordships'
intention to order me to be tried at a court martial,
as I had the post before received a letter from
very high authority at the Board, saying that
from any determination (which their lordships
very erroneously concluded me to have taken) of
relinquishing the appointment altogether, the
consequence would be that I should not be
continued in employment.

I have the honour to be, Sir,
Your very obedient and humble servant,

W. CORNWALLIS.

NEPEAN TO SPENCER

Admiralty. 2nd April, 1796.

The order has been given to Lord Howe, and
every arrangement has been made for the trial
of Admiral Cornwallis. I submitted to the con-
sideration of the Board and to Lord Howe the
alteration which your lordship suggested in the
draft which was sent to you, and they were of
opinion that the charges were sufficiently distinct.
I send your lordship a copy of a letter which I
have received from the admiral to-day and of
my answer to him.

Endorsed : ' Evan Nepean.'

CORNWALLIS'S TRIAL 227

NEPEAN TO CORNWALLIS

[Copy] Admiralty Office. 2nd April, 1796.

Sir, — I have received and communicated to
my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty your
letter to me of yesterday's date, expressing your
desire, in case their lordships should think fit
to order you to be tried by a court martial, that
such court may be ordered to assemble before
the flag-officers depart, who you understand are
preparing to sail, in order that you may not be
deprived of as many officers of that rank as can
legally sit at the said court martial ; and I have
their lordships' command to acquaint you that
they have already ordered the Earl Howe, admiral
and commander-in-chief of the fleet, to assemble
a court martial on Monday the 4th instant, or as
soon after that time as can conveniently be done
for your trial ; and that they are equally desirous
with you that a court as respectable as possible
should be assembled on this occasion, but that
circumstances may possibly occur which may
render the sailing of one or more of the flag-
officers from Portsmouth, before the court can be
assembled, a measure of necessity ; notwithstanding
which there will then remain at Portsmouth a
greater number of flag-officers than has ever sat
upon the trial of a flag-officer.

I am, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,
EVAN NEPEAN.

Q 2

228 THE SPENCER PAPERS

SPENCER TO HOWE

My Lord, — From the correspondence which
has passed between the Board of Admiralty and
Vice-Admiral Cornwallis since his receipt of the
letter acquainting him that a court martial would
be ordered, it appears probable that some allusion
may be made during the sitting of the court to
letters written by me to the vice-admiral subse-
quent to his return. I therefore think it neces-
sary to take this method of informing the court
through your lordship as president of it, that if
any such allusion should be made I have not the
smallest objection to the vice-admiral's producing
any letter he may have received from me, the
production of which he may deem requisite on
this occasion.

I have the honour to be, my Lord, &c. &c.,

SPENCER.

Bath. 3rd April, 1796.
Admiral Earl Howe.

I have inclosed a copy of this letter to the
vice-admiral for his information.

SPENCER TO CORNWALLIS

Sir, — Having observed in your correspondence
with the Board of Admiralty an allusion to letters
you have received from me, I think it right to
inclose to you a copy of a letter I have this day
written on the subject of those letters to Earl
Howe as president of the court martial now about
to be assembled.

I have the honour to be, &c., &c.,

SPENCER.

Bath. 3rd April, 1796.

The Honble. Vice-Admiral Cornwallis.

CORNWALLIS'S TRIAL 229

SPENCER TO LORD CORNWALLIS

PRIVATE AND CONFIDENTIAL.

My dear Lord, — I cannot help taking the first
moment, after having been informed of the sentence
of the court martial, to express the satisfaction I
feel that the court have seen in your brother's
case circumstances of so favourable a nature as
to induce them to pass the sentence they have
done. You know how much I have felt on the
necessity which I thought my public duty imposed
upon me on this occasion, and having the satis-
faction of reflecting that I have fulfilled that
duty, it is a great relief to me in every point of
view, and more particularly on your account,
that nothing of a more disagreeable nature has
arisen from it.1

[Draft of letter to Lord Cornwallis from Lord Spencer.]

1 Cornwallis was acquitted, but shortly afterwards he struck
his flag at his own request and was not employed again till 1801.

PART IV

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE

JANUARY 1796 TO MARCH 1797

233

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

THIS section of the correspondence is concerned mainly
with the anxieties which arose in consequence of so much
force being absorbed in colonial operations. On loth
May, 1796, Lord Spencer received from Mr. Naylor at
Bologna a very accurate appreciation of the lines on
which the French intended to act (p. 257). Echoes of
attempts to assist the Royalists in Normandy continue
in Sydney Smith's reports of his operations on the
coast, until, in a specially daring attempt, he was taken
prisoner. Strachan succeeded him, and with Warren,
who also had a cruiser squadron, was concerned in gaining
intelligence, watching for signs of a raid being prepared,
and arranging for the defence of the Channel Islands.
Trade defence also occupied much of Lord Spencer's
attention, and the heavy call on cruisers elicited from
Dundas a proposal for using merchantmen as auxiliaries —
on which Lord Spencer threw cold water, believing them
to be more profitably employed in discharging their
proper functions. In the West Indies, notwithstanding
the large force there, trade was almost at a standstill,
if we may believe the reports which the aggrieved
colonials sent to Dundas. He was no less anxious about
India, and it is interesting to note his suggestion. The
root of the trouble, in his opinion, was the excessive
concentration in Home waters, and to this view he
adhered (see post, p. 240) — a view which received some
support from the opinion which Kempenfelt expressed
in similar circumstances during the previous war.1

The anxiety was intensified when, during the summer.

Barham Papers, i. p. 361.

234 THE SPENCER PAPERS

Spain began to draw to France and we found it necessary,
as always in such a case, to protect the trade of Portugal
as well as our own and to keep her staunch by naval
support at Lisbon.

Off Ushant Pellew, with another cruiser squadron, was
guarding the entrance to the Channel and, by brilliant
captures, building up his great reputation as a cruiser
commodore. In the North Sea, where, since the success
of the French arms in Holland, the apprehension of a
raid had begun to be an abiding pre- occupation, Duncan
was maintaining his control, and an interesting strategical
memorandum by Gambier formulates alternative schemes
for enabling him to make his hold permanent without
exhausting his fleet. Dunkirk had also to be carefully
watched, as a flotilla expedition was being organised
there with the idea of eluding the British cruisers and
effecting landings in the north of England and setting up
centres of chouannerie to embarrass the government.
When, however, it was ordered to sail the troops would
not face the risk and mutinied. (Desbriere, I. part ii, ch. i.)

Further interesting light is thrown on our method
of gaining intelligence and on the telegraph system to the
Western ports.

Since Middleton's retirement the Board consisted,
besides Lord Spencer, of Lord Arden, Mr. Pybus, the
veteran Secretary Sir Philip Stephens, and three sea
lords, Lord Hugh Seymour, who was at sea, James
Gambier and William Young, all junior rear-admirals.
The professional element was thus comparatively weak.
Seymour was promoted in July 1795, Gambier and
Young in October 1794. Young, who succeeded Middleton,
was next above Gambier on the flag-list, but as Gambier
had been longer on the Board he appears to have been
in the position of First Sea Lord, so far as it then existed.

235

SPENCER TO DUNDAS

PRIVATE.

Dear Sir, — I have talked over the subject of
your note of last night, and I think it seems to
be so much the opinion of my naval coadjutors
that the Indiamen (except in cases of the most
pressing emergency) are so much fitter for the
purposes of commerce than for those of war, that
it would not be advisable to make any material
alteration in their construction with a view solely
to their being in future employed as ships of war.
At the same time I concur so much with you in
opinion that the resource to be desired from them,
on a sudden pressure, by Government either as
ships of transport for troops or stores or in some
cases perhaps even as ships of war, is so likely to
be felt as an essential assistance to the public
service, that I could by no means give up the idea
in toto ; and with this view of it, I think that if
some regulation as to the tonnage of these ships
were to be adopted which would confine them
generally to a class which might eventually be
useful in that way, it would be all we should have
to wish upon the subject. Those for instance of
1400 tons and upwards would of course be con-
sidered more proper for such services as I allude
to than ships of a smaller burthen, and I should
suppose it would answer equally well for com-
mercial purposes.

We have just had an account of Christian's

236 THE SPENCER PAPERS

fleet on the I2th instant to the amount of about
87 sail, including the men of war, in lat. 40 N.
longitude 17 W.: We have also heard of Admiral
Mann on the 2nd on his return from having
seen the Ceres and her convoy safe out of the
Straits.

I am, dear Sir, &c.,

SPENCER.

I cannot avoid repeating to you my very
sincere thanks for your kindness about my young
cousin, Mr. Martin.

Admiralty, igth January, 1796.
To the Rt. Honble. H. Dundas.
(Received igth January, 1796.)

THE KING TO SPENCER

Windsor. 3 ist January, 1796. 30 m. past 8 A.M.

I have carefully read the dispatches of Rear-
Admiral Christian as well as his private letter to
Earl Spencer, and do not see that the smallest
shadow of blame can be cast upon him.2 On the
contrary, that he has used every exertion to
overcome the greatest difficulties ; perhaps con-
sidering the damage the fleet has sustained it
may be fortunate that he has been ordered to
return to Spithead where it can be better and
more effectual refitted than it could have been
in the West Indies.

GEORGE R.

1 Christian had sailed for the second time on 9th December.
See ante, p. 163 n. The position is about 350 miles W. by N. of
Lisbon.

" The expedition had been broken up by bad weather and
had returned to Spithead on the 29th. See ante, p. 209.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 237

SPENCER TO GARDNER *
PRIVATE.

Dear Sir, — I write a line by the cutter which
takes this packet out to you just to say that we
have two objects in view in the instructions we
send for your guidance : one is the chance of
falling in with the Dutch outward-bound fleet,
which I suppose from the intelligence we have
received is destined either to the Cape or the
West Indies, and from going north-about will be
likely either to make the Western Islands or pass
a little way to the westward of them ; the other
the protection of our homeward-bound Jamaica
fleet, who were to sail from that island the I5th
of January last under convoy of one frigate, the
Penelope. Both these objects you will see are of
great importance, and I think the time you will
be on the station assigned seems likely enough in
all probability to cover them both. The Dutch
fleet sailed on the 23rd from the Texel, and on a
moderate calculation going north-about with a
fair wind may probably reach the latitude you
are hereby directed to cruise in in about 16 or
20 days ; I reckon you will remain about that
situation till towards the 24th or 25th of March,
unless anything should happen to bring you from
it, and I should imagine that if they have a good
passage and do not fall in with a squadron which
we have sent to intercept them if possible, they
will by that time have passed to the southward
of that latitude.

I take the liberty of making these observations

1 Vice- Admiral Sir Allan Gardner (afterwards Lord Gardner),
second-in-command of the Channel Fleet. For his reply see p. 243.

238 THE SPENCER PAPERS

that you might more clearly perceive what is
intended by our instructions.

We are a good deal chagrined here at finding
that Captain Russell, notwithstanding the very
precise orders he had to take the transports'
victuallers included in a list delivered to him by
Commissioner George under his convoy, sailed
from St. Helen's without a single ship of them,
tho', as it is stated to us, they were all ready,
and many of the masters waited on him for
instructions.

I hope this will reach you safe, and am, dear
Sir, with great truth,

Your very obedient humble servant,

SPENCER.

Admiralty. 25th February, 1796.

To Vice- Admiral Sir Allan Gardner, Bart.
(Copy.)

SIDNEY SMITH TO SPENCER

Diamond, off Jersey. i5th March, 1796.

My dear Lord, — I hasten to transmit to your
lordship better evidence of the existence of the
Royalist army in Normandy, than I was in posses-
sion of when I wrote last. I have written at
length to Mr. Windham not to inundate you with
the question which makes but a small portion of
your views. I trust it will increase in value in your
estimation as we get on. I have already been
sufficiently explicit on the score of the nature of
the force [that] I feel the want of in my progress.
I trust you pardon my pressing a point on which
you do not answer me, but I feel it my duty towards
government, and towards myself, to show clearly
where the ground is good, and how in my opinion
it may be improved. You will see by my letter

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 239

to Mr. Windham, which I have requested him to
communicate to you, wherein your lordship can
immediately afford me the aid and means I
require. This I was going to address to you direct,
but I am interrupted by a cannonade, which
obliges me to close and make sail towards it.

Your very faithful humble servant,
W. SIDNEY SMITH.

I beg to be understood to prefer this laborious
service, where there is nothing to be got but hard
blows, to the more lucrative service of cruising
on more ' productive ground/ if it is really in-
tended to enable me to go through with what I
have begun in a way that will be satisfactory and
serviceable.

DUNDAS TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

Somerset Place. 24th March.

My dear Lord, — A naval superiority of the
enemy in the East Indies would be attended with
uncalculable mischief, in a military, political, and
commercial view, that I cannot feel otherwise
than very uneasy under the uncertainty whether
a force superior considerably to ours may reach
India, or at least the Cape, before we can be in
condition to follow with an equal force. Nothing
can be better than the orders you have given on
this subject to Admiral Harvey,1 but I wish you
seriously to consider how far something more

1 These orders were in case of need to detach Sir Hyde Parker
with a squadron to the West Indies. See ' Spencer to Duckworth/
I5th September, post, p. 291.

240 THE SPENCER PAPERS

certain and immediate may not be necessary.
It is, I conceive, ridiculous under all the informa-
tion we receive of want of men, store, &c.. &c.,
to entertain any apprehension of any serious
annoyance near home from the naval force of the
enemy, and if anything was to menace us at home
there are thousands of resources of which foreign
and distant possessions are totally destitute in
cases of emergency. Upon that ground I confess
ever since I had occasion to think on subjects of
that nature I have always differed in opinion
from those who have thought that everything
was to be sacrificed to a strong Channel fleet.
Home will take care of itself. But whatever
feelings anybody in ordinary wars may enter-
tain on that point, there can be little doubt
that in the present war, and under its present
circumstances, there can be no real injury done
to this country but in its distant possessions.
And with that sentiment I cannot help always
entertaining an apprehension, that if the enemy
are in a condition to attempt anything, the
Eastern World is their only rational object.
I mean only in mentioning these particulars to
bring it under your serious attention, whether
it is right to leave anything in a state of un-
certainty in the East Indies ; and if you send
a speedy reinforcement to ensure superiority at
the Cape, I hope he will be a good-tempered as
well as an able admiral ; for I am a little
apprehensive from the dispatches I have this
day received that the present land and naval
commanders are not on the most cordial terms,
and even if Lord Macartney should ultimately
go it will be some time before we can look to his
going. At present General Craig is not only
commander-in-chief, but governor, and it is in

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 241

the last of these capacities that I am afraid of
any misapprehension taking place.1

Yours sincerely,
HENRY DUNDAS.

(Received 24th March, 1796.)

SPENCER TO DUNDAS
PRIVATE.

Dear Sir, — Upon finding (after I saw you last
night) that Admiral Pole was extremely averse to
the station to which in the arrangements we talked
over I had destined him, and on talking over
again the whole of those arrangements with Lord
Hugh Seymour, on whose confidential opinion
on these subjects I know I can depend, the
following has suggested itself to me which I
would wish you to communicate to Mr. Pitt,
and if you see no objections to it, may be
carried into execution immediately :

Admiral Murray 2 to remain where he is, where
he is well known and liked and is accustomed to
the sort of difficulties likely to be met with there.

Admiral Harvey 3 to take the command on the
Barbadoes station, proceeding thither as soon as
possible after his return from his present cruise.

Admiral Pole to proceed as was originally
intended with the division of convoy now pre-
paring to sail.

1 Vice- Admiral Sir George Keith Elphinstone (afterwards
Lord Keith) was the naval commander-in-chief. He was never
happy in his relations with his military colleagues and was
particularly unfortunate in the case of Abercromby in 1800-1.
Craig, on the other hand, in 1805 behaved in an exemplary
manner with Bickerton in very trying circumstances.

2 Vice- Admiral George Murray, commander-in-chief, North
America.

3 Harvey replaced Christian in June, 1796.

I. R

242 THE SPENCER PAPERS

Christian to go down to leeward on the arrival
of Harvey on his station.

Admiral Pringle1 to go to the Cape to be
under Elphinstone, and if he should return to
remain there as commanding officer.

Rainier 2 to remain commanding in the eastern
seas.

MacBride 3 to replace Pringle in the North
Sea ; and

Admiral Bligh to relieve Pole in the Leeward
Islands, towards the end of the summer, as from
family circumstances, &c., it may then be desir-
able for him to return and assume a station in
the Channel Fleet.

These are the best dispositions I can suggest
on the most mature deliberation upon the subject,
and I hope they will meet with yours and Mr.
Pitt's concurrence. I own I should have liked
to have sent Pole to the Cape as I have a regard
for him and think it a better station than the
one he is going to ; but as he feels so great
a repugnance, and I do not wish unnecessarily
to force officers where the discipline of the ser-
vice is not at stake, I am very willing to give
up1 that point ; and I believe Pringle will do
very well there, as it does not require any very
brilliant abilities, and he is likely, as I am told,

1 Rear- Admiral Thomas Pringle had been serving as Duncan's
second in the North Sea. He joined Elphinstone and brought
the Cape Squadron up to 7 of the line, one 5o-gun ship and 6
cruisers. After forcing a Dutch squadron of 9 sail to capitulate
in Saldanha Bay on iyth August, Elphinstone went home (in
October) and Pringle took over the command. Cf. p. 276.

2 Rear- Admiral Peter Rainier, who went out as commodore
with a convoy in the summer of 1794, obtained his flag in June,
1795. He remained in command of the station till 1805, amassing
immense quantities of prize money in the conquest of the Dutch
Spice Islands.

3 John Macbride — Rear- Admiral in 1793.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 243

to draw very well in conjunction with the other
services.

Pray do not let any one see this letter but
Mr. Pitt.

Yours ever sincerely,

SPENCER.

Admiralty. 26th March, £ past 8 A.M., 1796.

GARDNER TO SPENCER

Portsmouth. 3oth March, 1796.

My Lord, — I had the honour this morning of
receiving your lordship's private letter of the
25th ultimo, which I find was forwarded by a
cutter that was sent in quest of me after I had
sail'd from St. Helen's with the Mediterranean
and West India convoys, which I had the good
fortune to escort safely across the Bay, and as far
to the southward as I was directed to see them,
and parted from the latter on the ist instant. And
having received information from Mr. Nepean of
the sailing of the Jamaica convoy on the i,5th
January, it was my intention after separating
from the outward-bound convoy, not to have
return' d immediately home with the squadron,
but to have stood to the northward and westward
of the western islands, and to have cruised in
that tract until the 25th instant, in the hope of
meeting with the Jamaica convoy, or the Dutch
outward-bound fleet, supposed to have sailed
north-about. But the accident which happened
on the 8th instant to Sans Pareil and Triumph's
lower masts, frustrated my intentions, and in the
crippled state of these ships I thought it prudent
to proceed homewards with them under as easy
sail as possible ; and I got into the latitude of the

R 2

244 THE SPENCER PAPERS

Channel on the i6th, twelve degrees to the west-
ward, and did not reach St. Helen's until nine days
after, at which time the Jamaica convoy must
have been at sea ten weeks, the usual length of a
passage from that island.

I have the honour to be, my Lord,

Your most obedient humble servant,
A. GARDNER.

P.S. — I have by this post wrote to Mr. Nepean
to solicit their lordships for one month's leave of
absence from my duty to attend to my own affairs,
and if the public service will admit thereof, I
flatter myself my request will be granted.

[Note by Lord Spencer: '3istMarch. — Answered that tho' I
should have been glad if he could have cruised a little longer
I think he was perfectly right in returning for the reasons he
mentions.

' The Board would be very willing to grant him the leave
if the court martial on Admiral Cornwallis did not offer an
obstacle to it and which all the officers who have flags flying . . .' l

PELLEW TO NEPEAN

Indefatigable, Falmouth. 23rd April, 1796.

Sir, — I have most sensible pleasure in desiring
you to inform my Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty of my arrival at this port, accompanied
by the French national frigate La Virginie of 44
guns, 18- and g-pounders and 340 men, commanded
by Citizen Bergeret Captain du Vesseau [sic] who
sailed from Brest singly 4 days ago to cruise
off the Lizard in this favourite frigate which is
considered the finest ship and fastest sailer in

1 See ante, p. 227

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 245

the French navy, and of the largest dimensions,
being 158 feet long, and 43 broad.1

On Wednesday morning the 20th instant, after
I had sealed my dispatches for their lordships,
lying-to under the Lizard with the squadron,
waiting for the French frigate La Unite our prize
to weather that point, I observed a ship coming
in from the sea, which in mind looked rather
suspicious, and on her not answering the private
signal, when she tack'd from us, I immediately
gave chase to her, accompanied by the Amazon,
and La Concorde (having by signal directed La
Revolutionnaire to attend her prize into port,
and the Argo to proceed to Plymouth). The
superior sailing of the Indefatigable gave me the
satisfaction of coming up with her, after a chase
of 15 hours and running 168 miles. Fortunately
the wind prevented her from steering for Ushant
or she must have escaped.

A little past midnight I commenced action
with the enemy, which was closely continued under
a crowded sail, for one hour and forty-five minutes.
The enemy, who fought gallantly, was by this
time much crippled, her mizen mast and main
topmast being shot away. The Indefatigable
was not much less disabled, having lost her gaff
and mizen topmast. The main topsail was ren-
dered useless by an unlucky shot cutting both
leech ropes. In this situation we passed the
enemy without the power of avoiding it, having
no after sail to back, and I had long discovered

1 According to James (i. p. 360) she carried 22 guns in broad-
side. The Indefatigable was much superior, being a razee
or cut-down 64-gun ship, mounting 26 long 24-pounders on her
main deck, and 2 long 12-pounders and 18 42-pounder carronades
on the quarter deck and forecastle — in all 46 guns. Her tonnage
was 1384 to the Virginie's 1066, and her broadside 702 Ib. to
the other's 342 Ib.

246 THE SPENCER PAPERS

that we had not only to combat a ship of large
force, but that her commander was completely
master of his profession, in whose presence I could
not commit myself with impunity by throwing
my ship in the wind, without submitting to be
raked by him.

She had not at this time struck, and we kept
close ahead of her, reeving new braces to enable
us to bring the ship to to renew the attack.

At this period La Concorde appeared close
under her stern, and upon the enemy's seeing
her she fired a gun to leeward and struck her
light as a signal of surrender.

Altho' a very few minutes would have placed
the Indefatigable again alongside of her, I am
confident she would not have surrendered without
further resistance had not the Concorde so timely
come up.

I am extremely indebted to Captains Hunt
and Reynolds for their very particular attention
in keeping after us during the night, on so many
courses, which nothing but the most delicate
observance of my signals could have enabled
them to do, their distance astern being so great.

Their lordships are well aware how difficult
it is in a night action with a flying enemy, whose
rate of sailing is little inferior to her antagonist,
to choose a situation, and when it is remembered
how often this ship changed hers in the action,
I need scarcely say what great attention was paid
to my orders by every officer under my command.

To Lieutenants Pellowe, Thomson, and Norway
my thanks are above expression ; Lieutenant
Williams of the Marines, and Mr. Bell the master,
who were immediately about my person, rendered
me the most essential services. The ship's com-
pany, who have been my faithful companions

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 247

during the war and are endeared to me by their
uniform exertions, manifested on this occasion
nothing but ardour and zeal.

But above all other pleasures that I feel is
that of informing their lordships that I have
lost neither officer nor man in the contest. The
enemy suffered considerably, having 14 or 15
killed, 17 badly wounded, and 10 slightly ; the
ship much shattered in her hull and four feet of
water in her hold from shot holes.

I trust the services of my first officer, Lieuten-
ant Pellowe, on several occasions [in] this war,
and his exemplary character both as a gentleman
and officer, need not my feeble voice to introduce
him to notice.

Their lordships' liberality upon all fair occa-
sions of this sort has given to the navy of
England many of its best commanders ; a better
than this officer it cannot give.

I have sent La Concorde on to Plymouth with
La Virginie and shall proceed with the Amazon,
who has lost her head, for the same place to-morrow
in order to repair the damages we have sustained
in the action, a statement of which I have the
honour to send herewith. Inclosed I transmit
the journal of our proceedings during the cruise,
and am, Sir,

Your most obedient humble servant,

ED. PELLEW.

To Evan Nepean, Esq.

DUN DAS TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

Horse Guards. 22nd April, 1796.

My dear Lord, — Two Jamaica planters, Mr.
Long and Mr. Hibbert, have been with me this

248 THE SPENCER PAPERS

forenoon and left with me the accompanying
papers. There does seem to be a great depreda-
tion of their small trading vessels, which it would
be creditable to put an end to, and I suspect it
cannot be effectually done except by some small
portion of the naval force allotted for that quarter
being specially appropriated to the protection of
the Jamaica coast. I told them I could only
send the papers to you, and they need not doubt
of your doing whatever you could for their relief.
They talked with great satisfaction of the recent
protection they have received to their homeward-
bound Jamaica fleet.

I remain, my dear Sir,

Yours very sincerely,

HENRY DUNDAS.

(Received 23rd April, 1796.)

ENCLOSURES

Extracts from letters addressed to Messrs. Fisher
<§» Hibbert by the Grantham packet, dated
Jamaica, ^oth January to the i6th February,
1796.

' Our coasts are blockaded by privateers,
nothing escapes, every day announces a ship or
other craft captured by these marauders. Very
serious apprehensions are entertained of the
safety of the ships expected should they drop in
singly or on their separation from the convoy
off the east end to proceed to the different ports.
They come into our very harbours and bid defiance
to all opposition because we have not a boat to
send out after them/

CHARLES MITCHELL, ESQ.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 249

' I wrote you last packet to request that you
would make insurance on the Wasp, Captain
Stimpson's shallop, which I then informed you I
was fitting, but the coast is become so full of
privateers, without a single King's vessel to look
after them, that scarcely a droger [sic] l escapes
being taken, and I have, from the shippers refusing
to send their goods on board, been obliged to leave
the vessel where I found her without having used
her/ CAPTAIN DAWKINS CARR,

of the ship Jupiter.

' Several Dreguers [sic] l with supplies from
Kingston for the estates have been lately chased
into Port Royal and there detained for many
days, that harbour being as it were, in a state
of blockade, and though a King's yard is there
and the great depot of naval stores for the ships
on the Saint Domingo station, not a pendant was
flying/ SHEAN OSBORN, ESQ.

' I have to acknowledge your favours of the
6th October, 3rd November, and ist December,
and the invoice of insurance on the Arab, which
ship I am sorry to inform you shared the same
fate of almost every vessel that attempts coming
here, being carried into Aux Cayes by a brigand
privateer, which would be effectually prevented
if there was a single sloop of war to cruise off
the south side of Hispaniola ; and it is asserted
that one frigate could block up that port, which
has been for these eighteen months past the

1 Admiral Smyth has ' Drogher — a small craft which goes
round the bays in the West India Islands to take off sugars, rum,
&c. to the merchantmen.' Old French, Drogueur, a channel
craft engaged in the catching and drying of herrings — from
Flemish Droogen, to dry. See Glossaire N antique. Smyth gives
the form Drugger for these vessels. They are said to have been
lateen rigged.

250 THE SPENCER PAPERS

grand emporium of all the provisions sent from
Ireland for this island. I purchased 100 tierces
of coffee about 6 weeks ago to ship to you, but
finding that there is such difficulty in getting
anything home and no conjecturing when we shall
have a convoy, I am obliged to ship them to
Philadelphia. There are many here obliged to
adopt the same resource, and I am sorry to find
that Mr. Taylor has taken the resolution to sell
his crop here, instead of sending it to London
as usual/

Mr. THOMAS HYNES.

' Our coasts are so infested with privateers
that little or no produce is brought to market,
and the estates suffer much for the want of
supplies ; what the ships will do when they
begin to load there is no saying ; for some time
past we have had no man of war in any of the
ports or on the coasts of this island. The small
sloop the Lark came down from the Mole x yester-
day (i2th February) and returns again in a day
or two/

Messrs. ROBERT HIBBERT & Co.

' I think the ships we are now so much in
want of run a great risk if they come down singly,
and even when they arrive I do not know how
we are to get the supplies to the different proper-
ties, for a boat cannot go a mile from the shore but
she is sure of being taken. On the south side of
Saint Domingo shoals of privateers and a 44-gun
frigate are cruising. Nothing is cruising against
them, nor is there anything to send on that
business, for the few ships we have on this station

1 Le Mole St. Nicolas, in the N.W. of St. Domingo.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 251

have been obliged to be constantly stationed in
the ports of Saint Domingo to protect the garrisons
there ; two privateers are now lying in Cow Bay
(Saint David's, Jamaica) and we know of a many
lying off the north side ; I am just now informed
that 14 Virginia pilot-boats are arrived at Cape
Nicola Mole, loaded with flour, and that some of
them cannot carry above 200 barrels. What
these are now to do for us I cannot tell. A few
months ago they might have been serviceable on
our coasts against the smaller privateers, but we
have now brigs and schooners of 14 to 16 guns
to contend with, and these boats, it is said, cannot
carry above 6 guns. Admiral Parker's ships are
1 200 men short of their complement, so to buy
vessels and fit them out here is impossible. In
short, if they do not send out some frigates and
sloops of war here purposely to protect the trade,
you need not send any ships here, for you cannot
possibly expect any returns. I send you a list
of captures in the year 1795 which I have taken
out of the Royal Gazette. They will know some-
thing of it at Lloyds. I beg you will let it be seen
by Mr. Dundas and by the Board of Admiralty/

SIMON TAYLOR, ESQ.

List of vessels bound to and from Jamaica, taken
from ist January 1795 to ist January 1796,
as taken from the Royal Gazette.

Amphitrite. Alligator.

George. Kitty.

Anna. Dart.

Rosina. 10 Port au Prince
5 Brig George. packet.

Elizabeth. Schooner Lucy.

252

THE SPENCER PAPERS

Brig Yelverton.

Sloop William.

Sloop from

Jeremie.

15 Prince William
Henry.

Schooner Wey.

Schooner Ranger

A Snow.

Hawke.
20 Nelly.

Brig William.

The George.

Nor fork.

Sloop Jamaica.
25 Brig Courtney.

A schooner.

Brig Abercorn.

A schooner.

A shallop.
30 The Jenny.

New Albion.

Phoebe Ann.

Brig Mary Ann.

Ship Jamaica.
35 Ship Phynn.

Brig Eliza.

Ship Mermaid.

Flora.

A ship.
40 Ship Chaser.

Ship Dorset.

Ship (Eolus.

Brig Hope.

Schooner Mer-

cury.
Sloop Argus.

Diana.

Peggy.

Lord Sheffield.

Mary.
50 Countess of

Eglinton.

The St. Thomas.

Maria.

Monmouth.

Fanny.
55 Pomona.

The Belle.

60 3 ships and i
brig.

A ship from

Halifax.

A brig from

Leith.

Sloop Susan.

Prince William.

Henry packet.
65 Ship Alfred.

Schooner Eagle.

Snow Favorite.

Little Ann.
70 Fry all.

Trimmer.

Sloop Industry.

The Edward.

Molly.

Druid.
75 Martha.

Hodge.

Bellona.

Fame.

Firm.
80 BrigfCaesar.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 253

Ship Betty Cath-
cart.

Glasgow.

Alexander.

Lovely Peggy.
85 Schooner Gren-
ville.

Schooner Curlew.

A shallop.

Flying Fish.

Resolution.
90 The Dunmore.

Minerva.

General Mathews

Douglass.

Caledonia.
95 Hope.

Maria.

Jane.

Sally.

Eliza.
100 Swally.

William.

Greenville.

Bellmount.

Brig Mary.
105 Brig William.

Little Jane.

Britannia.

Triton.

Albion,
no Patomac.

John.

Gascoigne.

Ark.

Maria.
115 Minerva.

Margaret.
Susan.
Phoenix.
Brig William

Pitt.
120 A shallop.

Sloop St. Joseph.
Thomas Henry.
Betsy.

Sloop Gibraltar.
125 Sloop Hope.
The Eliza.
Schooner Cleo-
patra.

Two Maries.
Jamaica packet.
130 Providence.

Sloop Mermaid.
Schooner New

Hope.
Sophia (run on

shore) .

Sloop Fortitude.
135 Sloop Satellite.
The Eagle.
The Bellona.
Sloop Charles.
A brig.
140 A sloop.

Ship Hibberts.

„ Thames.

„ Albion.

„ Kent.
145 „ Fisher.

„ Urania.

,, Orient.
Brig Carrier.

254 THE SPENCER PAPERS

The Mary. 155 John and

150 The Esher. Prudence.

Ship Jane. The Mermaid.

,, Hawke. Sloop Surprise

,, Jessie. (run on shore).

The Industry. Brig Mary Ann.

Brig Top Lady.
159 ships.1

Extracts from Letters from Jamaica dated
26th January to izth February

1 At present every part of the islands swarm
with privateers of every description, from 4 swivels
to 16 guns and full of men and small arms, and
we are rather apprehensive we shall not find that
Admiral Parker will follow the directions given
as he has as yet made no purchases and says he
has no men. Every force he can collect he sends
to St. Domingo, so that our coast is quite defence-
less, and captures made every day. How the
ships' boats can bring the produce from the
barquadiers to the ports where the ships lie, I
know not, if some active measure is not taken.

' Reinforcements it is true have been intended
us, but the elements have declared war against us,
as well as the maroons. Naval support is pro-
mised, but our trade will be ruined ere it arrives.
Our coasts are infested with squadrons of daring
privateers, who practise wantonly every kind of
depredation in our very harbours, and not at
night nor in the shade, but in open day and in the
face of the sun.

' What with our internal troubles, the delays
of fleets and the neglect of our coasts now in a

1 The total is really 160.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 255

manner blockaded by swarms of petty privateers,
we have surely no bad ground of complaint against
those whose duty it was to have obviated or at
any rate to have rendered more tolerable the evils
we feel/

ETCHES TO SPENCER

My Lord, — Presuming from the length of the
letter which I had the honour to transmit to your
lordship on my return from France, that your
lordship may not have had leisure to take the
different subjects into consideration ; and having
reason to presume that I may be engaged in the
employ of another department of the Government
in communicating intelligence from that country
with which I conceive my services for that at
which your lordship presides may be coupled to
advantage :

I therefore submit the following hints of a
system for communicating intelligence of the
marine operations of France, with all humble
deference to your lordship's consideration. Confi-
dent from the authority I possess of the Marine
Minister of that country for visiting Brest, L' Orient,
Rochefort, Toulon, and all the dependent ports,
for the purchasing of prize vessels, and being
allowed the privilege of English seamen to navigate
them, I am very confident, that I can organise and
conduct an important system of communication
and intelligence for the information of your
lordship and the commanding officers of the
respective stations on the coast of France, which
no other person can possibly have the authority
or power of undertaking.

Exclusive of the importance of obtaining a

256 THE SPENCER PAPERS

supply of seamen from the prisons of France,
for His Majesty's service even without any
exchange — but from a confidence in my connec-
tions in that country, I am fully persuaded, that,
if properly authorised in the capacity of a private
individual, of not only renewing the exchange,
but of continuing of it during the war.
I have the honour to be

Your lordship's devoted and most

obedient servant,
RICHARD CABMAN ETCHES.

No. 19, Bryanston Street, Portman Square.
Saturday, yth May, 1796.

ENCLOSURE
A plan for communicating marine intelligence

First to visit in person the ports of Havre,
Cherbourg, St. Malo, Morlaix, and Brest ; at the
latter to purchase one or more vessels [and] give
orders for their equipment and for the prisoners
to navigate them. While that is conducting,
to visit a second or a third port — as L'Orient,
Nantes — make my observations and return to
Brest to dispatch the vessels — with orders, first
to run down to the admiral or commanding
officer on that station, apprise them of the equip-
ment going on, the vessels preparing for sea, &c., &c.
(Perhaps it might be prudent, to conceal the plan,
to impress the crew and send the vessels home
with seamen from the fleet), and afterwards to run
for England with my observations.

Being allowed by the Minister to authorise
agents for the same purpose, together with my
connections with most of the resident consuls
at the ports of France and Holland and [by means

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 257

of] colouring my real views with all the publicity
of a commercial speculation, I am very confident
that I can conduct and extend the plan, to all the
ports of France and Holland, and at a mere
trifling expenditure comparative with the im-
portance of the measure.

RICHARD C ADMAN ETCHES.

No. 19, Bryanston Street, Portman Square.
Saturday, yth May, 1796.

[Note by Lord Spencer on dorse : ' Settled with him by Mr.
Nepean.']

NAY LOR TO SPENCER

Bologna. loth May, 1796.

My Lord, — Circumstances having lately thrown
me in the way of a person who has taken an
active part in the French Revolution and who
seems to be perfectly acquainted with the views
of that ambitious republic, I took advantage of
the accident to endeavour to penetrate their real
sentiments with regard to a general peace ; and
as the information I picked up appears to me of
some consequence, I flatter myself it may not be
wholly unacceptable to your lordship.

The great object of the French in their present
invasion of Italy is to force the Emperor to a
separate peace ; an object in which, I fear, they
are now assured of succeeding, if His Imperial
Majesty is desirous of preserving one foot of his
hereditary dominions on this side the Alps. This
plan is indeed too obvious to escape the most
casual observer. Besides, the plunder of this
devoted country will afford resources for another
campaign.

But their schemes with respect to England are
I. s

258 THE SPENCER PAPERS

founded upon such deep policy, it was only upon
mature reflection, that I discovered the ingenuity
of the design. The great and brilliant successes
of the English navy make it difficult for me to
believe that France could be desirous of trans-
ferring the contest to an element where our
superiority is so decided ; and I was, in conse-
quence, surprised at hearing that in case of a
separate treaty with the Emperor, the Directory
were firmly resolved not to enter into any nego-
tiations with England, except upon terms of their
own dictating.

But my opinion changed when it was repre-
sented to be the intention of the republic cautiously
to avoid any decisive engagement by sea, and to
make war upon our commerce alone, by sending
out their vessels in small divisions and by giving
any possible encouragement to privateering — to
continue hostilities in the West Indies upon the
same destructive footing they are now carried
on ; and by keeping a formidable army upon
the coast to alarm England with the constant
apprehension of an invasion.

By pursuing this line of conduct, they know
it is impossible for us materially to lessen our
defences — they know that immense naval arma-
ments will be essentially requisite for the protec-
tion of our convoys, the safety of our islands, and
the security of our coasts — and they consequently
persuade themselves that, burdened as England
already is, she must ultimately sink under the
immense weight of her debt.

Thus by waging a kind of piratical war against
our trade and our finances, by placing themselves
in a situation not dissimilar from that of the States
of Barbary, possessed of the amplest means of
doing mischief, with everything to gain and

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 259

nothing to fear, they are confident the event
cannot be doubtful.

These considerations will have suggested them-
selves, in all probability, already to his Majesty's
ministers, and may have influenced their conduct
in supporting a Continental war ; but as I have
never yet seen the contest considered in this
point of view, I flatter myself your lordship will
at all events do me the justice to regard the
present communication as an humble attempt
to be useful to my country.

I have the honour to be

Your lordship's most obedient
humble servant,

F. HARE NAYLOR.

Your lordship will probably have heard that a
column of the French army is at Piacenza, and
has imposed a contribution of two hundred
thousand sequins upon the Duchy of Parma.

(Received yth June, 1796.)

SPENCER TO LORD GRENVILLE

[Copy.]

SECRET.

I have the honour to acknowledge the com-
munication of the papers received by your lord-
ship from Lisbon relating to the homeward-bound
fleet expected to arrive in Portugal about the
latter end of this month, and lose no time in
acquainting your lordship that in consequence
of the information respecting the probable arrival
of that valuable convoy off the islands of ^Flores
and Corvo, about the 20th of this month* Lord

S 2

260 THE SPENCER PAPERS

Hugh Seymour has been destined with a squadron
of six sail of the line, 2 frigates and a sloop to be
off those islands about that time, and had he
not been detained about ten days by contrary
winds would most probably have been there at
this moment. I have, however, the satisfaction
to observe that his detention will have enabled
him to receive the announcement which we have
dispatched to him of the alteration which the
Portuguese admiral has thought fit to make in
his course, and as Lord Hugh sailed yesterday
from St. Helen's with so fair a wind, I have very
little doubt of his being in a situation to secure
his falling in with the Brazil fleet time enough
to give it ample protection from any force of the
enemy to which it is likely to be exposed. Orders
have also been sent to Admiral Vandeput to pay
as much attention to this object as his force will
admit of,1 and means taken to send out to Lord
Hugh Seymour on his rendezvous the latest in-
telligence from Lisbon of the expected course
and arrival of the Portuguese fleet in those
seas.1

The accounts of a French squadron of six sail of
the line as described in the papers transmitted to
me by your lordship, which accounts had already
reached us from Admiral Mann at Gibraltar, must
incidentally have been ill-founded, as it is quite
certain that no such squadron has sailed from
Brest, and the ships alluded to must probably
be a squadron of frigates which is said to have

1 This solicitude for the Portuguese trade was of course
due to our traditional policy of keeping Portugal staunch to
the ancient alliance, when the attitude of Spain grew threatening.
Vice-Admiral Vandeput had been ordered to Lisbon in the
St. Albans, 74, and there he remained till December, when
Jervis arrived from the Mediterranean. Cf, Pitt to Grenville.
Aug. 15, 1796. Dropmore MSS, in. 235-6,

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 261

sailed about the time alluded to, and to be bound
to the West Indies. It is to be hoped that no
danger can be apprehended for the Brazil fleet
from Mons. Richery's squadron, as Admiral Mann
is constantly employed in watching his motions,
and has a force under his command fully equal
to that of the French at Cadiz. Your lordship
will perceive from [what] I have had the honour
to state, showing that every precaution possible
for the security of this important fleet and
convoy had already been taken by us before
the arrival of the express from Lisbon, and
it very fortunately happens that we were
enabled to apprise Lord Hugh Seymour of the
course they are destined to pursue, which will,
as far as it can be done, secure the object of
his joining them and giving them his protection
into port.

I have the honour to be, &c. &c.,

SPENCER.

Admiralty. i8th May, 1796.
(To Lord Grenville.)

MURRAY TO SPENCER

My Lord, — After the conversation which I had
the honour of having with your lordship on
Wednesday, and after my having acceded to your
proposal of my offering to undertake the comple-
tion of all the telegraphs for the sum of sixteen
thousand, five hundred pounds, it was with infinite
surprise that I this day received a letter from
the Board of Admiralty informing me that their
lordships had determined not to proceed with the
telegraphs to .Plymouth, &c., and making no
mention whatever of my claim of remuneration.

262 THE SPENCER PAPERS

What hope now remains for me to look forward
to, is beyond my grip.

I have the honour to be
Your lordship's obedient humble servant,

GEORGE MURRAY.1

No. 20, Devonshire Street, Upper Harley Street.

loth June, 1796.
(Received nth June, 1796.)

PELLEW TO SPENCER

Indefatigable, off Falmouth. i3th June, 1796.

My Lord, — I returned with the squadron off
Falmouth merely to land 170 prisoners taken out
of two copper'd brig corvettes who left Brest on
Thursday last to cruise in company for six weeks.
We luckily fell in with them off Ushant, and it is
a great pleasure to me to prevent the abundant
mischief such little spiteful rascals are calculated
to commit upon our trade. As neither of them
are fit for the King's service, I have refrained from
offering them to their lordships. The intelligence
I procured from them confirms what I reported
to their lordships a few days since on the examina-
tion of an American brig, i.e. 18 or 19 sail of the
line are getting forward in repairs and fitting ;
7 of them have sails bent, but cannot get men,
none of them having above 200. Whenever men
are sent on board they immediately desert, and
so discontented are the officers also from getting
no pay that they connive at their escape. These
brigs have had ten crews in six weeks from
desertion. Two divisions of frigates of 5 each
sailed about 3 weeks since. One had black troops
for the West Indies, the other is gone to North

1 The Rev. Lord George Murray, afterwards Bishop of St.
Davids, who invented the semaphore system of telegraph.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 263

America, and two divisions more are at sea. God
grant we may fall in with them. By a ship
from Cadiz 17 days, the master says ' the Spanish
fleet at anchor are 12 three-deckers, and 28 two-
deckers, with 1 8 or 20 frigates ; that Richery was
still there ; that accounts had arrived of the
Dutch squadron from Canaries consisting of 2
64/5, 4 large frigates, 2 sloops, all very sickly and
intending to return for Brest.'

The commander of the corvettes informs me
that Captain Bryant he saw at Brest, and that he
was to return to England, it being their intention
to keep Sir Sidney Smith in France.1 I hope
your lordship will think me right in landing the
prisoners for fear of getting sickly, and I shall now
date my fourth cruise from my departure to-day.
I ought further to inform you that in every
port of France they are equipping small vessels
of war to cruise upon the trade.

I have the honour to be

Your lordship's most devoted
humble servant,

ED. PELLEW.

(Received i8th June. Answered 2oth June, 1796.)

[Note by Lord Spencer : ' I have acknowledged receipt and
thanks for intelligence.']

GAMBIER* TO SPENCER

My Lord, — A commission is signed for Lieu-
tenant Lloyd to succeed Captain Preston, and one

1 On lyth April he was taken prisoner in an attempt to cut
out the Vengeur privateer from Havre with his boats.

* Rear- Admiral James Gambier, the younger, afterwards
Lord Gambier. He became Senior Naval Lord of the Admiralty
on Middleton's retirement (cf. Barham Papers, ii. 423, 425),
and, as a near relation — brother or nephew — of Lady Middleton,
probably continued under the influence of Sir Charles. Cf. p. 234.

264 THE SPENCER PAPERS

also for Lieutenant Phillips to be first of the
Nassau.

There are two plans for Duncan's squadron
that I would suggest for your lordship's con-
sideration, in order to keep the ships in good
condition and save the constant repairs that
they must require if kept at sea always, which
much retards our other works, as well as harass-
ing the men and reducing their complements by
sickness. To divide the whole into two squadrons,
one to look into the Texel once in ten days, and
the other to lay in Yarmouth Roads, relieving
each other as often as possible, keeping a frigate,
a sloop, and two or three cutters constantly off
the Texel to give the earliest intelligence of the
movements of the enemy. Another plan would
be to keep one of the divisions constantly at
Leith ready to sail at a moment's notice, that in
case the Dutch should come out with an intention
of going round to the northward, that division
should have discretionary orders to follow them.
The other division to lay in the Downs under
similar orders in case they should pass that way,
which I do not think probable. The frigates,
sloops, &c. off the Texel to give the earliest notice
to both squadrons, to the trade that may be
laying at Elsinore, and to us — and I cannot but
be persuaded that the ships now under Duncan,
with the Russians, are sufficient to divide into
two squadrons and each be strong enough for the
Dutch. In either case the ships should not be
kept longer at sea than three weeks, which is the
usual time that their beer lasts, and when they
are supplied with spirits they begin to fall sick.
The wine they have is generally bad, and it is
scarce. By either the above plans, our fleet will
be always fit for service, and the enemy will not

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 265

have it in their power to come upon us at a
moment when it may be disabled.

I congratulate your lordship on the recapture
of the Thames.1 We have desired Duncan to
recall the Isis (and squadron) as there appears
nothing in the North Sea and we shall be better
able to watch the frigates in Flushing,2 though,
if it's necessary, the Powerful with two frigates
could be sent upon that service immediately.
Including fifties and the Bellequeuse, Duncan will
have 15 sail of two-decked ships under his com-
mand. I have mentioned the plans as above to
Admiral Duncan who perfectly coincides with
me, particularly in the latter ; the only difficulty
is getting the Russians ready. The last account
of the Texel squadron was that they consisted of
nine sail of the line which must include fifties.

I am, my Lord, with great regard and sincere
attachment,

Your lordship's obliged and
faithful servant,

J. GAMBIER.

Admiralty, i4th June.

The brig proposed to be taken into the service
(at Dover) will be ready in a few days. As she
has 16 six-pounders and 95 men, I imagine the
Navy Board will propose that she be commanded
by a commander.

Private. (Received i5th June, 1796;. '

1 The Thames, 32, had surrendered to Captain Zacharie
Allemande (who was to play so prominent a part during the
Trafalgar campaign) in the Carmagnole, 40, and two other
frigates, in October, 1793, while she was refitting at sea after a
four hours' action with the Uranie, 36. She was retaken on
8th June, 1796, off the Irish coast by Captain Byam Martin,
in the Santa Margarita, 36. See N.R.S. vol. xxiv. pp. 262, 266.

3 See post, pp. 267-8.

266 THE SPENCER PAPERS

STRACHAN TO SPENCER

Melampus, off Guernsey. loth June, 1796.

My Lord, — Since I have had the honour to
receive your lordship's letter of the i8th there
has been no material occurrence to make it
necessary to address your lordship. Monsieur
Villebrune, by whom I expected intelligence from
the coast of Normandy, having missed me in his
passage from Marcou to Jersey, and as he has
not been at that island, I apprehend he may have
been obliged in the last hard western gale on the
30th ultimo to bear away for some port in England.

From what I can learn, the affairs of the
Royalists in Normandy are by no means in a
prosperous way. The Prince of Bouillon,1 who
I saw a few days ago, has informed me of his
having instructions to open a communication
with them from Jersey. Some persons were
landed on the 4th or 5th instant in a spot which
had been used for this purpose with success.
A boat belonging to the Royalist lugger attended
from that time to the gth without receiving any
account from them. I therefore think they have
been cut off, as the coast as far as I can discern,
is very vigilantly guarded. By the public letter
of this date to the Secretary to the Admiralty
your lordship will be acquainted with my pro-
ceedings, and the enclosed letter from Lieutenant
Pierson of the Daphne to me will explain that
officer's reason for wishing to return without
effecting a landing of the various articles he had
to present to the Royalists. Indeed I am so

1 Captain d'Auvergne, R.N., who, having been adopted by
the exiled Prince de Bouillon, became our chief intelligence
officer for French naval affairs. His headquarters were at
Jersey.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 267

convinced of the vigilance of the enemy upon that
part of the coast, that I am certain the greater
part, if not the whole, had it been landed would
have fallen into the hands of the Republicans.
I beg to observe to your lordship in reply to that
part of your letter (in which you guard me against
holding out expectations to the Royalists in
Normandy, which circumstances may prevent
being fulfilled), that I have not held out any
particular assistance, only in general terms offered
all that lay in my power whenever instructions
were given me for that purpose, as I was appre-
hensive if they did not get some reply to their
solicitations they might disunite.

It is not in my power, my lord, to express
my disappointment at the escape of the French
frigates from Havre. I had no idea of their
going eastward, and having so many points to
watch all to the westward, a day was lost before
I could collect the ships near Havre. Indeed
more than that time was lost, for notwithstanding
the attention of the captains they did not join
until the loth. The enemy sail'd the Qth at noon.
On the 8th it blew hard with thick weather.

I am almost certain they have not returned
westward. I have cruised near the Isle of Batz l
whenever the wind was easterly in hopes of seeing
them, if they came down Channel and designed
passing round Ushant. I did not return from
thence, as will appear by my letter to Mr. Nepean
of the 5th, until the western gale of the 3ist
ultimo, as there was then no probability of their
getting westward ; and having only the Diamond
in company and being anxious in case any orders
should be sent to the islands or my presence
required near them I thought it advisable to

1 MS. ' Bass.'

268 THE SPENCER PAPERS

return, particularly as it was probable my assist-
ance would be wanted by Captain D'Auvergne.

Whenever anything occurs deserving of your
lordship's notice, respecting the interior of Nor-
mandy or Brittany, or on other subjects which may
be interesting, I shall do myself the honour to
transmit to your lordship the earliest information.
I have the honour to be, my Lord, with the
greatest respect,

Your lordship's most humble and
obedient servant,

R. J. STRACHAN.

(Enclosing a copy of a letter from Lieutenant Robert Pearson
(sic) of the Daphne lugger.)
(Received I4th June, 1796.)

SPENCER TO STRACHAN

Dear Sir, — I have to acknowledge the receipt
of your letter dated the loth instant, and am
sorry to hear what you say of the difficulty of
communication with the coast, though I confess
it is nothing more than was to be expected.

I would wish to be understood that in recom-
mending caution to you in the communications
you might have, I was very far from wishing
to discourage those communications when they
might appear to be practicable without too much
endangering the persons concerned in them, and
I am happy to see that you have understood
exactly what I meant by the suggestion.

The French frigates are not yet gone to the
westward, but have been at Flushing almost ever
since. Whenever the wind comes easterly it is
very probable they may go down the Channel,
and we have taken every precaution we could

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 269

that in case of the Downs cruisers seeing any of
them, you should be apprised of it.

You will continue to communicate with Captain
D'Auvergne, who will occasionally receive in-
structions from the Secretary of State for his
proceedings, and as we have lately heard a good
deal of the preparation of great numbers of gun-
boats at the different French ports in the Channel
we shall be glad that you would collect all the
information you can on this point, and transmit
what you may obtain either by enquiries from
the vessels you may fall in with and speak to,
or by your own observation or that of any of the
ships of your squadron.

I am, dear Sir, with great truth,
Yours very, &c.,

SPENCER.

Bath. 1 5th June, 1796.
Sir R. J. Strachan, Bart.

GAMBIER TO SPENCER

My Lord, — As the wind still blows fresh from
the westward I hope it will continue so a day or
two longer. If we hear on Thursday that Colpoys
is at Spithead I think we must be fully justified
in ordering him to wait till the 30th when the
India ships, the Mediterranean, Oporto, Lisbon
and West India trade and victuallers with Bligh
may all sail together. Colpoys can go beyond
Cadiz with five ships, which with the Queen,
Brunswick, and Trusty will be strong enough for
anything that can come out of Brest. Should
Colpoys sail immediately he would have five ships
after the Alexander and Bellerophon had left him.
Will your lordship be so good as to determine
upon this, and we will proceed accordingly ?

Captain Evans of the Spencer has captured

270 THE SPENCER PAPERS

a corvette near Bermuda. The action appears to
have done him credit. I have desired his letter
may be sent to your lordship.

Admiral Young's l minute of the intended
orders will more fully explain the proposed plan,
and as Sir John Jervis gives us the tract of the
convoy home, it would be proper to have a
squadron cruising for it, which might go under
Sir A. Gardner — who may sail with Colpoys or
not as may be thought proper.

I am, my dear Lord,

Your most faithful and most
humble servant,
J. GAMBIER.

Admiralty. 2oth June.

Perhaps your lordship may not think five sail
sufficient for Colpoys to go to Cadiz with — we
might in that case give him another or two.

Private. (Received 2ist June, 1796.)

SPENCER TO STRACHAN
PRIVATE.

Sir, — I have to acknowledge the receipt of
your letter of the 3oth ultimo and to thank you
for the information it contains.

You will continue of course to communicate
with the Prince de Bouillon on all the subjects
which regard the station on which you are cruising,
and as he will receive the instructions of His
Majesty's Government for his proceedings, you
will learn from him everything which it will be
necessary for you to know as far as regards the
communications and defence of Jersey, &c.

The intelligence that we receive from the
several parts of the coast leads us to suppose that

1 Rear- Admiral George Young, a Lord of the Admiralty.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 271

some preparations are making for an attack
either on the islands of Jersey, Guernsey, or Alder-
ney, or perhaps upon St. Marcou. Your attention
will, of course, be turned not only to gain all
the information possible on that subject, but to
intercept any vessels that might be passing with
that view ; and we shall not fail to adopt such
measures from hence as may assist in checking
the progress of any expedition of this kind. Every
good opportunity you have of sending us informa-
tion that you think you can rely on, you will of
course make use of, and by moving about and
showing yourself frequently on different points
of the coast you will make it more difficult for
the enemy to conjecture what your station is or to
what particular part your attention is directed.

If you should at any time observe any unusual
accumulation of vessels, or any other symptoms
which may denote preparations in a state of
forwardness for an embarkation at any of the
ports, you will of course take the speediest means
of conveying us the intelligence, as it may be very
essential to be informed as early as possible.

As many of the inconveniences of which you
complain at the islands of St. Marcou as can be
relieved shall have attention paid to them, though
I am afraid from their situation and nature they
will always be liable to some. In the meanwhile
in respect of any particular articles of which they
stand much in want, they might be forwarded from
your ships, which might occasionally be sent over
to Portsmouth to procure fresh supplies.
Believe me, with great truth,
Yours very, &c.,

SPENCER.

Admiralty, 7th July, 1796.
Sir Richard Strachan, Bart.

272 THE SPENCER PAPERS

SCOTT1 TO GRENVILLE

My Lord, — I am honoured with your lordship's
letter dated June, inclosing a copy of a letter
received from the Lords Commissioners of the
Admiralty, containing an extract of a letter from
Sir John Warren representing that the trade of
France is now carried on under American and
Danish colours, and requesting me to report my
opinion on this subject, as far as I might be
informed thereupon. In obedience to your lord-
ship's request I have the honour of stating that,
if Sir John Warren can depend upon the correct-
ness of the intelligence he has received, he would
run no risk in bringing those ships in, for the
adjudication of themselves and their cargoes.
And if the mischief exists in the alarming extent
which his letter describes, I submit it to the judg-
ment of his Majesty's Government whether any
order should be given to that effect.

I have the honour to be, &c.,
WILLIAM SCOTT.

nth July, 1796.
Rt. Honble. Lord Grenville.

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

My Lord, — I should have written to your
lordship much sooner, if it had been possible to
have executed my orders in a shorter space of
time ; but the extreme badness of the weather
detained me three days in Granville Bay at the
Island of Jersey, and it was necessary to procure
pilots for that part of the French coast, where it is

1 Sir William Scott, Judge of the Admiralty Court, afterwards
Lord Stowell.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 273

very difficult for ships of so large a draft of water
as ours to navigate with safety or success. Indeed
the only safe anchorage round the islands of
Guernsey and Jersey is the above-mentioned bay,
which is defended by banks and rocks from most
quarters of the compass : and if 3 pair of moorings
in addition to those already there were laid down,
a small squadron of one frigate, two ship-sloops,
and two brigs, which from their light draft o-f
water would be best calculated for that coast,
were to be stationed there it, would prevent any
attack by surprise from the enemy and could be
reinforced, if a large force should be brought
against Jersey, which from its vicinity is the
most open to such enterprises. I have mentioned
moorings as essentially necessary, as the oyster
banks and small rocks cut and destroy the cables
of all ships who come to the island, and occasion
more expense in the expenditure of that article
than four pair of moorings would cost. I have
surveyed the coast all along with much attention,
notwithstanding the wind has at times been
contrary, and also collected all the information
that could be obtained. I am given to understand
that General Hoche has a number of young Irish-
men who were employed at St. Maloes in the
merchant houses and also others of indifferent
character, together with the famous Hamilton
Rowan at his headquarters : from which it is
presumed some expedition to Ireland is in agita-
tion, which if it should take place must certainly
be from Brest, as the small craft at St. Maloes
can only serve for a false attack upon the islands
of Jersey and Guernsey, or to cover a surprise,
which mode indeed is the favourite and successful
one that Hoche has always pursued. By means
of money and a number of his disciples of all
I. T

274 THE SPENCER PAPERS

nations, that he endeavours to introduce into the
places destined for conquest and pillage, force is
seldom or never used. If anything is attempted
on that side it must be by fishing boats, and at
the moment a small squadron at the spot would
defeat such measures and could be reinforced by
Strachan's ships from St. Marcou if wanted.
If any great stroke is intended to take place
upon Ireland, Corsica, Gibraltar, or the West
Indies, it must be by the fleet from Brest either
singly or in conjunction with the Spaniards, who
are expected to join their new allies.1 I trust
your lordship will pardon the liberty I have
taken in stating any ideas of mine upon the
subject, and which I only have ventured to do
in confidence from your kindness to me upon
several occasions. I learn that the Republicans
are building more frigates at Rochefort and
Bordeaux, and with a determination to increase
their marine ; and which, if money is obtained
from Spain or Italy, they perhaps may do in a
short time by some of those violent efforts of
which they are capable of making use, when
prompted by distress and rage. I am glad to
find, however, their convoys still pass at intervals,
and that this squadron could destroy one of them
within hearing and almost within sight of the
admiral's flag in Brest Road. If the small frigate
who escorted them had not started all her water

1 Spain had made peace with France by the Treaty of Bale,
1 2th July, 1795. The two Powers were now negotiating an
offensive and defensive alliance which was consummated by
the Treaty of Ildefonso on igth August, twelve days after
Warren's letter was written. It provided for a mutual guarantee
of their respective dominions both in the Old and New Worlds,
and that in case of attack each would assist the other with
24,000 troops, 30 ships of the line, and 6 frigates. It was followed
in October by Spain declaring war against Great Britain.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 275

and thrown quantities of things overboard, she
could not have escaped us. In the unfortunate
accident that happened to Sir Edmund Nagle's
midshipman, one of the seamen got on shore and
conversed seven or eight minutes with a number
of women who had come down to the waterside
out of church, as it was on a Sunday, and they
told and warned the fellow that the soldiers were
coming down, and desired him to get away as
fast as possible, or they would be all killed ; which
advice he instantly followed, and had the officer
put off earlier he might have been saved from
the misfortune that ensued.

I am much gratified in being enabled to
communicate to your lordship that the Anson
is now almost the second ship for sailing in the
squadron, and even Nagle, who has hitherto
believed the Artois omnipotent, owns that the
Razee holds him a tug, and large beats him.

I must again apologise for taking up so much
of your lordship's time and for the freedom of this
letter.

I have the honour to remain, with much regard,
Your lordship's sincere humble servant,
JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

La Pomone, off Falmouth. 7th August, 1796.

P.S. — I have enclosed a letter found in one of
the convoy. I fancy the ships in the road are
not yet ready but certainly preparing for some
expedition. I have just called off here to complete
our beer and water, and sail immediately ; if the
Spanish fleet are out, and anything hostile deter-
mined, I shall be sorry not to know something of
it at an early period, as I think our little squadron
would annoy them a good deal. I shall possibly
be off the Penmarcks a few days.

T 2

276 THE SPENCER PAPERS

Note by Lord Spencer on back of Sir J . B.
Warren's Letter

PRIVATE.

Dear Sir John, — I am much obliged to you for
your hints contained in your letter of the yth and
congratulate you on the continuation of your
usual success. I hope White in the Sylph will
prove an acceptable addition to your squadron,
as he will be able to get closer in shore than your
long-legged ships can do. We have ordered three
more pair of mooring chains to Granville Bay,
which I agree with you may be of great use.

I am sorry I cannot at present give you any
more certain information about Spain, but of
course you shall know all we do of it as soon as it
becomes necessary.

I am, &c.,

SPENCER.

Admiralty. I2th August, 1796.

(Received gth August. Answered 1 2th August, 1796.)

BLACKETT TO SPENCER

Saldanha Bay. igth August, 1796.

My Lord, — Allow me to congratulate you on
the very singular and fortunate event that has
taken place here by the capture of the Dutch
ships, of which you sent me the information,1 an
event which will give you more than satisfaction,
as having been accomplished without loss of

1 They surrendered to Sir George Elphinstone, Commander-
in-chief at the Cape, on I7th August, with a squadron double
that of the Dutch. See ante, p. 242, note. The prizes were
two 64*8, one 54, two 40*5, two frigates, and two sloops, or 9
sail in all. Of these 4 were bought into the service and re-
named, viz. Prince Frederich, 64, Saldanha, 38, Laurel, 26,
Vindictive, 24.

GENERAL CORRESPONDENCE 277

blood and that has preserved our ships in a state
of readiness for further service.

This event will effectually secure India, and
continue this colony in their obedience to the
King's government by the high impression it must
give them of the energy and activity of the
English. Whilst I congratulate your lordship
on so favourable an event to your own naval
administration, allow me likewise to assure you
I shall never be unmindful of your having
appointed me to a situation in which I have
endeavoured not to disgrace your protection.

I have the honour to be,
Your lordship's most faithful servant,

J. BLACKETT.

TURNBULL TO SPENCER

London. loth December, 1796.

At a general meeting of the merchants of
London trading to the southern ports of Europe,
and of delegates deputed to join them, and
co-operate with them, from the towns of -Leeds,
Halifax, Manchester, Birmingham, Exeter, and
Liverpool :

It was unanimously resolved :—

That the thanks of this meeting, considered as
the collected sense of the merchants and manu-
facturers of England, be given to Lord -Spencer,
and communicated to his lordship by the chairman,
for the judgment, zeal, and activity which he has
displayed, in directing the naval operations of
this kingdom, and protecting its commerce.

JOHN TURNBULL,
Chairman.

278 THE SPENCER PAPERS

My Lord, — It affords me the highest satisfac-
tion to have the honour to be encharged to
communicate to your lordship the unanimous
thanks of the general meeting of the merchants
of England trading to the southern ports of
Europe, for the very important services you have
rendered to your country.

Whatever shades of difference there may be
in the opinions of people in other respects,
they appear to be united in sentiments towards
your lordship of acknowledgement, esteem, and
attachment.

I beg to be permitted individually to profess
the sincerity of those sentiments, and to subscribe
myself, with great regard, my Lord,

Your lordship's most obedient and
most faithful servant,

JOHN TURNBULL.

London, nth December, 1796.
(Answered i4th December, 1796.)

PART V

OPERATIONS IN THE
WEST INDIES

1796

JUNE TO DECEMBER

28l

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

THE following papers relate only to the situation at
St. Domingo. To leeward Abercromby and Christian
were restoring British domination. Christian arrived on
2ist April and operations began immediately. By the
end of the month St. Lucia was recovered, and St.
Vincent and Granada by the second week in June. The
Dutch islands of Demarara and Berbice had been
occupied by invitation before Christian arrived. In St.
Domingo the difficulties were increased by the arrival
on I2th May of a French squadron with 1200 troops
and large quantities of arms and stores which in two
divisions had escaped out of Brest and Rochefort. But
General Whyte, after being once driven back by the
great storm, had also appeared with three regiments
from Ireland, and in spite of the ravages of yellow fever
all attacks on the British posts were beaten off, and so
strained grew the relations between the French Republican
officers and the local partisan leaders that by the autumn
the situation had greatly improved and there was even
a prospect of the Spaniards, blacks, and mulattoes accept-
ing a British Protectorate.

COMMODORE DUCKWORTH TO BAKER

[Extract.}

Leviathan, Cape Nicole Mole, ist June," 1796.

' The blundering and undigested expedition
against Leogane l has, I fear, totally done us up
as to making any progress in St. Domingo, as by
disabling the Leviathan and injuring the Africa,
so as to make it requisite for them to go to Jamaica
to repair their damages, we have not been able
to keep a sufficient strength off Cape Frangois to
prevent the French from receiving reinforcements ;
and I understand on my arrival at the Mole this
morning that about ten days since, three line-
of battle ships, four armes en flute storeships, and
three frigates and five other vessels with other
stores, got safe in. Added to this misfortune the
Salisbury, 5o-gun ship, from the coast of Africa
on her way down to Jamaica, ran ashore on the
Isle of Vache, where she is entirely wrecked, and
her crew made prisoners by the French at Aux
Cayes, St. Domingo. And indeed everything
here bears the most unfavourable aspect, and I
don't conceive our posts in this island will be
much longer tenable ; nor does there appear any

1 Leogane, west of Port au Prince, had been surrendered by the
Royalists to Commodore Ford in 1793, but had been recovered
by the Republicans. In March, 1796, Admiral Parker and
General Fuller organised an expedition to retake it. While the
troops were landed under the supporting fire of the cruisers, the
Leviathan, 74 (Duckworth), Africa, 64 (Captain Roddam Home),
and Swiftsure, 74 (Captain R. Parker) bombarded the place, but
the attack failed and the troops were re-embarked.

284 THE SPENCER PAPERS

energy from which you can augur good, or that
we shall avail ourselves of the present moment,
before the proclamation of the French Commis-
sioner, just arrived, has had its influence on his
countrymen, which I am confident it soon will,
as it is mild and a total remission of all former
errors. Alas ! Alas ! How many millions have
we thrown away from Government having, I con-
ceive, been kept in ignorance, or at least badly
informed about the state of the inhabitants of
this island. But true it is (and I have observed
it from my first arrival) that you have not a
friendly Frenchman but those who are made so by
local advantages ! Adieu ! my dear Sir, &c., &c.
P.S. — As no ship visits Port Royal to stay
there more than a fortnight, particularly with
such laborious work as the Leviathan had to do,
without great loss of men, I am told I am fortunate
in the way I have escaped, as they call it. But
from such an escape, good God defend me in
future ! As I have lost 40, and alas ! those I
most love, viz. dear, dear Edward Baker, and my
first lieutenant Mr. Scott besides. In the 40 are
included my boatswain, gunner, a soldier officer,
and one of the mates. But as the Africa, who
lay near me and had not half the damages to repair
I had, has lost upward of 70 in the five weeks,
it is by comparison I am deemed fortunate ;
and I am happy in being able to pronounce (for
the benefit of the service) that the progress of
the dreadful malady is checked, and I doubt not
we shall soon return to our pristine state of health.
But what availeth that to me now ? I hope you
will be able to read this scrawl, but there is no
accounting for nerves. God bless you !

J. T. D.

[Extract from Commodore Duckworth to Mr. Baker.]

WEST INDIES, 1796 285

DUCKWORTH TO SPENCER

My Lord, — To commence a command of such
high consequence with only a choice of difficulties,
your lordship will do me the honour to admit
requires fortitude in any climate ; but in this,
where we are surrounded with scenes of horror
and dissolution, nothing would support me in
the undertaking but the reflection that under
your lordship's auspices the most liberal con-
struction will be put upon my conduct. And the
mode in which the command has been conveyed,
arising from Rear-Admiral Parker's dangerous
illness, bears its due weight, and your lordship
may rest assured (that as far as zeal and profes-
sional ardour can reach) His Majesty's service
shall not dwindle under me. But though I
reluctantly intrude upon your lordship's time I
feel it a duty I owe to my honour and character,
when invested with a charge of such infinite
moment to my country, to state to you the tran-
sactions as they have arisen. On the zgth of
June the rear-admiral, who had been suffering
with great strength of mind for a long period, was
so suddenly bore down that the Faculty deemed
the change of situation to Jamaica instantly
necessary, and he was not then in a state to see
me, but left to me a plan of his intended opera-
tions with the squadron, a copy of which accom-
panies this ; and I have transmitted to the
Secretary of the Admiralty with my public letter
the dispositions of the squadron on the 2gth of
June, and 22nd instant ; from the first of which
your lordship will discover the various services
the line-of-battle ships were employed on, as
well as their divided state, and also from the

286 THE SPENCER PAPERS

rear-admiral's plan it was necessary for them to
form a junction with me previous to my proceeding
to sea ; as, independent of the three reinforcements
which had arrived at the Cape T with supplies for
the enemy, convoyed by two line-of-battle ships
and ten frigates and corvettes, before the admiral
sailed for Jamaica he had intelligence of seven
sail more of the line with three frigates being
hourly expected. I therefore have been anxiously
looking for our detached ships to proceed off the
Cape to prevent the last mentioned expected
squadron from getting in. But the Raisonnable
did not join (from accompanying the same convoy
to latitude 30.00 N.) till the I4th instant ; and
the Swiftsure, on which ship, from her being well
manned I had fixed great dependence, arrived
here the 22nd with the rear-admiral's flag, and
without anchoring he vested me with powers to
perform the duty of commander-in-chief in these
seas, but was so alarmingly ill, that I could have
no communication with him, or have the various
objects of this complicated command in any
way discussed ; and I fear from the accounts I
received of his health he will never reach home.
But being left in this situation it becomes my
province to transmit to the Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty an account of the defects, wants,
and shortness of complement of the squadron,
the latter of which I am truly afflicted to say is
beyond all possible belief from the ravages this
dreadful plague has [made] and is making in
every ship, and where or when it will stop God
only knows ; and the loss of the Leviathan, though
not equal in men to others, is, in valuable and
correct officers, a calamity almost unparalleled ;
and I have been twice given over within these six

1 Cap Francis.

WEST INDIES, 1796 287

weeks, though now recovered as much as the climate
will admit. But I have full confidence from the
tenor of the letter your lordship honoured me with
of the 26th of April last that I shall be indulged
to have my ship removed when consistent with
His Majesty's service. Added to this heaviest
of calamities, my lord, the great want of naval
stores is a most serious one, as there are neither
cables, sails, or passenger ships of magnitude, nor
can they be purchased here, and I fear for the
consequences during the approaching hurricane
months. Sorry am I to acquaint your lordship
that the Quebec, Captain John Cook, on the
7th instant, off Cape Raphael, the east end of
St. Domingo, fell in with two large French frigates
which captured the whole of his convoy consisting
of five sail, for the particulars of which I shall
refer your lordship to his Journal, &c. transmitted
to the Secretary of the Admiralty. But in return
for this I have the pleasure of announcing the
capture of the Renommee of 44 guns, and 320 men,
by the Alfred [74] in her way down to Jamaica
from Martinico, without a gun being fired by the
enemy. Captain Drury's letter on the subject
just received I have transmitted, and I under-
stand this frigate was one of those which captured
the above convoy. The Spaniards of this island,
who are particularly out of temper with their
new minister, have sent an embassy here soliciting
our aid against the common enemy of mankind ; *
but their demands commenced in having rations
for their army, field and heavy ordnance, with
ammunition and some small arms before they
took the field, the which Major-General Whyte
and. self objected to. But in case they chose to
commence hostilities on shore, I have guaranteed

1 All the eastern part of the island was Spanish.

288 THE SPENCER PAPERS

to use my best endeavours to prevent the French
from annoying them in sending troops by sea,
with which they appeared fully satisfied ; but I
am not sanguine in the exertions of such a torpid
indolent set of men. I observe in Rear- Admiral
Parker's extracts from your lordship's last letter
that it is your desire that Lieutenant Matthew
St. Clair of the Lapwing might be promoted to
a command. Should he ever present himself here
your lordship may depend upon his filling up the
first vacancy. I must beseech your lordship to
pardon this interlineated scrawl, but the sudden-
ness of the events that have so recently occurred
will not admit of my transcribing it, as I have no
secretary, and my own clerk is dead. And I have
the honour to be, my Lord, with high respect,
Your lordship's most obedient and
very faithful humble servant,
J. T. DUCKWORTH.

Leviathan. Mole St. Nicholas. 24th July, 1796.

ENCLOSURE
Rear-Admiral Parker's Plan for his Proceedings

(Received June 29th, 1796.)

From the number of transports that have
arrived the first object of attention was to get
them to the place of their destination, that they
might be at liberty to embrace the opportunity
of returning to England with the July convoy
from Jamaica, for the expense to the Crown
otherwise from demurrage would be enormous.
Besides, without great exertion it would almost
be impossible ever to get them out of the country,
their men falling down so fast with sickness. This

WEST INDIES, 1796 289

with other requisitions from the commanders in
the army has kept the line-of-battle ships from
cruising.

An arrangement is now made to strengthen
the garrisons of the different British possessions,
and as soon as the line-of-battle ships could be
assembled together (as several are about with
convoys) it was my intention to have proceeded
to sea, leaving the Abergavenny at the Mole, and
to have cruised on the north side, and in the
neighbourhood of -the Cape to intercept any further
arrivals, and according to the number and force
of the enemy to endeavour to draw them out from
the anchorage at the Cape to give them battle.

WILLIAM PARKER.

A Copy. J. T. Duckworth.

Private. (Received 4th September, 1796.)

SPENCER TO DUCKWORTH
PRIVATE AND SECRET.

Dear Sir, — I received your letter of the 24th
July on the 4th instant, and cannot express in
adequate terms the concern I felt at being informed
of the melancholy details which you were un-
fortunately under the necessity of conveying in it.
All we have to hope is that the ravages of this
dreadful fever may have ceased, and that though
so much reduced you may have been enabled by
keeping as much as possible at sea and on the
least unhealthy stations to preserve the remainder
of your officers and men.

It was undoubtedly very unfortunate that
Admiral Parker when he left the Mole was in so
bad a state of health as to disable him from
communicating more fully with you on the sub-
ject of your command. As he will, however,
I, u

290 THE SPENCER PAPERS

have left you all the official papers containing
the naval instructions received from home, and
you will since have received what we have sent at
subsequent periods, I hope they will be sufficient
for your guidance, and I feel the fullest confidence
in the zeal and attention with which every object
of them will be fulfilled as far as your means may
enable you to execute them. It will be our
business in the meanwhile to use every exertion
to repair the effects of the dreadful calamity the
fleet has been exposed to, though from the extreme
difficulty of procuring men here, and the urgent
call for them on every station, I much fear it
can only be done in part.

Before we knew of Admiral Parker's illness

and consequent return, we had apprised him of an

eventual change which might take place in the

command of the Jamaica station, and I had in a

long private letter to the rear-admiral explained

to him the reasons for which that alteration had

been intended. The circumstance is shortly thus :

We were informed that a considerable Spanish

squadron under Don Solano was upon the point

of accompanying Monsieur Richery's squadron

of 7 French line-of -battle ships to St. Domingo,

and feeling how very inadequate in that event our

force on that station would be we had instructed

Sir Hyde Parker, whom we had expected to take

on himself the command of a squadron of 7 sail

of the line crnising off Cadiz, to proceed to the

West Indies and, reinforcing himself on his way

by 5 or 6 sail of the line from the Barbadoes

station, go down to Cape Nicolas Mole in order to

act as occasion might require. In that event

there would have been a larger fleet assembled in

those seas than the common practice would justify

leaving under the command of a rear-admiral,

WEST INDIES, 1796 291

and this I stated to Rear- Admiral Parker as the
ground on which we had sent a senior officer to
take the command. I have thought it right to
enter into this detail with you, my dear sir, that
you may perceive that the arrangement in question
was made at a time when we thought Admiral
Parker still on this station and can therefore have
no reference to your being in the command there,
to whom, however, as only a commodore, the
argument I used with the rear-admiral would
apply in a still stronger manner as far at least as
standing in the service is considered.

The event has varied considerably from our
expectations at the time this arrangement was
adopted. The Spanish fleet under Don Solano did
indeed put to sea, but returned in a very few
days to Cadiz. Monsieur Richery went on, but
whither bound we do not exactly know at present,
though from the wretched condition of some of
his ships (the Victoire, Resolution, and Curseur)
and the mutinous state of all his crews, there is
much reason to believe he is not gone to the
West Indies. This fact, however, you will know
before this reaches you. Sir Hyde Parker on the
other hand did not join the squadron which was off
Cadiz, but most probably has proceeded to the
West Indies in pursuance of some conditional
orders he had received, and will (if that be the
case) I hope before you receive this have taken
upon himself the command on the Jamaica station
with a strong reinforcement of ships from Admiral
Harvey's squadron, which will be augmented by
three sail of the line now under orders to join you
from England.1 This force, we hope (even in the

1 Sir Hyde Parker was on his way home from the Mediterranean
in the St. George. He apparently missed the orders to relieve his
namesake in the West Indies, for he came straight home.

u 2

292 THE SPENCER PAPERS

now almost unavoidable event of a Spanish war),
will be fully adequate to the security of our
possessions in that quarter and the annoyance
of anything the enemy may have there, at least
at first, and if they should not send out more
naval force from Europe would, I flatter myself,
enable the commanding officer to send home those
ships which from sickness and other causes may
be most in need of returning. Whether the
Leviathan will come under that description or not
it is impossible for me here to judge, and I must
therefore of necessity leave it to the discretion of
the commander-in-chief ; but as the event of a
war with Spain may make the station of far
different importance from what it was before, and
as I hope and trust the dreadful mortality will
long since have been checked, I should not think
it impossible that an immediate return may
perhaps by the time this reaches you be no longer
an object of your wishes.

At all events, wherever you are serving, I am
perfectly satisfied, and so are all that know you,
that your services will be marked by the same
character of zeal, ability, and exertion which has
hitherto attended them ; and I am even sanguine
enough to flatter myself that, notwithstanding the
disadvantages under which your command com-
menced, you may have found some opportunity
of distinguishing yourself in it and adding to the
reputation you had before so deservedly acquired.

I am happy in having had an opportunity of
making a very handsome provision for Mr.
Pattison, your late surgeon, whose good character
seems to warrant the recommendation which your
friend Mr. Baker has given me of him. He is
appointed agent and surgeon to the naval hospital
at the Cape of Good Hope. . . .

WEST INDIES, 1796 293

Mr Henry Spencer, a midshipman on board
the Hermione, has been strongly recommended
to me ; if he should have served his time I should
be very glad to have him appointed a lieutenant,
and shall be much obliged to you to mention it
to the commander-in-chief if the command should
no longer be in your hands.

I am, dear sir, with great truth and respect,
Your very obedient humble servant,

SPENCER.

Admiralty. I5th September, 1796.
Captain Duckworth.

SPENCER TO DUCKWORTH
PRIVATE.

Dear Sir, — I have this morning received your
letter of the ist of last month by the Raisonnable.
The reasons you have given for sending that ship
home are very satisfactory, and though I cannot
help lamenting the necessity which has obliged
you to reduce your squadron so low, I am not
sorry that the Raisonnable is returned, as she
appears to want much repair, and your station
will very soon be strengthened by some fresh
ships and as good a supply of men as we can
spare you.

It is very probable that Monsieur Richery,
who sailed from Cadiz on the 4th August and has
since been on the banks of Newfoundland, may
be finally destined to St. Domingo. Before he
can reach it, I hope further reinforcements will
have arrived from the Windward Islands, and
before you receive this I have no doubt that Sir
Hyde Parker will be come down to take the
command of the Jamaica station, in which case
you will again find yourself in the situation of a

294 THE SPENCER PAPERS

private captain ; but as it may probably happen
that he may have under him a fleet of fifteen
sail of the line, I have strongly recommended it
to him, and have reason to believe he will be
influenced by my recommendation, to offer you
the appointment of captain of the fleet under him,
which I trust will be one agreeable to your views
and in the event of a Spanish war may probably
turn out as advantageous as any in which you
could be placed at home would the service allow
of your return. I thought it due to your standing
and character in the service to make you this
proposal and was very happy to find that Sir
Hyde so fully agreed with me in opinion upon it.
I am, dear sir, with great truth,

Your obedient humble servant,

SPENCER.

Admiralty. 22nd September, 1796.
Captain Duckworth.

DUNDAS TO SPENCER

Wimbledon. Sunday, 3rd December, 1796.

My dear Lord, — You will naturally suppose
that the repeated disasters which have befallen
our West Indian expedition in its progress to the
object of its destination have given me much
concern.1 In truth when they sailed last they
had not a moment to lose, and the recent mis-
fortunes they have met with create in me the
strongest impression that the time will be so far
elapsed as to make it highly improbable that the
whole objects in view can be accomplished, and
this of course has led me to reconsider the pre-
ference which ought to be given to one mode of
carrying on the campaign rather than the other.

1 See ante, pp. 134, 209.

WEST INDIES, 1796 295

Mr. Pitt has been here these two days past and
we have talked it over maturely and concur in
the same opinion. Indeed I would speak more
accurately if I was to state that the same train
of thinking on the subject had occurred to each
of us before we met. The result has been that I
have put our opinion in the shape of new instruc-
tions to Sir Ralph Abercromby, and if the opinion
is adopted by his Majesty's servants corresponding
instructions will be requisite on the part of the
Admiralty. I propose to summon the Cabinet
for Wednesday, but it is by no means my wish
to break in upon your recreation or rather neces-
sary quiet, but I have caused another copy of
the drafts to be made that by sending the accom-
panying ones to you I may have the benefit of
your opinion on the subject. It will occur to
you on the perusal of the drafts, that he is left
at more latitude than formerly with regard to
the Spanish part of St. Domingo. I am well aware
that is a subj ect of difficulty and delicacy. Without
that latitude I am of opinion he will perhaps
feel himself cramped in his operations at St.
Domingo, but if the Cabinet should view the
subject in a different point of view from that
which the instructions have suggested, they can
easily be varied, and the principles which have
led me to propose the material alteration of the
campaign still remain unshaken.

I remain, my dear Lord,

Yours very sincerely,

HENRY DUNDAS.

PART VI

PROJECTED ATTACK ON
THE TEXEL

1796
SEPTEMBER 27 TO OCTOBER 18

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

THIS little-known project is mainly interesting as con-
taining the germ of the famous Helder expedition of
1799. Originally conceived by Captain Drury — it would
seem, as an attack on the Dutch anchorage on the lines
of the more celebrated attempt in the Basque Roads, —
it was given on the Marquis of Buckingham's initiative
a more ambitious turn when the successes of the Arch-
duke Charles on the Rhine suggested the advantage of
extending the plan to a diversion in his favour. It was
precisely with such a dual object — that is, naval and
military — that the Helder expedition was undertaken after
the Convention with Russia was signed for the liberation
of Holland. Duncan found himself compelled to veto the
present scheme, as impracticable in the winter.

301

LORD BUCKINGHAM TO SPENCER

2 yth September, 1796.

My dear Lord, — I am very happy indeed that
you approve - -Js plan.1 I have suggested to
him the absolute necessity of his applying to you,
to let him take his barge-crew with him, and he
writes for that purpose to the Board, and sends
a copy of it this evening to Sir H. Parker, that
in case you approve it a short notice may be
sent to-morrow by the telegraph. I told him
likewise that I would write to you to recommend
that the two ships should be ordered to carry the
troops to Cork instead of Plymouth ; the reason
is that a letter from Plymouth would reach
London in two days, but it would be several days
before a letter from Cork would be received in
London, and consequently the secret would be
kept longer, and as the regiment is an Irish one,
nothing would appear more in the usual course
of things than that it should be ordered there on
this alarm of invasion. The secret is very strictly
kept, and I avow having requested from you as
a particular favour his removal to save him from
his former destination, so that I trust he will
escape any particular observation. I cannot
describe to you the satisfaction I feel at the
prospect of his attempt, or the conviction I feel
that it must succeed, or the advantages beyond

1 This was a plan for a fireship attack on the Texel, suggested
by Captain William O'Brien Drury . For its details see post, p. 305 .

302 THE SPENCER PAPERS

calculation that must arise from its success.
Adieu, my dear Lord ; do not answer this letter,
but believe me always

Your very faithful and obedient servant,

NUGENT BUCKINGHAM.1

P.S. — I always make a point of telling you
everything that can interest you, even though it
should be unpleasant ; and I know it cannot
(for very many reasons) be pleasant to you to
hear that the orders for the Sans Pareil to go into
harbour and to dock have for some days excited
a very loud clamour on the waste of time, stores,
and men, that will be lost by dismantling this
ship, and of the misapplication of the dock at
such a moment to a ship so lately repaired and
that wants nothing.

[Note by Lord Spencer : ' Answered 28th September, thank-
ing him for his letter, and he may trust me that the Sans Pareil
was not ordered to dock without very good reasons for it.']

BUCKINGHAM TO SPENCER

Portsea Barracks. 28th September, 1796.

My dear Lord, — As this letter will reach you
by a private hand (Mr. W. Fremantle) I wish to
suggest a matter which has dwelt very much in
my mind ever since I have connected this attempt
on the Texel with the politics of Lower Germany
in consequence of the Archduke's success. You
have determined to employ troops about 900 or

1 George Nugent Grenville, Marquis of Buckingham, brother
of Lord Grenville, to whom he wrote on the same subject 25th
September. See Dropmore MSS., iii. 257.

THE TEXEL PROJECT 303

1000 in this enterprise, and you have done wisely ;
but I wish that precautions may be taken for a
contingency which may occur, and which may
lead to consequences the most important. My
friend tells me that by the best information it
appears, that the works on the Helder are very
open and exposed, and that the hopes of being
able to carry them by a force landed on that shore
are very well founded. It is therefore possible
that they may be forced without material damage.
If at the same time the Dutch fleet should surfer
to the extent we hope, nothing will exist to prevent
Admiral Duncan from anchoring in the Texel
road, leaving only cruisers at sea ; and in that
contingency the whole force of Holland must
(if necessary) be assembled to dislodge him, for
the port of Amsterdam will be completely blocked
even against neutrals. Now if an engineer and
500 sets of intrenching tools are embarked with
the troops in the Russell and Robuste, and if
Admiral Duncan gives the use and work of 1000
seamen for two days (when he will have nothing
left to do) to assist in closing the rear of the
Helder forts, nothing will be able to force your
garrison of 1000 men, short of a regular and well-
appointed army with a regular train for the
attack. Their approaches must be made on the
narrow slip of land leading from the Hague to
the Helder, and if a few gun-boats are fixed to
flank their approaches, the siege may be protracted
for some weeks. In the meantime their trade is
annihilated, but what is more material is that
the whole military force in Holland, which is said
not to exceed 10,000 men, must be drawn from
the interior for this object. By this march the
country will be exposed to any insurrection, if
such a disposition exists, and you will have made

304 THE SPENCER PAPERS

it impossible for the French or Dutch to detach
further towards Diisseldorf. Perhaps too, this
measure will make it necessary for the cavalry
already marched to return, and at all events,
when these great purposes have been answered
and the place is no longer tenable, you may make
sure of carrying off your garrison. I do not say
that in all contingencies it may be wise to follow
up this idea to its full extent ; but very sure I
am that there are many contingencies in which
such a plan may contribute to consequences much
beyond any present calculation, and that it must
annihilate any idea of an offensive attack from
Holland on our east coast. I would likewise
suggest that it may be wise to order a marching
regiment to quarter either at Newcastle or at
Yarmouth or anywhere on the east coast, where
Duncan can easily get at them in case they should
be wanted as an additional garrison for this
object. I name Newcastle or Yarmouth because
there will be less jealousy1 in such a move than
in moving to Harwich or to Chatham. I do not
know whether 1 have explained myself quite
clearly in this letter as to my object in taking
this precaution. I do not mean to say that it

necessarily is coupled with Captain 's plan,

but circumstances may arise in which this pre-
caution may lead to very great consequences,
and the only additional preparation to be made
is an engineer or two and 500 sets of entrenching
tools. Pray consider this well over. I have no
hesitation in committing my crude ideas to your
correction, because I know that you will at least
give them full as much weight as they deserve,
and that you will not be startled at seeing in the
event of success I carry my ideas much beyond

1 I.e. ' suspicion.'

THE TEXEL PROJECT 305

the advantage, great as it is, that arises out of
the immediate blow, and this secondary object
is one for which the enemy is undoubtedly less
prepared than for any other blow. I have reason
to believe that the secret is very well kept, and

's removal is supposed to be a private job

originating in your kindness to my wishes.

Ever, my dear Lord,
Most faithfully and sincerely yours,
NUGENT BUCKINGHAM.

(Private.)

CAPTAIN DRURY'S PLAN FOR ATTACK
ON DUTCH FLEET IN THE TEXEL

Notwithstanding I consider the attempt with
fire vessels upon the Dutch fleet in their present
advanced situation as not likely to be successful,
yet I apprehend the carrying of the Helder may
be attended with favourable circumstances, such
as the destroying all the works and magazines
upon the New Deep ; seizing the merchant vessels
and sinking, if circumstances would allow of it,
the largest in the channels and firing the others,
and sending them with the tide amongst the
fleet.

As I trust my mind is fully made up to the
execution of my project, and as even the attack
of the fire vessels must depend upon the situation
of the Dutch fleet as they are advanced, and
how they are circumstanced ; and, believing that
I feel resolved to embrace any favourable moment
to push the fire vessels into effect, I should hope
that in case of failure blame would not be imputed
to me, unless there appeared something defective
in my conduct.

i. x

306 THE SPENCER PAPERS

I should have no objection to Captain Savage 1
taking upon himself the entire management of
the troops both for landing and re-embarking, and
from his zeal, courage, and resource I do consider
him as extremely well adapted to second any
effort of mine, or to assist me in case of being too
closely pressed by the Dutch ships.

As some light vessels and frigates should be in
the passages, Captain Savage could have the
entire direction of them, and after day send me
in any assistance he saw necessary and could
spare.

As to myself I could wish to have the entire
direction of the fire vessels and to command the
floating battery or vessel which covered those
vessels in, and which went against the battery.

The only objection I see to carrying into
execution the attack upon the Helder at present
(weather permitting it) is, the little prospect there
is of making an impression upon the Dutch fleet,
which could never be again attempted if it were
to fail in this instance.

The vessels at present at Yarmouth might be
fitted as fire vessels, and trust to the picking up
twenty other boats to land the troops in. The
Albion 2 I understand can anchor very near the
shore, but if the weather allowed of it I am of
opinion the troops should be put on board the
fishing boats in the evening some distance from
the shore and run in, followed by the Albion and
such other vessels as were found necessary.

The fire vessels to collect near the passage and
even enter it, but to close round my ship when I

1 Captain Henry Savage, R.N.

2 In 1794 the Albion 74 was armed as a floating battery
with twenty-eight 68-pounder carronades. She was lost in the
Swinin 1797 while under the command of Captain Henry Savage.

THE TEXEL PROJECT 307

entered between the buoys, also the cutters and
small vessels which must be employed to take
up the men from the fire vessels.

It will be necessary for Colonel Doyle l and me
to form a general plan of operations, and submit
it to the consideration of Admiral Duncan and
Captain Savage, who may find it necessary from a
more circumstantial knowledge to make altera-
tions and who may suggest ideas very useful that
have not occurred to us.

(October, 1796.)

DRURY TO SPENCER

Yarmouth. 2nd October, 1796.

My Lord, — I had the honour of delivering your
lordship's letter last evening to Admiral Duncan,
and have conversed with him upon the subject of
it as a seaman. His own knowledge of the coast
and the information he has acquired from the
captains and others of his fleet makes him cautious
of deciding without mature consideration upon an
enterprise where, tho' much may be gained, he
thinks a great deal may be lost in case of any
accident happening to his fleet, or part of it, from
weather or otherwise upon the enemy's coast.

Admiral Duncan considers that the Dutch
fleet may escape from their present anchorage
out of reach of the guns of the Helder (admitting
us in possession of it). He further thinks that
at this season in those seas so little dependence
can be had on the weather that it might be many
days before the troops could re-embark, and that
they would consequently be cut off, from the

1 Major-General Doyle, who had commanded the troops that,
with Warren, occupied the Isle d'Yeu.

308 THE SPENCER PAPERS

probable force which could be sent against them
in a short time.

Tho' I cannot help admitting those reasons
I am still sanguine were it practicable to put my
plan in execution, and could the Texel be included
and the batteries upon that island taken posses-
sion of, I see no possible means of the Dutch fleet
escaping.

I beg with all possible deference to observe,
if from circumstances and more consideration the
present idea should not be carried into execution
at this time, that your lordship will do me the
justice to believe that I considered my plan and
digested it before I proposed it ; that I still think
it a good one, and tho' it may be attended with
much risk, and many differ from me, that your
lordship will not consider me either speculative
or visionary.

I have the honour to be, with great respect,
Your lordship's most faithful and
most humble servant,

WILLIAM O'B. DRURY.

(Received 2nd October, 1796. Answered verbally.)

DUNDAS TO SPENCER

Wimbledon. 2nd Oct., 1796.

My dear Lord, — I have heard nothing of our
Texel business for some days. Is it making good
progress ? The intelligence one is receiving of
the whole force being drawn from Holland to
reinforce the armies on the Rhine increases one's
anxiety to take advantage of the moment, more
especially when we consider that in proportion
as the French army is drove nearer to their own
frontiers, in the same proportion we are subjected

THE TEXEL PROJECT 309

to the risk of the troops returning to Holland both
for its defence and to prevent insurrection.

Yours sincerely,
HENRY DUNDAS.

[Endorsed: 'Received and October, 1796. Answered verbally.']

DRURY TO SPENCER

Venerable, Yarmouth. iyth October.

My Lord, — In compliance with your directions
I have spoken to Admiral Duncan on the subject
of the fleet entering the Texel, in the event of our
possessing the Helder.

He feels the probability of great success could
such an enterprise be undertaken, but he sees the
difficulties of the attempt at this season, and the
risk of losing the British fleet, were the Helder
retaken.

The admiral has made every possible enquiry,
consistent with the secrecy necessary, but cannot
find a person who would undertake the piloting
any of the ships into the Texel, the channel being
apt to shift.

I 'must say the admiral's reasons against any
attempt at this advanced season are too strong
to be contradicted. At the same time he is fully
of opinion that it is highly practicable in good
weather, and he desires I may inform your lord-
ship that he has consulted Captain Savage, who
is perfectly agreed with him in every respect.

He has not yet received any information to
encourage the idea of the success of fire ships, but
expects to be fully informed upon that head
to-day or to-morrow by the officer he has sent
upon that service.

310 THE SPENCER PAPERS

I must take the liberty to call to your lordship's
recollection that I have ever been of opinion, that
so bold and hazardous an enterprise would not
bear consideration or reasoning upon ; that there
were local objections which could not be foreseen
and dangers at this season which, were they cal-
culated, nothing would be undertaken. Yet there
was something so promising and momentous in
the enterprise that I felt and still am disposed
to risk everything as to myself in the execution of
the project.

I have the honour to be, with much respect,
Your lordship's most obedient
humble servant,

WILLIAM O'B. DRURY.

(Received i8th October. Private.)

PART VII

ABANDONMENT

OF THE

MEDITERRANEAN AND THE
WAR WITH SPAIN

TO THE

BATTLE OF ST. VINCENT

AUGUST 21, 1796, TO MARCH 6, 1797

313

INTRODUCTORY NOTE

FROM the following papers it will appear how the
elaborate demonstrations of invasion and descents which
the French were making complicated the question of
retaining our hold on the Mediterranean, and how it
led to a discussion between Spencer and Dundas as to
whether in the circumstances it was necessary to keep
a superior fleet at home. Dundas refused to be intimi-
dated into a defensive attitude and his optimism as to
the intrinsic superiority of British fleets was fully justi-
fied by Jervis's action. The events to which these
papers and those in the next part relate are too well
known to need further exposition. Full details of
Hoche's expedition from the French side will be found in
Desbriere, Projets et tentatives, Vol. I. pt. iii.

315

INTELLIGENCE SENT BY PELLEW
INFORMATION.

arst August, 1796.

The road of Bertheaume was possessed by
four large ships, and a brig : it therefore became
impossible for my squadron to approach the port.
But after laying-to some time under Point St.
Mathieu, I boarded a Danish dogger come out
of the Port of Brest, and on board of which was
embarked the Danish consul (apparently an
intelligent man), from whom I learn that the
ships in Bertheaume Road consist of one 74, two
frigates en Razee of 50 guns, and one frigate of 36,
with a corvette, and I learn also from him upon
further interrogatory, the following state of the
naval force at Brest :

There are laying in Brest Water, with two
admirals' flags and the pendant of un chef d'escadre,
eleven sail of the line, two of which are three-
deckers, and ten frigates, all of them with sails
bent and ready for sea in point of equipment, but
none of them above half manned. In the inner
harbour equipping are two three-deckers, one of
them Le Vengeur, lately launched, of 120 guns,
and four seventy-fours in dock. Two ships of 74
guns, and two of 80, are building. One of each
it was said would be launched by the end of next
month.

With respect to their land forces, he (the consul)

3i6 THE SPENCER PAPERS

knew that 12,000 men were cantoned in the town
of Brest, and he knew also that a great many
troops had arrived and were quartered in the
environs. He believed their numbers'to be equal
to those in the town, and that they daily increased.
He also understood that all the troops, originally
under orders for the northern frontiers, were in
consequence of their extraordinary successes upon
the Rhine directed to rendezvous in the province
of Brittany.

In the basin alongside the wharfs, perfectly
equipped, were from twenty-five to thirty trans-
ports. On board of each ship heavy cannon
had been embarked, and they were kept in momen-
tary readiness to receive troops ; and such was
the political secrecy of their destination, that no
newspapers were permitted to be printed or
received in the town. Altho' many believed the
expedition was intended for the West Indies,
yet common report destined it for England, or
Ireland. Upon an interrogatory, whether the
spirit of the people appeared to be engaged upon
the expedition going forward, he answered as
follows :

That such was the discontent of the lower
orders of people from want of pay, that even the
artificers of the arsenals could scarcely be made
to work, and that the men sent on board the ships
of war embraced every moment that occurred
to desert from their ships. It was understood by
every person that Richery's squadron was daily
expected from Cadiz. Orders, it was said, had
positively been sent him to that effect. On the
i6th we boarded a ship from L'Orient called the
Douglas, Ephraim Evans, master, who had left
that port only two days. He stated the naval
force at that port to consist of three 74% one of

THE MEDITERRANEAN 317

them named the Constitution just launched. The
others were Le Muscius and Josparin. The
Daphne was the only frigate fitting out. On the
i8th at night we boarded a brig from Bordeaux,
only out thirty-six hours. The naval force in
that river consisted only of two frigates, one just
launched of 44 guns not masted. The other of
28 guns, had returned from the West Indies after
a passage of twenty-eight days and was going off
express again for the Colonies.

ED. PELLEW.

Indefatigable, at sea, aist August, 1796.

DUNDAS TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

Wimbledon. 24th August, 1796.

My dear Lord, — When one considers the con-
sequence of Jamaica in every point of view, I
cannot help regretting most sincerely that our
speculations relative to Spain, and the proba-
bility of warding off the blow till a later period in
the season, should have induced us to postpone
reinforcing the Jamaica station. There is, how-
ever, no looking back, but I wish your lordship
to consider whether the ships you are now taking
are not too tardy. It will be long before a fleet
can be collected at Jamaica, if it is to be formed
from the Mediterranean and the Leeward Islands
in consequence of orders still to be sent. Why
not send a large squadron to the Jamaica station
directly from home, and replace it by the Medi-
terranean fleet, if it is thought that we are too
weak in the Channel ? Upon that subject I
avoid saying anything, as I suspect I am a great
heretic on the whole of that system. But surely

318 THE SPENCER PAPERS

even upon that system we do not risk much if we
take the immediate steps of reinforcing without
delay the Jamaica station, and trust that our
Mediterranean force will be home before the
French are ready to invade us and march to
London. I cannot too often repeat, what I
sincerely feel, that the loss of Jamaica in the
present moment and state of the country would
be complete ruin to our credit and put you at
once at the feet of the enemy. I have no hesi-
tation in saying that I would much rather hear
that 15,000 men were landed in Ireland or even
in Great Britain, than hear that the same number
were landed in Jamaica with a fleet there superior
to ours.

I remain, my dear Lord,
Yours sincerely,

HENRY DUNDAS.

DUN DAS TO SPENCER

Wimbledon. a8th August, 1796.

My dear Lord, — I send you the letter I have
received from Mr. Pitt. Our messengers have
crossed upon the road. You see there is no
longer any difficulty as to Corsica, so far as
Cabinet is concerned; but upon talking again
with Canning l and Huskisson I cannot help enter-
taining my apprehensions of the other delay. I
hope in God the Duke will do it before he goes to
Weymouth, or if he cannot overtake it allow me
to do it. I will send him Mr. Pitt's letter the
moment you return it.

Yours truly,

HENRY DUNDAS.

1 Under-secretary for Foreign Affairs, January 1796.

THE MEDITERRANEAN 319

Note by Lord Spencer of His Answer

Received 28th August, 1796; answered same
day— That I hoped no further delays would arise
in the measures for the evacuation and that I had
no objection to the plan about Porto Ferrajo
provided it could be maintained without tying the
fleet down to that part of the Mediterranean where
it could get no supplies in the present state of
things and would be totally lost for all other
general purposes.1

SPENCER TO THE KING

Copy to the King, 2$th October, 1796

Earl Spencer is most concerned to be under
the necessity of laying before your Majesty the
accompanying letters from Real-Admiral Mann to
the Board of Admiralty with a private one
addressed by that officer to Earl Spencer himself.
The result of the information contained in them
will make it appear that your Majesty's fleet in
the Mediterranean will be in a situation of very

1 When in the summer of 1796 Bonaparte succeeded in raising
in Corsica an opposition to the British occupation, and it became
unsafe as a base of operations, Sir Gilbert Elliot ordered Nelson
to seize Porto Ferrajo in Elba as a substitute. This he did on
loth July. Orders were sent to Jervis to evacuate Corsica,
Elba, and the Mediterranean on 3ist August. They came to
hand on 25th September and the troops were embarked for Elba
on i gth October. This same day, however, owing to the Arch-
duke Charles's successes against Moreau and Jourdan on the
Rhine in September, the Cabinet sitting at Lord Spencer's house
decided to advise the King to cancel the orders for the evacuation
and a despatch to that effect was sent off on 2ist October, too
late of course to take effect. See ' Minute of Cabinet/ igth
October, Dropmore Papers, iii. 361.

320 THE SPENCER PAPERS

considerable difficulty from the circumstance of
the enemy's force being so much superior, but
from the known abilities and activity of Sir John
Jervis, Earl Spencer has the fullest confidence
that the best possible use which the circum-
stances will admit of will be made of the force
under his command.1

Admiralty. 25th October, 1796.

THE KING TO SPENCER

Windsor. 25th October, 1796, 7 m. past 7 P.M.

The letters communicated to me by Earl
Spencer undoubtedly paint the situation of the
fleet in the Mediterranean as highly perilous,
provided the Spanish one will show the activity
practised in our service. I own I build some
hopes on the want of that as well as on Sir John
Jervis's doing his utmost.2 Rear-Admiral Mann
seems to reason judiciously as to what he ought
to do on the present unpleasant occasion. It
seems highly necessary for Earl Spencer to con-
sider whether it would not be right to send some

1 By Jervis's orders Mann had raised the blockade of Cadiz at
the end of July and joined him at Corsica with 7 of the line,
but as he had neglected to fill up his ships with stores before
leaving Gibraltar he was sent back to replenish. On ist October,
off Cape de Gata, he was chased by De Langara, who had just
come through the Straits, but escaped into Gibraltar with the
loss of a brig and a transport. De Langara, after picking up
the Cartagena squadron, proceeded to Toulon, and with 26 of the
line joined there 12 French. In the circumstances Mann called
a council of war, and though under orders to rejoin Jervis,
decided to return home, leaving his commander-in-chief with
only 16 of the line to face the 38 of the Allies. See Introduc-
tion, p. xxv.

2 In this the King was justified. De Langara, with his 26 of
the line, had contact near Cape Corse with Jervis, who had only
14 with his flag, but instead of fighting him De Langara proceeded
to Toulon.

THE MEDITERRANEAN 321

succour, or whether it is best to await the event
before any positive step be taken.

GEORGE R.

(Received 25th October, 1796.)

DUNDAS TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

Wimbledon. 28th October, 1796, 6 o'clock.

My dear Lord, — I am just out of bed, no better
than I was four days ago when I took to it, and
have only this moment read your letter of yester-
day which has alarmed me beyond expression,
as it seems to announce an intention to abandon
the Mediterranean because Spain has declared
war against us. It puzzles me the more because,
altho' it was not the precise object of our con-
versation, I drew an inference from something
Mr. Pitt said this morning that a contrary reso-
lution had been taken.

Spain having declared war against us should
in my poor judgment have led to a very different
conclusion. Whatever calamities this country in
the course of the war has sustained in the persons
of its allies, its own glory has at least remained
untarnished, and the sentiment is universally
acknowledged and publicly boasted of by us
that our naval superiority stands unrivalled.
Did we mean to boast only that we were superior
to France ? Surely not. We meant to say
what every man feels, that a union of the naval
power of France and Spain would be brought to
confusion by our naval exertions, and we begin
the war by running out of the Mediterranean and
allowing immense fleets of theirs to parade and
ride triumphant in these seas. It is impossible
I. Y

T^
& '

322 THE SPENCER PAPERS

to figure a more humiliating circumstance. It
amounts to a distinct confession that whenever
France and Spain are at war (which will always
be the case when one is) we must abandon all
connection with the Mediterranean and in truth
with the whole South of Europe.

One was in hopes that upon the return of peace
it might have been possible in the experience of
their past folly and weakness to have persuaded
the States of Italy to have formed some efficient
confederacy for their general safety against that
destruction in detail which the present war with
France has brought upon them. If such a
confederacy is possible to be formed, it can only
be on the confidence that a British fleet in the
Mediterranean would be key-stone of the whole;
but if the commencement of the present war with
Spain is to hold out so little hope to them on that
score, where can be the doubt that they will all
place themselves under the protection of France
and Spain, and Portugal will soon follow the
example of the rest ? The peace which Naples has
made for herself strongly corroborates the whole of
this reasoning ; for as she has not been obliged to
submit to the exclusion of us from her ports, altho'
in some degree to limit, we can be under no
difficulty to obtain refreshments of every kind.
Nor does it occur that by a powerful navy in the
Mediterranean to the amount of thirty sail we
in truth take from our general strength. That
fleet will either confine within their ports or
destroy, if they come out of them, the whole force
now at Carthagena and Toulon, which you have
always stated at a larger force than I have sup-
posed us to apportionate for that station. In
the Mediterranean we have them in a cul-de-sac.
If we abandon it we shall be kept in constant

THE MEDITERRANEAN 323

alarm that they are detaching from the Medi-
terranean without being at any certainty con-
cerning it. If you tell me that you cannot spare
such a force for that station, I know you must
mean to keep more constantly in the Channel and
North Seas than there is any occasion for. But if
I was to be convinced of any error in that respect,
which I know I never shall, I would answer that
the measure of not abandoning the Mediterranean
is in my opinion so essentially connected with the
present and future naval strength and glory of
this country, that it ought to be preferred to
every other service whatever, which does not
necessarily involve the security of our own distant
possessions. I cannot state that sentiment more
strongly to your lordship than by assuring you
that however favourite objects both Trinidad and
the Pacific Ocean are in my estimation, the acquisi-
tion of them would be dearly bought by a sacrifice
of our naval pride and strength in the Medi-
terranean.1 If this system is sound what is the
use of Gibraltar ?

I am, my dear Lord,

Yours very sincerely,

HENRY DUNDAS.

SPENCER TO DUNDAS
PRIVATE.

Rt. Honble. H. Dundas, &c. &c.

3ist October.

Dear Sir, — If my letter occasioned alarm to you,
I confess yours did not create less surprise in me.

1 Abercromby had returned to England when the hurricane
season stopped further operations in the West Indies, and on the
outbreak of war with Spain he was ordered out again with instruc-
tions to take Trinidad. He sailed on i5th November. Dundas
was also apparently contemplating a raid into the Pacific.

Y 2

324 THE SPENCER PAPERS

I had imagined when the orders were issued
for the immediate evacuation of Corsica that the
ground of that measure (in which I understood you
to have concurred) rested very principally on the
necessity of setting our Mediterranean fleet at
liberty, on the probable event of a rupture with
Spain ; and though a subsequent order was sent
to suspend the completion of that measure, the
motive for such suspension was to hold out
encouragement to the Court of Naples, and if
possible to prevent her concluding a separate
peace, or at least to enable her conclude it on
less humiliating terms than the other Italian
Powers had been able to obtain. Now that
Naples has made peace, and on terms which, tho'
comparatively good, make it impossible for our
fleet to refit in the harbours of that kingdom,
I am at a loss to conjecture in what manner it is
expected that we can maintain so large a fleet
as you mention (and the thirty sail you mention
would not in my opinion be sufficient for the
purpose) through the winter season in those seas,
when it will become absolutely impossible for
them to keep the sea in the manner they have
done during the whole summer. In Corsica no
supplies are to be had but those we send from
home. With a Spanish fleet either at Cartha-
gena or Minorca, it would require nearly the whole
of our force to protect every convoy of stores or
any other description from Gibraltar to Corsica,
and when once the necessity of resorting to
Gibraltar is admitted, the object of protection
to the States of Italy falls at once to the ground
as much as if the fleet were in England.

What our boastings may have been on this
subject I really do not know ; but this I am sure
of, that whoever has boasted that our naval force,

THE MEDITERRANEAN 325

with all the enormous drains from it in the East
and West Indies, is or can be so proportioned to
the united navies of France, Spain, and Holland
in Europe as to maintain a decided superiority
over them in every sea, has been guilty of vain
boasting. The superiority at sea upon which I
have hitherto counted has certainly been confined
to a superiority over those only with whom we
had to contend, and you know that the principal
reason of my most earnest wish from the begin-
ning to avoid a Spanish war was no more nor
less than a decided opinion on this very question,
namely : — that such an event would infallibly
drive us from the Mediterranean. Whether this
leads to any of the general inferences you de-
duce from it or no, I hold to be of but little
weight in the consideration at present before us.
It is for us at present to consider whether on
a fair and correct statement of our naval force
and our means of maintaining or augmenting
it, compared with what we know of that of our
enemies, we can or ought to keep such a fleet
cooped up in the Mediterranean as would be
necessary to give us a decided superiority over
the fleets of Spain and France in that sea. Thirty
sail of the line will not do for this purpose as long
as Spain chooses to employ the Cadiz fleet in
conjunction with that of Carthagena and Toulon.
The Cadiz and Carthagena fleets are now at least
thirty sail in number, the Toulon fleet from
ten to twelve at present and soon may be fifteen.
Taking these last only at ten, there is a combined
fleet of forty sail of the line, to which our thirty,
if we had them there (though I have no doubt
they would fight a very good battle), would not
by any man in this country be considered as
superior, and it would only be under circumstances

326 THE SPENCER PAPERS

of particular advantage that an admiral would be
justified in attacking an enemy to whom he was
so inferior in number. This situation therefore
would not be the one so much desired of decided
superiority, and in my opinion nothing less than
an equal number of ships could properly be so
stated, because it is always occasionally neces-
sary to send ships into port to repair accidental
damages, and we, having no port but Gibraltar
for this purpose, are in that respect under an
evident inferiority to the French and Spaniards
who have Toulon, Port Mahon, Carthagena, and
will soon have Leghorn. In order however not
to press this argument too far (though I assure
you I feel it to the full extent of what I have said)
let us suppose that thirty-five sail of the line
would do, and then see how the present account
stands.

We have now belonging to the Channel fleet
ready, or nearly ready, thirty-four sail of the line
and two more which may be ready by the end of
December — say in all thirty-six. We have in the
Mediterranean twenty-one. The total therefore
of the line in Europe, exclusive of the North Sea,
is fifty-seven. Take from that number thirty-five
for the Mediterranean and you leave twenty-two
sail of the line for the defence of this country.
Such is the statement under a supposition that
we give up all our schemes of annoyance to Spain
abroad, where I believe we might act with much
more effect against her than we can in Europe.
For the two expeditions in contemplation, the
least possible force would be six ships of the line,
viz., four for the South American, and two to
reinforce Admiral Harvey for Trinidad. Take
these six (which must go very soon or not at
all) from our twenty-two, and sixteen sail of the

THE MEDITERRANEAN 327

line remain, when the least possible force which
you can alocate to the French Atlantic ports
is twenty-five, of which seventeen are said to
be actually at this moment ready at Brest ; and
besides these there are about twelve more Spanish
ships between Cadiz and Ferrol, which, though
they are not yet quite ready, we must not leave
out of our calculation.

I was not a little surprised at what you say
you collected from Mr. Pitt when he called upon
you relative to this subject, because the result of
a conversation I had with him and Lord Grenville
on Thursday was a very different plan, which in
the present state of affairs appeared to me to be
the best which we could adopt for our naval
campaign, and which I told Mr. Pitt I would talk
over with the naval members of the Admiralty in
order to learn what their opinion as professional
men was upon it. I had the satisfaction to find
that they much approved of it, and it really seems
to promise as much as we can at present aim at.

The general idea is this : to divide our European
fleet into two principal parts (I leave the North
Sea for the present out of the question), one of
which shall remain as hitherto for the Channel
service, and consist of about thirty sail of the line ;
the other, of about the present extent of our
Mediterranean fleet, be stationed from Cape
Finisterre to Gibraltar, making its headquarters
Lisbon, and acting in conjunction with the Portu-
guese fleet for the protection of Portugal, the
keeping up a communication with Gibraltar, and
taking every opportunity of annoying the enemy
at Cadiz or elsewhere that offered.

If the enemy detached, equivalent detach-
ments might be made from one or other of these
two fleets as the case might be, and if they were

328 THE SPENCER PAPERS

to unite into one large combined fleet (an opera-
tion very difficult for them to perform while
our force was so situated) we might unite both
our fleets likewise with infinitely more ease and
readiness than from the Mediterranean, and should
then have a force which acting together under a
good commander ought to be equal to anything
our enemies could collect. This is my general
idea ; the exact proportion of the two great
divisions of the fleet might be varied according
to circumstances, and from their respective
positions would admit of constant and easy
variation ; they would be placed in the most
advantageous manner for the protection of our
outward- and homeward-bound trade, and for
cutting up that of Spain, and they would probably
be the means of preserving to us the friendship
and the ports of Portugal, without which we shall
in a very short time have no port in Europe freely
open to our trade south of Embden.

In order to carry this plan into effect I should
propose to add the coasts of Spain and Portugal
as far north as Cape Finisterre to the limits of Sir
John Jervis's command, as I do not mean that he
should by any means be absolutely precluded
from, entering the Mediterranean, if on any
particular occasion he should see a strong reason
for so doing. I would be taking measures imme-
diately towards replacing by fresh ships those of
his fleet which ought to return home for repairs,
and we might, if it is thought expedient, go on
with our foreign expeditions at the same time.

This, my dear sir, is my general idea on this
subject, liable undoubtedly to much correction
and attention from those who are better able to
judge than I am. I think it promises the most
advantage and the least probable mischief, if

THE MEDITERRANEAN 329

the events which are at this moment perhaps
passing in that part of the world should be such
as to leave us at liberty to make an option, till
we hear again from thence. I confess I am under
the greatest anxiety about those events, and not
the less so from the very unsettled and contra-
dictory nature of the various orders which, as
occurrences have arisen, we have sent out. I
trust however that the very critical situation of
things will of itself point out both to Sir John
Jervis and Sir Gilbert Elliot l the necessity of
using a good deal of discretion in the execution
of those orders ; otherwise I should much fear that
hardly one set of them will be found properly
calculated for the circumstances in which they
will be received.

I am very sorry to hear that you are not
yet the better for your confinement. I should
have called to-day before I came to town, but
I purposely avoided it, lest you should be
tempted to see me, and talking all this over might
be prejudicial to you.

Believe me, dear Sir,
Yours very faithfully,

SPENCER.

Admiralty. 3oth October, 1796.

DUNDAS TO SPENCER

Wimbledon. 3ist October, 1796.

I am much obligedvto you, my dear Lord, for
the trouble you have taken in so distinctly stating

1 Sir Gilbert Elliot (afterwards Earl of Minto). He was
Viceroy of Corsica and our principal political agent in the Medi-
terranean. The orders related to various measures for supporting
the Italian States against the French.

330 THE SPENCER PAPERS

to me the grounds of the opinion you entertain on
a subject of certainly very great national im-
portance. It is a subject on which without
affectation I can assure you I believe your
opinion, especially on the material points of detail,
is much more likely to be right than mine. It
would have given me sensible pleasure if I could
have been able to confess myself a convert to
your reasoning, but I cannot do it consistent
with truth.

Whenever this country is engaged in a naval
war, there are four great theatres on which we
ought, if possible, to appear with pride and superi-
ority, and if there is any one of them where
we do not, we are in that proportion beneath
our scale of naval character in the world. The
places I allude to are the Channel — including the
coasts of Spain and Portugal — the Mediterranean,
the East Indies, and the West Indies. In none
of those places at present do I conceive there
is a rational ground of doubt of our power to
maintain a naval superiority.

I must object, however, to your way of com-
paring our own force and that of our enemy. In
stating the latter, you omit no one ship you find
in any list, and go even further by supposing all
ready or nearly ready for sea. Surely this is a
mode of treating your own fleet that is very
injurious to it. It makes no allowance for
superiority of officers, of men, of equipment,
and of all the other particulars which more
than numbers constitute our naval superiority.
Feeling as I do in this respect I cannot admit
that thirty sail of the line would not be perfectly
equal to keep in awe the whole of the naval
force of France and Spain now in the Mediter-
ranean, supposing them to amount to forty sail ;

THE MEDITERRANEAN 331

they would in all probability never stir out of
their own ports, or if they did, either jointly or
separately, I believe there is not a man in the
kingdom who would entertain a moment's anxiety
as to the result.

There is another fallacy which, with great
deference, runs through your opinion on all this
subject which I really cannot subscribe to in a
discussion of this kind. No man would certainly
wish the ships to be sent to sea inadequately
fitted in anything, and particularly in the article
of men, but I cannot admit that in a general
survey and distribution of your navy you are to
count upon nothing as adequate to naval service
that is not fitted out in all respects as if intended
for the East and West Indies. If you had twelve
or fifteen ships, only one-half or one-third manned,
but properly fitted out for a six weeks' cruise in
every other respect, and these ships stationed
either at Plymouth or Spithead, where can there
be room for rational doubt that in the case of
any sudden alarm, others of various descriptions
not calculated upon in the regular detail of
manning the navy would be found to pour into
those ships and immediately add to the Channel
strength near at home.

Another inaccuracy I think has likewise got
into your statement. It surely may not be
necessary now to keep so large a fleet at St.
Domingo, since the Spanish have sent so large a
body of their fleet into the Mediterranean. When
they kept so large a proportion of their force at
Cadiz and we were kept in a constant alarm that
they might detach in order to attack Jamaica
or do some other West India mischief, it was
absolutely necessary to have a very large force in
the Westward station ; but my reasoning and

332 THE SPENCER PAPERS

conviction goes to the point that by means of
thirty sail and the benefit of Gibraltar you place
at least forty of the enemy's ships hors de combat.
You of course are at liberty to take that circum-
stance under your consideration in every other
distribution of your naval force.

I have not immediately before me the paper
you have so often communicated to me containing
a detailed statement of our fleet amounting, to the
best of my recollection, to about 106 sail, and this
force, now that Spain has taken itself to the
Mediterranean, is, I am satisfied, without abandon-
ing the Mediterranean sufficient to furnish a naval
force for every station, and in particular to carry
into execution that most wise and judicious
arrangement you propose of keeping two large
squadrons cruising quite from home to the Gut
of Gibraltar.

I am truly sorry you have formed an opinion
that this arrangement cannot be executed without
giving up the Mediterranean. I am not satisfied
the opinion is warranted. It is certainly a very
disinterested one, for in adopting it you give up
a great deal of national and personal credit which
would attach to the other system of naval conduct
if you had felt yourself in a condition to pursue it.

You are mistaken in the ideas you suppose
me to have entertained as to Corsica. I do not
recollect that, since Corsica ceased to be in my
department, I ever brought forward any opinion
upon it except to express my hearty approbation
of endeavouring to hold it out as a lure to Russia.
Any other opinions I have had on the subject for
a long time past would not have been valuable
and perhaps not right. As things are now cir-
cumstanced I do not look upon Corsica as good
for anything, the Russian consideration out of

THE MEDITERRANEAN 333

the question. But if Corsica was annihilated, I
should indeed consider it as a great event,
which would tell in the general system of Europe
years after some of us would be off the theatre
of it, if all Europe, and particularly the Italian
and Mediterranean Powers, were now to be
witnesses for the remainder of this war of a
British fleet keeping at bay and probably in
some way bringing to disgrace the great naval
force of France and Spain stationed there.

I think you are likewise inaccurate in sup-
posing that a Spanish war was the great motive
for withdrawing the fleet from the Mediterranean.
I do justice to your lordship's opinion being always
that way, but during the short and reluctant
acquiescence given to that measure, I believe an
idea of its necessity prevailed as much from the
immediate prospect of Naples being in the hands
of France. That is now over and certainly
makes a very great change in the state of the
question, as Naples is undoubtedly kindly and
honourably disposed to this country, and there
is no doubt that we will meet with every aid
of refreshment, &c., that the ports of that country
can give to us. With that and Gibraltar, we
would in my judgment have every naval accom-
modation we could wish.

I have troubled you with a long and confused
scrawl, but as it gives me sincere concern to differ
with you on a point of such infinite magnitude,
I would not have done justice to my own feelings
if I had not candidly detailed to you at least some
of the outlines of the reasons which still detain
me reluctantly in my former opinion. Believe
me to be, my dear Lord,

Yours very truly,

HENRY DUNDAS.

334 THE SPENCER PAPERS

Note on Back of Letter by Lord Spencer

Answered ist November, stating that it is
right on these subjects to take into account
every thing precluded.

That he cannot be apprised of the evacuation
of Corsica having taken place, and the treaty with
Naples respecting their supplying us with stores
and provisions.

Stating generally the plan concerted with Mr.
Pitt and the different measures dependant on it,
and that I have no great expectations from the
North Sea on account of the weather.

DUNDAS TO SPENCER

Wimbledon, ist November, 1796, 10 m. past 12.'

My dear Lord, — I have this moment received
yours. I am free from fever and pain, and walked
out for half an hour to-day. I do not sleep at
all, and I believe it is much owing to the anxiety
created by the variety of objects which press on
me in the present moment, and to which I un-
fortunately have been prevented from giving the
usual attention. It is still necessary that I should
have a little conversation with you on some points
collaterally connected with the subject we have
lately discussed, and I will drive to the Admiralty
for half an hour to-morrow forenoon. I will be
there not long after eleven o'clock.

Yours sincerely,

HENRY DUNDAS.

(Received ist November, 1796.)

THE MEDITERRANEAN 335

GRENVILLE TO DUNDAS

Cleveland Row. isth November, 1796.

My dear Dundas, — I return you the paper
respecting the defence of this kingdom which is
highly interesting but shows too plainly how
much still remains to be done before we can
flatter ourselves that we have any real security
except what our fleets afford us — a security always
precarious and attended with the great incon-
venience of locking up an immense and expensive
navy employed for months together in cruising
in the sight of Brest where the French fleet lays
secure, not only from danger but even from the
wear and tear of service. For God's sake there-
fore exert yourself to carry the ideas of that
paper into execution, and above all that part of
it which recommends that the whole plan of
defence in its details shall be considered, agreed
upon, and reduced to writing — for then and then
only will you be able to watch the preparations
and to compare their progress with the expecta-
tions held out and the exigency of the service.

I am not a believer in the idea of invasion
just in the present moment, but own security
in this respect depends entirely on Austria, and
either separate peace or insufficient efforts in that
quarter would leave us exposed. It is therefore
our most evident duty to avail ourselves of
the interval, and of the alarm now raised in
the country (on account of the imminency of the
danger to which we were exposed, if the successes
of the Arch-Duke had not averted it) in order
to put ourselves in a state of real defence suited
to the importance and magnitude of the interests

336 THE SPENCER PAPERS

which the shortest and most partial success of
an invading enemy might shake to their very
foundation.

The object of this letter was, however, to
mention to you another idea which has suggested
itself to my thoughts, and which I cannot do
better than recommend in this manner to your
serious consideration.

The best we can hope from Sir J. Jervis is
that till he shall be reinforced he will retire to
Gibraltar if not to Lisbon. I take it for granted
(tho' the misfortune which has prevented my
attending Cabinets this last fortnight has put me
out of the way of hearing it) that immediate
steps have been taken to reinforce him according
to the ideas which were in question before we
heard of Mann's intention to come home. If these
reinforcements find him at either of the two
places above-mentioned he will have a powerful
fleet within two or three days of Cadiz, while the
Spanish force fit for service at sea is all in the
Mediterranean, and their army all collecting at
points very distant from Cadiz. I have always
heard that the means of attacking that place so as
to bombard it and to ruin in a few hours the naval
resources of Spain for half a century are within
the reach of a sufficient naval superiority without
requiring the disembarkation of any land force.1
The details must of course be examined, but if
they turn out such as they are commonly supposed
you will have the advantage of being able to
strike the greatest possible blow against Spain
without requiring even the least appearance

1 It is difficult to know how he gathered this opinion. Since
the partial success of Drake's naval raid in 1587, the opinion of
both services had always been that Cadiz could not be dealt
with effectually without a combined force.

THE MEDITERRANEAN 337

of preparation, as all that you send will seem
destined for the defence of Lisbon, and as the
principal part of the force required is already
collected in the neighbourhood of your point of
attack.1

You will find a very good detail of the un-
successful expedition under the Duke of Ormond
and Lieutenant-General Rooke,3 in Dalrymple's
Memoirs of Great Britain at the end of vol. 3 of
the octavo edition. I know you are not partial
to the author, nor am I, but that is no reason
for not making the best use of his information.
There is, I think, an account of the same business
in Burnet, but if I remember right it is, like all
his details, inaccurate and confused. I know not
where else to look for it. I know Simcoe had
considered this subject, but his ideas are of course
those of military attack.

Pray consider this point well. I know that
a sort of discretion was given in general terms
to Jervis, but he has not with him fire ships or
bomb vessels, both of which and particularly the
latter are indispensable, and may be disguised
as for Lisbon service.

Ever most truly yours,

P.S. — If you would let somebody copy for me
the paper I now return (unless the writer has any
objections) I should be very glad to have it by
me as a paper of reference.

[Endorsed : ' Lord Grenville to Mr. Dundas. Private. Com-
municated 1 9th November, 1796.']

1 See p. 338.

2 Sir George Rooke, by his commission (1702), was 'Admiral
and Commander-in-Chief.' Admiral Russell in 1694 had asked
for and obtained the rank of ' General ' to put him on a level
with his French and Spanish rivals. It is possible that Rooke
had a similar rank.

I. Z

338 THE SPENCER PAPERS

GRENVILLE TO SPENCER

Cleveland Row. 2yth January 1797.

My dear Lord, — In reading over again the
enclosed despatch from Wickham l with a view
to prepare the letters which are to go to-day by
Mr. Talbot, it has struck me that altho' these
papers, coming as they did after Hoche had
sailed, could not have been of use to us at the
time, they may throw some light as to the further
plans, if any, that may be acted upon, particularly
from Dunkirk. I have therefore sent them to you
and beg that when you have done with them you
will return them to the office.

The letter I had from Alicante speaks of the
intention of the Spanish fleet in the Mediterranean
to return to Cadiz. Would it be quite impossible
to put a part of our home fleets for a limited time
under Jervis's orders, and to let him by this
means have a very large force of ships ? — to
which 'you might add General Stuart and his army
from Lisbon * (when they get there) and so send
the whole for a sudden blow at Cadiz, of which
there could not be the least suspicion as the
greatest part of the force would be already at
Lisbon, and what you sent from here, being only
ships, would go out under the pretence of a
Channel cruise.

If you think this idea worth considering it
would be necessary to write to Jervis as soon as

1 See note ante, p. 153.

2 General Charles Stuart, commander-in-chief in the Mediter-
ranean, had been ordered on 3rd December to take command of
5000 troops for the defence of Portugal. They were to come
from Elba, but in fact through an error of the War Office they
remained at Elba till April, 1797. See Fortescue, vol. iv. pp. 512
and 601. The decision was taken early in November. See
' Dundas to Grenville/ Dropmore Papers, iii. 266.

BATTLE OF ST. VINCENT 339

possible to intimate to him the possibility of it,
to direct him to collect the necessary information,
&c., and particularly to instruct him to find
some pretence for delaying the transports or other
ships, whatever they may be, in which the troops
may come from the Isle of Elba. He must be
extremely cautious not to let the Portuguese
suspect it, as they would be frightened both at
the thoughts of being abandoned by the fleet and
troops, and at the certainty of offending Spain
beyond forgiveness by suffering their ports to be
made the rendezvous for such a plan.

Ever most sincerely yours,

(Lord Grenville to Lord Spencer.)

[Note on back of letter : ' Not acted upon.' *]

THE BATTLE OF ST. VINCENT

Extract from the 'Madrid Gazette,' 2 loth March,

1797

The account which Don Joseph de Cordova,
commander-in-chief of the Squadron in the Ocean,
gives of his action with the English squadron on
the I4th February last, off Cape St. Vincent, in
a letter written to His Excellency Don Juan de

1 But Lord Bridport on igth January had detached 5 of the
line and a frigate under Rear- Admiral William Parker to Jervis's
rendezvous off Cape St. Vincent, where they joined him on 6th
February, a week before the battle.

2 For the original Spanish see Duro, Armada Espanola, viii.
p. 92. This translation is very loose and evidently made by a
man who was unfamiliar with both the British and Spanish
terminology of seamanship and tactics. Amended readings are
given in the footnotes. Passages omitted are inserted in square
brackets from the original Spanish.

z 2

340 THE SPENCER PAPERS

Langara, dated the 2nd instant, at the entrance
of the Bay of Cadiz, is in substance what follows.

After having seen the gun-boats safe into
Algegiras, I entered into the ocean [with the
squadron under my command] and had the wind
from ENE to SE, which drove me into the meridian
of Cape St. Vincent, [not only because its violence
did not permit me to hold up to it, but also
because of the need to give convoy to the ureas
in bad condition and of very low speed.

On the night of the I3th the wind came round
from the SE by S to a vendaval,1 but seeing how
uncertain was the weather I found no opportunity
of sailing our true course till the morning of the
I4th, when the wind coming westerly I ordered a
course ESE. At 8.0 were heard some cannon shots
astern. As the horizon was much obscured and the
vessels of the convoy somewhat scattered,! decided
to tell off the ships San Pablo and Pelayo with the
frigate Mathilde to keep back with caution with
the object of protecting and reinforcing the scouts
(cazadores, lit. ' chasing ships '), which were sailing
in the rear-guard. This they did, hauling up for
the purpose on the starboard tack, and the rest of
the squadron carried on without change, formed
in three columns in order of convoy.2]

About nine in the morning some vessels on
the left indicated a suspicious sail being in sight
[bearing in the direction where our vessels of small
force were sailing] which I ordered the ship Prince

1 Local name for a strong wind S. by W.

2 For the bracketed passage the MS. has ' but a westerly
wind having sprung up on the morning of the I4th I steered my
course ESE, formed in three divisions or lines of convoy.' Order
of convoy was the normal sailing order recently borrowed from
the French.

BATTLE OF ST. VINCENT 341

of Asturias [112] to give chase to, as the best
qualified for it. A little after, the St. Firmin [74]
and Pearl frigate announced eight suspicious sail
in sight, and although the thickness of the weather
prevented their being seen from the Trinidada
(Santissima Trinidad 130) all the squadron
crowded sail ; and discovering by ten o'clock that
the vessels sighted were an enemy's squadron of
from fifteen to eighteen ships [of the line] with
several frigates, [which could be made out in
a clear interval,] I ordered ours to form in a
prompt and casual line of battle,1 [and clear for
action] hauling their wind on the larboard tack,
with a view of keeping the weather gage, and to
effect the evolution on that tack with more ex-
pedition than on the opposite one, considering the
position of the ships.3

In wearing the Prince [112], Regla [112], and
Oriente [74] fell so much to leeward that they
could not be incorporated in the line without
the risk of its being broke by the enemy who,
having met us as we came about in regular order
and with a press of sail, was then at a small
distance.3 In consequence I ordered those ships
to wear [virar, ' to go about '] and fall in the rear
of the line, and though the two first effected it,4
the Oriente could not, and was obliged to run to
leeward of the enemy.

The meeting of the lines was such that the
headmost ship of the enemy began the fire at

1 Literally ' a prompt line without regard to stations,1 i.e. to
form line as convenient.

2 The original has ' The disposition of my ships made it
more advantageous to form the line of battle on that tack than
on the opposite.'

3 who having met us, &c. Original has ' who in regular order
and on the opposite tack were already very close/

4 hicieron su virada por avante = succeeded in tacking.

342 THE SPENCER PAPERS

a quarter before eleven with the first ship ahead
of the Trinidada, from which point they ran by our
rear, tacking in succession, but at some distance.1
It is to be observed that the Trinidada [and the
Conception who took station and fought astern
of her (though little enough) in the forenoon] were
the last ships of our line ; its centre and van con-
sequently remained out of action.

The enemy's rear were considerably astern
[with wide gaps and two or three slow-sailing ships
to leeward of their line] ; on which account and to
avail ourselves in some measure of the fire of our
van, I made a signal at half past eleven that the
headmost ships should veer round,3 describe the
same circle 3 as the enemy, and double upon their
rear. This manoeuvre appeared [both to me and
my chief of staff, (Mayor-general) Frigate-captain
Don Ciriaco de Cevallos], the most expedient for
many powerful reasons which determined me to
order it, [besides those already stated. The first
because, as one ship and six frigates of the enemy
were far astern, we could easily cut them off and
prevent their falling upon part of our convoy to
leeward. The second, to prevent the loss of the
ship Oriente, who was isolated to leeward of the
enemy's line. The third was the doubt we felt
whether the Principe and Regla would be in time
to get into the wake of the squadron, in which
case, should the enemy fall on them, they would
be lost. Finally, to place our rear-guard in
position to batter the enemy in case they intended,
as seemed natural and opportune, to double on our

1 from which point, &c. Original has ' from which moment
(punto) the enemy bore up in succession to run along our rear-
guard.'

2 Virasen per redondo.= to wear.

3 Tomasen la propria vuelta = came on the same tack as.

BATTLE OF ST. VINCENT 343

rear and engage it with their whole force, as
indeed proved to be so. In such an event by
merely retiring our rear-guard, with the Principe
and Regla incorporated with it, the enemy would
be caught between two fires, and assuming we
had followed the tack they were first upon, without
going about this movement would serve to provide
unexpectedly, and with advantage, a considerable
body of ships to follow them up.

These and many others were the reasons of
convenience which induced me to order the
leading ships to take the same tack as the enemy
and to double upon the rear-guard,] but not being
able to execute it, as the ships to which it was
directed did not understand it, [in view of the
situation of both squadrons] I now looked upon
the loss of the Prince, Regla, and all our rear as
inevitable.

The proper moment of the intended move-
ment being passed I made a signal for all the
squadron to tack together,1 with the view of
contracting the distances from the enemy, bring
into action some more ships of our centre and van
[which were too much to windward] and enable
them to engage on the tack which the enemy
then appeared to have begun at the moment of
coming about.3 [When the moment for bearing
up came, the] Trinidada fell astern,3 closing the
enemy within musquet shot, which occasioned her
very considerable damage, having been fired upon
by the whole English line.

As soon as the head of that line had passed

1 arribase a un tiempo — to bear up together,

2 enable them to engage, &c. The original has ' to get them
into position for the fight en la vetivada ' (literally ' retreat/ but
here meaning apparently a i6-point turn to come back) which
the enemy's line seemed already to have begun.

3 se puso en pop a = put before the wind.

344 THE SPENCER PAPERS

across our rear, it tacked about and five or six
other ships did the same by counter-sailing,1
doubling us to leeward. When the last of the
ships destined for this object had finished its tack,
all the others came about at one time, and running
along our line on the starboard side, their ten
ships remained in consequence upon the other
side, firing at us, in a regular and powerful line,
by which manoeuvre they obtained a decision of
the combat in their favour. I was not diffident
in foreseeing this from the beginning, and there-
fore ordered a great while before that the ships
of the van should double on the lee of the enemy's
rear, and if six or eight more of the van had been
able to join seasonably with the Prince, Regla,
Oriente, and St. Firmin, they would have placed
the enemy between two fires, and the conclusion
of the action had been different.

When the enemy began the movement of their
tack in counter-sailing,2 the Prince and Regla
had not yet been able to gain the rear of our
line, but deriving notwithstanding every possible
advantage from their situation, incommoded and
fired on them in the moment of their evolution,
till they could extend their tack to get into the
wake of our squadron. [Certain quick-silver
vessels and the ship Firmin were also to leeward
of both lines, continuing to keep on the starboard
tack a long time, so that the last-named ship
could not get into action. The Oriente, which
should have tacked with the Principe and Regla

1 This was of course Nelson's independent movement.
' Counter-sailing ' probably represents the Spanish equivalent
of the French ' Virer par la contremarche ' (i6-point turn). But
this paragraph does not appear in Duro's version. In its place
are details of the Trinidad's damages.

2 Here the words are ' movimiento de retirada.'

BATTLE OF ST. VINCENT 345

and run to leeward, was able to join in the
afternoon.

After the English ships had tacked, they
passed our rear as far as the Trinidada increasing
their force, particularly against that ship, which
on account of the bad state of her rigging, fell to
leeward.1 Orders were given, by hailing and by
signal, for the ships Salvador [112], St. Joseph
[112], Soberano [74] and St. Nicolas [80] (which
were to leeward 2), to shorten sail and form under
our stern [in order to support us against the
enemy's squadron, which was divided and work-
ing to place us between two fires] which move-
ment they executed with brevity, entering into a
vigorous action [obstinate and without example].
At two o'clock, the van still remaining too much
to leeward, signals were made to come up, shorten
sail, and for a general attack upon the enemy.3

The Mexicano [112] was able to form upon
our bow about three o'clock and entered into
action with the headmost ship of the enemy's line,
which was employed the rest of the evening 4
against the Trinidad, San Josef, Mexicano, San
Nicolas, San Ysidro [74] [and Soberano], being
those that by themselves alone supported the
principal and hottest action with the enemy's
squadron.

In this situation — that is, against four times

1 This sentence should run : ' When the English ships came
about and ran down our rear-guard as far as the Trinidad they
concentrated their force particularly on that ship and the San
Isidro, giving and receiving an extraordinary fire. The evil
state of the Trinidad's rigging caused her to fall to leeward, and
as the bulk of the enemy were coming to concentrate on her,
orders were given,' &c.

2 In original : ' which were to windward (barlavento) and in
action.'

3 This sentence is not in Duro's version.

4 en el discurso de la tarde = in the course of the afternoon.

346 THE SPENCER PAPERS

their force, counting besides numbers the superi-
ority of their fire to ours — I being doubled on and
cut off from greater part of our said ships, and
they knowing that the enemy had no intention
of extending their attack beyond the Mexicano,
it would have been proper that our centre and van
should have veered to support us, but [they did
not do this, and] my ship wanting her topmasts,
running rigging, halyards, and every means of
making signals, it was not then in my power to
indicate that movement.

I cannot omit giving the due eulogium to the
valour with which the said ships, formed in my
rear, acquitted themselves in the action, but being
finally dismasted and disabled, some were obliged
to surrender and others to give up the action.

The Trinidada was battered all the evening
(afternoon) by a ship of three decks which lay to
her broadside and broadside, whilst three seventy-
fours cannonaded her [with grape and bar-shot]
upon the bows and quarters within pistol shot.
Whoever considers this state of things, and more-
over the rapidity and accuracy with which the
English handle their guns, can imagine what
must have been our condition at four o'clock,
after five hours' fighting. Besides having above
two hundred killed and wounded, her manoeuvring
powers were absolutely destroyed, [she had scarcely
an officer uninjured, and not a mast or spar un-
broken]. Notwithstanding which, she still con-
tinued the action for more than another hour.
[She had hardly a rope uninjured and not a mast
or spar whole. In spite of all this, with only her
fore-sail left, with more than 200 shot-holes and
her main yard in the slings . . . she was able to
keep headway and continue the action for another
hour. At last I determined to close to half pistol

BATTLE OF ST. VINCENT 347

shot with one of the ships that was battering me,
and as I bore down hard upon her, her main topmast
fell and the sail rendered most of my guns useless.

Others being dismounted, and those of the
first battery useless, I was absolutely incapable
of defence and suffering a horrible fire, that from
the tops being particularly galling, and the three
ships plying me with small shot with all their guns.
By that time the ship had eighteen inches of water
over the frame (cuaderna) ; the shot had left but
a single pump serviceable ; the main mast having
been struck twenty times was supported by a
single shroud and that fretted with grape ; the
mizen mast shattered and the main mast so torn
that it came down a few minutes after the action
ceased ; the guns in the batteries unserviceable
except six or eight ; dead and wounded in-
creasing every moment and in such numbers that
parties told off to carry them away scarcely sufficed
and were obliged to pile the dead and dying in
the batteries where they were stationed.

In this state of things I summoned the captain
and officers, and all were unanimously of opinion
that the ship could not carry on the action any
longer, my chief of the staff and aide-de-camps
(mi Mayor-general y ayudantes) expressing the
same view. I being equally convinced of this
could by no means do less than agree with the
opinion of intelligent officers who had been em-
ploying before my eyes all the ardour of glory and
that serene and quiet enthusiasm which is the
mark of true valour. Consequently I gave the
order to cease fire from the few guns that could
still be worked and for the other measures to be
taken to indicate our resolution to the enemy.1

1 This should settle the disputed question as to whether the
Trinidad actually struck or not.

348 THE SPENCER PAPERS

Such were the doleful circumstances to which
the Trinidada was reduced after six hours of an
incessant engagement, when the St. Pablo and
Pelayo [74' s] joined the action, which being kept
back by my orders in the morning came up with
full sail to the squadron the moment in which
they saw it engaged.

The reinforcement of these two ships suc-
ceeded to the lucky incorporation of the Conde de
Regla [and] the Prince [who] arrived a little after,
and our van [which till that moment had made no
movement, began to tack] ; which, being seen by
the enemy, they commenced a retreat, tacking
at the same time,1 covering the ships that had
surrendered, which were the San Josef, Salva-
dor [iia's], San Ysidro and San Nicolas [74's].

[So ended this memorable day in which our
constancy had to struggle not only with the valour
and skill of the enemy, but, what was worse,
with his luck]. Whoever follows the series of
events and accidents that happened from the
instant that we discovered the enemy, will [see
how every chance declared itself in his favour
and will] not be surprised at the ultimate con-
sequences of the action, [in view of the following
considerations. Since the enemy were cruising
in these waters,] it was natural that they should
have sailed in an order more easy to be con-
verted to the line of battle than our squadron
could perform it [being obliged to sail in order
of convoy,2] and steering with the wind large.
From whence it results that they were scarcely

1 The Spanish has ' bore up together and drew out of action.'

2 The British fleet also formed line as convenient. (See post,
P- 358-) Jervis signalled for the line of battle at n.o, which
seems to have been 10.15 Spanish time, as this account gives
10.45 as the time of the first shot, and the British accounts 11.31.

BATTLE OF ST. VINCENT 349

seen, when they were immediately formed in
order of battle, and so near to us to oblige me to
order a quick line without attention to station,
notwithstanding the unfavourable distribution,
as well of ships as commanders, which must
naturally follow. Add to all which, the Pelayo
and St. Pablo's having been separated by orders,
the St. Firmin and Oriente remained [unavoidably]
to the leeward of both lines and the Prince and
Regla, notwithstanding the diligence and correct-
ness of their manoeuvres, could not form up
till the evening, nor could the Firme, having lost
her fore top-mast, and they made all they could
of the situation ; it was not possible for them to
succour the ships engaged until the end of the
action ; so that only seventeen ships of my
squadron could form in order of battle, including
the St. Domingo, laden with quicksilver and of
very small force.

Of the seventeen ships above-named some
fought at intervals, and many did not come up
to fire a shot, with the result that all the enemy's
line were employed solely against six Spanish
ships, whose [obstinate and sanguinary] resistance
[stands as high as an actual victory and] is the
more worthy of praise as they were all destitute
of men sufficient to manage them.1

The Trinidada being absolutely dismantled
and without the power of using flags or lanthorns
for signals, I gave notice to Lieutenant-General
Don Joachin de Moreno that he should make the
signal to form and re-establish the line of battle

1 Here follows a passage explaining that he was from 3000 to
4000 hands short when he sailed from Cartagena, even after
embarking 1000 soldiers, who were ignorant of sea service, and
that his ship was so crank that he could not use his lower-deck
guns, and most of the shot from the others fell short into the
water because they lay over too much to get elevation enough.

350 THE SPENCER PAPERS

on the larboard tack [in case the enemy should
return to the attack before they were looked for.

Seeing what the condition of the Trinidad was,]
I gave my directions for raising jury masts, and
she was to be escorted by the frigate Mercedes on
the route to Cadiz, taking advantage of the
opportunity of wind [and darkness to hug the
coast as close as possible, which was feasible from
the nature of the wind] and of the enemy's
situation when night came on.

In consequence of this, I embarked myself
with my major-general and adjutants on board
the frigate Diana, sending various frigates l along
the line with instructions that the whole should
remain in the order which had been commanded
and should repair their damages with activity, with
the view of returning to action [in the morning.]
The squadron remained all night formed in order
of battle and laying-to on the larboard tack with
the wind from W to WNW till six in the morning
of the I5th when I ordered to veer round on the
other tack.3

My first attention after this was to ask by
signal what situation the ships were in for action,
to which the Conception, Mexicano, and Soberano
answered, that they were not in a state for a
second action] the Regla,3 Oriente, St. Pablo,
St. Pelayo, and San Antonio, that they were ; it not
being possible for me to perceive the answer of
the rest. Notwithstanding all which I continued
standing out, making nearly the course 4 on which
the enemy waited for me, who to the number of

1 Matilde, Paz, Ceres, and Perla.

2 To veer round, &c. The Spanish has ' to wear and form
on the same close-hauled line.'

3 Duro's version does not include the Regla.

4 haciendo el rumbo = steering on the bearing.

'BATTLE OF ST. VINCENT 351

twenty ships were seen after eight o'clock to the

ssw.

Being still undecided in my own opinion with
respect to the state of the ships of the squadron,
I asked in the evening if it was advisable to attack
the enemy. The Concepcion, Mexicano, St. Pablo,
Soberano, St. Domingo, St. Ildefonso, Nepomu-
ceno, Atlante, and Firme answered No ; the
Glorioso, Paula, Regla, and St. Firmin, that it
was proper to defer the action ; and the Prince, Con-
quistador, and Pelayo, alone, answered precisely
that it was advisable to engage.

But as I ought in the diversity of opinion,
[being obliged] to consider the answer of each
commander as the true expression of the par-
ticular state of his ship, I did not think it proper
to press sail upon the enemy, and especially as
the Mexicano, St. Domingo, and Soberano in-
formed me verbally that they had sustained very
serious damages, and the Atlante alleged her
want of people, a circumstance that this vessel
experienced in common with all the rest.

At three in the evening the enemy remained
to the ESE, and I ordered to steer to the SE,
which course was altered at five o'clock to SE J S
to pass Cape St. Vincent. In the ships that had
repairable damages they worked day and night
with activity, and to give time to those opera-
tions, I ordered at half past eleven that night
that the squadron, formed in order of battle,
should lay-to on the larboard tack.1

The i6th there were only seen some of the
enemy's scouts to the SE | S, to which point I
ordered to steer at seven in the evening with the
wind SW moderate, the ships sailing [in close-
hauled line] on the starboard tack. I entertained
1 Here follow particulars of emergency repairs.

352 THE SPENCER PAPERS

hopes of seeing [the body of] the enemy again
the next day, supposing them on their way
for Gibraltar [and that they would be compelled
to regulate their sailing to the low speed of
which their dismasted ships were capable]. But
at ten in the morning the I7th the Concepcion
announced by signal that the enemy were anchored
on the coast on the left side.

[Being anxious to obtain knowledge of the
fact and to leave no doubt in the intelligence,
I ordered her to pass under my stern, when she]
verbally informed me that they saw four large ships
anchored in Lagos. Our position did not permit
of our seeing the whole anchorage, but believing
that the enemy's squadron might also be there, I
ordered the line of battle to be formed on the
starboard tack, and placed myself at the head of
it.1 This measure being taken, I dispatched the
Bridget frigate to reconnoitre the anchoring place,
which she did [with judgment and sagacity a
mile from the coast,] counting all the enemy's
ships. The squadron made sail to get near, and
to fetch round the land on the starboard tack,2
continuing in that manner all the evening and
part of the night [till the return of the Brigida,
whose captain informed me that he had counted
in Lagos the captured Spanish ships and as many
as fifteen of the enemy, of which two were dis-
masted, and that the others made no movement
indicating an intention of coming out. In view of
all this, and the wind coming round to SE, I hauled
up to it on the larboard tack under easy sail].3

1 and placed myself, &c. The Spanish has ' me puse en facha
sobre el,' that is, hove-to on it (the starboard tack).

2 The squadron made sail, &c. The Spanish has ' The
squadron filled to approach the anchorage, and when abreast of
it hove-to on the starboard tack.'

3 Here Duro's version ends.

BATTLE OF ST. VINCENT 353

[ ' Gazette ' continued.]

He (Admiral Cordova) has not transmitted a
state of the killed nor wounded in the squadron,
as when he wrote the commanders of the rest of
the ships were not able to send him their respective
reports. But he says that by casual information
he knew that in the Conde de Regla the Rear-
Admiral Count de Amblimont died in the begin-
ning of the action by a cannon shot, the splinters
of which wounded Brigadier Don Gregorio Bravo,
captain of the ship, and Don Carlos Sellery,
lieutenant of frigate. In the Sovereign [Soverano]
the captain of frigate, Don Francisco Lees, died,
also the lieutenant of ship, Don Bernardino
Antillon, and another officer, whose name he did
not remember. In the Mexicano, Brigadier Don
Francisco Herrera and Cruzat was grievously
wounded, and expired in four days.

The killed in the Trinidada were Don Heracles
Guchi, ensign of the ship, and a midshipman ; and
the wounded, Don Francisco Alvarez, captain of
frigate, Don Juan Joseph Caurin and Don
Domingo Reynoso, lieutenants of frigates, the
pilot of the coast, Don Joachin Comacho, and
Don Antonio Castellanes, first pilot of the ship.

By the reports which Brigadier Don Pedro
Pineda, late commander of the San Josef, has
transmitted from Lagos, of the occurrences on
board her and the other three taken from us by
the English in the battle, we are also informed
that ten minutes after the action commenced
Rear-Admiral Don Francisco Winthneyson lost
his legs, in consequence of which he died that
night ; that Don Miguel de Doblas, ensign of ship,
perished also in the San Josef ; the first pilot

I. A A

354 THE SPENCER PAPERS

ranking as ensign of frigate, Don Santiago Cam-
pomar, was severely wounded, and, more slightly,
Don Francisco Ediaquez, ensign of ship, and
ensign of frigate Don Bartholomeo Morquecho,
having besides 46 killed, 56 grievously wounded,
above 50 slightly ; that in the Salvador her
commander, Brigadier Don Antonio de Yepes,
lieutenant of ship Don Miguel Roldan, ensign of
ditto Don Louis Corneillan, pilot ranking as
lieutenant of frigate Don Joachin Canso, and
second ditto, Don Manuel Illescas, perished ; the
captain of frigate Don Manuel Ruiz, and purser
Don Juan Francisco Martinez received contusions,
and there were besides above two hundred more
men killed or wounded ; that in the San Nicolas
(which was boarded by one of the three enemy's
that fought her) her commander, Brigadier Don
Thomas Geraldino died, also two ensigns of frigate
and one midshipman, a lieutenant and ensign of
ship, a pilot with the same rank, and a lieutenant
of Murcias Infantry were wounded, a lieutenant
of ship bruised, exclusive of 120 men killed and
wounded.

And finally in the San Ysidro, ensign of ship
Don Angel Maria de Laniella died ; the com-
mandant Don Theodora Argumosa, his second
Don Felipe Tournelle were wounded, the lieutenant
of ship Don Fermin de Argumosa (grievously),
Don Felipe Accevedo, and Don Augustin Roncali,
the ensign of ship Don Ramon Moyua, ensign of
frigate Don Joachin Verdugo, a midshipman and
first pilot, were also wounded, besides 41 killed
and wounded.

BATTLE OF ST. VINCENT 355

ADMIRAL SIR WILLIAM WALDEGRAVE*
ON THE BATTLE OF ST. VINCENT

Let the scoffer at Providence attend to the
following incidents and then doubt if he can.

Feb. ist. — Culloden parted company in chase.

,, 4th. — An American vessel came into our
squadron, consisting then only of
nine sail of the line, which intelligence
the master communicated to the
Spanish admiral.

,, 6th. — Rear- Admiral Parker joined the squad-
ron with five sail of the line.2

,, gth. — The Culloden and a cutter joined the
squadron.

,, 13 th. — Commodore Nelson joined the squad-
ron.3

,, I4th. — A fog concealing the smallness of the
British force enabled fifteen ships of
the line to attack the Spanish fleet
consisting of twenty-seven, seven of
which were three-deckers. The result
was two first rates, an 80- and a
74-gun Spanish ships being captured,
and La Santissima Trinidada of 130
guns being so disabled that she was
obliged to be towed off for Cadiz
during the night. This ship was in
so deplorable a state that, should she
arrive in Spain, there is little chance

1 Afterwards Lord Radstock.

2 From the Channel fleet. See note, p. 339.

3 In the Minerve, 38, from Elba with Sir Gilbert Elliot on
board and also Lieutenant-CoJkmel Drinkwater, the author of the
best account of the action.

A 2

356 THE SPENCER PAPERS

of her appearing at sea again during
the war.

Feb.i6th.— The squadron was forced into Lagos
Bay to secure our prizes, and repair
the damages that we had sustained
in the action. A few days after-
wards we experienced the tail of a
gale of wind. Had this blown home
every ship and man must have
inevitably perished, as, from the
badness of the ground, most of the
ships either drove or cut their cables.
The Victory, Irresistible, and Le Sal-
vador del Mundo parted their cables.

This requires a short explanation. The Ameri-
can captain had informed the Spanish admiral
that the British squadron consisted of only nine
sail of the line. This probably induced him to
seek us, or at least might protract his making
sail for Cadiz. On the I4th in the morning the
fog prevented any considerable number of ships
from being discovered at the same moment, unless
very near. One of the Spanish captains who was
afterwards made a prisoner, informed Sir John
Jervis that he was one of the look-out ships
on that day and that the instant he saw a
frigate and a cutter near him he was convinced
that our fleet was not far distant. He therefore
immediately made the signal for the enemy.
The Spanish admiral, probably relying on the
American's intelligence, and in consequence
despising the smallness of our force, paid no
attention to this, but suffered his ships still to
remain far extended, and in a certain state of
disorder. The Spanish captain then, in order
to rouse his chief (to use his own words), made

BATTLE OF ST. VINCENT 357

the signal that the enemy's force consisted of
forty sail of the line. We may fairly conjecture
that this sudden and unexpected sight threw
the Spanish admiral into the utmost consterna-
tion, and from that moment he considered him-
self as vanquished. We may likewise suppose
that the majority of his captains were no less
panic-struck, and this supposition was strongly
corroborated by the whole tenor of their sub-
sequent conduct.

Commodore Nelson's Receipt for Making a True
Olla Podrida

Take a Spanish first-rate and an 8o-gun ship,
and after well battering and basting them for
an hour, keep throwing in your force balls, and
be sure to let them be well seasoned. Your fire
must never slacken for a single moment, but
must be kept up as brisk as possible during the
whole time. So soon as you perceive your
Spaniards to be well stewed and blended together,
you must then throw your own ship on board the
two-decker, lash your sprit-sail yard to her mizen
mast, then skip into her quarter gallery window,
sword in hand, and let the rest of your boarders
follow you as they can. The moment that you
appear upon the 8o-gun ship's quarter-deck, the
Spaniards will all throw down their arms and fly.
You will then only have to take a hop, step, and
a jump from your stepping-stone and you will
find yourself in the middle of the first-rate's
quarter deck, with all the dons at your feet. Your
Olla Podrida may now be considered as completely
dished and fit to be set before His Majesty.

Nelson's New Art of Cookery.

[Endorsed : ' Facts from Admiral Waldegrave relative to the
action of I4th February, 1797.']

358 THE SPENCER PAPERS

ORDER OF BATTLE AT ST. VINCENT

The line formed as most convenient.

Culloden (74) Egmont (74)

Blenheim (98) Goliath (74)

Prince George (98) Britannia (100)

Orion (74) Captain (74)

Irresistible (74) Namur (90)

Colossus (74) Diadem (64)

Victory (100) Excellent (74)
Barfleur (98)

(signed) R. C.1

JERVIS'S PRESCRIBED ORDER OF
BATTLE*

Temporary Disposition of the Fleet in the
Order of Battle

' i. Blenheim (98)

2. Diadem (64)

3. Prince George (98; Parker's flag)

4. Irresistible (74)

5. Britannia (100; Vice- Adm. Thompson's flag)
6.

7. Captain (74 ; Nelson's broad pennant)
8,

9-
(io. Egmont (74)

1 Captain Robert Calder, Jervis's first captain. The order
differs slightly from that given by Laird Clowes.

2 The only special feature in this order is the tendency to
mass three-deckers as the van, rather than in the centre as had
been more usual.

BATTLE OF ST. VINCENT 359

11. Victory (100 ; Jervis's flag)

12. Culloden (74)

13. Orion (74)

14. Colossus (74)

16. Barfleur (98 ; Waldegrave's flag)

17. Excellent (74)
18.

19.

20. Goliath (74)
i. Namur (90)
Given on board the Victory off Cape St. Vincent,
6th February, 1797,

(signed) J. JERVIS.

To Captain Calder,

First Captain His Majesty's ship the Victory.
By command of the admiral,
GEO. PURVIS.

Exd. R. C.

PITT TO SPENCER

Downing Street. Monday, £ P.M.

My dear Lord, — It does not occur to me that
there can be any possible objection to your holding
the language you propose respecting Sir J. Jervis.
It would be right even with a view to making
him a viscount, but I agree entirely with you
that it would not be at all too much for the
occasion to make him an earl. Perhaps you
may have an opportunity of asking some of our
colleagues, before to-morrow, how it strikes them.

Yours sincerely,

W. PITT.

(Received 6th March, 1797. Private.)

PART VIII

HOCHE'S
EXPEDITION TO IRELAND

OCTOBER 13, 1796, TO MARCH, 1797

363

WARREN TO SPENCER

PRIVATE.

My Lord, — I am sorry to say the weather
being so bad since our leaving Falmouth five
days ago has prevented our getting to the west-
ward of Stilly ; and as your lordship's letter ex-
presses a wish for the squadron to return and be
in readiness to receive orders on the loth, if
none should arrive by this night's post I propose
anchoring in the road to-morrow and waiting your
commands, and also completing the ships with
water. I most sincerely hope we may at last
have directions to cruise, as we shall not other-
wise have an equal chance with our friends.

I have the honour to remain, with much
respect and regard,

Your Lordship's sincere humble servant,
JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

La Porno ne, off Falmouth. i3th October, 1796.
(Received zyth October, 1796.)

SPENCER TO WARREN
PRIVATE.

Dear Sir John,— I confess I am a little alarmed
at your letter of the I2th from Mevagissey Bay,
because, though I shall have great pleasure in
seeing you and your squadron bring in as many
and as rich ships as ever sailed from South

364 THE SPENCER PAPERS

America to Spain, at this particular moment
I feel extremely desirous that our frigates should
not stretch away too far from us, when we are not
quite sure that we shall not want you all for the
defence of the coast in case those mad enemies
of ours should venture to. attack it.1 It was with
this view that we had ordered you to return by
the loth instant, that you might not be too far
out of the way ; and with this view we have
again to-day called you back, though from your
letter to me I fear you will have got a good deal
to the southward of where we wished you to be.
We have likewise a very rich East Indian convoy
coming home, which may very well want a little
protection into the Channel.

On the subject of the chaplain to the Galatea,
I will consult our friends at the Board, and shall
be glad to do anything that can be done with
propriety to further your wishes, which seem to
have so very good an object.

Yours very faithfully,

JOHN SPENCER.

Admiralty. I5th October, 1796.
Sir J. B. Warren, K.B.

SPENCER TO WARREN
PRIVATE.

Dear Sir John, — The present situation of
things at Brest and the tenor of the orders which
we have in consequence of it been under the
necessity of giving to Admiral Thompson, who

1 By the plan of operations which Vice- Admiral Truguet had
drawn up the first division of the expedition under Hoche was
to sail at the end of October, but Hoche, objecting to dividing
his force, insisted on waiting till Richery arrived from America
and Villeneuve from Toulon.

HOCHE'S EXPEDITION 365

commands the squadron cruising off that port,1
making it absolutely necessary for him to have
the assistance of a considerable number of frigates,
we send you out to join him for a time and assist
the operations, which under these orders he may
think fit to adopt, intending by and by to release
you from the fleet and send you cruising again
on your old ground. I write this that you may
not be alarmed and fancy we are going to attach
you as a fixture to the great lumbering three-
deckers in the Western squadron.

Yours very faithfully,

SPENCER.

Admiralty. 2ist October, 1796.
Sir J. B. Warren, K.B.

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

My Lord, — I have just received the letter you
were so good as to address to me at Mevagissey
Bay this moment, and it affords me singular
pleasure to find that I had not proceeded to the
westward, but returned off Falmouth to receive
and execute your lordship's commands.

I have joined the fleet some time and looked
into Brest, and the particulars I make no doubt
Admiral Colpoys has ere this transmitted to
your lordship. I am not of opinion the French
are in a condition to undertake any invasion,

1 Vice- Admiral Charles Thompson. The Channel fleet or
Western squadron was now in three divisions — one under
Thompson before Brest, one under Curtis cruising to the west-
ward, i.e. in the approaches to the Channel, and the third under
Colpoys in reserve at Spithead. Colpoys relieved Thompson on
2Qth October, and Thompson's division went into reserve. The
idea was to deal with the armament that was preparing under
Hoche at Brest, its objective being variously reported as Ireland,
Gibraltar, and Portugal.

366 THE SPENCER PAPERS

notwithstanding the positions of troops and
appearance of things, but fear it is a diversion
to shade some operations elsewhere.

I do hope your lordship will think of us by
and by, and allow us to have an equal chance of
being useful with others.

I have the honour to remain, with much regard,
Your lordship's sincere humble servant,
JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

La Pomone, off Ushant.
8th November, 1796.

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

My Lord, — I have sent by the directions of
Admiral Colpoys a copy of my letter to him
respecting the French force in Brest Road, but
I must own it does not appear to me that they
are in a state to put to sea, and next month the
weather will be too severe for any land operations,
and trust that by that time Pellew may be in
a condition to relieve us. If Villaret should sail,
it can only be with a view of attacking Portugal
or joining Richery in some of the Spanish ports.1
Whatever may be the result, your lordship may
rest assured of my doing all in my power to

1 Intelligence on this point seems to have been very defective.
Richery had left Cadiz with De Langara as early as 4th August,
and having been escorted by a detachment of the Spanish fleet
300 miles to the westward, had proceeded to his original destina-
tion off the Newfoundland Banks. During September he and
his second, Allemand, were ravaging the coast and fisheries of
Newfoundland and Labrador. They returned independently
and, being headed off from Brest by our blockading squadron,
Richery made Rochefort on 5th November, and Allemand
L'Orient on I5th November. Vice- Admiral Sir James Wallace,
who commanded the North American station, had only one
50-gun ship and 3 or 4 frigates in his squadron, and was unable
to offer any opposition.

HOCHE'S EXPEDITION 367

execute your commands ; and I have the honour
to remain, with much regard,

Your Lordship's sincere humble servant,
JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

La Pomone, at Sea. I4th November, 1796.
(Received 2nd January, 1797.)

COLPOYS TO PELLEW

London, at Sea. nth-i2th December, 1796.

Dear Sir Edward, — I very highly approve of
the whole of your proceedings. It is a sad busi-
ness— Richery's having tricked us all in the manner
he has done.1 Pray direct Triumph and Phaeton
•to join me forthwith, and do you keep in shore
of us — but withall within sight of signal.

The Swift came to me last night with orders
for the Edgar to go to Spithead to join Lord
Bridport, but I have luckily detained her. From
the swell we have now I think it probable we shall
soon have a south-west wind, in which case I shall
go off the Lizard, and, if the weather comes very
bad, to Torbay.

I am very sincerely,
Your obedient humble servant,

THOMAS COLPOYS.

If you are obliged by stress of weather to quit
your station I would have you proceed to Fal-
mouth to be in readiness for returning off here the
first favourable moment.

(To Sir Edward Pellew.)

1 Richery, who by Truguet's plan was to take the second
division of Roche's expedition to its destination, had put out of
Rochefort on 8th December, and, evading Colpoys, slipped into
Brest on the nth. Only two of his ships were found fit to go
to sea again, but he was given command of a division which went
outside and continually drove off the British cruisers. See post,
p. 369-

368 THE SPENCER PAPERS

PELLEW TO SPENCER

My Lord, — Thinking it of much importance
that you should be informed of Monsieur Richery's
having entered the port of Brest, as soon as possible,
I have dispatched a ship to Falmouth for the
purpose of conveying the copies of such reports
as I have made and am now making to Vice-
Admiral Colpoys. There is now in Brest 21 sail
of the line appearing ready for sea, 2 of them
three-deckers, and 2 other three-deckers with
yards and topmasts down. I have no reason to
believe there are any transports or troops more
than common. We were so near in as to be fired
at from both sides of the Goulette and could
most distinctly see everything in the port. The
ships appear all clean painted as if newly fitted.
The squadron which went into port this day
seem'd to be refitted in sails and rigging but not
painted. We followed them close in within two
miles. How much it is to be regretted that this
squadron could not be intercepted, and more so
that our blocking fleet could not lay in Douarnenez
Bay, the finest and the safest that can be imagined —
no possible escape from Brest if this post were
occupied, but I believe so desirable an object
will never be attained. I thank your lordship
for having disposed of O'Brien. I sent him to
Falmouth yesterday. With all possible respect,
I am, my Lord, &c. &c. &c.

E. PELLEW.

(Private. Received I5th December, 1796.)

PELLEW TO SPENCER

My Lord, — Since my letter by the Amazon of
the nth instant, I must in a great measure refer

HOCHE'S EXPEDITION 369

you to the copies of my letters to Admiral Col-
poys. After the arrival of Richery I was chased
off every day by a squadron of 6 ships which
made it very difficult to reconnoitre the port, and
which indeed, by the enclosed letter from the
admiral he did not intend I should, as your
lordship will there see that I was not to be out
of sight of his signals. However, a blowing day
made me luckier. The squadron in Bertheaume
had to unwillingly remain at anchor. I therefore
worked up with my three ships towards them
and they suffered me to approach near enough
to see the fleet getting under way to make sail.
When the fleet approached the advanced squadron
in Bertheaume Road they also weighed and
chased me off. I then despatched the Phoebe
to the vice-admiral, 10 leagues west of Ushant.
Would to Heaven I could have got him nearer ;
the miserable moments I now feel would have
been spared.

At daybreak yesterday, after having worked
to windward all night, keeping sight of the French
squadron, I despatched my lugger to the admiral
with my report and that I was then proceeding
to determine if the fleet had left the port or not
and that I would then send him my last report
by La Revolutionnaire. By three in the after-
noon I made them all at anchor in Camaret Bay
and Bertheaume, but it was not possible to count
them ; and just as I had closed my letter No. 2
I saw them all again under way coming out. I
then added to my letter a postscript informing
the admiral that we counted in all 36 sail, and
that I had clear sight of 9 ships of the line forming
the van with 6 frigates leading them directly for
the Passage du Raz, and that many large ships
were in the rear of which I could not speak, only

I. B B

370 THE SPENCER PAPERS

that 5 or 6 of them appeared to be of the line.1
I sent a verbal message by Captain Cole saying
that I would certainly go thro' the Passage
du Raz with them if they attempted after dark
that passage, and in the morning I would go round
the west end of the Saints and look for him on
his rendezvous, which I intreated might [be] cor-
rectly kept ; and if the fleet came down the Bay
to the northward of the Saints that after seeing
them round I would repair to him.

This latter circumstance happened. The night
look'd threatening and after the leading ships,
of which I kept abreast, approached close to the
Passage they bore along the north side of the
Saints very close, as your lordship will perceive
by the traverse of my motions, and by eight
o'clock 16 or 18 sail had haul'd round the end of
the bank to the south-west. I then pursued the
routes marked down in the enclosed traverse for
the admiral, and it grieves me to the heart to say
that I have not yet met his fleet. If I could have
found him at midnight the happiest effects might
have followed. I have just now fallen in with
my lugger who put his letter on board the Marl-
borough at ii A.M. yesterday the i6th. The
Revolutionnaire, tho' dispatched at four o'clock
(before dark last night), I have this morning
spoken equally unfortunate. The weather is hazy
with small rain, wind at SE to SSW. Our

1 The fleet under Vice- Admiral Morard de Galles, who had
replaced Villaret, was 17 of the line, 13 frigates, 6 brigs, and
8 transports. The troops numbered about 18,000. None of
the Admirals sailed in their flagships. Morard de Galles and
Hoche were in the frigate Fraternite, Rear- Admiral Bouvet was
in the frigate Immortalit6, and Rear- Admirals Nielly and Richery
in two others. At the last moment Morard de Galles would
not face the Raz, and led for the Iroise Passage, but few ships
saw his move or his signals and the fleet became divided.

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HOCHE'S EXPEDITION 371

diligence shall never cease till we find him ; God
grant it may be soon. If I do not meet him
to-day among a thousand perplexities and diffi-
culties I shall give the French fleet only 24 hours'
start from last night and shape my course for
Cape Finisterre and so on to Lisbon to alarm
that Court, as I conjecture by their hauling to the
SW they may be going there. I counted at least
41 or 43 sail ; from 26 to 29 were ships of war, 2 or 3
large store ships, the rest small ships and brigs.

God knows, my lord, if I shall be doing right,
but left in a wilderness of conjecture I can only
say that the sacrifice of my life would be easy if
it served my gracious King and my country.
I have left sufficient look-out for the admiral,
and the absence of my ships can be nothing to
the mischief which may ensue from this fleet at
Lisbon. I trust myself to you, my Lord, upon
this perhaps most important crisis of my life.
My motives are pure and disinterested ; I must
leave them to your mercy, and subscribe myself
with all possible respect,

Your lordship's most devoted servant,

ED. PELLEW.

I enclose a traverse of our courses since the
time the fleet came out until twelve last night,
since which we have been working about. I have
not time to copy my public letters for your
lordship.

(Private. Received 2oth December, 1796.) l

1 This endorsement shows that the news of the French sailing
was received sooner than James believed. (See Naval History, ii.
23.) He says Pellew anchored at Falmouth on the 2oth and
then sent up the news, but clearly his message was received at
the Admiralty on the 2oth. (Cf. post, p. 396.) For the dispatch
sent from Falmouth on the 2oth see next document.

B B 2

372 THE SPENCER PAPERS

PELLEW TO SPENCER

Indefatigable, Falmouth.

2oth December, 1796, 10 A.M.

My Lord, — By this opportunity I have stated
to the Board the motives which have actuated
my conduct upon the recent transactions off
Brest.

The moment Richery's squadron arrived I
foresaw the immediate execution of some pre-
determined plan and this it was that determined
me to keep very close to the port even in contra-
diction to the admiral's commands expressed in
the letter I now enclose. I expressed my wishes
to him by Captain Barlow l that he would allow
2 or 3 of his line-of-battle ships to work up to
me, that I might by their presence get nearer to
reconnoitre, particularly to keep the advanced
squadron at Bertheaume at rest, who now daily
chased me out as far as Ushant. The admiral
thought that Richery's arrival made it more
necessary to concentrate his fleet, which he call'd
into close order. However, I bless God that he
received from me the very earliest information
of their first motion. I am also full of hopes
that Captain Cole 2 has found him, in which case
there was nothing left to communicate. Barlow
I know joined him the night before, so that the
admiral must be satisfied they were moving in
force.3 I flatter myself, and I don't see how it
can be otherways, that the admiral is gone to

1 Captain (afterwards Admiral Sir) Robert Barlow of the
Pho3be, 36.

2 Captain Francis Cole of the ReVolutionnaire, 38. He did
not join the Admiral till the 22nd.

3 The Phoebe did not find the admiral till the igth, at 9.30 A.M.
when he was in lat. 48° 41' N. long. 5° 43' W (about 30 miles NW

ROCHE'S EXPEDITION 373

the southward and to westward. We have so
often cross'd his track that it is impossible he
could be there, and I have returned here, blowing
a gale of wind, to gather information and take a
new departure immediately.

The gales have been such as I think will most
likely separate the French fleet. They could
not have advanced 50 or 60 leagues from the
Saints when the wind changed. Had that not
happen' d I should have push'd past them for
Lisbon. This change makes it unnecessary. I
am sorry I cannot speak with absolute certainty
upon the strength of the enemy. From what I
could see (and it was almost dark before the rear
came out) I should rate them from 15 to 18 sail
of the line and about 10 frigates, as it is possible
the whole may be out, in which case they are 24,
but by their staying from Sunday to Friday
after Richer y arrived it is likely the arrangement
of men might fall short. I had at first seeing
them made the admiral the offer of my Inde-
fatigable in his line if he should be outnumbered,
and I trust, my lord, that you will believe I did
my utmost to furnish him with the best informa-
tion. The event, my lord, is not upon me.

I have nothing left to explain to your lordship
that is not fully spoken of in my letter to the
Board, but I have to return my best thanks for
your appointment of Mr. Bell. I fear I shall go
out of my senses if I do not get a better assistant
to second me than Mr. Thomson,1 and yet a more

of Ushant) . The only ships he sighted were Villeneuve's squadron
from Toulon trying to make Brest, which on the 23rd he chased
into L' Orient. For his subsequent movements see the next
letter.

1 John Thompson, his first lieutenant. He was promoted
commander for the action with the Droits des Hommes (see post,
p. 381) and died in that rank in 1804.

374 THE SPENCER PAPERS

worthy man does not exist. I am, my lord,
entirely upon your mercy and in fullness of grati-
tude,

Your lordship's most respectful

and most devoted humble servant,

ED. PELLEW.

My Lord, — I have nothing of Admiral Colpoys
here which increases my hopes that he is suffi-
ciently informed upon the sailing of the enemy's
fleet. I shall depart with a cheerful heart in a
few hours.

My lord, I am, &c., &c.,

E. PELLEW.

I hope I shall be excused for sending this by
post office express, as I feel that you, my lord,
will of course be anxious.

(Private. Received 22nd December, 1796.)

SPENCER TO LORD CAM DEN1
PRIVATE.

My dear Lord, — I trust from what we hear from
all quarters I may now safely congratulate you
upon the total failure of the invasion projected by
the French on Ireland, and though we have not
as yet heard from Lord Bridport since he sailed,
I cannot help yet feeling very sanguine in my
expectations that he will have arrived in time
on the coast of Ireland to fall in with at least a
considerable part of those who may have escaped
the fury of the elements.2 After the disappoint-

1 Charles Pratt, first Earl Camden; since March 1795, Lord-
Lieutenant of Ireland.

2 Lord Bridport did not fall in with any of the returning
French ships.

HOCHE'S EXPEDITION 375

ment however which I experienced on Admiral
Colpoys' missing them and being driven by the
violence of the same storm, by which they must
have suffered so much, up the Channel, I cannot
help still retaining some anxiety lest any accident
should have prevented the appearance of our
fleet before the enemy were clear off ; and I am too
well acquainted with the sort of agitation and
impatience which most naturally attends cir-
cumstances of this kind not to feel that a con-
siderable degree of it may probably have arisen
during the late alarm in Ireland on not seeing a
British fleet at the same moment that the enemy's
appeared. I cannot avoid seeing too the sort of
impression which may possibly be made by this
sensation even on the firmest and best friends of
the Government ; but I flatter myself that a
simple statement of the case, with the usual official
documents which support it, will give a distinct
and unanswerable proof of the exertions of
Government here to give as speedy and effectual
protection to Ireland as the nature of the case
would permit.

Our not having been informed of the French
force being directed towards Ireland till so late
as the evening of the 3ist was an extraordinary
circumstance, but I cannot think it turns out to
have been at all an important one, for we could
have given no other orders than what we had
already given for ten days before that. Had we
received the information as soon as possible, and
had we given the orders, the state of the wind and
weather would not have permitted Lord Bridport
to sail before he actually did sail. Add to this,
till the 3ist we were not aware of Admiral
Colpoys' return, and concluded him to be in pur-
suit of the French fleet, which from the station

376 THE SPENCER PAPERS

which he cruised in off Brest he infallibly must
have seen, if the weather had not proved so ex-
tremely thick that it was with the greatest difficulty
that he could even keep his own ships together.
His return up Channel was produced by absolute
necessity, for having received no positive infor-
mation of the destination of the enemy, and
knowing that the weather was such as to make it
most probable they would be dispersed, he could
only keep his station off Brest as long as the
continuance of the easterly winds or of moderate
westerly winds allowed him ; and on its coming to
blow hard from the SW, which it did on the 2Qth,
he bore away to his rendezvous off the Lizard,
where he had a better chance of gaining authentic
intelligence from us or of being joined and re-
lieved by Lord Bridport as soon as his fleet could
sail. From this rendezvous he was driven by
the violence of the weather and many of his ships
were obliged to put into different ports of the
Channel in a disabled state, which would also
infallibly have been the fate of part if not the
whole of Lord Bridport 's fleet had he been able
to get to sea on the 25th, the day on which he
got under way and dropped down to St. Helens :
and the inevitable consequence would have been
that instead of having a powerful squadron ready
to sail from home in addition to one already at
sea (or on the event of the latter having been
driven in) we should have remained for some
time with none at all.

I trust and hope with a strong persuasion of
my hopes being well founded, that by this time
they have had more causes than the mere violence
of the elements for repenting their ill advised and
rash attempt, and that we shall still have the
pleasure of seeing a large proportion of their

ROCHE'S EXPEDITION 377

shattered remains arrive safely in the Irish or
English ports.

The French papers of the 7th (which I have
this moment seen since I wrote the above) mention
the return of nine or ten sail (ships and frigates)
to Brest, and state the rest not to have been
heard of.

Believe me, my dear Lord,

Yours very truly and faithfully,

SPENCER.

Admiralty. I2th January, 1797.
(To Lord Camden.)

CAM DEN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

My dear Lord, — I trust you will give me
credit for having always entertained a conviction
that every step which could be dictated by
promptitude and " prudence had been taken by
the Admiralty, and if I had wished to have had
that opinion confirmed it is completely so by the
statement I received last night by a messenger
of the Duke of Portland's. I am yet to learn
what induced ministers to think the expedition
was designed for Portugal, for I confess myself not
to have received any information which seems to
give ground to dispute the detailed and constant
intelligence which had been communicated to me
of the preparations being meant for Ireland.
However, altho' that opinion was entertained,
Colpoys did not act upon it, but even before he
had received any intimation of the destination
of the Brest fleet, he made for his rendezvous
which was peculiarly convenient for his sailing
to this country and totally out of the way to
Portugal.

378 THE SPENCER PAPERS

You are very naturally not surprised that the
anxiety and alarm which has pervaded the
country should have given rise to observation
upon the danger to which this country has been
and is exposed from invasion, and the fact of no
fleet having appeared off our coasts for 3 weeks
is perhaps more alarming after the explanation
than before, because it proves that with every
precaution and every attention on the part of
the Admiralty the purpose of the French had been
nearly accomplished.

I trust however the feelings which have been
excited may be turned to the best purpose. They
must convince and they have convinced the
inhabitants of Ireland that a fleet alone cannot
defend them. They must form a well regulated
army ; they must endeavour to secure strong
positions. I can tell you, however, they will
expect a strong squadron at Cork. I am by no
means prepared to state any opinion upon that
measure, and I can conceive it may be incon-
venient, but it is the opinion of many persons
that it would be desirable for Ireland to be at
the expense of equipping them. You are aware
I only mention this circumstance as part of
the considerations of the day and not at all as a
measure to be adopted.

I am persuaded the French will make another
attempt. The intelligence you will have received
from Kingsmill l will show the strength they now
have in Brest, and the addition of ten ships already
at that port will enable them speedily to fit
another expedition. They cannot pursue so good
a game and it is one upon which their interest
and their amour propre are so much concerned

1 Vice-Admiral Kingsmill, commanding the Irish cruiser
squadron.

ROCHE'S EXPEDITION 379

that I am convinced they will undertake it. It
will be better worth their while to employ a fleet
crippled in point of general strength in this sort
of expedition than in any other. I am so per-
suaded of this probability that I shall take what-
ever measures occur to me to give internal strength
— I hope the ministers in England will act also
under this expectation. There is a great cry
against absentees, and some of my friends, who
are the best friends to English connexion, have
been indiscreet in their language, but I am happy
to say they hold and entertain now very different
sentiments.

I cannot but look with anxiety tho' with

little expectation to our being relieved from the

cares which occupy us by a peace, but we must,

I conclude, prepare at least for the next campaign.

Believe me, my dear Lord, ever yours,

CAMDEN.

P.S. — As a proof of the satisfaction which
the friends of Government entertain at the conduct
of the Admiralty, it was suggested at a meeting
I had here, that no justification of the Admiralty
was necessary in my message, as it might argue
that we thought them to blame, but Pelham 1 will
take an opportunity of stating the circumstances
and the message has been altered accordingly. — C,

(Received aoth January, 1797.)

PELLEW TO SPENCER

Indefatigable, Falmouth. i7th January, 1797.

My Lord, — I am labouring under some diffi-
culty in communicating with your lordship from
my want of certain knowledge of my invaluable

1 See ante, p. 33, note 2.

380 THE SPENCER PAPERS

friend Captain Reynolds.1 We have been very long
brothers in affection and my grief would never
cease should any misfortune on this occasion
happen to him. We were both, my lord, in immin-
ent danger, but I believe my ship was rather most
crippled during the first onset before Reynolds
could get up. I therefore conclude the Amazon
to have been in a better stale than myself when
we hauled off. If she is safe my heart will be at
ease.

I fear your lordship will think me rather
imprudent on this occasion, but what can be done
if an enemy's coast is always to frighten us and
give them protection as safely as their ports?
If Lord Hawke had no fears from a lee shore
with a large fleet under his charge, could I for a
moment think of two inconsiderable frigates ? I was
anxious to tow this nondescript to England ; for
indeed, my lord, I cannot tell you what she was.
All those about me believe her a ship-of-the-line
without a poop. Two tier of guns she certainly
had, and I should think not less than 6 or 700
men. When he endeavour 'd to run me on board
his lion-head was at least 6 feet above our taff-
rail, and a heavy fire of musketry assailed us
through his head doors. In fact, my lord, we
must patiently await intelligence from France.
I have great doubt if any person can be saved ;

1 Pellew in the Indefatigable (44) and Reynolds in the Amazon
(36) had met, about 50 leagues SW of Ushant, the Droits des
Hommes (74), returning with General Humbert on board from
Ireland. They fought her from 5.30 P.M. on I3th January all
through the night in a heavy sea till past 4.0 next morning,
when land was sighted close ahead. The Indefatigable hauled
off and got clear, but the Amazon, very much injured, ran aground
half an hour later. She became a total wreck and her company
were made prisoners. The Droits des Hommes was also lost
with nearly all her crew, numbering about 1000. For a full
description of the action see next letter.

HOCHE'S EXPEDITION 381

the surf was tremendous and beating quite over
them. I have placed him on the chart about
3 or 4 miles to the southward of Audierne Town.
She must have suffered prodigiously ; our expenses
alone was above 100 barrels of powder. I never
experienced such severe fatigue. The ship was
full of water, the cockpit half-leg deep, and the
surgeon absolutely obliged to tie himself and
patient to the stantions to perform an amputation.
We broke no less than 28 gun breechings, besides
drawing several ring bolts thro' the side. We
were, however, fortunate in having no men killed,
and many of the wounded are but slight from
splinters. My worthy old lieutenant, Mr. Thom-
son, who has weather'd many a battle, received
rather a severe contusion on his breast and
shoulder. The surgeon is apprehensive the latter
will be troublesome. I entreat of your lordship
the favour of making him a commander. He is
truly a deserving man, and I trust will obtain
your favour altho' we have not brought the enemy
to England.

I cover to your lordship the copy of my letter
to the Board. It is very long, but I could not
make it shorter to be intelligible. I shall entreat
your lordship to curtail it if you think proper.

The Indefatigable must go into a dock ; there
are many shot very low in her bottom and her
Lisbon complaint in one part is leaky. I beg of
your lordship to direct her defects to be made
good that we may get again to sea.

I had a fair opportunity of looking into Ferrol,
where there is only one ship of the line and two
frigates.

I cannot speak too highly of my officers and
men. I beg of your lordship to give them all a
step without our parting ; it can be done by

382 THE SPENCER PAPERS

making the Indefatigable a fourth-rate as a mark
of your approbation of their conduct. Your
lordship will remember that none of them got
any promotion on taking La Virginie. Little
Cadogan is a most delightful boy.1 I think he
promises to be everything the heart can wish
He is stationed on the quarter deck, where, I
assure you, my lord, he was my friend. He stood
the night out in his shirt and kept himself warm
by his exertions. I cannot say too much in his
praise.

I have thus, my lord, run over a night of
severe difficulties. I entreat your indulgence to
my errors, your favourable opinion being the
height of my ambition, and there is no exertion
I would not make to obtain it. Being with very
high respect,

Your lordship's most grateful and

most oblig'd servant,

ED. PELLEW.

PELLEW TO THE ADMIRALTY.

Indefatigable, Falmouth. lyth January, 1797.

Sir, — I have the honour to make known to you
for the information of the Lords Commissioners
of the Admiralty that on Friday last the I3th
instant, in latitude 47° 30' N, Ushant bearing
NE 50 leagues, we discovered at half-past noon
a large ship in the NW quarter, steering under
easy sail for France. The wind was then at
west, blowing hard, with thick hazy weather.
I instantly made the signal to the Amazon for a
general chase, and followed it by the signal that
the chase was an enemy. At 4 P.M. the Inde-
fatigable had gained sufficiently upon the chase

1 Probably the Hon. George Cadogan.

ROCHE'S EXPEDITION 383

for me to distinguish very clearly that she had
two tier of guns, with her lower deck ports shut.
She had no poop, and according to my judgment
she was a French ship en razee. At a quarter
before 5 I observed with considerable regret that
she had carried away her fore and topmasts.
The Indefatigable at the same instant lost her
steering-sail booms. The ship at this time was
going ii or 12 knots, blowing very hard and a
great sea. I foresaw from this that the escape
of the enemy under her lower masts only in a
stormy night of 14 hours' continuance, should
her defence prove obstinate, was very possible,
and I believed as a ship of large force that she
would be induced to persevere in her resistance
from the expectation that we should be apprehen-
sive of entangling ourselves upon a lee shore
with the wind dead upon it.

The instant she lost her topmasts I reduced
my sails to close reef 'd topsails, and at 15 minutes
before 6 we brought the enemy to close action,
which continued to be well supported on both
sides near an hour, when we unavoidably shot
ahead. At this moment the Amazon appeared
astern, and gallantly supplied our place, but the
eagerness of Captain Reynolds to second his friend
had brought him up under a press of sail, and after
a well supported and close fire for a little time,
he unavoidably shot ahead also. The enemy,
who had nearly effected running me on board,
appeared to be much larger than the Indefatigable,
and from her very heavy fire of musketry I believe
was very full of men. This fire was continued
until the end of the action with great vivacity
altho' she frequently defended both sides of the
ship at once.

As soon as we had replaced some necessary

384 THE SPENCER PAPERS

rigging, and the Amazon had reduced her sail,
we commenced a second attack, placing ourselves
after some raking broadsides upon each quarter,
and this attack, often within pistol shot, was by
both ships unremitted for above 5 hours. Then
we sheer'd off to secure our masts. It would be
needless to relate to their lordships every effort
that we made in an attack which commenced at
a quarter before 6 P.M. and ceased not but at
intervals until half-past 4 A.M.

Night actions should not be inconsiderately
engaged in, but in ,this instance everything was
to be hazarded or the escape of the enemy was
absolutely certain, and altho' she was running
for her own ports, yet the confidence I felt in my
own knowledge of the coast of France forbade
me to listen for a moment to any suggestions of
danger therefrom. I placed also some consider-
able reliance that her commander would not
voluntarily sacrifice his ship and his crew by
running her for a dangerous part of the coast,
and I promised myself to see the day before we
should have run down our distance. But in fact
every creature was too earnestly and too hardly
at work to attend exactly to the run of the ship,
and I believe 10 hours or more severe fatigue was
scarcely ever experienced. The sea was high, the
people on the main deck were up to their middles
in water, some guns broke their breechings four
times over, and some drew the ring-bolts from
the sides, and many of them were repeatedly
drawn immediately after loading. All our masts
were much wounded, the maintopmast completely
unrigg'd, and saved only by uncommon alacrity.

At about 20 minutes past 4 the moon opening
rather brighter than before, shewed to Lieutenant
George Bell, who was watchfully looking out on

HOCH&S EXPEDITION 385

the forecastle, a glimpse of the land. He had
scarcely reached me to report it when we saw
the breakers ; we were then close under the
enemy's starboard bow, and the Amazon as near
upon the larboard. Not an instant could be lost,
and every life depended upon the prompt execu-
tion of my orders, and here it is with heartfelt
pleasure I acknowledge the full value of my officers
and ship's company who, with incredible alacrity,
hauled the tacks on board, and made sail to the
southward. The land could not be ascertained,
but we took it to be Ushant, and in the Bay of
Brest, crippled as we were, I had no particular
fears ; but before day we again saw breakers
upon the lee bow; the ship was instantly wore
to the northward, and myself satisfied that the
land we had before seen was not Ushant. The
lingering approach of daylight was most anxiously
look'd for by all, and soon after it opened we
saw the land very close ahead. We again wore
to the southward in 20 fathoms water, and in a
few minutes after discovered the enemy, who had
so bravely defended herself, laying on her broad-
side, and a tremendous surf beating over her ;
and the miserable fate of her brave but unhappy
crew was perhaps the more sincerely lamented
by us from the apprehensions of suffering a similar
misfortune. We passed her within a mile in a
very bad condition, with 4 feet water in the hold,
a great sea, and the wind dead on the shore ;
but we had ascertained to a certainty our situa-
tion to be that of Audierne Bay, and our fate
depended upon the possible chance of weathering
the Penmarck Rocks. Exhausted as we were with
fatigue, every exertion was made, and every inch
of canvas set that could be carried, and at n A.M.
we made the breakers, and by the blessing of
i. c c

386 THE SPENCER PAPERS

God weather 'd the Penmarck Rocks about half
a mile.

The Amazon had haul'd her wind to the
northward when we did to the southward ; her
condition I think was better than ours, and I
knew that her activity and exertions were fully
equal to them. The judgment with which she
was managed during so long an action and the
gallantry of her attacks could not but warm the
bosom of every spectator, and to the heart of
a friend it was particularly delightful. I have
full as much reason to speak highly of my own
officers and men, to whom I owe infinite obliga-
tion, the Lieutenants Thomson, Norway, and Bell,
Lieutenants O'Connor and Wilson of the Marines,
and Mr. Thomson the master, have abundant
claims upon my gratitude as well as every inferior
officer in the ship,.

The sufferings of the Amazon are unknown
to me. I am singularly happy to say that my
own is inconsiderable. The first lieutenant, Mr.
Thomson, a brave and worthy officer, is the only
one of that description wounded, with eighteen
men, twelve of which number have wounds of
no serious consequence, consisting chiefly of
violent contusions from splinters. I have the
honour to enclose the minutes of this action,
together with a state of the damages sustained
therein, and shall in a few days proceed to Ply-
mouth to be ready to receive their lordships'
orders for the repair of the said defects, and am,
with great respect, Sir,

Your most obedient and humble servant,

ED. PELLEW.

Evan Nepean, Esq.

ROCHE'S EXPEDITION 387

MR. ELLIOT TO SPENCER

Dublin, House of Commons,
Tuesday Night, iyth January, 1797, \ past n.

My Lord, — On my arrival here this afternoon I
found the House sitting on the subject of the mes-
sage, which was delivered yesterday, and the con-
sideration of which had been postponed till to-day.

Mr. Grattan in the course of his speech made
some animadversions on the delay of Lord Brid-
port's fleet. He was answered by Captain Paken-
ham, who was followed by Mr. Pelham, Sir
Hercules Langrishe, and several gentlemen on
the same side of the House. The sense of the
debate has been in the highest degree satisfactory,
and, except on the part of two or three of the
leaders of the Opposition, there appears to be a
general and perfect conviction that no exertion has
been omitted by the Admiralty, which could have
been made for the protection of the Irish coast.

The House is still sitting, but it is thought
the minority will not hazard a division.

I flatter myself your lordship will excuse the
liberty I have taken of sending so very short
and imperfect a sketch of the debate, but as I
have not been in bed since Friday I really am
so fatigued that I am unable to enter into a
longer detail. If, however, Mr. Cooke should
have time to write before the post goes out, I
will desire him to transmit to your lordship a
more circumstantial report.

I enclose a copy of the message, and am with
the greatest truth and respect, my lord,

Your lordship's most obedient and

humble servant,
WILLIAM ELLIOT.

(Received 2ist January, 1797. Private.)

c c 2

388 THE SPENCER PAPERS

WARREN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

My Lord, — I make no doubt but that your
lordship will be surprised at receiving a letter
dated from this place, where I have just received
the honour of your favour dated the I4th ultimo
from Falmouth. The SW winds and foggy
weather have detained us until now, altho' all
the squadron are out of the harbour and waiting
with anxiety to depart. It is hard to have been
so unfortunate as we have been lately, but I
earnestly hope that the blind goddess may still
bestow her favours upon us. I have ventured to
enclose your lordship a copy of Lord Bristol's1
remarks upon the Bay of Brest and Douarnenez,
and if I am not mistaken there is a similar one,
together with a chart, lodged at the Admiralty.
(It must have been nearly about the time of
Lord Hawke's command, off Ushant, 1759 ; as I
have just finished reading an account of the late
Lord Bristol's attacking and capturing several
Swedish merchantmen that had come through
the Passage du Four, and were endeavouring to
get into the Goulet in the month of July of the
same year, when he commanded the Monmouth [64]
and Pallas frigate in company. It is contained
in 4th vol., p. 252 of Entick's General History of
the late War.) If our fleet should be drove towards
the Channel, the best and a most excellent road,
where Admiral Spry3 anchored with all his fleet,
is that of Mevagissey, situated near the Dodman.
It will contain 14 sail of the line, and requires

xThen Commodore Augustus Hervey, the most brilliant of
Hawke's in-shore commanders.

2 Rear- Admiral Thomas Spry (formerly Davy), who got his
flag in the July promotion, 1795.

HOCHE'S EXPEDITION 389

only 24 hours' sail to regain the station off Brest,
and I really think preferable to Torbay. This,
with the Bay of Douarnenez, would keep the
enemy entirely in check, and without the fatigue
and expense of masts and yards, so far at sea to
the westward.

I rely upon your lordship's kindness to excuse
my mentioning these circumstances in confidence
to yourself. I also trust you will pardon the
freedom I make use of when I state to you that
I think it would be of much use to our little
squadron if it were possible, after this cruise, I
were honoured with the command of the Tigre
[74] upon the Falmouth station, as it is easy to
find good anchorage in that harbour for two or
three sail of the line ; and if that had been the
case upon the late event of the French invading
Ireland, I am convinced that we could have done
something handsome with them. I have two or
three followers, such as my purser and boatswain,
whom I wish to provide for, and in no way could
it be done with so much satisfaction as in the mode
I have mentioned. If ever such a change should
take place, it would be an additional obligation
to see my friend Keats1 succeed me in this ship,
as his zeal and abilities would be fully rewarded
by it, and whenever the former ship was ready a
fortnight would be sufficient to effect the change.

In suggesting my thoughts so freely however
to your lordship I beg leave to say that if it
should be impracticable or disagreeable to you, or
occasion the alteration of station, I should be
sorry to enter into it, and [would rather] continue,
notwithstanding my seniority and the severity
of our present service, as usual ; and I rely upon

Afterwards Sir Richard Goodwin Keats. He had been
commanding the Galatea, 32.

390 THE SPENCER PAPERS

your lordship's candour and goodness to again
pardon my saying anything upon the subject.

I have the honour to remain, with much
regard,

Your Lordship's sincere humble servant,

JOHN BORLASE WARREN.

La Pomone, Cawsand Bay. i8th January, 1797.

P.S. — I shall be under the necessity of return-
ing here after the cruise to refit in rigging and to
have a new knee to the head, and also to have the
ship paid ; but all this may be done, I trust,
without going higher up the harbour than Barn
Pool ; the other ships will go to Falmouth.

Lord Spencer's Answer on back of letter.

' PRIVATE.

' Many thanks to you, dear Sir John, for your
letter with the observations from Lord Bristol
which appear^to be very accurate and particular.
I beg you will never make any apologies to me
for sending me any information you may deem
useful.

' I am afraid the Tigre is far from being ready
yet. We have had so much to do at Portsmouth
with all these crippled ships, that I do not know
when she will be so. The wind seems come round
from the northward this evening here, so if you
have the same, I conclude you will be off before
this reaches you.

' Believe me, dear Sir,

' Yours very sincerely,

' SPENCER/

Admiralty. 24th January, 1797.

ROCHE'S EXPEDITION 391

CAMDEN TO SPENCER
PRIVATE.

Dear Lord Spencer, — I enclose you a letter I
have received from Lieutenant Pulling. His very
extraordinary zeal and alacrity in taking some
prisoners who had broken their parole introduced
him to my knowledge and gave him the oppor-
tunity of soliciting me to trouble you. All that
[I] undertook to do was to mention his name to
you. I am informed by Colonel Uniacke, D.Q.M.
General in Munster, that the lading of near one
hundred ships in victualling stores remains upon
the quays at Cork and that there were very few
transports lying there for their cargoes. This
great store is conceived at Cork to be an additional
temptation to the French to visit that part of
the kingdom, and the inhabitants are infinitely
anxious it should be sent away.

Believe me, my dear Lord,
Most sincerely yours,

CAMDEN.

Dublin Castle. 22nd February, 1797.

NOTES BY LORD SPENCER ON THE
FAILURE OF THE FLEET TO INTER-
CEPT HOCHE'S EXPEDITION l

Whether the fleet was properly disposed at the time
the French Expedition sailed?

The general disposition of the fleet when the
French fleet sailed from Brest, on the I7th
December.

1 Apparently notes for a speech delivered in defence of the
Admiralty during the debate in the House of Lords, i6th
March, 1797.

392 THE SPENCER PAPERS

Admiral Colpoys off Brest with 15 line-of-
battle ships, and 7 frigates, under orders to watch
the enemy's motions, looking frequently into Brest,
and to take every means to intercept them if
they should sail.

Lord Bridport's fleet consisting of 15 line-of-
battle ships at Portsmouth, to which it was pro-
posed to add a 64 then at Plymouth, and a 50
with 7 frigates, 2 fireships and a sloop.

The greatest part of the ships-of-the-line of
the last squadron had only returned from sea on
the i8th November, after having remained out a
fortnight longer than was intended, having been
detained by an easterly wind which kept them
from coming up Channel. They could not there-
fore be ready before about the middle of December,
and were all actually ready on the morning of the
25th when they got under way.

The whole of the Cork squadron under Admiral
Kingsmill, consisting of a 64 and several frigates,
were out cruising for the purpose of strengthening
and protecting several homeward-bound convoys
expected about that time, in which cruise they
all suffered extremely from the violence of the
weather.

The expectation of these convoys made it still
more desirable for Admiral Colpoys to keep his
station off Brest till he could be relieved by Lord
Bridport.

Why Admiral Colpoys was not Stronger

If it is asked why Admiral Colpoys's squadron
was not more numerous, it should be stated that
though in numbers of line-of-battle they were
2 inferior to the French fleet which sailed, there
being 4 three-deckers in the squadron made them

ROCHE'S EXPEDITION 393

fully equal to the 17 French ships which was
what the number the enemy's squadron was by
all the information received expected to consist
of.1 Their number of frigates were certainly
inferior to that of the French, but had the fleets
met, which in any tolerable weather could scarcely
have been avoided, there is no doubt of Admiral
Colpoys's being a perfect match for them,

(Note, ' Pellew's Squadron/)

Why Admiral Colpoys Remained on his Station
after the French Fleet Sailed

The state of the information received on the
destination of the French fleet left it very un-
certain whether they were bound to Ireland or
Portugal (some channels of intelligence pointed
at more distant objects). It was therefore
advisable for Admiral Colpoys, before he took
any decided course, to obtain some information
which might lead him to conjecture their destina-
tion, and from the very great tempestuousness
of the weather since their getting into motion on
the i6th (of which he received early intelligence)
and the circumstance of his falling in with the
Toulon squadron, he was naturally led to believe
that the enemy's fleet was dispersed, which formed
an additional reason for him to remain off Brest
in order to intercept any stragglers who might
have been obliged to return to that port.

1 This is one of the many passages which indicate the tendency
of the British Admiralty to count one three-decker as equal to
two 74's in the line-of-battle. On this basis Colpoys with 4 three-
deckers and ii others would have 19 units. The French had
one 80, and sixteen 74*3. So that Colpoys would be fully equal
to them.

394 THE SPENCER PAPERS

Why Admiral Colpoys returned

Till Admiral Colpoys was informed of the
enemy's being actually sailed it was not advisable
for him to quit his station, and when he was
informed of it his uncertainty of their real destina-
tion, added to the probability from the weather
and the other circumstance above mentioned of
their having been dispersed, made it most prudent
for him to keep his station till he should either
be relieved by Lord Bridport, or [have] received
more certain intelligence of the enemy, or be
driven from it by a strong westerly wind ; in
which case he announces in his letter of i8th
December to the Admiralty he proposed coming
off the Lizard as the best position either to receive
fresh orders and instructions or to meet Lord
Bridport in his way down Channel. The latter of
these three cases happened, and the gale which
induced Admiral Colpoys to bear up for the Lizard
continued so violently that it drove him up the
Channel, and he then judged it best to return to
Spithead, which he reached with 6 of his ships on
3 ist December ; the rest put into Plymouth and
Torbay, except the Powerful, who was ordered to
make the nearest port on the 26th, having received
some damage in a gale of wind, and the Swiftsure,
who, having lost a topmast, parted company
before the signal was given for bearing up to the
Lizard and accordingly remained out some days
looking for the admiral on his former rendezvous.

Whether Colpoys 's Fleet was in a Fit Condition to
Keep the Sea

Much has been said on the subject of Admiral
Colpoys's squadron being unable to keep the sea

ROCHE'S EXPEDITION 395

from the state of their provisions. It is true
they had been out rather longer than it was
originally intended they should be, but that was
only the case with a part of the ships. Of the
fifteen, seven had been at sea since the middle of
October, of which seven three went out victualled
for foreign service,1 and were accordingly pre-
pared to stay much longer at sea ; five others
had been from eight to nine weeks and two be-
tween four and five weeks. One ship only had
remained out from the beginning of September
and had consequently been between sixteen and
seventeen weeks at sea before she returned, but
this was entirely owing to her appearing to the
admiral to be in such good condition that when
he was directed to send her home in the month of
November he sent in another ship which happened
to have received damage and to be less fit for
service. The quantity of provisions on board of
some of the ships on their return may possibly
have been a good deal reduced, but that must
have been owing to their having spared pro-
visions to others when at sea,2 and this is par-
ticularly instanced in the Powerful who had very
little water remaining when she arrived at Cork
on the 3ist of December, having been at sea about
eleven weeks, though she was one of those which
when they sailed were victualled for foreign
service.

1 Note in MS. : ' It is presumed the 7 alluded to were the
last that sailed, viz. the Duke, Majestic, Defiance, Edgar, Minotaur,
Impetueuse, and Swiftsure, which were only victualled for Channel
service and sailed since the I5th October ; the others sailed before,
or on that day.'

2 Note in MS. : ' They had not been put to short allowance.'

396 THE SPENCER PAPERS

As to Lord Bridport's Sailing

Before the news of the sailing of the French
fleet arrived the intention of the Admiralty was
that Lord Bridport should sail with his squadron
as soon as they could be got ready for two pur-
poses : the one to take up Admiral Colpoys's
station off Brest for the purpose of watching the
enemy's motions, and of relieving those of his
ships which had been a sufficient time at sea ;
the other to detach a reinforcement of five sail of
the line to the Mediterranean fleet and Sir John
Jervis, then expected to be either at Gibraltar
or Lisbon. Lord Bridport hoisted his flag on
the igth.

On the 20th the news reached London that
the French had sailed on the iyth and were last
seen steering to the SW. From the known
position of Admiral Colpoys at that time, there
was every reason to suppose that he would fall
in with them ; and if he did, it was not too much
to expect that he either would defeat or at least
follow them wherever they might go, and as Sir
Edward Pellew's intelligence, on which it was
likely that Admiral Colpoys might act, tended
to the opinion of their being destined to the
southward, it became necessary to direct Lord
Bridport's attention to the other most probable
point of attack — Mediterranean. He was accord-
ingly ordered to proceed with all possible dispatch
to Colpoys's rendezvous and, not finding him, to
go off Cape Clear, by which movement he would
have had the best chance both of reinforcing him-
self with the freshest ships of Colpoys's squadron,
or if he missed him (which would probably be
owing to his being gone in pursuit of the enemy)
of being in a situation to defend the coast of
Ireland. He was by the same orders directed if

HOCHE'S EXPEDITION 397

possible to look into Brest, in order to ascertain
the state of things in that port, lest the enemy's
fleet should have slipped back behind Colpoys
and returned, or a second division should have
been preparing to sail (which was rather to be
expected from some of the information received).1
There was reason to expect that this squadron
would have been ready to sail on the 23rd, but
from some accidental and unforeseen delays in
the completion of the St. George (Admiral Parker's
flag ship) they could only get under way on the
25th with the wind at SE. The tide served so
late that there was scarce time for all the ships
to turn down, and in consequence of their doing
so, too near to one another, from their anxiety
to reach St. Helen's that evening, some of them
ran foul of one another and one got aground for
a short time. By this accident the Prince was
disabled, and the rest of the ships still at Spithead
(being 7 of the fifteen) came to an anchor there.
The next day it blew very hard from the SE as
also on the 27th, and on neither of these days
could any of the ships move from Spithead ;
neither could Lord Bridport have moved with
safety from St. Helen's even if it would have been
proper for him at that time to have sailed with
only 8 ships. On the 28th the whole squadron
dropped down and anchored at St. Helen's, and
then the wind changed, and on the 2gth blew a
hard gale at SW. It continued contrary till the
evening of the 2nd January, and on the morning
of the 3rd the fleet sailed.

1 Note in MS. : ' These orders were afterwards counter-
manded and he was directed not to lose time in shewing himself
off Brest or in seeking for Admiral Colpoys. It strikes me, without
better information of the course which his lordship took, that he
did not comply strictly with his orders, and in consequence of hi*
standing out too much for Brest, gave the French an opportunity
of leaving Ireland before his arrival.'

398 THE SPENCER PAPERS

PRECIS OF THE FOREGOING NOTES

Intelligence admitted to point out that an
expedition was preparing which had for its object
an attack most probably directed either to Ireland
or Portugal.

Nature of intelligence received in time of war
makes it very difficult to form so accurate a
judgment on it as to justify acting upon one part
of it rather than another. Impossibility of dis-
closing intelligence with propriety, for disallowing
a part only would not give any means of judging,
and disclosing the whole would be improper, and
the more so as it must be useless unless the several
quarters from which it was obtained were also
made known.

That part therefore of the subject must be
withheld from the public view, and it must rest
upon our assertion that our intelligence only
generally pointed at the two above-mentioned
objects.

With that intelligence the fleet was so disposed
as to give the best probability of intercepting the
enemy in going out, or if missed, of overtaking
them wherever they might be destined :

Colpoys off Brest ;

Lord Bridport at Spithead ;

Cork squadron cruising :

The ist to intercept the French fleet and to
cover our returning trade.

The 2nd to be in readiness to follow them
when their destination should be better known,
or to meet them if they came behind Colpoys into
the Channel.

The 3rd to strengthen and protect the home-
ward-bound convoys then expected.

HOCHE'S EXPEDITION 399

Colpoys

Orders to Colpoys such as to give the greatest
probability of his being informed of any motions
at Brest and falling in with them if they sailed.

His Strength

His number of ships and strength in guns
equal to any force the French were likely to send
to sea.

Why he remained off Brest

His reason for remaining off Brest after the
enemy sailed very fully and satisfactorily explained
by his letter of the 23rd December. He had
received no positive information of their destina-
tion, and the weather, added to the circumstance
of his meeting the squadron from Toulon, con-
vinced him they were dispersed, in which case his
wisest plan was to remain where he might most
probably intercept them.

Why he retired to Spithead

When he found himself driven off his station
by a strong westerly gale of wind his object was
naturally to go off the Lizard as he was there more
likely to meet with Lord Bridport, whom he
expected, or to receive any intelligence or orders
which might be sent to him from the Admiralty.
This he attempted to do, but was driven by stress
of weather up the Channel, and with a part of his
ships anchored at Spithead, the rest having put
in more or less damaged to Torbay and Plymouth.

400 THE SPENCER PAPERS

State of his Provisions

The detention of Lord Bridport's division
longer than was originally intended at Spithead,
first from their not being refitted so soon as they
would if Sir R. Curtis had come in at the period
at first expected, and secondly by the delays
occasioned by the weather, necessarily was the
cause of Colpoys remaining longer out than was
intended, as he could not be called in till the other
squadron had relieved him. On this account the
provisions of some of his ships were shorter than
is generally to be wished, and one of them was
very deficient in water, and was sent in for that
cause, though if the weather had been more
moderate she need not have been sent in as she
might have been supplied a second time as she
was a few days before from some other ships of
the fleet.1 A defect in the head of the ship is also
assigned as a cause for her having been ordered
to part company in Admiral Colpoys's letters of
the 24th and 28th December. There is no pre-
tence for saying that Colpoys was obliged to come
in for want of provisions, for even on the 28th
December he says that he shall proceed as high
up as the Lizard to wait for orders for his further
proceedings, and with respect to fuel, if it were
possible that he could have been in want of it,
he would certainly have mentioned it either in
his return or his letters, more especially as he
does mention it in speaking of the St. Fiorenzo,
which ship he ordered in on that account on
the 26th.

1 Note in MS. : ' See Colpoys' Journal, 2ist December.'

ROCHE'S EXPEDITION 401

Lord Bridport

Lord Bridport was preparing to sail before the
news of the French fleet having moved arrived.
He was to relieve Colpoys, keeping with him such
of the ships as were fittest to keep the sea, and
to detach Admiral Parker to Sir John Jervis.
On the 20th the news arrived of the French fleet
having sailed. Colpoys was expected to fall in
with them, or in case he did not, as there was a
chance of their coming into the Channel, it was
rather advisable to have a strong squadron in this
station. That however was impossible from the
continuance of the easterly winds immediately
after their sailing, and Lord Bridport was ordered
to sail immediately, pointing his attention more
particularly to the protection of Ireland, as there
was every reason to suppose that Colpoys would
pursue them should they take a southward course.

INDEX

ABERCROMBY

ABERCROMBY, General Sir
Ralph, expedition to West
Indies, 51, 152, 159, 165-
190 passim. Letters from,
171-2, 178-9 ; letters to,

15. 5i, 133-4. 136, 142, 159,
161, 163, 167, 169-70, 173-5,
176, 179, 180, 185, 189, 201,
213, 214, 215, 217, 241, 281,

295, 323
Address to Parliament, from

the Navy, 194, 200
Admiralty, 10, 179, 183, 194-

5» *98, 379 ; first - lord's

patronage, n ; Lords of,

xiv, 10 n., 12, 115, 234 ;

organisation of, 7-15
Affleck, Vice-Admiral Philip,

xiv, 10
Alge£iras, 340
Alicante, 338
Allemande, Captain Zacharie,

265, 366

Alvarez, Don Francisco, 353
Amblimont, Rear - Admiral

Count de, 353
America, South, proposed

operations in, 326
American War, 20
Americans, 158, 262, 272, 355
Amsterdam, 303
Antigua, 59

Antillon, Don Bernardino, 353
Appreciations, by Buckingham,

303-4 ; Camden, Earl, 378-

9 ; Christian, Admiral, 141-

4 ; Dundas, 148-9, 153,

BAKER

1 60, 240, 317-8, 321-2, 330-

i ; Jervis, Sir John, 4, 55-7 ;
the King, 320 ; Middleton,
51-2, 149-50 ; Nay lor, Mr.,
257-9 ; Spencer, Earl, 323—
9 ; Smith, Sir Sidney, 23,
36-9 ; Warren, Sir J. B.,
104-5, 365-6 ; Windham,
William, 19-21, 25, 122-3

Archangel trade, 17

Archduke Charles, 299, 302,

319, 335

Archer, Captain, 60
Armament of ships, 25, 59,

107, 145-6, 245, 306, 315.

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