University of California Berkeley
Harvey 0. Banks
CALIFORNIA WATER PROJECT, 1955 -
An interview conducted
by
Gardner M. Brown, Jr.
Edited by Gerald J. Giefer
Statewide Water Resources Center, University of California
in cooperation with the
Regional Oral History Office, Bancroft Library, Berkeley
Berkeley, 196?
All uses of this manuscript are covered by an
agreement between the Regents of the University
of California and Harvey 0. Banks, dated
15 August 1967. The manuscript is thereby made
available for research purposes. All literary
rights in the manuscript, including the right
to publish, are reserved to the Bancroft Library
of the University of California at Berkeley. No
part of the manuscript may be quoted for publi
cation without the written permission of the
Director of The Bancroft Library of the Univer
sity of California at Berkeley.
PREFACE
The following interview is one of a series on "The Oral
History of California Water Resources Development" sponsored by
the Water Resources Center of the University of California and
conducted at the Los Angeles and Berkeley campuses of the Uni
versity during 1965, 1966, and 1967. In setting up the project,
the nature and scope of the work was described as follows:
The basic purpose of this program will be to
document historical developments in California s water
resources by means of tape recorded interviews with men
who have played a prominent role in this field. Much of
the published material on California s water resources
describes engineering and economic studies of specific
water projects. Little, however, is devoted to the
concepts, evolution of plans, and areas of authority
exercised by various interested Federal, State and local
agencies.
For example, there is little reference material
with regard to the transition of administration of the
Central Valley Project from the State of California to
the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation in the early 1930 s.
Similarly, the negotiations leading to contracts for
water between the State of California and the Metropol
itan Water District of Southern California are not
documented. Yet, both of these agreements had profound
effects on water resources policy in California. Re
corded interviews can piece together these important
links in California s water resources history. The
resulting material will provide a valuable fund of infor
mation for researchers in the years to come.
The Berkeley project is under the faculty direction of
J.W. Johnson, Director, Hydraulics Engineering Laboratory;
ii
Professor, Hydraulic Engineering, and David K. Todd, Ph.D.,
Professor of Civil Engineering. Gerald J. Giefer, Librarian,
Water Resources Center Archives, is responsible for the inter
viewing and processing of the manuscripts which are being
handled in co-operation with the Regional Oral History Office of
the Bancroft Library. Final manuscripts are available for
research at the Water Resources Center, UCIA; Department of
Special Collections, Library, UCIA; Department of Special
Collections, Library, UC Davis; Water Resources Center Archives,
UC Berkeley; The Bancroft Library, UC Berkeley; and the Regional
Oral History Office, UC Berkeley.
Included in the series at this date are Harvey 0. Banks,
Sam Leedom, and Sidney T. Harding. The researcher is also
referred to oral history interviews on California water develop
ment done previously by the Regional Oral History Office with
Frank Adams, Louis Bartlett, Stephen Downey, William Durbrow,
Herbert Jones, Charles Lambert, and J. Rupert Mason.
Willa Klug Baum, Head
Regional Oral History Office
15 September 1967
Regional Oral History Office
Room 486 The Bancroft Library
University of California
Berkeley, California
iii
INTRODUCTION
The following interview with Harvey 0. Banks was conducted
by Gardner M. Brown, Jr. in August, 1965. The interview was tape
recorded at the San Francisco offices of Leeds, Hill and Jewett,
Inc., Consulting Engineers, where Mr. Banks is a Vice-President.
The interview was held in two sessions, a week apart.
Dr. Brown received his Ph.D. in Agricultural Economics in
196U at the University of California, Berkeley. His thesis
topic was titled, "Distribution of benefits and costs from water
development: a case study of the San Joaquin Valley -- Southern
California Aqueduct." Dr. Brown joined the faculty of the University
of Washington at Seattle in September, 1965.
An early draft of the transcript of this interview was checked
for accuracy by Dr. Brown before final copy was typed. Mr. Banks,
however, did not have the opportunity to read the transcript.
Funds supporting the recording and transcription of this
interview were provided by the Water Resources Center of the University
of California (Project 1-1&2U96-19900, 1965-66). The project was
under the immediate direction of the Water Resources Center Archives,
University of California, Berkeley.
Gerald J. Giefer, Librarian
Water Resources Center Archives
Sacramento Bee
9/27/96
Harvey Banks, water pioneer
_- . . . r * * ^^^ . -
By Steve Gibson
Bee Staff Writer ^ -"
Harvey O. Banks, an interna
tionally known water engineer
who played a key role in develop
ing the State Water Project, died
of leukemia Sunday in Austin,
Texas, where he had resided the
past few years. ,: ; .
He was 86.
Mr. Banks, a former director of
the California Department of Wa
ter Resources, .was perhaps best
known for his efforts to get the
State Water Project built.
"I d say that was his biggest
contribution," said William Gi-
anelli, a former director of the De
partment of Water Resources.
Mr. Banks worked tirelessly to
promote the legislation that creat
ed the gigantic system of dams,
reservoirs and viaducts to trans
port surplus Northern California
water to the San Joaquin Valley
and Southern California.
. The water project s pumping
plant at the south end of the Delta
- at the head of the 444-mile Cali
fornia Aqueduct - is named after
Mr. Banks.
. He was appointed director of
what was then a new agency, the
Department of Water Resources,
in 1956 by Gov. Goodwin Knight.
He was reappointed in 1958 by
Knight s successor, Edmund G.
"Pat" Brown.
He was graduated from Syra- .
cuse University with a bachelor s
degree in civil engineering in
1930. At Stanford University,
where he later earned a master s
degree in hydraulic and sanitary
engineering, he also taught math.
During World War IT, he served
with the Army Corps of Engineers
in the Pacific. By the time he re
turned to civilian life, he had
reached the rank of lieutenant col
onel. He did a stint as a consulting
engineer, and then went to work
for what was then called the Cali
fornia Division of Water Re-
so.urces.
j After leaving state service in
1961, he worked as a consulting
engineer, helped Texas develop its
water plan and served on the gov- /
eming board of the Water Educa- {
tion Foundation, a Sacramento-
j based nonprofit group.
^ "He had his own opinions, but
he tried to see all points of view,"
said Rita Schmidt Sudman, execu
tive director of the foundation.
Though his background was in
engineering, "he respected the
emerging ideas that the etiyiron-
znent needed protection," Sudman
said. "He didn t live in the past
He was proud of what he had ac
complished with the vrater proj
ect, and felt the pluses out
weighed the minuses. But he also
recognized the need to return wa
ter to the environment. 1 *
After leaving Sacramento, he
resided in Belmont far more than
25 years.
He was preceded in death by his
first wife, Mary Morgan Banks.
He is survived by his second wife,
Jean Ott Williams of Austin. Oth
er survivors include his three sons
from his first marriage Robert,
Philip and KimbaJl.
The family suggests that any
contributions be made to the Wa
ter Education Foundation, 717 K
St.. Sacramento. 95814.
Services were held Thursday st
First United Methodist Church in
Austin.
Water pioneer Harvey Banks dies
Oren Banks, who played a key role in breaking through the emotionalism and
gjsarive deadlock surrounding California water issues in the late 19505 and helped
; the marvel that would become che State Water Project, died of leukemia this past
September. He was 86.
Banks began state service as a young civi! engineer in 1938, was named director
of the just-formed state Department of Water Resources by Gov. Goodwin Knight in
1956, stepped down from DWR in 1961, and then ran a busy engineering consulting
firm into his 8os.
Banks was already a respected engineer when he came to DWR. He had a bachelor s
degree in civil engineering from Syracuse University and a master s degree in hydraulic
and sanitary engineering from Stanford, as well as stints with the Army Corps of
Engineers, die California Division of Water Resources and as a consulting engineer.
But he also brought to DWR something most engineers didn t have the ability to
work with politicians. Much of his previous work was, in fact, in the political arena,
and his skill in forging compromise played a major role in keeping die State Water
Project moving.
When Edmund G. "Pat" Brown, came to the governorship in rgsS, he reappointed
Banks as director of DWR. Besides helping to build bipartisan support for the project
Banks was a registered Republican the reappointmcnt allowed Banks to proceed with
a strategy that would soon be embodied in the Bums-Porter Act.
That strategy was a bond measure for financing the project at that time called the
Feather River Project whereby $3.75 billion in general obligation bonds would be repaid
from die sale of power produced by the project and from contracts for water service.
With Browns political muscle and Banks savior fairc as chief negotiator, the Burns-
Porter Act later to become Proposition i -passed die Legislature by a 25-11 vote.
At the polls, it would be much doser. A total of 5.8 million Califomians cast tiicir
ballots on November 8, 1960, and at one point Proposition
i was trailing by 100,000 votes. Only one Northern
California county, Butte, where Ortrville Dam was to
be built, voted for the bonds. Then the heavy Soudiem
California voces began to come in and, with San Diego
County voting 4-10-1, Proposition i passed by a slim
173,944 votes.
The State Water Project provides water to 6 out of
10 Califbmians, and this past November, 36 years after
Proposition I s original passage, California water was again
the focus of a major ballot measure. This time another suc
cessful bond initiative, Proposition 104, provides funds to
repair the ailing San Francisco Bay/Sacramcnto-San Joaquin
Delta Estuary, the source of water to the State Water Project.
Banks stepped down from public office a year after
Proposition 1 passed and went on to have a remarkable
career in the private sector until his retirement earlier this year. The internationally
renown water engineer once was asked about his decision to leave DWR just after he
had scored such a success.
"I always believed you should quit while you re ahead," he joked.
A glance at his lifetime full of accomplishments and it s apparent that Harvey Banks
was never behind.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Introduction ill-
Professional background 1
Water quality activities of the State 3
Water-rights activities of the State U
California water plan 5
Flood Control Act of 19UU 6
California Water Project
Metropolitan Water District and Colorado River 9
Water-based recreation 11
Development of Project plans lU
Areas of origin 17
Pricing policy 20
Land values, unjust enrichment issue 21
Bond Issue 2U
Allocation of cost 26
Uses of water (agriculture vs. municipal and industrial^?
California Water Fund 3U
Salt water demineralization 36
Department of Water Resources and policy-making Ul
Project power sales UU
Agricultural water and surcharge U6
Pricing policy U8
Reorganization of water agencies, 1956 50
Davis - Grunsky Act 5^
Burns - Porter Act 56
San Luis Act 63
Department of Water Resources, contracting, policy
development 6?
State Legislature and Project policy 71
State and role in multi-purpose water development 73
Index 81
INTERVIEW WITH HARVEY BANKS
AUGUST 17, 1965
Brown: This is an interview with Mr. Harvey Banks of Leeds, Hill
and Jewett on August IT, 1965. The interview is conducted
on behalf of the Water Resources Center Archives at the
University of California. The interviewer is Gardner Brown.
Mr. Banks, let s start off by having you give some of your
professional background prior to your coining to the Depart
ment and the kinds of activities that you are involved in.
When did you come to the California Dept. of Water Resources?
Banks: My undergraduate work was taken at Syracuse University from
which I was graduated in June of 1930, with a degree of
Bachelor of Sciences in Civil Engineering. Upon completion
of undergraduate work I attended Stanford University for
three years with a half time instructorship in Civil
Engineering and taking graduate work in Hydraulic and
Sanitary Engineering the other half of the time. I
received a Master of Science Degree from Stanford. After
leaving Stanford in 1933, I worked with the City of Palo
Alto on sanitary work of one kind and another and went with
the U.S. Soil Conservation Service in May of 1935 and spent
nearly three years with the federal government in that
particular agency. In 1938 I went with the then Division
of Water Resources at the end of the State in its L.A.
Office, working on ground water investigations and ground-
water adjudications. In 19^2, along with a few million
others, I went into the Armed Services and served a little
more than three years with the Corps of Engineers, from
Banks: which I was released in Oct. ly^5j having spent some two
years in overseas duty in the Solomon Islands . After
military service I went back with the Division of Water
Resources for a short time, and in 19^6 I entered into
private practice in Los Angeles as a partner in the firm
Harold Conkling, Consulting Engineer. In 1950, Boh Edmonston,
then State Engineer, asked me to come back to the Division of
Water Resources to take charge of the newly activated Water
Quality Program of the Division which was authorized by the
Dickey Water Pollution Act of 19^9. I continued to have
charge of that activity until June of 1953 when I was made
Assistant State Engineer, in charge of the administration
of water rights and the water quality activities of the
Division. In November of 1955, on the retirement of the
State Engineer Bob Edmonston, I became State Engineer, and
when the Department of Water Resources was formed in July
of 1956, I was appointed by Governor Knight as Director of
the Department of Water Resources. I was reappointed as
Director when Gov. Brown succeeded Gov. Knight.
Brown: That s very complete and quite specific. You ve had a
long record of involvement with the State.
Banks: My total years of service indluding credit for military
service amounts to about 19 and one half years.
Brown: This makes you as intimately qualified as anyone. Lots
of water problems. Two things interest me. The kinds of
work you did when you were associated with the water quality
Brown: investigations, and also the type of work you did when you
were working in the area of water rights adjudication. This
seems to be something distinct from engineering training.
Banks: The water quality activities of the then Division of Water
Resources and now of the Department Water Resources are
probably unique in the world. The water quality investi
gation program that was delegated to the Division by the
Dickey Water Pollution Control Act is very comprehensive.
Of course it does not encompass administration of the
pollution control laws themselves, but it does form a program
for not only extensive but intensive studies of the quality
of the water resources of the State, both surface and ground
water, and of the saline waters of our bays and off-shore
with respect to impairment of the quality of water, not only
due to sewage and industrial waste, but all other sources
in addition to investigations of quality and causes of
variations in quality. The program also encompassed the
investigations of feasibility of reclamation and reuse of
waste waters and the formulation of well drilling standards
to protect the quality of ground waters from the adverse
effects of improperly constructed wells and that sort of
thing.
Brown: How does California s involvement in water quality problems,
in its magnitude and extent compare with the concern of
other states and also perhaps with the federal program?
Is it in the avant-garde?
Banks: It is far ahead of the other states. Far ahead actually
of the federal programs. I would say that in most instances
when people think of quality they think solely in terms of
the effects of sewage and industrial waste whether treated
or not. The water quality program of California not only
considers those deleterious effects, but also such matters as
salt balance in ground water basins, the inflow of natural
saline waters, sea water intrusion into ground water basins, and
effects of return agriculture flows. The whole gamut of
quality problems.
Brown: That s very broad, far reaching.
Banks: Very broad.
Brown: And what about a remark or two on the period around 1953
when you were concerned with water rights? What kind of
things were you doing then?
Banks; Well, of course, at that time the Division of Water Resources- _
and we must make the distinction between the Division and
the Department because while the Department grew out of the
Division, the Department didn t succeed to all of the powers
and duties of the Division--but at the time the Division of
Water Resources in its administration of water rights, had
three principal functions:
l). Action on applications to appropriated and
unappropriated waters and granting of permits and licences in
connection with such application.
2). Adjudication of water rights
3). Provision of water-master service where water rights
had been determined either by court action or agreement.
Brown: Let s come a little closer to the present and maybe you d
talk about the setting in the mid 50 s out of which the
blueprint for the first stage of the California Water Plan
emerged, and indeed the California Water Plan itself, although
it does have predecessors dating back to the 20 s.
Banks: We should be clear. Are we speaking of the California Water
Plan as it is expressed in Bulletin 3* as a Master Plan or
are we speaking of the California State Water Project?
Brown: Let s talk about both. More generally about the plan as
expressed in Bulletin 3, and more specifically about the
precise projects which are called the State Water Facilities.
Banks: As far as the Calif. Water Plan is concerned we have to go
back to 19^5 when the State Water Resources Board was created
by the legislature. Initially the State Water Resources
Board was principally concerned with flood control in
California and the reallocation of State funds for flood
control purposes (reallocation to local agencies). Then
in 19^7 the powers and responsibilities of the State Water
Resources Board were broadened into the whole field of water
planning, water conservation and water utilization, as well
as flood control.
Brown: Let me interject a question. Do you know off-hand, in this
allocation of funds for flood control over various regions
within the State, what kinds of rules, specifif-d or ad-hoc,
*The California water plan . California State Water Resources
Board, May, 1957.
Brown: were applied? This is around the time the Watershed
Protection Act was applied.
Banks: It wasn t the Watershed Protection Act. The small Water
shed Protection and Flood Prevention Act was in 195 1 *--
Brown: I m sorry, yes.
Banks: But if you recall in the Flood Control Act of 19^> Congress
caught up on authorizations of flood control projects. In
other words, because of the war years, there had been little
or no activity in flood control for some period of time and
the Congress, looking to the future and the probable end of
the War in the need to reinstitute activity in the public
sector of water development, authorized a large block of
projects throughout the Nation, principally for flood control
although others were for other purposes. There were a con
siderable number of those authorized in California. And
there was some concern over whether or not local agencies
would be able to bear the non-federal costs of those. So
the legislature provided that the State would reimburse the
local agencies for their costs for lands easements,
rights of way and relocation of utilities, in connection with
federal flood control projects where those costs were specified
to be borne by non-federal interests.
Brown: Once again was California leading in development of policy
along these lines?
Banks: As far as I know, no other state had that provision and very
few of them have it at the present time.
7
Brown: And so, it was this agency in California that ranked
proposed flood control projects as they saw it and agreed,
in some cases, and agreed not to in other cases, to provide
reimburseable f unds.
Banks: Well, in effect the State Water Resources Board, which was
created by the Water Resources Act of 19^5 , w &s given
jurisdiction over flood control activities as far as the
State is concerned and in fact, the Water Resources Board
developed a policy along the lines that you suggest of
ranking proposed flood control projects in the order of
importance as they saw it and presenting that to the Congress
in support of flood control appropriations. Now, as far
as this reallocation of State funds, they had little discretion
in that, other than to review the amounts to make sure that
the money was properly expended.
Brown: What kinds of rules did they use in ranking? Or what
kinds of notions did they have? Were they well formalized?
Banks: Well, in the early days of the game they weren t too well
formalized.
Brown: This was before the "Green Book".
Banks: Yes. Well, normally in federal flood control projects the
Corps of Engineers, or Agriculture, as the case may be,
specifies that certain costs must be borne by a non-federal
interest, and on level and channel projects particularly
those non-federal costs include the cost of ]and easements,
rights of way, and relocation of utilities.
8
Brown: Channel improvements are more expensive locally than reservoirs.
Banks: That is correct.
Brown: O.K. When I interrupted we were distinguishing between the
water plan and the California Water Project as we know it
today, and you were saying it had, for your purposes, roots
dating back to 19^5-
Banks: At least. To reiterate, in 19^7 the scope of authority and
responsibility of the Water Resources Board was broadened by
the legislature and the Board was directed to develop plans
for the country and hence the development of water resources
of the State. Now this was in rather broad terms, but the
Board, in conjunction and cooperation with the State Engineer,
who was designed by law as Secretary to the Board, decided
that there should be a master plan developed for all of the
water resources of the State. That gave rise to what we
now call the California Water Plan.
Brown: Was the decision not to buy the Central Valley Water
Project an important inducement to work at a more rapid
rate towards development of what we now know as Bulletin 3-
Banks: So far as I m aware, the decision, or rather lack of action
toward buying the Federal Central Valley Project had relatively
little impact on the whole thing in spite of the allegations
of some of the, to put it bluntly, some of the acreage
limitation proponents.
Brown: What was the status of a couple of things at this time:
1st Were there any rumblings about attention to the Colorado
Brown: River Controversy? and 2nd Was there I m thinking in the
mid 50 s again a realized or perceived need for increased
water-based recreational facilities?
Banks: As far as the Colorado River water controversy is concerned--
that started in 1951, as I recall it- -the last action. N$w,
whether or not this had an impact depends on the viewpoint
that you re interested in. As far as the Metropolitan
Water District is concerned, up until 1960, that District
refused to admit even to themselves, so far as I m aware, that
they possibly could be cut down on the Colorado River supply.
I can remember distinctly in 1957 and 1958 being told by
members of the Board of Directors of the Metropolitan
Water District that there was no possibility of their being
short on water, and the fact that they did have ample water
supply for foreseeable future needs, at least as far as 1975,
and that they saw no reason to be interested in a state water
plan.
Brown: In your estimation this wasn t a bargaining tactic?
Banks: In my estimation, no. The reason of course that many people
wouldn t acknowledge the possibility of loss of the Colorado
River suit, or loss of part of the supply then considered to
be available from the Colorado, was simply legal tactics;
but I am sure that many members of the Metropolitan Water
District Board of Directors were convinced that they couldn t
possibly lose that suit. Now, on the other hand, many of us,
including myself, had no such conviction at all. In fact I
Banks : personally was much worried that the supply from the Colorado
might be cut down. And furthermore, I was also much more
certain that even if it were not cut down, that by 1970 or
19T5 j Southern California would need more water than they
had available to them on a firm basis, even were the Colorado
River supply to be maintained intact.
Brown: This raises an interesting problem of differences in the way
two public units view an uncertain event and gives a possible
explanation for necessity of state water planning.
Banks: Well, I think that it should be made clear that as far as
I m aware the Metropolitan Water District had done no
planning for future water supply at that time for that
District. At least, if they had, they never showed any
such plans to me.
Brown: Were there any important developing national or local trends
which might have accelerated the design of this blueprint,
both the grand conception in Bulletin 3 and a more specific
*
conception, say in Bulletin 78?
Banks: It should be made clear the Bulletin 3 is not a project
proposal. Bulletin 3 is, in effect, a physical plan for
conserving and redistributing the water resources of the
State to meet projected needs as such needs may arise in the
future in the various areas of the State and for the several
purposes concerned. It never was invisioned as being a
specific project proposal, in any way, shape or manner. Now...
This question is misinterpreted in the professional literature.
Brown:
* Bullet in~3 is: The California water plan. California State Water Re
sources Board, May, 1957; Bulletin 7b is: "investigation of
alternative aqueduct systems to serve Southern California, Dept ,
of Water Resources, 1959 -"0."
Banks: Yes, very much so and it continues to be misinterpreted...
We tried our best of course in writing it to make it clear
as to what its intent was, its objective, and its limita
tions, but unfortunately, too few people read it. The
California Water Plan as proposed in Bulletin 3 doesn t in
any way imply that this is to be a gtate constructed system
or a locally constructed system or a federally constructed
system.
Brown? Or that any of the facilities they talk about should actually
be constructed.
Banks: That s right. This is the way it can be done, when, as, and
if it becomes necessary and economic to serve this particular
need in this particular area. Now you asked a question
about recreation. I think possibly the State itself was
the leader in pointing up the importance of recreation.
In the mid 50 s, water based recreation was a nice thing,
but no one really paid too much attention to it and did
relatively little planning for it until such time as the
reservoirs were constructed, as at Folsom, and then everyone
flocked to it, and in the late 50 s, it was realized that
this was a tremendous social benefit as well as a economic
benefit, and that it should be planned for rather than allowed
to happen.
Brown: When you say nobody, are you thinking of people within the
State or people also outside the State?
Banks: I m thinking of both. If you ll recall, federal projects--
Banks: up until very recently the maximum Congress would go for was
minimum basic recreation facilities. It has only been in the
last four years that Congress has recognized the overall
importance of recreation.
Brown: When you were describing Bulletin 3 briefly, you talked in a
very general way about the kinds of objectives that were
implicit in it, or explicit in some cases. I wonder if you
could be more specific about the thinking of the department
along these lines. What real kinds of objectives were they
considering?
Banks: Well, of course, as an engineer I define objectives a little
differently than you do as an economist. I think we could
see at that time the fact that there would be a scramble
for water, that overall, there would be competition among
users for the available water resources and particularly,
the cheaper water resources.
Brown: Could you be more precise about who the competition would
be between?
Banks: Well, fundamentally, of course, the competition is both on
an areal basis and on a use basis. On an areal basis, we
have the competition between the primarily agricultural
demands and of course parenthetically, it should be pointed
out that the areal basis and use overlap here; but on an
areal basis you have the competition between the San Joaquin
Valley and the Sacramento Valley which are almost a unit
for the surplus waters of the Sierras versus Southern Call-
Banks: fornia and the Bay Area. On a use basis, of course, you
have the competition between agriculture on the one hand and
municipal-industrial use in the other direction. Plus
recreation and enhancement of fish and wildlife.
Brown : Power?
Banks: And power. Although by-and-large the competition for power
is not as severe in this state as other places simply because
water used for developing power by-and-large is available for
other uses. This may not be the case, for instance, on the
Colorado River in Texas, where the Lower Colorado River
Authority, which is primarily a power developing agency, is
determinedly hanging onto its water rights for power
development, even though the water is needed upstream for
other developments ---what we conventionally term as "higher
uses". But that conflict between power and consumptive uses
has never been as significant in this state as it is other-
places.
Brown: There was competition in the 30 s between the representatives
of power and the representatives of other uses.
Banks: Yes, competition has been not so much over the water itself
as over who should develop the power.
Brown : Yes .
Banks: That has been, of course, an acrimonious and, at times,
almost a violent controversy.
Brown: So the State felt there would be increasing competition
between areas and uses in the future for water. But in
Brown: constructing and writing Bulletin 3> they were thinking about
the actual facilities for a State Water Project. What sort
of objectives were they designing these projects for?
Banks: You speak now of the State Water Project.
Brown: Yes. Let s look only at the Water Project because that s a
definite plan.
Banks; Well, at that time, and this was in the early 50 s, we could
see a substantial need for supplemental water in the Bay
Area, Alameda County, Santa Clara County, in the west and
south. . .
Brown: In the area served by the North Bay Aqueduct too?
Banks: In time, yes (to some extent) although in our planning
it was not of high priority. That came about, of course,
because of the Abshire-Kelly Salinity Control Bill and the
directive to plan for a full water supply for the entire
Bay Area-
Brown: It was a reaction to a legislative...
Banks : Yes .
Brown: I see. And if the Department had had its own way, it might
not have included the North Bay and its plans initially?
Banks: It might well have considered it as a later development.
Brown: Along with the development of the Eel or something.
Banks: Yes, but we could see also a very large demand for agricul
tural water in the west side of the San Joaquin Valley,
Western Fresno County on south, and in Kern County. Those
portions of Kern County not projected for service under the
Central Valley Project. And of course we could see a very
15
Banks: substantial need for additional water in Southern California.
Brown: And you said that in part, Southern California "couldn t
see"; but how about the San Joaquin Valley?
Banks: I didn t say Southern California. I said the Metropolitan
Water District. There has always been In Southern California
a rather deep schism in thinking between some of the member
agencies of the MetopolLtan Water District, such as the
Department of Water and Power of the City of Los Angeles,
and San Diego County people, as to their viewpoints as to
the -future and the viewpoint of the Board of Directors of
the Metropolitan Water District as formally expressed. Now,
there was this schism within the Board of Directors of
Metropolitan, but I m speaking of their official policy and
official statements as adopted by the Board, and of course
its voting strengths, shall we say.
Brown: Well, my reason for asking the question is I m trying to
determine whether it was Sacramento on its own initiative
or if the Department of Water Resources was receiving
pressure from local groups to be concerned.
Banks: Initially, the magior pressure came from the San Joaquin Valley.
There were, it is true, some land-owners in the San Joaquin
Valley who turned to the State for additional water in the
hope that by going that route, even though it would be far
more costly-- and they recognized that it would be more
costly-- that they would be able to escape the acreage
limitations of the federal reclamation law, even though
Banks: under federal reclamation law their water would be far cheaper
than comtemplated under the State Water Project.
Brown: In planning for the present Water Project, was there any
objective that all geographic areas should receive some
benefit, or all uses should receive some benefit?
Banks; If you were referring to the Burns-Porter Act the State
water facilities set up under the Burns-Porter Actthen
"yes". There was, in formulating the entire program, as
distinguished from the State Water Project, and here again
we must make a clear distinctionthe State Water Project
as we are using the term here means now these facilities that
are actually being constructed and will be operated by the
State or which the State, in the case of the San Luis Joint
Facilities, the State is paying its share. Now, the total project,
the total programs authorized and funded by the Burns-Porter
Act and corollary acts includes not only these facilities
to be constructed by the State, but it includes basin
development. There is a provision in there that the State
is authorized to build projects for local needs in the basins
of origin. The Davis -Grunsky program is a part of the total
program funded by the Burns-Porter Act;and in setting up
that total program which is authorized and funded by the
Porter Act, yes, there was the deliberate and definite
thought of making this a program of as broad geographic
and user benefit as possible.
Brown: Were there any political reasons for doing this? Is it a
-Lf
Brown: kind of compensation for "robbing the North" of its waters.
Banks: Well, "Robbing the North of its water" is a fallacious
concept. The North could not possibly develop its water
without the assistance of the rest of the State. I mean
the North needed and still needs money. It could not
possibly without assistance, either through the federal
government or the state government, not develop its water.
NOW, you ask about political considerations. I will answer
tnat directly and say that you have to have a certain amount
of votes in the legislature to get a bill through. We were
not unaware of that necessity.
Brown: What were the forces and concerns which played a significant
role in the evolution of the area of origin doctrine.
Banks: Well, the concept of protection of the areas of origin
originated in the early 30 s. In 1929, as I recall the date,
the State Engineer presented the State Water Plan in a formal
report to the legislature. That particular plan generally
is what we now know as the Central Valley Project being con
structed by the Bureau of Reclamation. The concept in that
plan of transporting northern water, that is Sacramento
Valley water, to the San Joaquin Valley brought home to the
members of the legislature particularly, as well as to their
constituents, the fact that massive inter-regional transfers
of water inevitably would take place, and it aroused the
fears of the counties of origin, particularly the mountain
counties, that once works for such transfers were built, that
Banks: they might veil loose any possibility of ever acquiring
any water rights for their needs. Of course, at that point,
the State was operating under the strict appropriative
doctrine: the developer first in time is first in right.
And as a result of that concern on the part of the mountain
counties, as I read history, the Veigelbaum Act was passed
which set up what we know now as the County of Origin Act.
Brown: When was this passed:
Banks: 1931j I believe was the date. Now essentially, the County
of Origin Act is of limited protection in that it only applies
where State filings have been made pursuant to the provisions
of Section 10500 of the Water Code. But it does accord in
those instances water users within the counties of origin a
prior right to water originating in that county of origin.
Or, to put it in another context, the county of origin estops
an exporter who is proceeding under one of these so-called
State filings, from protesting a subsequent development for
use within the county of origin. In 1933 , the so-called
Watershed Protection Act was passed which applies to the
builder and operator of the Central Valley Project, as such
Project is authorized under the article. It is not a
prior right to water in the conventional sense of a water
right, but it is a prior right to Project water. There
is a very definite distinction here which was brought out of
course by the Attorney General in his opinions in interpreting
these acts which I believe were handed down in 1958.
Brown: I don t know.
Banks; The Attorney General was asked to study the implications
Banks: cr? both of these laws- -County of Origin Act and the Water
shed Protection Law and I believe his opinions were published
in 1958.
Brown: Do you recall if there was much controversy at the time
of the passage of the Area of Origin Act?
Banks: I was not present. That was before my time with the State,
so I can t really answer that question In any specific terms.
Brown: Would you think it a good idea that the other states in the
Northwest or Southwest pass area of origin laws?
Banks: The State of Texas in the last session of its legislature
passed an act which is even more specific than the Cali
fornia laws in this regard. The protection of the basis of
origin is a little more general term. It s implicit, I
think, in nearly every state and federal act that has been
passed in recent years. This is implicit even in the Water
Resources Planning Act of 19^5 which has been recently
signed by the President, whereby the River Basin Commissions
which are authorized under that act, are forbidden to make
any plans -for the export of water from another watershed
not under their jurisdiction.
Brown; As you look into the future, do you think there s going to be
any conflict between the states area of origin or basin
acts, and the plans of the federal government?
Banks: Definitely, there will come a conflict particularly if there
should be a series of water-short years. You see, in this
State, neither the County of Origin Act or the Watershed
Banks: Protection Act have actually caused any difficulty to anyone.
Now, the lawyers have worried greatly about the implications
of these acts as far as the firmness of contracts and that
sort o f thing, but there has been no case to my knowledge,
yet, where there has been any difficulty in that regard. Now,
this will not be the case if we should get an extended drought
period where water available, say for the Central Valley
Water Project, becomes short. Then, I think, there well may
be an assertion on the part of the Department of Justice
that it doesn t have to abide by these acts anyway.
Brown: Tf the conflict does develop, would you care to speculate
what the resolution would include?
Banks: Well, I have a considerable sum of money that I would be
willing to bet that if any state law pertaining to water
resources is ever contested in federal courts, and carried
through to the Supreme Court, that the state law would be
held ineffective and unenforcable as against the federal
agencies. This is implicit in all of the Supreme Court
decisions in the last 10 to 12 years.
Brown: Going back to the original question of objectives, was
there any thinking on the part of the policy planners in
the Department that there should be no windfalls, no specu
lative gains. Was this a concern in designing the policies
and projects?
Banks: Definitely. It wasn t a concern in the design of projects, it
was a concern when we came to formulating pricing policy.
Banks: There were very significant political overtones about this
matter which demanded a pricing policy which would, at least,
minimize the political objections toshould we sayunjust
enrichment.
Brown: So far, are there policies having to do with the ownership
of lands around a reservoir? Are these such that there is
not likely to be unusual, unjust enrichment, wind-fall,
speculative gains?
Banks: Oh, I think there will be some speculative gains. In fact,
I m sure there will be from land surrounding reservoirs.
Brown: You once testified about the kinds of increase in land
values as a result of substantial increases. And I m
wondering what are the State policies to prevent such a
recurrence .
Banks: Only to the extent that the taking of land around a reservoir
can be justified in connection with public recreational
development. I think it should be made clear that, illogical
though it actually. was, the concern with unjust enrichment
had only to do with the large owners of agricultural land.
There are many subdividers, and as you mention, land-owners
around reservoirs: This was not of concern with those who
raised the political issue of unjust enrichment.
Brown: Except perhaps Senator Cobey.
Banks: Yes, I m sure Cobey was slightly concerned with this because
the Senator was trying to broaden the concept of this.
Remember, the Senator comes from an agricultural county, and
Banks: he saw the fact that all blame, or theories of unjust
enrichment, as the thinking then went, would fall upon his
constituents, the agriculturalists. And he also foresaw and
correctly that many other classes of landowners would achieve
a very large unjust enrichment, and Senator Cobey was trying
to point this out.
Brown: That is a very good insight that one doesn t get explicitly
from reading the public record. What were the principle
hurdles which the Department thought could impede the
actualization of the State Water Project?
Banks: First and foremost was the problem of financing. Then there
was the public relations problem of convincing the people of
California that they had no justification for expecting that
the U.S. would solve all of their problems. One of the
fundamental reasons that I supported the State Water Project
when I became State Engineer and Director was that I could
see no prospect, whatso-ever, and events, I think, have proven
that I was right, I saw no prospect of Congress taking on
the job of developing all of the water resources in the
State o^ California for all purposes and for all areas of
the State. Now if you will examine the history of federal
appropriations and reduce those to constant value dollars
in terms of construction, you will find that the rate of
development of the water resources of California by the
federal agencies has not greatly accelerated even in recent
years. The dollar appropriations have gone up, but this has
23
Banks: been negated by the value and the decline of the dollar as
it relates to the volume of construction actually achieved.
In the last two or three years there has "been somewhat of a
upsurge. But again, the backlog of federal projects even
to serve the areas which are under federal service is very
large .
Brown: Do you have any offhand reason for this in view of the fact
that the State of California is as large?
Banks: Well, California has actually always got what people in some
states regard as an undue proportion of the federal appropri
ations for water development. Congress does not, frankly,
look at this in terms of total relative need. Congress
thinks more in terms of spreading its benefit over as wide
an area... its "largesse" if I may use the term. ..over as
wide an area as possible. And the fact that it authorizes
a large project in California in a given year acts to
prevent any subsequent authorization until a few other
states have been taken care of, irrespective
of the relative urgency of need. Unless some disaster
happens. Given a tremendous flood, or a disaster such as is
threatened in the East at the moment, then Congress does
look at the urgency of need. But in the normal course of
events where there is no real critical situation involved,
if California gets a major project authorized in the year
1965 and it looks like we might get Auburn authorized this
year, then it may be several years before another project is
Banks: authorized of significant size.
Brown: If the passing of the bond issue was as important as you
indicate, what sorts of things did the Department do to
influence its passage?
Banks: There is a State law which prohibits the use of State
monies to influence bond elections.
Brown: What I was referring to...
Banks: Our actions were limited solely to setting the facts before
the voters of California as to resources, needs, and ways
of statisfying those needs.
Brown: Was there any attempt on the part of the Department to how
the public concensus was going over the State and in any
one region? Did it have sensors out?
Banks: No, it did not have sensors out as far as the Department is
concerned. Of course, there were public relations firms
engaged; not by the Department , but by others, who did conduct
polls and that sort of thing. On the other hand, I think
I and my staff had a fairly good series of contacts, shall
we say, throughout the more critical areas of the State.
Brown: Would you care to mention the kinds of contacts?
Banks: Well, we always, even Before the bond issue was proposed,
maintained close contact with various and sundry water-user
organizations throughout the State as well as the state-wide
organizations which are interested in such matters, such
as the County Supervisors Association, Irrigation Districts
Association, the League of California Cities, and others.
Brown: Were there any other non-direct water organizations whose
opinion you were interested in? Banks or the League of
Women Voters? Labor unions?
Banks: We re very much interested in the opinions and works of the
League of Women Voters. We cooperated with the League in
their studies; furnished them with help; assistance and
data and that sort of thing, and we were very much interested
in their opinions. And I kept rather careful check on the
opinions, statements and policies of the AFL-CIO Federation.
Brown: As the referendum of the election was coming closer, did you,
or did the Department predict how it might go? Were there
any times when the Department fftlt it might not have a
majority?
Banks: There were numerous occasions when we had butterflies in our
stomachs .
Brown: As it was, it only passed by 2 per cent margin?
Banks: Less than that I think.
Brown: 1.5 per cent.
Banks: Yes, very, very close. No, we were never positive at any
time that it would go over.
Brown: The Federal Government in the very recent past has allocated
project cost by the method of separable cost remaining benefits .
This was the procedure adopted by the Department for the
allocation of the costs of the conservation facilities. But
the proportionate use of facilities method was used for the
Brown: transporation features. What were the reasons for this
choice?
Banks: Well, remember that in the allocation of the conservation
features, the reservoirs such as the Oroville, San Luis and
the other storage facilities, we did not allocate as between
consumptive uses. There has been an allocation to power,
an allocation to flood control, an allocation to recreation,
an allocation to the enhancement of fish and wildlife, and
an allocation to water conservation. We did not at anytime,
ever make a distinction between the use of water for irrigation
vs. the use of water for municipal-industrial purposes in the
cost-allocation process. So that fundamentally, the problem
of allocation of cost of the transportation facilities
was not among uses but as among users. This is the basic
reason for the distinction.
Brown: I see, but one might have used separable cost remaining
benefits to allocate over users.
Banks: Then we would have had a tremendous job of trying to quantify
benefits between contractors, and this would have been almost
insurmountable in point of difficulty. For instance, what
proportion will be used by Metropolitan Water District for
agriculture versus municipal-industrial purposes within
Metropolitan as contrasted to Kern County Water Agency,
where in the order of 90 per cent will be irrigation, and
only 10 per cent for municipal and industrial uses. It would
run into tremendous difficulties in trying to project the
Banks: relative amounts of water used by any one contractor for
various types of uses within its service area.
Brown: But, of course, the first approximation towards defining
these benefits was made in Bulletin 78.
Banks: There was an attempt there, yes.
Brown: In which favorable benefit-cost ratios were shown.
Banks: On an areal basis, but not among contractors.
Brown: Yes.
Banks: See, the purpose of a cost allocation on the transportation
facilities is among contractors not among areas.
Brown: But, it turns out to be among contractors...
Banks: In Southern California, yes, although now you have a considerable
number more contractors in Southern Calif, than we had originally
envisioned*
Brown: Was it only the technical difficulty of estimating benefits
or was it thought that any publication of the benefit to
some use or to some region might evoke a great deal of
controversy?
Banks: It was entirely on the basis of the technical difficulty of
trying to do it.
Brown: In a television program a number of years ago, there was
some discussion of what the use factor should be in a cost
allocation method whether it would be capacity or
quantity. I think on this program, you said that negotia
tion took place between the Met and the Department of Water
Resources, but that the Department wanted quantity use rates
Brown: to be used and the Met wanted, of course, capacity. And
so the two groups slit down the middle.
Banks; Remember that the Feather River Project, or more properly
as the report title gives it, the Feather River Diversions
Projects, were formulated long before any pricing policies
were dealt with or ever established. The Project was
formulated as far as yield was concerned on the conventional
basis that no deficiency would be allowable in municipal
and industrial supply, but that ^or agricultural purposes
a deficiency of up to say 50 per cent could be allowed in
any one year of a critical period with a total deficiency
in a critical period of one year s total supply. Then when
we came to formulate the . . .
Brown: ...the essence of this remark has been specified in the
contract itself.
Banks: Yes, that s true, but when we began to formulate pricing
policy and a policy which did not distinguish between types
of use, then we ran into the anomoly: that in the formulation
of the project, there was a distinction between types of use
in the firmness of supply. Furthermore, for agricultural
purposes, the aqueduct system had to be able to deliver about
18 per cent of the total years supply in the maximum month,
which requires a larger relative capacity as contrasted
to the municipal and industrial supply, where the design
criteria was the delivery of, as I recall it, of about 11
or 12 per cent of the years supply in the maximum month.
Banks: Now, had we gone to allocation of aqueduct cost strictly on the
basis of design capacity, then we would have put the agricul
tural user at a disadvantage, because he, under the formulation
of the project, had to take the first cut in the event of
shortage. It was my position in the beginning of negotia
tions with Met that inequitable treatment as between the
agricultural users in Kern County, recognizing that the
project was so formulated that they had to take the first
cut, that equity would demand a little more favorable cost
allocation to the agricultural user versus the municipal and
industrial user, in view of this mandatory requirement
that agriculture take the first cut in the event of shortage.
So I proposed that the cost allocation be based not on design
capacity but on total annual delivery. Metropolitan was
not willing to go along with that. They felt that irrespective
of the fact that agriculture whould have to take the first
cut in event of shortage that the cost allocation should
be on the basis of design capacity. Well, we finally
compromised by using the average of the two. That s about
what it amounts to.
Brown: What if the Metropolitan had said, "We won t compromise,"
and given the requirement that the State needed the Metro
politan before it could construct its program because of the
legislation?
Banks: We probably couldn t have had a program.
Brown: You wouldn t have?
Banks: We would not have because it would have gone on beyond the
payment capacity of agriculture.
Brown: ...perhaps the Metropolitan knew this too?
Banks: In the latter stages of negotiations, I m sure they knew
this.
Brown: So it was in tneir own interest too?
Banks: Well, certainly, it was in their own interest. Had I been
Metropolitan, I would have taken the same position for
negotiating purposes.
Brown : Sure .
Banks: I m not blaming them; after all, we were dealing with
considerable numbers millions of dollars and a considerable
volume of water.
Brown: Did the Metropolitan know how many millions of dollars you
were dealing with?
Banks: Oh, yes, I don t remember the exact figures, but they were
available and were freely discussed.
Brown: Let me ask another question. Did you want agriculture to
receive a break in its cost allocation? In the cost
allocation method to determine prices in order that all
the water could be sold to facilitate the actualization of
the plan, or only because of the equity reason which you
mentioned. Was there a pragmatic reason?
Banks: Well, there are pragmatic as well as idealistic considerations
involved. I certainly did not want to see the resultant
Banks; cost to agriculture be beyond their ability to pay with
the result of ruling out any agricultural sales.
Brown: But, had the prices been a little bit higher, it would
have meant that they would have taken . . .
Banks: ...a lot less water, if any.
Brown: So was there some objective then, that the San Joaquin Valley
should receive a certain amount of water at least?
Banks: There was a philosophic objective in that my concept of the
reasons for the State ever getting into this field of water
development, in the first place, was to insure a fairly
wide spread areal distribution of the benefits of water
development. If all of the water were going to Southern
California, there would be really no reason for the State
to have ever proposed the project. Metropolitan could have
financially built the projects to serve their needs.
Brown: And it was cheaper for them to have a State project than
their own project?
Banks: Yes, on a multiple purpose basis. I think we must remember
though that at the time we were negotiating this in 19^0
there had begun to percolate through to at least some members
of the Metropolitan Water District, the possibility that
they might need more water than they had originally contem
plated because of the probability of an adverse Supreme
Court decision in the Colorado River case.
Brown: And so they were trying to press for a lower...
Banks: They were trying to press ^or as much water as they could
possibly get out of this thing.
Signing of new Hogaa contract between Department of
lattr Keaourcsa and the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation
10ft to right: Col. H.A. Morris, Amy Eagineersj
Senator Alan Short, Stocktonj Councilman Harray Stull,
StooJrtonj Irving ^eumiller, Stockton t Gorernor "Pat"
Duggan, Bureau of Seclaaationi seated, Harre.7 o| Benka
Brown: Did the legislature, whatever that means, hold the same
philosophic position? Or was it something that you had to
argue strongly for with important members of the legislature?
Banks: I think the legislature would have been extremely critical
had we agreed to something which would have ruled out any
substantial sale for use of water in the San Joaquin Valley.
Brown: When you say substantial, can you think of a number?
Banks: I m thinking of anything less than 1/2 million acre-feet
per year. Something in that order.
Brown: In 1959* y u presented a paper to the Subcommittee on
Financing in Economic Policy for the State Water Project.
It was my impression that the tone of the paper implied
the implicit belief on your part, or on the Department s
part, that agricultural uses, and municipal and industrial
districts should be offered different repayment policies
and that other things being equal, agriculture should
pay a lower price for its water.
Banks : Well . . .
Brown: It seems that there was a change a shift in policy- -
between August of 59 and December or January of 60 when
the Governor s contracting principles came out.
Banks: Well, remember that we had, at the time... as I recall it, at
the time that that statement was made, I don t think that
the Burns-Porter Act had been finalized.
Brown : I think that s right .
Banks: Bo that we did not at that time have any real basis for
Banks: judging the repayment requirements. With the passage of the
Burns-Porter Act and the financing of the Project by general
obligation bonds, which of course could become a charge upon
the general taxpayer, and in due consideration of the total
financial needs of the State, it became apparent that we
had to have a pricing policy which would guarantee that
these bonds would never become a charge upon the State.
Brown: So it was a change that the Department made on its own and
not as a resvlt of pressure from the legislature that there
shouldbe no discrimination between uses?
Banks: Well, there were certain...
Brown : I think it s true . . .
Banks: The final policy was not the result of any specific pressure
from the legislature or direction from the legislature
although there were some members of the legislature who
were, as the record clearly shows, adverse to any distinc
tion in price. But fundamentally, the pricing policy has...
Brown: They were by-and-large all urban representatives, so it was
along use that the legislature...
Banks: But by-and-large the final pricing policy was developed in
recognition of two factors. Principally one factor. And
that is setting up a pricing policy that would assure the
State of sufficient revenue to meet its obligations on time.
Brown: Yes, the time.
Banks: Now this was the basic consideration. There were other
considerations that entered in the demand that there be no
Banks: unjust enrichment of agricultural lands and that sort of
thing^ and it was well known that very large blocks of the
lands in the areas proposed to be served were, and are,
owned by the Kern County Land Company and the Standard Oil
Company and Southern Pacific, et al, so that these political
demands had to be taken into account in the final policies
that evolved from the Governor s contracting principles of
January 19^0 and on through the contract negotiations with
Metropolitan.
Brown: I f the concern for developing a pricing policy was very much
determined by a need to meet certain fixed revenue obligations,
why did the Department of Water Resources argue that the
California water fund should be returned, indeed, the pay
ments returned with interest. Because, if they hadn t argued
for this, then repayment obligations could have been lowered?
Banks: There was a time when I think we might have agreed to some
differential as between repayment of bond funds versus re
payment of California water funds. On the other hand, the
Metropolitan, when we got to contracting a negotiation
with Metropolitan, Metropolitan was very insistent that
the California water fund be fully repaid with interest.
This was their position because they wanted to create
there-by additional monies to assure the construction of
additional projects to offset possible depletions to the
County of Origin Act and the Watershed Protection Act.
Brown: Actually, you re arguing that it wasn t the Department s
Brown: desire to aggrandize in the sense of getting earmarked
funds for the future but it was pressure from. . .
Banks: This was a significant element. Now, we also recognize that
there would by convention be some non-reimbursable costs
involved in this and that we wanted the flexibility of
repayment of the California water fund with interest in
order to have some money to cover these non-reimbursable
allocations.
Brown: Now, what about the advocacy on the part of the Department
for the repayment of the water fund plus interest. This
advocation was made prior to public negotiations. It was
made in 1959, I believe.
Banks: figain it comes back to the matter of being able to say
that there was no subsidy in this.
Brown: The Department felt this was important?
Banks: The Department felt this was a necessity to sell the program.
Brown: To the voters?
Banks: Yes.
Brown: And the fact that it was only simple interest and not
compound interest wasn t felt to be subsidy and felt to be
important.
Banks: There is compound interest.
Brown: There is compound interest on the general fund?
Banks: Well, now, there is simple interest charged on any advances
made out of the general fund to meet the bond. The mechanics
of the Burns-Porter Act is that the bond payment obligations,
Banks: both capital and interest, are an automatic charge on the
general fund. This is an automatic appropriation to meet
those in any one year. Now, if there isn t sufficient
revenue to repay that general fxind obligation in that year,
then any balance carries simple interest, but the repayment
schedules are so designed so there will be no carry-over of
this automatic general Fund appropriation.
Brown: But I m thinking specifically of that part of the California
water funds contributed by the tidelands oil and gas royalties.
Banks: Well, you get two different things here. The California
water fund monies do not go to pay anything on the bonds.
Brown: Yes, I see.
Banks: They do not go to pay any bond charges.
Brown: But if there were no tidelands oil royalties, perhaps a
higher bond issue would have to have been made.
Banks: Yes, there would have had to have been about little more
than a two billion bond issue instead of a 3/4 billion.
Brown: Why did they fix it at a billion and 3/U instead of two
or one?
Banks: The answer for the record is that we added up what we thought
the projects would cost and subtracted what we thought we
would get from the oil revenues and the answer was one and
3/4 billion.
Brown: In the mid 1950 s only a very few experts believed that the
price of desalinated water would become competitive with
State Water Project water in, say Southern California, during
Brown: the next three decades. Nov many more scientists and tech
nicians believe water can be desalinated in the 1980 s for
around 20 cents a thousand gallons or less. What was the
Department s thinking on this matter around the time Bulletin
7 8 was prepared? And in view of recent plant performance and
research developments, should and could the Department make
any changes in its present plans?
Banks: Well, if you will recall, Bulletin 78 proposes the aqueduct
be designed to meet the projected 2020 demands.
Brown: And it also estimates that the cost of desalination and uses
will be around $150.00 an acre-foot and uses that figure for
putting a value on benefits in that period.
Banks: Yes. At that point of time, that was a good value. But now,
as an administrative matter, after Bulletin ?8 was issued and
accepted by the legislature, or at least acknowledged by the
legislature, I cut the design period for the aqueduct back
to the projected needs for 1990 rather than the year 2020.
And one of the principal reasons for doing that was to be
able to take advantage of sea water conversion or desalination,
if it became economically competitive. In other words, it
seemed to me that it would be Justified to build a system to
supply 1990 needs without too much over- investment in case
water could, at sometime in the 1980 s, be developed at
competitive prices by desalination. In other words, we would
not have committed ourselves as to source of water supply so
far in the future that we could not take advantage of what
Banks: might develop in the way of a cheaper desalination cost. I
think that this may well prove out to be the case. We could
not have waited, of course, for desalination. Southern
California could begin to use today if it were available, the
additional water to be made available by the State Water
Project. It is interesting to note that Bechtel r s recent
report for Metropolitan projects a possible cost that may
be reached for its desalinized water, obtained from a
multipurpose plant, at about 22 cents per thousand gallons,
and a plant producing 150 million gallons a day. This would
be about close to $70 an acre-foot which is still somewhat
more than the average equivalent cost of State water. That
is for the overall. It ll be somewhat less than the cost
of the first few million acre-feet delivered, but considering
over the design period.
Brown: But they do have some design studies that show lower than 22,
one that even does 19 cents.
Banks: Larger sizes, yes. My own personal view is that in view of
the advances in technology and the possibility of combining
desalination with power generation, as far as Southern
California is concerned this may well be the next source to
which they should look for water
Brown: But if the price becomes competitive, the price of the
desalinated water becomes competitive in the 80 s, suppose
that were true, should the Department, if it had no constraints,
should the Department make any changes in its planning?
39
Banks: Oh, I think so, yes. If it does it certainly might not be
necessary. I emphasize "might" because we re getting into
variable costs, here, instead of total costs. The figures
we ve been tossing around here have been total costs. It
might not be necessary to install additional pumps on the
aqueduct. It probably would delay the construction or even
possibly make unnecessary construction of additional
conservation facilities. So it would, assuming desalination
costs to come down to competitive values in the BO s, it
would certainly necessitate a major change in the Department
planning, and I might say, this would be true in all agencies
planning for water development.
Brown: Is there a way in which, if the Department had its way, it
could better organize itself to handle elements of uncertainty
such as this, technological uncertainty? I suppose another
uncertainty would be demand uncertainty?
Banks: Well, the only way that this can be handled is maintaining
an attitude of flexibility. Water is not, and this ie where
I disagree with economists, water cannot be considered
wholly in the same light as we consider an industrial commodity.
In part, because of its essential nature to certain human
activities, and secondly, even with sea water conversion
plants, it takes time to build the plants and get them in
operation. And in our present attitudes towards water supply,
the water has to be there when the people want it. It
doesn t matter that we can buy a new car or don t need to buy
Banks: a new car; as long as you have wheels, you can get along.
But our present attitudes demand that the water be there when
the tap is opened.
Brown: You feel this is a public attitude.
Banks: This is a public attitude.
Brown: To wit, the New York Crisis.
Banks: Well, in fact, yes. The people in New York have long since
made the decision that they would rather spend more money
and have lots of water available at a flat rate, and this has
cost them money; it has cost them money not only from the
standpoint of building structures and distribution systems
and all the rest, but it has cost them more money for sewage
treatment. But they have made the decision that they would
much prefer to do it that way than to ration themselves by
the installation of meters. Now we can argue about the logic
of that attitude, but nevertheless, this has been their decision
to-date.
Brown: Of course, someone else who is much more optimistic of
desalination capacities or desalination technology might have
not only cut back the planned aqueduct capacity from the year
2020 to 1990, but also had built one aqueduct of a smaller
size anticipating building a second, if it turned out that
the desalination cost didn t come down. I realize that at
the time when engineering studies were being made, in the late
: 50 s, even in the early 60 s, there was very little
evidence that the desalination cost would come down as much
Brown: as researchers now believe it will.
Banks: Well, remember that actually the aqueduct capacity in view of
the probable impact of the Supreme Court decision on the
Colorado, the present acqueduct capacity could not, may not
be adequate even to 1990. The whole project was designed...
Brown: It might be right for the wrong reasons.
Banks; This is possible. On the other hand, the degree to which
one is justified in taking a risk in this business is a matter
of complete subjective judgment as of the moment. There is no
rational basis of determining the degree of risk that is
Justified.
Brown: Might there be any other, or any organizational rearrangements
which could insulate the Department from forces outside it,
which would better enable it to adjust to risk? In the
back o*" my mind, I guess I m thinking of, at the present time
it seems to me that it s necessary for the Department of Water
Resources to go through with its promise, but under another
situation where it didn t have to feel the pressures, if it
were insulated from pressures from the outside; but then, of
course, there are costs of insulation too.
Banks: Well, here you enter the whole field of the philosophy of
government. Personally, I don t think that any agency should
be insulated. I think this is a matter of personal philosophy,
of course, but I think the political forces, varied as they
are, tend to force compromises which are probably better in
the public interest than some arbitrary administrative decision
Banks: which is made more or less in a vacuum and without consideration
by political forces.
Brown: And these political forces that would also impinge on water
resources agencies at the federal level, is it your judgment
also that the solutions that are brought about, as a result of
these forces, are also pretty good too?
Banks: By-and-large, yes, I think they re pretty good. We made some
mis investments; we build projects before they re actually
needed; this has been true in some instances. But if one
considers it from a standpoint of the philosophy of a demo
cratic government, it may be better to do it this way and incur
some economic costs than to turn the decision -making power
completely over to administrative discretion.
Brown: If you had a free-hand at a redesign of the Water Resources
Agency of California, what kinds of chages would you make,
and for what kinds of reasons.
Banks: Well, you re asking a question there which I hesitate to
answer because whatever I say could and might well be
construed as criticism of the present setup. I do believe,
frankly, that there is a place in this for a policy making
board or commission. In other words, I believe that the
California Water Commission, which is a representative board
of water interest through the State, should have some greater
role than that merely of an advisory agency.
Brown: What sorts of results might the implementation of this
proposal provide in the future that could possibly not be
Brown: provided if the institution continues?
Banks: It s a matter of making the whole action a little bit more
responsive to overall needs on a State- wide basis, and in
this I have no intention of directly, indirectly, or impliedly
or other of criticizing any actions that have been or are
being taken. But I do believe that there is a place for
policies to be developed on a board or commission basis
rather than strictly as a line function in the executive
branch.
Brown: It s my understanding that there are some plans for
decentralization in the Agency today. Would it not be
possible for these decentralized units to serve as a vehicle
for reaching a regional consensus and then these consensus...
Banks: Well, remember the branch managers or district engineers,
whatever you want to call them are in fact, line positions.
They are, in effect, administrative positions and the branch
managers, apart from advising the Directors, are not a policy
making activity. Now, they will bring, of course, to the
Director, presumably, the views and attitudes and needs of
the particular areas which a specific branch represents.
Brown: But you feel that the commission that you mention might be
able to do this just as well.
Banks: Perhaps, I think, a little better. You re getting into
sensitive areas now.
Brown: I know. Let s switch to what I think of as a problem today--
I ve observed a continued reluctance o^ Pacific Gas and
Brown: Electric or other energy retailing agencies within the State
to enter into contract for over 600 thousand kilowatts of
Oroville power and other power from facilities. This appears
to be a classic case of monopolies bargaining. At the present
time, the Department, representing the State, does not appear
to be doing as well as it hoped.
Banks: Well, remember that the reluctance is over price, and the
hydroelectric power and energy simply is not worth as much
today as five years ago.
Brown: For what reasons?
Banks: Two reasons: The increased size and the increased efficiency
of thermal-generating units, and the decreased cost of thermal-
generating units. In other words, you can produce energy
cheaper, far cheaper today, by thermal-generation than you
could five years ago. And as I say, this is due partly to
increased efficiency which go together, and has caused a
general decrease in cost of thermal-generating units.
Brown: And has the unit-cost decrease been a trend through time?
Has it continued to decrease?
Banks : There s been a rather marked and sharp decrease in the last
four years. We used to consider that somewhere in the order
of 120-130 dollars per kilowatt of installed capacity was not
a bad price for even large size thermal-generating units.
Today, that s down in the order of 80-85 dollars and this
decrease has occurred in the last four years.
Brown: Will this threaten the ability of the plan to repay all its
Brown: costs, in your estimation?
Banks: It means that there isn t going to be as much surplus of power
revenue from Oroville, if any, to go toward payment for
conservation features conservation allocation. I m sure that
the . . .
Brown: And local projects?
Banks: And local projects, too
Brown: Will this be viewed as a piece of bad faith on the part
of the Department by the Northern counties who believed
that they were going to get some of this local project...
Banks: I doubt it.
Brown: Is there any way that the Department could have enhanced its
bargaining position? Any way that comes to your mind?
Banks: Well, even as late as 19^1, I think that Oroville power
and energy could have been contracted for at substantially
greater prices than is the case now.
Brown: What kind of reasons might there have been for their not
being contracted?
Banks: I think the basic, I m guessing now frankly, and let s
make it very clear that I m guessing because I have had no
contact with this aspect of the Department, but I ll guess
that there was a sincere desire to explore the possibilities
of other markets.
Brown; You mean outside the S-tate or....
Banks: No, other than the private utilities.
Brown: We have time for just a few more questions. In the interview
Brown; there has been mention at a couple of points of the federal
policy of acreage limitations. This policy was rejected by
the Department of Water Resources and by the majority of the
legislature as a feasible policy for the California State
Project. To whom would you trace the notion of the surcharge
which was thought to be useful and an important substitute
Tor the acreage limitations policy?
Banks: Well, I think that it should be made clear that the acreage
limitations policy or reclamation law is accompanied fcj> a
very great subsidy to agriculture.
Brown: Over $10.00 an acre- foot, it s been estimated.
Banks: Well, it s something in that order, and in some cases it
amounts to something much more than that. Actually in the
Central Valley under the^ederal reclamation laws the true
cost o p agricultural water delivered in the Valley is possibly
in the order of three to four times what the farmer actually
pays for. So that acreage limitation under reclamation law is
accompanied by a very large subsidy . The State obviously
cannot afford that type of subsidy--it doesn t have any sort
of revenue to pay the subsidy. TJow, as far as the surcharge
is concerned, remember that there was a widespread demand that
there be no opportunity for unjust enrichment. The basic
cost of water, of course, to the water users under the pricing
policy adopted by the State takes advantage of any excess
revenue from power generation to decrease the cost of water.
In other words, if there is $2.00 an acre-foot excess revenues,
Banks: why that goes into paying part of the conservation cnarge
or to decrease the Delta water charge. Now this can be
construed as a subsidy by the poweruser to the water user.
And in order to assure that there would be no subsidy in
any way, shape or manner to the large land owner, whether
he uses it for agricultural purposes or whatever, it was
decided that he should not get the benefit of this power
credit for the water used on the excess lands.
Brown: Where did this idea originate? Was it in the legislature or
in the Department?
Banks: No, the idea originated with the Governor and myself and
Ralph Brody.
Brown: Very good. What were some of the mcst difficult problems
with which you were confronted as Director of the Department?
Banks: Well, in the early stages of the game, of course, one of the
most difficult problems was to convince the legislature that
there was a necessity for the State to get into the water
development business if you want to put it that way. There
never was any question, of course, as to the propriety and
necessity of the State doing planning work, but there was
some question on the part of a good many legislators as to
whether it was really necessary and proper for the State to
actually build and operate water projects. That was the
initial hurdle that had to be gotten over. The second most
difficult aspect of the whole thing, of course, was the
development of a basic body of policy going beyond the very
Banks: broad and very generalized policies in the law.
Brown : The law was . . .
Banks: If you have examined our basic laws relating to water
development by the State, the basic policies in this regard
are not at all specific.
Brown: The Department has virtually infinite degrees of freedom in
setting policy.
Banks: That s right, so that the basic concepts and the basic policies
had to be developed at the executive level, and very largely
through the mechanism of contract negotiation, which, I may
add, is a rather difficult way to formulate policy.
Brown: Did the Department make any mistakes?
Banks: Oh, sure, we made lots of mistakes.
Brown: Were they of a reversible nature or...?
Banks: Unfortunately, what I considered to be some of our most
serious mistakes were not reversible. I m not at all sure
that the present pricing policy is the best policy that
could be evolved. But it is formalized and contracts made
and as such is irreversible for quite a few years.
Brown: And maybe this is tied in with your re*ommendatlon or your
view that it would be useful to have a policy-making board.
Banks: Unfortunately some of the work that has been done in recent
years by the University of California as to the economics of
water development was not available to us at the time that
we had to make decisions.
Brown: And It would have been helpful had it been more timely?
Banks: It would have been extremely helpful had we had some of the
more recent studies of the economics of water development,
the inputs and outputs, the McGaughey-Erlich study, the data
on economic farm sizes, that sort of thing. This would have
been extremely Helpful.
Brown: Thank you, Mr. Banks for allowing me to interview you today.
Banks: Wen, its been my pleasure and I hope I haven t confused the
issues too much.
L
Harvey 0. Banks, November 1958
iW WITii HHRV^Y BANKS
AUGUST 2k, 1965
Brown: Tn our last interview, Mr. Banks, you mentioned that there
was an important reorganization of the State water agencies
in 195^- Would you elaborate on what this meant for the
State? What kinds of changes were made? What changes in
decision-making powers did this imply?
Banks: Well, prior to 195^, of course, the agencies at the State
level of the Water Resources Board were the Division of
Water Resources which was a separate division of the State
Department of Public Works. The Division of Water Resources
was headed by the State Engineer whose duties were defined
by law, but who was a civil service appointee. The other
agencies were the State Water Resources Board which had
certain policy-making functions and certain functions with
respect to the allocation of funds, like allocation of funds
to the local agencies. There was, of course, the State
Water Pollution Control Board of which the State Engineer
was a member. Then there were the nine regional Water
Pollution Control Boards. The State Division of Water Resources
under the State Engineer handled all water planning for the
State under the overall direction of State Water Resources
Board. The State Engineer administered water rights, provided
water-master service, handling adjudications of water rights,
and the like.
There was a considerable area of uncertainty as to the
Banks: specific delineation of the duties and responsibilities
o p the State Water Resources Board as contrasted to the
State Engineer and the Division of Water Resources. There
was another agency which I should have mentioned- -the
State Water Project Authority which had been set up in
1933j T believe, under the Central Valley Project to provide
principally for the handling of the financial details of
construction of the Central Valley Project as it was then
planned, that is in 1933- The Water Resources Board was
composed entirely of ex-officio members, the State Attorney
General, the Director of Finance, and three of four others.
This information can be found in the old Central Valley
Project Act. I have forgotten the exact details o^ the
thing, but suffice it to say that the Water Project Authority
was composed entirely of ex-officio members, that is other
State officials.
Here again there was some considerable uncertainty as
to where the authority of the Water Project Authority ended
and the authority of the State Water Resources Board began
and ended, and where the authority of the State Engineer or
the Division of Water Resources started and stopped. It was
in recognition of that, and the fact that the job of water
development was becoming so important that it needed a com
pletely separate and straight -line agency to Governor Knight
that certain members of the legislature decided to reorganize
the whole set-up.
52
Brown: Who were these members of the legislature? Do you recall?
Ranks: principal]/ Senator Williams was in favor of it. Caspar
Weinberger was another. He Is now local head of the
Republican Party here in San Francisco. There was genera]
concurrence in the legislature that there should be a re
organization, there should be a straight-line set-up reporting
directly to the governor rather than through another department
as was the case with the Division of Water Resources, which
was under the Department of Public Works. There was practically
no dissension concerning the need for reorganization. However,
there was considerable dissension as to whether or not there
should be any commission formed. Governor Knight was quite
adamant in his belief that he wanted a completely straight -
line department with no boards or commissions. On the other
hand, certain of the water organizations, such as the
Irrigation Districts Association and others, ^elt that there
should be a policy-making board or commission appointed to work
with the new department.
Brown: Do you know why Knight wanted it to be completely straight -line?
Banks: The Governor was a strong believer in the straight-line type
of government; he was not a believer in the board or com
mission form of government.
The compromise, of course, was that the Water Resources
Board became the California Water Commission and given
advisory powers only, except in some very minor respects.
Brown: Who drew up the reorganization?
Banks: Primarily, Weinberger was the leader in the Reorganization
Bill.
"Brown: Were there alternatives which were seriously considered?
Alternatives to those which were \iltimately enacted?
Banks: Not too many. The only alternatives, as I said, were the
incorporation of a policy-making commission.
Brown: Would you elaborate on what the important differences would
be had a policy-making board been adopted? What differences
were entailed in this choice?
Banks: As the reorganization actually was enacted, the Director of
Water Resources had, at that time, the full authority to
make all the decisions on his own initiative subject only to
the governor s approval. Of course, his decisions had to be
within the framework of the enabling legislation. Once the
legislation was passed, the decisions as far as implementation
of it were concerned, the decision-making power rested solely
with the Director of the Department of Water Resources. Had
there been a commission with policy-making powers, these
matters would have been referred to the comirlsiion for
decision, with a recommendation, but the decision in many
cases would have been made by the commission. The commission
would have taken the responsibility for it.
Brown: Under the new arrangement would the California Water Commission
have had to be constituted in any different way?
Banks: Not necessarily. As I recall it , it never got as far in the
legislature as going into details as to how the policy-making
Banks; commission should be composed, that is geographic representa
tion or professional representation, etc.
Brown: Would you discuss the evolution of the Davis-Grunsky Act?
Who wanted it? Why?
Banks: Well, the Davis-Grunsky Act, I suppose I would have to take
as much responsibility for that as anyone. It grew out of
my conviction that if we were to have comprehensive water
development, multi-purpose water development, then some
way had to be found whereby the State could stimulate the
local agencies to broaden the purposes and perhaps the
scope and size of the projects. The only way this can be
done really is by putting some money into it. We must
remember that say a city enclosing a reservoir has little
or no interest in providing recreation around that reservoir
in general. In general, the city regards its reservoir as
a single purpose project. The same is true of many irrigation
systems. Furthermore, it seemed to me that in the northern
part of the State some of the smaller districts could, if
given some financial assistance, proceed on their own; but
they simply did not have the financial capability to go
it alone so to speak and needed financial assistance. So
the big purpose of the Davis-Grunsky Act was to encourage
the expansion of local participation in the job of water
development and at the same time enable their projects to
be enlarged in some cases, or in other cases to broaden
their "unctions in the state-wide interest. It evolved from
Banks: that initial beginning.
Brown: How did this proposal go through the legislature? Were there
any difficulties? Was there any opposition? Who were the
principal advocates in the Senate and in the Assembly? Did
it have an easy road?
Banks: In its Initial phases, as T recall it, it had no particular
difficulty. Of course, initially the legislature would have
had to appropriate the money in any event so that the
legislature still retained some considerable control over
it. Also at the time, Southern California regarded the Davis-
Grunsky Act to some extent as a good will gesture toward
the Northern counties. So initially there was not a great
deal of opposition to it. There was really no great amount
of money involved to start with.
Brown: When you or other members of the Department felt that
it was important to have a piece of legislation introduced,
discussed and eventually passed, what was the route that this
proposal took? What happened between the conception of the
idea and its ultimate passage in the legislature? I am
really thinking of informal lines.
Banks; Assuming that the proposal had the approval of the governor,
the first step would be to just chat with members of the
legislature interested to see what their reaction would be.
Brown: But the idea would first go up to the governor?
Banks: Oh, yes.
Brown: Then changes would be made on the basis of these informal
Rrovn: conversations. Turning to another important policy decision,
the Burns-Porter Act passed in 1959? can you discuss its
evolution and the kinds of forces that were brought to bear
on its passage?
Banks: The Burns-Porter Act evolved during the entire 1959 session
of the legislature. When Governor Brown went into office on
the first of January 1959* he went in with the concept that
to solve the stalemate which had developed over water
development In the State we should forget about the problems
which had caused the stalemate and concentrate solely on
financing. So in the 1959 session the only real issue before
the legislature was should money be provided for water
development or shouldn t it.
Brown: Could you .just tell briefly what the causes of this stale
mate were?
Banks: Primarily they had evolved from very simple issues. Tor
example, whether or not the County of Origin Act would be
fully applicable to the water projects constructed by the
State. Southern California had been seeking for about two
years what it termed a constitutional amendment to protect
its rights in and to the waters that might be developed by
the State to supply them. They had not succeeded in even
drafting an acceptable constitutional amendment. They had
not even succeeded in drafting one that would be acceptable
to all the people in Southern California.
Brown: Did they take this position because they believed that the
Brown: right to a particular source of water might mean that there
would be a consequent lower cost?
Banks; Basically this is right. The real reason for Southern
California and more particularly the Metropolitan Water
District s desire to acquire a firm right in a particular
water sources was their realization that as time goes on
water source are going to get increasingly expensive to
develop. Therefore, they wanted a firm right in their
particular source so that they would not have to bear the
cost of any additional development. By the first of 1959
a complete stalemate had developed on that score. Governor
Brown said, "Let s develop water instead of argument." So
his whole platform was the providing of funds to build water
projects.
Brown; Was it believed that once there was a certain very substantial
sum of money made available, then these other issues would
decrease in importance?
Banks : That was the Governor s fundamental concept that once water
was actually made available, all of these other issues wonld
become a small concern.
Brown 1 : What was the behavior of the members of the legislature from
the South during the time of this discussion over the
formulation of the Burns-Porter Act?
Banks: The Southern California people still hoped to get into the
Burns -Porter Act amendments which would accomplish substan
tially what they would hope for all along, which is, in effect,
Banks: negating the County of Origin Act in order to give them more
protection.
Brown: Who was it that fought to prevent these amendments?
Banks: Quite often the Northern California Senators, with some
help from other people . I was frankly never who] ly
sympathetic to Southern California s demands that they
be accorded a firm right to a specific amount of water
from each specific source so that further future demands
by others would have to rely on the more expensive sources.
I think I can say that I never gave them too much heed and
comfort in their desires. Frankly recognizing the complexion
of the Senate, that was before re apportionment, it was obvious
that the South did not have the power in the Senate to pass
any legislation which would be adverse to Northern Califor
nia.
Brown: Were there any joint discussions about this issue between
the Assembly and the Senate during 1959?
Banks: There was quite a bit of joint action. I have forgotten the
exact date but I would guess that it was in February or
March of 1959> there was an evening conference held for
the members of the legislature where the Department put on
a series of discussions of the water problems of the state.
They provided them with -factual information on where the
water is, where the needs were, how they proposed to solve
them, and that sort of thing.
Brown; DM the Governor at any time bring pressure to bear on the
59
Brown: Southern legislators to con-form with the Department s view
and perhaps with his view?
Banks: Yes, he held many discussions with the Southern California
legislators. After all, remember that Assemblyman Porter
wan -from Southern California.
Brown: How did he feel about the potential of introducing amend
ments, which as you said would mitigate the original act?
Banks : Assemblyman Portor had never been anything hut sympathetic
to the needs of Northern California. I think It can be
fairly and accurately stated that Carley has held consist
ently to a State-wide viewpoint as contrasted to a narrow
need of his own district. He has always adopted a very
broad-gauge approach to the water problem.
Brown: What enabled him to do this? Was his constituency passive
as to his role, or what?
Banks: In his particular area water was not a great issue. I
believe he was from Compton. In that area it has never been
a major issue. There was also the fact that he was always
very popular with respect to other issues anyway.
Brown: Could you highlight any particular skirmish that took place
in the legislature at this period in which you could describe
particularly the Department s role, the Governor s role, and
the role of a few of the Senators?
Banks: I suppose one of the best instances was the day the Burns-
Porter Act passed the Senate. We had held, in the earlier
pert of the day, particularly in the morning, a conference with
Banks: Senators who had amendments to of -Per. Some of them had
agreed to accept certain amendments when they were offered
on the Floor of the Senate. During the debate on the bill,
Ralph Brody and myself (Brody was at that time the Deputy
Director of the Department of Water Resources), sat with
Senator Burns at his desk. As amendments were offered, we
advised the Senator whether they could be accepted or
weren t accepted in the House. Amendments came from both
the North and the South. Some of the Northern Senators
offered amendments by which they desired to protect their
interests which would have hamstrung the whole project. It
would have made things so tight that nothing could have
happened.
Brown: Could you give an illustration of one such amendment? Also
the consequences that you foresaw if that amendment had been
introduced and passed?
Banks: I think the outstanding example of an amendment which has
consistently cropped up is one that Senator Christensen has
offered every year since 1959 which would have in effect
prohibited almost any export of water out of Northern
California. He has been consistent; it has been offered
every year.
Brown: Even now?
Banks : Yes .
Brown: What was the alignment, if any, of the interest groups with
regard to the passage of the Burns-Porter Act? The
Irrigation Districts Association, the Chamber of Commerce?
6l
Banks: Most of the organizations were in favor of it. The AFL-CIO
was not. They never had been.
Brown: Had they worked hard for its defeat or was it .just that they
went on record as being against it?
Ranks: No, their representatives had actvr.lly opposed it.
brown: Why? Do you recall?
Banks: primarily because there were no acreage limitations for
regions. This was the announced reason. What other reasons
they had I don t know.
Brown: Wh; were they against acreage limitations?
Banks: TY=y were not against it. They were consistently in ^avor
o-f it.
Brown: Rut their membership was in the urban area, not in the rural
area really.
Banks: One can only speculate as to what really motivates the ATTL-
CIO. Their pitch, o f course, had always been for preventing
unjust enrichment, the necessity of breaking up the large
l*nd holdings and that sort of thing.
Brown: But were they concerned with the enrichment if there was
any accruing to large manufacturers that hired..?
Banks: No one has ever to the best o^ my knowledge worried about
the unjust enrichment of land subdividers.
Brown: Were there any other major interest groups that come to mind
as opposed to the Burns-Porter Act?
Banks: The State Grange consistently opposed it very largely for
much the same reasons as the ATj-CIO, plus the additional
62
Banks; reason, which also applies to the AFL-CIO, of the necessity
of having land for farm families.
Brown: How did urban representatives regard the AT-CIO s claims?
Banks: I don t think that the A FL-CIO itself had very much influence,
Many member local unions of the AFL-CIO state organization
were in favor of the Burns-Porter Act. Many local machinists
unions and that sort of thing. On the other hand, I found
that thin worry about unjust enrichment of the large agri
cultural land-holder and the desireability of breaking up
the large land holdings was a great concern of many urban
residents. This was a matter of great concern to the League
o f Women Voters, for instance, p or a long timewhy acreage
limitations would not be desirable.
Brown: Did they ever change their position at all, moderate it with
time?
Banks: The League of Women s position on that was moderated; the
League did support the project, supported the Burns-Porter
Act and Proposition 1. Actually, as far as I know, the
League has never actively taken a position on acreage
limitation; however, my contact with members of the League
indicated that this was a question o^ great concern. When
I pointed out what acreage limitation would mean to the
State project, that it would necessitate extensive subsidies
to farmers, then they began to see that from the State s
standpoint at least that this was an impossibility. I think
it should be borne in mind always that when you are speaking
Banks : of acreage limitation you are speaking of the acreage limita
tions provisions of the Reclamation Law. Now in the Reclamation
Law there is a tremendous subsidy to the farmer.
Brown: There was another important policy decision which I am sure
California played a role in, but it took place outside of
California. That was the San Luis Act. I wonder if you would
talk about the underlying forces here?
Banks: Well, the principal problems with respect to the San Luis
Act was convincing both the Department of the Interior and
the Congress that California was, in fact, sincere in its
desire for a joint project. If enabling legislation was
passed then, in fact, it would be able to fulfill its part.
You must remember that there had never been anything pro
posed before similar to the joint undertaking which is now
being implemented in the San Luis construction...
Brown: Do you mean that the State of California had never before...
Banks: Never before in the nation had there been a situation where
the state had come forward and said, "Let s participate. We
are ready to pay a share of this provided we own a portion of
it when it is completed." This was a unique concept which had
never come before Congress before.
Brown: So it came at the behest of California Senators and Repre
sentatives?
Banks: No, again this concept was very largely my responsibility.
You see, the history of the San Luis Project is this: the
Bureau of Reclamation had been requested by the land-owners
Banks: in western Fresno County, those that now form the Westlands
Water District, to prepare or to formulate a project for
their benefit. This is about 1952 or 1953, I believe. Late
in 1955 the Bureau came up with its report on the feasibility
o p the San Luis unit as a unit of the federal Central Valley
Project. They proposed a million acre-feet o^ storage, I
believe, there. It would be supplied by pumping from the
Delta into the canal. In turn water would be released down
into the San Luis Canal to about Kettleman City to serve
the western l- resno County area.
Brown: What was the distribution of land ownership in that region?
Was it highly small ownership units, large ownership units?
Banks: The major landowner in that area was the Southern Pacific
Company. It was a very large land owner.
Now that report of the Bureau s was submitted to the
State for review, in accordance with the provisions of the
Flood Control Act of 19UU. About that time, too, the State
had reformulated or shortly before that, the State had
reformulated what was originally the Feather River and Delta
Diversion Project, and had itself proposed off -stream storage
at the San Luis site. In my review of the federal report
on the San Luis site, I made the first proposal for a joint
undertaking at that site, sharing the available source
capacity. It took from then until 1960 to arrive at
agreements with the federal Interior Department. Finally,
as I say, we convinced Congress that we were serious about
Banks: this matter. Actually, the legislation was very largely
drafted by Pat Conner and myself in Washington with the
o^icials of the Bureau of Reclamation. So I suppose you
could say that we bear whatever blame or praise can be attached.
Brown: What was the view of the California legislature through this
proposal period with regard to the San Luis Act?
Banks; As I recall it, the legislature was wholly in ^avor. " There
was no dissension in the legislature over the desirability.
Brown: When you worked on this arrangement, did you have any fear
that men like Douglas or Senator Morse would introduce
crippling amendments?
Banks: We knew that they would try but we felt pretty confident
that it could be overpowered.
Brown: What was achieved by this joint arrangement? What were thebene
fits to be gained, benefits incident upon the State?
Banks: Primarily benefits of scale.
Brown: Do you have in mind any kind of number that would express
this?
Banks: I don t recall the numbers but they are available in various
statements given in the 1959 and 1960 support of the San
Luis legislation as to the relative benefits accruing to
both the State and the United States through joint financing
o-f 1 a large project. I don t recall, but the benefits were
substantial to both parties. This is not a case where the
United States pays the base cost and the State only pays the
increment. They pay a portion of the cost. As a matter of
66
Banks: ^&ct, the actual proportion is 55$ state and kj jo federal.
The figure of $60,000,000 savings to the United States comes
to mind, but I do not guarantee that it is the correct
value. There were a good many millions in savings on both
parts. Plus the fact that there is no other site, that is,
as good a site. There is another site the State could have
developed to the south, but it would certainly have involved
more pumping.
Brown: Why did it take so long to get the San Luis Act formalized?
Banks: The principal reason was that we had to convince Interior that
we really meant business, reach an agreement, and various
sundry provisions.
Brown; They felt that you might renege at a later point? Does this
have anything to do with the State authorization of what is
now the Central Valley Project in the 1930 s?
Banks: No, I don t think that entered into it. It is just that it
was a new concept. It was something that Interior foresaw
as being difficult to sell Congress. It might delay their
project. Remember, they had not had a irajor project authorized
in California for quite a while.
Brown: When did they plan to build their facilities in the absence
of State participation?
Banks: I suppose if it had not been for the State participation, the
Bureau might have gotten the San Luis unit authorized one
year sooner, something in that order.
Brown: Authorized sooner than 19^0, but when had they expected that
Brown: there would be appropriations? That is, when, in their minds,
would the project have been completed as compared to when it
will now be completed?
Banks: I would guess maybe two years, not much difference. We also
had some opposition to the concept of a joint development
from people in the Westlands Water District area, particularly
Jack O Neal who is a leader of the Westlands Water District.
He is a man who in fact really sold the Federal San Luis
Project to people in his area. Jack was likewise convinced
that this was just a stalling tactic on the part of the
State, that the State had no real intention of ever going
ahead with it; the State was merely trying to stall the
San Luis Project.
Brown: Were there good reasons why he thought the State would want
to stall? What kinds of reasons did he have?
Banks: In the early days, say in the early 1950 s, there was some
considerable antagonism between the State and the Bureau of
Reclamation. They weren t always friendly.
Brown: In response to one of my questions in the last interview
about difficult problems you encountered, you said that it
was necessary to develop policies at the executive level and
through contract negotiations, and that this was difficult.
I wonder if you would talk a bit about what other ways would
have been better. If there are other ways, why weren t they
adopted?
Banks: Well, remember that I said when Brown came in as the governor,
68
Banks: his concept of the solution o p the water problem vas to appro
priate money for the projects; the policy questions, pricing
policy and all that sort of thing, should be put aside in
favor o f the single objective of getting a -funding bill
through the legislature. In fact this vas what was done in
the 1959 sessions. There were practically no policy bills at
all. The whole focus o" attention was in getting the Burns-
Porter Act passed, which is not in any way a policy bill ex
cept in the negative sense because it says that there are
certain things which can not be done. Other policies already
in the law apply to this. But such matters as pricing policy,
sale of hydroelectric power and all that sort of thing, no
consideration was given to those and the governor did not
want such bills in the legislature. Matters of agricultural
subsidy, differential pricing between agricultural water and
municipal-industrial water, and that sort of thing, there was
and still is no law on that subject. With no policy bills
having been enacted in the 1959 session, the 19^0 session
was a budget session so there were no bills enacted then
either, so that meant that in the process of negotiation in
getting that contract, all of these questions had to be
resolved by administrative decision within the very broad
framework that was already a part of the law. It was
extremely broad.
Brown: As the Director of the Department for Water Resources, were
you aware of any necessary conditions, certain policies or
69
Brown: changes which the governor or the legislature specified
implicitly to the Department? That is, while you were given
a great deal of freedom in reaching certain pricing policies,
coming to agreements on the contract negotiations, were you
guided by any limitations that you felt?
Banks: We were guided by certain financial constraints stemming
from the State s financial condition and from the fact that
in support of the Burns-Porter Act before the Congress there
were certain commitments made so that this program would not
be allowed to become a charge or a burden on the general tax
payer.
Brown: For example, one of the solutions was to contract with large
units who would then subcontract. The Department did not have
to make this decision, but did. It had an alternative. It
could have contracted with every small irrigation district.
For example . . .
Banks: It could have, but this had both a practical and a political
significance. The practical significance is that, say in
Southern California, if we attempted to contract with a
multiplicity of the smaller units and cities , it would have
meant that our distribution system would have to be much
more extensive. We would not have been able to take advantage
of the existing distribution system which the Metropolitan
Water District owned. From a political standpoint, remember
that the Metropolitan Water District, very largely in broad
water matters, speaks for Southern California. There would
70
Banks: have been political hazards involved shall we say. But
fundamentally, the decision to contract with the large
agencies such as Met. where it is available, was made mostly
on practical considerations, plus just the concept that for
good public administration, as long as there is a large
over-riding agency, why go down below that?
Brown: But in Kern County there was none until 19^1 or later.
Banks: Well, the Kern County Water Agency was created not for the
purpose that you imply, but to have an agency with sufficient
powers and sufficient breadth to bring the full financial
resources of Kern County to bear. That is, the Kern County
Water Agency has taxing powers, pnd has an areal extent far
greater than any of these member agencies of the Kern County
Water Agency with which contracts might have been initiated.
Brown: Were there irrigation districts within Kern County that
did not want to have a master agency contracting for them?
Was this a difficulty?
Banks : No, with the possible exception of, I do believe, that some
of the municipal water districts around the Bakersfield area
have on occasion voiced the thought that they might better
contract with the State. However, by and large, the agri
cultural agencies such as Semitropic Water Storage District,
Wheeler Ridge-Maricopa Districts I and II and the others
know and realize full well that they have to have the financial
support of the rest of the area before they can make it.
arown: I am interested in the role of the legislature in determining
71
Brown: water policy. You said that the pricing policy, for example,
had to be largely determined by administrative action. Apart
from the passage of the very important Burns-Porter Act
specifying the financing arrangement, could the legislature
be criticized for its failure to act in this very important
area o p decision?
Banks: Oh, I think one could level a mild charge of criticism against
the legislature for not being concerned with these problems.
The principal area of concern of the legislature seemed to
me not to be so much with regard to pricing as it was with
respect to economic evaluation. If you will read some of
the reports of the legislative analyst, for instance, he was
more concerned with how you justify projects whether you
use the benefit-cost ratio or a revenue-cost ratio, so he
was much more concerned with "pays how much" .
Brown: Why do you think that he had this concern and not the concern
of who pays how much?
Banks: I think this is very largely a personal idiosyncrasy of the
people involved.
Brown: What people were involved?
Banks: This again refers to people that are living, and some at least
are nominal friends of mine. Well, Don Benedict* for instance,
has always been concerned with the economics of projects.
I have never known Don to be overly concerned about pricing
policy. As far as pricing is concerned, his principal area
of Interest is whether or not the total revenue is sufficient;
legislative Budget Committee
72
Brown :
Thanks
Brown :
Hanks :
Brown :
Banks:
Brown :
Banks:
Brown:
Banks :
prices "between agriculture on the one hand, and municipal
and industrial uses on the other, and that sort of thing.
He took a great deal of interest in it.
And he was the legislative analyst?
I mention that as one governmental entity concerned with
the problems of the economics of the project.
Was he the analyst for the Senate and the Assembly both?
No, Don s work has been mostly with the Senate .
What was the Senate s position?
The Senate never took much interest in this.
How would you explain their lack of concern for a multi-
billion dollar project, or for some of the policies?
I can t really. You will find that the Senate Water
Committee did issue some reports. However, they never acted
on them. Why, I don t know. At that point the Senate depended
largely on Senator J. Howard Williams, of course, for its
leadership in water matters. I don t think J. Howard was
concerned too much about these matters. He was concerned
with getting the project going.
Did Williams and others realize the connection between getting
the project built and paying for it?
Well, no. I don t think they did. As a matter of fact, I
doubt there are very many people who understand the impl-
cations of economic theory, economic evaluation, and pricing
policies as they relate to the project formulations. Very
few people worry about these things.
Brown: Would it have made the Department s task any simpler if the
legislature had played a stronger role, or would it have
hampered the Department in actualizing their planned move
ment?
Banks; Oh, yesl Assuming that the legislature would have adopted
sound policies, it would have simplified things. On the
other hand, the legislature could have adopted policies which
would have been greatly restrictive. I remember, on an
analogous subject, one legislator from a mountainous county,
one time introduced a bill which would have reserved water
in quantitative amounts for the area s watershed. It actually
came out to be an average of about four feet over a whole
mountainous county that would have been reserved. Well, there
is not that kind of water.
Brown: In the last interview you made a distinction between the role
of the Department as the provider of information vs. the
Department playing a more active role in the planning and
actual development of water resources. Why was there this
difference in views and who held these different views?
Banks: I don t recall exactly the question that gave rise to that
distinction. If the question is "Why do I ^eel that the
State has to take a greater role?" the answers are manifold,
of course. I think it is necessary to understand that the
demands for water are rather rapidly expanding. Fifteen
years ago you could generally catagorize water demands
PS pover generation, irrigation, domestic municipal supply,
Banks: industrial supply, and there you stopped. Then gradually
there have been built up a number of other demands. The
demand of water for recreation is new; the demand of water
for fish and fishery enhancement; and now, what is very
important, water for water quality control. These are
relatively newly recognized demands shall we say. All of
these newer demands have a much broader base of interest than
the earlier ones. If we were only concerned with providing
water for irrigation, an irrigation district could well
handle them, or a city could well handle its regional water
by building, say a Hetch Hetchy Project as San Francisco has
done on the Tuolumne, or Pardee Dam, as the East Bay District
did on the Mokelumne. With these newer demands however, and
the increasing scarcity of water to meet the demands, it
becomes more and more necessary that multi-purpose development
be encouraged and, in fact, accomplished. This necessarily
implies a much broader base of interest in a given water resource
than any one particular district or particular locality can
handle. Now, that is one aspect of the problem: The
broadening base of interest in the whole field of water
development, the broadening base of benefits and the broadening
base of demands, all these things necessitated that the higher
levels of government take an interest in this field and act
to see that all of this broad base of interest and demand
was satisfied to the extent that it can be. In general, as
I say, it cannot and will not be satisfied fully by a local
agency without some participation by the higher levels of
government because their interests are restricting.
Brown: Is it far more difficult, in your view, to design legislation
which would enable local agencies to construct and manage
projects in a way which would be in the best interests of
this broad sector?
Banks: You also have to consider the question of money. Why should
an irrigation district, say, which is solely interested in
the irrigation of lands within its district, and where the
source of revenue is in the land, why should it build storage
in its reservoir at its expense to provide water for the
fishery down-stream which will perhaps be enjoyed by a few of
its land owners, but mainly will be a benefit to many people
from San Francisco and other places who come there to fish?
Or why should a city building a project on this river for
its benefit, why should it at its expense build storage in
that reservoir to release down-stream to dilute wastes from
other cities and industries not within its boundaries? Do
I make the distinction clear?
Now turning to another spectrum and going to the higher
levels of the government, namely the federal government, it
is important to recognize that the Congress has never stated
that it has any responsibility. It has set up certain
programs and certain policies the reclamation program, the
flood control program and a few others, and it has authorized
specific projects within those programs. It has never said
though, that this area of water development is our responsi
bility, and we will fulfill it.
Banks: With one or two exceptions, Congress has never said that
it will take on the full job of developing the water resources
of any given river basin or any given area. It has authorized
specific projects. Now, in connection with the Colorado,
Congress may say, "Now this is our job and we are going to do
it." On the other hand, it may take them a long time to do it
because Congress does not necessarily make appropriations on the
basis of relative needs, or even with proper consideration of
economy, taking into account the time of construction of that
sort of thing.
It seemed to me, considering the history of the federal
appropriation, the difficulty of getting federal appropriations
and the fact that actually from 1951 until about 1962 the
actual level of federal construction in water development
had gone down, considering that aspect of it, looking at the
federal picture and the limited objective of local development
in most cases, it seemed to me that here was an area where
if we are to develop the state s water resources effectively
with the broadest possible benefit, then there is no other
way in which the State should move.
Brown: You say, "It seemed to you . Do you mean that the California
legislature felt that should a problem of water need develop
that the federal government could be relied upon to fulfill it?
Banks: Some of the members of the legislature felt that way, but not
all or not even the majority. There were, and there are still
people who feel that the federal government has all the
77
Banks: answers. I might point out something that I learned last
Friday in a discussion with the officials of the State of
New Jersey who are dealing with the so-called water crisis
in New Jersey. The State officials through their public
relations had succeeded in driving the water consumption
in New Jersey down this year to about half of its 19^* value
by urging conservation. The day aPter President Johnson
and Secretary Udall made their pronouncements about the
solving of the State s water crisis, the water consumption
went up about 50$- There is no other apparent reason for
it other than the fact that people felt that the United
States is moving in so we have no more problems. There is
nothing in the world they can do except perhaps provide
money to drill a few little wells. Tney cannot alleviate
the crisis at all.
Brown: So while you held this view privately and, I am sure, more
publically than privately, how did you go about educating
the people of the State, the important people, that the
Department of Water Resources should get involved more
actively in water planning and development than it had been
up to that time?
Banks: Primarily by telling them that there was a problem whicu had
to be soi/w;d. This was goLig bo be a. future problem. There
ware no great crises which had to be resolved such as now
occurs in the East; there was no such crisis. The floods
in r>55, o^ course, gave an impetus to the construction of
78
Brown;
Banks:
Brown:
Banks:
the Orovllle Dam. Since the State at that time had proposed
to "juild it itself, well that particular crisis, regretable and
tragic though it WHS, helped the program , if you want to look
at it realistically. Basically thougli, it was a matter of
convincing the people, organizations, the legislwture, that
there is a need for the State to get into this picture.
Basically, that is the ground which I mentioned. There is
no reason to expect on the one hand the local agencies to
spend their money in the statewide interest . On the other
hand, there is no justification whatsoever for the people to
expect "the Great White father" in Washington to solve all
their problems. It ,}ust is not in the cards; you haven t
got that kind of money; you never have had it and you ere
not going to get it.
Were there other people in the legislature who had this,
I would call it, vision?
I think people like Car ley Porter, J. Howard Williams,
Weinberger, Prances Lindsey, to mention a few, Bruce Allen,
Nick Richards from Los Angeles recognized these problems.
Can you recall any important legal decisions which were made
and were not well documented, and also which we have not
discussed? A legal decision which facilitated the
actualization of a plan?
I suppose that the series of Supreme Court decisions, such as
the Pelton Dam decision, had some influence with water
organizations throughout the State in convincing them that if
79
Banks: the State vas to protect Its Interests in water resources,
then it had to take a more active role. Otherwise they could
loo 17 to increasing federal domination in water developing.
Brown: When was this decision made?
Banks: The decision came down in 1955 or 195-, somewhere in there.
Brown: How did it come about? Was it a push or a pull? Who was
instrumental in bringing about this decision?
Banks: Of course, this had nothing to do with California directly.
It was a decision involving the power development in the
Deschutes River in Oregon. The State had denied the right
and permit to the power company to build the dam on the
grounds that the State legislature had said that no dam
should be built on the Deschute because of the possible
interference with the salmon run. On the other hand, the
T.P.C. had granted the power company a license to build the
dam. The State appealed the Federal Power Commission s
license. The State was defeated. The court upheld the
federal license on the ground that the federal government
had jurisdiction. One end of the dam rested on federal
reserve land and the other site was on some other federal
reserve. The State had no jurisdiction.
This has given rise to a philosophy which if fully tested
will probably be held by the Supreme Court that the federal
government does, in fadt, own and control any and all water
arising on or flowing across federally withdrawn or reserved
land. It is subject to rights only which accrued thereto only
Banks: prior to the time of withdrawal or reservation.
Bl
INDEX
Abshire -Kelly Salinity Control Bill, lU
Acreage limitation, 15, ^6, 6l ff.
Allen, Bruce, ?8
AFL - CIO, 61
Bechtel Corporation, 38
Benedict, Donald W., 71
Brody, Ralph, U?, 60
Brown, Governor Edmund, 56 ff .
Burns - Porter Act, 16, 32, 33, 56 ff., 59
California Department of Water Resources, 50 ff., 69
California State Grange, 61
California Water Commission, 1*2, 52
California water plan (Bulletin 3), 5, 8, 10-11
California State Water Resources Board, 5, 7
California Water Fund, 3U ff .
Central Valley Project, 8, 18
Christensen, Senator Carl L. , 60
Cobey, Senator James A., 21
Colorado River, 9, 31
Conner, Pat, 65
"County of origin", 17 ff., 56
Davis - Grunsky Act, 16, 5U ff .
Dickey Water Pollution Control Act, 3
Flood Control Act of 19UU, 6
Irrigation Districts Association, 52
Kern County Land Company, 3U
Kern County Water Agency, 26, 70
Knight, Governor Goodwin J., 52
League of Women Voters, 25, 62
Lindsey, Frances, 78
Los Angeles Department of Water and Power, 15
Metropolitan Water District of Southern California, 9 ff., 15, 26, 29, 38, 69
North Bay Aqueduct, lU
O Neal, Jack, 67
Pacific Gas and Electric Company, U3
Pelton Dam Decision, 78 ff .
Porter, Senator Carley, 59, 78
Richards, Nick, 78
San Luis Project, 63
San Joaquin Valley, 15
Semi tropic Water Storage District, 70
Southern Pacific RR Company, 3^, 6U
Standard Oil Company, 3^
Texas, 13
University of California, 1+8
Water Resources Planning Act of 1965 19
Watershed Protection Act, 18
Weinberger, Caspar, 52, 53, 78
Westlands Water District, 6k
Wheeler Ridge - Maricopa Districts, 70
Williams, Senator J. Howard, 52, 72, 78
FRENCHMAN DA
- L
1st OF 5 DAMS APPROV
FOR CONSTRUCTION II
COUNTY
Frenchman Dam groundbreaking ceremonies
STATE DEPARTMENT OF WATER RESOURCES PRESS RELEASE
1120 N Street FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Sacramento, California March 2, 1959
(photo caption)
GROUNDBREAKING Governor Edmund G. Brown officiated today (Monday,
March 2) at the groundbreaking ceremony for the Whale Rock Dam Project
in San Luis Obispo County, marking the start of construction on the
$7 million earthfill dam near the community of Cayucos, 18 miles northwest
of San Luis Obispo. The project is a joint venture between the City of
San Luis Obispo and the State of California for the purpose of supplying
water for the City and two nearby State institutions -- California State
Polytechnic College and the California Men s Colony. Construction of the
dam, which will store 40,000 acre-feet of water, will be completed in
1960. Governor Brown is pictured here at the controls of a large bull
dozer, and is being assisted by an engineer for the construction company.
(Department of Water Resources Photo)
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KLAMATH RIVER COMMISSION
Seated left to right
Bert A. Phillips, Chairman - California Kla-nath River Commission
Nelson Reed, Chairman - Oregon Klamath itiver Commission
:>obert B. Bond, Executive Assistant - California Klamath River Commission
Standing left to ripht
F. L. Lathrop, Consultant - California Klamath River Commission
Ellis Louie, Member - California Klamath kiver Commission
Halph Koozer, Member - Oregon Klamath i-.iver Commission
James Kf;rns, Jr., Member - Oregon Klamath River Commission
Harvey 0. Banks, Member - California Klamath River Commission
and Director, California Dept. of Water Resources
James 0. Stearns, Vi ce-Chairrnan, California Klamath Hiver Commission
Georpe Stevenson, Member - ;)^e,~on K.lamath jtiv;;r Commission
Harry Pearson, Member - Oregon Klaiaath itiver Coramisrdon
Ariolnh f- oskovitz, Deputy Attorney General, State of California
Harvey 0. Banks
75 2 ft
