Proposals for the prevention of future wars

PROPOSALS FOR THE PREVENTION
OF FUTURE WARS

NOTE

Criticism and comments
on these proposals may be
addressed to—

THE EDITOR,

Proposals for the Prevention of
Future Wars,

Room 195.

1. Central Buildingi.

Westminster.

London. S.W.

PROPOSALS FOR
THE PREVENTION
OF FUTURE WARS

VISCOUNT BRYCE AND OTHERS

LONDON : GEORGE ALLEN A: UNW1N LTD.
RUSKJN HOUSE 40 MUSEUM STREET. W.C. i

First published in 19/7

659348

AU ngkti

PREFATORY NOTE

THE frightful catastrophe of the present war, involving
more than half the human race, and bringing grave I
on neutral nations also, has driven thoughtful men to
reflect on the possibility of finding means by which the
risk of future wars may be dispelled, or at least largely
reduced. The only effective and permanent remedy would
be to convince the several peoples of the world that they
have far more to lose than to gain from strife, and to
replace by a sentiment of mutual international goodwill
the violent national antagonisms that now exist. But
we may well fear, would be a slow process. Meantime
th.it which may be done, and which it seems possible to
do at once, is to provide machinery by and through which
the volume of international public opinion which favours
peace may be enabled to express itself, and bring its power
to bear upon any nation in which there may, from time to
time, exist a spirit of aggression, or a readiness to embark
on war in pursuit of selfish interests or at the bidding of
national pride.

The nature of the machinery required is indicated by
some facts whuh ttn> war has brought out in strong relief.
These are :—

i. The increased risks to peace that arise from the
teased speed with winch communications between

governments meditating war are exchanged, and

which momentous do ire taken.

0 PREFATORY NOTE

2. The difficulty neutral nations find in ascertaining
the merits of a dispute which has led to war, and thus
in judging between the disputants and throwing to
one or other side the weight of their opinion.

3. The gigantic scale on which war is now waged,
compelling governments, in order to secure themselves
from sudden onslaught, to maintain naval and mili-
tary armaments incomparably larger than ever before,
and thereby laying intolerable burdens on the peoples.

The machinery needed to meet these conditions would
•eem to be : —

(a) The prescribing of a certain period of time
within which steps could be taken to settle a dis-
pute amicably before a resort to arms.

(6) Means for ascertaining the facts and clearing
up the issues in dispute, so as to facilitate the forming
of an impartial opinion upon the merits.

(c) Arrangements between pacifically minded nations
for mutual protection against sudden attack by a State
which refuses to allow time for investigating and trying
to secure an amicable adjustment of its claims.

It may reasonably be hoped that if some scheme calcu-
lated to attain these objects were adopted by a considerable
number of States, the opinion of neutral nations, being
better instructed and having a vehicle for its expression,
would become a more effective force than it has been
hitherto in the way of deterring aggressive governments
from war. The feeling, powerful in the great majority of
men in nearly every nation, that peace is for them and
for all mankind one of the highest interests, has done
little to avert war because it has possessed no organ through

KFATORY NOTE 7

t could grow into a corporate consciousness or give
effect to its corporate judgn

A group of men in England who have long been seeking
for some method by which this aim might be attained have
1 to draft a scheme embodying, in outline, such a
method. It is briefly set forth in the document winch
follows, and is explained in the Introduction prefixed
thereto.

Those who have drafted the scheme are aware tl
deals with only one branch of a very large subject, and
they are duly sensible of the obstacles to be overcome
before even these limited and tentative proposals could
be likely to find acceptance with those who direct the
policy of States. But there are some advantages in sub-
mitting and bespeaking attention for one particular plan,
especially as the practical measures it points to would be
the extension and development of an institution (the Hague
Tribunal) which has so far worked for good.

Every one seems to feel the approach of a supremely
important moment. The reason and the conscience of
mankind have been roused, as never before, to a sense of
the moral as well as the material evil wrought by war, for
no conflict has ever inflicted such widespread suffering,
none has so gravely affected neutral nations, and none
has ever brought death and misery to so many innocent
non-combatants. If the opportunity which the close of
the present conflict will offer for the provision of means
to avert future wars be lost, another such opportu
may never reappear. If things are not then made be:
the prospect for mankind will be darker than ever,
and the condition of the world will have grown worse,
because the recurrence of like calamities will have been
recognized as a thing to be expected, and their causes as
beyond all human cure.

htbruaty 19

8 PREFATORY NOTE

PS. — Since the Draft Scheme which follows was first
prepared, an Association called The League to Enforce
Peace has been formed in the United States, which has
received the support of many eminent and influential
statesmen there, and has promulgated a scheme almost
the same as that here submitted. The idea embodied in
its proposals has been warmly approved by President
Wilson and by Mr. Charles E. Hughes, speaking as the
candidate of the Republican Party at the recent Presi-
dential Election. The recent establishment in Russia
of a free popular government, which renounces the old
autocratic traditions of militarism and conquest, raises
confident hopes for the accession to any scheme for
the preservation of Peace of all the greater as well
as most, or all, of the smaller free nations of Europe,
and for a disposition amongst all these to discharge
loyally the obligations which such a scheme would
create. These are events of great moment, for nothing
could do so much to bring a scheme of this nature within
the sphere of practical politics as the adhesion to it, not
only of the free peoples of Europe, but also of the greatest
among the nations of the Western world, should that
adhesion be given by the United States when the time
comes, after the close of this war, to consider the means
for securing (so far as possible) the future peace of the
world. Though practical steps cannot be taken till the
war ends, the entrance of the United States into the con-
flict makes it doubly desirable, not only that the action
of the American League should be warmly welcomed
in this country, but also that both their scheme (which
is appended hereto) and other schemes (such as that
here submitted by the British group already referred to)
should receive most careful consideration from those
who feel the supreme importance of the subject.

April 1917.

CONTENTS

PREFATORY NOTE . 5

INTRODUCTION . . 1 1

PROJECT FOR A TREATY . 3'

LEAGUE or NATIONS SOCIETY 37

LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE . 3*y

APPENDIX : QUOTATIONS FROM LEADING STATESMEN ON THE
SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHIPS AFTER THE

WAK . 41

INTRODUCTION

THE hope and intention that one outcome of
the present war shall be an international
agreement to substitute for war methods of
peaceable agreement has been expressed by
prominent statesmen of the Entente and em-
phatically endorsed by President Wilson, who
has offered the co-operation of the United
States.1 The Allied Governments have now
definitely included some such plan among
the objects for which they are contending.
They say in their note to President Wilson8
that they "declare their wholehearted agree-
ment with the proposal to create a League of
Nations which shall assure peace and justice
throughout the world. They recognize all the
benefits which will accrue to the cause of
humanity and civilization from the institution
of international arrangements designed to pre-
vent violent conflicts between the nations, and
so framed as to provide the sanctions neces-
sary to their enforcement, lest an illusory
security should serve merely to facilitate fresh
acts of aggression."

These aspirations, we believe, are shared
by the peoples of all the States at war, and the
support they have thus publicly received from

1 Thete speeches will be found in the Appendix.
• Jmnuai

12 THE PREVENTION OF FUTURE WARS

governments should bring them at once
into the region of practical politics. But to
embody them in an acceptable form will be
no easy task.

It is clear that the reforms to be introduced
must be drastic if they are to be effective.
On the other hand, there must be continuity ;
for proposals involving too violent a breach
with the established order are not likely to be
seriously considered. What is attempted here
is to put forward a scheme which, while it
involves a real and radical advance upon the
present organization of international relations,
yet does not break so violently with the course
of historical development as to be fairly
described as Utopian.

With the deep underlying causes of war we
do not here concern ourselves. Those causes,
mainly connected, in the modern world, with
false ideas and wrong feelings about the moral,
political, and economic relations of States, of
classes, and of individuals, can only be gradu-
ally dissipated by the spread of intelligence,
knowledge, and goodwill. And until they are
dissipated there can be no complete security
for peace. Meantime, however, we think it
possible, by such an arrangement as we sug-
gest, to diminish very considerably the risk
of war, and so to give time for the develop-
ment of that educative process upon which
we mainly rely.

Proposals for the reform of international
relations vary in range and extent from
complete schemes for a World-State, to im-

INTRODUCTION 13

provemcnts in (he conduct of diplomacy.
The project of a World-St . even of a

pun Federation, we do n advo-

cate. It is perhaps a possibility of the distant
tut urc, and it well deserves the discussion it
has provoked. But we do not believe it to be
practicable at any near date ; and there are
many who do not think it desirable. Our .inn
is a more modest one. We desire to give
definite shape to that idea of an association
or union of independent and sovereign St.r
winch is being advocated by many leading
men both in Europe and in America, and
which, we believe, could be realized immecii-
the conclusion of the war.

We propose, then, that existing States,
retaining their sovereignty, should enter into
a treaty arrangement with a view to the preser-
on of peace. What we contemplate is not
a league of some States against others, but a
union of as many as possible in the common
interest of all.

The question then immediately arises, what
States shall be admitted to the Union ? It
might be urged, with a good deal of force,
that all the States represented at the First or
Second Hague Conference shall be admitted.
But the admission, in the first instance, of so
large a number of States (44) of which some
(like those of Central and South Amer
are not intimately connected with European
politics, might seriously hamper the earlier
stages of the arrangement. On the other
hand, any limitation must be arbitrary. The

14 THE PREVENTION OF FUTURE WARS

suggestion in Clause i of the present draft
is for the inclusion, as of right, of the Great
Powers, and of any other European State
that may wish to adhere. But this particular
selection of States is not of the essence of
the scheme. What is important is, that the
membership should not be so narrow and
exclusive that the Union shall appear to be
a mere alliance directed against other States.
For this reason it seems essential that at least
all the Great Powers should be admissible as
of right, whether or no they all choose to
come in at the beginning. And there are
others of the lesser European States, such as
Holland, Belgium, the Scandinavian countries
and Switzerland, which should obviously be
included, as well as some of the chief South
American States. Later on, if the arrangement
were found to work well in practice, it might
be thrown open to all the States of the world.
jn formulating the conditions of the Union,
we have taken as our starting-point the series
of treaties recently concluded between the
United States of America and a number of
other States. The essence of these treaties is
that the contracting parties agree not to have
recourse to forcible measures until the matter
in dispute between them has been submitted
to a permanent Commission of Inquiry. Thus,
under the treaty ratified in 1914 between the
United Kingdom and the United States, the
parties agree " that all disputes between them,
of every nature whatsoever, other than disputes
the settlement of which is provided for and in

INTRODUCTION 15

fact achieved under existing agreements between
the High Contr Parties,1 shall, when

diplomatic methods of adjustment have failed,
be referred for investigation and report to a
Permanent Intc il Commission, to be

titutfil in the- : scribed in the

next succeeding article ; and they agree not
declare war or begin hostilities during such
vcstigation and before the report is submitted/'
What we propose efly, to generalize

an arrangement of ti , a

moratorium before recourse shall be had to
war ; and to add sanctions to ensure the
fulfilment of the treaty. We build thus upon
existing facts and tendencies, and may fairly
n to be advocating not a revolutionary
change, but an orderly development.

1 The disputes excepted by these words are of the kind
called by us " justiciable." The principal treaty dealing
with them is that of April 14, 1908, which provides that —

Differences which may arise of a legal nature, or
relating to the interpretation of treaties existing between
the two contracting Parties, and which it may not h
been possible to settle by diplomacy, shall be referred
to the permanent Court of Arbitration established at
The Hague by the Convention of July 29, 1899, provided
nevertheless that they do not affect • nterests,

the independence, or the honour of the two contract
rs,and do not concern the interests of third parties."

There is also a treaty in force (of January n, 1909)
which provides for the reference of disputes ari-
between the United States and the Dominion of Canada
to a Permanent Commission for examination and report.
The Commission may also offer conclusions and recom-
mendations. And there is also a treaty (of January 27,
1909) providing for the reference to arbitration of
ites about thr sheries.

16 THE PREVENTION OF FUTURE WARS

The members, then, of our proposed Union
would bind themselves by treaty : —

(1) To refer all disputes that might
>e between them, if diplomatic methods

of adjustment had failed, either to an
arbitral tribunal for judicial decision, or
to a council of conciliation for investi-
gation and report (Clauses 2 and 9).

(2) Not to declare war or begin hos-
tilities or hostile preparations until the
tribunal has decided or the council has
reported (Clause 17).

(3) To take concerted action, economic
and forcible, against any signatory Power
that should act in violation of the pre-
ceding condition (Clause 19).

(4) To take similar action against any
non-signatory Power that should declare
war or begin hostilities or hostile prepara-
tions against a signatory Power, without
first submitting the dispute to peaceable
settlement by the method indicated in (i)
(Clause 19).

The unction of Coercive action by the members of the

the treaty.

Union would be a treaty obligation only in
the case where a State had resorted to force
before submitting the dispute to peaceable
settlement. For the purposes of such action
it is not proposed to abolish national arma-
ments and substitute a force under international
control. But it might prove desirable and
practicable that the members of the Union
should create, concurrently with tlie setting up

INTRODUCTION 17

of the Council of Conciliation, a .itional

executive air power to call into action

forces of the League, when the occasion

should arise, and to direct operations in its name.

Military operations, however, are not the
only form of coercion possible, and the agree-
ment contemplates also economic pressure. 1 1 1
some cases this might be as effective as armed
force and as easy of application. A whole
series of such measures can be conceived,
differing in their severity and in their appli-
cability to different cases : e.g. an embargo
on the shipping of the recalcitrant State ; a
prohibition of loans to it ; cutting it off from
railway, postal, telegraphic, and telephonic
communication ; prohibition of exports to or
imports from it, supported if necessary by what
international lawyers call a " pacific blockade."
Applied against a small Power, such measures
as these would be likely, by themselves, to be
effective. Applied to a Great Power, they
might be met by armed force, which would
have to be repelled by force. But the possi-
bility of a concerted use of the boycott should
be seriously considered, when the case arises,
by the signatories to such a Union as we are
suggesting.

Passing from this question of the sanction
to the machinery for peaceable settlement,
our proposal is that disputes between the
treaty Powers should be referred either to
arbitration or to conciliation. We distmgu.
therefore, two classes of disputes and two
processes of settlement.

1

18 THE PREVENTION OF FUTURE WARS

<n The first class of disputes we call
"justiciable." They are such as are
capable of settlement by judicial deter-
mination ; for example, the interpretation
of a treaty, or any question either of inter-
national law or of fact, where the fact in
dispute is one which, if proved, would
constitute a breach of international duty
(Clause 4). In case of disagreement as to
whether a dispute is justiciable or not, the
arbitral tribunal is to decide (Clause 5).

All disputes of a justiciable character,
including those that involve honour and
vital interests, are to be referred to the
Hague Court, as it now is, or may in
future be constituted, or to some other
arbitral court.

In framing treaties of arbitration it has been
usual for States to exclude from the scope
of the treaty cases involving " honour " or
" vital interests." We have not excluded them
in our draft, partly because we propose to
determine by this judicial procedure those cases
only which are properly susceptible of such
procedure, leaving to conciliation cases to
which legal principles and methods cannot be
applied, and which will comprise at any rate the
great bulk of those involving " vital interests"
or " honour " ; partly because it seems essential
to an international order that, where law is
recognized, it should be applied, whatever the
consequences. A State, for instance, ought to
be compelled to submit to judicial process

. loHM'CTION 10

any dispute about territorial boundaries in-
volving treaty rights, however important it
consider the possession of the piece of
tory affected to be to its " vital interests."
As to "honour/* in any reputable sense of
term, it can never be to a nation's honour
to repudiate a legal obligation.

(2) The other class of disputes, and, of
course, the class most likely to lead to war,
comprises those which are not justiciable;
such as, for instance, those which arise
out of the general economic and political
rivalry of States, or, it may be, from the

•content of nationalities within a State,
where such discontent commands the

npathy of a kindred people. For the
settlement of such disputes a judicial
tribunal is not the best authority. 1
proposed, therefore, to institute for this
purpose a new international body which
we call the Council of Conciliation.
The functions of the Council would be
similar to those hitherto performed by the
diplomatic representatives of the Powers
when they meet in concert to discuss
difficult questions ; but it is intended
that the composition of the Council
should enable its members to take a
more impartial, comprehensive, and inter-
national view than diplomatists have
hitherto shown themselves inclined to
take, and to suggest a radical settlement
rather than a mere temporary compro-

20 THE PREVENTION OF FUTURE WARS

mise, likely to be broken as soon as some
Power is ready to risk war.

The difficulty, of course, will be to secure
the appointment of highly qualified impartial
men. Each Power must appoint its own repre-
sentative, or representatives, and determine the
method of appointment. But it is prescribed
in our draft (Clause 7) that the appointments
shall be made for a fixed term of years, the
Council being thus always complete and in
being.1 The object of this provision is, that
the members shall not be exposed to the sus-
picion of having been appointed for the pur-
poses of a particular dispute, and because of
their supposed views upon it. Nothing further
on this subject is laid down in the draft. But
it would seem desirable, if not essential, that
the members should not act under constant
instructions from their governments, but should
deliberate and vote freely according to their
best judgment, in the interests of the whole
society of nations. On the other hand, it is
to be presumed that the members will be,
and remain, sufficiently in touch with public
opinion in their own country not to be likely
to assent to proposals violently in conflict with
that opinion ; and also will be of sufficient
capacity to have influence with the Council,
and of sufficient weight in their own country
to ensure a fair consideration there of any

* A non-signatory Power sending a representative
under Clause 8 would, of course, appoint its represents
tivt ad hoc only.

INTRODUCTION 21

proposals with which they may associate
ves. The fulfilment of these condi-
> can only be ensured by the public
opinion of the appointing States. And with
a view to making that opinion effective it is
to be presumed that in every country possess-
ing representative institutions the names of the
members to be appointed will be submitted
to the approval of the Legislature.

The objection may be taken that govern-
ments will never consent to allow decisions
that may vitally affect their nation to be agreed
to by representatives who have not been sub-
ject to their constant instructions. But this
objection misapprehends the purpose and
powers of the proposed Council. It is a
Council of Inquiry and Conciliation only.
It would have no executive power, and
decisions would not bind the governments.
It would represent, and express to the public
opinion of the nations, the views of an inter-
national body as to that solution of an urgent
problem that is most in accordance with
equity and the general interest. And if it is
to do this honestly and effectively, it is
essential that its members should not take a
narrowly national view, nor be mere agents
of possibly reactionary governmen

The question arises whether the Powers
should be equally represented on the Council,
does not seem to be a point of funda-
mental importance, since the functions of the
Council are conciliatory only, and not execu-
tive. But since it is likely that the greater

THE PREVENTION OF FUTURE WARS

Powers would have a larger number of men
qualified to be members, they might be given
a greater representation : say three to each of
the Great Powers, and one at least to each
of the rest.

The Council, as has been explained, will
mediate between the disputants and endeavour
to arrange a settlement which shall not be a
mere compromise but shall rest upon intel-
ligible and accepted principles and have in
it some guarantee of permanence. Sometimes
it may be able to arrange such a settlement
privately with the parties. But in every case
where it fails to do this it should publish a report
or reports dealing with the whole situation
and setting forth its recommendations and the
grounds on which they are based (Clause n).
These reports and recommendations would
then form the subject of debates in national
Legislative Assemblies, and of discussion at
public meetings and in the press. And sufficient
time being allowed for this (Clause 17) it is not
unreasonable to hope that the best public
opinion of all countries would support the
Council in pressing for an amicable solution
on the lines suggested, and that the disputants
would yield to that pressure. Should this hope
not be fulfilled, then it must be clearly under-
stood that no Power would be under treaty
obligation either to accept the recommenda-
tions of the Council or to put pressure upon
a Power refusing to accept them. The States
would retain on these points all their liberty
of action. All that the treaty would prescribe

INTRODUCT1' 23

i% * uch a situation arises, the Powers

should meet in conference to consider whether
or not it is practicable or desirable for them to
take collective action (Clause 20). This confer-
ence would be composed of the diplomatic re-
presentatives of the Powers, and would proceed
in the ordinary way of such conferences, all
the governments being ultimately free to take
what action they think expedient or right.

It is possible then, that from such a situa-
tion war might, in the last resort, arise. It is
not claimed that the Union would make war
>ssible. But it is believed that the en-
forced period of delay, the consideration by an
impartial Council, and the publicity given to
ccommendations would be very likely to
prevent war by rallying the public opinion
of the world in favour of peace ; and that,
m the worst case, the area of war would be
likely to be restricted ; for a Power making
war in defiance of the recommendations of the
Council could not rely on support from the
other signatory Powers.

It will be observed that our plan implies and
presupposes such a measure of popular control
over international relations as is involved in
the publication of the results of impartial
inquiry, and their discussion in representative
assemblies and in the press. Without pretend-
ing that public opinion is always and every-
where paci believe that, when it
properly instructed, and when time is given for
passions to cool, it is more likely to favour peace
th m do the secret operations of diplomacy.

24 THE PREVENTION OF FUTURE WARS

the It may be worth while to emphasize the

EST^c«<5t difference between the Union we are pro-
posing and what has been known as the
Concert of Europe. In the first place, the
Union would not be confined to European
Powers. In the second place, it would bind
the signatory Powers, under the sanction, in
the last resort, of force, to submit their disputes
to peaceable settlement, before having recourse
to military measures. In the third place, it
would create for the discussion of the most
difficult and contentious questions an im-
partial and permanent Council, which would
have some advantages over the present
machinery of the Concert. We attach much
importance to the creation of such a per-
manent international organ, and believe that
its ultimate and indirect effects may be even
more important than its operations in par-
ticular cases.

Such, in outline, is the scheme proposed.
A few words may now be said as to some of
the more obvious and serious objections that
may be taken against it.

"rtparattont x- The essence of the proposal is to impose

a period of delay before recourse can be had to
hostilities, the period to be devoted to attempts
at peaceable settlement. But what exactly is
to be accounted " recourse to hostilities " ?
The phrase in our draft is "declare war or
begin hostilities or hostile preparations against
a signatory Power" (Clauses 17 and 19). We
are well aware that the term " hostile prepara-
tions" is a vague one, and in some cases

<i>n riON

would be difficult to interpret. Questions
may arise as to whether a mol is

directed against a particular Power, and as
to what, short of mobilization, is a hostile
preparation against a particular Power. The
circumstances which would constitute a hostile
preparation do not seem capable of exact
definition, and we have been urged, for t:
reason, to omit the term from our scheme.
But it is obvious that a strategical disposi-
tion of forces on a particular frontier might
, in certain cases, the Power having
recourse to it an advantage, as great as it
could attain by the actual invasion of the
territory of a neighbouring State. We feel,
therefore, that we must include the case of
:ile preparations against a signatory Power
as one of the events against which some
sanction must be provided, even though a
precise definition of the term cannot be
formulated.

If an agreement limiting armaments were
arrived at, a breach of the agreement would,
na facie, be regarded as a hostile prepara-
tion. For this reason, apart from any other,
such an agreement would appear to be
highly desirable, and the draft gives power
to the Council to make and submit to the
Powers suggestions in that sense (Clause 13).
We think that the comparative security which
the Union would guarantee to its members,
as well as the economic exhaustion following
the present war, and the determination of the
peoples to reduce tins tremendous burden,

26 THE PREVENTION OF FUTURE WARS

should make it possible for such an agreement
to be entered into, in spite of the well-known
difficulties it must encounter.

2. In case any Power declares war or begins
hostilities or hostile preparations against a
signatory Power, without first referring the
dispute to peaceable settlement and awaiting
the prescribed period, the signatory Powers are
under obligation to apply coercive measures,
both economic and forcible, against the Power
so acting (Clause 19). But they would have to
agree upon what those measures shall be, and
by whom and how they are to be carried out.
It may be urged, therefore, that difficulties are
likely to arise ; since either the Powers must be
unanimous, in which case action may be pre-
vented by the refusal of a single Power, or a
majority must decide, in which case Powers
that are liable to less risk or responsibility may
outvote Powers that are liable to more. The
difficulty is real, but it has not been thought
necessary to complicate the draft by entering
upon the details of a possible solution. It is
the kind of difficulty the Powers must settle for
themselves, either by common sense round their
council-table, or by forming some kind of con-
stitution involving a graduation of voting power.
And since they would be under treaty obliga-
tion to take immediate measures, the necessities
of the case would compel a prompt solution.

3. A more fundamental objection aims at
the ttaiui quo. the whole scope of our scheme. "If you are
successful," it may be said, "what you will really
do is to stereotype the status quo, as it may be

INTRODUCTI' L'7

established after this war. But no status can
be permanently satisfactory in a changing
world What is required is a machinery for
altering international relations as circum-
stances change, but for alter :i a
peaceable way." To this we • st, that
our scheme, though it delays war, does not
attempt to proh 1 1 leaves war as a last
escape from an impossible situation. Secondly,
that the recommendations of the proposed
Council of Conciliation will serve as sugges-
tions to the Powers for a peaceable alteration
of the status quo. Thirdly, that the draft gives
the Council power, even when there is not a
dispute, but the possibility of one is foreseen,
to make suggestions for dealing with the whole
situation out of which such disputes may arise
(Clause 12) ; and, generally, to make proposals
which may lead to the avoidance of war
(Clause 13). These are very wide powers ; and
if they were used, the Council might become
the originator of new international arrange-
ments and n

The development of international law, both
in scope and in precision, is one of the most
essential needs of the future ; and the ques-
tion by what body it may best be developed
is a very important one. The most obvious
body is the Hague Conference. And it is to
be hoped and expected that after the war
the Conference will be given a permanent
organization, will meet at regular intervals, and
address itself to the codification and de-
•pment of international law. On the other

28 THE PREVENTION OF FUTURE WARS

hand, if a Union such as \\r M ingest should
be formed and should not include all the
States represented at The Hague, it would
seem possible and desirable that the States
participating should adopt rules of law binding
on their members ; and the American League to
Enforce Peace makes this one of the obligatory
functions of the proposed league. Such rules
of law might afterwards be endorsed by the
Hague Conference. We are not at all opposed
in principle to this procedure, though we have
not thought it necessary to embody it in our
proposals.

In any development of an International
Organ with legislative powers, questions must
arise, at some stage, as to equality or inequality
of voting power, and the binding of a minority
by a majority. We do not here discuss or
prejudge these questions ; for, while recog-
nizing the great value of a Legislative Body to
complete international organization, we doubt
whether the time is ripe for constituting such
a Body. The present scheme is put forward,
not as ideal, but as something which we
believe to be immediately practicable, and
which would constitute a great advance upon
the present international anarchy. The very
recognition of its defects in practice may and
should lead to its development and comple-
tion. Meantime, we submit it to candid, and,
we hope, friendly criticism.

NOTE. — Since this draft was first drawn
up and circulated privately for discussion,

INTRODUCTION

es have been formed to advocate
plans which are, in their main features, the
same. One is the League of Nations Society
in England, the other the American League
to Enforce Peace, to which we have already
referred. The programmes of these Sock
are appended to our proposals. It will be
observed that the principal difference between
the proposals of this draft and those of the
League of Nations Society is that the latter
propose to apply a sanction to the awards of
the court (though not to the recommenda-
tions of the council), and this draft does not.
And that the principal difference between the
proposals of this draft and those of the
American League to Enforce Peace is th.it
the latter do not propose that the treaty
States should take action against military
aggression on a member of the League by a
State tl. ;iot a party to the treaty, and

draft does so propose. This difference
seems to be due to the geographical situation
and political traditions of the United States.
In our judgment a scheme on the lines here
put forward would be the most likely to com-
mand general assent at the present stage of
international development. But we have no
desire to dogmatize on these difficult qi
tions, and the differences between the plans
here set forth are far less important than their
fundamental agreement as to the way to go
ork.

PROJECT FOR A TREATY

i The parties to the treaty arrangement
contemplated in the succeeding clauses to be
the Great Powers (i.e. the Great Powers of
Europe, the United States, and Japan), or so
many of them as may desire to enter into it ;
such of the other European Powers as are
willing to become parties to it ; and any other
Powers which may hereafter be admitted by
the Powers aforesaid.

JUSTICIABLE DISPUTES.

2. The signatory Powers to agree to refer
to the existing Permanent Court of Arbitration
at The Hague, or to the Court of Arbitral
Justice proposed at the second Hague Con-
ference, if and when such Court shall be
established, or to some other arbitral tribunal,
all disputes between them (including those
affecting honour and vital interest*), which
are of a justiciable character and which the
Powers concerned have failed to settle by
diplomatic methods.

3. The signatory Powers so referring to arbi-
tration to agree to accept, and give effect to,
the award of the tribunal.

4. " Disputes of a justiciable characte;

be defined as " disputes as to the interpretation

32 THE PREVENTION OF FUTURE WARS

Court to d«cld«

{•EiUMi

of a treaty, as to any question of international
l.iw, as to the existence of any fact which, if
established, would constitute a breach of any
international obligation, or as to the nature
and extent of the reparation to be made for
any such breach."

5. Any question which may arise as to
whether a dispute is of a justiciable character,
to be referred for decision to the Court of
Arbitral Justice when constituted; or until it
is constituted, to the existing Permanent Court
of Arbitration at The Hague.

Constitution
and objects of
Council.

Appointment
and term of
office of

member*.

Temporary
representation

of non-signatory
Poi

PERMANENT COUNCIL OF CONCILIATION.

6. With a view to the prevention and settle-
ment of disputes between the signatory Powers
which are not of a justiciable character, a
permanent Council of Conciliation to be
constituted.

7. The members of the Council to be
appointed by the several signatory Powers
for a fixed term of years, and vacancies to
be filled up by the appointing Powers, so that
the Council shall always be complete and in
being.1

8. In order to provide for the case of dis-
putes between a signatory Power and an out-
side Power which is willing to submit its case
to the Council, provision to be made for the
temporary representation of the latter.

1 For some observations on the method of appoint-
ment, the number and character of the members to be
appointed by each Power, and the method of voting,
Mt Introduction, p. ao.

PROJECT FOR A TREATY

9. The signatory Powers to agree that every
party to a dispute, not of a justiciable char-
acter, the existence of which might ultimately
endanger friendly relations with another sig-
natory Power or Powers, and which has not
been settled by diplomatic methods, will sub-
mit its case to the Council with a view to
conciliation.

10. Where, in the opinion of : mcil,
. dispute exists between any of the si;

••• Powers which appears likely to endanger

T good relations with each other, the

Council to consider the dispute and to invite

each Power concerned to submit its case with

<> conciliation.

1 1. Unless, through the good offices of the
Council or otherwise, the dispute shall have
previously been settled between the parties, the
Council to make and publish, with regard to
every dispute considered by }X>rt or
reports, containing recommendations for the
amicable settlement of the dispute.

When it appears to the Council that,
from any cause within its knowledge, the
good relations between any of the signatory
Powers are likely to be endangered, the
Council to be at liberty to make suggestions
to them with a view to conciliation, whether
or not any dispute has actually arisen, and, if
it considers it expedient to do so, to publish
such suggestions.

Council to be at liberty to make
and submit for the consideration of the signa-
tory Powers, suggestions as to the limitation

34 THE PREVENTION OF FUTURE WARS

for'

Committees of
tht Council.

or reduction of armaments, or any other sug-
gestions which in its opinion would lead to the
avoidance of war or the diminution of iN evils.

14. The signatory Powers to agree to furnish
the Council with all the means and facilities
required for the due discharge of its functions.

15. The Council to deliberate in public or in
private, as it thinks lit.

16. The Council to have power to appoint
committees, which may or may not be coin-
posed exclusively of its own members, to
report to it on any matter within the scope
of its functions.1

Signatory
Powers to
abstain from
hostile action

ssssr

MORATORIUM FOR HOSTILITIES.

17. Every signatory Power to agree not t<>
declare war or begin hostilities or hostile pre-
parations against any other signatory Power
(a) before the matter in dispute shall have been
submitted to an arbitral tribunal, or to the
Council ; or (6) within a period of twelve months
after such submission ; or (c), if the award of
the arbitral tribunal or the report of the
Council, as the case may be, has been pub-
lished within that time, then not to declare
war or begin hostilities or hostile preparations
within a period of six months after the pub-
lication of such award or report.2

1 It will be observed that it is not proposed to confci
any executive power on the Council.

- If an agreement for limitation of armaments had
been arrived at, any departure from the agreement
would presumably be taken to be a " hostile prepara-
tion," until the contrary were shown. (See Introduc-
tion, p. 25.)

PROJECT FOR A TREATY

NUTATION OF EFFECT OF ALLIANCES.

1 8. The signatory Powers to agree that
signatory Power commencing hostilities
against another, without first complying \
the pro of the preceding clauses, shall

be entitled, by virtue of any now 4 or

future tiraty "t alliance or other cngagem
to the military or other material support of any
othei :y Power in such hostil

i OF THK PRECEDE

ry signatory Power to undertake

that in case any Power, whether or not a

atory Power, declares war or begins

host ilit arations against a

ithout hrst having sub-
case to an arbitral tribunal, or to
the Council of Conciliation, or (6) before the
expiration of the hereinbefore prescribed
periods of delay, it will forthwith, in conjunc-
tion with the other signatory Powers, take such
concerted measures, economic and forcible,
against the Power so acting, as, in their judg-
ment, are most effective and appropriate to
tlu tin es of the case.

20. The signatory Powers to undertake that
ver shall fail to accept and give
effect to the recommendations contained in
report of the Council, or in the award
he arbitral tribunal, they will, at a Con-
ference to be forthwith summoned for the
purpose, consider, in concert, the situation

36 THE PREVENTION OF FUTURE WARS

which has arisen by reason of such tailure,
and what collective action, if .my, it is
practicable to take in order to make such
recommendations operative.1

1 The measures contemplated in paragraphs
19, 20 would, of course, be taken by the govern-
ments of the signatory Powers acting in concert,
and not by the Council of Conciliation. (See Intro-
duction, pp. 21 and 23.)

LEAGUE OF NATIONS SOCIETY

•r. Set. : MRS. A. W. CLARKMONT.
Off* atral Buildings, Tothill Street, Westminster, S.\V.

PLATFORM.

1. That a trei 1 be made as soon as possible,
whereby as many States as are willing to do so shall form
a League binding themselves to use peaceful methods for
dealing with all disputes arising among them.

2. That such methods shall be as follows : —

(a) All dispute^ arising out of questions of Inter-
national Law or the Interpretation of Treaties shall
be referred to the Hague Court of Arbitration, or
some other judicial tribunal, whose decisions shall
be final, and shall be carried into effect by the
ties concerned.

(6) All other disputes shall be referred to, and in-
tigated and reported upon by, a Council of
Enquiry and Conciliation : the Council to be repre-
sentative of the States which form the League.

That the States which are members of the League

i unite in any action necessary for ensuring that every

•nbcr shall abide by the terms of the treaty.

4. That the States which are members of the League

shall make provision for Mutual Defence, diplomatic,

IT

38 THE PREVENTION OF FUTURE WARS

economic, or military, in the event of them being

attacked by a State, not a member of the League, which
refuses to submit the case to an appropriate Tribunal or
Council.

5. That any civilized State desiring to join the League
shall be admitted to membership.

LEAGUE TO ENFORCE PEACE

MEKICAN BRAN(

Frtiidtnt TMF. HON. \Viii.i\M HOWARD TAFT.
Stcrttary:

WW H 8 !ORT,

70 Fifth Avenue, New York Ciijr-

PLATFORM.

IT is desirable for the United States to join in a league of
nations binding the signatories to the following : —

1. All ju-ticiable questions arising between the
signatory Powers, not settled by negotiation, shall,
subject to the limitations of treaties, be submitted to
a judicial tribunal for hearing and judgment, both
upon the merits and upon any issue as to its jurisdic-

n of the question.

2. All other questions arising between the signa-
tories and not settled by negotiation shall be sub-
to a Council of Conciliation for hearing,

consideration, and recommendati

3. T: i.itory Powers shall jointly use forthwith
both their economic and military forces against any
one of their number that goes to war, or com
acts of hostility, against another of the signatories
before any question arising shall be submitted as
provided in the forego

40 THE PREVENTION OF FUTURE WARS

4. Conferences between the signatory Powers
be held from time to time to formulate and codify
rules of international law, which, unless some rigna-
tory shall signify its dissent within a stated period,
-hull thereafter govern in the decisions of the Judicial
Tribunal mentioned in Article i.

APPENDIX

QUOTATIONS FROM LEAIUNV. STATESMEN ON THE
SUBJECT OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONSHI

ER THK WAR

MR. ASQUITH

I should like, if I might for a moment, beyond this enquiry into
causes and motives, to ask your attention and that of my fellow-
countrymen to the end which in this war we ought to keep in
view. Forty-four years ago, at the time of the war of 1870, Mr.
Gladstone used these words. He said : "The greatest triumph of
our time will be the enthronement of the idea of public right as
the governing idea of European politics." Nearly fifty years have
passed. Little progress, it seems, has yet been made towards that
great and beneficent change, but it seems to me to be now at
this moment as good a definition as we can have of our European
policy. The idea of public right, what does it mean when trans-
lated into concrete terms ? It means first and foremost the clearing
of the ground by the definite repudiation of militarism as the
governing factor in the relations of States, and of the future moulding
of the European world. It means next that room roust be found
and kept for the independent existence and the free development
of the smaller nationalities— each with a corporate consciousness of
its own. Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland and the Scandinavian
countries, Greece and the Balkan States, they must be recognized
as having exactly as good a title as their more powerful neighbours
— more powerful in strength as in wealth— exactly as good a title
to a place in the sun.

And it means, finally, or it ought to mean, perhaps by a slow
and gradual process, the substitution for force, for the clash of com-
peting ambitions, for groupings and alliances and a precarious
equipoise, the substitution for all these things of a real European
partnership, based on the recognition of equal right and established
and enforced by a common will. A year ago that would have
sounded like a Utopian idea. It is probably one that may not or

o

44 APPENDIX

will not be realized either to-day or to-morrow. If and when
war is decided in favour of the Allies, it will at once come
within the range, and before long within the grasp, of European
statesmanship.

September 25, 1914.

VISCOUNT GREY OF FALLOD

at we and our AHics are fighting for is a free Europe. We
want a Europe free not only from the domination of one nationality
by another, but from hectoring diplomacy and the peril of war,
free from the constant rattling of the sword in the scabbard, from
perpetual talk of shining armour and war lords. In fact, we feel we
are fighting for equal rights, for law, justice, peace ; for civilization
throughout the world as against brute force, which knows no restraint
and no mercy. ... We want a settled peace in Europe and
throughout the world which will be a guarantee against aggres-
sive war.

Germany's philosophy is that a settled peace spells disintegra-
tion, degeneracy, the sacrifice of the heroic qualities in human
character. Such a philosophy, if it is to survive as a practical
force, means eternal apprehension and unrest. It means erer-
incr easing armaments. It means arresting the development of
mankind along the lines of culture and humanity. We are fighting
this idea. We do not believe in war as the preferable method
of settling disputes between nations. When nations cannot see
eye to eye, when they quarrel, when there is a threat of war, we
believe the controversy can be settled by methods other than those
of war. Such other methods are always successful when there is
goodwill, and no aggressive spirit.

Long before this war I hoped for a league of nations that would
be united, quick, and instant to prevent, and if need be to punish,
violation of international treaties, of public right, of national
independence, and would say to nations that come forward with
grievances and claims, "Put them before an impartial tribunal.
If you can win at this bar, you will get what you want ; if you
cannot, you shall not have what you ^ want, and if you attempt

49

45 APPENDIX

to start a war we all shall adjudge you the common enemy of
humanity, and treat you accordingly." As footpads, safe- breakers,
burglars, and incendiaries are suppressed in nations, so those wha
would commit these crimes, and incalculably more than these
crimes, will be suppressed among nations.

Unless mankind learns from this war to avoid war the struggle
will have been in vain. Over humanity will loom the menace of
destruction. The Germans have thrown the door wide open to
every form of attack upon human life. . . . They have come upon
bUmeless nations with invasion, incendiarism, and confiscation :
they have come with poisonous gases and liquid fire. All thi-ii
scientific genius has been dedicated to wiping out human life.
They have forced these things into general use in war. If the
world cannot organize against war, if war must go on, then the nations
can protect themselves, henceforth, only by using whatever de-
structive agencies they can invent till the resources and inventions-
of science end by destroying the humanity that they were meant
to serve.

Afay 15, 1916.

On May 18, 1916, Mr. Balfour, in discussing the problem which
he said lay behind all the changing aspects of this tremendous wai,
namely, how, when it is brought to an end, civilized mankind shall
so reorganize itself that similar catastrophes shall not be permitted
to recur, stated that if in our time any substantial effort is to be
made towards ensuring the permanent triumph of the Anglo-Saioo
ideal the great communities which accept it must work together.
But in working together, they must bear in mind that law is
not enough. Behind law there must be power. It is good that
arbitration should be encouraged. It is good that the accepted
practices of warfare should become ever more humane. It is good
that before peace is broken the would-be belligerents should be
compelled to discuss their differences in some congress of the
nations. It is good that the security of the smaller States should
be fenced round with peculiar care. But all the precautions are
mere scraps of paper unless they can be enforced. What is needed
now, and will be so long as militarism is unconquered, is the
machinery for enforcing them, and the contrivance of such a
machinery will tax to its utmost the statesmanship of the world.

May 18, 1916.

LIX)YD GEORGE

The best security for peace will be that nations will band them-
selves together to punish the first peacebreaker. In the armouries
of Europe every weapon will be a sword of justice. In the govern-
ment of men every army will be the constabulary of peace.

January 11, 1917.

4T

PRESIDENT WILSON

We are participants, whether we would or not, in the life of the
world. The interests of all nations are our own also. We are
partners with the rest. What affects mankind is inevitably our
affair as well as the affair of the nations of Europe and of Asia.

One observation on the causes of the present war we are at liberty
to make, and to make it may throw some light forward upon the
future, as well as backward upon the past. It is plain that this war
could have come only as it did, suddenly and out of secret counsels,
without warning to the world, without discussion, without any of
the deliberate movements of counsel with which it would seem
natural to approach so stupendous a contest.

It is probable that if it had been foreseen just what would happen,
just what alliances would be formed, just what forces arrayed against
one another, those who brought the great contest on would have
been glad to substitute conference for force.

If we ourselves had been afforded some opportunity to apprise
the belligerents of the attitude which it would be our duty to take,
of the policies and practices against which we would feel bound to
use all our moral and economic strength, and in certain circum-
stances even our physical strength also, our own contribution to the
counsel which might have averted the struggle would have been
considered worth weighing and regarding.

And the lesson which the shock of being taken by surprise in
a matter so deeply vital to all the nations of the world has made
poignantly clear is that the peace of the world must henceforth
depend upon a new and more wholesome diplomacy.

Only when the great nations of the world have reached some
sort of agreement as to what they hold to be fundamental to their
common interest, and as to some feasible method of acting in
concert when any nation or group of nations seeks to disturb
those fundamental things, can we feel that civilization is at last

48

APPENDIX 49

in a way of justifying its existence and claiming to be finally
established.

It is clear that nations must in the future be governed by the
same high code of honour that we demand of individuals.

j>eated utterances of the leading statesmen of most of the
great nations now engaged in war have made it plain that their
thought has come to this— that the principle of public right mutt
henceforth take precedence over the individual interests of par-
ir nations, and that the nations of the world roust in some
way band themselves together to see that that right prevails as
against any sort of selfish aggression; that henceforth alliance
must not be set up against alliance, understanding against under-
standing, but that there must be a common agreement for a common
object, and that at the heart of that common object must lie the
inviolable rights of peoples and of mankind.

e nations of the world have become each other's neighbours,
to their interest that they should understand each other. In
order that they may understand each other, it is imperative that
they should agree to co-operate in a common cause, and that they
should so act that the guiding principle of that common cause shall
be even-handed and impartial justice. This is undoubtedly the
thought of America. This is what we ourselves will say when there
comes proper occasion to say it. In the dealings of nations with
one another arbitrary force must be rejected, and we must move
forward to the thought of the modem world, the thought of which
peace is the very atmosphere. That thought constitutes a chief
part of the passionate conviction of America.

We believe these fundamental things : First, that every people
has a right to choose the sovereignty under which they shall live.
Second, that the small States of the world have a right to enjoy the
same respect for their sovereignty and for ti. orial integrity

that great and powerful nations expect and insist upon. And third,
that the world has a right to be free from every disturbance of
its peace that has its origin in aggression and disregard of the rights
of peoples and nations.

So sincerely do we believe in these things that I am sure that
I speak the mind and wish of the people of America when I say
that the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible
association of nations formed in order to realize these objects and
make them secure against violation.

There is nothing that the United States wants for itself that any

4

50 APPENDIX

other nation has. We are willing, on the contrary, to limit our-
selves along with them to a prescribed course of duty and respect
for the rights of others, which will check any selfish passion of
our own as it will check any aggressive impulse of theirs.

If it should ever be our privilege to suggest or initiate a move-
ment for peace among the nations now at war, I am sure that the
people of the United States would wish^heir Government to move
along the line of a universal association of the nations to maintain
the inviolate security of the highway of the seas for the common
and unhindered use of all the nations of the world, and to prevent
any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning
and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world — a
virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence.

I feel that the world is even now upon the eve of a great
consummation, when some common force will be brought into
existence which shall safeguard right as the first and most funda-
mental interest of all peoples and all governments, when coercion
shall be summoned not to the service of political ambition or
selfish hostility, but to the service of a common order, a common
justice, and a common peace.

God grant that the dawn of that day of frank dealing and of
settled peace, concord, and co-operation may be near at hand !

May 28, 1916.

There must be just and settled peace, and we here in America
must contribute the full force of our enthusiasm and of our
authority as a nation to the organization of that peace upon
world-wide foundations that cannot easily be shaken. No nation
can any longer remain neutral as against any wilful disturbance
of the peace of the world. The effects of war can no longer be
confined to the areas of battle. No nation stands wholly apart in
interest when the life and interest of all nations are thrown into
confusion and peril. If hopeful and generous intercourse is to be
renewed, if the healing and helpful arts of life are indeed to be
revived when peace comes again, a new atmosphere of justice
and friendship must be generated by means the world has never
tried before. The nations of the world must unite in joint guarantees
that, whatever is done to disturb the whole world's life, must first
be tested in the court of the whole world's opinion before it is
attempted to secure this end.

September 2, 1916.

APPENDIX 51

We want all the world to know that Americans are ready in
years to come to lend oar force, without slint, to the preservation of
peace in the interests of mankind. The world it no longer divided
into little circles of interest The world no longer consists of
neighbourhoods. The whole is linked together in a common life
and interest such as humanity never saw before, and the starting
of wars can never again be a private and individual matter for
nations.

October 5, 1916.

MR. CHARLES EVANS HUGHES
(Republican Candidate for the Presidency of the United States^ 1916)

If the conflict of national interests is not to be brought to the
final test of force, there must be the development of international
organization in order to provide international justice, and safe-
guard, so far as practicable, the peace of the world. . . . And
behind this international organization, if it is to be effective, must
be the co-operation of the nations to prevent resort to hostilities
before the appropriate agencies of peaceful settlement have been
utilized. If the peace of the world is to be maintained, it must
be through the preventive power of a common purpose. . . .
There is no national isolation in the world of the twentieth
century. If at the close of the present war the nations are ready
to undertake practicable measures in the common interest in order
to secure international justice, we cannot fail to recognize our
international duty.

July 31, 1916.

At the banquet of the American League to Enforce Peace,
November 24, 1916, the following

FROM VISCOUNT GRIY or FALLODEN.

I think public utterances most hare already made it dear that
I sincerely desire to see a league of nations formed and made effec-
tive to secure the future peace of the world after this war is over.
I regard this as the best, if not the only, prospect of preserving
treaties and of saving the world from aggressive wars in years to
come. If there is any doubt about my sentiments in the mat*
hope this telegram in reply to your own will remove it.

FROM M. BRIAND
(thtn Prim* Ministtr of tfu French Republic).

I have the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your com-
munication, the contents of which I have noted with lively
cst. In basing your effort on the fundamental principle of
respect for the rights and wishes of the various peoples of the
world, you are certain of being on common ground with the
countries who, in the present conflict, are giving their blood and
resources, without counting the cost, to save the independence
of the nations.

Please receive, Mr. Chairman, the assurances of my high
consideration.

PrinUd in Great Britain by

Lit WIN BROTHERS, LIMITED

WOKINO AND LONDON

International Government

Two Reports BX L. s. WOOLF

A PROJECT BY A FABIAN COMMITTEE FOR A

SUPERNATIONAL AUTHORITY THAT Wll
Dtmy 8»«. PREVENT WAR 6/. •//. Poittp &

"The most brilliant contHborioo to the crowing 'after the war
hat yet been made."— Dttijy Ntm **d

The Framework of a Lasting
Peace

/>/sr;8rf. EDITED BY LEONARD S. WOO v^-

This work contains a collection of all the more important schemes

i 11 i , , j . i , , , , f i . \, . • . , i

wnicn uave oven pui iw W<H« in America, onum, ana on me ixjnunaH

for a League of .hall have as its object the reconstruction

nuuional society and the prevention of war. Mr. Wood, in an
Introduction, subjects the different proposals to a critical

and shows that upon the most important points they are m

b ^f

e uncs 01

thrra inHi ~at«» lh*» ifiuia of internet i«wtftl AtfrMMiMni

practical sliloamiiiihir ought to follow after the war.

The Future of Constantinople

By LEONARD S. WOO I 1

Cr. 8r». 2/. 6V. •//.

This work deals with one of the most vital problems of British foreign

policy, the settlement of the Ottoman Empire after the war. It proposes

and discusses a settlement of Constantinople based upon the political.

l • ' >. i ' M i • • • h v • i ' ' (•• P i* ii • il i • •' '-'(•(<

on the European Commission of the Danube, is examined in detail, and
the history and achievements of the Danube Commission are for the
Erst tin book made fully available for English readers.

The United States and the

War

GILBERT
VIVIAN SELDES

?». l/. / net.

- The United States and .s an explanation of what the United

States has done and has not done since August 1914. The explanation to
found, not m U effort* of individuals, but in the traditions and

an people themselves On the same basis the
scs the possible relations of the United States with the liberal
nations of Europe. The author is an American Journalist now living

LUMJUN . Gi-.uKUL ALLKN ,V TNWIN LIMIihD

The Choice Before Us

BY G. LOWES DICKINSON
Demy Svo. 7/. 6d. net. Postage 6J.

This book describes briefly the prospect before the worM. if
international an ;iuc, and to be

after the war. It analyses and discus-
underlie M ng argued both th.it inh

!1 be conducted in the future implies the ruin of civil.
that it i* IV. t "inevitable," sketches the kind of n ,ut is

both possible and essential if war is not to > .unkind.

After -War Problems

EDITED BY WILLIAM HARBUTT DAWSON
Demy Svo. 7/. 6</. net. Postage 6d.

This important volume is intended to state some of the in
national problems which will need to be faced after the War, and to
offer a practicable Programme of Reconstruction. The cha:
all been written by ta deeply concerned in the subjects with

which they deal, as will be seen from the following synopsis : —
IMI'KKIAL FEDERATION. THE CULTIVATION OF PATRIOTISM

By the late EARL OF CROMKR. By the EARL OF MK

I-ATE AND THE CITIZEN. THE ALIEN QUESTI

By BISHOP WBLLDOM.

THBSTA, FRY.

LOtNT HA! ByDr W GAR\

THE ORGANIZATION OF NATIONAL

RESOURCES. By the Rr. HON. SIR TH1, «''OX TO

J. COMMON RICKBTT, M.P. LABOUR. By IT i \PMAN.

RELATIONS BETWEEN CAPITAL AND POSITION OF v ,OM1C

LABOUR, (i. LABOUR.) By GKO. H. LIFE. By MRS. FAWCCTT.

ROBERTS, J. P., M.P. THE LAND ^,
RELATIONS BETWEEN CAPITAL AND By W. JOYNSON HI..K MI'

THE REHABILITATION OF RURAL THE CARE OF CHLD LIFE
LIFE. By the BISHOP OF EXETER. TH^^L?r~ McSitiJ

VATinVAI HPAITH ' ' l " '

B?J AMES KERR S'.A, M.D., D.P.H. NAT .
UNSOLVED PK THE BX AKTHLK SHERWELL, M.P.

ENGLISH POOR LAW. By > \.\TION AFTER THK

WM. CHANCE, Bart., M^. WAR. By PROF. ALFRED MAI

The American League to
Enforce Peace

BY C. R. ASHBEE

WITH AN INTRODUCTION BY G. LOWES DICKINSON
Crown Svo. is. 64. net. Tostage $d.

The American League to Enforce Peace, a study of whose objects by
Mr. C. R. Ashbee we publish, may turn out to be one of the great land-
marks of the war. It will sever the United States from their traditional
policy, and bring them into a new comity of nations. Tin
challenge is to every democracy in Europe and it Ticant that

the League was inaugurated in May 1915 in Indepen il, the

historic home of the signing of the Declaration of Independence.
Ashbee, who, with one exception, was the only Englishman present at
the League's inauguration, goes into the question of its policy and the
force that underlies it (it is no peace campaign).

LONDON: GEORGE ALLEN & UNWIN LIMITED

VfMfttNQ SECT. MAR 1 1 1964

PLEASE DO NOT REMOVE
CARDS OR SLIPS FROM THIS POCKET

UNIVERSITY OF TORONTO LIBRARY

JX Bryce, James biyce,

viscount
B75" Proposals for tae

prevention of future