The processes of history [by] Frederick J. Teggart

NIVERSITY OF CA RIVERSIDE, LIBRARY

UNIVERSIT

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THE LIBRARY

OF

THE UNIVERSITY

OF CALIFORNIA

RIVERSIDE

THE PROCESSES OF HISTORY

The Processes of History

FREDERICK J. TEGGART

(^Associate 'Professor of History in the

UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA

NEW HAVEN
YALE UNIVERSITY PRESS

LONDON: HUMPHREY MILFORD

OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

MDCCCCXVni

Copyright, 1918
By Yale University Press

First published, April, 191 8

PREFACE

The question "Is History a science?" has now
been debated by successive generations of histo-
rians without any general agreement having been
reached. It would seem, therefore, that in some
particular the problem had been wrongly stated.
Hence, following the critique presented in my
Prolegomena to History, I have approached the
whole matter from a new angle by asking what
sort of results might be obtained by a strict appli-
cation of the method of science to the facts of his-
tory. The outcome of this procedure, stated in
general terms, is an attempt to do for human his-
tory what biologists are engaged in doing for the
history of the forms of life, and this publication
offers in summary form a first analysis of the fac-
tors and processes manifested in the history of
man.

For the sake of clearness, and in order that the
essential considerations might be brought within
a brief comprehensive view, the argument has
been condensed and made as explicit as circum-
stances would permit. Since footnotes and cita-

[v]

PREFACE

tions of authorities have also been eliminated in
the interest of brevity and directness, it should
be understood that there is no view expressed
which, I believe, is not already familiar to stu-
dents in one or another branch of humanistic in-
quiry. So far as I am aware, all that is new in the
present contribution is the co-ordination into one
consistent statement of results which are well
known, but which are widely scattered through-
out the literature of anthropology, history, po-
litical science, philology, education, geography,
and other studies. Further than this, the most
significant feature of the book is an insistence
that, in dealing with a problem of this magni-
tude, the prime requisite must be an exacting
care in regard to the method employed. Hence,
it seems to me, that the questions for immediate
consideration are: first, whether the problems of
method have been correctly stated; and, second,
whether the factors and processes indicated are
correctly described.

More generally, there is no disguising the fact
that the present world-situation is imperative in
forcing men to question searchingly the validity
of their own activities. Are, then, those of us who
are engaged in the study of History doing all that

[vi]

PREFACE

lies within our power to make our inquiries con-
tributory to the well-being of our fellow-men?
We must admit that while, during the last fifty
years, the students of Nature have most signifi-
cantly enlarged the knowledge of the world in
which we live, the students of Man have made
no such striking advance in their field of investi-
tion. It is true that we have been persistent in the
collection of facts, and in the refinement of the
technique of investigation, but it would seem as
if the utilization of all this accumulated knowl-
edge in the spirit of modern science might now
be undertaken. What, then, is presented here is a
tentative statement, based upon the application
of the method of science to the facts of History,
made in the earnest belief that inquiry conducted
along the lines marked out must ultimately lead
to an understanding of the difficulties that beset
our civilization, and to a furtherance of the wel-
fare of mankind.

[vii]

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

I. The Nature and Scope of the In-
quiry ..... I

II. The Geographical Factor in His-
tory ..... 41

III. The Human Factor in History . 79

IV. Method and Results . . .124

[ix]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE OF THE
INQUIRY

I. Science is, fundamentally, a method of deal-
ing with problems, and the initial step in any
scientific undertaking is the determination of the
problem to be investigated.

A survey of the present situation, in which men
everywhere find themselves involved on one or
the other side of a world-conflict, stimulates in-
terest in the wide differences that exist between
the many and various groups into which man-
kind is broken up. Thus, in the foreground, we
are vividly conscious of differing characteristics
when we speak of French, Belgians, and Italians,
Germans, Austrians, and Magyars; and impres-
sions associate themselves with the thought of
Canadians, Australians, and New Zealanders
which are not suggested by mention of English,
Scotch, and Irish. But the present conflict is not
restricted to inheritors of a western European
tradition, and the sense of difference becomes

[>]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

more acute when we turn to think of the eastern
panicipants. Few of us have any extended first-
hand knowledge of Russians, Rumanians, and
Serbs, of Turks and Bulgarians, but even the
daily recurrence of these names fails to remove
the feeling that attaches to them of remoteness
and unfamiliarity. Yet further off, in Asia,
peoples of a wholly un-European aspect are
bearing arms in the same cause — Japanese,
Chinese, Annamese; Sikhs, Rajputs, Afghans;
Arabs, Kurds. Armenians; Buddhists. Brahman-
ists, Mohammedans. In what terms, indeed, do
we think of the men who hold the Khyber Pass,
of those who actually oppose each other when
Turks and Russians meet in Persia, of those who
earn,' on a European war in equatorial Africa?
At best we comprehend vaguely that similarity
of military equipment does not at once bring all
these various races to the similitude of English-
men or Germans. But behind the combatants, as
it were, stand other peoples, now in the turmoil
forgotten : tribes of furthest Siberia, unsubdued
aboriginals of interior China, forest denizens of
India, desert dwellers of Australia, peoples
whose names are to us but as technical terms
of anthropological specialists, peoples whose

[2]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE

strange implements we gather into museums, and
whose uncouth ways provide materials, in every
generation, for travellers' tales.
There are differences enough and to spare, and,
at times, when the subject is brought forward,
we recollect that in appearance, practices, and
beliefs the men who people the earth are of the
most heterogeneous description; but, ordinarily,
we dismiss the fact, or entertain it momentarily
as contributor}- to our self-esteem. These others,
indeed, even though our comrades in arms, are
'different,' are 'backward,' are 'colored,' while
we (whoever we may be) are 'civilized' and
'progressive.' With such indefinite phrases we
escape the sense of a problem, and shield our-
selves from the embarrassment of the direct ques-
tion: "In what respect are these others different
from ourselves?" So we are able to ignore the
fact that even the 'white' race is not without its
lowly members; and our complacence is un-
shaken either by observation of our own byways
or by recognizing that such primitive groups as
the Ainus of Japan, Maotzi of China, Todas of
India, Veddas of Ceylon, and even the much-
discussed aborigines of Australia have been
classified as "Caucasian." Furthermore, though

[3]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY
the knowledge is a commonplace, we tend, in
forming judgments of our contemporaries, to
forget that, not many generations back, our own
progenitors fought with crude weapons, wore
skins, and painted their bodies. We tend, for ex-
ample, to forget that even in the eighteenth cen-
tury the civilization of China was regarded by
European travellers as superior to their own.
We ignore the consideration that our religion
was derived from a land we now regard as 'back-
ward,' and the fundamentals of our thought from
a people whose present representatives we are
disposed to patronize.
Nevertheless, the conflict has already had the
result of lessening the exclusiveness and self-
confidence of the western European, and has
induced in him an awakening appreciation of
the manhood and common human quality of out-
lying peoples. In truth, a new current of feeling
has made itself felt, and we come to regard the
differences and contrasts among men, not as a
basis for disparagement, but as something to be
explained. And here we may discern the nature
of the problem with which we are confronted.
Every human group, white, black, or yellow, en-
tertains precisely the same attitude of superiority

[4]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE

towards all the others, and the vindication of this
attitude in ourselves requires that we, for the
sake of all, should endeavor to determine, not the
reason for our own superiority, but how man
everywhere has come to he as he is.

2. The problem so stated is not new, and many
theories have been advanced to account for the
manifest differences in human groups. Of these
theories, the most popular and persistent is that
which attributes the diversities among peoples to
physical differences in race. Thus it is widely
believed that difference of race implies a real
and deep-rooted distinction in physical, mental,
and moral qualities, and that the contrasts in the
achievements of the various peoples are due to
differences in physical characteristics. Hence it
is thought that one race becomes a master because
of its physique, courage, brain-power, and mo-
rale, while another sinks in the struggle or lags
behind owing to its inferiority in these qualities.
This view naturally implies that the same race
preserves its character, not only in every region
of the world, but in every period of history, and
so the course of history would appear as a sus-
tained process of selection between the races that
are sluggish, cowardly, and retrogressive, and

[5]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

those that are energetic, brave, and progressive —
while the latter press forward, the former die out
or stagnate in lazy passivity. A slightly different
turn is given to the explanation by those who
maintain that the present savage races are those
which have been left impoverished and station-
ary as a result of the migration of their more
vigorous or stronger elements; the younger and
more alert in each generation, it is thought, go
out to seek new homes, and leave the older and
more conservative to perpetuate the original
group.
While the explanation in terms of race has been
supported, in recent discussions, by an appeal to
biology, there can be little doubt that its princi-
pal foundation lies in that inevitable human pro-
pensity to classify all those who are in any way
unlike ourselves, or who merely lie outside our
own group, as 'fiends,' 'aliens,' and 'barbarians.'
The Hebrews, though perhaps the best-known
example, have not been the only group to regard
themselves a 'chosen people' ; and while we may
point to Dante's opinion that the Romans of his
time were ordained to command, and to the mod-
ern German equivalent of the same doctrine, it
must be admitted that the passionate assertion of

[6]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE

nationality in the nineteenth century has been
colored at least by this feeling of a special worth
or importance in ourselves as contrasted with
others, a feeling, we must not forget, which the
Negro, Hindu, and Chinaman shares with the
most progressive of Europeans.

Once entertained, the idea that there have been
certain unique races in the past, and that there is
one such race in the present, yields itself readily
to interested elaboration. So the Hegelian theory
has been replaced, on further consideration, by
the view which sees all human advancement as
the varied expression of the power and genius,
not of the Absolute, but of the Aryan race; and
while this conception permitted, at first, of a
fairly generous interpretation, a more thorough
application has restricted the definition of the
conquering race to the dolichocephalic (or long-
headed) blonds from northern Europe. Wher-
ever this race has penetrated, there, it would ap-
pear, the surrounding peoples have been subju-
gated, and there prosperity and a great civiliza-
tion have sprung up. So complete is this clue,
indeed, that any manifestation of genius, whether
in Palestine, Greece, Italy, or Germany, becomes
an unequivocal proof of the presence of, at least,

[7]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

some members of this supreme race. Conversely,
wherever the brachycephalic (or short-headed)
races have made their appearance, decadence has
straightway followed; nor do the advocates of
this thorough-going conception shrink from the
conclusion that progress in the future must de-
pend upon the increased propagation and the
physical dominance of the long-headed variety.
An equally positive, though perhaps less ani-
mating theory places the emphasis, in seeking to
account for the differences of human groups, not
on the physical, but on the mental characteristics
of races, and from this root has grown the exten-
sive literature of "race psychology." According
to this view, the part played in history by any
aggregation of men is a direct reflection of its
collective character and mentality. The subject
and method of this psychology, initiated by Wil-
helm von Humboldt, seems first to have been
cultivated by Steinthal and Lazarus, but owes its
vogue, apparently, to men like Mommsen and
Renan. While the interest enlisted by the sum-
mary descriptions of the psychology of peoples
has been widely extended, the explanation af-
forded by the procedure is not illuminating, for
it consists merely in saying that events and insti-

[8]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE

tutions are the outcome of the genius of peoples.
Thus, for example, it appears that the Greeks
were a people distinctly marked out by nature as
freer than other mortals from all that hinders and
oppresses the activities of the spirit; or, briefly,
that Greek civilization was the creation of the
inborn genius of the Greek race. Furthermore,
the mode of determining the collective charac-
teristics of groups leaves much room for debate,
since while one authority may regard the Celt,
as "a gentle obstinate," another thinks him "tur-
bulent and vain," and a third declares him to be
the embodiment of "an indomitable passion for
danger and adventure."
When pressed, each of these theories, physical
and psychological, tends more and more to fall
back upon the influence of habitat or climate in
determining the character of groups, and we are
thus led to consider the type of explanation of-
fered by anthropogeography. It is argued, for
instance, that all human varieties are the outcome
of their several environments. Groups are what
climate, soil, diet, pursuits, and inherited quali-
ties have made them. What is true of man him-
self is no less true of his works, and so it follows
that racial and cultural zones must coincide,

[9]

&■

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

while a correspondence must exist between these
and the zones of temperature. Hence we arrive
at the theory that, in both hemispheres, the iso-
cultural bands follow the isothermal bands in all
their deflections. In this view, it is evident, all
the specific characteristics of humanity — phy-
sique, temperament, institutions, occupations,
and ideas — are the more or less immediate reflec-
tion of habitat, and it is maintained that each
breed of man which has changed its place of
domicile has had to adopt the type of culture
appropriate to the region into which it has pene-
trated.
The forms taken by this theory of the depend-
ence of man on habitat are very numerous, but a
few illustrations may serve to suggest the wide
scope of its applications. Thus it has long been
held that the advancement of man in northern
Europe was a direct result of the inhospitable
conditions which forced him to cultivate un-
precedented habits of industry. Again, it has
been explained that the extremes of character
attributed to the Slav are due to the extremes of
climate on the wind-swept steppes. The long and
bitter cold, it is said, has enabled the Russian
peasants to survive, since it has fostered the spirit

[10]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE

of comradeship, and this, in turn, has held them
together in their mir or village-community. The
habitat, it also seems, provides the conditions
which determine the progress or stagnation of
the group, for agricultural tribes, being bound
to the soil, are conservative, apathetic, and non-
progressive, while the nomadic or semi-nomadic
life sharpens the wits and calls forth courage,
self-reliance, and ingenuity. By others, again, it
is argued that the birth and precocious growth of
civilization are encouraged by a small, isolated,
and protected habitat, though at a later stage this
cramps progress, and lends the stamp of arrested
development to a people like the Greeks.
The types of theory thus briefly indicated have
this in common, that they attempt to describe fac-
tors which may be regarded as operative in all
human groups, and are thus to be considered as
offering an explanation on a scientific basis. To
all appearance, however, it has not seemed neces-
sary to the exponents of these views to show how
the factors described could have produced the
differences which we see around us. Indeed, the
mode of procedure adopted has been simply to
explain evident differences by alleging the ante-
cedence of other differences, less obvious, but

["]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY
still unexplained. Knowledge is not really ad-
vanced by asserting that all human advancement
has been due to the presence of some particular
race. In point of method, the failure lies in the
fact that the theory gives no insight into the pro-
cesses through which the assumed physical su-
periority of the Aryan or Teuton has been trans-
muted into cultural advancement. But, taken on
its own terms, and supposing, for the moment,
that the beginnings of cultural development in
China and India were associated with the intru-
sion of Aryans, the theory does not suggest how
later advances have taken place in these lands,
and it ignores the fact that there is ample evi-
dence of notable advancement in Mesopotamia
and in Egypt prior to any appearance of the
Aryan race. Similarly, it throws no light upon
the problem in hand to attribute the special cul-
tural characteristics of a people to correspond-
ingly particularized innate qualities.

In regard to anthropogeography, it may be said
more particularly that it represents not so much
an explicit theory as an almost unlimited mass of
correlations, some vague and unimportant, others
penetrating and of the highest value. In some
respects, indeed, this subject, at once new and of

[12]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE

a remote antiquity, represents, at the present
time, one of the most hopeful aspects of the study
of man, for, from its association, however in-
determinate, with geology, it has gained a
breadth and an inclusiveness of vision that has
been denied the better established humanistic
studies. Nevertheless, a too close association with
a science already highly elaborated, and a too
great dependence upon the work of pioneers who
had not fully entered into the spirit of modern
scientific method, have led to a logical formalism
in dealing with its subject-matter which has not
wholly been in the interests of scientific progress.
Anthropogeography, in short, provides a great
body of observations assembled under logically
arranged headings, but has failed to recognize
that investigation to be effective must be con-
ducted in presence of a specific problem.

Furthermore, in the actual consideration of the
influence of habitat upon human affairs, there is
almost invariably apparent, on the part of geog-
raphers, a certain laxity in regard to the facts of
vhistorical change. Though habitat and climate
have, in general, remained constant throughout
the historical period, civilizations have arisen
and decayed, to be followed by other civiliza-

['3]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY
tions under different environmental conditions.
If it is the hardy northerner who is 'progressive'
at one time, at another it is the Akkadian and
Sumerian in the hothouse of the Persian Gulf.
If the village-community is a response to the
relentless winter of the Russian steppes, it has
also persisted in torrid India. Egypt, Phoenicia,
Crete, and Greece may possibly be regarded as
protected areas, but if the rise of civilization is
dependent upon isolation, how shall we account
for the early development of Lagash and Nip-
pur? How, too, shall we account for the absence
of such developments in a hundred spots more
isolated and protected still? If Greek climate
and habitat are to be accepted as prepotent in-
fluences in the production of Periclean Athens,
and German climate and habitat as determining
factors in the development of the military power
of today, why have not these relatively constant
factors been equally operative in past and present
times?

Evidently, then, neither the race theory, nor
that of habitat offers an adequate basis for an ex-
planation of how man has come to be as he is, and
hence we are driven to inquire what other types
of theory have been advanced.

[■4]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE

3. From a wholly different point of view there
has been presented a theory to account for the
inequalities among men which has been accorded
an acceptance as wide as the theory of race, but
by a very different constituency, for while the
former may be said to appeal more directly to
militarists and certain groups attracted by mod-
ern biological ideas, the economic theory of
Marx and Engels has found the great body of its
adherents among the workers immediately in-
volved in the "class struggle."

Fundamentally, the point of departure of Marx
is the idea that the economic factor dominates all
the other factors of human existence, and his in-
sistence on this view, notwithstanding the exag-
geration it involves, has had the beneficial effect
of directing the attention of students to the im-
portance of a series of facts which, previously,
had been very generally ignored. In a measure,
Marx also may be said to have employed the
method of science, for what he attempted to do
was to isolate and describe a particular factor or
process manifested in human affairs. But in this
undertaking, notwithstanding the profound in-
fluence which his writings have had upon mod-
ern thought, the limitations of his outlook, and

[15]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY
his imperfect appreciation of the complexities of
the problem, have stood in the way of a perma-
nent success. It should, however, be remembered
that Marx did not set himself to work out a scien-
tific problem, but to carry forward a social prop-
aganda; he was not attempting to analyze the
elements of history; his interest was excited by
the special problem of labor under modern con-
ditions, and his dominating aim was to account
for this particular phenomenon in its present
aspect. Hence he neither considered the entire
field of economic activity in modern life, nor the
conditions of labor in any other than the capital-
istic form of society.

It must not be supposed, however, that Marx
and Engels, while maintaining that the great
moving power in all historical events was the
economic development of society, failed to recog-
nize that they had investigated only that form of
economic organization under which they them-
selves were actually living. "We ought," Engels
remarked, "to study, at least in their essential
features and taken as terms of comparison, the
other forms which have preceded it in time, or
exist alongside of it in less developed countries."
And he stated frankly: "Marx and I are partly

[i6]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE

responsible for the fact that the younger men
have sometimes laid more stress on the economic
fact than was necessary" ; but this overemphasis,
as he explained, arose from the exigencies of the
debate into which their main contention precipi-
tated them. It is not remarkable, therefore, that
the Marxian interpretation of history should
have failed to elucidate the means through which
so different results have been arrived at in Asia
and in Europe, in ancient and in modern times.
The fault, if there be any, lies not with these great
initiators who demonstrated the practical utility
of an investigation of the elements of history, but
with their successors who have failed to carry
forward and to broaden the scope of the inquiries
which they set on foot.
This theory, then, like those previously men-
tioned, is unacceptable as an explanation of how
man has come to be as he is, for, like the others,
it is based upon a limited view of the facts, and
represents a projection of a single factor upon the
complexity of human experience. Practically
speaking, the failure in all these cases has been
due to a lack of appreciation of the necessity of
a preliminary study of method. To be acceptable,^
any such theory must be applicable to 'backward'

[17]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

as well as to 'advanced' groups; it must apply
equally to all periods of history in all lands; it
must apply, furthermore, to the 'backward' and
'advanced' members of all groups, and hence to
the experience of the individual in the world
today.

4. The number and variety of the theories
which have heretofore been advanced should be
convincing proof that in approaching a problem
of this magnitude we must first endeavor to ar-
rive at a clear understanding of the method to be
followed in conducting the inquiry. There can be
no question that the investigation before us must
rest upon an examination of the facts of human
history, for we ourselves are aware that any pres-
ent situation in which we may happen to be in-
volved is the outcome of what has gone before.
But the practical problem with which we are
confronted appears only when we come to ask
how the concrete facts of history are to be util-
ized in order to explain the status of man as we
find him everywhere throughout the world.

During the nineteenth century, and indeed up
to the present, the student of history has carried
on his work in accordance with the assumption
that such an explanation would be afforded by a

[18]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE

statement, in the form of narrative, of what had
happened in the past.

Now, of all possible modes of explanation, the
earliest and the most universal is that naive form
which is represented in story-telling. This con-
sists in going back to some selected beginning,
and carrying forward a narrative of happenings
from that point to the situation which the narra-
tor has undertaken to make clear. It matters
nothing that, in its earliest manifestations, his-
torical narrative starts with some imaginary be-
ginning, such as the Mosaic account of Creation
or Hesiod's Golden Age, the principle is the
same in all cases, namely, the acceptance of a
situation that comes first, and the emergence
from this of a complexity which has its conclu-
sion in a known eventuality.

The initial difficulty for the historian, once his
starting-point has been decided upon, is that he
cannot include all the available facts of past oc-
currences in the narrative which as a literary
artist he is bent upon creating. The creation, as
in all art, involves the selection of facts for pre-
sentation, and while this selection must depend
ultimately upon what the narrator or artist him-
self is, it can be made only in the light of some

[■9]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

conception he has formed of the course of events,
of some interest or emotion awakened by what
he believes has taken place.
The most obvious basis of selection is the inter-
est enlisted by what is simply curious or unusual.
This is represented, in earlier writings, by the
miscellaneous nature of the records set down by
medieval chroniclers and annalists, and, in the
work of contemporary scholars, by the recurrent
statement: "What really happened was not what
you and everyone else has believed, but this that
I alone have discovered." On a broader plane,
the selection is determined by the interest taken
in the outcome of some specific series of events,
more particularly when this leads to an impres-
sive denouement, such as the defeat of Xerxes by
the relatively insignificant forces of the Greeks.
As, however, events but rarely work out to a com-
pletely satisfactory ending — witness Thucydides
— historical writers have fallen back upon the
method, characteristic in the drama, of depicting
personal character revealing itself in the stress of
critical circumstances. Following this line of de-
velopment, historiography has tended to empha-
size the part played by the individual in what
has happened, relying more and more for its ex-

[20]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE

planations upon the speculative interpretation of
individual motives, and justifying this procedure
j on an assumed similarity of the workings of the
' human mind in similar situations.

At a later stage, reflection on the seemingly
meaningless changes of fortune revealed in
events leads to the conscious effort to reach an
explanatory basis through the formulation of
some concept of the underlying meaning of the
course of history. Thus, for example, one recent
effort is directed towards showing that the mean-
ing lies in ''the existence of a mental conflict as to
the means by which happiness is to be attained,"
while another discovers history to be "the story
of man's increasing ability to control energy."
Such projections of abstract points of view have
been infinite in their variety, ranging from that
of Orosius who saw in events the hand of God so
ordering at all times the affairs of men that dire
calamity should unfailingly overtake neglect of
his service, to that of a contemporary who be-
lieves that "modern science is crowned by the
conception of an ordered progress in history."
But while, at this point, an extended resume of
theories would be of advantage as emphasizing
the fact that every successive generation attains

[21]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

new points of view, one must perforce assume
familiarity with such expositions of philosophies
of history as have been provided by Flint and
Barth, for what is really germane to the present
discussion is the residual fact that today the
search for an underlying principle in history is
dominated by the concept of "progress."

It may be well here to point out that the idea of
"progress" stands in much the same relation to
the study of man as that of "evolution" to the
study of the forms of life. But, whereas, in the
hands of Darwin, the study of biological evolu-
tion passed from the merely speculative into the
scientific stage, the study of human progress is
still in the pre-Darwinian period. Thus the so-
ciologist still sets before himself the aim of dis-
covering "the law of progress," while the histo-
rian, assuming "progress" without further ques-
tion, displays in narrative form the gradual emer-
gence of features which he personally regards as
distinctively modern or as particularly desirable.
In neither the one case or the other has the inves-
tigator concerned himself to apply to the subject-
matter in hand the method of analysis by which
Darwin was enabled to substantiate the specu-

[22]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE

lative concept of "evolution" by the scientific
theory of "natural selection."

If we are to appreciate the implications of the
idea of "progress," it will be necessary to observe
that this concept is based upon the assumption
that history — the entire course of events in time —
is unitary, that it constitutes a single sequence of
happenings in which progress is revealed. Now,
disregarding the use which is being made of this
idea in contemporary philosophical discussions,
and concerning ourselves only with its place in
historical study, it will readily be perceived that
the concept of "progress" is just the reflection of
a convention in accordance with which we base
our presentation of what has happened on the
records handed down to us by certain European
peoples with whose languages we are more or
less familiar. Frankly, our concepts are at the
mercy of such information as we have at com-
mand, and so the term "ancient history" suggests,
not diversified series of facts embodying the
experiences of mankind during a certain period
of time, but a narrative restatement of accounts
which record the varying fortunes of some of the
political units of Mediterranean lands, more
particularly Greece and Rome. We of the twenti-

[23]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY
eth century, with all our opportunities for ac-
quaintance with the history of Asia, have not
risen above the limitations of our predecessors,
and continue to imagine that we have arrived at
a synthesis of human history when we have con-
structed a narrative by selecting parts or periods
of the history of one European country after
another which seem to us as of special and pecu-
liar significance. On the other hand, if we look a
little further, it will be to discover that human
history is not unitary, but pluralistic; that what
we are given is not one history, but many; and,
that the concept of "progress" is arrived at by the
maintenance of a Europocentric tradition and
the elimination from consideration of the activi-
ties of all peoples whose civilization does not at
once appear as contributory to our own.

What, then, is essential for us to realize is that
the methodological assumption upon which the
work of the historian is based, namely, that we
may hope to arrive at an explanation of how man
has come to be as he is through the narrative state-
ment of what has happened in the past, is, criti-
cally considered, inadmissible. Narrative is a
form or genre of literature, and in this lies its
forceful appeal, for, so long as men endure, the

[24]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE
tale of what men have done, and how they have
striven, will never lose its interest and attraction.
Furthermore, so long as men continue to question
the meaning of life, the attempt will be contin-
ually renewed to grasp the ultimate significance
of the course taken by events in the past. But be-
yond the romance of human deeds, and quite
apart from any effort to penetrate the inscruta-
bility of fate, there remains for scientific investi-
gation the vital and fundamental problem how
man in all his diversity has come to be as we find
him now.

There are many histories, and this pluralism
reveals our task as historical students, which is
not to explain occurrences by the intercalation of
hypothetical motives, or to create narratives
based upon the selection of events which seem to
us of importance in view of some unverified
theory of progress, but to compare these several
histories with the object of ascertaining what it
is they hold in common. The fact is that an under-
standing of "how things have come to be as they
are" can be arrived at only through a study of
what has happened in the past, but this under-
standing is not furthered by the conventional
construction of narratives. What is requisite is

[25]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

that we should compare the events, the things
that have happened, without the intervention of
the subjective interests, often unacknowledged
because unconsciously held, of historical writers.
Precisely what we need to begin with are great
bodies of historical data, annals or fasti, relating
to all human groups without distinction, which
have not been subjected to the selective activities
of the literary artist and the philosopher.

Having thus seen that the conventionalized
method of the historian is inadequate, it now re-
mains to inquire how the concrete facts of history
may be utilized in dealing with the problem
before us.

5. As it is imperative for us to arrive at an un-
derstanding of the method to be employed in
dealing with the problem of how man has come
to be as he is, and as the narrative method hitherto
relied upon by the historian sacrifices the wealth
of concrete detail to the personal or speculative
interest of individuals, it may be well to observe
how men in other fields of history, such as Astron-
omy, Geology, and Biology, have conducted
their investigations.

In the first place, each of these subjects is con-
fronted with the complexity of a present status

[26]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE
which is assumed to be the outcome of all the
changes that have taken place up to the present
time. Secondly, in each of these cases the object
or aim of the investigation is to arrive at an un-
derstanding of how this present status has come
to be as it is, and the inquiry takes the form of an
examination of the nature of the changes which
have taken place.

What disguises the identity of the problem that
presents itself to the student of nature and the
student of man is that while the latter is provided
with a great body of dated evidence for what has
happened in the past, the former is left without
any strictly chronological data, and is forced to
be content with a merely relative time-order in
his historical facts. In short, in his efforts to in-
terpret the records of the past, the historian of
nature is deprived of the assistance of the testi-
mony of human witnesses. Nevertheless, while
this handicap has immeasurably increased the
difficulties in his way, it has not prevented him
from contributing in a most notable manner to
the sum of human knowledge.

It may fairly be said that the greater success of
the student of nature in arriving at a scientific
method for dealing with any history has been due

[27]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

to the greater difficulties which he has encoun-
tered. Thus while the historian of man has en-
gaged his efforts in creating narratives based
upon details arranged in chronological order,
the historian of nature has been forced to prove
that the facts upon which he must rely may even
be regarded as historical data. Indeed, this proof
was the main endeavor of the great group of
scientists in the first half of the nineteenth century
whose work may be said to have culminated in
the publication of Darwin's Origin of Species in
1859. The difficulties of the situation in which
the advocates of an historical point of view were
placed, not the least being the almost universal
acceptance of the theory of creation, necessitated
a careful consideration of the method to be em-
ployed, and so forced the recognition of the
axiom that any present status is to be regarded as
the outcome of the continued operation of natural
processes, which was accepted as the task of
science to discover.
Thus the geologist, having arrived at criteria
for determining the time-order of strata, pro-
ceeded to examine the disposition of the rocks
in every accessible area of the earth's surface.
Now, while the rocks are assumed to have been

[28]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE

laid down, as a result of the operation of natural
processes, in horizontal layers, they are actually
found in an infinite variety of positions. Hence it
became necessary to show how these dislocations
had been efTfected, and what one might speak of
as the explanatory "stock in trade" of the geolo-
gist consists in the series of processes which are
manifested in the geological history of the earth.
As a result of this way of looking at things, the
geologist comes to see around him the evidences
of how the earth has come to be as it is, and he
comes to regard the landscape before him, not
merely as a static disposition of picturesque form,
and light and shadow, but as an embodiment of
constant activities which, in the course of time,
have brought this scenery to its present aspect,
and will continue to modify it throughout all
time to come. He can still feel the grandeur of
the Alps, and still appreciate the beauty of Fuji-
yama, but in addition to the aesthetic pleasure,
the sights convey to his mind an added wealth of
suggestion regarding the ceaseless workings of
Nature.

Again, the biologist has in all times endeavored
to account for the infinite variety of the forms of
life, but even in the eighteenth century no further

[29]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

progress had been made than is represented by
the belief that species were just so many distinct
and permanent creations of God. In the nine-
teenth century, however, a new perspective was
gained, and men began to perceive an historical
depth in the relations of species. When the sys-
tematic classification of plants and animals had
been carried to a certain elaboration, it was dis-
cerned, through the co-operation of geology, that
the arrangement in order from simplest to most
complex represented a time-order from early to
late. As an additional result of the close associa-
tion of geologists and biologists, the latter also
adopted from their co-workers the axiom that
things had come to be as they are through the
continued operation of natural processes. Dar-
win's method, in fact, is just that of his geological
contemporaries applied to a new subject-matter;
and his object was the discovery of the process
or processes through which new species have
successively come into existence. In other words,
what he planned to carry out was an analysis of
the elements of biological history.
Whether Darwin was successful in his under-
taking is for biologists to decide, though up to
the present time they have not given sufficient

[30]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE

attention to his method and to the nature of the
assumptions upon which his theory was based.
All that need be observed in the present connec-
tion, however, is that, in putting forward his
theory of "natural selection," Darwin believed
that he had described the process through which
the forms of life have come to be as they are
today. Should it nevertheless appear that "nat-
ural selection" is inadequate to explain the origin
of species, this conclusion would not invalidate
the fundamental assumption that such processes
are actually in operation; it would simply mean
that Darwin's particular attempt at analysis was
incomplete, perhaps even erroneous throughout.
What would then remain to be done would be to
make an entirely new analysis with greater re-
gard to precision in method. It must be remem-
bered, whatever the decision, that the theory of
"natural selection" has created an interest in even
the lowliest forms of life that did not previously
exist, and that it has opened the eyes of men, in
a wholly new sense, to the ways by which Nature
accomplishes her ever varying and ever wonder-
ful results. Nor should it be overlooked that the
method of historical inquiry by which the natu-
ral scientist has attempted to explain how things

[31]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY
have come to be as they are, has led to results
which have been of the highest practical impor-
tance to mankind.

It has been suggested above that astronomers,
geologists, and biologists have been compelled to
conduct historical inquiries without the aid of
specifically dated materials, and there can be
little doubt that this deficiency has not only been
difficult to overcome, but has, in the case of biol-
ogy, at least, led to far-reaching controversies
and misunderstandings, and even to unconscious
assumptions which have become stumbling-
blocks in the path of knowledge. When, there-
fore, we consider the obstacles which have been
encountered by the students of nature, it must
be apparent that the student of man is placed in
a unique and enviable position, through the pos-
session of dated evidence, for the investigation of
the elements of human history. Indeed, the
chronological record, incomplete as it is, frees
the human historian from some of the greater
difficulties by which the historian of nature is
confronted.

On the other hand, it would seem that this un-
paralleled aid to investigation has, in itself,
threatened to become an insurmountable obstacle

[32]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE

to the advancement of science, for the interest ex-
cited by the effort to perfect this record, blinds
us, apparently, to the infinite possibilities which
it places in our hands. The historian, fortified by
an ancient convention, is so completely absorbed
in the details before him, and in perfecting his
own critical technique, that he leaves to one side
the wider problems of historical method. When,
however, these problems are actually taken up,
it comes to be seen that historical method is the
same whatever the history investigated — whether
that of the stellar universe, of the earth, of the
forms of life upon the earth, or of man. It comes
to be seen that in each case the problem is the
same, namely, to show how things have come to
be as they are; that in each case the investigation
presupposes the antecedence of innumerable
series of historical events; that in each case the
inquiry is based upon the assumption or axiom
that things have come to be as they are through
the continued operation of natural processes, and
that these processes are to be discovered only
through examination of what has happened in
the past. And here it must be clearly stated, since
this is a point upon which much misunderstand-
ing has arisen through Darwin's acceptance of

[33]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

Lyell's method, that the investigation of the pro-
cesses of change must be based upon the facts of
history, and cannot be discovered by examination
of the results given in the present. On the other
hand, if our inferences from the historical data
are correct, they should be verifiable by appli-
cation to things as they are.

6. It has been urged repeatedly that the en-
deavor to arrive at an analysis of the elements of
history is no longer ''history," since this, of neces-
sity, has its sole end in narrative. It might be
urged in contravention of this argument that the
word "history" originally meant "inquiry," and
only secondarily came to be applied to the em-
bodiment of the results of inquiry in the particu-
lar form of narrative. But, in reality, the situa-
tion is too serious to admit of debate in regard
to the application of a word having already
many recognized meanings. "History," in the
widest sense, means all that has happened in the
past, and, more particularly, all that has hap-
pened to the human race. Now, the v/hole body
of historical students is in possession of a vast
accumulation of information in regard to the
former activities and experiences of mankind,
and the problem which is uppermost at the pres-

[34]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE

ent time is how this accumulated information —
which already far exceeds the possibility of state-
ment in any narrative synthesis — may be utilized
to throw light upon the difficulties that confront
mankind. In the world as it is today, is the his-
torical scholar to look forward to contributing
the results of his specialized researches to some
later Cambridge Modern History, or is he, on
the other hand, to entertain the hope that his
investigations may stand beside those of the
biologist, for example, as contributing, through
an added knowledge of the operations of nature,
to the welfare of the human race?
Yet, while there are many who insist upon the
conventional aim of reducing all historical facts
to narrative, there are unmistakable evidences
that other historical students are seeking a new
outlet for their activities, and a new utilization
for their knowledge. It is only necessary to ob-
serve the interest accorded to Lord Acton's pro-
ject for a History of Freedom, it is only neces-
sary to take cognizance of the studies which mul-
tiply daily on the religious, economic, geographi-
cal, and other phases of modern history to see
that men are reaching out in directions unknown
to the older historiography, directions which are

[35]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

manifestly tentative approximations to a scien-
tific standpoint. For the undercurrent of all this
awakened interest is analytical; and whether we
set ourselves to isolate the strand of "freedom"
or that of ''class struggle," the influence of "sea
power" or that of "religious revivals," we are
contributing, in the long run, to an analysis of
the elements of history.

Only an optimist, however, would suggest that
this new movement in historical study had found
itself, and was thoroughly conscious of its meth-
odological foundations. The fact is that while we
are gradually escaping from the dominance of
narrative we have not as yet acquired the width
of outlook necessary for the pursuit of analysis
on a truly humanistic basis. Our vision is still
focussed upon Europe and the doings of Euro-
peans, and while we look with a kindly interest
at "the map of the world as known to Herodo-
tus," we seem unable to appreciate the fact that
relatively the scope of our own historical in-
quiries is less extensive than his. By one or an-
other eminent contemporary authority, the study
of history has been regarded as limited to the in-
vestigation of written documents; as limited to
the Christian era; as limited to southern and

[36]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE

western Europe; as limited to political events.
Nevertheless, there has long been a tendency
towards a wider outlook, but, as a matter of fact,
the development of this broader interest has been
forced to wait upon an extension of knowledge
which has only been achieved within the last few
decades through the progress of archaeological
discoveries and of Oriental studies. With this dif-
ficulty removed, we may face the situation that
the analytical study of history must be founded
upon a comparison of the particular histories of
all human groups, and must be actuated by the
conscious effort to take cognizance of all the
available facts. If this seems too much, let us re-
member that in a generation we have moved back
from Greece to Egypt, from Egypt to Babylonia,
and that now, thanks to the Carnegie Institution,
an even more remote vista has been opened up by
the excavations at Anau. The minimal unit of
history is not a series of empires, following each
other in time, from the plain of Shinar to the
British Isles, but the continental mass of the
Older World taken as a whole, and throughout
the time occupied by the generations of men.
Only with such an outlook may we hope, through
the application of analysis, to discover the factors

[37]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

and processes of history, and thus arrive at a
scientific knowledge of the way in which man
has come to be as he is.

Observation of the groups into which mankind
is broken up leads us to question how the dififer-
ences between them have come to be what they
are, and hence to examine such explanations of
the problem as have hitherto been advanced. A
consideration of certain typical solutions that
have been offered brings us to the conclusion that
in every case these have been based upon a re-
stricted view of the facts, and thus forces upon
us the necessity of taking up the entire problem
anew.

Seeing, however, that this problem is one of the
greatest magnitude and difficulty, it would seem
to be a proper precaution, in advance of embark-
ing upon the undertaking, to examine the meth-
odological equipment on which we shall be
forced to rely. As a result of such an examination,
it becomes apparent that the traditional method
still adhered to by the historian, the statement of
what has taken place in the form of narrative,
does not lead to any explanatory conclusion; and

[38]

THE NATURE AND SCOPE

so, if the whole attempt is not to be abandoned as
vain and chimerical, it becomes necessary to find
out how investigators have proceeded in other
fields of history. This leads to the discovery that
geologists and biologists utilize the historical in-
formation at their command, not for the purpose
of constructing narratives of happenings, but to
determine what have been the processes through
which things have come to be as they are.
The point of view thus gained at once clarifies
the situation, for it reveals the significance of the
chronological data which the human historian of
today has inherited from his predecessors; it
throws light upon the nature of the activities of
a large and increasing number of historical stu-
dents; and it displays the importance and utility
of the great residuary body of historical facts
which historiographers have been unable to in-
corporate in their narratives. Furthermore, it
shows that the objections which have been urged
regarding the application of scientific method
as falling within the province of the historical
student are negligible, for a knowledge of the
factors and processes of history can be arrived at
only through the study of history, and this type of

[39]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

inquiry provides an opportunity by which the
extraordinary wealth of dated material that is
characteristic of human history may be made to
subserve the highest interests of mankind.

[40]

II

THE GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR
IN HISTORY

I. Having arrived at a formulation of the prob-
lem to be investigated, and at a general concep-
tion of the method to be followed, it next becomes
necessary to consider the character of the evi-
dence to be employed. Freeman was far from be-
ing alone in the belief that, while the recovery of
the ancient records of Eastern peoples was to be
regarded with pleasure, the historian could not
accept these as materials for the study which was
his own. This is an artificial distinction and an
improper limitation to research, and, indeed, the
greatest obstacle to the scientific study of history
has been the conventional attitude, of which this
is an example, by which the attention of histo-
rians has been restricted to Europe and the activ-
ities of Europeans, for such limitation would im-
pose an absolute bar to the application of the
comparative method. If, however, the many his-
tories with which we are confronted, histories of

[4-]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

India, China, and Europe, are to be compared,
this involves the assumption that the essential
content of history is everywhere the same, that
human history is made up of the same materials
throughout, and v^oven upon the same loom.
Simple as this declaration may appear to be, it
involves conclusions of such far-reaching im-
portance that it becomes essential to examine the
bases for an acceptance of the homogeneity of
history.

Europe and Asia are indissoluble, and are sepa-
rated in name only. When we stop to consider the
map of the eastern hemisphere it is at once appar-
ent that Europe is just a westward extension or
peninsula of the great land-mass of Eurasia. The
convention by which we regard the two conti-
nents as divided is not an outgrowth of modern
geographical knowledge, but represents simply
a traditional nomenclature which we have in-
herited from immemorial antiquity. Physically,
Europe and Asia are continuous : the great north-
ern plain of Asia penetrates into the heart of
Europe; the mountain barrier which, alternately
expanding to enclose great basins like those of
Hungary, Persia, and Tibet, and focussing in
knots like the Alps, Ararat, and the Pamirs,

[42]

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

stretches from Atlantic to Pacific, is crossed only
by occasional passes; the line of depressions,
conspicuous in the Mediterranean, runs through
the Black, the Caspian, and the Aral seas,
through lakes like Balkash, Issik, Zaisan, and
Baikal, from west to farthest east; the desert
belt lies stretched, a veritable cincture, Sahara,
Arabia, Iran, Turkestan, and Takla Makan,
across the body of the older world.

Again, if we consider the distribution of peo-
ples, there is no point at which we may draw a
line of separation between Asia and Europe.
There are representatives of European stocks to
be found throughout the eastern continent, while,
conversely, in the West there is no nation without
its quantum of Asiatic blood : there are Finns in
the North, Mongols in Central Europe, Arabs in
Spain, Turks on the Aegean, and Semites every-
where.

Furthermore, in their history, the two parts of
Eurasia are inextricably bound together. Mac-
kinder has shown how much light may be thrown
upon European history by regarding it as sub-
ordinate to Asiatic; and while we may question
Ujfalvy's saying that Rome fell because the
Chinese built a wall, we cannot deny that the

[43]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

ancient history of Europe is as incomprehensible
without a knowledge of the Nearer East as medi-
eval history without reference to the migrations
of Asiatic peoples from the northern steppes.
The oldest of historians held the idea that the
epochs of European history were marked by al-
ternating movements across the imaginary line
that separates East and West; to us these move-
ments are distinguishable in remotely prehistoric
times, they have left their legible traces on the
languages we speak, they are evident in periods
of Greek history unknown to Herodotus, and are
already modern with the expeditions of Darius
and Alexander, with the appearance of Huns
and Moslems in the West and of Prankish king-
doms in the East. The tide has turned, we may
say, since Russia conquered Siberia and Britain
became paramount in Hindustan, but the East
has not been vanquished, and, possibly, the re-
turning tide may not long be delayed.

Something more than this intimacy of relation,
however, is necessary in order to demonstrate
that the history of man in Europe and Asia is
homogeneous. The fundamental basis of argu-
ment for holding that the History of man every-
where is of the same fabric, does not rest upon

[44]

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

the interconnections of events, but may be stated
in the form that the varying experiences of
human groups have been similarly conditioned
by the varying aspects of the conformation of the
globe. Man cannot escape the physical world in
which he lives, nor its infinite diversification;
this is obvious, but it will require some illustra-
tion to make clear the fact that the even-handed
dominance of nature leads inevitably to widely
different results in the lives of men.

2. Europe is visibly a projection from the block
of Eurasia, but if we examine the configuration
of the larger area it will be found that there are
other projections to the south and east. India, in-
deed, is easily recognizable as a peninsula, but
China lies quite as completely outside the quad-
rilateral of the central mass. Comparing these
three, which, incidentally, contain together by
far the greater part of all the inhabitants of the
globe, it will be discovered that China and India,
though seemingly more closely united to the cen-
tral block, are, from the point of view of human
accessibility, much more completely set apart
than Europe, For while the latter lies exposed
and open to the center, through the level plains
of Russia and the convenient approach of the

[45]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

Aegean and the eastern Mediterranean, the
former lie behind the protecting bulk of the
highest and most difficult mountain system in the
world. Hence India may be reached only by
utilizing one or other of a few tortuous routes
through the towering mountains on its north-
western frontier, while China, similarly, enjoys
the protection of the inaccessible mountains of
Tibet on its western flank, and of the wide-
extending deserts to the northwest. In either case,
the routes by which the borders of the country
may be reached are few and strictly defined, and
are impracticable in face of an organized de-
fence; and it will also be observed that both in
China and in India the entire country stretches
away from the gateway by which alone access
may be gained, and the defence of this protects
the land from molestation. In the case of Europe,
on the other hand, all this is changed, for here
there is no single or restricted strategic point at
which the whole area may be defended, and, as
a consequence, its penetration to the farthest re-
cesses has been repeated and complete. Here,
then, in its very simplest form is an example of
homogeneity, inasmuch as the fortunes, expressed
in history, of the inhabitants of these areas have

[46]

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

turned primarily upon the relative accessibility
of the land.

The principal reason, apart from the concentra-
tion of attention upon the affairs of Europe, why
this close dependence of history upon the irregu-
larities of the surface of the earth has not been
fully recognized, seems to be the unavoidable
tendency to regard as interchangeable or synony-
mous the geographical name of a land and the
title of its dominant political power. Thus we
speak of "the history of China" thinking at once
of political happenings and of a certain area of
the earth's surface which we Europeans have
agreed to call by this name. But the subject of the
historian's discourse is not an actual physical
land, he considers this only as the seat of a par-
ticular political organization, and hence a more
careful usage would distinguish between the title
of the political unit and the name of the country
over which its jurisdiction extends. It would,
indeed, obviate misunderstanding if we were to
speak habitually of the governmental unit, coin-
cident with the geographical area which we call
"China," as the "Middle Kingdom," Chung
Kwo, Hwa Kwo, or any of the titles used by the
Li Min or Han Ten themselves, for then we

[47]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

would recognize more easily that the political
organization has not always been, and strictly
speaking is not now, equated with the geographi-
cal area.

This consideration leads to the recognition of
another aspect of homogeneity, which is, that the
political organizations dealt with in History
have all come into being at definite and restricted
spots, from which, subsequently, they have ex-
panded. Indeed, no intimate knowledge of his-
tory is necessary to reveal how limited were the
original geographical areas from which grew the
political units known as the Roman, Chinese,
Russian, and British empires. A uniformity of
this sort is clearly of interest in and for itself; it
becomes of great significance, however, when we
turn to examine the elements common to all such
cases, and to see in these small beginnings the
universal influence of geographical factors.

Various attempts, already alluded to, have been
made to discover common elements in the begin-
nings of early civilizations. The diflSculty in all
these cases has been that the investigator has
limited his observation to the lands of the Nearer
East, and has failed to extend the comparison to
all known instances of the emergence of political

[48]

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

units. So, while at first sight it may appear that
these beginnings have some relation to the irri-
gable valleys of rivers like the Nile and the
Euphrates, further consideration will show, on
the one hand, that there were valleys of this
character in which civilizations did not arise,
and, on the other, that civilizations have made
their appearance in quite different situations.
Some part of the difficulty that has been expe-
rienced in the attempt to isolate the common
factors in the different instances of the emergence
of advanced groups is unquestionably due to the
use of such vague and all-inclusive terms as
"civilization." If, however, we restrict the in-
quiry, for the moment, to the beginnings of
political organization, a working basis for com-
parison will be obtained which will be found to
lead to definite and verifiable results.
When, therefore, we come to compare the dif-
ferent cases in which political units can be seen
to emerge, it is first to be observed that these units
are restricted in every case to small areas, and,
when the common character of these areas is ex-
amined, it is demonstrable that they are termini
of routes of travel, and hence points of pressure

[ 49 ]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

which have been strictly determined by the
physical conformation of the earth's surface.

It may be well, as far as possible, to envisage the
situation. South of the great Eurasian plain, the
mountain barrier and the desert belt offer very
real obstacles to human movement; the actual
ways, restricted to practicable passes and suffi-
ciently watered routes, provide but limited pos-
sibilities in lines of travel. Hence supposing that
any considerable body of men should, for any
reason whatever, be driven from an established
habitat to seek a new place of abode, the world
would be "open" to it only in the most general
sense. In such a case, indeed, any one choice
would severely restrict all the movements that
were to follow, and with each step in any given
direction, the options for the future would be-
come ever fewer. If now we turn to observe the
habitable extremities to which the routes lead, it
is manifest that a theoretical first migrating
group will settle down where conditions are en-
durable, but a second will find itself confronted
by the first as occupants in possession. In what-
ever manner this situation may be met, and in
certain cases there is evidence that the earlier
group moved on, the time comes when the ques-

[50]

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

tion of occupancy must be fought out at the gate-
way. In other words, while a little effort will
serve to move a single railroad car on the track,
a long line of cars lying ahead cannot be set in
motion by any amount of mere human pressure
exerted at one end.

Where these conditions have been fulfilled,
political organizations have arisen, sooner or
later, throughout the Eurasian continent. Thus
in China and in India, which, as has already been
pointed out, are pockets on a gigantic scale, the
earliest appearance of political units is just with-
in the entrance or opening. Something of the
same general character is to be seen in England,
where the earliest political units came into exist-
ence along the line of greatest exposure to the
continent, while, just as in China and India, the
population of the more remote and inaccessible
areas of the kingdom have scarcely been politi-
cized up to the present day.

All the termini of routes are not, however, of
this Indo-Chinese pattern, and Mesopotamia af-
fords an example of a different kind. Here, in-
deed, is a land which is accessible from every
quarter, so that it may be regarded as the focus
of routes leading in from different directions.

[SI]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

Nevertheless, the phenomena exhibited are of
exactly the same character; political organiza-
tions come into existence at the point of pressure,
and the only difference between this case and the
former is a difference in the degree of exposure,
which turns, not upon the activity of men, but
upon the physical disposition of mountains,
rivers, and deserts. Furthermore, if we think of
the Euphrates and Tigris, we may see that as
water would rise in a river in presence of some
obstacle, political units make their appearance
higher and higher upstream as successive en-
trants make their way along the different avenues
of approach.

Stated thus, even in the most general terms, it
becomes evident that everywhere the beginnings
of political organization have been determined
by the physical disposition of the land. It will
have been observed, however, that this determi-
nant influence of routes has been dependent upon
the presence of human beings, that it comes into
play only in case of the movement of peoples.
Hence the origin of these movements becomes a
matter of primary importance, more particu-
larly as the homogeneity of history is further ex-

[52]

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

hibited in the dependence of these movements or
migrations upon man's physical surroundings.

3. With practical uniformity, the view taken of
the origin of migrations is that these movements
have been the necessary outcome or manifesta-
tion of the "natural increase" or "automatic ex-
cess" of population. Nothing indeed could well
appear simpler to the modern mind than this
transference to earlier times of the typically
nineteenth-century picture of ever flowing
streams of emigration finding their way to distant
colonies. Yet, convincing as it may seem, the ex-
planation conceals a problem of some magnitude
and complexity.

To reach the core of the difficulty, it may be
pointed out that the great rise in European popu-
lation during the last century and a half is an
altogether exceptional phenomenon. At its very
beginning, this increase deeply impressed the
minds of thoughtful contemporaries, and, among
others, Malthus took up the problem, setting
himself "to investigate the causes that have
hitherto impeded the progress of mankind." The
object of the present inquiry might almost be
stated in the same terms, but Malthus, possibly
with greater discretion, limited his field of re-

[S3]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

search to an investigation of the effects, in the
case of man, of the constant tendency in all life
to increase beyond the available means of sub-
sistence. Of this tendency there can be little
doubt, and, later on, Darwin took it for granted
that organic beings may be regarded as striving
to the utmost to increase in numbers. He pointed
out that the progeny of a single pair of any spe-
cies, if unhindered, would soon cover the earth,
and Malthus estimated that, under favorable
conditions, the human race might double itself
four times in every hundred years. Manifestly,
however, no such "natural increase" takes place,
either among animals or men, and the crucial
point in the investigations both of Malthus and
of Darwin was the nature and effect of the
''checks" by which population is limited.

It was argued by Darwin that each organic
being lives by a struggle at some period of its life,
and, adopting the view expressed by Malthus
that those who labor under any original weakness
or infirmity would be the first to succumb, he
arrived, by inverting the idea, at the conclusion
that the survival of the fittest led eventually, not
merely to a maintenance of the standard, but to
the development of new species. As there has

[54]

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

been a marked disposition on the part of human-
istic students to apply Darwin's hypothesis to the
special case of man, it may be urged that Dar-
win's adaptation of Malthus' ideas should not be
permitted to supersede Malthus' contribution in
its own field. And this particularly since, not-
withstanding the common tendency of animal
and human population to increase, the difference
in the nature of the "checks" applied in the two
cases is so marked as to make separate considera-
tion imperative. Among animals, as Darwin saw,
the struggle is a direct physical effort, and results
in the elimination of individuals unable to bear
their part; among human beings, as Malthus
pointed out, actual want of food is, practically
speaking, never the immediate check. Indeed,
what we have to consider in the latter case is the
means adopted for the prevention of increase,
for in no human group has population been left
to grow with perfect freedom or without inter-
ference. The inquiry in the case of man must con-
cern itself, then, with the results of means
adopted, consciously or unconsciously, for the
restriction of population; and hence at the outset
we are confronted with a substitution of ideas in

[55]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

place of the physical processes represented in
"natural selection."

In beginning his examination of the influences
which have retarded human advancement,
Malthus set forth certain "propositions" which
he regarded as axiomatic. First, he considered
that "Population is necessarily limited by the
means of subsistence," and, second, that "Popu-
lation always increases where the means of sub-
sistence increase." To the first of these an adden-
dum might be offered, which, though by no
means self-evident, is regarded by Bateson as
axiomatic from the standpoint of the biologist.
This may be stated in the form that, as popula-
tion is necessarily limited by the means of sub-
sistence, in normal stable conditions it remains
stationary. Now it will readily appear that if
this addendum is a true statement of the case,
mere "natural increase" cannot be assigned as a
reason for migration, and hence some other ex-
planation must be sought to account for this
phenomenon. It follows, therefore, that the na-
ture of the arguments which may be advanced
in support of the added "proposition" must be
briefly indicated.

The point to be brought out is that owing to the

[56]

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

restrictive measures employed, primitive groups
do not multiply to such an extent that an over-
flow of population takes place. Among animals,
the individual arrives on the scene of life to ac-
cept the chances of a struggle in which the more
vigorous and fortunate have an advantage;
among primitive peoples, on the other hand, a
continuance of the life of the individual turns, in
the first instance, upon the decision of older
members of the group into which he is born, and
the chances of survival are arbitrarily limited by
the forethought, for their own well-being, of
those upon whom the new arrival is dependent.
Writing in the eighteenth century, Raynal called
attention to "that multitude of singular institu-
tions which retard the progress of population."
To convey a clear impression of the extent to
which the "natural increase" of early or lower
groups was restricted, it would be necessary to
consider each of these various practices; for the
present purpose, however, it will be sufficient to
take as an example the influence of infanticide.

First, it should be observed that, in order to
render population stationary, it would only be
necessary that the restricting practices should af-
fect a limited and variable surplus which would

[57]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

remain after allowance had been made for the
normal or average infant mortality of a given
place and condition of life, and for the number
actually necessary to maintain the full comple-
ment of the group. This being the case, it is of
importance to notice that infanticide, the killing
of newborn infants, has been practised univer-
sally throughout the world (until superseded in
modern times by more remote methods for ac-
complishing the same ends).

It is not to be assumed that, in its earliest appli-
cation, the practice of infanticide was inspired
by any far-sighted concern for the food supply
of later years. In its simplest form, the practice
seems to have arisen from the readily appreci-
able difficulty that a mother finds in caring for
more than one infant at a time under primitive
conditions of life. At a very early period, how-
ever, it seems to have been definitely recognized
that if all the children born were allowed to live
there would not be food enough to support every-
body. This truth, as has frequently been pointed
out, would soon force itself upon the attention of
islanders; and modern observers have reported
that in certain islands from a half to two-thirds
of all infants were killed at birth. When fore-

[58]

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

thought had once come to play a part, the prac-
tice of infanticide seems to have assumed some
fairly definite form, and to have come, in a meas-
ure, under public surveillance. So w^hile in one
group the first or even the first tw^o or three in-
fants would be killed, in another all after the first
three or four vs^ould be done away with. Twins,
weakly children, those born on unlucky days or
for whom the omens were inauspicious, children
whose upper teeth came first, appear, in general,
to have met with an untimely end. Before long
the selection evidently came into close association
with some conception of the needs of the group :
, Australian women are said, out of an average of
six children, to rear as a rule two boys and a girl,
and practically everywhere the ratio of boys and
girls is a matter of special concern.

Owing to the interest excited by M'Lennan's
theory of the origin of exogamy, the question of
the prevalence of female infanticide has to a
great extent overshadowed the more general
problem. Here it may be observed that male in-
fanticide seems to stand in the same relation to
mother-rite groups that female infanticide does
to patriarchal groups. In the former, since de-
scent passes through the female side, girls are

[S9]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

preferred, and boys are less desirable; while, in
the latter case, the conditions are reversed. So,
too, where daughters could be sold for a good
price to husbands, they would be valued, but
where a dower had to be given they would be
looked upon as a source of loss. Conversely, with
the introduction of the custom of tracing descent
through males, boys were preferred, more espe-
cially because the dead were dependent upon
heirs-male for the sacrifices associated with
ancestor-worship.

If the influence of infanticide in restricting
numbers is to be fully appreciated, it must be
understood that the practice was not a mere mat-
ter of individual caprice, but was commonly re-
garded as a public concern of moment to the
group as a whole. The decision was not by any
means universally left to the parents, and in some
places the carrying out of the sentence was en-
trusted to professional practitioners. The most
important aspect of the case, however, is that the
infant had no standing in the group into which it
was born — was veritably "a little stranger" —
until it had been formally accepted into the kin.
As van Gennep has pointed out, the attitude of
the group towards the infant was one of self-

[60]

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

defence, and it was necessary that the newcomer
should undergo purification, and remain for a
period in a state of probation, before the rite of
admission was celebrated. Very generally, it
would appear, the child was submitted to more
or less public inspection, and the rite of accept-
ance was performed by the headman of the vil-
lage or the head of the family group. At Athens
the decision seems, primitively, to have been ar-
rived at by a family council; later, the father
made official announcement before the altar of
Hestia as to whether the child was to be accepted
or abandoned; finally, it would seem, the official
ceremony was confined to acceptance — failure to
celebrate the birth was tantamount to rejection.

Clearly, then, the practice of infanticide alone
must have gone far towards limiting the numbers
of earlier groups and rendering population sta-
tionary, and it must not be overlooked that this is
but one of a number of such practices. That these
methods of keeping population within bounds
were effective may, furthermore, be inferred
from the stability of the boundaries between dif-
ferent primitive groups, and from the wide-
spread evidences of a persistent attitude of hos-
tility towards strangers. The boundaries of tribal

[6i]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

territory, as Grierson has shown, are, in general,
clearly defined, not merely by the natural land-
marks of rivers, lakes, forests, and mountains,
but even by artificial monuments. The borders
are jealously defended, and, being on either side
placed under the protection of supernatural
powers who are believed to take upon themselves
the punishment of venturesome intruders, are
not violated without trepidation. Indeed, beyond
the group boundary, the world was necessarily
full of menace, for, among all lower peoples, the
stranger was feared and treated as an enemy, and
the relation between stranger-groups was one of
persistent hostility. So, while Holsti has shown
conclusively that primitive warfare consisted
more of shouting and terrifying than of fighting
with intent to kill, it is not to be assumed that the
hostility was factitious; and the fact that peace-
ful intercourse between neighboring groups was
limited in the extreme is shown by the custom of
the "silent trade." Singular as it may appear, in
this mode of bartering, traces of which are still
to be found in every quarter of the globe, the
traffickers not only do not address, but do not
even see one another. The silent trade is simply
a means by which enemies may mutually ex-

[62]

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

change goods, and at the same time remain in
safety; "they, indeed, keep faith with one an-
other, but in so doing they are actuated, not by
any feeling of amity, but wholly by the wish to
serve their own interests."

It cannot be asserted that the addendum offered
to the first proposition of Malthus has the same
axiomatic character as the statement that "Popu-
lation is necessarily limited by the means of sub-
sistence" ; nor can it be demonstrated from statis-
tics that "in normal stable conditions population
remains stationary" ; nevertheless, it may now be
urged that there are weighty considerations
which tend to substantiate such a conclusion. So,
as the longevity of the savage is less than that of
civilized man, and as the conditions of savage
life undoubtedly have an appreciable influence
upon fecundity, the prevalence of such customs
as infanticide, not to speak of the influence of
various forms of marriage, must have made any-
thing like rapid increase of population impos-
sible. Furthermore, all we know of the habits of
lower groups, more particularly their dread of
strange places and strange people, tends to con-
firm the view that such groups have long re-
mained practically stationary in numbers. Fi-

[63]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

nally, Keane points out that most African negroes
south of the equator, most Oceanic negroes
(Melanesians and Papuans), all Australian and
American aborigines have remained in their
original habitats ever since what may be called
the first settlement of the earth by man; and,
after an exhaustive inquiry, Willcox arrives at
the conclusion that where the influence of Eu-
rope has not been deeply felt, notably in China,
and in Japan before its opening to Western in-
fluence, population has been nearly or quite sta-
tionary or has actually decreased.

4. Presuming, then, that population in normal
stable conditions remains stationary, that among
primitive peoples there is no "natural increase"
which would lead inevitably to migrations, it be-
comes pertinent to inquire how movements of
peoples have been brought about.

This suggests the second proposition of Mal-
thus, that "Population always increases where
the means of subsistence increase." If this be true,
then, obviously, its converse must be true, and
population will decrease when the means of sub-
sistence diminish. The initial point for consider-
ation, it will thus be seen, is not so much the rise
and fall of numbers as the increase and decrease

[64]

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

of the food supply. Unfortunately, Malthus took
up the case of diminution of numbers, not in rela-
tion to contraction of food supply, but merely as
illustrating the recuperative power of popula-
tion after such visitations as plague, pestilence,
and famine. The direction of his interest led him
to concern himself primarily with the mode by
which subsistence is increased, and so he points
out that population multiplies rapidly when, in
new colonies, the knowledge and industry of an
old state are applied to the unappropriated land
of a new country. The most notable rise in popu-
lation of which we have historical knowledge
has followed upon modern improvements in
agricultural methods, whether in old countries
or in new. We may say, in short, that increase of
population, in modern times, follows upon in-
creased production of food.

It must now be observed that while increase of
the food supply will permit more people to live
upon the same area, there is no reason to suppose
that this increase will lead to migration. And
accepting the fact that we know of no period at
which the earth was not filled up to the limit of
existing conditions — Keane dates the complete
occupation of the globe by man in the early pleis-

[65]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

tocene epoch — and assuming, from what has
been said, that any local advance would simply
mean that a greater number would be supported
on a given territory, we are still left without a
clue to the explanation of the movements of peo-
ples. If, however, we turn to consider, not the
efifect of an increase of the means of subsistence,
but the effect of a decrease, the difficulty will, I
think, be seen to disappear. If, briefly, it can be
shown that populations have actually been driven
forth in consequence of a shrinkage of food sup-
ply due to a lessening of the productivity of the
land, a satisfactory explanation would be pro-
vided for the historical movements of peoples.
While the productivity of the land is increased
by human activity, it may also be afifected inju-
riously by the same means. Population shifts, for
example, when the methods employed have led
to the working out of the soil, leaving as a me-
morial "the abandoned farm." So, too, popula-
tion has declined in more than one area when an
invasion has been followed by a lapse to inferior
methods of cultivation, as in the Euphrates-
Tigris valley; or when, as in the Turkish do-
minions, forms of taxation have been introduced
which bear with undue severity upon the agri-

[66]

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

cultural class. It is obvious, however, that these
cases are incidental to a relatively advanced civil-
ization, and cannot be utilized to throw light
upon earlier situations.

What would appear to be a simple illustration
of food shrinkage, with its accompanying results,
is provided by Livy when he states that in Gaul,
in the time of Ambigatus, whoever he may have
been, a succession of abundant harvests led to a
rapid increase in numbers, and that subsequently,
to relieve the country from the burden of over-
population, a considerable body was sent out to
seek a new home. Paulus Diaconus relates that
the same experiment was resorted to by the
Langobardi, who, he says, divided their whole
group into three parts, and determined by lot
which part should go forth. Machiavelli, im-
proving upon this, regards the increase as con-
stant, and the method of division and emigration
as an established custom. He seems, like many
later writers, to have been impressed by Paul's
explanation that the North, being colder than
the South, is more healthy, and better fitted for
the propagation of nations. He thought, indeed,
that the whole country was called "Germania"
because such great multitudes sprang up there, a

[67]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

theory which evidently takes its rise in the ety-
mology of Isodore, who imagined that the word
"Germany" was derived from "germinare"; the
same idea is represented in Jordanes, who traces
the Goths to this "hive of races or womb of na-
tions." While Malthus was inclined to follow
Paul and Machiavelli, Gibbon doubted the regu-
larity of these outpourings, and we can now see
that the entire series of explanations, from Livy
down, is simply an effort to account for the one
known fact that migrations occur. Modern schol-
ars, like Chadwick, prefer to attribute the move-
ments in question to pressure from behind rather
than to the effects of sporadic cases of over-
population.

Climate is everywhere variable, and wet spells
succeed dry spells in a halting rhythm. Good
seasons may possibly stimulate population, but,
after all, sporadic influences of this sort are not
likely to have changed the face of the world by
inaugurating the great migrations known to his-
tory as "the wandering of the peoples." A more
significant effect may be attributed to a succes-
sion of bad seasons, particularly when these take
the form of long-continued droughts. To observe
the full effect of such occurrences it is necessary

[68]

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

to turn from Europe to Asia. Thus in the North-
western Provinces of India, the meeting-point of
the two great rain currents, scarcity of moisture
is frequent, and from time to time the autumn
rains fail completely. Then famine ensues, and
the stricken people, to escape destruction, move
blindly "in the direction of Malwa, that Cathay
or land of plenty, where, in the imagination of
the North Indian rustic, the fields always smile
with golden grain and poverty is unknown." So,
too, in southern India the inhabitants, similarly
impelled, have been known to travel in thou-
sands towards the distant hills. Here then is a
force strong enough to overcome the most deeply
ingrained immobility, and to break down even
the strongest barriers of caste. Nevertheless, it is
difficult to discover in an exodus of disorganized
and starving beings more than a semblance of
e movements which have played so conspicu-
part in the history of man. If, however, we
consi^_er the conditions existing in Central Asia,
other important factors will be found to present
themselves.

Since the end of the eighteenth century the idea
has been widely entertained by linguistic schol-
ars that the distribution of languages in Europe

[69]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

is best to be explained on the hypothesis of a se-
ries of migrations of peoples from Central Asia.
While the literature of this discussion is extraor-
dinarily extensive, there does not appear to have
been any concerted effort on the part of philolo-
gists to inquire into the origin of migrations,
though as early as 1820 passages from the Zend-
Avesta had been cited to show that a sudden low-
ering of temperature in northern Asia (attribu-
ted later to the coming of the Ice Age in Siberia)
had compelled the population to seek a warmer
habitat. On this basis, seemingly, the phrase
''climatic change" has retained its place without
substantiation from direct investigation. A new
view of the matter was introduced in 1892 when
James Bryce, discussing the origin of migrations,
pointed out that "a succession of dry seasons,
which may merely diminish the harvest of those
who inhabit tolerably humid regions, will pro-
duce such a famine in the inner parts of a conti-
nent like Asia as to force the people to seek some
better dwelling-place." It was not, however, until
the narratives of recent explorers like Sven
Hedin and Aurel Stein, at the opening of the
twentieth century, had called attention anew to
the presence of sand-buried ruins in Central Asia

[70]

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

that the underlying problem was vigorously at-
tacked, and, this time, by geographers.
The active discussion of the origin of the migra-
tions from Central Asia may be said to have been
inaugurated in 1904 by two memorable papers
in the Geographical Journal. In the earlier of
these, Mackinder laid emphasis, first, upon the
aridity of the heart of the Eurasian land-mass,
its system of internal drainage, and the fact that
it is not a continuous desert like the Sahara, but
a steppe-land with alternations of desert areas
and river-fed oases. Secondly, he pointed to the
mobility of its horse-riding inhabitants — a fac-
tor which has also been dwelt upon by Demolins
and Vidal de la Blache. In the discussion which
followed, Holdich raised the question of the rea-
son for the overflow of peoples from Central
Asia, and was emphatic in his opinion that one of
the great compelling reasons for all these migra-
tions had been a distinct alteration in the physical
conditions of the country. It is of some interest to
notice, as showing the views held so recently as a
decade ago, that Mackinder, in reply, considered
that when you had the evidence of this constant
succession of descents, it was quite unnecessary to
ask for any explanation of it.

[7"]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

In the later paper, Prince Kropotkin developed
the theory, on a broad geological foundation,
that Central Asia is in a state of rapid desicca-
tion; and, adverting to the existing evidences of
a greater population in times past, stated the
theory that "it must have been the rapid desicca-
tion of this region which compelled its inhabi-
tants to rush down to the Jungarian Gate, down
to the lowlands of the Balkash and the Obi, and
thence pushing before them the original inhabi-
tants of the lowlands, to produce those great mi-
grations and invasions of Europe which took
place during the first centuries of our era." Here
again the discussion brought out important con-
siderations. Mackinder, while accepting Kropot-
kin's general contention, thought that there was
a tendency to exaggerate the rapidity of the des-
iccation during the historical period; he was in-
clined to doubt that the invasions of Europe had
originated in desiccation, but accepted Hedin's
conclusion that the shifting of sand by the wind
had frequently brought catastrophe to human set-
tlements. Freshfield, citing various climatolo-
gists, was convinced that oscillation, not desicca-
tion, in climate was what all the records pointed
to. Mill called attention to the constancy of the

[72]

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

total rainfall during historical time, and ex-
pressed the opinion that there was a drying-up of
the plateau regions of all the continents, compen-
sated for by an increase of precipitation else-
where. Evans insisted that the general question
of the desiccation of the globe should be kept dis-
tinct from that of the drying-up of Central Asia,
and pointed to recent changes in the physical
geography of the latter region which rendered
inevitable the desiccation of the country. The
whole problem was thus opened up, with an evi-
dent consensus of opinion that some change, con-
tinuous or fluctuating, had taken place in the cli-
mate of Central Asia. At the end of a decade,
during which the question of desiccation was
warmly debated, Gregory presented an exhaust-
ive review of the opinions embodied in the litera-
ture. From this it would appear that the co-
operation of geologists and geographers had
been able to reach no more definite result than
that as an increased rainfall had been demon-
strated for many parts of the world, there was a
predisposition in favor of a compensating de-
crease in Central Asia, though the conflict of
opinion on this point might be explained on the

[73]

PROCESSES OF HISTQRY

hypothesis that the desert is widening in some
places and contracting in others.

Now it must be evident that if the discussion of
the relation of change of climate to migration is
not to remain permanently (like its philological
counterpart) on the basis of the advocacy of per-
sonal views, actual investigation of the archaeo-
logical evidence must be carried out upon the
ground, for in this way only may direct proof be
obtained. It is to the high credit of Raphael
Pumpelly that he envisaged the problem in this
way; and it is fortunate that grants from the
Carnegie Institution made possible two expedi-
tions to Turkestan, in 1903 and 1904, under his
direction. It should be understood that these ex-
peditions were organized, and the grants made,
for the specific purpose of investigating the
theory that the great civilizations of the East and
West had their origins in Central Asia, and of
examining the evidence for the supposed occur-
rence of changes of climate in the same region.
The results arrived at in regard to these ques-
tions, therefore, were not by-products of some
other undertaking, and are further guaranteed
by the fact that the work was carried on by a se-
lected group of specialists. (It may be noted that

[74]

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

Ellsworth Huntington, whose Pulse of Asia has
enjoyed a wide popularity, was an assistant on
the two expeditions.) In the present connection
it is unnecessary to enter into detail in regard to
Pumpelly's successes; what is of importance here
is the fact that evidence was accumulated to show
that, in Turkestan, organized town life, with
agriculture and the breeding of animals, goes
back for many thousands of years before the
Christian era, and that after these investigations
no doubt remains that the inhabitants of the sites
explored had been repeatedly driven forth by
destructive changes of climate.

Population, then, is limited, in any given habi-
tat, by the means of subsistence; it remains sta-
tionary in normal stable conditions, but may in-
crease without disturbing the equilibrium if the
food supply be increased through improvements
in the methods of production. On the other hand,
the inhabitants of a given area will be forced out
when, through the operation of natural agencies,
such as a diminution of rainfall, the means of
subsistence decrease, and from this compulsory
movement ensue migrations. Clearly, therefore,
it is unnecessary to assume that among certain
groups population has been permitted to grow

[75]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

^

without restraint, or to imagine some "mighty
hive" from which nations have emerged in
"swarms," or to suppose the existence of specifi-
cally "restless" peoples. It is of some interest to
recollect, at this point, that any disturbance of
conditions will manifest itself in an increase of
population, and it can scarcely be doubted that
migratory movements lead to the multiplication
of population, instead of being the product of
overpopulation in an established community.
Finally, migrations are not to be attributed to a
spirit of enterprise; peoples do not wander forth
seeking for they know not what. We cannot as-
sume in groups long fixed in habitat and ideas the
sudden desire for booty, or freedom, or glory, or
for "something unattainable." Nor may we ac-
cept the hypothesis that man is primarily a mi-
gratory, restless being, and that his fossilization
ensues only when he is temporarily debarred
from pursuing his natural impulses, and is
brought to a standstill. Man is prone to remain
where he is, to fixity in ideas and in ways of doing
things, and only through nature's insistent driv-
ing has he been shaken out of his immobility and
set wayfaring upon the open road.
5. So far, then, it has been shown that political

[76]

GEOGRAPHICAL FACTOR

units have arisen at certain definitely circum-
scribed places. These places have not been con-
sciously selected or decided upon by men, but
have been determined by the conformation of the
earth's surface, that is, by the localization of
habitable areas and the possibilities of travel.
The common element to be observed in all cases
is that the places where political organizations
have come into being have been points of pres-
sure; they have not merely been lands upon
which one group after another might have set
covetous eyes, but have been the termini of routes
which, of necessity, have been followed by suc-
cessive migrant groups. The dependence of man
upon his physical surroundings, thus exhibited,
is made even clearer when it is observed that the
human movements which lead eventually to the
beginning of political organization have had
their origin, not in man's foresight or planning,
or as a result of the "automatic increase" of popu-
lation, but in changes of climate within a definite
area.

If, now, we accept this statement of the depend-
ence of man upon his physical surroundings, it
obviously becomes necessary to inquire how mi-
grations have operated to bring political organi-

[77]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

zations into existence. This inquiry will have the
additional advantage of showing the uniform
dependence of history upon a second set of natu-
ral factors, namely, the fundamental character-
istics of man himself.

[78]

Ill

THE HUMAN FACTOR IN HISTORY

I. Political organization is a comparatively
recent phenomenon which has made its appear-
ance among men in certain restricted places at
definite moments in time, and has spread but
slowly from different points of origin. This fact
has hitherto had little significance for the histo-
rian, for, owing to his preoccupation with the
study of documents, he has been more interested
in questioning the credibility of ancient narra-
tives than in examining the antecedent conditions
from which, in all cases, political units have
sprung. When, however, the matter is explicitly
brought up, it is evident that political organiza-
tion is an exceptional thing, characteristic only
of certain groups, and that all peoples whatso-
ever have once been or still are organized on a
different basis. Furthermore, it is also evident
that political organization has been but imper-
fectly extended over the population of the areas
where it is dominant, and, consequently, that

[79]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

"survivals" of the earlier regime are to be found
even in the most highly developed countries. It
will, therefore, be seen that the examination of
the problem presented by the emergence of po-
litical organization is essential to an understand-
ing of how man has come to be as he is, and that
the uniformity of origin exhibited in this emer-
gence is a further justification for maintaining
the fundamental homogeneity of history.

If we compare "primitive" and "civilized"
groups of men as we find them in the world
today, almost the first point of difference that
will strike the observer is that, among the former,
the individual identifies himself by particular-
izing his blood-relationships, whereas, in the
latter, the individual defines his status in terms
of relation to a given territory. For example,
"the Saxons brought with them across the Nar-
row Seas an organization according to families,
hundreds, and tribes, dependent, that is to say, on
blood-relationship. But the settlement of these
units in the conquered land gave rise to the later
parishes, hundreds, and counties. Gradually the
idea of domicile replaced that of clan as the prin-
ciple of social order, and whereas the family, or
the hundred of families were formerlv respon-

[80]

THE HUMAN FACTOR

sible for the malefactor, the modern police have
power of arrest within clearly defined county or
municipal areas. Thus, while in later history the
physical features of the country are in some ways
less coercive, administrative divisions have
grown more precise, and have become more con-
stant elements in the machinery of government."

This striking difference seems first to have been
emphasized, in 1861, by Sir Henry Maine, and
was dealt with, later, from the point of view of
the anthropologist, by Lewis Henry Morgan.

Archaic law, Maine remarks, "is full, in all its ^.
provinces, of the clearest indications that society
in primitive times was not what it is assumed to
be at present, a collection of individuals. In fact,
and in the view of the men who composed it, it
was an aggregation of families." If, then, kin-
ship in blood is the original basis of organization,
there is no revolution known to us, he continues, /-
"so startling and so complete as the change which
is accomplished when some other principle —
such as that, for instance, of local contiguity —
established itself for the first time as the basis of
common political action." "The idea that a num-
ber of persons should exercise political rights in
common simply because they happened to live

[81]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

within the same topographical limits was utterly
strange and monstrous to primitive antiquity."
*'The most recent researches into the primitive
history of society," he says in a later book, "point
to the conclusion that the earliest tie which
knitted men together in communities was con-
sanguinity or kinship." "We have next to con-
sider the epoch, reached at some time by all the
portions of mankind destined to civilization, at
which . . . the land begins to be the basis of
society in place of kinship. The change is ex-
tremely gradual, and in some particulars it has
not even now been fully accomplished, but it has
been going on through the whole course of his-
tory. The constitution of the family through
actual blood-relationship is of course an observ-
able fact, but, for all groups of men larger than
the family, the land on which they live tends to
become the bond of union between them, at the
expense of kinship, ever more and more vaguely
conceived."

Morgan, after describing the earlier form of
organization, goes on to say that the later form is
"founded upon territory and upon property, and
may be distinguished as a state (civitas). The
township or ward, circumscribed by metes and

[82]

THE HUMAN FACTOR

bounds, with the property it contains, is the basis
or unit of the latter, and political society is the
result. Political society is organized upon terri-
torial areas, and deals with property as well as
with persons through territorial relations. . . .
In ancient society this territorial plan was un-
known. When it came it fixed the boundary line
between ancient and modern society."

Now, while the forms and problems presented
by the facts of kindred organization are repre-
sented in anthropology by an extensive literature,
and while the forms and problems of political
organization have been described and discussed
by all the generations of historians and political
theorists from Herodotus and Aristotle to the
present day, I am unaware of any sustained ef-
fort that has been made to investigate the transi-
tion from the one to the other by comparison of
all the available data. The question of the rela-
tions of the different types of kindred organiza-
tion forms one of the major interests of anthro-
pology; on the other hand, it is with the expe-
rience of men under the conditions of the new
organization that History, in the accepted mean-
ing of the term, deals, and it must be apparent
now that the only satisfactory approach to the

[83]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

study of History will lie through the investiga-
tion of the phenomena of transition wherever this
may have taken place. But while the transition
has not yet been made the subject of extended
research, there is one fact at least which stands
out with such distinctness that it may be utilized,
at once to exhibit the homogeneity of history, and
to reveal the source of the most notable charac-
teristics of modern life.

2. To observe this fact in its proper setting, it is
necessary to see that, while the distinction be-
tween kindred and political units may readily be
defined, the description of the difference does not
explain how the later condition sprang from the
earlier. In other words, there is some step or
process involved in the transition which neither
Maine nor Morgan has brought to light.

To comprehend the situation fully, we may
begin by saying that kindred organization, in
whatever form it may assume, reflects the natural
facts of human generation. What follows imme-
diately from this is a commonplace of the study
of primitive man which must be constantly borne
in mind, for kindred organization implies the
unquestioned and unremitting dominance of the
group over the individual, and this leads to the

[84]

THE HUMAN FACTOR

tenacious and uncompromising maintenance of
customary ways and ideas. It will thus be seen
that the despotism of custom negatives the idea
that kindred organization could have been given
up voluntarily, or exchanged, after deliberation,
for something invented or considered better. The
change, as I have pointed out, has been forced
upon men at certain geographical points, deter-
mined by the physical distribution of land and
water, and by a series of exigencies which go
back to specific changes in climate within a defi-
nite area of the earth's surface. Furthermore, the
immediate occasion of the break-up of kindred
groups has been the collision and conflict, at the
termini of routes, which have ensued from the
migrations of men; and apparently it has re-
quired repeated, long-sustained, and bitter con-
flict, such indeed as Gilbert Murray has depicted
in The Rise of the Greek Epic, to overcome, even
in a limited degree, the adherence of such groups
to old customs, old ways of doing things, and old
ideas. Wherever political organizations have
come into existence these conflicts have taken
place, so that there is a direct historical relation
between war and this particular step in human
advancement.

[85]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

Now, there is a strong temptation to turn aside
here, under the guidance, let us say, of Chad-
wick's Heroic Age, and dwell upon the story of
these struggles, dimly conveyed to us through
the alluring haze of epic poetry, but it is essen-
tial, in the present connection, to keep clearly
before us what it is that, in these cases, war has
destroyed. The cardinal point is that the conflict,
in breaking up the older organization, liberated
the individual man, if but for a moment, from
the dominance of the group, its observances, its
formulae, and its ideas. Briefly, a situation was
created in which the old rites and ceremonies
could not be performed, one in which the old
rules of action were manifestly inadequate, and
hence one in which the individual became, in
some measure, a law unto himself. This, at bot-
tom, is the fact upon which all history turns.

It is difficult for the modern man to realize that,
in the earlier period, individuality did not exist;
that the unit was not the single life, but the
group; and that this was the embodiment of a
relatively fixed system, from which escape was
normally impossible. So completely was the indi-
vidual subordinated to the community that art
was just the repetition of tribal designs, literature

[86]

THE HUMAN FACTOR

the repetition of tribal songs, and religion the
repetition of tribal rites. Conversely, the break-
up which resulted from the ultimate conflict of
alien groups had, as its most essential feature, the
release of personal initiative, the creation of per-
sonal responsibility, and the recognition of per-
sonal worth and individuality. These appear in
actual life under the form of individual self-
assertion, which, in all later developments, re-
mains a significant phenomenon. And here, par-
enthetically, it may be pointed out that we accept
readily enough as characteristic of the transition
epoch the spirit of boasting which pervades the
literature of such periods, and we set down as the
all-pervading motive of action the hunger to win
personal glory, but when we come to the discus-
sion of our own times we show no disposition to
analyze the conventions that now define the ave-
nues through which the same spirit may find out-
let, nor do we seek to discover the means by
which this spirit is kept in check under modern
conditions, nor the relation that its expression
bears to opportunity. Needless to say the question
has never been taken up as to the delimitation of
the channels through which self-assertion might
properly realize itself in desirable activities.

[87]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

We are now in a position to see that the release
of individual self-assertion through the tempo-
rary overthrow of the domination of customary
restraints has been the necessary prelude to the
emergence of territorial organization and the
institution of personal ownership. However far
apart these two elements may appear to be in
modern life, in the beginning they are identical,
for the fundamental characteristic of political
organization is the attitude of personal owner-
ship assumed by the ruler towards the land and
the population over which he has gained con-
trol— an attitude expressed to this day in the J
phrases "my army" and "my people." What we
have uniformly at the beginning of the historical]
period in different lands is the assumption ofj
sovereign ownership by an individual leader orj
king who relies upon the aid of a military group,
caste, or aristocracy to hold in subjection a sub-
ordinate population of which little is heard ; andj
later History is, primarily, the record of the un-
ceasing efforts of kings to extend what they re-
gard as their personal possessions. Even today,]
the most advanced political theory (of German
origin, naturally) accepts the view that the state'l
is an institution imposed by a victorious group]

[88]

THE HUMAN FACTOR

upon those whom it has conquered, with the
single object of regulating the authority of the
victor over the vanquished, and guarding against
internal rebellion and external assault. Ruler-
ship, in this view, has no further purpose than
the economic exploitation of the conquered by
the conquerors.
The crucial point to be observed here is that
kingship and territorial organization represent
simply the institutionalization of a situation
which arose out of the opportunity for personal
self-assertion created by the break-up of primi-
tive organizations. And it should be understood
that just as the relative stability of the older units
follows from the fact that every human being is
born into a given group and becomes assimilated
to this in speech, manners, and ideas, so, in the
new organization, the status quo operates to per-
petuate itself, and the mere fact of its existence
becomes an argument for regarding it as ordained
by some super-mundane power. Thus, through-
out the past, we are presented with the anomaly
of men fighting to maintain the institutionalized
vestiges of the self-assertion of aggressive indi-
viduals on occasions of long-past upheavals. On
the other hand, it must also be observed that —

[89]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

under conditions which it is of paramount im-
portance for the historian to make clear — the
spirit of self-assertion has arisen from time to
time in the subordinate elements of composite
groups. Indeed, what we ordinarily designate
"constitutional history" is largely occupied with
the efforts put forth by one or another element,
class, or order included within a political group
to contest the dominance of a ruling minority,
and the theory of sovereign ownership. From
this internal contest has arisen the theory of indi-
vidual "rights" (of which perhaps the most fun-
damental is that of preventing other people from
interfering with a man's use of his own prop-
erty), and the theory that political authorities
may be tested and reformed in accordance with
current ideas. But, while these matters constitute
the marrow of history, we must leave them here
to concern ourselves more particularly with
other, less generally recognized, results of the
initial self-assertion.

3. The object we have in view is to discover, if
possible, how man everywhere has come to be as
he is. From what has been said it will appear that
this involves a consideration of the facts of
"transition" and "release," and a vivid realiza-

[90]

THE HUMAN FACTOR

tion that these phenomena have made their ap-
pearance only at certain geographical points and
at certain moments of time. It has been shown al-
ready that political organizations have arisen at
points definitely localized and determined by the
physical features of the earth's surface, and it
follows explicitly that the release of the indi-
vidual from the dominance of the group, and the
stimulus and opportunity necessary for the emer-
gence of individual initiative and self-assertion
have been similarly restricted. Hence we arrive
at an aspect of the case which is of fundamental
importance for an understanding of the present
condition of mankind, namely, that individual-
ization, and the politicization of groups has
never been other than irregular and incomplete.
The origin of this irregularity is, simply, that
pressure and conflict, coming at specific points,
have never been evenly distributed geographi-
cally; and the break-up of kindred organization,
never having been designed, has never been fully
and deliberately carried out. Of necessity, some
lands and some people, being nearer the imme-
diate seat of conflict, have been more deeply in-
volved in the struggle, and hence more com-
pletely exposed to the disturbing influences. Of

[91]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

necessity, too, release, being ultimately personal,
has opened different paths of opportunity to dif-
ferent members of the community.

The manifestations of the irregularity have
been of the most varied character. Within the
groups primarily affected, for example, the
breakdown of the old organization has not been
accompanied by the revelation of any "best pos-
sible" substitute, and so, in the stress of emer-
gency, the old forms are made over to do service
as best they may, new forms are called by old
names, and new ideas masquerade in faded habil-
iments. Furthermore, when the turmoil begins
to subside, the lately disturbed groups, as readily
as their forefathers, turn to impose their newly
acquired modes of thought and action upon the
rising generations, and hence the arrangements
of a given moment are perpetuated indefinitely.

Outside the original political group, again, the
influences of the upheaval spread, as from a
center, in ever widening and diminishing waves.
To observe the results of this extension, it is
necessary to make a distinction which, I think,
has not hitherto been observed. If, avoiding the
complexity of the situation presented in the
countries ordinarily included in "ancient" his-

[92]

THE HUMAN FACTOR

tory, we turn our attention to China and India,
it will be seen that a political organization comes
into being in the midst of non-political commu-
nities. Typically, the new political unit may be
regarded as maintaining contact with tribal or
kindred organizations on two frontages, and the
distinction to be made arises from differences in
the activities which follow from the conditions
in the two cases. It has already been pointed out
that, in China and India, political units make
their appearance just within the exposed fron-
tier; the result of this is that the new organiza-
tion has behind it, rearwards, an extensive coun-
try with a quiescent population grouped on the
old lines, and, in front, outwards, similar groups,
subject, however, to perennial uneasiness and
disturbance. From this situation there arise two
different types of activity on the part of the
middle group — and it is not without significance
that in other countries besides China there has
been a recognized "middle kingdom."

If, then, we consider the relations of the politi-
cal unit towards the "native" population in its
rear (avoiding the error of identifying an asser-
tion of territorial dominion with the politiciza-
tion of a population), it will readily become ap-

[93]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

parent that there is practically no case on record
in which this population has been wholly in-
corporated into the political organization, or in
which the kindred organization has been com-
pletely broken down. This condition is manifest
in China and India, but the statement holds true
equally of Great Britain, and is conspicuous in
the New World. The occasion of this unequal
politicization of geographically protected peo-
ples may be traced to the aggression or self-
assertion of small bodies of men, representing
individuals who have not submitted themselves
to the process of re-stabilization in the political
organization. It has been usual to classify these
men, somewhat invidiously, as "adventurers,"
but in reality they are individuals for whose
awakened initiative and desire for purposive
action the new arrangement provides no ade-
quate opportunity. It is the case, everywhere and
in all times, of "The man who would be king" : —
"we will go away to some other place where a
man isn't crowded and can come to his own."
So, in India, the Aryan settlement of the Punjab
was followed by the rise of small Aryan king-
doms in the neighboring Ganges valley, and the
footsteps of the adventurers may even be traced,

[94]

THE HUMAN FACTOR

still farther south, in the Deccan. Precisely the
same course of action is to be seen in China, and
is exemplified, frequently, in later times, in the
colonial expansion of European peoples.
Turning next to the policy of the "middle"
kingdom in regard to the outward or frontier
groups, a wholly different situation comes into
view, for, in this case, the aggression or pressure
is directed against the central political organiza-
tion, and not exerted by it. What is here to be
considered primarily is the means of defence
adopted by the political unit against migrant in-
vaders. In ancient times, it would seem that one
of the earliest expedients for protecting the ex-
posed frontier was the wall, and the barrier
erected by the Chinese is but one instance of a
practice which has been followed throughout
Asia and Europe. On the other hand, it was dis-
covered at a remote period, for example, by the
Chinese under the Han dynasty, that a more
effective defence of the land might be provided
by a military occupation and control of the
frontier territory lying beyond the actual bound-
ary of the organized political unit; and thence-
forward the Chinese government has followed
the policy of maintaining its hold upon the prov-

[95]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

inces of Mongolia and Sin Kiang. In this pro-
cedure we have an example of a strategic policy
which has played a most significant part in the
history of the world, and is even now a subject of
debate in every "foreign office" on the globe. It
is of interest to observe that the Romans should
have relied, in general, upon the earlier expe-
dient of the wall, with its accompaniment of a
march or "no man's land" in front. But after the
long series of barbarian invasions which brought
about the disruption of the Western Empire, the
newer political organizations which arose upon
its foundations adopted the later Chinese policy
and erected for defensive purposes, across Cen-
tral Europe, that series of marken — frontier
provinces under military control — from which
have sprung the German and Austrian govern-
ments of the present day.

Clearly, then, the extent of the influence exerted
by the "middle" kingdom, and its central politi-
cal organization, will differ radically in each of
these typical cases; and we may see, in brief, that
the present condition of the great contrasting
groups of East and West, of China and India on
the one hand, and of Europe on the other, springs
from the manner in which the results of localized

[96]

THE HUMAN FACTOR

transitions from kindred to political organiza-
tion have affected neighboring populations. In
the case of interiorly situated groups, the more
obvious institutions of the new regime are ex-
tended, through the forceful activity of indi-
viduals, without the earlier organization of the
groups brought under subjection being greatly
disturbed, or the individual members of these
groups being influenced by any awakening. Thus
the institution of kingship, with its accompany-
ing theory of sovereign ownership, is imposed in
new areas without an attendant break-up of kin-
dred organization, and without a resultant stimu-
lus to personal initiative. In the case of exteriorly
situated peoples, the influence exerted is, on the
other hand, altogether indirect. Beyond the wall,
there is no extension of politicization. The fron-
tier is a declaration of personal ownership, and
with the internal condition of the exterior bar-
barians the king has no concern. But the barrier
or pale, whether of masonry or of armed men,
obviously exerts a pressure of its own; it acts
effectively as a dam against which weight accu-
mulates, and so creates a point of pressure for
those outside. In the end, the barrier breaks, and
with the inundation a new situation is created in

[97]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

which new tribal units are broken up, new indi-
viduals awake to self-assertion, and a new redis-
tribution of ownership takes place.

I have remarked earlier that "transition" has
not been made the subject of extended compara-
tive research, and all that has been done here is
to suggest the fundamental importance of the
study. Nevertheless, even a superficial inquiry
brings to light certain points of great interest,
and we see that transition is in all cases the result
of pressure and conflict at geographical points
which are absolutely determined by the con-
figuration of the earth's surface, and that this
localization of transition, in place and time, leads
everywhere to irregularity and unevenness in the
distribution of political institutions. Most sig-
nificant of all, the central feature of transition is
not merely the substitution of territory for blood-
relationship as the basis of unity in human
groups, but the emergence of individuality and
of personal self-assertion, and hence it follows
that human advance rests ultimately upon the
foundation of individual initiative and activity.

4. At an earlier point in this discussion it was
found necessary, in order to escape from the

[98]

THE HUMAN FACTOR
vagueness of such terms as "civilization," to re-
strict the inquiry, for the moment, to the begin-
nings of political organization. If, however, we
are ever to understand how man has come to be
as he is, the investigation cannot be limited in
this manner; for while human life is, unquestion-
ably, conditioned by the organization under
which it is conducted, the actual content of life
cannot be summed up or expressed in terms of
organization. The differences which are to be
observed between groups at the present moment,
between earlier and later generations of the same
group, between individuals, and between earlier
and later periods in the life of the same indi-
vidual, cannot be epitomized in any description
of the forms of human association.

Here, for the sake of clearness, it may be pointed
out that the practice of any art involves the ac-
ceptance of specific limitations and the recogni-
tion of conventional forms within which the
artist's expression is confined. No student of
sculpture or poetry, for example, will confuse the
technique of a statue or a sonnet with the thought
and emotion which it attempts to convey. In
short, the work of art is something more than the
technical rules by which it is conditioned. Now

[99]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

the conduct of life is an art, and is limited by
specific rules and conventions, but there appears
to be a preponderant disposition on the part of
students of man to regard the exterior rules and
conventions, laws and social usages, as the essen-
tial matter for consideration. This is made clear
when we observe that legislators, publicists, and
"social workers" hold tenaciously to the opinion
that the advancement of man is to be effected by
the simple expedient of modifying the existing
regulations. Whether this be true or not, there
can be no question that in the investigation of the
elements of human history we must set ourselves
to inquire, not merely how the forms and con-
ventions of human aggregates have reached their
present status, but how the content of life has
come to possess the infinite variety which it ex-
hibits today.

In pursuit of this broader inquiry, we may
begin by saying that what differentiates man
from animal cannot be what he shares in common
with his closest non-human relations, and hence
that, in seeking to account for human advance-
ment, the common possessions of animal and man
must be eliminated from consideration. Fortu-
nately, there is practical agreement among all

THE HUMAN FACTOR

classes of investigators, psychologists, logicians,
and anthropologists, that the differentia of man
consists in his possession of articulate speech or
spoken language. Speech is a difference easily
determinable, and has in itself proved to be a
subject of profound interest to scholars, but the
success that has attended the study of words and
languages during the last century has somewhat
obscured the important fact that speech does not
exist in and for itself. The interest that has been
taken in the changes of form, sound, and mean-
ing of words has hindered, until quite recently,
a just appreciation of the fact that the study of
words cannot be separated from the study of
what they designate. Speech comes into exist-
ence in response to the desire on the part of a
human being to make himself understood by
someone else, and is an instrument for the com-
munication of ideas. Language is a conveying
medium, and the aim of speech is the convey-
ance of ideas, not the mere interchange of words.
Hence the humanist, or student of man, will in-
terest himself not merely in the form of expres-
sion, but in what is expressed; he will pass from
the individual words of a language to examine
the ideas conveyed. Linguistic scholars have

[lOl]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

rendered invaluable service in the composition
of grammars and vocabularies, but they have, not
infrequently, lost sight of the circumstance that
any given language is the medium through which
a particular system of ideas finds expression.
While, then, we may accept speech as the dis-
tinguishing mark of humanity, we cannot but
recognize that the fundamental object of inquiry
will be the system of ideas represented in a given
language at a given time.

If, then, we come to compare, not man and
brute, but the differing groups that go to make
up the human population of the globe, the dis-
tinguishing feature of any group will be, not its
language, implements, or institutions, but its par-
ticular idea-system, of which these other mani-
festations of activity are varying expressions.
Without exception, the products of human ac-
tivity are expressions or aspects of the entire men-
tal content of the group or individual. This men-
tal content, moreover, is not to be conceived of as
a mere assemblage of disparate units placed in
juxtaposition, but as cohering in an idea-system.
Ideas are not simply accumulated or heaped up;
on the contrary, every *'new" idea added not only
modifies, but is in turn modified by the existing

[ 102]

THE HUMAN FACTOR

system into which it is incorporated. Thus it ap-
pears that no idea-system, any more than an
actual spoken language, is a deliberate construc-
tion. Languages are made up of words, but these
are not consciously and systematically elabo-
rated; like the names in a scientific classification
they come into existence only as occasion de-
mands, and are elicited by objects, actions, and
events. Before ''plowing," "sowing," and "reap-
ing" could have been named these actions must
have been performed and recognized. Similarly,
the idea-system of a group is not to be attributed
to foresight or planning, but to the pressure of
circumstance. It will appear, then, that if we are
to consider the content of life in addition to the
exterior forms of human association, the study
before us must concern itself with the factors and
processes through which the idea-systems of dif-
ferent groups have come to be as we find them
today.

In justification of thus postulating idea-systems
as a basis for the comparative study of man, it
may be pointed out that what we find in "civili-
zation" is not the product of primary emotions,
which man shares with animals, but of some ac-
tivity which he has developed in a characteristic

[ 103 ]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

manner. This activity may be described as the
formation and expression of ideas. The physical
and psychological constitution of man being
"given" — a point to which reference will subse-
quently be made — what varies from group to
group is not this foundation, but the results of
mental activity; and we want to know how these
results have come to exhibit the differences we
find in the world today. Thus human "evolution"
is, fundamentally, intellectual "evolution," and
the diversity of status in human groups at the
present time is to be traced to differences in men-
tal activity. This basis of study will be found to
meet all the requirements of the comparative
method as exhibited in biological evolution,
which is founded upon a comparison of the
phylogenetic or historical series, the ontogenetic
or biographical series, and the facts of present
geographical distribution, and the investigation
of how man has come to be as he is must be placed
upon such a basis as will make the utilization of
these categories possible. Furthermore, this basis
has already been found necessary in different
lines of humanistic inquiry. Human "advance-
ment" is not measurable in terms of any one of
the classes or categories under which human

[ 104]

THE HUMAN FACTOR

activities have been grouped for purposes of
study. When we consider any one subject like
religion, art, language, or political organization,
by itself, we simply impose a voluntary limita-
tion upon our personal attention; in actual life,
on the other hand, the mental activity of man has
never been divided into separate compartments.
Hence in dealing with these separate studies we
require some more general basis of comparison.
So Hobhouse, tracing the "evolution" of morals,
takes as a foundation "the collective stock of
knowledge, the equipment of method and gov-
erning conceptions which constitute the working
intellectual capital of any community." Simi-
larly, S. A. Cook points out that "for the study
of religion it is necessary to observe the tendency
of man to blend into one whole his tested and
untested knowledge, his own experience and that
of others." "A 'body' or system of beliefs, prac-
tices, and the like, depends upon people; it is
part of their larger total 'body' of thought, and
undergoes development." "The development of
a man's life and that of his total world of thought
are interconnected ; and since his profoundest and
most valued beliefs are not unchangeable, the
most vital part of his physical being and that of

[105]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

his world of thought are both capable of develop-
ment. Each depends upon the other, and the
whole evolves."

All the more, therefore, when we come to take
up the broad problem of how man has come to be
as he is will it be necessary to adopt the canon
that judgment in regard to the mental activity of
a given group can be based only upon the totality
of the various mental phases of culture — lan-
guage, custom, myth, and art. And this position
is fortified by McDougall's opinion that "man,
since he became man, has progressed in the main
by means of the increase in volume and improve-
ment in quality of the sum of knowledge, belief,
and custom, which constitutes the tradition of
any society. It is to the superiority of the moral
and intellectual tradition of his society that the
superiority of civilized man over existing sav-
ages and over his savage forefathers is chiefly, if
not wholly, due."

As a result of these considerations, we arrive at
the view that the study of how existing idea-
systems have come to be what they are provides
a feasible basis for an investigation of the ad-
vancement of man. The alternative bases of study
which ordinarily are adopted concern them-

[io6]

THE HUMAN FACTOR

selves, on the one hand, with the physical consti-
tution of human beings, and, on the other, with
the exterior forms of human association. The
first of these leads at once to the theory that there
have been and are innately superior races, in-
nately superior classes, and innately superior in-
dividuals, and that human advancement has fol-
lowed from the spontaneous activity of these
higher elements. As, however, no effort has been
made to account for the sporadic emergence of
these exceptions to the general rule of backward-
ness and stagnation, in the long run the argument
is just an assertion of the physical superiority of
those who have become conspicuous. The second
basis of study fixes attention upon the forms of
group organization, and provides no opening to
a broader consideration of the content of human
life; whereas the basis here proposed brings
under one view the entire range of activities rep-
resented in religion, art, literature, philosophy,
science, and co-ordinates these activities with the
facts of history and of group organization.

5. If we turn to examine the relation of idea-
systems to group organization, a remarkable
parallelism in development becomes apparent.
It has already been pointed out that under primi-

[ 107 ]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

tive conditions organization is relatively stable,
and that the individual is bound by the authority
of the group. The idea-systems of primitive
groups are highly restricted in content, but, in
addition to this limitation, the traditional ideas
entertained have, in general, been transmuted
into customary actions and ways of doing things.
So, religious ideas are concentrated in rites and
observances, and explanations of natural phe-
nomena are embodied in symbolic ceremonies.
In short, the w^hole body of custom and tradition
represents ideas fixed in action. Since these modes
of action, which are associated with all the essen-
tial activities of life, must be prosecuted with
rigid adherence to precedent, it is evident that
any reconsideration of the validity of the ideas
upon which they rest is practically out of the
question. Primitive man does not "think," he
performs definitely prescribed actions under the
eye of the community, which, in turn, is vitally
concerned in the exactness with which the repe-
tition of formula or ceremony is carried out. It
will thus be observed, as Professor Shotwell sug-
gests, that a study of the relation of custom and
observance to idea-systems, and of the conditions
under which they become "survivals" when the

[.08]

THE HUMAN FACTOR

latter have changed, must ultimately constitute
an essential feature of this inquiry, but as yet
such study has not been undertaken.

It has been indicated that the breakdown of
kindred organization, following upon migration
and collision, tended to release the individual
from the domination of the group, and to create
a situation in which personal initiative and self-
assertion became possible. It has now to be
pointed out that, while this release may be re-
garded as affecting primarily the submission of
the individual to the mandatory authority of the
group, essentially it opens for the individual the
possibility of thinking for himself without refer-
ence to group precedent. The emergence of indi-
viduality, with its accompanying manifestations
of personal initiative and self-assertion, is inti-
mately associated with the beginnings of inde-
pendent mental activity, of thinking which may
lead the individual to question the validity of
inherited group ideas.

This striking result, it must be understood, is
not achieved by the individual of his own voli-
tion or accord ; it is thrust upon him by the force
of circumstances. To make the point clear, we
may say, speculatively, that had there ever been

[ 109]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

but one system of ideas common to all men, ad-
vancement would have been impossible, for
progress in ideas springs from comparison, and
a sense of difference could not arise from con-
templation of different instances of the same
thing. Conversely, the critical spirit is easily
enough aroused by the juxtaposition of different
means for attaining the same end; so that differ-
ent observances for effecting the same result, dif-
ferent mythological explanations of the same
phenomena, when brought into contact, may be
expected to lead to questionings and comparisons.
That some such path has actually been followed
in the past seems clear. Ernst Curtius pointed
out, long ago, that the influence of sea-navigation
upon the development of the Greeks had been
very marked, as it suddenly brought face to face
men who had been living under widely different
conditions, and hence induced an endless com-
paring, learning, and teaching. A more drastic
form of the same process is exhibited, however,
when successive migrating groups invade the
land, be it ancient Greece or medieval Italy, and
a time ensues of "constant war-paths and uproot-
ings of peoples." In such circumstances, the
whole traditional bodv of customs, rites, and

[i".o]

THE HUMAN FACTOR

observances tends to be overthrown, for the tur-
moil no longer permits of opportunity to pro-
pitiate the slain, or to maintain the sacrifices for
the dead ; the lines of kindred are broken, and
new groups, composed of men whom chance has
thrown together, are formed under the leader-
ship of some individual whose self-assertion,
backed by strength or craft, seems to offer pro-
tection. This is the essence of all "Dark Ages,"
in which, through swiftly moving change, con-
trasts are made vividly apparent, men awake to
the perception of dififerences in ideas, and criti-
cism is born.

At the present time the view is very widely en-
tertained that human advancement is the out-
come of the commingling of ideas through the
contact of different groups. Thus Henry Balfour
says, typically, "This process of grafting one idea
upon another, or, as we may call it, the hybridiza-
tion of ideas and experience, is a factor in the
advancement of culture whose influence cannot
be overestimated. It is, in fact, the main secret of
progress." So, too, F. W. Maitland holds that
"the rapidly progressive groups have been just
those which have not worked out their own sal-
vation, but have appropriated alien ideas."

[Ill]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

While, in the main, accepting these statements,
it must, nevertheless, be insisted that the great
advances of mankind have been due, not to the
mere aggregation, assemblage, or acquisition of
disparate ideas, but to the emergence of a certain
type of mental activity which is set up by the
opposition of different idea-systems. This is il-
lustrated in Jastrow's remark that civilization
is everywhere the result of the stimulus evoked
by the friction of one group upon another. The
stimulus is mental, and the friction springs from
the contact of differing customs and explana-
tions. The simple commingling of ideas un-
doubtedly takes place, but the important point is
that different ideas in regard to the same subject,
when maintained in opposition by members of
the same group, necessarily evoke comparison
and critical discussion. The outcome of this is not
always, nor even generally, a choice between two
alternatives, for the debate will leave neither of
the original positions wholly unchanged, and
hence a new idea-system will arise which is not
a selection of materials drawn from various
sources, but a resultant of the juxtaposition of
different bodies of thought.
We may see, then, that, under primitive condi-

[112]

THE HUMAN FACTOR

tions, the type of organization operates to main-
tain a fixity of relations, customs, and ideas;
under transitional conditions, however, the domi-
nant factor is the release of the individual, mani-
festing itself in the self-assertion which gives to
the new organization its characteristic form, and
in the personal criticism through which the older
idea-systems are modified and changed.

6. If, as would thus appear, differences in idea-
systems have been of crucial importance in the
history of mankind, the question as to how these
differences have arisen will naturally force itself
upon our consideration.

Differences in idea-systems are, fundamentally,
man's response to differences in his surroundings.
This fact has been obscured, in general estima-
tion, by the somewhat exaggerated use which has
been made of it by men like Buckle and Spencer,
who, for example, have attributed the growth of
superstition to the terror inspired by the threat-
ening aspects of nature in tropical countries. If,
however, we keep to a less speculative level, it
will readily be admitted that the surroundings
in which their respective lives are passed will
present very different objects for consideration
to the Eskimo and to the Arab; and so, while

["3]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

the language of the one has many different words
for "seal," that of the other displays a similar
elaboration of terms for the "camel." This form
of dependence of the group upon its habitat is so
far recognized as unequivocal and precise that
it has been made the basis of extended philologi-
cal research with the object of determining the
earliest seat of various peoples, notably the
"Aryans"; for where the names of natural ob-
jects, such as trees and animals, have been bor-
rowed from other languages it is assumed that
these could not have been known to the particu-
lar group in its original home. It is true that ob-
jections have been urged to this course of reason-
ing, but the fact remains that, where the condi-
tions of life lead men to pursue the occupation of
fishing, the foreground of their interest will be
dominated by terms and ideas which would be
entirely different if the same individuals were
engaged in cattle-raising or farming. In short,
the surroundings in which a group is placed de-
termine its primary interests, and these, as Boas
has pointed out, affect the entire character of its
vocabulary and the make-up of its system of
ideas.
This fact is illustrated, for example, in Jas-

[114]

THE HUMAN FACTOR

trow's study of Sumerian and Babylonian ideas
of beginnings, "which may be summed up," he
says, "in the statement that in the early Sumerian
view the chief factor in the Creation myth is the
bringing about of vegetation and fertility, where-
as in the later Babylonian or Akkadian tale the
main stress is laid upon the substitution of law
and order for primitive chaos and lawlessness."
Again, it is difficult to refrain from calling at-
tention, in however condensed a form, to the
examination of "The Background of Greek
Science" by J. L. Myres, in which he endeavors
"to recover some of the limiting conditions under
which any scheme of scientific knowledge and
scientific method necessarily came into being in
Greek lands."

Considered as a theatre, a place for observing
nature, he says, Greek lands offer in some re-
spects unequalled facilities. They are a region of
abrupt contrasts, and frank revelations of what
nature is, in its infinitely various detail. Its clear
air decimates distances — witness Lucretius' re-
mark that far-off lights do not grow smaller; but
its strong contrasts of hot and cold, due to in-
tensity of sunlight and rapidity of radiation, con-
tinually present the atmosphere as a perceptible
[IIS]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

fluid, with shimmering ripples over each roasted
rock, and with an upper surface, emphatic as a
sea-level, on which the wool-pack clouds sit like
snowflakes on a window pane. In such a climate,
too, 'wet' and 'dry' are as clearly defined in their
antagonism as 'hot' and 'cold'; for wet and dry
are not only natural opposites, but are engaged in
perpetual struggle here, in alternating seasons of
rain and rainlessness. With the other great an-
titheses of the physical philosophy, light and
darkness, hard and soft, sweet and bitter, it is the
same; but most striking of all, perhaps, is the
extraordinary rapidity both of decomposition
and of organic growth. All these, Myres con-
tinues, "challenge curiosity about the origin and
the nature of life, with peculiar insistence, and
apparent facility of experiment. Who, then, or
what, maintains the world? This, for men, as
for Olympians, if Olympians thought about such
things, was the supreme question to be asked of
nature. It was a question of minor interest, and
merely historical value, 'Who made the world?'
and 'What shall it be in the end thereof?' This
indifference to cosmogony and eschatology is
characteristic of Greek physical speculation, and
greatly lightened its task. It stands in the strong-

[ii6]

THE HUMAN FACTOR

est contrast to the Oriental, and particularly the
Babylonian, insistence on origins, and interest
in creation myths; and enhances the Greek in-
sistence on questions about the structure, the
maintenance, and the current behavior of the
world; questions which Oriental, and particu-
larly Babylonian thought, neglects, or glozes
over."

Fundamentally, then, differences in idea-sys-
tems are determined by differences in man's
physical surroundings, and these differences are
maintained through the discipline exercised by
the group over the individual. When, however,
we come to examine the factors in human ad-
vancement, it appears that radical changes in
idea-systems follow upon the collision of groups
from dissimilar habitats. So, it was not, as has
been thought, because he rode a horse that the
nomad from Central Asia influenced greatly the
lives of the dwellers in the outer circle of Eura-
sian lands, but because the conditions of his life
developed a system of ideas which was wholly
different from theirs. And here it is of the high-
est importance to observe, with Hogarth, that the
relatively small and well-marked area of the
Ancient East, in which the earliest marked ad-
[i'7]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

vancement of mankind appears to have taken
place, contains within itself no less than six
divisions characterized by large differences of a
geographical nature. These are Asia Minor,
Armenia, Syria, Arabia, Mesopotamia, and
western Iran, and I am unable, at the moment,
to recall any area similarly restricted in which
so many distinct types of habitat are placed in
close association. Neither lapse of time, nor
uniformity of government has been able to over-
come the striking differences which the varia-
tions in habitat have promoted in the idea-sys-
tems of the inhabitants of these regions. As has
already been indicated, the lower valley of the
Euphrates and Tigris represents the natural
focal point of human movement in these lands,
the terminal of many routes of travel, and we
may now see that while this central position im-
plies a maximum exposure to attack, it implies
also a maximum exposure to different systems of
ideas.

Finally, in confirmation of the hypothesis that
the changes which have contributed to human
advancement have ensued from the collision of
groups from widely different habitats, and hence
of different idea-systems, we may point to the

[ii8]

THE HUMAN FACTOR

initial stages of those great outbursts of intel-
lectual activity which have distinguished every
people which has risen above the level of primi-
tive man. So, the historian of China is forced to
repeat, from chapter to chapter, the formula :
"first the successful invasion, the destruction of
the old power, and then the formation of new
nations, governments, and types of men" ; and the
summary of results in each case is typified in the
statement that "not the least of the Mongols' gifts
to China was the stimulus and fertilization of the
native intellect in the domain of the imagina-
tion." Similarly, Vincent Smith, the latest his-
torian of India, remarks that "the rule of the
able and long-lived monarchs of the Gupta
dynasty coincided with an extraordinary out-
burst of intellectual activity of all kinds. The
personal patronage of the kings no doubt has
some effect, but deeper causes must have been at
work to produce such results. Experience proves
that the contact or collision of diverse modes of
civilization is the most potent stimulus to in-
tellectual and artistic progress, and, in my opin-
ion, the eminent achievements of the Gupta
period are mainly due to such contact with
foreign civilizations, both on the east and on the

[119]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

west." Again, the entire history of Babylonia and
Assyria is an epitome of such situations, and this
leads a recent historian to observe: ''it may be
put down as an axiom that nowhere does a high
form of culture arise without the commingling
of diverse ethnic elements." "The Euphrates
valley from the time that it looms up on the his-
torical horizon," he continues, "is the seat of a
mixed population. Egyptian culture is the out-
come of the mixture of Semitic with Hamitic
elements. Civilization begins in Greece with the
movements of Asiatic peoples, partly at least
non-Aryan, across the Aegean sea. In Rome we
find the old Aryan stock mixed with a strange
element, known as Etruscan. In modern times,
France, Germany, and England furnish illus-
trations of the process of the commingling of
diverse ethnic elements leading to advanced
forms of civilization." Ultimately, attention may
be called to Petrie's conclusion in his memorable
study of The Revolutions of Civilisation that
"every civilization of a settled population tends
to incessant decay from its maximum condition;
and this decay continues until it is too weak to
initiate anything, when a fresh race comes in,
and utilizes the old stock to graft on, both in

[ 120]

THE HUMAN FACTOR

blood and culture. As soon as the mixture is well
started, it rapidly grows on the old soil, and pro-
duces a new wave of civilization. There is no new
generation without a mixture of blood, parthe-
nogenesis is unknown in the birth of nations."

7. At this point, it is necessary to revert for a
moment to a theory which has gained wide ac-
ceptance in modern times, namely, that human
advancement has been the direct result of war.
Thus Brinton, himself a veteran of the Civil
War, urges that "in spite of the countless miseries
which follow in its train, war has probably been
the highest stimulus to racial progress. It is the
most potent excitant known of all the faculties.
The intense instinct of self-preservation will
prompt to an intellectual energy which nothing
else can awake. The grandest works of imagina-
tion, the immortal outbursts of the poets, from
Homer to Whitman, have been under the stimu-
lus of the war-cry ringing in their ears." It will
not be necessary to epitomize the views to which
this idea has given rise, or to indicate the variety
of the arguments which have been adduced in its
support. From all that has here been said, it is
obvious that war has played a most significant
part in the advancement of mankind, but the

[121]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

benefits it has conferred have been confined to
the break-up of crystallized systems of organi-
zation and of thought. Since man has not become
sufficiently self-conscious of the natural processes
which dominate his life, he continues to submit
to the fixative influences of group discipline, and
throws all his weight in favor of maintaining the
status quo. It follows that, in the past, the gate-
way of human advance has been the violent con-
flict of the representatives of old and new ways
of thought and action, whether the old and new
be embodied, for the occasion, in states, in groups
within a given state, or in single individuals. It
must, therefore, be regarded as a shortsighted
view which imagines the conflict thus precipi-
tated as in itself a desirable thing, though, here-
tofore, man's ignorance of himself has made such
conflicts inevitable. On the other hand, this
opinion emphasizes, as perhaps nothing else
could at the present moment, the supreme impor-
tance of an understanding of the elements of his-
tory. To reach this desideratum it has been neces-
sary, first of all, to show that the history of man
is homogeneous throughout, and to point out the
factors which exercise a determinant influence
upon the course of events; but to gain a knowl-

[ 122]

THE HUMAN FACTOR
edge which may be of direct service in the con-
sideration of human afifairs we must now turn
our attention, more specifically, to the processes
through the operation of which man everywhere
has come to be as he is.

[ 123]

IV

METHOD AND RESULTS

I. The task of science in the presence of a his-
tory, be it the history of the physical universe, of
the earth, of the forms of life upon the earth, or
of man, is the discovery of the processes through
vv^hich things — stars, strata, and species — have
come to be as they are, and each of the major
sciences, such as Astronomy, Geology, and Biol-
ogy, has entered upon the modern phase of its
activities with the recognition of this funda-
mental problem. Commonly, this new^ departure
is associated in men's minds with the acceptance
of the idea of "evolution," which, in its most
general form, implies simply that things have
come to be as they are through a sequence of
changes undergone in the past. As a consequence,
it has been affirmed that "evolution" is just the
projection of the idea of human history upon the
world of nature ; but the restricted sense in which
this notion is true is that men have come to ob-
serve the phenomena of nature in a time relation

[ 124]

METHOD AND RESULTS

or perspective. If, on this account, the student of
organic nature may be said to have applied the
idea of human history to his own subject-matter,
he has in no sense adopted the historian's method.
He does not attempt to write a narrative of what
has happened in the past. In fact, it is not open
to him to present his results in chronological
form, since the biological record is entirely lack-
ing in specific dates for happenings. From this
deficiency most important consequences have en-
sued, for, on the one hand, the evolutionist has
been forced to devote himself to the investigation
of the processes of history, while, on the other,
in presence of an undated record he has assumed
an eventless world.

The outcome of this situation is apparent in the
series of assumptions upon which Darwin based
his work. In a thoroughly scientific spirit he set
himself to discover the process or processes mani-
fested in the emergence of new species. Never-
theless, accepting the authority of Sir Charles
Lyell, he began by assuming that "Time is to
Nature endless and as nothing," and from this
proceeded to his second assumption that new
species have arisen only through the slow cumu-
lation of infinitely slight modifications. Further-

[I2S]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

more, he took over from Lyell the methodologi-
cal theory that we must interpret the past history
of the earth and its inhabitants by the present,
that we must seek for an explanation of what has
happened by the study of what is happening, on
the assumption that the processes manifested
have never been different in kind or degree from
what they are now. Lastly, he believed that there
had been but one process involved in the origin
of all species, that of "natural selection."
What Darwin attempted was to describe, as
simply and directly as possible, the mode by
which, in one particular field of nature, inter-
actions result in something new. The character
of his theory is immediately traceable to the ab-
sence of specific dates in the historical materials
«pon which he was forced to rely; had dated evi-
dence been available, his conception of unmarked
time, of time as an unbroken flow, could not have
arisen. It follows that, having dated events to
work from, the historian of man, when he comes
to investigate processes, will adopt a procedure
widely different from that followed by Darwin
and his contemporaries. Instead of confining his
attention to the present, utilizing the facts of the
past for purposes of verification only, he will

[126]

METHOD AND RESULTS

begin by examining the evidence for the actual
changes that have taken place. Hence the pro-
cedure v^hich is bound up with the conception
that the present is the key to the past will, if one
might so say, be reversed, and "History" will
remain the study of the past with a view to the
elucidation of the processes manifested in the
present.

2. The scientific student of human history can-
not accept Darwin's assumptions and procedure
as a model upon which to pattern his inquiry, but
he is not therefore left without guidance. An
alternative method for approaching the investi-
gation of how things have come to be as they are
was suggested by Huxley. The great exponent
of Darwinism pointed out that any hypothesis of
progressive modification must take into consid-
eration the fact of persistence without progres-
sion through indefinite periods, and, further-
more, urged upon Darwin's attention the pos-
sibility of occasional "rapid leaps" or changes in
nature. In short, Huxley recognized three differ-
ent sets of processes as contributory to the emer-
gence of the present status: first, those repre-
sented in fixity, stability, or persistence; second,
those manifested in slow continuous modifica-
[127]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

tions; and, third, those revealed in explicit
changes or events.

In later discussion the elements unrecognized
by Darwin have more and more forced them-
selves into the foreground of debate, and have
colored the views held by all investigators. Thus
De Vries supposed that after periods of relative
fixity, during which they are subject only to
fluctuating variations, living beings may pass
through shorter periods when their forms are
abruptly modified in different directions by dis-
continuous changes. So, too, George Darwin ex-
pressed the opinion that the study of stability and
instability furnishes the problems which the
physicist and biologist alike attempt to solve, and
he envisaged the course of "evolution," not as uni-
form and slow, but as divided between a sequence
of slight continuous modifications accumulating
through a long period, and somewhat sudden
transformations which would appear as histori-
cal events. Again, his brother, Francis Darwin,
regarded "evolution," not as a process of modi-
fication, but as a process of drilling organisms
into habits, and thought of an organism as a ma-
chine in which energy can be set free by some
kind of releasing mechanism. This latter idea,

[128]

METHOD AND RESULTS

as will appear later, has been carried further by
William Bateson, who also believes that varia-
tion occurs as a definite event, and that we can
see no changes in progress around us in the con-
temporary world which can be imagined likely
to culminate in the evolution of forms distinct
in the larger sense. Finally, not to multiply in-
stances unnecessarily, the essential feature of
what I have called the alternative mode of ap-
proach is brought out by Hans Gadow in asking
why it is that mammalian material can produce
what is denied to the lower classes. Why have
they not all by this time reached the same grade
of perfection? "Because," he says, "every new
group is less hampered by tradition, much of
which must be discarded by the new departure,
and some of its energy is set free to follow up this
new course, straight, with ever-growing results,
until in its turn this becomes an old rut out of
which a new jolt leads once more into fresh
fields."

In the study of man, the contemporaries of Dar-
win maintained a tradition of evolutionary in-
quiry which investigators likeTylor and M'Len-
nan regarded as completely independent of biol-
ogy. This, indeed, is evident when we find that
[ 129]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

Tylor considered the essential points for inquiry
to be "permanence, modification, and survival."
Maine had before this insisted that the stable
part of our mental, moral, and physical consti-
tution is the largest part of it, and offers a resist-
ance to change that is rarely overcome. Clifford,
while imbued w^ith the newer biological concep-
tions of his time, instituted a contrast between
positive and negative conditions of development:
"a race," he says, "in proportion as it is plastic
and capable of change, may be regarded as young
and vigorous, while a race which is fixed, per-
sistent in form, unable to change, is as surely
effete, worn out, in peril of extinction." Bagehot,
again, who wrote his Physics and Politics to il-
lustrate the application of the principles of
"natural selection" and "inheritance" to political
society, recurs throughout his book to the in-
fluences which have made nations "stationary."
He sees in revolutions the outbreak of passions
long repressed by fixed custom, but starting into
life as soon as that repression had been catas-
trophically removed. Furthermore, he sets a
question which must be regarded as funda-
mental: "If fixity is an invariable ingredient in

[ 130]

METHOD AND RESULTS

early civilizations, how then did any civilization
become unfixed?"

It is, however, in the study of the history of lan-
guage that this alternative method has been most
clearly defined. So Whitney, whose Life and
Growth of Language may be regarded as the
classic presentation of this subject in English,
utilizes explicitly the three types of processes
mentioned above. Thus, while, as is usual in the
writings of philologists, he devotes the greater
part of his book to a description of the processes
through which language has been slowly and
continuously modified in transmission from gen-
eration to generation, he calls attention to the
operation of processes which tend to maintain
every spoken dialect the same from age to age,
and points, as in a third category, to the fact that
occasionally whole communities have been led
to adopt the speech of another people as a result
of some great revolution. Indeed, it may be said
that, so far as method is concerned, the historical
study of language is one of the few subjects in
the whole range of evolutionary inquiry that has
been placed upon a satisfactory basis.

Here it may be observed, by way of addendum,
how frequently the idea has been expressed, as

[131]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

by Bagehot and L. H. Morgan, that portions of
the human race have been halted at certain stages
of progress. Henry Balfour, for example, is of
opinion that the heterogeneity of groups may
readily be explained by assuming that while the
progress of some races has received relatively
little check, the culture development of others
has been retarded to a greater or less extent.
Hocart, again, attributes "stagnation" to the fail-
ure of some factor or factors (described by him
as "constant in their operation") which make for
continuous progression. This point of view, how-
ever, embodies the assumption that "progress"
is to be anticipated, an opinion which Maine was
at pains to controvert, and which is in no way
justified by the evidence. "Progress" is excep-
tional; hence our first concern must be with the
processes, which are universal in their operation,
that make for fixity and stagnation. Having de-
termined what these processes are, it will then be
possible to observe the influences of other pro-
cesses through which modification and change
are brought about.

3. Before proceeding further, there is, however,
a point of some importance which must be dealt
with parenthetically. Expressed in the simplest

[ 132]

METHOD AND RESULTS

terms, this may be stated in the question : What
are the limits of humanistic inquiry? The query
must be faced, for humanists in all branches of
the study of man seem to feel it necessary to base
their discussions upon what they conceive to be
the conclusions of modern biology. In this way
the unavoidable difficulties of the study of man
have been needlessly complicated, and the stu-
dent involves himself in debates over highly
technical matters with which he is not compe-
tent to deal. Every science involves, as a funda-
mental condition of its pursuit, the conscious re-
striction of attention to a particular set of facts,
and the success of any scientific undertaking
turns upon the consistency and definiteness with
which this initial restriction is observed. For
scientific purposes, every investigation must be
confined within definite limits; no science pre-
tends to deal with the whole complex of natural
phenomena, and in the study of man there are
obvious reasons why the field of inquiry should
be limited wherever possible.
The problem before us is to find out how man
has come to be as he is everywhere throughout
the world today. The fundamental restriction
upon the limits of the inquiry is that the hu-

[ 133]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY
manist will accept man "as given," and leave all
questions as to his origin and physical differences
to the biologist.

While, at first sight, this may appear a radical
departure, there is ample justification for the
step, over and above the fact that neither the
biologist nor the humanist is in a position to deal
successfully with the entire field. There is, in
short, an important body of evidence which in-
dicates the "psychic unity of mankind." A typi-
cal example may be found in the remarks of
Stefansson on the Eskimo: "Commonly," he
says, "primitive people are supposed to have cer-
tain mental qualities, designated as instinctive,
through which they vastly excel us along certain
lines ; and to make up for this excellence they are
supposed to be far our inferiors in certain other
mental characteristics. My own observations in-
cline me to believe that there are no points in
which they, as a race, are any more inferior to us
than might be expected from the environment
under which they have grown up from child-
hood ; and neither have they any points of supe-
riority over the white man, except those which
are developed directly by the environment. Of
course an Eskimo can find his way about in the

[134]

METHOD AND RESULTS

wilderness better than the city dweller or the
sailor, but he is likely to fall behind the white
man of experience in just about the proportion
you would expect, from knowing the greater ad-
vantage of training in logical thinking which the
white man has had." Similarly, writing of the
Sea Dyaks of Borneo, Gomes says: "Allowing
for differences in environment, and consequent
difference of similes, the idea expressed in many
Dyak proverbs is precisely similar to that of
some well known among the English." "The
radical fundamental thoughts and passions of
mankind all over the world, in every age, are
much the same."

Judgments such as these may be found in the
reports of observers in every part of the world,
and the general view expressed is widely ac-
cepted by anthropologists. It is entirely possible
that the obvious physical differences between
men may be accompanied by corresponding
psychical difTferences, but even admitting that
there are congenital differences in "races," and
that the influences of these differences may ulti-
mately become an important study, in our present
state of ignorance these differences are negligible

quantities, and man may be treated as an un-

[■3S]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

changing quantity. The opinion of anthropolo-
gists coincides, in general, with that of psycholo-
gists like McDougall, who thinks that the pri-
mary innate tendencies, which are the essential
springs of motive powers of all thought and
action, are common to men of every race and of
every age. So investigators widely separated in
their immediate interests reach the same conclu-
sion, namely, that we have every reason to think
that the mind of the savage and the mind of the
civilized are fundamentally alike. "There can
be no doubt," Boas states, "that in the main the
mental characteristics of man are the same all
over the world." "The working of the human
mind," Gomme believes, "is on the same plane
wherever and whenever it operates or has op-
erated."

It must be admitted, however, that even this
unanimity does not remove all possibility of
question or debate, and therefore it is that we
accept Morgan's axiom of "the specific identity
of the brain of all the races of mankind," and
Temple's "law of the constancy of human rea-
soning," not as self-evident or demonstrated
truths, but as methodological assumptions set up
for the purposes of a particular investigation.

[136]

METHOD AND RESULTS

We delimit our field by taking man "as given,"
by assuming that all human groups have started
from the same level, that in every case the same
capacity for "advancement" has been present,
that man is, and has been, very much the same
all the world over.
4. Turning, then, to consider the processes
manifested in fixity or stagnation, we may ob-
serve that the mental activity of any individual
is conditioned at every step by the idea-system
of which he stands possessed. Now, at bottom,
this conditioning body of ideas is not a product
of the individual's own activity, but is imparted
to him by the group into which he is born, and
in which he is brought up. Every individual
comes into existence in association with some
group, and is subjected from the commencement
of his career to a discipline or drilling in the
modes of thinking, feeling, and acting of the
group. Thus at the foundation of his life there
lies a great body of conclusions, motives, and
customs for which he is in no manner responsible,
but in accordance with which his behavior is un-
consciously regulated. "He accepts from the
group," as Brinton says, "the ideas, conclusions,
and opinions common to it, and the motives of
[ 137]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

volition, such as customs and rules of conduct,
which it collectively sanctions."

This normal condition of dependence is most
easily discernible in the case of primitive man,
for the lower we descend in the scale of civiliza-
tion the more strictly, to all appearance, is the
individual controlled by the group of which he
forms a part. Indeed, the savage is completely
hedged about by conventions, at once minute and
obligatory, the violation of which is attended by
drastic penalties. Hence, as McDougall remarks,
"in primitive societies the precision of the cus-
tomary code and the exact coincidence of public
opinion with the code, allow no occasion for
deliberation upon conduct, no scope for indi-
vidual judgment and choice." "We see the same
result among all savage communities still exist-
ing on the earth, and among all peoples of whom
we have any record at the dawn of civilization.
Their actions, whether individual or collective,
are hampered, controlled, or enforced at every
step by custom." It is, unquestionably, due to this
rigid enforcement of custom that the lower
groups have remained for long periods of time
in a fixed or stationary condition, that their man-

[•38]

METHOD AND RESULTS

ners, customs, and modes of life have continued
almost unaltered for generations.

While, however, the discipline of the individ-
ual by the group may be more immediately ap-
parent in groups less advanced than our own, the
same process is visibly operative in modern life.
For, indeed, what we mean by "civilization" and
"culture" is neither more nor less than the store
of ideas, beliefs, conventional opinions, and
tastes which is transmitted from each generation
to the next, and into which each member of the
community is inducted by his elders. And while
the modern teacher, but recently become self-
conscious of his function, has much to say of the
responsibility of the community for the "educa-
tion" of the child, there has been, as Cook re-
marks, a pretty successful education of the race
from the days of primitive prehistoric man. It is
but formulating the practice of the ages to say
that the resources of government and law, reli-
gion and morality, must be enlisted to constrain
the individual in order to procure a common
likeness in impulses, habits, and ideas within the
group.

It follows from this unsought initiation into the
idea-system of his ancestors that, even in the most

[ 139]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

backward group, the individual enters upon life
at a relatively high stage of human advancement;
he stands upon a platform which has been labo-
riously constructed by his unremembered prede-
cessors. At the same time, it must be recognized
that, even in the most advanced groups, this in-
itiation imposes severe limitations. At best, the
platform is narrow; and the individual acquires
habits of thought and a fixity of ideas which ren-
der him unduly tenacious of what has been incul-
cated in him, and unduly suspicious and obsti-
nate in presence of what may appear to him to be
different or new. While, then, the educative dis-
cipline tends to preserve what has been acquired,
it presents a very real obstacle to further advance.
In face of this consideration, the theory com-
monly expressed, that "the inheritance of the
permanent achievements of one generation by the
next is the main factor of progress," that, in fact,
human advancement has been due to the mainte-
nance of tradition, to the drilling through which
the individual has been put in possession of the
acquisitions of the group, will be seen to express
but a partial truth, for if this process had been
the only one in operation advancement would,
manifestly, have been impossible. What, how-

[ 140]

METHOD AND RESULTS

ever, we have in this process of group discipline
is the fundamental element to be considered in
any attempt to show how man everywhere has
come to be as he is today. This it is that produces
that condition of sameness, stagnation, fixity, and
persistence which has been dwelt upon by all
who have had occasion to speak of backward
peoples, lower classes, and illiterate individuals.
The operation of this process tends to the mainte-
nance of the idea-system of the group or indi-
vidual as it exists at any given moment, and the
study of man involves, as its next step, an inquiry
as to how modifications and changes in idea-
systems have been, and still are, brought about.

5. Under actual conditions this fixity of ideas is
never complete, and in all human groups there
may be observed in operation certain processes
through which idea-systems are being slowly but
continuously modified.

The processes of modification are of various
types and these are of varying degrees of in-
fluence. In the first place, we may readily see that
while the initial discipline of any two individ-
uals may proceed along the same lines, and while
their lives may be led in the same surroundings,
their experiences in life will never be identical,

[141]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

and in maturity their responses to any given ex-
citation will not be exactly the same. The differ-
ence of response will be all the greater if the lives
of the two men have been passed in different cir-
cumstances. Again, while every member of a
primitive group is drilled in its traditional ob-
servances and customs, the performance of these
obligatory acts cannot be identically transmitted
from generation to generation; unconsciously
and unobserved, modifications will creep in.
This is true even in respect to verbal formulae,
the value of which is believed to reside in their
exact repetition, for here, in addition to the pos-
sible treacheries of memory, the reproduction
will be affected by the unceasing modifications in
the use of words. Language, indeed, provides in
itself a perfect illustration of the fact that use
entails wear, and it is in language that the pro-
cesses of modification have been most carefully
observed.

Furthermore, while it is taken for granted that
men are very much the same all the world over,
this is not to be taken to mean that all men are
identical. They are the same on the average,
which implies that with reference to any given
characteristic or faculty a certain percentage of

[ 142]

METHOD AND RESULTS

the individuals in a group will be above and
below the mean. It follows, for example, that in
any group there will be some individuals of
greater personal initiative than the majority of
their fellows. These undoubtedly will have an in-
fluence, but what is frequently overlooked is that
the mental equipment, the idea-system, of such
individuals, however gifted they may be, is
strictly that of the group to which they belong.
For more than one reason, indeed, no "genius"
can make any great departure from the idea-
system of his people; the individual may in-
fluence the group, but such modifications as he
may succeed in introducing will proceed along
established lines, and so cannot be regarded as
significant "changes."

It is evident, then, that the idea-systems of all
groups are subject to slow continuous modifica-
tion through the operation of processes which
may be described as internal or self-contained.
They are also modified in varying degrees by
"the contact of peoples." This term has acquired
a special significance in recent years as identified
with the hypothesis — based upon the ethno-
graphical study of the distribution of culture
objects, designs, and practices — that the present

[ H3 ]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

status of any group is to be explained in terms of
the transmission of culture elements from one
group to another. It may at once be said that this
hypothesis describes a process, practically uni-
versal in its application, which has been of the
greatest importance in the gradual modification
of idea-systems, but one, on the other hand,
which cannot be accepted as providing an expla-
nation of the phenomenon of "advance."
To make this distinction clear, it is necessary to
consider that the process of modification by ex-
terior contact has many phases. A simple form
may be instanced in the interchange of objects
between contiguous groups, and by this means
culture objects may be dispersed over great dis-
tances by a series of border exchanges, without
the coincident transportation of individuals.
An extension of this phase comes when the ob-
jects or practices are carried from one group to
another by traders, missionaries, or other trav-
ellers; and one has but to consider the spread of
the megalithic monuments to recognize the an-
tiquity of this mode of influence. Another stage
is reached when traders, like the Cretans, Phoe-
nicians, and Greeks, establish themselves among
alien peoples; and the furthest step on these lines

[ 144]

METHOD AND RESULTS

is taken when backward groups are brought
under subjection by others of superior culture,
as when the inhabitants of Iberia and Gaul were
conquered by the Romans, or those of Mexico
and Peru by Spain. Now, without question, an
influence is exerted in all these cases on the idea-
system of the recipient group, but this influence
is by no means subversive of the idea-system af-
fected. The new elements enter into the old sys-
tem, modifying and being in turn modified by it,
but do not effect its disintegration; for, although
any idea-system is a co-ordinated whole, separate
new ideas may be taken over gradually to an
almost unlimited extent without affecting its
predominant characteristics. This is notably the
case where material objects or mechanical inven-
tions are concerned, and the introduction of the
horse and gun no more revolutionized the Amer-
ican Indian's ways of thinking and acting than
the telephone and aeroplane have upset our own
conventionalized philosophy of life. A small
body of immigrants may thus have an influence
on the recipient group out of all proportion to
their number, and it would be wholly impossible
to understand the present condition of mankind
[145]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

without taking the process of modification by
contact into consideration.

Nevertheless, when we turn to apply this pro-
cess to the special problem of advancement —
exemplified concretely in the European civiliza-
tion of the present — it affords no direct explana-
tory assistance. The reason is not far to seek, for
while the contact process may tend, theoreti-
cally, to bring all groups to the level of the high-
est, it cannot serve to place any one group far in
advance of the rest. Even supposing that the in-
truding few, like the British in India, could raise
the recipient many to a level with themselves
(which may be regarded as an impossibility),
this would not raise the status of the more ad-
vanced group to which the intruders belong. We
may say, therefore, that, in the endeavor to dis-
cover how men everywhere have come to be as
they are today, we must take into account the
operation of a whole series of modifying pro-
cesses, but we must admit further that these
processes do not provide an explanation of the
emergence of higher idea-systems.

6. In approaching the problem of "change," it
is above all things important that the investigator
should be on his guard against the widely dis-

[146]

METHOD AND RESULTS

seminated idea that human advancement has
been due to human volition. We must beware of
projecting ourselves and our modern intellectual
interests into the past, and of imagining ourselves
freed from the limitations under which, as we
are quite ready to admit, our forefathers labored.
The exercise of the will is not a recent acquire-
ment, and today, as formerly, men are largely
unconscious of the factors and processes that lie
back of their most consciously determined reso-
lutions. No theory of advancement that is based
upon a supposed desire for betterment can be
accepted as explanatory of how man has come
to be as he is. Primitive man is not engaged in a
struggle to emancipate himself from tradition;
his efforts are not directed to the inauguration
of change, but to the maintenance of the existing
status — and it takes some radical upheaval to
disturb his confidence in his own ways. Again,
despite the prepossessions we unconsciously ab-
sorb from an acquaintance with biological dis-
cussions, we must avoid the assumption that
human history displays any such regular and
even process of change as is postulated in the
Darwinian conception of "evolution." This sup-
position leads inevitably to theories of slow un-

[147]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

broken progress directed towards some determin-
able end, but the evidence before us provides no
basis for optimistic philosophizing. What we
find actually throughout the course of history are
the unmistakable results of constant processes
manifested in fixity or persistence, tempered by
other processes which gradually efifect a modi-
fication of this rigidity. In addition to these two
sets of processes, however, there is abundant evi-
dence of the fact that at different times and in
different places certain events have led to signifi-
cant changes in the groups affected, and that
these changes stand in direct relation to the phe-
nomenon of "advance."

Investigation in different fields of the study of
man has led many contemporary scholars —
Petrie, Haddon, Rivers, Mackinder, Hogarth,
Myres, Temple, Balfour, Smith, Hall, Jastrow,
Sollas, to mention but a few — to observe that
human advancement has followed upon the col-
lision of different groups. Pieced together, the
conclusions arrived at so far may be summarized
in the statement that definite advance has taken
place in the past when a group, forced from its
habitat, ultimately by a change in climate, has
been brought into collision with another differ-

[148]

METHOD AND RESULTS

ing from it considerably in culture, and has re-
mained upon the invaded territory. It is prob-
able that this statement as a whole would not re-
ceive unquestioned support from all those who
have contributed to it in part; on the other hand,
it is to be understood that the palaeontologist,
geographer, anthropologist, archaeologist, or
historian, as the case may be, has arrived at his
conclusion, one may say, incidentally, and has
not turned aside from the matter in hand to give
this generalization independent consideration.
Thus in any given instance it might be sufficient
to say that "the dispossession by a newcomer of
a race already in occupation of the soil has
marked an upward step in the intellectual prog-
ress of mankind," without pursuing the question
further. As a consequence, the conclusions, even
in the consolidated form here given, have not
been carried to a point at which they might con-
stitute an hypothesis explanatory of human ad-
vancement.

Indeed, it is only when we take a further step,
and come to ask how conceivably usurpation of
territory, or war, or admixture of peoples could
affect intellectual advancement, that the under-
lying problem is brought to light. It cannot well

[ 149]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

be assumed that either the intermarriage of dif-
ferent stocks or the struggle of battle will of itself
bring about this result; and while it is said that
"if you would change a man's opinions — trans-
plant him," it does not follow that the change
will be effected by the scenery. In short, the
"change" that leads to advancement is mental.
What, then, is of importance to notice is that
when enforced migration is followed by collision,
and this by the alien occupation of territory,
there ensues as a result of the conflict the break-
ing down or subversion of the established idea-
systems of the groups involved in the struggle.
The breakdown of the old and unquestioned sys-
tem of ideas, though it may be felt as a public
calamity and a personal loss, accomplishes the
release of the individual mind from the set forms
in which it has been drilled, and leaves men op-
portunity to build up a system for themselves
anew. This new idea-system will certainly con-
tain old elements, but it will not be like the old,
for the consolidated group, confronted with con-
flicting bodies of knowledge, of observances, and
of interpretations, will experience a critical
awakening, and open wondering eyes upon a new
world. Thus it is not the physical contact of men

[150]

METHOD AND RESULTS

that is of supreme importance in human advance-
ment, but the overthrow of the dominance of the
traditional system in which the individuals com-
posing the group have been trained, and which
they have unconditionally accepted; though ad-
vancement seems rarely to have been possible, in
the past, save when diverse groups have been set
face to face in desperate struggle.

Here, then, is a process which differs essentially
from those previously described, for it is mani-
fested only when some exterior disturbance or
shock has, for the time being, weakened or over-
come the influence or effect of the previously
described processes; when manifested, however,
this process is the same in all cases. The hypothe-
sis required may now be stated in the form that
human advancement follows upon the mental
release, of the members of a group or of a single
individual, from the authority of an established
system of ideas. This release has, in the past, been
occasioned through the breaking down of pre-
vious idea-systems by prolonged struggles be-
tween opposing groups which have been brought
into conflict as a result of the involuntary move-
ments of peoples. What follows is the building
up of a new idea-system, which is not a simple

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PROCESSES OF HISTORY

cumulation of the knowledge previously ac-
cepted, but the product of critical activity stirred
by the perception of conflicting elements in the
opposed idea-systems.

7. The foregoing statement describes only in
the most general terms the processes manifested
in human history, and should be regarded merely
as indicating directions in which investigation is
required, for, as must be readily apparent, each
of these sets of processes demands careful analy-
sis. While this further analysis will not be con-
tinued here, it is of some importance for us to
arrive at an understanding as to the means which
may be employed to verify the results obtained.

It was stated earlier that any theory of how man
has come to be as he is must be applicable to all
human groups, ''backward" as well as "ad-
vanced"; must apply to the "backward" and
"advanced" members of all groups, and hence
must apply to the experience of the individual
in the world today. It follows, therefore, that the
processes indicated above are operative in our
several individual lives, and, consequently, that
the accuracy of the description may be tested by
each investigator from the resources of his own
personal observation. This, it must be clearly

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METHOD AND RESULTS

understood, does not mean that the individual is
in a position to discover the processes manifested
in history through introspection; it does mean,
on the other hand, that, when results have been
arrived at through the scientific study of the past,
these results may be verified by reference to what
is going on within and around us in the present.
Thus, for example, if we consider the processes
manifested in the fixity and persistence of idea-
systems and ways of doing things, no one can be
at a loss to discern the influence upon himself of
the community in which he has grown up. From
the beginning of life each one of us has been sub-
jected to a discipline by those surrounding us
which has determined and defined the avenues
open to us for self-assertion or individual pur-
posive activity. Again, each one of us is conscious
of explicit restrictions in mental activity due to
the particular selection of information and ideas
which has been imparted to him at the outset of
his career; the mental equipment which each one
receives represents only a limited selection from
the whole body of knowledge at the command of
the group, and yet this selection, which under
any other circumstances whatever would have

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PROCESSES OF HISTORY

been different, has been, and must remain, a
dominant factor in our lives.

Notwithstanding the tenacity with which we
cling to mental habits once acquired, our ideas
and ways of doing things are continually under-
going modification, the actuality of which we
may also verify by direct observation. Indeed,
this process is particularly noticeable in ad-
vanced groups, for in these, while group disci-
pline is effective in maintaining a certain uni-
formity in external behavior, the idea-systems of
individuals vary within wide limits. This varia-
bility is due, primarily, to the vast extent of the
intellectual heritage of modern groups. Among
ourselves, the body of knowledge immediately
available is so great that its complete transmission
to any individual is wholly unthinkable. It fol-
lows that, in modern groups, the participation
of the individual in the group idea-system is ir-
regular and incomplete, and that under actual
conditions each member of a given community
acquires a personal system of ideas which differs
considerably from that of his fellows, though
drawn from the same source. As a consequence,
the contact of individuals, being accompanied by
the interchange of differing personal views, leads

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METHOD AND RESULTS

to a continual criticism and modification of our
outlook upon the world; and, indeed, the atti-
tude which we regard as specifically character-
istic of members of advanced groups is a wide
tolerance of these differences in ideas, and a con-
scious admission of the merely tentative validity
of our most cherished convictions.

Every individual, then, may verify from his
own experience the actuality of the processes
which are manifested, first, in the persistence,
and, second, in the slow modification of ideas and
ways of doing things, but the case is different
when we come to consider the processes and fac-
tors of change and advance. As we have seen,
change ensues upon a condition of relative fixity
through the interposition of shock or disturbance
induced by some exterior incident. Now, while,
historically, advancement has been dependent
upon the collision of groups, the resultant re-
sponse has taken place in the minds of individ-
uals, and so we are led to see that all transitional
eras are alike in being periods of individual men-
tal awakening, and of the release or emancipa-
tion of individual initiative in thought and ac-
tion. This applies equally whether we consider
the past or the present, and, consequently, since

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PROCESSES OF HISTORY

the antecedents of advance are realized only in
exceptional cases, we are forced to rely, for the
verification we are now discussing, upon the tes-
timony of exceptional individuals. That the his-
torical process of individualization of thought is
also the form through which advancement pro-
ceeds today would best be shown by an extended
examination of the biographies of notable men,
but for the present we may accept the evidence
adduced by psychologists and other investigators
who have already called attention to the facts.

In reality, there is nothing abstruse about the
processes involved, for, primarily, as S. A. Cook
has pointed out, we hold ideas simply because
nothing has occurred to disturb them ; the fact is,
in the words of Sir Oliver Lodge, that unless we
encounter flaw or jar or change, nothing in us
responds. So Bateson, seeking for an alternative
to the method of Darwin, has proposed to "con-
sider how far we can get by the process of re-
moval of what we may call 'epistatic' factors, in
other words those that control, mask, or suppress
underlying powers and faculties." "I have con-
fidence," he says in the course of this inquiry,
"that the artistic gifts of mankind will prove to
be due not to something added to the make-up of

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METHOD AND RESULTS

an ordinary man, but to the absence of factors
which in the ordinary person inhibit the devel-
opment of those gifts. They are almost beyond
doubt to be looked upon as releases of powers
normally suppressed." It is, however, in the later
writings of William James that the subject re-
ceives fullest consideration. Reviewing Herbert
Spencer's Autobiography, he says, "Mr. Spencer
himself is a great social force. The effects he
exerts are of the nature of releases — his words
pull triggers in certain kinds of brain." "In
biology, psychology, and sociology," he con-
tinues, "the forces concerned are almost exclu-
sively forces of release." Furthermore, at this
point one might well incorporate entire his re-
markable essay on "The Energies of Men." In
this he points out that "as a rule men habitually
use only a small part of the powers which they
actually possess and which they might use under
appropriate conditions." "We are all," he says,
"to some degree oppressed, unfree. We don't
come to our own. It is there, but we don't get at
it." The inhibition is due to the influence of con-
vention, and he remarks that "an intellect thus
tied down by literality and decorum makes on
one the same sort of impression that an able-

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PROCESSES OF HISTORY

bodied man would who should habituate himself
to do his work with only one of his fingers, lock-
ing up the rest of his organism and leaving it
unused." To what, then, he asks, do men owe
their escape? and to what are improvements due,
when they occur? In general terms, he says, the
answer is plain: "Excitements, ideas, and efforts
are what carry us over the dam." Ideas, in par-
ticular, he regards as notable stimuli for unlock-
ing what would otherwise be unused reservoirs
of individual initiative and energy. This effec-
tiveness he ascribes to the fact, first, that ideas
contradict other ideas and thus arouse critical
activity, and, second, that the new ideas which
emerge as a result of this conflict unify us on a
new plane and bring to us a significant enlarge-
ment of individual power. Thus, in complete un-
consciousness of the historical aspect of the sub-
ject, James has described, from the point of view
of the individual, what proves to be the essential
element in the process through which human
advancement has everywhere been made.

8. We are now in a position to recognize the
nature of the processes which have been opera-
tive throughout human history, and to see how
the actuality of these may be verified under pres-

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METHOD AND RESULTS

ent conditions. It must be repeated, however,
that the statement here given is of the most gen-
eral character and that continued research, en-
tailing the minute examination and comparison
of eras of transition, will be required to deter-
mine fully and completely the elements of His-
tory. Nevertheless, it may be urged that the mode
of procedure here outlined brings into one con-
nected view bodies of fact which have hitherto
remained disparate and intractable, and that it
opens up new problems and new fields of inquiry
for historical investigation. Indeed, even to the
student who regards the construction of narra-
tives as the sole and proper aim of History, it
offers new phases of interest, suggests new aspects
of human activities, and provides a basis for the
treatment of "general" history which renders
him independent of time-honored philosophies.
Nor is it to be overlooked, in considering the
possibilities of this approach to the study of how
man has come to be as he is, that, in addition to
the stimulus it may afiford to History, it makes
feasible a mutual understanding and co-opera-
tion between the different specialties of human-
istic study. It must be admitted, I think, that the
manner in which studies like anthropology, his-

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PROCESSES OF HISTORY

tory, and geography, art, literature, and religion,
philology, politics, and economics have been car-
ried on in separate compartments has not been
conducive in the highest degree to the advance-
ment of knowledge. These subjects are not inde-
pendent sciences; they are aspects of the study
of man which have been pursued in comparative
isolation because of the circumstances of their
several origins, and because they have not been
brought into relation by a common methodology.
On the other hand, when it is seen that the under-
taking in which they are one and all engaged is
the attempt to determine how the idea-systems
of men have come to be as we find them today,
the fundamental unity of these studies at once
becomes apparent; and, indeed, as an illustration
of this unity, one might well agree with the sen-
timent (though certainly not with the wording)
of Ostwald's statement that the history of the
sciences furnishes the best and most trustworthy
materials for the study of the laws that govern
the development of humanity.

Finally, the method herein described brings the
study of History into direct relation with the
problems of life. I have indicated that, through-
out the past, human advancement has, to a

[i6o]

METHOD AND RESULTS
marked degree, been dependent upon war.
From this circumstance, many investigators have
inferred that war is, in itself, a blessing — how-
ever greatly disguised. We may see, however,
that this judgment is based upon observations
which have not been pressed far enough to elicit
a scientific explanation. War has been, times
without number, the antecedent of advance, but
in other cases, such as the introduction of Bud-
dhism into China, the same result has followed
upon the acceptance of new ideas without the
introductory formality of bitter strife. As long,
indeed, as we continue to hold tenaciously to cus-
tomary ideas and ways of doing things, so long
must we live in anticipation of the conflict which
this persistence must inevitably induce.

It requires no lengthy exposition to demonstrate
that the ideas which lead to strife, civil or inter-
national, are not the products of the highest
knowledge available, are not the verified results
of scientific inquiry, but are "opinions" about
matters which, at the moment, we do not fully
understand. Among modern peoples, the most
important of these opinions are concerned with
the ordering of human affairs; and in this area
all our "settlements" of the problems which con-
[.6i]

PROCESSES OF HISTORY

front us must continue to be temporary and un-
certain compromises until we shall have come to
apply the method of science in their solution.
Science is not a body of beliefs and opinions, but
is a way or method of dealing with problems. It
has been said by a notable contemporary that
men begin the search for truth with fancy, after
that they argue, and at length they try to find out.
Scientific method is the term we use for the or-
derly and systematic effort to find out. Hitherto,
the most serious afifairs of men have been decided
upon the basis of argumentation, carried, not in-
frequently, to the utmost limits of destruction
and death. It should be possible to apply in this
domain the method of finding out, and it has
been my hope to contribute, in however tentative
a manner, to this end.

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