The provocation of France; fifty years of German aggression

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Univ. of California

Withdrawn

THE PROVOCATION OF
FRANCE

FIFTY YEARS OF GERMAN
AGGRESSION

BY

JEAN CHARLEMAGNE BRACQ, LITT. D., LL.D.

PROFESSOR OF FRENCH LITERATURE W VASSAR COLLEGE

> NEW YORK
OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

AMERICAN BRANCH: 85 WEST 82ND STREET
LONDON, TORONTO. MELBOURNE, AND BOMBAY

1916

Copyright,
BY OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS
AMERICAN BRANCH

JHISTORY*!

-. : •

D

CONTENTS

CHAPTER PAGE

INTRODUCTION v

I. BISMARCK BEFORE THE EMS DISPATCH . . i

II. THE MUTILATED EMS DISPATCH 18

III. THE CONFLICT 29

IV. THE AIM OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE . . 43
V. THE KAISER'S PROVOCATIONS .... 58

VI. A GERMAN QUARREL 73

VII. FRANCE, GERMANY AND MOROCCO ... 83
VIII. FROM THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE TO THE

DELIVERANCE OF FEZ 95 -

IX. THE AGADIR PROVOCATION 108

X. THE ALSATIAN QUESTION 120

XL GERMAN MILITARISM 135 i

XII. GERMANY AND RUSSIA 150

v XIII. GERMANY, BELGIUM AND ENGLAND . . . 162

THE REAL ATTITUDE OF FRANCE . . . 173 -/}?

/4-7

XV. AUSTRIA AND THE GERMAN PROVOCATION . 182

THE INITIATORS OF THE GREAT WAR . . 193

INTRODUCTION

THE pages that follow merely describe acts and events
which have taken place within the range of the author's
recollections. He heard discussions as a boy, in France,
upon the war of Italian liberation, and saw soldiers
start for that campaign in 1859. His father and one of
his neighbors were greatly interested in the Prusso-
Austrian war against Denmark, which they considered as
the deliverance of poor molested Germans in a virtual
German country. Later on, in their own way, they
discussed the conflict between Prussia and Austria. For
one of these men, a Protestant, Prussia was the repre-
sentative of liberalism, of humanism, of progress ; while
for the other, a Catholic, Austria was the custodian of
European order, of the best conservative traditions in a
tottering society, and the great Power most loyal to the
Church. The conversations and discussions which the
boy heard were, as a rule, inaccurate in substance and
almost always in their conclusions, but they created for
him an interest in the problems of central Europe that
has been lasting. The Franco-Prussian war taught him
what to think of the much vaunted liberalism and pacific
spirit of the land of Bismarck. Subsequent history has
revealed to him what German leaders, not representing
ethically the people, could do to harrow the soul of a
neighboring nation and insult her Allies by attempting
to discredit them. The writer is conscious of the ster-
ling qualities and of the attainments of the enemies of
his native land, but it is their unjust, their aggressive

vi INTRODUCTION

and their provoking course that he has wished to bring
out as well as the casuistry with which German writers
have justified the duplicity of their leaders. He has used
as a guiding thread the editorial opinions of the Revue des
Deux Mondes, which have always been the work of mas-
terly minds such as Michel Chevalier, Charles de Mazade,
the Vicomte Georges d'Avenel and Francis Charmes.
These chroniques are, as a whole, the most reliable and
impartial interpretations of contemporary history, during
the last half century, with which the author is acquainted,
while the principal French books devoted to the most
burning international questions first appeared in this
review. His recent re-reading of these luminous and
honest statements of contentions among various peoples
has convinced him that they constitute a collection of
facts, bearing upon the question at issue, of the greatest
value. He has secured his evidence from varied and
reliable sources. Without surrendering his critical
independence, he confesses his readiness to accept, as
reliable, the statements of the noblest representatives
of France, of Lavisse, of Sorel, of Monod, of Taine, of
Renan, of Fouillee, while even the more emotional af-
firmations of E. Caro and of Pasteur seem to him trust-
worthy. He has consulted the best sources available to
him, and among these he cannot pass over in silence Le
Temps, which, for nearly a third of a century, has proven
to him the best instrument of information upon France
and Europe. This is not a book of erudition. It is the
simple putting together of facts which scarcely anyone
denies today, yet which point to an almost constant
aggression against France. It does not bring out the
acts of chance individuals, but of the rulers and govern-
ing classes beyond the Rhine. At the same time, it

INTRODUCTION

vn

attempts to show that if France has not always been
blameless, for she has also her militants and her mili-
tarists (this does not refer to her heroic soldiers), as
a rule her purpose has been international good-will and
peace. She faithfully endeavored to avert the present
colossal tragedy. Whatever she has accomplished during
the last twoscore years she has done it in the face
of an almost constant and exasperating provocation.
Her attitude, however, has been such that she can calmly
await the judgment of history.

BISMARCK BEFORE THE EMS DISPATCH

THAT most remarkable woman, Madame de Stael, did
fatal work for France when she idealized the Germans in
her masterpiece, De I'Allemagne. The book, rendered
popular among the liberals of France by the antagonism
of Napoleon, had a firm hold .upon the national mind.
Her pictures of German character and life were accepted
as real and as worthy of imitation by her countrymen.
The romantic movement, to whose rise she greatly con-
tributed, acted in the same direction; and the writers of
the Revue des Deux Mondes, in its early days, increased
the tendency to an extreme idealization of the trans-
Rhinean people. Heine in De I'Allemagne warned
Frenchmen not to take the pictures of the Sultane de la
pensee too seriously, not to trust these good neighbors
too much ; but the countrymen of Voltaire, so sensitive to
literary influences, continued to think of the Germans as
disciples of the author of Eternal Peace, men athirst
for the invisible realities of the universe, virtual philo-
sophical Quakers. Towards the sixties Victor Hugo
speaks of " that august Germany/' x About 1865, Miche-
let, Janet, Taine, Renan, About, and all the French
liberals looked upon them as embodying the greatest
amount of moral rectitude, of idealistic serenity, of sci-
entific calm and ethical excellence yet attained by men.

1 Les Mistrables, vol. Ill, p. 63.

2 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

In their eyes the expansion of Prussia meant the spreading
of these idyllic virtues.

The war of 1870 was the rending of the illusory veil
which opened up to these Germanophiles a new view of
the countrymen of Kant — men of iron — led against
France by an indomitable hatred, prepared by years of
Spartan military discipline and of aggressive purpose,
men who waged war with a harshness and a brutality
that defy words. The psychological reaction was as
depressing as it was sudden. There was, furthermore, the
sense that they had been deceived by the Prussians as
Napoleon III had been by Bismarck. At first, under the
impression that the French Emperor had been the provo-
cator, they accepted their defeat with a certain con-
trition; but when it became evident to them that the
war had been desired, planned and carried on with a
remorseless intent by Bismarck, and, what was worse,
that the terrible man, to their dismay, represented the
spirit of Prussia, there was a violent revulsion of feel-
ing. The people east of the Rhine appeared in a new
light in the eyes of their western neighbors. So great
was the disappointment of eminent Frenchmen that their
attitude toward most foreigners was seriously modified
by the recoil of their feelings after the war. Yet the
philosophical minds remained fairly calm, though they
were deeply hurt, not only by the injustice and horror
of the recent Franco-German clash, but by the sense of
the deep deception perpetrated upon them by the coun-
trymen of Bismarck and by Bismarck himself. They
had come to loathe the heavy complimentary words which
they had heard from the Prussians, the honeyed talks
of their public men, and all the flatteries of Bismarck-
ian insincerity. They had ignored the depths of racial

BISMARCK BEFORE EMS DISPATCH 3

antagonism that lay dormant in the Prussian heart,
ever ready to be called forth by the Chancellor and his
supporters.

Prussia, gradually risen from the Mark of Brandenburg
to her present state by sheer military effort, and by
the prominence given to her soldiers, endeavored to
deceive everyone. She maintained at this time more
soldiers proportionally than any other Power in Europe.
France, according to Renan,1 was far from aggressive.
She "had become the most pacific country of the
world. . . . The military career was abandoned. . . .
All activity was in the direction of the social question."
When she appeared militant it was because of the action
of Prussia creating a mighty military Power in the
heart of Europe. Germany, in general, and Prussia, in
particular, were hostile to everything French, notwith-
standing their unctuous attitude and their flatteries.
Four or five times in a century they attempted, and
accomplished, invasions of French territory.

The Kaiser, who, in his speeches, constantly refers to
Napoleon as if he had been the sole enemy of Germany,
and ever mentions the battle of Leipsic where Bonaparte
was defeated, never says that during eight years the
King of Prussia was the ally of the Corsican to the great
harm of German states. All through the early nineteenth
century Prussia was watching all possible chances for
aggressions and territorial extension. Not to speak of
other examples, in 1850 Prussian troops entered Hesse
to fight the states representing the authority of the
Diet. The Emperor Nicholas of Russia stopped them
when he said, " I shall fire on the first who fires." 2

1 La reforme intellectuelle et morale, 1871, p. 24.

3 Lowe, Charles, Prince Bismarck, N. Y. 1886, vol. I, p. 108.

4 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

Then there were the wranglings of Prussia with the
Diet, which she used when it served her purpose, and
discarded in the same way. Prussia was feared and
hated by most of the other states of the country, while
at home the military class was detested by those who
wanted political freedom. Those representing tradi-
tional ideas advocated the use of arms to repress the
spirit of independence among themselves, but found
in external aggressions a better way to attain their aims.
In 1856, they were burning to fight Switzerland, a con-
flict which was prevented by the kindly action of England,
and the hostility of Austria.1 During the Crimean war
Prussia remained neutral, thereby gaining the good-will
of Russia. During the Austro-Italian war in 1859, she
was watching her chances. Bismarck was not yet at the
helm of state, but he was already bent upon fighting
Austria, and driving her out of the German Confedera-
tion. As he said then, " if it is our aim to exclude her
from Germany, we can only profit by Austria first being
weakened by France."2 He urges Prussia, at this
juncture, to take the lead of the German Confedera-
tion.3 This, as he cynically says, will have to be done
ferro et igni, by the sword and by fire, already the
Bismarckian method.

Neutral in pretension, Prussia called up all her troops,
and it looked for a while as if Napoleon III would have
to fight on the Rhine as well as along the Po, inasmuch
as the Prussians had " bound themselves by word of
mouth to assist Austria in any circumstances if she

1 Lowe, vol. I, p. 220.

2 Ibid. , p. 391.

3 Ibid., p. 239.

BISMARCK BEFORE EMS DISPATCH 5

should be attacked by France in Italy." 1 If the Italian
war was suddenly ended and Venetia was kept by the
Hapsburgs it was largely due to Berlin.2 For some years
Bismarck, either at the Diet in Frankfurt or as ambas-
sador to Russia, had prepared the ground for his bellig-
erent policy. He had won the neutrality of Russia.
When, in 1863, after he had become prime-minister,
an insurrection took place in Warsaw, he made arrange-
ments with the Czar to help stamp it out.3 While there
were deep governmental affinities between the Russian
spirit and that of Bismarck he did this under the sense
of the value of the co-operation of St. Petersburg. For
years he had conquering designs upon Schleswig-
Holstein. This is evident from constant references to
it in his correspondence.

In 1859 he goes to Paris to gain the friendly attitude
of the French Government. The war which he desired
and planned against Denmark, he hypocritically repre-
sents as a conflict for the relief of oppressed Schles-
wig.4 It was a " national duty of honor " . . . " to
protect the German subjects of the King of Denmark
against the oppression and constitutional wrongs " which
they suffered. How tender the man who later on was
to distinguish himself by his inhuman treatment of the
francs-tireurs, of the Poles and of the Alsatians! He
had the Duchies invaded by 12,000 Saxons and
Hanoverians, followed by the Prussians and Austrians,
but once the Danes defeated, and terms of peace made
for the exclusive advantage of Prussia and Austria,
Bismarck invited both Saxons and Hanoverians to march

1 Prince Bismarck's Letters, p. 147.
1 Lowe, vol. I, p. 259.
* Ibid., p. 304.
, p. 327-

6 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

home, whether they were willing or not.1 It is not
astonishing that he was the man most hated by liberal
Prussians and by most Germans. Then Austria and
Prussia remained sole disposers of the Duchies ceded
to them by the King of Denmark.

In securing these results, there was not a country,
an international organization, or a ruler that the Iron
Minister did not mislead or deceive. England, France,
Denmark, Hanover, Saxony, the London Conference,
the Diet, Christian IX and the Duke of Augustenburg,
all were hoodwinked and mystified by the Prussian
leader.2 He practiced without scruple what in com-
merce and in the policies of most countries would be
methods of a sharper, a cutpurse, but he speaks of his
acts with pride. " When I was made a prince," he says,
" the King insisted upon putting Alsace-Lorraine into
my coat of arms. But I would much rather have had
Schleswig-Holstein ; that is the campaign, politically
speaking, of which I am proudest." 3

After this he found the opportunity of carrying out
his purpose to oust Austria from Germany as well as
from the newly conquered territories. For that purpose,
immediately after his coming to power " the number of
infantry was doubled, and the cavalry regiments were
increased by ten." * The army was the particular object
of his solicitude, as he wished to make it able to cope
with the Empire which, as he puts it, " kept his country
in a state of vassalage." To that end he had already
courted the French Government, which was quite unj

1 Lowe, vol. I, p. 343.
a Headlam, J. W., Bismarck, pp. 192-225.
8 Busch, M., Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His Historyt
vol. II, p. 171.
4 Lowe, vol. I, p. 289.

BISMARCK BEFORE EMS DISPATCH 7

friendly to Vienna, and tried to secure its neutrality in
the struggle; this was granted by Napoleon.1 He then
turned toward Italy and began to humor her by making
with her a generous commercial treaty. Though he had
not .the least sympathy with the aspirations of the
Venetians toward independence in 1859, and his Govern-
ment had prevented it, he now proposes that consumma-
tion as an inducement for the countrymen of Garibaldi
to unite with the Prussians against Austria. As his
advances were accepted, the Italian Government sent
General Gavone secretly to Bismarck and concluded a
treaty of aggression against Austria. Then, according
to the dispatch of the Italian Envoy, Bismarck said,
" Which of us is now going to apply fire to the pow-
der?" To Count Barral, the Italian Ambassador, he
said, " You would do us excellent service by attacking
first." 2

Such was the malignant and wicked design of the
great Prussian Mephistopheles. " Before the ' first shots
fell/ in 1866, he tried a last resource to obviate that
war, in deference to the wishes of the King, by propos-
ing an Austro-Prussian dualism in Germany, and an
Austro-Prussian alliance against France for the re-
conquest of Alsace." 3 The war took place nevertheless,
and the unspeakable stupidity of the Hapsburgs led
Austria to take the offensive. Thus he had first made
the war inevitable and then succeeded in making Austria
appear as the aggressor. She was signally defeated at
Sadowa. Bismarck allowed the Italians, defeated at
Custozza and at Lissa, to settle their own matters, and

1 Lowe, vol. I, p. 284.
3 Ibid., p. 376.
8 Ibid., p. 500.

8 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

made a most profitable peace with Austria. This war
cost Prussia 10,000 men, and Austria 22,000.* The
ambition and tortuous plans of the Iron Man had cost
32,000 lives, not to speak of the multitudes that were
mutilated.

Hanover and Hesse-Cassel shared the fate of Austria.
This campaign ended, as almost all the wars of Prussia
always did, by territorial extension and indemnities.
Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, the free city of Frank-
furt and Schleswig-Holstein became a part of Prussia.
What, perhaps, was the most important in all this was
the securing of Kiel as a naval base.

Having just concluded a war undertaken in the spirit
of buccaneers, Prussia now divided the spoils. Bismarck
received 400,000 thalers, Roon, the Minister of War,
300,000, and Moltke, the General-in-chief, 2OO,ooo.2
Thus Prussia has ever rewarded her war-makers. A
further result was the triumph of political absolutism.
Since 1848, some of the noblest sons of Prussia had
protested against the royal tyranny and the despotic
spirit of ministers — mostly against the Iron Minister —
but, after the policy of fire and sword had been so suc-
cessful, public opinion changed. " Of Bismarck's
treachery and Straffordism, and all the rest," says Lowe,
" there was now no more talk ; in less than a week,
success had made his policy not only pardonable but
adorable." 3

The aggressive brutal Prussian spirit had triumphed.
The intellectualists of the land began to laud the army
and to prepare the nation for the greater cultivation

1 Lowe, vol. I, p. 391.

2 Ibid., p. 412.
• Ibid., p. 385*

BISMARCK BEFORE EMS DISPATCH 9

of the Bismarckian spirit and the wider application of
Bismarck's policy.

Up to this period, there was no obsequious comedy
that the celebrated Prussian Minister had not been will-
ing to play in order to secure the good-will and the
neutrality of France. He went to Paris to consult with
Napoleon about the possible Prussian attack on Switzer-
land ; 1 he was there, as a minister, attempting to pave
the way for the future ; he was there many a time, under
all kinds of pretexts, but always courting the favors of
Napoleon to help his future plans. He had urged his
Government to form an alliance with Paris.2 He went
so far in this direction that he was accused of being
an accomplice of the Tuileries. To this he replied, doubt-
less with a sardonic smile, " If I have sold myself to a
devil, it is to a Teutonic and not a French one." 3

He succeeded in winning Napoleon completely over.
He had signed a treaty favorable to France and made
to Napoleon promises of future unmolested conquests
so as to maintain the balance of power in Europe and
satisfy the imperial vanity. Unquestionably he had
agreed to let him take Luxemburg; later on he tried
to have him turn toward Belgium, but that Bismarck
had made pledges and duped Napoleon is not doubted
now by any candid investigator. In 1866, the question
of Luxemburg brought the two peoples on the verge of
a conflict which was averted by a European Conference.
This did not prevent the King of Prussia from being
the guest of Napoleon at the time of the Exposition in
1867. When the King left at the end of his visit, he

1 Lowe, vol. I, p. 220.
a Ibid., p. 235.
1 Ibid., p. 260.

io THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

embraced the French Emperor, with great expression of
friendship, saying, " Adieu, dear brother and friend." *

Bismarck " went about feeling the national pulse and
preparing the future." 2 While he was maturing his
plans to attack France, he claimed to have reduced his
army to an absolute peace footing3 and that he was
only pursuing moral conquests and the natural expansion
of Prussia, while at that time his country had three per
cent, of her population in the army. Notwithstanding
the fact that this population was but two-thirds that of
France, her army was numerically equal * and, in train-
ing, far superior. Lowe, often echoing the ideas of
Bismarck, speaks of the Exposition as " that hollow and
high-sounding Carnival of Peace." 5 It would have been
a great Festival, of Peace had not the Iron Count been
bent on war. For fifty years Prussia has been the great
obstacle in the way of translating the best feelings of
mankind into the sane and normal relations of peace.

Bismarck continued to work in every direction to
carry out his design. He controlled and managed
all the great forces of Prussia, and to a certain
extent of Germany, to arouse feelings against the
" hereditary enemy " France.6 Never did a chief of
government have his fingers so completely upon the
organs of public opinion, if we are to believe Maurice
Busch and other German writers, and no one ever made

1 Lowe, vol. I, p. 445.

8 Ibid.

8 III, 73, 51. References like this refer to the Revue des Deux
Mondes. The Roman numbers indicate the series, those in italic
the volume and the other or others the page or pages.

4 HI, 53, 8.

6 Lowe, vol. I, p. 445.

• III, 73, 390.

BISMARCK BEFORE EMS DISPATCH 11

a more unscrupulous use of them. Thus the French
Ambassador handed him a note in reference to the
Treaty of Prague in which he had made a promise
that never was kept. The next morning all the Bis-
marckian papers were on fire against France.

He excelled in circulating those half-truths which are
the worst form of falsehoods. In 1867, the National
Gazette, inspired by him, alarmed the population of
Germany by the statement that France had concentrated
from 60,000 to 70,000 men in the eastern departments,
but kept silence upon the 75,000 Prussian soldiers who
were close to the French lines and who, upon a sudden
mobilization, would have numbered i2O,ooo.1 " Each of
Bismarck's wars," says Professor Ramsay Muir of the
University of Manchester, " was preceded by a marvel-
ous * mobilization of public opinion ' through the press." 2
He thereby succeeded in isolating France. He encircled
her with a ring of suspicion and hostility, misrepresent-
ing her real aims while, by intimidation and misrepresen-
tation, he was making treaties with German allies,
many of whom were reluctant to join him now and at
the crucial moment.

Meanwhile, French opinion had been affected by the
development of Prussia, her virtual hegemony of Ger-
man states, and the well-nigh formation of a great
military German Empire at the gates of France. There
were Chauvinists who wanted compensations, and, at
times, Napoleon had been influenced by them. There
were those also who spoke of natural frontiers, that is
the Rhine as the Franco-German line, but most French-
men sided with the Emperor, who was forced to recognize

'III, 74, 404.

3 Britain's Case against Germany, p. 29.

12 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

that, though Bismarck had duped him, he had done so
by carrying out in practice the great hobby of Napoleon,
the principle of nationalities. In the territorial divisions
and ethnological redistributions which took place in dif-
ferent parts of the globe, looking at the peoples who were
absorbed by another, France did not ask, " What lan-
guage do you speak ? " " To what race do you belong ? "
(those have been German tests of nationality) but, " To
what nation do you wish to belong ? " *• Annexations,
if any are legitimate, must be .made with the consent of
those most concerned. The soul of national morality, the
will, must be the supreme determinant. The French,
the Italians and the Germans of the Swiss Confedera-
tion, representing three ethnological groups and four
languages, the Flemish and the Walloons in Belgium,
must be allowed to form a nation if they so choose. All
new political accretions must be made after the free
choice of the annexed.

Led by these principles the French Emperor had en-
couraged and helped Italy to secure her independence,
thereby strengthening Prussia, helping her ultimately to
secure the leadership of German states. Napoleon was also
in favor of the gradual unification of Germany, though
it must be recognized that he insisted upon compensa-
tions to counterbalance the great Power which was just
created. Dishonest and dishonorable as were the bar-
gains between Bismarck and himself, in reference to the
Duchy of Luxemburg 2 he ever clung to the doctrine that

1 II, 91, 387.

3 Bismarck denied that he had made this promise. Queen
Victoria said to the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne: " Je sais ce
qui Jest passe. M. de Bismarck, bien qu'il le nie aujourd'hui,
vous a lui-meme encourages a reclamer le Luxemburg" Rothan,
G., L'Allemagne, p. 342.

BISMARCK BEFORE EMS DISPATCH 13

peoples have the right to dispose of themselves. Bis-
marck was bent upon using the sword to realize Ger-
man unity and that under the domination of Prussia.
Napoleon gave him a free hand, under the impression
that he was advancing the cause of international liberal-
ism in that part of the world. Duped, and ever duped,
by the Prussian Minister, he clung all along, with some
inconsistencies, to his favorite doctrine. After Sadowa,
when he mediated between Austria and Prussia, he se-
cured the insertion in the Treaty of Prague of article V,
which stipulates that " the people of the northern district
of Schleswig, if by free vote they express a wish to be
united to Denmark, shall be ceded to Denmark accord-
ingly." * This important article, signed by the Prussian
Government "In the name of the Holy and Indivisible
Trinity," 2 which contemplated fair play and justice to
the Danes, never was executed, although again and
again Napoleon endeavored to have it done.

In the great national movement of Italy the masses
desired unity. In some parts of the country, when the
people met one another they raised the forefinger of the
right hand for their salutation and said una,3 thus by
their greetings expressing, in a symbolic way, their
deepest national hopes of unity. His share in the realiza-
tion of the Italian ideal is one of the few noble achieve-
ments of the Coup d'etat man. He seconded their efforts
in carrying out the national purpose, but with incon-
sistencies and contradictions at times, so that he neither
satisfied the Italians nor the French. Thiers and Guizot
represented this as an act of signal folly, to help the

1 Treaty of Prague, Aug. 20, 1866.

2 Ibid.

9 Maxime du Camp, Expedition des Deux Sidles, p. 28.

14 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

building up of a great state next to France in the Italic
Peninsula. He had also to face the opposition of the
national clergy, who never forgave him the sacrifice of
the temporal power of the Pope. He trusted the
Risorgimento because it was the spontaneous rising of
a people testifying to its sense of oneness and of a
common historic purpose. It asserted its desire in a
democratic way, by the ballot. Italian unity was built
upon plebisciti.

He acted similarly at an earlier date, when Savoy
and Nice were annexed. The Savoyards were French
and the Nigois mostly so. They lived on the west side
of the Alps, which seemed a natural boundary. Napo-
leon had the power to take these territories, yet there
was a consultation of the people, who, by an overwhelm-
ing majority, expressed their wish to be an intrinsic
part of France. Would Bismarck have dared to have
a plebiscitum in Hanover, Hesse-Cassel, Nassau, Frank-
furt and Schleswig when he annexed them? His princi-
ple of national movements was might. For Danton's
motto: De I'audace, encore de I'audace et toujours de
I'audace, he would have substituted, " The Sword, the
Sword again, the Sword forever."

After Sadowa Napoleon had lost many of his illusions
in reference to Bismarck's determination to secure Ger-
man unity and Prussian domination at any cost. The
French Emperor was not more honest than his antago-
nist ; he was at this period a timid and idealistic dreamer.
At times, he was talking and acting like a pacifist, though
the name had not yet been invented.1 Had he not

1 The honor of coining that term belongs to a Frenchman, M.
Emile Arnauld, notary at Luzarches, Seine-et-Oise, who has been
indefatigable in the cause of the judicial settlement of interna-
tional difficulties.

BISMARCK BEFORE EMS DISPATCH 15

proposed the reunion of an international congress to
settle, in a friendly way, all the great pending questions
of the times ? 1 Bismarck, on the other hand, was a hard,
harsh, unscrupulous and realistic statesman marshaling
press, clergy, scientists and intellectualists, society and
commerce like a general. " His statesmanship," says
Lowe, " is of the military order." 2 His combativeness
is constant. The man who, as a student, fought twenty-
eight duels,3 remained an unscrupulous fighter all through
his career. He fought Prussian intellectuals, fought
Prussian democracy, fought the Pope, fought the Orders,
fought socialism. He had long since decided to fight
France. That seemed to him an essential part of his
colossal plans, and yet he wished to hide the fact that
he was the provocator. As Sorel puts it, " To unify
Germany, to dominate the Southern states, to secure the
vote of military credits, to obtain the help of Russia
he needed to be attacked. War was indispensable to
him and he could not undertake it." *

The movement of German unity was losing ground;
a conflict with the " hereditary enemy " would revive it,
but it was essential, says again Sorel, that the war
should be declared by France. In his Memoirs, speak-
ing of the cause for which he damned his soul — if
man ever did that — Bismarck tells us that he had
reached the conviction that " the gulf which diverse dy-
nastic and family influences and different habits of life
had, in the course of history, created between the South

1 Novicow, J., L' Alsace-Lorraine, obstacle a I' expansion alle-
mande, 1913, p. 48.

a Vol. II, p. 478.

8 Vol. I, p. 17.

4 Sorel, A., Histoire de la guerre Franco- Allemande, 1875,
vol. I, p. 49-

1 6 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

and the North of the Fatherland, could not be more effec-
tually bridged over than by a joint national war, against
the neighbor who had been aggressive for many cen-
turies." 1 He wanted the unity under the control of
Prussia. The end justified the means.

" So, paradoxical as it may seem," says J. Novicow,
" the greatest obstacle to the unification of Germany
came from Prussia. If Prussia had been a liberal state,
the unity of Germany could have been secured much
sooner and much better. But when the Germans heard
a King of Prussia declare that the imperial crown offered
to him by the Parliament of Frankfurt had been picked
up in the mud, because it was offered by the delegates
of the German people, there were reasons to doubt the
possibility of realizing German unity." 2 The greatest
obstacle was indeed the humiliation of democratic Ger-
many, irritated by the contempt of a King by divine right
who referred to the " imperial crown," so offered, as
"the iron fetter whereby the descendant of four and
twenty Sovereigns, the ruler of 16,000,000 subjects, and
the Lord of the loyalest and bravest army in the
world, would be made the mere serf of the Revolu-
tion/' 3

A Prussian sovereign can rarely ever be taken at his
word. The fact is that on that same day the news of the
victory of Austria at Novara reached Berlin. The fear
of Austria this day was the beginning of Prussian wis-
dom. However, the obstacle to German unity was not
in France, but in Prussia itself and among the German
states. Bismarck would unite all the recalcitrants by a

1 Bismarck, the Man and the Statesman, vol. II, p. 99.

8 Op. cit., p. 87.

9 Lowe, vol. I, p. 89.

BISMARCK BEFORE EMS DISPATCH 17

war with France. That he did. As Mr. James W.
Headlam states it, Bismarck " boasted that but for him
there would never have been a war with France." 1

1 Bismarck, p. 460.

II

THE MUTILATED EMS DISPATCH

THE late King of Rumania, in his autobiography, has
related for us how Bismarck had endeavored to direct
him toward the throne of Spain and how he refused to
move in that direction.1 When the candidacy of Prince
Leopold of Hohenzollern to the throne of Spain was an-
nounced Bismarck expressed surprise, but we know
now that he advocated it and did all he could to push it
forward.2 On this account the Governments of Paris
and Berlin were brought to explanations. The King
equivocated by saying that this was not a political but a
family affair. Bismarck speaks of what he called a
simple family gathering to decide the matter, but we
know that at this meeting there were the King, his son
Frederick, Antony and Leopold of Hohenzollern, Bis-
marck himself, Roon, Moltke, Schleinitz, Thile and
Delbriick. As M. Matter says, " this resembles a council
of war rather than a family affair." 3 The Governments
of France and Prussia were then brought to the verge
of war, and finally to war itself.

Bismarck maneuvered to bring this about while causing
Prussia to appear before public opinion as on the side
of reason and justice, and France as the aggressor. To
judge of his success, one has only to open such books

1 III, 128, 684.

2 Matter, P., Bismarck et son temps, vol. Ill, p. 13.
8 Op. cit., p. 23.

18

THE MUTILATED EMS DISPATCH 19

as Washburne, E. B., Recollections of a Minister to
France, N. Y., 1887, or the files of British and American
newspapers. The moral condemnation of France was
unanimous. He knew the political value of moral ap-
pearances. The King was as just as a Hohenzollern
could be and more pacific than his Minister, hence he
yielded to the complaints of France; but, unfortunately,
by the unreasonableness and stupidity of the Tuileries,
Napoleon fell into Bismarck's traps and asked for the
renunciation to the Spanish candidacy for all time. Even
then, circumstances favored the French Emperor, and
the last interview at Ems of the King with the French
Ambassador was such that Bismarck regarded the matter
as virtually settled. King William sent him a dispatch
which embodied such a conclusion and great was Bis-
marck's dismay. He has related with an unblushing
cynicism the way in which he made the Franco-German
war unavoidable. The three documents in which he con-
fessed his crime harmonize well with all the evidence
which we possess upon this supreme misdeed.

At the crucial moment, in the controversy between
Berlin and Paris, Bismarck, who was on his estate in
Varzin, rushed to Berlin. On his arrival he received
dispatches showing him that the two Governments were
on the way to a fair understanding. He invited to dinner
Count von Roon, the Minister of War, and Count von
Moltke, the General-in-chief, who shared his desires for
a war with France. At the time of the Luxemburg
Affair, Moltke was in favor of an immediate attack.
" Today," he said, " we would have fifty chances, in
one year from now we would no longer have more than
twenty-five." *

1 Rothan, G., L' Affaire du Luxembourg, 1882, p. 297.

20 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

The three men had a common aggressive aim. When
they heard, by a dispatch, of the withdrawal of the candi-
dacy of Prince Leopold Hohenzollern, and of the really
peaceful spirit of the King and of the French Ambas-
sador, Benedetti, they were dismayed, and ceased to eat.
Bismarck took the dispatch and mutilated it in such a
way as to arouse the French and the Germans alike.1
" It will be known," he says, " in Paris before midnight,
and not only an account of its contents, but also an
account of the manner of its distribution, will have the
effect of u red rag upon the Gallic bull . . . it is im-
portant that we should be attacked, and this Gallic over-
weening and touchiness will make us (appear) . . .
that we meet the public threats of France." z He ex-
pected a similar effect from the telegram in Germany,
and it did follow. When Bismarck had thus transformed
the King's dispatch his guests " recovered their pleasure
in eating and drinking and spoke in a more cheerful
vein." 3

This virtual forgery was cleverly sent to the press
everywhere, except to Paris. Special editions of the
North German Gazette containing the inflammatory mes-
sage were distributed gratis in Berlin.4 " The telegram
was published at nine o'clock and by ten the square in
front of the Palace was crowded with an excited multi-
tude cheering the King and shouting, ' To the Rhine !
To the Rhine ! ' " 5 ^ Very soon the poor mistaken crowds
in Paris yelled, "A Berlin! A Berlin!" The trick was

1 Busch, Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His History, 1898,
vol. II, p. 174.

* Bismarck, Autobiography, p. 101.
8 I bid., p. 1 02.

* Lowe, Op. cit., vol. I, p. 514.

* Ibid., p. 515.

THE MUTILATED EMS DISPATCH 21

played. The people of Germany, even those that hated
Bismarck and Prussia, were made to believe that France
forced war upon them, and Frenchmen that their Am-
bassador had been insulted at Ems.

Nothing is more instructive than Bismarck's direct
statement when he wished to vindicate his claims as
maker of the German Empire. " The King," he says,
" was at Ems. I was at Varzin when, in Paris, there
was the outcry against the candidacy of Prince Leopold
Hohenzollern to the throne of Spain. The French acted
entirely like men who had lost their head : I speak partic-
ularly of the Government, with Emile Ollivier at the
helm. Ollivier was in no way at the height of the
situation, and he did not dream of the harm which he
did in the Corps legislatif with his imprudent bravadoes.
The situation was then extremely favorable for us. We
were really challenged, and, as for a long time we had
been convinced that we would have to settle our quarrel
with France, the present moment seemed to us marked to
unsheathe our sword. I therefore left Varzin for Berlin
to consult there with Moltke and Roon upon important
questions. On the way I received the following telegram,
1 Prince Charles Antony of Hohenzollern has, for the
sake of peace, withdrawn the candidacy of his son
Leopold, everything is all right/

" I was greatly surprised at that unexpected solution,
for I asked myself the question : ' Will there ever be
such a favorable opportunity?' (to fight.)

" As soon as I was in Berlin, I called Rolandt and said
to him, ' Telegraph to my house that I will return in three
days.' At the same time, in a dispatch addressed to His
Majesty at Ems, I sent my resignation as Prime-minister
and as Chancellor of the Confederation. In answer, I

22 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

received a reply whereby the King called me to Ems.
For a long time I had clear ideas upon this situation
and I said to myself, ' If I go to Ems everything will
come to nought. At most we shall reach a rotten com-
promise, and the only great solution (war with France)
will escape us. I must do everything in my power to
have His Majesty come to Berlin. Here better than at
Ems the King will feel the pulse of the nation.' I
therefore exposed to him in the most respectful manner
the motives which prevented me from going to Ems;
my presence in Berlin was, at that time, absolutely in-
dispensable.

" Happily, the French, short-sighted and arrogant, did
at that time everything that they could to sink the new
chariot deeper into the mire. They asked to have the
King sign a document which would be tantamount to a
profound humiliation.1 The King asked my advice by
telegraph. I answered him with a good conscience, ' It
is impossible to sign/

" I had invited Moltke and Roon to dine on the evening
of July I4th, and we spoke of all eventualities. We all
shared the hope that the senseless course of France, that
the unheard-of invitation addressed to our King, would
set aside the danger of a weakish transaction without
glory. (That is, a peaceful solution.) Then — we were
still at the table — came a dispatch from Ems which began
as follows :

" ' The news of the renunciation of the Hereditary

1 Unreasonable as Benedetti's request was, he did not use the
brutal forms which are implied in Bismarck's words. There is
a gentleness in Benedetti's language which contrasts with the
Teutonic harshness of the Chancellor. Had the acts of the
French Ambassador been all that Bismarck says, that even
would not have justified a step which meant war.

THE MUTILATED EMS DISPATCH 23

Prince of Hohenzollern having been officially communi-
cated by the Spanish Government to that of France, the
French Ambassador, at Ems, has again addressed to His
Majesty a request to be authorized to telegraph to Paris
that His Majesty the King pledged himself forever to
refuse his consent in case the Hohenzollerns should
resume their candidacy/

" There followed a long statement, the sense of which
was that the King referred to what he had already said
to Count Benedetti, who had received his answer with
gratitude and that he would communicate it to his
Government.

" Thereupon, Benedetti asked again to be received by
the King, were it only to hear once more from the lips of
His Majesty the confirmation of what he had said in the
promenade. Then the dispatch added:

" ' However, His Majesty refused to receive once
more the French Ambassador and sent him word by
the aide-de-camp that " His Majesty has nothing more
to communicate to the Ambassador." '

" After I had read the dispatch, Roon and Moltke in
a similar way dropped their knives and forks upon the
table, and pushed back their chairs. There was a long
silence. We were all profoundly depressed. We had
the feeling that the affair was sinking in the sands.

" I then turned to Moltke and asked him this question :
* The tool which we need for the war, our army, is it
really good enough so that we could begin war depending
upon the greatest probability of success ? ' Moltke had
a confidence as firm as a rock : ' We never had a better
tool than at the present moment/ he said. Roon, in whom
it is true I had less confidence, fully confirmed what
Moltke had said.

24 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

" ' Very well, then, continue to eat undisturbed/ said I
to my two guests. I seated myself at a little round marble
table which was at the side of the one where they were
eating. I re-read the dispatch, took my pencil and
scratching out deliberately all the passage in which it was
said that Benedetti had asked for a new audience, etc., I
allowed to remain only the head and tail. Now the dis-
patch had an entirely different air. I read it to Moltke
and to Roon in the new form which I had given it.

" They both exclaimed, * Splendid ! That will produce
its effect/

" We continued to eat with the best appetite.

" I ordered immediately that the dispatch be sent as
rapidly as possible, by the telegraph offices, to all the
papers and to all the missions.1 And we were still to-
gether when we began to receive the desired information
upon the effect the dispatch had produced in Paris. It
had burst like a shell. After having made a most humili-
ating request to our King, the dispatch made the French
believe that their representative had been treated rudely
by him. All the loungers of the boulevard were of the
opinion that such a thing could 'not be endured. The
shout ' To Berlin ! to Berlin ' was uttered by those
howlers of the crowd. There was the effect in-
tended.

" The effect was the same here as there. The King,
who, yielding to my pressing representations, interrupted
his cure at Ems and returned to Berlin, was completely
surprised by the clamorous joy which the people mank
fested everywhere as he passed. He did not understand
what had taken place. The indescribable enthusiasm
which burst with furor in Berlin seized and shook deeply
1 To all the representatives of Prussia abroad.

THE MUTILATED EMS DISPATCH 25

our old master. His eyes grew moist. He recognized
that this was truly a national war, a popular war which
the people demanded and had to have.

" Even before our arrival in Berlin we had received
from the King the authorization of mobilizing at least
a part of our army. When the Prince Royal left the
train, he purposely spoke very loud in the station of the
mobilization at hand; the enthusiasm increased even
more. When we reached the Castle, His Majesty was
disposed to mobilize all the army.

" The sequel you know. There is a point in it con-
cerning which Gramont, in his Memoires, expresses his
sincere astonishment. He could not see the reason why,
after things had taken such a pacific turn, the belligerent
current had triumphed. ' A sinister apparition came
to view. Suddenly everything is changed. What had
happened? Here was Bismarck (arriving) in Berlin!'
That is just about what one reads in the Memoires of
de Gramont. I quote from memory. In any case, I
was the ( sinister apparition/

" I add that I was authorized to make what erasures
seemed to me absolutely necessary. I had the freedom to
publish the dispatch in exienso or by extracts. I have
not regretted to have made extracts." *

The following conclusions grow out of Bismarck's
accounts :

1. Bismarck left Varzin because he wanted the war.

2. He was cast down when he heard of the withdrawal
of Prince Leopold's candidacy.

3. He, von Moltke and von Roon were dejected when

1 The author was not able to get access to the Vienna Free
Press of Nov. 20, 1892. The text here given is from Le Temps
of Nov. 23.

26 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

the Ems dispatch arrived, and showed that the question
with France was virtually settled along the lines of peace,
or might be.

4. He would not go to Ems because he had not worked
up those around the King, while in Berlin his press and
his followers had done the work of excitement.

5. De Gramont and Emile Ollivier, bombastic and
swashbuckling as they were, never used in the Corps
legislatif, even by exception, such language as that of
Bismarck in the Reichstag during the subsequent years
that he remained in power.1

6. A fact which proves that Benedetti was not provok-
ing or arrogant is that he received the King's answer
" with gratitude."

7. The King not only did not insult the French Ambas-
sador, as the mutilated dispatch had reported it to the
French, but he was courteous to him, and at last did
really receive him in keeping with the Ambassador's
respectful request.2

8. The intent in mutilating the dispatch is that it was
" an opportunity that never would recur again " to fight.

9. He kept only " the head and the tail " of the dis-
patch, leaving out what was essential to its understand-

1 In a conversation with Lord Loftus, Ambassador of Great
Britain to Berlin, Bismarck gave him to understand that he was
about to address a challenge to France on account of the utter-
ances of de Gramont in the Chamber of Deputies. Letter of
Lord Loftus to Lord Granville, July 13, 1870. Had not the
Ems dispatch expedient succeeded, he would have found other
pretexts for a war.

2 Mr. James W. Headlam, speaking upon this, says, " Both
were anxious to avoid war, and the King to the last treated
Benedetti with marked graciousness ; he had while at Ems in-
vited him to the royal table, and even now, the next morning
before leaving Ems, granted him an audience at the station to
take leave." Bismarck, p. 338.

THE MUTILATED EMS DISPATCH 27

ing. It was a fraud and a practical forgery which he
did not date from Berlin but from Ems. It was sent
as the King's dispatch. .

10. Without forgetting the stupid levity of the
Tuileries, as the noisy agitation of small French cliques,
we must assert, as Bismarck has done, that he was the
great decisive personal factor that brought the war about.
He was proud of it. As he says, " I have never regretted
to have made extracts."

As the war began, the would-be aggressor of Switzer-
land, the author of the Danish war, the manipulator of
the Austro-Prussian war, the mutilator of the Ems dis-
patch followed his sovereign to the battlefield. He " had
some days previously partaken of the Sacrament in his
own room." x After performing this act inaugurated by
Him who said, " Do this in remembrance of Me," he
entered the war of his own making which cost the lives
of 200,000 Germans and of 300,000 Frenchmen, maimed
multitudes for life, and tore away 2,000,000 people from
the land they loved. In a moment of despondency and
probably of remorse, October 21, 1877, ne sa^> " There
is no doubt, however, that I have caused unhappiness to
great numbers. But for me three great wars would not
have taken place, 80,000 men would not have been killed
and would not now be mourned by parents, brothers, sis-
ters and widows." 2 " Eighty thousand men . . . killed ! "
How difficult for Bismarck to tell the truth! Busch
relates that during the Franco-German war his chief
overtook some francs-tireurs that were prisoners. He

1 Busch, M., Bismarck in the Franco-German War, N. Y., vol.
I, p. 8.

2 Busch, M., Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His History,
vol. II, p. 164.

28 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

spoke to them with great harshness. " I told them," he
said, " You shall all be hanged, you are not soldiers, you
are assassins." 1 These men patriots, though belonging
to free corps, defending their country against invaders,
and about to die, were insulted by him who had sent so
many thousands to an untimely death. Gladstone made
a signal mistake when he called Abdul-Hamid the great
assassin. When Vaillant, the French anarchist, ex-
ploded a bomb in the Chamber of Deputies the Ham-
burger Nachrichten reproached the socialistic organ, the
Vorwarts, for the lack of indignation in its columns on
account of this crime. This paper answered that the
noted anarchist was less criminal than the forger of the
Ems dispatch, whose hands were stained with the blood
of hundreds of thousands of men.

1 Bismarck in the Franco-German War, p. 61.

Ill

THE CONFLICT

FRENCH victims of this act were long in realizing the
extent to which they had been deceived. The Affaires
etrangeres made protests. Benedetti gave his own ac-
count of what had happened at Ems. De Gramont fur-
nished his version of the events that led to the fatal
war. Sorel, in 1875, made it morally certain that Bis-
marck had been the great factor in rendering the war
unavoidable. Liebknecht was the first in the press
to reveal the " nameless crime." Von Roon and von
Moltke, with great discretion, gave an account of the
night of the supreme misdeed, but the Germans con-
tinued their accusations against France. At last, the
Iron Chancellor himself made the confessions which we
have placed before our readers. Of course the men most
guilty in bringing about this catastrophe, Bismarck like
the Due de Gramont,1 von Moltke 2 and others, men of a
bygone age who had not even the excuse of belonging
to the fatalistic school of history, repeated the common-
place statement that the war was inevitable. A fact be-
yond question is the statement of von Sybel, repeated in
the Revue des Deux Mondes, that the people of France
did not wish the war any more than the people of
Germany.3 Sorel had pointed out the same fact.4 The

1 III, 98, 728.

2 V, 21, 275-

8 III, 128, 685.

* Op. cit., vol. I, p. 197.
29

30 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

act of Bismarck was at once followed by a wide spread-
ing of legends in Germany about the insults and intended
humiliation of Prussia by the French Government, of
the discourtesy of Benedetti to the King, all springing
from the false impression created by the Ems dispatch.
The Iron Chancellor cleverly secured the same unity
among the public men of Germany as that which exists
now. There was a general recital of the horrors of the
old French invasions and of their new aggressive aim.
On July 1 8, four days after the horrible deed, Bismarck
issued a circular to be sent to the representatives of
North Germany which Sorel calls "injures officielles in
the manner of barbarian heroes " * who insulted each
other before beginning their fight.

Calumny was ever a weapon of the Chancellor against
those whom he wished to attack. During the eight years
that he represented Prussia at the Diet of Frankfurt he
keeps on denouncing Austrian intrigues,2 Austrian ag-
gressions, Austrian representatives.3 He tells how non-
Prussians " gambled and drank, philandered, intrigued
and danced." 4 His portrait of the Austrian Count Thun
is equal to some of Voltaire's satires of his enemies.5
His sketch of Herr von Prokesch is the perfection of a
character seen through the prism of Prussian hatred
and drawn with sulphuric acid.6 He snubs them, slanders
them, and when he does not assail their morals, it is their
dress or their manners that he attacks.7 The imperial

1 Op. cit., vol. I, p. 201.

2 Lowe, vol. I, pp. 122, 123, 125, 157.

3 Munroe Smith, Lowe, vol. I, p. n.
* Ibid., p. 123.

5 Ibid., p. 122.

6 Ibid., p. 156.
''Ibid,, p. 142.

THE CONFLICT 31

house of Austria does not fare any better. " The Haps-
burgs have really been great through plundering old
families — the Hungarians, for instance. At bottom they
are only a family of police spies who lived upon and
made their fortune by confiscations." * In this he was
imitated by other Prussians. Treitschke said, " I am
German and a Protestant, do not expect me ever to ap-
prove a single act of Catholic and despotic Austria."2
Slanders had prepared the work of needle-guns at
Sadowa.

In his conversations Bismarck never fails now to
blackmail the French whom in former days he has so
flattered. Here are a few Bismarckian pearls. " France
is a nation of ciphers." The French " are nothing more
than 30,000,000 of Kaffres." 3 " They have barbarians
for comrades, and from their wars in Algiers, China,
Cochin China and Mexico, they have become barbarians
themselves." * " Strip off the white skin of such a Gaul
and you will find a Turco." 5 Still speaking of the
French at large they are " an uncleanly people," 6 " a
nation full of envy and jealousy that had been mortified
by the success at Koniggratz, and could not forgive it,
though it in no wise damaged them." 7

Frenchwomen are not spared. " I have traveled a
good deal through France, during peace, too, and I don't
recollect that I ever saw anywhere a single nice-looking

1 Busch, M., Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His History,
vol. I, p. 273.

2 III, 145, 692.

8 Busch, Bismarck in the Franco-German War, p. 146.
4 Ibid., p. 86.
B Ibid., p. 153-
8 Ibid., p. 586.
7 Ibid., p. 106.

32 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

girl, but I have seen frightfully ugly creatures often. I
believe that there are a few, only the pretty ones go off to
Paris to make their market there." x Did he not go so
far as to say that he thought that when Jules Favre
went to discuss the conditions of peace with him, " he was
painted white "? 2 The countess, his wife, writes to him,
" I am afraid there may be no Bibles in France, so I
will send you a psalm-book by the first opportunity, that
you may read the prophecy against the French : ' I say
unto thee that the wicked shall be rooted out/ " 3

The German university professors were bitter beyond
expression; they used their vast erudition to unearth
facts about the past of the French or arguments against
them. The celebrated men of the country acted like-
wise. Wagner lost all sense of truth and of justice.
Strauss, speaking of the successes of the German army,
considered them as just chastisements of the French for
their " thirst of rapine." According to him, it was not
the literature only that was corrupt, it was the very
nation itself. Before the war the good Germans had
" no idea of the rottenness of French society and of the
dissolution of all moral ties."4 This last aspersion
called forth, and deserved, the most pungent sarcasms of
one of the gentlest of men that France ever produced,
Ernest Renan. Mommsen in Italy made a similar on-
slaught upon the hated Gauls, when speaking of " French
immorality," of " moral dissolution," " absence of family

spirit," and of " permanent frivolity." 5 The Prussian

>-.

'Busch, Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His History, vol II,
p. 116.

* Busch, Bismarck in the Franco-German War, p. 186.
1 Ibid., vol. I, p. 587.

* III, 97, 548.
•Ill, 40, 269.

THE CONFLICT 33

Machiavel crowned his infamous course by another
abominable performance/ In his former diplomatic con-
ferences, seeking the neutrality of France, he had un-
questionably promised compensations along the Rhine,
then he threw over Luxemburg, and finally led the French
to turn their eyes toward Belgium. He and Benedetti
sought practical solutions. They reached conclusions
upon this matter; Bismarck asked the French Ambas-
sador to write them down. It was he that had made the
proposal, Benedetti had been but a scribe. On the 25th
of July, a few days after the declaration of war, he
published this document as a proposal of France to seize
Belgium.1 The effect of this act was prodigious in dis-
crediting France. These calumnies did their work among
neutrals. The Russians were with Bismarck at the
time, but when they learned the truth they were greatly
incensed against Prussia.2 So it was later on in Eng-
land and in America.

The war itself was a conquering march through
France. The fact that France had no treaty of alliance
with any Power shows that this war was unexpected by
her and that she had not planned it.3 The French were
unprepared, but the Prussian campaign had been care-
fully contrived long before. After the Luxemburg
Affair, Prussian officers, in many garbs, sometimes as
peddlers, as tourists and at other times as commercial
agents, were studying the land, preparing maps that were
far more perfect than those of French officers. When
Moltke went to Paris with the King of Prussia he took
" strategic walks " in the neighborhood of Paris.4 He

1 Lowe, vol. I, p. 423; Headlam, Op. cit., p. 281.
a Novicow, rp. 262.

* Ollivier, Emile, L'Empire liberal, vol. XIV, p. 106.

* Lowe, vol. I, p. 445.

34 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

had studied the year before the whole French frontier.
The whole plan of invasion was carried on with precision,
with energy and with indescribable cruelty. The shelling
of the Cathedral of Strasburg, the almost complete de-
struction of Chateaudun, the burning of Bazeilles, the
sending of bombs into the Latin Quarter of Paris, the
disregarding of the Red Cross flags over the Hospital
of the Val-de-Grace, the striking of the Pantheon, the
wholesale destruction of franc s-tireurs, the systematic
plundering in the occupied provinces, the trains loaded
with booty sent to Germany, all this is still vividly re-
membered. Wars, cruel in themselves, have always
traits of cruelty that make one shudder, but the Prussian
war by its harshness took one back to the methods of
warfare of bygone days. The army which, after
Sadowa, had seen Bismarck share the spoils of war,
helped itself upon French soil most liberally. This has
been recorded by most reliable witnesses, among whom
are Lavisse as well as Gabriel Monod, men whose testi-
mony is above suspicion.

Bismarck could be petty in his acts. As France and
Germany were in the last days of the conflict, did he not
endeavor to substitute German instead of French as the
language of diplomacy? All the Governments which he
thus addressed answered him in their own vernacular.1
Henceforth he sent his dispatches in French. This war
was not only deprived of sincere motives but of chivalry
and of all generosity. Already at Sedan he had treated
Napoleon with hardness. He would not allow him to
see the King until the military commanders had exacted

1 Busch, M., Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His History,
vol. I, p. 383.

THE CONFLICT 35

from him the severest possible terms.1 Similarly with
Jules Favre when the French patriot appealed for easier
terms and stood his ground, " Too late ! " he said, " the
Bonapartists are before you." " We are resolved," said
he, " to make peace with the best contracting party we
can find; the Emperor, the Prince Imperial with a
Regency, or Prince Napoleon; and if you do not agree
to our conditions we have in Germany about 100,000
excellent French troops captured at Metz, who are still
wholly devoted to the Imperial cause." 2 This was not
absolutely true.

To Thiers, who spoke of appealing to Europe, he re-
plied, " If you speak to me of Europe, I will speak to you
of Napoleon and of the 100,000 bayonets which, at a
wink from us, would re-seat him on his throne." 3 The
envoys had to yield to what the Russian sociologist,
Novicow, calls the " Peace of Damocles," * which he
characterizes as " one of the most fatal turning-points
of European history/' 5 the Treaty of Frankfurt. Speak-
ing to a group of citizens of this city on his way to
Berlin, Bismarck said, " I bring you a peace of fifty
years," 6 whereby he meant that France was bled and
exhausted, incapable of recovering before half a century.
He had needlessly humiliated her, after his obsequious
attitude of former years, by the foundation of the Ger-
man Empire at Versailles. He had unnecessarily hurt her
feelings by the entrance of the German army into Paris.

1 Busch, M., Bismarck in the Franco-German War, pp. 108-110.

2 Lowe, vol. I, p. 625.
• Ibid., p. 632.

4 Op. ciL, p. 5.
6 Ibid., p. 14.

•Ill, Itf, 102.

36 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

He demanded six. and obtained five billions of francs 1 as
well as Alsace and Lorraine. When the agreement had
been reached Bismarck asked about future commercial
relations; the delegates said that their instructions were
to keep the status quo, but, said Jules Favre, " Bismarck
opposed this with downright vehemence, declaring that
he would rather recommence the war of cannons than
expose himself to a war of tariffs." 2 Germany secured
the rights of the most favored nation. Bismarck almost
always showed his worst side to his enemies.

At this time there was genuine mutual hatred between
the two peoples; that of the Germans was deepened by
traditional legends and falsehoods recently circulated by
their Government. The French were still thinking and
talking of humaneness, of the higher laws of war, of
immanent justice which deepened their sense of horror
of a war after Treitschke's heart and which ought to have
pleased Bernhardi. They could only vindicate outraged
justice and some of them talked of revanche. The small
but noisy set that was temporarily to win some popularity
had not yet arisen. The Derouledes were exceptions.
The best citizens of the country, having silenced
every Miles Gloriosus of the last days of the Em-
pire, were pondering over their discovery of a new
Germany with its gospel of violence — they who had
thought her the champion of reason, of justice and the
friend of anti-militarism — they who had considered
Prussia as representing " the future and Austria the
past " 3 — they who, when the news of Sadowa reached

1 As a matter of fact Germany received 5,567,000,000 francs in
three years.

2 Lowe, vol. II, p. 5.

* Napoleon quoted by Lowe, vol. I, p. 234.

THE CONFLICT 37

them, made great displays of flags and of illuminations1
were now burning with violent indignation.

Bismarck, mistaken in his policy in reference to Ger-
many, and overexacting in reference to France, did
nothing to allay this wounded national sensitiveness.
The Treaty of Frankfurt was hard. Had it been more
oppressive, Europe would have protested. Deprecations
not a few were already heard in England and in America.
However, when circumstances demanded the interpreta-
tion of the Treaty, he ever made it harder than the text
warranted. He took advantage of the Commune to assert
that the Germans would be the judges of the time of
their departure from Paris, though the terms of the
Treaty were explicit.2 He made himself the only and
absolute interpreter of the text. Through General
ManteufTel, he drove such a sharp bargain with the
French Government, for the support of the army of occu-
pation, that millions were practically added to the colossal
indemnity and remitted to the Prussian and Saxon war
offices.3 The French soldiers who, during their cap-
tivity, had committed some misdemeanor and those
prisoners members of the free corps, not under but ap-
proved by the French Government, were still kept in
German fortresses. Bismarck showed no leniency
toward them.4 He wanted to exercise a sovereign fear
over Frenchmen. Two German soldiers had been killed
in a brawl, and the juries, right or wrong, rendered
verdicts of not guilty.

1 Lowe, vol. I, p. 392.

2 1, 93, 555-

* Von Moltke, Speech in the Reichstag. Essays and Speeches
and Memoirs, vol. II, p. 68.

4 De Broglie, La Mission de M. de Gontaut-Biron a Berlin,
1896, p. 14.

38 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

This decision in keeping with the institution of the
country were valid, but Bismarck threatened at once to
disregard it and to do his own police.1 He sent a dis-
patch to that effect to the French Minister and at the
same time gave a copy of it to his papers, in which
there were commentaries most galling for France.2 On
June 16, 1871, the very day that Emperor William made
his triumphal entrance into Berlin, Bismarck learned that
a zone which had been reserved to the German troops
had, as Jules Favre stated, been entered by French
soldiers through a misunderstanding. Dismounting from
his charger, he scratched a note informing the authorities
that if the troops were not withdrawn they would be
attacked at midnight. To the Chief of the Corps of
occupation he also sent the following telegram, "If the
French outposts advance further, attack them." 8

Owing to the habits of economy and thrift as well as
the earnest patriotism of the people the Government
under Thiers was able to pay the war indemnity before
the time mentioned in the Treaty. A clause of it
authorized this, but none referred to the immediate re-
moval of troops after the payment. For the great Ger-
man Shylock that was not in the bond. Advancing the
payment, it was expected by the French that, as a
corollary, the German soldiers would also hasten the
time of their departure, but he demurred. M. Thiers
asserted that the terms of payment and occupation were
inseparable, as they were extreme terms — that if France
could not defer the payment of her obligations she could
anticipate the dates fixed by the Treaty, and that Ger-

*De Broglie, p. 16.

2 Matter, Op. cit., vol. Ill, p. 354.

'Lowe, vol. II, p. £.

THE CONFLICT 39

many being paid she should remove her troops from the
six departments still occupied.

This situation resembled that of the Prussians in
France after Waterloo. They remained in France until
1818, and would not have left, even then, had it not been
for Wellington.1 Strange to say, in order to allow the
advanced payment followed by the German evacuation
of the country, a consummation which by peaceful
peoples would have been devoutly wished, Bismarck
wanted compensations.2 In the steps taken for the
restoration of normal relations between the two countries,
he ever reminded the vanquished of his might, of what
he could have done with it and of what he could do now.
For him Prussian might, then German might, was right.

After this Bismarck was rewarded with the title of
Prince and with the gift of the domain of Friedrichsruh,
officially valued at 1,000,000 thalers, but which in reality
was worth 3,ooo,ooo.3 His attitude toward France
hardly changed. He was rarely fairer or friendlier. He
had all along his ringers upon the Keyboard of German
public opinion, in the management of which he was a
master. It was not in vain that early in his career he
had been intrusted with the management of the Prussian
Press Bureau,4 and had made it a perfect tool of govern-
mental purpose. By it, he so kept in touch with national
feelings that the people shared his aims. On reading
Maurice Busch's Bismarck in the Franco-German War,
and seeing the extent to which the Chancellor's Secretary
wrote articles for the press everywhere, ever seeking

1 1, 96, 308.

2 1, 95, 694.

* Matter, Op. cit., vol. Ill, p. 283.

*Lowe, vol. I, p. 153.

40 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

to bring Germans to the aims of Bismarck, one realizes
the extent to which he had made the press a tool of his
policy. What most astonished Germans was that the
French were not discouraged, that they paid no homage
to their conquerors, that they did not passively accept
their defeat and become reconciled with their victors.
They were disappointed that the French did not accept
the final decisions of brute force, but appealed to the
immanent justice of the universe, the nemesis and the
rewarder of history.

The way in which the bruised Frenchmen reasserted
their energy, and offered fourteen times more money
than Thiers needed to pay Germany, a fact which aroused
the admiration of the whole world, excited rather bitter
feelings on the other side of the Rhine. France, de-
feated, mangled and crushed, healed her national wounds
like a healthy being. The English Teutophile, Charles
Lowe, who so praised Bismarck, speaks of the " truly
Antaeus power of her recuperation." * She rebuilt her
finances, displayed a new energy, and a new intelligence
in her education, reinvigorated her moral ideals, made
over her industrial life, extended her colonies, which,
later, became an object of German envy, restored her
army to an adequate condition in keeping with the
defensive duties of a great Power, and by her sterling
worth resumed her place in the councils of nations.
While the war hounds were barking on both sides of the
frontier, though much louder east of the Rhine, she
was devoted to the evolution of her national life and to
the framing of institutions in keeping with her present
needs. For the third time in her history, having found
the monarchical form of Government inadequate, she
1 Op. cit., vol. II, 51.

THE CONFLICT 41

was trying republican institutions, with which Bismarck
had not the least sympathy. He would rather sign a
treaty of peace with the impossible Comte de Chambord
than with Thiers. When the heir to the throne of the
Bourbons declined to accept the tricolor flag and hence
could not be King, Bismarck, speaking sarcastically to
the monarchical French Ambassador, said, " You will
have to keep Adolphe I " — referring to Adolphe Thiers.
Gontaut-Biron replied, " Yes, provided he has no heir." *
Notwithstanding such sallies, half sarcasm, half
humor, he continued to annoy France. At the election
of Marechal MacMahon to the presidency, the great Ger-
man statesman demanded that the chief Magistrate of
France should himself notify his rise to power to the
Emperor of Germany. He further asked that the Am-
bassador of France have new credentials. He had in-
duced Russia and Austria to take the same stand. It is
customary in monarchies to renew at the death of the
King the credentials of ambassadors, because the sover-
eignty resides in the monarch, who is its representative,
while in a republic the sovereign is the nation, which
does not change.2 The explanations given by the Iron
Chancellor showed that he was decided to meddle with
French internal matters. When Gontaut-Biron made
remonstrances Bismarck threatened to withdraw his
ambassador from Paris and that Russia and Austria
would follow the same course.3 He went so far as to say
that he would not recognize Gambetta as president of
the Republic were he elected.4 He demanded that the

1 Op. cit., p. 69.

a Broglie, Op. cit., p. 109. Matter, Op. cit., vol. Ill, p. 375.

* Broglie, p. Hi.

4 Ibid., p. 142.

42 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

French Government, which had already warned French
bishops to be moderate in their language if they spoke
of the Kulturkampf, should pursue and repress them.1
Dr. Windthorst and his supporters rightly denounced the
Chancellor's silencing French bishops as " an unjustifi-
able interference in the internal affairs of France." 2
That he should have been unfriendly to freedom of dis-
cussion in his own country was perfectly proper, but that
he should force a neighboring state to adopt the same
attitude is inadmissible. The episcopate of France con-
stituted an insignificant minority out of touch with the
nation. The Government was unfriendly to their
criticisms and to their acts, but notwithstanding that the
Chancellor identified them with the nation which he
threatened with war. " I declare," he said, " that if
France supports the Catholics in Germany I will not
wait to have her ready. That she will be in two years : I
will seize before that the favorable opportunity." 3 He
would have done it, but European sentiment and the
attitude of two European rulers saved her.

1 Broglie, p. 163.

3 Lowe, vol. II, p. 61.

8 Broglie, Op. cit., pp. 166, 188.

IV
THE AIM OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE

As we have already seen, before attacking Austria in
1866, Bismarck wanted that country to join Prussia in
an aggression against France.1 It was on some of his
later proposals to Vienna that von Beust spoke of Bis-
marck's treaties of alliance, as des chiffons de papier.
After the Franco-German war, the two adversaries upon
the battlefield of Bohemia, Emperor William and Em-
peror Francis Joseph, who had not seen each other since
Sadowa, met at Ischl, in Austria, while Bismarck himself
and von Beust conferred together at Gastein, preparing
an understanding to be followed by concerted action.
Unconsciously the Chancellor was working toward what
seemed a great federation or federations of Europe. An
honest federation without any aggressive thought be-
hind it would have been a great boon for the world, and
a most gratifying step forward towards the union of
the civilized states which is bound to come. Such was not
Bismarck's aim. He brought into that combination the
Emperor of Russia. Thus the Hohenzollerns, the Haps-
burgs and the Romanofs formed what was known as the
" Three Kaiser League." The three rulers had met at
Warsaw, in 1860, to discuss the European situation.2 In
1872 they met again in Berlin, where there were the
usual festivities, imperial embracings and conferences.

1 HI, 73, 523-

2 Lowe, vol. I, p. 265.

43

44 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

Whatever one may think of this trio of Powers, and
much good could have been said about it, one cannot
avoid the conclusion that its chief object, at this time,
was the isolation of France. One of the laudatory his-
torians of Bismarck sums up the character of this re-
union as follows : " The Meeting of the three Emperors
marked the first stage in the consummate policy by which
Bismarck sought to isolate France from the rest of
Europe, and thus minimize the danger of a war of
revenge." 1

This policy was pursued to the bitter end, and, two-
score years later, it failed because of its unjust purpose
and its subterfuges. Some German writers said, ironi-
cally, that the League was for French happiness, to pre-
vent Frenchmen from doing foolish things 2 and to
preserve peace, which the French were far from disturb-
ing. On the morrow of the war, the attorney general
Renouard, in his address at the reopening of the Cour de
cassation of Paris, spoke upon " Justice above Force."
He closed with these words : " We, the vanquished of
yesterday, dare to assert, in the face of the world, wit-
ness of our recent defeats, that the resentment of our
wounded pride does not extinguish in us the intelligence
of eternal verities : peace is good, war is criminal. Our
beloved fatherland can give no more striking sign of her
renascence than by not sacrificing to her rancor the cause
of civilization. Let her disdain from demanding to force
the revenge that she hopes; it is worthy of her to seek
in the supremacy of justice the reparation of her ills and
the return to her of all her children." 3

1 Lowe, Op. cit., vol. II, 22.

9 III, 122, 954.

8 Dreyfus, F., L'arbitrage international, 1894, P- 37.2.

AIM OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 45

It would be easy to multiply passages like this showing
the spirit of leading French citizens. In spite of that
Bismarck formed his League, which was so strong that
its members freed themselves from the most elementary
rules of international courtesy. Their purpose was to
paralyze France, and paralyzed she would not be. She
so acted that she soon regained the respect and the
esteem of the Powers, who had begun to understand
Bismarck's maneuvers, and to know how he had risen
upon the stepping stones of others' dead selves to higher
things — that his international combinations were not for
the development of the best European life, but machines
subserving his ambition. France attempted none, and
devoted herself to the duty of building up her republican
institutions, for which he did not lack contempt. " A
republic," he said, " will, with great difficulties, find an
ally against us, a Monarchical Government." x The genius
which was embodied in the Iron Chancellor was capable
of making some mistakes. Nations cannot be indifferent
to the interests of their growing democracy whatever be
the form of their Government. France needed peace,
wished for peace, and worked for peace. Gambetta said
in 1880, "If our hearts beat it is not for an ideal of
bloody adventures, it is that what remains of France
should remain entire, and that we may depend
upon the future to see if there is an immanent jus-
tice which comes on its chosen day and at its chosen
hour." 2

Frenchmen were in constant fear of seeing the hel-
meted men reappear in the East. Menaces were fre-
quent, not to say constant. In 1874, von Moltke, asking

1 II, 6, 925.

2 Berard, V., La France et Guillaume II, p. 42.

46 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

for more war credits in the Reichstag, said, "What we
have conquered in half a year by arms we must defend
by arms for half a century." He adds later on, " After
its wars Germany has caused herself to be feared and
to be esteemed, but she is not loved." True enough!
He draws pictures of the terrible armaments of France.
Forgetting the Bismarck dinner and the Ems dispatch,
he says, " What is borne to us from across the Vosges
is a rabid cry of revenge for the reverses which France
herself has courted." By a singular contradiction, he
recognizes that the majority of Frenchmen " is thor-
oughly imbued with a sense of the absolute necessity of,
above all, preserving peace." 1 On another occasion, in
the same hall of imperial legislation, discussing socialism,
he evokes needlessly the apparition " of the professeurs
des barricades and the petroleuses of the Commune of
1871. "2 The Germans used the French as the Spartans
did the drunken Helotes for the education of their chil-
dren. The Communists suggested mistaken ideas to
Moltke; some were Communalists demanding local gov-
ernment, some of them held doctrines of communism,
but the greater number had nothing to do with any new
social theories whatsoever.

The effect of his speech before a conservative German
audience was telling. As his examples of the outcome
of socialism were taken from Paris and the French it is
needless to say that it wounded the susceptibilities of
masses of the countrymen of Thiers who were no friends
of the destroyers of the Tuileries or of the murderer^
of Archbishop Darboy. In another instance he speaks
with an unblushing daring of the war. " In 1870 there

1 Essays, Speeches and Memoirs, vol. II, p. in.
3 Ibid., p. 77.

AIM OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 47

was as yet no united and powerful Germany in the heart
of Europe, and the war, with which France took us by
surprise, was waged principally with a view to prevent-
ing its establishment/' 1

There we have two positively erroneous assertions.
First, France did not force a war upon Prussia and, sec-
ond, she was not opposed to a spontaneous and peace-
ful unification of Germany. Every statement made by
German leaders, and every argument built on it, led to
one unfair and unfriendly conclusion. Bismarck was
even afraid that French finances could not long bear
the strain of French military burdens 2 and like his
friend, Moltke, was certain that war was forthcoming
and ought to be anticipated. Wilhelmstrasse discussed
questions of the French army as if France had been a
German protectorate.3 The German Ambassador in
Paris, von Arnim, did not hesitate to criticize the country
and her politics.4 Bismarck accused him of having
" facilitated, if not directly caused, the change of govern-
ment by thwarting his efforts to keep M. Thiers in
power." 5

The German press was most aggressive. In 1875, it
reached a high pitch of excitement which was far from
spontaneous. M. Tardieu has summed up the trend of
their grievances as follows : " To finish once for all with
France is not merely opportune. It is a duty Germany
owes to herself and to humanity. Europe will never
be tranquil as long as a struggle is possible, and there
will be this possibility of a struggle as long as the blunder

1 Essays, Speeches and* Memoirs, p. 116.

*Ibid., p. 205.

* Broglie, Op. cit., p. 224.

*V, 14, 19-

6 Lowe, vol. II, pp. 39, 50,

48 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

made by the Treaty of Frankfurt remains unrepaired.
For it leaves France in a position to survive and re-
commence the duel. Germany is troubled by the con-
sciousness of having only half-crushed her enemy and
of being able to defend herself only by sleeping with
one eye open." x

It is well known that Bismarck had been for some time
bent upon a new invasion of France. The old Emperor,
listening to a speech of the Prince prepared for the
opening of the Reichstag in 1874, declared that that
speech was a " menace " to France. He insisted that it
should be modified in a pacific sense. He said, later on,
to Prince Clovis von Hohenlohe : " I do not want war
with France, I am too old to undertake anything like that,
but I fear lest Bismarck may lead me to it little by
little." 2

In 1875, he intended to attack France and to " bleed
her white," but was prevented by Queen Victoria, through
the energetic action of Lord Derby,3 and by the Czar.
In 1887, he wished again to provoke her and had even
attempted to secure the neutrality of St. Petersburg in
advance,4 but the Czar was bent upon a pacific policy.
He realized all along that the great German's purpose
was to strike France. By a strange coincidence, the
two Powers which were bound ultimately to be her
friends stood by her then. Bismarck's hostility changed
in form, but remained unabated. As the French Ambas-
sador opposed many of his anti-Gallican designs, he
ceased to be persona grata, and was attacked by the

1 France and the Alliances, 1908, p. 124.

* Matter, Op. cit., vol. Ill, p. 380.

* Journal des Debats, Nov. 27, 1893.

4 Mevil, A., De la paix de Franc fort a la Conference d'Al-
gesiras, 1909, p. 5.

AIM OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 49

Bismarckian papers. According to them, he conspired
against the Empire, he had become a center of intrigues,
he had endeavored to secure the favor of the Emperor
over and above the head of the Chancellor, who wanted
his recall.1 In a letter to M. Decazes, the Ambassador
exclaims, " That man does not forgive me the service
which, with honor, thank God, I have rendered my
country." 2 The Prussian Richelieu could hardly bear
the wise and judicious policy advocated by the Ambas-
sador and practiced by France which foiled his bel-
ligerent purpose.3

He ever finds occasions to show his unfriendliness.
In 1894, as he received a deputation of German teachers,
he speaks of the teaching of history in the German
schools and at once proceeds to criticize bitterly the
French methods — that the Gallican teachers are in-
capable of imparting to their pupils anything like im-
partial and objective history — that they are very de-
ficient in their knowledge of geography, etc. France
under the Republic never had a blind interpretation of
national history like that of Treitschke, nor has Ger-
many any popular text-books of history superior to those
of Gabriel Monod and Lavisse, while the geographical
text-books of Vidal de la Blache and Foncin — to men-
tion only these — are equal to the best elsewhere. He ac-
cuses the French of waging a systematic war upon
German securities. It is true that French financiers were
unfriendly to national investments among the countries
of the Triplice. They were unwilling to have their
savings used against them by their avowed enemies.

1 Broglie, Op. tit.> p. 259.
8 Ibid., p. 266.
* Ibid., p. 293.

50 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

Right or wrong in so doing they were only following the
object-lessons of Bismarck, who, when temporarily op-
posed to Russia, did the very thing with which he re-
proached the French. He repeated ad nauseam that
France would attack Germany. In order to meet this
fictitious danger the peaceful German taxpayer, trusting
his leaders, consents to pay the taxes, but hates the French
whom he makes responsible for this burden, and the
Chancellor attains his twofold purpose, the credits and
the culture of antagonism to France.

The red rag of the revanche is constantly held before
their eyes. At times his accusations, made in public or
made in print, are exhibited in posters ; one of them was
placed on the walls of Metz.1 When the Government
publishes alarming news one may be certain that a mili-
tary project is in the air, and when negotiations are going
on in Paris the press may be furious, but as soon as the
arrangements are concluded it is almost silent. If the
Reichstag refuses to vote the seven-year army bill, he
conjures the members with the pictures of the Red-
breeches about to cross the Vosges.2 He speaks of
" her hatred against all her neighbors " and of her
being " the most turbulent nation that exists." He
wanted to secure his vote. He knew that a mighty army
is not only efficient for the purpose of obtaining a terri-
tory from a neighbor in time of war, but also to gain con-
cessions in time of peace. In other words he wished to
make it an instrument of intimidation. He was so
provoking that Boulanger owed some of his popularity'
to the fact that while every public man in France was
pacific, he dared, after one of Bismarck's bellicose

'HI, 59, 237.
a III, 88, 210.

AIM OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 51

speeches, to answer him with energy.1 However, as
soon as Boulanger saw the popular effect of his chal-
lenge, he put his musket on his other shoulder and
proclaimed that Boulangism meant peace. Like all
demagogues he knew what the French people desired
most and that he promised to them. " The fall of
Boulanger," said Bebel in the Reichstag, " proves that
France is not disposed to allow herself to be stirred to
war and to go into it led by an adventurer."

The Germans have often expressed the regret that
they are not loved by their western neighbors, without
ever imagining that they themselves may be at fault,
or that the French are a peaceful people. We are
not here speaking of a group of individuals, of ir-
responsible cliques such as exist in every country, but
of the men who were at the helm of things. They were
proper and correct with their trans-Rhinean peers. On
the other hand, Bismarck was haughty, arrogant. Dur-
ing the palmiest days of the Drei-Kaiser-Bund, his atti-
tude was exasperating. He practically demanded that
France should not help the Carlists of Spain and recog-
nize the government of Marshal Serrano.2 His stand
toward Belgium in 1875 was menacing and the brave
little state had her Bismarckian scare.3 He remonstrated
with Italy because of the protection which the Quirinal,
by the Papal Guarantee Law, gave to the Vatican.4
Spain, after the great consideration shown her to draw
her people into the alliance, had her turn when the con-
troversy about the Caroline Islands arose. For awhile

1 Barclay, Sir Thomas, Thirty Years Anglo-French Remi-
niscences, p. 91.

2 Lowe, vol. II, p. 59.

3 II, p, 222.

4 II, P. 332.

52 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

he was hard and unyielding,1 but at last the question was
referred to the arbitration of the Pope. It was in the
same spirit that he annoyed the Americans at Samoa.2
In 1889, he showed his dictatorial spirit against Switzer-
land, because she gave shelter to German Socialists.
With the support of Russia and Austria, at the time, he
demanded from the Swiss the suppression of the right
of asylum for socialistic fugitives and practically the
limitation of Swiss sovereignty, though this was sanc-
tioned and guaranteed by Europe.3

Again, he annoyed France by the use he made of the
acts of the French Catholic Clergy. It has ever been
repugnant to the Catholic Church to bend, or bow, before
any political Power, and at times it has been her glory
to face the mighty courageously, and, as in Belgium, to
have a Cardinal Mercier stand for justice and humanity.
What was contemptible in the Iron Chancellor was his
cunning use of the rantings of some French bishops to
alarm Italy, as if France intended to restore the temporal
power of the Pope, a step which no French Government,
not even that of President MacMahon, would have dared
to take. Bismarck used French clericalism to fight Ger-
man Catholicism at home, and to gain his ends in Italy.
He took advantage of the erratic action of the Clergy
to arouse Italian anger. He made the bishops representa-
tives of the people of France, and then caused French-
men, many of whom at Magenta and Solferino had shed
their blood for the independence of Italy — men still the
best friends of the land of Cavour and Garibaldi — to
appear as foes. This maneuver brought Italy into the

1 III, 71, 235.

a III, 92, 477, 950.

* III, 94) 236.

AIM OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 53

Triple Alliance with its crushing military burdens, a step
which many Italians regretted then and regret even more
now. By this time Russia had virtually slipped out of
it, and was gravitating toward the French rapprochement
which ultimately was to ripen into an alliance.

By his international combinations — less reliable than
he thought — he created periods of continental anxiety
that were detrimental to Europe and harmful to France.1
Ever resourceful he worked, at times, in two ways to
attain one result. Thus he and a representative of the
Dual Monarchy offered Italy to take possession of
Tunis.2 The purpose was to arouse France and thereby
send Italy toward Berlin and Vienna. Later on he en-
couraged the French to take it and they did, but his
gift of Tunis served the same purpose. It embittered the
Italians, though, among them, there remained those who
could show their gratitude to France for her past services
by approving her protectorate over Tunis. He intended,
according to M. Tardieu, to use his new allies for the
purpose of irritating and provoking France.3 He adds
later on, " Italy was a puppet in the hands of Berlin." *
He followed the same course in Egypt. At times he
sided with France and encouraged her to hold her
ground and at other times he urged England to "take
Egypt." 5 He hoped that the Land of the Pharaohs would
prove a bone of contention between the French and the
English nation. He tried to draw Spain into his combi-
nations. The German Crown Prince went to Madrid,
where he worked for the German cause. King Al-

> III, 89, 235.

3 III, 103, 889.

8 France and the Alliances, p. 91.

4 Ibid., p. 134.

5 Lowe, vol. II, p. 244.

54 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

phonso XII returned the visit in Berlin. William I
appointed him colonel of a Prussian regiment, but it was
stationed at Strasburg in the conquered country. The
festivities on that occasion were such that a few days
later the new Prussian colonel was greeted in Paris
with hisses and groans, though, before, the Parisians
were very friendly to him. Was this feast in Strasburg
accidental or was it the purpose of the Chancellor to
exasperate his neighbors again ? It is impossible to tell.

In 1 88 1, Rumania was apparently drawn into the same
movement.1 Inviting M. Bratiano to join the Triplice,
he said, " We want peace, we are a league of peace ; and
if you desire peace, you may find support with us; but
if war is your object, then you must go to others/' 2 An
alliance was reached, but the Rumanians demurred and
the project had to be abandoned.3 King Milan, who
was practically driven off his throne, and his reckless
son who was murdered, disloyal to their people, also
entered into the movement,4 but the Servians soon
realized who their real friends were. Mr. Lowe, who,
all along, has characterized the Bismarckian efforts as
meant to isolate — he might have said, strike — France,
speaks as follows : " The German Chancellor . . . had
thus gradually imposed his pacific will on all European
diplomacy, and gathered the nations of the Continent
into a Peace League to which it was discreditable, and
even dangerous, not to belong." 5 The Bismarckian iron
net was thus woven about France with a patience worthy
of a better cause. Charles de Mazade, in 1883, wrote,

1 Lowe, vol. II, p. 149.

* Ibid., p. 151.

* III, 109, 477-

* Muir, Ramsay, Britain's Case Against Germany, 1914, p. 141.
•Vol. II, p. 155.

AIM OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 55

" France is at present surrounded by a sort of circle
created with as much cleverness as power in such a way
as to compress her." 1 Indeed the Triplice ever pro-
tested that it loved peace, but it caused to rest over
France menaces of a conflict that were more alarming
because of their indefiniteness. Prince von Bismarck
could indeed have created a large instrument of peace,
but that which he evolved ultimately crumbled because
of its unquestionably belligerent purpose.

One of Bismarck's successors, von Biilow, hints that
the people who had joined this great alliance were drawn
together by a sense of " common dangers/' 2 and there
is the implication that they arose from France, but what
could she have done had she wished, to Servia, to
Rumania, to Spain, to Italy, to Austria or to Germany
herself, bristling with armaments? The new Chancellor
could not mention the least evidence of a French pur-
pose to attack a single one of these peoples. France
needed all her strength to cope with her overwhelming
home problems. These " dangers " were simply fanciful
creations of a German political leader who used them to
help or justify an aggressive course. This gentleman
has boundless faith in the Dreibund even when reduced
by the secession of Russia, Spain, Servia and Rumania.
He views it " as the resumption and the prolongation of
the Holy Alliance of bygone days " 3 and as " a mighty
fortification dividing the continent into two." 4 " Rarely,
if ever, has the history of Europe witnessed so solid an
alliance."5 In 1902, dealing with the same subject, he

1 III, 60, 707.

8 Imperial Germany, p. 69.

• V, 7, 477-

4 Imperial Germany, p. 67.

8 VI, 23, 273-

56 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

says, " We will continue to maintain Germany so strong
that our friendship shall be precious to each and that
it may not be indifferent to anyone to incur our enmity." x
In all his utterances there is a threat. " So solid an
alliance," " the masterpiece of statecraft " 2 of Bismarck,
received a strong blow, first by the Franco-Russian
Alliance, then a second one by the Franco-Italian En-
tente and a third one from the Anglo-French Agreement.
The remaining partner, Austria, is the prisoner of Ger-
many, which now commands at the Ballplatz.

With the extension and apparent progress of the
Triplice Bismarck did not fail to keep the French
national nerves unstrung. In 1884, someone spoke
to him of the possible drawbacks arising from the fact
that Germany had no navy. He replied that if Germany
had grievances there should be no need of going so far,
and that the gates of Metz opened into France.3 Later
on came the Schnoebele incident. This man, an agent
of the French Government, had been made liable for
some of his acts. He was living in France. While there,
however, German officials drew him, by deceit, into their
territory and there arrested him.4 Frenchmen had no
sympathy with the victim of this police system, but
resented strongly the methods employed to seize him
and, not without misgivings, demanded his release. The
country was for a few days in a terrible suspense. The
year was scarcely over, when along the frontier of the
Vosges Mountains a German guard fired upon French-
men, killing one and wounding another on French soih5

1 V, 7, 477-

* Lowe, II, p. 116.

• III, 64, 235.

4 III, 81, 222. Matter, Op. cit., vol. Ill, p. 551.
' III, 85, 950.

AIM OF THE TRIPLE ALLIANCE 57

French protestations probably contributed to the char-
acter of his next great speech. On February 8, 1888,
in the Reichstag he treats France with insulting con-
tempt. " One does not always wage war through
hatred," he said, " for were it so, France ought to be
ceaselessly at war, not only with us, but also with Eng-
land and Italy ; she hates all her neighbors." * These
were the senile rantings of a great man whose successors
were to find France surrounded by " un cercle d' alliances
et d'amities, toutes faites de coiirtoisie et de cordi-
alite" 2

1 Matter, Op. cit., vol. Ill, p. 539.

2 Pichon, S., Discours, Paris, Feb. 24, 1907.

THE KAISER'S PROVOCATIONS

WHEN Bismarck resigned, in 1890, Frenchmen could
not but rejoice that their great enemy had ceased to be
the Chancellor of Germany, and also that, later on, he
and the Kaiser were no longer on friendly terms. They
were far from the time when the Crown Prince, after
his grandfather's death and when his own noble father
was dying, spoke at a banquet of " Germany, with its
chief killed, its lieutenant-colonel deeply wounded, gather-
ing round its standard bearer, Bismarck." *• Now the
Prince, having come to power as King of Prussia and
Emperor of Germany, soon indicated his purpose of
being absolute. On March 5, 1890, at the banquet of
the provincial Diet of Brandenburg he said, " I will
break as a piece of glass those who will oppose me."
Soon after he inscribed on his portrait Sic volo, sic jubeo.
At the Rhinean Diet on May 4, 1891, he said, "There
is only one master in the country and that master it is I."
Later on, in Munich, he inscribed the following preten-
tious sentence, Suprema lex regis voluntas? These as-
sertions were a greater expression of absolute personal
power than when Louis XIV said, L'Etat, c'est moi.
These were uttered in France while Louis XIV was
young, in an age of ignorance, but the Kaiser was speak-

1 III, 86, 950.

3 Le Temps, Nov. 17, 1891.

58

THE KAISER'S PROVOCATIONS 59

ing at the end of the nineteenth century, in enlightened
Germany. What was worse than his formulae of divine
rights, or what Le Temps called cesaropopism, he as-
sumed the position of " standard bearer " and he dis-
missed Bismarck " like a lackey." 1

There followed a painful period when the young Kaiser,
who had displayed a certain harsh attitude toward his
parents, been ungrateful toward the Chancellor, draping
himself in the splendor of his authority, defiantly looked
at the recluse of Friedrichsruh and practically wished to
seal his lips. The latter had held the imperial helm for
twenty-eight years and had not only made Germany
but made her to his likeness. He had infused his ideas,
good and bad alike, into the life of the Empire. Humanly
speaking he was . . . " aussi grand qu'un front pent I'etre
sous le del." In spite of his wrongs, of his crimes,
even, no one in the Hohenzollern House had a right to
depreciate his work, which, from many points of view,
was great. He was sensitive in this direction and re-
mained fearless in his criticisms of those who attacked
him. The warnings which he received from Berlin
moved him but little. When the Imperial Government
resorted to persecutions such as its attitude at the time
of the marriage of his son, he remained stoically in-
flexible. The moment the Kaiser endeavored to lessen
his fame as the builder of the unity of Germany, and the
statement was made that it was the work of Emperor
Friedrich III, Bismarck made the confession which was
published by the Vienna Free Press and which we have
reproduced.2 This confession ought to have done away
with heaps of German literature, mountain high, which

1 These are Bismarck's own words.
1 P. 21.

60 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

repeat the falsehoods about the aggression of France in
1870.

With the elevation of Wilhelm II to the supreme im-
perial rank matters changed but little. Frenchmen did
not modify their attitude, nor did the Emperor and his
military caste. After the death of his father he wrote
to a friend, " The way is the same, and now, full speed !
Go ahead ! " x At times he seemed to be disposed to win
over the French, but some of his attempts were all but
happy. The visit of his mother to Paris is a case in
point. She had gone to urge French artists to take part
in an exhibition in Germany. Her going was like the
arrival of the Kaiser in Copenhagen, at the death of
King Christian IX, when he was not wanted by anyone.
Had German artists made a proposal like the one re-
ferred to above, it would have been eminently proper,
but for the mother of the reigning sovereign to do it was
construed as an undue attempt to break through a digni-
fied moral reserve which was legitimate. " She deeply
wounded French feelings," said Victor Berard, " when
she visited the Galerie des glaces of Versailles, where
the German Empire had been proclaimed, as well as the
ruins of St. Cloud." 2 Her good heart ought to have
saved her from committing such a blunder. The Pari-
sians made her feel this lack of kindness or at least of
tact. The Kaiser was irritated. Like Bismarck, he soon
took up the harping at the " hereditary enemy."

Nothing can help one better to understand the spirit of
the German Ruler than his addresses published in a book,
The German Emperor? by Professor Christian Gauss

'HI, 98, 714.

2 La France et Guillaume II, p. 16.

« N. Y. 1915-

THE KAISER'S PROVOCATIONS 61

of Princeton University, a book of modest pretensions
but of signal worth, as it exhibits in their fair historical
framework some of the typical utterances of the Kaiser.
There are some 700 or 800 of these oratorical produc-
tions.1 These outbursts of feeling — few of them are
anything else — tell us that the army is dominant, the
army is the rocher de bronze upon which the nation must
stand. The judgment of the reader will recoil at the
incense burned before the Hohenzollerns, his constant
praise — praise that comes only from him — for " my im-
mortal grandfather, His Majesty Emperor William the
Great." 2 There is much also about the expansion and
power of the German people, their destiny shaped by the
law of the " Old God," and a theology not far distant
from that of Constantine, of Clovis and, at best, of
Saint-Louis, six or seven centuries ago. One constant
note is that of the danger from without and principally
from France. At first, he endeavored to react against
the opinion credited to him that he was militant and
warlike, by asserting his determination to keep peace,
but war and hatred of France are in the Hohenzollern
blood. In 1889, at Aldershot, in England, in a speech
of one hundred and eleven words, considerably less than
twice the length of the Lord's Prayer, there are two
references to Waterloo and one to Malplaquet.3 Anti-
Gallicanism with him, as with Moltke and Bismarck, is
an obsession. He cannot keep it at home. It even be-
comes an article of exportation. On May 6, 1890, plead-

1 Tardieu, A., Op. cit., p. 162. Professor Gauss has given us
only the most important ones.

2 Von Arnim addresses William I as follows : " Most illustrious,
very powerful Emperor and King, gracious Emperor, King and
Sovereign." Document from von Arnim 's Trial.

* Gauss, p. 50.

62 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

ing before the Reichstag for more armaments, he lays
stress upon " the military organization of our neighbors,
(which) has been broadened and perfected to an unfore-
seen degree." * In 1891, on the occasion of the maneu-
vers of the Fourth Saxon corps, he referred to Jena and
again urged the Germans to prepare against the " com-
mon enemy." 2 In the latter part of 1892, there was
another proposal made by him for further armaments.3
No one needed to be told the reason of it. Not to speak
of other acts, on July 4, 1893, the rapprochement be-
tween France and Russia became the basis of his plea —
the Germans can ever find a rational pretext for what
they want — for an increase of war resources.4 Before
his access to the supreme honor of the Empire there had
been in Germany celebrations of the anniversaries of the
war of 1870, during which there were the threadbare
accusations against France — accusations that have been
so often repeated that their falsehoods have become like
infusible crystals in the national consciousness, as if they
were indisputable verities. Germany could not have been
held to the Prussian and Bismarckian ideals of militarism
unless the war spirit was kept up to a white heat by
misrepresentations of the neighboring state and culti-
vated by these war celebrations. In this, confederate
states were scarcely behind Prussia. The King of
Saxony, at about this time, speaking before some vet-
erans, lets his imagination run loose, and talks as if war
were actually on.5

The Kaiser, however, is not to be surpassed. In

Gauss, p. 59.
Ill, 107, 713.
Ill, 114, 234.
Ill, 107, 713.
HI, 95, 472.

THE KAISER'S PROVOCATIONS 63

September, 1894, he went to Metz on the date of the anni-
versary of the battle of Sedan. There, standing in front
of the bronze statue of his grandfather, he reviewed his
troops. It is to this city, wrested from France, and
close to the country which the Lorrainers love, that he
comes with the Prince of Naples, the grandson of
Victor Emmanuel, for his theatrical displays, his peace-
ful speeches ever spiced with indirect menaces. He
thus associates the House of Savoy, for which France
had done so much, with his irritating acts. On October
1 8, the anniversary of the battle of Leipsic, he says:
" This inspiring day is one whose memories move the
world and which marks an epoch in our German his-
tory." * This was a reference to France, though she was
not mentioned. At times his seconds come in. Von
Caprivi, before the Army Commission, the previous year,
also held up the imaginary specter of French aggression.
He points out the great peril resulting from the move-
ment of Russia toward France. He even saw possible
dangers in the direction of peaceful Denmark. Ger-
many ought not only to be able to defend herself, he
maintained, but to take the offensive from the beginning
of the war, to protect her " brethren from Alsace," new-
comers into the Empire, who should not be abandoned
to the rigors of the French armies.2 Von Caprivi, speak-
ing of the rigors of the French armies against " the
brethren from Alsace," gives the measure of his sincerity.
Rigors of the French armies against the loved Alsatians,
that is splendid ! The orators, speaking on behalf of the
project, did not fail to recall the siege of Dantzig, the
Napoleonic campaign of Eylau, as well as the burning

1 Gauss, p. 83.
Mil, 117, 472.

64 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

of the Palatinate under Louis XIV.1 This shows the
spirit, the methods of the men who, having no legitimate
wrongs to complain of, must have recourse to such
arguments as those of von Capri vi, or evoke such distant
occurrences and distort them so as to pose as victims.
Never do they refer to the services rendered by France
which weakened the hold that the House of Hapsburg
had upon them, helped German states oppressed by other
German states ; nor to the alliance of the King of Prussia,
who, during eight years, benefited, at the expense of other
German states, by Napoleonic conquests. There is also
perfect silence upon the fact that most of the invasions
of France proceeded from the East, and that Prussia
was foremost in them. In their conversations France is
the great disturber. On the occasion of the marriage
of the Grand Duke of Hesse-Darmstadt and the daughter
of Saxe-Coburg and Gotha, the Kaiser and Queen Vic-
toria of England were present as well as the Crown
Prince of Russia. Everyone talked of peace, but France
was spoken of as the only one to arm, when her arma-
ments were not one-half those of her antagonist.2 Such
was the talk of royalty and militaries, but the best in-
formed people must have been aware that France could
not be so dangerous even had she the designs ascribed
to her. In 1895, the year of the twenty-fifth anniversary
of the victories of 1870, Germany resounded with uni-
versal displays of mustered patriotism keeping up the
animosity against the Byzantine and decadent Republic
beyond the Vosges. France, though not without re-
minders of her own victories but having no such celebra-
tions, was not infrequently wounded by these uncon-

1 III, 117, 473.
a III, 123, 235-

THE KAISER'S PROVOCATIONS 65

trolled effusions of a patriotism raised to a white heat —
a patriotism that has two defects, one rests upon error
of facts, and the other leads astray by the cumulative
repetitions of the same fictitious and exaggerated
complaints, getting further and further away from
truth.

In 1895, as Bismarck reached his eightieth birthday,
the people of Germany organized a great celebration.
They wished to honor the man who, in their eyes, had so
splendidly served and enlarged the fatherland. They
resorted in large numbers to the great Recluse's place
of exile, Friedrichsruh. The Kaiser, perhaps conscious
of his former unkindness, or anxious to be forgiven
by the masses for his injustice towards the former
" standard bearer " of Germany, attended the celebration,
and presented him with a sword with " Alsace-Lorraine "
inscribed on it.1 The Emperor could find no better way
to honor this old broken-down servant of the Empire
than to bring him a sword on which was an inscription
equally harrowing to the feelings of Alsatians and of
Frenchmen. He sought to have his unkind treatment of
the old servant forgotten by referring to the bloodshed
at Mars-la-Tour.2 This did not soothe the wounded
feelings of the old Dictator. Henceforth to the end he
fought the New Order, attacked the policy of von Caprivi,
maligned some of the men who in the past had been his
docile tools, revealed his dishonest treaties with Austria
and Russia, and showed the depth of his rancor against
those who deposed him from what he had considered his
omnipotent and eternal seat of Power. Even then he
never ceased to show his resentment against the

1 III, 128, 714.
•Ill, 128,715.

66 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

land upon which he seemed to have concentrated his
hatred.1

The Kaiser continued in the same course. In 1897, as
he addresses his brother Henry, at Kiel, before his
departure for China, he cannot refrain from reminding
him that the step which he is taking is a consequence of
the great victories of 1870 and the establishment of the
Empire which followed.2 In the autumn of that year,
on another anniversary of the battle of Leipsic, his
monotonous speech again recalled the conflict with the
western enemies of the fatherland. At the following
anniversary, he once more reminds his hearers of the
work which his father and grandfather accomplished in
building the German Empire — for him and for his sub-
jects to do this was to crush France. On April 27, 1903,
while President Loubet was expressing pacific senti-
ments— and they were heartfelt — at a banquet in Naples,
the Kaiser was making a most belligerent speech in
Karlsruhe. " The recollection of the grand period when
the German people has accomplished its unity, the
memory of the battles of Woerth, of Wissembourg, of
Sedan, the remembrance of the outburst of joy with
which the Grand Duke of Baden greeted the first Em-
peror of Germany will deepen the conviction that God
will help us." 3 Four days later at Mayence and two
weeks later at Saarbriicken, his orations deserve the
famous saying of Alphonse Karr, Plus ga change plus
c'est toujours la meme chose. The battle of Leipsic,
not those in which the King of Prussia, betraying othef
German states, was on the side of Napoleon, stands fore-

1 Le Temps, April 10, 1896.
a Gauss, p. 1 18.
*Mevil, p. 152.

THE KAISER'S PROVOCATIONS 67

most. In 1913, it was to be celebrated with signal eclat,
as the centennial of the great event which was also the
twenty-fifth anniversary of his reign. An accident to a
Zeppelin prevented the carrying out of his plans. The
destruction of this aircraft, entailing the loss of the
lives of twenty-seven officers and men, hindered him from
attending the proposed historic celebration. It is prob-
able that this distressing casualty saved France from
being reminded once more of what Louis XIV and
Napoleon I, the French Kaisers of old, had done. Again
and again, he utters what was, in his eyes, an incentive
to German patriotism, and a challenge to France, as when
he speaks of his grandfather, " the great Emperor Wil-
liam." " Let us not forget that he lived through and
remembered Jena and Tilsit, and that, nevertheless, he
never despaired of the future of the Fatherland. From
Tilsit we traveled to Versailles." 1 Yes, but that was
not the first time. This idee fixe of the Kaiser is so
deeply rooted in him, that, in sending a message of apol-
ogy to Sir Edward Goschen for the insults to which the
English Ambassador had been subjected when war was
declared, he could not avoid making a reference to
Waterloo.

All along, the German Government had been increasing
the power of its army to vast proportions, frightening
the people into consent by the process that we have
mentioned. Now it was the turn of the navy. Everyone
knows that no armada was threatening Germany, that
her great commercial fleet was plowing the oceans, in
every direction, with complete liberty and increasing suc-
cess. After the Franco-German war her ambition was
in Europe, but now the field of her aspirations is the
1 Gauss, p. 230.

68 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

world. Then she justified her armaments on the basis of
French danger ; later on, of Russian and Danish danger ;
now the enemy is also England, " the great robber-state."
She cultivates hatred of Britons. She had long ex-
pressed contempt and indifference for colonies. Bis-
marck went so far as to oppose colonists. This Dr. Carl
Peters knew by a painful experience.1 About the time
of the foundation of the Empire, Bismarck said, " For
us in Germany, this colonial business would be just like
the silken sables in the noble families of Poland, who
have no shirt to their backs/' 2 Then the Germans
wished merely to develop their military, their industrial
life at home, their commerce abroad, and that they did
with a felicity applauded everywhere by all men who
admire success. Other Powers turned their eyes toward
unoccupied fields and made stupendous sacrifices for
distant territorial expansion. They had not attained the
goal reached by their German competitors in military,
industrial and commercial matters, but had legitimately
entered into possession of colonies. Towards 1880 the
attitude of Germany changed. In 1884, the Cameroon
country was seized. In 1885, German Southwest Africa
and German East Africa were annexed. The Caro-
line Islands shared the same fate. Longing for more
she cast her eyes upon the possessions of others.
According to German cant, she would not attack any-
one, she dreamed of no conquests, of no increase
of territory, if we heed von Biilow. However, he un-
covers the pot aux roses when he says, " Between
the Greater Britain and the New France we have a

1 Saunders, George, Builder and Blunderer, p. 16.

2 Lowe, vol. II, p. 209.

THE KAISER'S PROVOCATIONS 69

right to a Greater Germany,"1 and that is doubtless
what the Kaiser calls " a place in the sun." 2 This simply
means that as there are no more unclaimed territories,
Germany is entitled to those of others.

In 1898, the Kaiser visited Sultan Abdul-Hamid, the
cruel murderer of the Armenians and of some peoples
of the Balkans. The imperial visitor kissed him and
called him " brother." Indeed " a kind of political and
personal brotherhood was sworn between the two mon-
archs, and lasted through the later horrors of the
Sultan's reign until he was deposed by the revolution." 3
There is no need of saying that this comedy on the
part of the Christian Kaiser was royally paid for. It
was then that were negotiated the proposals of the
Bagdad railroad and were secured privileges which have
developed into a stupendous mortgage over the whole
Turkish Empire. French prerogatives and concessions
were arbitrarily revoked. British and French influences
in Constantinople were reduced to nought. His visit to
Jerusalem marked a new departure. He virtually as-
serted a religious protectorate over the Moslem world
and announced his determination to disregard that which
France had carried on for centuries in connection with
the Catholic Church. For a long time she went beyond
the religious world and protected Christian travelers in
the Levant and the Far East as well as the members
of the Orthodox Church now shielded by Russia. She
has the right, recognized and defended by the Holy See,
to look after all the Catholic institutions as well as after
groups of Eastern Catholics, the Maronites, the Melchites,

1 III, 157, 234-

"Gauss, p. 181.

* Saunders, G., Builder and Blunderer, p. 74-

70 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

the Chaldean and Armenian Catholics.1 The fact that,
until recently, she furnished as many missionaries as
all the Catholics of the world put together, gave promi-
nence to them. It was thought that the national pro-
tectorate was the cause of the influence exerted, while it
was due much more to the fact that France has ever been
fertile in men of genuine apostleship. Also the Govern-
ment gave subsidies to missions when most of their
work was educational and philanthropic. This protec-
torate was approved by the Pope and to some extent
was under his authority, but the institution itself rests,
with most states, upon international agreements.2 This
protective function doubtless increased French prestige
among the Orientals and did much good, though Free-
Thinkers are generally opposed to it. They do not ques-
tion the gains accruing thereby to general civilization,
but the whole system seems to them an anachronism.

The Kaiser while in the Holy City announced not only
a similar protectorate over Pan-Islamism, but that he had
rejected, as far as German priests were concerned, this
French Catholic protectorate. The Berlin Congress had
recognized in all Powers the right to protect their own
subjects, but the same article states "that the rights
acquired by France are continued, and that it is well
understood that no breach could be made in the status quo
of the holy places " 3 in Jerusalem. It was doubtless the
right of the Kaiser to act as he did, but it may be doubted
if he would have done so had not the protecting state

1 Le Temps, Nov. 22, 1912.

3 De Lanessan, J. L., Les missions et leur protectorat, Paris,
1907, p. 6. In this work the author has treated the subject with
great fairness and rare competence though not with much sym-
pathy.

8 Article 62.

THE KAISER'S PROVOCATIONS 71

been France. Be that as it may, a first fruit of this new
policy, January, 1897, was the taking of Kiao-Chou in
China, under the pretext that two German missionaries
had been massacred by the Celestials. The first act of
this protectorate was the taking of Chinese lands. This
new departure, unimportant in itself, was a part of the
unfriendly and aggressive course pursued against Paris
by his Government. It did not stop there. France was
anxious that Cardinal Rampolla, the liberal Secretary
of State under Leo XIII, should be elevated to the visible
headship of the Church. This aim had no international
bearing. It was thought by the Government that he alone
could have kept the French Clergy within proper bounds,
and he most probably would have averted the separation
of Church and State which Pius X unquestionably pre-
cipitated.1 Austria had given France the assurance that
she would not raise any opposition to the election of the
Cardinal, but at the last hour she sent in her veto.2 This
was done at the request of the German Government.

The constant nettling and ruffling of French feelings
was exasperating. The Kaiser's speech of the " mailed
fist," his hypocritical plea for " a place in the sun," the
clamor for a greater Germany, the assertion that, with-
out the German Emperor, no great decision dare hence-
forth be taken, his intoxication of power and his out-
spoken desire of domination made the French feel that
they had on their eastern frontier a great personal source
of danger. In 1900, he declared that the troops which
had gone to China were destined to " show that the arm
of the German Emperor reached to the farthest ends

1 See Bracq, J. C, France Under the Republic, 1910, pp. 290
and 312.

3 Mevil, A., Op. cit., p. 114.

72 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

of the earth/' * Similarly the book of Prince von Biilow,
Imperial Germany, which reflects the national aspirations,
is the work of a man overwrought with the sense of
German might and who can scarcely conceal the determi-
nation to use it against someone. " Bismarck," says
Novicow, " had to do a stupendous work to bring the
Prussian people to the policy of violence which rendered
possible the wars of 1864, 1866 and 1870." 2 Since then
the German leaders, thoroughly Prussianized, have even
intensified this policy of " Blood and Iron," but they can
no longer pose as men of peace. Books like, Usher, R.
G., Pan-Germanism; Fouillee, A., Psychologie des
peuples europeens; Cramb, J. A., Germany and England
or Villard, O. G., Germany Embattled have made such a
comedy impossible.

1 Saunders, Op. cit., p. 100.
1 Op. cit., p. 369.

VI

A GERMAN QUARREL1

MEANWHILE, France, after the period of just indigna-
tion, and hatred of her soulless conquerors, witnessed a
most remarkable movement making for international
comity which would have ultimately worked out a recon-
ciliation between her and Germany had not the latter
so acted as to deprive it of its potential efficiency. The
old idealistic traditions of the Abbe de Saint-Pierre, the
teachings of Saint-Simonians, the new education fostered
and expanded by the Republic, the scientific movement,
as well as the tendencies of philosophy, travel and the
wide dissemination of intelligence, had profoundly af-
fected French democracy. The movement was inter-
national to some extent, but nowhere was it more earnest
than in the land of Voltaire and Hugo. The moral sense
of the nation recoiled from the ideals of militarists, and
from the thought of the international murders that we
call war. Fashoda, which at other times might have left
a century of bitter memories, because the nation had
reached a higher conception of international comity, ulti-
mately led France and England to deal with each other
in the new spirit moving men everywhere toward saner
international relations. The doctrine of pacifism had
now sunk deeply into the national consciousness. Social-
ists and Radicals, led by what the writer calls a Christian

1 Popular French saying in speaking of a quarrel without
cause.

73

74 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

humanism, made these principles central in their political
propaganda. The Liberals were equally earnest. The
Government was — and had to be — the expression of
national ideals and feelings and, as such, was forced to a
friendlier attitude toward all Powers — even Germany.
Jaures, assassinated by a fanatic of the old form of
narrow patriotism, would have died a happier man had
he seen progress made toward reconciliation with the
trans-Rhinean Power.

It was not the fear of Germany but the growth of a
more reasonable spirit among various states that led the
French Government to sign numerous treaties of arbi-
tration. King Edward, ever a friend of France, fos-
tered better feelings in his own country and paid a visit to
President Loubet which was returned by the latter. This
was followed by reciprocal courtesies of the fleets, of
municipalities and of the members of the two Parlia-
ments. Baron d'Estournelles de Constant, the great friend
of peace with honor, or rather of peace with justice,
the man who had persuaded President Roosevelt to stop
the boycott against the court at The Hague by referring a
case to it, organized a group of members of Parliament in
view of giving unity and support to the peace ideals of the
nation. Meanwhile the two Governments were discuss-
ing the imperative Anglo-French difficulties that urgently
demanded a solution. Old and diverse were these inter-
national problems. M. Delcasse, one of the most dis-
tinguished statesmen that France has produced, was
the embodiment of conciliation. He laid stress upon the
fact that it was easier to solve twenty difficulties
than one, because in most problems it is a question
of give and take. He and Lord Lansdowne started with
the new and advanced point of view that, in their at-

A GERMAN QUARREL 75

tempts to reach an understanding, each would leave to
her competitor what meant most to her. Thus, in New-
foundland, the French Shore was far more important
for England than for France. In Egypt, freedom of
action was of more value to Great Britain than to her
neighbor. In these countries, and at other points, France
yielded to her. Similarly, Morocco meant more for
France than for England, and so, with definite restric-
tions, France secured a free hand there. As a whole
this adjustment was not only equitable but mutually con-
siderate. When on April 8, 1904, it was made public, it
failed to satisfy the jingoes of both countries, but peace-
ful men everywhere breathed more freely, and felt that
a great step forward had been taken by the two Govern-
ments for their own peace and that of the world. If the
most difficult Anglo-French contentions could thus be
settled calmly and peacefully by the new diplomacy, then
any international entanglement might be. A great moral
victory had been won on the side of reason and
conscience. M

The German authorities were hostile to the method and
to its results. In fact they were skeptical in reference to
the possibility of an Anglo-French Agreement. Many
of them would have been happy to see the two nations on
opposite sides of the Strait of Dover cross swords. The
hostility of the two countries was a fundamental postulate
of German diplomacy. The Egyptian stick, that Bis-
marck prided himself to use sometimes in striking Eng-
land and sometimes in annoying France, was no more.1
A conversation of M. Delcasse with Prince Radolin,
telling him of the nature of the transaction, had failed to

1 Mevil, A., De la paix de Franc fort CL la Conference d'Alge-
siras, p. 146.

76 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

bring conviction. France and England waited seventeen
days, during which Germany made no objection, before
signing the celebrated treaty. It was only then that Wil-
helmstrasse saw that this Anglo-French Agreement was
a reality.1 The attitude of the German Government had
two phases. First, Chancellor von Biilow made no oppo-
sition to it. On April 12, he said, and rightly too : " We
have no reason to suppose that that agreement is directed
against any Power whatsoever. It seems to be an at-
tempt to cause to disappears series of dissents existing
between France and England by a friendly understand-
ing. From the point of view of German interests, we -
have nothing to object."2 "We have before all," he
states again, " commercial interests there, and so it is of
much moment for us that calm and order should pre-
vail in Morocco. We must protect our mercantile
interests there and we shall protect them. We have
no cause to fear that they could be disregarded by any
Power/'

Let it be noticed that to introduce " calm and order "
was the task assumed by France. Furthermore, by her
position and experience, she was better prepared than
any other people to do that work. When Count
Reventlow criticizes the Anglo-French Agreement, from
a Pan-Germanistic point of view, the Chancellor heaps
cutting sarcasms upon him and defends the stand which
he has taken.3 Six months later the German Secretary
of State assures the French representative, M. Bihourd,
that Germany has only economic interests in Morocco.*

1 Mevil, pp. 145-148.

2 Ibid., p. 153-
1 Ibid., p. 158.

* Yellow Book, document 192, p. 167.

A GERMAN QUARREL 77

On the 2Qth of the following March, the Chancellor has
become the Jupiter Tonans of German politics. Herr
Bebel, opposed to an aggressive policy, accuses him of
having changed his position. He answers, " I must re-
mind him that the language and attitude of diplomatists
and politicians are regulated by circumstances." In
1914, the Great Statesman, speaking of the Anglo-French
Agreement retrospectively, says, " Just at this time
France was preparing to injure us in Morocco." * " In
certain French circles the original object was to ignore
Germany." 2 It was " the high-handed policy of France
in Morocco which threatened to ignore German industrial
and commercial interests as well as our national credit." 3
Ever thinking more of Germany than of the facts of
the case, he continues, " The treaty was indirectly aim-
ing at injuring the latter country." 4 " French Moroccan ..>, .
policy was an attempt to set Germany aside in an im-
portant decision on foreign affairs, an attempt to adjust
the balance of power in favor of France."5 The first
utterances of the Chancellor were the calm answer of a
statesman who, though disappointed by the fact that
France and England had become reconciled, and that
France and Italy had become friends again, spoke cheer-
fully of the Agreement.

Again the new relations with Italy were due largely
to the broad and noble spirit of M. Delcasse as well as
that of Marquis de Visconti-Venosta, who had recognized
the artificiality and burdensome character of the Triplice.
The renewal of the Triple Alliance, in 1902, had been

1 Imperial Germany, p. 44.

* Ibid., p. 102.

* Ibid., p. 93.
4 P. 95-

* P. 98.

78 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

freed from clauses which were threatening for France.1
Sig. Prinetti, in the Italian Parliament, and M. Delcasse,
in the Chamber of Deputies, asserted that the unfriendly
Bismarcko-Crispinian elements of the Treaty had dis-
appeared. France, previously hurt by the former Italian
ungratefulness, could have said, " He that is not with
me is against me," but now, satisfied with the Franco-
Italian treaty, settling the Mediterranean questions, and
with the modification of the Triplice, she could say, " He
that is not against me is on our part." The_^peech of
the Kaiser at Karlsruhe showed not only his ill-feeling
toward the Franco-Italian rapprochement but seemed to
imply that he did not admit of a policy for other peoples
not sanctioned by Germany. Von Bulow was aware of
the cooling of the Triplician zeal of Italy, but he did not
think that she was flirting with France. He referred to
it in a witty form: this was merely " un simple tour de
valse."

The evolution of English mind and feelings could not
be disposed of with a joke. England, walking hand in
hand with France, was a fact contrary to all German
anticipations, and, ascribing motives like their own to
the two participants, there was opened before them the
vision of contingencies that were not absolutely pleasant.
Italy's partial escape from the Dreibund was bad enough,
and the change that had come over England was most
serious, but both, taken together, justified a certain
anxiety that the Chancellor would not admit. Further-
more, public opinion, favorable to a rapid policy of ex-
pansion, was annoyed by what seemed a failure. The
resolutions voted on March 20, 1904, at Esslingen, by
1 Mevil, Op. cit., p. 123.

A GERMAN QUARREL 79

the Pan-Germanists of Wurtemberg,1 the address voted
on May 27, at Stettin, by the Colonial Society 2 and the
unanimous resolutions of the Pan-Germanist Union,
June 3, at Liibeck,3 urged the Government to take an -'HKV»^
aggressive stand in Morocco. The. opponents of the
Chancellor taunted him in the Reichstag for what
seemed a diplomatic defeat. All this doubtless contrib-
uted to his right-about-face and his new pugnacious
stand.

The attitude of mind and soul which had led the
French to work for the Anglo-French Agreement also
practically led them to what was a virtual disarmament.
Russia had been defeated in September, 1904, and by
March, 1905, she was crushed at the hands of the
Japanese without any hope of recovery. England was
but loosely pledged to stand by France, which was in the
throes of the separation of Church and State. This was
the time when, at the request of von Biilow,* the Kaiser ... • .<, .
went to Tangier and made the speech which was meant
to exasperate France and England, and possibly to bring
on a fearful war.

The writer loves the sincerely religious of all creeds,
and the earnest worshipers at all shrines, but he dreads
the pious effusions of German political leaders. Bis-
marck, notwithstanding the mutilation of the Ems dis-
patch and many other villainous performances, said,
" We Germans fear God and nothing else in the
world."5 Von Biilow naturally turns to religious gush.

1 Yellow Book, doc. 141, p. 121.
3 Ibid., doc. 162, p. 136.
1 Ibid., doc. 166, p. 138.

*V, 26, 269; von Biilow, Op. cit.t p. 98; Tardieu, A., France
and the Alliances, p. 24.
• III, 103, 885.

8o THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

He speaks of the " happy dispensation of Providence " *
and of what " Providence has granted us." 2 In a speech
at Bremen, on March 22, 1905, the Kaiser urged his
t^r* hearers " to hold fast to the conviction that our God
would never have taken such pains with our German
Fatherland and its people, if he had not been preparing
us for something greater." Then, with characteristic
German contradiction of pride and humility, he adds,
" We are the salt of the earth, but we must also be
worthy to be so." 3 Nine days later, the Kaiser reached
Tangier, in great pomp, to perform the task laid upon
him by his Chancellor. There are evidences that he hesi-
tated long, and that even after he had reached Tangier
he dreaded the fatal words that might bring about the
irretrievable. At last he made his speech. " I am
pleased," he said, " to make the acquaintance of the
pioneers of Germany to Morocco and to be able to tell
them that they have done their duty.

" Germany has great commercial interests here. I
shall advance and protect our commerce, which shows a
satisfying increase, and for that reason shall insist upon
equal rights with all Powers, which is only possible
through the sovereignty of the Sultan and the independ-
ence of the country. For Germany both of these must
be unquestioned, and I am, therefore, ready to intervene
for them at all times.

" I hope that my visit to Tangier declares this
plainly and emphatically and that it will call forth the
conviction that what Germany undertakes in Morocco

1 Op. cit., p. 12.

* Ibid., p. 297.

* Gauss, p. 239.

A GERMAN QUARREL 81

will be negotiated exclusively with the sovereign Sul-
tan." *

In all, the Kaiser was two hours in Morocco,2 but,
had nothing else happened, his speech would have put
back the potential reconciliation of France and Germany
for half a century. The speech was interpreted every-
where as a menace both to France and to England.3
What made his statements unpardonable is that he did
not frankly state the deep underlying motive of his
course, and that what he said was largely untrue. The
" great commercial interests " of Germany amounted to
9,500,000 of francs a year on the basis of the returns
of the four preceding years. France and Algeria had a
trade of 33,000,000 and England 31,000,000.* Professor
Gauss neatly stated the case when he said that German
" trade there did not amount to as much as that of an
ordinary department store or to that of a fairly successful
merchant." 5

At first the Germans claimed to have none but ex-
clusively economic interests in that country, but if that
had been true the Tangier Speech was the greatest pos-
sible blunder. " The German Government," says Novi-
cow, " has caused a stagnation of affairs which has made
its subjects lose ten times more money than the trade
with Morocco would have brought them in a century." 6
The twaddle about the " sovereign Sultan " does not bear
examination. As to the absolute disregard of Germany
in the Anglo-French Settlement, it is true that the Quai

1 Gauss, p. 242.
•V., 26,946.

* Ibid., p. 950.

4 Tardieu, La Conference d'Algesiras, p. 499.

* Op. cit., p. 241.
e Op. cit., p. 228.

82 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

d'Orsay had made no formal notification to Germany,
but M. Delcasse, with perfect correctness of manner
and frankness, had communicated the substance of the
Agreement to Prince Radolin, the German Ambassador
in Paris, a fortnight before it was signed.1 In the French
Yellow Book one is obliged to recognize that the great
Prime-minister had not forwarded an official communica-
tion of the document to the German Ambassador, though
he had made an informal one.2 It is certain that Wil-
helmstrasse knew all about it. Berlin waited a whole
year, made no remonstrances, friendly or otherwise,
showed not even those cant courtesies upon which states
and individuals are so punctilious in the case of strained
relations. In June, 1905, " the Germans," says M.
Tardieu, " knew that M. Rouvier was willing to do more
than pay the price of their good-will in Morocco." 3 If
Germany's intentions were peaceful why did she not
speak ? Why did she not ask explanations ? Why did
she choose the moment when Russia was overpowered
by Japan, and when France was torn asunder by what
looked like a possible revolution, to spring forth like one
in ambush for a chance? Were there in the act of
France any valid reasons for a people bent upon peace
to abandon diplomatic action, and to resort to a theatrical,
discourteous threat like that of Tangier? None, none
whatsoever. The Tangier Speech was une querelle
d'Allemand. Professor Gauss puts this conclusion into a
neat English form : " Germany was evidently picking a
quarrel with France."4

'V., 27, 948.

3 DOC. 142, p. 122.

8 France and the Alliances, p. 187.

4 Op. cit., p. 240.

VII
FRANCE, GERMANY AND MOROCCO

ALMOST all the German references to French colonies,
since the beginning of the present war, have been greatly
misleading. The colonial expansion of France has been
determined both by her history and by her environments.
For over three centuries, she has done colonial work
more and more appreciated by all. The countries which
have come under her sway during the last eighty years
have, in part at least, been forced upon her, and that is
particularly true of North Africa. She purged the Medi-
terranean Sea of Algerian pirates who seized her vessels,
as well as those of other countries, and even descended
upon her coast, carrying off men and women as slaves to
Algiers. The first action of France was no more of a
conquering nature than that of Commodore Decatur at
Tripoli. However, she felt compelled to push her action
further. The Algerian conquest was long, ever to be
renewed, and when it was considered ended it had to be
begun again. She, at times, contemplated giving up the
task. In the last days of the Orleanists, P. Christian
published his Afrique frangaise, in which he eloquently
protested against such a fatal consummation. Today
Algeria is one of the finest colonies of the world. This
led, perhaps not by straight roads but led, to the pro-
tectorate over Tunis. The depredations of its inhabitants
upon the Algerian frontier and the movements which led

83

84 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

Austria to Bosnia, England to Cyprus, doubtless con-
tributed to accelerate this action.

The expansion of the North African and of the West
African colonies in their hinterland brought about the
creation of a colonial dominion extending from the Medi-
terranean to the Congo. Not to speak of her other
colonial possessions, some of which date from the seven-
teenth century, France has, there at her very door, an
extensive colonial empire,1 though some of these terri-
tories seem to have but a trifling value. This shows the
unreliable character of the statements of learned
Germans, American university professors, when they
tabulated colonial reports and said that since 1870 she
had increased her colonies by so many square miles and
Germany by only so many. What is the value of
thousands of square miles of Saharan sands? Nations,
like individuals, have their course determined by their
aptitudes and uses of opportunities. Germany chose
military, industrial and commercial power, and when she
has attained a goal far in advance of others in these
domains she comes and asks those who have toiled in
other directions to give up the fruits of their efforts.
She asks it in a brutal way, as by the Tangier Speech.
Again, nations may have an especial policy like that of
England of old in Newfoundland, where her fisheries
were reserved for English fishermen from home, and
thereby increasing the number of her seamen, and
through that developing the greatest navy that the world
has ever seen. However, when Britain no longer found
it profitable to follow her former course she could not
ask the French, in Newfoundland, except by special

1 See Bracq, J. C, The Colonial Expansion of France, National
Geographic Magazine, vol. XI, no. 6, June, 1900.

FRANCE, GERMANY AND MOROCCO 85

agreement, as was done, to surrender prerogatives shaped
by the first policy. Similarly, Germany was signally in-
different to colonies for a long time, and now she is
bitter because she has not done what others did.

Unquestionably, Morocco looked to her like a desirable
field for a colony and to the French it seemed, at first,
like a most enviable morsel to be added to the French
colonial empire. There were, however, such dangers
associated with it that the most thoughtful Frenchmen
were averse to such an acquisition. On other grounds,
Socialists and Radicals clamored against the idea of
having either a protectorate over it, or of proceeding to
its annexation. Its general condition was forlorn.
Anarchy reigned supreme. In the eyes of all, govern-
ment meant violence and plunder. The Sultan had lost
almost all his power. To reconquer it for him, or to
win it for France, looked like a gigantic task. Generally,
Frenchmen were opposed to any form of action which
would lead even to a partial control. They found a great
danger in the very extension of this French Mediter-
ranean colonial Power. North Africa is peopled by a
very capable militant population ever ready to resort to
arms. Formerly, these North Africans, divided among
themselves, were in a continual state of civil war, and
security to the outside world came from their intense
particularism. With French rule, they have, willy-nilly,
lived under the pax Gallicana and some of their sons
have acquired considerable French culture through the
lycees and the Medersas for the Islamic Clergy. These
natives, formerly at variance with each other, have, in
later times, shown signs of a growing common moral and
religious consciousness. There is among the most intel-
ligent a sense of oneness which has never existed before.

86 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

Their belligerent spirit, which has been weakened by the
new life introduced by France, is frequently reawakened
by appeals from Mohammedan communities outside or
by local fanatics. A secret Moslem society, the Maghre-
binian Union, with headquarters at Alexandria, has long
worked to unite the Pan-Islamic forces in North Africa
under the auspices of Germany.1

The annexation of Morocco would have accentuated
the evil. Before long, according to an eminent authority,
M. Paul Leroy-Beaulieu, there would be 14,000,000
Arabs and Kabyls against, at most, 1,150,000 to 1,200,000
Europeans, and thirty Moslems for one Frenchman.2
This increase might imperil French colonies. Further-
more, Jaures and his followers made the most violent
opposition to the taking of Morocco in any way whatso-
ever.3 Thece was no national desire to possess that
territory, but when it became evident that the Germans
were aiming at a foothold there, the sense of a greater
danger loomed up. The aggressive spirit of the Ger-
mans, so dangerous in Europe, would be even more so
in Africa. The French army in Algeria, and Tunisia,
would have to be increased, and the chances of German-
French friction would be multiplied. To quote the words
of Sir Thomas Barclay, a man very friendly to Germany,
writing before the present war, " Beyond the latent feel-
ing about the lost provinces, there was at the time no
hostility on the part of Frenchmen to Germany/' 4 Look-
ing at the matter calmly — for the population of France
exhibited a great deal of self-control at this time — it was

1 Le Temps, Nov. 2, 1912.

2 V, 43, 22.
8V, 43, 709-

* Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences, p. 26%,

FRANCE, GERMANY AND MOROCCO 87

better to take chances with the Arabs and the Kabyls than
with the men who were clamoring for the " Greater Ger-
many," and complained that their territories were insuf-
ficient for all their needs ; as if all progressive nations did
not depend upon other countries to supply some of the
increased wants created by our civilization.

England was compelled to take the same attitude as
France, and for many similar reasons. She had more
than four times greater economic interests there x than
the Germans. She had and could have kept her ascend-
ency over the Sultan. Englishmen had done much for
the introduction of Western civilization in that country.
There was also the question of Gibraltar. England could
hardly have countenanced the establishment of the hel-
meted men on the opposite shore. As someone has said,
" Morocco was mortgaged with the question of the
Strait " 2 guarded by the impregnable English fortress.
Spain, somewhat cramped between two strong neighbors,
did not wish to see the advent of a third one, Germany.
An entente with the Castilian Government was recorded
on October 6, 1904. Italy had already approved the
Anglo-French Agreement as a compensation for a free
hand in Tripoli. The unanimity of these Powers grew
out of the fact that this was the culminating point of a
great historic status, during which the nations had made
great sacrifices and through which the world had been
greatly benefited. They were all at one about the es-
sential work to be done in Morocco, to put an end to an
impossible life there and to open the land to all. These
Powers recognized that France, on account of her posi-
tion and experience, was better equipped and better quali-

1 Tardieu, La Conference d'Algesiras, p. 499.
* Menil, Op. cit.t p. 137.

88 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

fied than any other Power for this work. Again Germany
had in former years showed a singular indifference to
the land of the Sultan. In 1880, Bismarck, in a report
to the Kaiser, said that Germany should encourage
France to go to Morocco.1 When the Count de Saint-
Vallier went to see him about the protectorate over
Tunis, he expressed the hope that France would also
annex Morocco. " We can but rejoice at that," 2 said
he. The land of the Kaiser, as we have seen, had but
scanty interests there, created by the recent emissaries
sent to prepare the way for the future action of her
Weltpolitik.

We have already said that Morocco was not really a
country with a regular government. There were only
sections of the territories that accepted fully the authority
of the Sultan, who at times seemed more like a mediaeval
baron robber than like a modern ruler. His sway was
at best nominal over the greater part of the land. His
subordinates did what they had seen their Prince prac-
tice and that in cruel ways. Absence of government and
lawlessness reigned supreme. Neither the property nor
the persons of the natives, nor the belongings nor the
persons of foreigners were in 'security. No one has
summed up the situation better than M. Andre Tardieu
when he says, " For the last ten centuries it has been the
lot of Moroccan Sultans to have continually to conquer
their subjects, and the special occupation of the subjects
has been that of disobeying their sovereigns. To tell the
truth, the notion of sovereignty does not exist. Where
there is no hierarchy, it is impossible that there should
be any moral notion attaching to revolt. Morocco is a

1 VI, 6, 718.

2 Matter, Ibid., vol. Ill, p. 512.

FRANCE, GERMANY AND MOROCCO 89

country of feudal and theocratic anarchy; and the dis-
turbances that have occurred there in recent times are
merely a fresh manifestation of tendencies that have
long existed. It is Europe alone which, first through
mental assimilation, and subsequently through political
interests, has created the unity of Morocco. In such
unity there has never been either reality or totality.
What does exist is a Moorish empire with which other
Powers treat; but inside the empire one finds merely
tribes who, in battles or else in incessant negotiations,
seek their personal profit only." 1 To carry out his ag-
gressive purpose, the Kaiser maintained this fiction of a
government as if it had been real.

The Yellow Book published in December, 1905, is an elo-
quent defense of the friendly attitude of France toward
Morocco. A long list of grievances, plunders, murders
speaks well for the patience of the stronger Power.2 To
remedy this, France did not assail the Sultan, but en-
deavored to help him. On that long frontier of nearly a
thousand miles, after so many incursions of Moroccan
tribes and marauders into Algeria, she could have found
many pretexts for invasion. She had by the treaty of
1845 the "right of pursuit" whereby she could track
Moroccan intruders into the country. She had made
several punitive expeditions into the Sultan's territories,3
but as a whole she acted as a friend ready to help him to
solve his own difficulties. Several treaties show a mutual
understanding between the two Governments. The
amicable disposition of France is shown by the fact that

1 France and the Alliances, p. 108.

a See documents I, 3, 4, 25, 44, 46, 47, 48, 54, 67, 68, 79, 80, 83,
84, 114, 115, 118, 125, 128, 136, 144, 148, 221, 225, 240, 264.
•Tardieu, Op. cit., p. 115.

90 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

several times she allowed the Sultan's troops to cross
her territory on the way to restore order 1 or Moroccan
subjects pursued by enemies to find refuge in Algeria.2
She rendered many other services.

The French policy of peaceful penetration was already
being carried out at the beginning of this century. Some
French officers were endeavoring to put some order in
the Sherifian army at Fez. French customs officers were
organizing the fiscal service in the various parts. > The
chief of police of Tangier was a Frenchman, his two
helpers were Algerian Moslems but appointed by the
Sultan. He was to decide upon who would be their
successors. This work was done quietly without hurt or
shock; it was to be an evolution and not a revolution.3
The Anglo-French Agreement was really the continua-
tion of this which was already opposed at Fez by
German agents. The Sultan had borrowed some
money from French banks for important public works.
French officials had displayed much energy for the re-
lease of the American subject, Perdicaris, captured by
the brigand Raisuli. -The most imperative and reason-
able reforms contemplated by the Agreement had re-
ceived at least a partial application. The French aim,
according to M. Tardieu, was directed by three guiding
principles, " Morocco's integrity, the Sultan's authority,. •_.
commercial liberty." 4 As M. Delcasse said, " Far from , '
lessening the Sultan's authority we were particularly
anxious to enhance his prestige." " We are endeavor-
ing to give the country (Morocco) security to assure

1 Yellow Book, docs. 26, 29, 69, 86, 92, 95, 97, 188.

2 Ibid., docs. 59, 69, 124, 193, 201, 218, 250, 354.
8 Le Temps, Aug. 17, 1904.

4 Op. cit.f p. 120.

FRANCE, GERMANY AND MOROCCO 91

ours," hoping that it " would know our presence by the
benefits that would accompany it. France seeks her
advantages only in the harmony of interests and for the
benefit of all." 1 M. Delcasse has all along endeavored to
introduce a real idealism into international relations. No
French statesman, more than he, has shown the danger
from a narrow patriotism and a national selfishness. No
one ever was more opposed to the spirit of conquest and
domination according to the Bismarckian method. M.
Delcasse has been at one with modern sociologists who
have proclaimed the evil of national greed and the
beneficence of general good-will. In dealing with inter-
national problems, he always saw the reasonableness of
conflicting claims. In the spirit of conciliation he pro-
ceeded to just concessions. A Hay or a Root, only even
gentler, he wished to have French action permeated with
a lofty form of humanitarianism good for the Moroccans
as well as for the world at large. The Tangier. .Speech-..

put an end to all this.

On its own side, the German Government sent at once
Count von Tattenbach to Fez to work upon the feelings
of the Sultan.2 Agents in different parts of the country
tended to keep up national anarchy.3 As a matter of
fact Germany has generally been indifferent to the
wrongs endured by small and backward nations. She
did not side with the Greeks, the Bulgarians, the Servians •',
or with any of the peoples so outrageously treated by
the Turks. She has ever been against the oppressed,
hand in hand with the massacrers. She never took an
important part in opposing indescribable wrongs in the

1 Mevil, A., Op. cit., p. 174.
1 V, 27, 236, 474.
•&x

92 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

Congo, or in the Turkish possessions, as the United
States, England and France have done. Philanthropic
considerations of the well-being of the natives in Morocco
never entered the mind of the Germans. Their repre-
sentatives posed as the defenders of Islamism. In his
address in Damascus the Kaiser spoke as the protector
of the Moslems. " May the Sultan," 1 he said, " and may
the 300,000,000 of Mohammedans throughout the world
who reverence him as their Caliph, be assured that at all
times the German Emperor will be their friend." 2 He
has been popularly presented to the Turks as " Hadji
Mohammed Guillioun." 3 It was therefore easy for Count
von Tattenbach, imitating his chief, to get close to the
Sultan of Morocco, to convince him that his country was
in the hands of the French, that the German Turcophiles
were his friends — he sadly learned the contrary later on
— and that they would be the deliverers of his empire.
He worked with him, and finally succeeded in convinc-
ing him of the importance of a European conference to
settle North African matters.4

Meanwhile the German Government was seeking in
Paris to undermine and overthrow the great minister
who had made friends for France, and had introduced a
new spirit into international relations. All kinds of
falsehoods were circulated to show that France at Fez
had claimed to act by virtue of a mandate from Europe
— that she was about to send an ultimatum to the Sultan
demanding that he should accept French terms, — that
M. Delcasse had tried to form combinations against

1 Abdul Hamid.
'Gauss, p. 129.
' Le Temps, Jan. 19, 1915,
' V, 27, 951.

FRANCE, GERMANY AND MOROCCO 93

Germany, that he had done his work with England in an
underhanded way — charges which do not bear exami-
nation. There were threats softened by the suggestions
that if M. Delcasse were thrown overboard, Germany
would be more conciliatory. There were even hints of
war. Dernburgs were sent to Paris to conciliate the
Radicals and to have the Minister of Foreign Affairs
removed. The official diplomacy of Prince Radolin was
supplemented by an officious one headed by Prince
Henckel von Donnersmark, who worked in every way to
win his point.1 The pacifists headed by M. Rouvier,
thinking that. Germany was in earnest, sacrificed the
great minister.2 European opinion interpreted this act
as a victory of von Biilow. The great English dailies
expressed their regrets, and the Daily Chronicle had a
heading, " A Victory of the Kaiser." As soon as the
latter received the news of M. Delcasse's downfall he
drove in great haste to the residence of the aggressive
Chancellor, and announced to him his elevation to the
rank of Prince.3

Before this there were two possible courses open to
the French Government. One was, with the help of
England, help that had been offered, to resist Germany.
This was the Delcasse policy which was rejected. The
other was to yield as much as possible to Wilhelmstrasse,
showing a spirit of peace at any price. This was the
course taken by M. Rouvier. France in her concessions
went to the borderland of cowardice, but that did not
modify the attitude of Prince von Biilow. As a matter
of fact Morocco was a mere pretext. What astonished

1 Mevil, Op. cit., p. 273.
8 Ibid., Chap. V.
8 Ibid., p. 301.

94 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

the yielders was that the Chancellor, having won his
point in the matter of the great Minister, was more than
ever pressing the Moroccan question, and demanding a
conference. Five days after the resignation of M.
Delcasse, Prince von Radolin had an interview with M.
Rouvier urging the question and concluding with these
threatening words, " You must know that we stand
behind Morocco." *

Von Biilow, appealing to various countries, had but
little encouragement. The Government in Washington,
after looking into the matter, asserted its disinterested-
ness in the question. President Roosevelt and Secretary
Taft gauged at once the true purpose of von Biilow.2
Had the advice of M. Delcasse been followed a con-
ference would have been impossible. The Powers at
large, while perhaps not absolutely satisfied with every
part of the Agreement, approved it. The Quai d'Orsay
could not accept at once the idea of a conference. Its
inquiries from the defenders of the proposal as to the
specific aims and methods and the particular questions to
be discussed were met by a cold mutism and a suggestion
that France should inquire at Fez. This way of doing
was in perfect keeping with the previous action of Prince
von Biilow and in fact it was a new manner of waging
war. Before the Algeciras Conference, he had another
thrust at France, made another menacing speech in the
Reichstag, and asked more money for armaments upon
land and sea.3 The substance of the speech was a repeti-
tion of that of the Kaiser at Tangier. After all this, the
Kaiser, his Chancellor and the German provocators had
yet the monumental boldness to pose as friends of peace.

1 Yellow Book, document 269, p. 232.
3 Mevil, p. 230.
* V, jo, 954.

VIII

FROM THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE TO THE
DELIVERANCE OF FEZ

M. ROUVIER had thought that Germany would yield
after the resignation of M. Delcasse, but she did not.
On the contrary she became more exacting, and finally
France accepted the principle of a conference which in
reality was nothing but a German intervention. This
conference convened at Algeciras on January 16, 1906.
The delegates of von Biilow had explicit instructions to
leave to France only the frontier, to give Spain the
Mediterranean coasts, to secure for Berlin or for Ger-
man allies or for some neutral Power the police of the
ocean.1 For officers, they had Austria propose repre-
sentatives of neutral Powers that could easily be in-
fluenced, such as Switzerland or Holland.2 With the
beginning of the session the language of the German
Government was hard, imperious and menacing. Ger- v
many wanted to dictate what should be done. She tried
hard to faire la pluie et le beau temps. She rejected with
haughtiness offers of arbitration made by Italy, Russia,
America and Austria.3 Before the Conference the Ger-
mans endeavored to place their claims upon the basis
of the Conference of Madrid in 1880, but German jurists
were the first to discover that the Conference which

1 Berard, Op. cit.} p. 212.

2 Ibid., p. 213.

8 Tardieu, Op. cit., p. 202.

95

96 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

dealt then with a special issue had no bearing upon the
present difficulty.

A striking change in the attitude of Germany is that
from the first she attempted to internationalize a problem
which really concerned three Powers, and this was done
by the most nationalistic nation of Europe. Novicow
has shown that "since 1871, the Germans have not,
with the exception of the postal-union, taken a single
step for the organization of Europe." * All at once, in
Algeciras, they were seized with zeal for the interests
of all. They began to talk of equal treatment as if
France had had no more rights in the land of Abd-el-
Aziz than Belgium, Holland and Sweden. Did not
England, with her peculiar position at Gibraltar, the key
to the avenue of her Eastern Empire, have more claims
than Germany in deciding what should be done with the
bankrupt and collapsed Moroccan state ? Was not Spain,
with her establishments on the coast of the country, more
concerned than the United States? Was the combined
work of France, England and Spain of no moment and
were the services which they had rendered to civilization
to give them no special recognition? Was Germany, so
long indifferent to colonies and never having done any-
thing on behalf of the Moroccans, entitled to the same
treatment as France, who had so long been annoyed by
her Moslem neighbors, and who, by treaty, enjoyed in
Morocco all the prerogatives of England as well as her
own?

After much useless opposition the agents of von
Biilow were forced by the spirit of the Conference to
admit France's special rights. Italy, England, Russia,
the United States, Spain, Portugal, Belgium and
1 Op. cit.t p. 243-

• • * * * "*/ *** *•

711 M

THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 97

Holland, were thoroughly won over to the side
of Rouvier's representatives, while Morocco and
Austria were with Germany.1 This last statement must
be modified. M. Tardieu says that " although devoted
to Germany, she (Austria) .could not go against plain
evidence, and had exercised a conciliatory action, which
now and again inclined distinctly in favor of France." 2
Morocco was representing mere nominality and nullity
as a state. In spite of all, the representatives of the
Powers were under the impression that French claims
were as fair as they were moderate.3 Germany was at
times inconsistent. She recognized some special rights
to her antagonist in Morocco and at the same time
wished to secure the internationalization of everything.
She wanted to have a " general inspector " chosen from
the diplomatic corps of Tangier to look after Moroccan
matters and at the same time stood for the independence
of the Sultan.4 Finally the Conference voted that France
and Spain should be intrusted with the work of pacifica-
tion and organization.

Most of the Powers realized that behind German
action there was a bold, aggressive and pugnacious pur-
pose, and so they decided on behalf of the two Powers
who had really the greatest interests at stake there.
Germany gained no prestige, but, rather, emerged crest-
fallen. Her press was full of severe denunciations.
There was as usual the stereotyped complaint that Ger-
many could not have her " place in the sun." There was
intense bitterness against Russia,5 while Italy was

* Op. cit., p. 203.

* V, 3*> 7i7.
4 V, 32, 718.

* V, 32, 957.

98 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

greatly censured.1 What was more painful for Ger-
many than the fiasco of Algeciras was that she be-
gan to have misgivings about the Triplice. Italy was
in favor of an alliance of peace, while Germany, by
her methods and action, was for a Triplice of

war.

fi i**td,

The great German nation began to feel, what she had <
so long imposed upon France, a sense of isolation that
was positively depressing. Von Biilow, who kept up a ~ *
brave countenance, was obliged to recognize in a speech ,
in the Reichstag a certain entente cordiale of the Western
Powers unsympathetic to Germany and on that account
dangerous.2 A similar movement, inaugurated by Bis-
marck, the purpose of which was to isolate France,
was praised by Prince von Biilow, but this one which
menaced no one was characterized by him as follows:
" A policy which would have for its purpose to create
a ring of Powers to isolate and paralyze us would be a
very dangerous policy. The foundation of such a ring
is not possible unless there is exerted a certain pression ;
a pression creates a counter-pression; pression and
counter-pression may easily produce explosions." 3 The
Entente was the child of the Dreibund, of the Triplice,
and above all of the violent and aggressive course of
Prince von Biilow. In his mind, the German coalitions
were legitimate, but a coalition of the other Powers was
wrong. For him the only international morals must be
German ethics. What is right for Deutschland is
wrong for some other country. Instead of recogniz-
ing that the cause of this international friction was

1 V, 33, 218.

2 V, 36, 717-

8 Quoted from Berard, Op. cit., p. 243.

THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 99

himself, he concluded with the great expression of
Prussian faith in force, " Let us keep our sword
sharp." 1

The task intrusted to France was specially difficult,
as her government was censured alike by Jaures and his
supporters as well as by the Germans. She was doomed
to be blamed either for overdoing or for failing to do.
One fact, however, which we must notice is that the
privileges granted to France by the Powers at Algeciras
were not essentially different from the previous ones
assumed after the Agreement. If we examine the in-
structions given by M. Delcasse to M. Saint-Rene Tail-
landier when he went to Fez to announce to the Sultan
the great historic Anglo-French understanding, and if
we look at the Franco- Spanish Agreement of the same
year, both contain a pledge to respect " the integrity of
the Moroccan Empire under the sovereignty of the Sul-
tan." 2 The mission of pacifying Morocco was rendered
harder by the Germans, who had excited the natives —
they who needed so little incentive to rise against any-
one— against the French. The German war-machine to
create public opinion in their favor, or against their
antagonists, the machine that sent Dernburg to the United
States, Baron von Schenk to Athens, Prince von Billow
to Italy, that has secured members of the German Em-
bassy to help Dr. Dumba to disorganize American in-
dustries, that has sent emissaries to India, to Egypt, to
Tripoli, Tunis, Algiers, and especially to the colonies of
France and Great Britain,3 was at work and carried
on efforts to make the French task impossible.

1 V, 36, 718.

2 Tardieu, A., Op. cit., p. 102.

8 Le Temps, March 7, 27, and July 3, 1915.

ioo THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

The natives were furious against these Frenchmen
whose aims were represented to them in sinister colors.
At all points in the Sultan's country, they were annoyed,
insulted, ill-treated and several lost their lives. Dr.
Mauchamp, who practiced medicine, was assassinated by
Moslem fanatics.1 At Casablanca, on the west coast,
Frenchmen were outrageously treated, and their work —
they were building a breakwater — was destroyed so that
French soldiers were landed to protect Europeans and
the French consulate. As these mariners came in sight
of the city gates, though there was a pre-arrangement
with the authorities, Moroccan soldiers began to fire
upon them, and a reckless mass of native fighters, from
the country, came in not only to attack the French, but
also to give vent to their deepest instinct, plunder. The
French defended themselves and then protected the city.2
They did what the Americans were compelled to do in
Vera Cruz, but did not do what the Germans have done
in Louvain.3

This incident, common enough in the history of colonies
and protectorates — the French could not honorably have
acted otherwise — at once aroused the German military
element and the German press.4 Did they ever imagine
that in such a country and with such a people, the French
could do their work and not meet " bloody points with
bloody points "? Again France and Spain were intrusted
wjth restoring order, but Germany kept on interfering.
Thus when the two brothers, Abd-el-Aziz, who was in
power, and Moula'i-Hafid, who was a pretender, were

*V,&7<*

a V, 39, 947-

* Supposing that the Belgians attacked them, which is most
improbable.
4V, 41, 235.

THE ALGECIRAS tTONFEREN C £ Kli

' *"

fighting, Germany received the delegates of the latter.1
Again, when the former was defeated Germany sent her
Consul, Herr Vassel, to Fez to work upon the new Sul-
tan's mind. At the same time she sent a note to the
Powers urging them to recognize Moulai-Hafid. She
acted as if there had been no Conference at all. She had
given Abd-el-Aziz the greatest assurances of friendship,
proclaimed his independence urbi et orbi, asserted in
the Tangier Speech that he was the only ruler that she
would recognize, persuaded him to resist France, but
now when fortune betrayed the hapless ruler, Germany
not only dropped him but she urged other nations to
support his brother.

This resembles the treatment of President Kriiger.
When, in 1884, a Boer delegation, anti-English in char-
acter, was received in Berlin, it was entertained with
lavish hospitality at the Emperor's expense. Kriiger
" sat at the Emperor's table next to Bismarck, and talked
about the glorious future of the Dutch and German races
in South Africa."2 On January 6, 1896, the Kaiser
telegraphed to him, " I beg to express to you my sincere
congratulations that, without help from foreign Powers,
you have succeeded with your own people and by your
own strength in driving out the armed bands which
attempted to disturb the peace of your country and in
re-establishing order and in defending the independence
of your people from attacks from outside." When, later
on, at the hour of great bitterness and sorrow, the van-
quished President of the South African Republic wished
to see him, Wilhelm II declined. He has related in the
Daily Telegraph interview how he made plans for the

1 V, 45, 474-

a Lowe, vol. II, p. 235.

102 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

defeat of the Boers. These plans were sent to London.
It was in following them that Lord Roberts achieved
victory.1

Similarly the poor Sultan was thus betrayed by those
who had pledged themselves to stand by him, and who
now attempted to help his brother against him. France
was indifferent as to who the Sultan was in the first
place, but she was loyal to him until it was demon-
strated that the Moroccans had transferred their
allegiance to his brother. Even then Paris insisted
that the defeated ruler should have his life spared,
and be treated with kindness and becoming dignity.2
She even provided him with means to lead a decent
existence.

Berlin kept up its policy of irritation. In 1908, the
Kaiser, in his interview with a reporter of the Daily
Telegraph, stirred up his own people by references to the
Boer war and by his moral color-blindness in his boast
of what he had done for England; but he managed to
say things about France that would damage her in
British eyes — things which, according to Mevil, were
most erroneous.3 During the year his Government re-
curred to the Moroccan Question. After the decision
of the Conference, Germany again objected that one
Power should have a more favored position in the Moor- ?
ish Empire than any other.4 She really tried again to
take Morocco out of French and Spanish hands. Accord- *'
ing to the Conference, all Powers were to be upon the /
same economic basis, but not upon the same basis of *

1 Gauss, p. 272.

2 V, 47, 476.

8 Op. cit., chap. I.
* V, 47, 712,

THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 103

influence. The Chancellor asked for more. In Novem-
ber of the same year an incident occurred that intensified
the bitterness of feeling created by the action of Berlin.
The French were at Casablanca, having restored order
in the city and in the Chaouia. The occupied country
was under martial law. As is shown further on, the
Germans had long been hostile to the Foreign Legion,
a French corps of foreign volunteers. Now it happened *
rthat six of these men, in order to desert their regiment,
had placed themselves under the protection of the Ger-
man Vice-consul. On September 25, 1908, when he at-
tempted to smuggle them on board of a German steamer,
the men were recognized by the French authorities, who
endeavored to arrest them. There was a serious scuffle
of both parties. The German Vice-Consul raised his
cane to strike a French officer, and the officer, in the
legitimate performance of his functions, took up his
revolver. At the time when Vera Cruz was under
martial law, let us suppose that the German Consul of
that city had tried to help American soldiers to desert
from the American army, and had attempted to smuggle
them on board of a German steamer, what would
Americans have thought of such acts? Would not the
consular immunities have appeared slight as compared
with the wrong of helping to disorganize the American
army? So it was at Casablanca. The deserters, what-
ever their nationality, were French soldiers. They had
become so by a free regular engagement. Of their own
free will they had entered the French army. What made
the matter more delicate, the deserters were not all

1 U Illustration says that there was in Casablanca " a real
agency of desertion " under the protection of the German Con-
sul. Nov. 28, 1908, p. 355.

104 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

Germans. There were an Austrian, a Swiss and a non-
German Pole. One of them was a French subject recently
naturalized German. In reality there were only two
Germans. Another report speaks of three Ger-
mans.1

The trans-Rhinean press and Government took up a
very menacing attitude. It demanded the immediate
release of the men as well as an apology. It was inti-
mated that in the case of refusal Prince Radolin, the
German Ambassador, would be immediately recalled.
The Quai d'Orsay asked that, as several contradictory
principles were involved in the question, the whole
matter be referred to The Hague Court, with the under-
standing that if France was blamed she would apologize
and vice versa. This was finally accepted. The award of
the Court, which was favorable to France, deeply ~ ^A
wounded her opponents beyond the Rhine. The rela-
tions of the two countries were far from improved
thereby.

The persistent aggressive ill-will of Germany against
France continued with the exception of a period of
nearly two years during which Berlin would have been
happy to array her against England. TJiere came a time
when it was realized that all the initiatives of Berlin
had been checked and its hostile combinations against
France had largely failed. Prince von Biilow put on a
brave countenance, but he was painfully reminded by
his opponents in the Reichstag that his maladroit and
hostile moves had been far from improving Germany's '..'•< ,
international situation, and that the opposite was true. ' (fa
The alliance of France with Russia had been strength- &f\
ened. Among important treaties signed there was one
1 Oppenheim, L. F. L., International Law, 1912, p. 503.

THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 105

of arbitration between Paris and Tokio, June 13, 1907.
On August 31 an agreement, most earnestly seconded
by France, was made between England and Russia.1
The hostility of these two Powers had hitherto been
considered as a permanent statical force in European
affairs.

Nothing at present proves that the Germans were
concerned in the unfortunate occurrence between Ad-
miral Roszdestvensky's fleet and British fishermen off
the Dogger Bank, but it is strange that the rumors that
led to it emanated from Germany.2 France not only
helped the pacific settlement of this deplorable incident,
but contributed to an understanding between London
and St. Petersburg.

A fact of the greatest importance for the two nations
dwelling on either side of the Pyrenees was the marriage
of the King of Spain with an English princess. The
Entente with England greatly facilitated that with Spain.
It was not pleasant for Wilhelmstrasse to hear, in 1907,
of the treaty between Japan and Russia, a treaty complet-
ing that of 1905 and sealing the reconciliation of the
two peoples. This not only freed the land of the
Romano fs from any anxiety in the East, but, during the
present war, Japan has proven an inexhaustible source
of supplies. Wilhelm II had doubtless hoped great
things from the Russo-Japanese rivalry, but at this point
his hopes were baffled.3

All along, the restless and aggressive spirit of Ger-
many forced upon the Entente Powers the conviction of
a common danger, and that, sooner or later, one or all

1 V, 52, 84.

2 Saunders, G., Op. cit.t p. 104.
8 Ibid.-

io6 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

of them would be attacked. This consciousness strength-
ened the Entente itself. 1?he Germans on the other
hand had the feeling that they were encompassed by
unsympathetic nations. They made others responsible
for a situation which they themselves had created.

In 1909, an agreement indicating good- will on both
sides was signed in which Germany pledged herself no
longer to oppose France in Morocco. The two Govern-
ments and their representatives had not found practical
formulae for carrying out the understanding, but that was
no proof that it could not be done. Early in 1911, while
French officers were doing a work agreed upon between
Paris and Fez for the training of the Moroccan army so
as to render her capable of establishing order in the
country, a small colony of Europeans had been gathered
at the capital. Suddenly it was learned that masses of
natives from several points threatened the lives of all
Europeans in this city as well as those of the authorities.
To allow fanatics to massacre these peoples would have
been a crime. It would have given the lawless hordes a
free hand in one of the few spots of the country where
there was yet what, with charity, we may call Govern-
ment. Something had to be done. As soon as prepara-
tions were made to relieve the Europeans in Fez the
official German newspapers began their menaces.1 The
troops started for their work of deliverance and reached
the city when it was no longer tenable. Both Europeans
and loyal Moroccans had fallen, cut off from their base
of supply and from the possibility of national relief..
French troops did not enter the city, but remained out-
side to do their work of pacification. Again it must be
reasserted that France did not wish to go to Fez. It

*VI,3, 476.

THE ALGECIRAS CONFERENCE 107

is a characteristic of such enterprises that they compel,
by unexpected accidents, nations to do what was abso-
lutely contrary to their desires at the outset. This is
what the Radicals and Socialists of the French Parliament
had feared all along.

IX

THE AGADIR PROVOCATION

GERMANS have peculiar ways of their own. They
often dispense with diplomatic courtesies which, in time
of strained relations, make the continuance of interna-
tional life possible. They who are so sensitive have done
things which, with people of a similar spirit, would have
meant war at once. The sudden sending of the Panther - *
to Agadir on the coast of Morocco early in July, 1911,
was a most warlike challenge. The Government in Ber-
lin informed the French Mimster of Foreign Affairs
of the fact after the vessel had been sent. There was
no disturbance on the coast,1 so that this was without
excuse. It was the repetition of the Tangier Comedy.
What France and England in answer to this ought to
have done would have been to send their own men-of-
war and have done everything which the German ag-
gressors did, but such a course would have been fraught - .
with momentous possibilities. It was said that this move '
on the part of Wilhelmstrasse was intended to please
Pan-Germanists, and that the Government at their sug- ,
gestion had already chosen Agadir as a future German
port. This step was considered by many of them as a
virtual seizure of that part of the disputed Moorish
Empire. Other apologists of Germany said that the
Panther incident was a means of compelling the French
to negotiate, but the Quai d'Orsay had been ready at all

1 Le Temps, July 3,
108

THE AGADIR PROVOCATION 109

times so to do. M. Jules Cambon, whom many will re-
member for his splendid services in Washington, had
long endeavored to discuss the question, and, as a matter
of fact, he had actually had conferences- on the subject
with von Kinderlen-Waechter,1 so that this explanation
is inadequate. The Agadir coup was the obvious dis-
regard of the Cambon Agreement of 1909 and an un-
friendly challenge to the Entente. By this agreement
Germany had pledged herself not to interfere " with the
consolidation of order and peace in the Sherifian Em-
pire " 2 towards which France was working. According
to this, had the Germans had any special interest to de-
fend in Agadir they ought to have referred the task to
France. It was understood that if difficulties arose the
two Powers would consider them and settle them in the
spirit of mutual concession, nay, in the spirit that had
made the Anglo-French Agreement of 1904 a possibility.
The most elementary international courtesy demanded
that Germany should have announced hej ^intentions and
have acted, in keeping with the Cambon Agreement, for
the carrying out of the decisions of Algeciras. '"<>

There were Germans who justified the Agadir coup
by the fact that there were French soldiers at Fez.3
Agadir in their eyes was the counterpart of Fez. These
vindicators of this unfriendly course seem to have for-
gotten that when the Cambon Agreement was signed,
in 1909, there were French troops at Oudjda, and that
thousands of French soldiers held the Chaouia. This
was not an unusual fact. Furthermore, General Moinier
went to Fez to -save human lives and France had prom-

1 VI, 4, 472.

2 Accord du 8 fevrier 1909.
8 See p. 331-

no THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

ised to withdraw these Fez men as soon as possible. She
intended to do there what she had performed in Syria
in i860.1 Even then this attempt to whitewash the op-
probrium of Agadir ignored the fact that the Sultan of
Morocco was sovereign. Germany had been loud in her
assertions of his independence. Now this sultan, exer-
cising the fullness of his rights, called France to his aid
and she went, saving thereby the lives of the authori-
ties as well as those of Europeans doomed to be crushed
by a Moroccan Boxer Movement. She was ready to re-
call her forces from there, but had it been otherwise, so
long as the Sultan and the Makhzen 2 approved the Ger-
mans could not find in that situation any excuse for the
Agadir coup. It was a violent reopening of the Moroccan
Question which confirmed absolutely in the French heart
the sense of the aggressive intentions of the Teutons.

In the eyes of Europe, at large, it was unmistakably
an act of provocation from a Power that deemed itself
capable of whipping the whole world. For Russia it
seemed a castis foedens. England, though less out-
spoken, was deeply alive to the great European danger.
France was willing to talk, to negotiate and to com-
promise for the sake of peace. Her statesmen, calm and
resolute, were the very opposite of the de Gramonts and
the Emile Olliviers of the last days of the Second Em-
pire. They were even then reasonably conciliatory. The
two Governments took up the whole Moroccan Question.
By this time Germany had given up all talk of the sover-
eignty of the Sultan, the integrity and independence of
Morocco and the internationalization of the Question.
She had ceased to pose as the defender of the rights of

1 Le Temps, July 3, 1911.

2 Practically the ministers of the Sultan.

THE AGADIR PROVOCATION in

all. Now it was merely a matter of bartering for her
own advantage. The Cambon Agreement was forgotten,
the decisions of Algeciras were set at naught. .Her^
former contentions had practically been set aside, now
she was after a bargain. France ought to have refused
to consider the proposals and to have appealed to a new
conference. She could have shown the unreasonable
demands of Berlin and made the Powers the, judges of
her use of the trust placed in her hands in 1906. Von
Kinderlen asked, at first, one half of the French Congo
next to the ocean l as well as the right of pre-emption
which France had over the Belgian Congo in order to
cease all opposition to France in the land of the Sultan.
Everyone acquainted with Morocco knew that the pre-
requisite of all reforms was peace in the country and
that peace, according to the decisions of Algeciras and
the Cambon Agreement, was to be established by France.
It was impossible to open the economic life of Morocco
to European trade until a political order of some kind
was established ; but as soon as France tried to face the
imperative issues in that direction Germany intervened.
Again, in order to have the French bring about the
pacification from which the whole world would benefit,
she asked the compensations stated above. Moreover,
what right had she, in that respect, that did not belong to
other Powers? Why should not the United States or
Sweden have made similar claims? It is true that
France was having a virtual extension of territory, but
did Germany say a single word when England annexed
the Transvaal in 1902, or when Japan took Corea? Did
she protest against the British protectorate over Egypt
by virtue of this selfsame Anglo-French Agreement?
1 V, 4, 7i6.

H2 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

Did she offer any objection when Spain really took pos-
session of the northern coast of Morocco from Ceuta to &
Melilla? No. No. No. The reason for her action ,-,.v
was her national aggressive spirit against the " hereditary
enemy " and her burning desire for new territories. Her
hard harsh attitude can only be explained on the ground
that she expected that the British would abandon France
to her own fate. She was sorely disappointed.

England saw clearly where the Franco-German wrang- -/
ling would lead. The British press sounded a strikingly fa
united warning to the Goths. On July 4, Sir Edward
Grey had a conference with Count Wolff Metternich in
which he did not conceal his displeasure over the Agadir
provocation. The British political leaders uttered no
uncertain sound.1 On July 6, Asquith called the atten-
tion of the Parliament to the seriousness of the German
pretensions in Morocco.2 On July 21, Lloyd George
gave the threatening Teutons to understand that their
course was shocking the deepest sense of fair-play of the
Britons. Balfour spoke for the Unionists in the same
strain. Ramsay Macdonald voiced the feelings of the
labor-party — all were most outspoken, and gave Ger-
many to understand what the course of England would
be. There was a united front against the aggressiveness

The Germans, who had thought the British
hopelessly divided upon everything, found them intensely
of one mind upon this issue. The helmet men who had
so long delighted in showing their swords, their German
swords, as a menace resented like exhibitions on the part
of others. The furor of Pan-Germanists was great.
In 1908, they had used with Russia the bluff of force

1 VI, 4, 949-
'VI, 4. 953.

THE AGADIR PROVOCATION 113

successfully on the occasion of the annexation of Bosnia ;
they attempted a similar arrogant act with Morocco, and
wished to dictate their will, as law. The French with- "
stood their opponent, and the British Lion gave an un- /*&£
mistakable growl which practically meant, " Hands off ' '-" .
from France ! " The Kaiser and his subjects understood.
They realized that they must give up all territorial ambi-
tion in the Sherifian Empire.

In that interesting book, Imperial Germany, a book to
which the writer has so frequently referred, Prince von
Biilow makes a most eloquent plea pro domo sua, and
that with no excessive modesty. He offers a brilliant
defense of his administration, not as an historian, but as
a Prussian politician. No book, not even Bernhardi's
The Next War, gives such an insight into the psychologi-
cal and ethical conceptions of Prussians. We say Prus-
sians, because we repudiate the idea that all Germans
are Bernhardians and Biilowans. He recalls the state-
ment made by someone that after M. Delcasse's over-
throw, which brought to the imperial chancellor princely
honors, Germany ought to have come to an understand-
ing. " It is a question," he replied, " whether France
was at all inclined to pay an acceptable price." * There
lies the explanation of the rattling of the German saber
in Tangier, at Algeciras and at Agadir.

Von Kinderlen asked one-half of the French Congo
and French reversionary rights over the Congo Free
State. These rights, to which, in case that country
should pass into other hands than those of the Belgians,
France would have a first claim, Germany coveted. For
a long time Pan-Germanists had spoken of Belgium as
an essential part of Germany. In addition to one-half

1 P. 100.

ii4 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

of the French Congo, Wilhelmstrasse wished to secure
these potential claims of France in the heart of Africa.
In the case that brave little state were annexed, having
secured the French reversionary rights, the Congo Free
State would become a German possession, while the
conquest of Belgium would not entail the transfer of
these colonies. Unquestionably the Teutons had already
some plans to seize that country, and were stretching
their hands forward so as to have at the same time the
Congolese possessions. This was not all. " The open
door" was promised again. They wanted much more.
Before Algeciras and even after they worked to reserve
all concessions exclusively for the Sultan, but now, they
wanted to have from the French some of these conces-
sions, such as railroads built by Germans and operated
by Germans — not to speak of other privileges among
which was that of having proteges — natives enjoying
German citizenship, protection and exemption from fiscal
burdens.

France was willing to abide by the terms of the Al-
geciras Conference, liberally interpreted, that is, bearing
m mind the contingencies arising in different parts of the
country and meeting them squarely. She was willing to
open the country to civilization. She was ready to help
the natives to do the work for themselves, and to evolve
toward a modern state, if a Mohammedan community has
ever attained such an end. She was willing to do the
work which would increase the possibilities of German
trade in Morocco as she had done in Algeria and Tunisia,
where things " Made in Germany " had a great sale.
She hesitated long to dispose of territories that had been
won by her noble explorers and kept by men who, as a
whole, have done heroic service. Her rights of pre-

THE AGADIR PROVOCATION 115

emption to the Congo Free State were for her intangible.
Furthermore, the German claims were ever followed by
new requests from Germany.

At last the threats of British leaders seriously modified ^
the attitude of Berlin, though matters had become so
serious that a financial panic ensued.1 The Germans be-

•V ...... , .

came more conciliatory and at last the two Governments
came to an understanding.2 The delay in reaching this ;:
goal weighed heavily upon Europe. T<o put an end to
German claims, France reluctantly established a pro-
tectorate over Morocco, but this involved the sacrifice
of over 100,000 square miles of the Congo colony. This
settlement was not the result of fear. The great barome- /
ter of French feelings, the Bourse, had scarcely any ups
or downs. It was not, either, an act imposed by the sense
of the justice of German claims, but by French love of
^ ir^peace. The Germans secured territories in which they
had never performed any service, had never spent a
dollar or lost a man.3 A fact which shows their quarrel-
some spirit is that hardly had the treaty been signed
when they claimed islands in the Congo River, though
the text carefully stipulated " jusqu'a la rive."*

This treaty excited the most bitter dissatisfaction of
Pan-Germanists. They naturally blamed everyone but
themselves, though Chauvinists are the same the world
over. When it was presented in the Reichstag it ex-
cited the hilarity of Socialists as well as of numerous
* malcontents, among whom the Crown Prince was con-
spicuous. The Minister of Colonies, von Lindequist,

1 VI, 5, 475-

2 VI, 5, 7io.
8 VI, 5, 471-
4 VI, 6, 239.

ii6 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

was so disappointed that he resigned.1 The impression
left by these proceedings was painful for their admirers , <
abroad. Public opinion in Russia and in Great Britain
had crystallized into a profound conviction that Germany
courted war. In France, the Tangier Speech and the
long silence that followed, the German tactics for the
overthrow of M. Delcasse, the maneuvers at the Al-
geciras Conference, the Agadir incident bold and bad,
the surrender of a large part of the territories acquired
mostly by the heroic labors of Savorgnan de Brazza, the
brutal ways of dealing with a land in which the suamter
in modo ever takes precedence over the fortiter in re
struck deeper than the Teutons thought or perhaps
meant. Shortly after this, however, the Kaiser posed
as a pacifist when he said, " We have given a new proof
of our willingness to settle international points of dispute
amicably wherever this can be done in accordance with
the dignity and the interests of Germany, through the con-
clusion of our agreement with France." * How clever !
The great miracle of our day is that there are still people
who believe what the Kriegsherr of Germany says.

From this time on to the present war, Germany armed
even more than in the past. In three years, three laws
for the increase of armaments and men were passed.
Von Bethmann-Hollweg repeated the old Prussian
Comedy before the Reichstag. He made the statement
that he had discovered beyond the Vosges " a revival of
Chauvinism." 3 Indeed there was something1 new in
France, a new consciousness of- danger uniting parties
and creeds, leading men to reject pacifistic tenets at the

1 VI, 6, 472.
2 Gauss, p. 306.
8 VI, 14, 94&

THE AGADIR PROVOCATION 117

sight of the German danger. There was indeed a new
spirit awakened by the long German provocation. Inci-
dents of an irritating nature deepened these feelings.
In May, 1913, the descent at Luneville of a Zeppelin
with a party of German officers who, before coming there,
had flown over many of the fortified cities along the
frontier did not seem accidental. These men asserted
that, owing to a fog, they had lost their way. That may
have been true, the Government accepted it as such, but
it is not unreasonable to doubt it. The Nancy incident,
when a few Frenchmen annoyed some Germans on a
Sunday evening — a rare occurrence in view of the situa-
tion— made the German press furious, though absolutely
silent concerning the Luneville Affair. The French
authorities punished the prefect of Nancy, and the con-
temptible policeman who had failed to do his duty in pro-
tecting the young insulted German underwent a severe
penalty. The new German Minister of Foreign Affairs
denounced violently this insignificant brawl, which re-
sembled all such quarrels that take place constantly on
the frontier of all civilized peoples, and viewed it as a
manifestation of " French Chauvinism," repeating the
very terms which von Bethmann-Hollweg had used a few
days before. The French Government took efficient
measures so that nothing should be done in France which
would irritate the Germans. This applied to theaters, to
comic papers and to military life. At an earlier date a
French general who had spoken freely about Germany
was punished by being sent from Eastern France to
Algeria.1

Among other provocations of the Germans during this
period, they carried on a campaign of unpardonable

ii8 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

slanders against the Foreign Legion to which reference
has already been made. It is a body of foreign volunteers
who have generally served in the colonies and especially
in North Africa. All that is asked from them is good
service, good behavior and no question is raised in ref-
erence to their antecedents or to their nationality. As
many of the men have a past which it is better to forget,
the rules of this corps are severer than in others, but
not inhumane. If it is discovered that a man enlists
before he is of age, he is dismissed at once. The same
thing is true with what pertains to their health. A great
sense of fairness tempers the severity of their life with
justice and humaneness. What kindled this German
antipathy is that a large number of Alsatians joined the
Legion. In spite of great exertions in Germany and in
Alsace against this military institution, more Alsatians
entered the Foreign Legion in 1912 than in any single
year since I87O.1 Misrepresentations availed nothing.
The people in whose army there has been such cruel
treatment of soldiers that when Red Rosa called for
witnesses to defend her statements 1,100 came forth
— the people that made no protest against the massacres
of Armenians by Kurds, or those of the Balkan popula-
tions by the Turks, were seized with a most holy zeal
for the poor victims of this organization. In April, 1913,
there was a play in Berlin against the Foreign Legion
patronized by representatives of the army and navy, to
arouse popular feelings. Some Germans who had taken
service in this corps came forward to protest against
these slanders. The alleged statements that France had
recruiting agents in Germany were baseless. These men
could never be found and what was a most perfect refuta-
1 Gauss, p. 100.

THE AGADIR PROVOCATION 119

tion was that France had more volunteers for the Legion
than she needed. Herr Zimmermann, a state official
who had thoroughly looked up the matter, said that every
time that the German administration had made inquiries,
the conclusions had always been that these assertions
were groundless.1 It is easy to see the purpose of this
campaign in which, by the side of the irritating challenges
of Germany, there was a pin-prick policy calculated to
exasperate France.

1 VI, 21, 475.

X

THE ALSATIAN QUESTION

A GREAT source of irritation to France was Alsace.
The Treaty of Frankfurt has, ever since 1871, cast its
fatal shadows upon central Europe. The country taken
by the might of the conquerors has remained in the
German organism like an infusible substance which their
mighty genius cannot assimilate. The survival of na-
tional loyalty is sometimes extraordinary. "If an igno-
rant nation like Bulgaria," says Novicow, " did not
abandon her national aspirations after five centuries it
is easy to see what those of the Alsatians will be." 1 It
is not only the Poles, the Schleswigians, the Holsteinians
but also the Hanoverians, the Nassovians, the Hessians
and the Frankfurtians that were incorporated in spite of
themselves into Prussia. Many there were, and there are
still, in the Empire who hate Prussian domination.
Alsatians likewise hated the Prussian character and the
Prussian method of holding men as if they were pos-
sessions. Nothing is more pathetic than the noble stand
of the deputies of the annexed provinces at Bordeaux
and their eloquent protestations. " Before any 'delibera-
tion of the National Assembly, we, Alsatians and Lor*
rainers, gathered together in Bordeaux, wish to pro-
test vehemently against even the very idea of a cession
whatsoever of the least part of our territory, we are
1 Op. cit., p. 355-

120

THE ALSATIAN QUESTION 121

French and we want to remain French. . . . " * Eleven
days later, another protestation, " Abandoned in spite of
all justice and by a hateful abuse of force to foreign
domination we have a last duty to perform. We declare
again null and void a pact which disposes of us without
our consent.

" The vindication of our rights remains forever open
to all and to each in the form and in the measure which
our conscience shall dictate to us." 2 In ten years 100,000
Alsatians — chiefly young people — left the country,3 a
few of the rest were won by favors, but the greater
number became more and more unreconcilable. The
efforts to win them have been colossal failures. This
was particularly visible at the polls. At the elections in
1881, the German candidates had 13,000 votes, the Cleri-
cals 20,000, but the pro testators had 133,000. In 1887,
18,000 were given to the Germans while the protestators
elected all their candidates and had 630,000 votes.4 The
Prussian mind cannot understand that force, brutal
force, is a poor instrument of conquest. " It is the
Prussian Government," says again Novicow, " which by
its oppressive laws prevents Posen from being Ger-
manized." 5 The same thing might be said of Alsace.

France has rapidly drawn to her new peoples. This
an English writer has luminously set forth in an admir-
able passage which we quote. " This power of attracting
loyalty from neighbouring conquered states is one of
which France may fairly boast, for she is almost alone
in Europe in its possession. The Germans cannot con-

1 Feb. 18, 1871.

* Florent-Matter, L' Alsace-Lorraine de nos jours, 1908, p. 84.
8 Matter, P., Op. cit., vol. Ill, p. 489.

4 Floretit-Matter, Op. cit., pp. 87, 90.

• Op. cit,, p. 131.

122 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

ciliate the Poles even as much as the Russians can, and
have been resisted by the Magyars for centuries, with
ultimate success. They are hated by the Bohemians, and
have never succeeded in making themselves endurable to
any section of the population of Italy. The Russians
cannot absorb the Poles, and are not liked by the Finns ;
while the Spaniards have never been able fully to digest
the Basques, and could not keep the Portuguese after
sixty years of union, and this though Lisbon is the natural
capital of the entire Peninsula. The Danes never re-
moved the deep distaste felt for them by the Holsteiners,
while the Norwegians to this day, after seventy-three
years of alliance, regard the Swedes, their own Norse
kinsfolk, with the deepest suspicion and dislike. Our
own failure in Ireland is at this moment the governing
factor in English politics; and though Scotland is more
than friendly, the fusion of the two Kingdoms, such as
France has always insisted on in all absorbed States,
would be next to an impossible revolution. France only
has secured a loyalty at once complete and obedient, and
the fact is the more remarkable because France has the
power of exciting bitter national enmities. If all her
neighbours regarded her with liking or even with toler-
ance, there would be nothing wonderful in the success of
her annexations. ... It is when annexation is com-
plete, and bitterness should grow rancorous, that in all
white subjects of France it begins to die away. . . .
Government by France after annexation is always
honorific. It is insolent during an occupation, but
absorption once decreed, logic secures that there shall
be no inequality, that laws shall be the same, that votes
shall be equal in force, that even the mob of Paris shall
respect the new citizens of France, the fresh children of

THE ALSATIAN QUESTION 123

the Republic. * That attitude is carried straight through
in the smallest as in the highest detail, so that a Savoyard
who succeeded as Deputy or Senator would have just
as good a chance of the Presidential chair as if he were
a Parisian, as he would also, if successful in a little way,
have just the same chance of gaining permission to open
a tobacco shop; and it removes much, if not all, the
bitterness of conquests. No Frenchman is looked down
on in France, the status of Frenchmen being, for any
one who accepts it, a kind of civil consecration. . . .
France can, in a very special degree, assimilate absorbed
peoples, and this is one of her greatest political re-
sources, and one of which she has the greatest reason
to be proud." x

The peoples in France, drawn within the national
orbit, have been assimilated and nationalized through
kind and generous treatment. The authorities never
dreamed of robbing these populations of their essential
liberties, such as that of language, for instance. The
inhabitants of Provence, still using their vernacular with
the French, have become almost bilingual. Some of
them, though loyal to the old Langue d'oc, have become
incomparable prose writers in French like Daudet and
Aicard, not to mention others. The Basques still use
their very ancient tongue. The Bretons enjoy the
language and the poetry of the French Welsh, and in
the northernmost part of French Flanders the people
hammer away at their Germanic Flemish, while the
French language penetrates slowly, very slowly but
surely, among all. A broad-minded Government would
have favored a bilingual culture which is so potent in
the life of a nation, but in Alsace French was ostracized
1 The Spectator, Sept, 10, 1892, p. 343.

124 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

everywhere. Some local newspapers have had a perma-
nent ironical heading. " French Inscriptions Hunting." x
It was prohibited in all postal documents for Alsace and
Lorraine. It was interdicted upon all public signs. A
hairdresser was prevented from having his sign, Coiffeur,
he had to put Friseur. Milliners could no longer have
the sign, Modiste, which was replaced by Modistin.
Restaurant had to be transformed into Restauration.
The Cafe du Griffon was obliged to drop the du and
became Cafe Griffon and Cafe italien was compelled to
have its adjective begin with a capital because it gave
the name a German appearance. Cafe imperial was inter-
dicted by the police, it was too French. A restaurant
posted its bill of fare, the Menu du jour, which had the
advantage of being artistic. It was tabooed. Cigarettes
franqaises en vente id, posted upon a cigar store in
Savern, had the same fate.2 The police of Strasburg
allowed eight French plays a year, each one approved by
the chief of police. This privilege was revoked.3 The
singing of the Marseillaise was prohibited even in the
city of Strasburg where it was composed. The tricolor
bows, which young Alsatian women wore on their hair,
were violently snatched by the police.

The Eden-Theater of Strasburg wishing to play
La Vivandiere, an operetta representing the life of the
French Revolution, the police objected to the French
flag in it. After awhile a compromise was reached and
the Dutch flag was used instead.* There was also the
disbanding of all kinds of societies with French sympa-

1 Florent-Matter, Op. cit., p. 188.

2 Op. cit., pp. 188-192; Les Annales, March 7, 1915.
8 Ibid., May 30, 1915.

* Florent-Matter, Op. cit., p. 235.

THE ALSATIAN QUESTION 125

thies, such as choral unions, literary circles, dramatic
associations, botanical and zoological societies and even
those harmless organizations, societies of mutual help.1
The Club of Alsatian and Lorrainer Students was closed.2

The teaching of French was suppressed in the schools,
its use in the courts, and everywhere the language was
pursued with a relentless spirit. The names of citizens
in public records had to be Germanized; Guillaume be-
came Wilhelm, Jean was written as Johann and Albert
assumed the form of Albrecht.3 Even the inscriptions
upon the clothes or the caps of employees and porters
in private establishments had to be in German. This did
not accomplish its purpose. In 1895, 159,532 Alsatians
reported that their mother tongue was French; in 1900,
it had become 198,173. Several newspapers, either
published in German or in two languages, during the
Second Empire have now become French.4

The Alsatians were made to feel that everything which
they cherished was to be eradicated from their hearts,
and above all their great national hope. No wonder that
they did not love their conquerors. Already in 1871,
Busch speaks of " the inexplicable attachment of the
Alsatians for France; of their voluntary Helotism, and
their infatuation which prevents their seeing and feeling
that a Gaul regards them only as Frenchmen of the
second class, and treats them in many respects accord-
ingly/' 5 As far as common, uneducated Frenchmen were
concerned, there may be a little truth in Busch's state-
ment in reference to Alsatians, but the elite of France

1 III, 96, 692.

2 L' Illustration, June 24, 1911.

8 Florent-Matter, Op. cit., p. 191.

* Ibid., p. 195.

6 Bismarck in the Franco-German War, p. 130.

126 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

had the greatest admiration for them. They were given
important positions in the educational, the scientific and
the historical world. They have had such popular
literary men as About, Erckmann-Chatrian and eminent
artists. Some of them have succeeded in every high
domain that demands intelligence and character. This
is particularly true of the army. Five years ago Jules
Claretie made the following statement : " At the present
hour there are 76 generals of divisions or of brigades
coming from Alsace-Lorraine whose names stand on the
books of the French army." 1 The fact which is evident
from Busch's statement is the attachment of the Alsatians
to France. That " inexplicable attachment " already
existed at the beginning of the eighteenth century. In
1709, a Prussian Minister, Schmettau, wrote to Prince
Eugene and to the Duke of Marlborough, " It is evident
that the inhabitants of Alsace are more French than the
Parisians, and that the King of France is so sure of their
affection in his service and for his glory that he has
ordered them to provide themselves with rifles, pistols,
halberds, swords, powder and lead every time that he
hears that the Germans intend to cross the Rhine, and
that they rush in masses toward the bank of the river
to prevent or at least to dispute the passage to the Ger-
man nation, at the evident peril of their own lives, as if
they were going to a triumph." 2

Miss Ruth Putnam has pointed out the inconsistency
of a German historian who speaks of Alsace brought
" back to the newly founded German Empire. That a
newly founded institution could receive back territory it

1 Quarante ans apres, p. 194.

2 Quoted from Matter, P., Bismarck et son temps, vol. III.
p. 227.

THE ALSATIAN QUESTION 127

was too young to have lost, sounds a trifle illogical/'1
Yes, it is more than illogical, the statements of German
writers do not correspond to reality. " There never
was," says Dr. Matter, " any Reichsland under the name
of Elsass-Lothringen : that geographical expression has
existed only since 1871 ; up to their assimilation by France
the territories of this region were partitioned and varied.
Belfort and the Sundgau, objects of contention by
princes in the course of centuries, were united to France
in 1648 ; Mulhausen, a Swiss city, gave herself freely in
1798 ; Colmar and the cities about were in reality annexed
in 1673 ; Strasburg became French in 1681 ; Metz entered
into its new fatherland with Toul and Verdun in 1552.
Until the time of their annexation, these territories were
distinct, rival, and such a city as Saint-Marie aux Mines
was divided by a frontier which made two hostile parts
of its population. It was the work of France to ag-
glomerate these divers parts, to assimilate them into one
same nation, and to breathe into them the same patriot-
ism: there were no longer Alsatians or Lorrainers,
peoples of the plains or of the mountains, but French-
men."2 Their treatment by the Germans, so different
from that of their fathers, closed their hearts to their
conquerors. Their open, frank nature did not conceal
the fact. At the time of the discussion of the septen-
nate of Bismarck, some one of his supporters said that
if the bill was not passed the enemy would invade the
Reichsland. An Alsatian member of the Reichstag
sprang up and exclaimed, " The enemy has been among
us for more than sixteen years." 3

1 Alsace and Lorraine, 1915, p. 177.

2 Matter, P., Bismarck et son temps, vol. Ill, p. 227.
« III, 88, 210.

128 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

One of the harshest measures was the closing of the
Alsatian frontier to those who had made their option
for France. Again and again, when aged parents were
passing away, asking to see once more their loved sons,
the latter were held at the frontier by a stern order re-
quiring the imperative passport, and not infrequently if
the required permit came at all it would be after the
old father or mother would be under the sod.1 In the
Treaty of Frankfurt there is a clause stating that sub-
jects born in the ceded territories are free to keep their
property there. The right to own property ought to
include the right to visit it, and to use it, but such was
not the interpretation of German officials.2 One of the
outcomes of the Franco-Russian Alliance is that as soon
as it had become a reality the hard regime of passports
was ended.3

There were periods of calm as there were spasms of
violence. The furious treatment of the caricaturists,
Zislin and Hansi, who had sketched so skillfully the
foibles and ridicules of the conquerors, excited protests
everywhere. What the authorities called treason, and
wished to punish like treason, should have called forth the
heartiest laughter of healthy men. Who were ever more
often exposed to the sarcasms of satirists in every part
of the world, and deservedly so, than the French? They
have never thought of bringing the clever artists before
the courts and condemning them to a long imprison-
ment because they had exaggerated in a very clever way
French weaknesses. Hansi was referred to the Court
of Leipsic. He was charged to have, in My Village,

1 III, 20, 475-

2 III, 96, 682.

8 Journal des Debats, Oct. 6, 1915.

THE ALSATIAN QUESTION 129

excited the Alsatians against the German regime and
prosecuted for high treason.1 Then comes the Savern
incident2 which called forth the horror of men with a
large heart in every country. To assail men as Col. von
Reutter and Lieutenant Forstner did, " sabring and
persecuting the civilians, who were driven almost to
revolt by the overbearing arrogance of the military,3
carries one back to the regime of the brutal violence of
olden times. Yet these men were exonerated by their
military judges.4 At an earlier period Marshal von
Manteuffel did not see the sad irony contained in his
statement, when he spoke of the Alsatians as " the re-
conquered brethren." 5 " The reconquered brethren "
subjected to this regime!

The spirit of the victors in Alsace in dealing with the
vanquished is shown by a few facts taken at random. One
of their most ungenerous and tactless acts was the erec-
tion of the statue of William I upon the finest square of
Strasburg. The Alsatians were thereby challenged in
their sentiments toward the Hohenzollerns. Kindness
of heart would have prevented such a step. When Herr
Herzog, Director of Affairs for the Reichsland, visited
Mulhausen, someone asked him to be considerate for the
people. He answered, " The wishes of the people are
absolutely indifferent to me." 6 One recalls the Prus-
sians crossing Hanover, and Manteuffel's telegram to
Bismarck asking how the Hanoverians should be treated,
" As friends if one can, if not in a deadly way " was the

1 L' Illustration, May 23, 1914.

1 III, 15,954-

* Villard, Oswald Garrison, Germany Embattled, 1915, p. 55.
4 VI, 19, 479-

* Larousse, Grand dictionnalre, vol. XVII, p. 206.

* III, 88, 205.

130 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

reply.1 Giving instructions to the chiefs of adminis-
tration in Schleswig-Holstein, he advises them to
deal severely with those undisciplined peoples after the
principle, "If thou canst not be loved thou must be
feared." 2 In parts of Germany conquered by Prussia,
King William met a cool reception. He reproached his
Minister for it. Bismarck answered, " We have no
time to make ourselves loved." 3 " In annexing Alsace-
Lorraine, his primary object," he said, " was not to make
the inhabitants happy and contented, but to secure Ger-
many against future aggression."4 " Alsace must for-
ever be and remain the glacis of the Empire." 5 Apart
from the heartlessness contained in these statements, they
were rendered much more hateful by revealing the stiff,
hard and harsh ways of the conquerors. The French
treatment was different. When, at various times, most
of the sections of Alsace-Lorraine came under the French
flag, they were won over by considerateness. An Alsa-
tian member of the Reichstag eloquently voiced the recol-
lection of French rule in his appeal for a fairer treat-
ment of his people, " Make," he said, " for the Alsatians
and Lorrainers a home in which they will be at ease and
can forget a happy past. The German Empire could only
gain by following the example of France. You possess
the language, you have force, but there is something
that is not in you, it is generosity. What we ask is not
generosity but equity." 6

1 V, 14, 753.

2 V, 2it 245.

8 III, 73, 54L

4 Lowe, Op. cit., vol. II, p. 382.

6 Ibid., p. 390.

e VI, i, 957.

THE ALSATIAN QUESTION 131

The regime of German harshness, alike in every one
of the conquered territories, equally severe with the
Danes, the Poles and the Alsatians, did but little to ad-
vance the conquerors' cause. One is astonished to hear
the Kaiser say, in a speech at Strasburg, July 30, 1908,
" The people of Alsace-Lorraine have given me such an
expression of their love and loyalty." In this he must
have mistaken German emigrants for genuine Alsatians.
Unquestionably, German leaders believe in this policy
when dealing with the vanquished who remain refractory
to German expectations. Prince von Biilow would say
of Alsace what he has uttered about Poland, " This policy
must ultimately reconcile our Polish fellow-countrymen
to the fact that they belong to the Prussian State and
to the German Empire." * The Prince might have added
that virtual expulsion and real expropriation of Poles
from the home and land of their fathers, will, if con-
tinued, be more efficient, but the terrible mistake of
Prince von Biilow and of Germans at large is that in
their opinion the Poles and the Alsatians belong, that
they are the property of German states and that behind
this conception there is the German first principle that
" Might makes Right." That which Germany cannot
forgive the Alsatians, any more than the Poles or the
Danes, is the survival of their national hopes. They do
not forget the iniquity which has denationalized them,
and they continue to appeal to the immanent justice which
dominates history.

The question of Alsace remains to be settled. Ger-
man misrepresentations of the question have been signal
provocations west of the Rhine. Prince von Biilow says,
" France moves in a circle round the thought of Alsace-
1 Op. cit.t p. 309-

132 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

Lorraine."1 Anyone acquainted with the variety and
richness of French thought during the last forty years
will smile at the statement that France has been hypno-
tized by such an idea, however noble. Again, " France
will not look upon her great colonial empire as a suffi-
cient compensation for the loss of Alsace-Lorraine." 2
It is not land, but justice to a people that France wishes.
The German Emperor is reported to have said to some-
one, referring to the Alsatian Question, " It is impossible
that all the progress of the civilized nations should depend
upon knowing if 1,800,000 individuals shall be Ger-
man or French.75 3 The question is not whether or no
" 1,800,000 individuals shall be German or French," but
whether or no they can be what they choose; whether
they can have political freedom or no. Prof. Munster-
berg speaks as if France had no other feelings than those
of revenge, and again and again repeats his calumnies *
as if Alsace were an all-absorbing question, and the only
possible solution of which would be war upon Germany.
Yes, for over twoscore years France has thought and has
thought much of Alsace. There were French militants
— not a large number — who would have been willing to
attack Germany to redress the Alsace wrong, but the
nation at large was not. " Here is the fact," says
Novicow. ( " Since 1871 France has performed no act
showing that she wished to take back the lost provinces
by arms. There have been many German bluffs since
1871, there has not been a single French one." 5) The
spirit of revanche has existed if that meant the vindica*

1 Op. cit., p. no.

3 Ibid., p. 93.

8 Novicow, Op. cit., p. 6.

4 America and the War, pp. 43, 76, 95, 139, etc.
6 Op. cit.f p. 199.

THE ALSATIAN QUESTION 133

tion of Alsace, " but," says the same author, " if the
Germans think that it has been heroic for them to main-
tain their claims during 223 years, it would be the op-
posite for Frenchmen to do the same for 44 years." *

Everywhere the spirit of revanche had died out, when
it was revived by the aggressive course of Germany in
Morocco, by the ill-treatment of Alsatians and by the
colossal armaments beyond the Rhine. The thought of
revanche had so subsided that, in 1904, Francis de Pres-
sense challenged the conservatives in Parliament, daring
them to put upon their program a war for the recovery
of Alsace.2 In 1909, Le Temps, examining French text-
books used in the schools, draws the following conclusion,
" France has lost the hope and even the desire of re-
venge." 3 The great Parisian paper was right, ' the
pacifistic movement had largely swept away the revanche
aspect of the Alsatian Question, and this would have
continued had it not been for the late indignities to
which France has been subjected by Germany^

The mass of Frenchmen would not have dreamed of
attacking Germany — they had too keen a sense of the im-
morality and irrationality of war — but they hoped that,
with the international readjustments which the Teutons
would force upon the world, the lost provinces would
recover, as they may do, their freedom. On the other
hand the Germans are only too ready to see but one
solution for questions of this kind, and that is war.
They tried to settle the question of Alsace that way in
1870, and since then they have ascribed like motives to
the French. Some of the most civilized nations point

1 Novicow, p. 192.
1 V, 19, 916.
•V, 54. 477-

I34 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

with pride to other solutions of international issues either
by arbitration or by conciliation. There have been more
than 75 cases in which the United States and Great
Britain have deemed such solutions the only ones be-
coming highly civilized states. The arbitration of the
Alabama Case between the two countries was a higher
index of civilization than the great scientific institutions
which are the boast of Teutonic peoples. It is because
of the signal German difficulty of rising to such a fair
judicial point of view that they cannot reconcile French
feelings for Alsace with a French love of peace. Even
when they recognize the nobleness of the French attitude
they seldom fail to give a suggestion which is far from
flattering for their opponents. Prince von Bulow, speak-
ing of England and France, says, " The mainspring of
English policy toward us is national egoism; that of
French policy is national idealism. He who follows his
interest will, however, mostly remain calmer than he
who pursues an idea." 1 Let us overlook the " national
egoism " of England, and perhaps also the suggestion
of the absence of national selfishness among Germans,
but after the irritation in reference to Alsace, the Tangier
Speech, Agadir and other provocations, France was
calmer than her Teutonic opponent. It must be added
that all along the sufferings and trials of the Alsatians
were sympathetically those of Frenchmen ever ready to
listen to " L'eternelle plainte des vaincus," 2 that is', to
protest against the unrighteous decisions of war.

1 Imperial Germany , p. 109.

2 Jules Ferry.

XI

GERMAN MILITARISM

ONE fact which makes Frenchmen indignant is the
na'ive way in which German apologists endeavor to de-
ceive the public, acting and talking as if the thought
of war was not an obsession of the national mind. Von
Biilow asserts that the German Empire " is and must
remain a military state." *• Prussia has risen to the
supreme leadership among other states by war. The
French historian, Lavisse, who has written with so much
competence and impartiality upon Prussia, truly says,
with a point of irony, " The Hohenzollern is someone
who ever wishes to have more money to pay more sol-
diers. He has the habit of acquiring new territories;
this habit is so old and so strong that he cannot give it
up. Today, he dreams of governing the world." 2 That
the Hohenzollern has been a territory, and largely a
German territory, grabber is not an invention of Teuto-
phobists. Bismarck relates how he spoke to his royal
master. " I pointed out to the King, for instance, that
all his predecessors, with the exception of his late
brother, had added to their territories, and asked him
whether he wished to follow that brother's example." 3
Thanks to Bismarck, he did not.

1 Op. tit., p. 338.

2 Le Temps, Feb. 15, IQIS-

8 Busch, M., Bismarck. Some Secret Pages of His History,
vol. II, p. 172.

135

136 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

With the Prussians war purpose and territorial ex-
tension go hand in hand. The highest distinctions of
the Empire are for militaries. The Kriegherr, the War-
Lord, is the supreme soldier and thereby the supreme
magistrate. " God's will placed him at the head of the
army/' Wherever his sons are, and at whatever age,
they appear in their military dress. At great national
functions the army officers come before the representa-
tives of the nation. At the opening of the imperial
House of Parliament, its members were not the hosts ;
on the contrary, there was a rope stretched separating
them from the dignitaries of the Court, and from the
representatives of the army. Everywhere the man with
a helmet comes before the philosopher and the scientist.
The commonest lieutenant assumes a certain superiority
over the rector of a university. The scholar subordinates
his work to, and harmonizes his conclusions with, the
aims and purposes of the military clique. The historian,
betraying his mission of telling the objective truth, ever
celebrates the perfections of his race and its military
attainments. Even the clergymen have lost all inde-
pendence in their international judgments. The Reichs-
tag is ten times more military and more responsive to
military appeals than any other parliamentary institu-
tion in Europe. The late Professor J. A. Cramb speaks
of " the annual appearance of very nearly seven hundred
books dealing with war as a science," while in England
there is published barely a score of books on the same
subject.1 The German army, the military organization, is"
the central axis of national efforts, the greatest instru-
ment of the will to power, and preparation to fight the
supreme end of the nation's life. For Bismarck the army

1 Germany and England, p. 71.

GERMAN MILITARISM 137

was " Prussia's life-nerve." * For Treitschke, it was
" the expression of a nation's will to life and must ad-
vance with that life." " A nation's military efficiency is
the exact co-efficient of a nation's idealism." Bethmann-
Hollweg says, " The vital strength of a nation is only
the measure of that nation's armaments." 2

For the Germans at large war itself has been spiritual-
ized, made divine and paramount, and for some of them a
state of things resting upon peace would be immoral.
The doctrine of evolution of Darwin explaining zoologi-
cal relations has been extended to nations who develop
through the natural selection of war which brings about
the survival of the fittest, the German, " the most perfect
creation that history has produced up to now." 3 That
German wants to be the strongest and that for him means
the greatest. He has thrown himself without restraint
into a mad industrialism and mercantilism which have
dwarfed his spiritual life. He is not so foolish as to
dream of liberty, equality and fraternity for all. He
does not try to harmonize his patriotism with humanity,
as the French have done. He has but little interest in
mankind. Germany is the exclusive center of his pre-
occupations, Deutschland uber Alles. It is true that
German Socialists have platonically reproved all wars,
and held to the principle that peoples have a right to dis-
pose of themselves, but they voted for the increase of
armaments, and when the war came, they acted like the
other Germans. To the prevalence of these ethics must
be ascribed the relative failure of pacificism in that

1 Lowe, vol. I, p. 81.

a Cramb, J. A., Germany and England, p. .51.

* Letter of Dr. Adolf Lassen.

i38 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

country, and its attitude toward the judicial settlement of
international difficulties.

Dr. Andrew D. White, ever an admirer of Germany,
has shown us, in a masterly way, her attitude at the
first Hague Conference. He speaks as follows of the
chief of the German delegation : " Count von Munster
insisted that arbitration must be injurious to Germany;
that Germany is prepared for war as no other country is
or can be; that she can mobilize her army in ten days;
and that neither France, Russia, nor any other power
can do this. Arbitration, he said, would simply give
rival Powers time to put themselves in readiness, and
would therefore be a great disadvantage to Germany." 1
Again, " He was out of humor with all the proceedings
of the conference. He is more than ever opposed to
arbitration.2 . . . He came out, as he did the day
before in his talk with me, utterly against arbitration,
declaring it ' humbug/ " 3 At the closing of the Con-
ference, after speeches by M. de Staal and others, Count
von Munster, as the presiding delegate from Germany,
had to make a closing address. " It must have been pain
and grief to him," says again the renowned American
educator, " for he was obliged to speak respectfully, in
the first place, of the Conference, which for some weeks
he had affected to despise; and secondly, of arbitration
and the other measures proposed, which, at least during
all the first part of the Conference, he had denounced as
a trick and a humbug." * Another member of the Ger-

1 Autobiography, N. Y. 1905, vol. II, p. 265.
8 Ibid., p. 296.
8 Ibid., p. 297.
* Ibid., p. 346-

GERMAN MILITARISM 139

man delegation, Professor Baron von Stengel of Munich,
was especially known for a book which he had written
against arbitration.1 With them was Colonel Schwartz-
hoff, a man strongly " prejudiced against the Conference."
Herr Zorn von Bulach, another German delegate, main-
tained that an international tribunal is incompatible with
the sovereignty of a monarch. These delegates accord-
ing to Novicow blocked every attempt to solve inter-
national difficulties by judiciary processes.2 So much
for the attitude of the German delegation at The Hague
in 1899.

The American diplomatist, already quoted, throws
further light upon the position of the German authorities
at this time. " It now appears," he says again, " that the
German Emperor is determined to oppose the whole
scheme of arbitration/' 3 " There are also signs that the
German Emperor is influencing the minds of his allies
— the sovereigns of Austria, Italy, Turkey, and Roumania
— leading them to oppose it." 4 " There is no longer any
doubt that the German Emperor is opposing arbitration,
and, indeed, the whole work of the Conference." . . .
" I had learned from a high official, before I left Berlin,
that the Emperor considered arbitration as derogatory
to his sovereignty." 5 At times, on account of Teuton
opposition, the American delegates seem discouraged, but
they go on. " Those of us who are faithful to arbitra-
tion plans," says the chief of the American delegation,
" will go on and do the best we can ; but there is no
telling what stumbling-blocks Germany and her allies

1 Ibid., p. 259.

2 Op. cit., p. 77-
9 Op. cit., p. 293.
4 Ibid., p. 294.

6 Ibid., p. 298.

140 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

may put in our way." 1 The American Ambassador
makes earnest appeals to Count von Minister, as if he
were more concerned for German moral interests than
for those of his own countrymen, but he was struggling
for a great ethical issue, and his conspicuous services
will be remembered. He wrote a most impressive letter
to von Biilow in view of modifying the stand of the
German Government. At last he went so far as to send
Judge Frederick Holls to Berlin, as a special delegate,
imploring the Germans to cease their hostility to arbitra-
tion and assuring them that, unless they yielded, the
Emperor would be the most hated man in the world.2
He did not fail to act in other directions. He urged
Baroness von Suttener "to write with all her might to
influence public prints in Austria, Italy and Germany in
behalf of arbitration." 3 At last the Emperor relented
and ceased his opposition, but the attitude of Germany
at this time leaves room for no uncertainty. She showed
there how fundamentally hostile she is to the rational
and equitable settlement of international difficulties, and
how, in her mind, the sword is almost the sole ultima
ratio.

We are told repeatedly that the Kaiser is a man of
peace. Hardly a defender of Germany has failed to
mention the quarter of a century of peace during his
reign, but as Moliere puts it, Le temps ne fait rien a
Vaffaire. If it takes two to marry, it takes two to fight.
Indeed the Ruler of Germany has said, " It is incom-
patible with my Christian faith and with the duties which,
as Emperor, I have assumed toward the people need-

1 Ibid., p. 299.

2 Ibid., pp. 299, 302, 311.
• Ibid., p. 309.

GERMAN MILITARISM 141

lessly to bring upon Germany the sorrows of war, even
of a victorious one." * Notwithstanding that, his utter-
ances are those of a man hypnotized by the army and
ever rolling the word, sword, upon his tongue like a
sweet morsel. When he wishes to honor Bismarck,
who was on the border of the grave, he presents him with
" the noblest weapon of the Germans." His military
metaphor of " the sharpened sword " recurs as by a
fixed idea. " We Germans," he says in 1909, " are a
people who rejoice in weapons and who lightly and joy-
fully wear our uniforms, because we know that it pre-
serves peace for us." 2

On July 31, 1914, speaking of the Allies, he says,
" they are forcing the sword into my hand," and on
August i, " We hope and pray that our good German
sword will come out of the struggle victorious." The
threats of " the mailed fist," the demand that his soldiers
shall use their " weapons in such a way that for 1,000
years no Chinese shall dare to look upon a German
askance," and the supreme behest to his men that they
" give no pardon " and take " no prisoner " are not the
ways of speaking of a man of peace. To this " mailed
fist" speech Prince Henry replied, "One thing alone
draws me on. It is to publish in foreign lands to every-
one who will listen and also to those who will not listen
the gospel of your Majesty's hallowed person. This
gospel I mean to have inscribed upon my banner, and I
will inscribe it wherever I go. . . .1 call upon those
who .are so fortunate as to be my comrades in this
voyage to keep this day in their recollections, to imprint
the person of the Emperor upon their minds, and to send

1 Gauss, p. 45.
a Ibid., p. 278.

THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

»rth into the world afar the cry : ' Our most illustrious,
our most high and mighty, our beloved Kaiser, King and
Lord for ever and ever! Hurrah! Hurrah! Hur-
rah ! ' " * What a valuable document of mental pathol-
ogy! The categories of the Kaiser's mind deny at every
step his pretensions in this direction. His telegram to'*
President Kriiger and his speech at Tangier do not sug-
gest the spirit of " peace on earth, good-will toward men/'
At the time of the Morocco Affair he was bold, pushing,
conscious of being backed by the mightiest army on earth,
resolved to use it.

Militarism and thirst for power are two dominant
characteristics of German activity. Every human dis-
covery and every form of progress is at once mortgaged
for war purpose. " The constant increase of German
armaments by land and sea," says Professor Muir, " has
turned all Europe into an armed camp." 2 Dr. David
Starr Jordan speaks of Germany which had acquired " a
monstrous and menacing military equipment before
breaking the world's peace." Never has the world seen
such an amazing amount of war provisions, the Spandau
Treasury, the Kiel Canal, deepened and enlarged for war
purposes, the numerous strategic railroads that make it
so easy, in time of conflict, to transport ammunitions and
soldiers from one frontier to another.3 There were also
great exertions to prepare foodstuffs. From 1911 on,
the Germans bought large quantities of meats even in
France which they gathered in their cold storage.4 There

1 Saunders, G., Op. cit., p. 88.

2 Britain's Case Against Germany, p. 132.

8 Prof. E. Doumergue of Montauban speaks of eleven lines of
strategic railroads transporting troops to the front. Foi et Vie,
May 16, 1915.

* Houlaigue, L., Le Temps, Nov. 15, 1914.

GERMAN MILITARISM 143

is an almost encyclopedic world of war preparations from
the control of the press, the spying system, the organized
agitation in hostile and neutral countries to stupendous
strategic activities, secret to an extent that would be
impossible in any other country. Had Germany made
the same efforts for peace the so-called Utopias of paci-
fists would have become world-wide realities!

After 1870, the imperial rule imposed military service
upon all, while France adopted that measure, with in-
numerable exceptions, only later. The German tendency
to larger armaments increased with time. Every inter-
national event was turned into a pretext for increased
war appropriations. In 1911, 1912 and 1913, legislative
acts continued this unreasonable accumulation of means
of human destruction, though when the last law was
passed the Chancellor said that no one threatened his
country. Nevertheless, the army at one vote and by a
war levy of $250,000,000 was increased by 200,000 units
and presented, in 1913, an aggregate of 850,000 men
in time of peace, while France, with a very much smaller
army, had to discount the men of various services, and
60,000 men immobilized in North Africa. Germany's
figures represent fighters, the different services were
provided with men to be added to the effective fighting
numbers. According to various French authorities the
relative strength of German and French contingents
was something like three to two or at least four to
three.1 If we are to accept the statements of Le Temps,
Germany increased her war expenses 227 per cent, from
1883 to 1913, that is in thirty years, and France only
70 per cent.

The German hallucination, or perhaps mere pretext,
1 VI, 14, 231.

144 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

of the French revenge has caused them not only to see
enemies in the West, but the Russo-French alliance led
them to see them in the East also, and the same spirit
has revealed to them foes on the sea. Ttje creation of
one of the most powerful navies of the world cannot be
put upon the score of French aggression, or that a
foreign fleet menaced its merchantmen. The colossal
growth of her navy cannot be explained on the basis of
love of peace. The imperial naval formulae, " The
trident ought to be in our fist," " Bitterly we need a
powerful German fleet," " Nothing can now be done in
the world without Germany and the German Emperor,"
were the outbursts of an unsated ambition and of an
aggressive purpose. We know that Germany showed a
conspicuous unfriendliness to the work of The Hague
and also that she refused to accept every proposal —
there were many — of England for the limitation of naval
increase.1 We know that during the Greek-Turkish
war in 1897, when the Powers were doing their utmost
to limit the conflict, Germany lent her officers and fur-
nished implements of war to the Turks. We know that
in 1912, when Russia, France and England made noble
attempts to prevent and stop the Balkan war, Germany
showed a signal indifference, and her officers took a
very important place in the Turkish army, while the
great Powers of Europe remained neutral. We know
that she stood by Austria — perhaps pushed her in 1908,
and supported her in the annexation of Bosnia and
Herzegovina. Germany encouraged her, or at least
backed her, in the present war. In viewing the facts
that we have pointed out and many others besides, there
loomed before Frenchmen the sense of a great potential
1 Muir, Ramsay, Britain's Case Against Germany, p. 16.

GERMAN MILITARISM 145

and unavoidable danger. The disingenuous utterances
of the Kaiser irritated them still further. In the Reichs-
tag on August 14, 1914, he said, " Too often have our
attempts to come to friendlier relations with the French
Republic failed because of her old resentments." * Yes,
the " attempts to come to friendlier relations " in French-
men's eyes were the alliances to isolate them, the Bis-
marck designs to fight them again, his misrepresen-
tations and those of the Kaiser, colossal menacing
armaments, the Morocco challenges, Agadir, and the
harrowing treatment of the Alsatians.

There is a German psychological trait, almost exas-
perating for the French, which throws considerable light
upon their provoking acts. This was brought out many
years ago by A. Fouillee, in his Esquisse psychologique
des peuples europeens,2 and has been put in striking
relief — Horresco refer ens — in a conversation of Chan-
cellor von Biilow with Sir Thomas Barclay. " We Ger-
mans," he said, " at least the Gebildeter Stand (the
educated middle class), have history on the brain. It is
an intellectual disease which makes Germans see cur-
rent events out of focus. Far-off happenings stand out
in their mind as large as the nearer ones. We see them
without the sense of perspective that fixes their true
value. The professor and his pupils are as indignant at
wrongs inflicted on Germany a century or even cen-
turies ago as they are at what happens today, and
publicists seriously write historical books to show up the
evil ways of their neighbors, as if they might be prece-
dent for action today." 3 This is very true, so true

1 Gauss, p. 326.

a P. 256.

* Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences, p. 270.

146 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

that the Chancellor, having become a Prince, is uncon-
sciously to give us many proofs of it. In his book,
Imperial Germany, he says, " We wish to prevent the
return of such times as those of Louis XIV and of
Napoleon I and for our greater security have therefore
strengthened our frontiers against France." x Speaking
of the treatment of the Poles, whom the Germans with
great cruelty have endeavored to drive away from their
ancestral homes, he says, " In the seventh century we
Germans abandoned all lands east of the Elbe." 2 " West
Prussia was regarded not as a newly acquired land,
but as German land that had been recovered and rightly
so." 3 Notice, lands abandoned " in the seventh cen-
tury," the Germans endeavor now to recover by methods
unworthy of a civilized people. Decidedly they have
good memories. During the Franco-Prussian war and
after Sedan, M. Thiers met Ranke in Vienna. He asked
the Prussian historian, " Now that you have Napoleon,4
against whom are you fighting?" "Against whom?"
answered Ranke, " Against Louis XIV." 5 Von Moltke,
in the Reichstag, evokes the specter of Napoleon and his
generals as if they were about to cross the Rhine.6 He
speaks of the milliard squeezed by Bonaparte and the
robbery of the Hamburg bank by a French General as
if they were a matter of yesterday.7 One would think
from these German ways of viewing things that Turenne

1 P. 87.

2 P. 297.

* P. 302.

4 In a manifesto one German General had said: "We do not
fight the French but Napoleon."

* Le Temps, March 31, 1915.

e Essays, Speeches and Memoirs, vol. II, p. 112.
' Ibid., p. 138.

GERMAN MILITARISM 147

and Villars are with General Joffre, that the Palatinate,
not Louvain, not Dinant, not Ypres, not Reims, not
Arras, not Senlis, is still burning — that President Pom-
care, the first servant of France, is still Louis XIV, the
former War-Lord, the Kaiser of France — and that
French soldiers, the earnest sons of French democracy
— not the hirelings and mercenaries of Louis XIV — are
ready to renew the awful tragedies of attacking Germany
" thirty times in two hundred years," as the humane von
Tirpitz who torpedoed the Lusitania puts it.1 These
men who seek in history only pretexts for their aggres-
sive purpose never say that many of the wars were
undertaken for the protection and liberation of German
peoples, and never have anything to say about their own
invasions of the land west of them.2

They do not refer to the unpardonable invasion of
France by Prussia and Austria, in 1792, to defeat the
men who were endeavoring to free their country from
the despotism of the Ancien regime. Both were de-
feated at Valmy by French soldiers fighting for the
first time under the inspiring strains of the Marseillaise.
Prussia and Austria were fighting, not only against those
who stood for the rights of France, but for those of
man. Two years later they joined the whole of Europe
against France. After having been for nearly eight
years the allies of Napoleon, and having secured through
this compact all possible benefits, they turned against
their ally, invaded France after Waterloo, and once

1 New York Sun, Dec. 22, 1915.

3 We commend particularly on this subject an essay of that
able and courageous member of the French Parliament, Joseph
Reinach, De V influence historique de la France sur I'Allemagne,
in his Histoire et litterature, 1889.

i48 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

more in 1870 when they worked out the scheme of
conquest of Bismarck. In their statement of grievances,
they never formulate them objectively or stand defi-
nitely by an issue. Finally, they do France a great in-
justice not only by the misstatement of their case, but
by overlooking the generous, broad, human and humani-
tarian evolution of the last century. One feels that
behind German acts and German historiography there
is a strong, unreasoning, hostile passion against France.
The writer does not maintain that the latter has always
been as amiable as she might have been. Amicability
is less a right than a favor. France has had a correct
attitude, at times frigidly correct, but correct even when
Germany was exasperating.

The subjects of the Kaiser do not seem to be aware j
of the fact that uncultured foreigners know something [
of the work of the Naval League, of the German Colonial ^
Society, of the Pan-Germanistic Association as well as
other organizations which may differ in character, but
have the common purpose of territorial expansion and of
ethnological accretions at any cost. In broad daylight,
publicly, some of these organizations have advocated the
annexation of Belgium and of large parts of France.
Almost all demanded dominant positions in the North
Sea, all the land along the Meuse, the Scheldt, and the
Rhine, the mining basin of Belgium for coal and that
of Lorraine for iron. Such pretensions among French-
men, in reference to other countries, would have met
with popular reproof. In the country in which a large
party had for its motto at a time when the matter was
discussed, " Tonkin for the Tonkinese ! " and when re-
cently the same party in Parliament fought with the
rallying cry of " Morocco for the Moroccans ! " the aims

GERMAN MILITARISM 149

of Pan-Germanists seemed to belong to another age.
In fact they were in keeping with those of jurists, of
economists, of sociologists and philosophers pointed out
by M. Fouillee, men among whom there is a perfect
worship of brute force, the ethical justification of na-
tional aggressiveness and a complete acceptance of the
doctrine that might makes right.

XII
GERMANY AND RUSSIA

THE Franco-Russian Alliance was peculiarly annoy-
ing to the Germans and the characterization of their
Eastern neighbors was greatly resented in France. The
Kaiser is said to have spoken of them as " Asiatic Bar-
barians." In the recent apologetic literature of German
origin, one meets constantly expressions like the follow-
ing, " barbaric Pan-Slavism," " the Cossacks ready to
crush the culture of Germany/' " the uncultured hordes
of the East/' " the onrush of barbaric masses " who
have " the force of blind barbarity " ; in the present
war, the Germans defend " the cause of civilization as
opposed to Muscovite barbarism." Dr. Andrew D.
White has done justice to the often quoted epigram,
" Scratch a Russian and you will find a Tartar," which
is no more correct than to say, " Scratch an American
and you will find an Indian." 1 Those who are so severe
with the subjects of the Czar do not tell us that again
and again Russia had rendered conspicuous services to
Prussia and that she saved her at the time of Napoleon.
" Did the Prussians and Austrians," says Professor Paul
Vinogradoff of Oxford, " reflect on the humiliation of an
alliance with the Muscovites, and on the superiority of
the Code Civil, when the Russian Guard at Kuhn stood
like a rock against the desperate onslaught of Van-
damme? Perhaps by this time the inhabitants of Berlin

1 Autobiography, vol. II, p. 26.
150

GERMANY AND RUSSIA 151

have obliterated the bas-relief in the ' Alley of Victories '
which represents Prince William of Prussia, the future
victor of Sedan, seeking safety within the square of the
Kaluga regiment ! " 1

During his ambassadorship, Bismarck did all he could
to secure the friendship of the Czar, while later on he
avoided irritating him and furthermore helped him to
subdue the Poles. In 1866, his neutrality enabled Prus-
sia to crush Austria. When, during the next year,
France asked Prussia to carry out Article V of the
Treaty of Prague, again Russia gave her moral support
to Berlin.2 In 1870, she influenced Denmark and
Austria, preventing them from joining France. Emperor
William, after the war, wrote to the Czar : " Never will
Prussia forget that it is thanks to you that the war has
not assumed extreme proportions. God bless you. ..."
" Your eternally grateful friend." 3 During the Franco-
German war, there is no favor that Bismarck is not
ready to confer upon St. Petersburg. He " proposed
the opening of the Dardanelles and of the Black Sea to
all nations. It would probably be agreeable to Russia." 4
Later on, referring to the same subject, he says, " In
the London Conference on the Black Sea Question we
are to support the Russian claims with all our strength." 5
Two or three years later the Germans were profuse in
their flatteries to Russia.6 " Never place us in the
alternative of choosing between you (Austria) and Rus-
sia," said he to Count von Andrassy, the Hungarian

Paul Vinogradoff, The Times, Sept. 14, 1914.

Ill, 73, 391.

Mevil, Op. cit., p. iv.

Busch, Bismarck in the Franco-German War, vol. II, p. 109.

Ibid., p. 185.

Ill, 2, 222.

152 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

statesman.1 In 1878, when the Russians were excessive
in their demands from Turkey, someone urged him to
do something for peace. He answered that he did not
know what he could do, but he exclaimed Beati possi-
dentes,2 which practically meant, leave them alone, so far
so good. During the war he made representations to the
Porte at the request of the Russian Government on ac-
count of the barbarity of the Turks against the soldiers
of the Czar, but had previously declined to comply with
a similar request from the Sultan.3

The German press changed its tone completely with
the Franco-Russian Alliance. It began to speak of Rus-
sia as a Barbarian nation, but, except for a little while,
the Iron Chancellor did not modify his attitude. Again
and again, he expresses his gratitude to the Russians *
and in 1892 he censures von Caprivi because he has pre-
pared a rupture between the two empires.5 At times
he went to a great length in his courtesies toward St.
Petersburg. When Alexander of Battenberg, the hand-
some Prince of Bulgaria, the victor at the battle of
Slivnitze, wished to marry Princess Victoria of Prussia,
a project highly favored by the Queen of England, ap-
proved by the Emperor and by the royal family, Bis-
marck opposed this step and carried the day because he
did not wish to displease the Czar.6 While there were
brief periods when his warmth for Russia lost some of
its intensity, as at the time of the Berlin Congress and

1 III, a, 705.

2 III, 26, 228.
'Lowe, Op. cit., p. 93.
4 III, 103, 884.

• III, 112, 473.

6 Busch, Bismarck. Some Secret Papers of His History, vol. II,
p. 414.

GERMANY AND RUSSIA 153

even later, he was, to the last, a partisan of an alliance
with her and that to prevent a Russo-French rapproche-
ment and above all to keep France at his mercy. This
attitude he did not modify even during his last days at
Friedrichsruh.1 He knew that had it not been for
Russia, -he could not have accomplished what he did.2
Again and again the German Government endeavored to
detach the Czar from France, but all in vain. The Kaiser
did his utmost with Russia, embraced the Czar again and
again, but the embraces, so potent with the Turkish
Sultan, were of no avail. The German detractors of
Russia do not realize how justly irritating to Frenchmen
were German calumnies of the subjects of the Czar.

Granted that Russia has but lately emerged from
political absolutism, have the Germans, with all their
assumptions of superiority, reached anything like free-
dom from personal government? Do they ever give
Russians credit for what they have done? The mass of
Russians are backward, but where is there a country that
like theirs has, without a revolution, transformed 20,000,-
ooo slaves into free landowners like the Empire of the
Czar ? 3 Where is the people that would have given up
all at once the use of Vodka, a kind of Russian absinthe,
that yielded the treasury 2,000,000,000 francs a year?
This indicates a self-control not possessed by nations
boasting of their enlightenment. Russia is making
progress in many ways. Her education is spreading
rapidly. A. Rambaud says that she had 250 lycees and
colleges for women when France scarcely possessed any.4

1 III, 129, 237.

• III, 143, 233-

8 Rambaud, A., Journal des Debats, Oct. 6, 1893.

* Ibid.

154 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

She has philosophers and scientists of considerable
eminence. Her economist, Novicow, has treated in a
masterly way some of the most difficult European prob-
lems. Russia has her artists, and Germany never had
one more humane than Vereshtchagin, the painter, who
attempted the impossible task of making war seem as
horrible as it really is. She has her musicians, never
more appreciated than now, and the world — very igno-
rant of the Empire of the Czar — was astonished when,
through Melchior de Vogue, came a revelation of the
noteworthy literature of the country. It is impossible
not to agree with Professor Vinogradoff of the Oxford
University when he says, " A nation represented by
Pushkin, Turgeneff, Tolstoy, Dostoyevsky, in literature,
by Kramskoy, Vereshtchagin, Repin, Glinka, Monssorg-
sky, Tchaikovsky in art, by Mendeleeff, Metchnikoff,
Pavloff in science, by Kluchevsky and Solovieff in his-
tory, need not be ashamed to enter the lists in an enter-
national competition for prizes of culture/' x One fact
which is evident is that in 1866, Austria was not slan-
dered one whit less by the Prussians, while in 1870,
France was represented as the incarnation of ignorance
and depravity.

The work of Russia in the cause of civilization and
humanity cannot be overlooked. The great Russian
Jurist, F. de Martens, one of the most conspicuous
figures at the First Conference of The Hague, has told
us of the services rendered by Catharine II of Russia to
the cause of international progress. In 1780, she made
the celebrated " declaration of the rights of nations and
of neutral commerce which served as a basis to armed
neutrality." Sir J. Harris of England, later Lord
1 The Times, Sept n, 1914.

GERMANY AND RUSSIA 155

Malmesbury, made fun of it. The Empress answered,
" Laugh at my declaration, call it if you like my armed
neutrality, my armed nullity. It is a fact which will
remain." This principle of Catharine has entered into
the body of international law recognized by the world.1
At the time of the invasion of Hesse, in 1850, by the
Austro-Bavarian army on the one hand and by that
of Prussia on the other the Czar Nicholas said to them,
" I shall fire on the first who fires." 2 In 1864, Alexander
II was prominent among those interested in the Con-
ference of Geneva for the humanization of war. In
1868, he summoned the Conference of St. Petersburg
to limit war excesses and to prevent the use of certain
projectiles and arms 3 and especially of explosive bullets.4
In 1875, after the war scare created by Bismarck, the
Duke of Cambridge speaking with Gavard of the French
Embassy said, " What a week we have just passed ! The
opinion, however, is that it is all over and that it is
Russia that has saved the peace of Europe." 5

The Czar rendered then signal service to France. He
came to hold to the principle of national rights. The
Treaty of San Stefano, March 3, 1878, reads, " The
final frontiers of the Bulgarian principality shall be
traced by a commission which shall bear in mind the
nationality of the majority of the inhabitants of the
frontiers." The great basis of decision here is not strat-
egy or territories, but respect for the inherent rights of
men. "If Bismarck," says again Novicow, " had sup-

'V, 18, 318.

* Lowe, vol. I, p. 108.

* Higgins, A. P., The Hague Peace Conferences, p. 6.

* Larousse, Grand dictionnaire, ist supplement, p. 87.
B Journal des Debats, Nov. 27, 1893.

156 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

ported Russia at the Berlin Congress the whole of Bul-
garia, the whole of Servia, Greece and Albania would
have been delivered from the fatal Ottoman yoke." *
In 1888, at the time of the visit of the Kaiser to Russia,
it is said that the Czar already talked with him of dis-
armament.2 It was not Kaiser Wilhelm II, but the
Czar Nicholas II, who took the leadership in the calling
of the Conference at The Hague in 1899. The sovereign
of a great and powerful nation proclaimed there, before
the whole world, " the necessity for Governments to
bear in mind the aspirations and wishes of peoples, and
to try to discover the basis of a lasting peace among
them by a decrease of military forces." 3 In his rescript,
the Czar, speaking most wisely of armaments, said, " It
seems evident that if this situation continues, it will lead
fatally to that very cataclysm which one attempts to
avoid, the horrors of which cause all human thought to
shudder beforehand." 4 There were not two opinions
among the delegates, except those of Germany, concern-
ing the earnestness of the Czar whom a German-Ameri-
can delegate called, " The August Initiator of the Peace
Conference." 5 There is no doubt as to the value of the
co-operation of Baron de Staal, whom Andrew D. White
calls " the foremost diplomatist of this epoch," or of
that of the most renowned authority on international law
in the Empire, Fedor de Martens. It would be unjust
not to mention the presence there of Jean de Bloch, whose
works are said to have converted the Czar to peace

1 Novicow, Op. cit., p. 245.
8 III, 88, 714-
'V, i5,3i5.
4 V, 18, 333.

' Holls, F. W., The Peace Conference at The Hague, N. Y.,
1910.

GERMANY AND RUSSIA 157

ideas while he left his fortune to establish the Peace
Museum of Lucerne.

Russia espoused with singular devotion the peace and
humanitarian ideas discussed at the first conference.
She took a scarcely less important place at the second
conference in the same city. At all times, she earnestly
sustained every move that made for international comity,
for the humanization of war, and the permanent estab-
lishment of peace by reasonable and rational methods.
Dr. Andrew D. White twice suggests, in his Auto-
biography, that the Czar would have shown better his
earnestness at the time of The Hague Conference "by
dismissing from 200,000 to 250,000 troops " from his
army,1 but this would have been an unwise step, as the
Russo-Japanese war has demonstrated. France took
such a step, but that only made the Germans more ag-
gressive. Why did not the American Ambassador rec-
ommend that course to the Germans? Russia, unfortu-
nately like all other Powers, had moments when she
failed to show in practice her pacifistic principles, but her
efforts have not been inglorious. " The Franco-Russian
Alliance was not an alliance made for revenge," says
Andre Tardieu.2 At the banquet given to the Czar, at
the time of his visit to Paris, in September, 1901, he said,
" No doubt can exist as to the fact that the alliance has
its origin in the desire for peace, and no one can deny
that the alliance has contributed to the preservation of
the balance of European Power — the necessary condi-
tion of peace." This peaceful aspect of Russian aims
appealed very much to Frenchmen, while the alliance
delivered them from the dread of German aggression.

1 Vol. II, p. 28.

3 France and the Alliances, p. 12.

158 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

This pacifistic tendency gave rise to statements in the
German press that Russia was willing to take French
money, but would not fight for her ally. Von Biilow
asserts almost triumphantly that " England, like Russia,
has refused to serve the cause of French revenge." *
This, meant as a slur upon France, is by ricochet a com-
pliment to the peaceful spirit of England and Russia.

The record of the Czar's Government in the direction
of practical pacific action is not insignificant. In 1815,
Alexander I, at the Congress of Vienna, defended the
neutrality of Switzerland with energy and success.2 The
Due de Richelieu received a map from Alexander I
showing what the Prussians wanted to secure from
France — " a line including a part of Franche-Comte, the
whole of Alsace, a great part of Lorraine, the Trois-
Eveches, Stenay, Sedan, Mezieres, Givet, all of Hainaut,
and of French Flanders to the sea." 3 This thirst for
territories was not quenched by Russia. Even Nicholas I
did much to protect Christians under Turkish rule, and
joined France and England on behalf of the Greeks.
When Bismarck wished to fight France again in 1875,
the French Ambassador, Gontaut-Biron, told the Czar
what the situation was. The master of All the Russias
answered, " Peace is necessary to the world, and each
nation has enough to do at home. Depend upon me and
have no fear." * He did what was essential to cause
Prince Bismarck to desist from his purpose.

The Treaty of San Stefano, stiff as it was, stipulated
valuable advantages for all Christian peoples in Turkey,

1 Op. cit., p. 108.

1 V, 18, 319-

' Nouvelle Revue, Oct. 15, 1895.

4 Broglie, Op. cit., 240.

GERMANY AND RUSSIA 159

independence for some of them, and virtual autonomy
for others.1 Russia, in the flush of victory, heeded
Europe after San Stefano, and never was a menace to
her western German friends. She continued to work
for the protection of the Balkan peoples, standing regu-
larly for the principle of nationalities and the respect of
sovereignties.2 When the Greeks provoked war with
Turkey in 1897 they received no encouragement and no
support from Russia. In 1899 and 1900 the Cabinet of
St. Petersburg was endeavoring to put a stop to the
South African war by friendly mediation.3 It was
agreed by France and Germany that the offer of good
offices should be extended by " Russia alone."

After the Russo-Japanese war, which was largely
brought about by the impatience of Japan and the slow-
ness of Russian diplomatic action — a war which would
not have taken place had Russia's reply, having already
granted Japan's demands, arrived one day earlier,4 she
not only came to terms with the Japanese, but in 1907
she signed a treaty with Japan which established a per-
fect understanding between the two countries. Then
came the remarkable agreement with England which not
only put an end to the historic antagonism in the East,
but prepared the ultimate evolution of the Entente. In
1908 when Austria annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina —
when Europe was threatened with the war that has now
come, Russia yielded, and in 1911 she reasserted her
desire not to interfere with Bosnia and Herzegovina.6

Ill, 103, 876.

Ill, 103, 411.

Mevil, Op. cit., pp. 55-59.

Mevil, Op. cit., pp. 73-117.

VI. I, 476.

160 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

When Austria mobilized armies on the Servian frontier,
she mobilized none. During the first Balkan war " the
policy of disinterestedness," presented to all the great
Powers, was the proposition of Russia.1 She yielded
also during the London Conference to the unreasonable
claims of Austria in the matter of Scutari.2 When it
seemed necessary to coerce Montenegro to take away
all pretexts of interference on the part of Vienna, she
asked France and England to join her in a demonstra-
tion against the brave little kingdom. When the Servians
seemed aggressive against the Dual Monarchy, Russia
issued a communique to the press which led the Servians
to recall their troops. In July, 1913, she sent an earnest
appeal to Servia and to Bulgaria, urging them not to
fight,3 an appeal from a friendly country which ought
to have been heeded.

In Southern Europe she has exerted a kind of Russian
Monroe Doctrine, protecting Greek Catholics against the
Turks, and against the Roman Catholic inhabitants of
Austria-Hungary. One fact is evident. The peoples
protected by the Czar have their autonomy and fullest
independence — an independence which is far from bow-
ing before everything Russian — while Bosnia and Her-
zegovina are under the yoke of Austria. In the days of
the war crisis, Russia showed a reasonable spirit. She
offered to refer the contention to the Court of The
Hague, baffled only by the determination of the Dual
Alliance to move southward. A fact of great signifi-
cance is that while Prussia was small and weak, Russia
never attacked her. She may become aggressive and

1 VI, 12, 470.

2 V, 15, 234-
•VI, id, 233.

GERMANY AND RUSSIA 161

military, through the examples and inspiration of her
western neighbors. The threats of Pan-Germanists
have compelled the Swiss to arm more and more, the
Russians may be affected in a similar way. They may
follow the example of Japan, which has so completely
assimilated Teutonic Kultur.

XIII
GERMANY, BELGIUM AND ENGLAND

FOR some years the scholars of Deutschland have laid
stress upon the common ethnological traits of the British
and themselves as the strongest assets on the side of
peace. On November 16, 1907, the Kaiser, addressing
English journalists, said to them, " We belong to the
same race and religion. These are bonds which should
be strong enough to preserve harmony and friendship
between us." 1 In this the Emperor of Germany was,
and should have been, disappointed. Race and religion
have seldom prevented peoples from fighting ; on the con-
trary they have often brought about the bitterest con-
flicts. The ethnocrates who give prominence to physical
kinship ought to remember that, according to their the-
ories, it is the peoples who are most alike who are most
opposed to each other. In the struggle for existence the
species that are most similar have the same wants, com-
pete for the same food, and therefore are the most
destructive of each other.

Germany, as usual, makes others responsible for the
war. England, according to the Germans, is the great
transgressor. They lay stress upon what they call a
" race treason." 2 Their violent and prejudiced diatribes
have revealed the decadence of objective thinking in
Germany and the fact that they have been misled by

1 Gauss, p. 264.

a Miinsterberg, H., America and the War, p. 73.
162

GERMANY, BELGIUM AND ENGLAND 163

the teachings of Gobineau. This man, a mediocre diplo-
mat, advanced theories of races that gave the highest
place among the peoples of the world to the Germans.
Most serious thinkers in our day have given up the use
of the word " race " as ambiguous and deluding, but the
Gobinists spoke of what they called by that name as
permanent and almost unchangeable. These theories,
inadequate from the point of view of facts, ethically bad,
and in their application, often ridiculous, have been ac-
cepted by almost everyone in Germany, and have fully
entered into all the philosophical and literary productions
of the country. Anyone with anything like independence
of mind knows that the nations of the world are the
result of a mixing process which has gone on for several
hundred thousand years, and that, as a consequence,
almost all of them are the resultants of ages of physical
and moral crossings. According to Virchow the fair-
haired dolichocephalous type, generally identified with the
Germans, is observed only from 33 to 43 per cent, in
northern Germany, 25 to 32 per cent, in the center and
1 8 to 24 per cent, in the south.1 There is no country
absolutely Germanic, or nearly so, in the Gobinian sense
of the term, and no ethical judgment can rest merely
upon an ethnological basis. Professor Miinsterberg and
Professor Bergson, both of them Hebrews, have become
so permeated with the spirit of the peoples among whom
they have lived that at times they outdo them in their
national characteristics. Almost all the ethnological
twaddle of English and German Gobinists is bad philos-
ophy and worse morals.

The charges of the Teuton allies against England are
gratuitous and fanciful. The people really dominated by
1 Fouillee, Op. cit., p. 247.

1 64 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

jealous and aggressive ends have been the Germans.
That is the only way to explain their hostility to England
and their arraignments of her past. They ascribe the
present war to English " jealousy " and to " economic
rivalry." We are not ready to say that these feelings
did not exist in England and that in some minds they
have not determined a hostile attitude, but had they
been potent, they would have manifested themselves by
means of parties, by some Pan-British or anti-German
association, with a program akin to that of Pan-German-
ists. No such party or even group existed in Great
Britain, where every " ism" from the upholders of the
theory of the " Lost Tribes " x to every form of theo-
logical and social Utopias have their organizations. Had
there been such a spirit the British would have taken
measures in Parliament to check German commercial
progress, but where is there a single fact which points
to the least truly national attempt to limit or hinder the
progressive German exportations ? Had there been an
aggressive British spirit, the English, who are a practical
people, would have prepared for war, would have mus-
tered large armies, their arsenals would have been ade-
quate to war possibilities, their military stores would
have been filled with limitless munitions, provision
would have been made for the landing of vast military
corps on the Continent, preparations would have been
in readiness for the use of French, Belgian and German
railroads, millions of men would have been trained ready
to be rushed for continental service. All this, and much
more, was wanting. There can be no better refutation of

1 Some years ago an organization in Great Britain not only
gathered data to identify the British people with the "Lost
Tribes " of Israel, but propagated the belief in such an identity.

GERMANY, BELGIUM AND ENGLAND 165

German accusations. They who of recent years had
provided belligerent Japanese, Boers, Tripolitans, Turks
and others with all possible implements of war pro-
tested against American commercial liberty, and charged
the people of this land with a violation of neutrality.
The very fact that a country like England lacked mu-
nitions of war, when her industrial capacities along that
line were so great, is an evident proof that her people
could not have planned an aggression against Germany.
In any case such a proof is unnecessary since we have
conclusive evidence as to who were those desiring the
war.

Again, in the Empire of the Kaiser, there were no
great protests, similar to those of British scholars, of
what the Tory journals called the " Cocoa Press," of
the peace societies, and of the Socialists to avert the
war as in Great Britain. The general attitude of Ger-
many and her roughshod way of dealing with France
inspired great national distrust. The British, whose
confidence in German peaceful intentions had been so
weakened by the course followed by Wilhelmstrasse, felt
that the interests of peace were best safeguarded by
France and her ally, Russia. Their attitude was very
much assaulted by cosmopolitan financiers of German
origin who exerted their efforts in every direction, but
especially upon the Cabinet and most of all upon Sir
Edward Grey. The Kaiser sent a letter to The Times
in which were his usual protestations of his love of
peace — a letter which was not published.1 There were
the frantic efforts of the good Quakers, of English paci-
fists and of labor organizations who failed to realize that
they were working to hand over France and Russia to
1 Wickham Steed, Lecture in Paris, May 2, 1915.

i66 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

the greatest militarists of the world. American peace
workers, then in England, were far from neutral. Some
of them would have allowed the French, who had taken
them at their word, and attempted to introduce their
principles into national politics, to be crushed by the
mighty Teutons. The British Government did nobly
for peace. It had given Berlin the assurance that she
would never support any aggression of her allies against
the Kaiser's people, and similarly Great Britain, unwill-
ing to encourage a possible " bellicose spirit of the
French " or the martial activities of the Russians, de-
clined to promise British co-operation with France. At
the same time, Sir Edward had warned the German
Ambassador that in case of a conflict in which France
would be a participant, England would not remain neu-
tral. No one could have done more to discourage
militants on all sides and to avoid the terrible con-
flict.

It was only on August 2 that M. Paul Cambon secured
the pledge from Downing Street that Great Britain, in
case of a German attack on the sea, would defend
French coasts. For some Gallican critics the apparent
hesitation of the Foreign Office was unexplainable ; the
Germans feel that Britain ought to have been more out-
spoken, but the friends of peace and humanity are obliged
to note that Sir Edward kept to the end his faith in the
possibility of avoiding the great international collision.
It was only when he saw the evidence of the brutal pur-
pose of Germany to do violence to Belgium that he felt
that his country was bound to have her share in opposing
this aggression. Sir Edward had earned the gratitude
of all peace lovers of the world by his practical tact, his
earnestness and his fairness at the London-Balkan Con-

GERMANY, BELGIUM AND ENGLAND 167

ference.1 The German Chancellor, speaking of his
leadership, at that time, said, " Europe will be grateful to
Sir Edward Grey for the exceptional zeal and spirit
of conciliation with which he directed the discussions
of London." 2 The same judgment must be passed upon
the noble bearing and the remarkable fairness of pur-
pose which he displayed at this time. It is not astonish-
ing that he should have had such support from the Brit-
ish Parliament, nay from the whole British Empire.
However, this is the man and his is the people that have
been spoken of by German writers in terms that are at
once contemptuous and insulting. The Comedy of 1870
was renewed and England was treated with the same de-
tracting spirit wherewith Germany then treated France.
Misrepresentations and the sword have ever been two
favorite Prussian weapons.

Belgium has not fared any better. The Germans were,
and still are, supremely incensed against her people.
The writer, acquainted with them for over half a cen-
tury, has seen them rise from great poverty to an unusual
prosperity by hard work, by education and by a strong
sense of conduct. No group of men drawn together has
had a deeper consciousness of the importance of its
unity. L'unlon fait la force is its motto. The national
cohesion, overcoming ethnic and linguistic dissent, is
paramount with them. They are conscious of their
rights as neutrals and also of their obligations. Again
and again they have reminded their neighbors of this by
the zeal with which they were safeguarding the trust
laid upon them by the Powers of Europe. Whenever
a Frenchman suggested to Belgians the possible union of

1 VI, 13, 477.

2 VI, 13, 956.

i68 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

their country with France — the writer has tried it — he
would receive an answer that would lead him not to
renew the experience. They would not tolerate such
suggestions, either, from Englishmen, Dutchmen or Ger-
mans. With the exception of a few Socialists, they love
their country with a strong, deep and unflinching patriot-
ism, capable of the greatest sacrifices. They were aware
that the French and the English were friendly. They
trusted the Dutch, whose loyalty is evident. Not so Ger-
many. They remembered the way in which Bismarck
threatened them in I875-1 The program and the agita-
tion of Pan-Germanists, who, again and again, advocated
the annexation of Belgium, the large number of teachers,
merchants and laborers settling there, the strategic rail-
roads started after the defeat of the Russians in Man-
churia and, about 1912, so completed as to be able to
throw an enormous army into this little Kingdom in no
time ; the doubling of lines having no economic interests,
the establishment of enormous military sidings, 600, 700
and 1,000 feet long, the massing of five army corps near
the frontier of the neutral country 2 greatly alarmed the
elite of Belgium. No doubt the Government asked Eng-
land and France what each would do in the event of a
German invasion. They began especial works of de-
fense in view of what seemed an impending danger, It
would have been almost criminal for them to do less.
Led by similar considerations the French General Staff
urged France to fortify the north of their country, but
the pacifists opposed such a course most violently. They
found in the Parliament a majority to prevent this most
elementary precaution against the dangerous and

1 II, 9, 222 ; Broglie, Op. cit., p. 192.
* Le Temps, Dec. 22, 1911.

GERMANY, BELGIUM AND ENGLAND 169

threatening foe. The pacifists — the writer is one of
them — ever pleaded extenuating circumstances on behalf
of Germany, and even when she was obviously working
at her scheme of invasion of northern France, a fact
which most German writers now admit. The arguments
of the friends of Jaures were that the people east of the
Rhine would never dare to incur the moral opprobrium
that would fall upon them were they to carry out the
purpose ascribed to them.

Prussian leaders have never been very considerate
for the rights of neutrals. When, in 1856, the Prussians
sought a pretext to fight Switzerland they wished very
much to go through Baden, Hesse-Darmstadt and Nassau.
Bismarck was incensed because Austria supported these
states in opposing the transit of Prussian troops through
their territories.1 Then he went upon what he called " a
simple holiday trip of pleasure " to France, but what
in reality was intended to secure from Napoleon III
" the permission to allow Prussian troops to cross Alsace
and Lorraine, but the French Emperor declined, as that
would arouse too much feeling in France." 2 The cam-
paign contemplated toward the Canton of Neuchatel was
as outrageous as that against the Duchies.

In a similar way the Germans planned to reach France
by first invading Belgium. We know now how they have
dared to do it, how they have burned Louvain, Dinant,
Ypres, committed nameless atrocities, shot innocent men
in presence of wife and children, executed priests with-
out any form of judgment, laid waste a country culti-
vated like a garden, destroyed most means of livelihood,
requisitioned foodstuffs, subjected the population to

1 Lowe, vol. I, p. 217.

* Busch, Bismarck in the Franco-German War, vol. II, p. 43.

170 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

war exactions worthy of a barbaric age and destroyed
venerable institutions of a region historically as interest-
ing as classic lands. Some of the worst insults to the
good sense of the civilized world are statements like
the following, from a Harvard professor, " Belgium chose
to put itself on the side of France." x According to this
writer there were only two sides, the German and the
French. He did not think of a third alternative, the
pledged duty of remaining neutral. Again, " Germany
did not come to Belgium as an enemy." What would
Germany have done that she did not do, had she come
as an enemy ? " Germany could do this with a clear
conscience ; it did not violate the higher laws of honor." 2
Not satisfied with statements which betray an ineradi-
cable moral color blindness, the author hints at the
duplicity of the Allies, suggests that the Belgians were
in league with them prior to the invasion. What could
have been their motives for so doing? What gains
could they have made? We are not told. His proofs
are like the celebrated rocher de bronze of King Fred-
erick William and of the Kaiser. A rocher de bronze
is something like " German Silver," like " Hamburg
steak/' like " German Delft " something ungenuine. " It
was reported," he says, " that fifty automobiles," etc.
Reported, by whom ? Reported when ? Reported where ?
Again, "Everything suggested that"3 What thing?
To people of singular historic misfortunes we should
not offer German Tartufe-casuistry. We owe them re-
spect and truth.

Similarly they invaded Luxemburg early in the morn-

1 Miinsterberg, Op. cit., p. 182.
*Ibid., p. 185.
•P. 181.

GERMANY, BELGIUM AND ENGLAND 171

ing of August 2, that is, more than thirty-six hours
before the declaration of war by Germany upon France.
The pretext here, as in Belgium, was that France had
previously invaded the Duchy. The French Premier
showed the untenableness of such an assertion in his
protestation to Berlin. France, far from moving forward
into others* territories, was keeping her troops at a
distance of ten kilometers from the frontier. She had
so well shown her intention of respecting the neutrality
and the integrity of Luxemburg that she tore up the
railroad on her side leading there.1 With Belgium
similar German acts and similar German pretexts. Even
before reaching Brussels, the Germans reiterated that
they had proofs of Belgium's agreement to have England
and France invade the country, but why did they not
give those proofs to the public? They ransacked the
archives in Brussels and found some correspondence
which they considered as incriminating Belgium, but it
merely served to show that their evidence is a good deal
like that of the Harvard professor. This gentleman has
also taxed our credulity by telling us that the atrocities
of German soldiers in Belgium — those in France had not
taken place as yet — were only " hallucinatory phenom-
ena." 2 The destruction of Tirlemont, Termonde and
Louvain, according to him, were delusions of the Allies.
It is remarkable what a great German psychologist can
see ! It is no wonder that the healthy, honest and ener-
getic Belgians dreaded to see such things and to be
compelled by German science to see them like that.

Their manly courage has excited the admiration of
the world. What will be the future of that noble land ?

1 Le Temps, April 7, 1915.
a Ibid., p. 177-

172 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

Will she be allowed to restore her crumbled homes and
to resume her normal life so brutally wrecked by her
soulless conqueror? That will depend upon the success
or failure of the friends of that state. In the case of
their success, will the boundaries remain where they
have been since Leopold I ? It is well known that there
is a part of the country east of the province of Liege
which is Walloon and given to Prussia by the Treaty of
Vienna. Many foreigners have suggested that this terri-
tory might be restored to her former owner, but the
Belgians are far from wishing to increase the German
elements among them, and doubtless would oppose such
an annexation. It is to be hoped that Belgium, formerly
able to take care of 255 inhabitants to the square kilo-
meter when the Germans complain with their 120 per
square kilometer, will soon be able to resume her former
life, restore her ruined institutions, live again her strenu-
ous and progressive history and call forth in a greater
degree still the admiration of mankind.

XIV
THE REAL ATTITUDE OF FRANCE

WE have endeavored to reduce German calumnies
against French allies to nought. It is time to show that
France also has been treated in a similar manner.
As far as the German charges of belligerency on her
part during the last forty-four years are concerned, it
must be remembered that she was absorbed to the ut-
most by her burning political and social problems when
the people were asking themselves anxiously, Shall we
have a republic or a monarchy ? — a liberal or a socialistic
Republic? — absorbed by colonial expeditions, those of
Madagascar, of Indo-China and by the effects of the
Panic of Langson ; — absorbed by the reform of her educa-
tion, having to decide whether it should be free, broad,
lay and republican or otherwise ; — absorbed by the Drey-
fus question, when the nation seemed hopelessly divided
over a question of practical justice; — absorbed when
she attempted to free herself from monastic forces that
were tending to stifle her freedom; — absorbed by the
gigantic task of the separation of Church and State,
when the relations that had so long existed between these
two institutions were torn by their very roots ; — absorbed
by all these issues and reforms which evoked the deepest
passions and most dangerous enthusiasms. How, under
these circumstances, could the French have thought of
waging war upon their mighty neighbor? Would a
sensible people have dared so to do, even if that had been

J73

174 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

their aim? Again, their economic interests were on the
side of peace. " We produce on a small scale," says
V. Berard, " but handsomely, not for the human beast,
but for the civilized man; the progress of our wealth
is bound up with that of civilization." x

Their industrial products are mostly for the better
classes, so that their fine goods and their financial in-
vestments demand peace for their best returns. France
was therefore held to a pacific policy by all her most
vital interests. All possible evidences of national tend-
encies point in a similar direction. When, in 1907, the
Petit Parisien had a plebiscite which called forth 15,000,-
ooo votes upon the greatest Frenchman, the highest place
was not given to a warrior but to a scientist who ever
preached peace — Pasteur. The second was awarded to
Victor Hugo — the poet who, in his best days, exalted
peace — while Napoleon came only fourth. Another
paper by the same process asked, " Who are the great
men not yet in the Pantheon?" The men designated
were Pasteur, Gambetta, Thiers, Parmentier, Curie,
Denfert-Rochereau, Savorgnan de Brazza, Alexandre
Dumas and Lamartine. The only soldier in this list
was Denfert-Rochereau, the heroic defender of Belfort.
The writer does not produce these names as represent-
ing " the greatest Frenchmen " or those worthy to have
above them the beautiful inscription, " Aux grands
hommes la patrie reconnaissante," but as indicating the
peace ideals of the voters.

There were many causes at work for peace. Those,

even, who are least favorable to pacifism must admit that

idealistic sympathies for judicial ways of settling fhe

difficulties of nations indicate unfriendliness to war.

1 La France et Guillaume II, p. 89.

THE REAL ATTITUDE OF FRANCE 175

Temperance people do not open saloons to promote the
non-alcoholic regime. Orthodox religious people do not
encourage radical religious teachings to promote con-
servative religion and traditional faith. A people that
outwardly has risen above aggressive militant feelings
to rational ethics that proclaim the bankruptcy of war
is more likely to be peace-loving than one that protests
that war is " moral," that it is an agent of justice and an
historic necessity. That is the case with France as com-
pared with Germany. France, following Enfantin, said,
"If you want peace prepare for peace," while Germany
has clung to the old Latin irrational motto, Si ins pacem,
para bellum — in other words, if you want a railroad build
a canal. The attitude of Enfantin's country is in keeping
with her ancient traditions. It is needless to lay much
stress upon the great scheme of peace of Sully x and
of Henry IV, of the teachings of the Abbe de Saint-
Pierre, of the utterances of Voltaire and of Madame de
Stae'l, or the eloquent protestations against war of En-
fantin and its sublime condemnations by Victor Hugo.
France has been led by her idealism to enter into every
movement that made men just and on that account
lessened the frequency of war. She has been largely
represented at every international gathering that made
for peace. Judge Holls has praised the great services
rendered at The Hague by M. Leon Bourgeois, by Pro-
fessor Louis Renault of the Paris Law School, and by
Baron d'Estournelles de Constant.

At the two conferences French delegates joined with
everyone who endeavored to stem the tide of inter-
national wranglings. They were as earnest and as active

1 The Great Design of Henry IV, with an introduction by
Edwin D. Mead.

i;6 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

at the international peace congresses in different parts
of the world as in their national congresses at home.
They honored at the Academy of Moral and Political
Sciences as well as at the Sorbonne Frederic Passy, the
most distinguished pacifist of France, the courageous
prophet of better relations among men, the economist
who insisted that by the play of economic and ideal
forces the reign of international peace would come,
that the Utopia of the ideal would be realized. " L'utopie
est le reve d'aujourd'hui et la realite de demain." They
honored one of the noblest sons of France because he
voiced her highest aims and her hopes. The strength of
the pacifist movement may be measured by the violent
utterances of the militarists. The reading of the address
of the eminent Catholic educator, Pere Didon, on July 20,
1898, shows the power of the ideas which he combated.1
All the great national organizations were pledged to
peace by judicial and not by martial methods. The ideal
of most of them was : la paix par le droit. All the men
who joined Waldeck-Rousseau, Briand and Jaures as
the mouthpiece and leaders of Socialism were equally
decided against militarism, armaments and war. ~~ This
was an essential part of their programme. Can the Ger-
mans point to a movement in France similar to that of
Bismarck, his alliances and his Berlin Congress that were
war machines? Can they show in France anything like
the Navy League of Germany with its millions of mem-
bers and with a paper, Die Flotte, having a circulation
of over one-third of a million ? 2 Can they suggest any-
thing which corresponds to the push of the Colonial
Society or to the Pan-Germanists ? The Ligue des

1 Le Temps.

* Barker, J. Ellis, Modern Germany, p. 235.

•

THE REAL ATTITUDE OF FRANCE 177

patriotes was never more than a loud-talking and parad-
ing society. In a dozen of the best books, written by
Americans and by Englishmen, discussing contemporary
France there is not a single reference to it. The leading
societies of France, whatever else they were, were paci-
fistic. Hence the policy of a virtual disarmament.

The term of military service was reduced, after 1870,
from seven years to three, and in 1900 from three to
two. General Gallieni told the writer shortly before
the war that he had been consulted by the Government
about the possibility of reducing their service further to
one year. Within a brief period, the military drill of
reservists was shortened from sixty-nine days to forty-
nine. The Minister of War, a pacifist like the rest of the
Cabinet, managed for some time to keep the contingent
of men in service to 65 per cent, of legal requirements.
Classes of men that should normally have been held in
the barracks were allowed to go home. France not only
decreased her army, but it was permeated by the most
positive and extreme spirit of pacifism and on that ac-
count hostile to any bellicose end. Colonel Bonysson
reports that one of liis lieutenants, addressing soldiers,
began by saying : " I am an anti-militarist." l A large
number of the troops were not only socialists but positive
internationalists.2

In 1913, there were military uprisings in Toul and
Belfort.3 The Germans then denounced France as a
unit of aggressiveness and as a hotbed of anarchy.
Whatever she was, she could hardly have been both.
She was not in the race for armaments; for while, in

1 V, 41, 950.
» VI, 15, 7io.
» Ibid., p. 712-

i;8 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

1870, her navy came only second, now it stands fourth
or fifth.1 This was not because she lacked money.
Under the Combes Cabinet, Camille Pelletan, Minister of
the Navy, had the audacity to postpone indefinitely the
building of warships voted by the Parliament.2 Thus
while France was considering war as an anachronism,
as a relic of barbarism, was having the principle of arbi-
tration and conciliation accepted by the majority of her
people, Germany was idealizing war, defending its utility
as a force of justice and was arming to an extent only
now — it never was before — revealed to the world by her
limitless resources on the battlefield.

At last, but too late, France woke up, and began to
restore the three years7 military service, which was ac-
cepted as a natural necessity by the people. The Parlia-
ment voted $100,000,000 for armaments and for war
credits. It recognized that while pacifism is right, that
it is the only compass whereby a nation may steer its
ethical life, it is a signal folly for a neighbor of a
mighty warlike and belligerent Power to be alone in dis-
arming. Thanks to the intelligence and patriotism of
the nation much was done to regain lost time. The
world at large may not have given France credit for
heeding absolutely principles that seemed premature, but
recognized her pacific and reasonable spirit.

The leading nations of Europe, aware of the danger
that threatened that land, became more sympathetic.
This was especially true of English-speaking peoples and
particularly of Great Britain. Von Bulow recognizes this
(evolution. " For many reasons," he says, " English
public opinion is more favorable to France than to us,

1 V, 56, 953.
* V, 24, 719.

THE REAL ATTITUDE OF FRANCE 179

for England no longer looks upon her as a rival, and
certainly not as a competitor at sea." x Again we have
the German monochord idea, ever ascribing one motive
for an action that may have one hundred, but never giv-
ing the most evident one. In the same way he deals
with France. The armaments are made because of her
" hypersensitive national pride " or upon national resent-
ment against Germany, " the soul of French policy." 2
" So far as man can tell, the ultimate aim of French
policy for many years to come will be to create the neces-
sary conditions, which today are still wanting, for a
settlement with Germany with good prospects of suc-
cess." 3 Another interested calumny, " France would
attack us if she thought she were strong enough." * She
is a nation that for " a whole generation has cherished
one hope and one ideal," the revanche.5 He expresses the
charitable thought that she will ruin herself in her com-
petition for armaments. " It is just possible," he says,
"that the effect of convulsively straining her military
resources to the utmost may, by reacting on the economic
and social conditions of France, hasten the return of
pacific feelings, and that once again the French
proverb may prove true, Que I'exces du mal amene la
guerison" 6 When " pacific feelings " were absent it was
because German Chancellors, and foremost among them
Prince von Bulow, had done their best to drive them
away. A most certain fact is that her armaments did
not precede but succeeded those of Germany. It was

1 Op. tit., p. 39.

2 Ibid., p. 84.

* Ibid., p. 103.
4 P. 108.

B P. 106.

• P. 103.

i8o THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

impossible for her to do aught that could compare with
the results of a country that had centered its national
energies upon the production and accumulation of war
implements. Her people remained pacific and, as a
whole, pacifistic, but the course of Germany united
Frenchmen under the sense of danger as they never
had been. Their feelings were not unlike those of forty
years ago. The old spirit of revanche which had died
away was revived. The Alsatian Question, considerably
in the background, came again to the front. A sense of a
deep German ill-will prevailed and there was the con-
viction that the mighty and remorseless Goth was about
to strike, and so he did.

France had not only professed sound principles of
international relations at home but had practiced them
abroad. In the splendid movement of international
understandings which led the most civilized nations be-
tween 1904 and 1910 to sign over one hundred treaties
of arbitration, Germany signed none,1 but France was
foremost. She did much to reconcile Russia and Japan.
She herself drew nearer to the land of the Mikado and
contributed to the rapprochement and entente between
England and Russia after having done great things to
help the settlement of the Dogger Bank Anglo-Russian
incident. " There can be no doubt," said two English
writers, " that French influence was largely responsible
for the gradual reconciliation of England and Russia in
those years, for the growth of a feeling in both countries
that their Asiatic interests, hitherto the main cause of dis-
putes, were by no means irreconcilable." 2 She has dealt
with Italy and Spain so as to win their respect and their

1 Muir, R., Op. cit., p. 177.

a French Policy Since 1870, Oxford Pamphlets, p. 22.

THE REAL ATTITUDE OF FRANCE 181

friendship. She had no great success in the Balkans —
no one of the great Powers had — but she did all she could
to prevent the first war, and when it was on, to prevent
it from bringing the whole of Europe into a gigantic
conflict. M. Poincare, then Prime-minister, on the first
report of a silent compact for a war against Turkey by
the Balkan states, summoned the leading bankers of
Paris to him and urged them not to lend the sinews for
an aggressive war even against the Turks. As presi-
dent, he centered all his efforts upon a policy of peace.
The Quai d'Orsay sided with every proposal, even those
of Count Berchtold,1 that tended to restore normal re-
lations. At the London Conference, in conjunction with
other Powers, she moved in line with the peacemakers,
humoring the Austrians so as to keep them from the
Balkan fray. When Europe was menaced with the
greatest catastrophe of history, she was one with Eng-
land, Russia and Italy to try to avert the nameless crime
which has soiled the escutcheon of the two Teutonic
Powers. In the conflict which was forced upon her, she
deserved fully the judgement passed by the editor of the
New York Evening Post, " The onlookers abroad know
that France has borne herself with rare dignity and re-
straint ; that her moral position is clearer and more shin-
ing than that of any other of the combatants ; that she
has revealed a fortitude in defeat and a resoluteness to
succeed in the end which, together with unexpected
qualities of self-control, command the .admiration of all
who behold with unprejudiced eyes. The nation of
Lafayette, of De Grasse, of Rochambeau, has lived up
to its best." 2

1 VI, n, 237.

'Villard, Oswald Garrison, Germany Embattled, p. 101.

XV
AUSTRIA AND THE GERMAN PROVOCATION

WERE the Austrians to hate France they would not be
without good reasons from some points of view. One
of the great services rendered by her to Germany was
the weakening of the power of the Hapsburgs. The
deliverance of Italy from its cruel rule was accomplished
by the co-operation of Napoleon Ill's soldiers, who helped
to drive the Austrians from that fair land. The work
done so well and so long by France was continued by
Prussia, practically driving out Austria from Germany.
After Sadowa, Austria was collecting her thoughts. Bis-
marck made efforts to attract her and to prevent an
alliance with Napoleon III. With his usual far-sighted-
ness after the Austrian defeat, Bismarck realized the im-
portance of Austria as an ally, and pleaded for gentle
treatment. After the Franco-Prussian war, he drew the
Emperor of Austria as well as the Emperor of Russia into
the Three Kaiser League. Austria, doomed to ultimate
disruption on account of the many conflicting ethnic
elements within her borders and feeling her insecurity,
yielded. The Iron Chancellor had a twofold policy with
these strong neighbors. He wished to change the course
of their interests. He urged Russia to move eastward, to
extend her sway as far as possible in Asia, to establish
herself there so as to weaken her hold in the West.
This Bismarckian policy was also that of the Kaiser, who
encouraged the Czar in the same direction. Four months

182

AUSTRIA AND GERMAN PROVOCATION 183

after the occupation of Kiao-Chou, the Russians were
entering Port Arthur, where they were bound to meet
Japanese opposition. The French Government warned
St. Petersburg of the grave danger of a collision with
the Empire of the East. In a conversation with Presi-
dent Loubet, the Czar recognized the seriousness of the
situation, and said that never would Russia declare
war upon Japan.1 He was sincere in his purpose, but
the force of events was stronger than he. The disaster
of Port Arthur followed, and the policy of Germany
bore its intended fruits. With this came the elevation
of Japan to the rank of a great Power.

As to Austria, now that she had given up her aspira-
tions to the hegemony of German states, Bismarck
wanted to prevent the return of her former ambition and
also to have her forget Sadowa. Accordingly he led her
to give a complete reversal to her traditional policy and
to try to expand in the direction of Slavdom. This
policy, if successful, would increase the importance
of the Slav element in the Dual Monarchy, and ulti-
mately might release the German populations of Austria
and incorporate them into the Empire. For him the true
goal for Austria was the ^L'gean Sea, and the ideal sea-
port for her was Salonica. At the Berlin Congress von
Moltke urged Count Karoly to advise his Government to
go to Salonica. The tempter added, " We will approve
you ; better still, we will sustain you." 2 As a matter
of fact the Ballplatz did not need these counsels. It had
long coveted Bosnia and Herzegovina. As early as 1867,
von Beust had his eyes turned toward those provinces,
and this had long been known not only in Berlin but

1 Mevil, Op. cit., p. 79-
8 /&»<*., p. 8.

184 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

also in Saint Petersburg.1 The Iron Chancellor had
prepared everything before so that the two Teutonic
Powers should be gratified at the Berlin Congress. The
population of the provinces was practically handed over
to Emperor Francis Joseph. Having been oppressed so
long by the Turks they deserved a better fate. They
were denied the right to live their own national ideals.
They unquestionably gained in the transfer by coming
under a Christian Power, but the consoling prospects of
former days that there were independence and freedom
ahead for them had vanished. Bismarck, on the other
hand, demanded his pay for his services in the form of
an alliance by which Austria was compelled to defend
Germany in case she were attacked, but the terms were
far from reciprocal.2 Many Austrians, but chiefly the
Young Czechs, were eloquent in their denunciation of
this agreement.3

In November 1896, Bismarck, with his usual cynicism,
revealed to the world that, while he had made a treaty
with Austria involving her support of the new German
Empire against the possible attacks of the Czar, he had
at the same time a secret treaty with Russia, against
Austria, covering the same period. Why the unscrupu-
lous statesman made this other startling revelation no one
can absolutely tell. It is thought by many that he wished
to show the Germans that in losing him they had been
deprived of a valuable ally. He furthermore may have
wished to have France doubt the sincerity of Russia.4
Austria, however, knew nothing of this double-dealing.5

1 HI, 74, 4i3.

2 III, 103, 883.

• III, 87, 233-

• III, 138, 470.

• III, 138, 715-

AUSTRIA AND GERMAN PROVOCATION 185

Professor Miinsterberg accuses Russia of "playing a
double game " of late.1 That would be natural, as the
Czar had so long learned practical lessons from Berlin.

Then there was the abrogation of Article V of the
Treaty of Prague. France, who in 1866 had mediated
between Prussia and Austria, succeeded in having in-
serted in this treaty a clause whereby the inhabitants of
Schleswig should have a vote to decide to what country
the province would belong. During twelve years, the
Iron Chancellor had held that population in subjection
without ever keeping his promise. By a preliminary
treaty, October 1878, published in February 1879, the
two Powers abrogated that part of the Treaty of Prague 2
and doomed the Danes of the province to become Ger-
man subjects.

Meanwhile, Austria unquestionably made improve-
ments in the Balkan provinces, but left no stone unturned
to assimilate and Germanize them. The promises of
virtual autonomy and of a liberal administration were
never kept. The Germanic elements of the Dual
Monarchy, ever seeking preponderance over other races,
continued after the virtual protectorate over Bosnia and
Herzegovina. In 1908, the Austrian Government pro-
ceeded to annex the two provinces. Turkey and Russia
protested. England practically did the same thing. Prince
von Biilow sums up the reasons for his militant attitude
at this time as follows : " The antagonistic policy of Eng-
land seemed aimed less against Austria than against
Germany, Austria's ally. For the first time, the Austro-
German Alliance was to prove its durability and strength
in a grievous conflict.

1 Op. tit., p. 72.

2 III, 31, 953-

1 86 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

" In my speeches in the Reichstag, I made it clear that
Germany was resolved to preserve her alliance with
Austria at any cost. The German sword had been
thrown into the scale of European decision, directly in
support of our Austro-Hungarian ally, indirectly for the
preservation of European peace, and above all for the
sake of German credit and the maintenance of our posi-
tion in the world." 1 Of the right and wrong of the case,
not a word, but, to test the Alliance and for national
credit, he was willing to plunge Europe into a war. No
one will be deceived by his German cant about " the
preservation of European peace," which no one disturbed
except Austria and Germany. Furthermore Wilhelm-
strasse and the Ballplatz declined every proposal of a con-
ference to deal with this matter.2 As we have seen,
Russia yielded.

The Government of the Hapsburgs laid its hands upon
the Serbs of the annexed provinces. It had previously
endeavored to have Servia gravitate within the Austrian
orbit. The wretched King Milan and his ill-fated son
had been used to keep Belgrade under Austrian influence,
but all in vain. The people on both sides of the frontier
knew full well that the Dual Monarchy would not respect
them nor their ideals and traditions. After the annexa-
tion Servia, feeling that she had been wrongly dealt with,
assumed that she was entitled to some compensations,
toward the Adriatic, and had Austria been generous she
might have humored her, but she did the opposite.3 The
Ballplatz did not object to having Servia reach the JEgean
Sea, for, in attempting so to do, she would have been

1 Op. tit., p. 63.

2 V, 49, 234.
•VI, 12, 479.

AUSTRIA AND GERMAN PROVOCATION 187

crushed by the Turks, and then Austria would have had
her opportunity. It was the Adriatic that Servia needed 1
to escape from her economic dependence on Austria.
The Dual Monarchy never tried, we do not say gentle-
ness, but fairness, with Servia, and was bitterly opposed
to two essentially modern principles that govern the
political life of the most progressive countries, first, the
rights of democracy, and second, the building of a Govern-
ment either upon the consensus of wills or upon ethno-
logical affinities. When, in 1859, Prince Napoleon had an
interview with the Emperor Francis Joseph to settle peace
conditions, he presented the French memorandum in the
following words, " The Emperor of Austria surrenders
his rights upon Lombardy to the Emperor of the French,
who, according to the wishes of the populations, trans-
mits them to the King of Sardinia." The Austrian Em-
peror protested against the clause which we have itali-
cized and said, " What you call ' the wishes of the
populations,' I call revolutionary rights which I can-
not admit. I only recognize the rights inserted in
treaties. From them, I possess Lombardy. I am
willing, as a consequence of the fate of arms, to sur-
render my rights to Napoleon, but I cannot recog-
nize the wishes of populations nor anything like
that."2 According to him, then, peoples are perfectly
helpless in presence of the decisions of their supreme
owner. As a consequence the Dual Monarchy holds, by
force, " seventeen nationalities." 3 On the other hand,
Servia, notwithstanding her limitations, stands for a

1 VI, 12, 473-

2 Journal de ma mission aupres de I'Empereur d'Autriche.
Revu/des Deux Mondes, Aug. I, 1909, p. 489.

3 Le Temps, March 3,

188 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

modern principle, the rights of those that are governed.
As a rule she modestly asserted her claims to existence
and her wishes to open the door wide to her kinsmen.
At the London-Balkan Conference she showed an ad-
mirable spirit, placing her case in the hands of the
Powers,1 while her opponent was the only aggressive
nation.

Austria, in the south of Europe, land-locked on all
sides, without a seaport except Trieste, which remains a
part of Italia Irredenta and an object of Italian de-
sires, was unsatisfied. That she should by loyal means
have sought a way south either by Avlona to the Adri-
atic, or by Salonica to the ^Egean Sea, would have had
the approval of all liberal-minded men. The difficulty
with Avlona was that the Italians desired it also, and that
at best any seaport in the Adriatic was practically bottled
up by Italy. By an act of able and frank diplomacy,
Austria years ago could have worked her way to Salonica.
The Murzsteg Agreement between Russia and Austria,
in 1903, might by its condominium have paved the way
for such a consummation. Mutual concessions of the two
Powers involved might have secured that end. A nation
of 50,000,000 of inhabitants should have its own free
broad access to the waterways of the world. Her efforts
to realize this desideratum came too late, and the methods
employed were arrogant and dishonest. After the occu-
pation of the Sanjak of Novibazar by Montenegro and
Servia, the accepted time had passed. The way to
Salonica was blocked. Hence the greater earnestness not
to let Avlona escape — Avlona, one of the finest natural
harbors of the Mediterranean.

For years, Austria had, by her missionaries and by
1 VI, 12, 955.

AUSTRIA AND GERMAN PROVOCATION 189

other agencies, attempted to penetrate Albania. Every-
thing that could be done was tried to secure a great in-
fluence there, but Italy was watching and made it a
matter of important parleys with Vienna. The agree-
ment reached by the two Powers was that neither of them
would lay their hands upon Albania and that both of
them would exclude others from the coveted land.1
Austria and Italy, sustained by Germany, considered that
if their scheme as to Albania succeeded, it was important
that that kingdom should be as large as possible as a
field of Austro-Italian influence. If the program
failed, both countries would claim the fragments — the
larger the better.2 In either case Austria wished to keep
her own way clear along the Adriatic while still clinging
to the forlorn hope of the yE'gean Sea through Servia.
During the Balkan war she assembled an enormous army
on her southern frontier and showed her impatience to
move ahead. When the Powers were asked by Russia
for a pledge that they would keep the peace in this cam-
paign, Austria refused to give hers.3 Count Berchtold
again and again stated that she " reserved to herself
the defense of her interests." * He maintained the liberty
of fighting if it was for his advantage, or of sharing the
Balkan spoils, and above all he was not willing to commit
himself to the policy accepted by all the great Powers
when they promised to make no territorial extension,
to live up to what they called " the policy of territorial
disinterestedness." He was satisfied with the prolonga-
tion of the war, .because it would weaken the Balkan

1 VI, /*, 474-
8 VI, /7,475.
» VI, n, 958.
4 VI, 12, 240, 471.

190 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

peoples that stood in Austria's path.1 He encouraged
Bulgaria to resist the legitimate claims of Servia, bring-
ing about the war against Greece and her ally. He
similarly acted at Bucharest to conciliate Rumania. He
wished to break the Balkan alliance, he did break it, but
in it Rumania took the place of Bulgaria, and the alliance
continued. Then there was the miserable affair of
Prochaska, the Austrian Consul in Servia, and his scan-
dalous attempts to blackmail the Servians so as to create
a casus belli.2 Independent judges found in such acts an
explanation of the gigantic army which Emperor Joseph
kept along the Servian frontier, and of his purpose.3
Austria was ready at any instant to fall upon the Servians
or the Montenegrins if they dared to cross her pros-
pective designs. She was, as already said, the cause of
the second Balkan war. In the compact of the Balkan
allies, they had agreed to a partition of conquered terri-
tories on the assumption that no European Power would
interfere; but, now, as Austria had prevented Servia
from having her hypothetical share, she demanded — and
rightly too, if we admit these principles of territorial par-
tition— to have a revision of the agreement. At the
moment of hesitation Count Berchtold advised Bulgaria
not to yield, and she did not. War followed, an Austrian-
Balkan war by proxy. When King Ferdinand was de-
feated Vienna and Rome threatened to interfere to pro-
tect the treacherous aggressors.4

During the London Conference Austria did not become
more pacific. Her belligerent purpose seemed firmer.

1 VI, «, 713.

2 VI, 13, 237.
8 VI, 13, 237.
4 VI, i(5, 718.

AUSTRIA AND GERMAN PROVOCATION 191

That she wanted a clash with Servia seemed more and
more evident. Sig. Giolitti at a very important sitting in
the Italian Chamber, early in December, 1914, created a
violent commotion by an important communication. The
disclosure which he made was that during the second
Balkan war Austria intended to crush Servia. During this
period, on August 9, 1913, the Marquis di San Giuliano
had sent a dispatch to his colleague reading as follows:
" Austria informs us, as well as Germany, of her in-
tention to act against Servia, and declares that such a
step on her side could only be considered as defensive.
She hopes to make the casus focderis of the Triple Al-
liance work, but I think this cannot be made applicable
under present circumstances." No reasonable doubt can
be entertained now that at the same time Rumania was
informed of the aggressive purpose of Austria against
Servia.1 The Government of Bucharest took the same
stand as that of Rome.2 Austria's mobilization seemed
plausible so long as the Serbians had not given up their
purpose to have a foothold upon the Adriatic, but after-
ward she did not dismiss one man. How can that be
explained on the basis of a peaceful purpose? At the
London Conference, the Powers made concessions, even
against their better judgment, to prevent her from ag-
gressive action. She asked that the Servian territory
should not reach the Adriatic, it was granted. She de-
manded the independence of Albania, an independence
which its people did not desire, it was granted. She made
gigantic exertions to have Ipek, Prizrend and Diakova
included in this fictitious state, but while she failed in
that she succeeded in maintaining Scutari in it. She

1 Le Temps, Jan. 10, 1915.
*Ibid., Jan. 27, 1915.

192 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

took the initiative of a naval demonstration.1 Its pur-
pose was not doubtful, but its obviously dangerous char-
acter was eliminated by having other Powers take part
in it. In the matter of Scutari, she wanted to use force
against King Nicholas, demanding that he relinquish it,
but the Powers settled it by diplomatic action.2 She
antagonized the Servians at every point. Their legitimate
ambition to reach the sea was foiled, while her pet scheme
to create an Albanian state was carried out, to prove a
most humiliating failure.

, 473-

XVI
THE INITIATORS OF THE GREAT WAR

THE provinces of Bosnia and Herzegovina under
Austria had the benefit of a government that could not but
be an improvement upon that of the Porte, but they did
not enjoy self-government. They were treated as the
Italians had been, in an oppressive way and as conquered
peoples. The national attainments of Servia in various
ways and her recent victories made the Serbs of these
provinces proud. They naturally enough wished to be
united with the Serb family politically represented by
Servia. It would be impossible to prevent a certain
agitation among such a population and to banish proselyt-
ing. A people like this, largely kept by themselves, de-
spised by haughty masters indifferent to their interests
and their aims, could not but be hostile to their oppress-
ors. There, as in all countries under similar circum-
stances, the Tugendbund in Germany in 1808, and the
Carbonari in Italy, secret societies were working in con-
cealment to secure justice refused to them openly, and
which could not be obtained in any other manner. It
would have been impossible to cut off Servia from sym-
pathetic touch, and from social co-operation, with these
peoples. Fear could not be a permanent barrier. One
can no more crush these deep national desires and long-
ings by force of arms than eradicate, by the same means,
their language and their religion.

Austria was bitterly disappointed with the Bulgaro-

194 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

Turkish Treaty 1 and perhaps even more so with the
Treaty 'of Bucharest. She displayed her insincerity to
the extent of objecting to it on the ground that it was a
violation of the terms of the Berlin Congress. Her
friends disregarded them in 1886 2 and she herself had
been the flagrant delinquent in that respect by annexing
Bosnia and Herzegovina.3 She blamed Servia for most
of her own failures, for only a war that would have
shattered the Belgrade Government and opened the way
to Salonica would have satisfied the belligerent clique
of Vienna. She was hostile to her nominal Serb sub-
jects, who generously retaliated. The contempt for these
men, voiced in many ways, expressed itself in most of
the schools. In some of them the language against the
Servians exceeded all measure. Feelings ran high, es-
pecially among the young. Borne onward by the sense
of injustice and outrage, thousands of young people
were ready to give their lives to avenge the wrongs done
to Servia and to themselves. The Austrians were not
calmer. Having been baffled all along, they had ex-
pected to secure a footing in Servia during the two
wars. Then they had some hope of penetrating by
means of a Roman Catholic protectorate over Servia, that
is, to be made the custodians of Catholics in that Ortho-
dox country. Here again the Ballplatz men missed their
mark. The Vatican signed a Concordat with Servia
regulating the affairs of the Church in that country. This
added to the Austrian anger. The Archduke Ferdinand
was known as an anti-Serb. He was going south to
direct Austrian maneuvers close to the country to which

1 VI, 17, 716.
•Ill, 7^,234.
8 VI, id, 955-

INITIATORS OF THE GREAT WAR 195

he was hostile. This was enough to make him the butt
of the murderous aims of Bosnian avengers. The prince
and his wife lost their lives in the city of Serajevo, June
23, 1914. The violence of the Serbs was more than
matched by that of the Austrians.1

Notwithstanding the inquiries and explanations of Bel-
grade, the repeated assertions of its Government that it
had nothing to do with the events of the Bosnian capital
and that it was ready to punish any of its subjects, a
party to the crime, the Ballplatz remained mute as death.
What could Servia have gained by such a monstrous
act? It was cruel to let this painful period of suspension
oppress those who had so many reasons to fear. The
pretext so long sought for the invasion of Servia had
come at last. Mr. Oswald Garrison Villard, in his re-
markable book, Germany Embattled, says, " It is beyond
all question that the Austrian military party sought war
with Servia not once, but three times, and finally brought
it about, thanks to the Archduke's assassination." ' We
would say that for a long time the ravenous wolves
of Vienna were constantly watching for an opportunity.
Now circumstances seemed favorable. The representa-
tives of most Governments were away. The nations of
the Entente were harassed by vexatious problems,
finances in Russia, the Irish question in Great Britain, the
Caillaux excitement in France, and the labor difficulties
in all of them. This seemed for her the time to strike.
Therefore, she sent the famous, or infamous, ultimatum
so much in keeping with her ways. After the settlement
of the Balkan conflicts, the Albanians attacked the
Servians in their territories. They were defeated, and

1 VI, 22, 470.

2 P. 164.

196 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

in their retreat they were pursued by the Servians, who
then occupied insignificant parts of the fictitious Albania,
and made the statement that "this was temporary.
Austria, without consulting the Powers, sent Servia an
ultimatum to leave the occupied points within eight days.1
She acted in the same way with Greece in reference to
Epirus.2 When Prince von Wied went to Albania he
seemed the agent of the Dual Monarchy rather than that
of the Powers.3

The fatal ultimatum of July 23, 1914, was the cul-
minating point in the unreasonable course of Austria, and
was calculated to bring war, and war it did bring.4 It
had been prepared by Count Tisza, the Hungarian states-
man, more Austrian in his foreign politics than the most
Chauvinistic Austrian, by Count Forgach, the former
Minister to Servia, celebrated for the Fried jung for-
geries, and by Tchirschky, the German Ambassador,5
but it was a virtual repetition of a similar message sent
to the King of Sardinia in 1859. This also accused Sar-
dinia of being the home of conspirators and assassins.6
In this document, probably sketched before the tragedy
of Serajevo, Austria boldly asserted the guilt of Servia
without giving any fair and adequate evidence. She con-
demned Servia's anti-Austrian tendencies, but this little
country could have turned the tables upon Austria on
reciprocal grounds. The charges were in themselves acts
of international discourtesy. The acts of the Serbs
under Austria and of the Servians were manifestations

1 VI, 18, 237.

2 VI, 15,473.

8 VI, 22, 240.
4 VI, 22, 711.

8 Le Temps, Jan. 29, 1915.
6 The Times, July 30, 1914.

INITIATORS OF THE GREAT WAR 197

of public opinion that no country, except Austria, would
have attempted to stop. The accusations against Servian
officials were merely the assertions of Austrian agents
that had nothing judicial in them. Among other things
she demanded the suppression in Servia of anything
hostile to her annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
This would have been like the Germans demanding in
France the suppression of papers hostile to their pos-
session of Alsace. She enjoined the dissolution of the
Narodna Odbrana, the removal from the army of anyone
implicated in the Bosnian agitation of the Serajevo
murder, and the acceptance of " agents of the Imperial
and Royal Government in the suppression of the sub-
versive movement directed against" Austria, etc. The
Ballplatz gave Belgrade just forty-eight hours to answer
this humiliating order. The difficulties for the friends of
peace were increased by the fact that the ultimatum
was communicated to the Powers only twenty-four hours
after it was sent to the Servian Government. When the
document was received, one of the ambassadors asked
that the time be extended, but the Austrian official
answered that the note to the Powers was only for their
information, and that the question was exclusively a
matter between the Dual Monarchy and Servia. Con-
scious of the strength of the Triplice, he practically said
to the Powers, " Hands off ! " There was in Vienna the
usual diplomatic cant about having sufficient territory
and coveting none— the usual formula of all land grabbers
in all countries. We know what that means. There has
not been, in recent times, such an unscrupulous and
arrogant proceeding.

The poor Servians, poor at the outset, impoverished by
two wars, were in a most trying position. The ultimatum

198 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

would tolerate no delay, and their answer must be yes
or no. In either case their independence seemed in
hopeless danger. They were conciliatory to the utmost.
They granted all demands except those involving sover-
eign rights. These they were ready to discuss in a
friendly way or refer them to The Hague. Never did a
little people humble itself more to placate a great Power.
It was the old story of the Wolf and the Lamb. The
Austrians, like the Germans, repeated that it was a ques-
tion of life and death, a most absurd assertion. A great,
rich people of 50,000,000 of inhabitants having enjoyed
half a century of peace and prosperity could not resist
the action of 4,500,000 Servians exhausted by two ter-
rible wars ! It was as if the old whale had said, " I must
swallow Jonah, otherwise Jonah will swallow me." In
all her steps Austria was supported, and possibly inspired,
by Germany from the Conference of Berlin to this time.
There was the same concerted purpose among these
Teuton allies to put down Servia, to reach the ^'gean
Sea, and some think, Constantinople.

A study of all the diplomatic documents will convince
one that the Teutonic Alliance was unfriendly to inter-
national action for peace. Germany maintained that the
Austro-Servian quarrel was eminently Austria's concern,
while modern opinion more and more claims that war is
everybody's business. The whole human society suffers
from it, and hence has a right to protect itself. Four
of the Great Powers, Italy, France, England and Russia,
did their utmost to avert the conflict. Sir Edward Grey
proposed many ways out of the situation which would
have succeeded with Governments really desiring peace.
After great efforts for an honorable and just solution,
the English statesman asked Germany to propose some

INITIATORS OF THE GREAT WAR 199

means whereby the situations might be saved, but she
showed a faint-heartedness which cannot be explained
except on the assumption that she was bellicose. One is
forced to agree with M. Rene Viviani, who said, "If
Germany really loved peace she might have had it simply
by accepting pourparlers at London on July 29, or two
days later by accepting the Czar's call for an appeal to The
Hague Tribunal, or on July 31, Great Britain's call to
suspend military operations in view of negotiations at
London." 1

In her diplomatic papers Germany claimed to have
exerted all possible influence for peace in Vienna, but
none of her dispatches to that effect has been published
in her White Papers. Would it not be remarkable that in
such a publication, to justify her pacific attitude, to ex-
hibit her work in avoiding the present war, there should
not be a document showing that she even tried to influence
the war clique of Vienna? She became menacing when
the Powers were only taking the most elementary precau-
tions in view of all possible war eventualities. On July
27, Francis Joseph published a manifesto addressed " To
my peoples " which also resembles that of 1859 to Sar-
dinia. The documents are almost identical in spirit,
in the statement of grievances and in their abusive lan-
guage.2 On the next day, he declared war on Servia.
On July 29, the Kaiser demanded that Russia should
suspend her mobilization and on August I he declared
war. Three days after, he attacked France, whose troops,
notwithstanding German concentration of forces, had
remained at a distance of ten kilometers from the
frontier. On August 2, the imperial troops entered

1 Statement in Paris, Feb. 25, 1915.

2 The Times, July 30,

200 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

Luxemburg and then Belgium. Then followed the un-
speakable horrors of the present war.

Germany had hoped that the land of Cavour would
join the Teuton allies, but in this they were disap-
pointed. The Quirinal was perfectly aware of the ag-
gressive move of the two Powers. The withdrawal of
Italy from the Alliance was a virtual proclamation that
the act of Germany and of Austria was criminal. With
this there was a growing national consciousness that the
Germans had already made the economic conquest of
their country, had secured the control of their banking
institutions and of their navigation companies, had done
there what they had already accomplished in Belgium
and in Turkey. They remembered how, in former days,
Austria had treated them as now she wished to do with
Servia — they remembered the inhuman torments of
many victims such as Maroncelli and Silvio Pellico, con-
demned to death, and when this was commuted, subject-
ing them to moral tortures a hundred times worse than
death — they remembered that the Dual Monarchy still
holds under her sway their kindred who long to be
under the green, red and white flag of Italy — they re-
membered that France had helped them to secure their
independence, and that both lands were among the best
supports of liberal civilization. National feelings were
deepened by appeals of leading literary men, among whom
was Gabriele d'Annunzio. The movement became hostile
to neutrality and demanded action to such an extent that
the Government had to heed it and to head it.

To oppose this really national movement, Germany
sent to Rome her ablest Dernburg, Prince von Bulow.
Ever ready for concessions at the expense of the Dual
Monarchy, he attempted to bring back the Italians, by

INITIATORS OF THE GREAT WAR 201

making promises to them which were far from agreeable
to Vienna. He did not ask them to join the hosts of
the Kaiser, but attempted to make their neutrality a
virtual adherence of Italy to a fictitious Triplice. The
end of this was not only to stem the movement of practi-
cal sympathy with the Allies, but it looked beyond also to
the conclusion of the war. In the international congress
which will unquestionably modify the map of Europe,
Italy would support Germany. Austria was equally
desirous of securing this peculiar kind of Italian neutral-
ity, but in the diplomatic conferences which took place
she asked for " freedom of action in the Balkans," show-
ing that whatever was her attitude toward Italia irredenta,
she had not given up her purpose of a move southward
to the ^Egean Sea. The aged Austrian Emperor made a
positive refusal as to the concessions proposed by the
German Envoy on behalf of the Italians, who were not
asking favors, but the restitution of their own kindred,
not lands so much as men. They demanded for these the
right to live under institutions of their choice — a conten-
tion similar to that of France for Alsace. They asked
military frontiers taking the place of those imposed upon
them in 1866, and their preponderance in the Adriatic.
They were true to their old vindications against Austria
and perhaps to their old hatred. At last, they broke off
all relations and took their stand by the Allies.

The spirit of hatred and aggressive purpose so strenu-
ously cultivated first in Prussia, and then in Germany,
has borne its fruits. The long and systematic provoca-
tion of France has brought allies to her side. The
German abuses against them have been as painful to
Frenchmen as those against themselves. The awful
crash so desired by the enemies of the land of Poincare

202 THE PROVOCATION OF FRANCE

has come. The civilized world has expressed its judg-
ment upon those responsible for the Great War. The
manner of waging it has met with a similar condemnation.
Denials of atrocities were to be expected. These abomi-
nations have been established by evidence which no
philosophical-minded man will refuse to accept. The
countrymen of Bismarck will discover now — if not
now, some day — that there is a sovereign justice which
has its supreme hour of reckoning. Has that hour come ?
Events will soon tell. General Joffre, avaricious of
words, has said that it would be long, durf sur.

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516 The provocation of France

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