Full text of "The commentaries of Proclus on the Timaeus of Plato in five books; containing a treasury of Pythagoric and Platonic physiology. Translated from the Greek by Thomas Taylor"

THE

/
COMMENTARIES OF PROCLTJS

ON THE

TIM^EUS OF PLATO,
IN FIVE BOOKS;

CONTAINING A TREASURY OF

PYTHAGORIC AM) PLATONIC PHYSIOLOGY.

TRANSLATED FROM THE GREEK,

BY THOMAS TAYLOR.

po$ &lt;fit\oao^f&gt;vt tart iAta" trpni fttrrot ao^itirrat, i} ypa/i/ianffra, j ratovro yrrot trrpov

owe rvr er ^(Xin. /ijrc virrcpo^ wor yennro.

Apoliooius

TWO VOLUMES.
VOL. f.

LoiiUon :

PRINTED FOR AND SOLD DY THK AUTHOR, NO. 9, MANOR PLACE,

WALWORTH, SURREY,
BY A. J. V*LPT, RED LION COURT, FLEET STREET.

]820.

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OF that golden chain of philosophers, who, having tlicmselves happily pene
trated, luminously unfolded to others the profundities of the philosophy of Plato,
Proclus is indisputably the largest and most refulgent link. Bora with a genius
transcendent! y great, and accompanied through life with a fortune singularly
good, he exhibited in his own person a union of the rarest kind, in which power
concurred with will, the benefit resulting from genuine philosophy with the ability
of imparting it, and in which Wisdom was inseparable from Prosperity. Theeulo-
gium therefore of Ammonius lit rmcas, " that Proclus possessed the power of un
folding the opinions of the ancients, and a scientific judgment of the nature of
things, in the highest perfection possible to humanity," will be immediately assented
toby every one, Mho is an adept in th writings of this incomparable man.

I rejoice therefore, in the opportunity which is now afforded me of presenting
to the English reader a translation of one of the greatest productions of this Cory-
phean philosopher ; though unfortunately like most of his other works, ithasl&gt;ceu
transmitted to us in a mutilated state. For these Commentaries scarcely explain
a third part of the Timacus ; and from a passage in Olympiodorus On the Meteors
of Aristotle,* there is every reason to believe that Proclus left no part of the

FA it TI fai iftut burrjOfiriptv nvtvc /Ktiv irrfii rqv rov fii^\iou &lt;ra&lt;f&gt;r]vttay, airoyrj/inytuffarrtt rwr
r^yijarvy row Of wv rjffi^y c6a&lt;rtaAoi HpoiXoi- rov x-Xarwritoir ita^o^ov, rov tit axpov rrji atflfiu-irrjt fvcrmi
rijr re e;y)r*r)K rur tofovvruv roct *u\aio&lt;f ivrafjiv., ;ai ri/K tTiirr^ocuijK rrji fivircwi rwx orrwr tpiatv
aaKt]&lt;rarrot, woXA^K ay ry Xoyiji Off \apiy o^oXoyijaatftty. Aruraon. de lulcrpret. p. 1.

For important particulars respecting liiis extraordinary man, see my translation of bis Commentary en
thr first book of Kuclid. lie was born about tlic \car H - of Christ.

* See thit pissagr in tli*. note to my translation of llic Mcteort of Arittotle.

ir INTRODUCTION.

TimsEus without his masterly elucidations. This is likewise more than probable,
from what Marinus says in his life of him, "that he was a man laborious to a
miracle ;" for it cannot be supposed that such a man would leave the greater
part of one of the most important dialogues of l*lato unelucidated, and particu
larly as these Commentaries were written by him "(as the same Marinus informs
us) in the flower of his a^e, and that he preferred them b&lt;?yond all his other works.
Fortunately however, the most important part of this work is preserved ; or that
part in which the demiurgic, paradigmatic, and final causes of the universe are
unfolded; the corporeal nature of it is represented as fabricated with forms and
demiurgic sections, and distributed witli divine numbers ; and soid is produced
from the Demiurgns, and i&gt; filled with harmonic ratios, and di\ineand fabrica
te e symbols. The \\hole mundane animal too, is here shown to be connected, ac
cording to the united comprehension which subsists in the intelligible world ; and
the parts which it contains are so disposed as to harmoni/e \\itli the \\iiole, both
such as are corporeal, and such as are \ital. For partial souls such as ours, are
introduced into its spacious receptacle, are placed about the mundane (.iods, and
become mundane through the luciform vehicles with which they are connected.
The progression of the elements likew ise from their lirst incorporeal subsistence to
their subterranean termination, and the nuture of the heavens and heavenly
bodies, are beautifully developed. And as the result of the most scientific rea
soning, it is shown that very planet is surrounded \\ith satellites/ that the fixed
stars have periodic revolutions on their axes, though the length of their duration is
toils unknown; and that the stars, \\hich at times disappear and a-ain become
visible, are the satellites of other fixed stars of a more primary dignity, behind the
splendors of which they are occasionally concealed. 1 These and many other
most interesting particulars, are unfolded in these Commentaries, with an accu
racy and perspicuity whit h have seldom been equalled, and have never been ex
celled.

1 The late Dr. Charles Rurney, on being once asked by nif, whether he hail ever read these Com
mentaries, candidly replied, " that they were too much for him;" at the same time exclaiming, "\\hata
giant was Hroclus compared to Longinus !" Thii confession, as the Doctor had never studied the philo
sophy ofl Ulo. displaced a decree of pood sei se, winch is seldom to he- met will) in a grammarian and
philologist, on such an occasion ; and his candour is still more remarkable, when it is considered that
he had been a Ketkwer.

* See p. 270. Vol. 2. in which it is sain, "that in each of the pl.inetary sphere?, a number analogous
to the choir of the fi\td stars, subsists with appropriate circulations." Ste also p. 2hO and 281, of the
same volume, in wlmli tins h more fnll\ aSMftcd.

1 Sec p. -! ! Vol. 2.

INTRODUCTION. T

"When I speak however, of the perspicuity with which these particulars are
developed, I &lt;lo not mean that they are delivered in such a way, as to be. obvious
to every one, or that they may le apprehended as soon as read ; for this |&gt;ertain8
only to the fungous and frivolous productions of the present day ; lull my mean
ing is, that they are written with all the clearness, which they are naturally capa
ble of admitting, or which a genuine student of the philosophy 1 of 1 lato can desire.
And this leads me to make some remarks on the iniquitous opinion which, since
the ren\al of letters, has been generally entertained of the. writings of 1 rocJus and
other philosophers, who are distinguished by the appellation of the latter IMato-
Xlists, and to show the cause from which it originated.

The opinion to which I allude is this that IMotinus and his followers, or in
Other words, all the IMalonists that existed from his time, to the fall of the Roman
empire, and the destruction of the schools of the philosophers by Justinian, cor
rupted the philosophy of J lato, by filling it with jargon and rcvery, and by
ascribing dogmas to him, which are not to be found in his writings, and which
are perfectly absurd. It might naturally be supposed that the authors of this
calumny were men deeply skilled in the philosophy, the corruptors of which they
profess to ha\e detected ; and that they had studied the writings of the men whom
they so grossly defame. This howe\er is very far from being the case. For
since the philosophy of 1 lato, as I ha\e elsewhere shown, is the offspring of the
most consummate science, all the dogmas of it being deduced by a series of
geometrical reasoning, some of them ranking as prior, and others as posterior,
and the latter depending on the former, like the propositions in Euclid, certain
preparatory disciplines are requisite to the perfect comprehension of these doc
trines. Hence a legitimate student of this philosophy must be skilled in mathe
matics have been exercised in all the logical methods, and not be unacquainted
with physics. lie must also be an adept in the, writings of Aristotle, as pre
paratory to the more Kiihlime speculations of IMato. And in addition to all this, he
must possess those qualifications enumerated by Plato in the 7lh book of his Re
public; vi/. he must have naturally a good memory, learn with facility, bo magnifi
cent and orderly, and the friend and ally of justice, truth, fortitude, and temperance.
Since the revival of letters howevi r, this philosophy has not Ix. en studied by men,
who have had the smallest conception that these requisites were indispensably

1 It is w II *ai&lt;i by Petwin, alluding to ilni philosophy, " that t .irrc are certain truths acquired by
a long exercise uf reason, troth in particular, and likewise in those subjects that arc most general,
much, perhaps, out of the reach of the greatest mathematician, a* tbc (peculations of Newton arc above
the capacity of tome that are now called mathematicians."

VI INTRODUCTION.

necessary, or who have attempted the acquisition of it, in this regular and scienti
fic method. Hmce, they have presumed to decide on the excellence of works,
with the true merits of which, as they were thus unqualified, they were wholly
unacquainted, and to calumniate what they could not understand. They appear
likewise to have been ignorant, that Plato, conformably to all the other great
philosophers of antiquity, wrote in such a way as to conceal the sublimest of
his doctrines from the vulgar, as well knowing, that they would only be profaned by
them without being understood ; the eye of the multitude, as he says, not being
sufficiently strong to lx&gt;ar the light of truth. Hence, as Proclus well observes,
" it is needless to mention, that it is unbecoming to speak of the most divine of
dogmas before the multitude, Plato himself asserting that all these are ridiculous
to the many, hut in an admirable manner are esteemed by the wise. Thus also,
the Pythagoreans said, that of discourses some are mystical, but others adapted to
b delivered openly. With the Peripatetics likewise, some are esoteric, and others
exoteric; and Pannenides himself, wrote some things conformable to truth, but
others to opinion; and Zeiio calls some assertions true, but others adapted to
the necessary purposes of life." The men then fore, who have defamed the latter
Platonists, Iwing thus unqualified, and thus ignorant of the mode of writing
adopted by the great ancients, rinding from a superficial perusal of the most
genuine di&gt;eiples of Plato many dogmas which were not immediately obvious in his
writings, and which were to them incomprehensible, confidently asserted that
these dogmas were spurious, that the authors of them weie delirious, and that
they had completely corrupted and polluted the philosophy of their master. It
may also be added, as Olympiodorus justly observes, that the writings of Plato
like those of Homer, are to be considered physically, ethically, theologically, and
in short, multifariously; and that he who does not thus consider them, will in vain
attempt to unfold the latent meaning they contain, liy the latter Platonists
however, they have been explored in this way, and he who is capable of availing
himself of the elucidations of these most benevolent and most sagacious men, will
find the arduous .sublimities of Plato accessible, his mystic narrations conformable
to scientific deductions, and his apparent obscurity, the veil of conceptions, truly

1 Or t* atpcri] ra Orctrara TUV boyfiaTutv eonr, tit u.oai &lt;f,(pOfi(ru TUV wn\\n&gt;v, ovbtv fn \tytif,
avTiiv I\\UTWI o fiiroiro*, u/&gt; iraira rui&gt;ru iarn-/f.\&lt;i(jra pry tart roit iroXXoii, 0ui//ia&lt;rruii f aia rou
awfititi. UVTU. }( kat ot Hi/0uy&lt;y&gt;c&lt; ruiy Xuyup rout ^iv cfaakov -ai ^vartkovs, Tovt ft viraiOfnovi, ia vi
ti row riffHTaroK, roi/i ^&lt;f rourfpikovi, rou t t^urfptiavi, tai ai-rot Flap^trif /;t, rn ^t T^OI aX/Ofiai-
f pHft, ra te wpvt tv-,ai-, t.at o Zijiu/y it rcn ptv aX&gt;] )tii CKaXri ruv \oyvv, rout ft ^/xtwicii.

Procl. MS. Comment, in Purmrnii!.

INTRODUCTION.

luminous and divine. And thus much as to the cause of the prevailing iniqui
tous opinion, respecting the writings of the latter Platonists ; for the authors of jt,
I have not been able to discover. But of this I am certain, and posterity will
confirm the decision, that whoever they were, they were no less ignorant than
arrogant, no less contemptible than obscure.

With respect to the following translation, I have only to observe, that I ha\e
endeavoured fr the utmost of my ability to unite in it faithfulness with perspicuity,
and to preserve the manner as well as the matter of the original. Independent
of the dilliculties inseparable from such an undertaking, and which arise from the
abstruseness of the subjects that are discussed in this uork, the original abounds
with errors, not of a trilling, but of the most important nature; errors, \\hich so
materially a/Iect the sense, that no one can read these Commentaries, unless he
corrects them, and yet no one can correct the greater part of them, unless he is
well acquainted with the philosophy of Plato. Of this the reader may be con
vinced by perusing the notes which accompany this translation, in which he will
find upwards of eleven hundred necessary emendations. I call them necessary,
because they are not the oflspring of conjecture, but such as the sense indubitably
demands. Of translations too, of this work, I could not avail myself; for of the
whole of it there arc none ; and a Latin translation of a part of the 3d book, by
Nicholsons Leonicus Thoirueus, 1 is the only aid that has been afforded me in this
arduous undertaking. From this translation I have been able, as the learned
reader will perceive, to give many important emendations of the printed original,
and not [infrequently to add toil, not only particular words, but entire sentences
that were wanting.

And now I shall conclude with observing, that though like most others Mho
have laboured greatly for tin; good, not merely of their country, but of all man
kind, I have only met with ingratitude from the public for those labours ; and that
though on this account I am not much indebted, 1 yet I sincerely wish well to my
native land, and to every individual in it. That I have neither been influ
enced by the expectation of sordid emolument, nor of the honours of the multi
tude, in the prosecution of these labours, must be evident from the nature of them,
to the most careless observer. The most j&gt;erfect conviction indeed, that a greater
good than the philosophy of Plato and Aristotle was never imparted by divinity

This (i.uisl.ilion forms the latt part of the Opuscula of Thomaeus, printed at Venice in the vear
1.525 ; which work is so scarce, that Fabricius in his account of the Life and Writings of Procluj,
(Bibliotb. Gricc. Tom. 8.) sa\, he never taw it

* According to Plato in the 7th Book of his Republic, " that which springs up spontaneously, should
not be forward to pay any one for iU nurture."

v jjj INTRODUCTION.

to man, and the consequent persuasion, that I could not confer a more real bene
fit on the present age and posterity than by a dissemination of it in my native
ton-xie, as they induced me to en-age in such a difficult undertaking, hare also
been attended with the purest deli-lit, from a conviction that I was acting rightly,
and therefore in a way pleasing to dixinity. Hence in accomplishing this Hercu
lean task, 1 have l*en sati&gt;fcd with exploring myself, and imparting to others,
the treasures of ancient wisdom; and with endeavouring to deserve the. favourable
re-ard of that ineffable principle, whose approbation is not only the highest honour
that either mortals or immortals can obtain, but the most durable and substan
tial train.

NAMES OF THE PHILOSOPHERS QUOTED BY PROCLUS
IN THESE COMMENTARIES.

ADRASTUS APHRCPISIENSIS, one of the genuine Peripatetics, according to Simplirius On the

Categories of Aristotle.

AGLAOPHEMUS, one ho initiated Pythagoras in the mysteries of Orpheus.
ALHINUS, a Platonic philosopher, who flourished about the time of Galen.
ALEXANDER APHRODISIENSIS, a Peripatetic philosopher, who flourished under ibe Empero r

Severus.

AMF.LUJS, a Platonic philosopher, and a disciple of Plotinus.
AMMOMUS SACCAS, the preceptor of Plotinus.

ANAXAGORAS, the Clazomenian, flourished about the "Oth Olympiad.
ANTONINUS, a disciple of Ammonius Saccas.

ARISTOTLE, the disciple of Plato, was born in the first year of the 99th Olympiad,
ARISTOTLE, the Khodian.

ATTIC us, a Platonic philosopher, vho flourished under Marcus Antoninus.
CIIRYSIPPUS, a celebrated Stoic philosopher, died in the 143rd Olympiad.
GRANTOR SOLF.N sis, the first interpreter of Plato, also a fellow disciple with Xenocrates of

Plato, and an auditor of Polcmo.

DEMOCRITVS, the celebrated philosopher of Abdrra, flourished about the 80th Olympiad.
EMPEDOCLES, the celebrated Pythagorean philosopher, was an auditor when a young man of

Pythagoras.

EPICURUS, was born in the lOQlh Olympiad.
EC DEM us, the Khodian, a disciple of Aristotle, and to whom Aristotle inscribed his Eudemian

Ethics.

EURYM ACHUS, the Epicurean.
GAI.EN, the physician, who was also a Platonist. He wrote 200 Volumes, most of which were

burnt in the temple of Peace, and flourished under the Emperor Adr an.
HA RPOCRATION, the Platoiiist, an Argire, and the familiar of Augustus Caesar.
Hr.RAci.iDEs PONTICUS, a disciple of Plato and Speusippus.

HKKACI.ITVS EPIIESIUS, surnamed the obscure, flourished about the 70lh. Olympiad.
HEHMF.S TKISMEGISTUS.

JULIAN, the Theurgist, who flourished under Marcus Antoninus.
IAMHMCHI s, a Platonic philosopher, surnamcd the ditine, flourished under Uie Emperor Con-

stantine.

Tim. Plat. Vot I. A

NlCDMACHCi.the Pythagorean, was, according to Fabricius, somewhat posterior to the age of

Antoninus Pius.

NUMENIUS, a Pythagoric and Platonic philosopher, flourished prior to Plotinus.
OCELLUS LUCANDS, an auditor of Pythagoras, and one of his most etnuxMit disciples.
ORICKN, (not a father of the Church,) a disciple of Plotinus.

PARMENIOES, the Elean, a Pythagoric philosopher, flottfished about ihc 70th Olympiad.
PHERECYUES, the Syrian, the preceptor of Pythagoras.

PHILOI.ACS, of Tarentuin, an eminent Pythagorean philosopher, and a.\ auditor of Pythagoras.
PLATO, was born in the 4th year of the 88th Olympiad, and died in the iOBlh Olympiad.
PLOT IN us, one of the most eminent of the Platonic philosophers, flourished under the Emperors

Gordian and Galieuus.

PLL TAHCH.of Cl.a-ronca, in Boeotia, the preceptor of Trajan, and the celebrated biographer.
PORPHYRY, a disciple of Plotinus, and distinguished by the appellation of the pMotopher.
POSIDONIVS, a Sloic philosopher, flourished under the reign of Julius Cx-sar.
PKAXIPIIAN ES, a disciple of Theophrastus.

PIIOCLUS MALLOTES, is mentioned by our Proclus as one of the ancient philosophers.
PYTHAGORAS, the father of philosophy, flourished about the (JOlh Olympiad.
SEVF.RUS, a Platoniat, but the time in which he flourished is not known.

SOCHATK.-., the celebrated pret eptor of Plato, was born m the 4th year of the 77th Oljapiad.
SOCHATLS, tlie Platonist, was posterior in lime to Amelius.
SOLON, the Legislator, flourished about the -Unh Olympiad.
STKATO LAMPSACEM S, an auditor ar.d successor of Tlieophrastus.
SYMIANDS, ihe preceptor of Proelns. See the notes to this work.

Til ALES, was bo.n in the first year uf the 35th Olympiad, and died in the 58th Olympiad.
THF.ODORUS, Asis*i S, a disciple of Plotinus, and surnamcd the grtai.
THP.OKHRAkTUS, the celebrated disciple and successor of Aristotle.
XENAHCHUS, a IV-iipatctic phdosopher, and the friend of Augustus Ca*sar.
X KNOCRATI.S, a disciple, and successor of Plato.

XENOHIANES, the Colophonian, author of the Eleatic nu-thod of reasoning floufMhd i
the 00th Ol;:inpiail. I : or an account of this method, see the additional note, on this work.
ELEATES was an auditor of Parmenidcs, and flourished about the 8Gth Olympiad.

S B. The01&gt;mpic games were re Kored by [,,!,ie.i., 412 years after their f.rsl inslitulion, and about 7TT
year, before Christ. From tins list institution ll.e (Jrteks Logan to reckon Dy Oljriapiadi,cMb vf which con-
tiiRd tli *f-xt of 4 )tars. A.J this contmueU vcn to lUe rtign ttt Cvmunimc.

AN EXPLANATION OF CERTAIN TERMS USED BY
PROCLUS IN THIS WORK.

T v*ywyiiwy. Ti K Ah AC oc ic. That which elevates the soul from sensible! to intelligible*.

aAXoiovi,-. AtLlATioN. Change in quality.

Tixra&lt;7Ta:n{. Aroc ATASTASIS. Kcitjtuijon to a pristine form, or condition of being.

TO yjvfsnov^yixoy. THE GKNESIUKGIC. That which i* effective of generation,
o Icup Ms AfiTTort^f. THE DEMONIACAL ARISTOTLE. This philosopher was thus de
nominated by the ancient*, from his transcendent physiological knowledge; nature being
proximattly governed by dirmoos, or those powers that subsist between Gods and men.

yniTit. GENERATION. A How iug condition of being, or a subsistence in becoming to be.
Hence, TO yiyvfafla* signifies an extension in subsistence, or a tendency to being.

Zi^uoypyof Ty oXay. TH K DKM 1 1; tu.us OF WHOLES. The maker of the universe is thus
denominated, because he produces the universe, so far as it is a tchofe, and likewise all the
rtholet it contains, by his own immeHule energy, other subordioate powers co-operating with
him in the production of parts. Hence be produces the universe totally and at once.

Siavoia. DIANOIA. The discursive energy of reason ; or it is thai power which reasons scienti
fically, deriving the principles of its reasoning from intellect.

Sofa. OPINION. Is the last of the gnostic powers of the rational soul; and knows that
a thing is, but is ignorant of the cause of it, or why it is. For the knowledge of the son, or
Tchy a tiling i., belongs to Ciavota.

TO ii5v/xisTix5 ft- fo; Tr (J - 4^X1 - THE EpirnvMETir PART OF THE SOD L, or that part of the
soul which is the principle of ail-various desires. But desire is well defined, by the Puhago-
rcans, to be a certain tendency, impulse, and appetite of the soul, in order to be filled with
something, or to enjoy something present, or to be disposed according to some sensitive energy.
They add, that there is also a desire of the contraries to these, and this is desire of the evacua
tion and absence, and of having no sensible perception of certain things.

iixiviKcuf. ICON JCAI.L.T. A thing i.n said to subsist iconically, when it subsists after the manner
of an image.

1160X1x0;. looiilCA LLY. Adtimbratively.

fvitauTixifi,-. ENTHEASTICALLY. In a divinely-inspired manner.

o.aix;. UN ICAI.LY. In a way conformable to the nature of the one.

TO rrffoxiyijfoy. TH E AL r KR-MCTi v R. That which is moved by another thing, and not by
itself.

6vuo;. ANGKR. An appetite of the soul directed to the avcngcment of incidental molestations..

Aoyoi. REASONS. Productive principles or powers; and they also signify forms.
i. MORPHK. Pertains to the colour, figure, and magnitude of supcrhcits.

MCLTIPOTENT. Possessing much power.
vo.pa r.,3ox|. INTELLECTUAL PIM.JKCTION. The immediate energy of intellect is thus

denominated, because it is an intuitive perception, or an immediate darting forth, as it were, to

its proper object, the intelligible.
w INTFLI.I.C T. In the human soul is the summit of dianoia, and is that power by the light

proceeding from which, we perceive the truth of axioms. Hut in divine natures it is a self-

subsiiUnt, impartible, eternal c^.nce, perceiving all things at once.
cXsrr- \\noLr.NC.-s. A whole which has a perpetual subsistence, and which comprehends in

itself all the multitude of which it is the cause.
Xi;sa&gt;ufl(. PLE.MTf n E, ou COM P i.ETiiN r.ss. Is a whole which gives completion to the

universe.

r vo-coy * vtuyiXG X*TS,-. Tilt. I N T I. I.I.I C I BLE, O R INTELLECTUAL, OR PSYCHICAL

BREAimi; i. e. the extent of the progression of the i.itelligible, of intellect and of soul,
and of each of these according to its own order, and not according to a progression into an in
ferior order.

TO o-v5rrcv. TUP. COMPOSITE. 1 have used the word composite instead of compounded, because
the latter rather d, notes the mingling, than the contiguous union of one thing with another,
which the former through its derivation fiom the Latin word comp^ilns, solely denotes.

TiX. erixi] TJX*I- I " l: Tr.LEr.TlC AKT. Is tlie art \ riaining to niNstic operations.

iXjircXaxo;. PII i i.o i-o LKM i f . Aii i-pithet of Minerva, sigmfjing that she is a luver of rear :
just as she is also called philosophic, as being a lover of K isdorn.

v*af c &gt;i- HYPAKXIS. The first principle, or nundation, ai it were, of the essence of a thing.
Hence also, it is the summit of essence.

PROCLUS

TILE TIMYEUS OF PLATO.

BOOK I.

1I1AT the design of the Platonic Tinva-ns embraces ihe uliole of physiology,
and that it pertains to the theory of the universe, discussing this from the be
ginning to the end, appeal s to me to l&gt;e clearly evident to those who are not
entirely illiterate. For this very treatise of the Pythagoric Tima-ns Concerning
Xaturc, is written after the Pytha^oric manner; and Plato 1&gt;eing thence impelled,
applied himself to write the Tima-us, according to Sillographns. 1 On this account
we have prefixed the treatise of Tima-iis to these Commentaries, in order that we
may know what the Tima-ns of Plato says that is tin; same with what is asserted
in the treatise of TimaMis [the Ix)erian], what it adds, and in what it dissents.
And that we may investigate not in a careless manner the cause of this disagree
ment. All this dialogue, likewise, through the whole of itself, has physiology for
it* scope, surveying the same things in images and in paradigms, in wholes and
in parts. For it in filled with all the most Itoantiful boundaries* of physiology,
assuming things simple for the sake of such as are composite, parts for the sake
of wholes, and images for the sake of paradigms, leaving none of the principal
causes of nature uninvestigated.

t i:. Timon, who was so called from writing scurrilous comic j&gt;o&lt; iu. * /. r. Final munition*.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. A

2 PnOCLUS ON T TIIF. [BOOK f.

But that the dialogue deservedly embraces a design of this kind, and that Plato
alone preserving the Pythagoric mode in the theory concerning nature, has pro
secuted with great subtilty the proposed doctrine, ought to le considered hy
those who are more sagacious and acute. For since, in short, physiology receives
a threefold division, and one part of it is comeisant with matter and material
causes, but another part also adds the investigation of form, and evinces that this
is the more principal cause; and again, since a third part demonstrates that these
have not the relation of causes, 1ml of concaiises, and admits that there are other
causes, which are properly so called, of things generated hy nature, vi/. the eflec-
tive, paradigmatic and final cause ; this being the case, among the multitude of
physiologists prior to Plato, that directed their attention to matter, there Avas a
di\ersity of opinion respecting the subject of things. For Anaxagoras, who
appears to ha\ e seen, while the rest were aslerp, that intellect is the first cause
of generated nature-, made no use of intellect in hi&gt; explanation of things, hut
rather employed certain airs and a theis as the causes of things that are generated,
;IK Socrates says in the !*lia(lo. Hut of tho-e posterior to IMato, who were tho
patrons of a sect, not all, hut such of them as were more at curate than the lest,
thought tit to survey physical form in conjunction with matter, referring the prin
ciples of hodies to matter and form. For if they any where mention the pro-
du -ing cau-e, as when they say that nature is a principle of motion, they rather
take away its eflicacious and properly effective power [than allow the existence of
it] hy not ^ranting that it contains the reasons [or productive principles] of the
things ellected hv it, hut admitting that many things an- generated casually.
To which we ina\ athl, that lhe\ do not acknowledge that there is a pre-existing
producing cau-e tf, in short, all physical things, hut of those only that are home
along in generation. For of eternal natures they clearly s;y, that there is no
llectne eao-e ; in asserting which they are ignorant that they must cither give
subsistence to the \\ hole of heaven from t hunce, or c\ ince that \\hatiscasual is
itself productive of itself.

I lato howe\er alone, folio \\ in:; the I vtha^oreans, dcli\ers intleed, as the con-
caust s of natur.d ihinu;-, a uui\ersal ret ipient, and material form, which are MI!&gt;-
Hcnicnt tt&gt; causes properly so called, in the generation of things. Hut prior to
these, he investigates principal causes, vi/. the producing can-", the paradigm,
and the final cause. Through these* also, he places a demiurgic intellect our

1 Vi/. VriMotlr, ,in&lt;l \\\t folltmiTii

nooK i.] T1MJEUS OF PLATO. 3

the universe, and an intelligible cause in which tlio universe primarily subsists,
and the good, which is established prior to the producing cause, in the order of
the desirable. For since that which is moved by another thins:, is suspended
from the power of that which moves, as it is evidently not adapted either to pro
duct 1 , or perfect, or save itself, in all these it is in want of a producing cause, and
is conducted by it. It is i - therefore, that, the concauses of natural things,
.should be suspended from true causes, from which they are produced, with ;i
view to \\hich they Mere fabricated by the father of all things, and for
the sake of which they were generated. Justly, therefore, are all these delivered,
and investigated with accuracy by Plato ; and the remaining two, form and the
subject-matter, suspended from these. For this world is not the same with the
intelligible or intellectual worlds, which, according to some, subsist in pure forms ;
but one thinir in it has the relation of reason and form, and another, of a subject.
But that Plato very properly delivers all these causes of the fabrication of the
world, viz. the ^on,!, the intelligible paradigm, the maker, form, and the subject
nature, is e\idenl from the following considerations. For if he had spoken con
cerning the intelligible Gods, he would have evinced that the pood alone is the
can-ie of these; for the intelligible number is from this cause. But if concerning
the intellectual Gods, he would have shown that the gond and the intelligible are,
the causes of these. For the intellectual multitude proceeds from the intelligible
unities, and the one fountain of beings. And if he had spoken concerning the
supermundane Gods, he would have produced them from the intellectual and
total fabrication, from the intelligible Gods, and from the cause of all things.
For this cause gives subsistence to all things of which secondary natures are
generative, but in a primary, ineffable, and inconceivable manner. But since he
discusses mundaae affairs and the whole world, he gives to it matter and form,
descending into it from the supermundane Gods, susj&gt;ends it from the total*
fabrication, assimilates it to intelligible animal, and demonstrates it to l&gt;e a God
by the participation of the good ; and thus he renders the whole world an intel
lectual, animated God. This, therefore, and such as this, is, as we have said, the
scope of the Timn iis.

This however l&gt;eing the case, the order of the universe is appropriately indi
cated in the beginning of the dialogue, through images; but in the middle of it,

Instead of mri roi/rwr ill lliis place, it is nfcenar} to read atria* rovrwr.
1 Fur 11X171 here, it u accessary to read oXip.

4 PHOCU. S ON TUT. [BOOK i.

the whole fabrication of the world is delivered ; tuul in the end, partial natures,
and the extremities of fabrication, ;re woven together with wholes. For tin*
resumption of the discourse about a polity, ami the narration respecting the
Atlantic island, unfold throu-h images tin- theory of the world. I or it \\c direct
our attention to the union and multitude of mundane natures, we must say that
the polity which Socrati-s Hinnmarily tlisnwses, is an imugi of their union, csta-
l,li&gt;hin;r asitscnd tho roimiuiiiiou which pervades through all things; hut that the
w ar of the Atlanties with the Athenians, w hich Critias narrates, is an image of
the division of nuindane natures, and espe, ially of the oppo&gt;itioii aeoordmg to
the t\\o ro-ordiuati..ns of thii -s. Hut if ^e diside the nni\er&gt;,- into the celestial
ami suhhinary re-ions ue MIU&gt;( ^ay that the [Soeratie] polity, is avximilati-il to
the cfte&gt;tial order ; tor Socrates sa\s, that the paradi-m of it is e&gt;tal.lished in the
heavens; hut theuarofthe Atlantic-, to -nieration, \\hicli &gt;uhsi-ts throu-h on-
tranely and uuitatiuii. These thiu-^ tlu-ivfoiv, for the n a&gt;ons vvc have nu iitioned,
prreedi- the v. Imle uf ph\ siolo^y.

Hut all. i Ihi-, Ihe drniiuiL i., par.nliumalir and Inr.d raiiM-s of the uuiveisr an-
unfolded, in &lt; -oils. &lt;|ti&lt; IK &lt; of I M- pre rxistenee of \vlueli, the uui\ert&gt; i- f.ilincated
l.oth aceordin- to the v!i.|,- ami the paro of it. 1 i.r the rorpnival nature of it is
fa^iioned \\ilh form-, and iliuded hy di\ iue niuul.ers ; .soul al&gt;. is protluci-tl from
the Demim-us and is filled \\ilh harmonic rea^.n-, and dixiiu- ami demiur-ie
hViulwils; and tin- \\hole annual is uo\m lu-ji-thrr ronforiliahl) to the united
romprehension uf it in the intelli-Ue uorld. The parts likewise of it, are ar-
raii^-tl in a Ixcomin- manner in the \\hole, hoth &gt;u. h as are corporeal and Mich
as are vital For partial souls hriui; introduced into the. world, are arranged
ahout their leading &lt;ds ami tlirouh tlieir \ehules hccome mumlaiie, imitating
their presidmi, deities. Mt.ilal aiumaU hk-wi-e, are fahricated ami \iviliedhy
the celestial (iods; where aUo man isMirveved, and the mode of his stihsistcnce,
and through what cau&gt;es he w;,s c ,-nstituted. .Man iudtvd is considered prior to
other things, either hecause the theory r.-p.-ctih- him pertains to us who make
him the .xnl.jeet of discu- ion, and are ourselves men ; or l&gt;ecau&lt;e man is a mtero-
rosm, ami all such lhin-s sul.&gt;i&gt;t in him partially, as the woild contains divinely
and totally. For then- is an intellect in n* which is in ener-v, ami a rational
Mini proceeding from the same 1 father, and the -amc \i\iuY (Joddis-, as the soul

,ly ..-.,.
.virv li

nooK i.] TIM.TXS OF 1 LATO. 5

of the universe ; also an etherial vehicle analogous to the lu-avons, and a terres
trial bouy derived from the four elements, and with which likewise it is co-ordi
nate. It" therefore, it i&gt; necessary that the universe should be surveyed mnltifa-
rioiisly, in the intelligible, and in tin- sensible world, paradigmatic-ally, iconic-ally,
totally and partially, it \\ill be well, if the nature of man is perfectly discussed
in the theory of the universe.

Von may also say that conformably to the Tytlia^orie custom, it is necessary
to connect the discussion of that \\liich surveys with that which is surveyed. For
since we are informed \\liat the world is, it is requisite I lliink to add also, what
that is which considers these things, and makes them the subject of rational anim-
adursi Ui. Hut that I lato directs his attention likewise to this, is evident from
what lie says near the end of the dialogue, that it is necessary that the intellect of
him who intends to obtain a happy life, should he assimilated to the object of his
intellection. For the universe is always happy ; and our soul will like. wise le
happy, when it is assimilated to the universe; for thus it will he led hack to its
cause. For as the sensilile man is to the universe, so is the intelligible man to
animal itself. Hot there secondary natures alwavs adhere to such as .ire first, and
part" sulisist in unproceedini; union with their wholes, and are established in them.
Hence, when the sensible man is assimilated to the universe, he also imitates his
paradigm after an appropriate manner, In-coming a world through similitude to
the world, nnd happy through resemhlance to that hlessed -rod [the universe.]
The ends also of fabrication are snhtilely elahorated hy Plato, according to i;enus
and species, ami also what pertains to meteors, together with productions in the
earth, and in animals, such things as are preternatural, and such as are accord
ing to nature; in which part of llu Tima-us, likewise, the principles of medicine
are unfolded. I or the physiologist ends at these; since he is a surveyor of
nature. For a subsistence according to nature, exists together with nature ; hut
the preternatural is a departure from nature. It is the business, therefore, of the
physiologist to understand in how many modes this aberration subsists, and how
it becomes terminated in moderation and a natural condition. Hut it is the pro
vince of tlie medical art to unfold such particulars as are consequent to these.
And in these things especially, I lato has something in common with other
physiologists. For they were conversant with the most material, ami the ultimate
works of nature, nejjlectin:; the whole heaven, and the orders of the mundane
(iods, in couseijuence of directing their attention to matter; but they bade
farewell to forms and primary causes.

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

It also appears to me that the demoniacal Aristotle, emulating as much as
|X&gt;ssible the doctrine of Plato, thus arranges the whole of his discussion concern
ing nature, jxrceiving that the tilings which are common to every thing that haa
a natural subsistence are, form and a subject, that from whence the principle of
motion is derived, motion, time, and place; all which are delivered by IMato in
tin s dialogue, viz. interval, and time which is the image of eternity, and is con-
subsistent with the universe; the various sj&gt;ecies of motion; and the concauses of
things which have a natural subsistence. But with respect to the things peculiar
to substances according to an essential division, of these Aristotle discusses in
the first place such as pertain to the heavens, in a way conformably to IMato ; so
fur as he calls the hea\en unbegotten, and a fifth essence. For what dillerence is
there between calling it a fifth element, or a fifth world, and a fifth figure, as
Plato denominates it ? But in the second place, he discusses such things as are
common^ to every t jing that has a generated subsistence. And with respect to
tilings of this kind, IMato deserves t &gt; be admired, for having surveyed with much
accuracy the essence and powers of them, and for having rightly preserved their
harmony and contrarieties. And of these, such indeed as pertain to meteors,
Plato has .delivered the principles, but Aristotle has extended the doctrine
respecting them l&gt;eyond what is lit. But such as pertain to the theory of animals,
are distinguished by IMato according t. all final causes and concauses, but by
Aristotle are scarcely, and but in few instances, surveyed according to form.
For his discussion for the most purt stops at matter; and making his exposition
of things that have a natural subsistence from this, he shows to us that
he deserts the doctrine of \\i* preceptor, find tluih much concerning these par
ticulars.

In the next place it is requisite- to speak of the form and character of the dia
logue, and to show what they are. It is universally acknowledged, then, that
Plato receiving the treatise of the Pythagoric Tiuueus, which was composed by
him after the Pythagoric manner, began to write his Tima-us. Again, it is also
acknowledged by those who are in the smallest degree conversant with the writ
ings of IMato, that his manner is Socratic, philanthropic, and demonstrative. If,
therefore, he has any when- mingled the Pythagoric and Socratic peculiarity, he
appears to have done this in the present dialogue. For there are in it from the
Pythagoric custom, elevation of conception, the intellectual, the divinely inspired,
the suspending every thing from intelligible*, the bounding wholes in numbers, the
indicating things mystically and symbolically, the anagogic, the transcending

] TIM^EUS OF PLATO. 7

partial conceptions, and tlio enunciative or unfolding into light. But from tlio
Socrntic philanthropy, the social.!. , the mild, the demonstrative, the contemplat
ing beings through image*, the ethical, and every thing of this kind. Hence it is
a venerable dialogue; forms its conceptions supernally from the first principles ;
and mingles the demonstrative with the enunciative. It also prepares us to under
stand physics, not only physically, hut likewise theologically. For Nature herself
who is the leader of the universe, Ix-ing suspended from, and inspired by the
Gods, governs the corporeal-formed essence. And she neither ranks as a God
dess, nor is without a divine j&gt;eculiarity, but is illuminated bv the truly-cxistinir
Gods.

If, likewise, it be requisite that discourses should be assimilated to the things
of which they are the interpreters, as Tim;eus himself says, it will be fit that this
dialogue also should have the physical, and should also have the theological ;
imitating nature, which is the object of its contemplation. Far/her still, act ordin"
to the Pythagoric doctrine, things receive a threefold division into intel ligibles, \
things physical, and such as are the media between these, and which are usually &gt;
called mathematical. But all things may be appropriately Mimyed in all. For/
such things as are media, and such as are last; presubsist in intelligible* after a
primordial manner, and both these subsist in the mathematical genera ; first natures
indeed ironically, but such as rank as the third, ppradigmatlcally. In physical
entities, also, there are images of the essences prior to them. This, therefore, be in"
the case, Tima&gt;u, when he constitute 5 the soul, very properly indicates its powers,
its productive principles, nnd its elements through mathematical names. But
Plato defines its peculiarities by geonv .rical figures, and leaves the causes of all
these primordially pre-existing in the intelligible and demiurgic intellect. And
thus much concerning these things ; since when we descend to particulars, we
shall be able to know more perfectly the manner of the dialogue. But the hypo
thesis of it is as follows :

.Socrates having come to the Pinrus for the sake of the Bendidian festival ami
solemn procession, discoursed there concerning a polity with Polemarchus, the
son of (Vphaltis, Glauco and Adimantus, and likewise Thrasymaclius the sophist.
But on the day after this, he narrates the conference in the Pir.rus, as it is laid
down in the Republic, in the city, to Tima?us, Hermocrates and G riteas, and to
another fourth anonymous ;&gt;erson. I \\\\ ing, however, made this narration, he calls
upon the other associates, to feast him in return on the day after this, with the
banquet of discourse. The auditors therefore and ^peakers assembled together

1 ROCLUS ON THE [HOOK i.

on this day, which was the third from the conference in the Piraeus. For in the
Republic it is said, " I went down yesterday to the Piranis ;"* hut in this dialogue,
" Of tliose who were received hy me yesterday at a haiNjuet of discourse, hut who
ought now in their turn lo repay me with a similar repast." Not all of them how-
e\er, were present at this audition, Imt the fourth \vas wanting through indisposi
tion. What, then-fore, you will say, are these three auditors of a discussion about
the whole world? I reply, that it is tit the father of the discussion should he con
sidered as analogous to [the Demiiirgus, or] the father of works. For the fahrica-
tion of the w&lt;rld in words, is the image of the fabrication of it according- to intel
lect. J5ut the triad of those that receive the discussion of TilUlL Us, is analogous
to the demiurgic triad which receives the one. and total motion of th* fattier ; of
which triad Socrates is the summit, through an alliance of life immediately ((in-
joining himself to Tima-us, just as the first of the paradigmatic triad is united to
the falh er, who is prior to the tiiad. These things, ho\\e\er, if the (iods please,
we .shall render more manifest through what follows. AS \\e ha\e therefore
spoken concerning the- scope and management of the dialogue, have shown how
admirahle the character of it i.-, and \\ hat is the \\ hole of the h\ pothesjs, and have
indicated the adaptation of the per&gt;ons to the pre&gt;ent discussion, it will he propel-
that, IH taking ourselves to the words of Tima-us, \\e should investigate every par
ticular to the u lino- 1 ul oil I poNVef.

Sin re, however, the \vurd intlun 1 , heing dill;Tently lliuier&gt;tood hy dillerent per
sons, di&lt;Nturl tho.se who love to contemplate the conceptions of IMato, let us in
the fust place show what it appeared to him to \n\ and what his opinion was of
its essence. For the knowledge of what nature is, whence it proceeds, and how
far it extends to productions, will he adapted to the dialogue, which has for its
ohject the physical theory. For of the ancients, some indeed, as Anlipho, called
matter nature; hut others form, as Aristotle, in many places. Others again called
the whole of things nature, as some prior to IMato, of whom he speaks in the
J&gt;aws. Others denominated nature things which Milist hy nature. But others
gave the appellation of nature to physical powers, such as gravity and h-vity,
rarity and density, as some of the Peripatetics, and still more ancient physiolo
gists. Others called things which have a natural subsistence the art of ( iod ;
others soul ; and others something else of this kind. IMato, however, does not
think tit to give the appellation of nature primarily, either to matter, or material

1 For on &gt;/ I if re, il is uctcsijry to read o&lt; ^.

BOOK i.J T1MJEUS OF PLATO. ,

form, or body, or physical powers, but is averse to call it immediately soul.
Placing, however, the essence of it in. the middle of both, I mean, between soul
and corporeal powers, the latter being inferior to it, in const queuce of l&gt;eing divided
about bodies, and incapable of lx&gt;ing converted to themselves, but nature surpass
ing things posterior to it, through containing the reasons or productive principles
of all of them, and generating and vivifying all things, he has delivered to us the
most accurate theory concerning it. For, according to common conceptions,
nature is one thing, and that which subsists according lo, and by nature, another.
For that which is artificial, is something dillerent from art, and the intellectual
soul is one thing, and nature another. For nature, indeed, verges to bodies, and
is inseparable from them. But the intellectual soul is separate from bodies, is esta
blished in herself, and at one and the same time belongs to herself and to another.
She belongs to another, indeed, in consequence of being participated, but to herself,
through not verging to the participant ; just as the father of soul is of himself
being imparticipable, and, if you are willing, prior to him the intelligible paradigm
itself of the whole world. For these follow each other, viz. it*e!f; of itself ; of \
itself and tifanottur ; of another ; another. And with respect to the last of these, ^
it is evident that it is every thing sensible, in which there is interval and all-various
division. But of the next to this, [viz. that which is of another,] it is nature
which is inseparable from bodies. That which immediately precedes this [viz.
that which is both of itself and of another,] is soul which subsists in herself, and
imparts by illumination a secondary life to another thing. The next to this [or
that which JM of itself,] is the demiurgic intellect who abides [as Plato says] in
himself in hjs own accustomed manner. And tin; next to this [or itself,] is tho
intelligible cause of all things, whieh is the paradigm of the productions of tho
Demiurgus, and which Plato on this account thinks tit to call animal itself.

Nature, therefore, is the last of the causes which fabricate this corporeal-formed
and sensible essence. She is also the; boundary of the e\tnt of incorporeal
essences, and is full of reasons and powers through which she- directs and governs
mundane In-ings. And she is a Goddess indeed, in consequence oflieing deified,
but she has not immediately the subsistence of a deity. For we call divine !x&gt;dies
Gods, as being the statues of Gods. But she governs the whole world by her
powers, containing the heavens indeed in the summit of herself, !&gt;ut ruling over
generation through the heavens ; and every where weaving together partial natures
with whole*. Being however such, she proceeds from the vivific Goddess [liheu.]
[For according to the Chalditan oracle] " Immense Nature is suspended from the
Tim. Plat. VOL. J. U

10 PKOCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

back of the Goddess;" from whom all life is derived, both that which is intellec
tual, und that which is inseparable from the subjects of it* government. Hence,
being suspended from thence, she jnrvades without im|&gt;etUment through, and
inspires all things ; so that through her, the most inanimate beings participate of
a certain soul, and such things as are corruptible, remain perpetually in the world,
being held together by the causes of forms which she contains. For again the
Oracle says, " Unwearied Nature rules over the worlds and works, and draws
downward, that Heaven may run an eternal course," kc. So that if some one of
those who assert that there are three deiniurgi, is willing to refer them to these
principles, viz. to the demiurgic intellect, to soul, ami to total nature [or to nature
considered as a whole,] he will speak rightly, through the causes which have
been already enumerated. But he will speak erroneously, if he supposes that
there are three other deiniurgi of the universe, beyond soul. For the Demiurgus
of wholes is one, but more partial powers, distribute his whole fabrication into
parts. AVe must not therefore admit such an assertion, whether it be Amelius or
Theodorus [Asina-us] who wishes to make this arrangement; but we must be
careful to remain in ITatonic and Orphic hypotheses.

Moreover, those who call nature demiurgic, art, if indeed they mean the nature
which abides in the Demiurgus, they do not speak rightly ; but their assertion is
right, if they mean the nature which proceeds from him. Fur ur must conceive
thai art is triple, one kind subsisting in the artist, in unpruceeding union ; another,
proceeding indeed, but being converted to him ; and a third being tluit which has now
proceeded from the artist, and subsists in another thing. The art therefore, which is
in the Demiurgus, abides in him, and is himself, according to which the sensible
world is denominated the work of the artificer, and the work of the artificer of
the fiery world. But the intellectual soul is art indeed, yet art which at the same
time both abides and proceeds. And nature is art which proceeds alone; on
which account also it is said to be the organ of the Cods, not destitute of life, nor
alone niter-motive, but having in a certain respect the tself-tnotive, through the
ability of energizing from itself. For the organs of the Gods are essentiali/ed in
^flicacious reasons, are vital, and concur with the energies of the Gods.

As we have therefore shown what nature is according to Plato, that it is an
incorporeal essence, inseparable from bodies, containing the reasons or productive
principles of them, and incapable of perceiving itself, and as it is evident from

It ipptan to mr, that the words TOV aiyQrjrov tosher, are wauling here in the origiual.

BOOK i.] TIMyElTS OF PLATO. II

those things that the dialogue is physical, which teaches us concer.iing the whole
mundane fabrication, it remains that we should connect what is consequent with
what has been said. For since the whole of philosophy is divided into the theory
concerning intelligible and mundane natures, and this very properly, because
there is also a twofold world, the intelligible and the sensible, as Plato himself
says in the course of the dialogue, this be- ins; the case, the Parmenides compre
hends the discussion of intclligibles, but the Titna us that of mundane natures.
For the former delivers to us all the divine orders, but the latter all the progres
sions of mundane essences. But neither does the former entirely omit the theory
of the natures contained in the universe, nor the latter the theory of intelligible:*;
l&gt;ecause sensibles are in intelligible* paradigmatically, and intelligibles in sensible;*
iconically. But the one is exul&gt;erant about that which is physical, and the other
about that which is theological, in a manner appropriate to the men from whom
the dialogues are denominated : to Timajus, for he wrote a treatise of this kind
about the universe; and to Pannenides, for lie wrote about truly-existing l&gt;eings.
The divine lamhlichns, therefore, says rightly, that the whole theory of Plato is
comprehended in these two dialogues, the Tim;rus and Parmenides. For every
thing pertaining to mundane and supermundane natures, obtains its most excellent
end in these, and no order of U ings is l-ft uninvestigated. To those also who do
not carelessly inspect these dialogues, the similitude of discussion in the Timanas
to that in the Parmenides, will be apparent. For as Tima us refers the cause of
everything in the world to the first Demiurgus, so Parmenides suspends the pro
gression of all lyings from the one. And this is effected by the former, so far as
all things participate of the demiurgic providence; but by the latter, so far as
beings- participate of a uniform hyparxis, [or of an hyparxis which has the form of
the, one.] Farther still, as Timanis, prior to physiology, extends through images
the theory of mundane natures, BO Parmenides excites the investigation of imma
terial forms, prior to theology. For it is requisite after having l&gt;een exercised in
discussions about the besi polity, to IM? led to the knowledge of the universe; and
after having contended with strenuous doubts about forms, to be sent to the mystic
theory of the unities [of Ix-ings.] Having however, said thus much, it is now time
to consider the words of Plato, and investigate their meaning to the utmost of our
ability.

" [I see] One, two, three, but where, friend Timieus, is the fourth /

In all tlir editions of the Timarui, ij/jir follow! after p&lt;Xc Ti^aic, but is wauling in ibrse Couirncn-
t.-.nci of Procliu.

!*2 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

person of those who having been received by me yesterday nt a banquet
of discussion, ought now to repay me with a similar repast r"

Plato here, together with the grace and b";iuty of the words, raises and exalts
ihe whole period. Pra\i|&gt;li:mes ho\\e\er, the disciple of Theophrastus, blames
I lato, first because he in. ikes an enumeration of one, two, three, in a tiling which
is manifest to sense and known to .Sorrates. For what occasion had Socrates to
numerate, in order that he might know the multitude of those that assembled to
this conference? In the. second place lie blames him, because he makes a change
in usinir the word fourth, and in so doing, docs not accord with what had Ix en
said before. For the word Jour, inconsequent to one, two, thre ; but to the
Jourth, the first, second, and third are consequent. These, therefore, are the objec
tions of Praxiphanes. The philosopher Porphyry however directly replies to
him, and in answer to his second objection observes, that this is the (ireciun
custom, for the purpose of producing beauty in the diction. Homer 1 therefore:
has said many things of this kind :

Full t)f tho hru.vs tlrsrcndiu^ from above,
Through JIT hull ImU-s lie furious weapon drove,
Till in the feienth it li\ l.

And in a similar manner in many other places. Here also the mutation has a
cause. For to numerate the persons that *ere present, was to point them out.
For to say one, tuo, three, is indicative; but he signifies the person that was
absent (since it was in;poible to point him oul) through tin: fourth. For we use
the term the fourth, of one that is absent. Hut to the former objection Porphyry
replies, that if as many had been present as was requisite, it would have been
superfluous to nun.crate them, but one of them In-ing absent, of whosj name we
are ignorant, the "numeration of those that are present contains a representation
of the one that is wanting, as dei-irin^ that \\hich rema Ms, and as beinu in want
of a part of the whole number. Plato therefore indicating this, represents Socrates
enumerating the persons that were present, and requiring him who was wanting.
For if he had known him, anil had been able to manifest him by nacn , he would
perhaps have said, I see Critias, and Tinui-us, and Hermocrates, but that man I
do not see. Since however, he who was absent was a stranger, and unknown to

1 Iliad, vn. . 47.

HOOK I.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 13

him, he only know through niunlxr that he was wanting, and manifests ta us
that so many were present. All these observations, therefore, are elegant, and
such others of the. like kind as may be devised by some in subserviency to the
theory of the words before us. Hut it is necessary to rememl&gt;er that the dialogue
is Pythagorean, and that it is requisite interpretations should IK; made in a way
adapted to tin philosophers of that sect.

Such ethical Pythagoric dogmas then-fore, as the following, may lx&gt; derived
from the present text : Those men established friendship and a concordant life, as
the scope of all their philosophy. Hence Socrates prior to every thing else
adduces this, by giving Tima-us the appellation of friend. In the second place,
they thought that the compacts which they made with each other, should !&gt;e
stably preserved by them; and for the fulfillment of these, Socrates desires the
presence of the fourth person. In the third place, they embraced communion in
the invention of dogmas, and the writings of one, were common to all of them.
This also Socrates establishes, calling on them to U come both guests and hosts,
those that fill, and those that are filled, those that teach, and those that learn.
Others, therefore, have \\ritten arts concerning disciplines through which they
think they shall improve the manners of those that are instructed by them ; but
Plato delineates the forms of appropriate manners, through the. imitation of the
most excellent men, which have much greater ellicacy than those which are de
posited in mere rules alone. J or imitation disposes the lives of the auditors,
conformably to its own peculiarity. Hence, through these things it is evident
what that is about which the philosopher is especially abundant, that it is about
the hearing of discussions, and what he conceived to l&gt;e a true feast; that it is not
such as the multitude fancy it to be; for this is of an animal and brutal nature;
but that which bamjuets in us the [true] man. Hence too, there is much in Plato
about the feast of discourse. These therefore, and such particulars as these, are
ethical.

But the physical Pythagoric dogmas are as follow : They said that every phy
sical production was held together by numbers, and that all the fabrications of
nature subsisted conformably to numlM-rs. These numliers however art* partici
pated, just as all mundane forms are participate. Very properly, therefore, does
the dialogue at its commencement proceed through numl&gt;ers, and use numbers
as things numbered, and not those very things themselves of which they partici
pate. For the monad, duad, and triad are one thing, and one, two, three,
another. 1 or the former are simple, and each of these subsists itself by itself;

14 PROCLUS ON THE [oo* i.

but the latter participate of the former. Aristotle therefore, is not right in assert
ing, that these men considered nnrnl&gt;ers as subsisting in sensibles. For how
could this 1)0 admitted by those who celebrate number as the father of Cods and
men, and the tetractys, as the fountain of ever-flowing iv.ttnie? But since the dia
logue is physical, it makes its commencement from participated numbers, Mich HN
an- all numlN fN that nre physical, Further Mill, these men vciieniled physical
Communion, both lliat which ii ill gciid allon, uncording to which nil linn, uii&lt;
rendered -ll d&gt;h- and commensurate \\iili each oilier, and that \\lneh is in celchtiul
natures. I or these impart to cacli other their proper powers. Itightly therefore,
and in a way adapted to the thing proposed, does M jcrates think lit, that the same
persons should become both hosts and guests.

From these things also, you may survey such theological conceptions as the
following: These men generated all things through the first numbers, and which
also rank as rulers and leaders; and from three Cods, gave; subsistence to all
mundane natures. Ofthe.se three, the monad, duad and triad, arc indicative; so
that it is requisite to begin from these, and that he who Mincys nature inwardly
should look to these. Farther still, the concaues of natural things were also
contemplated by other philosophers, as by Auaxagoras and /eno ; but the final,
the paradigmatic, and the producing cau.se, were peculiarly investigated by IMato.
These causes then-lore are manifested through the above numbers. The final,
indeed, through the monad; for it presides over numbers in the order of the good.
But the paradigmatic through the duad ; for the dilVeivnee of beings separates the
primary causes of wholes. And besides this, the duad is the principle of the
tetractys of intelligible paradigms. But the producing cause, is signified through
the triad. For intellect is adapted to the triad, since it is the third from being
through life as the medium, or from the father through power, or from the intelli
gible through intelligence. For as the monad is to (lie; duad, so is being to life,
father to power, and the intelligible to intelligence.. But as the duad is to the
triad, so is life, antl also power and intelligence, to intellect. Again, all divine
natures are ; n all, and are united to each other, so that all of them are in one, and
each is in all, and they are connected together through divine friendship. The
sphere also which is there, comprehends the one union of Cods. Hence Socrates
who looks to dmnity, very properly U-giiiH from communion and concord, and
likewise calls the other JMTSOHS of the dialogue to this. Moreover, the words

I or ur ( )oi.i/- here, it i neceuary to rcail rcxr/runy.

BOOK i.] TiMJEUS OF PLATO. 15

feasting and banquet, arc words p.dapted to the Gods, and especially to the mun
dane Gods. For they proceed together with the liberated Gods to the banquet
and delicate food, as Socrates says in the Pha-drus : and the feasting on the nati
vity of Venus, was in conjunction with the great Jupiter. These things therefore,
Socrates thinks should subsist analogously with them, in their mutual participa
tions of divine conceptions. And it is not at all wonderful that Tima-us should
feast others, and be feasted by them. Farther still, communications and partici
pations of powers are celebrated by theologists, divine natures filling and l&gt;eing
filled by each other. For thus we hear from poets inspired by Phoebus, that the
Gods communicate with each other in intellectual or providential energies in the
works which they effect in the universe.

In golden cups ihe Cods each other pledge,

And \vhilc they drink, their eyes arc lix d on Troy.

They also know and intellectually perceive each other.
For Gods arc to each other not unknown.

But the intelligible according to the Chaldaean oracle is nutriment to that which
is intellective. From all which it is evident, that a reciprocation of banqueting
subsists primarily in the Gods. And of men, those that are more wise, imitating
in this respect the Grids, impart to each other in unenvying abundance, their own
proper intellectual conceptions.

"TiM. A certain infirmity has befallen him, Socrates: for he would not
willingly be absent from such an association as the present."

The philosopher Porphyry says, that what is apposite is delineated in these
words : that this is the one cause with wise men of relinquishing such like associa
tions, viz. infirmity of body; and that it is requisite to think that every thing of
this kind depends on circumstances and Is involuntary. Another thing also is
delineated, that friends should make fit apologies for friends, when they appear to
have done any thing rightly, which is contrary to common opinion. The present

1 Iliad iv. 2 ttq.

1(J PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

words therefore, comprehend both those, indicating the manners of Tima-us, and
the necessity of one being absent ; exhibiting the former as mild and friendly to
truth, but the latter, as an impediment to the life of a lover of learning. I5ut the
divine lamblichus speaking loftily on these words, says tint those who are exer
cised in the sur\cy of intelligible*, are nnadapted to the discussion of sensible*;
as also Socrates himself says in the Hepnblie, " that those \\lin are nurtured in
pure splendor, have their eyes darkened when they descend into the cavern,
through the obscurity which is there; just us it likewise happens to those who
ascend from the cavern, through their inability to look directly to the light. *
Through this cause therefore, the fourth person is wanting, as king adapted to
anoth.T nmtemplatii.n, thai of intelligible*. It is Uo necessary that this his
infirmity, should be a transcend, ncy of power, according to which he surpass
the present theory. For as the power of the wicked, is rather imput.-ney than
power, thus also imbecillity with respect to things of a secondary nature, is tran
scendency of power. According to lambliclnis therefore, the person who is
wanting, is absent in consequence of being incommensurate to physical discus
sions; but he would ha\e been willingl) piVM-nt, if il.trlli-il-les were to ],a\e been
considered. And nearly with respect to very thing [in this dialog..,.] prior t&lt;
physiology, one of these, i.e. lorph\r\. interprets e\ery thing in a more political
manner, n-ferrmg what is said to the \iitn,-, but the other, lamblichus, in a more
physical way. For it i&gt; necessary, that cxery thing should accord with the pro
posed scope": but the dialogui- is physical, and not ethical. Such therefore, are
the conclusions of the philosophers about these particulars. For I omit to men
tion those who labour to enncr, that this fourth person wa&gt; Thea-t.-tos, because,
lie was known to those who came out of the Kleatic school, and because we are
informed elsewhere] that he was ill. Hence he is said to ha\e been now absent
on account of illness. For tlnix Aristoclc* infer*., that the absent person was
Theielrtiis, who a little before the .!. ..lh of So. tales, brcume known to Soeiales,
and to the Klean stranger. Hut atbuiltiiig that he had been long before known
to the latter, w hat is (here in common between Tima-us and him? Tin- Platonic
Ptolomy however, thinks that the absent person was Clitophon : for in the dia
logue which bears his name, he is not thought desening of an answer by Socrates.
Hut DCICN Hides is of opinion that it was Plato: for he was absent through illness,

1 Set- llit bi-giiiiiiu^ of tin- 7lh book of the Ilepublic.

1 For \&lt;&gt;truov lu-rt, il ^pjKars lo nit lo be necessary lo rend E\un k ok.

BOOK i.] TIM. TUS OF PLATO. 17

when Socrates died. These, therefore, as I have said, I omit ; since it is well
observed by those prior to us, that these men neither investigate what is worthy of
investigation, nor assert any thing that can be depended on. All of them, like
wise, attempt a thing which is of a slippery nature, and which is nothing to the
purpose, even if we should discover that which is the object of their search. For
to say that it was either Theactetus or Plato, on account of illness, does not
accord with the times. For of these, the former is said to have been ill when
Socrates was judged, but the latter when Socrates was dead. I3ut to say it was
Clitophon is perfectly absurd. For he was not present on the preceding day,
when Socrates narrates what Clitophon said the day before, during the conference
in the Piraeus ; except that thus much is rightly signified by Atticus, that the
absent person appears to have been one of those strangers [or guests] that were
with Timceus. Hence Socrates asks Timaeus where that fourth person was ; and
Timacus apologizes for him, as a friend, and shows that his absence was neces
sary, and contrary to his will. And thus much for what is said by the more
ancient interpreters.

What, however, our preceptor [Syrianus] has decided on this subject, must be
narrated by us, since it is remarkably conformable to the mind of Plato. He says,
therefore, that in proportion as the auditions are about things of a more venerable
and elevated nature, in such proportion the multitude of hearers is diminished.
But the discussion in the Tima-us becomes, as it proceeds, more mystic and
arcane. Hence in the former discussion of a polity during the conference in the
Pirn-US, thi hearers were many, nnd those who had names were nix. But in
tin 1 MTond ronl t ivnrr, which in narrated by Socrates, those who receive the nar
ration iii i 1 four in mimlx r. And in the present conference, (he (mirth person IH
wanting; but tin: auditors are three. And by how much the discussion is more
pure, and more intellectual, by so much the more is the number of auditors con
tracted. For every where that which is discussed is a monad. But at one time,
it is accompanied with contention ; on which account also, the auditors have the
indefinite, and the definite is extended into multitude, in which /he odd is com
plicated with the even. At another time, however, the discussion is narrative,
yet is not liberated from opposition, and dialectic contests. Hence also, the
auditors are four in numl&gt;er ; the tetrad through its tetragonic nature, and alliance
to the monad, possessing similitude and sameness ; but through the nature of the
even, possessing difference and multitude. And at another time the discussion

1 It U necessary to supply in this place, I be words orow &.

Tun. Plat. VOL. I. C

18 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

is exempt from all agonistic doctrine, the theory being unfolded enunciatively,
and narratively. Hence, the triad is adapted to the recipients of it, since this
number is in every respect connascent with the monad, is the first odd number,
and is perfect. For as of the virtues, some of them subsist in souls the parts of
which are in a state of hostility to each other, am! measure the hostility of these
parts ; but others separate indeed from this hostility, yet are not perfectly liberated
from it; and others are entirely separated from it; thus also of discussions,
some indeed are agonistic, others are enunciative, and others are in a certain
respect media between both. Some-, indeed, being adapted to intellectual tran
quillity, and to the intellectual energy of the soul ; but others to doxastic ener
gies ; anil others to the lives that subsist between these. Moreover, of auditors
likewise, some are commensurate to more elevated auditions, but others to such
as are of a more groveling nature. And the auditors indeed of grander subjects,
are also capable of attending to such as are subordinate; but those who are
naturally adapted to subjects of less importance, are unable to understand such
as are more venerable. Thus also with respect to the \irtues, he who has the
greater possesses likewise the less; but he \\ho is adorned with the inferior, is
not entirely a partaker also of the more perfect virtues.

Why, therefore, is it any longer wonderful, if an auditor of discussions about a
polity, should not be admitted to hear the discussion about the universe? Or
rather, is it not necessary that in more profound disquisitions, the auditors should
IK. fewer in number? Is it not likewise Pythagoric, to define different measures
of auditions? For of those who came to the homacoion [or common auditory of
the Pythagoreans] some were partakers of more profound, but others of more
superficial dogmas. Does not this also accord with Plato, who assigns infirmity
as the cause of the absence of this fourth person ? For the imbecility of the soul
witli resjH ct to more divine conceptions, separates us from more elevated con
ferences, in which case the involuntary also takes place. For every thing which
iM iietits us in a less degree, is not conformable to our will. But the falling off
from more perfect good is involuntary; or rather it is itself not voluntary. But
the falling off \\hich not only separates us from greater goods, but leads us to the
infinity of vice, is involuntary. Hence also Tima-us says, that this fourth person
was absent not willingly from this conference. For he was not ;.bsent in such a
way as to be perfectly abhorrent from the theory, but as unable to be initiated in
greater speculations. It is possible, therefore, for an auditor of disquisitions
about the fabrication of the world, to be also an auditor of discussions about a

BOOK i.] TIMJEL S OF PLATO. 19

polity. But it is among the nnml&gt;er of things impossible, that one \vho is adapted
to receive political discourses, should through transcendency of power, omit to be
present at auditions about the universe. This fourth person, therefore, was
absent tin ough indigence, and not as some say, through transcendency of power.
And it must be said, that the imbecility was not the incommensuration of the
others to him, but the inferiority of him to the others. For let there be an imbe
cility both of those that descend from the intelligible, and of those that ascend
from the speculation of sensible^, such as Socrates relates in the Republic; yet
he \\ho becomes an auditor of political discussions, cannot through a tran
scendency unknown to those that are present, be absent from the theory of
pin sics. It likewise appears to me, that the words " has befallen him," sufficiently
represent to us the difference between him and those that were present, with
respect to discussions, and not with respect to transcendency. His being anony
mous also, seems to signify, not his being exempt from and circumscrilwd by
those that were present, hut the indefiniteness and inferiority of his habit. Plato,
therefore, is accustomed to do this in many places. Thus in the Pha-do, he do&gt;s
not think him deserving of a name, who in that dialogue answered badly. He
also mentions indefinitely, the father of Critobulus, who was absent from the
discussion of the subjects that were then considered ; and likewise very many
others. An auditor therefore of this kind would in vain 1 have been present at
these discussions ; since of those that were present, Critias indeed himself says
something; but Hermocrates is silently present, di tiering only from him who is
absent in a greater aptitude to hear, hut being inferior to all the rest, through his
inability to speak.

" Soc. It is your business, therefore, O Timacus, ond that of the com
pany present, to fill up the part of this absent person."

This also accords with what we have said. For in natures which are more
causal and divine, quantity is always contracted, and multitude diminished, but
power transcends. And this also is a dogma of the Pythagoreans, with whom
the triad is more venerable than the tetrad, the tetrad than the decad, and all the
numbers within, than those posterior to the decad. And in short, that which is

1 For apirrwi here, it it neccswry to read aopivrwt.

* Initead of o Jr| roiovroi arprnirqi, ow ptiTijv or *a/xyrcr roil Xoyoii, it appear* to me to be D*C*-
ry to read 9 rmovrot arpoari}i ovr, ^ar ijr r. X.

20 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

nearer to the principle, has a more primordial nature. But that which is more
primordial is more powerful ; since all power is antecedently comprehended in
the principle, and from the principle is imparted to other things. If, therefore,
the principle of things was multitude, it would !x&gt; requisite that what is more
multitudinous, should he more primordial and powerful than what is less so.
Since, however, the principle is a monad, that which is more monadic, is more
excellent and more powerful than tilings which are more separated from tlieir
cause. Hence .Socrates very properly makes a diminution of number to be a
symbol of superior perfection, which antecedently comprehends according to
power all secondary natures, and tills up their deficiency. But since, as we
have before observed, Socrates is the summit of this triad of auditors, and he
conjoins himself to the monad that disposes the conference, conformably to the
image of demiurgic Cods, it is worth uhile to observe, how he exempts Timii us
from the rest, and how he is extended to him, as to the dispensator of the whole
discussion. lie conjoins, howe\er, the other auditors to himself, as l&gt;eing inferior
to him in desert. For these things may be referred to divine causes, in which the
first of the [demiurgic] triad is united to the primary monad, and extends the
other parts of the triad to it. It also calls forth, indeed, the productive energy of
the monad, but excites the energies of the rest to fabrication. These things,
therefore, are conformable to what has l&gt;eeii l&gt;efore said. But according to Por
phyry, the ethical doctrine contained in these words is this, that friends ought to
endure all things for each other, both in words and deeds, and to supply their
wants, and cans them to be unindigent, by tilling up their deficiency. For
these are the peculiarities of pure and genuine friendship. lamblichus, however,
having supposed that the anonymous person was superior to those that were
present, and was a lover of the contemplation of intelligible?, says, that Socrates
indicates by these words, that though generated fall short of the nature of truly-
existing beings, yet a certain similitude is divulsed from these beings. And
conformably to this, the theory which is conversant with nature, participates in a
certain respect of the science of intelligible*, and this the filling up the part of the
absent person manifests.

"TiM. Entirely so, Socrates. And we shall endeavour to the utmost
of our ability, to leave nothing l&gt;elonging to such an employment

1 For ro t-wK here, it is necessary to read

BOOK i.] TIM^EL S OF PLATO. 21

unaccomplished. For it would not be just, that we, who were yesterday
entertained by you, in such a manner as guests ought to be received,
should not return the hospitality with readiness and delight."

Flic manners of Thrums are indicated by these words ; for they are shown
to be superb and modest, elevated and elegant, friendly and philanthropic.
For the words " Entirely so" indicate his promptitude respecting the absent
person, and the perfection of the science according to which he is readily dis
posed to fill up what is wanting in others; and they also indicate his genuine
sincerity. But the words, " We shall endeavour to the utmost of our ability, to leave
nothing belonging to tuc/i an employment unaccomplished" sufficiently present to our
view, his firmness in the fulfilment of his promises, and his modesty in speaking
of himself. Such, therefore, are the ethical indications that may be surveyed in
these words. But the physical indications are these, that the remuneration of
discussion, conveys an imago of the communion and compensation of powers,
through winch all tilings are co-ordinated, and contribute to the one harmony of
the universe. Likewise, that the energies of nature are changed according to
time, different energies operating at different times on different subjects. For to
these indications the words, "return the hospitality to you, by whom tec were yesterday
entertained in such a manner as guests ought to be received" are similar. That which
is theologically indicated is this, that the demiurgic cause proceeds through, and
fills all things, and cuts off every deficiency through his own power, and his pro
lific abundance, according to which he leaves nothing destitute of himself. For
he is characterised by the super-plenary, the sufficient, and the all-perfect. More
over, the expression, return the hospitality, is derived from the banqueting in
divine fables, according to which the (Jods pledge each other:
In golden goblets they each other pledge. Iliad IV. T. 2.

being filled with nectar from the mighty Jupiter. Nor is it simply said, to feast,
but to return the hospitality (or to feast in return}. For a reciprocation of feasting, 1
comprehends the entire, and completely perfect plenitude of banqueting. But
this also is seen in wholes. For the visible orders of things call forth invisible
powers, through their own consummate aptitude; and the latter through tran
scendency of goodness perfect the former. All these likewise, are conjoined with
each other, and the communication of perfection, becomes the retribution of

For a^&lt;?rtaru hre, it U ncetry to read araf n-ia&lt;m.

42 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

calling forth. Farther still, to do all these things, accompanied with justice,
conveyB an image of the Justice which arranges all things in conjunction with
Jupiter. But the becoming [or in such a manner as guests ought to be received] is
an image of the cause which illuminates wholes with demiurgic beauty. And the
term guests, is an image of the variety which is defined according to divine pecu
liarities. For each of the divine natures possesses appropriate powers and
energies. As therefor* Socrates feasted Timanjs with the discourses of his own
philosophy, thus also each of the Gods, energizing conformably to his proper
powers, contributes to the one and transcendent providential attention of the
Demiurgus to the whole of things. And these particulars are vxhibited as an
exercise to the theory of things, which presents itself to the view 1 after tin-
manner of an image, in the introduction to the dialogue.

From these things likewise, the times of the dialogues, the Republic, and the
Tima-us, are manifest ; since the one is supposed to have taken place during the
Bendidian festival in the Pira-us, but the other on the following day of the fes
tival. For that the Bendidian festival was celebrated in the Pira-us on the lUh
of April, is acknowledged by those who have written concerning festivals, so that
the Timutus must be supposed to have taken place on the 2()tl; of the same month.
But if, as will be observed in what follows, this dialogue is supposed to have
taken place during the Panathena-an festival, it is evident that this was the les*
Panathena-a. For the greater were celebrated on the 2Wh of June, according to
the narration of those whom we have jiM mentioned.

" Soc. Do you remember, therefore, the magnitude and quality of the
tilings which I proposed to you to explain r"

In the first place, it is requisite to attend to the order of the heads of what is
*aid, of which, that concerning the multitude ot those that form the conference,
is the leader. The next to this pertains to the filling up the part of him who is
absent. And the third is that which is now added, and respects the explication
of the thin-s proposed to be discussed. But these are in continuity with each
other. And with reference to tin: order, it is requisite to understand the accuracy
of the words. For the words " Do yuu remcmhcr" exhibit distributed knowledge
in the participations of discourse. For in the Demiurgus the recollection of all

For t/joaifo^n a in tin* place, I read ^oaio/iOn.

HOOK i.] TIM.El S OF PLATO.

things is a separate, exempt, and uniform knowledge, according to the Mnemo
syne which he contains, and which is the firm establishment of divine intelligence.
And this in the secondary Gods, is a subordinate intellection ; of both which the
present persons are images. Through this memory likewise, which pre-exists
in the universe, whole souls are established in intelligibles, and the demiurgic rea
sons, [or productive principles] possess an immutable and an immoveable nature;
so that such beings as are deprived of it, as is the case \\ith partial souls, and
the natures of things that are generated, fall ofl from their proper causes. But the
terms " such thiti^s, 1 and " about \chich" are indicative of the quantity and quality
of the productive principles, which proceed indeed from the total fabrication, and
also proceed from more partial Gods. And with respect to the words " aVmVi /
proposed to you to explain" if they were addressed to Critias arid Hermocrates, it
is evident how they are to be referred to things, and to the principles of the fabri
cation of the world ; but if also to Timnrus, they are not a symbol of transcen
dency [in Socrates], but of an evocation of the intellectual conceptions of Timaeus.
Besides these things, however, let us survey the answer of Timsus.

" TIM. Some things indeed, I recollect ; but such as I have forgotten,
do you recall ir.to my memory."

That which is ethical in these words, you will find to l&gt;e this, as Porphyry say?,
tint they are a medium between irony and arrogance. For Timscns does not
say that he recollects every thing, nor that he recollects nothing ; but that he
recollects Rome things, and not others. That which is logical in them is, that
they afford a pretext for the summary repetition of the problems: for to do this is
the province of dialectic. The physical indication of the words is this, that phy
sical productive principles always remain, and are always refluxive, just as the
present remembrance [of Tiimrus] is partly preserved, and partly lost. For what
is said by the man must be transferred to the whole of nature. And the theologi
cal indication is, that the one fabrication [which is that of the Demiurgus] pos
sesses indeed from itself, the immutable and nndefiled in its generations ; but
through secondary and third powers, is sustained as it proceeds, and is in itself
separate ; these powers attending it as guards, and running as it were before it
repress the tumult of generated natures. Or rather, that this fabrication is such,

For pin here, it is necessary to read 0*0.

24 PROCLUS ON THE [BOO* i.

through placing secondary powers o?er the subjects of its government. Farther
still, the recalling into the memory, brings with it an image of the renovation of the
productive principles in the universe. For that which is eflluxive in them, is cir
cularly recalled to the same, and the similar. And the order of generation re
mains never-failing, through the circular motion of the heavens. Uut this motion
subsists always after the same manner through intellect which connectedly con
tains and adorns all its circulation, by intellectual powers. It is very properly,
therefore, Socrates that recalls into the memory the discussions, who is the nar
rator of the polity, of which the celestial is the paradigm.

" Or rather, if it be not too much trouble, run over the whole in a
cursory manner from the beginning, that it may be more firmly establish
ed in our memory."

The polity [of Socrates] being triple, the first description of it was truly diffi
cult on account of sophistical contests ; the second was easier than that which
preceded it; but the third was [j&gt;erfectly] easy ; containing in itself contractedly
every species of a polity. The recapitulation however of it pertains to physical
things, through the regeneration which is in them, and the circular return to the
same form ; from which also, forms permanently remain in the world, revolution
recalling their efllux and their destruction. Through this cause likewise, the hea
vens are perpetually moved, and evolving many periods, return to the same life.
What, howe\er, is the reason that in the [first] narration of a polity, Socrates nei
ther makes mention of the persons, nor the promises, but here adds both these?
It is l&gt;ecause in wholes, paradigms indeed comprehend all the productive princi
ples of images, but the things which proceed from them, have not strength Mifli-
cient to comprehend all the power of their causes. AH, therefore, in the second
description of a polity, mention is made of the persons that were in the first con
ference in the Pir.eus, thus also in the third, he commemorates those that were
passed over in silence in the first. For effects may be surveyed more perfectly in
their more superior causes. You may also say theologically, that Tirna-us, as
being established analogous to the total fabrication, comprehends all the persons,
the promises, and the discussions themselves. But Socrates in the Republic,
being arranged analogous to the summit of the triple fabrication, fashions only

1 For oirXorfjrt here, it i necessary to rend cuporirn.

l TIM/EL S OF PLATO, &gt;&gt;: t

the form of a polity, tliis form being celestial. Here, therefore, as in on* 1 all-per-
fert animal, all things an; comprehended, \\/.. tilings first, middle, and last, ami
nil the evolution of wholes. Hut how, and through what cause is a polity nar
rated the third time? I* it because the life also of the soul is triple? The first
indeed, being that which represses and adorns the irrational part hy justice,
and governs it in a Incoming manner, lint the second being that which is con
verted to itself, and desires to perceive itself intellectually, in consequence of
subsisting according to its own justice. And the third ascending to its causes,
and establishing in them its proper energies. To which may l&gt;e added, thai " to
s|&gt;eak "in a curfory manner," brings with it an image of a life conspiring to one
intellect, which comprehends all things through an intelligible essence. The
words also " run over the whole" afford an admirable indication of an elevation to
the highest end, of perfection, and if you are willing so to sjM-ak, of a more
eternal intelligence. For this signifies to be more established, and to possess
that which is more firm and more eternal about the same things.

" Soc. Let it be so. And to begin : the sum of what was said by me
yesterday is this, \Vhut kind of polity appeared to me to be the best, and
of what sort of men such a polity ought to consist."

Some, considering the resumption of a polity in a more ethical point of view,
say that it indicates to us, that those who apply themselves to the, theory of wholes,
ought to be adorned in their manners, lint others think that it is placed liefore
us as an image of the orderly distribution of the universe. And others, as an indi
cation 1 of the whole of theology. For it \c&lt;tx usual rril/i the riflliagorcan.f, prior to
scientific Joclrine, to rentier manifest the jirojto.sed ohjccts &lt;&gt;/ enquiry, through xiniilt-
twits and images ; anil qflcr this, to introduce through symbols the arcane indication
respecting them. For thus, after the excitation of the intellection of the soul, and
the purification of its eye, it is requisite to introduce the whole science of the
things which are the subjects of discussion. Here, therefore, the concise narra-

1 For ai T*II ^i^r)t, it i requisite to roaJ rai rt| vivxi -

* For TOV XoynK hero, we must read TOV a\eyor.

* In tl&gt;c original 01 fr at,in\,aiv wi titnvn rrjt rou Tfu-roi ^lakoaft.^tut TpfliyiffBai riji n^tramn fc/&gt;V&gt;-
y.ai. Hut tliK, in the latter part, is evidently drfcelirr. After irf&gt;o^(Ta tlierefore, it ap^ar* lo mr
to l&gt;c nettswry to add the words, &lt;H ic w trltit.tr, agrwably to the above translation.

Tim. Plat. VOL. i. ]&gt;

2&lt;&gt; PKOCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

tion of a polity, prior to physiology, ironically places us in the fabrication of the
universe; hut (lie history of the Atlantic s accomplishes this symbolically. For it
is usual with fables to indicate many things through symbols. No that the phy
siologic character pervades through the whole of the dialogue; hut differently in
different places, according to the diticrcnt modes of tin; doctrine which is deli
vered. And thus much coneerning the scojx&gt; of the proposed words.

That in the present discussion, however, the summary repetition of a polity
very properly takes place, may be multifariously inferred. For the political sci
ence subsists primarily in the Demiurgus of the universe, as we may learn in tin-
Protagoras. And true virtue shines forth in this sensible world. Hence also Ti-
iiia-iis sa\s, that the world is known and is friendly to itself through \irtue. Far
ther still, the polity of Socrates beinj; triple, and the first being referred to the total
fabrication, as we have elsewhere shown, the form of this is very properly deli
vered here contructedly, where it is proposed to survey the whole Demiurgus, gene
rating and adorning the. universe. These things, therefore, are eapable of being
still farther discussed. Ix-t us however return to the text, and the words of So-
crates. Hut in these, there is much contention among the interpreters, who op
pose each other about a certain punctuation, and w ith reference; to this differently
explain the scope of the discussion. For some, making a stop at the word polity,
define the scope of it to be conformable to the inscription, and adduce Plato as
a witness that it is concerning a polity. Other s again, making a stop at the words
v/u/t was suit/, evince that the scope of it is about justice ; and that Socrates has
gi\en a certain summary of what was said about justice, which is concerning a
polity. If, however, it is requisite not to trifle in asserting and contradicting, it
must he said that both concur with each other. For the discourse concerning
justice, is a disquisition of the polity which is within the soul. For it rightly dis
poses the communion of the powers that we contain. The discourse, likewise,
about a polity, is a discussion of the justice which subsists in multitude. IJotb,
therefore, jx-rtain to the same thing. And the same thing is indeed justice in the
foul, a polity in a city, and gracefulness in the world. Nor is it fit to separate; from
each other, things which are conjoined by nature. And thus much for this par
ticular.

1 By au unaccountable mistake llic original has lwpar&gt;i&gt;- iiutedd of toa^o* in this (dace, which l;il-
Irr 11 &lt; vulrnlU the l.ur tta luiL -

BOOK i.j TIME S OF PLATO. 27

Longinus however and Origen contend with each other from another principle,
about wliat kind of jiolity Socrates speaks, in these words ; whether aliout the first,
or the middle polity. For in the latter, the polity is seen living physically, politi
cally, and intellectually. Longinus therefore thinks, that what is hero said per
tains to the middle polity, because Socrates calls the assistants guardians, and
says that the guardians are warriors. But Origen is of opinion that what is said
respects the first polity. For in this Socrates delivers disciplines to the guar
dians. We however say in answer to snch-like assertions, that it is not proper to
divulse the one polity ; nor to separate tin. 1 continuity of life from itself. For the
polity is one, perfecting itsrlf, and co-augmenting itself by more perfect additions.
But the whole polity possesses the physical in the mercenaries, the warlike in the
auxiliaries, and the intellectual in the guardians. So that the discussion is about
the whole polity. And it is not proper to contend about these tilings, but rather
to consider this, how the polity may very properly be said to be both subordinate
to, and superior to physiology. 1 For so far as it has for its matter human con
cerns, and is desirous of adorning these, it has an order secondary to, and more
partial than physiology. But so far as it subsists in universal reasonings, and is
arranged incorporeally, and immaterially, it is superior to, and more total than
physiology. The world also is a certain polity, and a partial polity [with reference
to the intelligible world], because every body is partial. In short, the polity pre
exists indeed in the intelligible, but esisls in the heavens, and subsists in the last
place in human lives. So that if it is superior to physical fabrication, it was very
properly discussed prior to the Titmcus; but if it is inferior to it, because it is an
ethical world, but the other is mundane and all-perfect, we arc very properly re
quired to recur from things subordinate to such as are of a more venerable nature.
And both are true, through the above-mentioned causes. Since, however, as we
hive said, the form of the polity is universal, and is impressed in a partial matter,
hence also Socrates employs the words what kind for the sake of the form, but the
words of what sort of men on account of the matter.

"TiM. And what was said, Socrates, was in the opinion of all of us very
conformable to intellect."

A narration conformable to intellect, but neither conformable to pleasure, nor
Here also the original has erroneously OeoXoyiai inttcad of &lt;f&gt;v&lt;no\vytai.

gll 1MIOCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

the decision of the vulgar, indicates the admirable j&gt;erfection und intellectual na
ture of the discussion [contained in it]. And prior to this, it obscurely signifies
the concordant congress of all secondary causes about one intellect, and one
united fabrication. The word ffj/ too, which is added, unfolds the transcendent
union, through which all demiurgic causes converge as to one centre, and one
paternal cause of all things.

" Soc. Did we not then, in the first place, separate husbandmen and
other artificers from the belligerent genus?

The discourse about a polity, and the conglomerated and concise repetition, in
a summary way, of the genera contained in it, contributes to the whole narration
of the mundane fabrication. For it is possible from these as images to recur to
wholes. This very thing also was in a remarkable decree adopted by the ]*\tha-
goreans, who investigated the similitudes of Ix-ings from analogies, and betook
themselves from images to paradigms ; which likewise is now in a prefatory man
ner effected by Plato, who points out to us, and gives us to survey in human lives
those things which take place in (lie universe. For tin* polities of worthy men
are assimilated to the celestial order. It is neces.sary, therefore, that we also should
refer the. images which arc now mentioned [to their paradigms], and in the first
place, what is said about the division of the genera. For this section of genera,
imitates the demiurgic division in the world, according to which incorporeal na
tures are not able to pass into the nature of bodies, nor mortal bodies to leave their
own essence, and migrate i:ito an incorporeal hvpostasis. .According to which,
also, mortal natures remain mortal ; iiiniiort.il natures eternally continue to be
never-failing ; and the di. li rent orders of them have paradigmatic causes pre-sub-
sisting in wholes. For if yon are willing to arrange tin? whole city analogous to
the whole world ; since it must not be said that man is a microcosm, and a city
not; and to divide it into two parts, the upper city and the lower, and to assimilate
the former to the heavens, and the latter to generation, you will find that the ana
logy is perfectly appropriate. Likewise, according to a division of it into three
parts, you may assume in the city, the mercenary, the military, and the guardian :
but in the soul, the epithxmetic part, which procures the necessities of the body;
the irascible part, whose ollice is to CX|M-| vv hatever is injurious to the animal, and
is also ministrant to our ruling power; and the rational part, which is essentially
philosophic and has a regal authority over the whole of our life. In every nmlti-

HOOK i ] TIM, ITS or IM.ATO. 2f&gt;

tilde of souls, howe\er, there are, that w hich performs the p;irl of a mercenary
about generation, that \\l.,h is ininistranl i the mundane providence of the
(io&lt;]s, anrl that which is elrvated to I In- intelligible, lint in all mundane natures,
there are, in short, the trilw of mortals, the tribe of da-mons, and the. order of
the relestial (iods ; for they are truly the guardians and saviours of the whole of
things. Ami airain, daemons precede as in a solemn procession the fabrication
of the celestial Gods, and suppress nil the confusion and disorder in the world.
There is likewise a certain physical providence of mortal natures, which gene
rates and comprehends them conformably to a divine intellect.

Farther still, according to another division, the agricultural tribe of the city i
analogous to the .Moon, which comprehends the sacred laws of nature, the cause
of generation. But the ins|&gt;ective guardian of the common marriages, is analo
gous to \ enus, who is the cause of all harmony, and of the union of the male
with the female, and of form with matter. That which providentially attends to
&lt; levant allotments, is analogous to Hermes, on account of the lots of which the
God is the guardian, and also on account of the fraud which they contain, lint
that which is disciplinative and judicial in the city, is analogous to the Sun, with
whom, according to theolo^ists, the mundane Dice, the clcmtor and the si i tn-foltl
reside. And that which is l&gt;clligercnt, is analogous to the order proceeding from
.Mars, which governs all the contrarieties of the world, and the dhersity of the.
universe. That which is royal, is analogous to Jupiter, who is the supplier of
ruling prudence, and of the practical and adorning intellect. But that which is
philosophic, is analogous to Saturn, so far as he is an intellectual God, and
ascends as far as to the first cause. These tilings, therefore, may thus l&gt;c
assumed through analogies. Plato, however, appears to have divided the city
into two parts, and to have established a.s one genus, that which is agricultural
and that which pertains to the arts, which is called demiurgic ; but that which is
belligerent, as another ; not that he now recapitulates the military polity, as
Ixmginus says, but Ix-cause through the word belligerent, he comprehends the
auxiliaries and the guardians. For of these, the. former war with their hands, but
the latter by their counsels. Just as also among the Greeks, Ajax indeed lights,
as being the barrier of the Greeks, and Nestor likewise fights, who is the guardian
of the Greeks ; the latter as a defender, repelling the enemy by his counsels ; but
the former, by employing his hands. Unless it should be said, that Plato now

For TO fai/ior 6vXof in this place, it is neceary to read TO latftotw &lt;f,v\ov.

* For ycwpyurjj, which occur* here by a strange mistake, it it obviously ncccssiry to read

30 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

peculiarly makes mention of the military tribe, l&gt;ecause lie wishes to narrate the
\\urlike actions of a polity of this kind.

" Soc. And when we liac! assigned to every one that which is accom
modated to his nature, and had prescribed one employment only to each
of the arts, 1 we likewise assigned to the military tribe one province only."

In the first place, there is a two-fold reading of these words. For it either is
" And when we had prescril&gt;ed one employment conformable to nature to each
of the citizens, in order that each might perform his proper work," or, " \Yhen we
had preseriltf d to each to pursue an employment conformable to nature, \vhich is
adapted to each according to the present aptitude of his nature." In the next
place, it must be enquired through what eaiiM- Socrates makes such a division, or
on what account he says, " that each employment is rightly pursued by Jinn vho is
naturally adapted to it, and vho in a becoming manner engages in it? For neither
is diligent attention, when deprived of aptitude, able to accomplish with rectitude
any tiling perfect, nor can dexterity without diligent attention proceed into
energy. The end, therefore, is from both. If, however, this In- the case, it is not
poihlc for him who engages in many works, to IM- similarly adapted to all of
them, or to pay attention similarly to all; in consequence of his ardor In-ing
divided about a multitude of things. Hence in this case, the pursuits of the
citi/ens must necessarily appear to be of a viler nature. But if this is not right,
one employment should be assigned to each of the citizens, to which he to whom
it is distributed is adapted, and he .should be ordered to extend all his care and
attention to one tiling. For lie who is properly adapted to this particular life,
and pursues it in a becoming manner conformably to nature, will, it is likelv,
perform in the best way his proper work. In human polities, therefore, it is easy
to survey a division of this kind ; for our nature is partible. Hut how is this true
with respect to the (Jods ? For a divine nature is all-powerful and all-perfect.
Or may we not say that with the Cods all tilings are in all of them, but that each
is all things according to the peculiarity of himself, and possesses the cause of
nil things, one after a Solar, but another after a Mercurial manner ? For pecu
liarity originating from the divine unities, proceeds through intellectual essences,
through divine souls, and through the bodies of these i-ouls. Hence of these,

The words fiutrrij Tf* are omitted in the Icxt of Proclus.

BOOK i.] TIM/El S OF PLATO. 31

some participate of demiurgic, others of prolific, others of connective, and others
of a dividing power. And after this manner they energi/e al&gt;out generation. In
divine natures themselves therefore peculiarity pre-exists, defining the unities
according to the infinity which is there, ami the di\ine. duad. Hut in intellects,
difference is pre-cxistent, which separates wholes and parts, and distributes
intellectual povtcrs, impacting a di Heron t peculiar order to a diili-rent intellect,
through vthich the purity of intellects is- not confounded. In souls progression
ami division pre-suhsist, according to a different life in different soul&lt;, some of
them being allotted a di\ine, others an angelic, others a da-moniacal, and others
a different hyparxis. Hut in bodies, interval pre-exists, producing different powers
in different bodies. For in these, there are ultimate representations of intelligi-
bles, according to which this particular body is effective of this thing, but another
of that. And this body has a sympathy with this thing, hut another sympathizes
with something else. A*, therefore, in this universe, each thing acts according
to nature upon that which it was arranged by the fabrication of things to act
upon ; thus also in the city, the employments of the citi/ens are divided, and each
is arranged to perform that for which he is naturally adapted. What, therefore,
the works are of the military tribe, Tinurus clearly shows in what follows :

" I mean that they ought to he only guardians of the city, sous to pro
tect it from the hostile incursions both of external and internal enemies ;
but yet in such a manner as to administer justice mildly to the subjects
of their government, as being naturally friends, and to behave with war
like fierceness towards their enemies in battle."

In these words Plato is willing that the guardians and auxiliaries should be
judges of those that act ill within the city, but contenders against those that are
out of it; in one way the auxiliaries, and in another the guardians, as we have
before observed. To be only guardians, however, is not a diminution of power.
For when we assert of the first cause that he is one alone, we do not by this
diminish him, and entirely enclose him within narrow bounds ; since neither is
that which is only the most excellent, diminished by In-iug so. Hut on the con
trary, every addition to a thing of this kind is a diminution ; so that by asserting
not only of a thing which was such from the beginning, yon diminish its excellence.
And thus much for such-like particulars.

Again, however, it is requisite to consider how wy may survey what is now

3 .&gt; PKOCLUS ON TH1. [HOOK i.

said in wholes. For what is that which is external in the universe ? Awl how
can it !* said that the universe does not comprehend all things? May we not
reply, that evil has a two-fold subsistence in the world, vi/. in souls and in
1 todies? And it is necessary that those who exterminate confusion and disorder
from the universe, should extend justice and measure to souls, hut should \v
antagonists to the unstable nature of matter. For some souls, indeed, are
naturally adapted to the intelligible, on which account, also, they may he said to
he infernal, and to belong to the extent of the intelligible universe; hut others,
!&gt;eing material and remote from the (iotl&lt;, are in a certain resjn-et aliens,
strangers, and external. Hence, those who are the accomplishes of justice,
use the former mildly, as l&gt;eing naturally friends ; hut are severe to those that are
home along in hodies in a confuted and disorderly manner, as twing incommen-
surate towards them, and as entirely abolishing their privation of order, and
amputating the ine.vhaustilile avidity of matter. For some things, indeed, cannot
sustain ornament of this kind, hut immediately vanish into non-entity. But
others which art 1 moved confusedly and disorderly, are repressed by the justice
which prevails in the universe, and by the invincible 1 strength of the order of
guardian powers. Hence he now says, that they are si-rer? to tho.se \\lio are
hostile to the city. For they are such as cannot endure to behold them. In
short, there are elevating and cathartic powers about souls, and also inspective
guardians of judgment and justice. And it is evident, that some ofthe.se are
analogous to guardians, but others to auxiliaries. About bodies, too, some are
connective, but others dissolving powers : and it is manifest that some of these
are analogous to guardians, but others to those that are Ix-lligerent. For these
pouers expand into the universe, things \\hich are no longer able to remain in
their proper series, in order that, all things may have an arrangement, and that
nothing may l-e indefinite or confused. If, likewise, you direct your attention to
the Demiurgus himself of wholes,. and to the immutable and invariable nature of
the intellects, which divine poetry calls the guards of Jupiter, you will also have
in the father [of the universe.] the pre-existent cause of these two-fold genera.
For through the demiurgic, being which he contains, he adorns all things ; but
through the immutable guard which is established in himself, every eternal order
remains, all disorder being entirely abolished. You may also see there Justice
governing all things in conjunction with Jupiter. For Justice follows him, being

1 For utTa-fVuoTt u licie, it is necessary lo read ava*Tay*vKno.

i.] TIM.F.US OF PLATO. 33

the avenger of the divine law. At the same time too, you may perceive the
armed order with which lie arranges the universe, as those assert who have
written the wars of the Titans and Giants. These things, however, we shall
hereafter discuss.

The vtords, however, external and infernal, may be understood as follows:
The confused and disordered (lux of bodies, at onetime arises from the impo
tence of the reasons, [fir productive principles participated by bodies,] and at
another, from the inexhaustible avidity of matter. Reasons, however, are fami
liar and allied to producing causes ; but matter, through the indefiniteness of itself,
and the remoteness of its diminution, is a stranger to its adorning causes. Hence,
th" imincible strength of the God-, and the immutable guard of fabrication,
ail-variously subverting its confusion, renovates the reasons of matter, and reme
dies their imbecility; but vanquishes the avarice of matter. Not that matter
resists the Gods who produced it, but that because on account of its indctinitencss
it Hies from ornament, it is vanquished by fortns through the demiurgic guard,
against which nothing is able to prevail. Hut it is necessary that all things in
the world should be ol&gt;ediciit to it, in order that they may |&gt;erpetually remain,
and that the Demiurgus may be the father of eternal natures.

" Soc. Tor we asserted, I think, that the souls of the guardians should
be of such a nature, as at the same time to be both irascible and philoso
phic in a remarkable decree ; so that they might be mild to their friends,
and severe to their enemies."

The philosophic and the irascible comprehend both the genera, viz. the
auxiliary, and that vhich is peculiarly called the guardian genus, just as the
epithymetic accord* with the third genus, which is called the mercenary. For
l&gt;ecause Socrates distinguishes the upper from the lower city, he manifests by
these two-fold names the differences of the orders contained in the city ; just as
if some one having divided the world into heaven and generation, should say
that in the former there are demoniacal and divine orders, and should call both
of them the guardians of generation and the universe. For the universe is
guarded by the Gods, and it is also guarded by daemons. By the former indeed
totally, unically, and exemptly ; but by the latter partially, multitudinously, and
in a manner more proximate to the natures that are guarded by them. For about
t-very God a multitude of daemons i.s arranged, which divides his one and total
Tim. Plat. VOL. I. E

34 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

providence. The term philosophic, then-fore, pertains to the Gods, so far as they
are united to the intelligible, and so far as they are filled with being. But the
irascible pertains to da-rnons, so far as they exterminate all confusion from the
universe, and so far as they are the saviours of the divine laws, and of the sacred
institutions of Ad rastia. Through these causes, however, they are mild to their
familiars, aptly applying a remedy to their imbecility, as being allied to them by
nature, but severe to those that are external [i. c. to those that are strangers to
them_] as abolishing the indetinitenes* of their nature, in an exempt manner, and
according to supreme transcendency.

" Soc. But what did we assert concerning their education ? AVas it not
that they should be instructed in gymnastic exercises, in music, and all
other becoming disciplines? 1 "

The assertions that have been already made, are certain common types,
extending to all things, according to the deii.iurgic allotment, and divine differ
ence, defining employments adapted to even, one, and distributing powers
appropriately to the recipients. But in the present \\ords, the life of the citi/ens
is unfolded, through education, employments, communion, and the procreation
of children, proceeding in a becoming manner from the beginning to the end.
\Yhat then is education, and ho\v is it assimilated to the universe ? For in the
[Socratic] city, it is the discipline of the soul, rightly adorning the irrational part
through music and gymnastic, the former giving remission to the strength ot
anger, but the latter exciting desire, and rendering it as it were elegant and
commensurate &gt;vith anger, in consequence of its Ik-ing vehemently remiss, and
through its descent to a material nature, filled from thence with a privation of
life. But this discipline adorns reason through the mathematical sciences, which
ha\c something of an attractive nature, are capable of exciting in us the recol
lection of true In ing, and elevate our intellectual part to that \\hicliisitsclfthe
most splendid of being. All \\liicli is evident to those \vlio are not entirely
forgetful of the arrangement* in the Socratic republic.

It is now, however, our business to investigate, what education, gymnastic and
imisic are in the universe, and what the disciplines are of the guardians ol the
universe. IVrhaps, therefore, we shall speak rightly if we say, that education is
the perfection which fills each thing with the good pertaining to it, and causes it
to be sufficient to itself, according to intellectual perceptions ami providential

nooK i.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 35

energies. Hut with respect to mu&gt;ic and gymnastic, thai the former causes the
lives in the universe to be harmonious, and the latter renders di\inc motion ryth-
mical and elegant, so as always to preserve the same form, and the same immu
table habit of the divine vehicles. For through these thing* 1 lato elsewhere alls
diune souls Sirens, and shows that the celestial motion is harmoniously elegant;
for gymnastic is indeed in them. lint medicine is in things sublunary in conse
quence of their receiving that which is preternatural. If, therefore, we assert these
things, we shall, as I have before observed, perhaps speak rightly. For powers
proceed supcrnally from intelligibles to all heaven, and impart to the celestial
livs by illumination the most excellent harmony, and to their vehicles undecay-
ing strength. ISut the disciplines which are in the universe, are the intellectual
perceptions of souls, and of celestial natures, according to which they run back
to the intelligible, following the mighty Jupiter, and surveying number charac-
teri/ed by unity, the truly-existing heaven, and intellectual figure. Hence you
may say, that the most true arithmetic, astronomy and geometry are in them.
For they behold swiftness itself, and slowness itself, which are the paradigms of
the celestial periods. And, in short, they survey the primordial and intellectual
circulation, diune number, and intellectual figures. You may likewise say, that
prior to these, they contain dialectic, according to which they intellectually
percehe the whole of an intelligible essence, and are united to the one cause of
nil the unities. And if it is necessary to speak by making a division, we may say,
that through such like disciplines they energi/.e about first natures ; but through
gymnastic, preside over things secondary with undeliled purity; and through
music, harmonically contain the colligation of wholes.

" Soc. We likewise established, that those who were so educated,
should neither consider gold, nor silver, nor any other possessions of a
similar kind, as their own private property."

Those things which are to be ordained in a city governed by the most equita
ble laws, have an exideiit cause, and were mentioned by Socrates in the Republic.
Hut how can we transfer them to the hcatei.s? Must it not be by surveying
through what cause men pursue the acquisition of gold and silver, and from what
conceptions they are induced to cherish this infinite love ! It is evident that it is
because they wish to supply their wants, and desire to procure such things as
may administer to their pleasures. For on this account, they are stupidly astonished

30 PKOCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

about muclirbelwed wealth. They say, therefore, conformably to Cephalus, that
the rich have many consolations. If, however, these things thus subsist, the
perfection of the celestial Cods, since it is sufficient to itself, and is converted to
the beautiful and the good, is not at all in want of this adventitious and apparent
self-sufliciency, nor does it look to convenience, or regard as its scope vulgar
utility; but being established reunite from all indigence and material necessity,
and replete with good, it has a leading and ruling order in the universe. .More
over, it does not admit partible and divided good. Hut it pursues that which is
common and impartible, and extends to wholes, and is especially characterized
according to this. Hence it harmoni/es with what is now said, "that those who
are so educated should neither cons id^- gold, nor silver, nor ami other possessions of a
similar kind, as their wv// private property "

If you are willing also, it may be said, that gold and silver, and each of the
metals, as likewise other things, grow in the earth, from the celestial Cods, and from
an ejjhuion thence derived. It is ...aid therefore, that gold pertains to the Sun,
silver to the Moon, lead to Saturn, and iron to Mars. Hence these are gene
rated from thence. But they Hil.M&gt;t in the earth, and not in the celestial Cods
who emit the etlluxions. For they do not receive any thing from material natures.
And all things there, are indeed from all, but at the same time a different pecu
liarity has dominion in a dilleivnt &lt;li\ inity, here, in a Satin nian, but there, in a
solar manner; to which those who love to contemplate these things directing
their attention, refer one material substance to this, but another to a dilleient
power. These things, therefore, are not the private, but the common property of
the Cods ; for they an the progeny of all of them. Nor do they subsist in them.
For as they produced them, they are not in want of them ; but the metals vhich
am here, derive their concretion from the ej]hi.ri&lt;uis of the celestial Cods. Why,
therefore, are these things earnestly pursued by men in a partible manner? It is
because they have a material life, and are extended to a partial nature, apostatiz
ing from the whole. For on this account there is much among them of mine and
not mine. But they abandon the union ami communion of life.

i! But that rather, after the manner of auxiliaries, they should receive
the wages of guardianship from those whom they defend and preserve ;
and that their recompense should be as much as is sufficient for tempe
rate men. That besides this, they should spend their stipend in com-

BOOK i.] TIM^EUS OF PLATO. 37

mon, and live cohabiting with each other, and neglecting oilier pursuits
should pay attention to virtue alone."

It is not at all wonderful (hat in human lives there should IK? donation and re
tribution, and a reward of beneficence. For it is well said by Socrates in the Re
public, that the mark at which lie aims is to render the whole city happy, but
not otie particular fjenus of it, such as the guardian. If, however, this l&gt;e ri^ht,
it \\ill be requisite that some persons in the city should be the saviours of it by
their providential caro and prudence, but that others by minislraul aid and servi
tude, should supply the saviours of the polity with the necessaries of lite ; just as
the nature which is in us, by fashioning and preserving the orjran, prepares milk
for the energies adapted to it. But in the world, what retribution can there I*-,
or what recompense can be made by mortals to the celestial Gods ? For may we
not say that these are the peculiarities of human imbecility, in consequence of not
possessing self-siilhciency, but that every God is suflicieiit to himself, and in con
junction with the self suflicient is superfull? 1 Hence through the union of super-
plenitude with self-sulliciency, he fills all secondary natures with ^ood, but re
ceives nothing from them. Or it may be said, that though divinity receives

- nothing, as heini; sutlicient and uniudi^ent, yet at the same time lie requires cer
tain remunerations from us, retributions of beneficence, the acknowledgment of
thanks, and equity, through which we are converted to him, and are tilled with
greater jrood. For beini; trood, he is desirous that all things should look to him,

. and should remember that all things are from him and on account of him. For
the preservation of the natures posterior to him, is for each of them to be suspend
ed from a divine cause. If, however, we interpret these things after this manner,
referring remunerations to conversions, and the acknowledgment of thanks, how
can it still further be inferred, that the Gods cohabit with us in common, and spend
a remuneration of this kind ? It is Iwtter, therefore, to understand remuneration
in a more physical way. For since ellluxions proceed from the heavens to the
mortal place, but exhalations ascend thither, and through these the fabrication of
the ( Mills about mortal natures receives its completion, hence Socrates calls such
like mutations and transition* of terrestrial natures, remunerations or wages from
sublunary matter, 1 which are |&gt;crfcclcd by the heavens, in order that generation

1 it is nrrrsinry after iy nvrn/uci lirre to supply tlir word virrpwXtfptt.
* For nynfW yap or, it i* obviously requisite la read aynfW, r. X.
loilcad of ano rqi 0X91 in ibn place, t read air0 rij X^i rrji

33 PROCUJS ON THE [noox i.

may never fail. But it must l&gt;e said, that the cohabiting in common, is the one
conspiration of divine fabrication, and the concordant providence of the celestial
Gods, through which every thing that undergoes a mutation from the earth is
consumed, and generation is variously changed through the harmonious dance
of the celestial divinities ; to which also Tima-ns looking says, " that the vhole
vorUt is friendly and knmcn to itself through virtue, and that its corruption is the
source of its nutriment, in consequence of effecting all tilings in, and suffering nil
things from itself.

What then is the end of this one and common lift- of the citizens ? Socrates says
virtue, vi/. divine virtue. For virtue subsists first with the Gods; afterwards from
them, in the genera sui&gt;erior to man ; and a certain portion of it descends also to
us. Tin- guardians of the world, therefor*, linn- conformably to this, are also
unoccupied by other pursuits. For they do not look to convenience, nor to ex
ternals ; for all things are within themselves. They likewise are the saviours of
all things, and till them with what is beautiful and good, being miiiistrant to, and
co-operating with the one father and D.-minrgus of wholes. Since, however, they
M\e measure to the mutations O f the earth, not in so doing departing from, but
being converted to themselves, and subsisting in themselves, on this account So
crates savs, " u recompense xuelt us is silt/intent fur tunjnralf. men." For being tem
perate and prudent in what relates to themselves, they measure secondary na
tures, comprehending then all-v arious mutations in the simplicity ot their own
life. Tim-, therefore what is said may be explained in this way. Hut in another
way we may say, that piety and a conversion to the Gods, especially contain a
measure, and are occupied by the gout. This measure, however, is defined by
the Gods themselves according to divine prudence, since the Gods are able
both to save themselves and others.

" Soc. Of women too we asserted, that they should be educated in
such a manner that their natures might be aptly conformed so as to be
similar to those of men ; with whom they should perform in common
both the duties of war, and whatever else belongs to the business ot life.

Plato very properly thought that the virtues of men and women are common,
since he evinces that both have one human form, but not the male one, and the
female another. For things which have a different jK-rfe^tion according to form,
are also different in species. But things which are the same in secies, have like-

BOOK i.] TIMvF.US OF I LATO. 39

wise one and the same perfection. This, however, is denied by others, who ns-
sert that there is a diH erenre according to form between men and women, though
Plato has shown that it is both possible and advantageous for women to have the
same virtues as men. It is possible, indeed, because this, history confirms. For
ther&lt; % have been found well-educated women, who have l&gt;een far sujM-rior to men.
lint it is advantageous, Iwrause it is l&gt;etter to have double than half the number of
those who exhibit virtue in their works. AN therefore we form the male guar
dians from such a particular education, and from such particular disciplines, thus
also we form the female guardians from the same : and in a similar manner, the
female warriors from the same institutes as the male.

In order, however, that we may admire in a greater degree the conceptions of
Plato, we must In-take ourselves to wholes, and to the order of the universe, where
we may survey a wonderful conspiration of the male and female nature. For in
the Gods, indeed, the&lt;e are so connascent with each other, that the same divinity
is called both male and female, as is the case with the Sun and Mercury, and
certain other Gods, \\here also they are distinguished from each other, the
works of the male ;md female that are of the same order, are common, so as that -7
they primarily proceed from the male, but in an inferior degree from the female.
Hence, likewise, in mortals, nature evinces that the female is more imlwcile in all
tilings than the male. \\ li;tte\er, therefore, proceeds from the male, this the female
also can produce in a diminished degree. Hence .Juno proceeds together with
Jupiter, generating all things in conjunction with the father. Hence, too, she is
said to he equal in rank with Jupiter, as is likewise Khea with .Saturn. For this
Goddess is the bosom of all the Satumian power. Farth also is equal in dignity
with Hea\en. For Karth is the mother of all things, of which Heaven i* the fa
ther. And prior to these elements, if we direct our attention to bound and infi
nity, which rank in the order of principles, we shall find that all things whatever,
which proceed into existence, are generated from both these. You have there
fore, in the intelligible, in the intellectual, and in the supermundane Gods, the har
monious conjunction of the male with the female. You may also see the same
in the heavens. For the whole of generation is go\erned by the Sun and Moon ;
in a greater and paternal degree by the former; but secondarily, by the latter.
Hence also, the Mooti is denominated by some, a lesser Sun. And among the
male divinities in flic Sun, there are iikmitc lunar God*, and analogous order*. But
if you direct your attention to da-mons, you will every where see the providence of
these Iwo-fold genera conjoined. For divine female du-mons, unitedly eiTect all

PROCLUS ON TIIK [BOOK i.

things in a secondary degree, which are accomplislied by divine male
primarily. Female psychical likewise, and female corporeal daemons, have to the
males the relation of mothers to fathers, and of duads to monads. For they ge
nerate all tilings with elimination, which the males produce paternally and united-
ly. If therefore we l&gt;efore rightly assimilated the guardians to the celestial Gods,
but the auxiliaries to du-mons their utteiidimts, and who are ministrant to their
providential energies, Plato very properly embraces in these genera, a similar
conjunction of the male with the female, and imparts to both common virtue, and
common employments; just as IS ature hinds these genera to, and causes them to
procreate the same things in conjunction with each other. But she does not
divide the one from the other, since w hates er is generated from both is unprolitic,
when either of them is separated ; though then- is a greater difference in the phy
sical orans than in the lives of these; yet at the &gt;ame time in these al&gt;o, Nature
makes the work of them to U- common. Much more, therefore, does the commu
nion of them in their employments, and the whole of their life, desene to h-
honoured.

" Soc. But what did vc establish concerning the procreation of chil
dren ? Though perhaj)s you easily remember this on account of its novel
ty. For we ordered that the marriages and children should be common;
as we were particularly cartful that none might be able to distinguish
their own children, but that all might consider all as their kindred. That
hence those of an equal age might regard themselves as brothers and sis
ters; but that the younger might reverence the elder as their parents and
grandfathers, and the elder might esteem the younger as their children
and triandsous.

" TIM. These things indeed, as you say, arc easily remembered."

If some one should impure why that which is unusual is easily remembered,
it is not difficult to reply, that it excites our phantasy in- greater decree as Ix-ing
unexpected ; and inserts in us a clearer impression of itself. .Moreover, it is easy
conformably to Plato, to show how what is here said of marriages and children
being common, applies to women. For he wished, according to the intention of

1 la the text of 1 roclus, aX /Gnav is erroneously i&gt;riut&lt; ! for imfltmx.

BOOK i.] TiM/CUS OF PLATO. 41

the rulers, that their connexion with men should take place in definite times,
accompanied with sacrifices and prayers; and that the woman that had con
nexion with a man, should not l&gt;e the property of any one man, hut should be
separated after connexion, and dwell apart, and again at other times should l&gt;e
copulated with that man whom the guardians might approve. But these things
are thus indicated in what is said in the Republic.

Referring, however, the theory of these particulars to nature, let us show how
they pertain to the. order of the universe. For these things by a much greater
priority exist in the Gods, on account of the union of the divinities. For all things
arc the progeny of all the Gods, though different things are characterized by a
di He rent peculiarity. All the Gods likewise are in all, and all are united to
all, in conjunction with an immingled purity adapted to all, to which Socrates di
recting his attention, embraces this communion, and this distribution of employ
ments, assigning one to each of the arts, conformably to nature. For not to know
their own progeny as peculiarly their own, takes place with the Gods. On which
account, indeed, their intellectual jMTceptions, and also their productions are
common. Each of them, however, benefits ;ind preserves that which is generated,
as being the common offspring of all of them. .Moreover, to consider all those as
brothers and sisters that are of an ecjual age, those that are elder as fathers and
grandfathers, and the younger as ehildren and grandsons, originates from the
Gods, and is transferred from thence to this polity. For similitude of essence,
derived from the same cause, is that which is fraternal in them. But prolific cause,
is in them that which is analogous to father and grandfather. And an efilux of
essence proceeding into a second and third series, exhibits the form of offspring.
For that the same Goddess is conjoined with different Gods, or the same God
with many Goddesses, may be assumed from mystical treatises, and from what are
called Sacred Mam ages in the nusteries, which Plato as much as possible imitat
ing in what he ordains about politics and marriages, calls the marriages sacred.
In physical productive powers also, we may six? that there is one and the same
recipient of different powers; and one productive power presenting itself to the
view in a multitude of recipients, and pervading through many receptacles. But
forms are analogous to males, and receptacles to females. Why therefore is
this very thing l*;held in the universe, but is paradoxical in human lives ! I say
it is because these lives arc cut off from wholes, and every human soul is partible.

1 For rovra litre, it is necetsary lo read varro.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. F

42 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

Hence the dogmas which embrace this communion appear to it most difficult to
IKJ admitted. If, therefore, some one should take away the condition of his pre
sent subsistence, and elevate himself to the whole of things, he would immediate
ly admit this communion, and de&gt;pi&gt;e the sympathy which is divided by the mul
titude. So far, however, as each of us is extruded, and minutely distributed
about a part, and thus relinqiii&gt;hes the whole and one, so far also he leaps to a
life of this kind, which is an unrestrained habitude, a disorderly arrangement, and
an indivisible division.

" Sue. Jjut that they might from their birth acquire a natural disposi
tion as far as possible the best, we decreed that the rulers whom we placed
over the marriage rites should, through the means of certain lots, take
care that in the nuptial league, the worthy were mingled with the worthy;
that no discord may arise in this connexion, when it docs not prove
prosperous in the end, but that all the blame may be referred to fortune,
and not to the guardians of such a conjunction."

Plato particularly assumes in his Itepuhlic similitude, sameness, and geometri
cal, in conjunction with arithmetical equality, in order that the similitude of it
to the heavens, as in sensible*, or to the intelligible, as in supercelestial lives, may
he perfectly preserved. For through this cause, in marriages also, he preserves
the union of the In-st woman with the best man, and of the le.ss excellent woman
with the less excellent man. For in the Cods likewise, primary natures are more
connascent with those of the first rank, and secondary with those of the second
rank; and together with union there is immingled purity. Hence in the second
genera after the Cods, a di&gt;lribution of this kind conformably to the intention of
the Cods, is effected according to desert. On this account, divine female de
mons are co-arranged with divine male da-mons, psychical female with psychical
male, and material female with material male da-mons. And very where, the
analogous in order proceeds as far as to the last of things. To which we may
add that the rulers contriving that this connexion may take place latently, suffi
ciently adumbrates to us that the cause of such a conjunction of genera sub
sists unapparently with the Cods ; being thence primarily derived, but seconda
rily from da inons, 1 and from the order of each, which the lot indicates; possess-

ll i* iifi-c!s?nry lirrr to ii.scrt the words, &lt;iw&lt;i rwy baifitinit.

HOOK t.J TIM.FAJS OF PLATO. 4.-J

ing the power of colligation from similitude of life, according to which each i*
co-arranged with the similar, tin- divine with the divine, the material with the
material, and that whieh has a middle subsistence, with the middle. On this
account, likewise, all sedition and dissension is removed from divine natures,
each loving that winch is allied to itself, according to its own order, perceiving
that this order is spontaneous, and not adventitious and demised ; of all which,
the citi/ens Iteinir conjoined in marriage liy lot, and not looking to elegance and
ornament in the connexion, is an image. For in natural things, also, receptacles
are distributed to forms appropriately; and each form may ascribe the cause of
its own co-ordination to material variety. At the same time, likewise, this is
effected according to causes which preside over the whole fabrication of things,
and v\hich are analogous to guardians. And thus much, therefore, has been said,
for the sake of the theory of wholes.

Lon^inns, however, doubts here, whether Plato was of opinion, that souls are
emitted together with the seed : for in order that they may become most excellent,
lie conjoins similars with similars. And Porphyry replies indeed to the doubt,
but not satisfactorily. Our preceptor, however, thinks that in the first place it
should be observed, that Plato himself adds, " In order that they might acquire a
natural disposition as far as possible the best." For children recci-re a physical
similitude from their pftrcnls, and participate of a certain dignify and excellence from
their begetters, according to the physical virtues. In the next place, it must be
observed, that though it is not true that souls are emitted together with the seed,
yet there is a distribution of the organs according to desert. For all souls are not
introduced into casual organs, but each into that organ which is adapted to it.

J-JXot fifv KrSAsj tlwt, X"? 3 - 2fX"/" vl fr""* *!*

says Homer. Farther still, as an initiator into the mysteries, by placing certain sym
bols about statues, renders them more adapted to the participation of superior powers,
thus also total nature fashioning bodies, by physical productive powers, the statues of
souls, disseminates a different aptitude in different bodies for the reception of different

* For ra ainara here, it is requisite to read ra atria.

* Iliad, ILIV. YS. 382. i. e. " He gave the pood [i. e. (lie brave] man, good tbings, but tbe lei* ex
cellent character, thing* of a less eiccllrnt nature. In tbe text of Protlu* it is erroneously t*Q\a ft*v
oti\a &lt;ivrr, K. A.

44 PROCLL S ON THE [BOOK i.

souls, the better and the worse ; which the politician likewise rightly understand
ing, pays attention to the emission of seed in the city, and to all physical aptitude,
in order that the most excellent souls may be generated for him in the most excel
lent natures. And thus much in answer to the doubt of Longinus. But why
does Plato conceive it is better to think that Fortune is the cause of this distribu
tion to the citizens ? Shall we say it is, because it is advantageous to us to know
the cause of tilings which we think to be good, but better to conceive the presence
of such as we apprehend to be e\il, to l&gt;e causeless, than to accuse the cause
which distributes these [seeming evils] for a good purpose? For this excites to a
contempt, or rather to a hatred of the giver; because every one avoids that which
becomes to him productive of evil.

" Soc. Moreover, we ordered that the children of the good should be
educated, but that those of the h;ul should be secretly sent to some other
city."

These things also are established in the Republic, but by a much greater prior
ity take place in the universe. With respect, therefore, to the productions of
Gods and Daemons, some genera abide in them, pure and remote from generation,
which on this account are calh d uiideliled ; but others descend into generation,
not being able to remain in the heat ens without a downward inclination. And
some of these are the oflspring of good, but others of less excellent powers. For
the term bad is indicative of less excellent. The horses, therefore, and charioteers
of the Gods, are all of them good ; but those of partial souls an of a mixed
nature. Hence in these, there is prcponderation, a verging downward, and a
defluxion of \\ings, which the celestial Gods send into generation, and da-muns
who preside over the descent of souls. The celestial and undefiled genera of
souls, therefore, are nourished following the Gods to the banquet and delicious
food, as it is said in the I ha-drus. And those that are subservient to generation,
communicate with it, leing latently sent into it from the heavens, as Socrates
isajs, indicating by the word latent the invisible and occult cause in the Gods of
the psychical descents, and that souls which thence descend, become subject
[latently] to another providential inspection, and to other guardians who preside
over generation.

1 Tim is ifj-t?d in the Ph;rdru. See tliis explained, in the notes at the end of this Trumlation.

BOOK i.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 45

" Yet so that such of the adult among these as should be found to be
of a good disposition, should be recalled from exile; while, on the con
trary, those \vho were retained from the first in the city as good, but
proved afterwards bad, should be similarly banished."

In the Republic, Socrates makes a transition not only from those that were
distributed from the upper into the lower city, but also from those of the golden
race that were born there. Here, however, the reference is made to those who
are recalled from exile. Do these things, therefore, accord with each oilier? Per
haps, indeed, it is possible to reconcile what is here said, with what is there deter
mined, if we understand the word adult , as not only pertaining to those sent from
the up|wr city, but likewise to all those that are educated in the lower city. For,
in short, the natural disposition is to be considered of those adults who were born
in the lower city, or of those who were sent from the up|&gt;er into the lower city, and
thus those that are worthy are to be recalled from exile. But if some one is will
ing to understand the words according to our first explanation of them, it must
be said, that what Socrates now deliters is conformable to the things proposed
to IM considered. For descending [rational] souls a^ain ascend, but not such
souls as had (heir .yposta-is from the iMx^innin^ in generation, and about matter,
such as are the multitude of irrational souls. And thus much for the words
themselves. See, however, how the same things lake place in wholes, as those
which Socrates ordains in his politj. For some things always have the same
order in the heavens, remaining divine and immutable; but others are always
conversant with generation ; and others are in a certain respect the media l&gt;etween
both; at one time, indeed, being suspended from dixine natures themselves, but
at another Ix-inu; mingled with those that embrace generation. It is not, therefore,
the daemoniacal j;enus which ascends or descends, nor is this to be asserted of
multiform lives, nor are da-mons subject to death, but partial souls, which are at
one time conversant with generation, and at another are transferred into a &lt;li\ine
demoniacal allotment ; which things bein^ known by Socrates in the Republic,
he legislatively ordains that which is analogous to them. For the celestial Jupiter
presides over the Gods in the heavens, over da&gt;mons that elevate partial souls [to
their paternal port], and also over others that lead souls into generation, in order
that the ascents and descents of souls may l&gt;e never failing in the universe. " For
though you should see this particular soul restored to its pristine perfection, yet

4 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK \.

the father send** another to be annmnerated," according to tlie divinely-inspired
indication about these things.

" Soc. Have we, therefore, again sufficiently resumed the epitome of
the discussion of yesterday, or do we require any thing further, friend
Timneus, which has been omitted f w

Tho resumption of the polity teaches us, through images, how the, universe is
filled with tin- most excellent productive powers. For generated naturrs in it are
separated from each other, and each communicating with other things, energizes
according t its own peculiarity. And primary, indeed, are exempt from secon
dary natures, \et employ their energies, ;is necessary to the completion of the
universe. Hut secondary are adorned by primary natures. The most excellent,
however, of mundane beings, are coiinaseently conjoined with the most excellent,
middle with middle, and last with such as are hist. Hut the same productive
powers penade through many subjects, and the same recipients participate, ol
many productive powers. Lives, also, at different times have dillerent allotments,
according to their desert. All these particulars therefore, snflicirlitly place be
fore our \iew the order of the universe. For in definite heads, Socrates ha-, in a
becoming manner, epitomised e\ery form of the polity, recurrinir to intellectual
impartibility, in order that he might imitate the (iod who adorns tlie celestial
polity intelligibly and paternally. Hut since every where measures and perfec
tion are definitely imparted to secondary natures from [piimary] causes, on this
account also Socrates recpie.sts Tima-us to inform him, whether he has compre
hended fin his epitome) e\ery form of the polity. For e\ery intellect being firmly
fixed in the deity prior to itself, defines itself by looking lo it. To which we may
add, that to speak summarily is a symbol of the first parts, and the head of the
universe being adorned by the fabricator of the heavens; which tin- Demiurgus
of the universe adorns in a more perfect manner, looking to the whole, and the
one life of the world. And thus mu h respecting the analogy of partial natures

tO wholes.

The investigation, however, is not attended with any difficulty, whether the

words mean, " f/aic :cc &gt;io:r epitomized the polity which wr (iisaiAtfd yesterday?" or
" JJarc u-c again epitomized to-day, the polity which tec epitomized yesterday T For

1 i. v. According to tlie Clialdraii Oracles.

BOOK i.] TIMyEliS OF PLATO. 47

whether yesterday Socrates spoke more diffusely, hut now summarily, or hi?
spoke summarily in both, the divine lumhlichus approves of either of the read
ings, and we do not at all differ from him. Perhaps, however, the latter con-
strurtion is more consonant. For attain to discuss the polity summarily, mani
fests that it was summarily discussed yesterday. And it is not at all wonderful,
that the summary discussion which took place in the licpuhlic, should not be
brought to li^ht. For many other things which are asserted heie, as brine; said
on the former day, are not to IK- found in that dialogue. Unless it should be said
that the word again, does not refer to the epitomizing, but to resuming the (incux~
xion. For In- resumes, who narrates at p-eat length what had been I M* fore- said ;
but he again resumes, who summarily contracts the narration. But whichever of
the constructions is adopted, neither of them is attended with any difficulty.

" Soc. Hear now, then, how I am affected towards this polity which
we have discussed."

What Socrates says in the words that follow, comprehends, that I may speak
summarily, these five particulars. First, what that is which in what has been
said, he desires should take place, alter the narration of the polity. Secondly,
that he is not sufficient to effect this himself. Thirdly, that neither is any one of
the poet* sufficient. Fourthly, that it is not proper to commit a work of this
kind to the sophists. Fifthly, that the auditors alone can accomplish that which
is earnestly desired by Socrates in a becoming manner. What, therefore, is
this? For it is necessary, in the first place, to speak concerning that which
Socrates desires to see after this polity, \i/. to see, as he says, a city of this kind
in motion, cnira^in^ in contests and labors, and warlike actions, in order that
after the peaceful life which he had delivered, he mitiht have to narrate the ener
gies of the city arising from circumstances of times and places. This, therefore,
is what he wishes to see accomplished.

Some one, however, may doubt to what the desire of Socrates is directed, and
on what account he wishes this to be accomplished. Porphyn therefore dis
solves the doubt by saying, that energies perfect habits, not only those energies
that are prior to habits, but also ihose that proceed from them. For the jKTtec-
tion in habit, is in conjunction with energy, since otherwise habit will bo in
a certain respect in capacity, and at rest through remission of energy. Socrates
therefore, in order that he may survey the polity truly perfect, requires that in

4ft 1 ROCLUS ON THIS [OOK i.

words it may be beheld in motion, engaged in warlike actions, and contending
with others. And it appears, says he, from hence, to be manifest that Plato does
not admit that the habit of virtue by itself, but when energi/ing. is sufficient to
felicity. It may, however, be said, in answer to Porphyry, that if the end was
military, it would be requisite to assert that war gives ]&gt;erfection to the polity.
But if the end of it is peace, what occasion is there to solve Platonic doubts by
introducing Peripatetic explanations? Or though the end is not military, yet
war exhibits the magnitude of \irtue in a greater degree than peace, ju-t as
mighty waves and a tem^st, show in a stronger light the skill of the pilot s art.
And in short, this is etlected by circumstances, as the Stoics also are accustomed
to say, " Cive circumstances, and take the man." For that which is not subdued
by things which enslave others, manifests a life in every respect worthy. Perhaps,
however, it is absurd to refer the cause to these things alone, though they have a
political reason, and not to look to the whole scop.- of Plato, according to which
the Cod who adorns the polity in the heavens, is willing also that generation
should be governed by the celestial Cods, and that the war of forms in matter
should always subsist; in order that the circle of generation may adumbrate the
celestial circulation. And this it is to see the city excited to war, to see genera
tion co-arranged with the celestial regions, and the whole of it governed from
thence. It appears likewise, that this is analogous to what is shortly after said
bv the Demiurgus of the universe, " I lmt ir/irn the gemrutin" Jtil/it-r understood
that this "rmrtiltd rtxcMnu c [///(&lt;/// 1 "/ / &lt;Yr//&lt;// &lt; "&lt;/ inun-J and ///, In:
vas ileiiffhhd \nth /m ,n.rL" In a similar manner, then-lore, Socraies wished
to ice his city moling and energi/ing ; just as the Cod who comprehends the
celestial polity wished to behold the natures which it contains riiergi/ing, and
adorning the n.ntnnicty produced by generation. Such an analogy, therefore,
ns this, takes place in the present instance.

If, however, we arranged In-fore, the lower city as analogous to generation, hut
now as analogous to war, you must not wonder. For the same things may l*&gt;
safely arranged among dilli-rcnt things according to dilli-rent analogies. For
generation also, according to the lives in it which an- inseparable from matter,
resembles the lower city; but according to its contrarieties and material tumult,
it is similar to war, and warlike dissensions. That we may, however, co-adapt
every thing to the theory of mundane wholes, prior to the consideration of cu-ry
particular, let us direct our attention to the second thing said by Socrates, ami
we how it accords with this theory. For incc Socrates is analogous to the first

BOOK 1.3 TIM.i:iS OF PLATO. 4J&gt;

of the llir.t fathers \vlio adorn the first of things, he says ho is not sufficient t&gt;
fashion \vlial follows. For the duimly who ^ivrs subsistence to all things, is
different froi-i him who constitutes tilings of a middle nature ; and this (od -again
is different from him who is the cause of things that rank as the third. But the
third particular is, that neither are the poets sufficient for this purpose. IS or. in
the fourth place, the sophists. The former, indeed, because they imitate the things
in which they have been nourished ; but the latter, because they are wanderers,
and not at one and the same lime, philosophers and politicians.

Again, therefore, let us see how these things are conformable to what has IXHMI
before said. For it is necessary that the powers that are to preside over generu-
tion should not be separable 1 from material natures, but conversant with thorn.
For these powers are analogous to poets who invent fables, and to imitators.
For these are employed about images, alone praise material and partible natures
which they only know, and are unable to ascend from matter. Xor is it fit that
these powers should be inseparable, 1 and very mutable, at different times ascend
ing or descending to different orders, such as are partial souls, who arc assimi
lated to sophists ; because they also possess all-beautiful productive powers, but
at different times wander to different parts of the world. Hence it is necessary
that the powers that connectedly contain generation, which is governed by the
heavens, should at one and the same time be philosophical and political ; in
order that through the philosophic characteristic, they may be separate from Jhe
subjects of their government, but may energize providentially through the political
peculiarity, performing the duties pertaining to their allotments according .to
intellect. For that which is physical, being productive, is inseparable from
matter; but the form of partial souls being sophistical, is abundantly wandering.
It is neceis&gt;ary, however, prior to things which are moved, that there should be.
the invariable and perpetually-permanent providence of the Gods, and immutable
prior to mutable allotments. In the fifth place, therefore, Socrates delivers to us
who those are, that are able to effect this. For these things are to be transferred
from words to deeds ; l&gt;ecause the Demiurgus of the universe, and the rest of the
fathers, fabricate totally and exemptly ; the second of which fathers gives subsist
ence to middle, but the third to hist natures. And to these Tima-us, (Jrilias, ami

For a^wporrovf litrt, it is necessary lo read ^w^nrrovr, and to supply aXAo, M ** MUtrad iff evrc

a^ttpierroot ai/rwr ttrni bri, sat cr avrau rrfxt^nprrat, to read owe ^wprrovi uvrwr cirai btt, aAAa cat K. \.

* Hence for \*fnrrat io tbii place, it is nrcesviry to read

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. &lt;i

60 PROCLUS ON TIIK [HOOK i.

Herrnocrntps, are analogous. But of those, the first in praised in an admirable
manner, Socrates also adding, " in my opinion;" but the Heeond, in a middle way,
conformably to his order; and the third, in the last degree, i.e. accord ing to the
testimon) of others.

" For 1 will illustrate the affair by *i similitude. Suppose then that
some one, on beholding beautiful animals, whether represented in a
picture or really alive, but in a state of rest, should desire to behold
them in motion, and engaging in some one of those contests which per
tain to bodies." 1

Longinus says, that Plato here decorates and beautifies his diction, through
similitudes and the gracefulness of the words. But Longinus says this in answer
to certain Platonists, who contend, that this mode of expression is spontaneous,
and not the result of art. For Plato, he observes, pays attention to the selection
of words, and does not employ them casually. It may, however, bo said, that
Plato made rhoice of this form of words from a mode of diction which was at that
time common and usual, and that he was very attentive to what was customary.
J or the atoms of Kpicunis would more rapidly by their concurrence produce the
world, than nouns and verbs would form a correct sentence by a casual compo
sition. But some blame Plato for employing metaphors in the use of words ;
though with respect to composition, all admire him. At the same time, however,
it may be inferred, not from this circumstance alone, but from such care and
industry as are exhibited iu the present words, that he paid great attention to
diction. For Socrates does nut simply say, that he desires to see this accom
plished by those that were with Tima-us ; but he speaks like one decorating his
words and alluring the hearer, \\lien he says: " For I "u ill illustrate the //&lt;/// by
it similitude. Stiftjiost: that sonic (me un beholding beautiful animals, u liethtr repre
sented in a picture, ur really ulire," k.c. And thus much for Longinus.

Origeii, however, grants indeed, that Plato is attenthe to the grace of diction,
not as regarding that which is pleasing, as the end of it, but that he employs this
image for the sake of exhibiting the manner in which he was himself allected.

1 The text of I roolut lus, erroiirou*)}, .ui "&gt; ru/K ro au^aat tviovt-Tuv ui i^ay fiira ri]v ayut iu&gt;-
riOAci/rii/&gt;, iiMltad of mi r iuv run autfiuai leKWVTW wfioainttf naru TIJV ayunai oOXovKra.

BOOK i.] TlM.Ers OF PLATO. 51

And we nay, that this similitude was written for the sake of tin- imitation of divine
natures; that the ijraee of the words presents to us an irnacje of the grace im
parted by the Deminrgus to celestial natures; and that the artifice of the dictiou,
which is mingled with the spontaneous, adumbrates divine production, which
has indeed a boundary from itself, and also a progression from IXMIISJ and
essence. If, likewise, you direct your attention to the image itself, beautiful
animals manifest those natures that are resplendent with [divine] beauty ; but /Aatr
represented in ft picture, or really alire, indicate corporal images, and true lives
prior to these imitations. For the figures of the (Jods are resemblances of (he
animals that are in them. But those that are in a stale of rest exhibit to MM the
natures that are full of intellectual arrangement, and of an equable and continued
life; those that are in motion such as proceed info another order, and a second
fabrication; and thnxe which engage in sonic one of the contests pertaining to bodies,
are images of those that impart to more imperfect natures their own proper
ellluxions and powers, and operate by their own powers on other things. And
thus much respecting the image. But the words whether represented in a picture
or really alive, are rightly asserted in both respects of divine bodies. For they are
depicted by the dodecahedron, and they possess efficacious and demiurgic lives.
If, however, you consider the words separately, they will signify that the before-
mentioned polity is indeed fashioned in words, and is assimilated to the heavens,
but exists, if not in human, yet in true or demoniacal lircs. Farther still, to desire t)
sec the city in motion, is analogous to the words [in another part of this dialogue-]
" as soon as the father saw the universe moving, he was delighted, and iris/ted to assi
milate it in a still greater degree to its paradigm" For thus also the adorner of
the hea\ens wished to see them in motion, and through motion governing the
war of generation. But the words "engaging in some one of the contests pertaining
to bodies" arc employed, because of contests some belong to souls, but others to
bodies ; and the latter are such as running, wrestling, and gymnastic.

" In such a manner am I also affected towards the city which we
have discussed. For I should gladly hear any one relating the contests
of our city with other cities, when it engages in a becoming manner in
war, and acts during such an engagement in a way worthy of its educa
tion and discipline, both with respect to practical achievements, and
verbal negotiations.*

52 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

We have before shown through what cause, and with reference to what para
digm, Socrates wished to t&gt;ee his republic contending in war. Because cities,
however, employ against their enemies both works and words; words indeed in
embassies, in compacts, in exhortations to battle, and in every thing of this kind;
but works in the pitching of camps, in spears, and the hurling of missive weapons;
on this account Socrates wishes that a city of this kind should l&gt;e celebrated
according to both these. In words indeed, as prudent, cautious, magnanimous,
and strenuous; but in deeds, as brave, \ehement, and well exercised. For thus,
according to both, it will imitate its paradigm, who, shining with physical and
intellectual productions, adorns all the war of generation.

" For, indeed, O Critias and Hermocrates, I am conscious of my
own inability to praise such men and Mich a city according to their
desert."

This is the second of the proposed heads, of which we have before assigned the
cause, and shall now again explore it according to another method. For now
some of the more ancient [interpreters] have said, that the encomiastic form of
writing is robust, superb, and magnificent ; but the Socratic character of diction
is slender, accurate, and dialectic. The latter, therefore, is contrary to the
former. Ilenee [say they] Socrates avoids panegyric, as knowing the power he
possessed, and the subjects to which it was naturally adapted. Those, however,
who assert this, in addition to their being directly refuted by the Mene.venus,
appear to me not to have perceived die magnificence of the diction of Socrates in
the Plurdrus. There are also those who &gt;ay it is lit that the artificer of Mich-like
encomiums, should lie skilled in warlike affairs. Hence many historians err in their
disposition of armies, through ignorance of tactics, lint Socrates having fought
at DeloH and Potida-a, was not unskilled in all Mich-like particulars. Others
again assert, that Socrates speaks ironically, just as he said with respect to other
things, that he was ignorant of them, so here he sa\s, that lie did not know how to
praise this city according to its desert. The irony, however, of Socrates was
employed against sophists and young men, and not against wise and scientific
men. It is better, therefore, instead of these things to say, that he guards against
becoming the third from the truth. For the works of a rightly instituted city, are
the third from the paradigm of truth [i. e. of the true or intelligible polity], Ilenee,
wishing to remain in the second from the truth, he sa\s, he is not able to bear the

BOOK i.] TIMJEUS OI PLATO. 53

tlcscont to the third species of life. And an impotency of this kind is an abund
ance of power. For to l&gt;o able to abide in paradigms, is effected through powor
which is transcendent. Yon may likewise see how this arcords with wh.it has
been before said by us respecting the analogy of these things to wholes. For the
second fabrication is assimilated to the first, and on this account is proximate to
it. For thr whole demiurgic series is one, possessing union together with M-par-
ation. Very proj&gt;erly, therefore, is Socrates precedaneonsly extended to Crilias
and Hermocrates, and he rightly thinks it lit that they should weave together the
particulars that are next in order. For Tinui-ns is about to deliver these things in
a more universal and elevated manner, and not through images, in consequence of
directly preserving his analogy to the Demiurgiis of wholes, who paints the
heavens with the dodecahedron, but generation with appropriate figures.

" Indeed, that I should be incapable of such an undertaking is not
wonderful, since the same imbecility seems to have attended poets, both of
the past am! present a &lt;j;e. Not that I despise the poetic genus ; but it is
perfectly evident, that the imitative tribe easily and in the best manner
imitate things in which they have been educated. But that which is
foreign to the education of any one, it is difficult to imitate well in deeds,
and still more difficult in words."

This is the third of the before-mentioned heads of discussion, in which Socrates
shows that none of the poets have Ix-en adequate to the praise of men and cities
of this kind, which have casually been engaged in warlike actions. Lon rr inus

however, and Origen, doubt, whether Plato comprehends Homer among the
poets, \\hen he says, that he has not only the same opinion of the poets then
existing (for this is nothing novel), but likewise of those of former times, so that
Porphyry informs us that Origen passed three whole days exclaiming, blushing and
toiling, asserting that the hypothesis and the doubt were great, and being ambi
tious to show that the imitation in the poetry of Homer is sufficient for lirtuoim
actions. For who speaks more magnificently than Homer, who, representing the
Gods as contending and fighting with each other, does not err in his imitation,
but speaks loftily conformably to the nature of things ? Porphyry, however, in
reply, says, that Homer is indeed sufficient to give magnitude and elevation to the
passions, and to excite actions to an imaginative bulk, but that he is not capable

54 PKOCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

of delivering an impassivity which is intellectual, and which energizes according to
a philosophic life. But I should wonder if Homer is not sufficient for these
things, but Critias is, or Hermocrates, and should l&gt;e thought lit to speak about
them. It appears, therefore, to mi 1 , that Plato divides poetry into the divinely-
inspired, and the artificial. And having made this division, he refers the magni
ficent diction and sublimity derived from inspiration, to the Gods. .For oracles in
a remarkable decree possess grandeur, vehemence, and magnificence of language.
But lie evinces that the poetry proceeding from human art, is not adequate to the
praise of the fortitude of this city, and of the great deeds of the men that are
educated in it. For if then? is any artificial sublimity in some one of the poets, it
has much of contrivance in it, and grandeur of diction, and makes great use
of metaphors, as is the case with Antimachus. But Socrates requires a pane
gyrist, \vlio exhibits in his praise a spontaneous sublimity, and a magnificence of
language, which is free from compulsion and pure; ju-t as actions in !n&gt; Republic]
have magnificence, not casually, but adapted to the education and discipline of
the men. That Socrates, however, does not reject the divinely-inspired poet,
nor the w hole of poetry, but that only \\luch is artificial, he manifests, I think,
when he .says, "that he din.s not despise tin: [xxtic genus" The portie genus,
then-fore, is di\ine, as he elsewhere says. But hr despises the imitative species of
poetry ; nor yet this simply ; but that which is nourished in depraved manners and
laws. For this, in consequence of verging to things of a less excellent nature, is
not naturally adapted to be imitative of more exalted manners. And thus much
in answer to I he doubt.

The last part, l:o\vc\er of I he word* of Socrates, being in a certain resjK-ct dif
ficult, may be rendered perspicuous as follows: But the words are, " that :r/tic/i is
foni^n to the education oj any one, it is d jjicult to imitate ;rc// in deeds, and stilt more
difficult in U crt/s* For it seems to be easy to imitate words or deeds. IS ot a
few, therefore, act suphistically, by exhibiting virtue as far as words, but in deeds
being entirely alienated from it. W ill it not, therefore, Ix? better to interpret these
words thus, viz. : To suppose the most excellent education is implied in th- words,
that which is foreign to the education of any one ; but to assume, in duds tind in
icords, as equivalent to, conformably (&lt;&gt; deeds, and eunfurinulily (o ico rds ; and tu imi
tate net/, as having the same meaning with tu be :&lt;c// unituUd ? And thus we may
collect from all these, that for that which is most excellent to be well imitated,
it is diflicull indeed according to deeds, but it is still more dillicult for it to be
well imitated according to words in a written work. For this is the thing

BOOK i.l TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 55

proposed to IK? effected in portry. And yon may see how this accords \vitli
tiling themselves. For he who in a written work narrates the deeds of the most
excellent men, composes a history, lint he who narrates the speeches of these men,
if he intenrls to preserve the manners of the speaker, assumes a disposition similar
io the speaker. For words are seen to differ according to the inward dispositions.
For thus we deride most of those, except I lato, who have written ihe Apology of
Socrates, as not pr".*&lt;r\in^ the Socntic manner in their composition. Though
the narration of this \ery thinir, that Soerates was accused, made an apology, and
was sentenced to die, would not he thought worthy of laughter, hut the dissimili
tude of imitation in the composition, rvnders the imitators ridiculous. Since, also*
to say of Achilles, that he came forth armed after such a manner, and that he
performed such deeds, is not difficult; hut to narrate copiously what lie said
when detained in the river, is not easy. But this is the province of one who is
ahlc to assume the manners of the hero, and to write conformably to what he
would IKIM- said. This also is e\ident from Socrates in the Hepuhlic, very much
blaming Il-uner respecting the imitation of words. But as to the Gods, it is said
tobeeasx by lan^ua^e to intitule the words or the deeds of the Gods. For w ho
can delineate their works according to their desert? Or it may he said that it is
the same tiling with respect to the Gods, to imitate their words or deeds. For
since their words are intellections, ;uul their intellections are productions, the
imitator of their words is also the imitator t&gt;f their productions. So that hy how
much he fails in the one, hy so much also is he deficient in the imitation of the
other. Lonirinus, howe\er, has the following doubts with respect to the proposed
words. For if poets are not worthy imitators of the works pertaining to such a
city as this, hecause they are not educated in the manners of tin- city, neither will
Critias and his associates be ahle toe/feet this. For neither did they live perform
ing the office of magistrates in it. But if it is hecause they have not science, but
are imitators alone, why by receiving types from us, may they not he ahle to imi
tate, since they possess an imitative power? In answer to these doubts, it mav l&gt;e
said, that the imitation of such a polity proceeds through a life concordant with
its paradigms. For he who does not live according to virtue, is incapable of
adducing words adapted lo worthy men. It is not, therefore, sufficient merely
to hear what form of life the polity possesses, in order to imitate it, as the doubt
of Lon^inus says it is. B lt Porphyry adds, that as all things, such for instance
as the diurnal li;, r ht, are not imitated by painters, so neither is the life of the most
excellent polity imitated by poets, inconsequence of transcending their power.

50 IMIOCLUS ON THK [BOOK i.

" liut with respect to the tribe of sophists, though I consider them as
skilled both in the art of speaking, and in man} other beautiful arts, yet
as they have no settled abode, but wander daily through a multitude of
cities, I am afraid, lest with respect to the institutions of philoso
phers and politicians, they should not be able to conjecture the qua-
lily and magnitude of those concerns, which wise and politic men are
engaged in \yitli individuals in warlike undertakings, both in deeds and
words."

With respect to (he sophists, some of them frequently pretended to l&gt;e skilled in
aMronomv, others in geometry, others in polities, and others in the art of dividing.
Hence they are now .said to l&gt;e skilled in many beautiful arts. Since, however,
they did not possess a scientific knowledge of these, it is added, that they are
skilled in them. For skill maniff sts an irrational occupation in mere words,
unaccompanied with the knowledge of the why. Because, however, they
not only lived at different times in different cities, hut were full of deception, of
false opinion, and unscientific wandering, they arejustly called wanderers. But as
they led a disorderly and inenulile life, eiu-rgi/ing according to passion, they are
very properly said not to have a settled tilwtte ; since it is requisite that every one
should arrange himself prior to other things. For all such particulars, as are in a
family and a city, are likewise in manners, and these prior to externals ought to
be filly governed. \Vlio then are the proper imitators of the deeds and words of
the host polity, if neither the poets nor the sophists are? They are such as are
both politicians and philosophers. For the union of both these is necessary, in
order that through the political character they may be able to perceive the works
of the citi/ens ; luit thrombi the philosophic, their words, in consequence of
inwardly pre-assiimiiig their life. And through the former, indeed, they com
prehend their practical wisdom, but through the latter, the intellectual energy of
the rulers. But from these images we should make a transition to demiurgic
causes. For it is necessary that these al-o should he total and intellectual, in
order that the universe may be consummately perfect, and that generation may
possess ironic ally such things as the heavens primarily contain.

" The genus, therefore, of your habit remains, which at one and the
same time participates of both these, by nature and by education."

BOOK i.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 37

Longinus, not disdaining to survey those words, and those that precede them,
says, that in that part of them beginning with, " But with respect to the tribe of
sophists, lam afraid, as they arc wanderers" &c. there is a difference of expression
through the desire of dignity and gravity in the diction. That in the words that
follow, " Lest ri/Y/i raped to the institutions of philosophers ami politicians, they
should not be able to conjecture the quality and magnitude of those concern.*" &c.
there is a distortion of phrase from what is natural. And that the third part,
" The genus therefore of your habit remains," Sec. is perfectly unusual. For it is
not at all dissimilar to the strength of Hercules, to ncr t i$ TeXstta^iio, the sacred
strength &lt;&gt;J Tclcmachus, 1 and other such like expressions. But Origen admits,
that the form of expression in the proposed words, is conformable to the manner
of historians. For such like periphrases are adapted to a narration of this kind,
as well as to poetry. We, however, say, that Plato everywhere changes his
mode of diction, so as to he adapted to his subjects; and in unusual things, stu
dies mutations of expression. But we do not admit that the proposed words are a
periphrasis. For they do not manifest the same thing as the expression you, like
the strength of Hercules ; from which there would only be an ability of giving that
which is adapted to the imitation of (he best polity. For those who are both
philosophers and politicians, by encrgi/ing according to the habit which they
possess, and which differs from the poetical and sophistical habit, will be
able to effect that which Socrates desires. And thus much for the words
themselves.

Looking, however, to the conceptions which they contain, we must say, that So
crates excites Critias and llermocrates to what remains to l&gt;e accomplished in the
polity. But he likewise calls on Tima-us to assist the undertaking. And this is
the fifth head of the things proposed for elucidation. You may also see how
magnificently Socrates celebrates the men from the very beginning, calling [the
wisdom which they possess] a habit, in order that he may exempt them from so
phistical wandering. But he says that they are partakers of the political science,
both by nature ami education, in order that you may contradistinguish it from
poetical imitation, which is nourished by less excellent laws. And he designates
the perfect from nature and education ; lest depriving nature of education, you thould
cause it to be lame ;* or you should think that education ought to he thrown into an

1 Od)s. u. 409.
* For \o\tff here, it it necciwry to read X*AI&gt; &gt;

77m. Plat. VOL. I. II

58 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

unapt and incongruous recipient. And thus much has l&gt;een said in common re-
s|x?cting the men. But if you wish to n|&gt;cak, proceeding to paradigms, the demi
urgic gemiN, which is total and intellectual, remains to l&gt;o arranged according to a
providential attention to wholes. Let us, however, mirvey separately every parti
cular.

" For Timteus here of Locris, an Italian city, governed by the best of
laws, exclusive of his not being inferior to any of his fellow-citizens in
wealth and nobility, has obtained in his own city the greatest honours,
and the highest posts of government ; and, in my opinion, has arrived at
the summit of all philosophy."

What testimony, therefore, can be more admirable than this, or what praise can
be greater? Does it not, in the first place, evince that TinuniB was a political
character; in the second place, that he possessed intellectual knowledge [in a
most eminent decree], by .saying, that he had arrived at the summit of all philo
sophy ; and adding, in nit/ opinion, which places a colophon on nil the panegyrics?
What other image also than this among nun, is more ca &gt;able of being assimilated
to the one 1)&lt; rniurgus ? For, in the first place, by the political and the philosophic,
the image is Jovian. In tin- next place, by asserting that Tima-us belonged to a
ily governed by the best of la\\s, it iinit.itt * the god wlio was nurtured in the in
telligible by Adrastia. And by Tima-us excelling in nobility of birth, it adum
brates the total, intellectual, and unical nature of the god. For all these the l)e-
miurgus possesses, by participating of the fathers prior to himself. By asserting
also that Tima-us had obtained the highest posts of government, it represents to us
the royal power of the Demiurgiis, and \\hich has dominion over wholes ; his
sceptre, according to theologists, consisting of four and twenty measures. But to
add likewise that he had enjoyed the greatest honours, presents us with an image
of that transcendency which is exempt from wholes, both in dignity and power.
It is the Demiurgu*, then-fore, who also distributes honours to others. And it
may !x? said, that the assertion that Timieus had arrived at the summit of philoso
phy, assimilates him to the god, who at once perfectly contains all knowledge in
himself. So that, from all that has been said, you may apprehend, as from ima
ges, who the Dcmiurgus of the universe is; that he is an intellect comprehensive
of many intellects, and arranged among the intellectual (Jods ; that he is full of

BOOK i.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 59

the first intelligible* ; and that he has a royal establishment, as surpassing in dig
nity the other demiurgic gods. If, however, Plato calls the city of Timacus Lo-
cris, it not being usual with the Greeks thus to denominate it, but to call it Locri
only, in order to distinguish it from the Locris opposite to Euboea, we must not
wonder. For Plato changes many tilings for the purpose of signifying in a clearer
manner the thing proposed. But that the Locrians were governed by the beat
laws is evident ; for their legislator was Zaleucus.

" Besides, we all know that Critias is not ignorant of any of the parti
culars of which we arc now speaking."

Critias, indeed, was of a generous and grand nature. He likewise engaged in
philosophic conferences, and was called, as history informs us, an ideot among
philosophers, but a philosopher among ideots. lie tyrannized also, being one of
the thirty. It is not, however, just to accuse Socrates on this account, because he
now thinks him deserving of a certain praise. For, in the first place, we should
attend to the manner in which lie praises him. For he says, that " he is not igno
rant (if any of tlir particulars of which we are now speaking," both on account of his
natural disposition, and his association with philosophers. In the next place, we
should observe, that the tyrannical character is an argument of an excellent na
ture, as we learn from the fable in the lOth book of the} Republic, which parti
cularly leads souls descending from the heavens to a tyrannical life. For l&gt;eing
accustomed there to revolve with the Gods, and to goYern the universe in conjunc
tion with them, in those terrestrial regions also, they pursue apparent power ; just
as those who possess the remembrance of intelligible beauty, embrace visible
beauty. That Critias, however, pertains, according to analogy, to the middle
fabrication of things, may be learnt, in the first place, from his succeeding to the
discourse of Socrates ; in the next place, from his narrating the Atlantic history,
the Atlantic* being the progeny of Neptune; nnd, in the third place, from his
own proper life. For the ruling peculiarity, and that which extends to many
things, are the characteristics of this life. Power, likewise pertains to media, and
therefore he possesses the middle place in the encomiums. For to assert of him,
that he was not one of the vulgar, but a partaker of the prerogatives of Timaeuft,
shows his inferiority to the first person of the dialogue. But that he was not en
tirely removed from him, indicates his alliance to him.

00 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

" Nor h this to be doubted of Hermocrates, since a multitude of cir
cumstances evince that he is, both by nature and education, adapted to
all such concerns."

Hermocrates was a Syracusan general, desirous of living conformably to law.
Hence also he participates, in u certain respect, of the political science and philo
sophy. He must be referred, therefore, according to analogy, to tl e third fabri
cation * of things. For the command of an army is a power allied to the god,
who arranges the last and most disorderly parts of mundane fabrication ; and to
be testified by a multitude of circumstances, indicates an analogy to the power that
produces fabrication into all multitude, and an ultimate di\ision. We therefore
make this arrangement, iu order that the men may have an analogy to the things.
But others arrange Critias as inferior to Hermocrates; though the absent person
was neither adapted to speak nor to hear, and of those that are present [at a
conference}, he who is an auditor, indeed, but is silent, is secondary to him who
is both an auditor and a speaker, and in th s respect imitates those that are about
Socrates and Tima;us. In the next place, this ;dso must be considered, that So
crates gives the preference to Critias, in what he says, praising him immediately
after Tima-us. There are likewise those who attribute- such an order as the fol
lowing to these persons, vi/. they arrange Tima-us according to the paradigmatic
cause, Socrates according to the ellicient, and Critias according to the formal
cause; for he leads into energy those that have been rightly educated ; but Her-
mocrates according to the material cause. Hence also he is adapted indeed to
hear, but not to speak. For matter receives productive powers externally, but is
not naturally adapted to generate. And this arrangement indeed will be found
to be very reasonable, if we abandon the former conceptions [relative to the ana
logy of the men].

Instead of fio tac *-oXiniji wi ptrtitf, in &lt;f&gt;i\o&lt;ro$iat tvtttv o\i r. X.. il is necessary to read fio
at iroXirnijJ .rwi ^iern^&lt; ia&lt; &lt;f&gt;t\uaiiif&gt;tat. oryrcr uv* f. X.

Tima-us is analogous to Jupiter, the Deiuiuruus of the univrr ; but Socrates, Critias. and Her-
niocrate*, are analogous to the three ruling fathers, or druiiurgi, Jupiter, Neptune, and 1 luto, who
form the summit of the supermundane order of (iods. For, according to the arcana of the Grecian
ttieolo, there is a twofold Jupiter; one being the Deiniurgu*. and existing at the extremity of the
int. llectual order ; but the other being the first of the supermundane demiurgic triad. See. the 6 th
fV&gt;ok of mj tramlation of Proclus on the Theology of I lato.

OOK i.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. d

" Hence when you yesterday requested me to discuss what pertains to
a polity, I readily complied with your request; being persuaded that the
remainder of the discourse could not be more conveniently explained bv
any one than by you, if you were but willing to engage in its discussion.
For when you have properly adapted the city for warlike purposes, there
is no one in the present age but you from whom it can acquire every
thing fit for it to receive. As I have, therefore, hitherto complied with
your request, I shall now require you to comply with mine in the above-
mentioned particulars. Nor have you, indeed, refused this employment ;
but have, with common consent, determined to repay my hospitality with
the banquet of discourse. I now, therefore, stand prepared, in a deco
rous manner, to receive the promised feast."

The summary repetition of the polity appears, indeed, as Socrates now says, to
have been made for the sake of the discussion of the contests in war of a rightly
constituted city. .Both the concise comprehension, however, of tlie polity, and
the Atlantic war, refer us to the one fabrication of the world. For, as we have
before observe;!, it is better, prior to the whole fabrication, and all the fonn of the.
production of the world, to make a survey from parts and images. Socrates, there
fore, resuming the polity in certain forms, and, first, through this imitating the
universe, very properly establishes himself, as it were, in essence; but excites
others to the discussion, who celebrate the power of such a city, and imitate those
who arrange the universe according to the middle demiurgic form, and uniformly
comprehend the contrarieties and multiform motions which it contains. As.
therefore, Jupiter, in Homer, being seated in his citadel on the summit of Oljm-
pns, and abiding in his own accustomed unity, sends the Gods who preside over
the mundane contrariety to the Grecian war ; thus also Socrates, being purely
established in the intelligible form of a polity, prepares those after him that are
able, to celebrate the motion and power of this polity, calling forth, indeed, the
science of Timaeus, to the survey of wholes totally, but preparing the others to the
total and concise comprehension of partial natures. For as lie had discussed the
polity totally, after this manner also, he wishes that the power of it should lie cele
brated by the rest. Since, however, all these discourses bring with them an image
of demiurgic works, and the whole conference adumbrates the fabrication of the

2 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

world, Socrates very properly says, " that he stands prepared, in a decorous manner*
to receive the promised feast , n his words being invested with modesty, as a form
adapted to virtue.

" HERM. But we, O Socrates, as Ti mains just now signified, shall
cheerfully engage in the execution of your desire ; for we cannot offer
any excuse sufficient to justify neglect in this affair. For yesterday, when
we departed from hence, and went to the lodging of Critias, where we arc
accustomed to reside, both in his apartment and in the way thither, we
discoursed on this very particular."

It was requisite that Ilermocrates should say something, and not he silently
present, like the unemployed persons in a comedy. Hence also he is represented
speaking to Socrates. And this indeed is logographic [or pertaining to the art of
writing]; hut it is likewise adapted to what has been before said. Tor it repre
sents to us, as in an image, that the. hist parts, of the fabrication of things, follow
the one father of wholes, and, through similitude to him, converge to the one
providence of the world. For Ilermocrates, following Socrates, says, that no
thing sliall In- wanting, either of alacrity or power, to the accomplishment of the
narrations investigated by Socrates. For these two things become especially im
pediments to us in our mutual energies, viz. our indolence, and any external im-
|M-diment. Removing, therefore, both these, he says, that there cannot be any ex
cuse siiflicient to justify their neglect, or prevent them from accomplishing the
mandate of Socrates. Very properly, therefore, does he call upon Critias for the
narration respecting the city of the ancient Athenians, in vhich the mandate of
Socrates terminates; just as Socrates calls on Tinurus, and makes himself a par
taker of his discourse. For on the preceding day, Ilermocrates says, they dis
coursed on this very particular together with Critias, just as the third Deuiiiirgns
in the universe communicates with the production of the second. For the whole
of generation is entirely in want of returns from the subterranean world. If, how
ever, these things subsist after this manner, the Atlantic history will appear to
have had the third narration. But those numbers, the duad and the triad, are
said to IM&gt; adapted to the middle fabrication, the former through power, and the
latter through its demiurgic providence, and which is also perfective of mundane
natures. So that whether you assign to this history a double or a triple narration

BOO* i.] TIMJEUS OF PLATO. 63

you will, from cither of the numbers, be able to recur to the conception of the in
tervening medium.

" He therefore narrated to us the following particulars from ancient
rumour, which I wish, O Critias, you would now repeat to Socrates, that
he may judge whether it any way conduces to the fulfilment of his re
quest.

" CRI. It is requisite to comply, if agreeable to Timzeus, the third as
sociate of our undertaking.

" TIM. I assent to your compliance."

You will find in these words an admirable indication, as in images, of divine
natures. For, as in them, such as are secondary call forth the prolific powers of
such as are primary, and produce them to the providential inspection of the sub
jects of their government; thus also here Ilermocrates calls on Critias to speak,
and gives completion to what was promised to Socrates. And as, among divine
natures, effects convert themselves to the reception of their causes, thus also here,
Ilermocrates is extended to Critias, but Critias looks to the mandate of .Socrates.
As likewise all demiurgic causes are suspended from the one father of the uni
verse, and govern all things conformably to his will; after the same manner here
also all the persons fly to Timaeus, and to his nod, or consent, or will, in order
that, being impelled from that as from a root, they may dispose their narration
agreeably to his desire. For thus what is going to be said will contribute to the
discourse about the whole fabrication of the world. Moreover, the words "from
undent rumour" if the narration is historical, signify ancient according to time.
Hut if they arc an indication of what takes place in tin; universe, they will ob
scurely signify the reasons or productive powers which are from eternity inherent
in souls. And if, likewise, they bring with them an image of divine cause*, they
show that these demiurgic causes, being supemally filled from more ancient (jods,
impart also to secondary natures their own providential energies.

" CRI. Hear, then, Socrates, a narration surprising indeed in the
extreme, yet in (very respect true, which was once delivered by Solon, the
wisest of the seven wise men.**

64 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

With repect tfc th whole of this narration about the Atlantics, some say, that
it is a mere history, which was the opinion of Crantor, the first interpreter of Plato,
who says, that Plato was derided by those of his time, as not Ijeing the inventor
of the Republic, but transcribing what the Egyptians had written on this subject;
and that he so far regards what is said by these deriders as to refer to the Egyi&gt;-
tians this history about the Athenians and Atlantics, and to believe that the Athe
nians once liu-d conformably to this polity. Crantor adds, that this is testified
by the prophets of the Egyptians, who assert that these particulars [which are
narrated by Plato] are written on pillars which are still preserved. Others
a- aiii, sa\, that this narration is a fable, and a fictitious account of things, which
by no means had an existence, but w hich bring vv ith them an indication of natures
which are perpetual, or are generated in the world ; not attending to Plato, who
exclaims, " that the narration is surliriwig in the extreme, yet is in every respect
true." For that which is in every respect true, is not partly true, and partly not
true, nor is it false according to the apparent, but true according to the inward
meaning; since a thing of this kind would not IM- perfectly true. Others do not
deny that these transactions took place alter thi&gt; manner, but think that they are
now assumed as images of the contrarieties that pre-exist in the universe. Tor
war, say they, is the father of all things, as Ileraclitus also asserted. And of
these, some refer the analysis to the fixed stars and planets : so that they assume
(he Athenians as analogous to the fixed stars, but the Atlantics l the planets.
They likewise sa\, that these stars light on account of the opposition in their cir
culation, but that the fixed stars vanquish the planets on account of the one con
volution of the world. Of this opinion, therefore, is the illustrious Amelius, who
\ehementlyeonteiidsthatthismii-tbe the case, because it is clearly said in the
Critias, that the Atlantic island was divided into seven circles. But I do not
know of any other who is of the same opinion. Others, again, as Origen, refer
the analysis to the opposil on of certain da-mons, some of them being more, hut
others less, excellent. And some of them being superior in multitude, but others
in power : some of them vanquishing, but others being vanquished. But others
refer it to the discord of souls, the more excellent being the pupils of Minerva,
but the inferior kind being subservient to generation; who also pertain to the
(lod that presides over generation [i. e. to Neptune]. And this is the interpreta
tion of Numenius. Others, mingling, as they fancy, the opinions of Origen and
Numemus together, say, that the narration refers to the opposition of souls to
da-mons, the latter drawing down, but the former being drawn down. And

BOOK i.] TIM/EL S OF PLATO. 6.5

with these men, dsrmon lias a triple suhsistence. For they say, that one kind is
that of di\ ine (hrinons ; another, of ihrmons according to hahitude, to which par-
tial souls give completion, \vhen they ohtain a demoniacal allotment ; and
another i* that of depraved d;rmons, who are also noxious to soul*. Da-mons,
tlieri fore, of this la-t kind, wage tliis war against souls, in their descent into
generation. And that, say they, which ancient ideologists refer to Osiris and
Typhon, or to Bacchus and the Titans, this, I lato, from motives of piety, refers
to the Athenians and Atlanties. Before, however, souls descend into solid
hodies, those theologists and Plato, deliver the war of them with material demons
who are adapted to the west ; since the ur.?/, ax the Egyptians *&lt;n/, is the place of
no.vious dtcmons* Of this opinion is the philosopher Porphyry, respecting uhom,
it would he wonderful, if he asserted any thing different from the doctrine of
Nmnenius. These [philosophers] however, are in my opinion, very * excellently
corrected hy the most dmne lamhliehus.

According to him, therefore, and also to our preceptor Syrianus, this con
trariety and opposition are not introduced for the purpose of rejecting the narra
tion, since on the contrary, this is to he admitted as an account of transactions
that actually happened ; hut, as we art* accustomed to do, vu&gt; must refer that
which precedes the suhject of the dialogue, to the scope itself of the dialogue.
Hence, they are of opinion, that this contrariety which is derived from human
affairs, should, according to a similar form, he extended through the whole world,
and especially through the realms of generation. That in consequence of this,
we should survey every where how things participate of contrariety, according to
the variety of powers. For since all things are from the one, and from the duad
after the one, are in a certain respect united to rach other, and have an opposite
nature; as iu the genera of IMMU^, there is a certain opposition of sameness to
difference, and of motion to permanency, hut all things participate of these ge-
ner; \ this heing the case, we must survey after what manner mundane natures
possess the contrariety which pervades through all things.

Moreover, if we consider he polity of Plato as analogous in every respect to
the world, it is necessary that we should survey this war as existing in every
nature. For the polity is analogous to existence and essences, hut war, to the
powers of these essences, and as Plato says, to their motions. We must, like-

1 For *i I M TI NTH, hen- it is necessary to road eirri rat rj fvirn, and for aiwruor, tai-wr-iiMr.
1 InMcail of m/ii^u in (his place, it Is requisite to read Koptly.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. J

O O PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

wise, refer tlie polity, by making it common to all things, to the whole union of
things ; but it must be said, that war is to lx&gt; assimilated to the mundane division,
and to the empire of victory. Whether, therefore, you give a twofold division
to the universe, by separating it into the incorporeal and the corporeal ; and
again divide the incorporeal into (he more intellectual and the more material
natures, and the corporeal into heaven and generation ; and heaven, into contrary
jK-riods, but generation into opposite powers ; or in \\hatever \\ay you assume
this opposite life, whether in the mundane Cods, or in da-mons, in souls, or in
bodies, you may every \\h -re transfer the analogies from mm to things. For
o( the (Jods themselves, tit: divine Homer makes oppositions; representing
Apollo as hostile! y opposed to Neptune, Mars to Minerva, the river Xanthus to
\ ulcan, Hermes to Latoiia, and Juno to Diana. For it is requisite to survey
generation in incorporeal nature-, in bodies, and in both. // is /ikcii ixe necessary
to consider Neptune and si Julio as the Jubricators of t/tc uliole &lt;&lt;/ generation, the one
totally, but the other partially. But Juno mid Diana, us the suppliers of vivijication,
the former ratio)iully t but ths latter pliysically. Jhnerva and Mars, us the causes
f&gt;/ I ht contrariety nhieh pervades throitgli both existence and life ; the former, if
that which is dtjined according tu intellect ; but the /titter, of that which is inure ma-
tcrial and passive. Hermes and Latona, as presiding over the tu of old perj\ct u&gt;u of
suuts ; the Junner, indeed, oier the perfection :C/HC/I is obtained through the gnostic
pwcrs* and the evolution into light of productive principles ; but the latter, over (he.
smooth, spontaneous, and voluntary tlcratiun uhteh is aeijuired through the lilal
]&gt;Ktcrs. l r ulcan and Xanthus, as the primary IctnUrs of the irlnde of a corp&lt;n\ul coit-
stiiutioH, and of the pon c&gt;$ it contains ; the former, of those that uie more &lt; [hcacious ;
but the latter if those that are ihorc pa\.\n-e. and as it :icrc inoie mahnal. Jlut he
leaves Vei,ux Inj herself, in order that she nun/ il/timinale all things mlh union and
harmony, and represents her as Jighting on tin :ior.*e ttt/e, because TDK osr. in those
that l&gt;elo" to tins side, is less r.m/A/// than multitude. For all contrariety is sur-
\eyed in a be&lt;-oiiiin^ manner in eonjuiiction \\itli a unity, \\luch is either prior to
it, orcoiinasccnl \\ith, or i&gt; in a certain respect an adjunct posterior to it. And
Plato, as well as theolo^ists, rightly perceixin^ that this is the case, have delivered
a multitudinous contrariety prior to the one fabrication of the world, and parts

a is oiuitttd in the original, ami the omission of if, renders the htttT part of the sentence \ery
ambiguous.

Fur Arro/irwi here, il ii IIC|IIIM(I- to read i t/&lt;ci&gt;fr.

HOOK i.] TIM;Er.S OF PLATO. 07

prior to wholes. Finding, likewise, these tiling in inincr*"" 5 prior to paradigms he
surveys this contrariety in men, which al&gt;o has an analogous subsistence in
wholes, neither liein^ in want of Titannie or (Ji^anlie wars. For how could he
narrate such wars to .Socrates, who on the preceding day had blamed I lie poets
for devising ihiiiijs of tliis kind? I\eei\in:r, therefore, transactions from history,
in order that he miiiht not assert of the (jods (hat they ii^ht with each other, he
ascribes these battlers to men, lint through a cautious and pious analogy, transfers
them also to the (ods. For such like wars are delivered Ity divinely-inspired
poets, prior to the one order of things. Their mode, however, of narrating them,
is adapted to them, hut the present mode to Plato; the latter, in conjunction
with the political science, hein^ more moderate, hut the former, in conjunction
with the telestic art, bein^ more replete with divine inspiration. And thus much
concerning the whole of the text.

In what is said by Critias, however, the word " hear" is proverbial, and is
employed in those things to which we wish to call the attention of the hearer.
The word hear, therefore, is equivalent to receive what /.v worthy of attention. But
the word " surprizing* (arorrov) manifests that which happens contrary to expec
tation, as in the (ioririas, " // is surprizing, O Xocralc*" ^TOT* -yt w iVox^anjf) ;
or that which is paradoxical, as in the Crito, " \Vhnt a surprizing dream, So-
cratcs ;" (tog OCTOTOI/ svtx-viw &lt;n i"Vnx,saTi;j) ; or ^l&lt;e wonderful, as in the Thea-tetus,
" And it ix not tit all surprizing, but it would he much more wonderful, ij it ircrc not
a thing of f hit kind" (xai v^t-v ys aroTov, rcXXa TroXj Sau/taffrort^V ti a?; TOIOVTOJ T;V.)
But here it is assumed as that which deserves admiration. This, however, is evi
dent from what follows, in which it is said, " that the deeds of I his city were great
and admirable." iMoreo\er, the word "narration" (xoyvc\ manifests Uie truth of
what is ^oiivjj to be related. J or thus it is said in the Cior^ias, that a fable differs
from Xiyoj ; [because the latter is true, but the former is not. 3 It is also very
properly said, that " So/on icas the wisest of the seven wise men ;" as l&gt;ein^ asserted
of one who was related to Plato ; as heini; said to another Athenian, and in the
Panatlu naia- ; and as indicating that the ensuing narration extends to all wisdom.
Nor is it requisite to wonder how Solon is said to lx&gt; the wisest of all the seven
wise men, nor to be anxious to know, how he can l&gt;e said to be the wisest of other
men, but one of the wise men, when all of them were most wise. For what al&gt;-
surdity is there, in calling a man the wisest of those that are of the same order
with himself ? But his legislation, his pretended insanity at Salami s, his armed
attack of Pisistralus the tyrant, who said he was more prudent than those that

03 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

were absent, and more brave than those that were present, his conference also with
Cru sus, and his answer to one who said, that he had established most beautiful
laws; for he replied, that lie hud not established the most beautiful, but powerful
laws, and that he knew laws that were more excellent than these ; all these par
ticulars !&gt;car testimony to his vtisdom. There is, likewise, a story told of a tripod
that was draped up in a net by certain young men, though it is not related by
all historians, and lliat the oracle [of Apollo] being consulted on the occasion,
the Cod answered, that it should be i\eii to the wisest man. That in COUSIN
tjuence of this, it was offered to Thales, but he sent it to another of the seven
vise men, this again to another, and so on, till at last it came to Solon, all of
them yielding it to him. Solon, however, sent it to the Cod, saying, that he was
the wisest of beings.- Solon, also, is said to have found, that the lunar month
does nut consi&gt;t of thirty days, and on this account he was the fust that called it
iv vfov a new one, and *.., iieic. And, in short, the di&gt;co\ery, that the- numbers of
the days revert from the twentieth day, is ascribed to him. Some, also, assert,
that pricr to Anaxagoras, Solon showed that intellect presided o\er the vthole of
things. From all which it is evident, that he was a participant of a certain
wisdom.

" Solon, then, was the familiar and intimate friend of our great-grand
father Dropides, as he himself frequently 1 relates in his poems. Hut lie
once declared to our grandfather Critias. (as the old man himself informed
us) that great and admirable actions had once been achieved by this city,
which nevertheless were buried in oblivion through length of time, and
the destruction of mankind."

The history of the race of Solon, and of the alliance of Plato to him, is as fol
lows: The children of Execestides were, Solon and Dropides, and of Dropides
Critias was the son, who is mentioned by Solon in his poems, where he sings,

Hid Critias witli the yellow locks,
Attention to his father pay,

1 The same &tory is also Mil of Solon, by Diogenes Laertim, in bis life of Tbales.
* In the original twr, which I conceive to he erroneously tnuiicribed for tv nr.
3 *ci\Xayi; \&gt; omitted in tht le*t of I ioilu.

BOOK i.] TIM.ECS OF PLATO. &lt;J9

For liy rovcriii}; \\liat lie says,
\(i f.mlly leader he ll obey.

But Calla scrus and Glauco were the sons of Critias : and a^ain the Critias of the
present dialogue was the son of Calla-scrus. This, however, is evident from Cri
tias in the Charmides, calling the father of Charmides, his uncle. But Charmides
aivd INTJclione were the oHspring of Glauro: and Peru tione was the mother of
Plato. So thai Glauco was the uncle of Critias, font the father of Charmides.
And Charmides was the uncle of Plato, font Solon was the forother of the "Teat-

grandfather of Critias. Such, therefore, is the truth [respecting the race of Solon.]
Thedhine lamfolichns, however, Drives a different account of the succession of
his race. For lie immediately makes Glaueo to foe the son of Dropides. But
others, as the Platonic Theon, assert, that Critias and Glaueo were the sons of
Calhfscrus; though in the C harmides, Critias says, that " Chunnidcs is the ton of
(rldiico our tinele, but is trn/ couzi/i." Hence Glauco is not the son of Dropides,
nor ihe forothcr of the younger Critias. To a man, however, \\lio pays attention
to things, it is of no consequence in whatever manner these particulars may sufo-
sM. Pa-sin^ on, therefore, to things, &gt;ou may assume from these particulars as
images, that all the discord of (lie \\nrld. and tin- twofold co-ordinations that are
in it, are suspended Irniu proximate demiurgic causes, and an- referred to other
more intellectual and ancient causes ; that the causes of (his motion are ronti-
nuoiiN and united, and suspended from one cause; that the superior causes are
more ancient in intellection; and that secondary receive the production of primary
natures, dillT from and yet have a connascent communion vtith them. In addi
tion to these tilings also, you may assume, (hat a two/old ublirictl /v j mluccd in
souls af the I In or &lt;/ of ir n til anil adinirulilc n lmlfx, arising cither fr&lt;&gt;in hating abandoned
for a Itnt j; tin,? a /i/ c a/ that l,iit&lt;/, or through /itirit/g Jnlltn immoderately into gene-
tion. I nr tins is far tin nul nitin to be truly corrupted. But souls that have fooen
recently perfected, and retain the memory of things in the intclligifole \\orld, in
conse(|uence of not falling into matter, easily acquire a reminiscence of the truth.
And thus much for these particulars. We must not, however, wonder, if Critias
calls Solon simply -A familiar. For we not only call those with whom we asso
ciate, font also our kindred, fiiiutiarx. But foy likewise adding, k and an intimate
J~ricnd, n he indicates, that there was not merely a communion of race, font a same
ness and similitude of life, in the ancestors of I lato. The prior Critias, also, is
called an old man, which signifies his possession of prudence and intellect, and his
being adapted to many disciplines.

PROCLUS ON THF. [BOOK i.

" In particular, lie informed me of one undertaking surpassing in
magnitude all tlie rest, which I now think proper to relate to you, both
that I may repay my obligations, and that by such a relation 1 may offer
my tribute of praise to the Goddess in the present solemnity, by cele
brating her divinity, as it were, with hymns, justly, and in a manner
agreeable to truth."

Longinus doubts what was the intention of Plato in the insertion of this narra
tion. Tor he does not introduce it either for the purpose of ivin^ respite to the
auditor*, or as being in want of it. And he dissolves ihe douht, as he thinks, by
saying, that it is assumed by Plato prior to physiology, in order to allure the
reader, and .soften the severity of that kind of writing. l&gt;ut On^en says, that the
narration is indeed a fiction, and so far he agrees with ISumenius and his fol
lowers, hut he docs not admit \\ith Lon-inus, that it was devised for the sake of
pleasure. lie does not, however, add the cause of the fiction. \Ve, therefore,
have frequently said, that it contribute-, to the whole theory of nature; and we
likewi-e say, that iu these words, Plato calls the one and common productive
principle of the l\\ofold co-ordinations in the world, and the one contrariety
which pervade- through wholes, the greatest and most admirable of works, as
containing the other fabrication of things in infrangible bond-, tliis fabrication
eonsiMing of partic -ipations of tlie contraries bo\uid and infmitv, as Philolaus
says, and as 4 lato also a-serts in the. Philebus. For he there says, " that there is
much bnnnd and nittch infinity in the world, tr /licit arc things most onttnin/ toiuch other,
and give coin/i/t tton to tliix n/iircrtc." Since, however, all things that contribute to
the production of the world, are said to recompense the benefits bestowed by total
causes, Critias sa\s \cry properly, that it becomes him to repay his obligations to
Socrates, who excited both the .second and third powers. These things, there
fore, may lie immediately assumed [from the words before us.]

But will you not say, that the Minenal solemnity has an indication of demi
urgic works? For the ( loddess herself indeed, connectedly contains all the mun
dane fabrication, and possesses intellectual li\es in herself, according to which
she weaves together the. uni\crse, and unifying power. s, according to which she
governs all the mundane oppositions. The .Minerval solemnity, ho\ve\er, indi
cates the i;ifl of the (Joddess which pervades through all things, and fills all
things with herself, and likewise the union which extends through all variety.

HOOK i.] TiM/EUS OF PLATO.

For in solemnities, \ve especially embrace :i common and concordant life. If,
however, wo have asserted (lieso things rightly, we may from these transfer our
selves to tlie \arioiis and one life of the world, and survey the difference lctween
the Parmeiiidcs and lliis dialogue. For both lia\e tlirir hypothesis in the Pana-
thena-a ; hut the t ormer in the greater, and the latter in the lesser of these; solem
nities. For thry were celehrated ahout the same time with the Bcndidian festival;
and this very properly. For since the productions of Minerva are twofold, total
and partial, supermundane and mundane, intelligible and sensible; the former of
these solemnities indeed, pertains to the exempt productions of the Goddess,
unfolding into liu.ht the intelligible series of the Gods, hut the latter to her sub
ordinate productions, interpreting the powers of the Gods ahout the world. And
the Bendidian festival, indeed, appears to manifest the suppression of the con
trariety externally acceding to the universe from a Barbarric temjK st, by the
Gods who are the in^pective guardians of the festival. Hence it is said to have
been celebrated in the I ir.rus as beiiv^ most adapted to the extremities, and
material parts of the unit erse. But the Panathena an festival, exhibits the esta
blished order which proceeds into the world from intellect, and the unconfiiscd
separation of mundane contrarieties. For this Goddess is at one and the same
time, a lover of wisdom, and a lo\erofwar. Another veil, therefore, was referred
to the Goddess [in (he lleudidian festival,] representing the war in which the
pii))ils of Minerva \\ere victorious ; ju^t as the veil in the Panatheiuean solemnity,
represented the G ants \aiiifiiished by the Olympian Gods. The Goddex, how
ever, is celebrated with hymns, justly and with truth; ///A-//;/, indeed, because it is
ncce&gt;-ar\ that every tiling which has proceeded, should be converted to its pro
per principle ; but with truth, because the hymn is assumed through things and
through beings. And because of hymns, some celebrate the essence, but others
the providence of the Gods, ami others praise the works that proceed from them, 1
and a hymn of this kind is the last form of celebration; (for the praise of the
divine essence precedes all other panegyrics, as Socrates asserts in the Banquet)
this heini; the case, the words " celebrating a.s it were," are very properly
added. For he wishes to celebrate the Goddess from the deeds performed
by the Athenians. But that the. Panathena?an followed tin: Bendidian fes
tivals, is asserted both by the commentators, and by Aristotle the Ilhodian.
For they say, that the Bendidia were celebrated in the Piraeus on the

For air UITOV her*, it is necessary to read air aurwr.

PROCLUS OK THE [HOOK i.

tvrentieth day of April; but that the festival sacred to Minerva followed
these.

" Soc. You speak well. But what is this ancient achievement, which
Critias once heard from Solon, and which is not narrated in history, but
was once actually accomplished by this city."

Socrates exciting Crilias lo narration, requests that ho would relate the mighty
undertaking which the ancient Critias said lie had heard from Solon, and which
though nut much cclehraled, yet \\ a&gt; really performed. In which, this in the first
place deserves to he considered, that many things happen in tin; universe of which
the ninltitiule are ignorant. .And in tliis, \\ortli\ men dill er from others, that
they see things of this kind, and understand the exents that take place. But
it is worth \\liile secondly to o!&gt;ser\e that the more perfect causes, rejoice in sim
plicity, and proceed from things of a composite natme, to Mich as are first. Hut
Mihordinate beings on the contrary, descend from things simple to things compo
site. J or tlms also here Socrates ncuis from lh.it \\ hich is downward as tar as
to Solon, in an ascending progression; hut Critias on the contrary, descends
from Solon to the mention of himself.

"Cm. I will acquaint you with that ancient history, which I did not
indeed receive from a youth, but from a man very much advanced in
years. "

Longinns here again ohserves, that Plato pays attention to elegance of diction,
hy narrating the same things dillcrently. I - or he calls the undertaking ap%*H&gt;v t
hut the iiiirrtitiuH T^X /IO.,-, and ttit tinm, nt u i/mil/t ; though as he signifies the
same thin;; through all these, he mi-lit ha\e deiiominaled all of them after the
same manner. Lonu,inns, therefore, as 1 lotinns said of him, was a philologist,
hut not a philosopher. Ori^en, ho\ve\er, dors not admit that Plato is studious of
artificial delight and certain ornaments of diction, hut that he pays attention to
spontaneous and unadorned credibility, and accuracy in imitations. This mode
also of expression has spontaneity, as heini; adapted to erudition. I or it was
rightly said hy Aristoxemis, the lyric poet, that the dispositions of philosophers
extend as far as to sounds, and exhihit in all things the arrangement \\hich they
possess \junt I thin!:, as this mi^/itt/ heaven, exhibits in ils transfigurations clear

i.] TIM;EUS OF PLATO. 73

images of the splendor of intellectual perceptions ; being moved in conjunction with
the unapparcnt periods of intellectual natures. The great lamblichus, however,
thinks that we should rather refer the variety of the words to things, and see how
in nature contraries are vanquished by the one ; how the one is varied, and how
great a mutation the same productive principles exhibit; subsisting in oneway
in the intellect of the universe, in another, in soul, in another, in nature, and in
the last place, subsisting in matter. And again, unfolding about matter a most
abundant difference in conjunction with similitude. For these observations are
worthy the conceptions of Plato, and not a solicitous attention to diction.

" For at that time Critias, as he himself declared, was almost ninety
years old, and I was about ten."

These three persons are assumed, as having preserved this history, or mytho
logy, Solon, the ancient Critias, and this junior Critias ; because perfect causes
precede the fabrication of the World, and perfective causes are antecedent to the
subjects of their government. The elder Critias, however, heard this narration
from Solon, one from one ; from the elder Critias it was heard by the junior Cri
tias and Amynamlcr; and from the junior Crilias three persons received it. For
the monad proceeds through the duad to the perfective providence of wholes.
The numbers also of the ages, have much alliance to the things themselves. Fur
the decad manifests the conversion of all mundane natures to the one ; and ninety the
restitution again to the monad, in conjunction with progression. Rut both numbcrt
arc symbolical of the world. You may say, therefore, that Solon is analogous to
the cause of permanency; but the former Crilias, to the cause which supplies
progression ; and the present Critias to the cause which converts and conjoins
things which have proceeded, to their causes. And the first of these, indeed,
preserves the relation of a ruling and leading cause ; the second, of the cause which
comes into contact with mundane fabrication in a liberated manner; and the
third, of that which now pays attention to the universe, and governs the ntundanr
war.

** When, therefore, that solemnity was celebrated among us, which is
known by the name of Curcotis Apaturiorum, nothing was omitted which

Instead of wyKirov^rrai ran cicovwr ayarrrt wfptoiou, it is necessary to read, myrirov/jrraf rat*
(&lt;*&gt;. . X.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. K

7 4 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

boys during that festivity are accustomed to perform. For when our
parents had set before us the rewards proposed for the contest of singing
verses, both a multitude of verses of many poets were recited, and many
of us especially sung the poems of Solon, because they were at that time
entirely new.

The Apaturia was a festival sacred to Bacchus, on account of the duel between
Melanthus and Xanthus the Bu-otian, and the victory of Melanthus through
deception; the Bu-otians and Athenians waging war with each other for
(Knoe. But this festival was celebrated for three days; of w hich the first day
Mas called ava^vnj,-, because many sacrifices were performed in it ; and the victims
were called avai^uara, because they t. ere dra:m njward, am! sacrificed. The second
day was called o7na ; for on this day there icere splendid banquets and much
feasting. lint the third day was called xv^emr*.,- ; for mi this day buys, three or
four t/cnr* old, z.&lt; r&lt; enrol/id in t/uir trilns. On this das also, such boys as were
more sagacious than the rest, sung certain poems, and those were victorious who
retained the greater number of them in their memory. They sang, however, the
poems of the ancients. But wilhr.-peet to tin tribes, it must be observed, that
after Ion there were four families, but from Cli-lln lies ten, and that after these,
each twelve of the families was divided into three: the tribes were arranged into
the same family and company, as being allied to each other : the enrolment of the
boy.s was into tin se tribes ; and this day, as we have before observed, was called
Cureotis, from the bo\s that weie enrolled. And such is the information derived
from history.

Again, however, let us direct our attention to things, and behold these in the
particulars that have been narrated, as in images. The festival, therefore, of the
Apatmia, which had for its pretext the victory of the Athenians, pertains to the
hypothesis according to which the Athenians conquered [the Atlantic*], and all
intellectual subdue material natures. Deception, likewise, is adapted to mundane
forms which separate themselves from imparlible and immaterial principles, and
become apparent, instead of truly-existing U ings. But the enrolment of the
bays, imitates the arrangements of partial wills into their proper allotments, and
their descents into different generations. The festival is an imitation of the
eternal hilarity in the world: for if it is tilled with &lt;iods, it celebrates a perpetual
festival. But the cuntct .s i,f rliapsmly, are analogous to the contests which souls
sustain, weaving their own life together with the universe. And the rhapsody

BOOK i.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 75

itself, resembles the above-mentioned woven life of the universe. For this ha* an
imitation of intellectual forms, in the same manner as the contests of rhapsody
have of heroic actions and manners, possessing together with an harmonious
conjunction, a connected series. The many pnctnx r&gt;f many })&lt;&gt;?(*, adumbrate the
many natures, and many cireum-miindane productive powers, 1 and, in short, the
division of physical imitations. Hut the nc~r jtocnix, are images of forms ulueh
art; perpetually flourishing, always perfect and prolific, and able, to operate effica
ciously on other things. And thus much concerning these particulars.

Mention, however, is made of the poems of Solon, not as of a poet in the popu
lar sense of the word, but as of one who mingled philosophy with poetry. For of
mnndane works likewise, and whole productions, a royal intellect is the leader.
And the praise is related as being mentioned to another person, i. e. to Amynan-
der, because, as we learn in the Pha-drus, that which judges differs from that
which makes and generates. Referring, however, all that has been said, to the
universe, we may infer as from images, that partial souls, partial natures, and
partible forms, and of these, those especially that are always new and efficacious*,
contribute to the mundane war. But all these are connected together by the
Gods, who are the mspective guardians of fabrication, and are co-arranged with
one world, one harmony, and one kindred life.

" But then one of our tribe, whether ho was willing to gratify Critias,
or whether it was his real opinion, affirmed that Solon appeared to him
to he most wise in other concerns, and in things respecting poetry, the
most ingenuous and free of all poets. Upon hearing this, the old man
(for I very well remember) was vehemently delighted ; and said, laughing
If Solon, O Amynander, had not engaged in poetry as a casual affair,
but had made it as others do a serious employment ; and if through sedi
tions and other fluctuations of the state in which he found his country
involved, he had not been compelled to neglect the completion of the
history which he brought from Egypt, I do not think that either IJe&gt;iod
or Homer, or any other poet, would have acquired greater glory and
renown."

Here again, the lovers of diction may indicate to their admirers, tiiat Plato
1 The word Xyoi it. I conceive, omitted in the original in thi place.

76 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

cautiously praises the poetry of Solon, since he represents the praise as bestowed
by a private individual, and for the sake of others, and not as given by one who
K pokc conformably to intellect and reason. For Plato, if any one, was a most
excellent judge of poets, as Longimw also admits. Heraclides Ponticus there
fore says, that Chu-rilus and Antimachus beina: at that time most renowned,
Plato preferred the poems of the latter to those of the former, and that he per
suaded Ileraclides at Colophon, to collect the poems of Antimachus. In vain,
then-fore, is it futilely observed by Callimachus and Duris, that Plato was not a
sufficient judge of ports. Hence, what is hero said manifests the judgment of the
philosopher, and it may be considered in a more historical point of view. The
investigator, however, of tilings, will think it requisite to show how all the
causes of the orderly distribution of the universe, and also the causes that are
connective of contrariety, are extended to one principle, and how the last
adhere through media to the first of things. For thus those who receive the
narration of the ancient Critias, are extended to him, but he looks to Solon.
Ami he, indeed, admires the poetic power of Solon ; but they, through Critias as
a medium, are referred to the poetry of Solon. For gratifying the former [i. e.
Critias], they praise the poetry of the hitter. But what is it that Critias says
respecting Solon ? That he was subordinate to divinely-inspired poets, from
these two causes; because he engaged in poetry as a casual affair; and because
when he came from Egypt, he found the city of the Athenians in a state of sedi
tion, and that he was not able, his country being involved in difficulties, to com
plete the history, which he brought from thence hither. What the history there
fore was, he informs us as he proceeds.

From these tilings, however, as images, Plato manifests, that Trhat is primarily
demiurgic, and every thing effective, have other primary energies ; but that their
secondary energy is the production of secondary things. Likewise, that the con
fused, disorderly, and unstable nature of matter, frequently does not receive
ornament from more divine causes, but subsists without symmetry to the gift
which proceeds from them. Hence, second and third powers are unfolded into
liilht, which proximately adorn its formless nature. Solon, therefore, being most
ingenuous, and imitating exempt causes, did not deliver through poetry the
Atlantic war. But Critias, and those posterior to him, transmit the account of
this war to others, imitating second and third causes, who produce the variety of

1 For uAAa evfipiTpun in this place, it it necessary to read, aAY a&lt;rv^erp.

BOOI i.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 77

effective principles, and the orderly distribution of things, which is harmonized
from contraries into a visible subsistence. Moreover, the assertion that Solon
was the icisctt of the seven wise men, exhibits his analogy to the first principles.
And his being most free, adumbrates the power which is exempt, and established
in itself, and which (ills all things in a liberated manner. A thing of this kind
likewise concurs with the wise man, as Ix ing immaterial, without a master, and
of itself. The ancient Critias, also, being said to be old, indicates a cause which
is intellectual, and remote from generation. For" wisdom" says Plato, "and true
opinions are most desirable things to him icho has arrived at old age." Again, the
assertion of Critias, that he vert/ well remembers, exhibits to our view the salvation
of eternal productive powers, and the stable energy of secondary causes, about
such as are first. But Solon engaging in poetry as a casual affair, represents to us
that production. 1 ; into secondary natures, hare only a secondary rank among first
causes. For their first energies are intellectual, according to which they are united to
the beings prior to themselves.

If, however, some one omitting the survey of things, should consider through
what cause Plato introduced these particulars, according to their apparent
meaning, he will very properly find that they contributed to the thing proposed.
For the design of Plato was to narrate the Atlantic war. But it was requisite
that the messenger of this history should neither deceive nor be deceived.
Hence also, Solon is said to have been most wise, and intimately acquainted
with those about Critias. For as a wise man, he was not deceived, and as being
an intimate acquaintance, he would not deceive. It was likewise requisite, that
the receiver of this history should neither have been aged, in order that the narra
tion may appear to be ancient, nor yet so young, as to be forgetful. Hence, Cri
tias is supposed to have lx&gt;en a youth, but smTicicntly able to remember, and in
consequence of this, to have contended with others in rhapsody, in which much
memory is necessary.

Farther still, it was requisite, that the ancient Critias should not commit such
like narrations to very young men, lest they should appear to them to be con
temptible. Hence, it is very properly said, that some one of the tribes, by enquiry
of Solon, heard the history. But it was requisite that he also should, in a certain
respect, have been familiar with Solon, in order that the old man might oppor
tunely relate all the history to him. Hence, likewise, the praises of the poetry of

For &lt;ropiffc*Xijrf read ra

78 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

Solon precede the history ; the praise being given by Amy nan tier in order to gra
tify Critias. And thus much concerning the disposition of what is said in the

text.

That Solon, however, vent to Kgypt, not only for the purpose of obtaining
the Atlantic history, but likewise; that the Athenians, during his absence, obeyed
his laws, which he had bound them by an oath not to violate, is e\ident. i or
during this time, also, he associated with Crojsns, and sailed to Egypt ; but on his
return, he Ix-came master of the city, which was in a tumultuous condition through
the l isi&gt;tratida-. And thus much we have derived from history. Origen, how
ever, doubts how I lato calls Solon most free : for this is not an encomium adapt
ed to a poet. And he dissohes the doubt by saying, that he is so (ailed, either
because he spent his money liberally, or because he used the greatest freedom of
speech ; and that on this account he \\as five, without any timidity in his poetical
compositions. Or lie \\as .so denominated, as being in his poetry remiss and un-
compelled. But lamblichus says, that no one of these solutions is true, but that
through this appellation, the lil&gt;t.rated condition of the intellect of Solon, the un~
.senile nature of his \iitue, and that which was venerable in his character, and
which transcended all other things, are signified. The same interpreter also savs,
th.it the laughter of Crilias manifests a generative progression from causes, perfect,
and rejoicing in its progeny. But the remembering ^&lt;7/, indicates the sahation of
effective principles in the world. \\liy, therefore, was Solon anxious to deliver
the Atlantic war in verse ? Because, says he, all natural \\orks and the mundane
contrariety subsist through imitation. I or this is analogous to its effective and
primary causes; just as Critias is analogous to proximate and secondary causes.
But why was he prevented by sedition ? Because material motions and material
tumult become an impediment, as we ha\c before ubsened, to the productive
jo\\ers of mundane causes.

44 III consequence of this, Amynumler enquired of Critias what that
history was. To which lie; answered, that it was concerning an a flair,
which ought most justly to he the greatest and most iciiowncd which this
city ever accomplished ; though through length of time, ami the destruc
tion of those by whom it was undertaken, the fame of its execution has
not reached the present age."

Longinus says, that something is wanting here to render the sense complete

ROOK i.] TIM/EL S OF PLATO. 79

J or tlic word considered is wanting to the words most justly to /&lt;*, because these
are required in what follows, 1ml not the word ovo-r^, being. Porphyry, however,
says, that Longinus did not perceive, that, in consequence of the undertaking
l&gt;cing the greatest, hut not yet celebrated, Plato adds, " ought woxt justly to be
most rcnou nal" lint we, directing our attention to things, say, that Plato calls it
the greatest uttdcrlakiti", as bringing with it an image of all contrariety, extending
itself every where. And that he denominates it most renvu:ncd, as contributing to
the visible fabrication of things. For thus, also, the works of nature are called by
Orpheus renoicncd.

Boundless eternity, and nature s works

Ilcnmvn d, remain.

" Relate this a flair, Critias, says Amynandcr, from the beginning,
and inform us what that transaction was, how it was accomplished, and
from whom Solon having heard it, narrated it as a fact."

I. e. llelate what this admirable deed was, how, or after what manner it
was performed, how it became known to, and by &gt;\hom being preserved, it reach
ed the hearing of Solon. Plato appears, through this, to investigate the whole
form of contrariety, how it was effected, or may be. known, and from what causes,
to us invisible, it is suspended. Before, therefore, he recurred through relatives
to the narration of Solon ; but now he investigates the superior histories of it, or,
that I may speak clearer, the principles of the fabrication of this contrariety. And
by directing your attention to this narration, you may survey, as in images, through
certain symbols, all the principles of this fabrication, as far as to the first causes
of it.

" There is, then, says he, a certain region of Kgypt, called Delta, about
the summit of which the streams of the Nile are divided, and in which
there is a province called Saitical."

In the first place, it is worth while to observe how the narration always delivers

.things comprehended, proceeding from such as are more comprehensive ; from

Egypt, indeed, the river, from this Delta, from this the Saitic province, and from

tin s Sa i s, sacred to Minerva. In the next place, having observed this, it will be

80 PROCLUS ON THE [BOO* i.

proper to ascent! through the analogy of these things, to the first and most com
prehensive causes of fabrication. For you may perceive this supcrnally compre
hended by more total causes, and proceeding as far as to the last of tilings ; com
prehending causes every where preceding sch as are comprehended ; the more
total, such as arc more partial; and the impartible fabrication, that which is parti
ble, and is (It-nominated recent ; to which also the present words refer the father
of the narration. And this fabrication, indeed, is filled from these causes, and
particularly participates of the undented power of Minerva. For, in short, since
we refer this war, for the sake of which tin: whole narration is excited, to the
mundane contrariety, it will be well, proceeding in the same way, to assimilate
all the knowledge of the Egyptian priests to the former [or impartible] fabrica
tion, which stably comprehends the productive powers contained in the universe ;
but the history of Solon, which is always recent, and placed in mutations, to the
more no&gt;cl fabrication, and which administers the all-various circulations of mun
dane natures. "NYe shall also be benefited by perceiving how, in images, the dif
ference between human anil di\ine fabrication* becomes apparent; and how, in
these, Solon, indeed, calls on the priest to the developement of ancient transac
tions, but the priest knows both such events as are reckoned ancient by the
Creeks, and prior to these, such as are truly ancient. For thus also, in divine
fabrications, that which is recenf or junior, is converted to that which is more an
cient, and is perfected by it ; hut the latter antecedently comprehends the causes
of the former, and is established above it, by still greater and more perfect intel
lectual perceptions and powers. And thus much concerning the w hole of the
text.

It is necessary, however, to discuss every particular. With respect to Egypt,
therefore, some call it an image of matter; others of the whole earth, as bein^c
divided analogously t( it ; and others of the intelligible, and the intelligible es
sence, liut we say, that in what is here asserted, it is assimilated to the whole
invisible order, which is the principle of visible natures. With respect to Delta
also, it is produced from the Nile, being divided about the Sa itic province, so as
to make its egress from one riu r ht line to the right and left, and to the sea, the
sea forming the hypothenuse of the triangle, which Plato calls the Sa itic province ;
indicating, in what he here says, that it is that about which the stream of the Nile
is diuded. It is, however, analogous to the one vivific fountain of all divine life,
and, in visible natures, to the celestial triangle which is connective t&gt;f all generation,
!eing proximate to the ram, which the Egyptians particularly honor, on account

BOOK i.l TTM/EUS OF PLATO. 81

of Atntnon having the fare of a ram, and also because the ram is the principle of
veneration, and is moral with (fie greatest celerity, as beiutr among the constellations
established about the equinoctial. The mention, therefore, of Delta is here very
appropriate : since the triangle., as we shall learn in what follows, is the principle
of the hypo-itasis of the mundane elements. But the Nile is to be arranged ana
logous to the y.odiac, as being situated under if, having an inclination similar to
it, and imitating, through its divisions, the obliquity of it. and its division aliout
I he equinoctial points. The Nile also is a symbol of the life which i.v pmtrcd on the
whole i or/t/. Moreover, the two sides of the ISile, \\hich run into the se;i from the
summit [of Delta], may be, in a certain resjM-ct. assimilated to tho two co-ordina
tions, which proceed from one root as far as to generation, and of which genera
tion is the recipient. So that a triangle is produced from them and their common
receptacle, into which they conjointly flow. But the Sa itic province, which forms
a great part of Delta, participates also of a great portion of the celestial regions.
Sa is, therefore, must le sacerdotally referred to the constellation called the Bear,
not because it is situated under it, nor on account of its coldness, but as partici
pating of a certain pecidiar elllux of the (iod [who presides over that constellation].
Hence likewise Sa i s is not shaken by earthquakes, in consequence of receiving a
firm establishment on account of the place alnmt the pole.

" Of this province, the greatest city is Sais, from which also king A ma-
sis derived his origin. The city has a presiding divinity, whose name is,
in the Egyptian tongue, Neith, but in the Greek Athena, or Minerva.
The inhabitants of this city were very friendly to the Athenians, to whom
also they said they were after a certain manner allied."

The word voixoc, or province, derived its appellation from the distribution of
land. For thus the Egyptians called divisions of the great parts of Egypt. But
from the city the whole province was denominated Sa itic, just as Sctannytic is
denominated from Sebennetus, and Canobic from Canobus. Amasis, however, is
now assumed analogous to Solon. Eor he paid attention to wisdom and justice
beyond all the (other Egyptian] kings. He is therefore conjoined with Solon,
and has the same relation to him, which the city has to Athens ; in order that we
may survey the cities and the men adorned by the Goddess [Minerva} as from
one monad, and secondary natures always perfected from such as are more per-
Tim. Plat. VOL. I. L

H 2 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

feet. CallisthcncH, however, ami Phanodenms relate, that the Athenians were
the fathers of the Saita*. But Theopompus, on the contrary, says, that they were
a colony of them. The Platonic Atticus says, that Theopompus altered the his
tory through envy. For, according to him, some of the inhabitants of Sai s came
to renew their alliance with the Athenians. But IMato only says thus much con
cerning them, " that the SniUe were very friendly tn the Athenians, uml after a cer
tain manner allieil to them." It is possible, ho\\e\er, that he mii;ht say this on
account of the tutelar (Joddess of the city being the same \\ith the Minerva of the
Athenians.

\Vith respect, however, to this (Joddess the guardian of the two cities, it is
requisite to know, that proceeding from intelligible and intellectual causes through
tlie supcrcelestial orders, to certain parts of the celestial regions and terrene dis
tributions, she is allotted places adapted to herself; not imparting an adventitious
government of herself, luit antecedently comprehending the essence and form of
it, and thus possessing this allotment in a manner adapted to herself. That the
government, howe\er, of this (Joddess extend* supernall) as far as to the last
of things, the (Greeks manifest liy assertinjr tliat she \\as-enerated from the head
of Jupiter. Hut the J^vplians relate, that in the ad\ turn of the (Joddess there
was this inscription, / am the things that are, thai mil In-, and that have been.
\o one has crcr laid upen the garment by -.ihich I am concealed. The Jiuit ir/nch J
brought Jorth wv/.v the *un. The (Joddess, therefor*-, ln-ini; demiur-ic, and at the
same time apparent and nnapparent, lias an allotment in the heavens, and illu
minates generation \\ith forms. J or of the tign* / the Zodiac, the ram is
ascribed to the (/W./t.j,v, and the equinoctial circle itself, it here especially a junccr
motive, of the universe is established. She i.s vi-ry proper!}, tlu refore, c-alled by
Plato a lover of wisdom, and a lover of war, and he no\\ denominatr.s her the
leader of these allotments in tlie earth. In the first place, likewise, he honours
the (Joddess in the lani;ua^e of liis country. For tlie Athenians denominate the
tutelar (Joddess of the city .Irche^eten, or the leader, ceh hrating her surname,
and her presiding po\\cr. In tlu&gt; next place, he indicates the uniform pre-
estahlished comprehension in herself, of tin- allotnu-nts which an 1 governed by
her. And U-sidcs this he clearly represents to us, that it is possible for the same

1 The furim-r part of tin-, HIM ri|&gt;tion is to \&gt;e fount! in IMutanh * treatise on Uis and Osiris; hut
llit latter (Kirt of it, tiz. thrjruit ichich I brvugh! forth teat thr inn, i* only to be found in these
Coinmeiitanes of Proclus. Tlie urigiual of tins part is, nv tyu kUjixuy frinvv t)\wi tytvtro.

&gt;OK i.] TIM/KUS OF rLATO.

things to be signified through many words, since words are images of the
signified by them. For many statues may be formed of one thing from different
materials; so that the Egyptians preserve the analogous, 1 because they call the
Goddess by a name which has the same signification with that of the Greeks.
Nor is it at all wonderful that both should denominate her rightly, in consequence
ot establishing the name according to one science. If, therefore, there is one
tutelar Goddess of the two cities Sai s and Athens, the inhabitants of Sai s are
very properly said to be lovers of the Athenians, as being in a certain respect
allied to them : for the aflinity is not wholly perfect. For some may participate
more and others less of the same providence. And some may participate of one,
but others of another power contained in the Goddess. For again, it ix likewise
iicccs.vary to f,nic ////*, that a variation is produced in different nations from the placet
vlucli they severally inhahil, from the temperature of the air, from hal&gt;itu&lt;le to the
heat-ens, and still more partially from spermatic productive powers, llttt you may say,
that they especially differ according to the gregal government of the Gods, and the
direr si t us of the tutelar powers, from ichich you will find a difference in colour, figure,
voice, and motion, in different places. So that those who migrate into other count rict

frequently change, I&gt;y duelling in those countries, their colour and roice ; just as
plants are changed together with the quality of the region, when they are trans
planted in a foreign land.

" In this country Solon, on his arrival tint her, was, as he himself
relates, very honourably received. And on his inquiring about ancient
affairs of those priests who possessed a knowledge, of such particulars
superior to other., lie perceived that neither himself, nor any one of the
Greeks (as he himself declared), had any knowledge of things of this
kind. "

Solon, on account of his political wisdom, and on account of the dignity and
worth of his city, justly appeared to be deserving of honor to the priests of Sai s.
Hut he found, with respect to memory and history, among the Greeks, that
neither himself, nor any other Grecian, had any knowledge of very ancient
transactions. The remembrance, however, of such transactions, contributes
indeed to political virtue, and also contributes to the theory of the mundane

* For Awmi/i niroAeycr in this place, 1 read uovtrir nraXoyor.

84 PROCLUS ON THE [IOOK i.

periods, which Solon being desirous to know, and interrogating for this purpose
the priests, found that he was perfectly deficient in knowledge of tin s kind.
These things, likewise, are symbols of divine concerns. For a certain fabrication
or workmanship, is called by theologists recent. But this is particularly
honoured [as being suspended] 1 from the father of wholes, and from the intelligi
ble Gods, with \\hointhere are intellectual perceptions exempt from other things,
and which have more eternal natures for their objects. But those intellectual
perceptions are more partial anil less excellent, \\hicli are in secondary natures.
And farther still, there is such a difference in demiurgic principles, that some of
them are comprehensive of more total, but others of more partial form*. And
some of them precede in dignity and power, but others are recent as with refe
rence to them, and possess a subordinate power.

" Hence, when lie once desired to excite them to the relation of pris
tine transactions, he tor this purpose began to discourse about those most
ancient events which formerly happened among us. I mean the tradi
tions concerning the first Phoroneus anil Niobe ; and after thetleluge, of
Deucalion and Pyrrha (as described by the mythologists), together with
their posterity ; at the same time paying a proper attention to the di lie-
rent ages in which these events are said to have taken place."

Of such a nature as this are all divine causes : for they call forth more divine
powers, and through this evocation, are filled from them with more di\ine and
total intellections ; Mich as is now al&gt;o effected by Solon. For extending to the
Egyptian priests the most ancient transactions of the Greeks, he in a certain
respect leads them to the narration of their antiquities; of -^hich (lie Egyptians
participate in a remarkable degree, as thai ,w//Tri/ icltliout ii&gt;i]&gt;&lt;. d unent the celestial
bodies, through the purity of the air, anil preserve ancient n&lt;.moriuls, in consei/ucm-e of
not being destroyed either b\i uahr orjirc. lint the Assyrians, sayx [(tmblichus, hace
nut only preserved the memorials of &even and twenty myriad? of years, as Uifiparchun
says they hare, but ltk;~cise of the vhulc tipocatttttasc. i and periods of the secen rulers vj
the ~uorld. So that tliis being admitted, there is still less reason to compare \\itli
these memorials the much-celebrated archa-ology of the Greeks: from which

The words wi ti&gt;;//r)^m apptar to me to be wanting in ibis plate in the original.

itouk i.] TIM. -EL S Ol ; PLATO. 5

likewise it is evident, that the present narration does not look to that which is
small, hut to the whole and the uiuTerse.

.Farther still, the archa-ology of the Greeks is different with different [Grecian
cities]. For with the Athenians it proceeds as far as to Erichthonius, who was a
native of Athens : but with the Arrives, as far as to i horoneus and Niol&gt;e. For
these two are with the Greeks the most ancient. For Argos descended from
iSiohe; lint from him lasos and Pelasgos, from whom Argos was denominated
iYlasgic. The particulars, however, respecting Deucalion and 1 vrrha, that a
delude taking place, they were preserved in Parnassus, and how miiiratin:; from
thence, they restored the human race, are manifest, and also that antiquity with
the Tliessalians is as far as to these. But according to some, the Argolie race
Infills from Inachns, hut that of the Athenians from Cecrops, each of whom was
prior to Deucalion. Solon, therefore, relating these and such-like particulars,
causes the Egyptian priests to narrate their antiquities. We shall however see,
what one of the ancient priests said respecting the narration of Solon. Ami these
tilings, indeed, will IM- evident through what follows. Solon, however, met at
Sai s with a priest called I ateneit ; hut at Ileliopolis, with a priest called Ochlapi ;
and at Sehennytns, with one. whose name was Ethimon, as we learn from the
histories of the Egyptians. And |&gt;erhaps it was the priest of Sa i s, who says as
follows to Solon :

" But upon this, one of those more ancient priests exclaimed, O
Solon, Solon, you Greeks are always children, nor is there an aged
Greek among you."

The Egyptian priest is ancient, in order that while he reprotes he may not l&gt;e
intolerable, and may have a probable reason for teaching about archaeology. But
he employ* a repetition of the name of Solon, not only as striving l&gt;eyond measure
in what he is about to say, but al&lt;o for the purpose of indicating the circulation of
things from the same to the same, which the more total causes of things gene
rated in the universe, comprehend stably and intellectually, through indelible
knowledge ; to which causes the priest is analogous. lie accuses, however, the
Greeks as being always children, because they have not acquired the all- various
wisdom of the Egyptians, but bear servile hairs in their soul. Juvenility, there
fore, indicates their want of wisdom. Or this privation of wisdom arises from
the frequent destructions of them, so that before they become truly ancient, they

M PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

hocome again juvenile through destruction. Or it is because ancient deeds are
not preserved by them ; but their knowledge is always confined to present events,
and such as sense apprehends. But with the F^yptians, past transactions are
always present through memory, as if they were recent. Anil the remembrance
is through history. But the history is fiom pillars, in which tiling paradoxical
and worthy of admiration, whether in actions or inventions, are inscribed. AYhy,
however, it may be said, does this priest accn.se the Greeks w ith such severity ?
J : or what is there admirable in his narration, since, as the noble Ileraclitus says,
a rtry learned knotrledge of past transactions docs not produce intellect ? But
if that which Eudoxus says is true, that the Egyptians call a month a year,
the enumeration of many of these years, \\ill not be attended with any tiling won
derful. Il was idle, therefore, in the Eiryptian priest to tliink highly of himself for
the knowledge of transactions in these. Or, though, -in Aristotle says, it is impossi
ble that memory and seine should be effective of science, y&lt;t at the suinc time it must be
admitted, that they contribute to the reminiscence of wholes. For by relating in many
things many similar circumstances, we produce one form of them, and finding
frequently from history concordant apocatasta-es of many tilings, we recur to the
one cause of them. For thus the observations O f t) lr aHections of the air were
framed by Calippio, and the knowledge from astmlo-y of the celestial motions.
And thus much in answer to the doubt.

Aiiain, however, let MS recur to the theory of wholes, and there survey Ihcjuiiior
fabrication, held together by .Minerva, and filled fiom more ancient and primoije-
nial causes. For from thence this fabrication possessing stability proceeds, 1 on
account of an exempt cause, and contributes to the mundane contrariety. For
every thin , in the demiurgic profession whidi is distributed into parts and mul
tiplied, proceeds on account of that principle. As, therefore, there are causes in
the world, some of which are ellcctive of the regeneration of things, but others are
guardians of the coherence o( productive powers, the priest, indeed, must be
assumed as analogous to these latter causes, but Solon to the former. Hence,
the one exhibits a transcendent remembrance of antiquity, but the other is said to
have related various mutations, vn&lt;-ratioii, and corruptions. It likewise appears
to me, that the arrangement of the eld. r prior to the younger person, is assumed
in a way adapted to the orderly distribution of the universe. For in the fabrica
tion of Jupiter, they have this order with reference to each other ; just as the

Instead of T(O. TO r^iip&gt;ifUfuf hfrc, I read, 1,1, ir/wna, tSu fo t^nifitfof utrint.

n.joic i.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 87

Klean guest [in Plato] says, that those who live in the Saturnian period, proceed
from being older to being younger ; hut those that live in the period of Jupiter,
proceed in a contrary direction. And in this dialogue, Tiina?us says, respecting
the soul, that the Drmiiirgus produced it more ancient than the body, and on this
account constituted it of a more principal nature. Now, therefore, the priest, who
is the guardian of divine institutions, excels through antiquity, though that which is
junior proceeds from a higher order; just as Solon comes from a city, which per
tains in a greater degree to Minerva. In mundane works, however, that which
is more ancient possesses a great dignity.

" To whom the priest : Because all your souls arc juvenile ; neither
containing any ancient opinion derived from remote tradition, nor any
discipline hoary from its existence it) former periods of time."

Jicvaiility of soul, in what is here said, is analogous to renovation of life, and to
more partial causes; but remote tradition, to stable intelligence, and to more an
cient principles. And lioanj disci/ilinc is analogous to the com prehension, which
is united and always the !;unc, of the nature and composition of all that the world
contains; through which, indeed, the fir*t and most divine of mundane natures
comprehend totally and exemptly the causes of all generated beings, and eternal
ly and antecedently contain in themselves temporal natures ; but comprehend
things more proximate to the universe partially and subordinate!} , as falling short
of the unical intelligence of wholes. Hence to some of the (jods hairiness is
adapted, but to others juvenility. For hoariness is a symbol of intelligence and
an undeiiled life, and which is remote from generation ; but juvenility of more
partial knowledge, and which now comes into contact with generated natures.

" But the reason of this is the multitude and variety of destructions of
the human race, which formerly have been, and again will be : the great
est of these, indeed, arising from fire and water ; but the lesser from ten
thousand other contingencies."

In what is here said, an inquiry is made, why the Greeks are always children,
but there is no discipline with them hoary from its existence in former periods of
time ? Or, if you wish to survey the paradigms of these things, the enquiry is,

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

HtJ

through what cause the junior fabrication presides over variety, generated natures
always rising into existence, and such as are ancient becoming renovated ? Be
fore, "however, he discovers the cause of s.uch-like doubts, he first discusses the
|K&gt;riods in the universe, and points out the variety of them ; of which the first
principles of the Gods, indeed, have an antecedent knowledge, stably and uni
tedly; but the second principles partially, and in such a way as to come into
contact with the nature of the things which they iro\ern; for this it is always to
know what is present. But to retain in the memory things that are absent, is
analogous to the perception of wholes separately and stably. There are, there
fore, certain various periods of things in the world ; but it must be admitted, that
there is always generation and alwavs corruption in the universe. Tor that which
U sensible is rising into existence, ;md tending to corruption, but ne\er truly is.
This "em-ration, however, and destruction, must he summed in one way in the
heavens, and in another in material natures. For, in the former, a mutation of
figures, and the motion of perpetually generated bodies, pre-exist. But genera
tion, Ix-ing governed through the mutations of these bodies, evolves its ou n circle.
In this circle, however, different elements have dominion at different times. Ami
wholes, inde&lt; d, always preserve the same and a similar order according to na
ture ; but the different parts of these wholes subsist at different times, either con
formably to nature, or preternaturally, in a In-coming manner. For either the
wholes and the parts alwavs subsist according to nature; or both, on a certain
time, have a preternatural subsistence; or the one has a preternatural, but the
other a natural subsistence, and this in a twofold respect. If, therefore, all tilings
[iK-r|M-tually] existed according to nature, the variety of generation would \*&gt; dis
sipated, jH-rpetual natures would !M&gt; the extremities of beings, and the first es
sences would IK- the. last of all things. But if all things were disposed preternatu
rally, there would be nothing stable; from which an invariable sameness of sub
sistence might be present with mutable nature*; nor would the circle of genera
tion be preserved. And it is impossible that wholes should have a preternatural,
but parts a natural, subsistence ; for parts follow wholes, and wholes are compre
hensive of parts. Hence it is impossible that the former should, at a certain time,
exist preternaturally, but the latter remain in a condition conformable to nature.
For neither is it possible, when the whole of our animal nature is moved, and its
order destroyed, that any one of its parts should still exist according to nature.

1 I up is oiuittni hrre in the original.

BOOK i.] TJMACUS OF PLATO. 89

It remains, therefore, that wholes being established in a natural subsistence, the.
parts at one time following tin- wholes, are disposed conformably to nature, but at
another time have a preternatural tendency. But as of partial animals, each is
indeed ;il ways generated and corrupted, on account of the efflux of them in the
universe; but one is more generated, and another is more corrupted than anothen
and one is more adapted to existence, but another to corruption; thus also the
several parts of the earth, receiving both a natural and preternatural subsistence,
some of the parts are more able to subsist conformably to nature, but others are
more adapted to sustain deviations into a preternatural condition of In-ing ; this,
indeed, on account of a different temperament, but afterwards on account of the
position being different of different parts, and in the next place, on account of ha
bitude to the heavens. For different parts of the earth are adapted to different
parts of the heavens, though they are preserved by other figures [or configurations].
And in addition to all that has been said, on account of the power of the inspec-
tive Gods, and of the divinities who preside over climates, and who are allotted
different peculiarities ; some rejoicing more in motion, but others in permanency,
seme in sameness, but others in difference; abundant corruptions likewise of par
tial natures being produced in different places ; the forms or species of the uni
verse have a never-failing subsistence. For man is always, the earth is always,
and each of the elements always is. For since corruption and generation pro
ceed from the celestial figures; but these are, imitations of divine intellections,
and the intellections are suspended from intellectual forms, but from these stabi
lity is derived ; this Ix-ing the case, continuity is produced in mundane formsi
and the visible figures are preservative of species, but corrupt ive of parts, so as to
cause things which are {reiterated in time, to be also dissolved in time, according

~ O

to a circular progression. For the universe does not envy salvation to such things
as are able to exist in conjunction with it ; but that which is incapable of l&gt;eing
administered together with the universe, is not able to abide in it. The law of
Jupiter, however, expels from essence every tiling of this kind as disgraceful.
For it is perfectly impossible that what is disgraceful should remain in the uni
verse. But that which .is deprived of order in the universe is disgraceful. We
have shown therefore why * abundant and partial corruptions are produced in
different places of the earth.

* For r/i/JaXAu lierr, it is necessary to read crf3oAAci.
* For ktort in this place, read No n.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. M

00 PR4CLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

In the next place it must l&gt;e shown why the greatest of destructions are
through the predominance of fire and water, and not through that of the other
elements. Fire, therefore, has an efficacious and productive order in the elements,
is sufficiently able to proceed through all other things, and is naturally adapted
to divide them. But water, is indeed moved with greater facility than earth, yet
is more difficultly passive than air. And by its facility of motion, indeed, it is able
to ojR-rate;but through being passi\c with difficulty, it is not affected by violence,
nor becomes imbecile when dissipated, like air; so that it reasonably follows, that
violent, and the greatest destructions are effected by deluges and conflagrations.
You may also say, that the. remaining two elements are more adapted to us.
For w e are pedestrious, and allied to earth ; and as we are on all sides compre
hended by air, in which we li\e, and which we re&gt;pire, it is e\ident that our bodies
are of a kindred nature with it. Hence these elements, as being more allied
to, are less destructive of us; but the others, which are contrary to these, bring,
with them more violent destructions. Farther still, according to another mode of
survey also, these elements earth and air, together with suffering themselves, and
suffer ing prior to us, appear to ojH-rate on us. For air when it becomes putrid,
produces pestilence; and earth when divulsed, abundant absorptions. But pes
tilence is a passion of air, and chasms and earthquakes are passions of earth.
Fire, however, and water are able to operate on u&gt;, without lieing previously af
fected themselves ; the former by permeating, but the latter by external impulsion.
Hence they are capable of producing more extended destructions, as being more
vigorous and powerful than the other elements, in consequence of not corrupting
through Ix-ing themselves distempered. Deludes, therefore, and conflagrations
are the greatest destructions. But famine and pestilence, earthquakes and wars,
and other such-like partial calamities, may be produced from other causes. And
of all these, the effective cause indeed is the order of the universe, and prior to
this, the junior fabrication, which always makes new effects, and at different times
produces the generation of different things. Fur this is asserted by the fables of the.
Greeks, and is indicated by the tradition of the Egyptians, which mystically says of the
sun, that he assumes different forms in the signs of the zodiac. It is not, therefore,
at all wonderful, if though there are many destructions, and in jnany places, yet man
and e\ery form always exist, through the immutable progression of dhine forms.
For through these, the productive principles in the universe possess an imariable

* Jx-c lliis t\|&gt;l.tiin.il further on, in OIH- of llic nolt s on tin- 4lli book;

HOOK i.] TIMJFAJS OF PLATO.

.01

sameness of subsistence, because every thing which is generated from an immovo-
able cause, is always suspended from its cause.

;&lt; For the relation subsisting among you, that Phaeton the offspring of
the Sun, on a certain time attempting to drive the chariot of his father,
and not being able to keep the track observed by his parent, burnt up
the natures belonging to tin 1 earth, and perished himself blasted by
thunder, is indeed said to have- the form of a fable."

That the first principles of beings comprehend* indeed things which are
moved, stably, things multiplied, unitedly, partial natures, totally, and such as
are divided according to time, eternally, is evident. And it is likewise well
known, that theologists refer the causes of periods, arid of the psychical ascents
and descents, and of all multiplied and divided life, to the principles that are
proximately established above the world. Hence it appears to me, that what is
now said, refers the mythology about Phaeton to the Greeks, and the knowledge
of .Solon. For .ill stirh-like corruptions and generations derive their completion
from the junior fabrication, [or the fabrication of the junior, or mundane Gods,]
from which also tbe circulation of forms, and tin: variety of corporeal and psychical
periods, is perfected. As, however, in divine natures, things secondary remaining,
perfection is imparted to them from such as are first; thus also, the Egyptian pre- .
serving what is related by the Greeks, teaches Solon from this concerning things
of which he had a knowledge prior to Solon. What therefore does this narration
obscurely signify ? That psychical lives, and the nature of bodies, havcstill multiform
mutations. And over these, indeed, the supermundane powers preside; but they
are connectedly comprehended by the intelligible orders of the Gods. And of
the former, indeed, the apparent meaning of the narration being historically deli
vered by the Greeks, is a symbol; but of the latter, the priest investigating the real
meaning of the history, and unfolding it into light, to Solon. And thus much
has been .said by us for the sake of the whole theory, ami in order to show that
the narration is not discordant with the things proposed to IM- discussed.

The fable respecting IMiaeton, liowe\er, requires a manifold discussion. For
in the first place, it is necessary to consider it historically; in the second place,
physically; and in the third place, philosophically. History therefore says, that

* For raft^ovoi la IT , it i* necessary to read rtpirxpvoi.

92 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOC i.

Phaeton was the offspring of the Sun, and of Clymene the daughter of Ocean,
and that driving tlie chariot of his father, he deviated from the projK&gt;r track. Tliat
Jupiter also fearing for tin; safety of the universe, destroyed him ly thunder; hut
lie In-inf? Masted by thunder, fell ahout Kridanus. The fire likewise proceeding
from him burnt every thiui; that was nourished by the earth: and his ulster*, the
lleliades, lamented liis fall. And such is the historical account of the fahle. It
is, however, ncct -s&lt;ary to admit that a conflagration took place; for the whole nar
ration is introduced for the sake of this; and, also, that the cause of it is neither an
impossibility, nor a certain tiling which may easily hap|&gt;en. Hut it w ill le im
possible if some one fancies that the Sim at one time drives his own chariot, and
at another time Ix-in^ changed ceases to drive it, and commits his proper em
ployment to another. And it will l&gt;e aiuonu; the number of things which may lx&gt;
t-asily accomplished, if it is supposed that this Phaeton was a comet, which being
dissolved produced an intolerable dryness from vehement lieat. For this sup.
position is generally vulopti d. Porphyry therefore xm/t, that ctrtain signs may be
assumed from the mutton of comets. Fur when this motion is tuirards the southern
parts, it is indicative of tttnpests, foi t &gt;.irds the north, of dryness from excessive
heat, towards the fast t of pest i ft nee, and toward* the icest t of fertility. The dis-
apjx-arance likewise of the comet, is said to be the destruction by thunder.

If, however, it ln&gt; re&lt;juisite to dissolve the fahle in a more physical way, it is
better to adopt the explanation of our associate Domninus, that sometimes .so
great a quantity of dry exhalation is collected together, as to he easily enkindled
liy the solar heat. Hut this In in- enkindled, it is not at all wonderful, that it
should burn all that p rt of the earth which is situated under it, and produce
such a conflagration as that of which the fahle speaks. In consequence, therefore,
of the inflammation being produced by the Sun, the authors of fables were
induced to call Phaeton the offspring of the Sun ; denominating this offspring
a male, on account of the cflicacy of the power of fire, and because likewise it
is usual to call fire a male, in the name manner as earth a female ; and to deno
minate the one matter, but the other form. Hut because this exhalation did not
proceed in a path parallel to that of the Sun, M&gt;thologists a&gt;sert, that Phaeton
did not drive the chariot conformably to the track of his father. The dissolution
of the cloud about the earth, was called by them, the fall of Phaeton ; and the
extinction of this cloud, the thundering of Jupiter. JJut the abundance of
rain after the extinction of the cloud, (for this takes place alter great conflagra
tions) is the lamentation of the sisters, or the wet exhalations, in as much as

BOOK i.] TIM.KUS OF PLATO. 93

those that weep, pour forth moisture. And the exhalations, both the dry
and the wet, have one cause, the Sun. Hut to the latter the female jwrtains, and
to the former the male. These explanations, therefore, are more physical.

It is however possible, that the fable may indicate something more sublime;
that partial souls proceed indeed from the father of wholes, hut are disseminated
about the mundane Gods, in order that they may not only he intellectual, come
into contact with intelligible*, and recede from bodies, but also that they may
have a mundane hypostasis. As, therefore, divine and da-moniacal souls are
arranged under secondary leaders; some indeed under the divinity of the Ivulh,
others under the Moon, and others under the Sun; some, under the government
of Jupiter, but others under that of Mars; that which is disseminated being of
divine origin, every where receives something from the nature of that in which it
is sown: just as things sown in the earth, receive something from the earth; but
those so\\n in an animal, receive something from the nature of the animal: so that
of offspring, some express the peculiarity of places, but others the similitude of
the mother. Hence also, souls that are disseminated about. their kindred stars,
recehe a certain peculiarity of life, from their leaders; so that each is not only
soul, but a soul of a certain kind, such for instance as Martial, or Jovi.m, or
Lunar. For whether the (iod is of an immutable characteristic, or is demiurgic,
or vivific, a certain representation of the peculiarity of the allotted deity accedes
to the souls that are arranged under it. And why is this wonderful, since the
peculiarity of presiding Gods extends as far as to herbs and stones? And there
is a stone, and also a herb suspended from the solar power, whether you are
willing to call them heliotropes, or by any other name. A similar reasoning
likewise must l&gt;e extended to the other Gods.

Of these souls therefore, those indeed that are undefiled, remain always
suspended from the Gods to whom they are allied, and govern the universe in
conjunction with them. But others descend, yet are not filled with genesiurgic
vice [or the depravity which is offspring of the realms of generation]. And others
receive a certain defilement from the subjects of their government. 1 or this is
the last form of life. The first of these souls, therefore, are truly sons of the Gods,
as not proceeding out of their fathers, being, as it were, fashioned by and remain
ing within them, running before the Gods, and having the order of guards or
attendants. The souls that have the middle rank, are indeed called on of the

For i o rut vror(rn}/irra&gt; m-rji v i \i, it &gt; rcijuiMl* to read rvi rat vworcray^ii, *. X.

pi rnocMJ.s ON THE [HOOK .

Gods, !&gt;ut receive td*o u secondary life, und Income !ho onn of Codx nnd men.
And souls of the third rank, are also sons of the Coda, but are not called genuine
sons, as not preserving the form of their proper Cod, but verge to matter, and
become oblivious of their genuine fathers. Whether, therefore, the authors of
fables call Tityus the son of Karth, or Phaeton the offspring of the Sun. or Musa-m
the son of .the Moon, they thus denominate them alter this manner, and others
differently conformably .to the before-mentioned causes, \\ith respect toother
sons of the Cods, however, we shall elsewhere speak.

But again, Phaeton is indeed the offspring of the Sun, as U?ing of the solar
series. Hence also he has a solar name. Since ho\\e\er, abiding on high, he
revolved and governed the universe in conjunction with his father, he is said to
have driven the chariot of his father. For the \elncle of Phaeton U-Iongs to the
solar chariots; since that also is entirely solar form. Hut when he fell into gene
ration, for he did not rank among the first of souls, he is said to ha\e been de
stroyed by the thunder of Jupiter. For thunder li. e. lightning] is a symbol of
fabrication, proceeding through all things without contact, 1 and vivifying all things;
but is not the cause of the dissolution of the spirit in which the soul is carried.
But there are many transpositions of souls into different polities, and from one
element into another; some being transferred from earth to the sphere of lire; but
others from the sphere of fire to earth; and some in order ; but others heaped
together, and accompanied with much tumult and disorderly motion, such as
Phaeton is said to have suffered. I - or being borne along on high collet lively,
and attracting empyrean vestments, he was moved through these in a disorderly
manner, when he proceeded to earth, and piodueed in certain parts of it a confla-
ralion. For souls in descending become invested with man\ garments aerial or

aquatic; and some have empv rean vestments. Of these also, some have the
vigorous,* but others tin; vehement and the jx-rcussive, from lire. And some
indeed, when they become situated in air, lay aside these garments, and assume
others that are more gross, but others preserve them even a* far as to the earth.
1 know, therefore, that the Oia-roneari Plutarch relates, that in one of the islands
of Britain, which appears to be sacred, and on this account is considered by the
rulers of it as an asylum, the inhabitants frequently assert, when prodigious rains
or thunder and lightning take place, that some one of the more excellent nature.*

1 I or urcif.ui lulf, il ii wr-iiiil\ to lril&lt;l nm^i/t.
* lis^liuil nl ufivf fHjf ill tins |&gt;I.C -, I rc.td ui/&lt;uiu&gt;.

HOOK i ] TIM.T.US 01- PLATO. 05

fails, they being accustomed to passions of this kind. But they denominate souls
that are transferred into bodies, and that relinquish a certain generation, more
excellent natures. It must not, however, be denied that Mich-like circumstances
befall souls descending into bodies, and especially those that are magnificent, and
are allotted a more demoniacal essence, such as the fable obscure!) signifies the
soul of Phaeton to have been. But it is not at all wonderful, that descending
souls should be in a greater degree co-passive with those elements which
are analogous to their presiding (iods, and should attract and become invested
with a greater number of Mich-like elementary garments; so that Saturnian souls
should in a greater degree rejoice in humid and aqueous vestments, and solar
souls in such as are empyrean, each being desirous of obtaining a material and
ponderous body, instead of immaterial garments; the (iods also employing these
as organs, in the same manner as they use material da-mons, int heir productions
about the earth. Through these souls likewise the (iods produce conflagrations,
or pestilence, or intlict certain other calamities on those who deserve to sutler
them, and employing souls that are allied to them as ministrant to the causes of
the effects that take place in the heavens, they accomplish that which they effect.
For it is nothing wonderful, that there should be many causes of the, same things,
some producing in one, and others in another way. Phaeton therefore, being borne
along about the earth, and after a certain demoniacal manner, burning those
places to which lie approached, through the stream of lire (for partial souls
effect many things out of the body, being then the instruments of avenging
or purifying da-mons) ; he was lamented by the Ilelidilcis, who were certain
solar souls, whence also they were said to be the sisters of Phaeton. But
they lamented him, not as alone commiserating him on account of his
descent into generation, but providentially inspecting him, in order that they
might in an undeliled manner pay attention to things which are generated
and corrupted. For the river Eridanus, and the falling into it, indicate the
lapse of the soul into the river of generation ; in which being situated, she
requires the providential care of the genera allied to herself, and the aid of
souls that are in a permanent condition. Theologists also signify the exten
sion of the solar providence to mortal natures through tears.

Tin- much-enduring race of men ihy tears
E\cilc.

riularch rrlalrs lln, in In- Irealitc On Iht I uilurr of tht Uiaclfi.

g0 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

So that the fable very properly manifests through tears, in a symbolical manner,
the providential attention to Phaeton of souls that are of the solar order. Again,
therefore, this corollary may be assumed from the fable, that the descents of
souls are effected through impotency. And that not only souls, but likewise
their vehicle participate of tin: peculiarity of their leading finds ; so that from
these divinities, some of them are denominated Solar, others Martial, and
others receive an appellation from some other (od. It may also IK* inferred that
destructions are effected by the providence of the Gods. For Jupiter was the
cause of the conflagration, by hurling the thunder at Phaeton. And likewise,
that the descents of souls are suspended from the one fabrication of things.
Hence Tima-us teaches us not only about the essence, but also about the ascents
and descents, the lives and all-various elections of souls.

" lint the truth is, that it indicates the mutation of the bodies re-
volvin r in the heavens about the earth ; and signifies that through long
periods of time, a destruction of terrestrial natures ensues from the
devastations of fire."

The Ivjjyptian priest only unfolds thus much of the fable that contributes to the
proposed discussion, that abundant destructions of terrestrial natures are
produced through fin?, in consequence of the mutation of the bodies that
revolve in the heavens about the earth. Hut through mutation he signifies either
the incoinmeiisuratiou of things in the earth to celestial natures: for all things while
they subsist coinincnsurutcly to the celestial eflluxions, are able to remain, but
when they are incommensurate to them, are corrupted. For things which are abb;
to sustain the dividing power of Mars, are preserved; but Mich as are too im!x&gt;cile
to endure his effective energy, are easily dissolved; just as if your eye not In-ing
able to endure the solar light, should be blinded by its effulgence, though some
other eye may be capable of looking directly to it without pain. And a similar
reasoning must be adopted with respect to the other (iods and their configurations.
For the universe is one animal, audits parts sympathizing with each other, it
preserves different things by different parts; nor is any thing which is generated
in it preternatural to the whole. For the natures which are generated in it, are
generated through it; and it is the world itself which operates, and operates on
itself. Or it may be said that this mutation is just as if a good father,
who is always benevolently disposed towards his son, should on a time

BOOK i.) TI M.T.US OF PLATO. 97

chastise him for the sake of hi* good; for in so doing lie will appear to hnve
changed his accustomed mode of treatment. Or this mutation may ho the
various configuration of the crlrstinl bodies. For those arc the bodies that revolve
in the heavens al&gt;out (lie railh, and at dill erent limes exliiliit dilli ri-nl ligun s
through the various intellectual perceptions of their informing souls, / or the
coiiftguratioiis arc (lie letters of these souls, and certain efficacious impressions produced
through them. Again, however, both these are true.. For the mutation of these
bodies, and the incommensnration of earthly natures, are the leading causes of
such-like destructions. But if it is necessary to call the fall of Phaeton from the
heavens to the earth, a certain mutation of some one of the bodies that revolve
in the heavens, it is not at all wonderful. For the mutation of the celestial Gods is
one thing, since this i.s an impassive transfiguration; but another, that of the souls
that revolve together with thorn, this being a habitude to terrestrial natures, from
a life without habitude: and that of places about the earth, is different from either
of the former, since it is a certain corniptive mutation; according to which neither
souls are changed, nor much less the Gods, the leaders of souls. Such-like cor
ruptions, therefore, of terrestrial natures are effected through partial souls; but are
also effected through da-mous alone. And as through these, destructions adapted
to their series are produced, the like also takes place through souls. For the
souls that when on high are delighted to illuminate immaterially, betake themselves
to sublunary conflagrations.

Why, however, do copious destructions of the human race happen through
long periods of time ; is it because a concurrence of many things is necessary
in order that such a destruction may take place ? For it is requisite that there
should be both the peculiar and common habit of the things that suffer, and a
conspiration of the agents. For what if that which is corruptive of one tiling,
should be preservative of another? It is also necessary that there should be an apti
tude of matter, and a preparation of instruments and times. For these also take
place in partial destructions, but more rarely in such as are common ; and this rea
sonably. For it is necessary that the progression from an incorruptible nature to
one that is easily corruptible, should be through things which are corrupted with
difficulty. If, therefore, wholes are always incorruptible, but more partial
natures are easily corrupted, the media between these may be very properly
arranged among things which are corrupted with difficulty, and which become
destroyed in long periods of time/ For wholes which remain during the
Tim. Plat. VOL. I. N

98 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

mundane period, are incomiptiMe and indestructible. For no configuration of
the stars is destructive of them, since all things are evolved in the whole period
of the universe. But partial natures and individuals receive an easy dissolution.
Copious destructions, however, of partial natures ;ire effected through long periods
of time ; but such natures are nevertheless dissolved. For there IH a life of :i
certain genus, as there is of one man, and of a city, and a nation. And as
Aristotle says, there are periods of these, of some, more, but of others, less
extended.

" Hence those who either dwell on mountains, or in lofty and dry
places, perish more abundantly than those who dwell near rivers or
the sea."

This is likely to happen in the \isihle destructions through fire : for those
who dwell near water, are defended from the devastation of fire. The phi
losopher Porphyry, however, transfers what is here said, from the pha-nomena
to souls ; and says, that in these the irascible part is at one time ellervescent,
and this inflammation is the destruction of the man within us. Thus Homer
represents the eyes of Agamemnon when lie was enraged with Achilles, as
" shining like fire." But at another time, the epithymetie. part, being deluged by
genesiurgic moisture, is enervated, and merged in the streams of matter. For, as
Heraclitus says, " another death of intellectual souls is occasioned by moisture."
But if these things are rightly asserted, those will be inexperienced in the pertur
bations arising from anger, who have the irascible part in a relaxed condition, and
commensurate to a proper attention to secondary concerns. For this is signified
by hollow places, and such as are near to water. But those are inexperienced in the
perturbations of desire, who have the epithymetie part in a more strenuous condi
tion, and exeited from the somnolency of matter. For this is indicated by lofty
placet. For in a certain respect, the irascible part is adapted to be easily mo\ed,
and to be etlicacious; but desire is languid and imbecile. A musician, therefore,
\sill be requisite, in order to relax the strenuous nature of anger, and gi\e inten
tion to the inertness of desire. The philosopher lamblichus, however, thinks lit
to survey these things physically, and not ethically. lie says, therefore, that when
a conflagration takes place, those perish more abundantly that dwell on lofty
mountains, as being more remote from the exhalations arising from water ; for these
exhalation? are not much elevated on account of the weight of the moist -substance.

BOOK i.] TIMJEUS OF PLATO. or)

Hence the air that surrounds them is not wet but dry, and becomes fuel to fire,
which naturally tends upward. But the contrary takes place in deluges. For
those that dwell in hollow situations, are more abundantly destroyed, since all
heavy substances naturally tend downward.

" To us, indeed, the Nile is a saviour in other respects, and also be
cause it liberates us from this destruction."

According to the apparent signification of what is here said, the Nile is the
cause to the Egyptians of many and all-various goods, viz. of geometry, of the
generation of fruits, and likewise of avoiding conflagrations. Its water also
preserves their bodies, and the divinity that connectedly contains this body,
elevates their souls. But from these things you may assume, that first causes,
being full of life and prolific power, connect themselves, and remain eternally, and
also think fit to impart connexion from themselves toother things, which are in a
flowing and dissipated condition; so that the name of saviour, adumbrates divine
and exempt providence ; from which also the light that is in the intelligible 1 Gods,
illuminates all the intellectual and demiurgic causes.

" But when the Gods, purifying the earth by water, deluge its surface,
then the herdsmen and shepherds inhabiting the. mountains arc preserved,
while those that dwell in your cities arc hurried away to the sea, by the
impetuous inundation of the rivers."

In what is hen- said, the efficient cause is clearly ascribed to the Gods. And this
also may be asserted of conflagrations. For purification is at one time effected
through water, and at another through fire. But every where purification to
.secondary is from primary natures. Hence likewise in Orpheus, Jupiter is ex
horted to bring purifications from Crete. For it is u.sual with thcvlogisls to ar
range Crete for the intelligible. But the material cause of purification is here
ascribed to the incursion of water. For each of these [i. e. fire and water]
produces without deliberation and involuntarily, being borne along according to
its own natural tendency. It is necessary, therefore, that there should l&gt;e a
pre-existent cause which employs them to beneficial purposes, and operates for

1 The words roijroit fwt arc wauling in the original.

J00 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

the sake of &lt;rood; which cause is beautifully ascribed to the Gods. But if there
are certain purifications in wholes, there are also powers that preside over these
purifications, operating as purifiers on wholes prior to partial natures. Then.- are
likewise divine mysteries, some powers initiating, and others IKMIIJ; initiated ;
nor will these ever desert tin- universe. The Egyptian priest likewise knowing
this to be the case, calls the destructions through water and fire by a sacerdotal
name, purifications, but not corruptions, as he would have done if he alone phy-
sio!ogi/ed.

"On the contrary, in our region, neither then, nor at any other time,
did the water descending from on high pour with desolation on the
plains ; but, the whole of it is capable of returning from the bosom of the
earth. And hence, and through these causes, the traditions which arc
preserved here, are said to be most ancient."

Though rain may sometimes happen in Egypt, yet it does not happen in the
whole of it, but usually takes place about the lower parts. This, however, says
Aristotle, is evidently the work of the river. But the upper parts do not receive
an afllux of this kind. Whence, therefore, does the Nile return ? Porphyry indeed
says, it was an ancient opinion of (he Egyptians, that the water issued upward
from beneath, by the ascent of the Nile; on which account also they called the
Nile, the waterer of the earth ; and that it returned from beneath; manifesting by
this, that what is dissolved in Egypt preserves the Nile. Not that the snow
lx in (T dissolved produces the quantity of its water; but that it is loosened from its
own fountains, and proceeds so as to l&gt;ecome visible, being prior to this impeded
nml detained. \Ve however understand the term ilissali-fj, with reference to
doubt : for speaking Attically, the Nile is dissolved, because it liberates us from
doubt. For it is not true that from snow bein^ dissolved the Nile is increased.
I or where in southern places, Mich as tho&gt;e through which the Nile Hows, is there
:\ collection of snow ? Nor does this river emerge from rarefied earth. For the
jaritv of the earth, does not give to the water a motion upward. But it is entirely
necessary that there should be something else, which impels it from cavities to
lofty places. And thus much with respect to the Egyptian opinion.

Others, however, say.that the Nile is increased from certain rains that are poured
into it, as is clearly asserted by Eratosthenes. Hence to returndovs not now sig-
mfv to -print: from beneath, but for the water, being elsewhere increased, to

OOK i.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. ]01

proceed above the earth ; streams of water l&gt;eing poured into the Nile from other
places. lint lamblirhus says, il is not requisite to investigate a thing of this kind,
but to understand in a more simple way the return of the water from IxMieath, as
equivalent to what is usually called the ascent of water ; and he assigns a two-fold
cause, through which the Egyptians avoid dry ness, from excessive heat, and
deluges. And this is manifest from what he says when examining the increase
from rains. For he says, that the lirst cause of the salvation of the Egyptians, is
the will of their presiding Gods, and the boundary from the first of fabrication.
But the second cause is the temperature of the air. For the seasons there are con
trary to those in the antarctic regions, from which the Nile flows to these places;
and in them the generation ofdryness from violent heat, and of great rains, reci
procates. If, however, some one should blame this explanation, l&gt;ecause the rains
being increased the increase is not regular, it must be said, that rain frequently
happens when there is no descent [or disappearance] of the Nile. At the same-
time, the uninterrupted succession of rain, and the magnitude of the mountains
in which the fountains of the Nile are contained, are the causes of the unceasing
increase ofthe water. For these mountains, receiving in all their sides the rain
impelled against them from the annual clouds, pour it incessantly into the foun
tains of the Nile. But these fountains becoming exuberant increase the river.
For this, says Theophrastus, is one cause of rain, viz. the pressure of clouds against
a mountain. Moreover, it is not at all wonderful, if clouds are not seen about
the cataracts. For the stream ofthe Nile is not first poured from these, but from
the Lunar mountains, which are thus denominated from their altitude. And the
clouds when present being collected about the mountains, impede the cataracts
by their superior magnitude. And thus much against the Egyptian oration of
Aristides,

Eratosthenes, however, says, it is no longer requisite to investigate the cause of
the increase ofthe Nile, when we direct onr attention to certain waters and rains
that run into it, so as to corroborate what is said by Aristotle. These things, there
fore, we ha\e concisely indicated on this subject. But from these particulars the
Egyptians infer, that their land will never experience either a deluge or a confla
gration. That it should however fail from other causes, is not at all wonderful;
since, as Aristotle rightly observes, every part of the earth becomes sea in the
infinity of time, and the same place is at one time continent, and at another, sea.

For OITICVI* here, it u necessary to read arraprrunm.

10 o PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

And looking to the infinity of time, it must not be denied that the water of the
Nile may fail. For what if the annual winds, blowing less vehemently, should not
impel the clouds against the mountains ? What also, if the mountains should fall,
in which there is a collection of clouds; the wind from subterranean places burst-
in" them, through which, likewise, the oracles sail, tfuit succeeding cities shall be tie-

strayed? And the clouds not being collected, the stream always becoming less and
less, \\i\\ be absorbed by the earth which is dry.

" But the truth is, that in all places, where neither intense cold nor
immoderate heat prevails, the race of men is always preserved, though it
is sometimes more, and at other times less numerous."

The priest has spoken concerning the mundane periods, and the different
mutations fin them], and has observed that the safety of the Egyptians is .derived
from the position of the region, and the proudence of the Nile. iVow, then-fore,
he infers in common respecting places of the earth, that e\ery place which is tree
from deludes and conflagrations, lias always the race of men remaining, more or
less numerous. For the greatest destructions are throun h lire and water, as was
before asserted. Some one, however, may say, that the race of men fail in a different
way. For- at present there arc none rrho inhabit these very places of the Jftic land
[which were formerly so populous), though neither a deluge nor a conflagration has
happened, but a certain dire impiety, vhich //us tntire.li/ obliterated the race of men. 1
Or it may be said that Plato now- calls climate*, place*. He says, therefore, that
every climate has men, though there should not have been a deluge &lt;r a confla
gration, at one time more, and at another less numerous. Some however will
also IM- saved in a delude, as Deucalion, who was preserved, when the climate
of Greece was deluded. After this manner, therefore, some unfold the meaning
of the passage.

JJut iiccording to our associate f Domninus], IMato means, that every place han
always a greater or less number of men, which is not excessively cold, or immo
derately dry through heat. For mathematicians say, that there are certain places
which are uninhabitable through excess of heat or cold. K\ery place, therefore,
which is adapted to the habitation of men, and every climate, has a greater or
less number of men. And this interpretation is reasonable, and conformable to

In my ropy of I he original of llu-so Comnu ntaii&lt;-, a certain aniintalor ob&gt;enis in the margin,
that "Prodiii alluilr*., in what lit- Jicrt- *;i)\ (&lt; the Chri-ti.in n-lij-iou."

HOOK i.] TLMvEUS OF PLATO. J0 3

the words of the text. For the words, " where neither intense cold, nor immo
derate heat prevails," appear to signify, where neither of the contraries being erces-
siiv, impedes Inibilntion. And, in short, since IMato had In-fore observed, that
the transactions of the Egyptians were said to be most ancient, he very properly
adds, that in reality, every climate which is commensurate to the habitation of
men, has always men more or less numerous. For not only mathematicians assert
that not every climate of the earth has men, but Orpheus also, who says :

The Demiiirpui for th* abode of men,
A seat opart from the immortals g:ive,
Where turns the Sun s mid axil stretching wide ;
Between excessive cold and lieat a mean.

And this likewise Plato now asserts, when he says, " where neither intense cold,
nor immoderate heat prevails, the race of men is always preserved, though it is some
times more, and at oilier times less numerous." ^ ith other nations, however, there
is an oblivion of ancient transactions, not through the failure of men, but in con
sequence of frequent destructions taking place, certain illiterate and rustic persons
alone remain. Hut with us [says the priest] many most ancient transactions are
said to be preserved, in consequence of every tiling being committed to writing
in our temples.

" But whatever lias been transacted cither by us, or by you, or in any
other place, beautiful or great, or containing any thing uncommon, of
which \vc have heard the report, every tiling of this kind is to be found
described in our temples, and preserved to the present day."

As the situation of the country and Us guardian Goddess impart safety to the
Egyptians, thus also the preservation of past transactions is effected by their own
care and attention, through which they apply a remedy to the oblivion produced
by time. But they are assisted in this by their temples, in which all great and won
derful actions are recorded, both of their own people and of others, and also para
doxical events of things. For this is the meaning of the words, "or containing any
thing uncommon." The history, however, of these things contributes to their know
ledge of similar events ; from which the reminiscence of wholes is produced, and
also to the knowledge of futurity. For through obtcrcatioiu of this kind, they dis
cover the effective pavers of the celestial configurations. For assuming that certain

104

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

things happen from certain things existing, they are able syllogistically to collect,
from the same signs, the causes of future events. It appears also to me, that the
doctrine of the Pythagoreans which prepares souls to rcmemlier their former lives,
imitates such a history as this of the Egyptians. For as it is tit to assume different
lives of one man, or rather of one soul, thus also different periods mu&gt;t he
assumed of one nation. Hence, as in the one, the recollections of the transac
tions of a former life are perfective, of sou s, so in the other, the histories of former
periods afford the greatest assistance to the acquisition of wisdom. Farther still,
such observations are assimilated to the orderly distribution of the universe. For
they imitate the stable productive powers of nature, through which remaining im-
moveable, order is ingenerated in things that are mutable. If, therefore, the world
is a most sacred temple, in which the productive powers that connect the universe
eternally remain, the recording of ancient dcods in temples will be an image ot
the Mibsjstence of the&gt;e powers. And what is assertrd by the Egyptians may
signify that whatever in sen&gt;ibles is .stable, of a linn consistence, and always suh-

O J *

sisting after the same manner, proceed;* from the intelligible (lods ; but that what
ever is moved, and at different time* is generated and corrupted in a different
manner, is derived from the junior fabrication. For the sacerdotal genus by
which mention is made of ancient transactions, conveys an image oi the divine
order, which is connective of wholes and of stability, and which guards all things
bv divine memory, and from which the junior fabrication being filled, imparts by
illumination to things of a very mutable nature, sameness, connexion, and per
manency.

" While on the contrary, you and other nations, commit only recent
transactions to writing, and toother contrivances which cities have em
ployed for transmitting information to posterity."

ConlritatK-c is a symbol of the cause which always fabricates new things, pro
duces things which are not yet in existence, and co-adapts all things to the one
perfection of the world. For in our domestic concerns, we call the preparation
of every thing necessary, contrivance. And such also in cities, are literature and
arts, forums and baths, and the like. But in the universe, contncanccs are such
things as receive a temporal and partial composition. As, therefore, temples sig
nify the receptacles of perpetual productive powers, and also of such as are of a
connective and guardian nature ; thus likewise cities manifest hypostases con^i&t-

1 TIM.EUS OF PLATO. lor&gt;

ing of many, dissimilar, and mortal powers. But recent transaction* only being
committed to writing, evinces that the existence of such writings and arts, is of a
more recent nature.

"And so again in accustomed years, a celestial cttluxion rushes on
them like a disease."

This also is evident in men. For deluges destroy their race, being excited indeed
from the celestial periods, but having water for their mailer. Hence the whole of
this is called a celesijal ellluxiou, ami, as it were, a disease, because it is eorrup-
livool other things. That, however, which is corruptive, is indeed to a partial
nature evil, hut to the whole of tilings good. Hut I lato says, " in accusfowal years,"
because such like destructions are accomplished conformably to certain circula
tions, which also have themselves a certain consecutive order with reference to the
whole period of a divinely generated [or perpetually circulating] nature. This also
seems to be manifested through these particulars, that such things as are alone
generated from holes are necessarily consummated according to mundane pei iods,
which are defined by the same number; but that such things as happen from
certain partial causes, will not entirely happen to be the same, though the
configurations of the period are the same. In the universe, however, you may
survey the same thing, by understanding that all generated natures are corrupted,
and yield to the mundane periods, and to the circulations of the whole life [of the
world ; and that the periods are conjoined to each other, and accomplish one
continued life.

llnuv those among you who survive, are illiterate and unac&lt;|iiainlcil
with the Muses. And thus it happens that you become juvenile again,
and ignorant of the transactions of ancient times, as well of those among
us, as of those in the regions which you inhabit."

For from a deluge, Plato .says, that herdsmen and shepherds are left, but that
the inhabitants of cities are destroyed. Hence those that remain are illiterate
and without the Muses. And on account of the former, indeed, they are. unable
through writing to transmit memorials of the prc-existcnl period ; but on account
of the latter, they are not sufficiently capable of preserving in vei&gt;e or melody the
events that happened prior to the deluge. Hence they become oblivious of all
Tim. Plat. VOL. I. O

J00 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

things. But through oblivion they return to the life of children. For an ignorant
old man, says Aristotle, does not at all differ from a child in understanding. A
thing of this kind, however, happens to souls that have recently descended into
generation. For having exchanged for the former period, which was intellectual, a
certain, secondan and genesinrgic condition of being, they become ohlivious of
intelligibles, through the deluge arising from matter. Such representations also
of intelligibles, as they once had from the vi&gt;ion of them they lose in the progres
sions of time. Thus, therefore, every thing in the world returns to juvenility from
juvenility through regeneration heini; liorne along differently at dillerent times, in
consequence of the form of it naturally subsisting in motion. .Moreo\er, the
assertion that mutations taking place, those that remain, are illiterate and unac
quainted \\ith the MUMS, indicates to those who consider il physically, that the
analysis of bodies takes place as far as to that \\hieli is formless and without
morphe ; and also that in this mill a tic MI, the destruction of the elements happens,
wjii( h is manifested through the word iliiUratc, and the dissolution of harmony,
whir h ajruin the (Jod&gt; who are the inspeclive guardians of renovation, easily
remedy, and restoro io a condition according to nature.

* The transactions therefore, O Solon, which you relate from your
antiquities, differ very little from j)uerile (able*.."

The Kgyptian priest compares the venerable and very ancient narrations of
Solon to the fables of children. For the fables of the w is.* are about thiii -s

of an eternal nature; but tho-e of children about temporal things and which
are of small consequence. And the former, indeed, contain intellectual concealed
truth : but the latter, truth of a grovelling nature, ;MM! which indicates nothiii"-

elevated. To the latter tables therefore, the histories of Solon are analogous ;
but to the former, the histories of the Egyptians, For the one look to that which
i*. small, lint the other ha\e a most extended survey. And the one are only
histories, but the other contribute lo science. From these things, therefore, the
paradigms also of them are to b" surveyed. The ellects, indeed, of the junior
fabrication, are called the sports of the (iods, and resemble fables. For they are
the images of !ieiin:s, and participate of forms in an ultimate degree. Hut tin;
things which primarily deiive ihcir subsistence from intelligibles, are intellectual,
eternal, and stable, aiid have the essence of themselves concealed.

1 Tor i(fu liore, il is ntctsjiv to read io&lt;^m.

HOOK i.] TIM^US OF PLATO. 107

" For, in tlie first place, you only mention one deluge of the earth,
though in former times there have been many.

For the delude of Deucalion is much celebrated by flic Greeks, though as
the Egyptian says, there \vere many others prior to it. Thus also in wholes, the
junior fabrication gives completion to Avholes partially, and mullitudinously, and
renders that which is present in a good condition through regeneration. But in
intelligibles, the causes of the first subsistence and of the circulation of forms,
are antecedently comprehended uuically [or according to the nature of tliec&gt;ne~\.

" And, in the next place, you are ignorant of a most beautiful and
excellent race of men, who once inhabited your country ; from whence
yon and the whole of your city descended, though a small seed only
of this admirable people once remained. JJut your ignorance in this
alfair is owing to the posterity of this people, who for many ages were
destitute of literature, and became as it were dumb."

The Egyptian wishes to conjoin the second to the former period, and to show
that there is one connexion and life of the first Athenians, and of those that now
exist, through a small seed, as lie says, remaining. For thus also in the world
the seeds of a former period conjoin that which succeeds it to its principles,
through the essence of causes, the unceasing motion of the universe, and as some
one says, it* immutable mutation. We must not, however, wonder if the priest
now indeed says, that Solon is the oflsjirin^ of those excellent men. For we
must a^ain direct our attention to the cause of all mundane contrariety. For
Solon, so far as he is an animal, possesses from them the genus; but so far as he
is a partial intellect, receiving the narration of a Avar, he is analogous to the divi
nity, Avho transports the productive principle of mundane contrariety, supernally
from intelligible* to the sensible region. IS or is it proper to l&gt;e distmbed by such
like objections, but to know the nature of analogies ; and that the same things
through analogy, become first, middle, and last.

* For prior to that greatest destruction by water, there Avas a most
excellent city of Athenians, which surpassed all others in Avar, and Avas in
every respect governed by the most equitable laws, and Avlkosc deeds and
polities are said to have been the most beautiful of all that we have receiv
ed the knowledge of by the hearing, under the heavens."

108 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

Plato does not ]&gt;erliaps mean ly the greatest destruction, the deluge of Deuca
lion, but some one of the deluges prior to it. But he rails the city f the Athenians
most warlike, and governed by the most equitable la\vs, as U-ing an imitation
of its guardian Goddess, whom he afterwards says, is loth philosophic and
philopolemic. For the Athenians partake of the warlike from the philopolemie,
and of eipiitahle legislation from the philosophic. By the inunt beautiful deals
he means the victory over thr Atlantics. But by the most beautiful politics
lie does not intend to signify that they changed many of them, Imt he thus speaks,
l&gt;ecause one polity may In- called the number of many polities ; just as one world
is connective of many worlds. For if the life of each individual is ;i certain polity,
hut the common life is tin; communion of many partial lives, the one polity will
consist of many polities, the beauty of it depending on its union. He also adds,
the most beauty til of all that :rc Linr.c under the /leai-fn.i, because it is the first imita
tion of the politv of the world ; so (hat &gt;oii may say, it is the best of tho&gt;e under
the heavens ; for the paradigm of it is in the heavens. And thus much forpar-
ticuhus.

Again, however, we should remind ourselves respecting the whole deed of the
Athenians, that it is neither called a fable, nor a mere history ; some indeed
receiving what is narrated as a history, but others, as a fable. And some assert
ing, that, in the tirt place, the developement of these, and such like narrations,
appeared to 1 lato himself to be the province of a certain laborious and not
very fortunate man; and in the second place, that what is delivered by
Plato is not a tiling of such an enigmatical nature, as the doctrine of
Pherecydes, but that he teaches with jMTspicuity concerning most of his dogmas.
Neither, therefore, say they, should we force him to analyse, since the man
proposes to instruct us w ithotit aiubi^uilv . They also add, in the third place, that
neither is a de\ elopement in the present instance necessary. l ; or the cause of
the insertion of this narration is known In he the delight and allurement of the
reader. And in the fourth place, that if we analyse all things, we shall snller the
same as those whom a slippery manner are conversant with Homer. Others
again think that the developement of this history should be referred to physical
harmony, from v hat Plato says of the narration about Phaeton, that it has indeed
the form of a fable, but that it manifests a certain natural event ; .v///ct- the
Egyptians al,&lt;o, :chii t as Plato tai/.s, u ere the lathers of this relation, obscurely signified
the arcana of nature through fable. So that the developem* nt of this narration

1 I l.ilo s;i\* tin-, in ilic I li.riliui of tin- mail \vlio tlors not ailil|ll (lie fx)&gt;licalioiis nl l.tltlts to divine
ii iiirnn, lnil inltrj&gt;rcts Hum |&gt;li&gt; sicalK.

LOOK i.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. , 09

will lo ;i(l:i|)tf,| to liim, who speaks in the person of the Egyptians. For as
Tima-us himself, conformably to the philosophy of tho Pythagoreans, makes liis
discussion from numbers and figures, as interpreting nature through images; thus,
also, the I jiryplian priest will teach tlie truth of things throimh symbols adapted
to himself. To which may l&gt;e added, that I ) lato himself else\\here accuses
those who speak every tiling from what is at hand, in order, says lie, that they
may render their wisdom manifest, even to shoemakers. So that he who delivers
(me. assertions through enigmas, is not foreign from the mind of Plato. And
such are the arguments of each.

We however, say, that all these particulars are a history, and also an indication
of the mundane contrariety, and the whole order of things; the history, indeed,
narrating the past transactions of men, hut symbolically comprehending in itself
those things which are comprehended in the universe, ami the mundane contra
riety. For the progression according to opposition, commencing from the first
intelligible*, divides the world hy powers that are oppositely arranged. And if
you are willing, we will divide the universe according to the divine orders, which
are m uninterrupted succession, and purvey, conformably to the Pythagoreans, the
co-ordinations that it contains. From the two principles, therefore, it is divided
into hound and infinity, or rather into things allied to hound and the infinite.
For of things that are mixed, some pertain to the former, hut others to the latter
principle. But from that which is unfolded into li^ht as the third after these,
principles, the universe is divided into the united and the multiplied. I -"or there
multitude first subsists unitedly. From the triad that is next to this, it is divided
into things perpetual, and things corruptible.* For the measure of existence to
all things is derived from thence. From the third triad it is divided into the male
and female: 1 for in this each of these primarily subsists. But from the first triad
of the next order, it is divided according to the even and the odd; for nmnl&gt;er
characterized by unity there. 4 From the second triad, it is divided into the
partial and the total. And from the third," into the straight and the circular. Again,
of the intellectual triads, it is divided, according to the first, into things that are

Tlii* tliinl tiling, after the two principles bound au&lt;l infinity, is bring ihrlf.
1 This triad constitutes intrlligiblr life, or tttrnily ilielf.

3 This triad forms intflligible inlellrcf, or [avroiuor] animal iltrlf.

4 This triad is the Miinn.it of the order which it called intelligible, and at the same lime intellectual.
The second triad of the above order is denominated Htrctn, Iy Plato in the Pha-dni*.

* Ami the third triad of this order, is called bj Plato in the Phvdrun, tkt tub-ctUttiml arcb.

110

PROCLUS ON THK [HOOK i.

in themselves, ami things that are in others. According to the second, into
thin"* animated and tiling inanimate, into things stable and tliin^n \\liicli aro
moved, lint according to tin- third, into things that an- the same and things
that an* diHerent. 1 And (ruin the urder of Uulers, 1 indeed, it is divided into
tilings which rejoice in similitude, and things allied to dissiinililude. lint from
the liberated 1 order, it receives a division into the separate and the inseparable.
These tiling, therefore, \\liich ha\e an arrangement elsewhere, ha\e now also been
as it wen; explored by us. For according to each division, tin; goodness of
better natures, desiring to fill things Mihortliir.ito, and to take away depravity,
produces war. But the desire of lc&gt;s excellent natures, to divulse a certain
portion of bcing&gt;, of a more excellent condition, excites the apparent opposition
of things ; since in w ar, also, those that contend against e.ich other, w ish to redncv
into their own power the property of their opponents, and entirely destroy them.
These things, therefore, are evident.

\\c may, however, understand the opposition of powers in the universe, by
making a division after the following manner, into the adorning and adorned.
And, in the first place, indeed, into things super-essential and essences. For the
genus of the ( i"ds is super-essential. In the next place, by dividing essences into
eternal lives, and those which ener^i/e according to time. Likewise, those which
energi/.c according to time, into souls and bodies. And (todies, into such as are
celestial, and such as subsist in lieneration. These, likewise, we must divide into
wholes and parts. For the division extends as far as to these extremes. -And,
attain, we must divide, super-essential natures into the divine peculiarities, such as
the male and the female, the odd and the even, that which unites, and that which
separates, the stable and the motive, lint eternal natures must be divided into
total and partial essences. And such as are total, into the divine and angelic.
Souls are to In; divided into the divine, and the attendants on the divine. And
divine souls, into the celestial, and those that pay a providential attention to
generation. Souls, likewise, that follow the (.jods, must be divided into those that
follow them perpetually, and those that are frequently separated from them. And
the division of those that are separated from them, is into (hose that preside over
generation with nndeliled purity, and those that become defiled with vice. For

1 The iiiirlliiiu.il triail consists of Salurn, Kliej, and Jupiter.
1 The urilcr &lt;i! Rulers, i" the tiiprnnundunt ordtr of (i&lt;N.

1 The liberated whidi immediately follows the M.|M&gt;rmun&lt;iunc order, is i^elf immediately follow d
hy the mundane order of God-,. See my transljtiou of Proclus on the Theology of Pljto.

BOOK i.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. n ,

the descent is far :s to those. Moreover, the celestial bodies must l&gt;e divided
into the inerratic and erratic. And those, into such as are moved with a simple,
and such as arc moved with a various motion. The latter, also, must lie divided
into the peculiarities of powers. And universally the dm&gt;ion in all the above
mentioned orders, is into that which adorns, and that which is adorned, that
which fills, and that which is filled.

If, however, it he requisite, not to look to a part, hut to adhere to the intellec
tual conception of wholes, it must be admitted that this opposition subsists even
where. For it is in (.iods, and in intellects, in souls, and in bodies. For in the
first of these, there is bound and infinity ; in intellects, sameness and difference. ;
in souls, the circle of the same, and the circle of the different ; and in bodies,
heaven and generation. But secondary natures are always arranged with
reference to such as are more excellent. Hence, also, we say that this narration
is useful to the whole theory of nature, as indicating to us the mundane contra
riety from energies and motions. For all the teachers of physiology lx?^in
from contraries, and make these to be principles ; which Plato also knowing,
delivers to us, through symbols and enijjmas, what the. contrariety is of the genera
in the universe, and how less are subjugated to more excellent natures, through
the intellectual energy of Mincna. Farther still, 1 iato very properly calls
the polity the work of the Athenians, because it is requisite that such an
analogy as this which the junior fabrication connects, should proceed through
all things ; but that total powers should by a much greater priority effect this,
from which al&lt;o the junior fabrication being filled, gives subsistence to mundane
intellect-", to souls antibodies conformably to the pecularity of itself.

" Solon, therefore, on hearing tliis, said that lie was astonished, and
burning with the most ardent desire, entreated the priests to narrate every
thing pertaining to bis ancient fellow eitizens."

This, likewise, is the peculiarity of divine natures, viz. for such as are secon
dary, genuinely to adhere to such as are first, and to be established in their un-
defiled intellectual perceptions ; but for such as are first, to impart by illumination
iheir own plenitude to such as are secondary, through * unenvyiiig cxulierant

1 For irpo rwr afinrni ur, it is necessary to read T/&gt;OI rttv n/tnrnruv.

"* J lMrad of ro fc -rpvTa, vra/irwr a^Oorwr, cat ayaOorifri, rou ktvrtpon t xtXafiwtiv rijr ap" cavrv r

m PRQCLUS ON THE [BOOK. .

power and goodness. Wonder, therefore, precedes, because in us, also, this is the
beo-innm" of the knowledge of wholes. But in divine natures, it conjoins that

f5 t

which wonders with the object of wonder. Hence, likewise, those who are wise,
in divine concerns celebrate T/UIUI/HIS, [whose name is dcriicd from tliaiuna,
wonder,] as one of tlie greatest of the Gods, who through wonder inclines secon
dary to primary natures. \\\\lunlfiit ;rywo/ follows, rendering that which ought
to partake of more perfect goods, adapted to the participation of them.

" That afterwards, one of the priests said : Nothing of envy,
Solon, prevents us from complying with your request. lUit for your
sake and that of your city, 1 will relate the whole; and especially on
account of the (ioddess."

Solon Ix-iit" an Athenian, lias a resemblance to the Tutelar (Joddess Minerva,

so far as he adheres to more perfect intellectual perceptions. And the priest re-
fsembles one shaking, as it were, from a certain adytum. For he teaches what
was committed to writing in the temples ; and piv.sents to us an imitation of
the middle orders of I he junior fabrication, and of the whole paternal cause;
which orders transmitting the gifts of a more elevated to a subordinate cause,
fill from that as from a certain fountain theduine order. All things, likewise,
are elegantly rlfected by the speaker. For Solon is perfected, the city is praised,
and the (.Joddess is celebrated. The ascent also is from Solon to the (Joddess
through the city an a medium ; imitating the comerlhe power of the (Joddchs.
And this, likewise, is indeed beneficent ; \i/. to eiicrgi/e for the sake of the
perfection of secondary natures: for it imitates providence, and the super-
plenary power of di\ine beings. Hut it is in a still greater degree beneliceiit, to
energi/e for the sake of the city: for the energy is more ample, and embraces
a greater power, liesides this, it is still more divine to extend all the nar
ration to the Goddess, and to terminate the whole energy in her; all which,
the nnenvying communication of the priest genuinely represents to us, not
only indicating the privation of envy, but the di\ine and prompt generation
of good.

Again, however, we must not IM- ignoranlly disturbed, if now indeed the priest
as Ix-ing the dispensator of the narration, is said to adumbrate a greater and more
divine cause ; but at another time, the Athenians being the ancestors of Solon,

irXifpu/aif in this place, it is iHTi"&gt;5ary lo read ru ^ ir^wra i Ivvaptuv a^&uwr, *u uyaOorr/roi, a. X.
For iroifirm litrt, it is mcisiarv to read /n/&lt;irai.

IKIOK i.] TIMjEUS OF PLATO. U.-l

arc more ancient than the inhabitants of Sai s ; the Athenians leing arranged ac
cording to the mundane causes of the whole contrariety of tilings. Tor so far as
pertains to the narration, they have this order ; but so far as pertains to physical
progression, they bring with them an ima^e of certain more elevated and divine
orders. Ami if you are willing so to speak, since all fabrication, and the mun
dane contrariety, are antecedently comprehended in the father of wholes, toother
with adorning causes, and things which are adorned, you may there also assume
according to analogy, the paradigmatic cause of the Athenians in intellectual
lives. For au r ain, the veil [of Minerva] is the Inst irnai;e of the whole contrariety
of things. But in the universe, the true works of the Gods have a precedency,
and likewise in the productive and primary causes of them; where also it is said,
Minerva became apparent, invested with armour. Or rather, the veil is the last
work of the weaving art, containing in itself an linage of the mundane war, and
of tht; demiurgic order proceeding from the Godde.ss into the universe; which
veil she wove in conjunction with her father. A better image however of this, is
that which in the narration of Plato, and in enigmas, represents to us the whole
contrariety of things, and of tin? works of Minerva ; which narration contributes
to the whole [descriptive] fabrication of the world, in the same manner as the veil
to the splendid procession of the Goddess, and the whole of the solemnity. For
the Pfi/ifil/icttrffj is (in image of I lie Mincrval fabrication in llic universe. The veil,
however, is superior to both these, which is woven in the universe, in the intellec
tual light of Minerva. For contrariety is spread under the one life of the
world, and the war is a part of the fabrication of things, which the ruling art of
Minerva arranges in a In-coming manner. And prior to all these, is the veil,
which is pre-established in paradigmatic causes and the intelligible, and is com
prehended in the one intellectual perception of Minerva. For,

In weaving, nil ill* immortals lic excels,

says Orpheus. Hence, the weaving art is there primarily, and the veil of the
essence of this Goddess, which essenc" is all things intellectually, that the uni
verse is according to a mundane characteristic. For in ruling over the war of the
universe, she does not look any where else than into herself.

That we may however recur to the thing proposed to be considered, the Egyp
tian priest directly imitates the unenvying providence of the Deiniurgus, about
which Plato a little farther on says, " He u as good, but envy ticccr subsists in him
U hoisgood, about anything. 11 For the orders which exist proximately with him,
Tim. Plat. VOL. I. P

114 PROCLUS ON THE [IOOK r.

have from him, and on account of him, an unenvying participation of good. And
through this privation of envy, the pnest fills indeed the mind of Solon, but
praises the city, and celebrates the tutelar Goddess ; conjoining partial and
total 1 natures, uniting things contained to the things that contain them, and sus
pending all things from the Goddess, according to one bond and one series.

" "Who is allotted the guardianship both of your city and ours, and by
whom they have been nourished and educated."

The Egyptian, after a certain admirable manner, converts all things to the God
dess, and produces them from, and again converts them to her. For recurring
from a citi/en through the city to the power who presides over it, he makes this con
version. But again proceeding from the Goddess to the natures that primarily,
and also to those that secondarily participate of her, he imitates the progression of
things from her dhinity. Again also asserting that the participants are nourished
and disciplined by the Goddess, he likewise converts these to her. How is it
possible, therefore, that these particulars .should not in an admirable manner imi
tate demiurgic powers, which are established in natures prior to themselves, and
generate those posterior to, anil corner! them to the causes of themselves ? And
thus much concerning these particulars.

What, howe\er, is the meaning of this allotment * And how are the Gods said
to be distributed into the universe 7 Of allotments therefore, some are those of
partial souls, and others, of the nndeliled genera. Some are demoniacal, others
angelic, and others, of the Gods themselves. For if the father of the universe was
one alone, and there was only one providence and one law, there would be no
need of allotments, nor of divine distribution. Since, however, after the one Hither
there is a triad, after the uniform a multiform providence, and after one law a
multitude of fatal laws, it is also necessary that there should be a division of the
subjects of government, and another pro\ idence and order about other thin r s.
Through this canst theirfore the universe is duu/cd l&gt;y demiurgic numbers, vi~. In/ the
ilnad, triad, ttfrad. /&gt;entdd, thdumad, and dodecud. For after the one fabrication, the
section of the universe into two, hea\en and generation, constitutes two-told allot
ments, the celestial and genesinrgic. After this, the triad divides the unircr.se,
about which Neptune in Homer* says,

To iiic lij loi belong* llir lioarv ilerp,

Tin- spaciuii* litaven to Jute, to l lut, 1 !.nf i &lt;bik.

For iVjio licir, it is uccesiary to read iA.u.

Iliad iv. \t. lyo, Ac.

nonK i.] TIM/1UJS OF PLATO. \ [~ t

Tlu. tetradic distribution follows the triple order; giving a four-fold arrangement
to the elements in the universe, as the Pythagoreans say, celestially and ethereally,
ahovt the earth, and under the earth. Next to this is the five-fold division. For
the world is one, consists of five parts, and is appropriately divided l&gt;y celes
tial, empyreal, aerial, aquatic, and terrestrial figures, and presiding Gods. After
this allotment, the division into seven parts follows. For the heptad Iwginniu"
supernal ly from the inerratic sphere, proceeds through all the elements. And
after all these, is the allotment of the universe defined in the dodecad. From the
divine allotments, however, the allotments of angels and da rnon.s are suspended
and have more various distributions. For OIK; divine allotment is comprehensive
of many angelical, ami of a still greater number of demoniacal allotments. For
every an^rl rules over a multitude of daemons, and every angelical allotment has
about itself many demoniacal allotments. Forwhat a monad is in the (iods, that a
tribe is to each allotment in da-mons. Instead ofatriad, therefore, we must assume
three companies, and instead of the tetratl or dodecad, four numbers and twelve
choirs, following their respective leatlers. And thus we shall always preserve
the higher allotments. For as in essences, as in powers, as in energies, progres
sions generate multitude, thus also in allotments, those (hat rank as tho tirst, have
a precedency in power, but are diminished in quantity; as beinjj more proxi
mate to the one father, and to the total and one providence. lint those that are
the second in rank, are allotted a diminished power, and an increased multitude.
These tilings then fore are to IK considered in common about allotments.

Since, however, we have divided allotments according to a section into two,
into the celestial and sublunary, concerning the former indeed there can be no
doubt respecting the nature of them, and whether they aluays remain invariably
the same. Hut the sublunary allotments are desenedly subjects of admiration.
whether they are said to he perpetual, or not. For if they are jMTpetual, how is
this possible? For how, since every thing in generation is mutable and flowing,
can the energies of the powers that providentially inspect it, be perpetual ? For
the things that are in generation, are not perpetual. And if these energies are not
j&gt;erpetiial, how is it that dhine inspection subsists differently at diflercnt times?
For an all .tuient is neither a certain separate energy of the (iods, in order that
tilings in generation being; changed into another condition, this energy may remain
exempt and immutable; nor is it alone that which is pnerned, in order that no
absurdity may follow from the allotment (lowing, and sustaining all-various muta
tion? ; but it is an assigned state, providence, and unrestrained government of
divinity, about these sublunary concern*. And on account indeed of the subject

116 PROCLUSON THE [BOOK i.

of jrovcrnment, the definition of per|&gt;etuity cannot l&gt;e applied to it; hut on account
of its being [always] present, it is destitute of corruption, in order that we may not
ascril&gt;e to the Gods the passion of partial souls, by assigning them different allot
ments at different times. Hence it remains for "s to sliow, how allotment is to be
explained, so as to preserve the immutable in the Cods, and mutability to things
in generation.

Perhaps therefore the discussion of this allair \vill be easy, by having recourse
to that theory, which we have frequently elsewhere employed, vis. that every
tiling in generation, and generation itself, must not 1&gt;e considered as alone con
sisting of mutable and flowing things, but there is also in these something immu
table, and naturally adapted to remain always the same. For the interval, which
receives all the parts of the world, comprehends them in itself, and is extended
through all bodies, is immovcahlc, lest, if it belonged to things which are moved,
it should also itself require another receptacle, and this should be the case ad
infinitinn. The ethereal \ehicles likewi&gt;e of divine souls, \\ilh which these souls
are circularly invested, and which imitate the lives in the heavens, have, a per
petual essence, and are eternally suspended from di\ine &gt;oitl&gt;, beintr full of pro
lific power, and performing a circular motion, according to a certain secondary
circle of the celestial orbs. And in the (bird place, the wholeness of the elements
remains always the same, though the parts sustain an all-various corruption, For
it is necessary that each form of the univcr.-e should be never-failinir, in order
that the universe may be perfect, and that bciistr generated from an iuimoveable
cause it may !* immovcahle according to essence. Hut creri/ u/iulem.fsi.t a form,
or rather it is that tc/iic/i it is said to be, thnnih the participation ofune entire form.

And here you may see, how the nature of bodies proceeds in [a becoming!
order. For one 1 thing [i. e. the interval of the universej is immoveahlc according
to every motion ; but another thing, [i.e. the vehicles of divine soul.s] receives
motion only according to place. For this is most remote from essential mutation.
And another thing, [i. e. the wholeness of the elements] admits of other mutations
in its parts, but the whole remains entirely immutable. And the cele&gt;tial allot
ments indeed, proximatcly dividing the interval, divide al together with it the
heavens. But with respect to the sublunar) allotments, in the lir.-t place indeed
they are allotted portions in the interval of the univer&gt;e. In the next place, they
make a distribution according to the definite vehicles of .souls. And in the third

/f l. ll " &gt;LM//K ri/&gt;a/Jto&gt;&lt; iiniatv eyivtAu-r Ti.n.iyjt i u, it i lii C is;ir^ to rr.lil tiri(
rjfirj yut I/JOK ^KI aftiuit, fiai n&gt; ijiui , K. X.
1 For ( xrrur, Tt ail rptruv.

BOOM.] TIMJZUS OF PLATO. 117

plaro, they remain always invariably tin* same, according to the whole parts of
generation. The allotments of the God* then-fore do not change, nor subsist
dilierently at different times. For they have not proxim. itely their hypostasis in
that which is changed. Mow, therefore, do the illuminations of the Gods take
place in these ! How are the dissolutions of sacred rites effected? And how is the
same place, at different times occupied by diflerent spirits ? May we not say, that
the Gods possessing perpetual allotments, and dividing the earth according to
divine nntnbers, similarly to the sections of the heavens, these divisions of the
earth also are illuminated, so far as they possess aptitude? But the circulation of
the celestial orbs produces indeed this aptitude, through certain configurations;
divine illumination, 1 at the same time, imparting a power more excellent than tle
then existing nature. Total nature likewise [or nature considered as a whole]
produces this aptitude, inserting divine impressions in each of the things illumi
nated, through which these spontaneously participate of the Gods. For she inserts
dillen nt images of the divinities in dilli-rent illuminated parts, in consequence
of these parts hem;; suspended from the Gods. Times also effect something,
according to which the conditions of other things are tjoverncd. The ^ood
temperament of the air too co-operates. And, in short, every tiling about us
contributes to the increase and diminution of this aptitude. \Vhen, therefore,
according to a concurrence of these many causes, aptitude to the participation of
the Ciods is in-generated in some one of the things naturally disposed to be
changed, then di\ inily is unfolded into lij;ht, even in these mutable natures, he
bein^ before concealed through the inaptitude of the recipients; possessing indeed
eternally his proper allotment, and always extending the participation of himself,
but not bein^ always received by the^e terrestrial places, on account of their
inaptitude. But in the same manner as of partial souls, which choose diflerent
lives at diflerent tunes, some choose such as are adapted to their proper Gods, but
others such as are foreign, through an oblivion of the divinities to whom they are
allied; thus, also, of sacred places, some are adapted to the power that ha&lt; there
his allotment, but others are suspended from another order. And on this account,
says the Athenian truest, some are accustomed to be more prosperous, but others
more unfortunate. \\ hether, therefore, the telestjc or legislative art dedicates this
particular city to the divinity who, according to an eternal allotment from the
le;jinnin;r, received lhi&lt; jKirlion [of the earth], the life [of the inhabitants] is through
this in a greater decree assimilated to the tutelar deity, and the works of him [who

!l .ij&gt;|n,ir-&lt; lo me liiat llir wor.l* Ottmt rX.\/i v rm arc wanting in ilm jil.u .

118 1MIOCLUS ON TIIR [BOOK i.

looks to this divinity in effecting them] are rendered more correctly great anil
admirable than those of the man who is not impelled to action from a principle
of this kind. And he who chooses a life conformable to that of the allotted
deity, acts with greater rectitude than he docs who transfers himself to another
order.

Conformably to this mode therefore, the Egyptian says, that Minerva is allotted
the city which is named after her, and also his own city Sais; inferring this per
haps from the great similitude of the life of the citizens to the Goddess; and per
haps also |&gt;erceiving that there was an allotment of tin s kind, from the telestic art,
and sacerdotal works. For as of the other Cods, so likewise of Minerva, there
is an allotment proceeding snjM-rnally from intellectual causes to the place of the
earth. Her allotment therefore is fust in her father; but in the ruling Gods accord
ing to a second order. In the twelve liberated Gods, it make-, a third progres
sion; but after this, it unfolds itself into light in the heaveu^, with unrestrained
authority. In one way indeed, in the inerratic sphere. For there a certain allot
ment of this Goddess is expanded, whether it lw the place about the Ham, or that
about the Virgin, or whether it be some one of the northern stars, as some say it
is the Electra, which is there. But in another way, it is unfolded into light in the
Sun. For there, according to theologists, an admiiable power, and a Mincrval
order, govern wholes in conjunction with the Sun. And again, in another way
in the Moon: for Minerva is the monad of the triad 1 which is there. 15ut in
another way in the earth, according to the similitude of the allotments of the eai th
to the celestial distributions. And la-tly, about the earth differently in diflerent
places, according to the peculiarities of providence. It is not therefore at all
wonderful, if one divinity should be said to be allotted both Athens and Sa is.
For the same thing must not he supposed to take place about the Gods, as about
partial souls, which are not adapted to dwell in two bodies at the same time,
l&gt;ecanse they exert a providential energy in conjunction with habitude; but there
is indeed a participation of the same power in dillereiit place*; and in the one
power there is also multitude. This power likevvUe i^ dillerciilly participated by
different places. And in some, sameness is more abundantly participated; but in
others, difference.

These things therefore are truly asserted, and the allotments ol the Gods are
|x&gt;rpetnally established in the universe. These likevv is.; existing, there are dillerent

This Iriail coruistj of .Minerva, l iorr|iiu*, and Diana.

HOUR i.l T1.NUJUS OF PLATO. j \Q

temporal evolution* of them into light, according Jo different places. Ancient
theology U!HO manifests the |&gt;erpetual essence of the allotmentx; as when it it* Haiti
in Homer,

To nip in ocean * honry ik rpi lo dwell,
Alrcnin, [ty lot l)clongn.

For the word ahcaijs is significant of perpetuity. And in short, since it is necessary
that prior to things which sun&lt;c(iifics, there should be natures which akrayx, parti
cipate of the Gods, it is likewise necessary that perpetual allotments should exist
prior to such as are temporal. For as daemons prior to partial souls follow the
Gods, thus also there are perpetual allotments suspended from the Gods, prior to
partial illuminations. And the mundane Gods comprehend these allotments;
the terrestrial Gods, such as are terrestrial; the aquatic, such as are aquatic; and
the aerial, such as |&gt;ertain to the air. These Gods likewise, prior to visible
bodies, ride in ethereal \ehicles, conformably to the Gods in the heavens. But
whether it mu*t be admitted, that there are other sublunary allotments, proceeding
from on high in conjunction with divine light, must be elsewhere considered: for
what has l&gt;een said, is sufficient for the present.

" Yours indeed, by a priority to ours of a thousand years, receiving
the seed of your race from Vulcan and the Earth."

With res[&gt;ect to the fabrication of Vulcan, how may some one decide, so as not
perfectly to fail in his conceptions of the power of the God ? For the assertions of
the multitude concerning him, lx*long to things which must be entirely rejected.
Cut that which is said by those whose notions are more intellectual* is indeed
true, but requires no small decree of confirmation. We shall therefore introduce
to our discussion from theologists, credibility concerning this divinity. That
Vulcan then is of the demiurgic, but not of the vivific, or connective, or any
other series, is manifested by theologists, when they represent him as fashioning
tiling from brass, employing the l&gt;ello\vs, and, in short, when they call him the
artificer. But that h&gt; is the fabricator of sensible, and not of psychical, or
intellectual works, is also manifested by them. For the formation of a mirror,

1 Iliad xv. v. 1&lt;)O.
Imlrad of o&lt; rfwrrpor in llin pUcr, il ;i|&lt;|MMn to me to be iicrovirv to read c&lt; rvrpwrtpor.

120 PKOCLUS ON Till- [DOOK i.

the exercise of the brazier s art, lamenes*, and every tiling of this kind, are symbols
of hia productive energy about a sensible nature. Moreover, that lie is the maker
of all sensible*, is ev ident from the same theolo;ists, ubo say that he was hurled
from Olympus as far as to the earth, and who make all the receptacles of the
mundane Gods, to have !&gt;een elaborated by Vulcan. If, therefore, Me admit that
these things are true, this (iod it-ill be the fabricator totally of aw/ corporeal-formed
substance ; preparing Jor the doits their visible seats, rendering all things subservient
to the out harmony of the world; jilting all fabrications in/// corporeal life ; and
adorning and connecting with forms the resisting and ^russ nature of matter. On
this account also he is said by theolo^ists to fashion things from brass, as beinsr
the artificer of resisting solids. And because the heavens an; [said to be] bra/en,
as In/ill^ an imitation of the intelligible, the maker of the heavens is likewise
[fabled to IH-] a bra/ier. But he is lame in both hi-, fret, 1 as beinj; the fabric. itor
of tilings that are last in the progressions ol bein^; for siicli aie bodies; and also
as beint; no longer able to proceed into another order. Likewise, because, he i&gt;
the maker of the universe, which, as Tnna-us says, i&gt; without lei^s. And he was
Imrled from on hifji to earth, as extending his fabi iealion through thejvliole of
a sensible essence. Whether, therefore, then: are said to he certain physical
productive principles in the universe, or whether there are spermatic principles,
the rause of all these must be referred to this (Jod. I or that which nature cllects
bv \eriiini; to bodies, this (iod fashions divinely and exemptly, exciting nature,
and nsini; her as an instrument to her own fabrication. 1 or innate In at is
Vulcanian, Ix-inij generated by \ id&lt;-an as Mibservient to corporeal production.
The productive cause therefore of generated natures is referred, in what I lato
says, to this (jod.

Since however matter is neceary to things that are generated; for the (iodw
in the heavens borrow parts from the universe, as things which will be a^ain
returned, for the generation of mortal animals; iln- also I lato delivers to us, in a
v-ry admiiahle manner, throiiyh earth. I or in seed i ^-|f, there are productive
powers, and a subject. And the former are derived !.,;:i l!ie art o| N ulcaii; but
tin- latter from earth. I or by earth, we miM now understand every material
cause; not that the Athenians spuing from the earth; but because it i&gt; usual to

It nnii! tir tan-fulls olis-rril, that ffi/fflt wln-n ;it iil&lt;fl to &lt;li\inc- naluri j udiiinlir.ilc lninn-fi;Jin.
cie$: jut a tliu-e \\lnne e&gt;t-s ur&lt;- tiili-tl willi ilic solar li-lit. arc -.uitl to lie incafuUe of perceiving
mumluiif oli|tft&gt;; for thij iitrai&gt;atiti/ i&gt; n&lt;itliiii&lt;: IIIOK- ili.m lranc*iclem \ of vision. In liU- inauucr,
the lunicue&gt; of \ulcan, iyuibolicjllj indiralCH his rn in|i!i&lt;in froru anv defective |&gt;rogresiun.

BOOK i.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 121

call all generation earth, and every tiling material, earthly. Fire, therefore, is a
Vnlcanian instrument; but earth is matter, which is excited and vivified through
fire, since it is of itself lifeless. Hence also, in consequence of this being filled,
the material order is now assumed in conjunction with Vulcan. And on thi*
account it is said that the seed of Vulcan, together with earth, gave subsistence to
the generation of the Athenians. For according to the fable also, Vulcan being
in love with Minerva, emitted his seed on the earth, and from thence the race of
the Athenians blossomed forth. In short, therefore, Vulcan is always in love
with Minerva, imitating her intellectual nature, in the fabrication 1 of sensible;*.
But Minenal souls, according to this eneriry of Vulcan, especially receive
vehicles from him, and are introduced into bodies from the productive powers
of Vulcan, and the hypostasis* of earth; the productive powers receiving
Minerval impressions. For this God, prior to nature, is the perfecter of bodies,
inserting in different bodies, different symbols of the divinities.

What however are the thousand years, according to which the Athenians are
prior to the inhabitants of Sais ? This, therefore, may be said historically. But
it seems also to signify the temporal priority of the life of the Athenian?, and in
short, that it is necessary their life should be more elevated than that of the Sa itans.
For as in the invisible orders of things, many genera are suspended from the same
leader, some indeed more proximately, but others more subordmately ; after the
same manner also, of Minerval souls descending into generation, some are assi
milated to Minerva, according to the highest degree of excellence; but others
subsist proximately after these. A thousand years, therefore, .signify this excellence.
For they arc the measure of a perfect gencxiurgic period, &lt;&gt;n account (&gt;f a thousand
being a cubic number. Hence this number is very properly adapted to a life
superior according to generation, and which is in a greater degree assimilated to
the [tutelar Goddess. If also you wish to transfer these things to the universe,
you may there behold all the visible fabrication which is Vulcanian, and adorning
causes and adorned effects ; some of which are more total, but others more partial.
And some l&gt;eing analogous to the Athenians, but others to the SaVtans. For

Instead of TO mrpnv avn\i TH* amOrjuy fjifiovfiaoi ill this place, wiiidi is evidently defective, 1 rrad
r rorpov oi/rijs tv ry liiftti inyitf rur airOifrwr fitfjuv/iryrn.

1 For rrj yijt vrvirraatv rwr Aoywr, nOijiaun &lt;r&gt; Orj^nra Xa/3nrwr, it SCCDI* nfCfSSary to read rijt yiji
W9fTttattft, ruf Xoywr aftijra/in, c. X.

Tim. Plat. Vou I. Q

, 2 . 2 PKOCLUS ON THE [&lt;"

nothing hinders, but tliat the same things may be sun eyed analogously, in
demiurgic causes, in the universe, and in an historical narration.

The divine lamhlichus however doubts, how the gods are said to be allotted
certain places, according to definite times ; as for instance, Minerva was first
allotted Athens, and afterwards Sa is. For if, their allotment commences from
a certain time, it will aUo at a certain time cease. I or whatever is measured
by time, is a thin- of this kind. Farther . s tJU, with respect to the place which
they are allotted at a certain time, was it without a ruler, w lieu it fell to their lot,
or was it under the dominion of other Gods ? For if, indeed, it was withuut a
ruler, how is it possible that any thini; hclon- m^ to the universe can be perfectly
destitute of divinity 7 How, in short, can any place remain without the -uardian
protection of more e\c. -llent natures ? Or how, if it is sutlicient to the pr-ser\a-
tion of itself, can it afterwards become the allotment of some one of the Gods f
But if it is under the dominion of another leader, it will also fall to the allotment
of another God, and thus an absurdity will ensue. For the second God does not
divul-ethe prefecture and allotment of the former divinity. Nor do the. God*
alternately receive the places of each other; nor do da-mons chan-e their allot
ments, lamblichus bavin- thus doubted, dissolves the doubts by say in-, that
tin-allotments of the Gods are perpetually cMulili-shed, but that the participants
of them, at one time derive advantage from the miardialiship of the rulers, and
at another time reap no benefit from it. He adds, that tln*c urc flit /Mirtii-i/ialioHJi
u hicli tire tm-asund &gt;v d&gt;"^ &lt;""/ u-huh s tacJ instiimiinis fra/ua.tlii full the tnrth-
J ti/sH/ llicduth. It has however been observed by us, that this resembles that
which happens about souls. For every soul has entirely a tutelar God. And
certain soul- choose lives adapted to other Gods. Tims, therefore, every place is
the allotment of a certain God, and there is a time when it becomes the allotment
of some other dh inity, who renders it adapted throu-h a certain period, or through
certain im-tic rites established by men. I or allotment is twofold, the one bem-j;
essential, but the other subsi&gt;tin^ according to habitude. Hut let us direct our
attention to what follows.

" Hut an account of the transactions of this our city, during the space
of e hdit thousand years, is preserved in our sacred writings."

f -

The priest assigns to the Athenians the number nine thousand, receiving this

BOOK i.] TINLEUS OF PLATO. j.^3

also from history ; but to the Sailans the number eight thousand; measuring the
lives of (lie citizens by the chiliad, conformably to the writings in the temples.
For by thin number, as the philosopher Porphyry says, damons also nicaxure t tine.
Farther still, the priest makes this narration from the sacred \vritin ir s ; which
manifests, as lamblichus would say, the stable guard of the mundane divine
guardians. These numbers, however, happen to lives according to a probable
reason. For ei^ht thousand is a cube on a cube ; but nine thousand is a letrugonic
superficies on a cube. Hence the one 1 gives depth to a superficies, and this
through the indefinite duad ; but the other preserves the superficies, itself in itself,
in similitude and perfection from the triad. 4 But it is the symbol of a better life, to
remain in itself, and to adorn secondary natures. And it is an indication of a
more imperfect life, to descend to secondary natures, to be assimilated to them,
and to be filled with a certain indefmitencss. Since however even a secondary
nature is not entirely deprived of similitude to divinity, the descent is through a
cube, in which there is a tetradic similitude. But it is better to imitate more
excellent nature through a more simple life, than through a life which is more
compounded. And a square is more simple than a cube. If however you
should say, that the number nine thousand is adapted to those that have their
hypostasis from Earth and Vulcan ; for a thousand is terrestrial, as being a
cube, but nine pertains to Vulcan,

With them 1 many artificial forms
For nine ycart fjsliiuu d - -

says Vulcan [in Homer, 6 ] in thus speaking, you will not wander from the

truth. But, in short, a cube is adapted to the terrestrial allotments of Minerva;
since the decad is attributed to the heavens, and the last progression of the decad
gives subsistence to the solid number one thousand. For the Gods make their
progression from the celestial allotments to the terrestrial, as the last. This
then-fore must be said by us.

The philosopher Porphyry however, in interpreting these tilings, supposes

For lc(&gt; is a cube, and so likewise is 8.

* For 9 is a square, anil IOOO is a cube.

1 800O gives drrtth to the superficies 20. For 20x20x20-8000. and thin is through the
duad, because C0= 2x 10.

4 For ynoo is llic cube of 30.

i. c. The descent is through &gt;OOO, in which there is a tetradic similitude, because u Procliu
had before observed, it is a Mjuate superficies ou a cube.

* Iliad. 1. 18. vs. iOO.

124 1 ROCIAJS ON THE [BOOK i.

Vulcan to be the intellect that presides over art, hut earth to be the lunar sphere. For
thit is called by the Egyptiant ethereal earth. lie says therefore that HOU!S which
derive their subsistence from divinity, hut participate of the artificial [or Vulcanic]
intellect, are disseminated in the body of the moon; souls that give themselves
to the arts, dwelling there; and that they ha\e bodies which are etlluxions of the
ethereal bodies. That nine thousand years, also, are adapted to the-e souls, after
the following manner. A myriad of years is, toys he, the period of the souh
which ascends and descends through the five stars, in order that each may have
two chiliads, yet not successive. Time indeed is successive according to concep
tion ; for it is not without continuity. Hence all the stars have nine lives ; which
is obscurely Minified through nine thousand years. !\mths also are performed
to the dead. And in a similar manner, some mve names to ihosc that are horn,
in the ninth year ; employing as symbols the periods of generation and production.
The priest, however, does not now assume a mviiad of years, but the number oi
nine thousand, in order that those of whom he is speaking may still IK* terrene, but
approximating to the period of a myriad of years. All tins interpretation, however,
the divine lainblichus rejects, and says that the discussion here is not about lives,
but about the different measures of .Minerval participation. It is absurd, therefore,
to make mention of the periods spoken of in the Plia-drus. But if it be requisite
to narrate what follows from the conception of Porphyry, it must be said, that
the soul lives indeed intellectually and Saturnally on hi^h, but descends first to
the conception of a political life, which is Jovian. Afterwards, she excites anger,
and lives ambitiously. But anger is .Martial. In the next place, she proceeds
in her descent to desire, and venereal lives; and at last, exerts physical reason*
[or productive powers]. But all reasons are Ilermaie. And Hermes is the
insjK-ctive guardian of physical reasons. Through the&lt;e, however, she is bound to
body. Anil again, receiving a body, .she first lives physically, being the supplier
of nutriment and increase to the body. Afterwards, she lives epithymetieally,
exciting genesinrgic powers. In {he next place, she. Hi eg under the influence of
anger, rising against her former habits, but entering into an ambitious life. After
wards, she lives politically, moderating the passions. And in the last place, she
lives intellectually. If therefore she is restored to her pristine state, her life is
intellectual, and the myriad is terminated. But in generation, though she is
conversant with it in the best manner, she lives according to a deficiency by the
chiliad. And of this the number nine thousand is a symbol, being adapted to the
!*-st polity of the Athenians.

BOOK i.j TIM.EUS OF PLATO. j^

" I will therefore briefly unfold to yon the laws, and the most beautiful
of the deeds of those citizens that existed nine thousand years ago. For
when we arc more at leisure, we shall accurately discuss every particular,
receiving for this purpose the sacred writings themselves."

If you wi*h to refer what is here said to the whole order of tilings, the number
nine thousand will manifest the total progression as far as to a cube, and terrestrial
works, and likewise the life which pervades through all things. Hut through the
word briefly, the union of many productive powers, and the comprehension of
them according to intellect, are indicated. For the synoptical is an image of
intellectual impartiality; but that which departs into multitude, of prolific
power; multiplying, producing, and dividing forms into minute parts, through
diversity. The la:is are images of the divided fabrication, which is united accord
ing to intellect. But the most beautiful work is an adumbration of the orderly
distribution of things which is extended to one 1 autiful end. For beauty
subsisting according to the united, proceeds from intelligible^ to the visible fabri
cation. And the resumption of the sacred writings, indicates the recurrence to the
paradigms of them, from which also the priest being filled, delivers these things
to Solon. The narration, therefore, will be concerning. the divided and multiplied
fabrication, which is connected by intellect, and extends as far as to terrestrial
works, as may IK? inferred from all that has l&gt;ecn said.

" In the first place then, consider the laws of these people, and compare
them with ours. For you will now find licre many paradigms of things
which then subsisted in your city."

As Socrates summarily discussed his own polity, thus also the priest briefly
discusses the laws of the ancient Athenians, in order that the latter may have dimi
nution w ith reference to the former, and also a similitude to it. And this very pro
perly. For the one is more universal, but the other more partial. And the one is
the work ufdianour, but the other of the phantasy. This diminution indeed may be
sun eyed, so far as Socrates has described a polity, but the priest laics. A polity, hwc-
evcr, is the union and conmon bond of the life of citizens ; but legislation is order pro
ceeding into multitude and division. A nd the former is more analogous to the providen
tial cause, but the latter to fate. But there is a similitude between Socrates and the

Instead of v&lt;*-&lt;m- t^y ravra iai cccira, it wf nm necttMfy lo rrd v^tmi- t^y ravra MM rpot mra.

!2 PttOCLUS ON THE [HOOK i.

priest, so far as both assert that they deliver the multitude of their words con
tracted ly.

Again, thereforo, these tilings embrace wholes and di\ine causes. For tlie
middle is stisjxhuled from the first fabrication, and is assimilated to it. And
each indeed pertains to the universe ; hut the latter according to union, and onr
sameness ; and the former according to progression and the difference of the
things fabricated. Just as the third fabrication siuVists according to conversion.*
And the first fabrication connects the \&gt;ar in generation celestially; but the
second subordinate!} and according to diminution ; just as the third connects
the extremities of the universe. Very properly therefore does Socrates summarily
deliver the laws, and the \\hole life of the Athenians, in the same manner as the
priest. And these things may IK assumed from what the priest now says. But
lie calls images paradigms, hi-causc the Sai tans participate secondarily of those
things, of which the Athenians participate primarily. For though archetypes
rank among the first of beings, yet images have the* first order with reference
to our knowledge*. As therefore things secondary by nature are said to be first,
thus also they are said to l&gt;e paradigms to the things that are elevated from them,
and which know through them the natures prior to them. Here also, what
pertains to the Athenians, indicates a more total, but \\hat pertains to the Sa i tans,
a more partial order. These things likewise are analogous, both in partial natures
ami in wholes. So that the polity which is about to be delivered, pertains to
the eity of the Athenians, or rather to the whole orderly distribution of things;
and the laws extend to the whole world from Minerva. For every law is said
to be the distribution of intellect, and is rightly said to be so. But the laws of
the Athenians, l&gt;eing established conformably to the tutelar Coddess, exhibit the
distribution of the M inen al intellect. But of this kind are the laws in the universe
which are defined conformably to one demiurgic intellect, and the one providence
of Minerva.

* For the race of the priests was separated from the rest of the inhabi
tants."

That in a certain resj&gt;ect all this order of the polity of the priest is more partial
and more divided than that of Socrates, imitating the middle fabrication, may be

For rprij here, it u neceary lo read rpirij.

The nature of ihese three f.iliru atiom i* unfolded farther oil.

1 Here a!w&gt; for *y&gt;rij, it is necessary to read rynrr;.

BOOK i ] TIM.TX S (&gt;r PLATO. 127

learnt from tlio multitude ami quality of the irenera in tin- city. For in the polity
of Socrates, there were three genera, (lit 1 guardian, the auxiliary, and the merce.
nary. For the triad is allied to the demiurgic monad, lint here then- are the double
of those, the sacerdotal, and the military ; the demiurgic, [or pertaining to
artificers! and the pastoral ; the venatic and the agricultural. For the middle
fabrication has at one and the same time the dnadic, and the triadic; and both
these numl&gt;crs are adapted to Minerva. Hut one of these indeed, viz. the triad,
is immediately adapted to the Goddess; but the other according to generation.
For the hexad is a triangle from the triad. By the trigonir therefore, and ly the
lievad from the triad, the diminution and at the same time alliance to the (jJoddcss
are manifested. For though every fabrication participates of .Minerva, yet the
first and supreme parts of the universe, and the first fabrication, and the first
father, are filled from her in a more abundant decree. Thus therefore, if
yon alone select these genera, you will find the number adapted to the (ioddess.
But if yon add, the presiding over wisdom, yon will entirely find the heptad,
which is of a Minerva! characteristic. And this is one of the things that are of
great notoriety. The feminine nature likewise of the heptad is celebrated, and
that it is produced from the monad alone. The monad also, flic triad, ami the liep-
tfid, fire xtud to /&gt;c c\/&gt;ccia//t( images &lt;&gt;/ Minerva; the first, indeed, nx being intellectual ;
the wontl, m converting the mound in it.tilf; nn.l the third, as proceeding from the
fntlur alone. Aller this manner, therefore, you may infer from numbers.

Il is necessary howe\er, from the quality of the genera, to survey the diminution
and transcendency of these. For the .sacerdotal is subordinate to the guardian
genus, which ascends as far as to the first cause. * For Plato himselfin the I oliti-
cns arranges the priests under the politician, and does not impart to them political
power. The military also is subordinate to the auxiliary genus. For the latter
arranges in a Incoming manner, and sufficiently disciplinen the inhabitants of the
city. lint the former pursues war alone, and things pertaining to it, and partici
pates of this study alone. And the mercenary tribe is divided into the remaining
penera. The polity of Socrates therefore surpasses* that of the priest, as l&gt;ein
more c-omprehensive, ami after a manner co-adapted to the genera prior to it.
So that both from number and cpialily, it become* evident to us that the polity

1 For 6 i* a triangular nun.bcr, anil U the ilouMr of .
PlMi ! rt tiiijof tlr giiar&gt;lian, in tm I r|iublic.

12 8 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

second after it. We establish, however, the analogies of the polity of Socrates
to the universe, to be as follows. The genus of guardians we arrange as analo
gous to the celestial Cods. The auxiliary genus to those more excellent natures,
the attendants on the celestial Gods, and the defenders of the universe. And the
mercenary genus, to those powers that connect a material nature with partial
souls. The first of these also, is analogous to the fixed stars, the second to the
planets, and the third to material natures. \\\&gt; may likewise assume in the celen-
tial Cods themselves, all these according to analogy.

Here, however, it is worth while to simey how, ami after what manner, these
genera ^enumerated by the priest] are to hi* assumed in the universe.. For the
philosopher Porphyry arranges them as follows: That (he priests are analogous
to the archangels in the hea\eus, who are converted to the Cods, of whom
they are the messengers. Jiut the soldiers are analogous to souls descend
ing into bodies. Again, the shepherds are analogous to tin- powers that are arranged
over the herds of animals ; rhic/i in arcane narrations are said to be touts that
are frustrated of the human intellect, but have a propensity towards animals. For
there is also a certain curator of the herd of men. And there are likewise certain
partial curators; some being the inspectors of nations; others of cities; and
others of individuals. Hut the hunters are analogous to those powers that
hunt after souls, and inclose them in bodies. There are likewise powers who
delight in the hunting of animals, such as Diana is said to l&gt;e, and another mul
titude together with her of venatic daemons. And the husbandmen ure analogous
to those powers that preside over fruits. All this administration therefore of
sublunary daemons is said by Plato to receive many demiurgic distributions, in
consequence of looking to the effect which now is, or is becoming lobe. The
divine lamblichus, however, reprehends these assertions, as neither Platonic nor
true. For archangels are not any where mentioned by Plato, nor does the mi
litary genus pertain to souls verging to bodies. For it is not proper to oppose
these to gods or da-mons. For we should act absurdly, in arranging these in
the middle genus, but Cods and da-mons among the last artificers. j\or must
it l&gt;e admitted, that those are shepherds, who are frustrated of human intellect,
but have a certain sympathy to animals. For the existence of da-mons who
govern the mortal nature, is not derived from men; nor are those powers hunters,
who inclose the soul in body, as in a net; since the soul is not thus conjoined to
which is now delivered, is subordinate to that of Socrates, and will rank as the

BOOK i.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 129

to the body. A or &gt; this mode of theory philosophic, but full of Barfxiric arrogance.
Nor are husbandmen to l&gt;e referred to Ceres : for the (Jods are oxonipt from the
proximate causes of nature. Reprehending, therefore, these assertions, ho consi
ders the priests as analogous through similitude to all sueli secondary essences
and powers, as honour and worship the causes prior to themselves, lint the shep
herds, as analogous to all those mundane powers, that are allotted the government
of the life which verges to body, and of the most irrational powers, and who dis
tribute these in an orderly manner. The hunters he places as analogous to those
universal powers who adorn secondary natures through the investigation of [real!
being. Cut the husbandmen, as corresponding to the powers that give efficacy
to the seeds that descend from the heavens to the earth. And the soldiers, to
the powers that subvert everything atheistical, and corroborate that which is
divine. After this manner, therefore, thedi\ine lamblichiis [interprets what is said
by the priest.] But it is common to both these philosophers, that they divide the
fabricative genus into the pastoral, the venatic, and the agricultural ; but they
do not produce the four genera from one. For no one, who rightly considers the
aliair, can place either the pastoral or the venatic under the fabricative genus.

Will it not therefore be belter to interpret the passage conformably to our
preceptor, by admitting that the sacerdotal and military tril&gt;es form one duad,
but the fabricative and agricultural another, and the pa.stor.il and venatic a third
duad ; ami assuming an order of this kind, to investigate the paradigms of them.
For the sacerdotal genus subsists in the anagogic (jods, tin; military in the
guardian, and the fabricative in the (ods who separate all (lie forms, and llie pro
ductive principles of mundane natures. lint (he agricultural genus subsists in
those (iods that siipernally excite nature, and disseminate souls about generation.
.For Plato, likewise, denominate* the lapse of the soid into generation, a dissemi
nation. Hut to sow is most adapted to husbandmen, as is, also, to collect pro
ductions of nature. The pastoral genus subsists in the Gods that govern
distinctly all the forms of life that revolve in generation. 1 or Plato, in the
Politicus, delivers to us certain divine shepherd*. And llic venatic subsists in
the divinities that give an orderly distribution to all material spirits. For it if usual
with thcologists to call these Gods hunters. All these genera likewise jxrtain to
the middle fabrication, viz. the convertive genus, the guardian, that which ad-

1 It it somewhat Mngular, tint Porphyry, who culled the Christian religion ttap l ^afo
li/ bold tcicktdnei*, thouUI have adopted I hit tltcury.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. K

HO IMtOCLUS ON THE [BOOK f.

ministers the psychical allotments, l!iat which governs the geneiurgic forms of
life, every thing \vhirli fabricates and gives form to material natures, and that
which arranges the last order of spirits. That, however, which pays attention to
wisdom, and that which is contemplative, must he considered as different from all
these genera, and which the Egyptian also celebrates above all the rest, making
mention in the first place, as bring a prit st, of the sacerdotal genus. All the
genera, tlierefore, are seven, and the monad is exempt from the liexad. And
(he monad, indeed, is analogous to the one intellect which connects all the. fabri
cation of generated natures ; but the hexad is analogous to the more partial orders
under this intellect, \i/. to the anagogic, guardian, formali/.ing, and vivifying
order*, and also to those that are the loaders of the herds of a tame life, and to
tho-e that rule over the brutal nature, \\hich orders in the universe, likewise are
separated from the fixed stars. Moreover, he says, that these orders may be seen
among men, in the first place, among the Athenians, but in the second place,
among the Saitans, according to the division of genera, each accomplishing its
proper work in a definite manner. For he manifests this by saung, .v&lt;y// &lt;;/c fruni
others, in order that we may understand the unmingled purity of the genera,
proceeding siipernally through diminution, as far as to the last of things.

" The artificers, also, exercised their arts in such a manner, that each
was en r a (r ed in his own employment without iniiiiding with that of other

O O -* ~ ~

artists. The same method was likewise adopted by shepherds, hunters,
and husbandmen."

The whole of this telractys has, indeed, the third order, according to a section
of the genera into three, hut is now enumerated by IMato as the second ; in
order that through this, what is said may imitate the universe, in which the la-&gt;t
is the middle, comprehended on all sides by more div me natures. For that which
is most material and gross, is enclosed by fabrication in the middle. For thus
alone 1 can it be preserved, being adorned and guarded according to the vt hole of
itself by id I the comprehending natures [in the universe]. Hut again, it is here
added, that the fabricati\e art was not mingled with the other arts, nor in a simi
lar manner any one of the others with the rest, but that each remained by itself,
and in its oun purity. For this not only produces accuracy and rectitude in

1 For //o\ii IHTC, it i-&gt; ucej?&gt;itr&gt; to n-.ul /jow&gt;.

T.OOK i.l TIM/HI S (&gt;F PLATO. J31

appropriate work-, but likewise cHects tin- sympathy of the citizens. For all will
thus be in want of all, in consequence of cadi nut exorcising many arts. For the
builder will !&gt;&lt;&gt; in want of the husbandman, the husbandman of the shepherd, the
shepherd of (lie hunter, and Iho hunter of the builder ; and thus each l&gt;eing in
want of the rest, will not bo nnminglcd with them; honor, there is sameness in
conjunction with difference, and separation accompanied with union.

"The warlike genus too, you will find was separated from all the other
genera, and was ordered by law to engage in nothing but what pertained
to war."

Every whore indeed, but especially in the warlike genus, the unmingled and
the separate are appropriate. For they have an alliance to the highest order,
which cuts oft" every thing material, and obliterates that which is disorderly and
confused. Very properly therefore does this genus pay attention to the concerns
of war. For on account of this, the city remains free from external and injurious
incursions ; and this invests it with a -juard from itself, imitating the guardian
order. For as a guardian deity is present with the first, so likewise with the mid
dle of the demiurgi. This, therefore, may bo assumed from theology, lint by
law in the universe, we must understand the divine institutions proceeding from
the one demiurgic intellection. For prior to mundane natures is the demiurgic
law, which is seated by Jupiter, and distributes together with him in an orderly
manner all the providential inspection which exists in the universe.

" A similar armour too, such as that of shields and darts was employed
by each. These we first used in Asia ; the Goddess in those places, as
likewise happened to you, first pointing them out to our use."

The narration extends the energy of Minerva supernally from paradigms,
as far as to the last genera. For there are things connascent with this energy,
participating of nndefiled powers, more total and more partial, and which arrange
the mundane genera from the middle fabrication. Analogously also to this, they
comprehend and are comprehended, are vanquished by the Minerval energies,
and remain perpetually undefiled with invariable sameness through it, in the uni
verse. It is requisite, therefore, to know these things in common about ail these

|34 PROCLL S ON THE [BOOK i.

particulars. We must however show what the armour, the shields, ami the
spears, are, and how these are antoedently comprehended in the Goddess.
Porphyry, indeed, calling the body the shield, assumes anger for the spear.
Hut these pertain to souls falling into gem-ration and to material things, and
are not the instruments of immutable t^Mv, but of a geneiurgic life, corrupting
the purity of intellect, and destroying the life \\hirh subsists according to
reason. The divine lambliclms, however, explains these in a di\ inely inspired
manner. Tor since it is requisite that every thing divine should operate and
not sutler, in order that by operating it may not have the ineflicacious, which
is assimilated to matter, and that by not suffering it may not have an eflicacious
power resembling that of material natures, which act in conjunction with passion;
in order that both these may l&gt;e accomplished, he sa\s, that shields are powers
through which a di\ine nature remains impassive and undeliled, snrroimding itself
with an infiangible guard. Hut s|&gt;ears art- the powers according to which it pro
ceeds through all things without contact, ami operates on all things, cutting oft
that which is material, and giving aid to every genesiurgir form. These powers,
however, are first seen about .Minerva. Ileuce in the statues of her she is repre
sented with a spear and shield. For she vanquishes all things, and according to
theoloiiists remains without declination, and with undeliled purity, in her father-
Hut these have a secondary subsistence, in both the total and partial Minerval
jtowers. For as the Jovian and demiurgic multitude, imitates its monad, and as
the prophetic and Apolloniacal multitude participates of the Apolloniacal pecu
liarity ; thus, also, the Minerval number, adumbrates the undeliled and unmingled
nature of Minerva. This also, takes place in an ultimate degree in Minerval souls.
For in these, likewise, the shield is the untamed and uninclining power of reason;
but the spear is that power which amputates matter and liberates the stud from
da-moniacal or fatal pas ions ; of which powers the Athenians participate in a
purer manner, but the Sa itans in a secondary degree, iecei\ing these through the
measure of alliance to the (Joddess.

" You may perceive, too, what great attention was paid immediately
from the beginning by the laws to prudence and modesty, and besides
these, to divination and medicine, as subservient to the preservation of
health. And Irom these, which arc divine goods, the laws, proceeding

1 For uKui^wk here, il is necessary to read ou^r/k.

nooK i.] TIM/F.US OF PLATO. 133

to the invention of such as are merely human, procured all uch other
disciplines as follow from those we have just enumerated."

A little farther on, ho calls the Goddess both a lover of wisdom and a lover of
war, in order that tlie arrangement of the polity of the Athenians and Saitans
might he produced con form a lily to IHT as a paradigm. And what indeed pertains
to the exerri.se of war, is sufficiently indicated from what has been said ; but that
which pertains to wisdom, he exhibits to us in the present words ; in order that
by the one, the philopolemic, and by the other, the. philosophic nature of
Minerva might l&gt;c adumbrated. What then is this prudence? The theory of
wholes and of supermundane natures, from which, after the first of goods which
are perfective of souls, a certain facility is obtained in the concerns of human life,
proceeding in conjunction with divination and medicine. And in one way, indeed,
this prudence is the source of disciplines in invisible causes, in another way, about
the world, and in the last place, about human a Hairs. For since the Goddess her
self is immaterial and separate wisdom, on this account, to (lie natures that are
allied to her, she unfolds into light all the parts of divine and human prudence.
For with respect to divination, also, one kind must he admitted to exist in the
intellectual, and another in the mundane Cods. And of the latter, one kind
proceeds from the Gods, another from daemons, and another from the discur
sive energy of the human soul, existing rather as something artificial and con
jectural. In a similar manner also with respect to medicine, one kind indeed
exists in the Gods themselves, and this is of a I a-onian nature ; but another kind,
in daemons, being ministrant and subservient to the Gods, from whom likewise
matter and instruments are procured for the advents of the Gods. For as there
are many da-mons about Ixne, thus also about Esculapius, some are allotted
the order of attendants, but others that of forerunners of the God. And ano
ther kind exists in human lives, being that which is imparted from theorems
and experience, according to which some are adapted in a greater, and others
in a less degree to divine medicine, lint there is also a mixture of these two
kinds of prudence, \\/,. the prophetic and the medicinal, with the Egyptians;
because the causes of these are antecedently comprehended in one divinity, and
from one fountain many streams are distributed about the world. And thus
much has been said in common about the prudence which is now mentioned.

In order, however, to unfold each particular more fully, we must say, that laze,
indeed, is the order proceeding from the one intellect of Minerva ; but

134

PHOCLUS OX THE [BOOK i.

the providence pervading from whole* as far as to material natures ; and immedi
ately from tkt beginning, the natural aptitude of Minerxal souls to pruilence. For
that which is neither adventitious nor foreiirn, appears to lie signified liy these
words. Hut if some one should ivfer what is *aid to the mundane order,
Wause the distrihution of things does not proceed from the imperfect to the
iH-rfect, hut is always arranged and accompanied in its progression with tliat
which is excellent, it appears to me that this is manifested hy the words inimedi-
nttli/ fnnn th&lt;:bi nnniig. The \\ords, however, mu-t be referred to the order of the.
whole world, because there are invisible eaiiscsof tin- natures ihut arearran^ed in the
world, \\hich perfect priidenee [i. e. \\ i-dom] priu\arily contemplates. F-r the
form of prudence is not, as Porphvry says it is, artil icial, or adapted to the arts.
Tor this, as lamhliehus oltserves, is the -it t of Vulcan, hut not of .Minerxa. IJut
uttcntii-n uY/.v nL&lt; i J tiid h&gt; ilirniutinn mill iiiulidiH , hecau&gt;e it is lit, in the first place,
to contemplate the other powers of the mundane (iods, and thus afterwards, their
prophetic and &gt;anative production; since we are allotted I he government ot a
tolerated hody, and to u&gt; wlio are enclo&gt;ed in hody, futurity is immanifi-st.
1 or a material life exhihits much of the contingent, ; -rid of an hyparxis dilli-rcntly
moved at dillerent times. Hut hy suck otlur ili^ipiincs a.s /.//A-u /mm t/icsc, he
donhtle&gt;s means geometry, astronomy, logistic, arithmetic, and tlu; sciences
allied to these; all wliich the law ha\ in- e&gt;tahh-hed, led the Athenians and Saitans
to the possession of an admirable prudence. And thus much concerning these
particulars.

Porphyry, howexer, stays, that medicine very properly proceeds from Minerva,
liccause J-&gt;enlapins is the lunar intellect, in the same manner as Apollo is the
solar intellect, lint the divine lamhliehus blames this assertion, us confounding
the essence* of the (iods, and as not alvxav* ri.uhtlv distrihulin^ according to pre-
NMit circumstances the intellects and souU of the mundane (iods. l ; &lt;r it must
he admitted that Ksmlapin* exi.sls in the MIII, and that he proceeds from that
luminary ahout the ireiierated place ; in order that as the heavens, so likewise
generation may he connected hy this divinity, according to a second participation,
and may he lilli-d from it vuth s\mnietry, and jjood temperament.

* According to all tliis orderly i!is&gt;trilmtion therefore, and co-arrange
ment, the Cioddess iii^t established and adurnctl your city."

The word all manifests the united comprehension in the Goddess of all tlio
natures that are adorned by her, and that neither is any thins: pretei milled by

HOOK i.] TIM.TiUS OF PLATO. 135

her, nor the inultitudc in her snflered to exist in a divided staff. But the word
oiaxiT/o;Tj, indicates the orderly distribution of the Miner* al providence. And
the word co-arrangcmcnt signifies tlie union of tliese, and their alliance to one
world. Farther still, the word ^-xxoT/ijj ri^ signifies the progression of wholes
from the (Joddess; but cu arrange/in nl, the conversion of them to herself. Since,
however, of the natures in the universe, some are total, but others are partial, and
some are analogous to monads, lnt others to numhers, and lioth participate of the
iMinerval providence, hut primarily such as are total and monadic, on this ac
count what is at present said, attributes the more ancient ami leading order to
the Athenians, but that which is secondary and diminished to the Saitans.

" Choosing for tliis purpose the place in which you were born ; as she
foresaw, that from the excellent temperature of the seasons it would
produce the most sagacious men."

Prior to this the (ioddess was said to have been #////&lt;&lt;/ tho Attic region ; but it
is now said that she clime it. Both, however, concur, and neither is the bein^ allot
ted contrary to her w ill. nor is her choice disorderly, as is the ca-c w itli a partial
soul. For divine necessity concurs with divine will, choice with allotment,
and to chti i. n with to be alltl ctl. \Vhat this place, however, is has IM-CII before
shown by us, \i/. that it is interval, and that which is truly place. For the divi
sions of divine allotments, are divisions of these, in order that they may IM- esta
blished with invariable sameness prior to things which subsist according to time.
lint it must now be added, that the soul of the universe possessing tho productive
principles of all divine [mundane] natures, and IHMII^ suspended from the essences
prior to herself, inserts in di Hi-rent parts of the interval an alliance to dilli-rent
powers, and certain symbols of the divine orders in the (iods. For this interval
is proximately suspended from her, and is an instrument connasecnt with her.
AH she is, therefore, a rational and psychical world, she also renders this [sensible]
world endued with interval, and vital through divine impressions. Hence the.
interval itself, though it i&lt; said to IM, continued and iminoveable, yet is not
entirely without dillcrence with reference to itself; since neither is the. soul of the
universe perfectly without dinvrcnco in itself towards itself, but one part [as it
were] of it, is the circle of tlicsamc, and another, the circle of the tiij/trcnf. And
why do I assert this of the soul? for neither is much celebrated intellect without
dillerence in itself, though all things in it are, as it were, of the same colour. For

13 fl PROCLITS ON THE [BOOK i.

all things do not possess an equal power in intellect, lint some are more total, and
others more partial. ISor is tliis wonderful. For the Demiurgus himself contain*
in himself, first, middle, and last orders. Whence, also, I think Orpheus, indicating
the order of his powers, says, " that his head is the refulgent heaven, hut his eyes
are the sun, and the opposing moon." Though, therefore, this interval should have
one essence, unattended with dillerence, jet the power of soul, and the allot
ted orders ofdiunons, and piior to thc.-e. the (Jods, dividing it, according to the
demiurgic order, and the allotment-* of jiMicc, demonstrate that there in much
dillerenee in the parts of it. llenccii mu&gt;t In- admitted, that the choice liecomeN
internal, and from the es&gt;eiiee of the &lt;iod&gt;, and that it is not such as \ve see in
partial souls. For the former i* essential ; hut the latter i aloue detined accord
ing to the present life. And the former i&gt; eternal, hut the latter temporal.

JJy jilucc, therefon 1 , \i e must not understand the earth or this air, hut prior to
these, the hnmovcahlc interval, which is always ilhnninnted alter the same man
ner by the (Jods, and divided by the allotments of justice. For these material
natures are at one time adapted, and at another unadapted, to the participation
of the (jods. And it is nec ssary that prir to things \\ Inch sometimes participate,
there should be those \\hichare alvvavs suspended alter the same manner from
the (jlods. Ami thus much may sutlice respecting these particulars.

M ith respect, ho\&gt;e\er, to the excellent temperature of the seasons, which is
productive of sagacious men, I an.etius, and certain other IMatonists, understand
the words according to their apparent meaning, vi/. that the Attic region, on
account of the excellent temperature of the seasons of the year, is adapted to the
production of sagacious men. lint Ixm^inus douhts the truth of their assertion.
For the contrary is seen to l&gt;e the case, since about this place, there is a great
n ant of symmetry in dry ness from excessive heat, and cold tempestuous weather.
Nor if the place was of this kind, would they yet Ix- aide to preserve the immor
tality of souls, if sagacity was implanted in them through the excellent tempera
ture of the seasons. But he says, that thin excellent temperature is not lobe
referred to tin 1 condition of the air, but that it is a certain nameless peculiarity of
the region contributing to sagacity. For as certain waters are prophetic, and
certain places are productive of disease, and are pestilential, thus, also, it is not
at all wonderful that a certain peculiarity of country should contribute In prudence
and sagacity. Origen, however, refers this excellent temperature to the circula
tion of the heaven* ; for from thence the fertility and sterility of soids are derived,
as Socrates says, in the Republic, lie, however, apprehends the truth in a more

HOOK i.l TIM.-Kl. S 01 IM.ATO , :{7

partial manner. But Longimis is ignorant thai he makes the peculiarity to le corpo
real, and that lie is entangled in the doubts which Porphyry proposes to him. For
how can one peculiarity of air render men adapted to different pursuits ? And in the
next place, a similar peculiarity still remaining, how conies it to pass that there
is no\v no longer the same natural excellence in the genius of the inhabitants ?
But if the peculiarity is corruptible, it must he shown what it is that is corruptive
of it. It is however belter to say, that the Gods having divided the whole of
space conformably to the demiurgic order, each portion of place receives souls
adapted to it ; that portion indeed which is Martial, receiving souls of a more
animated and irascible nature ; that which is Apolloniacal, prophetic souls; that
which is Esculapian, medical; and that which is Minerva), prudent and
sagacious souls. But this is effected through a certain quality, or rather each
portion of place possesses a power of this kind from its allotted divinity; and
Plato calls this adaptation, excellence of temperature; since there are many
physical, psychical, diernoniacal, and angelical powers in each portion of place,
but each unity of the allotted divinity unites and mingles all these in an unminglcd
manner. Since however the Seasons are allotted from the Father, the guardian
ship of these portions of place and allotments, to whose can-, as Homer says,
" tlie mighty Heaven and Olympus are committed," and according to which, the
co-adaptations of souls similiar to places is effected ; hence Plato suspends this
excellent temperature from the Seasons, the whole of it deriving from thence its
subsistence.

The Goddess therefore perceiving that the [Attic] portion of interval which is
always guarded by the Seasons, is adapted to the reception of sagacious souls,
selected it for this purpose; not that this place was once deprived of Minerva,
but at another time was under her allotted guardianship ; for the text demonstrates
the contrary ; but because there are also in the interval itself, different aptitudes
to the reception of divine illuminations, according to different parts ; which
aptitudes were inserted by the whole Demiurgus, who uniformly comprehends
the powers of all the Gods posterior to himself. These powers, however, are
corroborated and perfected by, or rather proceed from, the presiding Gods. As,
therefore, with respect to the elections of lives, the soul that chooses its proj&gt;er life,
act* with rectitude ; after the same manner, also, the oul which is arranged in a

iii^cl. V. T. 750.
Tim. Plat. VOL. I. S

138 PROC1AJS ON THE [BOOK i.

pluce conformable to the choice of its life, energizes in a greater degree than tin?
soul which is disseminated in a foreign place. But to this arrangement, the one
circulation of the heavens contribute*, \\hich introduces a fertility and sterility of
Minis. In fertile periods, then-Ion-, there is a greater, but in barren periods, a less
ir.imbcr of sagacious men. I fence, us when a husbandman chooses good land
for the efficacious gro\\th of the seed , knowing that \\lien the season is fertile,
i:c shall reap greater benefit, but \\heii it is barren less, on account of the power
of the earth; thus also the text s.ivs, that the Goddess chose this place, as pro
ductive, of sagacious men, in order that when tlie period is fertile it may have
more; aud when the period is barren, may have less 1 of prudent and
sagacious men, in consequence ol falling oil from a life adapted to the place.
We must not however wonder, if Plato praises the excellent temperature of
the visible Seasons. For then- is one excellent temperature with reference
to tin- health of bodies, and another contributing to the reception of sagacious
souls, such as is that of the Attic region. For though there is not always the
same sagacity in those that inhabit this region, yet there is always a certain
greater abundance of it through the jx-culiarity of the place, and the aptitude of
the Seasons. Such, therefore, is our opinion resjR cting these particulars.

The divine lamblichus, however, does not understand by place, one corporeal-
formed condition, but an incorporeal cause pervading through the earth, sus
taining bodies b\ life, and comprehendum all interval. For in a pi. ice of this
kind, lie i*avs the Goddess fashions truly good men, and causes them to inhabit.
I5ut whether he accords with the words of Plato, may !&gt;o surveyed from what
has been said. If, however, it be requisite, desisting from these things, to con
template wholes according to the analogous, it miM IM- said that this Goddess
fabricating and weaving the universe in conjunction with her father, every where
distributes to wholes, and to things of the Ix-tter co-ordination, a more perfect
allotment. Hut these are more replete with wisdom than their opposite*, and are
more adapted to the Goddess. We shall show, therefore, from the following
words of Plato, how that which excels in prudence is of a more Minerval
characteristic.

" The Goddess, therefore, being a lover both of war and wisdom, first
-elected this place tor the habitation of men most similar to herself."

luMeaH V f "" "*"&gt;iui Xror, ry fXurroi a-rowtvrnv ri)i ara rov TOXUV &lt;rirqciut WF/ ( , ill tills place.
It Is ntifssarj to re^d, xn aoop/ai r^rrtit, TU uwnwifTtif, i. X.

HOOK i.] T1M/EUS Ol- PLATO. J.^Q

In what is here said, Pinto delivers to us the most accurate conception respecting
this greatest divinity, unfolding to those who are sufficiently able to perceive his
meaning, the indications of thcologists. Different interpreters however betake
them*el\es todifli rent arrangements of the Goddess ; some indeed narrating their
opinion more enigmatically, hut others more clearly, yet not continuing what they
assert. I - or Porphyry, placing Minerva in the Moon, says that souls descend
from thence, which possess nt one and (lie same time iniseilility and mildness ; and
Unit on this account, the niystagogueg in I .lcuxis arc lovers of wisdom and Invert of
:&gt;&lt;!&gt; ; since it it said that the race of those irho arc leaders of the mysteries in
Klenxis, is derived from Mnsaus, the of/ spring of the. Moon ; and aLo that the
Hermes there subsists about the Moon, from which a/so (he race &lt;&gt;f the Crucrs is
dfi-irul. The di\ine lamhlichus, however, blame* fheM- assertions, as not well
preserving the analogy. For he interprets rrrtr as that which entirely subverts
the whole of a disorderly, confused, and material nature ; but u-isdvin as immate
rial and separate intelligence. He also says, that this (goddess is the cause
of hoth these; which likewise the Athenians imitate through a prudent and
warlike life. He adds, that the Athenian region is well adapted to the re
ception of sueh-like souls.

If, however, it IM: requisite that the conceptions of these men should Ix-come
manifest, and prior to these, that what is delivered by Plato should be shown
to accord in the highest degree with theologists, we must a&lt;sert as follows :
deriving what we say from a supernal origin. In the Deniiurgus and father of
the whole world, many orders of Ciods that have the form of the one, present
themselves to the view. Ami these an of a guardian, or demiurgic, or dela
ting, &lt;&gt;r connective, or perfective characteristic. Hut the nndefiled and un
tamed deity Miurna, is one of the first intellectual unities subsistiui; in the
DeuiiurgUH, nccording to which he himself reinniiiH firm und immutable, and all
thing* proceeding from him pariicipate of inflexible power; and through \\hirh,
he intellectually per&lt; eiven every thing, and is separate in an exempt manner from
all beings. All theologists, then-fore, call this divinity Minerva, as l&gt;eing
brought forth indeed from the summit of her father, and abiding in him ; being
a demiurgic, separate, and immaterial intelligence.

Hence Socrates, in the Cratylus, celebrates her as thfonoe [^eovor,] or deijic intel
lection. But theologihts, also, consider her as in conjunction with other divinities

1 Instead of r&gt;- Otuv here, it i necessary to read n)r Hror.

HO PHOCLIJS ON TIIK [ROOK i.

sustaining all things in the one Demiurgus, und arranging wholes together with
her father. Hence through the first of these, they denominate her philosophic,
but through the second philopoleinic. For she, who according to the form of the
one, connectedly contains all the paternal wisdom, is i\ philosopher. And she, who
invariably rules over all contrariety, may be properly called a lour of rt ttr.
Hence Orpheus speaking of her birth says, that Jupiter generated her from
h&gt; head,

\\ ilh armour vhiiung like a biaicn flowtr.

Since, however, it was necessary that she should proceed into second and third
orders, she appears in the order to which Proserpine belongs, according to the
iindcHled hcptad ; but she generates every virtue from herself, and elevating
powers; and illuminates secondary natures with intellect, and an undeliled life.
Hence she is called Cure Tnto^encs. She likewise appears among the liberated
(Jods, uniting the lunar order with intellectual and demiurgic light, causing the
productions of those divinities to be unth tiled, and demonstrating the one unity
of them to be immingled with their depending powers. She also appears in the
heavens and the sublunary region; and according to the united gift of herself,
imparts the cause both of the philosophic and the philopolemic power. For
her inflexibility is intellectual, and her separate w isdom is pure and immingled
with secondary natures; and the one characteristic peculiarity of .Minerval
providence, extends as far as to the last orders. For since wherever there are
partial souls that resemble her divinity, they exert an admirable prudence, and
exhibit an unconquerable strength, what ought we to say of her attendant choirs
1 of da inons, or divine, mundane, liberated, and ruling orders? For all these
receive as from a fountain the twofold peculiarity of this (Joddess. Hence also,
the divine poet [Homer] indicating both these powers of Miners a, in conjunction
with fabulous devices savs,

I lie radiant veil her sacred fingers wove

I loan in rich waves, ami spreads the court of Jove.

Her father * \\ailike robe her limbs invest. * *

1 Tor \&lt;p&lt;v;,*&gt; in tins place, il is neci-s-.ary to rlacl \i&gt;f&gt;*&gt;v TM. * Iliad, viii.

uuok i.J TIM.-11US OF PLATO. 141

In which verses ly the veil which slip wove, and to which she gave subsistence
by her intellections, her intellectual wisdom is signified. But ly the warlike rol*&gt;
of Jupiter, we must understand her demiurgic providence, which immutably
takes rare of mundane natures, and prepares more divine bein::s always to have
dominion in the world. Hence, also, I think Homer represents her as an asso
ciate in battle with the Greeks against the Barbarians; just as Plato here relates
that she was an associate with the (ireeks against the inhabitants of the Atlantic
island ; in Order that every where more intellectual and divine natures may
rule over such as are more irrational .and vile. For Mars, also, is a friend to
war and contrarieties, hut with a separation and division more adapted to the
things themselves. Minerva, however, connects contrariety, and illuminates the
subjects of her government with union. Hence, likewise, she is Maid to he
philopolemic. For,

Strife, fighting, war, sh always love*.

And she is a friend to war, indeed, !&gt;e.causc she is allotted the summit of se
paration ; but she is a lover of contrarieties, because these are in a certain respect
congregated through this goddess, in consequence of better natures havin fr
dominion. On this account, likewise, the ancients co-ai ranged Victory with
Minerva.

If, therefore, these things arc rightly asserted, she is philosophic indeed, as
being demiurgic intelligence, and as separate and immaterial wisdom. Hence,
also,* she is called Metis by the (iods. IJul she is p/rilopolcmic, as con
necting the contrarieties in wholes, and as an untamed and inflexible deity.
On this account, likewise, she preserves Bacchus undctilcd, but vanquishes the
giants in conjunction with her lather. She too alone shakes the/.rgis, without
waiting for the mandate of Jupiter. She also hurls the javelin ;

Shook |j\- licr arm, tlie tnisv javelin bcruM ;

llu;;e, ponderous, strong! that \\lini her fury burn*,

U hole ranki of heroes tames and overturns.

Again, she is Phosphorot, as every way extending intellectual light ; the Sa-
, as establishing every partial intellect in the total intellections of her father ;

1 Hind. viii.

142 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

Ergane, or the artificer, as presiding over demiurgic works. Hence the the-
ologist Orpheus *ays, that the father produced her,

That she the (|iite might be of mistily works.

But she is C(illitri,s, or the beautiful fabricator, as connecting by beauty all
the works of the father ; a J irgin, as exerting an undeliled and unmingled purity;
and ..7/"vW//c/.v, or u-gis-bcaung, as moving the whole of fate, and Ix-ing the leader
of its productions. We should, al-o, discuss the remaining appellations of the
Goddess, if, what we h;;ve aliv.idv saul might not appear to IK- prolix through my
sympathy with the discussion. Again, therefore, recurring to the thing proposed
we must say, that Plato calls both these divinities, Love and Minerva, philo
sophers, not for the same rea&gt;on; hut he thus denominates the former, as being
the middle of wholes, and as leading to intelligible wisdom; and the latter as
the summit of wholes, and as the union of demiurgic wisdom. Forthe Demiurgus
is " Meti&gt; the first generator and much-pleasing Love. And as Metis, indeed,
he brings forth Minerva; but as Love, he generates the amatory series.

" The ancient Athenians, therefore, using these laws, and being formed
by good institutions in a still greater degree than I have mentioned,
inhabited this region ; surpassing all men in every virtue, as it becomes
those to do, who are the progeny and pupils of the Gods."

We learn from history that the affairs of the Athenians are more ancient than
those of the Saitans ; that the establishment of their city is prior; and that their
laws are more proximate to Minerva. But in the mundane paradigms, also,
wholes are prior to parts ; and there is an order in them which is more divine, a
power which is greater, and a form of virtue which is truly Minerval. Forthe
genus of virtue is adapted to this greatest divinity, as being v irtue herself. For
abiding in the Demiurgus, sh- is wisdom and immutable intelligence, and in the
ruling [or supermundane] Gods, she unfolds the power of virtue.

Bj virtue s woilliv iKime she s culled,

says Orpheus. It is evident, however, that things which are more divine in the
universe, may IK- called the progeny anil pupils of the Gods. For they derive

HOOK i.] TIM/KUS OF IM.ATO. 143

their subsistence and are perfected, or rather they are always perfect, through the
fabrication of the Gods, and the undcfiled production of Minerva. Every tiling,
therefore, which is suspended and originates from the Gods, and is converted to
them, exhibits transcendent \irtue. 15ut this, also, is in wholes ; since it must be
admitted that there is divine virtue in the universe. And it is likewise in human
lives, accord ins; to a similitude to wholes. Hence what is now said is applied to
the Athenians. lint making the life of the Athenians to be one and continued,
il conjoins .Solon to the ancient inhabitants of Athens. For it says, they
" inhabited this region." For the paradigm of them is one, and in continuity
with itself; since the whole of the Minerva! series l iug one, extends as far as
lo the last of things, and originates supernally from the supermundane orders.

" Mainland mighty deeds, therefore, of your city are recorded in our
temples, and are the subject of admiration ; yet there is one which
surpasses all of them in magnitude find virtue."

The priest having promised summarily to relate the laws and deeds of the
Athenians, he delivered, ind&lt;vd, their laws according to a division of genera;
and it, therefore, remained for him to celebrate their deeds, through which an
encomium is passed on the city, and the tutelar Goddess is praised. Since, how
ever, of deeds there is a ntnnlcr, and there is also one unity comprehensive of
them, according to which the whole form of the polity is exhibited, he announces
that he shall narrate the greatest deed, and which surpasses all the rest in virtue;
this deed not being one of the many, but one prior In the many. For .such a
method of narration subsists appropriately with reference to the universe, in which
wholes accompl sh, and connectedly contain one life, and collect many con
trarieties, into one union with the Goddess. Hence, as there were many and
great deeds of the city, the priest very properly relates one deed which was
recorded in the temples. For there is, also, an intellectual paradigm of it, so far
as it is surveyed in the world, and which transcends in magnitude, and
virtue; transcendency according to ma^nltmlc presenting to our view that
which is ///, but according to virtue that which is intellectual. For wholes
and the more divine of mundane natures have many energies of the great
est magnitude, 1 and accomplish one life and polity, conformably to which
fighting under Minerva, they vanquish all Hihordinntc beings. After this

For ftrptt.ni licif , it i* wrtfjry lo read fit-ytarai.

!44 PROCLUS ON TIIK [BOOK i.

manner, (hercfore, we must explain what i* said. Porphyry, however, by
gn-at and admirable deeds, understand* such as an; accomplished l&gt;y .souls
against matter, and material modes. But he rails damions tmitcrial tmnlt-x. For,
according to him, there are two species of da-mons, of which the one consists of
souls, but the other ot intxlt s : and these art- material powers*, wliich are noxious
to the soul. For these dogmas, however, he is corrected by the interpreter that
came afler him. 1

" Tor these writings relate-, wliat a mighty power your city once
turned, which rushing from the Atlantic sea, spread itself with hostile
fury over all Europe and Asia."

Plato in what is here said, neither omits any tiling of encomiastic ungment, if
the. war of the Athenians against the Atlantics is considered as a mere history ; nor
fails in theological accuracy in conjunction with caution, if any one is willing to
pa &gt;s from partial natures to wholes, and to proceed from images to paradigms.
As it is usual, then-fore, in Panathena ic orations to celebrate most amply the Per
sian expedition, and the victories of the Athenians both by land and sea, with
which more recent orators fill their orations; Plato in praising the Athenians,
neither delivers the Persian invasion nor any other similar deed, but introducing
the Atlantic war against the parts inhabited by us, and which rushed from the
e\ternal sea with a force capable of entirely destroying these- parts, he informs us
that the Athenians wen \ietorioiis, and that they subdued this mighty power.
.Since, however, the Persian expedition came from the east against the (i reeks, and
particularly against the Athenians, Plato introduces the Atlantic war from the
west, in order that \ oil may survey the citv of the Athenians as from a centre,
castigating a Barbaric multitude pouring against it on each side in a disorderly
manner. To which ma\ be added, that in the institutes delivered by the ancestors
of the Athenians, and also in the mysteries, the ( ligantic war i&gt; celebrated, and
the \ictory of Minerva over the Giants, because in conjunction with her father
she vanquished these and the Titans. Plato, however, does not think it safe im
mediately to introduce war against the- (iods; for this is the very thing which he
blames in the ancient poets; and it would be absurd that Critias orTima-us, who wen;
auditors of what Socrates said against the poets on the preceding day, should

i. r !;\ iln diviiif laiublu liu&gt;.

BOOK i.] TINM.US OF PLATO. lift

again ascribe wars and seditions to the finds. Hut through the analogy &lt;f lininaa
to divine concerns lie delivers (his Atlantic wnr prior to the fabrication of the
world, assuming the Athenians instead of Minerva and the Olympian Gods, and
the Atlantics instead of tho Titans and Giants. For it is possible to survey the
same things in images as in wholes. And that 1 may remind you of the analogy,
through thename of the Athenians/he refers his readers to the Olympian co-ordina
tion which fought under tlie command of .Minerva ; but through that of the Allan-
tics, to the Titanic Gods. For the mighty Atlas was one of the Titans. T/ico-
fagixts also after the laceration of ttacchns, irhieh manifests the divisible progression
into the universe under Jupiter from the impartible fabrication, say that the other
Titans had diUcrcnt allotments, but that Atlas was established in the western
parts, sustaining the heavens.

15y strong ncccs.sity llic \\idc-Jprrad lirav n
In o;ntir&gt; extreme , by Atl;n \\;n Mi-l.cinM.

Farther still, the victories of Minerva, are celebrated by the Athenians, and there
is a festival sacred to the Goddess, in consequence of her having vanquished Nep
tune, and from the genesinrgic bring subdued by the intellectual order, and those
that inhabit this region betaking themselves to a life according to intellect, after
the procurement of necessaries. For \cptunc presides over generation ; but
Minerva is the inspeetivc guardian of an intellectual life. The. things proposed
therefore will contribute in the greatest degree to these analogies. For the Athe
nians bearing the name of the Goddess, arc- analogous to her; and the Atlantic s
through inhabiting an island, and through being called the progeny of Neptune,
preserve an analogy to this God ; so that it is evident from these things that the
At/antic :&lt;(]/ indicates the middle fabrication, according to which the second
father [Neptune] being filled by Minerva, and the other invisible causes, governs
diviner natures in a more powerful manner, and subjects all such things as have
a multiplied, divisible, and more material hyposlasis, to intellectual natures. For
the Gods themselves, indeed, are eternally united ; but the In-ings which are go
verned by them, are filled with this kind of division. After this manner, therefore,
these things must be separately understood.

In order however that we may pro-assume certain definite forms of the pro
posed analysis, it must be admitted, that the habitations within the pillars of Hcr-

For rovrovs IK re, it is necessary to rrH rvirovi.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. T

14 PUOCLUSONTHE [BOOK i.

rules, are analogous to the whole of the more excellent, but those external to them,
to the whoje of the inferior co-ordination, and that of this, there is one continued,
and variously proceeding life. Whether, therefore, Inhuming from the Gods, you
speak of the Olympian and Titanic divinities ; or l&gt;eginning from intellect, of per-
manencv and motion, or sameness and difference; or from souls, you speak ot the
rational and irrational ; or from bodies, of heaven and generation ; or in whatever
other way you may divide essences, according to all divisions, all the genus of
those within the pillars of Hercules will be analogous to the better, but of those
without to the less excellent co-ordination of tilings. For the true sea of dissimi
litude, and the whole of a material life which proceeds into interval and multitude
from I/it; one, are there. Hence, whether you are willing Orphically to arrange
the Olympian and Titanic genera in opposition to each other, and to celebrate
the former a* Mibduing the latter; or 1 v thagorically, to perceive the two co-ordi
nations proceeding from on high, as far as to the last of things, and the better
adorning the subordinate rank ; or Platonically, to survey much of infinity
and much of bound in the universe, as we learn in the Philebus, and the whole
of infinity in conjunction with the meaMires of bound, producing generation,
which extends through all mundane nahires, from all these, you may assume
one thing, that the whole composition of the world is co-harmonized from this con
trariety. And if the illustrious Heraclitus looking to this said, that r/v/r is th c
father of all things, he did not speak absurdly.

Porphyry, therefore, here refers the theory to daemons and souls, and makes
mention of the fabulous Titanic war, adducing some things to what is proposed
to be considered, with probability, but others, without it. The divine larnbli-
chus however, against those who adopt a more partial a^ignatiou of the cause of
the analysis, is of opinion after a certain wonderful manner, that what is said is
only to be understood according to the apparent meaning, though in the pre
face he himself delivers to us auxiliaries for the solution of such-like narrations.
May that divine man however, who has instructed us in many other particulars,
and also in these, be propitious to us. Betaking ourselves, therefore, to the inter
pretation of the words of Plato, we think it fit to remind ourselves, of the before-
mentioned foims of analysis ; and that we must arrange the Atlantics accord
ing to all the total natures of the inferior co-ordination. For in these, also,
some things are wholes, but others parts. But we must arrange their insolent
injustice, according to progression, a division through diminution, and a proximity
tu matter. For matter is truly infinity and baseness. Hence through nearness

n""* . i TINM;I;S or PLATO. 117

to, and lieinir in a certain respect in it, they are said to have, acted injuriously from
insolence. Tor the paradigm of them is manifested by the theologist, through
these names, v\hen he says of them, "that their mind is replete with r\il rounsrls,
and their heart is insolent." And we must arrange, the rushing from t.itcnutl
pnrtx according to a defection and separation remote from the Gods, and tiling
of a diviner nature in the universe. For the external does not indicate compre
hension of powers, hut an hypostasis departing from every thing stable, im
material, pure, and united. But the Atlantic sea must he arranged according to
matter itself, whether yon call it the abyss, or the sea of dissimilitude, or in whatever
other way you may IM* willing to denominate it. For matter receives the appella
tions of the inferior co-ordination, l&gt;eing called infinity and darkness, irrationality
and immoderation, the principle of diversity and the duad ; just as from the
Atlantic sea, the Atlantic island is denominated. For thus receding the analogies
in order, we shall understand that the whole of the inferior co-ordination, and the
more total and partial genera in if, are characterised by progression and division,
and a conversion to matter, and that thus it proceeds through all things, presenting
itself to the view appropriately in each, and appearing analogously in each nature,
viz. the dhinc and intellectual, the psychical and corporeal. Being however
such, it is adorned and arranged by the better order, which you may proj&gt;erly
say is IVlinerval, as being undefined, and subduing through its power things of a
subordinate nature. But the inferior co-ordination becoming adorned, ceases
from its abundant division and infinity; the genus of the Titans being connected
by the Olympian Gods ; but difference being united by sameness, motion by
permanency, irrational by rational souls, generation by the heavens, and in a
similar manner in all things. It must not however be supposed from this, that
two-fold divided principles of things are to be admitted. For we say that these
two co-ordinations are of a kindred nature. But the one precedes all contrariety,
as the Pythagoreans also say. Since, however, after the one cause of all, a
duad of principles is unfolded into light, and in these the monad is more excel
lent than the duad, or, if you wish to speak Orphically, irther than chaos, the
divisions are accomplished after this manner in the Gods prior to the world, and
also in the mundane Gods, as far as to the extremity of things. For among the
sujx-rmundane Gods the demiurgic and connective orders are under the monad,
but the vivific and the generative orders are under the duad. But among the
mundane Gods the Olympian genus is under the monad, but the Titanic under
the duad. And sameness, permanency, reason and form, arc under the more

148

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK

ancient, hut difference, motion, irrationality, and matter, are under the other of
these principles. For as far as to these the diminution of the two principles
procet-ds. Since however the one is beyond the first duad, tilings which appear
to be contraries are collected together, and are co-arranged with a view to one
orderly distribution of things. For in the universe there are these two-fold
"enera of Mods, the oppositely divided genera of being, the various genera of
souls, and the contrary genera of bodies. But tin subordinate are vanquished by
the more divine, and the world is ivndered one, being harmonised from contraries,
since it subsists according to Philolaus from things that bound, and from
tilings that are infinite. And according to the infinite, indeed, which it contains,
it derives its subsistence from the indefinite duad, or the nature of the infinite;
but according to the things that bound, from the intelligible monad, or the nature
of bound. And according to a subsistence from all these, it becomes one whole
and all-perfect form from the one. For it is Ciod, as Socrates says in the Philebus,
who gives subsistence to that which is mixed.

" For at that time the Atlantic sen was navigable, and had an island
before that moutli which is called by you the Pillars of Hercules. Uut

this island was greater than both Libya and Asia together, and aflbrdcd
an easy passage to other neighbouring islands ; as it was likewise easy to
pass from those islands to all the opposite continent which surrounded
that true sea."

That such and HO great an island once existed, is evident from what in said
by certain historians res|&gt;ecting what pertains to the external sea. For according
to them, there were M-VCU islands in that sea, in their times, sacred to Proserpine,
and aluo three others* of an immense extent, one of which was sacred to Pluto,
another to Ammon, and the middle [or second] of these to Neptune, the magni
tude of which was :i thousand stadia. They also add, that the inhabitants of it
preserved the remembrance from their ancestors, of the Atlantic island which
existed thrre, and was truly prodigiously great; which for many periods had
dominion over all the islands in the Atlantic sea, and was itself likewise sacred
to Neptune. These things, therefore, JMarceltus writes in his lit hivpic History. If
however this be the ra*e, and such an island once existed, it is possible- to receive,
what is said about it as a history, ami also as an image of a certain nature among

BOOK i.] TIM/FAJS OF PLATO, I4&gt;

wholes. Unfolding likewise the similitude of this, we may gradually accustom
those who survey things of this kind, to the whole theory of mundane natures.
For it is possible to behold the same analogies in a more partial, and in a more
comprehensive way. Hut it is necessary that doctrine proceeding from universal*
to the subtle elaboration of particulars, should thus give respite to theory. You
must not. therefore wonder, if before we. assumed this analogy more generally, but
now after another manner, and that we explore the same tiling with an accuracy
adapted to the things themselves. For since, as we have said, there is a two-fold
coordination in the universe, which originates from the (Jods, and is terminated
in matter and material form ; and since each possesses things more total, and
things more partial, [for this we have Ix fore said] ; but other things are the middles
of both these co-ordinations ; tor the divine genera are comprehensive of all things,
and the last elements arc the vilest of all things; and the intellectual and
psychical genera subsist between these; this being the case, we think tit in the
first place to divide in a three-fold manner the inferior co-ordination, and to
assume in it some things as most total genera, others as middle, and others as
last genera. And to some things, we shall arrange the Atlantics as analogous, to
others the other islands, and to others all the opposite continent. But we shall
consider the deep, and the Atlantic sea, as analogous to matter. For all the
inferior co-ordination is material, and proceeds into multitude and division. But
it also has, with resjx Ct to itself, transcendency and deficiency. Hence Plato
says that the Atlantics spread themselves externally, as being more remote from
the one and nearer to matter; but that they inhabited an island larger than both
Libya and A*ia, as proceeding into bulk and interval. For all things that are
more remote from the one, are diminished according to power, hut transcend
according to cpiantity; just as such as are nearer to the one, are contracted in
quantity, but possess an admirable power. Here, therefore, magnitude is sig
nificant of diminution, and of progression and extension to every thing. But the
sea was then navigable, since more total natures proceed as far as to the last of
things, and adorn matter, but having arrived at the end of the order, they stop,
and that which remains U-yond it is infinite. For that which in no respect has
a subsistence is successive to the boundaries of l&gt;eing. But the addition of those,
has an indication that total causes proceed without imi&gt;ediment through matter,
and adorn it, but that we do not always subdue it, but are merged in an infinite

1 For f\^nrra/ityn h* n , it is ntcestary to read r

150 I UnCl.l S ON Till. IIM..K i.

and indefinite rialurc. Since however the progression of things it* continued, and
no vacuum 1 any where intervenes, but a well-ordered diminution is surveyed from
more total to middle natures 1 , which comprehend and are comprehended ; nnd
from middle* to the last and vilest natures, on this account he says, there was a
passage from the Atlantic island to the other island.*, and from these to the
opposite continent. And that the Atlantic was one, but the other Mauds many,
and the continent was the greatest. For the monad is adapted to the first genus
in every thing ; but number and multitude to the second. For multitude subsists
together vvith the duad. And magnitude is adapted to the third genus, on
account of the progression of magnitude to the triad. Since, ho we\cr, the extremities
of the worse co-ordination are most material, he manifest* through the term
opposite, that they are at the greatest possible distance from more excellent natures.
Am! he does not alone use (lie term e.rter/ial, as he does of the Atlantic s, and
which evinces that they belong to the other part, but he also adds the word
opposite, that he may indie ale the most extreme diminution. Hut he signifies by
the words about that true sea, the Inpostasis of them about matter, and the last of
mundane natures. For the true sea is analogous to that which is truly false,
and truly matter, which in the I oliticus he calls the sea of dissimilitude. More
over, because it is necessary that these two-fold co-ordinations .should be sepa
rated from each other without confusion, and guarded by demiurgic boundaries, on
this account he says, that the I illars of Hercules separated the internal from tho
external habitable part. for he denoininalm llouriahing demiurgic production,
(in:l the divine separation of genera in the iiinicr.^; the latter oj illicit always remains
itablu and strenuously the same, the l*illarx /&gt;/ Hcreulcs. This Hercules therefore
is Jovian ; hut the one prior to this, and who is di\ ine, is allotted the guardian
order of the generative series. Hence from both the demiurgic division, which
niards these two separate parts of the universe, must IM- assumed.

" For the waters which are beheld within the mouth we have just
now mentioned, have the form of a port with a narrow entrance; but
the mouth itself is a true sea. Ami the land which surrounds it may
be in every respect truly denominated the continent."

The waters within the mouth indicate the genera of the letter co-ordination,
for puo* in this place, llic M-IHC requires w* should read MOV.

mm* i.J TlM.V.r.S OF 1 I.Alo. 1.11

as being converted to ihcmscUes itnd rcjoiriny: in a stable and uniting power.
For tin- innntli symbolically manife.stn the cause which defines and separates the
two portions of mundane nature*, lint the port with a narrow enlr.mce,
signifies the convolved, M-lf-converging, arranged, and immaterial h\ parxis of
these mundane portions. Tor through ihc w/r/vw entrance it is signified that
interval and extension proceed from the worse co-ordination. But through the
port an hyparxis is indicated, exempt from the confused and disorderly motion of
material natures. For such are ports affording u protection from the tumults in
the sea. If, however, some one should say, that an elevation to the more Intel-,
lectual and divine natures in the universe becomes a port to souls, he will not l&gt;o
far from the truth.

" In this Atlantic island there was a combination of kings, who with
great and admirable power subdued the whole island, together with
many other islands and parts of the continent ; and besides this sub
jected to their dominion all Libya as Car as to Egypt, and Europe as
far as to the Tyrrhene sea.

In what is here said it is requisite to recollect the Platonic hypotheses about
the earth, that IMato does not measure the magnitude, of it conformably to ma
thematicians; but apprehends the interval of it to be greater than they admit it
to l&gt;e, as Socrates says in the Plr.rdo ; and that he supposes there are many
habitable parts similar to the part which we inhabit. Jlcnee he relates that there
is an island and a continent of so great a magnitude in the external sea. For
in short, if the earth is naturally spherical.it is necessary that it should be so
according to the greater part of it. That portion of it, however, which is inha
bited by us, exhibits great inequality by its cavities and prominencies. Hence
there is elsewhere an expanded plane of the earth, and an interval extended on
high. For, according to Heraclilns, he who passes through a region very difficult
of access, will arrive at the Atlantic, mountain, the magnitude of which is said to
be so great by the Kthiopic historians, that it reaches to the a-thcr, and sends forth
a shadow as far as to live thousand stadia. For tin- sun is concealed by it from
the ninth hour of the day till it entirely sets. Nor is this at all wonderful. For.
Athos, a Macedonian mountain, emits a shadow as fur as to Lcmnos, which is
distant from it seven hundred stadia. And Marcellus, who wrote the Ethiopic
history, not only relates that the Atlantic mountain was of such a great height,

152

IMIOCLI. S OX TllK ("HOOK ,.

lint Ptolemy nlso say* that the Lunar mountains are immensely high, and Aristo
tle informs us tl.at Caucasus is illuminated by the solar rays during the third
part of the night after the setting, and also for the third part In-fore the rising, of
the sun. And he who looks to the whole magnitude of the earth, hounded l.y
its elevated parts, will infer that it is truly immense, according to the assertion of
Plato. So that we are not now ill want of certain mathematical methods to the
development of what is said aho.U the earth, nor do we attempt to reeur to them.
For thi*c methods measure the earth according to the surface iJiiJi n inhabited l&gt;y ;
but Plato says that ire tlu fll hi a uintii, and that then holt earth in derated, which
aho the sacred rumor of the F.gyl limi* asserts. And thus much concerning what
i&gt; related of tin; magnitude or the Atlantic island, in order to show that it is not
proper to disbelie\e what is said l.y Plato, though it should he rccciu-d as a men-
history. Jtnt with respect to the power of this island, that tin-re \\ere ten kin-- in
it wl.o" brgat live male twins, and that it ruled o\er the other islands, certain parts
ef the continent, and some parts within the Pillars of Hercules, all these par
ticulars are clearly related in the Critias.

Now liowe\rr, for it is proposed In make an analvsis of the particulars, tin-
power is -aid to he great and admirable, according to a reference to the universe,
hecan-eit proeci (Mo every thinir, and comprehends totally the whole of the
M-eond co-ordination, For it is held toother by ten kings, because the dccad
comprehends the rulers of the t o co-ordinations ; since the Pjthngoreans also
say, that all opposites are comprehended in the decad. Ii.it they were twins, so
that there are li\e dnads, twins bein- live times iM-gotteii from Neptune and
Clite-,; because according to the mca-nre.s of jn-tice, there is likewise an orderly
distribution of this co-ordination, of which the pentad is an image. The pro
gression of it !ioweu-r is through the duad, just as that of the better co-ordination
i s through the monad. Moreover, all of them are the descendants of Neptune,
because all the connexion of contraries, and the mundane war, belong to the
middle fabrication. For as this (Jod presides over the contrariety which every
where exists, lie likewise rul.s oxer generation and corruption, and all-various
motion. Hut tin-so kings subdued the Atlantic island as comprehending all the
first and most total genera of the worse co-ordination. And they subdued the
other islands, as likewise comprehending middles thronuh the wholeness of them.
]5ut they also \an&lt;mished parts of the continent, as adorning us Pinch as possible
the last of things. And they had dominion over certain parts of the internal
habitable region, because the la*t parts of the better me subservient to the first parts

BOOK i.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 1 W

of the worse co-ordination. Nor is this at all wonderful ; since certain d&lt;ewnn.i
are in subjection to certain heroes, and partial souls which belong to the intf/ii-
giblc portion of things are frequently slaves to fate. Such also is the Titanic
order with the Gods lo which Atlas belongs. And the first of these ten kings
was called Alias, and as it is said in the Atlauticiis gave the name to ilio
island. The summits, therefore, of the second co-ordination, are adorned
indeed by the Olympian Gods, of whom Minerva is the leader ; but they
snhdue the whole of the essence which is subordinate to the Gods, but ter
minates in the worse co-ordination; such as the essence of irrational souls,
of material masses, and of matter itself. Plato also appears to have called
the power of the Atlantics great and admirable, because Thaumas and
Bias are said by ancient thcologists to have belonged to this order. Per
haps too, he so denominated it, because the whole of the second co-or
dination is the progeny of infinity, which we say is the first [power 1 ], just
as the better co-ordination is the offspring of bound. On this account he
celebrates the power of the Atlantics, just as lie does the virtue of the
Athenians, which belongs to * bound : for it is the measure of those that possess it.
After this manner therefore, I think we may be able to make the analysis
according to the Pythagorean principles.

The words of Plato likewise, have a great augment, in order to exhibit the
work of the victors in a greater and more splendid point of view. For he says
SVVX/AIV re, through the union of the particle rt augmenting ?rjva[jnv power. And he
also adds, great, and admirable. But each of these is different from the other.
For power may be great though it is nothing else, but it is said to be admirable
from other things. And by how much the more admirable that is which is van
quished, by so much greater is the victor demonstrated to be. Besides this
also, indicating through divisions the multitude subdued by this power, he
evinces that it is multitudinous and transcendent.

" But then all this power being collected into one, endeavoured to
enslave our region and yours, and likewise every place situated within
the mouth of the Atlantic sea."

AVXI/IIK if omitted in the original.

* Instead of wpo rot&gt; xtparoi in this place, it is neceuary to read mpot rev wrpare*.

J For TO rovrp here, read rovevry.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. U

154

PROCLUS ON TIIK [BOOK i.

Plato does not say that there was once sedition among divine natures, or that
subordinate subdued more excellent beings. Hut let these things indeed be true
in human a flairs : the present narration ho\ve\er, indicates, that the most total
of the genera in the second co-ordination of things in the universe proceed
through all things. For there are both in the heavens and everywhere, a sepa
rating and uniting power, and nothing is destitute of these. In more excellent
natures however, these powers do not subsist with division, nor multitudinously,
but collected into one, and with one impulse; but this is, unitedly, and ac
cording to one and a continued life. For as in the worse co-ordination
the one is multiplied, thus also in the better, multitude is united. Hence mul
titude is every where, and is \ anguished through union. Of these things
the Atlantic* wishing to subdue every place within the mouth of the Atlan
tic sea, all their powers being collected into one, but at the same time being
\anciuishcd !&gt; the Athenians, are an image. For multitude and separation,
lhou"h they may be suneyed in the better co-onliiiation, yet they will be
seen to subsist there unitedly; multitude not In-ing there \ictorions, but
sameness, and in short, the better genera.

" Then it was, O Solon, that the power of your city was conspicuous
to all men for its virtue and strength."

"Plato opposes to the power of the Atlantic*;, the power of the Athenians;
preferring this appellation, as being adapted to the middle fabrication. And
he celebrates the more excellent power for its \irtue and strength ; in order that
throu- h virtue, he may indicate its alliance, to the philosophic nature of
Miner\a; (for another theology, and not the Orphic only, calls her \irtue,)
but through strength its alliance to her phllopolemic nature. Hut lie calls
the power conspicuous, because it is mundane, and contributes to the fabri
cation of sensible* : and to the Atlantic s indeed, he alone attributes power,
and this continually, becau-e they are arranged under infinity. Unt he
&gt;ays that the Athenians \aiujuished this power, throuuh virtue. For as they
In-long to the co-ordination of bound; they are characterized by \irttie,
which measures the passions, and uses powers in a becoming manner.

1 i. c. The Chaldtan theology.

HOOK i.j TIM;F.I;S or I&gt;L.\T&lt;&gt;. )lW

" For as its armies surpassed all others, both in magnanimity ami
military arts, so with respect to its contests, whether it was assisted
by the rest of the Greeks, over whom it sometime.* presided in
warlike a flairs, or whether it was deserted by them through the / \
incursions of the enemies, and thus was in extreme danger, yet still
it remained triumphant. In the mean time, those \vho were not
yet enslaved, it liberated from danger ; and procured the most ample
liberty for all those of us who dwell within the Pillars of Her
cules."

As wo have triply divided the inferior co-ordination, into first, middle, and
last boundaries, thus also wo mu-4 divide the superior, into the most total,
and the most partial genera, and those that subsist letween these. And
haunn made this dni*ion, we shall arrange the Athenians as analogous to
the iirst genera; hut the other Greeks who were not yet enslaved, to the
middle; and those who were now slaves, to the last genera. For according to
this arrangement, those that In-long to the Minenal series, vanquish those that
belong to the scries of Neptune; those that rank as Iirst, subduing those that
rank as &gt;econd, the monadic, the dyadie, and in short, the better vanquishing
the worse. But the middle genera eternally preserve their own order, and are
not vanquished by the worse co-ordination, on account of the, union of them
selves, and the stable genus of power. They likewise liberate from slavery those
that are enslaved, recalling them to union and permanency. For some things
indeed, are always in matter, others are always separated from it, and others,
sometimes become situated under the material genera, and sometimes have an
arrangement in a separate life. Just as in the drnma pertaining to us ; at one
time we are arranged under the Titanic, and at another, under the Olympian
order; ami at one time our course terminates in generation, but at another, in the
heavens. This however happens to partial souls, through the invariably |crinn-
nent providence of the Gods, which leads back nouls to their pristine felicity.
For as in consequence of there being genesiurgic Gods, souls descend, in sub
serviency to their will, thus also, through the prior subsistence of anagogic cause*,
the ascent of our soul* from the realms of generation is ellectcd. And thus much

1 For r,&gt;*Tuf here, it sccius necessary to read ttvrfpvr.

1JtJ PROCLUS ON THE [BOO* i.

concerning the whole meaning of the words before us. L^t us however, concisely
discuss each particular.

The words therefore, surpassed all others, manifest the total comprehension of
the first genera of the more dmne part. But the words in magnanimity, and
military arts, have the same meaning as Miner\ ally. For through magnanimity, they
imitate the philosophic characteristic of the Goddess, but through warlike arts,
her philopolemic characteristic. And the words, whether it was assisted by the
rest of the Greeks, over whom it sometimes presided in warlike affairs, or whether it
was deserted by them through the incursions of the enemies, signify that first and
total causes, produce some tilings in conjunction \\ith second and middle causes,
but others by themselves, beyond the production of these, and being alone in their
energy. For the genus of the Cods, and that \\hich is posterior to the Gods, do
not produce equally, but the effective power of the Gods proceeds to a greater
extent; since every where more dnine causes energize prior to, together with,
and posterior to their effects. Credibility therefore o( this may In- multifariously
produced. But the extreme danger manifests the last production of the first
genera. And the traph us signify that the second co-ordination is perfected
under the first, being adorned by it ; that it is in a certain respect converted by
the power of it; and that there are in the last of things invariably permanent
indications of the conversion of less excellent natures, proceeding from the first of
things. For whatever is arranged in the worse co-ordination, and invested with
form, material causes receding, affords a sullicient indication of the inspectivo
care of the better order, which is especially the peculiarity of trophies. But the
most ample liberty, is an indication of the divine and liberated order, proceeding
from on high to all things ; vthich liberty the- Athenians imparted to the Greeks,
by vanquishing the Atlantics; or rather the Olympic, by subduing the Titanic
genera. For thus the demiurgic will is accomplished, and the worse is vanquish
ed by the better co-ordination; in partial natures indeed the Atlantics by the
Athenians, but in wholes, the Titans by the Olympian Gods. " Though they are
robust, and oppose the better order, through pernicious pride, and insolent impro
bity," says the theologist ; whom Plato emulating, asserts that the Atlantics inso
lently proceeded against the Athenians.

" JUit in succeeding times prodigious earthquakes and deluges taking

For tvivrpaTtat here, it ii nccejsary to read txirraaiaf.

i.] TIM;EUS OF PLATO. 157

place, and bringing with .them desolation, in the space of one dreadful
day and ni^ht, all that warlike race of Athenians was at once merged

under the earth ; and the Atlantic island itself, being absorbed in the sea,
entirely disappeared. And hence that sea is at present innavigable, from
the impeding mud uhich the subsiding island produced. "

That what is hrrc said has a physical deduction, is evident to those who nre
not entirely ignor. nt of the physical theory. For it is not wonderful that there
should have l&gt;een an earthquake so great, as to have destroyed such n laru;e island ;
since an earthquake that happened a little l&gt;efore our time, shook both Egypt and
Bithynia, and it is not at all paradoxical, that a deluge should follow an earth
quake. For this usually happens in great earthquakes, as Aristotle relates, who
at the same time adds the cause. For where a deluge takes place together with
earthquakes, the waves are thetause of this passion. For when the spirit which
produces the earthquake, does not yet flow towards the earth, and is not aMe to
drive backward the sea which is impelled by a certain contrary spirit, urging it in
a contrary direction, through the wind which propels it, but nevertheless stops
the sea by hindering its progression, it is the pause of much sea which is impelled
by the spirit contrary to this, becoming collected together. Then however, the
sea thus collected (Urn ing most abundantly, the spirit impelling it in a, contrary
direction, enters under the earth and produces an earthquake. Hut the sea deluges
the place. For after this manner also about Aehaia, then 1 was an earthquake accom
panied with an ingress of the waves of the sea, which deluged the maritime cities,
JBouras and Helice ;J so that neither will any physiologist reject this narration, who
considers the affair rightly. Moreover, that the same place may become pervious
and impervious, continent and sea, is among the things admitted by physiologists,
according to Aristotle, and which history demonstrates. Aristotle also relates,
[in his Meteors,] that there was mud in the external sea, after the mouth ot it, and
that the place there was marshy ; so that if TO mjXoy xapra. &p&lt;*x.s&gt;&gt;s s -^ 1 if IPS marshy,
it is not wonderful. For even now rocks concealed under the sea, and having
water on their surface, are called breakers. Why therefore should any one con
tending for the truth of these things be disturbed?

That these particulars however, have reference to the admirable and orderly
distribution of the universe, we shall be convinced by recollecting what is said by

The text of Plato in this place is in the Commentarie* of Proclus very erroneous, ms the learned
reader will immediately perceive by comparing it with any of the editions of the Timaruf .

15B PROCLUS ON THE [,OOK i.

Orplieus about tlie hurling into Tartarus near the end of the fabrication of things.
For lie delivering the demiurgic opposition lietvveen the Olympian and Titanic
(Jod-, 1 terminates the whole onKily distribution in the extremities of tlu 1 universe,
and imparts to these also the undeiiled providence of the (.iods. IMato, therefore,
knowing this, and delivering to ns wholes in images, extends and leads into the
invisible, these twofold genera, and through this disappearing, imitates the Orphic
precipitation into Tartarus. For in order that the last of things may be adorned,
and participate of divine providence, it is requisite that both the superior and infe
rior co-ordination, should extend their production from on high as far as lo the
mundane extremity. Each however, elli-cts this in a manner adapted to itself;
the one being shaken, and entering under the earth, \\ hieh is the same as proceed
ing stably and solidly ; but the other disappearing, \\hichistliesame as becom
ing material, disorderly, and formless ; under the earth, being a symbol of the
firm and the .stable; but//; the sai, of that wliich is very mutable, disorderly and
flowing. For in the last of things, permanency and generation are from the better;
but corruption, mutation, and disonli ily motion are from the worse co-ordina
tion. Since however these things are adorned, both the invisible and visible fabri
cation receiving their completion, on this account Plato says, they happened in
one dreadful day and night, night indicating the invisible causes, but t uiy the visi
ble, and the dreuilfulness, signifying opposing power, the indexible, and that which
proceeds through all things. Hut because all these are accomplished according
to demiurgic powers, earthquakes and deluges took place, which are adapted to
the middle fabrication. For if he wished to signi y Jovian powers or energies, he
would have said, thunders and lightnings happened. Hut since he delivers Nep
tunian demiurgic energies, he assimilates them to earthquakes or deluges. For
it is usual to call this (iod turth-shukcr, and the source nj iinirinc irultr (xvav&^jTvjv).
And because time signifies a progression in order, and a well-arranged diminu
tion, he says that all these events took place //; succeeding time. It is not there
fore proper to say, that he who destroys an argument, takes away also the sub
jects, as Homer says of the Pha-accaus, and of the wall which the (i reeks raised;
since the things w hich are now asserted are not fictitious, but true. For many
parts of the earth are deluged by the sea; and what he says happened is not at
all impossible. Nor again, does he relate it as a mere history ; but he introduces
it for the purpose of indicating the providence which proceeds through all tilings,
and extends even to the last of things.

1 luMeail of TT)V TUV OXtyjviwp Ofuiv, tat TIJV Firunnjy waputuvt ttjmuvfiyttriv iiiriljtau in this |&gt;!.uf,
1 read ;&lt;i* Tiny OXi /jiriuv 6eu , nut rtjt ruv liroxxwr, K. X.

IIOOK i.] TINLi:US OF PLATO. ^

In short, it is necessary to assert, since tin 1 whole orderly distribution of things
receives its completion from the visible and invisible fabrication, that for the
purpose of gi\iu:r pei lection to the demiurgic productions of the? second father,
the gifls both of the belter and the worst; co-ordination, proceed as far as to the
last of l&gt;eiiigs; the former vanquishing the subjects [of its power] through the
warlike "(/IKS, and illuminating a stable 1 power, through entering under the curtly
[i. e. through proceeding firmly and solidly ;] but the latter producing ultimate
diuMon, and connecting the most material and indefinite motion of Tartarus.
Uut these things being adorned, it reasonably follows that what remains is an
impervious * and uninvestigable place of the sea. For there is no other passage and
progression of the adorning genera of the universe, but this is that which is truly
mud ; and \\hich is mentioned by Socrates in the 1 ha-do, when he is teaching us
concerning; the subterranean places. For the place under the earth obscurely
retains the forms of corporeity, which it possesses through the inferior co-ordina
tion subsiding, and proceeding to the end of the orderly distribution of things.
For the Titanic order being driven by Jupiter as far as to Tartarus, fills what is
there contained with dciform guards.

" And this, O Socrates, is the sum of what the elder Critias repeated
from the narration of Solon. But when yesterday you were speaking
about a polity and its citi/cns, I was surprised on recollecting the present
history. For I perceived how divinely 1 roni a certain fortune, and not
wandering from the mark, you collected many things agreeing with the
narration of Solon.

That the war of the Atlantics and Athenians contributes to [the theory of] the
whole fabrication of the world, and that the mundane contrariety is connected by
the middle fabrication proceeding from on high, from the first to the last of things,
the Minerval series adorning all tilings stably, and in a ruling and victorious
manner, expanding indeed the natures which are detained in matter, but pre
serving those undeliled that are separated from matter ; and also, that the other
fabrication imparts appropriately,* motion, division, and difference, to the things
fabricated, and proceeds su;&gt;ernaUy to the end ; all this has been sufficiently

1 For yuii/t In IP, it is necessary to read /JOX/IOK.
1 For nipoi hcrr, it is necessary to rrad artywi.
J Instead of cm \~purfitvn rcd
4 For wpo*ij*ti&gt;*i t read

1CO PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

shown and recalled to the memory by us, in what we have before Haid. Since
however, he by whom this narration is made, is analogous to the God who
connects this contrariety, he, in a certain resect imitates him. And through a
recurrence to the fathers of the narration, through what was heard by Critias and
Solon, he ascends to the Egyptians; conformably to what pre-exists in the
paradigm, which is tilled from first causes, and fills things posterior to itself, with
demiurgic power. Farther still, since In 1 brings with him an image of the second,
which proceeds from another fabrication, hence he says, that lie recollected the
history through the discourse of Socrates. For the recollection itself, is not a
transition from images to paradigms, but from universal conceptions to more
partial actions. Hence, also it is adapted to the progression of the whole
fabrication of things. For since all things are- in intelligibles, every demiurgic
cause distributes total productions according to its proper order.

Again, if you consider what is said after another manner, yon will find that
the Athenians are praised in an admirable manner, and that the polity of Socrates
is fitly celebrated. For that it is possible Jor tins polity to e.iist, is demonstrated
through the life of the [(indent} Athenians, and also that it is productive of the great
est good to those IT ho belong to it ; which also Socrates thinks fit to demonstrate in

O C*

his Republic. But he is likewise of opinion that those who live according to the
best form of a polity, should be shown to deserve the greatest admiration. For
those who are fashioned according to the first paradigm are truly admirable;
since of mundane natures also, the more divine which transcemlently receive the
whole form of their paradigms, are said to lie, and are monadic; but material
natures which have the same form in many subjects, possess the last order. This
therefore, which in the fabrication of things, belongs to the Gods, \i/. to partake
transcendently of their proper paradigm, the city of the Athenians also exhibits,
by applying itself in the mo&gt;t excellent manner to the best measure of life.

Moreover, the circle of benefits, imitates the mundane circle. For the Egyp
tians are benefited by the Athenians, through warlike works; and the Athe
nians are benefited by the Egyptians through sacerdotal narrations. For the
communication of an unwritten action, was a return of favour. lint in addition
to this, the doctrinal narration of the deeds of their ancestors, exhibits a multi
plied retribution. The mention also of fortune and divinity, and the excitation
of our reasoning powers, are worthy of the theory of Plato. For fortune and her

1 For TO eyicfci/jiof here, it ii necessary to rear! TQV c yro0yiior.

BOOK i.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. lg|

gifts are not irilhot t a scope, or indefinite ; but she is a power collective of many dis
persed causes, adorning things that are without arrangement, and giving completion to
what is allotted to each individual from the universe. Why then did Socrates
collect many things which agree with the narration of Solon? I answer, on
account of the cause which collects many dispersed causes, and on account of
the one divinity who connects the common intellect of .Socrates and Solon. For,
l&gt;eing f a Minerval characteristic, they are excited as it were from one fountain,
tlu ir tutelar Goddess, to similar conceptions.

L ?

* Yet I was unwilling to disclose these particulars immediately, as,
from the great interval of time since I first received them, my remem- ^
brance of them was not sufficiently accurate for the purpose of repetition.
] consider it therefore necessary, that I should fir&gt;t diligently revolve the
whole in my mind."

These things may also he surveyed in the universe ; viz. that the demiurgic
rause of beings which are generated according to time, gives subsistence to hi&gt;
own progeny prior to that of partial natures. And that the hypostatic cause
of things generated, first intellectually perceiving himself, and seeing in himself
the causes of his productions, thus gives also to other things a progression from
himself; in order that he, being sufficient and perfect, may impart his own power
to secondary natures. Conception therefore and resumption, and every thing of
this kind, manifest the comprehension of demiurgic productive principles in one.

" And on this account, I yesterday immediately complied with your
demands; for I perceived that we should not want the ability of pre
senting a discourse accommodated to your wishes, which in things of
this kind is of principal importance. In consequence of this, as Her-
inocratcs has informed you, as soon as we departed from hence, by com
municating these particulars with my friends here present, for the purpose

For fitav Otuv in this place, read fiiav Otuv.

1 The crroneouM&gt;e of the punctuation here, pcrvrrU the meaning of Procln. For the original i,
rnvro ni rr ry irarri Orarroy, wpo rw firpixw. TO f&gt;i)fiinvnyitov dinar rwr yiyrr&gt;jurw Kara \poruv
V^IOT/JITI rn tnvrov yfy&gt; rj/tnra. Kilt the punctuation ought to be &gt;1 follows: rur rni &lt;r ry rarri
6tartv&gt; . rpn rwf ^irfiitwK, ro brjfjiovp-ytfov airinf, *. X.

1 Instead of rpo rwv io thi* plarr, it u iwcc&gt;Mry to read vpwror.

Tim. fiat. VOL. I. X

J6 2 PROCLUS ON THE [J.OOK i.

of refreshing my memory, and afterwards revolving them in my mind by
night, I nearly acquired a complete recollection of the affair."

Why did Critias nearly rememhor? For he promised to accomplish what was
enjoined him. Because ho did not accurately rememher. But he first revolved
the affair in his mind, conceiving that in mandates of this kind, such as that in
which Socrates wished to see his polity in motion, the greatest undertaking is to
find an hypothesis from which it is possible to give what is adapted to the man
dates. And this Critias accomplishes, by receiving from histdry the war of the
Atlantics and Athenians, as a thing capable of exhibiting a life productive of the
best polity. He also revolved this narration by night, in order that he might
impart it to his associates without error.

Again therefore, from these things, let us Ix-take ourselves to wholes. For
there the demiurgic cause bring filled from an invisible cause (since all intellectual
causes are there primarily, to which he is united according to the highest trans
cendency), produces the power of himself into the visible world, conformably to
their will and judgment. Farther still, not to give the narration immediately,
but afterwards, is a symbol of the preparatory apparatus of nature, from which
perfection is produced in physical effects. You may also consider the caution
of Critias ethically. For it is not proper to attempt things of such a magnitude
rashly, without first revolving the whole undertaking by ourselves, in order that
we may bring them forth as from a treasury through speech, which is truly the
messenger of internal reasons. Moreover, the repeating the narration to himself,
imitates the conversion of demiurgic reasons to themselves, according to which
[the soul] surveys in herself [by participation] the productive principles of beings.
And to present a discourse accommodated to the wishes i,f those icho enjoined it, in
dicates in the fabrication of things the suspension of risible effects from their
causes.

" And, indeed, according to the proverb, what we learn in childhood,
abides in the memory with a wonderful stability. For with respect to
myself, for instance, I am not certain that I could recollect the whole of
yesterday s discourse ; yet I should be very much astonished if any thing
should escape my remembrance, which 1 had heard in some past time very

1 Foruiifjrcu here, it ia uectssary to read ciwrai.

BOOK i.] TIJLEUS OF PLATO. KM

distant from the present. Thus, as to the history which I have just now
related, I received it from the old man with great pleasure and delight ;
who on his part very readily complied with my request, and frequently
gratified me with a repetition of it. And hence, as the marks of letters
deeply burnt in, remain indelible, so all these particulars became firmly
established in my memory."

That children remember letter than mon is soon in works, and has many
probable causes. One indeed, as Porphyry says, because the souls of children
hare not an experience of human evils. Hence, as they are neither distracted nor
disturbed by externals, their imagination js void of impressions ; but their reasoning
power is more sluggish. For experience renders this power more acute. But
another cause is this, that the rational life in children is in a greater decree min
gled with the phantasy. As therefore, in consequence of the soul being co-passive,
and co-mingled with the body, the body becomes stronger and more vital ; after
the same manner also, the phantasy is strengthened through the habitude of
reason. And l&gt;oiiig strengthened, it has more stable impressions, from receiving
through its own power reason in a greater degree ; just as the body is more
powerful, in consequence of l&gt;eing more vital, through a more abundant commu
nion with the soul. A third cause in addition to these is, that the same things
appear to IH greater to the imaginations of children. Hence they are in a
greater degree admired by them, so that they are more co- passive with them, and
on this account ospoeially remember them. 1 or we deposit in the memory thing*
which vehemently pain, or vehemently delight us. They therefore operate on us
inn greater degree. Hence as that which suffers in a greater degree from fire,
preserves for a longer time, the heat imparted to it ; after the same manner, that
whioh suffers more from the external object of the phantasy, retains the impression
in a greater degree. Moreover the imagination of children sutlers more, on ac-
rount of the same things appearing to us to be greater during our childhood.
Hence children in a greater degree retain the impression, as suliering in d greater
degree from the same things. And it appears to me that (, ritias indicates tin*
when he says, that he heard this history from the old man with great delight, and
that on this account it became firmly established in his memory, like the marks
of letters deeply burnt in. But as Socrates in the recapitulation of his polity
asserts, that the cause of memory to us is the unusualness of the things which

For aXrjQnur hfJT. it U Of rcsiirj to K*d a^nar.

j&lt;*4 PROCMJS ON Tllli [BOOK i.

tve hear, thus Critias, in what is here said, ascribes this cause to tlie age of children.
For every tiling that occurs to children at first, appears to be unusual. And
perhaps this brings with it an indication, that the prolific fabrication of Gods of
the second rank i.s suspended from the stable sameness of those of the first order ;
just as the memory of a boy i&gt; the cause of memory to the associates of Critias.
If someone however, in addition to these solutions, should adhere to the whole
ihoorv of things, let him hear laiublichus asserting, that the memory of children
indicates the ever new, flourishing, and stable production of reasons; the
indelibility of the letters, the perpetually-flowing ;md never-failing fabrication ; and
the alacrity of the teacher, the unenvying and abundant supply afforded by more
ancient causes to secondary natures. Fur the&gt;e things also have a place in con
junction with the before-mentioned solutions.

" In consequence of this, as soon as it was day, I repeated the na na
tion to ni v friends, that together with myself they might be better pre
pared tor the purposes of the present association, lint now with respect
to that for which tin s narration was undertaken, I am prepared, () Socra
tes, to speak not only summarily, but so as to descend to the particulars
of cvcrv thing which I heard. We shall transfer, however, to reality the
citizens and city which you fashioned yesterday as in a fable ; consider
ing that city which von established as no other than this Athenian

5 *

city, and the citixens which you conceived, as no other than those ances
tors of ours described by the Egyptian priest. And indeed the a Hair
will harmonize in every respect ; nor will it be foreign from the purpose
to assert, that your citizens are those very people who existed at that
time. Hence, distributing the atlair in common among us, we will en
deavour, to the utmost of our ability, to accomplish in a becoming man
ner the employment which you have assigned us. It is requisite there
fore to consider, O Socrates, whether this discourse is reasonable, or whe
ther we should lay it aside, and seek after another."

Before, Crilias made his associates partakers of his narration ; but now, he calls
on them to accomplish in conjunction with him, the employment assigned them.
Because in the paradigms all things indeed are- united on high, and fill each
other with intellectual powers ; but in the demiurgic world for in the world
in Ihc intellect of the Demiurgus,] they subset with each other, according to
a certain dnine and total conspiration ; conformably to which, and through

P. .OK i.J TIMJ-US OF PLATO. j&lt;j.5

which, nil things are every where appropriately in each. Hence in tin 1
heavens (lie paradigms of generated natures pre-exist, and in generation tliere
:ire images of celestial natures. Since, however, \\ holeness every where pre
cedes parts, this also may be seen in the second fabrication. On this account
Critias lir&gt;t summarily discusses the war ; but afterwards he endeavours to
explain more copiously every particular, narrating all the polity of the At-
luntics, and the principle of their generation ; how they turned to injustice,
how the Athenians proceeded to war; from what apparatus, from what le
gations, through what ways, with whom they were co-arranged, and such
tilings as are consequent to the&gt;e. The genuine polity, therefore, [of Socrates]
is an imitation of the first fabrication. Hence indicating the mystic nature
of it, and its pre-existence in pure reason, he says, that it wtia faxh mned ax
it were in a fable. But the hypothesis of the Athenians has an indication,
as in images, 1 of the second fabrication; in which that which is more
partial presents itself to the view; and \\hat remains consists of contrariety and
motion, and that which is circumscribed in place. Since, however, the
second is suspended from the first fabrication, and is in continuity with
it, hence he says, " that the til/air wilt harmonize, in aery reaped, and
thai it v ill not be foreign to the purpose to ancrt, that the citizens in the Jie-
public of Socrates arc I fie rcry people icho existed at that time."

" Socit ATI-.S. Hut what other, O Critias, should we receive in prefer
ence to this ? For your discourse, through a certain affinity, is particularly
adapted to the present sacrifice to the Goddess. And hesidrs this,
we should consider, as a thing of the greatest moment, that your ;&lt;/&lt;/-
lion is not a mere fable, but a true history of tranxcentlenl niagnifittfc.
It is impossible, therefore, to say how and from whence, neglecting
your narration, we should find another more convenient.

Socrates approves the narration of Critias, in the first place as adapted
to the festival of the Athenians; for the [Atlantic] war is an image of mundane
wars ; and as a hymn accommodated to the sacrifice to Minerva. For if
speech is of any advantage to men, it .\hould be, employed in hymnx. And besides
this, since the Goddess is the cause of both theory and action ; throrgli

1 For wi crdi-wf CI-TUV in this place, it is nerrssary to read wi m.mv 01 TV*.

I6fl PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

sacrifice, indeed, we imitate her practical energy, but through the hymn her
theoretic energy. But, in the second place, Socrates approves the narration
as bearing witness to the possibility of his polity. For thin, in his discourse
about it, he thought worthy of demonstration. For it WAS sufficient for him
that this scheme of a polity existed in the heavens, and in one man; since all
thing* that have an external, have an internal uubsistence, and that which
is truly law, logins from the internal lift; itself. If also he shows, that this
polity once prevailed among the Athenians, he certainly demonstrates the
possibility of it. This, therefore, has such-like causes as these. Again how
ever it may l&gt;e assumed from these things, that the narration about the At-
lantics is not a fiction, as some have supposed it to be ; but a history
indeed, yet having an affinity to the whole fabrication of the world. So
that such things as Plato discusses about the magnitude of the Atlantic island,
must not be rejected as fabulous and fictitious on account of those who en
close the earth in a very narrow space.

" Hence it is requisite that you should speak with good Fortune,
but that I on account of my discourse yesterday, should now rest
from speaking, and be attentive to what you have to say."

Plato does not, like the Stoics, assert, that the worthy man has no need of
Fortune; but he is of opinion that our dianoetic energies, since they are com
plicated with corporeal energies, according to external progression, should l&gt;e
inspired by good Fortune, in order that they may proceed fortunately, and
that their effect upon others may be friendly to divinity. And as Nemesis is the
inspector of light words, thus also good Fortune directs the words both of
those that receive and of him that utters them, to a good purpose, in order
that the former may receive benevolently and sympathetically, but the latter
may impart in a divinely inspired manner, that which is adapted to every one.
Thus, therefore, in partial natures. But in wholes, good Fortune signifies a
divine allotment, according to which each thing is allotted an order adapted
to it, from the one father, and the whole fabrication. Moreover, for So
crates to rest from speaking, and to be attentive to what may be said, has
indeed an appropriate retribution. For the other persons of the dialogue did
this, when he narrated his polity. But this shows from analogy, how all
demiurgic causes being united to each other, have at the same time separate

BOOK I.] T1M&US OF PLATO. I(j 7

productions. For to hear is indicative of receiving through each other. And
for the others to rest, when one speaks, signifies the unraingled purity ac
cording to which each demiurgic cause produces and generates secondary natures
from its own peculiarity.

" GRIT. But nour consider, Socrates, the manner of our disposing the
mutual banquet of discussion. For it seems proper to us that Timacus,
who is the most astronomical of us all, and is eminently knowing in the
nature of the universe, should speak the first; commencing his discourse
from the generation of the world, and ending in the nature of men. But
that I after him, receiving the men which he has mentally produced, but
which have been excellently educated by you, and introducing them to
you according to the narration and law of Solon, as to proper judges,
should render them members of this city; as being in reality no other
than those Athenians which were described as unknown to us, in the
report of the sacred writings. And that in future we shall discourse
concerning them, as about citizens and Athenians."

The intention of this arrangement is to make Timanis a summit, and at the same
time a middle. For he speaks after Socrates and Critias, and prior to Critias and Iler-
mocratcs. And thus, indeed, heis a middle; hut in another rcsjM. ctJie is a summit,
according to science, andbrcausehegenerates the men, whom .Socrates indeed edu
cates, hut Critias arms. This, however, is also a manifest symbol of total fabrication,
which is at one and the same time a summit and a middle. For it is exempt
from all mundane natures, and is equally present to all. The summits likewise,
and the middle of the universe, belong to the Demiurgus, according to the doctrine
of the Pythagoreans. For the tower of Jupiter is, as they say, situated there.
But Critias, who spoke as the middle after Socrates, now again sunu.iarily speaks
prior to Hermocr.ites. For the ditadic pertains to the middle fabrication, and also
the whole in conjunction with parts ; juit as the if hole, \_prior to parts] belongs to the
Jirst, but parts to the last fabrication. Hence Socrates summarily delivered his
polity, and Hermocrates contributed to the parts of the history which was about
to be narrated by Critias. And thus much concerning the whole arrangement.

Some one, however, may doubt, what will be left for Hermocrates to accomplish
after Tuna-us has delivered the generation of the men, Socrates their education,

ltW PKOCLUS ON THE [BOOK i.

and Critias their actions. For to these things there is nothing successive. May
it not !&gt;e said that Hennocrates is the adjutor of Critias in his narration ; for the
relation of the history was a mixture of deeds and words. And Critias himself
promised to make a discussion of the actions, but calls on Ilermocrates to assist
him in the words. For the imitation of these is difficult, as was before observed.
Hence in the Atlanticus, Critias having assembled the Gods, as consulting about
the punishment of the Atlanties, he says " Jupiter thus addressed them? And he
thus terminates the dialogue, as delivering to Hennocrates the imitation of the
words. 15ut there is no absurdity in his not discussing [in the Atlanticusj the
remainder of the deeds. For, in short, having assembled the Gods, for the purpose
of chastising the insolence of the Atlantic-, he has every thing consequent to thi.-
comprehended in the. Gods being thus collected, \i/.. the preparation of the
Athenians, their egress, and their victory. Tima us, therefore, generates the men,
Socrates educates them, &lt;&gt;itias leads them fortli to actions, and Hennocrates to
words ; the first of these, imitating the paternal cause; the second, the supplier of
stable intelligence; the third, the supplier of motion and progression to secondary
natures; and the fourth, imitating the cause which converts the last of things to
their principles through the imitation of reasons [i. e. of productive powers]. Thus,
therefore, these particulars may be symbolically understood, and, perhaps, in no
very superfluous manner.

Some one, also, may doubt why the Tima-us had not an arrangement prior to
the Republic, since in the former dialogue the generation of the world, and also
i. f tlie human race, is delivered. For it is necessary, as Timtuus says, that men
should be generated ; and also, that they should be educated, which Socrates
effects in the Republic ; and that they should energi/e in a manner worthy of
their education, which in a certain respect the Atlanticus exhibits. And if, indeed,
Plato beginning from the end proceeded to the Tirruvus, which is first by nature,
it will be asserting, what is usual to say, that for the sake of doctrine, things that
are first to us, though posterior by nature, are first delivered ; but that now he
appears to have arranged the middle as the first, and the first a* the middle.
And if, indeed, this arrangement had been adopted by those who are studious of
ornament, it would have been less wonderful; but now Plato himself appears to
have acted in this manner. Here, therefore, there is a recapitulation of the polity,
as having been already summarily narrated in the shortest manner. In answer
to this doubt it must \tc said, that if all hypotheses were assumed from the nature
of things now in existence, or which were formerly, it would be necessary that the

BOOK i.] TIM/F.US OF PLATO. J6f)

doubt should l&gt;e valid, and that the Tima us is not rightly ranked in the second
place. If also, all the narrations were devised from hypothesis, it thus would l&gt;e
requisite that such things as are first according to nature, should be iir&gt;t assumed.
But since the hypothesis of Socrates subsists in words alone, and surveying; the
universal, applies itself to the nurture and education of men, but the hypothesis
consequent to this discusses beings and things in generation, the&gt;c are very
properly conjoined to each other; while the hypothesis of Socrates, as only
subsisting in words, and being on this account accurate, has an arrangement prior
to the rest. Perhaps, likewise, Plato wished to indicate this to us, that such things
as divine [human] souls, and which are ascending to the intelligible, produce, these
are some time or other effected on the earth, according to certain prosperous
vicissitudes of circulations. As Critias therefore asserts this, bearing testimony
to Socrates, we must say that those true ancestors of ours of which the priest
spoke, perfectly accord with those citizens which Socrates mentally conceived,
and our opinion is not to be rejected that they were those who existed at that
time. If however the Republic is inferior to the Tima-us, because it is conversant
with that which is partial, and to discuss mortal affairs is to dwell on an image,
yet the universal prevails in it. For the fame form of life exhibits indeed in the soul
justice, but in a city a polity, and in the world, fabrication.

Farther still, the deliberate choice of virtue is free, but the energy which is di
rected to externals, requires the mundane order, and hence the Atlanticus is pos
terior to the Tima-uR. But the habit of the citizens shows that virtue is without a
master. Plato also manifests through the&gt;e things, that the soul when she is of
herself [and does not depend on another] is superior to irtry physical hypostasis, and
runs above Fate ; but when flic n-rcs to actions, is cuni/uishcd b\i physical laws, and
is in subjection to Fate. In addition also to what has been said, it is requisite to
know this, that from the order of human life delivered in the Republic, the con
nexion of these dialogues, maybe obtained. For in that dialogue the men arc
first educated and instructed through disciplines. Afterwards, they ascend to
the contemplation of [true] beings ; and in the third place, descend from thence
to a providential attention to the city. Conformably to this congruity, the Re
public has an arrangement prior to the Tim.eus; and the Timacus to the Atlanti
cus. For the men leing instructed by the Republic, and elevated according to
theory by the Tim&us, will, living happily, wisely |erform such actions, as the

For filial here, I read r/j^porwi.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. Y

170 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK I.

Atlanticus narrates. After this manner therefore, we dissolve the doubt. The
philosopher Porphyry however, not directly for the sake of this doubt, but dis
cussing something 1 else, affords us the following aid in its solution ; that those who
Mish 1 to apprehend the whole theory genuinely, ought first to-be instructed in the
form of it, in order that being similar to the object of intellection, they may be in
a becoming manner co-adapted to the knowledge of the truth. This therefore,
the order itself of the dialogues demonstrates. For the auditors of the Tirna-us
ought first to have !&gt;een benefited by the Republic, and having been adorned
through it, to attend afterwards to the dogmas concerning the world, evincing
themselves to be most .similar through erudition to the excellent order of the uni
verse. And thus much in answer to this doubt.

Each particular however of the text must be considered. Tinv.rus therefore,
is now said to be most astronomical, not as directing his attention to the rapidity
of the celestial motions, nor as collecting the measures of the courses of the
sun,* nor as heiiiij conversant with the works of J ate, but as a.strotiomi/ing above
the heavens, conformably to the con pha-us in the Thea-tetus, and contemplating
the invisible causes which are properly stars. Hence Socrates does not exhibit
the visible man, but the man th.it is purely cssentiali/ed in reason ; and he
does this as imitating the \\hole deiniurgus, in whom the heavens and all
the stars sub-ist, as the theologist says, intellectually. Tiiiurus begins however,
from the generation of the world, and ends in man ; In-cause man is a mi
crocosm, possessing all things partially, which the uni\er&gt;e does totally, as
Socrates demonstrates in the I hilcbiis. Hut there are certain persons educated
by Socrates in the most excellent manner, who al.so educates the whole city,
and these an- the guardians and auxiliaries. J or in the universe, that which
transcendently participates of intellect is heaven, which also imitates intellect
through its motion. The men however, are introduced by Critias, conformably
to the law and conceptions of Solon, because Solon narrates, that the Athenians
were once thus governed, and establi&gt;hed laws how children oii^ht to le intro
duced into the polity, and into the tribes, and how they ouijit to Iw registered;

For jiooiMit ill tins jilace, it a|i|irar&gt; to MIC lit l&lt; IK crii.in to li-jil 0, \,;i rcu.

* Profliu here .illiuli - tu tin- following C lmMir in or.u Ir : " Direct not your attention In the immense
measures of the earth ; for the |&gt;!.mt of truth ii not in tin- earth. Nor mra-iire the diiiK-i^i.ni of the
MIII by meaiii of i ollei-ted rules; for it re\olvci hv thr t l.-rnal will of the father, unit not for j our suktf.
Dismiiis the sounding course of the moon ; for it perpetually TUUS through llie cxertionu of neceiiily.
The advauciug {irucession of thp [liietl] star*, was not generated for your sake," &lt;.\c. See my collectiou
ofthtjt Oraclis, iu No. \\V1I. of tlie Classical Journal.

BOOK i.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 171

nnd likewise, by what kind of judges, they should be tried, in one place from the
tribes, but in another, from other appropriates persons. As Critias there fore admiLv
that the-men educated by Socrates were Athenians, he follows the conceptions
and the law of Solon, conformably to which certain persons are introduced into
the polity.

Soc. " I seem to behold a perfect and splendid banquet of discussion

set before me. It belongs therefore, now to you, O Timajus, to begin the
discourse; having first of all, as is fit, invoked the Gods according to

In
aw.

The perfection and the splendor of the narration indicate the supernatural pro
duction of tilings on account of their paradigms, and which takes place universally.
And to these the words of Socrates refer. The banquet of discussion indicates
the perfect plenitude of demiurgic forms ; but the calling on Tinuvus^ the conversion
of partial causes to the whole, and an evocation of the goods thence derived ;
and the inrocafion of (he (iods, the fabrication supernally suspended from intel
ligible*. For the expression according to l&lt;i:i\ is not such as many of the Italic
or Attic interpreters suppose it to be, but it has the same meaning as the words
usually employed by the Pythagoreans, "Honor in the first place, the immortal
(iods, as they are disposed by law." For law manifesls the di\ine order, accord
ing to which secondary are always suspended from prior causes, and are. filled
from them. But law thus beginning from inlelligibles, extends to the demiurgic
cause, ami from this proceeds, and is divided about the universe. At the same
time, however, Socrates indicates through these things, that the I vlh.i^oric doc
trine requires that physiology should commence from a divine cause, and that it
should not be such as that which he reprobates in the 1 ha-do, which blinds the
eye of the soul, by assigning airs and aethers as causes, conformably to Anaxa-
goras. For it is necessary that true physiology should be suspended from theo
logy, in the same manner as nature is suspended from the Gods, atid is divided
according to the total orders of them ; so that words may be imitators of the things
of which they are significant. For mythologists also narrates that Vulcan who
presides over nature was in love with Minerva, who weaves the order of intellec
tual forms, and is I he supplier of intelligence to all mundane essences. As far as
to this therefore, the preface of the Tima-us receives its completion; of which
Severus, indeed, did not think fit to give any interpretation; but Longinus does
not nay that the whole is superfluous, but only such particulars as are introduced

|72 PROCLUS ON THE TIM^FAJS OF PLATO. [BOOK i

about the Atlantics, and tlie narration of the Egyptian ; so that ho is accustomed
to conjoin with the request of .Socrates, the promise of Critias. I mean, he con
nects with the words, " / now therefore stand prepared to receive the promised feast,"
the words, " Rut no~u&lt; consider, Socrates, the manner of our disposing the mutual ban
quet of discussion." But Porphyry and lamblichus hhow that this preface accords
with the whole design of tlie dialogue, tlie one indeed more partially, but the
other with more profound intuition ; so that we also shall here finish the book in
conformity to Plato, having adopted their order.

17.1

HOOK II.

Tin: preface of the Tinvrus consists of two heads ; a recapitulation of the polity
of Socrates, and a concise narration of the war of the Athenians against the
Atlantic*, and the victory which they obtained over them. Kach of tliese, how
ever, contributes in tin- greatest decree to the consummation of the whole theory of
the world. For the form of the [Socratic] polity, considered by it.self, is primarily
adapted to the orderly distribution of the heavens. IJut the narration of the
war and the victory, Incomes a symbol to (is of the mundane contrariety. And the
former describes in images the first fabrication, bm the latter the second. Or, if
you are willing, the former describes the formal, but the latter the material cause.
For all physiologists make principles to be contraries, and constitute the world
from the harmonious conjunction of contraries. And harmony indeed, and
order are derived from form, which in the recapitulation is shown to proceed from
the polity in common, and to extend in an orderly progression to every multitude.
For it is one tiling to deliver the polity which is in the soul, another, that which is
in men, and another, that which is mundane. But the recapitulation of Socrates,
describing the form itself of every polity separately, exhibits to ns primarily the
polity in the universe, to which also it entirely hastens to refer [the polities that
rank as] parts.

Farther still, if also you are willing to consider the affair after another manner,
the polity may l&gt;c arranged as analogous to the heavens, but the war to genera
tion. For the polity extends as far as to the last of things ; since all things are
arranged conformably to the series which proceeds from the demiurgus as far as to
mundane natures. Contrariety also pre-exists after a mariner in the heavens;

174

PROCLUS ON TI1F. [BOOK n.

cither according to the two-fold circulation* of the cehwtia! bodies, viz. to tho
ri"ht hand, and to the loft; or according to (lie two-fold circles of nonls, tho.
circle of sameness, and the circle of dillerence; or according to the genera of
being, jx-nnnnency and motion ; or according to the divine peculiarities, tho male
and the female; or according to any other snch-like division. The polity there
fore, is more allied to the heavens, but the war to generation. Hence the former
is Jovian, but tho latter pertains to the allotment of Neptune. Alter however
the theory of parts, it is necessary through images to he extended to the know
ledge of the whole. And after the survey of images themselves, it is requisite to
adhere to their paradigms, from small beinu initiated in greater [objects of con
templation!. For the former have the relation of things preparatory !o initiation,
and of small mysteries, exciting the eve of the M&gt;U| to the comprehension of the
whole ami the univer&gt;e, and to the contemplation of the one cause, and the one
progression of all mundane natures. For every thing is from tin- one, and the.
universe with having in dilVerent parts of it, more partial presiding powers,
proceeds vice versa to the one cause of its suh-i^tenoe.

Tima-us however, prior to entering on the whole discussion, converts himself to
the invocations of, and prayers to the Gods, imitating in this the maker of the
universe, who prior to the whole fabrication of tilings, is said to have approached
to the oracle of night, to have been there filled with divine intellectual concep
tions, to have received the principles of fabrication, and thereto dissolve, if it be
lawful so to speak, all his doubts. To night also, who calls on the father, [Jupiter]
to en-age in the fabrication of the universe, Jupiter is rejiTesented by the theolo-
gist as saving,

Maia, Mipirme of all l!ic puutrs tin me,
Immortal Niglii! liw \\iili uiicoiifjut r d mh)J
Miikl I the source of llic iinniottult Its ?

And he receives this answer from her,

All tilings receive inclus il on cv ry siJe,

In sttlur s wide ineffalile embrace ;

1 hen in tlie innKt of xlher place tlie lieav n.

1 For evtnaaif here, it is necessary (o read arativ.
* For cvpatu here, it is nece^ary to real oi/paOK.

iiftoK n.] TIM.IX S OF PLATO. !75

And he is instructed by her in all the consequent fabrication of the world. But
again to Saturn, after the bonds, Jupiter a 1 but praying says,

Damon, most t.tmM,our progeny direct.

And in all that follows, he calls forth the benevolence* of his father. For how
could he otherwise fill all things with Gods and assimilate the sensible world to
animal itself, [or the intelligible paradigm] than by extending himself to the invisible
causes of whole*, from which being himself filled,

lie truni lin [acrd] heart may godlike works
Again produre.

It is necessary therefore, prior to all other f tings, that we should know some- -
thing manifest concerning prayer, what its essence j s , and what its perfection,
and whence it is imparted to souls. For the philosopher Porphyry indeed, de
scribing those among the ancients that admitted prayer, and those that did not,
leads us from one opinion to another, and says in short, that neither those who
are diseased according to the first kind ofimpiety, derive any benefit from prayer,
since they do not admit that there are Gods, nor those who labour under the
second kind, and entirely subvert providence, granting indeed that there are
Gods, but denying their providential energies. Nor are they benefited by it,
who admit indeed the providence of the Gods, but assert that all things are
produced by them from necessity. For there is no longer any advantage to be
derived from prayer, if things of a contingent nature hare not 1 any existence.
But such as assert that the Gods providentially attend to all things, and that
many things that are generated art; contingent and may subsist otherwise, these
very properly admit the necessity of prayers, and acknowledge that they correct
our life. Porphyry also adds, that prayer especially pertains to worthy men,
because it is a contact with divinity. But the similar loves to IK? conjoined to the
similar : and the worthy man is most similar to the Gods. Because likewise
those who embrace \irtue are in custody, and are inclosed in the body as in a
prison, they ought to request the Gods that they may migrate from hence.
Besides, since we arc as children lorn from our parents, it is fit we should pray

For oXXwi yirtoOat o&gt; r&gt; here, it is necessary to read, a\\vi yntvOat ^ errvr.

17 fl PROCLUSONTI1E [BOOK n.

that we may return to our true parents the Gods. Those also resemble such as
are deprived of their fathers and mothers, who do not think it requisite to pray
and l&gt;e converted to tin; Gods. All nations likewise, that have excelled in
wisdom, have diligently applied themselves t&lt; prayer; among the Indians the
Ilrachmans, among the l &gt; ersians the Magi, and of tin- Greeks the laost theolo
gical, who instituted initiatory rites and mysteries. Hut the Chaldeans venerate
every othrr divinity, and likewise the \irtne itself of the Gods, which they deno
minate a Goddess ; so far are they from despising sacred worship, on account
of the possession of virtue. And in addition to all this, as \ve are parts of the
universe it is lit that we should he in want of the universe. Tor a conversion to
the whole imparts salvation to every thing. If therefore yon possess virtue., yon
should invoke that which antecedently comprehends all virtue. For that
which is all-good, will also he the cause to you uf appropriate good. Or if you
explore a certain corporeal good, there is a power in the world which compre
hends all body. It is necessary therefore that perfection should from thence be
derived to the parts. And this is the sum of what is said by Porphyry on this
subject.

The divine Iarnblichiii&gt; however, does not think that a history of this kind
pertains to what is here proposed to !&gt;e considered. I or Plato is not now speaking
about atheistical men, but about such as niv wise, and able to converse with the;
Gods, ^ior does he speak of such as are dubious about the works of piety; but
io such as wish to be saved by those tr/ia arc the saviours of u-holes, lie delivers the
inkier of pni i/er, ami its mimirable. iitid aiijicrmilnral perfection which transcends all
expectation.

It is lit however, that transferring what he says to what is more usual and more
known to the reader, we should render his meaning clear, and assign arguments
concerning prayer which accord with the doctrine of Plato. From hence there
fore we must beg in : All beings aie the progeny of the Gods, by whom they are
produced without a medium, and in whom they are firmly established. For the
progression of things which per|etnally subsist, and cohere from permanent causes,
is not alone perfected by a certain continuation, but immediately subsists from
the Gods, from whence all things are generated, however distant they may bo
from the divinities. And ihis is no less true, even though asserted of matter itself.
For a divine nature is not ah&gt;ent from anything, but is equally present to all

1 ! in !:, U t in ilui |il.u i-, it ii it i|iniiic tu icail ()..

.] TIMvEUS OF PLATO. 177

things. Hence though, you should assume tin; last of lyings, in these also you
will find divinity. For t/ic one is every where; and in consequence of its absolute
dominion, every tiling receives its nature and coherence from the Gods. As all
things however proceed, so likewise, they are not separated from the (iods, luit
radically abide in them, as the causes and sustainers of their existence. For where
can they recede, since the Gods primarily comprehend all things in their embrace ?
For whatever is placed as separate from the Gods has not any kind of suln
sistence. But all brings are contained by the Gods and reside in their natures, after
the manner of a circular comprehension. Hence, by a wonderful mode of subsistence,
all things proceed, and yet are not, nor indeed can lie separated from the Gods;
because all ofl&gt;pring when torn from their parents, immediately recur to the
immense vastness of non-entity. Uut in a certain respect they are established in
them; and in short, proceed in themselves, but abide in the (iods. Since how
ever, having proceeded, it is requisite that they should be converted and return,
imitating the evolution into light, and conversion of the Gods to their cause, in
order that these being arranged conformably to the perfective triad, may a^ain
be contained by the Gods anil the first unities, hence they receive from them a
certain secondary perfection, by which they may be able to convert themselves to
the goodness of the divinities, in order that Ix ing at first rooted in, they may
again through conversion be established in them, forming a certain circle, which
originates from and terminates in "the Gods.

All things therefore, both abide in, and convert themselves to the Gods, receiv
ing this power from the dhinities, together with two-fold impressions according
to essence ; the one, that they may abide there, but the other that, having
proceeded, they may convert themselves [to their causes]. And these things we.
may survey not only in souls, but also in inanimate natures. For what else
ingenerates in these a sympathy with other powers, but the syml&gt;ols which they
are allotted by nature, some of which are allied to this, but others to that series
of (iods? For nature l&gt;eing sujienially susj&gt;ended from the Gods, and distributed
from their orders, inserts also in bodies impressions of their alliance; to the
divinities. In some indeed, inserting solar, but in others lunar impression*, ami in
others again, the symbol of some other (iod. And these indeed, convert them
selves to the Gods ; some, as to the Gods simply, but others as to particular
Gods; nature thus perfecting her progeny according to different peculiarities of

For wnp COTI here, read ra^ari.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. Z

178

1MIOCLUS ON THE [BOOK iv.

the divinities. The Dominions of the universe therefore, by a much greater
priority, impressed these symbols in souls, by which they might Iw able to abide
in themselves, and again convert themsehes to the sources of their being. And
through the symbol of unity indeed he conferred on them stability ; but through
intellect, he imparted to them the power of conversion.

15ut to this conversion praver is of the greatest utility. For it attracts to itself
the beneficence of the (Jods, throut;h those incllable symbols which the father of
souls has dominated in them. It likewise unites those who pray with those to
whom prayer is addressed ; conjoins the intellect of the (Jods with the words of
those who pray ; excites the will of those who jM-rfectly comprehend good to the.
abundant communication of it; is the fabricator of divine persuasion ; and esta
blishes in the (Jods all that we possess.

To a perfect and true prayer however, there is required in the first place, a
knowledge of all the divine orders to winch he who prays approaches. For no
one will accede to the (Jods in a proper manner, unless, he has ;i knowledge of
their peculiarities. Hence also the oracle admonishes, that a Jire-lieitted Conception
Jiasthe first order in sacred u orship. ]5ul in the second place, there is re&lt;piired a
conformation of our life with that which is divine; and this accompanied with all
purity, chastity, discipline, and order, through which our concerns being intro
duced to the (Jods, we shall attract their beneficence, and our souls will become,
subject to them, f In the third place, contact is necessary, according to which we
touch the divine essence with the .summit of our soul, and verge to a union with
it. ) lint there is vet farther required, an approximating adhesion: lor thus the
&lt;racle calls it, when it says, the mortal ti] pn&gt;.ti&gt;nati)i to fire u /////t/XHW n li ht J ru in
I lie Gads. For this- imparts to usa greater communion w ith, and a more mani
fest participation of the light of the (Jods. In the last place, union .succeeds
establishing ttir. one of the soul in the UHC of the (Jods, and causing our energy to
iMTome one with divine energv ; according to which we are no longer ourselves,
but are absorbed as it were IH the (Jods, abiding in divine light, and circularly
comprehended by it. And this is the best end of tine prayer, in order that the
conversion of the soul may beYonjoined with its permanency, and that every thing
which pro eeds from the one of the (Jods, may again be established in the via; and
the litrht which is in us may be comprehended in tin- light ot the (Jods.

Praver therefore, j^ no small part of the whole ascent of souls. i\or is he who
possesses virtue .superior to the want of the good which proceeds from prayer ;
but on the contrary the ascent of the soul is clUcled through it, and together with
this, piety to the Clods, which is the summit of virtue. \ur in short, ought any

*OOK i..] TiM.lil S or IM.ATO. 17f)

other to \n~a\j than he \chn is trartscendcnlly "dod, r/v the Athenian guest [hi Plain]
sniis. For (n gue/t aonc, ccmccrsc with the (iods becomes nioft efficacious to the attain
ment of a linjip f life, Hut the contrary is naturally adapti d to befal the vicious.
For it is not lawful for the pure to he touched l&gt;y the impure. Hence, it is neces
sary that lie who generously enters on the exercise of prayer, should render the
Gods propitious to him, and should excite in himself conceptions full of intellec
tual linht. I ; or the favor and benignity of more exalted beings, is the most effec
tual incentive to their communication with our natures. And it is requisite to
continue without intermission in the worship of divinity. For [according to the
oracle] the rapid (iods perfect the mortal constantly employed in prayer. It
is also necessary to observe a stable order in the performance of divine works;
to exert those virtues which purify and elevate the soul from generation, together,
with faith, truth, and love ; to preserve this triad and hope of good, this immutable
reception of divine light, and segregation from every other pursuit, that thus be
coming fl/ow, we may associate with folilan/ deity, and not * endeavour to conjoin
ourselves with multitude lotficonc. I or he who attempts this, edicts the very
contrary, and separates himself from the Gods. For as it is not lawful in con
junction with non-entity to associate with being ; so neither is it possible with multi
tude to be conjoined with thconc. Such therefore are the particulars which ought
first to be known concerning prayer ; viz. that the essence of it congregates and
binds souls to the Gods, or rather, that it unites all secondary to primary natures.
For as the great Theodorus sa)s, all things pray except the first.

The perfection however of prayer, beginning from more common goods, ends
in divine union, and gradually accustoms the soul to divine liijit. Hut its effica
cious energy both replenishes us with irood, and causes our concerns to IK* com
mon with those of the (iods. \\ ilii respect to the causes of praver too, we may
infer, that so far as they are effective, they are the efficacious powers of the Gods
converting and calling upwards the soul to the (iods themselves. But that so far
as they are Jinnl or perfective, they are the immaculate u;oods of the soul, which
they derive as the fruits of being established in the (iods. That so far also as
they am paradigmatica/, they are the primordial causes of beings, which proceed
from t/icgnod, and are united to it, according to one ineffable union. lut that so
far as they are formal, they assimilate souls to the Gods, and give perfection to
the whole of their life. And that so far as they are material, they are the inipres-

i. c. The intrlligiMc (itxU.

1 For KM- IIITH r\tj&lt;hvi lirrr, it i n*r rosary li rcal iai /it/ /irrn :r.\q&lt;A;.

1 For toiAnrrfMtfr in this jiliirr, it it rojtmitc to read kotrorrpwr.

I |M , PKOCU S ON THK | noon n.

toions or Kymholi* inserted l&gt;y the Demiurgus in theescnec* of soul*, in order that
(hey may be excited to a reminiscence of the fouls who produced them, and
whatever else exists.

Moreo\er, we may likewise ill line tin- modes of prayer which HIV va
rious, accord in- to tlie genera and species of the (JoiN. For prayer i* either
.lemiunjir, or cathartic, or \i\itic. And ilu- t /ci/uiin. ic is Mich as that which
is offered for tin- sake of shoner.s and winds. For tin- tlciniur^i are the
CUIIMS of tli; ^.-nrration of thrw. And tin- pra\i-rs of tin- Athenians for
winds procuring srn-nity -of \\rathrr an- addn-sscd to thrs.- (Jods. lint tin-
catlnirlic prayer is that \\liicli ir&gt; oMi-rcd for tin- pnrpoM- ol a\.Hui . r diseases
originating from pestilence, and other contagious distempers ; sueli as M-C
lia^e \Nrilteu in our temples. And the tiV///c prajer is that with uhich \&gt;-
\\orship the (iods, who are the causes of vmlication, on account of the
origin and maturity of fruits. Hence prayers are of a peil ccthe nature,
because they ele\ate us to these orders of the (iods. And he \\ ho considers
Mich prayers in a dihYrent manner, fails in properly apprehending the nature
and etlicacy of prayer. lint a-ain, with reference to the things for which we
pray; tho-e prayers, which re-ard the sal\ati&gt;n of the soul, obtain tin; first
place; tlm-e which pertain to the pood temperament of the body, the second;
and tho&gt;e rank in the third place, which are oll ered lor the sake of ex
ternal CMiicerns. And lastly, with n&gt;|H ct to the dinsion of the times in
which we &lt;.ller up prayers, it is either accord in-/ to the seasons of the year,
or the centers of the solar revolution; or we establish multiform prayers ac-
conlinir to other snch-like conceptions.

TIM. " But, O Socrates, all such as participate but in the least
decree of temperance, [i. e. wisdom] in the impulse to every un
dertaking, whether small or ,reat, always invoke divinity."

Do yon see what kind .-fan hypothesis Plato refers to the Tinncus ; what kind of
mi auditor of it he introduces \i/. Socrates ; and what a beginning of the discus
sion lie has d.scrihed ? For the hj potht -is in&lt;leed, re fers to the whole fabrication of
things ; but the auditor is prepared to be led to it conformably to the one intellect
"and one-theory of wholes. Hence also he excites Tima-us to prayer. Hut the be^in-
ninirofthediscnssioii, beim: impelled from the invocation of the &lt;jods, thus imitates
tin proj:re:s&gt;ioiu&gt;fbemjis, w hich tir&gt;( abiding in the ( Jods, arethns allotted a generation
from them. Since howe\er, it is said, that " allnlto in (lie Icdst degree participate of

HOOK ii.] TIM.WJS OF PLATO.

181

temperance afa ays inrnkc divinity in the. impulse to cccrt/ undertaking, irhclher
il l&gt;c small or ^rcat," let us set 1 from what kind of conception they make this
invocation of the Gods in every tiling in which they engage. I or it is not pro
bable that those who are temperate will not make real In-ing the scope to
which they tend. And those who establish a pure intellect as the leader of their
theory; who deposit, the l&gt;eautiful and the good in the prerogatives of the soul,
and not in human afi .iirs, noi in external fortunes; and who perceive the power
of providence extending through all beings, and harmonizing all things to
the universe, so that both th&lt; whole and the parts may subsist most l&gt;eaulifullv,
and that nothing may lie destitute of the providence which proceeds from
deity to all things ; these will genuinely apprehend the science concerning the
Gods. But again, perceiving this to l&gt;e the case, they will vtrv properly in each
action, and according to each energy, call on divinity as the co-ad jutor of their im
pulse, introducing their productions to the universe in conjunction with wholes,
and establishing themselves in the goodness of the Gods. For things which appear
to he small, enjoy the providence of (he Gods, and are great so far as the}- are sus
pended from them ; just again, as things which are great in their own nature, when
they separate themselves from di\ inity, are seen to l&gt;e perfectly small, and of no worth.
These things therefore, temperance imparts to souls, not being a certain human
habit, nor approaching to what is called continence, but a divinely inspired
energy of the soul, converting herself to herself and to divinity, perceiving the
causes of all tilings in the Gods, and from thence surveying both other things,
and sue!) as proceed into a visible subsistence], through which as auxiliaries, *
we also may be able to recur to the Gods, by means of the gifts which they insert
in us. Tli" MMI! also, when thus converted to herself, finds symbols of the
Gods in each even of the smallest things, and through these renders every
thing familiar and allied to the Gods. Since however, the Gods produced the
whole of our essence and gave us a self-motive nature in order to the choice
of good, their producing power is particularly manifested in our external ener
gies ; though when we consult, vre require their providential attention ; (which
the Athenians manifest by honoring Jupiter the Counsellor) nnd when we
choose, we are in want of their assistance; in order that by consulting, we niny
discover what is advantageous; and that in choosing, we may not through
passion verge, to that which is worse; but rather, that both when acting, and when

I or iVKi-iofTi here, rcnl KI( -own.

1 For u -.n,.^fii MI llni place, il u npcr^an to read ui

182

PKOCLL S ON THE [BOOK u.

impelled, we may j&gt;erceive that the self-motive nature possesses the smallest
power, and tliat the whole of it is suspended from the providence of the (io ds.
Hence Tiuurus also says, that tliose who are temperate always invoke the (iods,
in the i////w/ff to every undertaking. For in our elections indeed, we are more
able to separate providence from that \\liirh i- ill om power; but we are inca
pable of ihmK lliM ill our impulse** because in theM- we have less of the self-
motivc cn ruy. For that which is in our po\\er is not NO extended IIH the pro-
vi&lt;h nee of the (iods ; !nl as we lia\e fre|iieiiily said, superior energize prior to
secondary natures, itnd together \\illi and po&gt;l i ir to lliem, and on all sides
comprehend the energies of subordinate beings. But, sav* the Epicurean Eur-
iraachus, how can we avoid proceeding to inlinity, l if in the impulse to every
small thin-, we require prayer: for though we should pray, we shall he in
want of another prayer, and we. ?hall no where, stop ? And I orphyry ili-sol\es
the donlit a- follows: that it is not &gt;aid it i-^ necessary to pray on account of
every thin-, lint in the impulse to every tiling. We are impelled therefore to
things, lint we are not impelled to impulses, so that there is not a progression to
inlinity. Or does not the doiiht still remain f For \\e are impelletl to prayer, so
that in this \ve shall a^ain reijuire pra\er, and an impulse to this anaiu to inlinity.
Hence it is Letter to say, that he \vho prays respectiii , any tiling, prior to this f
acknowledges to the (Jods, that he is allotted a power from them of conversion
to them, and that to other things indeed ^ood is imparted through prayer, hut to
prayer tlirou^h itself. It does not therefore require another prayer, since it com
prehends ood in itself, and procures communion with a divine nature.

" It is necessary tlim-lore, that wo sliouhl do this, who are about to
speak in a certain respect conceinin^ the universe, whether it was gene
rated, or is without generation, unless we are perfectly unwise."

Timsvus evinces, how very admirable the hypothesis is, but elegantly preserves
himself in the order of a prudent man, pursuing the medium between irony and
arrogance. For h:\vi n4 before said, that those who in the smallest decree partici
pate of temperance, invoke divinity in the impulse to every yreat or small under-

1 Instead of ?iaipiv&lt;u yap art fiiv TUV aifictriur, rt\v *fju&gt;u&lt;iic oiro rov r^ i)fitv alwnrovfttv, fjr ^f TUV
op/jut&gt;, fin).\ov IvnifitOa ill tlii* place, it is wcfs&gt;;iry ID trail, tm^ifat -/up ciri /jf ruv &lt;ifiaiuf, njv
poo arv rot/ tifi iiptv /la.VXor ?i/ &lt;i/&lt;fO(i, tri ft Tuif vpfiur, a^w aroi /if v.

1 For avitpvv here, read *f ipor.

HOOK ii.] TIM/KUS OF PLATO. 183

taking, lie very much exalts his proposed subject of discussion, ly opposing a
discourse. about (lie itnircrsc to a small thing. But he cautiously says, not that
lie has himself arrived at the summit of temperance [i. e. of wisdom]; for this is
(lie contrary, to the participation of temperance in the smallest dearer; Imt that
he is iv. ( perfectly unwise. And this he says from the hypothesis, in order that
he may ha\e to show, (hat the po\\er and science which he possesses, are from
the work itself, hut not from his own discussions. His theory therefore, will be
concerning the universe, so far as it is produced by the (iods. For the world
may be multifariously surveyed ; either according to its corporeal-formed nature,
or so far as it is full of partial and total souls; 1 or so far as it participates of
intellect. Tinurns however, considers the nature of the universe, not according
to these modes only, but particularly according to its progression from the Demi-
nrgus ; where also physiology appears to bo a certain theology; because things
which have a natural subsistence, have in a certain respect a divine hyparxis, so
far as they are. generated from the f.ods. And thus this must be determined.

It is usual however to doubt, why Plato here adds / /; a certain respect : for lie
says, u Tliose H hn are a!&gt;ut to speak in a certain rented concerning the universe." And
the more superficial indeed of the interpreters say, that the uni\erse is in a certain
respect nnhegotten, and / // a certain respect generated. Hence the discussion
of it is very properly in a certain respect, as of that which is unbegotten, and
in a certain respect as of that which is generated. Though Plato does not co-
arrange * TO TTY; in a certain respect, w it Ii the w ords unbegotten and generated, but with
the words alxnit to speak. Hut the div ine laniblic.lms says that the discussion is in a
certain respect about the universe, and in a Certain respect not; tor matter, as being
indefinite in the world, may be variously considered. To this interpretation
however, it may be said, that TTT; is co-arranged with something else, and not with
the universe. Will it not therefore, be better to say with our preceptor, that words
are multifariously enunciated. For the demiurgic words proceeding from intellect
are of one kind, such as th^ Demiurgus utters to the junior .Gods : for Plato says,
" that the soul speaks, being moved (o itself." Those words which are surveyed in
science, are of another kind. And those are of another kind which are allotted
the third hypostasis from intellect, and which proceed externally for the sake of
discipline and communication with others. Hence Timacns knowing that those

1 Instead \\tf OTOI- rX.yoft cirri yvyrwr rt xat oXivwr in this jiUcr, ilis nrcfiir&gt; to read, tff *ov

&lt;.u\ rt *ai

For ui rt y o UXnrwi- &lt;v TV nytMt hfrc, it it rfi[uisitc to rrad n rot y o ILXarwr pi tv, *. X.

184 PKOCLUS ON THE [BOOH n.

are demiurgic words which the Demiurgus employs, but tlint those arc scientific
which he is now about to generate, but which he pro-assumes in himself, and that
lie makes use of external words for the sake of Socrates alone, on this account he
says that he shall employ words in a certain respect about the universe. For it is
one thin^ to use them intellectually, another scientifically, and another, for the sake
of discipline; and jnj indicates these dillerence.s of words.

Attain then-fore, with respect to the words, " it fut/ier it was generated, or is uith-
vut generation," those inlerprrters read the former with an aspirate-, tint the latter
with a soft breathing, who saN thai IMato speaks about the unm-rse, so far as it
was generated from a cau&gt;e, or i-&gt; un!&gt;egotieii, in ordi-r that surveying it a ^-lie-
rated, we may perceive the nature which it cont.tins. Ami the IMatonic Albiiiuri
think*., that according to Plato the world bein^ perjM tual, ha* a beginning; of
generation, by which also it is more redundant than l&gt; inu, ; since this indeed
always is, but the world in addition to existing always, ha&gt; a beginning of gene
ration, in order that it may exist alwajs, and be generated. ,\ot that it is
generated after such a manner as to be so according to time ; for in this case it
would not always exist ; but in short, it has the relation of generation, on account
of its composition from things many and dissimilar. And it is necessary to refer
its liyposta&gt;is to another cause more ancient than itself, through which always
existing primarily, the world is in a certain reject, and always is, and is not only
generated, but is also unbegotlen. [This then fore is asserted by Albinusj,
tlioiigh Plato no where in what follows says, that the universe is in a certain
respect generated, and in a certain ropcct unbegotten. Others again, read both
the parts with an aspirate, in order that Tima-us may say, he if about to speak Con
cerning the unicerse so far as it is generated, an J so far as U is nn/ngutten ; erriiii; in
the same way as tho&gt;e prior to them ; unless indeed they as&gt;ert that the uni\erse
was generated according to form, but unbegotten according tt is nur&gt;e [matter].
For thus also Tima-us &gt;ays, that its nurse is nnl&gt;egotten, but that the world was
gem-rated, as receiving form from dhinity. JUit Porphyry and lamblichus read
both the parts &gt;viMi a soft breathing, in order that what is said may be whither the
universe was generated or is unbegut tin. For this is to be considered, prior to all
other things; since it contributes in the highest degree to the consummation of
the whole of physiology, rightly to admit that the world was generated or is un-
Ix-gotlen. For from this hypothesis we shall be able to see what the nature is of

1 Fur aytyr/rov hero, I flild uiNi&gt;&gt; .

BOOK ii.] TIMJEUS Oh PLATO. , 8a

its essence and powers, as will l&gt;o manifest to us shortly after. The discussion
therefore, concerning the universe, will be for the sake of discipline, and will pro
ceed from this principle, whether the world was generated, or is without genera
tion ; and from this, other things must be woven together in a consequent order.

" It is necessary, therefore, that invoking all the Gods and Goddesses,
we should pray that what we assert may especially be agreeable to their
divinities, and that in the ensuing discourse we may be consistent with

ourselves."

The division of male and female comprehends in itself all the plenitudes of the
divine orders. For the cause of stable power and sameness, the supplier of l&gt;eing.
and that which :s the first principle of conversion to all things, are comprehended
in the male. But that which emits from itself all-various progressions and sepa
rations, measures of life and prolific powers, is contained in the female. Hence,
Tim;rus, elevating himself to all the Gods, very properly comprehends the whole
orders of them, in a division into these genera. Such a division, likewise, is most
adapted to the proposed theory. For this universe is full of these twofold divine
genera. For heaven has to earth (that we may assume the extremes) the order of
the male to the female; l&gt;ecause the motion of heaven imparts productive princi
ples and powers to every thing [sublunary] ; and earth receding the eflluxions
thence proceeding, is parturient with and generates all-various animals and plants.
Of the Gods also in the heavens, some are distinguished according to the male,
but others according to the female. And of those powers that govern generation
in an unbogotten manner, some are of the former, but others of the latter co-or
dination. In short, the demiurgic choir is abundant in the universe, and there
are many rivers of life, some of which exhibit the form of the male, but others of
the female characteristic. And what occasion is there to say much on this sub
ject ? For from the liberated unities, 1 both masculine, and feminine, various
orders proceed into the universe. Hence, he who is entering on the discussion
of the universe, very properly invokes the Gods and Goddesses, from both which
the universe receives its completion, and hcsivrhes them that what he asserts may
be consistent, and particularly that it may be agreeable to their divinities. For
this is the sublimcst end of theory, to run upward to a divine intellect; and a* all

1 For rawy here, it i nrcr*ary to read &gt;ia&lt; v k.

Tim. Plat. VOL. J. 2 A

, at j 1MIOCLUS ON THE [loon n.

are uuiforinly comprehended in it, to arrange the discussion of things agree
ably to this causal comprehension. But that which is the second end, and is con-
i-ejuent to tins is,- for the whole theory to receive its completion conformably to
human intellect and the light of science. For the whole, the perfect, and the
uniform, pre-exist in a divine intellect; but that which is partial ami falls short
of divine simplicity, subsists about a mortal intellect.

^ hy however, does Tim.i-us say, that it is necessary to pray, and magnifi

cently proclaim that the Cods and Goddesses should be iimiked, yet does not

pray, though an opportunity for so doing presents itself, but immediately converts

hirnst-lf to the proposed discussion? \\creply, it is because some limits have

their end comprehended in the very will itself; hut others, distribute another

energy after the will, and through action accomplish that whu h was the object

of the will. And a life indeed, conformable to philosophy, depends on our will,

and a deficiency in it, is contrary to the will. [Uut the consequences resulting

from a life conversant with external actions, are not dependent on our will;] for

the end of them is not placed in us. We may justly, therefore, rank prayer among

the number of things w hich have all their perfi ction in the w ill. For the wish to

pray, is a desire of conversion to the (Jods. And this desire it.-elf conducts the

desiring soul, and conjoins it to dixinity, which is the first work of prayer.*

Hence it is not proper fust to wish, and afterwards to pray, but he that wishes to

pray, will at the same time have prayer as the. measure- ot his wish, one person

indeed ill a greater, but another in a less de-Tee. Farther still, this also is the

\xork of a true prayer, for those things for which \\e pray to be common to the

Cod*, both according to power* and energies, and for us to eflect them in con

junction with the Cods. "-Thus if some one should pray to the powers that ampu

tate matter, and obliterate the stains arising from generation, but should himself

particularly endeavour to ell ect tln\ through the cathartic virtues; such a one in

conjunction with the Coils, would entirely accomplish a dissolution of his mate

rial bonds. This therefore Tima-us here effects. For those things which he prays

to the (iods to accomplish, he himself completes, disposing the whole discourse

accordin" to human intellect, but so as to be in conformity to the intellect of the

( jods.

" And such is mv prayer to the Gods with reference to myself; but as

1 for airo&lt;i. in itm plate, 11111*1 read uror/uf.

1 For Cf\ J )err &gt; " * wbvioiisN ncccMarv ii nail ^xs l

BOOK ii. J TIM.T.US OI : PLATO. I7

to \vhat respects you, it is requisite to pray that you may easily learn,
and that I may be able to exhibit what I scientifically conceive, in the
clearest manner about the proposed subjects of discussion. [According to
my opinion therefore, the following division must first be made.] "

The exhortation of the auditors, is a thirty consequent to the prayers* [of
Tim;rus]. For it is necessary that the replenishing source being suspended from
its proper causes, should previously exeite its recipients, and convert them to
itself, prior to the plenitude which it confers ; in order that becoming more
adapted, they may happily receive the intellectual conceptions which it imparts.
For thus the participation will Income more perfect to them, 4 and the gift will be
rendered more easy to the giver. Moreover, this very circumstance of facility,
is adapted to those that imitate the whole fabrication ; from which abiding and
rejoicing in itself, all things proceed to the effects which it excites. Farther still,
to produce one series, through (lie contact of secondary with prior natures, adum
brates the demiurgic series, which proceeds as far as to the last of things. For
if the auditors receive what is said conformably to the intellect of Tinurus, but
Tim:rns disposes the whole discussion conformably to the intellect of the Gods,
it will happen that the whole conference will in reality In- referred to one intellect,
and one intellectual conception. Besides this also, the self-motive nature of souls
is sufficiently indicated, that l&gt;eing moved by the (ods, ihcy also move them Ivcs,
and produce from themselves sciences. For the words, " what I scicnti/ical y con-
dive," exhibit the energy which is impelled from a life whose power is free.

According to my opinion therefore, these things are first to be considered;
that Tiiirjrus l&gt;cing a Pythagorean, and preserving the form of l*\ thagoric dis
cussions, is immediately exhibited to us as such, 1rom the very be"inniri" .

r J

For Socrates does not enur.ciatively declare his opinions to -others, but having
dialectically purified their conceptions, unfolds truth into light; who also said
to them, that he knew nothing except to make an assertion [or give a reason]
and receive one. But Timacu&lt;, as also addressing his discourse to men, savs
that he shall enunciate his own dogmas, not at all busying himself with foreign opi-

1 The original of the words within the brarkrt* belongs to the text, hut is not to be found in Ihc
commentaries of Froclus, though ai the reader nrty MT, lie comment* on thetewordi.

* For Ci-x" ! litre also, it is i.ecrjsarv lo read n ^mi.

InMrail of vftoi rr; T.\TJOWT- in this place, we mut read wpo rij

* For ro yo/&gt; aiTou, read rnn ; np nvrixi .

188

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

nions, but pursuing one patli of science. Moreover, the word i8oo, i.e. / am
of opinion, is assumed here very aptly, and appropriately to what has been before
suid. For of the whole rational soul, one part is intellect, another is dianoia, and a third
is opinion. And the first of these indeed, is conjoined to the (Jods, the second produces the
sciences, and the third imparts them toothers. This man therefore, knowing these
thin"*, through prayer adapts his own intellect to the intellect of the Goiis. For
this is manifested l&gt;y the words, " that what we assert may especially be agreeable to
their divinities, and that in the ensuing discourse we may be consistent nidi ourselves."
But through exhortations, he excites the dianoetic part of the souls of his auditors.
For the words, what I scientifically conceive, have an indication of this kind. The
doxastic part therefore remains, which receiving a scientific division from dianoia,
delivers the streams of it to others. This however is not ambiguous, nor divided
about sensihles, nor does the formal distinction of it consist in hypolepsis * alone ;
but it is fdled from intellect and dianoia, surveys the demiurgic reason, and
distinguishes the nature of things. These particulars also, are sulliciently assimi
lated to the paradigm of the speaker. For there, a royal intellect precedes,
according lo which the paradigm is united to inU -lligihles ; a dianoia, containing
in itself the plenitudes of forms; and the first and uniform cause of opinion.
Hence, the paradigm contains intJii^iblcsin intellect, but introduces xense to the worlds,
us the Oracle says ; or as Plato, " such ideas thenfure, as intellect perceived to be
inherent in animal itself, so many lie dianoetically taw this universe ou^ltt to possess."

Moieo\er, the distinction between lyings and things generated, is consentaneous
to what has l&gt;een before said. For after the (Joels and Goddesses, and the
ineffable peculiarity which is in them, the separation of thesetwo genera, i. e. of being
and "eneration, takes place. For being is allied to the more excellent order of divine
natures , which is always established in invariable sameness, and is intelligible.
But ircm-rat um is allied to the inferior order, from which, infinite progression, and
all-various mutation, derive their subsistence. What then is this division, and after
what manner \\as it produced 1 Was it made as if it were the section of a certain
whole into parts, or as genus is divided into species, or as the division of one
word into many significations, or as that of essence into accidents, or vice versa,

1 This &lt;-rd is n&lt;.t to be found in an\ edition of llie Timseua of I lato; but from thii comment ot
t rotlu&gt;, it appears that it originally belonged to it.

\iz. In tin- apprehension of each of I he terms of whkh a s^llo-jiiw ton-,i&gt;(.
j. c. To Jupiter the Dcmiurgus of the woiM.

BOOK ii.] T1M/EUS OF PLATO. j89

that of accident into essences; for those are the species of division which some
persons are accustomed to applaud. It is ridiculous therefore, to divide being
and generation, either as accident into essences, or as essence into accidents.
For accident by no means pertains to j)erpetual being. Nor again must they l&gt;e
divided as a word into its significations. For what word is there which Plato
assuming as common, divides into perpetual being, and that which is generated ;
unless some one should say that TJ, i. e. a certain thing, is thus divided by him ? This
division however, is not Platonic, but is derived from the Stoic custom. Is the
division therefore, as that of a whole into parts? But what is that whole which
consists of perpetual being, and that which is generated? Or how can paradigm
and image give completion to one composition ? How likewise can perpetual
l&gt;eing be a part of a certain thing, since it is impartible, united, and simple ? For
the impartible is not a part of any thing which does not consist of all impartible*.
But that which is generated is not impartible. Hence there is not a common
genus of perpetual l&gt;emg, and that which is generated. For perpetual being
precedes according to cause that which is generated ; and the former is when the
latter is not. But perpetual being not existing, which it is not lawful to suppose,
generation also would vanish. How likewise, is there one genus of the first, and
the last of things ? For the division of genera into species, takes place in the
middle psychical reasons [i. e. productive powers]. But tilings prior to soul, subsist
in more excellent genera; and things posterior to soul, have their essence in
co-ordinate natures. How therefore, can being itself and that which is generated,
be arranged under one genus ? \Vhat also will this genus be ? For it is not being,
lest that which is generated, and which never [truly] is, should be arranged in
being. Nor will being itself be the one. Because, every genus is divided by its
proper differences, and antecedently assumes the differences, either in capacity, or
in energy. But it is not lawful that the one should have differences either in capa
city, lest it should l&gt;e more imperfect than secondary natures ; or in energy,
lest it should have multitude, But as it i* in short demonstrated to be suj&gt;erior
both to power and energy, it cannot in any way whatever ha\e differences; o
that neither will there in short, be a division of the one.

What then shall we say ? Must it not IM- this, that Plato does not now make
any division whatever, but that he proposes to define separately what each of
these two, perpetual being, and that which is generated, is ? For it appears to me
that the word aioti^irfoy has the same signification with &lt;5iax/s*r,rio. For since he
discourses about the world, the Demiurgus, and the paradigm of the world, he

1JXI

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOKII.

wishes separately to define j&gt;erpetual heing, ami separately that whidi is generated,
in order that through the given definitions we may know where the world, where
the Demiurgu.s, and where the paradigm are to he arranged ; and that we may
not confound the orders of things, hut ma&gt; separate them from each other, so far
as they are severally adapted to l&gt;e separated. lie likewise dors the very same
thin" in the 1 hilehns. For imiuiring concerning intellect, pleasure and the mixed
life, which is the hest of these, he assumes the genera of them, \ \l. hound, infinity,
and that which is mingled from hound and the infinite. For thus the order of
each will Income apparent, and he will manifest the peculiarity of them from their
genera. There however, hound and infinity heginnint; from the (lods, proceed
through all beings of whatever kind they may l&gt;e. For these also were in intelli-iliVs
according to the stahle and generative cause of intelligihles. They were likewise
in the intellectual order according to the paternal and material principle of the
intellectual (ods. And they were in the supermundane order, according to the
d"miurjiic monad and \ivifu: dnad, and in the last place, according to effective
and prolific powers. Here however, heing and that which is generated, do not
hegin from the (Jodr* ; for the unities, of (lie (iods are Miperior to heinir, and prior
to these the one itself is e\em|)t from all beings, hecanse the first (iod is one, 1 hut
the other (iod.s are unities. -\or are heing and that which is generated things
which are participated hy the (lods, in the same manner as the unities which are
posterior to the Ciods, are said to he and are participated hy heinir. IN or do they
extend as far as to the last of things. For n itlu r i&gt; it possil.le to say that matter
is perpetual heing, since we are n&lt; enstomcd to call it non-heing ; nor that which
is generated, which is not ahle even to sulli-r heing, lest perishing hy so doing, it
should entirely vanish. This therefore, will again he asserted hy us. It ishow-
e\er, [evident] that the division is not of one certain thing, and that the proposed
theory has necessarily, prior to other things the definition of these two-fold genera,
in order that the discussion proceeding as if from geometrical hypotheses to the
investigation of things ronse&lt;| ient, may discover the nature- of the universe, and
"the paternal and paradigmatic cause of it. For if the universe was generated, it
was geneiated hy a cause. There is therefore a demiurgic cause of the universe.
If there i&gt; a Demiurgus, there is also a paradigm of the world, with reference to
which he who constituted the universe fahricated. And thus in a consequent

For o liprr, ilia ol\iouily noce&gt;ar&gt; to read fr.
1 &lt;p.&lt;nrjri ii iiinittc-il in llic original.

BOOK ii.] TIM/EDS OF PLATO.

IP!

order tlie discussion about these things is introduced, and the physical theory
beautifully terminates for us in theology.

What that is which is always being, but is without generation, and
what that is which is generated indeed, [or consists in becoming to be]
but is never [real] being."

According to some, all l&gt;eiugs whatever, whether they subsist paradigmatically
or iconically, are comprehended in this distinction ; hut not all beings according
to others. And the interpreters contradict each other respecting this, not a little.
\Ve however, cannot know which of these assertions it is fit to adopt, unless we
examine each of them by itself. Let us then consider from the l&gt;eginning, what
power each of the words [of Plato] possesses in itself.

In the first place, therefore, TO TI, or the what is definitive. For we are accus
tomed to rive TI an antecedent arrangement in definitions. But it is not a genus,
as the Platonic Seterus thought it was, who says that TO n is the genus of bein"
and that which is generated ; and that the alt is signified by it. I - or thus that
which is generated, and likewise perpetual being, will be all. It was also doubted
by some that preceded us, why Plato did not demonstrate that there is such a
thing as perpetual being, prior to the inquiry what it is. For whence is the
subsistence of perpetual bein^ evident ? And it is the law in demonstrative dis
cussions, to consider// a thing is previous to the investigation, what it is. In
answer to this doubt it may be said, that perhaps Tima-us did not think this was
requisite to his purpose; as the day before, it was shown by .Socrates in what he
said about the soul, that the soul is unlicgotten and incorruptible, and that it
philosophises through its alliance to real beings, with which it comes into contact.
And likewise, as it was shown by him, that what is perfectly being, and truly
the object of science, is one tiling; that what is partly being, and partly non-
being, is another, and on this account is of a doxastic nature; and that what in
no respect is l&gt;eing, and is entirely unknown, is another. This was also granted
to Tima-us by Socrates, when he divides a line into four parts, the intelligible, the
dianoetie, the sensible, and the conjectural; where likewise speaking about the
rood he says, that it reigns in the intelligible place, in the same manner as the sun
in the visible region. 1 And farther still, the introduction of prayer previous to the
discussion, is a demonstration of the existence of being which always in. For if

Sre the litter rnd of i he &gt;ili book of 1 1n H public, w In rf all this is

1&2 PROCLUS ON TIIK . [BOOK n.

there are Gods.it is necessary that there should be truly existing being : for this
is united to the Gods ; but not that which is generated and which perishes, but
is never truly being. Or rather prior to these tilings it may be haid, that the exis
tence of something which always is, is deposited in our common conceptions.
For whence was that which is generated produced except from perpetual being?
For if this also was generated, it must have been generated from some other being.
And this must either be perpetual being, or must likewise have been itself generat
ed. So that we must either proceed to infinity, or generation is in a circle, or
perpetual being has a subsistence. But it is not lawful to proceed to infinity.
For from one principle which is the one, all things originate. Nor is generation in
a circle, lest the same things should be both better and worse, causes and effects.
Hence it remains that [true] being always is. Why then, it may be said, is not
generation from the one S Because, we reply, it is absurd that multitude should
be entirely produced without being. It is nece&gt;sary therefore, that there should
be truly existing being, which primarily proceeds from the one, in order that the
first principle may not be alone the cause of the last of things, but prior to these
may be the cause of being, from which also generation proceeds. After all that has
been said, however, the most true solution of the doubt is, that Plato now assuming
as au hypothesis that there is perpetual being, defines it. But after the discussion
about the fabrication of the world, resuming this very thing, he demonstrates that
peq&gt;etual being has a subsistence. Preserving however, what pertains to phy
siology, he proceeds from this hypothesis, and demonstrates such things as arc-
consequent to it. For science itself also is from hypothesis, and requires that hy
potheses should l&gt;e assumed prior to its demonstrations. In what he says there
fore about matter, he demonstrates not only that matter is, but also that being is.
But a little after, from one of the hypotheses, i. e. from the third, demonstrating that
there is a Demiurgus of the world, he obtains also from this that perpetual being
subsists prior to that which is generated. And again from the fourth hypothesis
he evinces, that the Demiurgus fabricated the unuerso, looking to an eternal
paradigm. But in the place we have mentioned, he demonstrates that perpetual
Ix-ing is itself by itself prior to generated natures. And thus much for this par
ticular.

With resjMTt however, to jwrpetual being itself, whether does it signify the
whole intelligible world, or the J)emiurgus, or the paradigm of the universe? for it
is differently assumed by different interpreters. And if indeed, it is the whole
intelligible world, whence does the intelligible breadth begin, and where does it

nuuic ii.] TIM/EUS 01- PLATO. jf3

proceed ? But if it is tlio paradigm, how comes it to pass that the Deminrjns i-
not jxirpetnal being, if the paradigm is one tiling, and the Dominions another?
And if it is the Demiurgus, whence is it that the paradigm is not a thing of this
kind ? That the paradigmatic cause, therefore, is tal&gt;c arranged in perpetual Ix.-in^,
i.s clearly evident from Plato when he says, " According to which of (lit paradigms did
the artificer fabricate the world? /( as it according to that which subsist* -jitk
invariable sameness, or according to that which was generated?" And he immediately
decides hy saying, " If the world indeed is beautiful, and the Demiurgus it good, it
is evident that he looked to an eternal paradigm. Hut if the. world is not beautiful,
and tlic Demiurgus is not good, which it is not lawful to assert, then he looked to a
generated paradigm." Jf therefore it is not lawful to assert this, the paradigm of
the universe is perpetual being. But that this is also true of the Demiurgus, is evi
dent from this ; that Plato calls the soul, which the Demiurgns constitutes, the
first of generated natures, and delivers the generation of it. The Demiiir^ns, how
ever, is prior to soul, so that he belongs to eternal beings. Hence also Plato says
concerning him, " After this manner therefore was there truly an eternal reasoning
of the God" And how is it possible that being a divine intellect he should not
rank among eternal beings ? Is therefore every intelligible world perpetual ln-in^ ?
The di&gt;ine lamhlichns, however, strenuously contends on this subject, evincing
that eternal being is superior both to the genera and the species ofbein^; and
establishes it at the summit of the intelligible essence, as that which primarily parti
cipates of ///f inic. But what is written in the Parmenides concerning the one
Iwin^ [or being characterized by the one], and also in the .Sophista, bears testimony
to these things. I - or then 1 Plato arranges the one beintj j)riorto whole, and prior
to the inli lligihlc all ; though the whole and the all are intelligible. Here, however,
IMato clearly calls the paradigm perpetual being, and a whole, and all-perfect.
For he denominates it all-perfect animal ; and a whole, when he says, " of i-hich
other animals art parts according to one, and according to genera." So that if the
paradigm is a whole and all-perfect, but that which is primarily lcing is above
whole and all, the paradigm and that being will not be the same.

NN ill it not, therefore, be better to say, that there is indeed sued an order of
b^ing, ;is that divine man [lamhliehus]] hns delivered, and such as Plato else
where surveys; but that now Plato thus denominates every eternal world?
ISor is this at all wonderful. For, at one lime, the intelligible is asserted ofcrcri/ /&gt;&lt;.;-.
Actual and invisible nature* as when it is said that the soul also i.s intelligible, as b\
Socrates in the Phrrdo. But at another time it in asserted of the natures that
Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 1 1

, 94 1 ROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

are more excellent than every psychical essence, an the division in the Rrpnl&gt;-
lic manifest*. Ami at another time, it is asserted of the first triads of beinjr,
as is evident from what Tima;us a little after says of them. After the same
manner, therefore, beinp in the Sophista, indeed, manifests the order of the one
bein ; Itut here it signifies the whole eternal world. Tor it is evident that U inj;
which i* primarily beiny;, is the summit of the intelligible breadth, ami the
monad of all bein-s. For every where, that which is primarily beiii in its
own series, has the hi-hest order; since if it ranked as the second, it would not
have the same form ; fur it would no longer Iw primarily that which it is. As
therefore, virtue itself possesses the highest place in the series of the v irtues, as
the equal itself in ei|u;ds, and animal itself in animals, thus also being itself
which is primarily bein-, is the summit of all brings, and from it all lein*
proceed. 1 Uut every intelligible anil intellectual hcinu;, and whatever ap-
jK-ars to exist, has the appellation of bein^, yet be in.:, and perpetual heiii
are not the same. For the one be ini; is bcvmid eternity. For eternity par
ticipates of bein-. Hence all such things as participate of eternity, have aNo
a certain portion of bciii, but not all such things as participate of In inir, par
ticipate likewise of eternity. The natures therefore that exist in time, participate
also of bein:;, so that what is primarily bein^ is bev oml the order of eternity,
liul periH tual bemx is eternal. Hence the n-asonin-; demon&gt;trates the very
(ontrary, that every tiling is rather I., be assumed from perpetual beiiip:, than
the one bem^. I ; or this latter is bed. T than l/ic inT, as subsisting l&gt;etvveen //if
&lt; &gt;it- and -ternily, and prior to Hernity b&lt; iti- denominated one bein-.

If, therefore, it be reipiisile that I should sav what appears to me to be the
truth, ritiln //;&lt; / &lt;(/&lt;/ luonsly u.\*mtu:i ti&lt;/j/ //////:, :. //a / is iitrittilli/ bring;
beginning, imUalJiom the mitnre "/ uniimil itvlf. / &lt;/ this is /niii.arily elirnul ;
but entliiisf in purt ml intdltclf. I .nt the one bein-, he peihaps omits, in ron-
M-quence of its existm- as the monad of tluse, and as U-in- inellable, and
ronioined to the one. Hence Plato will now speak in reality of every intelligible,
if that intelligible is not assumed which is o&lt; cult, is the highest, and does nut
depart (n&gt;m*hcwu. H .&gt; N therefor.-, sho.tlv after this, that animal itself is the
mo&gt;t beautiful of intelli-ibU-s, in c(.nse&lt;|uemx- of the natures prior to this, bcin-

In UK- or.-m.il wu ? 1,101. n. ru vr,,v&gt;; o ^wr, rn o, ., l(f ^ / "- " r " ffr " """ r "" "" "" &lt;&lt;ur&lt; "
,,, rru. Alter UT uir.u llu-r.-lorr, llif WOM!&gt; iru^rn ra .ri ihM&gt;t !&gt; " ) I !" 1 -
1 yn i uui.lin^ lirrt in tlir orij,iu.il.
T(ir /joia lien , read ^oa.

HOOK i..] TIMJEUS OF PLATO. H,5

through excess of union, superior to a subsistence as objects of intellect. Unless
lie says that animal itself is the most l&gt;cautiful of all the objects of intellect, both
animal itself and (he one being existing as objects of intellect also, the latter as
\w\tt causally ever, eternity as being so accord ing to fn/par.vis, and animal itself or 1 1 if;
eternal, as existing always, according to participation. Hence, if these things are
admitted, in that which always exists, eternity, animal itself, and the Demiur-
gus will be comprehended, and likewise the one l&gt;eing itself, which possesses the.
occult canst- of eternity. So that it is evident from this, that perpetual being
comprehends every nature prior to souls, whether it be intelligible, or intellec
tual ; be^innin^: indeed from being itself, but ending in a partial intellect, and that
it does not alone comprehend, as lamblichus says it does, the summit of all
brings, such as the beins is which is characterized by (lie one, or the one Iwing,
through which all beings are said to l&gt;e beings, and to which the one itself alone,
and the principles of being [bound and infinity] are superior. The one, therefore,
is better than that which is self-subsistent. For it is necessary that it should l&gt;e
exempt from all multitude. Perpetual being, however, is self-subsistent indeed,
but possesses the power of being so through the one. But that which is posterior
to it, such as is our nature, is self-subsistent, and at the same time derives its
subsistence from another producing cause. And the last of things proceed
indeed into existence from a more excellent cause, but are not self-suhsistent.
It is not however yet time for these observations.

But with respect to perpetual being, it must not be supposed, that it is partly
being, and partly rion-l&gt;eing ; for if it were, it would be a composite, and consist
ing of things of this kind, it would l&gt;e dissimilarly a composite. Nor is it at one
time being, and at another non-being ; for it is said to be always being. But it is
simply and eternally being, and is iintningled with even thing whatever it may
be, that is of a contrary nature. For it appears to me that the addition of the
words, " /;/// not having generation? indicates the unmingled and undeliled purity
of perpetual being, according to which it is exempt from every hypostasis which is
borne along in the images of beunr, and is changed by time. IS ot as some assert,
that perpetual l&gt;eing is said, for the sake of perspicuity, to be. without generation ;
nor according to others, that Plato was willing to sjK-ak of it both affirmatively
and negatively ; but that it is necessary perpetual being should le intellectually
perceived subsisting by itself, remote from al! temporal mutation. For soul

For rapiisi in llii place, it in requisite to read v^turt.

19rt 1 HOCLUS ON THE r.ooic n.

participates offline, anl the heavens are allotted a life which is evolved acced
ing to time; but the intelligible nature alone is, according to the whole of itself,
eternal. Hence, some of the ancients call the intelligible breadth truly existing
being ; the psychical truly enisling and at the same time not truly existing
being; the sensible not truly t. rifting being ; and matter, truly non-being. After
what manner, however, they made this arrangement, we shall elsewhere iines-
tiirate. But that the addition of " nut haring generation, is for the sake of indi
cating the separate essence of |K?rj&gt;ehial Ix-inij, is I think evident from what
has l&gt;een said.

In the next place, with respect to that which /.v generated, whether does it sig
nify the whole world, or a material and jwrfectly nuitahle composition? For
some of the ancients explain this in one way, and other* in another. Hut we un
derstand by it every corporeal fanned nature, and not the soul of the universe; so
far as this nature is of ilself indeed unadorned, but is always or at a certain
time, arranged by another. For the soul of the universe is, in a certain respect,
)MT|H iual beinir. -Much less is intellect tlmt -fhieh is generated : for tins is im
mediately perpetual Ix-inic- Hut body alone is that which is generated, and is
truly never real bein-j;. J or body is always in want of the world-producing
cause, and is always deriving from it the representation of existence. Why
then it may be said, did not IMato add, always, and tltal which is generated,
in the same manner as ln imf, or tit a icrtain time, in order that he might
have what is generated entirely opposed to jitrjietnal being? May we not say
that Plato devised this mode of expression, looking to the various nature of
that which is generated, and taking away from eternal being the existence
at a certain time, and the perpetuity of a generated nature? For the if/idles of auch a
nature are generated akeaiis, bin the parts at &lt;i c&lt; flam tiuic. And after another man
ner [of considering the allair] with re&lt;pect to forms, some are inseparable from
matter, and are alw ays generated from (hat \v ln&lt; h is (nil v alw ay s ; but others are in
time, and depart from matter. J- orcvr/torit /;/, indent, is n!.i fti/s generated fti/d is alua^x
aiuitt matter ; but tin form o/ /ire, or of &lt;nr, enters iutouiid ;!ef&gt;nrfs from matter, bieoin-
iiiififjKirntcdfroin it a&gt;nl jnrnhiiig, through the domination of a contrary nature. Hut
it the Merprluitv which detains matter is alwavs eenerali d, it never therefore /.v ;

and if the existence at a certain time is gmcfiited, it is never being. livery thing

Aflrr r.iffc&lt; po c-f t.i(\(.iioif ru ui;n.r irXaroi, illilf.ul of &lt;i (itiui I t &lt;\ r&gt;, ,;i ykt/i, it ii iHi f*-
&gt;sr\ lon.nl &lt;rwi tin o/.a i/v&gt;. ntrwt or.

nnox ii.] TIM/EUS 01- PLATO. 1 97

however, which is generated, is either ahcnt/s generated, or at a cerlain time..
Hence, every thing which is generated, is never [real] l&gt;eing.

These things, therefore, having l&gt;oeii said, let us, recurring; to tlie discussion from
the beginning, show whether perpetual being in this place is asserted of all beings,
or not of all. For if, indeed, we admit that j&gt;erpctual being indicates an eternal
nature alone, having the eternal according to the whole of itself, it is not asserted
of all beings. For neither the In-ing prior to eternity, nor the order of eternity,
nor again, such things as have indeed an eternal essence, but produce energies
according to time, can be arranged under this being. JJut if we assume every
thing whatever that is eternal, and which always is, either according to the whole
of itself, or partially, then soul also ranks among eternal natures, and also that
which contains in itself the causes of all things, unically, as it is said, and univer-
Hfilly. For the case is as follows : one thing fi. e. being itselfj is sujHT-etermd ;
[another thing is eternity; 1 ] another is simply eternal, and another is in a certain
respect eternal. With respect, however, to each of these perpetual l&gt;eings, the
first is as the power and fountain of the crcr ; the second, as that vthich is prima
rily always being, and the crcr itself, and not according to participation ; but the
third is always, as participating of the ere r, and as primarily wholly eternal; and
the fourth, is as that which in a certain respect participates of a peculiarity of this
kind. For each thing subsists triply, either according to cause, or according to
hyparxis, or according to participation. And the one being, indeed, is being alone
according to hyparxis, but is perpetual being according to cause. Kternity is per
petual I dng according to hyparxis, but being according to partieipalion. And
the eternal is perpetual being according to participation, but according to h\-
parvis is a certain other intelligible, or intelligible and intellectual, or intellectual
[only]. And if the last of these, it is either total or partial ; and if this, it is either
supermundane or mundane, ; and if this, it is either divine, or if* posterior to (he
(Jods and is each of these either according to existence alone, or according to
power and energy, and as far as to the jM rpetual being of thinirs which are in a
certain respect eternal.

Again therefore, with respect to that which is generated, if we as.-ume the uni
versal, we must assume generation ail-variously changed ; but if every thing gene
rated, in whatever way it may be, we shall find that the heavens also are gene
rated, so far as they partake of motion and mutation, ami that soul is the first of
generated natures, so far as it lives in time, and time is connascent with its ener-

Tlic words TO ^ ciiwr, are wauling in \ht original, bul nititl necvssaiiU tic 5&lt;i[&gt;j&gt;lic&lt;l.

jp 8 HROCLUS ON THE [BOOK u.

gies. And thus ascending from l&gt;eneath, we shall end in soul as the first of things
that are generated ; and descending from above, we shall again terminate our pro-
gression in soul, as the last of eternal natures. For though a certain person 1
rightly says that the heavens always exist, yet their being is always generated by
something else ; but soul possesses its own essence from itself. Hence also,
Socrates in the Pluedrus says, that it is unbegotten, and at the same time self-
moved, as being indeed the principle of all generation, but generating and vivify-
in" itself. If therefore we say, that it is both unbegotten and generated, eternal
and not eternal, we shall speak rightly. Hence too the Athenian guest 1 thinks
fit to call the soul indestructible, but not eternal, because it is in a certain respect
oniy eternal, and not according to the whole of itself, in the same manner as
truly existing luring. For it is one thing to be always, and another to be generated
always. And the heavens, indeed, are generated always ; for th_ y do not possess
being from themselves. But soul in always ; for it possesses being from itself. And
every thing prior to soul is not generated from a cause, but is from a cause. For
generation is alone in things which derive their subsistence from others. Through
these things therefore it will be manifest after what manner there is a comprehen
sion of all beings in the before-mentioned portions of division, and after what
manner all beings are not comprehended in them. There is not a comprehension
of all beings, because that which is eternal only, and that which is generated
only, are assumed ; one of which is prior to, but the other is posterior to soul.
And there is a comprehension of all beings, !M&lt; ause the extremes being assumed,
it is possible from these to find the middle, which is at one and the same time
both being and that which is generated.

That these distinctions, however, of that which always is, and of that which is
generated,. arc necessarily made prior to all other axioms, it is easy to learn; by
observing that this is the first of the problems which it is requisite to consider
about the universe in the beginning, i. e. nhttlier it always wa* t having no beginning
of generation, or u-iicther it was generated. For if this is the first of the tilings to
be investigated, then what that is which is generated, and what that is which is
eternal, have very properly the first order in the axioms. For the other axioms
follow these, just as the remaining problems follow the problem respecting the
generation of the world. And if it be requisite that resuming the discussion about
the hypotheses, I should more fully explain what appear*, to me on the biibjtct.

i. e. Aruiollf.

3 III Ihr 10th hook of the Laws.

UOOK .,.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. U,p

Pinto in tlu* same manner as geometricians, employs definitions and hypotheses
prior to demonstrations, through which he frames his demonstrations, and ante
cedently assumes the principles of the whole of physiology. For as the principles
of music an- different from the principles of medicine, and in a similar manner
there are different principles of arithmetic and mechanics; thus also there are
certain principles of the whole of physiology, which Plato now delivers to us ;
[and these are as follow :] Truly existing being in that which may be. comprehended
by intelligence in conjunction with reason. That which ii generated is to be apprehended
by opinion in conjunction w ith irrational sense. Every thing generated, is generated
by a cause. That which docs not derive its subsistence from a cause, is not generated.
That of which the paradigm it eternal being, is necessarily beautiful. That, of which
the paradigm is generated, is not beautiful. Let the universe be called heaven or the
world. For from these principles he produces all that follows. And it appears \
to me, that on this account he shows what perpetual being is, and also u-hat that
is which is {rein-rated, hut does not show us that each of them is. For the geo- ,
metrician informs us what a point is, and what a line is, prior to his demonstra
tions, hut he by no means teaches us that each of these is. For how can lie he a
geometrician, if he discusses his own principles ? After the same manner also,
the physiologist says what perpetual being is, for the sake of the demonstrations
he is ahout to u&gt;ake, hut he hy no means shows that it is ; for in so doing, he
would go beyond physiology. But since, as we have before observed, Timanis
does not resemble other physiologists, being a Pythagorean physiologist, and
Plato exhibits in this dialogue the highest science, hence he afterwards very
divinely proves that truly existing being is. For his present purpose, however,
it is sufficient for him to admit that it is, preserving the boundaries of physiology,
lie appears also to investigate the definition of perpetual being and of that which
is generated, in order that he may discover the causes which give completion to
the universe, vi/. form and matter : lor that which is generated is in want of these.
He assumes, however, the third hypothesis, in order that he may discover the
producing cause; but the fourth, that he may le able to infer that the universe was
generated according to a paradigmatic cause; and the fifth, which i* concerning
the name of the universe, in order that he may investigate the participation of
the good and the ineffable by the world, as will be shown in what follows.

It appears also to me, that Aristotle in his Physics, imitating Plato, assumes one

For *&lt; (v\i-//m amor htrr, read Tyxi? ciy/iancor airier.

200 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

hypothesis, when he says, it it supposed by us rcith respect to t/tingt tc/tich hart a
natural subsistence, that either all or some of them are moved. For it is entirely
necessary that there should he motion, if the discussion of the physical theory is
to proceed with success ; since nature is a principle of motion. But in his trea
tise On the Heavens, prior to every tiling else, he assumes tlio.se hypotheses con
cerning which Plotiuiis says, that Aristotle will find no difficulty in his discussion
if his hypotheses ahout the fifth hotly are admitted, meaning these five ; that the
motion is simple of a simple body ; that a simple body has a certain simple motion accord
ing to nature ; that there are trt n simple motions ; that one motion is contrary to
one ; and that the thing which has tint a contrary, ha* not that which can corrupt it.
From which hypotheses, he frames his demonstrations concerning the fifth body.
Aristotle, however, shows that the universe is unbegotU.n, from the hypotheses;
hut Plato that it is iM-nerated. Whether therefore, they are discordant or not,
will shortly after be manifest to us. And this, indeed, Mill again be considered.

Why, however, does Plato, who is accustomed to employ, when speaking of
intelligible*, the terms auro itftlf, and (,-rr-p that it hit h, now assume neither of these,
but rather prefers the term an aia ays, as connasccnt with being. For this also is
attended with a doubt, through what cause he employ s the third of these terms, i. e.
always, as better adapted to signify the nature of truly existing being. In answer
to this it may be said, that the term itself mnni/estji the simplicity of inttttigibles, a
subsistence according to Inipar.iis, and an e.n^ttiue -ahich is primary, which
is asserted conformably to the peculiarity ^ according to which intelligibles are
primarily that zt liic/i they are, and Jill secondary natures uith the participation oj
themselwi. But the term that which it, indicates purity, the unmingled, and
the not iH ing filled with a contrary nature. And the tar manifests the eternal,
the immutable, and the invariable, according to hypostasis. Thus for instance,
when we say the be a itiful itself, and the just itself, we survey Ix-auty which is
not bo by the participation of the beautiful, and justice which is not so by the par
ticipation of the just ; but that which is primarily l&gt;eautiful, and that which is
primarily just. But when we sny thit which is bt -autiful we mean that which is
not mingled with deformity, nor contaminated by its contiury, such as is material
beauty, which is situated in deformity, and is itself replete with its subject nature.
And when we use the term eier or always we indicate beauty which is not at one
time beautiful, and at another not, but which is eternally beautiful. So that the
1 first of these terms manifests the simplicity of intelligible*, and the supplying all
other things from themselves. For such is the beautiful itsc/f, by which

UMOK ii.j T1M.EUS Or rLATO. UOl

all beautiful things are beautiful, and the equal itself, by which all equal things are
equal, and in a similar manner in other things of this kind. But the second of these
terms, indicates onlyness and purity, the unmingled and the undented. For the
that which is (his, i. e. it is something which is not various, and which does not at
tract to itself any thing of a foreign nature. And thcc-ctr manifests immutability,
for the ci cr is this. Yet it does not simply indicate immutability, but a perma
nency in eternity. For a temporal ever in one thing, and an eternal ever, another ;
the latter l&gt;eing every thing collectively and at once ; but the former being co-ex
tended with the whole continuity of time, and being infinite. And the latter
subsisting in the now, but the former, in interval, the interval being unceasing, and
always in generation, or becoming to be. The term therefore itself, is derived to ,
beings from the paradigm. For that is the cause of simplicity to beings, and of /
imparting to other things that which it primarily possesses. But the term that \
which if, is derived from the one being. For that is primarily exempt from non-
being, and privation ; because it is primarily being, and all things subsists in it
occultly and indivisibly. And the term ever, is derived from eternity. For
as the one beiivj is the supplier of existence, so eternity impart* perpetuity to
intelligible*. Hence, if Plato had been speaking about participants and things
participated, and for this purpose had required leing, he would have inquired
\ihat bcin it. if If is. And if he had been discussing things unmingled, and thing-,
that are mingled, he would have used the term that which is. But since lie di&gt;-
courses about generation and the unbegotten, and for this purpose requires thr^e
definitions, he very properly inquires what that is which is alwayx being. For this
distinguishes the eternal from that which is temporal, in the same manner as the
unbegotten distinguishes eternity. Hence also the nature of animal itself, which
is comprehensive of all intelligible animals, is eternal; but time was generated
together with heaven, as Plato says in the course of the dialogue.

Moreover, though perpetual being is said to proceed from a cause, yet it must
not be asserted that it is generated according to all causes, but that it is according to
them. For it is 3&lt; o, that on account nfv/iich, and irpo$ o, that with relation to which,
and uy* ov, that by which. For perpetual being is self-subsistent, and is not gene
rated by itself, lest not existing at a certain time, it should be generated. For
that which is generated, when it is becoming to be is not. Nor is it gene
rated with relation to itself, lest it should be a composite. Nor an ac-

1 Instead of wi ynp Tovcirm TO tv m-, it it ncfsary torraH &lt;vi yap mv umi t. X.
Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 C

202 PKOCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

count of itself, lest it should IH? imperfect. Cut that winch is generated is sus
pended from another thing, and has its progression from other causes ; and such
is every corporeal-formed nature. After what manner however, is that which is
generated never being, concerning which Plato speaks clearly in the Sophista?
Not that it is non-being, but that it is never truly luring. Now, liowe\cr, it is
said to be never (it ant/ (imc being, because being has a prior arrangement in an eter
nal nature ; but that which is generated, is never that t.V//V/&lt; alicnys if. If, therefore,
existence, so far as it is being, is nnrereptive of non-existence, it is evident that
what is generated, since it lias the being \\hich is in it, of whatever kind it may be,
mingled with non-beint;, is never at any time being, so as to be genuinely being;
and being which subsists b\ itself, since this pertains to real existence alone, which
has not in a certain r. -sped non-existence in conjunction with existence, atone
and the same time being and not being.

" The former of these, indeed, is comprehended by intelligence in con-
junction with reason, since it always subsists with invariable sameness.
But the latter is perceived by opinion, in conjunction with irrational sense,
since it is generated and corrupted, and never truly i s."

*** To theseit happens, that they err in many other respects, and that they com
prehend in tin: definitions the things defined. For what perpetual being is, which
the first definition assumes is explained, and is said to be that which always sul&gt;-
sists with invariable sameness; and this (he second definition assumes, saying
it is that which is generated and corrupted, but ne\er truly is. Thi&lt;, however,
is to accuse both themselves and Plato of unskilfuluess in dialectic. Jiut others
dividing the sentence, show that in each of (he colons there- are definition, and
the thing defined. For in the former colon, the words, " that \Jiich is com
prehended by intelligence in Conjunction *t:t/i 7 cY/v-y/,"are a definition ; but the
words, sinct it alirays subsists \ritli invariable sameness, are the thing defined.
And in the second colon, the words " is perceived !&gt;y opinion in conjunction uith
irrational sense" are given as a definition ; but the remaining part of the sentence,
is the thing defined. To these men it will lie found our preceptor las well replied.
For by a little transposition of the words, the whole will be immediately apparent as
follows: Tltc.t u-liic/i ahi-in/s iub A i*ts uttlt it.i-uriablc, sameness, is- comprehended
by intelligence in conjunction - u -ith reason: but that icliich is generated and cor-

1 For c !"y .n re /.f i -.1 irrn , in llii-, |ii;cf, it i , ri . r ii-,itc l&gt; read ci ^ on ro /iij uv larif.
Tin Ltfiniiing ol lhU cuiiiiiitnl.trv, is unfurUiiutfly Hauling.

B OK ii.] I IM/El S OF I l.ATO.

203

rupled,and never truly is, is perceived Inj opinion, in conjunction with irrational
sense. For these things nro consequent to w liat was before said, " what is that which
is ah ays being but is without generation ;" ;in&lt;l "what is that which is generated,
but is never [real] being ;" that which always subsists with invariable sameness,
signifying the same thing as, that which is without generation ; and that which is
generated, hut is never [real], being, having the same signification as, ///&lt;// irA/cA
never truly is. tlioujrli they are more obscurely announced. And through the
addition of /;///// Plato indicates that so far indeed as it is generated, it is not ; but
that so far as it brings with it an image of being, so far it is not generated. For
in the definitions, he renders the things defined more elear through the additions.
Thus, one of the definitions says, " Khich i.t always bein^," in order that by the
term always we may not understand temporal |er|)etuity, but the eternal. For
this i all at once, and subsists with irnariable sameness. Hut temporal per
petuity, is co-extended wilh the infinity of time. Thus, too, the other definition
has. " tl,&lt;il n-hieli is generated," and together with it also says, " and is corrupted,"
ill order that we mr.y not understand by -reiterations simply progressions, which
are also ascribed (o the (Jods who are beyond being, but progressions which are
CO-ordinate \\itli de&gt;truetion. The assigned definitions, therefore, are such as
follow: 1 t-rpetual being, is that which is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction
wilh reason. That which is generated is perceived by opinion in conjunction with,
irrational sense.

For tliese definitions, however, it is usual to accuse Plato, in the first place,
indeed, that he does not assume genus, as the rules of definitions require. In the
next place, that he does not manifest what the nature is of the things defined, but
distinguishes them by our kno\\ledi;e. It is necessary, however, prior to this
habitude. In consider things themsehes by themselves. But [in defence of Plato]
we shall demonstrate the very contrary, vi/. that those who are accustomed thus
to doubt perfectly err. For what kind of i;enus has a place in lein.ir, which
comprehends every intelligible essence ? For if essence has no genus prior to itself,
nor definition, since it is most generic, what can you say respecting being which
is comprehensive of every essence, and of all powers and energies? IS either, there-\
fore, is being the genus of eternal being: for if it was, it would not be simply
being, but a certain being. \or is non-lK&gt;ing the genus of eternal being lest we /
should ignorantly make eternal non-being. For every where genera arc predicated
ofsj&gt;ecies. Hence, there is not a genus of being. Besides, is not a definition
derived from knowledge adapted to theory, anil to the proposed definitions? For if,

204 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK u.

as we said before, Plato wished to use these axioms and hypotheses in the demon
strations which he intended to make, it was necessary that they should !K&gt; known
and manifest to us. If, indeed, he hud exhorted us to investigate the nature of
things, itself in itself, he would have ignorantly filled the whole of hi* doctrine de
finitions with obscurity. But as he wished to make known through definitions
being and that which is generated, he produced the demonstrations through things
that are known, and clearly represents to us the peculiarity of them, in order that
bein-r excited and perfected, we may more manifestly survey what each of them
is. For since every thing "nustic, is either the thing known itself, or pereeiies,
or possesses the thing know ; fur intellect, indeed, is the intelligible, hut sense JH retires
uhat is sensible, and duinoia possesses in itself the duinoetic vb/ect ; and as we are not
naturally adapted to become tin: intelligible, but know it through the power in us
which is conjoined with it ; this being the case, we require this power, and through
this the nature of being is known to us. After this manner, therefore, we answer
the doubts.

It is requisite, however, to observe how Plato pioposing to himself the problems,
renders each of them manifest, both affirmatively and negatively. Hut giving an
answer to each, in perpetual being, indeed, he assumes the allirmative alone, but
in that which is crenerated, the negative, adding to it also, " and ~&lt;chich is destroyed"

He, also, explains the words, " but iJtich is /mr being" through the assumption
of, " never truly is." For since beinjj; is characterized by existence alone, but that
which is generated by non-existence, he -assumes the one, alone defining it, and
says, subsisting invariably the same; but he assumes the other together with
negation, yet not with negation alone, because definitions respect aflirmations,
and signify that which in each thing is inherent. It is not, however, wonderful,
if he not only says " which is gentrtited," but also, " and corruptttl" For as he.
adds to being, the words, " subsisting with invariable sameness" and not only
says, it is akmys ; so likewise to that it Inch is generated he adds, " ami corrupt
ed" For tlii so far as it is generated, is diflerent from perpetual l--ing; but so
far as it is corrupted, it differs from that which is invariably the same. I or that
which is generated, so far as it is generated and corrupted, is incapable ot con
necting itself; since if it were, it would also be able to produce itself. Assuming
therefore each by itself, i. e. being and that which is generated, he assumes the
former as that which is above generation, but the latter, as that which is not
indestructible. So that when the representation of being accedes to that which is
generated, it is able after a certain manner to abide in A condition of always
becoming to be.

UOOK n.J TIMAIUS OF PLATO. 205

Jx&gt;t us however, consider each of tlio words by itself, through which he com
poses the propositions ; and in the first place, let us see in how many -ways intelli
gence subsists, and collect by a reasoning process tlic other progressions of it.
The first intelligence therefore, is the intelligible, which passes into tlie same with
the intelligible, and is not any tiling different from it. This also is essentjal
intelligence, and essence itself, because every thing in the intelligible subsists
after this manner, viz. essentially and intelligibly. The second intelligence is that
whiclAfonjoins intellect with the intelligible, possessing a peculiarity wliich is con
nective and collective of the extremes, and existing as life and power, filling
indeed intellect from the intelligible, but establishing it in the intelligible. The
third is tliG J :ronjoined intelligence in a divine intellect itself, being the energy
of intellect, through which it comprehends the intelligible it contains, and accord
ing to which it intellectually perceives, and is what it is. For this intelligence is
energy, and intelligence itself, but is not intelligible intelligence. Nor does it
exist^s power, but (as we have said), as energy, and intellectual intelligence.
The^fntelligence of partial intellects has the fourth order- For ench of these
possesses this * and entirely contains in itself a certain conjoined intelligible and
intelligence. Or rather each has all tln H i partially, viz. intellect, intelligence,
and the intelligible, through which also it is conjoined to total intellects, intellec
tually perceives each of these, and likewise the whole intelligible world. The fifth
intelligence is that of the rational soul. For as lit? rational soul ix mf/nl intellect,
thus ahn tin- kiinn-lcilgt of it is niklligince, ami transitive intt lligcHie, and has time
. onndfccnt :///// /At . //. But the sixth intelligence, if you are willing also to con-
numerate this, is phantastic knowledge, or the knowledge of the imagination, which
by some is denominated intelligence; and the phantasy is called by them passive
intellect, because it knows such thing&gt; as it does know, inwardly, and accompa
nied with resemblances and figures. For / / is common to all intelligence to /ttrcc the,
djectx l its knowledge in-card. For in this also intelligence tiifters from sense.
In one order however, intelligence is the thing known itself. In another it ranks
as the second, but sees that which is first totally. In another it is partially the
ll. ing known, but sees w holes also through that which is partial. In another it
sees indeed wholes, but at the same time partially and not at once. And in

1 la the origin I. rpirq it q tv nvrif Oriy avSv-/&gt;&gt;f foijiru. But it H iicco.siry afler Ornf lo Juj |&gt;lj ly.

For rovrof here, it is requisite lu read rawij*-.
1 The jilunUsv is UIHJ called by Aristotle.

20G PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

another, the vision is accompanied with passion. So many therefore, are the
differences of intelligence.

Now, however, phantastic intelligence must not lw&gt; assumed; since this is not
naturally adapted to know truly existing being. For it is indefinite, because it
knows the object of its perception accompanied with figure and inorphe. But
j&gt;er|H tnal being is unfigured. And in short, no irrational knowledge is able to
survey being itself, since neither is adapted to perceive that which is universal.
iS or must the intelligence in the rational soul be assumed. For it does not
possess tlie at-once-collected, and that which is co-ordinate with eternal natures ;
but it proceeds according to time. IS or must we assume total intellections ; for
these- are. exempt from our knowledge. Hut Tinueus co-arranges intelligence
witli reason. The intelligence, therefore, of a partial intellect, must now bo
assumed. For it is in conjunction with thU, that we some tim -M- other perceive
real Ix-intr. For as sense is in the second duad below I he. ration; I soul, so intelli
gence is in the duad abo\e it. For a partial intellect is pro.viniate y established above
our essence, elevating and perfecting it, to U /m7/ :f arc comerted v//t/J purified
through philosophy, and ~ihcn TIC- conjoin our o~cn intellectual pir^er leith the intelli
gence oj this intellect. But -chat this partial intcllici is, anil that it is nut as one to one
rational soul, but is participated through souls *hich always energize according to if,
through -Jiich al.\u partial son.s sometimes participate of intcl ectual light, ice have
elsewhere uistinctli/ and copious,^ ditcuttcd. A oa , //outrt /, tliua i/.ucli mutt be assumed,
that it is participated indeed In/ ait other jiro.iimatc dd inoniacal soul*, Init illuminates
ours, r.7/f/j "ie coiner I ourselves to it, and render the reason i\. hie his in us intellectual. And
as in the Pha drus Plato calls this t/ic governor oj the soul, and tays that it alone intel
lectually perceives real being, l/ut lliat the soul perceives it together with this intellect,
when she i$ nourished by intellect and science ; thus al^o it must be said that this intel
ligence is prior to .soul, and is truly that intelligence [mentioned by IMato] but
that it is participated by soul when reason eiiergi/es intellectually. Hence IMato
bays in the following part of this dialogue, that intellect is indeed in the Gods, but
that a certain small genus \&lt;J men] participates of it. And it seems that in what he
sa\s unfolding the knowledge of perpetual bein^, he first calls it intelligence;
but that we may not apprehend it to be that alone, he adds to intelligence
reason, distinguishing by a transitive energy the latter from the former. So
that \ihcu rut &un intellectually Jh reeires /ler/ietual being, as reason indeed, it
energise* transit n eli/, but r/v pe red ring intellectually, -nit It simplicity ; timlirstaml-
ing carft thing as simple at once, yet not all things at once, but passing from sotne to

JUM.K ii.] TIM/KLS Oi I LATO.

others, ft transith fly hMcciw perceives intellectually n~cry thing nhich it jterccivcs
,is one thing, anda* Dimple.

After t!ir definition of intelligence however, let us set- what reason is, and how
it is connascent with intelligence. In the Theactetus therefore, Xoyoj;, reason, is
said to have a three-fold subsistence ; for it is cither enunciative, or a discursive
procession through the elements [of speech]; or that which exhibits the differences
of each tiling with respect to others. All these significations however, arc conver
sant with compositions and divisions, and arc nnadapted to the comprehension
of eternal being. For the similar is naturally adapted to he apprehended liy the
similar. 15ut eternal being is simple and indivisible, and is exempt from every
tiling which is contrary to these. A^ain, after another manner, one kind of
reason is said to be doxastic, another scientific, and another intellectual.
For since there are in us opinion, dianoia, and intellect ; but I call inlelkct here,
the summit iif dianoia ; and since the v hole of our essence is reason, in each of
ihese reason must be dillerently surveyed. Opinion however, is not naturally
adapted to be united to the intelligence of intellect in energy : for on the contrary
it is conjoined to irrational knowledge*. IVoris di.moia, so far as it proceeds into
multitude and division, able to recur to intellect; but on the contrary through the
variety of its discursive energies, it is separated from intellectual impartiality.
It remains, therefore, that the summit of the soul, and that in it which has most
the form of llic one, is e&gt;tabli.-hed in the intelligence of a partial intellect, being
through alliance united to it. Hence this is the reason which intellectually per
ceives the intelligible* co-ordinate to our nature, and the energy of which 1 Socra
tes in the Republic says is intelligence; just as dianoia is (he knowledge of things
tchich subsist between intelligible* und the objects of opinion. If, however, intelli-
gence is the energy of this n-asoii, it \\ill be a certain intellect. Plato in the ful-
lowing^art of this dialogue says, that this rctiS w in the same manner (is ACI&gt;HCC, is
iiigciici dtcd in the ft&gt;i&lt;(, irhrn it is moved about the intelligible, lint that science has
a more various energy, apprehending some things through others, and intellect a
more simple energy, intuiti\ely surveying being* [themselves. This highest there
fore, and most impartible portion of our nature, Pialo no a. dent minutes reason, as
unfolding to us intcl cct t and an intelligible nature. J : or when the soul abandons
phantasy and opinion, and \arious and indefinite knowledge, but recurs to its own
impartiality, according to which it is rooted in a partial intellect, and hating run
back to this, conjoins the energy of itself with the intelligence of that intellect, then

1 Instead of ri of o rrirnXirdp SwvyMirft, t&lt;ii\mr nre r/r frrpyciar iu llii.-* |)lacc, it i UCf eaiarj t&lt;

i ad ecu oJ o f voXirtiy iw^.arij or;&lt;r&lt;- cue rijK ftt^ /tntr.

208 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

it intellectually perceives eternal being together with it, its energy being both one,
and twofold, and both sameness and separation l&gt;eing inherent in its intellections.
For then the intelligence of the soul becomes more collected, and nearer to eternal
things, in order that it may apprehend the intelligible together with intellect, and
that the reason which is in us may like a Irss light, energise in conjunction with
one that is greater. For our reason in conjunction with intelligence, sees the
intelligible; but the intelligence of intellect always sees it, and always is ; and

\conjoins reason to it, when reason acquires the form of intellect.

After what manner however, is truly existing being comprehended by a partial
intellect, or by reason ? For this is still more admirable. May we not say, that
though the intelligible itself cannot be comprehended by intellect and reason,
because it is superior to all comprehension, and comprehends all things exemptly,
yet intellect possessing its own intelligible, is al.&gt;o on this account said to compre-

heml the whole [of an intelligible nature]. But reason through the intellect which
is co-ordinate to itself, receding the conceptions of real beings, is thus through
these said to comprehend Ix ing. Perhaps also it signifies, that reason running
round the intelligible, and energizing and being moved as about a centre, thus
surveys it; intelligence indeed knowing it intransitively and impartibly, but

^reason dancing ns it were round the essence of it in a circle, and evolving the
united hyposlasis in it of all things.

In the next place, let us direct our attention to opinion, and consider \\hat it is.
That it is therefore the boundary of the whole rational life, and that it is conjoined
to the summit of the. irrational life, is frequently acknowledged. But we shall
now unfiild such things as are the peculiarities of the Platonic doctrine; and
which are as follow : That the doxastic part comprehends the reasons [or pro
ductive principles] of sensibles ; that it this is also which knows the essences of
them ; and that it knows the on, or ///&lt;// a thing is, but is ignorant of the cause of
it. For since dianoia knows at one and the same time both the essences and tin. 1
causes of sensible**, but sense knows neither of these; for it is clearly shown in
the Thea-telus that sense does not know the essence of a thing, and that it is
perfectly ignorant of the cause of the objects of its knowledge; it is necessary
that opinion being arranged between sense and dianoiii, should know the essence*

1 These reason* iu a divine ioul, subsist both gnostically anil fubricalivvly, ami m the human soul al&gt;o,
liiey tlnii kiiboist, when il revolves on In^li in conjunction vsith the Gods : but during I lie union of the
oul *ith I hia ontw.ird body, they subsist in it gnostically only.

noox ii.] TIM/F.US Or PLATO. 20i)

of sensibles, through the reasons which it contains, but should l&gt;e ignorant of the
causes of them. For thus right opinion will differ from science in this, that it
alone kno\\s//m/ a tiling is, science being able to survey likewise the cause of it.
But sense adheres to opinion, being also itself a medium between the instrument
of sense and opinion. For the instrument of sense apprehends sensibles accom
panied with passion. Hence also it is corrupted through the excess of sensibles.
But Opinion possesses knowledge un defiled with passion. Sense however partici
pates in a certain respect of passion, but has also something gnostic, so far as it is
established in the doxastic. part, is illuminated by it, and partakes of the form of
reason, since it is in itself irrational. In this, therefore, the series of gnostic powers
is terminated, of which indeed intelligence is the leader, which is above reason,
and is without transition. But reason has the second order which is the intelli
gence of our soul, transitively coming into contact with real beings. Opinion
has the third order, being a knowledge of sensibles conformable to reason. And
sense has the fourth order, being an irrational knowledge of sensibles. For
dianoia, being a medium between intelligence and opinion, is gnostic of middle
forms, which require a more obscure apprehension than that of intelligence, but a
clearer perception than that of opinion ; as Socrates said on the preceding day,
when he defined the dillerent kinds of knowledge by the objects of knowledge.

It must be said, therefore, that opinion is according to reason, because it
possesses gnostic reasons of the essences of things, but that it is otherwise irrational.
as being ignorant of causes. For Socrates in the Banquet, speaking of it says
" since it is an irrnfional thing, hoir can it be science ? But it must In- admitted
that sense is entirely irrational. For in short, since each of the senses knows the
passion produced about the animal by the object of sense, hence intelligence is
an intransitive, but dianoia and reason a transitive knowledge; opinion a know
ledge in conjunction with reason but without the assignation of cause ; sense an
irrational knowledge of passions; and the instrument of sense passion only.
Thus, for instance, when an apple is presented to us, the wight indeed knows that it
is red from the passion about the eye, the smell that it is fragrant from the pas
sion about the nostrils, the taste that it is sweet, and the touch that it is smooth.
What then is it which says that the thing presented to us is an apple ? For it is
not any one of the partial senses ; since each of these knows one certain thing
only about the apple, and not the whole of it; nor does even the common .sense
know this. For this alone distinguishes the differences of the passions; but it
does not know that the thing which possesses an essence of such a kind is the
Tim. l&gt;lat. VOL. I. 2 D

210

PROCLUS ON THE f 800 * "

whole thin?. Hence, it is evident that there is a certain power superior to the
Censes, which knowing the whole prior to the things which are as it were parts,
an. I surveying the form of it, is impartiMy connective of these many powers.
Tliis power, therefore, Plato calls opinion, and on this account, he denominates
ihatwhich is sensible doxastic.

Farther still, since the senses frequently announce various passions, and not
Midi as things of this kind are in themselves, what is it in us which judges and
says, that the sight is deceived when it asserts that the sim is hut a foot in
diameter, and that the taste which pronounces honey to !e hitter, is the taste of
those that are diseased ? For it is entirely evident that in these, and all siich-hke
particulars, the senses announce indeed their own passions, and are not perfectly
deceived. For they say what the passion is aliout the in-truments of sense, and
it is a thin^ of such a kind as they assert it to lie; hut that which says what the
cause is of the passion, and forms a judgment of it, i&gt; something dillerent from
sense. Hence, there U a certain power of the soul superior to sense, which no
longer knows sensible* through an instrument hut through itself, and corrects the
Crossness of sensible information. And this power indeed which is reason as
with reference to sense, is irrational as with reference to the knowledge of truly
existing U-ings. But sense is simply irrational. On this account, LMato in the
Republic calling this power opinion, shows that it is a medium between
knowledge and ignorance: for it is indeed a rational knowledge, but it is
mingled with irrationality, knowing sensible* in conjunction with sense. I ut
sense is alone irrational, as Tima-us also denominates it; in the first place,
because it is also inherent in irrational animals, and is characteristic of every
irrational life; for by these things, what is said in the Thea-tetus distinguishes
it from science. In the second place, because in contradistinction to all the parts
of the irrational soul, it is disobedient to reason. For the irascible and epithy-
metie parts, are obedient to reason and its mandates, and receive from it erudi
tion. But sense though it should hear reason ten thousand times asserting that
the Mill is greater than the earth, \et would still see it to be a foot in diameter,
and would not otherwise announce it to us. In tin; third place, because neither
does it [accurate! v] know that which it knows. For it is not naturally adapted
to see the essence of it. For it does not know what a white thing is, but it knows
tlirough passion that it is white. It likewise is not separated from the instrument
of sense, 1 and is therefore on this account irrational. For thus in the Georgia*,

1 Instead of *.amy&gt;irui Jf TO ataO&gt;jT&gt;,fnr in this place, it is n&gt;ce$iar) to read ov tiakttptrai tt row

HOOK ii.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 211

irrational knowledge is defined to he not scientific, i)iit conjectural, fn the fourth
place, sense is alone irrational, because it is the boundary of the whole series of
knowledge, pos&lt; sses an essence most remote; from reason and intellect, pertains
to externals, and effects its apprehension of things through body. For all these
particulars demonstrate its irrationality.

Every thing gem-rated then-fore is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with
sense; the latter announcing passions, but the former producing from itself the rea
sons of them, and knowing the essences of sensibles. And as reason when in con
tact with intelligence sees theintelligible, thus also opinion co-arranged with sense,
knows that which is generated. For since the soul is of a middle essence it gives

completion to a subsistence between intellect and irrationality. For by its sum
mit it is present with intellect, but by its ultimate part it verges to sense. Hence
also Tuna-us in the former conjunction, arranges intelligence prior to reason, as
being more excellent ; but in the sucond he places opinion before sense. For
there indeed, reason is posterior to intelligence, as being a less intellect; but here
opinion is prior to sense, as being rational sense. Opinion however, and reason
circumscribe the whole breadth of the rational essence. JJut intellect is our king,
and sene our messenger, says the great IMotinus. Heason indeed, together^
with intellect, sees the intelligible; but by itself it surveys reasons or forms that
have a middle subsistence. And opinion in conjunction with sense, sees that
which is generated ; but by itself it contemplates all the forms it contains, con
cerning which we have elsewhere spoken, have shown how these forms subsi&gt;t,
how the. place of them is the doxastic part of the soul, and that the intelligible
is apprehended by reason, but by opinion, the intelligible is seen as a doxastic
object. For the object of its knowledge is external to, and not within it, as the
intelligible is within reason. Hence the object is not comprehended by it, but
is called opinable and not sensible ; l&gt;ecause opinion knows indeed the essences
of things, hut sense does not. Hence too, it receives the appellation of a clearer
knowledge, which knows what a thing is, but not alone that it is, which latter we
say is the employment of sense ; and in consequence of this Tiniitus very pro-/
j&gt;erly calls that which is generated the. object of opinion. For this is I ylhagoric ;
since Parmenides also considered the discussion of sensibles, a.s a discussion
according to opinion ; sensibles being in their own nature perceptible by this

1 Instead of cr&lt;i cat o tr Napfif nkfi, rr\v wrpt TUV alffOi/rwc rpay^amwr ill thl&gt; |lacr, it is DCCCary
to read crri citi o llapfunbii, rqr rrpc rvr ai90r)rwr rpuy^iurf ia&gt;.

oio PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

power of thr srud. Hence it is not pro|&gt;er to call that which is generated sensi
ble alone, localise sense is not gnostic of any essence, nor the object of opinion,
without the addition of sense.

Here however, Aristotle particularly blames the second assertion of Timicus.
For where is it [universally] true that \\hat is perceived by opinion in conjunction
with sense is generated and corrupted ? For heaven is u.ihegotten and indes
tructible, though it is perceived by opinion in conjunction with sense. And
Tima-ns in the couise of this dialogue, inquires whether the whole heaven was
generated. At present, therefore, it must be said by us, that generation and cor
ruption subsist according to analogy in the hea\ens, not only according to the
motions and mutations of figures, but also because a celestial body is not prtn
duced by itself, but alone subsists from another cause. Hence it is generated
as having the cause of its subsistence suspended from another tiling [diflerent
from itself. Since, however, it not only subsets from, lint is connected by another,
not lieing able to connect itself, and is corrupted according to its own proper
reason, on this account it assumes generation co-ordinately \\itli corruption. For
truly existing and eternal beings generate themselves, and are connected-toy
themselves, whence also they are said to be in their own nature iiiibegottcn and
indestructible. If, however, truly existing being is nnbegotten, and therefore sub-
Msts from itself, that which does not subsist from itself will not be truly unbe-
gottcn. And if that \\hich is truly indestructible is naturally adapted to connect
itself, that which is not naturally adapted to connect itself \\ill not be truly
indestructible. Heaven, however, but I mean by hea\en the corporeal-formed
nature of it alone, is neither adapted to produce nor to connect itself. For every
tiling of this kind which produces and connects itself, is impartible. Hence, it is
neither truly nnbegotten nor trulj indestructible, but so far as pertains to its
corporeal nature, it is generated and made. Farther still, as Aristotle himself
says, and clearly and generously demonstrates, no finite body possesses an inli-
nitepouer. But the celestial body is Unite, and therefore does not possess an
infinite power. The indestructible, howe\er, so far as indestructible, possesses an
infinite power. Hence body, so far as body, is not indestructible. So that from
the reasoning of Aristotle it is demonstrated to be a thing of this kind. But alter
what manner the heaven is unbegotten and j&gt;erpetual, will be manifest to us

1 lii-trail of on apa OT yeKijrw tonv in lliij place, it is olmouil) necessary to read ovc apa on-wi

BOOK ii.] TLM.LUS OF PLATO.

213

shortly after. i\o\v, however, this alone is evident from what has hern said, that
every tiling corporeal, is of itself, or in its own nature generated and corrupted,
hut never truly is, as Plato also says in the Politicus. For he there observes
" thai to subsist always invariably the same, alone pertains to the most divine of ail
tilings. But the nature of body is not of this order. That, howci-er, which we de
nominate heaven or the world, possesses indeed many and blessed prerogatives fmm
its generator ; but, as it partakes of body, it is impossible that it should be.
entirely fire from mutation? We have shown, therefore, how the heaven falls
under the above-mentioned distinctions.

If however, the da moniaeal Aristotle, should again doubt respecting what is
said of eternal being, not enduring to say that every thing which always is, is
comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with reason; since the most divine
of visible objects always exist; we think it fit, that he should not confound the
eternal, and that which subsists through the whole; of time. For In; also distin
guishes eternity from time ; and attributes the former indeed to intellect, but the
latter to lumen, and the motion of heaven. That always-existing being, there
fore, the eternal, is a thing of such a kind as Tiniit iis defines it to be. The
most divine, however, of visible objects, are after another manner perpetual, and
not according to an eternal permanency. But they are produced in the whole of
time from their causes, and the whole of their existence is in bceomin^ to be.

This also is said by Aristotle, that eternity is connascent with intelligible^, pos
sessing and comprehending in itself infinite time ; and therefore the eternal is truly
intelligible. 1 If, however, that which always is, signifies the eternal, why is it ne
cessary to refer the nature of heaven to this perpetual heiii j;, and why should we
not say that it is always generated, or becoming to l&gt;e, as being co-extended with
the perpetuity of time ? So that we shall thus dissolve the objections from his ar
guments, which he urges against these definitions. Since, however, we have
replied to this inquiry, we shall dismiss it ; for it will be spoken of hereafter.

But, in short, the opinion of Plato concerning criteria, may from these things
be assumed. For dilferent persons admitting a different criterion, some asserting
that it is sense, as the Protagorcans, others opinion, as he who said,

Opinion i in all tilings Irjm d ;

1 It is necessary litre, to supply tire word aec.

Instead of TO qtwrtof roijror orrot vrny in this place, it appears to me that we should read rai
TO aiwnor apa roip-oc CITWI c?nr.

.214 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

others that itjs reason, and others that it is intellect; Plato divides the essence of
the criteria conformably to things themselves, attributing intellect to intelligibles,
dianoia to dianoetic objects, opinion to doxastie objects, and sense to sen-
sibles. You must not however fancy that the criteria are on this account di-
vulsed according to him from each other. For the soul is both one and a mul
titude. If, therefore, the soul which judges is both one and a multitude, the judicial
power will also b&gt;- both uniform and multiform. Some one therefore may say,
what is this one power? We reply, reason. For this, when it proceeds to the
survey of intelligibles, uses both itself and intelligence; not that intelligence in
deed "is the instrument, and reason that which uses it, as the Platonic Severus
thou"ht, considering intelligence as inferior to reason, but that intelligence is tlie
, li&lt;jlit of rtaAOit, perfecting and titrating it, and illuminating its gnostic power.

Hut when it forms a judgment of middle reasons, it alone uses dianoia and
itself, and through this is converted to itself. When also it decides on objects
of opinion, it moves opinion ; but in judging of objects of imagination, it excites
the phantasy, and in judging of sensibles, sense. For when it considers the
sensible essence of forms, such as is every sensible object, it uses opinion as the
cu-adjutor of its speculation. For in this the reasons of sensibles subsist. But
when it directs its attention to the position or figure of a certain thing, as for in
stance, to the manner in which the earth is posited, which has in its summit a
habitude to the heavens, it then excites the phantasy, in order that it may
survey the object of its inquiry accompanied with interval and morphe, as it is.
And when it considers an eclipse, it employs sense as an adjutor in its obser
vations. At one time also, it admits the judgments of the second powers; but
at another, it blames the errors which they frequently happen to commit on ac
count of the instruments. Concerning the criteria therefore, thus much may
sullice for the present ; for we have discussed these things more copiously in our
Commentaries on the Theajtetus. From what has been said, however, the great
accuracy of the before-mentioned definitions is evident.

But if you are willing, we will also survey the same thing according to another
method. I say, therefore, that the nature which is primarily perpetual being, is
that which is eternal according to all things, vi/. according to essence, power,
and energy. And that the nature which is simply generated, is that which re-
reives all its essence, power and energy in time. For it is necessary that the

1 II is requisite here to supply the word tr.
* For xaauiv here, read -ruaar.

BO K "] TIM/F.US OF PLATO. OJ5

former should IH&gt; wholly eternal, but the latter wholly temporal. And that the
former should be at onco every thin- in a self-subsisterit manner, l.ut that the
latter should have its hypostasis suspended elsewhere than from itself, and con
sisting in an extension of existence. Since these, however, are the extreme*,
tlie media are, ihin-s \\hirh in a certain respect participate of a portion of king,
and in a certain respect communicate with generation. Hut again, there are two
natures which participate of neither of these, one in consequence of being su-
]MTior, hut the other through being inferior to them. For matter is neither be-in"-,
nor that which is generated. For it is neither comprehended by intelligence, urn-
is sensible. And this also is true of the one, as Parmenides demonstrates of both
these, of the latter in the first, ami of the former in the fifth hypothevis.
Perpetual being, therefore, is the whole of the intelligible, and the whole of the
intellectual genus, every supermundane intellect, every intellect participated hy
divine souls, ami every intellect which is called partial, and is participated bv an-
ri-ls, and da-mons ; and by partial souls, through angels and dirmons as media.
And as far as to this, perpetual being extends. For every intellect energizes
eternally, and is measured in the whole of itself by eternity. Jiut that which is
generated, is every thing which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, and
which in conception is surveyed prior to the production of the world ; likewise
e\ery thin- which is properly generated and corrupted, heaven, and all these
sensible and visible natures. Tiur.eus also defines that which is simply generated,
and that which is simply perpetual bein-, to be these. ]Jut the intermediate
natures are those which communicate with both these; and on each side of them
are th;? natures which participate of neither of these. Hence TimuMis proposes
both of them afiirmalively and negatively, as for instance, perpetual being, and
without generation, and again, that ic/iic/i is generated, and ix nercr real being, in
order that through the admirations he may separate them from things which
are the recipients of neither, but that through the negations they may be distin
guished from things which in a certain respect participate of both.

As these, therefore, are the extremes, vi/. every intelligible and intellectual
essence, and every sensible essence, let us direct our attention to the intermediate
nature. For TimaMis calls both time and the soul generated. And it is evident
that these, as not being sensible, are in a certain respect lyings, and in a certain
resect generated, but ]&gt;erfectly neither of these. Porphyry, therefore, rightly
observes, that Plato now defines the extremes, vi/,. that which is primarily

Fur xnpaTrnffd litre, rend waparaati.

2I6 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

and that which is alone generated, and that he omits the media ; such for instance
as, that which is at one and the same time being and a generate d nature, or that which
is both generated and being ; of which be ing and generated are ad apted to the nature
of souls, but vice versa that which is gnu-ratal and being, are allied to the summit
of generated natures. Such as this, however, is the nature of the universe which
vivifies the universe. For this n;.ture so far as it is divisible about bodies, is
uenerated, but so far as it is entirely incorporeal, is unhejjotten. But it is absurd
to say that matter is both generated and luinif. For thus it would be sii|erior to
generated sensible natures, since these are irenerated alone, but matter would also
participate of beint;. And if you are willing separately to assume that which is alone
perpetual bem-, and that which is alone generated, by taking away from one of
the definitions intellect, and from the other sense; you will produce the definition
of the medium. For this is known by reason and opinion. For reason knows
both itself and opinion, and opinion knows itself an. Treason ; the former indeed
both in conjunction with cause; but the latter both, without cause. For in this
reason and opinion dill er from each other. Opinion also is known by reason, and
reason by opinion. And the whole [rational] soul subsists through both these
which are media. Thus too, by assuming the worse of the two upward terms,
vi/. reason, and making it to be spurious reason, and of the two downward terms
sense, and making it to be insensible sense, you will then have the manner in which
Plato thought matter may be known, vi/. by spurious reason, and insensible sense.
Assuming likewise analogously in each, that which is the better of the two, and
making it to be spurious according to that which is more excellent, you will
Lave the manner in which the one is known, viz. by a spurious intellect, and
spurious opinion. Hence it is not properly simple, and is not known from cause.
It is known then-fore by a spurious knowledge, l*ecause it is known in a superior
manner according to each. For opinion does not know from cause, and the one
is not known from cause, but from not having a cause. And intellect knows that
which is simple; but a spurious intellect knows the one, because it is superior to
intellectual perception. The superior therefore, here, is spurious as with reference
to intellect, as the une also is more excellent than that which is simple, such as
that is which is intelligible to truly existing intellect, and to which intellect is
allied and i&gt; not spurious. It perceives therefore, the one, by that in itself which is not
intellect. But this is the out in it, according to which also it is a Cod.

1 For &lt;iri here, it U iiecei ary to read n.fitu. For 1 iocluj ii ipeAing of the ro ft.

BOOK n.l TIM/KUS OI- PLATO. &lt;J17

" Every tiling however, which is generated, is from necessity generated
by a certain cause. For it is perfectly impossible that it should have
generation without a cause."

TimaMis, in a manner truly conformable to tlio geometric method, aAcr the
definitions assumes these axioms. For having said what being and what that which
is generated are, he adds these other common conceptions ; that the tiling which
is generated, is entirely generated hy a cause; hut that the tiling which is not
generated by a cause, cannot have generation. From these axioms also it is
evident that TO o&lt;oui.roj/, does not Dignity the dividing method, Imt that the
hypotheses are to he defined. For the assertion that every thing which is generat
ed, is necessarily generated by a certain cause, and that it is impossible for it to
have generation without a cause, and also the following axiom, that what w
generated according to an eternal paradigm is rendered heautiful, all these being
axioms, are to IK- considered as belonging to the term oo^crrtov, and not to l&gt;e
parts of division. Since however one of the present axioms is more clear, hut the
other is less known and clear, hence Timicus places the one as the middle term,
hut the other as the conclusion. For the axiom, every thing which is generated,
is necessarily generated by a certain cause, is the conclusion. But the axiom,
it i.s entirely impossible that it should have generation without a cause, is the
middle, in order that the syllogism may be categoric, and may l&gt;c in the first
figure, as follows : It is impossible for that which is generated to [tc generated
without a cause. But this is necessarily generated by a certain cause. Every
thing therefore which is generated, is from necessity generated by a certain cause.
For it is letter to collect what is said after this manner, as the diune lamblichus
also thinks we ought, than to make, as some other persons do, the syllogism to
be hypothetical. But how is the middle more known than the conclusion ? For
it is evident that a thing must necessarily be, which it is impossible should not be,
and that it is impossible a thing should not be, which necessarily is. Or in a
certain respect each of these is the same. But frequently it is not known that a
thing necessarily is, but that it is impossible for it not to be, is known. Thus for
instance, the physician says [to his patient} it is necessary you should l&gt;e
nourished, and he will in a less degree persuade the sick man. But if he says, it
is impossible to live without l&gt;cing nourished, this will now comjH-1 the patient [to
take nutriment]. And again, death is neccHsary through a certain cause : for it
is impossible not to die [i. e. to avoid death]. And, it is necessary to give money
Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 E

. FKOCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

that i owing to a tyrant : for it is impossible not to give it. And in a great
variety of other instance*, you may in a similar manner see, that one of these is
more obscure, but the other more known, though both may appear to signify the
same thing.

How, therefore, in the words l&gt;efore us, is the one clearer than the other? For
what if in some things this should be true, but in others not? May we not say,
that hero also it is easy to learn how that which is generated, when it is separated
from its cause, is powerless and imbecile? For not l&gt;eing able to preserve itself,
neither is it connected by itself, liut as it derives from its cause alone its preser
vation and connexion, if it is M-p.ir.tted from its cause, it is eudent that it becomes
of itself powerless, and l&gt;cing dissipated, departs into non-entity, which also
demonstrates that what is generated, cai.not 1,.- generated without a cause. For
if it U generated, it is generated by si ce.L in maker. Hence it is rightly said in
the Philebus, that what is generate.! is miulr, but that which make* is the cause to
that which is made 1 [of its being made]. If, however, this be the rase, it is either
{reiterated by itself, or by another. Hut if by itsrlf, it pa&gt;srs into the MUIIU with
|&gt;erpetnal l*-ing ; and thus that which is gem -rated, and that which always is, will
l&gt;e the same, and a generated nature will rank among things that have an eternal
subsistence. Hut if it is not generated by itself, it is entneK generated by another.
For il is necessary that what is generated, should be gnu-rated by something, if
it is that which is generated, and not [real] being. Fur not connecting itself, nor
making itself in energy, it will sutler this from something else. And being itself
by itself imbecile, it will derive power from another. Farther still, though the
same thins: should both act and suller, so far indeed as it is that which Milli-rs, it
suiters from another, anil so far as it is cliective it operates on another. That also
which is generated, so far as it is generated suffers. Hut if it sutlers, it suffers
from something rise : for it is not naturally adapted to generate itself. For it
would IK.- before it is generated, and would be in energy prior to subsisting in
e-ipacity. For il is necessary that what ojx-i-ates should operate in energy on
that which is in capacity. Plato, therefore, conjoining that which is generated to
cause, which he does in the conclusion, very pvoj&gt;erly uses the term from necessity.
For firmness and stability accompanied by JH rsuasion accede to that which is
generated, from its cause : just as he says in the I oliticus, that a renovated immor
ality is imparted to the world from its father. Hut separating that which is

1 I or ry yiyi-f/irry here, it is requisite to rta.l ry in.tv/^iy.

:.,,OK ii.] TIM^US OF PLATO. 21}&gt;

generated from its cause, which he does in the middle, he uses the term impossible.

For that which is generated, surveyed by itself, is inefficacious and imperfect.

Moreover, in employing the word cause, he indicates the uniform power of the
demiurgic principle ; calling the demiurgic cause, not simply that which give*
subsistence to another thing ; for Socrates says that the good is the cause of intelli-
gibles, but it is not the demiurgic cause of them. For the demiurgic is attributed
to generation as Plato says in the Philebus, " that the demiurgic refers to that
"rhick is generated." Hence, prior to the world, there are different causes of
different things, but there are not demiurgic causes of generated natures. I
therefore, there are many demiurgic causes, there is also one such cause [prior to
the many]. For in short, if that which is generated is one, union must accede to
it from its cause, and therefore it is much more necessary that its cause should be
uniform and connective of multitude, in order that what is generated may become
one conformably to the union pre-existing in its cause. And thus much con
cerning these particulars.

It is here, however, usual to enumerate all the causes, and the differences of
causes according to Aristotle ; nor is this done unmethodically. For it is requi
site- to say that every cause is either essential or accidental, [and this proximately
or remotely,] and that these subsist in a two- fold respect, either simple or complex.
All these, likewise, have a two-fold subsistence ; as they are either in capacity, or
in energy. For thus the multitude of them may be surveyed. For on account of
the essential and accidental, there are two modes of the explication of causes.
But on account of these being attributed in a two-fold respect, either proximately
or remotely, there are four modes. And again, on account of all these subsisting
in ft two-fold respect, either as simple or complicated with each other, there are
eight modes. Through these also l&gt;eing two-fold, either in energy, or in capacity,
there are sixteen modes. But on account of causes being predicated in a four-fold
respect according to Aristotle, but according to Plato, causes subsisting in a three
fold, 1 and con-causes also, though in a different way, in a three-fold respect, hence
according to the former, there will be sixty-four modes of causes ; [but according
to the latter there will be forty-eight modes of causes,] and the same number of
con-causes. For thus the assumption will Income j&gt;erfectly methodical ; though
that of Plato is usually omitted by the interpreters, who having enumerated causes

1 Tbete causes are, iho producing, \\\t paradigmatic, and \\\vjinnl: and llir con-caur are, matter,
mat trial cautu, mnrl form.

220 PUOCLUSONTHK [BOOIC-II.

according to Aristotle, enquire how it is said that every tiling which is generated,
is gemTated by a certain cause. NVe, however, omitting all this superfluous discu*-
tion, say that Timaeus is here Awaking about the efli-ctive cause. Hence he uses the
words, by a certain cause. For the term Ay rr/m//, is adapted to that which IN
eflective. .But he adds a certain cause. For the intellect of the universe, soul
and nature, are said to !M&gt; producing causes, and prior to these, other causes have
this dignity, yet a,s many things are generated, and there are many causes, though
not of each particular, the word certain is very projw-rly added. For each par
ticular is generated hy a certain cause, and not hy all cause-. These thingH
therefore are manifest.

This axiom, however, is entirely derided by the Fpieurcans, who make the
whole world, and the most divine of \isjhle natures to be the work of chanee.
lint by the Aristotelians, for the name alone it is thought worthy of revrrcncr.
For they say indred, that what is generated, is entirely generate&lt;l liy a certain
rause, but they undesigned I y make the cause to be causeless, when they enumerate
chance with causes. I or chance is this very thing, (lie O/N.U/O*. Hut Plato alone,
following the Pythagorean?!, rightly nays that every thing which is generated, JK
generated by a cause, and places over generated natures, Fate and (iod. I or
though generated natuies are many, and separated from each other, and which
also on this account are generated from many causes, producing in a different
manner, yet there is one cause collective and connective of the makers, in
order that there may be nothing in vain, or adventitious in the universe. For it
is not proper that beings should !&gt;e gou-rned badly. I&gt;l then-, however, be one
nder, one cause of all things, one providence, and one chain of beings; let there he,
also together with the monad an appropriate multitude, many kings, various
causes, a multiform providence, and a different order; yet every where multitude
has a co- arrangement about the monad, things various about that \vhich is simple,
thin &lt;r s multiform about that which is uniform, and things different about that

t 7

which is common, in order that a truly golden chain may have dominion over all
things, and that all things may be constituted in a In-coming manner. For if, as
Aristotle says, all things are co-arranged with a view to form, it is necessary that
there should be a cause of the co-ordination, and that nothing which is in vain
should have a place in the universe, but that what appears to be in vain to apart,
should IK- advantageous to ;he whole. These ob&gt;crvations, however, have been
made elsewhere.

1 J hoe art the wonh of Arislollr, in the l. tli book ofhu Mtl.i|&gt;li\!&gt;ii-s.

B,,OK ii.] TIM. EL S OF PLATO. 221

lint what is said in the Philebus appears to be more universal than this axiom,
vi/. that every tiling which is mixed, subsists from a rertain cause of the mixture.
For if things \vhieli are mingled, are not to be mingled casually, it is necessary there
should !&gt;&lt; one cause collective of the separated natures, ami imparting union to
the mingled form. This cause, however, is in one mixture God, in another intel
lect, in another soul, in another nature, and in another a certain art, imitatin"-

nature. Indeed, every thing which is generated, is mingled, but not every thing
which is mingled is generated. For the first of beings, bound and infinity, subsist
mingled with each other. From these, therefore, Plato says other things, and also
bodies derive their subsistence. All that is said here therefore, is analogous to all
that is said in the Philebus, viz. the Demiurgns to the one, form to bound, matter
to the infinite, and that which is generated to that which is mixed. Jiut the latter
are more universal than the former ; because the latter [viz. the one, bound, the
infinite, and that which is mixed,] are beheld in all things, but the former [vi/. the
Demiurgus, form, matter, and that which is generated] are seen in mundane natures
only. For intellect is mixed, as being knowledge, and as possessing infinite
power, and also soul, as being at one and the same time impartible and partible.
J fence, a certain cause, is the cause of that which is generated, just as that which
is generated is a ctrtain mixture, and not every mixture; by which also it is evi
dent that the J)emiurgns is sulordiiiatc to the one, since he produces indeed a
mixture, but a mixture which is generated. For since the causes of the world
are these, the final, the paradigmatic, the eflective, the organic, 1 the formal, and
ihe material, Tima-us indeed points out to us afterwards, from reason and demon
stration, the final cause, but delivers the organic, the formal, and the material
cause, from the former before-mentioned axioms. For if the uniu rse is not [real]
being, but that which is generated, it is a form participated by matter, and by
the organic, formal, and material causes is proximately moved. But Tima-us
unfolds to us the eJlective cause from what is now said. For if the universe is
generated, there is an effective cause of it. And he unfolds the paradigmatic cause
in what will be said afterwards. For if the world is beautiful it was generated
according to an eternal paradigm. So that through these axioms investigating
for us the causes of the universe, he delivers all things in order. And the hypo
theses afl ord him this utility.

" When therefore, an artificer looking to that which possesses an inva
riable sameness of subsistence, and always employing* a certain paradigm

1 There i an omiHon lirre, in Ibc original, of TO opyonroK.
* For wpoir^nfufoi iu this plate, it isnctessary lo read

222 1 ROCLUS ON THE [BOOK it.

of this kind, expresses in his work the idea and power of it, then it is
necessary that the whole should be a beautiful effect; but when he looks
to that which is generated, employing a generated paradigm, then his
work will not be beautiful."

This also is in continuity with what has been said. For the paradigmatic is
investigated after the effective cause; except that the before-mentioned axioms
contribute to our discovering that there is a demiurgic cause of the universe, hut
the present axiom* do not contribute to the discovery that there is a paradigma
tic cause of the world, but to the knowledge of what kind of a paradigm it is,
whether eternal or generated. For from there being an elective cause, it follows
that there is aKo a paradigm, either pre-existing in the maker himself, or external
to him, and either superior, or inferior to, or of the same rank with him. For
universally, that which makes, living extended to a certain form, makes that
which it wishes to insert in the thing made. This therefore follows. It is neces
sary however to find that which is next in order, vi/,. whether the mundane para
digm is eternal, or generated. Hut to this the proposed axioms contribute : and
the whole of what is said, will In- truly consentaneous to itself. If the universe is
generated, there is a IVmiurgus of it ; if there is a Demiurgus of the universe, there
is also a paradigm. And if indeed that which is generated is beautiful, it was gene
rated on account of an eternal paradigm. But if it was not, that which is generated
is not beautiful. So that a continued syllogi&gt;m such as the following is produced.
The world was generated. livery thing generated, has a demiurgic cause. Every
tiling having a demiurgic, has also a paradigmatic cause. The world, therefore, has
both a demiurgicand paradigmatic cause. And as in the first axioms then* weretwo
hypotheses, what perpetual being is, and what that is which is generated, and
two other in the second axioms, viz. every thing which is generated has a cause,
that which has not a cause, is not generated ; thus also in these, then- are two
common conceptions, that which is generated on account of an intelligible para
digm is beautiful, that which is generated on account of a generated paradigm is
not beautiful.

Kach also of these is perfectly true. For he who makes on account of the intel
ligible, either similarly, or dissimilarly, imitates it. And if indeed similarly, he
makes the imitation l&gt;eautiful : for there, that which is primarily l&gt;eaiitifiil, sul&gt;-
sists. Hut ifdissimilarly, he does not make on account of the intelligible : for on the
contrary, he falls oll from the similitude. And he who makes any thing on account

HOOK ii.] TIM^US OF PLATO. 223

of that which is generated, if he truly directs his attention to it, evidently docs
not make that which is beautiful. For this very thing is full of dissimilitude, and
is not that which is primarily beautiful ; whence that which is generated on
account of it, is much more separated from beauty. Hence Phidias also, who
made the [celebrated] statue of Jupiter, would not have arrived at the conception
of the Jupiter iu Homer, if he had looked at a generated resemblance of the God.
And if he had been able to extend himself to the intellectual Jupiter, it is evident
that he would have rendered his work still more iH-autiful. For from the para
digm indeed, beauty or the want of l&gt;eauty accedes to the image ; but from the
maker, similitude or dissimilitude to the archetyjK? is derived. With reference to-
both however, the image is said to be the image of the paradigm, but the work
an ell ect of the maker. On this account also Timvrus, when he speaks of the
paradigm, conjoins with it its image: for he says, " Tints therefore ~a e must speak
concerning t/ic paradigm an&lt;l its ii/nigc." But when he speaks of the Demiurgus,
he conjoins \\ilh him his work : for he then says, " Of whom I am the Demiurgus
and father of works."

Since however paradigms are triple ; for there is either an eternal paradigm of
an eternal thinu, , or an eternal paradigm of a generated tiling, or a generated pa
radigm of a generated tiling; hence when there is ;.n eternal paradigm of aa
eternal thing, that which is entirely eternal is the paradigm of that which is so in
a certain respect, as intellect of soul. But when there is an eternal paradigm of
a generated nature, this paradigm also is in a certain respect eternal, i.e. according
to infinite time. And when there is an entirely generated paradigm of a generated
nature, this (alls oil from eternity. For it is not possible that what is essentially
generated, should be productive of eternal natures. The former, therefore, par
ticipate from their paradigms of In-auty and order, as being imitations of a stable
nature; but the latter, as deriving their subsistence from things mutable and in
motion, are not beautiful, and yet are not entirely deformed, but are alone mani
fested through the negation of beauty. Such things, therefore, as are the beautiful
progeny of art, are not beautiful when compared with the beauty which ac
cedes from an eternal paradigm to sensible paradigms. 1 And perhaps on this
account also, Tinurus docs not say that what derives its subsistence according to
a generated paradigm, is entirely deformed, but only that it is not beautiful. For
that which is constituted according to artificial reason, does not bubsist confonn-

For orofiuai here, it teem* ncccs^aiy to raH, rop

2-24 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK u.

ably to an eternal form, since there are not in intellect paradigms of tiling*
artificial. Hence, they are not simply beautiful, nor yet are they deformed,
l&gt;ecause in short, they derive their subsistence according to reason, [or that pro
ductive principle which is in the mind, of the artist.] That these axioms there
fore are true, we may through these observations be reminded.

Some however doubt, how Plato assumes as a thing acknowledged, that there
is a Demiurgus of the universe who looks to a paradigm : for there is not a De-
miurgus of it say they who directs his attention to that which is invariably the
same. And many of the ancients indeed are the patrons of this assertion ; among
whom are the Epicureans, who entirely deny the existence of that which is per
fectly eternal. The Stoics admit that there is .1 Demiurgus, but assert that he
is inseparable from matter. And the Peripatetics grant indeed, that there is some
thing which is separate from matter, yet do not allow that it is a producing, but
that it is a final cause. Hence they also take away paradigms, and place over
the whole of things an intellect void of multitude. Plato however and the
Pythagoreans celebrate a separate and exempt Demiurgus of the universe, a pro
ducing cause of all things, and a providence that is attentive to the welfare of
wholes; and this with the greatest propriety; for if the world, as Aristotle says,
aspires after intellect, and is moved towards it, whence does it derive this di-sire I
.For since the world is not the first of things, it is necessary that it .should pooses.s
this tendency, from a cause which excites it to desire. For he also says that the
appetible is motive of that which is appetitive. But if this is true, and the world
by its very lx-ing and according to nature is appetitive of intellect, it is evident
that the whole of its existence is from thence, whence also its being appetitive
is derived. Whence likewise is the world, since it is finite, moved ad infmitunl ?
For every body possesses, as he says, a finite power. Whence therefore does the
universe derive this infinite power, since it is not from chance, as Epicurus says
it is? In short, if intellect is the cause of a motion which is infinite, uninterrupted,
and one, there is something which is productive of the eternal. But if this Iw
the case, what should hinder the world from being perp -tual, and deriving its
subsistence from a paternal cause ; for as it receives an infinite power of being
moved, from the appctible, through which it is moved ad intinitiim, thus also it
will entirely receive from thence an infinitive power of existing, through the pro
position which says, that in a finite body there is not at any time an infinite
power. Either therefore, it has not a power through which it is connected, and

HOOK i..] TIM.r.US OF PLATO. 2 25

how ia this possible ? For every thing partible, lias something impartible which
connects it, us Aristotle himself somewhere says, and the universe also is an
animal. He therefore says that God is an eternal animal, but every animal is
connected by the life which is in it. Or the universe has, indeed, a power which
connects it, but this power is finite. This, however, is impossible: for if it is finite,
it will fail. Or it possesses an infinite power. And again, it will not have this
from itself. Something else, therefore, imparts to it the power of existing, and
imparts not the whole at once. For it is not receptive of the whole at one time.
Hence it imparts this power by influx, and the influx is perpetual, and always as
much as the world is able to receive. .So that the world is always becoming to be,
and never is.

Hut if intellect is the Demiurgus of the world, whether does it make that which
it makes, by a reasoning process, or by its very bring ? If indeed by consulting,
an absurdity follows. For there will be a mutation about it, and the passions of
a partial soul. It will not therefore consult. And if it should consult, it
must entirely antecedently assume in itself the work about which it consults;
just as every one does who consults In-fore he energizes. But if it makes by
its very being, it makes that which is similar to itself. And if it does this,
it will contain the- paradigms of the things that an; generated. And again,
we must investigate, whether these paradigms subsist primarily in it, or not, and
whence it derives this paradigmatic cause of wholes. Farther still, after what
manner do we see artificers that an; here produce? Is it not by possessing the
reasons cr productive principles of their effects ? This, therefore, the demoniacal
Aristotle will also grant. But if art imitates nature, it is nece&gt;sary that natrire,
much prior to art, should contain the reasons of the things which she generates.
And if nature does this, we must inquire whence she is moved, and whence she is
perfected ? For she is irrational ; and thus ascending, we must say that the causes
of all things arc in intellect. In opposition to Aristotle, indeed, much has
been said by many ; but our business, at present, is to explore what Plato says.

In the first place, then-fore, let us investigate from what cause he introduces to
generated natures the beautiful and the not beautiful, from the paradigm, and not
from tin- producing cause. It might then have been said, that there are two-fold
demiurgic causes, vi/. the generated and the intelligible, the latter l&gt;eing effective
of beautiful things, but the former of things that are not beautiful. But I lato
does -not speak after this manner, but says that intelligible paradigms arc the
paradigms of Ijcaiitiful cflects, but generated paradigms, of HUC!I as are uot beau*
Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 F

&gt; 2 . 29 PROCLUSONTHE [HOOK n.

liful. It tnav however be said, that what is here asserted contributes to enulition,
exhorting- us not to reject beautiful actions. For if lie had said that what is gene
rated, is not eflective of beauty, perhaps he might have rendered us more sluggish
with respect to beautiful actions. But it will be better and more physical, if we
&gt;.iv that it is possible for the same eflective cause to look to two-fold paradigms,
and to make a certain thing beautiful, and a certain thin-; not beautiful. For
soul looking to intellect, generate* truth and science, but looking to generation,
she procreates imaginations, and passive appetites, lint it is impossible for the
same paradigm to be the cause of beautiful and noi beautiful ellects. Very properly
therefore is it asserted, that from this cause beauty and deformity accede to lie-
rated natures. AS the paradigm however of this universe is beautiful, it i&gt; evident
tliut it is intelligible, and always sub-.i&gt;ts inv ariaMy the &gt;ame : to which al&gt;o the
Demiurgus looking, adonis tin- universe. If, therefore, it is the supplier of beauty,
it h;ts the highest order among eteini l brings :d belongs to the first intelligible*.
Hence the cause effective of beauty is then-, through which all (hum.- an- beautiful,
intellect, soul, and the nature of body. Ag.iiu, then-lore, the Denmirgus, indeed, is
the cause of form, but the paradigm of beauty, and ///&lt;.&"&lt;&lt;/ of union. And the last
of these, supplies all things at once, but the paradigm is the supplier of beauty and
form, and the demiurgic cause, -o far as it is inti-llectual, of form and essence.

Moreover, the demim-ic cause looking to the intelligible is multiform. For
the nhoic Deniiurgus fabiic.it. &gt; in one nay looking to it. He, therefore, is united
to it according to supreme transcendency. Hut the demiurgic triad labru ate.s m
another way. And of this triad indeed, the Mist [i. e. Jupiter] f-ihricatcs uniformly ;
the second [i.e. Neptune] generatively, and the last [i.e. PlutoJ conv. rtively.
And in one way in the ruling, in another in the liberated and in another, in the
mundane order. But after this triad, we must survey fabrication proceeding after
a diflerent manner to the many demiurgic (iods, who from these receive and are
allotted paternal powers. After these, also, it proceed* in one way to demiurgic
an-els, but in another to demiurgic da-mons, the attendants of this order.
Farther still, we must likewise survey the undeiiled forms of life, which contribute
to the demiurgic scries, and the genera of partial souls, which follow the demi
urgic choir. For the peculiarity and the mode of production, and of looking
to the intelligible, extend diligently to diSlerent natures, as far as to these. It is also
necessary to admue this in IMato, that he does not say that what is generated on

1 ur &lt;A\u lure, it is mtis-ai) lo u.ul ii.\Xu(.

BOOK ii.] I IMPELS OF PLATO. 227

account of an eternal paradigm is l^nutiful, but that what is generated by the
Demiurgus who looks to it. is most beautiful; since tbat \\liich is confused and
disordered is general -1, for it is visible and sensible. Hut every tiling of this
kind is and was generated, as he says further on, receiving from the intelligible
certain vestiges of forms prior to fabrication, and is not most beautiful, though h.
is in a certain respect beautiful, as with reference to the formless nature of matter.
Hence that which is geneiated OH account of an eternal paradigm, such for
instance as that disorderly and confused nature, is not simply beautiful, but that
which was generated by the Derniurgus looking to it. For from that confused
nature the Demiurgus was absent; but the intelligible prior to the Demiurgus,
illuminated that disorderly essence. So far, however, as it was generated by the
Demiurgus, it was also generated by the eternal paradigm, energizing on it through
tin" Demiurgus as a medium. And so far indeed as it wa.s generated by the
paradigm, it was invested \\ith form, but so far as by the Demiurgus, it was
arranged. For the Dcmiurgux ix the cmtsc (&gt;/ order ; hut the paradigm is simply the
cause of fnrtn to it.t participants.

Farther still, from the paradigm itself the difference of demiurgic powers may
be assumed. For some of these powers, indeed, looking to the whole of intelli-
giltles, produce according to the whole of them ; but others produce partially. And
some, indeed, survey the whole of intelligible*) through union ;. but others through
intelligence. Some, again, do not produce according to the whole of the intelli
gible; but some are divided according to the four primary causes; others proceed
into a greater number; and others make the 1 last forms the paradigms of their
productions. Hence ihrouuli these, there is one shepherd of men, but another of
horses, as Plato snis in the Polilicus, and in a similar manner in other forms.
As the demiurgic series therefore is various, and there are different paradigms of
dillerent things, some of which are more total, but others more partial, Timxus
very properly does not say, th.it he who uses this intelligible paradigm, makes that
which is generated to be beautiful, bnt he who uses a paradigm of I hi* kind. In
the intelligible paradigms therefore, the part is in a certain respect the whole, on
account of the union of intelligibles ; and the multitude is most similar to the
monad, through the domination of sameness. Since also the vrhole Demiurgus
looks indeed to the intelligible and all-perfect animal, but employs the paradigm
which is in himself, possessing intellectually the intelligible ; which paradigm also

1 For fiaiu\tir in this place, we mint read wpot aiwnor.

220 PUOCLUS ON TIIK [BOOK u.

is such as the intelligible through siniilitutle to it, but is of a more partial nature ;
hence Tinueus adds the words a certain to a thing of this kind. For these Intel-
liable* participate of the eternal paradigm, and are more partial than all-perfect
animal. Hence, too, he calls idea, TI, it certain tiling, assimilating that which is
generated to the paradigm. But fabrication imparts essences and powers to the
things that are generated. Why, however, of eternal being does he say " employing
a paradigm of this kind," but of that which is generated, he no longer adds the ex
pression " of this hind" but instead of this, adduces the term generated? Is it
not In-cause the intelligible has something similar to itself, as having the highest
rank, but that which is generated being the last of things, has nothing else
similar to itself? For that which is produced on account of it, is generated, and
to this the dissimilar is appropriate; but to the intelligible, the similar, (lie same,
and every thing of this kind, is allied. And thus much concerning these parti-
eulars. But the term a/irdi/s must be conjoined to a t&gt;iihsistcncc according to
sameness, in order that there may be that whuh looks to a nature always possess
ing a sameness of subsistence, For thus the philosopher I orphjry properly
decides. For TiiiKeus does not say that the Demiurgus in fabricating all things,
nhrays bchvlds, as Atticus thought, but that the intelligible always subsists after tlir.
*aic inantur. I nless it should IM: said, that on this account he assumes the
beholding alwajs, lest by seeing at one time, but at another not, he should
latently introduce into his production, that \\hichis not beautiful. The Demi
urgus, therefore, looks to that which is eternal, in order that he may produce that
which is similar to it, and beautiful.

" Let therefore tins universe be denominated by us, all heaven, or
tlit for/*/, or whatever other appellation it may be especially adapted
to receive."

This is the last of the axioms, giv ing a name to the subject [of discussion] con
formably to geometricians, when they speak about tin; gnomon in parallelograms.
For they say any one thing consisting of two complements is to be called a gno
mon. For since IMato intends to call the same thing both heaven and the
world, in order that you may not think he disturbs the doctrine, by employing
at different times different unmet*, h previously determine!* something about the

1 I or &lt; yafi \irtr, rtit&lt;l TI &gt;/&gt;.

ttooKii.] T1M/CUS OF PLATO. 229

names. For it must IK&gt; observed tliat these names had great ambiguity with the
ancients; some of them calling the sublunary region alone the world, but the
region above it, heaven ; but others denominating heaven a part of the world.
And some defined it to extend as far as to the moon ; but others called the sum
mits of generation heaven :

The wide-spread heav n in xthcr and the clouds
Fell to the lot of Jove.

Heuee Plato very properly determines concerning these names, prior to the whole
theory, calling the universe heaven and the world, and saying all heaven, that you
may not fancy he says, a divine body alone is denominated by us the world, or
by whatever other name it may rejoice to be called. And it seems, indeed, that he
calls the universe heaven, conformably to the. opinion of all men, but the world,
according to his own opinion. For he says, let it be called by us heaven and
the world. For the name oi u orld is adapted to it as a certain fabrication ; though
it is also possible to call it both heaven and the world : heaven, indeed, as behold
ing the things above, 1 as surveying the intelligible, and as participating of an
intellectual essence ; but the world, as being always tilled and adorned by truly
existing beings. It may also be called heaven, as being converted to its prin-
ple], but the world as proceeding from it. J or it is generated by, and is convert
ed to real being. But as of statues established by the telestic art, some things
pertaining to them are manifest, but others are inwardly concealed, being
symbolical * of the presence of the Gods, and which arc only known to the mystic
artists themselves ; after the same manner, the world being a statue of the intelligi
ble, and perfected by the father, has indeed some things which are visible indi
cations of its divinity ; but others, which are the invisible impressions of the par
ticipation of being received by it from the father who gave it perfection, in order
thai * through these it may be eternally rooted in real being. Heaven, indeed,

1 Iliad, xv. vs. 1.9&gt;.

* This is asserted in theCratylui.

1 For a^fo-i) here, it is necessary to read &lt;^arq.

4 InMiMii of i7i&gt;/^)oXtKi)t TUV Oiv wapovyiat in this place, it is nrcevtary to read, rv/j/3oXi*a r^t rwr
Q(W irnpot imii.

1 Instead of rij rovorwf fitro\ijt in ibis place, it is necessary to read rrji rovorrnr fierc^t.

6 In the woivisoti fiij it arrvr tppi$*ptroi p ^icuwriwi iv ry orri, it is obvious that pi ought to be
expunged.

PROCLUS ON THR [BOOK H.

and tlx u-orld. are names significant of the powers in the universe; the latter so
far as it proceeds from the intelligible, hut the former so far as it is converted to it.
It is however necessary to know that the divine name of its abiding power, and
which H a symbol of the impression of the Demiurgus, according to which it does
not proceed out of being, is ineffable and arcane, and known only to the Cods
themselves. For tin-re are names adapted to every order of things ; those; indeed
that are adapted to divine natures being divine, to the objects of dianoia, U-ing
dianoetic, and to the objects of opinion, doxastic. This aUo Plato says in the
Cratylus, where he embraces what i* asserted by Homer on this subject, \v ho ad
mits that names of tlie same things with the Cods, are different from those that
subsist in the opinions of men,

Xantlius by God*, by men Scaiuanrlcr call d.
\Vhicli the Uods Clialcb, mn Ctiiiindif ctll. *

And in a similar manner in many other names. Tor as the knowledge of tin-
Gods is different from that of partial *onLs, thus al&gt;o the names of the one are
different from those of the other; .since divine names unfold the whole e&gt;sence of
the things named, but those of men only paitially come into contact with them.
Plato therefore knowing that this pre-exists in the world, omit* the divine and
ineffable name itself, which is dillerent from the apparent name, and with the
greatest caution introduces it as a symbol of the divine impression which the world
contains. For the words, " or whutcw oilier ,//.///&lt;//;&lt;,/;," and " it may rectire"
are a latent hymn of the mundane name, as ineffable, and allotted a divine es
sence; in order that it may be co-ordinate to what is signified by it. Hence, also,
divine mundane names are delivered by Theurgists ; some of which are called by
them ineffable, but others effible ; and some being significant of the invisible
powers in the world, but others of the visible elements from which it derives its
completion. Through these things, therefore, as hypotheses, the mundane form,
the demiurgic cause and paradigm, and the apparent and nnappamit name of
the world, are delivered. And tin: former name indeed is duadic, but the latter
monadic. For the words " uhatci cr other are significant of oneness. You may
also consider tht imtfable name of the universe, [as significant 1 ] of its abiding m

Iliad xx. vs. 7-i

1 Iliad xi*. vs. ?91-

1 lu ibe original HI this place, ofj/jmruoy is omiltfd.

m.)K it.) TIM.I:US or PLATO. 231

the father ; hut the name :&lt;&lt;/&lt;!, as indicative of it* progression ; and heaven, of its
conversion. N"l through tin- three, you have the fhinl cause, on account of which
it is full of -;oo(l; abiding inellahly, proceeding perfectly, and converting itself to
the good as tin 1 antecedent object of desire. It is fit, however, to engage in the
discussion of the rest of the theory, terminating what follows hy the principles.

" In the first placo, therefore, that as an hypothesis, must be considered
respecting it, which ought in the l&gt;cginning to be surveyed about every
thing."

After (he prayer, the exhortation to the auditors, ami the delivery of the
hypotheses, nothing else remains than to dispose the whole, discussion conforma
bly t( the hypotheses them selves. Of this, however, that head is the leader, whe
ther the world was generated, or is tmhegotten, having no hcginiiing of generation.
For in what was asserted prior to the hypotheses, Tinr.ms said, " // is tuccxxarif
thai we who are about to speak concerning the universe, ichet/icr it icas generated or
is nnbentten, *fiou/d invoke the (ioih mid Goddesses* as from hence commencing the
theory. And in the hypotheses, " ll hat tlint is rrfiic/i is akrat/s bei&gt;t, but is without
"cncrtitinn, find ir/i (it that i.v which is generated, but is never Tn&lt;il~\ ban"," were the

c"" L. -J i

thinirs which were first assumed. This therefore must first lx? considered, as it
was the lir-t thin;; supposed in the principles. It is necessary, however, as Socra
tes says in the Pha-drns, respecting every tiling, to consider in the first place what
it is. But this is the form of the object of investigation. And the generated and
the unhejjolten j{ive distinction to the mundane form. 80 that this is very pro
perly thought to he the first tiling that deserves an appropriate consideration, to
which also Tima-ns immediately after this directs his attention. Hut since most
of the I latonists understand hy the words TJSJ rravroc, that Plato means alut
d crij thin*, conformahly to what is said in the Pha-dms, hut l*or|)hyry understand*
the words as pi&gt;rnifying ad/tut the universe, it hein^ lit to sj)eak /list concerning
the universe, aixl to show whether it is naturally imheirotten or generated, it is
rcfpiMte to know thaf the former interpretation has in a greater degree the spon
taneous. For to assume ro Taxroc for TO --^ rvt ^- xfTOj:, is a forced assumption.

That, howexcr, tiiese limits are sini|!y to IM.- investigated concerning every thing,
we may previously assume from common conceptions, and the first hypotheses. The
addition also of " whether the unrcertc uticiiyx "u-tix, having no beginning of genera tion t
.// whether it was generated" shows that what is said is asserted more generally of
the universe. For with reference to the world, it is demonstrated that it iia&gt; a

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK u.

beginning of generation, and that it is visible and tangible, but not with reference
to the universe. This, therefore, is manifest. But since it is also necessary to
discover in the first place the mundane form, whether it is to be arranged among
eternal, or among generated natures, let us nee what arguments the philosopher
employs, and follow him in his demonstrations whether it always was, having no
In-inning of gem-ration, or was generated from a certain principle; for we shall
find tliatlic uses all the dialectic 1 methods in the hypotheses. Thus he JiviJct
beint; from that whieli is generated, and Jfjinitively and al^o analytically assigns
what each of them is. For he recurs from generated natures to the demiurgic
and paradigmatic causes of them. Moreover, having indicated to us the truth
concerning ineffable and enable names, in perfect conformity to the doctrine of
Pythagoras, who said that number was tl.e wise.xt of things, but that he wa&gt; the
next in wisdom who gate name* to things, he afterwards eomerts himself to the
demonstrations of the problems eoneerning the world. And in the first place,
he endeavour* to find the form of it, and whether it must I*- admitted to be a
portion of perpetual being, or of a generated nature. And on this account lie
in M uires whether it has a certain principle of generation, or has none, not asking
whether it belong to eternal beings, or to gem-rated natures ; for he might have
said that it was a medium between both thcae, in the same manner as soul. But
he a&gt;ks whether it always was, having no principle whatever of generation, or
whether it was in some way or other generated, in order that he might apprehend
the medium letween both these to be that which has a certain principle of
generation, and yet alwa\&gt; is. Afterwards hating shown that the world is alone
generated according to its body, he grants it according to a certain other thing to
be unbegotten, according to which also it i&gt; a (Jod, as will be evident as we
proceed.

Such therefore being the inquiry, Plutarch, Atticns, and many other of the
Platonists, conceiving the generation here mentioned to be temporal, say that the,
inquiry is, whether the world is unbegotten or generated according to time. FOP
they assert that prior to the fabrication of the world, there was a disorderly
motion. But time entirely subsists together with motion ; so that there was time
prior to the universe. Time, howeier, was also generated together with the

A l the .li.iUclic &lt;.f Pl.ito i, pt-rfccllv .tiu.l.lir. .1% , li.n.- *li. n i" ll ? &lt;&gt; " "" ^ I -irriM-nnlrs,
aiM tiiij.lojs tl.e Hixi.lii., ilrlini..-, jn.tl^i..-, a... I lni,on&gt;tr.ilif nit tin..!.,, it i^ evi.lmt that msU-at! of
^nXoy,^,, ^.lOoN/a in tins plato, c sl.ouM rr;ul ?,,i.\*iTuan /uOufc..^. Tl.ii is al*o r%itici!l from wliat
follows.

BOOK ii.] TIMJEUS OF PLATO. 033

universe, being the nunil&gt;er of the motion of the universe; so that the former time
was prior to the fabrication of the world, being the number of a disorderly motion.
But the interpreters of Plato that follow Grantor, say that the world is said to be
exonerated, as being produced by another cause, and not Ix ing self-liegotten, nor
self-subsistent. And Plotinus, and the philosophers after Plotinus, &gt;iz. Porphyry
and lamhlichns, say that the composite nature is hen; called that which is
generated, and that with this, 1 generation from another cause is eon-subsi&gt;tent.

We however say, that all these assertions are most true ; and that the world is
generated, both an a composite, and as being indigent of other causes to its existence.
For every thing which has interval is a tiling of this kind, and that which in
sensible, is allotted such a nature as this. We think it fit however, that these
philosophers should look to other generated natures, I mean time and soul,
survey what is common in them, and extend it to these significations, and say,
that [real] l&gt;eing indeed is that, \\hich eternally possesses a stable essence, power
and eneriry. But that which is simply, or absolutely generated, is that which
receives all these according to time. And that which is in a certain respect
generated, possesses its energy in motion and extension. For it has been before
observed by us, that Plato defined the extremes to be, that which is simply
perpetual bei-n^, and that which is simply generated. But in what is here said,
he comprehends the media. Hence, that which does not possess at once, the \chole
tf its essence, or energy established in unity, is denominated generated. A tiling of
this kind also, entirely subsists through generation, and its existence is generated,
or becoming to be, but is not [real] being. This sensible world likewise, time
among things that are moved, and the transitive intelligence of souls, are things
of this kind. But it is manifest that all motion subsists according to a part, and
that the whole of it is not at once.

If, however, the essence of the world lias generation, and the perpetuity of it
subsists according to temporal infinity, some one by considering this may syllo-
gi/e as follows : First, that it is necessary l&gt;etween things that are eternally per
petual, and things which arc generated in a part of time, the medium should be an
hypostasis which is generated infinitely. And that this should l&gt;e two-fold, either
having the whole i&gt;erpetual, through the whole of time, but the parts in the parts
of time, as is the case with these elements, or having both the whole and the part*
co-extended with the perpetuity of the whole of time, as is the case with the celestial

For rovro here, it it necessary lo read rwp.
Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 G

234

PROCLUS OX THE [BOOI n.

bodies. For tliere is not the same perpetuity according to eternity and the whole
of time ; since neither is there the same infinity of time and eternity, because eter
nity and time are not the same. In the second place, that what is measured by
eternity, and exists in eternity, is necessarily impartible. For how can that which
is partible be fixed, and have its essence established in the impartible? In the
third place, that soul energizes according to time, and that hotly subsists entirely in
lime. For the energy of soul is nearer to eternal natures, than the essence of body.
What is it then, by which we may infer that the essence of the celestial bodies
is thus perpetual according to time? It is this, that it cannot be separated from the
cause that adorns it. For this makes it evident that it is allotted a renovated per
petuity, and is always generate;! from a source external to itself. For if it received
the whole of its proper essence from itself, it would be sufficient to itself, separ
/rate from that which makes it, and imparts to it essence. The intention indeed
jofTIatois to show, that the world is simply generated, as having its essence,
power, and energy, and also its perpetuity co-extended with the whole of time.
But he inquires from the first, whether it is eternal being, or belongs to things
which are jK-rfected by time. For the expression alu-ays was, signifies with Plato
tin- intelligible, as we have before observed. If, however, he says further on, that
/the term uas is not adapted to eternal natures, but the term is, we must not be
disturlx-d. For prior to a distinct evolution, he follows the accustomed mode of
speaking. Hence also, when celebrating the Demiurgus he says, "he teas good,"
though the Demiurgus ranks among eternal natures. And shaking of the
paradigm, he collects both these together at once : for he says, " The nature of
animal itself therefore was being eternal ;" together with atwvtog oura being eternal,

assuming TO tr^x avt zt as - ^ nc * in "M 1 " to al1 tn:it nas ** &gt;on sai&lt;1&gt; l)t cause tne
power of every finite body is not infinite, as Aristotle has demonstrated, but eter
nity is an infinite power, hence every finite body is incapable of receiving eternity.
It is necessary therefore that it should not always be, but should always be gene
rated, or becoming to be, receiving as much as possible a flowing existence.

Being, therefore, as I have said, and perpetual being, manifest the eternal.
But "that u Inch was generated" signifies the being allotted an hypostasis, mea
sured by time, such as is a sensible nature, which also is apprehemUd by opinion
in conjunction with sense. It has however been already said by us, that the intel
ligible is self subsistent and eternal; but that the sensible nature is produced by
something different from itself, and is cou-subsistent with time. For the eternal in
number is one thing, and the temporal another. And the former is in number,

UOOK ii.l TIMT.US OF PLATO. 035

hul the latter i* generated In number. For to the former eternity is conjoined, hut
to the latter time. That which is generated likewise, though it is said to be jwr-
petual, has an hypostasis co-extended with all time, and which is always gene
rated, and always adorned by its producing cause. If therefore, perpetual being
manifests the eternal, but that which has a principle of generation signifies that
which is produced by another cause ; for such is that which is always generated ;
but Plato always inquires, whether the world always was, or has the principle of
a certain generation; this being the case, an inquiry of this kind will Ixfthe
same as an investigation, whether the world l&gt;elongs to eternal natures, or to
things which are generated according to the whole of time ; and whether it
belongs to self-subsist en t natures, or to things which are adorned by another
cause.

Farther still, that which is generated belongs to things which are multifariously
predicated. For this very thing which has a temporal beginning, and is so much
spoken of, is called generated, whether it arrives at being through generation, or
without generation, as Aristotle says. Every thing likewise which proceeds from
a cause, is called generated, that also which is essentially a composite, and that
which has a generable nature [or which is naturally capable of being generated]
though it should not have been generated ; such as is that which has a visible nature,
though it should not be seen. That which is generated therefore, being predicated
multifariously, that which is generated according to time, has all the generations.
For it proceeds from a cause, is a composite, and has a generable nature. It doen
not, however, entirely follow that what is generated after another manner, has all
the generations. [If therefore Plato had inquired whether the universe lias all the
generations,] or not all, 1 we should say that he investigated whether it is generated
according to time, or has not a temporal principle of generation. Since, however,
this is not the case, but he asks whether it has no principle whatever of generation,
or has a certain principle of it, he renders it manifest to those who have the smal
lest degree of intelligence, that he does not doubt about its temporal beginning,
but whether the universe, since there are many generations, has a certain princi
ple of generation. For if it has no principle whatever of generation, it belongs
to eternal and self-subsistent natures, in which there is not generation, because
neither is Uiere time. For though we sometimes speak of the generations of the

It arenas that th following worth are wanting in this place in the original : n roirvr r&lt;r&gt;jr4
rXarwr rorrpor r* ar rural yci rat ycycrrii.

23Q PROCLUS ON T!!E [BOOK it.

Gods, yet we say this indicating their ineffable progression, and the difference of
wcomlary natures with reference to the causes of them. Theologists, hovrever,
previously subverting all such douhts, in order that tin; generations of the Godn
mav !&gt;e rationally devised by them, call the first principle of things Time, because
it is fit that where there is generation, time should precede, according to which
and on account of which generation subsists. AVith these, therefore, cause and
time are the same; since also with them progression is the same as generation.
That however which is truly gent-rated, is that which does not generate itself, hut
is {jenerated by another, becomes the image of another thing, is composed of
manv dissimilar things, ami always receives a renovated hypo.-tasis ; with which
also time is conjoined. It likewise has a never-failing generation, co-extended
with the infinity of time, and is -always becoming to be one and the same in num-
)KT, but is not one according to an eternal subsistence. 15ut that which is thus
generated you may say proceeds from non-being. For that which is self-subsis-
lent, U-ini; generated by itself, does not proceed from non-being. For though
y.u may dnide it by conception into cause and effect, yet it proceeds from being.
For the maker and that which i.s made- are one, so that it proceeds from the being
of itself. Hence also it is eternal, never at any time deserting itself. But that
which is alone from another thing, subsists from non-being, because it no
longer is \\hen separated from its cause; and the cause is different from the effect.
Thus, therefore, the physical axiom may be adapted according to analogy to
this generated nature : and that which is always generated and illuminated by
being, to that which is always in time. Hut this i.s e\ident ; for if you take away
the maker, the universe is immediately imperfect ; which is likewise the case with
every thing that is still generated. At one and the same time, however, the
universe is generated and perfect, and is always generated. Hence also its pej-
.petuity and its perfection, are according to the whole of time. For time was
generated together with the heaven [or the universe], not apart of time, but all
time : t&gt;o that the heaven is generated in an infinite time, and is never-failing
both with respect to beginning and end, in the same manner as time. Thus, there
fore, it is also said to have a principle of generation, and to originate from a cer
tain other principle. And in the first place, indeed, it originates as he hays from
the most proper principle, the final. For from this, the generating cause com
mences the generation of the world. In the next place, the generation of the

1 i. t. That the cause is different from the effect.

BOOK ii.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 037

world subsists with rofcrence to tJie final principle, and as the world is always
Incoming to bo, it is beginning to 1x3 generated, and possesses the end of it,
through generation in the whole of time. For with respect to the world, it teas
generated, is not one thing, and it is generated another; as neither is the lx?gin-
ning of it one thing, and the end another. That, therefore, which is generated
in a part of time, begins at one time, and is perfected at another ; but t hat u-hich
is generated in the whale of lime is ahcays beginning, and is always pcrject-
And it has indeed, a certain principle of generation, which is perfected by some
thing d lift-rent from itself, but it has not a certain principle, as not having the be
ginning of a certain partial time. For since generation is multifarious, the prin
ciple also of it is multifarious. So that the generation which subsists through the
whole of time is a certain generation, and this principle is the principle of a
certain, and not of all generation. "What therefore is this generation ? That
which has both the beginning * and the end contracted together [so as to be si
multaneous]. Because therefore the world is a body, it is generated, and has a
principle or l&gt;eginning of generation. But because intellect is the maker of it, it
was generated, and has an end of generation. Through both, however, it is
rising into existence, and is perfect according to generation, was generated, is
always becoming to be, and is generated. For these do not * subsist at one and
the same time, in things which are generated in a part of time. Thus for instance
the motion of the heavens, not being generated in a part of time, is always, as
Aristotle says, in the end ; but this is not the case with motions on the earth.

" It was generated. For it is visible and tangible, and has a body.
But all sucli things are sensible. And sensibles are apprehended by
opinion in conjunction with sense, and appear to be things which are
becoming to be, and are generated."

As the Demiurgus of wholes looking to himself, and always abiding in his own
accustomed manner, produces the whole world, totally and at once collectively,
and with eternally invariable sameness ; for he does not make at one time, and
at another not. lest he should depart from eternity ; after the same manner also

1 ypovov is omitted in the original.

* &lt;\r\n also is omitted in this place in the original.

1 It is necfSMry to supply er\ here.

238 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

Timaeus, being couvcrted to himself, delivers the whole theory, recurring to in
tellect from dianoia, and proceeding into a reasoning process from intellect;
doubting, therefore, and interrogating himself, he energizes according to the self-
motive nature of soul ; hut iit answering he imitates the projecting enertry of in
tellect. For he first comprehends the dogma in one word ytywt, it vtis gcneratcil,
and proclaims the conclusion prior to the demonstration, directly after the
manner of those who energi/e enthusiastically. For these set the whole collec
tively, and contract in intellect the end prior to the egress, jx?rceiving all tilings at
once. But syllogi/ing, he descends from intellect to logical progressions, and
the investigation through demonstration of the nature of the world. Hence,
in a manner perfectly divine, he shows from the hypotheses the whole form of the
universe. For if the world is visible and tangible, and has a hotly, hut that
which is visible and tangible, and has a body, is sensible, and that which is sen
sible is apprehended by opinion in conjunction with sense, and is generated, the
world therefore is generated. Hence he .shows this demonstratively from the de
finition, according to a conversion of the definition ; since geometricians also use
demonstrations of this kind.* And thus much concerning the form of the words.
Since, however, as we have said, he asks whether the universe is eternal, or
has a certain principle of generation, he answers, // r/ as generated. From this,
therefore, it is evident that he gives a certain generation to the world : for this was
the other part of tin- before-mentioned opposition. If, however, this IM; the case,
he establishes the universe remote from temporal generation ; for if the world has
a certain, and not crcry principle of generation, but that which is generated in
time has the principle of every generation, the world was not generated in
time. Farther still, let us also consider the wonderful hypotheses of Atticus,
who says that what was moved in a confused and disorderly manner is
unbegotten, but that the world was generated in time, and let us speak
concerning this assertion, " // was generated." Since, therefore, Atticus
admits that there is a cause of generation, let us see what the nature of
this cause is according to him ; for the world is visible and tangible.
Whether, therefore, was every thing sensible generated in time, or not every
thing? If indeed every thing, then that which was moved in a confused
and disorderly manner will be generated in time : for he says that this also

1 For eirirpoTijK here, it is necessary to read

1 See this explained farther on.

3 r&lt;&gt;o is omitted here in the original.

DOOK ,i.l TlM.r.l S 01- PLATO. 239

was visible. Cut it" not every tiling, then the reasoning of Atticus is unsyllo-
gistic and conclusive of nothing. Unless lie should say, indeed, that the world is
visible and tangible, but that what was moved in a confused and disorderly man
ner, is not now visible, but was so prior to the fabrication of the world ; since
Plato also speaks in this manner when he says, " every such thing as was risible,
and ii-as mo-ccd in a confused and disorderly manner." But in the words before us he
says, "for it i? visible and tangible, and has a body" He shows therefore that every
tiling which is visible and tangible, was generated, but not that which was visible and
tangible. Though, therefore, these things should be asserted by Atticus ; for the
man is skilful in defending what he advances ; it must be said in answer to him,
that there is nothing of this kind in the definition of that which is generated, but it
is simply said, that every thing generated is the object of opinion in conjunction
with irrational sense. So that if there is any thing which is entirely sensible, such
thing will be generated. But everything visible is sensible; and therefore that
which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, is generated. In addition
to which we may also say that Plato calls this very disorderly thing itself
generated. For he says that prior to the generation of the world, there were
three things, being, place and generation, subsisting in the vestiges of forms.
Hence that disorderly nature was generated, as well as that which is visible. It ^
is not proper therefore to s;iy that it was unlx-gotten according to time, and that
the universe was generated ; but either both were generated according to Plato,

or both were unbegotten. For both are similarly said bv him to be visible and~|

generated. If however both were generated, the world prior to being gene
rated such as it now is was changed into the confused : for to a contrary, the
generation is entirely from a contrary. And if he who made the world is
good, how is it possible he should not adapt it in a beautiful manner, or that
having beautifully adapted it, he should corrupt it? But if he is not good,
how not being good, did he make it to be arranged and adorned ? For it is
the province of a good being to adorn and arrange other things. If, however, 7
being visible and generated, it is not generated according to time, it is not neces
sary immediately to make the universe to be generated in time, because it is
visible and generated. And thus much against Atticus.

But let vis recur to our principles, and discuss the affair as follows : Whether
is the world perpetual being, in the same manner as the eternal, or is it not

For ?/i hrrr, h is ntccmry to rrad fM/ur.

540

PROCLUSONTHE [BOOK u.

eternal, but consubsistent with time? And whether is it self-subsistent, or
produced by another ? Such then is the inquiry. But the answer is, that it
is produced by another, mul is consubsistent with time. A thing; of this kind
however, is n&gt;nerated. For if it lias a composite form, it has a generation
according to the composition. And if it alone subsists from another cause,
it is generated, as not being itself productive of itself. If likewise it is not*
eternal.it has the whole of its hypostasis according to time. Forit is fabricated on
account of another, and is gem-rated as a flowing imago of being. Hence, as
that which is composite is to that which is simple, and us time is to eternity, so
is generation to essence. If, therefore, a simple and uniform essence is eternal,
the essence which is composite, multiform, and conjoined with time, is generation.
For it is divinely said by Plato, that the world originated from it certain principle,
Forthrt which is generated in a portion of time began from a temporal, from a
producing, from a final, from a material, and from a formal cause. For since
principle, is multifariously predicated that which was once generated has a begin
ning of generation according to all these causes. The world however originated
from a certain, and not from crcry principle. Vi hat therefore is this principle ?
You must not say it is a temporal principle. For that which originates from thin
is also allotted the principl" of generation from all the rest. But it originated
from that principle, in which he afterwards instructs us, I mean the most proper,
or the final principle. For it was generated on account of I lie p&gt;&lt;&gt;d ; and this
is the principle from which its generation originated, lie says therefore that this
is the most proper principle, so that this may be called the principle of the genera.
tion of the world. Hence in the first place he shown that the. world is generated
from its composition; forit is visible and tangible. These, therefore.are theextremes
of the universe. For heaven is visible, but earth is tangible. And visibility is in
enrth so far as it participates of light ; and tangibility in heaven, so far as a terres
trial nature is antecedently comprehended in it according to cause, lint the
world is simply [visible nnd tangible], and has a body in order that you may
also assume the middle plenitudes which it contains. And this again is asserted
by IMato conformably to the oracle, which says: // is an imitation of intellect, but
that u-hich is fabricated has sonttlhing of body. So far, thorvforc, as the universe

1 For rayo/m-or here, xatl wafiayo^ituv.
1 For fur line, it i mpiiMtc to read ^.
The wonl ofjurof *a. awrov u|t|&gt;cjr to me to be utuilted IJ tint plate,

BOOK ii.] TIM.T.US CM PLATO. 04 1

lias something corporeal, it is generated ; for according to this it is visible and
tangible. But every tiling vi&lt;ible and tangible, is sensible; for sense is touching and
seeing. Tint however which is sensible is (lie object of opinion, as being mingled
from sensible*, and not able to preserve tlie purity of intelligible forms. But every
tiling of this kind is -jenerated, as having a composite essence.

I hito. therefore, does not subvert the perpetuity of the universe, as some who
follow the Aristotelian hypotheses fancy he does. And that this is true we may
easily learn from hence. |JIe says that time was generated together with the
heaven oV universe. If therefore time is perpetual, the universe also is perpetual.
But if the universe* had a temporal beginning, then time also had a temporal
ho^innin^, which is of all things the most impossible. 1 They say, however, that
time is twofold, the one disorderly, hut the other proceeding according to number.
For motion is twofold, the one kind disorderly and confused, but the other
orderly and elegant. But there is a time * co-ordinate to each of these motions.
That a body, however, may be moved equably or anomalously is possible;
but it is impossible to conceive an equable and anomalous time. For thus the .
essence of time will be a composite. And why do I say this? For when the
motion is anomalous, time is equable. There are now, therefore, many motions ;
aixl some are swifter, but others slower, and one is more equable than another;
but there is one continued time -of all these, and which proceeds according to
number. Hence it i* not ri-^ht, thus to make a twofold time. If, however, time
is one and continued; if indeed it is nnbegotten, the universe also is unbegotten,
which is consubsistenl with time. But if it was generated, an absurdity will
follow ; since time, in onh r that it may be generated, will l&gt;e in want of time, and
this, though it does not yet exist. For when time was generated, time was
not yet.

Farther still, Plato conjoins the soul of the universe immediately on its lein&lt;.r
generated, with body, and does not uive to it life prior to the corporeal-formed
nature, but as soon as it is constituted incloses it. in body. Moreover, he .a}s
that soul ranks among beings that always exist. If, therefore, he makes body and
soul to be consnbsistent, but soul always exists, according to him body also is
[&gt;erpclual. For that which is at once consnbsistent with the perp -tual, is unl&gt;c-

Ifiitc.id ol fi if iii^tji- x r| ^onriirqr, ac o ofpavtif opx r &lt; r * rl XP"" l&gt; n * plf
necessary to rca&lt;l, ci t fiv^tat-ot oj^iji t\n xftonKijt; uni o x/oroi ap\tv rtt ^orurijr.
1 For x/wny here, it is requisite tw read xpo-oi.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 II

242 HKOLLt S ON Till: [nook 11.

gotten. Aj^ain, TimaniH here says, that tin? soul was generated ; hut Socrates in
the Pluedrus says, it is tiiiltegotteii. Hence, ho after another manner falls that
ijeuerated, \vliicli is clearly nnlie^otteil according to linn*. Farther still, he sayt
that the world is incorruptible, which is also granted by those who oppose him.
But in the Uepublic lie clearly asserts, or rather the !\!u?es, that e\ery tiling ge
nerated is necessarily corrupted, assuming in this place generation according to
time. From these things, therefore, jou may understand what I say : for tin-
world is thus demonstrated to hi- nnbegotten. For if tin- world is incorruptible,
but nothing which is generated according to time is incorruptible, the world is
not generated according to time. What occasion is there, however, for these
syllogisms ? For I lato in the l,;i\\s clearly s,i\s, that tune is infinite according to
the p.i-t, ami thai in this infinity I In re h.t\e been myriads on u:\riads o! b.irren
anil fertile periods of men. For investigating the he^inniim of a p&lt;ility, from
which cities change into \irtue and \ice, he adds : Jittt you ^ itl *tn;, fnn ir/icticc S
I indeed tliink from t/ic length anil /////////// / time, (tint tin- nmtdiioii.f ;7//f. / tiiLc place
in a thing of this kind." &lt; &gt;r rather that ue may ar^ue from what is in our hands, a
little prior to this, we may hear him &gt;a\ in:; , that " irlm c there i* init/tt rc.ttrt inc lunf
urcold, there the nice vf men &lt;//;&lt;-.///.y f.//v/.v i/iurc ur . .vj tiu/tn nuts." Hut if the race
of men always exists, the tiniver.-c al&gt;o is nec&lt; s-.arily jHipetnal.

Again, therefore, it the Demiiir^ns ranks amoiiL? eternal beings, lie does not at
one time fabricate, and at another not. For if he did, he would not ha\e an in
variable saint-ness of siih-istnice, and immutability. But if healw i\s fabricates,
i that which is fabricated by him aluavs exist-. For why, bein^ v\illin_:lv at rest
for an infinite time, did he at length convert himself to fabrication ! \\ as it
lecansc he apprehended it to be better? But was he, prior to tlii-, ignorant that
it was IM tier or not ? For it is absurd, beinij intellect, that he should be ignorant ;
wince there w ill he about him both ignorance and knowledge. But if he knew this,
why did lie not before heniu to ireiieiale ami produce the world ! And if it
was Ix-tter, why did he not persevere in ihis enei ;v, if it lie laul ul so to speak ?
J or it is not holy to conceive (hat, heiiiLj intellect and a &lt;iod, he would pursue
that which IN less instead of thai which is moiv beautiful. It is nece-sar\ , how-
ever, to admit these things, if the world is ;ei;era!ed according to time, ai;d is not
consubsistent with the inlinity of time. Tho-e a!.-o appear to me to sin against

1 tii5li-.nl ill iiXXu rj) urniiiif TOI/ ixififinu ei t i\ -.&lt; rtri. . in \\\\^ |i!,icc, It i tli Cl ^M .lV lo r;ul \\n /n) ty
nrtifny rov \pvHjv fft/H fK&gt;Tuii.

noiiK I..] TIM.KL S 01 I l.ATO. -JJU

the Demiur&lt;tus of the \\orhl, in another way, who say that the world once was
not. For if it once \vas not, there was a time in which the Demiunrns did not
make it. For (hat which is made, and that which makes, subsist together. IJiit
iftliere w as a time in which lie did not make, lie was then a maker in capacity.
And if lie was in capacity, he Mas imperfect, and afterward* perfect when ho
made. If, however, there is prior and posterior ahont him, it is evident that lie
doe- not belong to natures which energize eternally; hut that he passes from not
making according t&lt; time, to making. iNIoieover, he produces time. How
therefore having an energy which is in want of time, does he product 1 it through
this energy ? For lie once produced time, of which he is indigent, in order
that by his elUcthc energy In* may product; time. This, therefore, cannot be
otherwise.

Afl&lt; r this opinion, however, let us duvet our attention to Severus, who says
that tin world simply considered is indeed perpetual, but that this which now
exists and is thus nuned, was generated. For there are twofold circulations,
a*; lli- F.lran ^ii -st has shown; one of which is that which the universe now cir-
cmmol\es, but the- other the contrary to it. The world therefore is generated,
and originated from a certain principle, w Inch is the cause of this circulation.
Hul simply con-idered it is not generated. This interpretation, however, we shall
oj)pose, by ohscmii, that it is not proper to transfer fabulous enigmas to phy
siology. For liow is it po^-ihl: 1 that the soul which moves the unherse, sliould
be weary, and change the ancient circulation ! How also is the universe perfect,
and sufficient to it-elf, il it doires mutation ? I low can there he an alternate change
of circulations, w hen both that w hich i&gt; mo\ed, and that which motes, preserve their
proper habit ? .And how doe&lt; Tinui iis say. that tiie circulation of the nature whicli is
characterized by sameness, is moved to the rii:ht hand, according to the demiurgic
will, but that which is characterized by diili-rence, to the left hand ? For if it is neces
sary that lhe works of the Den.iui trns -honld remain invariably the same, and be
perpetual, it is likewise necessary that the circulations sliould be always thn same;
and that the period characterized by sameness should be moved to the ri^lit hand,
but that which is characterized by diil erence, to the left. For they proceeded at
one and the same time from the Deminr^us, and were allotted this circulation.
Faither still, is it not necessary, iltat ineijiiahihty must thus be introduced to the

1 Tltc \\onl&gt;rij ^f Ottrtpov t* apirrtpn, ;irc oniillttl in (lie original, Iml evidcally ought lo be intcrlcd
in llii^ pl.icc.

J44 1 HOCLIS ON Til 1 . 1 . [BOOK n.

motion of the universe! For every thirty which is about to erase from its former
motion, ami to pass on to another, hastens to the contrary, i. e. to rest, and causes
the precedaneous motion to waste away. For if it continued ti\ed in the same
energy, what is the cause of the second circulation ! By no means, then-Ion*, are
these interpretations which are not physical to lr admitted. IS or a^ain, must
such explanations be adopted, though they are more rational, as those which
aseriln* generation to the world, in conception only. For thus we may al&gt;o infer
according to conception, and not according to truth, that there is a Deminr^us of
the universe. For from admitting that the world \\as generated, if is demonstrated
that there is a producing .md demiurgic can-e of it. Or it may he said, that the
nnnerse is admitted to he generated * for the sake of perspicuity, and the doctrinal
method, in order that we ma) learn what the numerous ^nods arc, of which it
participates, from the demiurgic prox ideiice. I or tins is nuleeij in a certain roped
true, yet is not sufficient to the theory of 1 lato. For the perspicuous, says
lamhlichus, is \eiierahlc, when it is adapted to science. For admitting also ihat
the uniuTse is |&gt;erpetiial, it is po-iMe to p&lt;int out the ^oods imparted to it by
the Cods. And thus much in opposition to these interpretations.

Aiiain, ho\\c\er, let us show from thebejfinnini;, alter \\hat manner the universe
is said to he generated. For it is neither so according to tii ie, through tiie hefore
mentioned arguments, nor simply because it proceeds from a cause ; since it is not
Miflicient to say this. Fur intellect aUo i&gt; from the lir-t cau^c, and all tilings
afler l/ic unc are from a cause, \&lt; I all things are not generated. 1 or where d&lt;i&lt; s
the eternal suh^ist, if all thiii j&gt; are yenerated For the one is prior to eternity.
After what manner therefore, it may he said, is the unnerve generated ! As that
which now is always becoming to he, and at the sani" time always was hecomin^
to be, or rising into existence. For it is not that which is partial. IJody there-
fore, [i. e. partial body] is not only trenerated, but there is also a time when it \v:s
generated, lint the whole world alone suhsi-ts in becoming to /&gt;&lt;, and is not at
the same time that which wti.i generated. It is also according to Aristotle always
in the end, the (t lrtiyx hemi^ temporal, uccordiilt; to t-mp(ral inliiiiiy. I - or ;is
the solar-form liiiht proceecls from its proper fountain, thus also the world is
always generated, and always produced, and is always becoming to be, and at the

1 I cni i&gt; i&gt;ii:itii &lt;l in lhi&gt; |)!.nc; and the smlriue uu^ht \ In inlf n^,ili\c. llriur in&gt;lc;i.| i,f
i TI r(; &lt;urr;t tarui i &lt;py m, ri Kiriu ri/v &lt; v -i/Tpu afiuv&gt;..\i/0FWf, we Illll^t ri !l tin ~/"f&gt; ri/i &lt;IIT/&gt; inru*

nfpytiai i.X. with j m&gt;te of intrrrounliuii .tl ilii-t-ntl.

After vTrtdi-rtTt, -n: lit-ri , (In- \\ord - t ti, : ;ir mini !&gt;c iijijilii il.

TIM/L:US or PLATO. o 45

L " " -/"

rune, time always was so. Asa composite likewise ills ^cnerated. For all

composition is gniicratmn. But if is always compos!, it u as always bcomin &lt;r

- &gt;

lo be, with whirh to he ;;eneraied concurs. And it .appears to ni" tint l*lato\W&lt;
knowing this, says // &lt;*&lt;/.&lt; et/v//(Y/ instead of it is generated, just as of [real] lx-in &gt;r
he says it uas, insi ad of it is : for Ins words are" wiictln-r it -iLraifs .,-n.t For as
in the intelligible, the was and is are the same; for all limits are there accord
ing to sameness, since all things are in l/tc n&lt;rj\ which is more impartih!e lhan
the now which is according to time ; thus also ii i\ "fin-rated and / / r/v.v generated
proceed lo (lie same tiling in every seiisihle nalnr. . For it was .generated, as that
which always was hecomin.: to he, and as generated, it is. But that a thin"
iieneraled, when it is assumed according to a certain time, does not indicate
I hat \\hicli is simply a composite, is evident from its opposite. For to this
Plato opposes perpetual beinu r . If. therefore, perpetual beini; manifests that which
is simple, we must say that what is alone a composite is generated. B ll if eternal
hem-; -signified that which is always according to time, that which is originating
from a certain thinir, would he said to Ix- becoming to le. For that which is \
genera led is not opposed to the eternal, so far as it is generated, hut so far as it \
participates of lime; on which account also it is generated. That per|&gt;ctiiai /
lieiiiir, however, [or that which always is,] manilests the eternal, is evident ; since
llie Dnuiiir^us also who produces time, is called perpetual Ueini;, and the para-
diliin likewise is llnis denominated. Hence, it signifies an eternal hypostasis,
and not that which participates of temporal perpetuity

Some one, however, who acknowle.lijes this may nevertheless donht, why we
have hefore said that the world is generated, from having a hody ? l &lt;tr as then-
nre in it a hody, which is alone generated, a divine soul, which always is, and a
divine intellect prior to this, \vliy do we say that it is generated on account of its
hody, and not denominate it iniliegolten, on account of its soul, or its intellect

It is said, therefore, that the whole world is every where characterized from form

and not from the subject nature. For do we not call Socrates mortal, though he
has an immortal soul, Ix-cause the animal which is in him is mortal ? If, however,
you say that we now consider I he. corporeal-formed nature of the universe, not
yet co-arranged with MII|, yon will speak rightly. But when you see it animated
and endued w ilh intellect, you may call it a Cod. For thus Plalo iti the Uepnb-
lir calls it a dirinc generated tiling. But in this dialogue, he thinks lit lo denomi
nate the world, a blessed (joil. In the very words also In-fore us, he in a
reater decree celebrates the universe. For as he is about to call that which w

24({ PROCLUS ON THK [BOOK n

imbejrotten [viz. soul] generated, though he attributes an nnbegotten subsistence
to eternal natures, thus also he calls the world generated. For it is not when
denominated generated, diminished by a juxtaposition with the eternal. He
likewise conjoins the becoming to be of it, with // ;/.v generated ; in order thnt
as all or the universe, he may evince that it is perfect and being, but as ha\ ing
its essence in lime, that it is gem-rated. He likewise assigns to it the principle
of a certain and not of all generation. And according toils corporeal-formed
nature, he calls it, generation, omitting the di\ine po\\er.s in it, through \\hich it
is happy, and is call* d a &lt;od.

Moreover, the- demonstration is worthy of admiration, \i/. how seientifn ally
it proc-&lt;-ds from t lie definition. Hence also, lie invei N the order. For in the
hypotheses indeed, he defined that which is generated to In- the object of opinion ;
but to the demonstration of that which is generated, h.- assumes the converse, in
onler that he may make the definition to he th.- middle term, as in d&lt;-mo:i&gt;tra-
tions is perfectly requisite. I or this will cause \\hat i&gt; said to he truly a demon
stration. For opinion through pos,es&gt;ing the reasons ol generated natures,
introduces the order of cause* with reference to them. Hence it appears to me
that Plato is not satisfied with the term sensible in order to demonstrate that the
world is generated, but adds also that what is sensible is the object of opinion ;
since sense indeed knows the energy of seiisibles, in consequence of sidli/ring
by them, but opinion knows also their essences. Fur it antecedently compre
hends the reasons of (hem. In order, therefore, that he might e\ ince the essence
of seiisibles to lie generated, he forms his demonstration from that which is the
object of opinion. Farther still, his not adding ifnit tclitclt is ikxtnu titilc to tluit
:i IHC/I /.v iv/&lt;. ;//, shows his re\erential conceptions of the world; though it is
in a certain re&gt;pect true that the world is destructible, as we ha\e before said.
At the same time, this exhibits tons the caution and reverence of Plato: for
liaxint; that which is consequent [to the being generated], yet he does not ;u!d
it; which he ou^ht to admire who thinks that the world was generated according
to Plato in time. For this generated nature which he calls the olject of opinion,
is at the same time dt stiuclible ; but the world is not destructible at the same
lime that it is generated. Hence the world is both destructible and incorruptible,
yet the philosopher does not call it both tlu-M- according to the same; fur this
\ would be ridii nlous ; but lit call* it incorruptible, in the same manner as un be
gotten, according to time. For if that which is generated according to time,

1 Instead of ij ynp &lt;V; TH rtivt \&lt;i; ort x fl " r&lt;1 " yi &gt;i Tut &gt;n * | Jl c * iu - i I NS.iry lo rt .ul &gt;i ^iip
N ,,a rtt roi k Xd- ; oi.i i. X.

I.....K ii.] TIM.i:i S 01- PLATO.

217

is corruptible, as it is said lo he in (he U -public, that which is incorruptible is
lining Urn. Hut t/ic voi fd is dt sti HC(i/ifi\ n\ w.l &gt;n / //- at&gt; &lt; in connect it.\,lf. For
;is ui.it which i. corporeal s&gt; f.ir as p Tlaiu-&lt; to itself H alter motive, or moved by
another, thus a!-o so f.ir as pertains to itself it is destructible, in constvpimce of
Ji. inj; connected by something rise. For no lto&lt;ly is either ^enerative or connec
tive of iNelf; since every tiling \\liirli generates makes; l.ul every tlii:i- which
makes is incorporeal. For though it should l&gt;c a fxx/i/, t/it it makcx hi/ incui-pnrcnl
ji iiccrx. K\ery lliin^;, therefore, \\hicli generates i-; incorporeal; and every tiling
which connects, is cHvclur of a certain tiling, viz. it is elli-ctive of union, and tin;
undii|iated. IJiit e\ery tiling which is eilective is impartible. Hvery tiling tliere-
fore connective is iinpartilile. Hence it is impossible for that which connects
itself to be a body. For it is not the province of body to connect; since so far
as it is body, il is partible, as it is said in the Sophista against those who assert
lint all tilings are bodies Tml that whirli connect^ i^ impartible. 1C. however,
that which is connected is body, but that which connects is incorporeal, body
is not its.-lf connective of itself. Hence that which is connected by ilse!f is neces-
suily impartible. As therefore body has in its own nature a finite power, so
likewise it i&gt; in it&lt; own nature destructible, not as bein^ adapted to corruption,
but as not naturally capable of preserving itself, nor as corruptible in capacity,
that ye-u may aUo investigate the corruptible iu energy, but as incapable of im
parting, incorruptibility to itself.

^ hence, therefore, has it the perpetual, and whence does it receive inlinite,
power? N\ e reply, from its producing cause. For as it is moved from thence, so
likewise il is ijenerated from thence, and is always trenerated. For every thin &lt;r
which is generated from an immoveable cause, is allotted a never-failing nature, as
also the da .moniacal Aristotle says; so that according to this reaMinin^ likewise,
the world will have tiie perpetual proceeding from the immoveable [i. e. from the
intellectual] fabrication. Since, however, according to its own proper nature it is
generated, it is alwa\s generated from the father. But since the world bein^ all
and a whole, is not imperfect, in addition to beinjj generated, or becoming t () j^
it always was jyencrated, since, likewise, the motion of it is always in the end, as
Aristotle savs. Much more, therefore, is the essential p-ner. tioa of it always in
I he i.-nd, imitating; the perfection of its maker. So that it is tikcays generated, and
always uus generated ; nut receiving* at once tlic wlmlc itijinity of tfie

It i% oeccsarv \\trt lo supply /irj ^cyn/icroi.

248

1 ROCLUS ON THE [BOOK u.

power of its Maker, but always according to the now possessing the ability ofc.risting
from tins paver, and receiving something from it, according to tht instantaneous
participation of infinity. And it receives the same infinity, indeed, on iircnunt of
that which is imparted, hut on its own account is not aide to receive the same at
once. After tliis manner, therefore, the perpetuity ofthe world remains, and the
generation of it takes place ; and in this resjwct the In-fore mentioned men [\. e.
Plato and Aristotle] .ire not at variance. At the same time, however, they differ,
because IMato says, that the essence of the tmi\er&gt;e is co-extended with all time,
hut Aristotle supposes that it simply always exists, infers this to he necessary
through many arguments, and ascribes to it temporal infinity, asserting at tin-
same time that eternity i* stable infinite power. He likewise demonstrates that
no infinite powf r whatever can he present with a fmile hotly. Hence it follows,
that the world Ix-ing rorpoival always receive*, inlinile power, hut never has the
whole of it, because it is finite. It is therefore alone true to say, that from infinite
power it is ptm-ratcil, hut is not, iufmitely. lint if it is generated, it receives
infmitv on account of inlinile time. For It, /u infinite pertains alone to that which
is eternal ; hut a ^m rat ul infinite belongs to that w hich is temporal ; for generation
is conjoined with time. Hence Aristotle himself is romp* lied to acknowledge that
the world is in a cerlain re&gt;pect generated.

lioth likewise assert that it is the same in numher, hut Plato conformably to
principles, .says that it is generated. l ; or he established prior to the universe a
producing cause, from which he gives subsistence to the universe. But Aristotle
does not admit that any eternal nature is an efl ec live cause. And the former,
indeed, generates time together w ilh the essence of the universe, hut the hitler
together with motion: for time according to him i* that which is numbered.
Aristotle, however, is accustomed to do this in his other Treatises. For such
things as IMato asserts of /7/c one, Aristotle ascnhes to intellect, 1 vi/. the non-
possess.on of multitude, the d.sirahle, the ha\ ing no intellectual pe,ce| .(ion of
secondary natures. Hut Mich things as IMato attril.utes to the demiurgic intellect,
Aristotle asciiU-s to the heavens, and the celestial (iods : for according to him,
fabrication and providence are from these. Such things also as IMato ascribes
to the essence of the heavens, Aristotle attributes to their circular motion ; departing
indeed from theological principles, but dwelling more than is lit on physical

Aristotle in his luttjj.livskJ discuions aiccmls uo liiplu-r than intelligible intellect, which ^ will,
him the first caue. And perlup* this wa in coiiM-qtiri.cc of knowing that all brjoiul tin* intilli-tl is
truly inetfjlde.

BOOK ii.] TIM^EUS O* PLATO. 349

productive powers. Since, however, the daemoniacal Aristotle is very copious in
discussing the reciprocations of the generated with reference to the corruptible, and
of the unbegotten with reference to the incorruptible, he must be reminded, that
Plato much prior to him assents to these axioms; in the Republic indeed asserting
that corruption follows every thing which is generated; but in the Phacdrus, that the
unbegotten is also incorruptible. How is it possible, therefore, since Plato gives
generation to the universe, that he should not also introduce corruption to it ;
or that corrupting that which is moved in a confused and disorderly manner, he
should not give generation to it prior to corruption ! The generation of the
universe, therefore, was devised by him after a manner different [from its apparent
meaning].

" But we say that whatever is generated, is necessarily generated by a
certain cause."

The discussion accords with the hypotheses, or rather with the order of the
things from which the hypotheses are assumed. For as every where form is
suspended from the effective cause, so likewise, the first hypotheses are in conti
nuity with the second, and afford a principle to the demonstrations which are
consequent to them. For since it was demonstrated according to the first hypo
thesis, tiiat the world was generated, through the object of opinion as a medium,
afterwards that which is consequent to this is demonstrated according to the
second hypothesis, viz. that it was generated by a cause. For if the world is a
thing generated, or becoming to bo, but every thing generated is generated by a
certain cause, hence the world was necessarily generated by a certain cause.
What therefore is the producing cause of the universe ? That from which the
being generated is present to the world. For it is necessary to investigate this
immediately after the present demonstration. And we shall sec as we proceed,
what kind of arguments Plato uses on this subject.

Now, however, let us briefly recall to our memory, [the reasoning by which it
is shown] that every tiling which is generated, is necessarily generated by a cer
tain cause. Every thing generated, therefore, is in its own nature imperfect. But
being imperfect, it is not naturally adapted to perfect itself; since neither is any
other imperfect tiling. For every thing which is perfected, is perfected from that

1 Thn it because be discussed metaphysics physically, just as Plato discussed phj sirs metaphysically.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 I

IMIOCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

which i iu energy. But that which in in energy in perfect; HO that every thing
which jM ifccU another IH ulwayi* when it perfect* in energy according to thai form
lo which it give* perfection]. That however, which in generated, so far as it in
generated, i* imperfect. Hence that which is generated, HO far as it is generated
i* riot naturally adapted to perfect another thing. But if it cannot perfect another
thing, much more i* it incapable of pcilectmg iUelf. The latter, therefore, is a
greater undertaking than the former. Tor that which perfects itself, is also per
fective of another thing. 1 But if it is not perfected by itself, it is evident that it is
perfected by another. For how will it U- generated, unless it is perfected &gt;

Again, therefore, it must be said, the world is generated. But every thing
which is generated being imperfect, is either perfected by another thing, or by
itself. Hence every thing which i&gt; generated, is either perfected by another, or
by itself. But it is not perfected by itself. I 1 , is therefore perfected by another,
so that it is generated by a certain cause. Farther still, the world is a composite,
and has its hypostasis from dissimilars. But if it is a composite, it is either com
posed by itself, or by another. For it is necessary that composition should l&gt;e
from a cause, unless we intend to make it an accidental thing, and from chance.
If therefore it is composed by itself, again it will perfect itself, and give Mibsis-
tence to itself, and we shall ignorantly tiansfer it to an incorporeal essence. For
how will it compose itself? Will it be from the parts arranging themselves ? But
thus we shall make bodies to l&gt;e self-motive. Or will it be from im|&gt;clling each
other? And what in this case is that which primarily moves them. And how is
it holy to commit the whole world to such like impulsions and contrivances?
How likewise will there be order from things deprived of order, and ornament
from things unadorned? For every where that which makes is better than its
effect, and that which generates, than the thing generated. And if indeed the
parts are the material causes of the composition of the world, what is it which
made them? For this is what we investigate. But if they are the cllieiciit causes,
how is it possible that things unadorned can be effective of things that are adorned,
and disonh rly natures, of such as have order and arrangement ? If however the
world is not composed by itself, it is evident that it has this composition from
another. Hence if the world is a composite, hut that which is a composite is

1 Instead of ui n &lt;TT. in Iliis pl.uf, \r iltoultl doulillo* r.ad &lt;ii ifp&gt;&lt;ia tan.
1 Inxirad f TO -,op i Ul .T, T-rXtiu.rnoj- &lt;rr,r, wliali is evidently dc-fi-tlixc, it i-ffins rt|uiilr to read
ro -fti/t taiiTo rt.Xuricr, iai aXXcr ri Xjiu/rino- un .
1 it &gt;OtrK it onntud in (lie &lt;&gt;n,iu,i!.

BOOK ii.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 251

composed by a certain cause, the world therefore has its generation from a cause.
Hence too, from these things it is manifest, that what is generated, is generated
by a certain cause.

It is not however wonderful, if Plato calls the cause of every thing "enerated,
a certain cause. For the cause of all things, is simply cause, and not a certain
cause ; concerning which he also says, that it is the cause of all beautiful things.
For it is simply God. But every divinity posterior to it is a certain God, as for
instance, demiurgic or vivific. The cause therefore of generated natures is a cer
tain cause, as differing from the cause of all. Hence, he says, that what is ^one-
rated, is generated by a certain cause. It is also well that Plato says one cause
precedes the whole of generation. For multitude is co-arranged about one prin
ciple, and the many unities about the one. But with respect to other physiologists,
some rank cause with con-causes; others recur to physical powers; others to
dispersed infinite principles; others to nature; and others to soul. Plato, how
over, dismisses indeed theso causes, but supposes that there is one cause which
is the first of all causes. For with this cause, the psychical order indeed co-ope
rates, but nature is ministrant to it, and all con-causes are subservient to it, and
are moved conformably to its will. Because, therefore, the demiurgic monad pre
cedes multitude, he denominates this monad a cause : for this is significant of
unity. Because, however, it has not the first order among causes, nor is impar-
ticipahlo,* he adds the word certain. So that the words " by a certain cause"
have the same signification as, by one cause indeed, yet not the first cause. Hence,
neither is it reasonable immediately to produce that which is generated, but that
which is eternal, from (lie one ; in order that from the one, which is prior to eternity,
every eternal nature may proceed ; but from an eternal nature, that which is gene
rated and temporal. And that solf-subsislont natures likewise may proceed from
that which is superior to beings that produce themselves; but from these, those
that are generated by others. For the series and order of things which proceed
from the one, is continued ; and things nearer to the principle, give subsistence
to such as are more remote from it.

" It is difficult, therefore, to discover the maker and father of this uni
verse, and when found, it is impossible to speak of him to all men."

For MI here, it is requisite to read r n.

* Tlio demiurgic monad, (i. e. Jtipitrr or the Demiurgu*,) i* not imr&gt;articir*Me lxrne it immedi
ately illuminate*, or i con-*ubiMent with, intellectual intellect. See the 6th Book of my Transition
of Proclui on the theology of Plato.

PKOCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

It ha* been rightly observed by some prior to UH, thut Plato having shown that
the world was generated by n cause, immediately after ascends to the God who is
the DemiurgiiH of it, in a manner worthy of his iiiU-llectir.il conceptions. For it
seems that the artificial nature of the progeny, introduces a rational and divine
cause, and not accident or chance, which are neither causes, nor have an hypo-
static power, nor in short, sustain the well-ordered progression of beings. It is
requisite, however, that we should first examine the words themselves, and after
wards thus recur to the whole theory.

Father and maker therefore, differ from each other, KO far as the former is the
cause of matter, 1 hut the latter of tin- world and order, and in short, of the formal
cause; and so f.ir indeed as the l orm&lt; r is (lie supplier of being and union, but
the latter of pow-rs and a multiform essence ; and so far an the one stably contains
all tilings in himself, but the other is the cause of progression and generation ; nml
so far as the former signifies ineflalile and divine providence, but the latter an
abundant communication of productive principles. Porphvry however says,
that father is lie who generates the universe from himself, but maker he who
receives the matter of it from another. Hence Aristo indeed, is said to be the/u//ur
of Plato, but the builder of a house is the maker or fabricator of it, us not him
self generating the matter of which it consists. If however, this is true, there
was no occasion to call the Oeinimgus father, because, according to Tiin.i-ns, he
does not give subsistence to matter. Is not the demiurgus therefore, rather the
maker as producing form ? For we call all those makers who produce any thing
from a non-existent state into existence. Hut KO far UH the Demiurgus produces
that which he produces, in conjunction with life, he is father. For fathers are
the causes of animals, and of certain living beings, and impart seed together with
life. And thus much concerning this particular.

But " thin universe" signifies indeed, the corporeal masses, and the whole
spheres [of which it consists] and the plenitudes of each. It also signifies the
vital and intellectual powers, which ride as it were in the corporeal masses. It
also comprehends all the mundane causes l and the whole divinity of the world,
about which the number of the mundane Cods proceeds ; likewise, the one di
vinity, the divine soul, and the whole bulk of the world, together with the divine,

1 For G\IJ Here, it is necessary l read \&lt;n, because nutter according to Plato proceed* Irtun the
Uttier Ph-iues, or animal itrlf, :uid in&gt;t from the Demiurgus.
* For avTovt, it is necessary to read airmi.

noon u.] TIMJEL S OF PLATO. 253

intellectual, psychical, and corporeal-formed number that is conjoined with the
world. For every monad has a multitude co-ordinate to itself. All these there
fore must be assumed for the unirtrsc ; since it signifies all these. Perhaps like
wise the addition of (he pronoun this, is significant of the universe l&gt;eing in a
certain re&lt;pect sensible and partial. For the intelligible universe is not this, be
cause it is comprehensive of all intellectual forms. But the term this is adapted to
the \isible universe which is allotted a sensible and material nature. It is difficult
therefore, as Plato says, to discover the Deiniurgus of this uni \erse. For since
with respect to discovery one kind proceeds scientifically from such things as are
fust, 1 but another journeys on from things of a secondary nature, according to
reminiscence ; the discovery from such things as are first may l&gt;e said to be
difficult, because the invention of the intermediate powers, pertains to the high
est theory. But the discovery from such things as are secondary, is nearly more
difficult than the former. For if we intend from these to survey the essence of
the Deiniurgus, and his other powers, it is necessary that we should have beheld
all the nature of the things generated by him, all the visible parts of the world,
and the unapparent natural powers which it contain*, according to which the
sympathy and antipathy of the parts in the world subsist. Prior to these also,
we must have surveyed the stable physical reasons, and natures themselves,
both the more total and the more partial, 1 and auain, the immaterial and material,
the divine and d Demoniacal, and the natures of mortal animals. And farther still,
the genera which are under life, the perpetual and the mortal, the undefdcd and
he material, such as are wholes, and such as are parts, the rational and the irra
tional, and the prerogatives which are superior to ours, through which every thing
between the (Jods and the mortal nature are bound together. We must likewise
have beheld the all-various souls, the different numbers of Gods according to the
different parts of the universe, and the ineffable and eflable impressions of the
world through which it is conjoined with the father. For he who without having
seen these is impelled to the survey of the Demiurgus, is more imperfect than is
requisite to the intellectual perception of the father. I5ut it is not lawful for any
thing imperfect to be conjoined with that which is all-perfect.

Moreover, it i.s necessary, that the soul becoming an intellectual world, and
being assimilated as much as possible to the whole intelligible world, should in-

vis. From axioms and definitions.

* M&lt;pir*rrr/xif is omitted in the original.

* For 1 1| here, it if requisite to read k.

254

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

troflhce herself to the maker of the universe; and from this introduction, should
in a certain respect Ijecome familiar \vit!i him through a continued intellectual
energy. For uninterrupted energy ahout any thing, calls forth and resuscitates
our [dormant] ideas. But through this familiarity, becoming stationed at the
door of the father, it is necessary that we should be united to him. For dis
covery is this, to meet with him, to be united to him, to associate alone with the
alone, and to see him himself, the soul hastily withdrawing herself from every other
energy to him. For being present with her father, she then considers scientific
discussions to l&gt;e but words, 1 banquets together with him on the truth of real be
ing, and in pure splendor is purely initiated in entire and stable visions. Such
therefore is the discovery of the father, not that which is doxastic ; for this is du
bious, and not very remote from the irrational life. Neither is it scientific ; for
this is syllogistic and composite-, and does not come into contact with the intel
lectual essence of the intellectual Demiurgus. Hut it is that \\hich subsists
according to intellectual vision itself, a contact with the intelligible, and a union
with the demiurgic intellect. For this may properly be denominated diflicult,
either as hard to obtain, presenting itself to souls after every evolution of life; or
a.sthe true labour of souls. For after the wandering about generation, after pu
rification, and the light of science, intellectual energy and the intellect winch is
in us shine forth, placing the soul in the father as in a port, purely establishing
her in demiurgic intellections, and conjoining light with light, not such as that of
science, but more beautiful, more intellectual, and partaking more of the nature
of the o/ttthan this. For this is the paternal port,* and the discovery of the father,
viz. an undefiled union with him.

1 This is in consequence of a union with the Demiurgus beiug so much buperior to scientific per
ception.

Proclu* litre allude* to the fabulous wandering of t lyf.e in lh- Ody^cy. Fur Momor l&lt;y then*
ocullly indicate* the lift- of a man who |&gt;af&gt;scs in a regular manm-r from i&lt; miblc to an intellectual
life, aud who In-in;- ihrou-hly purified by the evi re ise of ihe cathartic virtues, is at lenytli able to
energi/e according to the intuitive perception of intellect, and thui after becoming re-uiiiied to Penelope
or Philosophy, nicett with and embraces his falli.r. This appears also to h.oe b.-en tin- opinion &lt;f the
Pythagorean Nuincnius, a we are informed by Porphyry in his trrali-e De Antro Nyui|&gt;haruiii. " 1 &lt;.r
he thought th.it the person of Ulysses in the Odyssey represented to us a man who passe* in a repul.r
manner over the dark and stormy sea of generation ; and thus at length arrives at (hat region (i. t. t&gt; e
intellectual legion") where teiiijH sl.s and seas are unknown, and finds a nation

Who ne er kntw salt, or heard ihe billows roar. "
See more onlhis subject in nay Restoration of the Platonic Theology, p. JOt.

nooKi,.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 255

But to sty " that when found it is impossible to speak of him to all men, 1 " perhaps
indicates the cuslom of the Pythagoreans, who had arrant- assertions about divine
natures, and did nof divulge tin in to all men. For as the Elean uuest says, the
eyes of the multitude arc not strong enough to look to truth. Perhaps also this
may ho said which is much more venerable, that it is impossible for him who has
discovered the maker and father of the universe to speak of him to certain persons
such as he, has seen him. For the discovery was not made by the soul speaking,
but closing her eyes, and being converted/ to the divine light. Nor was it made
by her b^ing moved with her own proper motion, but through being silent with
a silence which leads the way [to union]. For since the essence of other things
is not naturallyadapted to be spoken of, either through a name, or through definition,
or through science, but is seen through in t el lection alone, as Plato say sin his Epistles,
in what ether way can it be possible to discover the essence of the Demiurgus, than
by intellectual energy ? And how when having thus found it, is it possible to tell
what is seen, and explain it to others, through nouns and verbs? For the evolu
tion which is conversant with composition, cannot exhibit a uniform and simple
nature. \\ hat then, some one may say, do we not assert many things about the
Demiurgus, and about the other Gods, and even of the one itself? To this we
reply, we speak indeed about them, but we do not speak of each of th&lt;.m itself.
And we are able indeed to speak scienlijicaify of them, but not intellectually. For
this, as we have before observed, is to discover them. But if the discovery is a
silence of the soul, how can speech flowing through the mouth, be sufficient lo
lead that which is discovered into light.

After these tilings, therefore, let us, following the light of science, survey who the
Demiurgus is, and to what order of beings he belongs. For different philosophers
among the ancients were led to different opinions on this subject. For IS umenius,
indeed, celebrating three Cods, calls the first father, but the second maker, and
the third that which is made. For the world according to him is the third God.
So that with him the Demiurgus is two-fold, viz. the first and the second God,
and that which is fabricated is the third God. For it is better to aay this, than 1
to say as he does speaking tragically, grandfather, offspring, nephew. He how-

1 For /irj. v c t vpovra fi/rara Ji/iaroc eo-a \tyuv it is necessarj to r*ad, fttfc rvporrn CM crr
ii i nrur, . . X.

For n-rrrrTpn^jiit rjt, it it It qilisite to read fwtfrpafifitt rjt.

* it is necessary here lo supplj &gt;}.

25 PROCLUS ON THK [BOOK n.

ever, who assorts these things, in the first place does not rightly con-numerate the
good with these other causes. For it is not naturally adapted to be conjoined
with certain things, nor lias it an order secondary to another. But father with
Plato [in the text] is arranged as the second to maker. Farther still, Numenius
co-arranges that which is exempt, from all habitude, with the natures that are
under and posterior to it. It is necessary, however, to refer these indeed to the
first, but to take away from it all habitude. Neither therefore, is the paternal
nature of the maker 1 adapted to the first. For these things are apparent in the
orders of Gods posterior to it. In the third place; it is not right to divide father
and maker, since Plato celebrates one and the same Cod by both these names.
For one divine fabrication, and one maker and father, are every where delivered
by Plato. And by following names, to divulse the one cause [of the \\orld,] i*
just as if some one, !ecau.se Plato calls the universe both heaven and the world,
should .say there are tvo fabrications, the one heaven, and the other the world ;
juntas here, Numenius says there is a two-fold demiurgic Cod, the one father, Itut
the other maker.

With respect to Ilarpocration, it would l&gt;e wonderful, if he were consistent
with himself, in determining things of this kind about the Demiurgus. For this
man is inconsistent in what he says according to the doctrine of three Gods and
so far as he makes the Demiurgus to be two-fold. For he calls the first God,
Heaven and Saturn, the second, Dia and Zena, and the third, Heaven and the
World. But again changing the order he calls the first Cod Dia, and the king
of the intelligible ; hut he denominates the second Cod, the ruler, and the same
divinity, is with him Jupiter, Saturn, and Heaven. The first God therefore, is
all these ; from whom Parmenides takes away all things, every name, all lan
guage, and all habitude. And we, indeed, cannot endure to call the first God
even father ; but he denominates him father, and ofl spring, and the offspring
of an offspring.

But Atticus, the preceptor of Ilarpocration, immediately makes the Demiurgus
to be the same with the good, though the Demiurgus is called good by Plato, but
not the good. He is also denominated by him intellect, but he says that the good

* For fffjprrj^oo* in thii place, it it requisite to read ef^pij^oof.

* Instead of TOJTOI here, the sense evidently requires that we should read onjrow.

1 Father aud tinker are first apparent in the intelligible and intellectual, and afterward* iu the other
orderi of Gods.

BOOK ii.] TIMJEUS OF PLATO. 2.57

is the ransc of all essence, and is beyond being, as we may learn in the Republic.
\Vhat then will Atticus say concerning the paradigm? For it is either prior to the.
Demiurgus, and in this case, there will he something more ancient and honorable
than thcgvnd; or it is in the Demiurgus, and the first (Jod will l&gt;e many things ;
or it is posterior to the Demiurgus, and thus the good, which it is not lawful to
assert, will he converted to things posterior to itself, and will intellectually
perceive them.

After these men, Plotinus the philosopher, asserts that there is a twofold
Demiurgus, one in the intelligihle world, hut the other the leader and ruler of the
universe. And he says rightly. For the mundane intellect is in a certain
respect the Demiurgns of the universe. And Aristotle .shows that this is the first
God, denominates it Fate, and calls it by the name of Jupiter. But again, there
is an exempt father and maker, which Plotinus places in the intelligible, calling
every thing between the otic and the world, the intelligible. For there, accord
ing to him, the true heaven, the king of Saturn, and the Jovian intellect
subsist. Just as if some one should say, that the spheres of Saturn, Jupiter, and
Mars, are in the heavens. For the whole intelligible is one many, and is one
intellect comprehensive of many intclligibles. Plotinus therefore philosophizing
asserts these things.

Amelius, however, makes a threefold Demiurgus, three intellects, and three
kings, one being him that exists, another him that possesses, and the third him
that sees. But these differ, because the first intellect, indeed, is tru/y that which
it is. The second, is the intelligible which is in it, but has the intelligible prior
to itself, participates entirely of it, and on this account is the second intellect.
But the third, is also the intelligible which it contains ; for every intellect is the
same with its conjoined intelligible; but it possesses the intelligible which is in
the second, and sees the first intellect. For by how much greater the interval
is, by so much the more obscure is that which is possessed. He supposes, there
fore, that there arc these three intellects and Demiurgi, and says that with Plato
there are three kings, and with Orpheus also three, Phanes, Heaven, and .Saturn.
And he who, according to him, is especially the Demiurgus, is Phanes. It is
worth while, therefore, to observe to him, that every where Plato is accustomed
to recur from multitude to the unities, from which the order in the many proceeds.
Or rather, prior to Plato, unity always precedes multitude according to the
arrangement itself of things. And every divine order originates from a monad.
For it is necessary, indeed, that divine number should proceed from the triad ;
Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 K

PROCLU3 ON THE OOOK ti.

but the monad is prior lo the triad. Where, therefore, id the demiurgic monad, in
order that the triad may proceed from it ? How likewise is the world one, unless
it was fabricated by one cause ? For it is by a much greater priority necessary
that the cause itself should be united, and be monadic, in order that the world may
become only begotten. Let there then IMJ three Demiurgi ; but \vlio is the one
Demiurgus prior to the three? For no one of the divine orders originates from
multitude. Farther still, if the paradigm is one, and the world is one, how is
it possible that there should not also be one Demiurgus prior to the many, who
looks indeed to the one paradigm, but makes the world to be only begotten?
Hence, it is not proper that the demiurgic number should originate from a triad,
but from a monad.

After Amelius, Porphyry thinking to accord with Plotimis, calls (he super-
mundane soul the Uemiurgus, but tlio intellect of it to which it is converted,
animal itself, so as to be according to him the paradigm of the Demiurgus; whom
it is worth while to ask, in which of his writings Plotinus makes soul to be the
Demiur-us. How, likewise, is this conformable to Plato, who continually deno
minates the Demiurgus a God and intellect, but never calls him soul ? How also
does he call the world a Cod ? How does the Demiurgus proceed through all
mundane natures? For all things do not participate of soul, but all things
partake of the demiurgic providence. And divine production, indeed, is able to
generate intellect and duds, but soul is not naturally adapted to produce any thing
above the psychical order. I omit to say that this very thing itself requires much
confirmation, whether Plato knew that there is a certain imparticipable soul.

In the next place, therefore, the divine lamblichuH has written much against
the opinion of Porphyry, and has subverted it as being Plotinian ; but delivering
his own theology, he calls the whole intelligible world the Demiurgus; so that
from what has been baid, it is evident that h&lt;; asserts the same thing as Plotinus.
He says, therefore, in his Commentaries, " Thus we call that which i truly cause,
and the principle of generated natures, and the intelligible paradigms of the
world, the intelligible world. Such causes, likewise, as we admit to have an
existence prior to all things in nature, these, the demiurgic dod, whom we now
investigate, comprehending in one, possesses in himself." If, therefore, in what
is here said, he intends to signify that in the Demiurgus all things subsist demiur-

1 i. e. A Boul which is nol comutuisteut wilh body.

BOOK ii.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 259

gically, and being itself, and the intelligible world, lie speaks conformably both
to himself, and to Orpheus who says :

For in Jove s ample dwelling all things lie,
Ami in Jove s belly they together flow.

And all such like assertions. Nor is it at all wonderful, that each of the Gods
should bo the universe, but. after a different manner, one demiurgically, another
connectivity, another immutably, another convertivcly, 1 and another in some other
way according to a divine peculiarity. But if he says that the whole extent
between the world and the one, is the Demiurgus, this deserves to become the
subject of doubt ; and we may urge against this assertion the arguments which
we derive from him. For where are the kings that are prior to Jupiter, and are
the fathers of Jupiter ? Where are the kings, according to Plato, whom
he thinks fit to arrange above the world next to I fie one ? How likewise can we
say that perpetual being itself is the first being, if we also say that the Demi
urgus is the whole intelligible order, who is himself perpetual being, as is likewise
animal itself? For shall we not thus l&gt;e compelled to say, that the Demiurgus is
not an eternal being? Unless the Demiurgus likewise is comprehended together with
other eternal beings. That lambliclms himself, however, though he here celebrates
the demiurgic order in a more confused manner, yet speaks of it more accurately
elsewhere, may be from thence assumed. For writing concerning the fabrication
of Jupifer in the Tima-us, after the intelligible triads, and the three trh.ds of the
intelligible and at the same time intellectual 1 Gods, he attributes the third order
in the intellectual hebdomad to the Demiurgus. For he says that th \se three
Gods are celebrated by the Pythagoreans, who assert that the first of them is an
intellect comprehending in itself whole monads, the simple, the indivisible, the
boniform, that which abides and is united in itself, and who deliver such like
indications of its transcendency. But they say that the second is collective of the
perfection of things of this kind, and that the most beautiful indications of it are
divine fecundity, that which is collective of the three Gods, that which gives
completion to energy, that which is generative of divine life, that which proceeds

1 Instead of ru* fn rpt-rruf, it is necessary to read rov t frifTpcrrirvt.

* It is here necessary to supply u wcpwr. For the three triads of the intelligible and at the same
time intellectual Gods, immediately follow th intelligible triads, and the intellectual bebdouud follows
as the third in order.

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK m

every where, and that which is beneficent. And they teach us that of the third
who fabricates wholes, the most beautiful signatures are, prolific progressions,
the productions and connections of total causes, together with total causes defined
liy forms, all proceeding fabrications and oilier things similar to these. It is
worth while, therefore, to form a judgment of the lambliehean theology from these
things, and to determine what tin- nature of it is respecting the Demiurgus of
\i holes. For how can the Demiurgus be the whole of perpetual being, if indeed
jH-rpetual l&gt;emg has bet n already deliued by Plato ; but he now says that it is
difficult to find the Dciniurgus, and when found, impossible to speak of him to all
men ? And how can these things be \erilied of that which is definitively delivered,
and unfolded into light to all those that were present .

After latnbliclms, therefore, Theodorns, following Amelius, says that there are
three Demiurgi. lie arranges them, however, not immediately after the one,
but at the extremity of the intelligible and at the same time intellectual Gods.
He also calls the first an essential intellect, the second, an intellectual essence, and
the third, the fountain of souls, lie likewise says, that the first is indivisible, but
the second, divided into wholes, and the third receives a division into particulars.
Again, therefore, the same things must be said to him as were &gt;aid to the illustrious
Amelius; viz. that we indeed acknowledge that there are three Cods, or (lods
analogous to these, yet we do not admit that there are three Demiurgi, but that
the first is the intelligible of the Demiurgus, the second, his generative power,
and that the third is truly the demiurgic intellect. It is likewise requisite to con
sider whether the fountain of souls is to be arranged as the third : for power
pertains to the middle, as he somewhere says; and thus it must be denominated
partially, ami not called the universal fountain of life. For the fountain of souls,
is one of the fountains contained in this mi. Idle [or generative power of the De
miurgus.] For life is not in souls only, nor in animated K.itures alone, but there
is also a di\ine, and an intellectual, prior to the psychical life, which is said to
proceed diversely from thence, from divided ri\ers. And such, in short, are the
dogmas of the ancient interpreters concerning the Demiurgus.

1st us, however, concisely relate the opinion of our preceptor [Syrianus] on this
Hibjecl, as we think that it especially accords with the conceptions of Plato.

For o\vr here, it is necessary to reail o\o.

* lntra&lt;l of T. ru It TUV y^rvr re *a. wf&gt;* 0-, I retl tw t^aray rv roijrwx . X.

1 For ioy/iarw* Lere, it is necessary to read io-y^aro.

1*00 K no TIM;EUS or PLATO. 20 i

The one Demiurgus, therefore, according to him, 1 subsists at the extremity of the
intellectual divine monads, and the fountains of life. But he emits from himself
the total fabrication, and presides over the more partial fathers of wholes. Bein&lt;r,
however, himself immoveahle, he is eternally established on the summit of Olym
pus,* and rules over the twofold worlds, the supereclestial and the celestial, com
prehending also the beginning, middles, and ends of wholes. For of the 1 whole
demiurgic order, one part is a distribution of wholes totally, another of wholes
partially, another of parts totally*, and another of parts partially. Fabrication,
therefore, l&gt;eing fourfold, the demiurgic monad binds to itself the total providence
of wholes; but a demiurgic triad, is suspended from it, which rules over parts
totally, and over the divided power of the monad. Just again, as in the other,
or the partial fabrication, a monad is the leader of a triad, which orderly distri
butes wholes partially, and parts partially. Hut all the multitude of the triad
dances fas it were] round the monad, and being divided about it, distributes its
productions, and is filled from it. Of the many Demiurgi, therefore, there is
one Demiurgus [who is the monad of the rest], in order that all things may l&gt;e
consequent to each other, viz. the one, the paradigm in intelligibles, the one intelli
gible Demiurgus, the one only-begotten world. If, however, these things are rightly
asserted, the Demiurgus of wholes is the boundary of intellectuals, established
indeed in the intelligible, but being full of power, according to which he produces
wholes, and converting all things to himself. On this account also Tima-us calls
him intellect, and the best of causes, and says that he looks to the intelligible
paradigm ; ir&gt; order that by this he may separate him from the first intelligible
Gods. But by calling him intellect, he distinguishes him from the intelligible and
at the same time intellectual Gods. And by denominating him the best of
causes, he establishes him above all the other supermundane Demiurgi. For he
denominates the causes demiurgic, ay also he had l&gt;efore said, " Every thing ge
nerated is generated by a cause? and adds, " ll hen therefore an artificer, c."
Hence the Demiurgus is an intellectual God, exempt from all the Demiurgi. If,

For avri)i&gt; in this place, it is obviously requisite Jo read ai/ror.
1 i. e. He dwells eternally in the highest intellectual splendor.

1 Instead of wwt yap ir/^ ( oi^y&lt;rtjt . X., here, it u requisite to read rift yap . A.

* Afitr TO lr ruf oXwr /irpitwi, it is necessary to supply the word*, ro t* rwr /*rpwr oXwwc, ia order
to render the division complete.

For rpia&oi here, we must read porao.

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

however, he was the first among the intellectual Gods, lie would alone abide in his
own accustomed manner : for this is the illustrious property of the first. If he was
the second, he would be particularly the cause of life. But now, when he
generates soul, he energizes with the Crater [i. e. with Juno], but when he gene
rates intellect, he energizes by himself. Hence he is no other than the third of
the intellectual fathers. For his illustrious and principal work is to produce in
tellect, and nut to fabricate body. Fur he produces body not alone, but together
with necessity ; but he produces intellect through himself. Nor does his prin
cipal work consist in producing soul : for he generates soul together with the
Crater. But he alone by himself gives subsistence to intellect, and causes it to
preside over the universe.

Existing, therefore, as the producer of intellect, he very properly has an intellec
tual order. Hence also he is said by Plato to be both maker and father, and
neither father alone, nor maker alone, nor again father and maker. For the
extremes indeed, are father and maker; the former possessing the summit of
intelligibles, and Ixjing prior to the royal series [i. e. to Plumes, Night, Heaven,
Saturn, Jupiter, and Bacchus]; but the latter possessing the end of the [intellec
tual] order. And the former being the monad of paternal deity; but the latter
lieing allotted a producing power in the universe. Between both these, however,
are father and at the same time maker, and maker and at the same time father.
For each of these is not the same; but in one order the paternal, and in another
the efl ective has dominion. The paternal, however, is more excellent than the
t furtive. Hence in the media, though both are in each, yet the former 1 is more
father than maker. For it is the boundary of the paternal depth,* and the foun
tain of intellectuals. But the second is more maker than father. For it is the
monad, of total fabrication. Hence I think the former is called Metis, but the
latter Metictct. And the former indeed is seen, but the latter sees. The former
also is absorbed, but the latter is replete with the power of the former. And
what the former is in intelligibles, that the latter is in intellectuals. For the former
is the boundary of the intelligible, but the latter of the intellectual Gods. Con
cerning the former likewise, Orpheus says,

In a d*ik caveru these the father made.

1 Vii. f-ttlu-r and at the same lime maker. This God also i Phanej or animal itself, and lubsiiti
at llie eilrtiuil&gt; of the intelligible order.
* For /3o&lt;rov in this jilace, we uiubt rea

BOOK ii.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 263

But concerning the latter Plato says, " Of whom I am the, Dcmiurgus and father
(if n-orks" In the Politicus likewise, he makes mention of the doctrine of the
Demiurgus and father; because with the former [i. e. with Phanes] tlie paternal
is more predominant, hut with the latter [i. e. with Jupiter] the demiurgic. Each
ot the Gods however is denominated from his peculiarity, though each is compre
hensive of all tilings. And he indeed who is alone maker, is the cause of mun
dane natures, lie who is maker and father, is the cause of supermundane and
mundane natures. He who is father and maker, is the cause of intellectual,
supermundane, and mundane natures. But he who is alone father, is the cause
of intelligibles, of intellectuals, of supermundane and mundane natures.

Plato, therefore, admitting a Demiurgus of this kind, suffers him to IK? ineffable
and without a name, as having an arrangement prior to wholes in the portion of
the good. * For in every order of the Gods, there is that which is analogous to
the one. Such therefore is the monad in each world. But Oqihetis gives a name
to the Demiurgus, in consequence of In-ing moved [i. e. inspired] from thence ;
whom Plato himself likewise elsewhere follows. For the Jupiter with him, who
is prior to the three sons of Saturn, is the Demiurgus of wholes. After the
absorption therefore of Phanes, the ideas of nil things shone forth in him, as the
theologist says :

Hence with tlie universe great Jove contain!,
Extended xlhcr, heav n s cialtcd plains;
Tiic barren restless deep, and earth renown d,
Ocean immense, and Tartarus profound;
Fountains and rivers, and the boundless main,
A\ ith all that nature s ample re alms contain &gt;
And Gods and Goddesses of each decree;
All that is past, and all that e er shall be.
Occultly, and in fair connection lies,
in Jove s wide bellv, 1 ruler of the skies.*

i. c. Vulcan.

* vii. The Demiurgus has an arrangement analogous to t ft e good. For as the good is the exempt
monad of the intrlli^iltlc order, so the Derniurgtis is the exempt monad of the tupermundane order.

1 Celestial and sublunar) cause* and effects, are very properly said by Orpheus to ubut in tl*
belly of Jupiter, IMT.UIV- tlifso have a middle Rubnistence between supermundane and Tartarean
natures, just as the belly is in the middle of the body.

4 These verses are very defective in the original ; but the learned reader will find them in correct
late in the Orpheus of Herman.

264 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

Jupiter however, being full of ideas, through these comprehends in himself
wholes: which the theologist also indicating adds:

Jove it the first, and last, high-thundering king,

Middle and head, from Jove all beings spring.

Jove the foundation of the earth contains,

And the deep splendor of the starry plains.

Jove is a ling by no restraint cuiifinM,

And all things flow from Jove s prolific mind.

One mighty principle which never fails,

One power, one daemon, over all prevails.

Tor in Jove s royal body all thing* lie,

Fire, night and day, earth, water, and the sky.

Jupiter therefore, comprehending in himself wholes, produces in conjunction with
Night all things monadically and intellectually, according to her oracles, and
likewise all mundane natures, Cods, and the parts of the universe. Night
therefore says to him asking, how all things will be a certain one, and yet each
be separate and apart from the rest:

All things receive inclosed on ev ry side,

In aulhtr s wide ineffable, embrace :

Then in the midst of u-lher place the heav n ;

In winch let earth of infinite extent,

The sea, and stars, the crown of heav n, be fixt.

But after she has laid down rules respecting all other productions, she adds :

And when your power around the whole has ipread
A strong coercive bond, a golden chain
Suspend from a j ther.

This bond which is derived from nature, soul and intellect, being perfectly strong
and indissoluble. For Plato also says, that animals were generated, bound
with animated bonds. Orpheus, likewise, Homerically calls the divine orders

1 For &&amp;lt;vt&gt; herr, it is neceisary to rrtd 0eo.

BOOK ii. j TINLKUS OF IM.ATO. yc,. ,

which are above the world, a golden chain ; which Plato emulating says, " That
the Dcmittrgus placing intellect in smil, l&gt;nl soul in body, fabricated the universe ;"
and that he gave subsistence to the junior Gods, through whom also lie adorns
the parts of the universe. If therefore, it is Jupiter who possesses the one power,
who absorbs Phanes, in whom the intelligible causes of wholes first subsist, who
produces all things, according to the counsels of Night, and who gives authority
both to the other Gods, and to the three sons of Saturn, he is the one and whole
Demiurgus of all the world, and has the fifth order among the kitrjs, [i. e. among
the Gods of the royal series,] as it is divinely demonstrated by our preceptor in his
Orphic Conferences. Jupiter likewise,, is co-ordinate with Heaven and Phanes
and on this account he is both maker and father, and each of these totally.

That Plato, however, had these conceptions respecting the mighty Jupiter, is
manifested by him in the Cratylus from names : for lie .here shows that he is the
cause and supplier of life to all things. For he says, " That ire denominate Inm
Dia and Zcna, through ic/um ti/c is present In nil things. But in the Gorgias h^
co-arranges, and at the same time exempts him from the sons of Saturn, in order
that he may be prior to the three, and participated by them. He also makes Law
to be his assessor, in the same manner as Orpheus. For with him also I,aw is
placed by the side of Jupiter, according to the counsels of Night. Farther still,
I lato in the Law. s represents total Justice to be the attendant of Jupiter, in the
same manner as the ideologist. But in the Plulcbus he shows, that a royal soul
and a royal intellect pre-exist in Jupiter according to the reason of cause. And
conformably to this he now represents him as giving subsistence to intellect and
soul, unfolding the laws of Fate, and producing all the orders of the mundane
(iods, and constituting all animals as far as to the last of things; some things
being generated by him alone, but others through the celestial (iods as media.
To which we may also add, that in the Politicks he calls Jupiter the Demiurgus
and father of the universe, ju.st as in the present dialogue he says concerning him,
" Of whom I am (he I)&lt; niiurgus, and f (it her of works." He likewise says in the Poli-
ticus, that the present order of the world is Jovian, and that the world is moved
according to Fate. The world therefore living a Jovian life, has Jupiter for the
Demiurgus and father of its life. If, likewise, he represents the Demiurgus deli
vering a speech, 1 this too is in reality Jovian. For in the Meno, he on thw

InMcJil of TUI Onvr *y&gt;a&lt;wr vwo TV tfnirpiur 111 tint placr, il i nrrfnvary to read rwt 0nwr ru s
Wtfi r*f ry t r/iiwr.

For ^ij/jioi-pyoDira hfrr, it u nrceturj to read ^^iryyovtra.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 L

26$ PROCLUS ON THE [oo* n.

account calls him a sophist, as filling the Gods posterior to him with all-
various reasons. This also the divine poet [Homer]] manifests, who repre
sents him thus speaking from the summit of Olympus.

Hear, all }e Gods and Goddesses, my words.

And converting the two-fold co-ordinations to himself. Through the whole of
his poetry, likewise, he praises him as the supreme of rulers, and the father of men
and Gods, and celebrates him with all demiurgic conceptions. As, therefore, we
have shown that all the Grecian theology attributes the total fabrication of things
to Jui&gt;iter, what ought we to conceive of these words of Plato? Is it not, that the
same God king Jupiter, is with him maker and father, and is neither father alone,
nor father and maker. For father is the monad, as the Pythagoreans say, but
the decad is the demiurgic* order of divine nature*, " to which divine number
arrives from the secret recesses of the monad, which decad is the venerable uni
versal recipient, surrounding all things with bound, is immutable and unwearied,
and is called the sacred decad." Hence, after the paternal monad, and the
paternal and at the same time effective tetrad, the demiurgic decad proceeds.
And it is indeed immutable, because an immutable deity .subsists together with it.
Hut it surrounds all things with bound, as supplying with order things that are
disorderly, and with ornament things that are unadorned. It likewise illuminates
souls with intellect, as being intellect totally, and body with Mail, as possessing
and comprehending the cause of soul, and gem-rates things which are truly gene
rated, both such as are middles, and such as are last, in consequence of compre
hending in itself demiurgic being. From what is written also in the Protagoras,
we may collect what the demiurgic order is. For Jupiter there becomes the cause
of the whole political science, and of the reasons essentially disseminated in souls.
This, however, is to bind the whole fabrication of things, and to connect all things
by his own immutable powers. For as the theologist establishes about him the
Curetic order, thus also Plato says, that he is surrounded with terrible guards.
And as the former establishes him on the summit of Olympus, so the latter assigns
to him a tower, in which being eternally seated, he adoins all things through the
middle orders. \Vho the Demiurgus therefore is, and that he is a divine intellect,
the cause of total fabrication, is evident from what has been said ; and likewise
that Jupiter himself is celebrated as the Demiurgus both by Orpheus and Plato.

1 Here also it is requisite to make the &arue emendation at above.
1 Afyiicvpyici} is omitted in the original.

BOOK ii.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 267

Whether, however, we must say that he is a fontal or a ruling God, or belongs
to some other order of the demiurgic series, deserves not to be passed over ia
silence. It appears, therefore, that such things as the theurgist [Julian]] ascril&gt;e8
to the third divinity of the rulers, these Plato assigns to the Demiurgiis ; such as
to fabricate the heavens, inclosing them in a convex figure; to establish the nu
merous multitude of inerratic stars ; to give subsistence to the heptad of planetary
animals ; and to place earth in the middle, but water in the bosoms of the earth,
and air above these. If, however, we accurately consider the affair, we shall
find that the third of the mundane rulers divides the universe into parts; that the
second divides it into wholes, and is celebrated as the demiurgic cause of motion ;
and that the first by his will alone disposes all things, and constitutes the whole
world according to union. But the God who is said by Timonis to be the De
miurgus, produces all things by his will, imparts to the universe a division
into wholes, and also into parts, which give completion to all the wholenesses
[rag oXirTjTa? 7ra&lt;raj]. For he not only makes the universe to be a whole of
wholes, but he also produces the multitude of each wholeness. On all these
accounts therefore, we think it proper to assert that the Demiurgus is beyond the
triad of ruling fathers ; that he is one fontal cause, and that the Oracles represent
him eradicating the multitude of ideas in the fontal soul, and constituting the
world from intellect, soul and body, and producing our souls, and sending them
into generation. The Oracles likewise assert the same things of him as Timrrus.
For they say, " The father of Gods and men placed our intellect in soul, but soul
in sluggish body." 1 But this is the admirable thing celebrated by the Greeks, con
cerning him uho is according to them the Demiurgus. If however these things
are asserted conformably * both to Timacus and the Oracles, those who are incited
by the divinely delivered theology [of the Chaldeans] will say that this Demiurgus
is fontal; that he fabricates the whole world conformably to ideas, considered as

1 It appears to be necessary here to rend ry Iq/ncvpyy instead of ry totrfjy.

1 Tli Greek in this place is very faulty. For it is rarfOrro yap rov fitr er ^X7 tftpari i ifnm
tytsartOijft iranjp arbp+iv rt Orvt- re. Instead of which it ought to br,

Now* fttvft vi"XP&gt; ^Xl* & &lt;*" O*IIOTI "P*ff
\\fjfuf eytarfOfjM variy&gt; ai Ipvv re Orwr rt.

J For wap avrqi here, it is necessary to read wop vrou.
* For o^v^vXtM in this place read

PROCLUS ON THE (BOOK u.

one and as many, and as divided both into wholes and parts, and that he is cele
brated as the maker and father of the universe, and as the father of Gods and men
|, v Plato, Orpheus, and the Oracles ; generating indeed, the multitude of Gods, but
x mling souls to the generations of men, as Timn-us hiiUM-lf also says. Tor if he
IN the best of causes, as he says, by what contrivance can he be arranged in the
second orders of Demiurgi ? Tor the most excellent among the Demiurgi is
significant of thehighot transci ndency in the d.-rniurgic series. Hut the highest
summit of every MH s is fontal, so that this Dcmiurgus is necessarily fonlal, and
not ruling; the rulei&gt; Wing e\. ry where- secondary to llieir proper fountain.
Hence aUo he renders the mundane God&gt; Demiuriri, or fabricators, as being a
certain demiurgic fountain. Since, ho\\e\ r, tin re are many fontal Demiurgi, in
what place this I)einiurgu&gt; is to be arranged, requires greater consideration.
But from w hat lias been said, it is evident in what order of Gods it is necessary
to investigate him; from which likewise, it is manife&gt;t alter \\liat manner it is
lillicultto find him, and when fount! to speak of him to all men. It is also
evident hou he is lather and maker, and \\liat hiseirectiir power is ; and that he
i&gt; not as some say, the iiiuL-r of inanimate natures, but the yi;///tr of such as are
animated. J or he is both the maker and father ..fall things. For lie is called
ll.e father of works, as he himself sa)s in his speeeh [to the junior (JodsJ. But
h&lt;-i&gt; maker and father, as the cau&gt;e of union, e&gt;sence, and hypostasis, and the
supplier of providential inspection in all things.

" Again, however, this must !&gt;&lt; foiisidcred respecting him, viz. according
to which of the paradigms the artificer lubricated the world, whether
accoiding to that which subsists with invariable sameness, or that which
was generated."

Tima-us having *hovvu what the form is of the mundane system, that it is ge
nerated, and the manner in which it is generated, viz. as sensible; for he makes
no mention whatever of time, because he has not yet constituted time; and
having also shown w hut the demiurgic cause }^ t \h. that it is effective and at
the same time paternal, but this is, intellectual, imparticipable and total : he now
pae&gt; to the third object of inquiry, v\ hat the nature is of ihe paradigm of the
universe, whether generated, or eternal ? Tor he perceived that every artificer

1 llu.rjrrjf i uiiiittfd here in the original.

HOOK ii.] TiM.ia S OF PLATO. 26.0

cither assumes tlic paradigm of the things which he fabricates, externally, or
himself produces them from the paradigm in himself. Just as of human artificers,
some are able to imitate oilier things accurately ; but others possess themselves a
power capable of fashioning admirable and useful works. Thus he who first made
a ship formed in his imagination the paradigm of it. Farther still, this also must
be observed, that every thing which makes in an orderly manner, has the scope
and measure of that \\hicli is made. For if it has not, it will err in making, and
will not know whether it has arrived at the end when it has. For whence will it
know that this is the end, since something may l&gt;e deficient or redundant, and it
may 1&gt;c necessary to take something away, or to add something? For on tliis
account bodies make irrationally and stupidly, because they ha\e. no measure,
nor cause of the thin^ that is made. For it is necessary that the medicine should
be heated to a certain degree ; but if art and the medical intellect are not present,
defining the measure of energy to the fire, it uill operate too abundantly and
destroy the whole, though it was intended to contribute, to the production of the
remedy. For it has not the form of the thing produced. Every thing, therefore,
which makes ought to have the reason of the thing that is made, if it intends
to make in an orderly manner. Hence Plato perceiving this, at the same time
that he admits the effective cause, introduces the paradigm of the universe; just
as Aristotle also by subverting the paradigm, co-subverts likewise the maker.
Plato therefore, taking it for granted that there is a paradigm, investigates through
these tilings \\ hat the nature of it is, and employing the before-mentioned defini
tions, discovers the object of his inquiry, through the three former hypotheses.
IUit in what manner he makes the discovery, and through what kind of demon
stration, we shall shortly after survey.

In the first place, howeuT, this very thing must be shown by us, that the world
was generated according to a certain paradigm. And in the next place, we must
investigate what this paradigm is, and in what order of beings it subsists. If
indeed the fabrication of wholes is indefinite and without design, then: is not a
paradigmatic cause of the universe ; but if it is not lawful to conceive this to be
the case, and the Demiurgus knows what he produces, and knowing thus
produces the fabrication of the \\orld, the causes of the things generated are
contained in him, and it is necessary either that he should primarily possess these
causes, or that they should l&gt;e. imparted to him by more ancient principles. But
whichever of these we admit, there is a paradigmatic cause prior to the world.
Farther still, since the Demiurgus is intellect, if he produces by his very being,

270 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

he produces that which is most similar to himself. But this is to produce an
image of himself. If, however, he produces from deliberation, this is entirely
and in every respect unworthy of the demiurgic cause. And if some one should
admit this to be the case, yet it will follow that the form of the demiurgic work
pre-exists in him. For every one who deliberates and consults, antecedently
assumes in himself the paradigm of that about which he deliberates. This there
fore, may be demonstrated through many other arguments, that it is necessary the
paradigm of the world should have an existence prior to the world, and esjx?rially
when the demiurgic cause is pre-supposed. For it is necessary that the Derni-
urgus being intellectual, should either be ignorant of the order of what is fabricated,
or that he should know it. But if he is ignorant of this, how can he providentially
attend to it? And how can he give arrangement to the universe? If, therefore,
he knows it, how is it possible he should not comprehend that which is generated
by the intellection of it, according to one cause?

In the next place, it must l&gt;e considered what this paradigm is, and in what
order of beings it ranks. For there is a difference of opinion respecting this among
the more ancient interpreters. Thus according to the divine lamblichus, that which
is being itself, and which is comprehended by intelligence in conjunction with
reason, is the paradigm of the universe. For he admits that the one is l&gt;eyond the
paradigm, but shows that what is being itself concuis with it, and denominates
each that which is comprehended by intelligence. But the philosopher Porphyry
suppose*, as we have before observed, that imparticipable soul is the DemiurjTUR,
but that intellect is the paradigm, thus beholding in subordinate, natures which
exist in more ancient and venerable orders. For Plato having said that the
Demiurgus is intellect, denominates the paradigm intelligible. But this inter
preter assuming soul for the Demiurgus, calls the paradigm intellect. In the
third place, the admirable Theodorus dividing the demiurgic triad, and perceiving
that in each monad of it there is a first, middle and last, calls the last 1 in each
animal itself, and thus says that intellect looks to animal itself; for according to
him, intellect is proximately suspended from essential animal. Hence, either the
essential Demiurgus does not fabricate looking to animal itself, or the paradigmatic
causes are not many, or not every Demiurgus e fleets his proper production
according to a certain paradigm, lest the maker should make looking to things
posterior to himself, and thus should ignorantly sustain the passion of a partial
soul.

For eooro&gt;- her*, it is ntceisanr to rd ta^aref.

BOOK n.J TiMyEUS OF PLATO. 271

Our preceptor, however, according to his divine intellectual conceptions, has
thought fit to give this subject an appropriate examination. For of the ancients,
some have made; the Demiurgus himself to possess the paradigms of wholes, as
Plotinus ; others, not the Demiurgus, hut have asserted that the paradigm is prior
to him, as Porphyry ; and others, as Longinus, that it is posterior to him, whom
our preceptor asks, whether the Demiurgus is immediately posterior to the one,
or then: are also other intelligible orders, between the Demiurgus and the one.
For if the Demiurgus subsists immediately after the one, it is absurd that all the
multitude of intelligible* should be immediately posterior to that which is without
multitude. For through numbers proximate to the one, the progression is to the
whole of number, and the whole of multitude. But if there arc other orders
between the one and the Demiurgus, it must be investigated whether the paradigm
of the universe is in the Demiurgus primarily, or posterior to, or prior to him.
For if it is primarily in him, we must admit that he contains every intelligible
multitude. For the paradigm is the most beautiful of intelligibles, so that again
he will be intelligible, and not what we a little before demonstrated him to be,
intellectual, though the paradigm has four ideas alone, but the Demiurgus has
those w Inch are more partial than these, viz. the ideas of the sun and moon, and
each of the natures that have a perpetual subsistence. But if the paradigm is
posterior to him, he will be converted to that which is less excellent, and less
honorable, which it is not lawful to admit of any divine nature. So that the
paradigm is prior to the Demiurgus. If, however, it is prior to the Demiurgus,
whether is it seen by him, or not seen by him ? To say, therefore, that it is not seen
by him, does not accord with Plato and the nature of things. For it is absurd
that our soul should see it, and speak about it, but that it should not be seen by
intellect, and by a total intellect. But if the Demiurgus sees the intelligible,
whether being converted to himself does he see it, or does he alone perceive it
external to himself? If, however, he alone sees it external to himself, he sees the
image of l&gt;oing, and possesses sense instead of intelligence. But if converted to
himself, the object of his intellectual jKrception will be in himself. No that the
paradigm is prior to, and in the Demiurgus ; intelligibly indeed prior to him,
but intellectually in him.

The words of Plato also appear at one time to make the paradigm different
from, and at another the same with the Demiurgus. For when he says, " Such
and to many idem therefore, as intellect saw in that which is animal itself, so many
he conceived \&gt;\f a dianoetic energy this universe also should possess" he asserts that

.272 PROCLU8 ON THK [BOOK u.

the Demiurgus, as being different from the paradigm, is extended to animal itself.
And again, when he says, " Let us consider after the similitude of what animal the
composing artificer constituted (he world. Indeed, ire must by no mean? think that
he fashioned it similar to such an wuils us subsist in the form of a part ; but ice must
admit that it is the most similar of all things to that animal, of which other animals,
Loth considered individually, and according to their genera, are nothing- more than
parts ;" in these words also lie separates him who constituted the universe from
the paradigm. But when again he clearly says, lie was good ; but in that which
is good, enry can ne-cer be inherent about anything ichatci i-r : being therefore void
oj this, he was willing (hat all things should be as much as possible similar to himself ;"
here, the sameness of the Demiurgus with the paradigm, appears to le manifest.
So that in some places Plato &gt;a\s that the Demiurgus is the same, and in others,
that he is di /Keren t from the paradigm, and \ery properly makes rath of these a^ser-
tions. For the ideas, or four monads of ideas, prior to the fabrication of things subsist
intelligibly; but the order of forms proceeds into the Demiurgus ; and the whole
number of ideas is one of the monads which he contains. Orpheus also indicating
these things says, that the intelligible God [Plumes] "as ahsorl&gt;ed by the Demi-
nrgus of wholes. And IMato asserts that the Demiurgus looks to the paradi in,

--* or*

indicating through sight intellectual perception. According to the theologist,
however, the Demiurgus leaps as it were to the intelligible God, and as the fable
says, absorbs him. For if it be requisite clearly to unfold the doctrine of our
preceptor, the God who is called Protogonus by Orpheus, and who is established
at the end of intelligibles, is animal it&gt;elf, with Plato. Jlence it is eternal, and
the most beautiful of intelligibles, and is in intelligibles that which Jupiter is in
intellectuals. Each however is the boundary of these orders. 1 And the former
indeed, is the first of paradigmatic causes; but tin; latter is the most monadic
of demiurgic causes. Hence Jupiter is united to the paradigm through IS ight as
the medium, and being filled from thence, becomes an intelligible world, as in
intellectuals.

Then of Protogonus the mighty itrength
Was seen; for in his Lflly he cntainVi

For ry airowy here, read ro ni rnzuo*.

* i. e. Protogonu* it th boundary of the intelligible, and Jupiter of trie intellectual order.

BOOK ii.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 273

The whole of tiling?, and mingled where twas fit,
The force and powerful vigour of the God.
Hence, willi the universe gnat Jove contains, &.c.

Very properly, therefore, does Plato now say that the Derniurgus looked to the
paradigm, in order that becoming all things through the intellectual perception
of it, he may give subsistence to the sensible world. For the paradigm was the
universe intelligibly, but the Demiurgus intellectually, and the world sensibly.
Hence also the Ideologist says :

For in his sacred heart he these conccal d,
And into jo) ful light again reveal d.

That the world therefore, was generated according to a paradigm, what this pa
radigm is, after what manner it is above, and how it is in, the demiurgic intel-
lect, is manifest through what has been said.

.Some however doubt why Plato inquires whether the world was fabricated
according to that which is generated, or according to that which is intelligible ;
for there is not any other generated nature iti order that the universe might be fa
bricated with relation to it. If therefore the inquiry had been concerning So
crates, or any other partial nature, the question, say they, would have Ix-en rea
sonable. Hut as the, inquiry is concerning the universe, is it not impossible it
should have been constituted with relation to that which is generated ? For what
other generated nature is there besides the universe ? We may dissolve this doubt
howe\er, by recollecting what has him frequently said, that Plato calls soul
generated, so far as it participates of tune. But the inquiry here is, what is the
paradigm of the iHii verse, whether it is soul, or intellect, or the intelligible? For
these are the only things that are eternal. And on this account he asks, whether
the world was generated with relation to a generated or to an eternal nature.
After this manner, as it has appeared to some, the doubt may In; solved. May
it not, however be possible to solve it, by another more perfect method, through
which it will also be evident that the confused and disorderly nature prior to the

1 In the original ruv rnrr^i- tt &lt;Vpa, the word tr/iaf or body obviously signifying uhalr. In this
-rn,- al&gt;, the WOK! ovfin, \\liuli 11 likow ic bctly, i u^rd by Aristotle in Lib. 2. Cap. C. of bis
Meteors. For he there say, that the *fa it Ihr principle and body of all tralrr, afr^Tirtiftn &lt;" e*ft*
rnv irntTot vbarnt ij^ frr. Tin* principle loo, he afterwards calls ijOponr/jerot oyxot, a collrrtrd bulk or
matt. So tli.it trftai with Orpheus, and attfia with Aristotle, have in these place* Uie tame meaning as
d\orit or tcholrnru with the PiatonivN.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 M

374

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK it.

world, must not be said, as Atticus and Plutarch thought it must, to be unbe-
gotten? For if nothing; was generated prior to the universe, it was ridiculous to
inquire whether the world was generated with n-lation to i&gt;erpetual being, or to
that which is generated. This however, is now imestigated. Prior to the world
therefore, there was a certain generated nature. And since it was neither ]&gt;er-
petual being, nor place ; for three- things [as Plato says] were prior to the "one-
ration of the univcrso, viz. being, place, and gnu-ration; it is evident that the
so-much celebrated confused and disorderly nature was a thing of this kind.
Hence not the universe only, but that which was moved in u confused and dis
orderly manner, was generated, as we have said, and li.nl a prior subsistence.
The world therefore, possessing this confused nature as matter, but the intelligible
pre-oxistins; as more excellent, whether was the mmerse assimilated to the ma
terial nature which it contains, or to that which is essentially more di\ine? For
being a medium between the two, it is necessarily assimilated to one of the
extremes. For it is supposed that the Deiniurgus assumed that disorderly nature,
and perceives animal itself; so that Plato very pro^-rly inquires to which of
these the Demiurgus assimilates the universe, \\hether to that which he assumes,
or to that which he sees. To these things therefore, that which follows is con
formable ; viz. that the world being beautiful, it was assimilated to the intelligible,
and not to that which was moved in a confused and disorderly manner. For that
which is assimilated to this is deformed.

Some of the interpreters however say, that Plato does not inquire concerning
the Demiurgus, according to which of the paradigms he made the world, but
that he asks as with reference to us who know that there are twofold paradigms,
with relation to which of these the universe was generated. Ami this assertion is
after a certain manner reasonable. For we are those who look to both these pa
radigms, and not the Demiurgus. For it is not lawful for him to look to that
which is less excellent ; but we perceiving the natures which an- prior, and also
those which are posterior to him, interrogate ou.sehcs, in which of them it is tit
to place the paradigm. But others say that Plalo adduces that which is gene
rated, for the sake of a perfect division, in order that lie may not appear to
prevent the object of investigation, whether the mundane paradigm is eternal.
For supposing the paradigm to be generated, he shows that a certain absurdity
will follow. Others again say, that since of sensible*, some are preternatural,
but others according to nature ; and of these, some have the images of certain
generated natures, but others an- the similitudes of them ; hence Plato wishing

HOOK ir.] TIMJlit S OF PLATO. 27.-,

to demonstrate that tlte world was ijcnerated with relation to an eternal paradigm,
makes a subversion of the others, on account of the universe being most beautiful.
For that which is most beautiful, is neither preternatural, nor is derived from a
generated paradigmatic essence; since that which is derived from this is not most
beautiful. Hut because, in short, the universe is beautiful, it is not preternatural.
Such therefore, is the solution of the doubt.

It is worth while however concisely to survey the accuracy of the words. For
the words " a^ahi* and " must be considered" indicate the. order of the problem ;
viz. that it is in continuity with the things which precede it, and that this imme
diately follows those speculations. But the words, "respecting hint," collect all
the investigations, and refer them to the one theory about the world. For what
is said about the Demiurgus and the paradigm, is assumed for the sake of the
theory of the universe. The words, "according to which nf the paradigms" sepa
rate as extremes, and as different from each other, the intelligible, and that which
is generated ; the former existing among the first, but the latter among the last of
l&gt;eings. But the word artificer exhibits the production of form by its cause, and
demiurgic art proceeding into the world. For as the theologist says, the first
manual artificers gave to Jupiter the demiurgic powers of all the mundane
production. And,

\\ 1m thunder, and ilic lightning formed for Jove.
Vulcan and IVill.it the first artists, taught
Jove all thr i,rd:il arts, the world contain*.

I lato therefore follow ing what the theologist here asserts, continually uses the
words rrxr.,vmiv"&gt;^ and irrxrv.mri, which signify fahrieative energy, when speak
ing of the demiurgic production. 15nt the words, " according to that which sub
sist* with invariable .www.v.v," indicate the eternal paradigm of the universe, which
is the first of eternal natures, and is established at the end of the first intelligibles.
And again, " that u hic/t was gcneralciT signifies, that which was moved in a con
fused and disorderly manner. For this is a composite, is much mingled, and
altcr-motive, or moved by another; all which are the elements of a generated
nature. He does not therefore say that this disorderly nature is unbegotten and
incorruptible, and that the world is generated and corruptible ; but that the
former of those was generated, as being alter-motive and co-mingled. For Plato
clearly say, that prior to the generation of the universe there were these three

J76 PROCLUS ON THE [goox u.

things, place, generation, and being. And it is evident that by generation he
means the confused and disorderly nature. Generation then-fore is this ; and
the world is unl&gt;egotten according to temporal generation. Hence these things
are more concordant with Plato, and with our unperverted opinions about the
universe.

" Indeed, if this world is beautiful, and the Derniurgus of it is good, it is
evident that he looked to an eternal paradigm ; but if he is not good,

i o ~

which it is not lawful for any one to assort, he looked to that which was
generated."

In the first place, it is requisite that we should understand the logical method
of Plato, in order that we may see how demonstratively it proceeds. For from
the hypotheses! he had these twofold axioms, that what is generated according
to an eternal paradigm is beautiful ; but that what is generated according to a gene
rated paradigm is not beautiful. The converse however to these are, that what is
l&gt;eautiful was generated according to an eternal paradigm, but what is not beautiful
\?as not generated according to an eternal paradigm. For if to the opposite of
that which precedes, the opposite of that which is consequent folbws, then these
reciprocate with each other, and that which was proposed from the beginning
is demonstrated, through a deduction to an impossibility. For if that which is
beautiful was generated according to a generated paradigm, but that which is
so generated is not beautiful, through one of the axioms, then it will follow that
what is not !&gt;cautiful is beautiful. \\\iy then fore, did not Plato immediately in
the hypotheses assume these axioms, \i/.. that what is beautiful wa* generated
according to an eternal paradigm, what is not beautiful was not so generated ;
hut those to which these are the converse, though he intended to use the former,
and not the latter in his demonstration? In answer to lhi&lt;, it must be said, that
the latter which commence from causes, are more adapted to hypotheses, but
the former which are derived from tilings caused, are more allied to things
posterior to hypotheses. For when he says, " 7 /nit which was generated according
to an eternal juiradi^m is l&gt;&lt; dutiful," he begins from cause-, but ciuls in (hat which
is caused. But when iiceuT*a, he sa\s, " That /.v beautiful which was generated
according to an eternal paradigm," he makes the beautiful to be preeedaiieous, but
the cause consequent. He employs therefore, the former of these, in order that

noon ii.] TIMJEUS OF PLATO. 2 77

he may assume tilings adapted to principles and causes in the hypotheses, but
he employs (he latter, which is the converse, of the former, in the demonstrations,
selecting that which is appropriate to the things demonstrated. Hence laying
down these four axioms, lie very pn&gt;|eily enquires concerning the universe,
whether it is l&gt;eaii!ifiil, or is not beautiful. Tint if indeed the world is Ix-aiiliful,
it Mas generated according to an eternal paradigm ; hut if it is not heautiful,
according to a generated paradigm. That the world however is l&lt; aiititn!, is
evident fnun sense. It was therefore generated according to an eternal paradigm.
Since howe\er beauty is imparted to the world from the paradigm, through
the demiurgic cause as a medium, in the proposition which precedes, for the
purpose of showing that the world is beautiful, he assumes that the Demiurcrus
is good. For every artificer, who is a good artist, has dominion over his proper
matter, and superinduces the form which he wishes, on the subjects of his art.
And thi&lt; is accomplished in a much greater decree hy the whole Derniiir^tis, who
also gives subsistence to nature, the [universal] snhject of things, as other
assertions evince; and who produced it, that it might co-operate with him, in
receiving the world und fabrication from him. Since however, he had added
this in the second proposition, he passes over the opposite in silence. For the
defamation of the world is atrocious, since it is most beautiful, and a blessed
(od, but the defamation of the Demiurgus is still more so. Hence i lato employs
Themis* as a guard to what he says, who collects the Gods themselves to the
Demiurgiis, and does not suffer them to be divulsed from the goodness of the
father. And he does this, in order that through Themis, he may not ascrilx: any
tiling disorderly or defamatory to the Derniurgus. The propositions therefore,
being such, and receiving their U-ginning from the dividing art, let us see what
Plato afterwards adds.

" It is however, manliest to every one, that he looked to an eternal
paradigm ; tor the worUl indeed is the most beautiful of generated
natures, and the Dcmiurgus is the best of causes. But being thus gene
rated, it is fabricated according to that which may be apprehended by
reason and intelligence, and which subsists invariably the same."

Instead of atpym lit TO, it it requisite to read vunpyct.
For I lato uses the word Or/in, or Icw/vl, in tbis place.

278 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

Through what is here said, in the first place, he antecedently assumes the con
clusion, as lie is accustomed to do, deriving the principles of his demonstrations
from intellect. In the next place, he introduces the recollection of the assumiv-
tion, and afterwards adds the rest. 1 For the words, " // is hun erer manifest to
every one, that he looked to tin eternal paradigm," are the conclusion. But the
words, " For the U orld indeed is the most bcantijul of generated natures, and the
Demiurgus is the best of causes," are a narration of the assumption, as the causal
conjunction pi* indeed manifests. And the rest is the conclusion of all that is
said. Such therefore is the logical arrangement of the words. But again, be
taking ourselves to the theory of the things, let us in the first place see
through what cause he transfers the word beautiful to the word most beautiful, and
good to the bcxt. In the next place, let us survey how thr.se things are true, and
what kind of order they have with reference to each other.

That a beautiful fabrication therefore, was fabricated according to an eternal
paradigm is evident, and was before asserted. For whence could it obtain the
beautiful, except from the imitation of this paradigm? If however, this is most
beautiful, the fabrication was not simply made according to an eternal paradigm,
but if it be requisite to say so, it was assimilated to the most eternal of eternal
natures. For every image which more clearly participates of form, is the image
of a purer paradigm. And ax of the statue* produced by the telcstic art, some par
taking of the presence of a divine nature more obscurely, enjuy the second and third
pou-ers of the divinity, but others participating of it more clearly, partake also of the
frst and highest power* of the God /after the same manner likevv ise, the (Jod who
gives |&gt;erfection to the world, has rendered it most beautiful, as an image of the
first of eternal natures. For that which is most beautiful is derived to the world
from thence, and is extended to a similitude towards it, through its own beauty.
Again therefore, if the demiurgic cause is good, he looked to that which is eternal,
and not to that which is generated; lest by looking to what is less excellent,
which it is not lawful to assert, he should fall off from goodness. If, however,
this be the case, not only a good cause, but tin best among causes, looked to the
most eternal of paradigms. For by how much the percciver is more divine, by so
much the more elevated is the object of perception. For the same thing will not
be surveyed by the better and the less excellent nature. Plato therefore, indica
ting these things, and through these latently assisting the position that the para-

1 Instead of ro Xi/y&f here, it is necc.ssarj to read TO \oiwov.

COOK ii.] T1M.EUS OF PLATO, 279

digm of the universe does not rank among the multitude of eternal natures, but
is the most eternal of all of thorn, and primarily eternal, calls the world indeed
most l&gt;eautiful, hut the Demiurgus most excellent. For that which is most beau
tiful \vas generated according to the most divine paradigm, and that which is
most excellent necessarily looks to that which is supreme. For if that which is most
beautiful was not derived from the first paradigm, this first paradigm will either be
the paradigm of nothing, or of something less excellent. But it is not lawful for
superior natures to make that which is less excellent in secondary natures. And
unless that which is best looked to that which is first [either it will not make that
which is most beautiful 1 ] or not looking to that which is first it will make it. How
likewise, will that which is the first paradigm, rank as a paradigm, unless 1 that
which is best intellectually perceives it? And how can that which is intelligible to
a less excellent nature, be incomprehensible through transcendency by tl;at which
is more excellent ? Hence it is necessary that what is most beautiful should have
been generated according to that which is most divine, and that what is most excel
lent should look to that which is most eternal. Farther still, it is necessary that what
is most U autiful should be fabricated by that which is best. For of u hat is that
which is best the cause, unless of that which is the most beautiful of generated
natures? For if it is not the cause of the most beautiful effect, it is the cause of
something less excellent. If, therefore, that which is best is the cause of that
which is less excellent, that which is not best will be entirely the cause of that
which is most beautiful, and thus the order of things will be radically subverted.
It must be admitted therefore, that these three things are, as it is said, demonstrated
by geometrical necessities; and through these we are reminded after what manner
names are assumed by IMato. Porphyry however adds, that if the Demiurgu.s
is most excellent, it follows that he looks to an eternal nature, or 1 that he will not
fabricate what is beautiful. And in the next place,* it is necessary that he who
fabricates whnt is [truly] beautiful, should look to that. which is eternal, or 5 he will
not make what is beautiful as the l&gt;est of fabricators, but he will make it casually.
Hence also, I lato asserts that the fabricators of mortal natures are daemons.
And if indeed, they arc simply most excellent, nothing will prevent the artificer*
and framers of mortal natures from l&gt;eing likewise most excellent, and on thin

The words q ov woi TO tu\\tvT&lt;iv, arc omitted in the origin*!, but evidcntlj ought to l&gt;e inserted.

* Instead of &gt;, in this place, it i requisite In r&lt; ;ul n ftij.

Inslr.id of &lt; here, read r\. * For ore read nra.

5 The same emendation is also requisite here a* above.

280 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK it.

account the fabricators of beautiful images. Such therefore are the observations

of Porphyry.

We may easily however learn, that it is rightly said the world is most Ix-autiful,
and the Demiurgus the best of causes. In the first place, indeed, the beauty of
the heavens, the order of the periods, the measures of the seasons, the harmony
of the elements, and lie analogy which pervades through all things, demonstrate
to those who are not entirely Mind, that the universe is most beautiful. In the
next place, does not the order of the invisible powers it contains, according
to which the parts of the world are connected, and the gift of the intellectual
essence, evince that it is the most beautiful of generated natures? For there are
in it the harmonious choir of souls, the participation of intellect, the supply of a
divine life, the progression of ineffable deity, and the numlK-r of henads or uni
ties, from which the whole becomes full of beauty. Since also, the [partial] soul
which is assimilated to the universe, becoming elegantly adorned, exhibits iu her-
helf an admirable beauty, how is it possible that the universe should not possess
l&gt;eauty in a still greater degree ? hence theoloijists conjoining Venus with Vulcan,
say that he thus fabricated the universe. And again, from Vulcan and Aglaia,
they generate Eucleia and Eusthenia, Eupheme and IMiilophrosune, who render
the corporeal-formed nature decorated with In-auty. Neither therefore, do those
who revile the Demiurgus, dare to say that the woi Id is not mo^t beautiful, but
on the contrary they say that through the beauty of it souls are allured and
ensnared.

But how are we to adn.it that the Demiurgus is the best of eternal natures?
For some think that we must understand by this word best, the best of the causes
of generated natures, in order that he may not le absolutely the best of causes.
For this would IK; false, but that he may be the best of the causes of things that
are generated ; since the natures that are above him are not the causes oi these.
I however, should be ashamed of myself, if 1 were in want of such an artifice as
this, forgetting what was a little In-fore said, in which the Demiurgus now
delivered to us by Plato, was shown to be the fountain and monad of every
demiurgic order. On account of this therefore, lie is the Ix-st of causes, because
he is allotted the first order among the demiur-i of the uni\erse; Pluto here,
directly emulating Homer, who c. ills the Demiurgu* the father of wholes, and the
supreme of rulers ; and he thus denonu.iat. s him though he mentions the (Jods

1 It appears to me that the word ir^Wui must be supplied in this pUce.

noon ii.] JiM;i:US or PLATO. o 8 l

prior to liiin, as far as lo the (joddess iSiiiht. Because therefore Jupiter is tin"
most anrient and venerable of dcmiur^i, In; is celebrated by Homer as the
supreme of rulers, hut by Plato as the host 1 of causes. Others however by no
means dare to accuse the Demiurgu*, but blame this universe, and pervert the
assertions of the ancients, \\lio call it a ca\ern and a den. And others, as Hera-
cliliis, say, that the Dcmiurgus spurted in fabricating the world.

To these objections howexer it is easy to reply. For though the world is, a&lt;
Plato says, most beautiful, and a blessed God, yet when compared with the
intelligible, and the place which is there, it is deservedly called a cavern and a
den. .And it is especially so to partial souls who ver^e to bodies and matter.
But with respect to the Demiur^us, though lie is the best of causes, yet the whole
of his pro\ idential energies about the recent fabrications, may be called ,\porl,
when compared with the energies \\hieh are exempt from sensibles. For these
reasons therefore, the Demiur^us is thus celebrated in the pre-ent words, by
Plato. It is requisite also to understand how the coordination of the most
beautiful \\ilh the most xcelient. is suspended from the first principles. For as
in them beauty is suspended from I lie good, and the beautifying cause, from the
fountain of all i^ood, thus also here, the world is said to lx&gt; most beautiful, but the
Demiur^ns most excellent, and the most beautiful is suspended from that which
is host. In the next place it is requisite to understand how what is said about
the fabrication itself [of limits] imitates this fabrication. For as the world itself
was led from contusion to. order, and a similitude to the intelligible, |\ fabrica
tion, th.is also the discussion of it first employed abhorrent appellations, calling
it generated and destructible, but now the most \enerable names, denominating
it the best of generated natures, the offspring of the most excellent father, and
the ima^e of the most divine paradigm. Ami shortly after, he reminds us of it
by the most sacred of names.

" But again, tiicsc tilings [thus] subsisting, there is every necessity that
the world should be the image of u certain tiling."

To those who are more simple, what is here said may appear to be the same
Vvith what was before asserted. For some one who does not survey tilings accu
rately may ask what dnTerence there is hctwtvn saying, that the world was fabricat-

For ainoi Iirre, it is nt ccsmjr to read apteroi.
Tim. Plat. VOL. I. a N

OQO PROCLUS ON Till: [DOCK n.

ed according lo a paradigm, and that it is tin- linage of a certain thing, In reality
however, each of these is separated from the other. Tor Mice it is possible for an
rlilin-r to make confonnalily to a paradi-m, but tin- thin?; fabricated may not
become the imam; of the pa-adi-m in consequence of not U-in- vanquished by
the fabricating: cause ; in order that von may not fancy that this is also the ease
Mith tin- world, I lato lias shown that tin- Demiiinriii* indeed looked to a para
digm, and that In-ini; most excellent he looked to the most divine paradi-m, from
what he said respectm- the nniverse hem- faliru-atrd j-oiiforiiially to the intelli-
jrihle. lint that the universe aUo is \aiH|m&gt;hed hy form, and truly imitates its
paradigm, lie manifests from what is now sni.l. 1-or if the world i^ an ima-e,
the nni\er&gt;e is assimilated to the intelli-zihle. l ; or that which is not dissimilar
lint &gt;imilar and ronsentane&lt;Mi&gt;, is an im.ue. Ym !nne therefore, the sensible
iini\erse, the most beautiful o( images, the intellectual imiscise, the best of causes,
and the intelligible nni\ r&gt;e, the most divine of paradi-in^. J- ach of t .iese also is
t-v cry where. For the sensible universe participate* of intellect and beini: ; the
intellectual universe possesses sensible* uniformly, but intelligible* 1 secondarily ;
and the intelligible universe antecedently comprehends, primordially and united
ly, intellectuals and seiisibles. The universe however, subsists appropriately in
each order. And the sensible universe indeed, is placed bt fore ns as a fabrica
tion ; but the eternal is two-fold, the one bein^ as demiur-ic, but the other as
paradigmatic; though the paradigmatic is aUo m the deminr-ic. l- or the
l)emim-ns makes looking to himself; since every intellect sees itself, and is the
same with the intelligible it contains. And a-ain the detninr-ic is in the paradig
matic ; since it maki s that which is generated. I or it is not a paradigm like a
form impressed in wax, nor as the ima^e ol Socrates is the ima^e ot another
ima^e; but the paradigmatic cause by its very iM-in^ inak&lt;-s secondary natures
similar to its lf. At the same time however, to fabricate paradigmatic-ally, and
lo be a paradi-m demiurgically (i. e. fabritatively] diller. / -r the Jot -iiitr is to
energize t^cntni/li/ ; Intt the /alter ix t&lt;&gt; tiu\&gt;urt ts^tur energetically. And the
former is to perceive intellectually, intelligibly; but the tailor is to be intelli
gible intellectnally. l ur tin- jnruli&lt;tritii \ I lie /KinuJi^in is to uuiLc l i/ its niy
icing ; hut of t lie Dciniiti^n.i, to make Ay &lt;//&lt; r^r.uig. l ; or il is not the same thin-
to make by existing, and to know und en&lt; r^i/.e through know led-c ; since soul
ulto products lijc Inj e.ti&lt;itin r , but malax tirtijtcuiHj/ tlirvitgli knowledge. And it

1 For ovrok licrc, road i &gt; run.

* I or rn uioUtiTii hcrt 1 , it is ncccary lo rrad r lor/ra.

n.)K ii.] TI MAIL S OF PLATO. ^3

possesses indeed, ilit&gt; foninT essentially, hut tin- latter according to ener/v. And
why is if requisite Jo Implicit these observations philosophically ? For the throlo-
pist lup-j before, celebrates the demiurgic cans.- in Phancs. J vr Ihcrc, tix he says,
the sin ! lii diniuii, or dli-scchiz Jv/iifo , wax, awl antecedent lycjri&led j in order that
lie nti^ it lia\e as it were (lie fountains of (lie t\\o|old fabrication of things. Ho
also ei-li hratos (I H . paradi^iual ie cause in Jupiter. For a^ain, he likewise is, as
lie sa\s. Metis ili. first generator, and much-pleasing Love, lie is also continual
ly denominated |&gt;y hint. Dioiivsius, and I haiies, and FiicapaMis. All the causes
then ion 1 parlieio ile of each other, and are iti earh oilier; so that he \\lio s.ivs as
the dnine lani diehiis, that the Deiniurtrus coinprelienils in himself the paradigm,
and lie v. h" rs-nee-, ;i- the illustrious Ann hits, (hat the paradigm is the Deiniur-
H us. in a eeriain respect speak riL. r litl\. I or the latter &gt;a\v the deiniinxic peculiaritv
pre-e\iiinLi in the paradigm ; for there the lir-t .Jupiter exists, and on this account
he makes IMianes to he the Deiniiirirus ; hnt the former sa\v the paradigm in the
1&gt;( niiinuu^. I or .Metis also was in the Demmr^ns, |( in^ ahsorU d liy him.
And on this account he considered the paradigmatic to he the same \vith the
lemim^ic cause. And thus much concerning these particulars.

M &lt; mi-hl not however, to \vonder if Plato calls the world an iniaijo. l ; or
though it is most leaulifiil. \et it is the imaire of intelli^ildr heauty. Through
this similitude also, it exhihits such things as adorn and heautifv generation,
and receives as a \\ hole the form of the paradigm. Thus the philosopher calls
Hie world theimaije of the intelligible, as licini; assimilated to its paradigm. The
addition likewi-c of nt*.\i/i/, shows that the similitude of the former to the latter
is admirable and inellahle. Afterwards also, he testifies this by a demonstration
indubitable and firm. For it proceeds from the hypotheses themscUcs.

" Bui in every tinni:, to begin from a principle according to nature, is
the greatest of undertakings."

Some read what is here said by stopping at the word TTO.VTOS, cccn/ thing, AC-
corclin^ 1 to \\hoin the words indicate, that it is the greatest of all things, to make
that beuinuin; tf the discussion which is according to nature. But others, stop
ping at the \&gt;ord /xy&lt;rrov, nv//t A/, conjoin the word Tavroy with what follows; so
that \vith them the colon signifies that it is the greatest undertaking, to begin

For f-xtrpwrtvcvTa here, I read eiriirptiro^ro.

004 PIlOCUJS ON Till. [HOOK n.

the. tli*cii-*iou of tho universe, from ii principle which i* according to nature,
Others again say lliat these words are introduced for tho *aku of the thing* pre
viously UKaimiod, these Ix-ing rightly concluded through the h\ potheses which
were necessary. Nut according to others, they -.in- introduced for the sake of
what is directly after asserted, it I.. -inir requisite, if we intend to make a pioper
lieginning, to delme pn-viously what kind of discourses ..u-lit to IM- ad..,, tod
court-ruin - s-ii*il!rs. And otlu-rs say, llu-y an- introduc.-d for tlic&gt;ako of uhat
will aflT\vards lu; dc-liu-r.-d roiuvrnin- tin- final (MUM.-. For this is th,&gt; -ivatest
principl* , and according to nat.nv, \\liirh it is m|iii&gt;itf especially to survey, and
from which coninu-iu-in- it is lit to dUm^ what follows, lint that pn-vions to
tho ili^iuisiliou of this, he infoi ins us uhat tho mode will IIP. g - physical dis

cussions.

To me however, thi.s axiom a[prars to lie rightly assurtod of all things. 1 or it
is universal, and is adapted to what lias lieen lieforc saiil, to what immediately
follows, an&lt;l to what will be again said. Or ratlu-r, it is not adapted to these
alone, hut to all fabrication. For beginning from n piineiple according to nature
as from a root, Plato delivers afterward* explanations of cause homologous to this
principle. And science itself, from proper h\potheses, collects appropriate
conclusions. Science therefore follows the order of thm-s; but doctrinal dis
quisition follows science. And this i&gt; the greatest undertaking. In the first
place, because it imitates wholes, and the progression of beings. In the next
place, because if the smallest particular is overlooked in the principle, it becomes
multiplied as we proceed. And in the third place, the principle or beginning, is
said to be the half of the whole. If however, this be the case, it possesses the
greatest power. If, too, as some say, the principle is something more than the
whole, it is in an admirable manner said lo be the greatest thing. The truth qf
ihis is also testified by poets who say, k&lt; that every thing which receives a good
beginning usually ends well." And moreover, on this account the Athenian
guest calls the principle a (Jod, if it obtains that which is fit. For he says,
" Principle UiHZ established in men us a (, &lt;/, /irutlticcs (til things rightly if it obtains
a congruous jwrtion [or the part ichkh is adapted to it}."

But what is the meaning of the words " (tcconiinx to nature?" Is it the re
ceiving every thing which ought to be received, or is it that which first proceeds
from things which subsist essentially ? For that which is last is a principle as
with reference to us, but not with reference to nature. The principle therefore

BOOK ii.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 28/i

according to nature, of til*- universe indeed, is the final cause, hut of demonstra
tions the hypotheses, and of discussions the definition respecting the form of the
doctrine, whether it is to l&gt;e received as firm, immutable and accurate, or as
that which is merely probable, and is not indeed truth, but credible, and assimi
lated to (ruth.

" After this manner therefore, \vo must decide about the image, and
the paradigm of it."

These three particulars are connascently consequent to each other, the things,
the conceptions, and the words. According to the things and the conceptions
therefore, IMalo assumes the first hypothesis; but according to the words he
makes this definition. For when he separates that which is generated from being,
lie adheres to the theory of the things. Hut when he defines our knowledge

according to the objects of it, lie adheres to the theory of the conceptions. 1 And
now distributing the words according to the diversity in the knowledge of them,
he demonstrates tons their definite nature. Hence, these are consentaneous to
each other ; vi/. twofold things, being and that which is generated ; twofold
knowledges, intelligence and opinion; and twofold words, the stable anil the
probable. For whence are knowledges derived, except from the objects of know
ledge ? And whence is the difference of words derived, except from knowledges ?
Some therefore say, that it is the logographic art to define previously what the
mode is of the diction, and what kind of person the auditor of it ought to l&gt;e ;
and that Aristotle emulated this, and also many others more recent.

1 however should say that the. discussion imitates the fabrication itself of tilings.
For as that unfolds into light the invisible lives of the world, but gives subsistence
to that which is apparent, ami imparts a boundary to it prior to the whole world,
thus also Tima iis adheres indeed to the theory of the things; but also makes
the form of the words to be adapted to the things; and antecedently assumes,
and previously defines the mode of the whole theory of the discussion, in order
that he may dispose the whole of the doctrine conformably to this definition. Why
therefore docs he do this now and not before? Because, after the demonstra-

1 In tllC original, orr ?r rat n/irrfpni yiuernt tuipiStt, rrri rent *payftaaiv roiirw*- rnr)//&gt;irwr, which if ftj-
itcntly defective, but may be restored to it genuine meaning by reading, ere ft rot tyirrrpai yrwrm
jVpt &lt; &lt;*&lt; roil vpay/jarir, rijt arci\f ro Otwptai rwr wij^nrwr.

28 &lt;; PUOCLUS ON THI [BOOK n.

tion, that it is requisite the world should bo gem-rated, he necessarily defines
what the nature of the discussion about sensible things ouht ty IH-, but not prior
to this, tlir nature of the universe U-ing unknown, lint when lie calls the world
an image, an image of such a kind is not to be assumed, as we corn-cite that
of inanimate * natures to be, as neither is the paradigm un prolific and iliellicaci-
ous, but an assimilation must be gi\en to this world to the intelligible. In the
first place indeed, according to the prolilie power of the paradigm; for by its
very Iwin^r it produces the imaire from it-elf. In the second place, according to
the demiurgic cause, which renders the universe most similar to the intelligible,
by the energic* extended to it. And in the third place. accordm ; ; to the con
version of the world it-elf to the forming power and participation of intelligible*.
For " it as.similates it&gt; If, as the ( )racle says, hastening to be in\e&gt;ted with the im-
prc.ssjon of the images which the intelligible (Jods extend to it.

" As words therefore arc allied to the tilings themselves of which they
arc the interpreters.

As the progression of beings is from the otic which is prior to the many, and
mundane natures proceed from a monad to their proper number, thu,-&gt; also the.
discourse of Tim. ens, be in 4 assimilated, as he says, to beings, commences
from one axiom, and the unher.sal, and thus afterwards introduces dUision to his
words. What therefore is the one common axiom, in the words before u&gt; ? That
it is necessary language should be allied to the things, of w hich it is the interpreter.
And it seems that the I latonisls Albiims and (iaius, and their followers, took
occasion from hence to define in how many ways Plato dogmati/es ; and that he
does this in a twofold respect, either scientific. illy, or from probability, and not
according to one mode, nor as if all discus&gt;ion&gt; had one accuracy, whether they
are concerning beings, or things which subsist through generation ; but such as
is the nature of things, such also is that of the words which are divided in con
junction with things. Hence they subsist in such a way with respect to accuracy
and clearness about the things which are their subjects, that some words assert
the accuracy of the dogmas, but others their probability. For it is necessary that

()u is uinittrtl ill I lie oii-m.il.

1 For 4 V \ UV here , s necessary to read a\fV%uv,

3 Wf&gt;n is omitted in tlic original.

ii.] TiM.EUs or ri~vro. 207

lan&lt;4uao;e should be similar to things ; since it could not otherwise interpret their
nature, tlmn by being allied to them. For it is requisite that what the thing is
contracted ly, that lan^ua^e should lie evolvedly ; in order that it may unfold the
thing into litrht, and may be subordinate to the nature of it. Ilenre, the
divine ranges of lan^ua^e untold ol lrr this manner the; essences of tin- natures
prior to them, and are connascent with them. /// I he. Ciods therefore, the angel or
j&gt;!c&lt;\&lt; i/^cr of Jupiter [i. c. j/i-rmcs], who lias the relation of logos to the intellect of his
father, announces the icill of Jupiter to .secondary natures. Hut in essences, soul which,
is I l/c Jo^ns of hilclliziblcsi unfolds the united came of wholes which is in them, she
rciciiing from them her liyposlasis.* And in the gemra superior to us, the angelic order
has the relation of logos to the (.rods. Very properly therefore, is it here said, that
language is allied to the things of which it is the interpreter. This therefore,
must he said to be tin; one common axiom, prior to the divided particulars. And
TiinaMis in what follows, distributes different modes of words in conjunction wilh
the quality of the things.

- " Hence, respecting tliat wliicli is permanent and stable, and intellec
tually apparent, it is requisite, that the words should be as much as
possible permanent, without lapse, irreprehensible and immutable. JJut
in this [stability] the paradigm is in no respect deficient."

Prior to this, TiinaMis called the paradigm perpetual being, subsisting invariably
the same, and apprehended by intelligence; but now he calls it permanent and
stable; the former indeed, instead of perpetual be in;;, and which is apparent in
conjunction with intelli-ct, but the latter, instead of that which is apprehended by
intelligence. He also denominate)) the words respecting it permanent, indeed, in
order that through the sameness of the name, he may indicate the similitude of
them to tiling ; but without Iti/txc, in order that they might adumbrate the firm
ness of the thing. And irnprchcnsible^ in order that they may imitate that which
is comprehended by intelligence, and may scientifically accede. J or it is
necessary that words, in order that they may be adapted to intelligiblos, .should
have accuracy and firmness, as being employed about things of this kind. .For
as the knowledge of eternal natures is without lapse, so likewise is the discourse

For T&gt;tv vjroOtoif licrc, it i* necessary to rrad rt/r virooramr.

* Er is omitted in the original, but evidently ought to b inserted.

i&gt;88

PKOCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

about them. For it is an evolved knowledge. Since, however, it proceeds into
multitude, and is allotted a composite nature, and on this account falls short of
the union and impartibility of the thinir, he denominates the thing itself in the
singular nnmU-r |&gt;ermanent and stable, r.nd intellectually apparent ; but the
discourse about it in the plural numl&gt;cr, calling it stable icorJs, ichich are without a
hpse, and are in f/n Jietmiblc. And since in language there is a certain simi
litude to the paradigm, but there is also a certain dissimilitude, and this abundant,
he assumes one word in common the permanent, but the others diHerent. Since
aUo a scientific discourse is irrepreheiisible, as with reference to our knowledge;
for there is not any thing in us belter than science; but is confuted by the thing.
it&gt;elf, as not beini; able to comprehend the nature of it, such as it really is, and
as falling oil 1 from its impartiality, on this account he adds, " as nincli as
]n&gt;ssii&gt;lf." For science itself, as subsisting in souls, is indeed irrepreheiisible, but
is reprehended by intellect, for evolving that which is impartible, and apprehend
ing thai which is simple in a comport,- manner. For the phantasy also repre
hends sense, because its knowledge is in conjunction with passion, according to
a commixture, from which the phantasy is purified. Nut opinion reprehends
the phantasy be( -ause it-, knowledge is alleiided with t\pe and morplie, from
which opinion is free. Science reprehends opinion, because its knowledge is
without the explanation of cause, by which science is especially bound. And
intellect as wo have said, reprehends science, localise it transitively di\ ides the
object of knowledge, but intellect knows at one.- the whole in conjunction with
eoence. Hence intellect is alone unconquerable, but science, and scientific
diM ourse, are \anquishod by intellect, according to the knowledge of being.

" It is necessary however, that words respecting that which is assimi
lated to the permanent and stable, but which is the image of bcin g
should possess probability [alone]."

That the discussion of generated natures, is a discussion about an image, and
that on this account it is to be called prubabk, is evident. Perhaps however,
some one may inquire what words remain to be assigned to things which are not
assimilated to the intelligible, but yet at the same lime exist in the universe, such

1 For a-rcfir fot here, I ri ail airoar^oa^fOt.

For fx&gt; r r itrrjrur in this place, t is obviousl\ necf^an. to read wtpt r*v yoirvr.

BOOK it.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 2}{f)

as we assort conjectural and artificial things to bo. May we not say, that words
of a conjectural nature are adapted to those, which words are different from
those that aro assimilative! For to conjecture is one tiling; since this is more
&gt;bscurc than scuso ; and to assimilate another. For assimilation pertains to
the interpreters of the images of being. Artificial, therefore, and conjectural
things arc unfolded through conjectural words. Unless other such like words
are adapted to things which are truly conjectural ; hut with respect to artificial
things, assimilative or prohahle words, are adapted to those that are the first from
forms, hut to those which have a secondary hypostasis, and are the third from
truth, such words are adapted as pertain to things conjectural by nature. For
conjectural things are the images of sensihles, in the same manner as sensible*,
are the images of intelligible*. Thus the painted bed is the image of that which
is made by the carpenter.

Farther still, this also must l&gt;e considered, that Plato is now shaking about
physical images, and that on this account he gives a twofold division to words.
For things which are assimilated to the intelligible, subsist by nature or naturally ;
but this is not the case with things artificial. For the arti&gt;t does not make that
which he makes, according to certain ideas, though Socrates appears to say
this in the Republic. There, however, what is said, is asserted for the sake of the
paradigm, and is not concerning ideas themselves. For he says that God is the
maker and Dcminrgns of things artificial, but he is not the Dominrgus of ideas.
But in the Protagoras, it is cleaily shown by Plato that we do not contain the
reasons or productive principles of the arts, and much less of things artificial,

See tin 10th hook of llie Republic, w lif re lie speaks of the idea* of a !&gt;cd and a t;il&gt;lr. Pl.ito,
however, did not intend to signify, in what lie there s;i&gt;s, llut there is an idea of each of these in ilie
intellect of the DcniinrgMS of llie universe; or, in short, that (hero are ideas of thin;;* arlih cul; but
he call* b\ the name of idea, the reason or productive ami forming principle which soloists in the
dianoctic power of the artificer. This reason also lie says, is the offspring of deity, because lie
conceived, that tint very artiliri.il principle itself, is imparted to souU from divinity, I roclu*, in the
I arnicnide*, well observe*, that an argument of (he truth of this may !&gt;e derived from h nee, that
1 liilii calls a pcx-l the third from, or with repvct to, the truth, placing him analogous to a painter, who
docs not make a bed, but the image of it. The form of her), therefore, in the dianoctic |&gt;*rt of the
artificer, ranks as first with respect to truth; the bed which he rnakei as second; and that which is
piloted as the third. Rut if there was an idea of bed in the intellect of divinity, the painter
would be the fourth, and not the third from truth.

1 i. e. The soul does not ttitxtially contain the reasons of those arts which are solely ministrant to
the purposes of the moral life.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 O

2j)0 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK u.

and that neither are the paradigms of them established in the Gods. These
therefore were not generated according to the intelligible. Plato, however, now
divides words into those which pertain to the discussion of the intelligible, and
(hose which are concerning the linage of the intelligible. Hence indicating this he
says, that words respecting that ichich is assimilated to t/ie permanent und t,tuule^ but
which is the image of being, should possess probability [alone]. But the works of
nature are assimilated to the intelligible, and not the works of art; so that
neither have particulars this assimilation definitely, but the universal* \\hich are
in them. \\ e have, however, spoken concerning these things elsewhere.

" The latter words having the same relation to the former [as that
of an image to its paradigm]. For what essence is to generation, that
trulh is to faith."

Prior to this, Tima-us made two things antecedent, the intelligible and the
generated, or the paradigm and the image, and assumed two things as analogous
to these, science and probability, or truth and faith : so that as truth is to the
intelligible paradigm, so is faith to the generated image. Hut now alternately he
says, as truth is to faith, so is the intelligible to that which is generated. And
this perfectly \\i-ll. For he makes the intelligible and truth to be antecedent, but
at the saint- time lx-gins from that which is generated and faith, that he may
mingle that which has a reference to us with the order which is according; to
nature, and that he may preserve the proper worth of the things, and may argue
I rum what is known to us. Plato, there fore, clearly divides language and know
ledge conformably to the objects of knowledge ; and Parmenides though obscure
&lt;&gt;n account of his writings being poetical, yet at the same time indicating these
things, he says, " that truth is full of splendor and immutable, but that the
opinions of mortals have no real credibility." And a^ain, " that there are two paths,
one of which has a real existence, so that it is not possible for it not to exist.
But thi&gt; is the path of Persuasion, and is attended by Truth. The oilier, necessarily
has no true existence. The former of these paths, however, though replete with
the most perfect (MTSUUsion, is unpleasant. And again, " Neither can you have
any knowledge of non-being; for it is not attainable; nor can you make it
the subject of discourse. " The philosopher therefore says, that there are two.

Owing to the obscurity uf the original, 1 have only jjivfn the substance of th* MTSCS ofParnKuidcs

BOOK ii.] TiM.KUS Or PLATO. -j.,!

fold knowledges, of twofold tilings ; truth which ho calls [full of splendor, ;is
liming with intellectual liiilit ; and faith, from which ho takes away stable
knowledge. The faith, however, which Plato now mentions appears to ho
different from that spoken of him in the Republic, in the section of a line. For
there the faith is an irrational knowledge ; whence also it is di\ided from conjeo
ture, hut is arranged according to sense. The faith however of which he now
speaks is rational, hut is mingled with irrational knowledge, as it employs sense
and conjecture. Hence it is filled with much of the nnstahlo. For receiving from
sense or conjecture the on, or that a thing is, it thus explains causes. But these
kinds of knowledge, have much of the confused and unstable. Hence Socrates
in the Pica-do reprehends sense in many respects, l&gt;ocausc we neither hear nor see
any thing accurately.

How, therefore, can the knowledge which originates from sense possess the ac
curate and the irreprehensihle ? For the powers which use science alone, compre
hend the whole of the thing known with accuracy; but those that energize with
sense, are deceived, and deviate from accuracy, on account of sense, and because
the object of knowledge is unstable. For with respect to that which is material,
what can any one say of it, since it i* always changing and (lowing, and is not
naturally adapted to abide for a moment. But that which is celestial, in conse
quence of being remote from us, is not easily known, nor to be apprehended by
science, but we must be satisfied in the theory of it, with an approximation to the
truth, and with probability [instead of certainty]. For every thing which is in
place, requires the being situated there, in order to a perfect know ledge of ite
nature. The intelligible, however, is not a thing of this kind ; since it is not
apprehended by us in place. For wherever any one establishes his dianoetic
energy, there, truth being every where present, he comes into contact with it.
But if it is possible to assert any thing firm and stable about that which is celestial,
this also is possible so far as it participates of being, and so far as it can In-
apprehended by intelligence. For if any thing necessary can be collected
concerning it, it is alone through geometrical demonstrations which are universal.
But so far as it is sensible, it is difficult to be apprehended, and difficult to be
surveyed. And thus much concerning there particulars.

Some one, however, may doubt, how it can be any longer said to be ditlicult to
discover the Demiurgus, and impossible when found to speak of him to all men,
since we are able to employ stable, immutable, and irreprehensible language altout
the paradigm? Or is not that which is said about the Deraiurgns, in a much

292 PROCLUSONTHE [BOOK M.

greater degree adapted to the paradigm itself? For it is much more difficult to
discover the latter than the former, and when found to speak of it to all men.
Neither, however, does Plato deny that scientific language may be employed about
the Demiurgus, nor about any other of the natures that subsist always invariably
the same. For in what does Plato differ from other physiologists, except in ex
hibiting the science {Retaining to divine natures? But if he particularly reminds
us of this in the Demiurgic cause, that it is difficult to find it, \ve ought not to
wonder. For he knew, as it appears to me, that other physiologists tri-.nsfer the
effective cause to physical powers. Hence that we may not be affected in the
same way as they were, he shows that the Demiurgic principle is difficult to be
found, and difficult to be known. And this much in answer to the doubt.

Plato however in many places admits the truth of beings, conformably to
theologists. For uniform truth [or truth characterized by unity] is of one kind,
and is the light proceeding from the good, which, ns lie says in the Philebus,
imparts purity, and as he says in (he Republic, union to intelligibles. The truth
proceeding from intelligibles, is of another kind, and illuminates the intellectual
orders, which the r.ssence that is without figure, without colour, and without
contact primarily receives, where, also, as it is written in the Pha-drus, the plain
of truth is situated. Another kind of truth is that which is connar cent with souls,
which comes into contact with ln-ing through intelligence, and is conjoined
through science with the objects of science. For the psychical light, may lie
said to !M&gt; as in the extension of breadth the third from the intelligible ; the
intellectual breadth being lilled from the intelligible, but the psychical from the
intellectual. This truth, therefore, which is in souls, is that, which must now
IK* assumed, since we likewise assume this faith, and not that which is irrational,
and separated from all rational animadversion. The one also must he conjoined
to intelligibles, but the other to sensible*.

** You must not wonder, therefore, O Socrates, if asserting many
tilings about many concerning the Gods, and the generation of the
universe, I should not be able to employ language in every respect
accurate and consistent with itself."

Tima-us first exhibits the hypotheses of the whole of physiology, and collects
the lemmas pertaining to the theory of it ; the latter being three, but the former
five. In the second place, he defines the mode of the discussion. And in the

HOOK ii.] TIM/FUS OF PLATO. 293

third place, ho prepares the auditor to receive in a proper manner the discourse

which he is about to make. For it is necessary that he should not expert to
hear perfectly Accurate arguments in physical discussions, nor such as are truly
scientific, Imt such as are assimilated to (hem. It is besides this rei]iii&gt;ite he
slionld know, that as the \vorld is mingled from physical powers and an intel
lectual and divine essence; for " physical works, as the Oracle says, eo-suhsist
with the intellectual li-j;ht of the father;" thus also the discussion of it, makes a
commixture of faith and truth. For things which are assumed from sense par
ticipate largely of conjectural discussion ; hut things which commence from intel
ligibles possess that which is irrcprehensible, and cannot he confuted. For
when we say of the Demiurgns himself, that he consults, that he energizes diano-
etically, and that he makes these things prior to those, we relinquish the truth
of things. So that if when sjwaking of eternal beings, and showing how they
provide for the universe, we are compelled to divide that which is impartible,
and to make that which is eternal temporal, much more will the assertions re
specting sensihles themselves IK I deficient in accuracy [and truth]. M hat then,
someone may say, do we not sjvak accurately concerning the heavens when we say,
that the circles in them bisect each other ? Hut do we not fall off from accuracy, when
we are satisfied, not with the accurate, but with an approximation to it, in con*
sequence of our imbecility, and not on account of the nature of the tiling? Or,
also, when we receive indeed, principles from sense, yet is it not from uni\ersal
reasons! The assertions therefore, respecting the heavens, as in intelligible*, ex
hibit the irreprehensihle; but as in objects of belief, they also are reprehended
through immaterial forms. Consider then this very tiling which is now asserted,
that the greatest circles in the iica\ens bisect each other. Is it not necessary that
the section should be according to points! Hut a point is impartible. What,
then-fore, is there of this kind in a partible, nature ? What is there without inter
val in a nature distended with interval ? For every tiling which subsists in a phy
sical body, is co-divided with its subject. What, then, is there not likewise a
physical point ? This however relinquishes that which is truly impartible, and is
a point indeed, in physical substances, but is not simply a point. So that what
is said of a point, is not accurately adapted to a thing of this kind. In short, as
the assertions concerning intelligibles, are not adapted to dianoetic objects, so
neither is what is said of scientific objects adapted to sensibles. For intelligibles
are the paradigms of dianoetic natures, and dianoetic natures of sensibles. For

201

PROCIA S ON THK [BOOK if.

it is soul winch adorns the mighty heaven, and adorns it in conjunction with the
father. So that when we speak of circles in the heavens, of contact*, bisections,
and equalities, we sjM-ak accurately, as not speaking about sensible*. Since
therefore things of this kind may he asserted of all material natures, the ohjection
is trilling.

If, however, some one should ask us, is not that which is truly equal impartihle,
and that uhich is truly a circle, without interval? For each is a universal ; hut
universal is an impartihle reason and form. But the natures in the heavens are
partible, and not indivisible, and are in a subject. Here again, we do not say
that either circles, or equalities or any tiling else of this kind are in sensible* ;
and thus we are consistent with ourselves. \Vcsummarily, say, therefore, that
Plato at one time defines science, l&gt;u an explanation of causes alone ; at another time,
by the subjects of it, possessing an essence, perfectly stable", together with an explanation
of cause; and at another, by t/ic principles not being hypotheses. And according
to this last form, indeed, he asserts that there is one science [i. e. dialectic] which
ascends as far as to the principle of being. For this science pre-establishes the
principle which is truly principle, to In unhvpolhelical. It also has for its subject
truly exisiling being, and produces its reasoning* fiom cause. Hut according
to the second form, he also calls dianoetic knowledge science. And according
to the first alone, he allows the appellation of science to be given to physiology.
Now therefore looking to the first form he thinks tit to call it conj ctural know
ledge. And thus much in answer to the doubt, the whole of what is here said
being attended with difficulty on account of the construction of the words, which
may thus be corrected with a small addition. "//".&lt;&gt; Sucrtite*, as\crting main/
tilings about ninny" afterwards showing what these many things are, he adds,
" concerning the Gods, anil the generation of the universe. .And these- are the
many IK; alludes to. " // therefore, he sa\s, main/ things being nx^rled about
many, concerning the generation of the universe, and the Ci oJx it contains, each of tluse
being many, r/r should not be aide to employ accurate language, you mutt not wonder.
He says this, however, because it is not wonderful, to be occupied in things of a
necessary nature. But it is necessary that a discussion should not be accurate in
a twofold respect, \iz. v&gt;n account of the tiling known, nut being stable and clear,
and on account of our nature being human. So great therefore is the caution

1 It ii etiilmlly no&lt; cssary iiiblcitl of ^i-rr/jor fi^ in llii&gt; \&gt;\.ce, to rt:jil ir^ruv tit\,. 1 or duiloc-
1 c knowledge is l&gt;v llo IIH.IIH conjectural.

HOOK ii.] TIM/T.US OF PLATO. 095

which Plato employs in what lie says. This however is not the case with others.
Hut Heraelitus, by asserting of himself that he knew all things, makes all other
men to be destitute of science. And Emj&gt;edocles announces that he imparts
truth herself, and that, in vt hat he writes.

To Wisdom * summit rapidly lie leaps.

For these assertions are not conformable to philosophic caution. But the Stoics
say that there is the same virtue of fiods and men, luring; very far from emulating
the piety of Plato, and the modesty of Socrates.

* If therefore we shall afford arguments no less probable than others,
it is proper to be satisfied, calling to mind that I who speak, and that
you who are my judges, have the human nature [in common]. So that
if you receive a probable narration concerning these things, it is fit to
seek for nothing farther than this."

Thrums reminds us in a twofold respect of the privation of stability and accu
racy in physical discussions; tir.-t, from the essence of the things. For from im
material natures becoming material, from impartible partible, from separate
natures, such as are situated in a foreign seat, and from universal, becoming indi
vidual and partial natures, they do not receive the definition of things scientific
and irreprehensible, which is adapted to immaterial and impartible forms. But
in the second respect, from the imbecility ot that by which physical objects are
surveyed. For if it be requisite to know any tiling concerning them, it is also
requisite to embrace a knowledge co-ordinate to them. But this is sense. And
if indeed we were in the heavens, we should perhaps be less deceived ; but here
dwelling in the last part of the universe, and beini; most remote from them, \ve
employ sense in a gross and erroneous manner. For we are allotted the human
nature. But the human nature brings with it a life which is material and dark
ened by the body, and which is partible, and in want of irrational knowledge.
The Gods, however, know 1 that which is generated, in a way perfectly remote
from generation, that which is temporal, eternally, and that which is contingent,
necessarily. For by intellectually perceiving they generate all things, so that they

1 Tbt word yiytwvkotvir it wanting in (he original.

PKOCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

intellectually perceive them after the above-mentioned manner. For we must not
fancy that knowledge is characterized by the natures of the things known, or that
what is not stable is also not stable with the (Jods, as the philosopher Porphyry
savs; for this is asserted by him which it would have been better not to ha\esaid ;
but we must admit that the mode of know ledge \arieswiththedi\ersitiesofgnos-
tic natures. For the same thing is known by diunity indeed unitedly, by intel
lect totally, by reason universally, by the phantasy morphotically, 1 and hr- sense
passively. Nor does it follow, that because the thing known is one, the knowledge
also is one. Farther still, if knowledges are essential in the (Jods, and their intel
ligence is not adventitious, such as they arc, .such also is their knowledge. Hut
they are immaterial, eternal, united, and midefiled ; and, therefore, they know
immaterially, eternally, unitedly, and with imcoiitaminated purity. Hence they
antecedently comprehend that w hich is material, immaterially ; dispersed multitude,
uniformly; that which is changed according to time, stably and eternally; and
every thing preternatural, dark and impure, in a manner [transcendently lumi
nous and] pure. Would it not therefore be superfluous to add any further confir
mation of this truth ?

Again however this 1 may be assumed from what has been said, that the want of
accuracy in the theory of the images of being, arises from our imbecility For to
the knowledge of them we require phantasy, sense, and many other organs. But
the (Jods contractedly comprehend these in their unity, and di\ine intellection.
For in sublunary natures, we are satisfied in apprehending that which for the most
part takes place, on account of the instability of their subject matter. Hut again,
in celestial nature-, we are tilled with much of the conjectural, through employing
sense, and material instruments. On this account, we must be satisfied with
proximity in tin- apprehension of them, since we dwell remotely, at the bottom,
as it is said, of the universe. This also is evident from those that are conversant
with them, who collect the same things respecting them from dilleient hypotheses;
home things, indeed, tluou Ji eccentrics, others through epicycles, and others
through evolvents, [in all these] preserving the phenomena. What then, some
one may say, are we to be satisfied with Plato in physiologi/iug, ami in affording
HN arguments no less probable than others? .May we not reply, that it especially
becomes prudent men thus to speak about things of this kind, and to pursue the

TIu- ord moryhr, as we have rlx-u lirn- olm-rvcil, pi-rUins to iho rulour. figure, and ina K iiiHide
of su|K-itic ies. llencr, the pluntasy |*neives morphotically, because its sight is Ajlgurrd inception.
For rou here, it MTIUIS uecvsiary to redd roiro.

BO..K n.] TIM/I: rs OF PLATO. 297

medium between dissimulation and arrogance; for the latter is to say more. but
(In- former loss, than all others, ;md the medium is to say what is in no respect
less. In the next place, the words no Icxs, may not only be said of men in former
times, and speculators of nature, lut also of the conjectural things themselves.
As if he had said, " If therefore, t.r shall afford arguments no less prbtmltle than the
things thcmxetvcx, and shall not dc.iert the nature of I he object* nf kno;rla/c, we tmixf
he satisfied" The Gods indeed know these things in a more excellent manner,
lut we mast he satisfied with an approximating knowledge of tliem. For we are
men, are placed in body, and exert a partial form of life, and are filled with much 1
oi a conjectural nature. Hence, our discourses, may be very properly said to
resemble fables. For our language, which the word jau^y /A/e [used here by
J latoj indicates, is replete with crassitude and irrationality, and it is necessary to
pardon human nature.

" You speak most excellently, O Titmrus, and we shall receive what
you say, in every respect as you advise. Your preface indeed we won
derfully approve. Proceed therefore, and bring to a conclusion the sub
sequent melody. 1 "

In the Hepuhlie, where Socrates disposes the discourse. Tima-us was silently
present, not exhibiting his own judgment about what was said. Hut here
Socrates, after a certain admirable manner, receives what Tima-us says.
For in the things al&gt;o, of which the persons are images, while secondary
natures ener-i/e, those that are first are established in themselves, and do not
depart from themselves, nor^ver^e to inferior natures. Hut when more divine
beings enerjri/e, then more subordinate natures are elevated to the participa
tion of them, through the love of all-various wonder. Hence Socrates, in what
is here said, very properly surrounds Timseus with all possible praise. For
through wonder itself, lie is in a greater decree united to him. Moreover,
the word "nw.\t excellent" indicates indeed, the perfect, intellectual, and scientific-
nature of the doctrine of Timacus. And it also indicates his analogy to the Demi-
ur^us. For as he. is the best of causes in works, thr.s also Timanis is the lx?st in
discourses. The words likew ise, " we shall receive what you say in every reffuct

Tor vrj\ov lirir, it ii nccc.s .ary to read wn\v.

1 In the It ll of I rorlus, Aoyor in rrrnrouly printed for t .por.

Tun. Plat. VOL. I. 2 I

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

us you advise,* indicate what kind of jx.&gt;rson he ought to l&gt;e, who rightly receives
discussions concerning divine natures. That he ought assiduously to adhere to
the teacher; to perform with all his might that which is ordered l&gt;y him ; and to
persuade himself, that it is right to be |&gt;ert?uaded by what tlie teacher says.

Farther still the word " preface" indicates the comprehension of total concep
tions in the hypotheses. All tiling therefore, are in tin; preface itself. 1 For in
this preface, it is shown what the form 1 is of the object of inquiry, on what
hypotheses, 1 and things previously demonstrated from them it depends, and also
what the nature is of the discussion, and what are the requisite qualifications of
the auditor. But the word vopof mtlotly, is assumed from modulations adapted to
the harp. These then-fore, are certain melodies, some of \\hich are Minervnl,
nut others Martial. And some indeed, are enthcastic, but others are defamatory
of manner*. Prior, however, to these melodies, it is usual to arrange the preludes,
\\hichalso on this account are, railed firecontrd. -(titiunx. From thence therefore,
they are assumed. Hut the word tm ludy contributes to the tiling proposed to be
considered, because all the visible partible 4 order of things, being harmonious,
eternally remains, on account of the goodness of its producing causes. And
Iwcause likewise, it proceeds from, and subsists according to intellect, and pos
sesses total powers separated from each other, ami arranged in a manner adapted
to each. For melodies are culled vo/xovf lti:cs t because they remain immutable, and
1 it-cause such things as are tit are distributed from each.

" Let us narrate then on account of what certain cause, the composing
artificer constituted generation, ami this universe."

All that has been Ix-fore said delivers to us preparatives for the whole of physio
logy. Ami of these, some through images and symbols, exhibit the theory of the
world. A preface also of the whole discussion is prefixed, and of the demonstra
tion through images or symbols ; one part of which unfolds the union, but
another the separation of mundane natures. Of the prefatory parts also, some are
hypotheses, but others are as it were lemmas demonstrated through the hypo-

1 For iara r rt here, it seems requisite to rfad iaru rouro.

1 Instead of n Ttiu {tt uui in this plat*, it is necessary to read rt TV ti?n.

For tai votw vwirilcocuv rrad *a ct iroiwy vvvtifoiuy.

* Th word fjrpionj is omitted in the original.

BOOK ii.] T1NLEUS Or PLATO.

299

theses. For the particulars respecting the mode of diseussion, may l&gt;e placed
among the things demonstrated. For to the demonstration that the world is
generated, the assertion that the discussion of it is eikotolo;;y [or speaking from
probability], is consequent. .Hut again, these things having received an appro
priate end. Tima-us commencing the fabrication of the universe, begins from the
good, conceiving that the discovery of tlie linal cause will lx&gt; to him the most
beautiful incitation. For as the good is the cause of all beings, so likewise it is
fit that the generation of the world should proceed from this as the first prin
ciple. For all things are from the good. And of such tilings indeed, as the demi
urgic intellect is not the cause, as for instance of matter, of these the good is the
cause. And of such things as the paradigm is not hypostatic, these also derive
their subsistence from the good. For all things are for the sake of it, and it is the
cause of all beautiful things, as it is said in the Epistles. Hence Timanis refers
the other causes to this one cause. For having found the form of the world
through the hypotheses, and also the paradigmatic, and e/1 eclive cause, he now
wishes to assign the most principal, most venerable, and most ancient of causes,
the final, which he particularly desires in the fabrication of things. For since the
man who lives according to intellect performs every thing for the sake of good, will
not intellect itself, and a divine intellect, in a much greater degree fabricate all
things for the sake of the final cau^e ? For though the worthy man frequently
appears to perform something for the sake of the body, yet this is not the end
to him of the thing, nor does he principally regard the good of the subordinate
nature ; but he does this also for the sake of a similitude to divinity, and makes
that to Ix 1 his most intentional end. How much more therefore, must the Demi-
urgus of the uniterse fabricate for the sake of good, and the final cause? For lie-
does not energi/e without design, nor indefinitely. Hence also, as it appears to
me, Plato does not investigate in the beginning, if there is a final cause of the
composition of the world, but as if this was acknowledged by all men, lie inquires
what the final cause is. For the Demiurgus is supposed to be intellect and a
God, and not chance, as some say. But if intellect is the maker, there is certainly
that for the sake of x hich in the fabrication of things. For as the soul when it is
in an upright condition, performs all things according to intellect, so intellect in
fabricating, gives subsistei ce to all things conformably to divinity. But this is
the same as conformably to the food.

For ov*v /ir r e mr airioi here, it it neceary to read OOMV pr\ tartr airoi.

300 I ROCLUS ON THK [LOOK n.

\Vhether therefore, it he requisite to follow the Aristotelian prohlems, after n-lnit
the universe is, and what kind of a t/iiii" it is, it is necessary to in\ estimate on rrhut
account it is. For it has heen said tlr.it it is unit-rated indeed, hut is the linage of
heintj. And it is also requisite hesides this to consider, for the sake of \vliat it
was Generated. (.)r it it he necessary to adopt tlic Platonic causes, it is lit alter the
demiurgic cause and the paradigm, to discover the linal cause of tlie fahricntiou
ol tlie \vorld. For again, all other causes are suspended from this, ;md likewise
the di\ iiiity of \\w paradigm, the goodness of the maker, and tlie perfection of
that which is generated. And as lar a&gt; to this is the ascent to those who love
to contemplate liuth. It is usual however, to call the linal cause 010, nil ticcount of
which ; the paradigmatic cause rriGT ,, uilh rtUttic-n lu tc/tic/t, the demiurgic cause
JY c-j, by \ihich ; ihe instrumental cau^-e o/ c,j, tln uugh which ; form X JL J o, accord*
in&lt;f In u/nt/t ; and matter ^ vj, or ivi,tr&lt;&gt;&gt;n n/nc/i, or/;j irhtch. These causes also
received the same aj)])ellaliol)s from IMato hiniM-lf. For now investigating the
final cause he s:\\ s, en iicct&lt;niit of ichnt cau*c. liH|niring concerning the paradig
matic cause, he says, rr//// rdaii n to i, Inch of the paradigms. But concerning
the demiurgic cause, he says, that \vhich is generated, i&gt; from necessity gene
rated //// a certain cansi*. .And as we proceed, \\e shall point out the rest from
(he words theniM-l\&lt; s of IMato ; except that at ])ie&gt;eiit aUo it mu.-t he said, that
these appellations are adapted to the discriminating science of the philosopher.

\\hat ho\\e\er is genciation, and what is the universe? Some indeed h\
generation understanding tlie siihhmary place, call the universe the whole \\orld.
Uut these entirely w and-r liom t!i&lt; meaning of IMato. For the 1 )emiiii -us is
not represented as separately fashioning material natures, and separatt ly the
whole ivorld. And in the next place, gem ration itself is a part of the universe.
jl however, it should he -aid that IMato calls the heav en the universe, heca .ise it
i&gt; the greatest pail of the woild, lor the rest is small ; or heciMise it is the most
ilivim- and principal part, and as it were the summit of the universe ; for thf head
also is called the whole, as,

and IMato also says, that the world was surrounded with the remaining hulk of
hody for the sake of this; yet at the same time, the philosopher is accustomed
to call this likewise generation. Others again call matter generation, hut that

I Iliad, viii. v

ii.] TIM.1-:US OF PLATO.

r&gt;oi

which is adorned from matter [as the subject], they denominate the universe, by

whom main tilings written l&gt;y Plato, must necessarily be rejected. For lie savs
that every thin- generated, and all generation, is sensible, or tangible, and visible]
Farther still, lie i;i\es a division to generation opposite to that of matter, as \vhen
he says, llinv were these things subsisting scj);ir;&gt;tely, being, place, and generation,
Iroin \\liich the universe was constituted.

Our preceptor however says, that the fabrication of the world is to be under
stood in a twofold respect. For one part ol it consists in the formation of bodies,
but the other, in adapting bodies to the completion of one world. For it is one
thiiig to fashimi bodies themselves, through figures, but another to harmoni/e them
when fashioned, to the universe, (ieneratiem f! re/on; must be said to be the forma-
(ion of badie. &lt;, bfin^ a motion [or tendency] t&gt; the Wholeness and perfection of the
universe. / &lt;&gt;/ tluit iclt nh is composed / row jmrtx has a prc-cotiah-td production of
(lie parts. I fence the formation * ic/iic/i taken place bedm n matter, the u-hule orderly
distribution &lt;&gt;/ things, and the one conipletitm of the n/iirerse, must be called t iteration,
in order ///.// // may be a patli to (tie vliolc in :t hich the parts are comprehended. For
tin s is the universe, bein^ constituted perfect from perfect parts, according to the
one harmony of \\holes. Since howe\er, this uhole i- sensible, and not the in-
tellable all, or universe; for this was the paradigm ; nor the intellectual all; for
this \\as deiiiinr-ie ; on this account IMato adds tb, particle ////., manifesting by
it that which is sensible and partial. For every thin-j corporeal, though it should
be a \\hole, is partial. IJut the most principal \\lmle i^ that which is immaterial
ami without interval, and that is truly all \\lntherit be intellectual or intelli
gible. And Ihiis much concerning this particular.

IJut what tihall &gt;\e say is meant by composition? Ierhaps it indicates that
the world is composed from many things, and that the -&lt; neration of it is from
dissimilars. Perhaps also, it si-nilies that union and stability accede to it from
the total fabrication. For the collocation of &lt;r;v, w/V/i, [in the word
is significant of union, and .fthe ^inspiration of all things to one. But
pcnuaiu-Hci/, manifests tlie firm:,e^s and stability of the fabrication of the world.
Farther still, with respect to the words irvwrr^- and f&lt;rrr ( T-&lt;ro [i. e. he r 7io
co;///o.v ( y/ and //i i-..//.v//V///f,/]emph.\ed here by Plato, the former copulates the
present and past times, and the latter indicates the perfection and the, |&gt;er|X -
luity of the fabrication. For the former of the.se words manifests continual pro-

For Trnitnv lirrf, it is uercssary to read irXai-.

302 PROCLUS OX THE [ B00 n.

duction, and which is always consummately effected with invariable sameness ;
but the latter a wholeness which is allotted an existence in fulness. The signi
fying likewise, both the past and the present time through the same names, in
dicates that the divine fabrication proceeds through sameness and similitude.
For such as is the nature of that which is effective, such also is the energy which
it possesses. And as it is, so it fabricates ; because it produces by its very bein"-,
and from 1 its own proper essence.

" He was good, but in him who is good, no envy is ever ingenerated
about any thing."

Thofe \xho call the Demiurgus the good, are entirely ridiculous. For the good
ami one who is good are not the name. For the former i&gt; imparticipable itself
by list If, and is exempt from all things; but the latter is good through participa
tion of the former. And the one rules oxer all intelligibles ; but the other, if
indeed it is the same with the paradigm, is intelligibles themselves, but is not
the soxereign ruler of intelligibles ; and if it is subordinate to the paradigm is
in a much greater degree inferior to the king of all intelligible*. And in .short,
every certain God is a certain good, one being a demiurgic, another a xixific, and
another a perfective good. Hut the gumlis not a certain good, but is nmply good.
And it you say that it is demiurgic, you diminish its subsistence as simply good.

lhe.se distinctions therefore U-iug made, let us next consider the beginning of
what is here said. In the lirst place, therefore, as 1 lato xxheii inxestiualing the
mundane form, and inquiring \xhetherthe xxorld xxas generated, or is unbegotten,
adds prior to the \\hole demonstration, " // mis generated ;" and as when explor
ing the paradigmatic cause, he prexiotisly adds, " it i.s manifest to every one, that
it U tis generated frith re la (ion to an eternal paradigm," adducing the conclusion
prior to the xxhole of the reasoning ; thus also proposing to discover the
final cai^e after all the others, he add&gt;, " lie r/v/.v good," imitating int. llect
through this enunciation, and the at once collected comprehension of the
assertion. For in this colon, the xxhole of xxhat is hnestigated is comprehended,
because goodness is the final cause, \\hether it is simply so and one, or whether*
it is the demiurgic goodness. Fora* the paradigm is txxo-fold, the one l&gt;eing
intelligible, but the other intellectual ; and as the one is prior to the Demiurgus,

Frir avro lifrr, n-aJ a TO.
1 Lire is oniillrd in llic original.

ROOK ii.] TIM.l-US OF PLATO. 303

being primarily eternal and united, and comprehensive of all intelligible animals,
but the other which is in the Demiurgus of wholes, unically comprehends the
demiurgic number of forms ; thus also with respect to goodness, one kind is
simply so, but another is in the demiurgic intellect. And the former indeed, i.s the
fountain of all intelligible, intellectual, and supermundane good; but the latter
bein^ a certain goodness, is the cause and fountain of some things, but is allotted
an order subordinate to others. For if we wish 10 explore what it is which makes
a God, whether he be intelligible or intellectual, sii|&gt;eriniindanc or mundane, we
shall find that it is nothing else than goodness. l ; or what is it that makes each
of the bodies that are animated to be so, except tin; resemblance of soul ? What
is it which makes intellectual souls to be such, except the intellect that is in them,
and which is an illumination of total intellect? What therefore can deify intellect,
and an intelligible essence, except the participation of the first Clod, and the
forerunning illumination that proceeds from him? What therefore is the first? If
indeed, he were intelligible beauty we should say that intellect was a God
through beauty. But since the first God is the good, intellect also through partici
pating of goodness is a God. Hence this is the h\parxis of the Gods; and the
very essence of the Gods, if it be lawful so to speak, is goodness. According to
this likewise, every God r.xists as a (iod. And on account of this lie has a
providential, or a demiurgic, or a \i\ific, or a connective characteristic. For
intellect indeed, so far as intellect, is naturally adapted to have an intellectual
perception and knowledge of beings; but to encrgi/e providentially is divine.
So that the demiurgic intellect likewise, possesses its subsistence as demiurgic, on
account of the goodness which it contains. For on account of this, the intellect
which is in the Demiurgus, is the maker, and is not only gnostic of being. The
bein^ also which is in him, is an efficacious paradigm, and produces by its very
existence, and is not alone perfective of intellect. And intellect indeed in
making is corroborated by both these; by the paradigm, because it produces with
relalion to it ; and by goodness, l&gt;ecause it produces on account of it. But the
paradigm is corroborated by unity.

You have therefore, these successive, viz. goodness, the paradigm, intellect.
And these subsist in one way indeed, in the Demiurgus, and in another prior to
the Demiurgus. And if you are willing so to speak, the first goodness is the OIK,

* For tprcr in this place, it U wccswry to read

304 PROCLUS ON THR [BOOK n.

which in iK Yond even intellii-ibles themselves: for it is impnrticipable goodness.
But the paradigm is that intelligible which unitedly comprehends all the numlwr
of forms. And the maker is tin- intellectual intellect which gives subsistence to
v holes. So that if Amelius said that there are three deiniur^i after tliis manner,
perceiving this triad in the one Demiurtow, he said rightly. For one of them,
says he, makes [as it wen-] by eontrectation, another by mandate, and another by
his will alone. And the first indeed, is arranged analogously to the manual
artificer; the second pre-exists conformably to the architect; hut the third is
established prior to both, analogously to a kin-. .V Jar therefore, as the Demiur-
frus iv intellect, he produces till tiling / .v the intellectual perceptions of himself ; but so
j:,r r/.v f,c is intrlliH lc t /ic tunics In, his nry l&gt;an^ ; mul sof.ir * he is a du.l, hi, his
it-ill alone. If h\ve\er Amelias divulses the thiv,- Dnuiiir-i from the one Di.-miur-
j,nis &gt;ve must not admit il, uhile MV follow Plato. IM.P the same Drmiur-us in
CiK&gt;d, so far as he is a &lt;iod, and on ac.-oimt of -modm-ss he produces all things
by his will, and is int. -liable iutcll.-ctually ; for such is the- demiurgic lein^. lie-
is also intellect, the a.tifieci of the world. The words then-fore, " //r TIVM gwJ," ha\e
an explanation of ibis kind; in the term WAS, ihc supcr-plntan/, the consummately
perfect, and the .^er -eternal nature of his iln hic hypar.iis, being indicated. For Hie
term is, is significant of eternal things; the term WAS, of the super-eternal unities;
and the term w ILL K, of things vliiclt tuhisl in tune. For // the term is pertains tn
rterinil natures, the term WAS tr/// be adapted tn the natures prior to // , and the term
wi LL BK, to the natures posterior to these. But such are the bein-s which are indi
gent of time.

Since however the Demiur-us is -m,d, &lt;-nvy is never in-enerated in him about
anything But some one may say, what is there [ivmarkaWe] in inlelhrt not
b^Mnj; envious ? For this ] does not happen even to men that are moderately ^ood.
TluMer.u therefore tiever, is si-niticant of eternal p,-rfectioi ; since souls are at one
time passively ell ected, but at another, recur to impassivity. But the It-nn about
anything, is Mnilic:int of s.-lf-sullicieMcy ; since we indeed, for the sake of oth, r
things, are fn-qnently purified from envy, but in those things m which we have less
I than we think we ou-l.t to have in tlicse we are filled \N ith envy. What however, is

1 For a/&lt;tra(V t r&lt;. lifrc, MU ! u^.rt^rui.

1 Tor loiru,. ,-rr. in.pwi, I !&gt; II. cc^ary to r.M.t ill till* I l.iCC i-or/rr-i &lt;rr mr^u

1 For T,JV &gt;a, litre, it is rciuiile to read TOVTO yap.

BOOKII.J TIMJEUS OF PLATO. 305

the meaning of the term mtus, none." Is it because there are many kinds of envy that
he adds none? Or is it said through transcendency, in consequence of making a
perfect negation of envy ? But what kind of transcendency is it possible to find
in assertions concerning the Gods ? For all the appellations and words which are
employed about them, are beneath their dignity. Is not envy therefore, a pain
arising from the goods belonging to others, this passion iif us being mingled from
pleasure and pain, as Socrates has shown in the Pliilebus? Envy likewise, is for
a man to be able to benefit, and yet not benefiting, but keeping the good confined
to himself. And envy v aho l/ic -cant itself of good ; which the philosopher appears
to me especially to assume at present, exterminating it from a divine essence.
For it is naturally adapted to be perfectly exempt from this alone, since it is essen-
tiali/.ed in goodness itself. For to be pained from the goods pertaining to other*,
is inherent in all good which subsists according to participation, and which is not
primarily good. For adventitious good is one thing, good according to habit
another, and primary good another. For the first is mingled with its contrary,
in the same manner as adventitious beauty is mingled with deformity. But the
second is wholly boniform, yet is ,vc/* by participation. And the third, which
is primarily good, is good itself. For as intellect itself is the first intellect, and as
the beautiful itself is primarily beautiful, so good itself is primarily good. What
therefore is this ? It is the deity of each thing, according to which every truly-
existing being is a God. For it differs in no respect from goodness. But if any
one of secondary natures should be said to be a God, or good, it is among the num
ber of things drilled, and rendered good, and is a God through participation,
and not on account of its own proper essence, nor from itself.

This participation therefore, i liUo is accustomed to call indigence ;* just as in
the Banquet, he calls Love the rcant of things beautiful and good. Hence, a di-
\ine nature, so far as it is di\ine, is primarily good, and not according to parti-
( ipation ; sso that neither is it indigent of good. Hence too, it is superior to all
i-nvy. For as to the sun, which is generative of light, it is impossible for dark
ness to approach, but it is excluded from it at a great distance, about the cavities
f the earth; after the same manner, it is impossible for envy to approach to a
divine nature. For what kind of indigence can there be in such transcendent
abundance ? What imbecility is there in almighty deity ? What participation in the

1 i. t. OixVci tfiiotoi, no rnvy.

V.ttrinr if omittrd in the original.

T t m. Plat. VOL. I. 2 Q

306 PKOCLUS ON TI1K [BOOK n.

fountain of good ? The DemiurgUN therefore, being good by hi* very being, trim-
scends ul! indigence, anil ;tll participation which uccedeu from another tiling.
For he is united to the one itself, and doen not proceed out of it. For intellectual
union is of one kind, lut the union prior to intellect ol another, according to
which the generative deity of the Pemiurgus, and the goodness which eonncctn
all things, are united to the vnc itself. 1 or this goodness is not a certain power,
as some say, but the measure of all power. Nor is it will, hut will proceeds from
it. Nor is it a habit; for hahit pertains to anoilier tiling different from haliit ;
but goodness is itself of itself [i. e. jH-rtains to itself alone J. Nor, in short, is it an
i-s&i-ntial hvpostasis; but it is that \\hich unites essence, and is inellable, connects
powers, and is prolific- of demiurgic euer-ies. As therefore, every intellect is
essentiali/.cd in existing as intellect, but that which is above intellect is partici
pated b) it; and aseiery soul is es&gt;entiali/ed in exiting as soul, but intellect is
participated by it; thus al&gt;o every God is e&gt;sentu-.lized in being a God, or rather
is superes&gt;entialued, but there is not anything which is participated by him ;*
because the Gods are the mo-t ancient and venerable of all things. The demiur
gic intellect therefore, so f.ir as it is a (iod, in e\i&gt;tum as a God is primarily so,
and not according to participation. Thin however is the same with good. As
therefore, if some one should say that envy is the want of intellect, and a partial
intellect is superior to envy, but soul is not superior to it, for it is indigent of in-
lellert, because it is adapted to become intellectual by the participation of intel
lect ; thus also in goodnes&gt;, envy&gt; is the indigence of good ; but every thing
indigent is not primarily good. Soul incited and intellect are indigent of good,
because they are not primarily good. But a God, so tar as a God, being good, is
exempt from all envy, and transcends all indigence of whatever kind it may be,
whether it subsists according to diminution, or according to deviation. For
indigence is twofold, one kind as we have said being evil, but the other not.

" Being therefore entirely void of this, he was willing that all things
should become as much as possible similar to himself."

This is consequent to the before-mentioned axioms. For the first colon [or

1 or ii Wo lirrr, it it nfreoary to n ;nl ciXW.

i. -. i:\ii&gt; (Jo.t. i&lt;&gt; t\ir a* In- 11 4 &lt;;...!. \, a |)urlKi|Jitt of nothing inprrior to liiinxlf. For tlie
|ir&lt;-rt&gt;iou of (he (Jodi from the principle of all lhing, i not u participation, but an a^fr(/i return,
an iii -llablf unfolding into li^-lil.

1 For a^Ouiot here, read ^Oorui,

HOOK ii.J TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 307

part of the sentence] manifested the order, and the hyparxis of tlie Demiurgus,
that he i a God. And since with respect to deity, one God is imparticipable, but
another participate, IK; manife&gt;ts that the Demiurgiis is participate. For he does
not say that he was good ness, but that he was good. But he who is good participates
of goodness. And goodness itself indeed, is primarily good. But intellect and
being are good by participation. Again, the second colon shows that the Oemi-
urgus does not rank among deified natures. For one thing is entirely imparticipable,
such, for instance, as the good ; but another is good by* the participation of someother
nature, as every thing which is deified. 1 But that which is primarily good, isgood itself
And that which is participated, and is (lie medium of both the Iwfore-mentioned
natures is of such a kind as all the intelligible and intellectualordersof the Gods are
said to be. But this third colon comprehends the demiurgic peculiarity. For
not only to be good, but on account of the super-plenary, and the extended, to
proceed to all things, is indicative of the demiurgic and effective cause, desiring
to fill all tilings with itself, and to benefit all tilings; in order that all things may
become as much as possible similar to itself, by participating of a certain divine
nature, and of arcane and ineffable impressions, which accede to them from the
whole fabrication of things. If therefore, the maker of the universe is superior
to all indigence, he is exempt from all imbecility, and this eternally. For being
signifies the eternal ; and because he especially benefits all things, he impart? to
all things by illumination, the measure of good, a greater thing than which each
of the participants is by no means adapted to receive. And this indicates the
extension of providence. If likewise, he wished to supply all things with the
participation of good, there is nothing in the universe solely evil, so that neither
is there any thing disorderly, nor without the inspection of providence, nor
indefinite; but all things participate of beauty and order, so far as they are
naturally adapted to receive them. Hence he made all things similar to himself,
so far as he is a God, benefiting generated natures ; but he caused them to become
other things besides this, according to other paradigmatic reasons. For a*
Atticus says, as the carpenter makes all that he makes to be artificial, but diffcr-

1 TheDciniurgus.ii a participate deity, bcraiiM; hi* intellect participate* of his goodness, wliicli
constitutes his hyparxis.

1 Instead of ro ^tTo&lt;rytiy in this pbce, it it necesory lo read TV ^irra^ttf.

* Thus inul is dpi tied by the participation of intellect as medium ; because deity accede* to
soul Ihiough thf intervention of intellect ; and body is deified by the participation of oul a%
a medium.

30fl PUOCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

rnt things according to a different reason [or productive principle], causing one
thing to be a ladder, but another a bed ; thus also the DemiurgiH, HO far as lie i*
ood, assimilates all things to himself, rendering them good ; lint according to
forms which distribute their essences, he makes them with relation to paradig
matic causes. Porphyry however, admitting these tilings, thinks fit to a&lt;k
what it is by the reception of \\hiehgcneraare good. And he says it is by
the reception of harmony, symnu try, and order. For these are beautiful. But
every thing [truly] beautiful is good. Plato therefore manifests that good is
in these, when he says, " That God UJ that which wax dimnlcrly into order, through
liii wish to communicate good.

From all that has been said, therefore, it is easy to infer, that the Demiurgus
produces eternally ; that the world is perpetual, according to a perpetuity which
is extended through the whole of time; that it is always generated with
arrangement; and that it is not always incorruptible, but is always ^cm-nited or
becoming to be so, in consequence of always receiving good. Hut it is not imme
diately good like its generating father. For in him all things are contained
unitedly, [but in the \\orhl distributed!) ], 1 and not \\ith perfect reality, as in
eternal natures. For if the uni\erse was generated in time, \\as it from the
Demiur-us that it did not exist before, or from its subject nature U ing without
order! For if from the Demiurgus, was it because he also did not subsist
eternally ? Or is it not unlawful to assert this, and in other respects in vain ? For
concerning him, there is the same mode of interrogation, and whether Khali we
make all things generated, or will there be something primarily unlx-gotten,
and the Demiurgus stilt more so? Let it therefore be admitted, that it was in
consequence of the Demiurgus not energi/ing. \\ hether then, did he not fabri
cate, because he vsas not willing, or because he was not able? It indeed
we sav it was because he was not willing, we forget that we thus deprive him
of o-oodness. Hut if he was not able, it is absurd that he should at one time
have power, and at another imbecility. For we shall take away the eternal.
But if it was from its subject nature that the universe did not exist before,
whether was it from this nature being unadapted or adapted? If therefore it
was adapted, it was not this nature which prevented the universe from existing.
But if it was unadapted, how being unadapted for an infinite time, came it to be
now changed [into an adapted condition]? Whether did it move itself ? But it is not

The words t K T V tow f tr/prj/if wt, are omitted in (lie original.

BOOK ii.] T1MJEUS 01- PLATO. 30 j,

self- motive. Was it therefore moved by the Demiurgus ? And why was it not
moved by him before, if he also was then good, and was willing that all things
should Income similar to himself? The extension therefore of providence i*
suspended from the goodness of the father; but from this the eternal production
of the Demiurgus; and from this, the perpetuity of the universe, which subsists
for an infinite time in becoming to be, and is not a stable perpetuity. And the
same assertion subverts the perpetuity of the world, and the goodness of him who
made it. Tor if the Demiurgus was good, he always wished to impart good to
all things. For as the sun, as long as it exists, illuminates 1 all things, and fire,
heats as Ion::; as it is fire ; for the one is essentially illuminative, but th&lt;&gt; other
calefactivc; thus likewise, that which is always good, always wishes to impart
good, lest being willing indeed, but unable, it should sustain the paoion of the
vilest natures. For neither does the worthy man wish to efli-ct other things than
such as he is able to effect. Uut if the Demiurgus was always able to impart good,
lie always imparts it in energy, lest he should have an imperfect power. If how
ever, he always imparts good in energy, he always makes that which is good.
But if he always makes it, the world is always generated. Hence the world is
perpetual ; for the Demiurgus is always good. The world then-fore is perpetual,
not being but becoming to he perpetually. Hence, as we have said, the perpetuity
of the universe is suspended from the goodness of its maker. For the orderly
distribution of the universe sufficiently manifests the demiurgic power. For
matter, on account of its privation of form and morphe, has appeared to some to
be without (jod, and the confused and disorderly nature, to IM- remote from
divine providence. Since the universe however, is well-ordered and decorated
with beauty, it clearly demonstrates divine production. The visible order of
things therefore, being the progeny of the demiurgic cause, is consnh&gt;i*tcnt with
the goodness of the father.

" He therefore, who especially receives this most principal or proper
and powerful principle from prudent men, will receive it with the
greatest rectitude."

Timjrns assigns the final cause which extends itself to the goodness of the
Demiurgus, according to which uniting himself to the first, and imitating him,

1 For rnraXi/j-arrt, it is nrcr ttarv (o read

310 PROCLUS OX THE [BOOK n.

he generates all things. For the first principle is that which primarily produces
all things, and this Timaeus denominates the most proper and powerful principle,
because it is motive of causes themselves. For the demiurgic principle moves
indeed that which is generated, hut is moved from thence [i. e. from the first
principle]. And the paradigmatic principle moves the total fabrication, but
is moved bv goodness; because the good indeed, is prior to intelligibles, but the
paradigm is intelligible, and the Demiurgus intellectu.il. About the good also, all
intelligible and intellectual natures subsist: but about the intelligible, the order of
intellectuals subsists. The effective cause therefore, is a principal cause, but the
paradigmatic i more principal, and the- final is most principal. For it is that for
tin- sake of which all things sub-i^t, from which other things are suspended, and
which i* truly the end of fabrication. Hence the world is perfected indeed, on be
coming animated and inspired with life; but it is most perfect, so far as it partici
pate* of good, and of the union which extends through wholes. For as the good
is the leader of all things, so the goodness which is in each thing has the first
dignity in each. On these accounts therefore, he calls the final cause the most
principal, or the most proper and powerful principle. For the name of principle
comprehends also concauses. But by the addition of most principal, he indicates
that which is truly * cause. For the most principal principles are the causes of
generated natures ; but concauses are subservient to other things, and are in the
effects themselves. It must be said however, that generation and tiie iiorld,
us we hair before observed, are the path between matter and the whole arrangement
of things, and the perfection itself of tfit universe. Since also in dogmas concerning
the highest causes it is necessary that the speaker should have the intellectual
habit, and the auditor a prudent judgment, this is especially requisite in discu&gt;-
sions concerning the gocd. For intellect subsists on account o{ the good, and the
intellect which is in us, on account of the good which is in us. Hence Plato
thinks it is necessary, that those- who assert something concerning the ino.st proper
and powerful principle, should he prudent men, and that their auditors
should receive what they say with the greatest rectitude. What then,
may not any casual person say some-tiling concerning God and the final
cause? And do we not every day hear the multitude asserting that Cod is
good Jlut God *pktn vfiiithout true virtue is but a name, ax P lot i nun saj/s ; and

* Instead of *tpt ft rn orooi, ij rwv tonTvv iato^i;&lt;m in thi place, it is nrresvirv to rcacl vrp, ?f
rn oijrnr, n ru. vorpuv lianoopnoit. For the intelligible is superior to the intellectual order.
1 Tor r|* otTOI dinar here, It l requisite to read rijr OTUJ mrioi .

.J TLNLEUS OF PLATO. ,,

oil

tic is sfwktn of hi/ the multitude, not according to wisdom, but according to chance.
Do not da-moiis also know the goodness of the father, who dance [as it were]
round him; anil dmum-ic angels, who precede as in a solemn procession the
paternal production of thirds; and Gods who receive demiurgic powers from the
one fabricate cainu ? Gods however, possess this knowledge uniformly, an-els
intellectually, da nums with undeliled purity, eternally, and in a way allied to"the
natures prior to them, l.ut we must be sntisf.ed with hating this knowledge pru
dently and wisely, since we are in a certain respect media Urtwot-n more divine
natures and the multitude, between intellectual beings, and those that are deprived
of intellect. For such is human prudence, proceeding indeed from intellect and
intelligence, hut ruling over a life destitute of intellect. Hence, when we speak con
cerning the most proper principle, what we assert must he received as uttered by
prudent men. For prudence isa medium between intellect ami opinion ; so that a ritrht
judgment will be concordant with it. Hence too, Plato adds, he who especially."
For the assertion concerning this principle must be especially received from prudent
men. But from the natures above man, something better than this assertion must
be sought ; and from the multitude, a casual assertion.

1 For the divinity was willing that all things should be good, and that
as much as possible nothing should be evil."

The divine fabrication, and intellectual production proceeds from impartible*
to partibles, from things united to such as are multiplied, and from thirvs with
out interval, to every way extended masses. This also the discourse concerning
it adumbrating, in the first place, celebrates the final cause apophthegmatieally ;
in the next place, discursively ; and in the third place, it delivers iu an evolved
manner, the whole orderly distribution and progression from it. For the asser
tion, " he was ^ood," uniformly comprehends every final and the most divine of
causes. But the words, " //; him :t/io is cood, no cnry is ever ingeneratcd about any
thing; and being entirely -coid of thi.s, he was willing that all things should become as
much as possible similar tohini*&lt;lf" comprehend this cause discursively; 1 because
after the one will of intellect, he adds the divided theory of it. And what he now
says represents to us intelligence proceeding into all multitude, and interval, and
evolving all the demiurgic providence, and ail the parts of fabrication. The third

The word ^Kt^irwi is oniiltcd in the original.

311

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOR n.

assertion, likewise, is in continuity with the second, and the second with the
Grst. For since the first division was, " he was good" on this account the second
begins from good, but proceeds as far as to the will of the father. And the third
beginning from his will, delivers the whole of his providential energy. For if he
was good, lie wished to make all things good. But if he wished, he made them
to be so, and tin; universe obtained an elegant arrangement. For providence
indeed, is .suspended from will, but will from goodness. And thus much con
cerning the order and connexion of the assertions.

I&gt;-t us however survey what will is, in order that we may understand how it
is conjoined with goodness. The super-essential union itself, therefore, which is
of itself exempt from brings is one, ineffable, and uncircumscribed, from the one
//^// possessing its undefined and incomprehensible nature. Hence, if it be requi
site to survey in this, from what has been said, the triad which is characterized by
unity, or w hich has the form of the one, goodness indeed precedes, but the second
is will, and the third is pro\idencc; goodness producing the perfect, the sufficient,
and the desirable ; but will exhibiting the super-plenary, the extended, and the genera
tive; and providence imparting the ejjicacioux, the perfect i-cc of works, and the timle-
Jiled. According however, to this ineffable and united hvparxis of the triad, the
intelligible also is triply divided, into essence, power, and energy ; essence indeed,
)&gt;cing firmly established in this triad, and exiting self-perfect; but power pos
sessing anever-failing and infinite progression; and energy being allotted pel lection
.md ev-ential production. And again, intellect analogously receives a triple di.i-
.-i.m, into being, life, and the intellectual. For the first of these is the supplier
of existence, the second of vitality, and the third of knowledge. After these,
soul likewise is divided into the object of science, into science, and the scien
tific. For the first of these indeed, is that whi-li is kno\,n, the second is know
ledge, and the third is that which receives its completion from both. These
triads therefore, l&gt;eing four in number, as goodness is to will, so is essence to
power, being to life, and the object of science to science. And as will is to
providence, so is power to energy, life to intellect, and science to that which
is scientific. For essence, heini;, and the object of science, have an order
analogous to goodness. For the connective, the stable, the uniform,
and the perfective, pertain to goodness But power, life, and science, are
analogous to will. For the self-begotten, and that which comprehends and
measures all things li-long to will. And energy, intellect, and that which is
scientific, pertain to providence. For the efficacious, and that which proceeds

.] TIM /EUS OF PLATO. 3 J3

through and antecedently comprehends all things, are the resemblances of divine
providence. Since therefore, the Demiurgus also is a God, and an imparlicipable
intellect, so far as he is a Cod indeed, he possesses goodness, will, and provi
dence ; hut as intelligible, he has essence, power, and energy ; and as intellect,
-ie is, and Ins life, and a knowledge of wholes. The monad also which he
possesses is suspended from unity. And thus much concerning will.

Consequent to this, it remains to inquire how the Demiurgus wished all thin--*
to ho good, and if this is possible, and in what manner. For it may be said, if he-
was willing that this should be the case, it would be requisite that the progression
of things should stop at the Gods and undcOled essences. If, however, he not
only fabricated these, but also brutes, and reptiles, and men, and every thin"
material, he was not willing that all things should be good. Tor he was not willing
that better natures should alone exist, but also fabricated such as are worse. If
he had been willing, therefore, that all things should be good, he would have
stopped his fabrication at the Gods. We reply, however, that if the progression
of things was only as far as to the Gods, all things would not be good. For first
natures being allotted the last order, the good would l&gt;e destroyed ; since
being able and willing to generate through their goodness, yet in consequence of
an arrangement as the last of things, they would become unprolitic and not good.
Our opponents therefore say, if all tilings are good, the progression is as far as to
the Gods. But we say, if the progression of things extends only as far as to the
Gods, all tilings are not good. For if a divine nature is unprolific how is it good ?
But it will be unprolific, if it is the last of things. For every thing which generates
is better than that which is generated. But the less excellent nature not existing,
that which is more excellent will have no subsistence. Let there l&gt;e the God*,
therefore, and 1. 1 them have the first order. But after the Gods, let there IK? a
progression 1 as far as to matter itself; and let us give a transition to all beings,
from the first to the last of things. And neither let there be any thing wanting
even of the last of beings, nor any vacuum. For what vacuum can there b
when things characterized by itself 1 have the first subsistence; those that rank as
the second proceed from these ; those of the third order proceed from these and

1 ripnotov is orniltcd in the original.

* viz. Self-subsuteut super-e ^mtidl natures ; for to tliese the avrn, or itttlj, primarily belong*. Tlir
next to ihesc aro intellect*. Those in the third rank, are souli. Tlioie in the fouilh, the nature) lbt
,ve dnided about bodiet. And those in the fifth and last rank are bmliei.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 R

314

PROCLt S ON THE [BOOK u.

others ; those in the fourth rank are generated from things characterized by the
term another ; and those in the fifth rank l&gt;eing others only ; and on each side of
these those natures subsisting which are dissimilarly similar ! Such, therefore,
being the continuity in things, what can be deficient ? Immoveable natures In-ing
first established, self-motive natures hating the second, and ulter-motive natures,
the third rank, all of \\hicli are the last of tilings. For all beings derive their com
pletion from the above-mentioned orders. In short, the production of things may
be shown to be continued in many ways; and if you are willing so to speak,
analogy subsisting from on high as far as to the last of things, according to the
well-ordered progression of all beings from the one.

I^t, therefore, all these things b.- acknowledged, and let the generation of beings
be extended as far as to nothing ; but \\ hether is there nothing ev il in these, or shall
we admit that there is in a certain respect, and that there is what i* called depravity
in bodies, and in souls ? For some have been led by this doubt to take away evil
entirelv ; but others have been induced to deny a providence, in consequence of
lcliev ing, that if providence has a subsistence, all things are good. For il, indeed,
divinity was willing there should be evil, how can he be good? For it is the
province of that which is essentially good to benefit every thing, just as it is ot
that which is essentially hot, to give heat. Until is not lawful for the good to
effect any thing elve than what is good. And if divinity was not 1 willing there
should be evil, how can it have a subsistence I For something will exist contrary
to the will of the father of all things. Such therefore is the. doubt.

M e must say, however, conformably to the doctrine ot Plato, according to our
preceptor, that the habitude of divinity with respect to things subsists in a different
manner from that of ours. And again that the habitude of things w ilh reference to
deity is dillerent from their habitude with reference to us. For whole.-; have a
relation to parts different from that of parts to each other. To divinity therefore
nothing is evil, not even of the things which are called evil. For he uses these
also to a good purpose. But again, to partial natures there is a certain evil, these
being naturally adapted to suffer by it. And the same thing is to a part indeed
evil, but to the universe; and to wholes is not evil but good. For so far as it is a
being, and so far as it participates of a certain order, it is good. For this thing
which is said to be evil, if you apprehend if to be destitute of all good, you will

1 \\i. Tht itr, and matter.
MI !&gt; wauling iii thr original.

HOOK ii.] TIMJEUS OF PLATO. 315

make it to be beyond ovon that which in no resj)ect whatever is. For as the
gond itself \* prior to heinir, so &lt; *il itself is posterior to the nothingness of non
entity. For that which is most distant from the good is evil, and not that which
has no kind of subsistence. If, therefore, that which in no respect whatever is,
has more of subsistence than evil itself, but this is impossible, it is much more
im;&gt;os&gt;ilIe that there should be such a thing as evil itself.

If, howrver, that which is entirely evil lias no subsistence, but evil is complicated
with good, you give it a place among beings, and you make it good to other
things. And, indeed, how is it possible it should not, if it ranks among beings?
For that which participates of being, participates also of unity, and that which
participates of unity, participates likewise of good. Hence evil, if it is, partici
pates of good ; because e\il has not an unmingled subsistence, and is not entirely
deprived of order, and indefinite. Who therefore made it to be such? Who
imparted to it measure, and order, and bound ? It is evident that it is the Demiur-
gus who rendered all things similar to himself. For he filled both wholes and
parts with good. But if he benefits all things, and colours evil itself with good,
there is nothing evil according to the power of divinity and of recipients. For
power is twofold, one being that of divinity which benefits the depravity that is
so abundantly seen ;* but the other being that of recipi&lt; nts, which participate of
the goodness of the Demiurgus according to the measure of their order [in the
scale of beings]. In consequence therefore of I he Demiurgus being willing that
there should be nothing evil, nothing is evil. But if certain persons accuse him as
the cause of evil, because he gave subsistence to partial natures, they take away
the fabrication of the world, subvert the prolific power of wholes, and confound
the nature of things first and last.

That we assert these things, however, conformably to the opinion of Plato, may
be easily seen from his writings. For in the Politicus, he clearly says, " that the
world obtained from its maker all beautiful things, but from its former habit, all
such injustice, and evil, as are produced within the heavens." For Invause there
is generation, and also corruption, that which is preternatural has a subsistence.

* Tht good HtrlJ is prior to being. Nothing or non-being is not tii.it which is roost distant from
ihr gflod ; for it H tli.it in which the procession of being ends, but tfut winch is mo*l distant from tfi
fofd is ml ilir/J. Hence rril iltrlf is ponterior to nonentity.

1 For *o\vapaTov, it i necessary to read *-o\vop(tror.
For Tfipi here, it is requisite to read TO/MI.

PROCLUS ON TUG [BOOK n.

And because the deformity of matter fills partial souls with inelegance, through
an association with it, on this account that which is not conformable to reason
is allotted a certain resemblance of subsistence. At the same time, however, all
thrse particulars become brauliful through the goodness of the maker of the
universe. But in the Hi-public, Plato assigns no other cause of good than God,
and says that certain other causes of evils are to be investigated; through which
he manifests that evils do not derive their subsistence from divinity. For it is
not, says he, the province of fire to refrigerate, nor of snow to heat, nor of that
which is aH-"ood to produce evil. Ami he asserts that certain partial causes of
the&gt;e are to be admitted, and such as arc indefinite. For it is not in evils us in
thin-s that are good, vi/. that the out and what is primarily good, precede multi
tude ; and this on account of the indefinite diffusion of evil. The words others,
therefore, and cerium, evince that the causes of evil are partial and indefinite. But
in the Thca-tetus he says, " that it is neither possible for evils to be abolished, nor
for them to be in the Cods, but that they revolve from necessity about the mortal
nature, and this place of our abode." If, therefore, evil revolves necessarily in
the mortal place.it will not be according to Plato, that which in no respect
whatever has a subsistence, and which is exempt from all beings. So that
according to him evil exists, is from partial causes, and is benefited through the
bonifonn providence of the Demiurgus, because there is nothing \\hich is entirely
evil, but every thing is in a certain respect accomplished conformably to justice
and divinity.

For we may make the following division: Of all that the world contains, some
things are wholes, but others parts. And of pails, some eternally preserve their
own good, such as a partial intellect, and partial da-mons, but others are not
always able to preserve their proper good. And of these, some are alter-inotive,
but others self-motive. And ol self-motive natures, some have ev il established
in their choice; but in others, it terminates in actions. With respect to wholes,
therefore, they are perfectly good, supplying not only themselves, but also parts
with good. Such things, however, as are parts, and yet preserve their own good,
possess good secondarily and partially. But such as are parts, and alter-motive,
deriving their subsistence from other things, are suspended from the providence
of them, and are transmuted in a becoming manner, as is the case with such
bodies as are generated and corrupted. For if it is necessary that there .should
be generation, it is also necessary that there should be corruption. For genera
tion subsists according to mutation, and is a certain mutation. But if (here is

HOOK ii.] TIMvEUS OF PLATO. 317

corruption, it is necessary that the preternatural should l&gt;e secretly introduced.
As, therefore, (hat which is corrupted, is indeed corrupted with reference to itself,
hut is not destroyed with reference to tin? universe; for it is either air or water,
or something else into which it is changed ; thus also that which is preter
natural, is indeed with respect to itself disordered, but with respect to the
universe has an orderly arrangement. For if though it should be destroyed
and entirely deprived of order, it would not dissolve the order of the universe,
how is it possible that when having a preternatural subsistence which is of
itself nothing when deprived of all order, it can destroy the whole arran^e-
inent of things ? But again, partial natures which are self-motive indeed,
and whose energy is directed to externals, cause that which is effected by
their energy to be evil to themselves, yet in a certain respect this also is
good, and conformable to divinity. For since impulses and actions arc
from choice, actions follow elections, according to justice, when he who
chooses not only deserves the retribution consequent to his choice, but that
also which follows from his conduct. And simply, indeed, the action is not good,
but to him who chooses a certain thing, and is impelled in a certain way, it is
introduced according to justice; and is good to this individual and this particular
life. For of goods, some are good to all things, others to such as differ accord
ing to species, and others to individuals, so far as they are individuals. For
hellebore is not tjood to all men, nor to all bodies, nor yet to all diseased bodies,
but it is good to one who is*Jiseased in a particular manner, and is salutary from
a certain principle. Whether, therefore, the action is intemperate or unjust, to
those who perform it indeed it is good, so far as it is conformable to justice, but
simply it is not good, nor to those by whom it is done, but is to them the greatest
evil. And so far as it proceeds from them and is directed to them, it is evil ; but
so far as it proceeds from the universe to them, it is not evil. And so far as their
energy is directed to themselves, they destroy their life, becoming actually de
praved ; but so far as they sutler from the universe, they undergo the punishment
of their choice (just as it is said, that those who deliberate about betraying a
suppliant, subvert divinity) ; or they suffer the punishment of their will.

jLet us, however, direct our attention to what remains, viz. to such partial na
tures as energize selt-inotively, and who stop their depravity as far as to their
choice. For they suffer the punishment of their cogitation alone. For, as it is
said, there is a certain punishment of mere imagination, impulse and will; since
the God* govern us inwardly, and as they reward taneucent choice, so likewise

318 IMtOCLUS ON THE [ B 6oK 11.

they punish the contrary. But it may l&gt;e said, how ran choice itself have that
which is conformable to justice and divinity? May we not reply, localise it is
necessary there .should Ix; an e&gt;sence of this kind and a power of an ambiguous
nature, and which verges to ditleivnt lives ? If therefore that wliicli has dominion
over choice is from divinity, choice also i.s from divinity, and if this he tin* case,
it is good. For the electing soul alone is tr&gt;n&gt;terred to another and another
order. For all choice cither elevates tlie soul, or draws it downward [to an
inferior condition of being]. And if indeed the choice is from a depraved soul,
it is evil ; hut if it transfers that which chooses to its proper order, it is according
to justice* and good. For the choice it.sclf introduces punishment to (he electing
soul. Or rather, the choice becomes punishment in him \\ho chooses, causing the
soul to apostatize from good. For as a beneficent choice becomes truly the re
ward of itself, so a depraved choice becomes its own punishment. For this is the
peculiarity of self-motive powers. Hence there is no evil, which is not also in a
certain respect good ; but all things participate of providence.

If, however, certain persons should ask on what account an evil-producing

cause had at first a subsidence, though it should not rank among wholes, but is of

a partial nature, to these it must be said, that the progression of beings is continued,

and that no vacuum is left among them. Whether, therefore, is it necessary that

there should not be every self-motive life ? But we shall thus take away many

natures that are divine. &lt; )r shall we say il is necessary there should be wholes

that are self-motive, but there is no necessity there should be sell-motive parts ?

Hut how is il possible they should be wholes, if deprived of their proper parts* 1

And how will the continuity of beings he preserved, if wholes Mid self-motive

natures have a prior existence, and also partial and altcr-motive natures, but we

entirely destroy the intermediate natures, \i/. such as are self-motive indeed, but

at the same time partial ? And which through the partial form become connected

with habitude, but through the sc!f-moti\c power, are at a certain time lilxrated

from habitude. It is nece&gt;sary therefore, that there should be this life also, which is

a medium in beings, and the bond of things which have a it were an arrangement

contrary 1 to each other. Kvil, however, is not on this account natural to the soul ;

since she is essentially the mistress of her choice. For the animated body has an

essential tendency to disease ; for it is essentially corruptible ; and yet disease,

1 Mi ^rtrjf/m is omitted in the original.

1 For the proprr parts of il self-motive whole, are aNo stlf-molMe .

For air riirmi licr , it u uecesinr) to read awimtnuii.

KOOK n.j T1M/EUS OP PLATO. 310

is not according to nature. Hence, disease is indeed evil to the partial nature
which is allotted to connect this particular body, hut is t;ood to the wholeness
of bodies. For it is necessary that what is generated from other things, sliould
!&gt;&lt;&gt; changed into another tiling. As, therefore, to the nature which is in us, it is
good lor ihe nutriment to he changed, in order to the preservation of the animal;
thus also to every nature it is good for a part to he corrupted, in order that the
wholes may he preserved, which are always prior to parts. For if parts were
generated iioiu wholes, and the things generated should remain, all things would
he rapidly consumed, inconsequence of wholes becoming partial natures. For
a continued ahlation taking place from things of a finite nature, the whole must
necessarily fail, lint wholes not existing, either generation will he stopped, or
mutation to partial natures will IK- derived from other things. Hence that which
is evil to a partial nature is good to the whole life of the world.

Farther still, therefore, resuming the inquiry after another manner from the
beginning, if we are asked whether divinity was willing there should l&gt;e evil, or
was not willing, we reply that he was both. For he was willing, indeed, consi
dered as imparting being to all things. For every thing in the universe which
has any kind of bring proceeds from the demiurgic cause. Hut he was not
willing, considered as producing all things good. For he concealed evil in the
use of good. And if jou are willing to argue physically, evil is produced ctfc/ili-
allil indeed from a partial soul, but (Hridcnlally from divinity, so far as it is evil,
if it is admitted that divinity gave subsistence to the soul. Evil also, so far as it
is essentially good, originates from a divine cause, but accidentally from the sonl.
For so far as it subsists according; to justice, it possesses good. Again, Plato in
the Laws defines what punishment is, vi/. that it appears to consume him
who Millers it, and resembles the opening of ulcers. And he -who is incapable
of being healed without a certain action, is incited to the performance of it, in
order that, tin; souj being liberated from her partnriency and stupid astonishment
about that which is base, and repenting of her own evils, may begin to be puri
fied. For base and unjust actions, when they are the objects of hope, are lovely
to those that vehemently admire them, but when accomplished, till those that
perform them with repentance. And when, indeed, they are the subjects of medi
tation, they cause the soul to be latently diseased ; but when they have proceeded
into energy, they demonstrate their own imbecility, but liberate the soul from the

For TO n&lt;v iyra/icroy in this ]&gt;l;uc, it is ueccunry to read, ro /HI bvyapitwr.

3lf) 1MIOC1.US ON Till: r -0 o,i u.

most disgraceful parturition. And ome, indeed, exhibit thin punishment accord
ing to the whole of their life ; but others according to partial energies. For he
who does any thing irrational, does it from choice, is implied to that which is
the object of his choice, and leads into energy that which pre-existed in hi*
imagination.

In short, evil is neither in intellectual natures ; for the whole intellectual genus
is free from all evil; nor in whole souls, or whole bodies; for all wholes an*
exempt from evil, as being perpetual, and always subsisting according to nature.
It remains, therefore, that it must be iu partial souls, or iu partial bodies. Bui
neither is it in the essences of these. ; (or all their essences are derived from divi
nity ; nor iu their powers ; for these subsist according to nature. Hence it re
mains, that it must be in their energies. But with respect to souls, it is neither
in such as are rational; for all these aspire, after good ; nor in such as are irra
tional ; for these energize according to nature. But it subsists iu the privation
of symmetry of these with reference to each other. And iu bodies, it is neither
inform; for it wishes to rule over matter; nor in matter, for it aspires after the
supervening ornaments of form. But it consists in the privation of symmetry
between form and matter. From which also it is evident, that every thing evil
exists according to a parypo$tasi$, or resemblance of subsistence, and that at the
same time it is coloured by good ; so that all things arr good through the will
of divinity, and as much as possible nothing is destitute of good. For it was not
possible, that generation existing, evil also should not have a shadowy subsis
tence, since it is necessary to the perfection of the whole of things. Arid from
what has l&gt;een said, it is evident, that the w ill of divinity is not vain. For all
tilings are good with reference to him, and there is not any being which is not
vanquished by a portion of good. Xor are the words, "as viuch as pom&gt;iL&gt;lc t
written superfluously. For they do not signify an imperfect power, but that
power which rules over all things, and benefits all things through an abundance
of good.

"Thus receiving every thing that was visible, and which was not in a

state of rest, but moved in a confused and disorderly manner, be led it

.
from disorder into order, conceiving that the latter was in every respect

better than the former."

For vvufitri&gt;i&lt;f litre, it i necessary to reJ, aavfitnT/iif.

BOOK ii.] TIM/tUS OF PLATO. 321

Plutarch of Cherona and his followers, and also Aiticus, understand what i*
here said literally, as testifying for them the generation of the world from a certain
time. Tliey also any that unadorned mutter existed prior to the generation of the
universe, and likewise a malevolent soul, which moved this matter. For, [they
add,] whence was the motion except from soul ; and if the motion was disorderly
it was from a disorderly soul ? It is said therefore, in the Laws, that a l&gt;rnefi-
cent soul instructs in an upright and prudent manner, hut that a malevolent soul
is moved disorderly, and that what is governed hy it is conducted confusedly
and inelegantly. They farther add, that when the fahrication of the world hy
the Demiurgus commenced, matter was brought into a state adapted to the com
position of the world, and that the malevolent soul participating of intellect, was
rendered prudent, and produced an orderly motion. For the participation of
form, and the presence of intellect, brought it into order. Porphyry however,
and lamhlichus, and their followers, reprobate this opinion, as admitting in
wholes, that which is without, prior to that which has arrangement, the imperfect
prior to the perfect, and that which is without intelligence, prior to that which is
intellectual. And [they add], that Plutarch and Atticus are not only guilty of
impiety towards the Demiurgus, hut likewise, either entirely subvert his benefi
cent will, or his prolific power. For both these concurring, it is also necessary
that the world should be perpetually fabricated by him. They likewise say, that
Plato wishing to indicate the providence proceeding from the Demiurgus into the
universe, and also the supply of intellect, and the presence of soul, and the nume
rous and mighty goods of which they are the causes to the world, previously sur
veys bow the whole corporeal-formed composition is when considered it.self by
itself, disorderly and confuted. And that he does this, in order that by perceiving
by itself the arrangement derived from soul, and the demiurgic orderly distribu
tion of things, we may be able to determine what the nature is of the corporeal-
formed essence by itself, and what order it is allotted from fabrication; the world
indeed, always existing, but language dividing that which is generated from its
maker, and producing according to time things which are con-subsistent at once,
because every thing which is generated w a composite.

We may also observe, in addition to what is here rightly asserted, that since the
demiurgic production is twofold, the one being corporeal, 1 but the other decora
tive, Plato beginning from the latter, supposes with the greatest propriety, that

1 For Lwr^arurji berr, it is neceary to read &lt;r*i/jariiji.

Tim. P&/. VOL. I. 2 S

3-&gt;-&gt; PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

every thing corporeal is moved in a way perfectly confused and disorderly. For its
motion is such, so far as pertains to itself, when it is surveyed as not yet partici
pating of intellect, and animated by an intellectual soul. For when the universe
becomes a tiling of this kind, then it participates of supernatural powers. But
if it is moved, as he says, neither by intellect, nor by a prudent soul, from which
order is derived, its motion will be disorderly. A little after this however, Plato
delivers to us the demiurgic providence about the fabrication of bodies. For then
the Demiurgus is represented as fashioning the whole of a corporeal nature, which
Plato now says he assumed ; the Demiurgus .being the maker, the adorner, the
artist, and the manual artificer. If then-fore, he produces the first bodies, it is
evident that the generation of body is a part of his fabrication, the visible nature
receiving certain vestiges of forms, which are the forerunners of their distinct sub
sidence ; each thing when this distinction takes place, l&gt;eing perfectly adorned,
and obtaining an appropriate position nnd order in the universe. And there is no
1 occasion indeed, to say much about that which is moved in a confused and dis
orderly manner. For Plato clearly says, that the Demiurgus fashioned the whole
of the corporeal nature within soul. With respect to soul however, it is evident
that one thing pertaining to it \\as not a subject funproduced by the Demiurgus],
and that he alone produced its orderly distribution. For he first constitutes its
essence, and the same and the dillerent; of which as elements it consists. Hence,
if he produced the elements of soul, and the mixture of these, he produced the
whole of it. So that he did not assume one part of it as already existing, and add
another. And of soul indeed, which is incorporeal, this is true. But with re
spect to body, we have shown how divinity is the cause of the first forms.

Concerning matter itself, however, some one may enquire whether it is mi be
gotten, not being generated by a cause, as Plutarch and Atticus say, or whether
it was generated, and if so from what cause. For Aristotle indeed, in another
way demonstrates that it is unbegotten, as not being a composite, nor consisting
of another matter, nor again, Ix-ing analy/ed into another. The present discussion
however, says that it is perpetual, but investigates whether it is unbegotten arid
not generated by a cause, and whether according to Plato, t\\o principles of
wholes are to IK- admitted, matter and God, neither God producing matter, nor
matter God ; in order that the one may be entirely perpetual, and without God,
but the other entirely immaterial and simple. This tiling therefore, is among
the number of those which are very much investigated, and has been considered
by us elsewhere. IS ow, however, it is requisite to e.vhibit to these men, what the

&gt;* "-1 TIM.T-.US OF PLATO. &lt;3 ., 3

conception of Plato is on tin s subject. For that the Demitirgus is &lt;not the first \
who gave subsistence to matter, is evident from what Plato says further on, vix. that
these three things preceded the generation of the world, being, place, and genera
tion ; and (hat generation is an offering, hut place a mother. II.; appear* there
fore through these things to divide matter oppositely as it were to the Demiurgus,
according to t!ie maternal and paternal peculiarity, hut to produce generation
from the Demiurgus and matter. Does he not therefore give subsistence to mat
ter from another order, which has an arrangement prior to the Demiurgus In
the Phik-hus therefore, he clearly writes, " H r e say that God* exhibited tie bound,
and also the infinity of beings, from which bodies and all beings derive their composition"
Hence, if hod ies are from hound and infinity, what is the hound in them, and
what the infinity? It is evident indeed, that we say matter is infinity, hut form
hound. If therefore, as we have said, God gives subsistence to all infinity, he ^\
likewise gives subsistence to matter, which is the last infinity. And this indeed, )
is the first ind ineffable cause of matter. But since every w here sensible* are ana
logous to intelligible causes, and Plato constitutes the former from the latter ; as
for instance, the equal which is here, from the equal itself, the similar, from simi
litude itself, and after the same manner all sublunary animals and plants, it is
evident, that he likewise produces the infinity which is here, from the first infinity,
just as he produces the hound which is here from the hound which is there. It lias
however, been demonstrated by us elsewhere, that he establishes the fir&gt;t infinity
which is prior to things that are mingled inthesiimmitofintelligibles.andfromthencu
extends its illumination as far as to the last of things ; so thai according to him, mat
ter proceeds from the one and being, or if you are willing, from the one being also, [or
being characterized by t/icone] far as it is being in power. Hence likewise, it is in
a certain respect good and infinite, and the most obscure and formless being. On
this account also these are prior to forms, and the evolution of them into light.

Orpheus likewise delivers the very same things. For as Plato produces two-
told causes from the one, viz. hound and infinity, thus too the theologist gives
subsistence to ether and chaos from time ; ether being the cause of hound every
where, but chaos of infinity. And from these two principles he generates both
the divine and the visible orders of things ; from the more excellent principle
indeed, producing every thing stable, effective of sameness, and the source of
Pleasure and connexion ; but from the less excellent, every thing motive, eflectirc

1 i. Thr highest God, or the ottr.

.1-24

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

of difference, never failing progression, the nature \vhich is defined, and connected
by other things, and the last infinity by which matter also is comprehended.
Hence also matter is dissimilarly assimilated to the first infinity. And it is indeed
n separation (^(apif^a), us being the receptacle (xtupa) and place of forms ; but there is
neither bound, tior a buttom, tior a scat about it, as being infinite, unstable, and inde
finite. But a" am, the lust infinity may be denominated a perpetual darkness, as being
allotted a formless nature. Hence conformably to this assertion, Orpheus produces
matter from the first hypostasis of intelligible*. Fur there perpetual darkness* and
the infinite subsist. And these, indeed, subsist there in a way more excellent than
the successive orders of being. In matter however, the unilluminated, and the infi
nite are inherent, through indigence, and not according to a transcendency, but a
deficiency of power. Moreover, the tradition of the Egyptians asserts the same
thin &lt;r s conrernin rr it. For the divine lamhlirhus relates that according to Hermes

O &

materiality (U&gt;.OTT,TOJ is produced from essentiality (tx TTJ otwiorijrof). It is pro
bable therefore, that Plato derived from Hermes an opinion of this kind concerning
matter. And matter indeed primarily subsists from these principles [bound and
infinity]. But Plato also produces it according to second and third principles,
viz. intelligible and intellectual, super-celestial and mundane causes. And why
do I say this of the Gods themselves ? For the nature of the universe likewise,
produces matter so far as she is [a Goddess] 4 and according to the hyparxis of
herself. For according to this she participates of the first cause. The Demiurgus
therefore, according to the- unity which he contains, according to which likewise
he is a God, is 5 also the cause of the last matter; but according to his demi-
urjric being, he is not the cause of matter, but of bodies so far as they are bodies,

1 For vpoi mirrijK hf re, it it necessary to read rpoi avri\v, fi. e. irpoi avr^v awetptur.]

* The first hvpostasis of intclligibles i being itself, which is mingled from bound and infinity. Per
petual darkness therefore, may he said to reside here, because this liypojtasis through proximity to the
ineffable nine of all become* f aikenrd. " For being very near, as Damarcius admirably observes, to
the illumine principle, if it be lawful o to speak, it dwe!U as it were in the adytum of that truly mystic
silence." This darkness, however, is not any deficiency, but a transcendency of all that is luminous.
For as there is one kind of ignorance wlncli is below knowledge as being the defect of it, and another
which is above know ledge, being that iu which our ascent to the ineffable terminates ; thus also, there are
two kinds of darkness, the one being below, and the other above light.

1 See lamblif. Oc Mvsti-rns, p. 1 3f).

* The word Otoiii omitted in the original, but ought evidently to be inserted, because Proclus in the
Introduction to this work observes that Nature is a Goddess through being deified.

1 For en here, it is requisite to lead ion.

BOOK n.l TIM/EUS OF PLATO.

32. &gt;

and of corporeal qualities. Hence generation is the offspring tf being. According
to the life which he contains, he is the cau&gt;e of the animation which perxades
through all things; but according to his intellect, he is the cauve of the intellectual
supply imparted to the universe. And all such things indeed, as he produces
according to his secondary powers, lie produces in conjunction with those that
are primary. For every thing which participates of intellect, participates also of
life, of l&gt;eing, and of union. That also which lives is, and is one; and bein rr is
connected through its own projKT unity. The converse, however, is not true.
For such things as lie produces according to the one, 1 so many he does not produce
according to being. Nor does he give subsistence to as many things according to
the fountain of life, as he docs according to being. Noras many things according
to a royal intellect, as he does according to life ; but he gives the greatest extent
to his providence from his more elevated powers. These things, however, we
have elsewhere more fully discussed.*

Lei us therefore return to the words of Plato, and survey the meaning of each.
The word thus then, suspends the whole orderly distribution of things from the
goodness of the Demiurgus, viz. from his divinity. But the words, "everything
that was visible" in the first place, leave nothing solitary; and in the next place,
they show that this visible nature is corporeal. For it would not be visible if it s
was incorporeal and without quality. So that they neither signify matter, nor the
second subject [i. e. body void of quality]. But the visible nature is that which*
now participates of forms, and possesses certain vestiges, and representations, :
being moved in a confused and disorderly manner. For the idolic and indistinct: ,
presence of forms produces different motions in it, as Timauis says farther on. 1 1
These, however, all the orders of Gods prior to the Demiurgus illuminate; but the
paradigm transcendently illuminates them by his very being, and prior to fabri
cation. For superior energi/e prior to secondary causes, and the Demiurgus
makes in conjunction with the paradigm, but the paradigm, prior to the Demi
urgus, and permeates to those things to which the energy of demiurgic providence
does not extend. If therefore, you wish to disjoin primordial causes, and the
things which proceed from them, 4 you will find that the good which is the cause of v
all things, is also the cause of matter. On this account it is likewise the cause of

Instead of mra TO ij- here, it is uecrssary to read rara ro tr.
* For C4ij/rrara here, it is necessary to read fcrarr&lt;u.
Instead of a^im^ty in this place, it i* requisite to read n^qnr.
4 For ra or airrav here, read ra air vrwr.

320 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

it* being invested with forum; for every form i.s n measure; and of it* participation
of order. For order is tin* reason of things that are arranged. The paradigm,
/however, in not the cause of matter, hut of the production of form, uml of the order
j in forms. But the Demiurgus is the cause of order. Hmce also Plato says, that
the Dctniurgua received matter now advancing to the participation of forms.
Since all causes therefore, subsist always and at once, hut of their effects, some
proceeding as far as to things that are hibt [i. e. to hodies], but others as far as to
things which are beyond both, through the extension of superior causes; this
bring the case, the paradigm indeed, receives matter from the good, and invests
it with form; for forms, so far as they are forms, are the progeny of the paradigm ;
but the Demiurgus receiving forms from the paradigm adorns them with numbers,
and inserts in them order. After this manner tln-retbre, you must conceive, if you
disjoin causes. If also you say, that the Demiurgus is the one cause of all things,
he produces indeed in one. way according to his goodness [or (he good which he
derives from the ineffable], but in another way according to his own paradigmatic,
and as we may say, artificial peculiarity. A she produces like wise collectively, at once,
and eternally.diflerent things proceed from a different peculiarity contained in him.
j For according to the good, he produces matter, form and order; but according to the,
paradigm in him, form; and according to his artificial peculiarity, order. Hence this
thing which is invested with form prior to order, has these representations of forms
from the paradigm which is in its own nature intelligible From this order like
wise, the Oracles produce abundantly-various matter. For they say, " From thence
entirely leaps fortli the generation of abundantly-various matter." Fur the first
matter does not possess a great variety ; nor is there a generation of this, but of that
matter uhich has tCAtiges thejorerunners of forms from which it is evident that the
paradigm and the Demiurgus dilli r from each other, since matter indeed partici
pates of the former prior to the fabrication of the world, when according to the
hypothesis, the Demiurgus was absent; but it especially receives something
from the latter when it is arranged and adorned, and then the Demiurgus is
present with it. The word therefore receiving, may be said to indicate the para
digmatic cause which i.s exempt from the demiurgic providence, from which the
Demiurgus receives the subject of things, now varirgated with certain vestiges of
forms. It may also be said, that a different work participates of a different power,
though we may survey all powers in the Demiurgus. For he will !* the same
divinity who receives and who drlivers, cssentinli/ing, or adorning things by
different powers.

BOOK ii.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 32?

But the words, "which xas not in a state of rest but moved? show that the &lt;
hypothesis alone imparts to the subject a nature from which motion is derived.
For (lie nature of it being irrational and not governed by divinity, what kind of
order can it he able to preserve? This however is evident, from the Politicus,
where, separating the Demiurgus from the world, Plato says, that it was moved by
a certain fate, and an essentially ronnasrent desire. Hence supposing here in
conjunction with fabrication, what he there supposed after it, he introduces the
privation of order to the motion of the visible nature, this motion being produced
without intellect. And thus much for this particular. Again, the words, " he
led it from disorder into order, signify the participation of intellect, and an intel
lectual life. But the word conceiving indicates the demiurgic intelligence, which
is analogous to his will and power. Previously assuming therefore, will in the
expression " being rci/Iing* and power in the expression " as much as possible" in
the third place, he adds intellectual knowledge in the term, " conceiving." For in
the Lairs, lie characterizes dinne providence l&gt;y these three things, f/ c. by goodness,
pmccr, and knowledge. And goodness indeed is paternal, and pertains to the (irst
natures; but power is maternal, and ranks in the second place; and intellect,
which is gnostic, is the third. Goodness therefore is the first, but power is with
him, viz. with the first of the triad, and intellect, which is from him, is the third.
Again, the words, " that icas in every reject better than fhis," signify that order is
better than disorder. For it was thus said, viz. " that he led itfrom disorder into
order." The word (his also has an indication of the disorder then present which
the Demiurgus received ; but the word that represents to us the order pro-existent
in the Demiurgus, according touhich also he is about to arrange disorderly
natures. Aristotle therefore, did not know the order which is in the Derniurgus,
but that which is in effects. lie places however, the excellent in both ; in order
that according to him, intellect may abide in itself, but may in no respect In
effective of secondary natures. But Plato following Orpheus, says, that order
is first in the Demiurgus, and the whole prior to parts. For the Demiurgus being
all things intellectually, made all things to exist sensibly. For if he produces by \
his very being or existence ; and it is necessary that he should, in order that we)
may not ascribe to him deliberate choice, which is an ambiguous tendency ; he/
either produces by a separation of parts from himself, and by a diminution of his
own powers, in the same manner as fire, or abiding such as he is [without any

1 For l]\tv hcrf , it i. requisite to read iyc&gt; .

&lt;128 PROCLl S ON THE [BOOK n.

alteration J, he produces successive natures by his very being. It is however,
absurd to say, that lie produces by a separation of parts from himself: for neither
is nature diminished in producing the hair or teeth, or any other of the parts of
the body. Much more therefore, is it fit to preserve an exempt essence, and
which gives subsistence to itself, undiminished. But if remaining that which he
is, he produces by his very being, through this indeed, he produces that which is
similar to himself; but through a separation of parts, he does not make that
which he produces wholly similar to himself. For that which is diminished, does
not make according to the whole of itself. All things therefore, subsist in him
primarily. But external natures are the images of his allness, (wai/TO njTOf) and
order exists in one way in effects, and in another in paradigms. For the former
is complicated with disorderly natures, but the latter is order itself, subsisting in,
and being of itself; that it may be able to arrange things disorderly, and may IK.-
exempt from them, and preserve its own e.ssence in undefiled purity. And thus
much concerning the meaning of the words.

It deserves however not to be omitted, that Plato here imitates the theologists,
in supposing the exigence of a confused and disorderly nature prior to the
fabrication of the world. For as they introduce the wars and seditions of tFle
Titans against the Olympian Gods. So likewise Plato presupposes these two
things, the unadorned and that vthich is effective of ornament, that the former
of these may IK.- adorned, and participate of order. They however speak theologi
cally. For they arrange in opposition to the Olympian Gods, the patrons of
bodies. But Plato philosophically transfer* order from the Gods to the -subjects
of their government.

In the next place, therefore, let us concisely narrate the sacred conceptions
which the philosopher Porphyry here delivers. In the first place, then, he opposes
Atticus and his followers, who admit that there are many principles, conjoining
to each other the Demiurgus and ideas. These also say, that matter is moved by
an unbegotten, but irrational and malevolent soul, and is borne along in a con
fused and disorderly manner. That according to time likewise, matter exists
prior to that which is sensible, irrationality to reason, and disorder to order.
/Let there however be, as they say, matter and God, both being without genera
tion from a cause. Hence, the unbegotten is common to them. At the same
j time, they differ from each other. They differ therefore, by something else, and
\ uot by the unbegotten. Hence, that by which they differ from each other,

Instead of kafloWhcre. it i necesiary to read ov ia9

BOOK u.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO.

not be unbegotten. It will therefore l&gt;c generated. It is impossible, however,
that things without generation, should differ by the generated. In the next place,
what is the cause to them of their difference, and which makes the one to be pre
servative, but the other corruptive 1 For it is absurd to say, that it is the unbe-
gotten ; (for either every thing unbegotten is preservative, or every thing
unbegotten is corruptive;) if the unbegotten nature of God makes God to be
preservative, or the unbegotten nature of matter makes matter to be corrnptive.
But if something else is the cause of their difference, whether is that something else
unbegotten or generated ? For if it is generated, it is absurd that it should be the
cause of things unbegotten ; or if unbegotten, that it should l&gt;e the cause ot
unbegotten natures. So that again, we must investigate something else prior to
these, as the cause of their difference, and the ascent will be ad infinitum. For it*
there will be no cause of difference to things that differ, so as to render the one
preservative, but the other corruptive, the casual will have dominion over the
principles; for cause l&gt;eing subverted, the concurrence of sueh-like principles will
l&gt;e irrational, and without a cause.

Farther still, it is absurd to make evil eternal, in the same manner as the good.
For that which is without God, is not similarly honorable with that which is
divine; nor is it equally unbegotten, nor, in short, is it to be contrarily dirided.
For why is the one more sufficient to iNrlf, or more immutable, or indestructible,
than the oilier, if each of them is from eternity, and neither is in want of the other?
Again, if one of them is adapted to l&gt;e adorned, but (he other to adorn, whence
is their aptitude derived ? For it is necessary there should be something which
connects bolh, and makes them commensurate to each other. For these princi
ples being divulsed from, and subsisting contrary to each other, cannot render
themselves adapted to coalition. Unless they say, that this also arises from
chance. Nor in thus speaking do they attend to the Athenian guest, who says,
that this is the fountain of stupid opinion, to assert that the irrational is prior to
reason, and that chance has dominion prior to intellectual art. IVor to Socrates
in the Republic, who says, that it is not proper to remain in multitude, but to
recur from the many to their common monads. ^Farther still, it is necessary to (^
characterize the highest principle not by this alone, that it has not another
principle ; for this does not yet demonstrate its dignity * [but that it Is the prin-

! It is necessary here to supply aytv^Tov rwf, and therefore instead of reading, as in the original,
cirr aycrfTwr orrwr, we must read, rirr aytrqror rwr aycrip-wv orrwp.
* For araia* hffe, it U DCCCSUrjr tO read nia .

Tim. Plat. VOL. L 2 T

330

PROCLUS ON THE

[BOOK n.

J&gt;

ciplc of all principles]. But if this be the case, there will not be more [indepen
dent] principles than one. For if there were, God will not IMJ the cause of all
things, but only of certain things. But if lie also rules over matter, then- is one
principle, and not many principles. Farther fctill, if the existence qf principle
consists in this, that it is the principle of certain things, and that it adorns that
which is disorderly, it will be simultaneous with the things that proceed from it,
and the principle will be no less subverted from things posterior to it not existing,
than things posterior to it when the principle is subverted. 1 But this will be. the

case, since they frequently say, that the principle has its existence in fabricating.
If however this be true, it is not po-sihle lor the principle to exist, the woihl not
existing. But airain, averting dilleivntly from what they did before, they say,
l that God exists without fabricating They a-,M-rl this however, not 1 knowing
that true powers energi/e by their \ery being, and that tin; augmentative and nu
ll tritive powers, by their very being, increase and nourish the body. Thus also the
soul by its very existence animates, vivifies, and mo\es its instrument [the body].
For the body does not perceive or palpitate in coiiM-qneiice of our pre-deliberation ;
but the presence of soul alone accomplishes the.-e energies. lAgain, every thing
which is always naturally adapted to a certain thing, essentially possesses the
power of effecting it ; but that which is changed differently at different times, is
adscititious. If therefore God always fabricates, he will have a connascent
demiurgic power ; but if he does not, his power will be ad&gt;cititious. How there
fore, from being imperfect, does he become perfect, and from not l&gt;eing artificial,
an artificer ?

The second head therefore after this, is that which shows that Plato refers all
things to one principle. And this is e\ident from the Republic, where he asserts
that the sun is the cause of \isibl.-, but the trood of intelligible natures. Again
also, he calls the sun the offspring of the good. This is likewise evident from
his Epistles, in which he says that all things are about the king of all, and that
all things are for his sake. For if all things are converted to him, and subsist
about him, he is the principle of all, and not only of certain things ; since what
ever you may assume \vill be derived from thence. This too is manifest from the
Phih-bus, in which dialogue lie clearly says, that all things are from bound and

Instead of KU oi&lt;S&gt; ^\Xo&gt;&gt; ci&gt;/; W fr, rrj a
.pt.rai r, up^n. 1 read, &lt;ni ovltv ,ia\\nv afif"lfttvt)i

, " ** ra fitT at-r^- ;, tt TLVTUV, r. X.

is omitted here in the original.

HOOK ii.] TIM/F.US OF PLATO. 331

infinity, but that of Ihcse principles themselves there is onepre-cxistentrausc, which
is God. Hence, there is one principle and many principles; but these are |&gt;er-
fected by the one principle. From what is said also in the Philebns this i* evi
dent, in which dialogue he confutes those who assert that beings are [alone]
many, and likewise those who admit the principle to be being itself. For he de
monstrates, that it is neither proper to begin from the multitude of beings, nor
from the one being, but from the one itself.

In the. third place, therefore, neither do the principles which they assume per
tain any thing to Plato. For ideas are not separated from intellect, subsisting
by themselves apart from it ; but intellect being converted to itself, sees all forms.
Hence the Athenian guest assimilates the energy of intellect to the circulation of
an accurately-fashioned sphere. But they introduce ideas as things inefficacious,
resembling in themselves forms impressed in wax, and situated external to intel
lect. Nor is the Demiurgus the first God. For the first God is superior to
every intellectual essence. Nor does a certain irrational soul move that
which is borne along in a confused and disorderly manner. For every
soul is the offspring of the Gods. Nor, in short, did the universe, from being
without order, become arranged. For if God was willing to bring all things
into order, how was he willing ? Was he always w illing, or at a certain time ? For
if he was willing at a certain time, this was either from himself, or from matter.
But if from himself, an absurdity follows. For he is always good. Every
thing good, however, which always exists, M always effective. And if this arose
from the resistance of matter, how came it to be now adorned ? Because, say they,
it became adapted to receive the demiurgic productive power. For God observed
this, vi/. the aptitude of it. It is necessary therefore, that it should have \trrn
brought into order, not being itself disorderly. For if it had been disorderly, itj
would not have been adapted ; since the disorderly motion of it is inaptitude.]
Hence matter is not the cause of the privation of order and ornament. Moreover,
neither is the will of God the cause of this. For he is always good, and therefore
the world is always adorned ; and the Demiurgus always arranges the confused
and disorderly nature. On what account, therefore, did Plato hypothetically in
troduce this privation of order? It was that we might survey how the generation
of bodies is one thing, and the order of them when, generated, another; bodies
indeed existing, but being moved in a disorderly manner. For they are inca-

1 Instead of TO c aynOor war, act or iroiijruor, it .sccrm necessary to rrad ro it nyn W *nv nn rtt t

332 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n

pableof arranging themselves. He net Plato, wishing to indicate the order which
accedes to bodies from something different from themselves, shows that disorder is con-
siibsistent with their motions, without a divine cause. Aristotle, however, blames him
who asserts that disorder is assumed prior to order, merely according to hypothe
sis, and says that those things will not follow for which the hypotheses are
assumed, as is the case in geometry. For the hypotheses of geometry are of
themselves able to effect geometrical conclusions. To this we reply, that it is
not said after this manner according to hypothesis, that the unadorned ought to
he admitted prior to the adorned, but that Plato saw that which is formless prior
to forms, though it is m-ver separate from them. Thus too, that which is invested
with form, though yet without distinction, is assumed prior to order, though it
never was prior to it, but is consuhsistent \\ith order.

The fourth head, in addition to those that have been already considered, is
that in which JMato demonstrates the mode of fabrication; a divine intellect ef
fecting this by its very being, which he infers through many arguments. For
artists are in want of instruments to their energy, because they have not dominion
over every kind of matter. Hut this is evident from the instruments which they
use, in order to render matter pliant, boring, or polishing, or elaborating
it with a wheel; all which operations do not insert form, but take away
the inaptitude of the recipient of form. The reasuti iVit// howcccr, ur Jonn,
becomes present with the subject from art instantaneously, all the impedimenta being
removed. Hence if there was no impediment, form would immediately accede
to matter, and would not in bliort be in want of any instruments. Moreover,
the phantasy produces many passions about the body by its very energy alone.
For a man blushes through the imagination of what is base, and becomes red;
and through the conception of something dreadful is terrified, and his body is
rendered pale. And these, indeed, are the passions about the body. Hut the cause
of these is a phantasm, which does not employ impulsions and mechanical contri
vances, but energizes by being present alone. Farther still, theologists assert that
there arc certain powers superior to us, who employ efficacious imaginations, and
which by their very existence are effective of what they wish to accomplish, and
who are also able to produce illuminations, and to exhibit certain divine forms by
their motions, to such as are able to behold the visions which they externally pri-
sentto the view. If therefore human arts, the imaginations of partial souls, and
the energies of thrmons, effect things of this kind, why is it wonderful that the
Demiurgus, by the intellectual intuition of the universe, should gi\e subsistence to
the sensible nature ; generating, indeed, that which is material immaterially, that

BOOK i!.] TIMJEUS OF PLATO. 333

which is tangible, without contact ; and extending impartibly that wliich possesses
interval ? And, indeed, it ought not to be considered as an admirable circum
stance, if something which is incorporeal, and without interval, is the fabricator
of this universe. For human seed produces man, who is so much larger than the
seed, and in each part of it contains all the differences of the solids; as for
instance of the bones, those that are compact, and those that are hollow ; of the
soft parts such as the lungs and the liver ; of the dry parts, such as the nail*
and the hair; of thu moist parts, such as the blood and phlegm ; of the adipom
parts, as the marrow and fat; of the bitter parts, as the bile; of the parts with
out quality, as the saliva ; of the thick-set parts, as the nerves ; and of the ex
panded parts as the membranes. For all these, the substances of similar parts,
and those that in a certain respect are composed of them, derive their subsistence
from a small bulk ; or rather from that which is without bulk. For reasons [or
productive powers] generate these, and they are every where void of bulk. For
whatever p;irt you may take of the seed, you will find in it all things. Much
more, therefore, is the demiurgic reason able to produce all things, being not at
all in want of matter to their existence. But the fabricator of all tilings is eter
nally established in himself, and abiding in himself produces the universe.

1 But it neither was, nor is lawful, for that which is best, to effect
any thing else than that which is most beautiful."

Themis is very properly assumed in the beginning of the fabrication of the
universe. For she is the cause of the demiurgic sacred laws, and from her the
order of the universe is indissolubly connected. Hence also she remains a virgin
prior to the progression of the Demiurgus, according to the Oracles of Night.
But she produces, in conjunction with Jupiter, the triad of the Seasons, to whom

Olympus and great Hcav n are giv n in charge,
And a dense cloud to open, or to close.

She is therefore the monad of all the mundane order; on which account also.
Socrates in the Republic calls her Necessity, as is demonstrated in that dialogue.
He likewise convolves the world on her knees, she preserving the order of it
perpetually immutable and unshaken. Conformably therefore to this divine
cause of order, the Demiurgus also, leading that which is disordered into order,
imparts beauty to all things, and renders the world similar. to, and connects it

This word whith i* ucd here by Tlato, jignitifs both ihe Goddess of justice, ami lawful.

PKOCLUS ON THE nodV. 11.

334

with himself. For being himself moat excellent, he very properly causes the
world to be most beautiful ; because the first and intelligible beauty itself is sus
pended from, and is in goodness. Hence the world likewise, being most beauti
ful, is susj&gt;ended from the Demiurgus, who is the best [of fabricative causes].
And because the good is the cause of beauty, ou this account also the best of
fathers gives subsistence to the most beautiful ofl -pring. Farther still, as Themis
is the guardian of thfi divine laws, but they m:ike the generations of secondary
from first natures to proceed in an orderly series, and preserve the connexion of
divine beings, and the similitudes of things second to such as are first; on this
account also, the Deminrgus, rnergi/ing with Themis, renders the universe most
beautiful, being himself mo&gt;t excellmt. For if Socrates, being a man, says that
it is not lawful fur him to concede any thing that is false, or to obliterate the truth,
how is it possible we should s:iy that the demiurgic intellect effects any thing else
than what is I* autil ul, and that he does not exterminate deformity, being united
to Themis, who is likewise always present with him? And thus much concerning
this particular.

But the words, " it neither was nor is" are very appropriately assumed with
that which is best : for before this, he had called the Demiurgus good, and then
also the term wax, was added. For Timanis says; he was good. For the sim
plicity which is above intellect, and the peculiarity itself of drily, are more adapted
to the term WHS, as being super-eternal, and better than all intellectual perception.
Now 1 however he calls him the most excellent, as being a deified intellect. For
that which participates [of deity] is most excellent. The terms also avw and if,
are adapted to the Demiurgus ; as to a God indeed, the term WHS ; but as to an
intellect, the term is, in order that at one and the same time his divine union and
eternal hypostasis may be rendered manifest.

" By a reasoning process, therefore, he found that among the things
which are naturally visible, no whole work destitute of intellect would
ever be more beautiful than a whole work which possesses intellect."

Amelins in a wonderful manner endeavours to prove that Flato knew the
different demiurgic causes, and continually passes in a silent way from one of
these causes to another ; exhibiting, on account of their connexion, no one of the

1 Notf 11 erroneously printed here for t&gt; .

ii.] TLNLEfS OF PLATO.

335

divine causes themselves, but discoursing about them as if they were one and the
same, through the union of the demiurgi with each other. For all of them are
one, and one is all. Since now also he who rr///.v is one I)emiurus, he who
reasons is anoth* r, and he who assumes or receives is another. And the first, indeed,
makes by his will alone, the second by intelligence and intellectual perception,
but tin 1 ihird by [as it were] manual operation. For they placed intellect in soul,
but soul in body, and thus together fabricated the universe. The divine lamhli-
clnis however reprobates all such interpretations, as very superfluously devised.
But he defines Xoj/rr/ioc, or a reasoning process, to be that which causally precedes
beings, vhich is fabricative of essence itself, and which is according to energy
invariably the same ; from which all reasonings are connected, and have their
existence.

We indeed have already observed, that Tiimcus discourses about one and the
same Demiurgns, and shall now remind the reader that this must l&gt;c admitted.
For if there is a multitude in the demiurgi, [i. &lt;&gt;. if there are many demiting,] it is
necessary to arrange a monad prior to the multitude. Moreover, we think it fit
that the divine lamblichus should consider, whether the one and whole Demiur-
gus, being an intellectual world, is not multipoint, and does not by different
powers fabricate dilleient things, in addition to his being the father of all things ?
For let the same Demiurgus so far as he is good, and so far as he is a God, be
the producing cause of all things; yet since he comprehends in himself the cause
of all fabrications, and produces in one way the whole, but in another (he parts ;
the former indeed collectively and totally, but the latter in a distributed manner,
giving subsistence to each thin::, according to its pro|&gt;er cause; hence by one
intellectual perception, he adorns the whole, and generates it, collectively ; accord
ing to which also, the world is one animal. Mtit by a reasoning process, he pro
duces the parts in the world, and these as wholes; because lie ix the Demiurgus of
latal natures, fabricating total intellect, and total soul, and all the bulk of bodv.
I fence, as composing parts, he is said to make them by a reasoning process.
For Xoyio /xoy ix a distributed or divided evolution of parts, and a distinctive cause vf
things. For it docs not pertain to one who doubts; since neither does art, nor
science doubt ; but arlists and scientific men then doubt when they are indigent
of the habits by which the former Income artists, and the latter men of science.
If however these do not doubt, ng reason can be assigned why intellect should

1 For *vKT( cr&lt; in tliu place, it i&gt; nfcary to wad r&gt;rcrair*rm.

.7.70 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

doubt Hence this Xoy&lt;r/Lioj is not through the want of that which is fit taking
place. But the Demiurgus produces the whole world by intelligence. For
intelligence is collective of multitude into one; just as XoyKrju.oj is distributive
of the one into multitude. Such therefore is the meaning of " by a reasoning
process."

With resj&gt;ect however to the tilings which are naturally visible, to say that
they are sensibles is perfectly absurd. For these are not yet arranged in tin-
discourse of Timanis, and it is among the number of things impossible, that the
Demiurgus should l&gt;e converted to them. For how can he verge to that which is
less excellent, or what kind of representation can he receive of material tilings, to
which it is not fortunate cvon for a partial soul to incline? It is better therefore,
as the divine larnbliehus interprets tin 1 words, to think that things of this kind are
intelligibles. For that these are visible is evident from the things which Tima-us
shortly after says the Demiurgus perceives. For his words are, " As many
therefore, and such ideas, as intellect perceived to be inherent in that which is animal,
&lt;$r." That they are also naturally visible, will be evident if we consider, that
some things are visible with relation to MS, but others according to nature.
And the things indeed which are visible with relation to us, are in their own
nature dark and irnmanifest ; but those which are naturally visible are truly
known, and are resplendent with divine light. Hut intelligibles are things of
this kind. Perhaps too, as he had called that which is moved in a confused and
disorderly manner visible, and which subsists preternaturally as with reference
to fabrication, be now calls the intelligible paradigms of the Demiurgus, naturally
&gt;isible. Hence, in the introduction he inquires, whether an eternal or a generated
paradigm of tin 1 universe must be admitted; these two things existing prior to
the generation of the universe, being and generation. And where else can the
Demiurgus find the causes of generated natures, than in intelligibles? For in
dention with him is not a fortuitous thing, nor a syllogistic process; since this
pertains to partial souls ; but a union with the intelligible causes of the parts of
the universe, and a suney and plenitude from thence derived. For all things
exist paradigmatically in the natures prior to him, both such as an: the objects
of intellection, and such as are deprived of intelligence ; since truly existing
being comprehends uniformly the cause of intellectual natures, and of those that
do not participate of intellect. And the intellectual beings which are there, are

J or Kojfrwv here, it is necfssary to read aioijrw*.

BOOK M.] TIM.1IUS Or PLATO. 337

of a superior hut the rest, of an inferior order. For though all things there are
objects of intellectual perception, and intellects, yet in some of them, the cause
pos* -sses the intellectual nature of the things caused, hut in others, the privation
of intellect and the irrational : the causes themselves being intellectual, but the
things which proceed from them, deprived of intellect. Hence the Demiunrus
looking thither, very properly admits that what possesses intellect is more venera
ble than that which is without it, the genus of the one, than the genii* of the
otlier, and the individuals of the one, than the individuals of the other. For
man is better than horse, and a certain man than all horses, according to the
possession itself of intellect. If however, you assume a certain part of man and
a certain part of horse, it does not entirely follow that the one is better than the
other. Nor if you assume man fashioned by nature, and the man made by the
art of the statuary, is the former in every resj&gt;ect more venerable according to
figure than the latter. For art is in many res|&gt;ccts more accurate [in this instance
than nature]. One whole therefore, is every where better than another, when
the one possesses intellect, but the other is deprived of it. For through what
other thing c-m body l;e able to participate of intelligible beauty [than intrlh.-ctj /
Let no one therefore fancy that Plato makes the division of forms to be into those
that possess and those that are deprived of intellect. For all things there [i. e.
in the intelligible world] are, as we have said, intellects, where also Plato calls
all things in every respect Gods. But extending himself to the natures which are
there, he likewise perceived the separation which in here between the beings
which possess, and those- that are deprived of intellect. Hence lie thus says, that
nothing destitute of intellect, will be belter than that which possesses it, the
difference of these existing as in works, but there pre-existing according to cause.
Again however, let us survey how Plato says, that secondary enrrui/e on
account of more principal causes, the latter being more perfect than the former,
but the former Wing suspended from the latter. Because indeed, the Demiurgus
is good, on this account, he made the world to be most beautiful. For goodness
is the cause of beauty. But Ix-cause he mnde the universe to IK; most beautiful,
he rendered it endued with intellect. And l&gt;eauty fills the first intellect with
its own power. Because also he made the universe to l&gt;e endued with intellect,
he imparted to it soul. For soul proceeds from intellect. JJccause likewise he
rendered the world animated, he inserted life in that which was l&gt;cfore moved in

1 For vxrftrtpor read vrcprrpwr.

Tim. Plat. VOL. I. 2 U

338 PROCLUSONTHE [nooi n.

a con fused and disorderly manner. For this being well arranged, is able to
jiiirtiripate of soul, soul of ink-lied, and intellect of beauty. The whole world
however, becomes most beautiful from the good, and after this manner may !&gt;e
Miid to l&gt;e a blessed God. The Demiurgus likewise, seems, in what is here said,
to behold all the paradigms, which Plato calls naturally visible, not those only
which are in animal itself, but also such as are more partial than the four ideas
which are there. Or how does he see some things which are the paradigms of
intellective, but others which are the paradigms of unintellective natures, which
are not separated in animal itself? But he mentions the forms of this animal
itself, when be causes the universe to be an animal. For so far as it is an animal,
it is the image of animal itself, and so far also as it (-(insists of four parts [i. e.
of the four elements]. .So far however, as it is now divided into intellectual,
and non-intellectual beings, so far it entiiely derives its subsistence from other
paradigms more partial than those which exist according to the four ideas in
animal it&gt;elf. So that animal itself indeed, is a paradigm^but every paradigm
IN not : annual itself. Having discussed these particulars however, let us proceed
to \\liat follows.

" It is impossible however, for intellect to accede without soul."

The intellectual essence indeed, is impartible, uniform and eternal, but the
essence of bodies is partible and multiplied, and is consubsistent with temporal
representation. These therefore, exist contrarily with reference to each other f
and are in want 01 a medium which maybe able to collect them together; a
medium, which is at one and the same time partible and impartible, composite
and simple, eternal anil generated. But according to Plato, the psychical order
i&gt; a thing of this kind, intelligible, and at the same time the first of generated
natures, eternal and temporal, impartible and partible. If therefore, it is neces
sary that the universe should be endued with intellect.it is also necessary that
it ishould ha\e a soul. For soul is the receptacle of intellect, and through it
intellect exhibits itself to the masses of the universe. Not that intellect is in
want of soul: for thus it would be less honorable 1 than soul; but that bodies

1 liiilr.ul ol ru ti 7ruj&gt;mSiy/ju ill lliii place, it stems iH-ccstarv O read van bt -rapattiyftu.

1 r &lt;-i ru ui/rcrwo here, it isneci ury to read uu To nvro taut.
I or rvri/iwrrn jf litre, it ii IH COiUM to It jd ari/iwrruot.

DOOK ii.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 339

require soul, in order to tlHr participation of intellect. For the last, ami not
the. first of things, are in want of secondary natures. For the first of things are
every where present without a medium.* Hence it is necessary to understand,
that the soul which connects intellect with a sensible nature, ou^ht to he intellec
tual, and not deprived of intellect. For how can that which is destitute of
intellect he suspended from intellect? But to these another nvdium \\ill lw&gt;
requisite. The medium however, being a thing of this kind, will wisely and
orderly govern every corporeal-formed nature. But it will imitate intellect,
dancing as it were round it. If therefore, wholes are better than parts, things
eternal, than such as subsist in time, and efficients than effects, it is necessary
that the whole universe should be more divine than all the parts it contains. If
therefore, certain animals in the world, which are partial, material and mortal,
are naturally adapted to participate of intellect, what ought we to say of the
whole world? Is it not, that the whole of it exhibits through the whole, the
presence of intellect! For its figure, its order, and the measure of its powers, may
be said to a fiord clear indications of intellectual inspection. If however, intel
lect presides over wholes, and governs the universe, it is necessary that there
should l&gt;e an intellectual soul in the middle of it, adorning and ruling over bodies,
and at the same time separate from the subjects of its government, and filling
all things with life, in order that the world may through it, be firmly established
in intellect, and that intellect may illuminate the world.

If you are willing, we will also recall to your recollection what is written in
the Philebus, where Socrates shows that the world possesses intellect and is ani
mated, because that which is terrestrial in us is from the universe, and the fire
which is in us is from the mundane fire, and in a similar manner the air and the
water which we contain; and that it would be absurd that things less excellent
in us should pre-exist in the whole, but that things more divine should not analo
gously pre-subsist in it, and that total intellect and total soul should not be
contained in the universe. For either it must l&gt;e said that no animal possesses
intellect, or if there is a certain animal of this kind, it is absurd that it should

1 Instead of ffw/iarvr in this place, it i* requisite to read it\Tfpav.

* viz. They are not in want of a medium in order to be present every where: but the last of things
require secondary natures as media, l&gt;v which alone they can receive the illuminations of the firt
of things.

1 For avafitaOufitv here, it i necessary to read

340 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

participate of intellect prior to the universe. 1 For the universe is always arranged,
and through the sameness of its subsistence, is nearer to an intellectual essence.
But much of the disorderly and confused is inherent in partial animals. Much
more therefore, must it be said, that soul is in the universe. 1 Hence Plato very di-
\inelv admits that then- is a twofold intellect, the one being imparticipable and de-
minriiir, but the otlit-r participable, and inseparable J [from its subject]. For from
things \\hich are in themselves, those which an; in others, and are co-arranged
with inferior natures, are derhed. Me also gives to the universe a twofold life,
the one- connascent, but the other separate ; in order that the world may bean
animal through the life which is in it, animated through an intellectual soul, and
endued with intellect through much-honored intellect iiself. But Aristotle only
admits the half [of this doctrine of Plato], since he takes away 4 imparticipable
intellect from his philosophy. For the first intellect with liim, is the intellect of
the inerratic sphere; but he cuts oil" the intellectual soul, which is the medium
between intellect and the animated body of the universe ; and immediately con
joins iiilell.rt with the In ing body. In addition to these things also he appears
to me to err in another particular. For having placed intellect over the spheres,
lie does not establish the wiiole world in any intellect ; but this is the most absurd
otall thin^; for how is the world one, unless one intellect luisdoininion in it? \\ hat
co-arrangement likewise is there of intellectual multitude, unless it is suspended
from a proper monad? And how are all things co-ordinated to an excellent
condition of being, unless there is a certain common intellect of all mundane
natures For the intellect of the inerratic sphere is the intellect of that sphere
[alone]; and this i&gt; also the ca&gt;e with the intelleet of the solar, and of the lunar
sphere, and in a similar manner of the other spheres. Against Aristotle however,
we have written a peculiar treatise about these particulars.

\\ith respect to Plato however, is not hi* method admiraJde? For receiving
the world, dividing it into parts, and surveying by itself that which is moved in

1 In tlif original i* f "* - --"* rf ioiro,, arcror. iiX.V i/ri Tf.u rK irairoi ou ^Tf^nv. But Ills
necessary to expui;e a\V. and l altering the punctuation, to rtad ajfollowt: i) ti tori rt $*&lt;&gt; roinrrot ,
9T ir.ti on r-fjt- rot/ xu* rci, f. X.

* Tin- *oriljf&gt;-r r r.nn (iK.i.aro t.nHtlc.l ill llu- &lt;M i-m.il.

I of n^u/i.rjrot liiTf, It l IU I &gt; &gt;:ir\ to fi-ail X "/ " TT *

* Fori&gt;tiXt liffe, rfail nytiX*.

Fir an explanation &gt;f Uie inttlU-cl to which Ari^lollv aacruilcd, also uhy he wy BolhiDg iboul

thdt wliuh i&gt; bo\..u(J intflle t, an. I wliy lie appears to liienl in many tlini ;s from Plato, hut docs not
in ruliU, HT m\ Uisprtaliou On tlic 1 lnl ix.phy of Aristotle.

BOOK ii.] TIM.EL S OF PLATO. 341

a confused and disorderly manner, he stops it in his discussion. Just as in the
Laws, wishing to show that the self-motive nature is the cause of all motion, lie
stops the whole hoaven, and having stopped it, introduces soul into the universe,
in order that by pouring forth an abundance of life, she may animate the world.
He likewise introduces intellect to soul, which governs the world, beinu: con
verted to itself; through which the universe is moved in a circle, the whole is
arranged, and the whole world is immovable. Since however, all these parti
culars give completion to one animal, and one nature, it is requisite that a
collective and uniting cause of them should have a prior existence, and that
this should he intellectual. For to comprehend wholes collectively and at once,
and to bring them together, to the completion of one thing, is the work of an
intellectual cause. Hence, Plato establishing imparlicipable prior to participate
intellect, and placing the causes of all things in it, he produces from thence,
intellects, souls ami bodies, from which he gives completion to the sensible
world. That it is necessary therefore, that the universe should participate of an
intellectual soul, if it participates of intellect, is evident from what has IM.TII
said. For this soul is the bond of the extremes which are contrary to each
other.

But it must also be demonstrated that the converse is true ; viz. that an
intellectual soul existing in the universe, it is necessary that there should lie an.
intellect of the universe. For since it is said that this soul is intellectual, it is
likewise necessary that it should participate of intellect. Whether therefore, does
it alone participate of the whole of intellect, or does it participate of it through
a certain thing in itself derived from it? But if indeed, that which is corporeal
immediately participates of the fountain of souls, and not through that which is
in itself, it will be also requisite to admit, that the same thing takes place in the
whole soul [of the universe]. If however, there is in the Demiurgus the fountain
of souls, and there is also the fountain of the soul of tin, universe, and the universe
participates through the latter of the former, it is likewise necessary that the soul
itself of the universe, should be entirely suspended from imparticipablc intellect
through participate intellects. For as the body of the universe is to its soul, so
is the soul of it to intellect. And if indeed, so far as it is soul it becomes intel
lectual, 1 it would Iw necessary that every soul should be the same [i. e. should lie

* Instead of cat i fitr *aOt votpa, y\7 yifrrai, in thii place, it is necessary to rrad, *a n /irr KoOa
J/VVJ, * of p a ytrtrat.

342 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

intellectual]. But if it becomes intellectual through the participation of intellect,
it is necessary that it should participate of an intellect commensurate to it.
A thing of this kind however, is not intellect itself, but that which is a medium
between intellect itself and soul, v.-hich lias intellectual perception adscititious.
This intellect also is a certain intellect, and is essentially intellect, and notT
becoming to be so, like soul; for it is better than soul. But by In-ing 1 a certain
intellect, it is co-ordinate with soul. For intellect itself is intellect by c\m////".

* *"&gt; f

and not by bccomiNg tu be, and intellect which is simply so by its very being, it
superior to a co-ordination with soul. If also you collider, that every monad
constitutes a multitude similar to itself, a divine monad, a divine multitude,
a psychical monad, a psychical multitude, just as an intellectual monad produces
an intellectual multitude, and that secondary orders always participate of the
natures prior to themselves, it is necessary these things being admitted, that there
should be a certain intellect of the whole world. For it is necessary that an
intellectual sold should participate of intellect. But if some one should say,
it participates of the intellect which ranks as a whole, it is absurd. For
this intellect will not be the Demiurgus of all things.* And if it par
ticipates of a certain other intellect, this is the intellect of the universe, and
that which is properly participated, as giving completion to the universe in
conjunction \\ith soul. But the intellect which ranks us a whole, is so participated
Ini, as illuminating the soul of the universe. If therefore intellect presides over
wholes, the universe is animated ; but if the universe is animated, it is also
endued with intellect.

"Through this reasoning process therefore, placing intellect in soul,
but soul in body, lie fabricated the universe."

In the first place, it is requisite to see what this intellect is, and whether it is
essential, establi&gt;hed above soul, or a certain intellectual habit of soul. From
analogy however, it may be inferred that it is essential. For ns intellect is to
soul, so is soul to body. But soul does not so snb.sist with reference to body, a.s
to be a habit of it ; and therefore neither is intellect a habit of soul. This like-

1 For to lr TU foni, read r&lt;f t rii mui.

\iz. The intellect participated by soul, will not be the Demiurgus of all things. For the demiurgic
is an iinjt.irlicipable intellect, ur in other word), is not coujubsistent with soul.

BOOK 11.] TIM.tUS OF PLATO. 343

wise, may be inferred from the final cause. For Plato says that soul \vas
constituted on account of intellect. 1 But the converse is not true. If however,
soul is for thv sake of intellect, hut intellect is that for the sake of which soul
subsists, intellect is not a habit; for no where* does essence sr.bsist on account
of habit. And in the third place, the Demiurgus constitutes this intellect ; but
the soul as Plato says, ^ives subsistence to the intellect which is according to
habit, through the motion of the circle of sameness about the intelligible. For
[a* he adds] through th s motion, intellect and science are necessarily produced.
How therefore does the J)cniiurus constitute prior to soul, that to which soul
herself font s subsistence? To which we may add, that it is ri^ht to assume,
that in the Deminrgns there is a royal soul, and a royal intellect, as Socrates
says in the Philebus, subsisting according to the reason of cause [or causally];
and that according to these fountains of these two-fold genera, the Dcmiurgiis
now places intellect in soul, and soul in body, not because better are in less
excellent natures, nor that intellect is in want of a certain seat, or that the soul of
the universe is in a certain thing. For these things are unworthy of wholes and
divine essences; through which the world is called by Plato, a blessed Clod.
Because however, we conceive of the nature of things in a two-fold respect,
either according to their progression, or according to their conversion; henc&lt; ,
when we .survey their progression, we l&gt;egin from first natures, and say that
causes are in their f fleets. But we assert the converse of this, when we suney
their conversion. For then wo say that the things caused * exist in their causes.
This second mode therefore, Plato delivers to us shortly after, when lie places
body in soul, and analogously soul in body. Now, however, treating of f ne
mode of progression, lie places intellect in soul, because the whole of it ha* the
form of intellect, and nothing pertaining to it can be assumed, which is not under
the dominion of an intellectual nature. But soul in body, because this according
to the whole of itself participates of soul, and no part of it can lx&gt; assumed which
is inanimate; but oven that which is deprived of its proper life, .to far as it i-. a
part of the universe, is animated. For as we say that providence proceeds every
where, and isesery where because it is present with all things, and leaves nothing
destitute of itM lf ; aft&lt; r the same manner likewise, wr say that intellect is in

1 For f ta tnv here, it is nece&lt;;ir\ in rra&lt;l &lt;Sa t-ovf.
1 Al ler . i . v n/i a- in thi place, it rcrjuitilc to supply yan.
1 For ro curia here, it H necearv to rcadrra ainnra.

344 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK IT.

soul, as circularly illuminating the whole of it, and soul in body, because it is
pn sent with the whole of it.

Nor docs Plato speak after this manner, and Orpheus after another; but
if it he requisite to give my opinion, the conceptions of the thcologist become
manifest through what is here said. For Ip|&gt;n who is the soul of the universe,
and is Ihus called by tin- theologM, perhaps because her intellectual conception!*
are csM-ntiali/ed in the must vigorous motions, or perhaps on account of the most
r.ipid lation of the turners, of which she is the cause, placing a testaceous
v: -el 1 on her head, and encircling the fig leaves that bind her temples, with a
dra-on, receives Dionysius [or Bacchus]. For with the most divine part of her-
M-lf, she Incomes the receptacle of an intellectual essence, and receives the mun
dane intellect, which proceeds into her from the thigh of Jupiter. For there it
was united with Jupiter, but proceeding from thence and becoming participate
by her, it elevates her to the intelligible, and to the fountain of her nature. Fur
she hastens to the mother of the Gods, and to mount Ida, 1 from which all the
series of souls is derive.!. Hence also, Ippa is said to have received Dionysius
when he was brought forth from Jupiter. Fur as Plato before observed, it is mi-
possible fur intellect to accede to any thing without soul. Lut this is similar
to what is asserted by Orpheus ; by whom also Dionysus is called the sweet
ofl&gt;prinu of Jupiter. This however, is the mundane intellect, which proceeds
into li-ht conformably to the intellect that abides in Jupiter. Thus too, the di
vinely-delivered theology [of the Chaldeans] says, that the world derives its corn-
pi, tion from these three things [vi/. from intellect, soul and body]. Soul there
fore says [in the Chaldean Oracles,] concerning Jupiter fabricating the universe:
- J &gt;ou"l reside after the paternal conceptions, hot, and animating all things. 1 For
the father uf Gods and men placed our intellect in soul, but soul he deposited in
sh.iiiiish body." Plato likewise, bears testimony to the Oracles, when he calls
the Demiurgus father, and represents him generating souls, and sending them
into the generation of men according to the lirt life. And thus much concerning
these particulars. Since however, as we have said, both soul and intellect give
completion to one animal, Plato appears to me to use very appropriately the
words to constitute and co-fabricat,:, through the common preposition &lt;rw in both,

For Xiuox in this |&gt;lce, 1 rtuil Au-trur.

1 i. e. To The rrpion of ideas, an.l an intell^iljle iratitre.

J for Ofo^rf^nau hfre, rtad Otopn \i.v^ i\/ya.

HOOK ii.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 3(5

exhibiting the union of the universe. For by always making diviner to be more
comprehensive than less excellent natures, lie causes the world to become one;
but through the forms in each he manifests ia the one composition, but in the other
demiurgic art.

" In order that it might become most beautiful according to nature, and
the most excellent work."

In what is here said, Tinv.rus recurs to the principle from which all the
mentioned particulars wore deduced. For the world has arrangement on account
of soul, soul subsists on account of intellect, but intellect proceeds into th; uni
verse on account of intelligible beauty, and the world participates of this in order
that it may also participate off/ic one ; and this is the end to it of its composition.
that it may IK- rendered most beautiful and the best. IJut it becomes most beau
tiful indeed, on account of the beautifying cause which subMsts in the intelligible,
but the best, or most excellent, on account of the fountain of good. For the good
is the most excellent of all things. And through all these, the world Incomes
most similar to the Demiurgus. For he was railed by TiiiKrus most excellent.
He however, is the best of demiurgic causes, just as the gw&gt;d\s simply most excel
lent, existing beyond nil the divine causes. But the world is the most excellent
vorki for it is s\ fabrication. For here also the world participates of deity ; since
(lie goodness which is above intellect is deity ; and on this account the world is
denominated mo*t. excellent. In an admirable manner Plato likewise, does not
&gt;peak of the deity of the world in the same way as concerning intellect and soul,
vi/,. as acceding after intellect. For the union of intellect with its proper deity is
ineffable, and itellect itself being divine proceeds from the father, which also is
the peculiarity of total production. For as intellect indeed, it derives its subsis
tence from the total fabrication, but as a divine intellect, from deity. 1 Plato
therefore, does not make a division into deity and intellect, in consequence of
constituting the intellect of the world from the father. What however, is the
meaning hereof according to nature? Perhaps this is significant of order, according
to which the universe is likewise enabled to participate of divine beauty ; and there
fore will be the same with according to order. Perhaps also it manifests to us, that

Instead ofa-o r?ji r\;i here, I read axortjf Onnjroi.

Tim. Plat. VOL. i.

346 PROCLUS ON THK [BOOK n-

the Demiurgus makes by liis very being, and produces both intellect and soul
from his essence. And it is not improbable that it is used, because this fabrica
tion, the universe, is complicated with nature, and the most beautiful here is not
of such a kind as that which is better than nature ; but that which is above nature,
i* as it were mingled with nature, and intellectual with physical entities.

" Tims therefore, it is necessary to say, according to assimilative, rea
soning, that tins world was generated an animal, possessing in truth [or
reality] soul and intellect through the providence of God."

As the world itself is mingled, being composed of images and divine essences,
of physical and supernatural things, thus aKo Plato calls the discussion of itassi-
milative, and again truth. For according to that which is moved in a confused
and disorderly manner, it requires assimilative reasoning, but according to the
intellectual osence which is in it, it requires truth, and also according to the
divine cause from which it proceeds. Hence Plato, \\heuaboutto speak con
cerning the world adds the word assimilative, or probable, but the word truth,
when about to speak concerning the providence of divinity. Farther still, you
may perceive both assimilation and truth m the speaker himself; not only dividing
these conformably to the nature of things. For he frequently apprehends the
fabrication of things in a partible manner, assuming reasonings, divisions and com
positions, though all tilings subsist at once in divine production. And frequently,
he recurs to the whole intelligence of the father, as in the axioms, "lie van good,"
and " it neither was nor uill be lauful for that which is moat excellent to effect any
thing else than that which u most beautiful? For in the former of these his appre
hension is assimilative [but in the latter, conies into contact with truth]. For
from the multiform knowledges that are in us, he indicates what pertains to divine
and demiurgic intelligence. But how, say they, does he define the universe to be
an animal animated, or possessing soul, and endued with intellect ; for it seems
indeed, that unniuil is a certain part, but ani nutted a genus ? In answer to tliis, it
is necessary to recall to our memory those IMatonists who say, that animal extends
as far as to plants themselves, and to see how, according to this doctrine,
every thing animated is an animal, but not (very animal is animated. For
intelligible animal is bevond the causes of soul. For as Plato calls the ra-

tional soul an animal but also arranges life after the rational soul, lie very pro-

1 /u/&lt;&gt;i i I imiit .1 In ic in the original.

HOOK- ii.] TIM.i;US OF PLATO.

347

perly denominates every thing animated an animal, but nof v ice versa. If however,
this IM- the case, having said that the world is an animal, since there is an intel
ligible animal, and also a sensible animal participating of a rational soul, lie
properly adds, that it is animated. And since of souls, one kind is endued with
intellect, hut another is deprived of it, in addition to the universe l&gt;eing animated,
he likewise asserts that it possesses intellect. For it seems, that animal indeed,
accedes from the fir&gt;t intelligible, ami thus also from the intelligible father, 1 who
is prior to the intellectual (iods. But the animated accedes from the middle
cause, hoth the triadic and the hehdomadic. And the possession of intellect ac
cedes from the intellectual lather [Jupiter]. For if you survey these as with
reference to the Demiurgus alone, according to the paradigm which is in him,
the universe, is rendered an animal; hut according to his royal soul, animated ;
and accordingto his royal intellect, endued with intellect. All these however, Plato
comprehends unitedly in the words, "through the providence r&gt;f God." For from
thence the universe is rendered an animal, and a blessed God,* becoming perfect
through the providence of divinity. You may also see how the discourse proceeds
from goodness through will, and ends in providence. For will indeed, is sus
pended from goodness, and providence from will. And the universe is gene
rated, on account of the providence, the will, and the goodness of the father; the
last of these being essence prior to essence [i. e. being superessential essence], the
second, being as it wr re power prior to powers, and the first, energy prior to
energies. For these pertain to the Gods so far ax they arc Gods. For goodness
indeed is unijic of essence, and is the Jlowcr of it ; but will is the measure of pmcer ;
find providence is an energy prior to intellect. For this I think, the very name itself
manifests. We. therefore thus distinguish animal and animated.

lamblichus however, arranges animal, with every thing that has life, \n\\. anima
ted, uith the peculiar participation of souls. And perhaps he also, through the

i. e. From TO tr or, or from being characterized by the our, and which is the summit of the in-
Ifllipildconlrr.

1 i. r. From ;inim:ii itsrlf or i hancs, the eitrcmity of the intelligible order.

i.e. 7 /if animnttd accedes from the life, which is in tlif urdrr called intelligible, and at the same
lime intellectual, ami also from the life which is in the intellectual order, which life u the middle
ram* in both these order*.

* For cut Ituftvv in llii* place, read t }&lt;n/iwr.

i.e. l\pvrtna pro\ idence, is an energy wpo rov pricr to intellect.

348 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK 11.

possession of life indeed, comprehends intelligible animals, but through the ani
mated sensible animals alone. But it may be inferred, that the world is an ani
mal from its sympathy; that it is animated, from its perpetual motion ; and that
it is endued with intellect, from its excellent order, For if according to this,
mortal 1 are co-passive with celestial natures, and the latter impart an ellluxion to
the former, the universe is one animal connected and contained by one life. For
if this life were not common there would not be a sympathy of the parts in it. For
sympathy is effected through a participation of the same nature. And if the world
is peq&gt;etual!y moved, it is governed by soul. For every body which is itself
moved inwardly by itself, is animated ; but the body which is moved externally,
is inanimate. If therefore, the universe is always moved, what is it which moves
it ? For this is either immoveable, or self-motive. But it is not lawful for the irn-
moveable cause of motion to approach without a medium to things which are
moved by something ditlerent from themselves. Hence, it remains, that the self-
motive nature is that which always moves the world. But this is soul. The
world therefore is animated.

Moreover, in the third place, if the universe is always arranged, and if all
Ihinjrs are co-ordinated to well-bein", and there is nothing adventitious in the

~ n T

polity of the world, intellect governs the world. For the connexion, the order,
and the sacred l;iws of the natures contained in it, bring with them manifest
&gt;ymhols of intellectual government. Aristotle also, in another way shows this,
when he says that of animated natures, animals have the left hand and the right,
but plants have the upwards and downwards, and also the right hand and the
left, so that the world is animated and an animal. But it is likewise endued
with intellect. For that which moves it is intellect. According to both philo
sophers therefore, the \\orld is an animal animated and endued with intellect ;
except indeed, that according to Aristotle, if is animated, as having an insepa
rable life; for he does not admit that it has an intellectual soul, but that it lias
nn intellect above soul, and which is essentially suspended from another intelli
gible animal. For what I lato calls animal itself, he calls eternal animal, as in
liis Metaphysics, when he sa\s, " JfV ,V(/j/ t/uil (i/nl ii an clcnnil ttniniul" And in
short, since there are in the world thin:;- that are moved, and things that are
immoveable, things which are always one or the other of these, and things which
are sometimes in motion, and sometimes are immoveable, it is necessary that the

1 It is IUTCO.UIA lii-re, o suji|i!y ru tVrjrn.
1 I .i b omitted h.ie in tin- on^iiial.

HOOK ii.] TIMJEUS OF PLATO.

causes of botli these should preside over the world. Soul therefore is the cau&gt;t*
of motion; on vthich .Account also Plato in the Laws admitting [for the sake ot
argument] the universe to be immoveable, gives motion to it by the introduction
of soul. And in the Pha-drus taking away soul, lie makes all things to stand
still. Hut it !; evident that intellect belongs to immovcable natures. And beiiiL s
that are always moved, are moved about those that are immoveable, and on
account of the permanency of the latter, the former are perpetually moved.
Ileacc: it entirely follov, s. that there, is a mundane intellect above, soul. J{y
no mr-ans therefore, mu&lt;t that \\hich Chrysippus devised, be ascribed to the
world. For he confounded imparticipahle with participate causes, by sup
posing them to be the ,amo with each other, and also the. divine, and the intellec
tual, the immaterial and the material. For the same (iod, and who according to
him is the first God, pervades through the world, and through matter, and is both
soul and natu r e inseparable from the subjects of his government. Plato how-
ever, establishing prior to the whole world three causes, goodness, intelligible
animal, and the demiurgic intellect, imparts from these to the world in the first
place, a perfect intellect always fixed in energy, exempt from matter, and full of
uniiefiled intellections. In the second place, a divine intellectual soul, evolving
the essence of this one intellect, dancing round it, and convolving the universe.
In the third place, a union of the total essences in the world, and one deity and
"oodncss, connecting all the mundane multitude, and causing it to l&gt;e one. And

~ o

in the fourth place, a providence extending to all things its inspective care, sub-
sisting likewise from itself, and causing itself to be exempt from all the subjects
of its government.

Since however, as we have before observed, it is necessary to survey the pro
gressions and the conversions of wholes, both these are accomplished by Plato.
For he deliver* the progressions of them when he says that the Demiurgus placed
intellect in soul, and soul in body ; but their conversions, when beginning from
ttie world, he calls it an animal animated, and endued with intellect, and con
nects it through soul with intellect, which is the peculiar work of conversion.
And in the last place, he refers the composition of the world to the demiurgic
providence, through which conversion is imparted to all things. For goodness
indeed, unites the Demiurgus to the one. But will supplies wholes with good.
And providence converts all things to the good. For, as we have said, goodness is

1 II i* ncces?*ry litre to ?upply tat fn6i*Tut.

150 1 ROCLUS ON THE [BOOK U,

analogous to essence, will to power, and providence to energy ; because the first
indeed, establishes all things ; the second moves them to progression; and the
third recalls them according to the retrogression of all things to that which is
prior to intellect. If however, the Demiurgus adorns the universe on account of
goodness, but through adorning it causes it to possess intellect, and to IM- animated,
and doing these things, eflects them on account of providence, (for these wen
generated through the providence of God) if this be the case.it is necessary that it
should l&gt;e the same thing to produce on account of goodness as on account of provi
dence. And this very properly, because providence is the energy of goodness. So
that according to Plato, providence is nothing else than an energy conformable to
good. For in our concerns also, we say that to provide for some one, is to be the
cause of good to the object of our prov idential care. Not only, therefore, must provi
dence be defined to be that which converts all things to the first, but also to be that
the energy of which extends to all things, and which adorns all things, according to
one union. And this, is in reality providence, the communication of good to all
things, the conversion of all things to and the participation of the- giver [of every
good], who imparts to every thing that which it is able to receive. It is requisite
likewise to remember what the Cheronean [Plutarch] says about the name ol
providence, as that which Plato exhorts us to conceive of as something divine.
If also the Demiurgus is intellect, and providence so far as he has something
which is better than intellect, he has deservedly this name, on account of an
energy which is above intellect. For all things aspire after good, but all things
do not aspire after intellect. For such things as are perfectly destitute of intel
lect do not desire it, lest their desire should be in vain, or they should be deprived
of the end [which is their proper good]. And because lie is providence indeed,
he is suspended from the gw&lt;l itself; but because he is intellect he is suspended
from the first intellect. For the first intellect [i. e. Saturn] is not that which intel
lectually sees and fabricates, but that which alone intellectually perceives ; and
on this account, it is a pure intellect, as we learn from the- Cratvlus. Hence,
also, according to Plato, the hitter may be said to IM- ana; as having one energy
directed to him-elf; but the former l.,ur t together with this energy leceiving idno
u power f.ibiiculive of the universe, and not only legislatively regulating things
posterior to himself, but also abiding in his own accustomed manner, as Plato
says shortly after.

Prorlui Mm lliii, -Hutling to llie (. haldmn oradcn, in wl.ich Saturn i&gt; cullnl t&gt;nct bri/^nil, uml
Jujiitrr finer bryond.

HOOK ii.] T1M/EUS Or PLATO. 3-,!

" Tliis being determined, let us consider what is consequent to these,
things; vix. according to the similitude of what animal, the constituting
artificer constituted the world."

Plato clearly exhibits to us through what is here said the connexion of the
problems, and the suspension of secondary from primary natures. For the words,
" this bcin determined" and " let us consider what is consequent to these things"
indicate the connexion of what has boon with what will he said ; and that through
the truth of the former, the latter receive the principle of investigation. For
since it has been shown that the universe was rendered an animal conformably
to the providence of God, it is necessary that it should be assimilated to intelligi
ble animal. For where did the Deminrgiis look when he made the world to I*;
an animal, except to the intelligible? For it was one of the things pro-demon
strated, that the world being most l&gt;eautiful, was generated according to an
eternal paradigm. If therefore, the Dcmiurgns making it to be an image of the
intelligible, constituted it an animal, the paradigm itself will l&gt;e an intelligible
animal. For if that was not an animal, how could that which was generated an
image of it l&gt;e rendered an animal ? For so far as it is similar to that, it was gene
rated an animal. For it is sensible indeed, not as similar and separate [but as
visible and tangible]*. These however, [i. e. visibility, and tangibility,] it obtains
through a corporeal nature. But it is an animal, as being similar to intelligible
animal. And if it is similar, it is from thence allotted the morphe of animal. For
images also, have not only their forms, but their appellations, so far as they are
formalized, from their paradigms. So that if life is imparted to the world through
the paradigm, it is also similarly called an animal and animated from it, localise
the cause of its whole animation pre-exists in intelligibles. For the same reason
likewise, it is endued with intellect. It may however, in a greater degree IK*
railed an animal, on account of the most principal cause, Ix canse the paradigm is
the cause of animation, of the supply of intellect, and as I may say, of all life. For
every thing endued with intellect, is also animated, and tvcry thing animated is also an
animal ; but the converse is not true. For every animal is not animated. For that

In&gt;tfH(l of irwi row TO (-retro ytyorot cu-wr in this place, it is ncce^ary to read irn TO rutu-ov yt /ot* t

flk MC.

1 TJie words oXX #t rpnrov rot arof are omitted in the original, but, as it appears to me, ought to
IK- inserted.

PROCLUSONTHK [BOOK M.

which participate! of a rational soul in animated. Nor it every thing which is
animated endued with intellect. For the genus of wen that participate of intellect,
is small ; so that animal is more comprehensive than all the rest. And with those
things indeed, with which the rest are present, animal also is present; hut it is
not necessary that the rest should be inherent in those things with which this is
present. That however, which is more comprehensive, is nearer to the fir.-4 prin
ciple. But that which is nearer to it, is of a more, causal nature, since the first
principle is the cause of all beings. That Plato also not only knew intelligible
animal, but also the intelligible animated, is manifest from what he says in the
Sophi*ta. For placing life and soul in being, and wishing likewise to give to it
motion, he adds, " Hut that which has intellect and soul, if it ix tiut animated, mu*t
remain entirely tmmovcabk" II nee there are, intelligible life, and intelligible
animal; the cause of MMI!, and the animated; the cause of intellect, and that
which is endued with intellect. And animal itself is beyond all the intelligible
paradigms. Hence, Plato says, that the discussion of the similitude of the world
to intelligible animal, is consequent to the problem concerning the composition
of it. For because the universe being assimilated according to the form itself of
similitude, was rendered an animal by the Demiurgus, that may more properly
be called an animal, with reference to which the universe A\as generated an
animal. For it exists as an animal on account of the intelligible, and not on
account of that which is mo\ed in a confused and disorderly manner. It is
necessary however, that animal .should be present with the universe, either from
matter or from form ; so that if the world is not an animal from its subject
matter, it i.s so from form. If however from form, that which is primarily animal
is the cause to it of form.

It remains therefore, to survey in the next place after this problem, to what
animal the universe is assimilated. For that it is assimilated, is evident from
what has been already said, but to what it is assimilated, must next be con
sidered. For there is a multitude of intelligible animals, \\Iiich Plato aNo indi
cating, inquires to \\hat animal the Demiurgus constituted the world similar. For
beginning supernally from intelligibles, animal proee* ds through all the middle
orders; in one of these orders, subsisting intelligibly alone; in another intelligibly

For u(Vu)Tu. yap y&lt;*&lt;n, /VX" tariv cu /&lt;f7-&lt;V". it i&gt; nrc-ssar\ to read, aify.awuv ) &lt; f&gt; ;troi, /^nn &gt; u
tart* row row /ir7^o. I or IMjto sa\i this in the latter part of ihi Dialogue.

* For aXXoi- hcie, il i&gt; obviou;lv rcijuisitc to read t- t yvTfpai.

noox ii.] TIM.T-HIS OF PLATO. 3.- &gt;; j

indeed, but as in intelligible* and intellectuals ; and in another intellectually
alone. And in one of these orders indeed, animal subsists intelligibly alone, but
as in intellectuals; but in another vitally. And thus in each of the intellects
there is intelligible animal, subsisting appropriately in each. For every intellect
has a conjoined intelligible. Wry properly therefore, does Plato investigate
what kind of animal is the paradigm of the universe, whether it is super-mundane,
or intellectual only, or intelligible, and at the same time intellectual, or intelligible.
only. For the nature of animal 1 proceeds according to all the orders of intellect.
But Plato admits that the d inferences always subsist in the first animal itself
according to union, and gives a progression to them according to appropriate
numbers. For as the lust animal is tetradic, thus a different animal is defined
according to a different number. And in those things in which there is the same
number, in these there is a variety of subsistence according to the peculiarities of
animals. For it is necessary that in animal also, there should be the monadic
prior to the multiplied ; because this * is more allied to the one.. And universally,
every divine multitude begins from a monad. As therefore, the Demiurgus is the
monad of all effective causes, (hough the effective peculiarity is in many (iods,
thus also animal itself is the monad of all animals; in which lik -wi-,e tin- 1110-4
total paradigms of mundane natures, and the one cause of the whole world pre
exist.

\Vhy. however, some one may say, does IMato call the intelligible paradigm
animal \ Because it is the supplier of life, as I have before ob&gt;erv d ; and lecan&gt;t
it -.enerates the rau-es of the whole vivilic series, and the fountains themselves of
life. Because likewise, it is replete with the first and intelligible life. For the
one h ing, or being characterized by the one, i-&gt; be\ond life. But the middle
order of intelligible* is the first life, and is one and infinite. Animal itself, how
ever, being full of intelligible life, is very properly called animal. For as it is
eternal, on account, of being filled from eternity, thus also it is an animal, on
account of its reception of life. For it is intelligible, as being arranged [immedi
ately] after intelligible life. It is therefore called an animal, not as sensitive, nor
as having impulse, but as being vital. For every thing which lives, is according
to Plato, an animal. " For ficcanfc it ha.i life, says / interns, it mm/ be justly called
an animal." Hence also, Plato calls plants and seeds animals, characterizing the

1 tor f) rov row if,uirn licrr, it is nfrfMfjr t irivl * riv ?*&gt; &lt;fvrii.
1 For rovTf lierr , rra&lt;l TIVTO.
Tim. Plat. VOL. L 2 Y

PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK n.

3o4

animal by vitality. If therefore, the intelligible paradigm lives, as being eternal ;
for eternity, as Plolinus says, is the life of all things, so that the eternal lives ;
and if every thing that lives is an animal, hence the intelligible paradigm is an
animal. And you may from hence assume that this paradigm is in the third triad
of intelligibles. For it is not in the lirst triad ; for this is prior to life. Nor is it
in the second ; for this is life. Hence it is in the third. For it does not exist
out of mtellrnbles; since Plato on this 1 account alone calls the paradigm intelh-
-iblr. though he knew the super-mundane demiurgic intellect. But neither doe,
he call thehtter intelligible, nor the former intellectual. Before therefore, he
assumed every thin- "hid, perpetually exists as the paradigm of all generate.,;
among which eternally existing beings, animal itself and the Demiurgin are
included ; for each of these always is. Eternity likewise, which is the first thing
that always is, and the one bring itself, which is eternal being according to cause,
are in the number of eternally exiting beings. IS ow, however, he culls animal
Nell the paradigm of the world considered as living. Fur perpetual bang vas the
jwadivm ofJuorJcr/y pncratiun ; sinctfrom thence, forms without distinction, uere
patent with the disorderly nature, prior to tht generation of the universe.
we should assume animal itself, whirl, has the forms of the elements, tins also is
l .e paradigm of the vestiges of the elements. So far, however, as it is animal, il
* the paradigm of this universe now possessing life. So that simply considered,
animal itself, and the mt.-llig.ble paradigm are not the same. For eternity like
u ise w hich always exis. N is the- paradigm of time, but is not an intelligible animal ;
since not eu ry paradigm is an animal belonging to the intelligible order.
animal itself is eternal, eternity is prior to it, which is not an animal. 1-or pno
to animal itself, there is no other animal ; since neither prior to any other of tl.os
thills to which we apply the term itself, is there a certain-form prior to 1 1. As 1 n-
fore "eternity is prior to animal itself, not being yet an animal, so likewise, being i
is prior to Jternitv. Hence also eternity is that which is being, and is a certain
Mn-. Animal itself therefore, is the third intelligible triad, concerning winch
the [ChaMean] Oracles say, It is the operator, and the giver of life- bearing fire
11 fills the vivinc bosom of Hecate/ and pours on the Synoches the fertile strength
&lt; i - fire end.ied with mighty power." For all these assertions in no respect differ
from saying that all-perfect intelligible animal is the fountain of all Intel

For ?&lt;o TI her, it is nefes&gt;ary to read &lt;a rrtro.
1 For ttuorrn here, read E&lt;ar&gt;ji.

BOOK ii.] TIM;i:t S OF PLATO. :jo,5

life, and the cause of every paradigmatic iiyparxis. And thus uuicli concerning

this particular.

\\ith respect to the words of the text, " to constitute in the similituilf t n manifests

that the universe is in tlie highest decree assimilated to its paradigm. For not
every image is constituled in similitude, but that alone \vhich is perfectly similar;
since this is not the case, where dissimilitude predominates. For then similitude
is not the end. But the words, " the Cdnstittttittg artificer constituted," clearly de
monstrate to us, that the Demiurgus of the universe makes by his very being,
and possesses energy essentially. For Plato docs not call him in one way, and
the effective energy proceeding from him in another, hut he calls both by one
name. Farther still, the words likewise appear to signify, that the Demiurgusj
always produces, and that he always produces j&gt;erfectly. For the word cnn.siitu-
ting, manifests an ever-present making; but the word constituted, an all-j&gt;erfect
making, and which is suspended from its cause. But by the conjunction of both
these expression*, it is very manifest that tin 1 maker of the universe generates
eternally all things, his productive energy neither commencing, nor ending at
a certain time.

* We must not therefore assert, that lie thought it would be adequate
to its dignity, to assimilate it to any one of the animals which naturally
exist, in the form of a part. For that which is similar to an imperfect
thing, can never at any time become beautiful."

As there are many intelligible animals, some of which are more total, but others
more partial, some of which are united, but others divided, and some are
defined according to bound, but others according to infinity ; Plato inquiring
what the all-perfect paradigm of the universe is, and from what intelligible animal
the world is suspended, thinks that no partial animal ought to be placed in this
order. For each of these is imperfect as with reference to the whole. For it is
possible for the imperfect to be so called in a twofold respect, either with refer
ence to its own nature, or with reference to that which is better and more causal.
And the former indeed, it is not even lawful to conceive of divine natures. For
each has the measure of itself eternally, and its own proper good always exerted.
For, as Socrates says in the Republic, each of them is most excellent in its own

It is obviously necessary m this place, to supply the words, rwr it

35&lt;i J ROCLL S ON THE [BOOK n

order. But the latter ranks, as it is said, among the things that are usual. For a^
in the Banquet, Plato calls that which is riot primarily beautiful, but participates
ofleauty, indigent of beauty, thus also he calls that an imperfect animal which i-,
not the first animal, nor animal itself, but is such by participation, and subMsts
according to a progression from that which is lirst. If therefore, every partial
animal is imperfect, but the paradigm of the world is all-perfect, the paradigm of
the world will not Iw a partial animal. For whether docs the Demiur;us intellec
tually j&gt;erceive this all-perfect and lirst animal, or not ? It is impossible indeed,
that lie should not intellectually perceive those things which we perceive when our
&gt;oul t-nergi/es intellectually. But if he thus sees it, and all intellectual perception
of the Dcmiurgus is production or making, it is necessary that he should make
by intellectual perception itself. A\ hat therefore can he make more divine than
the universe ? .For he will not make any thing of a less excellent nature, v.hen
looking to I hat which is more excellent. Very properly therefore, does Plato
when investigating the paradigmatic principle of the world, recur to all-perfect
animal.

What then, some one may say, are not the sun and moon and each of the stars
(cautiful ? But how is this possible ? For each of these is assimilated to a partial
animal. To this we reply, that each of these is beautiful, when surveyed in con
junction with the whole, and co-arranged with the whole: just as the eye and the
chin are beautiful, in conjunction with the whole face, and while in the whole;
but surveyed by them.-elves apart from the face, do not exhibit the beauty which
is adapted to them. For in subsisting as a part and not as a whole, each when
essentially divnlsed from the whole, sutlers a diminution of its own proper beauty.
The. perfect therefore, and the beautiful are present \\ith these which are parts, on
account of the whole. The cause, however, of this, says Porphyry is, that in
intelligible forms the part is a whole. 1 For all such things are in each partially,
as are in the whole ail-perfectly, on account of the union of intelligible forms.
And the assertion is indeed true, that each of the parts in them is in a certain
respect a whole, each rccei \inir the form of whole, and becoming essentially
united on account of its communicating with all, and l&gt;eing all things according
to participation. Neverthclos the wholeness of it subsists partially, and not.
like that wholeness which is simply a whole. For it is one thing to be alter ;i
solar manner a whole, or to be so after a lunar manner, in consequence of each,

Iij3ii.nl of TO tXov nifivt tony, it 15 ntct jMiry to rtail TO f* i*&lt;i o\i&gt; t&lt;m&gt; .

HOOK ii.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. ^,7

intellect possessing all things in :i way adapted to itself, one form having: dominion,
v hieh makes tlie intellect to ho sucli an intellect, and a certain intellect ; and ano
ther thin-j; to he all things, without a partial peculiarity, be in-.: all thin^ so far asin-
(llect, and not so far as a particular kind of intellect. \Vhat then, are not these
also generated according to intelligible paradigms, ^i/.the sun and moon and each
of the star-? How therefore, are these beautiful? To this wo reply, that these are
beautiful, but not most beautiful. liutthe world is that which is trulymost l&gt;cautiful.
As therefore each of these is perfect, but not all-perfect, so likewise each is beautiful,
but not like the universe most beautiful. For that each of these is j&gt;erfect, Plato
manifests farther on, when, he says, " that thc&orlJ zcas generated perfect from
things perfect, and a vholc from wholes" Ilcnco the perfection of the whole is ono
tiling, and of the part another. And the wholeness of the all-perfect is diflfe.ent
from tlie wholeness of that which is only perfect. The beauty likewise which is
in the most beautiful is one tiling, but that which receives a more partial partici
pation of beauty, is another. And thus much in answer to this doubt.

The words however, " //; the form (fa part," may l&gt;e easily understood, if they
are considered ns signifying the same as, in the order of a part. And this is tin;
same with, becoming a part. IJut the divine lamblichus thinks tit to add the
conjunction ax to the words in the form, and to understand the whole as irnphing
that e\ery partial animal in intelligible*, naturally exists as in the form of a part.
For since part in them is not such as it is in sensible* ; since each is there accord
ing to its own order all such things as the whole is; on this account the philoso
pher adds, as in l/ie farm, in ordT that surveying the appellation of part in a
manner adapted to forms, we may not understand it as a thing attended with
interval, and susceptible of division, and thus relinquish the union of united and
impartible essences. For these according to the philosopher himself are impart
ible and united. ]&gt;ut with respect to the word " naturally, "we must not now under
stand by it according to nature, but the being c." serialized. For all essence* are
frequently calUd natures, as by Socratis in the Philebus, tchcn he says, " hence, in
tin: nature of Jupiter you may say, that there is u royal soul, and tt royal intellect,,
according t the reason of cause. " But the words, " he thought it nould he adequate.
to its dignity * are $?aid as if spoken in conjunction with the Demiiirgus and a&lt;*
truly apprehending ihe dignify of a divine cause. For he who mystically narrates
theci cnipt and all-perfect intellectual conceptions of a dirine nature, has an arrange
ment in conjunction with him. And the words, "for that which is similar to an im-
pcijcct thing can never be beautiful," is indeed true, but is attended wilh u doubt..

35a PROCLl S ON TUT. [BOOK ii.

For if in that which is a whole one thing is more, hut another loss excellent, must
not the whole become inferior to its more excellent part, by the addition of that
which i* less excellent ? 13ut the douht may be solved by observing, that the
co-arrangement of the less with the more excellent makes the whole to be one and
perfect; but when they are not conglomerated with each other, then the mixture
of the less diminishes the power of the more excellent nature. If however, some
one should make a syllogism from opposites, through what is here, and what has
Ix-en before said, so as to infer that e\ery thing which is generated according to
an eternal, is not generated according to an elernal paradigm, we may solve the
objection by observing that what is employed by the objector as the middle term,
is not so. For in one place, the words " in order that it might be beautiful" ma
nifest that which is beautiful, whether in a certain respect, or simply; but in
another place, they manifest that which is most beautiful. For a part has
indeed the beauty of a part, but simply considered, is not beautiful. But that
alone is absolutely beautiful which is a whole, to which also Hie beauty of the
parts contributes ; this beauty pertaining to certain things, and being itself a cer
tain [and not a tniircrsal) thing. For eury part is for the sake of another thing, i. e.
the whole, and the beauty which it possesses has the order of matter with reference
to the lieauty of the whole. Hence it is not so beautiful as to be most beautiful.

From what has been said, those assertions likewise maybe confuted, which
make they d to be a certain intelligible form and not prior to all intelligible*.
For if it is a certain form, it is also a part of the whole intelligible profundity in
which it subsists. But every part, as it is here said, is imperfect ; so that the good
likewise is imperfect. How therefore being imperfect is it tin- most happy of all
things? In reality also that which is similar to it is not beautiful. Nor are all
beings similarly with reference to it, either more good, or more beautiful, ii.
therefore the good being a part, will suffer tilings of this kind, it will not be a part
of the intelligible. Moreover, neither is it the whole of the intelligible. For
being the whole of the intelligible, over what will it still reign ? Since in ither is
the sun which has an arrangement analogous to the good the whole of that
which is visible. It is necessary therefore, that the good should be beyond the
intelligible, and lie neither a part nor the whole of it. Neither therefore, will
either animal itself, or the Demiurgus be the same with the good; since each of

these is a certain whole comprehensive of all lortus.

For r uyuOoK here, read r ayutfy.

.1 TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 3^9

" But \vc should admit it to be the most similar of all things to that
animal of which other animals, both according to one, and according
to genera, arc parts."

Some, as Atticus, assert that this " according to one, and according to genera" gives
a division to individual opposite to that of more common forms. But they call
individual forms those that are proximate, and the causes of individuals ; such
for instance as man itself, horse itself, and each of such-like forms. And they
denominate genera the more total and comprehensive paradigms of these.
Others again, as Amelias, say that Plato by these words, distinguishes that
which is particular from things that are more common. For some things are
paradigms of parts, but others of forms. Theodorus also, following Arnelius,
says there are twofold intellects, one of these being divided into wholes, but the
other into parts. And that these are the same with, " according to genera, and
according to one." But others, as Xenarehus, assert, that according to genera
manifests the pre-existent intelligible causes of animals; such for instance as the
celestial, aerial, aquatic and terrestrial, which are shortly after mentioned by
T ima-us. And that by " according to one" the formali/ing principles in earh of
these many are indicated. For in celestial natures, the paradigm of the sun is
different from the paradigm of the moon. In terrestrial natures, the paradigm of
men is different from that of lions. And in a similar manner in the natures which
have an intermediate subsistence. The divine lamblichus however, turns into a
path of interpretation contrary to all these. For they indeed make the "accord
ing to one" subordinate to, and more partial than, "according to genera ;" but lie,
on the contrary, makes it to IK* more venerable, as it is tit that in intclligibles
unity should precede multitude. lie says therefore, that all other animals are
the parts of animal itsrlf, both according to one, and according to genera. For
they are comprehended and perfected by animal itself, both according to the
multitudes they contain, and according to their unities. Nor is there any one of
them which does not proceed from the intelligible. For intelligible animal it com
prehensive of all the things posterior to it, not as deriving its completion from them.
For it is a u-ho/c prior to, and doc* not derive its subsistence from parts. Nor is it
a whole, as being predicated of parts ; for it is the cause of the many. But it is

Intelligible animal, or animal itself, is a whole prior to parU, because it comprehends parts in
itself cautally.

PKOCLUS ON TUF.

a whole, as a primordial principle, and as filling all things posterior to itself with
itself. Hence it comprehends what are called parts impartiMy, many species
uniformly, and exists in an all-perfect manner prior to secondary paradigm*
For this principle indeed, is the universe intelligibly ; hut of the natures posterior
to it, one is all things celestially, another alter a solar, another after a terrestrial
manner, and another in some other way, according to the different cause* of
mundane natures. So that this principle comprehends all things ail-perfectly,
hut all things are comprehended hy each of the natures posterior to it pailially,
as with reference to the intelligible allncss. The world therefor* , is also &gt;imilar
to these partial animals ; since it is likewise similar to the Deminrgus ; hut it is
most similar to animal itself, so far as it is an animal. For animal itself was
primarily intelligible animal. Hence, that which is most similar is so in a two
fold respect ; either because it H similar to oilier things, or because other things
are similar to it. Hut this is esjwcially the case- \\ith the universe, and it is espe
cially similar to animal itself.

" For this indeed, has all intelligible annuals comprehended in itself,
just as this world contains us, and such other animals as are the objocts
of sight."

Plotinns supposes animal itself to exist in a twofold respect. For at one time
he considers it to be more excellent than intellect, as in his treatise infilled
Different Considerations, but at another, a&lt; inferior to it, as in his treatise Concern
ing Numbers, when he sa)s that being is first, afterwards intellect, and afterwards
animal itself. But Theodoras, who says, that each of the demiurgi has a triple 1
hyparxis, thinks fit to call the third in each, animal itself. From both, however,
the truth may be assumed. From the admirable Theodorus indeed, that il has
flu- third order in intelligible* ; but from the mo.st di\ine JMotinns, that it is
inferior to one intellect, but beyond another. And it must be said, that unfold
ing it-elf into light at the end of intelligibles, it generates from intelligible life all
the number of intellectual, sup&lt; rmnndane, and mundane animals, stipernally as
fir as to the last of things. It is likeui.se conipnheiiM\e of all things, being ex
empt from, and uniformly and antecedently containing in itself the causes of them.
For Orpheus also indicates things of this kind about it, when theologi/ing

1 I or rpir/jj- hrrr, it is ntc&lt; usan to n-Jil rmT\i/i.

DOOK ii.] TIM.EUS OF PLATO. 3fil

concerning Phanes. The first God therefore, with him, has the heads of many
animals, viz. of a ram, ahull, a serpent, and a fierce lion. 1 He also proceeds
from the primogcnial egg, in which the animal exists spermatically ; and Plato
knowing this calls this mighty God animal itself. Tor what difference is there
U twern calling an occult cause an egir, or that which is unfolded into light from
it, an animal ? For what can l&gt;e generated from the egg of all things, hut an
animal ? This egg however, was the offspring of ether and chaos, the former of
which is established conformably to the bound, but the latter to the infinity of
intelligibles. For the former is the root of all things, but the latter has not any
boundary. If therefore that which first consists of bound and infinity is that
which is primarily l&gt;eing, the being of Plato will be the same with the Orphic
egg. And if Plianes is from this, who is arranged according to animal itself, it
is necessary to investigate it as situated next to eternity according to Orpheus,
which is a medium between animal itself, and that which is primarily being.
And thus it will be more clearly evident, that animal itself is no other than the
Plianes of the theologist. For if Phanes first proceeds from the egg, which is
manifestly with Orpheus the first intelligible intellect, but that which first and alone
proceeds from an egg, is necessarily nothing else than an animal, it is evi
dent that the most mighty Phanes is nothing else than the first animal ; and,
as Plato would say, animal itself. This therefore is demonstrated.

Let us however, in the next place, survey what is consequent to this. Phanes,
therefore, thus unfolding himself into light from the occult Gods, antecedently
comprehends in himself the causes of the secondary orders, viz. of the effective,
connective, perfective, and immutable orders; and also contains in himself
according to one cause, all intelligible animals. For he excites himself to the
most total ideas of all things. Hence also, lie is said [by Orpheus] to be tl.c first
of the Gods, and to have a form. But he produces all things, and unfolds the
intelligible and united causes of things, to the intellectual Gods. Hence too,
the Demiurgus being filled from these causes, gives subsistence to this visible

1 This M an Or)&gt;hic line, which M not noticed cither by Gesner or Hermann in their collodion of
Orphic fragments. It is however in the prinle&lt;l original in a defective Mate: for it is, *m mi
raepiovi &lt;xpiai, ^apo^nv rt \tot-Toi. Hut from Escheubach, who quote* it from a manuscript, it may be
amended as follows: xpw *n ravpov, oyxoi, ^.-ipox-ov re Afocroi.

* It is here necessary to supply the words row yw OITOJ.

1 For tivttfitfHf in ibis place, it u obviouily necessary to read qrw/itra, in order to agree with ona.

Tun. Plat. VOL. I. 2 Z

302

PKOCLITS ON THE [BOOK n.

world, and cause* it to contain nil sensible animals, both KUC!I as ore more divino,
nnd Hiich us an* mortal, which are prosily Osiauara 1 thrtimnuta, or tiling* \cltkk
m-c nourished, us entirely participating of the nutritive soul. All bodies likewise,
may properly be railed O e ( u ( uTM, us U- rng the progeny of nature, and as always
living from, and being connected by it, even though they should bo perpetual
bod it*; but not as requiring externally adventitious nutriment.. Unless indeed,
it be requisite to call all thiu-s in the world ^f/x/Ar, as b. inij nourished by Un
king of visible natures through the communication flight. I or Socniten iit lh
Hepublie *avN, that the HUH is the eau-e of nutriment and generation to all micll
tilings as he illuminate*. I - or every visible thin- i&gt; nourinhed U-iui; perfected by
li-^ht. I - or as we learn in the INditieus, it i* poN.sible to !H&gt; nourishvd e.xteimdly,
and not only internally. The Peiii mr^us tin -r I me, eompiehend.s all that the
world contains, in order that this hen&gt;ible worhl may IK- till and perfi-cl from the
parts that arc* in it, conformably to u similitude to him. Hence, this world is a
various animal, according to a different part of itself emitting a dillerent \oice,
and from all its parts one voice. For it is al&gt;o one, [as well as many]. 13 y u
much greater priority however, the intelligible world is one animal and a multitude
[of animals], contracting multitude in the one, just as this visible world also,
exhibits the one in multitude. Ami the latter indeed, is a whole from parts ; but
the former is a whole prior to parts, exempt I v, uniformly, and according to cause,
comprehending intelligible animals. For from it the fountains of divine, natures,
and all the most total genera proceed. JIciicc tilm, the tficdnifi^t n-jirc. H.-iilA it as a
most total animal; surroumls.it U it/i t he heads of a ram, a hull, a //*///, ami a Jragun ;
and ascribes to it primarily the female and the mak, as to the first animal.

Female ami fatlier, strong ami miglil) Goil,
Ericapaeus, 1

hays the theologist. He is likewise the first Cod that is represented with wings.
And what occasion is there to be prolix? For if lie has his progression from the
primogenial egg, this falile manifests that lie is the first animal, if it is fit to pre-
&gt;crve the analogy. For as the egg J antecedently comprehends the spermatic

1 The word used by Pl.ito here for animals.

1 In the origiual erroneously r/pi/*e irpoi.

1 For ro ox here, it is necessary to read TO *or.

BOOK n.] TIM/EUS OF PLATO. 3^3

cause of the animal, thus also llic occult order, uniformly comprehends the
whole of tin; intelligible. And as the animal now possesses in a distributed
manner, such things as were in the egg spennatically, thus likewise this (iod
produces into a visible subsistence that which is ineffable and incomprehensible
in first causes. Concerning these things however, what has now been said may
suflicc tor the present.

If however, as this world comprehends in itself all \isible natures, so its para
digm comprehends all intelligible*, and the mode of comprehension, as we have
said, is different in each, yet at the same time the visible in the former is analogous
to that of the latter. .For Phanes supernally illuminating intelligibles with intel
ligible light, causes all of them to be visible, and exhibits all things [in the intel
ligible] generated from invisible causes; and the world imparts visibility to bodies
through the light of the stars. Farther still, this also may IK- con&gt;idered as
admirable in the doctrine of J*lato, that at tin; same time that he preserves the
union of intelligible* unshaken, In; imparts to them an unminglcd purity. I "or if
all of them were so united to each other as to be confused, and so as not to
permit the peculiarity of each to remain undeiiled, there would ha\e l&gt;een no
occasion to enquire, according to what kind of paradigm the universe was gene
rated. For in things confused there is no distinction of quality. Andifthe.se
were so divided from each other as to IK; without any communion, some intel
ligibles would not comprehend, but others be comprehended. For to comprehend
and l&gt;e comprehended pertain to order and communion of power*, and to the
rapid conspiration of all secondary natures to become one. .Moreover, for the
union of them to subsist from essence, but their separation to be rendered appa
rent from externally proceeding energies, will be the peculiarity of incorporeal
and immaterial effects*. For if they are surveyed, themselves by themselves, all
will U&gt; found to IK- in each other, on account of their IK ing, as it were, of the
same colour, and especially if the unities of them are seen with the eye of intel
lect. But from secondary natures, and from their participants, we collect their
unconfused union. For whence is the separation of these derived, except from
the unmingled purity of their, efficient causes? For things which are confused
with each other, give subsistence to other such-like natures , [i. e. to natures which
are similarly confused.]

1 i.e. The firt Iriail of ihf iiitclliciW^ order, wliicli i called ly Plato in llic Parmfni Jc* r r .1,
throne bring, or bring characterised l&gt;&gt;, ami .ilisorlKtJ il were in Ihr our.

364 PROCLUS ON THE [BOOK u.

"For the divinity wishing to assimilate this universe, in the most exqui
site degree, to that which is the most beautiful, and in every respect per
fect of intelligible animals, he constituted it one visible animal, contain
ing all such things within itself, as are allied to its nature."

Atticus, in \vliat is here said, doubts whether the Demiurgus is comprehended
l)\ intelligible animal. For it would seem, if he were comprehended, that he is
ni.t perfect. For partial animals, he says, are imperfect, and on this account
tilings which resemble them are not beautiful. But if he is not comprehended,
animal it-elf will not be more comprehensive than all intelligible*. And having
doubted, he easily solves the doubt, by supposing that the Demiurgus is above
animal itself. On the contrary, Porphyry gives an order ,to the Demiurgus infe
rior to the intelligible. For establishing a supercelestial soul to he the maker of
llie world, he places in intellect the paradigm of generated natures. The divine
lamblichus, as a medium between both these, connects and unites the paradigm to
the Demiur-us, through the union of intellect \\ith the intelligible. But Amelius
makes the intelli-ible, which is defined according to being, to be the same with the
Denmir-us. 1 We however say, that animal itself is prior to, subsists in, and is
posterior to the Demiurgus. For it proceeds to every intellectual order both total
and partial. The 1), miurgus himself likewise, sees himse