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Full text of "Proceedings of the United States Naval Institute"

Vol. 43 



FEBRUARY 1917 



No. m 



..^....^^.....J ||||||||||f|'T^f,'^||,'j9|7,T,r,P>i|BLI^^^ LIBRARY 



United Svd'^^z'^ 
Naval Institu 

Proceedings 



2670 



GENEALOGY 

973.001 

AAINAVI, 

1917, 

FEP 





'MADE IN AMERICA" 
insulation" lOUIS STEINBERGER'S PATENTS 

LIGHTNING-PROOF INSULATORS 

1000 TO 1,000,000 VOLTS 
INSULATORS ARE STANDARD WITH 

UNITED STATES NAVY «»? ARMY 

AND WIRELESS TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE COMPANIES 



No. 7490 




No. 6634 



Sole Manufacturers 



60-82 Washingtoi St. 66-76 Front St. 
27-37 York St. 1-23 Flint St. 

BROOKLYN, N. Y., AMERICA 



Please mention the PEOOEEDINGS when writing advertisers 



-- «»* - 'MADE IN AMERICA 

aEau.s^T.oFF.airaMioiw 

INSULATION LOUIS STEINBERGER'S PATENTS 

LIGHTNING-PROOF INSULATORS 

1000 TO 1,000,000 VOLTS 

INSULATORS ARE STA 

UNITED STATES NAVY 

AND WIRELESS TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHO 





No. 7490 




Sole Manufacturers 



No. 6854 




60-82 Washingtoi St. 66-76 Front St. 
27-37 York St. 1-23 Flint St. 

BROOKLYN, N. Y., AMERICA 



Please mention the PHOCEEDINGS when writing advertisers 



INDEX TO ADVERTISEMENTS 



jManiifacturers of or dealers in 



Post office address 



Page 



Bethlehem Steel Co. 

C 
Cohn, Herman 

Col't's Firearms Co.. 



South Bethlehem, Pa. 



Continental' Iron Works, 
The 

D 
Davidson Co., M. T 



Outfitter Chief Petty and Warrant 
Officers 

Revolvers, Automatic Pistols, Ma- 
chine Guns 

]\Iorison Suspension Furnaces 



45 Sands St., Brooklyn, N. Y. 
Hartford, Conn 



Du Pont de Nemours Pow 
der Co., E. I. 



S^team Pumps, Pumping Engine 

Condensers, Evaporators, etc. 
Du Pont Powder 



West and Calyer Sts., N. Y., 
Borough of Brooklyn 

43-53 Keap Sit., Brooklyn, 

N. Y. 
Wilmington, Del 



Electric Boat Co. 
ElectroseMfg.Co. 



Goldschmidt Thermit Co.. 

Griscom-Russell Co., The. 

I 
International Nickel Co.. 

I nternational Printing Co. 



Submarine Torpedo Boats ti Fine St., New York, N. Y.i....24 

Electrose Insulators :6o-82 Washington Street, 

j Brooklyn, N. Y. 

Thermit Process |The Equitable Building, 120 ....14 

I Broadway. New York 

Engineers-Manufacturers :2i52 West St. Bldg., New ....19 

\ York 

Nickel for Nickel Steel {43 Exchange Place, Newi..-.20 

I York, N. Y. ! 
U. S. :\Iarine Corps Score Book. . . . '236 Chestnut St., Phila., Pa 21 



Journal of the U n i t e djMagazine Fort Monroe, Va. 

States Artillery I 



Lidgerwood Mfg. Co 


Hoisting Engines 


96 Liberty St., New York, 
N. Y. 


.5. 


Lord Baltimore Press, The 
National Review The . 


Printers and Bookbinders Greenmount Ave. & Oliver 

St., Baltimore, Md. 


....20 


Magazine •>"-• TT.'ftVi a, to ivfo«, v„,i. 




Navy League of the 
United States 




725 Soutbern Bldg., Wash- 
ington, D. C. 








Navy Publishing Co., The. 
R 


Magazine 


518 Southern Bldg., Wash- 
ington, D. C. 


• •■ 23i 




Roelker.H. B 


The Allen Dense Air Ice Machine. 41 Maiden Lane, New York 


....19 


S 








Schrader's Son, Inc., A... 




783-791 Atlantic Ave., Brook- 
lyn, N. Y. 


....21 





BOOKS 



PUBLISHED BY THE U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE 

U. S. Naval Institute Proceedings, Annapolis, Maryland. 

Published monthly. Annual subscription to the Proceedings for non- 
members, $3.00; s'ingle copies, 30 cents for monthly, 50 cents for 
bi-monthly and quarterly Proceedings. Foreign postage SO cents. 

Members or subscribers desiring to receive their copies of the Pro- 
ceedings bound in cloth may do so by the payment of $3.50 per year 
in addition to their dues or subscription, of which 50 cents is for 
postage. 

Members or subscribers desiring to have their copies of the Proceed- 
ings bound in half Morocco may have the work done through the 
Institute at a price of $1.50 per cover, postage or carriage additional. 
The Proceedings of each year stripped and bound, make two con- 
veniently sized volumes. 

NAVIGATION 
Navigation and Compass Deviations (Revised and Enlarged, 
igii). 

By Commander W. C. P. Muir, U. S. Navy, formerly Head of 
Department of Navigation, U. S. Naval Academy. A practical treatise 
on navigation and nautical astronomy, including the theory of compass 
deviation, prepared for use as a text-book at the U. S. Naval Academy. 
Though written primarily for use of midshipmen, the various subjects 
have been so presented that any zealous student possessing but a slight 
Jcnowledge of trigonometry may be able to master the methods given. 

I^1no, yds 4- xvi pages, illustrated by diagrams and many text figures. 
Price $4.20. Postage paid. 

Elements of Hydrographic Surveying (igii). 

By Lieut. Commander George Wood Logan, L^. S. N. All branches 
of the work connected with a marine hydrographic survey as ordi- 
narily carried out have been completely described, and the book is, 
therefore, available for purposes of reference for naval officers and 
others who may be engaged in such work. 

i^mo, 176 pages, full cloth. Price $1.50. Postage paid. 

A Practical Manual of the Compass (Revised, 1916), 

The revision consists chiefl}' of the addition of a chapter on service 
instruments and one on the gyroscopic compass. A valuable book for 
navigators and officers preparing for promotion. 

Originally prepared by Lieut. Commander Harris Laning, U. S. N., 
for the use of midshipmen to give them a sufficient knowledge of com- 
pass work to enable them to efficiently care for and use compasses on 



Publication of books marked with an asterisk (*) has been discontinued. 
The Institute, however, holds copies which may be obtained until the present 
edition becomes exhausted. 

■ Catalogue of books published bj^ the Institute containing detailed 
description and list of contents was published in the January number of 
the Proceedings and may be obtained on application to the Secretary and 
Treasurer, U. S. Naval Institute. 

(2) 



BOOKS—Continited 



board ship. The complex mathematical theory of the deviation of 
the compass and the derivation of formulae have been entirely omitted, 
but a sufficient explanation of causes and effects is given to enable the 
student to understand any ordinary problem that may arise. The book 
contains all the most recent data on the subject of compensation of the 
compass as well as copies of all the forms used in compass work with 
an explanation of how to use them. 

7 X loYz in., 146 pages. Bound in flexible cloth. Price $1.50. Post- 
age paid. 

Copies of first edition of this book on sale at 75 cents, postage paid. 



MARINE ENGINEERING 
Naval Reciprocating Engines and Auxiliary Machinery 
(" Naval Engines and Machinery," Revised and En- 
larged, I 9 14). 

By Commander John K. Barton, U. S. Navy, Former Head of De- 
partment of Marine Engineering and Naval Construction, U. S. Naval 
Academy. Revised by Comdr. H. O. Stickney, U. S. Navy, recently 
Head of Department of M. E. and N. C. U. S. Naval Academy. 

A text-book for the instruction of Midshipmen and for officers pre- 
paring for examination, fully illustrated with upwards of 260 text 
figures, and 48 plates 8x10 inches bound separately. 

8vo, 619 pages, full doth. Price $4.90. Postage paid. 

Marine and Naval Boilers (191 5). 

By Lieut. Commander Frank Lyon, U. S. N.. and Lieut. Commander 
A. W. Hinds, U. S. N. Revised by Lieutenants W. P. Beehler and 
John S. Barleon, IJ. S. Navy, of the Department of Marine Engineer- 
ing and Naval Construction, U. S. Naval Academy, under the super- 
vision of the Head of the Department. 

This book was prepared in order to provide an up-to-date text-book 
for the midshipmen at the U. S. Naval Academy. Plates and descrip- 
tions include the most modern boiler installations on naval vessels. 
The great gain in fuel economy made possible by»the combination of 
gas analysis with intelligent firing is fully described. The causes of 
boiler corrosion with the practical methods of its prevention are in- 
cluded. A study of the book should furnish all the information neces- 
sary for the efficient handling of a boiler plant. This book has been 
revised to May, 1915. 

The book is profusely illustrated by text figures and 16 folding plates. 

8vo, 404 pages. Bound in full cloth. Price $3.25. Postage paid. 

Steam Turbines. 

A treatise covering U. S. Naval Practice. By Lieut. Comdr. G. J. 
Meyers, U. S. Navy, of the Department of Marine Engineering and 
Naval Construction, L^ S. Naval Academy. 

This book covers turbine installations in the U. S. Navy with 
chapters on the elementary principles of design and construction. 
Especially adapted for use of midshipmen and officers of the navy 
and for an elementary text-book in colleges and universities. It was 
written to fill the want of a text-book more for the student and operat- 
ing engineer than for the designer. Illustrated with 165 text figures. 
9 plates II X40 inches showing half cross sections of the latest Curtis 
and Parsons turbines. 

Bound in full cloth. Price $4.50. (Subject to change.) 
(3) 



BOOKS— Continued 



Experimental Engineering (191 1). 

By Commander U. T. Holmes, U. S. Navy. 

In attempting to revise the volume of " Notes on Experimental 
Engineering," compiled by the author in 1907, so much new matter 
was at hand, and so many changes were found necessary, that it was 
deemed advisable to re-write the whole book. 

The new book should be of great assistance to those officers who 
wish to embrace the many opportunities to record valuable engineering 
data and make proper deductions therefrom. 

Sz'o, 311 pages, 152 illustrations, cloth. Price $2. IS. Postage paid. 

Mechanical Processes (191 2), 

Ry Lieut. G. W. Danford, U. S. Navy, Instructor in the Depart- 
ment of Marine Engineering and Naval Construction, U. S. Xaval 
Academy. 

Giving an account of the materials used in engineering construction 
and of the essential features in the methods of producing them, also 
describing shop processes and equipment for the shaping of metals 
into forms for engineering and general uses. 

Effort has been made to present the subject matter in brief and 
elementary form, with sufficient detail to outline methods and prin- 
ciples clearly. It is intended to show completely, though briefly, the 
steps of metal manufacture from the ore to the finished product, so 
that the student may be enabled to classify all branches of metal 
manufacture, and may pursue intelligently such study as will give 
fuller information than is possible to include herein. 

8vo, 421 pages, 270 illustrations, full cloth. Price $3.75. Postoi^c 
paid. 

Handy Book for Enlisted Men of the Engineer Department 
(1915). 

By Midshipman B. R. Ware, Jr., U. S. Navy. 

A brief, practical aid for the men composing the engineer department 
of a sea-going ship. 

88 pages, flexible buckram cover. Price 40 cents. Postage paid. 
The Institute does not publish this book but will supply it to 
individuals as stated above. 

-•^Internal Combustion Engines (1907). 

By Commander John K. Barton, U. S. Navy, Head of Department 
of Engineering and Naval Construction, U. S. Naval Academy. 

An elementary treatise on gas, gasolene, and oil engines for the in- 
struction of midshipmen. Well illustrated, clear and concise in style. 
A convenient hand-book for officers desiring a good working knowl- 
edge of the essential particulars of this class of engines. 

8vo, 135 pages, 32 illustrations, cloth. Price $1.10. Postage paid. 

*Engineering Mechanics (191 1), 

A revision of " Notes on Machine Design," prepared by Officers of 
the Department of Marine Engineering and Naval Construction, U. S. 
Naval Academy, combined with the mathematics and general principles 
necessary for the solution of the problems, by C. N. Offl.'ey. U. S. N. 

8vo. 326 pages, 2 plates. Bound in full cloth. Price $3.25. Postage 
paid. 



BOOKS— Continued 



*Mechanical Processes (1906). 

By Commander (now Rear Admiral) John K. Barton, U. S. Nav}'. 

A practical treatise on workshop appliances and their operation. The 
operation of an engineering plant treated as a whole in a manner as 
concise as is consistent with clearness. Its aim is to give as briefly as 
possible all the information needed, avoiding all unnecessary matter. 
Fully illustrated by 366 text figures and plates. 

Svo, 356 pages, full cloth. Price $3.70, Postage paid. 

*Notes on Steam Engineering (1901). 

Arranged for the use of Officers of the Old Line of the Navy. 
8vo, 154 pages. Bound in paper. Price 60 cents. Postage paid. 



Compiled and edited by the Department of Marine Engineering and 
Naval Construction, United States Naval Academy. 



NAVAL CONSTRUCTION 

Naval Construction (Revised and Enlarged, 1914). 

By Naval Constructor R. H. M. Robinson, U. S. N. A modern 
te.xt-book used in the course of naval architecture by midshipmen of 
the first class, prepared with a' view to the special requirements of the 
U. S. Naval Academy and based upon the practice of the U. S. Navy. 

Sfo, 28s -\- I'll pages, illustrated by 162 figures and 5 plates. Price 
$4.00. Postage paid. 

*The Oscillations of Ships (1902). 

Compiled and edited by the Depart 
aval Construction, United States >; 

Bound i>i flexible cloth. Price 55 cents. Postage paid. 

OFFICIAL DRILL BOOKS FOR THE U. S. NAVY 

AUTHORIZED BY THE NAVY DEPARTMENT 

The Landing Force and Small-Arm Instructions (Revised, 

1916). 

The contents of this book are as follows: Part I. The Landing 
Force, Camping, Military Hygiene, First Aid, Outposts and Patrols, 
Scouting, Marches, Advance and Rear Guards, Formations for Street 
Riots, Wall Scaling, Field Fortifications. — Part IL Manual of Guard 
Duty, Guard Mounting.— Part IIL Extended Order. — Part IV. Drill 
Regulations for Artillery, Artillery in the Field. — Part V. Firing 
Regulations for Small-Arms. — Part VI. Infantry Drill Regulations 
(Close Order). 

Fully illustrated. Bound in cloth, price $1.00; full Aexible leather 
binding, zvith pocket and tuck, price $1.50. Postage paid. 

The Deck and Boat Book of the U. S. Navy, 1914 (Corrected 

to Jan. I, 1916). 

The Deck and Boat Book is issued for use on the ship's bridge. 
No boat expedition shouM ever be without one for each boat and the 
means of making signals. As far as practicable all boats away from 
their ships on any duty where signal communication may be desirable 
should have a copy. Coxswains as well as signal men should be 
thoroughly familiar with its contents. 

184 pages and S Hag plates in four colors. Price 45 cents, fabrikoid. 
(5) 



BOOKS— Continued 



Ship and Gun Drills, U. S. Navy, 1914 (reprinted 1916). 

This drill book is designed to cover, so far as practicable, all drills 
and exercises which are carried out exclusivel}' on board ship. 
Illustrated. Cloth binding, price 45 cents. Postage paid. 



SEAMANSHIP 
The Recruit's Handy Book, U. S. Navy (Revised, September, 
1913)- 

B}' Captain W. F. P^ullani, U. S. Navy. A most useful primer for 
the Naval Recruit. It shows him what the nav}- offers him in the way 
of a career, and it contains instruction in the rudiments of a seaman's 
profession. 

102 pages, flc.vible buckram cover. Price 20 cents, postpaid. 

Bluejacket's Manual, U. S. Navy (Fourth edition, revised, 
1916). 

"The Bluejacket's Manual," originally prepared in 1902 by Lieu- 
tenant Ridley McLean, U. S. Navy, and now revised to correspond 
with the provisions of General Order No. 63 of December 16, 1913, 
is issued to the service for the guidance and the instruction of petty 
officers and enlisted men. In accordance with General Order No. 6^, 
the Manual is divided into the following parts : 

Part I. — The .Subjects which Every Man on Board Ship Should 
Know. 

Part 11. — The Subjects which Ordinary Seamen Should Know. 

Part III. — The Subjects which the Higher Ratings of the Seaman 
Branch Should Know. 

Part IV.— The Subjects which Chief Petty Officers Should Know. 

Part V. — The Subjects which Men of Special Ratings Should Know. 

Stiff Buckram. Price 75 cents, prepaid. 

"A Battleship's Order Book. 

A Battleship's Order Book OgoS). by Lieut. Commander A. B. 
Hoff, U. S. N.. follows the generally accepted ideas and regulations of 
the service and the Atlantic Fleet in regard to liberty, uniform, punish- 
ments, routine, etc. 

i2mo, g6 pages te.vt, g6 pages blank, full cloth. Price 85 cents. 
Postage paid. 

'•'Hints for Junior Officers Doing Line Duty (1909). 

Lieutenant B. B. Wygant, LT. S. Navy. 

26 pages, paper cover. Price 15 cents. Postage paid. 



ELECTRICAL ENGINEERING 

Manual of Wireless Telegraphy for the Use of Naval Elec- 
tricians (Revised and Enlarged, 1915). 

By Commander S. S. Robison, U. S. Navy, with revisions and addi- 
tions by L. W. Austin, Ph. D.. Navy Department, Bureau of Equipment, 
and W'm. S. Cowles, Chief of Bureau. 

Svo, ?JO pai^es te.yt, illustrated by J?n figures. Bound in full zvhite- 
canvas. Price $1.50. Postage paid. 

(6) 



BOOKS— Continued 



Naval Electricians' Text-Book. 2 vols. (3d Edition, 1915.) 

By Captain W. H. G. Bullard, U. S. Navy. 

Volume I contains the theoretical study of the subject in general 
and covers the principles involved in the construction of all direct- 
current machines, instruments, devices and apparatus, with an en- 
larged chapter of the principles of alternating currents and circuits. 

Volume II deals with the purely practical part of the subject, and 
contains descriptive matter of all generators, motors, motive power, 
etc., with their different applications, with elementary and completed 
wiring diagrams and sketches of connections including all means of 
interior communications. This volume has been considerably enlarged 
and furnishes practical information of much value. 

Volume I contains about 8S0 pages and 250 illustrations. Volume II, 
about 650 pages and 310 illustrations, bound in full cloth. Price $3.75 
per volume (2 volumes $7.50), postpaid. 

^Electrical Installations of the United States Navy (1907). 

By Commander Burns T. Walling, U. S. Navy, and Julius Martin, 
E. E., Master Electrician of the Equipment Department, Navy Yard, 
New York. 

A Manual of material, including its use, operation, inspection, care, 
and management, and method of installion on board ship. 

8vo, 648 pages, 300 illustrations, full cloth. Price $3.50. Postage 
paid. 



ORDNANCE 
Naval Ordnance (a text-book of ordnance and gunnery). 
Revised Edition, 191 5. 

By Lieut. Commander Roland I. Curtin and Lieut. Commander 
Thomas L. Johnson, U. S. Navy. 

This book has been adopted as a text-book at the U. S. Naval 
Academy. 

8vo, 383 pages, 57 illustrations, bound in full cloth. Price $4,85, 
postage paid. 

The Groundwork of Practical Naval Gunnery, or, Exterior 

Ballistics. 

By Philip R. Alger, Professor U. S. Navy. Revised and extended to 
include the formulae and methods of Colonel James AI. Ingalls, U. S. 
Army, by the officers on duty in the Department of Ordnance and 
Gunnery, LI. S. Naval Academy,. 

6y2X I0}i in., 360 pages, bound in full cloth. Price $6.25, postpaid. 

Range and Ballistic Tables (1914). 

To be used with Exterior Ballistics. 

Reprinted or the use of the Midshipmen of the Naval Academy in 
connection with their course of study in exterior ballistics.. They 
permit problems to be given covering nearly ail tlie guns in most fre- 
quent use in the navy at the present time. 

12 .V gy2 in,, (oblong quarto), 93 pages. Bound in full cloth. Four 
marginal tMmb indexes. Price $3.15, postpaid. 

<7) 



BOOKS— Continued 



*Ordnance and Gunnery (igio). 

Revised by officers of the U. S. Navy, under the supervision of the 
Head of the Department of Ordnance and Gunnery of the Naval 
Academy. The main purpose has been to illustrate fundamental 
principles and general types, upon the belief that such a course will be 
productive of better results than imparting a superficial knoM'ledge of 
many types. 

Svo, .V ^ 430 pages and illusfratioiis. hound in full cloth. Price 
$4.25. Postage paid. 

*A Text-Book of Ordnance and Gunnery (Revised Edition, 
1905)- 

By Lieut. Cornmander W. F. Fullam and Lieutenant T. C. Hart, 
U. S. Navy. This book is a complete work on the subject of Ordnance 
and Gunnery. The turret mounts and types of guns, etc., adopted by 
the Navy Department up to the last date of revision appear in this 
edition. 

Svo, II -p over 300 pages, bound in. full cloth. Price $4.35. Postage 
paid. 

INTERNATIONAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 
A Manual of International Law for the use of Naval Officers 
(1911). 

By Rear Admiral C. H. Stockton, U. S. N.. Retired. Sometime 
Lecturer upon International Law at the Naval War College, author of 
" The Laws and Usages of War at Sea : a Naval War Code." 

The aim of this work is to present sound and authoritative informa- 
tion based on the historical and accepted policy of our government, as 
well as the best and most recent European views upon matters of in- 
ternational law. 

i2mo, 313 pages, cloth. Price $1.50. Postage paid. 

Constitutional Law (1914), 

By H. J. Fenton, M. A., L. B., Instructor, U. S. Naval Academy. 
An introductory treatise designed for use in the United States Naval 
Academy and in other schools where the principles of the Constitution 
of the United States are studied. 

A study of the text of the Constitution and the principles of law 
pertaining to it. An abstract of the leading and most interesting 
Supreme Court cases bearing on the Constitution is printed in Chapter 
IX and serves to fix the principles of the Constitution clearly in mind. 

I2V10, 267 pages, cloth. Price $1.35. Postage paid. 

*Notes on International Law (1904). 

By Lieut. C. P. Eaton, V. S. N., member of the New Jersey Bar. 
This book consists of questions which have been asked on examination 
of Line Officers of the U. S. Navy, with their answers ; others arranged 
so as to laring out the subjects more fully, with answers, together with 
Situations and Solutions propounded and solved at the U. S. Naval 
War College. The form of " Questions and Answers " is a very con- 
venient one in many ways. 

Svo, 139 pages, bound in Hcvihle cloth. Price $1.10. Postage paid. 



BOOKS— Continued 



STRATEGY AND TACTICS 

School of the Ship, etc. (igio). 

By Rear Admiral A. W. Grant, U. S. N. (This book is being revised. 
Its issue has been delayed indefinitely.) 

'•'The Genius of Naval Warfare. I. Strategy. 

By Commander Rene Daveluy, French Navy. Translated by Philip 
R. Alger, U. S. N. 

Svo, 298 + viii pages, cloth. Price $1.40. Postage paid. 

"The Genius of Naval Warfare. II. Tactics. 

By Commander Rene Daveluy, French Navv. Translated bv Philip 
R. Alger, U. S. N. 

Svo, 104 + znii pages, cloth. Price $1.10. Postage paid. 

*War on the Sea. 

By Captain Gabriel Darrieus, French Navy. Translated bv Philip 
R. Alger, U. S. N. 

An exposition of the basic principles of naval strategy and tactics 
by the Professor of Strategy and Tactics at the French Naval War 
College. 

Cloth. $1.65. Postage paid. 

*The Fundamentals of Naval Tactics. 

By Lieutenant Romeo Bernotti, Royal Italian Navy. Translated 
by Lieutenant H. P. Mcintosh, U. S. Navy. 

i2mo, 184 pages, bound in cloth. Price $1.10. Postage paid. 



Naval War College Pamphlets. 

The Estimate of the Situation. 
The Formulation of Orders. 

Paper covers. Price IS cents each. 



By Commander Carlo B. Brittain, U. S. Navy, Head of Department 
of Seamanship, United States Naval Academy. 



'•'Elements of Naval Warfare (1909) 

By Commander Carlo B. Brittain. U. 
Seamanship, United States Naval A( 

i2mo, 124 pages, bound in cloth. Price $1.10. Postage paid. 

LANGUAGES 
A French Nautical Phrase Book and Reader (1914). 

By the Department of Modern Languages, U. S. Naval Academy. 

Part I of this work is based on "Nautical Phraseology" (ipn) 
embracing such changes in text and arrangement as experience in its 
use, and comment from the service at large, have indicated. Part II, 
the " Nautical Reader," is the outcome of an effort to teach the mid- 
shipmen ordinary naval words and expressions by the usual means of 
instruction. 

unto, 97 pages, cloth binding. Price 7S cents, postpaid. 

(9) 



BOOKS—Conlintted 



A Spanish Nautical Phrase Book and Reader (1914). 

By the Department of Modern Languages, U. S. Naval Academy. 

Part I of this work is based on "Nautical Phraseology" (1911) 
embracing such changes in text and arrangement as experience in its 
use, and comment from the service at large, have indicated. Part II, 
the " Nautical Reader." is the outcome of an efifort to teach the mid- 
shipmen ordinary naval works and expressions by the usual means of 
instruction. 

I2V10, gf, pages, cloth binding. Price 75 cciils, postpaid. 

=^=Nautical Phraseology (191 1). 

By the Department of Modern Languages, U. S. Naval Academy. 

This book is published for the use of the midshipmen of the first 
class at the U. S. Naval Academy. It contains examples of social 
correspondence in English, French, Spanish, and German, conversa- 
tions on subjects most frequently required in international naval 
intercourse, a table of corresponding ranks of officers of the United 
States, French, Spanish, German, and British navies, and a well 
selected professional vocabulary of about three hundred words. 
Although German is not a part of the course at the Naval Academy, 
the German text was available and was inserted with the idea that it 
might be useful to the midshipmen after graduation. This book is 
especially recommended for the use of midshipmen preparing for 
final examination. 

i2mo, in pages, cloth binding. Price 80 cents. Postage paid. 



MATHEMATICS 

Trigonometry and Stereographic Projections (Revised, 1913). 

By Professor S. J. Brown, V. S. N. Prepared for the use of mid- 
shipmen and adopted as a text-book. 

(S'^K), 13s pages, cloth binding. Price $1.35. Postage paid. 

Mechanics (1913). 

By Professor H. E. Smith, U. S. N. Prepared for the use of mid- 
shipmen and adopted as the text-book at the Naval Academy. 

isino. xi 4- 26Q pages, cloth binding. Price $3.60., .postage paid. 

■'•■ y- v>'A \- 
Practical Algebra. 

By Professor S. J. Brown, U. S. N., and Instructor Paul Capron, 
U. S. N. A. Used as a text-book by the midshipmen at the Naval 
Academy. 

unto, i.i- -f igr pages, cloth binding. Price $1.45. Postage paid. 

Calculus. 

By Professor S. J. Brown, U. S. N., and Instructor Paul Capron, 
V. S. N. A. Used as a text-book at the Naval Academy. 

isino, i.v -\- jS8 pages, cloth binding. Price $3.35. Postage paid. 

(10) 



BOOKS— CZnfuutcd '" 



MISCELLANEOUS j 

Physiology, First Aid and Naval Hygiene (191 6). 

By Doctor R. G. Heiner, U. S. Navy. A text-book for the Depart- 
ment of Naval Hygiene and Physiology at the U. S. Naval Academy, 
Annapolis, Md. • 

1 This book should be made available for the use of all officers and 

I enlisted men. It is highly recommended to Divisional Officers to be 
! used in the general instruction of their men. 

\ i2mo, 139 pages. Bound in full cloth, price $1.00. Postage- puid. 



fU. S. Navy Cook Book (1908). 

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V^ol. 43, No. 2 



February 1917 



Whole No. 168 



United States 
Naval Institute 

Proceedings 

PUBLISHED MONTHLY 
EDITED BY J. W. GREENSLADE 




U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE 
ANNAPOLIS '^'^—t:: MARYLAND 



COPYRIGHT, 191 7 

By J. W. CONROY 

TRUSTEE FOR U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE 



C^e £or& Qgftfttmere (pre«« 

BALTIMORE, MD., U. S. A. 



The writers only are responsible for the contents of their respective articles 



CONTENTS 



The Log of the "Constitution," Feb. 21-J4, 1815. The Capture 
of the Cyane and the Levant. By Naval Constructor C. W. 
Fisher, U. S. Navy 227 

Some Strategical Sketches. By Professor William Hovgaard, Late 
Commander, Royal Danish Navy 2.^3 

Logistics — Its Influence upon the Conduct of War and Its Bear- 
ing UPON the Formulation of War Plans. By Captain H. P. 
Huse, U. S. Navy 245 

"Ayesha" (Concluded). By Lieutenant Hellmuth von Miicke, 
Imperial German Navy. Translated by Lieutenant J. H. Klein, Jr., 
U. S. Navy 255 

A Combined Army and Navy War College. By Colonel Wm. W. 

Harts, U. S. Army 287 

A Plea for Universal Service. By Lieut. Commander John P. Jack- 
son, U. S. Navy ,. 295 

Our Navy and the West Indian Pirates (Continued). A Docu- 
mentary History. By Rear Admiral Caspar F. Goodrich, \j. S. 
Navy 313 

The Upper Yangtse River. By Lieutenant A. F. Carter. U. S. Navy. . 325 

Secretary's Notes 365 

Report of Audit for the Year Ended December 30, 191 6 371 

Professional Notes 377 

International Notes : Naval War Notes 407 

International Notes : Diplomatic Notes 412 

Review of Books 425 

Information Index : 369 



OFFICERS OF THE INSTITUTE 



I President 

Rear Admiral BRADLEY A. FISKE, U. S. Xavv 

Vice-President 
Captain E. W. EBERLE, U. S. Navy 

Secretary and Treasurer 
Lieut. Commander J. W. GREENSLADE, U. S. Navv 



Board of Control 

Chief Constructor D. W. TAYLOR, U. S. Navy 

Brigadier General JOHN A. LEJEUNE, U. S. Marine Corps 

Captain L. M. NULTON, U. S. Navy 

Commander W. T. CLUVERIUS, U. S. Navy 

Lieut. Commander JOHN HALLIGAN, U. S. Navv 

Lieutenant BYRON McCANDLESS, U. S. Navy 

Lieut. Commander J. W. GREENSLADE, U. S. Navy (ex ofUcio) 



PAST PRESIDENTS 

OF THE 

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE 



Admiral DAVID D. PORTER, U. S. Navy, 1873 

Rear Admiral JOHN L. WORDEN, U. S. Navy, 1874 

Rear Admiral C R. P. RODGERS, U. S. Navy, Jan. 1875-jAN. 1878 

Commodore FOXHALL A. PARKER, U. S. Navy, Jan. 1878-jAN. 1879 

Rear Admiral JOHN RODGERS, U. S. Navy, Jan. 1879-jAN. 1882 

Rear Admiral C R. P. RODGERS, U. S. Navy, Jan. 1882-jAN. 1883 

Rear Admiral THORNTON A. JENKINS, U. S. Navy, Jan. 1883-OcT. 

1885 
Rear Admiral EDWARD SIMPSON, U. S. Navy, Oct. 1885-OcT. 1887 
Rear Admiral STEPHEN B. LUCE, U. S. Navy, Oct. 1887-OcT. 1898 
Rear Admiral WM. T. SAMPSON, U. S. Navy, Oct. 1898-OcT. 1902 
Rear Admiral H. C. TAYLOR, U. S. Navy, Oct. 1902-OcT. 1904 
Rear Admiral C F. GOODRICH, U. S. Navy, Oct. 1904-OcT. 1909 

Rear Admiral RICHARD WAINWRIGHT, U. S. Navy, Oct. 1909-OcT. 
IQII 



UNITED STATES 
NAVAL INSTITUTE 

PROCEEDINGS 

Vol. 43, No. 2 FEBRUARY, 1917 Whole No. 168 

[copyrighted] 

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD. 



THE LOG OF THE CONSTITUTION, FEB. 21-24, 1815 
THE CAPTURE OF THE CYANE AND THE LEVANT 
By Naval Constructor C. W. Fisher, U. S. Navy 



Enclosed herewith is a blueprint of an extract from the log 
of the U. S. frigate Constitution, dated February 21 to February 
24, 181 5. This brief extract includes a description of the action 
between the Constitution and the British vessels Cyane and Levant. 
As an example of most admirable seamanship, excellent control, 
fine tactics, and a happy as well as forceful style of recording 
important events, I consider this brief extract to be of sufficient 
value to warrant its being published for the " information and 
guidance " of the navy to-day. It would be hard to find a better 
model than this modest record of a most unusual and courageous 
action.* 



^ Extract from letter transmitting the copies of the Constitution's log 
sheets. 



230 



The Log of tpie " Constitution " 







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The Log of the " Constitution " 



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[copyrighted] 

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD. 

SOME STRATEGICAL SKETCHES • 

By Professor William Hovgaard, Late Commander, 
Royal Danish Navy 



At a time when the United States Navy appears to stand on the 
threshold of a great enlargement, and problems of the general 
constitution of the fleet, as well as the choice of types of vessels 
most suitable to the service, press for immediate solution, it may 
not be without interest to make a speculative study of the stra- 
tegic conditions under which the navy is likely to be used in time 
of war. Essays on strategy are mostly of a general nature, 
and rarely embody the consideration of concrete cases, except 
as required to illustrate principles. It may perhaps by some be 
considered inappropriate to assume and discuss a state of war 
between countries actually at peace and unlikely to enter into 
conflict, but it is obviously impossible to form a clear idea of the 
problems that the navy of a given country has to solve without 
making definite assumptions as to the enemies with whom the 
country may be involved in war. All cases that are reasonably 
possible must be considered, and too much weight must not be 
attached to the political conditions existing at the moment. In 
these days, where kaleidoscopic changes are apt to take place in 
international relations, the naval defences can be safely planned 
only on the broad basis of past history. This is the more neces- 
sary as naval development, in order to be economic and sound, 
must follow a well-matured programme, extending over a number 
of years, during which political relations may undergo great 
changes. 

Strategic problems based on concrete cases of warfare are 
indeed worked out by admiralty staffs or other similar institu- 
tions in all navies, but the result of such studies must for obvious 
reasons remain buried in the archives. Yet. if the general public 



234 Some Strategical Sketches 

of a country is to judge intelligently of the requirements of the 
navy and the coast defences, it must be informed as to the prob- 
able course of events in wartime. Many fictitious war stories 
have appeared in the press and in the literature, but they are 
almost invariably of a popular nature, and often so exaggerated 
that they fail to impress serious people with the importance of 
the questions involved. In the present article it is attempted to 
give a sober although brief and sketchy presentation of the sub- 
ject, which may serve as a suggestion for a more complete and 
detailed study. 

It may be argued that the European War gives the best and 
most positive information on which to base a naval programme, but 
the strategic conditions of the European belligerents dififer so 
much from those that would exist in a war between the United 
States and other countries, that the experiences of the European 
War cannot be applied directly. A study must first be made of 
the form which naval wars are likely to take when this country 
is involved. 

The assumption as to the state of war must comprise the most 
typical and important of possible contingencies — not necessarily 
those that are most probable. They should be simple, unessential 
complications being avoided, but they must cover both defensive 
and ofifensive cases of warfare. On these general principles the 
assumed conditions are selected in the following. Other and 
more complex cases could be easily conceived and the courses 
of events might difiFer considerably from those here assumed, but 
the requirements to the navy would remain the same or would 
fall within those determined on the basis of the most important 
cases of warfare. 

The pictures here drawn of the events are necessarily incom- 
plete, since it is futile to carry the speculation beyond the first 
stages of the war, when numerous possibilities, largely of an 
accidental nature, present themselves and increase the complexity 
of the problem. The present study, however, in virtue of its con- 
crete nature, brings out sharply the principal requirements of 
the United States Navy, and it gives indications as to the rela- 
tive importance of the various types of warships as well as their 
general features. It also shows the urgent necessity of reinforc- 
ing the mobile defences of all outlying possessions, in particular 
those of the Panama Canal. 



Some Strategical Sketches 235 

We shall assume the status of the naval and military defences 
of the United States and of the other supposed belligerents to be 
essentially as at the present time, disregarding the actually existing 
state of war. 

I. Tke United States at War with England 

The issue of such a war would probably be determined on 
shore ; namely, on the North American Continent. Presumably 
the English main attack would take the form of an invasion 
across the Canadian border, and perhaps landing expeditions 
would be attempted at points of the East Coast. The primary 
duty of the British Navy would be to protect the lines of com- 
munication across the Atlantic. At the same time the British 
maritime trade would have to be safeguarded and that of the 
United States hindered or paralyzed. All these objects would 
be attained by clearing the sea of raiding vessels, and by an effec- 
tive blockade of the American coasts ; but these tasks present 
peculiar difficulties which it is necessary to consider in detail. 

The coast-line of the United States is not only very extensive, 
but is divided into three distinct sections, the Atlantic, the Gulf, 
and the Pacific coasts, facing strategic areas, each of which would 
have to be kept under separate surveillance. Numerous naval 
stations, navy yards, and commercial harbors are found scattered 
along these coasts, and the problem of blockading is further com- 
plicated by the existence of insular possessions and the Panama 
Canal. England possesses, indeed, several advanced bases rela- 
tive to these coast-lines, and two of them, Halifax and Bermuda, 
have an ideal location in front of the most important section of 
the Atlantic Coast ; but other stations are less favorably situated 
as bases for a blockading fleet (Jamaica, Vancouver), while 
some are too weak or too limited in harbor facilities and resources 
(Nassau). 

Hence, although the enormous extent of the littoral of the 
United States renders coast defence in a complete form practically 
impossible, it, on the other hand, presents the compensating advan- 
tage that an effective blockade is equally difficult to carry out. 
The Atlantic Coast is in this respect much more favorably situated 
than the German North Sea Coast in the present war. In the North 
Sea the British Islands, dotted with excellent harbors and pro- 
vided with all the resources needed bv a navv, extend as a barrier 



236 Some Strategical Sketches 

for about five hundred miles in front of and relatively close to the 
German naval bases, which are penned up in a corner of this nar- 
row sea, easy to watch and to blockade. In the war here con- 
templated the conditions are practically the reverse, since the 
blockading fleet must concentrate at one or two known points 
confronting a coast-line extending for about fourteen hundred 
miles. The blockading fleet, moreover, must depend for its con- 
tinued efficiency largely on supplies from the mother country. 

We assume that at or before the outbreak of the war a screen 
of American light cruisers and destroyers, assisted by submarines 
and aircraft and supported by armored cruisers in the rear, 
would be thrown out in front of the Atlantic Coast ; but with the 
existing outfit of cruisers, which are limited in number and most 
of them of relatively slow speed, the screen would be incomplete 
and weak, and could not safely be advanced to any great distance 
from the coast. It would probably, soon after the opening of 
hostilities, have to withdraw before the vastly superior forces of 
the English screen. After that the English would presumably 
attempt to establish a blockade of the Atlantic and Gulf coasts, 
as well as of the Panama Canal, light vessels being stationed ofif 
the shore outside harbors and estuaries, while battle cruisers 
would patrol the sea at a greater distance from the coast and 
the battle fleet would remain concentrated at Bermuda and Hali- 
fax. The blockade would have a mixed character, being partly 
" close " but essentially " open," and the American battle fleet 
would have considerable freedom of action even if debarred 
from operating at great distances from the coast. Probably it 
would be perferred to maintain the fleet " in being " rather than 
to risk a decisive action against superior forces. In fact, a vigor- 
ous offensive defensive, based on sporadic action, would appear 
very promising under the circumstances. Were such a policy 
adopted, the American main fleet might with advantage be dis- 
tributed between important naval stations on the Atlantic Coast, 
while independent squadrons might be detailed to the defence of 
the Gulf and the Pacific, since by such scattering of the forces, 
the difficulties of maintaining an efifective blockade w^ould be 
immensely increased for the English. Under these circumstances 
complete concentration of the main fleet might not always be pos- 
sible, and would be, in general, unnecessary, since a decisive fleet 
action would be the one thing to avoid ; but partial condensation 



^OME .Strategical m<etches 237 

of the forces for the purpose of overwhehiiing minor portions of 
the enemy fleet might frequently be effected, and thus good oppor- 
tunities of inflicting serious losses on the enemy might occur. 

The service of the blockading light vessels would probably be 
exceedingly strenuous, since they would be exposed to incessant 
and vigorous attacks from all classes of warships of the widely 
scattered American fleet. Raiding vessels would have frequent 
opportunities of breaking the blockade, being eventually sup- 
ported in this act by the battleships, and when at large they could 
prey upon British commerce and threaten the communication 
between England and Canada, but the American Navy in its pres- 
ent condition would not be able to make proper use of these oppor- 
tunities on account of its weakness in scouting cruisers and its 
total lack of battle cruisers. These deficiencies, in fact, would 
greatly simplify the task of the enemy. 

The American submarines would force the British battle fleet 
to operate with caution and normally to remain in port in the 
Bermudas and Halifax. If the United States were in possession 
of a number of larger sea-going submarines, which could be sent 
as far as the Gulf of St. Lawrence, the summer routes through 
Cabot Strait and the Strait of Belle Isle might be threatened. 

Probably a belt near the Atlantic Coast would remain under the 
control of American submarines and torpedo-craft, aided by mine 
fields ; but it seerhs doubtful whether the coastwise trade could be 
maintained. Waterways like the Cape Cod Canal would be of 
extreme value under these circumstances. 

As stated above, the blockade would probably from the begin- 
ning of the war be extended to the ports on the Gulf Coast and in 
the Caribbean Sea. Guantanamo and the other American sta- 
tions on the West Indian Islands, being practically without 
defences, would fall in the hands of the enemy, but the most 
important objective in this region would be the Panama Canal. 
Among all the detached strategic points belonging to the United 
States, the canal stands supreme in importance as the connecting 
link or bridge between the eastern and western strategic areas. 
The defences of both terminals of the canal against attack from 
the sea appear to be well provided for by coast fortifications, mines, 
and submarines, but against serious land attack the mobile gar- 
rison of the Canal Zone is entirely inadequate, consisting of a 
few infantry regiments and a company of engineers. Being with- 



238 Some Strategical Sketches 

out connection with the United States by land and having- nc 
independent technical military resources, the canal must depend 
for its tenure entirely on the navy. In the war here under con- 
sideration the English, being in command of the sea, could with- 
out difficulty dispatch a strong expeditionary force to the Isthmus. 
Landings might be effected in the vicinity of the Canal Zone on 
the Caribbean side beyond the region that is under direct control 
of the defences. Difficulties in the terrain might delay the opera- 
tions, but the fall of the position would only be a question of time, 
since the English could bring a practically unlimited pressure to 
bear on it. A British squadron in the Pacific could prevent rein- 
forcements from reaching the Canal Zone by way of Panama. If 
the canal fell into the hands of the enemy in unimpaired condition, 
the operations of the British fleet in the Pacific would be 
immensely facilitated and the blockade would be at once extended 
to the West Coast of the United States, if this step had not already 
been taken. The canal would thus become a positive disadvantage 
and a source of danger to the United States in the same measure 
as it would be of strategic value to the enemy ; but it seems likely 
that the garrison, before surrendering, would wreck the canal 
for the probable duration of the war. This could be accom- 
plished, for instance, by demolishing the Gatun Dam, or by 
simply letting out the water of the Gatun Lake, whereby the 
canal would be rendered useless for one or perhaps two years. 
It might be found wise even to make the canal inoperative and to 
evacuate the zone at once on the outbreak of hostilities, a procedure 
that would be analogous to the destruction of important bridges 
and the abandonment of untenable positions in land warfare. 

Whether the English were able to make use of the canal or not, 
it would be necessary for them ultimately to blockade the Pacific 
Coast of the United States in order to protect their commerce : 
but this blockade would be difficult to maintain, especially as 
long as Pearl Llarbor and other stations in the Pacific v^-ere still 
in the hands of the Americans, since the blockading vessels would 
then be exposed to attack from the rear. For this reason and so 
as to deprive raiders of all footholds; England w^ould have to 
seize or blockade all these stations, none of which, with the excep- 
tion of Pearl Harbor, could offer any serious resistance. In fact, 
tlie outlying possessions would in this, as in all wars against a 
])OA\er superior at sea, be a source of anxiety and weakness. 



Some Strategical Sketches 239 

We need not for our piirpose pursue the study further. It is 
clear that the American battleships, distributed in different ports 
on the extensive coast-lines and employed for energetic sporadic 
action, would greatly complicate the task of the British Navy. It 
seems evident, also, that in a war against an enemy, vulnerable 
in his commerce and under the necessity of transporting great 
armies across the ocean, battle cruisers, light cruisers, and sea- 
going submarines would be of the highest value. Bearing in mind 
the concern and embarrassment, which the small German East 
Asiatic cruiser squadron caused to the British Admiralty in the 
beginning of the present war, we can imagine what the result 
would be in the war here contemplated, if the United States were 
l^rovided with even a moderate outfit of raiding and scouting ves- 
sels of the above mentioned classes. 

2. The United States at War with Germany 
We shall assume that the strength of the German fleet, after 
deduction of the forces required for home defence, would be 
somewhat superior to the American in battleships and overwhebn- 
ingly stronger in cruisers and destroyers. 

Since Germany does not possess any naval stations in the. Atlan- 
tic that could be used as advanced bases in operations on the 
coast of America, we suppose that the first preliminary objectiy.e 
of the German Navy would be the seizure of one or more points 
suitable for this purpose. The West Indies appear to offer the 
best and perhaps the only opportunities for the acquisition of such 
bases. Several excellent harbors and anchorages are found on 
the islands such as St. Thomas, Samana Bay in Haiti, and others, 
which the Gemians. apart from opposition of the American fleet, 
could seize without encountering serious resistance. 

We shall assume first that the Americans would seek a decision 
before the German fleet had succeeded in establishing itself at 
a base, and that the main battle would take place in the vicinity 
of the West Indian waters after the American screen were driven 
back in a series of minor actions. The result would depend first, 
on the relative qualities and efficiency of the personnel in the two 
fieets, which, in a theoretical study like the present, must be 
assumed to be equal ; second, it would depend on the forces which 
the Germans could spare for the undertaking and on the condition 
of the fleet on its arrival in the West Indies, but apart from these 



240 Some Strategical Sketches 

uncertain elements the Americans would have a decided advantage 
in the individual superiority of their battleships. Comparing 
ships of the same date, and excepting the most recent of the Ger- 
man ships, the data of which have not been published, the Ameri- 
can ships are throughout of more rational design. They carrv- 
more powerful guns, the batteries are better arranged, and they 
possess, moreover, all the advantages that follow inherently from 
larger displacement. 

If the American fleet were victorious, the war would come to 
a speedy end. If it were defeated, it would probably fall back 
on Guantanamo or entirely withdraw from the West Indian waters 
and the situation would thus be similar to that already discussed 
in case of a war with England. 

Let us consider the case where the American fleet, instead 
of initially risking a decisive fleet action, followed a defensive 
policy and took up a position in the West Indies, while the Ger- 
man Fleet with its train seized a base in the Eastern Caribbean. 
We assume that the American fleet, so long as no defences are 
established on Culebra or St. Thomas, would choose Guantanamo 
Bay as a base, because it is singularly well situated as a flank 
position, whatever be the ulterior objective of the enemy. In fact, 
the Germans could not undertake any serious expeditions, whether 
against the United States, Panama, or South America, so long as 
the American fleet were unimpaired and free to make sorties 
from that station. The first task of the Germans would therefore 
necessarily be a close blockade of Guantanamo and attacks on the 
place by landing parties. At the same time the German Navy 
would have to prevent reinforcements from landing elsewhere on 
the Island of Cuba. Guantanamo, with the existing weak- 
defences, and unless it were in time provided with a strong mobile 
garrison, could not make a prolonged resistance. The American 
fleet, in order to avoid being destroyed in port like the Russian 
fleet at Port Arthur, would soon be forced to come out for a 
decisive battle, the possibilities of which have already been dis- 
cussed. 

If the United States fleet were defeated and for the time bein^' 
incapable of serious action, the American harbors would be 
blockaded and the Panama Canal attacked with the probable 
result that it would be rendered useless. 



Some Strategical Sketches 241 

We shall not attempt to discuss in detail the further operations 
or ultimate objective of the Germans, but the sea would now be 
clear for the transportation of large expeditionary forces or 
armies across the Atlantic, whether for the purpose of securing 
the acquisition of new colonial possessions or for invading the 
United States. 

Whatever the outcome of such a war, it is seen that, again, the 
issue would depend essentially on the battleships, while battle 
cruisers and fast light cruisers would be urgently needed by the 
United States Navy for disturbing the passage of the enemy's 
oversea expeditions and his communications. Battle cruisers 
would be useful also in fleet action, provided they are designed 
wnth this purpose in view. 

3. The United States at War with Japak 

The United States Navy would in this case be decidedly superior 
to that of the enemy in battleships, but would lack the element of 
speed which the Japanese Navy possesses in a squadron of battle 
cruisers. The Japanese Navy would be somewhat stronger also 
in older armored cruisers and scouts. 

Strategically, such a war would dififer markedly from those so 
far discussed in virtue of the enormous distances that separate 
the main bases of the two countries. The Panama Canal would 
again be of the utmost strategic value to the United States, and 
Pearl Harbor would form an excellent base in the Pacific, but, 
being about 3400 miles distant from Japan, it could serve only as 
an intermediate station in offensive operations against that coun- 
try. The Philippine Islands are in this respect more favorably 
situated, but are yet too remote from Japan to serve as an 
advanced base for a blockading fleet, Manila being about 1300 
miles from the southern Japanese islands. Japan, moreover, 
flanks the line of communication between the Philippines and 
Hawaii, which line is about 5000 miles in length. 

Guam Island, which is about 1700 miles nearer to Hawaii and 
Panama than is Manila, and which is no farther from Japan, is 
at present merely a coahng station, practically without any 
defences. Yet, this little island, of form and size as the extreme 
half end of the Gallipoli Peninsula, is much easier to defend than 
stations which, like Manila, are situated on larger islands where 
landings are more difiicult to prevent. It has a commodious 



242 So.Mii Strategical Sketches 

natural harbor which with proper improvements can be rendered 
serviceable for a large fleet. If the United States is to maintain 
a strategic position in the East, a strong naval base at Guam 
appears to be indispensable. In the hands of Japan it would abso- 
lutely destroy the security of the line of communication with the 
Philippines. 

As matters stand, the United States is without a base in the 
Pacific suitable for offensive operations against Japan, and it 
does not seem likely, therefore, that the American fleet at the 
opening of hostilities would be advanced beyond Hawaii. Pos- 
sibly a minor squadron would be detached to the Philippines and 
we shall suppose these islands to be garrisoned as at present, 
with some 13,000 United States troops. 

We assume further that the Japanese, eventually using the 
naval station Takow, on Formosa, as an advanced base, would 
open the war with a surprise attack on the Philippine Islands. 
The American squadron would be blockaded or destroyed by a 
superior Japanese fleet and an army would be landed. The posi- 
tions at ^Manila and Olongapo would fall and all important 
strategic ])oints on the islands would be occupied. Guam would 
be captured. These operations would probably be completed 
before succor could be rendered, and once the Japanese were 
firmly established, they could not be driven out of the islands till 
after their fleet was defeated or closely blockaded and the sea 
cleared of their cruisers ; but this task the American fleet, as now 
constituted, could hardly hope to accomplish under the given dis- 
advantageous strategic conditions. 

Having thus secured control of the western part of the Pacific, 
Japan would presumably follow a defensive policy, the battle fleet 
being kept in home waters for protection of the coasts and engage- 
ments with superior forces of the enemy being avoided. The 
older cruisers might be detailed for protection of commerce in 
Asiatic w^aters and the fast modern cruisers, including the battle 
cruisers, might carry out raiding operations in the eastern part of 
the Pacific, threatening in particular the communications of 
Hawaii. Eventually, important points in Alaska would be seized. 

It is difficult to see how under these circumstances the Ameri- 
can fleet could force the Japanese to a decision against their will. 
Ofl"ensive operations of importance could not be undertaken in 
these (la}-s of submarine dangers without the possession of an 



Some Strategical Sketches 243 

advanced base in the vicinity of the enemy's coast ; but no such 
base is known to be available near the littoral of the Japanese 
islands. Even if a suitable base were secured, the weakness of 
the American Navy in cruisers and flotillas would render blockad- 
ing operations inefifective and would jeopardize the vitality of 
the fleet, because it would be impossible to protect the extensive 
line of communications. 

It is likely, therefore, that the American main fleet would remain 
at Hawaii, where it would be strategically in the best position for 
protecting- the Pacific Coast and the canal, at the same time pre- 
venting the Hawaiian Islands from falling into the hands of the 
enemy. In fact, serious attacks by the Japanese fleet on points 
on the American Continent or on Hawaii would hardly be 
attempted, and the Japanese would probably be content to seek 
opportunities of overwhelming weaker divisions of the American 
fleet. The war would be essentially a cruiser war, in which the 
Japanese Avould have the advantage of a more modern and power- 
ful materiel, but by using battleships as convoys the American 
Navy should be able to protect its lines of communication in the 
Eastern Pacific. 

In order that the United States should be capable of carrying- 
out an oft'ensive war against Japan with an}' chance of success, 
it would need to possess a suitable advanced base and a fleet 
decidedly superior to that of the Japanese in all the various classes 
of warships. On account of the vastness of the Pacific Ocean, the 
ships of all classes must be endowed with the highest sea-going 
cjualities and steaming capability, and since they must also possess 
at least the same military qualities as ships of the same class in 
other navies, they must be of very large size. 

4. The United States at War with Germany and Japan 

If Germany and Japan were acting together as allies against 
the United States, the balance of naval power would be strongly 
in their favor. Yet, their added naval strength would fall far 
short of that of Great Britain, and they would not, like that power, 
be in possession of suitable advanced bases. Their forces would 
be — at least initially — divided. 

Let us first assume that the American fleet were concentrated 
in the Atlantic, leaving the Pacific Coast to depend on local 
defences, consisting chiefly of destroyers, submarines, mines, and 



244 Some Strategical Sketches 

fortitications. In such a case the situation in the Atlantic would 
be as in a war with Germany alone, but the Panama Canal would 
probably fall into the hands of the Japanese, since the American 
fleet could not be detailed to its defence without leaving the 
Atlantic seaboard open to attack, and a Japanese army could be 
landed at the Pacific end of the canal. All the outlying possessions 
in the Pacific, including Alaska and the Hawaiian Islands, would 
be untenable with the present means of defence, and Pearl Harbor 
would be liable to sufifer a fate similar to that of Kiao-chau in the 
present war. 

If the United States fleet succeeded in defeating the German 
fleet, it would perhaps later, after a period of recuperation, be able 
to clear the Pacific Coast of the Japanese ; but if it suffered a 
reverse, both seaboards would be open to attack and invasion. 

Instead of seeking a decision in a great battle, a more cautious, 
defensive policy, as explained in case of a war with England, 
based on sporadic action with a scattered distribution of the fleet 
on both coasts might be preferred. 

It is seen that the fleet of the United States, in order to derive 
full benefit from the favorable strategic situation existing at the 
beginning of such a war due to the division of the allied forces, 
must be capable of defeating each of the opponents singly with a 
good margin of strength, and the defences of the Panama Canal 
must be such as to render it absolutely secure against attack by 
sea or land. 



[copyrighted] 

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD. 



LOGISTICS— ITS INFLUENCE UPON THE CONDUCT 

OF WAR AND ITS BEARING UPON THE 

FORMULATION OF WAR PLANS 

By Captain H. P. Huse, U. S. Navy 



Strategy in its widest meaning includes logistics and tactics, but 
it is convenient to consider logistics and tactics as integral branches 
of the art of war, and the province of each must be understood and 
clearly defined before the work of the staff can be properly coordi- 
nated. To this end strategy is limited to planning and directing, 
while logistics provides the means and executes. Strategy, for 
instance, decides that we need a certain force in the Pacific and 
prescribes its character, disposition, and employment. Logistics 
provides this force, maintains it and places it, all in accordance 
with the demands of strategy. Tactics covers the movements and 
operations of the forces while in contact with the enemy. 

All the activities of the navy come under one of these three heads, 
but strategy and tactics are so closely connected that in a dis- 
cussion of logistics it is not necessary to differentiate between the 
former two. We will therefore consider only the two titles, 
strategy and logistics, and distribute the activities of the navy 
between these, leaving tactics and the line which divides it from 
strategy to a later paper. 

Naval strategy includes the following : 

(a) The number of vessels of each' type required and their 

characteristics. 

(b) Location of naval bases and repair stations and their 

capabilities. 

(c) War plans providing for all possible contingencies. 

(d) Organization of the forces. 

(e) Operations and movements of forces in the execution of 

policy in peace and war. 

(f) Operations and movements of forces for the purpose of 

exercise and test, as in war games. 



246 Logistics 

Naval logistics includes the following, all to be performed in 
accordance with the requirements of strategy: 

(a- 1) Planning, constructing and maintaining the fleet. 

( b-i ) Fortifying, developing and maintaining naval bases and 

stations. 
( c-i ) Enlisting, maintaining, educating, training and drilling 

personnel. This includes target practice, 
(d-i ) Providing, storing, and delivering supplies of all kinds, 
including ordnance, ammunition, fuel, clothing, pro- 
visions, etc. 
(e-i) Transporting personnel and materiel; care of ill and 
wounded. 
When we began a few years ago to build up our navy, it is hardly 
an exaggeration to say that the question of materiel occupied the 
attention of the leading minds of the service almost to the exclusion 
of all thought of the personnel. This was only natural, for the 
personnel seemed to be at hand, ready to be developed w-hen the 
materiel should have been supplied. But, as a result of this point 
of view, the materiel has developed faster than the personnel, and 
we are now suffering not only from the direct effects as shown in a 
shortage of officers and men, but indirectly in the difficulty we have 
found in educating the public to a realization of the fact that it 
requires as long to train a gunner as it does to build a gun, and 
much longer to develop an officer than it does to build a ship. How- 
ever, both materiel and personnel are now in a fair way to receive 
due consideration, and the development of the personnel of the 
individual ship has reached a high degree of efficiency. Logistics 
has performed this part of the task very successfully. We may say 
that the following items under logistics have been fairly well taken 
care of : 

(c-i) Enlisting, maintaining, educating, training and drilling- 
personnel. ' 
( d-i ) Providing, storing, and delivering sup]:)lies of all kinds, 
including ordnance, ammunition, fuel, clothing, pro- 
visions, etc. 
(e-i) Transporting personnel and materiel; care of sick and 
wounded. 
With items (a-i) and (b-i) it is different. 

Item ( a-i ), planning, constructing and maintaining tJie fleet, has 
received a great deal of attention, but the delays in planning and 



Logistics 247 

building- our ships, the frequent changes after construction, the 
unsatisfactory condition of our submarines, and the inadequacy of 
our aeronautical service, are clear indications that either the organi- 
zation of this branch of logistics is defective or that the personnel 
is inefficient. Now the general opinion of the service is that 
the personnel involved is not inefficient, and we must therefore 
attribute the trouble to defective organization. 

Item (b-i), fortifying, developing and maintaining naval bases 
and stations, has been the subject of much discussion in the service 
and out of it, but so far as the writer knows, it has never reached 
the stage where logistics could properly take it up. It is the busi- 
ness of strategy to determine the location and capabilities of naval 
bases and repair stations, just as it is the business of strategy to 
determine the number of vessels of each type and their character- 
istics. It is evident that in determining these questions, strategy 
is limited by logistics and must therefore give full weight to logistic 
considerations. Thus it might be desirable from strategic con- 
siderations to have a naval base at a certain place, but difficulties 
of construction or of fortification, or some other reason, might 
make the location there impossible. The same is true of ships 
where cost. ]irotection. armament, speed and radius of action are 
conflicting qualities. Here again strategy (or tactics) determines 
after receiving all possible information from logistics. 

I do not purpose in this paper to discuss in detail th.„ methods 
now followed at the Navy Department. That these are not thor- 
oughly successful is shown in the paragraphs preceding. My pur- 
pose is to take the department organization now in existence and 
without changing it materially allot the various tasks in accordance 
with more correct principles. It will be seen that nothing radical 
is necessary in order to accomplish this, but a clear understanding 
of certain ruling principles is essential. These may be formulated 
as follows : 

1. The diiTerence between strategy and logistics must be clearly 

understood. 

2. Tasks must be allotted among subordinates so that the task of 

each subordinate shall be in itself homogeneous in char- 
acter and logically within the scope of his capabilities. 

3. Each subordinate to whom a task is allotted must be given the 

authority and the means necessary to perform it. 

4. The responsibihty for the performance of each task must be 

undivided and personal. 



248 Logistics 

5. Superior authority having allotted a task to a subordinate 
must not interfere with his performance thereof. Superior 
authority must limit its activities to coordinating work and 
to such inspections as will enable it to be thoroughly cog- 
nizant of the progress and the result produced. 

There is a theory of government based on the principle of " bal- 
ance and check " where the liberties of the people are supposed to 
be protected by balancing and checking the power of one branch 
of the government by the power of another branch. We see this 
in our Congress where the Senate and House, originally intended 
to represent different interests, now merely serve the purpose of 
holding each other in check ; the veto power of the Executive is 
another example ; while the Supreme Court in declaring laws un- 
constitutional has frequently checked both Congress and the Execu- 
tive. But, however svtch a system may make for " safety first " with 
regard to the liberties of the people, it certainly does not make for 
progress, and there is a tendency in our day to sacrifice " balance 
and check " in exchange for greater efficiency. Curtailing the 
power of the British House of Lords is a case in point. 

We see this same system resorted to in party politics, and even 
sometimes in society, where one faction is played ofif against 
another by leaders who thus seek to retain control by holding the 
balance of power. 

But what should we think of a business corporation in which 
any of the energies of one department should be expended in neu- 
tralizing the energies of another? The answer is simple : the com- 
petition of more ably conducted corporations would soon drive it 
out of business and it would cease to exist. 

At the Navy Department we have an all-powerful head to whom 
strategy and logistics are as unfamiliar as are statesmanship and 
finance to a naval officer. He is appointed to the office as an 
exponent of the policy of the administration, and as such it is 
logical and correct that the expert officers directing the strategy 
and logistics of the navy should be under his orders and responsible 
to him ; but it is neither logical nor correct that he should direct 
any details of these highly technical divisions. 

The navy list shows that at the department there is a Secretary's 
advisory council consisting of the assistant secretary, the chief 
of naval operations, the chiefs of bureaus, the commandant of the 
marine corps, and the judge advocate general. There is also a 



Logistics 249 

chief of naval operations with a corps of assistants of high rank 
chosen for their ability and professional knowledge. There is a 
third body known as the general board, to whom are referred 
questions of moment by the Secretary. The composition of this 
board gives great weight to its decisions, and these have come to be 
regarded as expressing the highest technical opinion in our country 
on naval subjects. Again, each bureau chief holds his authority 
directly from the Secretary, and orders issued by a bureau chief 
within the scope of his responsibility have the same weight as if 
signed by the Secretary. There is too much talent here to be con- 
sulted ; too many authorities on highly technical matters to be 
coordinated and reconciled by one official to whom it is all new 
ground. 

There is a strong feeling among officers who are familiar with 
the practical work of the Navy Department and who have noted 
the loss of efficiency which results from so many heads that the 
chief of operations should exercise full authority over the bureau 
chiefs. This I believe to be radically incorrect. It is simply an 
illustration of the natural desire of strong men trained to exercise 
authority seeking to extend their power in every direction. 

In the first place, what should be the relation between the 
strategical branch of the navy and the logistics branch ? Of course, 
it must be recognized that the mission of logistics is prescribed by 
strategy, but it is incorrect to deduce from this that strategy must 
direct the manner in which logistics shall perform its task. My 
idea is that the office of operations represents strategy and that the 
various bureaus of the department represent logistics ; moreover, 
I believe that the relation of these two branches should correspond 
very closely with those which exist in mercantile life between the 
consumer and the producer. 

Consider one or two special cases : 

Operations (strategy) requires a number of battleships, battle- 
cruisers, scouts, destroyers, submarines, flying machines, etc., with 
certain characteristics. Operations does not produce these things ; 
it needs them in its operations. Accordingly, operations (strategy) 
calls upon the bureaus (logistics) to supply them. 

. Or, operations finds that certain ships are in need of repairs or 
alterations ; it calls upon the bureaus to make these repairs or alter- 
ations. 



250 Lo(;isTics 

Again, operations needs officers and men in accordance with its 
plans and organization. It is the duty of the bureaus concerned 
to fill this need. 

The examples could be multiplied indefinitely. 

The cooperation between operations and the manufacturing 
bureaus should be limited to the cooperation between consumer and 
l)roducer. The consumer does not enter the shops of the producer, 
nor does he dictate how the producer shall run his plant ; but he 
does consult with the producer and order in accordance with his 
needs and what the market affords. So operations should not enter 
the domain of the manufacturing bureaus of the Navy Department 
nor dictate to these departments how their shops should be run. 
Operations should consult with the manufactiu-ing bureaus, tell 
them what it wants, and then insist on getting it. Operations 
^should have no authority over the bureaus outside of this. If 
•operations cannot get what it wants, operations reports the fact to 
.the common superior, the Secretary, wdio then takes such adminis- 
trative action as may be necessary to correct the trouble. 

Efficiency in gunnery, aviation, or in any other department of 
the navy is a product just as much as efficient guns, flying machines, 
etc. The bureau of navigation (a better name for which would be 
bureau of personnel) should produce . (Officers and men capable 
of handling the materiel supplied to the fleet by the manufacturing 
department. A proper organization places the training of officers 
and men in the bureau of navigation (personnel) ; target practice 
and engineering competition have no pro])er place in operations. 

On the other hand, inspection is a very important department 
of operations. In mercantile life the producer nuist ])lease the con- 
sumer ; competition enforces this law. There is no such competi- 
tion in the Navy Department, and w^e must resort to inspection in 
order to maintain this important relation between the producer and 
the consumer. Accordingly, operations must develop and avail 
itself of a thoroughly organized system of inspection to pass judg- 
ment on personnel and materiel supplied 1\v the bureaus on demand 
of operations. 

In order that operations may be reasonable and logical in its 
demands on the bureaus, it must be competent to formulate cor- 
rectly all demands and specifications for the materiel and personnel 
it requires, and to this end there must be free conference between 
operations and the bureaus, and officers of the logistics branches 



Logistics 251 

should be detailed for duty in subordinate positions in the office of 
operations. 

It is a mistake for operations to duplicate the functions of the 
bureaus or to take charge of or direct any of their work. Its 
mission is to formulate its demands from the point of view of the 
consumer. When it loses sight of this mission and encroaches 
upon the various missions of the bureaus, it violates one of the 
principles 'of organization and there is a loss of efficiency. Here 
again we shall be kept in the straight and narrow path if we act 
on the theory that operations is the consumer and that the bureaus 
are the producers. 

We have now defined the relations between operations a'nd the 
bureaus ; but it is evident that if we are to get cooperation among- 
rhe bureaus themselves, they cannot deal individually with oper- 
ations, else we shall soon have operations the coordinating- factor, 
which would result in operations absorbing the bureaus — and this 
is exactly what many able officers advocate and which the writer 
believes is absolutely wrong. 

At present, the bureau chiefs communicate directly with the Sec- 
retary, who in general is without technical training and whose mis- 
sion is policy and is not logistics any more than it is strategy. But 
the Secretary appears to be the only recognized coordinating factor, 
and the Secretary's advisory council, consisting of the chief of 
operations, the chiefs of bureaus, the commandant of the marine 
corps, and the judge advocate general, emphasizes the democratic 
spirit of equality existing among these various departments of the 
navy. This is not correct organization. 

Just as all the activities of strategy are grouped under one head, 
the chief of operations, who is, nominally, the highest technical 
expert available in that branch, so the activities of logistics should 
be grouped under another head who should be the best technical 
expert available to cope with the problems he would have to handle. 
The office of assistant secretary of the navy ofters a suitable title 
and position for the person selected for the task. He would neces- 
sarily have authority over the chiefs of bureaus and over navy 
yards as industrial establishments. Any man competent to be the 
president of a railroad or of a large manufacturing concern would 
have the necessary quahfications. 

The marine corps is an organization complete in itself, with its 
own strategical and logistic divisions. It is correct that operations 
should direct its activities. 



^52 



Logistics 



The judge advocate general is technically in the Secretary's 
office. He is a law officer, pure and simple, and has no other 
functions. He properly has nothing to do with either strategy or 
logistics. 

The general board should be looked upon as a body of the 
highest technical experts to answer questions of strategy or tactics 
laid before them by the chief of operations. Plans of campaign 
drawn up in the office of operations should be thoroughly discussed 
by them, and they could themselves, if called upon to do so, draw 
up war plans for the chief of operations. 

A PROPOSED ORGANIZATION OF THE NAVY DEPARTMENT 

SHOWING THE RELATION OF POLICY. STRATEGY 

AND LOGISTICS 



Law 
J. A. G. 



POLICY 
(Secretary 



General 
Board 



STRATEGY 

Chief of Operations 
(Admiral) 



2.° 2 ^ o'^ ^ ^ K 






- ET. y :i =! ^ 

(Ti O) — • 



LOGISTICS 
Chief of Logistics 
(Asst. Secretary) 



C ^r, !i: -1 3 C 

•^ A T- '^ c-crq := 

►o :t.<^ 0-3 =-cf; 

n> o 3 2 -1 fl 



5 2 c- 



Note. — Logistics orders (from seniors) and recommendations (from 
juniors) affecting the movements of a vessel, or its efficiency to an 
important degree, should go through official channels, including oper- 
ations. Other logistics correspondence should pass direct between the 
bureau concerned and the commanding officer. 

There must be cordial cooperation between strategy and logistics, and 
both mu?t loyally support policy. 



Logistics 253 

The above organization eliminates the system of " balance and 
check," which now acts as a brake on the energy of the department. 
Far from diminishing the importance of the Secretary of the 
Navy, it enhances his importance and authority by liberating 
him from a multiplicity of unfamiliar details and leaves him free 
to exercise control and supervision, select the right man for each 
task, and direct the whole machine. He ceases to be the head of 
a number of small units, the energies of which he must constantly 
seek more or less effectively to coordinate ; he becomes the head of 
an organized body, a great unit which looks to him for supervision 
and guidance and whose energies he controls and directs. It is 
" scientific management " applied to the navy. 



U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD. 



AYES HA 
(concluded) 

By Lieutenant Hellmuth von Mucke, 
Imperial German Navy 

Free translation by Lieutenant J. H. Kleix, Jr., U. S. Navy 



NI. The Shipwreck 

The return from Sanaa was accomplished without interruption in 
the same manner as the march approaching that place. I went on 
ahead with a few men in order to hurry the preparations for 
another cruise at sea. I reached Hodeida about a day and a half 
ahead of the remainder. We managed to make the caravan trip 
in eight days. We rode day and night with very few pauses. Only 
when the animals had to be changed did we stop. As we had sent 
the Choising away, and as it was impossible to rake up any more 
steamers, the only way to leave Hodeida seemed to be by means of 
" zambuks." These are the small, open sailing vessels, rigged as 
" dhaus," used along this coast. 

I succeeded in unearthing two zambuks at Hodeida, each about 
14 meters long and 4 meters beam. These were gathered together 
in a small bight to the northward of Hodeida, called Jabana. 
Because of the French armored cruiser, which still maintained its 
permanent and sleepy watch, it was impossible for me to start 
from Hodeida. She might possibly wake up. Knowing that the 
country swarmed with English and French spies, I spread the 
rumor that I intended to sail from the bight at Isa on March 12. 
The expected actually happened. On the afternoon of March 12, 
for the first time since the beginning of the war, an English gun- 
boat appeared in the forlorn Isa bight, which boasted neither 
house, tree, blade of grass nor water, and examined the beach for 
us with its searchlight. The poor fools, what would they not have 
given to have really known where we actually were ! 

Note. — This story of Ayesha is published by permission of Ritter & Co., 
Boston, who hold the American copyright and by whom Ayesha will shortly 
be published in book form. J. W. G. 



256 " Ayesha " 

On March 14, about 5 p. m., my squadron left Jabana. The 
battle-flag- flew at the stern of my proud flagship, and, with three 
cheers to His Majesty the Kaiser, we started the cruise. Lieuten- 
ant Gerdis commanded the second flagship. Strict discipline took 
the place of the other absent ships of the squadron.^ As the other 
zambuk was a little larger than mine, I had the sick men put 
aboard that one. Malaria, dysentery and typhoid still bothered the 
men, and I had several whose health was such as to cause me not a 
little uneasiness. I was unwilling, however, to leave my sick 
behind, as I was certain that nothing but a change of climate would 
improve them. 

I managed to get all the latest information, such as it was, con- 
cerning the English, and I therefore knew that the English block- 
ading ships, two gunboats and the auxiliary cruiser Empress of 
Russia, were maintaining a line of blockade from Loheiya over to 
Kamaran, Jebel Zebayir to Jebel Zukur. I therefore had to run 
this blockade with my sailboats. In order to prevent both boats 
from being taken at the same place, I ordered Lieutenant Gerdis to 
leave me. We had decided upon a rendezvous to the north where 
each should wait for the other a certain length of time. 

Soon the second zambuk disappeared in the gathering darkness. 
For the first time we now began losing headway and at daybreak it 
was flat calm. To our great dismay we lay motionless, and at sun- 
rise found ourselves in the exact position where we least wished to 
be, namely, in the middle of the English blockading line. Any 
minute the appearance of the tops of English masts could be 
expected. Our hopes ran low. The calm succeeded in holding us 
more effectually to this place than any action of the enemy could 
bring about. But I had not planned my departure for over the 
" week-end " without an object in view. I was sufificiently familiar 
with the customs of the English to know that during the week-end. 
that is, Saturday evening and Sunday, the gentlemen were not keen 
for work. And so it happened that we were not sighted throughout 
that whole day. 

In the course of the afternoon the breeze set in again and about 
evening at sundown we could go to sleep with the comfortable 
reflection that we had, even with two becalmed sailboats, been able 
to run the English line of blockade. 

^ Translator's Note. — Rather difficult to properly express this German 
pun in English. 



" AVESHA " 257 

I continued the journey, with my light draft vessels, between the 
coral reefs of the Farisan bank. This is a giant coral bank, about 
350 sea-miles long, where large ships cannot go, and even small 
boats are not entirely free from danger. During the next day, my 
second zambuk came in sight. She received orders to remain with 
me thereafter. 

Life aboard the zambuks was. so to speak, right comfortable. 
There was not very much room. With the Arabs, who tended ship, 
the interpreters and pilots, we counted up 35 men per boat, so that 
in a space 14 meters long by 4 meters wide not much space remained 
for each individual. In addition, a great deal of room in the boat 
was given over to provisions, water, munitions and machine guns. 
As a protection against the glowing heat, we spread woolen 
blankets overhead during the day, so that at least our heads were 
kept in the shade. The equipment also was rather meager. In 
each zambuk a small open fireplace of sheet metal was built in and 
on this we had to cook for 30 men. We attempted to constantly 
change our menu with the various means at our disposal, so that 
on the first day we ate, for example, tough mutton with rice and 
grease ; on the next day, rice, grease and tough mutton ; on the 
third day, grease with tough mutton and rice ; and so forth and so 
on. We were making very slow progress. Frequently we had to 
contend with calms, adverse winds and currents. We were not 
spared internal dissensions either. At night they raged most 
strenuously. Of them, the cockroaches, bugs and lice were espe- 
cially active. Clothes not actually in use had to be lashed down in 
order to avoid the danger of having them walk away. As soon as 
the sun came up, shirts were pulled off and the process of " killing 
lice " begun. The record was 74 lice in one shirt. 

On Mach 17, I signalled my squadron " I intend to anchor 
this evening." We had now approached the place where my 
accompanying pilots declared it impossible, even for our small 
boats, to navigate at night. About 6 p. m. we were drawing close 
to the Island of Marka where we intended to anchor. The pilot 
steered the ship for the anchorage. I. with my zambuk, led the 
way. The second boat followed at about 200 meters. We had a 
right stiff breeze and a noticeable sea on, and were glad to get into 
the lee of the island. But we had not reckoned on our skilful 
Arabian pilot. He piloted so beautifully that presently we struck 
a coral reef. Two, three times we hit her hard so that I had the 



258 " Ayesha " 

gravest doubts as to whether the boat would stand it. Then we 
again drew clear (evidently jumped it) and were in deep water 
once more. I anchored immediately. In order to keep the rear 
ship from hitting the same reef, I yelled and signalled to her. But 
she also hit it. She had already arrived in the coral reef, and, when 
turning around, struck another reef. Noticing her flag being 
hoisted, I knew by this sign that something serious had hap- 
pened. Immediately I saw the boat slowly begin to list. From 
the way the mast shook I knew the ship had hit. In an instant the 
boat disappeared ; only the mastheads inclined backwards out of 
the water. And this occurred close to sunset. 

Night falls very quickly in this place. Ten minutes after sun- 
set it is absolutely dark. There was no moonlight. Immediate 
help was necessary. We had already hoisted sail on our zambuk. 
All hands got busy. The anchor was torn out of the ground, and 
while performing- a desperate maneuver, in which we almost struck 
the reef again, we managed to get clear and hasten to the aid of 
our comrades. I went as near as possible to the sunken zambuk and 
anchored. Due to the reefs I bad to stand off abotit 400 meters. 
We had no boats to communicate with each other. Each zambuk 
had a so-called dugout ( these are very small paddle boats chopped 
out of tree trunks) that could hold at most two men, and whose 
use was now *i serious f[uestion in this high sea. I promptly sent 
mv dtigouts over to her. 

Meantime it had grown dark. We had a lantern aboard our 
zambuk. Despite all eft'orts we could not light the lantern to 
show our location due to the breeze constantly blowing out the 
matches. " Bring the torches," I ordered. We had brought along 
several torches from the Emden and Choising for just such an 
emergency. They were broitght out and made ready. The fuse 
worked, but the torches would not light. They had, in the course 
of months, become too wet. 

Soon thereafter I heard voices in the night astern of us. They 
were the first of the men from the other zambuk who were swim- 
ming on past us because they could not see. We yelled and blew 
our battery whistles to attract their attention and, after several 
anxious minutes, succeeded in doing so. These men had been 
swimming away from the other zambuk. They had no other 
means of knowing which direction to swim, except by means of a 
star that indicated our general direction. How many men were in 



" Ayesha " 259 

the water I had no means of knowing-. I was also greatly alarmed 
because that entire region swarmed with sharks. Above all, I knew 
not what had become of the sick who were too weak to help them- 
selves. Now, once and for all, it became imperative to have light. 
As everything else had failed, I had wood gathered together, 
petroleum poured over it, and without considering the ever- 
present danger of a large fire in an open boat, I had the fire lighted. 
We held our torches in the flames until they became sufficiently 
dry to burn. At the same time we fired some white rockets that we 
still retained, and which, thank God, functioned properly, even 
though these rockets would call attention to us from miles around.. 
Finally, the two dugouts returned. They were each paddled by 
one man and carried a sick man in addition. The remaining sick 
that could not help themselves were brought back either in the dug- 
outs or were lashed alongside them in the water and towed aboard. 
At the same time the other swimmers arrived from all sides. 
Those that could not swim, and there were several, wore life pre- 
servers and tried to paddle along as best they could. By and by 
more returned. Soon we had over 50 men aboard so that my 
zambuk went down so far in the water that we could not hold any 
more men. I therefore ordered all superfluous cargo thrown 
overboard, including provisions and water, in order to lighten the 
ship and to endeavor to carry all the men. ( )nly weapons, muni- 
tions and provisions and water for three days remained aboard. 

^leanwhile our torches had almost burned out and I feared that 
the light would not last long enough to be certain of rescuing all 
the men from the sunken boat. Only the officers failed to arrive — 
and with the arrival of the last officer our last torch spluttered 
out. So now, at least, every man was saved. According to the 
advices of the officer, the sunken zambuk struck a steep coral reef 
and held there, and we had only our luck to thank for the fact that 
the masthead remained above water. It could easily have happened 
that the zambuk would have slid off the reef and disappeared 
into the deep. Then most certainly would all the sick have drowned 
and probably also a great portion of the non^swimmers. 

Near us lay another zambuk belonging to the tribe of " Idrisz." 
The Idrisz is an Arabian clan which is not on good terms with the 
Turks, and also strongly opposed to the advent of Europeans. 
This zambuk had also sent her dugout to help my second sunken 
boat. But as soon as she saw that we were Europeans, which she 



26o " Ayesha " 

knew by the tropical helmet of our doctor, she turned around and 
left us to our fate. As it was rather difficult for me to proceed with 
an overladen boat containing about 70 men, especially when I con- 
sidered the condition of our provision supply, I sent our Arabian 
interpreter to the Idrisz' boat shortly before daylight, to offer them 
a large sum for the use of their boat for a few days. They abso- 
lutely refused, however, stating that not even for £100,000 would 
they do anything for the dogs of Christians. It would have been an 
easy matter for me to have taken the zambuk by armed force, 
which I had planned to do that morning. The whole proceeding, 
• however, was not a pleasant one. as a tormenting political discus- 
sion would follow such an act. It resolved itself into a question of 
using armed force against an ally, even though this small uncivil- 
ized part of our ally consisted of a wild tribe. 

But the next day our " star shone bright " once again. A stiff 
and fresh southerly blow came on that made it possible to sail 
before the wind even with a heavily laden boat, and a speedy 
journey seemed to be ordained. Therefore I left the Idrisz' boat 
in peace. 

We quickly set to w^ork to rescue what we could from the 
sunken zambuk. The weapons especially were wanted. During 
the night the zambuk had sunk deeper. The mast broke off and 
the ship had capsized on the bottom. By diving we managed to 
salvage two machine guns, several revolvers and some ammunition. 
All the other stores, clothes, etc., and unfortunately our entire 
medical outfit, were lost. The stiff breeze pushed us ahead further 
that one single afternoon than we would have accomplished in 
perhaps six days under the preceding conditions. 

In the evening we landed at Kunfidda. Here we were received 
in grand style, and although advance preparations could not have 
been made for us, nevertheless they hurriedly prepared a Turkish 
meal which we, according to the customs of this region, quickly 
devoured without the use of knives, forks, plates, etc. A whole 
mutton, filled with rice, was set on the table. Eagerly we set to 
work to tear the flesh from the carcass, meanwhile stuffing hand- 
fuls of the rice into our mouths. In Kunfidda we met a Turkish 
official and his wife who also wished to journey to Constantinople 
and therefore they joined us. This official later on in the trip 
performed valuable service as a dragoman, i. e., as interpreter. 



" Ayes HA " 261 

Quickly we found a larger zambuk in Kuntidda. We rented this 
one and started off, all hands in one boat. We reached Lidd in the 
afternoon of March 24, not having encountered any special dan- 
gers. This was the most northerly point of the Farisan bank, 
among whose coral reefs we had, up to this time, found security 
from our English searchers. And now our cruise would have to 
be continued on the open ocean. It was well understood that the 
English would do everything possible to capture us. In Lidd I 
happened by chance to be given a letter that had been written by 
a merchant in Dschidda. He wrote that many English warships 
were closely blockading Dschidda and that every zambuk that 
attempted to leave the harbor was searched by the English. 

Therefore it was impossible to continue further by water. It 
was necessary to proceeed overland. We remained in Lidd for 
two days in order to gather the necessary animals and organize a 
caravan, to arrange for our water supply and to make such other 
necessary preparations as would enable us to go on ahead. 

In Lidd we had our first casualty. A seaman, Keil by name, had 
been suffering from typhus ever since we arrived at Hodeida. The 
shock of the shipwreck was too much for his w-eakened constitu- 
tion. Above all, he suffered the lack of medical assistance which 
we had been vmable to recently give him as we had lost all our 
medicines. He died at 3 a. m., March 27. Two of his comrades 
kept constant watch at his bedside and also later, at his bier. We 
prepared a small rowboat, sewed the remains in sailcloth and 
weighted it with stones. The war-flag covered the whole. On 
this we placed his hat and his bared saber. After a short religious 
ceremony we towed the remains of our comrade out to sea and 
sank it in deep water. Three volleys were fired over his watery 
grave. It was impossible to bury him ashore as the fanatical and 
wild inhabitants would probably have disturbed even the peace of 
the dead. On March 28, we again took up the march. 

XII. The Surprise 

It was not an easy matter to procure in Lidd sufficient camels for 
the journey. Lidd is a very small town of only a few hundred 
inhabitants and has no commercial relations. In order to make the 
journey more pleasant, I considered it necessary to call on the 
Sheik of Lidd. This was the first time a Christian had ever entered 
the sheik's house. 



262 " Ayes II A " 

The arrangeinents were made by my dragoman. After Ave had 
exchanged a few gifts he invited me to dine. His hovise was a 
wooden-framed, matting-covered atTair without windows. Two 
divans, covered with skins, were set on the sides of the room. 
Weapons hung from the walls. The other furnishings of the 
room consisted of smoking materials. Before the meal we were 
served with either cups of mokka or something like lemon-sour. 
The mokka was the Arabian kind, that is, not the beans but the 
shells of the beans were boiled. The whole concoction is a bitter 
drink, not very pleasing to the European taste, but out of defer- 
ence to our host had to be gulped d-nvn under any circumstances. 
While we were still sitting in the room, preparations for the meal 
were begun. These commenced with the laying of a fairly large, 
round, woven straw matting upon the bare earth. Servants then 
entered and heaped a mountain of rice on the straw mat. A small 
can of preserved mixed jMckles completed the table arrangements. 
Une sat, rather one la)-, at the table. For all that, everybody was 
provided with a spoon. All hands set gavly to work on the rice 
mountain.. Meantime, in front of the house, the meat Avas being- 
prepared, consistin.g of a whole roasted sheep. There were no 
knives and forks. Even the mutton did not appear on the table: 
instead, the two servants detailed for our service tore chunks of 
mutton from the sheep with their hands and laid the torri-oit pieces 
on the straw matting before each of us. 

During the tv/o days spent in I.idd \\-e succeeded in gathering 
in about go camels. With these we could begin the march. The 
remaining camels Ave could pick up on the road the next daA^ so 
sairl the sheik. I l:)ought a large outfit of straw mats vrhich T 
divided among mv ])eo]:)!e. These later on proved their worth as 
sunshades. In the evening Ave formed rmr caravan and left the 
place, taking up our march into the desert. A large number of 
camels carried only eciuipage, esjiecially waf-f-r, munitions, machine 
guns and proAasions. The A\'ater sup',)l\- Avas net satisfactory. T 
bad to coun.t on dift^.culties wliich would j^-event our replenisli-ing 
our water supply- for da) s at a time. 

A journe}- with camels is very tedious. Son-ietimes the camel 
goes ahead, and, according to its standard, not very fast: but Ave 
had a caravan of 90 at first, later on, i io camels. Except for the 
officers" camels, Avhich v\-ere running singly, the other animals 
v.-ere tied togetb.er ( in that tbe sr.out of the rear ariimal Avas con- 



" Ayesha " 263 

nected with the tail of the one forward of it by a Hne abotit 4 
meters long). A line of camels connected together in such a way 
could not, of course, proceed at the same speed that a single camel 
would travel, instead the speed of the whole line was limited by the 
speed of the slowest camel. Frequently halts had to be made 
because the packs slid sideways, the girths had to be replaced, the 
saddles fell oft', and so forth. 

We kept to a trail that skirted the sea. The entire region is 
unsafe. Robberies and caravan attacks occur daily. Since leaving' 
Lidd we carried our guns loaded and ready for action. ' Luckily 
for us, the nights were light, due to a full moon. According to 
rule, we travelled from 4 p. m. until the next morning between 9 
and 10, or whenever we reached a place where we intended to rest. 
The average day's work was approximately 14 to 18 hours" riding. 
Camels are pacers. The riding, therefore, was quite tiresome. 
The w^atering places that we passed were holes about 12 to 14 
meters deep, dug down in the desert sand, into which leather bags 
are lowered in order to draw water. The expression "water" 
does not mean water according to the European definition of that 
word. On the ground around the water-holes we frequently saw 
dog carcasses, sheep skeletons and such. The water was an evil- 
smelling, brown to black colored hog-wash, full of animals. In 
any case, it could not possibly be used before boiling. Frequently 
it had a very salty taste. 

We were piloted from Lidd by a Turkish officer and seven gen- 
darmes. Further along we Avere guided by the Arabian sheik of 
the territory in which we happened to be : because it is the custom 
to take the man, responsible for your safetv, along with you as 
hostage. Such measures are not unusyal in this region. And so 
our journey continued without interruption until March 31. 

On this day, about 1 1 a. m., we arrived at a water-hole one dav's 
journey distant from Dschidda. Dschidda was our next goal. At 
this water-hole we found an officer and 17 gendarme^ w'ho had 
come out from Dschidda as emissaries to greet us for our Turkish 
allies and the civil population of Dschidda. Also tliey brought us 
a bountiful supply of water. We made the usual arrangements at 
this water-hole, hung our straw mats and woolen blankets over the 
low bushes and lay down with our heads under the-e so as, by 
hook or by crook, to get some slielter from the sun's rays. Cook- 
ing began as usual, as soon as we were sheltered. l_ :^ually by this 



264 " Ayesha " 

time all hands had gathered all the dry wood lying around. Then 
we immediately built a regular fire and the customary food (rice, 
and when we had luck, mutton) was prepared at once. 

When I saw these men who were sent out from Dschidda, I 
thought that at last the most dangerous part of our trip was over. 
We were now again approaching a city in which a strong garrison 
of 300 men was to be found, so I said to myself that if 17 men 
could safely travel this distance out from Dschidda, then could I, 
most certainly, with my 50 men safely travel the same distance in 
to Dschidda. 

This region is inhabited by a clan consisting entirely of direct 
descendants of the prophet, but nevertheless noted because of its 
wildness and its thieving proclivities. The name of the region, 
which is very illustrative, is " Father of Wolves." 

As usual we got under way about 4 o'clock in the afternoon. 
The trail led a distance inland from the sea. The country con- 
sisted of nothing but sand-hills. It was never possible to see more 
than 400 meters away. As soon as we had ridden over one sand- 
hill, the next immediately cut ofif a further view. Tufts of tough 
grass, about 2 feet high, grew all over the hills. Suddenly, on our 
right hand, well off the caravan trail, appeared about 12 or 15 
Bedouins, riding at a brisk trot, and disappeared in the direction 
from which we had come. That was something strange, because, 
according to the rules governing caravans for thousands of years, 
it w^as understood that the usual trails should never be departed 
from, and, further, it was understood that no one should trot at 
night. Also our Turkish guides thought they were robbers, as it 
was reported in Dschidda that a band of 40 thieves were roaming 
around. While at Lidd I sent information on ahead to the authori- 
ties at Dschidda and also at Mekka, so I was reasonably certain that 
the entire region between these points would know of our coming. 
Everybody would also know that we were not an ordinary com- 
mercial caravan, accompanied merely by the usual guard, but that 
our caravan consisted of 50 armed men especially equipped with 
four machine guns. Therefore I had not worried much about the 
40 thieves roaming around here. In order to be better able to 
control and protect my men, I broke the long line of camels into 
two parts, making two lines of 50 camels each. I forbade the 
usual sleeping aboard the camels, had the guns prepared, and saw 
everything cleared for action. The orders for my men were, no 
matter what ha]'|tene(l, U> " Gather around the leader! '' 



" Ayesha " 265 

The officers rode at the head of the caravan. As the first Hght 
of day appeared over the high mountains, rising up out of the 
desert on our right hand, I began to beHeve that all was well and 
that an attack by Bedouins in daylight was not to be expected. I 
therefore hung my rifle over the saddle, unstrapped my heavy 
cartridge belt and rode slowly along the caravan to inspect the 
right flank. 

I had arrived at the middle of the caravan when I suddenly 
heard a clear, sharp whistle, followed by the crash of a volley. A 
rain of lead fell uninterruptedly upon our caravan from all sides 
and at short range. The whizzing and whistling of bullets was 
so loud and continuous that Twas unable to make myself heard 
sufficiently to give orders. I tore my gun ofif the saddle, sprang 
to the ground and ran forward followed by my men. At the head 
of the caravan the engagement had really commenced. We could 
see the flashes of the enemy guns through the twilight about 80 
meters away. The riflemen themselves could not be seen, norcould 
they see us much better, while the tall forms of the camels were 
plainly visible, forming excellent targets for the enemy. Our only 
points of aim were the flashes of the enemy guns. As we were 
attacked on all sides, it was impossible to decide which way to 
turn next. The larger part of my men lay up forward with me. 
A s^all part remained at the rear as per my orders. Then we 
decided to bring our best weapons, the machine guns, into action. 
Two of these were tied up on the camels up forward, the other 
two at the rear. After a few moments the machine guns were 
brought into action, and hardly had they begun to rattle ofif their 
salvos over the enemy's line, when the enemy, not accustomed to 
this new form of attack, ceased firing. We made use of this pause 
to pull the still standing camels to the ground, so that they would 
not make such excellent targets, and then we issued out ammu- 
nition and consolidated our forces. 

Having received the heaviest fire from forward and to the left, 
I brought my men up to that point. Our offensive equipment con- 
sisted of four machine guns, 13 German rifles, 10 old Turkish 
rifles that I received in Kunfidda to replace the ones lost out of the 
zambuk, and three modern Turkish rifles that were divided among 
the officers. In addition, we had 24 revolvers, but these could only 
be used for close action. I could not determine the exact strength 
of the enemy. There might have been 60 or 70 firing rapidly, or 
there might possibly have been considerably more firing leisurely. 



266 " Ayesha " 

The (juestion of enemy strength would soon be answered when the 
approaching- dayHght appeared. As it grew lighter we could see 
that all the nearest sand-hills, completely surrounding us, were 
black with Bedouins. ]\Iy men behaved excellently. In spite of the 
overwhelming strength of the enemy, who were estimated at not 
less than 300, there was not the slightest sign of fear among any of 
my men. Although I had not given any orders, bayonets had been 
fixed on the muzzles of all the rifles. While I w^as considering what 
should next be done, the answer to my question came from a man 
lying close to me on my right hand, who said : " What next? Are 
we going to start soon, lieutenant? "' " What do? " was my return 
question. " Why, charge them, of course! " replied this iS-year- 
old stripling. " So be it. You are right. Rise and charge ! "' 
And, amid loud cheers, we charged the enemy's line. Such a pro- 
ceeding at a caravan-looting was certainly something new. Like- 
wise very few shots came from the enemy. \\'hen the ghttering 
bayonets came on, the enemy fled precipitously. Our fire, thinning 
out his ranks, followed him. First we charged to the left, then 
forward, and then to the right. It was unnecessary to charge the 
rear. They had already disappeared in that quarter. 

In that wav we widened the surrounding circle so that the enemy 
w^as now about 1200 meters away. The fi.ring ceased. I assembled 
mv men around the caravan. The machine guns remained in 
position all ready for instant use. 

In s])ite of the rain of bullets, which they shoAvered on us at 
almost point-blank range, we had. thank God, but one (Tcmian 
wounded. But w^hen I turned toward our Arabian allies I was 
dumfounded. In Germany we have a proverb that says "He 
counts the number of his loved ones, and behold, instead of six he 
finds seven.'' But here this proverl) was reversed. Of the 24 gen- 
darmes there remained but seven. There were no deaths. The 
missing ones we found later on in Dschidda. The Arabs that 
stood by us had been hit in the legs. This was caused by their 
remaining lu^hind seeking shelter among the camels instead of 
advancin.g on the enemy with us. As mv men were firing from the 
ground at a distance of about 30 to 40 meters in advance of the 
camels, the enemy could not see them in the dark and fired over 
their lieads. They could only see the large camels. I'efore it 
occurred to the .Arabs to drag the can]els down to earth and thereby 
be better i)rotecte(l. the enemy l)ullets flew lietween the camels' legs 
and struck the precious bodies of these heroes. 



" Ayesha " 267 

We knew nothing" of course concerning the enemy's casualties. 
We did, however, count 15 dead ones in the places they abandoned 
when we charged. These corpses, except one, had neither rifles 
nor ammunition. According to Bedouin custom, the fallen are 
despoiled of their weapons. The single gun captured, a breech- 
loading rifle of modern English construction, was added to our 
service. We could still see the Bedouins on the sand-hills in the 
distance. As soon as any of them showed themselves, they were 
immediately fired upon, because it then occurred to me to give 
them a good moral lesson. 

We could not remain in our present position very long. At 
first I had an idea that I was confronted merely by an ordinary 
robbery, and imagined that the enemy, having already suffered a 
handsome loss, would see the error of his ways and accordingly 
disappear. 

A large number of our camels were struck. We unstrapped all 
supplies from them that were of any value, especially the water, 
and placed them on the other camels instead of the less necessary 
equipment which we then left behind. 

I decided to turn sharp to the left in the direction of the sea, 
which could be discerned shimmering in the distance. If I reached 
there I would have at least one flank free. It certainly angered me 
to be unable to use the machine guns on the march as I had no suit- 
able gun carriages. They had to be carried on camels. In order to 
keep the caravan closelv consolidated, T formed it in ranks of 
four to six camels. The wounded were secured to the sides of the 
camels awav from the enemy so as to Ije better protected. Two 
camels with two machine guns rode out ahead, the other two 
machine guns were similarly carried at the rear ; an advance guard 
of 10 men in open order preceded the caravan by about 150 
meters, a rear guard of to men also marched the same distance in 
the rear. Nine men with rifles were disposed as best we could on 
the tv,'0 flanks. The other men, armed solely with revolvers and 
who could, therefore, only fight at short rang:e, remained in the 
middle of the caravan. The advance guard was commanded by 
Lieutenant Gerdis, the rear guard by Lieutenant Schmidt, the 
flanks bv Lieutenant (iyszling. The caravan itself, with Dr. 
Lang in charge of the wounded, was led by Lieutenant Wellmann. 

Slowly we got underwa}- : flags waving at the head. My hopes 
that the enemv would not further molest us were not fulfilled. 
After marching about to minutes we were fired on again from all 



268 " Ayesha " 

sides. We could hardly see the enemy. The sand-hills prevented 
our looking ahead further than 400 meters. We could only see 
about 10 or 20 black heads bob up on this sand-hill and then on that 
sand-hill. The next instant a salvo would fall around the caravan^ 
and before we could prepare to return the fire the heads would 
disappear and another hail of lead would come from a different 
direction. 

Most remarkably, we had no casualties at first, even though the 
enemy's fire was heavy, small sand splashes rising about us, while 
pebbles and sand flecks flew up into our faces. Soon we dis- 
covered that the heaviest attack was directed on the rear guard. 
Every few minutes the men there had to turn about and, b>- heavy 
firing, check the enemy. 

I was with the rear guard when I received word from forward 
that strong detachments of the enemy were forming ahead of us. 
On arrival at the advance guard I found the whole horizon black 
with Bedouins. At the same time I received word from aft that 
one of the camels carrying a machine gun was shot down. The 
rear guard stopped to cover the machine gun and Lieutenant 
Schmidt ordered another camel unloaded and sent to the rear. I 
had already heard the machine guns of the rear guard firing. They 
had. in the meantime, been unstrapped and run into action. 

I then brought the caravan to a halt, which was not an easy 
matter as the majority of the Arabian gendarmes and camel 
drivers had deserted into the night at the beginning of the fight. 
On my way to the rear guard I received word that a seaman, 
Rademacher by name, had been killed and that Lieutenant Schmidt 
was fatally wounded by bullets through his abdomen and breast. 
Lieutenant Wellman had by this time assumed command of the 
rear guard, bringing with him from the caravan two animals to 
carry the machine guns. 

As we waited, the enemy's tire again increased and soon we were 
in the midst of a lively engagement. Suddenly, as if by magic, the 
firing absolutely ceased, and as I dumfoundedly looked around for 
the reason, I saw two of the still remaining Arabian gendarmes 
waving large white cloths and running toward the enemy. At 
the same time a third Arabian gendarme came to me to explain 
that his comrades wished to hold a parley with the enemy. As 
unnecessary as I deemed this to be, it was from the first wholly 
pleasing, because I had in the meantime clearly seen that this was 



" A YES HA " 269, 

not an ordinary robbery, but that we actually faced an organized 
military situation. As we were outnumbered at least ten to one, 
a march with camels on the open level under the continuous fire 
of the enemy was impossible. My most powerful weapons, the 
machine guns, could not be used on the march, and my 29 rifles 
were not much protection as I had an insufficient number of men 
to use them on all sides at the same time. And finally we would 
gradually be picked ofi^ one after the other as we proceeded. 

We used the pause in the firing to intrench ourselves. We made 
breastworks out of camel saddles (filled with sand), cofifee, rice 
and provision sacks. The encircling walls we filled up, to the best 
of our ability, with sand. In the middle of the camp we gathered 
the camels. Loop-holes were made in great haste. Other facilities 
lacking, we made the loop-holes with our swords and tin plates 
( scoops) . Of course, our construction work was done so hurriedly 
that it was not as efficient as could be desired. We buried the water 
:ontainers deep in the sand so that the enemy bullets would not rip 
them open and thus inflict irreparable damage. In the middle of 
the camp we constructed another small protection out of sand-filled 
petroleum tins, the walls being about i^ meters thick. Within 
this we placed the disabled and sick men. the wounded and the 
doctor. 

As we could expect to be attacked from all sides, and as 
our breastworks protected us only from the front, we so placed 
the camels around the sides that we also had " living " protection 
from the rear. Lieutenant Schmidt, fatally wounded, was carried 
into the camp on a stretcher made of rifles and woolen blankets. 
The dead seaman was buried then and there. 

The four machine guns were planted at the corners, each 
hastily protected by a hurriedly thrown up sand-hill. The rifle- 
men were detailed around to the important points, the men armed 
with revolvers were shoved into the gaps, and ammunition served 
out. We had hardly finished these preparations when the enemy's 
terms (stipulations) arrived. They were: 

" Deliver all weapons and ammunition, all camels, all provisions 
and water, and pay £1 1 ,000 in gold. We could then proceed unmo- 
lested." Now what do you think of that ! 

The negotiations were started by the dragoman, who, with his 
wife, had joined us at Kunfidda. He also was wounded ! Shot in 
the legs ! When he went out to parley, he did not forget to take 
his wife along. The next time we saw them was in Dschidda. 



2^6 " Ayesha " 

The answer that I gave, declared : 

" In the first place we had no money. In the second place we 
were guests of the land. Get your gold in Dschidda. In the third 
place it is not a German custom to deliver up our arms.'" 

And then the firing recommenced. The remaining camel drivers 
and a number of the Arabian gendarmes improved their time so 
well during the pause that they followed our interpreter and his 
wife and also disappeared. The fighting continued until dark. 
Lying there between our camels and their saddles, we were fairly 
well protected. I ordered that their fire be returned slowly. We 
did not have a great quantity of ammunition and we fouiid many 
cartridges that failed to fire owing to their having been sub- 
merged overnight when the zambuk capsized. Therefore I saved 
all the best ammunition for the machine guns so that in case of a 
night attack I could count on my most powerful weapons for a 
fight at close quarters. The remaining ammunition was divided 
among the riflemen. We had no further casualties. A number of 
camels were shot, but that did not lessen our protection. A dead 
camel holds just as many bullets as a live one. The whole day, 
however, we did not eat. We had no time to think of that during 
daylight. No sooner would one of our men poke his head over the 
saddles than a heavy fire was showered on us. 

The principal work started at nightfall. About one hour after 
sunset the moon rose. Dviring this hour it was so dark that we 
could hardly see more than 40 or 50 meters. Everything in the 
camp was cleared for repelling an attack in case they stormed us. 
All rifles and pistols were loaded, and machine guns made ready 
for instant use, the men kneeling with their guns resting on the 
breastworks. But nothing happened. With the rising of the moon 
we could see about 300 meters and then we set to work to improve 
our camp. First we issued out water and passed around some hard- 
tack. A part of the officers and men remained on watch and ready. 
The others continued to dig the trenches deeper, a job which pro- 
ceeded very slowly because of the lack of proper tools. The dead 
camels had to be gotten rid of. The carcasses decayed very rapidly 
in the extreme heat. They swelled up, the skin burst (along the 
welts caused by whipping) leaving the entrails exposed. 

Tt was long into the night before our work had progressed suf- 
ficiently so that we could no longer begrudge ourselves a little rest. 
The trenches were now deep enough to afi^ord sufficient protection 



" Ayesha " 271 

to a man lying down. On all sides, outboard of the camels, we 
built sand-hills. The rifles and revolvers were so choked with 
sand that they had to be taken apart, cleaned and then proof fired. 
Then we bound up the breech mechanisms with our handkerchiefs 
and placed small rag wads in the muzzles in order to keep out the 
sand. Above all things, the weapons had to be protected. In camp 
we kept a sort of watch in that a certain portion of men remained 
on post. The remainder were allowed to sleep on their loaded arms. 
One officer was always on watch. During the night the enemy did 
not attempt anything startling. 

At 9 p. m. Lieutenant Schmidt, w^ho had been fatally wounded, 
died. We dug a deep grave in the middle of the camp and about 
1 1 p. m. we four officers carried our comrade to his last resting 
place. The funeral had to be conducted without the honors of 
volley firing. This honor was paid our dead on the next day by 
the enemy. 

As Dschidda was only 10 hours away by camel and eight hours 
on foot, I sent, during the hour preceding moonlight, an English- 
speaking Arab that I had brought from Hodeida, into the town. 
The man had always appeared to be sensible and reliable. As 1 
learned later, he was able to steal through the enemy lines and to 
carry the information about our camp to the military authorities 
at Dschidda. 

A half hour before sunrise I had all hands awakened. This in 
case the enemy was there and waiting to recommence the fighting 
as early as possible. I intended, in order to make a moral impres- 
sion, to immediatelv answer his first shots with heavy salvos so 
that he would know that we were all on watch and that our strength 
had not diminished. 

My expectations were realized. At sunrise the enemy opened 
a heavy fire. We answered immediately, energetically firing full 
salvos, and each head that was exposed was soon covered by our 
fire. This proceeding as we could see, lowered the morale of the 
enemy. His firing grew markedly more cautious and weak. We 
had therefore accomplished our purpose. 

Prior to sunrise, each man was given a glass of water. For the 
remainder of the day I could not let them have any more. Not 
until after sunset was it possible to take another drink. As we 
could not cook during the night, the hardtack were eagerly eaten 
and pockets were stufifed full of them. 



2';2 " AVESHA " 

The enemy fired in a desultory manner. As we were very well 
protected, we gave only a weak reply. That we were not dealing' 
with an ordinary robbery, but with an organized force instead, was 
presently clearly made known to us. From our camp we could see 
two large zambuks at anchor ofif the coast. A regular transporta- 
tion service was being conducted between the zambuks and our 
besiegers. No doubt most of our enemies arrived there in these 
two ships. Another part came from overland because we could see 
a great horde of camels grazing along the desert horizon. 

Unfortunately we had two more severely wounded that day. Of 
these, a fireman, Lanig by name, shot through the breast and 
stomach, died during the night. We could not give our wounded 
much medical assistance, as we had lost all our medical outfit when 
the zambuk sank. Luckily we still had some of the Ejiiden's first- 
aid packages (that is, rolls of medicated bandages) and several 
bottles of cognac. 

The day was uneventful. We were made uncomfortable, how- 
ever, because one of the camels which broke out of the camp was 
shot to windward and the wind carried the most penetrating and 
putrid odors toward us. In the camp itself we were pestered by 
some most unwelcome guests. Hundreds of thousands of disgust- 
ing black beetles, about as long as one's thumb, ran right and left 
over the whole camp carrying camel manure. Our trenches were 
full of these animals and no matter how many one killed or trod on 
there were always more coming. Sleeping was practically out of 
the question. They crawled in through your clothes and walked 
out over your face. Moreover, in addition to being extremely 
unpleasant they introduced an immediate danger to our wounded ; 
tetanus germs breed more quickly in horse and camel manure than 
in anything else. Such an infection is always followed by the abso- 
lutely deadly lockjaw. 

The glowing sun made living in the daytime almost unbearable. 
Our light-colored head-dress could not be worn as it furnished the 
enemy a fine point of aim, while the dazzling light caused smarting 
eyes and headaches. It was so hot that one's hands were burned 
while shooting if the barrel of the gun were touched. The grease- 
soaked camel saddles began to swell, due to heat, and the ensuing 
smoky odor constantly pervaded the camp. We covered the sad- 
dles with sand as best we could. The wind never ceased blowing 
fine particles of sand all over us. Meantime we had to dig out the 



" Ayesha " 273 

trenches again because the}- became half filled with sand. The fine 
sand particles entered the eyes, ears, mouth and nose. The eyes 
burned from this continuous irritation. A heavy sand coat, made 
by the perspiration, covered our faces so as to make us unrecog- 
nizable. About 20 to 30 vultures circled high in the ^\v above the 
camp. 

At sunset the regular preparations were made again. Two 
Arabian gendarmes, disguised as Bedouins, were sent as messen- 
gers this night to Dschidda. When the moon rose the men not on 
watch lay down to sleep. The enemy began to fire when night fell. 

In the middle of the night our sentries began to shoot. Every- 
thing was ready for action, standing by to repulse the expected 
attack. "Where are they?" I asked the sentry. "Here, there 
were several crawling around about 40 meters away." And then 
a shower of lead was fired at them. Our guess that these were 
enemies was a mistake. They were hyenas and jackals that had 
crept up around the camp looking for prey and found the camels' 
carcasses to feast on. 

And now the sun rose for the third time over our camp. Our 
situation was critical. We had received no signs as yet from the 
Turkish garrison that our messengers had arrived, as they should 
have done, the preceding day. We could hold out this one day 
and then the water would be gone in spite of the fact that each 
man received only one small cup of water each morning and 
evening. Without water we were lost. W^e had to do something 
before our men lost their strength. So I gave the order that 
morning that we would make a powerful attempt to break through 
to Dschidda at sunset unless some news came in the course of the 
day. T had hoped thereby to get at least some part of my men 
through. Whoever fell. fell. The sick and wounded could not be 
taken along. We hoped to God that such extreme measures would 
not have to be adopted. 

About noon on the third day, a man waving a white cloth sud- 
denly appeared from that side where the firing had ceased. I 
admitted him to the camp and asked what he wanted. He an- 
swered that the enemy had abandoned the idea of our delivering 
up our arms, munitions, camels, provisions and water. Instead we 
should pay £22,000 in gold. I guessed that the enemy had informa- 
tion that the Turkish garrison was coming out and that now, as is 
customary with these people, they were endeavoring, as a last 



2/4 " Ayesha " 

resort, to get as much out of us as they possibl\- could. I therefore 
decided to draw out the proceeding's as long as practicable, to ward 
ott the raising of the siege, and then to bring the enemy between 
two fires. Therefore I painted a rosy description of our camp and 
pretended that nothing could be more agreeable to us than to spend 
the fresh summer in the desert, the music of salvo firing being- 
very pleasant. I showed the man the place where our empty water 
containers were buried and made it clear to him that with that 
amount of water I could comfortably hold out four weeks longer, 
and therefore I knew no reason why I should agree to any dis- 
advantageous terms. Munitions I had in abundance, as he knew. 
They could thank their lucky stars that I hadn't turned my machine 
guns loose on them and pressed the attack home. The parley was 
held through a Moroccan, who had been taken prisoner in Belgium 
and was sent back from there along with the other Mohammedans 
to Turkey. He had accompanied an expedition into Arabia, was 
picked up by me in Kunfidda and still remained with us. He spoke 
a little broken French. 

The enemy's emissary did not seem to be much impressed with 
my explanation. He left, but returned in another half hour and 
offered the same terms. In order to gain time I told him that I 
preferred above all to do business with the enemy commander in 
person, and invited the commander himself to visit me in my camp. 
The suspicious angel came not, but instead sent me the terrible 
threat that since we refused to pay. we would now have heaucoup 
de combat. I took this to mean that it was high time for him to 
leave and I expressed my surprise that their previous actions 
should also not be classed as heaucoup de combat. 

To me it had seemed so. Then we received some furious and 
violent salvos. Following this a dead silence ensued. 

A quarter and then a half hour passed without a single shot. 
Slowly and carefully we raised our heads over the camel saddles. 
Nothing in sight. " Be careful," I said, " that is only a ruse. Keep 
under cover! We have plenty of time. We can't leave before 
evening anyway." But as nothing further happened we began to 
get up, first on our knees, then finally we stood up and searched 
with our glasses. Nothing in sight. We knew not where they had 
disappeared. The sand-hills of the desert that swallowed them up 
now cut off our view. Fvidentlv thcv had withdrawn. 



" Ayesha " 275 

The next thing to do was to remain lying", because I was not yet 
certain the enemy had really retreated or whether he was trying to 
fool us. Anyway, we could not possibly proceed before night. 

About an hour after the firing ceased two camel riders appeared, 
who, from their clothes and rich saddle cloths, were recognized as 
belonging to a class above the Bedouins. Waving a white cloth 
they rode up to our camp. We hoisted up our battle-flag as a sign 
that we had seen them. They rode up to within 50 meters and then 
dismounted. I sent my Moroccan out to them to find out what they 
wanted. The answer came back that they wished to speak to the 
commander of the German troops. They came from the Emir of 
Mecca, who had heard of the attack made on us and was sending 
troops to our aid. 

That sounded pretty good, but there appeared no signs that this 
was really true. I had grown sufficiently accustomed to Arabia to 
be rather distrustful. I went out to them with my bared saber in 
my hand; behind me marched one of my men with his gun ready. 
I gave orders in the camp to be ready for an attack, and in case of 
an}- attack on me to commence firing regardless of my personal 
safety. But nothing occurred. The two men declared to me that 
the second son of the Emir of Mecca, Abdullah, would soon ride 
up with his troop. Correct, a half hour later a caravan of 70 camel 
riders appeared on the horizon carrying a dark red banner on 
which were inscribed various Koran characters. They made some 
sort of music on their drums and sang to it. This proceeding I 
thought to be rather imprudent as the troops were supposed to be 
ready to go into battle. 

Abdullah approached to greet me. He conveyed the compli- 
ments of his father, spoke his regrets at our having been attacked 
and said that he had water for us ; we could now quietly proceed to 
Dschidda, as our enemies had retreated. 

I distributed the water among my men, then under great dififi- 
culties packed the camels, a job which is not an easy one as 
" getting a camel ready " had not heretofore been described in the 
Bluejacket's Manual of the navy. A large amount of provisions 
had to be left behind because about 40 of our camels had been shot. 
Accompanied by the emir's troops, we left the camp. It is certainly 
a rare occurrence to see a Christian riding in the desert under the 
flag of the prophet, next to the son of the Emir of Mecca. After 
a few minutes we passed over the abandoned lines of the enemy. 



_!76 " Ayesha " 

The scoundrels had actually built themselves perfectly good 
trenches. 

We rode the whole of the next day and then encamped at a well. 
Here, for the first time in four days, we were able to have cooked 
food, to wash and to lie down to rest. The well was probably 
supplied with water by a spring and was about 40 meters deep. 
The water that we drew from this well was warm, probably about 
30° Celsius. 

From our camp, close to the edge of the sea, we could see a 
restless searchlight sweeping through the darkness. Our friends, 
the English, before Dschidda ! 

XIH. To THE Railroad 

We were very comfortably quartered in Dschidda. The sick 
and wounded were given good treatment in a military hospital. 
It Avas hard to decide which way to continue my- journey. I was 
told that the Bedouins who had attacked us were paid to do so by 
the English ; and they were armed with the most modern English 
rifles. Leaving here by Avater was next to impossible. The numer- 
ous tips of the masts of the English blockading tleet were- visible 
daily. In spite of that I decided to leave in zambuks. I still con- 
tinued to believe that the sea routes contained greater possibilities 
than the land routes. 

Therefore it now became necessary to spread the rumor that I 
expected to proceed overland. Secretly, however, I procured a 
zambuk and a reliable pilot. I was forced to remain in Dschidda 
several days because of the wounded. The departure date was set 
for April 8. I used a small motorboat. which I discovered in 
Dschidda harbor, to make a reconnaissance out to sea for a con- 
siderable distance. I saw no English. Was it possible that they 
actually swallowed the rumor about the overland route ! 

Having found a favorable breeze during the night of April 8-9, 
we started out. Conditions were much more favorable than when 
we broke through the English blockade ofif Hodeida. The wind 
held through the night and by sunrise we were out of sight of the 
blockading English. I kept the zambuk as near the beach as 
possible, squeezing closely to all the reefs in order to render pur- 
suit more difficult. Slowly, but surely, we made headway. We 
stopped for a short time, not more than a few hours, at several 



" Ayes MA " 277 

small coast towns in order to get the latest information and to pur- 
chase fresh provisions. The pilot I carried from Dschidda knew 
the coast very well and, in addition, spoke fairly good English. We 
anchored at night because we dared not sail through the reefs in 
the dark. At Scherm, Rabegh, I changed zambuks. The one I 
broltght from Dschidda was very frail. We had to fill the new^ 
zambuk with sand ballast. Without either cargo or sand ballast, 
it was not very safe to sail her. 

The evening anchoring was invariably an unusual evolution. 
We could not anchor wherever we wished. The coral reefs. 
among which we sailed, were surrounded by great depths of 
water. We anchored in something like the following manner. 
Sailing up to within a few meters of the reef we would douse sail. 
Two Arabs were standing on the bow ready to jump overboard, 
carrying with them a small line with iron grapnel hooks on it. 
These hooks were jammed in the cavities under the blocks of coral 
that were found near the surface. And so we lay. This was not 
always practicable, however, because in case the wind shifted we 
would have been set on the coral bank and stuck fast. 

We encountered a few sailing ships approaching from the north. 
It is an Arabian custom for two ships, when meeting, to greet each 
other with " howling." The passing ships were somewhat sur- 
prised to hear our 50 strong throats chiming in with the energetic 
howling of their native associates of our zambuk. 

There are no coast clans along this entire stretch, but we did 
encounter out at sea some small dugouts containing Arabians 
engaged in fishing ; and on those occasions w^e substituted fish for 
rice on our menu. 

Along the way northward we passed Mecca. The Arabians, as 
is their custom, carried on their prayers five times each day facing 
toward their holy city, bumping their foreheads on the ground. 
And so it happened that in the first days they faced forward w4ien 
praying, later on they faced to starboard, and finally they faced aft. 

Encountering no unusual difficulties we reached (April 28) 
Scherm Mannaiburra, a small protected harbor about 10 miles 
south of " El Weg,'' our goal. From there on we had to proceed 
without the protection of reefs, deep water being found close up 
to the beach. We had succeeded in hewing our way through for 
approximately the past six months, so it was now up to us to avoid 
every possible danger on this last stretch which was still dangerous. 



278 "Ayesha" 

So I decided not to sail this distance, but to anchor ofif Scherm 
Munnaiburra and proceed overland to El Weg. 

The authorities there had been previously notified of our coming 
by messengers who had gone overland. Several gendarmes had 
been sent out along the coast to meet us. One of these we picked 
up at our anchorage and sent him ahead to provide camels. During 
the night we could see small signal fires on the beach which showed 
us that our caravan had already been assembled. We took our 
guns and only sufficient provisions for one day. The remainder 
we sent back, with our compliments, on the zambuk. Luckily, this 
zambuk also managed to return home without sighting an enemy 
ship. We arrived at El Weg in the evening of April 29. 

The first thing we did here was to get thoroughly rested, also 
thoroughly bathed. Here, also, we finally secured another oppor- 
tunity of having our clothes washed and changed. It took two days 
to prepare the caravan. 

About 8 a. m., May 2, we marched out. In the north camels are 
ridden differently than they are ridden in the south. Down south, 
as we well knew, the camels are secured one behind the other in a 
long row, while up here in the north this is not customary. Each 
animal is ridden singly and must therefore be steered by its own 
rider. This was difficult at first, but after a while my men grew 
accustomed to it and managed to keep their beasts in hand, so that 
the caravan kept together after a fashion. We were guided by the 
Sheik Suleiman from El Weg. 

At first we marched through the desert, sufficiently familiar to 
us. But soon we came to a beautiful region. We went through 
the mountains amid wonderful scenery. The water supply also 
was much better than on our previous desert journeys. The wells 
were more numerous, supplying drinkable, even though not quite 
clean, water. Our Arabian guides had told us several days before 
that we should be greatly surprised when we saw running water 
on the top of the mountain. We did find the rivulet and it was 
actually flowing, but the whole thing could be stopped by a man 
placing both feet across the channel. As it was quite cool, we 
marched in the mountains during daylight and slept by night. 

As we had heretofore experienced so much danger in the desert, 
we intrenched ourselves each night, to the bewilderment of the 
Arabian guides. Rut we had finally reached the conclusion that no 
one was to be trusted. The intrenchins: did not take long because 



" Ayesha " 279 

we had now provided ourselves with shovels. And so each evening- 
we built a small armed camp in the desert from which pointed four 
threatening machine guns. We made no watch fires in the middle 
of the camp, but the sentries on outposts that circled the camp 
built fires which made sufficient illumination. As usual, we slept 
on our loaded arms. A camp such as this was not what you might 
call comfortable. The nights were very cold. Most of us had to 
give up our blankets to the sick men. But those that had no 
blankets did not complain, but simply followed the old rule, i. e., 
" Lie on your back and cover yourself with your stomach." 

The territory of our guide, Suleiman Pascha, did not quite reach 
to El Ula, where we would arrive at the Hedschas Railroad. Close 
to El Ula we would come into the territory of some other sheik who 
was not on good terms with our friends, so I could not use his 
camels on the last four hours of the trip through the other sheik's 
territory. Under these circumstances it appeared as if we would 
have to make another strenuous '' breaking-through " attempt. 
Suleiman Pascha also expected something of the sort. During 
the course of the day all the shiek's adherents from the surround- 
ing mountains joined him in small bodies, until the caravan finally 
reached a total strength of about 400 men. They certainly did 
make a most picturesque sight with their long xA.rabian guns, flow- 
ing brown robes and fluttering head-cloths. Although previously 
to this we had intrenched for our own protection, now Suleiman 
Pascha himself adopted similar protective measures for his men. 
A sign that conditions here were rather unsettled. We ourselves 
made similar detailed preparations. But the night passed quietly. 

Now we were only one day's journey from the railroad station. 
Our trail led through high mountains. There were some narrow- 
passes to go through which seemed to have been especially built 
for making a surprise attack. Only one camel at a time could 
pass along so the caravan had to be strung out in a very long- 
line and could not be maneuvered as a unit. In order to avoid a 
surprise, Suleiman organized a regular reconnoitering force which 
was wonderful to behold. Possibly this excellent reconnaissance 
was due to no little practice along that line in the past. Small 
patrols galloped ahead into each valley, collected information and 
raced back again to inform the main caravan. They reported 
that the wicked sheik of the next territory was, for the present, 
engaged in a raid to the northward, so we could proceed un- 
molested. 



jSo " Ayes 11 A " 

When I heard this news I decided to ride on ahead of the caravan 
in order to get on the wire at El Ula as soon as possible in order 
to provide for a special train and make the necessary preparations 
for the accommodations for my men. A few hours of trotting 
took me out of the territory of Suleiman Pascha, his two sons and 
the various other worthies. We made good friends with the shiek 
and his two sons, even though we could not thoroughly under- 
stand each other. The greatest interest was aroused among all 
three when, as we came through a mountain pass and could see the 
distant houses of El Ula among the palms, I took out my binocu- 
lars and endeavored to once more find a trace of a railroad line or 
a telegraph wire. Binoculars had never been heard of before in 
this country. Each wanted to see through them so the glasses were 
passed from hand to hand, each one continuing" to turn the focus- 
sing arrangement a little more. W'hat the last one managed to 
see was a mystery to me. In order to impress the accompanying- 
Arabs with the power of our weapons, I fired a short string from 
a machine gun. much to the astonishment of Suleiman Pascha. 
He did not dare to turn his head, and was much pleased when T 
Ijrought down a continuous stream of stones from the clififs at 
which I was aiming'. As all Arabs are exceedingly interested in 
rirearms, I gave the Pascha and his two sons each a revolver and 
some ammunition and T promised to send him a pair of l)inoculars 
from (iermany. 

As we were passing along a very high plain whose limits could 
Iiardly be seen, I used this occasion to impress the sheik with the 
might of (iermany. He was very astonished when I told him that 
a German ship could bring the enemy under fire even at a range 
much greater than the distance across this plain. Although this 
was a bit overdrawn, as the plain reached from one horizon to the 
other, it nevertheless created the desired impression. In regard 
to the size of the guns, I told him that a camel could comfortably 
gallop through inside of one. 

I reached El Ula about noon and to my surprise found every- 
thing already prepared. A special train awaited us, the engine 
being all readv for the order to light fires. And this order was 
5peedilv given. Two German gentlemen and a number of Turkish 
officers had come way down there to meet us, bringing us letters 
and information, and, from the German Colony in Syria, presents 
of cold Ivhine wine, Sekt. ])ears and such other tast\- bits which we 



" AVESHA " 281 

had not had in a long time. When I tirst had to choose between 
bathing or drinking wine, I chose the latter. Why suddenly 
break off our pleasant habits after remaining true to them for 
weeks at a time ? 

A few hours later my men also rode in. 

I rode out a piece to meet them, and, while being photographed 
from all sides, with frying flags we made our entry into this small 
town whose railroad line and waiting room gave us our first sight 
of real evidences of civilization. Wonderful food, very wonderful 
drinks, a short bath (of course) took up the next few hours. Then 
the train started north at the unheard of speed of 30 kilometers 
per hour, while we gave ourselves up to the long lost luxury of 
stretching out our weary bones on the red cushions. 

XI\\ Homeward IjOL'nd 

During the remainder of the journey we anticipated no further 
dangers. We travelled by rail via Damascus and Aleppo through 
Asia Minor toward Constantinople. At two places we had to leave 
the train and proceed in wagons and afoot, as the line is not com- 
pleted clear through. 

In the most hospitable and whole-souled manner we were every- 
where received by the German population and by the Turkish 
authorities. At every depot we found large crowds of people to 
greet us. We were received with mvisic and waving flags and 
decorated with roses, (nfts were showered into our cars. We 
were provided with complete new outfits of clothing, and without 
tears we discarded our old rags and their millions of co-inhabitants. 
Aly men, who had heretofore not been accorded such an unusual 
distinction, were invited to sit at the same table with the exalted 
functionaries and high civil authorities. Many priceless gifts were 
presented to us, and our baggage car, which had contained only 
our munitions and our old rags, gradually began to fill up. At the 
sidings, which were especially operated so as not to inconvenience 
us, large swarms of Bedouins gathered, raced along beside our 
cars and, whenever the train stopped, entertained us with trick 
riding. Many a good glass was drained in the family circles of the 
German residents. 

Finally, at Aleppo, after 10 months of waiting, we received the 
first news from home. Letters from our loved ones and the Iron 
Cross — what more could be expected ? We received two large 



282 " Ayesha " 

sacks of mail so that we passed the next few days in reading the 
letters from home, in studying- over the many letters and tales sent 
forward to us, in sending signatures [evidently post cards] and in 
consuming the supplies of cigars, chocolate, etc., contained among 
our presents. 

On Whitsunday, in the afternoon, our train arrived at the 
station at Haidar-Pascha, the last Asiatic station on this railroad. 
My men had received the long looked- for uniforms which had 
been sent out, and the officers were also able to lit themselves out 
m accordance with European " Kultur," to whose arms we were 
.again returning. 

The chief of the }^[editerranean fleet and, at the same time, chief 
of the Turkish fleet. Admiral Souchon, could not be dissuaded 
from coming with his staff clear to Haidar-Pascha to meet us. 
j\Iy men formed hurriedly. Our flag, that would no longer wave 
over us for 10 more months, was on the right wing. A few short 
commands which were smartly obeyed showed that even months 
of a life of privateering could not stamp out their military bearing ; 
then I lowered the tip of my sword before my superior : 

" I respectfully report the return of the Emderis landing force 
consisting of five officers, seven petty officers and 37 men ! " 

Another " Emden " Hero Returns Home' 

THE ADN'ENTURE.S OE LIEUTENANT LAUTERBACH (N.WAL RESERVE^) 
DURING THE PAST YEAR 

Mr. Edward Lyell Fox, the noted American writer, whose book 
" Behind the Scenes in War-Ridden German}' "" was of so much 
assistance in explaining our position to his countrymen, was 
granted the privilege of meeting Captain Lauterbach at the con- 
clusion of his long journey, and to him he gave the following" 
account, quoted verbatim, of his varied experiences: 

" And so you would like to hear the story that escaped the reporters in 
San Francisco," began Captain Lauterbach, with a pleasant chuckle as a 
smile spread over his weather-beaten but still peculiarly j^oung face. " Well, 
it was not as extraordinarj'' as all that — you know, at 'that time when the 

' Translator's Note. — While translating the foregoing adventures of 
Lieutenant von Miicke, I found the following article in the German press, 
" Der Tag" (The Day), of Berlin, dated October 17. 1913. In the hopes 
that it would be of interest in connection with the Ayesha yarn, the 
translation is appended herewith. 



" Ayesha " 283 

Etnden put the finishing touches on a Russian and a French ship — I have 
still lived through other things. But as Captain von Mueller knew that 
the Australian cruiser Sydney was on his trail and that we would sooner 
or later come to blows with her, he told me that I could not take part in 
this next engagement. I had taken part in the last fight, he said, and 
therefore would now have to make a place for another. The captain of 
our accompanying collier had also made an urgent request to be permitted 
to be present during a fight. And so there was nothing else for me to say. 

" At Keeling, with a boatswain's mate and a machinist, I had to shift 
over to the collier, whose captain was then transferred to the Eniden. 
It was known that Captain von Mueller intended to send Lieutenant von 
Miicke ashore to destroy the radio and cable stations on one of the Keeling 
Islands. We were told to cruise in the neighborhood and wait for the 
Emdcn. In case she did not again appear, I was to open the sealed orders 
which had been given me. We hated to leave the Emden and could hardly 
take our eyes off her. We waited a day. then another, three, five, ten days, 
two weeks, but no signs of cur Emden. Had something gone amiss? 
But — nonsense! Our Emdcn — nothing could happen to her. Some day 
we would see her smoke clouds on the horizon. And so four weeks passed. 
This uncertainty was unbearable, but the certainty, gradually becoming 
more apparent, that the Emden was destroyed, made the coldest blood boil 
in our veins. But, you know of course, that the Eniden in her final fight 
filled the whole world with her fame 

" Our supply of provisions was almost exhausted and we had nothing 
but rice and potatoes to live on. It is indeed a hard task to actually believe 
that a loving friend has passed away ! At the end of the fifth week there 
seemed no use in hoping for the return of our cruiser. I cannot express 
to you the deep sorrow with which we had to accept her loss. I opened 
the secret orders. They directed me to proceed to the neutral Dutch 
harbor of Padang on the east coast of Sumatra. Imagine our bad luck! 
Just 24 hours before our arrival, the North German Lloyd steamer 
Choising had left Padang and later took aboard at sea, from the Ayesha. 
Lieutenant von Mucke and his party. As you know. Captain von Miicke 
had, several days previously, entered Padang in the renowned Ayesha, 
which was later on destroyed when they shifted to the Choising. Of 
course, I did not know all this until a long time afterward. Here I lay 
before the high mountains of this silly country of Padang and knew not 
how to find my way through this channel, swarming with islands, into the 
harbor. My charts were of little help because the positions of the danger- 
ous rocks, water now washing over them, were not marked. I did not 
trust to luck to get in the harbor, but took special precautions to keep 
inside the three-mile limit where an enemy ship could not attack me without 
violating Dutch neutrality. From out there I signalled for a pilot. And 
then a huge ship appeared, heading in. A Dutchman I thought. But she 
then hoisted the English colors and I could read the name on her side. 
Empress of Japan. She came smoking up — as big as a mountain in com- 
parison with our small collier. ' Stop ! ' she signalled. Had I disobeyed the 
order, she would have rammed me. She lowered a boat and an officer 



284 " Ayes HA " 

came alioard declaring me and my crew to be prisoners of war. j\Iy s!ii;) 
would be sunk. 

" Before my eyes they sank the collier. My crew and I were taken as 
prisoners to Singapore. The natives of this island city were very friendly 
toward us. I had soon gained their confidence sufficiently to know that 
an attempt to escape would not miscarry. But I wanted to make prepara- 
tions to take my crew with me when I fled. We then began to dig a tunnel 
under the wire fence that surrounded our prison-camp. We had scarcely 
completed our work when the famous revolution among the natives in 
Singai3ore broke out. The English blamed me for inciting the blacks 
against them. I herewith declare that this blame is founded on untruths. 
When the revolution had been settled, we completed our tunnel, and, 
during the following night, nine of us gained our freedom. We marched 
the entire night along the northwest coast. As we had $2000 among us. 
we were soon able to get hold of two Malayan rowboats which took us 
across the Straits to the Dutch Island. Here we found some more sea- 
faring Malayans who were glad to take us for a cruise of several days 
further along the east coast of Sumatra. But even here, in spite of the 
hospitality of the natives, we could not linger long because we dared not 
violate the Dutch rules. After a long trip through blooming tobacco fields 
and cofifee plantations, through shady woods of rubber trees and endless 
plains covered with ylang-ylang, we managed to get through the almost 
impenetrable forest of the marshy coast regions, and finally arrived at the 
green Sea of Sumatra, where Malay seamen again awaited us to carry us 
across to Java and Celebes. 

" A fairly large boat had been lying on the beach of Celebes for the past 
seven months. It was an unreliable old thing that absorbed more water 
than a thirsty sailor could, even with his advantage of being able to drink 
more freety. But we took a chance and, in high spirits, stood out into the 
Sulu Sea. We had nothing to steer by except a pocket compass. During 
the night we consumed great quantities of matches trying to keep on the 
course. This was set for the Philippine Islands. How we managed to get 
safely over the Sulu Sea, God only knows I The boat danced like a nut- 
shell on the heavy seas. 

" Land ! On the seventh day out of Celebes we sighted land. We cer- 
tainly did learn to sympathize with old Columbus and his experiences in his 
day. It was Mindanao, the land of the black Moros, that now took us up 
as guests. Particularly the Americans living out there showed themselves 
to be very friendly. As our skins had peeled off and as we were burned 
to a dark brown, it was difficult to believe that we were really of European 
origin. Therefore we were considerably alarmed to hear the news that 
six Moros had gone " amuk " and were roaming the country, trying to 
kill off all the whites. It was later declared that they were last seen in 
the same direction in the jungles through which we would have to pass 
in order to reach the north coast. This was not a pleasant prospect inas- 
much as we were armed with nothing but pocket knives. We kept watch 
day and night until we reached our goal where we expected to meet our 
small steamer. Of course, it was not there. We therefore set forth in 



" Ayes HA " 285 

a small sailboat for the island of Cehu, and from there we finally reached 
Manila. 

" Here I shipped aboard the Japanese steamer Takachi Mani for Tientsin. 
I told the grinning skipper that I was a Hollander. But he did not seem 
to trust my nationality and continually spoke to me in English. ' Cannot 
understand ; only Dutch ! ' But this he did not understand. I was afraid 
of being recognized in Shanghai, as I had frequently entered that port as 
captain of a Hamburg-American liner, so I therefore cut off my beard and 
mustaclie. As quickly as possible I turned my back on Shanghai and, with 
two donkeys drawing my ancient Chinese wagon, proceeded into the interior 
where I was concealed by a friend. Eventually I heard that an American 
steamer, the Mongolia, would proceed from Shanghai to Japan. I therefore 
returned to Shanghai to make proper preparations. During the night on 
which the Mongolia was to sail I went aboard and reserved a cabin. 
Three days later, after no adventures, I landed in Japan. Unconcernedly 
and without molestation, I wandered around the country of our yellow 
enemies for eight days. Then I booked passage for America via Honolulu. 
And there on board I was recognized by a gentleman who had once upon 
a time been a passenger on one of my Hamburg ships. 

" In sufficient time I heard that the reporters and photographers of San 
Francisco would be waiting for me. These were the very people whom 
I wished above all things to avoid. They did not catch me." 

In regard to the last part of his trip, Captain J.auterbach had 
little to sa\'. He merely requested i\Ir. Fox to warn his country- 
men about the horrible proceeding's going on in the dives disguised 
as whiskey stores along the New York wate^'-front. A refugee 
these days must travel by devious paths if he wishes to arrive 
home safely and unrecognized. 

Captain Lauterbach then wrote a postcard. I volunteered to 
mail the letter for him. " That is addressed to an acquaintance." 
he said, laug-hing up his sleeve. " He bet me two hundred pounds 
that I would never return home to Germanv. He loses."" 



[copyrighted] 

U. S. NAA'AL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD. 



A COMBINED AR^IY AND NAVY WAR COLLEGE 
By Colonel Wm. W. Harts, U. S. Army 



The rules for morality for the individual and for the state, 
although based on the same foundations, are not always equally 
applicable to both. It will probably be generally agreed, however, 
even by those who have not given any attention to the comparison 
between these two, that self-preservation is a primal and funda- 
mental principle for both, with a diiiference that will be easily 
recognized. Self-preservation for the individual at¥ects only 
himself ; for the state it must include also the duty of protecting 
the higher interests of the many individuals composing the com- 
munity, but more particularly must it include the right of 
development in the future along lines that will insure for itself 
the greatest stability and for its citizens the best opportunity for a 
continued happy and prosperous existence. 

This national duty of protecting this right of development has 
in the past led to many wars between peoples, resulting from 
their conflicting lines of interest. We notice recent examples in 
the Balkan War, the Russo-Japanese War, the South African 
War, and particularly in the present European War. It has 
recently given rise to strained relations between this government 
and Japan over both the land and school questions in California, 
and a few years ago between the United States and England over 
the Venezuelan boundary. It seems probable that if- this country 
should ever be forced into a war it would be with another nation 
over some such clash of vital interests, for internal causes of war 
between sections or classes are at present so remote that any serious 
civil war such as that of 1861, for example, seems now quite 
impossible. 

The deduction is thus obvious, that the only war that we can 
anticipate as even reasonably possible is one with another nation. 
Our peculiar geogra]ihical separation from the other nations of 



288 -V Co-MBiXED Army and Navy War College 

the world by wide expanse of ocean makes such a war one in which 
both our army and navy must inevitably be engaged. These two 
services are not, properly speaking, independent forces, notwith- 
standing the wide difference in their mode of operating, but are 
merely two different forms of the military power of the nation. 
They are alike in organization, discipline, and purpose, but differ 
in training and functions. Each is strengthened immeasurably 
by the loyal cooperation of the other in times of action, and for 
this reason such cooperation is an end particularly to be sought. 

In all armies and navies the principal object of peace training- 
is the thorough education of the individual in his duties in war 
and an understanding of the confidence he may place on the sup- 
])ort of his comrades in arms. This principle extends from the 
lowest individual up to the largest units of command. Upon the 
degree of perfection of the habits instilled by this training the 
conduct of the nation's forces under the supreme test of battle 
may be reasonably predicted. Such inter-reliance in performing" 
its functions is, after all, the very essence of every organization, 
whatever its character. It is indispensable in the military service, 
where compactness and mobility are of utmost importance and 
often a deciding feature. This principle of cooperation is now 
well understood in the training of the component parts of both 
the army and the navy of this country ; but we will look in vain if 
we search for any authoritative means of enforcing the enormously 
important principle of unity of command between the army and 
navy themselves. It rests now only on the loyalty and devotion 
to the country's needs of the officers in separate command, and 
is open at any time to impairment should a case arise where 
high command should fall on an over ambitious or negligent 
officer, or even on one lukewarm in the eagerness with which 
he performs his duties. 

That this may be a very slight thread in a crisis can be shown 
by several historical instances in which this reliance has failed, 
and in consequence the opportunity has been lost to bring about 
those positive results which an expectant nation has a right to 
look forward to in time of war. While it is true that the fate of 
the nation is not in the balance in every battle, it may be easily 
understood that the whole strength of the nation's forces there 
engaged must be available, and any failure of one part to su])])ort 
another, which could be traced to faultv organization, would 



A Combined Army and Navy War College 289 

undoubtedly be called a defect that would require prompt cor- 
rection. In both the army and the navy the methods of exerting- 
their utmost force in battle is being given the earnest and incessant 
attention of the best intellect in these branches, and the reports 
from observers in each new war are carefully scanned to see 
whether they show weaknesses of organization or material that 
must be eradicated, or whether they point out better and newer 
methods or more efficient weapons that will give the nation pos- 
sessing them an advantage over its adversary. 

We can plainly trace an evolution in the war organization of 
our armies due to these compelling causes, and we can still more 
easily observe the enormous change in battleships within recent 
years. While all these progressive modifications are being made 
within the two separate services no corresponding steps are being 
taken so to coordinate the two main branches of the military 
forces of the country that combined operations may be put be}'ond 
the possibility of failure arising from lack of trained mutual 
support. 

Under the Constitution, the President is cOmmander-in-chief 
of both army and navy, and thus constitutes the theoretical 
unity of command necessary to single military control ; but vnider 
our present custom his conimand is invariably exercised through 
the Secretary of War and the Secretary of the Navy, at once 
a division of authority, the defects of which can only be obviated 
by some sort of single military control. It would be unquestion- 
ably too much to expect the President, in the midst of the pressure 
of his diplomatic duties, his administrative functions, and his 
political requirements at such an exciting time, to make his own 
plans for a military campaign, even if he felt disposed to engage 
in such a technical class of work. It might be said that he could 
appoint a board of military men familiar with the situation who 
would act as his advisers. In such a case the President would 
solve only a portion of this difficulty, for the orders putting the 
plan into execution would still need to be issued through the heads 
of the two departments. In the possible case of any failure to 
carry out such orders as were intended, arising through misunder- 
standing or jealousy, there would be no one with power to set the 
matter straight, particularly in the by no means impossible case 
where the two department heads themselves might not be on an 
entirely cordial footing. 



290 A Combined Army and Navv War College 

It thus happens that we have found in the past that the army 
plans and the navy plans have been correlated mainly through a 
common loyalty to the same cause and a patriotic desire to serve 
the country for which they were fightmg. This has generally 
worked well, but not always. During the Civil War there was 
comparatively small opportunity for cooperation, for there were 
so few combined operations. Early in the war there was much 
lost effort on the Mississippi until the navy stationed in those 
waters was put under the orders of General Grant. Later we see 
at Fort Fisher another example of lack of mutual assistance in the 
attack on that fortress. In the Spanish War, within our own 
memories, we recall the lack of cordial cooperation between Gen- 
eral Shaffer and Admiral Sampson, which certainly did not con- 
tribute to the success of the expedition. Cannot this cooperation, 
so highly desirable, be secured in a simpler and surer way ? Can- 
not the officers of the two branches be so trained together that the 
habit of interdependence and mutual reliance will be so confirmed 
during peace that during war none of these conflicts of authority 
need arise ? 

Among many methods of accomplishing this end a simple and 
elementary step would be to have the two war colleges combined. 
The Army War College is now situated at the post of Washington 
Barracks. It contains enough library room and map space to serve 
both colleges for a great many years. It contains lecture rooms 
and administration offices which would be ample for all combined 
purposes for a long time in the future. Although it is not large 
enough alone for all purposes of both war colleges, it could be 
very easily supplemented by two additional buildings for those 
separate functions and distinctive forms of instruction not com- 
mon to both services. All of the necessities of each war college 
could then be met and the central combined college be left for 
those common purposes which are not now served efficiently. 

Is it not therefore a reasonable suggestion that the present 
Army War College building be used for the combined war college, 
and that new buildings be added, one on each side, and properly 
joined with it by a suitable architectural connection, these to be 
occupied, respectively, by the Army General Staflf and the Navy 
General Staff, with the war colleges of the two arms of the service. 

The present Naval War College at Newport wall have to be 
abandoned sooner or later, and perhaps turned over to the Naval 



A Combined Army and Navy War College 291 

Training Station, which might prove to be a very useful exchange. 
In this event, all the books, charts, and equipment should be 
brought to Washington for use in the new building. It is admitted 
by many naval officers that Newport is a very unfortunate place 
for a naval war college, although it seems ideal for certain other 
naval purposes. By making the course for both army and navy 
of equal length a community of interest and unity of purpose 
could be included in the doctrine of both schools, so that a national 
and united policy could be emphasized. 

As the navy grows the needs of the Naval Training Station will 
require all of the facilities at the Newport station, including the 
buildings and grounds of the present war college ; and as the army 
grows the present Army War College will likewise be found not 
to meet all the requirements of an enlarged general stafif. Both 
of these developments can be met in an ideal way by an enlarged 
and combined army and navy war college. The space at the 
Washington Barracks site is ample for both, the location is admir- 
able, near enough to the center of Washington for convenience, 
and far enough away to avoid needless interruption. Further- 
more, the value of combined instruction cannot be overestimated. 
The higher education of officers for superior command can in no 
other way be so simply and satisfactorily coordinated with such 
beneficial results to the defense of the nation. 

The question of economy of instruction is purposely omitted in 
this article — the avoidance of duplication of work, the desirable 
concentration of all those sources of information which are alike 
valuable to both services. It has seemed that the inculcation of a 
common war doctrine for both services was of such paramount 
importance as to be reason enough in itself for a change which, 
though it may seem radical at first, still is so logical as to appeal 
strongly to the practical man. 

DISCUSSION 
Rear Admiral Austin M. Knight, U. S. Navy, President U. S. Naval 
War College. — The proposal to transfer the Naval War College from New- 
port to Washington is not a new one. It has come up frequently in the 
past and will doubtless continue to come up in the future. The argument 
of Colonel Harts is one of many interesting and impressive arguments that 
have been advanced in its support. Taken together, the arguments can 
hardly fail to be convincing if we accept the view upon which they are 
based as to the true mission of the war college. This view appears to he 



292 A Combined Armv and Navy War College 

that the college has, or should have, a share in the administrative activities 
which are the ultimate expression of the principles which it aims to develop 
and to teach. 

In my opinion this is a mistaken conception of the mission of the college, 
and one which has a tendency to obscure the true mission and to destroy 
the unity of purpose with which the mission should be pursued. 

As I see the missiofi of the college, it is, to educate officers in the art 
of war and to train them for war command. 

Its output is an output not of plans for war, but of officers fitted to 
prepare such plans. It has properly no part in the administrative work of 
a general staff, a division of operations, or a general board. It aims to 
prepare officers for the work of these organizations, but not to share in their 
work itself, except through its graduates. 

I do not know that I can do better at this point than to quote a few 
paragraphs from an address which I delivered to the graduating class of 
the college a few months ago : 

" Closely connected with the question of enlarging our present buildings 
is the question whether the college is to remain here or go to Washington, 
where it would be in close touch with the department, the General Board, 
and the Army War College. I have steadily opposed this plan for the 
very reasons which have seemed to its advocates a conclusive argument 
for its adoption. 

" I cannot think of the war college as benefiting by close association with 
so many activities so widely different in character from itself and from each 
other. It is easy, of course, to picture an institution differing entirely from 
the one that we are developing here. The Army War College is such an 
institution. Its work covers a wider field than ours and covers it, I am 
sure, very successfully. It is a part of the General Staff and includes within 
itself several important subdivisions of the staff ; as for example, the map- 
making and plan-making sections and the division of intelligence. It is not 
clear to me that there is any inherent justification for associating these 
branches of general staff work with a war college. I think, on the con- 
trary, that the tendencj^ of such association must be to draw off' attention 
from the function that I insist upon as the primary and almost the only 
function of a war college as such — the development of principles and the 
instruction of officers in the application of these principles to practical 
situations. 

" The war college is already in what seems to me its proper relation to 
the department and the General Board in that it trains officers for duty on 
the General Board and in the division of operations, just as it trains officers 
for the fleet. To give it the added function of taking part in the work of 
these organizations would be hardly less a mistake than to give it a part 
in the operations of the fleet. 

" The question is, then, do we want a war college, or do we want an insti- 
tution which is at once a war college, an office of intelligence, and a map- 
making and plan-making branch of the General Board? The more I see 
of the college as it exists here, and of the lines along which it is developing, 
the more strongly I feel that the unity of purpose which marks its present 
character is one of its most indispensable characteristics. 



A Combined Army and Navy War College 293 

'■ In the matter of location, I feel that we are fortunate, and in saying 
this I do not forget the many inconveniences connected with residence in 
Newport, where houses are not always obtainahle and rents and other 
expenses are always high. These and other inconveniences sink into insig- 
nificance in my mind when considered in connection with our freedom from 
the social and ofificial distractions by which we would be surrounded in 
Washington. We have here our own ' atmosphere ' and an atmosphere 
essentially reflective. 

"A factor of even greater significance is the intimate contact zvith tin- 
fleet during the summer months, which is made possible by our situation 
upon this magnificent sheet of deep and sheltered water — the natural and 
almost inevitable rendezvous of the fleet during the summer. However 
much importance may be attached to the association of the war college 
with the department, the General Board, and the Army War College, the 
association with the fleet is enormously more important. 

" Not only have we much to learn from the fleet and the fleet from us. 
but, quite apart from the material gain to be anticipated from an inter- 
change of experience, is the sense of comradeship which cannot fail to come 
from intimate association repeated year after year between the officers of the 
college and those of the fleet. If there should ever come a time when the 
college was disposed to emphasize unduly the theoretical side of its mission, 
there could be no better antidote for the tendency than would be found in 
the influence of the fleet. No one, I think, could claim any such effect as 
this for the influences that would surround the college in Washington. I 
do not say, and I do not believe, that the influences there would be narrow- 
ing. But I certainly see no reason to believe that they would be broadening, 
as I believe that frequent contact with the fleet is sure to be. 

" A still further argument in favor of Newport as compared with Wash- 
ington is connected with the matter of climate. Here the physical and 
mental faculties are stimulated 365 days in the year. In Washington they 
are more or less paralyzed through the three or four months of a hot and 
very depressing summer." 

No one can question the importance of cooperation between the army 
and navy. The Naval War College believes in this whole-heartedly 
and preaches it in season and out of season. It may safely be asserted that 
no graduate goes out from the college without a sound indoctrination on 
this subject. 

But to believe in a doctrine and to teach it is one thing ; to take part in 
an administrative effort to make the doctrine effective is another. The 
first of these is the function of the college ; the second is the function of 
the graduates of the college. 



D E VE LOPMENT 

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[copyrighted J 

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD. 



A PLEA FOR UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
By Lieut. Commander John P. Jackson, U. S. Navy 



In approaching- a subject of the nature of the one about to be 
considered, so entirely foreign to our national traditions, it is first 
of all necessary to demonstrate that a country like the United 
States really does need a large army to insure its security against 
aggression. Then we may take up the discussion as to the best 
means of raising this army. It is purposed therefore in this article 
to show: tirst, why we need a large army, or rather a trained 
force which can be formed at short notice into an army ; second, 
why our present system is totally inadequate to our needs ; third, 
why the best way of acquiring such a trained force is universal 
service ; and fourth, aside from any military reasons, what great 
advantages to the individual and to the race universal service 
would be. 

Why do we need a large trained military force? Has not the 
nation been taught to believe that the navy is its great bulwark 
of defense? Unfortunately too many of our countrymen have 
blind confidence in the navy's abiHty to keep the foreign invader 
from our shores. But is this confidence justified? Let us con- 
sider a few facts and investigate the conditions under which the 
navy is supposed to accomplish this stupendous task. It is a mili- 
tary axiom. that strategy never changes. Tactics change, weapons 
and methods of using them change, but the great principles of 
strategy never vary. One of the fundamental principles of 
strategy is that, other things being equal, the side which brings the 
greater force to bear at the decisive point wins. The theory 
of concentration has always been employed by the great military 
geniuses of the world. Mahan first demonstrated its equal appli- 
cability to the distribution of naval forces. His writings produced 
instant efifect. Previous to the publication of his works the great 
naval powers had their fleets scattered all" over the world. Each 



2gS A Plea for Universal Service 

trained men available. The comi)vitation was made before En- 
gland had increased her army to its present size. Her available 
tonnage is almost unlimited, and at the present time it is safe to say 
that she could land more men than Germany in the same 15 days. 

Hence, with our fleet defeated or bottled up and the enemy com- 
manding the sea, no miracle can prevent the arrival upon our coast 
of an army of invasion of several hundred thousand highly dis- 
ciplined troops. We are faced with the problem of preventing 
the landing of this force, or of afifecting its annihilation before 
it can be reinforced within a month by an expedition equal to the 
first. What have we with which to accomplish this ? The dream 
of 1,000,000 men springing to arms overnight is so absurd, and has 
been so ridiculed by avithoritative writers that even the pviblic, 
unversed in military matters, must realize the utter folly of such 
a suggestion. Nothing, of course, can be accomplished without 
organization, training, and material in abundance, represented by 
years of careful preparation and unremitting effort. The conclu- 
sion is obvious. In default of a navy superior to any possible 
enemy, we must have an army, and not a small one at that, nor 
an untrained one. 

Our present army consists of about 100,000 men. If an army is 
necessary at all, such a small one would be totally inadequate for 
the prosecution of a great war. It would constitute a mere nucleus 
of what we would need, if it was not wiped out in the first brush 
with the enemy, as was England's in the opening days of the pres- 
ent war. We must have many more men — four or five times as 
many to start with as the regular army now numbers. Where are 
they to come from? What reserves have we? Even if we did 
not have trouble in obtaining recruits, but a million volunteers 
came forward at the outbreak of war. they Avould be little better 
than useless. The day has jjassed when personal courage and 
determination alone can win against discipline and organization. 
Our recruits would have to be put in training camps for six or 
eight months, and by that time there might be no need for them. 
Heretofore our country, in the few and small foreign wars it has 
been called upon to fight, has found a voluntary system ample to 
meet the emergency. The Civil War was different, but was fought 
amongst ourselves, with each side equally unprepared ; and it was 
two years laefore either army was brought to a state of efficiency. 
What would have been the result if we had been engaged with a 
first-class military power? 



A Plea for Universal Service 299 

The only organized bodies of men we have to supplement the 
regular army are the state militias — a scant hundred thousand of 
them ; and by European standards they can in no sense be called 
trained or seasoned troops. Men join the militia as a sort of club 
and for social reasons ; not to become soldiers. It is composed 
of all classes of men, mostly unversed in military matters — too 
busy to make a serious study of them, and unable to spare the 
time for even rudimentary training. A few perfunctory drills a 
year, maybe a week in camp, and a certain amount of practice on 
the rifle range, is the extent of their training. They learn none of 
the real business of a soldier. Furthermore, under the system of 
electing officers, discipline is at a low ebb. An officer who depends 
upon his popularity for his commission can exert no real control 
over his men, nor command proper respect from those who know 
he is no better fitted bv knowledge and experience to be an officer 
than they are. 

The mobilization of the militia for duty on the ^Mexican border 
has shown up a bad condition of affairs, and yet nothing for 
which the personnel of a militia can be blamed under the system. 
They had not sufficient training for active service. They were 
mustered in and sent to do work wnth which they were entirely 
unfamiliar. Men who know nothing about the care of horses 
cannot be blamed if the horses die. Officers who do not know that 
men must be seasoned and acclimated before they can be sent 
out on long hikes under semi-tropical suns cannot be blamed if 
half their commands falls ill. Nor can those charged with the care 
of material be held to account if it deteriorates and becomes worth- 
less. Officers cannot instruct men in something they do not know 
themselves. The only wonder is that the militia were able to exist 
at all under such conditions, or that there was any sort of morale 
or subordination left in the ranks after the first week. 

By far the most crying need is, of course, for competent officers 
who have mastered the profession of a soldier and know how to 
command men. These are not created by merely putting on 
shoulder straps. It cannot be expected that a man straight from 
a bookkeeper's stool or a broker's office, however patriotic, can 
attain overnight what others have gained in a life profession. It 
seems hardly necessary to dwell upon these platitudes, and yet 
there exists a persistent belief that anyone can become a soldier 
by putting on a uniform and shouldering a gun. The naval 
profession is not troubled by such aspirants. 



300 A Plea for Universal Service 

If the mobilization of the militia has taught vis anything, if 
England's experience has not been wasted upon us, it is very 
plain that we must train our men before they are needed — plenty 
of time before — and perfect their organization. We cannot 
depend upon an army of 100,000 men; and a reserve of 100,000 
militia is far too small, even if it were highly trained. We cannot 
seriously contemplate throwing a mob of green volunteers, hastily 
gotten together at the outbreak of -war, against the machine guns 
and bayonets of disciplined troops. We must provide an efficient 
reserve for our regular army. We must decide upon the best 
method of raising this reserve and then give it the very best pos- 
sible preparation. No halfway measures should be tolerated. 
They are worse than useless, and very dangerous in that they 
delude the country into thinking that there is a reliable defense, 
when in fact none exists. No scheme which contemplates a 
month's tVaining a year can possibly accomplish anything — not 
even the preliminary seasoning of the men. War is the most com- 
plicated science of modern times, involving as it does the employ- 
ment of practically every other science. One had much better 
attempt to turn out dependable locomotive engineers or able sea- 
men by a month's training. 

To one unfamiliar with the conditions existing in a modern 
army the amount of thorough instruction which must be given to 
the individual soldier is astonishing. Trench warfare and the 
development of all kinds of special weapons used in its prosecution 
have introduced untold complications and rendered all previously 
existing manuals of tactics obsolete. For instance, voluminous 
instructions have been written upon the tactics of the hand grenade 
alone, and the men are given as complete and assiduous training 
in its use as they are in that of the rifle. Again, every different 
type of trench — fire-trench, communication trench, parallels, saps, 
and half a dozen others, are constructed according to certain 
rules and fixed dimensions which must be known to every soldier. 
They are laid out according to definite systems. The methods 
of communication by telephone and signal, the manner of getting 
food to the first line troops, of bringing up ammunition and dis- 
tributing it, are things in which the troops must be well instructed. 
The mere routine operation of relieving the men in the first line 
is one which must be carefully worked out, to avoid losses by 
hostile fire, congestion in the narrow communication trenches, and 



A Plea for Universal Service 301 

to i^revent whole detachments getting lost in the maze of passage- 
ways. Many instances of such things happened in the early days- 
of the present war. 

When it comes to the really complicated problems of planning 
an assault — the preparation of the terrain, the proper distribution 
of the storming troops, the timing of the successive waves of rein- 
forcements, the cooperation of the artillery — detailed instruction 
must be given and repeated rehearsals held to prevent certain 
disaster. This is only^to mention a few of the most obvious ele- 
ments of a soldier's training which have been learned by actual 
experience and at great cost in the armies of Europe. How can 
we hope to impart the least smattering of it to raw recruits in one 
month's training a year? We must not forget that ali foreign 
armies are learning this, even the neutral ones, from a close study 
of the actual operations. If we fail to do so while we have time, 
we cannot hope to put up any sort of resistance against troops well 
versed in the latest practices. Consistent work extending over a 
considerable and continuous period of time is necessary to even 
make a start in the right direction, and we must train the number 
of men w^e will need at the opening of hostilities. If our present 
system is inadequate and cannot produce results, one must be found 
which will do so. In this article we are not concerned with organ- 
ization, development of resources, accumulation of munitions and 
equipment, and the infinite number of things which must be accom- 
plished before successful mobilization can take place. These 
belong properly in a treatise on preparedness. What w^e are alone 
concerned with is the providing of the man power. 

There are four general methods by Avhich an army can be 
raised: (T) The voluntary system, (2) partial conscription, (3) 
general conscription, and (4) universal service with a short term 
of intensive training. Of the great powers. England, until: 
recently, and America represented the voluntary system ; Russia 
and Italy partial conscription ; and France and Germany general 
conscription. Switzerland represents universal training. Which 
method has proved the most efifective ? 

Nothing is clearer than that the voluntary system failed com- 
pletely in England, the only nation involved in the present struggle 
which employed it, and had to be abandoned in favor of general 
conscription. And so it will fail in every case where a nation is 
compelled to put forth its utmost efifort. England, at least, 
12 



302 A Plea for Universal Service 

had a navy of preponderant strength to hold back the enemy while 
she trained her new armies. How England has had cause to regret 
her voluntary system and how speedily she was obliged to renounce 
it in a great emergency must be evident. The result of her system 
made her difficulties ten times greater when she tried to raise 
armies by other methods. It took England two years of strenu- 
ous effort to raise her new armies. What would have happened 
to France in such a predicament? Or to England herself without 
her fleet to guarantee her the time she needed ? Our difficulties 
will assuredly be as great as England's ; and what is fatal to us 
is that we have not the necessary fleet to hold back the enemy 
while we are making our preparations on shore. 

Washington more than once bitterly complained of the voluntary 
system, upon which he had to depend to raise his ragged armies. 
In the first burst of patriotism and resentment against aggression, 
carried away by excitement and enthusiasm, volunteers may flock 
to the colors. But their ardor is soon cooled by discipline to which 
they are not accustomed, and the hardships of an active cam- 
paign. They seize the first opportunity to withdraw from the 
unpleasant situation into which their impetuosity thrust them. In 
our American Revolution we are told that men who volunteered 
for short terms of service left the colors upon the expiration of 
their enlistments, sometimes upon the very eve of battle. In the 
Civil War, after the first few months, volunteers no longer rushed 
forward to fill the gaps in the ranks. Before the battle of Gettys- 
burg many of the state regiments had been reduced to the size of 
a modern European company, because volunteers were not forth- 
coming to keep them up to strength. Can a nation the size, 
power and wealth of ours depend upon such an uncertain system 
for its defense, when even now the War Department is experienc- 
ing great difficulty in recruiting our present small army to the 
modest size allowed by the last military appropriation bill ? In all 
probability, to secure the increase granted by Congress, the induce- 
ments will have to be made particularly alluring and the pay of the 
soldier so increased that it will be found to be an expensive pro- 
ceeding. In other words, the maximvnn expenditure for the mini- 
mum result. And even then we would not secure what is needed. 

There is, moreover, in the voluntary system of service an element 
of great unfairness. The high spirited, courageous, and patriotic 
sacrifice comfort, personal interests, and many of them their lives ; 



A Plea for Universal Service 303 

while the selfish, timid and cowardly are permitted to shirk their 
duty. Military service is an obligation as incumbent upon one man 
as another, and when the need arises no one should be permitted 
to avoid it. It is the unfairness upon which this entire system is 
founded which makes it so unacceptable, placing upon the few the 
burden which should be borne by all. The nation should not take 
advantage of its patriotic citizens alone, but compel the slacker 
to do his share. 

The second method — partial conscription — was adopted by Italy 
because she could not afiford to support the financial burden of a 
standing army such as was maintained by France and Germany. 
She trained as great a part of her available material as her finances 
permitted. It was not her choice, but her necessity, which forced 
her to adopt partial conscription. Austria's case was similar. In 
the case of Russia, her population was so tremendous that there 
was no need of training everybody. The expense would have been 
enormous, and a further consideration made itself felt in the mat- 
ter of equipment, which was limited. She therefore trained enough 
men to insure her an army larger than Germany's. The best that 
can be said for partial conscription is that it is an expedient 
resorted to by nations which, for one reason or another, cannot or 
do not wish to support general conscription. It involves the same 
element of unfairness as exists in voluntary service, and in a more 
exaggerated form, since, at least, under that system the individual 
is willing. It possesses the advantage, however, over the voluntary 
system of being independent of the caprice of the individual in 
securing an army of any desired size. 

General conscription is, from the point of view of the seeker 
after eflliciency, the only logical way to develop the full strength 
of the nation. He reasons that it is absurd to leave to the whim of 
the individual whether he will undergo military training or not. 
Every male must be brought up in the knowledge that he owes his 
services to the state, and that this takes precedence over even 
family ties. He should not escape military service except by rea- 
son of physical unfitness. This obligation is so thoroughly 
ingrained into the people of France and Germany that their tour 
of miHtary service is performed as naturally as the ordinary occu- 
pations by which they earn their daily bread. When military serv- 
ice becomes as much a part of the life of a nation as this, three- 
fourths of its supposed hardships disappear. It is counted on, and 
the nation regulates its life accordingly. 



304 A Plea for Universal Service 

Only in nations where this system does not exist and has not 
become a part of the life of its people, is military service regarded 
as an irksome and unwarranted exaction on the part of the govern- 
ment, and an infringement upon the liberty of the individual. Such 
is tradition and custom ! The people of nations who do not live 
under the constant threat of invasion by aggressive neighbors 
do not see the necessity of military service nor admit the obliga- 
tion to serve. Those who do, can see the need and accept it with- 
out protest. But conditions change ; science and invention bridge 
space, and nations which were once remote from the turmoil of the 
world's battlefields suddenly find themselves within the reach of 
vast hostile armaments. Then must the traditions of the people 
readjust themselves to the conditions. 

The people of our country are ignorant of military science. 
By nature peace loving and undesirous of aggrandizement by 
foreign conquest, they cannot be convinced that other nations 
may cherish sinister designs and policies which may at any time 
embroil us in war — perhaps of national existence, such as is 
raging in Europe. Unfamihar, also, with world politics, they 
do not realize that we ourselves have certain foreign policies 
which are in direct conflict with the interests of the most powerful 
nations in the world. They are sure to be challenged sooner or 
later, and may prove to be a convenient pretext for a declaration 
of war at a moment favorable to an enemy. These policies must 
be renounced or we must make ourselves strong enough to fight 
for them. To cling to them without power to back them up means 
disaster. To renounce them through fear or weakness, on the 
other hand, means loss of prestige and humiliation. If then we 
hope to preserve our national honor and the respect of the world, 
to say nothing of our independence, the public must be convinced 
of the need of strong naval and military establishments, and of the 
revival of the obligation of military service which every individual 
owes to the state to which he has sworn allegiance. 

It cannot be denied that we have a pretty large contract before 
us in convincing the public of the necessity of universal service, 
and in demonstrating the advantages which would accrue from 
the system. Ours is a government by the people, in which the 
will of the people is law. No steps can be taken toward military 
efficiency and an adequate defense unless the people wish it.- The 
government can no more adopt compulsory military service or 



A Plea for Universal Service 305 

ram preparedness down the throats of the people than it can make 
laws abrogating freedom of speech or forbidding- religious wor- 
ship. With our traditions and temperament it will be no easy mat- 
ter to persuade our people that our theories regarding armament 
are quite obsolete. The old bugaboo that a large standing army 
is a menace to freedom can probably be quite easily disposed of. 
What will be difficult to overcome, will be the natural inertia of 
public opinion, and the disinclination to depart from long estab- 
lished tradition. Only a systematic campaign of education con- 
ducted by organized patriotic societies through lectures, circulars 
and pamphlets which will reach the masses, can succeed. When 
the people demand national defense the necessary legislation will 
not be long in coming. 

Will it take a severe jolt such as a foreign war to arouse us 
and shake antiquated notions out of our heads ? The opinion is 
often heard expressed that what this country needs is a good 
licking. But do those who so lightly talk in this manner stop to 
think what a good licking means when administered under modern 
conditions ? It might lead to the ruin of the nation, as it will to 
more than one of those engaged in the present war. At the least 
it will mean reduction to impotence and poverty for a generation. 
And then we will only come back, if it is in us to do so, by adopting 
the measures which would have prevented the ruin if taken now. 
We who are alive will not have the satisfaction of seeing the 
result. 

General conscription and universal service may very properly 
be considered almost synonymous terms. For the purpose of this 
article a distinction will be drawn between them. General con- 
scription as it is practiced in Europe consists in every physically 
tit male citizen serving one regular enlistment in the army or navy. 
With our non-militaristic ideas it is doubtful if such a system 
could ever be adopted, and there is really no need for it. What 
we do want is a system under which every man will receive suf- 
ficient training to make him a dependable soldier in time of 
need. The points of difference between such a system and gen- 
eral conscription may be stated as follows : Under the latter every 
individual is mustered into the regular army, and becomes a pro- 
fessional soldier. He is liable for all active service for which the 
army is called upon. Universal service, on the other hand, can 
mean something quite different. The recruit need not be enlisted 



3o6 A Plea for Universal Service 

in the regular army, or subject to its peace time duties, except in 
great emergencies. The regular army must be large enough to 
perform these. The recruit may be allowed to take the military 
training at any time he desires between the ages of eighteen and 
twenty-five. Thus men will not be taken away from civil vocations 
nor will courses at the universities be interrupted. The college 
man can take his training after graduation ; others whenever it 
is convenient, after finishing school and before starting to earn 
a living. In fact, for these the training would to some extent take 
the place of a college course. 

The recruits, after organization into companies, battalions and 
regiments, should be assembled in as large units as practicable 
for such period of intensive training as is decided upon — say one 
year. They should be placed under army discipline, live under 
canvas, and be put through a complete course of instruction and 
drill in all that concerns a solider, under the supervision of regular 
army officers. Toward the close of the period of training the 
entire force should be assembled for grand maneuvers such as 
were formerly held in the continental armies of Europe. Mobiliza- 
tion should take place on different frontiers in different years. 
The general object is the coordination of separate units and the 
gaining of practical experience in mobilization. The special object 
is the training of the officers in handling large bodies of men, in 
coordinating the method of employment of the different arms of 
the service, in gaining experience in supplying a great army in the 
field, and, in general, the study of the science of war, transporta- 
tion, and logistics, under actual conditions. 

There is no other way in which the general staff and officers 
in command in the field — the brain and directing power of the 
army — can gain this valuable experience. How can a general who 
has never seen more than 10,000 troops assembled be expected to 
handle forty or fifty times that number, as he would have to do in 
war? And how can a general staff work out the infinite details 
of transportation, supply and communication without some sort of 
actual trial? In every other sort of enterprise instruments are 
tried out in advance and organizations put to the test before they 
are applied to the uses for which they are intended. And yet this 
most complicated of instruments and organizations — an army — 
we propose to put into use without trial of any sort. In fact, we 
do not propose to create the instrument until it is time to use it. 



A Plea for Universal Service 



307 



It is like constructing an enormous gun, infinitely larger than any 
in use, and sending it out without test. Real progress and develop- 
ment cannot be made in enormous bounds. Ships and guns have 
gradually reached their present size. Fifteen years ago we would 
not have thought of building a ship of 30,000 tons and arming it 
with 18-inch guns. No nation except Germany, after years 
of experiment and slow development, can even now construct a 
Zeppelin. Yet if we had a war we would have to increase our 
army from its present size to perhaps a million men at one stroke. 
Hence the need of developing in time of peace a force somewhat 
approximating what we would need in time of war and of learning 
how we propose to handle it. It would be one thing for an enemy 
to know that after acquiring command of the sea we possessed 
no organized force to oppose his landing troops, and quite another 
if he knew that he would be faced by a nation in arms. In the lat- 
ter, case he would hestitate long before starting something he 
might not be able to finish. It is thus that a large army would 
prove our best guarantee of peace. 

In connection with universal service it would be necessary to 
establish schools for officers. Soldiers can be trained compara- 
tively quickly compared with officers, but a very great number 
of the latter are required. That has been England's greatest want 
and most serious difficulty in raising her new levies. The men 
were ready, but there were no officers judged competent to lead 
them under fire. After the war, this will probably be found to 
have been the chief factor of the great delay in launching her long 
awaited offensive. The mortality amongst officers has been 
enormous in all the armies — apparently far beyond w4iat was 
expected — and it has not been possible to make up the losses any- 
thing like quickly enough. Without brains and leadership the 
war machine is impotent. We need a large number of trained 
officers as a nucleus for a fighting force, even if we do not train 
a single man. As it is impossible to produce officers in the year's 
service required for soldiers, the necessary number of the most 
promising men who have undergone the regular training should 
be selected and sent to officers' schools, where they would learn 
the technic and the theory upon which the practical side of war 
is based. 

The great difficulty experienced by those who have thus far 
attempted to arouse enthusiasm in a preparedness movement has 



j^oS A Plea for Universal Service 

been in convincing" any particular individual that he should give 
up his time while his neighbor remains at home. The only logic 
in the matter seems to be that one rule should apply to all. The 
laboring class must not feel that it is enlisting to fight the battles 
of the rich, while the son of the banker and corporation president 
is immune. The French army knows no social distinctions, and 
no rank except what is attained by merit and courage. It is com- 
manded by generals of peasant extraction as well as those of 
aristocratic birth. Alany a titled descendant of old noble families 
is serving as an ordinary " poilu," in some cases under the authority 
of their former servants. 

If the poor man of this country realized that in performing mih- 
tarv service he would be doing what everyone was required to do, 
and that he would stand shoulder to shoulder in the ranks with the 
sons of the rich, in a service where advancement could only be 
secured by merit, what a spirit would be created and what a weld- 
ing of classes in defense of the common fatherland! In times of 
national emergency it is the educated classes who respond to the call 
to arms almost to a man. Noblesse obHge. It happened in England 
at the outbreak of the present war. The lower classes hung back 
and compelled her to adopt conscription. If we could learn a lesson 
from England's experience, we would not wait until war broke 
out and then sacrifice the flower of the land. Example is a potent 
factor, and the less educated instinctively look to their superiors 
for guidance. But the influence of example would be more felt 
in time of peace, when there would be time for it to produce its 
effect, than in the confusion of a sudden call. Let us then make 
use of this fine spirit of the upper class which would only be wasted 
if we wait until war comes. 

y\side from the military necessity of possessing a dependable 
reserve, the benefits of military training and discipline of the camp 
to our youths would be very great. There is no use in closing our 
eyes to the fact that physically the American youth does not com- 
pare favorably with the average youth of countries where com- 
pulsory military service exists. The average youth is not the 
college boy or the graduate of Annapolis and West Point. We 
are apt to consider them as representatives of the entire youth 
of the country, but this is far from being so. The college athlete, 
the midshipman and the West Pointer are physically the pick 
of the nation — the best we have, and not at all the average. 



A Plea for Universal Service 309 

The countless thousands who know no university training ; who 
do not know what proper physical exercise is, and have not the 
faintest idea how to develop their chests and harden their muscles, 
compose the average youth of the land. These, who far outnumber 
college bred men, are the bookkeepers, the clerks, shopkeepers, the 
factory hands, and the laboring and farming classes. Although 
the lives of the latter are physically more active than the other.-, 
their exercise is not of such a systematic and well directed kind as 
to develop healthy physiques. As a matter of fact, it has been 
stated that the city bred man in our Civil War made a tetter sol- 
dier and was better able to stand the long marches and hardships 
of active service than the over-fed country boy. But it was only 
after months of systematic military exercise that either type was 
converted into the seasoned soldier. 

Our scientists have declared that the American is below par 
physically, and in direct contrast with the well-developed German 
soldier ; that most men and women of forty have ill-health of some 
sort. Out f)f one thousand men picked from workmen of a 
well-known factory, fewer than one per cent were normal, more 
than sixty per cent showed signs of chronic organic disorders. 
and ninety per cent had no conception that there w^as anything the 
matter with them. Wrong habits of eating are said to account for 
six hundred thousand preventable deaths a year in the United 
States. Unless this condition of afifairs is checked it means the 
decay of the American nation. It would be hard to devise a better 
means of checking this decay than by universal service, in which 
special attention was paid to the health of the recruit. This 
could be made an essential part of the system. Besides our trained 
corps of army surgeons, the most eminent members of the civilian 
medical profession could be called upon to cooperate in this great 
work ; and the entire youth of our country could be taught sane 
methods of living and acquire proper habits of eating and taking 
care of their physical beings. 

The American character has also deteriorated in the last genera- 
tion. We have lost the stamina and rugged vigor for which the 
founders of this republic were famed. Decades of peace and 
immunity from the hardships of war have weakened the spirit 
and softened the fiber of the American people. Years of pros- 
perity have sapped their virility in the same manner as that 
of the ancient Romans. As the English were contemptuousl} 



3IO A Plea for Universal Service 

termed by Napoleon a nation of shopkeepers, so may we be aptly 
called a nation of business men, and seekers after wealth, ease, and 
pleasure. We have forgotten the ideals of our ancestors, who 
fought and bled for the blessings of freedom. They appreciated 
the value of that for which their great sacrifices were made, and 
were ever ready to fight in its defense. Our generation, born 
under these blessings, accept them as matters of course, and as the 
normal state of affairs. We do not know the conditions under 
which the oppressed peoples of half the world live, and on account 
of which immigrants flock to our shores by the million. There is 
no disposition, as of old, to fight for ideals. 

What a benefit it would be to the individual and to the stock 
of the race if the manhood of the country was brought up to a 
higher level of physical and moral fitness ! Once taught proper 
methods and having experienced the benefits or regular life and 
systematic exercise, our men in the majority of cases would con- 
tinue to apply what they had learned and keep themselves fit. It 
would constitute a veritable revitalizing of the nation. The dis- 
cipline and regularity of a soldier's life engendered by universal 
training would make for better citizenship and stronger and finer 
manhood. Every recruit would go forth better fitted for the voca- 
tions of civil life, and better able to take his place in the civil com- 
munity as a public spirited and valuable citizen. 

Universal service would teach and inspire patriotism, which, 
alas ! seems to be much needed in this country of ours with its 
diversified individual and selfish interests. The recruit w^ould be 
taught what this great country is ; what are its aims, and what 
should be its destiny. He would be brought into closer relation 
to the state ; he would learn the meaning of national honor and 
the power of a great nation to protect its citizens wherever they 
may be. His whole outlook would be broadened, and he would 
realize that there was something more in the life of a nation than 
his own restricted viewpoint formerly indicated. He would take 
pride in his privilege to serve in the armed forces of his country ; 
would desire to see her great, powerful and respected ; and through 
the remainder of his life would take more intelligent interest in 
her policies and foreign relations, and do his part to see that she 
was wisely ruled by the best and most capable men. 

While the horrors of war are so terrific, and the sorrow^ suf- 
fering, destruction and waste are so incalculable, in these days of 



A Plea for Universal Service 311 

scientific genius and mighty resources, that no man in his right 
mind can desire it; yet there can be no doubt of the invigorating 
effect of war. The heroic devotion of the French people, a race 
which the Germans beheved to be decadent, which has commanded 
the admiration of the world, was brought out by this most terrible 
of wars. It is not conceivable that anything else could have pro- 
duced the same result; but that France eventually would have 
lapsed into that decadence which Germany beheved was already 
upon her. The views that Bernhardi and other German military 
writers proclaimed, that war is the great revitalizer of the human 
race, must be admitted to contain a great deal of soundness. Can- 
not the beneficial effects of war be realized without its attendant 
horrors ? Just as peace maneuvers are executed by our naval and 
military forces to simulate the conditions of war without blood- 
shed ; so there should be some substitute for war to develop the 
characters of our youth and infuse spirit into them. Universal 
service would go a long way towards accomplishing this. 

That nation possesses the most important element of greatness 
which has a race of military men. Money has been called " The 
Sinews of War," but it is useless without the sinews of strong 
men's arms. History has taught us that wealth undefended by 
virile manhood is the undoing of nations. Greece, Rome and 
Spain, each in turn fell victims to the sinews of men's arms, when 
their manhood had degenerated. No state of ancient or modern 
times has ever achieved greatness except through military power, 
and has remained great only just so long as that military power 
endured. There is as yet no indication in this war-torn world of 
a coming change ; and, until the arrival of the millennium, military 
power will continue to decide the fate of nations. 



[coptrightedI 

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MB. 



OL'R NAVY AND THE WEST INDIAN PIRATES 
(continued) 
A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 
Bv Rear Admiral Caspar F. Goodrich, U. S. Navv 



Notwithstanding all this excellent work, we read that the 
schooner Shepherdess (Rufus Fink), of Warren, R. L. from 
Matanzas to New Orleans, on January 31 was boarded and robbed 
by a piratical open boat of 15 men. Also, that the brig Leader 
( Jonas Jones), of New York, was boarded and robbed by a pirati- 
cal boat of 12 men, nine miles east of Moro Castle. The crew were 
shamefully treated.' 

The next episode, while creditable to Stockton's energy, re- 
sulted, for the time being, disastrously to him, for his prize was 
not condemned and he was sued in the United States District 
Court for false seizure. He lost the case and was cast in heavy 
damages. On appeal, it was carried to the United States Supreme 
Court, which sustained the validity of the capture : " Portuguese 
ship Mariana Faliero, captured by Lieutenant R. F. Stockton, in 
the United States' schooner Alligator, sent into Boston." ^ 

Undeterred by a few misadventures, the pirates continued their 
attacks. " Piracies are still frequent ofif the coasts of Cuba ; 
American and British vessels are indiscriminately robbed under 
the most aggravating circumstances." ' 

The complaints direct and the expostulations in the public press 
against piracy were not without effect in Washington, for, on 
February 9. 1822, we learn that " Congress in resolutions is taking 

^ American Daily Advertiser, February 28, 1822. 
= ASP, I, 804; RFS, Chap. V. 
' N. February 9, 1822. 



314 Our Navy and the West Indian Pirates 

notice of the serious state of affairs in the West Indies." * The 
following shows the general feeling : 

U. S. Ship " Hornet " 

Hampton Roads 

2 1 St Feby 1822. 
.... The horrid system of piratical aggression and outrage, which has 
been so long carried on by those lawless men, notwithstanding our efforts to 
put a stop to it, seems to be increasing to a degree truly alarming to the 
mercantile interest, and afflicting to humanity ; and yet, the authorities of 
the Island from which they mostly eminate, and whose inhabitants are the 
principal authors, look on with a calm, cold blooded indifference, and adopt 
no measures to suppress them. It was even said publicly at Havanna that 
a number of villians who were known to be engaged in the piratical system 
had upon hearing of our Navy's success in destroying some of their band 
avowed their future intention to spare neither the lives or property of the 
Americans. 

I have the honor to remain 

Sir, very respectfully 
Your Obt Svt. 
R. Henley. 
The Honble. 

Smith Thompson 

Secretary of the U. S. Navy.^ 

The result of agitating the subject is seen in the following, taken 
from the report of the Committee on Naval Affairs, March 2, 
1822: 

The extent, however, to which the system of plunder upon the ocean is 
carried on in the West India seas, and Gulf of Mexico, is truly alarming 
and calls imperiously for the prompt and efficient interposition of the gen- 
eral government. Some fresh instance of the Atrocity with which the 
pirates infesting those seas carry on their depredations, accompanied too 
by the indiscriminate massacre of the defenceless and unoffending, is 
brought by almost every mail, so that the intercourse between the northern 
and southern sections of the Union, by sea, is almost cut off. 

The committee are induced to believe that this system of piracy is now 
spreading itself to a vast extent, attracting to it the idle, vicious, and 
desperate of all nations, and, more particularly, those who have heretofore 
been engaged in the Slave trade, from which the vigilance of the Ameri- 
can cruizers have driven them ; and that, if they are not winked at by the 
authorities in the Island of Cuba, they are in no respect restrained by their 
interference. 



* N, February 9, 1822. 
= MCL, 1822, No. 17. 



Our Navy and the West Indian Pirates 315 

That the sloop of war Hornet, of 18 guns; the brigs Enterprize and 
Spark, of 12 guns each; and the schooners Porpoise, Grampus, Shark and 
Alligator, of 12 guns each, are already cruizing in the West India Seas and 
Gulf of Mexico, for the protection of trade, the suppression of piracy, 
and traffic in slaves ; and that the two gunboats, Nos. 158 and 168, are also 
cruizing along the coasts of Georgia and Florida for the same purposes. 



Resolved, That it is expedient, forthwith, to fit out and put in service the 
corvettes Cyane and John Adams, and the sloops of war Peacock and Erie, 
for the protection of commerce, and the suppression of piracy in the West 
India seas, and the Gulf of Mexico, and also to employ the frigate Con- 
stellation, should the President of the United States deem the employment 
of a frigate necessary for the purposes aforesaid.' 

Nor was the government content with idle words, for we read 
that " the frigate Macedonian, Captain Biddle, is about to sail from 
Boston with four smaller vessels and 200 marines, with instruc- 
tions, it is said, to sweep the land as well as the sea of the pirates 
of Cuba." ' 

In the meantime, Lawrence Kearney was successfully busy at 
his wonted pastime : 

U. S. Brig " Enterprize," Off Cape Anton ia, 
7th March, 1822. 
Sir: 

Our first duty has occurred at Cape Antonio, the most dangerous place 
for Merchant Vessels to pass. 

My vessel being disguised, this morning was passing the Cape about 
7 A. M. when a twelve oared Barge was discovered in pursuit. But soon 
after she made a retreat towards Mangrove Point; and as I could not pur- 
sue her with success with the Brig, owing to the shoals, I ordered away 
my boats. 

The following note, this moment received, will inform you of the result : 
" To Lieut. Comdt. Kearney, 
" Sir, 

" I have the pleasure to inform you that we have succeeded in capturing 
four Boats and two Launches (sloop Rigged). We landed and took them 
in a creek, which I have not yet satisfactorily examined. I send you a 
Barge and a Cutter, and remain, 

"Yours, &c., 

(Signed) Jas. M. McIntosh, Lieut." 

"ASP. I, 788; NAV, No. S3. 2 et seq. 
'' N, March 2. 1822. 



3i6 Our Navv and the West Indian Pirates 

A guard of AJarines is sent to assist the party to apprehend the Pirates 

<on shore 

I am, very respectfully, &c., 

L. Kearnev. 
Com. Patterson, 
New Orleans/ 

A newspaper of a few weeks later gives us this account : 

^^'e have a report which appears to be true, that on the 8th ult- the U. S. 
brig Enterprise, lieut. Kearney, captured eight sail of piratical vessels, whose 
united crews amounted to about i6o men. This must be pretty nearly a fin- 
ishing stroke to the desperadoes : we have not latelj heard of so many 
piratical acts, but cases are just published which hap'pened in December 
last, in the capture of the brig Exertion, and schooner Constifuti&n, of 
Boston, that have caused no little feeling. The vessels thai seised them were 
partly maujied by the 21 wretches who were recently tried and condemned 
as pirates at Nezv Orleans, and pardoned by the president of the United 
States — they boasted of it ; and, in thirty days from the time of their libera- 
tion, were at their old trade, with a resolution to murder all their prisoners — 
but instead of this, they were so htunane as to put their prisoners- ashore 
on a low sand key, to perish for want of water or to be swept away by the 
sea." 

About this time a large barge was taken by the gunboat 
Revenge, under Lieutenant G. W. Hamersly, at some point in the 
West Indies, not specified, probably near the Balize. She was- 
evidentiy fitted for piratical purposes, a fact which was substan- 
tiated by her desertion by her crew." 

On INIarch 22, we have a record that the sloop Jay, Thompson,, 
of New York, was boarded near Neuvitas and robbed of her wiiole 
cargo. Fortunately, however, the vessel and crew were saved."^ 

About this time the Cuban authorities were aroused to the neces- 
sity of putting a stop to the depredations on foreign shipping from 
a base on Cuban soil, for we read that a descent was made by them 
upon the Cape Antonio gang, in which a number of the latter were 
killed and wounded. The captain and lieutenant of one gang, 
being seized, were tried, convicted, and shot. Another raid 
'resulted in the kilHng of six pirates and the taking of 15 prisoners. 
It appears that some goods from a Boston schooner led to the 
inculpation of five persons who Avere sent to prison. They are 

'C. L., 1822, Vol. 4, No. 58. Other authorities are: S. O. (M. C. L.) 
Vol. CXVIII, No. 90; 17C-2S, Sen. Doc. i, 56; ASP. I. 804; E. 76: M. II. 
28; NE. 547; RSN, 1822. 

» N, April 6. 1822. 

'" RSN, 1822. 

" MWIIP. 



Our Navy and the West Indian Pirates 317 

stated to have been young men of good appearance and residents 
of Havana. This last remark is proof, if proof were needed, that 
piracy was encouraged by even respectable people in that island/' 

The instance spoken of is among the very few in which Spanish 
■officials attempted to suppress piracy. There can be no doubt that 
too many of those gentlemen were directly or indirectly interested 
in its successful prosecution. 

The next reference, although textually quoted, doubtless refers 
to our revenue marine: " April 8, 1822. — ^Two of the U. S. cut- 
ters captured a piratical schooner called the Pilot, after an action 
of 15 minutes." ^" 

On April 29, the Alligator, under command of Lieutenant W. 
W. McKean, captured the Columbian privateer schooner Cicncqa. 
of five guns and 30 men, and sent her for adjudication to the 
United States." 

Among the duties which fell to Captain Biddle, now in command 
of the West Indian squadron, was that of securing the cooperation 
of the local authorities in the suppression of piracy. For this pur- 
]iose, he proceeded to Havana on the 30th of April, and addressed 
the following letter to the governor and captain general : 

U. S. Frigati-: " Macedonian,"' Havana, 

April 30, 1822. 
Sir : 

I have the honor to represent, that tlie commercial relations between the 
United States and Cuba are already very considerable, and that they would 
unquestionably be more considerable if rendered more secure from unlaw- 
ful depredations. As these relations, too, are mutually beneficial, it is 
important to both parties that they should be effectually protected. For this 
object, the Government of the United States, on its part, has emploj^ed an 
adequate naval force, which is placed under my direction and control. But 
as the depredations have been committed chiefly in open boats, immediately 
upon the coast and off the harbors, it is important that we should have 
your excellency's co-operation. I have therefore the honor to propose that 
your excellency should so far co-operate with me as to sanction the landing, 
upon the coast of Cuba, of our boats and men, when in pursuit of pirates. 
This measure would be promotive of our common benefit, is indispensable 
to the entire suppression of piracy, and is not intended in any manner to 
infringe upon the territorial rights of your excellency. It will operate 
against those only whose atrocious crimes render them obnoxious to every 

" N, March 23, 1822. 

''MWHP. 

" E, 76. 



3i8 Our Navy and the West Indian Pirath;s 

regular Government, and should place them without the protection of 
all law. 

I have the honor to be, with great consideration and respect, 
Your excellency's most obedient and very humble servant, 

James Biddle. 
His Excellency Don Nicholas Mahy, 

Captain General and Governor of Cuba, Havana." 

To the above, the captain general sent a reply, of which the 
following- is a translation : 

Havana, May 2, 1822. 

I am too sensible of the importance of the commercial relations which 
exist, and may continue, between the ports of this island and those of the 
United States, which I am desirous of cultivating, not to have adopted 
measures to put a stop to depredations which might obstruct them along 
the extensive coasts of this island under my jurisdiction. I repeat, that 
uch measures have been adopted, and have been made public, and, with 
the zealous co-operation with which you inform me you are charged, we 
shall doubtless effect shortly a happy extermination of those enemies who, 
under all colors, have laid waste and committed robberies, both upon the 
high seas and every coast, without respecting any flag. 

With respect to the permission you solicit for landing upon this coast 
with troops and people in boats, for the purpose of pursuing those pirates. 
I cannot and must not consent to it. I repeat, that the necessary measures 
have been adopted to defend my territorial jurisdiction, and for the appre- 
hension of every description of outlaws. 

All which I communicate in answer to 3'our official letter of yesterday. 

God preserve you many years. 

Nicholas Mahy 
Captain General of the Island of Cuba. 
James Biddle, Esq., commanding U. S. ship Macedonians^ 

That the protection of the Spanish authorities w^as of little 
avail may be known from the fact that Captain Thomas Brownell, 
of the brig Marcia, from Providence, R. I., beat off, in Havana 
harbor, under the very nose of the captain general, boats which 
tried to board his vessel on the 30th of April." This must have 
been immediately prior to the arrival in that port of Captain Bid- 
dle on board of the Macedonian. One wonders why this fact 
was not made use of by Captain Biddle in his ofificial communica- 
tion addressed to that distinguished officer. 

The chartered schooner Jane was placed under the command 
of Lieutenant R. F. Stockton, with 60 men from the Alligator and 

"ASP, I, 805: NAV. No. 2, 61. 
'* ASP, I, 805. 

" ■? 



Our Navy and the West Indian Pirates 319 

the Grampus. In the neighborhood of Sugar Key, on the ist of 
May. Stockton seized three schooners, one of them armed with 
two guns, which was boarded and burnt by Acting Sailing Master 
Barney. The second, with a full cargo taken from the English 
brig Cherub, was released. The third was chased on shore, the 
pirates escaping." 

Contemporaneous newspapers quote from the log-book of the 
Belvidera: 

"2d May, spoke the U. S. schooner Alligator, lieut. Stockton, off Sugar 
Key (cuba) ; was informed that they had burnt one schooner and taken 
another, and a sloop, from the pirates, besides an English brig, the captain 
and mate of which the freebooters hanged. The Alligator has also retaken 
the Colombian schooner Senega from the crew, who had mutinied and run 
away with her." When the Belvidera parted with the Alligator, captain 
Stockton was in-shore with 70 men from the Grampus and Alligator, on 
board of a schooner of an easy draft of water, and they were exchanging 
shots with a piratical schooner manned by 70 men. From her position it 
was considered doubtful whether the pirate could be carried. The famous 

Lafitte was among them. Captain Stockton had taken no prisoners 

This shews that our officers and seamen are very active — but it proves, 
also, that they must have the sanction of government to enter the country 
in pursuit of the miscreants." 

The newspaper account of the above-mentioned incident is 
interesting in itself and supplies some details not contained in the 
official report. It will be noticed that the Columbian privateer is 
herein* called " Cienega " : 

The U. S. schooner Alligator, lieut. com. Stockton, has arrived at Charles- 
ton from an active cruise in the West India seas, especially on the coast of 
Cuba, after pirates. Lieut. S. recovered several vessels from the possession 
of these wretches, and rescued some prisoners from their murderous hands, 
but made no prisoners — the pirates keeping close to the shore, and always 
being on the alert to escape. 

The account of the cruise of this vessel, (for a while in company with 
the U. S. schooner Grampus, lieut. com. Gregory) is highly interesting— 
but we have not room to give it now. There is no sort of doubt but that 
the pirates are encouraged and protected by certain of the authorities in 
Cuba, especially by the governor of Holguin, with whom a correspondence 
was held which will probably be published. Plundered goods were publicly 
brought in and sold at Xibara, and lieut. Stockton was hardly restrained, 
by his positive instructions, from settling the account with the commandant 
and people of that place. 

It appears that the famous Lafitte is at the head of some of those parties — 
that their business is increasing — that they often murder whole crews, and 

"E, 76. 

" N, June 22, 1822. 



320 Our Navy and the West Indian Pirates 

that some strong act of justice, after the manner of Jackso)i. must be com- 
mitted to suppress these dreadful villanies, to which there seem to be par- 
ties throughout the island of Cuba. 

The Alligator has brought in two prizes, one the Colombian privateer 
schr. called the Cienega, mounting i long 12 and 4 carronades, the crew of 
which had mutinied at Ragged Island,^ and was taken by the A. ofif Neu- 
vitas, without any commission on board ; the other a sloop, found in the 
neighborhood of the pirates at sea, with only a dog on board, and marks 
of blood on her deck." 

The correspondence of Captain Biddle at this time indicates 
the inefficiency of the measures referred to by the captain general 
of Cuba in his reply, under date of May 2, to Biddle's official 
communication. 

United States Frigate " Macedonian," 

Havana, ]\Iay 6, 1822. 
Sir: , 

.... On the 29th I had an interview with the Captain General relative 
to the business with which I am charged by Mr. Adams, the Secretary of 
State. On the 30th I addressed a communication to him upon the subject 
of landing our boats and men upon the Coast of Cuba, when in pursuit of 
pirates. I enclose a copy of my communication, as also of the Captain 
General's answer; and you will perceive he declines acceding to the proposi- 
tion I made to him. I think it preferable to pursue one object at a time 
with the government here, and I shall therefore drop this subject for the 
present, renewing it when my correspondence in regard to the Florida 
documents is terminated. He certainly ought, and perhaps will, consent to 
our landing upon those parts of the Coast that are uninhabited and where, 
tho' within his jurisdiction, he is utterly incapable of exercising any 
authority. There are many such places on the coast of this island. 

The measures adopted by the Captain General, and to which he refers 
in his letter to me, consist simply of a proclamation in March last establish- 
ing certain regulations with respect to the clearances of coasting vessels, 
launches and other boats. These regulations, I understand, are not strictly 
enforced, and even if they were, they are altogether insufficient for the sup- 
pression of piracy along the extensive coast of Cuba. As the proclamation 
lias been published in the American Newspapers, I do not think it necessary 

to send you a copy. 

********* 

I have the honor to be. 

Very respectfullj'. 

Your most obedient St.. 

James Biddle. 
Hon. Smith Thompson, 

Secretary of the Navy." 

■" In the Bahamas. 

='X. June I, 1822. 

--C. L., 1822, Vol. 4, No. 79. 



Our Navy and the West Indian Pirates 321 

Salt Key, or Cay Sal, some no miles east-northeast of Havana, 
about this time was obtaining" a questionable notoriety, for, on 
May 15, the brig- Aiirilla^^ from Baltimore to New Orleans, was 
plundered in this locality, and her people maltreated. Also, the 
brigs Busy, of Warren, Fair Trade, of Boston, and Hiram, of 
Newport, arriving at Havana on May 18, reported that they had all 
been captured on the 15th instant ofif Salt Key by two piratical 
schooners, receiving the same treatment as the brig Aurilla, 
besides having two men impressed out of the Busy!'* 

In June, the schooner Shark, Lieutenant M. C. Perry, accom- 
panied by the Grampus, Lieutenant F. H. Gregory, captured the 
pirate ship Bandara D'Sangare and a schooner. Three prisoners 
were taken and the vessels were sent to the United States."" 

An interesting side light on the intimate relations which existed 
between the pirates and the people on shore is found in the 
" Atrocities of the Pirates," in which Aaron Smith relates his 
experiences when forcibly detained by a Cuban pirate in 1822, and 
made to serve as navigator. His story amply justifies the title of 
his memoir. The following are a few extracts : 

At two o'clock in the afternoon, I perceived a number of boats and canoes 
pulling towards the corsair; and the Captain told me that he expected a 
great deal of company from the shore, and, among others, two or three 
magistrates and their families, and .some priests, observing also that I should 
see several pretty Spanish girls. I remarked, that I wondered he was not 
afraid of the magistrates. He laughed, and said I did not know the Spanish 
character. Presents of coffee and other little things, said he, will always 
ensure their friendship ; and from them I receive intelligence of all that 
occurs at the Havannah, and know every hostile measure time enough to 
guard against it. Two magistrates, a priest, and several ladies and gentle- 
men now came on board, and were received in great pomp by the captain, 
whom they congratulated on his success. 

********* 

Can it be a matter of surprise that these miscreants have committed their 
lawless depredations for so long a time, and with such impunity, when the 
very men whose duty it was to extirpate them, were daily encouraging them ; 
when the pirate could boast that the magistrate was his friend, and receive, 
in the face of all the laws of his country, and of nations, such proofs of his 
friendship, as to be enabled to thwart all hostile measures adopted against 
him? European nations may send out their crusades against them; but 
while the execution of the laws is placed in such hands; while the pirates 

^' Vide Introduction, p. 13. 
" N, June 22, 1822. 

^' E, 76 and RSN, 1822. A graphic account of a survivor may be found in 
WFL, 229-239. 



322 Our Navy and the West Indian Pirates 

plunder, and the magistrates and his myrmidons share; all their efforts will 
be vain ; and like the Hydra, when they destroy one head, a fresh one will 
supply its place. 

During the month of August but three captures by pirates are 
reported. They are : 

August 9— The schooner Coquette, Souther, of Georgetown, D. C, and 
schooner Eugene, Coffin, of Boston, were plundered by the brig Palmyra.^ 

The schooner Mentor, Harrison, of Philadelphia, was taken by pirates 
and robbed. The crew were cruelly treated. Vessel given up.^ 

The schooner Bee, Jones, of Charleston, was taken by pirates, near St. 
John's, Cuba.^' 

The details of this last case came out two years later in the trial 
of one of the pirates connected with it : 

Trial for Piracy — Yesterday, Josef Perez, the Spaniard, a sketch of 
whose case we gave on Wednesday, was arraigned before the Hon. Smith 
Thompson, in the Circuit Court of the United States, for piracy. The 
prisoner had been put on his trial at a former court, but the jury not agree- 
ing upon a verdict, were discharged; afterwards, by the Supreme Court, 
he was ordered to be tried by another jury, and was accordingly arraigned 
a second time, yesterday forenoon. 

The indictment charged him with committing the crime ot piracy off the 
Island of Cuba, in the month of August, 1822, on board the schooner called 
the Bee, of Charleston, Capt. Johnson. This vessel was bound from Charles- 
ton to St. Jean de Remedie, and when within a few miles of her destined 
port, was brought to by a piratical schooner, boarded, taken possession of, 
and then the pirate schooner was hauled along side of the Bee, and they 
commenced robbing her of her cargo. After taking the trunks, one of 
which contained a number of watches belonging to a passenger, wearing 
apparel, and such other articles of value as they could find in the cabin, they 
proceeded to break open the hatches and take on board of their schooner, 
such parts of the cargo as they pleased. They kept possession of the Bee 
nine days, during which time they took some of the cargo on shore and sold 
it. They compelled capt. Johnson and his crew to throw the ballast out of 
the hold of the piratical schooner to make room to receive the cargo of the 
Bee, and beat him with a rope's end when he did not work to suit them. 
At one time they beat him with a cutlass. To frighten the cook and make 
him disclose something relative to the property on board the Bee, Perez 
was in the act of cutting the peak halyards to hang him up, but was ordered 
to desist by one of their crew. At length they concluded to set captain 
Johnson, the passenger, and his crew, all except a man by the name of 
Debow, adrift in an old leaky boat which they had taken from some fisher- 
men on shore, and burn the schooner Bee, which they did. After being thus 
exposed for five days, in an open boat, with one whole and one broken oar, 
they reached Matanzas where they separated, and Porter, one of the crew, 

=» MWHP. 



Our Navy and the \\'kst I-xdian Pirates 323 

went to Nassau, (New Providence), where he saw Debow and three of the 
piratical crew who had robbed them, prisoners, on board the British sloop 
of war Tyne. From Nassau he came to New York. As he was walking up 
Broadway, the very day he landed, he met the prisoner and instantly recog- 
nized him, seized him & immediately took him to the Police office to make 
good his charges against him. On the statement he was fully committed 
for trial. In the meantime Cap. Johnson arrived, and both he and Porter 
appeared before the Court and Jury, and gave such a consistent and con- 
vincing account of the prisoner's guilt, in being concerned in the crime of 
Piracy on board the Bee, that, after many hours spent in the investigation 
of facts, the jury, to whom the cause was committed at half past 9, P. M. 
returned in less than an hour, with a verdict of Guilty." 

Perez was promptly sentenced to be hanged,"* but as promptly 
released from confinement and encouraged to continue his dirty 
work. " The President of the United States has, according to cus- 
tom, granted a pardon to Jose Perez." '" 

The capture on the i6th of August of the piratical brig Palmyra, 
formerly the Pancheta, nine guns, 83 men, is especially worthy of 
note for certain consequences that followed her seizure. After 
a short action, she surrendered, having lost one man killed and 
six wounded. She was sent to Charleston.'" The following is the 
official report by Lieutenant Gregory to Captain Biddle : 

U. S. ScHooxER " Grampus," St. Thomas, 
August 24, 1822. 
I have the honor to acquaint you, for the information of the honorable 
Secretary of the Navy, that I arrived at St. Bartholomew on the 2d of 
August, and sailed again on the 7th, with convoy for St. Thomas. On the 
morning of the 9th, fell in with two Spanish cruisers of Tortola, who 
demanded permission, and claimed a right, to board the convoy, which being 
peremptorily refused, they hauled off. The same day I arrived at St. 
Thomas, and received from Captain John Souther, of the schooner Coquette, 
of Georgetown, D. C. the enclosed deposition, having been plundered by 
those vessels. On the 14th I left St. Thomas with two valuable vessels 
bound to Curagoa, and on the evening of the 15th saw an hermaphrodite 
brig hovering upon our weather quarter, apparently a cruiser ; continued 
my course without regarding her ; at daylight made her ahead, and gave 
chase ; at half-past nine, having gained considerably upon her, she hoisted 
English colors, changed them to Spanish at ten and fired a gun to windward, 
and at half-past ten hove to and set a white flag at the fore. On nearing 
her I perceived her to be the pirate that had fired upon and plundered the 
Coquette, and therefore considered it my duty to arrest her. At twenty 
minutes past eleven the Grampus was laid under her lee, within pistol shot, 

"NEP, April 30, 1824. 

^ NEP, Mav 3, 1824. 
™ NEP, June 4, 1824. 
'"E, 76 and MWHP. 



324 Our Xavy and the West Indian Pirates 

and her surrender demanded as a pirate, which she affected not to under- 
stand, and answered me to that import. While repeating the demand, he 
poured into us a full volley from his small arms, and cannon, which was 
instantly returned, and continued three minutes and a half, when he struck 
his colors, a complete wreck, having one man killed and six wounded, and in 
a sinking condition. The boats were despatched instantly to their relief, 
and it was only owing to the great exertions of Lieutenant Voorhies that 
she was prevented from going down, having received three shot between 
wind and water, one of which injured the pumps. The Grampus received 
some trifling injury in her sails and rigging, but not a man hurt. 

The captured vessel proved to be the notorious privateer Palmyra, 
formerly the Pancheta, from Porto Rico; carries one long brass i8 and 
eight i8 pound carronades, and a crew of eighty-eight men. They acknowl- 
edged the robbery of the Coquette, and the only excuse given by the officer, 
is, that they could not prevent those things happening now and then. Sev- 
eral of the plundered articles were found on board." 

=\\SP. II. 193- 



[cofyriohted] 

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE, ANNAPOLIS, MD. 



THE UPPER YANGTSE RIVER 
By Lieutenant A. F. Carter. U. S. Navy 



Believing- that the upper Yangtse River (that is to say the river 
above Ichang-) is little known to the service, and that the condi- 
tions therein differ somewhat from those of other waters in which 
our vessels have cruised and with which the average officer is 
familiar, an attempt will be made to narrate some of our experi- 
ences and indicate the conditions encountered in those waters. 
Steam vessels, mostly gunboats, have been navigating the upper 
Yangtse since 1898, and a number of interesting books, containing 
useful navigational data, have been written. Should one desire to 
go into such details these may be consulted, but this article will 
deal only with impressions gained during less than two years in the 
upper Yangtse and the methods which have been found most useful 
in handling steam vessels. 

The river from Ichang to its mouth courses through a great 
alluvial plain, and its perils consist largely of silt banks and shift- 
ing channels. Starting up river from here there is an abrupt 
change. One-half hour after getting underway at Ichang and 
standing up river the steamer makes almost a complete right angle 
turn, and enters the Ichang Gorge. The cultivated slopes, the silt 
shoals and the high earthen banks (or levees) of the lower river 
are, indeed, a decided contrast to the deep gorge with precipitate 
rocky sides rising several hundred feet on both sides of the river. 
It all comes so suddenly and the scenery is so entirely different 
from ^hat which one sees on the lower river that doubtless few 
travelers really begin to appreciate the beauty of the Ichang Gorge 
before its several miles have been traversed and the Lampshire 
Gorge has been entered. When one first enters the Yangtse gorges 
the water appears peaceful and smooth, and there is really little 
to indicate the difficulties which await a steamer onlv a few hours 



326 The Upper Yangtse River 

farther up. As a vessel proceeds through the first two gorges the 
gradual increase in current strength is quite noticeable. 

Finally the Wu-i-tan. a rapid of the second or third order, 
depending upon the water level, is reached and your vessel has a go 
at her first rapid. 

This rapid is of little importance, and lies between Heng-shih-tse on one 
side and Cha-pou on the other. Having gotten through this without diffi- 
culty, the vessel enters a winding rocky stretch of water known to the natives 
as Yao-tsa-ho. Of all the bad places in the upper Yangtse, there is prob- 
ably none worse all the year round than this. The currents are strong at 
all water levels, and throughout its 14 miles of length it is always a source 
of danger to both junks and steamers. Here the river widens out arid is 
flanked on both sides by great irregular masses of rock, some solid, some 
just great banks of large boulders, and others of small rocks. Huge rocks 
and boulder banks abound in the river itself, and from some of the shore 
rocks long irregular ribs extend out into the swift-running stream, causing 
violent swirls and very strong currents. At low water the channel is 
irregular and full of sharp turns, while at high water this portion of the 
river becomes a mass of dangerous swirls and whirlpools, caused by the 
strong down-coming water striking the irregular rock formations and 
bounding off at varying angles. 

At the head of Yao-tsa-ho is the Kung-ling-tan — " tan " being the term 
applied by the natives to all rapids. In winter this is one of the impassable 
places ; not so much on account of the strength of the current as on account 
of the shoal and tortuous channel. With an Ichang watermark of seven 
feet or more it may be navigated with safety. With less than that it is 
dangerous. According to all information obtainable, only one vessel, the 
German S. S. Suihsiang, has attempted to navigate this rapid during low 
water. She left Ichang on the morning of December 27, 1900, bound up 
river on her maiden trip. About 11 a. m. she struck one of the so-called 
" pearls " of the Kung-ling-tan, and in less than an hour she was a total 
wreck. No doubt a comparatively small amount of money wisely spent 
could remove the worst dangers at this place, and make it at least no 
worse than many others which are navigated at low water with a fair 
margin of safety. 

Looking up river from the head of the Kung-ling-tan one sees less than 
half a mile away the stately entrance to the Niu-kan, Ma-fei-hsia. or Ox 
Liver, Horse Lung Gorge ; so called on account of certain formations on 
the cliffs bearing, to the imaginative Chinaman's mind, some resemblance 
to these internal organs of the animals named. This gorge is about four 
miles long, and is one of the prettiest in the river. 

At the upper end of this gorge is the Tching-tan, or New Rapid. About 
300 years ago, as nearly as can be ascertained, an enormous amount of rock 
broke loose from the mountain on the right bank and slid into the river, 
partly blocking its flow and forming the Tching-tan. At high and middle 
water this rapid disappears, but at low water there are three distinct rapids. 
Of these the uppermost one is by far the worst. With the Ichang water- 



The Upper Yangtsk River 327 

mark at or near zero this upper rapid is impassable for anything except 
junks controlled by numerous lines and in the hands of experienced pilots. 

Passing the Tching-tan, the Mitan Gorge, generally known as Ping-so- 
bao-jen Gorge, is entered. This gorge is only about one and one-half 
miles long, and due to the depth of the water a fairly slow current is 
encountered, except at high water. Above the Mitan Gorge the river widens 
and the currents become more troublesome. Particularly troublesome is 
that stretch of water generally known as the Kwei-chow Reach. This is 
very bad at low water, and troublesome at high levels on account of the 
numerous swirls. It embraces the very narrow passage of Whong-tsien 
and the turbulent races of Se-chi-tang, Ho-san-tan. Fong-tan and Lien- 
ho-tan. where the fairways are narrow and dangerous, and the danger of 
collision with downward bound junks is great. Strong water is encountered 
the greater portion of the distance between here and the Yetan. 

The Yetan is the strongest rapid on the river. The approach, 
except when the rapid is at its worst, is not so difficult ; but the 
current is very strong throughout a considerable rise and fall of 
the river. It is probably at its worst with an Ichang watermark 
of about 12 to 18 feet and river rising. The rapid was in this con- 
dition in May, 191 5, when the Monocacy was on her way down 
river. While still a mile above the rapid it could be plainly 
observed, and some time before reaching it the roar of the rush- 
ing water could be heard. Just before entering the rapid full 
speed was rung up, so as to give all possible assistance to the rud- 
ders, and we entered the strong water steering carefully for the 
center of the tongue. The vessel passed through the swiftest 
part of the rapid at almost incredible speed, probably not less 
than 26 knots over the ground. The drop over the rapid was 
very noticeable, and when the little Monocacy dove into the 
" chow " water below the decrease in speed was so pronounced 
that it seemed as though she had suddenly stopped. 

Yetan is caused by an immense boulder bank extending out from the left 
bank more than halfway across the river. When this bank is just under 
cover the navigation for junks is very dangerous. At high water no rapid 
exists at Yetan. 

About four and one-half miles above Yetan full speed is again required 
for a few minutes in order to steam the Ta-pa-tau-tan. About one and 
one-quarter miles above Ta-pa-tau-tan the Niu-kou-tan is encountered. 
The reach of water between Chong-shih-men and Niu-kou-tan is one of the 
most turbulerat in the river at high water, and is rendered particularly dan- 
gerous at such times on account of the difficulties incident to downward 
bound junk traffic. 

Niu-Kou-tan, like Yetan. is caused by a large boulder bank 
extending out from the left bank. If entered on the right or south 



328 The Upper Yangtse River 

side of the river by an ascending steamer of 13 knots speed Niu- 
kou-tan oft'ers no special difficulties at most water levels.. In 
October, 1914, when the Monocacy was bound up river, the pilot 
elected to enter the rapid from the left or north bank side. The 
boulder bank here extends out in such a manner that as a steamer 
comes up to the rapid point at full speed it must enter the rapid 
with a violent current on the bow. The result, naturally, is a literal 
submersion of all the forward portion of the main deck, with sheets 
of water thrown onto the upper deck and the bridge. The Monoc- 
acy on this occasion buried herself to such an extent that the 
forecastle was entirely under water, and for an appreciable time 
only the tops of the anchor engine and capstan were visible. As 
will be shown later, entering a rapid at such an angle is an 
extremely hazardous proceeding, and should not be done when 
avoidable. 

From Niu-kou-tan to the entrance of the Wushan Gorge the river pre- 
sents some excellent views, and although the currents are strong with a 
few lesser rapids, no particular navigational difficulties are encountered. 
The Tsing-chu-piao rapid, about one mile above Patung. is quite a strong 
rapid, and is difficult during low water. Except in high water and with 
river rising rapidly at mean water, the current in the Wushan Gorge is not 
strong, and the ordinary conditions for an up-bound steamer are very 
favorable. The Wushan Gorge is about 28 miles long. The cliffs on both 
sides are high, ranging on the average perhaps about 1000 feet above river 
level. In some places this gorge is probably not over 150 yards wide. The 
view as one passes through is magnificent. 

At the upper end of the Wushan Gorge is the city of Wushan, built on 
a slope well above the river level, and surrounded by the familiar type of 
Chinese wall. Between this place and Kwei-chou-fu are a number of rapids, 
but of these the most important are Hsia-ma-tan ( or " Get down from horse 
rapid") and the Pao-tse-tan. 

The Hsia-ma-tan is another rapid which is formed by a boulder bank 
projecting out from the left or north bank of the river. The bank is 
apparently caused by rocks, sand, etc., which are washed down from the hills 
by a small mountain stream entering the river just above it. Up the ravine 
caused by this stream is a remarkable old cave known as Old Dragon 
Cave. The story goes that all mounted men should alight at this place 
and do homage to the presiding genius in the cavern ; hence the name of 
the rapid. The rapid is worst at low water. The writer has never experi- 
enced an}-- difficulty here. At high water the rapid disappears. 

The Pao-tse-tan. however, is a different proposition. It is 
formed by a rocky bank on the right and a boulder 'bank on the 
left bank of the river. At all stages of the water, except dead 
low water, thi^ r.qiid exists, Intt it is worst at middle water and 



The Upper Yangtse River 329 

mean high water. It is rendered all the!* more dangerous by its 
unusually difficult approach. For some distance below it (varying 
in intensity according to the height of the water and the strength 
of the rapid) is a bay of swirls and whirlpools. Great care must 
be exercised in making the approach. Much difficulty is experi- 
enced in keeping a vessel on even an approximate heading, for the 
swirls throw her violently first to one side and then the other. It 
is at such places as this that the wisdom of fitting four power- 
ful rudders to a vessel of the Monocacy's class is emphasized. 

In October, 1914, the Monocacy found this rapid by far the most 
difficult between Ichang and Chungking. The watermark at 
Ichang upon departure was about 25 feet. On approaching 
Pao-tse-tan violent swirls were encovmtered, and although the 
vessel was steaming at top speed, we were obliged to give her prac- 
tically full rudder first one way and then the other. Finally the 
rapid was reached and entered from the left bank side well up 
above the end of the tongue. Both engines were forced to their 
utmost, and although they actually made 360 R.P.M. (their 
■designed R.P.M. is 300) we lost ground slowly for a few moments. 
Finally we made the top of the rapid and had just begun to forge 
steadily ahead when the working of the port engine telegraph indi- 
cated something wrong. The danger being past, that engine was 
stopped, and an investigation showed that a small rock had b^en 
taken in through the port circulating pump suction and had 
jammed the rotar of the pump. Had this accident occurred one- 
half minute earlier it is hard to predict what the outcome might 
have been. Fortunately, the auxiliary exhaust had been, as a mat- 
ter of caution, opened into both condensers. Had it been on the 
port condenser alone (as it had been earlier in the trip), steering 
engine, feed pumps, and all other auxiliaries would have been ren- 
dered inoperative almost immediately. A rather nerve-racking 
experience of the same character had previously demonstrated to 
us the wisdom of such a precaution. 

Having passed Pao-tse-tan one breathes a sigh of reHef, for unless the 
river is fresheting there are no first magnitude rapids to be encountered 
for many miles. About five and one-half miles above Pao-tse-tan the 
Bellow^'s Gorge opens into view, and soon the vessel enters this grandest 
of the Yangtse gorges. The cliffs rise sheer out of the water to a height 
of 700 feet, while not one-half mile back, on the left bank, the peaks are 
said to be more than 4500 feet high. The view on entering the gorge from 
either end is one of the most magnificent obtainable in the river. The 



330 The Upper Yangtse River 

water in the gorge is deef), and the navigation, except at high water and 
when the river is fresheting, is comparatively simple. During high water 
the Black Rock Rapid is bad, especially so for junks. Near the western 
entrance there are bad swirls and whirlpools at high water, and many junks 
come to grief in this locality. In fact, this gorge, like the others, is ren- 
dered dangerous if the river rises abnormally, for then the swirls become 
very violent. The reasons for this will be given later. 

As an up-bound vessel nears the western entrance to Bellows 
Gorge a number of chiseled holes may be seen on the port hand 
in the side of a perpendicular cliff rising probably not less than 
500 feet out of the river. The Chinese say that sometime about the 
third century, A. D., a war existed between the ruling authorities 
above and below the gorges. The invaders came up by river to 
attack Kwei-chou-fu, the city at the head of the Bellows Gorge. 
The western entrance, through which it seemed they must emerge, 
was strongly fortified, and enormous chains are said to have been 
forged and stretched across the river, their ends having been 
made fast to holes in the rocks on the right bank, and to huge iron 
posts imbedded in a flat rock of the left bank. The river people 
say in support of this that at low water these holes and the posts 
may be plainly seen if one knows where to look for them. Finding 
themselves confronted by such formidable defense, the invaders 
chiseled these holes in the side of the cliff, and from them built a 
ladder by which they were enabled to go up and over the cliff, thus 
taking the defenders on the flank, and hence accomplishing their 
ends. 

On the starboard hand as one goes up river, and probably 
a mile from thei western entrance, is a cave in the side of a cliff. 
In small crevasses, high up above the water, a nimiber of Chinese 
bellows or windboxes can be plainly seen. Just who put them 
there and when they were put there seems to be a matter of 
considerable doubt. Some say that it is from these that the gorge 
derives its name of " Bellows," or "Windbox," as it is sometimes 
called. From the Chinese the writer has heard several explana- 
tions offered, but no two of them agree. One old pilot said a " Joss 
man " had put them there to make a favorable wind blow through 
the gorge for up-bound junks. 

The city of Kwei-chou-fu, situated about two and one-quarter 
miles above the gorge, oft'ers a very good mooring place. Gun- 
boats and river steamers usually coal here. Few travelers, how- 
ever, go into the city, for although picturesque at a distance, it is 
not particularly inviting when seen close aboard. 



The Upper Yangtse River 331 

Above Kwei-chou-fu, or Kwei-fu, as it is commonly called, the appear- 
ance of the Yangtse is quite different. Precipitate cliffs and deep gorges 
gradually give way to long sloping banks, which, where possible, are cul- 
tivated. There are a number of rapids, but few of them offer any particular 
difficulty to a vessel of 13 knots or more at ordinary water levels. The 
navigation above Kwei-fu may therefore be considered much easier than 
that below this place. Between Kwei-fu and Wanhsien (a distance of 68 
miles) there are many rapids; but of these the following are the most 
important : The Lao-ma-tan, or " Old Horse Rapid," bad at low water, 
but never very difficult for a high-power steamer; the Miao-chi-tse-tan, or 
■' Temple Stairs Rapids," fairly bad at all levels, and always to be reckoned 
with; the Tung-yang-tse-tan, bad at low water, and the Hsin-lung-tan, or 
" New Dragon Rapid." The Tung-yang-tse-tan is a particularly vicious 
rapid during low water. The passage is narrow, and it is a very bad place 
to encounter downward bound junks. The Hsin-lung-tan was formed on 
September 30, 1896, when, after more than one month of incessant rain, a 
portion of the hill on the left bank suddenly broke loose and slid into 
the river. During low water this is the worst rapid in the Yangtse, and is 
one of the impassable places for steamers. The average difference in water 
level immediately above and below this rapid in February and March is 
said to be about seven to nine feet. In 1915 the water was lower than here- 
tofore, and experienced river men estimated the drop at that time as 12 
feet. No rapids exist between Kwei-fu and Hsin-lung-tan during high 
water, and except for the swirls even Hsin-lung-tan is negligible. 

About one and one-half miles above Hsin-lung-tan is the village 
and bay of Pan Tuo. As a winter mooring and drill place this is 
probably the best in the upper river. A vessel may anchor a hun- 
dred yards ofif the big sand bank, and men may be landed for drill 
and exercise. Anyone familiar with Szechuan, or similar hill 
country, will appreciate what it means to find a piece of ground 
which is fairly level for a couple of hundred feet. It is, indeed, 
unusual to be able to conduct an infantry drill in a space much 
larger than the average ship's quarter-deck. The Monocacy 
remained more than one week at Pan Tuo during December, 191 5. 
Pan Tuo is one of the few places in the upper river which is con- 
sidered safe as an anchorage, or a mooring, using anchors only. 
The Monocacy anchored in about four fathoms of water with 
about 18 fathoms on her riding chain. When day broke the fol- 
lowing morning the sand bank near which we had anchored pre- 
sented an appearance entirely different from that of the preceding 
day, and large portions of it could be observed breaking off and 
dropping into the water. The long sloping bank of the day before 
had entirely disappeared. Farther inshore was just a steep bank. 
Soundings were taken and the water found to vary from seven to 



^T^2 The Upper Yangtse River 

nine fathoms, but the vessel had apparently changed position 
very little. The water had actually fallen a few inches durin;^- the 
night. The only plausible explanation seemed to be that the whole 
bottom of the small bay is on a great sloping rock. Silt and sand 
were deposited by the heavily-laden high waters of summer, and 
when the river fell to a certain level cross currents or underwater 
swirls were set up which gradually eroded the sand flooring, and 
as this was washed out the heavier bank above gave way and 
worked down to take its place, a large portion of it in the mean- 
time having been taken up by the then fairly clear water and car- 
ried on down river. Needless to add, the Monocacy has since then 
made the practice of getting out lines apply to all mooring and 
anchoring places alike. 

About 24 miles above Pan Tuo is the city of Wanhsieii, distant about 
183 miles from Ichang and about 175 miles from Chungking. Officers, both 
naval and merchant, I believe, experience a distinct feeling of satisfaction 
when their vessels arrive safely at Wanhsien. There is a feeling that the 
worst half of the up-hill work from Ichang to Chungking is over, and that 
with an even break of luck the remainder will be safely and shortly accom- 
plished. Steamers can find a good mooring just opposite the city, but the 
water front which may be so used at all water levels is very limited. In 
years past Wanhsien was a very important center of trade, second only to 
Chungking in importance ; but in the past few years it is said to have been 
of less importance commercially than heretofore. Preparations are being 
made to open the port in the near future, and this will undoubtedly attract 
foreigners and add to its importance. On the other hand, the projected 
(and already surveyed) Szechuan railroad does not come within many miles 
of this city, and should the railroad be built and Wanhsien left entirely out 
of consideration it will seriously affect the progress of the place. There is 
usually an abundance of steaming coal at Wanshien, and all vessels fill 
bunkers here for the run to Fuchow and Chungking. 

Seven miles above Wanhsien is the famous Footan (or Hutan ) Rapid. 
At low water the rapid does not exist; at middle water it is bad. and at 
ordinary high water, say 60 feet local, it is the worst rapid in the Yangtse 
River. Above that level Footan improves, and the Fu-mien-tan and Kwan- 
yin-tan take precedence for hard going. Its appearance at low water is 
most peculiar. Extending out from the right bank is a huge pile of small 
boulders, while on the left bank the river is narrowed to less than half its 
average width by high ribs of peculiarly honeycombed rocks. Their appear- 
ance is not unlike a section of Swiss cheese. 

Above Hutan the river widens and the hills have a greater slope than 
they do farther down river. The navigation for alxnit 21 miles presents 
no special difficulties. Tn fact, there is fairly good going until Shili-pao-tsai 
is in sight. 



The Upper Yangtse River 333 

Probably the most picturesque place on the upper river is Shih-pao-tsai, 
a conspicuous rock rising up 300 feet on the left bank of the river and 
surmounted by an ancient Buddhist temple. From the river it appears to 
be rectangular, and the sides are so symmetrical that it is hard to believe 
that it has not been built by human labor. On the river side of the rock 
is a sort of pagoda-pavilion, containing a stairway to the top of the rock. 
Its appearance, I believe, impresses one more as a great medieval castle 
than as a temple. 

, Above Shih-pao-tsai the currents are strong all the year round. 
To even a maritime man this part of the river appears not fraught 
with many difficulties if he sees it with the watermark at Ichang 
at 25 to 35 feet. He will wonder,. however, why the pilot insists 
upon crossing back and forth so much, and he will decide in his 
own mind that the difficulties of the navigation are very much 
exaggerated. Let this same man make the trip with the Ichang 
watermark at about 15 feet, and again with it at about 5 to 10 
feet. As the water begins to fall he will see the tops of numerous 
ledges of rock, and then at low water he will be surprised to see 
the extent of these. They are everywhere ; some running out 
irregularly from one bank or the other ; some looking like huge 
feelers extending perhaps a mile or more down river, or at an 
angle to the flow of the current. Besides these there are detached 
masses of rock, great boulders reaching 70 or 80 feet above low 
water, and innumerable shingle banks which have proved the undo- 
ing of more than one vessel already. He will, in fact, realize that 
this rushing, rock-bound stream is, for navigational purposes, in a 
class limited to very few, and in many characteristics unequalled. 
He will understand why his native pilot is an old man before he is 
a reliable pilot ; and, if he has a sense of justice, he will admire 
and respect the intimate detailed knowledge of a man who, without 
charts, buoys, beacons, or other navigational aids, pilots his ves- 
sel in safety through 500 miles or more of this water at levels 
varying on an average of 60 to 70 feet to the year. 

There is really little change in the navigational aspect of the river from 
Wanhsien to Chungking, or even to Suifu, which is 238 miles above Chung- 
king. There are, of course, occasional reaches of safer and slower running 
water, but these are rare, and cover a comparatively small percentage of 
the river. Above Footan none of the rapids is bad except in high water 
freshets. At such times the difficulties incident to strong swirly water 
are quite general, but are accentuated at such places as Fu-mien-tan, Kwan- 
yin-tan, Yellow Flower Gorge, Kiun-chu-tan, etc. A good general rule to 
follow during a July or August freshet is to tie up and wait until the river 



334 The Upper Yangtse River 

stops rising, for bucking a rise of a foot an hour, or more, is a heart- 
breaking undertaking. 

About 48 miles above Wanhsien the city of Chungchau is passed. It is 
said to have been a place of importance in days gone by, and its appearance 
from the river indicates the probable truth of this statement. At present 
it is of little importance. An excellent mooring may be found here, and 
for naval vessels it is a good place for drills. An old target range may be 
found '"nside the city which the local officials will allow to be used. 

Leaving Chungchau, the next place of interest is Fengtu. Located on a 
low hill and " protected " by several pagodas and the " Mountain of the 
Emperor of Heaven, it presents a rather pleasing appearance from a vessel 
standing up river. It will not bear a closer inspection though, for, as 
some one has truthfully said, its streets are " filthy in fine, and impassable 
in wet weather." In the flood of 1870 the city was almost completely 
destroyed, and a new site, surrounded by an expensive and elaborate wall, 
was decided upon by the officials. The new site was 200 feet above river, 
in order to insure safety during the summer freshets ; but the people refused 
to leave the old site, some saying that the new city was haunted, and others 
that it was too far to carry water. Just below the city, on the left bank 
of the river, is the sacred Mountain of the Emperor of Heaven. On its 
summit are a number of temples, and its partially wooded slopes are literally 
honeycombed with graves and tombs. Few spots in China are more sacred 
to the native than this mountain. The temples are said to be more than 
1000 years old. Captain S. C. Plant, inspector for the upper river, in his 
account of -Fengtu says, "In one of these temples near the summit the 
visitor, with a show of ceremony, is shown a hole, said by the priest to lead 
to the center of the earth; but on dropping a piece of lighted paper down, 
bottom is reached at perhaps 20 feet. Another remarkable feature of the 
Tien-cho-shan is that for a very small sum a pass to Paradise, via the pole 
star, may be obtained, and for another small amount a document insuring 
the safe and happy delivery of the enciente, both bearing the seals of the high 
priest of the Temple of the Emperor and the local mandarin." The Yangtse 
Kiang Pilot, 1914 edition, describes another of these temples as follows : 
" The temple dedicated to the emperor of the ' Yin,' or dead, is supposed to 
be the residence of the emperor of Hades. At every Chinese death the 
officiating Taoist priest writes a letter to the Tien-tse, duly addressed to 
Fengtu Chang, notifying him of the newcomer. The dispatch, however, 
is not sent through the terrestrial, but the celestrial, post, being burnt to 
ashes. The precincts of Tien-tse-shan are supposed to be haunted by 
innumerable ghosts, and no Chinaman will venture near it at night." 

Just above Fengtu the navigation is very difficult at certain water levels. 
A great area of straggling rock, called Tsan-pei-leang, extends more than 
two-thirds the distance across the river from the left bank, while from the 
right bank, opposite this, large irregular rock formations project. When 
the water is low and flowing between these two there is no difficulty in 
piloting through the channel (called Hu-ping-tan) ; but when the water 
rises sufficiently to cover the rocks, the passage in between becomes a 
rapid. An intimate knowledge of the locality and skill in handling the 
river craft are required to safely navigate this place at such times. Long 



The Upper Yangtse River 335 

experience and close application, combined with good judgment, qualify 
the pilot to decide when the Hu-ping-tan channel must be followed, or when 
it is safe to cross over the top of the Tsan-pei-leang. The general rule is 
that the channel between the reef and the left bank is available when the 
Tsan-pei-leang reef is awash. It is such propositions as this that con- 
stantly confront the up-river pilot; and upon his judgment depends the 
safety of the vessel. 

About one and one-half miles above Hu-ping-tan is the Kwan- 
yin-tan. Like Footan, this rapid is nothing in low water. In very 
high water, and particularly when the river is fresheting, it is 
very strong and swirly. It was while attempting the approach 
of this rapid that the little steamer Shit-tutii:; struck on the top 
of one of the great projections of rock in this locality. 
The vessel was proceeding over exactly the same ground that 
she had covered on the preceding trip, and with water at the same 
level. Suddenly, and without any warning, a great boil and inrush 
of water, oversetting onto the rocks, rendered the vessel's engines 
and rudders useless for the moment, and she was thrown violently 
onto the rocks. These boils and oversets (called Fah-sui by the 
Chinese) occur off this rapid at regular intervals of about 15 min- 
utes during the high-water stage of the river. It is said that, 
viewed from the nearby rocks, they are not unlike the surf on the 
seashore. Attempts to float the Shu-tung proved unsuccessful and, 
as the river was falling rapidly, it seemed that the little vessel was 
doomed. Her commander and his European engineer determined 
to make a fight for it. and at once discharged the vessel as much 
as possible, and as the water went down shored her up so as to 
prevent her being seriously injured. As soon as she was entirely 
out of water her bottom was repaired and painted, the irregular 
rocks under her bottom were cut away, and all the available timber 
in the surrounding country was taken to make launching ways for 
her. Finally, after 30 days of incessant labor, the little vessel was 
launched into the river below, which in the meantime had receded 
40 feet, and proceeded on her way to Chungking. 

The run of 30 miles from Kwan-yin-tan to Fu-chow, although not pos- 
sessing any particular charm, is, if machinery is working well, never 
monotonous, for, unless the river is rising rapidly, good time is made and 
a certain degree of pleasure is derived from the anticipation of a good moor- 
ing place not many miles away. Then, too, if the run from Wanhsien to 
Fu-chow is attempted in a single day, keen interest in the speed is only 
natural, since it must decide whether the mooring place at Fu-chow can be 
reached before dark. The city of Fu-chow, situated on a high bluff at the 
confluence of the Yangtse and the Kien Kiang, presents a rather hopeful 



336 The Upper Yangtse River 

appearance as it opens into view from an up-bound vessel. On closer 
approach it is, like most other Chinese cities, distinctly disappointing. The 
Kien Kiang, or Little River, as it is sometimes called, is said to be navigable 
for native boats for a distance of 150 to 200 miles above Fu-chow^. The 
boats employed for this purpose are, perhaps, of all Chinese boats, the most 
eccentric in design. To the foreigner they are commonly known by the 
expressive term of " crooked-stern " boats. The after end of the main 
deck twists to one side until at the stern it is practically at right angles to 
the normal plane of the deck. Over the midship section of the unwieldy- 
looking craft is built a sort of flying bridge. An enormous sweep, extending 
over the stern and supported on the high side of the twisted stern, is worked 
from the flying bridge. These vessels are not fitted with rudders, but are 
steered solely by the sweep. The origin and idea of the " crooked-stern " 
design is somewhat uncertain, but it is probably the result of many cen- 
turies of the same kind of navigation on this swift mountain stream. 
Like everything else Chinese, the idea is probably the result of practical 
experience, and its embellishments the result of a certain degree of applied 
" Joss." 

Leaving Fu-chow, good time is made until about seven miles above, when 
the currents become much stronger. At a picturesque bend in the river about 
13 miles above Fu-chow is the city of Ning Shih. A conspicuous arched 
bridge at this place is a fine example of Chinese architecture. From here 
until Chai-pan-tsi is passed the navigation, generally speaking, is more 
difficult. Rocks, shingle banks, rapids and swirls have to be reckoned with, 
and like many other parts of the river, dififerent water levels affect the 
movements and the handling of a vessel. 

During low water one of the worst places on the river is the Chai- 
pan-tsi. A sketch of this place will tell more at a glance than could 
be included in a long- description (see Fig. i). The channel to the 
river's right bank is used until the Chungking watermark is about 
10 feet above zero, when it becomes unsafe on account of rocks. 
Thereafter during the low water season the channel to the river's 
left bank must be used. It is very narrow and swift. There is 
probably no w^orse place on the upper river to meet junks, and it 
has been the Monocacy's luck to encounter them here every time 
she has been through except one. The best policy in a place like 
this, if the steamer is bound up river, is to slow and give the down- 
coming junks a chance to get by in safety. Up-river native crafts 
have had to contend with the steamer very little, and the native 
skippers seem to lose their heads completely when one approaches. 
The recently appointed and very able river inspector, Captain S. C. 
Plant, who has been associated with the upper Yangtse for more 
than 16 years, is now endeavoring to formulate certain simple and 
practical rules of the road for the river which will help the junk 
master and the steamer skipper to a better understanding of each 
other. 



The Upper Yangtse River 



337 



For a reliable river pilot there is nothing very difficult between 
Chai-pan-tsi and Chungking, at ordinary waters. At very low 
water the upper end of the Lo-chi shingle bank presents some 
difficulties due to rocks and shoal water ; but by using a sounding 
pole a channel of sufficient depth can always be found. It is 
extremely difficult, however, to get a Chinese pilot to use the 
sounding pole. Generally speaking, he will not, if it is left to his 
discretion, use the pole for fear of " losing face " ; and he would 
prefer running a ship ashore to having other river men think that 
he does not know the exact depth at all places and at all water 
levels. As a result of such stupidity many accidents have occurred. 
It is reported that some time ago H. M. S. Widgeon had her bot- 







Fig. I. — Chai Pan Tsi — a narrow winter channel 



tom very badly injured on the Chang-chow shingle bank through 
not using the pole. The best rule to follow is to disregard the 
pilot's wishes in the matter entirely and keep at least one pole 
going practically all the time when underway, and two when in 
bad places. 

As a vessel enters the Tung-lo-hsia Gorge the lower customs 
station of Chungking (Tang-chai-to) comes into view, and the 
weary watch-stander realizes he is at last only eight miles from 
his moorings. As a rule good speed is maintained, and before 
long Tang-chai-to and the double bend of the river are left behind, 
and the seven-story pagoda below the little city of Kiang-pei 
bursts into view. Soon then the golden Buddha is abeam on the 
port hand, and Chungking is actually in sight. Proceeding about 
a mile beyond the golden Buddha the mouth of the Kia-ling-ho 



338 The Upper Yangtse River 

(or Little River) comes into view, indicating the dividing line 
between Chungking and its little sister city, Kiang-pei. As the 
steamer comes nearly abeam of Kiang-pei the splendid naval 
establishment of the French is conspicuous on the port bow. The 
so-called " naval barracks " are excellently located just below the 
junction of the Yangtse and the Kia-ling-ho. A safe natural 
mooring for summer and winter makes this location particularly 
well suited to the purpose. The " barracks " are located on a 
high rocky bluff overlooking the moorings. They are inclosed 
in a spacious compound, the stone walls of which are probably 
12 to 15 feet high. Healthful, roomy quarters are provided for 
enlisted personnel, and a large house, furnished and equipped, is 
provided for officers. Reading rooms, work rooms, etc., are fea- 
tures of this building. It is, when one considers the thought given 
to these details by the French, small wonder that their officers 
have accomplished more in their efforts to learn the Yangtse than 
those of any other nation. Their surveys of the lower Yangtse 
waters are, of course, well known and held in high regard by all 
officers navigating the lower river. But their survey work in the 
upper Yangtse was necessarily accomplished under trying condi- 
tions ; and its completeness, giving as it does a graphic representa- 
tion of the river combined with detailed information obtainable 
on no other charts, merits unstinted praise. Besides the quarters 
for officers and men, the French base is equipped with machine 
tools, forges, etc., in sufficient detail and number to make a vessel 
cruising in these waters practically self-sustaining. Adjoining 
and under the men's quarters are a large number of storerooms. 
A stock of all kinds of stores is kept here so that a vessel spending 
a few months in the upper river is not likely to find herself embar- 
rassed by the lack of certain necessities, her allowed stock of which 
has been used for proper purposes. 

Proceeding a few hundred yards farther the splendid view of 
Chungking, its suburbs and environs, opens out before the 
observer. Kiang-pei, really only a walled suburb of Chungking, 
rises out of the river on the starboard beam, while on the port 
hand the extensive suburbs occupying all the river bank between 
Wang-kia-to and Hai-tan-shih open into view. Ahead, on a 
rocky promontory, rising 300 feet out of the river, is the city of 
Chungking, pretentious, indeed, in appearance ; a veritable 
" Arabian Nights " city in its indefinite and, at times, almost 
opaque shroud of fog and smoke. There is no doubt a certain 



The Upper Yangtse River 



339 



degree of psychology connected with the mysterious, almost 
unnatural, feeling that comes over one when this magnificent view 
first comes into sight. The many junks and native boats of all 
kinds, the singing of the boatmen, the bustle and noise of the 
thousands of cargo and water coolies on shore, the (at a distance) 
almost sublime appearance of the city of Chungking, are in such 













f'h 



Fig. 2. — The city of Chungking 

decided contrast to the wild country through which one travels 
after leaving Ichang that the average traveler is really overcome 
for the moment, and lost in admiration of this, the noblest view of 
purely Chinese industry in all the Yangtse River. 

In general characteristics Chungking is not unlike most of the 
other up-river cities. It is, however, the largest and most impor- 
tant of these. The sketch plan will no doubt assist in making the 



340 The Upper Yangtse River 

description more comprehensive. Between the Yangtse and its 
affluent, the Kia-hng-ho, is a long, fairly narrow peninsula, the 
lower portion of which is the site of Chungking. The population 
of the city is variously estimated at from 200,000 to 500,000, but 
there are no accurate figures obtainable. To the writer's inquiry 
regarding this matter, a prominent Chinese official replied that he 
did not know, but that he would have a census taken right away 
and supply the desired information. Needless to say, he was 
merely " saving face," and had no intention of putting his volun- 
tary promise into execution. There is a great difference in the 
appearance of the city in summer and in winter, due to the varia- 
tion in water level. The two principal hills upon which the city 
is built are all of 300 feet above the normal zero water level of the 
river in winter. The fity is surrounded by a crenallated wall, which 
is said to have been built in the fourteenth century. There are 
eight main gates. Of those on the river, the most imporant are 
the Tai-ping-men, the Tun'g-shui-men and the Chao-tien-men. 
Leading up to these from the river are long flights of stone steps. 
Large, clumsy mailed gates guard the entrances, and these, 
with the exception of the Tai-ping-men, are closed and locked 
before sundown. Sentries representing both the commanding 
general and the police department flank the gates and scrutinize 
every parcel a Chinese carries ; and woe betide the poor unfortu- 
nate who is even suspected of attempting to smuggle forbidden 
articles into or out of the city. The Tung-yuan-men, or West gate, 
is the only one of the main gates which does not open onto the 
river. It is the terminus of the great thoroughfare to Cheng-tu, 
the capital of the province. Just outside this gate is the public 
execution ground, and many a poor devil meets an unhappy and 
untimely end here. In fact, during the writer's stay in this part 
of China these executions were of practically daily occurrence. 
Sometimes a day or so passed without the curious crowd being seen 
on the wall overlooking the gate — its presence is always a sure 
sign that another victim of China's peculiar form of government 
was paying the penalty. Sometimes only one poor soul faced the 
firing squad ; but frequently there were several. Many days there 
were 20 or more. When a large number were condemned the 
policy seemed to be to spread them out over several days, whether 
for the edification of the populace, or for the convenience of the 
official undertaker, it has not been ascertained. The people of the 



The Upper Yangtse River 341 

street have been hardened to this sort of thing, though, and par- 
ties of men, women, and children are always on hand when the 
tragic procession arrives at the gate. Usually the condemned man 
is shot. Neither ammunition nor sentiment is wasted, however, 
for usually a single shot is fired at very close range. The victim 
falls and the " firing squad," consisting of about a section of 
infantry, enthusiastically supported by the too curious spectators, 
eagerly watches his death agonies until he is officially pronounced 
dead. Frequently this is a long time, for the Chinese soldier is 
none too good a shot, nor are his senses of humane treatment so 
highly developed that he apparently cares just where the victim 
is struck. Generally the attempt is made to shoot them in the chest 
or the back, but frequently the shot goes wide, and they start all 
over. The writer has seen such a case, the victim having first been 
hit in the arm. Execution by beheading is not common now. Only 
a few cases of it having occurred here during our time, but we 
have seen many such during our stops at Fu-chow, 65 miles down 
river. Although more horrible to contemplate, death by beheading 
as practiced in China is decidedly preferable to death before the 
" firing squad." The Chinese executioner is certainly an expert 
at his job, for it seldom takes but one quick stroke to sever the 
head entirely, and this without loss of time or unnecessary pre- 
liminaries, once the execution ground is reached. However, exe- 
cution by beheading is looked upon as a disgrace, and as a rule only 
exceptionally bad robbers are beheaded. As the Chinese beHeve 
it impossible for a man to gain admittance to the next world if he 
is headless, the family, or some friend of a victim of the headman's 
axe, visually pays the few cash necessary to engage a competent 
and experienced tailor to sew it back in place. 

But to return to the city gates. All those affording access to the 
river are used by innumerable water coolies, each carrying across 
his shoulder a pole about six feet long with a large bucket on each 
end. All the water of the city, for whatever purpose, is supplied 
this way, for there is no other water supply system, and of course 
no drainage nor sewerage. There is a certain amount of natural 
drainage, but what of the sewerage, etc., that gets out of the city 
is also transported by coolies through the gates and down to the 
river, where, as might be expected, at certain times of day the 
odors are anything but inviting. With conditions like these, the 
narrow streets are always most unsanitary. In justice to Chung- 



34^ 



The Upper Yangtse River 



king-, though, it must be added that for Chinese streets the pave- 
ments ^e far above the average, and the streets proportionately- 
very wide. 

There are in the city a number of fine old temples, and to the 
native point of view many handsome residences. To the visitor 
these are not as a rule visible, for the Chinaman always surrounds 
his mansion with an enormous wall. Probably the real reason for 
this is the prevalence of robbers. The temples are practically all 
in a run-down condition, and like those in most parts of China, 
inspire little or no confidence in the present generation. 

The governments of the United States, France, Great Britain, 
Japan, and Germany maintain consulates or vice-consulates at 
Chungking. Both Catholic and Protestant missions are to be 
found in Chungking ; but aside from these and the maritime cus- 
toms staff there are few foreigners there. A few firms retain 
European representatives, but most of them seem to depend upon 
Chinese agents. 

The usual mode of conveyance is the sedan chair. The ordinary native 
chair has two bearers, but foreigners usually use four bearers. Comfortable 
chairs can be manufactured for about $io to $20 (Mexican) each, 
depending upon the quality desired ; and a team of four good coolies can 
be had for a total of $10 to $20 (Mexican) per month. Native 
ponies, too, are extensively used. It is impossible to get about any other 
way unless one walks, for the streets are continually crossing little rises 
and hills, and great stone stairwaj's replace the paving stones of the streets 
at such places. This is not only true of Chungking, but of nearly all of 
Szechuan Province, and certainly of all the Szechuan cities I have ever 
seen. The way these dexterous little ponies scamper up and down the 
steps reminds one of the ease with which a goat would do the same thing 
in America. A pony trots up and down the steps with a man on his back 
apparently with no effort whatever. No road seems too bad for them, and 
no hill too steep. 

Across the river from Chungking rise two ranges of hills. On these 
most of the foreigners have succeeded in leasing or buying enough room to 
build bungalows where the hot summer months may be spent. Most of 
these are attractively located and afford some excellent views of the river 
and the city. When one is reminded that in summer a temperature of 
112 degrees Fahrenheit in the shade has been recorded down on the river, 
the necessity for the bungalows is at once apparent. On the second range 
the British naval authorities possess two unpretentious, but thoroughly 
practical, bungalows for their officers and men. Considering the country in 
which these up-river vessels cruise, the very limited field of pastimes open 
to enlisted men as well as to officers, not to mention the conditions that 
exist on a small gunboat during the very hot summer weather, it is a wise 



The Upper Yangtse River 343 

policy which allows the expenditure of the small sums necessary for the 
equipment and maintenance of such an establishment. 

Just opposite the city of Chungking, and very conspicuous from 
the river, the British have built a naval canteen for their men. 
The building is perhaps one of the best in western China, and its 
equipment, although not elaborate, is good, sufficient and attractive^ 
On the lower floor are two large reading rooms and a bar, 
while on the second floor are a billiard room and a dining-room 
where good food may be had at reasonable prices. The cellar and 
the attic furnish excellent storeroom spaces, and quantities of sur- 
plus stores of all kinds are kept here for the two gunboats which 
Great Britain retains in the upper river. The fireroom forces of 
these vessels are natives, so that the crews of both British gun- 
boats here do not contain as many white men as one of our ves- 
sels of the same class. 

About one-half mile above the canteen the British have estab- 
lished a small, inexpensive, but thoroughly practical, workshop. 
It is equipped with forges, foundry, and sufficient machine tools 
to make their vessels here self-sustaining. At least one of the 
British gunboats now in Chungking has not been below Ichang 
for three years. For docking a stpne grid has been laid out on the 
sand inside the little harbor of Lung-men-hao, and taking advan- 
tage of the several rises and falls of the river in spring, the ves- 
sels are docked and painted. 

In the harbor of Lung-men-hao are the British gunboat moor- 
ings. These vessels not being in commission in the winters of 
1914-1915 and 1915-1916, a mooring in here was assigned the 
Monocacy. On account of the great difference in suinmer and 
winter water levels separate moorings are required for the two 
seasons. When the water rises to 20 feet above the normal zero 
the summer moorings have to be taken up. 

The total value of the trade passing through the maritime customs in 
1914 was Haekwan Taels 37,632,208. Of this amount, T23,773,020 were 
imports, and the remainder exports. In 1915 the value of the trade was 
approximately 2,500,000 taels less than in 1914. Medicines, silk, wool, hides, 
bristles, and hemp, are the principal articles of export. The imports con- 
sist mostly of cotton and woolen goods, dyes, medicines, and illuminating oil. 

There being no railroads in this part of China, and the country being 
extremely rugged and hilly, water communication with the outside world 
makes Chungking virtually the center of industry and finance for all the rich 
Szechuan country beyond the gorges. Many streams, affluents of the Yang- 



344 The Upper Yangtse River 

tse, provide a means for marketing goods in Chungking. Roads, several 
feet wide, built above the rice paddies and cut into the sides of the hills, 
afford the only other means of communication between Chungking and the 
numerous towns and cities of this province of 40,000,000 or more souls. 
Vehicles on wheels cannot be used, and cargo or freight of whatever kind 
must be carried on coolies' backs. During the Monocacy's cruise in the 
upper river in 1914, 1915. and 1916, the brigands have been so bad that both 
trade and travel have been seriously interfered with. There are four or 
five small steamers that run between Ichang and Chungking from April until 
December, but their freight rates run very high, so most of the shipping is 
done by junks. The latter make the trip from Chungking to Ichang in five 
to eight days ; but it takes them from one month to six weeks to make the 
trip up from Ichang. The risks, of course, are very great, and no insurance 
can be obtained. 

The Peculiarities of the Upper Yangtse 
Ichang-, distant nearly 1000 miles from the sea, is but one 134 
feet above the sea level, while Chungking, although only 358 miles 
above Ichang on the Yangtse, is 610 feet above the sea level. In 
other words, between these two places there is a difiference in alti- 
tude of 410 feet, or a drop in the river of about 16 inches to the 
mile. The statement has often been made that as one journeys 
through the gorges the sensation of looking down hill is experi- 
enced when looking down river, and indeed it does not seem impos- 
sible that this is no mere optical delusion when the above facts are 
considered. 

The incline of the river bed alone is sufficient to produce a strong 
current throughout the year, particularly if the irregular nature of 
the bottom is taken into consideration. Some of the reaches, more 
especially those in the big gorges, are very deep, many of them 
having been sounded to 70 fathoms, while an abundance of shoal 
places produces at different levels many varieties of races and 
rapids, not to mention the very important effects of the innumer- 
able ribs of rock which are so conspicuous in the low water season. 
But these characteristics probably hold true more or less for all 
mountain streams, and after all, the upper Yangtse is nothing 
more than a big mountain stream. Szechuan is a very moun- 
tainous region, and may boast a large number of streams. Most 
of these are tributaries of the Yangtse, and possessing, as they do, 
the usual characteristics of mountain streams, they pour their 
torrents into their common drain with marvelous rapidity during 
the heavy summer rains, which sometimes continue for several 



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346 The Upper Yangtse River 

days. At such times the volume of water is suddenly increased 
to several times the normal volume of the river, and at the narrow 
places in the gorges the volume becomes much greater than that 
which the cross-sectional area of the river at such places can nor- 
mally handle. This partial blocking of the stream causes what 
amounts to a backing up of water. The current for hundreds of 
miles above the gorges runs at an abnormal rate, and the river 
rises rapidly. It is not unusual during these freshets for the river 
to rise at Chungking at an average rate of one foot an hour for 
a total rise of 50 or more feet. In August, 1905, a rise of 80 feet in 
less than three days was recorded, the Chungking watermark 
on this occasion reaching a height of 108 feet above the normal 
zero. Such a rise at Chungking produces an even greater rise 
at Kwei-chou-fu and at Wu-shan, the cities at the heads of the 
two largest gorges. x\ rise to the 100-foot mark is not unusual at 
these cities during the summer. 

During these freshets the river becomes a raging torrent. The 
current at Chungking reaches a speed of eight knots or more, 
and the stream becomes a mass of seething water, full of swirls 
and dangerous whirlpools. At such times downward bound 
steam vessels proceed with their schedules as far as Kwei-fu. If 
the water is up around the 100-foot mark at this place the navi- 
gation of the gorges below becomes most dangerous, and should 
not be attempted except in cases of emergency. The violence of 
the swirls in the gorges is almost unbelievable. They travel at 
varying angles across the stream, and strike everything in their 
paths with such force that experienced river men never, of their 
own volition, take chances with them. Ordinarily it is wiser to 
tie up and await a fall in water of several feet, and this is the usual 
rule. So far it has not become necessary for the Monocacy to 
attempt the gorges at such a time ; but in August, 1914, the writer 
had the good fortune to make the trip down river in the powerful 
new steamship Shii-hun (500 tons), when the river was dan- 
gerously high. The vessel lost a day at Kwei-fu waiting for the 
water to fall, and entered the Bellows Gorge early the following 
morning. It was a splendid, and to the uninitiated, an almost 
terrifying sight to behold. The great rocks, so conspicuous at low 
and middle water, were submerged, and the water, rushing on 
with incredible swiftness, swirled and foamed over them. Enor- 
mous swirls with vortices several feet deep seemed to form every- 



The Upper Yangtse River 347 

where, and rotating rapidly would go charging athwart the stream 
to bring themselves up violently against a cliff, a projecting rock, 
perhaps, or the little Shu-hun. It was startling to see how they 
literally lifted the vessel, and would drop her two, three or more 
points off her course in spite of all that her captain and his crew 
of river veterans could do. Small wonder that full speed was rung 
up, and less wonder still that once safely through this gorge we 
moored to the bank and awaited a fall in water before attempting 
to negotiate the narrower gorges below Wushan. 

Such rises as that described above are phenomenal, and may be 
expected only during the period beginning in the first half of 
July and ending in the first half of September. While from the 
very nature of things the swirls and whirlpools are worst during 
the freshets, the rapids, as previously pointed out, are not peculiar 
to any season. Rapids are caused by a convergence of the stream, 
thus forcing the volume of water, which passes a normal section 
of the river at a moderate current rate, to accelerate to such an 
extent that the same volume will pass a reduced section in the same 
time. The great volume of the river is forced in from both banks, 
and assumes the shape of a huge cambered tongue of water with 
breaking edges. This water, rushing through the narrows, 
impinges itself on the quieter waters below, and these become dis- 
torted and break up into a mass of swirls and back water, which 
form the approach. As a rule, rapids may be divided into two 
general classes, namely : 

(i) Those rapids formed by land slides, or formed just below 
the mouths of gullies which, when fresheting. eject stones, peb- 
bles, and silt into the main stream, thus in time forming a bank 
which gradually partially blocks the flow of the stream and fills 
in the bed of the river to such an extent that there is a great dif- 
ference in the depth of water in and below the rapid, and just 
above it ; and 

(2) Those rapids which are caused by a narrowing of the 
stream, and in which the depths are not appreciably different from 
the water immediately above them. 

The Ye-tan is an excellent example of the first type. Here the 
great boulder bank extends out over halfway across the river, 
and the depth of water in the rapid is 8 to 10 feet less than 
it is just above it. This type of rapid is essentially a low or middle 
water rapid, for when the water rises, and the bank causing the 



348 The Upper Yangtse River 

rapid is well under cover, the added cross-sectional area is suffi- 
cient to take care of the additional volume of water, and a few 
swirls and whirlpools will probably be the only evidence of a fero- 
cious low water rapid. These banks vary in height and in width. 
This, together with the fact that the rapid varies in strength 
and permanence, according to the difference in the level of the 
river above and just below the rapid, explains the reason why all 
rapids of this kind are not at their worst at the same standard 
watermark of the nearest port. 

Of the second type probably the best example is the Hu-tan. 
At low water it is nothing, but as the river rises it increases pro- 
portionately in strength. Finally, as mentioned above, when the 
local watermark is about 60 feet above zero it is at its worst. 
The high rocky banks of this narrow stretch confine an enormous 
volume of water to this one passage, and conditions do not improve 
until the river rises still higher and overflows the walls of this 
rocky funnel, or falls sufficiently to readjust the relative cross- 
sectional areas in the rapid and just above it to figures more nearly 
the same. 

Races are plentiful in the Yangtse, but to the steam vessel they 
present no special difficulties. The distinguishing feature between 
races and rapids is that races do not assume the form of a tongue. 
They are usually formed by shoals or reefs, and are most in evi- 
dence during the low water season. 

Swirls are encountered at all water levels, but they do not 
assume dangerous proportions except at high water. They will 
always be found in the approach to rapids, but at normal water 
levels a veteran pilot knows just about how to expect them. The 
high water swirls present a different proposition. They are found 
to be worst in irregular rocky localities, or in reaches where the 
contour of the river banks is irregular. They are caused by the 
projection of many rocks which form small bays. The down-com- 
ing water drives into these with the full force of the current, and 
in so doing drives out against the current the water which was in 
these little bays. This latter strikes the main stream at an angle 
and assumes a circular form. If the force behind it is great it 
develops characteristics not unlike miniature storms. In high 
water these become violent, as pointed out above, and their vor- 
tices are often several feet deep. The running swirls, or oversets, 
known to the Chinese as pao-hsncn, are to be found, more or 



The Upper Yangtse River 349 

less, in all the turbulent reaches during high water. They 
are different from the ordinary swirl inasmuch as they appear to 
be volumes of water shot up from the bottom, which, upon reaching 
the surface, break into great " boils," and the whole mass of water 
sets rapidly in one direction or another. When the river is high 
and fresheting these are very conspicuous in the Bellows Gorge 
and in the Wushan Gorge. They constitute a decided menace to 
junk navigation. While only such swirls as those just mentioned 
attract any special attention, they are in reality very numerous in 
all the upper river. The strong waters impinge against the rocky 
banks, and innumerable small swirls, usually only a few inches in 
diameter, are formed. The presence of these is believed to account 
for the fact that no matter how hard the wind blows practically 
no waves are produced, and the surface of the water normally is 
smooth. The old adage, " It is an ill wind that blows no man 
good," applies forcibly in this case ; for while the swirl at certain 
stages of the river is a menace to steam navigation, and while it 
takes a heavy toll of celestials every year, its " calming " effect 
upon the waters saves many disasters. Very strong winds fre- 
quently blow in the winter time, particularly so in the gorges. If 
these caused a sea which compared favorably with what a less 
violent wind will cause in the river below Ichang many disasters 
would occur, and an entirely different type of native boat would 
have to be used. 

The whirlpools of the upper Yangtse are no different from the 
familiar type. They are not dangerous except at high water. 
They form where two streams join, or where a continuous and 
extensive back water joins with a portion of the main stream to 
form a great revolving circle of water. At high water the whirl- 
pool formed at the junction of the Yangtse and the Kia-ling- 
Kiang is very dangerous. It is said in Chungking that junks of 
70 tons displacement have been sucked down here, but this report 
has not been verified. One of the most troublesome whirlpools 
for junks is only a few miles below Fu-chow. On one side of the 
river is the down-going current, and on the other the back cur- 
rent, which on the surface appears to be almost as strong as the 
down-going. It is caused by the peculiar rock formations of this 
locality. It is not unusual for junks to spend a whole day trying 
to get out of this whirlpool. 



350 The Upper Yangtse River 

Among the other dangers of the upper Yangtse are the fogs. 
The winter months, particularly November and December, are the 
worst times for these. They seem to be most prevalent between 
Kwei-fu and Ichang, though sufficiently bad above Wanhsien to 
stop all traffic at times. It would be sheer madness to attempt to 
run in the upper river during a fog ; but in spite of all caution ves- 
sels are frequently caught by fogs in places where continuing 
on their way invites almost certain disaster, and mooring presents 
many dangers. The Yao-tsa-ho, for example, is most dangerous 
in this respect. The rocky winding river between Shih-pao-tsai 
and Chung-chou is also a bad place to be caught by a fog. During 
the time of the year that fogs are most prevalent a good general 
rule is not to get underway before ten in the morning if there is 
any chance of a fog shutting down. 

Probably the one thing that causes the greatest anxiety for 
steamers at all seasons is the junk traffic. Certainly 75 per cent 
of the hairbreadth escapes of downward bound steamers are due to 
encountering downward bound junks in narrow channels, or in 
turbulent reaches. If there is imminent danger on account of 
junks ahead in a narrow channel, the best procedure is to turn 
around and head up stream until the channel is clear, and then 
proceed. Such cases are easily handled; but to encounter junks 
in long turbulent reaches, such as the Niu-kou reach, the Yao- 
tsa-ho, or in the gorges during rising middle water, or high water, 
is a dififerent proposition. There can be but one hard and fast rule 
for the downward bound steamer under such conditions, and this 
is that some way, somehow, the steamer must keep clear. The 
cumbersome, unwieldy-looking junks are practically at the mercy 
of the current and swirls, which at any instant may throw them 
athwart the steamer's course, regardless of which side she chooses 
to pass on. The Chinese pilot usually knows the tendency of the 
swirls to set to right or left in any locality, but the river frequently 
fools the best of them. Probably the best procedure in such a 
case is to watch for a favorable opportunity and then put on all 
possible speed in order to pass the danger as quickly as possible. 
Under some circumstances it is safer to follow up a junk right 
astern, and then when fairly close up to him, make a break for tne 
most favorable side and pass him as soon as possible. It is a wise 
precaution to always keep a couple of small semaphore flags on 



The Upper Yangtse River 351 

the bridge and, by waving one of these from the bridge end, indi- 
cate to the junk the direction you wish him to take. These obser- 
vations, however, are quite general at best, for, after all, such 
cases resolve themselves into matters of judgment, decision, and 
prompt execution on the part of the skipper. 

With conditions like those briefly described above, it is apparent 
that the methods employed differ somewhat from those ordinarily 
practised in maritime ports and in deep-sea cruising. The upper 
Yangtse, in fact, may be said to have a seamanship, a river art, 
all its own. Anyone who witnesses the masterly handling of a 
small river steamer in one of the Yangtse rapids has abundant 
proof of this statement. Vessels do not anchor in the upper Yang- 
tse — they moor. There are a variety of moorings with which 
the river skipper must be familiar, for not only do the conditions 
differ from place to place, but the conditions at the same place may 
vary considerably during a rise or fall of 20 feet or less. The best 
of the native pilots still retain a degree of their " junk " ideas, and 
this applies particularly to the question of mooring places. Experi- 
ence has demonstrated, too. that in grave emergencies, such as 
a bad entry to a rapid, the Chinese pilot, figuratively speaking, 
" blows up." It therefore behooves him who would handle his ves- 
sel with intelligence, and indeed with safety, to make a study of the 
conditions before attempting the trip up from Ichang, no matter 
how good his pilot may be. An officer in command of a naval 
vessel should, upon approaching a mooring place, take the con 
himself, and assume direct charge of the mooring operation, 
asking, of course, his pilot's advice, learning all he can from his 
(the pilot's) experience, but using his own judgment regarding 
the details and their execution. 

The confused mass of turbulent water, made up principally of 
swirls and back water, which is encountered more or less at the 
foot of every rapid comprises what is termed the approach. 
Although alike in many respects, approaches have their individual 
peculiarities. It may safely be said that owing to the difficulty in 
bringing a vessel through the swirls and up to the rapid point 
the approach presents dangers equally as great to the steamer as 
does the rapid itself. Most approaches have a right and a wrong 
side. In many cases one side may be foul, and in many others the 
strong down-coming currents set up swirls and eddies which set 



352 



The Upper Yangtse River 



directly onto the rocky banks. This is shown in the diagram, 
Fig. 4. 

The method which we usually employ upon approaching a 
strong rapid is about as follows : Notify engine rooms and fire 
rooms about 15 minutes before the rapid is to be steamed, and tell 




Fig. 4. — Showing rapid points, the approach, and steamer's track 



them about what speed will be required. When the rapid is in 
sight, size up the situation, and give engine rooms and fire rooms 
such additional information as seems advisable. For example, 
it often happens that upon approaching a rapid it is apparent that 
full speed will not be needed ; or that nothing above 300 R.P.M. 
will be required ; or that all possible speed will be required, etc. 



The Upper Yangtse River 353 

When entering- the approach the engine rooms are usually given a 
" stand-by " signal. The vessel is carefully piloted through the 
approach just in the swirly broken water between the tongue and 
the back water. As the point of entering the rapid is approached 
full speed is rung up. Great care and skill, which only long experi- 
ence can give, are necessary here in order to avoid the back water, 
and at the same time keep clear of the strong down-coming cur- 
rent until the vessel is as near as practicable to the rapid point. 
Then she is eased over into the rapid so as to meet the rush of water 
as nearly head-on as possible. Once in the tongue the confusion 
and noise of the water, so characteristic of the approach, ceases 
and the vessel steams her utmost in the smooth swift waters of the 
tongue. In the meantime we watch with more or less anxiety (its 
degree depending upon the strength of the rapid) ranges which 
we pick up on shore to note whether or not the ship loses her head- 
way. In the Monocacy the first " full speed " signal is answered by 
speeding up the engines to 300 R.P.M. Then, when the vessel has 
entered the tongue, if she fails to forge ahead, full speed is rung 
up once more, and the engines are forced to 325 R.P.M. If this 
fails to get her over the top of the rapid, a third full speed is rung 
up, and the engines are given full boiler pressure. The two points 
on either bank which form the rapid are known as the rapid points. 
Where the approach will safely permit, the best practice sanctions 
entering the rapid as close as practicable to the rapid point far- 
thest up river. Then if, when the vessel enters the rapid, she 
keeps the current slightly on her near shore bow she goes slowly 
across toward the rapid point on the opposite side. If this rapid 
point is slightly below that of the entering side, and if the vessel 
has not lost too much ground in crossing over, she will, upon reach- 
ing the opposite bank, be above the rapid point on that side, 
and consequently over the worst part of the rapid. Where the 
rapid points are about opposite each other crossing over will seldom 
be of much benefit, and rapids so formed are frequently unsteam- 
able for vessels of less than 14 knots speed. In strong rapids the 
Monocacy usually loses all but the least perceptible speed over the 
ground, but only once in the writer's experience have ranges indi- 
cated that she was losing ground. Then gradually, as the vessel 
nears the opposite bank, having weathered the rapid point on that 
side, or as she bucks her way right into the teeth of it, the top of 
the rapid is made, and an increase in speed is at once apparent. 



354 The Upper Yangtse River 

A moment later normal cruising speed — usually about 260 
R.P.M. — is resumed, and the rapid lies behind us. Usually full 
speed is not required for more than 10 minutes at a time. 

The greatest care must be exercised upon entering a rapid. A 
sheer over so as to get the down-coming currents well on one bow 
means almost certain disaster. The diagrams shown under Figs. 
5 and 6 are self-explanatory. A sheer out of the narrow neu- 
tral zone of swirly water which lies between the tongue and the 
back water will throw the bow into the tongue and the stern into 
the back water. A strong force is exerted on the bow, and the 
effect of back water renders the rudders useless. The bow is 
thrown violently athwart the rapid by the down-coming waters, 
and the effect of the back water is to push the stern up stream. 
If a vessel gets into such a predicament, the only course to follow 
is to back full speed immediately and put rudders amidships. 
Then if the river dragon smiles upon you, and your vessel's bow 
is not smashed into the rocks on the opposite side of the river at 
the foot of the rapid, watch for a favorable opportunity to 
straighten out, heading either up river or down river, taking 
advantage of whichever way the swirls happen to throw your 
vessel. A British gunboat had a narrow escape at the Niu-kou-tan 
in just such a manner. She took a sheer, and before her engines 
could take effect she had been swept down and across the river, 
and her bow was smashed into the rocks. A German gunboat had 
a similar experience at the Pao-tse-tan ; and several other vessels 
have had narrow escapes. 

So far it has never become necessary for the Monocacy to get 
out a wire to assist her over a rapid. As this evolution forms an 
important part in river seamanship its omission is not believed 
advisable. Captain S. C. Plant, river inspector for the upper 
Yangtse, has very kindly authorized the following description and 
attendant figure. On account of his vast experience in this kind 
of work, his remarks on the subject may be considered avithori- 
tative : 

When there is a doubt as to whether or not the vessel will be able to 
steam the rapid the wire hawser should be laid out beforehand, because 
in many instances it is both dangerous and difficult to back out of a rapid 

after once having entered it It is when the vessel is in the tongue 

that the hawser (if necessary) must be got on board. In order to accomplish 
this it is necessary to edge the ship as close into the point as her draft 
will permit, so that a boat (already stationed there) can put off to the 



The Upper Yangtse River 





^ ^,i^^\[t'nir^t>eR'^G ^uavffTS useless. 



f , > A 



SHIT' iT/rvctf 

HEff£ B rs^ 





Fig. 5. — Showing accident that happened to a steamer through taking a 
sheer upon entering a rapid 







Fig. 6. — Showing narrow escape of a steamer in a rapid 



356 The Upper Yangtse River 

steamer with the Hne by which means the end of the wire hawser is brought 
on board. To get the hawser on board, taut, and fair leading, is generally- 
very troublesome, especially when the vessel's draft is more than three to 
four feet, and when the nature of the rapid "necessitates a very long stretch 
of wire. The difficulty is to keep it from fouling submerged rocks and 
boulders, and care should be taken to buoy it at intervals, where practicable, 
with sampans, which can be'cast off as the wire becomes taut and leading 
ahead. 

Perhaps everyone who comes to the upper Yangtse wonders 
why vessels designed specially for this work are not built with 
greater power. In the first place there are practical limits to 
length and draft, and since these largely limit tonnage, they gov- 
ern the weight of machinery which can be installed. A merchant 
vessel, which will run only in the high and middle water seasons, 
may safely have a length of 200 feet of a little more ; but a gun- 
boat, which in emergencies may be required to take her chances 
with the river at any stage of the water, should not be over 175 
feet long. There are many tortuous channels at low water, and 
some of the turns are very sharp. Furthermore, at all levels a 
good pilot usually hugs the favorable bank as closely as he safely 
can so as to avoid as much strong water as possible. With the 
more or less irregular banks, and the many small bays which 
offer perhaps a little back water (and the up-river pilot always 
takes advantage of them), a very varied course is steered. All 
up-river vessels are necessarily equipped with two to four rudders 
in multiple. Consequently, when the helm is put over five or ten 
degrees the stern is literally pushed to one side. This introduces 
another element of danger. The best native pilot (and there are 
no foreign pilots) knows considerably more about junks than 
he does about steamers, and the up-river junk is steered mostly 
by a long, cumbersome-looking steering oar, which runs straight 
out ahead. They average about 60 to 75 feet in length. The 
result is that when he has been educated up to steamer work he 
often fails to bear in mind the characteristic noted above, and 
pilots the ship as if she had only one end. As might be expected, 
a number of vessels have had narrow escapes due to their sterns 
having " side-swiped " the rocks. At least one foreign gunboat 
was damaged by an accident of this kind. The writer has on two 
occasions had to make a quick shift of helm in order to avoid 
almost certain collision in this way. 



The Upper Yangtse River 



357 



U A/STS^ 




TH£ SHfp JUST ffrrefi r/f/Cf^yc 



/^£-/rv//tfC oven t^^ >^f^/D, 






Fig. 7. — Showing disposition of line for heaving over a rapid 



358 The Upper Yangtse River 

In the low water of winter soundings of five feet may be 
obtained before the rapids are bad enough to make navigation 
impracticable. Also in the approach to rapids, even in summer, the 
bank will be skirted very closely so as to get as near up as possi- 
ble to the " rapid point " before entering and, in this way, sound- 
ings of six or seven feet are obtainable. A river steamer's draft 
must, of course, be limited primarily by the depth of water in 
which she will steam ; but for an up-river vessel the characteristics 
of the water through which she must steam also form an important 
consideration. The most efficient type of vessel is that employ- 
ing a spoon-shaped bow, the efifect of which is to present a smooth, 
rounded, and as nearly horizontal surface as possible to the water. 
The greater the draft the greater the angle of the spoon-bow to 
the horizontal. A proportionate increase in resistance results, and 
a draft of more than four and one-half to five feet will counteract 
the benefits of an otherwise excellent bow design. The idea of the 
spoon-bow is to reduce to a minimum the effects of sudden strong 
currents which are encountered at a slight angle to the vessel's 
course. By presenting a fairly smooth, well-inclined surface to 
the rush of the current instead of a sharp stem with the ordinary 
bow lines, steering is greatly facilitated and the strain on the ves- 
sel greatly reduced, due primarily to its tendency to ride up and 
over the new force. If the water be strong and swirly and the 
vessel of light draft and good general design its effect will not 
cause any particular worry, because the water really has no chance 
to " get a hold " on the vessel. Take, for example, the navy 
standard design 21-foot motor dory, with which the Monocacy 
was originally equipped, and the specially designed motor sampan, 
with which she is now equipped. The former gave excellent serv- 
ice in the lower river, and upon arrival in Chungking it was hoisted 
out and put into sirvice ; but not for long. After one or two trips 
to the shore had been attempted with this boat we considered 
ourselves lucky that no serious accident had occurred, and put it 
out of use permanently. On the other hand, the motor sampan, 
of practically the same length as the motor dory, takes races and 
rapids and goes straight through a swirl that would throw the 
motor dory eight points off' her course. To anyone familiar with 
the Yangtse Kiang sampan, with its flat curved bow and its light 
draft, the analogy between such a craft and the well-designed 
river steamer is obvious. The steamer's frames and plates must 



The Upper Yangtse River 359 

be of the lightest possible material consistent with the required 
strength. Machinery must be light and high powered. In fact, 
lightness combined with maximum strength should preponderate 
over all other considerations. In order that the propellers may not 
increase the draft they should work in tunnels, and should be able 
to drive the vessel, without undue forcing, at 14 knots. The spoon- 
bow and the tunnelled flat bottom of the modern light steamer are 
eloquent tributes to the craft of the river men as evidenced in the 
original ideas so conspicuous in their small boats. Considering 
these facts, it is no wonder that until comparatively recently vessels 
suitable for such waters have not been built. 

Moorings in the upper Yangtse may for convenience be divided 
into two general classes, namely : ( i ) Those in which anchors are 
not used; and (2) those in which one or more anchors are used. 
For mooring purposes all vessels should be equipped with two sam- 
pans of the native type, and a crew of natives should be employed 
to operate them. The Monocacy has two such boats, and employs 
five experienced river men. High-grade, flexible galvanized steel 
wire line, one and one-half inches or two inches in circumference, 
depending upon the circumstances, is also an essential part of the 
equipment. It should be carried on portable reels, at least one 
length of which should contain not less than 150 fathoms. Moor- 
ing pegs four feet long and three inches in diameter, mauls for 
driving the pegs, and coir line, furnish the other essentials. Moor- 
ing in bays of quiet, slack, or back water, should be avoided unless 
the locality is well known. Such places look most tempting ; but in 
many instances rocks or ledges of reef lurk a foot or so beneath 
the surface, and give no evidence of their whereabouts. It is 
a good general rule to moor only in places where there is sufficient 
down-stream current to give some indication of submerged rocks 
near the surface. In unfamiliar localities it is best to select a 
mooring place well before dark and tie up securely for the night. 
The Chinese pilot is prone to run on, if it suits him, until twilight, 
and then present you with the proposition of making fast at dusk 
at a poor mooring place. Almost surely your lines will foul sub- 
merged rocks, the ship will yaw all out of your calculations, and 
you will find yourself wishing you had tied up at some good place, 
probably only a few miles back. 

Assume first a mooring place on the port bow where the cur- 
rent is slow from ahead, the bottom and the beach sandy. Forward 



360 The Upper Yangtse River 

in a convenient position a reel of one and one-half inch wire has 
been placed, and a light boom, with a tail snatch-block rigged, 
has been lashed to a stanchion about 30 feet from the bow. The 
wire is rove through the snatch-block, and the snatch-block is then 
hauled up to the top of the extension boom so that it is as high 
as practicable above the water. About 15 to 20 fathoms of the 
wire are unreeled and coiled down on the deck, under and over 
fashion so as to not kink. Steam is gotten on the anchor engine, 
stern anchor is made ready for going over the side, stern lines 
are in readiness and, other preparations being completed, the ves- 
sel is ready for mooring. About one-half to one-quarter mile 
below the mooring, speed is reduced to one-third, and sampans 
are manned. When the vessel has lost sufficient headway to per- 
mit it, sampans are lowered, the port one hauling quickly forward 
and taking on board the coil of wire and the " peg party." This 
latter consists of three men equipped with two wooden mauls and 
usually four to six pegs. The starboard sampan in the meantime 
drops back on the quarter, takes stern anchor on board and awaits 
orders. When abreast the mooring place, and when the vessel is 
the proper distance ofif shore, let go the starboard anchor and shove 
off port sampan with the peg party and wire. The lead of this 
wire being through the elevated snatch-block, it is payed out care- 
fully from the deck, and kept out of contact with the water as long 
as possible. In this way the sampan is usually fairly close to the 
shore before it has to work against the force exerted by the current 
on the wire. Having landed well up on the bow, the peg party 
takes the wire ahead until told to make fast. One peg is driven, 
a turn taken with the wire and the ship signalled to that effect. 
Meanwhile chain has been veered, and by using the rudders the 
vessel has eased closer in shore. The snatch-block is lowered 
away, the wire given a fair lead and taken to the capstan, and a 
strain gradually taken. When the vessel has gone astern suffi- 
ciently to get the anchor bearing properly on the bow, the stern 
anchor is taken out, probably 30 to 50 feet, and let go. A bow 
and stern breast, a spring from forward, and an additional double 
lead of wire on the bow, with double pegs, complete the mooring. 
In case the stern is found to be in back water — a frequent occur- 
rence — the stern anchor is let go from deck so as to keep the 
stern from swinging too close in shore. 



The Upper Yangtse River 



361 




362 The Upper Yangtse River 

Variations from* this are moorings made in slack water, when 
the vessel should be backed full speed until sufficient chain is 
veered and the stern anchor let go ; and nioorings where rocks or 
trees may be used for making fast the mooring lines. It sometimes 
happens, too, that even with an anchor down a vessel moors close 
to a steep bank. In this case mooring poles, of the type described 
below, are used to shore the vessel off. 

There are many mooring places in the upper Yangtse where it 
is not practicable to let go an anchor. For example, the writer 
has, on several occasions, found it necessary to moor in the big 
gorges, or in some rocky reach where letting go an anchor would 
have meant its certain loss, and a complication in an evolution 
which otherwise might be considered fairly simple. In the gorges 
the water is too deep to even consider the use of an anchor, and 
in numerous other localities rocks and boulders abound in such 
quantity that the recovery of an anchor would be too much to hope 
for. In such places vessels moor to the bank by using lines and 
mooring- poles. The lines employed are the same as those described 
above. The poles are usually of some tough, well-seasoned native 
wood, and are about 30 feet in length. Every up-river vessel 
should be equipped with at least three of these. When underway 
two such poles, one aft and one forward, should always be ready 
for instant use. 

Assume a mooring place on the starboard side, located in a 
deep, rocky gorge, with broken, uneven shore line, and an in-shore 
current of two knots, vessel bound up river. Prepare wire on 
starboard side exactly as described above for use with anchor 
moorings. Lay poles athwart-ships, one forward and one aft, and 
rig two small tackles from each pole-head, leading at an angle of 
about 30 degrees, to eye-bolts forward and aft of the pole and well 
outboard. Approach the mooring with only enough speed to 
insure good control. Lower starboard sampan, haul forward, and 
transfer the wire and men composing peg party to it. Work the 
ship a little above the point where sampan has instructions to land 
and as close in shore as safe handling will permit. Shove off sam- 
pan, paying out wire with great care, taking pains not to unneces- 
sarily impede the progress of the sampan and at the same time 
keeping the wire clear of the water as long as practicable. Mean- 
while stop the oft'-shore (in this case, port) engine, and allow the 
current to force the vessel slowly astern against the ])ower of the 



The Upper Yangtse River 



363 



slow-running- in-shore (starboard) engine, thus insuring perfect 
control of the vessel. Continue to handle the vessel in this way, 
increasing- or decreasing the speed a little as may be necessary, 
but keeping the vessel in the desired locality until the wire has 
been made fast to some previously designated rock. Take the wire 
to the capstan, and having worked the vessel abreast the position 
where it is desired to moor her, gradually take a strain. The 
greatest importance is attached to the lead of this wire. If it is 
led from too far forward the head of the vessel is pulled in shore 
as soon as a strain is taken. When the Monocacy first came up 
river there was no alternative but to lead a wire of this kind from 
too far forward. As a result we considered ourselves lucky, when 
making such a mooring in the Wushan Gorge, that the vessel did 




Fig. 9. — A mooring without anchors 

not suffer serious injury, when, in spite of all efforts, the ragged 
rocks finally came in contact with her at the turn of the bilge. A 
heavy eye-bolt has now been installed on each side at frame 15, 
about 30 feet from the bow. Under conditions similar to those 
described above the vessel can be (and has been) worked in shore 
or off shore under perfect control. Using the rudders, capstan, 
and engines, the vessel is now worked slowly in shore, care being 
taken not to give her a decided sheer either way. The order is 
then given to " point the poles," and they are shoved out 12 or 
15 feet over the side, the head tackles being tautened up so as to 
control them. Quartermasters having graduated sounding poles 
and stationed forward and aft give warning as the vessel slowly 
comes in toward the bank, and if a sounding of less than 12 
feet is found it is best to " out poles " and hold her oft' until the 
water all along the ship's side can be sounded for rocks, which 



364 The Upper Yangtse River 

might be only a foot or so under cover. Meanwhile breast lines 
have been run ashore forward and aft, and a spring or quarter-line 
gotten out as a precautionary measure in case of a slight back 
water close in shore. Let the vessel come well in, if there is suffi- 
cient water. Then when all lines are made fast and the poles well 
set, breast out 12 or 15 feet from the bank and tauten up the moor. 
As a precautionary measure, the line on the bow should be doubled 
before engines are secured. To get underway from this mooring, 
the bow line should be singled, and all other lines taken in. Breast 
well off with poles, but if possible breast the bow out a little more 
than the stern. Give the vessel a little left rudder, and ease the 
bow line slightly. This allows the current to catch the vessel on 
the in-shore bow. As soon as she eases out sufficiently to take the 
strain off the poles take them in. Then with the vessel headed 
slightly off shore, ease rudders amidships and ring up one-third 
speed. When the stern is clear of the rocks the party ashore may 
be ordered to cast off the bow line. Straighten the vessel out with 
engines and rudders, and handle her in this position until the bow 
line is aboard, the shore party returned, and the boat clear of the 
water. 

While as a general rule absence from the larger units for any 
length of time is hardly advisable for a naval officer, there can be 
no doubt that experiences of a most valuable character may be 
had in these waters. To anyone, whether he be landsman or sea- 
man, the upper Yangtse is most interesting ; but to one accustomed 
to large ships and to the methods of deep w^ater, the attractions of 
this wonderful stream may easily become a fascination, the charms 
of which are so great that they outweigh in importance the dis- 
comforts that one must endure, the risks one must necessarily 
incur, and the region in which one must exist. 



U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE 

SECRETARY'S NOTES 
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Growth and even to a slight degree— its object of advancing 
Support professional, literary and scientific knowledge in 
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The reason then that the Institute needs all the support the 
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scribers, the subscription being the same as dues for members. 
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which may become associate members, and 
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mation bureau to others. 



366 Secretary's Notes 

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Comment and suggestions relative to the make- 
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Since December 19, 1916, 24 regular and 38 asso- 
Membership ciate members have joined the Institute. 
The following members have died : 
The Admiral of the Navy, George Dewew Jan. 16, 1917. 
Captain C. G. Calkins, U. S. Navy (retired), Dec. 20, 1916. 
Civil Engineer A. C. Cunningham, U. S. Navy, Jan. 13, 1917. 
Mr. W. S. McGunnegle, Nov. 15, 1916. 



Skcketary's Notes 367 

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Club Rates tween the Journal of the U. S. Artillery and the 

Discontinued U. S. Naval Institute has been terminated by 

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The publication of the article on the Civilian's Train- 
Civilian ing Cruise, 1916, by Lieut. Commander W. B. Tardy, 
Training U. S. Navy, announced to appear in this number has 
Cruise been unavoidably delayed. It will appear in the March 
issue of the Proceedings. 

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fied sources. Those " Questions and Answers " 
which are suitable for purposes of general information, will 
appear in the Proceedings. It is suggested that knotty questions 
which come up in professional examinations for promotion may 
well be submitted to this department. 

The Institute Book Department will supply any 
Book obtainable book, of any kind, at retail price, postage 

Department prepaid. The trouble saved the purchaser through 
having one source of supply for all books, should 
be considered. The cost will not be greater and sometimes less 
than when obtained from dealers. Bills will be rendered upon 
delivery of books. 

The Book Department is compiling a list of pro- 
Professional fessional books by subjects, and is prepared to 
Books submit lists of standard works to members and 

subscribers desiring such information. Lists of 
these books will be published from time to time. 

Authors of articles submitted are urged to 

Illustrations furnish w^ith their manuscript any illustrations 

they may have in their possession for such articles. 

The Institute will gladly co-operate in obtaining such illustrations 

as may be suggested by authors. 



368 Secretary's Notes 

Original photographs of objects and events which may be of 
interest to our readers are also desired, and members who have 
opportunities to obtain such photographs are requested to secure 
them for the Institute. 

The annual dues for 19 17 become payable on 
Annual Dues January i, 1917. It is suggested that dues be paid 
in lump sums covering a period of two to five 
years ; this method of payment has advantages for members as 
well as for the Institute and is practiced by a number of mem- 
bers, both regular and associate. Response to this notice will 
save the Institute a considerable sum in stationery and postage. 

Whole Nos. 145, 146, 147, 149 and 155 of the Pro- 
Notice CEEDiNGS (March. 1913, June, 1913, September, 1913, 
January-February, 1914, and January-February, 191 5) 
are exhausted ; there are so many calls for single copies of these 
numbers that the Institute offers to pay for copies thereof returned 
in good condition at the rate of 25 cents per copy. 

Members, especially those on the retired list, and 
Address of civilians are urged to keep the Secretary and Treas- 
Members urer informed of the address to which Proceedings 
are to be sent, and thus insure their receipt. 

Members and subscribers are urged to notify 

Non-receipt of the Secretary and Treasurer promptly of the 

Proceedings non-receipt of Proceedings, in order that 

tracers may be started. The issue is completed 

by the loth of each month. 

The attention of authors of articles is called to 
Reprints of the fact that the cost to them of reprints other than 
Articles the usual number furnished, can be greatly reduced 
if the reprints are struck ofif while the article is in 
press. They are requested to notify the Secretary and Treasurer 
of the number of reprints desired when the article is submitted. 
Twenty copies of reprints are furnished authors tree of charge. 



Secretary's Notes 369 

. The discount to newsdealers is now 10 per cent, 

, , instead of the 2S per cent heretofore allowed on 

Newsdealers , . . ^ ^ 

subscriptions. 

Anxapolis, Md., January 18, 1917, 

INFORMATION INDEX 

Page 

Advertisements, Index to I 

Publications, U. S. Naval Institute (2) 

Special Notice 428 

Prize Essay Topics 420 

Whole No. 
List of Prize Essays 167 218 

List of Articles Related to War College Work 167 223 



UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE, 
ANNAPOLIS, AID. 



REPORT OF AUDIT FOR THE YEAR ENDED DECEMBER 30, 1916 

Baltimore, Maryland, January 5, 1917. 
To THE Officers and Members of the United States Naval Institute, 
Annapolis, Maryland. 
Gentlemen: — In accordance with engagement we have audited the books, 
etc. of the United States Naval Institute, Annapolis, Maryland, for the 
year ended December 30, 1916, and submit herewith a certificate, and the 
following exhibits : 
Exhibit A. — Financial stateinent as of December 30, jqi6. 
Exhibit B. — Statement of cash receipts and disbursements for the year 
ended December 30, 1916. 
Exhibit C. — Investments {bonds, etc.). 
Exhibit D. — Accounts receivable. 

Exhibit E. — Accounts payable all as of December 30, 1916. 
Exhibit F. — Statement of income and expenses for the year ended 
December so, igi6. 

Respectfully yours, 

Black and Company, 
By Wilmer Black, C. P. A. 
Certified Public Accountants. 

UNITED STATES NAVAL INSTITUTE, 

ANNAPOLIS, MARYLAND 

Certificate 

We have audited the books, etc. of the United States Naval Institute, 
Annapolis, Maryland, for the year ended December 30, 1916, and 

J Ft? hereby certify that the accompanying financial statement and state- 
ment of income and expenses are correct; and, in our opinion, set forth the 
true financial condition and result of operations for the year, respectively, 
as disclosed by the books of account. 

Black and Company, 

By Wilmer Black, C. P. A. 
Certified Public Accountants. 
Baltimore. Maryland, January 5, 1917. 

EXHIBIT A 
Financial Statement, December 30, 1916 

ASSETS 

Current Assets. 

Cash (in bank), Exhibit B $20,364.54 

Investments, Exhibit C 56,000.00 

Accounts receivable, Exhibit D 2,939.48 

Certified checks i5-oo 

Inventory, December 30, 1916 (as taken 

by yourselves) 7,312.58 

Total current assets $86,631.60 



Balance $80,778.96 

Furniture and Fixtures 400.00 



$81,178.96 



37-2 Report of Audit for 1916 



LIABILITIES 

Current Liabilities. * 

Accounts payable, Exhibit E $5,852.64 



, Total current liabilities $ 5,852.64 

Balance (excess of current assets over 

current liabilities) 80,778.96 



$86,631.60 



Reserve Fund. 

Balance, January 2, 1916 $ 7,233.14 

Cash receipts 268.00 

Transferred from General Fund 62.00 



$ 7,563.14 

(This fund by the constitution is com- 
posed of $3,050, originally credited 
to it. together with all the life fees 
which have been, or may hereafter be, 
received and the principal of this fund 

. shall be held in perpetuity to guarantee 
the future interest of the life mem- 
bers.) 
Surplus. 

Balance. January 2, 1916 $72,123.65 

Net profit for the year ended December 
30. 1916 (for details see Exhibit F) . . 1.492. 17 

73,615.82 

$81,178.96 
EXHIBIT B 
Statement of Cash Receipts and Disbursements for the Year Ended 

December 30, 1916 
Balance. January 2, 1916 $14,578.67 

RECEIPTS 

Dues $ 6,121.11 

Subscriptions 1,816.05 

Sale of books purchased 868.49 

Advertisements 1,012.30 

Interest on investments 2,731.45 

Postage 541.95 

Binding 83.52 

Life membership fee 268.00 

Rebate on insurance 70.90 

Sundries 53.74 

Sale of extra publications 34,287.63 

Sale of Proceedings 335.o6 

Credits 20.29 

Certified checks 3,641.75 

Total receipts 51.852.24 

$66,430.91 

Balance. January 2, 1917 $20,364.54 



Report of Audit for 1916 373 



DISBURSEMENTS 

Printing and binding Proceedings $12,726.00 

Printing and binding extra publications 14.252.68 

Salaries 5,1 19.00 

Contributors ^ 2,877.00 

Authors of text-books (royalties) 2,510.40 

Postage and telegrams 1,018.95 

Expressage, freight and hauling 185.41 

Board meetings 255.60 

Purchase of books for sale 990.67 

Oflfice expenses • . 400.00 

Stationery 426.16 

Advertising 152.28 

Certified checks 3,441.75 

Prize essay award 200.00 

Honorable mention award 250.00 

Refunds 7.50 

Engraving prize essay, medal and case 22.15 

Insurance on Institute property 80.00 

Attorney's fee 100.00 

Discount 5.85 

Subscriptions refunded 6.55 

Dues refunded 4.00 

Prize essay fund 1,000.00 

Overpayments 33.52 

Total disbursements $46,066.37 

Balance, December 30, 1916 20.364.54 

$66,430.91 

Seaman's Bank for Savings, New York City. 

Balance as per letter dated January 6, 1917 • $3,ooo.cc 

Rhode Island Hospital Trust Company, 
Providence, R. I. 
Balance as per letter dated January 3, 1917 3.570.78 

Society for Savings, Hartford, Conn. 

Balance as per letter dated January 5, 1917 3.552.00 
Farmers' National Bank, Annapolis, Mary- 
land 10,241.76 

Balance as per statement dated January 2, 

1917 $11,475.70 

Less Outstanding Checks. 

#2747 ■ $ 2.50 

2976 32.00 

2977 112.00 

2978 45.00 

2981 24.00 

2982 7.50 

2986 .. . 10.00 

2988 5.00 

2989 5-00 

2990 5.00 

2991 5-00 

2994 823.45 

2995 1.32 

2996 42 

2997 r.59 

2998 16.30 

2999 96 



374 



Report of Audit for 19 i6 



EXHIBIT B— Continued 



#3000 ' . • ? '^■'^'^ 

3001 3.49 

3002 1-66 

3003 ^-o^ 

3004 3.?9 

300s ^J,-g 

3007 10.18 

-ic^rR 45 

36.13 



3009 
3010 



375 
25.00 



3012 

oon ^^-^ 

3m8 ::: -^6.35 

3019 90 

3020 "-^ 

$1,233-94 
$10,241.76 

$20,364.54 
EXHIBIT C 
Investments (Bonus) December 30. 1916 

Face Value Book Market 

i^ace value ^^^^^^ \3.\vif, 

$6,000 Southern Railway. */^.w.nn'R6T^ooo 

6 $1,000 57o registered gold bonds $ 6,000.00 ? 0,120.00 

2 000 Washington Railway and Electric Company. 

2 $1,000 A% 50-year gold bonds, consolidated t 6^- 00 

mortgage •■••• --■ -ooo.oo i, 3o- 

18 000 Northern Pacific and Great Northern R. K. 

8 $1,000 joint bonds, registered; 2 $5,000 „_„.^ 

C. B. & Q. collateral registered 18,000.00 I/./7dOO 

12,000 Northern Pacific Railway. 

4 $1,000 37o registered gold bonds, i $5,ooo 
3% registered gold bond, 3 $1,000 3% reg- 
istered gold bonds, general lien due Jan- ^^^^^ ^ ^^^^ 

9,000 *B. & O. R.'R. Co. 

I $5,000 first mortgage 4% 50-year gold reg- 
istered, I $1,000 first mortgage 4% 50-year 
gold registered, 3 $1,000 prior lien 3^/4%, 

due 1925 9,000.00 8,325.00 

2,000 Potomac Electric Power Company 5% 2,000.00 2,000.00 

7,000 New York City registered 4/2% 7,ooo-00 7.ooo.oo 

$56,000 $56,000.00 $50.985-00 

EXHIBIT D 
Accounts Receivable December 30, 1916 



Back dues 



775.00 



Subscriptions 221 46 

Advertisements 9nna2 

Extra publications '■,°//-'J 

$2,939.48 



^7,563.14 of these bonds belong to the Reserve Fund 



Report of Audit for 1916 37.5 

EXHIBIT E 
Accounts Payable Dfxember 30, 1916 

Brentano, New York $ 6.82 

Postmaster, Annapolis, Maryland 22.24 

M. Cox 13.80 

Wells Fargo Express Company 37.20 

Nautical Publication Company .90 

Globe Furniture Company 16.00 

McGraw-Hill Book Company 4.07 

Black & Company '. 100.00 

Lord Baltimore Press 3,329.42 

Authors of books (royalties) 2,301.90 

Sundry credits 20.29 

$5,852.64 

EXHIBIT F 
Income and Expenses for the Year Ended December 30, 1916 
Inventory, January 2, 1916. 

Back numbers of Proceedings $ 200.00 

Extra publications 13,161.78 

$13,361.78 
Purchases for Year. 

Books for sale $ 997.35 

Printing and binding Proceedings 12,792.17 

Printing and binding extra publications 11,918.44 



Inventory, December 30, 1916. 

Extra publications $ 7,012.58 

Extra numbers of Proceedings 300.00 

(as taken by yourselves). 



25,707.96 
$39,069.74 



7.312.5: 



Cost of publications sold $31,757.16 

Profit on sale of publications 4,117.41 



$35,874.57 



Sale of extra publications $34,671.02 

Sale of books: 868.49 

Sale of Proceedings 335.o6 

Total sale of publications $35.874..'^7 

expenses 

Postage and telegrams $ 489.28 

Expressage, freight and hauling 222.29 

Insurance 9.10 

Contributors 2,877.00 

Salaries 5,ii9.oo 

Authors of books (royalties) 3,329.90 

Office expenses 358.40 

Board meetings 255.60 



376 Report of Audit for 1916 

EXHIBIT E.— Continued 

Prize essay award $200.00 

Honorable mention award 250.00 

Attorney's fees 100.00 

Stationery 425.96 

Advertising 152.28 

Life members 62.00 

Engraving prize essay medal and case 22.15 

Total expenses §13,872.96 

Excess of income over expenses transferred to surplus 1,492.17 



[5.365-13 



INCOME 

Profit on sale of publications $ 4,1 17.41 

Dues 5,631.91 

Subscriptions 1,819.40 

Advertisements 982.44 

Interest on investments 2,731.45 

Binding 83.52 

Total income $15,365.13 

This report of audit was accepted and approved by the Board 
of Control, at the monthly meeting held January 16, 1917. 
J. W. Greenslade, 

Secretary and Treasurer, 

U. S. Naval Institute. 



PROFESSIONAL NOTES 

Prep'ared by Lieutenant R. S. Edwards, U. S. Navy 



Vessels Building. 
Characteristics of Xaval Vessels 

AND Aircraft. 
Naval Policy. 
Material. 
Personnel. 
Operations. 



GENERAL ARRANGEiMENT 

PAGE 

Austria 2,11 

France 377 

Germany 2)17 

Great Britain 2>n 

Holland 378 

Italy 379 

Japan 379 

Russia 380 

Spain 380 

(^ United States 380 

United States Naval Militia and Naval Reserve 398 

Engineering 399 

Submarines 400 

Aeronautics 401 

Lessons of the War 403 

Miscellaneous ! 404 

Current Naval and Professional Papers 404 

AUSTRLA. 

Vessels Building. — Nothing is known about the ships now building in 
Austria. 

FRANCE 

Vessels Building. — Nothing is known about the ships now building in 
France. 

GERMANY 

Vessels Building. — Nothing is known about the ships now building in- 
Germany. 

GREAT BRITAIN 

Vessels Building. — Nothing is known about the ships now building in 
Great Britain. 



37^^ 



Professional Notes 



Royal Navy Transport Service Established. — Last night's London 
Gazette contained an Order in Council sanctioning the establishment of a 
Royal Naval Transport Service. The schedule sets out the following 
grades, rank, and scale of pay under the new order, which takes effect as 
from December i. 1916: 



Grade of Transport Officer. 

Principal naval transport 

officer 

Do. 

Divisional naval transport 
officer 

Transport officer, ist grade 



Do. 


2d grade 


Do. 


3rd grade 


Do. 


4th grade 



Efjuivalent Rank. 

I f a flag officer, the rank he 
holds 

Otherwise, commodore 2d 
class 

Captain 

Commander, unless already 
of higher rank, when he 
retains that rank 

Lieut. Commander 

Lieutenant 

Subaltern or warrant officer 



Pay (Consoli- 
dated Rate). 



£1,700 



£1,100 
£1,000 



^550 
^450 
£400 
£250 



The above rates of pay not to apply to engineer officers, accountant offi- 
cers, chief gunners, chief boatswains, officers of the carpenter branch, 
chief officers of coastguard, lieutenants and quartermasters Royal 
Marines ; and all these officers to retain their present rates of pay and 
allowances. Officers granted a higher relative rank under the above table to 
enjoy the status and wear the uniform of that higher rank, but are not to 
be entitled to use the higher naval title. — Naval & Military Record, 27/12. 



HOLLAND 

VESSELS BUILDING 



Cruisers 



O 



6000 
6000 



10 6-i 
10 6-i 



Amsterdam 
Flushing 



Note. — Four submarines are building, three at Rotterdam and one at Flushing, of 836 
tons displacement and a siirface speed of 17^ knots. The two cruisers were to be built in 
Holland by Krupp, and it is not known whether or not construction is proceeding. 

Tne budget for 1917 provides for the construction of three more submarines and a 
mine layer. 



Holland to Take Over Interned Submarines. — London. The Dutch 
Minister of Marine, J. J. Rambonnet, says a Renter despatch from The 
Hague, announces that because naval construction has been hampered by the 
war, negotiations have been opened with the British and German govern- 
ments with a view to Holland taking over interned submarines. The trans- 
fer of one British and one German sulimarine has thus far been arranged. — 
Nciv York Herald. 9/1. 



Professional Notes 



379 



ITALY 

VESSELS BUILDING 



Name 


II 

5 


I 


Armament 


Builders 


Remarks 


Battleships 

Carraciolo 

Marcantonio-Co- 


30,000 
30,000 
30,000 
30,000 


25 

25 
25 


8 15-in., 16 6-in. 
same 
same 
same 


.... 


To be completed in 1917 


Cristofaro-Co- 





Francesco-Maro- 









Note. — In July, 1914, approximately 15 destroyers, two torpedo-boats, and eight sub- 
marines were building. 

It is probable that the building program has been accelerated and increased since the 
outbreak of the war. 

Italy Investigating Destruction of Battleships. — Rome, via Paris. 
More than 40 persons are novsr imprisoned as a result of the investiga- 
tions into the destruction, in September, 1915, and August, igi6, respectively, 
of the Italian battleships Benedetto Brin and Leonardo da Vinci. The 
latter was blown up in Taranto Harbor and 248 men perished. 

Lieutenant General Count Cardorna, Chief of Staflf, came to Rome on 
Thursday to attend a meeting of the Cabinet, which was held for the 
purpose of deciding upon the disposition of the prisoners, but the question 
has become a political one from the introduction into the case of the name 
of one of the officials of the Vatican. 

An Italian named Ambrogetti, who was among those charged with being 
implicated in the destruction of the warships, says he is the financial agent 
of Mgr. Gerlach, Pope Benedict's private chamberlain. Mgr. Gerlach is 
an Austrian, and according to information here was once a cavalry officer 
who became a priest and won the fayor of the present Pope when the latter 
was a Cardinal. He was the bearer of the red hat from the Pope to the 
three French Cardinals who were appointed at the December Consistory. 

It has been learned that Mgr. Gerlach, previous to Italy's entry into thc- 
war, was interested in a pro-Austrian newspaper at Vittoria, of whkhf 
Ambrogetti was manager. 

The Italian authorities have learned details of the plot which ended in the 
destruction of the two battleships from the Italian author, Archita Valente, 
who was arrested some months ago. The suspicion that the explosions on 
the ships were due to a conspiracy originated from the fact that certain 
naval machinists were aboard the ships at the time of their destruction, 
and on each occasion escaped uninjured. They were followed to Valente's; 
house in Rome and were there arrested.— Associated Press in N. Y. Herald. 

JAPAN 
VESSELS BUILDING 



Name 


re C 

1e 



1 


Armament , Builders 


Remarks 


Battleships 
Ise .. 


30,800 
30,800 
32,000 


22.5 


[ Kawasaki 


Launched 11-11-16. 


Huga 


Nagato 


24.0 12 15-in. (?) 1 Kure Arsenal 





Note.— On April i, 1916, Japan had nine destroyers under construction. 



380 Professional Notes 

Japan Denies Rumor of Transfer of British Ships. — The press has 
published rumors to the effect that after the war England would transfer 
to Japan a number of large war vessels, six to eight being the usual num- 
bers mentioned, while either battle cruisers or modern battleships were 
specified. The New York Times accordingly cabled the Imperial Govern- 
ment requesting confirmation or denial of the rumor and publishes the fol- 
lowing from the Foreign Minister in reply : 

ToKio, December 29. 
Consul General of Japan, Nezv York. 

It is alleged that the rumor seems to be prevalent at Washington that a 
certain agreement has been concluded between Great Britain and Japan 
that after the European war is ended the former will transfer to the latter 
six large sized men-of-war. The N'ezv York Times accordingly inquired 
by cable of the Imperial Government regarding the authenticity of the 
above rumor. As there is absolutely no foundation of fact whatever in that 
rumor you are herebv authorized to communicate with that newspaper to 
that effect. 

(Signed) Motono. 

RUSST.\ 

Vessels Building.. — Nothing is known about the sliips now building in 
Russia. 

SPAIN 

Vessels Building. — There are building or projected three 15,000-ton 
battleships, four 5600-ton cruisers, six destroyers, and 28 submarines. 

UNITED STATES 

Battleships of the 1917 Program. — A press dispatch frqm Washington 
says that Chief Constructor Taylor told the House Naval Committee that 
the battleships authorized at this session of Congress will have a displace- 
ment of 42,600 tons in order to carry the main battery of 12 16-inch guns 
and make 22, knots. 

Army and Navy to Build a Zeppelix. — It was officially announced on 
January 9 that a Joint Technical Board, consisting of the Chief Constructor 
of the Navy, as senior member, and three officers from the aeronautic 
branch of the army and three from that of the navy, will soon be appointed 
to construct a " large airship of the general Zeppelin type." The plans 
necessary before such construction can be actually begun are already 
under way. The expenditures made in the work will be borne equally by 
the army and the navy appropriations made by the Sixty-fourth Congress. 
The decision to construct a rigid airship of the type in which Germany has 
specialized and which, according to numerous dispatches from the European 
fronts, her engineers have brought nearest the point of perfection, was 
taken after a joint committee, composed ^f officers from the aeronautical 
branches of both services, the General Staff of the Army and the General 
Board of the Navy, had completed a thorough study of the present status 
of rigid airships and had reported the Zeppelin the type best fitted for the 
needs of this country. The recommendations of this joint committee have 
been approved by the Secretary of War and by the Secretary of the Navy. 
In announcing this important step in the development of the military air 
defense of the country, the War Department declared that the " importance 
of the rigid airship for military and naval purposes is fully realized, and it 



Professional Notes 



381 



UNITED STATES VESSELS BUILDING AND AUTHORIZED 



Name P^'S^- 



Main 
battery 



Where 
building 



fo com- 
pleted 
Jan. I 



Battleships 
New Mexico . . 
Mississippi. 

Idaho 

Tennessee 
California 
Colorado. . 
Maryland. 
Washington .. 
West Virginia. 
No. 49^ 

E 

53 
S4J 

Battle Ciuisers\ 
No. O 



32,000 
32,000 
32,000 
32,300 
32,300 

[32,600 



12 


14-in 


12 


14 


in 


12 


14 


in 


12 


14 


in 


12 


14 


in 



New York 

Newport News. 

Camden 

New York 

Mare Island... 

rCamden 

J Newport News 
1 Camden 

LNewport News 



35.000 
Charact 



10 14-in. 
tics not d 



j Contracts not 
( let 



Scout Cruisers 
No. 



etermined. 
Seattle ... 



&■ 



J Contracts 1 
1 let 



12 

Destroy I 

Allen 

Shaw 

Caldwell . 
Craven. . . 

Gwin 

Conner. . . 
Stockton . 
Manley .. 



20 (Nos. 75-94) 



085 
085 
123 
121 
121 
08s 

i,i8s 



r Bath 

Mare Island . 
Mare Island . 

J Norfolk 

Seattle 

Cramp's 

Cramp's 

Bath 

rS Fore River .. 
6 Union Iron 

Works 

4 Bath 

^2 Mare Island. 



30 (Nos. 95-124) [ CharacI 
Gunboats I 

No. 21 



1.575 
Charact 



4-in. I Charleston, 
not dietermined. . . 



To be begun by July i, 
1919. 



Bids under consider 

tion. 

To be begun by July 
1919. 



Each carries 4 aero- 
planes. 



To be begun by July 
1919. 



4 triple tubes. 



4 triple tubes. 



To be begun by July i, 
1919- 



To be begun by July 
1919. 



Submarines. 
Building 61. 

Authorized to be begun by July i, 1919;— 28 coast defence submarines. 
9 fleet submarines. 
Vessels of the train. 
Building and authorized: — 

4 fuel ships, I repair ship, 

• 1 supply ship, 2 transports, 

2 ammunition ships, 2 destroyer tenders, 

I hospital ship, i fleet submarine ter 



382 Professional Notes 

is believed that the problems involved can be worked out better, more 
rapidly and more economically by joint action than if each service took 
them up separately." — Army and Naz'y Journal, 13/1. 

The Navy's Air Policy. — The Army and Navy Register publishes the 
foUoviring abstract of the preliminary estimates for naval aeronautics, 
1918: 

The following are detailed estimates in accordance with total estimate of 
$5,133,000, which it is understood has been accepted as the preliminary 
estimate for aeronautics, 1918: 

Fleet : 

30 aeroplanes at $18,000 $540,000 

Spare parts, operation and maintenance for above 448,200 

$988,200 

Naval Militia : 

12 school aeroplanes at $9000 $108,000 

Spare parts, operation, and maintenance for above 89,840 

$197,840 

Marine Corps : 

One advance-base unit (4 aeroplanes at $18,000) $72,000 

Spare parts, operation, and maintenance for above 59,76o 

Two kite balloons 8,000 

Hydrogen-generating set and storage cylinders 50,000 

Hangars, runways, and shops 50,000 

Tool outfits, etc 45,000 

$284,760 

Pensacola aeronautic station : 

40 aeroplanes at average price $12,000 $480,000 

Spare parts, operation, and maintenance for above 398,000 

Station maintenance 70,000 

$948,000 

Pacific coast aeronautic station : Cost of development, including 
improvements to grounds, waterfront development, hangars, 
shops, and power plant $750,000 

Pearl Harbor station : Same as for Pacific coast station 500,000 

Canal Zone : Army has been requested to add $250,000 to sundry 
civil bill for development of navy aeronautic station on Canal 
Zone None. 

Lighter-than-air craft : 

2 large dirigibles $1,000,000 

2 hangars for same 250,000 

Hydrogen plants 200,000 

$1,450,000 

Total of items listed $5,119,200 

Miscellaneous .* 13.800 

Grand total $5,133,000 



Professional Notes 383 

In this connection the following letter of the Secretary of the Navy to 
Aviation and Aeronautical Engineering is of interest. 

Navy Department, Washington, D. C. 

Sir : I beg to acknowledge receipt of your letter requesting a statement 
in regard to the policy of development of aeronautics in the navy, and the 
method of training officers and men of, and connected with, the naval 
service. 

The policy is to develop seaplanes, dirigibles, and any other form of air- 
craft which may be useful, to a state where they will be of great assistance 
to the fleet in the many problems with which it has to contend or 
representing the first line of defense of the nation. 

It is anticipated that the following duties will be performed by naval 
aircraft : 

(a) Scouting from ships at sea. 

(b) Off shore scouting from coastal stations. 
(>•) Spotting. 

(d) Offensive operations against enemy aircraft and possibly against 
ships and stations. 

Of the duties enumerated it is considered that scouting is primary, and 
it is the endeavor of the navy to develop aircraft for this purpose. Sea- 
plane development has been carried on for several years, but has a long 
way to go before most of the required military conditions to make them 
a very useful adjunct are fulfilled. The conditions are much harder than 
for land machines ; i. c.. weights and head resistance are greater, difficulties 
of float construction are enormous, method of handling necessitates special 
construction, and additional engine power is required to break machine from 
water. The solution of the seaplane problem is difficult because so few 
people really understand the many difficulties encountered. A certain 
amount of co-educational work was therefore necessary before any real 
progress could be made. Development of lighter-than-air craft is equally 
slow, as most of this work has been done abroad, and the knowledge on 
the subject in this country is very limited. 

Now that sufficient funds have been appropriated the navy is in a posi- 
tion to push the development of this type of aircraft, and it is hoped that 
immediate results will be forthcoming. Specifications for lighter-than-air 
craft will be sent out before January i, 1917. 

The training of personnel has been slow, because of the lack of proper 
seaplanes with which to carry on the training. The system is thoroughly 
organized, and satisfactory seaplanes for this purpose are now being 
produced. The aeronautic station at Pensacola has been greatly developed, 
and the school at that place is working to the limit of its present capacity. 
In addition to training regular classes of naval and marine officers and 
men, classes of naval militia and coast guard officers and men are now 
received every three months and put through the course. In this way the 
trained personnel available in time of war is being rapidly increased. It is 
the intention to establish other stations as rapidly as the development of the 
air service will warrant. 

The U. S. S. Seattle, equipped with five seaplanes and catapult launching 
device, will go south with the destroyer force for the winter practice in 
the Carribean. The U. S. S. North Carolina will again go to sea after her 
repairs are completed. She is also equipped with seaplanes and catapult 
launching device. Specifications for a special type of seaplane for use from 
ships at sea have been sent to the various seaplane manufacturers through- 
out the country, and it is hoped that by next spring some of this type 
will be ready for use. 

In conclusion, it can be said that the training of personnel is now pro- 
gressing smoothly, and that efforts are being made in every direction, both 
in America and abroad to obtain material for the proper equipment of the 
navy. 

JosEPHUS Danii:ls, Secretary of the Navy. 



384 Professional Notes 

Bids for Scout Cruisers. — New bids for three scout cruisers were 
opened on January 3. The only bidder was the Fore River Shipbuildings 
Corporation, which submitted two bids, one proposing to build one vessel 
for $5,900,000 or two vessels for $5,825,000 each ; one in 40 months and the 
other in 42 months. The other bid was to build one or two vessels at 
actual cost of construction plus a fixed percentage to be agreed upon. One 
of the four scout cruisers authorized for immediate construction was 
awarded to the Seattle Construction and Dry Dock Company in December ; 
bids for the other three were unsatisfactory and were readvertised with the 
results noted above. 

Increased Facilities for Navy Yard Construction Recommended. — 
High prices and unwillingness to build in accordance with Department 
specifications have characterized some of the bids for vessels of the 1917 
program. One phase of this situation is outlined in the following from the 
Army and Navy Journal: 

" The report that difficulties attending the securing of contracts for the 
installation of electric drive or other electrical machinery in the ships 
authorized in the 1916 program, had led to a change in the plans for the 
vessels, is authoritatively denied. To the contrary, it can be said that the 
original specifications for these ships still stand, and every indication is that 
they will stand until the ships in question are commissioned. As gathered 
at the Navy Department the situation is as follows : Manufacturers of 
turbine engines, fearing the importance of the precedent established by 
electrically propelled vessels, made every effort to prevent such equipment 
in the initial case, but lost the fight. When the specifications for the new 
warships were made known, the fight was begun with renewed vigor but, as- 
a high official of the Navy Department said, ' they will again lose.' Asked 
if there was not good ground for the fear of the turbine makers that 
electric propulsion might become a fixture in all future vessels, this same 
official replied : ' At present there seems to be very good grounds for 
such fear.' " 

In an effort to reduce the cost of hull construction the Navy Department 
requested the steel manufacturers to revise their estimates of cost of 
structural steel to shipbuilders, and about 75 per cent of the firms interested 
cut from 8 to 15 per cent from their estimates. Even with these reductions, 
however, the Department found it impossible to secure contracts for new 
ships within the limits 'of cost set by Congress. According to the Army 
and Navy Journal the decision was reached late in December to build one 
of the battle cruisers at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, and on January 8 
the Secretary of the Navy recommended the appropriation of $12,000,000 
for fitting navy yards for ship construction. The Secretary's letter to the 
Chairman of the House Naval Committee, which we quote from the Army 
and Navy Journal, is as follows : 

" The situation with regard to the preparedness program is such that if 
the manifest intention of Congress and the country is to be carried out, 
radical action is necessary. It is required by the Act of August 29, 1916, 
that the vessels authorized be completed speedily. The Department has 
done its utmost in this connection, but finds that the private shipbuilders of 
■the country are unable or unwilling to undertake the complete program with 
any assurance of speed in completion, even at prices which the Department 
regards as unreasonably high. 



Professional Notes 385 

" The preparedness program halts by reason of this condition. The 
present situation demands that the Government largely increase its building 
facilities at the earliest possible moment. Six million dollars were author- 
ized by the Act of August 29, 1916, for improvement of our navy yard 
plants, in order to enable them to assist in connection with the program. 
Ships have been ordered built at the navy yards fully up to the limit of our 
present facilities, there being already under construction or on order at the 
navy yards 19 naval vessels of various types. I recommend that $12,000,000 
more be authorized for fitting up navy yards, to be made immediately 
available. 

" The present conditions as regards the vessels authorized by the Act of 
August 29, 1916, are as follows : Four battleships, one scout cruiser, 18 
destroyers, and 29 coast submarines have been awarded to private builders. 
Two destroyers, one coast submarine, one fuel ship, one hospital ship, one 
gunboat, and one ammunition ship have been assigned for navy yard con- 
struction. This leaves four battle cruisers and three scout cruisers for 
which as yet no satisfactory arrangements have been made. 

" The battle cruisers were advertised on October 2, 1916, and bids were 
opened on December 6, 1916. No bids at a fixed price were received for the 
construction of these vessels, but bids were received from four private 
shipbuilding companies to construct these battle cruisers on a basis of cost 
plus profit. . . . The cost of direct labor and material for these vessels, 
although not a simple matter, can be obtained during the course of their 
construction with a reasonable degree of accuracy. It is not, however, so 
easy to apportion fairly and accurately the indirect cost. 

" The bids as received proposed that the Government pay the actual cost 
of direct labor and material, plus a percentage to cover the indirect costs, 
plus a percentage for profit. The Department felt unwilling to place con- 
tracts on this basis without thorough investigation, as the proposed per- 
centages for indirect costs differed in the various bids and might or might 
not be a measure of the actual cost of building the ship. Several confer- 
ences have been held with representatives of the shipbuilders, who have also 
given the Department experts access to their books, in order that some 
basis of agreement might be reached in regard to the questions involved 
in the indirect cost. 

" The Department finally requested the Fore River Shipbuilding Cor- 
poration and the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Company to 
submit in writing their best final offer for the construction of the battle 
cruisers. 

" The Fore River Corporation in a letter dated January 4, 1917, submitted 
a revised proposal and estimate of cost for one battle cruiser, taking 
account of certain modifications permitted by the Department, as follows : 

Material. Labor. 

Hull $4,653,000 $3,259,000 

Machinery 5,901,500 777. 700 

Total Material $10,554,500 $4,036,700 

Total Labor 4,036,700 

$14,591,200 

" Accepting the above figures as base cost, the letter says the company is 
prepared to construct, in accordance with the terms of its previous proposal, 
one battle cruiser for the actual direct material and direct labor cost, plus 
35 per cent of such cost to cover all overhead charges and profit. This 35 
per cent amounts to $5,106,920, making the total estimated cost of the vessel 
to the Government $19,698,120. 

" It is further proposed that in case the actual costs are less than $14,591,- 
200, the company will receive, in addition to such amount, 35 per cent of the 
same and one-half of the difference between such amount and $14,591,200. 



386 Professional Notes 

In case the cost exceeds $14,591,200. the company shall be entitled to 35 
per cent of such sum, but shall refund to the Government 25 per cent of 
the excess of the actual direct material and direct labor costs beyond 
$14,591,200." 

Secretary Daniels continues : " The Department had previously informed 
the representatives of the shipbuilders that it considered the percentage of 
35 per cent named by them too high. The Department also regarded the 
estimate for material submitted by the shipbuilders as unduly high. This 
question is being taken up with various material contractors, and the 
Department will be prepared at an early date to make final report and 
recommendation with reference to the minimum limit of cost for these 
vessels if built by contract. 

■' Tt is evident that in any case the cost will exceed the limit of $16,500,000 
of the authorizing Act. This Act also allowed an additional sum of 20 per 
cent as premium ' to provide for the speedy construction of the vessels 
herein authorized and for the additional cost incident thereto.' Adding 20 
per cent to the limit of $16,500,000, we reach a limit of $19,800,000, and 
apparently the Department could at the present time contract for these 
vessels with a prospect of not exceeding that limit. The four bids that were 
received provide, in two cases, for construction within 48 months ; in one 
case for construction within 51 months, and in the other case no time is 
named. The shipbuilders state that they can do no better as regards time 
under the present and prospective conditions of the industry. 

" Without specific authorization, the Department would not feel justified 
in entering into a contract exceeding the limit of $16,500,000, even if under 
the limit of $19,800,000, in view of the fact that the times named for con- 
struction could not be considered as ' speedy.' It has been suggested that 
the act in authorizing the additional 20 per cent for ' speedy ' construction 
did not define the latter. Some light, however, is thrown upon the intention 
of Congress in this connection by the fact that while the bill was in the 
House, on a yea-and-nay vote on an amendment requiring, among other 
things, that five battle cruisers should be completed within two years frdm 
date of contract, there were, yeas 183, nays 189. 

" As regards the scout cruisers, when bids were opened for these four 
vessels on November i, 1916, but one bid was received on the basis of a 
fixed price, this being for one vessel for the sum of $4,975,000, and within 
the limit of cost of $5,000,000; contract was awarded for this vessel. The 
remaining three vessels were readvertised, and bids were opened on 
January 3, 1917. A bid was received from only one company, the price 
named being $5,900,000 for one vessel, or $5,825,000 for each of two 
vessels. This leaves one scout cruiser for which no bids have been 
received. The bids of January 3, 1917, were below the limit of $5,000,000, 
plus 20 per cent, but as the times named were 40 and 42 months, the addi- 
tional 20 per cent for ' speedy ' construction is not regarded as available 
any more than in the case of the battle cruisers. 

" To sum up : The Department has made earnest and strenuous efforts 
to carry out the provisions of the Act and to begin at the earliest date 
possible the construction of the 66 vessels directed therein to be begun 
as soon as practicable. It has been found impossible to place satisfactory 
contracts for the whole of the vessels with the private shipyards of the 
country, and, as previously stated, our present navy yard facilities are 
fully obligated. 

" In view of this fact, and in view of additional vessels of the program 
which must be taken in hand in the comparatively near future, it seems to 
the Department necessary that the Government building facilities should 
be largely expanded, so that the navy may be in a position to build a much 
larger part of the program than at present. This expansion, in view of 
present conditions, appears to be inevitable and necessary. Should Congress 
authorize it, the Department will do its utmost to fit up the yards at the 
earliest possible moment." 



Professional Notes 387 



Comment on the Shipbuilding Situation. — The Scientific American, 
in its issue of December 22,, comments editorially on the necessity for 
speeding up naval construction as follows : 

" One of the most encouraging facts in the naval situation, just now, is 
the zeal with which Secretary Daniels is applying himself to the problem 
of getting the steel makers and shipyards to undertake the construction of 
the large number of warships authorized in the Bill for Naval Extension, 
recently passed, and put the work through as a rush order. As the Secre- 
tary states in his report, it is one thing to make large appropriations for a 
new navy, but it is quite another thing to build it. 

" So far as the Navy Department is concerned, it must be admitted that, 
from the very moment at which the navy bill became law, it bent all its 
energies to expediting the work of construction, and great credit is due to 
Rear Admiral Taylor and the Bureau of Construction and Repair for the 
celerity with which it got out the plans and specifications for the new battle- 
ships, battle cruisers, scouts, destroyers and submarines, so as to have this 
material in the hands of the prospective bidders at the earliest possible 
date. Had the steel makers and private shipyards shown something of the 
same commendable zeal, the prospects of getting our new navy built and 
put in commission at a speed commensurate with the urgency of the situa- 
tion, would not to-day be so exceedingly disappointing. 

" It seems that, so long as our contractors have to do with a type of ship 
which conforms closely to those which they have just launched from their 
ways, they are willing to put in bids to do the work within the standard 
time of from three to three and a half years, in which previous ships have 
been built. But when the Department gets out plans for a new type of 
ship, the contractors, judging from the experience had in the attempt to 
secure satisfactory bids for the fast battle cruisers and scouts, either fight 
shy of the proposals altogether, or else they demand a length of time for 
construction which is altogether out of the question. 

" Take the case of the bids for the new battle cruisers, which ranged, if we 
remember rightly (in so far as the time element is concerned), from 48 to 
52 months for completion. Now 52 months is just four years and four 
months, which means that these ships would not be tried, accepted, put into 
commission and shaken down into thorough working condition until at 
least five years after the contracts had been let. It is all very well for the 
contractors to safeguard their own interests. In fact, it is perfectly proper 
that they should do this. But what about the interests of the country at 
large? So rapid is the present day development in size, power and speed 
of warships, that even these fast scouts and battle cruisers may be out- 
speeded and outgunned, and may be entering upon the first years of their 
obsolescence, in five or six years from the present writing. 

" Even if we make allowance for high wages, scarcity of skilled labor, and 
the difficulty of obtaining materials, this demand of the contractors that 
they should be given from 48 to 52 months in which to build a capital ship 
is simply preposterous, and we can prove it by the following facts : 

" We know of at least two of the leading shipbuilding yards on the Clyde 
in which there have recently been completed two superdreadnoughts, sister 
ships, of approximately the same length (85a feet) as our proposed battle 
cruisers, armed with 10 or 12 guns of 16-inch caliber or over, and protected 
with the heaviest armor, each of which was designed and built in approxi- 
mately 18 months' time. The Scientific American publishes these facts on 
the very best authority and they may be accepted as absolutely correct. 

" Now, the full significance of this will be appreciated when we rernember 
that there could have been no opportunity to accumulate the material ad- 
jacent to the building-ways beforehand, so as to secure a spectacular result 
in speedy construction ; for the p!ans„ were not commenced until 18 
months before the ship was commissioned. Moreover, the ships were built 



388 Professional Notes 

at a time when the whole of the engineering industries of the country were 
going under full pressure in the production of military material of every 
conceivable kind. 

" This remarkably rapid construction result was made possible by a com- 
bination of conditions ; conditions which we may, and should, repeat in this 
country ; conditions, which, if we bring them about, will make it possible 
for us to turn out capital ships just as rapidly as are the British. These 
conditions are, first, that the government work is given absolute pre- 
cedence over private work ; and, secondly, that the equipment of the yards, 
both in machinery and men, is worked up to its full capacity. In the case 
of the British yards, work goes on in two shifts of 10 hours each, with four 
hours' interval for overhaul. 

" Comparing this with the time actually occupied in construction of our 
more recent dreadnoughts, we find that the New York (starting, of course, 
with plans already completed) was launched in 14 months after the lay- 
ing of her keel, and the Arizona in 16 months, and that each ship was 
completed in 36 months. This rate of construction was obtained with only 
one shift of men, working eight hours per day. It is the opinion of our 
constructors that with three shifts of eight hours each, the time could be 
cut down to 18 months. Both these ships were built at the New York 
Navy Yard. 

" It is claimed by the private shipbuilding yards that the impossibihty of 
guaranteeing quick construction is due, in large part, to the difficulty of 
securing early deliveries of steel, and that, even if these were available, 
there would still remain the difficulty of securing the requisite number of 
skilled mechanics. Both of these objections could be overcome if the legis- 
lation suggested by the Secretary of the Navy were put upon the statute 
books ; and we agree with him that a law should be passed at once, render- 
ing it obligatory upon the steel makers and the shipbuilding yards to give 
the absolute preference to naval work. If this be done, no hardship will 
be imposed upon the steel makers ; for the sum total of naval and military 
tonnage would form but an insignificant percentage of the total output of 
our vast steel making plants. 

" Thus, the total tonnage required for this year's naval contracts is 383,800 
tons ; whereas the total output of finished rolled iron and steel in the United 
States last year was 24,392,924 tons ; so that the naval requirements con- 
stitute only 1^4 per cent of the country's output. 

" If, with a view to expediting work, the shipbuilding firms were required 
to put. say. two shifts, upon the more important naval construction, the 
cost of the ships to the nation would be higher, but the higher cost due to 
higher pay would be more than compensated for by the rapidity with which 
the magnificent naval program of igii7 would become available in the 
country's first line of defense." 

Cancels Awards for Three Submarines. — Contracts for the construc- 
tion of three coast defense submarines, which had been awarded to the 
California Shipbuilding Company, Long Beach, Cal., were cancelled by the 
Navy Department on January 9 at the company's request. The contracts 
were immediately taken over, two by the Electric Boat Company, of New 
London, Conn., and the other by the Lake Torpedoboat Company, of 
Bridgeport, Conn. Of the 27 coast defense submersibles authorized by the 
last Congress, this final apportionment gives 20 to the Electric and seven 
to the Lake company. The California company originally bid for the 
construction of five or six submarines of the coast defense type, but the 
Department decided not to award it more than three, that being regarded as 
the capacitv Hmit of the plant for completed work in the time specified. 
The contracts for these had not been signed when the request reached the 
Department that the award be cancelled. 



Professional Notes t,8<.) 

Bids for Navy Shells. — The opening of the bids for armor-piercing 
shells for the U. S. Navy with the revelation of the fact that a 
British firm underbid, by a considerable margin, the American concerns 
making projectiles has stirred up considerable discussion in the Navy 
Department and among the interested manufacturers on both sides of the 
ocean. Examination of the bids on January 4 showed that Hadfields, Ltd., 
of England, agreed to supply 3000 16-inch projectiles in 16 months at $513 
each, duty paid. The Bethlehem Steel Company asked $775 each, to provide 
4000 in 36 months, while the price from the Midvale Steel Company was 
$900 each for 1000 in 24 months. For 14-inch shells Hadfields, Ltd., offer a 
price of $356 each for 4500, which they agree to deliver in 11 months. The 
Midvale Steel Company asked $550 each for 5600 shells, to be delivered in 
30 months, while the Crucible Steel Company wanted $543.50 each for 2000, 
deliverable in 34 months. 

On January 5 Secretary Daniels charged that American steel companies 
had been demanding extortionate prices for shells for the navy. He based 
this on the bids of Hadfields, Ltd., which for armor-piercing projectiles was 
from 35 to 40 per cent lower than bids of American concerns. Charles M. 
Schwab, of the Bethlehem Steel Company, issued a statement on the same 
day that reads : " At Bethlehem we have spent very large sums of money 
trying to meet Government specifications on 14-inch shells, and so far only 
at a considerable loss, for the reason that the tests have been so severe 
that we have not yet been able to meet them. Since the war started, 
although we have been able to obtain abroad almost any price for our 
product, we have adhered in our charges to the United States Government 
to the basis of prices established before the war began. We believed it 
would be dangerous for this country to be dependent upon foreign manu- 
facturers for war material of any kind. We bid what we consider a fair 
price on any specifications issued by the Government." 

H. A. Gillis, the American representative of Hadfields, Ltd., said to a 
New York Sun correspondent in Washington : " I do not believe the 
American firms have been charging the Government imreasonable prices. 
To my mind the steel companies are simply calculating upon a fair profit 
after meeting the increasingly difiicult specifications. The Bureau of Ord- 
nance of the Navy Department now requires that these shells be tested by 
being fired at steel plate which is at an angle of 10 degrees when the 
projectile strikes. This, of course, robs the shell of part of its striking 
force and makes the test more difficult. In some instances half the shells 
fail to meet the Government's requirements on this account. And the 
Government must realize that this may result in increasing the price, 
especially if a concern has virtually to make two shells to sell the Govern- 
ment one. 

" We contend that we are able to provide armor-piercing shells which 
will meet this test, and we do not anticipate any of the trouble or addi- 
tional expense to which American firms have been put. Our absolute 
confidence in this respect is due to the fact that we know about everything 
that can be known concerning the manufacture of armor-piercing shells. 
We have provided almost every nation with projectiles, and our present 
efficiency is such as to insure the best results and the least cost. Since the 
war Hadfields has reached a state of efficiency previously supposed un- 
attainable. Not only is every ship in the British Navy fully supplied, but 
we have provided an immense surplus stock, which now reposes in store- 
houses and is far in excess of any demand that could be made upon it by 
the war. To keep our organization busy we have obtained permission from 
the British Government to bid for the American Government contract, and 
we are ready to put up bond to guarantee that we will meet the specifications 
in the time given and at the prices stated." Comment in the English news- 
papers bore out all these statements of the Hadfields representative. 

Secretary Daniels took the incident as a peg on which to hang a further 
argument in favor of the plan for establishing a Government plant for the 



390 Professional Notes 

manufacture of projectiles. Several memliers of the House Committee on 
Naval Affairs took the same ground, pointing to the Hadfields bid incident 
as evidence of the wisdom of their course in advocating such a plant. 

It is understood that at the conference between the Secretary of the 
Navy and representatives of the Bethlehem, Crucible and Midvale Steel 
companies at the Navy Department, on January lo, slight reductions were 
oft'ered in the bids submitted by the American manufacturers in the recent 
proposals for navy ammunition. These reductions, however, did not bring 
the bids from domestic concerns anywhere near that of Hadfields, Ltd., 
the British company, and it was probable that it will receive a contract for 
a large part of the needed shells. — Army and Navy Journal, 13/1. 

Engineer-in-Chief of the Navy Discusses Electric Drive. — Rear 
Admiral R. S. Griffin, engineer-in-chief, U. S. Navy, has answered fully 
and completely the statements made by Mr. S. S. Wheeler to Senator 
Swanson, of Virginia, in connection with the use of the electric drive in 
the new battle cruisers. His communication is addressed to Mr. Padgett, 
Chairman of the House Committee on Naval Affairs, before which hearings 
of shipbuilders in regard to this matter will be held next Wednesday. Rear 
Admiral Griffin's letter, dated January 5, follows : 

1. In compliance with your request that I comment on any statements 
of fact or opinions, contained in a letter from Mr. Schuyler S. Wheeler to 
Senator Swanson, on the subject of electric drive for our battle cruisers, 
I have the honor to submit the following : 

2. The first statement of Mr. Wheeler is that " the dynamos and motors 
each have to be large enough to equal the engines in power, and the engines 
are of 180,000 horse-power." The inference here is clear that each dynamo 
and each motor must be of 180,000 horse-power, which is far from the fact, 
and goes to show how one unfamiliar with the subject he is discussing 
may be led into error. The power of the ship is divided into four units of 
45,000 horse-power each. 

3. His first expression of opinion follows immediately upon this inaccu- 
rate statement and is : 

" I believe that such substitution will be a great mistake and that after 
completion the ships will be found quite inferior to those having mechan- 
ical drive." 

Such an opinion has value exactly in proportion to the experience of the 
one who expresses it and to his standing as an expert in such matters, and 
it is therefore necessary that Mr. Wheeler's competency in the matter under 
consideration be fully inquired into. I happened to be in the Secretary's 
office the day Mr. Wheeler called to see him, which was, I think, the day 
before lie saw Senator Swanson, and the Secretary invited me to hear 
what Mr. Wheeler had to say. He commenced by reciting substantially 
what is included in his letter to Senator Swanson. and which was quickly 
recognized as the argument of another who is financially interested in the 
adoption of mechanical gearing and who has been very active in enlisting 
opposition to electric drive. Mr. Wheeler was asked how it happened that 
he should be so familiar with certain features of the design of the battle 
cruisers, the data of which were supposed to be confidential between the 
Navy Department and the shipbuilders, but he gave no satisfactory reply as 



Professional Notes 391 

to the sf)urce of his information, contenting himself with the statement that 
he had " been told so." He was then asked whether he had ever had any 
experience with machinery for naval vessels and replied that he had not, 
but that he had had wide experience with electric machinery as applied to 
installations on shore. As he admitted his inexperience with naval machin- 
ery, but nevertheless presumed to advise the Secretary in regard to the 
most important installation ever contemplated, he was asked what type of 
machinery he would suggest for the battle cruisers, and notwithstanding 
his lack of knowledge of the requirements he unblushingly replied that he 
would recommend geared drive. Asked if he had had experience with such 
equipment, he said that he had, and when further pressed as to the power 
of the installations to which his experience extended, he replied that the 
largest was about 1000 horse-power. Finally, he was asked if he had any 
doubt that the electrical machinery which we contemplated installing would 
operate satisfactorily, and to this he replied that he had not. As satis- 
factory operation was the one thing we were looking for, and as the mili- 
tary features of the design of the ship as a whole far outweighed any other 
feature except this one of satisfactory operation, there seemed to be no 
reason for prolonging the interview, and Mr. Wheeler withdrew. 

4. Mr. Wheeler says further that the application of electric drive in the 
battle cruisers would not be a success ; that it would injure the electric art 
before the public ; that it would greatly increase the weight in the ships ; 
that it would take up an immense amount of room ; that it is experimental, 
and that satisfactory bids would not be obtained for the ships on account 
of the electric drive. 

5. Taking these up in order, it may be said that the Navy Department has 
the best possible reason for believing that electric drive will be a success ; 
that we are the only people who have had extended experience with it ; 
that that experience has been unqualifiedly satisfactory, and that the ship 
in which it is installed is so superior to the sister ship with geared drive 
as to put her in an entirely different class so far as reliability of operation 
and economy are concerned. 

6. As to injury to the electric art, this opinion is, of course, predicated 
on the failure of the electric drive. But we have Mr. Wheeler's own state- 
ment that it will operate satisfactorily, and we have also the statement of 
another engineer who is interested in geared drive and whose arguments 
Mr. Wheeler uses, that he would not go so far as to say that electric drive 
will not work satisfactorily. Besides this, we have the opinion of eminent 
electrical engineers that no difficulties are involved in the installation. There 
need not therefore be any apprehension about the electric art suffering by 
reason of this application of it. 

7. Mr. Wheeler seems to be much concerned over the weight of the 
electric machinery, as if that had not been considered in the design of the 
ship, and he undoubtedly is under the impression, for he states it in another 
paragraph, that the ships with electric drive will be 1000 tons heavier than 
they would be if they had geared drive. Here again those who gave Mr. 
Wheeler confidential information regarding the design of these ships did 
not tell him the whole story. If they had, they would have told him that, 



392 Professional Notes 

although the geared drive is per se much lighter than the electric, its use 
brings in its train a large increase in weight of steam piping and valves, 
infinitely greater complication, and, in addition, adds about 300 tons more 
armor, the net result for the ship as a whole being an increase of about 
300 tons instead of 1000. 

8. As to the space occupied, no other type of machinery than electric 
can be installed in the space available, and no other type can give the under- 
water protection to the ship that is possible with electric drive. 

9. Mr. Wheeler cannot have kept posted on what has been going on dur- 
ing the past four years if he regards electric drive for ship propulsion 
experimental. The Jupiter has been in commission for three and a half 
years and engaged in duty of a character to bring out any weak points in the 
design. That she has been an unqualified success is a fact well known to all 
prominent marine engineers and to many electrical engineers, and it is 
rather surprising that Mr. Wheeler should not be informed about her. 

ID. Mr. Wheeler's opinion regarding the difficulty in getting satisfactory 
bids for electric drive is not borne out by the bids received. Three firms 
bid — the Newport News Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., the William 
Cramp & Sons Ship and Engine Building Co., the Fore River Shipbuild- 
ing Corporation, and the Union Iron Works Corporation. (The Union 
Iron Works offered to build on the plans of Fore River, and, as both are 
subsidiaries of the Bethlehem Steel Corporation, the bids of these two 
companies may be considered one bid.) The Newport News Co. and the 
Cramp Co. bid only on electric drive. The Fore River Co. bid on electric 
drive and also on geared drive. In no case was a straight bid received, each 
firm offering to build on a cost-plus-percentage basis. The Fore River Co. 
did not make a different proposition in the one case than in the other, and 
therefore no qualification was made on account of the use of electric drive, 

11. Mr. Wheeler states that he has since the opening of bids met two of 
the shipbuilders and learne(f that the shipbuilders, at a conference with the 
Department, had urged geared drive, but that nothing but electric drive 
would be considered. Here again Mr. Wheeler is suffering from lack of 
knowledge of matters which he is discussing and evidently did not learn 
his lesson well. No conference was held with shipbuilders regarding geared 
drive for the battle cruisers. The conference to which he refers was in 
reference to the battleships. 

12. He again shows his lack of exact knowledge when he says that one 
of the shipbuilders submitted a letter stating that, with mechanical drive, he 
would guarantee 1000 tons less weight and $1,300,000 less cost. Such a 
letter was not submitted. Mr. Wheeler may have been told so, but there 
was no guaranty of anything, the shipbuilder merely stating that the weight 
of machinery would be about 1000 tons less, and that he " estimated " that 
it would cost $1,300,000 less than the electric drive. So far as guarantees 
are concerned, the figures might just as easily have been doubled ; they do 
not commit anybody to anything. 

13. Right here it may be well to point out the fact that the people who 
have given Mr. Wheeler information have not given him all the facts. I 
have indicated in paragraph 7 that the difference in weight is nothing like 



Professional Notes 395 

"what the advocates of geared drive claim ; but be the difference in cost what 
it may, the cost of the additional 300 tons of armor which must be supplied 
with the geared-drive installation will counterbalance any difference in 
■cost of machinery. Of course, Mr. Wheeler does not know about this, and 
those who have been prompting him took care not to tell him. As you 
know, armor is purchased from an appropriation other than that for the 
construction of the ship, and therefore its cost would not appear in the 
contract price of the ship, as it is supplied by the Government and installed 
"by the contractor. The Government would nevertheless have to pa}" the 

14. Mr. Wheeler is correct in his statement that there is a gain in economy 
of operation at full speed with the geared drive ; but this gain is small. 
At all speeds below 30 knots — and nearly all cruising will be done at the 
lower speeds — the superiority is with the electric drive and is so recognized 
by engineers. 

15. The advantage in having all boilers below the protective deck is great, 
provided they can be given adequate protection against torpedo attack, but 
it should be remembered that these ships will make 30 knots even if all the 
boilers above the protective deck are out of action. The arrangement of 
machinery submitted by the only shipbuilder who offered geared drive was 
far more objectionable in that a very important portion of the equipment 
which should be protected is above the deck. 

16. Mr. Wheeler's statement that a simple contract with simple guaranties 
•could be made if mechanical drive is used is answered by the statement that 
the only shipbuilder who offered geared drive submitted the identical 
proposition with that which he submitted for electric drive. 

17. When Mr. Wheeler comes to discuss the extent to which geared drive 
is used in the British Navy, he is clearly making statements about which 
lie cannot possibly have personal knowledge. The best information of the 
Navy Department is that the British Navy has not in service battle cruisers 
•of the power stated, nor indeed any under construction of anything like 
that power. The Navy Department has had some experience with geared 
installations, and this has been of such a nature as to make the transmis- 
sion of such high power through gearing appear far more experimental 
than by means of electrical transmission. 

18. Mr. Wheeler dismisses the important subject of reversing turbines 
in a few words, merely stating that nearly all turbine-driven ships use 
reversing turbines. Being unfamiliar with naval machinery and the im- 
portant role of the reversing turbine, he could not, of course, be expected 
to understand the military importance of backing power, nor could he know 
the troubles due to backing turbines that have been experienced in turbine- 
driven vessels. These troubles exist with the geared drive just as they do 
with the straight turbine drive, and any injury to one turbine involves 
stopping the ship and putting out of use the shaft to which that turbine is 
attached. Should an accident occur to one of the turbines of an electric- 
drive installation, it would simply mean a reduction in full speed of about 
two knots and this without necessitating stopping the ship. The absence 
of backing turbines, the fact that the turbines always run in one direction, 



394 Professional Notes 

and that full power of the engines can be utilized for backing are features 
not only of mechanical advantage, but of such military superiority as to 
leave little question as to the type to choose for capital ships. 

19. As Mr. Wheeler does not seem to be informed in regard to the 
cause of the recent disablement of the Jiit>itcr, it should be stated that it 
was due to a small piece of an oil-strainer basket becoming detached and 
being carried with the oil to the thrust bearing, causing heating of the 
thrust and necessitating stopping the turliine. A new thrust was fitted by 
the "ship's force, and the ship proceeded on the duty assigned her. The 
trouble was not in the remotest degree associated with her electrical 
equipment. 

20. Mr. Wheeler concludes by stating that the best design should be 
selected, regardless of other considerations, and that the subject should be 
■' reviewed by recognized impartial expert authorities." Can it be possible 
that Mr. Wheeler assumes that the Navy Department has determined on 
this installation without having given the subject most serious considera- 
tion? If so, he little knows the thoroughness with which the Department 
proceeds in such matters. As to " impartial expert authorities," it must 
be patent that the Secretary of the Navy alone can decide who such 
authorities are, and that the delegation of his authority to irresponsible 
people outside the naval service could not be considered. Under no circum- 
stances could the Secretary think of accepting as impartial authorities the 
people who communicated confidential information to Mr. Wheeler and 
who are pecuniarily interested in the installation of a type of machinery 
which the Navy Department does not believe to be suited to the conditions 
obtaining in the battle cruisers. In the last analysis the Secretary of the 
Navy must decide such matters, aided by the best technical advice he can 
obtain. His naval advisers are not interested in any firms that will manu- 
facture the machinery for these ships, nor will they receive royalties which- 
ever tj-pe is installed. Their only reward will be the satisfaction that may 
come to them after the ships are tried — that of duty well done. — .\rniy and 
Navy Register, 13/1. 

The " E-2's " Batteries. — Although the findings of the special l)oard 
appointed by the Secretary of the Navy to investigate the entire matter 
of submarine batteries, as a result of the battery explosion on the E-3 last 
January, have not been made public as yet, it became known through the 
statement made by Engineer-in-Chief Robert S. Griffin, U. S. Navy, before 
the House Naval Afifairs Committee, that the report had been received by the 
Navy Department. It will be remembered that the first board appointed to 
investigate the accident on the E-^ decided that it was due to a generation 
of hydrogen in the battery and recommended that no more of the Edison 
batteries be used in submarines until the one used in the E-^ had been 
thoroughly tested out, and until it was demonstrated that it was a perfectly 
safe battery to use. 

Engineer-in-Chief Griffin said, in reply to inquiries by members of the 
House Committee, that the Navy Department had settled on the Ironclad 
battery for the submarine being built at Portsmouth. He also said that 
"about the only way that we think of to really solve that problem (of 
hydrogen-gas detection) is to have abundant ventilation and to keep the 
ventilation going all the time." He explained that in all the lead batteries 
there is a generation of hydrogen when tlie liatteries are being charged, and 



Professional Notes 395 

unless that is carried away quickly there is danger of an explosive mixture 
being formed. The point about the Edison battery, he stated, was that " it 
gives ofif hydrogen in considerable quantity when reversed." There is also 
" about five times as much hydrogen gas liberated on charge m the Edison 
as in the lead batteries." That the accumulation of gas is more easily 
controlled in lead batteries than in other batteries was also stated. He 
added that to the best of his knowledge the defects in the Edison battery 
have been partially corrected. — Army and Navy Journal, 16/12. 

The Lewis Gun Controversy. — The Secretary of War, on December 17, 
issued a statement setting forth the reasons for the rejection of the Lewis 
gun, the text, taken from the New York Herald, being in part as follows : 

" At various times there have appeared charges and countercharges in 
the press with reference to the merits of the Lewis machine gun. The 
controversy reached the stage where open letters from high ranking army 
officers were published. In order to settle authoritatively the technical 
question involved, a board was constituted, the report of which was recently 
made public. In addition, the Inspector General of the Army was ordered 
to investigate the other aspects of the case. He has now done so, and his 
general conclusions are as follows : 

" First. There is no official record that Colonel Lewis ever offered a gun 
of his invention, through any individtial or through the Board of Ordnance 
and Fortification, to the United States Government free or at a price. 

" Second. The first and only offer of the gun to the Government, of 
record, was made by a representative of the American Arms Company on 
September 2, 1913, to the Chief of Ordnance — 100 guns, complete, 
at not to exceed $1000 each, and to license the Ordnance Department to 
manufacture and use such guns in the United States for a royalty of not to 
exceed $150 per gun. 

Subjected to Tests. — Third. Such tests as the Lewis gun has been 
subjected to have been under a program authorized by the Board of Ord- 
nance and Fortification and approved by the Secretary of War, and were 
made by boards of officers named in orders from the Adjutant General's 
office — one officer of the Ordnance Department on each board. 

" Fourth. The Savage Arms Company, through its president, in a letter 
to the Chief of Ordnance, with reference to the test conducted in April, 
1916, stated: 

" ' The company feels that the investigation has been entirely impartial 
and regards the board as one very capable of judging the value of the 
investigation to the Ordnance Department. We also appreciate the courtesy 
shown us by Colonel Peirce and his assistants.' 

" The records do not show any hostility on the part of General Crozier 
or the Ordnance Department to the Lewis gun, but do show that the 
department, by direction of its chief, afforded the owners of this gun every 
reasonable facility in placing it before the testing board at the Springfield 
Armory. 

'■ The Secretary of War has approved these conclusions of the Inspector 
General, and in accordance with the latter's recommendation has directed 
the controversy to cease." 

M.\NUF.\CTURE OF MACHINE GuNS IN THE UNITED STATES. — An interest- 
ing article describing the manufacture of machine guns, published in the 
January 13 issue of the Scientific American, throws some light on what 
may be expected of munitions manufacturers in case of war. It is stated 
that the company manufacturing the Colt-Marlin gun was not organized 
until late in 1915 and is now turning out 200 complete rifles a day, the 
plant at New Haven being, according to the writer of the article, probably 
the largest machine gun producing plant in the world. 



396 Professional Notes 

For Purchase of the Chesapeake and Delaware Canal. — By a resolu- 
tion passed at the last session of Congress the Secretaries of War and Navy 
Departments were authorized to appoint a committee of army and navy 
experts to make an investigation looking to the purchase of the Chesapeake 
and Delaware Canal and report to this session, hence a vigorous effort for 
the purchase of that waterway is now under way by those advocating making 
the canal a part of the inland route to parallel the Atlantic coast, which is 
l)eing urged as a military and commercial necessity. The Atlantic Deeper 
Waterways Association is a leading factor in this work and will leave no 
effort undone to bring it to success. — Marine Journal, 23/12. 

Government Control of Radio Recommended. — The New York Timer 
publishes the following account of the project of the Navy Department to 
take over the control of coastal radio stations : 

Washington. Jan. 2. The purchase by the Government of all existing 
coastal and commercial wireless stations in the United States, Alaska, 
Hawaii. Porto Rico, and the Swan Islands within two years is recom- 
mended liy Secretary Josephus Daniels of the Navy Department in an 
official communication made public to-night. Secretary Daniels is urging the 
control and ownership of radio communication by the Government as a 
matter of national defense and as making for efficiency in naval, military 
and commercial work. 

The letter was sent under date of December 29 by Mr. Daniels to Senator 
Fletcher of Florida, and Representative Alexander of Missouri, who are 
the chairmen of the committees in Congress which now have under con- 
sideration the Radio Bill proposed by the Interdepartmental Committee. 

" The bill," says Secretary Daniels, defining the attitude of the Navy 
Department, " covers the purchase of coastal stations only ; that is, only 
those used to communicate with ships, and, by permitting the Navy Depart- 
ment to open all of its stations to commercial business, discourages the 
extension of any existing commercial systems or the organization of new 
systems. 

■' The Department strongly recommends that the committee provide for 
the purchase of all stations used for commercial purposes. In some cases, 
the status of existing stations is constantly changing, and decisive action at 
this time will result in a saving of public funds. I recommend that Section 6. 
of the bill provide for the purchase, through the Navy Department, of all 
coastal and commercial stations in the United States, Alaska. Hawaii, Porto 
Rico, and the Swan Islands within two years, at reasonable valuation, and 
that no license be granted to any such station for operation after two years 
from the date of the passage of the bill." 

Secretary Daniels indorses the other provisions of the bill, especially 
those relating to the ownership, the licensing, and the control of stations 
by the Department of Commerce. 

" Mr. Daniels explains that the Navy Department " is convinced that 
government operation and control of all stations used for commercial 
purposes, other than those on board merchant ships, is necessary on account 
of the mutual interference between stations." 

'■ One station or system," he says, " must wait for another to finish ; there 
are many chances for disputes which sometimes are carried on between 
operators by radio, especially when the operators are not under strict con- 
trol, adding to the time wasted; there is needless duplication of effort, and 
in cases of distress the confusion resulting from many interests attempting 
to render aid. get news, or satisfy curiosity, is very dangerous. 

" Since only by the closest regulation can the best use of this art be 
obtained, not only for commerce and safety at sea, but for military 
purposes, radio telegraphy is a strict government monopoly with the larger 
number of foreign nations, and in those foreign countries where com- 
mercial stations are permitted, the government control is generally so 
strong as to ama mt to a monopoly. 



Professional Notes 397 

'■ Authority to take over and operate or to close commercial stations in 
time of war will not suffice. The stations must be in full government 
operation before the first hint of possible hostilities." 

Comment in the press is generally noncommittal, though the following 
from SJiipping Illustrated indicates that merchant shipping interests favor 
the scheme : 

There is but one opinion in shipping circles concerning the proposed 
taking over by the Government of all wireless stations in this country. The 
amateurs who rig up antennae on the roofs of their dwellings and inter- 
fere with the exchange of messages " for the fun of it," are greater nui- 
sances than is commonly supposed. Particularly in connection with danger 
warnings have these amateurs made themselves obnoxious and it can be 
said that at least one ship — that was sunk off Nantucket by the U-53, to 
the great discomfort of many Americans — would have escaped but for the 
fact that her efforts to elucidate the warning sent her by another ship, 
which had run afoul of the submarine, were blocked by interference from 
shore, probably on the part of amateurs. In all other countries, wireless 
communication is under the control of the government and it is time that 
the same policy were adopted here. 

The attitude of the Marconi Company is given in the Neiv York Herald 
as follows : 

Protesting against Secretary Daniels' advocacy of government monopoly 
of radio communication, as outlined in a letter addressed to the Commerce 
and Marine Committee of the Senate and House, Edward J. Nally, vice- 
president and general manager of the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Com- 
pany of America, declared yesterday that " Government control will tend 
to hamper the art of radio comnumication, because the Government has 
not the stimulus of commercial competition and the hope of individual 
reward, and it is prone to take present accomplishments as finalities." 

Another reason assigned by Mr. Nally for opposing the proposed measure 
is that " it will effectively stifle the growth of wireless telegraphy and 
amounts practically to a confiscation of private interests." 

" Moreover," said Mr. Nally, " it is against the established principle of 
the American nation, which has heretofore allowed free scope for all work, 
and especially work of an experimental nature. There are already ample 
laws and regulations giving the United States Government the necessary 
power for control of all radio stations in time of war or public peril. In 
fact, all ship and shore stations are now, and have been since 1912, operated 
under the control and supervision of the Department of Commerce of the 
United States. In times of emergency the Marconi Company has repeatedly 
offered to place at the disposal of the nation, not only all its operators, but 
the equipment of the company and the services of the entire staff. In the 
recent Mexican crisis, when American battleships were sent to Vera Cruz, 
the Marconi Company, through its president, John W. Griggs, offered to the 
Secretary of the Navy the free use of the Marconi coast stations for the 
United States Navy, and the offer was accepted." 

Mr. Nally said that although the Government had been a large user of 
wireless for many years, it had not contributed any of the important 
improvements which have been made during that time. 

" It would be an interesting study," said Mr. Nally, '| to compare the 
present cost to the Government of business handled by its own stations, 
message for message, with the cost to private companies for messages and 
business handled between private stations. And, finally, if the Government 
takes over the radio service it is only a step to federal operation of the 
telephone and telegraph systems of the country. It is the entering wedge 
to government ownership of these utilities." 

Experiments with Protectiv'e Deck Armor. — One of the experiments 
of the Navy Department to determine the effectiveness of deck protective 



398 Professional Notes 

armor was made at Rappahannock Spit on January 8, when the U. S. S. 
Oklahoma fired trial 14-inch shells at the U. S. S. Puritan, which had been 
specially fitted with a new protective deck designed to keep shell fragments 
from penetrating the deck. The Puritan was sunk by the shells, but as she 
was moored in shallow water she may be raised. — Arm\ and Navy Journal, 
l3/i- 

Milwaukee Aground. — On January 13 the cruiser Milwaukee grounded 
near Humboldt Bay while engaged in salvage operations on the submarine 
H-s. Press reports indicate that it will be impossible to float the vessel, but 
it is understood that her machinery and equipment can be salvaged without 
difficulty. Press reports state that the Milwaukee, at the time of the acci- 
dent, was in a dense fog and had a line attached to the H-3 when she was 
swept ashore by a heavy current. 

The Milwaukee is a first-class cruiser built at the Union Iron Works and 
first commissioned in May, 1906. Her displacement is 9700 tons, trial speed 
22.22 knots, armament 14 6-inch and 18 3-inch guns. 

Salvage Operations on " H-3.'" — Attempts to float the H-3 have so far 
been unsuccessful and the New York Herald says that a contract to float 
the vessel was, on January 14, entered into with a private concern. 



UNITED STATES NAVAL MILITLV AND NAVAL 
RESERVE 

Winter Training for Naval Volunteers. — The winter season of civilian 
naval training, which the Navy Department evolved out of last summer's 
" Naval Plattsburg " plan, was begun in the navy yard. New York, on 
January 8. Eighty-six students reported for instruction on board the 
U. S. S. Nezv Jersey for the afternoon session and 55 for the evening class. 
Commander Louis A. Kaiser, U. S. Navy, overlooked the work of the classes, 
but the actual instructors and their subjects are: Lieut. Randolph P. 
Scudder, ordnance and gunnery; Lieut. (J. G.) Ewart G. Haas, navigation; 
and Lieut. Sherwoode A. Taffinder, marine engineering. Most of the 
members of the winter classes took part in the civilian naval training cruise 
last summer. — Army and Navy Journal, 13/1. 

Department Plan for Civilian Naval Training. — The Naval Training 
Association of the United States, which is to the civilian naval training 
movement, what the United States Military Training Camps Association is 
to the Plattsburg movement, announced yesterday that the Navy Department 
was arranging an elementary course in naval training for civilians who 
desired to fit themselves for service with the navy in the event of war. The 
training will be followed by training cruises on reserve battleships next 
summer. 

The new departure, which is in line with the Navy Department program 
to create an adequate naval reserve force in this country, is one of the 
results of the training cruise for civilians held last summer. More than 
2000 men, from all parts of the country, enlisted for that cruise. 

" The Navy Department," the announcement issued from the head- 
quarters of The Naval Training Association, 31 Nassau Street, reads, 
" proposes to establish naval training stations for civilians at Newport, 
Norfolk, Chicago and .San Francisco, and probably at Pensacola. At these 
camps civilians will be trained for a period of a month, the instruction 
being the same as is given recruits for the active service. 



Professional Notes 399 

" Those civilians who underwent a course of training last summer will 
have the opportunity for a further and more advanced course of training 
on battleships of the United States Atlantic Reserve Fleet. Ten or twelve 
battleships of the reserve divisions, under command of a tlas^ officer, will be 
detailed for this purpose. Already arrangements have been completed 
wherein' civilians in certain of our seaports will have the opportunity to 
get preliminary training on battleships, the drills and instruction being so 
arranged that the tours at the training camps and on the ships next summer 
will be of more value to the civilian than would be the case did he not 
receive the preliminary instruction. 

"The battleships North Dakota and Minnesota have been detailed for 
these drills and instructions at Philadelphia, and the battlship Netv Jersey 
has been deailed at New York. It is estimated that fully 10,000 civilians will 
take advantage of the opportunity afforded them by the Navy Department 
for courses of training at camps and on battleships during the ensuing 
summer. 

" The time of holding the camps of instruction and cruises are tentatively 
arranged to take place between July 2 and August 4. Should more civilians 
apply to take the course of training afforded by the Department than can be 
accommodated by the training camps and battleships in one period, the 
Department proposes to have additional periods of instruction so that all 
who volunteer may be instructed. 

" To provide motor boat squadrons for use as patrol and dispatch vessels 
and other duties in connection with the defense of the coast in time of 
war. the Department will undertake to form and train motor boat squadrons 
in accordance with the provisions of the Act of Congress of August 2Q, 
1916, whereby owners and operators of motor boats may join the naval 
coast defense reserve. Under existing law the Department is authorized 
to establish schools or camps of instruction for the purpose of instructing 
members of the naval reserve force and those civilians who desire to fit 
themselves for such membership. Members of the naval reserve force 
receive small retainer pay, and their expenses are paid by the Government. 

" In order to make the Naval Reserve attractive to those civilians who 
desire to volunteer their services for training as naval reservists the Depart- 
ment proposes to recommend to Congress that the term of enrolimenc and 
re-enrollment in the Naval Volunteer Reserve be one year. Civilians who 
qualify for and enroll in the Naval Volunteer Reserve will have their 
expenses for transportation and subsistence defrayed by the Department. 

" At the present time the Department is enabled to furnish gasoline and 
oil to the boats of the motor boat squadron. The department proposes to 
ask the Congress also to furnish fuel and oil to other than gasoline boats 
that are suitable for use in patrol squadrons." — Neiv York Times, 27/12. 



ENGINEERING 

Results of Diesel Engine Trials in U. S. Navy. — While the trial trip 
of the U. S. fuel ship Maumee has proven her to be a success, there must 
be some radical changes in the Diesel engines with which she is equipped 
if they are to prove a success in battleships or other vessels requiring a 
high rate of speed. The Maumee has been sent to the New York yard for 
some alterations in her machinery, after which she will have another trial. 
Unless she shows more speed than she has up to date the Maumee may be 
the last large navy ship to be equipped with Diesel engines. The chief 
objection to the Diesel engine is the large amount of heat which it gen- 
erates. This difficulty can be overcome in ships of lower speed, but appar- 
ently not in engines of high power. The Maumee experiments show that 
the Diesel engine would be a success in tramp ships and vessels of this class. 
— Army and Navy Journal. 16/12. 



400 Professional Notes 

A New Method of Salvaging Sunken Ships. — Interest has been aroused 
in Brazilian technical circles by a recent lecture at the Club de Engenharia 
(Engineers' Club) of Rio de Janeiro, by Dr. Sylvio Pellico Portella, con- 
cerning his invention for the salvage of sunken ships. It is claimed by 
him that the invention is applicable to ships sunk at almost any depth, so 
long as divers are able to reach them, and that it is effective in putting a 
wreck afloat, no matter what its position on the sea fioor. 

The invention consists of a tender of special model, which is equipped 
with floats of waterproof material. These are neatly folded, but later, 
when inflated with air, they assume all sorts of shapes — parallelepipeds, 
spheres, cylinders, etc. They are carried down by divers and attached to 
various portions of the sunken vessel, both within and without, still retain- 
ing their connection by means of hose with the tender ship. When all are 
properly fastened in place they are inflated by air pressure from above, like 
the tires of an automobile. As they swell they are said gradually to displace 
the water within and about the wreck, and it is claimed that by their own 
buoyancy they float it to the surface. It is said that the invention had two 
trials in Paris. — Scientific American, 30/12. 



SUBMARINES 

The Ideal Submarine. — It seems to be necessary for every type of war- 
ship to pass through a phase of its development in which the matter of 
size is the all-absorbing question. Usually the disputants are divided into 
two schools,_ one of which believes in putting displacement into the biggest 
practical units, combining the maximum of speed, power and defense, the 
other believing that displacement should be distributed among a large 
number of smaller craft, which, though individually weak, would be over- 
whelming when they attacked in mass. 

Invariably (and students of naval construction should take careful note 
of this) the advocates of great power and speed have won out, and in this 
connection it is significant that the latest designs for our own navy call for 
42,000-ton battleships, 35,000-ton battle cruisers, 7000-ton scouts and 1200- 
ton destroyers, all of these classes, save the battleships, to have 35 knots 
speed. 

It is only when we come to the submarines that we find the old con- 
troversy still raging. A few of our naval men and, alas, the majority of 
our Congressmen, are still clinging to the belief in the efficiency of 
mosquito craft. They believe that a host of 500-ton coast-defense boats 
of moderate speed and small sea-going power, would afford a better defense 
than a smaller number of boats, twice their size, of greater speed, of wide 
radius of action, of great powers of offense, and capable of going out with 
the main fleet to tackle the enemy a thousand miles off shore, if need be. 

The principle of compromise controls all naval construction and it is 
particularly insistent when we come to the submarine. The sea-going 
officer asks for certain qualities in an ideal submarine, and the naval con- 
structor too often finds that within the limits of size imposed, the com- 
bination of these qualities in the degree asked for is impossible. It is 
largely because of this fact that the Department some time ago detailed 
a naval constructor, Mr. E. S. Land, to duty with the submarine flotilla, 
and during a period of many months he lived aboard our submarines, mak- 
ing many trips of greater or less duration. This practice of sending naval 
constructors to sea for observation is excellent, and we believe that it 
could be extended to very good effect. A notable instance was the dispatch 
of Naval Constructor Robinson with the fleet in its famous voyage around 
the world. Indeed, we are of the opinion that it would be advisable for 
every naval constructor, at stated intervals, to spend a certain amount of 
time with the fleet. 



Professional Notes 401 

In his recent testimony before the House Committee on Naval Affairs, 
Mr. Land gave it as his opinion, based upon his experiences at sea, that 
the ideal boat for the United States Navy would be one of between 750 
and 050 tons displacement and from 225 to 250 feet in length. A prelim- 
inary estimate shows that a boat of this size could be built with a surface 
speed of from 17 to 19 knots and a submerged speed which might reach 
14 knots. It could carry a powerful armament of torpedoes and rapid- 
fire guns, and it would provide comfortable berthing accommodations for 
the crew — this last a most important consideration in submarine work. 
A submarine of this size would be capable of keeping the sea and 
maneuvering in company with the main fleet ; something which our present 
submarine of 400 to 500 tons displacement cannot do. 

Since increased size brings such manifest advantages, the question 
naturally arises : Why not go yet higher and build submarines of 1200 to 
1500 tons displacement? The answer is that submarines of this size, with 
a length of from 300 to 400 feet, would be impracticable, or at least, in- 
advisable ; first, because they would be too slow in submerging, and secondly, 
because when submerging, except at very small angles of inclination, they 
would run the risk of reaching dangerous depths before they could be 
controlled ; dangerous depths being those at which the nose of the boat 
may strike bottom, or the hull be subjected to crushing stresses, due to a 
water pressure beyond the strength of the boat. 

Even at small angles of inclination the manipulation of a submarine, 
300 to 400 feet long, at high speed below the surface might carry the boat 
to dangerous depths before she could be controlled. A speed of 12 knots is 
equivalent to 20 feet per second ; and it would not take many seconds to 
carry the vessel beyond the danger line. 

Swift submergence, so necessary when attacked, becomes more difficult 
with the increase in size of the submarine, and it is believed that 800 to 900 
tons marks the limit, beyond which submergence is too slow to ensure 
safety against being rammed by a destroyer or submarine chaser. Sub- 
mergence depends upon ability to destroy the reserve buoyancy by filling" 
the ballast tanks, and the speed of filling depends upon the size of the 
valves. If the valves are big they are difficult to keep tight and the pres- 
sures upon them are such that they cannot be operated rapidly by man- 
power. 

Limitations of space prevent our following this argument any further ; 
but attention should be drawn to the fact that 800 tons is about the displace- 
men of the German sea-going submarines which lately have ventured so far 
afield. This type preponderates, so far as numbers are concerned, in the 
navies of England, Austria and France. Japan and Russia are building 
800-ton boats, and at the time of the Naval Affairs Committee examinations 
last year, reliable information came from Italy that they had abandoned 
the 400- to 500-ton type and were building only boats of from 750 to 950 
tons. — Scientific American, 13/1. 



AERONAUTICS 

Dimensions and Perform.\nces of Superzeppelins. — Figures on the 
dimensions and performances of the latest superzeppelins that are appar- 
ently authentic are published in Zeit. Four ships have been built at 
Friedrichshafen and tested over Lake Constance of which the following 
data are of interest : Length, 240 meters ; diameter, 23 meters ; volumetric 
contents, 32,000 cubic meters ; horse-poWer, 4000 to 5000 with eight motors ; 
maximum climb, 4000 meters : usual climb, 3000 meters ; maximum speed. 
120 km. per hour. These dirigibles can carry a munition load of 6000 to 
7000 kilograms. — Aviation, 15/12. 



402 



Professional Notes 



Table Showing Probable Zeppelin Losses from August i, 1914, to 
January 17, 1917 



Place 



Date 



Z-8* 
Z-5* 

?* 

LZ-31* 

■> 

L-3* 

L-9* 
L-8* 



LZ-37* 
LZ-38* 



Badonvillers, France 

Mlava, Russia 

Seradz, Russia .... 



Z-28 
L-22* 



?* 



24 L-19* 

25 LZ-77- 

26 ] L-15* 

27 I L-20* 



Diisseldorf, German} 
Friedrichshafen, Gei 
manv. 

North Sea 

Esbjerg, Denmark . 

Boulogne,. France . . 

Tirlemont, Belgium 

Thielt. Belgium 

North Sea ... 



Evere, Belgium 
Ghent, Belgium 



Ostende, Belgium 
Vilna, Russia . . . • 



Saint-Hubert, Belgium 
Maubeuge, France 
Grodno. Russia . . 
Tondern, Germany 



Hamburg, Germany 
Tondern, Germany . 



Kalkun, Russia . . . 
Mainvault, Belgium 

North Sea 

Revigny, France . . 
Kentish Knock, England 
Stavanger, Norway . . . . 



28 L-7* I Off Schleswig Coast. 



Cause of Loss 



8-1914 
8-1914 
9-1914 



- 1-1915 

- 2-1915 

- 3-1915 

- 3-1915 

- 4-1915 

- 5-1915 

- 6-1 91 5 

- 6-1915 

- 8-1915 

- 8-1915 

-10-1915 
-10-1915 
-11-1915 
-11-1915 



5-12-1916 
30- 1-1916 
21- 2-1916 

21- 2-I916 
I- 4-1916 

3- 5-1916 

4- 5-I916 



Salonika , 5- 5-1916 

Enfield, England , 2- 9-1916 



L-33* 



England 
England 
England 



Russia 

England. . 
England.. 
Germany. 
Germany. 



24- 
24- 


9-1916 
9-1916 


I- 


10-1916 


28- 
28- 


1I-I9I6 

11-1916 
n-1916 


— 


1-1917 


— 


I-I917 



Destroyed by French gunners. Part of 

crew lost. 
Destroyed by Russian gunners. Crew 

lost. 
Captured, while at anchorj by a cavalry 

patrol. Crew of 30, prisoners. 
Destroyed in shed by British aviators. 
Destroyed in shed by British aviators. 

Foundered during a storm. 

Stranded, having run out of fuel, and 

broke up. Crew of 16 interned. 
Foundered during a storm, after having 

raided Calais. - Crew lost. 
Damaged by British aviator; wrecked on 

landing. 21 of crew killed. 
Damaged, over Bethune, by French gun- 
ners; wrecked on landing. 
Broke away without crew; foundered 

off Heligoland. 
Destroyed in shed by British aviators. 
Destroyed in mid-air by British avia- 
tors; crew lost. 
Raided London. Destroyed, upon her 

return by British aviators. 
Shot down by Russian gunners; crew 

of 10 made prisoners. 
Destroyed by exploding in mid-air. 
Stranded on a chimney and broke up. 
Destroyed by the storm on landing. 
Wrecked in shed through an accidental 

explosion. 
Wrecked by the storm. 
Destroyed in shed through accidental 

explosion of a bomb. 
Shot down by Russian gunners. Crew 

lost. 
Raided Paris. Damaged by French avia 

tor; wrecked on landing. 
Raided England. Probably run out 

fuel; foundered. Crew lost. 
Shot down by I'rench motor guns; de 

stroyed in fall. Crew of 15 killed. 
Shot down by British gunners; crew o 

18 surrendered. Vessel sank. 
Raided Scotland. Stranded, having run 

out of fuel and drifted with the witid 

Blown up by crew; 3 killed, 16 in 

terned. 
Shot down by H. M. S. Galatea and 

Phaoton, and destroyed by submarine 

E-v. 
Shot down bv allied warships. 
Shot down by aeroplane during raid on 

London. 

Shot down by anti-aircraft gutis in 
Essex while returning from raid on 
London. 
Shot down by gun fire while attempting 

to reach London. 
Reported shot down by gun fire. 
Shot down at sea by airplanes while 
returning from a cross channel raid. 
'Unconfirmed report that these two 
were destroyed by accidental burn- 
_ ing of hangar. 



Destruction authenticated. 



Professional Notes 403 

The Wkight Patents. — The Wright-Martin Aircraft Company has 
relinquished the British Wright patents to that government and proposes 
that private manufacturers in the United States pay a Hcense for the use 
of devices covered by the American patents. The company stipulates a 
minimum annual royalty of $io,aoo. Considerable opposition has developed 
among airplane manufacturers. The situation is well summarized in the 
following editorial from the A^czu York Herald of December 21 : 

According to official reports our naval authorities seem to be agreed that 
for its purposes the development of air craft has not been commensurate 
with their wonderful usefulness as proved by the experiences of war. 
Finding it impossible to get what is needed at home they sought to obtain 
such machines abroad, where " the exigencies of war have stimulated talent 
and manufacture." But this also was impossible, so in lieu of taking 
inferior types the Navy Department has been forced to go slowly until its 
special problems are nearer solution. 

Something of the same impulse may have inspired the Wright-Martin 
Aircraft Company in its proposed licensing plan. In a statement furnished 
the Herald and published yesterday the president of this corporation 
declared that despite the proved safety of flight in properly constructed 
machines it is impossible to assure such safety when the instrumentalities 
are imperfectly designed. Therefore he declares that some check must be 
placed on their production. To effect this the company has decided, first, to 
require manufacturers using their patents to take out a license, and, 
secondly, to grant such permission only to parties properly equipped finan- 
cially and possessing the requisite engineering knowledge for producing 
normally safe machines and appliances. 

Adverse criticism insists that the real intention of the license is to crush 
opposition and to destroy the smaller companies. This charge is no less 
insistently denied by the owners of the patents, who declare that their 
action is in the real interests of preparedness. Where the government and 
the people enter is through a desire to have the safety of the fliers assured, 
and thereby hope that the aeroplane business will be organized on lines 
which will produce the best possible types in time and in sufficient quantities 
to help safeguard the country when the hour of stress and storm approaches. 



LESSONS OF THE WAR 

Influence of the Torpedo on Ship Construction. — Mr. Arthur Pollen, 
the naval expert of Land and Water, says : 

" Meantime there is one technical point worth brief examination. 

to which the recent raid attracts our attention. In my article last week I 
drew attention to the fact that in the German account of the August sortie, 
in which Falmouih and Nottingham were torpedoed, it was asserted by the 
enemy that it took three torpedoes, fired at an interval of two hours 
between the first and the last, before Falmouth was sunk. It has been 
rumored that Nottingham had to be hit more often even than this before 
she was disposed of. Last week we learned that the Mucnchen had been 
torpedoed by a submarine and had yet made her way home. These incidents 
are in line with a great many more narrated in the Jutland despatch. In 
that document, my readers will remember. Sir John Jellicoe and Sir David 
Beatty gave the details of 11 separate instances in which our destroyers 
fired torpedoes successfully against the German ships, and in only one 
instance, namely the attack led by Captain Ansalan Stirling, was it stated 
as certain that the torpedoed ship'blew up. In all the other cases, many of 
which occurred in the course of the.daylight action, it was not even claimed 
that the injured ship had to leave the line. In the British fleet, of course, 



404. Professional Xotes " 

only Marlborough was hit, and the excellence of her shooting afterwards, 
and the ease with which she kept her place in the line and then made her 
way home under her own steam, were duly emphasized by the commander- 
in-chief. Last August year it may be remembered, the German battle cruiser 
Moltkc was torpedoed in the Gulf of Riga and won back to Kiel all across 
the Baltic Sea without difficulty. Now the Admiralty communique tells 
us that the Nubian, whose sides and bulkheads must be of the frailest 
possible, not only survived torpedo attack, but was in a condition in which 
she could be tov/ed home. 

" All this stands in sharp contrast with the fate of the older vessels that 
fell to submarines in the earlier part of the war. Aboukir. Cressy, Hague, 
Niger, Hermes, Formidable, Triumph. Majestic and the rest were utterly 
doomed from the moment they were hit. It seems clear then that during 
the last 10 years naval constructors have provided against underwater 
attack with very singular success. 1 am, of course, far from suggesting that 
a single torpedo could not possibly sink the stoutest battleship in the world. 
But it certainly is startling and, as it seems to me. extremely consoling, that 
here we have nearly 20 cases of modern ships being torpedoed, of 
which only one was known to have proved fatal. The experience of 
Jutland, then, is on all fours with an almost equal number of cases before 
and since, and this may not improbably prove one of the most important 
lessons of that most instructive engagement." 

^[ISCELLAXEOUS 

Another Slide at Panama. — On January 10 a slight movement of the 
old Cucaracha slide occurred, part of the bank breaking off and reducing 
the width of the channel, while an upheaval of the bottom reduced the 
depth. In two days, despite further slight movement of the slide, the 
channel had been cleared to a depth of 22 feet and a width of 100 feet. 

CURRENT NA\ AL AND PROFESSIONAL PAPERS 
UNITED STATES 

World's Work. January. — The Next Five Years of the Navy, by Rear 
Admiral Bradley A. Fiske. 

Aviation. December 15. — Possible Improvements in Carrying Capacity 
and Speed of Rigid Airships, by C. Domic r (Count von Zeppelin's 
Engineer). A Time Controlled Aerial Torpedo, by JVillard G. Moore. 

Flying. January. — Aeroplane vs. Captive Balloon, by A French Officer. 
The War in the Air, by Ralph de Castro. 

Scientific American. December 23. — Present Status of Zeppelin Con- 
struction, by L. d'Orcy. 

GREAT BRITAIN 

Nineteenth Century and After. December. — A Sailor's Account of 
the Lowestoft Raid, bv Petty Officer H. J. G. Merrin. Artillery Methods 
in Modern War, by Capt. R. IV. Hallous. 

Fortnightly Review. December. — What is the Law of Nations? Sir 
Frederick Pollock. Sea Heresy, Invasion and Other Matters, by Archibald 
Hurd. The Cadet Movement in England, by Capt. Cecil Price. The 
Business of War, by Laurence Jerrold. 



Professional Notes 405 

The Engineer. December 8. — German Torpedo Craft in the War 
(designs). 

Engineering. December 8. — Salvage Equipment for Raising Submarine 
F-4, U. S. Navy, by Naval Constructor J. A. Purer, U. S. Navy. The Naval 
War and the Size of Battleships, by Ji'ni. Hovgaard. 

Land and Water. November 30. — German Reserves, by Hillaire Belloc. 
The New Warfare at Verdun, by A. D. fleurot. The Coming Trade War, 
by Arthur Kitson. December 7. — Turning the Big Gun, by Joseph Purncll. 
State Control of Factories, In- A. Kitson. Munition Making in America, 
by L. R. Free>nan. The Arming of the Fleet, by Arthur Pollen. 

CONTINENTAL EUROPE 

RiviSTA- Marittima (Italy). October. — Submarines and the Laws of 
Naval Warfare, by G. A. Rosso. 

Revue des Deux Mondes (Paris ). December. — Protection of Transports, 
by Contrc-Amiral Degony. 



Naval Operations ix.. 



INTERNATIONAL NOTES 

1. Na\'al War Notes 407 

2. Diplomatic Notes 412 

NAVAL WAR NOTES 

Prepared by Lieutenant R. S. Edwards, U. S. Navy 

British Naval Strategy 407 

Atlantic Ocean 408 

North Sea and Channel 409 

" Arctic Ocean 409 

The Mediterranean 410 

, The Far East 41 r 

Index of Ship Losses 411 

BRITISH NAVAL STRATEGY 

Mr. Archibald Hurd in The Fortnightly Review discusses the strategy 
of the British fleet and the effect of the Battle of Jutland as follows : 

" The general naval policy of Germany has never been a secret. It has 
been stated, on the highest authority, that the German High Seas Fleet will 
not fight unless opportunity offers of engaging under favorable conditions, 
which means in the vicinity of the German coast where every advantage 
can be obtained from the employment of destroyers, submarines, mines, and 
aircraft. They realize the advantage, moreover, of having dockyards at 
hand to which crippled men-of-war can be taken. The enemy has attempted 
to entrap one or more sections of the Grand Fleet. There is no reason to 
doubt that it was with that idea that Admiral von Scheer put to sea on 
May 31. Informed of the dispositions of the Grand Fleet, he thought 
that he could overwhelm the battle cruiser squadrons before Admiral 
Jellicoe could reach the scene of action with his greatly superior force of 
battleships. The fighting was continued until the battle squadrons appeared, 
and then the Germans fled. What conclusion is to be drawn from that 
battle, which was mainly a running fight between battle cruisers, at least so 
far as the British were concerned? The Germans evaded our battleship 
squadrons, half an hour saving them from what would have probably been 
annihilation. 

'■ A fight to a finish, if the Germans had any hope of success, was neces- 
sary for their salvation, but it was not necessary for ours. Before the 
fleets met in the North Sea we had little cause for discontent. All the 
world's oceans were open to us for use for naval, military, and commercial 
purposes, subject only to the restricted menace of submarines. If the Battle 
of Jutland had resulted in the extinction of the German High Seas Fleet, 
our position would not have been greatly altered : Germany would still have 
possessed in her destroyers, submarines, and mine-layers the only active 
element of her naval power ; her coast defences — which she believes to be 
impregnable — would have remained. The great ships would have gone, 
and to that extent our great ships would have been set free. For what pur- 
pose could they have been used after the German High Seas Fleet had been 
destroyed? It must be apparent that the naval situation would not have 



4o8 International Notes 

been greatly changed if the victory which Admirals JelHcoe and Beatty 
achieved had been so overwhelming as to wipe out every battleship and 
battle cruiser under the German ensign. We should have heaved a sigh of 
satisfaction and should have congratulated ourselves on a result of psycho- 
logical importance. But the Germans would still have had their sub- 
marines, destroyers, and mines ; the Baltic would have continued closed ; the 
powerful guns and minetields off the German and Belgian coasts would still 
have remained. 

" The suggestion that it was not absolutely necessary for the British to 
fight the Battle of Jutland, in conditions which exposed the British forces 
to considerable risk, has been denounced as sea heresy, representing a 
denial of the offensive traditions of the British Navy. What is the fact? 
Battles are not fought for the sake of fighting, and. in these days and 
under the present conditions, it is doubtful whether the stronger Power 
does gain much from victoriously engaging the enemy's weaker forces of 
battleships and cruisers. They may be sunk, but even then offensive- 
defensive elements remain — submarines, destroyers, mines, and coastal 
guns — and it is those elements which the weaker Power, having abandoned 
already the use of the oceans of the world, hopes to employ. A battle is 
fought for a specific purpose. That consists of the right to use the seas. 
We have been using the seas with a freedom which has never been known 
before during the progress of any war. If the High Seas Fleet were to 
disappear, what greater use could we make of the oceans of the world? 
That is the crucial test. No battle is unaccompanied by risk, and in the 
present circumstances the risks are not all on one side. The whole future 
of the Allies depends upon the efficiency and sufficiency of the Grand Fleet. 
If that fleet were defeated, although by no means annihilated — tricked into 
defeat by the Germans — the aspect of affairs throughout Europe and 
throughout the world would be changed. Everything depends on one 
factor, and therefore it must surely be evident that the officers commanding 
at sea must be ever on their guard against being drawn into action under 
conditions favorable to the enemy and deliberately planned by him. We 
have little to gain from a victory at sea, but everything to lose by a reverse. 
On the otherhand, the Germans, full of devilish resource, as the war has 
revealed, have everything to gain and little to lose, beyond a number of 
ships which, except for a few costly excursions, have remained inactive in 
their ports. The strategy of the Grand Fleet must be defensive, but its 
tactics offensive. It must stand ready to refuse the Gerrnans the right to 
use the seas — in other words, it must pursue the policy deliberately adopted 
in the early days of the war — it must control, and, under reasonable condi- 
tions, fight and defeat the enemy. The Grand Fleet, acting from its care- 
fully chosen bases, challenges Germany to action, but it insists that the 
action shall be fought, if at all, on its' conditions, imposed on the enemy 
in virtue both of its strength and its efficiency. In short, the position at sea 
may be summed up in a sentence — a battle to us would be a luxury, if a 
desirable luxury, for the mental relief which it would give, but to the 
Germans it is a necessity, if the iron dominion imposed upon Central 
Europe is to be broken before Germany and her partners fall crushed and 
ruined. 

NAVAL OPERATIONS 

From December 14 to January 17 

ATLANTIC OCEAN 
" SuFFBEN " Sunk by Submarine. — The French battleship Su-ffren, re- 
ported missing in the last issue of the Proceedings, was sunk on November 
26 off Lisbon by a German submarine, according to an official statement 
from Berlin. 



Na\al War Notes 409 

Submarines and Raiders on American Coast. — Warnings of a German 
cruiser at large in the Atlantic were continued by the Allied fleet in the 
Western Atlantic during the past month. The radio warnings describe the 
vessel as 350 feet long with two masts and one funnel. German submarines 
are still reported in the Atlantic and the press says that Great Britain has 
met this danger by sending a fleet of heavily armed converted cruisers 
disguised as mercliantmen to convoy vessels entering and leaving American 
waters. On January 11 the New York Herald published a dispatch saying 
that a German cruiser was supposed to be in the neighborhood of the 
Windward Passage and that all lighthouses under English control in that 
region had been darkened in consequence. There is an unconfirmed report 
that one German "commerce raider "was destroyed by British cruisers in 
the Atlantic early in January. The exact nature of the belligerent opera- 
tions in the Western Atlantic is kept secret, England having decided as a 
protective measure to suppress all shipping reports except announcements 
of casualties. The dates of departure of British liners are no longer 
advertised, and their arrival and departure from British ports is no longer 
announced. 

German Submarines Reported Sunk. — Press dispatches from Paris and 
Amsterdam report that the German submarines Li-45 and U-46 were sunk 
in the Bay of Biscay about December 20. There seems to be some doubt 
as to whether or not the dispatches refer to a single vessel, and the Nezv 
York Herald says it may have been the U-49, which sank the Columbian. 
The German reply to these rumors is that the V-46 returned safely to its 
home port. 

NORTH SEA AND THE CHANNEL 

Two British Destroyers Sunk. — Two of his Majesty's torpedo-boat 
destroyers were sunk in collision in the North Sea on December 21 during 
very bad weather, resulting in the loss of six ofiicers and 49 men. — Govern- 
ment Press Bureau in Army and Nazy Gazette. 

Cruisers " Shannon " and " Newcastle '' Reported Lost. — Dispatches 
from German sources say that the Shannon and the Neweastle were sunk 
by mines in November. The British Admiralty denies the loss of these 
vessels. 

Danes Hear Two Zeppelins Were Destroyed by Fire. — Two Zeppelins 
have been destroyed at Tondern, Schleswig, by a fire due to defective electric 
wiring in a recently constructed double shed, says a Renter dispatch from 
Copenhagen, quoting The Stiffs Tidende of Ribe, Jutland. — New York 
Times, 4/1. 

ARCTIC OCEAN 
German submarines are still reported to be operating in the Arctic 
Ocean, their activities being confined, apparently, to commerce destroying. 
The capture of one vessel near North Cape is reported from Berlin, the 
dispatch describing the prize as the Spezia, which formerly belonged to the 
Hamburg-American Line and was confiscated at \'ladivostok at the begin- 
ning of the war by the Russians, and used to carry war material from the 
United States to Archangel. 



4IO IXTERNATIONAL NoTES 

MEDITERRANEAN SEA 
Transports Sunk. — The French transport Magellan, 6000 tons, was sunk 
by submarines ofif Malta on December 11, and the British horse transport 
Russian met a similar fate on December 14. On January i, the Ivernia, a 
14,000-ton Cunard liner in the British transport service, was torpedoed by a 
submarine somewhere in the Mediterranean and sank with the loss of four 
officers and 146 men. 

"Patrie" Torpedoed ?— An Associated Press dispatch from Amsterdam 
says that Berlin has officially announced that a French battleship of the 
Patrie class was badly damaged by a torpedo from a German submarine 
near Malta on December 12. This statement is denied by the French 
Admiralty. 

Austrian Destroyers Raid Otranto Strait. — " On the night of Decem- 
ber 22-23 four Austro-Hungarian destroyers made a raid in the Otranto 
Strait, and after an engagement sank two armed patrol boats. On their way 
back at least six hostile destroyers of greater size and speed, evidently of 
the Indomito class, blocked their way. A violent combat with guns ensued. 
One hostile destroyer was set on fire and three others were hit several 
times at short range. The enemy's sea forces^ among which was one vessel 
of a more powerful and unknown type, were routed. 

" One of our destroyers was hit twice in the funnel and another was hit 
in the superstructure. One man was killed. There were no wounded." 

The Indomito class consists of 10 Italian destroyers 239 feet long, armed 
with one 4.7-inch gun and four 12-pounders. 

The official Italian account of this engagement, received last night, said 
two French destroyers and one Italian patrol boat were damaged slightly. 
—New York Herald. 

The " Gaulois " Sunk. — The French armored cruiser Gaulois was 
torpedoed in the Mediterranean Sea on December 2y and sank in half an 
hour, according to an official announcement made this morning. Owing to 
the coolness of the crew and the arrival of patrol boats there were only 
four victims, two of whom were killed by the explosion. 

The Gaulois belongs to the huge " upper works " class of the late '90s, 
which produced her sister ships the Charlemagne and St. Louis. She was 
completed in 1899 and refitted in 1907. When sunk her armament was four 
12-inch guns, 10 5.5-inch, eight 4-inch, 20 3-pounders, and four submerged 
torpedo tubes. The Gaulois' s displacement was 11,260 tons, and she carried 
631 officers and men. — New York Times. 

British Battleship and Seaplane Tender Sunkj — A British Admiralty 
announcement says : " H. M. S. CornwalHs was sunk by an enemy sub- 
marine on January 9 in the Mediterranean. The captain and all the officers 
are saved, but there are 13 men missing, and it is feared they were killed 
by the explosion. 

" H. M. seaplane carrier Beu-my-Chrce was sunk by gunfire in Kastelorizo 
Harbor, Asia Minor, on January 11. The only casualties were one officer 
and four men." 

Brassey's Annual says that the CornwalHs is a 14.000-ton battleship com- 
pleted in 1904. 

Italian Destroyer Sunk. — Berlin reports that an Italian destroyer was 
sunk off the island of Corfu early in December. 



Naval War Notes 411 

Italians Capture Austrian Submarines. — The Italian War Office on 
January 14 reported the capture of the Austrian submarines VT-12 and 
VC-12. The latter is said to be an ex-German craft, ceded to Austria- 
Hungary since the outbreak of the war. 

THE FAR EAST 

The "Tsukuba" Blown Up. — The Japanese cruiser Tsukuba was 
destroyed by an explosion on January 13 in the harbor of Yokosuka, an 
important naval station 13 miles southwest of Yokohama. Fire on the 
Tsukuba caused the magazine to blow up. 

One hundred and fifty-three of the crew of the Tsukuba were killed and 
157 injured, many of them seriously. 

Many men were rescued from the water. Most of the officers of the 
cruiser were ashore. 

The cause of the fire is not known. — Neiv York Herald. 

The Tsukuba was an armored cruiser of 13,750 tons displacement built at 
Kure in 1907. She had a 7-inch armor belt, mounted four 12-inch guns and 
her trial speed was 21 knots. She is sometimes referred to as a battle 
cruiser. 

INDEX OF WAR VESSEL LOSSES MENTIONED IN 
THIS NUMBER 

Note. — -A complete table of losses since the beginning of the war is 
pubHshed quarterly ; the latest appears in the January number of the 
Proceedings. 

British Vessels 

PACE 

2 destroyers 409 

Russian 410 

Ivernia 410 

Cornwallis 410 

Ben-my-Chree 410 

French Vessels 

Suffren 40S 

Magellan 410 

Gaulois 410 



Italian Vessels 
I destroyer 


page 

. . 410 


Japanese Vessels 
Tsukuba 


. . 411 


Austrian Vessels 
VT-r^ . .. 


. . 411 


VC-12 


. . 411 



412 Tnterxatkixal Notes 



DIPLOMATIC XOTES 

From December 15 to January 18 

Prepared by A. F. Westcott, Ph. D., Instructor, U. S. Naval Academy 

PRESIDENT WILSON'S NOTE TO BELLIGERENTS 
On December 18 President Wilson addressed a note to all belligerent 
nations, and sent copies for the information of neutrals, suggesting " an 
avowal of their respective views as to the terms upon which the war might 
be concluded." While remarking that "the objects, which the statesmen 
of the beUigerents on both sides have in mind in this war, are virtually the 
same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world," the 
note later adds that " the concrete objects have never been definitely stated." 

The President's Note 

(The words in brackets in the third paragraph were omitted in the copies 
to the Entente Powers) 

" Department of State, Washington, D. C, Dec. 18, 1916. 

" The President directs me to send you the following communication to be 
presented immediately to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the govern- 
ment to which you are accredited : 

" The President of the United States has instructed me to suggest to the 
[here is inserted a designation of the government addressed] a course of 
action with regard to the present war, which he hopes that the government 
will take under consideration as suggested in the most friendly spirit, and as 
coming not only from a friend but also as coming from the representative 
of a neutral nation whose interests have been most seriously affected by the 
war and whose concern for its early conclusion arises out of a manifest 
necessity to determine how best to safeguard those interests if the war is 
to continue. 

" The suggestion which I am instructed to make the President has long 
had it in mind to offer. He is somewhat embarrassed to offer it at this 
particular time, because it may now seem to have been prompted by [a 
desire to play a part in connection with] the recent overtures of the Central 
Powers. It has, in fact, been in no way suggested by them in its origin, and 
the President would have delayed offering it until those overtures had been 
[independently] answered but for the fact that it also concerns the question 
of peace and may best be considered in connection with other proposals 
which have the same end in view. The President can only beg that his 
suggestion be considered entirely on its own merits and as if it had been 
made in other circumstances. 

" The President suggests that an early occasion be sought to call out from 
all the nations now at war such an avowal of their respective views as to 
the terms upon which the war might be concluded and the arrangements 
which would be deemed satisfactory as a guaranty against its renewal or 
the kindling of any similar conflict in the future as would make it possible 
frankly to compare them. He is indifferent as to the means taken to accom- 
plish this. He would be happy himself to serve, or even to take the initiative 
in its accomplishment, in any way that might prove acceptable, but he has no 
desire to determine the method or the instrumentality. One way will be as 
acceptable to him as another, if only the great object he has in mind be 
attained. 

" He takes the liberty of calling attention to the fact that the objects, which 
the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war, are 



DiPL():\jAT!c Notes 413 

virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the 
world. Each side desires to make the rights and privileges of weak peoples 
and small states as secure against aggression or denial in the future as the 
rights and privileges of the great and powerful states now at war. Each 
wishes itself to be made secure in the future, along with all other nations 
and peoples, against the recurrence of wars like this and against aggression 
or selfish interference of any kind. Each would be jealous of the forma- 
tion of any more rival leagues to preserve an uncertain balance of power 
amid multiplying suspicions ; but each is ready to consider the formation 
of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world. 
Before that final step can be taken, however, each deems it necessary first 
to settle the issues of the present war upon terms which will certainly 
safeguard the independence, the territorial integrity, and the political and 
commercial freedom of the nations involved. 

■' In the measures to be taken to secure the future peace of the world the 
people and government of the United States are as vitally and as directly 
interested as the governments now at war. Their interest, moreover, in 
the means to be adopted to relieve the smaller and weaker peoples of the 
world of the peril of wrong and violence is as quick and ardent' as that of 
any other people or government. They stand ready, and even eager, to 
co-operate in the accomplishment of these ends, when the war is over, with 
every influence and resource at their command. But the war must first be 
concluded. The terms upon wdiich it is to be concluded they are not at 
liberty to suggest ; but the President does feel that it is his right and his 
duty to point out their intimate interest in its conclusion, lest it should pres- 
ently be too late to accomplish the greater things which lie beyond its con- 
clusion, lest the situation of neutral nations, now exceedingly hard to endure, 
be rendered altogether intoleralile, and lest, more than all, an injury be done 
civilization itself which can never be atoned for or repaired. 

" The President therefore feels altogether justified in suggesting an imme- 
diate opportunity for a comparison of views as to the terms which must 
precede those ultimate arrangements for the peace of the world, which all 
desire and in which the neutral nations as well as those at war are ready 
to play their full responsible part. If the contest must continue to proceed 
toward undefined ends by slow attrition until the one group of belligerents 
or the other is exhausted : if million after million of human lives must 
continue to be offered up until on the one side or the other there are no 
more to offer ; if resentments must be kindled that can never cool and 
despairs engendered from which there can be no recovery, hopes of peace 
and of the willing concert of free peoples will be rendered vain and idle. 

" The life of the entire world has been profoundly affected. Every part of 
the great family of mankind has felt the burden and terror of this unpre- 
cedented contest of arms. No nation in the civilized world can be said in 
truth to stand outside its influence or to be safe against its disturbing- 
effects. And yet the concrete objects for which it is being waged have 
never been definitely stated. 

" The leaders of the several belligerents have, as has been said, stated 
those objects in general terms. But, stated in general terms, they seem the 
same on both sides. Never yet have the authoritative spokesmen of either 
side avowed the precise objects which would, if attained, satisfy them and 
their people that the war had been fought out. The world has been left to 
conjecture what definitive results, what actual exchange of guaranties, what 
political or territorial changes or readjustments, what stage of military suc- 
cess, even, would bring the war to an end. 

" It may be that peace is nearer than we know ; that the terms which the 
belligerents on the one side and on the other other would deem it necessary 
to insist upon are not so irreconcilable as some have feared ; that an inter- 
change of views would clear the way at least for conference and make the 
permanent concord of the nations a hope of the immediate future, a concert 
of nations immediately practicable. 

16 



414 International Notes 

" The President is not proposing peace ; he is not even offering mediation. 
He is merely proposing that soundings be taken in order that we may learn, 
the neutral nations with the belligerent, how near the haven of peace may 
be for which all mankind longs with an intense and increasing longing. He 
believes that the spirit in which he speaks and the objects which he seeks 
will be understood by all concerned, and he confidently hopes for a response 
which will bring a new light into the affairs of the world. 

'■ Lansing." 
— New York Times, 21/12. 

Secretary Lansing's Explanations. — On December 20, when the Presi- 
dent's note was made public, Secretary Lansing issued two statements 
regarding its purpose, the second correcting a wrong impression made by 
the first. Though the statements aroused much comment, neither contains 
ideas that are not clearly implied in the note itself. The first statement 
reads : 

" The re'asons for the sending of the note were as follows : 

" It isn't our material interest we had in mind when the note was sent, 
but more and more our own rights are becoming involved by the belliger- 
ents on both sides, so that the situation is becoming increasingly critical. 

'' I mean by that that we are drawing nearer the verge of war ourselves, 
and therefore we are entitled to know exactly what each belligerent seeks, 
in order that we may regulate our conduct in the future. 

" No nation has been sounded. No consideration of the German over- 
tures or of the speech of Lloyd George was taken into account in the 
formulation of the document. The only thing the overtures did was to delay 
it a few days. It was not decided to send it until Monday. Of course, the 
difiiculties that faced the President were that it might be construed as a 
movement toward peace and in aid of the German overtures. He specifically 
denies that that was the fact in the document itself. 

" The sending of this note will indicate the possibility of our being forced 
into the war. That possibility ought to serve as a restraining and sobering 
force, safeguarding American rights. It may also serve to force an earlier 
conclusion of the war. Neither the President nor myself regard this note 
as a peace note ; it is merely an effort to get the belligerents to define the 
end for which they are fighting." 

Later in the day the Secretary issued the following statement : 

'■ I have learned from several quarters that a wrong impression was 
made by the statement which I made this morning, and I wish to correct 
that impression. 

" My intention was to suggest the very direct and necessary interest 
which this country, as one of the neutral nations, has in the possible terms 
which the belligerents may have in mind, and I did not intend to intimate 
that the government was considering any change in its policy of neutrality, 
which it has consistentl\- pursued in the face of constantly increasing 
difiiculties. 

'■ I regret that my words were open to any other construction, as I now 
realize that they were. I think that the whole tone and language of the 
note to the belligerents show the purpose without further comment on my 
part. It is needless to say that I am unreservedly in support of that purpose 
and hope to see it accepted." 

The German Reply. — On December 26 the Central Powers, in messages 
of similar purport, replied to the President's note by expressing the 
opinion that terms could best be presented in " an immediate meeting of 
delegates of the belligerent states at some neutral place." Germany's note 
follows : 



Diplomatic Notes 415 

" The high-minded suggestion made by the President of the United 
States of America in order to create a basis for the establishment of lasting 
peace has been received and considered by the Imperial Government in the 
friendly spirit in which it is expressed. 

" In the President's communication the President points out that which 
he has at heart and leaves open the choice of the road. To the Imperial 
Government an immediate exchange of views seems to be the most appro- 
priate road in order to reach the desired result. It begs, therefore, in the 
sense of the declaration made on December 12, which held out a hand for 
peace negotiations, to propose an immediate meeting of delegates of the 
belligerent states at some neutral place. 

" The Imperial Government is also of opinion that the great work of 
preventing future wars can be begun only after the end of the present 
struggle of nations. It will, when the moment shall have come, be ready 
with pleasure to collaborate fully with the United States in this exalted 
task." 

The note concludes in the usual diplomatic terms of politeness. 

The Entente Reply. — After considerable delay, the Entente Powers on 
January 10 presented a joint note in response to the President's proposal of 
December 18. Concurring in the hope of securing an enduring peace, the 
note expressed the belief that " it is impossible at the present moment to 
attain a peace .... which would permit the establishment of the future of 
European nations on a solid basis." After condemning the objects and 
methods of the Central Powers, it proceeds, in the third paragraph from 
the end, to give a concrete statement of the objects of the Entente in the 
war. 

The following is the translation of the French note : 

"American Embassy, Paris, Jan. 10, 1917. 

" The allied governments have received the note which was delivered to 
them in the name of the government of the United States on the igth of 
December, 1916. They have studied it with the care imposed upon them 
both by the exact realization which they have of the gravity of the hour 
and by the sincere friendship which attaches them to the American people. 

" In a general way they wish to declare that they pay tribute to the eleva- 
tion of the sentiment with which the American note is inspired and that 
they associate themselves, with all their hopes, with the project for the 
creation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the 
world. They recognize all the advantages for the cause of humanity and 
civilization which the institution of international agreements, destined to 
avoid violent conflicts between nations would prevent — agreements which 
must imply the sanctions necessary to insure their execution, and thus to 
prevent an apparent security from only facilitating new aggressions. 

" But a discussion of future arrangements destined to insure an enduring 
peace presupposes a satisfactory settlement of the actual conflict. The 
Allies have as profound a desire as the government of the United States 
to terminate as soon as possible a war for which the Central Empires are 
responsible, and which inflicts such cruel sufferings upon humanity. But 
they believe that it is impossible at the present moment to attain a peace 
which will assure them reparation, restitution, and such guarantees to which 
they are entitled by the aggression for which the responsibility rests with 
the Central Powers, and of which the principle itself tended to ruin the 
security of Europe — a peace which would, on the other hand, permit the 
establishment of the future of European nations on a solid basis. The 
allied nations are conscious that they are not fighting for selfish interests, 
but, above all, to safeguard the independence of peoples, of right, and of 
humanity. ' 



4i6 International Notes 

" The Allies are fully aware of the losses and suffering which the war 
'Causes to neutrals as well as to belligerents, and they deplore them, but 
they do not hold themselves responsible for them, having in no way 
either willed or provoked this war ; and they strive to reduce these damages 
in the measure compatible with the inexorable exigencies of their defense 
against the violence and the wiles of the enemy. 

" It is with satisfaction, therefore, that they take note of the declaration 
that the American communication is in nowise associated in its origin 'with 
that of the Central Powers transmitted on the i8th of Deceml^er by the 
government of the United States. They did not doubt, moreover, the 
resolution of that government to' avoid even the appearance of a support, 
even moral, of the authors responsible for the war. 

" The allied governments believe that they must protest in the most 
friendly but in the most specific manner against the assimilation, established 
in the American note, between the two groups of belligerents ; this assimila- 
tion, based upon public declarations by the Central Powers, is in direct 
opposition to the evidence, both as regards responsibility for the past and 
as concerns guarantees for the future ; President Wilson, in mentioning it, 
certainly had no intention of associating himself with it. 

" If there is a historical fact established at the present date, it is the 
willful aggression of Germany and Austria-Hungary to insure their hege- 
mony over Europe and their economic domination over the world. Germany 
proved by her declaration of war, by the immediate violation of Belgium 
and Luxemburg, and by her manner of conducting the war, her simulating 
contempt for all principles of humanity and all respect for small states. 
As the conflict developed, the attitude of the Central Powers and their 
allies has been a continual defiance of humanity and civilization. 

" Is it necessary to recall the horrors which accompanied the invasion 
'of Belgium and of Serbia, the atrocious regime imposed upon the invaded 
countries, the massacre of hundreds of thousands of inoffensive Armenians, 
the barbarities perpetrated against the populations of Syria, the raids of 
Zeppelins on open towns, the destruction ]:)y submarines of passenger 
steamers and of merchantmen even under neutral flags, the cruel treatment 
inflicted upon prisoners of war, the juridical murders of Miss Cavell, of 
Captain Fryatt. the deportation and the reduction to slavery of civil popu- 
lations, ct cetera? The execution of such a series of crimes, perpetrated 
without any regard for universal reprobation, fully explains to President 
Wilson the protest of the Allies. 

" They consider that the note which they sent to the United States in reply 
to the German note will be a response to the questions put by the American 
Government, and, according to the exact words of the latter, ' constitute 
a public declaration as to the conditions upon which the war could be 
terminated.' 

" President Wilson desires more : he desires that the belligerent powers 
openly afiirm the objects which they seek by continuing the war; the 
Allies experience no difficulty in replying to this request. Their objects in 
the war are well known ; they have been formulated on many occasions by 
the chiefs of their divers governments. Their objects will not be made 
known in detail with all the equitable compensation and indemnities for 
damages suffered until the hour of negotiations. But the civilized world 
knows that they imply, in all necessity and in the first instance, the restora- 
tion of Belgium, of Serbia, and of Montenegro, and the indemnities which 
are due them ; the evacuation of the invaded territories of France, of 
Russia, and of Rumania, with just reparation ; the reorganization of Europe, 
guaranteed by a stable regime and founded as much upon respect of 
nationalities and full security and liberty of economic development, which 
all nations, great or small, possess, as upon territorial conventions and 
international agreements, suitable to guarantee territorial and maritime 
frontiers against unjustified attacks ; the restitution of provinces or terri- 
tories wrested in the past from the .'Mlies by force or against the will of 



Diplomatic Notes 417 

their populations ; the Hberation of Itahans, of Slavs, of Rumanians, and of 
Tcheco-Slovaques from foreign domination ; the enfranchisement of popu- 
lations subject to the bloody tyranny of the Turks; the expulsion from 
Europe of the Ottoman Empire, decidedly alien to Western civilization. 
The intentions of his Majesty, the Emperor of Russia, regarding Poland 
have been clearly indicated in the proclamation which he has just addressed 
to his armies. 

" It goes without saying that if the Allies wish to liberate Europe from 
the brutal covetousness of Prussian militarism it never has been their 
design, as has been alleged, to encompass the extermination of the German 
peoples and their political disappearance. That which they desire above all 
is to insure a peace upon the principles of liberty and justice, upon the 
inviolable fidelity to international obligations with which the government 
of the United States has never ceased to be inspired. 

" United in the pursuit of this supreme object, the Allies are determined, 
individually and collectively, to act with all their power and to consent to 
all sacrifices to bring to a victorious close a conflict upon which, they are 
convinced, not only their own safety and prosperity depend, but also the 
future of civilization itself. 

Separate Reply from Belgium. — Belgium, in a separate reply of the same 
date (January 10), protested against any implication that the objects of the 
opposing powers were similar, and supported her protest by reciting the 
circumstances which forced her to enter the war. The note closed with the 
hope of support from the United States in securing restoration and repara- 
tion for Belgium in the definitive settlement of the war. 

Skparate Reply from Great Britain. — The press of January 18 pub- 
lished an additional note from Mr. Balfour, British Foreign Minister, dated 
January 13, and supplementing the Entente note of January .10. The 
British statement is a defense of the Entente terms, including the expulsion 
of Turkey from Europe, the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, and 
Italia Irredenta to Italy. The note closes as follows : 

" Though, therefore, the people of this country share to the full the 
desire of the President for peace, they do not believe peace can be durable 
if it be not based on the success of the allied cause. For a durable peace 
can hardly be expected unless three conditions are fulfilled : The first is 
that existing causes of international unrest should be as far as possible 
removed or weakened ; the second is that the aggressive aims and the 
unscrupulous methods of the Central Powers should fall into disrepute 
among their own peoples ; the third is that behind international law and 
behind all treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting hostilities some 
form of international sanction should be devised which would give pause to 
the hardiest aggressor." 

Responses from Neutrals. — Copies of President Wilson's request for a 
statement of aims on the part of belligerents were sent to neutral govern- 
ments for their information. The replies were in general non-committal. 
Switzerland (December 25) noted that the two republics had been for some 
time in touch with each other, and frankly pledged the Swiss Government's 
cooperation in the President's efforts. Spain in a note dated December 29, 
assuming from the manner in which the President's message was ])resented 
that her cooperation was invited, expressed sympathy with the movement 
but a belief that " the action in which Spain is invited to participate would 



4i8 International Notes 

not be effective, especially as the Central Empires have expressed their 
intention that the peace conditions shall be accorded exclusively among the 
belligerents." The language of the identical notes sent by Norway, Sweden, 
and Denmark (December 29) was as follows : 

" It is with the liveliest interest that the Norwegian Government has 
learned of the proposals which the President of the United States has just 
made with the purpose of facilitating measures looking toward the estab- 
lishment of a durable peace, while at the same time seeking to avoid any 
interference which could cause otfense to legitimate sentiments. 

" The Norwegian Government would consider itself failing in its duties 
toward its own people and toward humanity if it did not express its deepest 
sympathy with all efforts which would contribute to put an end to the ever- 
increasing suffering and the moral and material losses. It has every hope 
that the initiative of President Wilson will arrive at a result worthy of 
the high purpose which inspires it. 

ENTENTE REPLY TO GERMAN PROPOS.'XL FOR PEACE 
CONFERENCE 

The attitude of the Entente Powers toward the enemy's proposal for a 
conference of belligerents was clearly indicated by Premier Lloyd George's 
first speech to the British Parliament on December 19. The Premier in this 
speech outlined plans for vigorous prosecution of the war, and reiterated 
the terms put forward by his predecessor : " Restitution, reparation, guar- 
antees against repetition." 

The reply itself took the form of a collective note made public in Paris 
and London December 30. After declaring that a proposal for negotiations 
was " less an offer of peace than a war maneuver," the note seeks to show 
that the war was " desired, provoked, and declared by Germany," and 
thereupon refuses " to consider a proposal which is empty and insincere." 
The last part of the note deals entirely with Belgium. 

The text : 

" The allied governments of Belgium, France, Great Britain, Italy, Japan, 
Montenegro, Portugal, Rumania, Russia, and Serbia, united for the defense 
of the liberty of their peoples and faithful to engagements taken not to lay 
down their arms separately, have resolved to reply collectively to the pre- 
tended propositions of peace which were addressed to them on behalf of the 
enemy governments through the intermediary of the United States, Spain, 
Switzerland, and Holland. 

" Before making any reply, the allied powers desire particularly to pro- 
test against the two essential assertions of the notes of the enemy powers 
that pretend to throw upon the Allies responsibility for the war and 
proclaim the victory of the Central Powers. The allied governments can- 
not admit an affirmation doubly inexact and which suffices to render sterile 
all tentative negotiations. The allied nations have sustained for 30 months 
a war they did everything to avoid. They have shown by their acts their 
attachment to peace. That attachment is as strong to-day as it was in 1914. 
But it is not upon the word of Germany, after the violation of its engage- 
ments, that the peace broken by her may be based. 

" A mere suggestion without a statement of terms, that negotiations 
should be opened, is not an offer of peace. The putting forward by the 
Imperial Government of a sham proposal lacking all substance and precision 
would appear to be less an offer of peace than a war maneuver. It is 
founded on calculated misinterpretation of the character of the struggle 
in the past, the present, and the future. 



Diplomatic Notes 419 

" As for the past, the German note takes no account of the facts, dates, 
and figures, which estabHsh that the war was desired, provoked, and 
declared b}' Germany and Austria-Hungary. 

■' At The Hague Conference it was a German delegate who refused all 
proposals for disarmament. In July, 1914, it was Austria-Hungary, who, 
after having addressed to Serbia an unprecedented ultimatum, declared 
war upon her in spite of the satisfaction which had at once been accorded. 

" The Central Empires then rejected all attempts made by the Entente to 
bring about a pacific solution of a purely local conflict. Great Britain sug- 
gested a conference ; France proposed an international commission ; the 
Emperor of Russia asked the German Emperor to go to arbitration, and 
Russia and Austria-Hungary came to an understanding on the eve of the 
conflict. But to all these efl^orts Germany gave neither answer nor effect. 

" Belgium was invaded by an empire which had guaranteed her neutrality 
and which had the assurance to proclaim that treaties were ' scraps of 
paper,' and that ' necessity knows no law.' 

" At the present moment these sham offers on the part of Germany rest 
on the war map of Europe alone, which represents nothing more than a 
superficial and passing phase of the situation and not the real strength of 
the belligerents. A peace concluded upon these terms would be only to the 
advantage of the aggressors, who, after imagining that they would reach 
their goal in two months, discovered after two years, that they could 
never attain it. 

" As for the future, the disasters caused by the German declaration of 
war and the innumerable outrages committed by Germany and her allies 
against both belligerents and neutrals demand penalties, reparation and 
guarantees. Germany avoids mention of any of these. 

" In reality these overtures made by the Central Powers are nothing more 
than a calculated attempt to influence the future course of war and to end 
it by imposing a German peace. The object of these overtures is to create 
dissension in public opinion in the allied countries. But that public opinion 
has. in spite of all the sacrifices endured by the Allies, already given its 
answer with admirable firmness, and has denounced the empty pretense 
of the declaration of the enemy powers. 

"They [the peace overtures] liave the further object of stiffening public 
opinion in Germany and in the countries allied to her — one and all severely 
tried by their losses, worn out by economic pressure and crushed by the 
supreme effort which has been imposed upon their inhabitants. 

" They endeavor to deceive and intimidate public opinion in neutral 
countries, whose inhabitants have long since made up their minds where 
the initial responsibilities lie and are far too enlightened to favor the 
designs of Germany by abandoning the defense of human freedom. 

" Finalh', these overtures attempt to justify in advance in the eyes of the 
world a new series of crimes — submarine warfare, deportations, forced 
labor and forced enlistment of the inhabitants against their own countries, 
and violations of neutrality. 

" Fully conscious of the gravity of this moment, but equally conscious of 
its requirements, the allied governments, closely united to one another and 
in perfect sympathy with their peoples, refuse to consider a proposal which 
is empty and insincere. 

" Once again the Allies declare that no peace is possible so long as they 
have not secured reparation for violated rights and liberties, the recognition 
of the principle of nationality and of the free existence of small states, so 
long as they have not brought about a settlement calculated to end once 
and for all forces which have constituted a perpetual menace to the nations, 
and to afford the only effective guarantee for the future security of the 
world. 

" In conclusion, the allied powers think it necessary to put forward the 
following considerations, which show the special situation of Belgium after 
two and a half years of war. In virtue of the international treaties signed 



iNTERNA'liONAL NOTES 



by tive great European powers, of which Germany was one, Belgium 
enjoyed before the war a special status, rendering her territory inviolable 
and placing her, under the guarantee of the powers, outside all European 
conflicts. She was, however, in spite of these treaties, the first to suffer the 
aggression of Germany. For this reason the Belgian Government thinks 
it necessary to define the aims which Belgium has never ceased to pursue 
while fighting side by side with the Entente Powers for right and justice. 

■■ Belgium has always scrupulously fulfilled the duties which her neutrality 
imposed upon her. She has taken up arms to defend her independence 
and her neutrality violated by Germany and to show that she remains 
faithful to her international obligations. 

" On the 4th of August, 1914, in the Reichstag the German Chancellor 
admitted that this aggression constituted an injustice, contrary to the laws 
of nations, and pledged himself in the name of Germany to repair it. 
During two and a half years this injustice has been cruelly aggravated by 
the proceedings of the occupying forces, which have exhausted. the resources 
of the country, ruined its industries, devastated its towns and villages, and 
have been responsible for innumerable massacres, executions and imprison- 
ments. 

" At this very moment, while Germany is proclaiming peace and humanity 
to the world, she is deporting Belgian citizens by thousands and reducing 
them to slavery. 

" Belgium before the war asked for nothing liut to live in harmony with 
her neighbors. Her King and her government have liut one aim — the 
reestablishment of peace and justice. But they only desire peace which 
would assure to their country legitimate reparation, guarantees and safe- 
guards for the future." — A'. ]'. Tiiiirs, 31/^2. 

Entkntk Confkrknck .\t Rome 

A conference of Entente ministers and military leaders was held in Rome 
during the week ending January 6. Though the results are not disclosed, 
the object of the conference was presumably to supplement unity of airus 
with better coordination of action on the various fronts, and in particular 
to agree on a more positive policy in Greece. It is significant that General 
Sarrail was present at the conference, and that on December 31 a new 
ultimatum was dispatched to Greece. 

British 1mi'kri.\]. W.-xr Conference 

Great Britain has issued a call to the prime ministers of her self-govern- 
ing dominions for a war conference to be held the latter part of February. 
The purpose is indicated liy the telegram sent out by the Colonial Secretary 
on December 25: 

" I wnsh to explain that what his Majesty's government contemplates is 
not a session of the ordinary Imperial Conference, but a special war con- 
ference of the empire. They, therefore, invite your Prime Minister to 
attend a series of special and continuous meetings of the War Cabinet, in 
order to consider urgent questions affecting the prosecution of the war, 
the possible conditions on which, in agreement with our allies, we could 
assent to its termination, and the problems which will then immediately 
arise. For the purpose of these meetings your Prime Minister would be 
a racml)er of tlie \^'ar Ca))inet. — London Times, 27/12. 



Diplomatic Notes 421 

PENDING SUBMARINE CONTKO\ERSIES 
" Arabia " 
According to a statement issued 1)y Secretary Lansing on December 23, 
the Department of State had received information from the British Govern- 
m.ent that the P. and O. Hner Arabia, torpedoed November 6, was not and 
had not been a government transport, though she carried some passengers 
traveling at government expense. 

'■ COI.LMBIAX " 

The German reply to inquiries of the United States regarding the 
American steamship Colu))ibiaii, sunk in the Mediterranean November 8, 
was made public December 19. The reply justified the destruction of the 
vessel on the grounds; (i) that, contrary to the American statement, the 
vessel carried a cargo of steel and other war materials destined for Genoa : 
and (2) that, after having first been dismissed by the submarine, the vessel 
sent out wireless calls conveying information to the enemy. The vessel 
was then stopped, her papers were examined, and she was sunk the follow- 
ing day. The crew were put aboard a Norwegian ship and landed at the 
Bay of Camarinas, Spain. 

" Russian " 

The British steamer Russian, having landed a cargo of horses at 
Salonika, and while returning to Newport News, was torpedoed on 
December 14 near Malta. In the heavy seas and darkness, one of the life- 
boats capsized with the loss of 28 men, including 17 American muleteers. 
A detailed report from the American Consul at Malta was made public 
December 21. 

Captain Blaikif. 

According to a report from the U. S. Embassy at Berlin (December 19), 
the German Government has decided that Captain Blaikie, accused of 
attempting to ram a German submarine, should be held as an ordinary 
prisoner of war. The decision is based on the ground that Captain Blaikie's 
ship, the Caledonia, was an armed cruiser, and that the captain was carrying 
out his duty as a belligerent. 

CABINET CHANGES 
A u. stria 

Following the fall of the von Korber Cabinet, and the failure of Alexander 
Spitzmiiller, leader of the more strongly Germanistic element in Austria. 
to secure a ministry, the task was turned over to Count Clam-Martinitz. a 
Bohemian. 

The London Times (December 22), in giving the caliinet appointments. 
adds the following comment : 

" Should the Clam-Martinitz Cabinet be formed, and should it include 
Dr. Baernreither, it would probably represent a less drastic policy of 
Germanization in Austria than would have been represented by a Spitz- 
miiller Cabinet. From information given by the Austrian press and con- 



422 International Notes 

firmed from other sources, it is clear that the fall of Dr. von Korber was 
due to his stand against a scheme of ruthless Germanization. The scheme 
appears to have contemplated the complete exclusion of the Slav provinces 
of Galicia and Dalm.atia from Austria proper, the reorganization of admin- 
istrative districts in Bohemia so as to place the Czechs at the mercy of the 
Germans, and the proclamation of German as the language of state in 
Austria instead of the eight Austrian languages (German, Polish, Ruthen- 
ian, Czech, Slovene, Italian, Serbo-Croatian, and Rumanian) which have 
hitherto enjoyed equal ofificial recognition, though German has naturally 
been the predominant tongue and the general medium of intercourse." 

France 
By decrees of December 27 the title of Marshal of France was revived 
to honor General Joffre and he v^^as retired from active participation in the 
war councils. The control of the war is in the hands of the War Com- 
mittee, consisting, as stated in the preceding issue of the Institute, of 
the President, Premier, and Ministers of War, Marine, National Manu- 
factures, and Finance. 

Rl'ssia 

The latest of the extraordinary convulsions in the Russian Government 
was the resignation (January 9) of the Russian Premier, Alexander 
Trepoff. and the Minister of Public Instruction, Count Ignatieff. after less 
than two months in office. M. trepoff, whose appointment was regarded 
as a victory for the Duma, is succeeded by Prince Golitzine, 56 years of 
age, a member of the extreme conservative and reactionary group. While 
announcing that all efforts are to be centered in the prosecution of the 
war, the new Premier is averse to present internal reforms and to parlia- 
mentary interference. His views are in accord with those of M. 
Protopopoff, Minister of the Interior, who was an element of discord in 
Trepott's Cabinet and who is regarded as dominant in the present ministry. 

According to a report from Berlin (January 12), the fall of Trepoff was 
connected with the murder of the monk Gregory Rasputin. Attempts to 
shield those responsible for the murder led the Czar to take a decisive stand 
against radical elements. 

TtRKEY 

According to a note received in Washington on January i, Turkey 
repudiates the guardianship of the great Powers and proclaims her " entry 
into the group of European Powers, with all the rights and prerogatives 
of an entirely independent government." The Ottoman Government repudi- 
ates the Treaty of Paris of 1856 and the Treaty of Berlin of 1878, and 
announces that it has allied itself with Germany and Austria-Hungary " on 
a footing of entire equality." — A". }'. Nation, 4/1. 

Greece 
On December 31 Great Britain, France, and Russia presented a collective 
note to Greece again insisting on execution of the demands of the Allies, 
including transportation to the Peloponnessus of all cannon, machine guns, 
and surplus munitions, prohibition of meetings of reservists north of the 
Isthmus of Corinth, establishment of Allies' control, and apology and 



Diplomatic Notes 423 

reparation for the clash with Allies' forces December i and 2. The note 
pledged the Allies to maintain the neutral zone between Royalist and 
Venizelist forces, and stated that the blockade would be continued until 
satisfaction was accorded. 

The Greek reply was at first evasive, but according to later dispatches 
(January 17) the Greek Government accepted the Entente demands in their 
entirety, including the immediate release of Venizelist prisoners. 

On January i Great Britain announced the appointment of Earl Granville, 
Counsellor of the British Embassy at Paris, as diplomatic representative 
to the Venizelos Government. France appointed Robert de Billy, Counsel- 
lor at Rome, to similar duties. 

Mexico 
On January 15 the American-Mexican Joint Commission was formally 
dissolved. The American commissioners recommended that an ambassador 
be sent to Mexico to resume negotiations, in particular regarding an inter- 
national claims commission, protection of American life and property in 
Mexico, and protection of the border. 



REVIEW OF BOOKS 

ON 

SUBJFXTS OF PROFESSIONAL INTEREST 

" Inside the German Empire." By Herbert Ba3'ard Swope. 400 pages ; 16 
illustrations. Price $2.00 net. (New York: The Century Company, 1917.) 

An interesting outline of existing conditions from within the German Em- 
pire as seen by an American and set forth in a dispassionate style flowing; 
with the undercurrent of the German point of view. 

Mr. Swope expresses no personal opinions nor draws conclusions as to 
final outcome. He visualizes the present every-day life in the heart of the 
empire and strikingly records facts collected along the western battle lines. 
His manner of presentation is most stimulating and is a decided relief from 
the usual treatm-ent of the many side lights on the great war. H. S. C. 

" Examples in Alternating Currents." Volume I. F. E. Austin. Second 
ed. 220 pages; illustrated. Leather, $2.40. (New Hampshire: igi6. ) 

The introductory pages of this book present those principles of geometry, 
trigonometry and calculus which are of most importance in electrical 
engineering ; following these examples in pure mathematics there are given' 
57 electrical problems well chosen to illustrate the fundamentals of alter- 
nating currents. A number of pages are devoted to tables which provide 
short cuts in arithmetical work. 

The diagrams, always an important part of an electrical problem, are 
especially helpful, and the explanations of mathematical processes are so 
clear as to make this book valuable both to students who have the guidance, 
of a teacher and to those who are attempting to study electricity by 
themselves. J. B. A. 

" How to Make Low-Pressure Transformers." Prof. F. K. Austin. 
Third ed. 29 pages; illustrated. 40 cents. (New Hampshire: 1916.) 

This book tells very completely, and in simple language, how to con- 
struct a transformer to reduce the pressure from no volts to about S volts, 
as a mmimum, for experimental purposes. 

The author explains, step by step, how to construct a highly efficient 
transformer having a ring-shaped core and a secondary winding provided 
with taps for producing a variety of voltages. Directions are also given 
for building a transformer having a rectangular core, with coils wound 
on removable bobbins in order that the effect of various windings may 
be studied. 

Calculations are made to determine the cost of operation, to explain 
such terms as efficiency and regulation, and to show how the design may 
be modified where it is desired to operate the transformer on 220 volts. 

J. B. A. 



426 Review of Books 

'■ The Boy's Book of Famous Warships." B3' William O. Stevens, Pro- 
fessor of English, United States Naval Academy. 236 pages. Price $1.60. 
(New York: McBride & Co., 1916.) 

To write in a simple, familiar way, and yet to avoid the condescending, 
" Now my little readers " style, is the achievement of not every book for 
boys. Mr. Stevens' present volume has this merit; and, like his Story 
of Oitr Navy (Harpers), it does worthy service in gratifying the eagerness 
of youngsters for books about battles and about the sea. 

Taking his examples from all periods, and writing from ample historical 
knowledge, the author gives a good bird's-eye view of naval warfare from 
Salamis to present times. ' Down to the Victory or even the Monitor, the 
famous ships are also typical war-craft of their periods and fought in 
battles of historic importance. From this point of view, it is unfortunate 
that the Emden, whose exploits are related in the last chapter, is not a 
better example of modern naval progress. 

From an international standpoint, also, the book may appear a bit one- 
sided. Of the 14 ships whose careers are outlined, six are British and six 
American ; but there is no representative of Holland, France, or Spain, 
though these nations in their day were formidable rivals of Britain for sea 
control. Were the ships nameless in which the elder Tromp and De Ruyter 
first made naval warfare a science and fought valiantly against England 
and her allies? For the sake of variety, would it not have been well to 
chronicle the five or six hard-fought engagements of Suffren's flagship 
Her OS, in which the greatest of French admirals shook British power in 
the East, and once inflicted on his opponent losses exceeding those of the 
I'ictory at Trafalgar? 

But in naval matters, Britain has always claimed the lion's share; and 
since this book is for American boys, it is no doubt right that half of its 
pages should be devoted to the stirring deeds of our own ships, from the 
Constitution and Essex to the Alabama and the little Htuiley — the first 
successful submarine. The book closes with an axiom that time has not 
deprived of its force : " It is still true now as it was in the days of the oar 
that the things that make a man-of-war famous are the courage, initiative, 
and skill of the officers and men who fight on her decks." A. F. W. 



NOTICE 

The U. S. Naval Institute was established in 1873, having for its object 
the advancement of professional and scientific knowrledge in the Navy. It 
is now in its forty-fourth year of existence, trusting as heretofore for its 
support to the officers and friends of the Navy. The members of the Board 
of Control cordially invite the co-operation and aid of their brother officers 
and others interested in the Navy, in furtherance of the aims of the Insti- 
tute, by the contribution of papers and communications upon subjects of 
interest to the naval profession, as well as by personal support and influence. 

On the subject of membership the Constitution reads as follows: 

ARTICLE VII 

Sec. I. The Institute shall consist of regular, life, honorary, and associate 
members. 

Sec. 2. Officers of the Navy, Marine Corps, and all civil officers attached 
to the Naval Service, shall be entitled to become regular or life members, 
without ballot, on payment of dues or fees to the Secretary and Treasurer. 
Members who resign from the Navy subsequent to joining the Institute 
will be regarded as belonging to the class described in this Section. 

Sec. 3. The Prize Essayist of each year shall be a life member without 
payment of fee. 

Sec. 4. Honorary members shall be selected from distinguished Naval and 
Military Officers, and from eminent men of learning in civil life. The 
Secretary of the Navy shall be, ex officio, an honorary member. Their 
number shall not exceed thirty (30). Nominations for honorary members 
must be favorably reported by the Board of Control, and a vote equal to 
one-half the number of regular and life members, given by proxy or pres- 
ence, shall be cast, a majority electing. 

Sec. 5. Associate members shall be elected from Officers of the Army, 
Revenue Cutter Service, foreign officers of the Naval and Military pro- 
fessions, and from persons in civil life who may be interested in the pur- 
poses of the Institute. 

Sec. 6. Those entitled to become associate members may be elected life 
members, provided that the number not officially connected with the Navy 
and Marine Corps shall not at any time exceed one hundred (100). 

Sec. 7. Associate members and life members, other than those entitled to- 
regular membership, shall be elected as follows : " Nominations shall be 
made in writing to the Secretary and Treasurer, with the name of the mem- 
ber making them, and such nominations shall be submitted to the Board of 
Control, and, if their report be favorable, the Secretary and Treasurer shall 
make known the result at the next meeting of the Institute, and a vote shall 
then be taken, a majority of votes cast by members present electing." 

Sec. 8. The annual dues for regular and associate members shall be two 
dollars, all of which shall be for a year's subscription to the United States 
Naval Institute Proceedings, payable upon joining the Institute, and upon 
the first day of each succeeding January. The fee for life membership 
shall be thirty dollars, but if any regular or associate member has paid his 
dues for the year in which he wishes to be transferred to life membership, 
or has paid his dues for any future year or years, the amount so paid shall 
be deducted from the fee for life membership. 

ARTICLE X 

Sec. 2. One copy of the Proceedings, when published, shall be furnished 
to each regular and associate member (in return for dues paid), to each 
life member (in return for life membership fee paid), to honorary mem- 
bers, toeach corresponding society of the Institute, and to such libraries 
and periodicals as may be determined upon by the Board of Contrt)!. 

The Proceedings are published monthly, and anyone may subscribe for 
them. The annual subscription is $3.00; single copies, 50' cents for the 
bi-monthly and quarterly, and 30 cents for the monthly Proceedings. 
Annual dues for members and associate members, $2.00. Fee for life 
membership, $30.00. 

All letters should be addressed U. S. Naval Institute, Annapolis, Md., 
and all checks, drafts, and money orders should be made payable to the same. 



SPECIAL NOTICE 

NAVAl INSTITUTE PRIZE ESSAY, 1918 

A prize of two hundred dollars, with a gold medal, and a life-member- 
ship (unless the author is already a life member) in the Institute, is 
offered by the Naval Institute for the best essay presented on any subject 
pertaining to the naval profession. 

On the opposite page are given suggested topics. Essays are not limited 
to these topics and no additional weight will be given an essay in awarding 
the prize because it is written on one of these suggested topics over one 
written on any subject pertaining to the naval profession. 

The following rules will govern this competition : 

1. The award for the prize will be made by the Board of Control, voting 
by ballot and without knowledge of the names of the competitors. 

2. Each competitor to send his essay in a sealed envelope to the Secre- 
tary and Treasurer on or before January i, 1918. The name of the writer 
shall not be given in this envelope, but instead thereof a motto. Accom- 
panying the essay a separate sealed envelope will be sent to the Secretary 
and Treasurer, with the motto on the outside and writer's name and motto 
inside. This envelope is not to be opened until after the decision of the 
Board. 

3. The successful essay to be published in the Proceedings of the Insti- 
tute ; and the essays of other competitors, receiving honorable mention, to 
be published also, at the discretion of the Board of Control ; and no change 
shall be made in the text of any competitive essay, published in the Pro- 
ceedings of the Institute, after it leaves the hands of the Board. 

4. If, in the opinion of the Board of Control, the best essay presented 
is not of sufficient merit to be awarded the prize, it may receive " Honor- 
able Mention " or such other distinction as the Board may decide. 

5. In case one or more essays receive " Honorable Mention," the writers 
thereof will receive a minimum prize of seventy-five dollars and a life- 
membership (unless the author is already a life member) in the Institute, 
the actual amounts of the awards to be decided by the Board of Control 
m each case. 

6. An essay not having received honorable mention may be published 
also, at the discretion of the Board of Control, but only with the consent 
of the author. 

7. The essay is limited to fifty (50) printed pages in the Proceedings of 
the Institute. 

8. It is requested that all essays be submitted typewritten and in duplicate, 
if practicable ; essays submitted written in longhand and in single copy will, 
however, receive equal consideration. 

9. In the event of the prize being awarded to the winner of a previous 
year, a gold clasp, suitably engraved, will be given in lieu of the gold 
medal. 

By direction of the Board of Control. 

J. W. GREEN SLADE, 
Lieut. Cotnmander. U. S. N.. Secretary and Treasurer 



PRIZE ESSAY TOPICS 
Suggested at the Invitation of the Board of Control 

BY 

THE PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL INSTITUTE, THE SUPERINTENDENT 
OF THE NAVAL ACADEMY, THE PRESIDENT OF THE NAVAL WAR 
COLLEGE, AND THE COMMANDERS-IN-CHIEF OF THE ATLANTIC, 
PACIFIC AND ASIATIC FLEETS. 

" The Mutual Relations of Gunnery and Tactics.'' 

" The Place of the Naval Officer in International Affairs." 

" The Evolution of Naval Doctrine from National Character." 

" The Training of Enlisted Personnel to Produce Modern Man-o'- 

Warsmen : (a) Military Training; (b) Moral Training; 

(c) Education." 
" The Organization, Employment and Training of Reserve Fleets 

and Flotillas." 
" A Personnel Reserve for the Naval Service." 
"" Value of Speed as an Oiifensive Element in Battleship Strategy 

and Tactics, as Compared with Armor." 



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For Space and Rates in our advertising 
pages communicate with the 

SECRETARY AND TREASURER 

U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE 
ANNAPOLIS, MD. 

and not with our former agent 



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DAVIDSON PUMPS 

WITH IMPROVED VALVE MOTION 

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You Are An American! 

Keep In Touch^'With Your Nation 
By READING the 

NATIONAL REVIEW 

THE ORGAN OF PREPAREDNESS 

AND OF 

NATIONAL AFFAIRS 

On All Newsstands 15c. the Copy Yearly Subscription $1.50 

Special Series of Illustrations Now Appearing 

New American Super-Dreadnaughts Soldier and Sailor Monuments of the 

American Military Schools Country 

American Geniuses of Invention American Cities Worth Defending 

Notable Portraits of American Heroes Leading Cartoons of the Month 

Army and Navy Officers in Command Our National Parks 

Women Leaders of National Defense Our Lands Across the Sea 

Regular Departments Each Afont/i 

National Events of the The Army and the Navy Patriotic and Historical 

Month Universal Service ?\ayr, and Photo Plays 

The Administration Civilian Training Magazine Articles of the 

Congressional Military Education Month 

Political Civic Progress New Books 

National Reform Colonial America 

Says The Army and Navy Journal: — "The initial number of ^r ,^ 

June, 1916, gives excellent promise of the future of the publi- ^r ^o ^ 

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Says The Worcester (Mass.) Gazette:— "The text <^V e^.'^o"^^ 
cartoons and general spirit of the publication are so O^ ^ -^ 

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METALLIC PACKINGS 

FOR MAIN ENGINE PISTON RODS 
VALVE STEMS AND AUXILIARIES 

The United States Metallic Packing Co. 

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Our Specialty: Outfitting Chief Petty and Warrant Officers 



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A COMPLETE LINE OF GOODS FOR CIVILIAN DRESS 
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UNDERWOOD STANDARD TYPEWRITER 

The UNDERWOOD is designed on correct mechanical principles 
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(18) 



THE ALLEN DENSE AIR ICE MACHINE 

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Contains onl\ air of 75 lbi> pressure in refrigerating pipes. At about 30 
degrees below zero wlien seawater is at 90 degrees. More than two hun- 
dred ill use on U. S. Naval \ easels. Some since 1888. 

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NICKEL 



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The Lord Baltimore Press 



PRINTERS AND 
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Tde GoHia steam Trap 

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The Marine Corps Score Book 



A Rifleman's Instructor 



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Adopted by the War Department and issued by the Ordnance Department to organizations of the 
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Bethlehem Steel Company 

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Armor Plate Turrets Projectiles 

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It is a monthly magazine devoted to the interests of the 
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( -3 ) 



ELECTRIC BOAT 
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. ( 24 ) 



■iiiiMaiiwtiiii 



U. S. NAVAL INSTITUTE 
PROCEEDINGS 

Number 168 



. ...ii. ,.. i\i.mBmmmmmmmmmmmmiimmmmmmmmmmm 



The HF Group 

Indiana Plant 
093994 C 25 00